{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_69888/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_69888","id":"gutenberg_69888","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/69888","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Archaeology & Anthropology","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Sociology","Industrial arts -- History","Industries -- History","Technology -- History","Workmanship -- History"],"text":"THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration]\n\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n                  NEW YORK \u00b7 BOSTON \u00b7 CHICAGO \u00b7 DALLAS\n                        ATLANTA \u00b7 SAN FRANCISCO\n\n                        MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED\n                       LONDON \u00b7 BOMBAY \u00b7 CALCUTTA\n                               MELBOURNE\n\n                   THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.\n                                TORONTO\n\n\n\n\n                            THE INSTINCT OF\n                              WORKMANSHIP\n\n                  AND THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS\n\n\n                                   BY\n                            THORSTEIN VEBLEN\n              AUTHOR OF \u201cTHE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS\u201d\n\n\n                                New York\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n                                  1914\n\n                         _All rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\n                            COPYRIGHT, 1914,\n                        BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n            Set up and electrotyped. Published March, 1914.\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\n\n\n                                   TO\n                                 B K N\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe following essay attempts an analysis of such correlation as is\nvisible between industrial use and wont and those other institutional\nfacts that go to make up any given phase of civilisation. It is assumed\nthat in the growth of culture, as in its current maintenance, the\nfacts of technological use and wont are fundamental and definitive,\nin the sense that they underlie and condition the scope and method of\ncivilisation in other than the technological respect, but not in such\na sense as to preclude or overlook the degree in which these other\nconventions of any given civilisation in their turn react on the state\nof the industrial arts.\n\nThe analysis proceeds on the materialistic assumptions of modern\nscience, but without prejudice to the underlying question as to the\nulterior competency of this materialistic conception considered as\na metaphysical tenet. The inquiry simply accepts these mechanistic\nassumptions of material science for the purpose in hand, since these\nafford the currently acceptable terms of solution for any scientific\nproblem of the kind in the present state of preconceptions on this head.\n\nAs should appear from its slight bulk, the essay is of the nature\nof a cursory survey rather than an exhaustive inquiry with full\ndocumentation. The few references given and the authorities cited\nin the course of the argument are accordingly not to be taken as an\ninclusive presentation of the materials on which the inquiry rests. It\nwill also be remarked that where authoritative documents are cited the\ncitation is general and extensive rather than specific and detailed.\nWherever detailed references are given they will be found to bear on\nspecific facts brought into the argument by way of illustrative detail.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAPTER I\n                                                                    PAGE\n  INTRODUCTORY                                                         1\n\n\n  CHAPTER II\n\n  CONTAMINATION OF INSTINCTS IN PRIMITIVE TECHNOLOGY                  38\n\n\n  CHAPTER III\n\n  THE SAVAGE STATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS                            103\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV\n\n  THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE PREDATORY CULTURE                            138\n\n\n  CHAPTER V\n\n  OWNERSHIP AND THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM                               187\n\n\n  CHAPTER VI\n\n  THE ERA OF HANDICRAFT                                              231\n\n\n  CHAPTER VII\n\n  THE MACHINE INDUSTRY                                               299\n\n\n\n\nTHE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTORY\n\n\nFor mankind as for the other higher animals, the life of the species\nis conditioned by the complement of instinctive proclivities and\ntropismatic aptitudes with which the species is typically endowed. Not\nonly is the continued life of the race dependent on the adequacy of its\ninstinctive proclivities in this way, but the routine and details of\nits life are also, in the last resort, determined by these instincts.\nThese are the prime movers in human behaviour, as in the behaviour\nof all those animals that show self-direction or discretion. Human\nactivity, in so far as it can be spoken of as conduct, can never exceed\nthe scope of these instinctive dispositions, by initiative of which man\ntakes action. Nothing falls within the human scheme of things desirable\nto be done except what answers to these native proclivities of man.\nThese native proclivities alone make anything worth while, and out of\ntheir working emerge not only the purpose and efficiency of life, but\nits substantial pleasures and pains as well.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLatterly the words \u201cinstinct\u201d and \u201cinstinctive\u201d are no longer well\nseen among students of those biological sciences where they once had\na great vogue. Students who occupy themselves with the psychology\nof animal behaviour are cautiously avoiding these expressions, and\nin this caution they are doubtless well advised. For such use the\nword appears no longer to be serviceable as a technical term. It has\nlost the requisite sharp definition and consistency of connotation,\napparently through disintegration under a more searching analysis\nthan the phenomena comprised under this concept had previously been\nsubjected to. In these biological sciences interest is centering not on\nthe question of what activities may be set down to innate propensity\nor predisposition at large, but rather on the determination of the\nirreducible psychological--and, indeed, physiological--elements that\ngo to make up animal behaviour. For this purpose \u201cinstinct\u201d is a\nconcept of too lax and shifty a definition to meet the demands of exact\nbiological science.\n\nFor the sciences that deal with the psychology of human conduct a\nsimilarly searching analysis of the elementary facts of behaviour\nis doubtless similarly desirable; and under such closer scrutiny of\nthese facts it will doubtless appear that here, too, the broad term\n\u201cinstinct\u201d is of too unprecise a character to serve the needs of an\nexhaustive psychological analysis. But the needs of an inquiry into\nthe nature and causes of the growth of institutions are not precisely\nthe same as those of such an exhaustive psychological analysis. A\ngenetic inquiry into institutions will address itself to the growth\nof habits and conventions, as conditioned by the material environment\nand by the innate and persistent propensities of human nature; and\nfor these propensities, as they take effect in the give and take of\ncultural growth, no better designation than the time-worn \u201cinstinct\u201d\nis available.\n\nIn the light of recent inquiries and speculations it is scarcely to\nbe questioned that each of these distinguishable propensities may be\nanalysed into simpler constituent elements, of a quasi-tropismatic\nor physiological nature;[1] but in the light of every-day experience\nand common notoriety it is at the same time not to be questioned that\nthese simple and irreducible psychological elements of human behaviour\nfall into composite functional groups, and so make up specific and\ndeterminate propensities, proclivities, aptitudes that are, within the\npurview of the social sciences, to be handled as irreducible traits\nof human nature. Indeed, it would appear that it is in the particular\ngrouping and concatenation of these ultimate psychological elements\ninto characteristic lines of interest and propensity that the nature of\nman is finally to be distinguished from that of the lower animals.\n\nThese various native proclivities that are so classed together as\n\u201cinstincts\u201d have the characteristic in common that they all and\nseveral, more or less imperatively, propose an objective end of\nendeavour. On the other hand what distinguishes one instinct from\nanother is that each sets up a characteristic purpose, aim, or\nobject to be attained, different from the objective end of any other\ninstinct. Instinctive action is teleological, consciously so, and the\nteleological scope and aim of each instinctive propensity differs\ncharacteristically from all the rest. The several instincts are\nteleological categories, and are, in colloquial usage, distinguished\nand classed on the ground of their teleological content. As the term\nis here used, therefore, and indeed as it is currently understood,\nthe instincts are to be defined or described neither in mechanical\nterms of those anatomical or physiological aptitudes that causally\nunderlie them or that come into action in the functioning of any\ngiven instinct, nor in terms of the movements of orientation or taxis\ninvolved in the functioning of each. The distinctive feature by the\nmark of which any given instinct is identified is to be found in the\nparticular character of the purpose to which it drives.[2] \u201cInstinct,\u201d\nas contra-distinguished from tropismatic action, involves consciousness\nand adaptation to an end aimed at.\n\nIt is, of course, not hereby intended to set up or to prescribe a\ndefinition of \u201cinstinct\u201d at large, but only to indicate as closely as\nmay be what sense is attached to the term as here used. At the same\ntime it is believed that this definition of the concept does violence\nneither to colloquial usage nor to the usage of such students as have\nemployed the term in scientific discussion, particularly in discussion\nof the instinctive proclivities of mankind. But it is not to be\noverlooked that this definition of the term may be found inapplicable,\nor at least of doubtful service, when applied to those simpler and\nmore immediate impulses that are sometimes by tradition spoken of as\n\u201cinstinctive,\u201d even in human behaviour,--impulses that might with\nbetter effect be designated \u201ctropismatic.\u201d In animal behaviour, for\ninstance, as well as in such direct and immediate impulsive human\naction as is fairly to be classed with animal behaviour, it is often a\nmatter of some perplexity to draw a line between tropismatic activity\nand instinct. Notoriously, the activities commonly recognised as\ninstinctive differ widely among themselves in respect of the degree of\ndirectness or immediacy with which the given response to stimulus takes\nplace. They range in this respect all the way from such reactions as\nare doubtfully to be distinguished from simple reflex action on the\none hand, to such as are doubtfully recognised as instinctive because\nof the extent to which reflection and deliberation enter into their\nexecution on the other hand. By insensible gradation the lower (less\ncomplex and deliberate) instinctive activities merge into the class of\nunmistakable tropismatic sensibilities, without its being practicable\nto determine by any secure test where the one category should be\ndeclared to end and the other to begin.[3] Such quasi-tropismatic\nactivities may be rated as purposeful by an observer, in the sense\nthat they are seen to further the life of the individual agent or of\nthe species, while there is no consciousness of purpose on the part\nof the agent under observation; whereas \u201cinstinct,\u201d in the narrower\nand special sense to which it seems desirable to restrict the term for\npresent use, denotes the conscious pursuit of an objective end which\nthe instinct in question makes worth while.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe ends of life, then, the purposes to be achieved, are assigned\nby man\u2019s instinctive proclivities; but the ways and means of\naccomplishing those things which the instinctive proclivities so make\nworth while are a matter of intelligence. It is a distinctive mark of\nmankind that the working-out of the instinctive proclivities of the\nrace is guided by intelligence to a degree not approached by the other\nanimals. But the dependence of the race on its endowment of instincts\nis no less absolute for this intervention of intelligence; since it is\nonly by the prompting of instinct that reflection and deliberation come\nto be so employed, and since instinct also governs the scope and method\nof intelligence in all this employment of it. Men take thought, but\nthe human spirit, that is to say the racial endowment of instinctive\nproclivities, decides what they shall take thought of, and how and to\nwhat effect.\n\nYet the dependence of the scheme of life on the complement of\ninstinctive proclivities hereby becomes less immediate, since a more or\nless extended logic of ways and means comes to intervene between the\ninstinctively given end and its realisation; and the lines of relation\nbetween any given instinctive proclivity and any particular feature of\nhuman conduct are by so much the more devious and roundabout and the\nmore difficult to trace. The higher the degree of intelligence and the\nlarger the available body of knowledge current in any given community,\nthe more extensive and elaborate will be the logic of ways and means\ninterposed between these impulses and their realisation, and the more\nmultifarious and complicated will be the apparatus of expedients and\nresources employed to compass those ends that are instinctively worth\nwhile.\n\nThis apparatus of ways and means available for the pursuit of whatever\nmay be worth seeking is, substantially all, a matter of tradition out\nof the past, a legacy of habits of thought accumulated through the\nexperience of past generations. So that the manner, and in a great\ndegree the measure, in which the instinctive ends of life are worked\nout under any given cultural situation is somewhat closely conditioned\nby these elements of habit, which so fall into shape as an accepted\nscheme of life. The instinctive proclivities are essentially simple and\nlook directly to the attainment of some concrete objective end; but\nin detail the ends so sought are many and diverse, and the ways and\nmeans by which they may be sought are similarly diverse and various,\ninvolving endless recourse to expedients, adaptations, and concessive\nadjustment between several proclivities that are all sufficiently\nurgent.\n\nUnder the discipline of habituation this logic and apparatus of ways\nand means falls into conventional lines, acquires the consistency of\ncustom and prescription, and so takes on an institutional character\nand force. The accustomed ways of doing and thinking not only become\nan habitual matter of course, easy and obvious, but they come likewise\nto be sanctioned by social convention, and so become right and proper\nand give rise to principles of conduct. By use and wont they are\nincorporated into the current scheme of common sense. A elements of\nthe approved scheme of conduct and pursuit these conventional ways\nand means take their place as proximate ends of endeavour. Whence, in\nthe further course of unremitting habituation, as the attention is\nhabitually focussed on these proximate ends, they occupy the interest\nto such an extent as commonly to throw their own ulterior purpose\ninto the background and often let it be lost sight of; as may happen,\nfor instance, in the acquisition and use of money. It follows that\nin much of human conduct these proximate ends alone are present in\nconsciousness as the object of interest and the goal of endeavour, and\ncertain conventionally accepted ways and means come to be set up as\ndefinitive principles of what is right and good; while the ulterior\npurpose of it all is only called to mind occasionally, if at all, as an\nafterthought, by an effort of reflection.[4]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAmong psychologists who have busied themselves with these questions\nthere has hitherto been no large measure of agreement as to the\nnumber of specific instinctive proclivities that so are native to\nman; nor is there any agreement as to the precise functional range\nand content ascribed to each. In a loose way it is apparently taken\nfor granted that these instincts are to be conceived as discrete and\nspecific elements in human nature, each working out its own determinate\nfunctional content without greatly blending with or being diverted by\nthe working of its neighbours in that spiritual complex into which they\nall enter as constituent elements.[5] For the purposes of an exhaustive\npsychological analysis it is doubtless expedient to make the most of\nsuch discreteness as is observable among the instinctive proclivities.\nBut for an inquiry into the scope and method of their working-out in\nthe growth of institutions it is perhaps even more to the purpose\nto take note of how and with what effect the several instinctive\nproclivities cross, blend, overlap, neutralise or re\u00ebnforce one another.\n\nThe most convincing genetic view of these phenomena throws the\ninstinctive proclivities into close relation with the tropismatic\nsensibilities and brings them, in the physiological respect, into\nthe same general class with the latter.[6] If taken uncritically and\nin general terms this view would seem to carry the implication that\nthe instincts should be discrete and discontinuous among themselves\nsomewhat after the same fashion as the tropismatic sensibilities with\nwhich they are in great measure bound up; but on closer scrutiny such\na genetic theory of the instincts does not appear to enforce the view\nthat they are to be conceived as effectually discontinuous or mutually\nexclusive, though it may also not involve the contrary,--that they\nmake a continuous or ambiguously segmented body of spiritual elements.\nThe recognised tropisms stand out, to all appearance, as sharply\ndefined physiological traits, transmissible by inheritance intact and\nunmodified, separable and unblended, in a manner suggestively like the\n\u201cunit characters\u201d spoken of in latter day theories of heredity.[7]\n\nWhile the instinctive sensibilities may not be explained as derivatives\nof the tropisms, there is enough of similarity in the working of the\ntwo to suggest that the two classes of phenomena must both be accounted\nfor on somewhat similar physiological grounds. The simple and more\nnarrowly defined instinctive dispositions, which have much of the\nappearance of immediate reflex nervous action and automatically defined\nresponse, lend themselves passably to such an interpretation,--as, for\nexample, the gregarious instinct, or the instinct of repulsion with its\naccompanying emotion of disgust. Such as these are shared by mankind\nwith the other higher animals on a fairly even footing; and these are\nrelatively simple, immediate, and not easily sophisticated or offset\nby habit. These seem patently to be of much the same nature as the\ntropismatic sensibilities; though even in these simpler instinctive\ndispositions the characteristic quasi-tropismatic sensibility\ndistinctive of each appears to be complicated with obscure stimulations\nof the nerve centres arising out of the functioning of one or another\nof the viscera. And what is true of the simpler instincts in this\nrespect should apply to the vaguer and more complex instincts also, but\nwith a larger allowance for a more extensive complication of visceral\nand organic stimuli.\n\nWhether these subconscious stimulations of the nerve centres through\nthe functioning of the viscera are to be conceived in terms of\ntropismatic reaction is a difficult question which has had little\nattention hitherto. But in any case, whatever the expert students\nof these phenomena may have to say of this matter, the visceral or\norganic stimuli engaged in any one of the instinctive sensibilities\nare apparently always more than one and are usually somewhat complex.\nIndeed, while it seems superficially an easy matter to refer any one of\nthe simple instincts directly to some certain one of the viscera as the\nmain or primary source from which its appropriate stimulation comes to\nthe nerve centres, it is by no means easy to decide what one or more of\nthe viscera, or of the other organs that are not commonly classed as\nviscera, will have no part in the matter.\n\nIt results that, on physiological grounds, the common run of human\ninstincts are not to be conceived as severally discrete and elementary\nproclivities. The same physiological processes enter in some measure,\nthough in varying proportions, into the functioning of each. In\ninstinctive action the individual acts as a whole, and in the conduct\nwhich emerges under the driving force of these instinctive dispositions\nthe part which each several instinct plays is a matter of more or less,\nnot of exclusive direction. They must therefore incontinently touch,\nblend, overlap and interfere, and can not be conceived as acting each\nand several in sheer isolation and independence of one another. The\nrelations of give and take among the several instinctive dispositions,\ntherefore--of inosculation, \u201ccontamination\u201d and cross purposes--are\npresumably slighter and of less consequence for the simpler and\nmore apparently tropismatic impulses while on the other hand the\nless specific and vaguer instinctive predispositions, such as the\nparental bent or the proclivity to construction or acquisition, will\nbe so comprehensively and intricately bound in a web of correlation\nand inter-dependence--will so unremittingly contaminate, offset or\nfortify one another, and have each so large and yet so shifting a\nmargin of common ground with all the rest--that hard and fast lines\nof demarcation can scarcely be drawn between them. The best that\ncan practically be had in the way of a secure definition will be a\ndescriptive characterisation of each distinguishable propensity,\ntogether with an indication of the more salient and consequential\nramifications by which each contaminates or is contaminated by the\nworking of other propensities that go to make up that complex of\ninstinctive dispositions that constitutes the spiritual nature of the\nrace. So that the schemes of definition that have hitherto been worked\nout are in great part to be taken as arrangements of convenience,\nserviceable apparatus for present use, rather than distinctions\nenforced at all points by an equally sharp substantial discreteness of\nthe facts.[8]\n\nThis fact, that in some measure the several instincts spring from a\ncommon ground of sentient life, that they each engage the individual\nas a whole, has serious consequences in the domain of habit, and\ntherefore it counts for much in the growth of civilisation and in the\neveryday conduct of affairs. The physiological apparatus engaged in the\nfunctioning of any given instinct enters in part, though in varying\nmeasure, into the working of some or of any other instinct; whereby,\neven on physiological grounds alone, the habituation that touches\nthe functioning of any given instinct must, in a less degree but\npervasively, affect the habitual conduct of the same agent when driven\nby any other instinct. So that on this view the scope of habit, in so\nfar as it bears on the instinctive activities, is necessarily wider\nthan the particular concrete line of conduct to which the habituation\nin question is due.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe instincts are hereditary traits. In the current theories of\nheredity they would presumably be counted as secondary characteristics\nof the species, as being in a sense by-products of the physiological\nactivities that give the species its specific character; since these\ntheories in the last resort run in physiological terms. So the\ninstinctive dispositions would scarcely be accounted unit characters,\nin the Mendelian sense, but would rather count as spiritual traits\nemerging from a certain concurrence of physiological unit characters\nand varying somewhat according to variations in the complement of\nunit characters to which the species or the individual may owe his\nconstitution. Hence would arise variations of individuality among\nthe members of the race, resting in some such manner as has just\nbeen suggested on the varying endowment of instincts, and running\nback through these finally to recondite differences of physiological\nfunction. Some such account of the instinctive dispositions and their\nrelation to the physical individual seems necessary as a means of\napprehending them and their work without assuming a sheer break between\nthe physical and the immaterial phenomena of life.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nCharacteristic of the race is a degree of vagueness or generality,\nan absence of automatically determinate response, a lack of concrete\neventuality as it might be called, in the common run of human\ninstincts. This vague and shifty character of the instincts, or\nperhaps rather of the habitual response to their incitement, is to\nbe taken in connection with the breadth and variability of their\nphysiological ground as spoken of above. For the long-term success\nof the race it is manifestly of the highest value, since it leaves a\nwide and facile margin of experimentation, habituation, invention and\naccommodation open to the sense of workmanship. At the same time and by\nthe same circumstance the scope and range of conventionalisation and\nsophistication are similarly flexible, wide and consequential. No doubt\nthe several racial stocks differ very appreciably in this respect.\n\nThe complement of instinctive dispositions, comprising under that term\nboth the native propensity and its appropriate sentiment, makes up what\nwould be called the \u201cspiritual nature\u201d of man--often spoken of more\nsimply as \u201chuman nature.\u201d Without allowing it to imply anything like\na dualism or dichotomy between material and immaterial phenomena, the\nterm \u201cspiritual\u201d may conveniently be so used in its colloquial sense.\nSo employed it commits the discussion to no attitude on the question\nof man\u2019s single or dual constitution, but simply uses the conventional\nexpression to designate that complement of functions which it has by\ncurrent usage been employed to designate.\n\nThe human complement of instincts fluctuates from one individual\nto another in an apparently endless diversity, varying both in the\nrelative force of the several instinctive proclivities and in the\nscheme of co-ordination, coalescence or interference that prevails\namong them. This diversity of native character is noticeable among\nall peoples, though some of the peoples of the lower cultures show a\nnotable approach to uniformity of type, both physical and spiritual.\nThe diversity is particularly marked among the civilised peoples,\nand perhaps in a peculiar degree among the peoples of Europe and her\ncolonies. The extreme diversity of native character, both physical\nand spiritual, noticeable in these communities is in all probability\ndue to their being made up of a mixture of racial stocks. In point\nof pedigree, all individuals in the peoples of the Western culture\nare hybrids, and the greater number of individuals are a mixture of\nmore than two racial stocks. The proportions in which the several\ntransmissible traits that go to make up the racial type enter into\nthe composition of these hybrid individuals will accordingly vary\nendlessly. The number of possible permutations will therefore be\nextremely large; so that the resulting range of variation in the\nhybrids that so result from the crossing of these different racial\nstocks will be sufficiently large, even when it plays within such\nlimits as to leave the generic human type intact. From time to time\nthe variation may even exceed these limits of human normality and give\na variant in which the relative emphasis on the several constituent\ninstinctive elements is distributed after a scheme so far from the\ngenerically human type as to throw the given variant out of touch\nwith the common run of humanity and mark him as of unsound mind or as\ndisserviceable for the purposes of the community in which he occurs, or\neven as disserviceable for life in any society.\n\nYet, even through these hybrid populations there runs a generically\nhuman type of spiritual endowment, prevalent as a general average of\nhuman nature throughout, and suitable to the continued life of mankind\nin society. Disserviceably wide departures from this generically human\nand serviceable type of spiritual endowment will tend constantly to be\nselectively eliminated from the race, even where the variation arises\nfrom hybridism. The like will hold true in a more radical fashion as\napplied to variants that may arise through a Mendelian mutation.\n\nSo that the numerous racial types now existing represent only\nsuch mutants as lie within the limits of tolerance imposed by the\nsituation under which any given mutant type has emerged and survived.\nA surviving mutant type is necessarily suited more or less closely\nto the circumstances under which it emerged and first made good its\nsurvival, and it is presumably less suited to any other situation.\nWith a change in the situation, therefore, such as may come with the\nmigration of a given racial stock from one habitat to another, or with\nan equivalent shifting growth of culture or change of climate, the\nrequirements of survival are likely to change. Indeed, so grave are the\nalterations that may in this way supervene in the current requirements\nfor survival, that any given racial stock may dwindle and decay for no\nother reason than that the growth of its culture has come to subject\nthe stock to methods of life widely different from those under which\nits type of man originated and made good its fitness to survive. So,\nin the mixture of races that make up the population of the Western\nnations a competitive struggle for survival has apparently always\nbeen going on among the several racial stocks that enter into the\nhybrid mass, with varying fortunes according as the shifting cultural\ndemands and opportunities have favoured now one, now another type of\nman. These cultural conditions of survival in the racial struggle\nfor existence have varied in the course of centuries, and with grave\nconsequences for the life-history of the race and of its culture;\nand they are perhaps changing more substantially and rapidly in the\nimmediate present than at any previous time within the historical\nperiod. So that, for instance, the continued biological success of any\ngiven one of these stocks in the European racial mixture has within a\nmoderate period of time shifted from the ground of fighting capacity,\nand even in a measure from the ground of climatic fitness, to that of\nspiritual fitness to survive under the conditions imposed by a new\ncultural situation, by a scheme of institutions that is insensibly but\nincessantly changing as it runs.[9]\n\nThese unremitting changes and adaptations that go forward in the scheme\nof institutions, legal and customary, unremittingly induce new habits\nof work and of thought in the community, and so they continually\ninstil new principles of conduct; with the outcome that the same\nrange of instinctive dispositions innate in the population will work\nout to a different effect as regards the demands of race survival.\nTo all appearance, what counts first in this connection toward the\nselective survival of the several European racial stocks is their\nrelative fitness to meet the material requirements of life,--their\neconomic fitness to live under the new cultural limitations and with\nthe new training which this altered cultural situation gives. But the\nfortunes of the Western civilisation as a cultural scheme, apart from\nthe biological survival or success of any given racial constituent\nin the Western peoples, is likewise bound up with the viability of\nEuropean mankind under these institutional changes, and dependent\non the spiritual fitness of inherited human nature successfully and\nenduringly to carry on the altered scheme of life so imposed on these\npeoples by the growth of their own culture. Such limitations imposed on\ncultural growth by native proclivities ill suited to civilised life are\nsufficiently visible in several directions and in all the nations of\nChristendom.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhat is known of heredity goes to say that the various racial types of\nman are stable; so that during the life-history of any given racial\nstock, it is held, no heritable modification of its typical make-up,\nwhether spiritual or physical, is to be looked for. The typical human\nendowment of instincts, as well as the typical make-up of the race\nin the physical respect, has according to this current view been\ntransmitted intact from the beginning of humanity, that is to say from\nwhatever point in the mutational development of the race it is seen\nfit to date humanity,--except so far as subsequent mutations have\ngiven rise to new racial stocks, to and by which this human endowment\nof native proclivities has been transmitted in a typically modified\nform. On the other hand the habitual elements of human life change\nunremittingly and cumulatively, resulting in a continued proliferous\ngrowth of institutions. Changes in the institutional structure are\ncontinually taking place in response to the altered discipline of\nlife under changing cultural conditions, but human nature remains\nspecifically the same.\n\nThe ways and means, material and immaterial, by which the native\nproclivities work out their ends, therefore, are forever in process of\nchange, being conditioned by the changes cumulatively going forward in\nthe institutional fabric of habitual elements that governs the scheme\nof life. But there is no warrant for assuming that each or any of these\nsuccessive changes in the scheme of institutions affords successively\nreadier, surer or more facile ways and means for the instinctive\nproclivities to work out their ends, or that the phase of habituation\nin force at any given point in this sequence of change is more suitable\nto the untroubled functioning of these instincts than any phase that\nhas gone before. Indeed, the presumption is the other way. On grounds\nof selective survival it is reasonably to be presumed that any given\nracial type that has endured the test of selective elimination,\nincluding the complement of instinctive dispositions by virtue of which\nit has endured the test, will on its first emergence have been passably\nsuited to the circumstances, material and cultural, under which the\ntype emerged as a mutant and made good its survival; and in so far as\nthe subsequent growth of institutions has altered the available scope\nand method of instinctive action it is therefore to be presumed that\nany such subsequent change in the scheme of institutions will in some\ndegree hinder or divert the free play of its instinctive proclivities\nand will thereby hinder the direct and unsophisticated working-out of\nthe instinctive dispositions native to this given racial type.\n\nWhat is known of the earlier phases of culture in the life-history\nof the existing races and peoples goes to say that the initial phase\nin the life of any given racial type, the phase of culture which\nprevailed in its environment when it emerged, and under which the\nstock first proved its fitness to survive, was presumably some form of\nsavagery. Therefore the fitness of any given type of human nature for\nlife after the manner and under the conditions imposed by any later\nphase in the growth of culture is a matter of less and less secure\npresumption the farther the sequence of institutional change has\ndeparted from that form of savagery which marked the initial stage in\nthe life-history of the given racial stock. Also, presumably, though\nby no means assuredly, the younger stocks, those which have emerged\nfrom later mutations of type, have therefore initially fallen into and\nmade good their survival under the conditions of a relatively advanced\nphase of savagery,--these younger races should therefore conform with\ngreater facility and better effect to the requirements imposed by a\nstill farther advance in that cumulative complication of institutions\nand intricacy of ways and means that is involved in cultural growth.\nThe older or more primitive stocks, those which arose out of earlier\nmutations of type and made good their survival under a more elementary\nscheme of savage culture, are presumably less capable of adaptation to\nan advanced cultural scheme.\n\nBut at the same time it is on the same grounds to be expected that\nin all races and peoples there should always persist an ineradicable\nsentimental disposition to take back to something like that scheme\nof savagery for which their particular type of human nature once\nproved its fitness during the initial phase of its life-history. This\nseems to be what is commonly intended in the cry, \u201cBack to Nature!\u201d\nThe older known racial stocks, the offspring of earlier mutational\ndepartures from the initially generic human type, will have been\nselectively adapted to more archaic forms of savagery, and these show\nan appreciably more refractory penchant for elementary savage modes\nof life, and conform to the demands and opportunities of a \u201chigher\u201d\ncivilisation only with a relatively slight facility, amounting in\nextreme cases to a practical unfitness for civilised life. Hence the\n\u201cWhite Man\u2019s burden\u201d and the many perplexities of the missionaries.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nUnder the Mendelian theories of heredity some qualification of these\nbroad generalisations is called for. As has already been noted above,\nthe peoples of Europe, each and several, are hybrid mixtures made up\nof several racial stocks. The like is true in some degree of most of\nthe peoples outside of Europe; particularly of the more important and\nbetter known nationalities. These various peoples show more or less\ndistinct and recognisable national types of physique--or perhaps rather\nof physiognomy--and temperament, and the lines of differentiation\nbetween these national types incontinently traverse the lines that\ndivide the racial stocks. At the same time these national types have\nsome degree of permanence; so much so that they are colloquially spoken\nof as types of race. While no modern anthropologist would confuse\nnationality with race, it is not to be overlooked that these national\nhybrid types are frequently so marked and characteristic as to simulate\nracial characters and perplex the student of race who is intent on\nidentifying the racial stocks out of which any one of these hybrid\npopulations has been compounded. Presumably these national and local\ntypes of physiognomy and temperament are to be rated as hybrid types\nthat have been fixed by selective breeding, and for an explanation of\nthis phenomenon recourse is to be taken to the latterday theories of\nheredity.\n\nTo any student familiar with the simpler phenomena of hybridism it will\nbe evident that under the Mendelian rules of hybridisation the number\nof biologically successful--viable--hybrid forms arising from any cross\nbetween two or more forms may diverge very widely from one another and\nfrom either of the parent types. The variation must be extreme both in\nthe number of hybrid types so constructed and in the range over which\nthe variation extends,--much greater in both respects than the range of\nfluctuating (non-typical) variations obtainable under any circumstances\nin a pure-bred race, particularly in the remoter filial generations.\nIt is also well known, by experiment, that by selective breeding from\namong such hybrid forms it is possible to construct a composite type\nthat will breed true in respect of the characters upon which the\nselection is directed, and that such a \u201cpure line\u201d may be maintained\nindefinitely, in spite of its hybrid origin, so long as it is not\ncrossed back on one or other of the parent stocks, or on a hybrid stock\nthat is not pure-bred in respect of the selected characters.\n\nSo, if the conditions of life in any community consistently favour\na given type of hybrid, whether the favouring conditions are of a\ncultural or of a material nature, something of a selective trend will\ntake effect in such a community and set toward a hybrid type which\nshall meet these conditions. The result will be the establishment of a\ncomposite pure line showing the advantageous traits of physique and\ntemperament, combined with a varying complement of other characters\nthat have no such selective value. Traits that have no selective value\nin the given case will occur with fortuitous freedom, combining in\nunconstrained diversity with the selectively decisive traits, and so\nwill mark the hybrid derivation of this provisionally established\ncomposite pure line. With continued intercrossing within itself any\ngiven population of such hybrid origin as the European peoples, would\ntend cumulatively to breed true to such a selectively favourable hybrid\ntype, rather than to any one of the ultimate racial types represented\nby the parent stocks out of which the hybrid population is ultimately\nmade up. So would emerge a national or local type, which would show\nthe selectively decisive traits with a great degree of consistency\nbut would vary indefinitely in respect of the selectively idle traits\ncomprised in the composite heredity of the population. Such a composite\npure line would be provisionally stable only; it should break down\nwhen crossed back on either of the parent stocks. This \u201cprovisionally\nstable composite pure line\u201d should disappear when crossed on pure-bred\nindividuals of one or other of the parent stocks from which it is\ndrawn,--pure-bred in respect of the allelomorphic characters which give\nthe hybrid type its typical traits.\n\nBut whatever the degree of stability possessed by these hybrid national\nor local types, the outcome for the present purpose is much the same;\nthe hybrid populations afford a greater scope and range of variation in\ntheir human nature than could be had within the limits of any pure-bred\nrace. Yet, for all the multifarious diversity of racial and national\ntypes, early and late, and for all the wide divergence of hybrid\nvariants, there is no difficulty about recognising a generical human\ntype of spiritual endowment, just as the zo\u00f6logists have no difficulty\nin referring the various races of mankind to a single species on the\nground of their physical characters. The distribution of emphasis among\nthe several instinctive dispositions may vary appreciably from one\nrace to another, but the complement of instincts native to the several\nraces is after all of much the same kind, comprising substantially the\nsame ends. Taken simply in their first incidence, the racial variations\nof human nature are commonly not considerable; but a slight bias of\nthis kind, distinctive of any given race, may come to have decisive\nweight when it works out cumulatively through a system of institutions,\nfor such a system embodies the cumulative sophistications of untold\ngenerations during which the life of the community has been dominated\nby the same slight bias.[10]\n\nRacial differences in respect of these hereditary spiritual traits\ncount for much in the outcome, because in the last resort any race is\nat the mercy of its instincts. In the course of cultural growth most of\nthose civilisations or peoples that have had a long history have from\ntime to time been brought up against an imperative call to revise their\nscheme of institutions in the light of their native instincts, on pain\nof collapse or decay; and they have chosen variously, and for the most\npart blindly, to live or not to live, according as their instinctive\nbias has driven them. In the cases where it has happened that\nthose instincts which make directly for the material welfare of the\ncommunity, such as the parental bent and the sense of workmanship, have\nbeen present in such potent force, or where the institutional elements\nat variance with the continued life-interests of the community or the\ncivilisation in question have been in a sufficiently infirm state,\nthere the bonds of custom, prescription, principles, precedent, have\nbeen broken--or loosened or shifted so as to let the current of life\nand cultural growth go on, with or without substantial retardation. But\nhistory records more frequent and more spectacular instances of the\ntriumph of imbecile institutions over life and culture than of peoples\nwho have by force of instinctive insight saved themselves alive out of\na desperately precarious institutional situation, such, for instance,\nas now faces the peoples of Christendom.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nChief among those instinctive dispositions that conduce directly to\nthe material well-being of the race, and therefore to its biological\nsuccess, is perhaps the instinctive bias here spoken of as the sense\nof workmanship. The only other instinctive factor of human nature that\ncould with any likelihood dispute this primacy would be the parental\nbent. Indeed, the two have much in common. They spend themselves on\nmuch the same concrete objective ends, and the mutual furtherance of\neach by the other is indeed so broad and intimate as often to leave\nit a matter of extreme difficulty to draw a line between them. Any\ndiscussion of either, therefore, must unavoidably draw the other into\nthe inquiry to a greater or less extent, and a characterisation of the\none will involve some dealing with the other.\n\nAs the expression is here understood, the \u201cParental Bent\u201d is an\ninstinctive disposition of much larger scope than a mere proclivity\nto the achievement of children.[11] This latter is doubtless to be\ntaken as a large and perhaps as a primary element in the practical\nworking of the parental solicitude; although, even so, it is in no\ndegree to be confused with the quasi-tropismatic impulse to the\nprocreation of offspring. The parental solicitude in mankind has a\nmuch wider bearing than simply the welfare of one\u2019s own children. This\nwider bearing is particularly evident in those lower cultures where\nthe scheme of consanguinity and inheritance is not drawn on the same\nclose family lines as among civilised peoples, but it is also to be\nseen in good vigour in any civilised community. So, for instance, what\nthe phrase-makers have called \u201crace-suicide\u201d meets the instinctive\nand unsolicited reprobation of all men, even of those who would not\nconceivably go the length of contributing in their own person to the\nincoming generation. So also, virtually all thoughtful persons,--that\nis to say all persons who hold an opinion in these premises,--will\nagree that it is a despicably inhuman thing for the current generation\nwilfully to make the way of life harder for the next generation,\nwhether through neglect of due provision for their subsistence and\nproper training or through wasting their heritage of resources and\nopportunity by improvident greed and indolence. Providence is a virtue\nonly so far as its aim is provision for posterity.\n\nIt is difficult or impossible to say how far the current solicitude\nfor the welfare of the race at large is to be credited to the parental\nbent, but it is beyond question that this instinctive disposition has a\nlarge part in the sentimental concern entertained by nearly all persons\nfor the life and comfort of the community at large, and particularly\nfor the community\u2019s future welfare. Doubtless this parental bent in\nits wider bearing greatly re\u00ebnforces that sentimental approval of\neconomy and efficiency for the common good and disapproval of wasteful\nand useless living that prevails so generally throughout both the\nhighest and the lowest cultures, unless it should rather be said that\nthis animus for economy and efficiency is a simple expression of the\nparental disposition itself. It might on the other hand be maintained\nthat such an animus of economy is an essential function of the instinct\nof workmanship, which would then be held to be strongly sustained at,\nthis point by a parental solicitude for the common good.\n\nIn making use of the expression, \u201cinstinct of workmanship\u201d or \u201csense\nof workmanship,\u201d it is not here intended to assume or to argue that\nthe proclivity so designated is in the psychological respect a simple\nor irreducible element; still less, of course, is there any intention\nto allege that it is to be traced back in the physiological respect\nto some one isolable tropismatic sensibility or some single enzymotic\nor visceral stimulus. All that is matter for the attention of those\nwhom it may concern. The expression may as well be taken to signify a\nconcurrence of several instinctive aptitudes, each of which might or\nmight not prove simple or irreducible when subjected to psychological\nor physiological analysis. For the present inquiry it is enough to\nnote that in human behaviour this disposition is effective in such\nconsistent, ubiquitous and resilient fashion that students of human\nculture will have to count with it as one of the integral hereditary\ntraits of mankind.[12]\n\nAs has already appeared, neither this nor any other instinctive\ndisposition works out its functional content in isolation from the\ninstinctive endowment at large. The instincts, all and several, though\nperhaps in varying degrees, are so intimately engaged in a play of give\nand take that the work of any one has its consequences for all the\nrest, though presumably not for all equally. It is this endless[13]\ncomplication and contamination of instinctive elements in human\nconduct, taken in conjunction with the pervading and cumulative effects\nof habit in this domain, that makes most of the difficulty and much of\nthe interest attaching to this line of inquiry.\n\nThere are few lines of instinctive proclivity that are not crossed and\ncoloured by some ramification of the instinct of workmanship. No doubt,\nresponse to the direct call of such half-tropismatic, half-instinctive\nimpulses as hunger, anger, or the promptings of sex, is little if at\nall troubled with any sentimental suffusion of workmanship; but in\nthe more complex and deliberate activities, particularly where habit\nexerts an appreciable effect, the impulse and sentiment of workmanship\ncomes in for a large share in the outcome. So much so, indeed, that,\nfor instance, in the arts, where the sense of beauty is the prime\nmover, habitual attention to technique will often put the original,\nand only ostensible, motive in the background. So, again, in the life\nof religious faith and observance it may happen now and again that\ntheological niceties and ritual elaboration will successfully, and\nin great measure satisfactorily, substitute themselves for spiritual\ncommunion; while in the courts of law a tenacious following out of\nlegal technicalities will not infrequently defeat the ends of justice.\n\nAs the expression is here understood, all instinctive action is\nintelligent in some degree; though the degree in which intelligence is\nengaged may vary widely from one instinctive disposition to another,\nand it may even fall into an extremely automatic shape in the case\nof some of the simpler instincts, whose functional content is of a\npatently physiological character. Such approach to automatism is even\nmore evident in some of the lower animals, where, as for instance in\nthe case of some insects, the response to the appropriate stimuli is\nso far uniform and mechanically determinate as to leave it doubtful\nwhether the behaviour of the animal might not best be construed\nas tropismatic action simply.[14] Such tropismatic directness of\ninstinctive response is less characteristic of man even in the case\nof the simpler instinctive proclivities; and the indirection which so\ncharacterises instinctive action in general, and the higher instincts\nof man in particular, and which marks off the instinctive dispositions\nfrom the tropisms, is the indirection of intelligence. It enters more\nlargely in the discharge of some proclivities than of others; but\nall instinctive action is intelligent in some degree. This is what\nmarks it off from the tropisms and takes it out of the category of\nautomatism.[15]\n\nHence all instinctive action is teleological. It involves holding to\na purpose. It aims to achieve some end and involves some degree of\nintelligent faculty to compass the instinctively given purpose, under\nsurveillance of the instinctive proclivity that prompts the action. And\nit is in this surveillance and direction of the intellectual processes\nto the appointed end that the instinctive dispositions control and\ncondition human conduct; and in this work of direction the several\ninstinctive proclivities may come to conflict and offset, or to concur\nand re\u00ebnforce, one another\u2019s action.\n\nThe position of the instinct of workmanship in this complex of\nteleological activities is somewhat peculiar, in that its functional\ncontent is serviceability for the ends of life, whatever these ends\nmay be; whereas these ends to be subserved are, at least in the main,\nappointed and made worth while by the various other instinctive\ndispositions. So that this instinct may in some sense be said to be\nauxiliary to all the rest, to be concerned with the ways and means of\nlife rather than with any one given ulterior end. It has essentially\nto do with proximate rather than ulterior ends. Yet workmanship is\nnone the less an object of attention and sentiment in its own right.\nEfficient use of the means at hand and adequate management of the\nresources available for the purposes of life is itself an end of\nendeavour, and accomplishment of this kind is a source of gratification.\n\nAll instinctive action is intelligent and teleological. The generality\nof instinctive dispositions prompt simply to the direct and unambiguous\nattainment of their specific ends, and in his dealings under their\nimmediate guidance the agent goes as directly as may be to the end\nsought,--he is occupied with the objective end, not with the choice of\nmeans to the end sought; whereas under the impulse of workmanship the\nagent\u2019s interest and endeavour are taken up with the contriving of ways\nand means to the end sought.\n\nThe point of contrast may be unfamiliar, and an illustration may\nbe pertinent. So, in the instinct of pugnacity and its attendant\nsentiment of anger[16] the primary impulse is doubtless to a direct\nfrontal attack, assault and battery pure and simple; and the more\nhighly charged the agent is with the combative impulse, and the higher\nthe pitch of animation to which he has been wrought up, the less is\nhe inclined or able to take thought of how he may shrewdly bring\nmechanical devices to bear on the object of his sentiment and compass\nhis end with the largest result per unit of force expended. It is\nonly the well-trained fighter that will take without reflection to\nworkmanlike ways and means at such a juncture; and in case of extreme\nexasperation and urgency even such a one, it is said, may forget\nhis workmanship in the premises and throw himself into the middle\nof things instead of resorting to the indirections and leverages to\nwhich his workmanlike training in the art of fighting has habituated\nhim. So, again, the immediate promptings of the parental bent urge\nto direct personal intervention and service in behalf of the object\nof solicitude. In persons highly gifted in this respect the impulse\nasserts itself to succour the helpless with one\u2019s own hands, to do for\nthem in one\u2019s own person not what might on reflection approve itself\nas the most expedient line of conduct in the premises, but what will\nthrow the agent most personally into action in the case. Notoriously,\nit is easier to move well-meaning people to unreflecting charity on an\nimmediate and concrete appeal than it is to secure a sagacious, well\nsustained and well organised concert of endeavour for the amelioration\nof the lot of the unfortunate. Indeed, refinements of workmanlike\ncalculation of causes and effects in such a case are instinctively felt\nto be out of touch with the spirit of the thing. They are distasteful;\nnot only are they not part and parcel of the functional content of\nthe generous impulse, but an undue injection of these elements of\nworkmanship into the case may even induce a revulsion of feeling and\ndefeat its own intention.\n\nThe instinct of workmanship, on the other hand, occupies the interest\nwith practical expedients, ways and means, devices and contrivances of\nefficiency and economy, proficiency, creative work and technological\nmastery of facts. Much of the functional content of the instinct of\nworkmanship is a proclivity for taking pains. The best or most finished\noutcome of this disposition is not had under stress of great excitement\nor under extreme urgency from any of the instinctive propensities with\nwhich its work is associated or whose ends it serves. It shows at its\nbest, both in the individual workman\u2019s technological efficiency and in\nthe growth of technological proficiency and insight in the community\nat large, under circumstances of moderate exigence, where there is work\nin hand and more of it in sight, since it is initially a disposition to\ndo the next thing and do it as well as may be; whereas when interest\nfalls off unduly through failure of provocation from the instinctive\ndispositions that afford an end to which to work, the stimulus to\nworkmanship is likely to fail, and the outcome is as likely to be an\nendless fabrication of meaningless details and much ado about nothing.\nOn the other hand, in seasons of great stress, when the call to any one\nor more of the instinctive lines of conduct is urgent beyond measure,\nthere is likely to result a crudity of technique and presently a loss\nof proficiency and technological mastery.\n\nIt is, further, pertinent to note in this connection that the instinct\nof workmanship will commonly not run to passionate excesses; that it\ndoes not, under pressure, tenaciously hold its place as a main interest\nin competition with the other, more elemental instinctive proclivities;\nbut that it rather yields ground somewhat readily, suffers repression\nand falls into abeyance, only to reassert itself when the pressure\nof other, urgent interests is relieved. What was said above as to\nthe paramount significance of the instinct of workmanship for the\nlife of the race will of course suffer no abatement in so recognising\nits characteristically temperate urgency. The grave importance that\nattaches to it is a matter of its ubiquitous subservience to the ends\nof life, and not a matter of vehemence.\n\nThe sense of workmanship is also peculiarly subject to bias. It does\nnot commonly, or normally, work to an independent, creative end of\nits own, but is rather concerned with the ways and means whereby\ninstinctively given purposes are to be accomplished. According,\ntherefore, as one or another of the instinctive dispositions is\npredominant in the community\u2019s scheme of life or in the individual\u2019s\nevery-day interest, the habitual trend of the sense of workmanship\nwill be bent to one or another line of proficiency and technological\nmastery. By cumulative habituation a bias of this character may come\nto have very substantial consequences for the range and scope of\ntechnological knowledge, the state of the industrial arts, and for the\nrate and direction of growth in workmanlike ideals.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nChanges are going forward constantly and incontinently in the\ninstitutional apparatus, the habitual scheme of rules and principles\nthat regulate the community\u2019s life, and not least in the technological\nways and means by which the life of the race and its state of culture\nare maintained; but changes come rarely--in effect not at all--in the\nendowment of instincts whereby mankind is enabled to employ these\nmeans and to live under the institutions which its habits of life\nhave cumulatively created. In the case of hybrid populations, such\nas the peoples of Christendom, some appreciable adaptation of this\nspiritual endowment to meet the changing requirements of civilisation\nmay be counted on, through the establishment of composite pure\nlines of a hybrid type more nearly answering to the later phases\nof culture than any one of the original racial types out of which\nthe hybrid population is made up. But in so slow-breeding a species\nas man, and with changes in the conditions of life going forward\nat a visibly rapid pace, the chance of an adequate adaptation of\nhybrid human nature to new conditions seems doubtful at the best. It\nis also to be noted that the vague character of many of the human\ninstincts, and their consequent pliability under habituation, affords\nan appreciable margin of adaptation within which human nature may\nadjust itself to new conditions of life. But after all has been said\nit remains true that the margin within which the instinctive nature\nof the race can be effectively adapted to changing circumstances is\nrelatively narrow--narrow as contrasted with the range of variation in\ninstitutions--and the limits of such adaptation are somewhat rigid. As\nthe matter stands, the race is required to meet changing conditions\nof life to which its relatively unchanging endowment of instincts is\npresumably not wholly adapted, and to meet these conditions by the\nuse of technological ways and means widely different from those that\nwere at the disposal of the race from the outset. In the initial\nphases of the life-history of the race, or of any given racial stock,\nthe exigencies to which its spiritual (instinctive) nature was\nselectively required to conform were those of the savage culture, as\nhas been indicated above,--presumably in all cases a somewhat \u201clow\u201d or\nelementary form of savagery. This savage mode of life, which was, and\nis, in a sense, native to man, would be characterised by a considerable\ngroup solidarity within a relatively small group, living very near\nthe soil, and unremittingly dependent for their daily life on the\nworkmanlike efficiency of all the members of the group. The prime\nrequisite for survival under these conditions would be a propensity\nunselfishly and impersonally to make the most of the material means\nat hand and a penchant for turning all resources of knowledge and\nmaterial to account to sustain the life of the group.\n\nAt the outset, therefore, as it first comes into the life-history of\nany one or all of the racial stocks with which modern inquiry concerns\nitself, this instinctive disposition will have borne directly on\nworkmanlike efficiency in the simple and obvious sense of the word.\nBy virtue of the stability of the racial type, such is still its\ncharacter, primarily and substantially, apart from its sophistication\nby habit and tradition. The instinct of workmanship brought the life\nof mankind from the brute to the human plane, and in all the later\ngrowth of culture it has never ceased to pervade the works of man. But\nthe extensive complication of circumstances and the altered outlook of\nsucceeding generations, brought on by the growth of institutions and\nthe accumulation of knowledge, have led to an extension of its scope\nand of its canons and logic to activities and conjunctures that have\nlittle traceable bearing on the means of subsistence.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nCONTAMINATION OF INSTINCTS IN PRIMITIVE TECHNOLOGY\n\n\nAll instinctive behaviour is subject to development and hence to\nmodification by habit.[17] Such impulsive action as is in no degree\nintelligent, and so suffers no adaptation through habitual use, is\nnot properly to be called instinctive; it is rather to be classed as\ntropismatic. In human conduct the effects of habit in this respect\nare particularly far-reaching. In man the instincts appoint less of\na determinate sequence of action, and so leave a more open field for\nadaptation of behaviour to the circumstances of the case. When instinct\nenjoins little else than the end of endeavour, leaving the sequence\nof acts by which this end is to be approached somewhat a matter of\nopen alternatives, the share of reflection, discretion and deliberate\nadaptation will be correspondingly large. The range and diversity of\nhabituation is also correspondingly enlarged.\n\nIn man, too, by the same fact, habit takes on more of a cumulative\ncharacter, in that the habitual acquirements of the race are handed on\nfrom one generation to the next, by tradition, training, education,\nor whatever general term may best designate that discipline of\nhabituation by which the young acquire what the old have learned.\nBy similar means the like elements of habitual conduct are carried\nover from one community or one culture to another, leading to further\ncomplications. Cumulatively, therefore, habit creates usages, customs,\nconventions, preconceptions, composite principles of conduct that run\nback only indirectly to the native predispositions of the race, but\nthat may affect the working-out of any given line of endeavour in much\nthe same way as if these habitual elements were of the nature of a\nnative bias.\n\nAlong with this body of derivative standards and canons of conduct,\nand handed on by the same discipline of habituation, goes a cumulative\nbody of knowledge, made up in part of matter-of-fact acquaintance with\nphenomena and in greater part of conventional wisdom embodying certain\nacquired predilections and preconceptions current in the community.\nWorkmanship proceeds on the accumulated knowledge so received and\ncurrent, and turns it to account in dealing with the material means\nof life. Whatever passes current in this way as knowledge of facts\nis turned to account as far as may be, and so it is worked into a\ncustomary scheme of ways and means, a system of technology, into which\nnew elements of information or acquaintance with the nature and use of\nthings are incorporated, assimilated as they come.\n\nThe scheme of technology so worked out and carried along in the routine\nof getting a living will be serviceable for current use and have a\nsubstantial value for a further advance in technological efficiency\nsomewhat in proportion as the knowledge so embodied in technological\npractice is effectually of the nature of matter-of-fact. Much of\nthe information derived from experience in industry is likely to be\nof this matter-of-fact nature; but much of the knowledge made use of\nfor the technological purpose is also of the nature of convention,\ninference and authentic opinion, arrived at on quite other grounds\nthan workmanlike experience. This alien body of information, or\npseudo-information, goes into the grand total of human knowledge quite\nas freely as any matter of fact, and it is therefore also necessarily\ntaken up and assimilated in that technological equipment of knowledge\nand proficiency by use of which the work in hand is to be done.\n\nBut the experience which yields this useful and pseudo-useful knowledge\nis got under the impulsion and guidance of one and another of the\ninstincts with which man is endowed, and takes the shape and color\ngiven it by the instinctive bias in whose service it is acquired. At\nthe same time, whatever its derivation, the knowledge acquired goes\ninto the aggregate of information drawn on for the ways and means of\nworkmanship. Therefore the habits formed in any line of experience,\nunder the guidance of any given instinctive disposition, will have\ntheir effect on the conduct and aims of the workman in all his work\nand play; so that progress in technological matters is by no means an\noutcome of the sense of workmanship alone.\n\nIt follows that in all their working the human instincts are in this\nway incessantly subject to mutual \u201ccontamination,\u201d whereby the working\nof any one is incidentally affected by the bias and proclivities\ninherent in all the rest; and in so far as these current habits and\ncustoms in this way come to re\u00ebnforce the predispositions comprised\nunder any one instinct or any given group of instincts, the bias\nso accentuated comes to pervade the habits of thought of all the\nmembers of the community and gives a corresponding obliquity to the\ntechnological groundwork of the community. So, for instance, addiction\nto magical, superstitious or religious conceptions will necessarily\nhave its effect on the conceptions and logic employed in technological\ntheory and practice, and will impair its efficiency by that much. A\npeople much given to punctilios of rank and respect of persons will\nin some degree carry these habitual predilections over into the field\nof workmanship and will allow considerations of authenticity, of\npersonal weight and consequence, to decide questions of technological\nexpediency; so that ideas which have none but a putative efficiency may\nin this way come in for a large share in the state of the industrial\narts. A people whose culture has for any reason taken on a pronounced\ncoercive (predatory) character, with rigorous class distinctions, an\narbitrary governmental control, formidable gods and an authoritative\npriesthood, will have its industrial organisation and its industrial\narts fashioned to meet the demands and the logic of these institutions.\nSuch an institutional situation exerts a great and pervasive constraint\non the technological scheme in which workmanship takes effect under\nits rule, both directly by prescribing the things to do and the time,\nplace and circumstance of doing them, and indirectly through the habits\nof thought induced in the working population living under its rule.\nInnovation, the utilisation of newly acquired technological insight, is\ngreatly hindered by such institutional requirements that are enforced\nby other impulses than the sense of workmanship.\n\nIn the known lower cultures such institutional complications as might\nbe expected greatly to hinder or deflect the sense of workmanship\nare commonly neither large, rigorous nor obvious. Something of the\nkind there apparently always is, in the way, for instance, of the\ncustomary prerogatives and perquisites of the older men, as well as\ntheir tutelary oversight of the younger generation and of the common\ninterests of the group.[18] When this rule of seniority is elaborated\ninto such set forms as the men\u2019s (secret) societies, with exacting\ninitiatory ceremonies and class tabus,[19] its effect on workday\nlife is often very considerable, even though the community may show\nlittle that can fairly be classed as autocracy, chieftainship, or\neven aristocratic government. In many or all of these na\u00efve and\nearly developments of authority, and perhaps especially in those\ncultures where the control takes this inchoate form of a customary\n\u201cgerontocracy,\u201d[20] its immediate effect is that an abiding sense\nof authenticity comes to pervade the routine of daily life, such\nas effectually to obstruct all innovation, whether in the ways and\nmeans of work or in the conduct of life more at large. Control by a\ngerontocracy appears to reach its best development and to run with the\nfullest consistency and effect in communities where an appreciable\ndegree of predatory exploit is habitual, and the inference is ready,\nand at least plausible, that this institution is substantially of a\npredatory origin, that the principles (habits of thought) on which it\nrests are an outgrowth of pugnacity, self-aggrandisement and fear.\nUnder favouring conditions of friction and jealousy between groups\nthese propensities will settle into institutional habits of authority\nand deference, and so long as the resultant exercise of control\nis vested by custom in the class of elders the direct consequence\nis a marked abatement of initiative throughout the community and\na consequent appearance of conservatism and stagnation in its\ntechnological scheme as well as in the customary usages under whose\nguidance the community lives.[21] So these instinctive propensities\nwhich have no primary significance in the way of workmanship may come\nto count very materially in shaping the group\u2019s technological equipment\nof ideas and in deflecting the sense of workmanship from the na\u00efve\npursuit of material efficiency.\n\nThe rule of the elders appears to have been extremely prevalent in the\nearlier phases of culture. So much so that it may even be set down as\nthe most characteristic trait of the upper savagery and of the lower\nbarbarism; whether it takes the elaborately institutionalised form of\na settled gerontocracy, as among the Australian blacks, with sharply\ndefined class divisions and perquisites and a consistent subjection of\nwomen and children; or the looser customary rule of the Elders, with\na degree of deference and circumspection on the part of the younger\ngeneration and an uncertain conventional inferiority of women and\nchildren, as seen among the pagans of the Malay peninsula,[22] the\nEskimo of the Arctic seaboard,[23] the Mincopies of the Andamans,[24]\nor, on a somewhat higher level, the Pueblo Indians of the American\nSouth-west.[25] Illustrative instances of such an inchoate organisation\nof authority are very widely distributed, but the communities that\nfollow such a na\u00efve scheme of life are commonly neither large,\npowerful, wealthy, nor much in the public eye. The presumption is that\nthe sense of authenticity which pervades these and similar cultures,\namounting to a degree of tabu on innovation, has had much to do\nwith the notably slow advance of technology among savage peoples.\nSuch appears presumably to have been the prevalent run of the facts\nthroughout the stone age in all quarters of the Earth.\n\nIt is not altogether plain just what are the innate predispositions\nchiefly involved in this primitive social control which at its\nuntroubled best develops into a \u201cgerontocracy.\u201d There can apparently\nbe little question but that its prime motive force is the parental\nbent, expressing itself in a na\u00efve impulsive surveillance of the\ncommon interests of the group and a tutelage of the incoming\ngeneration. But here as in other social relations the self-regarding\nsentiments unavoidably come into play; so that (_a_) the tutelage\nof the elders takes something of an authoritative tone and blends\nself-aggrandisement with their quasi-parental solicitude, giving an\ninstitutional outcome which makes the young generation subservient\nto the elders, ostensibly for the mutual and collective good of\nboth parties to the relation; (_b_) if predatory or warlike exploit\nin any degree becomes habitual to the community the sentiment of\nself-aggrandisement gets the upper hand, and subservience to the\nable-bodied elders becomes the dominant note in this relation of\ntutelage, and their parental interest in the welfare of the incoming\ngeneration in a corresponding degree goes into abeyance under the\npressure of the appropriate sentiments of pugnacity and self-seeking,\ngiving rise to a coercive r\u00e9gime of a more or less ruthless character;\n(_c_) correlatively, along with unwearying insistence on their own\nprerogatives and collective discretion, on the part of the elders,\nthere goes, on the part of the community at large, a correspondingly\nhabitual acceptance of their findings and the precedents they have\nestablished, resulting in a universal addiction to the broad principles\nof unmitigated authenticity, with no power anywhere capable of breaking\nacross the accumulated precedents and tabus. Even the ruling class of\nelders, being an unwieldy deliberative body or executive committee,\nis held by parliamentary inertia, as well as by a circumspect regard\nfor their prescriptive rights, to a due observance of the customary\nlaw. The force of precedent is notoriously strong on the lower levels\nof culture. Under the rule of the elders deference to precedent grows\ninto an inveterate habit in the young, and when presently these come to\ntake their turn as discretionary elders the habit of deference to the\nprecedents established by those who have gone before still binds them,\nand the life and thought of the community never escape the dead hand of\nthe parent.\n\nWhen worked out into an institution of control in this way, and crossed\nwith the other instinctive propensities that go to make governmental\nauthority, it is apparently unavoidable that the parental bent should\nsuffer this curious inversion. In the simplest and unsophisticated\nterms, its functional content appears to be an unselfish solicitude\nfor the well-being of the incoming generation--a bias for the highest\nefficiency and fullest volume of life in the group, with a particular\ndrift to the future; so that, under its rule, contrary to the dictum of\nthe economic theorists, future goods are preferred to present goods[26]\nand the filial generation is given the preference over the parental\ngeneration in all that touches their material welfare. But where the\nself-regarding sentiments, self-complacency and self-abasement, come\nlargely into play, as they are bound to do in any culture that partakes\nappreciably of a predatory or coercive character, the prerogatives of\nthe ruling class and the principles of authentic usage become canons\nof truth and right living and presently take precedence of workmanlike\nefficiency and the fulness of life of the group. It results that\nconventional tests of validity presently accumulate and increasingly\ndeflect and obstruct the na\u00efve pursuit of workmanlike efficiency, in\nlarge part by obscuring those matters of fact that lend themselves to\ntechnological insight.\n\nBut like other innate predispositions the parental bent continually\nreasserts itself in its native and untaught character, as an ever\nresilient solicitude for the welfare of the young and the prospective\nfortunes of the group. As such it constantly comes in to re\u00ebnforce the\ninstinct of workmanship and sustain interest in the direct pursuit of\nefficiency in the ways and means of life. So closely in touch and so\nconcurrent are the parental bent and the sense of workmanship in this\nquest of efficiency that it is commonly difficult to guess which of the\ntwo proclivities is to be credited with the larger or the leading part\nin any given line of conduct; although taken by and large the two are\nafter all fairly distinct in respect of their functional content. This\nthorough and far-going concurrence of the two may perhaps be taken to\nmean that the instinct of workmanship is in the main a propensity to\nwork out the ends which the parental bent makes worth while.\n\nIt seems to be these two predispositions in conjunction that have\nexercised the largest and most consistent control over that growth\nof custom and conventional principles that has standardised the life\nof mankind in society and so given rise to a system of institutions.\nThis control bears selectively on the whole range of institutions\ncreated by habitual response to the call of the other instincts and\nhas the effect of a \u201ccommon-sense\u201d surveillance which prevents the\nscheme of life from running into an insufferable tangle of grotesque\nextravagances. That their surveillance has not always been decisive\nneed scarcely be specifically called to mind; human culture in all\nages presents too many imbecile usages and principles of conduct to\nlet anyone overlook the fact that disserviceable institutions easily\narise and continue to hold their place in spite of the disapproval of\nnative common sense. The selective control exercised over custom and\nusage by these instincts of serviceability is neither too close nor too\ninsistent. Wide, even extravagant, departures from the simple dictates\nof this native common sense occur even within the narrow range of the\ndomestic and minor civil institutions, where these two common-sense\npredispositions should concur to create a prescriptive usage looking\ndirectly to the continuation and welfare of the race. Considerations,\nor perhaps rather conventional preconceptions, running on other\ngrounds, as, for instance, on grounds of superstition or religion, of\npropriety and gentility, of pecuniary or political expediency, have\ncome in for a large share in ordering the institutions of family and\nneighbourhood life. Yet doubtless it is the parental bent and the sense\nof workmanship in concurrence that have been the primary and persistent\nfactors in (selectively) shaping the household organisation among\nall peoples, however great may have been the force of other factors,\ninstinctive and habitual, that have gone to diversify the variegated\noutcome.\n\nIt appears, then, that so long as the parental solicitude and the\nsense of workmanship do not lead men to take thought and correct the\notherwise unguarded drift of things, the growth of institutions--usage,\ncustoms, canons of conduct, principles of right and propriety, the\ncourse of cumulative habituation as it goes forward under the driving\nforce of the several instincts native to man,--will commonly run at\ncross purposes with serviceability and the sense of workmanship.[27]\n\nThat such should be the case lies in the nature of things, as will\nreadily appear on reflection. Under given circumstances and under the\nimpulsion of a given instinctive propensity a given line of behaviour\nbecomes habitual and so is installed by use and wont as a principle\nof conduct. The principle or canon of conduct so gained takes its\nplace among the habitual verities of life in the community and is\nhanded on by tradition. Under further impulsion of the same and other\ninstinctive propensities, and under altered circumstances, conduct in\nother, unrelated lines will be referred to this received principle\nas a bench-mark by which its goodness is appraised and to which all\nconduct is accommodated, giving a result which is related to the\nexigencies of the case only at the second remove and by channels of\nhabit which have only a conventional relevancy to the case. The farther\nthis manner of crossing and grafting of habitual elements proceeds\nin the elaboration of principles and usage, the larger will be the\nmass and the graver will be the complication of materially irrelevant\nconsiderations present in any given line of conduct, the more extensive\nand fantastic will be the fabric of conventionalities which come to\ncondition the response to any one of the innate human propensities, and\nthe more \u201cirrelevant, incompetent and impertinent\u201d will be the line of\nconduct prescribed by use and wont. Except by recourse to the sense\nof workmanship there is no evading this complication of ineptitudes\nand irrelevancies, and such recourse is not easily had. For the bias\nof settled habit goes to sustain the institutional fabric of received\nsophistications, and these sophistications are bound in such a network\nof give and take that a disturbance of the fabric at any point will\ninvolve more or less of a derangement throughout.\n\nThis body of habitual principles and preconceptions is at the same\ntime the medium through which experience receives those elements\nof information and insight on which workmanship is able to draw in\ncontriving ways and means and turning them to account for the uses of\nlife. And the conventional verities count in this connexion almost\nwholly as obstructions to workmanlike efficiency. Worldly wisdom,\ninsight into the proprieties and expediencies of human intercourse,\nthe scheme of tabus, consanguinities, and magical efficacies, yields\nvery little that can effectually be turned to account for technological\nends. The experience gained by habituation under the stress of these\nother proclivities and their derivative principles is necessarily\nmade use of in workmanship, and so enters into the texture of the\ntechnological system, but a large part of it is of very doubtful value\nfor the purpose. Much of this experience runs at cross purposes with\nworkmanship, not only in that the putative information which this\nexperience brings home to men has none but a putative serviceability,\nbut also in that the habit of mind induced by its discipline obscures\nthat insight into matter of fact that is indispensable to workmanlike\nefficiency.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBut the most obstructive derangement that besets workmanship is what\nmay be called the self-contamination of the sense of workmanship\nitself. This applies in a peculiar degree to the earlier or more\nelementary phases of culture, but it holds true only with lessening\nforce throughout the later growth of civilisation. The hindrance\nto technological efficiency from this source will often rise to\nlarge proportions even in advanced communities, particularly where\nmagical, religious or other anthropomorphic habits of thought are\nprevalent. The difficulty has been spoken of as anthropomorphism, or\nanimism,--which is only a more archaic anthropomorphism. The essential\ntrait of anthropomorphic conceptions, so far as bears on the present\nargument, is that conduct, more or less fully after the human fashion\nof conduct, is imputed to external objects; whether these external\nobjects are facts of observation or creatures of mythological fancy.\nSuch anthropomorphism commonly means an interpretation of phenomena in\nterms of workmanship, though it may also involve much more than this,\nparticularly in the higher reaches of myth-making. But the simpler\nanthropomorphic or animistic beliefs that pervade men\u2019s every-day\nthinking commonly amount to little if anything more than the na\u00efve\nimputation of a workmanlike propensity in the observed facts. External\nobjects are believed to do things; or rather it is believed that they\nare seen to do things.\n\nThe reason of this imputation of conduct to external things is\nsimple, obvious, and intimate in all men\u2019s apprehension; so much\nso, indeed, as not readily to permit its being seen in perspective\nand appreciated at anything like its effectual force. All facts of\nobservation are necessarily seen in the light of the observer\u2019s habits\nof thought, and the most intimate and inveterate of his habits of\nthought is the experience of his own initiative and endeavours. It is\nto this \u201capperception mass\u201d that objects of apperception are finally\nreferred, and it is in terms of this experience that their measure is\nfinally taken. No psychological phenomenon is more familiar than this\nubiquitous \u201cpersonal equation\u201d in men\u2019s apprehension of whatever facts\ncome within their observation.\n\nThe sense of workmanship is like all human instincts in the respect\nthat when the occasion offers, the agent moved by its impulse not\nonly runs through a sequence of actions suitable to the instinctive\nend, but he is also given to dwelling, more or less sentimentally,\non the objects and activities about which his attention is engaged\nby the promptings of this instinctive propensity. In so far as he is\nmoved by the instinct of workmanship man contemplates the objects with\nwhich he comes in contact from the point of view of their relevancy to\nulterior results, their aptitude for taking effect in a consequential\noutcome. Habitual occupation with workmanlike conceptions,--and in the\nlower cultures all men and women are habitually so occupied, since\nthere is no considerable class or season not engaged in the quest of\na livelihood,--this occupation with workmanlike interests, leaving\nthe attention alert in the direction towards workmanlike phenomena,\ncarries with it habitual thinking in the terms in which the logic of\nworkmanship runs. The facts of observation are conceived as facts\nof workmanship, and the logic of workmanship becomes the logic of\nevents. Their apprehension in these terms is easy, since it draws into\naction the faculties of apperception and reflection that are already\nalert and facile through habitual use, and it assimilates the facts\nin an apperceptive system of relationships that is likewise ready\nand satisfactory, convincing through habitual service and by native\nproclivity to this line of systematisation. By instinct and habit\nobserved phenomena are apprehended from this (teleological) point of\nview, and they are construed, by way of systematisation, in terms of\nsuch an instinctive pursuit of some workmanlike end. In latterday\npsychological jargon, human knowledge is of a \u201cpragmatic\u201d character.\n\nAs all men habitually act under the guidance of instincts, and\ntherefore by force of sentiment instinctively look to some end in all\nactivity, so the objects with which the primitive workman has to do are\nalso conceived as acting under impulse of an instinctive kind; and a\nbent, a teleological or pragmatic nature, is in some degree imputed to\nthem and comes as a matter of course to be accepted as a constituent\nelement in their apprehended make-up. A putative pragmatic bent innate\nin external things comes in this way to pass current as observed matter\nof fact. By force of the sense of workmanship external objects are\nin great part apperceived in respect of what they will do; and their\nmost substantial characteristic therefore, their intimate individual\nnature, in so far as they are conceived as individual entities, is that\nthey will do things.\n\nIn the workmanlike apprehension of them the nature of things is\ntwofold: (_a_) what can be done with them as raw material for use\nunder the creative hand of the workman who makes things, and (_b_)\nwhat they will do as entities acting in their own right and working\nout their own ends. The former is matter of fact, the latter matter of\nimputation; but both alike, and in the na\u00efve apprehension of uncritical\nmen both equally, are facts of observation and elements of objective\nknowledge. The two are, of course, of very unequal value for the\npurposes of workmanship. It should seem, at least on first contact with\nthe distinction, that the former category alone can have effectually\nconduced or contributed to workmanlike efficiency, and so it should be\nthe only substantial factor in the growth of technological insight and\nproficiency: while the latter category of knowledge should presumably\nhave always been an unmitigated hindrance to effective work and to\ntechnological advance. But such does not appear on closer scrutiny\nto have been the case in the past: whether such sheer discrimination\nagainst the technological serviceability of all these putative facts\nwould hold good in latterday civilisation is a question which may\nperhaps best be left to the parties in interest in \u201cpragmatic\u201d and\ntheological controversy.\n\nThese two categories of knowledge, or of _cognoscenda_, are\nincongruous, of course, and they seem incompatible when applied to the\nsame phenomena, the same external objects. But such incongruity does\nnot disturb anyone who is at all content to take facts at their face\nvalue,--for both ways of apprehending the facts are equally given in\nthe face value of the facts apprehended. And on the known lower levels\nof culture it appears that in the workman\u2019s apprehension of the facts\nwith which he has to do there is no evident strain due to this twofold\nnature and twofold interpretation of the objects of knowledge. So,\nfor instance, the Pueblo potter (woman) may (putatively) be aware of\ncertain inherent, quasi-spiritual, pragmatic qualities, claims and\nproclivities personal to the clay beds from which her raw material\nis drawn: different clay beds have, no doubt, a somewhat different\nquasi-personality, which has, among other things, to do with the\ngoodness of the raw material they afford. Even the clay in hand will\nhave its pragmatic peculiarities and idiosyncracies which are duly\nto be respected; and, notably, the finished pot is an entity with a\nlife-history of its own and with temperament, fortunes and fatalities\nthat make up the substance of good and evil in its world.[28] But all\nthat does not perceptibly affect the technology of the Pueblo potter\u2019s\nart, beyond carrying a sequence of ceremonial observance that may run\nalong by the side of the technological process; nor does it manifestly\naffect the workmanlike use of the pot during its lifetime, except\nthat the pragmatic nature of the given pot will decide, on grounds\nof ceremonial competency, to what use it may be put.[29] Matter of\nfact and matter of imputation run along side by side in inextricable\ncontact but with slight apparent mutual interference across the line.\nThe potter digs her clay as best she has learned how, and it is a\nmatter of workmanlike efficiency, in which empirical knowledge of the\nmechanical qualities of the material is very efficiently combined\nwith the potter\u2019s trained proficiency in the discretionary use of her\ntools; the tools, of course, also have their (putative) temperamental\nidiosyncracies, but they are employed in her hands in uncritical\nconformity with such matter-of-fact laws of physics as she has learned.\nThe clay is washed, kneaded and tempered with the same circumspect\nregard to the opaque facts known about clay through long handling of\nit. What and how much tempering material may best be used, and how\nit is to be worked in, may all have a recondite explanation in the\nsubtler imputed traits of the clay; a certain clay may have a putative\nquasi-spiritual affinity for certain tempering material; but the work\nof selection and mixing is carried out with a watchful regard to the\nmechanical character of the materials and without doubt that the given\nmaterials will respond in definite, empirically ascertained ways to the\npressure brought on them by the potter\u2019s hands, and without questioning\nthe matter of fact that such and so much of manipulation will mix\nsuch and so much of tempering material with the given lot of clay.\nThe clay is \u201cas wax in her hands;\u201d what comes of it is the product of\nher insight and proficiency. Still the pragmatic nature of all these\nmaterials viewed as distinct entities is never to be denied, and in\nthose respects in which she does not creatively design, manipulate\nand construct the work of her hands, its putative self-sufficiency of\nexistence, meaning and propensity goes on its own recognisances unshorn\nand inalienable.\n\nTechnological efficiency rests on matter-of-fact knowledge, as\ncontrasted with knowledge of the traits imputed to external objects in\nmaking acquaintance with them. Therefore every substantial advance in\ntechnological mastery necessarily adds something to this body of opaque\nfact, and with every such advance proportionably less of the behaviour\nof inanimate things will come to be construed in terms of an imputed\nworkmanlike or teleological bent. At the same time the imputation of\na teleological meaning or workmanlike bent to the external facts that\nare made use of is likely to take a more circumspect, ingenious and\nidealised form. Under the circumstances that condition an increasing\ntechnological mastery there is an ever-growing necessity to avoid\nconflict between the imputed traits of external objects and those\nfacts of their behaviour that are constantly in evidence in their\ntechnological use. In so far, therefore, as a simple and immediate\nimputation of workmanlike self-direction is seen manifestly to traverse\nthe facts of daily use its place will be supplied by more shadowy\nanthropomorphic agencies that are assumed to carry on their life\nand work in some degree of detachment from the material objects in\nquestion, and to these anthropomorphic agencies which so lie obscurely\nin the background of the observed facts will be assigned a larger and\nlarger share of the required initiative and self-direction. For so\nalien to mankind, with its instinctive sense of workmanship, is the\nmutilation of brute creation into mere opaque matter-of-fact, and\nso indefeasibly does the \u201cconsciousness of kind\u201d assert itself, that\neach successive renunciation of such an imputed bias of workmanship in\nconcrete objects is sought to be redeemed by pushing the imputation\nfarther into the background of observed phenomena and running their\nputative workmanlike bias in more consummately anthropomorphic terms.\nSo an animistic conception[30] of things comes presently to supplement,\nand in part supplant, the more na\u00efve and immediate imputation of\nworkmanship, leading up to farther and more elaborate myth-making;\nuntil in the course of elaboration and refinement there may emerge a\nmonotheistic and providential Creator seated in an infinitely remote\nbut ubiquitous space of four dimensions.\n\nThis imputation of bias and initiative has doubtless lost ground\namong civilised communities, as contrasted with the matter-of-fact\napprehension of things, so that where it once was the main body of\nknowledge it now is believed to live and move only within that margin\nof things not yet overtaken by matter-of-fact information,--at least\nso it is held in the vainglorious scepticism of the Western culture.\nMeantime it is to be noted that the proclivity to impute a workmanlike\nbias to external facts has not been lost, nor has it become inoperative\neven among the adepts of Occidental scepticism. On the one hand it\nstill enables the modern scientist to generalise his observations in\nterms of causation,[31] and on the other hand it has preserved the life\nof God the Father unto this day. It is as the creative workman, the\nGreat Artificer, that he has taken his last stand against the powers of\nspiritual twilight.\n\nOut of the simpler workday familiarity with the raw materials and\nprocesses employed in industry, in the lower cultures, there emerges\nno system of knowledge avowed as such; although in all known instances\nof such lower cultures the industrial arts have taken on a systematic\ncharacter, such as often to give rise to definite, extensive and\nelaborate technological processes as well as to manual and other\ntechnological training; both of which will necessarily involve\nsomething like an elementary theory of mechanics systematised on\ngrounds of matter-of-fact, as well as a practical routine of empirical\nways and means. In the lower cultures the growth of this body of opaque\nfacts and of its systematic coherence is simply the habitual growth\nof technological procedure. Considered as a knowledge of things it is\nprosy and unattractive; it does not greatly appeal to men\u2019s curiosity,\nbeing scarcely interesting in itself, but only for the use to be\nmade of it. Its facts are not lighted up with that spiritual fire of\npragmatic initiative and propensity which animates the same phenomena\nwhen seen in the light of an imputed workmanlike behaviour and so\nconstrued in terms of conduct. On the other hand, when the phenomena\nare interpreted anthropomorphically they are indued with a \u201chuman\ninterest,\u201d such as will draw the attention of all men in all ages, as\nwitness the worldwide penchant for myth-making.\n\nSuch animistic imputation of end and endeavour to the facts of\nobservation will in no case cover the whole of men\u2019s apprehension of\nthe facts. It is a matter of imputation, not of direct observation;\nand there is always a fringe of opaque matter-of-fact bound up with\neven the most animistically conceived object. Such is unavoidably the\ncase. The animistic conception imputes to its subject a workmanlike\npropensity to do things, and such an imputation necessarily implies\nthat, as agent, the object in question engages in something like a\ntechnological process, a workmanlike manipulation wherein he has his\nwill with the raw materials upon which his workmanlike force and\nproficiency spends itself. Workmanship involves raw material, and in\nthe respect in which this raw material is passively shaped to his\npurposes by the workman\u2019s manipulation it is not conceived to be\nactively seeking its own ends on its own initiative. So that by force\nof the logic of workmanship the imputation of a workmanlike (animistic)\npropensity to brute facts, itself involves the assumption of crude\ninanimate matter as a correlate of the putative workmanlike agent. The\nanthropomorphic fancy of the primitive workman, therefore, can never\ncarry the teleological interpretation of phenomena to such a finality\nbut that there will always in his apprehension be an inert residue of\nmatter-of-fact left over. The material facts never cease to be, within\nreasonable limits, raw material; though the limits may be somewhat\nvague and shifting. And this residue of crude matter-of-fact grows and\ngathers consistency with experience and always remains ready to the\nhand of the workman for what it is worth, unmagnified and unbeautified\nby anthropomorphic interpretation.\n\nThe animistic, or better the anthropomorphic, elements so comprised by\nimputation in the common-sense apprehension of things will pass in the\nmain for facts of observation. With the current of time and experience\nthis may under favourable conditions grow into a developed animistic\nsystem and come to the dignity of myth, and ultimately of theology.\nBut as it plays its part in the cruder uses of technology its common\nand most obstructive form is the inchoate animism or anthropomorphic\nbias spoken of above. In its bearing on technological efficiency, it\ncommonly vitiates the available facts in a greater or less degree.\nMatter-of-fact knowledge alone will serve the uses of workmanship,\nsince workmanship is effective only in so far as its outcome is\nmatter-of-fact work. Any higher and more subtle potencies found in or\nimputed to the facts about which the artificer is engaged can only\nserve to divert and defeat his efforts, in that they lead him into\nmethods and expedients that have only a putative effect.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis obstructive force of the anthropomorphic interpretation of\nphenomena is by no means the same in all lines of activity. The\ndifficulty, at least in the earlier days, seems to be greatest along\nthose lines of craft where the workman has to do with the mechanical,\ninanimate forces--the simplest in point of brute concreteness and the\nleast amenable to a consistent interpretation in animistic terms.\nWhile man is conventionally distinguished from brute creation as a\n\u201ctool-using animal,\u201d his early progress in the devising and use of\nefficient tools, taking the word in its native sense, seems to have\ngone forward very slowly, both absolutely and as contrasted with those\nlines of workmanship in which he could carry his point by manual\ndexterity unaided by cunningly devised implements and mechanical\ncontrivances;[32] and still more striking is the contrast between\nthe incredibly slow and blindfold advance of the savage culture\nshown in the sequence of those typical stone implements which serve\nconventionally as land-marks of the early technology, on the one hand,\nand the concomitant achievements of the same stone-age peoples in the\ndomestication and use of plants and animals on the other hand.\n\nNo man can offer a confident conjecture as to how long a time and what\na volume of experience was taken up in the growth of technological\ninsight and proficiency up to the point when the neolithic period\nbegins in European prehistory. In point of duration it has been found\nconvenient to count it up roughly in units of geologic time, where a\nthousand years are as a day. Attempts to reduce it to such units as\ncenturies or millennia have hitherto not come to anything appreciable.\nIn the present state of information on this head it is doubtless a safe\nconjecture that the interval between the beginning of the human era and\nthe close of pal\u00e6olithic time, say in Europe or within the cultural\nsequence in which Europe belongs, is to be taken as some multiple of\nthe interval that has elapsed from the beginning of the neolithic\nculture in Europe to the present;[33] and the neolithic period itself\nwas in its turn no doubt of longer duration than the history of Europe\nsince the bronze first came in.[34]\n\nThe series of stone implements recovered from pal\u00e6olithic deposits show\nthe utmost reach of pal\u00e6olithic technology on its mechanical side,\nin the way of workmanlike mastery of brute matter simply; for these\nimplements are the tools of the tool-makers of that technological era.\nThey indicate the ultimate terms of the technological situation on the\nmechanical side, for the craftsman working in more perishable materials\ncould go no farther than these primary elements of the technological\nequipment would carry him.\n\nThe strict limitation imposed on the technology of any culture, on its\nmechanical side, by the \u201cstate of the industrial arts\u201d in respect of\nthe primary tools and materials available, whether availability is a\nquestion of knowledge or of material environment, is illustrated, for\ninstance, by the case of the Eskimo, the North-west Coast Indians,\nor some of the islands of the South Sea. In each of these cultures,\nperhaps especially in that of the Eskimo, technological mastery had\nbeen carried as far as the circumstances of the case would permit,\nand in each case the decisive circumstances that limit the scope and\nrange of workmanship are the character of the primary tools of the\ntool-maker and the limits of his knowledge of the mechanical properties\nof the materials at his disposal for such use. The Eskimo culture, for\ninstance, is complete after its kind, worked out to the last degree\nof workmanlike mastery possible with the Eskimo\u2019s knowledge of those\nmaterials on which he depended for his primary tools and on which\nhe was able to draw for the raw materials of his industry. At the\nsame time the Eskimo shows how considerable a superstructure of the\nsecondary mechanic arts may be erected on a scant groundwork of the\nprimary mechanical resources.[35]\n\nIn the light of such a familiar instance as the Eskimo or the\nPolynesian culture it is evident that very much must be allowed, in\nthe case, _e.\u00a0g._, of the European stone age, for work in perishable\nmaterials that have disappeared; but after all allowance of this\nkind, the showing for pal\u00e6olithic man is not remarkable, considering\nthe ample time allowed him, and considering also that, in Europe at\nleast, he was by native gift nowise inferior to some of the racial\nelements that still survive in the existing population and that are not\nnotoriously ill furnished either in the physical or the intellectual\nrespect. And what is true of pal\u00e6olithic times as regards the native\ncharacter of this population is true in a more pronounced degree for\nlater prehistoric times.[36]\n\nThe very moderate pace of the technological advance in early times in\nthe mechanic arts stands out more strikingly when it is contrasted with\nwhat was accomplished in those arts, or rather in those occupations,\nthat have to do immediately with living matter. Some of the crop\nplants, for instance, and presently some of the domestic animals,\nmake their appearance in Denmark late in the period of the kitchen\nmiddens; which falls in the early stone age of the Danish chronology,\nthat is to say in the early part of the neolithic period as counted in\nterms of the European chronology at large. These, then, are improved\nbreeds of plants and animals, very appreciably different from their\nwild ancestors, arguing not only a shrewd insight and consistent\nmanagement in the breeding of these domesticated races but also a\nlong continued and intelligent use of these items of technological\nequipment, during which the nature and uses of the plants and animals\ntaken into domestication must have been sufficiently understood and\ntaken advantage of, at the same time that a workmanlike selection and\npropagation of favourable variations was carried out. Some slight\nreflection on what is implied in the successful maintenance, use and\nimprovement of several races of crop plants and domestic animals will\nthrow that side of the material achievements of the kitchen-midden\npeoples into sufficiently high contrast with their chipped flint\nimplements and the degree of mechanical insight and proficiency which\nthese implements indicate.\n\nTo this Danish illustrative case it may of course be objected, and with\nsome apparent reason, that these plants and animals which begin to come\nin evidence in a state of domestication in the kitchen middens, and\nwhich presently afforded the chief means of life to the later stone-age\npopulation, were introduced in a domestic state from outside; and\nthat this technological gain was the product of another and higher\nculture than that into which they were thus intruded. The objection\nwill have what force it may; the facts are no doubt substantially\nas set forth. However, the domestication and use of these races of\nplants and animals embodied no less considerable a workmanlike mastery\nof its technological problem wherever it was worked out, whether in\nDenmark--as is at least highly improbable--or in Turkestan, as may\nwell have been the case. And the successful introduction of tillage\nand cattle-breeding among the kitchen-midden peoples from a higher\nculture, without the concomitant introduction of a corresponding gain\nin the mechanic arts from the same source, leaves the force of the\nargument about as it would be in the absence of this objection. The\ncomparative difficulty of acquiring the mechanic arts, as compared\nwith the arts of husbandry, would appear in much the same light\nwhether it were shown in the relatively slow acquirement of these arts\nthrough a home growth of technological mastery or in the relatively\ntardy and inept borrowing of them from outside. So far as bears on\nthe present question, much the same habits of mind take effect in the\nacquirement of such a technological gain whether it takes place by\nhome growth or by borrowing from without. In either case the point\nis that the peoples of the kitchen-middens appear to have been less\nable to learn the use of serviceable mechanical expedients than to\nacquire the technology of tillage and cattle-breeding. The appearance\nof tillage and cattle-breeding (\u201cmixed farming\u201d) at this period of\nDanish prehistory, without the concomitant appearance of anything like\na similar technological gain in the mechanic arts, argues either (_a_)\nthat in the culture from which husbandry was ultimately borrowed\nand in which the domestication was achieved there was no similarly\nsubstantial gain made in the mechanic arts at the same time, so that\nthis culture from which the crop plants and animals originally came\ninto the North of Europe had no corresponding mechanical gain to offer\nalong with husbandry; or (_b_) that the kitchen-midden peoples, and the\nother peoples through whose hands the arts of husbandry passed on their\nway to the North, were unable to profit in a like degree by what was\noffered them in the primary mechanic arts. The known evidence seems to\nsay that the visible retardation in the mechanic arts, as compared with\nhusbandry, in prehistoric Denmark was due partly to the one, partly to\nthe other of these difficulties.\n\nTo avoid confusion and misconception it may be pertinent to recall\nthat, taken absolutely, the rate and magnitude of advance in the\nprimary mechanic arts in Denmark at this time was very considerable;\nso much so indeed that the visible absolute gain in this respect has\nso profoundly touched the imagination of the students of that culture\nas to let them overlook the disparity, in point of the rate of gain,\nbetween the mechanic arts and husbandry. In the same connection it\nis also to be remarked that the entire neolithic culture of the\nkitchen-middens, as well as their husbandry, was introduced from\noutside of Europe, having been worked out in its early rudiments before\nthe kitchen-midden peoples reached the Baltic seaboard. At the same\ntime the raw materials for the mechanic arts of the neolithic culture\nwere available to the kitchen-midden technologist in abundant quantity\nand unsurpassed quality; while the raw material of husbandry, the crop\nplants and domestic animals, were exotics. Further, in point of race,\nand therefore presumably in point of native endowment, the peoples of\nthe Baltic seaboard at that time were substantially the same mixture of\nstocks that has in modern times carried the technology of the mechanic\narts in western Europe and its colonies to a pitch of mastery never\napproached before or elsewhere. And the retardation in the mechanic\narts as contrasted with husbandry is no greater, probably less, in\nneolithic Denmark than in any other culture on the same general level\nof efficiency.\n\nWherever the move may have been made, in one or in several places,\nand whatever may have been the particular circumstances attending the\ndomestication and early use of crop plants and animals, the case sums\nup to about the same result. Through long ages of work and play men\n(perhaps primarily women) learned the difficult and delicate crafts of\nhusbandry and carried their mastery of these pursuits to such a degree\nof proficiency, and followed out the lead given by these callings\nwith such effect, that by the (geologic) date of early neolithic\ntimes in Europe virtually all the species of domesticable animals in\nthree continents had been brought in and had been bred into improved\nraces.[37] At the same time the leading crop plants of the old world,\nthose on whose yield the life of the Western peoples depends today,\nhad been brought under cultivation, improved and specialised with\nsuch effect that all the advance that has been made in these respects\nsince the early neolithic period is greatly less than what had been\naccomplished up to that time. By early neolithic times as counted in\nWest Europe, or by the early bronze age as counted in western Asia,\nthe leading domestic animals had been distributed, in domesticated and\nimproved breeds, throughout central and western Asia and the inhabited\nregions of Europe and North Africa. The like is true for the main\ncrop plants that now feed the occidental peoples, except that these,\nin domesticated and specialised breeds, were distributed through this\nentire cultural region at an appreciably earlier date,--earlier by some\nthousands of years.[38] In late modern times there have been added\nto the civilised world\u2019s complement of crop plants a very large and\nimportant contingent whose domestication and development was worked out\nin America and the regions of the Pacific; though most of these belong\nin the low latitudes and are on that account less available to the\nWestern culture than what has come down from the prehistoric cultures\nof the old world. These are also the work of the stone age, in large\npart no doubt dating back to pal\u00e6olithic times.\n\nAmerica, with the Polynesian and Indonesian cultural regions, shows\nthe correlation and the systematic discrepancy in time between the\nrate, range and magnitude of the advance in tillage on the one\nhand and of the primary mechanic arts on the other hand. When this\nculture was interrupted it had, in the mechanical respect, reached\nan advanced neolithic phase at its best; but its achievements in the\ncrop plants are perhaps to be rated as unsurpassed by all that has\nbeen done elsewhere in all time.[39] In the primary mechanic arts this\ncultural region had in the same time reached a stage of perfection\ncomparable at its best with pre-dynastic Egypt, or neolithic Denmark,\nor pre-Minoan Crete. The really great advance achieved was in the\nselection, improvement, use and cultivation of the crop plants; and\nnot in any appreciable degree even in the mechanical appliances\nemployed in the cultivation and consumption of these crops; though\nsomething considerable is to be noted in this latter respect in such\ninventions as the mandioca squeezer and the metate; and great things\nwere done in the way of irrigation and road building.[40] But the\ncontrast, for instance, between the metate and the contrivances for\nmaking paper bread on the one side, and the technologically consummate\ncorn-plant (maize) on the other, should be decisive for the point\nhere in question. The mechanic appliances of corn cultivation had not\nadvanced beyond the digging stick, a rude hoe and a rudimentary spade,\nthough here as well as in other similar connections the local use of\nwell-devised irrigation works, terraced fields,[41] and graneries is\nnot to be overlooked; but the corn itself had been brought from its\ngrass-like ancestral form to the maize of the present corn crop. Like\nmost of the American crop plants the maize under selective cultivation\nhad been carried so far from its wild form as no longer to stand a\nchance of survival in the wild state, and indeed so far that it is\nstill a matter of controversy what its wild ancestor may have been.\n\nPerhaps the races of this American-Polynesian region are gifted\nwith some special degree of spiritual (instinctive) fitness for\nplant-breeding. They seem to be endowed with a particular proclivity\nfor sympathetically identifying themselves with and patiently waiting\nupon the course of natural phenomena, perhaps especially the phenomena\nof animate nature, which never seem alien or incomprehensible to the\nIndian. Such at least is the consistent suggestion carried by their\nmyths, legends and symbolism. The typical American cosmogony is a\ntissue of legends of fecundity and growth, even more than appears\nto hold true of primitive cosmogonies elsewhere.[42] And yet some\ncaution in accepting such a generalisation is necessary in view,\nfor instance, of the mythological output along similar lines on the\nMediterranean seaboard in early times. By native gift the Indian is\na \u201cnature-faker,\u201d given to unlimited anthropomorphism. Mechanical,\nmatter-of-fact appreciation of external and material phenomena seems\nto be in a peculiar degree difficult, irrelevant and incongruous with\nthe genius of the race. But even if it should seem that this race, or\ngroup of races, is peculiarly given to such sympathetic interpretation\nof natural phenomena in terms of human instinct, the difference between\nthem and the typical racial stocks of the old world in this respect is\nafter all a difference in degree, not in kind. The like proclivity is\nin good evidence throughout, wherever any race of men have endeavoured\nto put their acquaintance with natural phenomena into systematic form.\nThe bond of combination in the making of systems, whether cosmologic,\nmythic, philosophic or scientific, has been some putative human trait\nor traits. It may be that in their appreciation of facts and their\nmaking of systems the American races have by some peculiar native gift\nbeen inclined to an interpretation in terms of fertility, growth,\nnurture and life-cycles.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAny predisposition freely to accept and use the deliverances of\nsensible perception on their own recognisances simply, in the terms in\nwhich they come, and to connect them up in a system of knowledge in\ntheir own terms, without imputation of a spiritual (anthropomorphic)\nsubstratum,--for the purposes of workmanship such a predisposition\nshould be of the first importance for effective work in the mechanic\narts; and a strong instinctive bias to the contrary should be\ncorrespondingly pernicious. Any instinctive bias to colour, distort\nand derange the facts by imputing elements of human nature will\nunavoidably act to hinder and deflect the agent from an effectual\npursuit of mechanical design. But the like is not true in the same\ndegree as regards men\u2019s dealings with animate nature. Anthropomorphic\ninterpretation is more at home and less disserviceable here. With less\nserious derangement in the objective results, plants and animals may\nbe construed to have a conscious purpose in life and to pursue their\nends somewhat after the human fashion; witness the facility with which\nthe story-tellers recount plausible episodes (feigned or real) from the\nlife of animals and plants, and the readiness with which such tales\nget a hearing. Readers and hearers find no great difficulty, if any,\nin giving make-believe credence to the tales so long as they recount\nonly such adventures as are physically possible to the animals of\nwhich (whom?) they are told; the hearers are always ready to go with\nthe story-teller down this highway of make-believe into the subhuman\nfairy land. Mechanical phenomena, happenings in the mechanic arts,\ncharacteristics of the existence of inanimate objects and the changes\nwhich they undergo, lend themselves with much less happy effect to the\nanthropomorphic story-teller\u2019s make-believe. Episodes from the feigned\nlife-history of tools, machines and raw materials are not drawn on with\nanything like the same frequency, nor do the tales that recount them\nmeet with the same untiring attention. There is always an unreality\nabout them which even the most robust make-believe can overcome only\nfor a short and doubtful interval. Witness the relative barrenness\nof primitive folk-tales on this inanimate side, as compared with the\nexuberance of the myths and legends that interpret the life of plants\nand animals; and where inanimate phenomena are drawn into the net of\npersonation it happens almost unavoidably that a feigned person is\nthrown into the foreground of the tale plausibly to take the part of\nbearer, controller or intrigant in the episodes related.[43]\n\nEven more to the same purpose, as showing the same insidious facility\nof anthropomorphic interpretation, are the bona-fide constructions of\nscientists and pseudo-scientists running on the imputation of purpose\nand deliberation to explain the behaviour of animals. Indeed, at the\nworst, and still in good faith, it may go so far as to impute some sort\nof quasi-conscious striving on the part of plants.[44] As good and\ntemperate an instance as may be had of such anthropomorphic imputation\nof workmanlike gifts is afforded, for instance, by the work of Romanes\non the behaviour of animals.[45] It goes to show how very plausibly\nsome of the lower animals may be credited with these spiritual\naptitudes and how far and well the imputation may be made to serve\nthe scientist\u2019s end. So plausible, indeed, is this anthropomorphism\nas to disarm even the scepticism of the trained sceptic. It will also\nappear in the later course of this inquiry that anthropomorphism, and\nespecially the imputation of workmanship, has borne a much greater part\nin the work of the scientists than the members of that craft would like\nto avow; so that the scientific use of the anthropomorphic fancy is by\nno means a unique distinction of Romanes and the large group or school\nof biologists of which his work is typical; nor does the presence of\nthis bias in their work by any means strip it of scientific value.\nIn point of fact, it seems to touch the substance of their objective\nresults much less seriously than might be apprehended.\n\nThe modern scientist\u2019s watchward is scepticism and caution; and what\nhe may be led to do concessively, in spite of himself, by too broad a\nconsciousness of kind, the savage does joyously and with conviction.\nHis measure of what he sees about him is himself, and his apprehension\nof what takes place is a comprehension of how such things would be\ndone in the course of human conduct if they were physically possible\nto man. The man (more often perhaps the woman) who busies himself with\nthe beginnings of plant and animal-breeding will sympathetically put\nhimself in touch with their inclinations and aptitudes with a degree of\nintimacy and assurance never approached by the followers of Romanes.\nIt is for him to use common sense and fall in with the drift and\nidiosyncracies of these others who are, mysteriously, denied the gift\nof speech. By the unambiguous leading of the anthropomorphic fancy he\nputs himself in the place of his ward, his animal or vegetable friend\nand cousin, and can so learn something of what is going on in the\nputative vegetable or animal mind, through patient observation of what\ncomes to light in response to his attentions in the course of his joint\nlife with them. The plant or animal manifestly does things, and the\nquestion follows, Why do these speechless others do those things which\nthey are seen to do?--things which often do not lie within the range\nof things desirable to be accomplished, humanly speaking. Manifestly\nthese non-human others seek other ends and seek them in other ways than\nman. Some of the objective results which it lies in their nature to\naccomplish in so working out their scheme of life are useful to their\nhuman cousins; and it stands to reason that when they are dealt kindly\nwith, when man takes pains to further their ends in life, they will\ntake thought and respond somewhat in kind. To turn the proposition\nabout, those things which men find, by trial and error, to bring a\ngood and kindly return from the speechless others are manifestly\nwell received by them and must obviously be of a kind to fall in\nwith their bent and minister to their inclinations; and prudence and\nfellow-feeling combine to lead men farther along the way so indicated\nat each move in the propitious direction.\n\nTo the unsophisticated--and even to the sophisticated sceptic--it\nis manifest that animate objects do things. What they aim to do, as\nwell as the logic of their conduct in carrying out their designs,\nare not precisely the same as in the case of man. But by staying by\nand learning what they are bent on doing, and observing how they go\nabout it, any peculiarity in the nature of their needs, spiritual\nand physical, and in their manner of approaching their ends, may be\nlearned and assimilated; and their life-work can be furthered and\namplified by judiciously ministering to their ascertained needs and\nmaking the way smooth for them in what they undertake, so long as their\nundertakings are such as man is interested in bringing to a successful\nissue. Of course they work toward ends that are good in their sight,\nthough not always such as men would seek; but that is their affair\nand is not to be pried into beyond the bounds of a decent neighbourly\ninterest. And they work by methods in some degree other, often wiser,\nthan those of men, and these it is man\u2019s place to learn if he would\nprofit by their companionship.\n\nMuch of the scheme of life of these speechless others is a scheme\nof fecundity, growth and nurture, and all these matters are natural\nto women rather than to men; and so in the early stages of culture\nthe consciousness of kind and congruity has made it plain to all the\nparties in interest that the care of crops and animals belongs in the\nfitness of things to women. Indeed there is such a spiritual (magical)\ncommunity between women and the fecundity of animate things that any\nintrusion of the men in the affairs of growth and fertility may by\nforce of contrast come to be viewed with the liveliest apprehension.\nSince the life of plants and animals is primarily of a spiritual\nnature, since the initiative and trend of vegetable and animal life is\nof this character, it follows that some sort of propitious spiritual\ncontact and communion should be maintained between mankind and that\nworld of fertility and growth in which these animate things live and\nmove. So a line of communication, of a spiritual kind, is kept open\nwith the realm of the speechless ones by means of a sign-language\nsystematised into ritual, and by a symbolism of amity re\u00ebnforced with\ngifts and professions of good-will. Hence a growth of occult meanings\nand ceremonial procedure, to which the argument will have to return\npresently.[46]\n\nBy this indirect, animistic and magical, line of approach the\nmatter-of-fact requirements of tillage and cattle-breeding can be\ndetermined and fulfilled in a very passable fashion, given only the\nnecessary time and tranquillity. Time is by common consent allowed the\nstone-age culture in abundant measure; and common consent is coming,\nthrough one consideration and another, to admit that the requisite\nconditions of peace and quiet industry are also a characteristic\nfeature of that early time. The fact, broad and profound, that the\nknown crop plants and animals were for the most part domesticated in\nthat time is perhaps in itself the most persuasive argument for the\nprevalence of peaceful conditions among those peoples, whoever they\nmay have been, to whose efforts, or rather to whose routine of genial\nsuperstition, this domestication is to be credited. This domestication\nand use of plants and animals was of course not a mere blindfold\ndiversion. Here as ever the instinct of workmanship was present\nwith its prompting to make the most of what comes to hand; and the\ntechnology of husbandry, like the technology of any other industrial\nenterprise, has been the outcome of men\u2019s abiding penchant for making\nthings useful.\n\nThe peculiar advantage of tillage and cattle-breeding over the primary\nmechanic arts, that by which the former arts gained and kept their\nlead, seems to have been the simple circumstance that the propensity\nof workmanlike men to impute a workmanlike (teleological) nature to\nphenomena does not leave the resulting knowledge of these phenomena\nso wide of the mark in the case of animate nature as in that of brute\nmatter. It will probably not do to say that the anthropomorphic\nimputation has been directly serviceable to the technological end\nin the case of tillage and cattle-breeding; it is rather that the\ndisadvantage or disserviceability of such an interpretation of facts\nhas been greater in the mechanic arts in early times. The instinct of\nworkmanship, through the sentimental propensity to impute workmanlike\nqualities and conduct to external facts, has defeated itself more\neffectually in the mechanic arts. And as in the course of time, under\nfavourable local conditions, the habitual imputation of teleological\ncapacities has in some measure fallen into disuse, the mechanic arts\nhave gained; and every such gain has in its turn, as conditions\npermitted, acted cumulatively toward the discredit and disuse of the\nteleological method of knowledge, and therefore toward an acceleration\nof technological gain in this field.\n\nThe inanimate factors which early man has to turn to account as a\ncondition precedent to any appreciable advance in the industrial arts,\noutside of husbandry and of the use of fruits and fibres associated\nwith it, do not lend themselves to an effectual approximation from the\nanthropomorphic side. Flint and similar minerals are refractory, they\nhave no spiritual nature and no scheme or cycle of life that can be\ninterpreted in some passable fashion as the outcome of instinctive\npropensities and workmanlike management. Anthropomorphic insight\ndoes not penetrate into the secret ways of brute matter, for all the\nreasonable concession to idiosyncracies, to recondite conceits, occult\nmeans and devious methods, with which unsophisticated man stands ready\nto meet them. He can see as far into a millstone as anyone along that\nline; but that is not far enough to be of any use, and he is debarred\nby his workmanlike common sense from systematically looking into the\nmatter along any other line. It is only the blindfold, unsystematic\naccretions of opaque fact coming in, disjointed and unsympathetic, from\nthe inhuman side of his technological experience that can help him out\nhere. And experience of that kind can come upon him only inadvertently,\nfor he has no basis on which to systematise these facts as they come,\nand so he has no means of intelligently seeking them. His intelligent\nendeavours to get at the nature of things will perforce go on the mass\nof knowledge which his intelligence has already comprehended, which\nis a knowledge of human conduct. Anthropomorphism is almost wholly\nobstructive in this field of brute matter, and in early times, before\nmuch in the way of accumulated matter-of-fact knowledge had forced\nitself upon men, the propensity to a teleological interpretation\nseems to have been nearly decisive against technological progress in\nthe primary and indispensable mechanic arts. And in later phases of\nculture, where anthropomorphic interpretations of workmanship have been\nworked out into a rounded system of magic and religion, they have at\ntimes brought the technological advance to a full stop, particularly on\nthe mechanical side, and have even led to the cancelment of gains that\nshould have seemed secure.\n\nIt is likewise a notable fact that, as already intimated above,\nmyth and legend have found this brute matter as refractory in their\nservice as the instinct of workmanship has found it in the genesis of\ntechnology; and for the good reason that the same human penchant for\nteleological insight and elaboration has ruled in the one as in the\nother. Inanimate matter and the phenomena in which inanimate matter\nmanifests its nature and force have, of course, taken a large place\nin folk-lore; but the folk-lore, whether myth, legend or magic, in\nwhich inanimate matter is conceived as speaking in its own right and\nworking out its own spiritual content is relatively very scant. In\nmagic it commonly plays a part as an instrumentality only, and indeed\nas an instrument which owes its magical efficacy to some efficacious\ncircumstance external to it. It has most frequently an induced rather\nthan intrinsic efficacy, being the vehicle whereby the worker of magic\nmaterialises and conveys his design to its execution. It is susceptible\nof magical use, rather than creative of magical effects.[47] No\ndoubt this characterisation of the magical offices of inert matter\napplies to early and primitive times and situations rather than to the\nhigh-wrought later systems of occult science and alchemical lore that\nare built on some appreciable knowledge of metallurgy and chemical\nreactions. So likewise early myth and legend have had to take recourse\nto the intervention of personal, or at least animate agents, to make\nheadway in the domain of brute matter, which figures commonly as\nmeans in the hands of manlike agents of some sort, rather than as a\nself-directing agent with initiative and a natural bent of its own. The\nphenomena of inanimate nature are likely to be thrown into the hands of\nsuch putative agents, who are then conceived to control them and turn\nthem to account for ulterior ends not given in the native character of\nthe inanimate objects themselves.[48] Even so exceptionally available\na range of phenomena as those of fire have not escaped this inglorious\neventuality. In the mythical legends of fire it will be found that\nthe fire and all its works come into the plot of the story only as\nsecondary elements, and the interest centres about the fortunes of some\nmanlike agency to whose initiative and exploits all the phenomena of\nfire are referred as their cause or occasion.[49] The legends of fire\nhave commonly become legends of a fire-bringer, etc.,[50] and have come\nto turn about the plots and counterplots of anthropomorphic beasts and\ndivinities who are conceived to have wrestled for, with and about the\nuse of fire.\n\nSo, on the other hand, as an illustration from the side of technology,\nto show how matters stood in this connection through the best days of\nanthropomorphism, fire had been in daily and indispensable use through\nan indefinite series of millennia before men, in the early modern\ntimes of Occidental civilisation, learned the use of a chimney. And\nall that hindered the discovery of this simple mechanical expedient\nseems to have been the fatal propensity of men to impute a teleological\nnature and workmanlike design to this phenomenon with which no truce or\nworking arrangement can be negotiated in spiritual terms.[51]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA doubt may plausibly suggest itself as to the competency of such\nan explanation of these phenomena. It would seem scarcely to lie\nin the nature of an instinct of workmanship to enlist the workman\nin the acquisition of knowledge which he cannot use, and guide him\nin elaborating it into a system which will defeat his own ends; to\nbuild up obstructions to its own working, and yet in the long run to\novercome them. In part this discrepancy in the outcome arises from the\nfact that the sense of workmanship affords a norm of systematisation\nfor the facts that come into knowledge. This leads to something like\na dramatisation of the facts, whereby they fall into some sort of\na sequence of conduct among themselves, become personalised, are\nconceived as gifted with discrimination, inclinations, preferences and\ninitiative; and in so far as the facts are conceived to be involved\nin immaterial or hyperphysical relations of this character they\ncannot effectually be made use of for the purposes of technology. All\nconceptions that exceed the scope of material fact are useless for\ntechnology, and in so far as such conceptions are intruded into the\nbody of information drawn on by the workman they become obstructive.\n\nBut in good part the discrepancies of the outcome are due to\ncomplications with an instinctive curiosity, the presence of which has\ntacitly been assumed throughout the argument,--an \u201cidle\u201d curiosity by\nforce of which men, more or less insistently, want to know things,\nwhen graver interests do not engross their attention. Comparatively\nlittle has been made of this instinctive propensity by the students of\nculture, though the fact of its presence in human nature is broadly\nrecognised by psychologists,[52] and the like penchant comes in\nevidence among the lower animals, as appears in many investigations\nof animal behaviour.[53] Indeed, it has been taken somewhat lightly,\nin a general way, as being a genial infirmity of human nature rather\nthan a creative factor in civilisation. And the reason of its being\ndealt with in so slight a manner is probably to be found in the nature\nof the instinct itself. With the instinct of workmanship it shares\nthat character of pliancy and tractability common in some degree to\nthe whole range of instincts, and especially characteristic of those\ninstinctive predispositions that distinguish human nature from the\nsimpler and more refractory spiritual endowment of the lower animals.\n\nLike the other instinctive propensities, it is to be presumed, the\nidle curiosity takes effect only within the bounds of that metabolic\nmargin of surplus energy that comes in evidence in all animal life,\nbut that appears in larger proportions in the \u201chigher\u201d animals and in\na peculiarly obtrusive manner in the life of man. It seems to be only\nafter the demands of the simpler, more immediately organic functions,\nsuch as nutrition, growth and reproduction, have been met in some\npassably sufficient measure that this vaguer range of instincts which\nconstitutes the spiritual predispositions of man can effectually draw\non the energies of the organism and so can go into effect in what\nis recognised as human conduct. The wider the margin of disposable\nenergy, therefore, the more freely should the characteristically\nhuman predispositions assert their sway, and the more nearly this\nmetabolic margin is drained by the elemental needs of the organism\nthe less chance should there be that conduct will be guided by what\nmay properly be called the spiritual needs of man. It is accordingly\ncharacteristic of this whole range of vaguer and less automatically\ndeterminate predispositions that they transiently yield somewhat\neasily to the pressure of circumstances. This is eminently true of the\nidle curiosity, as it is also true in a somewhat comparable degree\nof the sense of workmanship. But these instincts at the same time,\nand perhaps by the same fact, have also the other concomitant and\ncharacteristically human trait of a ubiquitous resiliency whenever and\nin so far as there is nothing to hinder. Their staying power is, in\na way, very great, though their driving force is neither massive nor\nintractable. So that even though the idle curiosity, like the sense of\nworkmanship, may be momentarily thrust aside by more urgent interests,\nyet its long-term effects in human culture are very considerable. Men\nwill commonly make easy terms with their curiosity when there is a\ncall to action under the spur of a more elemental need, and even when\ncircumstances appear to be favourable to its untroubled functioning a\nsustained and consistent response to its incitement is by no means an\nassured consequence. The common man does not eagerly pursue the quest\nof the idle curiosity, and neither its guidance nor its award of fact\nis mandatory on him.[54] Sporadic individuals who are endowed with\nthis supererogatory gift largely in excess of the common run, or who\nyield to its enticements with very exceptional abandon, are accounted\ndreamers, or in extreme cases their more sensible neighbours may even\nrate them as of unsound mind. But the long-term consequences of the\ncommon run of curiosity, helped out by such sporadic individuals in\nwhom the idle curiosity runs at a higher tension, counts up finally,\nbecause cumulatively, into the most substantial cultural achievement of\nthe race,--its systematised knowledge and quasi-knowledge of things.\n\nThis instinctive curiosity, then, comes in now and again serviceably to\naccelerate the gain in technological insight by bringing in material\ninformation that may be turned to account, as well as by persistently\ndisturbing the habitual body of knowledge on which workmanship draws.\nHuman curiosity is doubtless an \u201cidle\u201d propensity, in the sense that\nno utilitarian aim enters in its habitual exercise; but the material\ninformation which is by this means drawn into the agent\u2019s available\nknowledge may none the less come to serve the ends of workmanship.\nA good share of the facts taken cognisance of under the spur of\ncuriosity is of no effect for workmanship or for technological insight,\nand that any of it should be found serviceable is substantially a\nfortuitous circumstance. This character of \u201cidleness,\u201d the absence of a\nutilitarian aim or utilitarian sentiment in the impulse of curiosity,\nis doubtless a great part of the reason for its having received such\nscant and rather slighting treatment at the hands of the psychologists\nand of the students of civilisation alike.\n\nOf the material so offered as knowledge, or fact, workmanship makes use\nof whatever is available. In ways already indicated this utilisation\nof ascertained \u201cfacts\u201d is both furthered and hindered by the fact that\nthe information which comes to hand through the restless curiosity of\nman is reduced to systematic shape, for the most part or wholly, under\ncanons of workmanship. For the large generality of human knowledge this\nwill mean that the raw material of observed fact is selectively worked\nover, connected up and accumulated on lines of a putative teleological\norder of things, cast in something like a dramatic form. From which\nit follows that the knowledge so gained is held and carried over from\ngeneration to generation in a form which lends itself with facility to\na workmanlike manipulation; it is already digested for assimilation\nin a scheme of teleology that instinctively commends itself to the\nworkmanlike sense of fitness. But it also follows that in so far as\nthe personalised, teleological, or dramatic order so imputed to the\nfacts does not, by chance, faithfully reflect the causal relations\nsubsisting among these facts, the utilisation of them as technological\nelements will amount to a borrowing of trouble. So that the concurrence\nof curiosity and workmanship in the assimilation of facts in this\nway may, and in early culture must, result in a retardation of the\ntechnological advance, as contrasted with what might conceivably\nhave been the outcome of this work of the idle curiosity if it had\nnot been congenitally contaminated with the sense of workmanship and\nthereby lent itself to conceptions of magical efficacy rather than to\nmechanical efficiency.[55]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe further bearing of the parental bent on the early growth of\ntechnology also merits attention in this connection. This instinct\nand the sentiments that arise out of its promptings will have had\nwide and free play in early times, when the common good of the group\nwas still perforce the chief economic interest in the habitual view\nof all its members. It will have had an immediate effect on the\nroutine of life and work, presumably far beyond what is to be looked\nfor at any later stage. In the time when pecuniary competition had\nnot yet become an institution, grounded in the ownership of goods in\nseveralty and on their competitive consumption, the promptings of this\ninstinct will have been more insistent and will have met with a more\nunguarded response than later on, after these institutional changes\nhave taken effect. A manifest and inveterate distaste of waste, in\ngreat part traceable on analysis to this instinct, still persistently\ncomes in evidence in all communities, although it is greatly disguised\nand distorted by the principles of conspicuous waste[56] among all\nthose peoples that have adopted private ownership of goods; and\nserviceability to the common good likewise never ceases to command\nat least a genial, speculative approval from the common run of men,\nthough this, too, may often take some grotesque or nugatory form due to\npreconceptions of a pecuniary kind. This bias for serviceability and\nagainst waste falls in directly with the promptings of the instinct\nof workmanship, so that these two instinctive predispositions will\nre\u00ebnforce one another in conducing to an impersonally economical use\nof materials and resources as well as to the full use of workmanlike\ncapacities, and to an endless taking of pains.\n\nSome reference has also been made already to the technological value of\nthose kindly, \u201chumane\u201d sentiments that are bound up with the parental\nbent,--if they may not rather be said substantially to constitute the\nparental bent. It is of course in the non-mechanical arts of plant and\nanimal breeding that these humane extensions of the parental instinct\nhave their chief if not their only industrial value, both in furthering\nthe day\u2019s work and in contributing to the advance of technology. In the\nprimary mechanic arts, _e.\u00a0g._, an affectionate disposition of this\nkind toward the inanimate appliances with which their work is occupied\ndoes no doubt still, as ever, to some extent animate the workmen as\nwell as those who may have the remoter oversight of the work. But the\npart played by such humane sentiments is after all relatively slight\nin men\u2019s dealings with brute matter, nor do they invariably conduce\nto expeditious work or to a hard-headed insight into the mechanics\nof those things with which this work has to do. In fact such tender\nemotions so placed may somewhat easily become a source of mischief,\nin a manner similar to the mischievous technological consequences of\nanthropomorphism already spoken of.\n\nIt is otherwise with the bearing of the parental bent on the arts of\ntillage and cattle-breeding. Here its promptings are almost wholly\nserviceable to technological gain as well as to assiduous workmanship.\nThe kindly sentiments intrinsic to the parental bent are admirably in\nplace in the care of plants and animals, and their good effects in\nso giving a propitious turn to the technology of early tillage and\ncattle-breeding are only re-enforced by the parental and workmanlike\ninclination to husband resources and make the most of what comes to\nhand. The particular turn given to the anthropomorphic bias by this\nline of preconceptions also is rather favourable than otherwise to\na working insight into the requirements of the art. And it has had\ncertain specific consequences for the early technology of husbandry, as\nwell as for the early culture in which husbandry was the chief material\nfactor, such as to call for a more circumstantial account.\n\nUnder the canons of workmanship a teleological animus--an instinctive\nor \u201cspiritual\u201d nature--is imputed to the plants and animals brought\ninto domestication. The art of husbandry proceeds on the apprehended\nneeds and proclivities so imputed, and the technology of the craft\ntherefore takes the form of a \u201ctendance\u201d designed to further these\nquasi-animistically conceived beings in whatever ends they have at\nheart by virtue of their natural bent, and to so direct this tendance\nupon them as will conduce to shaping their scheme of life in ways\nadvantageous to man. Like other sentient beings, as is known to\nshrewd and unsophisticated man, they have spiritual needs as well\nas material needs, and they are putatively to be influenced by the\nattitude of their human cousins towards them and their conduct,\ninterests, and adventures. Further, their life and comfort are\nmanifestly conditioned by the run of the seasons and of the weather;\nvarious inclemencies are discouraging and discomforting to them, as to\nmankind, and other vicissitudes of rain and shine and tempest are of\nthe gravest consequence to them for good or ill. Under these delicate\ncircumstances it is incumbent on the keepers of crops and flocks to\nwalk circumspectly and cultivate the good-will not only of their crops\nand flocks but also of the natural phenomena that count for so much in\nthe life of the crops and flocks. These natural phenomena are of course\nalso conceived anthropomorphically, in the sense that they too are seen\nto follow their natural bent and do what they will,--or perhaps more\ncommonly what the personal agents will, in whose keeping these natural\nphenomena are conceived to lie; for unsophisticated man has no other\navailable terms in which to conceive them and their behaviour than the\nterms of initiative, design and endeavour immediately given in his own\nconscious action.\n\nNow, as has already been said, the scheme of life of the crops and\nflocks is, at least in the main, and particularly in so far as it\nvitally and always interests their keepers, a scheme of fecundity,\nfertility and growth. But these matters, visibly and by conscious\nsentiment, pertain in a peculiarly intimate sense to the women. They\nare matters in which the sympathetic insight and fellow-feeling of\nwomankind should in the nature of things come very felicitously to\nfurther the propitious course of things. Besides which the life of the\nwomen falls in these same lines of fecundity, nurture and growth, so\nthat their association and attendance on the flocks and crops should\nfurther the propitious course of things also by the subtler means of\nsympathetic suggestion. There is a magical congruity of great force\nas between womankind and the propagation of growing things. And these\nsubtler ways of influencing events are especially to the point in all\ncontact with these non-human sentient beings, since they are speechless\nand must therefore in the main be led by living example rather than by\nprecept and expostulation. And, again, being sentient, somewhat after\nthe fashion of mankind, it is not to be believed that they have not the\ngift visibly common to mankind and many animals, of following their\nleader by force of sympathetic imitation. It may not be easy to say\nhow far this instinctive impulse of imitation, necessarily credited to\nall phenomena to which anthropomorphic traits are imputed, is to be\naccounted the ground of all sympathetic magic; but it is at least to be\naccepted as sufficient to account for much of what is done to induce\nfertility in flocks and crops.\n\nSo that on many accounts it is evident that in the nature of things,\nthe care of flocks and crops is the women\u2019s affair, and it follows\nthat all intercourse with the flocks and crops in the early days had\nbest be conducted by the women, who alone may be presumed intuitively\nto apprehend what is timely, due and permissible in these premises.\nIt is all the more evident that communion with these wordless others\nshould fall to the women, since the like wordless communion with their\nown young is perhaps the most notable and engaging trait of their\nown motherhood. The parental bent also throws a stress of sentiment\non this simple and obvious phase of motherhood, such as has made\nit in all men\u2019s apprehension the type of all kindly and unselfish\ntendance; at the same time this ubiquitous parental instinct tends\nconstantly to place motherhood in the foreground in all that concerns\nthe common good, in as much as all that is worth while, humanly\nspeaking, has its beginning here. In that early phase of culture in\nwhich the beginnings of tillage and cattle-breeding were made and in\nwhich the common good of the group was still the chief daily interest\nabout which men\u2019s solicitude and forethought are habitually engaged,\nmotherhood will always have been the central fact in the scheme of\nhuman things. So that in this cultural phase the parental bent and\nthe sense of workmanship will have worked together to bring the women\ninto the chief place in the technological scheme; and the sense of\nimitative propriety, as well as the recognised constraining force\nexercised by example and mimetic representation through the impulse of\nimitation, will have guided workmanship shrewdly to play up womankind\nand motherhood in an ever-growing scheme of magical observances\ndesigned to further the natural increase of flocks and crops. Where\nanthropomorphic imputation runs free and with conviction, such\nobservances, designed to act sympathetically on the natural course of\nphenomena, unavoidably become an integral feature of the technological\nscheme, no less indispensable and putatively no less efficacious to\nthis end than the mechanical operations with which these observances\nare associated. There is no practicable line of division to be drawn\nbetween sympathetic magic and anthropomorphic technology; and in\nthe known cultures of this early type it is for the most part an\nopen question whether the magical observances are to be accounted an\nadjunct to what we would recognise as the technological routine of the\nart, or conversely. The two are not commonly held apart as distinct\ncategories, and both are efficacious and indispensable; and in both the\nfelt efficacy runs on much the same grounds of imputed anthropomorphic\ntraits.[57]\n\nOn grounds of magical-technological expediency, then, as well as by\nforce of the sense of intrinsic propriety, women come to take the\nleading r\u00f4le in the industrial community of the early time, and the\ncommunity\u2019s material interests come to centre about them and their\nrelation to the natural products of the fields; and since this interest\nbears immediately on the fecundity of the flocks and crops, it is\nparticularly in their character of motherhood that the women come\nmost vitally into the case. The natural produce on which the life of\nthe group depends, therefore, will appertain to the women, in some\nintimate sense of congruity, so that in the fitness of things this\nproduce will properly come to the good of the community through their\nhands and will logically be dispensed somewhat at their discretion.\nSo great is the reach of this logic of congruity that in the known\ncultures which show much reminiscence of this early technological phase\nit is commonly possible to detect some remnant of such discretionary\ncontrol of the natural produce by the women. And modern students,\nimbued with modern preconceptions of ownership and predaceous mastery,\nhave even found themselves constrained by this evidence to discover\na system of matriarchy and maternal ownership in these usages that\nantedate the institution of ownership. Conceivably, the usages growing\nout of this preferential position of women in the technology and\nritual of early husbandry will, now and again, by the uniform drift of\nhabituation have attained such a degree of consistency, been wrought\ninto so rigid a form of institutions, as to have been carried over\ninto a later phase of culture in which the ownership of goods is of\nthe essence of the scheme; and in such case these usages may then have\ncome to be reconstrued in terms of ownership, to the effect that the\nownership of agricultural products vests of right in the woman, the\nmother of the household.\n\nBut if the magical-technological fitness and efficacy of women has\nled to the growth of institutions vesting the disposal of the produce\nin the women, in a more or less discretionary way, the like effect\nhas been even more pronounced, comprehensive and lasting as regards\nthe immaterial developments of the case. With great uniformity the\nevidence from the earlier peaceable agricultural civilisations runs\nto the effect that the primitive ritual of husbandry, chiefly of a\nmagical character, is in the hands of the women and is made up of\nobservances presumed to be particularly consonant with the phenomena\nof motherhood.[58] And presently, when the more elaborate phases of\nthese magical rites of husbandry come, by further superinduction of\nanthropomorphism, to grow into religious observances and mythological\ntenets, the greater _daimones_ and divinities that emerge in the\nshuffle are women, and again it is the motherhood of women that is in\nevidence. The deities, great and small, are prevailingly females; and\nthe great ones among them seem invariably to have set out with being\nmothers.\n\nIn the creation of female and maternal divinities the parental\ninstinct has doubtless greatly re-enforced the drift of the instinct\nof workmanship in the same direction. The female deities have two main\nattributes or characteristics because of which they came to hold their\nhigh place; they are goddesses of fertility in one way or another,\nand they are mothers of the people. It is perhaps unnecessary to hold\nthese two concomitant attributions apart, as many if not most of the\ngreat deities claim precedence on both grounds. But the lower orders of\nfemale divinities in the matriarchal scheme of things divine will much\nmore commonly specialise in fertility of crops than in maternity of the\npeople. The number of divinities that have mainly or solely to do with\nfertility is greater than that of those which figure as mothers of the\npeople, either locally or generally. And perhaps in the majority of\ncases there is some suggestive evidence that the great female deities\nhave primarily been goddesses of fertility having to do with the growth\nof crops--and, usually in the second place, of animals--rather than\nprimarily mothers of the tribe;[59] which would suggest that their\ngenesis and character is due to the canons of the sense of workmanship\nmore than to the parental bent, although the latter seems to have had\nits part in shaping many of them if not all.\n\nThe female divinities belong characteristically to the early or\nsimpler agricultural civilisation, and what has been said goes to\nargue that they rest on technological grounds in the main; indeed, in\ntheir genesis and early growth, they are in good part of the nature of\ntechnological expedients. They are at home with the female technology\nof early tillage especially, and perhaps only in the second place do\nthey serve the magical and religious needs of peoples given mainly to\nbreeding flocks and herds; although it is to be noted that most of the\ngreater known goddesses of the ancient Western world, as well as many\nof the minor ones, are also found to be closely related to various\nof the domestic animals. In America and the Far East, of course, any\nconnection with the domestication of animals would appear improbable.\n\nWith a change of base, from this early husbandry to a civilisation\nin which the main habitual interest is of another kind, and in which\nthe habitual outlook of men is less closely limited by the same\nanthropomorphic conceptions of nurture and growth, the goddesses begin\nto lose their preferential claim on men\u2019s regard and fall into place\nas adjuncts or consorts of male divinities designed on other lines\nand built out of different materials and serving new ends.[60] But\nthe hegemony of the mother goddesses has unquestionably been very\nwide-reaching and very enduring, as it should be to answer to the\nextent in time and space of the civilisation of tillage as well as to\nits paramount importance in the life of mankind, and as it is shown to\nhave been by the arch\u00e6ological and ethnological evidence.\n\nA further concomitant variation in the cultural scheme, associated\nwith and presumably traceable to the same technological ground, is\nmaternal descent, the counting of relationship primarily or solely in\nthe female line. In the present state of the evidence on this head it\nwould probably be too broad a proposition to say that the counting\nof relationship by the mother\u2019s side is due wholly to preconceptions\narising out of the technology of fertility and growth and that it so is\nremotely a creature of the instinct of workmanship; but it is at least\nequally probable that that ancient conceit must be abandoned according\nto which the system of maternal descent arises out of an habitual doubt\nof paternity. The mere obvious congruity of the cognatic system as\ncontrasted with the agnatic, has presumably had as much to do with the\nmatter as anything, and under the rule of the primitive technology\nof tillage and cattle-breeding this obvious congruity of the cognate\nrelationship will have been very materially re-enforced by the current\npreconceptions regarding the preferential importance of the female\nline for the welfare of the household and the community. And so long\nas that technological era lasted, and until the more strenuous culture\nof predation and coercion came on and threw the male element in the\ncommunity into the place of first consequence, maternal descent as well\nas the mother goddess appear to have held their own.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt will have been noticed that through all this argument runs the\npresumption that the culture which included the beginnings and early\ngrowth of tillage and cattle-breeding was substantially a peaceable\nculture. This presumption is somewhat at variance with the traditional\nview, particularly with the position taken as a matter of course by\nearlier students of ethnology in the nineteenth century. Still it is\nprobably not subject to very serious question today. As the evidence\nhas accumulated it has grown increasingly manifest that the ancient\nassumption of a primitive state of nature after the school of Hobbes\ncannot be accepted. The evidence from contemporary sources, as to\nthe state of things in this respect among savages and many of the\nlower barbarians, points rather to peace than to war as the habitual\nsituation, although this evidence is by no means unequivocal; besides\nwhich, the evidence from these contemporary lower cultures bears\nonly equivocally on the point of first interest here,--viz., the\nantecedents of the Western civilisation. What is more to the point,\nthough harder to get at in any definitive way, is the prehistory of\nthis civilisation. Here the inquiry will perforce go on survivals and\nreminiscences and on the implications of known facts of antiquity as\nwell as of certain features still extant in the current cultural scheme.\n\nIt seems antecedently improbable that the domestication of the crop\nplants and animals could have been effected at all except among\npeoples leading a passably peaceable, and presently a sedentary life.\nAnd the length of time required for what was achieved in remote\nantiquity in this respect speaks for the prevalence of (passably)\npeaceable conditions over intervals of time and space that overpass all\nconvenient bounds of chronology and localisation. Evidence of maternal\ndescent, maternal religious practices and maternal discretion in the\ndisposal of goods meet the inquiry in ever increasing force as soon\nas it begins to penetrate back of the conventionally accepted dawn of\nhistory; and survivals and reminiscences of such institutions appear\nhere and there within the historical period with increasing frequency\nthe more painstaking the inquiry becomes. And that institutions of\nthis character require a peaceable situation for their genesis as well\nas for their survival is not only antecedently probable on grounds of\ncongruity, but it is evidenced by the way in which they incontinently\ndecay and presently disappear wherever the cultural situation takes\non a predatory character or develops a large-scale civilisation, with\na coercive government, differentiation of classes--especially in the\npecuniary respect--warlike ideals and ambitions, and a considerable\naccumulation of wealth.\n\nSome further discussion of this early peaceable situation will\nnecessarily come up in connection with the technological grounds of\nits disappearance at the transition to that predatory culture which\nhas displaced it in all cases where an appreciably advanced phase of\ncivilisation has been reached.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE SAVAGE STATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS\n\n\nTechnological knowledge is of the nature of a common stock, held\nand carried forward collectively by the community, which is in\nthis relation to be conceived as a going concern. The state of the\nindustrial arts is a fact of group life, not of individual or private\ninitiative or innovation. It is an affair of the collectivity, not\na creative achievement of individuals working self-sufficiently in\nseveralty or in isolation. In the main, the state of the industrial\narts is always a heritage out of the past; it is always in process\nof change, perhaps, but the substantial body of it is knowledge that\nhas come down from earlier generations. New elements of insight and\nproficiency are continually being added and worked into this common\nstock by the experience and initiative of the current generation,\nbut such novel elements are always and everywhere slight and\ninconsequential in comparison with the body of technology that has been\ncarried over from the past.\n\nEach successive move in advance, every new wrinkle of novelty,\nimprovement, invention, adaptation, every further detail of workmanlike\ninnovation, is of course made by individuals and comes out of\nindividual experience and initiative, since the generations of mankind\nlive only in individuals. But each move so made is necessarily made by\nindividuals immersed in the community and exposed to the discipline of\ngroup life as it runs in the community, since all life is necessarily\ngroup life. The phenomena of human life occur only in this form. It is\nonly as an outcome of this discipline that comes with the routine of\ngroup life, and by help of the commonplace knowledge diffused through\nthe community, that any of its members are enabled to make any new\nmove that may in this way be traceable to their individual initiative.\nAny new technological departure necessarily takes its rise in the\nworkmanlike endeavours of given individuals, but it can do so only by\nforce of their familiarity with the body of knowledge which the group\nalready has in hand. A new departure is always and necessarily an\nimprovement on or alteration in that state of the industrial arts that\nis already in the keeping of the group at large; and every expedient\nor innovation, great or small, that so is hit upon goes into effect\nby going into the common stock of technological resources carried by\nthe group. It can take effect only in this way. Such group solidarity\nis a necessity of the case, both for the acquirement and use of this\nimmaterial equipment that is spoken of as the state of the industrial\narts and for its custody and transmission from generation to generation.\n\nWithin this common stock of technology some special branch or line of\nproficiency, bearing on some special craft or trade, may be held in\na degree of isolation by some caste-like group within the community,\nlimited by consanguinity, initiation, and the like, and so it may be\nheld somewhat out of the common stock and transmitted in some degree\nof segregation. In the lower cultures the elements of technology that\nare so engrossed by a fraction of the community and held out of the\ncommon stock are most commonly of a magical or ceremonial nature,\nrather than effective elements of workmanship; since any such matters\nof ritual observance lend themselves with greater facility to exclusive\nuse and transmission within lines of class limitation than do the\nmatter-of-fact devices of actual workmanship. In the lower cultures\nthe exclusive training and information so held and transmitted in\nsegregation by various secret organisations appear in the main to be\nof this magical or ceremonial character;[61] although there is no\nreason to doubt that this technological make-believe is taken quite\nseriously and counts as a substantial asset in the apprehension of its\npossessors. In a more advanced state of the industrial arts, where\nownership and the specialisation of industry have had their effect,\ntrade secrets, patent and copyrights are often of substantial value,\nand these are held in segregation from the common stock of technology.\nBut it is evident without argument that facts of this class are after\nall of no grave or enduring consequence in comparison with the great\ncommonplace body of knowledge and skill current in the community. At\nthe same time, any such segregated line of technological gain and\ntransmission, if it has any appreciable significance for the state of\nthe industrial arts and is not wholly made up of ritual observances,\nleans so greatly on the technological equipment at large that its\nisolation is at the most partial and one-sided; it takes effect only\nby the free use of the general body of knowledge which is not so\nengrossed, and it has also in all cases been acquired and elaborated\nonly by the free use of that commonplace knowledge that is held in\nno man\u2019s exclusive possession. Such is more particularly the case in\nall but those latest phases of the industrial development in which\nthe volume of the technology and the consequent specialisation of\noccupations have been carried very far.\n\nIn the earlier, or rather in all but the late phases of culture and\ntechnology, this immaterial equipment at large is accessible to all\nmembers of the community as a matter of course through the unavoidable\ndiscipline that comes with the workday routine of getting along. Few,\nif any, can avoid acquiring the essential elements of the industrial\nscheme by use of which the community lives, although they need not\neach gain any degree of proficiency in all the manual operations or\nindustrial processes in which this technological scheme goes into\neffect, and few can avoid being so trained into the logic of the\ncurrent scheme that their habitual thinking will in all these bearings\nrun within the bounds of experience embodied in this general scheme.\n\nAll have free access to this common stock of immaterial equipment,\nbut in all known cultures there is also found some degree of special\ntraining and some appreciable specialisation of knowledge and\noccupations; which is carried forward by expert workmen whose peculiar\nand exceptional proficiency is confined to some one or a few distinct\nlines of craft. And in all, or at least in all but the lowest known\ncultures, the available evidence goes to say that this joint stock of\ntechnological mastery can be maintained and carried forward only by\nway of some such specialisation of training and differentiation of\nemployments. No one is competent to acquire such mastery of all the\nlines of industry included in the general scheme as would enable him\n(or her) to transmit the state of the industrial arts to succeeding\ngenerations unimpaired at all points.\n\nSome degree of specialisation there always is, even where there appears\nto be no urgent technological need of it. The circumstances of their\nlife differ sufficiently for different individuals, so that a certain\nindividuation in workmanship will result from commonplace experience,\neven apart from any deliberate specialisation of occupations. And with\nany considerable increase in the size of the group a more or less\ndeliberate specialisation of occupations will also set in. Individuals\nwho are in this way occupied wholly or mainly with some one particular\nline of work will carry proficiency in this line to a higher pitch than\nthe generality of workmen and will bring out details of technological\nprocedure that may never fully become the common possession of the\ngroup at large, that may not in all details become part of the\ncommonplace technological information current in the community. There\nseems, in fact, never to have been a time when the industrial scheme\nwas so slight and narrow that all members of the community could master\nit in the greatest feasible degree of proficiency at every point. But\nat the same time it holds true for all the more archaic phases of the\ndevelopment that all members of the community appear always to have had\na comprehensive and passably exhaustive acquaintance with the technique\nof all industries practised in their time.\n\nThis necessary specialisation and detail training has large\nconsequences for the growth of technology as well as for its custody\nand transmission. It follows that a large and widely diversified\nindustrial scheme is impossible except in a community of some\nsize,--large enough to support a number and variety of special\noccupations. In effect, substantial gains in industrial insight and\nproficiency can apparently be worked out only through such close\nand sustained attention to a given line of work as can be given\nonly within the lines of a specialised occupation. At the same time\nthe industrial community must comprise a full complement of such\nspecialised occupations, and must also be bound together in a system of\ncommunication sufficiently close and facile to allow the technological\ncontents of all these occupations to be readily assimilated into a\nsystematic whole. The industrial system so worked out need not be of\nthe same extent as any one local group of the people who get their\nliving by its use; but it seems to be required that if several local\ngroups are effectively to be comprised in a single industrial system\nconditions of peace must prevail among them. Community of language\nseems also to be nearly necessary to the maintenance of such a system.\nWhere the various local groups are on hostile terms, each will tend to\nhave an industrial system of its own, with a technological character\nsomewhat distinct from its neighbours.[62] If the degree of isolation\nis pronounced, so that traffic and communication do not run freely\nbetween groups, the size of the local group will limit the state of\nthe industrial arts somewhat rigidly; and on the other hand a marked\nadvance in the industrial arts, such as the domestication of crop\nplants or animals or the introduction of metals, is likely to bring\nabout such a redistribution of population and industry as to increase\nthe effective size of the community.[63]\n\nAmong the peoples on the lower levels of culture there prevails\ncommonly a considerable degree of isolation, or even of estrangement.\nIn a great degree each community is thrown on its own resources, and\nunder these circumstances the size of the community may become a matter\nof decisive importance for the industrial arts. Where a serious decline\nin the numbers of any of these savage or barbarous peoples is recorded\nit is also commonly noted that they have suffered a concomitant decay\nin their technological knowledge and workmanship.[64] In view of these\nconsiderations it is probably safe to say that under settled conditions\nany community is, commonly, no larger than is required to keep up and\ncarry forward the state of the industrial arts as it runs. The known\nevidence appears to warrant the generalisation that the state of the\nindustrial arts is limited by the size of the industrial community,\nand that whenever a given community is broken up or suffers a serious\ndiminution of numbers its technological heritage will deteriorate and\ndwindle even though it may apparently have been meagre enough before.\n\nThe considerations recited above are matters of commonplace observation\nand might fairly be taken for granted without argument. But so much\nof current and recent theoretical speculation proceeds on tacit\nassumptions at variance with these commonplaces that it seems pertinent\nto recall them, particularly since they will come in as premises in\nlater passages of the inquiry.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nGiven the material environment, the rate and character of the\ntechnological gains made in any community will depend on the initiative\nand application of its members, in so far as the growth of institutions\nhas not seriously diverted the genius of the race from its natural\nbent; it will depend immediately and obviously on individual talent for\nworkmanship--on the workmanlike bent and capacity of the individual\nmembers of the community. Therefore any difference of native endowment\nin this respect between the several races will show itself in the\ncharacter of their technological achievements as well as in the rate\nof gain. Races differ among themselves in this matter, both as to the\nkind and as to the degree of technological proficiency of which they\nare capable.[65] It is perhaps as needless to insist on this spiritual\ndifference between the various racial stocks as it would be difficult\nto determine the specific differences that are known to exist, or to\nexhibit them convincingly in detail. To some such ground much of the\ndistinctive character of different peoples is no doubt to be assigned,\nthough much also may as well be traceable to local peculiarities of\nenvironment and of institutional circumstances. Something of the kind,\na specific difference in the genius of the people, is by common consent\nassigned, for instance, in explanation of the pervasive difference in\ntechnology and workmanship between the Western culture and the Far\nEast. The like difference in \u201cgenius\u201d is still more convincingly shown\nwhere different races have long been living near one another under\nsettled cultural conditions.[66]\n\nIt should be noted in the same connection that hybrid peoples, such\nas those of Europe or of Japan, where somewhat widely distinct racial\nstocks are mingled, should afford a great variety and wide individual\nvariation of native gifts, in workmanship as in other respects.\nHybrid stocks, indeed, have a wider range of usual variability than\nthe combined extreme limits of the racial types that enter into the\ncomposition of the hybrid. So that a great variety, even aberration\nand eccentricity, of native gifts is to be looked for in such cases,\nand this wide range of variation in workmanlike initiative should\nshow itself in the technology of any such peoples. Yet there may\nstill prevail a strikingly determinate difference between any two\nsuch hybrid populations, both in the characteristic features of their\ntechnology and in their routine workmanship; as is illustrated in\nthe contrast between Japan and the Western nations. These racial\ndifferences in point of endowment may be slight in the first instance,\nbut as they work cumulatively their ulterior effect may still be\nvery marked; and they may result in marked differences not only in\nrespect of the character of the technological situation at a given\npoint of time but also in the rate of advance and the direction taken\nby the technological advance. So in the case of the Far East, as\ncontrasted with the Occidental peoples, the genius of the races engaged\nhas prevailingly taken the direction of proficiency in handicraft,\nrather than that somewhat crude but efficient recourse to mechanical\nexpedients which chiefly distinguishes the technology of the West.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe stability of racial types makes it possible to study the innate\ncharacters of the existing population under less complex and confusing\ncircumstances than those of the cultural situation in which this\npopulation is now found. By going back into the earlier phases of\nthe Western culture the scrutiny of the living population of Europe\nand its colonies can, in effect, be pushed back in a fragmentary way\nover an interval of some thousands of years. Such acquaintance as may\nin this way be gained with the spiritual make-up of the peoples of\nthe Western culture at any point in its past history and prehistory\nshould bear immediately and without serious abatement on the native\ncharacter of the generation in whose hands the fortunes of that culture\nnow rest; provided only that the inquiry assures itself of the racial\ncontinuity, racial identity, of these peoples through this period of\ntime. This question of race identity is no longer a matter of serious\ndebate so far as concerns the peoples of northern and western Europe,\nwithin the effective bounds of the Occidental civilisation and as far\nback as the beginning of the neolithic period. Assuredly there is\ndebate and uncertainty as to local details of racial mixture in nearly\nall parts of this cultural area at some point in past time, but these\nuncertainties of detail are not of such a nature or such magnitude as\nto vitiate the data for an inquiry into the general characteristics of\nthe races concerned. By and large, the mixture of races in north Europe\nhas apparently not varied greatly since early neolithic times, and the\nchanges that have taken place are known with some confidence, in the\nmain. Much the same holds true for the Mediterranean seaboard, although\nthe changes in that region appear to have been more considerable and\nare perhaps less readily traceable. For northern and western Europe\ntaken together, in spite of considerable local fluctuations, the\nvariations in the general racial composition of the peoples has, on\nthe whole, not been extensive or extremely serious since the latter\npart of the stone age. The three great racial stocks[67] of Western\ncivilisation have apparently shared their joint dominance in this\nculture among themselves since about the time when the use of bronze\nfirst came into Europe, which should be before the close of the stone\nage. And these three stocks are not greatly alien to one another; two\nof them, the Mediterranean and the blond, being apparently somewhat\nclosely related in point of descent and therefore presumably in point\nof spiritual make-up.\n\nIt is with less confidence that any student of these modern cultures\ncan test his case by evidence drawn from existing or historical\ncommunities living on the savage or lower barbarian plane and not\nclosely related, racially, to the peoples of Western Europe. The\ndiscrepancies in such a case are of two kinds: (_a_) The racial\ntype, and therefore the spiritual (instinctive) make-up of these\nalien savages or barbarians, is not the same as that of the modern\nEuropeans; hence the culture worked out under the control of their\nsomewhat different endowment of instincts should come to a different\nresult, particularly since any such racial discrepancy in the matter\nof instincts should be expected to work cumulatively to a different\ncultural outcome. These alien communities of the lower cultures can\ntherefore not be accepted off-hand as representing an earlier phase\nof Occidental civilisation. This infirmity attaches to any recourse\nto an existing savage or barbarian community for object-lessons to\nillustrate the working of European human nature in similarly primitive\ncircumstances, in the degree in which the community in question may be\nremote from the Europeans in point of racial type; which reduces itself\nto a difficult question as to the point in the family-tree of the races\nof man from which the two contrasted races have diverged, and of the\nnumber, character, and magnitude of the racial mutations that may have\nintervened between the presumed point of divergence and the existing\nracial types so contrasted. (_b_) It is commonly said, and it is\npresumably true enough, that all known communities on the lower levels\nof culture are far from a state of primitive savagery; that they are\nnot to be taken as genuinely archaic, but are the result either of a\ncomparatively late reversion, under special circumstances, from a past\nhigher stage, or they are peoples which have undergone so protracted\nan experience in savagery that their present state is one of extreme\nsophistification in all \u201cthe beastly devices of the heathen,\u201d rather\nthan substantially an early or archaic type of culture, such as would\nhave marked a transient stage in the development of those peoples that\nhave attained civilised life.\n\nNo doubt there is some substance to these objections, but they contain\nrather a modicum of truth than an inclusive presentation of the facts\nrelevant to the case. As to (_a_), the races of man are, after all,\nmore alike than unlike, and the evidence drawn from the experience of\nany one racial stock or mixture is not to be disregarded as having no\nsignificance for the probable course of things experienced by any other\nracial stock during a corresponding interval in its life-history. Yet\nthere is doubtless a wide and debatable margin of error to be allowed\nfor in the use of all evidence of this class. As to (_b_), by virtue of\nthe stability of racial types the populations of existing communities\nof the lower cultures should be today what they were at the outset,\nin respect of the most substantial factor in their present situation,\ntheir spiritual (instinctive) make-up; and this unaltered complement\nof instincts should, under similar circumstances and with a moderate\nallowance of time, work out substantially the same general run of\ncultural results whether the resulting phase of culture were reached\nby approach from a near and untroubled beginning or by regression from\na \u201chigher plane.\u201d So that the existing communities of savages or lower\nbarbarians should present a passably competent object lesson in archaic\nsavagery and barbarism whether their past has been higher, lower, or\nsimply more of the same.\n\nAll this, of course, assumes the stability of racial types. But since,\ntacitly, that assumption is habitually made by ethnologists, all that\ncalls for apology or explanation here is the avowal of it. The greater\nproportion of ethnological generalisations on this range of questions\nwould be quite impotent without that assumption as their major premise.\nWhat has not commonly been assumed or admitted, except by subconscious\nimplication, is the necessary corollary that these stable types with\nwhich ethnologists and anthropologists busy themselves must have\narisen by mutation from previously existing types, rather than by a\nlong continued and divergent accumulation of insensible variations. A\nresult of avowing such a view of the genesis of races will be that the\nvarious races cannot be regarded as being all of the same date and\nracial maturity, or of the same significance for any discussion bearing\non the higher cultures. The races engaged in the Western culture will\npresumably be found to be of relatively late date, as having arisen\nout of relatively late mutational departures, as rated in terms of the\naggregate life-history of mankind. Presumably also many of the other\nraces will be found to be somewhat widely out of touch with the members\nof this Occidental aggregation of racial stocks; some more, others less\nremotely related to them, according as their mutational pedigree may be\nfound to indicate.\n\nAn advantage derivable from such an avowal of the stability of types,\nas against its covert assumption and overt disavowal, is that it\nenables the student to look for the beginning, in time and space, of\nany given racial stock with which his inquiry is concerned, and to\nhandle it as a unit throughout its life-history.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn all probability each of the leading racial stocks of Europe began\nits life-history on what would currently be accounted a low level of\nsavagery. And yet this phase of savagery, whatever it may have been\nlike, will have been removed from the first beginnings of human culture\nby a long series of thousands of years. That such was the case, for\ninstance, with the European blond is scarcely to be questioned;[68] and\nit is at least highly probable that the other stocks now associated\nwith the blond, though probably older, must also have come into being\nrelatively late in the life-history of the species.\n\nVague as this dating may be, it signifies that the initial phase\nin the life-history of at least one, and presumably of all, of the\nleading races of Europe falls in a savage culture of a relatively\nadvanced kind as compared with the rudest human beginnings. Therefore\nwhen these stocks began life, and so were required to make good their\nsurvival, the selective conditions imposed on them, and to which they\nwere required to conform on pain of extinction, were the conditions of\na savage culture which had already made some appreciable advance in\nthe arts of life. They had not to meet brute nature in the helpless\nnakedness of those remote ancestors in whom humanity first began.\nMutationally speaking, the stock was born to the use of tools and to\nthe facile mastery of a relatively advanced technology. And conversely\nit is a fair inference that these stocks that have peopled Europe\nwould have been unfit to survive if they had come into the world\nbefore some appreciable advance in technology had been made. That is\nto say, these stocks could not by native gift have been fit for a wild\nlife, in the unqualified sense of the term; nor have they ever lived\na life of nature in any such sense. They came into the savage world\nafter the race had lived through many thousand years of technological\nexperience and (presumably) many successive mutational alterations of\nracial type, and they were fitted to the exigencies of the savage\nworld into which they came rather than those of any earlier phase of\nsavagery. The youngest of them, the latest mutant, emerged in early\nneolithic times, and since he eminently made good his fitness to\nsurvive under those conditions he presumably emerged with such an\nendowment of traits, physical and spiritual, as those conditions called\nfor; and also presumably with no appreciable burden of aptitudes,\npropensities, instincts, capacities that would be disserviceable, or\nperhaps even that would be wholly unserviceable, in the circumstances\nin which he was placed. And since the other racial elements of the\nEuropean population, at least the two main ones, do not differ at all\nradically from the blond in their native capacities, it is likewise to\nbe presumed that they also emerged from a mutation under circumstances\nof culture, and especially of technology, not radically different in\ndegree from those that first surrounded the blond.\n\nThe difference between these three racial stocks is much more evident\nin their physical traits than in their instinctive gifts or their\nintellectual capacity; and yet the similarity of the three is so great\nand distinctive even on the physical side that anthropologists are\ninclined to class the three together as all and several distinctively\ntypical of a \u201cwhite\u201d or \u201ccaucasic\u201d race, to which they are held\ncollectively to belong. Something to the like effect seems to hold\ntrue for the distinctive groups of racial stocks that have made the\ncharacteristic civilisations of the Far East on the one hand and of\nsouthern Asia on the other hand; and something similar might, again,\nbe said for the group of stocks that were concerned in the ancient\ncivilisations of America.\n\nIt may be pertinent to add that, except for a long antecedent growth\nof technology, that is to say a long continued cumulative experience\nin workmanship, with the resultant accumulated knowledge of the ways\nand means of life, none of the characteristic races of Europe could\nhave survived. In the absence of these antecedent technological gains,\ntogether with the associated growth of institutions, such mutants, with\ntheir characteristic gifts and limitations, must have perished.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOn that level of savagery on which these European stocks began, and to\nwhich the several European racial types with their typical endowment\nof instincts are presumably adapted, men appear to have lived a fairly\npeaceable, though by no means an indolent life; in relatively small\ngroups or communities; without any of the more useful domestic animals,\nthough probably with some domestic plants; and busied with getting\ntheir living by daily work. Since they survived under the conditions\noffered them it is to be presumed that these men and women, say of the\nearly neolithic time, took instinctively and kindly to those activities\nand mutual relations that would further the life of the group; and\nthat, on the whole, they took less kindly and instinctively to such\nactivities as would bring damage and discomfort on their neighbours and\nthemselves.[69] Any racial type of which this had not been true, under\nthe conditions known then to have prevailed in their habitat, must have\npresently disappeared from the face of the land, and the later advance\nof the Western culture would not have known their breed. Some other\nracial type, temperamentally so constituted as better to meet these\nrequirements of survival under neolithic conditions, would have taken\ntheir place and would have left their own offspring to populate the\nregion.[70]\n\nWhat is known of the conditions of life in early neolithic times[71]\nindicates that the first requisite of competitive survival was a\nmore or less close attention to the business in hand, the providing\nof subsistence for the group and the rearing of offspring--a closer\nattention, for instance, than was given to this business by those other\nrival stocks whom the successful ones displaced; all of which throws\ninto the foreground as indispensable native traits of the successful\nrace the parental bent and the sense of workmanship, rather than those\ninstinctive traits that make for disturbance of the peace.[72]\n\nBut through it all the suggestion insinuates itself that the latest, or\nyoungest, of the three main European stocks, the blond, has more rather\nthan less of the pugnacious and predatory temper than the other two,\nand that this stock made its way to the front in spite of, if not by\nforce of these traits. The advantage of the blond as a fighter seems to\nhave been due in part to an adventurous and pugnacious temper, but also\nin part to a superior physique,--superior for the purpose of fighting\nhand to hand or with the implements chiefly used in warfare and piracy\ndown to a date within the nineteenth century. The same physical traits\nof mass, stature and katabolism will likewise have been of great\nadvantage in the quest of a livelihood under the conditions that\nprevailed in the North-sea region, the habitat of the dolicho-blond, in\nthe stone age. Something to the same effect is true of the spiritual\ntraits which are said to characterise the blond,--a certain canny\ntemerity and unrest.[73] So that the point is left somewhat in doubt;\nthe traits which presently made the northern blond the most formidable\ndisturber of the peace of Europe and kept him so for many centuries\nmay at the outset have been chiefly conducive to the survival of the\ntype by their serviceability for industrial purposes under the peculiar\ncircumstances of climate and topography in which the race first came up\nand made good its survival.\n\nIn modern speculations on the origins of culture and the early\nhistory of mankind it has until recently been usual to assume,\nuncritically, that human communities have from the outset of the race\nbeen entangled in an inextricable web of mutual hostilities and beset\nwith an all-pervading sentiment of fear; that the \u201cstate of nature\u201d\nwas a state of blood and wounds, expressing itself in universal\nmalevolence and suspicion. Latterly, students of primitive culture,\nand more especially those engaged at first hand in field work, who\ncome in contact with peoples of the lower culture, have been coming\nto realise that the facts do not greatly support such a presumption,\nand that a community which has to make its own living by the help of\na rudimentary technological equipment can not afford to be habitually\noccupied with annoying its neighbours, particularly so long as its\nneighbours have not accumulated a store of portable wealth which\nwill make raiding worth while. No doubt, many savage and barbarian\npeoples live in a state of conventional feud or habitual, even if\nintermittent, war and predation, without substantial inducement in\nthe way of booty. But such communities commonly are either so placed\nthat an easy livelihood affords them a material basis for following\nafter these higher things out of mere fancy;[74] or they are peoples\nliving precariously hand-to-mouth and fighting for their lives, in\ngreat part from a fancied impossibility of coming to terms with their\nalien and unnaturally cruel neighbours.[75] Communities of the latter\nclass are often living in a state of squalor and discomfort, with a\npopulation far short of what their environment would best support even\nwith their inefficient industrial organisation and equipment, and their\ntechnology is usually ill-suited to a settled life and unpromising for\nany possible advance to a higher culture. There is no urgent reason\nfor assuming that the races which have made their way to a greater\ntechnological efficiency, with settled life and a large population,\nmust have come up from this particular phase of civilisation as their\nstarting point, or that such a culture should have been favourable to\nthe survival and increase of the leading racial stocks of Europe, since\nit does not appear to be especially favourable to the success of the\ncommunities known to be now living after that fashion.[76]\n\nThe preconception that early culture must have been warlike has not\nyet disappeared even among students of these phenomena, though it is\nlosing their respect; but a derivative of it still has much currency,\nto the effect that all savage peoples, as also the peoples of the\nlower barbarism, live in a state of universal and unremitting fear,\nparticularly fear of the unknown. This chronic fear is presumed to\nshow itself chiefly in religion and other superstitious practices,\nwhere it is held to explain many things that are otherwise obscure.\nThere is not a little evidence from extant savage communities looking\nin this direction, and more from the lower barbarian cultures\nthat are characteristically warlike.[77] Wherever this animus is\nfound its effect is to waste effort and divert it to religious and\nmagical practices and so to hinder the free unfolding of workmanship\nby enjoining a cumbersome routine of ritual and by warning the\ntechnologist off forbidden ground. But it is doubtless a hasty\ngeneralisation to carry all this over uncritically and make it apply\nto all peoples of the lower culture, past and present. It is known not\nto be true of many existing communities,[78] and the evidence of it in\nsome ancient cultures is very dubious. Such a characterisation of the\nneolithic culture of Europe, whether north-European or \u00c6gean, finds no\nappreciable support in the arch\u00e6ological evidence. These two regions\nare the most significant for the neolithic period in Europe, and the\nmaterial from both is relatively very poor in weapons, as contrasted\nwith tools, on the one hand, and there is at the same time little or\nnothing to indicate the prevalence of superstitious practices based\non fear. Indeed, the material is surprisingly poor in elements of any\nkind that can safely be set down to the account of religion or magic,\nwhether as inspired by fear or by more genial sentiments. It is one of\nthe puzzles that beset any student who insists on finding everywhere a\ncertain normal course of cultural sequence, which should in the early\ntimes include, among other things, a fearsome religion, a wide fabric\nof magical practices, and an irrepressible craving for manslaughter.\nAnd when, presently, something of a symbolism and apparatus of\nsuperstition comes into view, in the late neolithic and bronze ages,\nthe common run of it is by no means suggestive of superstitious fear\nand religious atrocities. The most common and characteristic objects\nof this class are certain figurines and certain symbolical elements\nsuggestive of fecundity, such as might be looked for in a peaceable,\nsedentary, agricultural culture on a small scale.[79] A culture\nvirtually without weapons, whose gods are mothers and whose religious\nobservances are a ritual of fecundity, can scarcely be a culture of\ndread and of derring-do. With the fighting barbarians, on the other\nhand, male deities commonly take the first rank, and their ritual\nsymbolises the mastery of the god and the servitude of the worshipper.\n\nIt is true, of course, that both of weapons and of cult objects far\nthe greater number that were once in use will have disappeared,\nsince most of the implements and utensils of stone-age cultures are,\nnotoriously, made of wood or similar perishable materials.[80] So that\nthe finds give no complete series of the appliances in use in their\ntime; whole series of objects that were of first-rate importance in\nthat culture having probably disappeared without leaving a trace. But\nwhat is true in this respect of weapons and cult objects should be\nequally true of tools, or nearly so. So that the inference to be drawn\nfrom the available material would be that the early neolithic culture\nof north Europe, the \u00c6gean, and other explored localities presumed\nto belong in the same racial and cultural complex, must have been of\na prevailingly peaceable complexion. With the advance in technology\nand in the elaboration and abundance of objects that comes into sight\nprogressively through the later neolithic period, down to its close,\nthis disproportion between tools and weapons (and cult objects) grows\nmore impressive and more surprising. Hitherto this disproportion has\nbeen more in evidence in the Scandinavian finds than in the other\nrelated fields of stone-age culture, unless an exception should be made\nin favour of the late neolithic sites explored at Anau.[81] But this\narch\u00e6ological outcome, setting off the Baltic stone age as peculiarly\nscant of weapons and peculiarly rich in tools, may be provisional only,\nand may be due to the more exhaustive exploration of the Scandinavian\ncountries and the uncommonly abundant material from that region. In\nthe later (mainly Scandinavian) neolithic material, where the weapons\nare to be counted by dozens the tools are to be counted by hundreds,\naccording to a scheme of classification in which everything that can be\nconstrued as a weapon is so classed, and there are many more hundreds\nof the one class than there are dozens of the other.[82] As near as\ncan be made out, cult objects are similarly infrequent among these\nmaterials even after some appreciable work in pottery comes in evidence.\n\nWhat has just been said is after all of a negative character. It says\nthat nothing like a warlike, predatory, or fearsome origin can be\nproven from the arch\u00e6ological material for the neolithic culture of\nthose racial stocks that have counted for most in the early periods of\nEurope. The presumption raised by this evidence, however, is fairly\nstrong. And considerations of the material circumstances in which\nthis early culture was placed, as well as of the spiritual traits\ncharacteristically required by these circumstances and shown by the\nraces in question, point to a similar conclusion. The proclivity to\nunreasoning fear that is visible in the superstitious practices of so\nmany savage communities and counts for so much in the routine of their\ndaily life,[83] is to all appearance not so considerable an element in\nthe make-up of the chief European stocks. Perhaps it enters in a less\ndegree in the spiritual nature of the European blond than in that of\nany other race; that race--or its hybrid offspring--has at any rate\nproved less amenable to religious control than any other, and has also\nshown less hesitation in the face of unknown contingencies. And the\ncircumstances of the presumed initial phase of the life-history of this\nrace would appear not to have favoured a spiritual (instinctive) type\nlargely biassed by an alert and powerful sentiment of unreasoning fear.\nSo also an aggressive humanitarian sentiment is as well at home in the\nhabits of thought of the north-European peoples as in any other, such\nas sorts ill with a native predatory animus. If it be assumed, as seems\nprobable, that the situation which selectively tested the fitness of\nthis stock to survive was that of the early post-glacial time, when\nits habitat in Europe was slowly being cleared of the ice-sheet, it\nwould appear antecedently probable that the new (mutant) type, which\nmade good its survival in following up the retreating fringe of the\nice-sheet and populating the land so made available, will not have been\na people peculiarly given to fear or to predation. A great facility of\nthis kind, with its concomitants of caution, conservatism, suspicion\nand cruelty, would not be serviceable for a race so placed.[84]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEven if it were a possible undertaking it would not be much to the\npresent purpose to trace out in detail the many slow and fumbling\nmoves by which any given race or people, in Europe or elsewhere,\nhave worked out the technological particulars that have led from the\nbeginnings down through the primitive and later growth of culture.\nSuch a work belongs to the ethnologists and arch\u00e6ologists; and it is\nsummed up in the proposition that men have applied common sense, more\nor less hesitatingly and with more or less refractory limitations, to\nthe facts with which they have had to deal; that they have accumulated\na knowledge of technological expedients and processes from generation\nto generation, always going on what had already been achieved in ways\nand means, and gradually discarding or losing such elements of the\ngrowing technological scheme as seemed no longer to be worth while,[85]\nand carrying along a good many elements that were of no material\neffect but were imposed by the logic of the scheme or of its underlying\nprinciples (habits of thought).\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOf the early technological development in Europe, so far as it is\ngenetically connected with the later Western civilisation, the culture\nof the Baltic region affords as good and illustrative an object\nlesson as may be had; its course is relatively well known, simple and\nunbroken. Pal\u00e6olithic times do not count in this development, as the\nneolithic culture begins with a new break in Europe.\n\nIt is known, then, that by early neolithic times on the narrow\nScandinavian waters men had learned to make and use certain rude\nstone and bone implements found in the kitchen-middens (refuse heaps,\nshell-mounds of Denmark), that they had ways and appliances (the\nnature of which is not known) for collecting certain shellfish and for\ncatching such game and fish as their habitat afforded, and that they\npresently, if not from the outset, had acquired the use of certain\ncrop plants and had learned to make pottery of a crude kind. From\nthis as a point of departure in the period of the kitchen-middens the\nstone implements were presently improved and multiplied, the methods\nof working the material (flint) and of using the products of the flint\nindustry were gradually improved and extended, until in the long\ncourse of time the utmost that has anywhere been achieved in that\nclass of industry was reached. Domestic animals began to be added to\nthe equipment relatively early,[86] though at a long interval from\nthe neolithic beginnings as counted in absolute time. Improvement and\nextension in all lines of stone-working and wood-working industry\nwent forward: except that stone-dressing and masonry are typically\nabsent, owing, no doubt, to the extensive use of woodwork instead.[87]\nAlong with this advance in the mechanic arts goes a growing density\nof population and a wide extension of tillage; until, at the coming\nof bronze, the evidence shows that these communities were populous,\nprosperous, and highly skilled in those industrial arts that lay within\ntheir technological range.\n\nApart from the pottery, which may have some merit as an art product,\nthere is very little left to show what may have been their proficiency\nin the decorative arts, or what was their social organisation or their\nreligious life. The evidences of warlike enterprise and religious\npractices are surprisingly scanty, being chiefly the doubtful evidence\nof many and somewhat elaborate tombs. From the tombs (mounds and\nbarrows) and their distribution something may be inferred as to the\nsocial organisation; and the evidence on this head seems to indicate\na widespread agricultural population, living (probably) in small\ncommunities, without much centralised or authoritative control, but\nwith some appreciable class differences in the distribution of wealth\nin the later phases of the period.\n\nWith interruptions, more or less serious, from time to time, and with\nincreasing evidence of a penchant for warlike or predatory enterprise\non the one hand and of class distinctions on the other hand, much the\nsame story runs on through the ages of bronze and early iron. Evidences\nof borrowing from outside, mainly the borrowing of decorative technique\nand technological elements, are scattered through the course of this\ndevelopment from very early times, showing that there was always some\nintercourse, perhaps constant intercourse, with other peoples more or\nless distant. So that in time, by the beginning of the bronze age,\nthere is evidence of settled trade relations with peoples as remote as\nthe Mediterranean seaboard.\n\nIn many of its details this prehistoric culture shows something of\nthe same facility in the use of mechanical expedients as has come so\nnotably forward again in the late development of the industrial arts of\nwestern Europe. It is in its mechanical efficiency that the technology\nof the latterday Western culture stands out pre\u00ebminent, and it is\nsimilarly its easy command of the mechanical factors with which it\ndeals that chiefly distinguishes the prehistoric technology of North\nEurope. In other respects the prehistoric material from this region\ndoes not argue a high level of civilisation. There are no ornate or\nstupendous structures; what there is of the kind is mounds and barrows\nof moderately great size and using only undressed stone where any\nis used, but making a mechanically effective use of this. There is,\nindeed, nothing from the stone age in the way of edifices, fabrics or\ndecorative work that is to be classed, in point of excellence in design\nor execution, with the polished-flint woodworking axe or chisel of that\ntime. From the bronze age at its best there is much excellent bronze\nwork of great merit both in workmanship and in decorative effect; but\nthe artistic merit of this work (from the middle and early half of the\nbronze age) lies almost wholly in its workmanlike execution and in\nthe freedom and adequacy with which very simple mechanical elements\nof decoration are employed. It is an art which appeals to the sense\nof beauty chiefly through the sense of workmanship, shown both in the\nchoice of materials and decorative elements and in the use made of\nthem. When this art aspires to more ambitious decorative effects or to\nrepresentation of life forms, or indeed to any representation that has\nnot been conventionalised almost past recognition, as it does in the\nlater periods of the bronze age, the result is that it can be commended\nfor its workmanship alone, and so far as regards artistic effect it is\nmainly misspent workmanship.[88]\n\nThe same workmanlike insight and facility comes in evidence in the\nmatter of borrowing, already spoken of. Borrowing goes on throughout\nthis prehistoric culture, and the borrowed elements are assimilated\nwith such despatch and effect as to make them seem home-bred almost\nfrom the start. It is a borrowing of technological elements, which are\nrarely employed except in full and competent adaptation to the uses\nto which they are turned; so much so that the arch\u00e6ologists find it\nexceptionally difficult to trace the borrowed elements to specific\nsources, in spite of the great volume and frequency of this borrowing.\n\nThere is a further and obscurer aspect to this facile borrowing. In\nthe cultures where the technological and decorative elements are\nfirst invented, or acquired at first-hand by slow habituation, there\nwill in the nature of the case come in with them into the scheme of\ntechnology or of art more or less, but presumably a good deal, of\nextraneous or extrinsic by-products of their acquirement, in the way\nof magical or symbolic efficacy imputed and adhering to them in the\nhabits of thought of their makers and users. Something of this kind has\nalready been set out in some detail as regards the domestication and\nearly use of the crop plants and animals; and the like is currently\nheld to be true, perhaps in a higher degree, for the beginnings of\nart, both representative and decorative, by the latterday students of\nthat subject; the beginnings of art being held to have been magical\nand symbolic in the main, so far as regards the prime motives to its\ninception and its initial principles.[89]\n\nIn the origination and indigenous working-out of any given\ntechnological factor, e.\u00a0g., such as the use of the crop plants or the\ndomestic animals, elements of imputed anthropomorphism are likely to be\ncomprised in the habitual apprehension of the nature of these factors,\nand so find lodgment in the technological routine that has to do with\nthem; the result being, chiefly, a limitation on their uses and on the\nways and means by which they are utilised, together with a margin of\nlost motion in the way of magical and religious observances presumed\nto be intrinsic to the due working of such factors. The ritual\nconnected with tillage and cattle-breeding shows this magical side of a\nhome-bred technology perhaps as felicitously as anything; but similar\nphenomena are by no means infrequent in the mechanic arts, and in the\nfine arts these principles of symbolism and the like are commonly\npresent in such force as to afford ground for distinguishing one school\nor epoch of art from another.\n\nNow, when any given technological or decorative element crosses the\nfrontier between one culture and another, in the course of borrowing,\nit is likely to happen that it will come into the new culture stripped\nof most or all of its anthropomorphic or spiritual virtues and\nlimitations, more particularly, of course, if the cultural frontier in\nquestion is at the same time a linguistic frontier; since the borrowing\nis likely to be made from motives of workmanlike expediency, and the\nputative spiritual attributes of the facts involved are not obvious\nto men who have not been trained to impute them. The chief exception\nto such a rule would be any borrowing that takes effect on religious\ngrounds, in which case, of course, the magical or symbolic efficacy\nof the borrowed elements are the substance that is sought in the\nborrowing. Herein, presumably, lies much of the distinctive character\nof the north-European prehistoric culture, which was in an eminent\ndegree built up out of borrowed elements, so far as concerns both its\ntechnology and its art. And to this free and voluminous borrowing may\nlikewise be due the apparent poverty of this early culture in religious\nor magical elements.\n\nA further effect follows. The borrowing being (relatively) unencumbered\nwith ritual restrictions and magical exactions attached to their\nemployment, they would fall into the scheme of things as mere\nmatter-of-fact, to be handled with the same freedom and unhindered\nsagacity with which a workman makes use of his own hands, and could,\nwithout reservation, be turned to any use for which they were\nmechanically suited. Something of symbolism and superstition might,\nof course, be carried over in the borrowing, and something more would\nunavoidably be bred into the borrowed elements in the course of their\nuse; but the free start would always count for something in the\noutcome, both as regards the rate of progress made in the exploitation\nof the expedients acquired by borrowing and in the character of the\ntechnological system at large into which they had been introduced.\nBoth the relative freedom from magical restraint and the growth of\nhome-made anthropomorphic imputations may easily be detected in the\ncourse of this northern culture and in its outcome in modern times.\nCattle, for instance, are a borrowed technological fact in the Baltic\nand North-Sea region, but superstitious practices seem never to have\nattached to cattle-breeding in that region in such volume and rigorous\nexaction as may be found nearer the original home of the domesticated\nspecies; and yet the volume of folk-lore, mostly of a genial and\nrelatively unobstructive character, that has in later times grown up\nabout the care of cattle in the Scandinavian countries is by no means\ninconsiderable.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE TECHNOLOGY OF THE PREDATORY CULTURE\n\n\nThe scheme of technological insight and proficiency current in any\ngiven culture is manifestly a product of group life and is held as a\ncommon stock, and as manifestly the individual workman is helpless\nwithout access to it. It is none too broad to say that he is a workman\nonly because and so far as he effectually shares in this common stock\nof technological equipment. He may be gifted in a special degree\nwith workmanlike aptitudes, may by nature be stout or dextrous or\nkeen-sighted or quick-witted or sagacious or industrious beyond his\nfellows; but with all these gifts, so long as he has assimilated\nnone of this common stock of workmanlike knowledge he remains simply\nan admirable parcel of human raw material; he is of no effect in\nindustry. With such special gifts or with special training based on\nthis common stock an individual may stand out among his fellows as a\nworkman of exceptional merit and value, and without the common run of\nworkmanlike aptitudes he may come to nothing worth while as a workman\neven with the largest opportunities and most sedulous training. It is\nthe two together that make the working force of the community; and in\nboth respects, both in his inherited and in his acquired traits, the\nindividual is a product of group life.\n\nUsing the term in a sufficiently free sense, pedigree is no less and\nno more requisite to the workman\u2019s effectual equipment than the common\nstock of technological mastery which the community offers him. But\nhis pedigree is a group pedigree, just as his technology is a group\ntechnology. As is sometimes said to the same effect, the individual is\na creature of heredity and circumstances. And heredity is always group\nheredity,[90] perhaps peculiarly so in the human species.\n\nThe promptings of invidious self-respect commonly lead men to evade\nor deny something of the breadth of their inheritance in respect of\nhuman nature. \u201cI am not as the publican yonder,\u201d whether I have the\ngrace to thank God for this invidious distinction or more simply charge\nit to the account of my reputable ancestors in the male line. With a\nchange of venue by which the cause is taken out of the jurisdiction of\ninterested parties, its complexion changes. So evident is the fact of\ngroup heredity in the lower animals, for instance, that biologists have\nno inclination to deny its pervading force, apart from any conceivably\nparthenogenetic lines of descent,--and, to the inconvenience of the\neugenic pharisee, parthenogenetic descent never runs in the male line,\nbesides being of extremely rare occurrence in the human species. As a\nmatter of course the Darwinian biologists have the habit of appealing\nto group heredity as the main factor in the stability of species, and\nthey are very curious about the special circumstances of any given\ncase in which it may appear not to be fully operative: and they have,\non the other hand, even looked hopefully to fortuitous isolation of\nparticular lines of descent as a possible factor in the differentiation\nand fixation of specific types, being at a loss to account for such\ndifferentiation or fixation so long as no insuperable mechanical\nobstacle stands in the way of persistent crossing. The like force of\ngroup heredity is visible in the characteristic differences of race.\nThe heredity of any given race of mankind is always sufficiently\nhomogeneous to allow all its individuals to be classed under the race.\nAnd when an individual comes to light in a fairly pure-bred community\nwho shows physical traits that vary obviously from the common racial\ntype of the community, the question which suggests itself to the\nanthropologists is not, How does this individual differ from others of\nthe same breed? but, What is the alien strain, and how has it come in?\nAnd what is true of the physical characters of the race in this respect\nis only less obviously true of its spiritual traits.\n\nIn a culture where all individuals are hybrids, in point of pedigree,\nas is the case with all the leading peoples of Christendom, the ways\nof this group heredity are particularly devious, and the fortunes of\nthe individual in this respect are in a peculiar degree exposed to the\ncaprice of Mendelian contingencies; so that his make-up, physical and\nspiritual, is, humanly speaking, in the main a chapter of accidents.\nWhere each individual draws for his hereditary traits on a wide\nancestry of unstable hybrids, as all civilised men do, his chances are\nalways those of the common lot, with some slight antecedent probability\nof his resembling the nearer ones among his variegated ancestry. But he\nhas also and everywhere in this hybrid panmixis an excellent chance of\nbeing allotted something more accentuated, for good or ill, in the way\nof hereditary traits than anything shown by his varied assortment of\nancestors. It commonly happens in such a hybrid community that in the\nnew crossing of hybrids that takes place at every marriage, some new\nidiosyncracy, slight or considerable, comes to light in the offspring,\nbeyond anything visible in the parents or the remoter pedigree;\nfor in the crossing of what may be called multiple-hybrid parents,\ncomplementary characters that may have been dormant or recessive in the\nparents will come in from both sides, combine, re-enforce one another,\nand cumulatively give an unlooked-for result. So that in a hybrid\ncommunity the fortunes of all individuals are somewhat precarious in\nrespect of heredity.\n\nSuch are the conditions which have prevailed among the peoples of\nEurope since the first beginnings of that culture that has led up to\nthe Western civilisation as known to history. In these circumstances\nany individual, therefore, owes to the group not only his share of\nthat certain typical complement of traits that characterise the\ncommon run, but usually something more than is coming to him in the\nway of individual qualities and infirmities if he is in any way\ndistinguishable from the common run, as well as a blind chance of\ntransmitting almost any traits that he is not possessed of.[91]\n\nIn the lower cultures, where the division of labour is slight and the\ndiversity of occupations is mainly such as marks the changes of the\nseasons, the common stock of technological knowledge and proficiency is\nnot so extensive or so recondite but that the common man may compass\nit in some fashion, and in its essentials it is accessible to all\nmembers of the community by common notoriety, and the training required\nby the state of the industrial arts comes to everyone as a matter of\ncourse in the routine of daily life. The necessary material equipment\nof tools and appliances is slight and the acquisition of it is a simple\nmatter that also arranges itself as an incident in the routine of daily\nlife. Given the common run of aptitude for the industrial pursuits\nincumbent on the members of such a community, the material equipment\nneedful to find a livelihood or to put forth the ordinary productive\neffort and turn out the ordinary industrial output can be compassed\nwithout strain by any individual in the course of his work as he goes\nalong. The material equipment, the tools, implements, contrivances\nnecessary and conducive to productive industry, is incidental to the\nday\u2019s work; in much the same way but in a more unqualified degree than\nthe like is true as to the technological knowledge and skill required\nto make use of this equipment.[92]\n\nAs determined by the state of the industrial arts in such a culture,\nthe members of the community co-operate in much of their work, to the\ncommon gain and to no one\u2019s detriment, since there is substantially no\nindividual, or private, gain to be sought. There is substantially no\nbartering or hiring, though there is a recognised obligation in all\nmembers to lend a hand; and there is of course no price, as there is no\nproperty and no ownership, for the sufficient reason that the habits of\nlife under these circumstances do not provoke such a habit of thought.\nDoubtless, it is a matter of course that articles of use and adornment\npertain to their makers or users in an intimate and personal way; which\nwill come to be construed into ownership when in the experience of\nthe community an occasion for such a concept as ownership arises and\npersists in sufficient force to shape the current habits of thought\nto that effect. There is also more or less of reciprocal service\nand assistance, with a sufficient sense of mutuality to establish a\ncustomary scheme of claims and obligations in that respect. So also\nit is true that such a community holds certain lands and customary\nusufructs and that any trespass on these customary holdings is\nresented. But it would be a vicious misapprehension to read ideas and\nrights of ownership into these practices, although where civilised men\nhave come to deal with instances of the kind they have commonly been\nunable to put any other construction on the customs governing the case;\nfor the reason that civilised men\u2019s relations with these peoples of\nthe lower culture have been of a pecuniary kind and for a pecuniary\npurpose, and they have brought no other than pecuniary conceptions from\nhome.[93] There being little in hand worth owning and little purpose\nto be served by its ownership, the habits of thought which go to make\nthe institution of ownership and property rights have not taken shape.\nThe slight facts which would lend themselves to ownership are not of\nsufficient magnitude or urgency to call the institution into effect and\nare better handled under customs which do not yet take cognisance of\nproperty rights. Naturally, in such a cultural situation there is no\nappreciable accumulation of wealth and no inducement to it; the nearest\napproach being an accumulation of trinkets and personal belongings,\namong which should, at least in some cases, be included certain weapons\nand perhaps tools.[94] These things belong to their owner or bearer\nin much the same sense as his name, which was not held on tenure of\nownership or as a pecuniary asset before the use of trade-marks and\nmerchantable good-will.\n\nThe workman--more typically perhaps the workwoman--in such a culture,\nas indeed in any other, is a \u201cproductive agent\u201d in the manner and\ndegree determined by the state of the industrial arts. What is obvious\nin this respect here holds only less visibly for any other, more\ncomplicated and technologically full-charged cultural situation,\nsuch as has come on with the growth of population and wealth among\nthe more advanced peoples. He or she, or rather they--for there is\nsubstantially no industry carried on in strict severalty in these\ncommunities--are productive factors or industrial agents, in the sense\nthat they will on occasion turn out a surplus above their necessary\ncurrent consumption, only because and so far as the state of the\nindustrial arts enables them to do so. As workman, labourer, producer,\nbreadwinner, the individual is a creature of the technological scheme;\nwhich in turn is a creation of the group life of the community. Apart\nfrom the common stock of knowledge and training the individual members\nof the community have no industrial effect. Indeed, except by grace\nof this common technological equipment no individual and no family\ngroup in any of the known communities of mankind could support their\nown life; for in the long course of mankind\u2019s life-history, since the\nhuman plane was first reached, the early mutants which were fit to\nsurvive in a ferine state without tools and without technology have\nselectively disappeared, as being unfit to survive under the conditions\nof domesticity imposed by so highly developed a state of the industrial\narts as any of the savage cultures now extant.[95] The _Homo Javensis_\nand his like are gone, because there is technologically no place for\nthem between the anthropoids to the one side and the extant types of\nman on the other. And never since the brave days when _Homo Javensis_\ntook up the \u201cwhite man\u2019s burden\u201d for the better regulation of his\nanthropoid neighbours has the technological scheme admitted of any\nindividual\u2019s carrying on his life in severalty. So that industrial\nefficiency, whether of an individual workman or of the community at\nlarge, is a function of the state of the industrial arts.[96]\n\nThe simple and obvious industrial system of this archaic plan leaves\nthe individuals, or rather the domestic groups, that make up the\ncommunity, economically independent of one another and of the community\nat large, except that they depend on the common technological stock\nfor the immaterial equipment by means of which to get their living.\nThis is of course not felt by them as a relation of dependence; though\nthere seems commonly to be some sense of indebtedness on part of the\nyoung, and of responsibility on part of the older generation, for\nthe proper transmission of the recognised elements of technological\nproficiency. It is impossible to say just at what point in the growth\nand complication of technology this simple industrial scheme will\nbegin to give way to new exigencies and give occasion to a new scheme\nof institutions governing the economic relations of men; such that\nthe men\u2019s powers and functions in the industrial community come to\nbe decided on other grounds than workmanlike aptitude and special\ntraining. In the nature of things there can be no hard and fast limit\nto this phase of industrial organisation. Its disappearance or\nsupersession in any culture appears always to have been brought on by\nthe growth of property, but the institution of property need by no\nmeans come in abruptly at any determinate juncture in the sequence of\ntechnological development. So that this archaic phase of culture in\nwhich industry is organised on the ground of workmanship alone may come\nvery extensively to overlap and blend with the succeeding phase in\nwhich property relations chiefly decide the details of the industrial\norganisation,--as is shown in varying detail by the known lower\ncultures.\n\nThe forces which may bring about such a transition are often complex\nand recondite, and they are seldom just the same in any given two\ninstances. Neither the material situation nor the human raw material\ninvolved are precisely the same in all or several instances, and there\nis no coercively normal course of things that will constrain the\ngrowth of institutions to take a particular typical form or to follow\na particular typical sequence in all cases. Yet, in a general way such\na supersession of free workmanship by a pecuniary control of industry\nappears to have been necessarily involved in any considerable growth of\nculture. Indeed, at least in the economic respect, it appears to have\nbeen the most universal and most radical mutation which human culture\nhas undergone in its advance from savagery to civilisation; and the\ncauses of it should be of a similarly universal and intrinsic character.\n\nIt may be taken as a generalisation grounded in the instinctive\nendowment of mankind that the human sense of workmanship will\nunavoidably go on turning to account what there is in hand of\ntechnological knowledge, and so will in the course of time, by\ninsensible gains perhaps, gradually change the technological scheme,\nand therefore also the scheme of customary canons of conduct answering\nto it; and in the absence of overmastering circumstances this\nsequence of change must, in a general way, set in the direction of\ngreat technological mastery. Something in the way of an \u201cadvance\u201d in\nworkmanlike mastery is to be looked for, in the absence of inexorable\nlimitations of environment. The limitations may be set by the material\ncircumstances or by circumstances of the institutional situation,\nbut on the lower levels of culture the insurmountable obstacles to\nsuch an advance appear to have been those imposed by the material\ncircumstances; although institutional factors have doubtless greatly\nretarded the advance in most cases, and may well have defeated it\nin many. In some of the known lower cultures such an impassable\nconjuncture in the affairs of technology has apparently been reached\nnow and again, resulting in a \u201cstationary state\u201d of the industrial arts\nand of social arrangements, economic and otherwise. Such an instance\nof \u201carrested development\u201d is afforded by the Eskimo, who have to all\nappearance reached the bounds of technological mastery possible in\nthe material circumstances in which they have been placed and with\nthe technological antecedents which they have had to go on. At the\nother extreme of the American continent the Fuegians and Patagonians\nmay similarly have reached at least a provisional limit of the same\nnature; though such a statement is less secure in their case, owing\nto the scant and fragmentary character of the available evidence. So\nalso the Bushmen, the Ainu, various representative communities of the\nNegrito and perhaps of the Dravidian stocks, appear to have reached a\nprovisional limit--barring intervention from without. In these latter\ninstances the decisive obstacles, if they are to be accepted as such,\nseem to lie in the human-nature of the case rather than in the material\ncircumstances. In these latter instances the sense of workmanship,\nthough visibly alert and active, appears to have been inadequate to\ncarry out the technological scheme into further new ramifications for\nwant of the requisite intellectual aptitudes,--a failure of aptitudes\nnot in degree but in kind.\n\nThe manner in which increasing technological mastery has led over from\nthe savage plan of free workmanship to the barbarian system of industry\nunder pecuniary control is perhaps a hazardous topic of speculation;\nbut the known facts of primitive culture appear to admit at least a\nfew general propositions of a broad and provisional character. It\nseems reasonably safe to say that the archaic savage plan of free\nworkmanship will commonly have persisted through the pal\u00e6olithic\nperiod of technology, and indeed somewhat beyond the transition to\nthe neolithic. This is fairly borne out by the contemporary evidence\nfrom savage cultures. In the prehistory of the north-European culture\nthere is also reason to assume that the beginnings of a pecuniary\ncontrol fall in the early half of the neolithic period.[97] There\nseems to be no sharply definable point in the technological advance\nthat can be said of itself to bring on this revolutionary change in\nthe institutions governing economic life. It appears to be loosely\ncorrelated with technological improvement, so that it sets in when a\nsufficient ground for it is afforded by the state of the industrial\narts, but what constitutes a sufficient ground can apparently not\nbe stated in terms of the industrial arts alone. Among the early\nconsequences of an advance in technology beyond the state of the\nindustrial arts schematically indicated above, and coinciding roughly\nwith the pal\u00e6olithic stage, is on the one hand an appreciable resort to\n\u201cindirect methods of production\u201d, involving a systematic cultivation\nof the soil, domestication of plants and animals; or an appreciable\nequipment of industrial appliances, such as will in either case require\na deliberate expenditure of labour and will give the holders of the\nequipment something more than a momentary advantage in the quest of\na livelihood. On the other hand it leads also to an accumulation of\nwealth beyond the current necessaries of subsistence and beyond that\nslight parcel of personal effects that have no value to anyone but\ntheir savage bearer.\n\nHereby the technological basis for a pecuniary control of industry is\ngiven, in that the \u201croundabout process of production\u201d yields an income\nabove the subsistence of the workmen engaged in it, and the material\nequipment of appliances (crops, fruit-trees, live stock, mechanical\ncontrivances) binds this roundabout process of industry to a more\nor less determinate place and routine, such as to make surveillance\nand control possible. So far as the workman under the new phase of\ntechnology is dependent for his living on the apparatus and the orderly\nsequence of the \u201croundabout process\u201d his work may be controlled and the\nsurplus yielded by his industry may be turned to account; it becomes\nworth while to own the material means of industry, and ownership of\nthe material means in such a situation carries with it the usufruct of\nthe community\u2019s immaterial equipment of technological proficiency.\n\nThe substantial fact upon which the strategy of ownership converges\nis this usufruct of the industrial arts, and the tangible items\nof property to which the claims of ownership come to attach will\naccordingly vary from time to time, according as the state of the\nindustrial arts will best afford an effectual exploitation of this\nusufruct through the tenure of one or another of the material items\nrequisite to the pursuit of industry. The chief subject of ownership\nmay accordingly be the cultivated trees, as in some of the South Sea\nislands; or the tillable land, as happens in many of the agricultural\ncommunities; or fish weirs and their location, as on some of the\nsalmon streams of the American north-west coast; or domestic animals,\nas is typical of the pastoral culture; or it may be the persons of\nthe workmen, as happens under divers circumstances both in pastoral\nand in agricultural communities; or, with an advance in technology\nof such a nature as to place the mechanical appliances of industry\nin a peculiarly advantageous position for engrossing the roundabout\nprocesses of production, as in the latterday machine industry, these\nmechanical appliances may become the typical category of industrial\nwealth and so come to be accounted \u201cproductive goods\u201d in some eminent\nsense.\n\nThe institutional change by which a pecuniary regulation of industry\ncomes into effect may take one form or another, but its outcome has\ncommonly been some form of ownership of tangible goods. Particularly\nhas that been the outcome in the course of development that has led\non to those great pecuniary cultures of which Occidental civilisation\nis the most perfect example. But just in what form the move will be\nmade, if at all, from free workmanship to pecuniary industry and\nownership, is in good part a question of what the material situation\nof the community will permit. In some instances the circumstances\nhave apparently not permitted the move to be made at all. The Eskimo\nculture is perhaps an extreme case of this kind. The state of the\nindustrial arts among them has apparently gone appreciably beyond\nthe technological juncture indicated above as critical in this\nrespect. It involves a considerable specialisation and accumulation of\nappliances, such as boats, sleds, dogs, harness, various special forms\nof nets, harpoons and spears, and an elaborate line of minor apparatus\nnecessary to the day\u2019s work and embodying a minutely standardised\ntechnique. At the same time these articles of use, together with\ntheir household and personal effects, represent something appreciable\nin the way of portable wealth. Yet in their economic (pecuniary and\nindustrial), domestic, social, or religious institutions the Eskimo\nhave substantially not gone beyond the point of customary regulation\ncommonly associated with the simpler, hand-to-mouth state of the\nindustrial arts typical of the pal\u00e6olithic savage culture. And this\narchaic Eskimo culture, with its highly elaborated technology, is\napparently of untold antiquity; it is even believed by competent\nstudents of antiquity to have stood over without serious advance or\ndecline since European pal\u00e6olithic times--a period of not less than\nten thousand years.[98] The causes conditioning this \u201cbackward\u201d type\nof culture among the Eskimo, coupled with a relatively advanced and\nextremely complete technological system, are presumed to lie in their\nmaterial surroundings; which on the one hand do not permit a congestion\nof people within a small area or enable the organisation and control of\na compact community of any considerable size; while on the other hand\nthey exact a large degree of co-operation and common interest, on pain\nof extreme hardship if not of extinction.\n\nMore perplexing at first sight is the case of such sedentary\nagricultural communities as the Pueblo Indians, who have also not\nadvanced very materially beyond the simpler cultural scheme of savage\nlife, and have not taken seriously to a system of property and a\npecuniary control of industry, in spite of their having achieved a\nvery considerable advance in the industrial arts, particularly in\nagriculture, such as would appear to entitle them to something \u201chigher\u201d\nthan that state of peaceable, non-coercive social organisation, in\nwhich they were found on their first contact with civilised men, with\nmaternal descent and mother-goddesses, and without much property\nrights, accumulated wealth or pecuniary distinction of classes. Again\nan explanation is probably to be sought in special circumstances\nof environment, perhaps re-enforced by peculiarities of the racial\nendowment; though the latter point seems doubtful, since both\nlinguistically and anthropometrically the Pueblos are found to belong\nto two or three distinct stocks, at the same time that their culture is\nnotably uniform throughout the Pueblo region, both on the technological\nand on the institutional side. The peculiar material circumstances\nthat appear to have conditioned the Pueblo culture are (_a_) a habitat\nwhich favours agricultural settlement only at isolated and widely\nseparated spots, (_b_) sites for habitation (on detached mesas or on\nother difficult hills or in isolated valleys or canyons) easily secured\nagainst aggression from without and not affording notable differential\nadvantages or admitting segregation of the population within the\npueblo, (_c_) the absence of beasts of burden, such as have enabled the\ninhabitants of analogous regions of the old world effectually to cover\nlong distances and make raiding a lucrative, or at least an attractive\nenterprise.\n\nThese, and other peculiar instances of what may perhaps be called\ncultural retardation, indicate by way of exception what may have been\nthe ruling causes that have governed in the advance to a higher culture\nunder more ordinary circumstances,--by \u201cordinary\u201d being intended such\ncircumstances as have apparently led to a different and, it would be\nheld, a more normal result in the old world, and particularly in the\nregion of the Western civilisation.\n\nIn the ordinary course, it should seem, such an advance in the\nindustrial arts as will result in an accumulation of wealth, a\nconsiderable and efficient industrial equipment, or in a systematic\nand permanent cultivation of the soil or an extensive breeding of\nherds or flocks, will also bring on ownership and property rights\nbearing on these valuable goods, or on the workmen, or on the land\nemployed in their production. What has seemed the most natural\nand obvious beginnings of property rights, in the view of those\neconomists who have taken an interest in the matter, is the storing\nup of valuables by such of the ancient workmen as were enabled, by\nefficiency, diligence or fortuitous gains, to produce somewhat more\nthan their current consumption. There are difficulties, though perhaps\nnot insuperable, in the way of such a genesis of property rights and\npecuniary differentiation within any given community. The temper of\nthe people bred in the ways of the simpler plan of hand-to-mouth and\ncommon interest does not readily bend itself to such an institutional\ninnovation, even though the self-regarding impulses of particular\nmembers of the community may set in such a direction as would give the\nalleged result.[99]\n\nThere are other and more natural ways of reaching the same results,\nways more consonant with that archaic scheme of usages on which the new\ninstitution of property is to be grafted. (_a_) In the known cultures\nof this simpler plan there are usually, or at least frequently, present\na class of magicians (shamans, medicine men, angekut), an inchoate\npriestly class, who get their living in part \u201cby their wits,\u201d half\nparasitically, by some sort of tithe levied on their fellow members\nfor supernatural ministrations and exploits of faith that are worth\nas much as they will bring.[100] As the industrial efficiency of the\ncommunity increases with the technological gain, and an increasing\ndisposable output is at hand, it should naturally follow, human nature\nbeing what it is, that the services of the priests or magicians should\nsuffer an advance in value and so enable the priests to lay something\nby, to acquire a special claim to certain parcels of land or cultivated\ntrees or crops or first-fruits or labour to be performed by their\nparishioners. There is no limit to the value of such ministrations\nexcept the limit of tolerance, \u201cwhat the traffic will bear.\u201d And much\nmay be done in this way, which is in close touch with the accustomed\nways of life among known savages and lower barbarians. To the extent to\nwhich such a move is successful it will alter the economic situation\nof the community by making the lay members, in so far, subject to the\npriestly class, and will gather wealth and power in the hands of the\npriests; so introducing a relation of master and servant, together\nwith class differences in wealth, the practice of exclusive ownership,\nand pecuniary obligations. (_b_) With an accumulation of wealth,\nwhether in portable form or in the form of plantations and tillage,\nthere comes the inducement to aggression, predation, by whatever name\nit may be known. Such aggression is an easy matter in the common run\nof lower cultures, since relations are habitually strained between\nthese savage and barbarian communities. There is commonly a state of\nestrangement between them amounting to constructive feud, though the\nfeud is apt to lie dormant under a _modus vivendi_ so long as there\nis no adequate inducement to open hostilities, in the way of booty.\nGiven a sufficiently wealthy enemy who is sufficiently ill prepared\nfor hostilities to afford a fighting chance of taking over this wealth\nby way of booty or tribute, with no obvious chance of due reprisals,\nand the opening of hostilities will commonly arrange itself. The\ncommunities mutually concerned so pass from the more or less precarious\npeaceful customs and animus common to the indigent lower cultures, to a\nmore or less habitual attitude of predatory exploit. With the advent of\nwarfare comes the war chief, into whose hands authority and pecuniary\nemoluments gather somewhat in proportion as warlike exploits and ideals\nbecome habitual in the community.[101] More or less of loot falls into\nthe hands of the victors in any raid. The loot may be goods, cattle\nif any, or men, women and children; any or all of which may become\n(private) property and be accumulated in sufficient mass to make a\ndifference between rich and poor. Captives may fall into some form of\nservitude, and in an agricultural community may easily become the chief\nitem of wealth. At the same time an entire community may be reduced\nto servitude, so falling into the possession of an absentee owner\n(master), or under resident masters coming in from the victorious enemy.\n\nIn any or all of these ways the institution of ownership is likely\nto arise so soon as there is provocation for it, and in all cases it\nis a consequence of an appreciable advance in the industrial arts.\nYet in a number of recorded cases a sufficient advance in technology\ndoes not appear to have been followed by so prompt an introduction of\nownership, at least not in the fully developed form, as the surface\nfacts would seem to have called for. Custom in the lower cultures is\nextremely tenacious, and what might seem an excessive allowance of\ntime appears to be needed for so radical an innovation in the habitual\nscheme of things as is involved in the installation of rights of\nownership. There are cases of a fairly advanced barbarian culture, with\nsufficiently coercive government control, an authoritative priesthood,\nand well-marked class distinctions which hold good both in economic\nand social relations, and yet where the line of demarcation between\nownership and mastery is not drawn in any unambiguous fashion--where\nit is perhaps as accurate a statement as the case permits, to say that\nthis distinction has not yet been made, and so would, if applied, mark\na difference that does not yet exist.[102]\n\nSo long as overt predatory conditions continue to rule the\ncase,--e.\u00a0g., so long as the community in question continues, in a\nsense, under martial law, \u201cin a state of seige,\u201d where the holders of\nthe economic advantage hold it on a tenure of prowess or by way of\ndelegated power and prerogative from a superior of warlike antecedents\nand dynastic right,--so long the rights of ownership are not likely\nto be well differentiated from those of mastery. Much the same\ncharacterisation of such a state of things is conveyed in the current\nphrase that \u201cthe rights of person and property are not secure.\u201d The\nvery wide prevalence in the barbarian cultures of some such state of\nthings argues that the genesis of property rights is likely to have\nbeen something of this kind in the common run, though it does not in\nother cases preclude a different and more peaceable development out of\nworkmanlike or priestly economies.\n\nBut even if it should be found, when the matter has been sifted, that\nthe genesis of ownership is of the latter kind, it would also in all\nprobability be found that among the peoples whose institutional growth\nhas a serious genetic bearing on the Western culture the holding of\nproperty has, late or early, passed through a phase of predatory tenure\nin which the distinction between ownership and mastery has so far\nfallen into abeyance as to have had but a slight effect on the further\ndevelopment. Where, as appears frequently to have been the case both in\nEurope and elsewhere, the kingship and temporal power has arisen out of\nthe priestly office and spiritual power--or perhaps better where the\ninchoate kingship was in its origins chiefly of a priestly complexion,\nwith a gradual shifting of kingly power and prerogative to a temporal\nbasis,[103]--there the transition from a creation of property and\nmastery rights by priestly economies (fraud?) to a tenure of wealth\nand authority by royal prerogative (force?) will have so blended\nthe two methods of genesis as to leave the attempt at a hard fast\ndiscrimination between them somewhat idle.\n\nBut whatever may be conceived to have been the genesis of ownership,\nthe institution is commonly found, in the barbarian culture, to be\ntempered with a large infusion of predatory concepts, of status,\nprerogative, differential respect of persons and economic classes, and\na corresponding differential respect of occupations. Whether property\nprovokes to predation or predation initiates ownership, the situation\nthat results in early phases of the pecuniary culture is much the same;\nand the causal relation in which this situation stands to the advance\nin workmanship is also much the same. This relation between workmanship\nand the pecuniary culture brought on with the advent of ownership is\na twofold one, or, perhaps better, it is a relation of mutual give\nand take. The increase in industrial efficiency due to a sufficient\nadvance in the industrial arts gives rise to the ownership of property\nand to pecuniary appreciations of men and things, occupations and\nproducts, habits, customs, usages, observances, services and goods.\nAt the same time, since predation and warlike exploit are intimately\nassociated with the facts of ownership through its early history\n(perhaps throughout its history), there results a marked accentuation\nof the self-regarding sentiments; with the economically important\nconsequence that self-interest displaces the common good in men\u2019s\nideals and aspirations. The animus entailed by predatory exploit is\none of self-interest, a seeking of one\u2019s own advantage at the cost of\nthe enemy, which frequently, in the poetically ideal case, takes such\nan extreme form as to prefer the enemy\u2019s loss to one\u2019s own gain. And\nin the emulation which the predatory life and its distinctions of\nwealth introduce into the community, the end of endeavour is likely\nto become the differential advantage of the individual as against his\nneighbours rather than the undifferentiated advantage of the group as\na whole, in contrast with alien or hostile groups. The members of the\ncommunity come to work each for his own interest in severalty, rather\nthan for an undivided interest in the common lot. Such sentiment of\ngroup solidarity as there may remain falls also into the invidious\nand emulative form; whereby the fighting patriot becomes the type\nand exemplar of the public spirited citizen, whose ideal then is to\nfollow his leader and humble the pride of those whom the chances\nof contention have thrown in with the other side of the game. The\nsentiment of common interest, itself in good part a diffuse working-out\nof the parental instinct, comes at the best to converge on the glory\nof the flag instead of the fulness of life of the community at large,\nor more commonly it comes to be centred in loyalty, that is to say in\nsubservience, to the common war-chief and his dynastic successors.\n\nIn the shifting of activities, ideals and aims so brought in with\nthe advent of wealth and ownership, the part of the priests and\ntheir divinities is not to be overlooked, for herein lies one of the\ngreater cultural gains brought on by the technological advance at this\njuncture. The margin of service and produce available for consumption\nin the cult increases, and by easy consequence the spiritual prestige\nand the temporal power and prerogatives of the priesthood grow greater.\nThe jurisdiction of the gods of the victors is extended; through the\nvicarious power of the priests, over the subject peoples, and as the\ntemporal dominion is enlarged and an increasing measure of coercion is\nemployed in controlling these dominions, so also in the affairs of the\ngods and their priests there is an accession of power and dignity. It\ncommonly happens where predatory enterprise comes to be habitual and\nsuccessful that the temporal power tends to centre in an autocratic\nand arbitrary ruler; and in this as in so much else, spiritual affairs\nare likely to take their complexion from the temporal, resulting in a\nstrong drift toward an autocratic monotheism, which in the finished\ncase comes to a climax in an omnipotent, omniscient deity of very\nexalted dignity and very exacting temper. For the habits of thought\nenforced in the affairs of daily life are carried over into men\u2019s\nsense of what is right and good in the life of the gods as well. If\nthere is any choice among the gods under whose auspices a people has\nsuccessfully entered on a career of predation, so that some of the gods\nhave more of a reputation for rapacity and inhumanity than others,\nthe most atrocious among them is likely, other things being equal, to\nbecome the war-god of the conquering host, and so eventually to be\nexalted to the suzerainty among the gods, and even in time to become\nthe one and only incumbent of the divine czardom.\n\nShould it happen that a relatively humane, tolerant and tractable deity\ncomes in for exaltation to the divine suzerainty, as well may be if\nsuch a one has already a good prior claim standing over from the more\npeaceable past, he will readily acquire the due princely arrogance and\nirresponsibility that vests the typical heavenly king. It may be added\nthat as a matter of course no degree of imputed inhumanity in the most\nhigh God will stand in the way of a god-fearing and astute priesthood\nvolubly ascribing to him all the good qualities that should grace an\nelderly patriarchal gentleman of the old school; so that even his most\ninfamous atrocities become ineffably meritorious and are dispensed of\nhis mercy.[104]\n\nWith the terrors of a jealous and almighty God behind them, and with\nfaith in their own mission and sagacity in its administration, the\npriesthood are in a position to make the affairs of the heavenly king\ncount for much in the affairs of men; more particularly since this\nspiritual power enters into working arrangements with the temporal\npower; so that in the outcome these institutions which in their origins\nhave grown out of a precarious margin of product above subsistence come\nto possess themselves of the output at large and leave a precarious\nmargin of subsistence to the community at large.[105]\n\nThese further matters of \u201cnatural law in the spiritual world\u201d are not\nin themselves of direct interest to the present inquiry, and they are\nalso matters of somewhat tedious commonplace. Yet this run of things\nhas grave consequences in the further working-out of the technological\nsituation as well as in the course of material welfare for the\ncommunity on whom it is incumbent to turn the technological knowledge\nto account, to conserve or improve and transmit it, and for this reason\nit has seemed necessary summarily to recall those general features of\nthe cultural scheme that are inherently associated with the earlier\npecuniary culture,--the full-blown barbarian culture. And it seems\npertinent also to add something further in the same connection before\nleaving this aspect of the case.\n\nIt is necessary to hark back to what was said in an earlier chapter,\nof the relations of tillage and cattle-breeding to the instinct\nof workmanship and the course of technological advance. Both the\ntechnological and the institutional bearing of cattle-breeding is\nparticularly notable in this connection. As already spoken of in what\nhas gone before, cattle-breeding has the technological peculiarity\nthat it may be successfully entered on and carried forward with a\nlarger admixture of anthropomorphic concepts than the mechanic arts,\nor even than the domestication and care of the crop plants. It is\nperhaps not to be admitted that the penchant of early man to take\nan anthropomorphic view of the lower animals and impute to them\nthe common traits of human nature has directly conduced to their\nsuccessful domestication, but it should be within the mark to say that\nthis penchant may have been primarily responsible for the course of\nconduct that led to the domestication of animals,[106] and that it has\napparently never been a serious drawback to any pastoral culture. Now,\nwealth in flocks and herds is peculiar not only in being eminently\nportable, even to the extent that in the usual course of this industry\nit is necessary for a pastoral community to migrate, or to go over\nan extended itinerary with the changing seasons, but it has also the\npeculiar quality of multiplying spontaneously, given only a degree of\nsurveillance and a sufficient range of pasture lands. It follows that\ncattle are easy and tempting to acquire by predation, will accumulate\nthrough natural increase without notable exertion on the part of their\nowners, and will multiply beyond the bearing capacity of any disposable\nrange. Hence a pastoral people, or a people given in great part to\npastoral pursuits, will somewhat readily take to a predatory life;\nwill have to be organised for defence (and offence) against raids or\nencroachments from its neighbours engaged in the same pursuits; will\nfind itself short of range lands through the natural increase of its\nflocks or herds, and so will even involuntarily be brought into feud\nwith neighbouring herdsmen through mutual trespass. Further, the\nwork of herding, on the scale imposed by the open continental cattle\nand sheep ranges, is man\u2019s work, as is also the incidental fighting,\nraiding, and cattle-lifting.\n\nThe effects of these technological conditions on the general culture of\na pastoral people are such as are set forth in their most favourable\nlight in the early historical books of the Old Testament, or such\nconditions as may be found today on the great cattle ranges of west and\nnorth-central Asia. The community falls necessarily into a patriarchal\nr\u00e9gime; with considerable concentration of wealth in individual hands;\ngreat disparity in wealth and social standing, commonly involving\nboth chattel slavery and serfdom; a fighting organisation under\npatriarchal-despotic leadership, which serves both for civil, political\nand religious purposes; domestic institutions of the same cast,\ninvolving a degree of subjection of women and children and commonly\npolygamy for the patriarchal upper or ruling class; a religious\nsystem of a monotheistic or monarchical complexion and drawn on lines\nof patriarchal despotism; with the priestly office vested in the\npatriarchal head of the community (the eldest male of the eldest male\nline) if the group is small enough to admit the administration of both\nthe temporal and spiritual power at the hands of one man--as Israel at\nthe time of the earlier sojourn in Canaan--or vested in a specialised\npriesthood if the group is of great size--as Israel on their return to\nPalestine.\n\nSuch a culture is manifestly fit to succeed both in avowedly predatory\nenterprise and in pecuniary enterprise of a more peaceable sort, so\nlong as range lands are at its disposal or so long as it can find a\nsufficiently large and compact agricultural community to reduce to\nservitude, or so long as it can find ways and means of commercial\nenterprise while still occupying a position defensible against all\ncomers. Its population is organised for offence and defence and trained\nin the habits of subordination necessary to any successful war, and the\npatriarchal authority and pecuniary ideals inbred in them give them\nfacility in co-operation against aliens, as well as the due temper for\nsuccessful bargaining. Such a culture has the elements of national\nstrength and solidarity, given only some adequate means of subsistence\nwhile still retaining its militant patriarchal organisation. Not\nleast among its elements of national strength is its religion, which\nfosters the national pride of a people chosen by the Most High, at the\nsame time that it trains the population in habits of subordination\nand loyalty, as well as in patient submission to exactions. But it is\nessentially a parasitic culture, despotic, and, with due training,\nhighly superstitious or religious. What a people of these antecedents\nis capable of is shown by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, Persians,\nthe Hindu invaders of India, the Hyksos invaders of Egypt, and in\nanother line by Israel and the Ph\u0153nicians, and in a lesser degree by\nthe Huns, Mongols, Tatars, Arabs and Turks.\n\nIt is from peoples of this culture that the great religions of the\nold world have come, near or remote, but it is not easy to find\nany substantial contribution to human culture drawn indubitably\nfrom this source apart from religious creed, cult and poetry. The\ndomestication of animals, for instance, is not due to them; with the\npossible exception of the horse and the dog, that work had to be done\nin peaceable, sedentary communities, from whom the pastoral nomads\nwill have taken over the stock and the industry and carried it out\non a scale and with cultural consequences which do not follow from\ncattle-breeding under sedentary conditions. Their religion, on the\nother hand, seems in no case to have been carried up to the consummate\nstage of despotic monotheism during the nomadic-pastoral phase of their\nexperience, but to have been worked out to a finished product presently\nafter they had engaged on a career of conquest and had some protracted\nexperience of warfare and despotism on a relatively large scale. The\nhistory of these great civilisations with pastoral antecedents appears\nto run somewhat uniformly to the effect that they collapsed as soon as\nthey had eaten their host into a collapse. The incidents along the way\nbetween their beginning in conquest and their collapse in exhaustion\nare commonly no more edifying and of no more lasting significance\nto human culture than those which have similarly marked the course\nof the Turk. These great monarchies were organised by and for an\nintrusive dynasty and ruling class, of pastoral antecedents, and they\ndrew their subsistence and their means of oppression from a subjugated\nagricultural population. In the course of this further elaboration of\na predatory civilisation, the institutions proper to a large scale and\nto a powerful despotism and nobility resting on a servile people, were\ndeveloped into a finished system; in which the final arbiter is always\nirresponsible force and in which the all-pervading social relation is\npersonal subservience and personal authority. The mechanic arts make\nlittle if any progress under such a discipline of personalities, even\nthe arts of war, and there is little if any evidence of sensible gain\nin any branch of husbandry. There were great palaces and cities built\nby slave labour and corv\u00e9e, embodying untold misery in conspicuously\nwasteful and tasteless show, and great monarchs whose boast it was that\nthey were each and several the best friend or nearest relative of some\nirresponsible and supreme god, and whose dearest claim to pre-eminence\nwas that they \u201cwalked on the faces of the black-head race.\u201d Seen\nin perspective and rated in any terms that have a workmanlike\nsignificance, these stupendous dynastic fabrics are as insignificant as\nthey are large, and none of them is worth the least of the fussy little\ncommunities that came in time to make up the Hellenic world and its\npetty squabbles.\n\nIn their general traits these various civilisations founded (in\nconquest) by the pastoral peoples are of the same character as is the\npecuniary culture as found elsewhere, but they have certain special\nfeatures which set them off somewhat in a class by themselves. They\nare predatory in a peculiarly overt and accentuated degree, so that\ntheir institutions foster the invidious sentiments, the self-regarding\nanimus of servility and of arrogance, beyond what commonly happens\nin the pecuniary culture at large; and they carry a large content\nof peculiarly high-wrought religious superstitions and fear of the\nsupernatural, which likewise works out from and into an animus of\nservility and arrogance. In these cultures it is true, even beyond\nthe great significance which the proposition has in the barbarian\nculture elsewhere, that the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom.\nThe discipline of life in such a culture, therefore, is consistently\nunfavourable to any technological gain; the instinct of workmanship is\nconstantly dominated by prevalent habits of thought that are worse than\nuseless for any technological purpose.\n\nMuch the same, of course, is true for any civilisation founded on\npersonal government of the coercive kind, whatever may be the remoter\nantecedents of the dynastic and ruling classes; but these other\ncultures have not the same secure and ancient patriarchal foundation,\nready to hand, and so they are constrained to build their institutions\nof coercion, domestic, civil, political and military, more slowly\nand with a more doubtful outcome; nor does their religious system\nso readily work out in a monarchical theology with an omnipotent\nsovereign and in all-pervading fear of God. A home-bred despotism in\nan agricultural community that has set out with maternal descent, a\nmatriarchal clan system, and mother goddesses, is hampered both on\nthe temporal and the spiritual side by ancient and inbred usage and\npreconceptions that can be effectually overcome only in the long course\nof time. The civilisations of Asia-Minor and the \u00c6gean region, and even\nof Egypt and Rome, however much of pastoral and patriarchal elements\nmay have been infused into them in the course of time, show their\nshortcomings in this respect to the last; perhaps in their religions\nmore than in any other one cultural trait, since religion is after all\nan epigenetic feature and follows rather than leads in the unfolding of\nthe cultural scheme.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBut these great civilisations dominated by pastoral antecedents have\nno grave significance for the modern culture, except as drawbacks,\nand none at all for modern technology or for that matter-of-fact\nknowledge on which modern technology runs. The Western peoples, whose\ncultural past is of more immediate interest, have also had their\nwarlike experience, late and early, but it seems never to have reached\nthe consummate outcome to be seen in the East. Neither as regards\nthe scale on which dynastic organisation has been carried out nor\nas regards the thoroughness with which their institutions have been\npermeated by predatory preconceptions have the Western peoples in their\nearlier history approached the standard of the oriental despotisms.\nEven now, it may be remarked, advocates of war and armaments commonly\nspeak (doubtless disingenuously) for the predatory r\u00e9gime as being a\nnecessity of defence rather than something to be desired on its own\nmerits. Not that the predatory r\u00e9gime has not been a sufficiently\ngrave fact in the history of occidental civilisation; to take such\na view of history one would have to overlook the Roman Empire, the\nbarbarian invasions, the feudal system, the Catholic church, the Era\nof statemaking, and the existing armed neutrality of the powers; but\nthese have, all but the last, proved to be episodes on a grand scale\nrather than such an historical finality as any one of the successive\nmonarchies in the Mesopotamian-Chald\u00e6an country,--the test being that\noccidental civilisation has not died of any one of these maladies,\nthough it has come through more than one critical period.\n\nWestern civilisation has gone through these eras of accentuated\npredation and has at all times shown an appreciable admixture of\npredatory conceptions in its scheme of institutions and ideals, in its\ndomestic institutions and its public affairs, in its art and religion,\nbut it is after all within the mark to say that, at least since the\nclose of the Dark Ages, a distinctive characteristic that sets off\nthis civilisation in contradistinction from any definitively predatory\nphase of the pecuniary culture, has been a pertinacious pursuit of\nthe arts of peace, to which those peoples that have led in this\ncivilisation have ever returned at every respite. For an appreciation\nof the relations subsisting between the sense of workmanship and\nthe discipline of habituation in the modern culture, therefore, the\nphenomena of peaceful ownership are of greater, or at least of more\nvivid interest than those of the predatory phase of the pecuniary\nculture.\n\nModern civilisation, and indeed all history for that matter, lies\nwithin the pecuniary culture as a whole; but the Western culture of\nmodern times belongs, perhaps somewhat precariously, to the secondary\nor peaceable phase of this pecuniary culture, rather than to that\npredatory phase with which the pecuniary scheme of life began\nsomewhere in the lower barbarism, and that has repeatedly closed its\nlife cycle in the collapse of one and another of the great dynastic\nempires of the old world.\n\nAs in the predatory phase, so also in the peaceable pecuniary culture,\nthe dominant note is given by the self-regarding impulses; and the\nsense of workmanship is therefore characteristically hedged about and\nguided by the institutional exigencies and preconceptions incident to\nlife under the circumstances imposed by ownership,--in a situation\nwhere the economic interest, the interest in those material means of\nlife with which workmanship has to deal, converges on property rights.\nOwnership is self-regarding, of course, and the rights of ownership are\nof a personal, invidious, differential, emulative nature; although in\nthe peaceable phase of the civilisation of ownership, force and fraud\nare, in theory, barred out of the game of acquisition,--wherein this\ndiffers from the predatory phase proper.\n\nAn obvious consequence following immediately on the emergence of\nownership in any community is an increased application to work. This\nhas been taken as a matter of course in theoretical speculations and\nis borne out by the observation of peoples among whom trade relations\nhave been introduced in recent times. An immediate result is greater\ndiligence, accompanied apparently in all cases, if the reports of\nobservers are to be accepted, by an increase in contention, distrust\nand chicanery[107] and an increasingly wasteful consumption of goods.\nThe diligence so fostered by emulative self-interest is directed to\nthe acquisition of property, in great part to the acquisition of more\nthan is possessed by those others with whom the invidious comparison\nin ownership is made; and under the spur of ownership simply, it is\nonly secondarily, as a means to the emulative end of acquisition, that\nproductive work, and therefore workmanship in its na\u00efve sense, comes\ninto the case at all. Ownership conduces to diligence in acquisition\nand therefore indirectly to diligence in work, if no more expeditious\nmeans of acquiring wealth can be devised. In its first incidence the\nincentive to diligence afforded by ownership is a proposition in\nbusiness not in workmanship. Its effects on workmanship, industry\nand technology, therefore, are necessarily somewhat uncertain and\nuneven. Apparently from the start there is some appreciable resort\nto fraudulent thrift, to the production of spurious or inferior\ngoods.[108] This of course very presently is corrected in the increased\nastuteness and vigilance exercised in men\u2019s dealings with one another,\nwhereby an appreciable portion of energy goes to defeat these artifices\nof disingenuous worldly wisdom.\n\nIt should be added that the pecuniary incentive to work takes the\ndirection of making the most of the means at hand, considered as\nmeans of pecuniary gain rather than as means of serviceability, and\nthat it conduces therefore to the fullest (pecuniary) exploitation of\nthe standard accepted ways and means of industry rather than to the\nimprovement of these ways and means beyond the conjuncture at hand.\nFurther, though this is also somewhat of a tedious commonplace, since\nthe only authentic end of work under the pecuniary dispensation is the\nacquisition of wealth; since the possession of wealth in so far exempts\nits possessor from productive work; and since such exemption is a mark\nof wealth and therefore of superiority over those who have nothing\nand therefore must work; it follows that addiction to work becomes a\nmark of inferiority and therefore discreditable. Whereby work becomes\ndistasteful to all men instructed in the proprieties of the pecuniary\nculture; and it has even become so irksome to men trained in the\npunctilios of the servile, predatory, phase of this culture that it was\nonce credibly proclaimed by a shrewd priesthood as the most calamitous\ncurse laid on mankind by a vindictive God. Also, since wealth affords\nmeans for a free consumption of goods, the conspicuous consumption\nof goods becomes a mark of pecuniary excellence, and so it becomes\nan element of respectability in any pecuniary culture, and presently\nbecomes a meritorious act and even a requirement of pecuniary decency.\nThe outcome is conspicuous wastefulness of consumption, the limits of\nwhich, if any, have apparently not been approached hitherto.[109]\n\nThe bearings of this pecuniary culture on workmanship and technology\nare wide and diverse. Most immediate and perhaps most notable is the\nconventional disesteem of labour spoken of above, which seems to follow\nas a necessary consequence from the institution of ownership in all\ncases where distinctions of wealth are at all considerable or where\nproperty rights are associated with facts of mastery and prestige. The\npecuniary disrepute of labour acts to discourage industry, but this\nmay be offset, at least in part, by the incentive given to emulation\nby the good repute attaching to acquisition. The wasteful expenditure\nof goods and services enjoined by the pecuniary canons of conspicuous\nconsumption gives an economically untoward direction to industry, at\nthe same time that it greatly increases the hardships and curtails the\namenities of life. So also, estrangement and distrust between persons,\nclasses and nations necessarily pervades this cultural era, due to\nthe incessant gnawing of incompatible pecuniary interests; and this\nstate of affairs appreciably lowers the aggregate efficiency of human\nindustry and sets up bootless obstacles to be overcome and irrelevant\nasperities to be put up with.\n\nThese and the like consequences of pecuniary emulation are simple,\ndirect and obvious; but the discipline of the pecuniary culture bears\non workmanship also in a more subtle way, indirect and less evident\nat first sight. The discipline of daily life imparts its own bent to\nthe sense of workmanship through habituation of the workman to that\nscheme and logic of things that rules this pecuniary culture. The\noutcome as concerns industry is somewhat equivocal; the discipline of\nself-seeking at some points favours workmanship and at others not. At\none period or phase of the pecuniary culture, generally speaking an\nearly or crude phase, the bent so given to workmanship and technology\nseems necessarily to be conducive to inefficiency; at another (later or\nmaturer) phase the contrary is likely to be true.\n\nThe pecuniary discipline of invidious emulation takes effect on the\nstate of the industrial arts chiefly and most pervasively through the\nbias which it gives to the knowledge on which workmanship proceeds.\nIt may be called to mind that the body of knowledge (facts) turned to\naccount in workmanship, the facts made use of in devising technological\nprocesses and appliances, are of the nature of habits of thought.\nThis is particularly applicable to those (tactical) principles under\nwhose control the information in hand is construed and connected up\ninto a system of uses, agencies and instrumentalities. These habits of\nthought, elements of knowledge, items of information, accepted facts,\nprinciples of reality, in part represent the mechanical behaviour of\nobjects, the brute nature of brute matter, and in part they stand for\nqualities, aptitudes and proclivities imputed to external objects and\ntheir behaviour and so infused into the facts and the generalisations\nbased on them. The sense of workmanship has much to do with this\nimputation of traits to the phenomena of observation, perhaps more than\nany other of the proclivities native to man. The traits so imputed to\nthe facts are in the main such as will be consonant with the sense\nof workmanship and will lend themselves to a concatenation in its\nterms. But this infusion of traits into the facts of observation,\nwhether it takes effect at the instance of the sense of workmanship,\nor conceivably on impulse not to be identified with this instinct, is\na logical process and is carried out by an intelligence whose logical\nprocesses have in all cases been profoundly biassed by habituation.\nSo that the habits of life of the individual, and therefore of\nthe community made up of such individuals, will pervasively and\nunremittingly bend this work of imputation with the set of their own\ncurrent, and will accordingly involve incoming elements of knowledge\nin a putative system of relations consistent with these habits\nof life. This comprehensive scheme of habitual apprehensions and\nappreciations is what is called the \u201cgenius,\u201d spirit, or character\nof any given culture. In all this range of habitual preconceptions\ntouching the nature of things there prevails a degree of solidarity,\nof mutual support and re-enforcement among the several lines of\nhabitual activity comprised in the current scheme of life; so that a\ncertain characteristic tone or bias runs through the whole,--in so\nfar as the cultural situation has attained that degree of maturity or\nassimilation that will allow it to be spoken of as a distinctive whole,\nstanding out as a determinate and coherent phase in the life-history\nof the race. To this bias of scope and method in the current scheme of\nlife, intellectual and sentimental, any new element or item must be\nassimilated if it is not to be rejected as alien and unreal or to fall\nthrough by neglect.\n\nAll this bears on the scope and method of knowledge, and therefore\non the facts made use of in the industrial arts, just as it bears on\nany other feature of human life that is of the nature of habit. And\nthe immediate question is as to the bias or drift of the pecuniary\nculture as it affects the apprehension of facts serviceable for\ntechnological ends. This pecuniary bias or bent may be described as\ninvidious, personal, emulative, looking to differential values in\nrespect of personal force or competitive success, looking to gradations\nin respect of comparative potency, validity, authenticity, propriety,\nreputability, decency. The canons of pecuniary repute preclude the\nwell-to-do, who have leisure for such things, from inquiring narrowly\ninto the facts of technology, since these things are beneath their\ndignity, conventionally distasteful; familiarity with such matters\ncan not with propriety be avowed, nor can they without offence and\nhumiliation be canvassed at all intimately among the better class. At\nthe same time pecuniary competition, when carried to its ideal pitch,\nworks the lower industrial classes to exhaustion and allows them no\nappreciable leisure or energy for indulging any possible curiosity of\nthis kind on their part. The habitual (ideal) frame of mind is that\nof invidious self-interest on the one hand, due to the imperative and\nubiquitous need of gain in wealth or in rank, and on the other hand\nclass discrimination due to the ubiquitous prevalence of distinctions\nin prerogatives and authentic standing. The discipline of the pecuniary\nreligions, or of the religious tenets and observances proper to the\npecuniary culture, runs to a similar effect; more decisively so in the\nearlier, or distinctively predatory, phases of this culture than in the\npeaceable or commercial phase. The vulgar facts of industry are beneath\nthe dignity of a feudalistic deity or of his priesthood; at the same\ntime that the overmastering need of standing well in the graces of an\nall-powerful, exacting and irresponsible God throws a deeper shadow of\nignobility over the material side of life, and makes any workmanlike\npreoccupation with industrial efficiency presumptively sinful as well\nas indecorous.\n\nThe pecuniary culture is not singular in this matter. Always and\neverywhere the acquirement of knowledge is a matter of observation\nguided and filled out by the imputation of qualities, relations and\naptitudes to the observed phenomena. Without this putative content\nof active presence and potency the phenomena would lack reality; they\ncould not be assimilated in the scheme of things human. It is only a\ncommonplace of the logic of apperception that the substantial traits\nof objective facts are a figment of the brain. Under the discipline of\nthis pecuniary phase of culture the requisite imputation of character\nto facts runs, as ever, in anthropomorphic terms; but it is an\nanthropomorphism which by habit conforms to the predatory-pecuniary\nscheme of preconceptions, such as the routine of life has made ready\nand convincing to men living under the discipline of emulation,\ninvidious distinctions and authentic pecuniary decorum. Under these\ncircumstances it is not in the anthropomorphism of na\u00efve workmanship\nthat the putative reality of facts is to be sought, but in their\nconformity to the conventionally definitive preconceptions of invidious\nmerit, authentic excellence, force of character, mastery, complaisance,\ncongruity with the run of the established institutional values and the\nordinances of the Most High. The canons of reality, under which sense\nimpressions are reduced to objective fact and so become available for\nuse, and under which, again, facts are put in practice and turned to\ntechnological account, are the same canons of invidious distinction\nthat rule in the world of property and among men occupied with\npredatory and pecuniary precedence. In effect men and things come\nto be rated in terms of what they (putatively) are--their intrinsic\ncharacter--rather than in terms of what they (empirically) will do.\n\nWithout pursuing the question farther at this point, it should be\nevident that the bias of the pecuniary culture must on the whole act\nwith pervasive force so to bend men\u2019s knowledge of the things with\nwhich they have to do as to lessen its serviceability for technological\nends. The result is a deflection from matter-of-fact to matter of\nimputation, and the imputation is of the personal character here\nspoken of. The dominant note appears to be a differential rating in\nrespect of aggressive self-assertion, whether in human or non-human\nagents. Theological preconceptions are commonly strong in the pecuniary\nculture, and under their rule this differential rating developes into\na scheme of graded powers and efficacies vested in the phenomena of\nexternal nature by delegation from an overruling personal authority.\nSuch a bent is necessarily prejudicial to workmanship, and it may\nseem that the ubiquitous repressive force of this metaphysics of\nauthority and authenticity should serve the same disserviceable end\nfor workmanship as the more genial and diffuse anthropomorphism of the\nlower cultures, but with more decisive effect since it runs in a more\ncompetently organised, compact and prescriptive fashion.\n\nWhere the pecuniary culture has been carried through consistently on\nthe predatory plan, without being diverted to that commercial phase\ncurrent in the latterday Western civilisation, the conclusion of the\nmatter has been decay of the industrial arts and effectual dissipation\nof that system of matter-of-fact knowledge on which technological\nefficiency rests. In the West, where the predatory phase proper has\neventually given place to a commercial phase of the same pecuniary\nculture, the general run of events in this bearing has been a decline\nof knowledge, technology and workmanship, running on so long as the\npredatory (coercive) rule prevailed unbroken, but followed presently\nby a slow recovery and advance in technological efficiency and\nscientific insight; somewhat in proportion as the commercialisation\nof this culture has gained ground, and therefore correlated also in a\ngeneral way with the decline of religious fear.\n\nThis run of events may tempt to the inference that while the\npredatory phase proper of this pecuniary civilisation is inimical to\nmatter-of-fact knowledge and to technological insight, the rule of\ncommercial ideas and ideals characteristic of its subsequent peaceable\nphase acts to propagate these material elements of culture. But what\nhas already appeared in the course of the inquiry into that still\nearlier cultural phase that went before the coercive and invidious\nr\u00e9gime of predation suggests that the case is not so simple nor so\nflattering to our latterday self-complacency. The self-regarding\nsentiments of arrogance and abasement, out of whose free habitual\nexercise the pecuniary culture, with its institutions of prerogative\nand differential advantage, has been built up, are not the spiritual\nsource from which such an outcome is to be looked for. These sentiments\nand the instinctive proclivities of which these sentiments are the\nemotional expression are presumed to have remained unchanged in force\nand character through that long course of cumulative habituation that\nhas given them their ascendency in the institutions of the pecuniary\nculture, and of their own motion they will yield now results of the\nsame kind as ever. But the like is true also for those other instincts\nout of whose working came the earlier gains made in knowledge and\nworkmanship under the savage culture, before the self-regarding\nsentiments underlying the pecuniary culture took the upper hand.\nThe parental bent and the instincts of workmanship and of curiosity\nwill have been overborne by cumulative habituation to the rule of the\nself-regarding proclivities that triumphed in the culture of predation,\nand whose dominion has subsequently suffered some impairment in the\nlater substitution of property rights for tenure by prowess, but these\ninstincts that make for workmanship remain as intrinsic to human nature\nas the others. What is to be said for the current commercial scheme of\nlife, therefore, appears to be that it is only less inimical to the\nfunctioning of those instinctive propensities that serve the common\ninterest. Hence, gradually, these instincts and the non-invidious\ninterests which they engender have been coming effectually into\nbearing again as fast as the stern repression of them exercised by the\nfull-charged predatory scheme of life has weakened into a less and less\neffectual inhibition, under the discipline of compromise and mitigated\nself-aggrandisement embodied in the rights of property.\n\nThat authentication of ownership out of which the sacred rights of\nproperty have apparently grown may well have arisen as a sort of mutual\ninsurance among owners as against the disaffection of the dispossessed;\nwhich would presently give rise to a sentiment of solidarity within\nthe class of owners, would acquire prescriptive force through habitual\nenforcement, become a matter of customary right to be consistently\nrespected under the institutional forms of property, and eventuate in\nthat highly moralised expression of self-aggrandisement which it is\ntoday. But with the putting-away of fancy-free predation, as being a\nconventionally disallowed means of self-aggrandisement, sentiments\nof equity and solidarity would presently come in--perhaps at the\noutset by way of disingenuous make-believe--and so the way would be\nmade easier under the shelter of this range of conceptions for a\nrehabilitation of the primordial parental instinct and its penchant for\nthe common good. And when ownership has once been institutionalised\nin this impersonal and quasi-dispassionate form it will lend but a\ndecreasingly urgent bias to the cultural scheme in the direction of\ndifferential respect of persons and a differential rating of natural\nphenomena in respect of the occult potencies and efficacies imputed to\nthem.\n\nAs the institutional ground has shifted from free-swung predation\nto a progressively more covert r\u00e9gime of self-aggrandisement and\ndifferential gain, the instinct of workmanship has progressively found\nfreer range and readier access to its raw material. The differential\ngood repute of wealth and rank has of course continued to be of much\nthe same nature in the later (commercial) stages of the pecuniary\nculture as in the earlier (predatory) stages. An aristocratic (or\nservile) scheme of life must necessarily run in invidious terms, since\nthat is the whole meaning of the phenomenon; and resting as any such\nscheme does on pecuniary distinctions, whether direct or through the\nintermediary term of predatory exploit, it will necessarily involve the\ncorollary that wealth and exemption from work (_otium cum dignitate_)\nis honourable and that poverty and work is dishonourable. But with the\nprogressive commercialisation of gain and ownership it also comes to\npass that peaceable application to the business in hand may have much\nto do with the acquirement of a reputable standing; and so long as\nwork is of a visibly pecuniary kind and is sagaciously and visibly\ndirected to the acquisition of wealth, the disrepute intrinsically\nattaching to it is greatly offset by its meritorious purpose. So much\nso, indeed, that there has even grown up something of a class feeling,\namong the class who have come by their wealth through industry and\nshrewd dealing, to the effect that peaceable diligence and thrift are\nmeritorious traits.\n\nThis is \u201cmiddle-class\u201d sentiment of course. The aristocratic contempt\nfor the tradesman and all his works has not suffered serious mitigation\nthrough all this growth of new methods of reputability. The three\nconventionally recognised classes, upper, middle, and lower, are all\nand several pecuniary categories; the upper being typically that\n(aristocratic) class which is possessed of wealth without having worked\nor bargained for it; while the middle class have come by their holdings\nthrough some form of commercial (business) traffic; and the lower class\ngets what it has by workmanship. It is a gradation of (_a_) predation,\n(_b_) business, (_c_) industry; the former being disserviceable and\ngainful, the second gainful, and the third serviceable. And no modern\ncivilised man is so innocent of the canons of reputability as not to\nrecognise off-hand that the first category is meritorious and the last\ndiscreditable, whatever his individual prejudices may lead him to\nthink of the second. Aristocracy without unearned wealth, or without\npredatory antecedents, is a misnomer. When an aristocratic class loses\nits pecuniary advantage it becomes questionable. A poverty-stricken\naristocrat is a \u201cdecayed gentleman;\u201d and \u201cthe nobility of labour\u201d is a\ndisingenuous figure of speech.\n\nThe transition from the original predatory phase of the pecuniary\nculture to the succeeding commercial phase signifies the emergence\nof a middle class in such force as presently to recast the working\narrangements of the cultural scheme and make peaceable business\n(gainful traffic) the ruling interest of the community. With the same\nmovement emerges a situation which is progressively more favourable\nto the intellectual animus required for workmanship and an advance in\ntechnology. The state of the industrial arts advances, and with its\nadvance the accumulation of wealth is accelerated, the gainfulness\nof business traffic increases, and the middle (business) class grows\nalong with it. It is in the conscious interest of this class to further\nthe gainfulness of industry, and as this end is correlated with the\nproductiveness of industry it is also, though less directly, correlated\nwith improvements in technology.\n\nWith the transition from a na\u00efvely predatory scheme to a commercial\none, the \u201ccompetitive system\u201d takes the place of the coercive methods\npreviously employed, and pecuniary gain becomes the incentive to\nindustry. At least superficially, or ephemerally, the workman\u2019s income\nunder this pecuniary r\u00e9gime is in some proportion to his product. Hence\nthere results a voluntary application to steady work and an inclination\nto find and to employ improvements in the methods and appliances of\nindustry. At the same time commercial conceptions come progressively\nto supplant conceptions of status and personal consequence as the\nprimary and most familiar among the habits of thought entailed by the\nroutine of daily life. This will be true especially for the common\nman, as contrasted with the aristocratic classes, although it is not\nto be overlooked that the standards of propriety imposed on the\ncommunity by the better classes will have a considerably corrective\neffect on the frame of mind of the common man in this respect as in\nothers, and so will act to maintain an effective currency of predatory\nideals and preconceptions after the economic situation at large has\ntaken on a good deal of a commercial complexion. The accountancy of\nprice and ownership throws personal prestige and consequence notably\nless into the foreground than does the rating in terms of prowess and\ngentle birth that characterises the predatory scheme of life. And\nin proportion as such pecuniary accountancy comes to pervade men\u2019s\nrelations, correspondingly impersonal terms of rating and appreciation\nwill make their way also throughout men\u2019s habitual apprehension of\nexternal facts, giving the whole an increasingly impersonal complexion.\nSo far as this effect is had, the facts of observation will lend\nthemselves with correspondingly increased facility and effect to the\npurposes of technology. So that the commercial phase of culture should\nbe favourable to advance in the industrial arts, at least as regards\nthe immediate incidence of its discipline.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nOWNERSHIP AND THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM\n\n\n_I. Peaceable Ownership_\n\nThe pecuniary system of social organisation that so results has grave\nand lasting consequences for the welfare of society. It brings class\ndivergence of material interests, class prerogative and differential\nhardship, and an accentuated class disparity in the consumption of\ngoods, involving a very extensive resort to the conspicuous waste of\ngoods and services as an evidence of wealth. These consequences of\nthe pecuniary economy may be interesting enough in themselves, even\nto the theoretician, but they need not be pursued here except in so\nfar as they have an appreciable bearing on the community\u2019s workmanlike\nefficiency and the further development of technology.[110] But the\nmore direct and immediate technological consequences of this move from\na predatory to a peaceable or quasi-peaceable economic system are\nalso sufficiently grave--partly favourable to workmanship and partly\notherwise--and these it is necessary for the purposes of this inquiry\nto follow up in some detail.\n\nThe interest and attention of the two typical pecuniary classes\nbetween whom the affairs of industry now come to lie, presently\npart company and enter on a course of progressive differentiation\nalong two divergent lines. The workmen, labourers, operatives,\ntechnologists,--whatever term may best designate that general category\nof human material through which the community\u2019s technological\nproficiency functions directly to an industrial effect,--these have\nto do with the work, whereby they get their livelihood, and their\ninterest as well as the discipline of their workday life converges,\nin effect on a technologically competent apprehension of material\nfacts. In this respect the free workmen under this peaceable r\u00e9gime of\nproperty are very differently placed from the servile workman of the\npredatory r\u00e9gime of mastery and servitude. The latter has little if\nany interest in the efficiency of the industrial processes in which he\nis engaged, less so the more widely his status differs from that of\nthe free workman. His case is analogous to that of the tenant at will,\nwho has nothing to gain from permanent improvement of the land which\nhe cultivates. Whereas the free workman is, at least immediately and\ntransiently, and particularly in his own current apprehension of the\nmatter, quite intimately dependent on his own technological proficiency\nand vitally interested in any available technological expedient that\npromises to heighten his efficiency. Such is particularly the case\nduring the earlier phases of the r\u00e9gime of peaceable ownership, so\nlong as the free workman is in the typical case working at his own\ndiscretion and disposes of his own product in a limited market. And\nsuch continues to be the case, on the whole, under the wage system so\nlong as the large-scale production and investment have not put an end\nto the employer\u2019s intimate supervision of his employ\u00e9s. Indeed, under\nthe driving exigencies of the competitive wage system the workmen are\nsomewhat strenuously held to such a workmanlike apprehension of things,\neven though they may no longer have the same intimate concern in their\nown current efficiency as in the earlier days of handicraft. The severe\npressure of competitive wages and large organisation, it might well be\nthought, should logically offset the slighter attraction which work\nas such has for the hired workman as contrasted with the man occupied\nwith his own work. The effect of this r\u00e9gime of free labour should\nlogically be, as it apparently has in great part been, a close and\nprogressively searching recourse to the logic of matter-of-fact in all\nthe workmen\u2019s habitual thinking, and in all their outlook on matters of\ninterest, whether in industry or in the other concerns of life that may\nconceivably be of more capital interest.\n\nOn the other hand the owners under this r\u00e9gime of peaceable ownership\nhave to do with the pecuniary management, the gainful manipulation of\nproperty. In the transitional beginnings of this system of peaceable\nownership and free workmen the owners are in the typical case owners\nof land or similar natural resources; but in due course of time there\narises a class of owners holding property in the material equipment of\nindustry and deriving their gains and livelihood from a businesslike\nmanagement of this property, at the same time that the landlords also\nfall into more businesslike relations with their tenants on the one\nhand and with the industrial community that supplies their wants on the\nother hand. These owners, investors, masters, employers, undertakers,\nbusinessmen, have to do with the negotiation of advantageous bargains;\nit is by bargaining that their discretionary control of property takes\neffect, and in one way or another their attention centres on the quest\nof profits. The training afforded by these occupations and requisite\nto their effectual pursuit runs in terms of pecuniary management\nand insight, pecuniary gain, price, price-cost, price-profit and\nprice-loss; and these men are held to an ever more exacting recourse to\nthe logic of the price system, and so are trained to the apprehension\nof men and things in terms which count toward a gainful margin on\ninvestments and business undertakings; that is to say in terms of the\nself-regarding propensities and sentiments comprised in human nature,\nand perhaps especially in terms of human infirmity.\n\nThis last point in the characterisation may seem unwarranted, and may\neven strike unreflecting persons as derogatory. It is, of course,\nnot so intended; and any degree of reflection will bring out its\nsimple bearing on the facts of business. As is well and obviously\nknown, the sole end of business as such is pecuniary gain, gain in\nterms of price. It need not be held, as has sometimes been argued,\nthat one businessman\u2019s gain is necessarily another\u2019s loss; although\nthat principle was once taken for granted, as the foundation of the\nMercantilist policies of Europe, and is still acted on uncritically by\nthe generality of statesmen. But it is at any rate true, because it is\ncontained in the terms employed, that a successful business negotiation\nis more successful in proportion as the party of the second part is\nless competent to take care of his own pecuniary interest, whether\nthrough native or acquired incapacity for pecuniary discretion or from\npecuniary inability to stand out for such terms as he otherwise might\nconceivably exact. A shrewd businessman can, notoriously, negotiate\nadvantageous terms with an inexperienced minor or a necessitous\ncustomer or employ\u00e9. Pecuniary gain is a differential gain and business\nis a negotiation of such differential gains; not necessarily a\ndifferential of one businessman as against or at the cost of another;\nbut more commonly, and more typical of the competitive system, it is a\ndifferential as between the businessman\u2019s outlay and his returns,--that\nis to say, as between the businessman and the unbusinesslike generality\nof persons with whom directly or indirectly he deals as customers,\nemploy\u00e9s, and the like. For the purposes of such a negotiation of\ndifferentials the weakness of one party (in the pecuniary respect)\nis as much to the point as the strength of the other,--the two being\nsubstantially the same fact. The discipline of the business occupations\nshould accordingly run to the habitual rating of men, things and\naffairs in terms of emulative human nature and of precautionary\nwisdom in respect of pecuniary expediency. Instead of workmanlike or\ntechnological insight, this discipline conduces to worldly wisdom.[111]\n\nBut the disparity between the discipline of the business occupations\nand that of industry is by no means so sheer as this contrast in their\nmain characteristics would imply, nor do the men engaged in these two\ndivergent lines of work differ so widely in their habitual outlook on\naffairs or their insight into facts. Such is particularly the case in\nthe earlier and simpler phases of the r\u00e9gime, before the specialisation\nof occupations had gone so far as to divide the working community in\nany consistent fashion into the two contrasted classes of businessmen\non the one side and workmen on the other. As this modern r\u00e9gime of\npeaceable ownership and pecuniary organisation has advanced and its\npeculiar features of organisation and workmanship have reached a\nsharper definition, the division between the two contrasted kinds of\nendeavour--business and workmanship--has grown wider and the disparity\nin the distinctive range of habits engendered by each has grown more\nmarked. So that something of a marked and pervading contrast should\nlogically be found between the habitual attitude taken by members\nof the business community on the one hand and that of the body of\nworkmen on the other hand; and this contrast should, logically, go\non increasing with each successive move in advance along this line\nof specialisation of occupations and \u201cdivision of labour.\u201d Some such\nresult has apparently followed; but neither has the specialisation\nbeen complete and consistent, nor has the resulting differentiation\nin respect of their intellectual and spiritual attitude set the two\ncontrasted classes of persons apart in so definitive a fashion as a\nfirst and elementary consideration of the causes at work might lead one\nto infer.\n\nBusinessmen have to do with industry; more or less remotely perhaps,\nbut often at near hand, for it is out of industry that their business\ngains come; and they are also subject to the routine of living imposed\nby the use of the particular range of industrial appliances and\nprocesses available for that use. The workmen on the other hand have\nalso to do with pecuniary matters, for they are forever in contact\nwith the market in one way and another, and it is in pecuniary terms\nthat the livelihood comes to them for which they are set to work. And\nboth businessmen and workmen enter on their two divergent lines of\ntraining with much the same endowment of propensities and aptitudes.\nYet it appears that the training in pecuniary wisdom that makes up\nthe career of the typical businessman is after all of little avail\nin the way of technological insight or efficiency, as witness the\nubiquitous mismanagement of industry at the hands of businessmen who\nare, presumably, doing their best to enhance the efficiency of the\nindustries under their control with a view to the largest net gain from\nthe output.[112] If the \u201cefficiency engineers\u201d are to be credited, it\nis probably within the mark to say that the net aggregate gains from\nindustry fall short of what they might be by some fifty per cent, owing\nto the trained inability of the businessmen in control to appreciate\nand give effect to the visible technological requirements of the\nindustries from which they draw their gains. To appreciate the kind\nand degree of this commonplace mismanagement of industry it is only\nnecessary to contrast the facility, circumspection, shrewd strategy\nand close economy shown by these same businessmen in the organisation\nand management of their pecuniary, fiscal and monetary operations, as\nagainst the waste of time, labour and materials that abounds in the\nindustries under their control. But for the workmen likewise, their\ndaily work and their insight into its requirements and possibilities\nare, by more than half, a \u201cbusiness proposition,\u201d a proposition in the\npecuniary calculus of how to get the most in price for the least return\nin weight and tale.\n\nThese various considerations, taken crudely in their first incidence,\nwould seem to preclude any technological advance under this\nquasi-peaceable r\u00e9gime of business. Business principles and pecuniary\ndistinctions rule the familiar routine of life, and even the common\nwelfare is conceived in terms of price, and so of differential\nadvantage; and under such a system there should apparently be little\nchance of the dispassionate pursuit of such a non-invidious interest as\nthat of workmanship. The prime mover in this cultural scheme appears\nto be invidious self-aggrandisement, without fear or favour; and\nits goal appears to be the conspicuous waste of goods and services.\nYet in point of fact the technological advance under these modern\nconditions has been larger and more rapid than in any other cultural\nsituation. Therefore the circumstances under which these modern\ngains in technology have been made will merit somewhat more detailed\nattention; as also the cultural consequences that have followed from\nthis technological advance or been conditioned by it. And at the risk\nof some tedious repetition it seems pertinent summarily to recall these\npeculiar circumstances that have conditioned the modern culture and\nhave presumably shaped its technological output.\n\nBy and large this modern technological era runs its course within the\nfrontiers of Occidental civilisation, and in the period subsequent\nto the feudal age. Roughly, its centre of diffusion is the region of\nthe North Sea, and its placement in point of time is in that period\nof comparative peace spoken of as \u201cmodern times.\u201d Such of the peoples\ncomprised within this Western culture as have continued to be actively\noccupied with fighting during this modern period have had no creative\nshare in this technological era, and indeed they have had little share\nof any kind. The broad centre of diffusion of this technology coincides\nin a curious way with that of the singularly competent and singularly\nmatter-of-fact neolithic culture of northern Europe; and the racial\nelements that have been engaged in this modern technological advance\nare still substantially the same, and mixed in substantially the same\nproportions, as during that prehistoric technological era of the lower\nbarbarism or the higher savagery. This implies, of course, that the\nspiritual (instinctive) endowment of the peoples that have made the\nmodern technological era is still substantially the same as was that of\ntheir forebears of the Danish stone age.\n\nThe peoples that have taken the lead in this cultural growth, and more\nparticularly in the technological advance, have never lived under a\nfull grown and consistently worked out patriarchal system, nor have\nthey, therefore, ever fully assimilated that peculiarly personal and\narbitrarily authoritative scheme of anthropomorphic beliefs that\ncommonly goes with the patriarchal system. In the earlier phases of\ntheir cultural experience, and until recently, they have lived in\nsmall communities, under more or less of local self-government, and\nhave in great part shown some degree of religious scepticism and\ninsubordination. They have had some experience of the sea and of that\nimpersonal run of phenomena which the sea offers; which call on\nthose who have to do with the sea for patient observation of how such\nimpersonal forces work, and which constrain them to learn by trial\nand error how these forces may be turned to account. Latterly, in the\ndays of their most pronounced technological advance, these peoples\nhave had experience of an economic and industrial system organised on\nan unexampled scale, such as to constitute a very wide and inclusive\nindustrial community within which intercourse has been increasingly\neasy and effective.\n\nThese circumstances have determined the range of their habituation\nin its larger features; and these peoples have come under the\ndiscipline of this situation with a spiritual endowment apparently\ndiffering in some degree from what any other group of peoples has\never brought to a similar task. How much of the outcome, cultural and\ntechnological, is to be set down na\u00efvely and directly to a peculiar\ntemperamental bent in this human raw material would be hazardous to\nconjecture. Something seems fairly to be credited to that score. The\nparticular mixture of hybrids that goes to make up these peoples,\nand in which the dolicho-blond enters more or less ubiquitously,\nappears to lack a certain degree of subtlety, such as seems native\nto many other peoples that have created civilisations of a different\ncomplexion,--a subtlety that shows itself in a readiness for intrigue\nand farsighted appreciation of the springs of human nature, and which\noften shows itself also in high-wrought and stupendous constructions\nof anthropomorphic myth and theology, religion and magic, as well as\nin such large and fertile systems of creative art as will commonly\naccompany these anthropomorphic creations. Those peoples that are\ninfused with an appreciable blond admixture have on the other hand,\nnot commonly excelled in the farther reaches of the spiritual life,\nparticularly not in the refinements of a sustained and finished\nanthropomorphism. Their best efficiency has rather run to those\nbull-headed deeds of force and those mechanic arts that touch closely\non the domain of the inorganic forces.\n\nOf such a character is also this modern technological era. It is in\nthe mechanic arts dealing with brute matter that the modern technology\nholds over all else, in matter-of-fact insight, in the na\u00efvet\u00e9 of the\nquestions with which its adepts search the facts of observation, and in\nthe crudity (anthropomorphically speaking) of the answers with which\nthey are content to go back to their work. Outside of the mechanic arts\nthis technology must be rated lower than second best. In subtlety of\ncraftsmanlike insight and contrivance or in delicacy of manipulation\nand adroit use of man\u2019s physical aptitudes the peoples of this Western\nculture are not now and never have been equal to the best.\n\nSuch a characterisation of the modern technology may seem too broad\nand too schematic,--that it overlooks features of the case that are\nsufficiently large and distinctive to call for their recognition\neven in the most general characterisation. So, e.\u00a0g., in the light\nof what has been noted above in speaking of the domestication of the\ncrop plants and animals, the question may well suggest itself: Is not\nthe patent success of these modern industrial peoples in the use and\nimprovement of crops and cattle to be accepted as evidence of a genial\nanthropomorphic bent, of the same kind and degree as took effect in\nthe original domestication of plants and animals? For some two hundred\nyears past, it is true, very substantial advances have been made in\ntillage and breeding, and this is at the same time the peculiar domain\nin which the anthropomorphic savages of the stone age once achieved\nthose things which have made civilisation physically possible; but the\nmodern gains made in these lines have, in the main if not altogether,\nbeen technologically of the same mechanistic character as the rest\nof the modern advance in the industrial arts, with little help or\nhindrance due to any such anthropomorphic bias as guided the savage\nancients. It is rather by virtue of their having come competently to\napprehend these facts of animate nature in substantially inanimate\nterms, mechanistic and chemical terms, that the modern technological\nadepts in tillage and cattle-breeding have successfully carried this\nline of workmanship forward at a rate and with an effect not approached\nbefore. The livestock expert is soberly learning by trial and error\nwhat to attempt and how to go about it in his breeding experiments, and\nhe deals as callously as any mechanical engineer with the chemistry\nof stock foods and the use and abuse of ferments, germs and enzymes.\nThe soil specialist talks, thinks and acts in terms of salts, acids,\nalkalies, stratifications, 200-mesh siftings, and nitrogen-fixing\norganisms. The crop-plant expert looks to handmade cross-fertilisation\nand to the Mendelian calculus of hybridisation, with no more imputation\nof anthropomorphic traits than the metallurgist who analyses fuels and\nfluxes, mixes ores, and with goggled eye scrutinises the shifting tints\nof the incandescent gases in the open hearth. It is from such facts so\nconstrued that modern technology is made up, and it is by such channels\nthat the sense of workmanship has gone to the making of it.\n\nSo the question recurs, How has it come about that this pecuniary\nculture--with its institutions drawn in terms of differential advantage\nand moved by sentiments that converge on emulative gain and the\ninvidiously conspicuous waste of goods--has yet furthered the growth\nof such a technology, even permissively? In its direct incidence, the\ndiscipline of this pecuniary culture is doubtless inimical to any\nadvance in workmanlike insight or any matter-of-fact apprehension and\nuse of objective phenomena. It is a civilisation whose substantial\ncore is of a subjective kind, in the narrowly subjective, personal,\nindividualistic sense given by the self-regarding sentiments of\nemulous rivalry.[113] But when all is said it is after all a peaceable\nculture, on the whole; and indeed the rules of the business game of\nprofit and loss, forfeit and sequestration, require it to be so. It has\nat least that much, and perhaps much else, in common with the great\ntechnological era of the north-European neolithic age. The discipline\nto which its peoples are subject may be exacting enough, and its\nexactions may run to worldly wisdom rather than to matter-of-fact;\nbut its invidious distinctions run in terms of price, that is to say\nin terms of an objective, impersonal money unit, in the last resort a\nmetallic weight; and the traffic of daily life under this price system\naffords an unremitting exercise in the exact science of making change,\nlarge and small. Even the daydreams of the pecuniary day-dreamer take\nshape as a calculus of profit and loss computed in standard units of\nan impersonal magnitude, even though the magnitude of these standard\nunits may on analysis prove to be of a largely putative character. The\nimputation under the price system is of an impersonal kind. In the\ncurrent apprehension of the pecuniary devotee these magnitudes are\nwholly objective, so that in effect the training that comes of busying\nhimself with them is after all a training in the accurate appreciation\nof brute fact.\n\nAt the same time, the instinct of workmanship, being not an acquired\ntrait, has not been got rid of by disuse; and when the occasion\noffers, under the relatively tranquil conditions of this peaceable or\nquasi-peaceable pecuniary r\u00e9gime, the ancient proclivity asserts itself\nin its ancient force, uneager and asthenic perhaps, but pervasive and\nresilient. And when this instinct works out through the B\u0153otic genius\nof the north-European hybrid there is a good chance that the outcome of\nsuch observation and reflection will fall into terms of matter-of-fact,\nof such close-shorn na\u00efvet\u00e9, indeed, as to afford very passable\nmaterial for the material sciences and the machine technology.\n\nSo also, the ancient and time-worn civil institutions of the\nnorth-European peoples have apparently not been of the high-wrought\ninvidious character that comes of long and strenuous training in\nthe practices and ideals of the patriarchal system; nor are their\nprevailing religious conceits extremely drastic, theatrical or\nceremonious, as compared with what is to be found in the cults of the\ngreat dynastic civilisations of the East. On the whole, it is only\nthrough the Middle Ages that these peoples have been subject to the\nrigorous servile discipline that characterises a dynastic despotism,\nsecular or religious; and much of the ancient, pagan and prehistoric\npreconceptions on civil and religious matters appear to have stood\nover in the habits of thought of the common people even through that\ninterval of submergence under aristocratic and patriarchal rule. In the\nsame connection it may be remarked that the blond-hybrid peoples of\nChristendom were the last to accept the patriarchal mythology of the\nSemites and have also been the first and readiest to shuffle out of it\nin the sequel; which suggests the inference that they have never fully\nassimilated its spirit; perhaps for lack of a sufficiently strict and\nprotracted discipline in its ways and ideals, perhaps for lack of a\nsuitable temperamental ground.\n\nThere is, indeed, a curiously pervasive concomitance, in point of time,\nplace, and race, between the modern machine technology, the material\nsciences, religious scepticism, and that spirit of insubordination that\nmakes the substance of what are called free or popular institutions. On\nnone of these heads is the concomitance so close or consistent as to\nwarrant the conclusion that race and topography alone have made this\nmodern cultural outcome. The exceptions and side issues are too broad\nand too numerous for that; but it is after all a concomitance of such\nbreadth and scope that it can also not be overlooked.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe course of mutations that has brought on this modern technological\nepisode may be conceived to have run somewhat in the following manner.\nFor lack of sufficient training in predatory habits of thought (as\nshown, e.\u00a0g., in the incomplete patriarchalism of the north-Europeans)\nthe predatory culture failed to reach what may be called a normal\nmaturity in the feudal system of Europe, particularly in the North\nand West, where the blond admixture is stronger; by \u201cnormal\u201d being\nhere intended that sequence of growth, institutionalisation, and decay\nshown typically by the great dynastic civilisations erected by Semitic\ninvaders in the East. In the full-charged predatory culture, in its\nearlier phases, there appear typically to be present two somewhat\ndivergent economic principles (habits of thought) both of which have\nsomething of an institutional force: (_a_) The warrant of seizure by\nprowess,[114] which commonly comes to vest in the dynastic head in case\na despotic state is established; and (_b_) the prescriptive tenure\nof whatever one has acquired. These two institutional factors are at\nvariance, and according as one or the other of the two finally takes\nprecedence and rules out or masters its rival postulate, the predatory\nculture continues on lines of coercive exploitation, as in these\nAsiatic monarchies; or it passes into the quasi-peaceable phase marked\nby secure prescriptive tenure of property and a settled nobility, and\npresently into a commercialised industrial situation. Either line of\ndevelopment may, of course, be broken off without having reached a\nconsummation.\n\nWithin the region of the Western Civilisation, both in north Europe\nand repeatedly in the \u00c6gean, the course of events has fallen out in\nthe line of the latter alternative; the growth of institutions has\nshifted from the footing of prowess to that of prescriptive ownership.\nSo soon as this shift has securely been made, the development of trade,\nindustry and a technological system has come into the foreground, and\nthese habitual interests have then reacted on the character of the\ninstitutions in force, thereby accelerating the growth of conditions\nfavourable to their own further advance. There is, of course, no marked\npoint of conjuncture in the cultural sequence at which this transition\nmay definitely be said to have been effected, but in a general way\nit may be held that the point of transition has been passed so soon\nas the current political and economic speculations uncritically give\nprecedence to the \u201ccommonweal\u201d as against the fiscal interests of\nthe crown or the \u201cstate,\u201d whereby the crown and its officers come,\nin theory and public pronouncement, to be rated as guardians of the\ncommunity\u2019s material welfare rather than autocratic exploiters of the\ncommunity\u2019s productive capacity. Roughly from the same period there\nwill duly set in something of an acceleration in rate of improvement\nin the state of the mechanic arts. This movement seems plainly to come\non the initiative of the lower or industrial classes and to be carried\nby their genius, rather than by that of the ruling classes, whether\nsecular or spiritual. It shows itself, typically, in a growth of\nhandicraft and petty trade.\n\nSo the sense of workmanship and its associated sentiments again come,\nby insensible degrees, to take the first place among the factors\nthat determine the run of habituation and therefore the character of\nthe resulting culture,--so making the transition from barbarism to\ncivilisation, in the narrower sense of the term; which is accordingly\nto be characterised, in contrast with the predatory barbarian culture,\nas a qualified or mitigated (sophisticated) return to the spirit\nof savagery, or at least as a spiritual reversion looking in that\ndirection, though by no means abruptly reaching the savage plane. The\nnew phase has this in common with the typical savage culture that\nworkmanship rather than prowess again becomes the chief or primary norm\nof habituation, and therefore of the growth of institutions; and that\nthere results, therefore, a peaceable bent in the ideals and endeavours\nof the community. But it is workmanship combined and compounded with\nownership; that is to say workmanship coupled with an invidious\nemulation and consequently with a system of institutions embodying a\nrange of prescriptive differential benefits.\n\n\n_II. The Competitive System_\n\nDominated by the tradition handed down from the beginning of the\nnineteenth century, current economic theory has habitually made\nmuch of accumulated goods as the prime requisite of industry. In\nindustrial enterprise as it was then carried on the prevailing unit of\norganisation was the private firm, with partnership concerns making up\na secondary and less commonplace element in the business community.\nOrdinarily and typically these private firms and partnerships\nowned a certain material equipment employed in industry, and they\ntook the initiative in industrial enterprise on the ground of this\nownership; hiring the workmen, buying materials and supplies, and\nselling the products of the establishment. Credit relations, such as\ngo to the creation and conduct of a modern corporation, were still\nof secondary consequence, being resorted to rather as an expedient\nin emergencies than as the initial move and the substantial ground\nof business organisation; the measure of the concern\u2019s magnitude and\nconsequence was still (typically) its unencumbered ownership of the\nmaterial equipment, the size of the plant and the numbers of its hired\nworkmen. It follows by easy consequence that in the practical business\nconceptions of that time the equipment of material means, which\nembodies the concern\u2019s assets and affords the ground of its initiative\nand its rating in the business community, should commonly be rated as\nthe prime mover in industry and the chief productive factor. So, also,\nthe theoretical speculation that drew on that business traffic for its\nworking concepts came unavoidably to accept these tangible assets, the\ncommunity\u2019s material equipment,--implements, livestock, raw materials,\nmeans of subsistence,--as the prime agency in the community\u2019s economic\nlife. As is true for the working conceptions and principles of\nindustrial business, so also in the theoretical formulations of the\neconomists, the community\u2019s immaterial equipment of technological\nproficiency is taken for granted as a circumstance of the environment\nconditioning the community\u2019s economic life,--the state of the\nindustrial arts and the current workmanlike aptitudes and efficiency.\nAs the phrase runs, \u201cgiven the state of the industrial arts.\u201d\n\nThis is good, homely, traditional common sense; it reflects the\nhabitual practical run of affairs in the industrial community of that\nrecent past. Such was the attitude of practical men toward industrial\nmatters at the time when the current economic situation took its rise.\nBut such a conception is no longer so true to the practical exigencies\nof the immediate present, nor do the men of affairs today habitually\nsee these matters in just this light; although the principles of the\nlaw that govern industrial enterprise still continue to embody these\ntime-worn conceptions, to which the economists also continue to yield\nallegiance. Like other elements of habitual knowledge this conception\nof things is drawn from past experience--chiefly from a past not too\nremote for ready comprehension--and it carries over the frame of mind\nout of which it arose.\n\nIn the earlier days of the machine industry, then,--say, in the closing\nquarter of the eighteenth century,--the conduct of industrial affairs\nwas in the hands of business men who owned the material equipment\nand who directed the use of this equipment and turned it to account\nfor their own gain, on the prescriptive ground of such ownership.\nDiscretion and initiative vested in the capitalist-employer, who at\nthat time, (typically) combined ownership of the plant with a somewhat\nimmediate supervision and control of the industrial processes. The\ndirective control of industry, covering both the volume and the\ncharacter of the processes and output, was in the typical case directly\nbound up with the ownership of the material equipment as such,--as\ntangible assets, not as corporation stock-holdings. Since then changes\nhave come over the business situation, particularly through an\nextensive recourse to credit, such that this time-worn conception will\nno longer answer the run of current business practice, particularly\nnot as touches that large-scale enterprise that now rules industrial\naffairs and that is currently accepted as the type of modern business\nenterprise.\n\nAmong the assumptions of a hundred years ago was the premise,\nself-evident to that generation of thoughtful men, that the phase of\ncommercialised economic life then prevailing was the immutably normal\norder of things. And the assumptions surrounding that preconception\nwere good and competent for a formulation of economic theory that\ntakes such an institutional situation for granted and assumes it to\nbe unchanging, or to be a _terminus ad quem_. But for anything like\na genetic account of economic life, early or late, capitalistic or\notherwise, such assumptions and the theoretical propositions and\nanalyses that follow from them are defective in that they take for\ngranted what requires to be accounted for. Theoretical speculation\nthat presupposes the (somewhat old-fashioned) institutions formerly\ngoverning ownership and business traffic, and assumes them to have the\nimmutable character and indefeasible force _de facto_ which is assigned\nthem _de jure_, and that likewise assumes as immutable a passing\nphase in the \u201cstate of the industrial arts,\u201d may serve passably for\na theory of how business affairs should properly arrange themselves\nto fit the conditions so assumed; and such, indeed, has commonly\nbeen the character of theoretical formulations touching industry and\nbusiness. And as should fairly be expected, in the speculations of\nthe economists, these theoretical formulations have also commonly been\naccompanied by a parallel line of remedial advice designed to show what\npreventive measures should be applied to prevent the run of business\npractice from doing violence to these assumed conditions that are held\nto be immutably normal and indefeasibly right.\n\nNow, since in the received theories the accumulated \u201cproductive goods\u201d\nare conceived to be the most consequential factor in industry, and\ntherefore in the community\u2019s material welfare and in the fortunes of\nindividuals, it logically follows that the discretionary ownership of\nthem has come to be accounted the most important relation in which\nmen may stand to the production of wealth and to the community\u2019s\nlivelihood; and the pecuniary transactions whereby this ownership is\narranged, manipulated and redistributed are held to be industrially\nthe most productive of all human activities. It is only during the\nnineteenth century that this doctrine of pecuniary productivity has\nbeen worked out into finished shape and has found secure lodgment in\nthe systematic structure of economic theory--in the current theory of\n\u201cthe Function of the Entrepreneur;\u201d[115] but it is also only during\nthis period that business enterprise (pecuniary management) has come\nto dominate the economic situation in a substantially unmitigated\ndegree, so that the material fortunes of the community have come to\ndepend on these pecuniary negotiations into which its \u201ccaptains of\nindustry\u201d enter for their own gain.[116] In the sense that no other\nline of activity stands in anything like an equally decisive relation\nof initiative or discretion to the industrial process, or bears with a\nlike weight on the material welfare of the community, these business\nnegotiations in ownership are unquestionably the prime factor in modern\nindustry. But that such is the case is due to the peculiar institutions\nof modern times and to the peculiar current state of the industrial\narts; and the former of these peculiar circumstances is conditioned by\nthe latter.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is not practicable to assign a hard and fast date from which this\nmodern era began, with its peculiar scheme of economic life and the\neconomic conceptions that characterise it. The date will vary from\none country to another, and even from one industrial class to another\nwithin the same country. But it can be said that historically the\nmodern era begins with the rise of handicraft; it is along the line\nof growth marked out by the development of handicraft that the modern\ntechnology has emerged, together with that industrial organisation and\nthose pecuniary conceptions of economic efficiency and serviceability\nthat have gradually come to their current state of maturity on the\nground afforded by this technology. What historically lies back of the\nera of handicraft is not of a piece with the economic situation of\nmodern times; nor is it characteristic of the Western civilisation,\nas contrasted with the agricultural and predatory civilisations of\nantiquity.\n\nAs indicated in an earlier chapter, in speaking of the decay of\nthe predatory (feudalistic) r\u00e9gime and its servile agricultural\norganisation of industry, when peace and order supervene the instinct\nof workmanship by insensible degrees and in an uncertain measure\nsupplants the invidious self-regarding sentiments that actuate the\nlife of prowess and servility characteristic of that culture; so that\nworkmanship comes again into the foreground among the instinctive\npropensities that shape the community\u2019s habitual interest and so bend\nthe course of its institutional growth and determine the bias of its\ncommon sense.\n\nThe habitual outlook and the bias given by the handicraft system are of\na twofold character--technological and pecuniary. The craftsman was an\nartificer engaged in mechanical operations, working with tools of which\nhe had the mastery, and employing mechanical processes the mysteries\nof which were familiar to his everyday habits of thought; but from the\nbeginning of the era of handicraft and throughout his industrial life\nhe was also more or less of a trader. He stood in close relation with\nsome form of market, and his proficiency as a craftsman was brought\nto a daily practical test in the sale of his wares or services, no\nless than in the workmanlike fashioning of them. Also, the price as\nwell as the workmanlike quality of the goods presently became subject\nof regulation under the rules of the crafts; and the petty trade\nwhich grew up as an occupation accessory to the handicraft industry\nwas itself organised on lines analogous to the crafts proper and was\nregulated by similar principles; the trader\u2019s work being accounted\nserviceable, or productive, in the same general sense as that of any\nother craftsman and being recognised as equitably entitling those who\npursued it to a fair livelihood.\n\nThe handicraft system was an organised and regulated system of\nworkmanship and self-help; and under the conditions imposed by its\ntechnology proficiency in the latter respect was no less indispensable\nand no less to the purpose than in the former. Both counted equally\nand in combination toward the successful working of the system, which\nis a practicable plan of economic life only so long as the craftsmen\ncombine both of these capacities in good force and only so long as the\ntechnological exigencies admit the exercise of both in conjunction. The\nsystem broke down so soon as the state of the industrial arts no longer\nenabled the workmen to acquire the necessary technological proficiency\nand do the required work at the same time that they each and several\nwere able to oversee and pursue their individual pecuniary interests.\nWith the coming on of a wider and more extensively differentiated\ntechnological scheme, and with wider and remoter market relations, due\nin the main to increased facilities of transportation, these necessary\nconditions of a practicable handicraft economy gradually failed, and\nthe practice of industrial investments and the larger commerce then\ngradually supplanted it.\n\nThe discipline of everyday life under the handicraft economy was a\ndiscipline in pecuniary self-help as well as in workmanship. In the\npopular ideal as well as in point of practical fact the complete\ncraftsman stood shrewdly on his individual proficiency in maintaining\nhis own pecuniary advantage, as well as on his trained workmanship;\nand the gilds were organised to maintain the craft\u2019s advantages in the\nmarket, as well as to regulate the quality of the output. The craft\nrules governing the quality of the output of goods were in the main\nenforced with a view to the maintenance of price, and so with a view\nto securing an adequate livelihood for the craftsmen. Efficiency in\nthe crafts came in this way presently to be counted very much as the\nmodern \u201cefficiency engineers\u201d would count it,--proximately in terms\nof mechanical performance, ultimately in terms of price, and more\nparticularly in terms of net gain. So that the habits of life ingrained\nin the gildsman, and in the community at large where the gild system\nprevailed, comprised as a main fact a meticulous regard for details of\nownership and for pecuniary claims and obligations. It is out of this\ninsistent, pervasive, and minutely concrete discipline in the practice\nand logic of pecuniary detail that there have arisen those \u201cnatural\nrights\u201d of property and those \u201cbusiness principles\u201d that have been\ntaken over by the later era of the machine industry and capitalistic\ninvestment.\n\nThe rules of the gild, as well as the larger legislative provisions\nthat had to do with gild regulations, were avowedly drawn with a view\nto securing the gildsman in a fair customary livelihood, and the\nmeasures logically adopted to this end were designed to secure him in\nthe enjoyment and disposal of the returns of his work as well as in his\nright to pursue his trade within the rules laid down for the collective\nwelfare by the gild. With due training in this logic of the handicraft\nsystem it became a plain matter of common sense that the craftsman\nshould equitably be entitled to whatever he can get for his work under\nthe conventionally settled rules of the trade, and should be free to\nmake the most of his capacities in all that pertains to his pursuit of\na livelihood; and the like principles (habits of thought) apply to the\ntraffic of the petty trade; which, being presently interpreted in terms\nof contract and investment, has come to mean the right to do business\nand to enjoy and dispose of the returns from all bargains made in due\nform.\n\nPresently, as the technological situation gradually changed its\ncharacter through extensions and specialisation in appliances and\nprocesses--perhaps especially through changes in the means of\ncommunication and in the density of population--the handicraft system\nwith its petty trade outgrew itself and broke down in a new phase of\nthe pecuniary culture. The increasingly wide differentiation between\nworkmanship and salesmanship grew into a \u201cdivision of labour\u201d between\nindustry and business, between industrial and pecuniary occupations,--a\ndisjunction of ownership and its peculiar cares, privileges and\nproficiency from workmanship. By this division of labour, or divergence\nof function, a fraction of the community came to specialise in\nownership and pecuniary traffic, and so came to constitute a business\ncommunity occupied with pecuniary affairs, running along beside the\nindustrial community proper, with a development of practices and usages\npeculiar to its own needs and bearing only indirectly on the further\ndevelopment of the industrial system or on the state of the industrial\narts.\n\nMaster-workmen with means would employ other workmen without means,\nand might or might not themselves continue to work at the trade. Petty\ntraders or hucksters, nominally members of some craft gild, would\ngrow wealthy with the increasing volume of traffic and would organise\na more and more extensive household (sweatshop) industry to meet the\nincreasing demands of their market; or they might become jobbers, carry\non more far-reaching trade operations over a longer term, withdraw\nmore distantly from the actual work of the craft, and in the course of\na generation or two (as, e.\u00a0g., the Fuggers) would grow into merchant\nprinces and financiers who maintained but a remote and impersonal\nrelation to the crafts. Or, again, the associated merchants (as, e.\u00a0g.,\nthose of the Hansa) would establish depots and agents, \u201cfactories,\u201d\nthat would gradually assemble something of a working force of craftsmen\nto sort, warehouse and finish the products which they handled, at the\nsame time that they would exercise an increasingly close and extensive\noversight of the industries from which these products were derived;\nuntil these depots, under the management of the factors, in some cases\ngrew into factories in somewhat the modern acceptance of the term. In\none way and another this trading or huckstering traffic, which had\nbeen intimately associated with the handicraft industry and gild life,\nbranched off in the course of time as the industries advanced to a\nlarger scale and a more extensive specialisation; and this increasing\n\u201cdivision of labour\u201d between workmanship and salesmanship led presently\nto such a segregation of the traders out of the body of craftsmen as to\ngive rise to a business community devoted to pecuniary management alone.\n\nBut the principles on which the new and larger business was conducted\nwere the same as those on which the earlier petty trade had been\ncarried on, and therefore the same in point of derivation and tenor\nas had been worked out by long experience within the handicraft system\nproper. Business traffic was an outgrowth of the handicraft system, and\nit was in as secure a position in respect of legitimacy and legal and\ncustomary guaranty as the industrial system from which its principles\nwere derived and from which its gains were drawn.\n\nThe source from which the new line of businessmen drew the\naccumulations of wealth by force of which they were enabled to do\nbusiness is somewhat in dispute; but however interesting a question\nthat may be in its own right, it does not particularly concern the\npresent inquiry, and the like is true for the still more interesting\nand spectacular phenomena that marked the growth and decline of that\nearly business era that ran its course within the life-history of\nthe handicraft system.[117] Throughout that great period of business\nactivity on the continent of Europe that gathered head in the sixteenth\ncentury and that closed in decay and collapse in the seventeenth,\nthe principles (habits of thought) which underlay, authenticated and\nanimated the business community and its pecuniary traffic continued to\nbe much the same as animated the body of craftsmen in their pecuniary\nrelations from the beginning of the era of handicraft to its close.\nSuch, in its turn, was also the case with the later business era that\nset in with the great industrial advance of England in the Eighteenth\nCentury, and such continued to be the case through the greater part\nof its life-history in the Nineteenth Century. Of the latterday and\nlatest developments in business practice and principles the like\ncannot unhesitatingly be said, but this too is a matter that does not\nimmediately concern the inquiry at this point. But the principles of\nthe new and larger business were the same as had been slowly worked\nout under the system of petty trade. These business principles have\nproved to be very tenacious and stable, even in the face of apparently\nadverse technological circumstances, coming as they do out of a long\nand rigorous habituation of very wide sweep and having acquired the\nauthenticity due to formal recognition in legal decisions and to the\npainstaking definition given them in the course of a protracted and\nexacting struggle against the institutional remnants of the feudal\nsystem. These circumstances attending the genesis and growth of\nmodern business principles have led to their being formulated in a\nwell-defined conceptual scheme of customary right and also to their\nembodiment in statutory form. To this, perhaps, they owe much of\ntheir tenacious resistance to latterday exigencies that have tended\nto modify or abrogate them. In their elements, of course, these\nbusiness principles are even older than the era of handicraft, being\nsubstantially of the same nature as that sentimental impulse to\nself-aggrandisement that lies at the root of the predatory culture and\nso makes the substantial core of all pecuniary civilisations.\n\nThe distinguishing mark of any business era, as contrasted with the\nhandicraft economy, is the supreme dominance of pecuniary principles,\nboth as standards of efficiency and as canons of conduct. In such\na businesslike community efficiency is rated in terms of pecuniary\ngain; and in so far as business principles rule, efficiency in any\nother direction than business traffic can claim recognition only in\nthe measure in which it may be reduced to terms of pecuniary gain.\nWorkmanship, therefore, comes to be rated in terms of salesmanship. And\nthe canons of workmanship, and even of technological efficiency, fall\nmore and more into pecuniary lines and allow pecuniary tests to decide\non points of serviceability.\n\nThe instinct of workmanship is accordingly contaminated with ideals\nof self-aggrandisement and the canons of invidious emulation, so that\neven the serviceability of any given action or policy for the common\ngood comes to be rated in terms of the pecuniary gain which such\nconduct will bring to its author. Any pecuniary strategist--\u201ccaptain\nof industry\u201d--who manages to engross appreciably more than an even\nshare of the community\u2019s wealth is therefore likely to be rated as a\nbenefactor of the community at large and an exemplar of the social\nvirtues; whereas the man who works and does not manage to divert\nsomething more from the aggregate product to his own use than what one\nman\u2019s work may contribute to it is visited not only with dispraise\nfor having fallen short of a decent measure of efficiency but also\nwith moral reprobation for shiftlessness and wasted opportunities. So\nalso, to the current common sense in a community trained to pecuniary\nrather than to workmanlike discrimination between articles of use,\nthose articles which serve their material use in a conspicuously\nwasteful manner commend themselves as more serviceable, nobler and more\nbeautiful than such goods as do not embody such a margin of waste.[118]\n\nUnder this system of business principles, in one way and another,\nthe sense of workmanship is contaminated in all its ramifications by\npreconceptions of pecuniary merit and invidious distinction. But what\nis here immediately in question is its deflection into the channels\nof gainful business, together with the more obvious consequences that\nfollow directly from the substitution of differential gain in the\nplace of material serviceability as the end to which the instinctive\npropensity of workmanship so comes to drive men\u2019s ideals and efforts\nunder the discipline of the pecuniary culture.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFor the purposes of a genetic inquiry into this modern business\nsituation and its bearing on the sense of workmanship and on the\ntechnological phenomena in which that instinct comes to an expression,\nit is necessary summarily to recall certain current facts pertinent\nto the case: (_a_) It is a competitive system; that is to say it is a\nsystem of pecuniary rivalry and contention which proceeds on stable\ninstitutions of property and contract, under conditions of peace and\norder. (_b_) It is a price system, i.\u00a0e., the competition runs in terms\nof money, and the money unit is the standard measure of efficiency and\nachievement; hence competition and efficiency are subject to a rigorous\naccountancy in terms of a (putatively) stable money unit, which is in\nall business traffic assumed to be invariable. (_c_) Technologically\nthis situation is dominated by the mechanical industries; so much\nso that even the arts of husbandry have latterly taken on much of\nthe character of the mechanic arts. Hence a somewhat thoroughgoing\nstandardisation of processes and products in mechanical terms; which\nfor business purposes has with a fair degree of success been made\nconvertible into terms of price, and so made subject to accountancy\nin terms of price. (_d_) Hence consumption is also standardised,\nproximately in mechanical terms of consumable products but finally,\nthrough the mechanism of the market, in terms of price, and like other\nprice phenomena consumption also is competitively subject to and\nenforced by the like accountancy in terms of the money unit. (_e_)\nThe typical industries, which set the pace for productive work, for\ncompetitive gains, and through the standard rates of gain ultimately\nalso for competitive consumption, are industries carried on on a large\nscale; that is to say they are such as to require a large material\nequipment, a wide recourse to technological insight and proficiency,\nand a large draught on the material resources of the community. (_f_)\nThis material equipment--industrial plant and natural resources--is\nheld in private ownership, with negligible exceptions; the noteworthy\nexceptions to this rule, as e.\u00a0g., harbours, highways, and the like,\nserving chiefly as accessory means of industry and so come in chiefly\nas a gratuitous supplement to the industrial equipment held in private\nownership and used for competitive gain. (_g_) Technological knowledge\nand proficiency is in the main held and transmitted pervasively by\nthe community at large, but it is also held in part--more obviously\nbecause exceptionally--by specially trained classes and individual\nworkmen. Relatively little, in effect a negligible proportion, of\nthis technological knowledge and skill is in any special sense held\nby the owners of the industrial equipment, more particularly not by\nthe owners of the typical large-scale industries. That is to say,\nthe technologically proficient workmen do not in the typical case\nown or control any appreciable proportion of the material equipment\nor of the natural resources to which this technological knowledge\nand skill applies and in the use of which it takes effect. (_h_) It\nresults that the owners of this large material equipment, including the\nnatural resources, have a discretionary control of the technological\nproficiency of the community at large, as well as of those special\nlines of insight and skill that are vested in these specially trained\nexpert men in whom a specialised proficiency is added to the general\nproficiency that is diffused through the community at large. (_i_) In\neffect, therefore, the owners of the necessary material equipment own\nalso the working capacity of the community and the usufruct of the\nstate of the industrial arts. Except for their effective ownership\nof these elements of productive efficiency their ownership of the\nmaterial equipment of industry would be of no effect. But the usufruct\nof this productive capacity of the community and its trained workmen\nvests in the owners of the material equipment only with the contingent\nqualification that if the community does this work it must be allowed\na livelihood, whereby the gross returns that go in the first instance\nto these owners suffer abatement by that much. This required livelihood\nis adjusted to a conventional standard of living which, under the\ncurrent circumstances of pecuniary emulation, is in great part--perhaps\nchiefly--a standardised schedule of conspicuous waste.\n\nIn what has just been said above, the view is implied that the\nowners of the material means, who are in great part also the\nemployers of workmen and are sentimentally spoken of as \u201ccaptains\nof industry,\u201d have, in effect and commonly, but a relatively loose\ngrasp of the technological facts, possibilities, and requirements\nof modern industry, and that by virtue of their business training\nthey are able to make but a scant and uncertain use of such loose\nideas as they have on these heads. To anyone imbued with the\ncommonplaces of current economic theory it may seem that exception\nshould dutifully be taken to this view, as being an understatement\nof the businessmen\u2019s technological merits. In current theoretical\nformulations the businessman is discussed under the caption of\n\u201centrepreneur,\u201d \u201cundertaker,\u201d etc., and his gains are spoken of as\n\u201cwages of superintendence,\u201d \u201cwages of management,\u201d and the like. He\nis conceived as an expert workman in charge of the works, a superior\nforeman of the shop, and his gains are accounted a remuneration for his\ncreative contribution to the process of production, due to his superior\ninsight and initiative in technological matters. This conception of\nthe businessman and his relation to industry has stood over from an\nearlier period, the period of the small-scale industry of handicraft\nand petty trade, when it still was true that the owner-employer, in the\ntypical case, kept a personal oversight of his workmen and their work,\nand so filled the place of master-workman as well as that of buyer and\nseller of materials and finished goods. And such a characterisation\nof the businessman and his work will still hold true in the modern\nsituation in so far as he still is occupied with industry conducted\non the same small scale and continues to fill the place of a foreman\nof the shop. But under current conditions--the conditions of the past\nhalf century--and more particularly under the conditions of that\nlarge-scale industry that is currently accounted the type of modern\nindustry, the businessman has ceased to be foreman of the shop, and\nhis surveillance of industry has ceased effectually to comprise a\ntechnological management of its details; and in corresponding measure\nthis traditional theoretical conception of the businessman has ceased\nto apply.\n\nThe view here spoken for, that the modern businessman is necessarily\nout of effectual touch with the affairs of technology as such and\nincompetent to exercise an effectual surveillance of the processes\nof industry, is not a matter of bias or of vague opinion; it has in\nfact become a matter of statistical demonstration. Even a cursory\nsurvey of the current achievements of these great modern industries\nas managed by businessmen, taken in contrast with the opportunities\noffered them, should convince anyone of the technological unfitness of\nthis business management of industry. Indeed, the captains of industry\nhave themselves latterly begun to recognise their own inefficiency in\nthis respect, and even to appreciate that a businessman\u2019s management\nof industrial processes is not good even for the business purpose--the\nnet pecuniary gain. And it is all the more ineffectual for the\npurposes of workmanship as distinct from the businessmen\u2019s gains.\nSo, a professional class of \u201cefficiency engineers\u201d is coming into\naction, whose duty it is to take invoice of the preventable wastes\nand inefficiencies due to the business management of industry and\nto present the case in such concrete and obvious terms of price and\npercentage as the businessmen in charge will be able to comprehend.\nThese men, in a way, take over the functions assigned in economic\ntheory to the \u201centrepreneur;\u201d in that they are men of general\ntechnological training and insight, who go into their inquiry on the\nground of workmanship, take their data in terms of workmanship and\nconvert them into terms of business expediency, somewhat to the same\npurpose as the like work of conversion was done by the owner-employers\nunder that small-scale system of industrial enterprise from which the\ncurrent theoretical concept of the \u201centrepreneur\u201d was derived. It is\nthen the duty of these efficiency engineers to present the results so\nobtained, for the conviction and guidance of the businessmen in charge,\nwho thereupon, if their business training has left them enough of a\nsense of workmanship, will give permissive instructions to the expert\nworkmen in direct charge of the industrial processes to put these\nstatistically indicated changes into effect. It is the testimony of\nthese efficiency engineers that relatively few pecuniary captains in\ncommand of industrial enterprises have a sufficient comprehension of\nthe technological facts to understand and accept the findings of the\ntechnological experts who so argue for the elimination of preventable\nwastes, even when the issue is presented statistically in terms of\nprice. These men go about their work of ascertaining the efficiency,\nactual and potential, of any given plant, process, working force,\nor parcel of material resources, by the methods of precise physical\nmeasurement familiar to mechanical engineers, and as an outcome they\nhave no hesitation in speaking of preventable wastes amounting to ten,\ntwenty, fifty, or even ninety per-cent, in the common run of American\nindustries.[119]\n\nThe work of the efficiency engineers being always done in the service\nof business and with a view to business expediency, their findings\nbear directly on the business exigencies of the case alone, and give\ndefinitive results only in terms of price and profits. How much\ngreater the ascertained discrepancies in the case would appear if\nthese findings could be reduced to terms of serviceability to the\ncommunity at large, there is no means of forming a secure conjecture.\nThat the discrepancy would in such case prove to be appreciably greater\nthan that shown by the price rating is not doubtful. Under such an\nappraisal, where the given industrial enterprises would be brought to\nthe test of net serviceability to the community instead of the net\ngain of the interested businessmen, many industrial enterprises would\ndoubtless show a waste of appreciably more than one hundred per cent of\ntheir current output, being rather disserviceable to the community\u2019s\nmaterial welfare than otherwise.\n\nThat the business community is so permeated with incapacity and lack\nof insight in technological matters is doubtless due proximately to\nthe fact that their attention is habitually directed to the pecuniary\nissue of industrial enterprise; but more fundamentally and unavoidably\nit is due to the large volume and intricate complications of the\ncurrent technological scheme, which will not permit any man to become a\ncompetent specialist in an alien and exacting field of endeavour, such\nas business enterprise, and still acquire and maintain an effectual\nworking acquaintance with the state of the industrial arts. The current\ntechnological scheme cannot be mastered as a matter of commonplace\ninformation or a by-occupation incidental to another pursuit. The\nsame advance to a large and exhaustive technological system, in the\nmachine industry, that has thrown the direction of industrial affairs\ninto the hands of men primarily occupied with pecuniary management has\nalso made it impossible for men so circumstanced at all adequately to\nexercise the oversight and direction of industry thereby required at\ntheir hands. And the ancient principles of self-help and pecuniary\ngain by virtue of which these men are held to their work of business\nenterprise make it also impossible for them adequately to surrender the\ndiscretionary care of the industrial processes to other hands or to\npermit the management of industry to proceed on other than these same\nbusiness principles.\n\nThis technological infirmity of the businessmen assuredly does not\narise from a lack of interest in industry, since it is only out of\nthe net product of industry that the business community\u2019s gains are\ndrawn--except so far as they are substantially gains of accountancy\nmerely, due to an inflation of values. Perhaps no class of men have\never been more keenly alert in their interest in industrial matters\nthan the modern businessmen; and this interest extends not only to\nthe industrial ventures in which they may for the time be pecuniarily\n\u201cinterested,\u201d but also and necessarily to other lines of industry\nthat are more or less closely correlated with the one in which the\ngiven businessman\u2019s fortunes are embarked; for under modern market\nconditions any given line of industrial enterprise is bound in endless\nrelations of give and take with all the rest. But this unremitting\nattention of businessmen to the affairs of industry is a business\nattention, and, so far as may be, it touches nothing but the pecuniary\nphenomena connected with the ownership of industry; so that it comes\nrather to a training in the art of keeping in touch with the pecuniary\nrun of business affairs while avoiding all undue intimacy with the\ntechnological facts of industry,--undue in the sense of being in excess\nof what may serve the needs of a comprehensive short-term outlook over\nmarket relations, and which would therefore divert attention from this\nmain interest and befog the pecuniary logic by which businessmen are\ngoverned.\n\nProbably, also, no class of men have ever bent more unremittingly to\ntheir work than the modern business community. Within the business\ncommunity there is properly speaking no leisure class, or at least\nno idle class. In this respect there is a notable contrast between\nthe business community and the landed interest. What there is to be\nfound in this modern culture in the way of an idle class, considered\nas an institution, runs back for its origins and its specific\ntraits to a more archaic cultural scheme; it is a survival from an\nearlier (predatory) phase of the pecuniary culture. In the nature\nof things an idle life of fashion is an affair of the nobility\n(gentry), of predatory antecedents and, under current conditions, of\npredatory-parasitic habits; and as regards those modern rich men who\nwithdraw from the business community and fall into a state of _otium\ncum dignitate_, it is commonly their fortune to be assimilated by a\nmore or less ceremonial induction into the body of this quasi-predatory\ngentry or nobility and so assume an imitative colouring of archaism.\n\nThe business community is hard at work, and there is no place in it\nfor anyone who is unable or unwilling to work at the high tension of\nthe average; and since this close application to pecuniary work is of\na competitive nature it leaves no chance for any of the competitors\nto apply himself at all effectually to other than pecuniary work.\nThis high tension of work is felt to be very meritorious in all\nmodern communities, somewhat in proportion as they are modern; as is\nnecessarily the case in any work that is substantially of an emulative\ncharacter. It spends itself on salesmanship, not on workmanship in the\nna\u00efve sense; although the all-pervading preoccupation with pecuniary\nmatters in modern times has led to its being accounted the type of\nworkmanlike endeavour. It concerns itself ultimately with the pecuniary\nmanipulation of the material equipment of industry, though there is\nmuch of it that does not bear immediately on that point. The exceptions\nunder this broad proposition are more apparent than real, although\nthere doubtless are exceptions actual as well as apparent. In such a\ncase the business transactions in question are likely to bear on the\nownership of certain specific elements of the immaterial technological\nequipment, as e.\u00a0g., habits of thought covered by parent-right or\nmechanical expedients covered by franchise. Beyond these there are\nelements of \u201cgood-will\u201d that are subject of traffic and that consist\nin preferential advantages in respect of purely pecuniary transactions\nhaving to do not with the material equipment but with the right to\ndeal with it and its management, as e.\u00a0g., in banking, underwriting,\ninsurance, and the phenomena of the money market at large.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBut the mature business situation as it runs today is a complex\naffair, large and intricate, wherein the effective relations in\nwhich business traffic stands to workmanship and to the community\u2019s\nimmaterial equipment of technological knowledge at large are\ngreatly obscured by their own convolutions and by the institutional\narrangements and convictions to which this traffic has given rise. So\nthat the matter is best approached by way of a genetic exposition that\nshall take as its point of departure that simpler business enterprise\nof early modern times out of which the larger development of the\npresent has grown by insensible accretions and displacements.\n\nBusiness enterprise came in the course of time to take over the affairs\nof industry and so to withdraw these affairs from the tutelage of the\ngilds. This shifting of the effectual discretion in the management\nof industrial affairs came on gradually and in varying fashion and\ndegree over a considerable interval of time. But the decisive general\ncircumstance that enforced this move into the modern way of doing was\nan advance in the scope and method of workmanship.[120] What threw the\nfortunes of the industrial community into the hands of the owners of\naccumulated wealth was essentially a technological change, or rather a\ncomplex of technological changes, which so enlarged the requirements\nin respect of material equipment that the impecunious workmen could\nno longer carry on their trade except by a working arrangement with\nthe owners of this equipment; whereby the discretionary control of\nindustry was shifted from the craftsmen\u2019s technological mastery of\nthe ways of industry to the owner\u2019s pecuniary mastery of the material\nmeans. In the change that so took place to a larger technological scale\nmuch was doubtless due to the extension of trade, itself in great part\nan outcome of technological changes, directly and indirectly. For the\ncraftsmen and their work the outcome was that recourse must be had to\nthe material equipment owned by those who owned it, and on such terms\nas would content the owners; whereby the usufruct of the workmen\u2019s\nproficiency and of the state of the industrial arts fell to the owners\nof the material equipment, on such terms as might be had.[121] So it\nfell to these owners of the material means and of the products of\nindustry to turn this technological situation to account for their\nown gain, with as little abatement as might be, and at the same time\nit became incumbent on them each and several competitively to divert\nas large a share of the community\u2019s productive efficiency to his own\nprofit as the circumstances would permit.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE ERA OF HANDICRAFT[122]\n\n\nOwing, probably, to the peculiar topography of Europe, small-scale and\nbroken, the pastoral-predatory culture has never been fully developed\nor naturalised in this region; nor has a monarchy of the great type\ncharacteristic of western Asia ever run its course in Europe. The\nnearest approach to such a despotic state would be the Roman Empire;\nwhich was after all essentially Mediterranean, largely Levantine,\nrather than peculiarly European. And owing probably to the same\nconditioning limitations of topography the subsequent sequence of\ninstitutional phenomena have also been characteristically different in\nthis European region from that in the large and fertile lands of the\nnear East. It is necessarily this run of events in the Western culture\nthat is of chief interest to the present inquiry; which will therefore\nmost conveniently follow the historical outlines of this culture in its\nlater phases, in so far as these outlines are to be drawn in economic\nterms of a large generality.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn a passably successful fashion the peoples of Christendom made the\ntransition from a frankly predatory and servile establishment, in the\nDark Ages, to a settled, quasi-peaceable situation resting on fairly\nsecure property rights, chiefly in land, by the close of the Middle\nAges. This transition was accompanied by a growth of handicraft,\nitinerant merchandising and industrial towns, so massive as to outlive\nand displace the feudal system under whose tutelage it took its rise,\nand of so marked a technological character as to have passed into\nhistory as the \u201cera of handicraft.\u201d Technologically, this era is\nmarked by an ever advancing growth of craftsmanship; until it passes\nover into the r\u00e9gime of the machine industry when its technology had\nfinally outgrown those limitations of handicraft and petty trade that\ngave it its character as a distinct phase of economic history. In its\nbeginning the handicraft system was made up of impecunious craftsmen,\nworking in severalty and working for a livelihood, and the rules of the\ncraft-gilds that presently took shape and exercised control were drawn\non that principle.[123] The petty trade which characteristically runs\nalong with the development of handicraft was carried on after the same\ndetail fashion and was presently organised on lines afforded by the\nsame principle of work for a livelihood.\n\nPresently, however, in early modern times, larger holdings of property\ncame to be employed in the itinerant trade, and investment for a profit\nfound its way into this trade as also into the handicraft system\nproper. The processes of industry grew more extensive and roundabout,\nthe specialisation of occupations (\u201cdivision of labour\u201d) increased,\nthe scale of organisation grew larger, and the practice of employing\nimpecunious workmen in organised bodies under the direction of\nwealthier masters came to be the prevailing form taken by the industry\nof the time.\n\nFrom near the beginnings of the handicraft system, and throughout the\nperiod of its flourishing, the output of the industry was habitually\nsold at a price, in terms of money. In the earlier days the price\nwas regulated on the basis of labour cost, on the principle that a\ncompetent craftsman must be allowed a fair livelihood, and much thought\nand management was spent on the determination and maintenance of\nsuch a \u201cjust price.\u201d But in the course of generations, with further\ndevelopment of trade and markets, this conception of price by degrees\ngave way to or passed over into the modern presumption that any article\nof value is worth what it will bring; until, when the era of handicraft\nand petty trade merges in the late-modern r\u00e9gime of investment and\nmachine industry, it has become the central principle of pecuniary\nrelations that price is a matter to be arranged freely between buyer\nand seller on the basis of bargain and sale.\n\nThe characteristic traits of this era are the handicraft industry and\nthe petty trade which handled the output of that industry, with the\ntrade gradually coming into a position of discretionary management,\nand even dominating the industry of the craftsmen to such an extent\nthat by the date when the technology of handicraft begins to give way\nto the factory organisation and the machine industry the workmen are\nalready somewhat fully under the control of the businessmen. Visibly,\nthe ruling cause of this change in the relations between the craftsmen\non the one hand and the traders and master-employers on the other hand\nwas the increasing magnitude of the material means necessary to the\npursuit of industry, due to such a growth of technology as required an\never larger, more finished and more costly complement of appliances.\nSo that in the course of the era of handicraft the ancient relation\nbetween owners and workmen gradually re-established itself within the\nframework of the new technology; with the difference that the owners in\nwhose hands the discretion now lay, and to whose gain the net output of\nindustry now inured, were the businessmen, investors, the owners of the\nindustrial plant and of the apparatus of trade, instead of as formerly\nthe owners of the soil.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nUnder the handicraft system, and to the extent to which that system\nshaped the situation, the instinct of workmanship again came into a\ndominant position among the factors that made up the discipline of\ndaily life and so gave their characteristic bent to men\u2019s habits of\nthought. In the technology of handicraft the central fact is always the\nindividual workman, whether in the crafts proper or in the petty trade.\nIn that era industry is conceived in terms of the skill, initiative\nand application of the trained individual, and human relations outside\nof the workshop tend also by force of habit to be conceived in similar\nterms of self-sufficient individuals, each working out his own ends in\nseveralty.\n\nThe position of the craftsman in the economy of that time is peculiarly\nsuited to induce a conception of the individual workman as a creative\nagent standing on his own bottom, and as an ultimate, irreducible\nfactor in the community\u2019s make-up. He draws on the resources of his\nown person alone; neither his ancestry nor the favour of his neighbours\nhave visibly yielded him anything beyond an equivalent for work done;\nhe owes nothing to inherited wealth or prerogative, and he is bound\nin no relation of landlord or tenant to the soil. With his slight\noutfit of tools he is ready and competent of his own motion to do the\nwork that lies before him, and he asks nothing but an even chance to\ndo what he is fit to do. Even the training which has given him his\nfinished skill he has come by through no special favour or advantage,\nhaving given an equivalent for it all in the work done during his\napprenticeship and so having to all appearance acquired it by his\nown force and diligence. The common stock of technological knowledge\nunderlying all special training was at that time still a sufficiently\nsimple and obvious matter, so that it was readily acquired in the\nroutine of work, without formal application to the learning of it; and\nany indebtedness to the community at large or to past generations for\nsuch common stock of information would therefore not be sufficiently\napparent to admit of its disturbing the craftsman\u2019s na\u00efve appraisal of\nhis productive capacity in the simple and complacent terms of his own\nperson.\n\nThe man who does things, who is creatively occupied with fashioning\nthings for use, is the central fact in the scheme of things under\nthe handicraft system, and the range of concepts by use of which\nthe technological problems of that era are worked out is limited by\nthe habit of mind so induced in those who have the work in hand and\nin those who see it done. The discipline of the crafts inculcates\nthe apprehension of mechanical facts and processes in terms of\nworkmanlike endeavour and achievement; so that questions as to what\nforces are available for use, and of how to turn them to account,\npresent themselves in terms of muscular force and manual dexterity.\nMechanical appliances for use in industry are designed and worked out\nas contrivances to facilitate or to abridge manual labour, and it is in\nterms of labour that the whole industrial system is conceived and its\nincidence, value and output rated.\n\nSuch a fashion of conceiving the operations and appliances of industry\nseems at the same time to fall in closely with men\u2019s natural bent\nas given by the native instinct of workmanship; and fostered by the\nconsistent drift of daily routine under the handicraft system this\nattitude grew into matter of course, and has continued to direct\nmen\u2019s thinking on industrial matters even long after the era of\nhandicraft has passed and given place to the factory system and the\nlarge machine industry. So much so that throughout the nineteenth\ncentury, in economic speculations as well as in popular speech, the\nmechanical plant employed in industry has habitually been spoken of as\n\u201clabour saving devices;\u201d even such palpable departures from the manual\nworkmanship of handicraft as the power loom, the smelting furnace,\nartificial waterways and highways, the steam engine and telegraphic\napparatus, have been so classed.\n\nThere need be no question but that these phenomena of the machine era\nwill bear such an interpretation; the point of interest here is that\nsuch an interpretation should have been resorted to and should have\ncommended itself as adequate and satisfactory when applied to these\nmechanical facts whose effective place in technology and in its\nbearing on the economy of human life has turned out to be so widely\ndifferent from that range of manual operations with which it is so\nsought to assimilate them.[124]\n\nThe discipline of the handicraft industry enforces an habitual\napprehension of mechanical forces and processes in terms of manual\nworkmanship,--muscular force and craftsmanlike manipulation. This\ndiscipline touches first, and most intimately and coercively, the\nclasses engaged in the manual work of industry, but it also necessarily\npervades the community at large and gathers in its net all individuals\nand classes who have to do with the facts of industry, near or remote.\nIt gives its specific character to the habits of life of the community\nthat lives under its dispensation and by its means, and so it acts as\nan overruling formative guide in shaping the current habits of thought.\n\nThe consequences of this habitual attitude, for the technology of the\nmachine era that presently follows, are worth noting. The mechanical\ninventions and expedients that lead over from the era of handicraft,\nthrough what has been called the industrial revolution, to the\nlater system of large industry, bear the marks of their handicraft\norigin. The early devices of the machine industry are uniformly\ncontrivances for performing by mechanical means the same motions which\nthe craftsmen in the given industries performed by hand and by man\npower; in great part, indeed, they set out with being contrivances to\nenable the workmen to perform the same manual operation in duplicate\nor multiple--(as in the early spinning and weaving machinery) or to\nperform a given operation with larger effect than was possible to the\nunaided muscular work (as in the beginnings of steam power). In their\nbeginnings the new mechanical appliances are conceived as improved\ntools, which extend the reach and power of the workman or which\nfacilitate or lighten the manual operations in which he spends himself.\nThey are, as they aim to be, labour saving devices, designed to further\nthe workmanlike efficiency of the men in whose hands they are placed.\n\nThe early history of steam power shows how closely this workmanlike\nconception limited the range of invention. It was first employed to\npump water out of mines. In this use the pressure of the air on a\npiston, in a low-pressure cylinder, was brought to bear on a lever\nso suspended as to yield formally the same motion as a like lever\npreviously moved by human muscle. After a long interval, sufficiently\nlong to make the use of this intermittent pressure and the resulting\nreciprocating motion familiar and impersonal in men\u2019s habitual\napprehension, the reciprocating motion was turned to use to produce a\nrotary motion,--after the fashion suggested by the treadle of a lathe\nor spinning wheel, which was already familiar enough to have been\ndivested of something of that fog of personality that had doubtless\nsurrounded it at its first invention.[125] The next serious move in\nthe development of the steam engine is the invention of the automatic\nvalves, for admission and escape of steam from the cylinder. According\nto the ancient myth, a boy whose work it was to shift the valves by\nhand, contrived to connect them by cords with the moving parts of\nthe machine in such a way as to lift them at the proper moment by\nthe motion of the machine itself; so making the machine perform what\nhad in the original concept of the valve mechanism been a manual\noperation. Later still, after the due interval for externalisation\nand assimilation of this mechanical valve movement as an impersonal\nfact of the machine process, further improvement and elaboration of\nthe elements so gained has worked out in the highly finished mechanism\nfamiliar to later times.\n\nDetail scrutiny of any one of the greater mechanical inventions, or\nseries of inventions, will bring out something of the same character as\nis seen in the sequence of successive gains that make up the history\nof the steam engine. It is to be noted in this connection that time\nappears to be of the essence of the process of mechanical invention\nin any field; so much so, indeed, that it will commonly be found that\nany single inventor contributes but one radical innovation in any one\nparticular connection; which may then presently be taken up again as a\nsecurely objective element by a later inventor and pushed forward by\na new move as radical as that to which this original invention owed\nits origin. This time interval which plays such a part in mechanical\ninventions appears necessary only as an interval of habituation, for\nthe due externalisation of the element, to relieve it, by neglect, of\nthe personal equation with which it is contaminated as it first comes\ninto use, and so to leave it such an objective concept as may be turned\nto account as mere technological raw material.\n\nIt appears, then, that the accumulation of technological experience is\nnot of itself sufficient to bring out a consecutive improvement of the\nindustrial arts, particularly not such an advance in the industrial\narts as is embodied in the machine technology of late-modern times.\nIn this modern machine technology the ruling norm is the highly\nimpersonal, not to say brutal, concept of mechanical process, blind\nand irresponsible. The logic of this technology, accordingly, is the\nlogic of the machine process,--a logic of masses, velocities, strains\nand thrusts, not of personal dexterity, tact, training, and routine.\nIn the degree in which the information that comes to hand comes\nencumbered with a teleological bias, a connotation of personal bent, it\nis unavailable or refractory under this logic. But all new information\nis infused with such an anthropomorphic colouring of personality;\nwhich may presently decay and give place to a more objective habitual\napprehension of the facts in case use and wont play up the mechanical\ncharacter and bearing of these facts in subsequent experience of them;\nor which may on the other hand end by giving its definitive character\nand value to the acquired information in case it should happen that\nthe facts of experience are by use and wont bent to an habitual\nanthropomorphic rating and employment. To serve the needs of this\nmachine technology, therefore, the information which accumulates must\nin some measure be divested of its na\u00efve personal colouring by use\nand wont; and the degree in which this effect is had is a measure of\nthe degree of availability of the resulting facts for the uses of the\nmachine technology. The larger the available body of information of\nthis character, and the more comprehensive and unremitting the share\ntaken by the discipline of the machine process in the routine of daily\nlife, therefore, the greater, other things equal, will be the rate of\nadvance in the technological mastery of mechanical facts.\n\nBut much else goes to the make-up of use and wont besides the routine\nof industry and the utilisation of those mechanical processes and\nthat output of goods which the modern machine industry places at\nmen\u2019s disposal. To put the same thing in terms already employed in\nanother connection, the sense of workmanship is still subject to\ncontamination with other impulsive elements of human nature working\nunder the constraining limitations imposed by divers conventional\ncanons and principles of conduct; besides being constantly subject to\nself-contamination in the way of an anthropomorphic interpretation that\nconstrues the facts of experience in terms of a craftsmanlike bent.\n\nAs bearing on the effectual reach of this self-contamination of the\nsense of workmanship it is pertinent to recall that craftsmanship ran\nwithin a class, and so had the benefit of that accentuated sentiment of\nself-complacency that comes of class consciousness. From its beginnings\ndown to the period of its dissolution the handicraft industry is an\naffair of the lower classes; and, as is well known, class feeling\nruns strong throughout the era, particularly through the centuries\nof its best development. Whether their conceit is wholly a na\u00efve\nself-complacency or partly a product of affectation, the sentiment is\nwell in evidence and marks the attitude of the handicraft community\nwith a characteristic bias. The craftsmen habitually rate themselves as\nserviceable members of the community and contrast themselves in this\nrespect with the other orders of society who are not occupied with\nthe production of things serviceable for human use. To the creative\nworkman who makes things with his hands belongs an efficiency and a\nmerit of a peculiarly substantial and definitive kind, he is the type\nand embodiment of efficiency and serviceability. The other orders of\nsociety and other employments of time and effort may of course be well\nenough in their way, but they lack that substantial ground of finality\nwhich the craftsman in his genial conceit arrogates to himself and his\nwork. And so good a case does the craftsman make out on this head,\nand so convincingly evident is the efficiency of the skilled workman,\nand so patent is his primacy in the industrial community, that by the\nclose of the era much the same view has been accepted by all orders of\nsociety.\n\nSuch a bias pervading the industrial community must greatly fortify\nthe native bent to construe all facts of observation in anthropomorphic\nterms. But the training given by the petty trade of the handicraft\nera, on the other hand, is not altogether of this character. The\nitinerant merchant\u2019s huckstering, as well as the buying and selling\nin which all members of the community were concerned, would doubtless\nthrow the personal strain into the foreground and would act to keep\nthe self-regarding sentiments alert and active and accentuate an\nindividualistic appreciation of men and things. But the habit of rating\nthings in terms of price has no such tendency, and the price concept\ngains ground throughout the period. Wherever the handicraft system\nreaches a fair degree of development the daily life of the community\ncomes to centre about the market and to take on the character given\nby market relations. The volume of trade grows greater, and purchase\nand sale enter more thoroughly into the details of the work to be done\nand of the livelihood to be got by this work. The price system comes\ninto the foreground. With the increase of traffic, book-keeping comes\ninto use among the merchants; and as fast as the practice of habitual\nrecourse to the market grows general, the uncommercial classes also\nbecome familiar with the rudimentary conceptions of book-keeping, even\nif they do not make much use of formal accounts in their own daily\naffairs.[126]\n\nThe logic and concepts of accountancy are wholly impersonal and\ndispassionate; and whether men\u2019s use of its logic and concepts takes\nthe elaborate form of a set of books or the looser fashion of an\nhabitual rating of gains, losses, income, and outgo in terms of price,\nits effect is unavoidably in some degree to induce a statistical habit\nof mind. It makes immediately for an exact quantitative apprehension\nof all things and relations that have a pecuniary bearing; and\nmore remotely, by force of the pervasive effect of habituation, it\nmakes for a greater readiness to apprehend all facts in a similarly\nobjective and statistical fashion, in so far as the facts admit of a\nquantitative rating. Accountancy is the beginning of statistics, and\nthe price concept is a type of the objective impersonal, quantitative\napprehension of things. Coincidently, because they do not lend\nthemselves to this facile rating, facts that will not admit of a\nquantitative statement and statistical handling decline in men\u2019s\nesteem, considered as facts, and tend in some degree to lose the\ncogency which belongs to empirical reality. They may even come to be\ndiscounted as being of a lower order of reality, or may even be denied\nfactual value.\n\nDoubtless, the price system had much to do with the rise of the machine\ntechnology in modern times; not only in that the accountancy of price\noffered a practical form and method of statistical computation, such as\nis indispensable to anything that may fairly be classed as engineering,\nbut also and immediately and substantially in that its discipline has\ngreatly conduced to the apprehension of mechanical facts in terms not\ncoloured by an imputed anthropomorphic bent. It has probably been the\nmost powerful factor acting positively in early modern times to divest\nmechanical facts of that imputed workmanlike bent given them by habits\nof thought induced by the handicrafts.\n\nThis reduction of the facts of observation to quantitative and\nobjective terms is perhaps most visible not in the changes that come\nover the technology of industry directly, in early modern times,\nbut rather in that growth of material science that runs along as\na concomitant of the expansion of the mechanical industry during\nthe later era of handicraft. The material sciences, particularly\nthose occupied with mechanical phenomena, are closely related to\nthe technology of the mechanical industries, both in their subject\nmatter and in the scope and method of the systematisation of knowledge\nat which they aim; and it is in these material sciences that the\nconcomitance is best seen, at the same time that it is the advance\nachieved in these sciences that most unequivocally marks the transition\nfrom medi\u00e6val to modern habits of thought. This modern interest in\nmatter-of-fact knowledge and the consequent achievements in material\nscience, comes to an effectual head wherever and so soon, as the\nhandicraft industry has made a considerable advance, in volume and in\ntechnological mastery, sufficient to support a fair volume of trade and\nmake thoughtful men passably familiar with the statistical conceptions\nof the price system.\n\nIt is accordingly in the commercial republics of Italy that the modern\ngrowth of material science takes its first start, about the point of\ntime when industry and commerce had reached their most flourishing\nstate on the Mediterranean seaboard and when the attention of these\ncommunities was already swinging off from these material interests\nto high-handed politics and religious reaction. The higher interests\nof church and state came to the front, and science, industry, and\npresently commerce dwindled and decayed in the land that had promised\nso handsomely to lead Western civilisation out of the underbrush of\npiety and princely intrigue.\n\nNext followed the Low Countries, with the south German industrial\ncentres, where again industry of the handicraft order grew great,\ngave rise to trade on a rapidly increasing scale, and presently to\nan era of business enterprise of unprecedented spirit and scope. But\nthe age of the Fuggers closed in bankruptcy and industrial collapse\nwhen the princely wrangles of the era of statemaking had used up the\nresources of the industrial community and exhausted the credit of that\ngeneration of captains of industry. Here too religious contention\ncame in for its share in the set-back of industry and commerce. In\ntheir economic outlines the two cases are very much of the same kind.\nCentral Europe ran through much the same cycle of industrial growth,\ncommercial enterprise, princely ambitions, dynastic wars, religious\nfanaticism, exhaustion and insecurity, and industrial collapse and\ndecay,--substantially repeating, on an enlarged scale and with\nmuch added detail, the sequence that had brought South Europe into\narrears. Meantime the material sciences had come forward again in\nthe West, and flourished at the hands of the Netherlanders, South\nGermans and French scholars, who under the favouring discipline of\nthis new advance in industry and commerce had slowly come abreast\nof the same matter-of-fact conceptions that had once made Italy the\nhome of modern science. And here again, as before, princely politics,\nwith the attendant war, exactions and insecurity, followed presently\nby religious controversies and persecutions, not only put an end to\nthe advance of industry and business but also checked the attendant\ndevelopment of science nearly to a standstill.\n\nSo that when a further move of the kind is presently made it is\nthe British community that takes the lead. Great Britain had been\nin arrears in all those respects that make up civilisation of the\nOccidental kind, and not least in the material respect; until the\ntime when the peoples of the Continent by their own act fell into\nthe rear in respect of those material interests--technology and\nbusiness enterprise--which afford the material ground out of which\nthe Occidental type of civilisation has grown. In Great Britain the\nsequence of these cultural phenomena has not been substantially\ndifferent, taken by and large, from that which had previously been run\nthrough by the Continental communities; except that the same outcome\nwas not reached, apparently because the sequence was not interrupted by\ncollapse at the same critical point in the development.\n\nThe run of events under the handicraft system in England differs\nin certain consequential features from that among the Continental\npeoples,--consequential for the purposes of this inquiry, whether\nof similarly grave consequence from the point of view given by any\nother and larger interest. These peculiar traits of the British era\nof handicraft yield a side light on the methods and reach of the\nhandicraft discipline as a factor in civilisation at large, at the\nsame time that a consideration of them should go to show how slender\nan initial difference may come to be decisive of the outcome in case\ncircumstances give this initial difference a cumulative effect.\n\nAs regards the ultimately substantial grounds of the British situation,\nin the way of racial make-up, natural resources, and cultural\nantecedents, the British community has no singular advantage or\ndisadvantage as against its Continental competitors. What is true of\nEngland in respect of peculiarly favourable natural resources later\non, about and after the close of the era of handicraft, does not hold\nfor the beginnings or the best days of that era. Racially there is no\nappreciable difference between the English population of that time and\nthe population of the Low Countries, of the Scandinavian peninsulas,\nor even of the nearer lying German territories; and no markedly\ncharacteristic national type of temperament had at that time been\ndeveloped in Great Britain, as against the temperamental make-up of its\nContinental neighbours,--whatever may be conceived to have become the\ncase in the nearer past.\n\nThe characteristic, and apparently decisive, peculiarities of the\nBritish situation may all confidently be traced to the insular position\nof the country. Owing to the isolation so given to the Island the\nBritish community was notably in arrears in early modern times, as\ncontrasted with the more cultured, populous and wealthier peoples of\nthe Continent; and this backward state of England in the earlier period\nof the era of handicraft is no less marked in respect of technology\nthan in any other. As is well known, England borrowed extensively and\npersistently from its Continental neighbours throughout the era, and\nit was only by help of these borrowed elements that the English were\nable to overtake and finally to take the lead of their competitors.\nSimilarly, the British commercial development also comes on late\nas compared with the Continent; so much so that the British had\nsubstantially no share in the great expansion of business enterprise\nthat has been called the Age of the Fuggers. This late start of the\nEnglish, coupled with their peculiar advantage in being able to borrow\nwhat their neighbours had worked out, conduced to a more rapid rate and\nshorter run of industrial advance and expansion in the Island, and so,\namong other consequences, hindered the rounded system of handicraft,\nindustrial towns, and gild organisation from attaining the same degree\nof finality, and ultimately of obstructive inertia, that resulted in\nmany of the Continental countries.\n\nAgain, owing to the same geographic isolation that long held England\nculturally in arrears, the English community lay, in great measure,\noutside of that political \u201cconcert of nations\u201d that worked out the\nexhaustion and collapse of industry and business on the Continent.\nNot that the English took no interest in the grand whirl of politics\nand princely war that occupied the main body of Christendom in that\ntime. The English crown, or to use a foreign expression, the English\nState, was deeply enough implicated in the political intrigues of late\nmedi\u00e6val and early modern Europe; but as modern time has advanced\nthe English community has visibly hung back with an ever growing\nreluctance. And whatever may be conceived to be the share of the\nEnglish crown in the political complications of the Continent, it\nremains true that the English community at large, during the mature\nand concluding phases of the era of handicraft, stood mainly and\nhabitually outside of these princely concerns.[127] In effect, after\nthe handicraft era was well under way, England is never for long or\nprimarily engaged in international war, nor, except for the civil war\nof the Commonwealth period, in destructive war of any kind. Hence the\nera runs to a different outcome in England from what it does elsewhere.\nIt ends not in the exhaustion of politics, but in the industrial\nrevolution. The close of the handicraft system in England comes by way\nof a technological revolution, not by collapse.\n\nTo this attempted explanation of the English case, as due to its\ngeographic isolation, the objection may well suggest itself that\nother cases which parallel the British in this respect do not show\nlike results. So, for instance, the Scandinavian countries enjoyed an\nisolation nearly if not quite as effective as that of Great Britain\nduring this period of history; whereas the outcome in these countries\nis notoriously not the same. The Scandinavian case, however, differs\nin at least one essential respect, which seems decisive even apart\nfrom secondary circumstances. These countries were too small to make\nup a self-supporting community under the conditions required by the\nsystem of handicraft. They had neither the population nor the natural\nresources on such a scale as a passably full development of the\nhandicraft system required. At any advanced stage of its growth the\nsystem can work out into a self-balanced technological organisation,\nwith full specialisation of labour and local differentiation of\nindustry, only in a community of a certain (considerable) size.\nThis condition was not met by the Scandinavian countries. Hence\nthey remained in a relatively backward state, on the whole, through\nthe handicraft era, and never reached anything like an independent\nposition in the industrial world of that time, either technologically\nor in point of commercial development; hence also they failed to\nachieve or maintain that degree of independence, or isolation, in their\npolitical relations that left England free to pursue a self-directed\ncourse of material development.\n\nAt an earlier period, as, for instance, from neolithic times down to\nthe close of paganism, under the slighter, less differentiated, less\ncomplex technological conditions of a more primitive state of the\nindustrial arts, the Scandinavian countries had, each and several,\nproved large enough for a very efficient industrial organisation;\nand, again, during the early historical period they had also proved\nto be of a sufficient and suitable size to make up national units\nof a thoroughly competent sort, autonomous politically as well as\nindustrially and working out their own fortunes in severalty,--very\nmuch as the British community does later on, in the days of the later\nhandicraft era and the early growth of the machine industry. But\nduring the era of handicraft, and indeed somewhat in a progressive\nfashion as the technology of that era grew to a fuller development and\nrequired larger territorial dimensions, the Scandinavian countries\nlost ground, relatively to the larger communities of Great Britain\nand the Continent; in a degree they progressively lost autonomy both\nin the political and the industrial respect, and much the same is to\nbe said for their position in point of general culture. This falling\ninto arrears and dependence is least marked in the case of Sweden, the\nlargest and still passably isolated community among them; and it is\nmost marked in the case of Norway and Iceland, the most isolated but\nat the same time the least sizable units of the Scandinavian group.\nIn material sciences, that most characteristic trait of the Western\nculture, the case of these peoples is much the same as in the matter of\ntechnology and cultural autonomy at large; the largest of them has the\nmost to show.\n\nGreat Britain, on the other hand, fulfilled the conditions of size and\nisolation demanded in order to a free development of the industrial\narts during this era, when the traffic in dynastic politics stood ready\nto absorb all accessible resources of industry and sentiment. And\nEngland accordingly takes the lead when the era of handicraft goes out\nand that of the new technology comes in.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMaterial science of the modern sort has been drawn into the discussion\nas a cultural phenomenon closely bound up with the state of the\nindustrial arts under the handicraft system. This modern science may,\nindeed, be taken as the freest manifestation of that habit of mind that\ncomes to its more concrete expression in the technology of the time. To\nshow the pertinency of such a recourse to the state of science as an\noutcome of the discipline exercised by the routine of life in the era\nof handicraft some further detail touching the state and progress of\nscientific inquiry during that period will be in place.\n\nIn its beginnings, the theoretical postulates and preconceptions of\nmodern science are drawn from the scholastic speculations of the\nlate Middle Ages; the problems which the new science undertook to\nhandle, on the other hand, were, by and large, such concrete and\nmaterial questions as the current difficulties of technology brought\nto the notice of the investigators. These traditional postulates,\npreconceptions, canons, and logical methods that stood over from the\npast were essentially of a theological complexion, and were the outcome\nof much time, attention and insight spent on the systematisation of\nknowledge in a cultural situation whose substantial core was the\nrelation of master and servant, and under the guidance of a theological\nbias worked out on the same ground. The postulates of this speculative\nbody of knowledge and the preconceptions with which the scholastic\nspeculators went to their work of systematisation, accordingly, are of\na highly anthropomorphic character; but it is not the anthropomorphism\nof workmanship, at least not in the na\u00efve form which the sense of\nworkmanship gives to anthropomorphic interpretation among more\nprimitive peoples.[128] It may be taken as a matter of course that\nthe sense of workmanship is present in its native, direct presentment\nthroughout the intellectual life of the middle ages, as it necessarily\nis under all the permutations of human culture; but it is equally a\nmatter of course that the promptings of an unsophisticated sense of\nworkmanship do not afford the final test of what is right and good in a\ncultural situation drawn on rigid lines of mastery and submission.\n\nDuring the middle ages the faith had taken on an extremely\nauthoritative and coercive character, to answer to the similar\nprinciples of organisation and control that ruled in secular affairs;\nso that at the transition to modern times the religious cult of\nChristendom was substantially a cult of fearsome subjection and\narbitrary authority. Much else, of a more genial character, was of\ncourse comprised in the principles of the faith of that time, but\nwhen all is said the fact remains that even in its genial traits it\nwas a cult of irresponsible authority and abject submission,--a cult\nof the pastoral-predatory type, adapted and perfected to answer the\ncircumstances of feudal Europe, and so embodying the principles (habits\nof thought) that characterised the feudal system.\n\nNotoriously, the fashions of religious faith change tardily. Such\nchange is always of the nature of concession. And since the conceptions\nof the cult are of no material consequence, taken by themselves and\nin their direct incidence, they are subject, as such, to no direct\nor deliberate control or correction in behalf of the community\u2019s\nmaterial interests or its technological requirements. It is almost if\nnot altogether by force of their consonance or dissonance with the\nprevailing habits of thought inculcated by the routine of life that\nany given run of religious verities find acceptance, command general\nadherence to their teaching, or become outworn and are discarded; and\nsuch lack of consonance must become very pronounced before a radical\nchange of the kind in question will take effect. Barring conversion\nto a new faith, it is commonly by insensible shifts of adaptation and\nreconstruction that any wide-reaching change is worked out in these\nfundamental conceptions. Such was the character of the move by which\nthe Medi\u00e6val cult merged in the modernised theological concepts of a\nlater age.\n\nGradually, by force of unremitting habituation to a new scheme of\nlife, and marked by long-drawn theological polemics, a change passed\nover the spirit of theological speculation, whereby the fundamentals\nof the faith were infused with the spirit of the handicraft system,\nand the preconceptions of workmanship insensibly supplanted those of\nmastery and subservience in the working concepts of devout Christendom.\nMeantime, while the routine of the era of handicraft was slowly\nreconstructing the current conceptions of divinity on lines consonant\nwith the habit of mind of workmanship, the ancient conceptions\ncontinued with gradually abating force to assert their prescriptive\ndominion over men\u2019s habitual thinking. This gradually loosening hold\nof the ancient conceptions is best seen in the speculations of the\nphilosophers and in the higher generalisations of scientific inquiry in\nearly modern times.\n\nIn the medi\u00e6val speculations whether theological, philosophical or\nscientific, the search for truth runs back to the authentic ground of\nthe religious verities,--largely to revealed truth; and these religious\nverities run back to the question, \u201cWhat hath God ordained?\u201d In the\ncourse of the era of handicraft this ultimate question of knowledge\ncame to take the form, \u201cWhat hath God wrought?\u201d Not that the creative\noffice of God in the divine economy was overlooked or in any degree\nintentionally made light of by the earlier speculators; nor that the\nsovereignty of God was denied or in any degree questioned by those\ndevout inquirers who carried forward the work in later time. But in\nthat earlier phase of faith and inquiry it is distinctly the suzerainty\nof God, and His ordinances, that afford the ground of finality on which\nall inquiry touching the economy of this world ultimately come to rest;\nand in the later phase, as seen at the close of the era of handicraft,\nit is as distinctly His creative office and the logic of His creative\ndesign that fill the place of an ultimate term in human inquiry--as\nthat inquiry conventionally runs within the spiritual frontiers of\nChristendom. God had not ceased to be the Heavenly King, and had not\nceased to be glorified with the traditional phrases of homage as the\nMost High, the Lord of Hosts etc., but somewhat incongruously He had\nalso come to be exalted as the Great Artificer--the preternatural\ncraftsman. The vulgar habits of thought bred in the workday populace by\nthe routine of the workshop and the market place had stolen their way\ninto the sanctuary and the counsels of divinity.\n\nSimilarly, in the best days of scholastic learning scientific inquiry\nran back for a secure foundation to the authentic ordinances of the\nHeavenly King; under the discipline of the era of handicraft it learned\ninstead to push its inquiries to the ground of efficient cause,\nultimately of course, in the philosophical liquidation of accounts in\nthat devout age, to the creative efficiency of the First Cause. In\nthe scientific inquiries of the earlier age the test of truth was the\ntest of authenticity, and the logic of systematisation by use of which\nknowledge in that time was digested and stored away was essentially a\nlogic of subsumption under securely authentic categories that could\nbe run back at need to the ascertained requirements of the glory of\nGod. The canon of truth is that of the revealed word, re\u00ebnforced and\nfilled out with the quasi-divine Aristotelian scheme of things. It is a\nlogic of hierarchical congruity in respect of potencies and qualities,\nsuggestively resembling the devolution of powers and dignities under\nthe finished scheme of feudalism. In the later age the good of man\ngradually, insensibly supplants the glory of God as the ultimate ground\nof systematisation. The sentimental ground of conviction comes to\nbe the recognised serviceability of the ascertained facts for human\nuse, rather than their conformity with the putative exigencies of a\nself-centred divine will. The Providential Order that means so much in\nthe scheme of knowledge in the mature years of the era of handicraft is\nan order imposed by a providentially beneficent Creator who looks to\nthe good of man; as it has been expressed, it is a scheme of \u201chumanism.\u201d\n\nBy the close of the era this beneficent providential order had worked\nout in an Order of Nature, indued with the same meliorative trend; and\nin the sentimental conviction of the inquiring spirits of that age it\nlay in the nature of this beneficent order of the universe that in the\nend, in the finished product of its working, it would bring about the\nhighest practicable state of well-being for man,--very much as any\nskilled workman of sound sense and a good heart would turn out good\nand serviceable goods. And in this Order of Nature, as it runs in the\nmatter-of-course convictions of thoughtful men at the close of the era,\nthe person of the deity, even as a workmanlike creative Providence,\nhad fallen into the background. The Order of Nature, with its scheme\nof Natural Law, is felt as the work of a consummately skilful and\ningenious workmanlike agency that looks to a serviceable end to be\naccomplished; and the profoundly thoughtful scientific inquiry of that\ntime harbours no doubt that this workmanlike agency of Nature at large\nrules the world of visible fact and will achieve its good work in good\ntime. But this quasi-personal Nature is not reverenced for anything but\nits workmanlike qualities; the awe which it inspires is not the fear of\nGod, such as that fear has played its part under the feudalistic rule\nof the church and sent men hunting cover from the imminent wrath to\ncome. As he stands in the presence of this eighteenth-century Nature,\nman is not primarily a sinner seeking a remission of penalties at all\ncosts, but rather a focus of workmanlike attention upon whose welfare\nall the forces of the visible universe beneficently converge.\n\nHow this workmanlike Nature goes about her[129] work is no more\nplain to the casual spectator than are the recondite processes of\nhigh-wrought handicraft to the uninstructed. But Nature after all\naccomplishes her ends in a workmanlike fashion, and by staying by and\npatiently watching the operations of Nature and construing the facts of\nobservation by the sympathetic use of a rational common sense men may\nlearn much of the methods of her manipulation as well as of the rules\nof procedure under whose guidance the works of Nature are accomplished.\nFor it is a matter of course to that generation that Nature is\nessentially rational in her aims and logic as well as in the technology\nof her work; very much after the fashion of the master craftsman, who\ngoes to his work with an intelligent oversight of the available means\nand the purpose to be wrought out, as well as with a firm and facile\ntouch on all that passes under his trained hand. Like the perfect\ncraftsman, \u201cNature never makes mistakes,\u201d \u201cnever makes a jump,\u201d \u201cnever\ndoes anything in vain,\u201d \u201cnever turns out anything but perfect work.\u201d\n\nThe means whereby this work of Nature is brought to its consummate\nissue are forces of Nature working under her Laws by the method\nof cause and effect. The principle, or \u201claw,\u201d of causation is a\nmetaphysical postulate; in the sense that such a fact as causation is\nunproved and unprovable. No man has ever observed a case of causation,\nas is a commonplace with the latterday psychologists. But such a doubt\ndoes not present itself seriously in the days of handicraft; it would\nbe out of touch with the spirit of the time and the discipline of\nthat craftsmanship out of which the spirit of the time arises. To the\ninquiring minds of that era it is a matter of course and of common\nsense that the forces of Nature are seen to work out the effects which\nemerge before their eyes. What they see in fact may be, as the modern\npsychologists would perhaps say, a certain concomitance and sequence\nin the observed phenomena; but what those observers see in effect is\nalways a certain cause working out a certain effect. The imputation of\ncausal efficiency to the observed phenomena is so thoroughly a matter\nof course that there is no sense of imputation in the observer\u2019s mind.\n\nObservation simply, without imputation of anthropomorphic qualities\nand efficacies, should yield nothing more to the purpose than idle\nconcomitance and sequence of phenomena, but there is, in effect, none\nof this early scientific work done in terms of simple concomitance\nor sequence alone; nor for that matter, has any of the effective\n(theoretical) work of modern science been carried to an issue by the\nuse of such objective terms of concomitance and sequence alone, whether\nin that or in a later age, without the help of a putative causal nexus.\nThrough the early modern scientific period there runs an increasingly\nfree and frequent recourse to statistical argument,--in the material\nsciences a recourse to punctilious measurement, enumeration and\ninstruments of precision; but it is of the essence of the case that the\nphenomenal facts which so are subjected to measurement and statistical\ncomputation are facts selected for the purpose on the strength of their\n(putatively) known causal implication in the problem whose solution\nis sought, and that the facts which emerge from these measurements,\ncomputations, and instruments of precision, are turned to account in\nan argument of cause and effect; they have served their purpose only\nwhen and in so far as they enable the inquirer to determine the course\nof efficient transition from a putative cause to a putative effect, or\nconversely.\n\nThe relation of cause and effect, as commonly conceived by the vulgar\nand as commonly employed by the scientist, is a putative relation\nbetween phenomena which can not be said to stand in any observed\nrelation of efficiency to one another. Efficiency, as understood in\nthis connection, is not a fact of observation, but of imputation;\nand efficiency, performance of work, is the substance of the causal\nrelation as that concept is universally employed in modern science.\nIt may well be said that this recourse to the concept of efficient\ncause--a metaphysical postulate touching a putative fact--is the\ndistinguishing characteristic of modern science as contrasted with any\nother scheme of systematised knowledge.[130]\n\nNot only does the development of modern science rest on this postulate\nof causality, but the concept of causation which so characterises the\nmodern sciences is of a particular and restricted kind. At least on\nthe face of things it seems unquestionable that the peculiar temper\nand limitations of this modern European concept of causation are to\nbe credited to the habits wrought out by a life under the handicraft\nsystem. It has been noted already that the ubiquitous prevalence\nof trade and of the price system in modern times has given to the\nmodern apprehension of facts a certain objectivity, a degree of\nimpersonality, which is at least a characteristic of modern knowledge,\nwhether scientific or commonplace, even if it cannot be said to be\na unique distinction of modern science as contrasted with other\ndeliberate systems of knowledge. But it is the unique distinction\nof modern science, particularly as it comes into view in its early\nphases, that its concept of causality is drawn not simply in terms\nof workmanship but specifically in terms of craftsmanship. There\nneed probably be no argument spent on the thesis that the sense of\ncausality is, by and large, a particular manifestation of the sense\nof workmanship. But the sense of workmanship in its native scope\napparently covers something more than the manual efficiency of the\nskilled workman simply. And in other times and under other cultural\n(technological) circumstances the sense of workmanship has apparently\ngiven rise to concepts of causation of a wider, or at least of a\nlooser, scope. In the na\u00efve rating of savage peoples workmanship\nappears to cover, perhaps uncertainly, notions of generation, nurture,\ntendance, and the like, without any sharp line being drawn between\nthese various lines of effective endeavour on the one side and manual\nefficiency on the other. And so, on the other hand, in the cosmological\nknowledge (or quasi-knowledge) current among these peoples explanation\nin terms of generation and growth are accepted as final along with\nexplanations in terms of what the modern man would conceive to be the\nstricter sense of cause and effect. Even in the speculations of the\nsages of classical antiquity, and again in the cosmologies and natural\nhistory of the far-Oriental peoples, many questions of cause and effect\nare found to be sufficiently disposed of when worked out in the like\nterms of generation, growth and quasi-physiological mutation.\n\nTo modern inquiry explanations in these terms, other than those of\nphysically effective work, are provisional at the best, and are held\nto only as awaiting a final solution in a materially, mechanistically\ncompetent way. And what is alone materially competent in the modern\nscientific apprehension is such an explanation as will make things\nplain in terms of matter and motion, working a change in the\nconstitution of things by displacement through contact and pressure.\nCausation is conceived as manual work,--to use a French term, it is\na _remaniement_ of raw materials at hand. Physiological or chemical\nexplanations must finally be recast in terms of physics, to satisfy\nthe modern scientist\u2019s sense of finality, and physics must be made to\nrun in terms of impact, pressure, displacement in space, regrouping of\nmaterial particles, co\u00f6rdinated movements and a shifting of equilibrium.\n\nThrough all this runs the concomitant requirement of quantivalence,\nstatable in statistical form. The scientist\u2019s results are not finally\nmerchantable, on the scientific exchange, until they have been reduced\nto such terms of accountancy as would be comprehensible to the man\ntrained in the merchandising traffic of the petty trade, for whose\nconviction things must be punctiliously rated in exchange value. But,\nas has been noted above, it is only as an expedient of scientific\naccountancy that the facts under inquiry are kept account of in an\nitemised bill of values. This meticulous statistical accountancy is\nnecessary to safeguard the accuracy of the work done and its conformity\nwith the facts in hand; but the work so done handles these facts as\nactive factors which go efficiently to the production of the results\nobserved. The cause is conceived to produce the effect, somewhat after\nthe fashion in which a skilled workman produces a finished article\nof trade. But when the scientist has set forth the operations and\nworking conditions that have brought forth the effects which he is\nengaged in explaining, he must also, in order to the conviction of his\nfellow craftsmen, show a statistically itemised statement of receipts\nand expenditures covering the facts engaged,--in quantitative values\nhe must show that the costs are balanced by the values that emerge\nin the finished product of that workmanlike process of causation\nwhose recondite nature and course he has so laid bare to the light of\nunderstanding.\n\nThis attempted characterisation of modern scientific inquiry and its\nworking concepts applies immediately to the earlier phases and down\nto a date well past the advent of the machine industry,--so far past\nthat date as to allow time and experience to work the new habits of\nthought peculiar to the machine technology into the texture of men\u2019s\npreconceptions. In time, but tardily, as is the case with the pervasive\neffects of any new line of habituation, the discipline of the machine\nhas wrought a further, though, hitherto less profound and decisive,\nchange in the aims and methods of science; a discussion of which\nis deferred until it comes up again in its connection with the new\ntechnology. Less cogently and with qualifications, however, the above\ncharacterisation will apply to the later phases of modern science, as\nwell as to that initial stage that marks the era of handicraft.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSomething further is due to be said of the cultural consequences of\nthis discipline in workmanship during the era of handicraft, besides\nits guidance in the growth of technology and the related field of\nmaterial science. As has been intimated above, habituation to the\nworking conceptions of handicraft had much to do with that revision\nof the religious cult and its theological tenets that has shaped the\nspiritual life of modern times in contrast with the medieval life of\nfaith. But it is an ungrateful, perhaps ungraceful, office to turn the\ndry light of matter-of-fact on the sacred verities, and a degree of\nparsimony will best be observed in any layman\u2019s discussion of these\nintimate movements of the spirit. Yet it seems necessary to call to\nmind at least one point of singular concomitance between the state of\nthe industrial arts and fortunes of the Christian faith.\n\nCharacteristic of modern times has been the Protestant rehabilitation\nof the cult and its tenets. In this rehabilitation, which has not been\nwithout effect even within the Catholic church, much of the ancient\nspirit of subjection has been lost, replaced in part with a certain\nattitude of self-help and autonomy on the part of the laity. There\nis a degree of democratic initiative and a gild-like spirit of lay\ndiscretion in spiritual affairs. As already noted above, the tenets\nof the faith have also in some degree been revised and reconstructed\nin terms consonant with the workmanlike conceptions of the handicraft\nsystem. Such a protestant or quasi-protestant reconstruction of the\ncult and its tenets set in, as is well known, successively in the\nseveral leading countries of Europe, somewhat in the same order as\nthese several countries successively advanced to a high level of\ntechnological and commercial enterprise. As noted above, in the\nsouth in the so-called Latin countries, this era of industrial and\ncommercial enterprise was presently checked; the like being true in a\nless pronounced fashion for the peoples of Central Europe. Wherever the\nadvance was seriously checked, so that the era of handicraft closed in\ncollapse or reaction on its secular side, there the reconstruction of\nthe religious cult also came to an incomplete issue at the most. So\nthat by the definitive close of the era of handicraft those peoples of\nChristendom that had maintained the advance achieved in this secular\nrespect were also the ones that had accepted and continued to hold the\nrevised form of the faith. Where this era of industrial and business\nenterprise closed in exhaustion and collapse, there the ancient form\nof the faith also triumphed over the heretics. It is, indeed, to be\nremarked as a sufficiently striking coincidence that even now the\ncentre of diffusion of the modern industry is at the same time the\ncentre of diffusion of religious protestantism and heresy. And the\nantique forms and fervour of the faith are found in better preservation\nprogressively outward from this centre of diffusion; and even in\nsomewhat minute detail it appears to hold true not only that the more\nadvanced industrial peoples are the less amenable to religious control\nand less given to superstitious observances of the archaic sort, but\nalso that within these industrial countries the industrial centres in\nthe narrower sense of the word are less devout, or devout in a less\narchaic fashion, than the non-industrial population at large. Something\nof the kind, indeed, has been visibly true ever since a relatively\nearly phase of the handicraft system; though nothing like undevoutness\ncan be alleged of the industrial town population during the handicraft\nera proper. The handicraft population was devout, but not consistently\northodox; and the industrial towns of that time were devout enough in\ntheir way, but it was in a way obnoxious to the received dogmas of the\nchurch. They were centres of devout heresy. It is only in late modern\ntimes that the malady has progressed so far that it may fairly be\ncalled a degree of apostacy. This concomitance between technological\nmastery and religious dissent is doubtless susceptible of a good and\nserviceable explanation at the hands of the religious experts; it is\nhere cited without prejudice as having at least a negative bearing on\nthe question of how the discipline of the handicraft industry may be\nconceived to affect men\u2019s spiritual attitude in a field so remote as\nthat of the life of faith.[131]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhat is known to economic history as the era of handicraft is for\nthe purposes of the political historian spoken of as the era of\nstatemaking. The two designations may not cover precisely the same\ninterval, but they coincide in a general way in point of dates, and the\nphenomena which have given rise to the two designations have much more\nthan an accidental connection. It is not simply that the development\nof handicraft happens to fall in the same general period of history\nthat is characterised by the dynastic wars that went to the making\nof the larger states. The growth of handicraft had much to do with\nmaking the large states practicable and with supplying the material\nmeans of large-scale warfare; while the traffic of dynastic politics\nin that time had in its turn very much to do with bringing that era of\nindustrial and commercial enterprise to an inglorious close. The new\nindustry supplied the sinews of war, and the wars ate up the substance\nof the industrial community.\n\nThe new industry gave rise to a growth of industrial towns and\ncommercial centres, primarily occupied by the traffic of the itinerant\ntraders. One of the immediate consequences of this extension of\nmerchandising enterprise was the improvement of means of communication,\nboth in the way of an extension and improvement of shipping--itself a\ntechnological fact--and in the way of improved routes of communication.\nA secondary consequence was a growth of population, coupled with its\nconcentration in urban centres, together with a growth of wealth, in\ngood part drawn together in the same centres. These changes enabled the\npowers in control to extend an effectual coercion over larger distances\nand over larger aggregations of population and wealth; it became\npracticable, mechanically, to swing a larger political aggregation and\nto hold it together in closer co\u00f6rdination than before. The physical\nconditions requisite to the formation and enduring maintenance of large\npolitical organisations were in this way supplied by the new industrial\nera as an incidental result of its technological efficiency.\n\nMore direct and obvious, though of no graver importance, is the\ncontribution made by the new technology to the means of coercion placed\nat the disposal of the warlords, in the way of improved weapons and\narmour, defences and warlike appliances. The improvements worked out\nin the means of warfare during the early half of the era of handicraft\nexceed in material effect and in boldness of conception all the\ntraceable improvements wrought in that line by all the warlike peoples\nof classical antiquity and all the fighting aggregations of Asia and\nAfrica, from the beginning of the bronze age down to modern times.\nThe craftsmen spent their best endeavours and their most brilliant\ningenuity on this production of arms and munitions, with the result\nthat these articles still lie over in the modern collections as the\nmost finished productions of workmanship which that era has to show.\nThe (unintended) result at large was that these improved appliances\nenabled the warlords and their fighting men to control the industrial\nclasses for their own ends and to levy exactions on trade and industry\nup to the limit of what the traffic would bear, or perhaps more\ncommonly somewhat over that limit. It was, in this way, their own\ntechnological mastery that furnished the means of their own undoing,\ndirectly (mechanically speaking) and indirectly (in the resulting\ngrowth of warlike sentiment).\n\nThat the craftsmen went so diligently into this production of ways\nand means for their own discomfort and abiding defeat is due not to\nany innately perverse bent of the sense of workmanship as it comes\nto expression in the spirit of the handicraft community, but rather\nto the exigencies created by the price system, with its principles\nof self-help,--a secondary, conventional product of the handicraft\nindustry. As has been noted already, with perhaps tedious iteration,\nthere runs through the handicraft community a high-wrought spirit of\nindividual self-sufficiency. So soon as the petty trade has grown to\neffective dimensions the individual workman comes into somewhat direct\nrelations with the market, and except for the collective interest\nand action embodied in the gild organisations the craftsmen stand in\nlittle else than a pecuniary relation to one another and bear little\nelse than a pecuniary responsibility to their fellow craftsmen or to\nthe community. It is the place of each to gain a livelihood by honest\nwork through his own individual skill and enterprise. Notoriously,\nthe craftsmen were in effect lacking in that sense of solidarity that\nmakes an efficient organisation for defence or offence; concerted\naction, outside the regulative activity of the gild, was to be had only\nwith extreme difficulty on any other basis than individual pecuniary\nadvantage. Each worked for himself, with an eye steadily to the main\nchance. And the main chance, from an early date in this era, meant gain\nin terms of price. So the craftsman worked for such customers as would\npay his price, and he spent his skill and ingenuity on such goods as\nwere in demand. The trade in arms and weapons was good at that time.\nThese appliances were a means of livelihood to the men at arms and\na means of income and prestige to their princely employers. So the\ntraffic went busily on, and the individual craftsmen put forth their\nbest efforts toward enhancing the efficiency of the ruling and fighting\nclasses, whose endeavours, without much collusion but by the inevitable\ndrift of circumstance, converged on the subjection of the community of\ncraftsmen at large and on the exhaustion of the community\u2019s resources.\n\nThrough its side issue in the commercial enterprise which it fostered\nthe handicraft industry brought to the hands of the politicians a\nfurther means of trouble. The trade brought on the price system, and\nso made it possible for ambitious princes to buy what they needed in\ntheir warlike negotiations; with funds in hand stores and munitions\ncould be bought where they were needed, so enabling warlike operations\nto be carried on with greater facility at a greater distance than\nwas feasible under the earlier rule of contributions in kind. The\nprice system also enabled the warlords to hire mercenaries, and so\nto organise and maintain a standing force of skilled fighting men,\nmobile and irresponsible. But to hold one\u2019s own in the competitive use\nof this new arm the prince must have funds; which led incontinently\nto all available manner of exactions on trade and commerce, since it\nwas from these sources almost solely that funds could be had. But it\nled also and equally to an increasing traffic between the princes and\nthe captains of industry, for the use of funds. Funds had become the\nsinews of war, since the handicraft industry had come to turn out\ngoods for sale and the merchandising trade had made funds accessible\nin sufficient volume to be worth while. So the princes dealt with the\ncaptains of industry, selling what they could and hypothecating what\nthey could not sell, in a competitive struggle to outdo one another\nat war and diplomacy. The game was then as always an emulative one,\nin which any advantage was a differential advantage only. Hence the\nprinces engaged, each and several, needed all the funds they could\nget the use of, and their need was ever present, not to be deferred.\nHence they borrowed what they could and where they could, their\nborrowings being floated by the help of all manner of expedients.\nSome of these fiscal expedients brought monopolistic advantage to the\ncaptains of industry, and so contributed to their further gain and to\nthe concentration of wealth in fewer hands. Meantime, the princely\nchancelries, being in debt as far as possible, extorted further loans\nfrom the captains by seizure and by threats of bankruptcy; and whatever\nwas borrowed was expeditiously used up in the destruction of property,\npopulation, industrial plant and international commerce. So, when all\navailable resources of revenue and credit, present and prospective,\nhad been exhausted, and all the accessible material had been consumed,\nthe princely fisc went into bankruptcy, followed by its creditors, the\ncaptains of industry, followed by the business community at large with\nwhose funds they had operated and by the industrial community, whose\nstock of goods and appliances was exhausted, whose trade connections\nwere broken and whose working population had been debauched, scattered\nand reduced to poverty and subjection by the wars, revenue collectors\nand forced contributions. Meantime, too, habituation to the sentiments,\nideals, standards and manner of life suitable to a state of predation\nhad swamped the handicraft spirit and put abnegation and dependence\non arbitrary power in the place of that initiative and pertinacious\nself-reliance that had made the era of handicraft. It was from this\neventuality that England in great measure escaped by favour of her\ninsular position and the inability of her princes to draw a reluctant\nindustrial community into the traffic of dynastic intrigue that filled\nthe Continent.\n\nIt will have been remarked that one of the essential moves in this\nsequence of events, from the beginnings of handicraft in impecunious\nand self-reliant workmanship to its eventual collapse in exhaustion,\nis the gradual accumulation of commercial and industrial wealth in\nrelatively few hands. This accumulation of wealth, or rather its\nsegregation in few hands, appears, as already indicated, to have\nentered as a potent factor in the course of things that lead the system\nof handicraft through maturity to collapse, as on the Continent, or to\ndecay, as in England. It will accordingly be in place to go somewhat\nmore narrowly into the circumstances of its beginnings and growth\nand the manner in which it plays its part in the organisation of the\nhandicraft industry.\n\nIt appears that this uneven distribution of wealth arises out of the\ntechnological exigencies of handicraft and of the petty trade which\ncharacteristically runs along with the handicraft industry in its early\nstages.[132] In its earliest, impecunious beginnings, handicraft as\nknown in medi\u00e6val Europe was like its congener, the manual arts of\nthe savage and lower barbarian peoples, in that the whole material\nequipment requisite to its pursuit consisted of a skilled workman\nand an extremely slender kit of tools. The tradition countenanced by\nhistorical students says that the beginnings of the handicraft system,\nwith its specialised industry and trained workmanship, is due to such\nworkmen, possessed of substantially nothing but their own persons, who\nescaped in one way and another from the bonds of the manorial system,\nor its equivalent, and found shelter on sufferance near some feudal\nprotector or religious corporation that found some advantage in this\nnovel arrangement.[133]\n\nOn looking into this inchoate working arrangement between these\nmasterless workmen and their patrons, and generalising the run of facts\nas may be permitted an inquiry that aims at theoretical presentation\nrather than historical description, the probable causal relation\nrunning through these obscure events will appear somewhat as follows.\nIt happened in Europe, as it has happened now and again elsewhere,\nthat the ownership of the soil in advanced feudal times took shape as\na Landed Interest living at peace and under settled relations with the\ncommunity from which they drew their livelihood and their means of\ncontrolling the community. Under these circumstances there grew up an\never-widening industrial system, under manorial auspices, in which the\nforemost place is taken by the mechanic arts, in the way of specialised\ncrafts and mechanical processes and appliances. The tranquil conditions\nthat prevail under such a settled, pacific or sub-predatory scheme\nof control bring out an increased volume of consumable products,\nparticularly since these same settled conditions admit a larger and\nmore economical use of all industrial appliances. The immediate\nconsequence is that an increased net product accrues to the propertied\nclass; which calls them to an intensified consumption of goods; which\nrequires increased elaboration and diversity of products; which calls\nfor an increasing diversity and volume of appliances and more prolonged\nand elaborate technological processes. The needs of the propertied\nclass, particularly in the way of superfluities, reach such a degree\nof diversity that it is no longer practicable to supply these needs by\nspecialised work within the industrial framework of the manor or its\nequivalent. The itinerant trade comes in to help out in this difficult\npassage by bringing exotic luxuries, curious articles of great price;\nbut that is not sufficient to cover the requirements of the case, since\nthere is much needed work of elaboration that cannot be taken care of\nby way of an importation of finished goods.\n\nHere comes the opportunity of the skilled masterless workman. The\ngrowth of wealth has provided a place for him in the economy of the\ntime, and having once got a foothold he and his followers congregate in\nindustrial towns and find a living by the work of their hands.\n\nThe point should be kept in mind in any consideration of the era of\nhandicraft that its beginnings are made by these \u201cmasterless men,\u201d who\nbroke away (or were broken out) from the bonds of that organisation\nin which the arbitrary power of the landed interest held dominion. By\ntenacious assertion of the personal rights which they so arrogated to\nthemselves, and at great cost and risk, they made good in time their\nclaim to stand as a class apart, a class of ungraded free men among\nwhom self-help and individual workmanlike efficiency were the accepted\ngrounds of repute and of livelihood. This tradition never dies out\namong the organised craftsmen until the industrial system which had\nso been inaugurated went under in the turmoil of politics and finance\nor was supplanted by the machine era that grew out of it. With this\nclass-tradition of initiative and democratic autonomy is associated, as\nan integral fact in the system, the concomitant tradition that work is\na means of livelihood.\n\nIn these early phases of the system the individual workman is\n(typically) competent to work out his livelihood with the use of such\na slight equipment of tools as could readily be acquired in the course\nof his employment. In great part, indeed, the craftsman of the early\ndays made his tools and appliances as he went along. But it follows\nnecessarily that further training in the skilled manipulations of the\ncrafts led to the use of improved and specialised tools as well as to\nthe use of larger appliances useful in the technological processes\nemployed, such as could scarcely be called tools in the simpler sense\nof the word but would rather be classed as industrial plant. With\nthe advance of technology the material equipment so requisite to\nthe pursuit of industry in the crafts increases in volume, cost and\nelaboration, and the processes of industry grow extensive and complex;\nuntil it presently becomes a matter of serious difficulty for any\nworkman single-handed to supply the complement of tools, appliances and\nmaterials with which his work is to be done. It then also becomes a\nmatter of some moment to own such wealth.\n\nAs under any earlier and simpler industrial r\u00e9gime, so in this\nearly-advanced phase of the handicraft system the workman must also\nhave command of that immaterial equipment of technological information\nat large that is current in the community, in so far as it affects his\nparticular occupation; and he must in addition acquire the special\ntrained skill necessary in his own branch of craft. The former he will,\nat that stage of technological growth, still come by without particular\ndeliberate application, in the ordinary routine of life; it is made\nup of general information and familiarity with current ways of doing,\nsimply, and on the level of general information which then prevailed\nno special training or schooling seems to have been needed to place\nthe young man abreast of his time. In other words, the common stock of\ntechnological knowledge had not by that time grown so unwieldy as to\nrequire special pains to assimilate it. As for the latter, the special\nskill which would make him a craftsman, that was also accessible at the\ncost of some application; but under the rules of handicraft the early\napprentice gained this trained skill at no cost beyond application to\nthe work in hand. But the like does not continue to hold true of the\nmaterial equipment; which presently was no longer to be compassed as\na matter of course and of routine application to the work in hand. It\nwas becoming increasingly important and increasingly difficult to be\nprovided with these means with which to go to work, and the ownership\nof such means gave an increasingly decisive advantage to their owner.\n\nWhat adds further force to this position of affair is the fact that\nin many of the crafts the work could no longer be carried on to full\nadvantage in strict severalty; the best approved processes required a\ngang or corps of workmen in co\u00f6peration, and required also something\nin the way of a \u201cplant\u201d suitable for the employment of such a corps\nrather than of a single individual. Such a condition, of course, came\non earlier and more urgently in some crafts, as, e.\u00a0g., in tanning,\nor brewing, or some of the metal-working trades, than in others, as,\ne.\u00a0g., the building trades, locksmithing, cobbling, etc. But an\nadvance of this kind, and the exigencies which such an advance brings,\ncame on gradually and with such a measure of general prevalence through\nthe crafts that the general statement made above may fairly stand as a\nfree characterisation of the state of the industrial arts in the crafts\nat large at the period in question. The growing resort to working\nmethods requiring organised groups of workmen together with something\nin the way of collective industrial plant would greatly hasten the\nconcentration of the ownership of the material equipment. Ownership in\nall ages is individual ownership; and then as ever any single item of\nproperty, such as a workshop and its appliances, would presently fall\ninto the possession of an individual owner. The owners of the plant\nbecame employers of their impecunious fellow craftsmen and so came into\na position to dispose of their working capacity and their product.\n\nWhen and in so far as the advanced state of the industrial arts,\ntherefore, made it impracticable for the individual craftsman readily\nto acquire the material means for work in his craft, any proficiency\nin the craft would be of no effect except by arrangement with some one\nwho could supply these material means. The possession of the material\nequipment, therefore, placed in the discretion of its owners the\nutilisation of such technological knowledge and skill as the members\nof the given crafts might possess. The usufruct of the handicraft\ncommunity\u2019s technological proficiency in this way came to vest in the\nowners of the plant, in the same measure as this plant was necessary to\nthe pursuit of industry under the technological scheme then in force.\nThis effect would be had so soon and in such measure as it became a\nmatter of appreciable difficulty to acquire and maintain the material\nequipment requisite to the workmanlike pursuit of industry; and it\nwould become generally decisive of the relation between master and\nworkman so soon as the outfit of material means required for effective\nwork had grown larger than the common run of workmen could acquire in\nthe course of such training as would fit them to do the work in the\nparticular branch of industry in which they engaged.\n\nThe change brought on in this way by the growth of technology was\nneither abrupt nor sharply defined. Like other changes in the\ntechnological scheme it was an outgrowth of the knowledge and methods\nalready previously current, and it took effect in detail and in a very\nconcrete way, leading on through fluctuating usage to a gradually\nsettled general practice which came at length to differ substantially\nfrom the situation out of which it had grown. By insensible gradations\nit came into such general prevalence and everyday recognition, and\nestablished such stable methods of procedure, as presently left it\nstanding as an established institutional fact. It grew into the\nprevalent habits of thought without a visible break, and made its way\nmore or less thoroughly in the several branches of industry which\nit touched, until it came to be accepted as the type of handicraft\norganisation to which other, outlying branches of industry would\nthen also tend to conform, even when there was no direct provocation\nfor these outlying members of the industrial system to take on the\ntypical form so given. But given the tranquil conditions necessary to\nthe accumulation of such industrial appliances and to the invention\nand employment of long and roundabout processes in industry, and\nthe resulting change that sets in will be of a cumulative character,\naffecting an ever increasing proportion of the industrial arts, and\npermeating the industrial system at large in a progressive fashion.\n\nUnder these circumstances, and in proportion as these technological\nexigencies take effect in one branch of industry and another, the\nusufruct of the industrial community\u2019s current productive efficiency\ncomes to vest effectually in those who own the material means of\nindustry. Their effectual exploitation of the community\u2019s industrial\nefficiency will extend to such industries, and with such a degree of\nthoroughness and security, as the state of the industrial arts may\ndecide. This effectual engrossing of the technological heritage by the\nowners will extend to any branch of the industrial arts in which so\nconsiderable a material equipment is required, in appliances and raw\nmaterials, that the workmen who go into this given line of employment\ncannot practically create or acquire it as they go along. In an\nuncertain measure, therefore, and varying in degree somewhat from one\nindustry to another, the owner of the plant becomes in effect the owner\nof the community\u2019s technological knowledge and workmanlike skill, and\nthereby the owner of the workman\u2019s productive capacity.\n\nIn the small beginnings of the handicraft industry the craftsman\ntypically passed by a simple routine from the status of apprentice\nto that of master, picking up the slight necessary outfit as he went\nalong; in the closing phases of the era handicraft methods had reached\na high degree of specialisation and made use of extensive processes\nand appliances, and it was then only by exception that any craftsman\ncould pass from apprenticeship through the intervening stages to the\nposition of a working master, without the help of inherited means\nor special favour. Toward the close of the era the masters were,\ntypically, employers of skilled labour and foremen in their own shop,\nexcept in the frequent case where they altogether ceased to work at\nthe trade and gave their whole attention to the business side of the\nindustry. Many of these nominal master craftsmen were in fact mere\ntraders, captains of industry, businessmen, who never came in manual\ncontact with the work.[134]\n\nSo capitalism emerged from the working of the handicraft system,\nthrough the increasing scale and efficiency of technology. And on the\nground afforded by this capitalistic phase of the system arose that era\nof business enterprise that ruled the economic fortunes of Europe in\nthe fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with its captains of industry\nand great financial houses. Whether the large means with which these\ncaptains of industry operated were primarily drawn from the gains of\nthe petty trade that had gone before, or were drawn into this field\nof business from outside, is a debated question which need not detain\nthe present inquiry. The fact remains that, by whatever means, this\ndevelopment of the situation comes out of that growth of handicraft\nwhereby the ownership and control of the industrial plant passed out of\nthe hands of the body of working craftsmen.\n\nWhen this business situation collapsed, therefore, as already spoken\nof above, the handicraft industry at its best was organised on\ncapitalistic lines and managed for capitalistic ends,--with a view to\nprofits on investment, not primarily with a view to the livelihood\nof the working craftsmen. The new situation which then presented\nitself, as a consequence of the collapse of the business community,\nwas industrially and commercially better suited to the simpler and\nruder methods of handicraft that had succeeded in the early days of\nthe system; but the current preconceptions and trade relations that\nactually ruled at the time were of a capitalistic kind, and the current\nstate of the industrial arts, even where industry had fallen into a\nfragmentary state, was such as technologically required the large-scale\norganisation in order to its due working. Between the impossibility\nof going forward on the accustomed lines and the impracticability of\nan effectual rehabilitation of more primitive methods, there resulted\na period of poverty and confusion, helped out by the continued\nmismanagement of the dynastic politicians; so that the industrial\nsituation of the Continent never recovered until it was overtaken by\nthe new era of the machine industry inaugurated by the English.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe circumstances of life for the common man underwent more than one\nsubstantial change during the era of handicraft, and these changes were\nnot all in the same sense. The dominant note changes from workmanship\nin the earlier phases of the era to pecuniary competition and political\nanxiety toward the close, particularly as regards the industrial\ncommunities of the Continent. The era is a long period of history,\nall told, running over some five or six centuries, from an advanced\nstage of the feudal age to the eighteenth century, or to various\nearlier dates in those countries where the handicraft system came to\na provisional close in the era of statemaking; and the discipline of\nlife does not run to the same effect in the earlier of these phases\nof the development as in the later. Not that handicraft ceased to be\nthe prevailing method in the mechanical industries of these countries\nwhen the reaction overtook them, but the technological advance had\nbeen seriously checked, and such handicraft industry as still went on\nhad ceased to dominate the economic situation and no longer held the\nprimacy among the factors that shaped the life of the communities in\nquestion. Its place as a dominant force was taken by the new political\ninterests and by such commercial enterprise as still went on.\n\nBut through the centuries of its earlier growth the handicraft\nindustry, simply as a routine of workmanship, shaped the conditions of\nlife for the common people more pervasively and consistently than any\nother one factor. Its discipline, therefore, was of protracted duration\nand touched the current habits of thought in an intimate and enduring\nfashion; so as to leave a large and enduring effect on the institutions\nof the peoples among whom it prevailed. The English-speaking community\nshows these effects in a larger measure and a more evident manner than\nany other,--visible only in a less degree in the Low Countries, and\nmore equivocally in the Scandinavian countries. These peoples had not\nbeen subjected to the handicraft discipline for a longer time or in a\nmore exacting fashion than their Continental neighbours, but they had\non the other hand escaped the full measure of the political activity of\nthe era of statemaking that did so much to neutralise the effects of\nthe handicraft system in the larger Continental countries.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSomething has been said above of the way in which the discipline of\nlife under the rule of handicraft shaped and coloured men\u2019s thinking\nin those materialistic sciences whose early growth runs parallel with\nthe technological advance in modern times. It has also been evident\nthat this training in the manner of conceiving things for the purposes\nof technology wrought certain broad changes in the theological and\nphilosophical conceptions that guided the inquiring spirits of the\nsame and subsequent generations. This effect wrought by the routine\nof life under the handicraft system on scientific and philosophical\nconceptions is of a very pervasive character, being of the nature of\nan habitual bent, an attitude or frame of mind, whose characteristic\nmark is the acceptance of creative workmanship as a finality. It became\nan element of common sense in the apprehension of thoughtful men whose\nframe of mind was formed under the traditions of that era that creative\nworkmanship is an ultimate, irreducible factor in the constitution of\nthings, accepted as a matter of course and used unsparingly and with\never-growing conviction as a _terminus a quo_ and _ad quem_.[135]\n\nCreative workmanship, fortified in ever-growing measure by the\nconception of serviceability to human use, works its way gradually into\nthe central place in the theoretical speculations of the time, so that\nby the close of the era it dominates all intellectual enterprise in\nthe thoughtful portions of Christendom. Hence it becomes not only the\ninstrument of inquiry in the sciences, but a major premise in all work\nof innovation and reconstruction of the scheme of institutions. In that\nextensive revision of the institutional framework that characterises\nmodern times it is the life of the common people, their rights and\nobligations, that is forever in view, and their life is conceived in\nterms of craftsmanlike industry and the petty trade. By and large, the\noutcome of this revision of civil and legal matters under handicraft\nauspices is the system of Natural Rights, including the concept of\nNatural Liberty. The whole scheme so worked out is manifestly of the\nsame piece with that Order of Nature and Natural Law that dominated the\ninquiries of the scientists and the speculations of the philosophers.\n\nIt lies in the nature of the case that the English-speaking community\nshould take the lead in the final advance in all these matters and\nshould work out the most finished, secure and enduring results within\nthese premises, both in the field of scientific inquiry and in that of\nthe theory of institutions. It lies in the nature of the case because\nthe English-speaking community had the benefit of the technological\ngains made before their time, because they had a long and passably\nuneventful experience of the handicraft routine in industry and in the\nworkday life to whose wants the handicraft industry ministered, and\nbecause the discipline of the handicraft era was not in their case\nneutralised in its closing phase by the turmoil, insecurity and civic\ndebaucheries of an epoch of war and political intrigue. And here again\nthe neighbouring peoples come into the case as copartners in this work\nwith England in much the same measure in which their experience through\nthis period was of the same general nature.\n\nThe scheme of Natural Rights, and of Natural Liberty, which so emerges\nis of a pronounced individualistic tenor, as it should be to answer\nto the scheme of experience embodied in the system of handicraft. In\nthe crafts, particularly during the protracted early phases of the\nsystem, it is the individual workman, working for a livelihood by use\nof his own personal force, dexterity and diligence, that stands out as\nthe main fact; so much so, indeed, that he appears to have stood, in\nthe apprehension of his time, as the sole substantial factor in the\nindustrial organisation. Similarly under the canon of Natural Liberty\nthe individual is thrown on his own devices for his life, liberty and\npursuit of happiness. The craftsman by immemorial custom traditionally\ndisposed of his work and its product as he chose, under the rules of\nhis gild. He was by prescription in full possession of what he made,\nsubject only to the gild regulations imposed for the good of his\nneighbours who were similarly placed. The most sacred right included\nin the scheme of Natural Rights is that of property in whatever wealth\nhas been honestly acquired, subject only to the qualification that\nit must not be turned to the detriment of one\u2019s fellows. In the days\nof the typical handicraft system the petty trade runs along with the\nhandicraft industry, in such a way that every master craftsman is more\nor less of a trader, disposing of his goods or services in plenary\ndiscretion, and even the apprentices and journeymen similarly bargain\nfor their terms of work and at times for the disposal of their product;\nwhile the professional itinerant trader is a member of this industrial\ncommunity on much the same footing as the craftsmen proper. So it is\na secure item in the scheme of Natural Rights that all persons not\nunder tutelage have an indefeasible right to dispose by purchase and\nsale not only of products of their own hands but of whatever items they\nhave come by through alienation by its producer or lawful owner. And\nownership is in natural-rights theory always to be traced back to the\ncreative workmanship of its first possessor.[136]\n\nIn the sequel this natural right freely to dispose of one\u2019s person and\nwork, when it had found lodgment among the principles of civil rights\nin the eighteenth century, contributed substantially to the dissolution\nof that organ of surveillance and control that the craftsmen of an\nearlier generation had instituted in the gild system. The case is\nbut an instance of what is continually happening and bound to happen\nin the field of institutional growth. Institutional principles, such\nas this item of civil rights, emerge from use and wont, resulting\nas a settled line of convention from usage and custom that grow out\nof the exigencies of life at the time. But use and wont is a matter\nof time. It takes time for habituation to attain that secure degree\nof conventional recognition and authenticity that will enable it to\nstand as an indefeasible principle of conduct, and by the time this\nconsummation is achieved it commonly happens that the exigencies which\nenforced the given line of use and wont have ceased to be operative,\nor at least to be so imperative as in their earlier incidence. The\ncontrol which the gilds were initially designed to exercise was a\ncontrol that should leave the gildsmen free in the pursuit of their\nwork, subject only to a salutary surveillance and standardisation of\nthe output, such as would maintain the prestige of their workmanship\nand facilitate the disposal of the goods produced. The initial purpose\nseems, in modern phrase, to have been a creation of intangible assets\nfor the benefits of the body of gildmen. Under the new conditions that\ncame to prevail when capitalistic management took over the direction\nof industry these gild regulations no longer served their purpose,\nbut they seem on the contrary to have become an obstacle to the free\nemployment of skilled workmen.\n\nA similar fortune was about the same time beginning to overtake this\nprinciple of Natural Liberty itself, and that even in the particular\nbearing which seems at the outset to have been its primary and most\nsubstantial aim. Initially, it seems, the point of interest, and\nindeed of contention, was the freedom of the masterless workman to\ndispose of his person and workmanship as he saw fit and as he best\ncould and would,--to take care of his life, liberty and pursuit of\nhappiness without let or hindrance from persons vested with authority\nor prerogative. With the passage of time, use and wont erected this\nconventional rule into an inalienable right. But included with it,\nas an integral extension of the powers which this inalienable right\nsafeguarded, was the right of purchase and sale, touching both work\nand its product, the right freely to hold and dispose of property.\nPresently, toward the close of the handicraft era, or more specifically\nin the late eighteenth century in England, industry fell under\ncapitalistic management. When this change had taken passably full\neffect the workman was already secure in his civil (natural) right to\ndispose of his workmanship as he thought best, but the circumstances\nof employment under capitalistic management made it impossible for\nhim in fact to dispose of his work except to these employers, and\nvery much on their terms, or to dispose of his person except where\nthe exigencies of their business might require him. And the similarly\ninalienable right of ownership, which had similarly emerged from use\nand wont under the handicraft system, but which now in effect secured\nthe capitalist-employer in his control of the material means of\nindustry,--this sacred right of property now barred out any move that\nmight be designed to reinstate the workman in his effective freedom to\nwork as he chose or to dispose of his person and product as he saw fit.\n\nThe connection so shown between the growth of handicraft and the\nsystem of Natural Rights does not purport to be a complete account\nof the rise of that system, even in outline. The more usual account\ntraces this system to the concept of _jus naturale_, of the late Roman\njurists. There is assuredly no call here to question or disparage\nthe work of those jurists and scholars who have busied themselves\nwith authenticating the system of Natural Rights by showing it to\nbe founded in the _jus gentium_ and the _jus naturale_ of the Latin\nCodes. Their work is doubtless historically exact and competent. But\nas is commonly the case with such work at the hands of jurists and\nscholars, especially in that past age, it contents itself with tracing\nan authentic pedigree, rather than go into questions of the causes that\nled to the vogue of these concepts at the time of their acceptance\nor the circumstances which gave these Natural Rights that particular\nscope and content which they have assumed in modern theory of law and\ncivil relations. The thesis which is here offered is to the effect that\nthe habituation of use and wont under the handicraft system installed\nthese rights, in an inchoate fashion, in the current preconceptions\nof the community, and that this habituation is traceable, causally\nrather than by process of ratiocination, to the sense of workmanship\nas it took form and went into action under the particular conventional\ncircumstances of the early era of handicraft; that the preconceptions\nthat so went into effect determined the current attitude of thoughtful\nmen toward questions of civil rights and legal principle; and that the\njurists who had occasion to take notice of these current preconceptions\ntouching human rights found themselves constrained to deal with them as\nelementary facts in the situation as it lay before them, and therefore\nto find a ground for them in the accepted canons, such as would satisfy\nthe legal mind of their authenticity by ancient prescription, or such\nas should determine the scope of their application in conformity with\nlegal principles having a prior claim and authoritative sanction.\nThe thesis, therefore, is not that the jurists founded these modern\nprinciples of legal theory on the popular prejudices current in their\ntime and due in point of habituation to the routine of handicraft,\nnor that they stretched the ancient principles of _jus naturale_ to\nmeet the demands of popular prejudice, but that on prompting of legal\nexigencies to which the practical acceptance of these principles had\ngiven rise, the jurists found in the capitularies of the code what\nwas necessary to authenticate these principles of legal theory and\ngive them the sanction of authority,--a work of reasoning all the more\ncongenial and convincing to the jurists since they in common with the\nrest of their generation were by habit and tradition imbued with the\npenchant to find these principles right and good, and consequently to\nfind none other in the codes that might fatally traverse those whose\nauthentication was due. But these are matters of pedigree, and this\nwork of the great jurists and philosophers is in great part of the\nnature of accessory after the fact, so far as bears on that sweeping\nacceptance of these principles and that incontestable efficiency that\nmarks the course of their life-history in modern times. The jurists and\nphilosophers have sought and shown the sufficient reason for accepting\nthis scheme of principles, as well as for the particular fashion in\nwhich they have been formulated; but the insensible growth of habits\nof thought induced by the conditions of life in (early) modern times\nmust be allowed to stand as the efficient cause of their dominant\ncontrol over modern practice, speculation, and sentiment touching all\nthose relations that have been standardised in their terms. By use and\nwont the range of conventional elements included in the scheme had\nbecome eternal and indubitable principles of right reason, ingrained\nin the intellectual texture of the jurists as well as in their lay\ncontemporaries; and the task of the jurists therefore was to work out\ntheir authentication in terms of sufficient reason; it was not for them\nto trouble with any question of the causes to which these principles\nowed their eternal fitness in the scheme of Nature at that particular\ntime.\n\nThe Natural Rights which so found authentication at the hands of the\njurists were of the individualistic kind which the discipline of the\nhandicraft system had inculcated, and the authentication found in the\n_jus naturale_ does not range much beyond the individualistic bounds so\nprescribed, nor are other lines of ancient prescription, at variance\nwith these rights, brought at all prominently into the light by the\nlegal inquiries of the jurists. Whereas it is no matter of serious\nquestion that the chief bearing of the ancient findings embodied in the\ncode is not of this individualistic character. The causes which brought\non the modern acceptance of this scheme of Natural Rights are a matter\nof use and wont, quite distinct from that line of argument by which the\njurists established them on grounds of sufficient reason resting on\nancient prescription.\n\nThe extreme tenacity of life shown by the system of Natural Rights\nmay raise a reasonable doubt as to the adequacy of any account that\nassigns their derivation to the discipline of use and wont peculiar\nto any particular cultural era, even when the era in question is of\nso consistent a character and such protracted duration as the era\nof handicraft. What adds force to such a question is the fact that\nsomething like these preconceptions of natural right is not uncommon in\nthe lower cultures. So that on the face of the returns there appears\nto be good ground in the nature of things for designating these\nconventional rights \u201cnatural.\u201d Something of the kind is current in an\nobvious fashion among the peaceable communities on the lower levels\nof culture, among whom the scheme of accepted rights and obligations\nbears more than a distant resemblance to the Natural Rights of the\neighteenth century. But something of the kind will also be found\namong peoples on a higher level, both peaceable and predatory; though\ndeparting more notably in point of contents from the eighteenth-century\nsystem. The point of similarity, or of identity, among all these\nsystems of conventionally fundamental and eternal human rights is to be\nfound in their intrinsic sanction--they are all and several right and\ngood as a matter of course and of common sense; the point of divergence\nor dissimilarity is to be found in the contents of the code, which are\nnot nearly the same in all cases. In the medi\u00e6val natural common-sense\nscheme of rights, prerogative, personal and class exemption, is of the\nessence of the canon; but the scheme is none the less intrinsically\nmandatory on those who had been bred into a matter-of-course acceptance\nof it by the routine of life in that age. Differential rights, duties\nand privilege give the point of departure in this medi\u00e6val system of\ncivil relations; whereas in the system worked out under the auspices of\nthe handicraft industry the denial of differential advantage, whether\nclass or individual, is the beginning of wisdom and the substance of\ncommon sense as applied to civil relations. The one of these schemes\ncomes out of an economic situation drawn on lines of predation,\nancient, prescriptive and settled, and its first principle is that\nof master and servant; the other comes of a situation grounded in\nworkmanlike efficiency, and its first principle is that of an equitable\nlivelihood for work done.\n\nThat some of the working systems of civil rights in customary force\namong the peaceable communities of the lower culture have more in\ncommon with modern Natural Rights than this medi\u00e6val scheme, should\nlogically be due to a similarity in the conditions of life out of\nwhich they have arisen. In these savage or lower barbarian communities,\ntoo, the principle of organization is work for a livelihood, and the\nconventional ground of economic relations is that of workmanship, as\nit is under the early handicraft system; but with the difference that\nwhereas the technology of handicraft throws the skilled workman into\nperspective as a self-sufficient individual, and so throws self-help\ninto the foreground as the principle of economic equity, among these\nsavages and lower barbarians living by means of a technology of a less\nhighly specialised character, with a material situation not admitting\nof the same degree of severalty in work or livelihood, the prime\nrequisite in the relations governing the rights and duties of the\nmembers of the group is not the individual livelihood of the skilled\nworkman but that of the group at large. The individual\u2019s personal\nclaims come in only as secondary and subservient to the needs of the\ngroup at large; rights of ownership are loose and vague, and they\nlack that tenacity of life that characterises the like rights under\nthe handicraft system. It is true, the product of industry belongs\nprimarily to the producer of it, it is his in some sense that might\npass into ownership if the technological situation admitted of work for\na livelihood in strict and consistent severalty; but in the actual case\nas found on these lower levels the product commonly escapes somewhat\neasily from his individual possession and comes to inure to the use of\nthe group. Except for such articles as continue to pertain to him by\nvirtue of intimate and daily use, the producer\u2019s possessive control of\nhis product is likely at the best to be transient and dubious, readily\ngiving way before any urgent call for its use by other members of the\ngroup.[137]\n\nA fact of some incisive effect in this connection is doubtless the\ncharacteristic trait of handicraft that, in its early phases wholly and\nobviously and in its later development also somewhat evidently, it was\nthe affair of a class; whereas in the savage communities with which it\nis here compared, the technology and the livelihood in question are\nthose of the community at large, not of a class that stands in contrast\nand in some degree of competition with the community at large. The\ncraftsmen were a fraction of the community by work for whose needs\nthey got their livelihood, even though, in the course of time, they\nbecame the dominant element within the local community (municipality)\nwhose fortunes they shared. And as between this fraction of the\npopulation and outside classes with whom they carried on their traffic,\nparticularly the well-to-do and land-holding classes, there could be\nno constraining sense of a solidarity of interest. The ancient bond\nof master and servant had been broken by something like an overt act\nof class secession on the part of the craftsmen, and nothing like a\nbond of fellowship had taken its place. The fellowship ran within the\nlines of craftsmanship, while the traffic of each craftsman typically\nran across the line that divided the craftsman from the old order and\npopulation outside of this industrial system.\n\nThat the eighteenth-century system of Natural Rights shows such a\ndegree of approximation to the scheme of rights and obligations\nobserved among many primitive peoples need flutter no one\u2019s sense\nof cultural consistency. Return to Nature was more or less of a\npassword in the closing period of the era of handicraft and after,\nand in respect of this system of civil relations it appears that the\npopular attitude of that time was in effect something of a reversion\nto primitive habits of thought; though it was at best a partial return\nto a \u201cstate of nature\u201d in the sense of a state of peace and industry\nrather than a return to the unsophisticated beginnings of society.\nThat such a partial reversion takes effect in the habits of thought of\nthe time appears to be due to a similarly partial return to somewhat\nanalogous habits of life. The correspondence in the habits of thought\nis no greater than that in the habits of life out of which these habits\nof thought emerged. The primitive peoples that show this suggestive\nresemblance to the system of Natural Rights typically are living under\na routine of workmanship and in a state of habitual peace,--in these\nrespects being placed somewhat similarly to the handicraft community.\nThe handicraft system comes true to the same characterisation in so\nfar that it was dominated by a routine of workmanship and so far as,\nin effect, its life-history falls in an era of prevailingly peaceable\nconditions; and such a characterisation holds true of the industrial\ncommunity proper through the period during which handicraft is the\nruling factor in the community\u2019s habitual range of interest. It is\nnot that the era of handicraft was an era of reversion to savagery,\nbut only that the tone-giving factor in the community of that time\nreverted, by force of the state of the industrial arts, to habits of\npeace and industry, in which direct and detailed manual work takes a\nleading place. There is also the further point of economic contact\nwith the savage state that in the handicraft community distinctions\nof wealth are neither large nor of decisive consequence during the\nlong period of habituation that brought the preconceptions of that era\ninto the settled shape that gave them the character of a finished and\nbalanced system of principles.\n\nIt may be added, at the risk of tedious repetition, that the habits of\nlife characteristic of the era, as well as the frame of mind suited\nto this characteristic routine of life, seem peculiarly suited to the\nnative endowment of the European peoples,--perhaps in an especial\ndegree suited to the native bent of those sections of the population\nin which there is an appreciable admixture of the dolicho-blond\nstock. That such may be the case is at least strongly suggested by\nthe tenacious hold which this system of Rights apparently still has\non the sentimental allegiance of these Western peoples, after the\nconditions to which these Rights owe their rise, and to which they are\nsuited, have in the main ceased to exist; as well as by the somewhat\nblind fervour with which these peoples, and more especially the\nEnglish-speaking section of them, go about the idyllic enterprise of\nrehabilitating that obsolescent \u201ccompetitive system\u201d that embodied the\nsystem of Natural Rights, and that came up with the era of handicraft\nand went under in its dissolution.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE MACHINE INDUSTRY\n\n\nThe era of the machine industry has been designated variously, to\nanswer to the varying point of view from which it has been considered\nby divers writers. As an historical era it shows divers traits, more or\nless characteristic, and it has been designated by one or another of\nthese traits according to the particular line of interest that may have\ndirected the attention of those who have had occasion to name it. It is\nspoken of as the era of the factory system, of large-scale industry,\nas the age of Capitalism or of free competition, or again as an era of\nthe credit economy. But as seen from the point of view of technology,\nand more specifically from that of workmanship as it underlies the\ntechnological system, it is best characterised as the era of the\nmachine industry, or of the machine process. As a technological period\nit is commonly conceived to take its rise in the British industrial\ncommunity about the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the\nconventional date of the Industrial Revolution,--those who have a taste\nfor precise dates assigning it more specifically to the sixties of that\ncentury, to coincide with the earliest practical use of certain large\nmechanical inventions of that age.[138]\n\nSuch a precise date is scarcely serviceable for any other than a\nmnemonic purpose. If the matter is taken in historical perspective\nthe era of the machine process will be seen to have been coming on in\nEngland through the earlier years of the century, and even from before\nthat time; whereas notable mechanical inventions, and engineering\nexploits of the like general bearing in technology, had begun to affect\nthe industrial situation in some of the Continental countries at an\nappreciably earlier period. So, _e.\u00a0g._, practical improvements had\ngone into effect in water-wheels, pumps and wind mills, in the use of\nsails and the designs of shipping, in wheeled vehicles (though the\nearly modern improvements in this particular may easily be over-rated)\nand in such appliances as chimneys; and, again, there is the peculiar\nbut highly instructive field of applied mechanics represented by the\ninvention and improvement of firearms. Such engineering enterprises as\nthe drainage systems of Holland also belong here and are to be counted\namong the notable achievements in applied mechanics.\n\nEven the most casual review of the technological situation in Europe,\nsay in the seventeenth century, will bring out characteristic features\nthat cannot be denied honourable mention as applications of mechanical\nscience, although the reserve caution is immediately to be entered\nthat these early mechanical expedients and their employment stand out\nas sporadic facts of mechanical contrivance in an age of manual work,\nrather than as characteristic traits of the industrial system in which\nthey are found. The beginnings of the machine industry are of this\nsporadic character. They come up as an outgrowth of the handicraft\ntechnology, particularly at conjunctures where that technology is\ncalled on to deal with such large mechanical problems as exceed the\nforce of manual labour or that elude the reach of the craftsman\u2019s tools.\n\nSo, _e.\u00a0g._, in England, say from the sixteenth century onward, there\nare improvements in highways and waterways and in the drainage of\nagricultural lands; and, as an instance more obviously related to the\nmachine industry as commonly apprehended, there comes early in the\neighteenth century the \u201chorse-hoing cultivation\u201d on which Jethro Tull\nspent his enthusiasm. Along with this obviously mechanical line of\nendeavour and innovation is also to be noted the deliberate efforts to\nimprove the races of sheep and cattle that were in progress about the\nsame time. These are perhaps not to be rated as mechanical inventions\nin the simple and obvious sense of the phrase, but they have this\ntrait in common with the inventions of the machine era that they turn\nascertained facts of brute nature to account for human use by a logic\nthat has much of that character of impersonal incidence that marks\nthe machine technology. The machine industry comes on gradually;\nits initial stages are visible in the early eighteenth century, but\nit is only toward the close of that century that its effects on the\nindustrial system become so pronounced that the era of the machine\ntechnology may fairly be said to have set in; and it is only in Great\nBritain that it can be said to prevail at that period.\n\nOf the other features above alluded to as characteristic of this period\nof history none are of so substantial a character or so distinctive\nof this particular period as its technological peculiarities. Free\ncompetition, _e.\u00a0g._, belongs as much to the era of handicraft as to\nthat of the machine, having prevailed--more extensively in theory\nthan in practice--under the former r\u00e9gime as under the latter; and\nin point of fact it gradually falls under increasing restrictions as\nthe machine age advances, until in the more highly developed phases\nof the current situation it has largely ceased to be a practicable\nline of policy in industrial business. So, also, Capitalism did not\ntake its rise coincident with the industrial revolution, although its\nbest development and largest expansion may lie within the machine age.\nIt had its beginnings in the prosperous days of handicraft, and one\ncapitalistic era had already run its course, on the Continent, before\nthe machine industry came in. The \u201ccredit economy,\u201d associated with\nthe capitalistic management of industry, is also of older growth, so\nfar as regards the days of its early vigour, although the larger and\nmore far-reaching developments of credit come effectually into play\nonly in the later decades of the machine age. Much the same is true\nof the so-called large-scale organisation of industry and the factory\nsystem. Its highest development comes with the advanced stages of the\nmachine technology and is manifestly conditioned by the latter, but it\nwas already a force to be counted with at the time of the industrial\nrevolution. The large-scale industry contemplated, with a degree of\napprehension, by Adam Smith, e.\u00a0g., was not based on the machine\ntechnology but on handicraft with an extensive division of labour, and\non the \u201chousehold industry\u201d as that was gaining ground in his time. The\nlatter was, in form, what has since come to be known as the \u201csweatshop\u201d\nindustry.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn this new era technology comes into close touch with science; both\nthe science and the technology of the new age being of a matter-of-fact\ncharacter, beyond all precedent. So much so that by contrast, the\ntechnology of handicraft would appear to have stood in no close or\nconsistent relation with the avowed science of its time. Not that\nanthropomorphic imputation is altogether wanting or inoperative in this\nlatterday scientific inquiry, or in the technological utilisation of\nthe facts in hand; but in the later conceptions anthropomorphism has at\nthe best been repressed and sterilised in an unprecedented degree. And\nit holds true for the machine technology beyond any other state of the\nindustrial arts that the facts of observation can effectually be turned\nto account only in so far as they are apprehended in a matter-of-fact\nway. The logic of this technology, by which its problems are to be\nworked out, is the logic of a mechanical process in which no personal\nor teleological factors enter. The engineer or inventor who designs\nprocesses, appliances and expedients within these premises is required\nto apprehend and appreciate the working facts after that dispassionate,\nopaque, unteleological fashion in which the phenomena of brute matter\noccur; and he must learn to work out their uses by the logic of brute\nmatter instead of construing them by imputation and by analogy with the\nmanifestations of human workmanship. Less imperatively, but still in a\nmarked degree, the same spirit must be found in the workmen under whose\ntendance these processes and appliances are to work out the designed\nresults.\n\nUnder the simpler technology of more primitive industrial systems\nrecourse to anthropomorphic imputation has also always been a hindrance\nto workmanlike mastery, more particularly in the mechanic arts proper,\nand only less pronounced in those industrial arts, like husbandry,\nthat have to do immediately with plants and animals. Knowledge of\nbrute facts as interpreted in terms of human nature appears never to\nhave been serviceable in full proportion to their content. But in\nthese more primitive industrial systems--as also in the better days\nof handicraft--the workman is forever in instant control of his tools\nand materials; the movements made use of in the work are essentially\nof the nature of manipulation, in which the workman adroitly coerces\nthe materials into shapes and relations that will answer his purpose,\nand in which also nothing (typically) takes place beyond the manual\nreach of the workman as extended by the tools which his hands make use\nof. Under these conditions it is a matter of relatively slight effect\nwhether the workman does or does not rate the objects which he uses as\ntools and materials in quasi-personal terms or imputes to them a degree\nof self-direction, since they are at no point allowed to escape his\nmanual reach and are by direct communication of his force, dexterity\nand judgment coerced into the forms, motions and spatial dispositions\naimed at by him. His imputing some bias, bent, initiative or spiritual\nforce or infirmity to brute matter will doubtless incapacitate him by\nso much for efficiently designing processes and uses for the available\nmaterial facts; his creative imagination proceeds on mistaken premises\nand goes wrong in so far; and so this anthropomorphic interpretation\nmust always count as a material drawback to technological mastery\nof the available resources and in some degree retard the possible\nadvance in the industrial arts. But within the premises given by the\nindustrial arts as they stand, he may still do effective work as a\nmechanic skilled in the manual operations prescribed by the given state\nof the arts. For in the mechanic industries of all these other and\nmore archaic industrial systems the workman does the work; it may be\nby use of tools, and even by help of more or less extended processes\nin which natural forces of growth, fermentation, decay, and the like,\nplay a material part; but the decisive fact remains that the motions\nand operations of such manual industry take effect at his hands and by\nway of his muscular force and manual reach. Where natural processes, as\nthose of growth, fermentation or combustion, are drawn into the routine\nof industry, they lie, as natural processes, beyond his discretionary\ncontrol; at the most he puts them in train and lets them run, with some\nhedging and shifting as they go on, to bring them to bear in such a way\nas shall suit his ends; he takes his precautions with them and then he\ntakes the chance of their coming to the desired issue. They are not,\nand as he sees the work and its conditions they need not be, within\nhis control in anything like the fashion in which he controls his\ntools and the materials employed in his manual operations; they work\nwell or ill, and what comes of it is in some degree a matter of his\nfortune of success or failure, such as comes to the man who has done\nhis best under Providence. In case of a striking outcome for good or\nill from the operation of such natural processes the devout craftsman\nis inclined to rate it as the act of God; very much as does the devout\nhusbandman who depends on rain rather than on irrigation. It is the\npart of the wise workman in such a case to take what comes, without\nelation or repining, in so far as these factors of success and failure\nare not comprised in his presumed workmanlike proficiency.\n\nThe matter lies differently in the machine industry. The mechanical\nprocesses here engaged are calculable, measurable, and contain no\nmysterious element of providential ambiguity. In proportion as they\nwork to the best effect, they are capable of theoretical statement, not\nmerely approachable by rule of thumb. The designing engineer takes his\nmeasures on the basis of ascertained quantitative fact. He knows the\nforces employed, and, indeed, he can employ only such as he knows and\nonly so far as he knows them; and he arranges for the processes that\nare to do the work, with only such calculable margin of error as is due\nto the ascertained average infirmity of the available materials. He\ndeals with forces and effects standardised in the same opaque terms. He\nwill be proficient in his craft in much the same degree in which he is\nmaster of the matter-of-fact logic involved in mechanical processes of\npressure, velocity, displacement and the like; not in proportion as he\ncan adroitly impart to the available materials the workmanlike turn of\nhis own manual force and dexterity, nor in the degree in which he may\nbe able shrewdly to guess the run of the season or the variations of\ntemperature and moisture that condition the effectual serviceability of\nnatural processes in handicraft.\n\nThe share of the operative workman in the machine industry is\n(typically) that of an attendant, an assistant, whose duty it is to\nkeep pace with the machine process and to help out with workmanlike\nmanipulation at points where the machine process engaged is\nincomplete.[139] His work supplements the machine process, rather\nthan makes use of it. On the contrary the machine process makes use of\nthe workman. The ideal mechanical contrivance in this technological\nsystem is the automatic machine. Perfection in the machine technology\nis attained in the degree in which the given process can dispense\nwith manual labour; whereas perfection in the handicraft system means\nperfection of manual workmanship. It is the part of the workman to know\nthe working of the mechanism with which he is associated and to adapt\nhis movements with mechanical accuracy to its requirement. This demands\na degree of intelligence, and much of this work calls for a good deal\nof special training besides; so that it is still true that the workman\nis useful somewhat in proportion as he is skilled in the occupation\nto which the machine industry calls him. In the new era the stress\nfalls rather more decidedly on general intelligence and information,\nas contrasted with detail mastery of the minuti\u00e6 of a trade; so that\nfamiliarity with the commonplace technological knowledge of the time\nis rather more imperative a requirement under the machine technology\nthan under that of handicraft. At the same time this common stock of\ntechnological information is greatly larger in the current state of the\nindustrial arts; so much larger in volume, and at the same time so much\nmore exacting in point of accuracy and detail, that this commonplace\ninformation that is requisite to any of the skilled occupations can no\nlonger be acquired in the mere workday routine of industry, but is to\nbe had only at the cost of deliberate application and with the help of\nschools.\n\nOn this head, as regards the requirements of industry in the way of\ngeneral information on the part of the skilled workmen, the contrast\nis sufficiently marked, _e.\u00a0g._, between Elizabethan times and the\nVictorian age. At the earlier period illiteracy was no obstacle to\nadequate training in the skilled trades. In the seventeenth century\nThomas Mun includes among the peculiar and extraordinary acquirements\nnecessary to eminent success in commerce, matters that are now easily\ncomprised in the ordinary common-school instruction; and in so doing\nhe plainly shows that these acquirements were over and above what was\nusual or would be thought useful for the common man. Even Adam Smith,\nin the latter half of the eighteenth century, shrewd observer as he\nwas, does not include any degree of schooling or any similar pursuit of\ngeneral information among the requisites essential to the efficiency of\nskilled labour. Even at that date it appears still to have been true\nthat the commonplace information and the general training necessary to\na mastery of any one of the crafts lay within so narrow a range that\nwhat was needful could all be acquired by hearsay and as an incident\nto the discipline of apprenticeship. Within a century after the first\ninception of the machine industry illiteracy had come to be a serious\nhandicap to any skilled mechanic; the range of commonplace information\nthat must habitually be drawn on in the skilled trades had widened to\nsuch an extent, and comprised so large a volume of recondite facts,\nthat the ability to read came to have an industrial value; the\nhigher proficiency in any branch of the mechanic arts presumed such\nan acquaintance with fact and theory as could neither be gained nor\nmaintained without habitual recourse to printed matter. And this line\nof requirements has been constantly increasing in volume and urgency,\nas well as in the range of employments to which the demand applies,\nuntil it has become a commonplace that no one can now hope to compete\nfor proficiency in the skilled occupations without such schooling as\nwill carry him very appreciably beyond the three R\u2019s that made up the\ncomplement of necessary learning for the common man half a century ago.\n\nIt follows as a consequence of these large and increasing requirements\nenforced by the machine technology that the period of preliminary\ntraining is necessarily longer, and the schooling demanded for general\npreparation grows unremittingly more exacting. So that, apart from all\nquestion of humanitarian sentiment or of popular fitness for democratic\ncitizenship, it has become a matter of economic expediency, simply as\na proposition in technological efficiency at large, to enforce the\nexemption of children from industrial employment until a later date\nand to extend their effective school age appreciably beyond what would\nonce have been sufficient to meet all the commonplace requirements of\nskilled workmanship.[140]\n\nThe knowledge so required as a general and commonplace equipment\nrequisite for the pursuit of these modern skilled occupations is of\nthe general nature of applied mechanics, in which the essence of the\nundertaking is a ready apprehension of opaque facts, in passably\nexact quantitative terms. This class of knowledge presumes a certain\nintellectual or spiritual attitude on the part of the workman, such an\nattitude and animus as will readily apprehend and appreciate matter\nof fact and will guard against the suffusion of this knowledge with\nputative animistic or anthropomorphic subtleties, quasi-personal\ninterpretations of the observed phenomena and of their relations to one\nanother. The norm of systematisation is that given by the logic of the\nmachine process, and the scope of it is that inculcated by statistical\ncomputation and the principle of material cause and effect.\n\nIn some degree the routine of the machine industry necessarily induces\nsuch an animus in its employees, since such is the scope and method of\nits own working; and the closer and more exacting the application to\nwork of this kind, the more thorough-going should be the effects of\nits discipline. But this routine and its discipline extend beyond the\nmechanical occupations as such, so as in great part to determine the\nhabits of all members of the modern community. This proposition holds\ntrue more broadly for the current state of the industrial arts than any\nsimilar statement would hold, _e.\u00a0g._, for the handicraft system. The\nordinary routine of life is more widely and pervasively determined by\nthe machine industry and by machine-like industrial processes today,\nand this determination is at the same time more rigorous, than any\nanalogous effect that was had under the handicraft system. Within the\neffective bounds of modern Christendom no one can wholly escape or in\nany sensible degree deflect the sweep of the machine\u2019s routine.\n\nModern life goes by clockwork. So much so that no modern household\ncan dispense with a mechanical timepiece; which may be more or less\naccurate, it is true, but which commonly marks the passage of time with\na degree of exactness that would have seemed divertingly supererogatory\nto the common man of the high tide of handicraft.[141] Latterly the\ntime so indicated, it should be called to mind, is \u201cstandard time,\u201d\nstandardised to coincide over wide areas and to vary only by large and\nstandard units. It brings the routine of life to a nicely uniform\nschedule of hours throughout a population which exceeds by many fold\nthe size of those communities that once got along contentedly enough\nwithout such an expedient under the r\u00e9gime of handicraft. In this\nmatter the demands of the machine have even brought on a revision of\nthe time schedule imposed by the mechanism of the heavenly bodies, so\nthat not only \u201csolar time,\u201d but even the \u201cmean solar time\u201d that once\nwas considered to be a sufficient improvement on the ways of Nature,\nhas been superseded by the schedule imposed by the railway system.\n\nThe discipline of the timepiece is sufficiently characteristic of\nthe discipline exercised by the machine process at large in modern\nlife, and as a cultural factor, as a factor in shaping the habits of\nthought of the modern peoples, it is itself moreover a fact of the\nfirst importance. Of the standardisation of the time schedule just\nspoken of, the earlier, the adoption of \u201cmean solar time,\u201d was due\nimmediately to the exigencies of the machine process as such, which\nwould not tolerate the seasonal fluctuations of \u201capparent\u201d solar time.\nThis epithet \u201capparent,\u201d by the way, carries a suggestion that the\ntime schedule so designated is less true to the actualities of the\ncase than the one which superseded it. And so it is if the actualities\nto which regard is had are those of the machine process; whereas the\ncontrary is true if the actualities that are to decide are those of\nthe seasons, as they were under the earlier dispensation. \u201cStandard\ntime\u201d has gone into effect primarily through the necessities of\nrailway communication,--itself a dominant item in the mechanical\nroutine of life; but it is only in a less degree a requirement of\nthe other activities that go to make up the traffic of modern life.\nThe railway is one of the larger mechanical contrivances of the\nmachine age, and its exigencies in this respect are typical of what\nholds true at large. Communication of whatever kind, as well as the\nsupply of other necessaries, is standardised in terms of time, space,\nquantity, frequency, and indeed in all measurable dimensions; and the\n\u201cconsumer,\u201d as the denizens of these machine-made communities are\ncalled, is required to conform to this network of standardisations in\nhis demand and uses of them, on pain of \u201cgetting left.\u201d To \u201cget left\u201d\nis a colloquialism of the machine era and describes the commonest form\nof privation under the r\u00e9gime of the machine process. It is already a\ntime-worn colloquialism, inasmuch as it is now already some time since\nthe ubiquitous routine of the machine process first impressed on the\ncommon man the sinister eventuality covered by the phrase.\n\nThe relation in which the consumer, the common man, stands to the\nmechanical routine of life at large is of much the same nature as that\nin which the modern skilled workman stands to that detail machine\nprocess into which he is dovetailed in the industrial system. To take\neffectual advantage of what is offered as the wheels of routine go\nround, in the way of work and play, livelihood and recreation, he\nmust know by facile habituation what is going on and how and in what\nquantities and at what price and where and when, and for the best\neffect he must adapt his movements with skilled exactitude and a\ncool mechanical insight to the nicely balanced moving equilibrium of\nthe mechanical processes engaged. To live--not to say at ease--under\nthe exigencies of this machine-made routine requires a measure of\nconsistent training in the mechanical apprehension of things. The mere\nmechanics of conformity to the schedule of living implies a degree of\ntrained insight and a facile strategy in all manner of quantitative\nadjustments and adaptations, particularly at the larger centres of\npopulation, where the routine is more comprehensive and elaborate.\n\nAnd here and now, as always and everywhere, invention is the mother\nof necessity. The complex of technological ways and means grows\nby increments that come into the scheme by way of improvements,\ninnovations, expedients designed to facilitate, abridge or enhance\nthe work to be done. Any such innovation that fits workably into the\ntechnological scheme, and that in any appreciable degree accelerates\nthe pace of that scheme at any point, will presently make its way into\ngeneral and imperative use, regardless of whether its net ulterior\neffect is an increase or a diminution of material comfort or industrial\nefficiency. Such is particularly the case under the current pecuniary\nscheme of life if the new expedient lends itself to the service of\ncompetitive gain or competitive spending; its general adoption then\nperemptorily takes effect on pain of damage and discomfort to all\nthose who fail to strike the new pace. Each new expedient added to and\nincorporated in the system offers not only a new means of keeping up\nwith the run of things at an accelerated pace, but also a new chance of\ngetting left out of the running. The point is well seen, e.\u00a0g., in the\ncurrent competitive armaments, where equipment is subject to constant\ndepreciation and obsolescence, not through decline or decay, but by\nvirtue of new improvements. So also in the increase and acceleration\nof advertising that has been going on during the past quarter of a\ncentury, due to increased facilities and improved methods in printing,\npaper-making, and the other industrial arts that contribute to the\nappliances of publicity.\n\nIt is of course not hereby intended to imply that these modern\ninventions meet no wants but such as they themselves create. It is\nbeyond dispute that such mechanical contrivances, for instance, as\nthe telephone, the typewriter, and the automobile are not only great\nand creditable technological achievements, but they are also of\nsubstantial service. At the same time it is at least doubtful if these\ninventions have not wasted more effort and substance than they have\nsaved,--that they are to be credited with an appreciable net loss.\nThey are designed to facilitate travel and communication, and such\nis doubtless their first and obvious effect. But the net result of\ntheir introduction need by no means be the same. Their chief use is\nin the service of business, not of industry, and their great further\nuse is in the furtherance, or rather the acceleration, of obligatory\nsocial amenities. As contrivances for the expedition of traffic both\nin business and in social intercourse their use is chiefly, almost\nwholly, of a competitive nature; and in the competitive equipment and\nman\u0153uvres of business and of gentility the same broad principle will\nbe found to apply as applies to competitive armaments and improvements\nin the technology of warfare. Any technological advantage gained by\none competitor forthwith becomes a necessity to all the rest, on\npain of defeat. The typewriter is, no doubt, a good and serviceable\ncontrivance for the expedition of a voluminous correspondence, but\nthere is also no reasonable doubt but its introduction has appreciably\nmore than doubled the volume of correspondence necessary to carry on\na given volume of business, or that it has quadrupled the necessary\ncost of such correspondence. And the expedition of correspondence by\nstenographer and typewriter has at the same time become obligatory\non all business firms, on pain of losing caste and so of losing the\nconfidence of their correspondents. Of the telephone much the same is\nto be said, with the addition that its use involves a very appreciable\nnervous strain and its ubiquitous presence conduces to an unremitting\nnervous tension and unrest wherever it goes. The largest secure result\nof these various modern contrivances designed to facilitate and abridge\ntravel and communication appears to be an increase of the volume of\ntraffic per unit of outcome, acceleration of the pace and heightening\nof the tension at which the traffic is carried on, and a consequent\nincrease of nervous disorders and shortening of the effective working\nlife of those engaged in this traffic. But in these matters invention\nis the mother of necessity, and within the scope of these contrivances\nfor facilitating and abridging labour there is no alternative, and life\nis not offered on any other terms.[142]\n\nOther kinds of routine, standardised and elaborate, have been or\nstill are in force, besides this machine-like process of living as\ncarried on under modern technological conditions; and one and another\nof these will at times rise to a degree of exigence quite comparable\nwith that of the machine process. But these others are of a different\ncharacter in that their demands are not enforced by sanctions of an\nunmediated mechanical kind; they do not fall on the delinquent with\na direct mechanical impact, and the penalties of non-conformity are\nof a conventional nature. So, _e.\u00a0g._, the punctilios of religious\nobservance may come to a very rigid routine, to be observed on pain\nof sufficiently grave consequences; but in so far as these eventual\n(eschatological) consequences are statable in terms of material\nincidence (of fire, sulphur, or the like) the mechanically trained\nmodern consumer will incline to hold that they are of a putative\ncharacter only. So, again, in the matter of fashion and decorum the\nschedule of observances may be sufficiently rigorous, but here too\nfailure to articulate with the sweep of a punctilious routine with all\nthe sure and firm touch of the expert is not checked with an immediate\ndisastrous impact of mechanical shock. Conformity in the technological\nrespect with the routine of living under other technological systems\nthan that of the machine process had also something of this character\nof conventional prescription; and the discipline exercised by the\nroutine of living in these more archaic technological eras was also\nsomething more in the nature of a training in conventional expedients.\nThe resulting growth of habits of thought in such a community should\nthen also differ in a similar way from what comes in sight in the\npresent.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBoth in its incidence on the workman and on the members of the\ncommunity at large, therefore, the training given by this current state\nof the industrial arts is a training in the impersonal, quantitative\napprehension and appreciation of things, and it tends strongly to\ninhibit and discredit all imputation of spiritual traits to the facts\nof observation. It is a training in matter-of-fact; more specifically\nit is a training in the logic of the machine process. Its outcome\nshould obviously be an unqualified materialistic and mechanical animus\nin all orders of society, most pronounced in the working classes, since\nthey are most immediately and consistently exposed to the discipline\nof the machine process. But such an animus as best comports with\nthe logic of the machine process does not, it appears, for good or\nill, best comport with the native strain of human nature in those\npeoples that are subject to its discipline. In all the various peoples\nof Christendom there is a visible straining against the drift of\nthe machine\u2019s teaching, rising at time and in given classes of the\npopulation to the pitch of revulsion.\n\nIt is apparently among the moderately well-to-do, the half-idle\nclasses, that such a revulsion chiefly has its way; leading now and\nagain to fantastic, archaising cults and beliefs and to make-believe\ncredence in occult insights and powers. At the same time, and with\nthe like tincture of affectation and make-believe, there runs through\nmuch of the community a feeling of maladjustment and discomfort, that\nseeks a remedy in a \u201creturn to Nature\u201d in one way or another; some sort\nof a return to \u201cthe simple life,\u201d which shall in some fashion afford\nan escape from the unending \u201cgrind\u201d of living from day to day by the\nmachine method and shall so put behind us for a season the burdensome\nfutilities by help of which alone life can be carried on under the\nroutine of the machine process.\n\nAll this uneasy revulsion may not be taken at its face value; there\nis doubtless a variable but fairly large element of affectation that\ncomes to expression in all this talk about the simple life; but when\nall due abatement has been allowed there remains a substantial residue\nof unaffected protest. The pitch and volume of this protest against\n\u201cartificial\u201d and \u201cfutile\u201d ways of life is greatest in the advanced\nindustrial countries, and it has been growing greater concomitantly\nwith the advance of the machine era. What is perhaps more significant\nof actualities than these well-bred professions of discomfort and\ndiscontent is the \u201cvacation,\u201d being a more tangible phenomenon and\nstatable in quantitative terms. The custom of \u201ctaking a vacation\u201d has\nbeen on the increase for some time, and the avowed need of a yearly\nor seasonal holiday greatly exceeds the practice of it in nearly\nall callings. This growing recourse to vacations should be passably\nconclusive evidence to the effect that neither the manner of life\nenforced by the machine system, nor the occupations of those who are in\nclose contact with this technology and its due habits of thought, can\nbe \u201cnatural\u201d to the common run of civilised mankind.\n\nAccording to accepted theories of heredity,[143] civilised mankind\nshould by native endowment be best fit to live under conditions of\na moderately advanced savagery, such as the machine technology will\nnot permit.[144] Neither in the physical conditions which it imposes,\ntherefore, nor in the habitual ways of observation and reasoning which\nit requires in the work to be done, is the machine age adapted to the\ncurrent native endowment of the race. And these various movements of\nunrest and revulsion are evidence, for as much as they are worth, that\nsuch is the case.\n\nNot least convincing is the fact that a considerable proportion of\nthose who are held unremittingly to the service of the machine process\n\u201cbreak down,\u201d fall into premature decay. Physically and spiritually\nthese modern peoples are better adapted to life under conditions\nradically different from those imposed by this modern technology.[145]\nAll of which goes to show, what is the point here in question, that\nhowever exacting and however pervasive the discipline of the machine\nprocess may be, it can not, after all, achieve its perfect work in the\nway of habituation in the population of Christendom as it stands. The\nlimit of tolerance native to the race, physically and spiritually,\nis short of that unmitigated materialism and unremitting mechanical\nroutine to which the machine technology incontinently drives.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFor anything like a comprehensive view of the effects which the machine\ntechnology has had on the scope and method of knowledge in modern\ntimes it is necessary to turn back to its beginnings. Historically the\nmachine age succeeds the era of handicraft, but the two overlap very\nextensively. So much so that while the era of the machine technology\nis commonly held to have set in something like a century and a half\nago it is still too early to assert that the industrial system has\ncleared itself of the remnants of handicraft or that the habits of\nthought suitable to the days of handicraft are no longer decisive in\nthe current legal and popular apprehension of industrial relations.\nThe discipline of the machine process has not yet had time, nor has\nit had a clear field. The best that can be looked for, therefore, in\nthe way of habits of thought conforming to the ways and means of the\nmachine process should be something of a progressive approximation;\nand the considerations recited in the last few paragraphs should leave\nit doubtful whether anything more than an imperfect approximation to\nthe logic of the machine process can be achieved, through any length\nof training, by the peoples among whom the greatest advance in that\ndirection has already been made.\n\nThe material sciences early show the bias of the machine technology, as\nis fairly to be expected, since these sciences stand in a peculiarly\nclose relation to the technological side of industry,--almost a\nrelation of affiliation. At no earlier period has the correlation\nbetween science and technology been so close. And the response in\nrespect of the scope and method of these sciences to any notable\nadvance in technology has been sufficiently striking. As has already\nbeen indicated above, modern science at large takes to the use of\nstatistical methods and precise mechanical measurements, and in this\nmatter scientific inquiry has grown continually more confident and\nmore meticulous at the same time that this mechanistic procedure\nis continually being applied more extensively as the technological\nadvance goes forward. How far this statistical-mechanistic bias of\nmodern inquiry is to be set down to the account of the drift of\ntechnology toward mechanical engineering, and how far it may be due\nto an ever increasing familiarity with conceptions of accountancy\nenforced by the price system and the time schedule in daily life, may\nbe left an open question. The main fact remains, that in much the\nsame degree as niceties of calculation have come to dominate current\ntechnological methods and devices the like insistence on extreme\nniceties of mechanical measurement and statistical accuracy has also\nbecome imperative in scientific inquiry; until it may fairly be said\nthat such meticulous scrutiny of quantitative relations as would have\nseemed foolish in the early days of the machine era has become the\nchief characteristic of scientific inquiry today.[146] It is of course\nnot overlooked that in this matter of quantitative scruple the relation\nbetween current technology and the sciences is a relation of mutual\ngive and take; but this fact can scarcely be urged as an objection to\nthe view that these two lines of expression of the modern habit of\nmind are closely bound together, since it is precisely such a bond of\ncontinuity between the two that is here spoken for.\n\nAs shown in the foregoing chapter, in the course of the transition to\nmodern times and modern ways of thinking the principle of efficient\ncause gradually replaced that of sufficient reason as the final\nground of certitude in conclusions of a theoretical nature. This\nshifting of the metaphysical footing of knowledge from a subjective\nground to an objective one first and most unreservedly affects the\nmaterial sciences, as it should if it is at all to be construed as an\noutcome of the discipline exercised by the then current technology of\nhandicraft. But the like effect is presently, though tardily, had in\nother lines of systematic knowledge that lie farther from the immediate\nincidence of technology and secular traffic. So that by the time of the\nindustrial revolution the like mechanistic animus had come to pervade\neven the philosophical and theological speculations current in those\ncommunities that were most intimately and unreservedly touched by the\ndiscipline of craftsmanship and the petty trade.[147]\n\nBy this time,--the latter part of the eighteenth century,--the material\nsciences (overtly) admit no principle of systematisation within their\nown jurisdiction other than that of efficient cause. But at that date\nthe concept of causation still has much of the content given it by\nthe technology of handicraft. The efficient cause is still conceived\nafter an individualistic fashion; without grave exaggeration it might\neven be said that the concept of cause as currently employed in the\nscientific speculations of that time had something of a quasi-personal\ncomplexion. The inquiry habitually looked to some one efficient cause,\nengaged as creatively dominant in the case and working to its end under\nconditioning circumstances that might greatly affect the outcome\nbut that were not felt (or avowed) to enter into the case with the\nsame aggressive thrust of causality that belonged to the efficient\ncause proper. The \u201ccontributory circumstances\u201d were conceived rather\nextrinsically as accessory to the event; \u201caccessory before the fact,\u201d\nperhaps, but none the less accessory. And scientific research took the\nform of an inquiry into the causal nexus between an antecedent (a cause\nor complex of causes) and its outcome in an event. The inquiry looked\nto the beginning and end of an episode of activity, the outcome of\nwhich would be a finished product, somewhat after the fashion in which\na finished piece of work leaves the craftsman\u2019s hands. The craftsman\nis the agency productively engaged in the case, while his tools and\nmaterials are accessories to his force and skill, and the finished\ngoods leave his hands as an end achieved; and so an episode of creative\nefficiency is rounded off.\n\nFrom an early period in the machine era a new attitude toward questions\nof causation comes in evidence in scientific inquiry. The obvious\nchange is perhaps the larger scale on which the sequence of cause\nand effect is conceived. It is no longer predominantly a question of\nepisodes of causal efficiency, detached and rounded off. Such detail\nepisodes still continue to occupy the routine of investigation;\nnecessarily so, since these empirical sciences proceed step by step in\nthe determination of the phenomena with which they are occupied. But in\nan increasing degree these detached phenomena are sought to be worked\ninto a theoretical structure of larger scope, and this larger structure\nof theory falls into shape as a self-determining sequence of cumulative\nchange. The same concept of process that rules in the machine\ntechnology invades the speculations of the scientists and results in\ntheories of cumulative sequence, in which the point of departure as\nwell as the objective end of the sequence of causation gradually come\nto have less and less of a determinative significance for the course\nof the inquiry and for its results. In theoretical speculations based\non the data of the empirical sciences, interest and attention come\nprogressively to centre on this process of cumulative causation, so\nthat the interest in the productive efficiency of consummation ceases\ngradually to be of decisive moment in the formulations of theory; which\ncomes in this way to be an account of an unfolding process rather than\na checking up of individual effects against individual causes. What\nonce were ultimate questions have in modern science become ulterior\nquestions and have lost their preferential place in the inquiry.\nNeither the seat of efficient initiative, that would be presumed to\ngive this unfolding process of cumulative change its content and\ndirection, nor its eventual goal, wherein it would be presumed to come\nto rest when the initial impulse has spent itself and its end has been\ncompassed,--neither of these ultimates holds the attention or guides\nthe inquiry of modern science.\n\nIt is only gradually, concomitant with the gradual maturing of the\nmachine technology, that the systematisation of knowledge in scientific\ntheory has come by common consent to converge on formulations of a\ngenetic process of cumulative change. This science of the machine age\nis \u201cevolutionary\u201d in a peculiarly impersonal, indeed in a mechanistic\nsense of the term. In the consummate form, as it stands at the\ntransition to the twentieth century, this evolutionary conception of\ngenetic process is, at least ideally, void of all teleological elements\nand of all personality--except as personality may be concessively\nadmitted as a by-product of the mechanistic sweep of the blind\nmotions of brute matter. Neither the name nor the notion of a genetic\nevolution is peculiar to the machine age; but this current, impersonal,\nunteleological, mechanistic conception of an evolutionary process is\npeculiar to the late modern fashion of apprehending things.\n\nIt goes without saying that this mechanistic conception of process has\nworked clear of personation and teleological bias only gradually, by\ninsensible decay and progressive elimination of those preconceptions\nof personal force and teleological fitness that ruled all theoretical\nknowledge in the days when the principle of sufficient reason held over\nthat of efficient cause; and it should likewise be a matter of course\nthat this shift to the mechanistic footing is by no means yet complete,\nthat scientific inquiry is not yet clear of all contamination with\nanimistic, anthropomorphic, or teleological elements; since the change\nis of the nature of habit, which takes time, and since the discipline\nof modern life to which the mechanistic habit of mind is traceable is\nby no means wholly consistent or unqualified in its mechanistic drift.\nYet so far has the habituation to mechanistic ways of thinking taken\neffect, and so comprehensive and thorough has the discipline of the\nmachine process been, that a mechanistic, unteleological notion of\nevolution is today a commonplace preconception both with scientists\nand laymen; whereas a hundred years ago such a conceit had intimately\ntouched the imagination of but very few, if any, among the scientific\nadepts of the new era.\n\nTo what effect Lucretius and his like in classical antiquity, _e.\u00a0g._,\nmay have speculated and tried to speak in these premises is by no\nmeans easy to make out; nor does it concern the present inquiry,\nsince no vital connection or continuity of habit is traceable between\ntheir achievements in this respect and the theoretical preconceptions\nof modern science or of the machine technology. In the course of\nmodern times conceptions of an evolutionary sequence of creation\nor of genesis come up with increasing frequency, and from an early\nperiod in the machine age these conceptions take on more and more\nof a mechanistic character, but it is not until Darwin that such a\ngenetic process of evolution is conceived in terms of blind mechanical\nforces alone, without the help of imputed teleological bias or\npersonalised initiative. It may perhaps be an open question whether\nthe Darwinian conception of evolution is in no degree contaminated\nwith teleological fancies, but however that may be it remains true\nthat a purely mechanistic conception of a genetic process in nature\nhad found no lodgment in scientific theory up to the middle of the\nnineteenth century. With varying success this conception has since\nbeen assimilated by the adepts of all the material sciences, and\nit may even be said to stand as a tacitly postulated commonplace\nunderlying all modern scientific theory, whether in the material or\nthe social sciences. It is accepted by common consent as a matter of\ncourse, although doubtless much antique detail at variance with it\nstands over both in the theoretical formulations of the adepts and in\npopular thought, and must continue to stand over until the course of\nhabituation may conceivably in time enforce the sole competency of this\nmechanistic conception as the definitive norm of systematic knowledge.\nWhether such an eventuality is to overtake the scope and method of\nknowledge in Western civilisation should apparently be a question of\nhow protracted, consistent, unmitigated, and how far congruous with\ntheir native bent the discipline of the machine process may prove in\nthe further history of these peoples.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs has been shown above, in its beginnings the machine technology\ntook over the working concepts of handicraft, and it has gradually\nshifted from the ground of manual operation so afforded to the\nground of impersonal mechanical process; but this shifting of base\nin respect of the elementary technological preconceptions has not\nhitherto been complete, much of the personal attitude of craftsmanship\ntoward mechanical forces and structures being still visible in the\nwork of modern technologists. In like manner, and concomitant with\nthe transition to the machine industry, there has gone forward a\nlike shifting in respect of the point of view and the elementary\npreconceptions of science. This has taken effect most largely and gone\nfarthest in the material sciences, as should be expected from the close\nconnection that subsists between these sciences and the technology of\nthe machine industry; but here again the elimination of craftsmanlike\nconceptions has hitherto not been complete. And, what is more\ninstructive as to the part played by technological discipline in the\ngrowth of science, the character of this change in scientific scope,\nmethod and preconceptions is somewhat obviously such as would be given\nby habituation to the working of the machine process. Where later\nscientific inquiry has departed from or overpassed the limitations\nimposed by the habits of thought peculiar to craftsmanship the movement\nhas taken the direction enforced by the machine technology.\n\nSo, _e.\u00a0g._, while the elements made use of by the machine technology,\nand characteristic of its work, are conceptions of mass, velocity,\npressure, stress, vibration, displacement, and the like, these\nelements are made use of only under the rule that action in any of\nthese bearings takes effect only by impact, by contact directly or\nthrough a continuum. The mathematical computations and elucidations\nthat are one main instrumentality employed by the technologist do not\nand can not include this underlying postulate of contact, since it\nis an assumption extraneous to those magnitudes of quantity in terms\nof which this technology does its work. How far this preconception\nthat action can take place only by contact is to be rated as an\nelementary concept carried over from handicraft, where it is obviously\nat home and fundamental in all work of manipulation, may perhaps be\nan idle question. In any case the machine technology is at one with\ncraftsmanship on this head, even though there are many features in\nmodern industrial processes that do not involve action by contact in\nany such obvious fashion as to suggest its necessary assumption, as,\n_e.\u00a0g._, in processes involving the use of light, heat or electricity.\nYet it remains true that, by and large, the technology of the machine\nprocess is a technology of action by contact; and, apparently under\nstress of this wide though not necessarily universal application of the\nprinciple, the trained technologist does not rest content until he has\nin some tenable fashion construed any apparent exception as a special\ninstance under the rule.\n\nSo also in modern scientific inquiry. The conceptual elements with\nwhich the scientist is content to work are precisely those that have\ncommended themselves as competent in their technological use. Since\naction by contact is, on the whole, the working principle in the\nmachine process, it is also accepted as the prime postulate in the\nformulation of all exact knowledge of impersonal facts. There is,\nof course, no inclination here to criticise or take exception to\nthis characteristic habit of thought that pervades modern scientific\ninquiry. It has done good service, and to this generation, trained\nin the enexorably efficient ways of the machine process, the fact\nthat it works is conclusive of its truth.[148] Yet the further fact\nis not to be overlooked that adherence to this principle is not due\nto unsophisticated observation simply. It is a principle, a habit of\nthought, not a fact of simple observation. Doubtless it is a fact of\nobservation, direct and unambiguous, in respect of our own manual\noperations; and doubtless also it is a matter of such ready inference\nin respect of many external phenomena as to do duty as a fact of\nobservation in good faith; but doubtless also there are many of these\nexternal phenomena that have to be somewhat painstakingly construed\nto bring them under the rule. Conceivably, even if such a habit of\nthought had not been handed down from the experience of handicraft\nit might have been induced by the discipline of the machine process,\nand might even have been ingrained in men exposed to this discipline\nin sufficiently rigorous fashion to serve as a prime postulate of\nscientific inquiry; the machine process doubtless bears out such a\nprinciple in the main, and very rigorously. But in point of historical\nfact it is quite unnecessary to suppose this principle of action by\ncontact to be a product _de novo_ of the discipline of the machine,\nsince it is older than the advent of the machine industry and is also\nquite consonant with the habits of work enforced by the technology of\nhandicraft, more so indeed than with the technology of the machine\nindustry. It appears fairly indubitable that this principle is a legacy\ntaken over from the experience of life in the days of craftsmanship.\nAnd it may even be an open question whether the machine technology\nwould not today be of an appreciably different complexion if it had,\nas it conceivably might have, developed without the hard and fast\nlimitations imposed by this postulate. Doubtless, scientific inquiry,\nand the theoretical formulations reached by such inquiry, would differ\nsomewhat notably from what they currently are if the scientists had\ngone to their work without such a postulate, or holding it in a\nqualified sense, as a principle of limited scope, as applying only\nwithin a limited range of phenomena, only so far as empirical evidence\nmight enforce it in detail.\n\nIf, as seems at least presumably true, this principle of action by\ncontact owes its origin to habits induced by manipulation, it will\nbe seen to be of an anthropomorphic derivation. And if it further\nowes its acceptance as a principle universally applicable to material\nphenomena to the protracted discipline of life under the technology of\nhandicraft, its universality must also take rank as an anthropomorphic\nimputation enforced by long habit. It is of the nature of habit, and\nmoreover of workmanlike habit. Casting back into the past history\nof civilisation and into the contemporary lower cultures, it will\nappear that the principle (habit of thought) in question is prevalent\neverywhere and presumably through all human time; as it should be if\nit is traceable to so ubiquitous an experience as manipulation. But it\nwill also appear that, except within the bounds, in time and space,\nof the high tide of craftsmanship and the machine technology, this\nprinciple does not arrogate to itself universal mandatory authority in\nthe domain of external phenomena. Not only are the tenets of magic and\ntheology at variance with the proposition that action can take place\nonly by mechanical contact; but in the na\u00efve thinking of commonplace\nhumanity outside this machine-made Western civilisation, action at\na distance is patently neither imbecile nor incomprehensible as a\nfamiliar trait of external objects in their everyday behaviour.\n\nNor is it by any means a grateful work of spontaneous predilection,\nall this mechanistic mutilation of objective reality into mere inert\ndimensions and resistance to pressure; as witness the widely prevalent\nrevulsion, chronic or intermittent, against its acceptance as a final\nterm of knowledge. Laymen seek respite in the fog of occult and\nesoteric faiths and cults, and so fall back on the will to believe\nthings of which the senses transmit no evidence; while the learned\nand studious are, by stress of the same \u201caching void,\u201d drawn into\nspeculative tenets of ostensible knowledge that purport to go nearer\nto the heart of reality, and that elude all mechanistic proof or\ndisproof. This revulsion against thinking in uncoloured mechanistic\nterms alone runs suggestively parallel with that other revulsion,\nalready spoken of, against the geometrically adjusted routine of\nconduct imposed on modern life by the machine process; the two are\nin great part coincident, or concomitant, both in point of the class\nof persons affected by each and in point of the uncertain measure\nof finality attending the move so made in either case. Neither the\nmanner of life imposed by the machine process, nor the manner of\nthought inculcated by habituation to its logic, will fall in with\nthe free movement of the human spirit, born, as it is, to fit the\nconditions of savage life. So there comes an irrepressible--in a\nsense, congenital--recrudescence of magic, occult science, telepathy,\nspiritualism, vitalism, pragmatism.[149]\n\nIt was noted above that action by contact is not included, except by\nsubsumption, in the mathematical formulations of technology or science.\nIt should now be added that in all the concomitance and sequence\nwith which the mathematical formulations of mechanical phenomena are\noccupied, the assumption of concomitance or sequence at a distance will\nfill the requirements of the formul\u00e6 quite as convincingly and commonly\nmore simply than the assumption of concomitance by contact only. To\nrealise the difficulties which beset this postulate of action by\nmechanical continuity solely, as well as the _prima facie_ imbecility\nof the principle itself, it is only necessary to call to mind the\ntortuous theories of gravitation designed to keep it intact, and the\nprodigy of incongruous intangibilities known as the ether,--a rigid and\nimponderable fluid.\n\nAssociated with the principle of action by mechanical continuity alone\nis a second metaphysical postulate of science,--the conservation\nof energy, or persistence of quantity. Like its fellow it does not\nadmit of empirical proof; yet it is likewise held to be of universal\napplication. This principle, that the quantity of matter or of energy\ndoes not increase or diminish, or, perhaps better, that the quantity\nof mechanical fact at large is invariable, has a better presumptive\nclaim to rank as a by-product of the machine technology; although such\na claim could doubtless be allowed only with broad qualifications.\nNot that the principle was not known or not formally accepted prior\nto the machine age; long ago the Roman scholar and the scholastic\nphilosophers after him declared _ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse\nreverti_. But throughout the era of handicraft there continued also\nto be devoutly held the postulate that the material universe had a\nbeginning in an act of creation, as also that it would some day come\nto an end, a quantitative collapse. As the era of handicraft advanced\nand, apparently, as the discipline of life under that technology\nenforced the habitual acceptance of the proposition that the quantity\nof material fact is constant, much ingenuity and much ambiguous speech\nwas spent in an endeavour to reconcile the mechanical efficiency of\nthe creative fiat with the dictum, _ex nihilo nihil fit_. But down to\nthe close of that era it remains true that, by and large, the peoples\nof Christendom continued to believe in the mechanically creative\nefficiency of the Great Artificer; although, it must be admitted, with\nan ever growing apprehension that in this tenet of the faith they were\nface to face with a divine mystery. The eighteenth-century scientists,\nand many even in the nineteenth century, continued to profess belief in\na creative origin of material things, as well as also in a providential\nguidance of material events,--which latter must have been conceived to\nbe exerted by some other means than action through mechanical contact,\nsince one term of the relation was conceived not to be of a mechanical\nnature.\n\nIt is not until the machine age is well under way and the machine\ntechnology has come to occupy the land, that faith in the theorem\nof the conservation of energy has grown robust enough to let the\nscientists lose interest in all questions of creation. The tenet\nhas died by neglect, not by confutation. That it has done so among\nthe adepts of the material sciences, and that it is doing so among\nthe lay population at large in the modern industrial communities, is\nprobably to be credited to the discipline of the machine process and\nthe technological conceptions to which that discipline conduces. It\nconduces to this outcome in more than one way. This modern technology\nis a technology of mechanical process; it looks to and takes care of\na sequence of mechanical action, rather than to the conditions of its\ninception or the sequel of its conclusion. A mind imbued with the\nlogic of this machine process does not by habitual proclivity or with\nincisive effect attend to these alien matters that have no meaning\nwithin the horizon of that logic. The creative augmentation of material\nobjects is a matter lying without the scope of the machine\u2019s logic.\n\nAs has already been remarked, the principle (habit of thought) that\nthe quantity of material fact is constant is necessarily of ancient\nderivation and long growth. Taken in a presumptive sense, and held\nloosely as a commonplace of experience, it must have come up and\nattained some force very early in the workmanlike experience of the\nrace. And the closer the application to the work in hand, the more\nconsistently would this principle of common sense approve itself; so\nthat it should, as indeed is sufficiently evident, be well at home\namong the habitual generalisations current in the days of handicraft;\nalthough it does not seem to have been generally accepted at that time\nas a principle necessarily having a universal application,--as witness\nthe ready credence then given to theological dogmas of creation and\nthe like. The habits of accountancy that came on under the price\nsystem, as the scope of the market grew larger with the growth and\ndiversification of handicraft, seem to have had a great effect in\nextending and confirming the habitual acceptance of such a theorem.\nA strict balance, a running equilibrium of the quantitative items\ninvolved, is the central fact of the accountant\u2019s occupation. And\nthis habit of scrutiny and balancing of quantities, and a meticulous\ntracing out and accounting for any apparent excess or deficiency in\nthe sums handled, pervades the community at large, though in a less\npronounced fashion, as well as that fraction of the population employed\nin trade. The discipline of the handicraft system in this respect gains\nincontinently in scope and vigour as the growth of that technological\nsystem, with its characteristic business management, goes forward.\n\nWhen presently the machine technology comes forward this habitual\npreconception touching the invariability of material quantity finds\nnew applications and new refinements of application, with the outcome\nthat its guidance of men\u2019s thinking grows ever more inclusive and more\nperemptory. But it is not until half a century after the Industrial\nRevolution that the principle may be said finally to have gained\nunquestioning acceptance as a theorem universally binding on material\nphenomena. By that time--about the second quarter of the nineteenth\ncentury--the unqualified validity of this theorem had become so\nunmitigated a matter of course as to have fairly shifted from the\nground of empirical generalisation to that of metaphysical thesis. Men\nof science then quite ingenuously set about proving the law of the\nConservation of Energy by appeal to experiments and reasoning that\nproceeded with absolute na\u00efvet\u00e9 on the tacit assumption of the theorem\nto be proven.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn its bearing on the growth of institutions the machine technology\nhas yet scarcely had time to make its mark. Such institutional factors\nas, e.\u00a0g., the common law are necessarily of slow growth. A system\nof civil rights is not only a balanced scheme of habitual responses\nto those stimuli at whose impact they take effect; it is at the same\ntime a scheme which has the sanction of avowed common consent, such as\nwill express itself in rating these institutional elements as facts\nof immemorial usage or as integrally inherent in the nature of things\nfrom the beginning. Such civil institutions take shape as prescriptive\ncustom, and matters of habit which so are supported by broad grounds\nof authenticity and correlation with other elements of a prescriptive\nscheme of things will adapt themselves only tardily to any change in\nthe situation or to any new bias in the drift of discipline. What\nhappened in the matter of civil rights under the system of handicraft\nis an illustration in point. There need be little question but the\neighteenth century scheme of Natural Rights was an outcome of the\nprotracted discipline characteristic of the era of handicraft, and an\nadaptation to the exigencies of daily life under that system.\n\nThe scheme of Natural Rights, with its principles of Natural Liberty\nand its insistence on individual self-help, was well adapted to the\nrequirements of handicraft and the petty trade, whose spirit it\nreflects with admirable faithfulness. But it was of slow growth, as\nany scheme of institutions must be, in the nature of things. So much\nso that handicraft and the petty trade had been in effectual operation\nsome half-a-dozen centuries, in ever increasing force, before the\ncorresponding system of civil rights and moral obligations made good\nits pretensions to rule the economic affairs of the community. Indeed,\nit is only by the latter half of the eighteenth century that the system\nof Natural Rights came to passable maturity and finally took rank as\na secure principle of enlightened common sense; and by that time the\nhandicraft system was giving way to the machine industry. And even then\nthis result was reached only in the most advanced industrial community\nof Europe, where the discipline of handicraft and trade had had the\nfreest scope to work out its natural bent, with the least hindrance\nfrom other dominant interests at variance with its schooling.[150]\n\nSo it has come about that while the system of Natural Rights is an\ninstitutional by-product of workmanship under the handicraft system\nand is adapted to the exigencies of craftsmanship and the petty trade,\nit never fully took effect in the shaping of institutions until that\nphase of economic life was substantially past, or until the new era,\nof the machine industry and the large business brought on by the new\ntechnology, had come to rule the economic situation. So that hitherto\nthe work of the machine industry has been organised and conducted\nunder a code of legal rights and business principles adapted to the\nstate of the industrial arts which the machine industry has displaced.\nLatterly, it is true, the requirements of the machine technology, in\nthe way of large-scale organisation, continuity of operation, and\ninterstitial balance of the industrial system, have begun to show\nthemselves so patently at variance with these business principles\nengendered by the era of handicraft as to throw a shadow of doubt\non the adequacy of these \u201cNatural\u201d metaphysics of natural liberty,\nself-help, free competition, individual initiative, and the like.\nBut, harsh as has been the discrepancy between the received system of\neconomic institutions on the one side and the working of the machine\ntechnology on the other, its effect in reshaping current habits of\nthought in these premises has hitherto come to nothing more definitive\nthan an uneasy conviction that \u201cSomething will have to be done about\nit.\u201d Indeed, so far is the machine process from having yet recast the\nprinciples of industrial management, as distinct from technological\nprocedure, that the efforts inspired in responsible public officials\nand public-spirited citizens by this patent discrepancy have hitherto\nbeen directed wholly to regulating industry into consonance with the\nantiquated scheme of business principles, rather than to take thought\nof how best to conduct industrial affairs and the distribution of\nlivelihood in consonance with the technological requirements of the\nmachine industry.\n\nIt is true, among the workmen, and particularly among those skilled\nworkmen who have been trained in the machine technology and are exposed\nto the full impact of the machine\u2019s discipline, uncritical habitual\nfaith in this institutional scheme is beginning to crumble, so far\nas regards that principle of Natural Rights that vests unlimited\ndiscretion in the owner of property, and so far as regards property\nin the material equipment of industry. But this is about as broad a\nproposition of such a kind as current facts of opinion and agitation\nwill bear out, and this inchoate break with the received habitual views\ntouching the dues and obligations of discretion in industrial matters\nis extremely vague and almost wholly negative. Even in those members\nof the community who are most directly and rigorously exposed to its\ndiscipline the machine process has hitherto wrought no such definite\nbias, no such positive habitual attitude of workmanlike initiative\ntowards the conventions of industrial management as to result in a\nconstructive deviation from the received principles.[151]\n\nOn the other hand the business principles engendered by the habit of\nmind that gave rise to the system of Natural Rights has had grave\nconsequences for workmanship under the conditions imposed by the\nmachine industry. As has been shown in some detail in the foregoing\nchapter, the individualistic organisation of the work, coupled with\nthe personal incidence of the handicraft technology, and the stress\nthrown on price rating and self-help by the ever increasing recourse to\nbargain and sale (\u201cfree contract\u201d) under that system, led in the end\nto the habitual rating of workmanship in terms of the price it would\nbring. Then as always workmanlike efficiency commanded the approval\nof thoughtful men, as being serviceable to the common good and as a\nsubstantial manifestation of human excellence; and at the same time,\nthen as ever, efficient work was a source of comfort and complacency to\nthe workman. But under the teaching of the price system efficiency came\nto be rated in terms of the pecuniary gain.\n\nWith the advent of the machine industry this pecuniary rating of\nefficiency gained a new impetus and brought new consequences for\ntechnology as well as for business enterprise. Typically, the machine\nindustry runs on a large scale, as contrasted with handicraft, and it\ninvolves a relatively wide and exacting division of labour between\nworkmanship and salesmanship. Under the conditions of large ownership\nimplied in this modern industrial system the workmen no longer\nhave, or can have, the responsibility of the pecuniary management\nof the industrial concern; on the other hand the same conditions\nof large ownership and extensive business connections require the\nbusinessmen in charge to delegate the immediate oversight of the\nplant and its technological processes to other hands, and to devote\ntheir own energies to the pecuniary management of the concern and its\ntransactions. Hence it follows that as the machine system and the\nhighly specialised business enterprise that goes with it reach a larger\nscale and a higher degree of elaboration the businessmen in charge are,\nby training and by progressive limitation of interest, less and less\ncompetent to take care of the technological exigencies of the machine\nsystem. But at the same time the discretion in technological matters\nstill rests in their hands by force of their ownership. So that, while\nthe responsibility of technological discretion still rests on them, and\ncannot be fully delegated to other hands, the exigencies of business\nenterprise and of the training which it involves will no longer permit\nthem to meet this responsibility in a competent fashion.\n\nThe businessmen in control of large industrial enterprises are\nbeginning to appreciate something of their own unfitness to direct or\noversee, or even to control, technological matters, and so they have,\nin a tentative way, taken to employing experts to do the work for them.\nSuch experts are known colloquially as \u201cefficiency engineers\u201d and are\npresumed to combine the qualifications of technologist and accountant.\nIn point of fact it is as accountants, capable of applying the tests of\naccountancy in a new field, that these experts commend themselves to\nthe businessmen in control, and the \u201cefficiency\u201d which they look to is\nan efficiency counted in terms of net pecuniary gain. \u201cEfficiency\u201d in\nthese premises means pecuniary efficiency, and only incidentally or in\na subsidiary sense does it mean industrial efficiency,--only in so far\nas industrial efficiency conduces to the largest net pecuniary gain.\nAll the while the businessmen retain the decisive superior discretion\nin their own incompetent hands, since all the while the whole matter\nremains a business proposition. The \u201cstaff organisation,\u201d in which\nvests the superior control of these technological affairs, consistently\nremains an organisation of worldly wisdom, business enterprise--not of\ntechnological proficiency,--a state of things not to be remedied so\nlong as industry is carried on for business profits.\n\nMeantime the workmen of all kinds and grades--labourers, mechanics,\noperatives, engineers, experts--all imbued with the same pecuniary\nprinciples of efficiency, go about their work with more than half an\neye to the pecuniary advantage of what they have in hand. The attitude\nof the trades-unions towards their work and towards the industrial\nconcerns in whose employ their work is done illustrates something of\nthe habitual frame of mind of these men, who are avowed experts in the\nmatter of workmanship.\n\nLatterly many inconveniences have beset the community at large as well\nas particular sections and classes of the industrial community, due\nin the main to a consistent adherence to these business principles\nin the management of industrial affairs. The capitalist-employers,\non the one hand, have gone on the full powers with which the modern\ninstitution of ownership and its broad implications has vested them;\nwith the result that the public at large, investors, consumers of\nindustrial products, users of \u201cpublic utility\u201d agencies serving such\nneeds as light, fuel, transportation, communication, amusement, etc.,\nfeel very much aggrieved; as do also and more particularly the workmen\nwith whom the capitalist-employers do business on the lines laid down\nby the authentic business principles involved in the discretionary\nownership of the industrial plant and resources. On the other hand the\nworkmen, resting their case on the same common-sense view that the\nindividual is a self-sufficient economic unit who owes nothing to the\ncommunity at large beyond what he may freely undertake \u201cfor a good\nand valuable consideration in hand paid,\u201d--the workmen stand likewise\non the full powers given them by the current institutions of ownership\nand contractual discretion, and so work what mischief they can to\ntheir employers and to the public at large, always blamelessly within\nthe rules of the game as laid down of old on the pecuniary principles\nof business discretion, and in the light of such sense as their\ntraining has given them with regard to efficiency in the industries\nthat have fallen into their hands. And then the \u201cmoney power\u201d comes\nin as a third pecuniarily trained factor, with ever increasing force\nand incisiveness, to muddle the whole situation mysteriously and\nirretrievably by looking after their own pecuniary interests in a\nfashion even more soberly legitimate and authentic, if possible, than\nthe workmen\u2019s management of their own affairs.\n\nOf course, all this working at cross purposes is not altogether due to\ntrained incapacity on the part of the several contestants to appreciate\nthe large and general requirements of the industrial situation;\nperhaps it is not even chiefly due to such inability, but rather to\nan habitual, and conventionally rightful, disregard of other than\npecuniary considerations. It would doubtless appear that a trained\ninability to apprehend any other than the immediate pecuniary bearing\nof their man\u0153uvres accounts for a larger share in the conduct of the\nbusinessmen who control industrial affairs than it does in that of\ntheir workmen, since the habitual employment of the former holds them\nmore rigorously and consistently to the pecuniary valuation of whatever\npasses under their hands; and the like should be true only in a higher\ndegree of those who have to do exclusively with the financial side\nof business. The state of the industrial arts requires that these\nseveral factors should co\u00f6perate intelligently and without reservation,\nwith an eye single to the exigencies of this modern wide-sweeping\ntechnological system; but their habitual addiction to pecuniary rather\nthan technological standards and considerations leaves them working\nat cross purposes. So also their (pecuniary) interests are at cross\npurposes; and since these interests necessarily rule in any pecuniary\nculture, they must decide the line of conduct for each of the several\nfactors engaged.\n\nThese discrepancies, obstructive tactics and disserviceable practices\nare commonly deplored and are presumably deplorable, and they doubtless\nmerit extensive discussion on these grounds, but their merits in this\nbearing do not properly come into consideration here. The matter has\nbeen brought in here not with any view of defence, denunciation or\nremedy, but because it is a matter of grave consequence as regards\nthe training given by business experience to these men in whose hands\nthe current scheme of institutions has placed the technological\nfortunes of the community. And whether these pecuniary tactics and\npractices that fill so large a place in the attention and sentiments\nof this generation come chiefly of a lack of insight into current\ntechnological exigencies, or of a deliberate choice of evils enforced\nby the pecuniary necessities of the case, still their disciplinary\nvalue as bearing on the sense of workmanship taken in its larger scope\nwill be much the same in either case. Habituation to bargaining and\nto the competitive principles of business necessarily brings it about\nthat pecuniary standards of efficiency invade (contaminate) the sense\nof workmanship; so that work, workmen, equipment and products come to\nbe rated on a scale of money values, which has only a circuitous and\noften only a putative relation to their workmanlike efficiency or their\nserviceability. Those occupations and those aptitudes that yield good\nreturns in terms of price are reputed valuable and commendable,--the\naccepted test of success, and even of serviceability, being the gains\nacquired. Workmanship comes to be confused with salesmanship, until\ntact, effrontery and prevarication have come to serve as a standard\nof efficiency, and unearned gain is accepted as the measure of\nproductiveness.\n\nEfficiency conduces to the common good, and is also a meritorious and\ncommendable trait in the person who exercises it. But under the canons\nof self-help and pecuniary valuation the test of efficiency in economic\nmatters has come to be, not technological mastery and productive\neffect, but proficiency in pecuniary management and the acquisition\nof wealth. Both in his own estimation and in the eyes of his fellows,\nthe man who gains much does well; he is conceived to do well both as\na matter of personal efficiency and in point of serviceability to the\ncommon good. To \u201cdo well\u201d in modern phrase means to engross something\nappreciably more of the community\u2019s wealth than falls to the common\nrun. But since gains, and hence efficiency, are conceived in terms of\nprice, it follows that the man, workman or businessman, who can induce\nhis fellows to pay him well for his services or his goods is accounted\nefficient and serviceable; from which it follows that under this canon\nof pecuniary efficiency men are conceived to serve the common good\nsomewhat in proportion as they are able to induce the community to pay\nmore for their services than they are worth.\n\nThe businessman who gains much at little cost, who gets something for\nnothing, is rated, in his own as well as in his neighbours\u2019 esteem,\nas a public benefactor indispensable to the community\u2019s welfare, and\nas contributing to the common good in direct proportion to the amount\nwhich he has been able to draw out of the aggregate product. It is\nperhaps needless to call to mind that of this character are the main\nfacts in the history of all the great fortunes;[152] although the\ncurrent accounts of their accumulation, being governed by pecuniary\nstandards of efficiency and serviceability, dwell mainly on the\nservices that have inured to the community from the traffic with\nwhich the great captains have interfered in their quest of gain. The\nprevalence of salesmanship, that is to say of business enterprise, and\nthe consequent high repute of the salesmanlike activities and aptitudes\nin any community that is organised on a price system, is perhaps the\nmost serious obstacle which the pecuniary culture opposes to the\nadvance in workmanship. It intrudes into the most intimate and secret\nworkings of the human spirit and contaminates the sense of workmanship\nin its initial move, and sets both the proclivity to efficient work and\nthe penchant for serviceability at cross purposes with the common good.\n\nBut under the conditions engendered by the machine technology the\nscope of this pecuniary standard of workmanship has been greatly\nenlarged. On the whole the machine industry calls for a large-scale\norganisation, increasingly so as time has passed and the machine\nprocess has come more fully to dominate the industrial situation. By\nthe same move initiative and discretion have come to vest in those\nwho can claim ownership of the large material equipment so required,\nand the exercise of such initiative and discretion by these owners\nis loosely proportioned to the magnitude of their holdings. Smaller\nowners have the same freedom of initiative and discretion, in point\nof legal and conventional competency,--such freedom and equality\nbetween persons being of the essence of Natural Rights; but in point\nof practical fact, as determined by technological and business\nexigencies, there is but small discretion left such smaller holders.\nInitiative and discretion in modern industrial matters vest in the\nowners of the industrial plant, or in such moneyed concerns as may\nstand in an underwriting relation to the owners of the plant; such\ndiscretion is exercised through pecuniary transactions; and these\npecuniary transactions whereby the conduct of industry is guided and\ncontrolled are entered into with a view to gain in terms of price.\nIt is but a slight exaggeration to say that such transactions, which\ngovern the course of industry, are carried out with an eye single to\npecuniary gain,--the industrial consequences, and their bearing on\nthe community\u2019s welfare, being matters incidental to the transaction\nof business. In every-day phrase, under the rule of the current\ntechnology and business principles, industry is managed by businessmen\nfor business ends, not by technological experts or for the material\nadvantage of the community. And in this control of industrial affairs\nthe smaller businessmen are in great part subject to the discretion of\nthe larger.[153]\n\nBy ancient habit, handed down from the days of handicraft and petty\ntrade, this pecuniary management is conventionally conceived to be\ndirected to the production of goods and services, and the businessman\nis still conventionally rated as a producer and his gains accepted as a\nmeasure of his productive efficiency. In conventional speech \u201cproducer\u201d\nmeans the owner of industrial plant, not the workmen employed nor\nthe mechanical apparatus about which they are employed.[154] The\n\u201cproducers,\u201d \u201cmanufacturers,\u201d \u201ccaptains of industry,\u201d whose interests\nare safeguarded by current legislation and by the guardians of law and\norder are the businessmen who have a pecuniary interest in industrial\naffairs; and it is their pecuniary interests that are so safeguarded,\nin the na\u00efve faith that the material interests of the community at\nlarge coincide with the opportunities for gain so secured to the\nbusinessmen.\n\nIt has already been spoken of above that the processes of industry\nare bound in a comprehensive system of give and take, in such a\nmanner that no considerable fraction of this industrial system\nfunctions independently of the rest. The industrial system at large\nmay be conceived as a comprehensive machine process, the several\nsub-processes of which technologically inosculate and ramify\nin what may be conceived as a network of elements working in a\nmoving equilibrium, none of which can go on at its full productive\nefficiency except in duly balanced correlation with all the rest.\nThis characterisation will strictly apply only so far as the machine\ntechnology has taken over the various branches of industry, but it\napplies in a loose though by no means idle fashion also as regards\nthose elements of the industrial system in which the machine technology\nhas not yet become dominant. In so far as the industrial system is of\nthis character it will also hold that the business management of any\none branch or line or parcel of industries will have its effect on\nthe rest, primarily and proximately on those other branches or lines\nwith which the given parcel stands in immediate relations of give\nand take, through the market or more directly through technological\ncorrelation,--as, e.\u00a0g., in the transportation system. Business\nmanagement which affects a large section of this balanced system will\nnecessarily have a wide-reaching effect on the working of the system\nat large. Such business control of industry, as has just been remarked\nabove, is exercised with a view to pecuniary gain; but pecuniary gain\nin these premises comes from changes, and apprehended changes, in the\nefficiency of the various industrial processes that are touched by such\ncontrol, rather than from the workday functioning of the several items\nof equipment involved. The changes which so bring gain to these larger\nbusinessmen may be favourable to the effective working of industry,\nbut they may also be unfavourable; and the opportunities for gain\nwhich they afford the larger businessmen may be equally profitable\nwhether the disturbance in question is favourable or unfavourable to\nindustrial efficiency. The gains to be derived from such disturbance\nare proportioned to the magnitude of the disturbance rather than to its\nindustrial productiveness. It should follow, of course, that if the\nmachine technology should come so to dominate the industrial situation\nas to bind all industry in a rigorously comprehensive balanced process,\nthe material fortunes of the community would come to rest unreservedly\nand in all details in the hands of those larger businessmen who hold\nthe final pecuniary discretion.\n\nIn qualification of this broad proposition it is to be noted that,\nwhile the gains of the superior rank of businessmen accrue in the\nmanner indicated,--by means of disturbances which may indifferently\nbe favourable or unfavourable to industry,--yet in the long run it\nis necessarily true that the gains which so inure to the pecuniary\nmagnates must be derived from the net product of industry and will\nin the long run be larger in the aggregate the more productive the\ncommunity\u2019s industry is. What makes business profitable to the\nbusinessmen is, after all, their usufruct of the community\u2019s industrial\nefficiency. In the long run nothing can accrue as income to the\npecuniary magnates more than the surplus product of industry above\nthe subsistence of the industrial community at large. But so long as\nthe magnates have not come to a working arrangement on this basis and\n\u201cpooled their interests\u201d the proposition as formulated above appears to\nbe adequate to the facts,--that the gains of these larger businessmen\nare a function of the magnitude of the disturbances which they create\nrather than of their productive effect.\n\nIt should also follow, and so far as the above characterisation holds\nit does follow, that the current pecuniary organisation of industry\nvests the usufruct of the community\u2019s industrial proficiency in the\nowners of the industrial equipment. Proximately this usufruct of the\nindustrial community\u2019s technological knowledge and working capacity\nvests in the detail owners of the equipment, but only proximately.\nAt the further remove it vests only in the businessmen whose command\nof large means enables them to create and control those pecuniary\nconjunctures of industry that bring about changes in the market value\nand ownership of the equipment.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] Cf. Jacques Loeb, _Comparative Physiology of the Brain and\nComparative Psychology_, ch. i.\n\n[2] Cf. W. James, _Principles of Psychology_, ch. xxiv and xxv, where,\nhowever, the difference between tropism and instinct is not kept well\nin hand,--the tropisms having at that date not been subjected to\ninquiry and definition as has been true since then; William McDougall,\n_Introduction to Social Psychology_, ch. i.\n\n[3] Loeb, _Comparative Physiology of the Brain_, pp. 177\u2013178.\n\n[4] Cf. Graham Wallas, _Human Nature in Politics_, especially ch. i.\n\n[5] Cf., e.\u00a0g., James, _Principles of Psychology_, ch. xxiv; William\nMcDougall, _Introduction to Social Psychology_, ch. iii.\n\n[6] Loeb, _Comparative Physiology of the Brain_, especially ch. xiii.\n\n[7] It is of course only as physiological traits that the tropisms\nare conceived not to overlap, blend or interfere, and it is likewise\nonly in respect of their physiological discontinuity that the like\nargument would bear on the instincts. In respect of their expression,\nin the way of orientation, movement, growth, secretion, and the like,\nthe tropismatic response to dissimilar stimuli is often so apparently\nidentical that expert investigators have at times been at a loss\nto decide to which one of two or several recognised tropismatic\nsensibilities a given motor response should be ascribed. But in respect\nof their ultimate physiological character, the intimate physiological\nprocess by which the given sensibility takes effect, the response due\nto different tropismatic sensibilities appears in each case to be\ndistinctive and not to blend with any other response to a different\nstimulus, with which it may happen to synchronise.\n\n[8] Cf., e.\u00a0g., McDougall, _Introduction to Social Psychology_, ch.\ni-iii.\n\n[9] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Otto Ammon, _Die Gesellschaftsordnung_; G. Vacher\nde Lapouge, _Les s\u00e9lections sociales_, and _Race et milieu social_,\nespecially \u201cLois fondamentales de l\u2019Anthroposociologie.\u201d\n\n[10] The all-pervading modern institution of private property appears\nto have been of such an origin, having cumulatively grown out of the\nself-regarding bias of men in their oversight of the community\u2019s\nmaterial interests.\n\n[11] Cf. McDougall, _Social Psychology_, ch. x.\n\n[12] Latterly the question of instincts has been a subject of\nsomewhat extensive discussion among students of animal behaviour, and\nthroughout this discussion the argument has commonly been conducted\non neurological, or at the most on physiological ground. This line of\nargument is well and lucidly presented in a volume recently published\n(_The Science of Human Behavior_, New York, 1913) by Mr. Maurice\nParmalee. The book offers an incisive critical discussion of the Nature\nof Instinct (ch. xi) with a specific reference to the instinct of\nworkmanship (p. 252). The discussion runs, faithfully and competently,\non neurological ground and reaches the outcome to be expected in\nan endeavour to reduce instinct to neurological (or physiological)\nterms. As has commonly been true of similar endeavours, the outcome is\nessentially negative, in that \u201cinstinct\u201d is not so much explained as\nexplained away. The reason of this outcome is sufficiently evident;\n\u201cinstinct,\u201d being not a neurological or physiological concept, is\nnot statable in neurological or physiological terms. The instinct\nof workmanship no more than any other instinctive proclivity is an\nisolable, discrete neural function; which, however, does not touch the\nquestion of its status as a psychological element. The effect of such\nan analysis as is offered by Mr. Parmalee is not to give terminological\nprecision to the concept of \u201cinstinct\u201d in the sense assigned it in\ncurrent usage, but to dispense with it; which is an untoward move\nin that it deprives the student of the free use of this familiar\nterm in its familiar sense and therefore constrains him to bring the\nindispensable concept of instinct in again surreptitiously under cover\nof some unfamiliar term or some terminological circumlocution. The\ncurrent mechanistic analyses of animal behaviour are of great and\nundoubted value to any inquiry into human conduct, but their value\ndoes not lie in an attempt to make them supersede those psychological\nphenomena which it is their purpose to explain. That such supersession\nof psychological phenomena by the mechanistic formulations need nowise\nfollow and need not be entertained appears, e.\u00a0g., in such work as that\nof Mr. Loeb, referred to above, _Comparative Physiology of the Brain\nand Comparative Psychology_.\n\n[13] Endless in the sense that the effects of such concatenation do not\nrun to a final term in any direction.\n\n[14] Many students of animal behaviour are still, as psychologists\ngenerally once were, inclined to contrast instinct with intelligence,\nand to confine the term typically to such automatically determinate\naction as takes effect without deliberation or intelligent oversight.\nThis view would appear to be a remnant of an earlier theoretical\nposition, according to which all the functions of intelligence were\nreferred to a distinct immaterial entity, entelechy, associated in\nsymbiosis with the physical organism. If all such preconceptions of a\nsubstantial dichotomy between physiological and psychological activity\nbe abandoned it becomes a matter of course that intellectual functions\nthemselves take effect only on the initiative of the instinctive\ndispositions and under their surveillance, and the antithesis between\ninstinct and intelligence will consequently fall away. What expedients\nof terminology and discrimination may then be resorted to in the study\nof those animal instincts that involve a minimum of intellect is of\ncourse a question for the comparative psychologists. Cf., for instance,\nC. Lloyd Morgan, _Introduction to Comparative Psychology_ (2nd edition,\n1906) ch. xii, especially pp. 206\u2013209, and _Habit and Instinct_, ch. i\nand vi.\n\n[15] Cf. H.\u00a0S. Jennings, _Behavior of the Lower Animals_, ch. xii, xx,\nxxi.\n\n[16] See McDougall, _Introduction to Social Psychology_, ch. iii and x.\n\n[17] Cf. M.\u00a0F. Washburn, _The Animal Mind_, ch. x, xi, where the\nsimpler facts of habituation are suggestively presented in conformity\nwith current views of empirical psychology.\n\n[18] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_; Seligmann, _The Veddas_.\n\n[19] Hutton Webster, _Primitive Secret Societies_, especially ch. iii\nand iv.\n\n[20] J.\u00a0G. Frazer, _Early History of the Kingship_, ch. iv, p. 107.\n\n[21] E.\u00a0g., some native tribes of Australia; cf. Spencer and Gillen,\n_The Native Tribes of Central Australia_, especially ch. i.\n\n[22] Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_.\n\n[23] J. Murdoch, \u201cThe Point Barrow Eskimo,\u201d _Report of the Bureau of\nAmerican Ethnology_, 1887\u20131888; F. Boas, \u201cThe Central Eskimo,\u201d _Ibid_,\n1884\u20131885.\n\n[24] E.\u00a0H. Man, \u201cOn the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,\u201d\n_J.\u00a0A.\u00a0I._, vol. xii.\n\n[25] _Reports, Bureau of American Ethnology_, numerous papers by\ndifferent writers, perhaps especially Mrs. Stevenson, \u201cThe Sia,\u201d 11th\nReport (1889\u20131890).\n\n[26] Current economic theory commonly proceeds on the \u201chedonistic\ncalculus\u201d, so called, (cf. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the\n_Principles of Morals and Legislation_) or the \u201chedonic principle\u201d,\nas it has also been called, (cf. Pantaleoni, _Pure Economics_, ch.\ni). This \u201cprinciple\u201d affords the major premise of current theory. It\npostulates that individual self-seeking is the prime mover of all\neconomic conduct. There is some uncertainty and disagreement among\nlatterday economists as to the precise terms proper to be employed\nto designate this principle of conduct and its working-out; in the\napprehension of later speculators Bentham\u2019s \u201cpleasure and pain\u201d has\nseemed too bald and materialistic, and they have had recourse to such\nless precise and definable terms as \u201cgratification,\u201d \u201csatisfactions,\u201d\n\u201csacrifice,\u201d \u201cutility\u201d and \u201cdisutility,\u201d \u201cpsychic income,\u201d etc., but\nhitherto without any conclusive revision of the terminology. These\ndifferences and suggested innovations do not touch the substance of the\nancient postulate. Proceeding on this postulate the theoreticians have\nlaid down the broad proposition that \u201cpresent goods are preferred to\nfuture goods\u201d; from which arise many meticulous difficulties of theory,\nparticularly in any attempt to make the deliverances of theory square\nwith workday facts. The modicum of truth contained in this proposition\nwould appear to be better expressed in the formula: \u201cProspective\nsecurity is preferred to prospective risk;\u201d which seems to be nearly\nall that is required either as a generalisation of the human motives\nin the case or as a premise for the theoretical refinements aimed\nat, whereas the dictum that \u201cpresent goods are preferred to future\ngoods\u201d must, on reflection, commend itself as substantially false.\nBy and large, of course, goods are not wanted except for prospective\nuse--beyond the measure of that urgent current consumption that\nplays no part in the theoretical refinements for which the dictum is\ninvoked. It will immediately be apparent on reflection that even for\nthe individual\u2019s own advantage \u201cpresent goods are preferred to future\ngoods\u201d only where and in so far as property rights are secure, and\nthen only for future use. It is for productive use in the future, or\nmore particularly for the sake of prospective revenue to be drawn from\nwealth so held, by lending or investing it, that such a preference\nbecomes effective. Apart from this pecuniary advantage that attaches\nto property held over from the present to the future there appears to\nbe no such preference even as a matter of individual self-seeking,\nand where such pecuniary considerations are not dominant there is\nno such preference for \u201cpresent goods.\u201d It is present \u201cwealth,\u201d not\npresent \u201cgoods,\u201d that is the object of desire; and present wealth\nis desired mainly for its prospective advantage. It is well known\nthat in communities where there are habitually no businesslike\ncredit extensions or investments for profit, savings take the form\nof hoarding, that is, accumulation for future use in preference to\npresent consumption. There might be some division of opinion as to the\ncharacter of the prospective use for which goods are sought, but there\ncan be little question that much, if not most, of this prospective use\nis not of a self-regarding character and is not sought from motives of\nsensuous gain.\n\n[27] Traditionally a theoretical presumption has been held to the\ncontrary. It has been taken for granted that the institutional outcome\nof men\u2019s native dispositions will be sound and salutary; but this\npresumption overlooks the effects of complication and deflection\namong instincts, due to cumulative habit. The tradition has come\ndown as an article of uncritical faith from the historic belief in a\nbeneficent Order of Nature; which in turn runs back to the early-modern\nreligious conception of a Providential Order instituted by a shrewd\nand benevolent Creator; which rests on an anthropomorphic imputation\nof parental solicitude and workmanship to an assumed metaphysical\nsubstratum of things. This traditional view therefore is substantially\ntheological and has that degree of validity that may be derived from\nthe putative characteristics of any anthropomorphic divinity.\n\n[28] Cf. e.\u00a0g., F.\u00a0H. Cushing, \u201cA Study of Pueblo Pottery as\nillustrative of Zu\u00f1i Culture Growth,\u201d _Report, Bureau of Ethnology_,\n1882\u20131883 (vol. iv); J.\u00a0W. Fewkes, \u201cArcheological Expedition to Arizona\nin 1895,\u201d sections on \u201cPottery\u201d and \u201cPaleography of the Pottery,\u201d\n_ibid_, 1896\u20131897 (vol. xviii); W.\u00a0H. Holmes, \u201cThe Ancient Art of\nChiriqui,\u201d _ibid_, 1884\u20131885 (vol. vi).\n\n[29] The restrictions in this respect are mainly those which devote the\n\u201csacred\u201d vessels, distinguished by peculiar shapes and decorations, to\nparticular ceremonial uses.\n\n[30] Cf. E.\u00a0B. Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, especially ch. xvii.\n\n[31] Cf. \u201cThe Evolution of the Scientific Point of View,\u201d _University\nof California Chronicle_, Oct., 1908.\n\n[32] So, e.\u00a0g., the proficiency of Bushmen, Veddas, Australians,\nAmerican Indians, and other peoples of a low technological plane,\nin tracking game has been remarked on with great admiration by all\nobservers; and the efficiency of these and others of their like is\nno less admirable as regards swimming, boating, riding, climbing,\nstalking, etc.\n\n[33] Cf. G. and A. de Mortillet, _Le Pr\u00e9historique_, especially the\nchapter \u201cDonn\u00e9es chronologiques,\u201d pp. 662\u2013664; W.\u00a0G. Sollas, _Ancient\nHunters_, ch. i and xiv.\n\n[34] Cf. Sophus M\u00fcller, _L\u2019Europe Pr\u00e9historique_.\n\n[35] Cf., e.\u00a0g., _Report of Bureau of American Ethnology_, 1884\u20131885,\nFranz Boas, \u201cThe Central Eskimo;\u201d _ibid_, 1887\u20131888, John Murdoch, \u201cThe\nPoint Barrow Eskimo.\u201d\n\n[36] What is assumed here is what is commonly held, viz. that the\nracial stocks that made up the late pal\u00e6olithic population of Europe\nare still represented in a moderate way in the racial mixture that\nfills Europe today, and that these older racial types not only recur\nsporadically in the European population at large but are also present\nlocally in sufficient force to give a particular character to the\npopulation of given localities. (See G. de Mortillet, _Formation de la\nnation fran\u00e7aise_, 4me partie, and Conclusions, pp. 275\u2013329.) Great\nchanges took place in the racial complexion of Europe in the beginning\nand early phases of the neolithic period, but since then no intrusion\nof new stocks has seriously disturbed the mixture of races, except in\nisolated areas, of secondary consequence to the cultural situation at\nlarge.\n\nSee also W.\u00a0G. Sollas, Ancient Hunters and their Modern Representatives.\n\n[37] These improved races are commonly, if not always, a product of\nhybridisation, though it is conceivable that such a race might arise as\na \u201csport,\u201d a Mendelian mutant. To establish such a race or \u201ccomposite\npure line\u201d of hybrids and to propagate and improve it in the course of\nfurther breeding demands a degree of patient attention and consistent\naim.\n\n[38] The late neolithic, or \u201c\u00e6neolithic,\u201d culture brought to light\nby Pumpelly at Anau in Transcaspia shows the synchronism of advance\nbetween the technology of the mechanic arts on the one hand and of\ntillage and cattle-breeding on the other hand in a remarkably lucid\nway. The site is held to date back to some 8000 B.\u00a0C. or earlier and\nshows continuous occupation through a period of several thousand years.\nThe settlers at Anau brought cereals (barley and wheat) when the\nsettlement was made; so that the cultivation of these grains must date\nback some considerable distance farther into the stone age of Asia. In\nsucceeding ages the people of Anau made some further advance in the\nuse of crop plants; whether by improvement and innovation at home or\nby borrowing has not been determined. Presently, in the course of the\nnext few thousand years, they brought into domestication and adapted\nto domestic use by selective breeding the greater number of those\nspecies of animals that have since made up the complement of live stock\nin the Western culture. In the mechanic arts the visible advance is\nslight as compared with the work in cattle-breeding, though it cannot\nbe called insignificant taken by itself. The more notable improvements\nin this direction are believed to be due to borrowing. Perhaps the\nmost characteristic trait of the mechanic technology at Anau is the\ntotal absence of weapons in the lower half of the deposits.--Raphael\nPumpelly, _Explorations in Turkestan: Prehistoric Civilizations of\nAnau_. (Carnegie Publication No. 73.) Washington, 1908.\n\n[39] Cf. O.\u00a0F. Cook, \u201cFood Plants of Ancient America.\u201d _Report of\nSmithsonian Institution_, 1903. E.\u00a0J. Payne, _History of the New World\nCalled America_, vol. i, (1892), pp. 336\u2013427.\n\n[40] Cf. E.\u00a0J. Payne, as above.\n\n[41] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, vol. i, ch. vi.\n\n[42] Cf., e.\u00a0g., J.\u00a0W. Powell, \u201cMythology of the North American\nIndians,\u201d Report, _Bureau of Eth._, 1879\u20131880 (vol. i); F.\u00a0H. Cushing,\n\u201cOutlines of Zu\u00f1i Creation Myths,\u201d _ibid_, 1891\u20131892; J.\u00a0O. Dorsey, \u201cA\nStudy of Siouan Cults,\u201d _ibid_, 1889\u20131890.\n\n[43] Witness, again, the tales collected under the caption of _The\nDay\u2019s Work_, where the anthropomorphic romance of mechanics is made the\nmost of by the same master who told the tales of the _Jungle Book_ and\nof \u201cThe Cat that Walked.\u201d\n\n[44] Cf. Presidential Address by Francis Darwin at the Dublin meeting\nof the British Association for the Advancement of Science; cf. also H.\nBergson, _\u00c9volution cr\u00e9atrice_, and particularly passages that deal\nwith the \u00e9lan de la vie.\n\n[45] Cf. G.\u00a0J. Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, especially the\nIntroduction.\n\n[46] Cf. Jane E. Harrison, _Prolegomena to the Study of Greek\nReligion_, especially ch. iv; The same, _Themis_, especially ch. i, ii,\niii and ix; with which compare the Pueblo cults referred to above.\n\n[47] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Skeat, _Malay Magic_, perhaps especially ch. v,\nsection on the cultivation of rice.\n\n[48] Hence animism, which applies its conceptions to inanimate rather\nthan animate objects.\n\n[49] The like applies in the case of the seasonal and meteorological\nmyths; where it happens rarely if at all that the phenomena of the\nseasons or the forces that come in evidence in meteorological changes\nare personified directly or unambiguously. It is always some god or\nd\u00e6mon that controls or uses the wind and the weather, some indwelling\nsprite or manlike giant that inhabits and watches over the hill or\nspring or river, and it is always the interests of the indwelling\npersonality rather than that of the tangible objects in the case that\nare to be safeguarded by the superstitious practices with which the\nmyth surrounds men\u2019s intercourse with these features of the landscape.\n\n[50] As in the legends of Prometheus; compare legends and ritual of\nfire from various cultures in L. Frobenius, _The Childhood of Man_, ch.\nxxv-xxvii.\n\n[51] For an interesting illustration of this point see a paper by\nDuncan Mackenzie on \u201cCretan Palaces\u201d in the _Annual of the British\nSchool at Athens_ for 1907\u20131908, where the whole discussion hangs\non the fact, unquestioned by any one of the disputants in a wide\nand warm controversy, that during some centuries of unwholesome\nnuisance from smoky fires in draughty rooms the great civilisation\nof the Mediterranean seaboard never hit on the ready solution of the\ndifficulty by putting in a chimney.\n\n[52] Cf., e.\u00a0g., W. James, _Principles of Psychology_, ch. xxiv;\nMcDougall, _Social Psychology_, ch. iii.\n\n[53] Cf., e.\u00a0g., M.\u00a0F. Washburn, _The Animal Mind_, ch. xii, xiii.\n\n[54] For illustrations see Dudley Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_,\nespecially ch. ii, on \u201cNative Beliefs.\u201d\n\n[55] Cf. \u201cThe Place of Science in Modern Civilisation,\u201d _Journal of\nSociology_, March, 1906, pp. 585\u2013609; \u201cThe Evolution of the Scientific\nPoint of View,\u201d _University of California Chronicle_, vol. x, pp.\n396\u2013415.\n\n[56] Cf. _Theory of the Leisure Class_, ch. iv, v.\n\n[57] This technological blend of manual labour with magical practice is\nwell seen, for instance, in the Malay ritual of rice culture.--W.\u00a0W.\nSkeat, _Malay Magic_, various passages dealing with the ceremonial of\nthe planting, growth and harvesting of the rice-crop.\n\n[58] Cf. J.\u00a0E. Harrison, _Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion_,\nespecially ch. iv; J.\u00a0G. Frazer, _Adonis, Attis, Osiris_, bk. i, ch.\niii.\n\n[59] Such seems to be the evidence, for instance, for Cybele, Astarte\n(Aphrodite, Ishtar), Mylitta, Isis, Demeter (Ceres), Artemis, and\nfor such doubtfully late characters as Hera (Juno),--see Harrison,\n_Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion_; Frazer, _Adonis, Attis,\nOsiris_, and _The Golden Bough_. Quanon may be a doubtful case, as\npossibly also Amaterazu. The evidence from such American instances as\nthe great mother goddesses of the Pueblos and other Indian tribes runs\nperhaps the other way, or at the best it may leave the point in doubt.\nSee, for instance, Matilda C. Stevenson, \u201cThe Zu\u00f1i Indians,\u201d _Report\nBureau of American Ethnology_, 1901\u20131902, section on \u201cMythology;\u201d\nThe same, _ibid_, 1889\u20131890, \u201cThe Sia;\u201d Frank H. Cushing, _ibid_,\n1891\u20131892, \u201cZu\u00f1i Creation Myths.\u201d\n\n[60] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Frazer, _Adonis, Attis, Osiris_, bk. ii, ch. iii, bk.\niii, ch. vi and xi.\n\n[61] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Hutton Webster, _Primitive Secret Societies_,\nespecially ch. iii, iv, v; Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of\nCentral Australia_, ch. vii, viii, ix, xvi.\n\n[62] Cf. for instance, Codrington, _The Melanesians_; Seligmann, _The\nMelanesians of British New Guinea_.\n\n[63] These considerations may of course imply nothing, directly, as to\nthe size of the political organisation or of the national territory or\npopulation; though national boundaries are likely both to affect and to\nbe affected by such changes in the industrial system. A community may\nbe small, relatively to the industrial system in and by which it lives,\nand may yet, if conditions of peace permit it, stand in such a relation\nof complement or supplement to a larger complex of industrial groups\nas to make it in effect an integral part of a larger community, so far\nas regards its technology. So, for instance, Switzerland and Denmark\nare an integral part of the cultural and industrial community of the\nWestern civilisation as effectually as they might be with an area and\npopulation equal to those of the United Kingdom or the German Empire,\nand they are doubtless each a more essential part in this community\nthan Russia. At the same time, as things go within this Western\nculture, national boundaries have a very considerable obstructive\neffect in industrial affairs and in the growth of technology. It will\nprobably be conceded on the one hand that any appreciable decline\nin the aggregate population of Christendom would result in some\ncurtailment or retardation of the technological advance in which\nthese peoples are jointly and severally engaged; and it is likewise\nto be conceded on the other hand that the like effect would follow on\nany marked degree of success from the efforts of those patriotic and\ndynastic statesmen who are endeavouring to set these peoples asunder in\nan armed estrangement and neutrality.\n\n[64] Cf., as an extreme case, Matilda C. Stevenson, \u201cThe Sia,\u201d _Report\nBur. Eth._, xi (1889\u20131890).\n\nThe like decline is known to have occurred in many parts of Europe\nconsequent on the decline of population due to the Black Death and the\nPlague.\n\n[65] On such native differences between the leading races of Europe,\ncf., e.\u00a0g., G.\u00a0V. de Lapouge, _Les S\u00e9lections Sociales_; and _l\u2019Aryen_;\nO. Ammon, _Die Gesellschaftsordnung_; G. Sergi, _Arii e Italici_.\n\n[66] For instance, the Japanese and the Ainu, the Polynesians and the\nMelanesians, the Cinghalese and the Veddas. On the last named, cf.\nSeligmann, _The Veddas_.\n\n[67] Cf. W.\u00a0Z. Ripley, _The Races of Europe_; G. Sergi, _The\nMediterranean Race_; V. de Lapouge, _L\u2019Aryen_; cf. also, J. Deniker,\n_Les races europ\u00e9ennes_, and \u201cLes six races composant la population de\nl\u2019Europe,\u201d _Journal Anthropological Institute_, vol. 34.\n\n[68] The available evidence indicates that the dolicho-blond race\nof northern Europe probably originated in a mutation (from the\nMediterranean as its parent stock?) during the early neolithic period,\nthat is to say about at the beginning of the neolithic in western\nEurope. There is less secure ground for conjecture as to the date\nand circumstances under which any one of the other European races\noriginated, but the date and place of their origin seems to lie outside\nof Europe and earlier than the European neolithic period. Unfortunately\nthere has been little direct or succinct discussion of this matter\namong anthropologists hitherto.--Cf. \u201cThe Mutation Theory and the Blond\nRace,\u201d _Journal of Race Development_, April, 1913.\n\n[69] The Melanesians may be contrasted with the Baltic peoples in\nthis respect, though the comparison is perhaps rather suggestive\nthan convincing. The Melanesians are apparently endowed with a very\nrespectable capacity for workmanship, as regards both insight and\napplication, and with a relatively high sense of economic expediency.\nThey are also possessed of an alert and enduring group solidarity.\nBut they apparently lack that reasonable degree of \u201chumanity\u201d and\ncongenital tolerance that has on the whole kept the peoples of the\nBaltic region from fatal extravagances of cruelty and sustained hatred\nbetween groups. Not that any excess of humanity has marked the course\nof culture in North Europe. But it seems at least admissible to say\nthat mutual hatred, distrust and disparagement falls more readily into\nabeyance among these peoples than among the Melanesians; particularly\nwhen and in so far as the material interest of the several groups\nvisibly suffers from a continued free run of extravagant animosity.\nThe difference in point of native propensity may not be very marked,\nbut such degree of it as there is has apparently thrown the balance\nin such a way that the Baltic peoples have, technologically, had the\nadvantage of a wide and relatively easy contact and communication;\nwhereas the Melanesians have during an equally protracted experience\nspent themselves largely on interstitial animosities--Cf. Codrington,\n_The Melanesians_; Seligmann, _The Melanesians of British New Guinea_.\n\n[70] These considerations apparently apply with peculiar force to the\nblond race, in that the evidence of early times goes to argue that\nthis stock never lived in isolation from other, rival stocks. It began\npresumably as a small minority in a community made up chiefly of a\ndifferent racial type, its parent stock, and in an environment at large\nin which at least one rival stock was present in force from near the\noutset; so that race competition, that is to say competition in terms\nof births and deaths, was instant and unremitting. And this competition\nthe given conditions enforced in terms of group subsistence.\n\n[71] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Sophus M\u00fcller, _Vor Oldtid_, \u201cStenalderen.\u201d\n\n[72] It has not commonly been noted, though it will scarcely be\nquestioned, that fighting capacity and the propensity to fight have\nrarely, if ever, been successful in the struggle between races and\npeoples when brought into competition with a diligent growing of crops\nand children, if success be counted in terms of race survival.\n\n[73] It is apparently an open question whether these spiritual traits\nare properly to be ascribed to the dolicho-blond as traits of that\ntype taken by itself, rather than traits characteristic of the hybrid\noffspring of the blond stock crossed on one or other of the racial\nstocks associated with it in the populations of Europe. The evidence at\nlarge seems rather to bear out the view that any hybrid population is\nlikely to be endowed with an exceptional degree of that restlessness\nand discontent that go to make up what is spoken of as a \u201cspirit of\nenterprise\u201d in the race.\n\n[74] As, e.\u00a0g., the inhabitants of many Polynesian islands at the time\nof their discovery. See, also, Codrington, _The Melanesians_.\n\n[75] Not an unusual state of things among the Melanesians and\nMicronesians, and in a degree among the Australians.\n\n[76] See note, p. 120.\n\n[77] E.\u00a0g., some Australian natives and some of the lower Malay\ncultures.\n\n[78] E.\u00a0g., the Pueblo and the Eskimo.\n\n[79] Indeed, such as very suggestively to recall the ritual objects and\nobservances of the Pueblo Indians.\n\n[80] For an extreme case of this among living communities, see Skeat\nand Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, vol. i, pp. 242\u2013250,\nwhere the generalisation is set down (p. 248) that \u201cthe rudimentary\nstage of culture through which these tribes have passed, and in some\ncases are still passing, may perhaps be more accurately described as a\nwood and bone age than as an age of stone,\u201d in as much as the evidence\ngoes to show that before they began to get metals from the Malays their\nonly implements of a more durable material were \u201cthe anvil and hammer\n(unwrought) ..., the whetstone, chips or flakes used as knives, and\ncooking stones.\u201d From the different character of their environment this\nrecourse to wood and bone could scarcely have been carried to such an\nextreme by the savages of the Baltic region.\n\n[81] Cf. Pumpelly, _Explorations in Turkestan_.\n\n[82] A casual visit to the Scandinavian museums will scarcely convey\nthis impression. To meet the prepossessions of the public, and perhaps\nof the experts, the weapons are made much of in the showcases, as is to\nbe expected; but they are relatively scarce in the store-rooms, where\nthe tools on the other hand are rather to be estimated by the cubic\nyard than counted by the piece.\n\n[83] Seen, e.\u00a0g., in the observance and sanction of tabu in many of the\nlower cultures.\n\n[84] The Eskimo are placed in circumstances that are in some respects\nsimilar to those presumed to have conditioned the life of the blond\nrace and its hybrids during the early phases of its life-history, and\namong the traits that have made for the survival of the Eskimo is\nundoubtedly to be counted the somewhat genial good-fellowship of that\nrace, coupled as it is with a notable disinclination to hostilities.\nSo also the Indians of the North-West Coast, whose situation perhaps\nparallels that of the neolithic Baltic culture more closely even than\nthe Eskimo, are not among the notably warlike peoples of the earth,\nalthough they undoubtedly show more of a predatory animus than their\nnorthern neighbours. In this case it is probably safe to say that\ntheir technological achievements have in no degree been furthered by\nsuch warlike enterprise as they have shown, and that their comfort and\nsuccess as a race would have been even more marked if they had been\ngifted with less of the warlike spirit and had kept the peace more\nconsistently throughout their habitat than they have done.--Cf. Franz\nBoas, \u201cThe Central Eskimo,\u201d _Bureau of American Ethnology_, Report,\n1884\u20131885; The same, \u201cThe Secret Societies and Social Organisation of\nthe Kwakiutl Indians,\u201d _Report, National Museum_, 1895; A.\u00a0P. Niblack,\n\u201cCoast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia,\u201d\n_ibid_, 1888.\n\n[85] Such loss by neglect of technological elements that have\nbeen superseded may have serious consequences in case a people of\nsomewhat advanced attainments suffers a material set-back either in\nits industrial circumstances or in its cultural situation more at\nlarge,--as happened, e.\u00a0g., in the Dark Ages of Europe. In such case\nit is likely to result that the community will be unable to fall back\non a state of the industrial arts suited to the reduced circumstances\ninto which it finds itself thrown, having lost the use of many of the\ntechnological elements familiar to earlier generations that lived under\nsimilar circumstances, and so the industrial community finds itself in\nmany respects driven to make a virtually new beginning, from a more\nrudimentary starting point than the situation might otherwise call for.\nThis in turn acts to throw the people back to a more archaic phase of\ntechnology and of institutions than the initial cultural loss sustained\nby the community would of itself appear to warrant.\n\n[86] Sophus M\u00fcller, _Vor Oldtid_, \u201cStenalderen,\u201d sec. iii, \u201cTidsforhold\ni den \u00e6ldre Stenalder;\u201d O. Montelius, _Les temps pr\u00e9historiques en\nSu\u00e8de_, ch. i, p. 20.\n\n[87] Compare the case of the Indians of the North-West Coast, who\nhave occupied a region comparable to the neolithic Baltic area in the\ndistribution of land and water as well as in the abundance of good\ntimber.\n\n[88] Sophus M\u00fcller, _Vor Oldtid_, \u201cBronzealderen,\u201d secs. xiii, xiv;\nMontelius, _Les temps pr\u00e9historiques en Su\u00e8de_, ch. ii.\n\n[89] Cf., e.\u00a0g., C.\u00a0A. Haddon, _Evolution in Art_, section on \u201cMagic\nand Religion.\u201d\n\n[90] Except for species that habitually breed by parthenogenesis.\n\n[91] The caution is perhaps unnecessary that it is not hereby intended\nto suggest a doubt of Mr. Galton\u2019s researches or to question the\nproposals of the Eugenicals, whose labours are no doubt to be taken for\nall they are worth.\n\n[92] See, e.\u00a0g., Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay\nPeninsula_, vol. ii, part ii; _Report, Bureau of American Ethnology,\n1884\u20131885_, F. Boas, \u201cThe Central Eskimo.\u201d\n\n[93] Cf. Basil Thomson, _The Diversions of a Prime Minister_, and _The\nFigians_.\n\n[94] The extent of this \u201cquasi-personal fringe\u201d of objects of intimate\nuse varies considerably from one culture to another. It may often be\ninferred from the range of articles buried or destroyed with the dead\namong peoples on this level of culture.\n\n[95] A doubt may suggest itself in this connection touching such\ncultures and peoples as the pagan races of the Malay peninsula, the\nMincopies of the Andaman Islands, or (possibly) the Negritos of Luzon,\nbut these conceivable exceptions to the rule evidently do not lessen\nits force.\n\n[96] It may be pertinent to take note of the bearing of these\nconsiderations on certain dogmatic concepts that have played a part in\nthe theoretical and controversial speculations of the last century.\nMuch importance has been given by economists of one school and another\nto the \u201cproductivity of labour,\u201d particularly as affording a basis\nfor a just and equitable distribution of the product; one school of\ncontroversialists having gone so far against the current of received\neconomic doctrine as to allege that labour is the sole productive\nfactor in industry and that the Labourer is on this ground entitled,\nin equity, to \u201cthe full product of his labor.\u201d It is of course not\nconceived that the considerations here set forth will dispose of these\ndoctrinal contentions; but they make it at least appear that the\nproductivity of labor, or of any other conceivable factor in industry,\nis an imputed productivity--imputed on grounds of convention afforded\nby institutions that have grown up in the course of technological\ndevelopment and that have consequently only such validity as attaches\nto habits of thought induced by any given phase of collective life.\nThese habits of thought (institutions and principles) are themselves\nthe indirect product of the technological scheme. The controversy as\nto the productivity of labor should accordingly shift its ground from\n\u201cthe nature of things\u201d to the exigencies of ingrained preconceptions,\nprinciples and expediencies as seen in the light of current\ntechnological requirements and the current drift of habituation.\n\n[97] See Sophus M\u00fcller, _Vor Oldtid_, \u201cStenalderen,\u201d and _Aarb\u00f6ger for\nnordisk Oldkyndighed_, 1906.\n\n[98] Cf. W.\u00a0G. Sollas, _Ancient Hunters_.\n\n[99] See, e.\u00a0g., Basil Thomson, _The Figians_, especially ch. iv, xiv,\nxxviii, xxxi.\n\n[100] The Pueblos offer a curious exception to this common rule\nof a parasitic priesthood. While they are much given to religious\nobservances and have an extensive priestly organisation, comprising\ndivers orders and sub-orders, this priesthood appears commonly to\nderive no income, or even appreciable perquisites, from their office.\n\n[101] The difference in importance and powers between the war chief\nof the peaceable Pueblos on the one hand and of the predatory Aztecs\non the other hand shows how such an official\u2019s status may change _de\nfacto_ without a notable change _de jure_.--Cf. also Basil Thomson,\n_The Figians_, ch. iv, xxxi, on \u201cConstitution of Society,\u201d and \u201cThe\nTenure of Land,\u201d where the growth of custom is shown to throw pecuniary\nprerogative and control into the hands of the successful war chief.\n\n[102] For instance, somewhat generally in the island states of\nPolynesia. Something suggestively reminiscent of such a condition\nof things is visible in early feudal Europe, where feudal holdings\nchanged hands with a change in the status of their holders in a way\nthat suggests that ownership was in great measure a corollary following\nfrom the tenure of certain civil powers. So, also, in ecclesiastical\nholdings of the same period and later. And, again, in the doubtful and\nchanging status of the servile classes of feudal Europe, where the\ndistinction between mastery and ownership often seems something of\na legal fiction or a distinction without a difference. Feudal Japan\naffords evidence to much the same effect.\n\n[103] Cf. J.\u00a0G. Frazer, _Lectures on the Early History of the\nKingship_. The drift of evidence for the North-European cultures of\npagan antiquity appears to set strongly in this direction, though the\nterm \u201cpriestly,\u201d as applied to these pagan kings, is likely to convey\ntoo broad an implication of solemnity and vicariously divine power.\n\n[104] Witness the alleged dealings of Jahve with his chosen people and\nthe laudation bestowed on Him by His priests for \u201cconduct unbecoming a\ngentleman.\u201d\n\n[105] As witness Pharaonic Egypt, Ancient Peru, Babylon, Assyria,\nIsrael under Solomon and his nearer successors.\n\n[106] See F.\u00a0B. Jevons, _Introduction to the History of Religion_, ch.\nx.\n\n[107] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Basil Thomson, _The Figians_, ch. iv.\n\n[108] As shown, for instance, by the pottery and baskets made for trade\nby the American Indians where they come in trade contact with civilised\nmen.\n\n[109] For a more detailed discussion of these secondary consequences\nof the institution of ownership, the irksomeness of labour and the\nconspicuous waste of goods, which cannot be pursued here, see _The\nTheory of the Leisure Class_, ch. ii-vi.\n\n[110] For some further analysis of the relation between ownership,\nearnings and the material equipment see _Quarterly Journal of\nEconomics_, August, 1908, \u201cOn the Nature of Capital;\u201d as also a paper\nby H.\u00a0J. Davenport in the same Journal for November, 1910, on \u201cSocial\nProductivity versus Private Acquisition.\u201d\n\n[111] For a more detailed discussion of this disciplinary disparity\nbetween business and industrial occupations, cf. _The Theory of\nBusiness Enterprise_, ch. iv, viii and ix.\n\n[112] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Harrington Emerson, _Efficiency as a Basis for\nOperation and Wages_, ch. i, iv.\n\n[113] Such is tacitly assumed to be the nature of modern economic life\nin the current theoretical formulations of the economists, who make the\ntheory of exchange value the central and controlling doctrine in their\ntheoretical systems, and who with easy conviction trace this value\nback to an individualistic ground in the doctrines of differential\nutility--\u201cmarginal utility.\u201d\n\n[114] Apart from scattered and progressively inconsequential\nmanifestations of this canon of pecuniary equity in the European\ncommunity at large, there occurs a quaint and well-defined application\nof it in the practice of \u201c_h\u00f3lmgangr_\u201d in late pagan and early\nChristian times among the Scandinavian peoples. The \u201cwager of battle\u201d\nis probably of the same derivation, at least in part.\n\n[115] Cf. Frederic Barnard Hawley, _Enterprise and the Productive\nProcess_, for an extreme, mature and consistent development of this\ntenet.\n\n[116] See _The Theory of Business Enterprise_, ch. iv, vi, vii, for\na more detailed discussion of this business traffic and the working\nprinciples which govern it. See also H.\u00a0J. Davenport, _The Economics of\nEnterprise_ (New York, 1913).\n\n[117] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Ehrenberg, _Das Zeitalter der Fugger_; Sombart, _Der\nModerne Kapitalismus_, bk. i.\n\n[118] Cf. _The Theory of the Leisure Class_, ch. iv, v, vi.\n\n[119] Cf. Harrington Emerson, _Efficiency as a Basis for Operation and\nWages_.\n\n[120] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Karl B\u00fccher, _Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft_,\n(3d ed.), ch. iv, \u201cDie gewerblichen Betriebssysteme,\u201d ch. v. \u201cDer\nNiedergang des Handwerks;\u201d W.\u00a0J. Ashley, _English Economic History\nand Theory_, part ii, ch. i, sec. 25, ch. iii, especially sec. 44;\nW. Cunningham, _The Growth of English Industry and Commerce_, vol.\nii, Introduction; Werner Sombart, _Der Moderne Kapitalismus_, bk. i,\nespecially ch. iv-xii.\n\n[121] To complete the sketch at this point, even in outline, it would\nbe necessary to go extensively into the relations of ownership and\ncontrol (largely indirect) in which the owners of land and natural\nresources, the Landed Interest, had stood to the industrial community\nof craftsmen before this transition to the business era got under\nway, as also into the further mutual relations subsisting between\nthe landed interest, the craftsmen and the business community during\nthis transition to a business r\u00e9gime. In the most summary terms the\npertinent circumstances appear to have been that from the beginning of\nits technological era the handicraft community, with its workmanship\nand its technological attainments, was in an uncertain measure at the\ndiscretionary call of the landed interest, largely in an impersonal way\nthrough channels of trade and on the whole with decreasingly exacting\neffect as time went on; and the industrial community at large had by no\nmeans emancipated themselves from this control when the era of business\nenterprise set in; for the landed interest continued to draw its\nlivelihood from the mixed agricultural and handicraft community, and\nthe products of handicraft still continued to go chiefly as supplies to\nthe landed interest in return for the means of subsistence controlled\nby the latter; and long after the businessmen had taken over the\ndirection of industry the claims of the landed interest still continued\nparamount in the economic situation, and industry still continued to\nbe carried on largely with a view to meeting the requirements of the\nlanded interest.\n\n[122] \u201cHandwerk (im engeren Sinne) ist diejenige Wirtschaftsform,\ndie hervorw\u00e4chst aus dem streben eines gewerblichen Arbeiters\nseine zwischen Kunst und gew\u00f6hnlicher Handarbeit die Mitte\nhaltende Fertigkeit zur Herrichtung oder Bearbeitung gewerblicher\nGebrauchsgegenst\u00e4nde in der Weise zu vertreten, dass er sich durch\nAustausch seiner Leistungen oder Erzeugnisse gegen entsprechende\n\u00c4quivalente seinen Lebensunterhalt verschafft.\u201d--Sombart, _Moderne\nKapitalismus_, bk. i, ch. iv.\n\n[123] Cf. Sombart, _Der Moderne Kapitalismus_, bk. i; W.\u00a0J. Ashley,\n_English Economic History and Theory_, bk. i, especially ch. iii; Karl\nB\u00fccher, _die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft_, ch. iv, v.\n\n[124] A classic passage of Adam Smith shows this handicraft conception\nof the mechanics of industry: \u201cThe annual labour of every nation\nis the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries\nand conveniencies of life which it annually consumes....\u201d \u201cBut this\nproportion [of the produce to the consumers] must in every nation\nbe regulated by two different circumstances; first, by the skill,\ndexterity, and judgment with which its labour is generally applied;\nand, secondly, by the proportion between the number of those who\nare employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so\nemployed.\u201d--_Wealth of Nations_, Introduction, p. 1.\n\nAdam Smith consistently speaks of industry in terms of manual\nworkmanship, as the traditions and the continued habitual outlook of\nthat generation unavoidably led him to do; and the sweeping way in\nwhich his interpretation of economic life finds acceptance with his\ncontemporaries shows that in so doing he is speaking in full consonance\nwith the prevailing conceptions of his time. He writes during the\nopening passages of the machine era, but he speaks in terms of the past\nindustrial era, from which his outlook on the economic situation and\nhis conception of normal economic relations had been derived. It may\nbe added that his conception of natural liberty in economic matters\nis similarly derived from the traditional situation, whose discipline\nduring the later phases of the handicraft era inculcated freedom of\nownership as applied to the workman\u2019s product and freedom of bargain\nand sale as touches the traffic of the typical petty trader. And so\nthoroughly had this manner of conceiving industry and the economic\nsituation been worked into the texture of men\u2019s thinking, that the\nsame line of interpretation continues to satisfy economic theory for a\nhundred years after Adam Smith had formulated this canon of economic\ndoctrine, and after the situation to which it would apply had been put\nout by the machine industry and large business management.\n\n[125] The case of the treadle applied to the production of rotary\nmotion is typical of what happens to a technological element of the\ngeneral class here under discussion. Such a new technological expedient\nappears at the outset to be apprehended in terms of manual workmanship;\nbut presently it comes, through habitual use, to take its place as a\nmechanical functioning of the tools in whose use it takes effect,--to\nbe associated in current apprehension with the mechanical appliances\nemployed in its production and, by so much, dissociated from the person\nof the workman. In a measure, therefore, it falls into the category of\nimpersonal facts that are available as technological raw material with\nwhich to go about the work in hand. With further use, and particularly\nwith the interjection of further mechanical expedients between the\nworkman and this given technological element, it will be conceived in\nprogressively more objective fashion, as a fact of the mechanics of\nbrute matter rather than an extension of the workman\u2019s manual reach;\nuntil it passes finally into the category of mechanical fact simply,\nobvious and commonplace through routine use; in which there remains but\na vanishing residue of imputed personality, such as attaches to all\nconceptions of action. The given technological element in this way may\nbe said to pass by degrees out of the workman\u2019s \u201cquasi-personal fringe\u201d\nof manual effects, into the domain of raw material available for use\nin workmanship; where it will, in apprehension, be possessed of only\nsuch imputed quasi-personal or anthropomorphic characteristics as are\nnecessarily imputed to external facts at large.\n\nConcretely, the concept of the treadle seems in its beginnings to be a\nvariant of the same conception that leads to the use of the bow-drill.\nBoth inventions comprise at least two distinct forms. In each the\nsimpler and presumably more primitive form converts a reciprocating\nlongitudinal motion into a reciprocating rotary motion; and it is\napparently only after an interval of familiarity and externalisation\nof this mechanical achievement that the next move takes place in the\ndirection of the perfected treadle, which converts a reciprocating\nlongitudinal into a continuous rotary motion.\n\n[126] Cf. Sombart, _Moderne Kapitalismus_, bk. i, Exkurs zu Kapitel 7,\nbk. ii, ch. xv.\n\n[127] The adventures of Charles I and James II sufficiently illustrate\nthis insular temper of the industrial and commercial community as\ncontrasted with the crown and the court party.\n\n[128] See ch. ii and iii, above.\n\n[129] The imputation of the feminine in this personification of Nature\nis probably nothing more than a carrying over of the Latin gender\nof the word, but there is commonly involved in this quasi-personal\nconception of Nature a notable imputation of kindliness and gentle\nsolicitude that well comports with her putative womanhood. By\nextraordinarily easy gradation _Natura naturans_ passes over into\nMother Nature. The contrast in this respect, simply on its sentimental\nside, between the conception of Nature, say in the eighteenth century,\non the one hand, and the patriarchal Heavenly King, remote and austere,\nof the Medi\u00e6val cult on the other hand is striking enough. In point of\nsentimental content this conception of Nature is more nearly in touch\nwith the medi\u00e6val Mother of God than with the Heavenly King.\n\n[130] This, of course, does not overlook the fact that in the course\nof scientific inquiry there has been an increasing use of statistical\nmethods and results, and that this recourse to statistics has been of\nan increasingly objective character, both in its methods and in the\nitems handled. It is also to be noted that from time to time serious\nand consequential attempts have been made to reduce scientific argument\nat large to similarly objective terms of quantity, quantivalence and\nconcomitance. Karl Pearson\u2019s _Grammar of Science_, for instance is a\nshrewd and somewhat popularly known endeavour of this kind. So, again,\nthe philosophical views associated with the names of Leibnitz and of\nBerkely are of this nature, and there is not a little of the same line\nof scepticism in the speculations of Hume. But it is equally to be\nnoted that except on the remote plane of generality that belongs to\nphilosophical speculation, and except in the works of pure mathematics,\nthis method of handling facts has not proved available for scientific\nends. The \u201cidle curiosity\u201d which finds employment in scientific inquiry\nis not content with the vacant relation of concomitance alone among the\nfacts which it seeks and systematises. In scientific theory no headway\nhas been made hitherto without the use of this indispensable imputation\nof causality.--In this connection cf. a paper on \u201cThe Evolution of\nthe Scientific Point of View,\u201d _University of California Chronicle_,\nNovember, 1908, especially footnote, p. 396.\n\n[131] In this connection it is worth noting, for what it may be worth,\nthat there is a similarly rough concomitance between the diffusion of\nthe blond racial stock in Europe and the modern forms of protestantism\nand religious heresy. Whether this fact strengthens or weakens any\nargument that may be drawn from the concomitance of heresy and industry\ncited above may perhaps best be left an open question.\n\n[132] See chapter v, above.\n\n[133] Cf. Ashley, _English Economic History and Theory_, bk. i, ch. i;\nKarl B\u00fccher, _Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft_, ch. iii.\n\n[134] Cf. R. Ehrenberg, _Das Zeitalter der Fugger_.\n\n[135] Seen, as indicated above, in the matter-of-course resort of\nthe scientists to the conception of efficient cause as a solvent of\nproblems touching material phenomena, as well as in the theologians\u2019\nand philosophers\u2019 resistless drift toward creative efficiency as the\nultimate term of their speculations.\n\n[136] Cf. Locke, _Of Civil Government_, ch. v, \u201cThough the earth and\nall inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a\nproperty in his own person; this nobody has a right to but himself. The\nlabour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly\nhis. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath\nprovided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to\nit something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.\u201d\n\n[137] Illustrative instances of such a customary code of \u201cnatural\u201d\nrights and obligations are numerous in the late literature of\nethnology. Good illustrations are afforded by various papers in the\n_Reports of the Am. Bureau of Ethnology_, on the culture of the\nPueblos, Eskimo, and the Indians of the North-West Coast; so also\nin Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, or in\nSeligmann, _The Veddas_.\n\n[138] Cf., e.\u00a0g., C. Beard, _The Industrial Revolution_, ch. ii;\nSpencer Walpole, _History of England from 1815_, vol. i; C.\u00a0W. Taylor,\n_The Modern Factory System_, ch. i, ii.\n\n[139] In a general way, the relation in which the skilled workman in\nthe large industries stands to the machine process is analogous to that\nin which the primitive herdsman, shepherd or dairymaid stand to the\ndomestic animals under their care, rather than to the relation of the\ncraftsman to his tools. It is a work of attendance, furtherance and\nskilled interference rather than a forceful and dexterous use of an\nimplement.\n\n[140] It follows also, among other secondary consequences, that the\neffective industrial life of the skilled workman will, in order to the\nbest average effect, begin at an appreciably more advanced age, and\nwill therefore be shortened by that much. The period of preparation\nbecomes more protracted, more exacting and more costly, and the\neffective life cycle of the workman grows shorter. Although it does\nnot, perhaps, belong in precisely this connection, it may not be out\nof place to recall that the increasingly exacting requirements of\nthe machine industry, particularly in the way of accurate, alert and\nfacile conformity to the requirements of the machine process, interrupt\nthe industrial life of the skilled workman at an earlier point in\nthe course of senile decay. So that the industrial life-cycle of the\nworkman is shortened both at its beginning and at its close, at the\nsame time that the commonplace preparation for work grows more costly\nand exacting.\n\nChild labour, which once may, industrially speaking, have been an\neconomical method of consuming the available human material, is no\nlonger compatible with the highest industrial efficiency, even apart\nfrom any question of hardship or deterioration incident to an excessive\nor abusive recourse to child labour; it is incompatible with the\ncommunity\u2019s material interests. Therefore the business community--the\nbody of businessmen at large--for whose behoof the industries of the\ncountry are carried on, have a direct interest not only in extending\nthe age of exemption from industrial employment but also in procuring\nan adequate schooling of the incoming generation of workmen. The\nbusiness community is evidently coming to appreciate this state of the\ncase, at least in some degree, as is evidenced by their inclination to\nfavour instruction in the \u201cpractical\u201d branches in the public schools,\nat the public expense, as well as by the wide-reaching movement that\naims to equip private and state schools that shall prepare the youth\nfor work in the various lines of industrial employment.\n\n[141] _Cf._, _e.\u00a0g._, Adam Smith\u2019s reflections on the uses of an\naccurate watch, _Theory of the Moral Sentiments_, part iv, ch. 2.\n\n[142] On the other hand the aphorism often cited, that \u201cNecessity\nis the Mother of Invention,\u201d appears to be nothing better than a\nfragment of uncritical rationalism. It offers a rationalised, _ex\npost facto_ account of changes that take place, and reflects that\nancient preconception by help of which the spokesmen of edification\nwere enabled to interpret all change as an improvement due to the\nachievement of some definitely foreknown end. It appears also to be\nconsistently untrue, except so far as \u201cinvention\u201d is to be taken as a\neuphemistic synonym for \u201cprevarication.\u201d Doubtless, the felt need of\nways and means has brought on many changes in technology, but doubtless\nalso the ulterior consequences of any one of the greater mechanical\ninventions have in the main been neither foreseen nor intended in the\ndesigning of them. The more serious consequences, especially such as\nhave an institutional bearing, have been enforced by the inventions\nrather than designed by the inventors.\n\n[143] See pp. 18\u201321, above.\n\n[144] Cf., however, what has been said above (pp. 21\u201323) of the\nvariability and adaptability of a hybrid population and the possible\nselective establishment of a hybrid type more suitable to current\nconditions of life than any one of the racial stocks out of which the\nhybrid population is made up.\n\n[145] So, _e.\u00a0g._, the modern technology has, directly and indirectly,\nbrought on the growth of large cities and industrial towns, as well as\nan increasing density of population at large. This modern state of the\nindustrial arts is a creation of the European community of nations,\nwith the blond-hybrid populations leading. The population of these\ncountries is drifting into these machine-made cities and towns, and\nthis drift affects the blond-hybrids in a more pronounced degree than\nany other similarly distinguishable element in the population. At the\nsame time the birth-rate is lower and the death-rate higher in these\nmodern urban communities than in the open country, in spite of the fact\nthat more attention is given to preventive sanitation in the urban\nthan in the rural communities, and it is in the urban communities that\nmedical attendance is most available at the same time that its most\nefficient practitioners congregate there. This accelerated death-rate\nstrikes the blond-hybrids of the towns in an eminent degree; and\ninfant mortality in the towns, particularly, runs at such a figure as\nto be viewed with the liveliest apprehension. In its summary effects\non the viability of the modern peoples this modern technology appears\nto be as untoward as would their removal to an unsuitable climate.\nIndeed the hygienic measures that are taken or advocated as a remedy\nfor these machine-made conditions of urban life are of much the same\ncharacter and require much the same degree of meticulous attention\nto details that are required to preserve the life of Europeans under\nthe precarious climatic conditions of the low latitudes. So that, for\nthese Europeans at least, the hygienic situation created by their own\ntechnology has much of that character of a comprehensive clinic that\nattaches to the British occupation of India or the later European\noccupation of West Africa or the Philippines.\n\n[146] The statisticians of a hundred years ago, _e.\u00a0g._, were content\nto work in round percentages where their latterday successors are\ndoubtfully content with three-place decimals.\n\n[147] An eminently illustrative instance of the mechanistic bias in the\nmoral sciences is afforded by the hedonistic conceptions of the early\nnineteenth century; and the deistic theology of that period and earlier\nis no less characteristic a symptom of the same animus.\n\n_Cf._ also, for a view running to a conclusion opposed to that spoken\nfor above, H. Bergson, _Creative Evolution_ (translation by Arthur\nMitchell, New York, 1911), ch. i, especially pp. 16\u201323; where the\nmechanistic conception is construed as an instinctive metaphysical norm\nand contrasted with the deliverances of reason and experience, which\nare then held to inculcate an anthropomorphic interpretation of the\nsame facts.\n\n[148] \u201cPragmatism\u201d is the term that has been elected to cover this\nmetaphysical postulate of efficiency conceived as the bench mark of\nactuality.\n\n[149] Of all these latterday revulsionary schemes of surcease from the\nvoid and irritation of the mechanistic conception, that spoken for\nby M.\u00a0H. Bergson is doubtless the most felicitous, at the same time\nthat it is, in its elements, the most engagingly na\u00efve. Apart from,\nand without prejudice to, the (doubtless very substantial) merits of\nthis system of speculative tenets, the vogue which it has achieved\nappears to be due in good part to its consonance with this archaic\nbent of civilised human nature, already spoken of. The immanent, or\nrather intrinsically dominant, creative bent inherent in matter and not\nobjectively distinguishable from it, is sufficiently suggestive of that\npraeter-mechanical efficacy that seems so easy of comprehension to many\nof the peoples on the lower levels of culture, and that affords the\nsubstantial ground of magical practices and finds untroubled expression\nin the more na\u00efve of their theoretical speculations. It would be a\nwork of extreme difficulty, e.\u00a0g., to set up a consistently tenable\ndistinction between M. Bergson\u2019s _\u00e9lan de la vie_, on the one hand, and\nthe _mana_ of the Melanesians (_Cf._ Codrington, _The Melanesians_,\nesp. ch. vii and xii), the _wakonda_ of the Sioux (_Cf._ A.\u00a0C. Fletcher\nand F. la Flesche, \u201cThe Omaha Tribe,\u201d _Bureau of Ethnology, Report\nxxvii_ (1905\u20131906), esp. pp. 597\u2013599), or even the _hamingia_ of\nScandinavian paganism, on the other hand.\n\nIn fact, the point of departure and support for M. Bergson\u2019s\nspeculations appears to be nothing else than a projection, into\nobjective reality, of the same human trait that has here been spoken of\nas the instinct of workmanship; this norm of initiative and efficiency\nwhich so is imposed on objective facts being then worked out with great\nsubtlety and sympathetic insight, to make a comprehensive, cosmological\nscheme. The like projection of workmanlike initiative and efficiency,\nand its imputation to objective reality, both at large--as with M.\nBergson--and in concrete detail, with more or less of personalisation,\nis one of the main, though frequently misunderstood, factors in the\ncosmologies that do duty as a body of science and philosophy among\nsavages and the lower barbarians.\n\nThat the roots of this speculative scheme of \u201ccreative evolution\u201d\nshould reach so far into the background of human culture and draw on\nsources so close to the undisciplined prime-movers of human nature is,\nof course, in no degree derogatory to this system of theory; nor does\nit raise any presumption of unsoundness in the tenets that so are, in\nthe course of elaboration, built up out of this metaphysical postulate.\nIn point of fact, the characterisation here offered places M. Bergson\u2019s\nthesis, and therefore his system, precisely where he has been at pains\nto explain that he wishes to take his initial position in advocating\nhis view,--at an even break with the mechanistic conception; the merits\nof which, as contrasted with his own thesis, will then be made to\nappear in the course of the further argument that is to decide between\ntheir rival claims to primacy. In point of formal and provisional\nlegitimation, such an imputation of workmanlike efficacy at large rests\non ground precisely even with that on which the mechanistic conception\nalso rests,--viz. imputation by force of metaphysical necessity, that\nis to say by force of an instinctive impulse. The main theorem of\ncausation, as well as its several mechanistic corollaries, are, in the\nlast resort, putative traits of matter only, not facts of observation;\nand the like is true--in M. Bergson\u2019s argument admittedly so--of the\n_\u00e9lan de la vie_ as well. So far, therefore, as regards the formally\ndeterminable antecedent probability of the two rival conceptions, the\none is as good as the other; but M. Bergson\u2019s argument, running on\nground of circumstantial evidence in the main, makes out at least a\ncogently attractive likelihood that the conception for which he speaks\nis to be accepted as the more fundamental, underlying the mechanistic\nconception, conditioning it and on occasion overruling its findings in\nmatters that lie beyond its ascertained competence. Which would come,\nin a different phrasing, to saying that the imputation of creatively\nworkmanlike efficiency rests on instinctive ground more indefeasibly\nintrinsic to human nature; presumably in virtue of its embodying\nthe functioning of an instinctive proclivity less sophisticated and\nnarrowed by special habituation, such special habituation, e.\u00a0g., as\nthat exercised by the technology of handicraft and the machine process\nin recent times.\n\n[150] All this, of course, neither ignores nor denies the substantial\npart which the _jus gentium_ and the _jus naturale_ of the Roman\njurists and their commentators have played in the formulation of the\nsystem of Natural Rights. In point of pedigree the line of derivation\nof these legal principles is doubtless substantially as set forth\nauthentically by the jurists who have spent their competent endeavors\non that matter. So far as regards the English-speaking communities this\npedigree runs back to Locke, and through Locke to the line of jurists\nand philosophers on whom that great scholar has drawn; while for the\npromulgation of the like system of principles more at large the names\nof Grotius, Pufendorf, Althusius doubtless have all the significance\ncommonly assigned them. See pp. 290\u2013293 above.\n\n[151] Unless the \u201cSyndicalist\u201d movement is to be taken as something\nsufficiently definite in its principles to make it an exception to the\nrule.\n\n[152] Cf., e.\u00a0g., Anna Youngman, _The Economic Causes of Great\nFortunes_, especially ch. vi; R. Ehrenburg, _Grosse Verm\u00f6gen_; Ida\nTarbell, _History of the Standard Oil Company_.\n\n[153] Cf. a paper \u201cOn the Nature of Capital\u201d in the _Quarterly Journal\nof Economics_, November, 1908.\n\n[154] As late as Adam Smith\u2019s time \u201cmanufacturer\u201d still retained its\netymological value and designated the workman who made the goods. But\nfrom about that time, that is to say since the machine process and the\nbusiness control of industry have thoroughly taken effect, the term no\nlonger has a technological connotation but has taken on a pecuniary\n(business) signification wholly; so that the term now designates\na businessman who stands in none but a pecuniary relation to the\nprocesses of industry.\n\n\n\n\nThe following pages contain advertisements of books by the same author\nor on kindred subjects\n\n\n\n\nBy the Same Author\n\n\n_The Theory of the Leisure Class_\n\nAn Economic Study of Institutions\n\n                                                _Cloth, 12mo, $2.00 net_\n                         _Macmillan Standard Library Edition, $0.50 net_\n\n\nEXTRACT FROM PREFACE\n\nIt is the purpose of this inquiry to discuss the place and value of\nthe leisure class as an economic factor in modern life, but it has\nbeen found impracticable to confine the discussion strictly within the\nlimits so marked out. Some attention is perforce given to the origin\nand the line of derivation of the institution, as well as to features\nof social life that are not commonly classed as economic.\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n  Chapter    I. Introduction.\n  Chapter   II. Pecuniary Emulation.\n  Chapter  III. Conspicuous Leisure.\n  Chapter   IV. Conspicuous Consumption.\n  Chapter    V. The Pecuniary Standard of Living.\n  Chapter   VI. Pecuniary Canons of Taste.\n  Chapter  VII. Dress as an Expression of the Pecuniary Culture.\n  Chapter VIII. Industrial Exemption and Conservation.\n  Chapter   IX. The Conservation of Archaic Traits.\n  Chapter    X. Modern Survivals of Prowess.\n  Chapter   XI. The Belief in Luck.\n  Chapter  XII. Devout Observances.\n  Chapter XIII. Survivals of the Non-Invidious Interest.\n  Chapter  XIV. The Higher Learning as an Expression of the Pecuniary\n                  Culture.\n\n    \u201cThe study is a thoughtful and interesting one and is couched\n    in clear and straightforward English.\u201d--_Minneapolis Journal._\n\n\n                              PUBLISHED BY\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n           Publishers      64\u201366 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n\n\n\nTwo New Books of Related Interest\n\n\n_Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation_\n\nBY J.\u00a0A. HOBSON, M.A.,\n\nAuthor of \u201cIndustrial Society,\u201d \u201cJohn Ruskin, Social Reformer,\u201d etc.\n\n                                                 _Cloth, 8vo, $2.00 net_\n\n    Mr. Hobson is an economist of established reputation\n    whose writings have for years been eagerly read by his\n    fellow-economists. The purpose of this, his latest work, is\n    to present a just and formal exposure of the inhumanity and\n    vital waste of modern industries by the close application of\n    the best approved formulas of individual, and social welfare\n    and to indicate the most hopeful measures of remedy for a\n    society sufficiently intelligent, courageous and self-governing\n    to apply them. The wholly satisfying fashion in which the\n    author has achieved this purpose results in a suggestive and\n    stimulating review from a novel standpoint of problems in which\n    all students of economy are interested. Not only is the book\n    an important contribution to the literature of its field; it\n    is no less valuable in its bearing on general questions of the\n    day with which other than purely professional economists are\n    concerned.\n\n\n_Violence and the Labor Movement_\n\nBY ROBERT HUNTER,\n\nAuthor of \u201cPoverty,\u201d \u201cSocialists at Work,\u201d etc.\n\n                                                _Cloth, 12mo, $1.50 net_\n\n    This book deals with the mighty conflict that raged throughout\n    the latter part of the last century for possession of the soul\n    of labor. It tells of the doctrines and deeds of Bakounin,\n    Netchayeff, Kropotkin, Ravachol, Henry, Most and Caserio.\n    It seeks the causes of such outbursts of rage as occurred\n    at the Haymarket in Chicago in 1886 and are now being much\n    discussed as Syndicalism, Haywoodism and Larkinism. It is a\n    dramatic, historical narrative in which terrorism, anarchism,\n    syndicalism and socialism are passionately voiced by their\n    greatest advocates as they battle over programs, tactics and\n    philosophies.\n\n\n                              PUBLISHED BY\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n           Publishers      64\u201366 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n\n\n\nTwo Important Interpretations of Present Movements\n\n\n_Progressive Democracy_\n\nBY HERBERT CROLY,\n\nAuthor of \u201cThe Promise of American Life.\u201d\n\n                                                 _Cloth, 8vo, $2.00 net_\n\n    The object of the author in this book is three-fold. He has\n    in the first place analyzed the modern progressive democratic\n    movement in this country in order to separate its essential\n    from its non-essential ingredients to discover whether there\n    is any real issue between American progressivism and American\n    conservatism. In the second place he has tried to reconstruct\n    the historical background of progressivism to see what roots\n    or lack of roots it has in the American political and economic\n    tradition. And finally he has attempted to trace what we may\n    reasonably expect from the progressive movement, to show what\n    tools it must use in order to carry out its program and what\n    claims it has on the support of patriotic Americans. The work\n    seeks, therefore, to express for the first time a consistently\n    educational theory of democracy.\n\n\n_Progressivism and After_\n\nBY WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING,\n\nAuthor of \u201cThe Larger Aspects of Socialism,\u201d \u201cSocialism As It Is,\u201d etc.\n\n                                                _Cloth, 12mo, $1.50 net_\n\n    This is a book which every thoughtful socialist, social\n    reformer and those to whom social reform makes any appeal,\n    ought to read. Mr. Walling views social and economic questions\n    as a thinker and student, never merely as a theorist or\n    partisan. In the political events of the last few years\n    Mr. Walling sees much that is significant not only for the\n    present but for the future. What the progress of affairs in\n    the next generation is to be he outlines in this work in\n    a fashion that is as convincing as it is unusual from the\n    socialistic standpoint. Of particular interest are his analyses\n    of President Wilson, Colonel Roosevelt and other prominent\n    leaders, while his description of that which has been and that\n    which is to come is trenchant and keen. Whether one agrees with\n    his predictions or not the force and clearness with which the\n    issues are indicated distinguish the volume for all kinds of\n    readers.\n\n\n                              PUBLISHED BY\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n           Publishers      64\u201366 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n\n_American Syndicalism--The I.\u00a0W.\u00a0W._\n\nBY JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS\n\nAuthor of \u201cAs Others See Us,\u201d \u201cThe Social Unrest,\u201d etc.\n\n                                     _Cloth, $1.25 net; postpaid, $1.36_\n\n    \u201cMr. Brooks\u2019s book is a careful, sympathetic, and critical\n    study of American syndicalism as represented in the order named\n    the Industrial Workers of World.\n\n    \u201cThe theory, or \u2018philosophy,\u2019 of this syndicalism is given, a\n    review made of the practical experiences of the movement as it\n    has expressed itself here in the last few years, and a view\n    sought of its possible destinies in the United States. Mr.\n    Brooks says:\n\n    \u201c\u2018In it and through it is something as sacred as the best of\n    the great dreamers have ever brought us. In the total of this\n    movement, the deeper, inner fact seems to be its nearness to\n    and sympathy with that most heavy laden and long enduring mass\n    of common toilers. Alike to our peril and to our loss shall we\n    ignore this fact.\u2019\u201d--_New York Tribune._\n\n\n_The Social Unrest_\n\nStudies in Labor and Social Movements\n\nBY JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS\n\n                                     _Cloth, 12mo, 394 pages, $1.50 net_\n\n    \u201cThe author, Mr. John Graham Brooks, takes up and discusses\n    through nearly four hundred pages the economic significance\n    of the social questions of the hour, the master passions at\n    work among us, men _versus_ machinery, and the solution of our\n    present ills in a better concurrence than at present exists--an\n    organization whereby every advantage of cheaper service and\n    cheaper product shall go direct to the whole body of the\n    people.... Nothing upon his subject so comprehensive and at the\n    same time popular in treatment as this book has been issued\n    in our country. It is a volume with live knowledge--not only\n    for workman but for capitalist, and the student of the body\n    politic--for every one who lives--and who does not?--upon the\n    product of labor.\u201d--_The Outlook._\n\n    Mr. Bliss Perry, the editor of _The Atlantic Monthly_, says\n    of it: \u201cA fascinating book--to me the clearest, sanest, most\n    helpful discussion of economic and human problems I have read\n    for years.\u201d\n\n\n                              PUBLISHED BY\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n           Publishers      64\u201366 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n\n\n\nBy WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING\n\n\n_The Larger Aspects of Socialism_\n\n                                     _Cloth, $1.50 net; postpaid, $1.63_\n\n    \u201cFor the second time William English Walling has made a notable\n    contribution to the literature of Socialism.\u201d--_Mary Brown\n    Sumner in The Survey._\n\n    \u201cYour two books, together and separately, constituted the\n    supreme English contribution to Socialism.\u201d--_Professor George\n    D. Herron._\n\n    \u201cThis book is exceptionally suggestive and interesting....\n    It is to be hoped that Mr. Walling will continue to give\n    us such careful and suggestive analyses of socialistic\n    thought.\u201d--_Alexander Fleisher in The Annals of the American\n    Academy._\n\n    \u201cThe author has earned a right to a front-rank place among\n    the American Socialist \u2018intellectuals.\u2019... A clear-sighted\n    observer, and a reporter honest with himself and the\n    public.\u201d--_The Nation._\n\n    \u201cYou are certainly one of those exasperating men who must\n    be counted with. I have gone over your first book with\n    admiration and extreme disapprobation. There is no book with\n    which I have any acquaintance which is so truthful in telling\n    what a considerable body of our countrymen are thinking\n    about.\u201d--_Professor Albert Bushnell Hart._\n\n\n_Socialism As It Is_\n\nA Survey of the World-Wide Revolutionary Movement\n\n                               _Cloth, 12mo, $2.00 net; postpaid, $2.12_\n\nA NEW DEPARTURE IN SOCIALIST BOOKS\n\n    \u201cCan be most highly recommended as a sane and clear exposition\n    and is not a rehash of the various volumes that have been\n    already published on the subject, but is a contribution from a\n    distinct and new point of view.\u201d--_The New York Times._\n\n    \u201cThe best and most scholarly presentation of the subject that\n    has yet fallen into my hands. It gave me an insight into the\n    situation, for which I longed but to which I could not find any\n    access.\u201d--_Professor Jacques Loeb._\n\n    \u201cYou certainly give a wonderful insight into Socialism as it\n    is and getting to be--and it is an insight that every citizen\n    ought to have.\u201d--_Professor John R. Commons._\n\n    \u201cI have been reading your book with great interest. The great\n    contribution, it seems to me, is the clear contrast between\n    State Socialism and revolutionary socialism.\u201d--_Professor Simon\n    N. Patten._\n\n\n                              PUBLISHED BY\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n           Publishers      64\u201366 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n\n_The Theory of Social Revolutions_\n\nBY BROOKS ADAMS\n\nAuthor of \u201cThe Law of Civilization and Decay,\u201d \u201cThe New Empire,\u201d etc.\n\n                                                _Cloth, 12mo, $1.25 net_\n\n    \u201cA remarkable work.\u201d--_The Argonaut._\n\n    \u201cA cleverly written book by a clever man. The argument is that\n    the existing social system will soon be changed and that the\n    courts have become political and not judicial.\u201d--_Pittsburgh\n    Post._\n\n    \u201cNo one interested in either history or politics can afford to\n    neglect Mr. Adams\u2019 views.\u201d--_Newark Evening News._\n\n    \u201c... no more fascinating study of a topic so grave is often\n    printed.\u201d--_New York World._\n\n    \u201c... there has not appeared in recent years so calm and\n    determined an attack upon judicial legislation.\u201d--_La\n    Follette\u2019s Magazine._\n\n    \u201cA very stimulating study.\u201d--_Review of Reviews._\n\n\n_Labor and Administration_\n\nBY JOHN R. COMMONS\n\nPROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN\n\n                                                _Cloth, 12mo, $1.60 net_\n\n    The history of labor laws and strikes has this in common to\n    both--laws become dead letters; the victories of strikes are\n    nibbled away. Some philosophers fall back on the individual\u2019s\n    moral character. Little, they think, can be done by law or\n    unions. There are others who inquire how to draft and enforce\n    the laws, how to keep the winnings of strikes--in short, how to\n    connect ideals with efficiency.\n\n    These are the awakening questions of the past decade, and the\n    subject of this book. Here is a field for the student and\n    economist--not the \u201cfriend of labor\u201d who paints an abstract\n    working-man, but the utilitarian idealist, who sees them all\n    as they are; not the curious collector of facts and statistics\n    but the one who measures the facts and builds them into a\n    foundation and structure. His constructive problem is not so\n    much the law and its abstract rights, as administration and its\n    concrete results.\n\n\n                              PUBLISHED BY\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n           Publishers      64\u201366 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Notes\n\n\nPunctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a\npredominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they\nwere not changed. Some apparent errors are noted below.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation\nmarks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left\nunbalanced.\n\nPage 72: \u201cgraneries\u201d was printed that way.\n\nPage 76: \u201cwatchward\u201d was printed that way.\n\nPage 158: \u201cseige\u201d was printed that way.\n\nPage 262: \u201cBerkely\u201d was printed that way; may be a reference to the\nIrish philosopher George \u201cBerkeley.\u201d\n\nFootnotes, originally at the bottoms of pages, have been collected,\nsequentially renumbered, and repositioned after the main text of the\nbook, just before the advertisements.","title":"The instinct of workmanship, and the state of industrial arts","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":104194}