{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_70666/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_70666","id":"gutenberg_70666","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/70666","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Biology","Ethics","Psychophysiology"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Note\n  Italic text displayed as: _italic_\n\n\n\n\n  THE ETHICS OF\n  HERCULES\n\n\n\n\n_SOME BORZOI TEXT BOOKS_\n\n\n  SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY\n  _Harry E. Barnes_\n\n  THE ORAL STUDY OF LITERATURE\n  _Algernon Tassin_\n\n  THE BASIS OF SOCIAL THEORY\n  _Albert G. A. Balz_\n\n  ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC THEORY\n  _Simon Nelson Patten_\n\n  THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM\n  _Nelson A. Crawford_\n\n  THE TREND OF ECONOMICS\n  _Various Writers_\n\n  AN ANALYSIS OF WRITING\n  _Harold P. Scott_\n\n\n\n\n  THE ETHICS OF\n  HERCULES\n\n  _A Study of Man\u2019s Body as the Sole\n  Determinant of Ethical Values_\n\n\n  BY\n  ROBERT CHENAULT GIVLER, PH.D.\n  _Professor of Philosophy in Tufts College_\n\n\n  [Illustration: Decoration]\n\n  NEW YORK ALFRED \u00b7 A \u00b7 KNOPF MCMXXIV\n\n\n\n\n  COPYRIGHT, 1924, BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.\n\n  _Published, March, 1924_\n\n\n  _Set up, electrotyped, and printed by the Vail-Ballou Press, Inc.,\n    Binghamton, N. Y._\n  _Paper furnished by W. F. Etherington & Co., New York._\n  _Bound by H. Wolff Estate, New York._\n\n  PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n\n\n\n  DEDICATED\n\n  TO\n\n  THE THOUSAND MEN\n\n  OF MY GENERATION\n\n  WHOSE THOUGHT I HAVE THE HONOR\n\n  OF MAKING ARTICULATE.\n\n\n\n\n  \u201c_Waste not free energy; treasure it and make the best use of it._\u201d\n  WILHELM OSTWALD, \u201c_The Imperative of Energetics_.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis book deals with ethics as a strictly natural science, and\nparticularly as a branch of mechanistic psychology. It regards the\nrealm of ethics as coterminous with the arena of human activity, and\nholds that the problems of conduct, being exclusively man\u2019s problems,\nare to be solved by the methods of applied science. Moreover, since\nhuman conduct is in the last analysis dependent upon the postures and\nman\u0153uvres of our muscle-fabric, he who would understand ethics must\nfirst comprehend something of the mechanics of the human organism.\nIndeed, this book attempts to show, not only that ethics and\nphysiology can no longer be studied apart from one another, but also\nthat it is the structure and functions of the human body which have\ndetermined just what our ethical values are.\n\nSuch a program is not strictly original, for the student of\nphilosophy will readily find its antecedents. Nevertheless, while\nmany ethical writers have heretofore given numerous intimations of a\nmechanistic scheme in ethics, yet usually as they proceed to discuss\nwhat are called higher things, they seem to forget that it is the\nhuman body which performs every human action, even those deeds which\nmove us most profoundly. No such faltering, we trust, will be found\nin these pages. Indeed, it may be stated at the outset that one of\nthe fundamental conceptions from which this book originated is that\nthe well-being of the physiological organism is the final criterion\nof whatever is ethically valuable.\n\nThe title, \u201cThe Ethics of Hercules,\u201d is doubly symbolical. Those\nwho have heard of this ancient hero will immediately recognize the\nemphasis which is placed upon that type of personality who with\nstrength, skill, and persistence works out the problem that lies\nnearest at hand. Moreover, Hercules the valiant, the thoroughbred\nwho never once shirked from his task, is here contrasted with\nCinderella, the patron goddess of all those ineffectual dreamers,\nwho, instead of balancing their ethical books day by day, whimper\nafter the supernatural, and cultivate an inner life of subterfuge and\ndisorder. We hold here that no man can have freedom given to him,\nbut that he must earn it by positively constructive, honest efforts\nto adjust himself to and gain control of his environment. The motto\nof Cinderella is, \u201cWhere you are not, there is happiness,\u201d while the\nmotto of Hercules is, \u201cFriends lost, something lost; honor lost, much\nlost; pluck lost, all lost.\u201d\n\nThe realization that in all science many false starts are made before\na single true one is achieved, makes for caution and vigilance.\nSeeing, however, that the trend of ethical thought has been\ncontinually growing more and more mechanistic, it seems not unlikely\nthat we are at the beginning rather than at the end of a chapter in\nthe empirical science of human nature. If this book utters no more\nthan the first sentence of that chapter, the effort will not have\nbeen in vain.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n     I. INTRODUCTION                                                 3\n\n    II. A PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE ANTAGONISM\n        BETWEEN ALL SUCH WORDS AS\n        \u201cGOOD\u201d AND \u201cBAD,\u201d AND \u201cRIGHT\u201d AND\n        \u201cWRONG\u201d                                                     12\n\n   III. THE BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICATION OF THE\n        WORD \u201cGOOD\u201d                                                 36\n\n    IV. THE ACTION-PATTERNS IMPLIED BY THE\n        WORD \u201cBAD,\u201d WITH A NOTE ON THE PHYSIOLOGY\n        OF \u201cEVIL\u201d                                                   58\n\n     V. \u201cRIGHT\u201d AS A GESTURAL SIGN                                  75\n\n    VI. THE MEANING OF THE WORD \u201cWRONG\u201d                            116\n\n   VII. \u201cVIRTUE\u201d AND \u201cVICE\u201d AS FUNCTIONS OF THE\n        ORGANISM                                                   127\n\n  VIII. IS CONSCIENCE ALWAYS A PATHOLOGICAL\n        PHENOMENON?                                                155\n\n    IX. THE MITIGATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN\n        FREEDOM AND OBLIGATION                                     175\n\n     X. THE ACQUISITION OF AN ETHICAL TECHNIQUE                    189\n\n        INDEX                                                      203\n\n\n\n\n  THE ETHICS OF\n  HERCULES\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIt would be an impertinence for an amateur in physiological science\nto assert that the significance of ethical values can be understood\nonly through a study of the mechanics of the human body, were not\nthe ethical implications of physiology so numerous, so compelling,\nand so plainly apparent. Ever since anatomists and physiologists\nfirst began to demonstrate that all the vital functions of man\nwere dependent upon his intimate structure; and more recently that\nconduct and thought are in the strictest sense of the term functions\nof man\u2019s flesh, they have been laying the foundations,\u2014even if\nunconsciously,\u2014of a scrupulously natural science of ethics. The\npurpose of this book is to attempt the formulation of such a science.\n\nThere is little need to state that any proposal to deal with ethics\nin a thoroughly naturalistic manner will be met with considerable\nresistance. Although it has been everlastingly recognized that\nhuman conduct is the direct product of human bodies, especially\nas is evidenced by our bestowal of rewards and punishments on\nindividually specified persons, nevertheless, the opinion still\nwidely prevails that a man and his actions are two such different\nthings that the former cannot be defined in terms of the latter.\nAgainst this naturalistic or mechanistic view,\u2014that a man _is_ what\nhe _does_,\u2014several classes of people tenaciously hold contradictory\nopinions.\n\nThere are, for example, those who consider ethics as the humble\nhandmaid of what is curiously termed \u201crevealed religion,\u201d and who\nconsequently hold that all the knowledge necessary for the conduct of\nlife has long ago been vouchsafed us by Infallible Wisdom. To such\npersons it is of no importance that human nature has actually altered\nto such an extent as to make it necessary to find new solutions\neven for ancient problems; nor does it seem to occur to them that\nthe homage devoted to the past may often be simply a pleasant way\nof escape from the intellectual responsibilities of the present. A\nmechanistic ethics plans to undermine the notion that the ethical\ntruth of one generation is necessarily sufficient for the problems of\nthe generation that succeeds it, and aims to supersede it with the\nview that man\u2019s progress is dependent, not upon his ability to escape\nfrom his problems, but rather upon his ability to analyse and solve\nthem.\n\nAgain, there are those who regard ethics solely as a subject for\nphilosophical discussion on the basis of an ideal never illustrated\nby any one man, but only conceived in abstract terms. \u201cHow should\nthe ideal man behave?\u201d is the sole burden of their discussion.\nEven the mechanist hesitates to condemn this esthetic attitude\ntoward conduct too severely. For it is well known that thinking may\ninvolve preparation for action, and that consequently he who thinks\nout the best course of conduct in advance may be more likely to\nact accordingly when a real problem is to be solved. On the other\nhand, the human body and brain are so constructed that all fanciful\nromancing is necessarily tinged with delusion to such an extent that\nhe who conceives an ideal apart from the actual is bound to lose\nhis orientation. And the sequel of this loss is everywhere manifest\nin purely philosophical discussions about ethics. In the effort to\nextricate themselves from the verbalism in which they are entangled,\nethical theorists have invariably either rejected the world as evil,\nor else they have dug themselves in under a mountain of meaningless\nwords. To all such persons a mechanistic ethics seeks to restore a\nglimpse of the reality they have sought in vain, by showing that the\nhighest ideals need not be in any way fictitious.\n\nResistance to a naturalistic ethics may also be expected from those\nbiologists and physiologists who regard the human body essentially as\na corpse animated by a psyche. These people are known as vitalists,\nand their number is very great. The customary gloom of these men is\ndoubtless derived from their attitude toward the human body, which\nthey know best either in the form of specimens preserved in alcohol,\nor microscopic slides of slaughtered tissue. Now, to be sure, such\nobjects of intense study do not of themselves yield an adequate\npicture of a living, thinking man. But these morphologically-minded\npersons, instead of pertinaciously remembering what manner of\norganism they have slain for research, and instead of keeping ever\nin mind that all human tissues actually die while performing their\nnormal functions, deem it somehow necessary to postulate a vital,\nthat is, an immortal principle, which makes the organism _go_. A\nmore perverse logic does not arise even in the realms of theology.\nOddly enough, the conversation of these men is not so happy as\ntheir metaphysic might indicate. \u201cNo, no,\u201d they will repeat in a\nplaintive outcry, \u201cyou can never find the secret of life.\u201d The\nsentiment underlying such a remark is not difficult for even a casual\nstudent of psychology to detect. Moreover, logicians know that when\na man states a problem in terms of a mystery, and seeks thereby to\nhinder the search for its solution, he commits an error which has\nbeen called \u201cthe fallacy of initial predication.\u201d[1] Obviously,\nindeed, we have already found out fully a thousand of the secrets\nof living matter,\u2014for instance, its principal chemical ingredients,\nits dependence upon oxygen, its optimal temperature, its rate of\ndying with different vital organs removed, and the like,\u2014and so when\na vitalist speaks of \u201c_the_ Secret of Life,\u201d he simply shows that\nhe is still a worshipper of magic. Although the way of intellectual\nprogress lies in another direction, yet, since the majority of\nmankind court mystery as a way of escape from the \u201cdespotism of\nfact,\u201d the vitalist can be expected to lead a voluble resistance\nagainst a mechanistic ethics. Nevertheless, even he can perhaps be\ninduced to recognize that although Psyche does seem to regulate Homo,\nyet it is always the structure of Homo that determines what manner\nof function he shall manifest. And if the mechanist can elicit this\nadmission from the vitalist, he can at least maintain his chief\ncontention. Otherwise, seeing that the mechanists are on the whole\nyounger men than the vitalists, nature\u2019s own slow processes will have\nto soften the asperities of this conflict.\n\nHaving thus begun our outline of a mechanistic ethics by stating the\nchief points of its disagreement with certain traditional ways of\nthinking, let us now proceed to establish without interruptions the\nfoundations upon which this science of human conduct is to be built.\nAnd first a word as to its antecedents.\n\nAll modern scientific thinking, which is essentially a pertinacity of\nattention,\u2014a dogged following upon a clue sagaciously intuited,\u2014is\nour heritage from ancient Greek thought, and particularly from\nSocrates. And it is quite a significant, though oft-forgotten fact,\nthat while almost all our scientific inquiry has been directed\ntoward the conquest of physical nature, Socrates himself scorned to\ndevote his powers to any but the subjects of ethics and the theory\nof knowledge. It is, then, something like a return to the chief\ninterest of Greek life to employ the methods of general science\nin the analysis of the ethical problem. \u201cKnow _thyself_\u201d was the\nwell-known motto of Socrates; but it has required an infinitude of\nother knowledge before we could see clearly enough to know ourselves.\nNevertheless, we may now say that in thus employing modern science\nstrictly in the interest of ethics, the homage to Socrates is no\nless profound than the implied confidence in the trend of that\ncivilization which originated in his brilliant mind.\n\nThe antecedents of a naturalistic ethics, however, are not all\nlocated in one man. With varying emphases, we find similar tendencies\nappearing in Aristotle, in Leonardo da Vinci, in Hobbes, in Spinoza,\nin John Stuart Mill, in Herbert Spencer, and in many other wise and\nkind men. Today this same influence is more aggressive and expanding\nthan ever before. Lucien Levy Br\u00fchl, Edwin Holt, John Dewey, William\nMorris Davis, George Clarke Cox, and Roy Wood Sellars are typical\nrepresentatives of the movement devoted to making ethics as objective\nas the science of mechanics. Consequently it would seem that the\nattempt we shall make here to define ethical values in terms of man\u2019s\nbiological functions is not a forlorn hope, either historically\nunforeseen, or lacking contemporary sympathizers.\n\nWhat, then, is implied by the statement that ethical values are to be\ndefined in terms of man\u2019s biological functions? In the first place,\nwe imply that just as man\u2019s body, by means of brain, sense organ,\nmuscle and gland, makes, upon stimulation, all the mind it ever\nmanifests, so likewise that same body of man, through the mechanisms\njust enumerated, creates ethical notions. That is to say, the realm\nof ethics is coincident with the realm of human behavior in so far as\nthat behavior is judged to be good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous\nor vicious. Now the body of man performs many and various functions,\nsome of which are called physical, some chemical, some mental, and\nsome ethical; and any structure of man\u2019s body, such as an arm or a\nleg, can be shown to perform all these four types of function at the\nsame time. Such a statement will cause no surprise to those who have\nfollowed the trend of psychological and ethical theory in the last\ndecade. And while it is obviously impossible to prove any theory to\nthe negatively suggestible obstructionist, it is a very hopeful sign\nthat today great numbers of even untutored men are disbelieving in\nthe transcendence of mental and ethical qualities, and are relocating\nthem among the natural phenomena of the world. Hereafter, then, we\nshall also understand ethical values to be achievements of man\u2019s\nmind, which is a function of his protoplasm, which is a function of\nthe sun.\n\nA second implication of our basic assertion is that since our\nknowledge of man has, after a hundred false starts, just recently\nbecome in any way accurate, so must our views on ethical questions be\nregarded as still in the infancy of their truth. Moreover, just as\nscientific inquiry in every other field is subject to revision upon\neach new discovery of signal importance, so must ethical science,\nduring the period of its infancy, be subject countless times to an\nequally sweeping revision. In other words, the scientific attitude\ntoward ethics forestalls any attempt or wish to draw on some\nphantom bank account to eke out the ethical resources of mankind,\ninsufficient though such resources may at times appear to be. He\nwho, like the mechanist, believes that virtue is a strictly natural\nphenomenon, must not carry a-priori standards into his work, but must\nbelieve that an accurate description of human nature will furnish\nall the necessary data for an applied science of human conduct. To\nbe sure, since man is a creature who likes and dislikes, who prefers\nand rejects, this very fact precludes an ethics without any mention\nof ideals of one sort or another. Nevertheless, it is our particular\nbusiness here not to establish or insist on any set of ideals in\nadvance of an empirical study of human conduct, for it may well be\nthat what we call our highest ideals are, in the light of science,\nin need of considerable revision.\n\nWith this by way of introduction, we shall at once proceed with\nthe work already proposed. And just as a new proprietor of an old\nbusiness begins by taking inventory, so shall we at once take stock\nof the ethical resources of man. Our method for the time being will\nbe the method of the statistician. Following the arrangement of\nour data as we find them, we shall first seek to answer that most\ninteresting and, indeed, fundamental question, namely, Why do our\nethical judgments always occur in pairs of antonyms? This enquiry\nwill bring us to the very center of the ethical problem. Next we\nshall ask just what our ten principal ethical concepts really mean,\nand shall seek to discover their relationships to one another.\nFinally, we shall endeavor to show how the knowledge thus derived,\nwhen combined with insight into the mechanics of body and mind,\nfurnishes us with an ethical technique which transcends both in scope\nand effectiveness all that we have hitherto possessed.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] R. B. Perry, \u201cPresent Philosophical Tendencies,\u201d p. 127.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n  A PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN ALL SUCH\n  WORDS AS \u201cGOOD\u201d AND \u201cBAD,\u201d AND \u201cRIGHT\u201d AND \u201cWRONG\u201d\n\n    \u201cA word is the shadow of an act.\u201d\n                         DEMOCRITUS.\n\n\nIt is a fact of the greatest significance that the words by which we\nconvey our ideas of value always occur in pairs, one of which is the\nopposite of the other. In esthetics the beautiful is contrasted with\nthe ugly, and the charming with the disgusting; in logic the true\nclashes with the false, and in philosophy the real with the unreal;\nin matters of public and private economy the cheap is antithetical to\nthe expensive, and the generous to the miserly; while in ethics we\nconstantly hear the words good and bad, right and wrong, virtuous and\nvicious employed to denote the opposition and contradiction of human\ninterests and ideals. What is the ultimate reason why we thus employ\nsuch pairs of antonyms in our judgments of praise or blame, our\nexpressions of desire or aversion, and in our estimations of merit or\ndefect?\n\nThis modern question, upon which the founding of a true science of\nethics depends, cannot be answered by any appeal to the speculative\nmetaphysics of bygone generations. We have passed out of that\nperiod in which men were content with an explanation based on the\nZoroastrian hypothesis of a world divided between the warring forces\nof light and darkness, while our ears are now equally unresponsive to\nthe bi-polar principles of love and hate which Empedocles propounded.\nEven our recent Emerson\u2019s \u201cLaw of Compensation,\u201d born though it was\nof canny, scientific thinking, is not marked by the least sign of\nthat finality which the answer we seek should possess. It is, indeed,\nour conviction that the presence of antonyms in human speech is not\nto be accounted for by the assumption of a theory concerning the\nworld as a whole, but rather by an examination of some of the baldest\nfacts of our everyday experience. Nay more, it is our declared\npurpose to show that the metaphysical and theological notions of\nEmpedocles and Zoroaster are themselves to be explained by reference\nto the physics and the physiology of man,\u2014in terms of the structure\nand functions of the human body. But before we can comprehend the\nsignificance of such a thesis, it is first necessary to understand\nsome of the physiological mechanisms underlying thought and speech.\n\n\n_The Rise of Mechanistic Psychology_\n\nEver since William James employed the phrase \u201cthe _stream_ of\nthought\u201d to describe mental phenomena, the whole trend of\npsychology has been altered. Not only did the wide-spread use of\nthat phrase result in the giving up of many traditional beliefs in\nregard to things mental, but it also stimulated the most profitable\ninvestigations in psychological science. One of the most ancient of\nthe beliefs which it demolished was the belief in Ideas as eternal,\nexternal, and immutable. According to the notion of a stream of\nconsciousness (itself a variable conception), ideas are sensory\nimages which show individual variations, which never are exactly\nrepeated, and which have meaning only when they refer or lead to\nsome concrete reality. This view, which finally replaced the ancient\nPlatonic conception, is now held by practically all psychologists.\nMoreover, the influence of James\u2019 teaching was such as to show that\nwill, intellect, feeling, and the like were not separable parts of a\nmind (i. e., faculties) which were capable of acting independently,\nbut were merely handy words to indicate the various qualities\nof the stream of thought. The stream flows swiftly,\u2014call that\nimpulsiveness; it flows again broadly and deeply with many glancing\neddies,\u2014call that deliberation; it flows once more with swift descent\nand foam,\u2014call that strong feeling. Nevertheless, the stream of\nthought is one stream, and mental phenomena one and all specify its\nlabile and fluid consistency. And now let us see to what further\ndevelopments this striking conception has led.\n\nObviously, the astute, enquiring person at once asks, \u201cWhat makes\nthis stream of thought? To what is its flowing character due?\u201d At\nfirst it might seem that one must despair of any satisfactory reply.\nOne feels as did William Harvey, almost hopeless in his quest after\nthe secret of the circulation of the blood. But just as Harvey boldly\nexperimented with his eye on the critical features of his problem,\nso have a multitude of keen investigators devised test after test to\ndiscover the laws of mental phenomena. And while we cannot yet say\nthat \u201cScience has laid her doomful hand\u201d upon all of the intricate\nsecrets of mind, nevertheless, it is becoming more and more certain\nthat the stream of thought is just as much a bodily function as\nis the breath-stream and the blood-stream. Strangely enough, this\nconception is not brand-new. It was Aristotle who said, \u201cIf the eye\nwere an organism, vision would be its soul.\u201d Similar thinking is\nrevealed in our modern view that mind is a function of the body, and\nthat it depends upon the body for its existence. It \u201cis generated\nby the body as the result of its immediate contacts with the\nenvironment, in much the same way as electricity may be generated by\na turbine that has been placed in the midst of a tumbling waterfall.\u201d\nMoreover, the stream-like character of thought, the play of feeling,\nthe linger and strain of deliberation and expectation are due to the\nmanner in which the storage battery of the brain releases energy, and\nto the way in which the muscles and glands transform it. William\nJames wrote in 1890, \u201cAll consciousness is motor,\u201d that is, it is\ndependent upon the expression mechanisms of the body; and today we\nhave demonstrated the fundamental r\u00f4le of the muscles and glands of\nthe body in \u201cthe transformation of the common energies of nature into\nthe special energies of mind.\u201d\n\nIt can be seen at once that such a philosophy of mind furnishes the\nmost striking and far-reaching ethical implications. If what we call\nour mental life turns out upon close inspection to be dependent upon\nbodily functions, it follows that conduct and thought differ only in\nthe degree to which the body is excited to activity (molar motion).\nIn a word, conduct is overt (visible), while thought is covert\n(invisible), behavior. Edwin Holt, in the \u201cFreudian Wish,\u201d speaks\nof thought (\u2018wish\u2019 as he terms it there) as \u201c_a course of action\nwhich the living body executes or is prepared to execute with regard\nto some object or some fact of the environment_.\u201d (pp. 56-7.) John\nDewey voices a similar tendency in his \u201cHuman Nature and Conduct\u201d\nwhen he says that _bodily habits do our thinking_. (Italics mine.)\n\u201cThe habit of walking is expressed in what a man sees when he keeps\nstill, even in dreams.\u201d (p. 37.) Thus the old idols are tumbled to\nthe ground. Over the doorway of the Germanic Museum at Harvard is\nthe inscription: \u201cEs ist der Geist der sich den Koerper baut.\u201d\nComplete reversal of such an animistic and subjectivistic sentiment\nis proposed by Dewey when he declares that a man stands erect, not\nbecause he wills to, but because he can. His willing is the result,\nand not the cause, of the muscular contractions which elevate the\nchest and keep it convex. The old dualism of mind and body, and the\nolder superstition that mind rules matter, have both received their\ndeath-blows. In their place a complete mechanistic philosophy is now\nsecurely enthroned. It would thus seem likely that a _natural history\nof virtue_ will not long hence be written.\n\nOf all the vexed questions which psychologists have had to answer,\nperhaps none is more difficult than the question as to the place\nof language in the mental economy. What is language for? How did\nit originate? What is its relation to thinking? To overt activity?\nIt is at once apparent that the answers to these questions are\nhighly important to ethics, since the words good and bad, right and\nwrong, and the like, play such a prominent r\u00f4le in our judgments\nupon our fellow-men. Neither does it seem possible to understand\nwhy we employ these pairs of antonyms until we know what the single\nterms of the pairs signify. And while it will require several of\nthe following chapters to give a satisfactory answer to some of the\nabove questions, it is readily agreed that our judgments of value\nare employed principally for two purposes:\u2014(1) to sort out some of\nthe objects of the environment, e. g., by calling these _good_ and\nthose _bad_, etc., and (2) to indicate to other persons what kind\nof behavior is to be expected of us with regard to the objects thus\ndesignated. That is our common experience. If a man calls a shop a\n_good_ shop, his future behavior toward it can be predicted. If he\ncalls his neighbor _vicious_ he can be expected not to leave his\nwheelbarrow or his lawn-mower out at night. Moreover, if we know what\nsort of things a man calls bad, virtuous, or right, his whole social\nphilosophy can be plotted from the data provided by these particular\njudgments. To state it briefly, speech becomes an instrument for the\ntransmission of _meanings_. Before we proceed further, let us see\njust what this involves in terms of bodily mechanisms.\n\n\n_A Mechanistic Interpretation of the Meaning of Words_\n\nTo the superficial observer of a man who declares that something is\ncheap, or beautiful, or good, the sight of his lips moving and the\nsound of the words as they are produced might appear to be the whole\nphenomenon. Nevertheless, if anyone were to look carefully behind\nthe scenes of this performance, one would find a much more elaborate\nplay being enacted than is apparent on the surface. Just as we know\nnow from the findings of the physiologist that when the eye _sees_,\nfar more structures than the retina are affected, and just as we\nare now certain that when the ear _hears_, many more organs than\nthe ear-drum and cochlea take part in the response to the stimulus,\nso we are convinced that when the words we speak have a meaning, a\nneuro-muscular drama of a very elaborate character is being silently\nperformed within our skin.\n\nNovelists and story-tellers of all ages seem to have intuited this\ntruth in their portrayal of human emotions. They speak of \u201cpent-up\nanger,\u201d of \u201cstifled sorrow,\u201d and they describe often in minute detail\nthe course of a passion that in seeking to get adequate expression\ncauses the face to flush, the hand to clench, or the body as a\nwhole to be violently agitated. The Iliad and the Odyssey abound in\ndescriptions of this sort, and every novelist since the days of Homer\nhas felt the need of such portrayals in order to make his characters\nunderstood. Indeed, the cultivation of this technique is the essence\nof dramatic art. But mark, that such emotions are aroused not only\nwhen a person is confronted by the physical facts of battle, murder,\nor sudden death, for example, but also _by the bare mention of the\nwords or phrases_ which appropriately describe such catastrophes. The\nmore carefully such a person is observed, the plainer will it become\nthat the agitation which his body is covertly manifesting would, if\nit were unhindered in its free expression, result in an elaborate\npantomine appropriate to the events described by the story-teller.\nIn other words, the emotions which a thrilling narrative arouses\nare substitutes for the overt activity which the auditor might be\nexpected to manifest were he actually a participant in the scene\ndescribed. When, then, we say that a dramatic situation _moves_\nus, the description is absolutely accurate. Indeed, from the most\ncredible scientific evidence we possess, the emotions which are thus\naroused are characterized by all the organic stresses and strains\nwhich are present in the most violent overt activity of which we\nare capable. We inwardly writhe and tussle, we half-start one kind\nof positive behavior, only to find it checked by the initiation of\nits opposite,\u2014in a word, we display on a small scale all the conduct\nappropriate to the situation. And this elaborate arousal to activity\nis, we undertake to say, precisely what gives every dramatic scene or\nnarrative its meaning.\n\nDr. George W. Crile has coined the appropriate phrase\n\u201caction-pattern\u201d to describe the mechanism involved in the cases just\ncited. Crile\u2019s \u201caction-pattern\u201d is, indeed, practically identical\nwith Holt\u2019s \u201cspecific response,\u201d and with Titchener\u2019s \u201cmotor set,\u201d\nof which phrases the latter two are today familiar to most students\nof psychology. Briefly, this action-pattern is simply a more or less\nfixed way in which some part of the body produces a movement. It\ndepends principally upon the physical structure of the part, as well\nas upon its muscle and nerve supply, and secondly upon the habits of\nmovement which external stimuli have repeatedly produced in it. Thus\nevery healthy leg has acquired the action-patterns of walking and\nrunning, and some legs have in addition the patterns of kicking, or\nof \u201cstepping on the gas\u201d in open level country. What we call the most\nskilful parts of the body are those which have the greatest number\nof action-patterns. The hands, lips, eyes, and tongue could on this\npoint be properly called the reservoirs of intelligence. Certainly in\nthe evolution of man they have played the strategical part. Moreover,\nit is supposedly these action-patterns, these habits of movement,\nwhich are aroused whenever we are said to remember or imagine, to\ncogitate or ponder; and this is, I take it, what Dewey implies when\nhe says that bodily habits do our thinking. I have elsewhere shown[2]\nhow one action-pattern of the human hand performs yeoman service in\nthis respect, and it would not be difficult to demonstrate that every\naction-pattern is capable of generating a multitude of thoughts.\nWhen, then, we say that a novelist or poet has portrayed a moving,\ntragic scene, we shall now understand that he has re-aroused in\nus bodily habits which we started to acquire when we first became\nacquainted with grief.\n\nWhile we do not claim that all cases of meaning involve such\nwide-spread and imperative bodily disturbances as those which occur\nin connection with tragic or erotic situations, it is nevertheless\na valid inference that words which stimulate us to no activity\nwhatsoever mean nothing to us. Certain it is, at least, that the\nmore meaningful or significant any word is, the more does it stir up\nlatent tendencies to action throughout our whole organism. Political\nand religious slogans are telling examples of this. \u201cGreat is Diana\nof the Ephesians!\u201d \u201cRemember the Maine!\u201d and \u201cFor God, for Country,\nand for Yale!\u201d have been for some persons phrases of the maximal\nphilosophic content. Moreover, the same word may arouse different\nmeanings (or action-patterns) in different people, depending not only\non how the word is spoken, but also on the mood of the auditor. It is\na matter of common observation that the shout of \u201cFire!\u201d calls forth\nby no means the same responses from an insured landlord as it evokes\nfrom an uninsured tenant, while the mention of _water_ will stimulate\none sort of reflex action in a thirsty man, and quite another sort in\na man who has just been rescued from drowning.\n\nIt is plain, then, that if physiological science has achieved the\nleast light upon the problems of psychology, the meaning which any\nword or phrase possesses is not something that the sound of the word\nor its written symbol is endowed with, or something that filters\nthrough from any Platonic realm of ideas, but the meaning of any word\nis given to it by the person who speaks or hears it. Moreover, this\nendowment of meaning is implicit in the arousal of action tendencies\nat the time when the word is spoken or heard. In the example recently\ncited, the word \u201cfire\u201d had a different meaning for the insured\nlandlord from what it had for the uninsured tenant because the habits\nof precaution which the former had acquired established a different\nmotor attitude toward fire than did the procrastination of the\nlatter. Consequently, the shouting and the conflagration were stimuli\nin the presence of which the landlord could be calm, while the tenant\ncould not.\n\nThe application of this principle of the dependence of meaning upon\naction-patterns extends, however, to other situations than those\nin which emotional riots are observable. Indeed, we undertake to\nsay that even such plain, concrete words as _basket_, _horse_, and\n_river_ have a meaning because they arouse us to motor activities\nof one sort or another. It may well be, of course, that we start\nto think of a basket in terms of its color, or shape, or its cost;\nand of a horse in like terms; while we think of a river only in\nconnection with its height during seasons of drought or flood: but\neventually the basket will, by implying _receptacle_, lead in our\nimagination to the acts of filling and emptying; while the horse\nwill be finally pulling our loads or carrying our weight on his\nback; and the river will be either waded or swum by us, or become\nrelated to our necessities or pastimes (our habits) in some other\nmanner. And when we thus develop a specific action-pattern toward\nsuch an object, we are said to know what it _means_. It has long been\na maxim in education that not until we know how to use and control\nour environment, do we become fully intelligent towards it. The\ntheory and the fact of action-patterns gives unusual support to this\nparticularly profitable maxim. Spinoza laid down the principle that\nthe will and the intellect are one and the same, and this principle\ntoo has complete verification from mechanistic psychology. Thought\nis dependent upon bodily activity, and it does not matter for our\npresent purpose whether that activity be overt or subtly concealed.\n\nThe question now arises: Does the meaning of abstract terms, of the\nterms we use in our judgments of value, consist in the same kind of\nmotor tendencies as those which are aroused by concrete terms? From\nthe following considerations I believe we can say that it does.\n\nTo begin with, abstract terms are one and all the result of the\nprocess of abstraction. This process consists in our picking out some\ncommon feature or quality from a great variety of objects, and giving\nit a name in order to fix it in our memory. For example, fire, the\ninside of ripe watermelon, and the outside of ripe cherries may all\nbe called _red_. The concept, or abstract term, \u201cred\u201d can thereafter\nbe used on occasion as a gestural sign for all these various\nobjects when their color is being signified. Moreover, the process\nof abstracting these common qualities is itself a motor process. It\nis, physiologically speaking, the same sort of activity as collecting\npostage stamps or beetles\u2019 wings. Indeed, the simplest perception\nof any concrete object, any red object, for example, involves motor\nactivity of a highly elaborate character. When we look at such an\nobject, not only is the retina of the eye stimulated, but various\nmuscles and glands are simultaneously activated to an elaborate\ntransformation of energy. Likewise, when we hear, taste, smell, or\nhave any other perception, other characteristic transformations of\nenergy are taking place through the arousal of action-patterns.\nNow we have just stated that abstract terms are derived from the\nmultifarious perception of concrete objects. In what, then, does the\nmeaning of abstract terms consist? It consists in their function of\nrecalling some of the particular experiences from which they were\nderived. Such an abstract word as \u201cred\u201d has, then, a meaning for\nus simply because it arouses in any of its phases that particular\naction-pattern which all sorts of red things have stimulated in us.\n\nThis same principle may now be applied to show how even the meaning\nwhich attaches to the words we employ to convey judgments of value\nmay be explained in physiological terms. For the highly abstract\ncharacter which the words _cheap_, _beautiful_, and _good_ seem at\ntimes to possess is simply due to the fact that at the mention of any\nsuch word we are simultaneously stimulated to so great a variety of\nactions that we are unable to follow any one of them through to its\nconclusion. When such a condition persists, the meaning is said to be\nvague.\n\nIt is, of course, not to be forgotten that every time we use a word,\nwhether we read it, speak it, or hear it, the meaning it arouses is\ntraceable to the fact that firm bonds have been established between\nthe eye, ear, and throat mechanisms on the one hand, and related\nparts of the body which are involved on the other. This union of the\nreading-reflexes with the somatic-reflexes is provided for by a very\nsimple mechanism called the conditioned reflex. By such a device, any\ntwo reflexes which have been aroused _together_ frequently enough by\nexternal stimuli will ever thereafter tend to arouse each other. That\nis why the word \u201cfire\u201d which we all were taught to use to indicate\na certain kind of object, will, even if spoken in a wilderness of\nsnow, make us feel some of the effects which flame once produced\nupon us. Contrariwise, the blindfolded man will, by no other cue\nthan the touch of his fingers, name such objects as carpet, leather,\nsandpaper, and nails. And from what we have already said about the\nsource of the meaning of abstract terms being traceable to concrete\nexperiences, we may now say that such words as cheap, beautiful, and\ngood, one and all owe their significance to the fact that they too\nexhibit the law of the conditioned reflex both in their origin and in\ntheir maturity.\n\n\n_How the \u201cAll-or-none\u201d Principle Helps to Disclose an Amazing Secret_\n\nIt being thus apparent that words possess meaning because they arouse\nmotor tendencies in us, let us now see what justification there\nis for the assertion previously made that these motor tendencies\nneed not be at all visible as overt actions in order to perform\ntheir epistemological function. This justification is found in the\nall-or-none principle of nervous and muscular activity,\u2014a principle\nhaving the most far-reaching consequences for both psychology\nand ethics. We are all familiar with the fact that less work is\ninvolved in lifting the arm leisurely to a horizontal position than\nin moving it through the same radius with a heavy weight held in\nthe hand. However, we are not all familiar with the fact that in\nthe case of the leisurely movement only a few of the myriad nerve\nand muscle fibers of the arm are being innervated, the rest being\ncompletely passive, while in the case of lifting the heavy weight,\nthe proportion of fully active and inertly passive fibers is just the\nopposite. But this is exactly the case. According to the all-or-none\nprinciple discovered by Lucas and Adrian,[3] whenever a single nerve\nfiber functions at all, it acts in its maximum capacity. Never is\nsuch a fiber partially activated; in its all-or-none functioning it\nis as uncompromising as gravity. Consequently, even though the arm\nmay _feel_ uniformly flabby when it is indolently moved about, some\nfew of its nerve and muscle fibers are working to their limit.\n\nThis being the case, it is readily apparent that the various\nqualities of muscular movement,\u2014languid, intentional, unintentional,\nor deliberate,\u2014have one and all a strictly quantitative basis. If a\nman\u2019s smile spreads out into a grin, this change in the quality of\nhis countenance is caused by the simple addition of fully functioning\nneuro-muscular units under the skin of his face. If the grin dwindles\nto the smile, and that again vanishes into a look only faintly\nreminiscent of pleasure, the opposite process of subtraction is then\ntaking place. Consider now the further implications of this law of\nLucas and Adrian. For the logical inference is that when we merely\n_think_ of lifting our arm, but do not lift it visibly, an essential\npart of the arm-lifting mechanism has been nevertheless specifically\nstimulated to activity; it is only because not enough muscle fibers\nhave been innervated to overcome the inertia of the limb that the\narm does not rise. That is, indeed, our common experience. When we\nlie abed on a cold winter morning and speculate on the question\nof getting up, our imagination of the heroic deed is perfectly of\na piece with the real business of shivering on the drafty floor.\nIndeed, according to the all-or-none principle, since even the\nslightest neuro-muscular activity is _positive_, the terms \u201covert\u201d or\n\u201ccovert\u201d as applied to action refer merely to what an observer can or\ncannot readily perceive. This principle can be justly applied to the\nproblem of the meaning of words. The implication is sound that even\nthough the action-patterns which are aroused by words are unfelt by\nus or invisible to an onlooker, these motor tendencies are just as\ntruly positive physiological events, so far as they go, as are the\nmost violent efforts we openly manifest. For the pattern of action is\nthe same; the only difference is in the number of nerve and muscle\nfibers involved.\n\nIt was a motto of Jesus that \u201cAs a man thinketh in his heart, so is\nhe.\u201d Although the particular phrase, \u201cin his heart,\u201d is now regarded\nas too wild a hyperbole to be justified by the facts, yet the\nall-or-none principle furnishes an unsuspected substantiation of the\nessential truth of this motto with respect to certain individuals.\nWe have long known that thinking did somehow lead to action,\u2014that\nboth the rogue and the philanthropist, the slanderer and the coquette\noften schemed and planned secretly for years without giving any\noutward hint of what their future behavior was to be. History is full\nof the trouble caused for those who had \u201cno art to read the mind\u2019s\nconstruction in the face\u201d of him who could \u201csmile and smile and be a\nvillain.\u201d And now the secret is out why for so many centuries it was\nbelieved that thought produced action and mind ruled matter. Thought\n_is_ action, but action of so elusive a character as to be totally\nbeyond the unaided eye to detect; and thought \u201cleads\u201d to action for\nthe same reason that a spark can produce a conflagration and a hole\nin a dyke produce a flood. In all three cases the greater effect is\ndue to the magnification of the exciting cause. The ancients held\nthat mind ruled the body for the reason that, being ignorant of the\nfact of covert muscular responses, they assumed an incorporeal cause\nfor a series of events whose end-term alone they were able to discern\nas embodied in the movements of matter.\n\nIt is thus finally apparent how by means of the law of the\nconditioned reflex and the all-or-none principle, both concrete and\nabstract terms serve not only as gestural signs, but also serve\nto imply and predict human activities. We have shown that every\nword which has a meaning _ipso facto_ implies action. It matters\nnot whether that action be sudden or violent, or merely one that\nis carried out on \u201clow gear,\u201d so to speak, by the neuro-muscular\nmechanisms of the body. Neither does it matter whether that action be\nprecise or groping, specific or diffuse; if the word has a meaning\nit will be accompanied by an action-tendency, and that tendency\nwill be added to the kinetic potentialities,\u2014the character,\u2014of the\nindividual. For if it is the case that by the law of the conditioned\nreflex, words _get_ meaning, it is equally to be asserted that by\nvirtue of the all-or-none principle, they _keep_ it. Moreover,\nHolt to the contrary notwithstanding, it is such demonstrable\nphysiological principles as these, and not the mysterious Freudian\ncategories, which are the keys whereby the secrets of mind will be\nunlocked.\n\nHaving thus dealt with the problem of how the neuro-muscular\nmechanisms of the body generate and maintain the meanings of words,\nlet us now return to the original question of this chapter, namely,\nWhat is the ultimate reason why we employ such pairs of antonyms as\n\u201cgood\u201d and \u201cbad\u201d in our judgments of praise or blame, our expressions\nof desire or aversion, and in our estimations of merit or defect?\nOur answer is that the felt opposition and contradiction of antonyms\nis due to the conflict of motor tendencies, and in support of this\ntheory we cite a well-recognized physiological principle,\u2014the law of\nreciprocal innervation.\n\n\n_The Physiological Explanation of the Opposition of Antonyms_\n\nEvery freely moving part of the body, such as the leg, the arm, and\nthe head, is equipped principally with two sets of muscles, called,\nfrom their functions, the _flexors_ and the _extensors_. The flexors\nare those muscles which for example, upon contracting, draw the\nlegs and the arms toward the body and fold them close to it, and\nwhich lower the head upon the chest; while the extensors stretch out\nthe arms and legs, open wide the hands, and raise the head to an\nerect posture. Other parts of the body are similarly equipped for\nproducing motions of an opposite character in the skeletal system.[4]\nThe eyeballs are lowered by the use of a different muscle than that\nby which they are elevated; the muscle which depresses the wings of\nthe nose is a direct antagonist of the other muscles which control\nthe movements of this organ, and so on throughout the whole of our\nmovable bodily structures. Moreover, when one such pair of muscles is\ncontracted, the opposed member is normally relaxed, and vice versa;\nor, as the physiologist would say, the two muscles are reciprocally\ninnervated.[5]\n\nHowever, it must not be understood that this law refers only to\nthe visible contractions of the muscles which produce the overt\nbehavior of a man, for it equally explains the case where a very\nsmall number of nerve and muscle fibers are activated. That is to\nsay, the law of all-or-none _and_ the law of reciprocal innervation\ncan both operate in the face or the hand at the same time. Indeed,\nwe must not neglect to consider that _all_ of the myriad fibers\nof our largest muscles are never simultaneously contracted; rather\nis it the rule that these fibers contract in relays,[6] thereby\nautomatically saving us from the fatigue and exhaustion which would\notherwise ensue. Moreover, the more intelligent and skilful we\nbecome, or, as we sometimes say, the more our head saves our heels,\nthe fewer muscle fibers are required to generate and maintain any\nspecific action-tendency. Consequently, then, the law of reciprocal\ninnervation can be exhibited in the antagonism of extremely small\nmuscular units, such as we have postulated to be involved in\ncertain cases of meaning provided they be anatomically situated in\nthe correct position for producing antagonistic strains. Now the\nexperimental demonstration of the law of dynamogenesis at the hands\nof Richet, Charcot, etc., revealed that just such slight movements of\nan opposed character are produced when we merely \u201cthink\u201d of _up_ and\n_down_, _right_ and _left_, _in_ and _out_, and the like. In every\ncase of this sort, some part of the movable, skeletal system performs\novertly or covertly the appropriate movement, thereby giving meaning\nto the word. We may therefore, unless we read all signs incorrectly,\nsafely affirm that whatever be the action-pattern which any abstract\nterm arouses in us, the antonym of that term, if indeed it be its\nlogical and physiological antonym, arouses action-patterns of an\nopposite character.\n\nOur physiological explanation of the meaning of words and the\ncontradiction of antonyms is now complete. For if, as we have\npreviously shown, even abstract terms acquire and keep their meaning\nby virtue of the reflex tendencies which they arouse, it is likewise\napparent that the basis of logical opposition and contradiction is to\nbe found by an examination of the baldest facts of the physics and\nphysiology of the human body. In brief, then, _antonyms are those\nwords whose utterance stimulates us so to react as to illustrate\nthe law of reciprocal innervation_. And this, moreover, is the\nonly reason why _cheap_ is the opposite of _expensive_, _true_ the\ncontradictory of _false_, and _good_ the antithesis of _bad_.\n\nTwo words more, however, remain to be said. The first of these is,\nthat the number of pairs of antonyms we have in our vocabulary\nsignifies how many different pairs of antagonistic motor tendencies\nor action-patterns we could, were we fully aroused, overtly\nmanifest. Since thought is either a rehearsal for, or a rumination\nupon, action, it is essentially a process which employs the same\nstructures of the body as those which are activated in our buying and\nselling, our giving and taking, our toil and our play. The second\nword is, that if it be due strictly to our muscular architecture\nthat antonyms occur in human speech, we can now safely affirm that\nany philosophy or religion which construes the universe as divided\nbetween the warring forces of light and darkness, or as everywhere\nillustrating the bi-polar principles of love and hate, is likewise\nbased upon the law of the reciprocal innervation of antagonistic\nmuscles. Such philosophies are, indeed, profound, since they attempt\nto inscribe on the firmament the drama of man\u2019s limitations.\n\nWith this by way of introduction, we are now prepared to examine the\nvarious terms by which we are wont to convey our ideas of ethical\nvalue, in order to see just what the words \u201cgood,\u201d \u201cbad,\u201d \u201cright,\u201d\n\u201cwrong,\u201d and the like really _mean_. And while the difficulties of\nsuch a task are admittedly great, yet the presumption is entirely in\nfavor of the methods of mechanistic psychology to give a strictly\nscientific interpretation to the subject matter of ethics.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[2] \u201cThe Intellectual Significance of the Grasping Reflex,\u201d Jour. of\nPhil., Vol. XVIII, No. 23, pp. 617-628.\n\n[3] See \u201cJournal of Physiology\u201d (1909), 38, 113-133; ibid. (1914),\n47, 460-474; also Bayliss, W. M., \u201cPrinciples of General Physiology,\u201d\n383-4; Starling, E. H., \u201cPrinciples of Human Physiology,\u201d 205-6.\n\n[4] Mark carefully, that according to this, so-called \u201cvoluntary\u201d\nmovement (or will) is simply movement produced by one member of any\npair of antagonistic muscles. This physical equipment is of paramount\nimportance to the function of willing. Note also, that \u201cfree will\u201d\nalways did mean the choice of two alternatives!\n\n[5] See Bayliss, op. cit., pp. 494-8; Starling, op. cit., pp. 335-6.\n\n[6] This is especially observable in all free-hand or free-arm\nmovements, as, for example, when one tries to throw missiles in quick\nsuccession at a target. In spite of one\u2019s own verbal suggestions,\nboth speed and accuracy vary with every shot. This peculiar property\nof muscle should henceforth factor into our definitions of _chance_\nand _luck_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICATION OF THE WORD \u201cGOOD\u201d\n\n  \u201c... The majority attend to words rather than to things; and thus\n  very frequently assent to terms without attaching to them any\n  meaning, either because they think they once understood them, or\n  imagine they received them from others by whom they were correctly\n  understood.... Wherefore, if we would philosophize in earnest, and\n  give ourselves to the search after all truths we are capable of\n  knowing, we must, in the first place, lay aside our prejudices;\n  in other words, we must take care scrupulously to withhold our\n  assent from the opinions we have formerly admitted, until upon\n  new examination we discover that they are true.\u201d DESCARTES, \u201cThe\n  Principles of Philosophy,\u201d LXXIV, LXXV.\n\n\nWhat do we mean by the word \u201cgood\u201d? That is to say, how shall we\ndescribe the action-pattern which the stimulus of this word arouses\nin us? What does it mean when _we_ use it, and what does it mean to\nus when _others_ employ it in their speech? Before we can answer\nthese questions, it is first essential to scan the list of things to\nwhich this word is applied, for only by so doing can we identify the\nterm _good_ with some specific function of the human organism.[7]\n\nAlthough such a task is a difficult one, the difficulty does not\nappear to be insurmountable. In spite of the fact that nearly eighty\nsignifications are possessed by this word, they will, nevertheless,\nif pondered long enough, reveal some common core of meaning. And if\nwe now bear in mind that every such synonym implies a motor mechanism\nthat is developing a specific attitude toward the environment, we\nshall hope to find a true solution to the problem of the meaning of\nthe concept \u201cgood\u201d.\n\nThe term _good_ is used as an adjective, noun, and adverb, and\noccasionally (Ex. 15) as a verb; in addition, it has sometimes an\nidiomatic significance, in which case its exact status as a part of\nspeech is doubtful. These differences, however, need not concern\nus here. _Good_ has originally an adjectival signification, and by\nderivation implies _fitting_ or _suitable_. This is highly important,\nfor since _fitting_ and _suitable_ exclusively describe things which\nhelp us realize our purposes, we may consider the relationship\nbetween _good_ and human behavior to be inseparable. The type of\naction-pattern implied by this word may also be faintly foreseen.\n\nWe have now the canvas stretched on which our picture of _good_ may\nbe delineated. Let us proceed to sketch in the first faint lines of\nthe picture. In the New Oxford Dictionary it is stated that _good_ is\nthe \u201cmost general adjective of _commendation_, implying the existence\nin a high, or at least satisfactory degree of _characteristic_\nqualities, which are either admirable in themselves [sic!] or\n_useful for some purpose_.\u201d This definition succeeds far better in\ncombining the theory of the Epicureans (good is what you like), of\nthe Platonists (the good is the typical), and of the Benthamites (the\ngood is the useful), than it succeeds in throwing a clear light upon\nthe question we are here attempting to answer, namely, what sort\nof responses does the human organism make toward those objects and\npersons which it calls \u201cgood\u201d? From Palmer\u2019s definition of _good_ as\n\u201cgood _for_\u201d (\u201cThe Nature of Goodness,\u201d p. 13), we are able to derive\neven less assistance, especially since it avoids the main issue in\ncontaining the very word to be defined.\n\nLet us now attack this problem by a new method. A survey of all\nthe things which this word _good_ indicates reveals not only that\nit _denotes_ (or simply points out) a host of distinguishable\nobjects and properties, but that it also _connotes_ (or implies) an\nexceedingly numerous array of human activities. And while the sum\ntotal of all these denotations and connotations appears at first to\nbe an unwieldy mass, it can, I think, be suitably dealt with under\nthe following five classes:\u2014\n\nA. That which is useful, fit, serviceable, and the like, for any\npurpose whatsoever. With such primitive use of the term, the purpose\ninvolved is neither praised nor blamed. The burglar\u2019s jimmy is as\n\u201cgood\u201d for his purpose as is an overcoat to keep out the cold. Some\nethical writers refer to this as _immediate_, as opposed to _remote_\nor _mediate_ good, or as non-moral as opposed to moral good. It is\n\u201cgood _for_,\u201d without any limitations as to what the \u201c_for_\u201d implies.\nWilliam James might have called it \u201cdecerebrate good.\u201d\n\nB. That which is useful, fit, or serviceable in the sense of being\n_continuously_ or _continually_ so. An extended time being here\nintroduced, _good_ now becomes almost synonymous with dependable.\nOur concept here may refer to anything that sustains life, or\nbrings peace and contentment in society, and hence at one moment\nit emphasizes intelligence and skill, while at another it points\ndirectly to benevolent, spiritual, and esthetic agencies. Moreover,\nit not only denotes property (Ex. 28, \u201cgoods\u201d), but also frequently\nconnotes an emotional enthusiasm in the possessor of it.\n\nC. That which fulfils expectation. This signification is sometimes\nequivalent to \u201cnormal\u201d or \u201ctypical,\u201d which terms are also frequently\nincluded in the connotation of \u201cuseful\u201d and \u201cdependable.\u201d But here a\ndistinctly new factor enters into the use of this concept, namely,\nthe tone of voice by which the word \u201cgood\u201d is uttered, for all\ncolors and shades of emotion and sentiment may be registered by this\nmeans. Hence the concept \u201cgood\u201d may be used to imply that which just\npassably fulfils expectation, or\u2014\n\nD. It may be used to indicate that expectation has been greatly\nand even suddenly exceeded, in which case it sometimes denotes\nthe presence of something which is rated far above the normal, the\nimmediately useful, or the mildly beneficent (thereby identifying\nitself with some of the significations exhibited in Class B), or\u2014\n\nE. It may be merely expletive. Here the use of the term \u201cgood\u201d\nrapidly becomes exotic. It signifies only surprise, shock, or spasm.\n\u201cGood\u201d as an expletive also becomes closely allied with \u201cgood\u201d as an\nadverb, in which case its significance as a term by which to express\na judgment of value rapidly evaporates.\n\n\n  _The Results of an Experiment to Determine Which of These Five\n  Classes Are Implied by the Seventy-Nine Significations of the Word\n  \u201cGood\u201d_\n\nThe choice of these five classes was the result of a test carried\nout over a period of several years. Each one of the seventy-nine\nsignifications was printed on a separate slip of paper, and then,\nfirst choosing one of them at random, and employing it as a tentative\nstandard, the points of similarity and difference between it and the\nremaining significations were determined and recorded. From this\nprocedure there gradually arose, by differentiation and condensation,\nthe five classes we have just indicated, which, as may be observed,\nare defined so as to include as many and to exclude as few of the\nuses of \u201cgood\u201d as possible. Had our classes been defined with too\ngreat emphasis upon the meaning of any single term of our array, the\nwhole idea of a classification would have had to be abandoned.\n\nHaving thus determined upon these five classes as representative and\nsignificant, one hundred college students were asked to ponder these\nclasses in connection with the subjoined array of the common uses\nof the word \u201cgood,\u201d to choose one of the classes as the one most\nappropriate in each case, and then to choose as many other of these\nclasses as seemed to be involved, and to rank them in order of their\nimportance. For example, they were shown the first two terms of the\narray,\u2014(1) \u201cGood food; fit to eat, untainted,\u201d and (2) \u201cGood food;\nnutritious, palatable,\u201d and were asked whether they belonged in Class\nA, B, C, D, or E. It was at once seen that membership in more than\none class was implied in both cases, but it was also admitted that\nnutritious and palatable food (No. 2) was a more dependable \u201cgood\u201d\nthan was the food specified by example No. 1. First choices were\nconsequently indicated on this basis. After that, second, third, and\nsucceeding choices were made for Nos. 1 and 2; following which, the\nremainder of the array was treated in the same manner.\n\nThe average of the results derived from this experiment indicates\nthat Class B (dependable \u201cgood\u201d) has a majority of votes, it being\ngiven first place 49 times, and a subsidiary place 75 times. Class C\nwas given first place 20 times, and a secondary\n\n[Illustration:\n\n_CHART_\n\n_Showing the distribution of the 79 significations of the word\n\u201cGood.\u201d_\n\n(_Explanation in text._)\n\n\n_Key_\n\n  = _First Choice._\n\n  = _Second Choice._\n\n  = _Third Choice._\n\n  = _Fourth Choice._\n\n  = _Not Chosen._\n\n\n_Classes A B C D E_] place 65 times. Class A was the first to be\nimplicated in 5 uses of the word \u201cgood,\u201d and was mentioned as a\nlater choice 26 other times. Class D was voted to be the one most\nobviously implied only 2 times, but was mentioned in an associative\nrelationship 59 times, while Class E, which received only one\nvote, got that for first place. The importance of Class B is thus\nclearly apparent. However, an almost equally significant fact seems\nto be that there were only five cases in which one class alone\nwas implicated, whereas two classes were used in 18 cases, three\nclasses were used in 34 cases, and four classes were simultaneously\nimplicated by 20 terms of this array. The appended chart renders this\ndistribution and overlapping more obvious. From all this, moreover,\nwe seem to be warranted in inferring that, with all the unlikeness\nthere is between these various synonyms for \u201cgood\u201d when taken one\nat a time, when taken all together (_sub specie aeternitatis_, as\nSpinoza would say) there is more of a common core of meaning in them\nthan one might na\u00efvely expect. Consequently, we may safely presume\nthat if we can satisfactorily define any one of the preceding five\nclasses of \u201cgood\u201d in physiological terms, we shall at the same time\nhave hinted the definitions of all the remaining classes.\n\nIn this connection one important thing must be borne in mind. Which\nis, that in attempting to reach our final definition of \u201cgood\u201d we\nneed only to abstract the common characteristic,\u2014in mathematical\nparlance,\u2014the greatest common divisor of all the particular uses\nfor which this word is employed. Consequently the definition we are\nsearching for cannot be expected to have any bias toward private or\nprovincial conceptions of the term \u201cgood.\u201d It must be catholic and\nunpartisan.\n\n\n_The Action-Patterns Implied by the Use of the Word \u201cGood\u201d_\n\nWe are now prepared to answer the question propounded at the opening\nof this chapter: \u201cWhat do we mean by the word \u2018good\u2019? That is to say,\nhow shall we describe the action-pattern which the stimulus of this\nword arouses in us?\u201d For if we can find out \u201cwhat the organism is\ndoing\u201d when its vocal organs are uttering this concept, we shall be\nable to discover what the word \u201cgood\u201d means.\n\nIt does not appear especially difficult to find what we are now\nseeking. We have just given the total array of uses to which this\nword is put, and we have also reduced that array to some measure of\ncoherence by means of our five classes. Is it not, indeed, a matter\nof the commonest observation just what conduct human beings manifest\nwhen they use the term \u201cgood\u201d and signify thereby what is included in\nClass A? It will be recalled that this class includes \u201cthat which is\nuseful, fit, serviceable, and the like, for any purpose whatsoever.\u201d\nKeeping our eye upon the specific behavior patterns implied by this\nclass of \u201cgood,\u201d we may now venture the following mechanistic\ninterpretation: _When a man is ready to perform any action, he\ncalls anything_ GOOD _which assists or furthers that particular\naction-tendency_. Or, the same thing may be conveyed in the following\nwords: _Any stimulus that evokes a response we are ready to make we\nare wont to call good_.\n\nAny picture of the human race that one may draw furnishes evidence\nof the cogency of this definition. The child calls candy \u201cgood,\u201d\nnot because he knows that sugar is muscle food, but simply because\nhe craves it, and sucks it in his mouth with avidity. This mode of\nspeech he got long ago from his parents. His wanting the candy makes\nit \u201cgood\u201d to him when he gets it, because the candy is a stimulus\nthat evokes a response he was ready to make. The boy of ten wants\na top that will spin like those which the other boys have, and he\ncalls his a \u201cgood\u201d top, when it satisfies the action-pattern which\nhe has been developing. The rough youth of seventeen gives his\nbullying chum a \u201cgood\u201d punch in the eye, by which he again means\nthat the action-tendency he was covertly developing toward him has\nbeen provided a chance to expand into a full excitation. The college\nman of twenty-two calls a dance tune a \u201cgood\u201d one, when, by its\nrhythmic effects it induces him to caper and relax, and satisfy his\nsemi-sexual tendencies in public. And the old man of sixty-five\noften speaks of his wife as a \u201cgood\u201d woman, because she has always\nhad his dinner ready for him piping hot when, upon coming home,\nhis whole alimentary system was keyed up to perform elaborate acts\nof chewing and swallowing. These and countless other cases, taken\nfrom every hour of the day and night, fully support the mechanistic\ninterpretation which we have just given. But mark, that no question\nis in place here as to whether all such persons _ought_ to use the\nword \u201cgood\u201d in such connections. The fact that they _do_ use it is,\nfor the present, the only essential item to be considered in an\nempirical science of human conduct.\n\nJust as when we enquired into the basic nature of antonyms, we\ncarried our investigation a little below the surface of the organism,\nso may we here carry on a similar study to advantage. It is obvious\nthat the readiness with which we respond to the objects called \u201cgood\u201d\nis necessarily dependent upon the integrity of certain internal\nmechanisms, which, though never observed in their uninterrupted\nworking, have nevertheless been deduced from a multitude of\nscientific investigations. Moreover, it has been discovered that\nevery response we make is chiefly a function of the muscular and\nnervous systems of the body. How, indeed, would a child reach out\nfor candy unless his arm were an extensible hinge, and how could it\nbe extended unless something, namely, his triceps muscle, pulled\non the radial bone, and how also could the muscle contract, unless\na motor nerve from the spinal cord were stimulated to perform this\nspecific activity? We do not, of course, specify that the definition\nof \u201cgood\u201d be restricted to imply only this particular set of facts,\nbut on the other hand we stipulate that this significant mechanism be\nnot lost sight of by him who seeks without prejudice to understand\nhow ethical concepts originate. Even more specific information than\nthis is now available. Any muscle that is ready to contract (or, as\nthe vitalist would say, to do Psyche\u2019s bidding in attaining Homo\u2019s\n_good_) is said to be in a condition of tonus or elastic tension.\nSo far, then, as the muscles are concerned, the \u201cgood\u201d of Class\nA implies a normal muscular tonus, which can, under the proper\nconditions, be developed into a full contraction. Physicians know\nthat in both of the abnormal conditions of tetanus and contractured\ntonus, the organism cannot obtain some of the things which are\nessential for its adaptation of the world about it. The possession of\na normal muscular tonus is, then, an ethical desideratum of no mean\nimportance.\n\nEvery such muscular contraction as we have just described is brought\nabout by means of a nervous impulse, originating at a receptor\norgan, either external or internal, which impulse proceeds toward\na muscle or a group of muscles. However, this impulse (which in a\nsense may be thought of as a desire on its way to fulfilment), is\noften subject to a rather eventful history of interruptions before\nit finally produces muscular action. Between the individual nervous\nstrands along the pathway of its motion the impulse may encounter\nblockades, unless electrically charged particles (called _ions_)\nare present at the various gaps in considerable numbers. Here again,\nthen, we reach a further refinement in our understanding of what one\nclass of \u201cgood\u201d means. The \u201cpermeability of the synapses\u201d (to use\na phrase descriptive of the above situation), thus becomes a large\ndeterminant in human action. And if one of the classes of our concept\nis definable in terms of actions that are facilitated, the light\nwhich neurology throws upon ethics is not to be despised.\n\nOur next adventure is the search for the various implications of\nthe term \u201cgood\u201d as employed with respect to Class B. This class, as\npreviously stated, involves the general notion of _dependability_.\nThings of this class are nominally useful, fit, or serviceable, not\nmerely with reference to the desire of the moment, but also and more\nparticularly they are useful for the future also. Nevertheless, this\nphrase, \u201cuseful for the future,\u201d must be taken to mean \u201cimagined as\ncontinuously or continually useful,\u201d for although we commonly regard\ntomorrow as a sort of package that is coming to us in the mail, it is\nstrictly something not yet existing and consequently unreal. Just as\nWilliam James said, \u201cThe feeling of past time is a present feeling,\u201d\nso is the feeling of dependability here to be interpreted not as a\nproperty of objects, but as a condition of the organism. And, while\nno incontrovertible evidence of the nature of such a condition has\nyet been brought to light, it is directly in line with the facts as\nwe know them to assert that the \u201cgood\u201d included in Class B implies\nboth a maintenance of muscular tone and a steady permeability of\nthe synaptic membranes involved in the action-patterns aroused by\nthe things we keep calling \u201cgood.\u201d To which we might also safely\nadd, that the receptor organ requisite for initiating such an energy\ntransformation has also become so attuned to receiving the stimulus\nas to show what the psychologists call a lowered threshold. Suppose\nwe now condense this whole account, and state it more pointedly\nby saying that Class B refers to those objects that produce the\nresponses for which the organism has mobilized its maximum available\nenergies. Some of these dependable \u201cgoods\u201d may thus imply habitual\nresponses, while others may simply imply a craving long denied its\novert satisfaction. And I doubt not that between these two extremes\nevery man can find his own \u201chighest _good_.\u201d\n\nIn passing, it might be pertinent to remark that the \u201cgood\u201d implied\nby Class B is always _life-enhancing_, were it not for the fact that\nthis obtrudes a standard not warranted by all users of this term. For\nthe snap judgment (or even the pondered conclusion) of an exceedingly\ngreat number of people makes money the chief dependable \u201cgood,\u201d that\nof others puts friends and companions in this category, while with\nfewer still knowledge is so regarded. Some of these things do not\nalways turn out to be life-enhancing,\u2014time, place, circumstance, and\nthe ductless glands alter the assumed value of any such hypothesis.\nHence \u201cgood\u201d has been here defined simply in terms of what the\norganism is doing, and not in terms of any spurious teleological\nprinciple. Empirical science has no books to balance. He who watches\na little closely will see that as far as conduct reveals it (which\nis, indeed, very far), all sorts of things that are not particularly\nlife-enhancing are chosen hourly as the \u201chighest goods\u201d in the\nsense of being greedily and furiously pursued. Sexual excitement,\ndrug-taking, gourmandizing, idling, and the latest styles in clothing\nvie with any and all of these soberer values for first place in the\nattention of numberless people. And while many a man may choose for\nhimself, yet none can choose for all.\n\nClass B includes skilful and kind persons as objects to which the\nterm \u201cgood\u201d is customarily applied. No new difficulties confront\nour attempt to pronounce the physiological implications of our\nconcept as thus employed, even if we are obliged to alter to some\nslight extent our previous point of view. The skilful man is\ncalled \u201cgood\u201d simply because he does or can mobilize his energy to\nproduce something which is regarded as useful, fit, or serviceable.\nLikewise, the skilful or kind person is one who may be counted on\nto assist in maintaining, restoring, or increasing any state of\nthings that is regarded as desirable. And we who employ the concept\n\u201cgood\u201d to praise or encourage such a man insinuate that the same\nmobilization of energy is going on within us. Indeed, as could be\nreadily shown, all perceptions of persons involve an imitative or\nempathic response. That is why skill and virtuosity of all sorts are\nagreeable to behold. They furnish numerous outlets for subconscious\naction-tendencies.\n\nAs regards Class C, the concept \u201cgood\u201d points to \u201cthat which\nfulfils expectation,\u201d that is, the _normal_ or _typical_ thing.\nThese words \u201cnormal\u201d and \u201ctypical\u201d (\u201cimplying the existence of\ncharacteristic qualities\u201d) are related to the word \u201cgood\u201d by means\nof the conditioned reflex. Our experience with all such things as\nmotor-cars, for example, involves not only cognition, but eventually\ndiscrimination and comparison as well. Thereafter, when we hear of a\n_good_ motor-car, we think of such a one as we have been trained to\nregard as capable of a certain kind of performance. The same thing\nholds with respect to all other objects and persons concerning whom\nwe have become discriminative. \u201cGood,\u201d thus employed, seems to imply\nthat energy is being mobilized to perform selective activity, and\nalso that the sense organs have become specially attuned to receive\na specific stimulus. The \u201cgood\u201d cat is not any old beast of the back\nalley, but a mouser with a certain number of catches to her credit.\nThe \u201cgood\u201d grocer (that is, supposedly _normal_) is one who gives\nfull weight and makes prompt deliveries. Moreover, there is implicit\nin all such uses of this value predicate some reference to that\ndependability which was discussed in connection with Class B. Here,\nthen, we may state that Class C implies _the mobilization of energy\nfor the performance of such action as will maintain our physical\nor mental equilibrium_. And this, physiologically speaking, is\nultimately a matter of the progressive coordination of reflexes and\nthe maintenance of muscular tone.\n\nThe objects referred to by class D are those which greatly or even\nsuddenly exceed expectation, whence, as has been hinted before,\nthe signification of our concept frequently approaches that of an\nexpletive. Let us see what physiological mechanisms provide this\nshade of meaning. It is generally realized that not only do our\nsuccesses and failures, our disappointments and satisfactions attune\nour neuro-muscular mechanism to respond to the typical or normal\nthing by calling it \u201cgood,\u201d but these same successes and failures may\nalso whet our appetite for things which, by exceeding the average,\nshall make up for those experiences which have been especially\ndisappointing. All normal protoplasm is insatiable for the maximum\nsuccess. And hunger of any sort, physiologically speaking, may be\ndescribed as a condition in which the motor mechanism is activated\nto greater efforts than usual in order to relieve the condition of\nwant. Consequently, the physiological implications of the concept\n\u201cgood\u201d may be made as precise with respect to Class D as with any of\nthe preceding classes. The action-patterns implied by this class are\nthose which are exhibited by anyone when, after long privation, the\ntensions he has accumulated are suddenly relieved by the appearance\nof the desired stimulus. Indeed, such action-patterns may sometimes\nbe described as rapacity, as is illustrated in the case of our crying\nout \u201cGood!\u201d when some misfortune has befallen a particularly annoying\nprig.\n\nThe physiological implications of the term \u201cgood\u201d as regards Class\nE have already been sufficiently hinted in our delineation of that\nclass. Moreover, the surprise, shock, and spasm which it connotes\nprevent its having an important r\u00f4le to play in our judgments of\nvalue.\n\nLet us now sum up and condense these several points. From the\nforegoing it appears that he who uses the word \u201cgood\u201d is at the\nsame time exhibiting a certain specific motor attitude toward the\nenvironment which gives this word its meaning. As we have already\nshown, the action-pattern involves the following physiological\nconditions:\u2014(1) the presence, maintenance, or even heightening of\nmuscular tone, (2) the permeability of the synaptic membranes,\nespecially of those along the motor pathways, (3) selective activity\nand selective excitability, and (4) normally, the nice coordination\nof the motor responses involved in overt action. This positively\nresponsive condition of the organism may now be expressed in simpler\nwords by saying that the word \u201cgood\u201d is the sign of an _outgoing\nreaction_. That is to say, in the first place, the things we call\n\u201cgood\u201d release the energy that is ready to be discharged; in the\nsecond place, we participate more fully in that environment which\ncontains a \u201cgood\u201d than in one that does not; and in the third place,\nthe effect of the presence of continuously \u201cgood\u201d stimuli is to\nrender us more and more responsive, and to provide a wide margin of\nresiliency for our organic interior.\n\nOur definition of good in physiological terms has now been achieved.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[7] The following list of uses of the word \u201cgood\u201d has been taken\nfrom Murray\u2019s New Oxford Dictionary, The Century Dictionary and\nEncyclopedia, Webster\u2019s, and the Standard Dictionary. From the same\nsources also were derived the lists given in the following five\nchapters. It should, however, be well noted that the lexicographer\nrarely attempts such an analytical definition of words as we are\nin search of here. He confines himself chiefly to the etymology of\na word and its synonyms, and to citing quotations which illustrate\nthe accepted usage of words. As a result, the man who looks into\na dictionary will increase his range of associations long before\nhe will be stimulated to perform that most fruitful of all mental\nactivities,\u2014critical analysis.\n\n\nTHE USES OF THE WORD \u201cGOOD\u201d\n\n  1. Good food; fit to eat, untainted.\n\n  2. Good food; nutritious, palatable.\n\n  3. Good medicine; useful as a remedy.\n\n  4. Good soil; fertile, arable.\n\n  5. Good ice; easy to skate on.\n\n  6. Good ice; fit to dissolve in drinking water.\n\n  7. Good ship; capable, or under sail, or expressing pride in the\n  owner, or as an expression of well-wishing.\n\n  8. Good cat; able mouser, house-broken, etc.\n\n  9. Good child; quiet, obedient, not troublesome.\n\n  10. Good person _for_: capable, thorough, skilful, competent,\n  clever at, in concord with.\n\n  11. \u201cTo can no good,\u201d (colloq.); to be untrained.\n\n  12. Good for a period of time; well able to accomplish.\n\n  13. In good earnest; vigorously and effectively.\n\n  14. Good king; one who fulfils his function, or is beloved by his\n  subjects.\n\n  15. To good; to improve land by manuring it.\n\n  16. Good space or time for; available for the purpose.\n\n  17. Good opinion; favorable or approving, laudatory.\n\n  18. Good cry; beneficent, profitable, salutary, wholesome.\n\n  19. Good spirits; not depressed or dejected, indicative of\n  resilience or ambition.\n\n  20. Good offices; friendly use of power.\n\n  21. Good man; kind, benevolent, gentle, gracious, friendly,\n  favorably disposed, virtuous, skilful, commendable, pious, devout,\n  or religiously approved.\n\n  22. Good season; holy days.\n\n  23. The good book; \u201ctending to spiritual edification.\u201d\n\n  24. The good God; \u201cconnoting perfection or benevolence.\u201d\n\n  25. Highest good; conventional phrase of philosophers.\n\n  26. \u201cAntonio is a good man\u201d; reliable, safe, able to fulfil his\n  engagements, financially sound.\n\n  27. \u201cA man of good\u201d; of property, standing, rank.\n\n  28. Goods; property, merchandise, wares, live-stock, cattle, etc.\n\n  29. \u201cA great good\u201d; a large sum of money.\n\n  30. To yield a good product or result; to turn to a person\u2019s\n  advantage.\n\n  31. To the good; balance on the credit side, excess of assets over\n  liabilities.\n\n  32. \u201cGood fors\u201d; colloquial in South Africa for promissory notes,\n  drafts, \u201cI.O.U.\u2019s,\u201d etc.\n\n  33. Good wind; favorable, not too weak or too strong.\n\n  34. Good health; conducive to peace of mind and longevity.\n\n  35. Good order; stable, satisfying.\n\n  36. Good complexion; gratifying, favorable, advantageous, etc.\n\n  37. Good face; fair or smooth, or indicating intellectual ability\n  or trustworthiness of character.\n\n  38. Good play; agreeable, amusing, skilful.\n\n  39. Good fame; honorable, not sullied.\n\n  40. To have a good night of it; to sleep undisturbedly and to be\n  refreshed by so doing.\n\n  41. To have a good time of it; period of enjoyment.\n\n  42. Good will; benevolence.\n\n  43. \u201cGood morning\u201d; elliptical for well wishing.\n\n  44. \u201cGood bye\u201d; elliptical for well wishing at departure.\n\n  45. To take in good part; to be somewhat pleased, or at least not\n  displeased.\n\n  46. \u201cGood to overcome\u201d; easy to overcome.\n\n  47. To appear or seem good; implying various degrees of\n  commendation, depending, however, upon the accent of the speaker.\n\n  48. A good deal; an amount greater than expected.\n\n  49. A good deal; adequate, abundant, ample, sufficient.\n\n  50. As good as; practically or to all intents and purposes the same.\n\n  51. To be as good as one\u2019s word; to act up to the full sense of the\n  letter or the meaning.\n\n  52. To make good; to succeed, fulfil, or perform, carry out or\n  succeed in performing.\n\n  53. To make good; to fill up even or level.\n\n  54. To make good; to repair or restore, to compensate for, to\n  supply a deficiency, to pay a debt.\n\n  55. To make good; to secure prisoners for the night.\n\n  56. To make good; to prove to be true or valid, to demonstrate or\n  substantiate a statement.\n\n  57. Good for a certain amount; spoken of a person expected to pay\n  or contribute.\n\n  58. Good debts; those which are expected to be paid in full.\n\n  59. To make one\u2019s part good; to make a successful resistance.\n\n  60. To become good for; to fulfil expectation.\n\n  61. To come to good; spoken of a dream that comes true.\n\n  62. Good birth; average or above the average, not humble or mean.\n\n  63. Good coin; genuine, not counterfeit.\n\n  64. Good purpose or conduct; commendable, acceptable, up to\n  standard, not causing trouble.\n\n  65. Good jest; smart, witty, typical, or even exceptional.\n\n  66. Good right, claim, reason, plea, proposition; valid, sound.\n\n  67. Good legal decision, or contract; valid, effectual, not\n  vitiated by any flaw.\n\n  68. To have a good mind to; to be ready to act, to have a matured\n  intention.\n\n  69. \u201cOur good wishes go with you\u201d; expectation of happiness or\n  prosperity.\n\n  70. For good and all; valid conclusion, finally.\n\n  71. \u201cGood my lord\u201d; courteous address, deferential attitude,\n  expectation of favor or esteem.\n\n  72. Good life insurance risk; likely to live a long time.\n\n  73. \u201cGood men and true\u201d; spoken of a jury that is expected to\n  render a fair verdict.\n\n  74. Good old; possibly a term of praise, or merely meaning very old.\n\n  75. \u201cGood words!\u201d; equivalent to \u201cdo not speak so fiercely,\u201d or \u201cI\n  expected kind words from you.\u201d\n\n  76. \u201cThe good people\u201d; palliatory with reference to the fairies or\n  witches.\n\n  77. Good gracious! good Peter! good God!; exclamatory, possibly\n  signifying the presence of something that is unexpected, which may\n  be either welcome or otherwise.\n\n  78. Good folk; used in a jocular or depreciatory sense.\n\n  79. Goody good; mildly depreciatory of trustful simplicity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n  THE ACTION-PATTERNS IMPLIED BY THE WORD \u201cBAD,\u201d WITH A NOTE ON THE\n  PHYSIOLOGY OF \u201cEVIL\u201d\n\n  \u201cIt is noteworthy that there has never been a problem of good,\n  but always a problem of evil. Man takes the good in his life for\n  granted, while he bewails the presence of evil in all its forms.\n  May not reality be of such a character that evil is as natural as\n  good?\u201d\n\n  R. W. SELLARS, \u201cThe Next Step in Religion,\u201d pp. 153-5.\n\n\nGood and bad, or good and evil, have from the most ancient times been\nheld to be diametrical and thoroughgoing opposites of each other. In\nthe system of Zoroaster this antithesis is metaphorically projected\ninto the remotest heavens, where Mazda, the God of Light, whose\ndeeds were goodness itself, endlessly strove to annihilate Angra,\nthe tireless perpetrator of deceit. The Christian mythologists, in a\ncharacteristic imitation of pagan creeds, loved to imagine a final\nDay of Judgment, when the mild, spotless followers of the Lamb were\nto be rewarded by an eternal separation from the sooty henchmen of\nSatan. Similar conceptions, though none of them nearly so poetic,\nhave tinged the thought of every subsequent era. Most of us are\nfamiliar with Milton\u2019s fabulous version of the theology of the Middle\nAges, in which God the Father is depicted as struggling against the\npowers of darkness, not, however, by sending irresistible cohorts to\nbesiege and conquer Hell, but rather by counteracting their insidious\npropaganda in the playground of Adam\u2019s Eden. Indeed, one has but to\nlearn to read the simplest literature in any language to realize\nhow much of what is called thinking consists simply in devising\ncontrasts and antitheses. It is the orator\u2019s chief _tour de force_,\nthe historian\u2019s commonplace, the dramatist\u2019s all-important method of\nproducing a plot, and, in fact, without it, no literature would seem\nto give an adequate picture of the realities of human life. Small\nwonder then, that in the philosophy of Empedocles, the world-view\nof Zoroaster, and the theology of Christendom, this stereotyped\nway of thinking, originating in and generated by the physics and\nphysiology of man\u2019s musculature, should be manifest; or that the\ncommon man should so readily and persistently hold to the diametrical\nopposition between good and bad, and right and wrong. The law of\nreciprocal innervation, being implicit in the body\u2019s architecture, is\nnecessarily a basic formula for man\u2019s thought.\n\nEven though this be admitted, it guides us only a little ways through\nthe tangle of ethical problems. In the first place, no such dramatic\nportrayal as, for example, that of Zoroaster,\u2014whatever theatrical\nagonies it might provoke,\u2014has either reduced the sum of the world\u2019s\ndistresses, or furnished the least insight into the nature of the\nsupposed opposites of goodness. For that matter, indeed, very little\nknowledge of this character has arisen out of ethical debate or\nspeculation. The assumptions have been many, the facts few; and\nusually, whenever this discrepancy has been realized, overdrafts\nhave been written on the phantom bank of theory with the vain hope\nthat by this means ethical solvency could be attained. In the second\nplace, it has scarcely occurred to any one to ask whether there was\nnot some other way of looking at the ethical problem than in this\nduplex manner, for if an irreconcilable opposition in the field of\nethics is assumed as a fundamental principle, nothing but an eternal\ndeadlock can result in the conclusion. Now the empirical fact is that\nman\u2019s muscles (the functions of which determine his thoughts), can do\nother things than oppose and counteract each other, for every day of\nour lives we see these other motor activities manifested. However,\nour traditional ethical theory would have it that the dilemma is\ninescapable,\u2014that things are either good or bad, or actions either\nright or wrong, and people either virtuous or vicious, and that\nthere is no middle ground, or possibility of reconciliation. Mark,\nhowever, that only in serious pathological cases do we observe a\ncomplete rigidity of the body due to chronic muscular antagonisms.\nIs it not therefore a valid inference that the mental rigidity\nof most adherents to the bi-polar theory in ethics is likewise a\npathological sign, and, if so, are we not driven to the conclusion\nthat man\u2019s traditional ethical notions are symptoms of physiological\nmalfunctioning?\n\nImportant as all this is, however, it cannot turn us aside from our\ninterest in finding out just to what an extent the word \u201cbad\u201d is a\nreal antonym to the word \u201cgood,\u201d especially since knowledge of this\nsort is first necessary before we can employ the method of science in\nthe service of the problems of human conduct. Let us, then, resume\nour original search.\n\nThe term \u201cbad\u201d is a gestural sign which we employ in two different\nsenses,\u2014to point out a deficiency or lack, (that is, to indicate\nmerely the _absence of_ good), and in a positive sense, to hint\nthe presence of something definitely _antagonistic to_ good. By an\nanalogy, if money is a good, we should call it \u201cbad\u201d in the privative\nsense of the term for one to be without it; while it is \u201cbad\u201d in\nthe positive sense for one to be deeply in debt. But even while we\nponder these two behavior situations, they tend, at least partly, to\ncoalesce, very much indeed as Classes A and B of \u201cgood\u201d merged at\ntimes imperceptibly into one another. For if the man who is without\nmoney, but not in debt, passionately desires to purchase and spend,\nhe will immediately place himself in the class of debtors, and\nexperience therewith the positive form of \u201cbadness,\u201d at least so far\nas his feelings of inhibition are concerned. However, just to what\nan extent these two categories of \u201cbad\u201d may be identified cannot be\nshown until we have first reviewed the separate uses to which this\nterm is put,[8] and have also deduced the action-patterns which it\nimplies.\n\nIt can be divined at once from a careful perusal of this brief array,\nherewith subjoined, that the concept \u201cbad\u201d is, on the whole, a far\nless variegated symbol than is the concept \u201cgood.\u201d Its use is more\nrestricted, its connotation is less rich in variety, and, as can be\nalready predicted, the number of separate classes into which our\narray may be distributed is fewer than was the case with the term\n\u201cgood.\u201d For while we have here hints of three classes which are,\nroughly speaking, negatives of Classes A, B, and C of \u201cgood,\u201d we have\nnothing at all comparable to the negatives of Classes D and E. To\nwit:\u2014\n\nClass A. That which is useless, unfit, unserviceable, and the like,\nfor any purpose whatever.\n\nClass B. That which brings pain, discomfort, loss, or death. In some\nrespects this class is the negative of Class B of \u201cgood,\u201d having the\ngeneral meaning of _undependable_. However, it is not the negative of\nevery shade of meaning implied by that class, as can at once be seen\nwhen we consider that there are no \u201cbads\u201d which are the antitheses of\ngoods, that is, property. For, as we have already observed, even some\ndebts are _good_ debts.\n\nClass C. That which disappoints expectation.[9] Here also the\nnegation is limited, for while with Class C of \u201cgood\u201d the tone of the\nvoice could convey an immense variety of meanings, here no such great\narray of nuances is found.\n\nIn consideration, then, of what has just preceded, we may\nemphatically deny that \u201cbad\u201d is a true antonym of the word \u201cgood.\u201d\nNot only is this to be instantly deduced from the array of uses to\nwhich these terms are put, but also from the contents of the five\nclasses of \u201cgood\u201d and the three classes of \u201cbad.\u201d We shall presently\ndiscover whether \u201cevil,\u201d as an adjunct of the concept \u201cbad,\u201d makes up\nthis discrepancy.\n\nResuming, then, our main theme, how shall we proceed to define\nprivative and positive \u201cbad\u201d in physiological terms, and by what\nmeans shall we discover the action-patterns which are implied by the\nthree classes of \u201cbad\u201d which we have just delimited?\n\nIn general, and from the reader\u2019s own experience, \u201cbad\u201d means\nthwarting, inhibition, opposition, the interruption of action, the\ndurable dissatisfactions of life. We need, however, to come at the\nmatter a little more closely. In the preceding chapter we saw that\nwhen we are ready to act, the stimulus that elicits the reaction for\nwhich we are keyed up is called \u201cgood.\u201d Employing the methods of\ninductive science, with our eye on the behavior possibilities of the\nhuman organism, we find the following stimulus-response situations\nadequate to reveal the origin of the word \u201cbad.\u201d\n\n1. When we are ready to act in some precise manner, but no stimulus,\nthat is, opportunity, is afforded for such action, the term \u201cbad\u201d\nadequately describes the situation. Here it becomes a gestural sign\nwhich may point either to the environment or to the organism. It is\nfor this reason that a man in debt, hungry, and in want is said to\nbe \u201cin a _bad_ way\u201d; while in his predicament counterfeit money and\ntainted food would be unequivocally bad.\n\n2. When we are ready to act, but are prevented from releasing the\nenergy we have mobilized because the stimulus is inadequate, and\ndoes not call forth the exact response which we have been preparing\nto make, the situation may again be described as \u201cbad.\u201d \u201cThat\u2019s too\nbad,\u201d we sometimes say of a suit of clothes which, while adequately\nkeeping out the winter\u2019s cold, does not quite fit the shoulders.\n\n3. When we are _unready_, to act in a certain way, but are summarily\ncalled upon to mobilize our energy for this purpose, the situation\nis again often described as \u201cbad.\u201d Unexpected, excess taxes always\nproduce an emotional situation specifically related to this value\npredicate.\n\n4. Any inadequate response, in other words, one that is faulty,\nerroneous, and the like, may be called \u201cbad.\u201d Sometimes, also, the\nperson making such a response is described by the same term.\n\nFrom this it appears that the general meaning of \u201cbad\u201d is within\nthe scope of our discovery. Not only is this deducible from our\nprevious identification of this concept with the _useless_, the\n_independable_, and with _that which disappoints_, but it is also\nplainly foreshadowed by the four behavior situations we have just\ndescribed. \u201cBad\u201d seems to imply that action, interest, purpose, and\nthe like, have been thwarted; that the organism has become a center\nof inhibitions, and is in discomfort either because the energy which\nit has mobilized cannot be released into action, or because demands\nfor such release cannot be met. Such a physiological condition is\nbest described as _incoordinate_. And this term covers all three of\nour classes of \u201cbad.\u201d Moreover, by partial contrast with _good_,\n\u201cbad\u201d implies a _withdrawing reaction_, with either a slump in\nmuscular tone (in which case we have _privative_ \u201cbad\u201d), or else a\nsudden onset of unrelieved tensions\u2014(_positive_ \u201cbad\u201d). Accompanying\nsuch a condition, we may safely postulate synaptic impermeability\nand inhibition, together with varying degrees of unpleasant strain\nsensations. But mark, that we do not say that the \u201cbad\u201d is always\nequivalent to the painful.\n\nWere physiological science sufficiently advanced, it would be\npossible for us to complete our definition of badness in terms of the\nmal-functioning of such internal systems as the alimentary canal,\nthe cardiac, respiratory, and excretory mechanisms, and the endocrine\nglands. Our common experience indubitably indicates that all forms\nof thwarting and inhibition which prompt our exclamations, react\nviolently upon the internal machinery. Indeed, it is not too much to\nclaim that both the centrifugal and centripetal types of behavior\nwhich are implied by the terms \u201cgood\u201d and \u201cbad\u201d respectively just\nas often as not have their source in the postures and man\u0153uvres of\nour organic interior. That is, brief to say, why the healthy man and\nthe dyspeptic, the optimist and the pessimist, will give precisely\nopposite accounts of the same external world. We remarked before that\nspeech not only points out and distinguishes objects for us, but\nalso implies and predicts human activities. Our analysis of good and\nbad fortifies this thesis beyond contradiction, and shows that any\nvalue predicate that has a specific reference to the environment has\nspecific implications for the organism as well.\n\n\n_The Physiology of \u201cEvil\u201d_\n\nIn some minds the term \u201cevil\u201d has primarily what is called a\n_moral_ signification, and implies first and foremost anything\n\u201ccontrary to an accepted standard of righteousness,\u201d or anything\n\u201cinconsistent with or violating the moral law\u201d; and consequently,\nit is equivalent to the terms \u201csinful\u201d and \u201cwicked.\u201d Let us not\nmeet such minds too intimately. Speaking in this fashion is not only\nvague, but misleading as well. For when duly examined, almost every\nso-called \u201cstandard of righteousness\u201d becomes a totally unspecific\ncategory of behavior, while the term \u201cmoral law\u201d is not _law_ in\nany dependable sense of the term at all. Certainly it is not a law\nof nature,\u2014of human nature,\u2014for it does not adequately describe any\ntypical behavior situations. Neither is it law to a jurist, since\nthere is no organized force that can be brought to bear upon human\nbeings to compel them to obey it in their actions, much less in\ntheir thinking. Moreover, the terms \u201csinful\u201d and \u201cwicked\u201d are so\nnarrow and provincial and so exclusively employed by religionists \u201cto\npelt their adversaries with,\u201d that their equivalence to \u201cevil\u201d as\na term of value in the broadest ethical sense is, to say the least\nof it, problematical. Whether unfortunately or not, none of the\npurely _moral_ categories are fundamental for an understanding of\nthe actual behavior of human beings. Indeed, as a usual thing, they\nhint uncritical and disorderly thinking in him who uses them, rather\nthan specify any intelligent and sympathetic appreciation of human\ninterests, or any analytical insight into the environment which now\nthwarts and now furthers such interests.\n\nAnd now to our analysis. The term \u201cevil\u201d is much more assertive\nthan is the word \u201cbad,\u201d and more forceful than all but a few\nsignifications of the word \u201cgood.\u201d It originally had the adverbial\nforce of _up_ or _over_, two words whose empathic significance is\nworthy of remark. Today the term \u201cevil\u201d signifies either (a) \u201cthat\nwhich exceeds due measure,\u201d or (b) \u201cthat which oversteps proper\nlimits.\u201d Here, then, we notice at the outset that \u201cevil,\u201d unlike\neither good or bad, always carries with it the presumption of\nstandards or rules.\n\nTo a large extent the place in the language formerly occupied by\nthe term \u201cevil\u201d is now held by the term \u201cbad.\u201d With the reasons for\nthis change we are not especially concerned here, although it may be\nappropriate to point out that the popularity of any term that has\nbeen used almost exclusively by religionists for purposes of anathema\nis doomed. Besides, the word \u201cevil\u201d calls up literary associations\nwhich condemn it to modern minds. Such expressions as \u201cThe Evil One\u201d\n(that is, the Devil of the Middle Ages), the \u201cevil eye\u201d (another\noutworn superstition), the \u201cKing\u2019s Evil,\u201d and a dozen other equally\nobsolete terms have fallen into such low repute that they have\nweakened, so to speak, the gestural significance of the remnants\nof this concept. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there is\nfar more dramatic vocal quality attaching to the term \u201cevil\u201d than\nto either of the words \u201cgood\u201d or \u201cbad.\u201d Few words in the language\nprovide such an opportunity as does this one for the simultaneous\ndisplay of eye-, lip-, and jaw-gestures, whose combined effects are\nnone the less striking, no matter how empathically unpleasant they\nhave become. We invite you to stand before the mirror, and say the\nword \u201cevil\u201d with clenched teeth and canines showing, and verify this\nremark.\n\nWhile the term \u201cevil\u201d is employed as an adjective, a noun, and an\nadverb, we do not need to stop here to catalogue its uses under\nthese three headings. All we need to consider is that \u201cevil\u201d is an\nintensification of \u201cbad\u201d in the positive sense of that term.[10] It\nis also a forceful negative of Class B of good, in the sense that\nit implies _that which actively operates to produce incoordination,\nmal-adjustment, discomfort, and the like_. It will be recalled\nthat Class B of \u201cgood\u201d included whatever conduced to life, health,\npleasure, and stability. On the contrary, \u201cevil\u201d is a gestural sign\nthat indicates any and all processes of disintegration, disruption,\nand confusion. It at once implies something which is energetically\nantagonistic to our purposes.\n\nThe definition of evil in mechanistic terms is now within our\nreach. We have said before that \u201cevil\u201d is an intensification of the\nterm \u201cbad,\u201d which latter term was used to describe an incoordinate\ncondition of the organism brought about because its wishes,\ninterests, and purposes,\u2014in a word, its action-patterns,\u2014had been\nthwarted. Just what more than this does \u201cevil\u201d imply? _It implies\nthat our wishes have been thwarted to such an extent as to call\nforth from us the most energetic, antagonistic reactions of which\nwe are capable._ \u201cGood\u201d signifies an outgoing reaction, \u201cbad\u201d\nsignifies a withdrawing reaction, while \u201cevil\u201d means that within the\norganism some of the available energies are being hastily mobilized\nto compensate for an outgoing reaction that has been thwarted. Of\ncourse, there are many persons who never attempt any compensation of\nsuch a constructive character as to prevent the recurrence of the\nsame evil situation, either because they are physically unfit, or are\npoor in spirit, but in such cases the word \u201cevil\u201d is used without\nvery much meaning.\n\nOur definition of this concept will, I think, serve to provide a\nnew interpretation of the statement made previously, namely, that\n\u201cevil always carries with it the presumption of standards or rules.\u201d\nWhat, precisely, does this statement mean? It means that whenever\nwe have lost our organic equilibrium in the presence of a situation\ndescribed as _evil_, whatever we do to recover it _ipso facto_ at\nthat moment defines not only the standard and rule by which our\nconduct is regulated, but such behavior also reveals to others just\nwhat the \u201cproblem of evil\u201d really means to us. For example, if we\nare vexed and become profane, profanity is patently an integral\nfactor in our philosophy of compensation. If we lose our money, and\nsteal another\u2019s to make good our loss, theft is a cardinal principle\nin our doctrine of equalization. We may, to be sure, immediately\nthereafter lament the outburst by which we attempted to \u201cset things\nto rights,\u201d but we cannot retrieve the action by which we defined\nand exhibited our practical ethical philosophy. Our recent Emerson\nhad this scientific truth in mind when he said, \u201cWhat you are speaks\nso loud, I cannot hear what you say.\u201d Examples of another sort\nare equally illuminating. If Socrates is condemned to death for\ncorrupting the Athenian youth, and calmly drinks the hemlock in order\nto remain a law-abiding citizen to the end, this deed of probity\ndefines the dominant action-pattern in his philosophy of retaliation.\nIf Jesus is crucified for blasphemy and inciting to insurrection,\nand manifests an attitude of non-resistance and equanimity, these\naction-patterns once more exhibit his method of dealing with the\nproblem of evil. In every such case the bodily habits which have long\naccumulated are automatically released by the appropriate stimulus\ninto overt behavior. In physiological terms, what a man does in\nresponse to evil, shows what sort of reciprocal innervations his\nbody has acquired. And while such a mechanistic interpretation of an\nethical standard may seem astonishing, yet such a _modus agendi_ is,\nunless we are greatly deceived, the one which human beings actually\nemploy, and consequently it is the only one which has any place in an\nempirical science of conduct.\n\n\n_A Further Remark on the Opposites of \u201cGood\u201d_\n\nFrom our definition of \u201cevil\u201d as an intensification of \u201cbad\u201d in the\npositive sense of that term, it can at once be noted that these two\nwords do not even together supply a thoroughgoing antonym to the\nword \u201cgood.\u201d For they do not strictly imply action-patterns which in\nthe minute and fine are opposed to those underlying all the valid\nuses of the word \u201cgood.\u201d It is not to the point that \u201cin general\u201d\n(which can only mean here _vaguely_) these words are antithetical\nto each other; our analysis has produced knowledge that henceforth\ndiscounts all such remarks. And, if anyone says that for the purposes\nof morality, the traditional antithesis is still valid, the answer is\nthat morality, after all, is only custom, while ethics is primarily\na critical insight into that reality which the moralist has always\nsought to make obscure.\n\nA more important conclusion, however, is still to be drawn from the\nforegoing analysis. Which is, that \u201cevil\u201d is not, as has usually been\nconcluded, an opposite of \u201cgood.\u201d Indeed, if we have described the\nsituation fairly, when we say that \u2018evil denotes that our wishes have\nbeen thwarted to such an extent as to call forth from us the most\nenergetic, antagonistic reactions of which we are capable,\u2019 we can\nonly deduce from this that the antagonistic reactions are aroused for\nthe purpose of replacing something that is \u201cbad\u201d by something that is\n\u201cgood.\u201d But if this be the case, then the emphatic quality attaching\nto the word \u201cevil\u201d is really a sign that we have already started an\noutgoing reaction that shall furnish the desired compensation. This\ntwo-fold meaning of the word \u201cevil\u201d is worthy of more than a passing\nremark, but suffice it to say that in the light of what has gone\nbefore, the \u201cproblem of evil\u201d now becomes the problem of educating a\nman how to replace the \u201cbad\u201d with the \u201cgood,\u201d rather than a problem\nover which the metaphysician may dawdle or the moralist mope.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[8]\n\n\nTHE USES OF THE WORD \u201cBAD\u201d\n\n\nI. _The Privative Significations of the Word \u201cBad.\u201d_\n\n  1. Bad air; vitiated, which cannot sustain healthy respiration.\n\n  2. Bad coin; debased, counterfeit.\n\n  3. Bad food; deficient in nourishment.\n\n  4. Bad food; repugnant on account of its smell or taste, whether\n  deficient in nourishment or not.\n\n  5. Bad shot or guess; incorrect, faulty, below standard or par.\n\n  6. Bad debts; those which cannot or are not expected to be paid. 7.\n  To go bad; to decay.\n\n  8. Bad workmanship; defective, below par, sometimes called poor or\n  worthless.\n\n  9. In a bad way; in a wretched or miserable state, unfortunate,\n  unfavorable.\n\n  10. With a bad grace; unwillingly.\n\n\nII. _The Positive Significations of the Word \u201cBad.\u201d_\n\n  1. Bad air; noxious, poisonous.\n\n  2. Bad food or water; injurious to health, hurtful, dangerous,\n  pernicious.\n\n  3. Bad company; depraved, wicked, vicious.\n\n  4. Bad fit (as of a shoe); causing inconvenience, displeasure, or\n  pain.\n\n  5. Bad smell; unpleasant, offensive, disagreeable, troublesome,\n  painful.\n\n  6. \u201cBad blood\u201d; harsh, angry feeling.\n\n  7. In bad health; suffering from disease or injury, (in pain).\n\n  8. \u201cTo the bad\u201d; to ruin, in deficit.\n\n  9. \u201cIn bad\u201d (slang); spoken of a man who has made trouble for\n  himself and others.\n\n\n[9] In passing, it might be pertinent to consider the question as to\nwhether the word \u201cbad\u201d _is_ synonymous with \u2018that which disappoints\nexpectation.\u2019 One might ask, for example, \u201cDo not chronic pessimists\nliterally expect catastrophe?\u201d Here, as elsewhere, we must not be\ndeceived by a trick of speech. For he who says, \u201cI expect disaster,\u201d\nis unwittingly making an equivocal statement. The man who makes such\na remark cannot be implying that his whole body, with its numerous\naction-patterns, is completely set to receive the stimulus that will\ndemolish his equilibrium. Rather should we infer from this utterance\nthat he is at least partly prepared to resist it, partly to rejoice\nat the incident discomfiture to others, with the hope thereby of\nmaking his own troubles dwindle by comparison, and perhaps also\npartly anticipating the relief that will come when the suspense\nof waiting is over. None of these interpretations disallow the\nformulation of any of the above classes of \u201cbad.\u201d To be sure, there\nare certain abnormal types, like the sadist and the masochist, to\nwhom pain is an erotic stimulus, but even so, their expectations are\nalways directed to that particular element of the situation which, by\naffording an outgoing reaction, is for them a \u201cgood.\u201d\n\n[10]\n\n\nTHE SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE TERM \u201cEVIL\u201d\n\n  1. That which causes or increases harm, injury, misfortune, or\n  disease.\n\n  2. Such advice as is misleading, mischievous, or disastrous.\n\n  3. Any wish whose fulfilment would lead to calamity, trouble, or\n  death.\n\n  4. Any abusive, malicious, or slanderous statement, (compare\n  \u201c_evil_ tongue\u201d).\n\n  5. Any period of time characterized by misfortune or suffering.\n\n  6. The term \u201cevil\u201d is also used in special senses, such as in the\n  expression \u201csocial evil\u201d (that is, prostitution). But such a use of\n  this word, being special and more or less provincial, should not be\n  over-emphasized in our definition. There are, moreover, many other\n  social evils than prostitution, and some producing far more ethical\n  disaster.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\u201cRIGHT\u201d AS A GESTURAL SIGN\n\n  \u201cFrom every point of view, the overwhelming and portentous\n  character ascribed to universal conceptions is surprising. Why,\n  from Plato and Aristotle downwards, philosophers should have vied\n  with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular, and\n  in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand, seeing\n  that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of the more\n  adorable things, and that the _things_ of worth are all concretes\n  and singulars. The only value of universal characters is that\n  they help us, by reasoning, to know new truths about individual\n  things.... In sum, therefore, the traditional universal-worship\n  can only be called a bit of perverse sentimentalism, a philosophic\n  \u2018idol of the tribe.\u2019\u201d W. JAMES, \u201cPrinciples of Psychology,\u201d Vol. I,\n  Chap. XII, pp. 479-80.\n\n\nThere had been a murder in the Maritime Provinces, and two men,\na jurist and a layman, were discussing it. The murdered man, it\nappeared, had from time to time missed some of his sheep, and one\nday, upon hearing a shot fired, ran down into his pasture, and came\nupon two boys, one of whom was carrying a gun, and the other a bag\nwhose contours plainly revealed that it contained the body of a\nsheep. The farmer ordered the boys to follow him to town to give an\naccount of their misbehavior; and this they proceeded to do without\nany show of resistance or word of objection. But suddenly, and\nwithout any warning, the boy who carried the gun shot the farmer in\nthe back of the head, killing him instantly. The murderer was later\napprehended, and put into the county jail, awaiting trial.\n\n\u201cAnd would they hang a boy of seventeen in Canada?\u201d asked the layman.\n\n\u201cWhy not?\u201d enquired the jurist, \u201cThey can hang anyone here who has\nreached the age of discretion, and who knows the difference between\nright and wrong.\u201d\n\n\u201cAnd will you tell me,\u201d parried the layman, \u201cjust what that age is,\nand exactly what that difference is?\u201d\n\nThe jurist eyed his inquisitor for a moment, and burst into a laugh.\n\u201cOnly a fool would ask such a question!\u201d he retorted, and turned away.\n\nAll of which goes to show that a man may be proficient in legal\ntechnique, and yet be an ignoramus in ethics. Knowledge of the\nmeaning of the word \u201cright\u201d is both possible and profitable, and it\nis hardly too much to suppose that such knowledge, when disseminated,\nmight even produce a salutary effect upon legal theory and legal\npractice.\n\nAnyone who endeavors to marshal the array of all the uses to\nwhich the word \u201cright\u201d is put, will be astonished to find out how\nextensive the list is. In point of the richness of its denotation\nand connotation, this concept exceeds the term \u201cgood.\u201d And while it\nresembles that word in being used as a noun, a verb, an adjective,\nand an adverb, it significantly differs from the term \u201cgood\u201d in that\nit is employed to refer principally to the relations and functions of\nthings, and hardly ever to objects of the physical environment.\n\nNo man\u2019s span of perception is large enough, or his span of attention\nlong enough, to surround the complete array of the uses of the word\n\u201cright\u201d unless this array be divided into classes. Such division\nwill presently appear. And I think it can be shown that no matter\nhow little in common some of the terms of this array seem, to a\ncasual observer, to possess, when they are thus grouped into classes,\nthey will be subtly linked together by adequate bonds. Let us then\nintroduce:\n\n\nCLASS A\n\n  _The Word \u201cRight\u201d as a Term that is Descriptive of Certain\n  Mathematical Relationships and Physical Functions._[11]\n\nThe original signification of our concept was _straight_, a word, be\nit noted, that is usually defined in the negative. (See Ex. 1, p.\n76.) Why we have a negative definition for a word that seems to have\na positive meaning, especially to mathematicians and draughtsmen,\nis not at first quite obvious. However, when this phenomenon is\nduly examined from the point of view of the mechanics of man\u2019s\nlocomotor apparatus, its secret is no longer hidden. All of the\nmovements naturally produced by the appendages of the body are\ncurvilinear: the arm being a lever, or radius vector, it always draws\narcs in space or on paper; so does the hand as a whole, and so do\nthe fingers. \u201cRight\u201d signifying _straight_, therefore, is defined\nnegatively simply because straight lines are alien to the physics and\nmechanics of man\u2019s original nature.\n\nWhere, then, did man get the notion of straightness, and what has\nthis first class of the uses of \u201cright\u201d to do with ethics? Man got\nthe notion of straightness, we surmise, from such things as freely\nfalling bodies, which give not only the idea of perpendicular, but\nalso and at the same time the ideas of _direct_ and _immediately_;\nfrom the sunbeams which drew for him imaginary lines among the clouds\nand through the foliage of the forest; from his need of taking the\nshortest course across the fields in pursuit of wild animals for\nthe supply of his larder; and from his reminiscent ponderings of\nthe comparative merits of less and less curved and crooked arrows\nused in the chase. Moreover, man walks with the greatest safety and\npursues his game with the greatest chances of success when his feet\ngo without hesitation on a level or straight surface. Under these\nconditions he can attain his ends directly and immediately; as the\nsaying is, \u201cThings will then come out all _right_.\u201d Consequently,\neven the straight line has ethical implications: the speed with\nwhich some actions are performed and the time required to cover the\ndistance between man and his objective are very often the chief\nconsiderations in the attainment of a good or the avoidance of an\nevil thing.\n\nAnd this brings us by a very slight transition to\n\n\nClass B\n\n  _\u201cRight\u201d as Descriptive of the Method (or Object) by Which the\n  Desired End Can be Obtained._\n\nHere the purpose involved, or the end sought, is neither praised\nnor blamed. Nor have we indeed as yet reached any basis by which a\ncriterion of purposes and ends can be established. So far as we have\ngone, \u201cright\u201d implies technique, and nothing more.\n\n  The members of this class are as follows:\n\n    13. The \u201cright\u201d information.\n\n    14. \u201cRight\u201d whale; the one to capture in order to get whalebone.\n\n    15. \u201cRub your sarsnet well, the _right_ way of the sarsnet.\u201d\n\n    16. \u201cLet it be a constant rule to scrub the boards the _right_\n    way of the grain, that is, lengthwise.\u201d\n\n    17. \u201cThe ship ceased rolling and _righted_ herself.\u201d (Compare\n    this signification with _perpendicular_, previously given.)\n\n    18. \u201cStand it _upright_, or it will fall.\u201d\n\n    19. \u201cWhose inhabitants were _right_ shooters (at an haires\n    breadth and faile not).\u201d\n\n    20. \u201cSwears he will shoot no more, but play with sparrows, And be\n    a boy _right_ out.\u201d\n\n    21. \u201cI am _right_ of mine old master\u2019s humour for that.\u201d\n\n\nCLASS C\n\n  _\u201cRight\u201d as Descriptive of any Statement Which Reports the Facts;\n  of any Opinion or Judgment that is Correct; and of any Person Who\n  Judges, Thinks, or Acts in Accordance with the Facts or the Truth\n  about a Matter._[12]\n\nIt will be observed that the significations in this class are all\nsymptomatic of a slight change in the meaning of the concept \u201cright.\u201d\nThe emphasis here is upon true opinions and judgments in contrast to\nfalse ones. Moreover, the range of behavior covered by Class C is\nsomewhat broader than that denoted by the two preceding classes. He\nwho now uses this word \u201cright\u201d becomes judicial, and makes statements\nhe is willing to defend. More than this we cannot say. We assume\nmany a time, no doubt, that the statements we call true are backed\nby something not ourselves; and while in some cases nature\u2019s laws\nare in a sense \u201cbehind\u201d our statements, yet unless this is the case,\nthere is nothing whatever to fall back upon. Thus, while a man may\ndemonstrate that dynamite is, as he says, truly explosive, yet in\ncases of the equitable adjustment of social frictions, where both\nparties pour out a tumult of exaggerations, no similar truth of\nopinion is obtainable. It would therefore be illogical to assume\nthat we have reached any absolute criterion in passing from Class B\nto Class C of \u201cright.\u201d He who uses this concept in this connection\nhas, indeed, ventured more than he who uses it only to imply the\npreceding two classes, but he is not thereby gifted with superior\npowers of discretion. All we can say is that he who undertakes to\nmake a judgment with all the available information before him is more\nlikely to be chosen as a referee again. He will at least have the\nsatisfaction of knowing that if he makes mistakes, they will probably\nbe some that he has never made before. And this way much of human\nprogress lies.\n\n\nCLASS D\n\n  _\u201cRight\u201d as the Distinctive Epithet of the Hand Which is Normally\n  the Stronger._[13]\n\nThe use of our concept in this connection is firmly bound to its\nuse in the preceding classes. For it is no accident that in the\nmechanistic process called evolution human aims and purposes have\ncome to be furthered and achieved principally through the power and\nskill of the arm and hand. The \u201cright\u201d arm and hand point reasonably\n_straight_, throw missiles in a fairly direct _manner_, and their\npowerful shots bring down the quarry _immediately_. (Class A.)\nThese parts of the body are also among the most educible and skilful\nin the technique requisite for bringing about a desired end. Their\naction-patterns are indeed often the very method by which ambitions\nare achieved. (Class B.) And when we have reached a judgment that\nis deemed to be true or in accordance with the facts of the matter\n(Class C.), it is our \u201cright\u201d hand that is ready to be motivated\nin its defence. Even the art of writing, in the original sense of\ncutting, tearing, or scratching to produce a record or a design, is\nnot at all distantly related to the functions of this part of the\nbody.\n\nWith this clearly understood, the transition is easy to make to\n\n\nCLASS E\n\n  _Legal \u201cRights\u201d; that is, Those Claims and Interests the\n  Establishment and Protection of Which May Be Secured by Force and\n  even Violence._[14]\n\nAs used in this connection, \u201cright\u201d is partially equivalent to\n_might_, since our concept here connotes an organized force,\u2014a\nphysical power,\u2014which, under given conditions, can be employed for\nthe purpose of establishing claims and protecting interests. This\norganized force is popularly referred to as \u201cthe Law,\u201d especially\nby those who indulge in back-yard altercations and cry out: \u201cIf you\ndo that again, I\u2019ll have the Law on you!\u201d And the ordinary man,\nwhose six or seven years of public schooling have implanted in him\nthe fixed habit of reifying all abstractions, understands the law\nas equivalent to a transcendental force of some kind which makes\nhis threats effective. As befits the mental calibre of such a man,\nthe law frequently becomes synonymous with the functions of the\npolice, who are na\u00efvely supposed to know when and how to protect\neverybody\u2019s legal rights. This is an error. Not only are the police\nextremely ignorant persons, but they have scarcely any legal status\nwhatever. They are \u201cthe tolerated remnant of the autocratic power\nwhich absolute monarchs once exercised over their subjects.\u201d Law and\nlegal rights are functions of the courts, while the police are simply\nunattached huskies hired to bring into court those who do not come\nthere of their own initiative. We must look elsewhere for the source\nof the might which legal rights are said and felt to possess, namely,\nin the origin and function of law itself.\n\nBriefly stated, law originated as a means to protect men against\nloss of property, against bodily harm, and against damage to their\npersonality through the actions of their fellows. It did not\noriginate as a means to prevent or repair the damage to life or\nproperty caused by cloudbursts or lightning, or the loss of income\nbrought about by avalanches, laziness, or disease; it had only to do\nwith actions for which some man could be held responsible. Now the\nactions which produce the loss of property, bodily harm, and damage\nto personality are usually actions arising from, as well as leading\nto, emotional disturbances. Theft, murder, and libel, for example,\nare about the most potent stimuli to violent retaliation that can be\nprovided. Nevertheless, it is sound psychology that most emotions\nquickly cool if the stimulus be withdrawn, that wrath has to be\nnursed if it is to be kept warm, and that absence does not make the\nheart grow fonder. Here is where the law performs its chief function.\nFor the law is simply an ingenious device to get a judgment on\nthe conflict of human interests which shall not be tinged with the\npassions that provoked the conflict. And while legal procedure may\nnot always be fair, especially in the eyes of the loser, its methods\ncertify that it shall not be precipitous or rancorous in rendering a\ndecision. Legal rights, therefore, are not equivalent to the capacity\nfor revenge, but rather consist in the ability to get old quarrels\nlooked at by new and unbiased eyes. Herein consists much of the\nprestige of the law, and since prestige has always been regarded as a\nkind of power, men are not slow to employ it in the establishment of\ntheir claims and the protection of their interests.\n\nLaw, however, is frequently misinterpreted when its function\nis thought to be preventative of discord, rather than judicial\nand equitable. Law is no guardian angel. No law can prevent the\nunobserved Richard Roe from murdering the defenceless John Doe; nor\ncan it hinder the murderer (still unobserved) from altering Doe\u2019s\nwill to his own material advantage; neither can it be guaranteed to\nforestall the murderer from making the false plea that Doe was about\nto assault his daughter. The law did not make man in its own image;\naccording to scripture it was God who did that. Law does not set\nout to protect the careless or the poor in spirit. Its machinery is\nnormally put into operation only for those with enough initiative to\nlook out for their own interests. If a patentee knowingly allows\none infringement of his patent rights, he might as well donate his\ninvention to the public. The law does not hunt for trouble, or carry\non a bureau for the exchange of expressions of malcontent. It does\nnot even demand that a clearly known offender of society, and one\nconscious of his offence, enter a plea of guilty. Actually, the\nfunction of law is simply to preserve and to restore order and peace\nin society, and not to define what that order and peace shall be.\nWere ninety per cent of the people in the world suddenly to become\nstubbornly devoted to thieving, the public peace would have to be\nredefined in terms of their attitude toward property. Moreover, as\nit is now, the law merely attempts to imitate the security which\nis provided by \u201cgentlemen\u2019s agreements,\u201d which security is largely\nmaintained without the help of the courts. For it is very plain that\nmillions keep the peace, while only a few hundreds know the law. Law,\nthen, may be fairly characterized as an impersonal referee, whose\nbusiness it is to persuade and oblige the disturbers of the social\nequilibrium to employ the methods and standards of conduct which have\nalways marked free men.\n\nWith this by way of introduction, it is not difficult to understand\nwhy \u201cright\u201d in the legal sense of the word is so closely related to\n_might_. For the term \u201clegal rights\u201d refers not only to those claims\nand interests which may be established and protected, but also and\nrather to those which _have long been_ secured by force. In other\nwords, some of them have the advantage of the momentum of custom and\ntradition. Now custom and tradition, whatever else they may be, are\ncertainly action-patterns which are generated and maintained by the\nbodies of human beings. They are habits, both of overt action and\ncovert thought,\u2014response processes of the neuro-muscular apparatus.\nThe tenacity of these habits, moreover, is due to the combined\naction of two well-known physiological mechanisms,\u2014the conditioned\nreflex and the circular reflex. The conditioned reflex, which is\ndependent upon the repetition of stimuli, is particularly prevalent\nwhere day by day the same persons, the same kinds of property, and\nthe same predicaments of living are met with; and so we may say\nthat customs and traditions (and with them the inevitable claims\nand interests) are created by the environment as much as by the\norganism. The circular reflex, or proprio-ceptive reinforcement of\nany action-tendency, governs much of our behavior, even though we\nlittle suspect it. It underlies occupational postures, idiosyncracies\nof gait and of facial expression, and indeed, without circular\nreflexes we should not have either tenacity of purpose or the ability\nto hold a grudge. Its function in the establishment and maintenance\nof those action-patterns on which tradition depends is of paramount\nimportance. And since these two reflexes are largely responsible for\nthe difficulty with which habits of action and thought are broken,\nthe support which they give to maintaining the tradition of legal\nrights is hardly to be overestimated. Thus, from the mechanistic\npoint of view, the homage which we give to legal rights is after all\nsimply equivalent to the expenditure of energy in our bodies for the\npurpose of maintaining particular habits of action. Indeed, in those\nwho maintain the public peace, all the energy which goes into actions\nwhich promote the order of society is literally spent to uphold legal\nrights of one sort or another. It is this energy, this physical\npower, which we referred to recently when we said that \u201cright\u201d is\npartially equivalent to _might_.\n\nAnd yet, in spite of the apparently great amount of muscle power\nthat is, so to speak, behind all legal rights, from the logical\npoint of view, the use and effectiveness of this power is altogether\ncontingent upon the exact nature of the claim and interest which\none desires to be secured. The logical statement of the situation\nhere involved would take the form of a hypothetical proposition,\nnamely, _If_ the claim or interest is of a certain kind, _then and\nthen only_ may it be established and protected. And while this might\nseem at first to indicate that legal rights were seriously lacking\nin point of authority, yet this is not the case, for the strongest\npossible assertions that can be made are always couched in the form\nof hypothetical propositions. As Couterat states in his \u201cAlgebra of\nLogic,\u201d \u201cEvery proposition which implies another is stronger than the\nlatter, and the latter is weaker than the one which implies it.\u201d The\nblunt categorical proposition is far less powerful, since by itself\nit implies nothing whatever, whereas hypotheticals leave no doubt as\nto the necessary consequences. All the laws of nature, which, by the\nway, cannot be broken, are stated in hypothetical form. Moreover,\nsince it is the antecedent, and not the consequent, of a hypothetical\nproposition which gives it strength, it is easy to see that any\nparticular claim and interest is rendered all the more likely of\nbeing established and protected _if_ similar claims and interests\nhave long been recognized in the law as valid. In practice we find\nthis to be the case: the common law which is the oldest code is also\nthe one to which new claims to legal right are invariably referred.\n\nHaving looked at the picture of legal rights from one angle, let us\nnow look at it from another. While in strict logic the statement of\nthese rights in the form of a hypothetical imperative gives them an\nundeniable strength, it must now be admitted that from the pragmatic\npoint of view it signifies at times a discouraging weakness. For it\nhas often been the case that the establishment of claims and the\nprotection of interests has in practice depended upon such vexatious\nvariables as the pet theories of experts (e. g., alienists), the\nhunger, fatigue, and stubbornness of jurymen, the internal secretions\nof judges, a crowded or empty condition of the jails, current\nsociological theory, and even such astonishing things as one\u2019s\naffiliation with secret societies, or one\u2019s political \u201cpulls,\u201d not to\nmention, except by a passing remark, the determination of a litigant\nto carry his case to the higher courts clear beyond the ability of\nhis antagonist\u2019s purse to follow him there. So that if we ask whether\nsome particular claim or interest can and will be established or\nprotected, the real answer in a large number of border-line cases is,\n\u201cNobody knows.\u201d Justice, who carries in her hand a balance whereby\nto weigh the evidence fairly, has also her eyes blindfolded against\nseeing what manner of weights are put into either pan. This defect of\nlaw, however, is not to be wondered at when we remember that legal\ntheory cannot anticipate all of the innumerable claims and interests\nwhich either honest or knavish persons are likely to support as\nvalid. If the theory of law had been as complicated as human society\nhas become, it could not have accomplished the half of what it has\nalready achieved.\n\nFrom all this it can be seen that the assertion of a legal right\nis not always equivalent to its substantiation. Times change,\nbringing with them new faces and other minds, new problems and new\ninterpretations. Nor, for that matter, are all commonly accepted\nrights under the law equally to be supported by physical force.\nStrictly speaking, only those rights which imply a correlative duty\nare truly legal rights. Reciprocity of action is essential. For\nexample, if Baker has a legally recognized or substantiated right to\ndo, receive, or enjoy something, it is the duty of Atkins and others\nnot to infringe or nullify that right. Mark also, that both duty and\nright here imply that physical force may be directed against some\nspecified person, or against all persons generally in case of need,\nin order to establish the claim and protect the interest involved.\nHowever, as may be already suspected, not everything that is legally\nsanctioned or which enters into legal machinery has the same force\nbehind it as in the case we have just cited. The right of ownership,\nfor example, which to the layman seems to be a unit right, involves\nfive distinct things, as follows: (1) the _jus disponendi_, or right\nto give away, (2) the _jus utendi_, or right to use, (3) the _jus\nabutendi_, or the right to abuse, (4) the _jus prohibendi_, the right\nto keep others away, and (5) the _jus possidendi_, or the right to\nrecover the property. But only one of these is, strictly speaking, a\nright in the sense that it involves a correlative duty, namely, the\n_jus prohibendi_. For the _jus disponendi_ is simply a power, and not\na right at all: and the _jus utendi_ is wholly negative in the legal\nsense, implying non-interference in the exercise of a natural power;\nwhereas the _jus abutendi_ is a liberty (neither a right nor a power)\nwhose exercise is nominally unrestricted: while the _jus possidendi_\nis simply the legal capacity to get back that which one is said to\nown.\n\nThis ends our account of legal rights. We now pass to the\nconsideration of the other uses of this most comprehensive ethical\nconcept. Somewhat by way of contrast to that which has just\npreceded, let us at once consider\n\n\nCLASS F,\n\nunder which are comprised what are popularly known as \u201cmoral\u201d\n_rights_.[15]\n\nA casual glance at the appended list of the members of this class\nmight lead one to consider them simply as a continuation of legal\nrights, but this is by no means the case. Albeit moral rights are\nidentical with legal rights in so far as they imply a multitude\nof human claims and interests, they are nevertheless emphatically\ndifferent from them on a much more important point. Moral rights lack\nall implications of an organized physical force to compel their\nrecognition. The only compulsions that can be said to assist in the\nestablishment of the claims and the protection of the interests\ncomprised under the scope of moral rights are the approval and\ndisapproval of the group which undertakes to recognize and support\nthem. In fine, these compulsions amount to the force of public\nopinion. And while this force is at times provocative of changes\nin the method or content of the law which may later be recognized\nas good, on the whole, public opinion is usually so unspecific and\ninconstant as to be wholly negligible as a power to enforce any\ndemands. Certainly no jurist regards moral right as obligatory.\n\nOn still another count moral rights show a serious defect. For when\nwe say that the enforcement of the claims and interests comprised\nwithin the scope of moral rights depends upon the approval of the\ngroup, it must not be supposed that the actions of any group and the\nactions which it approves are necessarily one and the same. This\nis a sour paradox, but its appropriateness cannot be successfully\ndenied. The standard of conduct which any group subscribes to under\npressure, either in writing, or before an audience, is singularly\ndifferent from the behavior of the group under easier circumstances.\nMoreover, it is the exception, and not the rule, for those who\ndominate a group,\u2014whether such masters be parents, political bosses,\nor any other form of lordling,\u2014to hold their charges to a stricter\naccountability than they themselves, removed from correlative\nrestraints, recognize as imperative. Doubtless, in the execution of\nthe law, many a time privileges are granted to people of wealth and\nprestige which are denied to the humbler petitioners at the bar; but\nthe difference between legal and moral practice is significantly\nthis: that in legal practice evasions are no integral part of the\nmachinery. This does not amount to a condemnation of moral rights:\nit is merely holding up the mirror to man, in order that he may see\nhimself clearly. All in all, consistency may be as impracticable as\nit has been unsought for in the daily affairs of men.\n\nHowever, when we consider the unusual claims made in behalf of moral\nrights, there are valid exceptions to be taken to them. For while in\nthe strict legal sense, moral right is impotent, yet according to\nthe expressed opinion of the untutored majority, moral right is far\nmightier than legal right. Let us see why this is so.\n\nIn the first place, not all human claims and interests are or can be\nprotected by law. It is not the purpose of law to be rigid. However\nmany statutes, for example, are enacted year by year, the interests\nthey are supposed to protect increase too rapidly to be covered by\nsuch statutes. Moreover, as in the case with the right of ownership,\nmany powers and privileges are granted, the exact enjoyment or\nexercise of which no law could either predict or circumscribe. Hence\nthere always remains a residue of interest that is not comprised\nwithin the scope of matured legal tradition. But it is just these\nnewer interests for which some persons demand most emphatically\nthe right to be satisfied. We live not in the past, but on the\nforemost edge of time, and we are prone to demand as much support\nfor our youngest claims as for those which have a thousand years of\nlegal recognition behind them. Now, undoubtedly, many claims are\ninsufficiently recognized by law. When, however, in the pause before\nthis recognition is secured, people begin to claim for such interests\na \u201csuperior\u201d moral right to be satisfied, and in comparison to that\n\u201csuperior\u201d right assert that legal rights are merely unfounded\nprejudices, the charge of inconsistency can be leveled directly\nagainst them. Ignorance of the function and scope of the law is\nno excuse for holding it up to ridicule. Indeed, it is not at all\ncertain that the law could include the satisfaction of every human\nclaim and interest whatever without becoming itself destroyed by this\ninclusion.\n\nIn the second place, there are some persons in whom the law\u2019s\ndelays, as well as their experience with the _un_evenhandedness of\njustice, has provoked a deep-seated prejudice against particular\nlawyers and jurists, which prejudice, by means of the fallacy of\ncomposition, they readily transmute into a scorn for whatever is\nexpressly denominated as legal. Under such conditions the penchant\nfor moral rights may be often nothing but the product of a mind that\nhas become malcontent with things as they are; with the result that\nsolace is sought in the fiction of a set of moral rights which are\nregarded as possessing a \u201chigher\u201d or final authority. From such a\nperson come Examples Nos. 59 and 76, recently cited. Two comments\ncan be made upon such a case as this. The first of these is that it\nis quite certain that no man who has become so pessimistic will see\nhis way clear to the solution of the problem that has given him so\nmuch tragic concern. As Spinoza says, \u201cThe will and the intellect are\none and the same,\u201d but as Spinoza also hinted, the intellect and the\nemotions are not. Moreover, such malcontentedness is relatively easy\nto annul: let anyone who curses the law begin to make use of it to\nhis advantage, and his \u201csuppressed complex,\u201d as the Freudians would\nsay, rapidly evaporates.\n\nA third and final reason why moral rights and the so-called moral\nlaw are sometimes regarded as superior to all things legal is that\namong so many persons the curious conviction obtains that they are\nindividually the pets of Providence, and that consequently whether\nthey stir themselves or not, become sagacious or remain meek as\nlambs, their affairs will be satisfactorily adjusted without their\nexertions. Under such illusions many persons take refuge throughout\ntheir lives, forgetting curiously enough that the order of nature has\nnot supplied them with benevolent guardians, tutors, and managers.\nThe result is that to such people right is synonymous merely with\nwhat _ought to be_, rather than with even a small part of what\nalready is. But when they thus employ the term right, it is debased.\nOne often hears such people say with regard to a catastrophe: \u201cOh,\nwell, I suppose we shall have to make the best of it,\u201d\u2014a remark\nthat is rarely prophetic of anything more than continued brooding.\nIf it prophesied the accumulation of technique for a continuous,\nconstructive effort, their moral rights would not be so bereft of\nreality.\n\n\nCLASS G\n\nHere the word \u201cright\u201d signifies certain unspecified and unrestricted\nliberties and privileges sanctioned in the manner of customs, the\nonly authority behind which is the threat of social ostracism should\nthey be disregarded.[16] As will be observed at once, some of the\nmembers of this class might, if one prefers, be included in some of\nthe other classes of \u201cright.\u201d\n\n\nCLASS H\n\nThat which is most convenient, desirable, or favorable; conforming\nto one\u2019s wish or desire; to be preferred; fortunate; lucky, etc.[17]\nSome of these examples, like those in the preceding class, may in\nthe eyes of some judges be more appropriately classified in another\nplace. If so, let the change be made. There is undoubtedly an echo\nof Class B and of Class F in several instances. But a more important\nitem seems to be that here are unmistakable hints of an adverbial or\nexpletive signification for our concept. This hint is fully carried\nout in the final division,\n\n\nCLASS I\n\nin which the term \u201cright\u201d signifies \u201cvery,\u201d \u201cin a great degree,\u201d\nas in certain titles: (111) \u201c_Right_ reverend,\u201d (112) \u201c_Right_\nhonorable,\u201d as well as in the expressions: (113) \u201c_Right_ truly\nmay it be said,\u201d and (114) \u201cThe word \u2018cootie\u2019 is _right_ old\nScottish.\u201d However, as this use of the concept _right_ is often to\nbe interpreted as signifying \u201cjustly entitled to the name of,\u201d or\n\u201chaving the true character of,\u201d Class I may be regarded as a footnote\nto Classes C and G.\n\nThis completes our search for the significations of the word\n\u201c_right_.\u201d Nevertheless, all this is merely a preliminary step toward\nthe main business of our investigation, namely, the discovery of the\naction-patterns which are implied by these nine classes we have just\ndelimited. We have seen that these classes are all subtly connected,\nand this leads us to hope that some greatest common denominator will\nbe found that will factor into all of them. It is also apparent that\nas we pass from Class A to Class E, we reach a climax, after which\nwe decline; that up to the climax there is order and dignity, and\nthat from Class F onwards our array consists mostly of scraps and\ndebris. Our problem, then, is to exhibit not only the motor attitude\nwhich each class implies, but also the procession of such attitudes\nthroughout the whole nine classes. For only by so doing shall we be\nable to comprehend the meaning of this important ethical concept.\n\n\n_The Meaning of the Word \u201cRight\u201d_\n\n1. As deduced from Class A. It will be recalled that this class\nsignifies _straight_ (not curved or crooked in any way), _direct_\n(by the shortest course), and _immediately_ (in the quickest time).\nThese words, moreover, refer not only to events in nature, but\nalso and more particularly, to human activities. It has also been\npointed out that when a man can proceed in a straight line toward his\nobjective, he will proceed directly, and arrive there in the quickest\npossible time. Such behavior is, within the limits hitherto defined,\ndescribed as _right_. Now what does all this involve in the way of\naction-patterns? It involves, first, perception of the goal, second,\nability to keep the goal in mind, and third, energy sufficient to\nattain it. According to Max Meyer, one of the instincts manifested\nby a hungry organism is \u201cto proceed forward in a straight line\u201d (!)\nAnd whether this be truly instinctive or not, the example illustrates\nour point very nicely. For any organism vexed with hunger of any\nsort whatsoever (and there are, according to the poets, many kinds),\nwill do \u201cright\u201d in following Max Meyer\u2019s advice. The action-pattern\nimplied in all this is not difficult to determine. It is the\ncoordination of motor activities requisite for the movement of the\nwhole body speedily through space, unwaveringly toward its objective.\n\nThe complete analysis of the mechanisms by which such behavior is\naccomplished would be both too difficult and too exhaustive to be\nundertaken here. We may, however, point out some few of the salient\nfactors involved. It has been shown that, so far as Class A is\nconcerned, to do _right_ is to proceed directly and immediately,\nand along a straight line, if possible, to the desired object. Such\nbehavior requires both strength and skill; from which it also follows\nthat a feeble, untrained body will be unable to do \u201cright\u201d in a great\nmany cases, simply because it cannot reach its goal in the face of\nobstacles. This is our common observation. Before a baby learns to\nwalk, it cannot proceed directly or immediately across a floor.\nNeither can an exhausted man, unable to use the sun for a compass,\nfind his way to safety out of a tropical forest. For a person in his\npredicament, things are not likely to come out \u201cright.\u201d Furthermore,\nin a great many cases of the same sort, skill and strength are _both_\nrequired; neither one alone is sufficient to attain the desired end.\nLet now the psychologist tell the story of how the attainment of\nskill depends upon a standard equipment of sense organs, a sound and\ncomplete brain, and muscles from which sensory stimuli elicit precise\nresponses. Let also the physiologist relate here how bodily vigor\nlikewise depends upon the interrelation of internal functions: how\nthe heart, lungs, brain, muscles, thyroid, liver, and adrenals all\nwork together to make any effort successful and complete. When this\nhas been said, the meaning of the word \u201cright\u201d as defined in Class A\nwill have been more fully revealed.\n\n2. As deduced from Class B. Here the word \u201cright\u201d is used to describe\nthe method or object by which any desire may be realized. The\nrequirements for membership in this class appear at first to be less\nrigid than was the case with Class A. The speed of motion that was\nstressed in the former class is inessential here, as well as the\nnecessity of proceeding by the shortest course. Here also a beefy\nbody is not as imperative as are skill and sagacity. But let us not\nmake a favorite of either class before we have heard the whole story.\nAnd first let us ask, what is the typical action-pattern implied\nby Class B? The answer is not difficult to give. There is a phrase,\n\u201cselective excitability,\u201d which psychologists have long applied to\nthe situation where a sensori-motor mechanism is attuned by practice\nto respond to one specific stimulus, and to be entirely unresponsive\nto others. We exhibit this selective excitability every time we take\n\u201cour\u201d hat from the crowded coat-room, choose \u201cour\u201d favorite cigar\nfrom a case full of attractive Havanas, or fumble thoughtfully in\n\u201cour\u201d pocket for a cent to give to the crouching beggar. In every\nsuch case, we are said to employ the \u201cright\u201d object and perform the\n\u201cright\u201d action. Actions of this sort involve choice, which as we have\nalready hinted (See footnote, p. 32, Chap. II.), involves the use of\none member of a pair of antagonistic muscles. Consequently, we may\ndescribe the action-pattern underlying the use of \u201cright\u201d in Class\nB as any sort of behavior which involves selective excitability and\nselective activity. So that whatever Class B lacks in generality as\ncompared with Class A, is compensated for by an increase in precision\nand, what is equally important, by an _economy_ of human energy in\nthe pursuit of the desired object. The importance of this last factor\nhas already been sufficiently hinted at in the quotation that appears\non the title-page of this book.\n\n3. As deduced from Class C. The change from Class A to Class B\ninvolved an increase in what is known as intelligence, that is, the\nability to solve new problems. The change to Class C may be regarded\nas involving a continued advance of the same general character. But\nthis change involves something more. For, as we have already stated,\n\u201cright\u201d now becomes \u201cdescriptive of any statement which reports the\nfacts: of any opinion or judgment that is correct: and of any person\nwho judges, thinks, or acts in accordance with the facts or truth\nof a matter.\u201d Two changes in emphasis are consequently to be noted\nhere. First, the word \u201cright\u201d is applied to utterances rather than to\ndeeds alone; and second, a metonomy is introduced in the application\nof our concept to persons who make correct statements. This shift\nof emphasis from an action to the description of it, and from the\ndescription to the describer need not cause us any difficulty, even\nthough it envisages for us a million years of the education of the\nhuman race.\n\nThe success of our search for the meaning of our concept is here\ndependent upon the function of speech to imply and predict action,\u2014a\nfunction which we have already commented upon in our second chapter.\nWords, like thoughts, are either reminiscent of overt action, or\nelse they assist in preparing us for it. When, then, a man uses the\nword \u201cright\u201d to commend either statements or persons, it is the same\nas if he were to say: \u201cEither there were, or there are, or there\nmay be, objects and events as you describe, and I think as you do\nabout them.\u201d The action-pattern here implicated is plainly that of\n_belief_. It involves a lowered threshold with respect to the person\nor statement called \u201cright,\u201d and a correspondingly higher threshold\ntoward those persons or statements which contradict what is accepted.\nAnd as was the case with Class B, this action-pattern involves the\nuse of one of the halves of a system of antagonistic muscles, since\nthe \u201cemphasis here is upon true opinions and judgments in contrast\nto false ones.\u201d This, however, is not all that can be said upon this\npoint. For every case of belief is a case of constitutional readiness\nso to respond. And while we do not exactly know how the body provides\nsuch predeterminations, if the theory of action-patterns is sound,\nthe conjecture is not unfounded that belief is a function of chronic\npostures maintained in the muscles of the voluntary system.\n\nEvidences in favor of this conjecture are readily supplied from\nour everyday scrutiny of the faces of our fellow-men. The beggar\u2019s\nhand is actually a different hand than the hand of the donor; as\nhe sits on the sidewalk, his predetermination to receive alms is\npatent in the chronic posture of even his palm and fingers. The\ncourtesan not only manifests her willingness to exchange smiles by\nthe chronic postures in her eyelids and mouth, but with a fitness\nthat a De Maupassant might celebrate, she also acquires a carriage\nthat betokens her particular vocation. Contrariwise, the generous,\naffable man gives evidence that his traits are at least muscle-deep;\nwhile every actor will confess that if he gets into the adequate\nposture, the character he is depicting is automatically portrayed.\nThose who pray also confess that there are certain bodily attitudes\nwhich hinder, and others which assist, the flow of sentiment which\nthey desire. Photographic evidences such as these, however, are not\nthe only proofs we possess of postural predeterminations of action\nand thought, for it is sound physiology that in the multifariously\ncomplex musculature of the body, there are unnoticed postural\ntensions being generated and maintained all the while. And since,\naccording to the all-or-none principle of nervous and muscular\nactivity, every motor tendency is a truly positive physiological\nevent, whenever we manifest belief, some part of the body is\npreparing to execute a movement appropriate to the assertion implied.\nIndeed, we may safely postulate that a large portion of what we call\nour individuality is a function of those chronic postures which\nour habits have hitherto established in our motor mechanism,\u2014which\npostures ever thereafter determine what we shall do, say, and believe.\n\n4. As deduced from Class D. Here the word \u201cright\u201d is used to signify\n\u201cthe hand which is normally the stronger,\u201d whence, by association,\nit refers to a variety of related things, as hitherto indicated. We\nhave previously noted that the concept \u201cright\u201d is a term we often use\nwhen the attainment of a purpose is under consideration, and here we\nagain see the same motif displayed. Everybody knows that the \u201cright\u201d\nhand is important in the acquisition of skill of all sorts, and in\ngetting in touch with the things we call \u201cgood.\u201d Evidences of the\nparamount usefulness of the \u201cright\u201d hand to carry out overt actions\nare ubiquitous. Moreover, levers, pliers, and a hundred other tools\nare simply extensions of its functions and magnifications of its\npowers. What, then, are the action-patterns suggested by this use\nof our concept? The answer is extremely simple. The action-patterns\nwe seek are the innumerable activities of the _right_ hand itself.\nFor, as we have previously shown, even to think of the hand involves\nneuro-muscular activity in it. What the right hand _does_, is what\nthe concept \u201cright,\u201d as applied to the hand, _means_. And if, for any\nreason, the \u201cright\u201d hand is incapacitated or missing, some other part\nof the body executes the appropriate gesture or man\u0153uvre.\n\n5. As deduced from Class E. The transition from Class D to Class E\nis made on the basis of a common element that is shared by both. We\nhave just seen that the \u201cright\u201d hand is the stronger and the more\nadroit, and that consequently it is the one more adequately equipped\nto turn our wishes into wills. No logician, then, is required to\nconvince us that legal \u201cright,\u201d in the sense of being equivalent\nto might, connotes the same sort of strength and force as are\ninvolved in the grasp and tug of the hand. Were the policeman the\npure embodiment of legal \u201crights,\u201d the action-patterns implied by\nClass E would be easy to determine, since they would be simply the\ntotal behavior of that functionary while on his beat. The problem\nbefore us is, to be sure, not quite so easy of solution as reference\nto the policeman would make it, but nevertheless, our previous\ndiscussion of legal \u201cright\u201d has hinted just what that solution is to\nbe. For legal \u201crights\u201d are one and all concerned with the security\nof whatever things a man calls _his_, together with the adjustment\nof conflicting claims regarding them. To enumerate in detail all\nthe action-patterns here implied would be equivalent to making an\ninventory of all the deeds that had ever been performed to preserve\nproperty, life, and personality, and to maintain and restore peace\nand order in society. Let the historian open his books and show us\nthe panorama of these achievements. And while we should see upon many\nof his pages portrayals of torpid conservatism, ruthless domineering,\nand magnificent cunning, we should also behold examples of that\nimpersonal referee of whom we have already spoken, whose business it\nis to persuade and oblige the disturbers of the social equilibrium to\nemploy the methods and standards of conduct which have always marked\nfree men. He who would clearly comprehend such a panorama must needs\ngive it more than a fugitive glance; for as it required time to be\ncreated, so does it require time in which to be appreciated.\n\n6. As deduced from Class F. Moral \u201crights\u201d are all those unsecured\nclaims and inexactly specified interests whose only protection\nis the approval and disapproval of the community, reinforced at\ntimes by an appeal to a super-human protagonist. A comparison\nbetween the motor-attitudes implied by Class E and Class F reveals\nseveral important differences. Juristic thinking, which we may for\nconvenience characterize as the attitude implied by Class E, is on\nthe whole logically coherent; moralistic thinking, on the contrary,\ncommits every known logical fallacy. Again, juristic thinking is\ncontent to regard human problems capable of solution at the hands of\nhuman beings, and to consider that the verdicts of unruffled men and\nof men expert in their lines is final; while moralistic thinking is\never prone to employ methods which, on account of their provincialism\nand importunity, do not stand analysis at the hands of unbiased\ninvestigators. Finally, the \u201chigher judge\u201d which moralists assert\nstands behind the claims they make, is simply a misinterpretation of\nthe meaning of long unrelieved tensions which have accumulated in\ntheir skeletal muscles. For while we do not declare that all claims\nunsecured by law are ethically invalid, we do nevertheless assert\nthat the typical moralist\u2019s attitude toward all such unsecured claims\nis not one that is suited to bridge the gap between our liquid matter\nand its good. Nevertheless, we may say without equivocation that\nbehind every declaration of moral rights there is an anxiety lest\nsome dependable good be lost, and this motor attitude we conceive to\nbe the greatest common divisor of all the significations included\nunder Class F.\n\n7. As deduced from Class G. Although this class resembles the\npreceding one in that it refers to customs whose maintenance depends\nupon the approval and disapproval of the group, Class G lacks all\nof the fiercely Stoical and Puritanical elements found in Class\nF, just as it lacks the logical rigor pertaining to Class E. The\naction-patterns implied by this present class are rather those of a\ncourteous gentleman, who persuades whenever he can by a gesture, but\nwho does not try twice to persuade those who will not yield to that\nkind of a suggestion.\n\n8. As deduced from Class H. Since \u201cright\u201d here signifies that which\nis convenient, desirable, favorable, etc., the action-patterns which\nit implies are practically identical with those of the first three\nclasses of \u201cgood.\u201d Certainly every example previously cited under\nthis class points to an outgoing reaction.\n\n9. As deduced from Class I. The adverbial use of our concept here\nimplies merely a gesture of positive emphasis that may be added to\nany other action-pattern.\n\nHaving previously sorted the manifold significations of the word\n\u201cright\u201d among these nine classes, and having subsequently shown\nwhat the organism was doing when it employed this word with respect\nto each of these classes, it now remains to discover whether any\none action-tendency is commonly hinted by each and all of these\nnine classes. If such a common tendency can be discovered, the\nword \u201cright\u201d may then indeed be said to possess all these various\nsignifications indicated in our array; otherwise, we shall err in\nconsidering it to be one and the same word in all the examples\npreviously cited. In attempting to discover and certify such a common\ntendency, moreover, we shall employ the same method suggested for\nthe summarizing of the meanings of the word \u201cgood.\u201d We recognize\nthat in the title by which each class of \u201cright\u201d is denoted, there\nis no presumption that such a title does more than indicate the\ngeneral trend of that class; logically, the titles merely imply the\ngreatest common divisors of the many phrases included in the classes.\nSo that when we now attempt to define the common tendency in all\nthe action-patterns we have just deduced from these nine classes,\nwe are to consider only their similarities, while discarding their\ndifferences. There is nothing novel in this method; it is simply the\nway in which all concepts have been unconsciously derived.\n\nSuch a common tendency is not difficult to discover. Each class\nas we defined it in behavioristic terms turned out to imply an\naction-tendency that played an important part in the behavior of\nhuman beings while in the pursuit of the objects they desire, or\nin the attainment of their ends, however variously conceived or\nprojected. Let us, then, bring the whole matter to a focus by saying\nthat _whenever we describe a behavior situation in which the\ndominant feature is the controlling and directing of human energies,\nthe employment of technique to further man\u2019s purposes, or the\nattaining of any good whatsoever, the critical word is \u201cright._\u201d This\nis, indeed, what our concept, as we have analysed it, finally _means_.\n\nFurther than this a strictly scientific ethics does not go, and,\nmoreover, further than this no intellectually honest man will go.\nRight simply means what people use the word to signify,\u2014employing\nit either as a gesture to point out some object or relationship in\nthe environment, or else as an index of what sort of behavior may\nbe expected of them in the future. Accordingly, all insistence on a\n\u201chigher and immutable right\u201d as _the one real_ meaning of the term\nis either a sign of mal-observation or of logorrhea. And if anyone\nstill insists on knowing how one determines what is _right_, we refer\nsuch a person to our array of 114 terms, where in each case the basis\nfor such determination can be inferred. But if such a person still\ndemands an ultimate and irrefutable criterion, the only thing left\nfor him to do is to attempt to be God; but it is suggested in advance\nthat the role of deity might, under the circumstances, be even more\ndifficult to play than the more familiar r\u00f4le of man.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[11] Class A is divided into the following sub-classes:\n\n  I. Straight.\n\n    1. That which is not bent, curved, or crooked in any way; for\n    example, a _straight_ line.\n\n    2. That which is formed by, or with reference to, a line drawn\n    to another line or surface by the shortest course (i. e., a\n    perpendicular), as, for example, _right_ line, _right_ angle,\n    _right_ ascension, etc.\n\n    3. Used to describe solid figures having the ends or base at an\n    angle of 90 degrees with the axis, e. g., _right_ solid, _right_\n    sphere, _right_ cone, _right_ helicoid, etc.\n\n    4. _Right_ circle; in the stereographic projection, a circle\n    represented by a straight line.\n\n    5. _Right_ line pen; one that is adapted especially for ruling\n    lines.\n\n  II. Direct.\n\n    6. The shortest course; that which keeps one and the same\n    direction throughout.\n\n    7. That which goes straight to its destination. Compare: \u201cRight\n    across the track.\u201d\n\n  III. Immediately. (Compare \u201cdirectly.\u201d)\n\n    8. Suddenly, at once; e. g., \u201cHe went _right_ home.\u201d \u201c_Right_ up\n    the mountain.\u201d \u201cLet thine eyes look _right_ on.\u201d \u201cHe went _right_\n    off.\u201d\n\n    9. _Right_ away, _right_ here, _right_ now, _right_ down (Cf.\n    downright). \u201cThese strata falling, the whole tract sinks down \u2018to\n    rights\u2019 in the abyss.\u201d\n\n  IV. Idiomatic uses derived from the foregoing.\n\n    10. In hunting, the scent or track of the game. \u201cThe dogs have\n    got the _right_.\u201d\n\n    11. \u201c_Right_ the helm,\u201d that is, put it in line with the keel.\n\n    12. \u201c_Right_ aft,\u201d that is, in direct line with the axis and\n    stern of the ship.\n\n\n[12]\n\n  This class includes:\n\n    22. \u201cYou say not _right_, old man.\u201d\n\n    23. \u201cA _right_ description of our sport, my Lord.\u201d\n\n    24. \u201cThere hath been a terrible to-do, I could not possibly learn\n    the very _right_ of it.\u201d\n\n    25. \u201cYou are certainly in the _right_.\u201d\n\n    26. \u201cTo put the saddle on the _right_ horse.\u201d (That is, to impute\n    blame where it is deserved.)\n\n    27. \u201cThe clock that stands still points _right_ twice in the four\n    and twenty hours; while others may keep going continually and be\n    continually going wrong.\u201d\n\n    28. \u201cA fool must now and then be _right_ by chance.\u201d\n\n    29. \u201cAnd this wise world of ours is mainly _right_.\u201d\n\n  30. \u201cSome praise at morning what they blame at night,\n      But always think the last opinion _right_.\u201d\n\n  Idiomatic and archaic uses, signifying _true_, _real_, _actual_,\n  _genuine_, _correct_.\n\n    31. \u201cIf they be not _right_ Granado silk.\u201d\n\n    32. \u201cA pound of ointment of _right_ spikenard.\u201d\n\n    33. \u201cA _right_ pipe of Trinidad.\u201d\n\n    34. \u201cMy _ryghte_ doghter, tresoure of myn herte.\u201d\n\n    35. \u201cThe Poet is indeed the _right_ Popular Philosopher, whereof\n    Esops tales giue good proofe.\u201d\n\n    36. \u201cBe sure you\u2019re _right_, then go ahead.\u201d\n\n    37. _Right!_ _Right_-O! _Right_ you are! (Slang.)\n\n\n[13] This class includes:\n\n  38. That side of the body which is on the east when the face is\n  toward the north, its limbs, their clothing, etc., as, for example,\n  _right_ arm, cheek, leg, ear, coat-sleeve, and so on.\n\n  39. Motions in the direction implied in the preceding example: \u201cGo\n  to the _right_.\u201d \u201c_Right_ about.\u201d\n\n  40. Anything, usually one member of a pair, shaped or otherwise\n  adapted for a _right_-hand position or use, e. g., gloves, shoes,\n  etc.\n\n  41. A _right_-side tool. A _right_-hand thread on a machine screw.\n\n  42. _Right_ camphor; \u201cThe camphor produced from the Lauraceae which\n  gives a _right_ polarization to light.\n\n  43. _Right_ bower; in euchre the knave of trumps, which is the\n  highest card next to the joker. This card has a place in our study\n  of \u201cright\u201d if for no other reason than that it signifies power of\n  achievement in that player who finds it in his hand.\n\n  44. The _right_ hand of fellowship. This expression denotes a\n  custom of very ancient origin, practised in treaties by the\n  Persians and Parthians, not only as an inviolable pledge of\n  fidelity (\u201cIn union there is strength.\u201d), but also as a proof that\n  no club or other weapon was concealed in the hand.\n\n  45. In the politics of continental Europe,\u2014that party which\n  occupies the position to the _right_ of the president in the\n  legislative assembly.\n\n  46. By metonomy (conditioned reflex) the conservative political\n  party.\n\n  47. By selective association, the party or party principles which\n  one approves.\n\n\n[14] As a partial list of the significations included in this class,\nmay be cited:\n\n  48. In the legal sense, that which justly accrues or falls to\n  anyone, that which one may properly claim, one\u2019s due, e. g.,\n  territory, estate, dominion.\n\n  49. Particular cases of the preceding: _Right_ of eminent domain,\n  Constitutional _rights_, Corporeal _rights_, Inchoate _right_ of\n  dower, Innominate _rights_, etc.\n\n  50. Idiomatic expressions: \u201cTo be in the _right_,\u201d \u201cTo have the\n  _right_,\u201d \u201cWith _right_,\u201d \u201cBy _right_ or _rights_,\u201d \u201cOf _right_,\u201d\n  \u201cTo have due _right_,\u201d etc.\n\n  51. Joint _rights_; a title or claim to something properly\n  possessed by two or more persons.\n\n  52. A document substantiating a legally recognized claim or title.\n\n  53. Legally just or equitable treatment.\n\n  54. \u201c_Right_ drawn sword,\u201d drawn in a just cause.\n\n  55. The person, party, or cause which is sustained in a\n  controversy. (Compare Ex. 47, Class D.)\n\n  56. To do one _right_; to do one justice.\n\n  57. \u201c_Right_ money\u201d; money paid as the condition or consideration\n  of acquiring a \u201cright\u201d to the purchase of land.\n\n  58. The title or claim to the enjoyment of privileges or\n  indemnities. (A relatively unemphatic use of the term \u201clegal\n  _right_.\u201d)\n\n\n[15] The significations included in this class are numerous and\nvarious. As follows:\n\n  59. \u201cIn conformity with the moral law; permitted by the principle\n  which ought to regulate conduct; in accordance with truth, justice,\n  duty, or the will of God; ethically good, equitable, just.\u201d\n\n  60. \u201cA poor man has no [legal] right to relief, but it is [morally]\n  right that he should have it. A rich man has a [legal] right to\n  destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be\n  [morally] right.\u201d\n\n  61. \u201cGoodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that\n  which is done well we term right.\u201d\n\n  62. \u201cCousin of Hereford, as thy cause is right, So be thy fortune\n  in this royal fight.\u201d\n\n  63. \u201cHe Who now is Sovran can dispose and bid What shall be right.\u201d\n\n  64. \u201cThat which is consonant with equity, or the light of nature;\n  that which is morally just or due.\u201d\n\n  65. \u201cRight conduct; a just and good act, or course of action;\n  anything which justly may or should be done.\u201d\n\n  66. \u201cWrest once the law to your authority; To do a great right, do\n  a little wrong.\u201d\n\n  67. \u201cToo fond of the right to do the expedient.\u201d\n\n  68. \u201cWith firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right.\u201d\n\n  69. _The_ right; the cause of truth and justice.\n\n  70. That which is proper for or incumbent on one to do: one\u2019s duty.\n  (Obsolete.)\n\n  71. The standard of permitted and forbidden action within a certain\n  sphere. (Obsolete.)\n\n  72. \u201cObedience to or harmony with the rules of morality, justice,\n  truth, and propriety.\u201d\n\n  73. \u201cActing in accordance with the highest moral standard; free\n  from guilt or blame.\u201d\n\n  74. \u201cA God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is his\n  name.\u201d\n\n  75. \u201cI have made him just and right, Sufficient to have stood,\n  though free to fall.\u201d\n\n  76. \u201cRight reason: that which recommends itself to enlightened\n  intelligence: some inward intimation for which great respect is\n  felt and which is supposed to be common to the mass of mankind.\u201d\n\n  77. To be in the right; \u201cto have justice, fact, or reason upon\n  one\u2019s side.\u201d\n\n  78. In prepositional phrases, with, by, of right; properly, with\n  reason, justice, etc.\n\n  79. To have a right. To have reason or cause; hence, to come near,\n  have a narrow escape from (_sic!_); e. g., \u201cI\u2019d a good right to be\n  run over by the train this morning.\u201d (Colloquial.)\n\n  80. \u201cDivine right of kings.\u201d\n\n  81. \u201cRight way; the way of moral excellence or spiritual\n  salvation.\u201d \u201cBut you are a presbyterian...?\u201d \u201cI am, sir; praised be\n  the light that shewed me the right way!\u201d\n\n  82. Of persons and dispositions; disposed to do what is just.\n\n  83. Of belief; orthodox, true. That which ought to be accepted or\n  followed.\n\n  84. To do justice to; to relieve from distress; to vindicate; often\n  used reflexively.\n\n  \u201cSo just is God, to right the innocent.\u201d\n\n  85. To do right; to act according to the \u201claw or will of God.\u201d\n\n  86. To feel right toward a person; to be either kind, or\n  sympathetic, or to cooperate with him.\n\n\n[16] We cite here:\n\n  87. \u201cThe first place is yours, Timothy, in _right_ of your gray\n  hairs.\u201d\n\n  88. \u201cI have a perfect _right_ to grieve over him.\u201d\n\n  89. \u201cShe has a _right_ to be admired, for she is beautiful.\u201d\n\n  90. \u201cNot only is she a peeress, but she has fourteen thousand a\n  year in her own _right_.\u201d\n\n  91. \u201cPut your bonnet to the _right_ use; \u2019tis for the head.\u201d\n\n  92. \u201cWhy do you twist words out of their _right_ use?\u201d\n\n  93. \u201cMr. _Right_\u201d \u201cMrs. _Right_,\u201d the destined husband or wife.\n\n  94. \u201cThat part of the quarry given to the hounds as their share or\n  due.\u201d\n\n  95. \u201cA stag\u2019s full complement of antlers, consisting of the brow,\n  the bay, and the tray.\u201d\n\n  96. \u201cTo do one _right_\u201d to pledge one in a toast. (Compare: \u201c_faire\n  raison \u00e0_.\u201d)\n\n  97. \u201cThe _right_ word is always a power, and communicates its\n  definiteness to our actions.\u201d\n\n\n[17] For example:\n\n  98. \u201cI should have been a woman by _right_.\u201d\n\n  99. \u201cThe lady has been disappointed on the _right_ side.\u201d\n\n  100. \u201cIf he should offer to choose, and choose the _right_ casket,\n  you should refuse to perform your father\u2019s will....\u201d\n\n  101. Idiomatic colloquial phrases expressing satisfaction or\n  approval: as \u201cYour conduct and dress are all _right_.\u201d \u201cHe has done\n  it all _right_.\u201d \u201cAre you ready? All _right_, go ahead.\u201d\n\n  102. To set _right_; to adjust or correct something out of order.\n  \u201cYour mother\u2019s hand shall _right_ your mother\u2019s wrong.\u201d\n\n  103. In a satisfactory or proper state or order: \u201cIt\u2019s a snug\n  little island, a _right_ little, tight little island.\u201d\n\n  104. Skilfully performed, correctly done: \u201cThe sum is not _right_.\u201d\n  \u201cThe drawing is not _right_.\u201d \u201cNothing goes _right_.\u201d\n\n  105. \u201cTo _rights_,\u201d properly, fittingly, as, for example, \u201cShe put\n  the room to _rights_.\u201d\n\n  106. \u201cI put him _right_ on the matter,\u201d that is, corrected or\n  directed him, or both.\n\n  107. The safe, advantageous, appropriate, or desirable side of\n  anything, as, \u201cA widow on the _right_ side of thirty.\u201d\n\n  108. Fitting, proper, appropriate, exactly according to what is\n  required or suitable, as, \u201cThings of the _right_ size.\u201d\n\n  109. The outward, front, or most finished surface of anything, as,\n  \u201cThe _right_ side of a piece of cloth.\u201d\n\n  110. In good health or spirits, sound, comfortable, or sane, as:\n\n    \u201cAn old uncle of mine who isn\u2019t exactly _right_.\u201d\n\n    \u201cHe is not in his _right_ mind; he is talking nonsense and is\n    stark mad.\u201d\n\n    \u201cThe heart\u2019s aye the part aye\n\n    That makes us _right_ or wrang.\u201d\n\n    \u201c\u2018Oh,\u2019 said Mr. Winkle the elder, \u2018I hope you are well, sir.\u2019\n    \u2018_Right_ as a trivet, sir,\u2019 replied Bob Sawyer.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE MEANING OF THE WORD \u201cWRONG\u201d\n\n  \u201cThe human mind is capable of having very many perceptions, and the\n  more capable, the greater the number of ways in which its body can\n  be disposed.\u201d SPINOZA, \u201cEthics,\u201d Part II, Prop. 14.\n\n\nLexicographers are wont to state that \u201cwrong\u201d is the opposite of\n\u201cright\u201d in all of its principle senses, but as can be seen at a\nglance from the appended array,[18] this statement cannot be taken\nto imply that any such extensive list of significations as we\nexhibited in our analysis of \u201cright\u201d can be reproduced here. Indeed,\nin what respect \u201cwrong\u201d is the antonym of \u201cright,\u201d or, in other\nwords, how far this pair of terms illustrates the law of reciprocal\ninnervation, can be seen only from a detailed comparison of the two,\nas follows:\u2014\n\n              RIGHT                               WRONG\n\n  Class A.\n\n  The word \u201cright\u201d as\n  descriptive of certain\n  mathematical relationships\n  and physical functions.\n\n      Sub-class I.\n\n  \u201cStraight,\u201d (a word in\n  current usage)                  negated by \u201cCrooked,\u201d Ex. I,\n                                           (obsolete).\n\n      Sub-class II.\n\n  \u201cDirect\u201d                                 No antonym\n\n\n  FOOTNOTES:\n\n  [18] As follows:\n\n\n    1. Crooked, twisted, or wry. (Obsolete)\n\n    2. Disordered, not properly adjusted, as in the expression: \u201cI\u2019ve\n    heerd my aunt say as she found out summat was _wrong_ wi\u2019\n    Nancy as soon as the milk turned bingy.\u201d\n\n    3. Incorrect, or uncorrected; that is, not according to\n    requirement, intention, purpose, or desire, as _wrong_ ideas,\n    _wrong_ courses, the _wrong_ font of type, etc.\n\n    4. Esthetically undesirable or unsuitable, as,\u2014\u201cYou have put the\n    _wrong_ side of the cloth outermost.\u201d\n\n    5. Erroneous or mistaken belief or assertion.\n\n    6. \u201cIn the _wrong_ box\u201d (slang), in an awkward situation,\n    mistaken.\n\n    7. Perverse, wilfully mistaken or erroneous. (Cf. \u201cevil.\u201d)\n\n    8. Unjust action; violation of obligation or propriety; a tort.\n\n    9. Harm or \u201cevil\u201d inflicted; damage or detriment suffered; an\n    injury, mischief, or hurt; pain imparted or received.\n\n    10. To be \u201cin the _wrong_\u201d; to be mistaken, to act or think\n    incorrectly or unjustly.\n\n    11. \u201cTo have _wrong_\u201d; to be mistaken; to act erroneously or\n    unjustly.\n\n    12. \u201cTo have _wrong_\u201d; to suffer injury; e. g., \u201cC\u00e6sar has had\n    great _wrong_.\u201d\n\n    13. \u201cTo put in the _wrong_\u201d; to represent erroneously.\n\n    14. \u201cTo go _wrong_\u201d; not to run smoothly, as of machinery.\n\n    15. \u201cTo go _wrong_\u201d; to go astray from the intended direction.\n\n    16. \u201cTo go _wrong_\u201d; to do \u201cevil.\u201d\n\n    17. To \u201c_wrong_\u201d; to treat unfairly, unjustly, or harmfully;\n    to oppress, offend, or injure.\n\n    18. \u201cTo _wrong_\u201d; in an old nautical sense, to take the wind\n    from the sails of a ship which is sailing in line with another to\n    windward.\n\n\n      Sub-class III.\n\n  \u201cImmediately\u201d                      No antonym\n\n  Class B.\n\n  \u201cRight\u201d as descriptive of\n  the method (or object)\n  by which the desired end\n  can be obtained                 negated by Examples 3 and 5;\n                                     but only if we override\n                                     the objection that \u201cright\u201d\n                                     here usually refers to one\n                                     specific method or object,\n                                     while \u201cwrong\u201d can refer\n                                     to any one of a number\n                                     of unspecified things.\n\n  Class C.\n\n  \u201cRight\u201d as descriptive of\n  any statement that reports\n  the facts; of any\n  opinion or judgment that\n  is correct; and of any\n  person who judges,\n  thinks, or acts in accordance\n  with the facts or\n  the truth about a matter        negated by Examples 3, 5, 7, 9,\n                                     10, and 11, except for the\n                                     difference just previously\n                                     mentioned, and omitting\n                                     examples 31-35 inclusive\n                                     on p. 80.\n\n  Class D.\n\n  \u201cRight\u201d as the distinctive\n  epithet of the hand\n  which is normally the\n  stronger                          No antonym\n\n\n  Class E.\n\n  Legal \u201crights\u201d; those\n  claims and interests the\n  establishment and protection\n  of which may be secured\n  by force and even\n  violence                        negated only with respect to\n                                     some particular cases of\n                                     \u201cright\u201d by Examples 8,\n                                     9, and 17.\n\n\n  Class F.\n\n  Moral \u201crights\u201d                  negated by Examples 7, 8, 9, 10,\n                                      11, 13, 16, and 17; but\n                                      only in the same way that\n                                      moral \u201cright\u201d is incompatible\n                                      with legal \u201cright.\u201d\n\n\n  Class G.\n\n  Unspecified and unrestricted\n  liberties and\n  privileges                      negated restrictively by the single\n                                      example of No. 18.\n\n\n  Class H.\n\n  That which is most convenient,\n  desirable, or\n  favorable; conforming to\n  one\u2019s wish or desire; to\n  be preferred, etc.,             negated by Examples 2, 4, 6, 9,\n                                      10, 12, 13, 14, and 15.\n\n  Class I.\n\n  \u201cRight\u201d signifying very,\n  in great degree                   No antonym\n\nThis comparison obviously reveals no basis for the statement that\n\u201cwrong\u201d and \u201cright\u201d are complete antitheses to each other, at least\nin the fine sense that _up_ is the opposite of _down_, _in_ of _out_,\nor _east_ of _west_. So that, if we accept the word \u201cright\u201d as\ndescriptive of a behavior situation in which the dominant feature is\nthe controlling and directing of human energies, the employment of\ntechnique to further man\u2019s purposes, or the attainment of any \u201cgood\u201d\nwhatsoever, the word \u201cwrong\u201d cannot,\u2014either according to the detailed\nlist of its uses just presented, or according to the above scheme of\nits logical relationship to \u201cright,\u201d\u2014be said to be the true antonym\nof that word. The law of reciprocal innervation does not, in its\nintegrity, apply here.\n\nHow then shall we explain the fact that people so habitually say\nand feel that \u201cwrong\u201d is the opposite of \u201cright,\u201d if it cannot\nbe admitted that antagonistic muscles are always employed in the\nthoughts and the acts to which these two words refer? Perhaps the\nfollowing interpretation will answer. Logicians are accustomed to\nsay that any universal proposition, any sweeping statement, such as,\n\u201cEvery swan is white,\u201d or \u201cNo aliens need apply,\u201d is contradicted\nby the admission that one single exception is to be allowed. But\nobviously, such logical contradiction, such admission of a lone\nbut effective exception, is not equivalent to granting that \u201cNo\nswans are white,\u201d or that \u201cEvery alien is requested to apply.\u201d\nNevertheless, the tradition among logicians is that with the granting\nof one such exception, the sweeping statement originally made is\nheld to be untrue, and hence, false. In physiological terms (than\nwhich there are none more fundamental), contradiction is for the\nlogician equivalent to a partial but effective inhibition of any\nfully developed action-tendency. When Plato would say, \u201cYou may\nall now come in to dinner,\u201d but is deterred by seeing Diogenes\nmuddying his feet in order to tread the more scornfully on the\nclean banquet floor, Plato\u2019s action-pattern of wholesale, cordial\ninvitation is suddenly interrupted. And, _so far as Plato\u2019s emotions\nare concerned_, the need to make one important exception in his\ninvitation, is very much like having to turn the whole company out\nof doors. This tendency for an emotional repugnance to blot out all\nsense of proportion is clearly illustrated in certain oft-repeated\nfables. The story of the involuntary guest who had not on a wedding\ngarment, of the ninety and nine sheep, and of the rich young man are\ncases in point. Similar examples may be found in the behavior of any\nhousehold. The vexed hostess is heard complaining that one little\n_faux pas_ on the part of her serving-girl \u201ccompletely spoiled the\nwhole evening.\u201d The sweet young thing whose lover arrives a quarter\nof an hour later than his appointment accuses him of being elsewhere\nenamoured to stay. The wife whose husband forgets only one of her\ntwenty birthdays since their marriage often finds it impossible to\noverlook the single, unhabitual fault. It is not that such people\ncrave or dote on perfection; they do nothing of the sort: it is\nonly that their behavior mechanisms are unable to readjust quickly\nto another stimulus than the one which they have expected, and this\nfailure to readjust releases energies by way of the viscera instead\nof along other and more pacific pathways.\n\nAll this has an important bearing on the meaning of the word\n\u201cwrong.\u201d We saw that this word has only 18 significations, as\ncompared with the 114 significations of \u201cright.\u201d We also saw that\nit is only partially antagonistic to the concept to which it is\ncommonly opposed. And it has further been revealed that our customary\nlogic makes a single exception the grounds for an assumption of\ncontradiction. On the basis of these observations, then, we may\ndeclare that \u201cwrong\u201d refers to some very special behavior situations\nwhere human energies cannot be controlled and directed as desired,\nwhere the employment of technique to further man\u2019s purposes has been\nhindered, and where \u201cgood\u201d cannot be obtained. This, however, is not\nequivalent to saying that \u201cwrong\u201d is the antonym, the unqualified\ncontradictory, of \u201cright,\u201d any more than red is the opposite of blue,\nor coffee the opposite of tea.\n\n\n_A Physiological Warrant for Ethical Optimism_\n\nA question of considerable importance both in physiology and in\nethics arises when we ask why the concepts \u201cright\u201d and \u201cgood\u201d have\nso many more significations than do \u201cwrong,\u201d \u201cevil,\u201d and \u201cbad.\u201d We\nhave already emphasized the relation between speech and conduct\nsufficiently to indicate that upon the answer to such a question\nsomething essential for a technique in ethics depends. A word can\nhave a great number of significations only by its being employed in a\ngreat variety of situations, and this means that very many different\nspecific responses are implicit in the use of our most comprehensive\nconcepts. Contrariwise, with a word of fewer significations, fewer\nsuch responses are implied. Now we have already cited the fact that\n\u201cgood\u201d and \u201cright\u201d refer primarily to outgoing (extensor) reactions,\nand that \u201cwrong,\u201d \u201cevil,\u201d and \u201cbad\u201d signify withdrawing (flexor)\nreactions. Are we, then, summarily to conclude, without any further\nknowledge of the body\u2019s mechanisms, that since we seem to use our\nextensor system in a more diversified manner than our flexor system,\nthe muscular equipment of the former is superior to that of the\nlatter?\n\nIf we do so conclude, we shall be in error. It is the opposite\nthat is nearer the truth. Both larger and stronger, and, on the\nwhole, more easily educated muscles exist in the flexor than in the\nextensor system. The innumerable capacities of the half-closed\nhand are representative of this superiority. Still more important,\nhowever, is the fact that the flexor system is practically the\ndominant system in the human body. The hinges of the knee, hip,\nshoulder, elbow, wrist, and jaw are more often, more strongly, and\nmore readily closed maximally than they are expanded to the full.\nBesides, occupational postures are almost universally crystallized\nwithdrawing responses. Where, then, shall we look for the answer to\nour question?\n\nWe shall look directly at the behavior of the organism as a whole.\nWhile it is admitted that flexor actions are stronger, more numerous,\nand more universal than are extensor reactions, yet when we consider\nhow the flexor reactions dispose the body toward its environment,\nwe shall at once have light on this curious problem. For the effect\nof such reactions is to cut off the body from a large part of the\nenvironment, and consequently to reduce the possibility of effective\ncontact with it. Stooping, crouching, bowing the head, and lowering\nthe eye are significant examples of flexor responses which reduce\nthe span of perception, while every man knows that activities of\nthe opposite character allow a greater number of stimuli to come in\ncontact with his eyes and his ears. Consequently, even though flexor\nactions will always be in the majority, extensor actions have the\nadvantage of providing the conditions under which a greater variety\nof stimuli can be presented to the organism. This is the same as\nsaying that the open-minded person necessarily becomes discriminative\nand exploratory, while the opposite type is left to stew in his own\njuice. The flexor type of man is, indeed, in the end reduced to\ncontacts with his own body, while to the extensor type of man his\nbody is only one of the many sources of motivation, the rest being\nin the external environment. It seems thus to be primarily due to\nthe very mechanics of the organism that the words \u201cright\u201d and \u201cgood\u201d\nhave a greater variety of significations than have the words \u201cbad,\u201d\n\u201cevil,\u201d and \u201cwrong.\u201d\n\nOne additional word, however, can still be said. As we have already\nindicated, these three so-called negative ethical concepts are all\ndescriptive of behavior situations in which thwarting and inhibition\nare dominant symptoms. Henceforth, however, thwarting and inhibition\nwill be understood as temporary interruptions of an outgoing reaction\nwhich would have eventuated had the environment contained the\nstimulus to which the organism was attuned to respond. As we say in\ncommon speech, a desire is not satisfied by being denied, and from\nour every-day experience we know that great aggravations produce as\nmuch scheming as do our easiest successes. He who casts his eye over\nthe numerous significations of our two positive ethical concepts\nwill now realize where much of the adroitness and sagacity which\ncharacterizes them originates.\n\nIn these two simple facts, namely, that extensor actions bring more\nof the world of action within our range, and that even the thwarted\nman imaginatively explores the environment to find substitute stimuli\nto release his energy upon, we find the reason why man has more uses\nfor the words \u201cright\u201d and \u201cgood\u201d than he has for the words \u201cbad,\u201d\n\u201cevil,\u201d and \u201cwrong.\u201d And with this we achieve by a purely empirical\nand anti-supernaturalistic method a physiological warrant for ethical\noptimism. If anyone is looking for a \u201chigher\u201d truth, let him ponder\nthis one.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\u201cVIRTUE\u201d AND \u201cVICE\u201d AS FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANISM\n\n\n  \u201cIn nearly all these philosophic discussions of ethics one has\n  somehow the haunting sense of a wrongness of direction. Virtue\n  is somehow imposed from above, it is descending upon us. And the\n  unfortunate part of this is that it has to descend very low indeed\n  before it reaches us; and when there, it has lost the buoyancy\n  wherewith to lift us up.\u201d\n\n  EDWIN HOLT, \u201cThe Freudian Wish.\u201d\n\n\nIn the foregoing analysis of the five most frequently used ethical\nconcepts we have had to feel our way rather carefully, inasmuch as\na completely new path was being cut through the tangle of human\nexperience; henceforth, however, our task will be somewhat easier,\nsince we shall now be able to apply the truth we have already\ndiscovered in the remainder of our investigations. Directly, then, we\nshall proceed to ask what another pair of ethical antonyms, namely,\nvirtue and vice, signify in terms of our physiological functions.\n\nIt will be recalled that our first five ethical concepts were rather\nlargely employed to point out objects and relationships in the\nexternal environment. It is common to speak of _good_ and _bad_\nautomobile tires, of the _right_ golf club to use near a bunker, of\nthe _wrong_ side of a sheet of drawing paper, and of the _evil_ that\nmen do which lives after them. When, however, we take up the study,\nfirst of \u201cvirtue\u201d and \u201cvice,\u201d and later on, that of \u201cconscience,\u201d\n\u201cduty,\u201d and \u201cfreedom,\u201d we are no longer to be primarily concerned\nwith things outside of the organism, but rather with processes\ngoing on within it. Significantly enough, this deepening of our\nabsorption into the field of ethics involves a further penetration\ninto the realm of physiology. Thus in a curious and unforeseen way\nour fundamental thesis with regard to the close relationship between\nphysiology and ethics obtains additional support. Consequently, we\nare not to turn suddenly from objective to subjective ethics, as\nhas usually been the case when the five concepts we are forthwith\nto analyse have been discussed; on the contrary, just as we began\nby defining ethical values in terms of human activities, so shall\nwe continue until we have made an end. And although it is commonly\nasserted that the deepest meanings are _inner_ meanings, yet in a\nuniverse that has neither an inside, nor an outside, nor an edge,\nsuch a figure of speech simply betokens an introversive tendency on\nthe part of him who uses it.\n\nHerewith, also, the need to combat another equally stultifying\ntendency is manifest. I refer to the proclivity of all second-rate\nminds to reify abstract terms. \u201cVirtue\u201d and \u201cvice\u201d have been so\nreified, as have likewise \u201cconscience,\u201d \u201cduty,\u201d and \u201cfreedom\u201d\nto such an extent as to make it almost impossible to get a fair\nhearing for any one who wishes to discover the sources from which\nthese concepts have been derived. It is admitted, of course, that\nthe evolution of man has been greatly hastened by his ability to\nmake and use abstract terms; but when a man uses an abstract term\nwithout knowing or caring from what sources it has been derived, he\nis manifesting little more than a desire to escape from reality.[19]\nIndeed, it might be said that unless the use of abstractions assists\nus in dealing more effectively with concrete persons and things, it\nis time to regret that language has been universally acquired.\n\nThe terms \u201cvirtue\u201d and \u201cvice,\u201d therefore, instead of being treated\nas abstract entities which existed even prior to man\u2019s advent on\nthe planet, and which will survive his leave-taking of it, will be\nhere regarded simply as words by which a man describes the behavior\nof himself and of his fellows. And, as was the case five times\npreviously, our definitions of these particular concepts will be\nthe result of a search for the greatest common divisors of all the\nparticular virtues and vices respectively.\n\nStrangely enough, however, no complete catalogue of either the\nvirtues or the vices exists. Moreover, every list which the\ndifferent philosophies and religions furnish reflects a different\nbias or determining tendency. One need only to scan the Platonic, the\nAristotelian, and the Christian inventories[20] in order to verify\nthis remark. The determining tendency thus revealed turns out upon\nanalysis to contain two elements:\u2014first, the desire to reduce the\nessential virtues to the smallest number possible, and second, the\ninclination to rank them from the highest, or supreme virtue, to the\nlowest. Such a procedure as the latter,\u2014that of building the edifice\nof virtue down from the top,\u2014is, in our estimation, no part of a\nscientific method in ethics. Neither does it tell us what _a_ virtue\nis. Besides, as might be expected from such biased and provincial\nsystem-making, what one philosophy or religion calls a virtue, may\nbe classified by another as a vice. Witness the ambiguous status of\n_humility_ as treated now by the followers of Nietzsche, and again\nby the early Christians. Perhaps, however, such ambiguities may be\ntraced to the fact that the term \u201cvice\u201d is of uncertain etymology,\nwhile no such perplexity arises concerning the origin of the word\n\u201cvirtue.\u201d\n\nThis lack of unanimity or completeness in the various invoices of\nvirtue is not in any way fatal to our purpose. In spite of special\nemphases philosophies and religions may exhibit or insist upon, every\nparticular virtue is undeniably _some quality, trait, or performance\nwhich is admired or esteemed_. Taking this description as our\npoint of departure, let us first consider what sort of traits and\nperformances have been thus commended, after which we shall be able\nto discover to what an extent virtue and vice are contradictory. For\nit is by no means obvious at the start that they are true antonyms.\n\nLet it be recognized, then, that the original signification of\nvirtue refers to the so-called manly or noble qualities of bravery,\nvalor, daring, courage, and the like. From this it is inferable\nthat just as _might_ and _right_ were found to have much in common,\nso do virtue and physical power. Perhaps the biologist would call\nthis phase of virtue a manifestation of positive thigmotaxis, that\nis, the tendency to face and fight against physical obstacles. We\nmight also call these manly or noble qualities the _spectacular_\nvirtues, since he who displays them is always subject-matter for the\ndramatist, whether a man exhibit his valor in the midst of a crowd on\nBroadway, or alone in the fastnesses of the Yukon. How far this sort\nof virtue can be attributed to the dumb animals has not yet become\npart of ethical inquiry. In Plato\u2019s Dialogue \u201cLaches\u201d Socrates argues\nthat the virtue that is strength, in so far as it pertains to human\nbeings, contains an intellectual element that is wanting in the lower\nanimals, however pluckily they may defend their young against an\nintruder. Nevertheless, sympathetic and careful observers of animal\nbehavior are becoming more and more convinced that the defence which\nsuch a bird as the penguin makes against the egg-eating skua-gulls is\njust as courageous an act, and therewith just as virtuous, as that\nof a weak nation against a mighty invader. Reduced to its lowest\nterms, every act of bravery is the same: it is only the interests\ninvolved which make the sacrifices of Regulus and Andreas Hofer seem\nfundamentally different from those of dumb animals at bay before the\nmerciless hunter. But evidences of a growing doubt on this point are\nmanifest today in the fact of our awarding hero-medals to dogs and\nhorses in the same manner as we award them to men.\n\nA second class of traits which have been traditionally commended\nincludes such things as caution, probity, temperance, sobriety,\nhonesty, and the like. These virtues are at once seen to lack the\ntheatrical or spectacular quality which attaches to displays of\nphysical courage or intrepidity. They might, therefore, perhaps\nbe called the _unobtrusive_ virtues. It is not to be understood,\nhowever, that these unobtrusive virtues require any less physical\nenergy than do those with which they have just been contrasted. To be\nsure, the energy expended is on the whole less suddenly released, for\nit may involve far more work to acquire the habitual trait of honesty\nthan to be gallant for an hour or so on the field of battle. Perhaps\nit is due to the recognition of this fact that today raw physical\nfortitude is not the first association which the mention of \u201cvirtue\u201d\ncalls up in our minds.\n\nA third use of the term \u201cvirtue\u201d signifies any inherent property\ncapable of producing certain effects, in which connection it\nparticularly refers to the medicinal efficacy of drugs distilled from\nplants. This sort of virtue is _good for_ something, and is usually\nregarded as life-enhancing.\n\nFinally, this concept appears in certain familiar phrases, such\nas \u201cby virtue of,\u201d \u201cin virtue of,\u201d and the like, where it usually\nconnotes _strength_, or _efficacy_, or even _reason_, and _right_.\nThus we see that the word \u201cvirtue,\u201d like the other ethical concepts\nwe have analysed, loses almost all of its specificity when it enters\ninto idiomatic phrases.\n\nThese four classes exhaust the uses to which this concept has been\nput. What, then, shall we declare to be the common element in them\nwhich we may call the essence of virtue with respect to human beings?\nIn giving our answer, it is necessary to call attention to the fact\nthat our third use of the word \u201cvirtue\u201d (signifying the medicinal\nefficacy of drugs) will occupy a minor, or even negligible place in\nour definition. As for the rest, seeing that the virtues are one and\nall traits which are commended or praised, they may be considered as\naction-patterns or action-tendencies which human beings manifest. We\ncan also go further than this. Employing the physiological principles\nhitherto used in defining ethical concepts, it appears at once that\nthe word \u201cvirtue\u201d means that _energy is either being mobilized or\nexpended to obtain what the organism considers to be a dependable\ngood_. This can also be stated in another way, by saying that those\nhuman traits which have been expressly denominated virtues are some\nof the attributes of what is commonly called a \u201cgood\u201d man. (See Ex.\n21, p. 38.) In this restricted sense, furthermore, the _virtuous_, or\n_good_, man is the one whose acts are called _right_. And this leads\nus at once to a very important question.\n\nWhy is it, we ask, that so few of the innumerable human traits that\nare commended every day\u2014not only by words of praise, but also by\nthat subtler and more emphatic sign of unconscious imitation\u2014have\nbeen chosen as virtues, while so many others have been left out of\nthe list? The four cardinal virtues,\u2014courage, prudence, temperance,\nand justice,\u2014exemplify this high degree of selectiveness, while this\ninventory omits all mention of human skill in any form, in spite of\nthe fact that when the list was made by Plato, human skill in the\nfine arts had reached one of its limits of excellence.\n\nThe answer here sought is highly significant as a comment upon\nethical speculation in a pre-scientific age. The list of cardinal\nvirtues is merely an index of the bias of its maker with regard to\nthe outstanding problems of his own time. These four traits which\nPlato elevated to the top of his system are not, then, to be taken\nas an indication of what Plato saw most frequently exhibited by the\ncitizens of Athens, but, if anything, just the contrary. Anyone who\nhas read Plato\u2019s \u201cRepublic\u201d will recall that his aim was to describe\nan ideal, that is, a not-yet-existing state, and that these four\nvirtues were lauded, not because they had been found in actual life\nto be either sufficient or practicable, but rather because they\nseemed to Plato to fit into his ideal scheme. Now it is seldom denied\nthat courageous men, prudent men, temperate men, and just men are\nto be soundly commended, or do we in any sense deny it here. Our\nonly question is, Should these four traits be called the cardinal or\nsupreme virtues before the whole list of commendable traits has been\nscrutinized? The answer which the scientifically trained mind gives\nis in the negative. Something else, however, is even more important\nfor the foundation of an empirical ethics, namely, the question:\nAre those traits which we _openly_ praise to be regarded, in the\nstudy of actual conduct, of prior importance to those which, by\nbeing unconsciously imitated, receive our silent, and therewith more\nsignificant approval? This, however, is the same as asking whether\nman has ever dared to face with courage and sincerity the real\nethical problem.\n\nA glance at another well-known list of selected virtues reveals even\nless of a tendency toward the statistical method in ethics than even\nPlato showed. We refer to those significantly unobtrusive virtues\nwhich characterized the ethics of primitive Christianity, and which\nwere doubtless derived from the Beatitudes. Readers of the English\nBible may recall that the epithet \u201cblessed\u201d was employed by Jesus to\ndescribe (1) those who were poor in spirit, (2) those who mourn, (3)\nthe meek, (4) those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, (5)\nthe merciful, (6) the pure in heart, (7) the peacemakers, (8) those\nwho have been persecuted for righteousness\u2019 sake, (9) those falsely\nreproached, (10) the poor, and (11) those who weep, which persons, in\nthe average, are an entirely different class of organisms from those\nwhom Plato would have called \u201cblessed,\u201d that is, commendable.[21]\nThere is evidence to believe that this novel emphasis upon a certain\ntype of person,\u2014a type hitherto openly unpraised in the ethical\nthought of man,\u2014gave rise to the tendency to elevate such traits as\nhumility, kindliness, self-denial, meekness, patience, and the like,\nto a supreme position in the minds of primitive Christians.\n\nHowever, this class of virtues is again not to be considered as\nindicative of the only traits which people commend, either openly,\nor by more subtle and significant signs. It is even safe to say\nthat no group of Christians, be it either small or large, existing\nin a remote or a modern generation, were ever na\u00efvely satisfied,\nor brought by dint of training, to act on the principle that these\nunobtrusive traits were the chief virtues. The reason for this\nplainly lies in the one-sidedness of such traits. Paulsen, in\nhis \u201cSystem of Ethics,\u201d points out that whereas the Greeks found\npositive values in (1) scientific knowledge, (2) esthetic and other\npleasures, (3) temperance, (4) courage, (5) justice, (6) honor and\nhigh-mindedness, (7) bodily cultivation, (8) economic solvency, (9)\nfamily life, and (10) the state, the early Christians considered\nalmost none of these things to be worth their while. And whereas it\nwould be more or less insulting to the memory of Jesus to call the\ndoctrines of the early Christians an extension of his teachings,\nyet we can say that the unobtrusive virtues which early official\nChristianity sought to emphasize, are one and all withdrawing\nreactions, and as such must be rejected as the sole basis of a\nscientific ethics.\n\nWe reject them because they are not based upon a sufficient\nconsideration of the total needs of man\u2019s body,\u2014that on which his\nlife and mind depend. Man has not only a flexor system, but an\nextensor system of muscles as well, and it must be plain from the\ndiscussions in the preceding chapters that both of these systems\nare ethical mechanisms. However, official Christianity has often\nseen fit, by its exclusive emphasis upon those virtues which involve\nwithdrawing reactions, literally to declare that the extensor system\nshall be denied a stimulus. The Greeks were far wiser; for even\nthough they may have failed to achieve a conception of virtue which\ntook into consideration the wholesome balance between flexor and\nextensor activities, they nevertheless did not err in propounding a\ndoctrine that ignored the simplest principles of human behavior.\n\nAs a matter of historical record, primitive Christians did not\nsucceed, by the exhibition of these unobtrusive virtues, in making\nthemselves either inconspicuous or immune to their persecutors. If\nanything, indeed, they were all the more actively hounded because of\ntheir queer traits. And why? For the simple reason that the typical\nChristian virtues, being withdrawing reactions, and consequently\nallied to and confused with the attitudes of secretiveness and\ndissimulation, led the Roman officials quite reasonably to suspect\nthat the early Christians were dangerous to the state. And it can\nbe substantiated that primitive Christianity was far from being\na patriotic movement. In those days, at least, the man who did\nnot retaliate a blow was regarded first with amazement, then with\ncontempt, then fear, and finally with the most diabolical hatred.\nSuch a silent man might know something very important, might have\nknowledge of a world-wide insurrection ready to break tonight. Tear\nhim to pieces, then; he shall at least not maintain that exasperating\nsmile! How is such a meek man \u201cblessed\u201d? It may be true that our\nsentiments can partially apologize for a system of ethics based upon\nthe functions of the flexor system alone, yet the sense of proportion\nwhich we inherit from the Greeks demands that we strike out on new\npaths which are not littered with the blunders of the past.\n\nWe must not forget to say, however, that one reason why these\nunobtrusive virtues have been given a chief place, not only in\nofficial Christianity, but also in Mohammedanism and Buddhism, is\nbecause of the simple, even though disquieting, fact that the flexor\nsystem is by nature stronger than the extensor system. Man, then, is\nby endowment more inclined to be humble and secretive than to be bold\nand frank, since the larger and stronger and more often activated\nmuscles of his body are those which produce withdrawing reactions.\nThat is also why man is prone to introspection, and to cultivate an\ninner life, and why also, to borrow a phrase of Dr. Morton Prince,\nhe is frequently more interested in his own \u201cmental mud-puddle\u201d\nthan in the external environment. Again, this physiological fact is\nresponsible for each man having his own house, his nest, into which\nhe retreats to escape from the novelties he can no longer adjust to,\nand where he may \u201cbathe his receptors in comfort-giving stimuli.\u201d\nAnd so, one is finally tempted to say that the unobtrusive virtues\nhave obtained such a vogue because they are the only ones which over\nsixty per cent of mankind can appreciate and will ever really attempt\nto achieve. Perhaps, also, it is for the same reason that today the\nword \u201cvirtue\u201d signifies almost exclusively _chastity_, a trait of\ncharacter and an action-pattern which any physician will tell you is\ndependent for its existence and maintenance upon the contractions of\nvery powerful flexor muscles.\n\nThe upshot of all this discussion is that from the study of man\u2019s\nbody as an ethical machine, it appears that he who would formulate\na list of the chiefly desirable traits or virtues should first\ncarefully consider the total needs of the organism. This new\ncatalogue of virtues will be based upon the realization that man\npossesses both a flexor and an extensor mechanism. We know already\nthat many ailments of the body are traceable to a lop-sided use\nof it, by which is usually meant the acquisition of chronic\nfatigue-postures in the flexor muscles. Indeed, chronic postures are\nrecognized to be of such paramount importance, that experts have\nbeen employed to devise adequate stretching exercises (actuating the\ndisused extensor system) in order to restore the organic balance\nof a nation. Moreover, just as the hygiene of the body depends\nupon a liberal use of all of its muscles, so likewise the ethical\nbalance of the organism can be maintained only by the cultivation\nand commendation of a sufficient variety of traits to provide an\noutlet for all the action-tendencies which man naturally possesses.\nVirtue, then, we may henceforth regard as being based directly upon\nour physiological needs, and not upon the assumption, so frequently\nemployed in the past, that ideals must be unattainable in order to be\nrespectable.\n\nMoreover, a strictly natural science of ethics will have a regard for\nthe fact of individual differences among men, and, recognizing that\nblood-pressure, metabolism, talents, and capacities differ so widely\nas to make it impossible for any one trait to be the \u201chighest\u201d virtue\nfor all persons, it will place the emphasis solely upon the needs of\nthe individual case. Already this development has become wide-spread.\nThe juvenile courts, the Society for Mental Hygiene, the National\nChild Welfare Association are all examples of an ethical technique\nbased entirely upon the sciences of physiology, psychology, and\nmedicine. This emancipation of ethics from official religion is one\nof the most momentous events in the history of civilization.\n\nAnd finally, we may say that it is time to recognize that since\neach one of the \u201cseven ages of man\u201d has its own particular mental\nand physical characteristics, so likewise does each of these ages\nhave its own particular virtues. Too long have parents whispered\nthemselves into the belief that the child ought to strive to copy\nthe man, for the result of this unconscious egotism has only forced\nsuch parents to discover that when their child has grown up, they\nimmediately wanted him to be an infant again! But it is becoming\nrecognized among those who learn to look at the world without such\nan exaggerated self-preference, that every phase of life,\u2014infancy,\npuberty, youth, manhood, middle-age, maturity, and senescence,\u2014brings\nwith it ever new ethical opportunities in the appearance of traits\npeculiar to each phase, and that it is in the development of these\nvarious potentialities into their own natural end-product that the\nultimate ethical values consist.\n\n\n_Is Vice the Opposite of Virtue?_\n\nIt now remains to be seen what the word \u201cvice\u201d means, first by\nscanning the uses to which it is popularly put, and second, by\nreference to its physiological implications. Accordingly, then, we\nfind the following general classes of things called vices.\n\nAny fault, mistake, or error may be called a vice, as, for instance,\na \u201cvice of method.\u201d This signification is practically identical with\none use of the term \u201cbad.\u201d (E. g., bad workmanship, defective, below\npar; sometimes called poor or worthless.)\n\nLikewise, any imperfection, defect, or blemish falls under this\ncategory, as \u201ca vice of conformation,\u201d \u201ca vice of literary style.\u201d\nHere again this use of the concept may be identified with some of\nthe significations of \u201cbad\u201d and \u201cwrong.\u201d These first two classes of\nvice may be related to one another in the sense that the first is\nthe cause, and the latter the effect,\u2014the erroneous (vicious) method\nproducing the blemish (vice) in the product.\n\nIn our third class are found the significations most commonly implied\nby this concept today, namely, those habits or actions contrary to\npublic policy, and especially those which arouse violent censure.\nSuch are gluttony, indolence, mendacity, drunkenness, debauchery, and\nthe like, which might also be included in any complete list of the\nthings which are called \u201cbad,\u201d \u201cevil,\u201d and \u201cwrong.\u201d The peculiarly\nspecific element which enters here, however, is the damage to the\norganism which these vices entail. Sometimes, also, this concept is\nused in the expression, \u201can age of vice,\u201d a phrase which denotes\na period of time in which these censured practices are extremely\nprevalent, or given particular notice.\n\nThe term \u201cvice\u201d is also used in describing animals not thoroughly\ntrained, as when it is said: \u201cThat bird-dog has the vice of mouthing\nthe quarry,\u201d or \u201cI must break this horse of his vice of cribbing.\u201d\n\nFormerly, indeed, some inherited bodily defects were spoken of as\n\u201cconstitutional vices,\u201d but this use of the term is now rare.\n\nIt can be seen at once that while virtue and vice are popularly\nregarded as opposites, no amount of stretching applied to either of\nthese concepts will make it the true antonym of the _other_. It is\nidle for anyone to remark that they ought nevertheless to be regarded\nas diametrically opposed; empirically they are not, as the following\nanalytical table plainly shows:\u2014\n\n            VIRTUES                        VICES\n\n  Valor, courage, intrepidity,     No antonym, except in the\n  (strength). The spectacular      rare cases where cowardice\n  virtues.                         may be regarded as vicious.\n\n  Caution, probity, temperance,    Negated by mendacity,\n  sobriety (and the unobtrusive    drunkenness, and debauchery,\n  Christian virtues).              but not precisely; nor\n                                   popularly by gluttony and\n                                   indolence.\n\n  Medicinal efficacy of drugs.     No antonym.\n\n  The phrases, \u201cby virtue of,\u201d     No antonym.\n  \u201cin virtue of,\u201d etc.\n\n  No antonym.                      Fault mistake, error.\n\n  No antonym.                      Imperfection, defect, or\n                                   blemish.\n\n  No antonym.                     The faults of untrained\n                                  animals.\n\n  No antonym.                     Constitutional vices.\n\nHow, now, shall we proceed to construct our definition of the ethical\nconcept \u201cvice\u201d? It will be recalled that we used the term virtue to\ndescribe a situation in which energy was being either mobilized or\nexpended to obtain what the organism considered to be a dependable\ngood. Does vice imply the opposite of this? Hardly, for it must be\nadmitted by the uncensorious observer that many of even the most\nviolently condemned actions could be described as part of somebody\u2019s\nprogram to attain a durable satisfaction. The glutton, remembering\nonce more how comfortable a full belly makes him feel, may gorge\nhimself without stint; and even if he has been warned that diabetes\nand gout are likely to be the final results of such persistent\ndevotion to the pastry and the roast, he may still pursue these foods\nwith avidity, cheerfully and hopefully making himself an exception\nto the general rule of impending disaster. In the same way, the\nlusty pursuer of sex enjoyments may be dispassionately regarded as\nplanning and achieving his own type of satisfaction, and while he\nmay often \u201cin a cool hour\u201d be aware of the likelihood of entangling\nalliances, yet even his self-censure is not guaranteed to keep him\nfrom mobilizing his energy for the attainment of his chosen, private\n\u201cgood.\u201d\n\nOnce more, then, we realize that \u201cvirtue\u201d and \u201cvice\u201d are not true\nantonyms. We saw this to be the case with \u201cgood\u201d and \u201cbad,\u201d and\nlikewise with \u201cright\u201d and \u201cwrong.\u201d It is only when these pairs of\nterms are used with the most severely restricted denotation, that\nis, with a provincial bias, that their opposition and contradiction\nappears. Such bias is also shown, when it is said that the glutton\nand the debauch\u00e9 \u201creally know that they shouldn\u2019t\u201d indulge themselves\nas they do, a statement which signifies something like this: If these\nmen who do what I call \u201cwrong\u201d were only to act as I direct, they\nwould not be censured. Obviously so, but what a host of fallible\nassumptions this involves! It is merely ignoring the problem, and\nsuch a treatment furnishes no hint as to its solution. One begins\nto doubt the validity of all praise and blame as profitable ethical\ninstruments. Besides, the appeal to self-censure, as employed in\nthe above case, is, in the end, relatively inefficacious in actual\npractice, and is hence illogical as a basic principle in ethical\ntheory. Indeed, it is idle to say that we all know what we should\ndo; if we had that much information, we would act upon it, for the\nwill and the intellect, as Spinoza remarked, are one and the same.\nThe great need in ethics is to get right down to the empirical facts\nof conduct and to let them teach us, rather than to hide the facts\nbehind a screen of pious insincerity. Importunate chiding may be a\ntraditional tool of morality, but it does not contribute anything to\nthe establishment of an ethical science.\n\nConsequently we shall have to reject any definition of the vices\nwhich goes no further than to describe them as those actions which\nsome observer regards as unprofitable. It may be that such a\ndefinition superficially fits a great many cases, but great danger\nlies in accepting it without scrutiny, since it tends to imply\nthat ethics is merely a study of _opinions_ about conduct, and not\nof conduct itself. Now, no other science is a study of opinions,\nnot even the normative sciences of bridge-building or landscape\ngardening; and ethics is no exception to this general rule. Moreover,\nsince we do not know of any absolutely wise observer to whose opinion\nwe can appeal in every doubtful case, a true definition of vice has\nnot yet been achieved.\n\nHowever, if we bear in mind that praise and blame, or commendation\nand censure are always relative to certain environmental conditions,\nand if, furthermore, we can discover what they really imply, we shall\ndoubtless be able to arrive at a conception of virtue and vice that\nwill square with the observable facts of human conduct. And the first\npoint to be emphasized is that whenever these concepts are used,\nsome standard seems to be implied. What is this seemingly hidden\nstandard, this presupposed line, which, especially in the case of\nthe vices, one is forbidden to cross under pain of censure? Sometimes\nit seems to be a line drawn within a family, sometimes within a\nneighborhood, while often it is confined to a class or profession,\nand again it is delimited by a national culture. Would it not seem\nthat every such tacitly assumed standard is created by the relatively\nunconscious judgment of the group in the very effort to have a group,\nthe members of which recognize each other as belonging to it? In\nother words, are not all such standards a function of the desire of\nthe group to employ the pronouns \u201cwe\u201d and \u201cus\u201d significantly? This\nis not oversimplifying the matter, since the use of such pronouns\nimplies much more than is commonly realized. Indeed, when man says\n\u201cwe\u201d instead of \u201cI,\u201d he indicates that a point in evolution has\nbeen reached where a similarity of predicaments has produced a\nsimilarity of aims. To fight a common foe, to till a common land,\nand to keep a common eye upon strangers are one and all actions\nimplicit in the establishment of group standards. And even though\nthese standards are often ill-defined, and frequently neglected by\ncertain individuals within the group, nevertheless they remain as\na background of reference (in strict mechanistic terms, as an old\nhabit-posture), whenever there is any danger felt lest the word \u201cwe\u201d\nshould become meaningless. Danger felt by whom? Particularly, we are\nobliged to say, by the most conservative members of the group, for\nbe it remembered that praise and blame, and reward and punishment\nare insisted upon most violently by undiscriminating persons. Such\npersons, it seems, are most sensitive to the waxing and waning of\ncertain benefits which others have achieved for them, and which they\nregard as valuable to retain and dangerous to lose.\n\nIf anyone wishes to know what such benefits are he has only to\nrecall what traits his own group calls virtues and vices, and to\nask in every case just what they imply in terms of the needs of the\ngroup which sanctions or condemns them. For example, valor, courage,\nand intrepidity, together with the other spectacular virtues, have\ncertainly been commended because they supply two very obvious and\nwell-nigh universal group needs. The first is a common, stalwart\ndefence, and the second is a healthy progeny. Cripples and deformed\npersons have never been objects of admiration or praise. As for the\nunobtrusive virtues, many of these have likewise been commended by\nsuch a group as feels itself beset or insecure on account of its\ninability to compete with the strong on their own terms, and this\ngroup has adopted them in a semi-paradoxical attempt to acquire\nsolidarity. To turn at once to the other side of the picture, we\nfind that the vices of gluttony, drunkenness, and lechery have been\ncondemned not only because they effeminate and debilitate, and\nthereby undermine the defence-power of the group, but also because\nthey tend to reduce the capacity of the group to create a sound\nand fertile offspring. This is doubtless why certain congenital\nabnormalities were formerly spoken of as \u201cconstitutional vices.\u201d As\nfor the word \u201cvice\u201d being sometimes applied to botchy work, incorrect\nmethods, and the faults of untrained animals, we can see how in\nspecial instances a group might regard these things as peculiarly\ndetrimental to its solidarity. Contrariwise, the \u201cvirtue\u201d of a\nmedicinal plant might, under the harassing circumstances of a plague\nor an epidemic, be the chief cause of even a nation\u2019s concern.\n\nIn thus defining virtue and vice in terms of the assets and\nliabilities of the group, what becomes of our previous attempt to\ndefine virtue in individualistic terms? The answer is that this\nprevious conception remains as a necessary complement to, and check\nupon, group intolerance. For while the desires of the group and\nthose of the individual may sometimes clash, they do not need to be\nconsidered as basically or essentially opposed to one another. The\nhistorical fact is often manifest that when group solidarity tends\nto produce mediocrity, there is a sudden overt demonstration of\nindividualism. Our own generation shows an example of this type of\nreaction. When, again, extreme individualism fails to yield group\nassets, the conservative tendencies begin to reassert themselves more\npowerfully once more. Yet it is doubtful whether exactly the same\ntype of conservatism is ever repeated, since the individualism which\nit seeks to counteract is, in succeeding generations, different from\nthe type which preceded it.\n\n\n_Is Virtue Its Own Reward?_\n\nFrom the foregoing it is apparent that the ethical concept \u201cvirtue\u201d\nhas two alternative interpretations. One of these involves the\ncommendation of the group on the basis of what its members feel\nto be required for the maintenance of its traditions. The other\ninterpretation is based upon what the individual mobilizes and\nexpends his energy to obtain. Which of these is superior to the\nother, that is, which would survive in case of mutual conflict, only\nthe last volume of recorded history will relate. What is more of a\nreal problem to us is the question, commonly asked, Is virtue its own\nreward?\n\nThis curious question involves the philosophical theory of internal\nrelations,\u2014a theory of very doubtful validity. The statement that\nvirtue is its own reward is equivalent to the assertion that virtue\nis valuable in and for itself. But if so, then virtue is unique,\nand this again is doubtful, for whether we observe the individual\ndevoting his energies to the attainment of some dependable good, or\nthe group commending him for it, it appears at once that virtuous\nactions are never undertaken without some hope of reward either\nin the shape of praise or of tangible results. Upon hearing this,\nsome will groan, claiming that a good man should act ever and only\non principle, and leave the rest to the gods. And yet nobody ever\ndid so. Moreover, it is plain that the truly virtuous man, whether\nacting within the taboos of his clan, or striking out on entirely new\npaths after a \u201cgood\u201d that he could depend securely upon, received a\nthree-fold reward of a very substantial nature. He achieved power, he\nattained wisdom, and he secured peace; and these rewards, moreover,\nin the degree to which they were gained, automatically thereafter\nbecame the measure by which the dependability of any good could be\nestimated. And we also venture to say that the same criterion could\nbe employed in determining to what extent any particular trait of\ncharacter was a vice.\n\nEven more than this, however, can now be said. For such a criterion\nas is here suggested has significant implications for the human\nbody,\u2014that upon which life and mind ultimately depend. Experiments\nin psychology and psychiatry have revealed that traits of character\nare more than skin-deep and brain-deep; indeed, they are more than\nmuscle-deep: they are as deep as the vital organs themselves. Even\nmore than this is apparent, for these same sciences have demonstrated\nthat not only is such a trait as anxiety just another name for a\nchronic muscular tension, but also that many diseases are, if not\ncaused, at least abetted by what we think, how we act, and what\nfeelings we cultivate. In more precise terms, the mechanisms of\nthought and action, being partly identical with the mechanisms of\nlocomotion and metabolism, can produce either a hygienic or an\nunhygienic effect upon the whole structure of man\u2019s organism. And in\nthis fact, I think, we can find an acceptable basis, even if a new\none, for the distinction between virtue and vice.\n\nThis basis we propose is not altogether a novelty to keen students\nof human nature. We know that the normal, healthy and successfully\nadapted human individual is characterized by a relaxed and resilient\ncondition, not only of his superficial or locomotor muscles, but\nalso of the muscles of his alimentary tract. Both his voluntary\nand involuntary systems are constantly in a state of readiness to\nperform their necessary functions, and they also return to this\ncondition after any series of actions has been performed. Such a\nman possesses aplomb, and is an example of the healthy Greek ideal\nof a sane mind in a sound body. In striking contrast to such a\nnormal, resilient state, there are frequently found two other organic\nconditions which are readily delineated. The one is called muscular\nflabbiness, characterized by a powerless or a-tonic state of the\nmuscles of either the voluntary (or teachable) and the involuntary\n(or unteachable) systems, or both. A man in this a-tonic plight is\nincapable of vigorous, coordinate action, and his muscles do not\nmanifest a normal readiness to respond to successive stimulations.\nThe other abnormal condition, at the opposite pole from this one, is\nthe one involving chronic muscular tensions, a condition which may be\ncompared to the state of a steel spring which is always kept under\nsevere strain, and which is never released far enough to give the\nmetal a chance to recover from the stresses it undergoes. Highstrung,\nover-anxious, jealous, irascible people illustrate this type of\norganism with exactness.\n\nThe ethical implications of the foregoing must have already been\nguessed. Is it not possible to define the virtuous man as the\nrelaxed, resilient, coordinate individual, and the vicious man as\neither the muscularly flabby, and therewith the lazy, spineless,\nprocrastinating, lecherous man; or else as the abnormally hypertonic\norganism, whose muscles constantly pay dividends of wrath, and whose\ngrudges and malice are carried even through his slumber? If so,\nthere should be no paradox implied in speaking of virtue and vice as\nfunctions of the human organism.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[19] Compare the expression, \u201cAnd now abideth faith, hope, and\ncharity\u201d with \u201cAnd now there are faithful men, hopeful men, and\ncharitable men.\u201d Only the latter of these statements has any real\nmeaning.\n\n[20] Plato\u2019s list is very brief, and his virtues correspond to the\nthree parts of the soul as he conceived it. Self-control, courage,\nand wisdom are the three virtues which characterize the desire, the\nwill, and the reason respectively, while the supreme virtue is a\nharmony or health of the soul.\n\nFor Aristotle, virtue is found in a moderation between extremes. For\nexample, the virtue of courage is a mean between cowardliness and\nrashness. Others of his virtues likewise derived are: temperance,\nliberality, high-mindedness, mildness, friendliness, candor,\nurbanity, and justice.\n\nThe Christian virtues, while never stated in systematic form, are\ntypically represented by humility, kindliness, self-denial, meekness,\npatience, temperance, and, perhaps, other-worldliness.\n\nComparatively few ethical writers attempt to give a list or\nscale of virtues and vices, and some of them ignore the question\ncompletely. Martineau, in a somewhat successful attempt to free\nhimself from an irreconcilable dualism in ethics, presents a scale\nof traits beginning, presumably, with vices (e. g., censoriousness,\nvindictiveness, suspiciousness), and ending with virtues (compassion,\nreverence, and veracity). In the application of this system, the\nchief question is, not what is bad or what is good, but simply, which\ntrait is better and which worse than another.\n\n[21] It is to be observed that Jesus was much more specific and\nempirical than either Plato or St. Paul, since in his treatment of\nthis phase of the problem of conduct, Jesus often described the\nsituation concretely, e. g., \u201cthose persecuted for righteousness\u2019\nsake,\u201d rather than by employing, as did Plato and St. Paul, abstract\nnouns, such as \u201ccourage,\u201d \u201ccharity,\u201d and the like. But it must also\nnot be forgotten that of all the ethical teachers of antiquity,\nSocrates alone consistently stuck to the concrete realities of ethics\nand constantly admitted the size and difficulties of the problems\ninvolved.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nIS CONSCIENCE ALWAYS A PATHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON?\n\n  \u201cWhen the rookery is pretty well filled, and the nest-building\n  is in full swing, the birds have a busy and anxious time. To get\n  enough of suitable small stones is a matter of difficulty, and\n  may involve long journeys for each single stone. The temptation\n  is too strong for some of them, and they become habitual thieves.\n  The majority remain stupidly honest. Amusing complications result.\n  The bearing of the thief clearly shows that he knows he is doing\n  wrong. He has a conscience, at least a human conscience, i. e.,\n  the fear of being found out. Very different is the furtive look\n  of the thief, long after he is out of danger of pursuit, from the\n  expression of the honest penguin coming home with a hard-earned\n  stone.\n\n  \u201cAn honest one was bringing stones from a long distance. Each stone\n  was removed by a thief as soon as the owner\u2019s back was turned. The\n  honest one looked greatly troubled as he found that his heap didn\u2019t\n  grow, but he seemed incapable of suspecting the cause.\n\n  \u201cA thief, sitting on his own nest, was stealing from an\n  adjacent nest, whose honest owner was also at home, but looking\n  unsuspectingly in another direction. Casually he turned his head\n  and caught the thief in the act. The thief dropped the stone and\n  pretended to be busy picking up an infinitesimal crumb from the\n  neutral ground.\u201d\n\n  \u201cThe Heart of the Antarctic,\u201d SIR ERNEST SHACKLETON, Vol. II, p.\n  253 (Section on the Adelie Penguin, by James Murray, Biologist of\n  the Expedition).\n\n\nThe word \u201cconscience\u201d was perhaps originally synonymous with\nconsciousness, but it gradually came to mean _self_-consciousness\nof a very special type, namely, the silent commendation or censure\nwhich a man may bestow upon his actions or his projects. This word\n\u201cconscience\u201d replaced the Middle English term _inwit_,\u2014a term made\nfamous in the title of a book (circa 1340) called the \u201cAyenbite of\nInwit\u201d (that is, the \u201cAgain-bite or Remorse of Conscience\u201d). The\nconcept of conscience has played an important part in modern ethical\ntheory, and it is supposed by many persons to be the foundation of\nall morality. What place it deserves to hold in a constructive,\nmechanistic ethics can be determined, however, only by careful\nanalysis. So many extravagant claims have been advanced in its behalf\nas to make one suspect that none of them are true. Things which\npeople have \u201calways heard lauded and never discussed\u201d are only with\ndifficulty saved from oblivion when intellectual revolutions have\naltered the emphasis which man puts on the values of life. It was\nthus with the word \u201csoul,\u201d and with the word \u201cimmortality,\u201d and it is\nlikely to be the same with the word \u201cconscience.\u201d At least it will\nbe an advantage to look at the philosophical pedigree of this once\nmighty shibboleth.\n\nIt may be surprising to learn that as far as ethical theory is\nconcerned, the doctrine of an infallible conscience is the product of\nno less recent a time than the XVIII century. The Conscience-theory\nis the philosophical property of such men as Butler, Clarke, Kant,\nShaftesbury, and Reid, rather than of their predecessors. Thomas\nHobbes (1588-1679), who founded critical English ethics, flatly\nrefused to give to the then immature concept of conscience any\nrecognition; indeed, he declared it to be nothing less than a\n\u201cdisease\u201d of the state, and one \u201cof those things that weaken or\ntend to the dissolution of a commonwealth.\u201d In Chapter XXIX of the\n\u201cLeviathan,\u201d he states the current notions of conscience: (1) \u201cThat\nevery private man is judge of good and evil actions,\u201d and (2) \u201cThat\nwhatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin.\u201d Both of these\nnotions Hobbes condemns. \u201cFor,\u201d he observes with characteristic\nsagacity, \u201ca man\u2019s conscience and his judgment is the same thing, and\nas the judgment so also the conscience may be erroneous.\u201d\n\nThis emphasis which Hobbes placed upon the untrustworthiness of\nprivate ethical judgments was fatal to his purpose. His successors\nbegan straightway to reanimate that which he had sought to bury once\nand for all, and, whether on account of their temperamental antipathy\nto the intellectualism of Hobbes, or because they were honestly\nseeking for some valid ethical principle, they asserted, first\ntimidly, and later with a surprising boldness the very thing which\nHobbes had sought especially to efface from the docket of ethical\ndiscussion.\n\nWe find this reaction beginning in Shaftesbury (1671-1713). Albeit\nthis author gives a minor place in his ethical theory to the notion\nof a \u201cmoral sense,\u201d or rational, reflex affection which approves only\nsocially beneficial actions, yet the positive emphasis which he puts\nupon it is nevertheless significant. The affirmation proved to be\ncontagious, for those who followed Shaftesbury immediately elevated\nconscience to a central position in their systems. We refer here to\nButler, Clarke, Kant, and Reid, who are known as intuitionists.\n\nAccording to Butler (1692-1752), conscience is a \u201cprinciple of\nreflection\u201d and not a mere _feeling_. And this principle of\nreflection is for him a natural or inherent property of man\u2019s\nmind. It is the principle by which a man \u201capproves or disapproves\nhis heart, temper, and actions\u201d; it is a faculty which \u201ctends to\nrestrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads them to do\ngood.\u201d Be it noted here that Butler says nothing about the so-called\ninfallibility of conscience, nor does he argue that it must be the\nsame for all persons. Moreover, he gives a somewhat analytical\ndefinition of it, and is willing to grant that its function is\nutilitarian.\n\nThe old belief in the certainty of conscience now begins to reappear.\nIt was Clarke (1675\u20141729) who attempted to defend it by the use of\na mathematical analogy. We are all familiar with the axiom (or\ntruism) that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to\neach other. If now we keep the general form, but alter the substance\nof this axiom, so that it reads: \u201cWhatever I judge reasonable or\nunreasonable for another to do for me, that by the same judgment I\ndeclare reasonable or unreasonable that I in the like case should do\nfor him,\u201d we have Clarke\u2019s Law of Equity. To an arm-chair philosopher\nsuch a statement sounds fairly cogent, but its empirical value is not\nthereby guaranteed. As every student of psychology knows, individual\ndifferences, individual preferences, and the capacity of individuals\nby this method of give-and-take are completely ignored in the\nformulation of this law. Besides, Clarke\u2019s conception of conscience\nmay be said to contain a hint of ethical solipsism, or the theory\nthat oneself is the only accurate authority on social justice. We\nneed not pause longer over the insuperable difficulties of such a\npoint of view.\n\nIt is, however, in the writings of Kant and Reid that the\nconscience-theory attains its modern, sentimental form. In his\n\u201cMetaphysic of Morality\u201d Kant (1724-1804) makes the following\nstraddling assertion: \u201cNothing in the whole world, or even outside of\nthe world [sic!] can possibly be regarded as good without limitation\nexcept a _good will_.\u201d But this is not the full extent to which this\nphilosopher presses his claims. For he continues, \u201cA man\u2019s will is\ngood, not because the consequences which flow from it are good, nor\nbecause it is capable of attaining the ends which it seeks, but it is\n_good in itself_, or because it wills the good. Its intrinsic value\nis in no way increased by success or lessened by failure.\u201d From all\nof which Kant concludes that \u201cAs the will must not be moved to act\nfrom any desire for the results expected to follow from obedience to\na certain law, the only principle of the will which remains is that\nof the conformity of actions to universal law. In all cases I must\nact in such a way that I can at the same time will that my maxim\nshould become a universal law.\u201d This last statement is the famous\ncategorical imperative.\n\nAt first glance this appears to have profundity, but it turns out\neven upon the slightest analysis to be quite the opposite. For\nexample, the first passage quoted (\u201cNothing ... can be regarded as\ngood without limitation except a good will\u201d) contains assertions\nthat nobody can know enough to make. It is ritualistic philosophy.\nMoreover, the expression \u201cgood will\u201d actually does (Kant to the\ncontrary, notwithstanding) put a logical limitation upon the concept\n_good_, just as \u201cgood\u201d cat, or \u201cgood\u201d razor does. Besides, the term\n\u201cwill\u201d or volition always refers to a phenomenon which is strictly\ndependent upon circumstances, for a man wills _only when_ there\nis something to be possessed. These are not all the errors which\nKant here commits. His attempt to explain why the good will is good\n(itself a statement exhibiting the fallacy of ambiguity) reveals\nthat Kant was a very poorly equipped psychologist. I ask you, how\nmany persons is it possible to find,\u2014indeed, is it possible to find\none single man except among the psychopathic cases,\u2014who would ever\nbe stimulated to live,\u2014much less to subscribe to Kant\u2019s theory,\u2014if\nhis successes or failures had no effect whatever upon his future\nvolitions? We do not imply by this rhetorical question that every man\nis, or can be, or should be immoderately egoistical, but only that\nKant had no insight whatever into the psychological problems involved\nin ethics.\n\nConsequently, the categorical imperative as a deduction from Kant\u2019s\nfirst principles is to be regarded as completely erroneous. How,\nindeed, can a man act in such a way as to make the maxim of his\naction a universal law? Suppose we offer a simple example. When I\nam hungry, and food is before me, I eat it. Does this imply that my\nwill to eat becomes a universal law, namely, that all the hungry\nshould eat? But when I learn of the many hungry who are unable to\neat, my will to eat illustrates not a universal law, but an extremely\nparticular law, that is to say, the law that _if_ I am hungry, and\n_if_ food is supplied, and, furthermore, _if_ I am willing to risk\nthat food, then, but only then, do I eat it. There seems to be no way\nto establish the validity of Kant\u2019s imperative, regardless of the\ndirection one\u2019s thought takes. To cite a different example entirely,\nlet us imagine a hungry man who, having cornered all the food of\nhis tribe, eats it on the assumption that every other man would do\nthe same thing if he were similarly fortunate. Here the categorical\nimperative appears in such a light as to shock its author profoundly.\nAnd yet in strict logic, this interpretation is a valid one for an\nintuitionist ethics. Do we wonder that Levy-Br\u00fchl speaks of \u201cthe\nambiguous and bastard concept of the moral law,\u201d when they who\nattempt to state such a law have neither comprehension nor patience\nenough to discover the simplest principles of human conduct?\n\nIt is, however, in the \u201cEssays on the Active Powers of Man,\u201d by\nThomas Reid (1710-1796) that the commonplace notion of conscience\nreceives its principal philosophical support. Concerning this\n\u201cmoral sense,\u201d as Reid calls it in reminiscence of Shaftesbury, the\nfollowing formidable assertions are made. In the first place, \u201cIt is\nwithout doubt far superior to every other power of the mind.\u201d In the\nsecond place, \u201cThe testimony of this moral sense,\u201d like that of the\nrest of the senses, \u201cis the testimony of nature, and we have the same\nreason to rely upon it.\u201d In addition, just as the sense of vision\nis fundamental for space perception, so \u201cThe truths immediately\ntestified by our moral faculty are the first principles of all moral\nreasoning.\u201d Reid would also have us note that this reasoning is not\ninductive, but deductive, for he says, \u201cThe first principles of\nmorals are the _immediate_ dictates of the moral faculty.\u201d\n\nThe outstanding fault of such a theory is that it assumes that every\nname we choose to manufacture has a reality corresponding to it.\nThis is the fallacy of hypostatization, to which all idealistic\nphilosophers are addicted. Granted that it is true, as Butler says,\nthat we approve and disapprove of some of our actions, yet this does\nnot imply that there is a transcendent faculty within us which we\nare at liberty to substantialize as Conscience or a Moral Sense.\nSuch language is merely noun-worship. It is granted that the words\n\u201cmoral\u201d and \u201csense\u201d have each separately a meaning, but it does not\nfollow that the compound term \u201cmoral-sense\u201d must therefore have one.\nMoreover, all of these intuitionists are wilful and unperspicuous\nrationalists, demanding a fundamental principle in ethics _before_\nthey have employed any induction or experimentation that might help\nthem to frame such a principle correctly. They are willing to do no\nhard work, and to perform no crucial tests in order to see whether\ntheir guesses are facts or fictions. To complete our criticism, we\nmust not omit to state that Reid\u2019s elevation of conscience to a place\namong the senses merely reveals the extent to which he was willing\nto go in his defence of the testimony of the senses in general\nagainst the idealists of his age. His use of the \u201cmoral sense\u201d was\na debater\u2019s trick. The high esteem in which conscience was held by\nhis antagonists tempted him to turn one of their own weapons against\nthem.\n\nWe can now better understand the statement previously made that the\npersonification of conscience was the peculiar artifice, the \u201cuseful\ndodge,\u201d of a certain school of ethical thinkers in the XVIII century.\nConsequently it is erroneous to suppose that the commonplace view\nof this phenomenon has always held undisputed sway over theoretical\nethics. It had no place whatever in the minds of Greek ethical\nwriters. Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, and their contemporaries\nfounded the science of ethics without even dreaming that there was\na conscience. Epictetus, Epicurus, and Marcus Aurelius showed no\npoverty of constructive thought for the lack of it. Even Helvetius,\na contemporary of the intuitionists, rejected it as spurious when he\nwrote: \u201cHe who will warrant his virtue in every situation is either\nan impostor or a fool; characters equally to be mistrusted.\u201d\n\nMost people who have heard the name of John Locke will recall his\narguments against the assumptions of the moral intuitionists in\nthose passages where he combats the theory of innate moral ideas.\nAccording to Locke, all such ideas would have to be (1) independent\nof geographical location and climate, (2) independent of the age of\nthe person and of his training, and (3) recognized by all persons as\nfundamental. But none of these conditions are found to be satisfied\nby anyone who makes the shortest pilgrimage through the world in the\nsearch for these statistics. And consequently the intellectually\nhonest Locke rejects the philosophical theory of conscience,\nindependently of his recognition of the facts of self-approval and\nself-disapproval.\n\nIt remained, however, for John Stuart Mill to foreshadow the\nbeginning of the end of this fantastic theory of the moral faculty in\nChapter III of his \u201cUtilitarianism.\u201d He writes:\u2014\n\n  \u201cThe internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty\n  may be, is one and the same\u2014a feeling in our own mind; a pain,\n  more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in\n  properly cultivated moral natures rises, in more serious cases,\n  into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling ... is\n  the essence of Conscience; though in that complex phenomenon as it\n  actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted over\n  with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love,\n  and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling;\n  from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from\n  self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even\n  self-abasement.\u201d\n\nThis analysis of Mill\u2019s reveals that what the intuitionists loosely\ntermed _conscience_ is a far more complex phenomenon than they had\nsuspected, and with this revelation the whole logical structure\nof intuitionism breaks down. For if conscience is not the simple,\ninnate, infallible principle or faculty which the intuitionists\npostulated it to be, the deductions they made from this hypothesis\nbecome more and more untenable the longer they are scrutinized.\nMill\u2019s analysis of the psychological factors in conscience, together\nwith Locke\u2019s discovery of the cultural and geographical limitations\nof any moral sense make it necessary to define this ethical\nphenomenon in purely empirical terms.\n\nSuch a definition as we seek, however, could only be obtained by\nsecuring an elaborate census of cases in which the words \u201cconscience\u201d\nor \u201cmoral sense\u201d were used. The census-taker would have to roam\nover the whole earth, ask questions all day long, and even become\nan eavesdropper at night, in order to gain the information he\ndesired. Even this method would hardly be exhaustive, since perhaps\nfar more \u201cpangs of conscience\u201d are felt than are ever expressed\nin language; and so our census-taker, were he as thorough as we\nmight desire him to be, would have to be equipped with a sort of\nultra-stethoscope,\u2014one that could elevate a blush into an audible\nphenomenon,\u2014in order to return with a full and complete report. The\nlack of such exhaustive statistics must, of course, be permanent;\nnot only for want of census-takers, and for want of accuracy and\nsincerity on the part of those giving their introspection, but also\nbecause the concept of conscience may be slowly evolving, so that the\nend of the census might not harmonize with its beginning.\n\nGranting, indeed, that such an evolution exists, it does not\nnow appear to be either uniform or universal. For while, as we\nhave recently shown, the concept of conscience first attained a\nphilosophic importance in the XVIII century, and was thereafter\nvariously modified and developed, yet the popular notion of a moral\nsense,\u2014of \u201cthis deity within my bosom,\u201d as some have even expressed\nit,\u2014has actually degenerated into something unworthy of a place\namong the positive ethical values. Our quotation from James Murray\u2019s\naccount of the behavior of the Adelie penguin is extremely pertinent\nhere. \u201c_The fear of being found out_\u201d is, we venture to say, the very\nnucleus and core of the consciences of the majority of men. And while\nwithout doubt some forms of fear are well-grounded, as, for example,\nthe farmer\u2019s fear lest the oncoming storm wash out his seedlings, yet\nwhen fear tends to limit prudence, or take the place of prevision,\nthe organism in which that fear arises is sub-normal and unsound.\nConscience, then, in so far as it is identical with this degrading\nemotion of fear, and in so far as it begins and ends in a withdrawing\nreaction, is nothing but a blight.\n\nYet something more remains to be said about the popular conception\nof the word \u201cconscience.\u201d This word, as commonly used, denotes an\nemotional state which, far from being in harmony with the ideals of\nthe group, often denotes the very opposite condition. It is hardly\nnecessary to remark that the fear of being found out does not imply\nloyalty to the group any more than it implies the recognition of\nthat which makes for power, wisdom, and peace in the individual.\nIndeed, conscience as popularly experienced, involving as it\ndoes anxiety, trepidation, self-abasement, and a host of other\nintroversive tendencies, is an ethical liability, both to the group\nand to the individual. The man who has transgressed the will of the\ngroup is surely not a bit better off because of his fear of being\ncaught, nor can he regard his fear, even though he has already been\ntortured by it, as giving him any right to a mitigation of the\npenalty. As for himself, the conscience-stricken individual may have\nso long squandered his energy in his effort to conceal his offence\nas to bring him very close to ethical bankruptcy. The picture we\ndraw is not extreme,\u2014it can be duplicated in every neighborhood,\nif not in every family on the globe. For conscience, as it is\nusually experienced, is a painful, withdrawing reaction, implying\nnegation rather than affirmation, incoordination rather than skilful\nprevision, and morbidity instead of frank, overt, constructive\naction. Accurate indeed is the phrase, \u201cThe pangs of conscience,\u201d as\na description of the organic turmoil incident to this condition of\nmal-adjustment. Can it not, then, be truthfully said, that in the\ncases just described conscience is a pathological phenomenon?\n\nThus to discover that the popular form of conscience implies a vice\nrather than a virtue is not, however, enough. We wish also to know\nhow and why this form of conscience has attained so great a vogue.\nAnd here again we touch upon matters of the greatest importance for\na mechanistic ethics.\n\nConscience as a form of fear is so strong and so wide-spread for\ntwo reasons. The first is already familiar to us, and is briefly\nrepeated. It is that the flexor system is originally stronger than\nthe extensor system. And so in the great majority of men whose\nnatures are less evolved, fear is almost a daily experience,\u2014not\nonly the fear of nature and of the unknown, but also the fear of\nthe group by whose tolerance they exist. Moreover, sentiment and\nnot knowledge is the great group asset, by which we imply no such\neducated sentiments as are derived from analytical inquiry, or from\nan open search after the facts, but rather that kind of sentiment\nwhich passively bars and actively hinders the enlargement of the\nunderstanding. The group really never explains. When offended, it\nsimply becomes suspicious, and its gossips freely translate this\nsuspicion into rumor and inuendo. It is small wonder, then, that the\nconscience-stricken individual, as a product of his group, has as\nhis first, and sometimes his only reaction, the tendency to shrink\nand become unresilient when he realizes that his acts, or worse\nstill, his thoughts, have transgressed the taboos of his tribe. It\nis a case of like master, like man; the group does not usually know\nwhat its purposes are, much less does it ask to have those purposes\nexamined and revealed; and so the conscience-stricken individual,\u2014the\nsentimental child of the group,\u2014reacts to his realization of\nestrangement from the group in a manner that makes his last state\nworse than his first.\n\nThis cannot be taken to imply that it is a sign of intellectual\nmaturity to transgress all the taboos of the group. Yet the argument\nstill holds that the influences produced by the exclusive use of this\nnegative form of conscience are baleful. Very early in the life of\nthe average child the expressions: \u201cDon\u2019t,\u201d \u201cIf you dare to do that\nagain, I\u2019ll whip you,\u201d \u201cWhat would people say?\u201d and a score of other\nnegations are employed by his parents and teachers on the principle\nthat ethical guidance is achieved by such means. As a result, says\nEdwin Holt, \u201cThe parent has set a barrier between the child and a\nportion of reality; and forever after the child will be in some\nmeasure impeded in its dealings\u201d with those things which have become\ntaboo, always first feeling the prohibition, rather than the urgency\nto act discriminatively upon a knowledge which a close contact with\nthe reality should produce. Such a parent has not \u201ctrusted the\ntruth,\u201d and the final result is that the child has actually become \u201ca\nsecond-rate mind, not in harmony with itself,\u201d since not in creative\ntouch with the environment.\n\nEven more pointedly John Dewey writes in his criticism of the\ndoctrine of self-denial. \u201cMorals is a matter of direction, not of\nsuppression. The urgency of desires cannot be got rid of; nature\ncannot be expelled. If the need of happiness, of satisfaction of\ncapacity, is checked in one direction, it will manifest itself in\nanother. If the direction which is checked is an unconscious and\nwholesome one, the one which is taken will be likely to be morbid and\nperverse. The one who is conscious of continually denying himself\ncannot rid himself of the idea that it ought to be \u2018made up\u2019 to him;\nthat a compensating happiness is due him for what he has sacrificed,\nsomewhat increased, if anything, on account of the unnatural virtue\nhe has displayed. To be self-sacrificing is to \u2018lay up\u2019 merit, and\nthis achievement must surely be rewarded with happiness\u2014if not now,\nthen later. Those who habitually live on the basis of conscious\nself-denial are likely to be exorbitant in the demands which they\nmake on some one near them, some member of their family or some\nfriend; likely to blame others if their own \u2018virtue\u2019 does not secure\nfor itself an exacting attention which reduces others to the plane of\nservility. Often the doctrine of self-sacrifice leads to an inverted\nhedonism; we are to be good\u2014that is, forego pleasure\u2014now, that we may\nhave a greater measure of enjoyment in some future paradise of bliss.\nOr, the individual who has taken vows of renunciation is entitled by\nthat very fact to represent spiritual authority on earth and to lord\nit over others.\u201d\n\nThey who wish even a more striking picture of the extent to which\nthe negative type of conscience degrades the intellect, have\nonly to consult Alfred Adler\u2019s \u201cThe Neurotic Constitution.\u201d If\nDr. Adler correctly depicts the salient traits of the neurotic,\nmany intuitionists themselves are by implication introverts, and\nconsequently forfeit their claims to ethical leadership. The neurotic\nis described as \u201ca person possessing anxiety,\u201d \u201cthe self-sacrificing\nvirtue,\u201d \u201ca marked sensitiveness,\u201d \u201can irritable debility,\u201d \u201can\nestrangement from reality,\u201d as well as \u201ca person with a strong\ntendency to symbolization,\u201d and a penchant for \u201cguiding fictions\u201d\ninvented for the purpose of compensating him for his feeling of\ninferiority at having lost solid contacts with reality. This, then,\nis the success which the conscience-theory has met with at the hands\nof scientific experts,\u2014keen and sympathetic observers of the ways of\nmen.\n\nSuch an account of the degeneration of conscience into a\nself-annihilating sentiment is, however, only one chapter in the\nhistory of this concept. And while the list of uses to which the\nword \u201cconscience\u201d has been put does not furnish as solid a basis\nupon which to build a constructive ethical technique as did the uses\nof \u201cgood,\u201d \u201cright,\u201d and \u201cvirtue,\u201d we can nevertheless still find a\npositive ethical value for this term. How, then, will this value be\ndiscovered?\n\nIt will be found by a study of those persons who have attained the\npower to view the world in a purely objective and empirical manner;\nof those persons who treat their own and other peoples\u2019 actions\nas experiments in the great laboratory of time, rather than as\ntimid ventures to be apologized for on the slightest provocation;\nof those persons who have evolved to that point where their\nknowledge determines their sentiments, and not their sentiments\ntheir knowledge; and of those who, having by this means chosen\ntheir dependable goods, learn the right methods to attain them, and\nthereafter employ plain judgments of fact in estimating the success\nwhich they acquire and the quality of the virtue which they achieve.\nIn such persons the positive, constructive, liberalizing type of\nconscience exists,\u2014a conscience which, through being built up of\nobjectively tested judgments, becomes the outstanding ethical asset\nof the personality.\n\nThis type of conscience is not a myth, for it may be acquired in the\nsame way as any other skill is acquired. The objective knowledge\nwhich it presupposes can be gained where every natural curiosity\nof a child or an adult is developed into a frank acquaintance with\nthe object of curiosity; where fear is turned into intrepidity by a\nbold analysis of its cause and by a frontal attack upon the exciting\nstimulus; where one learns that ethical problems are always solved by\nforming serviceable habits and never by the cultivation of permanent\nanxieties; and where, finally, all the entangling alliances forced\nupon one by unprofitable acquaintances are boldly, but politely,\nannihilated. Even though many strongly entrenched traditions and\ninstitutions of the world would decay were the type of conscience we\nhere describe to become wide-spread, yet this cannot deter the wise\nman from making it his life work to add as many new names to the\nlist of those possessing ethical insight as it is within his power to\ndo. Indeed, whenever this list becomes so large as to be generally\nregarded by autocrats as dangerous, we shall have come to that place\nin the course of civilization where the first real ethical advance is\nto be made.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE MITIGATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FREEDOM AND OBLIGATION\n\n  \u201cThere is a phrase \u2018liberty of conscience\u2019 which well expresses the\n  modern conception of moral obligation. It recognizes that duty in\n  the last analysis is imposed upon the individual neither by society\n  nor even by God, but by himself; that there is no authority in\n  moral matters more ultimate than a man\u2019s own rational conviction of\n  what is best.\u201d\n\n  R. B. PERRY, \u201cThe Moral Economy,\u201d p. 34.\n\n\n\u201cOne could scarcely construct a more erroneous view than that every\nhuman being is endowed at birth with the same \u2018lump sum\u2019 of freedom,\nwhich remains an inalienable possession throughout life. Our freedom\nis not complete, it is in the making.... The process by which freedom\nis won is the process of enlightenment. It is the truth that sets men\nfree, the clear perception of moral relations and moral laws, the\nunderstanding of human nature and its true needs.\u201d\n\n  W. G. EVERETT, \u201cMoral Values,\u201d pp. 358-9.\n\n\nOne of the most revolutionary changes which the scientific study of\npsychology has wrought consists in the demolition of all the barriers\nwhich formerly divided the body from the mind. The intellect, once\nsecurely enthroned as the highest faculty in the mental hierarchy;\nthe reason, erstwhile religiously devoted to the contemplation\nof pure truth; and the will, which formerly completed this trio\nof sublime, unitary faculties, have, in the unbiased and careful\nscrutiny of laboratory science, been shown to be not only highly\ncomplicated processes, but products of experience as well; and not\nonly products of experience, but functions of brain and gland.\nFurthermore, they have been revealed to be not solely functions of a\nbiological mechanism controlled by external stimuli, but also in a\nlarger sense they are now regarded as means by which the body of a\nman adjusts itself to and gains control of its physical and social\nenvironments. No longer do we ask the old question: \u201cWhy has the mind\na body?\u201d but rather, \u201cWhy does the body have a mind?\u201d And the answer\nis: The body has a mind to enable the body to experiment with its\nenvironment so that when it gets what it seems to want, it can know\nthat it has really wanted what it has gotten.\n\nSome results of this highly reconstructive iconoclasm upon ethical\nthought have already been depicted in the preceding chapters. Here\nwe are soon to see what effect such a doctrine has upon the last two\nethical concepts we shall analyze, namely, duty and freedom.\n\nAs may have already been divined, a mechanistic ethics on its\nconstructive side does not maintain a pension list for the outworn\nconceptions of an earlier day. Consequently, in this place we\nshall not ask what used to be thought of the \u201cFreedom of the Will,\u201d\nnor shall we quote Wordsworth\u2019s \u201cOde to Duty\u201d as a prologue to our\ntheme. For while only a hundred years ago no ethical teacher could\nhave safely omitted giving great emphasis to the theological setting\nof these two concepts, today such a treatment would not arouse the\nslightest \u201cproblematic thrill.\u201d What used to be called \u201cthe Will\u201d is\nnow an obsolete expression;\u2014indeed, ever since Spinoza wrote, it has\nbeen regarded as a myth. In its stead, we speak of the individual or\nparticular volitions of men, and we discuss their value in reducing\nthe gap between our liquid matter and its good. Likewise, what was\nonce called the lump-sum of our Duty has now become separated and\nanalyzed into claims, interests, other-regarding sentiments, and the\nlike, each one of which has a history and a real meaning for our\nflesh-and-blood personality.\n\nAll such changes, while perhaps highly disconcerting to those persons\nwho feel that they cannot get along without their \u201cguiding fictions,\u201d\nare really signs of a salutary advance along ethical lines. Once it\nis realized that what is popularly termed \u201cwill-power\u201d is after all\nonly _skill-power_, and that \u201cmoral obligation\u201d should be translated\ninto _pragmatic urgency_, it will be plain that only clearly-prevised\naction-tendencies can properly be called either right or virtuous. It\nmay be true that many a successful action has been performed in the\nname of a fetichistic belief, but who will doubt that an even more\nprofitable action could have been motivated with less waste of the\nbody\u2019s energies, had there been correct insight and a frank facing\nof the facts. As long as people are afraid of life, so long are they\nbound to allege some false cause of their actions. Conversely, as\nsoon as they realize that they _are_ what they _do_, and whenever\nthey learn that their ethical books cannot be balanced by drawing on\na phantom bank account, they begin to pile up ethical assets, and to\nreduce their ethical liabilities.\n\nFrom our earlier remark that the science of ethics is primarily\nconcerned with what _is_ rather than what _ought to be_, it may\nbe difficult to imagine what place the concept of human freedom\ncan have in a mechanistic treatment of the problems of conduct.\nIt might seem easier to foreshadow what will be the fate of the\nconcept of obligation, especially when we realize that oughting is\nalways hypothetical, rather than categorical. For every obligation\nis specific and particular,\u2014it depends upon conditions, places,\ntimes, and persons, just as does every signification of good and\nbad, and right and wrong. There is no general Ought, as our recent\ndiscussion of Kant\u2019s categorical imperative clearly implied. When,\nthen, we ask from whom or from what obligation arises, what answer\ndoes a mechanistic ethics provide? Some may expect us to make the\ntraditional answer, namely, that it comes from the group, and that\nthe _feeling_ of obligation is a variation of the elemental type of\nconscience. This sort of an answer is not to be given here. Although\nthe group largely determines how we shall feel with regard to what\n_ought_ to be done, yet the final education of an ethically adult\nperson leaves him with a different mind on this point. Indeed, it\nis our purpose here not only to show that the concept of ethical\nfreedom is a valid concept for a mechanistic ethics, but also and\nmore particularly that a true conception of ethical obligation\ndepends upon the discovery of what ethical freedom implies. That this\ninvolves no paradox will be understood as soon as we comprehend what\nit means to say that a man is _free_. Herewith we shall state five\nconditions under which freedom of action is guaranteed.\n\nThe first meaning of free action is _action that is physically\npossible_. I am not now, I never was, and I never shall be free (that\nis, able) to walk backward and forward at the same time, or to be\nin Boston and New York simultaneously. Neither can I, while kissing\nJennie at her fireside, be also kissing Kate at her doorway a mile\nfrom Jennie\u2019s house. On the other hand, the man who is sound of limb,\nsensorially acute, and otherwise endowed with natural capacities, can\nbe said to be free to employ these capacities whenever and wherever\nthe conditions provide the opportunity.\n\nRight here we ask whether this first meaning of freedom does not\nhave an important bearing on the question of ethical obligation. Is\nit, indeed, not plain that just as we cannot do what is physically\nimpossible, so there is no valid obligation under these conditions?\nThis, however, is something which the intuitionists and the idealists\nhave persistently ignored, regarding it often as somehow the very\nacme of virtue to declare as an ideal of conduct something which\nis totally impossible of realization, and thereby fostering the\nneurotic temperament instead of ethical enlightenment. Yet it is\nplain that if, while being unable to do the impossible, I still am\npathologically anxious about it, I shall succeed only in accumulating\nimpatience and turmoil, and be forced to get what sour consolation\nI can from Schopenhauer, or else to \u201cgnaw the file\u201d in some other\nfashion. Moreover, according to a mechanistic ethics, I am an evil\nperson as long as I waste energy in this fashion, or in demanding\nconsolation for my erroneous sentiment. Not only am I bound to fail,\nand thereby to create discord rather than relieve it, but I am also\nlosing time and energy which might have gone into more profitable\npursuits. On the other hand, while we do not yet say that we are\nunder obligation to perform every physically possible action, yet\nevery valid urgency still lies in that direction.\n\nThe second meaning of the word \u201cfreedom\u201d is _absence of external\nrestraints_ imposed by physical obstacles or generated by human\nbeings. No man is free to act when external hindrances are too great\nfor him to overcome. Thus while it is possible for a sound man\nto walk either forward or backward, he cannot keep on walking in\na straight line if his path is intercepted by the sheer wall of a\nhundred-foot cliff, or if some one stronger than himself obstructs\nhis going. Excellent examples of such thwarting occur in the Greek\nmythology of Hades. Tantalus was forever hindered by the gusts of\nwind from plucking the fruit from the tree; Sisyphus could not force\nthe stone over the brow of the hill; and the daughters of Danaus\nlost all the water they carried in their sieves. They were not,\ntherefore, _free_ to perform these actions. They may, it is true,\nhave everlastingly _wished_ them, but they could not _will_ them.\n\nNevertheless, while many similar hindrances to human action exist,\nsuch as the friction-hindrance to perpetual motion, and the wall\nwhich kept Pyramus from Thisbe, yet, on the whole, most of the\nso-called external restraints are far less serious barriers to\nfreedom than we realize. This is not only attested by the magnificent\nconquests of nature recently made by applied science, but it might\nalso be deduced from the properties of man\u2019s protoplasm as modified\nin his muscular architecture. For protoplasm is liquid, and liquids\nflow; and man\u2019s stream of thought as a derivative of his liquid\nprotoplasm acquires its labile character as a sort of natural\nright. Just as a liquid under pressure transmits that pressure in\nall directions, so a man who is made of good protoplasm tends, when\nconfronted by such obstacles as we have just described, to think,\nand plan, and experiment, that is, TO FLOW, out of the difficulty.\nHis neuro-muscular equipment also singularly facilitates the turning\nof his wish into a will. Our muscles do not only contract and relax\nto produce lever movements in one plane, but they also combine\ntheir movements into pronation, supination, and rotation, and these\nsynergic actions enable us to explore the obstacle and almost\nliterally to flow around it. This is also the mechanism by which\nwe puzzle out any problem. The all-or-none principle makes mental\nanalysis always possible and often accurate. Applied to Pyramus,\nthis means that the wall that separates him from Thisbe stimulates\nhim with her aid so variously that he not only rebels and laments,\nbut also starts to explore its surface and its possibilities, with\nthe final result that he vaults it and descends \u201cuntil he can\ncome at Thisbe\u2019s lips more directly.\u201d There has always been an\nabundance of old saws to encourage the bold and the faint-hearted\nto regard obstacles as merely stepping-stones to future success,\nbut the physiological basis of such maxims we are only beginning to\ncomprehend. In fine, then, when we speak of a permanent obstacle to\nour actions, we mean it only in so far as we do not also imply some\nserious deficiency in the quality of our protoplasm.\n\nThe relation between this second type of freedom and obligation\nis very obviously hinted at by the popular maxims on the theme\nof perseverance. Moreover, it is historically demonstrable that\npragmatic urgency usually increases in direct ratio to the ease with\nwhich external restraints can be surmounted. On the other hand,\nit is gradually becoming recognized that \u201cthere are hundreds of\nthousands of human beings who can by no possibility ever do what is\nexpected of them by society. Society must give over expecting such\nthings.\u201d[22] Those who have no power to plan, scheme, or supervise,\nare consequently not educated enough to appreciate the obligations\nwhich such abilities involve.\n\nWe may now consider a third meaning of the concept \u201cfreedom.\u201d _It\nis exhibited in those actions which we have been so well trained\nto perform that they occur without any conscious effort whatever._\nAccordingly, the man with training and skill is more free than the\nman who lacks these abilities. If the oboist of a symphony orchestra\nis too sick to play, only another oboist is free to sit as a\nsubstitute at his desk. A plumber will not do. It will be perceived\nat once that many sorts of skill, even though they be the exclusive\npossession of one person, may yet be turned to the equal advantage\nof a great number of people, making them all co-sharers in his\nfreedom. By using the skill of the substitute oboist, for example,\nboth the managers and the patrons of the concert are free to carry\nout their wishes. The enormous social advantages of most forms of\nskilful technique require only a passing comment. Indeed, what we\ncall business and trade are ultimately the bargains we make for each\nother\u2019s skill. And here again the pragmatic urgency implicated by\nthis form of freedom is apparent, not only in the sharing of socially\nprofitable skill, but also in the acquisition of it.\n\nA fourth empirical characterization of freedom may now be considered.\nFor free actions, in addition to those which are physically\npossible, externally unhindered, and within the range of our skill,\nare especially _those which some mechanism of the body actually\ncarries out in the manner in which it was originally set to do\nit_. In popular speech this form of freedom is exemplified by such\nexpressions as, \u201cI was successful,\u201d \u201cI was determined to do it,\nand I did it,\u201d or, \u201cThe clerk tried to palm off a substitute, but\nI persevered in getting the original.\u201d Such freedom emphatically\nimplies a _continuity in behavior_ which is absent in cases where\nthe desire is thwarted or suppressed. The physiological processes\nwhich guarantee this form of freedom are interesting to contemplate.\nAs the wish passes over into will, not only are more and more muscle\nfibers involved in the action-scheme stimulated to their maximum\ncontraction, but also wider and wider synergies of muscular groups\nare brought into play, until all the available kinetic energy of the\nbody is released along the channel of one final common motor pathway.\nMoreover, each and every muscle involved in such an action-scheme\nstimulates, upon its contraction, a receptor nerve embedded within\nit, and these circular reflex stimulations automatically reinforce\nthe contractions already begun. This is nature\u2019s own contribution to\nthe unification of our personality in the performance of this type\nof free activity. The whole neuro-muscular architecture involved in\nsuch behavior becomes an automatic mechanism for reinforcing the\ncentrifugal bodily posture, and for providing against the wilting\nof any motor discharge in any single muscle due to its prolonged\ncontraction. Such actions, then, which involve the steady and\nuninhibited output of energy that we have described we call _free_.\nThey are equally manifested by the cat who springs upon and catches\nthe mouse she has been warily watching, and by the violoncello\nvirtuoso who scurries safely through the cadenza and arrives at the\n_tutti_ without having either produced a \u201cwolf tone\u201d or dropped his\nbow. It is such action which is connoted by the popular phrase \u201cfree\nwill.\u201d\n\nThe final touch to our delineation of freedom may be added by saying\nthat _only when a man\u2019s actions result in enlarging his environment,\nand in providing him with increasing opportunities for turning his\nwishes into wills, is he in the highest sense ethically free_. The\npreceding characterizations of the free man were derived from simply\nwatching him _in the midst_ of any of a thousand activities. This\nlast part of the picture is obtained by reckoning the permanent\nethical assets which his efforts have provided. These assets are,\nmoreover, defined in terms of a continuing freedom. For while we are\nall in a sense free to do anything within our ability, and for which\nthere is the time, the place, and the opportunity, yet only under\ncertain conditions can we follow such an action with another of our\nown choosing. The liar, the thief, and the slanderer know very well\nto what an extent their putative freedoms produce antagonists of\ntheir own making with whom they must ever thereafter wage a dismal\nconflict. On the other hand, the man of frankness and a truthful\ntongue, the man who makes fair bargains with the universe, and the\nman who can solve his problems without the loss of his own temper or\nthe respect of other persons, is ipso facto equipped with the ability\nto synergize his muscles repeatedly into freely willed activities.\nMoreover, while this fifth type of freedom is dependent upon the\npresence of the other four, its effect upon them is reflexively\nbeneficial, in making more actions physically possible, reducing the\nexternal hindrances to them, increasing the skill by which they are\nperformed, and insuring the continuity with which they are carried\nout. Indeed, we may now identify virtue with the attainment of\nthis last type of freedom, and vice with its loss or decline. Such\nactivity is also right, and its stimulus is a dependable good.\n\nIn thus defining the conditions under which human freedom exists, we\nhave, I surmise, also discovered the secret of ethical obligation,\nof pragmatic urgency. That is to say, whenever an action is possible,\nwhen it is not opposed by restraints beyond a man\u2019s power to\novercome, when he has the skill with which to perform it, and when he\ncan will it as well as wish it, and when also the performance of this\naction increases the range of his effectiveness, then, but not till\nthen, can it be said that he _ought_ to perform it. The expressions,\n\u201cI ought,\u201d or \u201cI should,\u201d henceforth mean: \u201cI imagine that there\nwould be greater freedom if this course of action which I contemplate\nwere to be carried out.\u201d Under this new conception of pragmatic\nurgency, oughting is neither a _vis a tergo_, nor a _vis a fronte_,\nnor yet Somebody\u2019s fiat superadded to the data of ethics, but it is\nsimply the logical resultant of the conditions of such human activity\nas produces dependable goods. We recognize no valid obligations\nimposed upon men from above; obligations are rather implicit in any\nactivity which employs a man\u2019s skill to satisfy his needs at the same\ntime that it educates his desires.\n\nIt is thus plain that there is no fundamental difference between\nethics and any other science. Just as the business of physical\nscience is to describe the conditions under which any phenomenon\noccurs, so the business of ethical science is to ascertain, by a\nstudy of the mechanisms of human behavior, the conditions which\nunderlie all of our ethical values. Wisely indeed did Protagoras\nremark that \u201cMan is the measure of all things,\u201d but it was not until\nmany centuries after this statement had been made that a positively\nconstructive interpretation, could be put upon it.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[22] George Clarke Cox, \u201cThe Public Conscience,\u201d p. 25.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE ACQUISITION OF AN ETHICAL TECHNIQUE\n\n  \u201cOne of the reasons why pantheistic revery has been so popular is\n  that it seems to offer a painless substitute for genuine spiritual\n  effort.... When pushed to a certain point the nature cult always\n  tends towards sham spirituality.\n\n      \u2018Oh world as God has made it\n           All is beauty,\n       And knowing this is love, and\n           Love is duty,\n    What further can be sought for or desired?\u2019\n\n  It seems to follow from these lines of Browning, perhaps the most\n  flaccid spiritually in the English language, that to go out and\n  mix oneself up with the landscape is the same as doing one\u2019s duty.\n  As a method of salvation this is even easier and more \u00e6sthetic\n  than that of the Ancient Mariner, who, it will be remembered, is\n  relieved of the burden of his transgression by admiring the color\n  of water-snakes!\u201d\n\n  IRVING BABBITT, \u201cRousseau and Romanticism.\u201d\n\n  \u201cObjection: Will not this end in ethical scepticism? Answer:\n  Nothing is further from scepticism than the conception of a reality\n  subject to laws, and of a rational action based on the knowledge of\n  those laws.\u201d\n\n  L. LEVY-BR\u00dcHL, \u201cEthics and Moral Science,\u201d\n  Table of Contents, p. xi.\n\n\n  \u201cIn the preceding pages we have no doubt often hurt\u2014but we have\n  hurt to heal. The good surgeon probes deeply in order that he may\n  not have the operation to perform again. Even a minute amount of\n  diseased tissues left behind can prevent the return of vigorous\n  and creative health. Thus what may seem to the anxious patient\n  unnecessary cruelty may be the greatest kindness. A sentimental\n  compromise is never welcomed by the mature judgment of the brave\n  man. And in this day when so many have willingly given their lives\n  for the sake of a human ideal, is it just and right to flinch\n  in the spiritual warfare which confronts our generation? We are\n  seeking nothing less than a renaissance in which men\u2019s energies\n  will be wisely and loyally directed to what is greatly human\n  and humanly great. In such a service we must will to be hard on\n  ourselves and on others.\u201d\n\n  ROY WOOD SELLARS, \u201cThe Next Step in Religion,\u201d p. 211.\n\n\nLittle did Descartes dream that his attempt to find truth by the\nmethod of candid doubting was a sign that human evolution had \u201cturned\na corner,\u201d or that the method he employed was to be the precursor\nof an ethical renaissance. Yet the introduction of this one form of\npsychological test as a philosophic instrument was an entering wedge\nof such power that where great darkness had been, much light was\nshed; and where the stolid inertia of many centuries had existed,\nmovement and life and enlightenment began to appear. But nature is\nslow, and always takes plenty of time to play its elaborate game;\nindeed, often nature seems to us to proceed by circuitous paths\nwhere we would make an open right of way. However, even though it\nwas several centuries after Descartes before the first psychological\nlaboratory was founded, the development of thought toward the\nrecognition and use of the psychological method was nevertheless\nsteadily proceeding. Today there is no word we are more wont to\nconjure with than the word _psychology_. And even if the foolish\nalways use it with derision, yet those who are wise know well to what\nan extent it is symbolical of a new era of human development, on the\nthreshold of which era we now confidently stand.\n\nWhat is this psychological method which has so silently become\nestablished, and what has it to do with the acquisition of an\nethical technique? It is the method of analysis, experiment, and\nconstructive scepticism, which treats all phenomena objectively, that\nis, by leaving out the personal equation, and by asking not how do\nwe preconceive that things _should_ appear, but only how _do_ they\nappear with our personal bias in abeyance.\n\nSuch a method, which, by the way, is the essence of psychological\nscience, is very difficult to achieve. Indeed, for many it is\nconstitutionally impossible. The history of physical science records\nhow great were the struggles of men to become objectively-minded even\ntoward their external environment, struggles which have only recently\nbecome successful. Witness the fact that for many centuries the\nalchemists sought for the philosopher\u2019s stone, a mineral which they\nfalsely preconceived to have the power of transmuting lead into gold;\nwitness the fact that the science of anatomy was for generations\ndenied its birth on account of pious prejudice and taboo; and witness\neven today that many physical objects are said to be _bewitched_\nwhen they fail to operate as expected, and that luck at cards is\nstill stoutly affirmed by otherwise estimable people. Indeed, there\nare thousands of farmers in the United States who appeal to the\nmethods of divination in planting their crops and shingling their\nhouses. Consequently, it is plain that if the power to become\nobjectively-minded toward the physical world is so rarely attained,\nit is even more difficult to become detached and un-self-conscious\ntoward the mental and social behavior of our fellow-men.\nNevertheless, this method of detachment, of looking at old things\nwith new eyes, is just what hundreds of teachers of psychology are\ntraining thousands of students every year to employ; and its salutary\neffects are being felt in every corner of the civilized world.\n\nTo some persons all this may come as a surprise, since the criticism\nhas already been publicly uttered that the study of psychology\ntends to make one incurably introspective. On these grounds alone\nthe self-styled hard-headed business man often hastily classifies\npsychology among the foibles of women and poets. This, however, is\nsimply another error due to hostile preconceptions. For even though\nsome psychologists have fallen into the practice of cultivating\nPsyche for her own sake, yet their method originated from distinctly\nother motives. Psychology, it is true, when cultivated by persons\nconstitutionally possessed of an introversive bias, may not always\neradicate that bias, any more than will the putting of an army rifle\ninto the hands of a timid man make him forthright into a model\ntop-sergeant.\n\nIn another strain, it is sometimes alleged that psychology is simply\na new head set upon the body of ancient Roman stoicism. But it\nmust be remembered that the detachment which the Stoics cultivated\nlacked all the elements of a scientific inquisitiveness. It was\nmarked chiefly by a sweet indifference and unconcern, traits which\nwere derived from the belief that Reason which ruled the world was\ninterested only in the headlines of universal news. The psychologist,\nfar from being indifferent to the most transient phenomena of\nhuman experience, regards them most steadfastly. Nevertheless, he\nendeavors to maintain an equality of interest in all human affairs,\nknowing full well that as soon as he takes sides, he loses his\nsense of the proportions of the whole. Unlike the Stoic, he admits\nthe reality and inevitableness of pain and anguish; yet while he\nstudies these phenomena, he keeps a sharp lookout lest his personal\nequation obtrude itself in the shape of sympathetic sorrows,\u2014these\nhe steadfastly refuses to add to his report of the objective facts.\nNevertheless, it is conceivable that had not the elements of\nstoic indifference been a basic capacity of human protoplasm, the\npsychological attitude might not have been evolved.\n\nCuriously enough, psychology has been both defended and attacked\non the basis of its supposed kinship with certain doctrines of\nJesus, as, for example, the Golden Rule. No psychologist is greatly\ninterested in any debate carried out on these lines. When Edwin\nHolt\u2019s \u201cThe Freudian Wish\u201d first appeared a few years ago, some\ncaustic reviewer accused its author of \u201chaving gotten religion in\nthe form of Freud.\u201d It is doubtful whether anyone, be he Christian\nor non-Christian, would regard such a remark either as a help or\na hindrance to the acceptance of psychology as a contribution to\nthe technique of ethics. As far as the Golden Rule is concerned,\nits relations to scientific method may be briefly indicated by\nsaying that while this maxim can be interpreted to imply a kind\nof other-regard which seems to possess the elements of scientific\ndetachment, yet other things must also be considered before final\njudgment is passed. For this hypothetical imperative,\u2014\u201c_Whatsoever ye\nwould_ that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them,\u201d\u2014is only\npossible of application among equals of intellect or of sentiment,\nand it can be used then only by a forehanded and judicious person,\none with discriminative sympathies, and able to mature his wishes\ninto wills. Psychology ventures to make no universal rules of\nconduct, especially since it must first take an inventory of human\nnature in order to find out what rules there are to which man will\ngive his uncoerced and unconscious loyalty.\n\nLet it not be assumed, however, that the psychologist urges an\nethical moratorium while he is pursuing his search into the secret\nplaces of human nature. The method of scientific detachment has\nitself provided such an insight into the problems of conduct as to\nmake any such assumption absurd. He who catches a glimpse of what\nit means to understand his fellow-men, rather than to regard them\nprimarily as creatures to be classified as either good or bad,\nvirtuous or vicious, begins to grow into an ethically adult person.\nHe at once loses that ancient, clandestine, stultifying tendency to\nobtrude his own bias into his social environment, and he no longer\nfinds his chief comfort in adoring those who are most like unto\nhimself, or in mentally lynching in advance those who rub his ego\nthe wrong way. Scientific neutrality hath also its victories. The\napplication of the psychological method to prison reform, where\nthe criminal is regarded as an effect as well as a cause of social\nmal-adjustments, has already been acknowledged as humanly great. Is\nit not possible that we see in such phenomena the passing of an age\nin which maxims were necessary, and the birth of an era where the\neducative methods of wise and kind men will take their places?\n\nThe further drift of this would be hard, indeed, to conceal. Ethics\nas a branch of psychology is inevitably bound up with the abolition\nof praise and blame, and of reward and punishment, as the chief\nthemes in the judgments we pass upon our fellow-men. The tendency to\nmake such bi-polar judgments usually implies a prejudice inherited\nfrom a pre-scientific age. With this change, of course, many of the\ntraditional moral categories will be replaced by the true categories\nof the understanding,\u2014categories derived from psychological insight\ninto the ethical potentialities of the natural man. Even now,\nhowever, such a replacement is in progress, the results of which are\nneither small nor unimportant.\n\nWe refer here to the wide-spread use of trait analyses, both in\nbusiness and in education, by which a man is estimated on the basis\nof his tendencies, capacities, and powers. His body is measured for\nits strength and resiliency, and where defects are discovered, a\nregimen leading to the re-education of his physique is prescribed.\nHis mental developments are tested, and the common attributes of\nthe human mind, such as sensory acuity, retention, discrimination,\nand the like, are estimated and recorded. The special talents he\npossesses are revealed by performance tests, and his hitherto\nundeveloped potentialities are induced to betray themselves. The\nemotions from which he either profits or suffers are discovered by\nmethods adroitly devised for the purpose. Likewise, the individual\u2019s\nsociability,\u2014whether it be merely gang-attachment, or a zest for\ncooperative endeavors,\u2014is made a matter of sympathetic study; while\nstill other bases upon which a man may be estimated are employed in\nthe attempt to help him find out just what manner of man he is.\n\nWhile it is admitted that physical and mental tests are often\nstupidly devised and bigotedly inflicted on the testee, yet it seems\nlikely that we have given here a method which can be employed to the\ngreatest advantage even in every-day ethics. For the psychological\nmethod, in that it teaches one first to become analytical and\ndiscriminative, replaces the old, unfounded prejudice that men are\nunequivocally either good or bad, virtuous or vicious, saints or\nsinners, by a desire to know just what can be done with and for them.\nAnd while the methods of psychology will probably always rank men on\na scale from low to high, and will always employ opposite poles in\nits judgments, yet in the multitude of such antonyms there is safety.\nScientific judgments are, by being unemotional, devoid both of that\nextreme congratulation and sharp censure which attach to purely\nmoral estimates, while the wide range of observation upon which they\nare made provides for the greatest number of human contacts and\nof educative measures possible. To extol a man is often not much\ndifferent in effect than to blame him, and both praise and blame can\nequally hinder his power to acquire an ethical technique. Men differ\ntoo variously to be fitted to any one Procrustean bed; the human mind\nhas infinitely more than two dimensions. Moreover, the moralist\u2019s\nuse of bi-polar judgments tends inevitably to separate men, rather\nthan to unite them, or to teach them to cooperate with one another.\nAnd when we consider that from now on, at least, the predicaments of\nthis planet will be common liabilities of the whole human race, the\npragmatic urgency to employ the methods of psychology in attaining\nsocial harmony are undisguisedly patent.\n\nThe benefits derived from employing the psychological method in\nethics are, however, by no means exclusively social. The use of this\nmethod reacts directly upon the user in several significant ways.\nIn the first place, the man who employs even as few as twenty-five\nof the newer categories in making a trait analysis of his fellows,\nsoon becomes aware of the fact that his former analysis of himself\nis in need of revision. Exaggerated self-preference is thus broken\ndown, and replaced, not by its opposite,\u2014self-abasement,\u2014but by an\nestimate which arises from comparisons and contrasts resulting from\nthe use of an objective standard. Again, the user of this method\nlearns that human behavior is not the product of some mysterious\nmental element called \u201ccharacter,\u201d but that character itself is the\nproduct of traits, and, furthermore, that every trait has had a\ndevelopmental history, which is at every point a record of the effect\nof environmental stimulus upon original nature. His own character\nthereafter becomes subject to scientific scrutiny, and he realizes,\nfor example, that his previous emotional repugnances were not always\nsigns of incorruptibility, but very frequently, indeed, signs of the\nextent to which his own desires had been prevented from reaching\ntheir maturity. And, only to mention one more of the many benefits\nof such new scientific insight, the use of this method reveals that\ntimes out of number purely moral judgments are employed to quench,\nrather than to quicken thought, and are uttered not so much to\nindicate that discriminative sympathies are being acquired, as to\nshow that they have long since ceased to germinate. Henceforth the\nemployment of the psychological method goes hand in hand with the\nurgency to prevent as many young minds as possible from suffering on\naccount of a retarded development.\n\nSuch a change of emphasis from traditional morals to scientific\nmethods implies unequivocally that the problems of ethics are\nhenceforth to be solved by experts. Already the recognition of the\nneed of such a change is evident in the reliance that is being placed\nupon psychiatrists and other medical men to assist in the cure of\nthose who are maladjusted to their environment. Health-clinics\nlikewise are being both promoted and attended by those who realize\nthat the virtues go as deep as the viscera, and that often such\nthings as ignorance of the shape of one\u2019s stomach have been the\nsource of many a lapse from normality. This reliance upon trained\nexperts is, moreover, a sign of still further changes in our\noccidental philosophy of life. It means that we are acquiring the\nconviction that constructive criticism is better than ritual, and\nanalysis more efficacious than prayer. For we have begun to see\nthat progress must come by honest, painstaking efforts in the here\nand now, rather than by presuming upon the perfection of a universe\nwhich we have only begun to understand. It is indeed the well-born\nsentiment of many thousands of people today that science wisely\nemployed for the benefit and use of men is the only true word of God.\n\nHerewith, also, the question of what sort of ideals an applied\nmechanistic psychology of conduct provides may have an answer. On\nthis point we need not be dumb, nor can we make a \u201csentimental\ncompromise.\u201d When the mechanist asserts that we _are_ what we\n_do_, he does not thereby denounce ideals; on the contrary, he\nthus only affirms his purpose to take the whole question of ideals\nseriously, more seriously, in fact, than it was ever taken before.\nHerein also he declares for the Ethics of Hercules rather than the\n\u201cEthics of Cinderella.\u201d For while he must admit that there is,\naccordingly, no class of people who can be truthfully said to be\n\u201cthe pure in heart,\u201d\u2014owing to the fatigue of attention incident to\nall other-worldly contemplation,\u2014yet he also asserts that the man\nwho knows his capacities and powers as the result of an objective\nanalysis, is by that means equipped to advance to more inclusive\nlevels of conduct than he who merely cultivates an inner life of\nprivate mystery. The mechanist would therefore let new standards\ngrow out of the development of natural human capacities, out of the\nstruggle to educate men so that their desires and abilities mature\nsimultaneously, and out of the freedom which can thus be achieved by\nthose able to achieve it.\n\n\u201cGreat love comes from great knowledge,\u201d said Leonardo da Vinci, and\nthe advance of science today in all its branches corroborates this\nassertion. Although at the present hour it does not seem clear just\nwhat the universe is doing, yet they who recognize even in seemingly\ndisastrous tumults the struggles of man to enlarge his power to\nthink, will see that even if nature\u2019s way appears to be circuitous\nand even at times crude, it is nevertheless nature\u2019s inevitable way.\nMuch lamentation is heard today over the changes which evolution has\nbrought to this planet, and the outcry is even raised that science\nhas taken away our souls. Is it necessary to reply that a faith\nin stagnation is clearly out of joint with the creative functions\nof time, or that the loss of an ancient belief may be the sign of\na truly ethical advance? Indeed, we can well be assured that the\ntype of soul which is composed of self-stifled desires, of restless\nsentiments due to an ignoble retreat from reality, of the fear of\nultimate annihilation, not only _will_ die, but it also _ought_ to\ndie. There is another and a better kind of soul,\u2014the one created out\nof sagacity, skill, and kindness, which generates power, wisdom, and\npeace,\u2014and this type of soul, as long as the sun remains hot, and the\nearth\u2019s crust keeps flowering into men, will have its immortality\nguaranteed. This is the mechanist\u2019s religion,\u2014a consequence of,\nrather than an apology for, his ethics. For religion, though it be\na word made base by those who claim to have an endless copyright\non truth, and a retroactive monopoly on the deeper human emotions,\nmeans to a mechanist something more closely allied to its original\nsignification. It means a reliance on that much of nature, and a\nsupport from that much of humanity, as contributes to the development\nof a man\u2019s talents, to the freedom of his actions, and to his peace\nof mind. The new labors of Hercules will consist in making this true\nfor the whole human race.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  Abstract terms, 24\n\n  Action-pattern, 20\n\n  Adler, A., 171\n\n  Adrian, E. D., 27\n\n  Andreas Hofer, 132\n\n  All-or-none principle, 27-30, 109\n\n  Aristotle, 8, 15\n\n\n  Babbitt, Irving, 189\n\n  Bayliss, W. M. 27, n; 32-n.\n\n  Buddhism, 139\n\n  Butler, Joseph, 157-8\n\n\n  Charcot, J. M., 33\n\n  Circular reflex, 89, 185\n\n  Clarke, Samuel, 158-9\n\n  Composition, fallacy of, 98\n\n  Conditioned reflex, 26, 54, 89\n\n  Couterat, L., 90\n\n  Cox, C. G., 8\n\n  Crile, G. W., 20\n\n\n  Davis, W. M., 8\n\n  Democritus, 12\n\n  Descartes, 36, 190\n\n  Dewey, I., 8, 16, 17, 21, 170-171\n\n  Diogenes, 121\n\n  Dynamogenesis, law of, 33\n\n\n  Emerson, 13, 72\n\n  Empedocles, 13, 59\n\n  Everett, W. G., 175\n\n\n  Golden Rule, 194\n\n\n  Harvey, William, 15\n\n  Helvetius, 164\n\n  Hobbes, 8, 157\n\n  Holt, E. B., 8, 16, 20, 31, 127, 170\n\n  Homer, 19\n\n  Hypostatization, fallacy of, 163\n\n\n  Initial predication, fallacy of, 6\n\n\n  James, W., 13, 51, 75\n\n  Jesus, 29, 72, 136\n\n\n  Language, functions of, 17-18\n\n  Law, \u201cmoral,\u201d 68, 162\n\n  Legal rights, 84-94\n\n  Leonardo da Vinci, 8, 201\n\n  Levy-Br\u00fchl, L., 8, 162, 189\n\n  Locke, J., 164-5\n\n  Lucas, Keith, 27\n\n\n  Mahommedanism, 139\n\n  Meaning, 21-24\n\n  Meyer, Max, 104\n\n  Mill, J. S., 8, 165\n\n  Milton, 59\n\n  Morality not the same as ethics, 73\n\n  \u201cMoral\u201d rights, 94-100\n\n  \u201cMotor set,\u201d 20\n\n  Murray, James, 156\n\n\n  Outgoing reaction, 56\n\n\n  Paulsen, F., 137\n\n  Perry, R. B., 6, n; 175\n\n  Plato, 121, 130\n\n  Prince, Morton, 140\n\n  Protagoras, 187\n\n\n  Reciprocal innervation, law of, 32-35, 59\n\n  Regulus, 132\n\n  Reid, T., 162-3\n\n  Richet, C., 33\n\n\n  \u201cSecret of Life,\u201d 5\n\n  Sellars, R. W., 8, 58, 190\n\n  Shaftesbury, 158\n\n  Socrates, 7-8, 72, 132\n\n  \u201cSpecific response,\u201d 20\n\n  Spencer, H., 8\n\n  Spinoza, 8, 99\n\n  Starling, E. H., 28, n; 32, n.\n\n  Stoics, 193\n\n  \u201cStream of thought,\u201d 14\n\n\n  Thigmotaxis, 131\n\n  Titchener, E. B., 20\n\n\n  Vitalist, 5-7\n\n  Vague, meaning of, 26\n\n\n  Withdrawing reaction, 66\n\n\n  Zoroaster, 13, 58-9\n\n\n\n\n_A PARTIAL LIST OF BORZOI TEXTS_\n\n\nEARLY CIVILIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY\n\n  _By Alexander A. Goldenweiser, Lecturer on Anthropology and\n  Sociology at the New School for Social Research, New York_\n\nLarge 8vo, Cloth, XXIV 424 pages\n\nWhile offering an elementary text for the beginner in anthropology,\nthis volume is mainly designed as a source book of information and\nsuggestion for students of sociology who may wish to amplify their\nfamiliarity with modern social phenomena by an inquiry into the\nnature of early civilization and the workings of the primitive mind.\n\n\nSECRET HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT\n\n_By Wilfrid Scawen Blunt_\n\nLarge 8vo, Cloth, 450 pages\n\nThis book makes clear the varying motives\u2014imperialistic, economic,\nand personal\u2014which brought about the English occupation of Egypt.\nBased on personal records and contemporary documents, its statements\nand conclusions have a profound interest and importance for students\nof history in general and of English history in particular.\n\n\nTHE GERMAN CONSTITUTION\n\n  _By Ren\u00e9 Brunet, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University\n  of Caen (translated from the French by Joseph Gollomb, with an\n  Introduction by Charles A. Beard)_\n\n8vo, Cloth, XIV 339 pages\n\nThis is a critical discussion of the new German Constitution, the\nactual text of which is included, in English, as an appendix.\nIt gives a lucid and unbiased account of the German Revolution,\ndescribes the conflict of forces which ended in the establishment of\nthe Republic, and concludes with a systematic analysis of the new\nplan of government.\n\n\nTHE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE\n\n  _By James Mickel Williams, Professor of Economics and Sociology in\n  Hobart College_\n\nLarge 8vo, Cloth, XVI 494 pages\n\nA comparative study of the psychological aspects of the social\nsciences. It treats of the relation of social psychology to political\nscience, jurisprudence, economics, history and sociology, analyzing\nthe psychological assumptions underlying the behavior of men living\nin social relations.\n\n\nPRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY\n\n  _By James Mickel Williams, Professor of Economics and Sociology in\n  Hobart College_\n\nLarge 8vo Cloth, XII 459 pages\n\nThis book represents the first attempt that has been made to explain\nsociety concretely in psychological terms. It describes the essential\nprocesses that extend thruout the social organization, analyzing the\nconflict of the different types of behavior in all human relations.\n\n\nTHE HISTORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n  _By Franz Carl M\u00fcller-Lyer (translated from the German by E. C. and\n  H. W. Lake, with Introductions by L. T. Hobhouse and E. J. Urwick)_\n\n8vo, Cloth, 362 pages\n\nThis volume is mainly designed as a text for beginners in social\nstudies. It surveys broadly the various phases of man\u2019s origin and\nprogress, co-ordinating the general facts of social evolution from\nthe earliest times and indicating the probable trend of future\ndevelopments.\n\n\nHUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS\n\n  _By Graham Wallas, Professor of Political Science in London\n  University_\n\n8vo, Cloth, 320 pages\n\nThis is a slightly revised edition, with a new Preface, of Professor\nWallas\u2019 famous work first published in England, in 1908, and for some\ntime out of print. It offers a clear and forceful analysis of the\npsychological processes which underlie political thought and action,\nlaying special emphasis upon the application of social psychology to\npolitics.\n\n\nHOW ENGLAND IS GOVERNED\n\n  _By Rt. Hon. C. F. G. Masterman_\n\n8vo, Cloth, XVI 293 pages\n\nAn introductory study of the working of the British Constitution,\nwritten from the standpoint of one who has had actual experience\nof the working of the political machinery of England. Students of\npolitics and government will find in this volume a most interesting\nand valuable source of information.\n\n\nFACING OLD AGE\n\n  _By Abraham Epstein, Formerly Director of the Pennsylvania\n  Commission to Investigate Old Age Pensions_\n\n8vo, Cloth, XVI 352 pages\n\nThis book offers a scientific examination of the social and economic\nproblems presented by the aged. Frankly a plea for social action, it\npresents in a most thoro and lucid manner the latest available data\nbearing upon this interesting and important question.\n\n12mo, Cloth, 280 pages\n\n\nOUR WAR WITH GERMANY\n\n  _By John Spencer Bassett, Professor of American History in Smith\n  College_\n\nLarge 8vo, Cloth, 398 pages\n\nThis is a compact but complete account of the part played by the\nUnited States in the World War. It is in no sense a mere record of\nmilitary events, but an analytical account of the political, economic\nand military events that marked the period of the war.\n\n\nCONSUMERS\u2019 COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES\n\n  _By Charles Gide, Professor of Economics at the University of Paris\n  (translation from the French, edited by Cedric Long)_\n\n8vo, Cloth, 300 pages\n\nThis translation of Professor Gide\u2019s famous work is intended to meet\nthe needs of American students of Distributive Co-operation. The\nfirst three chapters are devoted to an elucidation of the meaning and\nhistory of the co-operative movement, while the bulk of the volume\ndeals with the practical problems of organization, administration and\ndevelopment of consumers\u2019 societies themselves.\n\n\nTHE ETHICS OF HERCULES\n\n  _By Robert Chenault Givler_\n\n12mo, Cloth 210 pages\n\nA strictly behavioristic treatment of ethical values. Not only is\nhuman conduct the result of external and internal stimuli upon the\nhuman body, but even our notions of right and wrong are derived from\nthe reactions of our nerves and muscles to the various stimuli which\nexcite them.\n\n\nTHE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM\n\n  _By Nelson Antrim Crawford_\n\n8vo, Cloth 270 pages\n\nA clear-cut, objective exposition and analysis of contemporary\njournalistic practice with reference to advertising, news, and\neditorial, carefully documented. Here is a pioneer book on a subject\nwhich is attracting keen attention especially among practicing and\nprospective journalists.\n\n\nTHE BASIS OF SOCIAL THEORY\n\n  _By Adam G. A. Balz, with the collaboration of William S. A. Pott_\n\n12mo, Cloth 253 pages\n\nThe writers of this book take the position that a science of Human\nNature is requisite for the progress of all the social sciences, that\nSocial Psychology is failing to accomplish its fundamental purpose of\nclarifying the uncertainties and ambiguities concerning the nature of\nsocial facts and causes.\n\n\nTHE TREND OF ECONOMICS\n\n  _By Various Writers (edited by Rexford G. Tugwell)_\n\n8vo, Cloth 550 pages\n\nA series of monographs contributed by thirteen outstanding American\neconomists of the younger generation designed to set forth the\npresent tendencies of economic thought and inquiry in the light of\ntheir historical development.\n\n\n\n\n  Transcriber\u2019s Notes\n\n  pg 30 Changed: if the word have a meaning\n             to: if the word has a meaning\n\n  pg 52 Changed: Class B is always life-enchancing\n             to: Class B is always life-enhancing\n\n  pg 149 Changed: adopted them in a semi-parodoxical\n              to: adopted them in a semi-paradoxical","title":"The ethics of Hercules : $b A study of man's body as the sole determinant of ethical values","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":50321}