{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_70091/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_70091","id":"gutenberg_70091","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/70091","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Descartes, Ren\u00e9, 1596-1650","First philosophy","God -- Proof, Ontological","Knowledge, Theory of","Metaphysics","Methodology"],"text":"SIX\n                               METAPHYSICAL\n                              _MEDITATIONS_;\n\n                           Wherein it is Proved\n                             That there is a\n                                   GOD.\n                          And that Mans MIND is\n                      really distinct from his BODY.\n\n                       Written Originally in Latin\n                         By _RENATUS DES-CARTES_.\n\n                    Hereunto are added the OBJECTIONS\n                      made against these Meditations\n\n                            By _THOMAS HOBBES_\n                             Of _Malmesbury_.\n\n                        With the AUTHORS Answers.\n\n                 All Faithfully Translated into ENGLISH,\n                         with a short Account of\n                           _Des-Cartes\u2019s Life_.\n\n                          By _WILLIAM MOLYNEUX_.\n\n             _London_, Printed by _B.G._ for _Benj. Tooke_ at\n               the _Ship_ in St. _Pauls_ Church-yard, 1680.\n\n\n\n\nSome Books sold by _John Lawrence_, at the _Angel_ in _Cornhill_, near\nthe _Royal Exchange_.\n\n\nA Collection of Letters for the improvement of Husbandry and Trade,\nintended to be continued Monthly, by _John Houghton_, fellow of the\n_Royal Society_, \u2019tis designed that every Letter shall be usefull to\nMankind, and by degrees for most persons of both Sexes.\n\nThe _Merchant Royal_, (a very pleasant Sermon) Preached before the King\nat _White-Hall_, upon the Nuptials of an Honourable Lord and his Lady, in\nQuarto, price 6_d._\n\n_Humane Prudence_, or the Art by which a man may raise himself and\nFortune to Granduer, by _A. B._, the second Edition, with the Addition of\na Table; in Twelves, price Bound, 1_s._\n\n\n\n\nTHE TRANSLATORS PREFACE.\n\nTO THE READERS.\n\n\n_Had honor or applause and not the publick advantage of English Readers\nbeen the design of this Undertaking, the consideration of the common Fate\nof Translations had discouraged Me from permitting this even to have seen\nthe light; for meer Versions do alwayes carry with them this Property,\nthat if not well done they may much disgrace, but if well, not much\ncommend the doers._\n\n_And certainly I might well have expected the same chance, had this\nbeen the Translation of an History, Play or Romance; wherein there is\nrequisite not onely a bare version but a conformation of Idiom and\nlanguage, manner and customary expression; But the nature of this\npresent Work will not admit of the like liberty, and therefore, I hope,\namongst Judicious Readers it may be exempt from the common Fate of\nTranslations; for if we look upon it as a Philosophical or Metaphysical\nTract, or rather as (really it is) a Physico-Mathematical Argumentation,\nwe shall find that a great strictness of Expression is requisite to be\nobserved therein. So that had a Translator taken upon him to use his own\nliberty of Phrase, he would thereby have endanger\u2019d the sense and force\nof the Arguments; for Politeness of language might as well be expected in\na Translation of ~Euclide~ as in this. And all that are acquainted with\nthis famous Authors design, do very well know, that it was his intention\nin these Meditations ~Mathematically to demonstrate~, that there is a\n~God~, and that mans ~mind~ is ~incorporeal~. And it was his opinion,\nthat metaphysicks may as clearly be demonstrated as mathematicks, as\nwitness his expression in the Dedicatory Epistle of this Work to the\n~Sorbone~ Doctors, ~Eas~ (Rationes scilicet) ~quibus hic utor certitudine\n& evidenti\u00e2 Geometricas \u00e6quare, vel etiam superare existimem~; That he\nreputed his Arguments used in these Meditations, to equal if not excell\nGeometrical certainty._\n\n_And this, I suppose, is sufficient to make the Reader, not expect herein\nany smoothness of phrase or quaintness of Expression; what is here\ndelivered in English is immediately taken, as it is naturally in the\nOriginal. The words, we hope, may be apposite enough, and fit to express\nwhat is here designed, and I think it a derogation from the Authors skill\nto draw the Picture of his mind in any other Colours, than what his own\nCopy expresses._\n\n_Thus far in vindication of the Philosophical plain stile and rough\nLanguage of the following Translation. I shall add a line or two, first\nrelating to the Readers, secondly of the Author, and lastly of the\nMeditations themselves, together with the Motives which excited me to\nthis Work._\n\n_As to the Readers, \u2019tis, I suppose, so evident that candour of mind,\nand freedome from prejudice is requisite to all that desire to advantage\nthemselves by reading other mens notions, that it need not be here\ninsisted on with much earnestness; yet considering the Antiquity of this\nsubject, and the novelty of the Arguments here produced, it seems to be\nmore than ordinarily requisite for an impartial perusal of the ensuing\nTract. Neither are the following Meditations to be slightly passed over,\nbut with diligence and attention to be read; for as in mathematical\ndemonstration, the careless missing of any one single Position may\nrender the Conclusion obscure and sometimes inconsequent, so in these\nmetaphysical Demonstrations, which (as, before has been noted from\nthe illustrious Author thereof) for certainty do equal, if not excel\nGeometrical Propositions, the slight attention to any one particular\nArgument may frustrate the design of the whole discourse._\n\n_The Reasoning therefore here being close and solid, and (as in\nMathematicks) the knowledge of the latter depending on the knowledge\nof what went before, \u2019tis the duty of every Reader seriously to attend\nthe Particulars, as also the connexion of the whole. Let him weigh the\nArguments and perpend the Conclusions, and after a clear and distinct\nKnowledge, lett him pass his judgement._\n\n_And to this end I shall make it my request to every Reader, that he\nwould not be content with a single perusal of the following Discourses,\nbut that he would often repeat his reading them over; for by this means\nthe force of those Arguments, which at first may by chance escape the\nmost diligent and attentive Peruser, by a second or third Essay may\noffer themselves more fully to his Consideration. This was the desire\nof our Author in an other of his pieces, I mean his ~Principles of\nPhilosophy~, which I am sure do not require so strict an attention of\nmind, as these abstracted speculations; and therefore if it were his\nRequest in that case, we may Reasonably think that \u2019twas no less his\ndesire in this._\n\n_When we come to speak of the Incomparable Author of these Meditations,\nwe have reason to lament our own Ignorance, and to blame the Ingratitude\nof the Age wherein he lived, for not transmitting to Posterity more\ncertain and ample Records of the Life and Conversation of this Excellent\nPhilosopher, all that has been Written in this kind gives us only so\nmuch light into the Life of this Prodigious Man, as may make us wish for\nmore; imparting which, I shall recommend the Readers to a further enquiry\ninto the inward Thoughts, (largly discover\u2019d in the Writings) of our\nFamous Author, of whose outward actions and condition we have so small\nknowledge._\n\n_Renatus Des-Cartes was born on the last day of ~March~ in the year 1596.\nat ~Tours~, or at ~Castrum Eraldum~ a Town near ~Tours~ in ~France~;\nHe came of an Antient and Noble Family, being by Descent ~Lord~ of\n~Perron~, His Father was a Senator of his Country, and a Man of no mean\nestate, leaving to this his only Son by a second Wife between six and\nseven thousand pounds a year._\n\n_He was Educated in his younger years according to the manner of his\nCountry (and as he himself recommends in one of his Epistles, ~viz.\nEpist. 90. partis secund\u00e6~ to One for the Instruction of his Son) in the\nAristotelian principles of Philosophy, a whole course whereof he had\nrun through at the Age of seventeen in the Schools of ~Flexia~, or ~La\nFlesche~ a Town in the Province of ~Anjou~, famous for the Colledge of\nJesuites there establish\u2019d by ~Henry~ the ~4th~._\n\n_But to this he did not Continue long devoted, giving early testimonies\nof his dislike to the unsatisfactory Notions, and verbose emptiness of\nthe Peripatetick Philosophy; He used therefore his utmost endeavours (as\nhe himself testifies in his ~Dissertatio de Methodo~) to get loose from\nthose Chains and Fetters of Mind to which the weakness of his tender\nyears had subjected him._\n\n_To this end he betook himself to a long course of Travel, that by the\nvariety of Objects, which he was likely to meet with in his journeys,\nthe memory of his past Notions might be blotted out; In his travel he\napplied himself much to the study of the Art Military, and Mathematicks;\nIn the latter he has left the World large testimonies of his Excellence\nin his ~Book of Geometry~; and in the former we have reason to believe\nhim most expert, for He was personally present at some Sieges and Battles\nboth in ~France~ and ~Germany~, as particularly at the Siege of ~Rochel~,\nof ~Gava~ near ~Genoa~, of ~Breda~, at the Battle of ~Prague~, ~&c.~ so\nthat we may conclude that he had a Genius fitted (according to the Motto\nof the noble ~Sir W. Raliegh~) ~Tam Marti, quam Mercurio~, For the Pike\nas well as Pen. And as the Glorious Roman Emperour became a ~C\u00e6sar~ by\nhis Book as well as Sword, by the Conquests of his mind as well as those\nof his arm; so our Famous Author was ~Ex Utroque Clarus~._\n\n_In his Travels he spent many years, in all which time he was not Idle,\nbut highly improved himself by his converse with the ~Beaux Esprits~,\nwhich he met with in several Regions he visited; The first Place he\nbetook himself to, was ~Italy~, then he went into ~Denmark, Germany,\nHungary, &c.~ And after a Long but advantagious Peregrination he\nreturn\u2019d to ~Amsterdam~, where he intended to take up his Rest, had he\nnot been called by the French King upon very Honourable terms to ~Paris~;\nDuring his Continuance there he so order\u2019d his annual Revenue, that he\nmight be supplied by the hands of a Friend wherever he was. He staid at\n~Paris~ three years, and then retired Himself to a solitary village in\n~Holland~ called ~Egmond~, where he lived twenty five years, during which\ntime he apply\u2019d himself wholly to the Restauration of true Philosophy,\nwherein he gave the World such mighty testimonies of his Excellence,\nthat in a short time he became celebrated in the mouths of all Learned\nMen. Neither were the Courts of Princes silent in his deserved Praises;\nfor after a Retirement of twenty five years he was Invited by ~Christina\nQueen of Sweedland~ to her Court; Thither upon the intreaty of this brave\nand Learned Princess he betook himself, where he had not continued Long\nbefore he was struck with a Peripneumonia or Inflammation of the Lungs\n(contracted, as it is thought by the long Discourses which he used to\nhold bare headed with the Queen, continuing them sometimes till far in\nthe Night,) of which unhappy distemper he Died the seventh Day after he\nsicken\u2019d._\n\n_Thus Expired this Wonder of his Own and succeeding Ages, desired and\nlamented by all men, \u00c6qual\u2019d by none. He was buried in a costly Monument\nconsisting of four sides, upon which were inscribed Epitaphs; bestow\u2019d\nupon him by many Renown\u2019d Persons._\n\n_What shall we now say sufficient to express our Grief for the untimely\nDecease of this Worthy Philosopher? But Especially what shall we now do\nto recover our Loss? Let us endeavour to Redeem what we have lost by well\nHusbanding and careful improvement of what is left; which may be done\nin Part by a Diligent Perusal of the Works written by this Excellent\nAuthor; This, This only is the way of Reviving him again, and of giving\nhim Immortality in spight of his untimely Fate. And so let him for ever\nlive celebrated by the Deserved Praises of all ingenious Enquirers after\ntruth, and Learning._\n\n_Let us therefore cast our eye upon the Present Work of this\nextroardinary Philosopher, and therein let us admire his profound\nJudgment and vigorous Fancy, for if we seriously consider it, we shall\nhardly find a more solid close piece of Reasoning either in this or\nForegoing ages; ~Here~, what was commonly asserted without proof, is not\nonly proved but ~Mathematically~ Demonstrated, ~viz.~ That ~God is the\nFountain and Original of Truth~; His sharp Wit, like ~Hannibals~ Vinegar,\nhath eaten thro the Mazing and overtowring hills of Errors, a Plain and\nPleasant Way to the Divine seat of Knowledge._\n\n_In fine, such is the Excellence of these six Meditations, that I cannot\nresemble his Performance herein better than to the Six Days Work of the\nSupream Architect; and certainly next to the Creation of All things out\nof Nothing, the Restauration of Truth out of Errors is the most Divine\nWork; so that (with Reverence be it spoken) the Incomparable ~Des-Cartes~\ndoes hereby deserve as it were the name of a Creatour. In the first\nMeditation we are Presented with a Rude and Indigested Chaos of Errours\nand Doubts, till the Divine spirit of the Noble ~Des-Cartes~ (pardon\nthe Boldness of the Expression) ~moves upon the confused face of these\nWaters~, and thereout produces some ~clear~ and ~distinct Light~; by\nwhich ~Sun-shine~ he proceeds to bring forth and cherish other ~Branches\nof Truth~; Till at last by a six Days Labour he Establishes this Fair\nFabrick (as I may call it) of the ~Intellectual World~ on foundations\nthat shall never be shaken. Then sitting down with rest and satisfaction\nhe looks upon this his Off-spring and Pronounces it ~Good~._\n\n_These Things Consider\u2019d, I need not make any long Apologies for my\nundertaking a translation thereof; The excellency of the Original is\nsufficient to vindicate my endeavours to present the English World with\na Copy, and he that shall blame my Intentions of Communicating the\nMethods of Truth to those that have only the English Tongue, may as well\nfind fault with those English that propagate the Christian Religion\namong savage Indians, and translate the Scriptures into their Language,\nbecause they have not the English Tongue. To understand Latin is no (or\nat most a very small) part of Learning, and that which certainly every\nCobler in ~Rome~ was once endow\u2019d with; and therefore must there then\nbe no translations out of Greek into Latin? I doubt not, but there are\nmany Persons in our Nations, who tho wanting Latin, are notwithstanding\nvery capable of the most abstracted speculations; the late disturbances\nof our Kingdomes occasion\u2019d many Youths, who were then in a fair way\nof Instruction, to forsake their learning, and divert their intentions\nfrom Literature to Arms, and yet many of these have afterwards become\nMen of extraordinary nary abilities and qualifications for learning\nnotwithstanding their deficiency in the Roman Tongue. And I see no Reason\nwhy it should not be the desire, and consequently the endeavour of\nevery true English man, to make his language as universal as is now the\n~French~, into which the best Books in all sorts of Learning, both Poetry\nand Prose, are daily translated out of all languages, but especially\nout of Greek and Latine. Among which these Meditations are to be found,\nentituled, ~Les Meditations Metaphysiques De Rene Des Cartes touchant\nla Premiere Philosophie~. This was translated out of the Authors Latine\ninto French by ~Monsieur le D. D. L. N. S.~ The several Objections also,\nwhich were made by divers learned Persons against these Meditations, with\nthe Authors Answers, were translated into French by ~M. B. L. R.~ And, I\nhope, no one will assert, that the French are more fit to receive those\nmetaphysical Notions delivered herein than the English Nation._\n\n_But \u2019twas none of the smallest motives I had to this undertaking, that\ntho some famous English Authours have taken notice of the Arguments here\nproduced (for the proof of a ~Deity~ drawn from the ~Idea~ we have of\n~God~ in our Mind, ~&c.~) Particularly the most excellent and learned\n~Dr. Stillingfleet~ in the first Chapter of the third Book in his\n~Origines Sacr\u00e6~, who refers his Readers to a further search into these\nMeditations in the ~400 page~ of that Discourse; as also the Reverend Dr.\n~Henry More~ in his ~Antidote against Atheism~, and more fully in his\n~Appendix~ annex\u2019d thereto, hath treated of our Authors demonstration;\nand yet nothing of the genuine original from whence they have borrowed\nall their Copies (tho some of them drawn in a larger size, yet I question\nwhether so expressive) nothing of our Authors proper management hath ever\nappear\u2019d in English. Those that assert these Arguments to have been long\nbefore thought upon by some of the Fathers, I shall refer to our Authors\njust vindication of himself in his several Answers to Objections made\nagainst these Discourses._\n\n_And here I shall dismiss the Reader detaining him no longer from\nthat satisfaction which he may reasonably expect from the perusal of\nthe following Meditations; this Translation is dedicated to no one in\nparticular, but is humbly submitted to the moderate censure of all candid\nReaders, by_\n\n                                                      Their humble servant\n                                                      Will. Molyneux.\n\n_Dublin Feb. 19. 1679/80._\n\n\n\n\nThe Contents.\n\n\n  Meditation 1. _Of Things Doubtful._                              Pag. 1.\n\n  Meditat. 2. _Of the Nature of Mans Mind, and that \u2019tis easier\n    Proved to Be then our Body._                                    p. 11.\n\n  Meditat. 3. _Of God, and that there Is a God._                    p. 27.\n\n  Meditat. 4. _Of Truth and Falshood._                              p. 55.\n\n  Meditat. 5. _Of the Essence of Things Material, and herein\n    again of God, and that He does Exist._                          p. 70.\n\n  Meditat. 6. _Of Corporeal Beings and their Existence, as also\n    of the Real Difference between Mind and Body._                  p. 83.\n\n  _Objections and Answers._                                        p. 155.\n\n\n\n\nERRATA.\n\n\nPag. 1. line 8. dele _off_. p. 3. l. 21. _there wants the sign\nof Interrogation_. p. 8. l. 10. r. _Premeditated_. ib. l. 14. r.\n_falshoods_. p. 18. l. 15. r. _that it may_. p. 20. l. 11. r. _suffers_.\n_In the two or three first chapters there are ~Astericks~ wanting_.\np. 33. l. 10. dele I. p. 39. l. 25. r. _formally_. p. 49. l. 14 r.\n_Duration_ and _Continuance_. p. 54. l. 2 _for the Point put a Comma_. p.\n61. l. ult. r. _I enquire_. p. 91. r. _in the margin_ _doubted_. p. 124.\nl. 6. r. _have no affinity_.\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Note: These errata have been corrected, along with some\nobvious typos. The spelling in this book is not only of its time, but\nalso wildly variable, and has been left well alone. Upright text within\n_italic_ passages is marked ~like this~.\n\n\n\n\nTHE\n\nMetaphysical Meditations\n\nOF\n\n_Renatus Des-Cartes_, &c.\n\n\n\n\nMEDITAT. I.\n\n_Of Things Doubtful._\n\n\nSome years past I perceived how many _Falsities_ I admitted as _Truths_\nin my Younger years, and how _Dubious_ those things were which I raised\nfrom thence; and therefore I thought it requisite (if I had a designe\nto establish any thing that should prove _firme_ and _permanent_ in\nsciences) that once in my life I should clearly cast aside all my former\nopinions, and begin a new from some _First principles_. But this seemed a\ngreat Task, and I still expected that maturity of years, then which none\ncould be more apt to receive Learning; upon which Account I waited so\nlong, that at last I should deservedly be blamed had I spent that time in\n_Deliberation_ which remain\u2019d only for _Action_.\n\nThis day therefore I conveniently released my mind from all cares, I\nprocured to my self a Time Quiet, and free from all Business, I retired\nmy self Alone; and now at length will I freely and seriously apply my\nself to the General overthrow of all my former Opinions.\n\nTo the Accomplishment of Which, it will not be necessary for me to prove\nthem all _false_ (for that perhaps I shall never atcheive) But because my\nreason perswades me, that I must withdraw my assent no less from those\nopinions which seem _not so very certain_ and _undoubted_, then I should\nfrom those that are _Apparently false_, it will be sufficient if I reject\nall those wherein I find any _Occasion_ of doubt.\n\nNeither to effect this is it necessary, that they all should be run\nover particularly (which would be an endles trouble) but because the\n_Foundation_ being once undermin\u2019d, whatever is built thereon will of\nits own accord come to the ground, I shall therefore immediately assault\nthe very _principle_, on which whatever I have believed was _grounded_.\nViz.\n\n_Whatever I have hitherto admitted as most true, that I received either\nfrom, or by my Senses; but these I have often found to deceive me, and\n\u2019tis prudence never certainly to trust those that I have (tho but once)\ndeceived us._\n\n1 _Doubt._ But tho sometimes the _senses_ deceive us being exercised\nabout _remote_ or _small_ objects, yet there are many other things of\nwhich we cannot doubt tho we know them only by the senses? as that at\npresent I am in this place, that I am sitting by a fire, that I have a\nWinter gown on me, that I feel this Paper with my hands; But how can it\nbe denied that these hands or this body is mine? Unless I should compare\nmy self to those mad men, whose brains are disturbed by such a disorderly\nmelancholick vapour, that makes them continually profess themselves to\nbe Kings, tho they are very poor, or fancy themselves cloathed in Purple\nRobes, tho they are naked, or that their heads are made of Clay as a\nbottle, or of glass, _&c._ But these are mad men, and I should be as mad\nas they in following their example by fancying these things as they do.\n\n1 _Solution._ This truly would seem very clear to those that never\n_sleep_, and suffer the same things (and sometimes more unlikely) in\ntheir repose, then these mad men do whilst they are awake; for how often\nam I perswaded in a Dream of these usual occurrences, that I am in this\nplace, that I have a Gown on me, that I am sitting by a fire, _&c._ Tho\nall the while I am lying naked between the Sheets.\n\nBut now I am certain that I am awake and look upon this Paper, neither\nis this head which I shake asleep, I knowingly and willingly stretch out\nthis hand, and am sensible that things so distinct could not happen to\none that sleeps. As if I could not remember my self to have been deceived\nformerly in my sleep by the like thoughts; which while I consider more\nattentively I am so far convinced of the difficulty of distinguishing\nsleep from waking that I am amazed, and this very amazement almost\nperswades me that I am asleep.\n\n2 _Doubt._ Wherefore let us suppose our selves _asleep_, and that these\nthings are not _true_, viz. that we open our eyes, move our heads,\nstretch our hands, and perhaps that we have no such things as hands or a\nbody. Yet we must confess, that what we see in a Dream is (as it were)\n_a painted Picture_, which cannot be devised but after the _likeness_ of\nsome _real_ thing; and that therefore these Generals at least, _viz._\neyes, head, hands, and the whole body are things _really existent_ and\nnot _imaginary_; For Painters themselves, (even then when they design\nMermaids and Satyrs in the most unusual shapes) do not give them natures\naltogether new, but only add the divers Parts of different Animals\ntogether; And if by chance they invent any thing so new that nothing\nwas ever seen like it, for that \u2019tis wholy fictitious and false, yet\nthe colours at least of which, they make it must be _true Colours_; so\nupon the same account, tho these General things as eyes, head, hands,\n_&c._ may be imaginary; yet nevertheless we must of necessity confess\nthe more _simple_ and _universal_ things to be _True_, of which (as of\ntrue Colours) these _Images_ of things (whether _true_ or _false_) which\nare in our minds are made; such as are the nature of a body in General,\nand its Extension, also the shape of things extended, with the quantity\nor bigness of them; their number also, and place wherein they are, the\ntime in which they continue, and the like, and therefore from hence we\nmake no bad conclusion, that _Physick_, both _Natural_, and _Medicinal_,\n_Astronomy_, and all other _sciences_, which depend on the consideration\nof _compound things_, are _Doubtful_. But that _Arithmetick_, _Geometry_,\nand the like (which treat only of the most _simple_, and _General_ things\nnot regarding whether they really are or not) have in them something\n_certain_ and _undoubted_; for whether I sleep or wake, _two_ and _three_\nadded make five; a _square_ has no more sides than _four_ _&c._ neither\nseems it possible what such _plain truths_ can be _doubted_ off.\n\n2 _Solution._ But all this While there is rooted in my mind a certain old\nopinion of the _being_ of an _Omnipotent God_, by whom I am _created_ in\nthe state I am in; and how know I but he caused that there should be no\nEarth, no Heaven, no Body, no Figure, no Magnitude, no Place, and yet\nthat all these things should seem to me to be as now they are? And as I\nvery often judge others to Erre about those things which they think they\n_Throughly understand_, so why may not I be _deceived_, whenever I add\n_two_ and _three_, or count the sides of a Square, or whatever other easy\nMatter can be thought of?\n\n3. _Doubt_. But perhaps _God wills not_ that I should be _deceived_, for\nhe is said to be _Infinitely Good_.\n\n3. _Solution._ Yet if it were _Repugnant_ to his _Goodness_ to create\nme so that I should be _always deceived_, it seems also _unagreeable_\nto his _Goodness_ to permit me to be deceived _at any time_; Which\nlast no one will affirme: Some there are truely who had rather deny\n_Gods Omnipotence_, then beleive all things _uncertain_; but there at\npresent we may not contradict. And we will suppose all this of _God_ to\nbe _false_; yet whether they will suppose me to become what _I_ am by\nFate, by _Chance_, by a _continued chain_ of _causes_, or any other way,\nbecause to _erre_ is an _Imperfection_, by how much the less _power_ they\nwill Assigne to the _Author_ of my _Being_, so much the more Probable it\nwill be, that I am so _Imperfect_ as to be _alwayes deceived_.\n\nTo which Arguments I know not what to answer but am forced to confess,\nthat there is nothing of all those things which I formerly received as\n_Truths_, whereof at present I may not _doubt_; and this doubt shall not\nbe grounded on inadvertency or Levity, but upon strong and Premeditated\nreasons; and therefore I must hereafter (if I designe to discover\nany truths) withdraw my assent from them no less then from _apparent\nfalshoods_.\n\nBut \u2019tis not sufficient to think only _Transiently_ on these things, but\nI must take care to _remember_ them; for dayly my old opinions returne\nupon me, and much against my Will almost possesse my Beleife tyed to\nthem, as it were by a continued _use_ and _Right_ of _Familiarity_;\nneither shall I ever cease to _assent_ and _trust_ in them, whilst I\nsuppose them as in themselves they really are, that is to say, _something\ndoubtful_ (as now I have proved) yet notwithstanding _highly Probable_,\nwhich it is much more Reasonable to beleive then disbeleive.\n\nWherefore I conceive I should not do amiss, if (with my mind bent clearly\nto the contrary side) I should deceive my self, and suppose them for a\nWhile altogether _false_ and _Imaginary_; till at length the Weights of\nprejudice being equal in each scale, no ill custome may any more Draw my\nJudgement from the _true Conception_ of things, for I know from hence\nwill follow no dangerous Error, and I can\u2019t too immoderately pamper my\nown Incredulity, seeing What I am about, concernes not _Practice_ but\n_Speculation_.\n\nTo Which end I will suppose, not an _Infinitely perfect God_, the\n_Fountain_ of _truth_, but that some _Evil Spirit_ which is very\n_Powerful_ and _crafty_ has used all his endeavours to _deceive_ me; I\nwill conceive, the Heavens, Air, Earth, Colours, Figures, Sounds, and all\noutward things are nothing else but the delusions of Dreams, by which he\nhas laid snares to catch my easy beleif; I will consider my self as not\nhaving hands, Eyes, Flesh, Blood, or Sences, but that _I_ falsely think\nthat _I_ have all these; _I_ will continue firmly in this Meditation; and\ntho it lyes not in my power to _discover any truth_, yet this is in my\npower, not to _assent to Falsities_, and with a strong resolution take\ncare that the _Mighty deceiver_ (tho never so _powerful_ or _cunning_)\nimpose not any thing on my beleife.\n\nBut this is a laborious intention, and a certain sloth reduces me to\nthe usual course of life, and like a Prisoner who in his sleep perhaps\nenjoy\u2019d an imaginary liberty, and when he begins to suppose that he\nis asleep is afraid to waken, but is willing to be deceived by the\n_Pleasant delusion_; so I willingly fall into my opinions, and am afraid\nto be Roused, least a toilsome waking succeeding a pleasant rest I may\nhereafter live not in the _light_, but in the confused _darkness_ of the\n_doubts_ now raised.\n\n\n\n\nMEDITAT. II.\n\n_~Of the nature of Mans mind~, and that \u2019tis easier proved to ~be~ then\nour ~body~._\n\n\nBy yesterdays Meditation I am cast into so great _Doubts_, that I shall\nnever forget them, and yet I know not how to answer them, but being\nplunged on a suddain into a deep Gulf, I am so amazed that I can neither\ntouch the bottome, nor swim at the top.\n\nNevertheless, I will endeavour once more, and try the way I set on\nyesterday, by removing from me whatever is in the _least doubtful_, as if\nI had certainly discover\u2019d it to be _altogether false_, and will proceed\ntill I find out some _certainty_, or if nothing else, yet at least this\n_certainty, That there is nothing sure_.\n\n_Archimedes_ required but a _point_ which was _firm_, and _immoveable_\nthat he might move the _whole Earth_, so in the perfect undertaking Great\nthings may be expected, if I can discover but the _least thing_ that is\n_true_ and _indisputable_.\n\nWherefore I suppose all things I see are _false_, and believe that\nnothing of those things are really existent, which my deceitful memory\nrepresents to me; \u2019tis evident I have no senses, that a Body, Figure,\nExtension, Motion, Place, _&c._ are meer Fictions; what thing therefore\nis there that is _true_? perhaps only _this, That there is nothing\ncertain._\n\n[Sidenote: _Doubts and Solutions._]\n\nBut how know I that there is nothing _distinct_ from all these things\n(which I have now reckon\u2019d) of which I have no reason to _doubt_? Is\nthere no _God_ (or whatever other name I may call him) who has put these\nthoughts into me? Yet why should I think this? When I my self perhaps\nam the _Author_ of them. Upon which Account, therefore must not I be\nsomething? \u2019tis but just now that I denied that I had any _senses_, or\nany _Body_. Hold a while\u2014Am I so tied to a _Body_ and _senses_ that I\ncannot _exist_ without them? But I have perswaded my self that there is\nnothing in the World, no Heaven, no Earth, no Souls, no Bodies; and then\nwhy not, that I _my self am not_? Yet surely if _I_ could perswade my\nself any thing, _I was_.\n\nBut there is _I_ know not what sort of _Deceivour_ very _powerful_\nand very _crafty_, who always strives to _deceive_ Me; without Doubt\ntherefore _I am_, if he can _decieve me_; And let him _Deceive_ me as\nmuch as he can, yet he can never make me _not to Be_, whilst _I think\nthat I am_. Wherefore _I_ may lay this down as a _Principle, that\nwhenever this sentence I am, I exist, is spoken or thought of by Me, \u2019tis\nnecessarily True_.\n\nBut _I_ do not yet fully understand _who I am_ that now necessarily\n_exist_, and _I_ must hereafter take care, least _I_ foolishly _mistake_\nsome other thing _for my self_, and by that means be _deceived_ in that\nthought, which _I_ defend as the most _certain_ and _evident_ of all.\n\nWherefore _I_ will again Recollect, what _I_ believed _my self to be_\nheretofore, before _I_ had set upon these Meditations, from which _Notion\nI_ will withdraw whatever may be _Disproved_ by the _Foremention\u2019d\nReasons_, that in the End, _That_ only may Remain which is _True_ and\n_indisputable_.\n\nWhat therefore have I heretofore thought my self? _A Man._ But what is a\nman? Shall I answer, a _Rational Animal_? By no means; because afterwards\nit may be asked, what an _Animal_ is? and what _Rational_ is? And so from\none _question_ I may fall into greater _Difficulties_; neither at present\nhave I so much time as to spend it about such Niceties.\n\nBut I shall rather here Consider, what heretofore represented it self\nto my thoughts _freely_, and _naturally_, whenever I set my self to\nunderstand _What I my self was_.\n\nAnd the first thing I find Representing it self is, that I have _Face_,\n_Hands_, _Arms_, and this whole _frame_ of _parts_ which is seen in my\n_Body_, and which I call my _Body_.\n\nThe next thing represented to me was, that I was _nourish\u2019d_, could\n_walk_, had _senses_, and could _Think_; which functions I attributed to\nmy _Soul_. Yet what this _soul_ of mine was, I did not fully conceive; or\nelse supposed it a small thing like _wind_, or _fire_, or _aire_, infused\nthrough my _stronger parts_.\n\nAs to my _Body_ truly _I_ doubted not, but that _I_ rightly understood\nits _Nature_, which (if _I_ should endeavour to describe as _I_ conceive\nit) _I_ should thus Explain, _viz._ By a _Body_ _I_ mean whatever is\n_capable_ of _Shape_, or can be _contained_ in a _place_, and so fill\u2019s\na space that it excludes all other _Bodys_ out of the same, that which\nmay be _touch\u2019d_, _seen_, _heard_, _tasted_, or _smelt_, and that which\nis _capable_ of _various_ _Motions_ and _Modifications_, not from it\n_self_, but from any _other thing moving_ it, for _I_ judged it _against_\n(or rather _above_) the _nature_ of a _Body_ to _move it self_, or\n_perceive_, or _think_, But rather admired that _I_ should find these\n_Operations_ in certain _Bodys_.\n\nBut How now (since _I_ suppose a certain _powerful_ and (if it be lawful\nto call him so) _evil deluder_, who useth all his endeavours to deceive\nme in all things) can _I_ affirme that I have any of those things,\nwhich I have now said belong to the _nature_ of a _Body_? Hold\u2014 Let me\nConsider\u2014, Let me think\u2014, Let me reflect\u2014 I can find no Answer, and I am\nweary with repeating the same things over-again in vain.\n\nBut Which of these _Faculties_ did I attribute to my _Soul_, my\n_Nutritive_, or _Motive faculty_? yet now seeing I have no _Body_, these\nalso are _meer delusions_. Was it my _sensitive faculty_? But this also\ncannot be perform\u2019d without a _Body_, and I have seem\u2019d to _perceive_\nmany things in my _sleep_, of which I afterwards understood my self _not_\nto be _sensible_. Was it my _Cogitative Faculty_? Here I have discovered\nit, \u2019tis my _Thought_, this alone cannot be separated from Me, I _am_,\nI _exist_,\u2e3a_tis true_, but for what time _Am I_? Why _I am_ as long as\n_I think_; For it May be that When I cease from _thinking_, I may cease\nfrom being. Now I admit of nothing but what is necessarily true: In\nshort therefore I _am_ only a _thinking thing_ that is to say, a _mind_,\nor a _soul_, or _understanding_, or _Reason_, words which formerly _I_\nunderstood not; I am a _Real thing_, and _Really Existent_, But what sort\nof thing? I have just now said it, _A thinking thing_.\n\n[Sidenote: * _Places noted with their Asterisk are refer\u2019d to in the\nfollowing Objections._]\n\nBut am I nothing besides? I will consider\u2e3aI am not that _structure_ of\n_parts_, which is called a Mans _Body_, neither am I any sort of _thin\nAir_ infused into those Parts, nor a _Wind_, nor _Fire_, nor _Vapour_,\nnor _Breath_, nor whatever I my self can feign, for all these things I\nhave supposed _not to Be_. Yet my Position stands firm; _Nevertheless I\nam something._ Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which\nI suppose not to exist (because to me _unknown_) are in reallity nothing\n_different_ from that very _Self_, which I _know_. I cannot tell, I\ndispute it not now, I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I\nhave some knowledge. I am sure that I exist, I ask who I am whom I thus\nknow, certainly, the knowledge, of _Me_ (precisely taken) depends not on\nthose things, whose existence I am yet ignorant of; and therefore not on\nany other things that I can _feign_ by my _imagination_.\n\nAnd this very Word (_feign_) puts me in mind of my _error_, for I\nshould _feign_ in deed, if I should _imagine_ my self any thing; for to\n_imagine_ is nothing else but to think upon the _shape_ or _image_ of\na _corporeal_ thing; but now I certainly know that I _am_, and I know\nalso that \u2019tis possible that all these _images_, and generally whatever\nbelongs to the _Nature_ of a _Body_ are nothing but _deluding Dreams_.\nWhich things Consider\u2019d I should be no less Foolish in saying, _I will\nimagine that I may more throughly understand what I am_, then if I should\nsay, _at Present I am awake and perceive something true, but because it\nappears not evidently enough, I shall endeavour to sleep, that in a Dream\nI may perceive it more evidently and truely_.\n\nWherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by my _imagination_,\ncan belong to the _Notion_ I have of _my self_, and that I must carefully\nwithdraw my mind from those things that it may more _distinctly_ perceive\nits _own Nature_.\n\nLet me ask therefore _What I am, A Thinking Thing_, but What is That?\nThat is a thing, _doubting_, _understanding_, _affirming_, _denying_,\n_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. These truely are\nnot a few _Properties_, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not\nbelong to me? For am not I the very same who at present _doubt_ almost of\nAll things; yet _understand_ something, which thing onely I _affirm_ to\nbe true, I _deny_ all other things, I am _willing_ to know more, I _would\nnot_ be deceived, I _imagine_ many things _unwillingly_, and _consider_\nmany things as coming to me by my _senses_. Which of all these faculties\nis it, which is not as _true_ as that I _Exist_, tho I should _sleep_, or\nmy _Creatour_ should as much as in him lay, strive to _deceive_ Me? which\nof them is it that is _distinct_ from my _thought_? which of them is it\nthat can be _seperated_ from _me_? For that I am the same that _doubt_,\n_understand_, and _will_ is so _evident_, that I know not how to explain\nit more _manifestly_, and that I also am the same that _imagine_, for tho\nperhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be _imagined_ is _true_,\nyet the _imaginative Power_ it self is _really_ existent, and makes\nup a part of my _Thought_; and last of all that I am the same that am\n_sensitive_, or _perceive corporeal_ things as by my _senses_, yet that\nI now _see_ light, _hear_ a noise, _feel_ heat, these things are false,\nfor I suppose my self _asleep_, but I _know_ that I _see_, _hear_, and am\n_heated_, that cannot be _false_; and this it is that in me is _properly_\ncalled _Sense_, and this strictly taken is the same with _thought_.\n\nBy these Considerations I begin a little better to _understand My self_\nwhat I am; But yet it _seems_, and I cannot but _think_ that _Corporeal\nThings_ (whose _Images_ are formed in my _thought_, and which by my\n_senses_, I perceive) are much more _distinctly known_, then that\n_confused Notion_ of _My Self_ which _imagination_ cannot afford me. And\nyet \u2019tis strange that things _doubtful_, _unknown_, _distinct from Me_,\nshould be _apprehended_ more _clearly_ by _Me_, then a Thing that is\n_True_, then a thing that is _known_, or then _I my self_; But the Reason\nis, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded\nwithin the strict limits of _Truth_.\n\nLet it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins,\nthat hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be\nmore easily Govern\u2019d.\n\nLet me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived\nmost _evident_, that is to say, _Bodies_ which we touch, which we see,\nnot bodies in General (for those _General_ Conceptions are usually\n_Confused_) but some one _Body_ in particular.\n\nLet us chuse for example this piece of _Bees-wax_, it was lately taken\nfrom the _Comb_, it has not yet lost all the _tast_ of the _Honey_,\nit retains something of the _smell_ of the _Flowers_ from whence \u2019twas\ngather\u2019d, its _colour_, _shape_, and _bigness_ are manifest, \u2019tis _hard_,\n\u2019tis _cold_, \u2019tis _easily felt_, and if you will knock it with your\nfinger, \u2019twill _make a noise_: In fine, it hath all things requisite to\nthe most perfect notion of a _Body_.\n\nBut behold whilst I am speaking, \u2019tis put to the Fire, its _tast_ is\npurged away, the _smell_ is vanish\u2019d, the _colour_ is changed, the\n_shape_ is alter\u2019d, its _bulk_ is increased, its become _soft_, \u2019tis\n_hot_, it can scarce be _felt_, and now (though you strike it) it makes\nno _noise_. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this\nall confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was\nthere in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things\nwhich I _perceived_ by my _senses_; for what I _smelt_, _tasted_,\nhave _seen_, _felt_, or _heard_, are all _vanish\u2019d_, and yet the _Wax\nremains_. Perhaps \u2019twas this only that I now think on, _viz._ that the\n_Wax_ it self was not that _tast of Honey_, that _smell of Flowers_,\nthat _whiteness_, that _shape_, or that _sound_, but it was a _Body_\nwhich awhile before appear\u2019d to me _so_ and _so modified_, but now\n_otherwise_. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me\nconsider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me\nsee what will remain, _viz._ this only, a _thing extended_, _flexible_,\nand _mutable_. But what is this _flexible_, and _mutable_? is it that\nI _imagine_ that this Wax from being _round_ may be made _square_, or\nfrom being _square_ can be made _triangular_? No, this is not it; for I\nconceive it capable of _innumerable_ such _changes_, and yet I cannot by\nmy _imagination_ run over these _Innumerables_; Wherefore this notion\nof its _mutability_ proceeds not from my _imagination_. What then is\n_extended_? is not its _Extension_ also _unknown_? For when it _melts_\n\u2019tis _greater_, when it _boils_ \u2019tis _greater_, and yet _greater_ when\nthe heat is increas\u2019d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I\nnot think it capable of more various _Extensions_ than I can _imagine_.\nIt remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot _imagine_ what\nthis Wax is, but that I _perceive_ with my _Mind_ what it is. I speak\nof this _particular_ Wax, for of Wax in _general_ the _notion_ is more\n_clear_.\n\nBut what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? \u2019Tis the same\nwhich I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same\nwhich at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the\n_perception_ thereof is not _sight_, the _touch_, or the _imagination_\nthereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem\u2019d so. But the\n_perception_ thereof is the _inspection_ or _beholding_ of the Mind only,\nwhich may be either _imperfect_ and _confused_, as formerly it was; or\n_clear_ and _distinct_, as now it is; the _more_ or the _less_ I consider\nthe Composition of the Wax.\n\nIn the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for\nthough I revolve these things with my self _silently_, and _without\nspeaking_, yet am I intangled in _meer words_, and am almost deceived\nby the usual way of _expression_; for we commonly say, _that we see the\nWax it self if it be present_, and not, _that we judge it present by\nits colour or shape_; from whence I should immediately thus conclude,\ntherefore the Wax is known by the _sight_ of the _eye_, and not by the\n_inspection_ of the _mind_ only. Thus I should have concluded, had not\nI by chance look\u2019d out of my window, and seen men passing by in the\nStreet; which men I as usually say that I _see_, as I do now, that I\n_see_ this Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which\nperhaps may cover only _artificial Machines_ and _movements_, but I judge\nthem to be men; so that what I thought I only _saw_ with my eyes, I\ncomprehend by my _Judicative Faculty_, which is _my Soul_. But it becomes\nnot one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter of\n_doubt_ from those ways of _expression_, which the Vulgar have invented.\n\nWherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more\n_perfectly_ and _evidently_ what the Wax was, when I first look\u2019d on\u2019t,\nand believed that I knew it by my outward _senses_, or at least by my\n_common sense_ (as they call it) that is to say, _by my imagination_; or\nwhether at present I _better understand_ it, after I have more diligently\nenquired both _what it is_, and how it may be _known_. Surely it would be\na foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts\nare true; What was there in my first _perception_ that was _distinct?_\nWhat was there that seem\u2019d not incident to every other Animal? But now\nwhen I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it\nas if it were naked, with it\u2019s coverings pull\u2019d off, then I cannot but\nreally perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.\n\nBut what shall I now say as to my _mind_, or my _self_? (for as yet\nI admit nothing as belonging to me but a _mind_.) Why (shall I say?)\nshould not I, who seem to perceive this Wax so _distinctly_, know my\n_self_ not only more _truly_ and more _certainly_, but more _distinctly_\nand _evidently_? For if I judge that _this Wax exists_, because I _see_\nthis Wax; surely it will be much more _evident_, that I _my self exist_,\nbecause _I see this Wax_; for it may be that this that I see is not\nreally Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any\nthing; but it cannot be, when I _see_, or (which is the same thing) when\n_I think that I see_, that I who _think_ should not _exist_. The same\nthing will follow if I _judge that this Wax exists_, because I _touch_,\nor _imagine_ it, &c. And what has been said of Wax, may be apply\u2019d to all\nother outward things.\n\nMoreover, if the _notion_ of Wax seems more _distinct_ after it is made\nknown to me, not only by my _sight_ or _touch_, but by more and other\ncauses; How much the more _distinctly_ must I confess my _self known_\nunto my _self_, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in\nthe _perception_ of _Wax_, or any other _Body_, does also encrease the\nproofs of the _nature_ of my _Mind_. But there are so many more things\nin the very _Mind_ it self, by which the _notion_ of it may be made more\n_distinct_, that those things which drawn from _Body_ conduce to its\nknowledge are scarce to be _mention\u2019d_.\n\nAnd now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in;\nfor seeing I have now discover\u2019d that _Bodies themselves_ are not\n_properly perceived_ by our _senses_ or _imagination_, but only by our\n_understanding_, and are not therefore _perceived_, because they are\n_felt_ or _seen_, but because they are _understood_; it plainly appears\nto me, that nothing can possibly be _perceived_ by _me easier_, or more\n_evidently_, than my _Mind_.\n\nBut because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former\nOpinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be\nbetter fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.\n\n\n\n\nMEDITAT. III.\n\n_Of GOD, and that there is a God._\n\n\nNow will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses,\nI will blot out the Images of _corporeal_ things clearly from my mind,\nor (because that can scarce be accomplish\u2019d) I will give no heed to\nthem, as being _vain_ and _false_, and by discoursing with my self, and\nprying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by\ndegrees more known and familiar to my self.\n\nI am a _Thinking Thing_, that is to say, _doubting_, _affirming_,\n_denying_, _understanding_ few things, _ignorant_ of many things,\n_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. For (as before\nI have noted) though perhaps whatever I _imagine_, or am sensible of,\nas without me, _Is not_; yet that _manner_ of _thinking_ which I\ncall _sense_ and _imagination_ (as they are only certain _Modes_ of\n_Thinking_) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have\nmention\u2019d whatever I _know_, or at least Whatever as yet I _perceive_ my\nself to _know_.\n\nNow will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some\nother Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That\nI am a _Thinking Thing_, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to\nmake _certain_ of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My _first knowledge_\n\u2019tis Nothing but a _clear_, and _distinct perception_ of What I affirm,\nWhich would not be sufficient to make me _certain_ of the _Truth_ of\na Thing, if it were _Possible_ that any thing that I so _clearly_ and\n_distinctly_ Perceive should be _false_. Wherefore I may lay this Down as\na _Principle_. _Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly\nTrue._\n\nBut I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very _Certain_ and\n_manifest_, Which I afterwards found to be _doubtful_. Therefore What\nsort of Things were they? _Viz._ Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other\nthings which I perceived by my _Senses_. But What did I Perceive of\nThese _Clearly? Viz._ That I had the _Ideas_ or _Thoughts_ of these\nthings in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these _Ideas_\nin Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm\u2019d, and Which (by\nReason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I _Clearly_ Perceived;\nWhich nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there\nwere Certain Things _Without Me_ from whence these _Ideas Proceeded_, and\nto which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either\n_Deceived_, or if by Chance I Judged _truly_, yet it Proceeded not from\nthe strength of my _Perception_.\n\nBut When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in\nArithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not\nI Perceive them _Clearly_ enough to make me affirm them True? Truly\nconcerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to _Doubt_, but That I\nthought Perhaps there may be a _God_ who might have so created me, that\nI should be _Deceived_ even in those things which seem\u2019d most _Clear_ to\nme. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of _Gods great Power_\ncomes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to\nErr even in those things which I Think I perceive most _Evidently_ with\nmy Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge\nmy self to perceive so _Clearly_, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I\neasily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he\nshall never Cause me _Not to Be_ whilst _I think that I Am_, or that it\nshall ever be True, _that I never was_, Whilst at Present \u2019tis True _that\nI am_, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five;\nfor in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing\nI have no reason to Think any _God_ a _Deceiver_, Nor as yet fully know\nWhether there Be _any God_, or _Not_, \u2019Tis but a slight and (as I may\nsay) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of\nwhich I am not yet Perswaded.\n\nWherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought\nto Enquire, Whether there _Be a God_, And if there be One, Whether he can\nbe a _Deceiver_, For whilst I am _Ignorant_ of this, I cannot possibly\nbe fully _Certain_ of any Other thing.\n\nBut now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain\nHeads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly\nConsists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to\nthese alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon\na Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are\nothers of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will,\nwhen I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever\nI think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought,\nbut in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think\nupon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some\nare called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_.\n\nNow as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider\u2019d alone as they are in\nthemselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly\nbe _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, \u2019tis as\n_Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t\u2019other. Also in the _Will_ and\n_Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for\n_evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_\nthat I Wish for them.\n\nWherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I\nmust take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual\n_Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that\nare _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are\n_without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of\nmy _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford\nme an Occasion of _Erring_.\n\nOf these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others\nseem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_\nIs, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my\nown _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_\nheat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But\nLastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by\n_My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_,\nor all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not\nas yet discover\u2019d their true _Original_.\n\nBut _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count\n_Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_,\nthat I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things\nthemselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also\nI know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_;\nfor they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they\nsay) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat,\nand therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated\nto me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the\n_heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for\nme to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me,\nrather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort\nof arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.\n\nWhen I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that\nI am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that \u2019tis\n_discover\u2019d_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two\ndiffer very much. For whatever is discover\u2019d to me by the _Light_\nof _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I\nthink_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other\n_Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the\n_Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things\nare _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to\nmy _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led\nby them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing\n_one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever\n_trust_ them in any other thing.\n\nAnd then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not\ntherefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_.\nFor as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention\u2019d) are in me,\nyet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there\nmay be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the\n_Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them\nto be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External\nObject_.\n\nAnd last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are\n_different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be\n_like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the\n_Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers\n_Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly\nI reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very\n_smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is\nto say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from\ncertain _natural notions_) by which \u2019tis rendred something bigger then\nthe Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun\nwhich is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is\nmost _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self.\n\nAll which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a\n_true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are\ncertain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their\n_Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other\nway.\n\nBut I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things\n(whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me;\nAnd that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I\nacknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me\nin the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_,\nan _other Thing_, \u2019tis Evident there is a _Great difference_ between\nthem. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_\nare something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective\nReallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_;\nand again, _That_ by Which I understand a _Mighty God_, _Eternal_,\n_Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides\nhimself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those\n_Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited.\n\nBut Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be\n_as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the\n_Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its\n_Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that\n_Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it?\n\nAnd from hence it follows, that neither a _Thing_ can be made out of\n_Nothing_, Neither a Thing which is _more Perfect_ (that is, Which has in\nit self _more Reallity_) _proceed_ from That Which is _Less Perfect_.\n\nAnd this is _Clearly_ True, not only in those _Effects_ whose _Actual_\nor _Formal Reallity_ is Consider\u2019d, But in Those _Ideas_ also, Whose\n_Objective Reallity_ is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of\nIllustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which _was not_,\nshould now begin _to Be_, unless it were produced by _something_, in\nWhich, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either _Formally_ or\n_Virtually_; neither can _heat_ be Produced in any Thing, which before\nwas _not hot_, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a _degree_ of\n_Perfection_ as _heat_ is; But also \u2019tis Impossible that I should have\nan _Idea_ of Heat, or of a _Stone_, unless it were put into me by some\n_Cause_, in which there is at Least as much _Reallity_, as I Conceive\nthere is in heat or a Stone. For tho that _Cause_ transfers none of its\nown _Actual_ or _Formal Reality_ into my _Idea_, I must not from thence\nconclude that \u2019tis _less real_; but I may think that the _nature_ of the\n_Idea_ it self is such, that of it self it requires no other _formal\nreality_, but what it has from my _thought_, of which \u2019tis a _mode_. But\nthat this Idea has _this_ or _that objective reallity_, rather then any\n_other_, proceeds clearly from some _cause_, in which there ought to be\nat least as much _formal reallity_, as there is of _objective reallity_\nin the _Idea_ it self. For if we suppose any thing in the _Idea_, which\nwas not in its _cause_, it must of necessity have this from _nothing_;\nbut (tho it be a most _Imperfect manner_ of _existing_, by which the\nthing is _objectively_ in the _Intellect_ by an _Idea_, yet) it is not\n_altogether nothing_, and therefore cannot proceed from _nothing_.\n\nNeither ought I to doubt, seeing the _reallity_ which I perceive in\nmy _Ideas_ is only an _objective reallity_, that therefore it must of\nnecessity follow, that the same _reallity_ should be in the _causes_\nof these _Ideas formally_. But I may conclude, that \u2019tis sufficient\nthat this _reallity_ be in the very _causes_ only _objectively_. For as\nthat _objective manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of\nan _Idea_, so that _formal manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very\n_nature_ of a _cause_ of _Ideas_, at least to the _first_ and _chiefest\ncauses_ of them; For tho perhaps one _Idea_ may receive its birth from\nan other, yet we cannot proceed in _Infinitum_, but at last we must\narrive at some _first Idea_, whose _cause_ is (as it were) an _Original\ncopy_, in which all the _objective reallity_ of the _Idea_ is _formally\ncontain\u2019d_. So that I plainly discover by the _light_ of _nature_, that\nthe _Ideas_, which are in me, are (as it were) _Pictures_, which may\neasily _come short_ of the _perfection_ of those things from whence they\nare taken, but cannot _contain_ any thing _greater_ or _more perfect_\nthen them: And the _longer_ and _more diligently_ I pry into these\nthings, so much the more _clearly_ and _distinctly_ do I discover them to\nbe _true_.\n\nBut what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the _objective\nreallity_ of any of my _Ideas_ be _such_, that it cannot be in me either\n_formally_ or _eminently_, and that therefore I cannot be the _cause_\nof _that Idea_, from hence it necessarily Follows, that _I alone_ do\nnot only _exist_, but that some other thing, which is _cause_ of that\n_Idea_, does _exist also_.\n\nBut if I can find no _such Idea_ in me, I have no argument to perswade\nme of the _existence_ of any thing besides my self for I have diligently\nenquired, and hitherto I could discover no other _perswasive_.\n\nSome of these _Ideas_ there are (besides that which represents _my self_\nto _my self_, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent\nto me, one of them a _God_, others of them _Corporeal_ and _Inanimate_\nthings, some of them _Angels_, others _Animals_, and lastly some of them\nwhich exhibite to me _men like my self_.\n\nAs touching those that represent _Men_ or _Angels_ or _Animals_, I easily\nunderstand that they may be _made up_ of those _Ideas_ which I have of\n_my self_, of _Corporeal_ things, and of _God_, tho there were neither\n_man_ (but my self) nor _Angel_, nor _Animal_ in being.\n\nAnd as to the _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things, I find nothing in them of\nthat _perfection_, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into\nthem more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday\n(_in the second Medit._) I did the _Idea_ of Wax, I find there are but\nfew things which I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ in them, viz.\n_Magnitude_ or _extension_ in _Longitude_, _Latitude_, and _Profundity_,\nthe _Figure_ or _shape_ which arises from the _termination_ of that\n_Extension_, the _Position_ or _place_ which divers _Figured Bodies_\nhave in _respect_ of each other, their _motion_ or _change of place_; to\nwhich may be added, their _substance_, _continuance_, and _number_; as to\nthe other, such as are, _Light_, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smels_, _Tasts_,\n_Heat_, and _Cold_, with the other _tactile qualities_, I have but very\n_obscure_ and _confused thoughts_ of them, so that I know not, whether\nthey are _true_ or _false_, that is to say, whether the _Ideas_ I have of\nthem are the _Ideas_ of _things_ which _really are_, or _are not_. For\naltho _falshood formally_ and _properly_ so called, consists only in the\n_judgement_ (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of\n_material falshood_ in _Ideas_, when they represent a _thing_ as _really\nexistent_, tho it does _not exist_; so, for example, the _Ideas_ I have\nof _heat_ and _cold_ are so _obscure_ and _confused_, that I cannot\ncollect from them, whether _cold_ be a _privation_ of _heat_, or _heat_ a\n_privation_ of _cold_, or whether either of them be a _real quality_, or\nwhether neither of them be _real_. And since every _Idea_ must be _like_\nthe thing it represents, if it be _true_ that _cold_ is nothing but the\n_privation_ of _heat_, that _Idea_ which represents it to me as a thing\n_real_ and _positive_ may deservedly be called _false_. The same may be\napply\u2019d to other Ideas.\n\nAnd now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other _Author_ of\nthese _Ideas_ but _my self_; for if they are _false_, that is, represent\nthings that _are not_, I know by the _light_ of _nature_ that they\nproceed from _nothing_; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other\naccount, but because my _nature_ is _deficient_ in something, and\n_imperfect_. But if they are _true_, yet seeing I discover so little\n_reality_ in them, that that very _reality_ scarce _seems_ to _be realy_,\nI see no reason why I my self should not be the _Author_ of them.\n\nBut also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are\n_clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow\u2019d from the _Idea_ I\nhave of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like;\nFor when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing\napt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_,\ntho I conceive _my self_ a _thinking substance_ and _not extended_, and\nthe _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there\nis a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_\nin this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as\n_now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and\nsince I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from\nhence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which\nafterwards I apply to other things.\n\nAs to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as\n_extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in\nme, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain\n_modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may\nseem to be in me _eminently_.\n\n* Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must\nconsider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly\nhave its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain\n_Infinite Substance_, _Independent_, _Omniscient_, _Almighty_, by whom\nboth _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do\n_Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high\nnature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive\nmy self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions.\n\nFrom what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_;\nfor tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my\nself am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite\nsubstance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a\n_substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that\nI have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the\n_negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by\nthe _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary\nI plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite\nsubstance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_\nof an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of\na _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or\n_desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not\naltogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_\nthen _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own\n_Imperfections_.\n\nNeither can it be said that this _Idea_ of _God_ is _false Materialiter_,\nand that therefore it _proceeds_ from _nothing_, as before I observed of\nthe _Ideas_ of _heat_ and _cold_, _&c._ For on the contrary, seeing this\n_notion_ is most _clear_ and _distinct_, and contains in it self more\n_objective reality_ then any other _Idea_, none can be more _true_ in\nit self, nor in which less _suspition_ of _falshood_ can be found. This\n_Idea_ (I say) of a _being infinitely perfect_ is most _true_, for tho\nit may be supposed that such a _being_ does _not exist_, yet it cannot\nbe supposed that the _Idea_ of such a _being_ exhibites to me nothing\n_real_, as before I have said of the _Idea_ of _cold_. This _Idea_\nalso is most _clear_ and _distinct_, for whatever I perceive _clearly_\nand _distinctly_ to be _real_, and _true_, and _perfect_, is wholy\n_contain\u2019d_ in this _Idea_ of _God_.\n\nNeither can it be objected, that I cannot _comprehend_ an _Infinite_, or\nthat there are innumerable other things in _God_, which I can neither\n_conceive_, nor in the least _think upon_; for it is of the _very\nnature_ of an _Infinite_ not to be _apprehendable_ by _me_ who am\n_finite_. And \u2019tis sufficient to me to prove this my _Idea_ of _God_ to\nbe the most _true_, the most _clear_, and the most _distinct Idea_ of all\nthose _Ideas_ I have, upon this _account_, that I understand that _God_\nis _not to be understood_, and that I judge that whatever I _clearly_\nperceive and know _Implys_ any _perfection_, as also perhaps other\ninnumerable _perfections_, which I am ignorant of, are in _God_ either\n_formally_ or _eminently_.\n\n_Doubt._ But perhaps _I am_ something _more_ then I take my self to\n_be_, and perhaps all these _perfections_ which I attribute to _God_,\nare _potentially_ in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and\nbreak into action. For I am now fully experienced that my _Knowledge_ may\nbe _encreased_, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not _encrease_\nby degrees in _Infinitum_, nor why by my _knowledge_ so _encreased_ I\nmay not attain to the other _perfections_ of _God_; nor lastly, why the\n_power_ or _aptitude_ of _having_ these perfections may not be sufficient\nto produce the _Idea_ of them in _me_.\n\n_Solution._ But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that\nmy _Knowledge_ is capable of being _increased_, and that many things are\nin me _potentially_, which _actually_ are not, yet none of these go to\nthe making an _Idea_ of _God_, in which I conceive nothing _potentially_,\nfor tis a certain argument of _imperfection_ that a thing _may be\nencreased Gradually_. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be _more_ and _more\nencreased_, yet I know that it can never be _actually Infinite_, for it\ncan never arrive to that _height_ of _perfection_, which admits not of\nan _higher degree_. But I conceive God to be _actually_ so _Infinite_,\nthat nothing can be _added_ to his _perfections_. And lastly, I perceive\nthat the _objective being_ of an _Idea_ cannot be _produced_ only by the\n_potential being_ of a _thing_ (which in proper speech is _nothing_) but\nrequires an _actual_ or _formal being_ to its _production_.\n\nOf all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not _evident_\nby the _light_ of _reason_ to any one that will diligently consider them.\nYet because that (when I am careless, and the _Images_ of _sensible_\nthings _blind_ my _understanding_) I do not so easily call to mind the\nreasons, why the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_ should\nof necessity proceed from a _being_ which is _really more perfect_; It\nwill be requisite to enquire further, whether _I_, who have this _Idea_,\ncan possibly _be_, unless _such_ a _being_ did _exist_. To which end\nlet me aske, _from whence_ should I _be_? From _my self_? or from my\n_Parents_? or from any other thing _less perfect_ then _God_? for nothing\ncan be thought or supposed _more perfect_, or _equally perfect_ with\n_God_.\n\nBut first, If _I_ were from my self, I should neither _doubt_, nor\n_desire_, nor _want_ any thing, for I should have given my self all those\n_perfections_, of which I have any _Idea_, and consequently I my self\nshould be _God_; and I cannot think that those things I _want_, are to\nbe acquired with _greater difficulty_ then those things I _have_; but on\nthe contrary, \u2019tis manifest, that it were much more _difficult_ that _I_\n(that is, _a substance_ that _thinks_) should _arise_ out of _nothing_,\nthen that I should _acquire_ the _knowledge_ of many things whereof I\nam _Ignorant_, which is only the _accident_ of that _substance_. And\ncertainly if I had that _greater thing_ (viz _being_) from my self, I\nshould not have _denyed_ my self (not only, those things which may be\neasier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are\ncontain\u2019d in the _Idea_ of a _God_; and the reason is, for that no other\nthings _seem_ to me to be _more difficultly_ done, and certainly if they\nwere _Really more difficult_, they would _seem_ more _difficult_ to me\n(if whatever _I have_, I _have_ from my self) for in those things I\nshould find my _Power_ put to a stop.\n\nNeither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to\n_have alwaies Been, what now I am_, and that therefore I need not seek\nfor an _Author_ of my _Being_. For the _Duration_ or _Continuance_ of my\nlife may be _divided_ into _Innumerable Parts_, each of which does not\nat all _depend_ on the _Other Parts_; Therefore it will not follow, that\nbecause _a while ago, I was_, I must of necessity _now Be_. I say, this\nwill not follow, Unless, I suppose some _Cause_ to _Create me_ (as it\nwere) _anew_ for _this_ Moment (that is, _Conserve me_). For \u2019tis evident\nto one that Considers the Nature of _Duration_, that the same _Power_\nand _Action_ is requisite to the _Conservation_ of a Thing each _Moment_\nof its _Being_, as there is to the _Creation_ of that Thing _anew_, if\nit did _not exist_. So that \u2019tis one of those _Principles_ which are\n_Evident_ by the _Light_ of _Nature_: that the _Act_ of _Conservation_\ndiffers only _Ratione_ (as the Philosophers term it) from the _Act of\nCreation_.\n\nWherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whether _I_, who _now_\nAm; have any _Power_ to _Cause_ my self to _Be hereafter_? (for had I any\nsuch _power_, I should certainly _know_ of it, seeing I am nothing but\na _Thinking Thing_, or at least at present I onely treat of that part\nof me, which is a _Thing_ that _Thinks_) to which, I answer, that I can\ndiscover no such _Power_ in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that\n_I depend_ on some _Other being distinct_ from _my self_.\n\nBut what if _I_ say that perhaps this _Being_ is not _God_, but that\n_I_ am produced either by my _Parents_, or some other _Causes less\nperfect_ then _God_? In answer to which let me consider (as _I_ have\nsaid before) that \u2019tis _manifest_ that whatever is in the _effect, so\nmuch_ at least ought to be in the _cause_; and therefore seeing _I_\nam a thing that _thinks_, and have in me an _Idea_ of _God_, it will\nconfessedly follow, that whatever sort of _cause_ I assign of my _own\nBeing_, it also must be a _Thinking Thing_, and must have an _Idea_ of\nall those _Perfections_, which I attribute to _God_; Of which _Cause_\nit may be again Asked, whether it be _from it self_, or from any other\n_Cause_? If _from it self_, \u2019tis evident (from what has been said) that\nit must be _God_; For seeing it has the _Power_ of _Existing of it self_,\nwithout doubt it has also the _power_ of _actually Possessing_ all those\n_Perfections_ whereof it has an _Idea_ in it self, that is, all those\n_Perfections_ which I conceive in _God_. But if it Be from an _other\nCause_, it may again be asked of that _Cause_ whether it be _of it self_,\nor from an _other_; Till at length We arrive at the _Last Cause_ of All,\nWhich will Be _God_. For \u2019tis evident, that this _Enquiry_ will not admit\nof _Progressus in Infinitum_, especially when at Present I treat not\nonly of that Cause which at _first made_ Me; But chiefly of that which\n_conserves_ me in this _Instant_ time.\n\nNeither can it be supposed that many _partial Causes_ have _concurred_\nto the making Me, and that I received the _Idea_ of one of _Gods\nperfections_ from _One_ of them, and from an _other_ of them the _Idea_\nof an _other_; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be\nfound _scattered_ in the World, but not all of them _Joyn\u2019d_ in any\none which may Be _God_. For on the contrary, _Unity_, _Simplicity_,\nor the _inseparability_ of All Gods Attributes is one of the _chief\nPerfections_ which I conceive in Him; and certainly the _Idea_ of the\n_Unity_ of the _Divine Perfections_ could not be _created_ in me by any\nother _cause_, then by _That_, from whence I have received the _Ideas_ of\nhis other _perfections_; For \u2019tis Impossible to make me conceive these\n_perfections_, _conjunct_ and _inseparable_, unless he should also make\nme know what _perfections_ these _are_.\n\nLastly as touching my _having_ my _Being_ from my _Parents_. Tho whatever\nThoughts I have heretofore harbour\u2019d of Them were _True_, yet certainly\nthey _contribute_ nothing to my _conservation_, neither proceed I from\nthem as _I am_ a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, for they have onely _predisposed_\nthat _material Thing_, wherein _I_, that is, _my mind_ (_which_ only\nat present I take for _my self_) _Inhabits_. Wherefore I cannot _now_\nQuestion that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude\nthat because _I am_, and because I have an _Idea_ of a _Being most\nperfect_, that is, of _God_, it evidently follows that _there is a God_.\n\n* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this _Idea_\nof _God_. For I have neither received it by _means_ of _my Senses_,\nneither comes it to me _without_ my _Forethought_, as the _Ideas_ of\n_sensible_ things use to do, when such things _Work_ on the Organs of my\n_Sense_, or at least _seem_ so to work; Neither is this _Idea_ framed\nby _my self_, for I can neither _detract from_, nor _add_ any thing\n_thereto_. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is _Innate_, even as\nthe _Idea_ of me _my self_ is _Natural_ to my self.\n\nAnd truly \u2019tis not to be Admired that _God_ in Creating me should\n_Imprint_ this _Idea_ in me, that it may there remain as a _stamp\nimpressed_ by the _Workman God_ on _me_ his _Work_, neither is it\nrequisite that this _stamp_ should be a Thing _different_ from the _Work_\nit self, but \u2019tis very Credible (from hence only that _God Created_ me)\nthat I am made as it were according to his _likeness_ and _Image_, and\nthat the same _likeness_, in which the _Idea_ of God is contain\u2019d, is\n_perceived_ by Me with the _same faculty_, with which I _perceive my\nSelf_; That is to say, whilst _I reflect_ upon my self, _I_ do not only\n_perceive_ that I am an _Imperfect_ thing, having my _dependance_ upon\nsome other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires _more_ and _better_\nthings _Indefinitely_; But also at the same time I understand, that _He_\non whom I _depend_ contains in him all those _wish\u2019d for things_ (not\nonly _Indefinitely_ and _Potentially_, but) _Really_, _Indefinitely_;\nand that therefore he is _God_. The whole stress of which * Argument\nlies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature\nI am, _Viz._ Having the _Idea_ of a _God_ in me, unless really there\nwere a _God_, a _God_ (I say) that very _same God_, whose _Idea I_ have\nin my _Mind_ (that is, Having all those _perfections_, which I cannot\n_comprehend_, but can as it were _think upon them_) and who is not\n_subject_ to any _Defects_.\n\nBy which \u2019tis evident that _God_ is no _Deceiver_; for \u2019tis manifest by\nthe _Light_ of _Nature_, that all _fraud_ and _deceit_ depends on some\n_defect_. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other\n_Truthes_ which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and\ndwell upon the Contemplation of this _God_, to Consider with my self\nHis _Divine Attributes_, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of\nthis _Immense light_, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my\n_dark_ Understanding. For as by _Faith_ we _believe_ that the greatest\n_happiness_ of the _next Life_ consists alone in the _Contemplation_ of\nthe _Divine Majesty_, so we _find_ by _Experience_ that now we receive\nfrom thence the greatest _pleasure_, whereof we are capable in _this\nLife_; Tho it be much more _Imperfect_ then that in the _Next_.\n\n\n\n\nMEDITAT. IV.\n\n_Of Truth and Falshood._\n\n\nOf late it has been so common with me to withdraw _my Mind_ from my\n_sences_, and I have so throughly consider\u2019d how few things there are\nappertaining to _Bodies_ that are _truly_ perceived, and that there are\nmore Things touching _Mans mind_, and yet more concerning _God_, which\nare _well known_; that now without any difficulty _I_ can turn my\nThoughts from things _sensible_, to those which are only _Intelligible_,\nand _Abstracted_ from _Matter_. And truely _I_ have a much more _distinct\nIdea_ of a _Mans mind_ (as it is a _Thinking Thing_, having no _Corporeal\nDimensions_ of _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, nor having any other\n_Corporeal Quality_) then the _Idea_ of any _Corporeal Thing_ can be. And\nwhen I reflect upon my self, and consider how that I _doubt_, that is,\nam an _imperfect dependent Being_, I from hence Collect such a _clear_\nand _distinct Idea_ of an _Independent perfect Being_, which is _God_,\nand from hence only that _I have such an Idea_, that is, because _I_ that\nhave this _Idea_ do _my self Exist_; I do so _clearly_ conclude that\n_God also Exists_, and that on him my _Being depends_ each Minute; That\nI am Confident nothing can be known more _Evidently_ and _Certainly_ by\n_Humane Understanding_.\n\nAnd now _I_ seem to perceive a _Method_ by which, (from this\nContemplation of the _true God_, in whom the Treasures of _Knowledge_ and\n_Wisdome_ are Hidden) _I_ may attain the _Knowledge_ of other Things.\n\nAnd first, _I_ know \u2019tis impossible that this _God_ should _deceive_\nme; For in all _cheating_ and _deceipt_ there is something of\n_imperfection_; and tho to be _able_ to _deceive_ may seem to be an\nArgument of _ingenuity_ and _power_, yet without doubt to _have_ the\n_Will_ of _deceiving_ is a sign of _Malice_ and _Weakness_, and therefore\nis not _Incident_ to _God_.\n\nI have also found in my self a _Judicative faculty_, which certainly (as\nall other things I possess) I have received from _God_; and seeing he\nwill not _deceive_ me, he has surely given me such a _Judgement_, that\nI can _never Err_, whilst I make a _Right Use_ of it. Of which truth I\ncan make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That\ntherefore _I can never Err_; for if whatever I have, I have from _God_,\nand if he gave me no _Faculty_ of _Erring_, I may seem not to be _able to\nErr_. And truly so it is whilst I think upon _God_, and wholly convert\nmy self to the _consideration_ of him, I find no occasion of _Error_ or\n_Deceit_; but yet when I return to the _Contemplation_ of _my self_, I\nfind my self liable to _Innumerable Errors_. Enquiring into the _cause_\nof which, I find in my self an _Idea_, not only a _real_ and _positive\none_ of a _God_, that is, of a _Being infinitely perfect_, but also\n(as I may so speak) a _Negative Idea_ of _Nothing_; that is to say, I\nam so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect _Being_\nand _No-being_, that as I am _Created_ by the _Highest Being_, I have\nnothing in Me by which I may be _deceived_ or drawn into _Error_; but as\nI pertake in a manner of _Nothing_, or of a _No-Being_, that is, as I my\nself am _not_ the _Highest Being_, and as I _want_ many _perfections_,\n\u2019tis no Wonder that I should be _Deceived_.\n\nBy which I understand that _Error_ * (as it is _Error_) is not any _real\nBeing_ dependant on _God_, but it is only a _Defect_; And that therefore\nto make me _Err_ there is not requisite a _faculty_ of _Erring_ given\nme by _God_, but only it so happens that I _Err_ meerly because the\n_Judicative faculty_, which he has given me, is not _Infinite_.\n\nBut yet this Account is not fully _satisfactory_; for _Error_ is not\nonly a meer _Negation_, but \u2019tis a _Privation_, or a _want_ of a certain\n_Knowledge_, which _ought_ (as it were) to be in me. And when I consider\nthe _Nature_ of _God_, it seems impossible that he should give me any\n_faculty_ which is not _perfect_ in its _kind_, or which should _want_\nany of its _due perfections_; for if by how much the more _skilful_ the\n_Workman_ is, by so much the _Perfecter Works_ proceed from him. What can\nbe made by the _Great Maker_ of all things which is not _fully perfect_?\nFor I cannot Doubt but _God_ may _Create_ me so that I may _never_ be\n_deceived_, neither can I doubt but that he _Wills_ whatever is _Best_;\nIs it therefore _better_ for me to be _deceived_, or not to be _deceived?_\n\nThese things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind,\nFirst, that \u2019tis no cause of Admiration that _God_ should do Things\nwhereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt his _Being_,\nbecause there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend _Why_\nor _How_ they are done; for seeing I now know that my _Nature_ is very\n_Weak_ and _Finite_, and that the _Nature_ of _God_ is _Immense_,\n_Incomprehensible_, _Infinite_; from hence I must fully, understand, that\nhe can do numberless things, the _Causes_ whereof lie _hidden_ to Me.\nUpon which account only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from\nthe End (viz. _Final Causes_) as of no use in _Natural Philosophy_, for I\ncannot without Rashness Think my self _able_ to Discover _Gods_ Designes.\n\nI perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the\n_Works_ of _God_ are _perfect_, we must not Respect any _one kind_ of\nCreature _singly_, but the _Whole Universe_ of _Beings_; for perhaps what\n(if considered _alone_) may Deservedly seem _Imperfect_, yet (as it is a\n_part_ of the _World_) is most _perfect_; and tho since I have _doubted_\nof all things, I have discover\u2019d nothing _certainly_ to _Exist_, but _my\nself_, and _God_, yet since I have Consider\u2019d the _Omnipotency_ of _God_,\nI cannot deny, but that many other things _are made_ (or at least, _may\nbe made_) by him, so that I my self _may be_ a _part_ of this _Universe_.\n\nFurthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what these _Errors_\nof mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my _Imperfection_) * I\nfind them to _depend_ on _two concurring Causes_, on my _faculty_ of\n_Knowing_, and on my _faculty_ of _Choosing_ or _Freedome_ of my _Will_,\nthat is to say, from my _Understanding_, and my _Will together_. For\nby my _Understanding alone_ I only perceive _Ideas_, whereon I make\n_Judgments_, wherein (_precisely_ so taken) there can be no _Error,\nproperly_ so called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things,\nwhose _Ideas_ I have _not_ in Me, yet I am not _properly_ to be said\n_Deprived_ of them, but only _negatively wanting_ them; and I cannot\nprove that _God ought_ to have given me a _greater faculty_ of _Knowing_.\nAnd tho I understand him to be a _skilful Workman_, yet I cannot Think,\nthat he _ought_ to have put all those _perfections_ in _each_ Work of his\n_singly_, with which he might have _endowed some_ of them.\n\nNeither can I complain that _God_ has not given me a _Will_, or _Freedom_\nof _Choise_, _large_ and _perfect_ enough; for I have experienced that\n\u2019tis _Circumscribed_ by _no Bounds_.\n\nAnd \u2019tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so\n_perfect_ and so _Great_, but I Understand that there may be _Perfecter_\nand _Greater_, for if (for Example) I consider the _Faculty_ of\n_Understanding_, I presently perceive that in me \u2019tis very _small_ and\n_Finite_, and also at the same time I form to my self an _Idea_ of an\nother _Understanding_ not only _much Greater_, but the _Greatest_ and\n_Infinite_, which I perceive to belong to _God_. In the same manner if I\nenquire into _memory_ or _imagination_ or any other faculties, I find\nthem in my self _Weak_ and _Circumscribed_, but in _God_ I Understand\nthem to be _Infinite_, there is therefore only my _Will_ or _Freedome_\nof _Choice_, which I find to be _so Great_, that I cannot frame to my\nself an _Idea_ of _One Greater_, so that \u2019tis by this _chiefly_ by which\nI Understand my self to Bear the _likeness_ and _Image_ of _God_. For\ntho the _Will_ in _God_ be without comparison _Greater_ then Mine, both\nas to the _Knowledge_ and _Power_ which are _Joyn\u2019d_ therewith, which\nmake it more _strong_ and _Effective_, and also as to the _Object_\nthereof, for _God_ can apply himself to _more_ things then I can. Yet\nbeing taken _Formally_ and _Precisely Gods Will_ seems _no greater_ then\nMine. For the _Freedome_ of _Will_ consists only in this, that we can\n_Do_, or _not Do_ such a Thing (that is, _affirm_ or _deny_, _prosecute_\nor _avoid_) or rather in this Only, that we are _so carried_ to a Thing\nwhich is _proposed_ by Our _Intellect_ to _Affirm_ or _Deny_, _Prosecute_\nor _Shun_, that we are _sensible_, that we are _not Determin\u2019d_ to the\n_Choice_ or _Aversion_ thereof, by any _outward Force_.\n\nNeither is it Requisite to make one _Free_ that he should have an\n_Inclination_ to _both_ sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more\n_strongly_ I am inclined to _one_ side (whether it be that I _evidently\nperceive_ therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that _God has so\ndisposed_ my _Inward Thoughts_) By so much the _more Free_ am I in my\n_Choice_.\n\nNeither truly do _Gods Grace_ or _Natural Knowledge_ take away from\nmy _Liberty_, but rather _encrease_ and _strengthen_ it. For that\n_indifference_ which I find in my self, when no Reason inclines me _more_\nto _one side_, then to _the other_, is the _meanest_ sort of _Liberty_,\nand is so far from being a sign of _perfection_, that it only argues a\n_defect_ or _negation_ of _Knowledge_; for if I should always _Clearly\nsee_ what were _True_ and _Good_ I should never _deliberate_ in my\n_Judgement_ or _Choice_, and Consequently, tho I were _perfectly Free_,\nyet I should never be _Indifferent_.\n\nFrom all which, I perceive that neither the _Power_ of _Willing\nprecisely_ so taken, which I have from _God_, is the _Cause_ of my\n_Errors_, it being most _full_ and _perfect_ in its kind; Neither also\nthe _Power_ of _Understanding_, for whatever I _Understand_ (since \u2019tis\nfrom God that I _Understand_ it) I _understand aright_, nor can I be\ntherein _Deceived_.\n\nFrom _Whence_ therefore proceed all my _Errors_? To which, I answer,\nthat they proceed from _hence_ only, that seeing the _Will_ expatiates\nit self _farther_ then the _Understanding_, I keep it not within the\n_same bounds_ with my _Understanding_, but often extend it to those\nthings which I _Understand not_, to which things it being _Indifferent_,\nit easily Declines from what is _True_ and _Good_; and consequently\nI am _Deceived_ and _Commit sin_. * Thus, for example, when lately I\nfelt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth _Exist_, and found\nthat from my setting _my self_ to Examine such a thing, it evidently\nfollows that I _my self Exist_, I could not but _Judge_, what I so\n_clearly Understood_, to be _true_, not that I was _forced_ thereto by\nany _outward impulse_, but because a _strong Propension_ in my _Will_\ndid follow this _Great Light_ in my _Understanding_, so that I believed\nit so much the more _freely_ and _willingly_, by how much the less\n_indifferent_ I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I\n_Exist_ as I am a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, but I also meet with a certain\n_Idea_ of a _Corporeal Nature_, and it so happens that I _doubt_,\nwhether that _Thinking Nature_ that is in me be _Different_ from that\n_Corporeal Nature_, or Whether they are _both the same_: but in this\n_I_ suppose that _I_ have found no Argument to _incline_ me _either\nways_, and therefore _I_ am _Indifferent_ to _affirm_ or _deny either_,\nor to _Judge nothing_ of _either_; But this _indifferency_ extends it\nself not only to those things of which I am _clearly ignorant_, but\ngenerally to all those things which are _not_ so very _evidently known_\nto me at the Time when my _Will Deliberates_ of them; for tho never so\nprobable _Guesses incline_ me to _one_ side, yet the Knowing that they\nare only _Conjectures_, and not indubitable _reasons_, is enough to Draw\nmy _Assent_ to the _Contrary_ Part. Which Lately _I_ have sufficiently\nexperienced, when _I_ supposed all those things (which formerly _I_\nassented to as most _True_) as very _False_, for this _Reason_ only that\n_I_ found my self _able_ to doubt of them in some manner.\n\nIf I abstain from _passing_ my _Judgment_, when I do _not clearly_ and\n_distinctly_ enough perceive what is _Truth_, \u2019tis evident that I do\n_well_, and that I am _not deceived_: But if I _affirm_ or _deny_, then\n\u2019tis that I _abuse_ the _freedome_ of my _will_, and if I turn my self\nto that part which is _false_, I am _deceived_; but if I _embrace_ the\n_contrary_ Part, \u2019tis but _by chance_ that I light on the _Truth_, yet\nI shall not therefore be Blameless, for \u2019tis Manifest by the _light_\nof _Nature_ that the _Perception_ of the _Understanding ought_ to\npreceed the _Determination_ of the _Will_. And \u2019tis in this _abuse_ of\n_Free-Will_ that That _Privation_ consists, which Constitutes _Error_;\nI say there is a _Privation_ in the _Action_ as it proceeds from Me,\nbut not in the _Faculty_ which I have received from _God_; nor in the\n_Action_ as it _depends_ on _him_.\n\nNeither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a _larger\nIntellective Faculty_, or more _Natural Light_, for \u2019tis a necessary\nIncident to a _finite Understanding_ that it should not Understand _All_\nthings, and \u2019tis Incident to a _Created Understanding_ to be _Finite_:\nand I have more Reason to thank him for what he has _bestowed_ upon me\n(tho he _owed_ me nothing) then to think my self _Robbed_ by him of those\nthings which he _never gave me_.\n\nNor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a _Will_ larger then\nmy _Understanding_: for seeing the _Will_ Consists in _one_ thing only,\nand as it were in an _Indivisible_ (viz. to _Will_, or _not to Will_) it\nseems contrary to its nature that it should be _less_ then \u2019tis; and\ncertainly by how much the _Greater_ it is, so much the more _Thankful_ I\nought to be to _him_; that Gave it me.\n\nNeither can I Complain that God _concurrs_ with me in the Production of\nthose _Voluntary Actions_ or _Judgements_ in which I am _deceived_: for\nthose _Acts_ as they _depend_ on _God_ are altogether _True_ and _Good_;\nand I am in some measure _more perfect_ in that I can _so Act_, then if\nI could _not_: for that _Privation_, in which the _Ratio Formalis_ of\n_Falshood_ and _Sin_ consists, wants not the _Concourse_ of _God_; For\nit is _not A Thing_, and having respect to him as its _Cause_, ought\nnot to be called _Privation_, but _Negation_; for certainly \u2019tis no\n_Imperfection_ in _God_, that he has given me a _freedome_ of _Assenting_\nor _not Assenting_ to some things, the _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge\nwhereof he has not _Imparted_ to my _Understanding_; but certainly \u2019tis\nan _Imperfection_ in me, that I _abuse_ this _liberty_, and _pass_ my\n_Judgement_ on those things which I do _not Rightly_ Understand.\n\nYet I see that \u2019tis Possible with _God_ to effect that (tho I should\nremain _Free_, and of a _Finite Knowledge_) I should _never Err_, that\nis, if he had endowed my _Understanding_ with a _clear_ and _distinct_\nKnowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an _Occasion_ of\n_deliberating_; or if he had only so firmly fix\u2019d in my Mind, that I\nshould never forget, this, _That I must never Judge of a thing which I\ndo not clearly and distinctly Understand_; Either of which things had\n_God_ done, I easily perceive that _I_ (as consider\u2019d in my self) should\nbe _more perfect_ then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that\nthere _may be a greater perfection_ in the _whole Universe_ of Things,\nfor that some of its parts are Obnoxious to _Errors_, and some not, then\nif they were all _alike_. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has\npleased God, that I should _Act_ on the _Stage_ of this _World_ a _Part_\nnot the _chief_ and _most perfect_ of all; Or that I should not be able\nto abstain from _Error_ in the _first way_ above specifi\u2019d, which depends\nupon the _Evident Knowledge_ of those things whereof _I deliberate_; Yet\nthat I may abstain from _Error_ by the _other means_ abovemention\u2019d,\nwhich depends only on this, _That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth\nwhereof is not Evident._ For tho I have experienced in my self this\n_Infirmity_, that I cannot _always_ be intent upon _one_ and the _same_\nKnowledge, yet _I_ may by a _continued_ and _often repeated_ Meditation\nbring this to pass, that as often as _I_ have use of this Rule _I_ may\nRemember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an _habit_ of _not\nerring_.\n\nIn which thing seeing, the _greatest_ and _chief perfection_ of\n_Man_ consists, _I_ repute my self to have gain\u2019d much by this days\n_Meditation_, for that therein _I_ have discover\u2019d the _Cause_ of\n_Error_, _and Falshood_; which certainly can be no other then what _I_\nhave now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, _I_ bridle\nmy _Will_ so that it extend it self _only_ to those things which I\n_clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, it is impossible that I can _Err_.\nFor doubtless All _clear_ and _distinct_ Perception is _something_, and\ntherefore cannot _proceed_ from _Nothing_, but must necessarily have\n_God_ for its _Author_ (_God_, I say, Who is _infinitely Perfect_, and\nwho _cannot Deceive_) and therefore it Must be _True_.\n\nNor have I this Day learnt only what I must _beware off_ that I be not\n_deceived_, but also what I must _Do_ to Discover _Truth_, for _That_ I\nshall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things _only_,\nwhich I _perfectly_ understand; and if I distinguish between those and\nwhat I apprehend but _confusedly_ and _obscurely_; Both which hereafter I\nshall endeavour.\n\n\n\n\nMEDITAT. V.\n\n_~Of the Essence~ of Things ~Material~. And herein Again of ~God~. And\nthat he does ~Exist~._\n\n\nThere are yet remaining many Things concerning _Gods Attributes_, and\nmany things concerning the _nature_ of _my self_ or of my _Mind_, which\nought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some\nother Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite\n(feeling I have discover\u2019d what I must _avoid_, and what I must _Do_ for\nthe _Attaining_ of _Truth_) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my\nself from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try\nwhether I can have any certainty of Material Things.\n\nBut before I enquire whether there be any such things _Really Existent\nwithout_ Me, I ought to consider the _Ideas_ of those things, as they are\nin my Thoughts and try which of them are _Distinct_, which _confused_.\n\nIn which search I find that I _distinctly imagine Quantity_, that which\nPhilosophers commonly call _continued_, that is to say, the _Extension_\nof that _Quantity_ or thing _continued_ into _Length_, _Breadth_, and\n_Thickness_, I can _count_ in it divers Parts, to which parts I can\nassign _Bigness_, _Figure_, _Position_, and _Local Motion_, to which\n_Local Motion_ I can assign _Duration_. Neither are only these _Generals_\nplainly discover\u2019d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration,\nI perceive Innumerable _particulars_ concerning the _Shapes_, _Number_,\nand _Motion_ of These Bodies; The _Truth_ whereof is so _evident_, and\n_agreeable_ to my _Nature_, that when I first discover\u2019d them, I seemed\nnot so much to have _Learnt_ any thing that is _new_, as to have only\n_remembred_ what I have known _before_, or only to have thought on those\nthings which were in me _before_, tho this be the first time that I have\nexamin\u2019d them so _diligently_.\n\nOne thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my\nself innumerable _Ideas_ of certain things, which tho perhaps they _exist\nno where without_ Me, yet they cannot Be said to be _Nothing_; and tho\nthey are _Thought_ upon by me at my _will_ and _pleasure_, yet they are\nnot _made_ by _Me_, but have their own _True_ and _Immutable Natures_.\nAs when, for example, * I _Imagine_ a _Triangle_, tho perhaps such a\n_Figure Exists no where_ out of my _Thoughts_, nor ever _will Exist_,\nyet the _Nature_ thereof is _determinate_, and its _Essence_ or Form is\n_Immutable_ and _Eternal_, which is neither _made_ by me, nor _depends_\non my mind, as appears for that many _properties_ may be _demonstrated_\nof this Triangle, _viz._ That its three Angles are equal to two right\nones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such\nlike, which I now _clearly_ know whether _I will or not_, tho before _I_\nnever thought on them, when I _imagine_ a Triangle, and consequently they\ncould not be invented by Me. And \u2019tis nothing to the purpose for me to\nsay, that perhaps this _Idea_ of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of\n_sense_, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a _Triangular Shape_;\nfor I can think of Innumerable other _Figures_, which I cannot suspect\nto have come in through my _senses_, and yet I can _Demonstrate_ various\n_properties_ of them, as well as of a _Triangle_, which certainly are all\n_true_, seeing I know them _clearly_, and therefore they are _something_,\nand not a meer _Nothing_, for \u2019tis Evident that _what is true is\nsomething_.\n\nAnd now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that _what I clearly perceive,\nis True_; And tho I had _not demonstrated_ it, yet such is the _Nature_\nof my _Mind_, that I could not but give my _Assent_ to what I _so_\nperceive, at least, as long as I _so_ perceive it; and I remember\n(heretofore when I most of all relied on _sensible Objects_) that I held\nthose _Truths_ for the most _certain_ which I _evidently_ perceived,\nsuch as are concerning _Figures_, _Numbers_, with other parts of\n_Arithmetick_, and _Geometry_, as also whatever relates to _pure_ and\n_abstracted Mathematicks_.\n\nNow therefore, if from this alone, _That I can frame the Idea of a Thing\nin my Mind_, it follows, _That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive\nbelonging to a thing_, does _Really belong to it_; Cannot I from hence\ndraw an Argument to Prove the _Existence_ of a _God_? Certainly I find\nthe _Idea_ of a _God_, or _infinitely perfect Being_, as _naturally_ in\nme, as the _Idea_ of any _Figure_, or _Number_; and I as _clearly_ and\n_distinctly_ understand that it appertains to his _Nature Always to Be_,\nas I know that what I can _demonstrate_ of a _Mathematical Figure_ or\n_Number_ belongs to the _Nature_ of that _Figure_ or _Number_: so that,\ntho all things which I have _Meditated_ upon these three or four days\nwere not _true_, yet I may well be as _certain_ of the _Existence_ of a\n_God_, as I have hitherto been of _Mathematical Truths_.\n\n_Doubt._ Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so _evident_, but\nlooks rather like a _sophism_; for seeing I am used in all other things\nto _Distinguish Existence_ from _Essence_, I can easily perswade my self\nthat the _Existence_ of _God_ may be _distinguish\u2019d_ from his _Essence_,\nso that I may _Imagine God_ not to _Exist_.\n\n_Solution._ But considering it more strictly, \u2019tis manifest, that the\n_Existence_ of _God_ can no more be _seperated_ from his _Essence_,\nthen the _Equality_ of the _Three Angles_ to _two right ones_ can be\n_seperated_ from the _Essence_ of a _Triangle_, or then the _Idea_ of a\n_Mountain_ can be _without_ the _Idea_ of a _valley_; so that \u2019tis no\nless a _Repugnancy_ to think of a _God_ (that is, _A Being infinitely\nperfect_) who wants _Existence_ (that is, who wants a _Perfection_) then\nto think of a _Mountain_, to which there is _no Valley adjoyning_.\n\n_Doubt._ But what if I cannot imagine _God_ but as _Existing_, or a\n_Mountain without a Vally_? yet supposing me to think of a _Mountain with\na Vally_, it does not from thence follow, that there _Is a Mountain_\nin the World; so supposing me to think of a _God_ as _Existing_, yet\ndoes it not follow that _God Really Exists_. For my _Thought imposes_\nno _necessity_ on Things, and as I may imagine a _Winged Horse_, tho no\n_Horse_ has _Wings_, so I may imagine an _existing God_, tho no _God\nexist_.\n\n_Solution._ \u2019Tis true the _Sophism_ seems to lie in this, yet tho I\ncannot conceive a _Mountain_ but with a _Vally_, it does not from hence\nfollow, that a _Mountain_ or _Vally_ do _Exist_, but this will follow,\nthat whether a _Mountain_ or a _Vally do_ or _do not Exist_, yet they\ncannot be _seperated_: so from hence that I cannot think of _God_ but\nas _Existing_, it follows that _Existence_ is _Inseperable_ from _God_,\nand therefore that he _Really Exists_; Not because my _Thought_ does\nall this, or _Imposes_ any _necessity_ on any Thing, but contrarily,\nbecause the _necessity_ of the thing it self (_viz._ of _Gods Existence_)\n_Determines_ me to _think_ thus; for \u2019tis not in my Power to think a\n_God_ without _Existence_ (that is, _A Being absolutely perfect_ without\nthe _Cheif Perfection_) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either\n_with_ or _without Wings_.\n\n_Doubt._ And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose _God\nExisting_, after I have supposed him _endowed_ with all _Perfections_,\nseeing _Existence_ is one of them; but that my _First Position_ (_viz._\nHis _Absolute Perfection_) is not _necessary_. Thus, for example, \u2019tis\nnot _necessary_ for me to think all _Quadrilateral Figures_ inscribed in\na _Circle_; But supposing that I think _so_, I am then _necessitated_ to\nConfess a _Rhombe Inscribed_ therein, and yet this is evidently _False_.\n\n_Solution._ For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a _God_; yet\nas often as I cast my Thoughts on a _First_ and _Cheif Being_, and as\nit were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an _Idea_ thereof,\nI must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of _Perfections_, tho\nI do not at that time _count_ them over, or _Remark_ each single One;\nwhich _necessity_ is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to\nconsider _Existence_ to be a _Perfection_) conclude _Rightly, That the\nFirst and Chief Being does Exist_. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at\nany time to imagine a _Triangle_, yet whenever I please to Consider of a\n_Right-lined Figure_ having only _three Angles_, I am then _necessitated_\nto allow it all those _Requisites_ from which I may argue rightly, _That\nthe Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones_, Tho\nupon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I\nenquire what Figures may be _inscribed_ within a _Circle_, I am not at\nall _necessitated_ to think that all _Quadrilateral Figures_ are of that\nsort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing,\nbut what I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand: and therefore there\nis a great Difference between these _False suppositions_, and _True\nnatural Ideas_, the _first_ and _Chief_; whereof is that of a _God_;\nFor by many wayes I understand _That_ not to be a _Fiction depending_\non my _Thought_, but an _Image_ of a _True_ and _Immutable Nature_;\nAs first, because I can think of no other thing but _God_ to Whose\n_Essence Existence_ belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine _Two_ or _More\nGods_, and supposing that he is _now_ only One, I may plainly perceive\nit _necessary_ for _Him_ to _Have been from Eternity_, and _will Be to\nEternity_; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in _God_,\nWhich I cannot _Change_, and from which I cannot _Detract_.\n\nBut whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one\nThing, That I am fully perswaded of the _Truth_ of those things only,\nwhich appear to me _clearly_ and _distinctly_. And tho some of those\nthings, which I so perceive, are obvious to _every_ Man, and some are\nonly discover\u2019d by Those that search more _nighly_, and enquire more\n_carefully_, yet when such _truths_ are discover\u2019d, they are esteem\u2019d\nno less _certain_ than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily\nappear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal\nto the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended\nunder its Largest Angle, yet the _first Proposition_ is _no less\ncertainly_ believed when once \u2019tis perceived, then this _Last_.\n\nThus in Reference to _God_; certainly, unless I am overrun with\n_Prejudice_, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with _sensible\nObjects_, I should acknowledge nothing _before_ or _easier_ then him;\nFor what is more _self-evident_ then that there is a _Chief Being_, or\nthen that a _God_ (to whose _essence alone Existence_ appertains) does\n_Exist_? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus\nmuch, yet _Now_, I am not only equally _certain_ of it, as of what seems\nmost _certain_, but I perceive also that the _Truth_ of other Things so\n_depends_ on it, that without it nothing can ever be _perfectly known_.\n\nFor tho my _nature_ be _such_, that during the time of my _Clear_ and\n_Distinct_ Perception, I cannot but believe it _true_; yet my _Nature_\nis _such_ also, that I cannot fix the _Intention_ of my _Mind_ upon one\nand the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it _clearly_, and the\nRemembrance of what _Judgement_ I have formerly made is often stirred\nup, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a\nJudgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not _know\nGod_) may easily _move_ me in my _Opinion_; and by this means I shall\nnever attain to the _true_ and _certain Knowledge_ of any Thing, but\n_Wandring_ and _Unstable opinions_. So, for example, when I consider the\nNature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the\nPrinciples of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right\nones; And this I must of necessity think _True_ as long as I attend to\nthe _Demonstration_ thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from\nthe _Consideration_ of its _Proof_ (altho I remember that I have once\n_Clearly_ perceived it) yet perhaps I may _doubt_ of Its _Truth_, being\nas yet _Ignorant_ of a _God_; For I may perswade my self, that I am so\nframed by _Nature_, as to be _deceived_ in those things which I imagine\nmy self to perceive most _evidently_, Especially when I recollect, that\nheretofore I have often accounted many things _True_ and _Certain_, which\nafterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive\nthat there is a _God_; because at the same time I also Understand\nthat all things _Depend_ on Him, and that he is not a _Deceiver_; and\nwhen from hence I Collect that all those Things which I _clearly_ and\n_distinctly_ perceive are _necessarily True_; tho I have no further\nRespects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it _True_, yet if\nI do but remember, that I have _once clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceived\nit, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me\n_doubt_, but that I have _true_ and _certain_ Knowledge thereof; and not\nonely of that, but of all other _Truths_ also which I remember that I\nhave _once Demonstrated_, such as are _Geometrical Propositions_ and the\nlike.\n\nWhat now can be _Objected_ against me? shall I say, that I am so made by\n_Nature_, as to be often _deceived_? No; For I now Know that I cannot be\n_deceived_ in those Things, which I _clearly_ Understand. Shall I say,\nthat at other times I have esteem\u2019d many Things _True_ and _Certain_,\nwhich afterwards I found to be _falsities_? No; for I perceived none\nof those things _clearly_ and _distinctly_, but being Ignorant of this\n_Rule_ of _Truth_, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward\nfound to be _Weak_. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I\nobjected) that Perhaps I am _asleep_, and that what I now think of is\nno more _True_, then the _Dreams_ of People _asleep_? But this it self\n_moves_ not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were _asleep_, if any thing\nappear\u2019d _evident_ to my Understanding, \u2019twould be _True_.\n\nAnd Thus I Plainly see, that the _Certainty_ and _Truth_ of all _Science_\nDepends on the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_, so that before I had _Known\nHim_, I did _Know nothing_; But now many things both of _God_ himself,\nand of other _Intellectual Things_, as also of _Corporeal nature_, which\nis the _Object_ of _Mathematicks_, may be _Plainly Known_ and _Certain_\nto me.\n\n\n\n\nMEDITAT. VI.\n\n_~Of Corporeal Beings~, and Their ~Existence~: As Also of the Real\nDifference, Between ~Mind~ and ~Body~._\n\n\nIt now remains that I examine whether any _Corporeal Beings_ do _Exist_;\nAnd already I know that (as they are the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_)\nthey _May_ (at least) _Exist_, for I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive\nthem; and doubtless _God_ is _able_ to _make_, whatever I am _able_ to\n_perceive_, and I never Judged any thing to be _beyond_ his _Power_, but\nwhat was _Repugnant_ to a _distinct perception_. Moreover, such _Material\nBeings seem_ to _Exist_ from the _faculty_ of _Imagination_, which I\nfind my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I\nattentively Consider what _Imagination_ is, \u2019twill appear to be only _a\ncertain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or\nObject that is before it_; and if it be _before it_, It must _Exist_.\n\nBut that this may be made more _Plain_, I must first examine the\n_difference_ between _Imagination_, and _pure Intellection_, or\n_Understanding_. So, for example, when I _Imagine_ a Triangle, I do not\nonly _Understand_ that it is a _figure comprehended_ by _three Lines_,\nbut I also _behold_ with the _eye_ of my _mind_ those _three lines_ as\nit were _before Me_, and this is that which I call _imagination_. But\nif I convert my Thoughts to a _Chiliogone_, or _Figure consisting_ of a\n_Thousand Angles_, I know as well that this Is a _figure comprehended_ by\na _Thousand sides_, as I know that a _Triangle_ is a _Figure Consisting_\nof _three sides_; but I do not in the same Manner _Imagine_, or _behold_\nas _present_ those _thousand sides_, as I do the _three sides_ of a\n_Triangle_. And tho at the time when I so think of a _Chiliogone_, I may\n_confusedly_ represent to my self some _Figure_ (because whenever I Think\nof a _Corporeal Object_, I am used to _Imagine_ some _Shape_ or other)\nyet \u2019tis evident that this _Representation_ is not a _Chiliogone_,\nbecause \u2019tis in nothing _different_ from what I should Represent to my\nself if I thought of a _Milion-angled figure_, or any other Figure of\n_More sides_; Neither does such a _Confused Representation_ help me in\nthe least to know those _Properties_, by which a _Chiliogone_ differs\nfrom other _Polygones_ or _Manyangled Figures_. But if a Question be\nput concerning a _Pentagone_, I know I may _Understand its Shape_, as\nI _Understand_ the _Shape_, of a _Chiliogone_, without the help of\n_Imagination_, but I can also _imagine_ it, by applying the _Eye_ of my\n_Mind_ to its _Five sides_, and to the _Area_ or _space_ contained by\nThem; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a _peculiar\nsort_ of _Operation_ in the _Mind_ to _imagine_ a Thing, which I require\nnot to _Understand_ a Thing; which _New Operation_ of the _Mind_ plainly\nshews the _difference_ between _imagination_ and _pure Intellection_.\n\nBesides this, I Consider that this _Power_ of _Imagination_ which is in\nme (as it differs from the _Power_ of _Understanding_) does not appertain\nto the _Essence_ of _Me_, that is, of _my mind_, for tho I _wanted_ it,\nyet certainly I should be the _same He, that_ now _I am_: from whence it\nseems to follow, that it depends on something _different_ from _my self_;\nand I easily perceive that if any _Body_ whatever did _Exist_, to which\nmy _Mind_ were so _conjoyn\u2019d_, that it may Apply it self when it pleased\nto _Consider_, or (as it were) _Look_ into _this Body_; From hence, I\nsay, I perceive _It may so be_, that by this very _Body_ I may _Imagine\nCorporeal Beings_: So that this _Manner_ of _Thinking_ differs from _pure\nIntellection_ only in this, that the _Mind_, when it _Understands_, does\nas it were turn _it self_, to _it self_, or _Reflect_ on it self, and\n_beholds_ some or other of those _Ideas_ which are in it self; But when\nit _Imagines_, it _Converts_ it self upon _Body_, and therein _beholds_\nsomething Conformable to that _Idea_, which it hath _understood_, or\n_perceived_ by _Sense_.\n\nBut \u2019tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination\n_May be_ so performed, supposing _Body_ to _Exist_. And because no\nso convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence\nI _probably_ guess, that _Body_ does _Exist_. But this I only say\n_probably_, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments\ndrawn from the _distinct Idea_ of _Body_, which I find in my\n_Imagination_, yet I find none of them, from whence I may _necessarily_\nconclude, _that Body does Exist_.\n\nBut I have been accustomed to _Imagine_ many other things besides that\n_Corporeal Nature_ which is the _Object_ of _pure Mathematicks_; such\nas are, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Tasts_, _Pain_, &c. but none of these so\n_distinctly_. And because I perceive these better by _Sense_, from Which\nby the Help of the _Memory_ they come to the _Imagination_, that I may\nwith the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to\nConsider _Sence_, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of\n_Thought_, which I call _Sense_, I can deduce any certain Argument for\nthe _Existence_ of _Corporeal Beings_.\n\nAnd first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were,\nwhich being perceived by _Sence_ I have heretofore thought _True_, and\nthe _Reasons_ why I _so thought_: I will then enquire into the _Reasons_\nfor which I afterwards _doubted_ those things. And last of all I will\nconsider what I _ought_ to _think_ of those Things at _Present_.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses._]\n\nFirst therefore I have always thought that I have had an _Head_,\n_Hands_, _Feet_, and other _Members_, of which _This Body_ (which I have\nlook\u2019d upon as a _Part_ of _Me_, or Perhaps as my _Whole self_) Consists;\nAnd I have also thought that this _Body_ of _Mine_ is Conversant or\nengaged among many _Other Bodies_, by which it is Liable to be _affected_\nwith what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_; What was _Advantagious_\nI judged by a certain _sense_ of _Pleasure_, what was _Hurtful_ by\na _sense_ of _Pain_. Furthermore, besides _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, I\nperceived in my self _Hunger_, _Thirst_, and other such like _Appetites_,\nas also certain _Corporeal Propensions_ to _Mirth_, _Sadness_, _Anger_,\nand other like _Passions_.\n\nAs to What hapned to me from _Bodies without_, Besides the _Extension_,\n_Figure_, and _Motion_ of those _Bodies_, I also perceived in them\n_Hardness_, _Heat_, and other _tactile Qualities_, as also _Light_,\n_Colours_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Sounds_, &c. and by the _Variation_ of\nthese I _distinguish\u2019d_ the _Heaven_, _Earth_, and _Seas_, and all other\n_Bodies_ from each other.\n\nNeither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these _Ideas_\nof _Qualities_, which offer\u2019d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone\nI _properly_ and _Immediately perceived_) that I thought my self to\nPerceive some Things _Different_ from my _Thought, viz._ The _Bodies_ or\n_Objects_ from whence these _Ideas_ might _Proceed_; for I often found\nthese _Ideas_ come upon me without my _Consent_ or _Will_; so that I can\nneither perceive an _Object_ (_tho I had a mind to it_) unless it were\n_before_ the Organs of my _Sense_; Neither can I _Hinder_ my self from\nperceiving it, when it is _Present_.\n\nAnd seeing that those _Ideas_ which I take in by sense are much more\n_Lively_, _Apparent_ and in their kind more _distinct_, than any of those\nwhich _I knowingly_ and _Willingly_ frame by Meditation, or stir up in\nmy _Memory_; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from _my self_.\nThere remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from\nsome other Things _Without_ Me. Of Which Things seeing _I_ have no other\nKnowledge but from these _Ideas_, _I_ cannot Think but that these _Ideas_\nare _like_ the Things.\n\nMoreover, Because _I_ remember that _I_ first made use of my _senses_\nbefore my _Reason_; and because _I_ did perceive that those _Ideas_\nwhich _I_ my self did frame were not so _Manifest_ as those which _I_\nreceived by my _senses_, but very often _made up of their parts_, _I_ was\neasily perswaded to think that _I_ had no _Idea_ in my _Understanding_,\nwhich I had not _First_ in my _sense_.\n\nNeither was it without Reason that _I_ Judged, _That Body_ (which by a\n_peculiar right I_ call my _Own_) to be _more nighly_ appertaining to\n_Me_ then any _other Body_. For from It, as from other _Bodies_, _I_\ncan never be _seperated_, _I_ was _sensible_ of all _Appetites_ and\n_Affections in It_ and _for It_, and lastly _I_ perceived _pleasure_ and\n_Pain_ in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the\n_sense_ of Pain a certain _Grief_, and from the _sense_ of _pleasure_ a\ncertain _Joy_ of the _Mind_ should arise, or Why that _Gnawing_ of the\n_stomach_, Which _I_ call _Hunger_, should put me in mind of _Eating_, or\nthe _driness_ of my _Throat_ of _Drinking_, _I_ can give no other Reason\nbut _that I am taught so by Nature_. For to my thinking there is no\n_Affinity_ or _Likeness_ between that _Gnawing_ of the _Stomach_, and the\ndesire of _Eating_, or between the _sense_ of _Pain_, and the _sorrowful\nthought_ from thence arising. But in this as in all other _judgments_\nthat I made of _sensible objects_, I seem\u2019d to be taught by _Nature_, for\nI first perswaded my self that things were _so_ or _so_, before ever I\nenquired into a Reason that may prove it.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I doubted my senses._]\n\n[Sidenote: _Medit. I._]\n\nBut afterwards I discover\u2019d many experiments, wherein my _senses_ so\ngrosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers\nwhich seem\u2019d _Round_ a far off, nigh at hand appear\u2019d _square_, and\n_large_ Statues on their tops seem\u2019d _small_ to those that stood on the\nground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the _judgements_\nof my _outward senses_ were _deceived_: and not of my _outward_ only,\nbut of my _inward senses_ also; for what is more _intimate_ or _inward_\nthan _Pain_? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut\noff, that they have felt _pain_ in that part which they _wanted_, and\ntherefore I am not _absolutely certain_ that any part of me is affected\nwith _pain_, tho I _feel pain_ therein. To these I have lately added\ntwo very _general Reasons_ of _doubt_; The first was, that while I was\n_awake_, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could\nnot think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I were _a sleep_; And seeing\nI cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my _sleep_ proceeds\nfrom _outward Objects_, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I\nperceive whilst I am _awake_? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing\nI know not the _Author_ of my _Being_ (or at least I then _supposed_ my\nself not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered\nby _Nature_ as to be _deceived_ even in those things which appear\u2019d to me\nmost _true_. And as to the _Reasons_, which induced me to give _credit_\nto _sensible_ Things, \u2019twas easie to return an answer thereto, for\nfinding by experience, that I was impelled by _Nature_ to many Things,\nwhich _Reason_ disswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I\nwas taught by _Nature_. And tho the perceptions of my _senses_ depended\nnot on my _Will_, I thought _I_ should not therefore conclude, that they\nproceeded from _Objects different_ from my self; for perhaps there may\nbe some other _Faculty_ in me (tho as yet _unknown_ to me) which might\nframe those _perceptions_.\n\n[Sidenote: _How far the senses are now to be trusted._]\n\nBut now that I begin better to know _my self_ and the Author of my\n_Original_, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my\n_senses_ are _rashly_ to be _admitted_, neither are all things so _had_,\nto be _doubted_. And first because I know that whatever I _clearly_\nand _distinctly_ perceive, _may be_ so made by _God_ as I perceive\nthem; the _Power_ of _understanding clearly_ and _distinctly_ one Thing\n_without_ the other is sufficient to make Me _certain_ that One Thing is\n_different_ from the Other; because it _may_ at least be placed apart by\n_God_, and that it may be esteem\u2019d _different_, it matters not by what\n_Power_ it _may_ be so _sever\u2019d_. And therefore from the knowledge I\nhave, that _I my self exist_, and because at the same time I understand\nthat nothing else appertains to my _Nature_ or _Essence_, but that I am a\n_thinking Being_, I rightly conclude, that my _Essence_ consists in this\nalone, that I am a _thinking Thing_. And tho _perhaps_ (or, as I shall\nshew presently, \u2019tis _certain_) I have a _Body_ which is very _nighly_\nconjoyned to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and _distinct\nIdea_ of my self, as I am only a _thinking Thing, not extended_; and on\nthe other side because I have a _distinct Idea_ of my _Body_, as it is\nonely an _extended_ thing, _not thinking_, \u2019tis from hence _certain_,\nthat I _am really distinct from my Body_, and that I can _exist without_\nit.\n\nMoreover I find in my self some _Faculties_ endow\u2019d with _certain_\npeculiar waies of _thinking_, such as the _Faculty_ of _Imagination_,\nthe _Faculty_ of _Perception_ or _sense_; without which _I_ can conceive\nmy _whole self clearly_ and _distinctly_, but (changing the phrase) _I_\ncannot _conceive_ those _Faculties_ without _conceiving My self_, that\nis, an _understanding substance_ in which they are; for none of them\nin their _formal Conception_ includes _understanding_; from whence I\nperceive they are as _different_ from _me_, as the _modus_ or _manner_ of\na Thing is _different_ from the _Thing it self_.\n\nI acknowledge also, that I have several other _Faculties_, such as\n_changing_ of _place_, _putting on various shapes_, &c. Which can\nno more be understood without a _substance_ in which they are, then\nthe foremention\u2019d _Faculties_, and consequently they can no more be\nunderstood to _Exist_ without that _substance_: But yet \u2019tis Manifest,\nthat this sort of _Faculties_, to the End they may exist, ought to be\nin a _Corporeal_, _Extended_, and not in an _Understanding substance_,\nbecause _Extension_, and not _Intellection_ or _Understanding_ is\nincluded in the _Clear_ and _Distinct conception_ of them.\n\nBut there is also in me a certain _Passive Faculty_ of _sense_, or of\n_Receiving_ and _Knowing_ the _Ideas_ of _sensible Things_; of which\n_Faculty_ I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in\nsomething else, a certain _Active Faculty_ of _Producing_ and _Effecting_\nthose _Ideas_. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no\n_Understanding_, and those _Ideas_ are Produced in me, tho I help not,\nand often against my _Will_. There remains therefore no Place for this\n_Active Faculty_, but that it should be in some _substance different_\nfrom me. In which because all the _Reallity_, which is contain\u2019d\n_Objectively_ in the _Ideas_ Produced by that _Faculty_, ought to be\ncontain\u2019d _Formally_ or _Eminently_ (as I have Formerly taken notice)\nthis _substance_ must be either _a Body_ (in which what is in the\n_Ideas Objectively_ is contain\u2019d _Formally_) or it Must Be _God_, or\nsome _Creature_ more _excellent_ then a _Body_ (In which what is in the\n_Ideas Objectively_ is contain\u2019d _Eminently_). But seeing that _God_ is\nnot a _Deceivour_, \u2019tis altogether Manifest, that _he_ does not Place\nthese _Ideas_ in me either _Immediately_ from himself, or _Mediately_\nfrom any other Creature, wherein their _Objective Reallity_ is not *\ncontain\u2019d _Formally_, but only _Eminently_. And seeing _God_ has given\nme no _Faculty_ to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from _Corporeal_\nor _Incorporeal Beings_, but rather a _strong Inclination_ to believe\nthat they are sent from _Corporeal Beings_, there is no Reason Why God\nshould not be counted a _Deceiver_, if these _Ideas_ came from any Where,\nbut from _Corporeal Things_. Therefore we must conclude that there are\n_Corporeal Beings_. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend\nthem by _my sense_ (for Perception by sense is in many Things very\n_Obscure_ and _Confused_) but those things at least, which I _clearly_\nand _distinctly_ Understand, that is to say, all those things which are\ncomprehended under the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_; those things I\nsay at least are _True_.\n\nAs to What Remains, They are either some _Particulars_, as that the\nSun is of such a _Bigness_ or _Shape_, _&c._ or they are Things less\n_Clearly_ Understood, as _Light_, _Sound_, _Pain_, &c. And tho these and\nsuch like Things may be very _Doubtful_ and _Uncertain_, yet because\n_God_ is not a _Deceiver_, and because that (Therefore) none of my\nOpinions can be _false_ unless God has Given me some _Faculty_ or other\nto _Correct_ my _Error_, hence \u2019tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes\nof attaining _Truth_ even in these very Things.\n\nAnd certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever _I_ am taught by _Nature_\nhas something therein of _Truth_. By _Nature_ in General I understand\neither _God_ himself, or the _Coordination_ of Creatures Made by God.\nBy my _Own Nature_ in _Particular_ I understand the _Complexion_ or\n_Association_ of all those things which are given me by God.\n\nNow there is nothing that this _my Nature_ teaches me more _expresly_\nthen that I have a _Body_, Which is not _Well_ when I _feel Pain_, that\nthis _Body_ wants _Meat_ or _Drink_ When I am _Hungry_ or _Dry_, _&c._\nAnd therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are _True_. And\nby this _sense_ of _Pain_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, &c. My _Nature_ tells me\nthat _I_ am not in my _Body_, as a _Mariner_ is in his _Ship_, but that I\nam most _nighly conjoyn\u2019d_ thereto, and as it were _Blended therewith_;\nso that _I_ with _It_ make up _one_ thing; For Otherwise, when the _Body_\nwere hurt, _I_, who am only a _Thinking Thing_, should not therefore\n_feel_ Pain, but should only _perceive_ the Hurt with the _Eye_ of my\n_Understanding_ (as a _Mariner perceives_ by his _sight_ whatever is\nbroken in his Ship) and when the _Body_ wants either Meat or Drink, I\nshould only _Understand_ this want, but should not have the _Confused\nsense_ of _Hunger_ or _Thirst_; I call them _Confused_, for certainly\nthe _Sense_ of _Thirst_, _Hunger_, _Pain_, &c. are only _Confused Modes_\nor _Manners_ of _Thought_ arising from the _Union_ and (as it were)\n_mixture_ of the _Mind_ and _Body_.\n\nI am taught also by _Nature_, that there are many other _Bodies Without_\nand _About_ my _Body_, some whereof are to be _desired_, others are to\nbe _Avoided_. And because that I Perceive very Different _Colours_,\n_Sounds_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, _Hardness_, and the Like, from\nthence I Rightly conclude that there are _Correspondent Differences_ in\n_Bodies_, from which these _different perceptions_ of _sense_ proceed,\ntho perhaps not _Alike_. And because that some of these _perceptions_\nare _Pleasant_, others _Unpleasant_, \u2019tis evidently _certain_, that my\n_Body_, or rather my _Whole self_ (as _I_ am compounded of a _Mind_ and\n_Body_) am liable to be _Affected_ by these _Bodies_ which encompass me\nabout.\n\nThere are many Other Things Also which _Nature_ seems to teach Me, but\n_Really_ I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an _ill use_ of\nPassing my Judgement _Inconsiderately_, and from hence it is that these\nthings happen often to be _false_; as that all _space_ is _Empty_, in\nwhich I find _nothing_ that _works_ upon my _Senses_; That in a _hot\nBody_ there is something _like_ the _Idea_ of _Heat_ which is in me; That\nin a _White_ or _Green_ Body there is the same _Whiteness_ or _Greenness_\nwhich I _perceive_; And the same _Taste_ in a _bitter_ or _sweet_ Thing,\n_&c._ That _Stars_, _Castles_, and Other _Remote_ Bodies are of the same\n_Bigness_ and _Shape_, as they are _Represented_ to my _senses_: and\nsuch like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter,\nwhich I cannot _Distinctly_ perceive, it behoves me here to determine\nmore _Accurately_ What I mean when I say, _That I am taught a Thing by\nNature_.\n\nHere I take _Nature_ more _strictly_, then for the _Complication_ of all\nthose Things which are Given me by _God_; For in this _Complication_\nthere are many things contain\u2019d which relate to the _Mind alone_, as,\nThat I perceive What is _done_ cannot be _not Done_, and all Other things\nwhich are known by the _Light_ of _Nature_, but of these I speak not at\npresent. There are also many Other Things which belong _only_ to the\n_Body_, as, That it _tends Downwards_ and such like, of these also I\ntreat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only which _God_ hath\nbestowed upon me as I am _Compounded_ of a _Mind_ and _Body together_,\nand not _differently Consider\u2019d_. \u2019Tis _Nature_ therefore thus taken that\nteaches me to _avoid troublesome Objects_, and _seek_ after _pleasing\nOnes_; but it appears not that this _Nature_ teaches us to conclude any\nthing of these Perceptions of our _senses_, before that we make by our\n_Understanding_ a diligent examination of _outward Objects_; for to\nEnquire into the _Truth_ of Things belongs not to the _Whole Compositum_\nof a Man as he Consists of _Mind_ and _Body_, but to the _Mind alone_.\n\nSo that tho a _star affect_ my eye no _more_ then a _small spark_ of\nFire, yet there is in my Eye no _Real_ or _Positive Inclination_ to\n_believe_ One no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been used to\nJudge from my Childhood without any Reason: and tho coming nigh the Fire\nI feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to\nperswade me, That in the Fire there is any thing _like_ either that Heat\nor that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be,\nthat excites in us those _sensations_ of Heat or Pain: and so tho in some\nspace there may be nothing that Works on my _senses_, it does not from\nthence follow, that there is no _Body_ there; for I see that in these\nand many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because\nI use these _perceptions_ of _sense_ (which properly are given me by\nNature to make known to the mind what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_ to\nthe _Compositum_, whereof the _mind_ is part, and _so far_ only they are\n_Clear_ and _Distinct_ enough) as _certain Rules_ immediately to discover\nthe _Essence_ of _External Bodies_, of Which they make known nothing but\nvery _Obscurely_ and _Confusedly_.\n\n[Sidenote: Medit. 4.]\n\nI have * formerly shewn how my _Judgement_ happens to be false\nnotwithstanding _Gods Goodness_. But now there arises a new _Difficulty_\nconcerning those very things which _Nature_ tells me I am to _prosecute_\nor _avoid_, concerning my _Internal senses_, Wherein I find many\n_Errors_, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort\nof Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance\nit cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the\n_Poyson_, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire\nthe _Meat_ only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can\nbe concluded but, That _Mans-Nature_ is not _All-knowing_; which is no\nWonder seeing Man is a _Finite Being_, and therefore nothing but _Finite\nPerfections_ belong to him.\n\nBut We often err even in those things to Which we are _Impelled_ by\n_Nature_, as when sick men desire that _Meat_ or _Drink_, which will\ncertainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply\u2019d, That\nthey _Err_ in this because their _Nature_ is _Corrupt_. But this Answers\nnot the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less _Gods Creature_ then a Man\nin Health, and therefore \u2019tis as Absurd to Imagine a _Deceitful Nature_\nimposed by _God_ on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made\nup of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the _Laws_ of its\n_Nature_, when it is _ill_ contrived, and tells the hours _falsly_, as\nwhen it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if\nI consider the body of a Man as a meer _Machine_ or _Movement_, made up\nand compounded of _Bones_, _Nerves_, _Muscles_, _Veins_, _Blood_, and\n_Skin_; so that, tho there were no _mind_ in It, yet It would perform all\nthose Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from\nthe _Will_, and consequently from the _Mind_) I do easily acknowledge,\nthat it would be as _natural_ for him (if for example sake he were sick\nof a _Dropsie_) to suffer that _Driness_ of his _Throat_ which uses to\nbring into his mind the _sense_ of _Thirst_, & that thereby his Nerves\nand other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his\ndisease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no\nsuch Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to\nDrink, when \u2019tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a\nClock I may say that it _Errs_ from its _Nature_, when it tells the Hours\n_wrong_, and so considering the _Movement_ of a _Mans Body_ as contrived\nfor such _Motions_ as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That\nalso to _Err_ from its _Nature_, if its _Throat_ is _Dry_, when it has\nno want of Drink for its _Preservation_. Yet I Plainly discover, that\nthis last _Acceptation_ of _Nature_ differs much from that whereof we\nhave been speaking all this While, for this is only a _Denomination\nextrinsick_ to the Things whereof \u2019tis spoken, and _depending_ on my\n_Thought_, while it _Compares_ a _sick_ man, and a _disorderly_ Clock\nwith the _Idea_ of an _healthy_ man and a _Rectified_ Clock. But by\n_Nature_ in its former _Acceptation_ I Understand something that is\n_Really_ in the _Things_ themselves, which therefore has something of\n_Truth_ in it.\n\nBut tho Respecting only a _Body sick_ of a Dropsie it be an _Extrinsick\nDenomination_ to say, that its _Nature_ is _Corrupt_, because it has\na _Dry Throat_, and stands in _no need_ of Drink; yet respecting the\n_Whole Compound_ or _Mind joyn\u2019d_ to such a _Body_, \u2019tis not a _meer\nDenomination_, but a _real Error_ of _Nature_ for it to _thirst_ when\n_drink_ is _hurtful_ to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how\nthe _Goodness_ of _God_ suffers _Nature so taken_ to be _deceivable_.\n\nFirst therefore I understand that a _chief difference_ between my _Mind_\nand _Body_ consists in this, That my _Body_ is of its _Nature divisible_,\nbut my _Mind indivisible_; for while I consider my _Mind_ or _my self_,\nas I am only a _thinking Thing_, I can distinguish _no parts_ in Me,\nbut I perceive my self to be but _one entire_ Thing; and tho the _whole\nMind_ seems to be _united_ to the _whole Body_, yet a Foot, an Arm, or\nany other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive\nany _part_ of my _Mind_ taken away; Neither can its _Faculties_ of\n_desiring_, _perceiving_, _understanding_, &c. be called its _Parts_, for\n\u2019tis one and the _same_, _mind_, that _desires_, that _perceives_, that\n_understands_; Contrarily, I cannot think of any _Corporeal_ or _extended\nBeing_, which I cannot easily _divide_ into _Parts_ by my thought, and by\nthis I understand it to be _divisible_. And this alone (if I had known it\nfrom no other Argument) is sufficient to inform me, that my _mind_ is\n_really distinct_ from my _Body_.\n\nNextly I find, that my _mind_ is not _immediately affected_ by all parts\nof my _body_, but only by the _Brain_, and perhaps only by one small part\nof it, That, to wit, wherein the _common sense_ is said to reside; Which\npart, as often as it is disposed in the _same manner_, will represent to\nthe _mind_ the _same thing_, tho at the same time the other parts of the\n_body_ may be _differently_ order\u2019d. And this is proved by numberless\nExperiments, which need not here be related.\n\nMoreover I discover that the _nature_ of my _body_ is such, that no part\nof it can be _moved_ by an other _remote_ part thereof, but it may also\nbe _moved_ in the _same manner_ by some of the _interjacent_ parts, tho\nthe more _remote_ part lay still and acted not; As for example in the\nRope,\n\n                                 A\u2e3aB\u2e3aC\u2e3aD\n\nif its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than\nif one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D.\nrest quiet. So when I feel _pain_ in my _Foot_, the consideration of\nPhysicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of _Nerves_\ndispersed through the Foot, which from thence being _continued_ like\nRopes to the very Brain, whilst they are _drawn_ in the Foot, they also\n_draw_ the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein\nexcite a certain _motion_, which is ordain\u2019d by _Nature_ to affect the\n_mind_ with a _sense_ of _Pain_, as being in the _Foot_. But because\nthese Nerves must pass through the _Shin_, the _Thighs_, the _Loins_, the\n_Back_, the _Neck_, before they can reach the _Brain_ from the _Foot_, it\nmay so happen, that tho _that part_ of them, which is in the Foot were\nnot touch\u2019d, but only some of their _intermediate parts_, yet the same\n_motion_, would be caused in the _Brain_, as when the _Foot_ it self is\n_ill affected_, from whence \u2019twill necessarily follow, that the _mind_\nshould _perceive_ the same _Pain_. And thus may we think of any other\n_Sense_.\n\nI understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform\u2019d in that\npart of the _Brain_, which _immediately affects_ the _mind_, excites\ntherein only one sort of _sense_, nothing could be contrived more\nconveniently in this case, than that, of all those _Senses_ which it\ncan cause, it should cause that which _cheifly_, and most _frequently_\nconduces to the _conservation_ of an _healthful Man_; And experience\nwitnesses, that to this very _end_ all our _senses_ are given us by\n_Nature_; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not\nabundantly testifie the _Power_ and _Goodness_ of _God_. Thus for\nExample, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than\nordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the\n_Medulla Spinalis_ of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it\nsignifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is\nthis but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited\nto use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the\nFoot. But the _Nature_ of _Man_ might have been so _order\u2019d_ by _God_,\nthat That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other\nthing, _viz._ either it self as \u2019tis in the Brain, or it self as it is\nin the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or\nlastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much\nconduced to the _Conservation_ of the _Body_. In the like manner when we\nwant drink, from thence arises a certain _dryness_ in the _Throat_, which\nmoves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the\nBrain, and this motion _affects_ the _mind_ with the _sense_ of _thirst_;\nbecause that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then\nthat we _want drink_ for the _Preservation_ of our _Health_. So of the\nRest.\n\nFrom all which \u2019tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the _infinite\nGoodness_ of God) \u2019tis impossible but the _Nature_ of _Man_ as he\nconsists of a _mind_ and _body_ should be _deceivable_. For if any cause\nshould excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any\nother part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the\nBrain, that _self same_ motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being\ntroubled, the _Pain_ would be felt _as in the Foot_, and the _sense_\nwould be _naturally_ deceived; for \u2019tis consonant to Reason (seeing that\nThat same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same\nsense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause _hurtful_ to the _Foot_, than\nfrom any other) I say \u2019tis reasonable, that it should make known to the\n_mind_ the Pain of the _Foot_, rather than of any other _part_. And so\nif a _dryness_ of _Throat_ arises (not as \u2019tis used from the _necessity_\nof _drink_ for the _conservation_ of the _Body_, but) from an _unusual\nCause_, as it happens in a _Dropsie_, \u2019tis far better that it should\n_then deceive us_; then that it should _alwayes deceive_ us when the\n_Body_ is in _Health_, and so of the Rest.\n\nAnd this consideration helps me very much, not only to _understand_ the\n_Errors_ to which my _Nature_ is subject, but also to _correct_ and\n_avoid_ them. For seeing I know that all my _Senses_ do oftener inform\nme _falsly_ than _truely_ in those things which conduce to the _Bodies\nadvantage_; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one\nto _Examine_ the same thing, as also I can use _memory_, which joyns\npresent and past things together, and my _understanding_ also, which\nhath already discovered to me all the _causes_ of my _Errors_, I ought\nno longer to fear, that what my _Senses_ daily represent to me should be\nfalse. But especially those _extravagant Doubts_ of my First Meditation\nare to be turn\u2019d off as ridiculous; and perticularly the _chief_ of\nthem, _viz_. That * of not _distinguishing Sleep_ from _Waking_, for now\nI plainly discover a great _difference_, between them, for my _Dreams_\nare never _conjoyned_ by my _memory_ with the other _actions_ of _my\nlife_, as whatever happens to me _awake_ is; and certainly if (while\nI were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently\ndisappear (as in _Dreams_) so that I could not tell _from whence_ he\ncame or _where_ he went, I should rather esteem it a _Spectre_ or\n_Apparition feign\u2019d_ in my Brain, then a _true Man_; but when such\nthings occur, as I distinctly know from _whence_, _where_, and _when_\nthey come, and I _conjoyn_ the _perception_ of them by my _memory_ with\nthe other _Accidents_ of my _life_, I am _certain_ they are represented\nto me _waking_ and not _asleep_, neither ought I in the least to doubt\nof their _Truth_, if after I have called up all my _senses_, _memory_,\nand _understanding_ to their _Examination_ I find nothing in any of\nthem, that clashes with other truths; For _God_ not being a _Deceiver_,\nit follows, that In such things I am not _deceived_. But because the\n_urgency_ of _Action_ in the common _occurrences_ of _Affairs_ will not\nalwayes allow time for such an _accurate examination_, I must confess\nthat _Mans life_ is _subject_ to many _Errors_ about _perticulars_, so\nthat the _infirmity_ of our _Nature_ must be _acknowledged_ by Us.\n\n\n_FINIS._\n\n\n\n\nADVERTISEMENT CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS.\n\n\nAmong seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against\nthese Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy,\nas being Penn\u2019d by _Thomas Hobbs_ of _Malmesbury_, a Man famously known\nto the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and\ntherefore \u2019tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to\nhis Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength\nof a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance,\nso fares it with these _Meditations_ which stand unshaken by the\nViolent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess\u2019d\nthat the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot\nbe well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr.\n_Hobbs_\u2019s Philosophy, especially His Book _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_,\nThe former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore\nnot Impertinently refer\u2019d to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And\nthis is the Reason that makes the Great _Des-Cartes_ pass over many of\nthese Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the\nwhole Fabrick of the _Hobbian Philosophy_ had he but known upon What\nFoundations it was Built.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECTIONS\n\nMade against the Foregoing\n\nMEDITATIONS,\n\nBY THE FAMOUS\n\n_THOMAS HOBBS_\n\nOf MALMESBURY,\n\nWITH\n\n_DES-CARTES\u2019S_\n\nANSWERS.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. I.\n\n_Against the First Meditation: Of things Doubtful._\n\n\n\u2019Tis evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation, that\nthere is no _sign_ by Which we may Distinguish our _Dreams_ from _True\nSense_ and _Waking_, and therefore that those _Phantasmes_ which we\nhave waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward\nObjects, neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist; and\ntherefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground, we may well\ndoubt whether any Thing _Be_ or _Not_. We therefore acknowledge the Truth\nof this Meditation. But Because _Plato_ and other Antient Philosophers\nargued for the same _incertainty_ in sensible Things, and because \u2019tis\ncommonly Observed by the Vulgar that \u2019tis hard to Distinguish Sleep from\nWaking, I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts\nput forth so antique Notions.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nThose Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as _true_,\nwere proposed by Me only as _Probable_, and I made use of them not that\nI may vend them as _new_, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my\nReaders for the Consideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they seem\u2019d\nto me very necessary; And partly that thereby I may shew how firm those\nTruths are, which hereafter I lay down, seeing they cannot be Weaken\u2019d by\nthese Metaphysical Doubts: So, that I never designed to gain any Honor by\nrepeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, then a Writer in\nPhysick can pass over the Description of a Disease, Whose Cure he intends\nto Teach.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. II.\n\n_Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind._\n\n\nI _am a Thinking Thing_. \u2019Tis True; for because I _think_ or have a\n_Phantasme_ (whether I am _awake_ or _asleep_) it follows that _I am\nThinking_, for _I Think_ and _I am Thinking_ signifie the same Thing.\nBecause _I Think_, it follows That _I am_, for whatever _Thinks_ cannot\nbe _Nothing_. But when he Adds, _That is_, _a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an\nUnderstanding_, _Reason_, I question his Argumentation; for it does not\nseem a Right Consequence to say, _I am a Thinking Thing_, therefore _I am\na Thought_, neither, _I am an Understanding Thing_, therefore _I am the\nUnderstanding_. For in the same manner I may Conclude, _I am a Walking\nThing_, therefore _I am the Walking it self_.\n\nWherefore _D.Cartes_ Concludes that an _Understanding Thing_ and\n_Intellection_ (which is the _Act_ of an Understanding Thing) are the\nsame; or at least that an _Understanding Thing_ and the _Intellect_\n(which is the _Power_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet\nall Philosophers distinguish the _subject_ from its _Faculties_ and\n_Acts_, that is, from its _Properties_ and _Essence_, for the _Thing it\nself_ is one thing, and its _Essence_ is an other. It may be therefore\nthat a _Thinking Thing_ is the _Subject_ of a _Mind_, _Reason_, or\n_Understanding_, and therefor it may be a _Corporeal Thing_, the Contrary\nWhereof is here _Assumed_ and not _Proved_; and yet this _Inference_ is\nthe _Foundation_ of that Conclusion which _D.Cartes_ would Establish.\n\n[Sidenote: * _Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the\nforegoing Meditations here Objected against._]\n\nIn the same Meditation, on, * _I know that I am, I ask, What I am Whom I\nThus Know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely so taken depends not\non those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant_.\n\n\u2019Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on this,\n_I think_ as he hath rightly inform\u2019d us; but from whence have we the\nknowledge of this Proposition, _I think_? certainly from hence only,\nthat we cannot conceive any _Act_ without its _subject_, as _dancing_\nwithout a _Dancer_, _knowledge_, without a _Knower_, _thought_ without a\n_thinker_.\n\nAnd from hence it seems to follow, that a _thinking Thing_ is a\n_Corporeal Thing_; for the _Subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood only\nin a _Corporeal way_, or after the manner of _matter_, as he himself\nshews hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its\n_colour_, _consistence_, _shape_, and other _Acts_ is yet known to\ncontinue the _same thing_, that is, the _same matter subject_ to so many\n_changes_. But I cannot conclude from another _thought_ that _I now\nthink_; for tho a Man may _think_ that he _hath thought_ (which consists\nonly in _memory_) yet \u2019tis altogether impossible for him to _think_ that\nhe _now thinks_, or to _know_, that _he knows_, for the question may be\nput _infinitely_, how do you _know_ that you _know_, that you _know_,\nthat you _know_? &c.\n\nWherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on\nthe knowledge of this _I think_, and the knowledge of this is from hence\nonly, that we cannot separate _thought_ from _thinking matter_, it seems\nrather to follow, that a _thinking thing_ is _material_, than that \u2019tis\n_immaterial_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nWhen I said, _That is a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_,\n&c. I did not mean by these _names_ the _Faculties_ only, but the\n_things_ indow\u2019d with those _Faculties_; and so \u2019tis alwayes understood\nby the two first names (_mind_ and _soul_) and very often so understood\nby the two last Names (_understanding_ and _Reason_) and this I have\nexplain\u2019d so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that\nthere is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning.\n\nNeither is there any parity between _Walking_ and _Thought_, for\n_walking_ is used only for the _Act_ it self, but _thought_ is sometimes\nused for the _Act_, sometimes for the _Faculty_, and sometimes for the\n_thing_ it self, wherein the _Faculty_ resides.\n\nNeither do I say, that the _understanding thing_ and _intellection_ are\nthe same, or that the _understanding thing_ and the _intellect_ are the\nsame, if the _intellect_ be taken for the _Faculty_, but only when \u2019tis\ntaken for the _thing it self that understands_. Yet I willingly confess,\nthat I have (as much as in me lay) made use of _abstracted words_ to\nsignifie that _thing_ or _substance_, which I would have devested of all\nthose things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher\nuses the most _concrete Words_ to signifie this _thinking thing_, such\nas _subject_, _matter_, _Body_, &c. that he may not suffer it to be\nseparated from _Body_.\n\nNeither am I concern\u2019d that His manner of joyning many things together\nmay seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I\nseparate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and\nspeak of things.\n\n_It may be_ (sayes he) _that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing,\nthe contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved._ But herein he is\nmistaken, for I never _assumed_ the _contrary_, neither have I used it as\na _Foundation_, for the rest of _my Superstructure_, but left it wholly\n_undetermin\u2019d_ till the _sixth Meditation_, and in that \u2019tis proved.\n\nThen he tells us rightly, _that we cannot conceive any Act without its\nsubject_, as _thought_ without a _thinking thing_, for what _thinks_\ncannot be _nothing_; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against\nthe usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, _that hence it\nseem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being_. Truly the\n_subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood under the notion of _substance_,\nor if you please under the notion of _matter_ (that is to say of\n_metaphysical matter_) but not therefore under the notion of _Bodies_.\n\nBut Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some\n_Spiritual_, some _Corporeal_ substances. And by the Instance of Wax I\nonly proved that _Colour_, _Consistence_, _Shape_, &c. appertain not to\nthe _Ratio Formalis_ of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of\nthe _Ratio Formalis_ of the _Mind_, neither of _Body_.\n\nNeither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts,\n_That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought_, for Who\nbesides Himself ever Imagin\u2019d This? But that I may explain the matter in\na few words, \u2019Tis certain that _Thought_ cannot be without a _Thinking\nThing_, neither any _Act_ or any _Accident_ without a _substance_ wherein\nit resides. But seeing that we know not a _substance immediately by it\nself_, but by this alone, that \u2019tis the _subject_ of several _Acts_, it\nis very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should\ncall by _different names_ those _substances_, which we perceive are the\n_subjects_ of very _different Acts_ or _Accidents_, and that afterwards\nwe should examine, whether those _different names_ signifie _different_\nor _one_ and the _same_ thing. Now there are some _Acts_ which we call\n_corporeal_, as _magnitude_, _figure_, _motion_, and what ever else\ncannot be thought on without _local extension_, and the _substance_\nwherein these reside we call _Body_; neither can it be imagin\u2019d that\n\u2019tis one _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _Figure_, and another\n_substance_ which is the _subject_ of _local motion_, &c. Because all\nthese _Acts_ agree under one common notion of _Extension_. Besides\nthere are other _Acts_, which we call _cogitative_ or _thinking_, as\n_understanding_, _will_, _imagination_, _sense_, &c. All which agree\nunder the common notion of _thought_, _perception_, or _Conscience_;\nAnd the _substance_ wherein they are, we say, is a _thinking thing_,\nor _mind_, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not\nconfound it with _corporeal substance_, because _cogitative Acts_ have\nno affinity with _corporeal Acts_, and _thought_, which is the common\n_Ratio_ of _those_ is wholly different from _Extension_, which is the\ncommon _Ratio_ of _These_. But after we have formed two _distinct\nconceptions_ of these two _substances_, from what is said in the sixth\nMeditation, \u2019tis easie to know, whether they be _one_ and the _same_ or\n_different_.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. III.\n\n\n* _Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them\nis it that can be separated from me?_\n\nSome perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who _think_ am\ndistinct from my _thought_, and my _thought_ is _different_ from me\n(tho\u2019 not _seperated_) as _dancing_ is _distinguished_ from the _Dancer_\n(as before is noted.) But if _Des-Cartes_ will prove, that _he_ who\n_understands_ is the same with his _understanding_, we shall fall into\nthe Scholastick expressions, the _understanding understands_, the _sight\nsees_, the _Will wills_, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or\nat least the _Faculty_ of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure,\nimproper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble\n_Des-Cartes_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nI do not deny, that _I_ who _think_ am _distinct_ from my _thought_,\nas a _thing_ is _distinguish\u2019d_ from its _modus_ or _manner_; But when\nI ask, _which of them is it that is distinct from my thought_? this I\nunderstand of those various _modes_ of _thought_ there mention\u2019d, and\nnot of _substance_; and when I subjoyn, _which of them is it that can be\nseparated from me_? I only signifie that all those _modes_ or _manners_\nof _thinking_ reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of\n_doubt_ or _obscurity_ can be imagined.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. IV.\n\n\n* _It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this\nWax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is._\n\nThere is a great Difference between _Imagination_ (that is) having\nan _Idea_ of a Thing, and the _Conception of the Mind_ (that is) a\n_Concluding_ from _Reasoning_ that a thing _Is_ or _Exists_. But\n_Des-Cartes_ has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides,\nthe Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver\u2019d as a Doctrine, that\n_substance_ is not _perceived_ by _sense_ but is _Collected_ by\n_Ratiocination_.\n\nBut what shall we now say, if perhaps _Ratiocination_ be nothing Else but\na _Copulation_ or _Concatenation_ of _Names_ or _Appellations_ by this\nWord _Is_? From whence \u2019twill follow that we _Collect_ by _Reasoning_\nnothing _of_ or _concerning_ the _Nature_ of _Things_, but of the _names_\nof _Things_, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we _joyn_ the\n_Names_ of _Things_ according to the _Agreements_ which at Pleasure we\nhave made concerning their _significations_; if it be so (as so it may\nbe) _Ratiocination_ will depend on _Words_, _Words_ on _Imagination_,\nand perhaps _Imagination_ as _also Sense_ on the _Motion_ of _Corporeal\nParts_; and so the _Mind_ shall be nothing but _Motions_ in some Parts of\nan _Organical Body_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nI have here Explain\u2019d the Difference between _Imagination_, and the Meer\n_Conception_ of the _Mind_, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax,\nwhat it is therein which we _Imagine_, and what it is that we _conceive_\nin our _Mind_ only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place\nHow we _understand_ one way, and _Imagine_ an other way One and the same\nThing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure.\n\nThere is in _Ratiocination_ a _Conjunction_ not of _Words_, but of\n_Things signified_ by _Words_; And I much admire that the _Contrary_\ncould Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that\na _Frenchman_ and a _German_ may argue about the _same Things_, tho\nthey use very _Differing Words_? and does not the Philosopher Disprove\nhimself when he speaks of the _Agreements which at pleasure we have made\nabout the significations of Words_? for if he grants that _something_ is\n_Signified_ by _Words_, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are\nrather about this _something_, then about _Words_ only? and by the same\nRight that he concludes the _Mind_ to be a _Motion_, he may Conclude Also\nthat the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. V.\n\n_Against the Third Meditation of God._\n\n\n* _Some of These (viz. ~Humane Thoughts~) are as it were the Images of\nThings, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when\nI Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God._\n\nWhen I Think on a _Man_ I perceive an _Idea_ made up of _Figure_ and\n_Colour_, whereof I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of a _Man_\nor not; and so when I think on _Heaven_. But when I think on a Chimera, I\nperceive an _Image_ or _Idea_, of which I may _doubt_ whether it be the\n_Likeness_ of any _Animal_ not only at present Existing, but possible to\nExist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not.\n\nBut thinking on an _Angel_, there is offer\u2019d to my Mind sometimes the\n_Image_ of a _Flame_, sometimes the _Image_ of a _Pretty Little Boy_\nwith _Wings_, which I am certain has no _Likeness_ to an _Angel_, and\ntherefore that it is not the _Idea_ of an _Angel_; But beleiving that\nthere are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are\nInvisible, and Immaterial, upon the _Thing Believed_ or _supposed_ we\nImpose the _Name_ of _Angel_; Whereas the _Idea_, under which I Imagine\nan Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things.\n\nIn the like manner at the Venerable Name of _God_, we have _no Image_ or\n_Idea_ of God, and therefore we are forbidden to _Worship God_ under any\n_Image_, least we should seem to _Conceive_ Him that is inconceivable.\n\nWhereby it appears that we have no _Idea_ of _God_; but like one _born\nblind_, who being brought to the _Fire_, and perceiving himself to be\n_Warmed_, knows there is _something_ by which he is _warmed_ and Hearing\nit called _Fire_, he Concludes that _Fire Exists_, but yet knows not of\nwhat _shape_ or _Colour_ the Fire is, neither has he any _Image_ or\n_Idea_ thereof in his _Mind_.\n\nSo Man knowing that there must be some _Cause_ of his _Imaginations_\nor _Ideas_, as also an other _cause before That_, and so _onwards_, he\nis brought at last to an _End_, or to a _supposal_ of some _Eternal\nCause_, Which because it never _began_ to _Be_ cannot have any other\n_Cause before it_, and thence he Concludes that \u2019tis _necessary_ that\nsome _Eternal Thing Exist_: and yet he has no _Idea_ which He can call\nthe _Idea_ of this _Eternal Thing_, but he names this _Thing_, which he\nbelieves and acknowledges by the Name _God_.\n\nBut now _Des-Cartes_ proceeds from this Position, _That we have an Idea\nof God in our Mind_, to prove this Theoreme, _That God (that if an\nAlmighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists_, whereas he ought to have\nexplain\u2019d this _Idea_ of _God_ better, and he should have thence deduced\nnot only his _Existence_, but also the _Creation_ of the World.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nHere the Philosopher will have the Word _Idea_ be only Understood\nfor the _Images_ of _Material_ Things represented in a _Corporeal_\nPhantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no\nProper _Idea_ of an _Angel_ or _God_. Whereas as I declare every Where,\nbut especially in this Place, that I take the Name _Idea_ for whatever is\nimmediately _perceived_ by the _Mind_, so that when I _Will_, or _Fear_,\nbecause at the same time I _perceive_ that I _Will_ or _Fear_, this\nvery _Will_ or _Fear_ are reckon\u2019d by me among the number of _Ideas_;\nAnd I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with\nthe Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of _Perceptions_ in the\n_Divine Mind_, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in\n_God_: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by.\n\nAnd I think I have sufficiently explain\u2019d the _Idea_ of _God_ for those\nthat will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those\nthat will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them.\n\nLastly, what is here added concerning the _Creation_ of the World is\nwholly beside the Question in hand.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. VI.\n\n\n* _But there are Other (~Thoughts~) That have Superadded Forms to them,\nas when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have\nalwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object\nof my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something\nMore which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of\nthese Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them\nJudgements._\n\nWhen any one _Fears_ or _Wills_, he has certainly the _Image_ of the\n_Thing Fear\u2019d_, or _Action Will\u2019d_, but what more a _Willing_ or\n_Fearing_ Man has in his Thoughts is not explain\u2019d; and tho _Fear_ be a\n_Thought_, yet I see not how it can be any other then the _Thought_ of\nthe _Thing Fear\u2019d_; For what is the _Fear_ of a _Lion rushing on me_, but\nthe _Idea_ of a Lion Rushing on me, and the _Effect_ (which that _Idea_\nproduces in the _Heart_) whereby the Man _Fearing_ is excited to that\nAnimal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of _Flying_\nis not _Thought_, it remains therefore that in _Fear_ there is no other\n_Thought_, but that which consists in the _likeness_ of the thing. And\nthe same may be said of _Will_.\n\nMoreover _Affirmation_ and _Negation_ are not without a _voice_ and\n_words_, and hence \u2019tis that Brutes can neither _affirme_ or _deny_ not\nso much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge.\nBut yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we\n_affirme_ that a Man runs, we have not a _thought_ different from what\na Dog has when he sees his Master running; _Affirmation_ therefore or\n_Negation_ superadds nothing to _meer thoughts_, unless perhaps it adds\nthis thought, that the _names_ of which an _Affirmation_ consists are (to\nthe Person _affirming_) the _Names_ of the _same thing_; and this is not\nto comprehend in the _thought_ more then the _likeness_ of the _thing_,\nbut it is only comprehending the same _likeness twice_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\n\u2019Tis self evident, That \u2019tis one thing to _see_ a Lion and at the same\ntime to _fear_ him, and an other thing _only_ to _see_ him. So \u2019tis one\nthing to _see_ a Man Running, and an other thing to _Affirme_ within my\nself (which may be done without a voice) That I _see_ him.\n\nBut in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. VII.\n\n\n* _Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of\nGod, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes\nit to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to\ndo, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so\nto work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add\nto, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is\ninnate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self._\n\nIf there be no _Idea_ of _God_, as it seems there is _not_ (and here \u2019tis\nnot proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And\nas to the _Idea_ of _my self_ (if I respect the _Body_) it proceeds from\n_Sight_, but (if the _Soul_) there is no _Idea_ of a _Soul_, but we\ncollect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body,\nthat imparts to it _Animal Motion_, by which it _perceives_ and _moves_,\nand this (whatever it be) without any _Idea_ we call a _Soul_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nIf there be an _Idea_ of _God_ (as \u2019tis manifest that there is) this\nwhole _Objection_ falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, _That we\nhave no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination_, \u2019Tis the same\nas if he should say, that there is no _Image_ thereof represented in the\n_Phantasie_, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an _Idea_.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. VIII.\n\n\n* _An other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomers,\nthat is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions._\n\nAt the same time we can certainly have but one _Idea_ of the Sun, whether\nit be look\u2019d at by our eyes, or collected by _Ratiocination_ to be much\nbigger than it seems; for this last is not an _Idea_ of the Sun, but a\nproof by Arguments, that the _Idea_ of the _Sun_ would be much larger, if\nit were look\u2019d at nigher. But at different or several times the _Ideas_\nof the Sun may be diverse, as if at one time we look at it with our bare\neye, at an other time through a Teloscope; but Astronomical arguments do\nnot make the _Idea_ of the Sun greater or less, but they rather tell us\nthat the _sensible Idea_ thereof is _false_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nHere also (as before) what he says is not the _Idea_ of the Sun, and yet\nis described, is that very thing which I call the _Idea_.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. IX.\n\n\n* _For without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something\nmore, or (as I may say) have more of objective Reality in them, then\nthose that represent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which\nI understand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent,\nCreatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more\nobjective reality, then those by which Finite substances are exhibited._\n\nI have before often noted that there can be no _Idea_ of _God_ or\nthe _Mind_: I will now superadd, That neither can there be an _Idea_\nof _Substance_. For _Substance_ (Which is only _Matter Subject_ to\n_Accidents_ and _Changes_) is _Collected_ only by _Reasoning_, but\nit is not at all _Conceived_, neither does it _represent_ to us any\n_Idea_. And if this be true, How can it be said, _That those Ideas\nwhich represent to us Substances have in them something More, or More\nObjective Reality, then those which represent to us Accidents_? Besides,\nLet _Des-Cartes_ again Consider what he means by ~More Reality~? Can\n_Reality_ be increas\u2019d or diminish\u2019d? Or does he think that One _Thing_\ncan be _More A Thing_ then an other Thing? let him Consider how this can\nbe Explain\u2019d to our Understandings with that _Perspicuity_ or Clearness\nwhich is requisite in all _Demonstrations_, and Which He Himself is used\nto present us with upon other Occasions.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nI have often noted before, That that very Thing which is _evidenc\u2019d_\nby _Reason_, as also whatever else is perceived by any other Means, is\nCalled by Me an _Idea_. And I have sufficiently explain\u2019d How _Reality_\nmay be _Encreas\u2019d_ or _Diminish\u2019d_, in the same manner (to wit) as\n_Substance_ is _More_ a _Thing_, then A _Mode_; and if there be any such\nthings as _Real Qualities_, or _Incomplete Substances_, these are _More\nThings_ then _Modes_, and _Less Things_ then _Complete Substances_:\nand Lastly if there be an _Infinite Independent Substance_ this is\n_More_ a _Thing_, then a _Finite, Dependent Substance_. And all this is\nself-evident.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. X.\n\n\n* _Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider\nwhether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its\nOriginal from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance,\nIndependent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self and every\nthing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All\nwhich attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively\nI consider them, the Less I Conceive my self alone possible to be the\nAuthor of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must\nConclude there is a God._\n\nConsidering the _Attributes_ of _God_, that from thence we may gather an\n_Idea_ of _God_, and that we may enquire whether there be not something\nin that _Idea_ which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover\n(if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the _Venerable name_\nof _God_ proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that\nthey should have any other _Original_ then from _Outward Objects_. For\nby the Name of _God_ I understand a ~Substance~, that is, I understand\nthat _God_ Exists (not by an _Idea_, but by Reasoning) ~Infinite~ (that\nis, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I\ncan Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an _Idea_ of\n_Gods Infinity_ but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the\nWord _Infinite_. ~Independent~, That is, I do not conceive any _Cause_\nfrom which _God_ may proceed; from whence \u2019tis evident that I have no\nother _Idea_ at the word _Independent_, but the memory of my own _Ideas_\nwhich at Different Times have _Different Beginnings_, and Consequently\nthey must be _Dependent_.\n\nWherefore, to say that God is _Independent_, is only to say That _God_ is\nin the Number of those things, the _Original_ whereof I do not Imagine:\nand so to say that _God_ is _Infinite_, is the same as if we say That He\nis in the Number of Those Things whose _Bounds_ we do not Conceive: And\nthus any _Idea_ of _God_ is Exploded, for What _Idea_ can we have without\n_Beginning_ or _Ending_?\n\n~Omniscient~ or Understanding all things, Here _I_ desire to know, by\nwhat _Idea_, _Des-Cartes_ understands _Gods Understanding_? ~Almighty~,\nI desire also to know by What _Idea Gods Power_ is _understood_? For\n_Power_ is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For\nmy Part, I understand _Power_ from the Image or Memory of past Actions,\narguing with my self thus, He did so, therefore he was _able_ (or had\n_Power_) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have\n_Power_ to do so. But now all these are _Ideas_ that may arise from\n_external Objects_.\n\n~Creatour~ of all things, _I_ can frame an _Image_ of _Creation_ from\nwhat I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that\nshape and size he now bears; an other _Idea_ then this no man can have at\nthe word _Creatour_; But the _Possibility_ of _Imagining_ a Creation is\nnot sufficient to prove that the world _was created_. And therefore tho\nit were _Demonstrated_ that some _Infinite Independent Almighty Being_\ndid _exist_, yet it will not from thence follow that a _Creatour exists_;\nunless one can think this to be a right inference, we _believe_ that\nthere exists something that has created all other things, therefore the\nworld _was Created_ thereby.\n\nMoreover when he says, that the _Idea_ of _God_, and of our _Soul_ is\n_Innate_ or _born in us_, I would fain know, whether the _Souls_ of those\nthat _sleep soundly_ do _think_ unless they _dream_; If not, then at that\ntime they have no _Ideas_, and consequently no _Idea_ is _Innate_, for\nwhat is _Innate_ to us is never _Absent_ from us.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nNone of _Gods_ Attributes can proceed from _outward objects_ as from a\n_Pattern_, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in\n_External_, that is, _Corporeal_ things; Now \u2019tis manifest that whatever\nwe think of in him _differing_ or _unlike_ what we find in them proceeds\nnot from them, but from a cause of that very _diversity_ in our Thought.\n\nAnd here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces _Gods\nUnderstanding_ from _outward Things_, and yet I can easily explain\nwhat _Idea_ I have thereof, by saying, that by the _Idea_ of _Gods\nUnderstanding_ I conceive whatever is the _Form_ of any _Perception_;\nFor who is there that does not perceive that he _understands_\nsomething or other, and consequently he must thereby have an _Idea_ of\n_understanding_, and by enlarging it _Indefinitely_ he forms the _Idea_\nof _Gods Understanding_. And so of his other Attributes.\n\nAnd seeing we have made use of that _Idea_ of _God_ which is in us to\ndemonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain\u2019d in this _Idea_\nsuch an _Immense Power_, that we conceive it a contradiction for _God_ to\n_Exist_, and yet that any thing should _Be_ besides Him, which was not\n_Created_ by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence\nwe demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from\n_God_, were _Created_ by God.\n\nLastly when we assert, that some _Ideas_ are _Innate_ or _natural_ to us,\nwe do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no _Idea_\nwould be _Innate_) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of\nproducing them.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. XI.\n\n\n* _The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it\nimpossible for me to be of the same nature I am, ~viz~, having the Idea\nof a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very\nsame God, whose Idea I have in my mind._\n\nWherefore seeing \u2019tis not _demonstrated_ that we have an _Idea_ of\n_God_, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that _God_ is\n_Inconceivable_, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an _Idea_ of\nHim, it follows, that the _Existence_ of _God_ is not demonstrated, much\nless _the Creation_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nWhen _God_ is said to be _Inconceiveable_ \u2019tis understood of an _Adequate\nfull conception_. But I am \u2019een tired with often repeating, how\nnotwithstanding we may have an _Idea_ of _God_. So that here is nothing\nbrought that makes any thing against my _demonstration_.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. XII.\n\n_Against the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falshood._\n\n\n* _By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being,\nDependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err\nthere is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God._\n\n\u2019Tis Certain that _Ignorance_ is only a _Defect_, and that there is no\nOccasion of any _Positive Faculty_ to make us _Ignorant_. But this\nposition is not so clear in Relation to _Error_, for Stones and Inanimate\nCreatures cannot _Err_, for this Reason only, because they have not the\n_Faculties_ of _Reasoning_ or _Imagination_; from whence \u2019tis Natural\nfor us to Conclude, That to _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of\n_Judging_, or at least of _Imagining_, both which _Faculties_ are\n_Positive_, and given to all _Creatures_ subject to Error, and to Them\nonly.\n\nMoreover _Des-Cartes_ says thus, _I find_ (my Errors) _to Depend on two\nconcurring Causes_, viz. _on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of\nChoosing, or Freedom of my Will_. Which seems Contradictious to what he\nsaid before; And here also we may note, that _Freedom of Will_ is assumed\nwithout any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nTho to make us _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of _Reasoning_ (or\nrather of _Judging_, that is, of _Affirming_ and _Denying_) because\n_Error_ is the _Defect_ thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that\nthis _Defect_ is any thing _Real_, for neither is _Blindness_ a _Real_\nThing, tho stones cannot be said to be _Blind_, for this Reason only,\nThat they are _incapable of sight_. And I much wonder that in all these\n_Objections_ I have not found one _Right Inference_.\n\nI have not here assumed any thing concerning the _Freedom_ of _Mans\nWill_, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most\nevident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should\nsay that this is Contradictious to any former Position.\n\nPerhaps there may be Many, who respecting _Gods predisposal_ of Things\ncannot Comprehend, How their _Freedom_ of _Will_ Consists there-with,\nbut yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by\nExperience, That \u2019tis one and the same Thing to be _Willing_, and to be\n_Free_. But \u2019tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in\nthis Matter.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. XIII.\n\n\n* _As for Example, When lately I set my self to examine Whether any\nThing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting my self to examine such a\nThing, it evidently follows, That I my self Exist, I could not but Judge,\nwhat I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto\nby any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did\nfollow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so\nmuch the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I\nwas thereunto._\n\nThis expression, _Great Light in the Understanding_, is _Metaphorical_,\nand therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that\nDoubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a _Light_, and has no less a\n_Propension_ in his _Will_ to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that\n_really_ and _truely_ knows a Thing. Wherefore this _Light_ may be the\ncause of _Defending_ and _Holding_ an Opinion _Obstinately_, but never of\n_knowing_ an Opinion _Truly_.\n\nMoreover not only the _Knowledge_ of _Truth_, but _Belief_ or _Giving\nAssent_, are not the _Acts_ of the _Will_; for Whatever is _proved_ by\n_strong Arguments_, or _Credibly_ told, we Believe whether we will or no.\n\n\u2019Tis true, To _Affirm_ or _Deny_ Propositions, to _Defend_ or _Oppose_\nPropositions, are the _Acts_ of the _Will_; but it does not from thence\nFollow that the _Internal Assent_ depends on the _Will_. Wherefore the\nfollowing Conclusion (_so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that\nPrivation consists which Constitutes Error_) is not fully Demonstrated.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\n\u2019Tis not much _matter_, Whether this expression, _Great Light_, be\n_Argumentative_ or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all\nmen know, that by _light in the understanding_ is meant _clearness_ of\n_knowledge_, which every one has not, that _thinks_ he has; and this\nhinders not but this _light_ in the _Understanding_ may be very different\nfrom an _obstinate Opinion_ taken up without _clear perception_.\n\nBut when \u2019tis here said, _That we assent to things clearly perceived\nwhether we will or no_, \u2019tis the same, as if it were said, _that willing\nor nilling, we desire Good clearly known_; whereas the word _Nilling_,\nfinds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill\nthe same thing.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT XIV.\n\n_Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things._\n\n\n* _As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure\nexists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature\nthereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal,\nwhich is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this,\nthat many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle._\n\nIf a Triangle be _no where_, I understand not how it can have _any\nNature_, for what is _no where_, is not, and therefore has not a _Being_,\nor any _Nature_.\n\nA Triangle in the _Mind_ arises from a Triangle _seen_, or from one made\nup of what has been _seen_, but when once we have given the name of a\n_Triangle_ to a thing (from which we think the _Idea_ of a _Triangle_\narises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the _name_ continues; In\nthe like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, _That all\nthe Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones_, and when we have\ngiven this other name (viz. _Having its three Angles equal to two right\nones_) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the\nWorld, yet the _Name_ would still continue, and this Proposition, _A\nTriangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones_, would\nbe _eternally true_. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if\nall Triangles were destroy\u2019d.\n\nThis Proposition likewise, _A Man is an Animal_, will be _true_ to\n_Eternity_, because the Word _Animal_ will eternally signifie what the\nWord _Man_ signifies; but certainly if _Mankind_ perish, _Humane Nature_\nwill be no longer.\n\nFrom whence \u2019tis Manifest, That _Essence_ as \u2019tis distinguish\u2019d from\n_Existence_ is nothing more than the _Copulation_ of _Names_ by this word\n_Is_, and therefore _Essence_ without _Existence_ is meerly a _Fiction_\nof our own; and as the _Image_ of a _Man_ in the _Mind_ is to a _Man_, so\nit seems _Essence_ is to _Existence_. Or as this Proposition _Socrates\nis a Man_, is to this, _Socrates Is or Exists_, so is the _Essence_ of\n_Socrates_ to his Existence. Now this Proposition, _Socrates is a Man_,\nwhen _Socrates_ does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the\nNames, and the word _Is_ carries under it the _Image_ of the _unity_ of\nthe thing, which is called by these _Two Names_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nThe Difference between _Essence_ and _Existence_ is known to all Men. And\nwhat is here said of _Eternal Names_ instead of _Eternal Truth_, has been\nlong ago sufficiently rejected.\n\n\n\n\nOBJECT. XV.\n\n_Against the Sixth Meditation. Of the Existence of Material Beings._\n\n\n* _And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas\nproceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe,\nthat these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should\nnot be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from\nCorporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings\nexist._\n\n\u2019Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for\ntheir Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their\nGood, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the _fault_ of _Deceit_ does\nnot consist in the _falsity_ of _Words_; but in the _Injury_ done to the\nPerson deceived.\n\nLet _D. Cartes_ therefore consider whether this Proposition, _God can\nupon no account deceive us_, Universally taken be _true_; For if it be\nnot _true_ so universally taken, that Conclusion, _Therefore Corporeal\nBeings exist_, will not follow.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\n\u2019Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, _That we\ncannot be deceived on any account_ (for I willingly granted, that we\nmay be _often_ deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our\n_Error_ argues that in _God_ there is such a _Will_ to _Cheat_ us as\nwould be _contradictious_ to his _Nature_. And here again we have a\n_wrong inference_ in this _Objection_.\n\n\n\n\nThe Last Objection.\n\n\n* _For now I plainly discover a great difference between them (~that is\nsleep and waking~) for my Dreams are never conjoyn\u2019d by my Memory, with\nthe other Actions of my Life._\n\nI desire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man _dreaming_, that the\n_doubts_ whether he _dream or not_, may not _Dream_, that he joyns his\n_Dream_ to the _Ideas_ of things past long since; if he may, than those\n_Actions_ of his past life, may be thought as _true_ if he were awake.\n\nMoreover because (as _D. Cartes_ affirms) the _Certainty_ and _truth_ of\nall _knowledge_ depends only on the _knowledge_ of the _True God_, either\nan Atheist cannot from the _Memory_ of his past life conclude that he\nis _awake_, or else \u2019tis possible for a man to know that he is _awake_\nwithout the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_.\n\n\nANSWER.\n\nA Man that _dreams_ cannot _really_ connect his _dreams_ with the _Ideas_\nof past things, tho, I confess, he may _dream_ that he so connects them;\nfor whoever deny\u2019d That a man when he is _a sleep_ may be _Deceived_? But\nwhen he awakens he may easily discover his Error.\n\nAn Atheist from the memory of his past life may collect that he is awake,\nbut he cannot know, that this _Sign_ is sufficient to make him _certain_,\nthat he is not _deceived_, unless he know that he is _created_ by a _God_\nthat will not _deceive_ him.\n\n\nFINIS.\n\n\n\n\n_A Catalogue of some Books sold by ~Benjamin Took~ at the Ship in St.\n~Pauls~ Church-yard._\n\n\n_Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri novem ejusdem narratio de\nvita Homeri, Gr. Lat. & H. Stephani Apologia pro Herodoto accesserunt\nhuic Edition Chronologia Historia, & Tabula Geographica Herodot\u00e6\u00e6,\nnecnon variantes Lectiones & not\u00e6 ex pluribus M. S. S. Cod. & Antiquis\nscriptoribus collect\u00e6._ fol.\n\n_Francisci Suarez. Doct. Theol. Grau. Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo\nLegislatore in decem libros distributus._ fol.\n\n_Thorndicius de Ratione ac Jure finiendi Controversias Ecclesi\u00e6._ fol.\n\nThe Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by _N. Causin_,\ntranslated by Sir _T. H._ the fourth Edition. _fol._\n\nThe Works of the most Reverend _John Bramhal_, D. D. late L. Archbishop\nof _Armagh_, some of which never before printed, with the life of the\nAuthor, _&c._ _fol._\n\nThe History and Vindication of the Irish Remonstrance against all\nCalumnies and Censures in several Treatises. _folio._\n\nA Collection of all the Statutes now in use in the Kingdom of _Ireland_,\nwith Notes in the Margin. And likewise the Acts of Settlement and\nExplanation, with the rest of the Acts, made in the Reign of his Majesty\nthat now is, to the dissolution of the Parliament, _Aug. 7. 1666_.\n\nSeveral Chyrurgical Treatises by _Rich. Wiseman_, Serjeant Chyrurgion.\n_folio._\n\nThe Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined, according\nto the light of Nature, written by Sir _M. Hale_, Kt. late Lord Chief\nJustice of the Kings Bench. _folio._\n\n_Sir Rich. Baker_\u2019s Chronicle of the Kings of _England_ from the Romans\nGovernment to this time.\n\nThirty five Sermons by the Right Reverend _R. Sanderson_ late Lord Bishop\nof _Lincoln_.\n\n_Le Beau Pledeur_, a Book of Entries containing Declarations,\nInformations, and other select and approved Pleadings; with special\nVerdicts and Demurrers in most actions real, personal, and mixt, which\nhave been argued and adjudged in the Courts of _Westminster_, with\nfaithfull references to the most authentick Law Books, by Sir _Humphry\nWinch_, Kt. sometimes one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas,\n_fol._\n\n_Etymologicon Lingu\u00e6 Anglican\u00e6; seu explicatio vocum Anglicarum\nEtymologica ex propriis fontibus. Omnia Alphabetico ordine in quinque\ndistinctas Classes digesta. Authore Step. Skinner, M.D._ folio.\n\nA large Dictionary in three Parts by _Tho. Holyoake_ D.D. _folio._\n\n_Hor\u00e6 Hebraic\u00e6 & Talmudic\u00e6 impens\u00e6 in Evangelium S. Johannis._ p. I.\nLightfoot. quarto.\n\nDoctor _Browns_ Travels in _Hungaria_, _Servia_, _Bulgaria_, _Macedonia_,\n&c. As also through a great part of _Germany_, with Observations on the\nMines, Baths, and mineral Waters in those Parts, illustrated with the\nFigures of some habits and remarkable places. _quarto._\n\nA Representation of the State of Christianity in _England_, and of its\nDecay and Danger from Sectaries as well as Papists.\n\nThe Controversial Letters, or the grand Controversie, concerning the\npretended authority of Popes and true Soveraign of Kings, in 16 Letters.\n_quarto._\n\nA True Widow, a Comedy written by _T. Shadwel_. _quarto._\n\nA Vindication of the sincerity of the Protestant Religion in the point of\nObedience to Sovereigns, opposed to the Doctrine of Rebellion authorised\nand practised by the Pope and the Jesuites, by _Peter Du Moulin_.\n_quarto._\n\n_Phoc\u00e6na_, or the Anatomy of a Porpess dissected at _Gresham_ Colledge,\nwith a Preliminary discourse concerning Anatomy, and a Natural History of\nAnimals. _quar._\n\n_Dodwells_ separation of Churches from Episcopal Government, as practised\nby the present Nonconformists proved Schismatical from such principles\nas are least controverted, and do withal most popularly explain the\nsinfulness and mischief of Schism. _quarto._\n\n\u2014Two Letters of Advice. 1. For the susception of Holy Orders. 2. For\nStudies Theological, especially such as are rational; at the end of the\nformer is inserted a Catalogue of the Christian Writers, and genuine\nworks of the first three Centuries. _octavo._\n\n\u2014Some Considerations of present Concernment; how far Romanists may be\ntrusted by Princes of another Perswasion. _octavo._\n\n\u2014Two short Discourses against the Romanists 1. An Account of the\nfundamental Principle of Popery. 2. An Answer to six Queries. _twelves._\n\nNavigation and Commerce their Original and Progress, containing a\nsuccinct account of Traffick in general, by _John Evelin_, Esq; _octavo._\n\nOf Gifts and Offices in the publick Worship of God, in three parts,\nendeavouring an impartial account, what was in the inspired Age of the\nChurch, what succeeded in the more ordinary State; what reasonably may\nbe allowed in Prayer, singing, and preaching, by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D.\n_octavo._\n\nThe Catechism of the Church of _England_ with marginal Notes, very\nplainly setting forth its meaning, and proving the same out of the\nScriptures, for the use of Schools by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D.\n\nPoems and Songs by _Tho. Flatman_. _octa._\n\nPoems by _N. Tate_. _octavo._\n\nThe Degrees of Consanguinity affinity described and delineated, by\n_Robert Dixon_, D.D. in _octavo_.\n\nThe French Gardiner instructing how to cultivate all sorts of Fruit Trees\nand Herbs for the Garden, together with instructions to dry and conserve\nthem, written in French, and Englished by _Jo. Evelin_, Esq; in _octavo_.\n\n_Ataxi\u00e6 Obstaculum_; being an Answer to several Queries dispersed in\nseveral parts of _Glocestershire_ in _octavo_.\n\n_S. Gardinerus S. T. P. de Trinitate contra Sandium_, in octavo.\n\n_Deus Nobiscum._ A Narrative of a great Deliverance at Sea, by _W.\nJohnson_, D.D. _Ph\u00e6dri Augusti C\u00e6saris Liberti Fabularum Esopiarum Libri\nV. in usum scholarum Angl\u00e6._ octavo.\n\nA Short View of the chief points in Controversie between the Reformed\nChurches, and the Church of _Rome_, by Dr. _Peter Du Moulin_. in _octavo_.\n\nThe Country Parsons advice to his Parishioners in two Parts. 1.\nContaining a plain and serious Exhortation to a Religious Life. 2.\nGeneral Directions how to live accordingly. in _octavo_.\n\n\nFINIS.","title":"Six metaphysical meditations: $b Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":33803}