{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_71885/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_71885","id":"gutenberg_71885","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/71885","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Metaphysics"],"text":"------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nItalics are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character as _italic_. Superscripted\ncharacters are prefix with \u2018^\u2019.\n\nFootnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are\nreferenced.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n _Elements of Metaphysics_\n\n ========\n\n A. E. TAYLOR\n\n _Late Professor of Moral Philosophy\n in the University of Edinburgh_\n\n \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f74 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f24\u03bb\u03b8\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n UNIVERSITY PAPERBACKS\n\n ------------------------------------\n\n METHUEN : LONDON\n\n\n\n\n First published by Methuen & Co Ltd in 1903\n Printed in Great Britain by\n Morrison & Gibb Ltd, Edinburgh\n Catalogue No 2/6775/27\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n _University Paperbacks are published\n by_ METHUEN & CO LTD\n _36 Essex Street, Strand, London WC2\n and_ BARNES & NOBLE INC\n _105 Fifth Avenue, New York 3_\n\n\n\n\n TO\n F. H. BRADLEY\n\n _In heartfelt acknowledgment of all that\n his example and his writings have been\n to the men of my generation_\n\n Ante Ararim Parthus bibet, aut Germania Tigrim,\n Quam nostro illius labatur pectore vultus.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n ELEMENTS\n OF METAPHYSICS\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE\n\n\nIn acknowledging my indebtedness to recent writers for many of the ideas\ncontained in the following pages, I have in the first place to express\nmy deep and constant obligations to the various works of Mr. F. H.\nBradley. My chief debt to other recent English-speaking philosophers is\nto Professor Royce and Professor Ward, and I am perhaps scarcely less\nindebted to Professor Stout. My chief obligations to Continental writers\nare to Avenarius and to Professor M\u00fcnsterberg. I trust, however, that\nthere is not one of the authors with whose views I have dealt in the\ncourse of my work from whom I have not learned something. At the same\ntime I ought perhaps to say here once for all that I make no claim to\nrepresent the views of any one author or school, and I shall not be\nsurprised if the thinkers to whom I owe most find themselves unable to\nendorse all that I have written.\n\nWith respect to the references given at the end of the several chapters,\nI may note that their aim is simply to afford the reader some\npreliminary guidance in the further prosecution of his studies. They\nmake no pretence to completeness, and are by no means exclusively drawn\nfrom writers who support my own conclusions.\n\nOne or two important works of which I should have otherwise been glad to\nmake extended use have appeared too recently for me to avail myself of\nthem. I may mention especially the late Professor Adamson\u2019s _Lectures on\nthe Development of Modern Philosophy_, Professor Ostwald\u2019s _Vorlesungen\n\u00fcber Naturphilosophie_, and Mr. B. Russell\u2019s _Principles of\nMathematics_, vol. 1.\n\nFinally, I have to express my gratitude to my friends Professor S.\nAlexander and Mr. P. J. Hartog for their kindness in reading large\nportions of my proofs and offering many valuable corrections and\nsuggestions.\n\n 1903\n\n --------------\n\nThe sudden demand for a re-issue of this volume prevents my making any\nalterations beyond the correction of a number of misprints. Had the\nopportunity offered, I should have been glad, while leaving the main\nargument essentially as it stands, to have attempted certain\nimprovements in details. I may mention in particular, as the most\nimportant of the changes I could have wished to make, that the treatment\nof the problem of infinite regress and of the Kantian antinomies would\nhave been remodelled, and I trust improved, as a consequence of study of\nthe works of Mr. Bertrand Russell and M. Couturat.\n\nI should like to take this opportunity of thanking all those who have\nbeen kind enough to favour me with criticisms of the book.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS\n\n BOOK I\n\n GENERAL NOTIONS\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n THE PROBLEM OF THE METAPHYSICIAN\n\n PAGE\n\n #\u00a71. The generality and simplicity of the metaphysical\n problem make it difficult to define the study. \u00a72.\n Problem is suggested by the presence of contradictions\n in ordinary experience. \u00a73.. By making a distinction\n between reality and appearance the sciences remove some\n of these contradictions, but themselves lead to further\n difficulties of the same sort; hence the need for\n systematic inquiry into the meaning of the distinction\n between the real and the apparent, and the general\n character of reality as such. \u00a74.. Metaphysics, as an\n inquiry into the ultimate meaning of \u201creality,\u201d is akin\n to poetry and religion, but differs from them in its\n scientific character, from the mathematical and\n experimental sciences in its method, from common\n scepticism in the critical nature of its methods as well\n as in its positive purpose. \u00a75.. The study is difficult\n (_a_) because of the generality of its problems, (_b_)\n and because we cannot employ diagrams or physical\n experiments. \u00a76.. The objection that Metaphysics is an\n impossibility may be shown in all its forms to rest upon\n self-contradictory assumptions of a metaphysical kind.\n \u00a77.. The minor objections that, if possible, the science\n is superfluous, or at least stationary, may be met with\n equal ease. \u00a78. Metaphysics is partly akin to the\n mystical tendency, but differs from mysticism in virtue\n of its positive interest in the world of appearances, as\n well as by its scientific method. \u00a79.. It agrees with\n logic in the generality of its scope, but differs in\n being concerned with the real, whereas logic is\n primarily concerned with the inferrible. \u00a710. The\n problems of the so-called _Theory of Knowledge_ are\n really metaphysical. 1\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION AND THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD\n\n\n \u00a7 1. In the principle that \u201cReality is not\n self-contradictory\u201d we have a universal and certain\n criterion of reality which is not merely negative, but\n implies the positive assertion that reality is a\n consistent system. \u00a7 2. The validity of this criterion\n is not affected by the suggestion that it may be merely\n a _Logical_ Law; \u00a7 3. Nor by the raising of doubt\n whether all our knowledge is not merely \u201crelative,\u201d a\n doubt which is itself meaningless. \u00a7 4. As to the\n material of the system, it is experience or immediate\n psychical fact. \u00a7 5. It must be actual experience, not\n mere \u201cpossibilities\u201d of experience; but actual\n experience must not be identified with \u201csensation.\u201d \u00a7 6.\n Nor must we assume that experience consists of subjects\n _and_ their states; nor again, that it is a mere\n succession of \u201cstates of consciousness.\u201d \u00a7 7. The\n _differentia_ of matter of experience is its\n _immediacy_, _i.e._ its combination in a single whole of\n the two aspects of _existence_ and _content_. \u00a78. This\n union of existence and content is broken up in\n reflective knowledge or thought, but may be restored at\n a higher level. \u00a7 9. Experience further always appears\n to be implicitly complex in respect of its content. \u00a7\n 10. An adequate apprehension of reality would only be\n possible in the form of a complete or \u201cpure\u201d experience,\n at once all-inclusive, systematic, and direct. The\n problem of Metaphysics is to ascertain what would be the\n general or formal character of such an experience, and\n how far the various provinces of our human experience\n and knowledge approximate to it. The knowledge\n Metaphysics can give us of the ultimate nature of\n reality as it would be present in a complete experience,\n though imperfect, is final as far as it goes. \u00a7 11. As\n to the method of Metaphysics, it must be _analytical_,\n _critical_, _non-empirical_, and _non-inductive_. It may\n also be called _a priori_ if we carefully avoid\n confusing the _a priori_ with the psychologically\n primitive. Why our method cannot be the Hegelian\n Dialectic 18\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF METAPHYSICS\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The traditional sub-division of Metaphysics into\n _Ontology_, _Cosmology_, _Rational Psychology_, common\n to all the great modern constructive systems. \u00a7 2.\n Precise sense in which we adopt these divisions for the\n purposes of our own treatment of the subject. \u00a7 3.\n Relation of _Cosmology_ and _Rational Psychology_ to the\n empirical sciences 42\n\n\n BOOK II\n\n ONTOLOGY\u2014THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF REALITY\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n REALITY AND EXPERIENCE\n\n\n \u00a7 1. In a sense \u201creality\u201d for each of us means that of which\n he must take account if his special purposes are to find\n fulfilment. \u00a7 2. But ultimately the world must possess a\n structure of which _all_ purposes, each in its own way,\n must take account. This is the \u201cUltimate Reality\u201d or\n \u201cAbsolute\u201d of Metaphysics. In Metaphysics we regard it\n from the special standpoint of the scientific intellect.\n There are other legitimate attitudes towards it, _e.g._,\n that of practical religion. \u00a7 3. The inseparability of\n reality from immediate experience involves the\n recognition of it as teleological and as uniquely\n individual. \u00a7 4. The experience within which all reality\n falls cannot be my own, nor yet the \u201ccollective\u201d\n experience of the aggregate of conscious beings. It must\n be an individual experience which apprehends the\n totality of existence as the harmonious embodiment of a\n single \u201cpurpose.\u201d The nearest analogue our own life\n presents to such a type of experience is to be found in\n the satisfied insight of personal love. \u00a7 5. The\n experience of such an \u201cAbsolute\u201d must not be thought of\n as a mere reduplication of our own, or of the scientific\n hypotheses by which we co-ordinate facts for the\n purposes of inference. \u00a7 6. Our conception is closely\n connected with that of Berkeley, from which it differs\n by the stress it lays on the purposive and selective\n aspect of experience. \u00a7 7. Realism, both of the Agnostic\n and of the Dogmatic type, is incompatible with the\n meaning we have been led to attach to \u201creality.\u201d But\n Agnosticism is justified in insisting on the limitations\n of our knowledge of Reality, and Dogmatic Realism in\n rejecting the identification of Reality with experience\n as a merely cognitive function of finite percipients. \u00a7\n 8. Subjectivism, according to which all that I know is\n states of my own \u201cconsciousness,\u201d is irreconcilable with\n the admitted facts of life, and arises from the\n psychological fallacy of \u201cintrojection\u201d 50\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE SYSTEMATIC UNITY OF REALITY\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The problem whether Reality is ultimately One or Many is\n inevitably suggested to us by the diverse aspects of our\n own direct experience of the world. The different\n theories may be classed, according to their solution of\n this problem, as Monistic, Pluralistic, and Monadistic.\n \u00a72. Pluralism starts from the presumed fact of the\n mutual independence of human selves, and teaches that\n this independence of each other belongs to all real\n beings. But (_a_) the independence with which experience\n presents us is never complete, nor the unity of the\n \u201cselves\u201d perfect. (_b_) The theory is inconsistent with\n the systematic character of all reality as presupposed\n in both knowledge and action. \u00a7 3. Monadism again makes\n the systematic unity of the real either an illusion or\n an inexplicable accident. \u00a7 4. Reality, because\n systematic, must be the expression of a single principle\n in and through a multiplicity. The unity and\n multiplicity must both be real, and each must\n necessarily involve the other. \u00a7 5. If both are to be\n equally real, the whole system must be a single\n experience, and its constituents must also be\n experiences. A perfect systematic whole can be neither\n an aggregate, nor a mechanical whole of parts, nor an\n organism. The whole must exist for the parts, and they\n for it. \u00a7 6. This may also be expressed by saying that\n Reality is a subject which is the unity of subordinate\n subjects, or an individual of which the constituents are\n lesser individuals. \u00a7 7. The nearest familiar analogue\n to such a systematic whole would be the relation between\n our whole \u201cself\u201d and the partial mental systems or\n lesser \u201cselves.\u201d \u00a7 8. The nearest historic parallel to\n this view is to be found in Spinoza\u2019s theory of the\n relation of the human mind to the \u201cinfinite intellect of\n God\u201d 84\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n REALITY AND ITS APPEARANCES\u2014THE DEGREES OF REALITY\n\n\n \u00a7 1. Reality being a single systematic whole, the nature of\n its constituent elements is only finally intelligible in\n the light of the whole system. Hence each of its\n \u201cappearances,\u201d if considered as a whole in itself, must\n be more or less contradictory. \u00a7 2. But some\n \u201cappearances\u201d exhibit the structure of the whole more\n adequately than others, and have therefore a higher\n degree of reality. \u00a7 3. This conception of degree of\n reality may be illustrated by comparison with the\n successive orders of infinites and infinitesimals in\n Mathematics. It would be the task of a complete\n Philosophy to assign the contents of the world to their\n proper place in the series of \u201corders\u201d of reality. \u00a7 4.\n In general any subordinate whole is real in proportion\n as it is a self-contained whole. And it is a\n self-contained whole in proportion as it is (_a_)\n comprehensive, (_b_) systematic; that is, a thing is\n real just so far as it is truly individual. \u00a7 5. The two\n criteria of individuality, though ultimately coincident,\n tend in particular cases to fall apart for our insight,\n owing to the limitation of human knowledge. \u00a7 6.\n Ultimately only the whole system of experience is\n completely individual, all other individuality is\n approximate. \u00a7 7. In other words, the whole system of\n experience is an infinite individual, all subordinate\n individuality is finite. Comparison of t\u201chis position\n with the doctrines of Leibnitz. \u00a7 8. Recapitulatory\n statement of the relation of Reality to its Appearances 104\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE WORLD OF THINGS\u2014(1) SUBSTANCE, QUALITY, AND RELATION\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The natural or pre-scientific view of the world regards\n it as a plurality of \u201cthings,\u201d each possessing\n _qualities_, standing in _relation_ to others, and\n interacting with them. \u00a7 2. Hence arise four problems:\n those of the Unity of the Thing, of Substance and\n Quality, of Relation, of Causality. \u00a7 3. No simple\n answer can be given to the question, _What is one\n thing?_ The Unity of the Thing is one of teleological\n structure, and this is a matter of degree, and also\n largely of our own subjective point of view. \u00a7 4.\n _Substance and Quality._ The identification of the\n substance of things with their primary qualities, though\n useful in physical science, is metaphysically\n unjustifiable. \u00a7 5. Substance as an \u201cunknowable\n substratum of qualities\u201d adds nothing to our\n understanding of their connection. \u00a7 6. The thing cannot\n be a mere collection of qualities without internal\n unity. \u00a7 7. The conception of a thing as the law or mode\n of relation of its states useful but metaphysically\n unsatisfactory. Ultimately the many can be contained in\n the one only by \u201crepresentation\u201d; the unity in things\n must be that of an individual experience. \u00a7 8.\n _Relation._ We can neither reduce qualities to relations\n nor relations to qualities. \u00a7 9. Again, the attempt to\n conceive Reality as qualities in relation leads to the\n indefinite regress. \u00a710. We cannot escape this\n difficulty by taking all relations as \u201cexternal.\u201d And\n Professor Royce\u2019s vindication of the indefinite regress\n seems to depend on the uncriticised application of the\n inadequate category of whole and part to ultimate\n Reality. The union of the one and the many in concrete\n experience is ultra-relational. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: Dr.\n Stout\u2019s reply to Mr. Bradley 120\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n THE WORLD OF THINGS\u2014(2) CHANGE AND CAUSALITY\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The conception of things as interacting leads to the two\n problems of Change and Causality. The paradoxical\n character of change due to the fact that only what is\n permanent can change. \u00a7 2. Change is succession within\n an identity; this identity, like that of Substance, must\n be teleological, _i.e._ must be an identity of plan or\n end pervading the process of change. \u00a7 3. Thus all\n change falls under the logical category of Ground and\n Consequence, which becomes in its application to\n succession in time the Principle of Sufficient Reason. \u00a7\n 4. _Causality._ Cause\u2014in the modern popular and\n scientific sense\u2014means the ground of a change when taken\n to be completely contained in preceding changes. That\n every change has its complete ground in preceding\n changes is neither an axiom nor an empirically\n ascertained truth, but a postulate suggested by our\n practical needs. \u00a7 5. In the last resort the postulate\n cannot be true; the dependence between events cannot be\n one-sided. The real justification for our use of the\n postulate is its practical success. \u00a7 6. Origin of the\n conception of Cause anthropomorphic. \u00a7 7. Puzzles about\n Causation. (1) _Continuity_. Causation must be\n continuous, and yet in a continuous process there can be\n no distinction of cause from effect. Cause must be and\n yet cannot be _prior_ in time to effect. \u00a7 8. (2) _The\n indefinite regress_ in causation. \u00a7 9. (3) _Plurality of\n Causes_. Plurality of Causes is ultimately a logical\n contradiction, but in any form in which the causal\n postulate is of practical use it must recognise\n plurality. \u00a7 10. The \u201cnecessity\u201d of the causal relation\n psychological and subjective. \u00a7 11. Immanent and\n Transeunt Causality: Consistent Pluralism must deny\n transeunt Causation; but cannot do so successfully. \u00a7\n 12. Both transeunt and immanent Causality are ultimately\n appearance 158\n\n\n BOOK III\n\n COSMOLOGY\u2014THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n INTRODUCTORY\n\n\n \u00a7 1. Distinction between the experimental sciences and a\n Philosophy of Nature and Mind. The former concerned with\n the description, the latter with the interpretation of\n facts. \u00a7 2. Cosmology is the critical examination of the\n special characteristics of the physical order. Its main\n problems are: (1) The problem of the nature of Material\n Existence; (2) problem of the justification of the\n concept of the Mechanical Uniformity of Nature; (3)\n problems of Space and Time; (4) problem of the\n Significance of Evolution; (5) problem of the Place of\n descriptive Physical Science in the system of Human\n Knowledge 191\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE PROBLEM OF MATTER\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The physical order, because dependent for its perceived\n qualities on the sense-organs of the percipient, must be\n the appearance of a more ultimate reality which is\n non-physical. \u00a7 2. Berkeley\u2019s criticism is fatal to the\n identification of this reality with \u201cmaterial\n substance.\u201d The logical consequence of Berkeley\u2019s\n doctrine that the _esse_ of sensible things is\n _percipi_, would be the subjectivist view that the\n physical order is _only_ a complex of presentations. \u00a7\n 3. But this is clearly not the case with that part of\n the physical order which consists of the bodies of my\n fellow-men. These have an existence, as centres of\n feeling, over and above their existence as presentations\n to my senses. \u00a7 4. As the bodies of my fellows are\n connected in one system with the rest of the physical\n order, that order as a whole must have the same kind of\n reality which belongs to them. It must be the\n presentation to our sense of a system or complex of\n systems of experiencing subjects; the apparent absence\n of life and purpose from inorganic nature must be due to\n our inability to enter into a direct communion of\n interest with its members. \u00a7 5. Some consequences of\n this view 198\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE MEANING OF LAW\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The popular conception of the physical order as\n exhibiting a rigid mechanical conformity to general\n _laws_, conflicts with our metaphysical interpretation.\n \u00a7 2. Our interpretation would, however, admit of the\n establishment of averages or approximately realised\n uniformities by the statistical method, which deals with\n occurrence _en bloc_ to the neglect of their individual\n detail. \u00a7 3. \u201cUniformity\u201d in nature is neither an axiom\n nor an empirically verifiable fact, but a postulate. A\n consideration of the methods actually employed for the\n establishment of such uniformities or \u201claws\u201d of nature\n shows that we have no guarantee that actual concrete\n cases exhibit _exact_ conformity to law. \u00a7 4. Uniformity\n is a _postulate_ arising from our need of practical\n rules for the control of nature. It need not for this\n purpose be exact, and in point of fact our scientific\n formul\u00e6 are only exact so long as they remain abstract\n and hypothetical. They do not enable us to determine the\n actual course of an individual process with certainty. \u00a7\n 5. The concept of the physical order as _mechanical_ is\n the abstract expression of the postulate, and is\n therefore essential to the empirical sciences which deal\n with the physical order. \u00a7 6. Consideration of the\n character of genuine machines suggests that the\n mechanical only exists as a subordinate aspect of\n processes which, in their full nature, are intelligent\n and purposive 216\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n SPACE AND TIME\n\n\n \u00a7 1. Are time and space ultimately real or only phenomenal? \u00a7\n 2. The space and time of _perception_ are limited,\n sensibly continuous, and consist of a quantitative\n element together with a _qualitative_ character\n dependent on relation to the _here_ and _now_ of\n immediate individual feeling. \u00a7 3. _Conceptual_ space\n and time are created from the perceptual data by a\n combined process of synthesis, analysis, and\n abstraction. \u00a7 4. They are unlimited, infinitely\n divisible, and there is valid positive ground for\n regarding them as mathematically continuous. Thus they\n form infinite continuous series of positions. They\n involve abstraction from all reference to the _here_ and\n _now_ of immediate feeling, and are thus homogeneous,\n _i.e._ the positions in them are indistinguishable. They\n are also commonly taken to be unities. \u00a7 5. Perceptual\n space and time cannot be ultimately real, because they\n involve reference to the _here_ and _now_ of a finite\n experience; conceptual space and time cannot be\n ultimately real, because they contain no principle of\n internal distinction, and are thus not individual. \u00a7 6.\n The attempt to take space and time as real leads to the\n difficulty about qualities and relations, and so to the\n indefinite regress. \u00a7 7. Space and time contain no\n principle of unity; there may be many space and time\n orders in the Absolute which have no spatial or temporal\n connection with each other. \u00a7 8. The antinomies of the\n infinite divisibility and extent of space and time arise\n from the indefinite regress involved in the scheme of\n qualities and relations, and are insoluble so long as\n the space and time construction is taken for Reality. \u00a7\n 9. The space and time order is an imperfect phenomenal\n manifestation of the logical relation between the inner\n purposive lives of finite individuals. Time is an\n inevitable aspect of finite experience. _How_ space and\n time are transcended in the Absolute experience we\n cannot say 241\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n SOME CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The concept of _evolution_ an attempt to interpret\n natural processes in terms of individual growth. \u00a7 2.\n Evolution means change culminating in an end which is\n the result of the process and is qualitatively new. The\n concept is thus teleological. \u00a7 3. Evolution, being\n teleological, is essentially either progress or\n degeneration. If it is more than illusion, there must be\n real _ends_ in the physical order. And ends can only be\n real as subjective interests of sentient beings which\n are actualised by the process of change. \u00a7 4. Thus all\n evolution must take place within an _individual_\n subject. \u00a7 5. Further, the subject of evolution must be\n a _finite_ individual. All attempts to make \u201cevolution\u201d\n a property of the whole of Reality lead to the infinite\n regress. \u00a7 6. The distinction between progressive\n evolution and degeneration has an \u201cobjective\u201d basis in\n the metaphysical distinction between higher and lower\n degrees of individuality. \u00a7 7. In the evolutionary\n process, old individuals disappear and fresh ones\n originate. Hence evolution is incompatible with the view\n that Reality consists of a plurality of ultimately\n independent finite individuals 265\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE\n\n\n \u00a7 1. Scientific _description_ may be contrasted with\n philosophical or teleological _interpretation_, but the\n contrast is not absolute. \u00a7 2. The primary end of all\n scientific description is intercommunication with a view\n to active co-operation. Hence all such description is\n necessarily restricted to objects capable of being\n experienced in the same way by a plurality of\n individuals. \u00a7 3. A second end of scientific description\n is the _economising_ of intellectual labour by the\n creation of _general_ rules for dealing with typical\n situations in the environment. In the course of\n evolution this object becomes partially independent of\n the former. \u00a7 4. From the interest in formulating\n _general_ rules arise the three fundamental postulates\n of physical science, the postulates of _Uniformity_,\n _Mechanical Law_, and _Causal Determination_. \u00a7 5. The\n mechanical view of physical Nature determined by these\n three postulates is systematically carried out only in\n the abstract science of _Mechanics_; hence the logical\n completion of the descriptive process would mean the\n reduction of all descriptive science to Mechanics. That\n the chemical, biological, and psychological sciences\n contain elements which cannot be reduced to mechanical\n terms, is due to the fact that their descriptions are\n inspired by \u00e6sthetic and historical as well as by\n primarily \u201cscientific\u201d interests. \u00a7 6. The analysis of\n such leading concepts of mechanical Physics as the\n Conservation of Mass and of Energy shows them to have\n only _relative_ validity 279\n\n\n BOOK IV\n\n RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY\u2014THE INTERPRETATION OF LIFE\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The various sciences which deal with the interpretation\n of human life all avail themselves of the fundamental\n categories of Psychology. Hence we must ask how the\n concepts of Psychology are related to actual experience.\n \u00a7 2. Psychology is a body of abstract descriptive\n formul\u00e6, not a direct transcript of the individual\n processes of real life. It presupposes the previous\n construction of the physical order. \u00a7 3. The\n psychological conception of conscious life as a\n succession of \u201cmental states\u201d or \u201cimages\u201d is a\n transformation of actual experience devised primarily to\n account for the experience of other subjects, and\n subsequently extended to my own. The transformation is\n effected by the hypothesis of \u201cintrojection.\u201d \u00a7\u00a7 4, 5.\n The logical justification of the psychological\n transformation of facts is twofold. The psychological\n scheme serves partly to fill up the gaps in our theories\n of physiological Mechanism, and also, in respect of the\n teleological categories of Psychology, to describe the\n course of human conduct in a form capable of ethical and\n historical appreciation. Psychology may legitimately\n employ both mechanical and teleological categories. \u00a7 6.\n The objections sometimes brought against the possibility\n of (_a_) psychological, (_b_) teleological description\n are untenable 294\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE PROBLEM OF SOUL AND BODY\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The problem of psychophysical connection has to do with\n the correlation of scientific abstractions, not of given\n facts of experience. \u00a7 2. The \u201cconsciousness\u201d of\n Psychology is thus not the same thing as the finite\n individual subject of experience, and Reality must not\n be said to consist of \u201cminds\u201d in the psychologist\u2019s\n sense. Again, we must not assume _a priori_ that there\n can be only _one_ working hypothesis of psychophysical\n connection. \u00a7 3. The possible hypotheses may be reduced\n to three, Epiphenomenalism, Parallelism, and\n Interaction. \u00a7 4. _Epiphenomenalism_ is legitimate as a\n methodological principle in Physiology; it is untenable\n as a basis for Psychology because it implies the\n reduction of psychical facts to mechanical law. \u00a7 5.\n _Parallelism._ The arguments for Parallelism as\n necessarily valid to Psychophysics because of its\n congruity with the postulates of mechanical Physics, are\n fallacious. We cannot assume that Psychology must\n necessarily conform to these postulates. \u00a7 6. As a\n working hypothesis Parallelism is available for many\n purposes, but breaks down when we attempt to apply it to\n the case of the initiation of fresh purposive reactions.\n A teleological and a mechanical series cannot ultimately\n be \u201cparallel.\u201d \u00a7 7. We are thus thrown back on the\n hypothesis of _Interaction_ as the only one which\n affords a consistent scheme for the correlation of\n Physiology and Psychology. We have, however, to remember\n that what the hypothesis correlates is scientific\n symbols, not actual facts. The actuality represented by\n both sets of symbols is the same thing, though the\n psychological symbolism affords a wider and more\n adequate representation of it than the physiological 313\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE PLACE OF THE \u201cSELF\u201d IN REALITY\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The \u201cself\u201d is (1) a teleological concept, (2) implies a\n contrasted not-self (where this contrast is absent from\n an experience there is no genuine sense of self); (3)\n but the limits which divide self and not-self are not\n fixed but fluctuating. The not-self is not a merely\n external limit, but consists of discordant elements\n within the individual, which are extruded from it by a\n mental construction. (4) The self is a product of\n development, and has its being in the time-series. (5)\n The self is never given complete in a moment of actual\n experience, but is an ideal construction; probably\n self-hood implies some degree of _intellectual_\n development. \u00a7 2. The Absolute or Infinite Individual,\n being free from all internal discord, can have no\n not-self, and therefore cannot properly be called a\n self. \u00a7 3. Still less can it be a person. \u00a7 4. In a\n _society_ of selves we have a more genuinely\n self-determined individual than in the single self.\n Hence it would be nearer the truth to think of the\n Absolute as a Society, though no finite whole adequately\n expresses the Absolute\u2019s full nature. We must remember,\n however, (_a_) that probably the individuals in the\n Absolute are not all in _direct_ relation, and (_b_)\n that in thinking of it as a Society we are not denying\n its real individuality. \u00a7 5. The self is not in its own\n nature imperishable; as to the particular problem of its\n continuance after death, no decision can be arrived at\n on grounds of Metaphysics. Neither the negative\n presumption drawn from our inability to understand the\n conditions of continuance, nor the lack of empirical\n evidence, is conclusive; on the other hand, there is not\n sufficient metaphysical reason for taking immortality as\n certain 334\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE PROBLEM OF MORAL FREEDOM\n\n\n \u00a7 1. The metaphysical problem of free will has been\n historically created by extra-ethical difficulties,\n especially by theological considerations in the early\n Christian era, and by the influence of mechanical\n scientific conceptions in the modern world. \u00a7\u00a7 2, 3. The\n analysis of our moral experience shows that true\n \u201cfreedom\u201d means teleological determination. Hence to be\n \u201cfree\u201d and to \u201cwill\u201d are ultimately the same thing.\n Freedom or \u201cself-determination\u201d is genuine but limited,\n and is capable of variations of degree. \u00a7 4.\n _Determinism_ and _Indeterminism_ both arise from the\n false assumption that the mechanical postulate of\n _causal_ determination by antecedents is an ultimate\n fact. The question then arises whether mental events are\n an exception to the supposed principle. \u00a7 5.\n _Determinism._ The determinist arguments stated. \u00a7 6.\n They rest partly upon the false assumption that\n mechanical determination is the one and only principle\n of rational connection between facts; \u00a7 7. Partly upon\n fallacious theories of the actual procedure of the\n mental sciences. Fallacious nature of the argument that\n complete knowledge of character and circumstances would\n enable us to predict human conduct. The assumed data are\n such as, from their own nature, could not be known\n _before the event_. \u00a7 8. _Indeterminism._ The psychical\n facts to which the indeterminist appeals do not warrant\n his conclusion, which is, moreover, metaphysically\n absurd, as involving the denial of rational connection.\n \u00a7 9. Both doctrines agree in the initial error of\n confounding teleological unity with causal determination 359\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n SOME METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHICS AND RELIGION\n\n\n \u00a7 1. If Reality is a harmonious system, it must somehow make\n provision for the gratification of our ethical,\n religious, and \u00e6sthetic interests. \u00a7 2. But we cannot\n assume that ethical and religious postulates are\n necessarily _true_ in the forms in which our practical\n interests lead us to make them. \u00a7 3. Thus, while\n morality would become impossible unless on the whole\n there is coincidence between virtue and happiness, and\n unless social progress is a genuine fact, \u201cperfect\n virtue,\u201d \u201cperfect happiness,\u201d \u201cinfinite progress\u201d are\n logically self-contradictory concepts. \u00a7 4. But this\n does not impair the practical usefulness of our ethical\n ideals. \u00a7 5. In religion we conceive of the ideal of\n perfection as already existing in individual form. Hence\n ultimately no part of the temporal order can be an\n adequate object of religious devotion. \u00a7 6. This leads\n to the _Problem of Evil_. \u201cGod\u201d cannot be a finite being\n within the Absolute, because, if so, God must contain\n evil and imperfection as part of His nature, and is thus\n _not_ the already existing realisation of the ideal. \u00a7\n 7. This difficulty disappears when we identify \u201cGod\u201d\n with the Absolute, because in the Absolute evil can be\n seen to be mere illusory appearance. It may, however, be\n true that religious feeling, to be practically\n efficient, may need to imagine its object in an\n ultimately incorrect anthropomorphic form. \u00a7 8. The\n existence, within the Absolute, of finite \u201cdivine\u201d\n personalities, can neither be affirmed nor denied on\n grounds of general Metaphysics. \u00a7 9. Proofs of the\n \u201cbeing of God.\u201d The principle of the \u201contological\u201d and\n \u201ccosmological\u201d proofs can be defended against the\n criticism of Hume and Kant only if we identify God with\n the Absolute. The \u201cphysicotheological proof\u201d could only\n establish the reality of finite superhuman\n intelligences, and its force depends purely upon\n empirical considerations of evidence 381\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n\n \u00a7 1. Can our Absolute Experience be properly called the\n \u201cunion of Thought and Will\u201d? The Absolute is certainly\n the final realisation of our intellectual and our\n practical ideals. But (1) it includes aspects, such as,\n _e.g._, \u00e6sthetic feeling, pleasure, and pain, which are\n neither Thought nor Will. (2) And it cannot possess\n either Thought or Will _as such_. Both Thought and Will,\n in their own nature, presuppose a Reality which\n transcends _mere_ Thought and _mere_ Will. \u00a7 2. Our\n conclusion may in a sense be said to involve an element\n of Agnosticism, and again of Mysticism. But it is only\n agnostic in holding that we do not know the precise\n nature of the Absolute Experience. It implies no\n distrust of the validity of knowledge, so far as it\n goes, and bases its apparently agnostic result on the\n witness of knowledge itself. Similarly, it is mystical\n in transcending, not in refusing to recognise, the\n constructions of understanding and will. \u00a7 3.\n Metaphysics adds nothing to our information, and yields\n no fresh springs of action. It is finally only justified\n by the persistency of the impulse to speculate on the\n nature of things as a whole 408\n\n\n INDEX 417\n\n\n\n\n ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS\n\n\n\n\n BOOK I\n GENERAL NOTIONS\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n THE PROBLEM OF THE METAPHYSICIAN\n\n\u00a7 1. The generality and simplicity of the metaphysical problem make it\n difficult to define the study. \u00a7 2. Problem is suggested by the\n presence of contradictions in ordinary experience. \u00a7 3. By making a\n distinction between reality and appearance the sciences remove some\n of these contradictions, but themselves lead to further difficulties\n of the same sort; hence the need for systematic inquiry into the\n meaning of the distinction between the real and the apparent, and\n the general character of reality as such. \u00a7 4. Metaphysics, as an\n inquiry into the ultimate meaning of \u201creality,\u201d is akin to poetry\n and religion, but differs from them in its scientific character,\n from the mathematical and experimental sciences in its method, from\n common scepticism in the critical nature of its methods as well as\n in its positive purpose. \u00a7 5. The study is difficult (_a_) because\n of the generality of its problems, (_b_) and because we cannot\n employ diagrams or physical experiments. \u00a7 6. The objection that\n Metaphysics is an impossibility may be shown in all its forms to\n rest upon self-contradictory assumptions of a metaphysical kind. \u00a7\n 7. The minor objections that, if possible, the science is\n superfluous, or at least stationary, may be met with equal ease. \u00a7\n 8. Metaphysics is partly akin to the mystical tendency, but differs\n from mysticism in virtue of its positive interest in the world of\n appearances, as well as by its scientific method. \u00a7 9. It agrees\n with logic in the generality of its scope, but differs in being\n concerned with the real, whereas logic is primarily concerned with\n the inferrible. \u00a710. The problems of the so-called _Theory of\n Knowledge_ are really metaphysical.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. It is always difficult, in treating of any branch of knowledge, to\nput before the beginner a correct preliminary notion of the nature and\nscope of the study to which he is to be introduced, but the difficulty\nis exceptionally great in the case of the body of investigations\ntraditionally known as Metaphysics.[1] The questions which the science\nseeks to answer are, indeed, in principle of the simplest and most\nfamiliar kind, but it is their very simplicity and familiarity which\nconstitute the chief difficulty of the subject. We are naturally slow to\nadmit that there is anything we do not understand in terms and ideas\nwhich we are constantly using, not only in the special sciences, but in\nour non-systematised everyday thought and language about the course of\nthe world. Hence, when the metaphysician begins to ask troublesome\nquestions about the meaning and validity of these common and familiar\nnotions, ordinary practical men, and even intelligent students of the\nspecial sciences, are apt to complain that he is wasting his time by\nraising idle and uncalled-for difficulties about the self-evident.\nConsequently the writer on Metaphysics is almost inevitably compelled to\nbegin by rebutting the natural and current prejudice which regards his\nscience as non-existent and its problems as illusory. The full\nvindication of metaphysical inquiry from this charge of futility can\nonly be furnished by such a systematic examination of the actual\nproblems of the study as will be attempted, in outline, in the\nsucceeding chapters of this work. All that can be done in an\nIntroduction is to present such a general description of the kind of\nquestions to be subsequently discussed, and their relation to the more\nspecial problems of the various sciences, as may incline the reader to\ngive an impartial hearing to what is to follow.\n\n\u00a7 2. The course of our ordinary experience, as well as our education in\nthe rudiments of the sciences, has made us all familiar with the\ndistinction between what really _is_ or _exists_ and what merely\n_appears_ to be. There is no opposition more thoroughly enshrined in the\nlanguage and literature of civilised races than the contrast of\n_seeming_ with _reality_, of _substance_ with _show_. We come upon it\nalike in our study of the processes of nature and our experience of\nhuman character and purpose. Thus we contrast the seeming stability of\nthe earth with its real motion, the seeming continuity and sameness of a\nlump of solid matter with the real discontinuity and variety of its\nchemical constituents, the seeming friendliness of the hypocritical\nself-seeker with his real indifference to our welfare. In all these\ncases the motive which leads us to make the distinction is the same,\nnamely, the necessity to escape from the admission of a contradiction in\nexperience. So long as our various direct perceptions are not felt to\nconflict with one another, we readily accept them all as equally real\nand valid, and no question arises as to their relative truth or\nfalsehood. Were all our perceptions of this kind, there would be no need\nfor the correction, by subsequent reflection, of our first immediate\nimpressions about the nature of ourselves and the world; error would be\na term of no meaning for us, and science would have no existence. But\nwhen two immediate perceptions, both apparently equally authenticated by\nour senses, stand in direct conflict with one another,[2] we cannot,\nwithout doing violence to the fundamental law of rational thinking,\nregard both as equally and in the same sense true. Unless we abandon\nonce for all the attempt to reconcile the course of our experience with\nthe demand of our intellect for consistency in thinking, we are driven\nto make a momentous distinction. We have to recognise that things are\nnot always what they seem to be; what appears to us is, sometimes at any\nrate, not real, and what really is does not always appear. Of our two\nconflicting perceptions, only one at best can be a correct\nrepresentation of the real course of things; one of them at least, and\npossibly both, must be mere seeming or appearance, and we are thus cast\nupon the problem which every science tries, in its own sphere and its\nown way, to solve: what part of our conceptions about the world gives us\nreality and what part only appearance?[3] It is because of the\nimportance of these puzzles of immediate perception as stimulating to\nsuch scientific reflection that Plato and Aristotle called philosophy\nthe child of Wonder, and it is because the processes of change present\nthem in a peculiarly striking form that the problem of change has always\nbeen a central one in Metaphysics.\n\n\u00a7 3. The attempt to harmonise by reflection the contradictions which\nbeset immediate perception in all its forms is one which is not confined\nto a single science; the common task of all sciences is to say what, in\nsome special department and for special purposes, must be taken as\nreality and what as mere appearance, and, by degrading the contradictory\nto the level of appearance, to satisfy the instinctive demand of our\nintellect for coherency and consistency of thought. But the development\nof scientific reflection itself in its turn, while it solves some of our\ndifficulties, is constantly giving rise to fresh perplexities of a\nhigher order. Our scientific principles themselves frequently seem to\npresent us with contradictions of a peculiarly distressing kind. Thus we\nfind ourselves forced in some of our geometrical reasonings to treat a\ncurve as absolutely continuous, in others to regard it as made up of a\nnumber of points. Or, again, we are alternately compelled to regard the\nparticles of matter as inert and only capable of being moved by impact\nfrom without, and yet again as endowed with indwelling \u201ccentral forces.\u201d\nBoth the opposing views, in such a case, clearly cannot be ultimately\ntrue, and we are therefore compelled either to give up the effort to\nthink consistently, or to face the question, Is either view ultimately\ntrue, and if so, which? Again, the principles of one branch of study may\nappear to contradict those of another. For instance, the absolute\ndetermination of every movement by a series of antecedent movements\nwhich we assume as a principle in our mechanical science, appears, at\nleast, to conflict with the freedom of human choice and reality of human\npurpose which are fundamental facts for the moralist and the historian;\nand we have thus once more to ask, which of the two, mechanical\nnecessity or intelligent freedom, is the reality and which the mere\nappearance? Finally, the results of our scientific reflection sometimes\nseem to be in violent disagreement with our deepest and most\ncharacteristic aspirations and purposes, and we cannot avoid the\nquestion, which of the two have the better title to credit as witnesses\nto the inmost nature of reality?\n\nIn all these cases of perplexity there are, short of the refusal to\nthink about our difficulties at all, only two courses open to us. We may\nanswer the question at haphazard and as it suits our momentary caprice,\nor we may try to answer it on an intelligible principle. If we choose\nthe second course, then clearly before we formulate our principle we\nmust undertake a systematic and impartial inquiry as to what we really\nmean by the familiar distinction between \u201cseems\u201d and \u201cis,\u201d that is to\nsay, a scientific inquiry into the general characteristics by which\nreality or real being is distinguished from mere appearance, not in some\none special sphere of study, but universally. Now, such an inquiry into\nthe general character of reality, as opposed to more or less unreal\nappearance, is precisely what is meant by Metaphysics. Metaphysics sets\nitself, more systematically and universally than any other science, to\nask what, after all, is meant by being _real_, and to what degree our\nvarious scientific and non-scientific theories about the world are in\nharmony with the universal characteristics of real existence. Hence\nMetaphysics has been called \u201can attempt to become aware of and to doubt\nall preconceptions\u201d; and again, \u201can unusually resolute effort to think\nconsistently.\u201d As we cannot, so long as we allow ourselves to think at\nall, avoid asking these questions as to what \u201cis\u201d and what only \u201cseems,\u201d\nit is clear that the attempt to dispense with metaphysical speculation\naltogether would be futile. We have really no choice whether we shall\nform metaphysical hypotheses or not, only the choice whether we shall do\nso consciously and in accord with some intelligible principle, or\nunconsciously and at random.\n\n\u00a7 4. Our preliminary account of the general character of the\nmetaphysician\u2019s problem will enable us to distinguish Metaphysics from\nsome other closely related forms of human thought, and to give it at\nleast a provisional place in the general scheme of knowledge. (_a_)\nClearly, Metaphysics, as an inquiry into the meaning of reality, will\nhave some affinity with religion as well as with imaginative literature,\nboth of which aim at getting behind mere appearances and interpreting\nthe reality which lies beneath them. In one important respect its\nrelation to both is closer than that of any other department of\nknowledge,\u2014inasmuch as it, like them, is directly concerned with\n_ultimate_ reality, whereas the special sciences deal each with some one\nparticular aspect of things, and avowedly leave all ultimate questions\non one side. Where it differs from both is in its spirit and method.\nUnlike religion and imaginative literature, Metaphysics deals with the\nultimate problems of existence in a purely scientific spirit; its object\nis _intellectual_ satisfaction, and its method is not one of appeal to\nimmediate intuition or unanalysed feeling, but of the critical and\nsystematic analysis of our conceptions. Thus it clearly belongs, in\nvirtue of its spirit and method, to the realm of science. (_b_) Yet it\ndiffers widely in method from the other types of science with which most\nof us are more familiar. It differs from the mathematical sciences in\nbeing non-quantitative and non-numerical in its methods. For we cannot\nemploy the numerical and quantitative methods of Mathematics except on\nthings and processes which admit of measurement, or, at least, of\nenumeration, and it is for Metaphysics itself, in the course of its\ninvestigations, to decide whether what is ultimately real, or any part\nof it, is numerical or quantitative, and if so, in what sense. It\ndiffers, again, from the experimental sciences in that, like Logic and\nEthics, it does nothing to increase the stock of our knowledge of\nparticular facts or events, but merely discusses the way in which facts\nor events are to be interpreted if we wish to think consistently. Its\nquestion is not what in detail we must regard as the reality of any\nspecial set of processes, but what are the _general_ conditions to which\nall reality, as such, conforms. (Just in the same way, it will be\nremembered, Logic does not discuss the worth of the evidence for\nparticular scientific theories, but the general conditions to which\nevidence must conform if it is to prove its conclusion.) Hence Aristotle\ncorrectly called Metaphysics a science of being _qu\u00e0_ being, \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f96\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, (as opposed, for instance, to Mathematics, which only studies\nexistence in so far as it is quantitative or numerical).\n\nAgain, as an attempt to discover and get rid of baseless preconceptions\nabout reality, Metaphysics may, in a sense, be said to be \u201csceptical.\u201d\nBut it differs profoundly from vulgar scepticism both in its method and\nin its moral purpose. The method of vulgar scepticism is _dogmatic_,\u2014it\ntakes it for granted without inquiry that two perceptions or two\nspeculative principles which conflict with one another must be equally\nfalse. Because such contradictions can be detected in all fields of\nknowledge and speculation, the sceptic dogmatically assumes that there\nis no means of getting behind these contradictory appearances to a\ncoherent reality. For the metaphysician, on the contrary, the assumption\nthat the puzzles of experience are insoluble and the contradictions in\nour knowledge irreconcilable is itself just one of those preconceptions\nwhich it is the business of his study to investigate and test. Until\nafter critical examination, he refuses to pronounce which of the\nconflicting views is true, or, supposing both false, whether one may not\nbe nearer the truth than the other. If he does not assume that truth can\nbe got and reality known by our human faculties, he does at any rate\nassume that it is worth our while to make the attempt, and that nothing\nbut the issue can decide as to its chances of success. Again, the\nmetaphysician differs from the sceptic in respect of moral purpose. Both\nin a sense preach the duty of a \u201csuspense of judgment\u201d in the face of\nultimate problems. The difference is that the sceptic treats \u201csuspense,\u201d\nand the accompanying mental indolence, as an end in itself; the\nmetaphysician regards it as a mere preliminary to his final object, the\nattainment of determinate truth.\n\n\u00a7 5. We can now see some of the reasons which make the science of\nMetaphysics a peculiarly difficult branch of study. It is difficult, in\nthe first place, from the very simplicity and generality of its\nproblems. There is a general conviction that every science, if it is to\nbe anything more than a body of disputes about mere words, must deal\nwith some definite subject-matter, and it is not easy to say precisely\n_what_ is the subject dealt with by the metaphysician. In a certain\nsense this difficulty can only be met by admitting it; it is true, as we\nhave already seen, that Metaphysics deals in some way with everything;\nthus it is quite right to say that you cannot specify any particular\nclass of objects as its exclusive subject-matter. This must not,\nhowever, be understood to mean that Metaphysics is another name for the\nwhole body of the sciences. What it does mean is that precisely because\nthe distinction between the real and the apparent affects every\ndepartment of our knowledge and enters into every one of the special\nsciences, the general problem as to the meaning of this distinction and\nthe principle on which it rests cannot be dealt with by any one special\nscience, but must form the subject of an independent inquiry. The\nparallel with Logic may perhaps help to make this point clearer. It is\njust because the principles of reasoning and the rules of evidence are,\nin the last resort, the same for all the sciences, that they have to be\nmade themselves the subject of a separate investigation. Logic, like\nMetaphysics, deals with everything, not in the sense of being another\nname for the whole of our knowledge, but in the sense that it, unlike\nthe special sciences, attacks a problem which confronts us in every\nexercise of our thought. The question of the difference between the two\nsciences will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.\n\nThere are two other minor sources of difficulty, arising out of the\nuniversality of the metaphysical problem, which ought perhaps to be\nmentioned, as they present a serious obstacle to the study of\nMetaphysics by minds of a certain stamp. In Metaphysics we have no such\nhelps to the imagination as the figures and diagrams which are so useful\nin many branches of Mathematics; and again, we are, by the nature of the\nproblem, entirely cut off from the aid of physical experiment. All our\nresults have to be reached by the unassisted efforts of thought in the\nstrictest sense of the word, that is, by the rigid and systematic mental\nanalysis of conceptions. Thus Metaphysics stands alone among the\nsciences, or alone with Logic, in the demand it makes on the student\u2019s\ncapacity for sheer hard continuous thought This may help to explain why\nmen who are capable of excellent work in the domain of mathematical or\nexperimental science sometimes prove incompetent in Metaphysics; and\nagain, why eminent metaphysical ability does not always make its\npossessor a sound judge of the results and methods of the other\nsciences.\n\n\u00a7 6. It is now time to consider one or two objections which are very\ncommonly urged against the prosecution of metaphysical studies. It is\noften asserted, either that (1) such a science is, in its very nature,\nan impossibility; or (2) that, if possible, it is useless and\nsuperfluous, since the other sciences together with the body of our\npractical experience give us all the truth we need; or, again, (3) that\nat any rate the science is essentially unprogressive, and that all that\ncan be said about its problems has been said long ago. Now, if any of\nthese popular objections are really sound, it must clearly be a waste of\ntime to study Metaphysics, and we are therefore bound to discuss their\nforce before we proceed any further.\n\n(1) To the objection that a science of Metaphysics is, from the nature\nof the case, impossible, it would be in principle correct to reply that,\nas the proverb says, \u201cYou never can tell till you try,\u201d and that few, if\nany, of those who urge this objection most loudly have ever seriously\nmade the trial. If any one thinks the task not worth his while, he is\nnot called on to attempt it; but his opinion gives him no special claim\nto sit in judgment on those who think differently of the matter. Still,\nthe anti-metaphysical prejudice is so common, and appears in so many\ndifferent forms, that it is necessary to exhibit its groundlessness\nrather more in detail.\n\n(_a_) It is sometimes maintained that Metaphysics is an impossibility\nbecause the metaphysician\u2019s problems, in their own nature, admit of no\nsolution. To a meaningless question, of course, there can be no\nintelligible answer, and it is occasionally asserted, and often\ninsinuated, that the questions of Metaphysics are of this kind. But to\ncall the metaphysician\u2019s question a senseless one is as much as to say\nthat there is no meaning in the distinction, which we are all constantly\nmaking, between the real and the apparent. If there is any meaning at\nall in the distinction, it is clearly a necessary as well as a proper\nquestion precisely by what marks the one may be distinguished from the\nother. Our right to raise this question can in fairness only be\nchallenged by an opponent who is prepared to maintain that the\ncontradictions which lead us to make the distinction may themselves be\nthe ultimate truth about things. Now, whether this view is defensible or\nnot, it is clearly not one which we have the right to assume without\nexamination as self-evident; it is itself a metaphysical theory of first\nprinciples, and would have to be defended, if at all, by an elaborate\nmetaphysical analysis of the meaning of the concepts \u201ctruth\u201d and\n\u201creality.\u201d Again, the objection, if valid, would tell as much against\nexperimental and mathematical science as against Metaphysics. If the\nself-contradictory can be true, there is no rational ground for\npreferring a coherent scientific theory of the world to the wildest\ndreams of superstition or insanity. Thus we have no escape from the\nfollowing dilemma. Either there is no rational foundation at all for the\ndistinction between reality and appearance, and then all science is an\nillusion, or there is a rational foundation for it, and then we are\nlogically bound to inquire into the principle of the distinction, and\nthus to face the problems of Metaphysics.[4]\n\n(_b_) What is essentially the same objection is sometimes put in the\nfollowing form. Metaphysics, it is said, can have no place in the scheme\nof human knowledge, because all intelligible questions which we can ask\nabout reality must fall within the province of one or other of the\n\u201csciences.\u201d There are no facts with which some one or other of the\nsciences does not deal, and there is therefore no room for a series of\n\u201cmetaphysical\u201d inquiries over and above those inquiries which constitute\nthe various sciences. Where there are facts to investigate and\nintelligible questions to be put, we are, it is contended, in the domain\nof \u201cscience\u201d; where there are none, there can be no knowledge. Plausible\nas this argument can be made to appear, it is easy to see that it is\nfallacious. From the point of view of pure Logic it manifestly contains\na flagrant fallacy of _petitio principii_. For it simply assumes that\nthere is no \u201cscience,\u201d in the most universal acceptation of the\nterm\u2014_i.e._ no body of reasoned truth\u2014besides those experimental\nsciences which have for their object the accumulation and\nsystematisation of facts, and this is the very point at issue between\nthe metaphysician and his critics. What the metaphysician asserts is not\nthat there are facts with which the various special branches of\nexperimental science cannot deal, but that there are questions which can\nbe and ought to be raised about the facts with which they do deal other\nthan those which experimental inquiry can solve. Leaving it entirely to\nthe special sciences to tell us what in particular are the true facts\nabout any given part of the world\u2019s course, he contends that we still\nhave to ask the more general question, what we mean by \u201creal\u201d and\n\u201cfact,\u201d and how in general the \u201creal\u201d is to be distinguished from the\nunreal. To denounce the raising of this question as an attempt to\nexclude certain events and processes from the \u201cprovince of science,\u201d is\nsimply to misrepresent the issue at stake. Incidentally it may be added,\nthe objection reveals a serious misunderstanding of the true principle\nof distinction between different sciences. The various sciences differ\nprimarily, not as dealing with different _parts_ of the world of\nreality, but as dealing with the whole of it so far as it can be brought\nunder different _aspects_. They are different, not because they deal\nwith different sets of facts, but because they look at the facts from\ndifferent points of view. Thus it would be quite wrong to suppose that\nthe difference between, _e.g._, Physics, Physiology, and Psychology, is\nprimarily that each studies a different group of facts. The facts\nstudied may in great part be the same; it is the point of view from\nwhich they are regarded by which each of the three sciences is\ndistinguished from the others. Thus every voluntary movement may be\nlooked at either as a link in a series of displacements of\nmass-particles (Physics), as a combination of muscular contractions\ninitiated from a centre in the cortex of the brain (Physiology), or as a\nstep to the satisfaction of a felt want (Psychology). So Metaphysics\ndoes not profess to deal with a certain group of facts lying outside the\nprovince of the \u201csciences,\u201d but to deal with the same facts which form\nthat province from a point of view which is not that of the experimental\nsciences. Its claim to do so can only be overthrown by proving what the\ncriticism we are considering assumes, that there is no intelligible way\nof looking at the facts besides that of experimental science.\n\n(_c_) More commonly still the intrinsic intelligibility of the\nmetaphysician\u2019s problem is admitted, but our power to solve it denied.\nThere may be, it is said, realities which are more than mere appearance,\nbut at any rate with our human faculties we can know nothing of them.\nAll our knowledge is strictly limited to appearances, or, as they are\noften called, _phenomena_.[5] What lies behind them is completely\ninaccessible to us, and it is loss of time to speculate about its\nnature. We must therefore content ourselves with the discovery of\ngeneral laws or uniformities of the interconnection of phenomena, and\ndismiss the problem of their real ground as insoluble. This doctrine,\ntechnically known as Phenomenalism, enjoys at the present time a\nwidespread popularity, which is historically very largely due to an\nimperfect assimilation of the negative element in the philosophy of\nKant. Its merits as a philosophical theory we may leave for later\nconsideration; at present we are only concerned with it as the alleged\nground of objection against the possibility of a science of Metaphysics.\nAs such it has really no cogency whatever. Not only do the supporters of\nthe doctrine constantly contradict their own cardinal assumption (as,\nfor instance, when they combine with the assertion that we can know\nnothing about ultimate reality, such assertions as that it is a certain\nand ultimate truth that all \u201cphenomena\u201d are connected by general laws,\nor that \u201cthe course of nature is, without exception, uniform\u201d), but the\nassumption itself is self-contradictory. The very statement that \u201cwe\nknow only phenomena\u201d has no meaning unless we know at least enough about\nultimate realities to be sure that they are unknowable. The\nphenomenalist is committed to the recognition of at least one\nproposition as an absolute and ultimate truth, namely, the proposition,\n\u201cI know that whatever I know is mere appearance.\u201d And this proposition\nitself, whatever we may think of its value as a contribution to\nPhilosophy, is a positive theory as to first principles the truth or\nfalsity of which is a proper subject for metaphysical investigation.\nThus the arguments by which it has been sought to demonstrate the\nimpossibility of Metaphysics themselves afford unimpeachable evidence of\nthe necessity for the scientific examination of the metaphysical\nproblem.[6]\n\n\u00a7 7. With the other two anti-metaphysical contentions referred to at the\nbeginning of the last section we may deal much more briefly. (2) To the\nobjector who maintains that Metaphysics, if possible, still is useless,\nbecause the sciences and the practical experience of life between them\nalready supply us with a coherent theory of the world, devoid of\ncontradictions, we may reply: (_a_) The fact is doubtful. For, whatever\nmay be said by the popularisers of science when they are engaged in\ncomposing metaphysical theories for the multitude, the best\nrepresentatives of every special branch of mathematical and experimental\nscience seem absolutely agreed that ultimate questions as to first\nprinciples are outside the scope of their sciences. The scope of every\nscience, they are careful to remind us, is defined by certain initial\nassumptions, and what does not fall under those assumptions must be\ntreated by the science in question as non-existent. Thus Mathematics is\nin principle restricted to dealing with the problems of number and\nquantity; whether there are realities which are in their own nature\nnon-numerical and non-quantitative[7] or not, the mathematician, as\nmathematician, is not called upon to pronounce; if there are such\nrealities, his science is by its initial assumptions debarred from\nknowing anything of them. So again with Physics; even if reduced to pure\nKinematics, it deals only with displacements involving the dimensions of\nlength and time, and has no means of ascertaining whether or not these\ndimensions are exhibited by all realities. The notion that the various\nsciences of themselves supply us with a body of information about\nultimate reality is thus, for good reasons, rejected by their soundest\nexponents, who indeed are usually so impressed with the opposite\nconviction as to be prejudiced in favour of the belief that the\nultimately real is unknowable. (_b_) Again, as we have already seen, the\nresults of physical science, and the beliefs and aspirations which arise\nin the course of practical experience and take shape in the teachings of\npoetry and religion, often appear to be in sharp antagonism. \u201cScience\u201d\nfrequently seems to point in one direction, our deepest ethical and\nreligious experience in another. We cannot avoid asking whether the\ncontradiction is only apparent or, supposing it real, what degree of\nauthority belongs to each of the conflicting influences. And, apart from\na serious study of Metaphysics, this question cannot be answered. (_c_)\nEven on the most favourable supposition, that there is no such\ncontradiction, but that science and practical experience together afford\na single ultimately coherent theory of the world, it is only after we\nhave ascertained the general characteristics of ultimate reality, and\nsatisfied ourselves by careful analysis that reality, as conceived in\nour sciences, possesses those characteristics, that we have the right to\npronounce our theory finally true. If Metaphysics should tum out in the\nend to present no fresh view as to the nature of the real, but only to\nconfirm an old one, we should still, as metaphysicians, have the\nadvantage of knowing where we were previously only entitled to\nconjecture.\n\n(3) The charge of unprogressiveness often brought against our science is\neasily disproved by careful study of the History of Philosophy. The\nproblems of the metaphysician are no doubt, in a sense, always the same;\nbut this is equally true of the problems of any other science. The\nmethods by which the problems are attacked and the adequacy of the\nsolutions they receive vary, from age to age, in close correspondence\nwith the general development of science. Every great metaphysical\nconception has exercised its influence on the general history of\nscience, and, in return, every important movement in science has\naffected the development of Metaphysics. Thus the revived interest in\nmechanical science, and the great progress made in that branch of\nknowledge which is so characteristic of the seventeenth century, more\nthan anything else determined the philosophical method and results of\nDescartes; the Metaphysics of Leibnitz were profoundly affected by such\nscientific influences as the invention of the calculus, the recognition\nof the importance of _vis viva_ in dynamics, the contemporary\ndiscoveries of Leuwenhoeck in embryology; while, to come to our own\ntime, the metaphysical speculation of the last half-century has\nconstantly been revolving round the two great scientific ideas of the\nconservation of energy and the origin of species by gradual\ndifferentiation. The metaphysician could not if he would, and would not\nif he could, escape the duty of estimating the bearing of the great\nscientific theories of his time upon our ultimate conceptions of the\nnature of the world as a whole. Every fundamental advance in science\nthus calls for a restatement and reconsideration of the old metaphysical\nproblems in the light of the new discovery.[8]\n\n\u00a7 8. This introductory chapter is perhaps the proper place for a word on\nthe relation of Metaphysics to the widely diffused mental tendency known\nas Mysticism.[9] Inasmuch as the fundamental aim of the mystic is to\npenetrate behind the veil of appearance to some ultimate and abiding\nreality, there is manifestly a close community of purpose between him\nand the metaphysician. But their diversity of method is no less marked\nthan their partial community of purpose. Once in touch with his reality,\nwherever he may find it, the mere mystic has no longer any interest in\nthe world of appearance. Appearance as such is for him merely the untrue\nand ultimately non-existent, and the peculiar emotion which he derives\nfrom his contemplation of the real depends for its special quality on an\never-present sense of the contrast between the abiding being of the\nreality and the non-entity of the appearances. Thus the merely mystical\nattitude towards appearance is purely negative. The metaphysician, on\nthe contrary, has only half completed his task when he has, by whatever\nmethod, ascertained the general character of the real as opposed to the\nmerely apparent. It still remains for him to re-examine the realm of\nappearance itself in the light of his theory of reality, to ascertain\nthe relative truth which partial and imperfect conceptions of the\nworld\u2019s nature contain, and to arrange the various appearances in the\norder of their varying approximation to truth. He must show not only\nwhat are the marks of reality, and why certain things which are\npopularly accepted as real must, for Philosophy be degraded to the rank\nof appearance, but also how far each appearance succeeds in revealing\nthe character of the reality which is its ground. Equally marked is the\ndifference between the mystic\u2019s and the metaphysician\u2019s attitude towards\nultimate reality itself. The mystic\u2019s object is primarily emotional\nrather than intellectual. What he wants is a feeling of satisfaction\nwhich he can only get from immediate contact with something taken to be\nfinally and abidingly real. Hence, when he comes to put his emotions\ninto words, he is always prone to use the language of vague imaginative\nsymbolism, the only language suitable to suggest feelings which, because\nimmediate and unanalysed, cannot be the subject of logical description\nin general terms. For the metaphysician, whose object is the attainment\nof intellectual consistency, such a method of symbolism is radically\nunsuitable.\n\nA symbol is always a source of danger to the intellect. If you employ it\nfor what you already understand, and might, if you chose, describe in\nscientific language, it is a mere substitution of the obscure for the\nclear. If you use it, as the mystic commonly does, for what you do not\nunderstand, its apparent precision, by blinding you to the vagueness of\nits interpretation, is positively mischievous. Hence, though some of the\ngreatest metaphysicians, such as Plotinus and Spinoza, and to a certain\nextent Hegel, have been personally mystics, their philosophical method\nhas invariably been scientific and rationalistic. At the same time, it\nis probably true that, apart from the mystic\u2019s need for the satisfaction\nof emotion by the contemplation of the eternal and abiding, the\nintellect would be prone to exercise itself in less arid and more\nattractive fields than those of abstract Metaphysics. The philosopher\nseeks, in the end, the same goal as the mystic; his peculiarity is that\nhe is so constituted as to reach his goal only by the route of\nintellectual speculation.\n\n\u00a7 9. We have compared Metaphysics more than once with Logic in respect\nof the universality of its scope and the analytical character of its\nmethods. It remains briefly to indicate the difference between the two\nsciences. There is, indeed, a theory, famous in the history of\nPhilosophy, and not even yet quite obsolete, according to which no\ndistinction can be drawn. Hegel held that the successive steps by which\nthe human mind gradually passes from less adequate to more adequate, and\nultimately to a fully adequate, conception of the nature of reality\nnecessarily correspond, step for step, with the stages of a process by\nwhich the reality itself is manifested with ever-increasing adequacy in\nan ascending order of phenomena. Hence in his system the discussion of\nthe general characteristics of reality and the general forms of\ninference constitutes a single department of Philosophy under the name\nof _Logic_. Our motive in dissenting from this view cannot be made fully\nintelligible at the present stage of our inquiry, but we may at least\nfollow Lotze in giving a preliminary reason for the separation of the\ntwo sciences. Logic is clearly in a sense a more general inquiry than\nMetaphysics. For in Logic we are concerned with the universal conditions\nunder which thinking, or, to speak more accurately, inference, is\npossible. Now these conditions may be fulfilled by a combination of\npropositions which are materially false. The same relations which give\nrise to an inference materially true from true premisses may yield a\nfalse inference where the premisses are materially false. Valid\nreasoning thus does not always lead to true conclusions. Hence we may\nsay that, whereas Metaphysics deals exclusively with the characteristics\nof reality, Logic deals with the characteristics of the validly\ninferrible, whether real or unreal. The distinction thus established,\nhowever, though real as far as it goes, is not necessarily absolute. For\nit may very well be that in the end the conditions upon which the\npossibility of inference depends are identical with or consequent upon\nthe structure of reality. Even the fact that, under certain conditions,\nwe can imagine an unreal state of things and then proceed to reason\nvalidly as to the results which would follow if this imaginary state\nwere actual, may itself be a consequence of the actual nature of things.\nAnd, as a matter of fact, logicians have always found it impossible to\ninquire very deeply into the foundations and first principles of their\nown science without being led to face fundamental issues of Metaphysics.\nThe distinction between the two studies must thus, according to the\nwell-known simile of Bacon, be compared rather with a vein in a\ncontinuous block of marble than with an actual line of cleavage. Still\nit is at least so far effectual, that while many metaphysical questions\nhave no direct bearing on Logic, the details of the theory of evidence\nare likewise best studied as an independent branch of knowledge.\n\n\n\u00a7 10. In recent years considerable prominence has been attained by a\nbranch of study known as _Epistemology_, or the _Theory of Knowledge_.\nThe _Theory of Knowledge_, like Logic, is primarily concerned with the\nquestion of the conditions upon which the validity of our thinking, as a\nbody of knowledge about reality, depends. It differs from ordinary Logic\nin not inquiring into the details of the various processes of proof, but\nconfining its attention to the most general and ultimate conditions\nunder which valid thinking is possible, and discussing these general\nprinciples more thoroughly and systematically than common Logic usually\ndoes. Since the conditions under which truth is obtainable depend, in\nthe last resort, on the character of that reality which knowledge\napprehends, it is clear that the problems of the _Theory of Knowledge_,\nso far as they do not come under the scope of ordinary Logic (the theory\nof the estimation of evidence), are metaphysical in their nature. As\nactually treated by the writers who give this name to their discussions,\nthe study appears to consist of a mixture of Metaphysics and Logic, the\nmetaphysical element predominating. There is perhaps no serious harm in\nour giving, if we choose, the name _Epistemology_ or _Theory of\nKnowledge_ to our discussions of ultimate principles, but the older\ntitle Metaphysics seems on the whole preferable for two reasons. The\ndiscussion of the implications of knowledge is only one part of the\nmetaphysician\u2019s task. The truly real is not only the knowable, it is\nalso that which, if we can obtain it, realises our aspirations and\nsatisfies our emotions. Hence the theory of the real must deal with the\nultimate implications of practical conduct and \u00e6sthetic feeling as well\nas those of knowledge. The Good and the Beautiful, no less than the\nTrue, are the objects of our study.\n\nAgain, if the name _Theory of Knowledge_ is understood, as it sometimes\nhas been, to suggest that it is possible to study the nature and\ncapabilities of the knowing faculty apart from the study of the contents\nof knowledge, it becomes a source of positive and dangerous mistake. The\ncapabilities and limitations of the knowing faculty can only be\nascertained by inquiring into the truth of its knowledge, regarded as an\napprehension of reality; there is no possible way of severing the\nfaculty, as it were, by abstraction from the results of its exercise,\nand examining its structure, as we might that of a mechanical appliance,\nbefore investigating the value of its achievements. The instrument can\nonly be studied in its work, and we have to judge of its possibilities\nby the nature of its products. It is therefore advisable to indicate, by\nour choice of a name for our subject, that the theory of Knowing is\nnecessarily also a theory of Being.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_,\nIntroduction; L. T. Hobhouse, _The Theory of Knowledge_, Introduction;\nH. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, Introduction (Eng. trans., vol. i. pp. 1-30)\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n The name simply means \u201cwhat comes after Physics,\u201d and probably owes\n its origin to the fact that early editors of Aristotle placed his\n writings on ultimate philosophical questions immediately after his\n physical treatises.\n\nFootnote 2:\n\n For an example of these puzzles, compare the passage (_Republic_, 524)\n where Plato refers to cases in which an apparent contradiction in our\n sensations is corrected by _counting_.\n\nFootnote 3:\n\n Of course we must not assume that \u201c_every_ appearance is _only_\n appearance,\u201d or that \u201cnothing is both reality and appearance.\u201d This is\n just the uncritical kind of preconception which it is the business of\n Metaphysics to test. Whether \u201cevery appearance is only appearance\u201d is\n a point we shall have to discuss later.\n\nFootnote 4:\n\n Cf. F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, pp. 1-4.\n\nFootnote 5:\n\n I may be pardoned for reminding the reader who may be new to our\n subject, that \u201cfacts\u201d and \u201cprocesses\u201d are only properly called\n _phenomena_ when it is intended to imply that as they stand they are\n _not_ genuine realities but only the partially misleading appearance\n of reality which is non-phenomenal or ultra-phenomenal. (We shall do\n well to avoid the pretentious error of calling the ultra-phenomenal,\n _as such_, \u201c_noumenal_.\u201d)\n\nFootnote 6:\n\n _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 12, p. 129 (ed. 1).\n\nFootnote 7:\n\n As, for instance, all mental states are, according to certain\n psychologists, non-quantitative.\n\nFootnote 8:\n\n The student will find H\u00f6ffding\u2019s _History of Modern Philosophy_\n (English translation in 2 vols., Macmillan) particularly valuable for\n the way in which the author brings out the intimate historical\n connection between the development of Metaphysics and the general\n progress of science.\n\nFootnote 9:\n\n For further discussion the reader may be referred to Royce, _The World\n and the Individual_, First Series, Lects. 2 and 4. See also _infra_,\n Bk. IV. chap. 6, \u00a7 2.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION AND THE\n METAPHYSICAL METHOD\n\n\u00a7 1. In the principle that \u201cReality is not self-contradictory\u201d we have a\n universal and certain criterion of reality which is not merely\n negative, but implies the positive assertion that reality is a\n consistent system. \u00a7 2. The validity of this criterion is not\n affected by the suggestion that it may be merely a _Logical_ Law. \u00a7\n 3. Nor by the raising of doubt whether all our knowledge is not\n merely \u201crelative,\u201d a doubt which is itself meaningless. \u00a7 4. As to\n the material of the system, it is experience or immediate psychical\n fact. \u00a7 5. It must be actual experience, not mere \u201cpossibilities\u201d of\n experience; but actual experience must not be identified with\n \u201csensation.\u201d \u00a7 6. Nor must we assume that experience consists of\n subjects _and_ their states; nor, again, that it is a mere\n succession of \u201cstates of consciousness.\u201d \u00a7 7. The _differentia_ of\n matter of experience is its _immediacy_, _i.e_, its combination in a\n single whole of the two aspects of _existence_ and _content_. \u00a7 8.\n This union of existence and content is broken up in reflective\n knowledge or thought, but may be restored at a higher level. \u00a7 9.\n Experience further always appears to be implicitly complex in\n respect of its content. \u00a710. An adequate apprehension of reality\n would only be possible in the form of a complete or \u201cpure\u201d\n experience, at once all-inclusive, systematic, and direct. The\n problem of Metaphysics is to ascertain what would be the general or\n formal character of such an experience, and how far the various\n provinces of our human experience and knowledge approximate to it.\n The knowledge Metaphysics can give us of the ultimate nature of\n reality as it would be present in a complete experience, though\n imperfect, is final as far as it goes. \u00a711. As to the method of\n Metaphysics, it must be _analytical_, _critical_, _non-empirical_,\n and _non-inductive_. It may also be called _a priori_ if we\n carefully avoid confusing the _a priori_ with the psychologically\n primitive. Why our method cannot be the Hegelian Dialectic.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. If we are, in the end, to attach any definite intelligible meaning\nto the distinction between things as they really are and things as they\nmerely appear to be, we must clearly have some universal criterion or\ntest by which the distinction may be made. This criterion must be, in\nthe first place, infallible; that is, must be such that we cannot doubt\nits validity without falling into a contradiction in our thought; and,\nin the next, it must be a characteristic belonging to all reality, as\nsuch, and to nothing else. Thus our criterion must, in the technical\nlanguage of Logic, be the predicate of an exclusive proposition of which\nreality is the subject; we must be able to say, \u201cOnly the real possesses\nthe quality or mark _X_.\u201d The argument of our last chapter should\nalready have suggested that we have such a criterion in the principle\nthat \u201cwhat is real is not self-contradictory, and what is\nself-contradictory is not real.\u201d Freedom from contradiction is a\ncharacteristic which belongs to everything that is real and ultimately\nto nothing else, and we may therefore use it as our test or criterion of\nreality. For, as we have seen in the last chapter, it is precisely our\ninability, without doing violence to the fundamental structure of our\nintellect, to accept the self-contradictory as real which first leads to\nthe drawing of a distinction between the real and the merely apparent;\non the other hand, where we find no contradiction in thought or\nexperience, we have no valid ground for doubting that the contents of\nour experience and thinking are truly real. In every application, even\nthe most simple and rudimentary, of the distinction between what really\nis and what only seems, we are proceeding upon the assumption that, if\nthings as we find them are self-contradictory, we are not yet in\npossession of the truth about them; while, on the other hand, we may\nlegitimately treat the results of our thinking and experience as fully\ntrue until they are shown to involve contradiction. Thus, in setting up\nthe proposition \u201cWhat is real is never self-contradictory\u201d as a\nuniversal criterion, we are only putting into explicit form, and\nproposing to apply universally, a principle involved in all rational\nreflection on the course of things. Audacious as the attempt to make\nsuch a general statement about the whole universe of being appears, it\nis an audacity to which we are fully committed from the first moment of\nour refusing to accept both sides of a contradiction as true.\n\nThe principle that \u201cReality is not self-contradictory\u201d at first sight\nmight appear to be merely negative; we might object that it only tells\nus what reality is _not_, and still leaves us quite in the dark as to\nwhat it _is_. This would, however, be a serious misconception. As we\nlearn from modern scientific Logic, no true and significant negative\njudgment is merely negative; all significant negation is really\nexclusion resting upon a positive basis. I can never, that is, truly\ndeclare that _A is not B_, except on the strength of some piece of\npositive knowledge which is inconsistent with, or excludes, the\npossibility of A being B.[10] My own ignorance or failure to find\nsufficient ground for the assertion _A is B_ is never of itself logical\nwarrant for the judgment _A is not B_; that _A is not B_ I can never\ntruly assert, except on the ground of some other truth which would be\ncontradicted if A were affirmed to be B. Hence to say \u201cReality is not\nself-contradictory\u201d is as much as to say that we have true and certain\nknowledge that reality is positively self-consistent or coherent; that\nis to say that, whatever else it may be, it is at least a systematic\nwhole of some kind or other. How much further our knowledge about\nreality goes, what kind of a whole we can certainly know it to be, it\nwill be the business of succeeding portions of this work to discuss; but\neven at the present stage of the inquiry we can confidently say that\nunless the distinction between the real and the apparent is purely\nmeaningless, it is positively certain that Reality,[11] or the universe,\nis a self-consistent systematic whole.\n\n\u00a7 2. Our declaration that the principle of the self-consistency of the\nreal affords a certain and infallible criterion of reality, may probably\nprovoke a sceptical doubt which is of such importance that we must give\nit full consideration before making any further advance. I state the\ndifficulty in what appears to me its most reasonable and telling form.\n\u201cYour alleged criterion,\u201d it will be said, \u201cis simply the logical Law of\nContradiction expressed in a novel and misleading way. Now, the Law of\nContradiction, like all purely logical laws, is concerned not with real\nthings, but exclusively with the concepts by which we think of them.\nWhen the logician lays it down as a fundamental truth of his science\nthat _A cannot be both B and not B_, his A and B stand not for things\n\u201cin the real world to which our thoughts have reference,\u201d but for\nconcepts which we frame about the things. His law is thus purely what he\ncalls it, a Law of Thought; he says, and says truly, \u201cyou cannot, at the\nsame time, and in the same sense, _think_ both that A is B, and that it\nis not B\u201d; as to whether such a state of things, though unthinkable to\nus, may be real \u201cas a fact,\u201d he makes no assertion. You take this law of\nour thinking, silently assume that it is also a law of the things about\nwhich we think, and go on to set it up as an infallible criterion of\ntheir reality. Your procedure is thus illegitimate, and your pretended\ncriterion a thing of nought.\u201d[12]\n\nOur reply to this common sceptical objection will incidentally throw an\ninteresting light on what was said in the last chapter of the close\nconnection between the problems of Logic and those of Metaphysics. In\nthe first place, we may at least meet the sceptic with an effective _tu\nquoque_. It is you yourself, we may say, who are most open to the charge\nof illegitimate assumption. Your whole contention rests upon the\nassumption, for which you offer no justification, that because the Law\nof Contradiction is admittedly a law of thought, it is therefore _only_\na law of thought; if you wish us to accept such a momentous conclusion,\nyou ought at least to offer us something in the nature of a reason for\nit. Nor shall we stop here; we shall go on to argue that the sceptic\u2019s\ninterpretation of the Law of Contradiction rests on a positive\nconfusion. By a Law of Thought may be meant either (_a_) a\n_psychological_ law, a true general statement as to the way in which we\nactually do think, or (_b_) a _logical_ law, a true general statement as\nto the conditions under which our thinking is valid; the plausibility of\nthe sceptical argument arises from an unconscious confusion between\nthese two very different senses of the term. Now, in the first place, it\nseems doubtful whether the principle of contradiction is even true, if\nit is put forward as a psychological law. It would be, at least, very\nhard to say whether a human being is capable or not of holding at once\nand with equal conviction the truth of two contradictory propositions.\nCertainly it is not uncommon to meet persons who do fervently profess\nequal belief in propositions which _we_ can see to be inconsistent; on\nthe other hand, they are usually themselves unaware of the\ninconsistency. Whether, in all cases, they would, if made aware of the\ninconsistency, revise their belief, is a question which it is easier to\nask than to answer. But it is at any rate certain that the logician does\nnot intend his Law of Contradiction to be taken as a psychological\nproposition as to what I can or cannot succeed in believing. He means it\nto be understood in a purely logical sense, as a statement about the\nconditions under which any thought is valid. What he says is not that I\ncannot at once think that A is B and that it is not B, but that, if I\nthink so, my thinking cannot be _true_. Now, to think truly about things\nis to think in accord with their real nature, to think of them as they\nreally are, not as they merely appear to an imperfect apprehension to\nbe; hence to say that non-contradiction is a fundamental condition of\ntrue thinking is as much as to say that it is a fundamental\ncharacteristic of real existence. Just because the Law of Contradiction\nis a logical law, it cannot be _only_ a logical law, but must be a\nmetaphysical law as well. If the sceptic is to retain his sceptical\nposition, he must include Logic along with Metaphysics in the compass of\nhis doubts, as the thorough-going sceptics of antiquity had the courage\nto do.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. But now suppose the sceptic takes this line. All our truth, he may\nsay, is only relatively truth, and even the fundamental conditions of\ntrue thought are only valid _relatively_ and for us. What right have you\nto assume their _absolute_ validity, and to argue from it to the real\nconstitution of things? Now, what does such a doubt mean, and is it\nrational? The answer to this question follows easily from what we have\nalready learnt about the logical character of denial. Doubt, which is\ntentative denial, like negation, which is completed denial, logically\npresupposes positive knowledge of some kind or other. It is never\nrational to doubt the truth of a specific proposition except on the\nstrength of your possession of positive truth with which the suggested\njudgment appears to be in conflict. This is, of course, obvious in cases\nwhere we hesitate to accept a statement as true on the ground that we do\nnot see how to reconcile it with another specific statement already\nknown, or believed, to be true. It is less obvious, but equally clear on\nreflection, in the cases where we suspend our judgment on the plea of\ninsufficient evidence. Apart from positive knowledge, however defective,\nas to the kind and amount of evidence which _would_, if forthcoming, be\nsufficient to prove the proposition, expressions of doubt and of belief\nare equally impertinent; unless I know, to some extent at least, what\nevidence is wanted, how indeed am I to judge whether the evidence\nproduced is sufficient or not?[13] Thus we see that the paradox of Mr.\nBradley, that rational doubt itself logically implies infallibility in\nrespect of some part of our knowledge, is no more than the simple truth.\nWe see also that the doubt whether the ultimate presuppositions of valid\nthinking may not be merely \u201crelatively\u201d valid, has no meaning. If the\nsceptic\u2019s doubt whether Reality is ultimately the self-consistent system\nthat it must be if any of our thinking can be true is to lay any claim\nto rationality, it must take the form of the assertion, \u201cI positively\nknow something about the nature of Reality which makes it reasonable to\nthink that Reality is incoherent,\u201d or \u201cSelf-consistency is inconsistent\nwith what I positively know of the nature of Reality.\u201d Thus the sceptic\nis forced, not merely to lay claim to absolute and certain knowledge,\nbut to use the test of consistency itself for the purpose of disproving\nor questioning its own validity. Our criterion of Reality, then, has\nbeen proved infallible by the surest of methods; we have shown that its\ntruth has to be assumed in the very process of calling it in question.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. Reality, then, in spite of the sceptic\u2019s objections, is truly known\nto be a connected and self-consistent, or internally coherent, system;\ncan we with equal confidence say anything of the data of which the\nsystem is composed? Reflection should convince us that we can at least\nsay as much as this: all the materials or data of reality consist of\n_experience_, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical\nmatter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. In other words,\nwhatever forms part of presentation, will, or emotion, must in some\nsense and to some degree possess reality and be a part of the material\nof which reality, as a systematic whole, is composed; whatever does not\ninclude, as part of its nature, this indissoluble relation to immediate\nfeeling, and therefore does not enter into the presentation, will, and\nemotion of which psychical life is composed, is not real. The real is\nexperience, and nothing but experience, and experience consists of\n\u201cpsychical matter of fact.\u201d[14]\n\nProof of this proposition can only be given in the same way as of any\nother ultimate truth, by making trial of it; if you doubt it you may be\nchallenged to perform the experiment of thinking of anything whatever,\nno matter what, as real, and then explaining what you mean by its\nreality. Thus suppose you say \u201cI can think of A as real,\u201d A being any\nthing in the universe; now think, as you always can, of an imaginary or\nunreal A, and then try to state the difference between the A which is\nthought of as real and the A which is thought of as merely imaginary. As\nKant proved, in the famous case of the real and the imagined hundred\ndollars, the difference does not lie in any of the qualities or\nproperties of the two A\u2019s; the qualities of the imagined hundred dollars\nare precisely the same as those of the real sum, only that they are\n\u201cimaginary.\u201d Like the real dollars, the imagined dollars are thought of\nas possessing such and such a size, shape, and weight; stamped with such\nand such an effigy and inscription; containing such and such a\nproportion of silver to alloy; having such and such a purchasing power\nin the present condition of the market, and so forth. The only\ndifference is that the real dollars are, or under specified and known\nconditions may be, the objects of direct perception, while the imaginary\nones, because imaginary, cannot be given in direct perception. You\ncannot see or handle them; you can only imagine yourself doing so. It is\nin this connection with immediate psychical fact that the reality of the\nreal coins lies. So with any other instance of the same experiment. Show\nme, we might say, anything which you regard as real,\u2014no matter what it\nis, a stone wall, an \u00e6sthetic effect, a moral virtue,\u2014and I will ask you\nto think of an unreal and imaginary counterpart of that same thing, and\nwill undertake to prove to you that what makes the difference between\nthe reality and the imagination is always that the real thing is\nindissolubly connected with the psychical life of a sentient subject,\nand, as so connected, is psychical matter of fact.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. Two points should be carefully noted if we wish to avoid serious\nmisapprehension. It might be objected, by a disciple of Kant or of Mill,\nthat a thing may be real without ever being given as actual psychical\nfact in immediate apprehension, so long as its nature is such that it\n_would_ be psychical fact under known and specified conditions. Many, if\nnot most, of the objects of scientific knowledge, it may be said, are of\nthis kind; they have never entered, possibly never will enter, into the\ncontents of any man\u2019s direct apprehension, yet we rightly call them\nreal, in the sense that they would be apprehended under certain known\nconditions. Thus I have never seen, and do not expect that any one ever\nwill see, the centre of the earth, or, to take a still stronger case, no\none has ever seen his own brain. Yet I call the centre of the earth or\nmy own brain real, in the sense that _if_ I could, without ceasing to\nlive, penetrate to a certain depth below the soil, I _should_ find the\ncentre of the earth; _if_ an opening were made in my skull, and a\nsuitable arrangement of mirrors devised, I _should_ see the reflection\nof my own brain. A comet may be rushing through unpeopled space entirely\nunbeheld; yet it does not cease for all that to be real, for _if_ I were\nthere I _should_ see it, and so forth. Hence the Kantian will tell us\nthat reality is constituted by relation to _possible_ experience; the\nfollower of Mill, that it means \u201ca permanent _possibility_ of\nsensation.\u201d\n\nNow, there is, of course, an element of truth in these arguments. It is\ntrue that what immediately enters into the course of my own direct\nperception is but a fragment of the full reality of the universe. It is\ntrue, again, that there is much which in its own nature is capable of\nbeing perceived by human beings, but will, as far as we can judge, never\nbe perceived, owing to the physical impossibility of placing ourselves\nunder the conditions requisite for perception; there are other things\nwhich could only be perceived if some modification could be effected in\nthe structure of our perceptive organs. And it may therefore be quite\nsufficient for the purposes of some sciences to define these unperceived\nrealities as \u201cpossibilities of sensation,\u201d processes which we do not\nperceive but might perceive under known or knowable conditions. But the\ndefinition, it will be seen, is a purely negative one; it takes note of\nthe fact that we do not actually perceive certain things, without\ntelling us anything positive as to their nature. In Metaphysics, where\nwe are concerned to discover the very meaning of reality, we cannot\navoid asking whether such a purely negative account of the reality of\nthe greater part of the universe is finally satisfactory. And we can\neasily see that it is not. For what do we mean when we talk of the\n\u201cpossible\u201d? Not simply \u201cthat which is not actual,\u201d for this includes the\nmerely imaginary and the demonstrably impossible. The events of next\nweek, the constitution of Utopia, and the squaring of the circle are all\nalike in not being actual. Shall we say, then, that the possible differs\nfrom the imaginary in being what would, under known conditions, be\nactual? But again, we may make correct inferences as to what would be\nactual under conditions suspected, or even known, to be merely\nimaginary, and no one will maintain that such consequences are\nrealities. If I were at the South Pole I should see the Polar ice, and\nit is therefore real, you say, though no one actually sees it; but if\nwishes were horses, beggars would ride, yet you do not say that the\nriding of beggars is real. Considerations of this kind lead us to modify\nour first definition of the \u201cpossible\u201d which is to be also real. We are\ndriven to say that, in the case of the unperceived real thing, all the\nconditions of perception except the presence of a percipient with\nsuitable perceptive organs, _really exist_. Thus the ice at the South\nPole really exists, because the only unfulfilled condition for its\nperception is the presence at the Pole of a being with sense-organs of a\ncertain type. But once more, what do we mean by the distinction between\nconditions of perception which are imaginary and conditions which really\nexist? We come back once more to our original experiment, and once more,\ntry as we will, we shall find that by the real condition as\ndistinguished from the imaginary we can mean nothing but a state of\nthings which is, in the last resort, guaranteed by the evidence of\nimmediate apprehension. If we take the term \u201cactual\u201d to denote that\nwhich is thus indissoluble from immediate apprehension, or is psychical\nmatter of fact, we may sum up our result by saying we have found that\nthe real is also actual, or that there is no reality which is not at the\nsame time an actuality. We shall thus be standing on the same ground as\nthe modern logicians who tell us that there is no possibility outside\nactual existence, and that statements about the possible, when they have\nany meaning at all, are always an indirect way of imparting information\nabout actualities.[15] Thus \u201cThere really exists ice at the South Pole,\nthough no human eye beholds it,\u201d if it is to mean anything, must mean\n_either_ that the ice itself, as we should perceive it if we were there,\nor that certain unknown conditions which, combined with the presence of\na human spectator, would yield the perception of the ice, actually exist\nas part of the contents of an experience which is not our own.[16]\n\nThe second point to which we must be careful to attend may be dismissed\nmore briefly. In defining experience as \u201cimmediate feeling\u201d or \u201cthe\ncontent of immediate feeling\u201d or \u201capprehension,\u201d[17] we must not be\nunderstood to mean that it is in particular _sensation_. Sensation is\nonly one feature of immediate feeling or apprehension, a feature which\nwe only distinguish from others by means of a laborious psychological\nanalysis. A pleasure or pain, an emotion of any kind, the satisfaction\nof a craving while actually present, are felt or apprehended no less\nimmediately than a sense-perception. I am aware of the difference\nbetween actually feeling pleasure or pain, actually being moved by love\nor anger, actually getting the satisfaction of a want, and merely\nthinking of these processes, in precisely the same way in which I am\naware of the difference between actually seeing a blue expanse and\nmerely thinking of seeing it. A real emotion or wish differs from an\nimagined one precisely as a real sensation differs from an imaginary\nsensation. How exactly the difference is to be described is a question,\nand unfortunately at present an unduly neglected question, for\nPsychology; for our present purpose we must be content to indicate it as\none which can be experienced at will by any reader who will take the\ntrouble to compare an actual state of mind with the mere thought of the\nsame state. Of the epistemological or metaphysical interpretation of the\ndistinction more will be said in the course of the next few paragraphs.\nAs an instance of its applicability to other aspects of mind than the\npurely sensational, we may take Kant\u2019s own example of the hundred\ndollars. The real hundred dollars may be distinguished from the\nimaginary, if we please, by the fact that they can be actually touched\nand seen; but we might equally make the distinction turn on the fact\nthat the real coins will enable us to satisfy our desires, while the\nimaginary will not.[18]\n\n\n\u00a7 6. In the present state of philosophical opinion, the proposition that\n\u201cwhatever is real consists of experience,\u201d or again, \u201cof psychical\nmatter of fact,\u201d is in danger not so much of being rejected, as of being\naccepted in a fundamentally false sense. If we are to avoid the danger\nof such misunderstanding, we must be careful to insist that our\nprinciple does not assert that _mere_ actuality is a complete and\nsufficient account of the nature of reality. When we say that there is\nnothing real outside the world of psychical fact, we are not saying that\nreality is _merely_ psychical fact as such. What we do say is that,\nhowever much more it may be, it is at least that. How much more we can\nsay of reality, beyond the bare statement that it is made up of\nexperiences or psychical matters of fact, it is the task of our\nmetaphysical science to determine; at present our problem, though given\nto us in its general elements, still awaits solution. In particular, we\nmust take care not to fall into the error of so-called \u201cSubjective\nIdealism.\u201d We must not say that reality consists of \u201c_the states of\nconsciousness of sentient subjects_\u201d or of \u201c_subjects, and their\nstates_.\u201d We must not falsify our data as metaphysicians by starting\nwith the assumption that the psychical facts of which reality is made up\nare directly experienced as \u201cstates\u201d or \u201cmodifications\u201d of \u201csubjects\u201d\nwhich are their possessors. Such a theory would in fact contradict\nitself, for the \u201csubject\u201d or \u201cI,\u201d who am by the hypothesis the owner of\nthe \u201cstates,\u201d is never itself given as a \u201cstate of consciousness.\u201d Hence\nHume was perfectly correct when he argued from the principle that\nnothing exists but states of consciousness, to the conclusion that the\nthinker or \u201csubject,\u201d not being himself a state of consciousness, is an\nillusion. Yet, on the other hand, if there is no thinker or subject to\n\u201cown\u201d the passing states, they are not properly \u201cstates\u201d or\n\u201cmodifications\u201d of anything. Apart from this explicit contradiction in\nthe formulation of the theory that all things are \u201cstates of\nconsciousness,\u201d we must also object that the theory itself is not a\nstatement of the data of experience, but a hypothesis about their\nconnection. The division of experience into the self or the subject on\nthe one side and its states on the other is not given in our immediate\napprehension, but made in the progress of reflection on the contents of\napprehension. Sensible things and their properties never appear to us in\nour direct apprehension of them to be states or modifications of\nourselves; that they really are this and nothing more is simply one\nhypothesis among others which we devise to meet certain difficulties in\nour thought. Reality comes to us from the first in the guise of pieces\nof psychical fact; we feel certain, again, that these pieces must\nsomehow form part of a coherent whole or system. We try to understand\nand account for this systematic character of the real on the supposition\nthat the matters of fact of which it consists are connected with one\nanother through the permanent character of the \u201csubjects\u201d to which they\nbelong as temporary \u201cstates\u201d or \u201cmodifications.\u201d But this special\ninterpretation of the way in which the facts of experience form a system\nis no part of our initial postulate as to the general nature of the\nreal; it is simply one among other theories of the concrete character of\nthe universe, and it is for Metaphysics itself to test its merits.\n\nSimilarly, we should be making an unwarranted addition to our initial\npostulate about Reality if we identified it with the doctrine of Hume\nand his followers, according to whom what really exists is _merely_ a\nseries of \u201cimpressions and ideas\u201d connected by certain psychological\nlaws of succession, any profounder structural unity of experience being\ndismissed as a \u201cfiction of the mind.\u201d The secret of the fallacy here\nlies in the _petitio principii_ committed by the introduction of the\nword \u201cmerely\u201d into our statement. From the identification of reality\nwith psychical facts which somehow form a systematic unity, it does not\nin the least follow that the _only_ unity possessed by the facts is that\nof conformity to a certain law or laws of sequence. _That_ all reality\nconsists of psychical facts, and _that_ these facts must form a system,\nwe are, as we have already seen, entitled to assert as a fundamental\nmetaphysical principle which cannot be doubted without falling into\ncontradiction; _how_ they do so we have yet to discover, if we can.\n\nThe merits of the Humian solution of the problem will come before us for\nconsideration at a later stage; the impossibility of assuming it without\ninquiry as a principle, may perhaps be brought home to the mind of the\nreader by a simple illustration. Take the case of any \u00e6sthetic whole,\nsuch as, for instance, the play of _Hamlet_. The play of _Hamlet_\nconsists, for the student who reads it in his closet, of a succession of\nprinted words. These words form the whole material of the play; it is\ncomposed of them all and of nothing else. Again, the words which are the\nmaterial of the play are connected by the grammatical and euphonic laws\nwhich regulate the construction of English sentences, and the metrical\nlaws of English dramatic versification. Thus it would be a true\ndescription of the play, as far as it goes, to say that it is a series\nof words put together in accordance with grammatical and metrical laws.\nIt would, however, be positively false to say that _Hamlet_ is nothing\nmore than such a succession of words; its character as a work of art\ndepends entirely on the fact that it possesses, as a whole, a further\nunity of structure and aim, that the words and sentences which are its\nmaterial embody an internally coherent representation of human character\nand purpose. Apart from this inner unity of meaning, mere uniformity of\ngrammatical and metrical construction would not of themselves constitute\na work of art. It will be one object of our later discussions to show\nthat what is thus obviously true of an \u00e6sthetic whole is universally\ntrue of every genuine system or totality.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. The data or material of reality, then, are facts of experience, and\nnothing but facts of experience.[19] And experience, we have said, means\nfor our purposes _immediate_ feeling or apprehension. What _immediacy_\nmeans, as we have already seen, we cannot further explain in\npsychological terms, except by saying that it is what distinguishes an\nactual mental state from the mere thought of that state. The reason why,\nin Psychology, we have to be content with such an account is manifest.\nTo characterise immediate feeling further, we should have to identify\nthe _qualities_ by which it is universally marked off from what is not\nimmediate. We should, in fact, have to describe it in general terms, and\nbefore we can do this we must cease to feel or apprehend directly, and\ngo on to reflect upon and analyse the contents of our apprehension. What\nour psychological description depicts is never the experience as it\nactually was while we were having it, but the experience as it appears\nfrom the point of view of subsequent reflection, interpreted in the\nlight of all sorts of conscious or unconscious hypotheses about its\nconditions and its constituents. Thus our psychological descriptions\ndepend for their very possibility upon the recognition of distinctions\nwhich are not present, as such, in the experience itself as directly\npresented to us but created by later reflection about it From the point\nof view of Metaphysics, however, it is possible to specify one universal\ncharacteristic of immediate feeling, which is of the utmost importance\nfor our theories of reality and of knowledge. When we reflect upon any\npsychical fact whatever, we may distinguish within it two very different\naspects. There is, in the first place, the fact that it _does_ happen,\nthat it is a genuine psychical occurrence,\u2014the existence or _that_, as\nwe may call it, of the piece of psychical fact in question; and there is\nalso the peculiar character or quality which gives _this_ mental\noccurrence its unique nature as distinguished from any other which might\nconceivably have been presented in its stead,\u2014the content or _what_ of\nthe psychical fact. Thus a simple colour-sensation, say that of green,\nhas its _that_,\u2014it is actually present, and is thus distinguished from a\nmerely remembered or anticipated sensation; it has also its _what_,\u2014the\npeculiar quality by which it is distinguished, for example, from a\nsensation of blue. So again with an imagined sensation; it is actually\nimagined, the imagining of it is an actual occurrence with its\nparticular place in the course of the occurrences which together make up\nmy mental life; and again, it is the imagination of some content with\nqualities of its own by which it is distinguished from any other\ncontent.\n\nThe most striking illustration of the presence of these distinguishable\naspects in all psychical occurrences is, of course, afforded by the case\nof error or illusion, the essence of which is the false apprehension of\nthe _what_. Thus, when an ignorant villager sees a ghost, or a\nhypochondriac is tormented by \u201cimaginary\u201d symptoms of disease, the ghost\nor the malady is not simply non-existent; something is actually seen or\nfelt, but the error consists in a mistake as to the nature of what is\nseen or felt. Now, the peculiarity by which direct and immediate\napprehension is distinguished, for the metaphysician, from subsequent\nreflection about the contents of apprehension, is that in immediate\napprehension itself we are not conscious of the distinction between\nthese two aspects of psychical fact. The immediately experienced is\nalways a _this-what_ or process-content[20] in which the distinction of\nthe _this_ from the _what_ does not enter into consciousness. In any act\nof reflection, on the other hand, the _what_ is explicitly distinguished\nfrom the _that_, and then ascribed to it as something which can be truly\nsaid about it. The judgment or proposition, which is the characteristic\nform in which the result of reflection finds its expression, consists,\nin its most rudimentary shape, of the embodiment of this distinction in\nthe separation of predicate from subject, and the subsequent affirmation\nof the first about the second. The work of thought or knowledge in\nmaking our world more intelligible to us essentially consists in the\nprogressive analysis of a content or _what_, considered in abstraction\nfrom the _this_ to which it belongs. The _this_ may, as in the singular\njudgment or the particular judgment of perception, actually appear in\nour propositions as the subject to which the _what_ is explicitly\nascribed; or again, as in the true universals of science, both the\npredicate and the ostensible subject of the proposition may belong to\nthe content analysed, and the _this_, or directly apprehended reality of\nwhich the content forms an attribute, may not appear in the proposition\nat all. This is why the true universal judgment has long been seen by\nlogicians to be essentially hypothetical, and why, again, thought or\nknowledge always appears to the common-sense man to be dealing with\nrealities which have previously been given independently of the \u201cwork of\nthe mind.\u201d He is only wrong in this view because he forgets that what is\ngiven in this way is merely the _that_ or existence of the world of real\nbeing, not its _what_ or content in its true character as ultimately\nascertained by scientific thought.[21]\n\n\u00a7 8. The fundamental characteristic of experience, then, for the\nmetaphysician, is its immediacy: the fact that in experience as such the\nexistence and the content of what is apprehended are not mentally\nseparated. This immediacy may be due, as in the case of mere\nuninterpreted sensation, to the absence of reflective analysis of the\ngiven into its constituent aspects or elements. But it may also be due,\nas we shall have opportunities to see more fully later on, to the fusion\nat a higher level into a single directly apprehended whole of results\noriginally won by the process of abstraction and reflection. There is an\nimmediacy of experience which is below mediate reflective knowledge but\nthere is also a higher immediacy which is above it. To explain and\njustify this statement will be the work of subsequent chapters; for the\npresent we may be content to illustrate it by a simple example. A work\nof art with an intricate internal structure, such, for instance, as a\nmusical composition or a chess problem, as directly presented to the\nartistically uncultivated man, is little more than a mere succession of\nimmediately given data in which the aspects of existence and content are\nas yet hardly separated; it has no significance or meaning, but merely\n_is_. As education in the perception of artistic form proceeds, the\nseparation becomes at first more and more prominent. Each subordinate\npart of the structure now acquires a meaning or significance in virtue\nof its place in the whole, and this meaning is at first something over\nand above the directly presented character of the part, something which\nhas to be grasped by reflective analysis and comparison of part with\npart. The individual part has now, through analysis of its content, come\nto mean or stand for something outside itself, namely, its relation to\nall the other parts. But with the completion of our \u00e6sthetic education\nthe immediacy thus destroyed is once more restored. To the fully trained\nperception the meaning of the composition or the problem, its structure\nas an artistic whole, is no longer something which has to be pieced\ntogether and inferred by reflective comparison: it is now directly\napprehended as a structural unity. The composition has a meaning, and\nthus the results of the intermediate stage of reflection and comparison\nare not lost, but taken up into the completed experience. But the\nmeaning is no longer external to the existence of the composition; it is\nwhat it means, and it means what it is.[22] We may subsequently see that\nwhat is thus strikingly illustrated by the case of artistic perception\nholds good, to a greater or less degree, of all advance in the\nunderstanding of reality. It is perhaps the fundamental philosophical\ndefect of what is popularly called Mysticism that it ignores this\ndifference between a higher and a lower immediacy, and thus attempts to\nrestore the direct contact with felt reality which scientific reflection\ninevitably loosens by simply undoing the work of analytic thought and\nreverting to the standpoint of mere uninterpreted feeling.[23]\n\n\u00a7 9. We may perhaps specify one further characteristic which seems, at\nleast, to belong to every datum of immediate experience. Every\nexperience seems to be implicitly complex, that is, its aspect of\n_content_ appears never to be absolutely simple, but always to contain a\nplurality of aspects, which, as directly felt, are not distinct, but are\nat the same time distinguishable as soon as we begin by reflection to\ndescribe and analyse it. From the nature of the case this complexity\ncannot be directly ascertained by inspection, for the inspection itself\npresupposes that we are dealing with the experience not as immediately\nfelt, but as already sufficiently analysed and reflected upon to be\ndescribed in general terms. Indirectly, however, our result seems to be\nestablished by the consideration that, as soon as we reflect upon the\ngiven at all, we find these distinguishable aspects within its content,\nand that, unless they were there implicitly from the first, it is hard\nto see how the mere process of reflection could have given birth to\nthem. Thus, for instance, in even the most rudimentary experience there\nwould appear to be something answering to the distinction between the\npresentational quality of a sensation and its accompanying tone of\npleasure or pain. It is difficult, again, not to think that in any\nsentient experience there must be some difference between elements which\ncorrespond to more or less stable conditions of the sentient organism\nitself (\u201corganic sensation\u201d) and those which correspond to relatively\nnovel and infrequent features of the environment. Some philosophers\nwould indeed be prepared to go further, and to maintain that a more or\nless explicit consciousness of distinction between self and not-self, or\nagain between subject and object, is logically involved in the very\npossibility of an experience. The question, as a psychological one, need\nnot be raised here; it must, however, be carefully remarked that\nwhatever view we may adopt as to the number and character of the aspects\nwhich analysis reveals within the contents of the simplest experience,\nthose aspects, as directly apprehended, originally constitute an\nunanalysed whole. Our various subsequent analyses all presuppose\ntheories as to the ultimate _what_ of experience which it is the\nbusiness of Metaphysics to test.\n\n\u00a7 10. Our foregoing discussion of the metaphysical criterion will\nsuggest a fairly definite ideal of what a completely adequate\napprehension of the whole of reality would be. A completely adequate\napprehension of reality would be one which contained all reality and\nnothing but reality, and thus involved no element whatever of deceptive\nappearance. As such it would, in the first place, be all-embracing; it\nwould include in itself every datum of direct experience, and, since\nnothing but data of experience, or, as we have also called them, matters\nof psychical fact, are the materials of reality, it would contain\nnothing else. In the second place, it would contain all its data without\ncontradiction or discrepancy as part of a single system with a\nharmonious internal structure of its own. For wherever there is\ndiscrepancy, as we have already seen, there is imperfect and therefore\npartially false appearance. And, in the third place, such an\nall-embracing harmonious apprehension of the whole data of experience\nwould clearly transcend that separation of existence from content which\nis temporarily effected by our own efforts to restate _our_ experience\nin a consistent form. It would, because complete in itself, involve at a\nhigher level that immediacy which, at a lower level, we know as\ncharacteristic of feeling. It would thus experience the whole of real\nexistence directly as a system with internal consistency and structure,\nbut without any reference to anything beyond itself. As we said of the\nartistic whole, so we may say of the whole of existence as it might be\napprehended by a completed insight, it would be what it meant, and mean\nwhat it was. To such an ideally complete experience of reality as a\nsingle system, by way of marking its exclusively experiential nature, we\nmay give the name, introduced into Philosophy by Avenarius, of a \u201cpure\u201d\nexperience, that is, an experience which is in all its parts experience\nand nothing else. Of course, in adopting the name, we are not\nnecessarily identifying ourselves with the further views of Avenarius as\nto what in particular the structure of such an experience would be.\n\nOur own human experience clearly falls far short of such an ideal, and\nthat for two reasons. To begin with, our experience is incomplete in\nrespect of its data: there is much in reality which never directly\nenters into the structure of our experience at all. Of much of what\nfalls within the scope of our knowledge we can only say, in a general\nway, how it would appear to ourselves supposing certain conditions of\nits perceptibility to be realised, and even these conditions are usually\nonly most imperfectly known. What the actual matters of psychical fact\ncorresponding to these conditions and to the appearance which they would\ndetermine for us are, we are totally unable to say. Again, there may\nwell be much in the real world which never, even in this indirect way,\nenters into the structure of human knowledge at all. Hence our human\nexperience and the intellectual constructions by which we seek to\ninterpret it have always the character of being piecemeal and\nfragmentary. Perfect apprehension of systematic reality as a whole would\nbe able to deduce from any one fact in the universe the nature of every\nother fact. Or rather, as the whole would be presented at once in its\nentirety, there would be no need for the deduction; every fact would be\ndirectly seen as linked with every other by the directly intuited nature\nof the system to which all facts belong. But in our imperfect human\napprehension of the world our facts appear to be largely given us in\nisolation and independence of one another as bare \u201ccasual conjunctions\u201d\nor \u201ccollocations,\u201d and the hypotheses by which we seek to weld them into\na system, however largely determined by the character of our data, never\nquite get rid of an element of arbitrary \u201cfree\u201d construction. They are\nnever fully necessitated as to their entirety by the nature of the facts\nthey serve to connect. Hence we can never be certain that our\nhypothetical constructions themselves are true in the sense of\nconsisting of statements of what for a completed experience would be\nmatters of fact. Our ideal is to connect our presented facts by\nconstructions in which each link is itself matter of fact, or\nexperience, in the sense that it would under known conditions form the\ncontent of a direct apprehension. But it is an ideal which, owing to the\nfragmentary character of our own experience, we are never able\nadequately to realise. In all our sciences we are constantly compelled\nto use hypothetical constructions, which often are, and for all we know\nalways may be, merely \u201csymbolic,\u201d in the sense that, though useful in\nthe co-ordination of experienced data, they could never themselves\nbecome objects of direct experience, because they conflict either with\nthe general nature of experience as such, or with the special nature of\nthe particular experiences in which they would have to be presented. Our\nscientific hypotheses thus present a close analogy with the\nuninterpretable stages in the application of an algebraical calculus to\na numerical or geometrical subject-matter. Their usefulness in enabling\nus to co-ordinate and predict facts of direct experience need no more\nguarantee their own reality, than the usefulness of such a calculus\nguarantees our ability to find an intelligible interpretation for all\nthe symbolic operations it involves.[24] In a pure or completed\nexperience, at once all-comprehending and systematic, where existence\nand content, fact and construction, were no longer separated, there\ncould of course be no place for such ultimately uninterpretable\nsymbolism.\n\nOur fundamental metaphysical problem, then, is that of discovering, if\nwe can, the general or formal characteristics of such a complete or\n\u201cpure\u201d experience, _i.e._ those characteristics which belong to it\nsimply in virtue of its all-containing and completely systematic nature.\nFurther, it would be the work of a completed Metaphysic to ascertain\nwhich among the universal characteristics of our own human experience of\nthe world are such as must belong to any coherent experience in virtue\nof its nature, and are thus identifiable with the formal characteristics\nof a \u201cpure\u201d experience. Also, our science would have to decide what\nfeatures of human experience, among those which do not possess this\ncharacter, approximate most nearly to it, and would thus require least\nmodification in order to enable them to take their place in an\nabsolutely complete and harmonious experience of reality. If we could\ncompletely carry out our programme, we should, in the first place, have\na general conception of what in outline the constitution of experienced\nreality as a systematic whole is; and, in the second, we should be able\nto arrange the various concepts and categories by which we seek, alike\nin everyday thinking and in the various sciences, to interpret the world\nof our experience, in an ascending order of degrees of truth and\nreality, according to the extent to which they would require to be\nmodified before they could become adequate to express the nature of a\nsystematic experienced reality. The knowledge conveyed by such a science\nwould, of course, not be itself the pure or all-embracing experience of\nReality, but merely mediate knowledge about the general nature of such\nan experience, and would therefore, so far, be like all mere knowledge\nabout an object, abstract and imperfect. It would still refer to\nsomething beyond itself, and thus have a meaning other than its own\nexistence. But, unlike all other knowledge, our metaphysical knowledge\nof the formal character of an all-inclusive experienced whole would be\n_final_, in the sense that no addition of fresh knowledge could modify\nit in principle. Fresh knowledge, which in all other cases involves at\nleast the possibility of a transformation of existing theories, would\nhere do no more than fill in and make more concrete our conception of\nthe system of Reality, without affecting our insight into its general\nstructure.\n\nWe may perhaps illustrate this conception of a knowledge which, though\nimperfect, is yet final, by an instance borrowed from elementary\nMathematics. We know absolutely and precisely, _e. g._, what the symbol\n\u03c0 stands for. \u03c0 is completely determined for us by the definition that\nit is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. And\nagain, we can define unequivocally both the terms, circumference and\ndiameter of the circle, which we have employed in our definition of \u03c0.\nThus our knowledge of the meaning of the symbol is clearly final; no\nfresh accretion to our knowledge will make any modification in it. At\nthe same time, our knowledge of \u03c0, though final, is imperfect. For the\nquantity \u03c0 is incommensurable, and thus we can never precisely evaluate\nit. All we can do is to assign its value correctly within any desired\ndegree of approximation. Again, while no approximation gives an\nabsolutely correct value for the quantity, one approximation is, of\ncourse, closer than another. Because no approximation is more than\napproximately the truth, it by no means follows that all are equally\nwide of the mark. Similarly, it may well be that, though we can say with\nfinality what the general nature of experience and experienced Reality\nas a systematic whole is, yet, when we come to ask after the character\nof the system in detail, we have to depend on sciences which are merely\napproximate in their results; it will not follow, as is sometimes\nassumed, that the categories of one science do not present us with a\nnearer approximation to the absolute truth than those of another.[25]\n\n\u00a7 11. We may end this chapter with some general reflections on the\n_method_ required for such a science of Metaphysics as we have described\nin the preceding paragraphs. The true character of any scientific method\ncan, of course, only be discovered by the actual use of it; a\npreliminary disquisition on the nature of a method not previously\nexhibited in actual use is apt to be at best sterile, and at worst a\npositive source of prejudices which may subsequently seriously hamper\nthe process of investigation. Still, there are certain general\ncharacteristics of the method imposed on us by our conception of the\nproblems to be solved which may conveniently be pointed out at this\nstage of our inquiry. Our method will, in the first place, clearly be\n_analytical_ and _critical_ in its character. We analyse experience with\na view to discovering its implications, and we analyse our various\nscientific and unscientific theories of the contents of the world-system\nfor the same purpose. Also, once having determined what are the formal\ncharacteristics of an all-embracing, systematic whole of experienced\nfact, we criticise our various concepts and theories by reference to\nthese characteristics as an ultimate standard of reality and truth.\nNegatively, we may add that our method is _non-empirical_, and also\n_non-inductive_, in the same sense in which pure Mathematics, for\ninstance, may be called non-inductive. It is non-empirical inasmuch as\nwe are called upon to analyse all our data and criticise all our\npre-conceived theories. We are not allowed to accept any fact without\nanalysis, or any concept without criticism, as an unchallenged datum\nupon which we may build without preliminary justification. Hence our\nmethod is non-empirical. Also, as our analysis is concerned entirely\nwith the internal character and self-consistency of the data analysed,\nit is, like the reasonings of pure Mathematics, independent of external\nconfirmation outside the analysed data themselves, and is therefore\nnon-inductive.[26] In precisely the same sense our method and its\nresults may be called, if we please, _a priori_; that is to say, we\nproceed entirely by internal analysis of certain data, and are, alike in\nprocedure and result, independent of experience outside the experience\nwe are concerned with analysing. We can, of course, add that our method\nis _constructive_, that is, if successfully carried out it would\nculminate in an intellectual attitude towards the world which, as an\nintellectual attitude, we did not possess before entering on our study\nof Metaphysics; but as construction, in this sense, is characteristic of\nall scientific method, it does not seem necessary to specify it as a\npeculiarity of metaphysical procedure in particular.\n\nHistorically, our conception of metaphysical method as fundamentally\nanalytical and directed to the detection and removal of internal\ncontradictions in the categories of ordinary thought, is perhaps\nnearer to the view of Herbart than to that of any other great\nphilosopher of the past. In our insistence upon the non-empirical and,\nin a sense, _a priori_ character of Metaphysics, we are again, of\ncourse, largely in agreement with the position of Kant. There is,\nhowever, a most important difference between our own and the Kantian\nconception of the _a priori_ upon which it is essential to insist.\nA-priority, as we have used the term, stands merely for a peculiarity\nof the _method_ of Metaphysics; by an _a priori_ method we understood\none which is confined to the internal analysis of a datum and\nindependent of external reference to outside facts. With Kant the _a\npriori_ is a name for certain forms of perception and thought which,\nbecause revealed by analysis as present in every experience, are\nsupposed to be given _independently of all experience_ whatsoever, and\nso come to be identified by him as \u201cthe work of the mind,\u201d in\nopposition to the empirical factor in experience, which is held to be\nthe product of an external system of \u201cthings-in-themselves.\u201d Hence\nKant\u2019s whole discussion of the _a priori_ is vitiated by a constant\nconfusion between what is metaphysically _necessary_ (_i.e._ implied\nin the existence of knowledge) and what is psychologically\n_primitive_. This confusion, perplexing enough in Kant, reaches a\nclimax in the works of writers like Mr. Spencer, who appear to think\nthat the whole question of the presence of a non-empirical factor in\nknowledge can be decided by an appeal to genetic Psychology. It is\nclear that, from our point of view, the identification of the _a\npriori_ with the \u201cwork of the mind\u201d would involve a metaphysical\ntheory as to the constitution of experience which we are not entitled\nto adopt without proof.[27]\n\nA word ought perhaps to be said about our attitude towards the\n\u201cdialectical\u201d method as employed by Hegel and his followers. It was\nHegel\u2019s conviction that the whole series of concepts or categories by\nwhich the mind attempts to grasp the nature of experienced Reality as a\nwhole, from the most rudimentary to the most adequate, can be exhibited\nin a fixed order which arises from the very nature of thought itself. We\nbegin, he held, by the affirmation of some rude and one-sided conception\nof the character of what is; the very imperfection of our concept then\nforces us on to affirm its opposite as equally true. But the opposite,\nin its turn, is no less one-sided and inadequate to express the full\ncharacter of concrete reality. Hence we are driven to negate our first\nnegation by affirming a concept which includes both the original\naffirmation and its opposite as subordinate aspects. The same process\nrepeats itself again at a higher stage with our new category, and thus\nwe gradually pass by a series of successive triads of categories, each\nconsisting of the three stages of affirmation, negation, and negation of\nthe negation, from the beginning of an intellectual interpretation of\nthe world of experience, the thought of it as mere a \u201cBeing,\u201d not\nfurther defined, to the apprehension of it as the \u201cAbsolute Idea,\u201d or\nconcrete system of spiritual experience. It was the task of abstract\nMetaphysics (called by Hegel, Logic) to exhibit the successive stages of\nthis process as a systematic orderly advance, in which the nature of\neach stage is determined by its place in the whole. As Hegel also held\nthat this \u201cdialectic\u201d process is somehow not confined to the\n\u201csubjective\u201d or private intelligence of the student of Philosophy, but\nalso realised in the structure of the \u201cobjective\u201d universe, it followed\nthat its successive stages could be detected in physical nature and in\nHistory in the same order in which they occur in \u201cLogic,\u201d and many of\nHegel\u2019s best-known works are devoted to exhibiting the facts of Physics,\nEthics, Religion, and History in the light of this doctrine. The\nsubsequent advances of the various sciences have so completely proved\nthe arbitrariness and untrustworthiness of the results obtained by these\n\u201cdeductions\u201d that some of the best exponents of the Hegelian type of\nPhilosophy are now agreed to abandon the claim of the Dialectic to be\nmore than a systematisation of the stages through which the individual\nmind must pass in its advance towards a finally satisfactory conception\nof Reality. But even within these limits its pretensions are probably\nexaggerated. No satisfactory proof can be produced that, even in\nabstract Metaphysics, the succession of categories must be precisely\nthat adopted by Hegel. There are some categories of the first\nimportance, _e.g._, that of _order_ in Mathematics, which hardly get any\nrecognition at all in his system, and others, such as those of\n\u201cMechanism\u201d and \u201cChemism,\u201d which play a prominent part, are obviously\nlargely dependent for their position upon the actual development of the\nvarious sciences in Hegel\u2019s own time. Hence the method seems unsuitable\nfor the original attainment of philosophical truth. At best it might\nserve, as Lotze has remarked, as a convenient method for the arrangement\nof truth already obtained by other means, and even for this purpose it\nseems clear that the succession of categories actually adopted by Hegel\nwould require constant modification to adapt the general scheme to later\ndevelopments of the various special sciences.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 13,\n14; B. Bosanquet, _Essentials of Logic_, Lect. 2; Shadworth Hodgson,\n_Metaphysic of Experience_, bk. i. chap. 1; J. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines\nof Metaphysics_, bk. i. chaps. 2 and 4. And for criticism of the\nHegelian dialectic: J. E. M\u2018Taggart, _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic_,\nchaps. 1-3; J. B. Baillie, _The Origin and Significance of Hegel\u2019s\nLogic_, chaps. 8-12, especially chap. 12; and also Adamson, _Development\nof Modern Philosophy_, bk. i. pp. 271 ff.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 10:\n\n See Bosanquet, _Essentials of Logic_, Lect. 8. As an illustration we\n may take an extreme case: \u201cThe Jabberwock was not killed yesterday.\u201d\n What is the ground of this denial? At first sight it appears to be\n merely negative, \u201cthere are no such things as Jabberwocks to kill.\u201d\n But before I can say \u201cthere are no such things as Jabberwocks\u201d with\n confidence, I must have enough positive information about the\n structure and habits of animals to be aware that the qualities\n ascribed to the Jabberwock conflict with the laws of animal life. Or,\n if I deny the existence of Jabberwocks simply on the ground that I\n have never come across a specimen, this involves a positive judgment\n as to the relation between the animal world and the part of it I have\n examined, such as, \u201cif there were Jabberwocks, I should have come\n across one\u201d; or, \u201cmy acquaintance with the varieties of animals is\n sufficiently exhaustive to afford ground for a valid generalisation.\u201d\n The fact that symbolic Logic finds it _convenient_ to treat the\n universal affirmative as a double negative must not mislead us as to\n its actual priority in thought.\n\nFootnote 11:\n\n To meet the kind of criticism which finds it humorous to jest at the\n expense of those who \u201ctake consolation from spelling Reality with a\n big R,\u201d may I once for all say that when I spell Reality thus it is\n simply as a convenient way of distinguishing the ultimately from the\n merely relatively real?\n\nFootnote 12:\n\n We shall meet this same difficulty again later on as the principle of\n the famous Kantian objection to the \u201contological proof\u201d of God\u2019s\n existence. _Infra_, Bk. IV. chap. 5. \u00a7 8.\n\nFootnote 13:\n\n Take a concrete example. A theory as to the early religious history of\n the Hebrews, let us say, is put forward upon grounds derived from\n Semitic philology. Though unacquainted with Semitic philology in\n particular, I may be able to form some sort of estimate of the cogency\n of the professed reasoning if I already have an adequate acquaintance\n with the use and value of philological evidence in parallel cases,\n say, in the study of Greek antiquities. But if I have no positive\n acquaintance at all with the use of philology in antiquarian research,\n it would be the merest impertinence for me to offer any opinion\n whatever.\n\nFootnote 14:\n\n What follows must be regarded as a mere outline which awaits\n subsequent filling up by the more concrete results of Bk II. chap. 1.\n\nFootnote 15:\n\n For the modern logical doctrine of possibility consult Bradley,\n _Principles of Logic_, 192-201; Bosanquet, _Logic_, i. chap. 9.\n\nFootnote 16:\n\n This is\u2014apart from non-essential theological accretions\u2014the principle\n of Berkeley\u2019s argument for the existence of God (_Principles of Human\n Knowledge_, \u00a7\u00a7 146, 147).\n\nFootnote 17:\n\n I should explain that I use \u201cfeeling\u201d and \u201capprehension\u201d indifferently\n for immediate and non-reflective awareness of any psychical content.\n The exclusive restriction of the term to awareness of pleasure and\n pain seems to me to rest on a serious mistake in psychology, and I\n therefore avoid it.\n\nFootnote 18:\n\n In fact, we shall see in Bk. II. chap. 1 that in virtue of its unity\n with immediate _feeling_, all experience is essentially connected with\n purpose.\n\nFootnote 19:\n\n I take \u201cfact\u201d as equivalent to \u201cwhat is directly apprehended in a\n single moment of consciousness.\u201d In a previous work (_The Problem of\n Conduct_, chap. 1) I used the word in a different sense for \u201cthe\n contents of a _true_ description of experience.\u201d This employment of\n the word, however, seems at variance with established philosophical\n usage, and I therefore abandon it as likely to lead to\n misapprehension.\n\nFootnote 20:\n\n Of course, the apprehended \u201ccontent\u201d may itself be a \u201cprocess,\u201d as is\n the case in all instances of the apprehension of _change_; but the\n apprehended process is always distinguishable from the process of\n apprehension.\n\nFootnote 21:\n\n We shall see in Bk. II. chap. 1 that the \u201cthat\u201d of an experience\n implies relation to a unique individual interest or purpose.\n\nFootnote 22:\n\n Of course this is only partly true. As we shall see in the sequel, to\n \u201cbe what it means and mean what it is\u201d is an ideal never _fully_\n realised in the structure of any finite piece of reality, precisely\n because the finite, as its name implies, is never a completely\n systematic whole.\n\nFootnote 23:\n\n On the psychological processes by which meaning is acquired, see\n Stout, _Manual of Psychology_^3, bk. i. chap. 3; and on the\n apprehension of form, the same author\u2019s _Analytic Psychology_, bk. i.\n chap. 3. Much interesting discussion of the difference between\n \u201cexternal\u201d and \u201cinternal\u201d meaning will be found in Royce, _The World\n and the Individual_, First Series.\n\nFootnote 24:\n\n For some good observations on the fallacy of assuming that\n mathematical symbolism must always be interpretable, see B. Russell,\n _Foundations of Geometry_, p. 45-46; or Whitehead, _Universal\n Algebra_, vol. i p. 10 ff. For a further elaboration of the argument\n of the foregoing section I may refer to my _Problem of Conduct_, pp.\n 14-21. I need hardly warn the reader against confusing a \u201csymbolic\u201d\n concept in my sense of the word, _i.e._ one which cannot be fully\n interpreted in terms of direct experience, with a \u201csymbolic\u201d idea in\n Mr. Spencer\u2019s sense, _i.e._ one which is not, psychologically, a copy\n of the presentations for which it stands. Our use of the word is, of\n course, purely logical, and has nothing to do with the psychological\n character of mental images, but only with their meaning.\n\nFootnote 25:\n\n Compare my _Problem of Conduct_, pp. 22-39.\n\nFootnote 26:\n\n The fundamental peculiarity of \u201cinductive\u201d procedure, in fact, is\n that, while its object is the internal analysis of its data, which, if\n completed, would permit of a universal conclusion being drawn from the\n single case, it is never able to effect the analysis, and is driven to\n reinforce it by external comparison with \u201csimilar\u201d cases.\n\nFootnote 27:\n\n On the confusion between the metaphysical and psychological standpoint\n in Kant\u2019s own treatment of the _a priori_, see B. Russell,\n _Foundations of Geometry_, pp. 1-4, and Adamson, _Development of\n Modern Philosophy_, bk. i. pp. 244-247.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF METAPHYSICS\n\n\u00a7 1. The traditional sub-division of Metaphysics into _Ontology_,\n _Cosmology_, _Rational Psychology_, common to all the great modern\n constructive systems. \u00a7 2. Precise sense in which we adopt these\n divisions for the purposes of our own treatment of the subject. \u00a7 3.\n Relation of _Cosmology_ and _Rational Psychology_ to the empirical\n sciences.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. English philosophers, who have usually been imbued with a wholesome\ndistrust of deliberate system-making, have commonly paid comparatively\nlittle attention to the question of the number and character of the\nsub-divisions of metaphysical philosophy. They have been content to\nraise the questions which interested them in the order of their\noccurrence to their own minds, and have gladly left it to the systematic\nhistorians of Philosophy, who have rarely been Englishmen, to discuss\nthe proper arrangement of the parts of the subject. Continental\nthinkers, who are naturally more prone to conscious systematisation,\nhave bestowed more thought on the problem of method and order, with the\nresult that each great independent philosopher has tended to make his\nown special arrangement of the parts of his subject. The different\narrangements, however, seem all to agree in conforming to a general\ntype, which was most clearly exhibited by the otherwise rather arid\nWolffian dogmatism of the eighteenth century. All the constructive\nsystems (those, _e.g._, of Hegel, Herbart, Lotze,) feel the necessity of\ngiving the first place to a general discussion of the most universal\ncharacteristics which we find ourselves constrained to ascribe in\nthought to any reality which is to be an intelligible and coherent\nsystem and not a mere chaos. This division of the subject is commonly\nknown by the title it bears alike in the Wolffian Metaphysic and the\nsystems of Herbart and Lotze, as _Ontology_,[28] or the general doctrine\nof Being; with Hegel it constitutes, as a whole, the contents of the\nscience of _Logic_, as distinguished from the other two great\ndepartments of speculative thought, the Philosophies of _Nature_ and\n_Mind_; and its most formal and general parts, again, compose, within\nthe Hegelian Logic itself, the special first section entitled \u201cDoctrine\nof Being.\u201d\n\nFurther, every system of metaphysical philosophy is bound to deal with\nmore special problems, which readily fall into two principal classes. It\nhas to consider the meaning and validity of the most universal\nconceptions of which we seek to understand the nature of the individual\nobjects which make up the experienced physical world, \u201cextension,\u201d\n\u201csuccession,\u201d \u201cspace,\u201d \u201ctime,\u201d \u201cnumber,\u201d \u201cmagnitude,\u201d \u201cmotion,\u201d\n\u201cchange,\u201d \u201cquality,\u201d and the more complex categories of \u201cmatter,\u201d\n\u201cforce,\u201d \u201ccausality,\u201d \u201cinteraction,\u201d \u201cthinghood,\u201d and so forth. Again,\nMetaphysics has to deal with the meaning and validity of the universal\npredicates by which we seek to interpret the nature of the experiencing\nmind itself, and its relation both to other minds and to the objects of\nthe physical world, \u201cthe soul,\u201d \u201cthe self,\u201d \u201cthe subject,\u201d\n\u201cself-consciousness,\u201d \u201cethical purpose,\u201d and so forth. Hence it has been\ncustomary to recognise a second and third part of Metaphysics, dealing\nrespectively with the most general characteristics of external Nature\nand of conscious Mind. These sections of the subject are commonly known\nas _Cosmology_ and _Rational Psychology_. In Hegel\u2019s system they appear\nin a double form: in their most abstract generality they constitute the\n\u201cDoctrine of Essence,\u201d and the \u201cDoctrine of the Notion\u201d in the Hegelian\n_Logic_; in their more concrete detail they form the second and third\nparts of his complete system or \u201cEncyclop\u00e6dia\u201d of the philosophical\nsciences, the previously mentioned Philosophies of _Nature_ and _Mind_.\n\nIn the pre-Kantian eighteenth century it was not unusual to add yet a\nfourth division to Metaphysics, _Rational Theology_, the doctrine of the\nexistence and attributes of God, so far as they can be deduced from\ngeneral philosophical principles apart from the appeal to specific\nrevelation. Kant\u2019s onslaught on the whole Wolffian scheme in the\n\u201cDialectic of Pure Reason,\u201d while profoundly modifying for the future\nthe view taken by metaphysicians of Cosmology and Rational Psychology,\nproved annihilating so far as eighteenth-century Deism and its\nphilosophical offspring, Rational Theology, were concerned, and that\nsub-division may fairly be said to have disappeared from subsequent\nphilosophical systems.[29]\n\n\u00a7 2. There are good and obvious reasons why we should adhere, in the\nform of our inquiry, to the main outlines of this traditional scheme. It\nis true that it is largely a question of simple convenience what order\nwe adopt in a systematic metaphysical investigation. A genuinely\nphilosophical survey of the general character of knowledge and\nexperience would exhibit so complete a systematic unity, that you might\nstart from any point in it and reach the same results, much as you may\ngo round a circle equally well from any point of the periphery. But for\nthe beginner, at any rate, it is advantageous to start with the general\nquestion what we mean by Being or Reality, and what character is to be\nascribed to the whole of Being as such, before attacking the problem of\nthe particular kind of Being which belongs to the various \u201crealities\u201d of\ncommon life and the special sciences. Thus we have to discuss in the\nfirst part of our programme such questions as the relation of Being in\ngeneral to experience, the sense in which Being may be said to be\ninseparable from, and yet again to transcend, experience; the problem of\nthe existence of different kinds or degrees of Being; the question\nwhether Being is ultimately one or many; the relation between Real Being\nand its appearances. All these problems correspond with reasonable\ncloseness to the contents of what was traditionally known as Ontology.\n\nIt is only when we have reached some definite conclusion on these most\nfundamental questions that we shall be in a position to deal with the\nmore special problems suggested by the various departments of science\nand common life; hence we shall do well to acquiesce in the arrangement\nby which Ontology was made to precede the other divisions of the\nsubject. Again, in dealing with the more complex special problems of\nMetaphysics, it is natural to recognise a distinction corresponding to\nthe separation of Cosmology from Rational Psychology. Common language\nshows that for most of the purposes of human thought and action the\ncontents of the world of experience tend to fall into the two groups of\nmere things and things which are sentient and purposive\u2014Physical Nature\non the one hand, and Minds or Spirits on the other. We must, of course,\nbe careful not to confuse this division of the objects of experience\nwith the distinction between an experienced object as such and the\nsubject of experience. We are to start, in our critical investigation,\nnot with the artificial point of view of Psychology, which sets the\n\u201csubject\u201d of presentations over-against the presentations considered as\nconveying information about \u201cobjects of knowledge,\u201d but with the\nstandpoint of practical life, in which the individual agent is opposed\nto an environment itself consisting largely of similar individual\nagents. It is not \u201cNature\u201d on the one side and a \u201cperceiving mind\u201d on\nthe other, but an environment composed partly of physical things, partly\nof other human and animal minds, that furnishes the antithesis on which\nthe distinction of Cosmology from Rational Psychology is founded. There\nis no confusion against which we shall need to be more on our guard than\nthis fallacious identification of Mind or Spirit with the abstract\nsubject of psychological states, and of the \u201cenvironment\u201d of the\nindividual with Physical Nature. Of course, it is true that we\nnecessarily interpret the inner life of other minds in terms of our own\nincommunicably individual experience, but it is equally true that our\nown direct experience of ourselves is throughout determined by\ninteraction with other agents of the same type as ourselves. It is a\npure delusion to suppose that we begin by finding ourselves in a world\nof mere physical things to some of which we afterwards come by an\nafter-thought, based on \u201canalogy,\u201d to ascribe \u201cconsciousness\u201d akin to\nour own. Hence, to avoid possible misunderstandings, it would be better\nto drop the traditional appellations \u201cCosmology\u201d and \u201cRational\nPsychology,\u201d and to call the divisions of applied Metaphysics, as Hegel\ndoes, the _Philosophy_ of _Nature_ and of _Spirit_ or _Mind_\nrespectively.[30]\n\nIn recognising this sub-division of applied Metaphysics into two\nsections, dealing respectively with Physical Nature and with Mind or\nSpirit, we do not mean to suggest that there is an absolute disparity\nbetween these two classes of things. It is, of course, a matter for\nphilosophical criticism itself to decide whether this difference may not\nin the end turn out to be merely apparent. This will clearly be the case\nif either minds can be shown, as the materialist holds, to be simply a\npeculiar class of highly complex physical things, or physical things to\nbe, as the idealist contends, really minds of an unfamiliar and\nnon-human type. It is sufficient for us that the difference, whether\nultimate or not, is marked enough to give rise to distinct classes of\nproblems, which have to be treated separately and on their own merits.\nWe may feel convinced on general philosophical grounds that minds and\nphysical things are ultimately existences of the same general type,\nwhether we conceive that type after the fashion of the materialist or of\nthe idealist, but this conviction does not in the least affect the fact\nthat the special metaphysical problems suggested by our experience of\nphysical things are largely different from those which are forced on us\nby our interest in the minds of our fellows. In the one connection we\nhave, for instance, to discuss the questions connected with such\ncategories as those of uniform spatial extension, uniform obedience to\ngeneral law, the constitution of a whole which is an aggregate of parts;\nin the other, those connected with the meaning and value of ethical,\nartistic, and religious aspiration, the concept of moral freedom, the\nnature of personal identity. Even the categories which seem at first\nsight most readily applicable both to physical things and to minds, such\nas those of quality and number, lead to special difficulties in the two\ncontrasted cases. This consideration seems to justify us in separating\nthe metaphysics of Mind from the metaphysics of Nature, and the superior\ndifficulty of many of the problems which belong to the former is a\nfurther reason for following the traditional order of the two\nsub-divisions, and placing Rational Psychology after Cosmology. In so\nfar as the problems of Rational Theology can be separated from those of\ngeneral Ontology, the proper place for them seems to be that section of\nRational Psychology which deals with the meaning and worth of our\nreligious experiences.\n\n\u00a7 3. It remains, in concluding the present chapter, to utter a word of\ncaution as to the relation between the two divisions of applied\nMetaphysics and the body of the empirical sciences. It is perhaps hardly\nnecessary to warn the student that Rational Cosmology and Psychology\nwould become worse than useless if conceived of as furnishing in any\nsense a substitute for the experimental study of the physical,\npsychological, and social sciences. They are essentially departments of\nMetaphysics, and for that very reason are incapable of adding a single\nfact to the sum of our knowledge of ascertained fact. No doubt the\ndiscredit into which Metaphysics\u2014except in the form of tacit and\nunconscious assumption\u2014has fallen among students of positive science, is\nlargely due to the unfortunate presumption with which Schelling, and to\na less degree Hegel, attempted to put metaphysical discussion in the\nplace of the experimental investigation of the facts of nature and of\nmind. At the present day this mistake is less likely to be committed;\nthe danger is rather that applied Metaphysics may be declared purely\nvalueless because it is incapable of adding to our store of facts. The\ntruth is, that it has a real value, but a value of a different kind from\nthat which has sometimes been ascribed to it. It is concerned not with\nthe accumulation of facts, but with the interpretation of previously\nascertained facts, looked at broadly and as a whole. When the facts of\nphysical Nature and of Mind and the special laws of their connection\nhave been discovered and systematised by the most adequate methods of\nexperiment, observation, and mathematical calculation at our disposal,\nthe question still remains, how we are to conceive of the whole realm of\nsuch facts consistently with the general conditions of logical and\ncoherent thought. If we choose to define positive science as the\nsystematic establishment of the special laws of connection between\nfacts, we may say that over and above the _scientific_ problem of the\nsystematisation of facts there is the further _philosophical_ problem of\ntheir interpretation. This latter problem does not cease to be\nlegitimate because it has been illegitimately confounded by certain\nthinkers with the former.\n\nOr we may put the case in another way. The whole process of scientific\nsystematisation involves certain assumptions as to the ultimate nature\nof the facts which are systematised. Thus the very performance of an\nexperiment for the purpose of verifying a suggested hypothesis involves\nthe assumption that the facts with which the hypothesis is concerned\nconform to general laws, and that these laws are such as to be capable\nof formulation by human intelligence. If \u201cnature\u201d is not in some sense\n\u201cuniform,\u201d the conclusive force of a successful experiment is logically\n_nil_. Hence the necessity for an inquiry into the character of the\npresuppositions involved in scientific procedure, and the amount of\njustification which can be found for them. For practical purposes, no\ndoubt, the presuppositions of inductive science are sufficiently\njustified by its actual successes. But the question for us as\nmetaphysicians, as we have already seen, is that not of their usefulness\nbut of their truth.\n\nIt may be said that the inquiry ought in any case to be left to the\nspecial student of the physical and psychological sciences themselves.\nThis, however, would involve serious neglect of the great principle of\ndivision of labour. It is true, of course, that, other things being\nequal, the better stored the mind of the philosopher with scientific\nfacts, the sounder will be his judgment on the interpretation and\nimplications of the whole body of facts. But, at the same time, the\ngifts which make a successful experimentalist and investigator of facts\nare not altogether the same which are required for the philosophical\nanalysis of the implications of facts, nor are both always conjoined in\nthe same man. There is no reason, on the one hand, why the able\nexperimenter should be compelled to desist from the discovery of facts\nof nature until he can solve the philosophical problems presented by the\nvery existence of a world of physical facts, nor, on the other, why the\nthinker endowed by nature with powers of philosophical analysis should\nbe forbidden to exercise them until he has mastered all the facts which\nare known by the specialists. What the philosopher needs to know, as the\nstarting-point for his investigation, is not the specialist\u2019s facts as\nsuch, but the general principles which the specialist uses for their\ndiscovery and correlation. His study is a \u201cscience of sciences,\u201d not in\nthe sense that it is a sort of universal encyclop\u00e6dia of instructive and\nentertaining knowledge, but in the more modest sense of being a\nsystematised reflection upon the concepts and methods with which the\nsciences, and the less methodical thought of everyday practical life\nwork, and an attempt to try them by the standard of ultimate coherence\nand intelligibility.\n\n\n_Note._\u2014If we retain _Psychology_, as is done, _e.g._, by Lotze, as the\ntitle of our Metaphysic of Mind, we ought in consistency to give the\nword a greatly extended sense. The facts which the Metaphysic of Mind\nattempt to interpret, comprise not only those of Psychology in the\nstricter sense (the abstract study of the laws of mental process), but\nthose of all the various sciences which deal with the concrete\nmanifestation of mind in human life (Ethics, \u00c6sthetics, Sociology, the\nstudy of Religion, etc.). This is one reason for preferring the Hegelian\ndesignation \u201cPhilosophy of Mind\u201d to the traditional one of _Rational\nPsychology_. The associations of the word Philosophy in English are,\nhowever, so vague that the adoption of the Hegelian title might perhaps\nbe understood as identifying this division of Metaphysics with the whole\ncontent of the mental sciences. But for the unfamiliarity of the\nexpression, I should recommend some such phrase as Metaphysics of Human\nSociety as the most adequate description of this branch of our science.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 28:\n\n The name is ultimately derived from Aristotle\u2019s definition of \u201cFirst\n Philosophy\u201d\u2014which along with Mathematics and Physics constitutes\n according to his system, the whole of Theoretical Science\u2014as the\n knowledge of \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f96 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, _i.e._ of the general character of the real\n _as_ real, as distinguished from the knowledge of the mathematician\n and the physicist, who only deal with the real in so far as it\n exhibits number and magnitude, and sensible change respectively.\n\nFootnote 29:\n\n Less effective in immediate results, but no less thorough and acute\n than the Kantian \u201cCritique of Speculative Theology,\u201d were Hume\u2019s\n posthumous _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, a work which has hardly\n received its full meed of consideration from the professional\n historians of Philosophy.\n\nFootnote 30:\n\n The fallacy of the assumption that our environment is directly given\n in experience as merely physical is best brought out by Avenarius in\n his masterly little work _Der Menschliche Weltbegriff_, which should\n be familiar to all students of Philosophy who are able to read German.\n The purely English reader will find many fruitful suggestions in Ward,\n _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, pt. iv., \u201cRefutation of Dualism.\u201d Much\n confusion is caused in philosophical discussion by the unscholarly use\n of the epistemological term \u201cobject\u201d (which properly signifies \u201cobject\n of _cognition_\u201d) instead of the more familiar \u201cthing\u201d to denote the\n constituent elements of our environment as it is actually experienced\n in practical life. In strictness the elements of the environment are\n \u201cobjects\u201d only for an imaginary consciousness which is thought of as\n merely cognisant of presented fact, a point which Prof. M\u00fcnsterberg\n has emphasised. For practical life the essential character of the\n environment is not merely that it is \u201cpresented,\u201d but that it\n interacts with our own purposive activity; it thus consists not of\n \u201cobjects,\u201d but of \u201cthings.\u201d\n\n In including the minds of our fellows among the things which\n constitute our environment, we must not commit the mistake of\n supposing \u201cminds\u201d as factors in immediate experience to be\n \u201cincorporeal realities,\u201d or \u201ccomplexes of states of consciousness.\u201d\n The distinction between mind and body, and the concept of mind as\n \u201cwithin the body,\u201d or again as a \u201cfunction\u201d of the body, are\n psychological hypotheses which only arise in the course of subsequent\n reflective analysis of experience. Of the worth of these hypotheses we\n shall have to speak later. At present it is enough to note that for\n direct experience a \u201cmind\u201d means simply a thing with individual\n purpose. What for my direct experience distinguishes my fellow-man\n from a stock or stone, is not the presence within him of an\n incorporeal \u201csoul\u201d or \u201cconsciousness,\u201d but the fact that I must take\n account of his individual purposes and adapt myself to them if I wish\n to achieve my own. Here again the reader of German will do well to\n consult Prof. M\u00fcnsterberg (_Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_, vol. i. chaps.\n 1-3). See also a paper on \u201cMind and Nature\u201d by the present writer in\n _International Journal of Ethics_ for October 1902.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n BOOK II\n ONTOLOGY\u2014THE GENERAL\n STRUCTURE OF REALITY\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n REALITY AND EXPERIENCE\n\n\u00a7 1. In a sense \u201creality\u201d for each of us means that of which he must\n take account if his special purposes are to find fulfilment. \u00a7 2.\n But ultimately the world must possess a structure of which _all_\n purposes, each in its own way, must take account. This is the\n \u201cUltimate Reality\u201d or \u201cAbsolute\u201d of Metaphysics. In Metaphysics we\n regard it from the special standpoint of the scientific intellect.\n There are other legitimate attitudes towards it, _e.g._, that of\n practical religion. \u00a7 3. The inseparability of reality from\n immediate experience involves the recognition of it as teleological\n and as uniquely individual. \u00a7 4. The experience within which all\n reality falls cannot be my own, nor yet the \u201ccollective\u201d experience\n of the aggregate of conscious beings. It must be an individual\n experience which apprehends the totality of existence as the\n harmonious embodiment of a single \u201cpurpose.\u201d The nearest analogue\n our own life presents to such a type of experience is to be found in\n the satisfied insight of personal love. \u00a7 5. The experience of such\n an \u201cAbsolute\u201d must not be thought of as a mere reduplication of our\n own, or of the scientific hypotheses by which we co-ordinate facts\n for the purposes of inference. \u00a7 6. Our conception is closely\n connected with that of Berkeley, from which it differs by the stress\n it lays on the purposive and selective aspect of experience. \u00a7 7.\n Realism, both of the Agnostic and of the Dogmatic type, is\n incompatible with the meaning we have been led to attach to\n \u201cReality.\u201d But Agnosticism is justified in insisting on the\n limitations of our knowledge of Reality, and Dogmatic Realism in\n rejecting the identification of Reality with experience as a merely\n cognitive function of finite percipients. \u00a7 8. Subjectivism,\n according to which all that I know is states of my own\n \u201cconsciousness,\u201d is irreconcilable with the admitted facts of life,\n and arises from the psychological fallacy of \u201cintrojection.\u201d\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the preceding book we have seen that the very nature of the\nmetaphysical problem predetermines the general character of the answer\nwe are to give to it. What our intellect can accept as finally real, we\nsaw, must be indissolubly one with actual experience, and it must be an\ninternally coherent system. In the present book we have to discuss more\nin detail the structure which must belong to any reality possessing\nthese general characteristics. The present chapter, then, will be\ndevoted to an examination of the implications of the experiential\ncharacter of real Being; in the next, we shall deal with the nature of\nits unity as a single system.\n\nWe may perhaps most conveniently begin our discussion with a\nre-definition of some of our principal terms. We have hitherto spoken of\nthe object of metaphysical knowledge indifferently as \u201cBeing,\u201d \u201cWhat\nis,\u201d \u201cWhat truly exists,\u201d and as \u201cReality,\u201d \u201cthe ultimately real.\u201d So\nfar as it is possible to draw a distinction between these two sets of\nnames for the same thing, we may say that each series lays special\nstress on a somewhat different aspect of our object. When we say that a\nthing \u201cis\u201d or \u201chas Being,\u201d we seem primarily to mean that it is an\n_object_ for the knowing consciousness, that it has its place in the\nsystem of objects which coherent thought recognises. When we call the\nsame object \u201creal\u201d or a \u201creality,\u201d we lay the emphasis rather on the\nconsideration that it is something of which we categorically _must_ take\naccount, whether we like it or not, if some purpose of our own is to get\nits fulfilment.[31] Thus again the \u201cnon-existent\u201d primarily means that\nwhich finds no place in the scheme of objects contemplated by consistent\nscientific thought; the \u201cunreal,\u201d that with which we have not, for any\nhuman purpose, to reckon.\n\nThis is what is often expressed by saying that reality means what is\nindependent of our own will, what exercises resistance, what constrains\nor compels our recognition, whether we like it or not. Philosophers have\npointed out that this way of putting the case is only half the truth.\nThe \u201cstubborn\u201d facts or realities which, as we commonly say, force us to\nrecognise them, only do so in consequence of the presence in us of\ndefinite interests and purposes which we cannot effect without adapting\nourselves to the situation expressed by our statement of the \u201cfacts.\u201d\nWhat lies entirely outside my interests and plans gets no kind of\nrecognition from me; it is \u201cunreal\u201d for me precisely because I have no\nneed to take account of it as a factor to be reckoned with in the\npursuit of my special ends. Thus, so long as we use the term in a\nrelative sense and with reference to the special ends of this or that\nparticular agent, there may be as many different orders of \u201creality\u201d as\nthere are special purposes, and what is \u201creal\u201d for the agent inspired by\none purpose may be unreal for his fellows whose purposes are different.\nThus, for example, to an English Christian living at home in England the\nrules of \u201ccaste\u201d in India are usually for all practical purposes unreal;\nhe has no need to take their existence into account as a condition of\nthe successful prosecution of any of his aims and interests; for him\nthey have no more significance than the rules of legal procedure adopted\nin Wonderland. But for the historian of Indian society, the native Hindu\nChristian, and the devout worshipper of Shiva, the rules of caste are a\ntrue reality. Not one of the three can execute _his_ special purposes\nwithout taking them into account and allowing them to operate in\ndetermining his way of proceeding to his goal. Again, the kind of\nreality which the rules of caste possess for each of our three men is\ndifferent, in accord with the differences in their characteristic\npurposes. For the historian, they are real as a system of ideas which\nhave influenced and do influence the conduct of the society of which he\nis writing the history, in such a way that without understanding them he\ncannot get a clear insight into the social structure of Hinduism. To the\nnative Christian, they are real as a standing source of difficulty and a\nstanding temptation to be false to his highest ideals of conduct. To the\nShivaite, they are real as the divinely appointed means to bodily and\nspiritual purification from the evil that is in the world.\n\n\u00a7 2. So far, then, it might seem that \u201creality\u201d is a purely relative\nterm, and that our previous choice of ultimate freedom from\ncontradiction as our standard of reality was an arbitrary one, due to\nthe mere accident that _our_ special purpose in sitting down to study\nMetaphysics is to think consistently. Of course, it might be said,\nwhatever game you choose to play at, the rules of that particular game\nmust be your supreme reality, so long as you are engaged in it. But it\ndepends on your own choice what game you will play and how long you will\nkeep at it. There is no game at which we all, irrespective of personal\nchoice, have to play, and there is therefore no such thing as an\nultimate reality which we must all recognise as such; there are only the\nspecial realities which correspond to our special individual purposes.\nYou have no right to set up the particular rules of the game of\nscientific thought as a reality unconditionally demanding recognition\nfrom those who do not choose to play that particular game.[32]\n\nSuch an argument would, however, be beside the point. It is true that\nthe special nature of the facts which any one of us recognises as real\ndepends on the special nature of his individual purposes. And it is true\nthat, precisely because we are, to some extent, genuine individuals, no\ntwo men\u2019s abiding purposes are identically the same. It is therefore\ntrue, so far as it goes, that Reality wears a different and an\nindividual aspect for each of us. But it is emphatically not true that\nthere is no identical character at all about the purposes and interests\nof different individuals. The very recognition of the fact that any one\nindividual purpose or interest can only get expression by accommodating\nitself to a definite set of conditions, which constitute the reality\ncorresponding to that purpose, carries with it the implication that the\nworld is ultimately a system and not a chaos, or, in other words, that\nthere is ultimately a certain constitution of things which, under one\naspect or another, is of moment for all individuals, and must be taken\ninto account by every kind of purpose that is to get fulfilment. If the\nworld is systematic at all,\u2014and unless it is so there is no place in it\nfor definite purpose of any kind,\u2014it must finally have a structure of\nsuch a kind that any purpose which ignores it will be defeated. All\ncoherent pursuit of purpose, of whatever type, must therefore in the end\nrest on the recognition of some characteristics of the world-order which\nare unconditionally and absolutely to be taken into account by all\nindividual agents, no matter what the special nature of their particular\npurposes. This is all that is meant when it is said that the reality\ninvestigated by Metaphysics is absolute, or when the object of\nmetaphysical study is spoken of as the Absolute.\n\nWe may, in fact, conveniently define the Absolute as that structure of\nthe world-system which any and every internally consistent purpose must\nrecognise as the condition of its own fulfilment To deny the existence\nof an Absolute, thus defined, is in principle to reduce the world and\nlife to a mere chaos. It is important, however, to bear in mind that in\nMetaphysics, though we are certainly concerned with the ultimate or\nabsolute Reality, we are concerned with it from a special point of view.\nOur special purpose is to _know_, or to think coherently, about the\nconditions which all intelligent purpose has to recognise. Now this\nattitude of scientific investigation is clearly not the only one which\nwe can take up towards the ultimately real. We may, for instance, seek\nto gain emotional harmony and peace of mind by yielding up the conduct\nof our practical life to the unquestioned guidance of what we directly\nfeel to be the deepest and most abiding elements in the structure of the\nuniverse. This is the well-known attitude of practical religion. _Prim\u00e2\nfacie_, while it seems to be just as permissible as the purely\nscientific attitude of the seeker after truth, the perennial \u201cconflict\nof religion and science\u201d is sufficient to show that the two are not\nidentical. How they are related is a problem which we shall have, in\noutline, to consider towards the end of our inquiry; at present it is\nenough for our purpose to recognise them as divergent but _prim\u00e2 facie_\nequally justified attitudes towards what must in the end be thought of\nas the same ultimate reality. As Mr. Bradley well says, there is no sin\nwhich is metaphysically less justifiable than the metaphysician\u2019s own\nbesetting sin of treating his special way of regarding the \u201cAbsolute\u201d as\nthe only legitimate one.\n\n\u00a7 3. To return to our detailed investigation of the connection between\nReality as now defined for the metaphysician, and Experience. We can now\nsee more completely than before why it is only in _immediate_ experience\nthat reality is to be found. Our reason for identifying reality with\nimmediate experience has nothing to do with the theory according to\nwhich \u201csensations,\u201d being the product of a something \u201cwithout the mind,\u201d\nare supposed to carry with them a direct certificate of the independent\nexistence of their \u201cexternal\u201d cause. For we have seen: (1) that\nimmediacy means simply indissoluble union with a whole of feeling, and\nthat this immediacy belongs to every mental state as actually lived\nthrough; (2) that the dependence of sensations in particular on an\n\u201cexternal\u201d cause, is in no sense an immediate datum of experience, but a\nreflective hypothesis which, like all such hypotheses, demands\nexamination and justification before it can be pronounced legitimate;\n(3) that it is a philosophical blunder to identify the real with the\nmerely \u201cindependent\u201d of ourselves. What is merely independent, as we\nhave now seen, would for us be the merely unreal. Presence in immediate\nexperience is a universal character of all that is real, because it is\nonly in so far as anything is thus presented in immediate unity with the\nconcrete life of feeling that it can be given as a condition or fact of\nwhich an individual interest must take account, on pain of not reaching\naccomplishment. Actual life, as we have already learned, is always a\nconcrete unity of feeling in which the two distinguishable aspects of a\npsychical fact, its existence and its content, the that and the what,\nthough distinguishable, are inseparable. Scientific reflection on the\ngiven we found to be always abstract, in the sense that its very essence\nis the mental separation of the content from the process. By such\nseparation we mediately get to know the character of the separated\ncontent better, but our knowledge, with all its fulness, still remains\nabstract; it is still knowledge referring to and about an object outside\nitself. It is only when, as a result of the reflective process, we find\nfresh meaning in the individual process-content on its recurrence that\nwe return once more to the concrete actuality of real existence.\n\nNow, we may express this same result in another and an even more\nsignificant way. To say that reality is essentially one with immediate\nfeeling, is only another way of saying that the real is essentially that\nwhich is of significance for the attainment of purpose. For feeling is\nessentially teleological, as we may see even in the case of simple\npleasure and pain. Amid all the confusion and complexity of the\npsychological problems which can be raised about these most simple forms\nof feeling, one thing seems clear, that pleasure is essentially\nconnected with unimpeded, pain with impeded, discharge of nervous\nactivity. Pleasure seems to be inseparable from successful, pain from\nthwarted or baffled, tendency.[33] And if we consider not so much the\nabstractions \u201cpleasure in general,\u201d \u201cpain in general,\u201d as a specific\npleasure or pain, or again a complex emotional state, the case seems\neven clearer. Only a being whose behaviour is consciously or\nunconsciously determined by ends or purposes seems capable of finding\nexistence, according as those purposes are advanced or hindered,\npleasant or painful, glad or wretched, good or bad. Hence our original\ndecision that reality is to be found in what is immediately experienced,\nas opposed to what is severed by subsequent reflective analysis from its\nunion with feeling, and our later statement that that is real of which\nwe are constrained to take account for the fulfilment of our purposes,\nfully coincide.\n\nThis point may perhaps be made clearer by a concrete example. Suppose\nthat some purpose of more or less importance requires my immediate\npresence in the next town. Then the various routes by which I may reach\nthat town become at once circumstances of which I have to take note and\nto which I must adapt my conduct, if my important purpose is not to be\nfrustrated. It may be that there are alternative routes, or it may be\nthat there is only one. In any case, and this is fundamental for us, the\nnumber of alternatives which my purpose leaves open to me will be\nstrictly limited. I can, as a matter of mere mathematical possibility,\ngo from A to B in an indefinite number of ways. If I have to make the\njourney in actual fact on a given day, and with existing means of\ntransit, the theoretical infinity of possible ways is speedily reduced\nto, at the outside, two or three. For simplicity\u2019s sake we will consider\nthe case in which there happens to be only one available way. This one\navailable way is \u201creal\u201d to me, as contrasted with the infinity of\nmathematically possible routes, precisely because the execution of my\npurpose restricts me to it and no other. The mathematically possible\ninfinity of routes remain unreal just because they are thought of as all\nalike mere possibilities; no actual purpose limits me to some one or\nsome definite number out of the infinity, and compels me to adapt myself\nto their peculiarities or fail of my end. They are \u201cimaginary\u201d or\n\u201cmerely possible\u201d just for want of specific relation to an experience\nwhich is the expression of a definite purpose.\n\nThis illustration may lead us on to a further point of the utmost\nimportance, for it illustrates the principle that the real as opposed to\nthe merely \u201cpossible\u201d or \u201cmerely thought of\u201d is always individual. There\nwas an indefinite number of mathematically conceivable ways from A to B;\nthere was only one, or at least a precisely determinate number, by which\nI could fulfil a concrete individual purpose. (Thus, if I have to make\nthe journey to B in a given time, I _must_ take the route followed by\nthe railway.) So universally it is a current common-place that while\nthought is general, the reality about which we think and of which we\npredicate the results of our thought is always individual. Now, what is\nthe source or principle of this individuality of the real as opposed to\nthe generality of the merely conceivable? It is precisely that\nconnection of reality with actual purpose of which we have spoken. The\nresults of thought are general because for the purposes of scientific\nthinking we isolate the _what_ of experience from its _that_; we\nconsider the character of what is presented to us apart from the unique\npurpose expressed in the experience in which it comes to us. In other\nwords, the problems of scientific thought are all of the form, \u201cHow must\nour general purpose to make our thought and action coherent be carried\nout under such and such typical conditions?\u201d never of the form, \u201cOf what\nmust I take account for the execution of this one definite purpose?\u201d The\nreason for this difference is at once apparent. In making \u201cthis definite\npurpose\u201d a topic for reflection, I have _ipso facto_ abstracted its what\nfrom its that and converted it into a mere instance or example of a\ncertain type. It was only while it remained this purpose as actually\nimmanent in and determining the immediate experience of actual life that\nit was a completely determinate unique _this_; as reflected on it\nbecomes a type of an indefinite number of similar possibilities.\n\nNow, it is necessary here to observe very carefully that it is from the\nunique individuality of the purpose expressed in an actual experience\nthat the objects or facts of immediate experience derive the\nindividuality in virtue of which we contrast them with the generalities\nor abstract possibilities of science. It is the more necessary to dwell\nexplicitly on this point, because there is a common but erroneous\ndoctrine that the individuality of actual existence is derived from its\noccupying a particular place in the space and time orders. Scientific\ntruth is general, it is often said, because it refers alike to all\nplaces and times; actual \u201cfact\u201d is individual because it is what is\n_here_ and _now_. But we should be able to see that such an account\ndirectly inverts the real order of logical dependence. Mere position in\nspace and time can never be a true \u201cprinciple of individuation,\u201d for the\nsimple reason that one point in space and one moment in time, considered\napart from the things and events which fill them, are, at any rate for\nour perception,[34] indistinguishable from all other points and moments.\nIt is, on the other hand, precisely by their correlation with unique\nstages in lives which are the embodiment of unique and individual\npurpose, that places and times and the things and events which occupy\nthem become for us themselves unique and individual. _Here_, for me,\nmeans where I now am, and _now_, this unique and determinate stage in\nthe execution of the purposes which, by their uniqueness, make me unique\nin the world. Thus we seem to have reached the significant conclusion\nthat to say \u201cReality is experience\u201d involves the further propositions,\n\u201cReality is through and through purposive\u201d and \u201cReality is uniquely\nindividual.\u201d\n\n\u00a7 4. We have already seen that to identify reality with experience does\nnot mean identifying it with my own experience just as it comes to me in\nactual life, still less with my own experience as I mentally reconstruct\nit in the light of some conscious or unconscious philosophical theory.\nMy own experience, in fact, is very far from satisfying the conditions\nof completeness and harmony which we found in our last book to be\nessential to a \u201cpure\u201d or perfect experience. Its defectiveness is\nprincipally manifested in three ways. (1) As we have already seen, its\ncontents are always fragmentary. It never contains more than the poorest\nfragment of the whole wealth of existence. The purposes or interests\nwhich make up my conscious life are narrowly limited. The major portion\nof the facts of the universe, _i.e._ of the conditions of which note has\nto be taken by its inhabitants if their aims are to be fulfilled, lie\noutside the range of my individual interests\u2014at least, of those which I\never become explicitly aware. Hence, being without significance for my\nindividual purposes, they do not directly enter into my special\nexperience. I either know nothing of them at all, or know of them only\nindirectly and through the testimony of others for whose lives they have\nreal and direct significance. And these others again are, in virtue of\nthe individual interests which differentiate them from me, only\npartially cognisant of the same factual reality as I am.\n\n(2) Again, my insight even into my own aims and interests is of a very\nlimited kind. For one thing, it is only a fragment of them which is ever\ngiven in the form of what is immediately felt in an actual moment of\nexperience. I have largely to interpret the actually felt by theoretical\nintellectual constructions which reach, in the form of memory, into the\npast, and, in the form of anticipation, into the future. And both these\ntypes of intellectual construction, though indispensable, are\nnotoriously vitiated by fallacies. For another, even with the fullest\naid of such intellectual construction, I never succeed in completely\ngrasping the whole meaning of my life as the embodiment of a single\ncoherent purpose. Many of my purposes never rise sufficiently into clear\nconsciousness to be distinctly realised, and those that do often wear\nthe appearance of having no systematic connection with one another.\nSmall wonder, then, that the realities or \u201cfacts\u201d of which I learn to\ntake note for the execution of my aims more often than not appear to\nbelong to a chaos rather than to the orderly system which we cannot help\nbelieving the world to be, could we see it as it truly is.\n\n(3) Finally, I have the gravest grounds for the conviction that even of\nthe realities of which I do take note I never perceive more than just\nthose aspects which attract my attention just because they happen to be\nsignificant for my special interests. What startling experiences teach\nus in the case of our fellow-men may be true everywhere, namely, that\neverything that is has an infinity of sides to it, over and above those\nof which we become aware because of their special importance for our own\npurposes; there may be an infinite wealth of character in the most\nfamiliar things, to which we are blind only because, so to speak, it has\nno \u201ceconomic value\u201d for the human market. For all these reasons we are\nabsolutely forbidden to identify our own limited experience with the\nexperience of which we have said, that to be real is to be bound up with\nit, and to be bound up with it is to be real. Neither, again, can we\nidentify this experience with the \u201ccollective experience\u201d of the\naggregate of human or other finite sentient beings in the universe. This\nis obvious for more reasons than one. To begin with, \u201ccollective\nexperience,\u201d if it has any meaning at all, is a contradictory\nexpression. For experience, as we have seen, is essentially\ncharacterised by unique individuality of aim and interest; in this sense\nat least, a true experience must be that of an individual subject, and\nno collection or aggregate can be an individual subject. The so-called\n\u201ccollective experience\u201d is not one experience at all, but simply an\nindefinite multiplicity of experience, thrown together under a single\ndesignation. And even if we could get over this difficulty, there\nremains a still more formidable one. The various experiences of finite\nindividuals are all, we have said, fragmentary and more or less\nincoherent. You cannot, therefore, get an experience which is\nall-comprehensive and all-harmonious by adding them together. If their\ndefect were merely their fragmentariness, it would be conceivable that,\ngiven an outside observer who could see all the fragments at once, they\nmight constitute a whole by merely supplementing one another\u2019s\ndeficiencies. But our finite experiences are not only fragmentary, but\nalso largely contradictory and internally chaotic. We may indeed believe\nthat the contradictions are only apparent, and that _if_ we could become\nfully conscious of our own inmost aims and purposes we should at the\nsame moment be aware of all Reality as a harmonious system; but we never\ndo, and we shall see later that just because of our finitude we never\ncan, attain this completed insight into the significance of our own\nlives. Hence the experience for which all reality is present as a\nharmonious whole cannot be any mere duplicate of the partial and\nimperfect experiences which we possess.\n\nWe thus seem driven to assert the necessary existence of a superhuman\nexperience to which the whole universe of being is directly present as a\ncomplete and harmonious system. For \u201creality\u201d has been seen to have no\nmeaning apart from presence in a sentient experience or whole of\nfeeling, while it has also been seen infinitely to transcend all that\ncan be given as directly present to any limited experience. If this\nconclusion is sound, our \u201cAbsolute\u201d can now be said to be a conscious\nlife which embraces the totality of existence, all at once, and in a\nperfect systematic unity, as the contents of its experience. Such a\nconception clearly has its difficulties; how such an all-containing\nexperience must be thought to be related to the realm of physical\nnature, and again to our own finite experiences, are problems which we\nshall have to take up in our two succeeding books. We shall find them\nfar from simple, and it is as well for us from the first to face the\npossibility that our knowledge of the character of the absolute\nexperience may prove to be very limited and very tentative. That it is\nwe seem compelled to assert by the very effort to give a coherent\nmeaning to our notion of reality, but of what it is we may have to\nconfess ourselves largely ignorant.\n\nBut we may at least go so far as this, at the present stage of our\nargument. However different an all-containing coherent experience may be\nin its detailed structure from our own piecemeal and largely incoherent\nexperience, if it is to be experience at all, it must apprehend its\ncontents in the general way which is characteristic of direct experience\nas such. It must take note or be aware of them, and it must\u2014if it is to\nbe a direct experience at all\u2014be aware of them as exhibiting a\nstructural unity which is the embodiment of a consistent plan or\npurpose. We have to think of it as containing in a systematic unity not\nonly all the \u201cfacts\u201d of which our various experiences have to take note,\nbut all the purposes which they express. Hence it is natural for us,\nwhen we attempt to form some approximate concept of such an ultimate\nexperience in terms of our own conscious life, to conceive it as the\nunion of perfected knowledge in an indivisible whole with supreme will.\nWe must, however, remember that, for such an experience, precisely\nbecause of its all-comprising character, the what and the that are\ninseparable. Hence its knowledge must be of the nature of direct insight\ninto the individual structure of the world of fact, not of\ngeneralisation about possibilities, and its will must have the form of a\npurpose which, unlike our own, is always consciously expressed with\nperfect harmony and completeness in the \u201cfacts\u201d of which it is\naware.[35] Hence knowledge and will, involving as they do for us\ndiscrepancy between the what and the that of experience, are not wholly\nsatisfactory terms by which to characterise the life of the\nAbsolute.[36] The most adequate analogue to such a life will probably be\nfound in the combination of direct insight with satisfied feeling which\nwe experience in the relation of intimate and intelligent love between\npersons. The insight of love may be called \u201cknowledge,\u201d but it is\nknowledge of a quite other type than the hypothetical universals of\nscience. I know my friend, not as one case of this or that general class\nabout which certain propositions in Physiology, Psychology, or Ethics\ncan be made, but as\u2014for me at least\u2014a unique individual centre of\npersonal interest. Again, in my relations with my friend, so far as they\nremain those of satisfied love, my individual interests find their\nfullest embodiment. But the will to love is not first there in an\nunsatisfied form, and the embodiment afterwards added as the result of a\nprocess through means to an end. The purpose and its embodiment are\nthroughout present together in an unbroken unity, and where this is not\nso, true mutual friendship does not as yet exist.[37] After some such\ngeneral fashion we shall best represent to ourselves the kind of\nconsciousness which we must attribute to an all-embracing\nworld-experience. Only, we must bear in mind that, owing to the\nfragmentariness of our own lives, the identity of purpose on which human\nfriendship rests can never be close and intimate enough to be an\nadequate representative of the ultimate unity of all experience in the\nAbsolute.[38]\n\n\u00a7 5. It may be well to add a word of caution against a plausible fallacy\nhere. If there is such an Absolute Experience as we have demanded, all\nthe realities that we know as the contents of our environment must be\npresent to it, and present to it as they really are in their\ncompleteness. But we must be careful not to suppose that \u201cour\u201d\nenvironment, as it appears to an experience which apprehends it as it\nreally is, is a mere replica or reduplication of the way in which it\nappears to us. For example, I must not assume that what I perceive as a\nphysical thing, made up of separable parts external to one another and\napparently combined in a mechanical way into a whole which is a mere\ncollection or aggregate of parts, is necessarily apprehended by the\nAbsolute Experience as an aggregate of similar or corresponding parts.\nThe thing as it appears to my limited insight may be no less different\nfrom the thing as apprehended in its true nature by such an experience,\nthan your body, as it exists for my perception from your body as you\napprehend it in organic sensation. In particular, we must not assume\nthat things exist for the Absolute Experience in the form into which we\nanalyse them for the purpose of general scientific theory, for instance,\nthat physical things are for it assemblages of atoms or individual minds\nsuccessions of \u201cmental states.\u201d In fact, without anticipating the\nresults of succeeding books, we may safely say at once that this would\nbe in principle impossible. For all scientific analysis is in its very\nnature general and hypothetical. It deals solely with types and abstract\npossibilities, never with the actual constitution of individual things.\nBut all real existence is individual.\n\nTo put the same thing in a different way, scientific theory deals always\nwith those features of the _what_ of things of which we take note\nbecause of their significance for our human purposes. And in dealing\nwith these features of things, it seeks to establish general laws of\nlinkage between them of which we may avail ourselves, for the practical\npurpose of realising our various human interests. This practical motive,\nthough often not apparent, implicitly controls our whole scientific\nprocedure from first to last. Hence the one test of a scientific\nhypothesis is its success in enabling us to infer one set of facts from\nanother set, Whether the intermediate links by which we pass from the\none set to the other have any counterpart in the world of real\nexperience or are mere creations of theory, like the \u201cuninterpretable\u201d\nsymbols in a mathematical calculus, is from this point of view a matter\nof indifference. All we require of our hypothesis is that when you start\nwith facts capable of experimental verification, the application of it\nshall lead to other facts capable of experimental verification. For this\nreason we may justifiably conclude that to any experience which is aware\nof things in their concrete individuality they must present aspects\nwhich are not represented in our scientific hypotheses, and again cannot\nappear to it as the precise counterpart of the schemes according to\nwhich we quite legitimately reconstruct them for the purpose of\nscientific investigation. We shall need to bear this in mind in future\nwhen we come to discuss the real character of what appears to us as the\nworld of physical nature.[39]\n\n\u00a7 6. The conclusion we have reached so far is largely identical with\nthat of the anti-materialistic argument of Berkeley\u2019s well-known\n_Principles of Human Knowledge_ and _Three Dialogues between Hylas and\nPhilonous_. But there is one important difference between the two\nresults which will lead to momentous consequences. Berkeley\u2019s argument\nagainst the independent existence of unperceived matter proceeds\nthroughout on the principle that to be means to be present in an\nexperience, and his exhibition of the contradictions into which the\ndenial of this principle leads the supporter of scientific materialism\nremains the classic demonstration of the truth of the opposing or\n\u201cidealistic\u201d view. But it is to be noted that he works throughout with\nan inadequate conception of \u201cexperience\u201d and \u201cpresence in experience.\u201d\nHe treats experience as equivalent to mere passive \u201cawareness\u201d of a\nquality presented to perception. To experience with him means simply to\nbe conscious of a presented quality; experience is treated as having, in\npsychological terminology, a merely presentational character. Hence he\nis led to infer that the things with which experience confronts us are\nnothing more than complexes of presented qualities, or, as he phrases\nit, that their whole being consists in being perceived.\n\nThe full extent of the paradox which this identification of the _esse_\nof material things with _percipi_ involves, will be more apparent when\nwe come to deal in our next book with the problem of matter. At present\nI merely wish to call attention to one of its many aspects. On the\ntheory that experience is purely passive and presentational, consisting\nmerely in the reception of certain sensations, the question at once\narises, What determines what in particular the sensations we at any\ngiven moment receive shall be? On the Berkeleian view, their order must\nbe determined altogether from without by a principle foreign to the\nexperience which, he assumes, has nothing to do but to cognise the\nqualities put before it. Hence he is led to appeal to the agency of God,\nwhom he supposes directly and immediately to cause perceptions to\nsucceed one another in my experience in a certain definite order. Now,\napart from further difficulties of detail, this doctrine at once leads\nto the result that the attitude of God to the world of things is totally\ndifferent from that of us who experience it. Experience is to me a\npurely passive receptivity of presentations; God\u2019s relation to the\npresented objects, on the other hand, is one of active production. There\nis no common element in these fundamentally contrasted relations; hence\nit is really a paralogism when Berkeley allows himself to bring God\nunder the same categories which he applies to the interpretation of\nhuman experience, and to attribute to Him a consciousness of the things\nwhich have been declared to be only the presentations His agency raises\nin the human mind.[40]\n\nBerkeley is, in fact, inconsistently combining two conflicting lines of\nthought. He argues, on the one hand, that since there must be some\nreason for the order in which presentations succeed one another in my\nmental life, that reason is to be found in a source independent of\nmyself. This source he identifies with God, but, as far as the argument\ngoes, it might equally well have been found, as by Locke, in the\noriginal constitution of matter; all that the argument requires is that\nit shall be placed in something outside the succession of presentations\nthemselves. On the other hand, he also argues that since the existence\nof the physical world means simply the fact of its being presented to\nconsciousness, when its contents cease to be present to my consciousness\nthey must be present to that of God. And here again the objection might\nbe suggested, that if presence to my own experience, while it lasts, is\nan adequate account of the _esse_ of a thing, it does not appear why I\nshould recognise the reality of any other experience. If I am to hold\nthat disappearance from my experience does not destroy the reality of\nanything, I must logically also hold that its being, while I perceive\nit, is not exhausted by _my_ awareness of it. Its _esse_ cannot be\nmerely _percipi_.\n\nThe complete solution of Berkeley\u2019s difficulty would be premature at\nthis point of our discussion. But we may at once point out its principal\nsource. It arises from his failure to take adequate account of the\npurposive aspect of experience. Experience, as we have seen, is not mere\nawareness of a succession of presented objects, it is awareness of a\nsuccession determined by a controlling interest or purpose. The order of\nmy experiences is not something simply given me from without, it is\ncontrolled and determined by subjective interest from within. Berkeley,\nin fact, omits selective attention from his psychological estimate of\nthe contents of the human mind. He forgets that it is the interests for\nwhich I take note of facts that in the main determine which facts I\nshall take note of, an oversight which is the more remarkable, since he\nexpressly lays stress on \u201cactivity\u201d as the distinguishing property of\n\u201cspirits.\u201d[41] When we make good the omission by emphasising the\nteleological aspect of experience, we see at once that the radical\ndisparity between the relation of the supreme and the subordinate mind\nto the world of facts disappears. I do not simply receive my presented\nfacts passively in an order determined for me from without by the\nsupreme mind; in virtue of my power of selective attention, on a limited\nscale, and very imperfectly, I recreate the order of their succession\nfor myself.\n\nAgain, recognition of the teleological aspect of all experience goes far\nto remove the dissatisfaction which we may reasonably feel with the\nother half of Berkeley\u2019s argument. When I conceive of the \u201cfacts\u201d of\nexperience as merely objects presented to my apprehension, there seems\nno sufficient reason for holding that they exist except as so presented.\nBut the moment I think of the succession of presented facts as itself\ndetermined by the subjective interests expressed in selective attention,\nthe case becomes different. The very expression \u201cselective attention\u201d\nitself carries with it a reminder that the facts which respond to my\ninterests are but a selection out of a larger whole. And my practical\nexperience of the way in which my own most clearly defined and conscious\npurposes depend for their fulfilment upon connection with the interests\nand purposes of a wider social whole possessed of an organic unity,\nshould help me to understand how the totality of interests and purposes\ndetermining the selective attention of different percipients can form,\nas we have held that it must, the harmonious and systematic unity of the\nabsolute experience. The fuller working out of this line of thought must\nbe left for later chapters, but it is hardly too much to say that the\nteleological character which experience possesses in virtue of its unity\nwith feeling is the key to the idealistic interpretation of the\nuniverse.[42]\n\nIdealism, _i.e._ the doctrine that all reality is mental, as we shall\nhave repeated opportunities of learning, becomes unintelligible when\nmental life is conceived of as a mere awareness of \u201cgiven\u201d\npresentations.\n\n\u00a7 7. We may now, before attempting to carry out in detail our general\nview of what is involved in being real, enumerate one or two\nphilosophical doctrines about the nature of real existence which our\nconclusion as to the connection of reality with experience justifies us\nin setting aside. And, first of all, we can at once see that our\nprevious result, if sound, proves fatal to all forms of what is commonly\nknown as _Realism_. By Realism is meant the doctrine that the\nfundamental character of that which really is, as distinguished from\nthat which is only imagined to be, is to be found in its independence of\nall relation to the experience of a subject. What exists at all, the\nrealist holds, exists equally whether it is experienced or not. Neither\nthe fact of its existence nor the kind of existence it possesses depends\nin any way upon its presence to an experience. Before it was experienced\nat all it had just the same kind of being that it has now you are\nexperiencing it, and it will still be the same when it has passed out of\nexperience. In a word, the circumstance that a mind\u2014whether yours or\nmine or God\u2019s is indifferent to the argument\u2014is aware of it as one of\nthe constituents of its experience, makes no difference to the reality\nof the real thing; experience is what is technically called a relation\nof one-sided dependence. That there may be experience at all, and that\nit may have this or that character, there must be real things of\ndeterminate character, but that there may be real things, it is not\nnecessary that there should be experience. This is, in brief, the\nessence of the realist contention, and any philosophy which accepts it\nas valid is in its spirit a realist philosophy.\n\nAs to the number and nature of the supposed independent real things,\nvery different views may be held and have been held by different\nrepresentatives of Realism. Thus some realists have maintained the\nexistence of a single ultimate reality, others of an indefinite\nplurality of independent \u201creals.\u201d Parmenides, with his doctrine that the\nreal world is a single uniform unchanging material sphere, is an\ninstance in the ancient, and Mr. Herbert Spencer, with his Unknowable,\nan instance in the modern world of a realist of the former or \u201cmonistic\u201d\ntype. The ancient atomists, and in more recent times Leibnitz with his\ninfinite plurality of independent and disconnected monads, and Herbart\nwith his world of simple \u201creals,\u201d afford the best known instances of a\ndoctrine of pluralistic Realism. So again, the most diverse theories\nhave been propounded as to the nature of the \u201creals.\u201d Ancient and modern\natomists have thought of them as material, and this is perhaps the form\nof realistic doctrine which appeals most readily to the ordinary\nimagination. But though a materialistic metaphysician is necessarily a\nrealist, a realist need not be a materialist. Herbart thought of the\nindependent \u201creals\u201d as qualitatively simple beings of a nature not\ncapable of further definition, Leibnitz as minds, while Agnostic\nphilosophers of the type of Spencer conceive their ultimate reality as a\nsort of neutral _tertium quid_, neither mental nor material. The only\npoint on which all the theories agree is that the reality of that which\nthey recognise as true Being consists in its not depending for its\nexistence or its character on relation to an experience. The differences\nof detail as to the number and nature of independent \u201creals,\u201d though of\ngreat importance for our complete estimate of an individual realist\u2019s\nphilosophical position, do not affect our general verdict on the\ntenability of the first principle of Realism.\n\nThe one point of divergence among realists which may be considered as of\nmore than secondary importance for our present purpose, is the\ndifference between what we may call Agnostic and Dogmatic Realism.\nAgnostic Realism, while asserting the ultimate dependence of our\nexperience upon a reality which exists independently of experience,\ndenies that we can have any knowledge of the nature of this independent\nreality. The independent reality by which all experience is conditioned\nis, on this view, an Unknowable or Thing-in-itself,[43] of which we are\nonly logically entitled to say _that_ it certainly is, but that we do\nnot in the least know _what_ it is. The doctrine of Agnostic Realism has\nprobably never been carried out by any thinker with rigid consistency,\nbut it forms a leading feature of the philosophy of Kant as expounded in\nhis First Critique, and through Kant has passed into English thought as\nthe foundation of the systems of Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Herbert\nSpencer.[44]\n\nDogmatic Realism, of which Leibnitz and, at a later date, Herbart are\nthe most important representatives in modern philosophy, on the\ncontrary, while maintaining that real being is independent of\nexperience, at the same time holds that it is possible to have positive\nknowledge not only of its existence but of its nature. In principle,\nboth these forms of Realism have been already excluded by the argument\nof Book I. chap. 2, \u00a7 4. The supreme importance of the principle on\nwhich the argument rests may perhaps warrant us in once more briefly\nrecurring to it. Our reasoning, it will be remembered, took the form of\na challenge. Produce any instance you please, we said to the realist,\nwhom we had not then learned to know by that name, of what you\npersonally regard as reality, and we will undertake to show that it\nderives its reality for you from the very fact that it is not ultimately\nseparable from the experience of a subject. A thing is real for you, and\nnot merely imaginary, precisely because in some aspect of its character\nit enters into and affects your own experience. Or, what is the same\nthing in other words, it is real for you because it affects favourably\nor otherwise some subjective interest of your own. To be sure, the thing\nas it enters into your experience, as it affects your own subjective\ninterests, is not the thing as it is in its fulness; it only touches\nyour life through some one of its many sides. And this may lead you to\nargue that the real thing is the unexperienced \u201ccondition\u201d of a\nmodification of your experience. But then we had again to ask what you\nmean by saying that facts which you do not experience are real as\n\u201cconditions\u201d of what you do experience. And we saw that the only meaning\nwe could attach to the reality of the \u201ccondition\u201d was presence to an\nexperience which transcends your own.\n\nTo this general argument we may add two corollaries or supplementary\nconsiderations, which, without introducing anything fresh, may help to\nmake its full force more apparent.\n\n(1) The argument, as originally presented, was concerned directly with\nthe _that_ of reality, the mere fact of its existence. But we may also\nstate it, if we please, from the side of the _what_, the nature\npossessed by the real. You cannot affirm any doctrine about the real\nexistence of anything without at the same time implying a doctrine about\nits nature. Even if you say \u201cReality is unknowable,\u201d you are attributing\nsomething beyond mere independence of experience to your reality; you\nare asserting that what is thus independent possesses the further\npositive quality of transcending cognition. Now what, in logic, must be\nyour ground for attributing this rather than any other quality to your\nindependent reality? It can only be the fact or supposed fact\u2014which is\nindeed regularly appealed to by the Agnostic as the foundation of his\nbelief\u2014that our experiences themselves are all found to be\nself-contradictory. There is no ground for taking the unknowability of\nReality to be true unless you mean by it a character which belongs not\nto something which stands outside all experience, but to experience\nitself. The same contention applies to any other predicate which the\nrealist affirms as true of his ultimate reality.\n\n(2) Again, we may with effect present our argument in a negative form.\nTry, we may say, to think of the utterly unreal, and see how you will\nhave to conceive it. Can you think of sheer unreality otherwise than as\nthat of which no mind is ever aware, of which no purpose has ever to\ntake account as a condition of its fulfilment? But to think of it thus\nis to attribute to it, as its definition, precisely that independence in\nwhich the realist finds the mark of ultimate reality. And if\n\u201cindependence\u201d constitutes unreality, presence to and union with\nexperience must be what constitutes reality.\n\nYet, however fatal this line of argument may be to the principle of the\nrealistic contention, we ought not to be satisfied with such a mere\ngeneral refutation. We must try to see what is the element of truth in\nthe realistic views to which they owe the plausibility they have always\npossessed for minds of a certain type. In Philosophy we are never really\nrid of an error until we have learned how it arises and what modicum of\ntruth it contains.\n\n(1) _Agnostic Realism._ We may begin with Agnosticism, with which we\nought now to have no serious difficulty. Agnostic Realism, as we have\nseen, is in principle a doubly self-contradictory theory. For it\ncombines in one breath the irreconcilable declarations that the reality\nof things is unknowable and that it knows it to be so.[45] Further, as\nwe have just said, it makes alleged contradictions which only exist in\nand for experience, its sole ground for affirming that something, of\nwhich we can only specify that it is _outside_ all experience,\ntranscends cognition. To have grasped these two points is to have\ndisposed of Agnosticism as a metaphysical theory.\n\nYet with all its defects Agnosticism still enshrines one piece of truth\nwhich the metaphysician is peculiarly prone to forget. Of all men the\nmetaphysician, just because his special interest is to know something\nfinal and certain about Reality, is the most apt to exaggerate the\namount of his certain knowledge. It is well to be reminded that the\ncertainty with which we may say that Reality is experience is compatible\nwith a very imperfect and limited theoretical insight into experience\nitself. In actual life this is a far from unfamiliar fact; the\nliterature of common sense is full of observations to the effect that we\nnever really know our own hearts, that the most difficult task of the\nsage is to understand himself, and so forth,\u2014complaints which all turn\non the point that even our own limited direct experience of our own\nmeanings and purposes goes far beyond what we can at any moment express\nin the form of reflective knowledge. Yet it is easy, when we come to\ndeal in Metaphysics with the nature of ultimate Reality, to forget this,\nand to suppose that the certainty with which we can say that the\nultimately Real is an experience justifies us in wholesale dogmatising\nabout the special character of that experience. As a protest against\nsuch exaggerated estimates of the extent of our theoretical knowledge of\nthe nature of Reality, Agnosticism thus contains a germ of genuine and\nimportant truth, and arises from a justifiable reaction against the\nundue emphasising of the merely intellectual side of our experience, of\nwhich we have already seen, and shall hereafter still more fully see,\nground to complain as a besetting weakness of the metaphysically minded.\n\n(2) _Dogmatic Realism_, that is, Realism with admittedly knowable\nindependent \u201creals,\u201d is a much more workable doctrine, and in one of its\nforms, that of the so-called \u201cna\u00efve realism\u201d which supposes the world of\nexperienced things with all its perceived qualities to exist\nindependently of any relation to an experiencing subject in precisely\nthe same form in which we experience it, fairly represents the ordinary\nviews of unphilosophical \u201ccommon-sense\u201d men. Nothing seems more obvious\nto \u201ccommon sense\u201d than that my perception of a thing does not bring it\nout of nothing into existence, and again does not create for it new\nqualities which it had not before. It is because the thing is already\nthere, and has already such and such a nature, says \u201ccommon sense,\u201d that\nI perceive it as I do. Therefore the whole world of perceived things\nmust exist independently in the same form in which they are perceived,\nas a condition of my perception of them.\n\nWhen this view comes to be worked out as a philosophical theory, it\nusually undergoes some transformation. The fact of illusion, and the\nexperimentally ascertained subjective differences between individual\npercipients,[46] or between different states of the same percipient,\nmake it hard for the realist who wishes to be scientific to maintain\nthat _all_ the perceived qualities of experienced things are equally\nindependent of the experiencing subject. Reflection usually substitutes\nfor the \u201cna\u00efve\u201d realism of everyday life, a theory of \u201cscientific\u201d\nrealism according to which the existence and some of the known\nproperties of the experienced world are independent of the experiencing\nsubject, while others are regarded as mere secondary effects arising\nfrom the action of an independent reality on the subject\u2019s\nconsciousness. With the further differences between the various types of\nscientific realism, according to the special properties which are held\nto belong to things independently of the percipient subject, we are not\nat present concerned.[47]\n\nIt is, of course, clear that our general argument against the existence\nof any reality except as in an experience tells just as much against\n\u201cna\u00efve\u201d realism and its more reflective outgrowth \u201cscientific\u201d realism\nas against Agnosticism. But the very plausibility and wide diffusion of\nrealistic views of this type make it all the more necessary to reinforce\nour contention by showing what the truth Realism contains is, and just\nwhere it diverges from truth into fallacy. Nor is it specially difficult\nto do this. The important elements of truth contained in Realism seem to\nbe in the main two. (i) It is certain that a thing may be real without\nbeing consciously present as a distinguishable aspect in my experience.\nThings do not begin to exist when I begin to be aware of them, or cease\nto exist when I cease to be aware of them. And again, the fact that I\nmake mistakes and am subject to illusion shows that the qualities of\nthings are not necessarily in reality what I take them to be. (2)\nFurther, as is shown by the fact of my imperfect understanding of my own\nfeelings and purposes, something may actually be an integral part of my\nown life as an experiencing subject without my clearly and consciously\nrecognising it as such when I reflect on the contents of my experience.\n\nBut precisely how much do these two considerations prove? All that is\nestablished by the first is the point on which we have already insisted,\nthat it is not _my_ experience which constitutes Reality; and all that\nis established by the second, that experience, as we have already\nrepeatedly seen, is not merely cognitive. But the admission of both\nthese positions brings us not one step nearer the conclusion which the\nrealist draws from them, that real existence is independent of all\nexperience. Because it is easy to show that the reality of a thing does\nnot depend on its being explicitly recognised by any one finite\npercipient or any aggregate of finite percipients, and again, that there\nis more in any experience of finite percipients than those percipients\nknow, the realist thinks he may infer that there are realities which\nwould still be real though they entered into no experience at all. But\nthere is really no logical connection whatever between the premisses of\nthis inference and the conclusion which is drawn from them.\n\nThis may be made clearer by a couple of examples. Take, to begin with,\nthe case of the mental life of my fellow human beings. And, to state the\ncase in the form in which it appears most favourable to the realist\nconclusion, let us imagine an Alexander Selkirk stranded on a barren\nrock in the midst of the ocean. The hopes and fears of our Selkirk are\nindependent of my knowledge of them just as completely and in just the\nsame sense in which the existence and conformation of the rock on which\nhe is stranded are so. I and all other inhabitants of the earth may be\njust as ignorant of Selkirk\u2019s existence and of what is passing in his\nmind as we are of the existence and geological structure of his rock.\nAnd again, what Selkirk explicitly cognises of his own inner life may\nbear as small a proportion to the whole as what he explicitly cognises\nof the properties of his rock to the whole nature of the rock. Yet all\nthis in no wise shows that Selkirk\u2019s hopes and fears and the rest of his\nmental life are not experience or have a reality \u201cindependent of\nexperience.\u201d Hopes and fears which are not experience, not psychical\nmatter of fact, would indeed be a contradiction in set terms. And what\nthe argument fails to prove of Selkirk\u2019s mental life, it fails, for the\nsame reason, to prove of Selkirk\u2019s rock.\n\nWe may pass from the case of the mental life of a fellow-man to the case\nof unperceived physical reality. A recent realist philosopher, Mr. L. T.\nHobhouse, has brought forward as a clear instance of an independent\nphysical reality, the case of a railway train just emerging from a\ntunnel. I do not perceive the train, he says, until it issues from the\ntunnel, but it was just as real while it was running through the tunnel.\nIts reality is therefore independent of the question whether it is\nperceived or not. But, in the first place, the argument requires that\nthe train shall be empty; it must be a runaway train without driver,\nguard, or passengers, if the conditions presumed in the premisses are to\nbe fulfilled. And, in the second place, we may retort that even an empty\nrunaway train must have been despatched from somewhere by somebody. It\nmust stand in some relation to the general scheme of purposes and\ninterests expressed in our system of railway traffic, and it is\nprecisely this connection, with a scheme of purposes and interests,\nwhich makes the runaway train a reality and not a mere fiction of an\ningenious philosopher\u2019s imagination. If Mr. Hobhouse\u2019s argument proves\nthe independent reality of the train in the tunnel, it ought equally to\nprove, and does equally prove, the independent existence of Selkirk\u2019s\nfluctuations from hope to despair and back again on his isolated rock.\nAnd precisely because it proves both conclusions equally, the sort of\nindependence it establishes cannot be independence of experience. Like\nall realist arguments, it turns on the identification of experience with\nthe cognitive aspect of experience, an identification too often\nsuggested by the language of the \u201cidealists\u201d themselves.[48]\n\n\u00a7 8. The persistent vitality of Realism is due to its protest against\nthe fallacies of an opposing theory which has of late especially found\nfavour with some distinguished students of natural science, and which we\nmay conveniently call Subjectivism.[49] Realism, as we saw, started from\nthe true premisses, that there are real facts of which my experience\ndoes not make me explicitly aware, and that my cognition even of my own\nexperience is incomplete, and argued to the false conclusion that there\nare therefore realities independent of any experience. Subjectivism\nreasons in the opposite way. It asserts truly that there is no reality\noutside experience, and then falsely concludes that I can know of no\nreality except my own cognitive states. Its favourite formula are\nexpressions such as, \u201cWe know only the modifications of our own\nconsciousness,\u201d \u201cAll we know is our own perceptions,\u201d \u201cNothing exists\nbut states of consciousness.\u201d These formul\u00e6 are not all obviously\nidentical in meaning, but the exponents of Subjectivism seem to use them\nwithout any conscious distinction, and we shall probably do the theory\nno injustice if we criticise it on the assumption that the expressions\nare meant to be of identical signification.\n\nNow it is clear that the logical consequences of the subjectivist\ndoctrine are so subversive of all the practical assumptions upon which\ndaily life is based, that they should require the most stringent proof\nbefore we give our assent to them. If Subjectivism is true, it follows\nimmediately that not merely the \u201cwhole choir of heaven and furniture of\nearth,\u201d but the whole of humanity, so far as I have any knowledge of its\nexistence, is a mere subjective affection of my own \u201cconsciousness,\u201d or,\nas the scientific subjectivist usually, for some not very obvious\nreason, prefers to say, of my own brain. Every argument which the\nsubjectivist can produce to show that \u201cthings\u201d are, for my knowledge at\nany rate, \u201cmodifications of my own consciousness,\u201d applies to the case\nof my fellow-men with as much force as to the case of the inorganic\nworld. The logical inference from the subjectivist\u2019s premisses, an\ninference which he is rarely or never willing to draw, would be that he\nis himself the sole real being in a world of phantoms, not one of which\ncan with any certainty be said to correspond to a real object. And\nconversely, any valid ground for recognising the existence of my\nfellow-men as more than \u201cstates of my own consciousness,\u201d must equally\nafford ground for admitting the reality, in the same general sense, of\nthe rest of the world of things familiar to us from the experiences of\neveryday life.[50] For if any one of the things composing the world of\npractical life has a reality which is not dependent upon its presence to\nmy particular experience, then there is the same reason for believing\nthat every other such thing has a like reality, unless there happen to\nbe special grounds for regarding the perception to which it is present\nas an hallucination.\n\nWe must not, however, simply dismiss the subjectivist theory in this\nsummary way. We must examine the doctrine in detail sufficiently to\ndiscover where the fallacy comes in, how it arises, and what modicum of\nsound philosophic insight it may possibly contain. To take these three\npoints in logical order\u2014\n\n(_a_) The current arguments for Subjectivism are often so stated as to\nconfuse together two quite distinct positions. When it is said that what\nwe perceive is \u201cour own subjective states,\u201d the meaning intended may be\neither that there is, at least so far as I am able to know, no real\nexistence in the universe except that of my \u201cstates of consciousness\u201d;\nor again, that there are such realities, but that the _properties_ which\nI perceive do not belong to them in their own nature but are only\nsubjective effects of their action upon my \u201cconsciousness,\u201d or, if you\nprefer to speak in physiological language upon my nervous system. Now,\nmany of the arguments commonly urged by the subjectivist would at most\nonly prove the second conclusion, in which the subjectivist agrees to a\nlarge extent with the scientific realist. Thus it is an _ignoratio\nelenchi_ to reason as if the facts of hallucination, illusion, and\ndiscrepancy between the reports of different percipients or different\nsense-organs of the same percipient gave any support to the special\ndoctrine of Subjectivism. These facts, which, as we have seen, are\nequally appealed to by scientific realists, prove no more than that we\ndo not always perceive the world of things as it is, and as it must be\nthought of if we would think truly,\u2014in other words, that there is such a\nthing as error.\n\nNow the problem \u201cHow is it possible for us to think or perceive\nfalsely?\u201d is, as the student of Greek philosophy knows, both difficult\nand important. But the existence of error in no way shows that the\nthings which I perceive are \u201cstates of my own consciousness\u201d; on the\ncontrary, error is harder to explain on the subjectivist theory than on\nany other. For if what I perceive has some kind of existence distinct\nfrom the mere fact of my perceiving it, there is at least a possibility\nof understanding how the reality and my perception of it may be\ndiscrepant; but if the existence of a thing is only another name for the\nfact that I perceive it, it seems impossible that I should perceive\nanything except as it is. On the subjectivist theory, as Plato showed in\nthe _Theaetetus_, every percipient being ought, at every moment of his\nexistence, to be infallible.\n\nWe may confine our attention, then, to the grounds which the\nsubjectivist alleges for the former conclusion, that nothing can be\nknown to exist except my own \u201cstates of consciousness,\u201d and may dismiss\nthe whole problem of erroneous perception as irrelevant to the question.\nNow the general argument for Subjectivism, however differently it may be\nstated by different writers, consists, in principle, of a single\nallegation. It is alleged as a fact in the Psychology of cognition, that\nthings are immediately perceived by us as modifications of our own\nsensibility, or \u201cstates of our own consciousness,\u201d and that it is\ntherefore impossible to get behind this ultimate condition of all\nperception. Against this psychological doctrine we have to urge (1) that\nit is in flagrant contradiction with the certain facts of actual life;\nand (2) that, as a doctrine in Psychology, it is demonstrably false.\n\n(1) There are certain realities, admitted by the subjectivist himself,\nwhich are manifestly _not_ \u201cstates of my consciousness,\u201d and of which I\nyet, as the subjectivist himself admits, have a genuine though imperfect\nknowledge; such realities are, _e.g._, the ends and purposes of my\nfellow-men, and again many of my own ends and purposes. It is allowed on\nall hands that I can know not only the fact of the existence of other\nmen, but also, to some extent at least, the character of their various\npurposes and interests. This is involved, for instance, in the simple\nfact that when I read a letter it is normally possible for me to\nunderstand the writer\u2019s meaning. It is equally involved in the fact that\nI can know the truth of any ordinary historical matter of fact, _e.g._,\nthe date of the great fire of London. Neither the date of the fire of\nLondon nor the meaning of my correspondent\u2019s sentences is a \u201cstate of my\nconsciousness\u201d in any intelligible sense of the words, yet both are\ntypical instances of the kind of facts of which our ordinary knowledge\nof the world of everyday life and practice wholly consists. And what is\ntrue of facts relating to the deeds and purposes of others is equally\ntrue of my own deeds and purposes. The facts which make up my own life\ncannot, without violence to language, be reduced to \u201cstates of my\nconsciousness.\u201d For instance, I may know that I have a certain\ntemperament or disposition, _e.g._, that I am irascible by temperament\nor of a sentimental disposition; but though my knowing these truths\nabout myself may in a sense be called a state of my consciousness, the\ntruths themselves cannot be called \u201cstates of my consciousness\u201d without\na serious logical fallacy of equivocal middle term.\n\n(2) This will be made clearer by a consideration of the psychological\nprinciple invoked by the subjectivist. What the subjectivist means when\nhe says that in perception I am aware only of the states, or subjective\nmodifications, of my own consciousness, is that the object of which each\nperceptive state is aware is simply itself as a perceptive state; the\nperception perceives itself and nothing else. _E.g._, when I say I see\nred, what I am really aware of is that I am in a state of perceiving\nred; when I say I hear a noise, what I am aware of is that I am in a\nstate of hearing a noise, and so universally. Now this is so far from\nbeing a truth, that it is absolutely and demonstrably false. We may, in\nfact, definitely lay it down that the one thing of which no one, except\nthe introspective psychologist, is ever aware is his own perceptive\nstate in the act of perceiving, and that, even in the case of the\npsychologist who sets himself purposely to study his own states, no\nperceptive state ever perceives itself. What I am aware of when I look\nat a red surface is not \u201cmyself-as-perceiving-red,\u201d but the splash\nof red colour itself. When I see a man, I do not perceive\n\u201cmyself-as-seeing-a-man,\u201d but I perceive the other man. So when I\ntake a resolution to act in a certain way or realise that I\nam in a certain mood, what I am directly aware of is not\n\u201cmyself-as-forming-the-resolution\u201d or \u201cmyself-as-in-the-mood,\u201d but the\nresolution or the mood. Even when, as an introspective psychologist, I\nsit down to study the formation of resolutions or the peculiarities of\nemotional moods by reflection on my own experience, the state in which I\nstudy the formation of a resolution or the nature of a mood is not\nitself the state of resolving or of experiencing the mood in question.\nWe cannot too strongly insist that, if by \u201cself-consciousness\u201d is meant\na cognitive state which is its own object, _there is no such thing, and\nit is a psychological impossibility that there should be any such thing,\nas self-consciousness. No cognitive state ever has itself for its own\nobject. Every cognitive state has for its object something other than\nitself._[51]\n\nEven where I make an assertion about my subjective condition, as when I\nsay \u201cI know I am very angry,\u201d the state of knowing about my feeling is\nas distinct from the feeling itself as the state of knowing that I see\nred is from the red colour that I see. What the subjectivist does is to\nconfuse the two. Because the act of knowing is itself a state of the\nknowing subject, and because in some cases the knowledge may again have\nreference to some other state of the same subject, he infers that what I\nknow at any moment is my own subjective condition in the act of knowing.\nIn other and more technical words, he confuses the cognitive act or\nstate with its own object. To what absurd results this confusion would\nlead him, if he were logical in the inferences he makes from it, we have\nalready seen. We can now see that psychologically the confusion is a\ndouble one. (1) The subjectivist confuses experience with mere awareness\nof a presented content. He ignores the presence of the true \u201csubjective\u201d\nfactor of selective attention throughout experience, and is thus led to\nforget that all experiences imply an element which is in the\nexperiencing mind but not _presented to it_. (2) And in confining his\nattention to the presentational aspect of experience, he goes on to\nconfound the presented content with the fact of its presentation. As\nagainst this second confusion it is essential to a true theory of\nknowledge to emphasise three points of distinction between the presented\ncontent or object of a cognitive state and the state itself, considered\nas a process in the history of an experiencing subject. (1) The\ncognitive state is never its own object, it _refers_ to or _cognises_ an\nobject distinct from its own existence as a psychical occurrence. This\nis the truth which Realism distorts into the doctrine that the object of\nknowledge must have a reality of \u201cindependent of\u201d experience. (2) The\nobject of knowledge is never created by the occurrence of the psychical\nstate in which a particular percipient becomes aware of its existence.\nThis is just as true of so-called \u201cmerely ideal\u201d objects as of physical\nthings. The properties of the natural logarithms or of the circular\nfunctions in trigonometry are just as independent of my knowledge of\nthem as the qualities of the trees and animals I should see if I turned\nfrom my writing desk and looked out at the window. (3) The object of\nknowledge has always a character of which only a fragment is ever\npresented to my perception or reflection in any cognitive state. Every\ncognitive state _refers to_ or _stands for_ a great deal more than it\ndirectly means to me.\n\n(3) The origin of the subjectivist fallacy, as has been brilliantly\nshown by Avenarius,[52] is to be found in the \u201cintrasubjective\nintercourse\u201d of a plurality of percipients capable of communicating\ntheir experience to each other. So long as I am dealing solely with\nmyself as an experiencing being and my relation to my own environment,\nthere is no possibility of a subjectivist interpretation. In my own\ndirect experience I have to do neither with \u201cmental states\u201d nor with\nmere \u201cobjects of cognition,\u201d but with _things_ which in various ways by\ntheir interference assist or hinder the accomplishment of my various\npurposes, and of which I have therefore to take note, so as to adapt my\nways of reaching my ends to their ways of behaviour. Hence the \u201cnatural\u201d\nview of the world, for a single experiencing being, would be that of\n\u201cna\u00efve realism,\u201d to which the things forming my environment are real in\nprecisely the same sense in which I am real myself. But as soon as I\nhave to take account of the experiences of other percipients, there\narises an inevitable fallacy which leads to philosophical consequences\nof the gravest kind. Starting with the assumption that the things I\nperceive are the real things, I feel a difficulty as to how the same\nthings can be perceived by the other percipients around me. _E.g._, if\nthe sun I see is the real sun, what about the sun seen by some one else?\nInstead of finding the true explanation, that all the percipients are in\nrelation to a common environment which is independent of its presence to\nany one percipient\u2019s experience, I very naturally fall into the mistake\nof thinking the things perceived by other men to be \u201cideas\u201d or\n\u201cpercepts\u201d of the real things perceived by me. These perceptual copies\nof the real things I, for obvious reasons, locate somewhere \u201cin\u201d the\norganisms of my fellow-percipients. Then I go on to interpret my own\nexperience in terms of the theory I originally devised to meet the case\nof my fellow-men, and infer that what I myself perceive is a set of\n\u201cpercepts\u201d or \u201cideas\u201d produced \u201cin\u201d my organism by a reality \u201coutside\u201d\nall experience. And it is then an easy step to the final conclusion\nthat, inasmuch as all known and knowable things are mere \u201cideas in some\none\u2019s head,\u201d nothing else exists. Subjectivism is thus the last step in\nthe development of the fallacy which begins with what Avenarius calls\n\u201cintrojection.\u201d Just as we learned that the existence of our fellow-men\nis the cardinal fact of experience which affords the most immediate\nrefutation of the subjectivist theory, so the original source of the\nsubjectivist fallacy is failure to recognise their experience as being\non the same level of reality as our own.\n\n(4) We need not say much on the element of truth which Subjectivism\npreserves in a distorted form. We have seen that, as against Realism,\nSubjectivism is right in maintaining the indissoluble unity of real\nbeing with experience, though it twists this truth into an absurdity by\nfirst identifying experience with my own limited and imperfect\nexperience and then giving a false psychological interpretation of the\nnature of that experience itself. How a reality can be independent of\npresentation in _my_ experience and yet be in its very nature dependent\nupon experience for its existence and character, has already been\nsufficiently illustrated. But we may perhaps say that even in the\nidentification of experience with my own experience there is an\nunderlying substratum of genuine philosophic truth. For, as we have more\nthan once insisted, there is manifestly a great deal more in my own\nexperience than what is at any time present as the object of conscious\ncognition. Or, as Mr. Bradley is fond of putting it, there is always\nmore _in_ my mind than _before_ it. I am never fully aware at any moment\neven of the full nature of my own purposes and feelings. This is why the\ndeceitfulness of my own heart has become a common-place of religious\nself-examination as well as of worldly wisdom.\n\nAgain, every increase of insight into our own real feelings and purposes\ninvolves increased insight into the feelings and purposes of the other\nfeeling beings with whom we stand in the various relations of social\nintercourse.[53] Hence it might fairly be contended that fully to know\nyour own meaning, fully to understand what you want, would imply\ncomplete insight into the structure of the whole world of reality,\u2014in\nfact, that self-knowledge and knowledge of the universe must ultimately\nbe the same thing. The systematic unity of the whole world of experience\nmay be so complete that there is nothing in it anywhere which does not\ncorrespond to some element in the experience of every one of its\nmembers. Each member may, like the monads of Leibnitz, represent the\nwhole system though at very different levels of coherency and from very\ndifferent points of view. But such a conception, though it would concede\nto Subjectivism that whatever forms a part of the system of real being\nsomehow falls within my individual experience, would take as the\nfoundation of its assertion that very distinction between what is\nimplicitly present _in_ my experience and what is explicitly _before_ it\nwhich Subjectivism consistently ignores. Whether the doctrine as thus\nre-stated can be affirmed as more than a fascinating possibility, we\nshall be better able to judge when we have discussed in our next chapter\nthe systematic unity of Reality.\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 13,\n14; T. Case, _Physical Realism_, pt. 1; L. T. Hobhouse, _The Theory of\nKnowledge_, pt. 3, chap. 3, _The Conception of External Reality_; H.\nLotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. chap. 7 (pp. 207-231 of vol. i. in Eng.\ntrans.); J. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines of Metaphysics_, bk. i. chap. 3,\n_Theories of Metaphysics_; J. Royce, _The World and the Individual_,\nFirst Series (Lecture on the First Conception of Being).\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 31:\n\n See, in particular, Royce, _The World and the Individual_, Second\n Series, Lecture 1, for a telling elaboration of this thought. I should\n note that I do not myself use the term \u201cexistence,\u201d as is sometimes\n done, with special restriction to the sense of presence as a sensible\n event at a particular point of space and time. When so used, it is, of\n course, much narrower in scope than the term \u201cBeing.\u201d\n\nFootnote 32:\n\n Compare the brilliant but not altogether convincing argument of\n Professor James, in _The Will to Believe_.\n\nFootnote 33:\n\n See the whole treatment of question of feeling in Dr. Stout\u2019s _Manual\n of Psychology_. I do not, of course, mean that \u201cconsciousness of\n activity\u201d successful or thwarted as a fact precedes and conditions\n pleasure-pain. On the contrary, it is a familiar fact of experience\n that we often learn what our purposes are for the first time by the\n pain which attends their defeat. _E.g._, a man may first realise that\n he is, and has been, in love by his pain at his mistress\u2019s preference\n of a rival suitor. And nothing seems more certain than that many\n pleasures are quite independent of \u201cactual conation,\u201d as Plato long\n ago recognised.\n\n I must take this opportunity to guard once for all against some\n plausible misconceptions. (_a_) When I speak of feeling as \u201cpurposive\u201d\n or \u201cteleological,\u201d I do not mean to make what, to my own mind, would\n be the monstrous assumption, that it necessarily presupposes\n _conscious_ anticipation of its guiding end or purpose. All that I\n mean is that the processes of conscious life are as a matter of fact\n only intelligible with reference to the results in which they\n culminate and which they serve to maintain; or again, that they all\n involve the kind of continuity of interest which belong to attention.\n (_b_) If attentive interest is not necessarily actual conation, actual\n conscious effort, still less is it necessarily actual _will_. For me,\n as for Mr. Bradley (see his article in _Mind_ for October 1902), where\n there is no ideal anticipation of the result of a process there is\n neither actual desire nor actual will. And since I cannot see that all\n attention implies ideal anticpation, I certainly could not agree with\n Prof. Royce that ultimate Reality is simply the \u201cinternal meaning of\n an _idea_.\u201d\n\n My own meaning will be made clearer by reference to the illustration\n given at the beginning of this note. A man first realises that he has\n been in love because he feels pained at a rival\u2019s success. So far as\n this is so, I should say, there has been no actual conation, and _a\n fortiori_, no actual will or desire. But\u2014and this is my point\u2014he would\n not feel the pain unless the success of the rival thwarted the\n successful issue of a specific psychophysical tendency of an\n essentially forward-reaching or teleological kind. The failure may for\n the first time make him aware of the presence of the tendency, but it\n must previously have been there as a condition of its own failure.\n\nFootnote 34:\n\n This qualification has to be added to avoid prejudging the very\n difficult question whether \u201cposition\u201d itself is \u201crelative\u201d or\n \u201cabsolute.\u201d Fortunately our argument is independent of the\n determination of the problem. Even if there should be differences\n between points as \u201cabsolute\u201d as the difference between red and blue,\n our contention would retain its force.\n\nFootnote 35:\n\n For otherwise the facts which lay outside the purposes or interests of\n the Absolute would be \u201cforeign\u201d facts \u201cgiven\u201d from without and not in\n systematic harmony with its experience as a whole. The complete\n systematic unity of all facts would thus fall outside what was to be,\n _ex hypothesi_, an all-containing experience. _Q.E.A._\n\nFootnote 36:\n\n For further reflections upon the unsatisfactoriness of such a\n conception of the Absolute as the \u201cunion of Thought and Will,\u201d see Bk.\n IV. chap. 6, \u00a7 1, where it is shown that knowledge and will alike, as\n actual knowledge and actual will, belong only to finite beings.\n\nFootnote 37:\n\n _I.e._ if _will_ be taken strictly to mean an actual volition, love\n and a \u201cwill to love\u201d cannot co-exist; if we take will improperly to\n mean a \u201cstanding\u201d interest of purpose, the case is different.\n\nFootnote 38:\n\n The student of the history of Philosophy will be reminded of the\n grounds on which Spinoza objects to ascribe \u201cintellect\u201d and \u201cwill\u201d in\n the proper sense of the terms to his God, as well as of the \u201cknowledge\n of the third or intuitive kind\u201d and the \u201cinfinite intellectual love\u201d\n of God for Himself which are so prominent in the fifth part of the\n _Ethics_. Similar considerations have sometimes led to a preference\n for the term \u201corganic\u201d rather than \u201cpurposive\u201d or \u201cteleological,\u201d as\n expressive of the ultimate unity of experience. The word \u201corganic,\u201d\n however, might suggest biological conceptions of growth, dependence on\n an external environment, etc., which would be out of place. But the\n student may compare with what has been said of the \u201cpurposive\u201d\n character of individuality Spinoza\u2019s conception of the being of a\n thing as a _conatus in suo esse perseverandi_.\n\nFootnote 39:\n\n For a full examination of the relation between reality and scientific\n symbolism, consult Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, part 1. The\n more clearly it is realised that scientific hypotheses are essentially\n a system of mathematical symbolism, the more impossible it becomes to\n suppose that they deal directly with the concrete nature of things.\n\nFootnote 40:\n\n In _Principles of Human Knowledge_, \u00a7\u00a7 70-75, Berkeley indeed seems on\n the very verge of denying that God Himself \u201cperceives\u201d the \u201cideas\u201d\n which by His action He excites in us. But at \u00a7 139 we find that a\n \u201cspirit\u201d means \u201cthat which perceives ideas, and wills and reasons\n about them,\u201d and in the third Dialogue it is expressly stated that\n sensible things are \u201cperceived by God\u201d [Works, Edit. in Bohn\u2019s\n Libraries, vol. i. p. 368]. In fact, from the psychological standpoint\n of Berkeleian sensationalism, to deny God\u2019s possession of \u201cideas\u201d\n (_i.e._ sense-contents) would have been tantamount to denying His\n spirituality.\n\nFootnote 41:\n\n Unfortunately Berkeley, like so many philosophers, thought of\n \u201cactivity\u201d as primarily an external relation between a \u201ccause\u201d and the\n material on which it \u201cworks.\u201d This is probably why he failed to\n realise the \u201cactive\u201d character of the perceptual process.\n\nFootnote 42:\n\n The reader will do well to compare with the whole of the foregoing\n section the treatment of perception as essentially teleological in Dr.\n Stout\u2019s _Manual of Psychology_,^3 bk. iii. pt. 1, chap. 2.\n\n I need hardly observe that recognition of the fundamental significance\n of purpose and selection for mental life does not of itself entail the\n adoption of \u201cvoluntarist\u201d views in Psychology. What is fundamental for\n real mental life may perfectly well admit of analysis into\n hypothetical simpler elements for the purpose of the psychologist.\n Thus the admission that all mental life is teleological and selective\n need not involve the adoption of such metaphysical theories of\n activity as are adversely criticised by Mr. Bradley in his _Appearance\n and Reality_, chap. 7, or the introduction of a peculiar\n \u201cconsciousness of activity\u201d as an unanalysable datum into Psychology.\n The antithesis between the actualities of life and the data of\n Psychology maintained by Prof. M\u00fcnsterberg in his _Psychology and\n Life_, and _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_, if untenable in the extreme\n form in which he states it, is important as a corrective of the\n opposite tendency to treat as ultimate for psychological analysis\n whatever is of supreme importance for life.\n\nFootnote 43:\n\n Thing-_in-itself_, _i.e._ not affected by the\u2014according to this\n doctrine\u2014extraneous conditions imposed upon it by relation to an\n experiencing mind.\n\nFootnote 44:\n\n The inconsistencies of both Kant and Spencer will illustrate the\n reluctance of the human mind to acquiesce in a genuine Agnosticism. In\n the _Critique of Pure Reason_ itself Kant so far contradicts himself\n as to treat the Thing-in-itself as the cause of sensation, though it\n is a fundamental doctrine of his system that the concept of causal\n relation can only be legitimately applied to connect facts inside\n experience; and in a later work, the _Critique of Judgment_, he\n tentatively suggests its identity with Will. Of Mr. Spencer it has\n been truly said (I believe by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller in _Riddles of the\n Sphinx_) that in the course of his ten volumes of Synthetic Philosophy\n he speaks much more positively about the nature of the Unknowable than\n dogmatic theology ventures to speak about the nature of God.\n\nFootnote 45:\n\n The sceptics of antiquity, who were more alive to this contradiction\n than most of our modern Agnostics, tried to evade the difficulty by\n saying that they maintained the unknowability of things not as a\n demonstrated certainty, but as a \u201cprobable opinion.\u201d But this\n distinction is itself illogical, for unless some propositions are\n certain there is no ground for considering any one proposition more\n probable than another. _E.g._ if I know that a die with six faces has\n four pips on each of two faces, and five pips on only one, I can\n logically say \u201cit is probable that with this die four will be thrown\n oftener than five.\u201d If I am totally uncertain what number of pips is\n marked on the various faces, I cannot regard one throw as more\n probable than another.\n\nFootnote 46:\n\n _E.g._, peculiarities of the individual\u2019s colour-spectrum, total and\n partial colour-blindness, variations in sensibility to musical pitch,\n etc., etc.\n\nFootnote 47:\n\n The best known and most popular version of the theory is that of Locke\n and of a great deal of our popular science, according to which the\n \u201cprimary\u201d qualities of matter, _i.e._ those which have to be treated\n as fundamental in the physical sciences, are independently real, while\n the rest are mere effects produced by their action on our\n sense-organs. The more thorough-going metaphysical doctrines of\n realists like Leibnitz and Herbart, being much further removed from\n the \u201cna\u00efve realism\u201d of unreflective common sense, have never enjoyed\n the same currency.\n\nFootnote 48:\n\n Compare Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii. p. 178 ff., and\n Royce, _World and Individual_, First Series, Lect. 3. Prof. Royce\u2019s\n treatment of Realism, though interesting and suggestive, is perhaps a\n little too much of a \u201cshort and easy way\u201d with the antagonist to be\n quite convincing. Mr. Hobhouse\u2019s anti-idealistic argument (_Theory of\n Knowledge_, 517-539) seems to me only to hold good against the\n \u201cSubjectivism\u201d discussed in our next section, but the reader will do\n well to examine it thoroughly for himself.\n\nFootnote 49:\n\n We might also suitably call it Presentationism, if the name were not\n already appropriated in a different sense as distinctive of certain\n psychological theories. The English reader will find a confused but\n typical exposition of Subjectivism in the opening chapters of Prof.\n Karl Pearson\u2019s _Grammar of Science_. Subjectivist writers usually call\n themselves \u201cidealists,\u201d and regard themselves as disciples of Berkeley\n and Hume. Berkeley was, however, a subjectivist, if at all, only in\n respect to the physical world, while Hume\u2019s conclusions are purely\n sceptical. The reader of Prof. Pearson must carefully observe that the\n \u201cdescriptive\u201d theory of physical science has no special connection\n with Subjectivism, and is, in fact, held by philosophers like Profs.\n Ward and Royce, who are not subjectivists.\n\nFootnote 50:\n\n On the existence of my fellow-men as the one real proof of the\n objective existence of the physical world, see Royce, _Studies in Good\n and Evil_, essay on \u201cNature, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness,\u201d\n and \u201cMind and Nature,\u201d by the present writer, in _International\n Journal of Ethics_ for October 1902. In the latter essay I have, I\n think, sufficiently exposed the flimsy reasoning by which\n subjectivists attempt to justify belief in the existence of other\n human beings from the subjectivist point of view.\n\nFootnote 51:\n\n The self-knowledge which is a fact in real life, as distinguished from\n the fictitious self-consciousness of some psychologists, is quite a\n different thing and involves two distinct acts of cognition: (1) the\n awareness of certain objects of cognition, and (2) the recognition of\n those objects as in some way qualifying my \u201cself.\u201d And the \u201cself\u201d\n which I recognise as thus qualified is again no immediate datum of\n experience, but a largely hypothetical intellectual construction, as\n we shall have opportunity to see later on.\n\n This is perhaps the place to add the further remark, that if we would\n be rigidly accurate in psychological terminology, we ought to banish\n the very expression \u201cconsciousness\u201d or \u201cstate of consciousness\u201d from\n our language. What are really given in experience are attentive\n processes with a certain common character. We abstract this character\n and give it the name of \u201cconsciousness,\u201d and then fall into the\n blunder of calling the concrete processes \u201cstates\u201d or \u201cmodifications\u201d\n of this abstraction, just as in dealing with physical things we first\n make abstraction of their common properties, under the name of\n \u201cmatter,\u201d and then talk as if the things themselves were \u201cforms\u201d of\n \u201cmatter\u201d. _Properly speaking, there are physical things and there are\n minds, but there are no such things in the actual world as \u201cmatter\u201d\n and \u201cconsciousness,\u201d_ and we do well to avoid using the words where we\n can help it.\n\nFootnote 52:\n\n See _Der Menschliche Weltbegriff_, pp. 21-62; and, for the merely\n English reader, Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii p. 168 ff.\n\nFootnote 53:\n\n This is true even in what seems at first the the exceptional case of\n advance in mere theoretical insight. The more clearly you realise the\n character of the problems which your own intellectual pursuits lead up\n to and the nature of their solution, the clearer becomes your insight\n into the problems and purposes of other workers in the same field.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE SYSTEMATIC UNITY OF REALITY\n\n\u00a7 1. The problem whether Reality is ultimately One or Many is inevitably\n suggested to us by the diverse aspects of our own direct experience\n of the world. The different theories may be classed, according to\n their solution of this problem, as Monistic, Pluralistic, and\n Monadistic. \u00a7 2. Pluralism starts from the presumed fact of the\n mutual independence of human selves, and teaches that this\n independence of each other belongs to all real beings. But (_a_) the\n independence with which experience presents us is never complete,\n nor the unity of the \u201cselves\u201d perfect. (_b_) The theory is\n inconsistent with the systematic character of all reality as\n presupposed in both knowledge and action. \u00a7 3. Monadism again makes\n the systematic unity of the real either an illusion or an\n inexplicable accident. \u00a7 4. Reality, because systematic, must be the\n expression of a single principle in and through a multiplicity. The\n unity and multiplicity must both be real, and each must necessarily\n involve the other. \u00a7 5. If both are to be equally real, the whole\n system must be a single experience, and its constituents must also\n be experiences. A perfect systematic whole can be neither an\n aggregate, nor a mechanical whole of parts, nor an organism. The\n whole must exist for the parts, and they for it. \u00a7 6. This may also\n be expressed by saying that Reality is a subject which is the unity\n of subordinate subjects, or an individual of which the constituents\n are lesser individuals. \u00a7 7. The nearest familiar analogue to such a\n systematic whole would be the relation between our whole \u201cself\u201d and\n the partial mental systems or lesser \u201cselves.\u201d \u00a7 8. The nearest\n historic parallel to this view is to be found in Spinoza\u2019s theory of\n the relation of the human mind to the \u201cinfinite intellect of God.\u201d\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The problem of the One and the Many is as old as Philosophy itself,\nand inevitably arises from the earliest and simplest attempts to think\nin a consistent way about the nature of the world in which we play our\npart. On the one hand, our experience, in the piecemeal shape in which\nit first appears as we begin to reflect on it, seems to exhibit an\nindefinite plurality of more or less independent things, each pursuing\nits own course and behaving in its own way, and connected at best with\nonly a few of the other members of our environment. There is, for\ninstance, no obvious connection between one man\u2019s career and those of\nmost of his contemporaries, to say nothing of the innumerable host of\nhis predecessors and successors in the race of life. And, similarly, the\nbehaviour of one inanimate thing seems at first sight to be unaffected\nby that of most of the other things around it. The world seems to us at\ntimes to be made up of an indefinite multiplicity of beings who merely\nhappen to be actors on the same stage, but have, in the majority of\ncases, no influence upon each other\u2019s parts.\n\nYet, on the other hand, there are equally strong _prim\u00e2 facie_ reasons\nfor regarding the world as a single unity. Every addition to our\ntheoretical insight into the structure of things adds to our recognition\nof the intimate connection between things and processes which previously\nseemed merely disconnected. Physical science, as it grows, learns more\nand more to look upon nature as a realm of interconnected events where\nno one fact is ultimately entirely independent of any other fact;\npolitical experience and social science alike reveal the intimate\ninterdependence of human lives and purposes. And, over and above the\nascertained empirical facts which point to the ultimate unity of the\nworld, there is another potent influence which we might call the\n\u201cinstinctive\u201d basis for the belief in unity. However discontinuous my\nenvironment may appear, it is never a mere disconnected multiplicity.\nThe very circumstance that it is throughout _my_ environment, and thus\nrelative to the ends by which my attention is determined, gives it to a\ncertain degree the character of a coherent system. At the lowest level\nof philosophic reflection, we cannot permanently fail to apprehend our\nworld as in principle one, precisely because it is _our_ world, and we\nourselves are all in some degree beings of steady systematic purpose,\nnot mere bundles of disconnected and conflicting impulses. While yet\nagain, it is the very limitation of our own interests and our lack of\nclear insight into their full import which leads us at other times to\nfind apparent disconnected multiplicity and lack of cohesion in our\nworld.\n\nThe problem of Philosophy in dealing with these rival aspects of the\nworld of experience then becomes that of deciding whether either of them\ncan be adopted as the truth in isolation from the other. Or if neither\nis the whole truth, we must ask ourselves in what way the world can be\nat once One and Many, how the characters of systematic unity and of\nindefinite variety can be consistently thought of as belonging to the\nsame Reality. Is Reality, we have to ask, One or is it Many, and if it\nis both, how are the unity and multiplicity connected?\n\nThe answers which different philosophical systems have given to this\nquestion may conveniently be classified under three general\ndenominations. There are (1) the _Monistic_ views, which lay the\nprincipal stress upon the unity of the real, and tend to treat the\naspect of plurality and variety as illusory, or at least as of secondary\nimportance; (2) the various forms of _Pluralism_, according to which the\nvariety and multiplicity of real beings is the primary fact, and their\nsystematic unity either an illusion, or at any rate a subordinate aspect\nof their nature; (3) _Monadism_, which aims at harmonising the positions\nof the monist and pluralist, by treating the world as a multiplicity of\nreally independent things or \u201cmonads,\u201d which are somehow combined from\nwithout into a system. From this last point of view the plurality and\nthe systematic unity are alike real and alike important for the\nunderstanding of the world, but are of different origin, the plurality\nbeing inherent in the things themselves, the unity external to them and\ncoming from a foreign source. Within each of the three main types of\ntheory there is, of course, room for the greatest divergence of view as\nto the special nature of the real. A monistic system may be purely\nmaterialistic, like that of Parmenides, who taught that the world is a\nsingle homogeneous solid sphere, or idealistic like that, _e.g._, of\nSchopenhauer; or again, it may treat mind and \u201cmatter\u201d as \u201caspects\u201d of a\ncommon reality. A pluralist or monadist, again, may conceive of each of\nhis independent real things as a physical atom, as a soul of any degree\nof organisation, or even, in the fashion of some contemporary thought,\nas a person.\n\nWith regard to the relation between this classification of philosophical\ntheories and that of the last chapter, I may just observe that, while a\nmonist is not necessarily an idealist, a consistent pluralist or\nmonadist ought logically to be a realist. For the mutual independence of\nthe various real things cannot exist without involving in itself their\nindependence of experience. If A and B are two completely independent\nthings, then the existence and character of A must be independent of\npresence to the experience of B, and similarly A must be equally\nindependent of presence to the experience of C, or of anything in the\nworld but itself. And we have already seen that there is always more in\nthe nature of any finite percipient than can be present to his own\nexperience. Thus ultimately the existence and qualities of A must be\nindependent of all experience, including A\u2019s own.[54] For this reason I\ncannot but think that the various attempts to combine Pluralism with\nIdealism by maintaining that the universe consists of a number of\nindependent \u201csouls\u201d or \u201cpersons,\u201d rest on confusion of thought. These\ndoctrines appear to be essentially realist in their spirit.\n\n\u00a7 2. We may conveniently attempt to construct our own theory of the One\nand the Many by first excluding views which appear mistaken in\nprinciple, and thus gradually narrowing the issues. Among these mistaken\nviews I am forced to reckon all forms of consistent and thorough-going\nPluralism. Pluralism, so far at least as I am able to see, begins by\nmisapprehending the facts upon which it professes to base itself, and\nends by giving an interpretation of them which is essentially\nirrational. The fundamental fact from which Pluralism starts as an\nultimate datum of all experiences is the familiar one that there are\nother men in the world besides myself. My world is not simply a theatre\nfor the execution of my own aims and the satisfaction of my own wants.\nThere are interests in it which are not mine, and to which I must adapt\nmyself if I mean to achieve my own purposes. The world thus contains\nminds other than my own, and what makes them _other_ is that the\ninterests and purposes by which their lives are determined are, like my\nown, unique and incommunicable. Now, Pluralism bids us take the facts,\nas thus stated, as the model for our conception of the universe. The\npattern upon which the pluralist views of Reality are constructed is\nthat of a community consisting of a great number of selves or persons,\neach with its own unique interests, and each therefore at once\ninternally simple and indivisible and exclusive of all the rest. In\nwhatever special form the pluralist thinks of his ultimate realities,\nwhether as physically indivisible particles, as mathematical points, or\nas sentient beings, it is always from the facts of human social life\nconceived in this ultra-individualist way that he in the last resort\nderives his concept of their simplicity and mutual repulsion.\n\nBut (_a_) the facts themselves are not correctly stated. The human\nexperiences upon which the pluralist relies for his conclusion present\nat once too much and too little unity for the purposes of his theory. On\nthe one hand, the selves or persons composing society are not themselves\nsimple, undifferentiated unities. Just as your interests and mine may\noften collide, so within what the pluralist assumes as the indivisible\nunit of my own personality there may be a similar collision. What I call\nmy \u201cown interests\u201d or my own \u201capperceptive systems\u201d or \u201ctrains of\nthought\u201d may exhibit the same kind of incompatibility and the same sort\nof conflict for superiority as is found where your ideas and mine clash.\nThus Ethics and Psychology are led to distinguish between my \u201ctrue\u201d self\nand the false selves by which it may on occasion be dominated, between\nmy \u201chigher\u201d self and the \u201clower\u201d selves which, in morality, have to be\nrepressed by the higher, my \u201cpermanent\u201d self, and the temporary\ninterests by which it is often overpowered, to say nothing of\n\u201csubliminal\u201d consciousness and \u201cdual\u201d or \u201calternating personality.\u201d The\n\u201cself\u201d is so far from being a mere unit, that the variety and, what is\nmore, the incompatibility of its contents is a matter of everyday\nexperience.[55]\n\nPluralism may, of course, and often does, verbally admit this. The units\nof the pluralist, we are often told, are not mere units devoid of\nvariety, but wholes which are the union of differences. But to concede\nthis is to cut away the ground from under the pluralist\u2019s feet. If the\nvariety and the mutual struggle between the elements of the self are not\nenough to destroy its unity, by parity of reasoning the multiplicity of\nselves in the world and their mutual repulsions are not enough to prove\nthat the whole of Reality is not, in spite of its multiplicity of\ndetail, a unity more complete than any of the partial unities to be met\nwith in our experience. In fact, the pluralist has to meet the following\ndilemma. Either his units are mere units without internal variety, and\nthen it is easy to show that they are the merest nothings, or they have\ninternal variety of their own, and therefore simply repeat within\nthemselves the problem they are supposed to solve.\n\nOn the other hand, just as the facts of experience show us internal\nstruggle and repulsion within the supposed units, so they also exhibit\nother relations than that of mutual exclusion between the different\nunits. Human personal interests, for instance, are never merely mutually\nexclusive. No society consists of individuals whose purposes and\ninterests are simply reciprocally repellent. My aims and purposes may\nnever completely coincide with those of other members of the same\ncommunity, yet they have no meaning and could get no realisation but for\nthe fact that they are, partially at any rate, comprised in the wider\nwhole of social interests and purposes which makes up the life of the\nsocial organisations to which I belong. As the very etymology of such\nwords as \u201csociety\u201d and \u201ccommunity\u201d shows\u2014to say nothing of the results\nof psychological inquiry into the process of learning by imitation\u2014the\nconception of human selves as independent units which somehow happen to\nstand in merely accidental or external relations is in flagrant conflict\nwith the most fundamental facts of our social experience. It is only by\nthe systematic suppression of fact that personal and social life can be\nmade to support the hypothesis of Pluralism.\n\n(_b_) Again, even if we could accept the pluralist account of the facts,\nthe theory which Pluralism puts forward to account for them is in the\nend unintelligible. What Pluralism does, consciously or unconsciously,\nis to separate the unity of the world from its multiplicity. The\nmultiplicity is supposed to be grounded in the ultimate nature of the\nreal things themselves, their unity as a system, if they really are a\nsystem, to be imposed upon them from without. We are, in fact, left to\nchoose between two alternatives. Either the world is not a systematic\nwhole at all, but a mere chaos of purely independent atoms, in which\ncase the whole of our thought, with its indispensable presupposition of\nthe systematic unity of the object of knowledge, is an illusion, or else\nthe world really is a system, but a system, so to say, by accident. The\nthings of which the system is composed are real as detached separate\nunits, but by a fortunate chance they happen all to possess some common\nrelation to an external _tertium quid_ (for instance, to God), by which\nthey are combined into a system and thus become knowable as a connected\nwhole.\n\nNow we cannot, if we are intellectually conscientious, rest finally\ncontent with a statement of this kind, which leaves the plurality and\nthe systematic unity of the real world side by side as two independent\nunconnected facts. If the contents of the world really form a system at\nall, in any way whatever, that is itself one fact among others which a\nsound metaphysical theory must recognise, and of which it must offer\nsome intelligible account. _E.g._, suppose you say, with some recent\npluralists, that the world consists of a number of independent persons\nor spirits, who nevertheless form a connected system or \u201cmoral kingdom,\u201d\nin virtue of the fact that they all find their moral ideal in God, the\nmost perfect among them. You have now not one ultimate fact before you,\nthe multiplicity of independent selves, but two, this multiplicity and\nthe relation of each element in it to God. Unless you are going to treat\nthis second fact as an \u201cultimate inexplicability,\u201d _i.e._ a fortunate\naccident, you are now bound to treat the systematic relation of the\nselves to God and through God to each other as no less a part of their\nultimate nature than their distinction from each other. Their\nseparateness and independence is thus no longer for you the ultimate\ntruth; they are just as truly one by your account as they are many.\nTheir union in a system is no longer an external relation foreign to\ntheir own nature, but the deepest truth about that nature itself.\n\nI will repeat the essence of this argument in another form. Any genuine\nPluralism must be resolute enough to dismiss the idea of a systematic\ninterconnection between its independent realities as an illusion of the\nhuman mind. But in doing so it must, to be consistent, deny the\npossibility of their mutual knowledge of each other\u2019s states. Each real\nthing must be a little world to itself, shut up within the closed circle\nof its own internal content. And thus, supposing Pluralism to be true,\nand supposing myself to be one of the real things of the pluralist\nscheme, I should have no means of knowing it to be true. Pluralism is\nunable to stand the question propounded by Mr. Bradley as the test of a\nphilosophical doctrine, \u201cIs the truth of this theory consistent with the\nfact that I know it to be true?\u201d\n\nThe persistent popularity of Pluralism in many quarters is in fact due\nto the intrusion into Metaphysics of other than genuinely philosophical\ninterests. It is maintained, not on its philosophical merits as a\nconsistent theory, but because it is believed by its adherents to\nsafeguard certain interests of morality and religion. It gives us, we\nare told, a \u201creal God\u201d and \u201creal moral freedom.\u201d But, apart from the\nquestion whether these claims are justified by candid examination of the\ndoctrine,[56] we must protest against their being allowed any place at\nall in a metaphysical discussion. Metaphysics is, from first to last, a\npurely speculative activity; its one concern is to think logically about\nthe constitution of Reality, and the only interests it has a right to\nconsider are those of consistent logical thought. If consistent logical\nthought about ethical and religious problems involves the recognition of\na \u201creal God\u201d and \u201creal freedom,\u201d and if these again are only possible on\nthe pluralistic theory, then the mere process of consistent thought is\nbound in the end to lead us to a pluralistic result, and it is\nsuperfluous to appeal to extra-logical interests in the matter. But if\nthose who defend Pluralism on the ground that it gives us a \u201creal God\u201d\nand \u201creal freedom\u201d mean that, apart from the question of their\nintellectual justification, these beliefs ought to be maintained in\nMetaphysics because certain persons will be less moral or less happy\nwithout them, we must answer that Metaphysics has nothing to do with\nmaking us moral or happy. It is no proof of the truth of a belief that\nit increases my personal virtue or happiness, nor of its falsity that it\ndiminishes them. And if the study of Metaphysics could be shown to make\ncertain persons less virtuous or less happy, Metaphysics would still be\nin no worse case than Ethics or Medicine. There may be persons for whom\nit is undesirable, on grounds of happiness or morality, to devote\nthemselves to the pursuit of speculative truth, but it is none the less\na lapse from intellectual single-mindedness for the man who has elected\nto play the game of speculation to violate its rules by indulging in\nconstant appeals to speculatively irrelevant issues.[57]\n\n\u00a7 3. The _Monadism_ of Leibnitz was an attempt to effect a compromise\nbetween Pluralism and Monism. According to this view, the universe\nconsists of an infinite plurality of fundamentally separate beings.\nThese beings are at once simple and indivisible, and at the same time\neach of them contains an infinite variety of internal states. Being\nmutually independent, the monads have no genuine relations with each\nother; each is conscious only of the succession of its own states. As\nLeibnitz expressed it in a metaphor which has become classic, the monad\nhas no windows. So far the system is pure Pluralism. But at the same\ntime the unity of the whole system of monads, though \u201cideal\u201d and not\n\u201creal,\u201d is to be genuine. They form a system \u201cideally,\u201d\u2014_i.e._ for the\nunderstanding of an omniscient spectator,\u2014inasmuch as the internal\nstates of each monad are adjusted to those of all the rest, or, as\nLeibnitz also puts it, inasmuch as each monad \u201crepresents\u201d the same\nsystematic structure from its own special point of view. Hence, though\nno monad really perceives or acts upon any other, every monad behaves as\nit would _if_ there were mutual perception and interaction between all.\nWhen we ask after the source of this \u201cpre-established harmony,\u201d we meet\nwith a double answer. On the one hand, its actual _existence_ as a fact\nis due to the creative will of God. On the other, it was precisely the\ncomplete adjustment of the internal states of its various monads which\ndetermined God to will the existence of the actual world-order in\npreference to that of any other of the indefinitely numerous logically\npossible arrangements which He foresaw and might have chosen. This\nrelation between God and the world-order is further complicated by the\nfact that on occasion Leibnitz treats God as simply one, though the\nsupreme one, among the monads.\n\nNow a system of this kind seems to exhibit all the defects of Pluralism\nwith certain superadded difficulties of its own. We might reasonably\nobject that experience presents us with no example of a genuine system\nin which all the elements are actually independent. The nearest approach\nto such a case seems to be found in the classes of an \u201cartificial\nclassification,\u201d in which things standing in no relation of interaction\namong themselves are put together by us because it is convenient for\nsome extraneous purpose of our own to comprehend them under a single\npoint of view. But, apart from the impossibility of constructing a\nclassification which shall be more than relatively artificial, such a\nmere aggregate or collection is not a real system. In a true system, as\ndistinct from a mere collection, the principle of unity has always some\nsort of significance for the members of the system themselves. It\nrepresents, at the least, the way in which the members interact with\neach other. (Thus, to take an extreme case, the serial arrangement of\ncutting implements in a museum, from the flaked stone of the Pal\u00e6olithic\nage to the latest specimen of Sheffield cutlery, is more than a merely\n\u201cartificial\u201d classification, precisely because it is more than a mere\ngrouping of separate objects according to their likeness and unlikeness;\nit represents the stages of a continuous historical evolution.) Now, it\nis essential to Monadism that the monads, because ultimately\nindependent, shall only seem to interact. They appear to form a single\nworld with a history in which each distinct state of each monad is a\nstage. But really, while the successive states of the individual monad\nare, what they seem to be, a connected process of development, the\nvarious processes do not make up a single-world history at all. They\nonly seem to do so by an inevitable illusion. Hence the unity of the\nwhole system must after all be not only ideal, but, strictly speaking,\nimaginary.\n\nSimilar difficulties arise from the ambiguous position accorded to God\nin the scheme. If the \u201cpre-established harmony\u201d between the states of\nthe individual monads were simply due to a creative fiat of God, we\nshould be thrown back upon mere arbitrary chance as the reason, if it\ncan be called a reason, why existence is not a chaos. But if God\u2019s\nchoice to create this scheme of things rather than another was due to\nthe superior attraction which a world with at least the appearance of\nconnected system had for the divine intellect, then it is ultimately in\nthe constitution of the divine mind that we have to find the reason why\nthe alternative possibilities before creation were what they were;[58]\nand again, why just this one was preferred to all the rest. And thus the\nmonads cease to be any longer ultimate and independent, and the nature\nof God becomes the single determinate ground of all reality.\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to add that Monadism suffers besides from all\nthe defects which we found in Pluralism. If the monad be made into a\nmere unit without internal variety, it ceases to be a thing with a\ndefinite nature at all; and if its unity is compatible with the variety\nof its states, there seems to be no special reason why the wealth of\nvaried existence in the world should lead us to assume a plurality of\nindependent principles as its ground. It has been pointed out that\nLeibnitz was apparently determined in favour of Monadism against Monism\nby the assumption that individual human selves are internally simple\nunits and externally entirely exclusive of each other, an assumption we\nhave already seen reason to reject.\n\n\u00a7 4. We seem driven, then, to reject the view that the ordered world of\nexperience can be the expression of a plurality of ultimately distinct\nand heterogeneous principles. Because the world as known, or again as\nproviding for the coherent realisation of practical purposes, is an\norderly system, and on any other supposition coherent knowledge and\nconsistent action are alike impossible, the world must for Metaphysics\nbe regarded as the complete embodiment and expression of a single\nultimate principle. We are thus committed to some form of theory of the\ntype generally known as Monism. The _name_ Monism we may perhaps be\nallowed to avoid, as it has gathered about it associations which are apt\nto mislead. Among the doctrines most frequently spoken of as monistic\nare some which treat the apparent variety and multiplicity of existence\nas purely illusory. Again, the name has of late been widely used as the\nself-chosen designation of the doctrine according to which \u201cmind\u201d and\n\u201cmatter\u201d are alike \u201caspects\u201d or \u201cmanifestations\u201d of a third principle\nwhich is neither material nor mental. It should already be clear that\nthe doctrine indicated by our previous discussions differs widely from\nboth these types of Monism. We have insisted that the source of fallacy\nin Pluralism and Monadism was one-sided emphasis upon one term in the\nantithesis of the Many and the One to neglect of the other, and we have\nno intention of repeating the mistake for ourselves. Also, we have\nalready come to the conclusion that Reality, whatever its detailed\nstructure, is mental in its general character; we can have nothing\ntherefore to do with a \u201cneutral\u201d or \u201cagnostic\u201d Monism. Our detailed\ntheory of the relation between the unity of the world and its\nmultiplicity must do equal justice to both, and it must be consistent\nwith our previous recognition of the experiential nature of the real.\n\nWe may perhaps work out our theory in detail as follows. The world for\nknowledge must, we have seen, be an orderly whole or system. To be a\nsystem at all, it must be the development or expression in detail of a\nsingle principle. Therefore it must most certainly be one; it cannot be\na medley of independent elements which somehow luckily happen to form a\ncoherent collection. But again, because it is a system, it cannot be a\nmere unit; it must be the expression of a single principle in and\nthrough a multiplicity of terms or constituents. Not only must it be\nboth one and many, but it must be many precisely because it is truly\none, and one because it is truly many.[59] Further, we must add that\nbecause the world-system is a perfectly systematic whole, not only is\nmultiplicity in general necessary to its unity, but each particular\nelement in the multiplicity is necessitated or logically implied by the\ncharacter of the unity. In a complete system no single member can be\nmissing or be other than it is without the fundamental law of\nconstruction of the whole being changed. Also, we may incidentally\nobserve that in a complete system the number of distinct terms may be\nactually endless, while the law of construction is perfectly\ndeterminate. To think of the world as a single systematic unity, then,\nmeans to think of it as the manifestation in a possibly infinite\nmultiplicity of detail of one perfectly determinate principle. And, of\ncourse, what we have called the individual elements of the multiplicity\nmay on inspection themselves turn out to be systems of infinite\ncomplexity determined by a law of construction derived in a determinate\nway from that of the complete system, and so on literally _ad\ninfinitum_. Thus the unity of ultimate principle we demand for Reality\nin no way excludes its possession of a wealth of detail infinitely\ninfinite.\n\n\u00a7 5. We may take a further most important step forward. In the\nall-embracing systematic whole the unity and the multiplicity must be\nequally real and each must be real through the other. How is this\npossible? Only on condition that the whole system forms a single\nexperience, and that the constituent factors again are single\nexperiences. This will perhaps be best brought out by examining some\ntypical case of the kind of unity in multiplicity which is insufficient\nfor our purpose. (_a_) The unity of the world cannot be that of a mere\ncollection or aggregate. In a mere aggregate the elements are real\nindependently of their relation to one another as elements in this\naggregate. So long as we keep strictly to the case of what is no more\nthan an aggregate, the quality of the elements is entirely unaffected by\ntheir inclusion in the aggregate. The aggregate has no unitary character\nof its own which reveals itself in and through the behaviour of its\nelements. Its unity consists in nothing more than the fact that we have\nfound it convenient to think of its elements together. An aggregate of\nten bricks, for instance, has no character as a whole beyond the mere\nfact of being thought of in one mental act. It has not even a collective\nweight until you put your ten bricks into the same cart, or on the same\nscale-pan, and then they have ceased to be a _mere_ aggregate in the\nvery moment of exerting pressure upon the same surface, and have become\na true material system.\n\n(_b_) Nor can the world of Reality be satisfactorily thought of as a\nmere _whole of parts_. A whole of parts approaches indeed more nearly to\nthe ideal of a true systematic unity than a mere aggregate, inasmuch as\nit has a determinate single character as a whole, which manifests itself\nin the structure of the various parts. For this reason a geometrical\nfigure or a machine is much more than a mere aggregate; it has a\ncharacter as a whole, and this character is differently expressed by the\nconstruction of the different parts. The figure or machine is thus a\ntrue unity of differences. Yet in this case we cannot really say that\nthe unity and the variety are equally real. For the whole cannot exist\nwithout the parts, whereas the parts may continue to exist, though not,\nof course, _as_ parts of this whole, without the whole. The whole is\nconstituted by the successive generation or construction of the parts,\nand thus may be said to be formed out of pre-existing parts, and the\nparts again may survive the destruction of the whole. There is not that\nequal reality and complete mutual implication of the two sides which we\nhave deemed necessary to a genuine systematic unity.\n\n(_c_) An organism is in some respects a truer systematic unity than a\nmere whole of parts. It has a systematic character of its own which\nmanifests itself in and through the difference of its various members.\nAnd here, the whole is not historically subsequent to and generated by\nthe members. It is not their resultant but their living unity. The\nmembers only come into being along with the whole, and in the course of\nits growth as a whole; and though they may, in a sense, continue to\nexist after severance from the whole, it is not with the same kind of\nexistence which belonged to them as members.[60] But an organism, like a\nmachine, fails to exhibit the perfect systematic unity of the One and\nthe Many of which we are in quest. In the machine the aspect of\nmultiplicity was relatively more real than that of unity; in the fully\nevolved organism the unity seems more completely real than the\nmultiplicity. For the unity is a conscious one; in some degree at least\nit exists for itself, and its members again for it. Whereas it must be\nvery doubtful whether the member exists for itself, and still more\ndoubtful whether the whole exists in any sense for the members. And\nthough the member cannot retain its peculiar form of existence except as\na member in the whole, yet in even the highest organism the unity is so\nfar relatively independent that it is unaffected by the removal of some\nof the members.\n\nNot every member is of vital significance for the life of the whole. But\nin a complete systematic unity, as we saw, the unity and the\nmultiplicity of the system must be equally real and equally\ninterdependent. This can only be the case if the whole is for its\nmembers as well as the members for the whole. And that this may be so,\njust as the all-embracing whole of reality must, as we have learned, be\nan experience, so each of its members must be itself an experience. And\nbecause the members form a single system, just as there can be nothing\nin the experience of any member which is not contained in the experience\nwhich is the whole, so, on the other side, there can be nothing in the\nwhole which does not in some way affect the experience of every member.\nOnly in this way can we conceive of a systematic Reality in which the\nunity and the multiplicity of the system are alike real and equally\nreal. Such a view is, strictly speaking, hardly to be called either\nPluralism or Monism. It is not Pluralism, for it does not make the unity\nof the system an illusion or an inexplicable accident; it is not Monism,\nin the current sense of the word, because it does not make the\nmultiplicity deceptive. If a name is wanted, we might perhaps agree to\ncall it Systematic Idealism.\n\n\u00a7 6. We may say, then, that Reality is a systematic Experience of which\nthe components are likewise experiences. It would be much the same thing\nif we called it a subject which is the unity of subordinate subjects. It\nis tempting again, at first sight, to say it is a self of selves. But\nthe extreme ambiguity of the term \u201cself\u201d as used in contemporary\nPsychology makes it desirable to avoid an expression which is capable of\nthe gravest misuse.[61] It is scarcely possible to say with any\nprecision what we mean by one \u201cself,\u201d whereas it is possible in a\ngeneral way to say what we mean by one experience. An experience may be\ncalled one and the same in so far as it is the systematised expression\nof a single coherent purpose or interest, in so far, in fact, as it has\na teleological unity. In practice it may be impossible to say precisely\nwhen this condition is fulfilled, but the slightest acquaintance with\nthe psychological facts of the struggle between competing systems of\nideas in normal, and of \u201cdual\u201d and \u201cmultiple\u201d personality in abnormal,\nmental life is sufficient to show that the limits thus set by our\ndefinition to the single experience do not coincide with those ascribed\nto my \u201cself\u201d or \u201cpersonality\u201d in any of the shifting senses of the\nterms. The limits within which experience remains _one_ experience\naccording to our definition are, as the facts just alluded to show,\noften narrower, but again, the definition suggests that they may also be\nwider, than any which would currently be given to the \u201cself.\u201d\n\nMoreover, what we have already said as to the possibility of each\n\u201cmember\u201d of our system being itself a system of lesser systems, forbids\nus to identify our view with any doctrine which asserts merely atomic\nand simple \u201cselves\u201d as the elements of Reality.\n\nAnother way of expressing the same thought would be to say that Reality\nis an Individual of which the elements are lesser individuals. The\nadvantage of this form of expression is that it emphasises the\nfundamentally teleological character of the unity of the real, and also\nof each and all of its constituents. A thing, as we have already seen,\nis individual just so far as it is unique, and only that which is the\nembodiment of a single purpose or interest can be unique. A single whole\nof experience, owing its unity as a whole precisely to the completeness\nand harmony with which it expresses a single purpose or interest, is\nnecessarily an individual. The all-embracing experience which\nconstitutes Reality is thus in its inmost nature a complete individual.\nAnd the lesser experiences which form the elements or material content\nof Reality are each, just so far as each is truly one experience,\nindividual in the same sense as the whole. We may thus call Reality a\ncomplete or perfect individual of minor or incomplete individuals.\n\nWhat the fundamental distinction between the supreme individual whole\nand the lesser individuals must be taken to consist in we shall discuss\nin our next chapter. Meanwhile we may note two points:\u2014(1) The important\nthing about an individual is not its mere numerical unity, but its\nqualitative uniqueness. Any experience which we can pronounce to be\nindividual must be called so, not merely because it is numerically one\nand not many, but because it is the consistent and harmonious embodiment\nof a coherent purpose. Numerically considered, every such individual is\nnecessarily many as well as one, precisely because it is a system. This\napplies especially to the supreme or absolute individual, the complete\nsystem of experience. It is individual primarily not because it is\nnumerically one, but because it is the complete expression of a coherent\nidea or purpose. It has been the defect of too many monistic theories to\noverlook this, and to lay the main stress on the numerical oneness of\nthe real.\n\n(2) An experience individual in the sense already explained is what we\nmean by a \u201cspirit.\u201d Spirit cannot be properly defined by\ncontradistinction from a supposed non-spiritual reality, such as\n\u201cmatter,\u201d for such a definition would only amount to the assertion that\nspirit is what is not other than spirit; and would tell us nothing of\nthe term to be defined. Nor, again, is spirit properly defined as a\nseries of states or modifications of the abstraction \u201cconsciousness.\u201d\nThe positive characteristic by which spiritual existence may be\nrecognised is that in it the _what_ and the _that_ are combined in the\nunity of immediate feeling. And immediate feeling, as we have seen, is\nessentially teleological. Where you have a connected system of factors\nwhich can only be understood as a whole by reference to an explicit or\nimplicit end, which constitutes their unity, you have spirit, and where\nyou have spirit you have such a system. So that to call reality an\nindividual of individuals is the same thing as to say that it is a\nspiritual system of which the elements, constituents, or terms, are in\ntheir turn spiritual systems.[62] Our doctrine may thus be seen to be\nfairly entitled to the name Idealism, which current usage has\nappropriated to the view that all existence is ultimately mental.\n\n\u00a7 7. Such a relation as we have asserted between the individual whole of\nReality and the elements or terms within the whole is necessarily\nunique, and cannot be adequately illustrated from any less perfect type\nof systematic unity recognised by everyday or by scientific thought. In\nparticular, we must carefully avoid the mistake of conceiving the\nrelation of the elements to the totality in a mechanical way as that of\n\u201cparts\u201d to a \u201cwhole of parts\u201d; or, again, in a merely biological way, as\nthat of \u201cmembers\u201d to an organism. All such analogies lose sight of the\nintimate character of a union in which the elements and the totality\nexist not merely in and through, but also for each other.\n\nThe individual experiences which compose the supreme experience have a\ngenuine, if an imperfect and partial, individuality of their own. They\nare not in it merely \u201cideally\u201d or implicitly, as the points on a curve\nmay be said to be in the periphery. And the whole, again, is a real\nindividual, not a mere aggregate in which the parts are real but their\nunity merely imaginary. We may, if we like, say that it is made up of\nexperiences or minds, but we must not say that it is a _collection_ of\nminds. For a mere collection, as we have seen, in so far as it is a\ncollection and nothing more, cannot be said to have any genuine\nindividuality, precisely because it has no teleological unity of\nstructure beyond that which we arbitrarily, and with reference to ends\nlying outside its own nature, impose upon it in the very act of counting\nits members, _i.e._ arranging them in serial order. Whether we could\nproperly speak of the absolute whole as a _society_ of minds is a\nfurther and a more difficult question. A society is much more than a\nmere collection: it has a purposive unity of structure which exists not\nmerely for the sociological observer from without, but for its own\nmembers as active in assigning to each of them his own special place in\nrelation to all the rest. How far society can be said to have such a\nunity _for itself_ is a question which we cannot answer until we have\ndealt more fully with the problem of the relation between selfhood and\nindividuality. And until we have answered it, we must defer the decision\nas to whether the systematic individuality of the Absolute would be\nadequately recognised if we thought of it as a society. (See _infra_,\nBk. IV. chap. 3.)\n\nIf we are to look at this stage for some analogue within our partial\nexperience for the kind of unity of individuals in a single supreme\nindividual which we have demanded for the system of Reality, we shall\nprobably do best to turn to what is after all the most familiar thing in\nthe world,\u2014our own personal experience. If we consider the nature of any\ncoherent purpose or \u201cmental system,\u201d we shall find that, as the coherent\nembodiment of a purpose, it possesses a degree of individuality of its\nown. In proportion to the comprehensiveness, and again to the inner\nharmony or systematic structure of the interest it embodies, it\nconstitutes a genuine self-existing individual whole of the kind which\npsychologists recognise as a \u201cself.\u201d And again, in so far as my life\nexhibits determinate character, so far do these systematic purposes or\nminor \u201cselves\u201d form a larger system, also individual, which may be\ncalled my \u201ctotal self.\u201d And both the many lesser \u201cselves\u201d and the larger\n\u201cself\u201d are real in the same sense of the word. Neither exists merely in\nor for the other; the wider or whole \u201cself\u201d is no mere collection or\nresultant or product of the more special \u201cselves,\u201d nor are they again\nmere results of a theoretical process of analysis and abstraction. In so\nfar as they are genuine systems at all, they are not mere \u201cparts\u201d of a\nwhole, but each is the expression, in a concrete conscious life, of the\nnature of a larger whole from a special \u201cpoint of view.\u201d The whole, if\nnot equally in every part, is yet as a whole present in every part, and\nprecisely for that reason the category of part and whole is inadequate\nto express their relation. Somewhat after this fashion we must conceive\nthe structure of any individual whole of lesser individuals. Why, in\nspite of the analogy, it is desirable not to speak of the whole of\nReality as a \u201cSelf,\u201d will be made clearer as we proceed.[63]\n\n\u00a7 8. The view we have formulated is perhaps more closely akin to\nSpinoza\u2019s conception of the relation of the human mind to the \u201cinfinite\nintellect of God,\u201d than to any other historically famous theory.\nAccording to Spinoza, the individual human mind is an \u201ceternal mode of\nconsciousness which, taken together with all other such \u2018modes,\u2019 makes\nup the infinite intellect of God.\u201d The meaning of the epithet \u201ceternal\u201d\nwe cannot, of course, enter into until we have discussed the relation of\nthe time-process to experience. The rest of the definition pretty\nclearly coincides in its general sense with the view we have tried to\nexpound of the nature of the relation between the supreme experience and\nits constituent experiences. For the \u201cmodes\u201d of Spinoza are definitely\nthought of as genuinely individual manifestations of the nature of his\nultimate reality, \u201csubstance\u201d or \u201cGod.\u201d Their individuality and their\ninfinite multiplicity is no result of illusion or illegitimate\nabstraction. And, on the other hand, \u201csubstance\u201d itself is genuinely\nindividual; it is no mere abstract name for the common properties of a\nnumber of ultimately independent things.\n\nMost of the adverse criticism which Spinozism has met with, as far at\nleast as regards its doctrine of the nature of the human mind, seems to\nbe based on misapprehension about the first of these points. From his\nuse of the numerical category of whole and part to express the relation\nbetween substance and its modes, Spinoza has incorrectly been taken to\nbe denying the fact of the genuine individuality of the finite\nexperience, and therefore to be declaring the very existence of the\nfinite to be mere baseless illusion. With his doctrine as thus\nmisinterpreted, ours has, of course, no similarity. Nothing is explained\naway by calling it \u201cillusion\u201d; the \u201cillusory\u201d fact is there in spite of\nthe hard names you choose to bestow on it, and demands explanation no\nless than any other fact. Our theory aims not at dismissing finite\nindividuality as illusion, but at ascertaining what it means, what are\nits limits, and how it stands related to the complete individual whole\nof experience which Spinoza calls the _infinitus intellectus Dei_.[64]\n\nThe mention of Spinoza will no doubt suggest to the reader the famous\ndoctrine, which has played so large a part in the subsequent development\nof philosophical Monism, of the double \u201caspects\u201d or \u201cattributes\u201d of\nReality. It is from Spinoza that modern Monism has learned the view that\nthe mental and physical orders are related as two parallel but distinct\nmanifestations of a common underlying reality, so that to every member\nof one order there corresponds a determinate member of the other. The\ntwo are thus everywhere inseparable and everywhere irreducible\n\u201cparallel\u201d expressions of a nature which is neither mental nor physical.\nOn this fundamental point our theory, as will have been seen already,\ncompletely parts company with Spinozism. That the nature of one and the\nsame common whole should be _equally_ manifested in two entirely\nirreducible forms, is a patent impossibility. Either the unity of the\nwhole or the absolute disparateness of its twin manifestations must be\nsurrendered if we are to think consistently. Hence we cannot avoid\nasking in which of the two series the assumed common nature is more\nadequately expressed. According as we answer this question we shall find\nourselves led in the end either to thorough-going Materialism or to\nthorough-going Idealism. For our own part, the perception that Reality\nis experience and nothing else has already committed us to the view that\nboth of the seemingly disparate series must in the end be mental. Thus\nour doctrine may be said to be much what Spinoza\u2019s would be if the\nattribute of \u201cextension\u201d were removed from his scheme, and the whole of\nReality identified with the \u201cinfinite intellect of God.\u201d[65]\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014B. Bosanquet, _Essentials of Logic_, lect. 2;\n_Logic_, vol. ii. chap. 7; F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_,\nchaps. 13, 14, 20; L. T. Hobhouse, _Theory of Knowledge_, pt. 3, chap.\n6, \u201cReality as a System\u201d; H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. chap. 6 (Eng.\ntrans., vol. i. pp. 163-191); J. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines of Metaphysic_,\nbk. i. chaps. 2, 3; bk. iii. chap. 6; J. E. M\u2018Taggart, _Studies in\nHegelian Cosmology_, chap. 2.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 54:\n\n This consideration obviously influenced Leibnitz. It is a much-decried\n doctrine in his system that every \u201cmonad,\u201d or simple real thing,\n perceives nothing but its own internal states; there are no \u201cwindows\u201d\n through which one monad can behold the states of another. It is easy\n to show that this doctrine leads to extremely far-fetched and\n fantastic hypotheses to account for the apparent communication between\n different monads, but not so easy to show that Pluralism can afford to\n dispense with it. See in particular Leibnitz\u2019s _New System of the\n Nature of Substances_ (Works, ed. Erdmann, 124 ff.; ed. Gerhardt, iv.\n 477 ff.; Eng. trans. in Latta\u2019s _Leibnis: the Monadology_, etc., p.\n 297 ff.), especially \u00a7\u00a7 13-17 and _Monadology_, \u00a7\u00a7 7-9, 51.\n\nFootnote 55:\n\n See for a recent treatment of this point in its bearing upon the\n theory of volition and moral accountability, Mr. Bradley\u2019s article on\n \u201cMental Conflict and Imputation\u201d in _Mind_ for July 1902. There is\n probably no part of Psychology which suffers more from an improper\n over-simplification of awkward facts.\n\nFootnote 56:\n\n As the reader will readily collect from the preceding discussion, I do\n not myself admit that they are justified. On the contrary, I should\n hold that any consistent Pluralism must issue in what, if I held it\n myself, I should feel compelled to describe as Atheism, and the\n doctrine of blind chance as the arbiter of all things. In this matter\n I should like to associate myself entirely with the emphatic protest\n of Mr. Bradley, in _Mind_ July 1902, p. 313, and with the remarks of\n Mr. B. Russell in his work on _The Philosophy of Leibniz_, p. 172. I\n need not say that I do not make these remarks for the purpose of\n disparagement. By all means, if Atheism is the logical outcome of\n consistent thinking, let us say so; what I object to is the constant\n appeal to theistic beliefs on the part of metaphysicians who, so far\n as I can see, ought to be atheists if they were in earnest with their\n own position.\n\nFootnote 57:\n\n For a popular exemplification of the kind of appeal to religious and\n ethical interests here objected to, see the first essay in Prof.\n James\u2019s _Will to Believe_. I have never been able to understand why\n these appeals, if legitimate, should not be allowed in Psychology or\n any other science as readily as in Metaphysics. Would Prof. James\n regard it as a valid argument for the \u201ctimeless self\u201d or the\n _Innervationsgef\u00fchle_, that some men may be better or happier for\n believing in them? Or again, is it in itself an objection to the study\n of Ethics that certain persons may become both less moral and less\n happy as a consequence of studying it?\n\nFootnote 58:\n\n _N.B._\u2014These possibilities, it must be remembered, though numerically\n infinite, are assumed to be qualitatively determinate, being\n constituted of the condition of conformity to the logical principle of\n non-contradiction. Now there is no reason in the nature of a plurality\n of _independent_ things why this principle should be recognised rather\n than not.\n\nFootnote 59:\n\n A medley of independent things would not even be really \u201cmany.\u201d For\n until you can count \u201cfirst, second, third....\u201d you have not your Many.\n And nothing but the terms of a coherent connected series can be\n counted. What you can count as many is shown by the very fact of your\n ability to count it to have a common nature or ground which permits of\n its orderly arrangement, and thus to be part of one system. Compare\n Plato, _Parmenides_, 164, 165.\n\nFootnote 60:\n\n As Aristotle more than once says, a human hand, for instance, is not\n when severed from the rest of the body a \u201chand\u201d at all, except\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u201cequivocally,\u201d any more than the \u201chand\u201d of a statue is a true\n hand. (_I.e._ it is only a \u201ctrue hand\u201d so long as it _does the work_\n of a hand. Captain Cuttle\u2019s hook probably deserved the name of \u201chand\u201d\n better than the severed member it replaced).\n\nFootnote 61:\n\n I shall attempt to show in a later chapter (Bk. IV. chap. 3) that, in\n any useful signification of the term \u201cself,\u201d Reality is not a \u201cself\u201d\n nor yet a mere community of \u201cselves.\u201d\n\nFootnote 62:\n\n Again, I must remind the reader that this recognition of the\n teleological character of mind does not in the least preclude the\n necessity for psychological analysis of mental states. Still less does\n it require us to include in our analysis a volitional element as one\n distinguishable aspect or component of the isolated mental state by\n the side of others, such as the presentational and emotional aspects.\n It might even be contended that a \u201ctripartite\u201d or three-aspect\n Psychology commits the mistake of counting in the whole psychical fact\n as one of its own components.\n\nFootnote 63:\n\n See _infra_, Bk. IV. chap. 3, where we shall find that the relation of\n the individual self to a social whole probably furnishes a still\n better, though not altogether satisfactory, illustration of our\n principle.\n\nFootnote 64:\n\n For Spinoza\u2019s doctrine see especially _Ethics_, I. 15, 25; II. 11, 40;\n III. 6-9; V. 22, 23, with the explanations of any good exposition of\n his system, such as that of Pollock or Joachim.\n\nFootnote 65:\n\n See further on the \u201cParallelistic\u201d doctrine, Bk. IV. chap. 2.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n REALITY AND ITS APPEARANCES\u2014THE\n DEGREES OF REALITY\n\n\u00a7 1. Reality being a single systematic whole, the nature of its\n constituent elements is only finally intelligible in the light of\n the whole system. Hence each of its \u201cappearances,\u201d if considered as\n a whole in itself, must be more or less contradictory. \u00a7 2. But some\n \u201cappearances\u201d exhibit the structure of the whole more adequately\n than others, and have therefore a higher degree of reality. \u00a7 3.\n This conception of degree of reality may be illustrated by\n comparison with the successive orders of infinites and\n infinitesimals in Mathematics. It would be the task of a complete\n Philosophy to assign the contents of the world to their proper place\n in the series of \u201corders\u201d of reality. \u00a7 4. In general any\n subordinate whole is real in proportion as it is a self-contained\n whole. And it is a self-contained whole in proportion as it is (_a_)\n comprehensive, (_b_) systematic; that is, a thing is real just so\n far as it is truly individual. \u00a7 5. The two criteria of\n individuality, though ultimately coincident, tend in particular\n cases to fall apart for our insight, owing to the limitation of\n human knowledge. \u00a7 6. Ultimately only the whole system of experience\n is completely individual, all other individuality is approximate. \u00a7\n 7. In other words, the whole system of experience is an infinite\n individual, all subordinate individuality is finite. Comparison of\n this position with the doctrines of Leibnitz. \u00a7 8. Recapitulatory\n statement of the relation of Reality to its Appearances.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Reality, we have seen, is to be thought of as a systematic whole\nforming a single individual experience, which is composed of elements or\nconstituents which are in their turn individual experiences. In each of\nthese constituents the nature of the whole system manifests itself in a\nspecial way. Each of them contributes its own peculiar content to the\nwhole system, and as the suppression or change of any one of them would\nalter the character of the whole, so it is the nature of the whole which\ndetermines the character of each of its constituents. In this way the\nwhole and its constituent members are in complete interpenetration and\nform a perfect systematic unity. In the happy phrase of Leibnitz, we may\nsay that each of the partial experiences reflects the whole system from\nits own peculiar \u201cpoint of view.\u201d If we call the completed system, as it\nis for itself, Reality _par excellence_, we may appropriately speak of\nthe partial experiences in which its nature is diversely manifested as\nits Appearances. We must remember, however, that to call them\nappearances is not to stamp them as illusory or unreal. They will only\nbe illusory or unreal when we forget that they are one and all partial\naspects or manifestations of a whole of which none of them adequately\nexhausts the contents.\n\nWhen we forget this and treat any partial experience as though it were\nthe complete and adequate expression of the whole nature of Reality,\u2014in\nother words, when we try to apply to existence or the universe as a\nwhole conceptions which are only valid for special aspects of\nexistence,\u2014we shall inevitably find ourselves led to contradictory and\nabsurd results. Each partial aspect of a total system can only be\nultimately understood by reference to the whole to which it belongs, and\nhence any attempt to treat the part in abstraction as itself a\nself-contained whole,\u2014or, in other words, to treat the concepts with\nwhich we have to work in dealing with some special aspect of the world\nof experience as ultimately valid in their application to the whole\nsystem,\u2014is bound to issue in contradiction. Again, just because our\nknowledge of the structure of the system as a whole is so imperfect as\nit is, our insight into the structure of its constituents is also\nnecessarily limited. Hence it will commonly happen that, even within the\nlimits of their applicability, the special concepts of our various\nsciences are not, when thought out, free from internal contradiction.\nFor instance, we are led to absurd results when we try, as Materialism\ndoes, to interpret the whole system of experience in terms of the\nconcepts used in the purely physical sciences; and again, even in their\nrestricted use as physical categories, these concepts seem incapable of\nbeing so defined as to involve no element of contradiction.\n\nIn both these senses all Appearance implies an element of contradiction;\nonly for an insight which could take in at once the whole system of\nexistence would its details be completely coherent and harmonious. But\nthis does not alter the fact that, so far as our insight into any part\nof the whole and its connection with other parts is self-consistent, it\ndoes convey genuine, though imperfect, knowledge of the whole. Though\nour detailed insight into the structure of the whole may never reach the\nideal of perfect self-consistency, yet it may approximate to that ideal\nin different degrees, at different stages, or with reference to\ndifferent aspects. And the closer the approximation the less the\nmodification which our knowledge would require to bring it into complete\nharmony with itself, and the greater therefore the element of truth\nabout Reality which it contains.\n\nIn particular, we must carefully avoid falling into the mistake of\nthinking of the Reality and the world of its appearances as though they\nformed two distinct realms. In a systematic unity, we must remember, the\nwhole can exist only in so far as it expresses its nature in the system\nof its parts, and again the parts can have no being except as the whole\nexpresses itself through them. To the degree to which this condition is\ndeparted from by any of the types of system familiar to us, those\nsystems fall short of being perfectly systematic. Reality, then, being a\nsystematic whole, can have no being apart from its appearance, though\nneither any of them taken singly, nor yet the sum of them thought of\ncollectively,[66] can exhaust its contents. And though no appearance is\nthe whole of Reality, in none of them all does the whole Reality fail to\nmanifest itself as a whole. The whole is truly, as a whole, present in\neach and every part, while yet no part is the whole.[67]\n\nWe may once more illustrate by an appeal to our own direct experience.\nConsider the way in which we set to work to execute any systematic\nscheme or purpose, _e.g._ the mastery of a particular science or a\nparticular business. We have in such a case a central aim or purpose,\nwhich in the process of execution spreads out into a connected system of\nsubordinate ideas and interests welded into one by the reference to a\ncommon end which pervades the whole. The supreme or central aim is only\nrealised in the successive realisation of the subordinate stages; at the\nsame time, while it is what sustains all the members of the system, it\nhas no existence apart from them, though it is identical neither with\nany one of them nor yet with their sum collectively considered.\n\n\u00a7 2. If our conviction that Reality is a single systematic unity\npervading and manifesting itself in lesser systematic unities is\ncorrect, we shall expect to find that some of the lesser systematic\nunities with which we have to deal in practical life and in the various\nsciences exhibit more of the full character of the whole to which they\nbelong than others. The \u201cpoints of view\u201d from which each minor system\nreflects the whole, though all true, need not be all equally true.\nThough the whole, in a genuine system, must be present as a whole in\nevery part, it need not be equally present in all; it may well _not_ be\n\u201c_as_ full, _as_ perfect in a hair as heart.\u201d To take a concrete\nexample, a cluster of mass-particles, a machine, a living organism, and\na human mind engaged in the conscious systematic pursuit of truth, are\nall to some degree or other systematic unities, and all to some degree,\ntherefore, repeat the structure of the universal whole to which they all\nbelong. But it does not follow that all manifest the structure of that\nwhole with equal adequacy and fulness. Indeed, any philosophy which\nadmits development as a genuine feature of the world-process must\nmaintain that they do not, that the nature of the whole system of\nReality is exhibited with infinitely greater adequacy and clearness in\nthe working of the conscious mind than in the changes of configuration\nof the system of mass-particles or even the vital processes of the\nphysical organism.\n\nIn practical life, too, one of our most ineradicable convictions is that\nthere are degrees of worth which coincide with degrees of the adequacy\nwith which partial systems exhibit the nature of the larger wholes to\nwhich they belong. For instance, among the different mental systems\nwhich may be called my partial \u201cselves,\u201d there are some which I call\n\u201ctruer\u201d than others, on the ground that they more fully reveal my whole\ncharacter as an individual human being. My whole character undoubtedly\nappears in and determines all the subordinate systems which make up my\nmental life. Each of them _is_ the whole character in a special aspect,\nor as reacting upon a special system of suggestions, but some of them\ncontain the whole in a more developed and explicit form than others. I\nam in one sense myself wherever I may be and whatever I may be doing,\nand yet I am \u201cmore myself\u201d in health than in sickness, in the free\npursuit of self-chosen studies than in the forced discharge of\nuncongenial tasks imposed on me by the necessity of earning an income.\n\nWe ought, then, to be prepared to find the same state of things\nuniversally in the relation of Reality to its Appearances. In a world\nwhere \u201chigher\u201d and \u201clower,\u201d \u201cmore\u201d and \u201cless\u201d true have a meaning, some\nof the lesser systems in which the nature of the whole is expressed must\nbe fuller and more adequate representations of that nature than others.\nThis is as much as to say that it would require comparatively little\ntransformation of some of the partial systems recognised by our\nknowledge to show how the common nature of the whole system of Reality\nis expressed in them; in other cases the amount of transformation\nrequired to show how the whole repeats itself in the part would be much\nmore extensive. To take a single instance, if our preceding analysis of\nthe general nature of Reality is sound, we can see much more clearly how\nthat nature reappears in the structure of a human mind than how it is\nexhibited in what we call a physical thing, and we may therefore say the\nhuman mind expresses the fundamental character of the whole system much\nmore fully and adequately than physical nature, as it exists for our\napprehension. More briefly, the same thought may be expressed by saying\nthat Reality has degrees, and that the forms of Appearance in which its\ncommon nature is most fully and clearly manifested have the highest\ndegrees of reality.\n\n\u00a7 3. This conception of Reality as capable of degrees may at first seem\nparadoxical. How can anything, it will be asked, be more or less \u201creal\u201d\nthan anything else? Must not anything either be entirely real or not\nreal at all? But the same difficulty might be raised about the\nrecognition of degree in other cases where its validity is now\nuniversally admitted. Thus to some minds it has appeared that there can\nbe no degrees of the infinite or the infinitesimal; all infinites, and\nagain all zeros, have been declared to be manifestly equal. Yet it\nhardly seems possible to escape the conclusion that the concept of\nsuccessive orders of infinitely great, and again of infinitely small,\nmagnitudes is not only intelligible but absolutely necessary if our\nthought on quantitative subjects is to be consistent (When the sides of\na rectangle, for instance, become infinitely great or infinitely small\nrelatively to whatever is our standard of comparison, it still remains a\nrectangle, and its area therefore is still determined by the product of\nits sides, and is therefore infinitely great or small, as the case may\nbe, in relation not only to our original standard but to the sides\nthemselves.[68]) What is in one sense not a matter of degree, may yet in\nanother not only admit but positively require the distinction of degrees\nof more and less. And this is precisely the case with Reality as it\nmanifests itself in its various appearances. In the sense that it is the\nsame single experience-system which appears as a whole and in its whole\nnature in every one of the subordinate experience-systems, they are all\nalike real, and each is as indispensable as every other to the existence\nof the whole. In the sense that the whole is more explicitly present in\none than in another, there is an infinity of possible degrees of reality\nand unreality. We should be justified in borrowing a term from\nmathematical science to mark this double relation of the appearances to\ntheir Reality, and speaking of them as successive orders of Reality. And\nwe might then say that it is one of the principal problems of a complete\nPhilosophy to ascertain and arrange in their proper sequence, as far as\nthe limitations of our knowledge permit, the orders of Reality.\n\n\u00a7 4. Such a task as this could only be carried out by an intelligence\nequally at home in metaphysical analysis and in the results of the\nspecial sciences, and would form the proper work of applied Metaphysics.\nIn a discussion of general metaphysical principles it is sufficient to\nindicate the general nature of the criteria by which the degree of\nreality exhibited by any special partial system must be determined. Now,\nthis general nature has been already made fairly clear by the foregoing\ninquiry into the unity of Reality. Reality, we have seen, is one in the\nsense of being an individual self-contained whole of experience. And its\nindividuality means that it is the systematic embodiment of a single\ncoherent structure in a plurality of elements or parts, which depend for\ntheir whole character upon the fact that they are the embodiment of\nprecisely this structure. If this is so, we may say that degrees of\nreality mean the same thing as degrees of individuality, and that a\nthing is real precisely to the same extent to which it is truly\nindividual.\n\nA thing, that is, no matter of what kind, is really what it appears to\nbe, just in so far as the thing, as it appears for our knowledge, is\nitself a self-contained and therefore unique systematic whole. Or, in\nother words, just in so far as what we recognise as one thing shows\nitself, in the face of philosophical criticism and analysis, to be a\nself-contained systematic whole, so far are we truly apprehending that\nthing as a manifestation of the fundamental character of Reality, of\nseeing it as it really is, and so far does our knowledge give us genuine\nReality. On the other hand, just so far as what at first seemed a\nself-contained whole is discovered by subsequent analysis not to be so,\nso far have we failed to see the facts in their true place in the single\nwhole of Reality, and so far is our knowledge affected with error and\nunreality. Or, again, the more truly anything is a self-contained\nindividual whole, the higher its place in the scale of Reality.\n\nWhen we ask what are the marks by which one thing may be shown to be\nmore of a true individual whole than another, we shall find that they\nmay be reduced to two, both of which we can easily see to be in\nprinciple the same, though, owing to the limitations of our insight,\nthey do not always appear to coincide in a given case. One thing is\n_ceteris paribus_ more truly an individual whole than another: (1) when\nthe wealth of detailed content it embraces is greater; (2) when the\ncompleteness of the unity with which it embraces that detail is greater.\nOr, the degree of individuality possessed by any system depends: (1) on\nits _comprehensiveness_; (2) on its _internal systematisation_. The more\na thing includes of existence and the more harmoniously it includes it,\nthe more individual it is.\n\nIt is manifest, of course, that these two characteristics of a\nsystematic whole are mutually interdependent. For, precisely because all\nReality is ultimately a single coherent system, the more there is\noutside any partial system the greater must be the dependence of its\nconstituents for their character upon their connection with reality\noutside, and the less capable must the system be of complete explanation\nfrom within itself. The more the partial system embraces, the less will\nits constituents be determined by relation to anything outside itself,\nand the more completely will its organisation be explicable by reference\nto its own internal principle of structure. That is, the greater the\ncomprehensiveness of the system, the completer in general will be its\ninternal coherence. And, conversely, the more completely the working of\nthe whole system in its details is explicable from within as the\nexpression of a single principle of internal structure, the less must be\nthe dependence of its contents on any external reality; and therefore,\nseeing that _all_ reality is ultimately interconnected, the less must be\nthe extent of what lies outside the system in question. That is, the\ngreater the internal unity, the greater in general the comprehensiveness\nof the system. Thus ultimately the two criteria of individuality\ncoincide.\n\n\u00a7 5. In practice, however, it constantly happens, as a consequence of\nthe fragmentary way in which our experiences come to us, that\ncomprehensiveness and thorough-going systematic unity seem to be opposed\nto one another. Thus we can see, as a general principle, that the\nsystematic organisation of knowledge depends upon its extent. The wider\nour knowledge, the greater on the whole the degree to which it exhibits\norganic structure; the systematisation of science and its extension\nultimately go together. Yet at any one moment in the development of\nknowledge the recognition of fresh truths may necessitate a temporary\nintroduction of disorganisation and discrepancy among the accepted\nprinciples of science. Thus in the history of geometry the recognised\nprinciples of the science were temporarily disorganised by the admission\nof incommensurable magnitudes which was forced upon the early Greek\nmathematicians by the discovery that the side and diagonal of a square\nhave no common measure, and the discrepancy was only removed when it\nbecame possible to revise the principles of the theory of numbers\nitself. So again at the present day there is a real danger that\npremature anxiety to give the study of Psychology precise systematic\ncharacter by an exact definition of its subject and its relation to the\nvarious physical and mental sciences, may stand in the way of the\nextension of our knowledge of the facts of psychical life. We have often\nto purchase an important extension of knowledge at the cost of temporary\nconfusion of principles, and to be content to wait for the future\nreadjustment of facts to principles in the course of subsequent\nprogress.\n\nSo in our moral life we judge one man\u2019s character more individual than\nanother\u2019s, either on the ground of the superior breadth of his\ninterests, or of the superior consistency with which his interests are\nwrought into a self-consistent whole. The man of many interests has so\nfar a truer individuality than the man of few, and again the man of\nsteady purpose than the man whose energies are dissipated in seemingly\nconflicting pursuits. But the two criteria do not always, for our\ninsight, coincide. An increase in variety and breadth of interests may\nbe accompanied by a diminution in coherency of aim, and a gain in\ncoherency of aim appears often to be bought by concentration upon a few\nspecial objects. And we should find it hard or impossible to decide,\nwhere the two aspects of individuality appear to fall thus apart,\nwhether the man of many interests and relatively dissipated energies, or\nthe man of few interests and intense concentration upon them, exhibits\nthe higher individuality. For what looked like self-dissipation in the\npursuit of disconnected objects might really be the systematic pursuit\nof a consistent purpose too wide to be clearly apprehended in its unity\neither by contemporary observers or by the actor himself, yet apparent\nenough to the reflective historian reading the significance of a life by\nits whole effect upon society, and what seemed at the time the single\nobject of the man of one idea might similarly be found in the light of\nthe sequel to be the hasty combination of radically inconsistent\naims.[69]\n\nSuch reflections, however, only show that our limited insight is\ninsufficient to assign to every appearance with certainty its own place\nin the ordered system of appearances through which the single Reality\nexpresses itself. They do not touch our general position, that where\ncomprehensiveness and harmony _can_ be seen to go together, we are\njustified in using them as the measure of the individuality and\ntherefore of the reality of the partial system in which we discover\nthem. It is on such grounds, for instance, that we may safely pronounce\nthat an organism, which is the living unity of its members, is more\nindividual and therefore a higher reality that a mere aggregate of\npre-existing units, in which the nature of the parts is wholly or mainly\nindependent of the structure of the whole; and again, that a mind\nconsciously and systematically pursuing a coherent self-chosen system of\nends is more individual, and therefore again a higher reality, than an\norganism reacting according to the temporary character of its\nenvironment or its momentary internal condition in ways which form no\nsystematic execution of a connected scheme of ends. And it is clear\nthat, if only on this ground, we should have to say that we are nearer\nthe truth in thinking of the individual whole of complete Reality as an\norganism than in thinking of it as an aggregate, and nearer the truth\nstill in thinking of it as a mind. Similarly in our judgments upon our\nown lives and character. So far as one life possesses more breadth and\nagain more conscious unity of aim than another, so far it is more truly\nindividual, and therefore a more adequate type of complete reality. Just\nso far as I am individual, I am truly real. And just so far as I fall\nshort of systematic individuality, whether from the poverty of my\ninterests or their mutual incompatibility, the appearance of unity in my\nlife is illusory, and I must be pronounced an unreal appearance.\n\nAt this point we may observe our metaphysical criterion of reality\ncoincides with our ethical criterion of moral worth. For in morality too\nwe esteem one life worthier than another, either for the superior\ncomprehensiveness of its ideals or for the thoroughness with which they\nare wrought into a harmonious whole of coherent purpose. The better man\nis either the man of the wider ideal, or again the man of completer and\npurer self-devotion to his ideal. And thus for Morality the measure of\nour worth, as for Metaphysics the measure of our reality, lies in our\nindividuality. And for Morality no less than for Metaphysics\nindividuality is pre-eminently a thing of degrees. In both cases, again,\nthe same difficulty besets us as soon as we attempt to use our criterion\nfor application to particular cases. Its two aspects fall apart; it is\nnot always the more comprehensive ideal which is served with the higher\nfidelity of purpose. And so our actual moral judgments on the worth of\nparticular men, like our metaphysical judgments on the order of reality\nto which particular things belong, are often necessarily uncertain and\nfluctuating. We rate one man morally high for the comprehensive\nrationality of his ideals, though he suffers from a lack of concentrated\nenergy, another for the steady and earnest purpose with which he follows\nwhat we perhaps deplore as a contracted ideal.\n\n\u00a7 6. One more point of supreme importance concerning the relation of the\nlesser individuals to the perfect individual which is the absolute whole\nof Reality. Now that we have learned what is meant by degrees of\nindividuality, we can see that there can, in the last resort, be only\none perfect and complete individual, the whole of Reality itself, and\nthat the subordinate individuals can never be wholly and entirely\nindividual in themselves. For to be a complete individual would be, as\nwe have seen, to be a whole system absolutely self-contained and\nexplicable solely by reference to internal structure. Whatever requires,\nfor the full understanding of its systematic character, reference to\nexistence outside itself, we have seen, must also, so long as it is\nconsidered apart from the rest of existence, be internally wanting in\ncomplete systematic harmony, and thus must fall doubly short of the\nideal of individuality.\n\nAnd precisely because the whole of experience is a single system, no\nlesser system within the whole is entirely explicable in terms of its\nown internal structure. For a full understanding of the nature of the\nlesser system, and of the way in which it manifests a common character\nthrough the variety of its elements, you have always, in the last\nresort, to go outside the system itself, and take into account its\nrelation to the rest of the whole system of existence. And for that very\nreason no subordinate individual, considered in itself, is a completely\ncoherent self-determined whole. For a limited knowledge like our own,\nwhich has in the main to deal with subordinate systems as we find them,\nand without that complete understanding of the whole structure of\nReality which would enable us to see their precise place in the whole,\nthe subordinate systems themselves, when closely scanned by a resolute\nphilosophical analysis, will inevitably exhibit some degree of\ndiscrepancy and want of systematic unity.\n\nConsider, for instance, such a system as is formed by the life-work of a\nman of marked \u201cindividuality.\u201d On the whole, the life of such a man may\nfairly be said to be the systematic working out of a consistent scheme\nof purposes. But this is, after all, only approximately the truth. It is\nnot the case that the nature of the central or dominant purpose of the\nscheme is of itself enough to determine the nature and order of the\nsuccessive stages by which it finds expression. We have to take into\naccount factors in the man\u2019s \u201cheredity,\u201d and again in his social and\nphysical environment which form no part of the nature of his central\ndominant ideal and yet influence the manner of its fulfilment. We are\nthus thrown back for our full understanding of the \u201cindividual\u201d system\nin question upon circumstances which are, so far as that system is\nconcerned, \u201caccidental,\u201d _i.e._ which are equally with itself part of\nthe whole system of experienced fact, without our being able to see\n_how_ it and they form a wider coherent whole. The subordinate\nindividual, because incapable of explication solely from within, is in\nthe end only approximately \u201cindividual,\u201d and we therefore fall into\ncontradictions whenever we isolate it from the rest of Reality and treat\nit as absolutely individual and self-contained.\n\nIn dealing with subordinate wholes, we always, if we go far enough, come\nto a point where we have to recognise their dependence upon a realm of\nexternal fact which _our_ knowledge fails to see in its systematic\nrelation with them, and has therefore to treat as accidental or as an\nultimate \u201ccollocation.\u201d This is why, as has already been said, full\nknowledge of our own aims and interests as a genuine systematic whole\nwould coincide with complete insight into the structure of the whole\nuniverse. We may invert the sentiment of a hackneyed verse, and say with\nequal truth that until you know what God and man is, you cannot really\nknow what the \u201cflower in the crannied wall\u201d is. This is as much as to\nsay that every appearance must involve some element of contradiction for\nour philosophical analysis precisely because we cannot in the end see\nfully _how_ any appearance is related to the whole of Reality. But we\nmust carefully remember that if appearances, taken by themselves, are\ncontradictory, this is not because they are appearances, but because, as\nso taken, they are all to some extent _mere_ appearance. The conclusion\nof the whole matter is, that the individuality of anything less than the\nultimate whole of being is a matter of degree and approximation. We\nshall be equally in error if we assume that because no subordinate\nsystem is fully individual, some are not more individual and therefore\nmore real than others or if we declare that, because whatever is real at\nall must be in its degree individual, therefore every element of Reality\nis completely real in its isolation. The first error is that of a\none-sided Monism, the second that of an equally one-sided Pluralism.\n\nOnce more we may note a point of coincidence between our general\nmetaphysical theory of individuality and our personal experience as\nmoral agents. In so far as each of us is truly an individual, his aims\nand ends form a system with an internal unity pervading its structure,\nand therefore capable of progressive realisation as a system. Yet again,\nbecause each of us is less than the whole of Reality, or, what is the\nsame thing, because the systematic unity of our inner life is never\ncomplete, and our totality of interests relations, and aspirations never\na completely self-contained ordered whole, our ideals will always be\nfound to contain aspects which will not fully harmonise, elements which\nfall outside such a unity of structure as it is possible to effect\nwithin the limit of our single personality. And thus all our victories\ncontain an inseparable element of defeat. The defeated aspects of the\nself may no doubt, and in general do, in proportion to the degree of our\nindividuality, belong to the \u201clower\u201d and relatively more \u201cuntrue\u201d self,\nyet they are elements in the whole self, and their suppression is a\ngenuine if necessary self-suppression. There is a sense in which an\naspect of failure is an inevitable feature in the life of every\nsubordinate and therefore imperfect individual. Human life, even in the\nmillennium, as we rightly feel, would not be human life if the note of\nsadness were altogether absent from it. Only in the single experience of\nthe absolute whole can the discordant notes be finally resolved into a\nfaultless harmony.\n\n\u00a7 7. Technically, we may mark the distinction between complete and\napproximate individuality by saying that the absolute whole is an\ninfinite individual, whereas all lesser wholes are but finite\nindividuals. And here it is important to note carefully the true meaning\nof these often much-abused terms. The infinite must not be confounded\nwith the indefinite or unfinished. Its fundamental property is not the\nmerely negative one of having no end or \u201clast term,\u201d but the positive\none of having an internal structure which is the harmonious and complete\nexpression of a single self-consistent principle. The finite, again, is\nfinite not primarily merely because it has a \u201clast term,\u201d _i.e._ because\nthere is something else outside it, but because its \u201clast term\u201d is\narbitrarily determined, _i.e._ determined by something other than the\nprinciples of its internal structure. In other words, the essential\ndefect of the finite is that it is not solely determined by its own\nstructural principle.\n\nWe can see this even in the simple case of the familiar \u201cinfinite\nseries\u201d of arithmetic and algebra. Such a series as 1, 1/2, 1/4 ... is\n\u201cinfinite\u201d not merely because you never come to the last term, but\nbecause its character is determined from _within_, solely by the\nprinciple according to which each term is derived from the one before\nit; that the series has no end is a simple consequence of this positive\nproperty of self-determination. But suppose I take _n_ terms of this\nseries and no more, where _n_ is a specified number, the resulting\nseries is now _finite_, not primarily because there are more terms of\nthe same kind outside it, but because the number of terms to be taken is\nnot prescribed by the law of formation of the series, but fixed with\nreference to some object independent of the principle of the series\nitself. In other words, only the infinite is in the full sense of the\nwords a completely self-determined whole. The finite is the imperfect,\nnot primarily because there is something outside it, but because its\ncontents are not solely prescribed by the principle of structure which\nthey embody. I, for instance, am a finite being, not principally or\nmerely because there are other men in the world, but because my ideas\nand purposes are not a fully coherent systematic whole in\nthemselves.[70]\n\nThe view we have taken of individuality and the distinction between\nfinite and infinite individuality is closely akin to some of the most\nfundamental ideas in the philosophy of Leibnitz. It was the doctrine of\nLeibnitz that each of his monads \u201crepresented\u201d the nature of the whole\nsystem of existence, _i.e._ repeated the structure of the whole in its\nown special structure, from a particular \u201cpoint of view.\u201d According to\nthe fulness and clearness of the \u201crepresentation,\u201d _i.e._ the adequacy\nwith which the structure of the monad repeated the structure of the\nwhole system, the monads were classed as higher or lower in the scale of\nexistence. The clearer a monad\u2019s representation of the whole within\nitself, the greater the monad\u2019s \u201cactivity\u201d; the more confused the\nrepresentation, the greater its \u201cpassivity.\u201d It followed that, inasmuch\nas no created monad fully exhibits the systematic structure of the whole\nof Reality within itself, every one contains some element of\n\u201cpassivity,\u201d and that to be \u201cpassive\u201d primarily means not to be affected\nby extraneous influences, but to contain internal \u201cconfusion.\u201d\n\nThus the \u201cactivity\u201d of Leibnitz exactly corresponds to what we have\ncalled individuality, and his \u201cpassivity\u201d to that want of complete\ninternal systematisation which we have found inseparable from finite\nexistence. The immense significance of this definition of activity and\npassivity in terms of internal systematisation will be more apparent\nwhen we come, in our concluding book, to discuss the meaning of human\nfreedom, and its connection with determination and \u201ccausality.\u201d For the\npresent it is enough to note that our own doctrine is substantially that\nof Leibnitz freed from the inconsistency which is introduced into it by\nthe monadistic assumption of the complete independence of the various\nfinite individuals. It is, of course, impossible to unite, as Leibnitz\ntried to do, the two thoughts. Either there is ultimately only one\nindependent individual, the infinite individual whole, or there is no\nmeaning in speaking of higher and lower degrees of individuality.\nLeibnitz\u2019s inconsistency on this point seems due entirely to his desire\nto maintain the absolute individuality of the particular human \u201csoul,\u201d a\ndesire which is explained, partly at least, by his anxiety not to come\ninto collision, as Spinoza and others had done, with the official\ntheology of the period.\n\n\u00a7 8. The definition of infinite and finite individuality completes the\ngeneral outline of our conception of Reality as a whole, and its\nrelation to its constituent elements. Recapitulating that doctrine, we\nmay now say that the real is a single all-embracing whole of experience\nor psychical matter of fact, determined entirely from within by a\nprinciple of internal structure, and therefore completely individual.\nBecause the matter of the system is in all its parts experience, the\nprinciple of its structure must be teleological in character.[71] That\nis, the system must be the embodiment, in a harmonious unity of\nconscious feeling, of a consistent interest or mental attitude. As such\nwe may call it the realisation indifferently of a purpose or idea, and\nwe may speak of the absolute experience as the completed expression of\nan absolute knowledge or an absolute will.\n\nBut if we do so, we must bear in mind that there can be here no question\nof a thought which works upon and reconstructs into systematic harmony a\nbody of data originally supplied to it in a relatively unintelligible\nand disconnected form from some foreign source, or of a volition which\ngradually translates into reality an end or purpose originally present\nto it as an unrealised idea. The processes of thought and volition can\nclearly have no place in an experience for which the what and the that\nare never disjoined; as we shall by and by see more fully, they involve\nexistence in time, and existence in time can belong only to the finite\nand imperfect. Hence it is best, in the interest of intellectual clarity\nand candour, to avoid the use of such expressions as knowledge and will\nin speaking of the absolute experience; at best they are in large part\nmetaphorical, and at worst potent weapons of intellectual\ndishonesty.[72] The constituents of the system, again, are lesser\nexperience systems of the same general type, in each of which the nature\nof the whole manifests itself, though to different degrees. They are\nthus all finite individuals of varying degrees of individuality. The\nmore comprehensive and the more internally unified by an immanent\nprinciple of teleological structure such a system, the more fully\nindividual it is, and the more adequately does it reveal the structure\nof the all-pervading whole. This is the intellectual justification for\nour instinctive belief that what is for our human experience highest and\nbest is ultimately in the constitution of the universe most completely\nreal.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 24,\n\u201cDegrees of Truth and Reality\u201d; Plato, _Republic_, vi. 509 ff., with the\ncommentary in R. L. Nettleship\u2019s _Lectures on Plato\u2019s Republic_, or\nBosanquet\u2019s _Companion to the Republic_.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 66:\n\n Not the sum of them, because the systematic whole of Reality is not a\n sum but a single experience. To identify it with the _sum_ of its\n appearances would be the same error which occurs in Ethics as the\n identification of happiness (a qualitative whole) with the sum of\n pleasures (a quantitative collection).\n\nFootnote 67:\n\n The reader will find it instructive to observe how Prof. Sidgwick\n unconsciously assumes that the distinction between Reality and\n Appearance means a distinction between two more or less independent\n \u201cworlds\u201d or \u201cthings\u201d (_Philosophy: its Scope and Relations_, Lectures\n 1 and 4), and thus deprives his own criticism of the antithesis of all\n validity as against a view like our own.\n\nFootnote 68:\n\n So, again, a velocity which is already infinitesimal may receive an\n acceleration which is infinitesimal in relation to the velocity\n itself. The reader\u2019s own studies will no doubt furnish him with\n numerous other illustrations of the same kind.\n\nFootnote 69:\n\n See for illustrations of the impossibility of carrying out a single\n principle in our actual judgments of particular cases, Mr. Bradley\u2019s\n already quoted article in _Mind_ for July 1902.\n\nFootnote 70:\n\n For a fuller exposition of the conception of infinity here adopted I\n may refer the reader to the famous essay of Dedekind, _Was sind und\n was sollen die Zahlen_, especially pp. 17-20. The English reader will\n find an account of Dedekind\u2019s work, with an acute discussion of its\n metaphysical significance, in Royce, _The World and the Individual_,\n First Series, Supplementary Essay. It does not seem necessary for the\n purpose of this chapter to specify the points in which I find myself\n unable to follow Professor Royce in his use of the theory. See\n _infra_, chap. 4, \u00a7 10.\n\nFootnote 71:\n\n It would not be hard to show that in the end all systematic structure\n is teleological. For all such structure in the last resort is a form\n of order, and depends on the possibility of saying \u201chere this is\n first, that is second.\u201d And wherever we predicate order we are\n asserting the embodiment in detail of some dominant purpose.\n\nFootnote 72:\n\n In fact, it is clear that if we speak of \u201cidea\u201d or \u201cvolition\u201d in\n connection with the absolute individual, we cannot mean _actual_\n \u201cideas\u201d or _actual_ \u201cvolitions.\u201d We must be using the psychological\n terms improperly in something of the same sense in which we speak of a\n man\u2019s \u201cguiding ideas\u201d or \u201csettled will\u201d to denote what clearly,\n whatever it may be, is _not_ actual ideational or volitional process.\n See further, Bk. IV. chap. 6, \u00a7 1.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE WORLD OF THINGS\u2014(1) SUBSTANCE,\n QUALITY, AND RELATION\n\n\u00a7 1. The natural or pre-scientific view of the world regards it as a\n plurality of \u201cthings,\u201d each possessing _qualities_, standing _in\n relation_ to others, and interacting with them. \u00a7 2. Hence arise\n four problems: those of the Unity of the Thing, of Substance and\n Quality, of Relation, of Causality. \u00a7 3. No simple answer can be\n given to the question, _What is one thing?_ The Unity of the Thing\n is one of teleological structure, and this is a matter of degree,\n and also largely of our own subjective point of view. \u00a7 4.\n _Substance and Quality._ The identification of the substance of\n things with their primary qualities, though useful in physical\n science, is metaphysically unjustifiable. \u00a7 5. Substance as an\n \u201cunknowable substratum of qualities\u201d adds nothing to our\n understanding of their connection. \u00a7 6. The thing cannot be a mere\n collection of qualities without internal unity. \u00a7 7. The conception\n of a thing as the law or mode of relation of its states useful but\n metaphysically unsatisfactory. Ultimately the many can be contained\n in the one only by \u201crepresentation;\u201d the unity in things must be\n that of an individual experience. \u00a7 8. _Relation._ We can neither\n reduce qualities to relations nor relations to qualities. \u00a7 9.\n Again, the attempt to conceive Reality as qualities in relation\n leads to the indefinite regress. \u00a710. We cannot escape this\n difficulty by taking all relations as \u201cexternal.\u201d And Professor\n Royce\u2019s vindication of the indefinite regress seems to depend on the\n uncriticised application of the inadequate category of whole and\n part to ultimate Reality. The union of the one and the many in\n concrete experience is ultra-relational. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: Dr.\n Stout\u2019s reply to Mr. Bradley.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. When we turn from the inquiry into the structure of Reality as it\nmust be conceived by a consistent Philosophy, to consider the aspect in\nwhich it appears to ordinary non-philosophical thought, the systematic\nunity which has demanded our attention in the two preceding chapters\nseems to be replaced by a bewildering and almost incalculable variety.\nAccording to the na\u00efve pre-scientific theory of existence to which the\nexperiences of practical life naturally give rise, and which serves as\nthe point of departure for all the more scientific and systematic\ntheories of the physicist, the psychologist, and the metaphysician, the\nworld is composed of a multitude of apparently independent things,\npartly animated, like ourselves, partly inanimate. Each of these things,\nwhile in some sense a unit, is thought of as possessing an indefinite\nmultiplicity of _qualities_ or _properties_, as capable of standing in a\nvariety of _relations_ to other things, and as _acting_ upon other\nthings and _being influenced_ by them in a variety of ways.\n\nIn all these respects, it should be observed, the na\u00efvely realistic\nthought of the pre-scientific mind treats what from a more developed\npoint of view would be distinguished as mental and physical existences\nalike. Human persons, like the other things of which my environment is\ncomposed, are thought of as being at once units and the possessors of\ndiverse properties, as capable of a variety of relations to one another\nand to other things, and as interacting with each other and the rest of\nthe environment. The recognition of the psychical as an order distinct\nfrom the physical, with its momentous consequences for general\nmetaphysical theory, belongs to a later and much more sophisticated\nstage of intellectual development. Also, it must be noted, for the\nna\u00efvely realistic intelligence, I am myself thought of as simply one\nobject or thing in an environment of things of a similar nature, and my\nrelations to that environment are conceived as being of the same type as\nthe relations between its various component parts. I too am, for my own\nthought, so long as it remains at this primitive level, simply a thing\nwith numerous properties, in various relations to other things, and\ninteracting with them in diverse ways.[73]\n\nWe have called this exceedingly primitive way of conceiving the nature\nof existence \u201cpre-scientific,\u201d on the ground that both in the mental\ndevelopment of the individual and in that of a community of individuals\nit precedes even the most tentative conscious efforts to organise\nthought about the world into a coherent whole. All scientific and\nphilosophical constructions may be regarded as so many artificial\nmodifications of this earlier point of view, instituted and carried out\nfor the purpose of rendering it more coherent and systematic. At the\nsame time, our use of the epithet \u201cpre-scientific\u201d must not be allowed\nto mislead. The \u201cpre-scientific\u201d view may and does co-exist in the same\nmind with the various modifications of it which arise in the effort to\nthink consistently. We are all of us habitually \u201cna\u00efve realists\u201d in\nrespect of those aspects of the world of experience which lie outside\nthe limits of our personal scientific studies; and even as regards those\naspects of existence in respect of which our theoretical views may be of\na much more developed type, we habitually relapse into the\n\u201cpre-scientific\u201d attitude when our immediate object is practical[74]\nsuccess in action rather than logical consistency in thinking. For the\npurposes of everyday life, the most \u201cadvanced\u201d man of science is content\nto be a na\u00efve realist outside his laboratory.\n\nAgain, pre-scientific as the primitive attitude towards existence is, in\nthe sense of being unaffected by the deliberate effort after system and\ncoherency of thought, it is so far scientific as to be a real though\nrudimentary and unconscious product of our intellectual need for order\nand system of some kind in our thought about things. It is a genuine\nthough an unconscious result of our earliest reflection on the course of\nexperience, and thus a true thought-construction, not a passive\nreproduction of a merely \u201cgiven\u201d material. It performs in rudimentary\nfashion, and without explicit purpose, the same task of systematising\nexperience which the various scientific and philosophical theories of\nthe more developed mind undertake more elaborately and with conscious\nintent. It is thus pre-scientific, but not properly speaking\nunscientific.\n\nAs the mass of ascertained fact accumulates and reflection upon it\nbecomes more systematic and deliberate, our primitive conception of the\nsystematic nature of the real inevitably proves unsatisfactory for two\nreasons. New facts are discovered which we cannot fit into the old\nscheme without modification of its structure, and, again, the concepts\nin terms of which the scheme was originally constructed prove on\nexamination to be themselves obscure and ambiguous in their meaning.\nThere is thus a double motive perpetually operative in bringing about\nreconstruction of the original scheme. To the various sciences it falls\nin the main to devise such alteration of the old schematism as is\nnecessary for the inclusion of fresh facts; it is the special province\nof metaphysical criticism to examine the various terms both of the\noriginal scheme and its subsequent modifications, with a view to\ndetermining how far they form an ultimately intelligible and coherent\nsystem.\n\n\u00a7 2. When we scrutinise the original \u201cpre-scientific\u201d theory of the\nworld from this point of view, we shall find that its four leading\nfeatures give rise to four metaphysical problems of great generality and\nconsiderable difficulty. The conception of the world as made up of a\nmultiplicity of things, each of which is one, gives rise to the problem\nof the unity of the thing; the plurality of the qualities, and again of\nthe relations ascribed to the single thing, gives rise to the problems\nof _Substance_ and _Quality_ and of _Relation_; the belief in the\ninteraction between different things finally gives rise to the\nexceptionally important and difficult problem of _Causality_. The four\nproblems are not altogether disconnected; in particular, it is hard to\ndiscuss the sense in which a thing can be spoken of as \u201cone,\u201d without at\nthe same time raising the question how the \u201cone\u201d thing stands to its\nmany properties, and again discussing the general meaning of relation.\nAnd the problem of Causality may be raised in so general a form as to\ninclude the other three. Still, for the sake of having a definite order\nof discussion, it will be well to take them as far as may be separately,\nand to proceed from the simpler to the more complex. When we have\nindicated in outline our solution of these problems, we shall have to\nask what is the general conception of a thing which our results\nestablish, and whether and on what grounds we are warranted in believing\nin the actual existence of things answering to our conception. The\npresent chapter will be devoted to the examination of the first three\nproblems; in the succeeding chapter we shall discuss the meaning of\nCausality, and indicate our general conclusion as to the existence of\n\u201cthings.\u201d With this result our survey of the general structure of\nReality will be completed, and we shall then proceed in our third and\nfourth books to examine the most important of the special problems\nsuggested by the existence of physical nature and conscious mind\nrespectively.\n\n\u00a7 3. _The Unity of the Thing._\u2014The problem we have to face is as\nfollows: in what sense do we call any thing \u201cone thing,\u201d and what gives\nit its character as a unity? It is obvious that we may attack this\nquestion from either of two rather different points of view. We may ask\neither, why do we mark off just this portion of our environment from all\nthe rest as a single thing among many things; or, again, how is the\noneness which we predicate of any part of the environment so marked off\ncompatible with the multiplicity of its properties? The question we\npropose to deal with in this section is the former of the two just\npropounded; the latter shall be dealt with next as the problem of\nsubstance and its qualities. What, then, do we mean by the unity which\nwe ascribe to whatever we recognise as one thing among a multiplicity of\nothers? We have, in a way, implicitly answered this question already by\nthe result arrived at in our discussion of the character of the elements\nor constituents of the system of Reality. But whereas, in our former\ninvestigation, we started from the general notion of Reality as a\nsystematic whole of experience, and went on to ask what character is\nimposed on the elements of such a system by their presence in it as its\nelements, we have now to raise the same question from the other side;\nstarting with our everyday recognition of our environment as divided\ninto things, we have to ask how far these things possess the character\nwhich must belong to the genuinely individual members of an individual\nwhole of subordinate individuals.\n\nFor the purpose of the inquiry we must begin by taking the term thing in\nthe same wide and ambiguous sense in which everyday thought and\ndiscourse use it. We must reckon among the things which are the topic of\ndiscussion, human persons, animals, plants, greater and smaller\ninorganic masses, in a word, whatever the most matter-of-fact\ncommon-sense thinking recognises as possessed of a character in virtue\nof which it can as a whole determine the course of experience at a given\nmoment. The character or aspect in virtue of which such a whole\ndetermines the course of experience in this one special way rather than\nanother, is by this definition excluded from our conception of a thing;\nit is not the thing itself but its quality or property or relation to\nsome other thing, and forms the subject of our second and third\nproblems. Thus we may say of a thing, in the sense in which we are using\nthe term, that it is what has existence as a whole here and now in the\nseries of experiences, though in saying so we must be careful to bear in\nmind that the here and now of the thing\u2019s existence are not indivisible\npoints of space or time, but continuous stretches of extension and\nduration. Now, when we ask in what sense such a thing is one, and why we\nmark off the limits which separate the one thing from the other things\njust where we do, it at once becomes apparent that the oneness is a\nmatter of degree. We seem at first sight able with comparatively little\ndifficulty to decide that the organism of a human being or of one of the\nhigher animals is one thing; when we come to deal with the lower\norganisms which consist of loosely aggregated colonies of largely\nindependently functioning cells, we begin to feel more diffidence in\npronouncing what is one organism, though we still think we can say what\nis one cell. So, in dealing with inanimate masses, while we might be\nready to say without much misgiving that a machine of our own\nconstruction is one, we should find it much harder to decide whether\nwhat we perceive as a mere inorganic mass is one or many, and harder\nstill to give reasons for our decision in a particular case. And even in\nthe cases where our decision is most unhesitatingly pronounced,\nsubsequent reflection will show that the matter may not be so obvious as\nit seems. For instance, a pair of separated Siamese twins would\nundoubtedly be generally held to be two organisms and not one; but\nwhether they were one or two before the severance is a question we\nshould find it easier to ask than to answer.\n\nWhen we try to detect some common principle in our various judgments as\nto whether a thing is one thing or several, the following results seem\nto emerge:\u2014(1) A thing is clearly not made _one_, as is sometimes\nassumed, by the possession of an unbroken contour or an uninterrupted\ntemporal existence. The succession of my mental states may make up one\nmental life, and again my organism from the cradle to the grave may be\npronounced in some sense one, though no one can prove that there are no\ngaps in their temporal existence. Again, even if we leave out of account\nthe corpuscular theories of body according to which every thing that\nlooks to us like a spatially continuous whole with an unbroken contour\nis really composed of discrete particles with interstices between them,\nit is abundantly clear that common sense regards as one thing the parts\nof a system which works as a connected whole, quite independently of the\nexistence or non-existence of immediate contact between them.\n\n(2) Again, the unity of the one thing does not depend upon identity of\nmaterial, whatever that phrase may mean. My organism still remains one\nthing, though its material is constantly changing by the loss of some\nelements and the acquisition of others.\n\n(3) On the positive side, it is clear that the unity we attribute to one\nthing is that of teleological structure. A thing is one or many\naccording to the point of view from which you look at it, _i.e._\naccording to the idea or purpose in the light of which you study it.\nThat is one thing which functions as one, in other words, which is the\nsystematic embodiment of a coherent scheme of structure. Thus, when we\nare considering the whole of an organism as subservient to the\nrealisation of a unique individual aim or interest, the organism is\nnecessarily judged to be one, because in respect of that interest it\nbehaves as a whole; when we are studying the specific mode of reaction\nof a particular nerve, for instance, the same organism just as naturally\nappears to us a multiplicity of distinct but interconnected things.\nSimilarly, a system of material particles appears one thing to us so\nlong as our interest in the system is directed to those ways in which it\nbehaves as one, _e.g._, the exchanges of energy between it and other\nsystems external to it. Generally we may say that whatever is called one\nis called so because it is the systematic expression of a single aim or\ninterest. A thing, in fact, is one just in so far as it has the\ncharacter we ascribed, in our last chapter, to a finite individual. Its\nunity is never _merely_ numerical, but always qualitative, the unity of\ncoherent structure.\n\nEven in our rough-and-ready way of treating continuity of contour as\nevidence of oneness in inanimate and apparently structureless masses, we\nmay detect the influence of this principle. We judge the sensibly\ncontinuous mass to be one rather than many things, because in many\nobvious respects it functions as one (_e.g._, in respect of its weight,\nthe simultaneous displacement of its parts in rotation or translation\nthrough space). Also, no doubt, our judgment is influenced by the\nanalogy of our own bodies, which are sensibly continuous. We project in\nimagination into the sensibly continuous inanimate mass the same kind of\nteleological unity which we find in our own mental life. The sensibly\ndiscontinuous, on the other hand (_e.g._, two inorganic masses separated\nby an apparently empty interval), is judged to be many things rather\nthan one, because, in imagination, we project such an inner mental life\ninto each of the discontinuous parts.\n\nIf all this is so, it would follow that the line of demarcation between\none thing and another can never be drawn with hard and fast precision.\nFor if one thing ultimately means one individual, the embodiment of a\nunique self-consistent idea, the only thing which is fully and\nabsolutely one will be the infinite individual Reality itself. The\nextent to which any lesser portion of the whole can be pronounced one\nthing will depend on the extent to which it exhibits self-contained\nsystematic individuality, and thus will be a matter of degree. The\nhighest kind of finite unity we can conceive will be that of a life\nwhich is the conscious progressive realisation of coherent purpose. Such\na life is one not merely for the outside observer who detects its\nunderlying unity of aim, but for itself. Its oneness may thus be said to\nbe both objective and subjective. Thus the more completely our own inner\nlife is the systematic expression of consistent purpose, the greater the\nright with which we may regard ourselves as being each truly \u201cone thing\u201d\nand as such truly individual. But when we remember how far what any one\nof us calls \u201chis\u201d inner life is from exhibiting such complete internal\ncoherency of structure, we shall realise that even in the highest case\nthe unity is still a matter of degree.\n\nThis is still more palpably the case with the lower forms of organic\nlife. Not to speak of the well-known puzzles which arise when we seek to\ndetermine whether a creature which is a colony of largely independent\ncells is one animal or many, our difficulties begin as soon as we have\nto deal with any type of life below the most fully self-conscious. We\ncan say, to some extent, that a human character is one so long as it is\nthe conscious expression of systematic purpose, but it is less easy to\nsay in what sense we call an animal\u2019s conscious life one. The absence of\nanything like systematic unity of aim and interest from the life of\nanimal impulse makes it appear, at least at first sight, more reasonable\nto speak of it as a bundle or collection of distinct impulses and\ninstincts rather than as one.[75] If, in spite of this, we still\nhabitually speak and think of the particular higher animal as _one_\nrather than many, the reason no doubt is that we tacitly ascribe to it\nsomething like the conscious unity of interest which we find in our own\nmental life, though with a diminished clearness.\n\nWhen we come to the inanimate world, it seems to become purely a matter\nof our own subjective interest what we shall call one thing and what we\nshall call many. That is one which may be regarded as acting as one\nwhole in respect of its bearing upon any interest of ours; that many\nwhich, in respect of our interests, does not behave as a whole. Thus,\nexcept where we are dealing with forms of life to which we can with more\nor less plausibility ascribe some degree of conscious unity of aim and\ninterest, there seems no valid reason for drawing the line between\ndifferent things in one place rather than in another, except reasons of\nconvenience. It is important to bear this in mind in applying our\nidealistic theory of existence to the case of the inanimate world. If\nthe foundations of the idealistic theory are sound, every real existence\nmust be a finite individual experience of some order of individuality,\nand this must of course hold good of that part of existence which\nappears to us as the inanimate world. The inanimate world must be\u2014as we\nshall see more fully in the succeeding book\u2014a system of individual\nexperiences, which appears to us lifeless and purposeless merely because\nthe kind of life it possesses is too far removed from our own for us to\nrecognise it. But we must most carefully observe that the line of\ndemarcation between the different individual experiences which\nconstitute the reality of that world need not in the least coincide\neverywhere with the line which we, for purposes of our own, draw between\ndifferent things.\n\n\u00a7 4. _The Problem of Substance and Quality._\u2014More important, in the\nhistory of metaphysical theory, has been the other aspect of the problem\nof the unity of things. What we call one _thing_ is said, in spite of\nits unity, to have many _qualities_. It is, _e.g._, at once round,\nwhite, shiny, and hard, or at once green, soft, and rough. Now, what do\nwe understand by the _it_ to which these numerous attributes are alike\nascribed, and how does it possess them? To use the traditional technical\nnames, what is the _substance_ to which the several qualities belong or\nin which they inhere, and what is the manner of their _inherence_? The\nfull difficulty of this problem may be most easily exhibited by\nconsidering the ways in which popular thought commonly tries to solve\nit.\n\n(1) One of the commonest and most obvious solutions is to identify the\n\u201csubstance\u201d which has the qualities (or, to use the more general\nscholastic expression, the _accidents_) with some one group of the\nthing\u2019s properties which we regard as specially important or permanent.\nThe \u201csubstance\u201d is then taken to be just this group of \u201cprimary\u201d\nqualities, and is said to have or possess the less permanent \u201csecondary\nqualities.\u201d For obvious reasons, the \u201cprimary\u201d qualities have in modern\nPhilosophy usually been identified, as by Galileo, Descartes, and Locke,\nwith those mathematical properties of body which are of fundamental\nimportance for the science of mechanical Physics.[76] And usually,\nthough not always, the way in which the substance, as thus defined,\n_has_ the secondary qualities, has been further explained by saying that\nthese latter are subjective changes in our sensibility produced by the\naction of the primary qualities upon our various sense-organs. Neither\nof these special views is, however, necessarily involved in the\nidentification of the substance of things with their fundamental\nqualities. The essential principle of the theory consists simply in the\nrecognition of some groups of qualities as of primary importance, and\nthe identification of the one \u201csubstance\u201d which has the many properties\nwith this group.\n\nNow, it would be impertinent for us to raise any objection to the use of\nsuch a theory as a working hypothesis in the physical sciences, so long\nas it does in those sciences the work for which it is required. The\nobject of the physical sciences as a body is simply to enable us to\ndescribe and calculate the course of events in nature with the highest\ndegree of accuracy and the least complicated set of formul\u00e6. If this end\nis most successfully attained by treating a certain group of the\nproperties of sensible things as of primary importance and all the rest\nas mere derivatives of them, this fact of itself affords sufficient\njustification for the scientific use of the distinction. For the special\nobjects of physical science any group of properties which thus lends\nitself to the purposes of description and calculation is of primary\nimportance. But it is no less true that its importance for physical\npurposes does not afford the least ground for regarding it as equally\nvaluable as a solution of the metaphysical problem of the meaning of\nsubstance. For instance, one reason why the mathematical properties of\nbody are of such supreme importance for Physics is that in respect of\nthem bodies can be treated as differing not in kind but only in number.\nThis is why they are of such inestimable service as the basis of our\ncalculations as to the behaviour of things. But it might very well be\nthat the true nature of things is most fully manifested just in those\npoints in which they are different in kind; from the standpoint of the\nmetaphysician, a view of non-human nature, however serviceable, which\nrests entirely upon the aspects in which things are most alike, may be\nas superficial as the statistical sociologist\u2019s view of human nature.\nThe true being of a concrete thing may be as inadequately expressed by\nits mathematical properties as the true character of an individual man\nby a list of anthropometrical results.[77]\n\nIn point of fact, we can readily see that the distinction between\n\u201cprimary\u201d and \u201csecondary\u201d qualities, when propounded as an answer to the\nproblem about substance, leaves us just where we were before. For (1) we\nascribe the primary qualities to the \u201csubstance\u201d of the thing in just\nthe same fashion as the secondary. The thing _is_ of such and such a\nconfiguration, _is_ of such and such a mass, _is_ solid, etc.; just as\nit _is_ rough, or heavy, or green. Or, again, it _has_ configuration,\nmass, solidity; just as it _has_ weight, taste, colour. Hence the old\nproblem breaks out again with respect to the primary qualities\nthemselves, however the list of them may be constructed. Again we have\nto ask, what is the _it_ which possesses shape, mass, velocity, etc.?\n\n(2) Moreover, the theory fails to explain the nature of that\n\u201cpossession\u201d of the secondary qualities which it ascribes to the group\nof primary qualities. In what way, we ask, do the primary qualities have\nor possess the secondary? The only serious attempt to answer this\nquestion seems to be that of the numerous philosophers (Descartes,\nGalileo, Locke, etc.) who treat the secondary qualities as \u201csubjective\u201d\neffects of the primary qualities upon our sense-organs. Now, this\nfamiliar solution of the problem seems deficient in logic. For the one\nsolid argument which has been advanced in favour of the subjectivity of\nsecondary qualities seems to be the contention that they cannot be\nperceived without sense-organs of a special type. Colours, it is said,\nexist only for an eye, sounds for an ear, taste for a tongue, and so\nforth. And differences of structure or temporary condition in the\nsense-organ lead to the perception of different secondary qualities, as\nwhen, to take the stock examples, everything looks yellow to the\njaundiced eye, the same water feels warm to one hand and cold to the\nother, and so forth.\n\nBut these considerations seem just as applicable to the supposed\n\u201cprimary\u201d as to the \u201csecondary\u201d qualities of things. Geometrical form,\nfor instance, is imperceptible apart from sight or touch; motion, again,\nand consequently change of configuration, and similarly mass, which is a\nratio of accelerations, require either sight or touch for their\nperception. Of course, we can think of motions and masses which we are\nnot actually perceiving, just as we can think of an absent colour or\nsmell, and in both cases we can in reasoning about motions or masses or\ncolours or smells abstract altogether from the presence of a percipient.\nBut this does not affect the fact that the mathematical qualities of\nbody are just as dependent for perception upon the presence of a\npercipient with suitable sense-organs as anything else. Configurations,\nextensions, and motions which no one perceives by sight or touch or any\nother sense are exactly in the same case as a colour which no one sees\nor a sound which no one hears. The argument from the indispensability of\na perceiving organ ought logically to tell just as much in the one case\nas the other.[78]\n\nAgain, and this is a point of the first importance, experience never\ngives us the \u201cprimary quality\u201d by itself. What we get in actual\nexperience is always the conjunction of primary and secondary qualities\nin a concrete perception. Thus we never perceive extension apart from\nsome special visual or tactual filling of the \u201csecondary\u201d kind. The\nextended has always some quality of colour, or texture, or resistance.\nAn extension which is totally devoid of colour, tactual quality, and\neverything which belongs to the so-called sensible, non-mathematical, or\n\u201csecondary\u201d properties of body, is an unreal abstraction, got by leaving\nout an aspect which in actual experience appears inseparable from it,\nand therefore presumably illegitimate. Illegitimate, that is, when\noffered as an account of the fundamental reality of body, however useful\nfor the special purposes of natural science. Thus the attempt to take\nthe so-called primary qualities as the unitary \u201csubstance\u201d which has or\n\u201cpossesses\u201d the secondary qualities, and to dispose of these latter as\n\u201csubjective,\u201d leads to no satisfactory result. The former, too, must be\nmerely qualities possessed by a more ultimate substance.\n\n\u00a7 5. Hence it constantly happens that the same writers who treat\nsubstance as identical with the primary qualities of things, alternate\nthis view with another according to which substance is an unknowable\nunit of which we can say no more than that it, whatever it may be, is\nwhat is presupposed in all propositions about the behaviour of things as\nthe \u201cunknown substratum\u201d of their various qualities. According to this\nview, the many qualities of the thing in some inexplicable manner \u201cflow\u201d\neither from the nature of its own unknown substratum or substance, or\nfrom the relations in which this substratum stands with that of other\nthings.[79] Our knowledge is then held to be confined to these\nconsequences of the unknown ultimate character of real things; we are\nignorant, it is said, of the substance both of physical and of mental\nexistence, we know only its attributes or manifestations. Or it is\notherwise phrased thus: we do not know what things really are, we know\nonly their effects on one another and on our own senses. This is, for\ninstance, the view represented by those portions of Locke\u2019s Essay in\nwhich emphasis is laid upon our inability in the last resort to know the\ntrue substance of things.\n\nNow, such a general doctrine as this is manifestly open to grave\nobjections. (1) If we are serious in maintaining the unknowable\ncharacter of the substratum of a thing\u2019s qualities, it is hard to see\nhow the assertion of its existence can be any addition to our knowledge\nof the thing. To say that we are entirely ignorant of the nature of this\nsubstratum only amounts to saying in other words, that we have really no\nidea how the many qualities can be qualities of a single thing. If this\nis so, it does not appear what we gain by talking of the single thing at\nall as the owner or possessor of its qualities. It would, we might\nthink, be better to abandon the confessedly unintelligible notion of a\nsingle substratum in which the qualities \u201cinhere,\u201d and say that the\nthing, for our intellect, is simply the many qualities themselves. How\nthis view would have to be reconciled with the tacit assumption of the\nthing\u2019s unity as a substance, which underlies all the judgments in which\nits attributes are predicated of it, we shall have to discuss more fully\nin the next section.\n\n(2) A still more serious difficulty remains behind. Not only is an\n\u201cunknowable substratum of qualities\u201d a superfluous luxury in\nmetaphysical theory, but the nature of the supposed relation between\nsuch a substratum and the attributes which \u201cflow\u201d from it is\nunintelligible. We can understand neither what a substance or substratum\ntotally devoid of qualities could possibly be, nor yet how the various\nqualities of the world of things presented to our experience could\n\u201cflow\u201d as secondary consequences from one or more such substrata. We\ncannot conceive how things could first \u201cbe\u201d without this being of theirs\npossessing any definite character, and then subsequently, in virtue of\ntheir relations among themselves, give rise to their qualities or\ncharacteristic modes of being. Nothing can be at all without being in\nsome determinate way, and this \u201cbeing in some determinate way\u201d is\nprecisely what we mean by the qualities of a thing. A thing cannot be\nwithout behaving in special ways towards its environment, and these\nspecial ways of behaving are the thing\u2019s qualities. We cannot,\ntherefore, divorce the being or _that_ of a thing from its determinate\nmode of being or _what_, and regard the latter as something which\nsupervenes on or is derived from the former, or the former as something\nwhich can exist without and apart from the latter. Things are not first\nthere and afterwards in some mysterious way clothed with qualities;\ntheir qualities are simply their special way of being there. As Lotze\nwell puts it, all such attempts to formulate a theory of the way in\nwhich the _what_ of things flows from a mere _that_, are attempts to\nanswer the absurd question how Being is made.[80] The notion that things\nhave a _that_ or substance prior to their _what_ or quality, and\nconsisting simply in \u201cbeing\u201d which is not this or that determinate mode\nof being, is thus unmeaning as well as superfluous.\n\n\u00a7 6. Accordingly the whole notion of a substantial unity in things\nbehind the multiplicity of their states or qualities has been regarded\nwith disfavour by many students of positive science. The qualities being\nall that interests us in things, and the notion of an indeterminate\nsubstratum contradictory, we ought, it is argued, to identify the thing\nand the series of its states and qualities without more ado. From this\npoint of view the thing ceases to be an unknown somewhat, which in some\nmysterious way _has_ properties; it becomes the properties themselves\nthought of as a collection. It is no longer the unperceived _this_ which\n_has_ warmth, redness, etc., it is the warmth, the redness, and the rest\nof the sensible qualities taken collectively. For phenomenalist\nMetaphysics, as for associationist Psychology, the thing is a \u201cbundle of\nattributes\u201d and nothing more.\n\nWhen we ask how, if a \u201cthing\u201d is merely the series or sum of its\nattributes, and possesses no underlying unity to which the attributes\nbelong, the whole of our ordinary language about things comes to be\nconstructed on the contrary assumption, how it is that we always talk\nand think as if every \u201cbundle\u201d of attributes were owned by something of\nwhich we can say that it _has_ the quality, we are met by the\nphenomenalist with a reference to Psychology. Owing to the fact, which\nPhenomenalism and Associationism are content to accept as ultimate, that\nsensible qualities are always presented to our perception in definite\ngroups, it is argued that the thought of any one member of such a group\nis enough to revive by association the thought of the other qualities\nwhich have regularly been presented simultaneously with itself or in\nimmediate succession to it. Hence, because thus associated in our\nperception, the group comes naturally, though illegitimately, by one of\nthose mental fictions of which Hume treats so fully, to be thought of as\none, though it is actually a discrete multiplicity. The unity of the\nthing thus lies not in itself, but solely in our way of perceiving and\nthinking.\n\nA more recent version of the same doctrine, which avoids the old\nassociationist mistake of treating perception as a merely passive\nreception of a given material, is that the unity of the one subject of\nmany predicates is ultimately derived from the unity of our own acts of\nattention. The qualities appear to belong to \u201cone\u201d thing because _we_\nattend to them together as one in a single moment of attention. Thus the\nunity of substance which common sense believes itself to find in its\nobjects has really been put into them by the perceiving mind itself.\nWhat is \u201cgiven\u201d to it is a disconnected plurality of qualities; by\nattending to groups of them as one it makes those groups into the\nattributes of a single reality. This is the essence of the doctrine of\nKant, according to which the concept of \u201csubstance\u201d is simply one form\nof the \u201csynthetic unity of apperception\u201d _i.e._ the process by which we\nproject the unity of our own acts of attention into their objects, and\nthus create an orderly world for our own thought out of sensations which\nas they are given to us are a chaos. In principle, Kant\u2019s doctrine,\nthough intended as a refutation of Hume\u2019s Associationism, only differs\nfrom Hume\u2019s in the stress it rightly lays on the element of subjective\ninterest in perception; the two theories agree on the main point, that\nthe bond which unites the many qualities of sense perception into one\nthing is a subjective one,\u2014in Hume\u2019s expressive phrase, a \u201cfiction of\nthe mind.\u201d[81]\n\nWith the psychological aspects of this doctrine we are not directly\nconcerned in the present inquiry. For us the problem is not by what\nprecise steps the mind comes to \u201cfeign\u201d a unity in its objects which is\nnot really there, but whether this conception of a feigned or subjective\nunity imposed by the mind upon a number of actually disconnected\nqualities is itself ultimately intelligible. Thus the metaphysical issue\nmay be narrowed down to the following question: Can we intelligibly hold\nthat a thing is in reality simply a number of qualities, not in their\nown nature connected, which we arbitrarily regard for our own purposes\nas one?[82] In other words, can we say the thing is simply identical\nwith its qualities considered as a mere sum or collection, and any\nfurther unity of the kind the old Metaphysics denotes by \u201csubstance\u201d a\nmental addition of our own to the facts?\n\nNow there are two considerations\u2014both ultimately reducible in principle\nto one\u2014which seem fatal to the identification of a thing with its\nqualities, considered as merely discrete. (1) There can be no doubt that\nit is largely true to say that a given group of qualities appear to us\nto be the qualities of one thing because we attend to them as one. And\nagain, attention is undoubtedly determined by, or, to put it in a better\nway, is an expression of, our own subjective interests. But these\nconsiderations do not in the least show that attention is purely\narbitrary. If we take any group of qualities to form one thing because\nwe attend to it as one, it is equally true that we attend to it as one\nbecause it affects our subjective purposes or interests as one. That\ngroup of qualities is \u201cone thing\u201d for us which functions as one in its\nbearing upon our subjective interests. What particular interest we\nconsider in pronouncing such a group one, in what interest we attend to\nit, may be largely independent of the qualities of the group, but the\nfact that the group does function as one in respect to this interest is\nno \u201cfiction\u201d or creation of our own thought; it is the expression of the\nnature of the group itself, and is independent of \u201cour mind\u201d in\nprecisely the same sense in which the existence and character of any\nsingle member of the group of qualities is independent. There is no\nsense in assigning the single quality to \u201cthe given,\u201d and the union of\nthe qualities into a single group to \u201cthe work of the mind\u201d; in one\nsense both are the \u201cwork of the mind,\u201d in another both are the\nexpression of the nature of the \u201cgiven.\u201d[83]\n\n(2) Again, the insufficiency of the simple identification of the thing\nwith its qualities considered as a mere collection, may be illustrated\nby considering what the group of qualities must contain. The group of\nqualities is obviously never present in its entirety at any moment of\nexperience. For the majority of what we call the qualities of a thing\nare simply the ways in which the \u201cthing\u201d behaves in the presence of\nvarious other things, its modes of reaction upon a number of stimuli.\nNow, at any moment of the \u201cthing\u2019s\u201d existence it is only actually\nreacting upon a few of the possible stimuli, and thus only exhibiting a\nfew of its qualities. The vast majority of its qualities are at any\nmoment what Locke calls \u201cpowers,\u201d _i.e._ ways in which it _would_ behave\nif certain absent conditions were fulfilled. Thus the thing to which we\nascribe a number of predicates as its qualities is never the actual\ngroup of predicates themselves. Grass is green, but its greenness is not\na fact in the dark; the sun is capable of melting the wax, and this\ncapacity qualifies it permanently, but it does not actually melt the wax\nunless the wax is there, and various other conditions are also given; a\nman is temperamently choleric, but he is not actually at every moment of\nhis existence in a passion. He is only predisposed to fly into a passion\nreadily on the occurrence of provocation. Most of a thing\u2019s qualities\nthus are mere possibilities; the nature of the thing is to act in this\nor that way under certain definite conditions which may or may not be\nrealised in actual existence. Thus the collection of qualities with\nwhich Phenomenalism identifies a thing has itself no real existence as a\ncollection. The collection is just as much a \u201cfiction of the mind\u201d as\nthe unity which we attribute to it. Yet the fact that the thing\u2019s\nqualities are mainly mere possibilities does not destroy the existence\nof the thing. It actually is, and is somehow qualified by these\npossibilities. And for that very reason its existence cannot be\nidentified with the actual realisation of these possibilities in a group\nor collection of events. We might add as a further consideration, that\nthe number of such possibilities is indefinite, including not only the\nways in which the thing has behaved or will behave on the occurrence of\nconditions at present non-existent, but also all the ways in which it\nwould behave on the occurrence of conditions which are _never_ realised\nin actual existence. But the previous argument is already in itself\nsufficient, the moment its significance is fairly grasped, to dispose of\nthe notion that anything can be merely identical with a group of\nactually existing sensible qualities. The being of the things must be\nsought not in the actual existence of the group of sensible qualities,\nbut in the law or laws stating the qualities which would be exhibited in\nresponse to varying sets of conditions.[84]\n\n\u00a7 7. Considerations of this kind compel us to forego the attempt to find\nthe substance or being of a thing in the mere sequence of its different\nstates considered as an aggregate. To make Phenomenalism workable, we\nare forced to say at least that the thing or substance to which the\nvarious attributes are assigned is the \u201c_law_ of its states,\u201d or again\nis \u201cthe _mode of relation_ of its various qualities.\u201d Such a definition\nhas obviously a great advantage over either of the two we have just\nrejected. It is superior to the conception of the thing as an unknown\nsubstratum of qualities, since it explicitly excludes the absurd notion\nof a world of things which first _are_, without being in any determinate\nway, and then subsequently set up determinate ways of existing among\nthemselves. For a law, while not the same thing as the mere collection\nof occurrences in which it is realised, has no existence of its own\napart from the series of occurrences which conform to it. Again, every\nlaw is a statement of possibilities, a formula describing the lines\nwhich the course of events will follow _if_ certain conditions are\noperative; no law is a mere register of actually observed sequences.[85]\nHence, in defining the thing as the \u201claw of its states,\u201d we avoid the\ndifficulty dealt with in the last paragraph, that the collection of the\nthing\u2019s states never actually exists as a \u201cgiven\u201d collection. Thus for\nordinary practical purposes the definition is probably a satisfactory\none.\n\nYet it should be evident that in calling the thing the \u201claw\u201d of its\nstates, we merely repeat the metaphysical problem of the unity of\nsubstance without offering any solution of it. For, not to dwell on the\nminor difficulty that we might find it impossible to formulate a\n_single_ law connecting _all_ the ways in which one thing reacts upon\nothers, and thus ought more properly to speak in the plural of the laws\nof the states, we are now left with two distinct elements or aspects of\nthe being of the thing, namely, the successive states and the law of\ntheir succession, and how these two aspects are united the theory fails\nto explain. We have the variety and multiplicity on the one hand in the\nstates or qualities of the thing, its unity on the other in the form of\nthe law connecting these states, but how the variety belongs to or is\npossessed by the unity we know no better than before. Thus the old\nproblem of substance returns upon us; the many qualities must somehow be\nthe qualities of a single thing, but precisely how are we to conceive\nthis union of the one and the many?[86]\n\nAt this point light seems to be thrown on the puzzle by the doctrine of\nLeibnitz,[87] that the only way in which a unity can, without ceasing to\nbe such, contain an indefinite multiplicity is by \u201crepresentation.\u201d\nExperience, in fact, presents us with only one example of a unity which\nremains indubitably one while embracing an indefinite multiplicity of\ndetail, namely, the structure of our experience itself. For the single\nexperience regularly consists of a multiplicity of mental states, both\n\u201cfocal\u201d and \u201cmarginal,\u201d simultaneous and successive, which are\nnevertheless felt as one single whole because they form the expression\nof a coherent purpose or interest. And this conscious unity of feeling,\ndetermined by reference to a unique interest, is the only instance to\nwhich we can point when we desire to show by an actual illustration how\nwhat is many can at the same time be one. If we can think of the thing\u2019s\nqualities and the law of their connection as standing to one another in\nthe same way as the detailed series of acts embodying a subjective\ninterest of our own, and the interest itself which by its unity confers\na felt unity on the series, we can in principle comprehend how the many\nqualities belong to the one thing. In that case the thing will be one\n\u201csubstance\u201d as the embodiment of an individual experience, determined by\na unique subjective interest, and therefore possessing the unity of\nimmediate feeling. Its many qualities will \u201cbelong\u201d to it in the same\nsense in which the various constituents of an experience thus unified by\nimmediate feeling are said to \u201cbelong\u201d to the single experience they\nconstitute. And thus our idealistic interpretation of the general nature\nof Reality will be found to contain the solution of the problem of\nSubstance and Quality.\n\nNow it is fairly clear that some such idealistic solution is already\ncontained in germ in the pre-scientific view of the world of things.\nThere can be little doubt that our original notion of the unity of the\nthing as contrasted with the multiplicity of its qualities has been\nobtained by \u201cintrojectively\u201d ascribing to whatever groups of qualities\nact upon us as one in respect of some interest of our own, the same\nconscious unity of feeling which we know in ourselves and our fellows.\nWe shall have frequent opportunities, as we proceed, of discovering the\nenormous extent to which the whole pre-scientific view of the world is\nbased upon the interpretation of all existence in terms of our own.\nSystematic Idealism will thus gradually be found to be no more than the\nconsistent and deliberate carrying through of that anthropomorphic\ninterpretation of Reality which lies at the bottom of all man\u2019s attempts\nto make his surroundings intelligible to himself. It will follow, if our\ngeneral attitude towards the problem of substance is tenable, that only\nwhat we have already defined as an individual experience can truly be\ncalled a \u201csubstance,\u201d and that such experiences are \u201csubstances,\u201d if the\nword is to be retained in our philosophical vocabulary, to the same\ndegree to which they are truly individual. And thus we should be led in\nthe end to the distinction between the one infinite substance which\nforms the whole of Reality and the finite and imperfect substances which\nare its components.\n\nAgain, we should have once more to remember that since, in general, we\ncall that group of qualities one which acts on our interests as one, and\nour insight into those interests themselves is limited and confused, the\nboundaries assigned by us to the group of qualities we ascribe to a\nsingle substance as \u201cits\u201d states will be more or less arbitrary, and\ndependent upon the degree of our actual insight. It is possible for us\nto group together as states of the same thing qualities which a\nprofounder insight would have disjoined, and _vice vers\u00e2_. And in the\nend, if all that is is contained in a single coherent self-determined\nsystem, it is clear that, speaking rigorously, there will ultimately be\nonly one \u201csubstance\u201d\u2014the central nature or principle of the system\nitself\u2014of which all subordinate aspects or parts of existence will be\nthe attributes.\n\n\u00a7 8. _The Problem of Relation._\u2014More perplexing than the problem of\nSubstance and its Qualities is the question to which the pre-scientific\nassumption that the world consists of a number of _interrelated_ things\ngives rise. This problem of Relation becomes still more prominent when\nreflection upon the problem of Substance and Quality has made it\nmanifest that what we call the qualities of things are one and all\ndependent upon their relations either to our perceptive organs or to\nother things. Put quite simply the problem is as follows: Things stand\nin a variety of relations to one another, and what we commonly call the\nqualities of each are dependent on (_a_) its modes of relation to other\nthings, (_b_) its relation to our percipient organism. Again, the\nvarious qualities of one thing stand in relation among themselves. To\nbegin with, they all exhibit the relations of identity and difference.\nThey all so far possess a common nature as to be capable of being\ncompared in respect of the special ways in which they manifest that\nnature, and are thus so far identical; again, they can be discriminated\nand distinguished, and are so far in the relation of difference.\nFurther, the qualities of one thing are interconnected, as we have\nalready seen, by various special laws or modes of relation, which\nexhibit the changes in the behaviour of the thing corresponding to\nchanges in the surrounding circumstances.\n\nThus Phenomenalism, when it has banished the notion of a substantial\nunity in things, has to identify the world of things, as we have already\nseen, with qualities in relation to one another. But now the question\narises, How are we to understand the conception of qualities in\nrelation? Can we, on the one hand, reduce all qualities to relations or\nall relations to qualities, or, on the other, can we form an\nintelligible idea of the way in which a single whole or system can be\nformed by the union of the two? There are, of course, other questions of\ngreat though relatively secondary importance connected with the problem\nof relation, _e.g._, the question as to the number of ultimately\nirreducible kinds of relation, but the scope of the present work will\npermit of nothing beyond a brief discussion of the central difficulty.\nWe will take the various alternatives in order.\n\n(1) Philosophers have often been tempted to evade the difficulty of\nshowing how qualities _and_ relations together can make up a system by\nsuppressing one member of the antithesis altogether. Thus it has been\nmaintained, on the one hand, that the world of real things consists\nentirely of simple unrelated qualities, and that what we call relations\nbetween these qualities are merely our own subjective ways of\napprehending them. On the other hand, it has been suggested that there\nmay be nothing in the real world except relations, and that what we call\nqualities of various kinds are nothing but forms of relation. But\nneither of these views seems seriously tenable.\n\nFor (_a_) reality cannot consist of _mere_ relations. Every relation\nimplies two or more terms which are related. And these terms cannot be\ncreated by the relation itself. In every relation the terms have _some_\ncharacter of their own over and beyond the mere property of being terms\nin that relation. Thus, to take a simple example, the successive terms\nof the series of ordinal numbers express in themselves nothing beyond\ndeterminate position in an ordered series, but when they are applied to\nthe actual arrangement of any content in serial order, that content is\n(_c_) not created by the arrangement of it in an ordered series of\nterms, and (_b_) is dependent for the actual order of its terms upon\nsome positive character of its own. In other words, whenever you\nactually count you count something other than the names of the numbers\nyou employ, and you count it in an order which depends on the character\nof the particular things counted.[88] And so generally of all relations.\nA question has been raised which presents considerable difficulty and\ncannot be discussed here, whether there are or are not merely _external_\nrelations (_i.e._ relations which are independent of the special\nqualities of their terms). But even if we admit that there may be such\nmerely external relations, which do not depend upon the nature of the\nterms between which they subsist, it is at least clear that there cannot\nbe relations without _any_ terms, and that the terms are not created out\nof nothing by the relation between them.[89] Perhaps it might be\nrejoined that what I call the terms of a certain relation, though no\ndoubt not created by that particular relation, may be themselves\nanalysed into other relations, and those again into others _ad\nindefinitum_. Thus it might be said that the term A of the relation A-B\nmay no doubt have a quality of its own which is not created by this\nrelation. But this quality, call it A_{1}, is found on analysis to be\nresoluble into the relation C-D, and the quality C_{1} of C again into\nthe relation E-F, and so on without end. This would not, however, amount\nto a reduction of qualities to mere relations. For it would give us, as\nthe unit of our scheme of things, a pair of terms or qualities in\nrelation; and however often we repeated the process of analysis, we\nshould still always be left with the same type of triad, two terms and a\nrelation, as the result of analysis. Whatever its worth, this particular\nsolution falls under our second alternative, and must be considered in\nconnection with it.\n\n(2) But again, it is even more manifest that we cannot reduce all\nreality to qualities, and dismiss the relations between them as simply\n_our_ subjective mode of apprehension. This line of thought is capable\nof being worked out in two slightly different ways. We might hold that\nwhat really exists is disconnected simple qualities, each distinct from\nall others as red is from sweet, or loud from hot, and that the whole\nnetwork of relations by which everyday and scientific thought bring\nthese \u201creals\u201d into connection is a mere intellectual scaffolding to\nwhich nothing in the real world corresponds. Something like this would\nbe the logical outcome of the Humian doctrine that all relations are\n\u201cthe work of the mind,\u201d and that reality is the residuum left after we\nhave removed from our conception of the world everything which is of our\nown mental fabrication. The grounds upon which this doctrine was\nadvanced by Hume and his followers have already been destroyed by the\nprogress of Psychology and the consequent abandonment of the old\nhard-and-fast distinction between sensation and mental construction. It\nwas the belief of Hume, and apparently of Kant, that what is given in\n\u201csensation\u201d is single uncompounded qualities, and that all relations\nbetween these psychical atoms are produced by a subsequent process of\nsubjective synthesis. But the advance of Psychology, by leading to the\nrecognition that sensation itself is a continuous process containing a\nmultiplicity of \u201cmarginal\u201d elements which in all sorts of ways modify\nthe character of its central or \u201cfocal\u201d element, has made it impossible\nany longer to maintain an absolute distinction between the sensory and\nthe intellectual factor in cognition.\n\nAnd apart from the illusory nature of the distinction on which the\ntheory was based, it is sufficiently condemned for Metaphysics by its\nown inherent absurdity. For the fundamental presupposition of\nMetaphysics, as of all serious science, is that Reality is a coherent\nsystem. But, according to the view which regards relations as pure\n\u201cfictions of the mind,\u201d just that element in our thought which gives it\nits systematic character is an unwarranted addition of our own to the\nreal. Order and system are in fact, on this view, mere illusion. And, as\nhas often been pointed out by the critics of Hume, it is quite\ninconceivable how, in a world where nothing but disconnected simple\nqualities exist, the illusion should ever have arisen. If even our own\ninner life is simply incoherent, it is quite impossible to see how we\ncan ever have come, even by a fiction, to read system into the world of\nfact.\n\nA more plausible attempt to reduce all relations to qualities proceeds\non the following lines. Relations, it is said, are of subjective\nmanufacture, but they are, for all that, not mere fictions. For every\nrelation between two terms, say A and B, is based upon the presence in A\nand B of certain qualities, which are called the _fundamenta relationis_\nor basis of the relation. These qualities may be the same in both the\nterms, in which case the relation is called symmetrical; such a case is\nthat, _e.g._, of the equality of A and B, a relation having for its\n_fundamentum_ the fact that A and B have both the same magnitude. Here\nthe real fact is taken to be that A has this magnitude, and again that B\nhas it. The subjective addition to the facts is thought to come in in\nthe voluntary comparison of A and B in respect of this property and the\nconsequent assertion of their equality. Or the qualities which are the\nfoundation of the relation may be different in each of the terms, in\nwhich case the relation is technically called asymmetrical. Examples of\nsuch asymmetrical relations are, _e.g._, A greater than B, B less than\nA, or again, A father to B, B son to A. Here the actual facts would be\ntaken to be A possessed of magnitude _x_, B of magnitude _x_-_y_, A\nqualified by the circumstance of begetting B, B by the circumstance of\nbeing begotten by A. The subjective addition would come in, as before,\nwhen we brought A and B under one joint of view by comparing them in\nrespect of these properties.\n\nThe inherent difficulties of the reduction of relations to qualities\nare, however, only thinly disguised in this version of the doctrine. To\nargue that the establishment of judgments of relation presupposes\nsubjective comparison of the related terms from a more or less\narbitrarily chosen point of view, is metaphysically irrelevant. The\nwhole question is as to whether the result of the process is to make\nthings more intelligible as a systematic whole; if it is, the\nsubjectivity of the process is no ground for discrediting the result as\ntruth about the real. If it is not, the philosophers who insist on the\nsubjectivity of relations should explain how we can coherently think of\na systematic whole of reality in terms of quality apart from relation.\nThis they have never been able to do, and that for obvious reasons. It\nis manifestly impossible to give any intelligible account of the\nqualities which we recognise as _fundamenta_ of relations without\nintroducing previous relations. Thus the possession of the common\nmagnitude _x_ may be assigned as the foundation of the relation of\nequality between A and B; but when we ask what is meant by predicating\nof A and B possession of the magnitude _x_, we find that we are thrown\nback upon a relation between A, B, and some third term S, which we take\nas our unit of measurement. A and B are both of magnitude _x_ because\neach contains S, let us say, _x_ times exactly. So again the fact \u201cA\nbegetter of B\u201d was assigned as the _fundamentum_ of the asymmetrical\nrelation of paternity between A and B, and the same fact under another\nname as the _fundamentum_ of the asymmetrical relation of filiation\nbetween B and A.\n\nBut now what is meant by saying that the _same_ fact qualifies A and B\nin _different_ ways? Any answer to this question plunges us back at once\ninto a perfect network of relations. For first, that a fact x may be\nknown to qualify A and B differently, A and B must themselves be\ndiscriminated, _i.e._ they must be compared and found different, and\nwithout relation difference is unmeaning. For ultimately two terms are\ndifferent only when they also possess a common character which admits of\ntheir comparison with reference to a common standard. Thus only things\nwhich are like can be different, and the problem of the relation of\ntheir likeness to their difference is inevitably forced upon us by the\nvery existence of the difference. And similarly, the common fact _x_\nqualifies either term in a definite way, which can be discriminated from\nthe ways in which other facts qualify the same term, and this\ndiscrimination leads in precisely the same manner to the assertion of\nvarious relations among the different qualities of A and again of B.[90]\n\nIt is not difficult to see the common source of the difficulties which\nbeset both the attempt to reduce all reality to qualities, and the\nattempt to identify it with mere relations. In actual experience our\nworld always comes to us as at once many and one, never as merely single\nnor as merely discrete. If you pay exclusive regard to the aspect of\nunity and interconnection, you will naturally be tempted to dwell on the\nrelations between your elements to the exclusion of the various elements\nthemselves; if you think solely of the aspect of variety, it is equally\nnatural to treat the elements as real and their relations as fictions.\nBut in either case you arbitrarily concentrate your attention on a\nsingle aspect of the experienced fact taken in isolation from the other,\nand are thus led to results which are bound to collide with the whole\nfacts. A true view, if possible at all, can only be got by impartial\nadherence to the whole of the facts.\n\n\u00a7 9. We are thus brought to the second of our alternatives. Can we\nconceive of Reality as _qualities in relation_ or qualities _and_ their\nrelations? This is really, in a somewhat more developed form, the same\nproblem as that suggested by the definition of a thing as the \u201claw of\nits states.\u201d We are now to take the qualities as fixed terms with a\ncharacter of their own which stand in or support further relations, and\nwe have to ask if the view of the world thus formulated is entirely\nintelligible. And it speedily becomes clear that such a view is\nconfronted by a formidable difficulty. For suppose that A and B are two\nqualities which stand in any relation C. (For simplicity\u2019s sake we might\nsuppose this relation C to be, _e.g._, that of being discriminated, and\nwe might take as instances of A and B, say, two definitely discriminated\nshades of the same colour.) Then A and B, standing in the relation C,\nare not identical with A and B as they would be apart from this\nrelation. (A, for instance, as qualified by contradistinction from B, is\nnot the same thing as _mere_ A not in any way affected by B, a fact\nwhich is frequently brought home to us with startling force by the\neffects of contrast.) At the same time the relation C cannot create its\nown terms; A, which is qualified in some special way by its standing to\nB in the relation C, may also exist out of this relation, and the mere\nfact of our recognising it as A shows that, both in the relation C and\noutside it, it has a recognisable identical character. (_E.g._, A as\ndiscriminated from B is not precisely the same thing as A before\ndiscrimination, but the difference of A from B has not been created by\nthe act of discrimination; it must previously have been different in\norder to be discriminated.)\n\nThus we seem forced to split up the quality A, which we took as one of\nthe terms of our relation, into two aspects, A (A_{1}) the quality as it\nwas before the establishment of the relation, and A (A_{2}) the quality\nas it is after the establishment of the relation. And the two aspects\nthus discovered in what we took for the single quality A must again be\nsomehow in relation to one another. Hence within A (A_{1}) and A (A_{2})\nitself the same process will be repeated, and what we began by regarding\nas the fixed terms of the relation will turn out to be themselves\nsystems of qualities in relation, and this process will have no limit.\nThe classification of the contents of experience into fixed terms with\nrelations between them, it is contended, is no solution of the problem\nhow the experienced world can be both one and many but a mere\nrestatement of it. \u201cWe have to take reality as many and to take it as\none, and to avoid contradiction.... And we succeed, but succeed merely\nby shutting the eye which if left open would condemn us.\u201d Hence the\nconclusion is drawn that \u201ca relational way of thought ... must give\nappearance and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical\ncompromise, most necessary but in the end most indefensible.\u201d[91]\n\n\u00a7 10. The foregoing reasoning, which has been condensed from the fuller\nexposition in Mr. F. H. Bradley\u2019s _Appearance and Reality_, demands most\ncareful examination, as the consequence to which it leads is of supreme\nimportance for our whole metaphysical view of the nature of ultimate\nReality. If the conclusion of Mr. Bradley is sound, it is clear that our\ndiscursive thought with its scheme of predication, which is from first\nto last relational, can never give us adequate insight into the nature\nof the union of the one and the many. We shall then have to conclude\nthat it is not in thought about Reality, but in some mode of experience,\nif such there is, which enables us to transcend the separation of\nsubject from predicate, and is therefore suprarelational, that we come\nnearest to experiencing the real as it really is. We should thus be more\nor less in sympathy with the traditional Mysticism which has always made\nthe transcending of the distinction of subject from predicate the\nkeynote of its special way of experiencing the Divine. On the other\nhand, if the relational scheme of ordinary knowledge could be defended\nas a self-consistent way of regarding the facts, we should have the\nadvantage of being able to construe the absolute Experience in terms of\nour own intellectual life much more completely than Mysticism allows.\n\nHow, then, might the interpretation of the world as a system of\nqualities in relation be defended against Mr. Bradley\u2019s powerful\nformulation of the mystic\u2019s objection, and what is the worth of\nthe defence? Two possible lines of argument suggest themselves as\nsufficiently plausible to call for examination. (1) The edge of\nthe objection would be turned, as far as it rests upon the\nunsatisfactoriness of the indefinite regress, if we could regard\n_all_ relations as \u201cexternal,\u201d that is, as making no difference in\nthe qualities they relate. Now, some relations, it has been\nasserted, are merely external, _e.g._, relations of position and\nagain of _sense_ in the geometrical meaning of the word (like the\ndifference between a right-hand and a left-hand glove). Why, then,\nmay this not ultimately be the case with all relations? But if all\nrelations are external, we can no longer argue that the related\nterms must contain a further relation between themselves as the\nbasis and themselves as the result of the first relation, and so\nthe whole anti-relational case falls to the ground.\n\nSuch a view seems, however, to suffer from fatal deficiencies. For (_a_)\nit is at least hard to see how any relation can be ultimately external\nto its terms. For you cannot hold two terms in a relation of any sort\nwithout discriminating them; until they are at least discriminated as\ntwo they cannot be terms with a relation between them. Thus\ndiscrimination, and therefore the relation of distinction, is\nfundamental in all relation. But where we can distinguish there must\nalready be in the discriminated terms some difference to afford a basis\nfor discrimination. Only what is already different can be distinguished.\nAnd with this admission the door is once more opened for the indefinite\nregress.\n\n(_b_) And even if this were not so, it seems unthinkable that _all_\nrelations should be in the end external to their terms. If no relation\nin the end makes any difference to its terms, and thus has no foundation\nin their nature, it becomes a standing miracle how or why the terms\nshould enter into relations to which they are all the time absolutely\nindifferent. The logical consequence of such a view would surely be the\ndismissal of all relations as pure illusion, and the reduction of real\nexistence to a chaos of disconnected reals which we by some inexplicable\nintellectual perversity persist in taking for a system. The now\nuniversally recognised failure of Herbart\u2019s attempt to work out a theory\nof Realism on these lines seems ominous for the success of any future\ndoctrine of the same kind.\n\n(2) Much more subtle is the line of thought suggested by Professor Royce\nin the Supplementary Essay appended to his book, _The World and the\nIndividual_, First Series. Professor Royce admits the indefinite regress\nas an inevitable consequence of the reduction of the world to terms in\nrelation, but denies that it affects the soundness of the reduction. On\nthe contrary, he regards it rather as a proof of the positive\ncorrectness of the interpretation of existence which gives rise to it.\nHis argument, which is based upon the modern doctrine of infinite\nseries, may be briefly summarised as follows:\u2014It is a recognised\ncharacteristic of an infinite series (and of no others) that it can be\nadequately \u201crepresented\u201d by a part of itself. That is to say, if you\ntake any infinite series you please, you can always construct a second\nseries such that it consists of a selection, and only of a selection,\nfrom the terms of the first series, and that every term is derived from\nand answers to the corresponding term of the first series according to a\ndefinite law. And this second series, as it is easy to prove, is itself\ninfinite, and therefore capable of being itself represented adequately\nin a third series derived from it in the same manner as it was derived\nfrom the first, and so on indefinitely.\n\nFor instance, let the first series be the infinite series of the natural\nintegers 1, 2, 3, 4, ... then if, _e.g._, we construct a second series,\n1^2, 2^2, 3^2 ... of the second powers of these integers, the terms of\nthis second series are derived by a definite law from those of the first\nto which they correspond, and again they constitute a selection out of\nthe terms of the first series. Every one of them is a term of the first\nseries, but there are also terms of the first series which are not\nrepeated in the second. Again, if we make a third series from the second\nin the same way as the second was made from the first, by taking the\nterms (1^2)^2, (2^2)^2, (3^2)^2, and so on, the terms of this third\nseries fulfil the same conditions; they correspond according to a fixed\nlaw with the terms of the second, and are also themselves a selection\nfrom those terms. And thus we may go on without end to construct\nsuccessive infinite series each of which \u201cadequately represents\u201d the\npreceding one. And we are led into this indefinite regress by the very\nattempt to carry out consistently a single definite principle of\ncorrespondence between our original infinite series and its first\nderivative. In constructing the first derived series in our illustration\n1^2, 2^2, 3^2 ... we necessarily also construct the series (1^2)^2,\n(2^2)^2, (3^2)^2, ... and the other successive derivatives. Therefore\nProf. Royce claims that any consistent attempt to make an orderly\narrangement of the terms of an infinite whole _must_ lead to the\nindefinite repetition of itself. Hence that each term of every relation\non analysis turns out itself to consist of terms in relation, is no\nvalid objection to the soundness of our principle of interpretation, but\na necessary consequence of the infinity of Reality.[92] Any consistent\nattempt to exhibit an infinite whole as an orderly system of terms\n_must_ lead to the indefinite regress.\n\nNow it strikes one at once that Professor Royce\u2019s conclusion is in\ndanger of proving too much. You certainly do not show a method of\ndealing with facts to be sound by showing that it leads to the\nindefinite regress. It is a common experience that the liar who tells\nhis first lie must tell a second to back it, and a third to support the\nsecond, and so on indefinitely. And you cannot put a quart of liquor\ninto a pint pot without first putting half the quart into half the\nspace, and so forth _ad indefinitum_. Yet these considerations do not\nprove that lying or putting quarts of liquor into pint pots is a\nconsistent way of dealing with reality. A purpose may lead in execution\nto the indefinite regress because it is self-contradictory and therefore\nself-defeating, as these familiar illustrations suggest. And this raises\nthe question whether the purpose to arrange an infinite whole in an\nordered system of terms may not lead to the indefinite regress for the\nsame reason, namely, that the treatment of a true whole as a sequence of\nterms is incompatible with its real nature. It is at least worth while\nto ask whether Professor Royce\u2019s own treatment of the subject does not\ncontain indications that this is actually the case.[93]\n\nTo begin with, we may note one point of some importance in reference to\nwhich Prof. Royce\u2019s language is at least ambiguous. He speaks of the\nindefinite succession of infinite series which arise from the single\npurpose of \u201crepresenting\u201d the series of natural integers adequately by a\nselection out of itself as if they could be actually constructed in\npursuance of this purpose. But this is clearly not the case. All that\nyou can actually do is to construct the various series _implicitly_ by\ngiving a rule for their formation. The actual construction of the series\nwould be a typical instance of a self-defeating and therefore internally\ncontradictory purpose, inasmuch as it would involve the actual\ncompletion of an unending process. Hence we seem forced to make a\ndistinction which Prof. Royce has perhaps unduly neglected. If your\npurpose of ordering the number series on a definite plan means no more\nthan the formulation of a rule for obtaining any required number of\nterms of the successive series, it can be executed, but does not involve\nthe indefinite regress; if it means the actual completion of the process\nof formation of the series, it does involve the indefinite regress, but\nis therefore self-contradictory and cannot be realised in act.\nSimilarly, we may say of the scheme of qualities in relation, that if it\nis taken for no more than a rule for the systematic arrangement and\norganisation of a finite material, it does not involve the completion of\nan infinite process, and is both workable and useful; but if presented\nas an account of the way in which a completed all-embracing and\nperfectly harmonious experience of the whole of Reality is internally\norganised, it involves the completion of the infinite process, and is\ntherefore self-contradictory and finally inadequate.[94]\n\nThis reflection may serve to lead up to another which seems to take us\ninto the heart of the matter. The researches upon which Prof. Royce\u2019s\ndefence of the relational scheme is based were in the first instance\ninvestigations into the significance of the number-series. As such they\nstart with the conception of a system which is a whole of _parts_\nexternal to one another[95] as the object of inquiry. Consequently,\nwhile such investigations are of the highest philosophical importance as\nbringing out the implications of this concept, they are only valid as an\nanalysis of ultimate Reality, provided that the concept of whole and\npart is an adequate expression of the way in which the whole Reality is\npresent in its constituents and they in it. But if, as we ourselves\nurged in a previous chapter, the conception of a whole of parts is\nentirely inadequate to express the intimate union between the absolute\nexperience and finite experiences,[96] the proof that the indefinite\nprocess is logically implied in the relation of whole and part does not\nshow it to belong to the structure of ultimate Reality. Rather, we\nshould be inclined to urge, the fact that the relational scheme leads to\nthe indefinite process proves that the conception of whole and part upon\nwhich it is based does not truly represent the mode of union between a\ncompleted experience and its components. And therefore the attempt to\ninterpret this union in terms of the number-series cannot stand the test\nof criticism.\n\nAt the same time, Professor Royce\u2019s argument in any case throws\nconsiderable light upon the problem of relation. For it shows _why_ the\nattempt to construct the world as a system of qualities in relation\nleads to the indefinite regress. For a complete experience embodying at\none stroke the whole of existence, such a construction would, as we have\nseen, because essentially incomplete, be impossible. But when _we_ try\nto piece together the data of our fragmentary experience into a\nconnected whole, we inevitably have to start with more or less isolated\nfacts as fixed terms and weld them together by a relation. In doing so\nwe unavoidably put ourselves at the point of view from which the\nnumerical series arises; we unavoidably treat existence _as if_ it were\na whole of mutually external parts. And so the indefinite regress\ninvolved in the nature of the number-system inevitably parades the whole\nof our discursive and relational thinking about existence. But its\npresence is due to the inadequacy of the conception of Reality with\nwhich discursive thought has to work.\n\nOn the whole, then, it seems that Prof. Royce\u2019s investigations only make\nit more apparent than before that the relational scheme which discursive\nthought uses does not adequately express the true nature of the real,\nand that the mystics of all ages have been so far justified in their\ncontention that the form of our experience which presents the truest\nanalogy to the experience of the Absolute must be supra-relational, or,\nin other words, that the most real type of finite experience must be one\nwhich transcends the distinction of subject and predicate. To admit this\nis, however, not to admit that we are altogether ignorant how the one\nand the many are united in Reality. For there are many other types of\nhuman experience besides that which is dominated by the discursive and\nrelational intellect.\n\nIn immediate simple feeling we have obviously a type of conscious\nexperience in which distinction and relation have as yet not emerged.\nAnd I have tried in Bk. I. chap. 2 to show how in the direct intuition\nof an \u00e6sthetic whole by trained artistic perception we have at a higher\nlevel an experience which contains the results of an elaborate process\nof distinction and relation, but contains them in a way which transcends\nthe relational form and reverts in its directness to the unity of\nimmediate feeling. While again we have in the personal love which is one\nwith mutual insight a form of experience that, if translated into the\nlanguage of the intellect, would require for its description a whole\nworld of relations and predicates, and is yet, as experienced, an\nintimate unity no relational scheme can more than faintly adumbrate. And\nit is worthy of consideration that religious emotion in all ages has\nborrowed from these forms of experience its favourite expressions for\nthe highest modes of communion between the finite and the infinite, the\n\u201cbeatific vision,\u201d the \u201clove of God,\u201d etc.\n\nIt seems indeed as if the function of the mere intellect were always\nthat of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a\nhigher level of immediate apprehension. It breaks up, by the relations\nand distinctions it introduces, the original union of the _what_ and the\n_that_ of simple feeling, and proceeds to make the _what_, which it\ndeals with in its isolation, ever more and more complex. But the\nultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only\nsatisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental\ndevelopment to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive\nwhole in the immediate unity of its _that_ and its _what_. The besetting\nphilosophical sin of the mere mystic is not so much his refusal to\naccept the work of the mere intellect as the highest and truest type of\nhuman experience, as his tendency to satisfy his demand for the fuller\nunion of the _what_ with the _that_ by reverting to the lower forms of\nimmediacy upon which intellectual reflection has not done its work,\ninstead of pressing on to the higher in which the effect of that work is\npreserved though its form is transcended.\n\nThese reflections may serve to obviate the objection that to reject the\nrelational scheme when it is offered as the ultimate truth is to deny\nthe value and significance of the scientific work we accomplish by means\nof it. Though the scheme of relations cannot adequately express the mode\nof union between the finite and the infinite, there is no fresh addition\nto the system of relations into which scientific analysis translates the\nreal world of experience that does not increase our knowledge of what\nthe real world must contain, though it may fail to explain how it\ncontains it. And, in conclusion, let it be remembered that it is true\nnot only of the religious mystic\u2019s special experience of union with\ndeity, but of all direct experience, that the relational scheme is quite\ninadequate to explain how it holds its double aspects, its unity and its\nmultiplicity, its _that_ and its _what_, in complete interpenetration.\nFor _no_ living experience is a mere whole of parts, and none,\ntherefore, can be fully represented by a scheme based upon the concept\nof whole and part.[97]\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 1-3,\n15, 27; L. T. Hobhouse, _Theory of Knowledge_, pp. 172-181 (Qualities\nand Relations), 540-557 (Substance); H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i.\nchap. 1 (The Being of Things), chap. 2 (The Quality of Things), chap. 3\n(The Real and Reality); J. Royce, _The World and the Individual_, First\nSeries, Supplementary Essay; B. Russell, \u201cThe Concept of Order\u201d (_Mind_,\nJanuary 1901), and article on \u201cPosition in Space and Time\u201d (_Mind_, July\n1901); G. F. Stout, \u201cAlleged Self-contradictions in the Concept of\nRelation\u201d (_Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_, New Series, vol.\nii. pp. 1-14, with the accompanying discussion, pp. 15-24).\n\n -----------------------\n\n SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER IV.\n\n DR. STOUT\u2019S REPLY TO MR. BRADLEY\u2019S CRITICISM\n OF THE CONCEPT OF RELATION.\n\nSince the preceding chapter was written, I have had the opportunity of\nstudying Dr. Stout\u2019s paper in the current volume of _Proceedings of the\nAristotelian Society_. I have not thought it necessary to make any\nalterations in the text of Chapter 4, in consequence of Dr. Stout\u2019s\ncriticism, but I may perhaps be permitted to add the following remarks,\nwhich must not be regarded as a systematic appreciation or examination\nof Dr. Stout\u2019s views. The latter, as he himself pleads, cannot indeed be\nfinally judged until he has worked out the theory of Predication for\nwhich his present paper merely prepares the way.\n\n1. Dr. Stout begins by admitting what to my own mind is the essence of\nthe anti-relational argument. \u201cNo relation or system of relations can\never constitute a self-subsistent and self-contained Reality. The\nall-inclusive universe cannot ultimately consist in (? of) a collection\nof interrelated terms\u201d (_op. cit._, p. 2). This being once conceded, I\nshould have thought it an inevitable consequence that a \u201ccollection of\ninterrelated terms\u201d cannot give us the final truth about the nature of\nanything. For the whole idealist contention, as I understand it and have\ntried to sustain it in the present work, is that the structure of the\nwhole is so repeated in any and every one of its members that what is\nnot the truth about the whole is never the _ultimate_ truth about\nanything. precisely because there is ultimately nothing apart from the\nwhole, and the whole again is nothing apart from its members. So much, I\nhad thought, we have all learned from Hegel, and therefore Dr. Stout\u2019s\ndilemma that any proposition asserting relation (p. 5) must be false,\nunless the relational scheme, so long as it is not affirmed of the\nultimate whole itself, gives us truth, does not seem to me to possess\nany real cogency. With Mr. Bradley himself, as quoted by Dr. Stout, I\nshould urge that if the relational scheme is not itself internally\ndiscrepant, there remains no valid ground for disputing its\napplicability to the whole.\n\n2. Dr. Stout\u2019s introduction into a \u201crelational unity\u201d of the third\nterm,\u2014_relatedness_ does not seem to me to remove the difficulties\ninherent in our problem. And the illustration by which he supports it\nappears to be unsound. He argues that when my hat is on my head this\nstate of things implies (1) the two related terms, the hat and the\nhead,(2) a relation of _on_ and _under_. (3) the fact that the terms\nstand in this relation\u2014their relatedness. For (1) and (2) by themselves\nwould be compatible with my hat being on the peg and my head bare. But\nsurely there is here a confusion between the relation of _above_ and\n_below_, and the very different relation of _on_ and _under_. The latter\nrelation includes, as the former does not, immediate contact as part of\nits meaning. If there are (1) a hat and a head, and (2) the relation\n_on_ and _under_\u2014in this sense\u2014between the two, there is surely no need\nof a third factor to complete the concrete actuality of \u201chat on head.\u201d\nIf the hat is not actually on the head, then (2), the supposed relation,\nis not there at all. And if (2) is there the whole fact is already\nthere. In a word, Dr. Stout seems to me to count in the concrete fact of\n\u201cthing exhibiting related aspects\u201d as a third constituent in itself,\nprecisely as popular Logic sometimes counts in the actual judgment,\nunder the name of _Copula_, as one factor of itself.[98]\n\nThen to Dr. Stout\u2019s use of his distinction between the relation and the\nfact of relatedness, I think it may be replied that it leaves us\nprecisely where we were before. The hat is qualified by being _on_ the\nhead, the head by being _in_ or _under_ the hat, and hat and head\ntogether by the relation of _on_ and _under_ between them. But how these\nvarious aspects of the fact are to be combined in a single consistent\nview we are no nearer knowing.\n\n3. _The endless regress._ I think it will be seen from the preceding\nchapter that in my own view a genuine endless regress is evidence of the\nfalsity of the conception which gives rise to it, and that I hold this\non the ground that the endless regress always presupposes the\nself-contradictory purpose to sum an admittedly infinite series. Hence I\ncould not concur, so far as I can see at present, in Dr. Stout\u2019s\ndistinction between the endless regress which does and that which does\nnot involve self-contradiction. As to his illustration of endless\nregress of the second kind, the infinite divisibility of space (p. 11),\nI should have thought that there is no actual endless regress in\nquestion until you substitute for infinite divisibility infinite actual\n_subdivision_, and that when you make this substitution it commits you\nat once to the self-contradictory completion of an unending task. (Cf.\nwhat was said above, \u00a7 10, with reference to infinite numerical series.)\n\n4. Dr. Stout goes on to deny that there is any endless regress,\nself-contradictory or not, involved in the relational scheme. According\nto him, what connects the relation with its terms is not another\nrelation (which would of course give rise to an endless regress), but\ntheir relatedness, which is \u201ca common adjective both of the relation and\nthe terms\u201d (p. 11). I have already explained why this solution appears\nto me merely to repeat the problem. The relatedness, so far as I can\nsee, is a name for the concrete fact with its double aspect of quality\nand relation, and I cannot understand how mere insistence upon the\nconcrete unity of the fact makes the conjunction of its aspects more\nintelligible.\n\n5. Dr. Stout further supports his contention by a theory of the nature\nof continuous connection which I have perhaps failed to understand.\nReplying in anticipation to the possible objection of an opponent, that\nif the \u201crelatedness\u201d connects the terms with their relation there must\nbe a second link to connect the term with its relatedness, he says\n\u201cthere is no intermediate link and there is need for none. For the\nconnection is continuous, and has its ground in that ultimate continuity\nwhich is presupposed by all relational unity\u201d (p. 12, cf. pp. 2-4). And,\nas he has previously told us, \u201cso far as there is continuous connection\nthere is nothing between [_i.e._ between the connected terms], and there\nis therefore no relation.\u201d\n\nNow there seems to me to be a contradiction latent here. Continuous\nconnection, of course, implies distinct but connected terms which form a\nseries. Where there are no such distinct terms there is nothing to\nconnect. Now it is, as I understand it, part of the very nature of a\ncontinuous series that any two terms of the series have always a number\nof possible intermediate terms between them. And therefore, in a\ncontinuous series, there are _no_ immediately adjacent terms. Dr.\nStout\u2019s own illustration brings this out\u2014\n\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\n \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n \u03b2 \u2502 \u03b1 \u2502 _a_ \u2502 _b_\n M\n\nIn a diagram like the accompanying _b_ and \u03b2 are, he argues, \u201cmediately\nconjoined,\u201d but _a_ and \u03b1 are \u201cimmediately co-adjacent.\u201d Surely Dr.\nStout forgets here that what can be intelligibly called \u201cco-adjacent\u201d\nare not lines but points or positions on the lines. And between any\npoint in \u03b1 and any point in _a_ there are a plurality of intermediate\npositions, except for the special case of the extreme left point of _a_\nand the extreme right point of \u03b1. These, of course, coalesce in the\nsingle point M, and there is therefore no connection, mediate or\nimmediate, left in this case.[99] The illustration, I think, may serve\nto reveal a serious discrepancy in Dr. Stout\u2019s theory. He sees that\nrelations presuppose a unity which is supra-relational, and which he\ncalls \u201ccontinuous,\u201d on the ground of its supra-relational character. At\nthe same time, to save the relational scheme from condemnation as\nleading to the endless regress, he has to turn this supra-relational\nunity itself into a sort of relation by calling it an immediate\nconnection between _adjacent_ terms, and thus ascribing to it the\nfundamental character of a _discontinuous_ series. And I cannot help\nregarding this procedure as unconscious evidence to the truth of the\nprinciple, that what is not the truth about the whole of Reality is not\nultimately the truth about any reality.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 73:\n\n See the admirable account of the \u201cnatural conception\u201d of the world in\n the final chapter of Avenarius, _Der Menschliche Weltbegriff_.\n\nFootnote 74:\n\n May I say here once for all, that when I oppose _practice_ to\n intellectual speculation, I must be understood to mean by practice the\n alteration by myself of some datum of given existence. The activity of\n thought is thus for me not practical, precisely because the \u201ctruths\u201d\n which I know or contemplate are not _qu\u00e0_ truths given existences\n operated upon and altered by the act of thinking.\n\nFootnote 75:\n\n Such a view of the mental life of the animal seems to have been\n actually held, for instance, by the late Professor T. H. Green. Yet\n see Green, Works, ii. 217.\n\nFootnote 76:\n\n Strictly speaking, the \u201csolidity\u201d or \u201cimpenetrability\u201d of the ultimate\n particles of matter, which is with Locke and Newton one of the most\n prominent \u201cprimary\u201d qualities, is not a \u201cmathematical\u201d property, but\n it still owes its inclusion in the list to the conviction of these\n philosophers that it is, like extension and form, fundamentally\n important for mathematical Physics. The explanation of the \u201csecondary\u201d\n qualities as _subjective_ appears to go back to Democritus.\n\nFootnote 77:\n\n See the further elaboration of this analogy in Bk. III. chap. 3, \u00a7 2\n ff.\n\nFootnote 78:\n\n Professor Sidgwick\u2019s defence of the Lockian view (_Philosophy: its\n Scope and Relations_, p. 63 ff.) seems to me to ignore the point at\n issue. namely, that in any sense in which \u201csecondary\u201d qualities get\n their meaning from the content of sensation, primary qualities do the\n same. The whole point is that the sensation is not merely (as process)\n the _occasion_ of our cognition of, _e.g._, hardness or softness, but\n also (as content) furnishes the very meaning of \u201chard\u201d or \u201csoft.\u201d Cf.\n with what follows, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 1.\n\nFootnote 79:\n\n The former alternative is that of scholasticism; in modern science the\n latter has been more or less consciously adopted by those thinkers who\n retain the notion of substances. The various qualities are on this\n view consequences of the relations in which each substance stands\n (_a_) to other interacting substances, and (_b_) in particular to the\n unknown substratum of our \u201cconsciousness.\u201d\n\nFootnote 80:\n\n See chaps. 1 and 2 of bk. i. of his _Metaphysic_.\n\nFootnote 81:\n\n The reader who desires to study Kant\u2019s doctrine in detail may begin by\n taking up Kant\u2019s own _Prolegomena to the Study of any future\n Metaphysic_, which may be profitably consulted even by those who find\n the _Critique of Pure Reason_ too diffuse and technical. The latest\n and cheapest translation is that included in the Open Court Publishing\n Co.\u2019s series of Philosophical Classics.\n\nFootnote 82:\n\n \u201cArbitrarily\u201d because it is, as all recent psychology insists, the\n direction of our attention which determines _what_ qualities shall be\n presented together, and thus become \u201cassociated.\u201d\n\nFootnote 83:\n\n In Psychology this comes out in the rejection by the best recent\n writers of the whole associationist account of the process of\n perception, according to which the perception of a thing as a whole\n was taken to mean the actual presence in sensation of one of its\n qualities _plus_ the reinstatement by association of the \u201cideas\u201d of\n the others. For the modern doctrine of the perception of a whole, as\n distinct from the mere perception of its constituent parts, consult\n Stout, _Analytic Psychology_, bk. i. chap. 3, or _Manual of\n Psychology_,^3 bk. i. chap. 3.\n\nFootnote 84:\n\n This is just as true of the so-called primary qualities of things as\n of any others. Thus the mass and again the kinetic energy of a\n conservative material system are properly names for the way in which\n the system will behave under determinate conditions, not of modes of\n behaviour which are necessarily actually exhibited throughout its\n existence. The laws of motion, again, are statements of the same\n hypothetical kind about the way in which, as we believe, particles\n move if certain conditions are fulfilled. The doctrine according to\n which all events in the physical world are actual motions, rests on no\n more than a metaphysical blunder of a peculiarly barbarous kind. Cf.\n Stallo, _Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics_, chaps. 10-12.\n\nFootnote 85:\n\n Thus, _e.g._, so fundamental a proposition in our current mechanical\n science as the \u201cfirst law of motion\u201d is avowedly a statement as to\n what _would_ be the behaviour of things under a condition which, so\n far as we know, is never actually realised. On the thing as the \u201claw\n of its states,\u201d see Lotze, _Metaphysic_, I. 3. 32 ff. (Eng. trans.,\n vol. i. p. 88 ff.), and L. T. Hobhouse, _The Theory of Knowledge_, pp.\n 545-557.\n\nFootnote 86:\n\n Mr. Hobhouse (_op. cit._, p. 541 ff.) thinks that the solution is\n simply that those qualities belong to one \u201csubstance,\u201d which are\n apprehended together as occupying one space. As a working criterion of\n what we mean by one bodily thing, this account seems satisfactory, and\n has probably suggested itself spontaneously to most of us. But it\n leaves untouched the more fundamental question how the identification\n of a certain sight-space with a certain touch-space is effected, and\n what are the motives which lead to it. Mr. Hobhouse is content to take\n the identification as \u201cgiven in adult perception,\u201d but it seems to me\n to emerge from his own good account of the matter that it is the still\n more primitive apprehension of my own body as a felt unity upon which\n the synthesis between sight and touch spaces is based. If so, the\n ultimate source of the \u201cunity of substance\u201d must be sought deeper than\n Mr. Hobhouse is willing to go for it. And _quaere_, whether his\n account, if accepted as ultimate, would not lead to the identification\n of substance with space? For the difficulties which arise when you say\n the substance is the space and its filling of qualities, see\n _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 2, pp. 19, 20 (1st ed.).\n\nFootnote 87:\n\n _Monadology_, \u00a7\u00a7 8-16, 57-62.\n\nFootnote 88:\n\n This is true even where we merely count a number of qualitatively\n equivalent units in order to ascertain their sum. It is their positive\n character of being qualitatively equivalent which makes it permissible\n in this case to take any one of them indifferently as first, any other\n as second, etc. Whenever you apply the numerical series to the\n arrangement in order of the qualitatively dissimilar, the nature of\n your material as related to the character of your special interest in\n it decides for you what you shall call first, second, third, etc.\n\nFootnote 89:\n\n As to the possibility of relations which are in this sense external to\n their terms, see B. Russell, _The Philosophy of Leibniz_, p. 130, and\n the articles by the same writer in _Mind_ for January and July 1901.\n\nFootnote 90:\n\n See the elaborate discussion of the relational scheme implied in any\n assertion of difference in Royce, _The World and the Individual_,\n Second Series, lect 2.\n\nFootnote 91:\n\n Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 3. Compare also chap. 15,\n \u201cThought and Reality.\u201d\n\nFootnote 92:\n\n The reader who desires further knowledge of the researches in the\n theory of Numbers upon which Prof. Royce\u2019s doctrine is based, may\n profitably consult Dedekind, _Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen_, and\n Couturat, _L\u2019Infini Math\u00e9matique_.\n\nFootnote 93:\n\n Professor Royce\u2019s own illustration of the map of England executed upon\n a portion of the surface of the country is really a typical instance\n of a self-contradictory purpose. He argues that such a map, to be\n theoretically perfect, must contain a reduced facsimile of itself as\n part of the country mapped, and this again another, and so on\n indefinitely. But the whole force of the reasoning depends on\n overlooking the distinction between the surface of England as it is\n before the map is made, and the surface of England as altered by the\n presence of the map. Prof. Royce assumes that you set out to represent\n in the map a state of things which can in fact have no existence until\n after the map is made. The previous existence of the map at a certain\n spot is falsely taken to be one of the conditions to which the\n map-maker is to conform in executing it. Every one of the supposed\n \u201cmaps within the map\u201d will thus involve distortion and\n misrepresentation of the district it proposes to map. It is as if\n Hamlet had chosen \u201cHamlet\u201d as the subject of the \u201cplay within the\n play.\u201d The professor\u2019s illustration thus does less than justice to his\n theory.\n\nFootnote 94:\n\n The fundamental defect in Professor Royce\u2019s reasoning seems to me to\n lie in the tacit transition from the notion of an infinite _series_ to\n that of an infinite completed _sum_. Thus he speaks of the series of\n prime numbers as a \u201cwhole\u201d being present at once to the mind of God.\n But are the prime numbers, or any other infinite series, an actual sum\n at all? They are surely not proved to be so by the existence of\n general truths about any prime number.\n\nFootnote 95:\n\n See, _e.g._, Dedekind, _op. cit._, \u00a7 2: \u201cIt frequently happens that\n different things _a_, _b_, _c_ ... are apprehended upon whatsoever\n occasion under a common point of view, mentally put together, and it\n is then said that they form a _system_; the things _a_, _b_, _c_ ...\n are named the _elements_ of the system\u201d; and \u00a7 3 (definitions of\n _whole_ and _part_).\n\nFootnote 96:\n\n _Ante_, Bk. II. chap. 2, \u00a7 5.\n\nFootnote 97:\n\n It is no answer to this view to urge that as soon as the intellect\n undertakes to reflect upon and describe Reality it unavoidably does so\n in relational terms. For it is our contention that the same intellect\n which uses these relational methods sees _why_ they are inadequate,\n and to some extent at least how they are ultimately merged in a higher\n type of experience. Thus the systematic use of the intellect in\n Metaphysics itself leads to the conviction that the mere intellect is\n not the whole of Reality. Or, in still more paradoxical language, the\n highest truth for the mere intellect is the thought of Reality as an\n ordered system. But all such order is based in the end on the\n number-series with its category of whole and part, and cannot,\n therefore, be a perfectly adequate representation of a\n supra-relational Reality. Hence Truth, from its own nature, can never\n be quite the same thing as Reality.\n\nFootnote 98:\n\n Or does Dr. Stout merely mean that there may be a hat and a head, and\n also a relation of on and under (_e.g._, between the _hat_ and the\n _peg_), and yet my hat not be on my head? If this is his meaning, I\n reply we have not really got the _relation_ and its _terms_; if the\n hat is not on the head, hat and head are not terms in the relation at\n all. I do not see why, on his own principles, Dr. Stout should not add\n a fourth factor to his analysis, namely, qualified_ness_, or the fact\n that the qualities are there, and so on indefinitely.\n\nFootnote 99:\n\n If you consider the _lines_ _a_ and \u03b1, as Dr. Stout prefers to do, I\n should have thought two views possible. (_a_) There are not two lines\n at all, but one, the \u201cjunction\u201d at M being merely ideal. Then there\n remains nothing to connect and there is no relation of \u201cimmediate\n connection.\u201d Or (_b_), the junction may be taken as real, and then you\n have a perfectly ordinary case of relation, the terms being the\n terminated lines _a_ and \u03b1, and the relation being one of contact at\n M. On every ground (_a_) seems to me the right view, but it is\n incompatible with the reduction of continuity to \u201cimmediate\n connection.\u201d Thus the source of the difficulty is that (1) immediate\n connection can only hold between the immediately successive terms of a\n discontinuous series, and yet (2) _cannot_ hold between them precisely\n _because_ they are discontinuous.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n THE WORLD OF THINGS\u2014(2) CHANGE AND\n CAUSALITY\n\n\u00a7 1. The conception of things as interacting leads to the two problems\n of Change and Causality. The paradoxical character of change due to\n the fact that only what is permanent can change. \u00a7 2. Change is\n succession within an identity; this identity, like that of\n Substance, must be teleological, _i.e._ must be an identity of plan\n or end pervading the process of change. \u00a7 3. Thus all change falls\n under the logical category of Ground and Consequence, which becomes\n in its application to succession in time the Principle of Sufficient\n Reason. \u00a7 4. _Causality._ Cause\u2014in the modern popular and scientific\n sense\u2014means the ground of a change when taken to be completely\n contained in preceding changes. That every change has its complete\n ground in preceding changes is neither an axiom nor an empirically\n ascertained truth, but a postulate suggested by our practical needs.\n \u00a7 5. In the last resort the postulate cannot be true; the dependence\n between events cannot be one-sided. The real justification for our\n use of the postulate is its practical success. \u00a7 6. Origin of the\n conception of Cause anthropomorphic \u00a7 7. Puzzles about Causation.\n (1) _Continuity._ Causation must be continuous, and yet in a\n continuous process there can be no distinction of cause from effect.\n Cause must be and yet cannot be prior in time to effect. \u00a7 8. (2)\n _The indefinite regress_ in causation. \u00a7 9. (3) _Plurality of\n Causes._ Plurality of Causes is ultimately a logical contradiction,\n but in any form in which the causal postulate is of practical use it\n must recognise plurality. \u00a710. The \u201cnecessity\u201d of the causal\n relation psychological and subjective. \u00a711. Immanent and Transeunt\n Causality: Consistent Pluralism must deny transeunt Causation; but\n cannot do so successfully, \u00a712. Both transeunt and immanent\n Causality are ultimately appearance.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The fourth of the features which characterise the pre-scientific\nview of the world we found to be the belief that things act and are\nacted upon by one another. The problems to which this belief gives rise\nare so vast, and have been historically of such significance for\nMetaphysics, that they will require a separate chapter for their\ndiscussion. In the conception of the interaction of things as it exists\nfor the na\u00efve pre-scientific mind, we may distinguish at least two\naspects. There is (1) the belief that things _change_, that within the\nunity of the one thing there is a succession of different states; and\n(2) the belief that the changes of state of various things are so\ninter-connected that the changes in one thing serve as occasions for\ndefinite changes in other things. We thus have to discuss, first, the\ngeneral notion of change as an inseparable aspect of the being of\nthings, and next the concept of systematic inter-connection between the\nchanges of state of different things.\n\n(_a_) _Change._ The problem presented by the apparently unceasing\nmutability of existence is one of the earliest as well as one of the\nmost persistent in the whole range of Philosophy. In itself it might\nseem that the successive presentation in time of various states is\nneither more nor less noteworthy a feature of the world of experience\nthan the simultaneous presentation of a like variety, but the problem of\nmutability has always appealed with special force to the human\nimagination from its intimate connection with our personal hopes and\nfears, ambitions and disappointments. Tempora mutantur, _nos_ et mutamur\nin illis; there is the secret of the persistence with which our\nphilosophic thought has from the first revolved round this special\nproblem. There, too, we may find a pregnant hint of the central paradox\nimplied in all mutability\u2014namely, that only the identical and permanent\ncan change. It is because the self which changes with the flux of time\nand circumstance is still in some measure the same old self that we feel\nits changes to be so replete with matter for exultation and despair.\nWere we completely new-made with each successive change in our self,\nthere would no longer be ground for joy in transition to the better or\ngrief at alteration for the worse.\n\nThe thought that only what is permanent can change has affected\nPhilosophy in different ways at different periods of its history. At the\nvery dawn of Greek Philosophy it was the guiding principle of the Ionian\nphysicists who sought to comprehend the apparent variety of successive\nphenomena as the transformations of a single bodily reality. As the\ndifficulties inherent in such a materialistic Monism became more\napparent, the felt necessity of ascribing unity of some kind to\nexistence led Parmenides and his Eleatic successors to the extreme view\nthat change, being impossible in a permanent homogeneous bodily reality,\nmust be a mere illusion of our deceptive senses. While yet again the\nlater Ionian physicists, and their Sicilian counterpart Empedocles,\nsought to reconcile the apparent mutability of things with the criticism\nof Parmenides by the theory that what appears to the senses as\nqualitative change is in reality the mere regrouping in space of\nqualitatively unalterable \u201celements\u201d or \u201catoms\u201d\u2014\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03bc\u03b9\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\nAt a more developed stage of Hellenic thought, the necessity of taking\nsome account of the mutability as well as of the permanence of existence\nimpelled Plato to draw the momentous distinction between two worlds or\norders of being\u2014the real, with its eternal unvarying self-identity, and\nthe merely apparent, where all is change, confusion, and instability. In\nspite of Plato\u2019s manifest failure to make it intelligible how these two\norders, the eternal and the temporal, are ultimately connected, this\ndistinction in one form or another has continued ever since to haunt all\nsubsequent metaphysical construction. Even our modern scientific\nMaterialism, with its loudly avowed scorn for all merely metaphysical\nquestions, shows by its constant endeavour to reduce all material\nexistence to a succession of changes in a homogeneous medium, both the\npersistence with which the intellect demands a permanent background for\nchange, and the difficulty of finding logical satisfaction for the\ndemand.\n\nYet there have not been wanting attempts to get rid of the paradox by\ndenying its truth. As the Eleatics sought to escape it by reducing\nchange itself to a baseless illusion, so some at least of the disciples\nof Heracleitus seem to have evaded it by refusing to admit any permanent\nidentity in the changeable, and they have not been entirely without\nimitators in the modern world. Incessant change without underlying unity\nhas had its defenders in the history of Metaphysics, though they have\nnot been numerous, and we must therefore briefly consider what can be\nurged for and against such a concept. Apart from the general difficulty\nof seeing how what changes can at the same time be permanently identical\nwith itself, the only special argument in favour of the doctrine that\nonly incessant change is real seems to be the appeal to direct\nexperience. In any actual experience, it is contended, however\ncontracted its limits, we are always presented with the fact of change\nand transition; we never apprehend an absolutely unchanging content.\nEven where the object before us exhibits no succession, self-examination\nwill always detect at least alternating tension and relaxation of\nattention with the accompanying fluctuations of bodily sensation.\n\nNow there can, of course, be no gainsaying these facts of experience,\nbut the conclusion based on them evidently goes much further than the\npremisses warrant. If experience never gives us mere persistence of an\nunchanging content, neither does it ever give us mere change without\npersistence. What we actually experience always exhibits the two aspects\nof identity and transition together. Usually there will be, side by side\nwith the elements which sensibly change in the course of the experience,\nothers which remain sensibly constant throughout it. And even when,\nthrough inattention, we fail to detect these constant elements, the\nsuccessive states of the changing content itself are not merely\nmomentary; each has its own sensible duration through which it retains\nits character without perceptible changes. Experience thus entirely\nfails to substantiate the notion of mere change apart from a background\nof permanent identity.\n\nThe positive disproof of the notion must, however, be found in its own\ninherent absurdity. Change by itself, apart from a background of\nidentity, is impossible for the reason that where there is no underlying\nidentity there is nothing to change. All change must be change of and in\nsome thing. A mere succession of entirely disconnected contents held\ntogether by no common permanent nature persisting in spite of the\ntransition, would not be change at all. If I simply have before me first\nA and then B, A and B being absolutely devoid of any point of community,\nthere is no sense in saying that I have apprehended a process of change.\nThe change has been at most a change in myself as I passed from the\nstate of perceiving A to the state of perceiving B, and this subjective\ntransition again can only be called change on the assumption that the I\nwho am qualified first by the perception of A and its various emotional\nand other accompaniments, and then by that of B and its accompaniments,\nam the same. And where you have not merely a change of perception but an\nactual perception of change, the case is even clearer. What we perceive\nin such a case is \u201cA changing into B,\u201d the two successive states A and B\nbeing held together by the fact that they are successive states of some\nmore permanent unity [gamma]. Apart from the presence of this identical\n[gamma] in both the earlier and later stages of the process, there would\nbe no meaning in speaking of it as one of change.\n\n\u00a7 2. Change, then, may be defined as succession within an identity, the\nidentity being as essential to the character of the process as the\nsuccession. In what way, then, must we think of this identity or common\nnature which is present throughout the whole succession of changes? It\nshould be clear that this question\u2014how that which changes can be\npermanent?\u2014is simply our old problem of quality and substance, how the\nmany states can belong to one thing, considered with special reference\nto the case of states which form a succession in time. Thus, whatever is\nthe true nature of the unity to which the many states of one thing\nbelong, will also be the true nature of the identity which connects the\nsuccessive stages of a process of change.\n\nNow we have already seen in what the unity to which the many states\nbelong must be taken to consist. We found that this unity is essentially\nteleological; that group of states, we saw, is one thing which functions\nas one in regard to an end or interest, or, as we may also say, is the\nembodiment of coherent structure. The same is true of the process of\nchange. The earlier and later stages of the process are differences in\nan identity precisely because they constitute one process. And a process\nis one when it is the systematic realisation of a single coherent end.\nTo be one process means to be the systematic expression in a succession\nof stages of a single coherent plan or law. The succession of stages is\nthus welded into a unity by the singleness of the plan or law which they\nembody, and it is this systematic connection of each stage with all the\nrest which we express by saying that whatever changes possesses an\nunderlying permanent identity of character. It would amount to precisely\nthe same thing if we said the successive states of anything that changes\nform a connected system.\n\nWe must be careful here, as we were in dealing with the problem of\nSubstance, not to be misled by taking symbolic aids to imagination for\nphilosophical truths. Just as it is easy to imagine the \u201csubstance\u201d of\nthings as a sort of material substratum, it is easy to imagine the\nidentity which pervades all changes as that of a number of pieces of\nmatter, and to think of the changes as constituted by their motion\nthrough space. But such a representation must not be taken for anything\nmore than an aid to imagination. It helps us to make a mental diagram,\nbut it throws absolutely no light upon the real nature of the connection\nbetween the identity and the succession. For the same problem breaks out\nwithin each of the \u201cself-identical\u201d pieces of matter; we have to say\nwhat we mean by calling it one and the same throughout the series of its\nchanging positions, and the necessity of answering this question shows\nus at once that the identity of a material particle throughout its\nmotion is only one _case_ of that identity pervading succession which\nbelongs to all change, and in no sense affords any explanation of the\nprinciple it illustrates.[100] As a recent writer puts it, \u201cit seems to\nbe a deeply rooted infirmity of the human mind ... that it can hardly\nconceive activities of any sort apart from material bases, ... through\nhabitually seeking to represent all phenomena in mechanical terms, in\nterms of the motion of little bits of matter, many of us have come to\nbelieve that in so doing we describe the actual events underlying\nphenomena.\u201d[101] This \u201cdisease of the intellect,\u201d as the same writer\naptly calls it, is nowhere more insidious than where we are dealing with\nthe problem of Change.\n\nChange, then, involves two aspects. It is a succession of events in\ntime, and these events are connected by a systematic unity in such a way\nthat they form the expression of a plan or law of structure. The series\nof successive states which make up the history of a thing are the\nexpression of the thing\u2019s nature or structure. To understand the thing\u2019s\nstructure is to possess the key to the succession of its states, to know\non what principle each gives way to its successor. And similarly, to\nhave complete insight into the nature or structure of Reality as a whole\nwould be to understand the principles according to which every\ntransitory event in the history of the Universe, regarded as a series of\nevents in time, is followed by its own special successor.\n\nIt is evident that, in proportion as our knowledge of any thing or\nsystem of things approaches this insight into the laws of its structure,\nthe processes of change acquire a new character for us. They lose their\nappearance of paradox, and tend to become the self-evident expression of\nthe identity which is their underlying principle. Change, once reduced\nto law and apprehended as the embodiment in succession of a principle we\nunderstand, is no longer change as an unintelligible mystery. We should\nbear this in mind when we reflect on the doctrine of Plato that the\nphysical world must be unreal because the scene of incessant change.\nSuch a view is only to be understood by remembering that before the\ninvention of the mathematical methods which have enabled us with such\nconspicuous success to reduce physical phenomena to orderly sequence\naccording to law, the physical world necessarily appeared to the\nphilosopher a scene of _arbitrary_ change following no recognisable\nprinciple. Change, so far as understood in the light of its principle,\nhas already ceased to be mere change.[102]\n\n\u00a7 3. _Ground and Consequence._ In the technical language of Logic, the\nunderlying principle of any system is called its _Ground_, the detail in\nwhich the principle finds systematic expression is called its\n_Consequence_. Ground and Consequence are thus one and the same\nsystematic whole, only considered from two different points of view. The\nGround is the pervading common nature of the system, thought of as an\nidentity pervading and determining the character of its detail; the\nConsequence is the same system, looked at from the point of view of the\ndetail, as a plurality of differences pervaded and determined by an\nidentical principle. The understanding of a process of change thus\nclearly consists in bringing it under the principle of Ground and\nConsequence. In so far as we are successful in detecting a principle in\nthe apparently arbitrary succession of events, these events become for\nus a system with a common principle of structure for its Ground, and a\nplurality of successive states as its Consequence.\n\nChange is not, however, the only instance of the principle of Ground and\nConsequence. These two aspects may also be found in systematic wholes\nwhich contain no element of succession in time, _e.g._ in a body of\nlogical deductions from a few fundamental premisses. The special\npeculiarity of the case of Change is that it is the principle of Ground\nand Consequence as applied to a material which is successive _in time_.\nAs thus applied, the principle has received the special name of the\n_Principle of Sufficient Reason_, and may be formulated thus: _Nothing\ntakes place unless there is a sufficient reason why it should occur\nrather than not_. It is clear that such a proposition is a mere result\nof the application of the conception of Reality as a systematic whole to\nthe special case of the existence of the successive in time. It is\ntherefore simply one case of the fundamental axiom of all knowledge, the\naxiom that what truly exists is a coherent whole.[103] We must of course\nobserve that the principle does nothing to solve the perhaps insoluble\nproblem _why_ succession in time should be a feature of experience. This\nis a question which could only be answered if we could show that\nsuccession in time is a logical consequence of the existence of any\nmultiplicity forming a systematic whole. Until we are able to establish\nthis result, we have simply to accept succession as a datum of our\nexperience. (Yet for some light upon the problem, see _infra_, Bk. III\nchap. 4, \u00a7 9)\n\n\u00a7 4. _Causality._ So far we have said nothing of a concept which is much\nmore familiar in the popular treatment of the problem of Change than\nthat of Ground and Consequence, the concept of _Cause_. In proceeding to\ndiscuss this concept, it is necessary in the first place to explain\nwhich of the numerous senses of the word we are taking for examination.\nThere was an old scholastic distinction, which still reappears\noccasionally in philosophical writings, between the _Causa cognoscendi_,\nor reason for affirming a truth, and the _Causa existendi_ or _fiendi_,\nthe cause of the occurrence of an event. It is this latter meaning of\nthe word \u201ccause,\u201d the meaning which is predominant wherever the term is\nused in modern scientific language, that we shall have in view in the\nfollowing sections.\n\nThe _Causa cognoscendi_, or logical _reason_ for the affirmation of a\ntruth, as distinguished from the psychological factors which lead a\nparticular individual to affirm it, is clearly identical with what\nmodern logicians call the _Ground_. A given proposition must logically\nbe affirmed as true in the last resort, because it fills a place in a\nwider system of truths which no other proposition would fill. Thus,\n_e.g._, a special proposition about the relation between the sides and\nangles of a triangle is logically necessitated, because it is an\nintegral element in the development of a system of geometrical ideas\nwhich repose as a whole upon certain fundamental assumptions as to the\ncharacter of spatial order. The original presuppositions cannot be\nworked out to their logical consequence in a body of internally coherent\ngeometrical notions unless the proposition in question is included in\nthat body. And reciprocally, the logical justification for regarding\nthese presuppositions rather than any others as sound, lies in the fact\nthat they yield a body of internally consistent consequences.\nIncidentally, we see by means of this illustration that Ground and\nConsequence are mutually convertible, which is what we might have\ninferred from the way in which we defined them as mutually complementary\naspects of a single systematic whole.\n\nWhat we are concerned with in the everyday and scientific treatment of\nCausation, is not this purely logical relation of Ground and\nConsequence, but something partly identical with it, partly different.\nThe _Causa fiendi_ has no significance except in connection with\noccurrences or events in time, and may roughly be said to correspond\nwith what Aristotle denotes the \u201cSource of Change\u201d\u2014\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 or \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f21 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u2014and his medi\u00e6val followers named the Efficient Cause. Cause,\nin the popular sense of the word, denotes the attempt to carry out the\nprinciple of the interconnection of events in a system along special\nlines by regarding every event as completely determined by conditions\nwhich are themselves previous events. Widely as the popular and the\nscientific uses of the term \u201ccause\u201d diverge in minor respects, they\nagree in the essential point. That every event has its cause is\nunderstood, both in everyday life and in the sciences which use the\nconcept of causation, to mean that the occurrence and the character of\nevery event in the time-series is completely determined by preceding\nevents. In more technical language, causation for everyday thought and\nfor the sciences means _one-sided dependence_ of the present on the\npast, and the future on the present.\n\nIt is, of course, obvious that the principle of Causation as thus\nunderstood is not a necessary logical deduction from the principle of\nGround and Consequence. It might be the case that all occurrences form a\ncoherent plan or system, such that if you once grasped the principle of\nthe system you could infer from it what precise occurrence must take\nplace at any one moment, and yet it might be impossible to discover this\nprinciple by an examination of the course of events up to the present\nmoment. In other words, the principle of the systematic interconnection\nof events might be valid, and yet the events of the present might depend\non those which will succeed them in the future no less than on those\nwhich have preceded them in the past. In that case it would be\nimpossible with absolute logical certainty to infer what will occur at a\ngiven moment from the mere examination of what has preceded, _i.e._ the\nprinciple of Causation as used in the sciences would not be logically\nvalid.[104]\n\nCause, as currently understood, is thus identical not with the whole\ntrue logical ground, but with the ground so far as it can be discovered\nin the train of temporally antecedent circumstances, _i.e._ cause is\n_incomplete_ ground. This point is important, as it shows that the\nprinciple of Causation is not, like the principle of Sufficient Reason,\naxiomatic. It is no necessary logical consequence of the knowability or\nsystematic character of the Real that an event should be completely\ndetermined by temporally antecedent events; for anything that is implied\nin the systematic character of the Real, the event may be equally\ndependent on subsequent occurrences. Again, the principle of Causation\ncannot be empirically established by an appeal to the actual course of\nexperience. Actual experience is certainly not sufficient to show that\nevery event is absolutely determined by its antecedent conditions; at\nmost the success of our scientific hypotheses based upon the assumption\nof causality only avails to show that events may be inferred from their\nantecedents with sufficient accuracy to make the causal assumption\npractically useful.\n\nRegarded as a universal principle of scientific procedure, the causal\nassumption must be pronounced to be neither an axiom nor an empirical\ntruth but a _postulate_, in the strict sense of the word, _i.e._ an\nassumption which cannot be logically justified, but is made because of\nits practical value, and depends upon the success with which it can be\napplied for confirmation. In the sense that it is a postulate which\nexperience may confirm but cannot prove, it may properly be said to be\n_a priori_, but it is manifestly not _a priori_ in the more familiar\nKantian sense of the word. That is, it is not a necessary and\nindispensable axiom without which systematic knowledge would be\nimpossible. For, as we have already seen and shall see more fully in the\nimmediate sequel, it may not be, and indeed in the last resort cannot\nbe, true.\n\n\u00a7 5. This last statement will possibly appear startling to the reader\nwho is unacquainted with the history of metaphysical investigations into\nCausality. But it is easy to show that it is really the expression of an\nobvious truth. For the causal principle, as we have just seen, is an\nimperfect expression of the really axiomatic principle of Sufficient\nReason or Ground and Consequence. And it is readily seen that the\nexpression it gives to that principle, because imperfect, must be\npartially false. What the principle of Ground and Consequence says is,\nthat the whole of existence is a single coherent system in which every\npart is determined by the nature of the whole as revealed in the\ncomplete system. But if this is true, each constituent of the system can\nonly be completely determined by its connections with all the rest. No\nconstituent can be entirely determined by its relations to a lesser part\nof the whole system, in the way presupposed by the notion of one-sided\ncausal dependence. The \u201ccause\u201d must, if the principle of Ground and\nConsequence be valid, be determined by the \u201ceffect\u201d no less than the\n\u201ceffect\u201d by the \u201ccause.\u201d And therefore the causal postulate cannot be\nthe whole truth.\n\nHow this fatal logical defect in the principle of Causation makes itself\nfelt in the logic of the inductive sciences, and how logicians have\nsought without success to avoid it, we shall incidentally see as our\ndiscussion proceeds. At present we must be content to note that, owing\nto this flaw, Causation, wherever it is asserted, can only be Appearance\nand never complete Reality, and that no science which works with the\nconcepts of cause and effect can give us the highest truth. Of course,\nthe logical defects of the concept need not impair its practical\nusefulness. Though it can never, for the reason given already, be\nultimately true that any event is absolutely determined by antecedent\nevents, the assumption may be sufficiently near the truth to yield\nuseful deductions as to the course of occurrences, precisely as a\nmathematical approximation to the value of a surd quantity may, without\nbeing the exact truth, be close enough for practical use. Also, it might\nwell be the case that the causal postulate approximates more nearly to\nthe truth in some spheres of investigation than in others, a\nconsideration which is not without its bearing on the ethical problems\nof freedom and responsibility.\n\nIf we ask how the causal postulate, being as it must be only imperfectly\ntrue, comes to be made, the answer is obvious. The whole conception is\nanthropomorphic in origin, and owes its existence to our practical\nneeds. To take the latter point first, logically there is no better\nreason for treating an event as determined solely by antecedents, than\nfor treating it as solely determined by subsequent events. Yet when the\nlatter supposition is made, as it is by all believers in omens and\npresages, we all agree to condemn it as superstitious. Why is this? Two\nreasons may be assigned. (_a_) Even granting that an event may be\ndetermined by subsequent events, yet, as _we_ do not know what these\nevents are until after their occurrence, we should have no means of\ninferring by _what_ particular events yet to come any present event was\nconditioned, and thus should be thrown back upon mere unprincipled\nguess-work if we attempted to assign its, as yet future, conditions.\n\n(_b_) A more important consideration is that our search for causes is\nultimately derived from the search for _means_ to the practical\nrealisation of results in which we are interested. We desire to know the\nconditions of occurrences primarily, in order to produce those\noccurrences for ourselves by setting up their conditions. It is\ntherefore essential to us for our practical purposes to seek the\nconditions of an occurrence exclusively among its antecedents, and the\ncausal postulate which asserts that the complete conditions of the event\nare comprised somewhere in the series of antecedent events is thus the\nintellectual expression of the demand made by our practical needs upon\nReality. We postulate it because, unless the postulate is approximately\nrealised, we cannot intervene with success in the course of events. We\nrefuse, except as a pure speculation, to entertain the notion that an\nevent may be determined by subsequent as well as by antecedent events,\nbecause that notion leads to no practical rules for operation upon our\nenvironment.\n\n\u00a7 6. As might be expected of a postulate so obviously originated by our\npractical needs, the concept of cause on examination reveals its\nanthropomorphic character. This is particularly obvious when we consider\nthe concept of Causation as it figures in everyday unscientific thought.\nThe various scientific substitutes for the popular notion of cause all\nexhibit traces of the endeavour to purge the conception of its more\nanthropomorphic elements. In the popular use of the concept this\nanthropomorphism comes out most strikingly in two ways. (_a_) A cause,\nas popularly conceived, is always a person or thing, _i.e._ something we\ncan imagine as a whole, and into which we can mentally project a\nconscious life akin to our own. To the scientific mind it seems obvious\nthat causes and effects are alike _events_ and events only, but for\npopular thought, while the effect is always a quality or state (_e.g._,\ndeath, fever, etc.), the cause is regularly a thing or person (the\nbullet, the poison, the tropical sun, etc.).\n\n(_b_) Closely connected with this is the emphasis popular thought lays\nupon what it calls the _activity_ of the cause. The cause is never\nthought of as merely preceding the effect as an \u201cinseparable\nantecedent\u201d; it is supposed to _make_ the effect occur, to bring it\nabout by an exercise of activity. According to the most coherent\nexpositions of this type of thought, in causation one thing is always\n_active_ in producing a change in another thing which is _passive_. The\norigin of this notion is sufficiently obvious. As all philosophers since\nHume have recognised, the \u201cactivity\u201d of the cause results from the\nascription to it of the characteristic feeling of self-assertion and\nself-expansion which accompanies our own voluntary interference in the\ncourse of events. Similarly, the \u201cpassivity\u201d of the thing in which the\neffect is produced is only another name for the feeling of coercion and\nthwarted self-assertion which arises in us when the course of nature or\nthe behaviour of our fellows represses our voluntary execution of our\ndesigns.\n\nScience, in its attempt to extend the concept of causal determination\nover the whole domain of existence, has naturally felt these\nanthropomorphic implications as obstacles. From the effort to expel them\narises what we may call the common scientific view of causation, as\nordinarily adopted for the purposes of experimental investigation and\nformulated in the works of inductive logicians. The concept of a thing,\nexcept as the mode of interconnection of states, being unnecessary for\nthe sciences which aim simply at the reduction of the sequence of\noccurrences to order, the notion of causation as a transaction between\ntwo things is replaced in the experimental sciences by the conception of\nit as merely the determination of an event by antecedent events.\nSimilarly, with the disappearance of things as the vehicles of causal\nprocesses falls the whole distinction between an active and a passive\nfactor. As it becomes more and more apparent that the antecedent events\nwhich condition an occurrence are a complex plurality and include states\nof what is popularly called the thing acted upon as well as processes in\nthe so-called agent, science substitutes for the distinction between\nagent and patient the concept of a system of reciprocally dependent\ninteracting factors. These two substitutions give us the current\nscientific conception of a cause as the \u201ctotality of the conditions\u201d in\nthe presence of which an event occurs, and in the absence of any member\nof which it does not occur. More briefly, causation in the current\nscientific sense means sequence under definitely known conditions.\n\nIndispensable as this notion of the determination of every event by a\ndefinite collection of antecedents and by nothing else is for practice,\nregarded as a logical formulation of the principle of the systematic\nunity of existence, it is open to grave objections, most of which will\nbe found to have made themselves felt in the logic of the inductive\nsciences quite independently of conscious metaphysical analysis. In\ndealing with these difficulties, we shall find that their general effect\nis to place us in the following dilemma. If we wish to state the causal\nprinciple in such a way as to avoid manifest speculative falsehood, we\nfind that it has to be modified until it becomes identical with the\nprinciple of Ground and Consequence in its most universal form, but as\nthus modified it is no longer of any service for the purposes of the\nexperimental sciences. You seem driven to take it either in a form in\nwhich it is true but practically useless, or in one in which it is\nuseful but not true. To illustrate the way in which this dilemma arises,\nwe may examine three of the main problems which have actually been\ncreated by the scientific use of the principle,\u2014(_a_) the puzzle of\ncontinuity; (_b_) the puzzle of the indefinite regress, (_c_) the puzzle\nof the plurality of causes.\n\n\u00a7 7. (_a_) _The Puzzle of Continuity._ Continuity is, strictly speaking,\na property of certain series, and may be defined for purposes of\nreference much as follows. A series is continuous when any term divides\nthe whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which\nbetween them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term\nwhich so divides the series is itself a term of the series. From this\nsecond condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate\nterms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a\ncontinuous series; no term of the series has a _next_ term. This is the\npeculiarity of the continuous with which we shall be specially\nconcerned. Thus the series of points on a straight line is continuous\nbecause (1) any point P on the line divides it into two collections of\npoints in such a way that every point of the one is to the left of every\npoint of the other, and every point of the second to the right of every\npoint of the former; and (2) every point which divides the line in this\nway is a point on the line. Again, the whole series of real numbers is\ncontinuous for the same reason. Every member of the number-series\ndivides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than\nevery number of the other, and every number which thus divides the\nseries is itself a term of the number-series.\n\nBut the series of _rational_ real numbers is not continuous, because it\ncan be divided into mutually exclusive classes by terms which are not\nthemselves members of the series. (_E.g._ \u221a2 is not a member of the\nseries of rational numbers, but we can exhaustively divide all rational\nnumbers into the two mutually exclusive classes, rational numbers _less_\nthan \u221a2 and rational numbers _not less_ than \u221a2.)[105] From the\ncontinuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other\nseries which corresponds point for point with the terms of the\nnumber-series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the\nsuccessive parts of time. Every moment of time divides the whole series\nof moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments _before_\nitself and the moments which are _not before_ itself. And whatever thus\ndivides the time-series is itself a moment in that series. Hence from\nthe continuity of the time-series it follows that any puzzles created by\nthis property of continuousness will apply to the case of Causation. In\nwhat follows I shall not discuss the general problem of the continuous,\na problem which requires special mathematical equipment for its\nefficient handling, but shall confine myself to the difficulties\nintroduced by continuity into the scientific concept of causal relation.\n\nWe may conveniently attack the problem by taking it up in the form in\nwhich Hume bequeathed it to modern science. As any careful reader of\nHume must perceive, Hume\u2019s whole doctrine of Causation is based on the\nassumption that the causal process is not continuous. Experience is\nsupposed by him to come to us not in an unbroken stream, but in isolated\nseparate pieces which we subsequently proceed to link together\nartificially by the notion of Causation. We are supposed to begin by\nobserving the sequence of an event B on a previous distinct event A, and\nthe problem of Causation thus becomes that of discovering the nature of\nthe link by which the originally distinct A and B are connected in our\nscientific thought. In more technical language, Hume thought of the\nseries of events as one in which every member has a next term, and this\nway of conceiving it has coloured the whole subsequent treatment of\nCausation by the inductive logicians who have commonly got their\nmetaphysical doctrines from Hume.\n\nNow, recent Psychology, in deserting the old notion of the atomic\nsensation for that of the \u201cstream of consciousness,\u201d has completely\ndestroyed the supposed empirical foundation for this Humian theory of\nthe discontinuity of the course of events. The real problem for the\ninductive logician we can now see to be not to discover the link by\nwhich an originally separate A and B have got joined together in\nthought, but to find the source of the distinction we habitually draw\nwithin what comes to us as one continuous process between an earlier\nstage A which we call cause, and a later stage B which we call effect.\nWe are not, however, concerned here with the psychological weakness of\nHume\u2019s doctrine, but with the logical difficulty to which it gives rise.\n\nWe may state the difficulty thus: (1) Causation cannot possibly be\nthought of as discontinuous, _i.e._ as the sequence of one distinct\nevent upon an assemblage of other events without gross contradiction. To\nthink of it as discontinuous, we must conceive the _cause_ A to exist\nfirst in its completeness, and then to be suddenly followed by the\neffect B. (That the cause A consists of a number of conditions, _a_,\n_b_, _c_ ... which themselves come into existence successively, and that\nA is not there until the last of these conditions has been realised,\nmakes no difference to the principle.) Now this seems to be what is\nactually implied by the language of those inductive logicians who insist\nthat in all Causation the cause must _precede_ the effect. But what can\nsuch precedence mean? It can only mean that after the complete\nrealisation of the conditions included in the cause A, there must\nintervene a space of empty time _before_ the effect B enters on the\nscene. However brief and \u201cmomentary\u201d you take this gap in the stream of\nevents to be, the gap must be there if your language about the cause as\nbeing _before_ the effect is to have any meaning. For if there is no\nsuch gap, and the entrance of B is simultaneous with the complete\nrealisation of its conditions A, it is no longer true to say that the\ncause A is _before_ the effect B. A does not exist as A until _a_, _b_,\n_c_ ... are all present, and as soon as they are present B is present\ntoo. And thus the relation between A and B is not that of the sequence\nof a later event on an earlier. They are actually _together_.\n\nIn fact, the doctrine that the cause precedes the effect rests upon the\nnotion that the time-series is one in which each member has a next term.\nAnd this seems inconceivable. For not only can you subdivide any finite\ntime, however small, into two mutually exclusive parts, but the point at\nwhich the division is effected is itself a moment in the time-series\nlying _between_ the beginning and the end of the original interval. Time\ntherefore must be continuous, and if causation is not equally\ncontinuous, we must suppose that gaps of empty time are what separate\nthe first event, the cause, from the subsequent event, the effect. Yet\n_if_ this could be regarded as a defensible doctrine on other grounds,\nit would then follow that the assemblage of events A is not the totality\nof conditions requisite for the occurrence of B. The \u201ctotality of\nconditions,\u201d _i.e._ the _cause_ as previously defined, would be the\nevents A _plus_ a certain lapse of empty time.[106] And so the cause\nwould once more turn out not to precede the effect, or we should have to\nsuppose the end of the interval of empty time included in it as\nseparated from the beginning of B by a second lapse, and so on\nindefinitely.\n\n(2) These difficulties, in a more or less clearly apprehended form, have\nled many recent writers on inductive Logic to modify the definition\nwhich was still satisfactory to Mill. Cause and effect, we are now told,\nare not distinct events, but earlier and later stages in a continuous\nprocess. The real business of science is not to discover \u201claws of\nconnection\u201d between distinct events or \u201cphenomena,\u201d but to invent\ngeneral mathematical formulae by the aid of which we may trace the\ncourse of continuous processes. The discovery of causes, from this point\nof view, is reduced to the construction of formul\u00e6 which exhibit some\nquantity as a function of a time-variable. Fully worked out, this view\nof the nature of experimental science leads to the so-called\n\u201cdescriptive\u201d ideal of scientific explanation, advocated by such eminent\nthinkers as Kirchhoff, Mach, and Ostwald among physicists, and, with\nvarious modifications, Avenarius, M\u00fcnsterberg, Royce, and James Ward\namong recent philosophers. According to this doctrine, the ultimate\nideal of science, or at any rate of physical science, is simply the\ndescription of the course of events by the aid of the fewest and\nsimplest general formul\u00e6. _Why_ things happen as they do, it is now\nsaid, is no proper question for science; its sole business is to enable\nus to calculate _how_ they will happen. With the general epistemological\nquestions raised by this doctrine we must deal later in our third and\nfourth books. At present we are concerned only with its bearing on the\nnotion of Causal Relation.[107]\n\nThe important point for our immediate purpose is that the reduction of\nall events to continuous processes really does away with Causation\naltogether, as is recognised by those adherents of the theory who openly\npropose to expel the word \u201ccause\u201d from the language of science.[108] For\nin a continuous process it is purely arbitrary where we shall mentally\ndraw the dividing line which is to mark the boundary between the\n\u201cearlier\u201d and the \u201clater\u201d stage. What the descriptive formula, with the\naid of which we trace the course of the process by giving a series of\nsuccessive values to our time-variable presents, is not the \u201ccause\u201d of\nthe process but the \u201claw\u201d of it. Instead of looking upon the later\nstages of the process as determined by the earlier, we are now looking\nupon the process as a whole as the expression in detail of a single\nprinciple. We have, in fact, abandoned the category of cause and effect\nfor that of Ground and Consequence. We are seeking the ground of the\nwhole process not in a set of temporally preceding events, but in its\nown pervading principle.\n\nFrom this point of view the one-sided dependence of effect on cause,\ncharacteristic of the causal relation, disappears. Whether we shall\ninfer the later stages of the process from the earlier, or the earlier\nfrom the later, depends simply upon our choice of positive or negative\nvalues for our time-variable. For \u201cdescriptive\u201d science, what we\nsuggested at first as a paradoxical possibility is the actual fact. The\npast is determined by the future in precisely the same sense in which\nthe future is determined by the past, namely, that as both are stages of\nthe same continuous process, if once you know the principle of the\nprocess you can start equally well with either and reason to the\nother.[109] Thus, within the limits of experimental science itself, the\nconception of causal relation has given way to the conception of events\nas logically connected into a system in virtue of their underlying\nground or principle. For practical purposes experimental science has, in\nits application of this conception, to be guided by two postulates,\nneither of which can be metaphysically justified. It has to assume (_a_)\nthat the course of events is composed of a plurality of more or less\nindependent continuous processes, each of which has its own ground\nwithin itself, at least to such an extent as to be capable of being\ntreated for our purpose as independent of others; (_b_) that the\nunderlying ground or grounds of all events can be adequately expressed\nin terms of mathematical symbolism.\n\nAs to the first of these points, our discussion of the unity of Reality\nconvinced us that there must in the end be a single ground of all\nexistence, and therefore the complete reason of any partial process\ncannot be entirely within itself. The independence of the various\nprocesses must be relative, and even the belief that it is sufficient to\nenable us to treat them for our own special purposes as self-contained\nand independent, must be a postulate prompted by our practical needs,\nand justified in the end by its success. The second point will engage\nour attention more fully in subsequent chapters. At present one remark\nupon it must suffice. The calculability of the laws of continuous\nprocesses depends upon our ability to reduce them to numerical and\nquantitative forms. Wherever we have the appearance, at any stage in a\nprocess, of a new quality, we have in fact an apparent breach of\ncontinuity, and it ceases to be in our power to exhibit the new stage of\nthe process as a mere transformation of what was already expressed in\nformer stages. Hence the success of natural science in reducing all\nsequences of events to continuous processes depends upon the assumption\nthat we can establish equations between qualitatively different\nmagnitudes.\n\nNow this assumption is even more evidently than the preceding a\npostulate. We have to make it, if we are to calculate the course of\nevents, but we have no guarantee that it will succeed beyond the fact of\nits actual success. If it fails anywhere, as we shall hereafter contend\nthat it does in the critical case of the sequence of psychical on\nphysical events, and _vice vers\u00e2_, two results will follow, one\npractical, the other speculative. The practical consequence of the\nfailure is that in such cases we cannot apply the concept of continuous\nprocess, and have to fall back upon the cruder notion of causal\nsequence. Thus, in attempting to create a science of Psychophysics we\ncannot hope to exhibit the whole of a psychophysical process as the\ncontinuous realisation of a single principle; we must be content to\nestablish laws of causal connection between the physical and the\npsychical sides of the process. The speculative consequence is that the\nprinciple of Ground and Consequence is only imperfectly represented by\nthe conception of a continuous process, inasmuch as that conception is\nonly applicable where qualitative differences within the consequences of\na single ground can be disregarded. This hint will prepare us for\nsubsequent criticism of the concept of continuity when we come to deal\nwith the metaphysics of the time-process.[110]\n\n#\u00a7 8 (_b_). _The Indefinite Regress._ The defects of the causal\npostulate as a principle of explanation may also be exhibited by showing\nthe double way in which it leads to the indefinite regress. The\nindefinite regress in the causal series is an inevitable consequence of\nthe structure of time, and, as we please, may be detected both outside\nand inside any causal relation of two events, or two stages of a\ncontinuous process. For it follows from the structure of the time-series\n(_a_) that there are an indefinite number of terms of the series between\nany two members, between which there is a finite interval, and (_b_)\nthat there is also an indefinite number of terms before or after any\ngiven member of the series. Like the series of real numbers, the\ntime-series, because it satisfies the definition of a continuous\ninfinite series, can have neither a first nor a last term, nor can any\nmember of it have a next term.[111] Applying this to the case of\nCausation, we may reason as follows:\u2014\n\n(1) The same reasons which lead us to demand a cause A for any event B,\nand to find that cause in an assemblage of antecedent events, require\nthat A should be similarly determined by another assemblage of\nantecedent events, and that this cause of A should itself have its own\nantecedent cause, and so on indefinitely. Thus the causal principle,\nlogically applied, never yields an intelligible explanation of any\nevent. Instead of exhibiting the transition A-B as the logical\nexpression of a coherent principle, it refers us for the explanation of\nthis transition to a previous instance of the same kind of transition,\nand then to another, and so forth without end. But it is impossible that\nwhat is not intelligible in one instance should become intelligible by\nthe mere multiplication of similar unintelligibilities.\n\n(2) Similarly if we look within the transition A-B. This transition\nbeing continuous must have its intermediate stages. A becomes B because\nit has already become C, and the transition A-C-B is again \u201cexplained\u201d\nby showing that A became D which became C which became E which became B.\nAnd each of the stages A-D, D-C, C-E, E-B can be once more submitted to\nthe same sort of analysis. But in all this interpolation of intermediate\nstages there is nothing to show the nature of the common principle in\nvirtue of which the stages form a single process. We are, in fact,\ntrying to do what we try to do wherever we establish a relation between\nterms, to answer a question by repeating it. And we decided at the end\nof our last chapter that this kind of repetition is never an answer to\nany question. How entirely it fails to answer the question we ask\nwhenever we look for a cause is obvious. We want to know why B exists,\nand we are told that B exists because it is determined by the previous\nexistence of A. But why does A exist? Because of the previous existence\nof C. And so ultimately the existence of everything depends on the\nexistence of something else, and this again on the existence of still\nsomething else. If this is so, since nothing can exist until its cause\nhas existed, and the cause again not until its cause has existed, then,\nas this unending series has no first term, nothing can ever come into\nexistence at all. This inevitable introduction of the indefinite regress\nwhenever we try to think out the causal principle to its logical\nconsequences, has sometimes been treated as proving the inherent\ndefectiveness of the human mind. What it proves rather is that Causality\nis not a proper formulation of the real principle of the unity of all\nexperience.\n\nA word may be said about the attempts which philosophers have made to\nextricate themselves from the difficulty without giving up Causality as\nan ultimate principle of explanation. The least philosophical method of\nescape is that of arbitrarily postulating a first cause with no\npreceding cause, which amounts to the same thing as a beginning of\nexistence or a first moment of time. This way out of the difficulty\nobviously amounts to an arbitrary desertion of the causal principle at\nthe point where it becomes inconvenient to remain faithful to it.\nWhatever the nature of the event you pitch upon as your \u201cfirst cause,\u201d\nthe causal principle, if logically valid at all, is just as applicable\nhere as anywhere else Your \u201cfirst cause\u201d must have had a previous cause,\nor else the whole causal scheme must be, as we have contended that it\nis, the illogical and imperfect perversion of a genuine principle of\nsystematic connection, useful and indeed indispensable in practice, but\nquite indefensible in theory.\n\nIt would not help you out of the difficulty to distinguish between a\nfirst event and a first moment of time, by postulating a first cause\nwith an indefinite lapse of empty time before it. For the causal\nprinciple would then require you to look for the determining conditions\nof the first event in the preceding lapse of empty time. But this lapse,\nbecause merely empty, cannot contain the determining conditions for any\nspecial occurrence in preference to others. This is why the conception\nof a beginning of the causal series in time, with an empty lapse before\nit, has always led to the insoluble riddle, \u201cWhy did God create the\nworld when He did, rather than at some other point of time?\u201d\n\nNor can the difficulty be escaped by taking refuge in the continuity of\nthe stream of events. For (1) as we have seen, the recognition of events\nas continuous processes necessarily leads to the surrender of the causal\nprinciple as inadequate to express the real connection of facts.\nCausality, as a special form of the category of Ground and Consequence,\nmust stand or fall with the view of occurrences as sequences of\ndiscontinuous events. And (2) even apart from this consideration, the\nappeal to continuity can at best only be worked as a rejoinder to the\ninternal analysis of a sequence into an infinite process. When it is\nurged that, on the causal principle, there must be an infinite number of\nintermediate stages between the cause and the effect in any given case,\nit is possible to retort that the stages are not \u201creally\u201d distinct, but\nonly distinguished by an artificial abstraction, that the process is\nactually one and continuous, and therefore does not involve an infinite\nregress, except for the logician who erroneously construes it as\ndiscontinuous. But with the external regress _in indefinitum_ you cannot\ndeal in this way. The absence of a beginning follows as necessarily from\nthe principle of explaining the later stages of a continuous process as\nconditioned by the earlier, as it does when the stages are taken to be\ndistinct events. (This is easily seen from the simple consideration that\nthe time-variable in your formula for the successive stages of the\nprocess may have an unlimited range of possible values from -[infinity]\nto +[infinity].)\n\nIn short, whether the succession of events be taken as continuous or\nnot, the attempt to translate the axiom that whatever happens has its\nground in the nature of the whole system to which it belongs, into the\ndoctrine that the posterior in time is completely determined by and\ndependent on the prior, leads straight to the infinite regress. And, as\nwe said in our last chapter, the occurrence of the infinite regress is\nalways a sign that there is imperfection somewhere in the thought which\nsets it up. For it always implies the formal contradiction of the actual\nsummation by successive increments of an infinite series. Further\nconsiderations on this point may be deferred till we come to treat of\nthe continuity of time.[112]\n\n\u00a7 9 (_c_). _The Plurality of Causes._ The indefinite regress may be\nshown to be inherent in Causation by a different line of argument,\nwithout appealing to the principle of the continuity of time. As the\nreader is doubtless aware, it was a favourite doctrine of John Stuart\nMill, that whereas the same cause is always followed by the same\neffect\u2014in the absence of counteracting circumstances\u2014the same effect\nneed not be preceded by the same cause. An effect may be \u201cproduced\u201d on\ndifferent occasions by entirely different sets of antecedents. Thus\ndeath may be due either to disease or to violence, and both the disease\nand the violence may have very different forms, yet the result is the\nsame, namely, death. Heat may ensue from friction, percussion, chemical\ncombination, and so forth. This doctrine of the Plurality of Causes is\nan obvious result of generalisation from the important practical\nconsideration that different means will often lead us to the same end,\nso that where we cannot employ one we can often fall back on another.\n\nMill\u2019s critics have not failed to point out that his doctrine is based\non the rather illogical combination of a concrete cause with an abstract\neffect. He considers the \u201ceffect\u201d in its utmost generality simply as a\nstate or quality, _e.g._, \u201cheat,\u201d \u201cdeath,\u201d and rightly contends that\nthis general state or quality may issue on different occasions from\ndifferent combinations of conditions. But he fails to observe that in\nany concrete case this effect exists in a special form, and with special\nmodifications corresponding to the special character of the antecedents.\nDeath, for instance, may result from a thousand circumstances, but the\ntotal effect in each case is never mere death, but death in some one\nspecial shape. A man who is shot and a man who is drowned are both dead,\nbut one is dead with the special symptoms of death by drowning, the\nother with those of death by shooting. The water will kill you and a\nbullet will kill you, but death with a bullet-hole does not come from\ndrowning, nor death with one\u2019s lungs filled with water from a gunshot.\nIf you take cause and effect at the same level of concreteness, they are\nalways strictly correlative. Any variation in the one must have a\ncorresponding variation in the other, for circumstances which vary\nwithout affecting a result are by definition no part of its conditions.\n\nSo far Mill\u2019s critics among the inductive logicians. But we can push the\nargument a step further, and show that it leads logically to a dilemma.\n(1) There cannot really be more than one \u201ccause\u201d for one \u201ceffect\u201d; yet\n(2) in any sense in which we can single out one \u201ceffect\u201d from the rest\nof the contents of the universe, and assign it its \u201ccause,\u201d there is\n_always_ a possibility of the Plurality of Causes. We will consider the\nalternative of this dilemma separately.\n\n(1) Cause and effect must be strictly correlative. For to say that there\nmay be variations in the cause not followed by corresponding variations\nin the effect, is to say that there can be conditions which condition\nnothing; and to admit variation in the effect without variation in the\ncause, is to allow that there are occurrences which are at once, as\neffects, determined, and yet again are not determined, by the assemblage\nof their antecedents. Thus Plurality of Causes is excluded by the very\nconception of a cause as the totality of conditions. Following up this\nline of thought further, we see that it leads to a perplexing result.\nThe \u201ctotality of conditions\u201d is never a real totality. For there are no\nsuch things as isolated effects and causes in the world of events. The\nwhole fact which we call an effect is never complete until we have taken\ninto account its entire connection with everything else in the universe.\nAnd similarly, the whole assemblage of conditions includes everything\nwhich goes to make up the universe. But when we have thus widened our\nconception of the cause and the effect, both cause and effect have\nbecome identical with one another and with the whole contents of the\nuniverse. And thus Causation itself has disappeared as a form of\ninterconnection between the elements of Reality in our attempt to work\nout its logical implications.\n\nThis is an inevitable consequence of the continuous interconnection of\nall Reality established by our examination of the problem of the One and\nthe Many in Chapter II. In other words, you never have reached the full\ncause of any event until you have taken into account the _totality_ of\nits conditions, _i.e._ the totality of its connections with all the rest\nof existence. But this totality cannot be obtained in the form\npresupposed by the phrase \u201ctotality of conditions\u201d as a plurality of\nevents. For to obtain it in this fashion would mean to sum an infinite\nseries. But when you abandon the form of the infinite series, cause and\neffect alike become identical with the systematic whole of Reality.\n\n(2) On the other hand, the _usefulness_ of the causal postulate depends\nentirely upon our ability to establish single threads of Causality\nwithin the stream of events, _i.e._ on our ability to assign particular\nassemblages of events, less than the \u201ctotality,\u201d to particular\nsubsequent events as their necessary and sufficient condition. Unless we\ncan do this we can formulate no rules for the practical employment of\nmeans for the production of a desired result, and, as we have already\nseen, it is the necessity of knowing the means to our ends which is the\nprimary, and indeed the sole, motive for the establishment of the causal\npostulate. Now, to effect this assignation of particular causes to\nparticular effects, we have to make use of a distinction which is more\npractically necessary than theoretically defensible. We distinguish\nbetween indispensable conditions and accessory circumstances, which may\nor may not be present without affecting the nature of the special result\nin question.\n\nNow it is clear that the making of this distinction depends upon the\nseparation of a certain part of the \u201ctotal\u201d stream of events from the\nrest, and its isolation as \u201cthe special result in question.\u201d And this\nisolation, as we have seen, must always rest upon arbitrary abstraction.\nWhen once this arbitrary abstraction of some one part or aspect of the\nstream of events from its context has been made, we are compelled to\nrecognise the existence of the context from which we have abstracted by\nsaying that any effect may enter into or form part of a variety of\ndifferent larger effects, according to the nature of the context in\nwhich it occurs. And, from the very principle of the complete\ncorrelation of condition and conditioned, it follows that what we call\nthe special or partial effect will be preceded by varying conditions,\naccording as it enters into different larger wholes or contexts. Thus\nany form of the causal postulate of which we can make effective use\nnecessitates the recognition of that very Plurality of Causes which we\nhave seen to be logically excluded by the conception of cause with which\nscience works. As we contended above, any form of the principle in which\nit is true is useless, and any form in which it is useful is untrue.\n\nThe final result of our discussion, then, is that the causal postulate\naccording to which events are completely determined by antecedent events\nleads to the belief that the stream of events is discontinuous. This\nbelief is inherently self-contradictory, and therefore ultimately\nuntrue. The principle of Ground and Consequence cannot therefore be\nadequately represented by the causal postulate, however indispensable\nthat postulate may be in practice. Whether the conception of a\ncontinuous stream of events affords any better formulation of the\nprinciple of the systematic interconnection of all Reality, we shall be\nbetter able to judge after the discussions of our third book. If it does\nnot, we shall have to recognise that the conception of temporal\nsuccession itself is not adequate to express the way in which the Many\nand the One of real existence are united, _i.e._ that time is not real,\nbut only phenomenal.\n\n\u00a7 10. A word may be said here as to the nature of the \u201cnecessity\u201d which\nwe ascribe to the connection of cause and effect. There can be little\ndoubt that the origin of this \u201cnecessity\u201d must be found in our own\nfeelings of constraint when our action is dictated from without. It is\nclear, however, that we have no right to ascribe this feeling of\nconstraint to the event which is determined by its connection with the\nrest of the system of Reality. All that is meant in science by the\n\u201cnecessity\u201d of the causal relation is that given the conditions the\nresult follows, and not otherwise. In other words, _if_ you assert the\nexistence of the conditions, you are logically bound to assert the\nexistence of the result. The constraint thus falls within ourselves, and\nis of a hypothetical kind. So long as your purpose is to think\nlogically, you feel constraint or compulsion when, after asserting the\ncondition, you seek for any reason to escape asserting the result. It is\none of the conspicuous services of Hume to philosophy, that he for the\nfirst time brought out clearly this subjective character of the\n\u201cnecessity\u201d of the causal relation, though it must be admitted that he\nwent on to complicate his argument by an admixture of error when he\nsought to base the necessity of the logical inference from Ground to\nConsequence on the psychological principle of Association.\n\n\u00a7 11. Before closing our discussion of Causality, we must briefly take\nnote of certain special difficulties by which the problem has been\ncomplicated in the systems of some eminent philosophers. A distinction\nhas often been drawn between Transeunt and Immanent Causality. In so far\nas the changes of state of one thing are regarded as occasions of change\nof state in others, the relation has been technically called one of\nTranseunt Causality; the determination of a thing\u2019s change of state by\nits own previous changes has, on the other hand, been named Immanent\nCausality. As a consequence of this distinction, grave difficulties have\narisen in connection with the notion of Transeunt Causality. Such\nCausality, _i.e._ the determination of the changes of one thing by the\nchanges of others, is of course an essential feature in the\npre-scientific view of the world of experience as a multiplicity of\ninteracting things.\n\nFor systematic Pluralism this conception inevitably presents insoluble\ndifficulties. For it is impossible to reconcile the ultimate absolute\nindependence of the various real things with the admission that the\nsequence of states in any one depends upon sequences of states in any of\nthe others. If a plurality of things are ultimately independent of each\nother, it is manifest that each must form a complete whole,\nself-determined and containing the ground of its details entirely within\nitself. Conversely, if a thing cannot be explained by a principle of\npurely internal systematic connection, but requires for its complete\nexplanation reference to an outside reality with which it stands in\ninterconnection, its independence can be only partial. Hence Pluralism,\nin its more consistent forms, has always sought to deny the reality of\nTranseunt Causality, and to reduce all causal relations to the internal\ndetermination of the states of a thing by its own previous states.\nHistorically, the principal devices which have been adopted for this\npurpose are (_a_) Occasionalism, and (_b_) the theory of a\nPre-established Harmony.\n\n(_a_) _Occasionalism._ Occasionalism has appeared in the history of\nPhilosophy as a professed solution of the special problem of the\napparent interaction between body and mind, taken as two entirely\ndisparate and independent realities, though it is equally applicable in\na wider sense to the more general problem of the apparent connection of\nany two independent real things. The doctrine is most closely associated\nwith the names of the Cartesians, Arnold Geulincx and N. Malebranche,\nbut was in part also adopted by Berkeley as a consequence of his belief\nin the pure passivity of non-mental things. Starting from the Cartesian\nconception of mind and body as two entirely independent and disparate\nkinds of reality, Geulincx and Malebranche were confronted by the\napparent fact that mental states lead to modifications of bodily state\nin voluntary motion, and _vice vers\u00e2_, bodily states determine the\noccurrence of mental states whenever a sensation follows upon a\nstimulus.\n\nThe \u201cnatural view of the world\u201d unhesitatingly accepts these cases as\ninstances of interaction or Transeunt Causality on exactly the same\nlevel as the origination of change of state in one body by change in\nanother, and Descartes himself had acquiesced in this interpretation.\nBut such a view, as his successors saw, is quite incompatible with the\nalleged disparateness and independence of the two orders of existence,\nthe bodily and the mental. Geulincx and Malebranche accordingly took\nrefuge in the doctrine that the interaction is only apparent. In reality\nthere is a complete solution of continuity wherever the series of\nchanges in the one order terminates and that in the other begins. What\nreally happens, they taught, is that God adapts the one series to the\nother. On the occurrence of the bodily stimulus, God intervenes to\nproduce the sensation or emotion which is required to harmonise our\naction with our environment. Similarly, on the occurrence of a volition,\nGod interferes to set the corresponding movement going in our bodily\norganism.\n\nThus the change in the one order is merely an occasion for the\nintervention of God, who is the actual cause of the corresponding change\nin the other. Within each order the series of changes once initiated are\nthen supposed to be causally connected. The divine interference only\ncomes in where the two orders come into contact. Berkeley adopted half\nof this doctrine without the complementary half. Inasmuch as, according\nto him, physical or non-mental things are mere complexes of\npresentations, or, in his own terminology, \u201cideas,\u201d and ideas are purely\ninert, the real cause of every sensation must be God, who thus directly\nintervenes to give us an indication of the further sensations we shall\nreceive according to the action we take on the present presentation.\nTranseunt Causality in the reverse direction, the immediate origination\nof bodily movement by volition, Berkeley seems to have admitted without\ncriticism as a self-evident fact.[113]\n\nIt will not be necessary here to discuss the half-hearted version of\nOccasionalism adopted by Berkeley. It is clear that the admission of\ndirect origination of bodily change by mental cannot be consistently\ncombined with the denial of all Transeunt Causality in the reverse\ndirection. If all physical existence, my own body included, is nothing\nmore than an inert complex of presentations, it is just as hard to see\nhow it can be the recipient of mentally originated change as to see how\nit can originate mental change. What is not in any sense active cannot\nbe passive, for passivity is simply repressed and thwarted activity.\n\nWe confine ourselves, then, to Occasionalism of the thorough-going type.\nNow, against such Occasionalism there is the obvious objection that it\ntransforms the whole course of our existence into one long succession of\nmiracles, a point upon which Leibnitz is fond of insisting in his\ncriticisms of Malebranche. And the doctrine is not really consistent\nwith itself for two reasons. (1) It is clear that, according to any\npossible definition of Causation, the doctrine of Occasionalism involves\ncausal interaction between God on the one hand and both the supposedly\ndisparate orders of reality on the other. Changes in either order\ndefinitely determine the intervention of God to originate definitely\ndetermined changes in the other order. Thus God\u2019s internal\ndeterminations are at once causes and effects of changes in either\norder. But if, _e.g._, a material change of state can be the cause of a\ndetermination in God, the whole basis of the denial that a change in the\nmaterial order can originate change in another order of reality, is\nswept away. The net result of the theory is simply to re-establish the\ntranseunt action of the two orders on each other by means of a\nroundabout circuit through the mind of God.\n\nWhat Geulincx and Malebranche really had in mind was the simple\nreflection that we cannot tell _how_ a physical change can bring about a\nmental change, or _vice vers\u00e2_.[114] But this problem is not advanced in\nthe least by introducing God as a third factor. How a change in the one\norder can bring about a determination in the mind of God, and how again\nGod brings about the corresponding change in the other order, are simply\ntwo insoluble problems of the same kind as that they were intended to\nexplain. After the introduction of God as third factor in the causal\nprocess, the fact still remains as before, that certain definite changes\nin the one order ensue upon definite changes in the other, and this is\nprecisely the fact which is denoted by the name of Transeunt Causality.\n\nOf course the problem would alter its character if God were conceived as\nanother expression for the total system of Reality. The doctrine of\nOccasionalism would then become simply a statement of the view that no\ntwo things are really independent, and that it is in virtue of their\ninclusion in a larger systematic whole that what we call separate things\ncan influence each other. But, in spite of numerous passing utterances\nwhich point to this view, it is quite certain that Occasionalism was\nseriously intended by its authors as a solution of the problem of\nCausality on strictly traditional theistic lines.\n\n(2) A second defect of the doctrine lies in the failure of its\noriginators to extend it to _all_ cases of causal relation. It is a mere\nprejudice when Geulincx and Malebranche allow themselves to assume that\nthe sequence of physical change on preceding physical change, or mental\nchange on preceding mental change, is more self-explanatory than the\nsequence of a mental change on a physical. In both cases we can\nascertain that one state definitely follows a previous one; in neither\ncan we answer the ultimately unmeaning question, by what machinery this\nsequence is brought about. For any answer must obviously consist in the\ninterpolation of an intermediate link, and with regard to the production\nof this intermediate link the same question arises, and thus we come to\nthe indefinite regress, the invariable indication that we have been\nasking an unmeaning question.\n\n(_b_) _The Pre-established Harmony._ More philosophical was the attempt\nof Leibnitz to reconcile Pluralism with the apparent interaction of\nthings. According to Leibnitz, every ultimately real thing or monad is a\nself-contained whole; it contains, therefore, in itself the ground of\nthe sequence of its own states. Hence there can be no real origination\nof change in one monad by the occurrence of change in another. The life\nof every monad must consist purely in the development of its own\ninternal nature. As Leibnitz phrases it, there are no windows in the\nmonads through which states and qualities can fly from one to another.\nYet some account must be taken of the apparent fact that, since the\nworld of experience is not a chaos, the changes in one thing seem to be\nconnected by definite law with the changes in others.\n\nNow, according to Leibnitz, this apparent interaction can only be\naccounted for, if we decline to tolerate the perpetual miracle of\nOccasionalism, by the theory of a Pre-established Harmony between\nmonads. If the whole of the independent monads are of such a nature that\neach, while actually following the law of its own development, behaves\nin the way required by the internal development of all the rest, then,\nthough each is really self-contained, there will be the appearance of\ninteraction. Leibnitz illustrates the possibility of such a harmony by\nthe case of two clocks which keep time with each other, without either\nthe actual regulation of the one by the other, or the maintenance of a\nconnection between them, simply because each is properly constructed;\nand again, by the case of a number of musicians playing from the same\nmusic but concealed from each other\u2019s observation, who keep time and\ntune simply because each is playing his own score correctly.\n\nProbably this is the most satisfactory hypothesis which can be devised\nfor the conciliation of apparent interaction with a radical Pluralism.\nBut its logical defects are apparent on the face of it. When we ask to\nwhat the harmony between the internal states of the several monads is\nultimately due, Leibnitz hesitates between two answers. It is due,\naccording to one account, to the choice of God, who in His wisdom saw\n_fit_ to establish the best of all the possible worlds. But at the same\ntime it was God\u2019s recognition of the harmony between the monads of this\nspecial world-system which led Him to give it the preference over other\nantecedently possible systems, and to bring it rather than any other\nfrom mere possibility into actual existence.\n\nNow it seems clear that, if the creative activity of God is to be taken\nseriously, the relation of God to the system must be one of Transeunt\nCausality. But if Transeunt Causality is admitted in the single case of\nGod\u2019s attitude towards the monads, it no longer seems obvious why it\nshould be denied as regards the attitudes of the monads among\nthemselves. For there is now at least one property of each monad of\nwhich the ground lies not in itself but in God, namely, its actual\nexistence;[115] and the principle that every monad is the ground of all\nits own properties once being deserted, there remains no further reason\nfor denying interaction. If, on the other hand, we lay stress on the\nview that the harmony is no mere result of an arbitrary creative act,\nbut is a property contained in the concept of the world of monads,\nthought of as merely possible, why may we not equally well think of a\nworld of interacting and interconnected and therefore not ultimately\nindependent things as possessing equal claims to realisation? The\nPluralism of Leibnitz, from which his denial of Transeunt Causality\nlogically follows, seems to rest upon nothing better than uncriticised\nprejudices.[116]\n\n\u00a7 12. We may briefly indicate the view as to the problem of Transeunt\nCausality which is involved in our discussion of the causal postulate.\nFor any purpose for which it is possible and desirable to think of the\nworld as a plurality of things, Transeunt Causality must be maintained.\nFor precisely because the things in the world in the end form a\nconnected system, the complete ground of the states of a thing cannot\nlie in itself but only in the whole system. In any sense in which there\nare a plurality of things, and in which the principle of ground and\nconsequence can be approximately represented by the causal determination\nof subsequent occurrences by anterior occurrences, we must be prepared\nto find that the states of one thing appear among the conditions of the\nsubsequent states of other things.\n\nBut again, since the apparently separate things are not entirely\nindependent, but are the detailed self-expression of a single system,\nTranseunt Causality must in the end be appearance. Inasmuch as all\ninterconnection between things depends upon their inclusion in the\nsingle system of Reality, it may be said that, when you take the whole\ninto account, all Causality is ultimately immanent. But again, as we\nhave already seen, Immanent Causality is an imperfect way of expressing\nthe systematic connection of all existence according to the principle of\nGround and Consequence. Fully thought out, Immanent Causality, as the\ndetermination of one state of the whole by a preceding state, is\ntransformed into the concept of the interconnection of the various\nstates by the purely logical principle that they form together the\ndetailed expression of a single coherent principle of structure. And\nthus all Causality is finally imperfect appearance.\n\nA point of some interest is the following. As we have seen, only\nindividual experiences can in the end possess the kind of relative\nindependence and internal unity which thought seeks to express in the\nnotion of a thing. We may add that just in the degree to which any\nexistence has this individuality, and thus forms a self-contained whole,\nwill its behaviour have its ground within the thing itself. Hence the\nmore completely individual a thing is, the more will the conditions upon\nwhich its states depend appear when we apply the postulate of Causality,\nto be included in other states of the same thing. Thus the more\nindividuality a thing has, the more fully will it appear to exhibit\nImmanent as distinguished from Transeunt Causality in its internal\nstructure, that is, the less will be the modifications that structure\nundergoes in its intercourse with other things. If we like to denote the\nmaintenance of unchanged internal structure against instigations to\nchange from without by the term \u201cempirical activity,\u201d we may express our\nresult by saying that the more individual a thing is, the more\nempirically active it is.\n\nWhen we come to deal with the special problems of moral and social life,\nwe shall have to face further questions as to the connection of causal\ndetermination with moral freedom and responsibility, and again with\nconscious purposive action for ends. Our previous discussion will then\nbe found to have cleared the way for these more complex questions, by\nremoving the difficulties which arise when the causal postulate is\nmistaken for an axiomatic principle of the interpretation of the\nsystematic nature of Reality.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014B. Bosanquet, _Essentials of Logic_, pp. 164, 165;\n_Logic_, vol. i p. 253 ff., vol. ii. p. 212 ff.; F. H. Bradley,\n_Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 5 (Motion and Change), 6 (Causation), 7\n(Activity), 8 (Things); H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. chaps. 4\n(Becoming and Change), 5 (Nature of Physical Action); L. T. Hobhouse,\n_Theory of Knowledge_, pt. 2, chaps. 8, 15 (for discussion of\n\u201cPlurality\u201d of Causes); Karl Pearson, _Grammar of Science_, chaps. 3 and\n4; B. Russell, _Philosophy of Leibniz_, chaps. 4, 11 (Pre-established\nHarmony); James Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, pt. 1, lectures 2-6;\nHume\u2019s famous discussion of Causation (_Treatise of Human Nature_, bk.\ni. pt. 3, \u00a7\u00a7 3-15) seems to me to have lost little of its value, and to\nbe still perhaps the most important single contribution of modern\nPhilosophy to the systematic discussion of Causality.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 100:\n\n For a discussion of the same point in dealing with _energy_, see\n Professor Schuster, _British Association Report_, 1892, p. 631.\n\nFootnote 101:\n\n W. M\u2018Dougall in _Mind_ for July 1902, p. 350.\n\nFootnote 102:\n\n See the admirable remarks of Bosanquet in _Companion to Plato\u2019s\n Republic_, pp. 275, 276.\n\nFootnote 103:\n\n On the category of Ground and Consequent and the principle of\n Sufficient Reason, consult Bosanquet, _Logic_, bk. i. chap. 6, and bk.\n ii. chap. 7.\n\nFootnote 104:\n\n It is no answer to this suggestion to urge that the present, being\n real, cannot be conditioned by the future, which is unreal. Such a\n rejoinder commits the metaphysical _petitio principii_ of taking for\n granted that only the present is real. It is obvious that one might\n say with equal cogency that the past, being over and gone, is now\n unreal and therefore cannot influence the real present.\n\nFootnote 105:\n\n For a fuller explanation of what is meant by continuity, consult\n Dedekind, _Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen_, specially \u00a7\u00a7 3-5, or\n Lamb\u2019s _Infinitesimal Calculus_, chap. 1. Readers who have been\n accustomed to the treatment of continuity by the older philosophical\n writers should specially remark (1) that continuity is properly a\n characteristic of _series_, and (2) that though continuity implies\n indefinite divisibility, the reverse is not, as was sometimes assumed\n by earlier writers, true. The series of rational numbers is a familiar\n illustration of endless divisibility _without_ continuity.\n\nFootnote 106:\n\n There would arise further difficulties as to whether the magnitude of\n this lapse is a function of A, or whether it is the same in all cases\n of causal sequence. But until some one can be found to defend such a\n general theory of causal sequence it is premature to discuss\n difficulties of detail.\n\nFootnote 107:\n\n For the English reader the best sources of information as to the\n \u201cdescriptive\u201d theory of science are probably volume i. of Professor\n Ward\u2019s _Naturalism and Agnosticism_; and Mach, the _Science of\n Mechanics_ (Eng. trans.). Students who read Gennan may advantageously\n add Avenarius, _Philosophie als Denken der Welt gem\u00e4ss dem Princip des\n kleinsten Kraftmasses_. Professor J. A. Stewart is surely mistaken\n (_Mind_, July 1902) in treating the doctrine as a discovery of\n \u201cidealist\u201d metaphysicians. Whatever may be thought of some of the uses\n to which \u201cidealists\u201d put the theory, they cannot claim the credit of\n its invention.\n\nFootnote 108:\n\n Cf. Mach, _op. cit._, p. 483 ff.; Pearson, _Grammar of Science_, chap.\n 4.\n\nFootnote 109:\n\n _E.g._, eclipses can be calculated equally well for the future or the\n past.\n\nFootnote 110:\n\n _Infra_, Bk. III. chap. 4. It will be enough to refer in passing to\n the curious blunder which is committed when the principle of Causality\n is confounded with the doctrines of the Conservation of Mass and\n Energy. That the principle of Causality has nothing to do with these\n special physical theories is manifest from the considerations: (1)\n That it is at least not self-evident that all causal relation is\n physical. Philosophers have indeed denied that one mental state\n directly causes another, but no one has based his denial on the\n assertion that there can be no causality without mass and energy. (2)\n The principle of Causality, as we have seen, is a postulate. If we are\n ever to intervene successfully in the course of events, it must be\n possible with at least approximate accuracy to regard events as\n determined by their antecedents. The doctrines of conservation of mass\n and energy are, on the contrary, empirical generalisations from the\n observed behaviour of material systems. Neither science nor practical\n life in the least requires them as an indispensable condition of\n success. In practical life they are never appealed to, and the ablest\n exponents of science are most ready to admit that we have no proof of\n their validity except so far as it can be established by actual\n observation. In short, they are largely _a posteriori_, while the\n principle of Causality is, as already explained, _a priori_. See\n _infra_, Bk. III. chap. 6, \u00a7 6.\n\nFootnote 111:\n\n Neither can have a first term, because each has two opposite _senses_,\n positive and negative in the one case, before and after in the other.\n\nFootnote 112:\n\n I suppose I need not remind my reader that when a number is spoken of\n as the actual sum of an infinite series (as when 2 is called the sum\n of the series 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + ... to infinity), the word _sum_\n is used in a derivative and improper sense for the limiting value\n assumed by the sum of _n_ terms as _n_ increases indefinitely. See\n Lamb, _Infinitesimal Calculus_, p. 11.\n\nFootnote 113:\n\n For the various views here summarised, see as original sources,\n Geulincx, _Metaphysica Vera_, Pars Prima, 5-8; Malebranche,\n _Entretiens sur la Metaphysique et sur la Religion_, 7th dialogue;\n Berkeley, _New Theory of Vision_, pp. 147, 148; _Principles of Human\n Knowledge_, \u00a7\u00a7 25-33, 51-53, 57, 150; _Second Dialogue between Hylas\n and Philonous_.\n\nFootnote 114:\n\n Geulincx expresses the principle in the following formula (_op. cit._,\n pt. 1, 5): quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis.\n\nFootnote 115:\n\n Not that existence can intelligibly be treated as a property; on this\n point Kant\u2019s famous criticism of the \u201contological proof\u201d seems\n conclusive. But _from the point of view of Leibnitz_ it must be\n imagined as an additional predicate, somehow added by the creative act\n of God to those already contained in the concept of the world as\n \u201cpossible.\u201d\n\nFootnote 116:\n\n For Leibnitz\u2019s doctrine consult further, _The Monadology etc., of\n Leibniz_, edit. by R. Latta, Introduction, pts. 2 and 3, and\n translations of _Monadology_, _New System of the Communication of\n Substances_, with the _First_ and _Third Explanations_ of the New\n System. Also see the elaborate criticisms of B. Russell, _The\n Philosophy of Leibniz_, chap. 4 and following chapters.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n BOOK III\n\n COSMOLOGY\u2014THE INTERPRETATION\n OF NATURE\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n INTRODUCTORY\n\n\u00a7 1. Distinction between the experimental sciences and a Philosophy of\n Nature and Mind. The former concerned with the description, the\n latter with the interpretation, of facts. \u00a7 2. Cosmology is the\n critical examination of the special characteristics of the physical\n order. Its main problems are: (1) the problem of the nature of\n Material Existence; (2) problem of the justification of the concept\n of the Mechanical Uniformity of Nature; (3) problems of Space and\n Time; (4) problem of the Significance of Evolution; (5) problem of\n the Place of descriptive Physical Science in the System of Human\n Knowledge.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In our two remaining Books we shall have to deal with the more\nelementary of the problems created by the apparent existence of two\norders of Reality, a physical and a psychical, which again at least seem\nto stand in reciprocal interaction. In the present Book we shall discuss\nsome of the leading characteristics which everyday thought and\nscientific thought respectively assign to the physical order, and shall\nask how these characteristics compare with those we have seen ground to\nascribe to Reality, _i.e._ we shall attempt to form a theory of the\nplace of physical existence in the whole system of Reality. In the\nFourth Book we shall discuss in the same way some of the leading\ncharacteristics of the psychical order as currently conceived, and the\nnature of its connection with the physical order. Our treatment of these\ntopics will necessarily be imperfect and elementary for more reasons\nthan one: not only are the facts of which some account must be taken so\nnumerous and complicated that they would require for their mastery\nsomething like an encyclop\u00e6dic acquaintance with the whole range of the\nexperimental sciences, physical and psychological, but their adequate\ninterpretation, especially on the cosmological side, would demand a\nfamiliarity with the ultimate foundations of mathematical theory which\nis rarely possessed either by the experimentalist or by the\nmetaphysician. The utmost we can hope to accomplish in this part of our\nwork is to establish one or two broad results as regards general\nprinciples: any suggestions we may make as to the details of\ninterpretation must be avowedly tentative.\n\nWe must be careful to distinguish the task of a Philosophy of Nature and\na Philosophy of Mind from those of the experimental sciences which deal\ndirectly with the fact of the physical and psychical orders. The\nfundamental business of the latter is, as we have already seen, the\ndiscovery of descriptive formul\u00e6 by the aid of which the various\nprocesses which make up the physical and psychical orders may be\ndepicted and calculated. The fewer and simpler these formul\u00e6, the more\nthey economise the labour of calculation, the more completely do the\nexperimental sciences perform the work for which we look to them. And so\nlong as our formul\u00e6 adequately accomplish this work of calculation, it\nis indifferent for the experimental sciences whether the language in\nwhich they are couched represents a \u201creality\u201d or not. The \u201catoms,\u201d\n\u201cforces,\u201d and \u201cethers\u201d of our physical, the \u201csensations\u201d of our\npsychological formul\u00e6, might be as purely symbolic creations of our own\nimagination as the \u201cimaginary quantities\u201d of mathematics, without their\nunreality in any way interfering with their scientific usefulness. In\nthe words of an eminent physicist, \u201cthe atomic theory plays a part in\nphysics similar to that of certain auxiliary concepts in mathematics,\n... although we represent vibrations by the harmonic formula, the\nphenomena of cooling by exponentials, falls by squares of times, etc.,\nno one will fancy that vibrations _in themselves_ have anything to do\nwith the circular functions, or the motion of falling bodies with\nsquares\u201d (Mach, _Science of Mechanics_, p. 492). When it is asserted\nthat the usefulness of a scientific hypothesis, such as, _e.g._, the\natomic theory or the hypothesis of the existence of an etherial\nundulating medium, of itself proves the real existence of things\ncorresponding to the concepts employed by the hypothesis, the same\nfallacy is committed as when it is contended that if an algebraical\ncalculus is generally capable of geometrical interpretation, every step\nin its operations must be interpretable.\n\nThe work of the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind only begins where that\nof the experimental sciences leaves off. Its data are not particular\nfacts, as directly amassed by experiment and observation, but the\nhypotheses used by experimental science for the co-ordination and\ndescription of those facts. And it examines these hypotheses, not with\nthe object of modifying their structure so as to include new facts, or\nto include the old facts in a simpler form, but purely for the purpose\nof estimating their value as an account of ultimately real existence.\nWhether the hypotheses are adequate as implements for the calculation of\nnatural processes is a question which Philosophy, when it understands\nits place, leaves entirely to the special sciences; whether they can\nclaim to be more than useful formul\u00e6 for calculation, _i.e._ whether\nthey give us knowledge of ultimate Reality, is a problem which can only\nbe dealt with by the science which systematically analyses the meaning\nof reality, _i.e._ by Metaphysics. We may perhaps follow the usage of\nsome recent writers in marking this difference of object by a difference\nin terminology, and say that the goal of experimental science is the\nDescription of facts, the goal of Metaphysics their Interpretation. The\ndifference of aim is, however, not ultimate. Description of facts, when\nonce we cease to be content with such description as will subserve the\npurpose of calculation and call for description of the fact as it really\nis, of itself becomes metaphysical interpretation.\n\nThe chief danger against which we must guard in this part of our\nmetaphysical studies is that of expecting too much from our science. We\ncould never, of course, hope for such a complete interpretation of facts\nas might be possible to omniscience. At most we can only expect to see\nin a general way how the physical and again how the psychical order must\nbe thought of if our view as to the ultimate structure of Reality is\nsound. For an exact understanding of the way in which the details of\nphysical and psychical existence are woven into the all-embracing\npattern of the real, we must not look. And the value of even a general\ninterpretation will of course depend largely upon our familiarity with\nthe actual use the various sciences make of their hypotheses. With the\nbest goodwill in the world we cannot hope to avoid all misapprehensions\nin dealing with the concepts of sciences with which we have no practical\nfamiliarity.\n\nThough this general caution is at least equally applicable to the\namateur excursions of the student whose mental training has been\nconfined to some special group of experimental sciences into the field\nof metaphysical criticism, it would be a good rule for practice if every\nstudent of Metaphysics would consider it part of his duty to make\nhimself something more than an amateur in at least one branch of\nempirical science; probably Psychology, from its historical connection\nwith philosophical studies, presents unique advantages for this purpose.\nAnd conversely, no specialist in experimental science should venture on\nultimate metaphysical construction without at least a respectable\nacquaintance with the principles of Logic, an acquaintance hardly to be\ngained by the perusal of Jevons\u2019s _Elementary Lessons_ with a supplement\nof Mill.\n\n\u00a7 2. Cosmology, then, means the critical examination of the assumptions\ninvolved in the recognition of the physical as a distinct order of\nexistence, and of the most general hypotheses employed by popular\nthought and scientific reflection respectively for the description of\nspecially physical existence. It is clear that this very recognition of\na distinction between the physical and other conceivable forms of\nexistence implies a degree of reflective analysis more advanced than\nthat embodied in the na\u00efve pre-scientific view with which we started in\nour last two chapters. In the simple conception of the world of\nexistence as consisting of the changing states of a plurality of\ninteracting things, there was not as yet any ground for a distinction\nbetween the psychical and the purely physical. That there really exists\na widespread type of thought for which this distinction has never\narisen, is put beyond doubt by the study of the psychology of the child\nand the savage. Both, as we know, draw no hard-and-fast line between the\nanimated and the inanimate, and the savage, in his attempts to account\nfor the phenomena of life, does so habitually by supposing the physical\norganism to be tenanted by one or more lesser organisms of the same\norder of existence. The \u201csoul\u201d he ascribes to things is simply a smaller\nand consequently less readily perceptible body within the body.\n\nFor civilised men this conception of all existence as being of the same\norder, an order which we might describe from our own more developed\nstandpoint as at once animated and physical, has become so remote and\ninadequate, that we find it hard to realise how it can ever have been\nuniversally accepted as self-evident truth. Physical science, and under\nits guidance the current thought of civilised men, has come to draw a\nmarked distinction between the great majority of sensible things, which\nit regards as purely physical, and a minority which exhibit the presence\nof \u201cconsciousness.\u201d Thus has arisen a theory of the division of\nexistence into two great orders, the physical and the psychical, which\nso dominates our ordinary thought about the world, that all the efforts\nof philosophers, both spiritualist and materialist, to reduce the two\norders once more to one seem powerless to make any impression on the\ngreat majority of minds.\n\nWhen we ask what are the distinguishing marks of the physical order as\ncurrently conceived, the precise answer we obtain will depend on the\ndegree of scientific attainments possessed by the person to whom our\nquestion is addressed. But in the main both current science and everyday\nthought, so far as it has reflected on the problem, would probably agree\nas to the following points. (_a_) Physical existence is purely\n_material_ or _non-mental_, or again is _unconscious_. The exact\nsignificance of these predicates is probably rarely clear even to those\nwho make the freest use of them. On the face of it, such epithets convey\nonly the information that existence of the physical kind differs in some\nimportant respect from existence of a mental kind; the nature of the\ndifference they leave obscure. Reflection, however, may throw some light\non the matter.\n\nThe distinction between persons and animals on the one side and mere\nthings on the other seems to rest in the last resort on an important\npractical consideration. Among the things which, according to the na\u00efve\nRealism of the pre-scientific theory, form my environment, there are\nsome which regularly behave in much the same general way in response to\nvery different types of behaviour on my own part. There are others again\nwhich behave differently towards me according to the differences in my\nbehaviour towards them. In other words, some things exhibit special\nindividual purposes, dependent in various ways on the nature of my own\nindividual purposes, others do not. Hence for practice it becomes very\nimportant to know what things can be counted on always to exhibit the\nsame general type of behaviour, and what cannot, but require individual\nstudy before I can tell how they will respond to different purposive\nbehaviour of my own. It is on this practical difference that the\ndistinction of mental and conscious from purely physical and unconscious\nexistence seems to be based. We shall probably not be far wrong in\ninterpreting the _unconsciousness_ of purely material existence to mean\nthat it exhibits no traces of purposive individuality, or at least none\nthat we can recognise as such. More briefly, the physical order consists\nof the things which do not manifest recognisable individuality.\n\n(_b_) Closely connected with this peculiarity is a second. The physical\norder is made up of events which conform rigidly to certain universal\n_Laws_. This is an obvious consequence of its lack of purposive\nindividuality. The elements of which it is composed, being devoid of all\npurposive character of their own, always behave in the same surroundings\nin the same regular uniform way. Hence we can formulate precise general\nLaws of their behaviour. Originally, no doubt, this uniformity of the\nphysical order is thought of as a point of contrast with the irregular\nbehaviour of purposive beings, who respond differently to the same\nexternal surroundings according as their own internal purposes vary.\nWith the growth of Psychology as an experimental science of mental\nprocesses there inevitably arises the tendency to extend this concept of\nuniform conformity with general Law to the processes of the psychical\norder, and we are then confronted by the famous problem how to reconcile\nscientific law with human \u201cfreedom.\u201d The same antithesis between the\napparently regular and purposeless behaviour of the elements of the\nphysical order and the apparently irregular and purposive behaviour of\nthe members of the psychical order is also expressed by saying that the\nsequence of events in the physical order is _mechanically_ determined by\nthe principle of Causality, whereas that of the psychical order is\n_teleological_, _i.e._ determined by reference to _end_ or purpose.\n\n(_c_) Every element of the physical order fills a position in _space_\nand in _time_. Hence any metaphysical problems about the nature of space\nand time are bound to affect our view of the nature of the physical\norder. Here, again, there is a point of at least possible contrast\nbetween the physical and the psychical. As the accumulation of\nexperience makes it increasingly clearer that the bodies of my\nfellow-men and my own body, in so far as it is an object perceived like\nothers by the organs of the special senses, exhibit in many respects the\nsame conformity to certain general laws, and are composed of the same\nconstituent parts as the rest of the sensible world, such animated\nbodies of purposive agents have to be included along with the rest of\nsensible existence in the physical order. The individual\u2019s purposive\nindividuality has now to be thought of as residing in a distinct factor\nin his composition of a kind foreign to the physical order, and\ntherefore imperceptible by the senses, _i.e._ as a _mind_ or _soul_ or\n_stream of consciousness_ in the current psychological sense. Such a\nmind or soul or stream of consciousness is then usually regarded as not\nfilling a series of positions in space, and sometimes as not filling a\nseries of positions in time.\n\n(_d_) The physical order, as thus finally constituted by the\nintroduction of the concept of an imperceptible soul or mind, now\ncomprises all sensible existence[117] as an aggregate of events in time\nand space, linked together by the principle of Causality, and exhibiting\nconformity with general law. To this conception recent science has made\nan important addition in the notion of a continuous _evolution_ or\n_development_ as manifesting itself throughout the series. So that we\nmay ultimately define the physical order as a body of events occupying\nposition in time and space, conforming to general laws with rigid and\nundeviating uniformity, and exhibiting continuous evolution.[118]\n\nFrom these general characteristics of the physical order, as conceived\nby current science and current popular thought, arise the fundamental\nproblems of Cosmology. We have to discuss\u2014(1) the real nature of\nmaterial existence, _i.e._ the ultimate significance of the distinction\nbetween the two orders, and the possibility of reducing them to one; (2)\nthe justification for the distinction between mechanical and\nteleological processes, and for the conception of the physical order as\nrigidly conformable to uniform law; (3) the leading difficulties of the\nconceptions of time and space, and their bearing on the degree of\nreality to be ascribed to the physical order; (4) the philosophical\nimplications of the application of the notion of evolution or\ndevelopment to the events of the physical order; (5) finally, we ought\nperhaps to deal very briefly and in a very elementary fashion with the\nproblem of the real position of descriptive physical science as a whole\nin its relation to the rest of human knowledge.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 26\n(pp. 496-497, 1st ed.); H. Lotze, _Outlines of Metaphysic_, pp. 77-79;\nJ. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines of Metaphysics_, bk. iii. chap. 2; J. Ward,\n_Naturalism and Agnosticism_. lect. 1.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 117:\n\n _I.e._ existence of the _same kind_ as that perceived by the senses,\n whether actually so perceived or not. In this sense the solid\n impenetrable extended atoms of Newton or Locke are \u201csensible\u201d\n existence, inasmuch as their properties are the same in kind as\n certain perceptible properties of larger masses, though they are not\n themselves actually perceptible.\n\nFootnote 118:\n\n Of course the evolution must be mere subjective appearance if, as is\n sometimes assumed, the processes of the physical order are one and all\n purely mechanical. But this only shows that the current concept of the\n physical order is not free from inconsistencies.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE PROBLEM OF MATTER\n\n\u00a7 1. The physical order, because dependent for its perceived qualities\n on the sense-organs of the percipient, must be the appearance of a\n more ultimate reality which is non-physical. \u00a7 2. Berkeley\u2019s\n criticism is fatal to the identification of this reality with\n \u201cmaterial substance.\u201d The logical consequence of Berkeley\u2019s doctrine\n that the _esse_ of sensible things is _percipi_ would be the\n subjectivist view that the physical order is _only_ a complex of\n presentations. \u00a7 3. But this is clearly not the case with that part\n of the physical order which consists of the bodies of my fellow-men.\n These have an existence, as centres of feeling, over and above their\n existence as presentations to my senses. \u00a7 4. As the bodies of my\n fellows are connected in one system with the rest of the physical\n order, that order as a whole must have the same kind of reality\n which belongs to them. It must be the presentation to our sense of a\n system or complex of systems of experiencing subjects; the apparent\n absence of life and purpose from inorganic nature must be due to our\n inability to enter into a direct communion of interest with its\n members. \u00a7 5. Some consequences of this view.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the preceding chapter we have very briefly indicated the nature\nof the steps by which reflective thought comes to distinguish sharply\nbetween a physical and a psychical order of existence. The physical\norder, when the concept has been brought into its complete shape by the\ninclusion of my own body and all its parts, is thought of as a system\ncomprising all the bodies in the universe, that is, all the existences\nwhich are of the same kind as those which I directly perceive by means\nof the special senses.[119] Now, with regard to the whole physical order\nthus conceived two things seem fairly obvious upon the least reflection,\nthat it does not depend for its _existence_ upon the fact of my actually\nperceiving it, and that it does depend upon my perception for all the\n_qualities_ and _relations_ which I find in it. Its _that_ appears\nindependent of the percipient, but its _what_, on the other hand,\nessentially dependent on and relative to the structure of the perceiving\norgan. As we have already seen, the familiar experience of the\nvariations in perception which accompany differences in the permanent\nstructure or temporary functioning of the organs of sense led, very\nearly in the history of Philosophy, to the recognition of this\nrelativity, so far as the so-called \u201csecondary\u201d qualities, _i.e._ those\nwhich can only be perceived by one special sense-organ, are concerned.\nWe have also seen sufficiently (in Bk. II. chap. 4) that the same\nconsideration holds equally good of those \u201cprimary\u201d qualities which are\nperceptible by more senses than one, and have probably for that reason\nbeen so often supposed to be unaffected by this relativity to a\nperceiving organ.\n\nWithout wasting the reader\u2019s time by unnecessary repetition of our\nformer reasoning, it may be worth while to point out here how this\nthorough-going relativity of the qualities of the physical order to a\npercipient organ leads directly to the indefinite regress, the\napparently invariable consequence of all contradictions in Metaphysics,\nwhen we try to take those qualities as independently real. I perceive\nthe properties of physical existence by special sense-organs, and the\nproperties as perceived are conditioned by the structure of those\norgans. But each sense-organ is itself a member of the physical order,\nand as such is perceived by and dependent for its perceived qualities\nupon another organ. This second sense-organ in its turn is also a member\nof the physical order, and is perceived by a third, or by the first\norgan again. And there is no end to this mutual dependence. The physical\norder, as a whole, must be a \u201cstate\u201d of my nervous system, which is\nitself a part of that order. We shall see more fully in our final Book,\nwhen we come to discuss the problem of Mind and Body, that this\ncontradiction is an inevitable result of the inconsistency involved in\nthe inclusion of my own body in the physical order, an inconsistency\nwhich is, in its turn, a necessary consequence of the hard-and-fast\nseparation of the two orders of existence.[120]\n\nConsiderations of this kind have led to the general recognition that the\nphysical order must be regarded as phenomenal, as the manifestation to\nsense-perception of a reality which is in its own nature inaccessible to\nsense-perception, and therefore, in the strictest sense of the words,\nnot physical. When we ask, however, how this non-physical reality of\nwhich the physical order is the phenomenal manifestation to our senses,\nis to be thought of, we find ourselves at once plunged into the same\ndifficulties which we have already met, in a more general form, in\ndiscussing the concept of Substance. Popular thought, and science so far\nas it is content to accept the notions of popular thought without\ncriticism, have commonly fallen back on the idea of the non-phenomenal\nground of the physical order as an unperceived \u201csubstratum.\u201d To this\nsubstratum it has given the name of _matter_, and has thus interpreted\nthe physical order as the effect produced by the causal action of an\nunperceived matter upon our sense-organs, or rather, to speak with more\nprecision, upon _their_ unknown material substratum. Frequently, as\nmight have been expected, the attempt has been made to identify this\nsubstratum with those of the known qualities of the physical order which\nappear least liable to modification with the varying states of the\npercipient organs, and lend themselves most readily to measurement and\ncalculation, the so-called \u201cprimary\u201d qualities of mechanical science.\nThis is the standpoint adopted by Newton and, in the main, by Locke, and\nlargely through the influence of their work still remains the most\nfamiliar to the ordinary English mind. But the inconsistencies we have\nalready found inherent in such a conception of Substance as is here\npresupposed, so inevitably make themselves felt upon any serious\nexamination, that the doctrine regularly appears in the history of\nthought as a mere temporary halting-place in the advance to the more\nradical notion of matter as the entirely unknown non-phenomenal\nsubstratum of the sensible properties of bodies.\n\n\u00a7 2. This latter notion is again manifestly open to all the objections\npreviously brought against the more general concept of substance as an\nunknown substratum or support of properties. It is from these objections\nthat Berkeley\u2019s famous criticism of the concept of matter, the most\noriginal attempt at a constructive theory of the real nature of the\nphysical order in the history of English Philosophy, starts. Berkeley\nfirst takes the identification of material substance with the primary\nqualities of body, which Locke had made current in English speculation,\nand shows, by insisting upon the relativity of perceived quality to\npercipient organ, that it is untenable. Having thus driven his opponent\nto surrender this identification, and to define matter as the unknown\nsubstratum of the physical order, he proceeds to argue that this notion\nof an unknown substratum is both useless and unintelligible. It is\nuseless, because our knowledge of the actual properties and processes of\nthe physical order can neither be extended nor made clearer by the\naddition of an unknowable; it is unintelligible, because we can give no\naccount to ourselves of the nature of the \u201csupport\u201d supposed to be\nbestowed by the substratum or the properties.\n\nMaterial substance being thus dismissed as an unmeaning fiction, what is\nleft as the reality of the physical order? According to Berkeley,\nnothing but the actual presentations, or \u201cideas,\u201d in which the\npercipient subject is aware of the properties of bodies. A body is\nsimply such a complex of presentations to a percipient; except as so\npresented it has no existence. As Berkeley is fond of putting it, the\n_esse_ of the material thing is simply _percipi_, the fact of its being\npresented. But just when we expect Berkeley to accept the complete\nsubjectivist contention that bodies are simply \u201cstates of the\npercipients\u2019 consciousness\u201d and nothing more, he remembers that he has\nto account both for the fact that we cannot perceive what we please and\nwhere we please, but that our perceptions form an order largely\nindependent of our own choice, and for the deep-seated conviction of the\ncommon-sense mind that things do not cease to exist when my perception\nof them is interrupted. To reconcile his theory with these apparently\nconflicting facts, he has recourse, as is the custom of philosophers and\nothers in a difficulty, to divine assistance. The continued existence of\nthe physical world in the intervals of perception, and its systematic\ncharacter and partial independence of our volition, he explains by the\nhypotheses that God produces perceptions in us in a fixed order, and\nthat God continues to be aware of the system of presentations which I\ncall the physical world, when my perception of it is suspended. The same\nexplanation would, of course, have to be invoked to account for the\nexistence of physical realities which no human subject perceives.[121]\n\nIt is fairly obvious that the two halves of Berkeley\u2019s theory will not\nfit together into a coherent whole. If the whole _esse_ of physical\nthings is merely _percipi_, there can be no reason why I should suppose\nthem to exist at all except in so far as and so long as they are\npresented to my perception. The whole hypothesis of an omnipresent\ndivine perception which remains aware of the contents that have vanished\nfrom my own perception, thus becomes purely gratuitous. It also labours\nunder the disadvantage of being, on Berkeley\u2019s theory, internally\ninconsistent. For if it is necessary to invoke the agency of God to\naccount for the occurrence of presentations to my experience, it is not\nclear why we have not to suppose a second deity who causes the series of\npresentations in the experience of God, and so on indefinitely. On the\nother hand, if God\u2019s experience may be taken as uncaused, it is not\nclear why my own experience might not have been taken so in the first\ninstance, and the introduction of God into the theory avoided. Thus the\nlogical outcome of the doctrine that the _esse_ of physical things is\nmerely _percipi_, would have been either Solipsism, the doctrine\naccording to which I have no certain knowledge of any existence except\nmy own, everything else being a mere state or modification of myself; or\nthe Humian scepticism, which resolves my own existence, as well as that\nof the external world, into a mere sequence of fleeting mental\nprocesses. Conversely, if I have adequate reason to believe that any\nmember of the physical order whatever is more than a presentation, and\nhas an existence in some sense independent of my perception, I have no\nright to declare of any member of that order, unless for special\nreasons, that its being consists _merely in_ being perceived.\n\n\u00a7 3. Why, then, did Berkeley, as a matter of fact, accept neither the\nsolipsist nor the sceptical conclusion? Why does he, after all, credit\nthe members of the physical order with an existence independent of the\nfact of my perceiving them, and thus introduce a patent contradiction\ninto his system? It is not hard to see the reasons by which he must have\nbeen influenced. The whole physical order cannot be dismissed as a mere\nsubjective illusion, because there are some members of it which\nundoubtedly have an existence independent of the fact of being perceived\nby my sense-organs. Such members are my own body and the bodies of my\nfellow-men.\n\nBoth my own body and those of my fellow-men, as they are perceived by\nthe various special senses, belong to the physical order, and share its\nqualities. But over and above its existence as a member of the perceived\nphysical order, my own body has further another quite different kind of\nexistence. It is, in so far as I perceive its parts, as I do other\nbodily existence, by the sensations of the various special sense-organs,\na complex of presentations, like everything else in the physical world.\nBut my body is not merely an object presented to me by the organs of the\nspecial senses; it is also something which I feel as a whole in common\nor organic sensation, and in the changing organic thrills of my various\nemotional moods. This unique feeling of my body as a whole accompanies\nevery moment of my conscious life and gives each its peculiar tone, and\nthere seems to be no doubt that it forms the foundation of the sense of\npersonal identity. If we recollect the essentially teleological\ncharacter of feeling, we shall be inclined to say that my body as thus\napprehended is nothing other than myself as a striving purposive\nindividual, and that my experience of it is the same thing as the\nexperience of my purposive attitudes towards my environment. It is, in\nfact, this experience of my body as apprehended by immediate feeling,\nthat Psychology describes as the \u201csubject\u201d of the various \u201cmental\nstates\u201d of which it formulates the laws. For Metaphysics, it does not\nseem too much to say, this double existence of my own body, as a\npresented object about which I have knowledge in the same way as about\neverything else, and as an immediately felt unity, affords the key to\nthe whole problem of the \u201cindependent\u201d existence of a reality beyond my\nown presentations. To see how this comes about, we must first consider\nthe influence it has on our conception of one very special part of the\nphysical order, the bodies of our fellows.\n\nThe bodies of our fellow-men are, of course, from one point of view\ncomplexes of presentations which we receive through our sense-organs; so\nfar their _esse_, as Berkeley would have said, is _percipi_. But all\npractical communion with my fellows through the various institutions of\nsociety is based upon the conviction that, over and above their\nexistence as presentation-complexes, or contents of my perceptive\nstates, the bodies of my fellows have the same kind of existence as\ndirectly apprehended in immediate feeling which I ascribe to my own. In\nother words, all practical life is a mere illusion, unless my fellow-men\nare, like myself, centres of purposive experience. By the existence\nindependent of my own perception which I ascribe to them, I mean\nprecisely existence as feeling purposive beings. Hence, unless all\nsocial life is an illusion, there is at least one part of the physical\norder, external to myself, of which the _esse_ is not mere _percipi_,\nbut _percipere_, or rather _sentire_. If my fellow-men are more than\ncomplexes of presentations or \u201cideas in my head,\u201d then the subjectivist\nreduction of all reality to states of my \u201cconsciousness\u201d breaks down, at\nleast for this part of the physical order. Hence the acceptance or\nrejection of the subjectivist theory will ultimately depend on the\nnature of the evidence for the independent existence of human feelings\nand purposes beyond my own.\n\nOn what grounds, then, do we attribute such \u201cindependent\u201d existence as\nexperiencing subjects to our fellows? According to the current\nsubjectivist explanation, we have here a conclusion based on the\nargument from the analogy between the structure of my own body, as\npresented in sense-perception, and those of others. I infer that other\nmen have a mental life like my own, because of the visible resemblances\nbetween their physical structure and my own, and this inference receives\nadditional support from every fresh increase in our anatomical and\nphysiological knowledge of the human frame. But, being an argument from\nanalogy, it can never amount to a true scientific induction, and the\nexistence of human experience, not my own, must always remain for the\nsubjectivist a probability and can never become a certainty.\n\nI am convinced that this popular and superficially plausible view is\nradically false, and that its logical consequence, the belief that the\nreal existence of our fellows is less certain than our own, is a grave\nphilosophical error. That the argument from analogy is no sufficient\nbasis for the belief in human experience beyond my own, can easily be\nseen from the following considerations:\u2014(1) As ordinarily stated, the\ndata of the supposed inference do not actually exist. For what I\nperceive is not, as the subjectivist assumes, three terms\u2014my own mental\nlife, my own anatomical structure, and the anatomy of my neighbour, but\ntwo, my own mental life and my neighbour\u2019s anatomy. If I cannot be sure\nof the reality of my neighbour\u2019s experience until I have compared the\nanatomy and physiology of his organism with that of my own, I shall have\nto remain in doubt at least until science can devise a mechanism by\nwhich I can see my own nervous system. At present one of the terms on\nwhich the analogical argument is said to be based, namely, my own\ninternal physical structure, has to be mostly taken on trust. It would\nbe little less than the truth to invert the subjectivist\u2019s position, and\nsay that, until science can devise means for seeing our own brains, we\ninfer the resemblance of our own anatomy to our neighbour\u2019s from the\npreviously known resemblance of his inner experience and ours.\n\n(2) And even supposing this difficulty already surmounted, as it\nconceivably will be in the future, there is a still more serious flaw in\nthe presumed analogical inference. If I once have good ground for the\nconviction that similarity of inner experience is attended by similarity\nof physical structure, then of course I can in any special case treat\nthe degree of structural resemblance between one organism and another as\na sufficient reason for inferring a like degree of resemblance between\nthe corresponding inner experiences. But upon what grounds is the\ngeneral principle itself based? Obviously, if my own inner experience is\nthe only one known to me originally, I have absolutely no means of\njudging whether the external resemblances between my own organism and\nyours afford reason for crediting you with an inner experience like my\nown or not. If the inference by analogy is to have any force whatever in\na particular case, I must already know independently that likeness of\noutward form and likeness of inner experience at least in some cases go\ntogether. The plausibility of the usual subjectivist account of the way\nin which we come to ascribe real existence to our fellows, is simply due\nto its tacitly ignoring this vital point.\n\nHow, then, do we actually learn the existence of feeling purposive\nexperience outside our own? The answer is obvious. We learn it by the\nvery same process by which we come to the clear consciousness of\nourselves. It is a pure blunder in the subjectivist psychology to assume\nthat somehow the fact of my own existence as a centre of experience is a\nprimitive revelation. It is by the process of putting our purposes into\nact that we come to be aware of them as our purposes, as the meaning of\nour lives, the secrets of what we want of the world. And, from the very\nfact of our existence in a society, every step in the execution of a\npurpose or the satisfaction of a want involves the adjustment of our own\npurposive acts to those of the other members of our social whole. To\nrealise your own ends, you have to take note of the partly coincident,\npartly conflicting, ends of your social fellows, precisely as you have\nto take note of your own. You cannot come to the knowledge of the one\nwithout coming by the same route and in the same degree to the knowledge\nof the other. Precisely because our lives and purposes are not\nself-contained, self-explaining wholes, we cannot possibly know our own\nmeaning except in so far as we know the meaning of our immediate\nfellows. Self-knowledge, apart from the knowledge of myself as a being\nwith aims and purposes conditioned by those of like beings in social\nrelations with myself, is an empty and senseless word.\n\nThe recent psychological studies of the part which imitation plays in\nall learning make this result still more palpably manifest. For they\nreveal the fact that, to an enormous extent, it is by first repeating\nwithout conscious aim of its own the significant purposive acts of\nothers that a child first comes to behave with conscious significance\nitself. It is largely by learning what others mean when they utter a\nword or execute a movement that the child comes to know his own meaning\nin using the same word or performing the same movement. Thus we may\nconfidently say that the reality of purposive significant experience\nwhich is not my own is as directly certain as the reality of my own\nexperience, and that the knowledge of both realities is inevitably\ngained together in the process of coming to clear insight into my own\npractical aims and interests. The inner experience of my fellows is\nindubitably real to the same degree as my own, because the very\nexistence of my own purposive life is meaningless apart from the equal\nexistence of theirs.[122]\n\n\u00a7 4. We may now apply the results obtained in the previous section to\nthe general question as to the \u201cindependent\u201d existence of the physical\norder. In doing so we observe two consequences of the highest\nimportance. (1) Now that we have found that at least a part of that\norder, namely, the bodies of our fellow-men, are not mere complexes of\npresentations in our own experience, but have a further existence as\nthemselves experiencing subjects, and are so far \u201cindependent\u201d of their\nactual presentation in our own experience, we can no longer conclude,\nfrom the dependence of the physical order for its sensible properties\nupon presentation to ourselves, that it has no further existence of its\nown. If one part of that order, which as presented stands on the same\nfooting with the rest, and is, like it, dependent on presentation for\nits sensible properties, is certainly known to be more than a mere\npresentation-complex, the same _may_ at least be true of other parts. We\ncan no longer assert of any part of the physical order, without special\nproof, that its _esse_ is merely _percipi_.\n\nWe may go a step further. Not only _may_ other parts of the physical\norder possess a reality beyond the mere fact of being presented to our\nsense-perception, but they _must_. For (_a_) we have to take note, for\nthe obtaining of our own practical ends, of the factors in our\n_material_ environment precisely as we have to take note of the\npurposive behaviour not our own which forms our _social_ environment.\nJust as our own inner life has no coherent significance except as part\nof a wider whole of purposive human life, so human society as a system\nof significant conduct directed to the attainment of ends, cannot be\nunderstood without reference to its non-human surroundings and\nconditions. To understand my own experience, reference must be made to\nthe aims, ideals, beliefs, etc. of the social whole in which I am a\nmember; and to understand these, reference has again to be made to\ngeographical, climatic, economical, and other conditions. Thus of the\nphysical order at large, no less than of that special part of it which\nconsists of the bodies of my fellows, it is true to say that its\nexistence means a great deal more than the fact of its presentation.\nUnperceived physical existence must be real if I am myself real, because\nmy own inner life is unintelligible without reference to it.\n\n(_b_) This conclusion is further strengthened by the evidence supplied\nby the various sciences, that human life forms part of a great system\ncharacterised by evolution or development. If one part of a connected\nhistorical development is more than a complex of presentations, the\nother stages of that development cannot possibly be mere\npresentation-complexes. Against any \u201cIdealism\u201d which is mere\nSubjectivism or Presentationism calling itself by a less suspicious\nname, it would be a sound and fair argument to contend that it reduces\nevolution to a dream, and must therefore be false.[123]\n\nIt cannot, then, be true of the physical order as a whole, that it has\nno reality beyond the fact of its presentation to my senses. Elements in\nit not so presented must yet have reality, inasmuch as my own inner life\nrequires the recognition of their reality as a fundamental condition of\nthe realisation of my own \u201csubjective\u201d ends. As the facts of\nhallucination, \u201csuggestion,\u201d and subjective sensation show, what appears\nto us as an element in the physical order _may_ sometimes have no\nreality beyond the fact of its appearance; there _may_ be presented\ncontents of which it would be true to say that their _esse_ is\n_percipi_. But the very possibility of distinguishing such hallucinatory\npresentations from others as illusory, is enough to prove that this\ncannot be true of the whole physical order. It is precisely because\nphysical existence in general is something more than a collective\nhallucination, that we are able in Psychology to recognise the\noccurrence of such hallucinations. As has been already observed, you are\nnever justified in dismissing an apparent fact of the physical order as\nmere presentation without any further reality behind it, unless you can\nproduce special grounds for making this inference based upon the\ncircumstances of the special case.\n\n(2) The second important consequence of our previous conclusion is\nthis,\u2014We have now seen what was really meant, in the crucial case of our\nfellow-men, by maintaining an existence \u201cindependent\u201d of the fact of\npresentation to our sense-organs. Their \u201cindependent\u201d existence meant\nexistence as centres of experience, as feeling, purposive beings. The\nwhole concept of \u201cindependent\u201d existence was thus social in its origin.\nWe have also seen that the grounds on which an \u201cindependent\u201d existence\nmust be ascribed to the rest of the physical order are essentially of\nthe same kind as those on which we asserted the \u201cindependent\u201d existence\nof our fellow-men. It appears patent, then, that \u201cindependent\u201d existence\nmust have the same general sense in both cases. It can and must mean the\nexistence of centres of sentient purposive experience. If we are serious\nin holding that the _esse_ of the physical order, like that of ourselves\nand our fellows, is not mere _percipi_, we must hold that it is\n_percipere_ or _sentire_. What appears to us in sense-perception as\nphysical nature must be a community, or a complex of communities of\nsentient experiencing beings: behind the appearance the reality[124]\nmust be of the same general type as that which we, for the same reasons,\nassert to be behind the appearances we call the bodies of our fellows.\n\nThis conclusion is not in the least invalidated by our own inability to\nsay what in particular are the special types of sentient experience\nwhich correspond to that part of the physical order which lies outside\nthe narrow circle of our own immediate human and animal congeners. Our\nfailure to detect specific forms of sentience and purpose in what we\ncommonly call \u201cinorganic\u201d nature, need mean no more than that we are\nhere dealing with types of experience too remote from our own for\ndetection. The apparent deadness and purposelessness of so much of\nnature may easily be illustrated by comparison with the apparent\nsenselessness of a composition in a language of which we are personally\nignorant. Much of nature presumably appears lifeless and purposeless to\nus for the same reason that the speech of a foreigner seems senseless\njargon to a rustic who knows no language but his own.\n\nIt would be easy, but superfluous, to develop these ideas more in detail\nby the free use of imaginative conjecture. The one point of vital\nprinciple involved is that on which we have already insisted, that\nexistence \u201cindependent\u201d of sense-perception has only one intelligible\nmeaning. Hence it must have this same meaning whenever we are compelled\nto ascribe to any part of the perceived physical order a reality which\ngoes beyond the mere fact of its being perceived. The assertion that the\nphysical order, though dependent for its perceived qualities upon the\npresence of a percipient with sense-organs of a particular type, is not\ndependent on any such relation for its existence, if it is to have any\ndefinite meaning at all, must mean for us that that order is phenomenal\nof, or is the appearance to our special human sense-organs of, a system\nor complex of systems of beings possessing the same general kind of\nsentient purposive experience as ourselves, though conceivably\ninfinitely various in the degree of clearness with which they are aware\nof their own subjective aims and interests, and in the special nature of\nthose interests.\n\n\u00a7 5. We may end this chapter by drawing certain conclusions which follow\nnaturally from the acceptance of this doctrine. (1) It is clear that the\nresult we have reached by analysis of what is implied in the\n\u201cindependent\u201d existence of the physical order agrees with our previous\nconclusions as to the general structure of Reality. For we saw in our\nlast Book that it seemed necessary to hold not only that Reality as a\nwhole forms a single individual experience, but also that it is composed\nof members or elements which are themselves sentient experiences of\nvarying degrees of individuality. And in our discussion of the unity of\nthe thing we saw reason to hold that nothing but a sentient experience\ncan be individual; thus we had already convinced ourselves that if there\nare things which are more than complexes of presentations arbitrarily\nthrown together for the convenience of human percipients in dealing with\nthem as unities, those things must be sentient experiences on subjects\nof some kind. We have now inferred from the actual consideration of the\nphysical order that it does, in point of fact, consist of things of this\nkind. Our result may thus be said to amount in principle to the logical\napplication to physical existence of the previously ascertained\nconclusion, that only what is to some degree truly individual can be\nreal.\n\nIt is interesting to contrast with this consequence of our metaphysical\nattempt to interpret the course of physical nature, the result which\ninevitably follows from consistent adherence to the procedure of\ndescriptive science. The whole procedure of descriptive science depends\nupon our willingness to shelve, for certain purposes, the problem\nwherein consists the reality of the physical order, and to concentrate\nour interest upon the task of adequately and with the greatest possible\neconomy of hypothesis describing the system of presented contents in\nwhich it reveals itself to our senses. For purely descriptive purposes,\nour sole interest in the physical order is to know according to what\nlaws of sequence one presented content follows upon another. Hence, so\nlong as we can establish such laws of connection between presented\ncontents, it is for purely scientific purposes indifferent how we\nimagine the Reality in which the sequence of presentation has its\nground. Whether we think of it as a system of finite subjects, the will\nof a personal Deity, a complex of primary qualities, or an unknown\nsubstratum, or whether we decline to raise any question whatever about\nthe matter, the results are the same, so long as our sole object is to\nexhibit the sequence of presented sense-contents as regulated by laws\nwhich admit of calculation. Science can go its way in entire\nindifference to all these alternative metaphysical interpretations of\nthe Reality which is behind the phenomenal order.\n\nThe logical consequence of this absorption in the problem of describing\nthe phenomenal sequence of events, apart from inquiry into their ground,\nis that the more thoroughly the task is carried out the more completely\ndoes individuality disappear from the physical order as scientifically\ndescribed. Everyday thought looks on the physical order as composed of\ninteracting things, each of which is a unique individual; current\nscience, with its insistence on the uniform behaviour of the different\nelements of the material world, inevitably dissolves this appearance of\nindividuality. In the more familiar atomic theories, though the\ndifferences between the behaviour of the atoms of different elements are\nstill retained as ultimate, the atoms of the same element are commonly\nthought of as exact replicas of each other, devoid of all individual\nuniqueness of behaviour. And in the attempts of contemporary science to\nget behind atomism, and to reduce all material existence to motions in a\nhomogeneous medium, we see a still more radical consequence of the\nexclusive adoption of an attitude of description. Individuality has here\ndisappeared entirely, except in so far as the origination of\ndifferential motion in a perfectly homogeneous medium remains an\nultimate inexplicability which has to be accepted as a fact, but cannot\nbe reconciled with the theoretical assumptions which have led to the\ninsistence upon the homogeneity of the supposed medium.\n\nThe logical reason for this progressive elimination of individuality\nfrom scientific descriptions of the processes of the physical order\nshould now be manifest. If all individuality is that of individual\nsubjects of experience, it is clear that in disregarding the question of\nthe metaphysical ground of the physical order we have already in\nprinciple excluded all that gives it individuality from our purview; the\nmore rigorously logical our procedure in dealing exclusively with the\nphenomenal contents of the physical order, the less room is left for any\nrecognition of an element of individuality within it. Our purpose to\ndescribe the phenomenal logically involves description in purely general\nterms. It is only when, in Metaphysics, we seek to convert description\nof the phenomenal into interpretation of it as the appearance to sense\nof a more ultimate Reality, that the principle of the individuality of\nall real existence can come once more to its rights.\n\n(2) It is perhaps necessary at this point to repeat, with special\nreference to the interpretation of the physical order, what has already\nbeen said of all interpretation of the detail of existence by reference\nto its ground. We must be careful not to assume that lines of division\nwhich we find it convenient for practical or scientific purposes to draw\nbetween things, correspond to the more vital distinctions between the\ndifferent individual subjects of experience which we have seen reason to\nregard as the more real existences of which the physical order is\nphenomenal. This is, _e.g._, an error which is committed by confident\ntheories of the animation of matter which attribute a \u201csoul\u201d to each\nchemical atom. We must remember that many of the divisions between\nthings which we adopt in our descriptive science may be merely\nsubjective demarcations, convenient for our own special purposes but\npossibly not answering to any more fundamental distinctions founded on\nthe nature of the realities of the physical order themselves. It does\nnot in the least follow from our view of nature as the manifestation to\nour senses of a system of sentient individuals, that the relations\nbetween those individuals are adequately represented by the relations\nbetween the different factors of the material world as it is constructed\nin our various scientific hypotheses.\n\nThus, _e.g._, our own self-knowledge and knowledge of our fellows show\nthat in some sense there is a single experience corresponding to what,\nfor physical science, is the enormous complex of elements forming the\ndominant centres of the human nervous system. But apart from our direct\ninsight into human experience, if we only knew the human nervous system\nas we know a part of inorganic nature, we should be quite unable to\ndetermine that this particular complex was thus connected with an\nindividual experience. In general we have to admit that, except for that\nsmall portion of physical nature in which we can directly read purposive\nexperience of a type specially akin to our own, we are quite unable to\nsay with any confidence how nature is organised, and what portions of it\nare \u201corganic\u201d to an individual experience. This caution must be\nconstantly borne in mind if we are to avoid the abuse of our general\ntheory of the meaning of the physical order in the interests of\n\u201cspiritualistic\u201d and other superstitions. It may also serve to guard\nagainst over-hasty \u201cPhilosophies of Nature,\u201d like those of Schelling and\nHegel, which start with the unproved assumption that approximation to\nthe human external form of organisation is a trustworthy indication of\nthe degree in which intelligent experience is present in physical\nnature.\n\n(3) One more point may receive passing notice. It is clear that if\nphysical nature is really a society or a number of societies[125] of\nexperiencing subjects, we must admit that, from the special character of\nour human experience with its peculiar interests and purposes, we are\nnormally debarred from social communion with any members of the system\nexcept those who are most akin in their special type of purposive life\nto ourselves. Of the vast majority of the constituents of the physical\norder it must always be true that, while we may be convinced, on grounds\nof general metaphysical theory, that they possess the character we have\nascribed to them, we have no means of verifying this conclusion in\nspecific cases by the actual direct recognition of the individual life\nto which they belong, and consequent establishment of actual social\nrelations with them. Yet it does not follow that we are always\nabsolutely debarred from such direct social relations with extra-human\nsentient life. The \u201cthreshold of intercommunicability\u201d between physical\nnature and human intelligence may conceivably be liable to fluctuations\nunder conditions at present almost entirely unknown. Conceivably the\ntype of experience represented in literature by the great poets to whom\nthe sentient purposive character of physical nature has appealed with\nthe force of a direct revelation of truth, and known in some degree to\nmost men in certain moods, may depend upon a psychological lowering of\nthis threshold. It is thus at least a possibility that the poet\u2019s\n\u201ccommunion with nature\u201d may be more than a metaphor, and may represent\nsome degree of a social relation as real as our more normal relations\nwith our human fellows and the higher animals. It may be true that in\nthe relations of man with nature, as in his relations with man, it is\nthe identity of purpose and interest we call love which is the great\nremover of barriers.\n\n(4) It should hardly be needful to point out that such a view of the\nmeaning of nature as has been defended in this chapter is in no way\nopposed to, or designed to set artificial restrictions on, the\nunfettered development of descriptive physical science. Whatever our\nview of the ultimate nature of the physical order, it is equally\nnecessary on any theory for the practical control of natural processes\nin the service of man to formulate laws of connection between these\nprocesses. And the work of formulating those laws can only be\nsatisfactorily done when the analysis of the physical order as a system\nof sense-contents is carried on with complete disregard of all\nmetaphysical problems as to its non-phenomenal ground. It would not even\nbe correct to say that, if our metaphysical interpretation is valid, the\nview of nature presented in descriptive physical science is _untrue_.\nFor a proposition is never untrue simply because it is not the whole\ntruth, but only when, not being the whole truth, it is mistakenly taken\nto be so. If we sometimes speak in Philosophy as though whatever is less\nthan the whole truth must be untrue, that is because we mean it is\nuntrue _for our special purposes_ as metaphysicians, whose business is\nnot to stop short of the whole truth. For purposes of another kind it\nmay be not only true, but _the_ truth.[126]\n\nOur metaphysical interpretation of the physical order is no more\nincompatible with full belief in the value and validity for _their own\npurposes_ of the results of abstract descriptive science, than the\nrecognition of the singleness and purposiveness of a human experience\nwith the equal recognition of the value of physiological and anatomical\ninvestigation into the functions and mechanism of the human body. Of\ncourse a man, as he really exists, is something quite different from the\nphysiologist\u2019s or anatomist\u2019s object of study. No man is a mere walking\nspecimen of the \u201chuman organism\u201d; every man is really first and foremost\na purposive sentient agent. But this consideration in no way affects the\npractical value of anatomical and physiological research into the\nstructure of the man as he appears in another man\u2019s system of\nsense-presentations. What is true in this case is, of course, equally\napplicable in all others.\n\nWe have yet to discuss the most serious stumbling-block in the way of\nthe idealist interpretation of nature, the apparent conformity of its\nprocesses to rigid laws of sequence, which at first sight might seem to\nexclude the possibility of their being really the acts of purposive\nsubjects. This difficulty will form the topic of our succeeding chapter.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 22; L.\nT. Hobhouse, _Theory of Knowledge_, pt. 3, chap. 3; H. Lotze,\n_Metaphysic_, bk. ii. chaps. 5, 6; H. M\u00fcnsterberg, _Grundz\u00fcge der\nPsychologie_, i. pp. 65-92; K. Pearson, _Grammar of Science_, chap. 2\n(The Facts of Science), 8 (Matter) [mainly written from the\n\u201cphenomenalist\u201d standpoint, but with unconscious lapses into a more\nmaterialistic view]; J. Royce, Nature, Consciousness, and\nSelf-Consciousness\u201d (in _Studies of Good and Evil_); _The World and the\nIndividual_, Second Series, Lect. 4; J. Ward, _Naturalism and\nAgnosticism_, Lects. 1-5, 14, 19. Of the older philosophical literature,\nDescartes, _Meditation_ 6; Leibnitz, _Monadology_ and _New System_;\nLocke, _Essays_, bk. iv. chap. 11; Kant\u2019s \u201cRefutation of Idealism,\u201d in\nthe second edition of the _Critique of Pure Reason_, in addition to the\nalready cited works of Berkeley will probably be found most important.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 119:\n\n This definition of the physical order approximates very closely to\n that adopted by Prof. M\u00fcnsterberg in his _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_,\n vol. i. pp. 65-77. Prof. M\u00fcnsterberg defines a _physical_ fact as one\n which is directly accessible to the perception of a plurality of\n sentient individuals, as opposed to the psychical fact which can be\n directly experienced only by one individual. It must be remembered, of\n course, that my body as directly experienced in \u201ccommon sensation\u201d and\n \u201cemotional mood\u201d belongs to the psychical order. It is only my body as\n perceptible by other men that is a member of the physical order.\n\nFootnote 120:\n\n Cf. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 22, pp. 260-267 (1st\n ed.). The attempts which have been made to exempt \u201cprimary\u201d qualities\n from this relativity do not seem to demand serious criticism. The\n argument in the text applies as directly to extension and shape as to\n colour or smell. It is not defensible to contend, as Mr. Hobhouse\n does, that qualities, whether primary or secondary, depend on the\n percipient organ only for their _perception_, not for their existence.\n The contention rests upon taking two aspects of experience which are\n always given together, the _that_ and the _what_ of a sense-content,\n and arguing that because these two aspects of a single whole can be\n distinguished, therefore the one can exist in actual separation from\n the other. It would be quite as logical to infer by the same method\n and from the same premisses that there can be a perceptive state\n without any content, as that the contents can exist as we know them,\n apart from the state.\n\nFootnote 121:\n\n See particularly the detailed statement of his contention and the\n elaborate examination of objections in the _Three Dialogues between\n Hylas and Philonous_, which form a commentary on the briefer\n exposition of _Principles of Human Knowledge_, \u00a7\u00a7 1-134.\n\nFootnote 122:\n\n See the fuller exposition of this line of argument in Royce, _Studies\n in Good and Evil_, essay on \u201cNature, Consciousness and\n Self-Consciousness,\u201d to which I am largely indebted throughout the\n present chapter, and for a detailed criticism of the alleged\n \u201canalogical\u201d inference the closely related reasoning of my own essay\n on \u201cMind and Nature\u201d in _International Journal of Ethics_, October\n 1902. The similar but briefer criticism in Royce, _The World and the\n Individual_, Second Series, lecture 4, \u201cPhysical and Social Reality,\u201d\n p. 170, I had not had the opportunity to study when the above was\n written. For the whole subject of imitation, see in particular\n Professor Baldwin\u2019s _Mental Development in the Child and the Race_.\n\nFootnote 123:\n\n For a study of the significance of the \u201cpartial independence\u201d of the\n physical world on my will as a factor in producing belief in its\n \u201cexternal reality,\u201d see Stout, _Manual of Psychology_,^3 bk. iii. pt.\n 2, chaps. 1-2, \u201cThe Perception of External Reality.\u201d\n\nFootnote 124:\n\n The doctrine of degrees of reality must be borne in mind throughout\n this discussion. The reality of which the physical order is phenomenal\n may itself be phenomenal of a higher reality.\n\nFootnote 125:\n\n _Societies_ would be the more natural supposition. We have no reason\n to deny that the various types of non-human intelligence may be cut\n off from social intercourse with each other, as they are from\n intercourse with ourselves.\n\nFootnote 126:\n\n That is, there are degrees of truth as well as of reality, and the two\n do not necessarily coincide. The degree of truth a doctrine contains\n cannot be determined apart from consideration of the purpose it is\n meant to fulfil. For the special purposes of Metaphysics, the purpose\n of thinking of the world in a finally consistent way, whatever is not\n the whole truth is untrue. But what the metaphysician regards as the\n lesser truth may be the higher truth relatively to other purposes than\n his own. Compare the doctrine of Dr. Stout\u2019s essay on \u201cError\u201d in\n _Personal Idealism_.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE MEANING OF LAW\n\n\u00a7 1. The popular conception of the physical order as exhibiting a rigid\n mechanical conformity to general _laws_, conflicts with our\n metaphysical interpretation. \u00a7 2. Our interpretation would, however,\n admit of the establishment of averages or approximately realised\n uniformities by the statistical method, which deals with occurrence\n _en bloc_ to the neglect of their individual detail. \u00a7 3.\n \u201cUniformity\u201d in nature is neither an axiom nor an empirically\n verifiable fact, but a postulate. A consideration of the methods\n actually employed for the establishment of such uniformities or\n \u201claws\u201d of nature shows that we have no guarantee that actual\n concrete cases exhibit _exact_ conformity to law. \u00a7 4. Uniformity is\n a _postulate_ arising from our need of practical rules for the\n control of nature. It need not for this purpose be exact, and in\n point of fact our scientific formulae are only exact so long as they\n remain abstract and hypothetical. They do not enable us to determine\n the actual course of an individual process with certainty. \u00a7 5. The\n concept of the physical order as _mechanical_ is the abstract\n expression of the postulate, and is therefore essential to the\n empirical sciences which deal with the physical order. \u00a7 6.\n Consideration of the character of genuine machines suggests that the\n mechanical only exists as a subordinate aspect of processes which,\n in their full nature, are intelligent and purposive.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In our view of the underlying reality of the physical order, as\nexplained in the last chapter, we have scarcely gone further, except in\nthe explicitness of our phraseology, than we should be followed by many\nwho profess a complete disbelief in metaphysical construction and an\nexclusive devotion to positive natural science. From the side of\npositive science we have often been reminded that no hard-and-fast line\ncan logically be drawn between the organic and the inorganic, that we\nare not entitled to assume that the continuity of evolution ceases when\nwe are no longer able to follow it with our microscopes, that we are,\nwith the eye of scientific faith, to discern in the meanest particle of\nmatter the \u201cpromise and potency\u201d of all life, and so forth. All which\nstatements seem to be confused ways of suggesting some such conception\nof the physical order as we have attempted to put into more precise and\nlogical form. It is not until we come to deal with the problem indicated\nby the title of this chapter that our most serious difficulties begin.\nWe have to face the objections which may be urged against our view of\nthe physical order on the strength of the principle known in inductive\nLogic as the \u201cUniformity of Nature.\u201d\n\nThe events of the physical order, it may be urged, cannot be expressions\nof the more or less conscious purposes and interests of individual\ncentres of experience, and that for a simple reason. How a purposive\nagent will behave is always a mystery, except to those who actually\nunderstand his purposes. It is impossible, apart from actual insight\ninto those purposes, to infer from the mere examination of his past\nbehaviour what his behaviour in the future will be. For the special\ncharacteristic of purposive action is its power to find new ways of\nresponse to stimulus. Hence it is that we rightly regard the power to\nlearn by experience, that is, to acquire more and more _appropriate_\nreactions to stimulus, as the test of a creature\u2019s intelligence. Where\nthere is no progressive adaptability there is no ground to assume\nintelligence and purpose. Hence again the impossibility of calculating\nbeforehand with any certainty what course the behaviour of an\nintelligent being will take, unless you are actually aware of the\npurposes he is seeking to realise.\n\nNow, except in the case of the organic world, it may be urged, we do not\nfind progressive _adaptability_ in Nature. The inorganic constituents of\nthe physical order always react with absolute uniformity in the same way\nupon the same environment. Their behaviour exhibits absolutely\nundeviating conformity to general routine laws of sequence, and can\ntherefore be calculated beforehand, provided that the resources of our\nmathematics are adequate to deal with the problems it presents, with\nabsolute exactitude and certainty. That this routine uniformity exists\nin physical nature is, in fact, a fundamental principle in the logic of\ninductive science. Every indication of sentience and purpose is thus\nabsent from physical nature, outside the world of living organisms; it\nis a realm of rigid conformity to laws of sequence. And these sequences,\nbecause absolutely without exception and incapable of modification, are\npurely _mechanical_, _i.e._ non-purposive and non-intelligent. Nature\nis, in fact, a complicated _mechanism_, in which every event follows\nfrom its conditions with undeviating _necessity_.\n\nViews of this kind are often supposed to be logically necessitated by\nthe principles of physical science. It is manifest that if they are\nsound our whole preceding interpretation of the physical order is\ninvalidated. For this reason, as well as because of the far-reaching\nconsequences often drawn from them as to human freedom and moral\nresponsibility, it will be necessary to examine their foundation in some\ndetail.\n\n\u00a7 2. The main problems confronting us in this examination will then\nbe\u2014(1) How far is calculable uniformity of sequence really incompatible\nwith the presence of purpose and intelligence? (2) Have we any real\nground for ascribing _such_ uniformity to the actual sequences of\nphysical nature? (3) if not, What is the real logical character of the\nprinciple of the so-called uniformity of nature? (4) and What amount of\ntruth is contained in the conception of the physical order as a\n_mechanism_? Into the problem suggested by the popular contrast between\nthe _necessity_ of mechanical sequence and the _freedom_ of purposive\naction, it will be needless to enter at any length. For, as we saw in\ndealing with the popular view of necessary causal relation, the\nnecessity of a mechanical sequence is a purely subjective and logical\none. The sequence is necessary only in the sense that _we_ are\nconstrained, so long as we adhere to the purpose of thinking logically,\nto affirm the consequent when we affirm the antecedent. True _necessity_\nis always compulsion, and therefore, so far from being opposed to\npurposive action, can only exist where an actual purpose is overruled or\nthwarted.[127] So long as we are dealing solely with phenomenal sequence\nin the physical order, necessity is a mere anthropomorphic name for\nroutine undeviating uniformity of sequence.\n\n(1) _Calculable Uniformity and Intelligent Purpose._ It is sometimes\nassumed that all successful _prediction_ of a thing\u2019s behaviour is\nincompatible with the ascription of intelligence or purpose to the\nthing. Thus it has been argued, and continues to be argued in moral\nphilosophy of a popular type, that if we are intelligent beings with\npurposes of our own, it must always be impossible for an onlooker to\npredict how we shall behave in circumstances which have not yet arisen.\nThis extreme view of the incompatibility of calculability with\nintelligent purpose, however, manifestly rests on a double confusion. To\nbegin with, those who assert this view commonly make the mistake of\nsupposing that _prediction_ of the future stands somehow on a different\nlogical level from _calculation_ of the past from present data.\nPrediction of my future behaviour is supposed somehow to conflict with\nmy character as a purposive being in a way in which inference as to my\npast behaviour does not. This is, of course, an elementary fallacy in\nLogic. The conditions required for the successful inference of the\nabsent from the present are identical in the two cases, as we have\nalready seen in dealing with the problems of Causality. Precisely the\nsame kind of insight is requisite to judge how a given man must have\nbehaved in a certain situation in his past history as are needed to\ndetermine how he will behave in a situation which is yet to arise. We\nmay thus dismiss from consideration the special case of _prediction_,\nand confine ourselves to the general question, how far the general\ncalculability of the course of a process is incompatible with its\npurposive and intelligent character.\n\nAn answer to this question is at once suggested by reflection upon our\nordinary attitude towards such attempts to calculate the course of our\nown behaviour.[128] It is by no means every such calculation that we\nresent. So far from being affronted by the assumption that our conduct\nexhibits sufficient uniformity to admit of calculation, we expect our\npersonal friends to have sufficient reliance on its uniformity to assume\nwith confidence that we shall certainly do some things and refuse to do\nothers, that we must have acted in certain ways and cannot have acted in\nothers. \u201cYou ought to know me better than to suppose me capable of that\u201d\nis between friends a tolerably keen expression of reproach, \u201cI know I\ncan count on you to do it,\u201d a common expression of confidence. On the\nother hand, we should certainly resent the assumption on the part of a\ncomparative stranger of such a knowledge of our character as would\nwarrant confident calculation of our conduct, and if the calculation was\navowedly drawn not from personal knowledge at all, but from general\npropositions of Psychology or Anthropology, we should pretty certainly\nfeel that a more than accidental success threatened our moral\nindividuality.\n\nNow, what is the explanation of this difference of feeling? Manifestly\nit must be sought in the great difference between the grounds on which\nthe calculation is based in the two cases. In the first case we expected\nand welcomed the calculation, because we felt it to be founded upon our\nfriend\u2019s personal acquaintance with the guiding interests and purposes\nof our life; it was an inference based upon insight into our\n_individual_ character. In the other case we resented the success of the\ncalculation, because we assumed it to be made in the absence of any such\npersonal insight into our individual purposes and interests, on the\nbasis of mere general propositions about human nature. We rightly feel\nthat the regular success of calculation of this second sort is\ninconsistent with the ascription of any reality to our individual\ncharacter. If all our actions can be calculated from general theorems in\na science of human nature, without taking individual purpose into\naccount, then the apparent efficacy of individual interests and purposes\nin determining the course of our history must be an empty illusion; we\ncannot be truly intelligent agents, seeing that we never really do\nanything at all.\n\nThus we see that it seems necessary to draw a marked distinction between\ntwo types of calculability. Calculation based on insight into individual\ncharacter and purpose is so far from being inconsistent with\npurposiveness and intelligence, that the more coherent and systematic\nthe purposes by which a life is controlled, the more confident does such\ncalculation become. Calculation without such special knowledge, and\nbased upon mere general propositions, on the other hand, cannot be\nregularly successful where one has to deal with the behaviour of\nindividual purposive beings.[129]\n\nNow, the difficulty as to our interpretation of the physical order as\nthe presentation to our sense of a system of intelligent purposive\nbeings, is that the successes of physical science seem at first sight to\nshow that just this \u201cmechanical\u201d calculation of the course of events\nfrom observed sequence, without insight into underlying individual\npurpose, _is_ possible when we are dealing with physical nature. For, on\nthe one hand, we ourselves admitted that if physical nature is permeated\nby individual purposes, we do not know what those purposes in detail\nare; and, on the other, it is undeniable that physical science, which\nsystematically disregards their presence, has been signally successful\nin the past, and may be expected to be even more successful in the\nfuture, in detecting uniformities in physical nature, and so submitting\nit to exact calculation. Hence it might be thought that the actual\nsuccess of the empirical sciences cannot be reconciled with the\nprinciples of our metaphysical interpretation of the course of nature.\n\nWe must, however, draw a very important distinction. There is one method\nby which uniformities of a certain kind can be detected in the behaviour\nof purposive intelligent beings, without insight into the nature of\ntheir individual purposes\u2014the method of statistical averages. Thus,\nthough it would be quite impossible to say with certainty of any\nindividual man that he will shoot himself or will get married, except on\nthe strength of insight into his individual character and interests, we\nfind by experience that it is possible to say, within a certain narrow\nrange of error, what percentage of Englishmen will shoot themselves or\nwill get married in the year. The percentage is, of course, rarely or\nnever precisely realised in any one year, but the longer the period of\nyears we take for examination, the more exactly do the deviations from\nthe average in individual years compensate one another. The explanation\nis, of course, that on the whole the incentives to marriage or suicide,\nin a reasonably stable state of society, remain constant from year to\nyear, so that by taking an average of several years we can eliminate\nresults which are due to individual peculiarities of temperament and\nsituation, and obtain something like a measure of the degree in which\nthe general conditions of social existence impose a certain common trend\nor character on the interests and purposes of individuals.\n\nTwo things are at once noticeable in connection with all uniformities\nobtained by the method of averages. One is that the result formulated in\nthe statistical law is always one to which the actual course of events\nmay reasonably be expected to conform within certain limits of\ndeviation, never one to which we have a right to expect absolute\nconformity. Not only is the actual number of marriages, _e.g._, in any\none year, usually slightly above or below the average percentage\ncomputed, _e.g._, for a ten years\u2019 period, but as we compare one longer\nperiod with others, the average percentage for the longer period itself\nfluctuates. It is only in the \u201clong run,\u201d that is, in the impossible\ncase of the actual completion of an interminable series, that the\ncomputed average would be exactly realised. As every one who has to deal\nwith averages in any form knows, precise realisation of the computed\naverage within a finite series of cases would at once awaken suspicions\nof an error somewhere in our calculations. Thus the uniformities of this\nkind are never absolutely rigid; they are ideal limits to which the\nactual course of events is found to approximate within certain limits of\ndivergence.\n\nThe second point is that the existence of such a uniformity never\naffords logical ground for confident affirmation as to the actual event\nin a particular concrete case. To revert to our illustration, just as we\nhave no right to infer from the approximately constant percentage of\nmarriages per year in a given society, that this precise percentage will\nbe realised in any one special year, so we have still less right to\ninfer that a particular member of that society will or will not marry.\nNothing but insight into the character, situation, and interests of this\nspecial member of society can give me the right to judge with confidence\nhow he will actually behave. Similarly, it is possible to say within\ncertain limits of error how many persons over sixty years of age may be\nexpected to die in the next twelve months, but it would be the height of\nlogical presumption to infer that a particular man will die during the\nyear, except on the strength of special information about his pursuits,\nhabits, and general state of health.[130] Thus our general conclusion\nmust be, that calculation and the establishment of uniformities is\npossible, without insight into individual purpose, but that the\nuniformities thus obtained are always variable and approximate, and\nafford no safe ground for inference as to special concrete cases.\n\n\u00a7 3. (2) _Uniformity in Physical Nature._ The existence of ascertainable\nuniformities in physical nature, then, will not conflict with our\ngeneral interpretation of the physical order, provided that these\nuniformities are of the type just illustrated by reference to ordinary\nsocial statistics. On the other hand, the exact and rigid conformity of\nthe actual course of concrete events with such uniform general \u201claws,\u201d\nwould certainly be inconsistent with the presence of teleological\nadaptation to ends. A reign of rigid routine conformity to general law\ncannot co-exist with individual purposive life. Now, it is commonly\nassumed, and we shall shortly see that the assumption is both necessary\nand justified as a practical methodological postulate, that the \u201creign\nof law\u201d in physical nature is absolute. But are there any grounds for\nrecognising this assumption as more than a possibly unrealised postulate\nmade for human practical purposes? I think it is easy to show that there\nare none whatever, and that the conception of a nature devoid of purpose\nand sentience, and swayed absolutely by mechanical \u201claws,\u201d is simply a\nmetaphysical nightmare of our own invention.\n\nTo begin with, it is clear that the undeviating conformity of the actual\ncourse of any concrete process to scientific \u201claw\u201d cannot be verified as\nan empirical fact by observation or experiment. For in no observation or\nexperiment can we ever deal with the whole of any concrete actual event\nor process. We have always, for the purposes of our observation, to\nselect certain of the general aspects of the process, to which we attend\nas the \u201crelevant factors\u201d or \u201cconditions\u201d of the result, while we\ndisregard other aspects as \u201cimmaterial\u201d or \u201caccidental\u201d circumstances.\nAnd this artificial abstraction, as we saw in discussing Causality,\nthough indispensable for our practical purposes, is logically\nindefensible. Again, within the aspects selected for attention, all that\nexperiment can establish is that the deviation from uniform law, if\nthere is any deviation, is not sufficiently great to affect our\nmeasurements and calculations. But how far our standards of measurement\nare from rigid precision may be readily learned from the chapter on\nphysical standards in any good work on the logic of the inductive\nsciences.[131] Our failure to detect deviation from law is absolutely\nworthless as evidence that no deviation has taken place.\n\nThus, if the absolute uniformity of natural processes is more than a\npractical postulate, it must be an axiom, that is, it must be implied in\nthe very notion of those processes as elements in a systematic whole.\nBut it should at once be clear that we have no more ground for asserting\nsuch uniformity as an axiom, than we had for treating the causal\npostulate as axiomatic. It is by no means implied in the concept of a\nsystematic whole that its parts shall be connected by uniform law. For\nthe unity of the system may be teleological, that is, the parts may be\nconnected by the fact that they work together to realise the same end,\nto execute the same function. In that case the behaviour of any one part\nwill depend on the demands laid upon it by the plan which the working of\nthe system fulfils. As these demands vary from time to time, the\nbehaviour of the part under consideration will then vary\ncorrespondingly, though to all appearance its surroundings may, for a\nspectator who fails to grasp the end or purpose realised by the system,\nbe identical.[132] This is actually the case with those systematic\nwholes in which human insight can directly detect unity of purpose or\naim. A man with definite purposes before him does not react in a\nuniformly identical way upon situations which, apart from their relation\nto his purpose, would be pronounced identical. He learns, for instance,\nfrom previous failure in the same circumstances, and so acquires the\npower to react on them in a way better adapted to the obtaining of his\nend. Or his progressive execution of his purpose, where there has been\nno failure, may require different conduct on the two occasions. To speak\nwith strict logical accuracy, the situations, relatively to his special\npurpose, are never identical, though it may be no difference could be\ndetected in them apart from that relation to this peculiar purpose.\nRelatively to the system of intelligent purposes which realises itself\nthrough the circumstances, every situation is, properly speaking,\nunique.\n\nNow, if we consider the methods by which the uniformities called \u201claws\u201d\nof nature are actually formulated, we may see ground to conclude that\nthey may one and all be uniformities of the approximate non-exact type.\nIn many cases, if not all, these uniformities have manifestly been\nobtained by statistical methods. Thus, for example, when it is said that\nall the atoms of a given chemical element are absolutely alike, _e.g._,\nthat every atom of oxygen has the atomic weight 16, there is absolutely\nno valid ground for regarding this uniformity as actually realised\nwithout deviation in individual cases. If the atom should prove, as it\nmay, to be no more than a convenient device of our own, useful for\ncomputing the behaviour of sensible masses but with no real existence of\nits own, it is of course evident that there can be no question of the\nreal conformity of individual cases to the law. But even if there really\nare indivisible bodies answering to our conception of atoms, still we\nhave to remember that we have no means of dealing with the individual\natom directly. We infer its properties indirectly from the behaviour of\nthe sensible masses with which we can deal more directly. Hence, at\nmost, the statement that the atom of oxygen has a certain weight means\nno more than that we can for our practical purposes disregard any\npossible individual divergences from this value. The oxygen atoms, if\nthey really exist, might actually fluctuate in individual atomic weight\nabout an average; yet, so long as we cannot deal with them individually\nbut only in bulk, these fluctuations, if only sufficiently small, would\nproduce no appreciable effect on our results, and would therefore\nproperly be treated in our science as non-existent. Conceivably, then,\nsuch chemical uniformities may afford no safer ground for precise\nstatements about the weight of the individual atom, than anthropological\nstatistics do for precise statement about the actual height, weight, or\nexpectation of life of an individual man. And we can readily see that a\nnon-human observer with senses incapable of perceiving the individual\ndifferences between one man and another, might be led from the apparent\nuniformity of behaviour exhibited by large collections of human beings\nto the same sort of conclusions which we are tempted to make about\natoms.[133]\n\nSimilarly with other cases of apparently rigid uniformity. As any one\nwho has worked in a laboratory knows,[134] such results are in actual\npractice obtained by taking the mean of a long series of particular\nresults and treating the minor divergences from this mean as\nnon-existent because they are negligible for all practical purposes. In\nother words, the apparently rigid conformity of natural processes to\nuniform law is an inevitable consequence of the fact that we are\ndebarred by various limitations of a subjective kind from following the\ncourse of any process in its individual detail, and have therefore to\nmake all our inferences from the observation and comparison of series of\nprocesses sufficiently extended for individual differences to neutralise\neach other. But in all this there is absolutely no warrant for the\nconclusion that the course of any one individual process is absolutely\nuniform with that of any other. There is room within the uniformity got\nby these methods of comparison for an infinite variety of individual\ndetail, of which our scientific constructions take no account, either\nbecause our means of observation are insufficient to detect it, or\nbecause, when detected, it is of no significance for the original object\nof our science\u2014practical success in interference with the course of\nevents.\n\nIt is easy to point out some of the conditions upon which failure to\ndetect actually existing individual deviations from uniformity may\ndepend. Professor Royce has, in this connection, laid special stress\nupon one such condition, the limitation of what he calls the time-span\nof our attention. We are unable, as the student of Psychology knows, to\nattend to a process as a whole if its duration exceeds or falls short of\ncertain narrow limits. Now, there seems no foundation in the nature of\nthe attentive process for the special temporal limitations to which it\nis subject in our own experience, and we have no means of denying the\npossibility that there may be intelligent beings whose attention-span is\nmuch wider, or again, much more contracted, than our own. One can even\nconceive the possibility of a being with a power of varying the span of\nattention at will. Now, it is clear that if we could so vary our\nattention-span as to be able to take in as single wholes processes which\nare at present too rapid or too slow to be perceived by us in their\nindividual detail, such a purely subjective change in the conditions of\nour own attention might reveal individuality and purpose where at\npresent we see nothing but routine uniformity. In the same way, we can\nreadily understand that a being with a much wider attention-span than\nour own might fail to see anything but purposeless routine in the course\nof human history. Supposing that we are placed in the midst of a\nuniverse of intelligent purposive action, it is clear that we can only\nhope to recognise the nature of that action in the case of beings who\nlive, so to say, at the same rate as ourselves. A purposive adaptation\nto environment with consequent deviation from uniformity in reaction\nwould necessarily escape our notice if it took place with the rapidity\nof the beat of a gnat\u2019s wing, or again, if it required centuries for its\nestablishment.[135]\n\nOther similar subjective conditions which would necessarily cut us off\nfrom the recognition of purposive fresh adaptations widely different\nfrom those which occur in our own life, are the limitations of our power\nof attending to more than a certain number of presentations\nsimultaneously; and again, the restriction of our sense-perception to a\nfew types, and the impossibility of perceiving contents belonging to\nthose types when they fall below or above the lower and upper\n\u201cthresholds\u201d of sensibility. These considerations do not, of course,\npositively prove that the routine uniformity of natural processes is\nonly subjective appearance, but they are sufficient to show that there\nis no valid reason for taking it to be more, and in conjunction with our\nprevious positive argument for the sentient individuality of all real\nexistence, they suffice to bring our general interpretation of the\nphysical order under Mr. Bradley\u2019s canon that \u201cWhat must be and can be,\nthat _is_.\u201d\n\n\u00a7 4. (3) What, then, are we to make of the principle of the \u201cUniformity\nof Nature\u201d? Any principle which does actual work in science must somehow\nbe capable of justification, and if our interpretation of the physical\norder really conflicts with a fundamental scientific principle, it must\ncontain fallacy somewhere. Fortunately, there is no real conflict. In\ndealing with the principle of Uniformity, we must distinguish very\ncarefully between the sense in which it is actually required for the\npurposes of science and the sense which has been put upon it in the set\nof metaphysical doctrines popularly but illogically deduced from the\nactual procedure of the sciences. As we have seen already, it is\nimpossible to affirm the principle of Uniformity as an axiom of\nsystematic thought. It is also not capable of verification as an\nempirical truth. Its logical character must therefore be that of a\npostulate, an assumption defensible on the ground of practical\nusefulness, but only so far as it actually succeeds.\n\nNow, this is precisely the place which the principle fills in the actual\nprocedure of the sciences. We have absolutely no means of showing that\nthe concrete course of Nature is strictly uniform, as has already been\nseen. But also, we have no need, for our scientific ends, that it should\nbe uniform. All that we require is that natural processes, when dealt\nwith in the bulk, should exhibit no divergence from uniform routine\nexcept such as we may neglect for the purposes of practical calculation\nand control of the course of events. The actual success of the empirical\nsciences shows that this demand for approximate uniformity is actually\nfulfilled with sufficient closeness for all our practical purposes. That\nit would be so fulfilled we could have had no theoretical means of\ndivining before putting it to the actual test. In this sense the\nprinciple, like that of Causality may be said to be a postulate made _a\npriori_ and in advance of experience. But, once more like the principle\nof Causality, it could not be presumed to be trustworthy unless the\nsubsequent results of its employment vindicated it; it cannot,\ntherefore, be _a priori_ in the Kantian sense of being known to be true\nindependent of empirical verification.[136]\n\nThis result is confirmed by consideration of the way in which the\nprinciple of uniform law is actually applied to concrete cases.\nScientific laws, as we all know, are purely general and abstract. They\nstate not what _will_ happen, but what _would_ happen providing that\ncertain specified conditions and no others were operative in determining\nthe result. In this abstract form they are, of course, statements of\nexact and absolute uniformities. But in this abstract form they cannot\nbe directly applied to the calculation of the actual course of any\nprocess. To take, for instance, an example which has been used by\nProfessor Ward.[137] We learn in Mechanics that equilibrium is\nmaintained on the lever when the moments of the weights about the\nfulcrum are equal and opposite. As an abstract generalisation this is a\nstatement of a rigid uniformity. But in order that it may be universally\ntrue, we must suppose the conditions implied in the formulation of the\nproposition to be fulfilled. The lever itself must be absolutely rigid,\nand must be weightless; it must be of absolutely uniform structure, the\nfulcrum must be a mathematical point, in order that friction may be\nexcluded, and so forth. Similarly, the weights must be thought of as\nmere masses without any further difference of quality, and thus only\ncapable of affecting the lever through the one property of their weight;\ntheir attachments, again, must be of ideal tenuity, or fresh\ncomplications will be introduced. But when all these conditions have\nbeen taken into account, the principle has become so abstract as to\namount to the tautology that what only operates by its mass and its\ndistance from the fulcrum will not operate by any other property.\n\nIn any actual case, the course of events will be liable to be affected\nby all the conditions which had to be excluded from the abstract\nformulation of the principle. No actual lever will be weightless or\nincapable of being bent or broken; its construction will never be\nuniform. Actual loads, again, may influence the behaviour of a lever\ndifferently according to their bulk, their chemical composition, the\nnature of their attachments. At an actual fulcrum there will be some\ndegree of friction between the lever-bar and its support, and so on. In\nactual fact, any or all of these circumstances may affect the behaviour\nof the lever bar when the loads are suspended from it. Consequently, it\nis quite impossible to apply the mechanical generalisation with\ncertainty to determine the course of events in a concrete case.\n\nWhat holds good in this instance holds good in all similar cases of the\n\u201claws\u201d of nature. In so far as these laws are really exact they are all\nhypothetical, and deal only with the problem. What would be the course\nof a physical sequence, assuming its complete ground to be contained in\nthe conditions enumerated in the enunciation of the law? That is, they\nall, in so far as they are absolute, are different forms of the\ntautological proposition, that where there is nothing to make any\ndifference between two cases, there will be no difference. But the\nmoment we apply our laws to the calculation of the actual course of an\nindividual process, we have to recognise that the condition for their\nrigid exactness is absent; in the individual process there are always\naspects not comprised in the conditions for which the law was\nenunciated, and nothing but actual experience can inform us whether the\npresence of these aspects will perceptibly affect the result in which we\nare interested. As applied to the study of an individual process, the\nprinciple of Uniformity is thus a postulate, like the principle of\nCausality, which can only be justified by its actual success.\n\nAgain, like the principle of Causality, the principle of Uniformity may\nbe successful to different degrees, according to the special nature of\nthe processes for which it is assumed. As the causal postulate rested on\nthe assumption that a selection from the antecedents of an event may for\npractical purposes be treated as equivalent to its complete ground, so\nthe more general postulate of Uniformity rests on the assumption that\nindividual purpose may be left out of account in assigning the ground of\na process. It does not follow that these postulates will receive the\nsame amount of empirical justification for all departments of the\nphysical order. There may well be certain processes in which the\nindividual purposive character is so prominent that, even for our\npractical purposes, we cannot safely calculate their course without\ntaking their end or purpose into consideration. In that case the\nprinciple of Uniformity and that of Causality would, for this part of\nthe physical order, lose their practical value. It is a popular belief\nthat such a failure of these practical postulates actually takes place\nwhere we come to deal with the conscious volitions of human agents. The\nproblem is one which must be kept for fuller consideration in our next\nBook, but we can at present make two general statements.\n\n(1) Such a failure of the postulates of Causality and Uniformity in\napplication to a particular sphere would not involve a breach of the\nfundamental logical principle of Ground and Consequence, since, as we\nhave seen sufficiently already, both postulates impose special\nrestrictions on that principle for which the nature of the principle\nitself affords no warrant. It would thus not be an unthinkable or\nlogically untenable position to hold that no general laws of human\naction can be formulated.\n\n(2) While this extreme denial of the possibility of laws of human action\nis logically possible, the actual success of those sciences which deal\nwith human behaviour in the statistical way forbids us to accept it. The\nsuccess of these sciences shows that human behaviour, considered in the\ngross, does exhibit certain approximate uniformities. But there seems to\nbe no means of proving that all aspects of human behaviour would show\nsuch uniformity if considered in gross in the same fashion. It is at\nleast conceivable that some social activities would fail to exhibit\napproximation to an average value, no matter how extended the area and\nperiod taken as the basis of investigation. We might conceivably have to\nadmit that there are departments of social life for which no \u201claws\u201d can\nbe formulated. If we disregard this possibility in practice, the reason\nis a methodological one. It is our _interest_ to discover such\nuniformities, and therefore, as failure _may_ only mean a temporary\ncheck to the success of our investigations, we properly make it a rule\nof method to assume that it is no more than this. We treat all sequences\nas capable, by proper methods, of reduction to uniformity, for the same\nreason that we treat all offenders as possibly reclaimable. We desire\nthat they should be so, and we cannot prove they are not so, and we\ntherefore behave as if we knew they were so.\n\nA word may be said as to the nature of the practical need upon which the\npostulate of Uniformity is based. As we have previously seen, the allied\npostulate of Causality arose from the practical need of devising means\nfor the control of natural processes. But the causal postulate alone is\nnot enough to satisfy this need. For even if we can assume that every\nevent is determined, sufficiently for practical purposes, by its\nantecedents, and thus that the knowledge of those antecedents, when\nobtained, is a knowledge of the means to its production, our practical\ncommand over the production of the event is not yet assured. For we can\nhave no general confidence in our power to produce the event by\nemploying the ascertained means, so long as it is possible that the\nresult may on each occasion be affected by variations too minute for our\ndetection, or for other reasons not accessible to our perception. We\nneed to be assured that what seems the same to us is, for practical\npurposes, the same, and so that the employment of the _same_ means may\nbe trusted to lead to the same result. This is the condition which is\nexpressed in an abstract form by the principle of Uniformity, which\nstates that the course of natural processes conforms to general laws; in\ntheir actual application to the concrete processes of actual nature\nthese laws are properly practical rules for the production of effects,\nand their inviolability means no more than that we may successfully\ntreat as the same, in their bearing on the results in which we are\ninterested, things which appear the same in relation to certain\nstandards of comparison. As we have seen, the validity of this\nassumption could never have been known _a priori_; it can only be said\nto be actually valid where actual use has justified it. At the same\ntime, it is clearly a principle of method to assume the universal\napplicability of our practical postulates wherever it is to our interest\nthat they should be applicable, as explained in the last paragraph. This\nis why we rightly assume the applicability of the postulates in spheres\nwhere the successful establishment of general uniformities has not\nhitherto been effected, so long as no positive reason can be shown why\nthey should not apply. We shall find this last reflection suggestive\nwhen we come to deal with the ethical difficulties which have been felt\nabout the application of the postulates of Uniformity and Causality to\nvoluntary action.\n\nIt is of course clear that our reduction of Uniformity to a mere\npractical postulate does not introduce any element of pure \u201cchance\u201d into\nthe actual order of existing things. \u201cChance\u201d is a term with more than\none meaning, and its ambiguity may easily lead to misapprehensions.\nChance may mean (_a_) any sequence for which our actual knowledge cannot\nassign the ground. In this sense chance, as another name for our own\nmere ignorance, must of course be recognised by any theory which does\nnot lose sight of the fact of human ignorance and fallibility.\n\nOr again, chance may mean (_b_) a sequence of which the ground is\npartially understood. We may know enough of the ground of the sequence\nto be able to limit the possibilities to a definite number of\nalternatives, without knowing enough to say which alternative completely\nsatisfies the conditions in a special case. It is in this sense that we\nspeak of the \u201cchances\u201d of any one of the alternative events as capable\nof computation, and make the rules for their computation the object of\nspecial mathematical elaboration in the so-called \u201cTheory of\nProbability.\u201d\n\n(_c_) Finally, chance may mean \u201cpure\u201d chance, the existence of something\nfor which there is no \u201cground\u201d whatever, as it stands in no organic\ninterconnection with a wider system of real existence. Chance in this\nlast sense is, of course, absolutely excluded by our conception of the\nsystematic unity of the real as expressed in the principle of Ground and\nConsequence, as an ultimate axiom of all consistent thought. Our denial\nof the absolute validity of the principles of Causality and Uniformity\nwould only amount to the admission of \u201cpure\u201d chance into things if we\naccepted those principles as necessary consequences of the axiom of\nGround and Consequence. If they are mere practical postulates, which\npresent the axiom of Ground under artificial restrictions for which\nthere is no logical justification in the axiom itself, the admission\nthat they are not ultimately true in no way conflicts with full\nrecognition of the thorough systematic unity of existence; it merely\nmeans that the view of the nature of that unity assumed by our practical\npostulates, though eminently useful, is inadequate.\n\nWe may here conveniently recapitulate our results. On metaphysical\ngrounds, we felt compelled to regard the physical order as the\nmanifestation to our special sensibility of a system of interconnected\nbeings with sentient and purposive experiences like ourselves. The\napparent purposelessness and deadness of the greater part of that order\nwe explained as intelligible on the supposition that the subjective\npurposes and interests of many of its members are too unlike our own for\nour recognition. We then saw that if nature consists of such sentient\nexperiences, the apparent domination of it by absolute law and\nuniformity cannot be the final truth. Such uniformity as there is must\nbe approximate, and must result from our having to deal in bulk with\ncollections of facts which we cannot follow in their individual detail,\nand will thus be of the same type as the statistical uniformities\nestablished by the anthropological sciences in various departments of\nhuman conduct. Next, we saw that the uniformities we call the \u201claws\u201d of\nnature are, in fact, of this type; that they represent average results\ncomputed from a comparison of large collections of instances with which\nwe cannot, or cannot so long as we adhere to our scientific purpose,\ndeal individually, are only absolute while they remain hypothetical, and\nnever afford ground for absolute assertion as to the course of concrete\nevents.\n\nWe further saw that the only uniformity science requires of the actual\ncourse of nature is uniformity sufficiently close to enable us, for our\nspecial purposes, to neglect the individual deviations, and that the\nprinciple of Uniformity itself is not a logical axiom but a practical\npostulate, expressing the condition necessary for the successful\nformulation of rules for practical intervention in the course of events.\nFinally, while we saw that we have no _a priori_ logical warrant for the\nassumption that such rules can be formulated for all departments of the\nphysical order, we are bound on methodological grounds to assume that\nthey can, unless we have special positive reasons for believing the\ncontrary. Thus the universality of a postulate of uniformity does not\nmean that it is universally _true_, but that it has universally to be\nmade wherever we have an interest in attempting the formulation of\ngeneral rules.\n\n\u00a7 5. (4) _The Conception of the Physical Order as a Mechanism._ The\nconception of nature as rigidly conformable to general laws, finds its\ncompletest expression in the view of the whole physical order as a\ncomplicated _mechanism_.\n\nIt is not easy to say just how much is always implied when we hear of a\n\u201cpurely mechanical\u201d theory of the world or of physical processes.\nSometimes all that is meant is that the theory in question treats the\nprinciple of rigid uniformity according to general laws as an ultimate\naxiom. Sometimes, again, a \u201cmechanical view\u201d of the world is taken to\nmean, in a narrower sense, one which regards all the chemical,\nelectrical, and other processes of the physical order as merely\ncomplicated cases of change of configuration in a system of mass\nparticles. In this narrower sense the \u201cmechanical\u201d theory of the\nphysical world is another name for the somewhat crude form of realist\nMetaphysics according to which nothing exists but moving masses,\neverything in the form of secondary qualities being a subjective\nillusion. Both the wider and the narrower form of the mechanical view\nagree in treating the processes of physical nature as unintelligent and\nunconscious, and regarding them as completely determined by antecedent\nconditions, without reference to any end or purpose which they effect.\nThe theory owes the epithet \u201cmechanical\u201d to the analogy which is then\nsupposed to subsist between the physical order and the various machines\nof human construction, in which the various constituent parts similarly\nexecute movements determined by relation to the remaining parts, and not\nby any consciousness of an end to be attained.[138]\n\nIt is of course manifest that, so understood, the mechanical view of\nphysical processes is forced upon us by our practical needs wherever it\nis requisite to formulate rules for successful intervention in the\ncourse of nature. If we are to intervene with success in the course of\nevents, that course must, as we have already seen, be capable of being\nregarded as approximately uniform, otherwise we can have no security\nthat our intervention according to rule and precedent will have a\nuniform and unambiguous result. Hence, if we are to formulate general\nrules for practical intervention, we must be able to treat the course of\nthings as\u2014to all intents and purposes\u2014mechanical. And, on the contrary,\nif there are processes which cannot be even approximately regarded as\nmechanical, our power of framing general rules for the practical\nmanipulation of events cannot extend to those processes. The limits of\nthe mechanical view of events are likewise the limits of empirical\nscience and of the general precepts of the practical arts.\n\nWe see this admirably exemplified in the study of human natures. The\nbehaviour of large aggregates of human beings, as we have already\nlearned, exhibits approximate uniformity, at least in many respects, and\nmay thus be treated as to all intents and purposes mechanical in those\nrespects. Hence it is possible to have a number of empirical sciences of\nhuman nature, such as Ethnology and Sociology, in which those\nuniformities are collected and codified, and to base on these sciences a\nnumber of general prudential maxims for the regulation of our behaviour\ntowards our fellow-men considered in the abstract. But when we come to\ndeal with the actual conduct of concrete human individuals, the\nmechanical view, as we have seen, fails us. What a concrete individual\nwill do can only be inferred with certainty from the knowledge of his\ninterests and purposes; there can thus be no general science of\nindividual character, and consequently no general rules of prudence for\nbehaviour towards an individual fellow-man. It is not to the so-called\nsciences of human nature, but to personal experience of the individual\nhimself, we have to go for the knowledge how to regulate our conduct\ntowards the actual individuals with whom life brings us into direct and\nintimate personal relation. Philosophical reflection upon the nature and\nlimits of scientific knowledge fully confirms the verdict passed by the\npractical sense of mankind on the doctrinaire pedantry which seeks to\ndeduce rules for dealing with actual individuals from anything but\nconcrete understanding of individual character and purpose.\n\nThe mechanical view of physical processes is thus an indispensable\npostulate of the various empirical sciences which seek to describe those\nprocesses by the aid of general formul\u00e6. Hence the protests which are\nsometimes urged against the use of mechanical interpretations in\ndescriptive science are really in spirit no more than the expression of\na personal distaste for the whole business of scientific generalisation\nand description. If there are to be sciences of physical processes at\nall, these sciences must be mechanical, in the wider acceptation of the\nterm. It does not, however, follow because the mechanical view of\nphysical processes is a necessity for our empirical sciences, that this\nview is consequently ultimately true. As we have learned already, when\nwe pass from the statement that the processes of the physical order may,\nfor the purpose of description by general formul\u00e6, and the invention of\npractical methods for their production, be treated as to all intents\nmechanical, to the very different assertion that the physical order\nreally is rigidly mechanical, we have deserted empirical science for\ndogmatic Metaphysics, and our metaphysical dogma must stand or fall by\nits own ultimate coherency and intelligibility as a way of thinking\nabout Reality. The usefulness of the mechanical interpretation for other\npurposes is no evidence whatever of its value for the special purpose of\nthe metaphysician.[139]\n\n\u00a7 6. Our previous discussion has already satisfied us that, as\nMetaphysics, the postulate of Uniformity upon which the mechanical view\nof the physical order rests, is unintelligible and therefore\nindefensible. But we may supplement the discussion by one or two\nreflections which throw into striking relief the inadequacy of that\nconcept of the physical order as a huge self-acting machine which is so\noften offered us to-day as the last word of scientific thought. In the\nmechanical metaphysical theories two points always receive special\nemphasis. The physical order, according to the thorough-going exponents\nof the doctrine, is a mechanism which is (_a_) self-contained and\nself-acting, and (_b_) entirely devoid of internal purpose.\n\nNow, in both these respects the supposed world-machine differs\nabsolutely from the real machines upon analogy with which the mechanical\ntheory is in the last resort based. Every real machine is, to begin\nwith, the incarnation of the internal purpose of a sentient being. It is\nsomething which has been fashioned for the express object of attaining a\ncertain result, and the more perfect its structure the greater is the\nimpossibility of understanding the principle of construction without\ncomprehension of the result it is devised to effect. Why the various\nparts have precisely the shape, size, strength, and other qualities they\nhave, you can only tell when you know what is the work the maker of the\nmachine intended it to do. In so far as this is not the case, and the\nstructure of the machine can be explained, _apart_ from its specific\npurpose, by consideration of the properties of the material, the\npatterns of construction consecrated by tradition, and so forth, it must\nbe regarded as an imperfect realisation of its type. In a perfect\nmachine the character and behaviour of every part would be absolutely\ndetermined by the demands made on that part by the purpose to be\nfulfilled by the working of the whole; our inability ever to produce\nsuch a perfect mechanical structure causes all our actual machines to be\nimperfect and inadequate representations of the ideal we have before us\nin their construction.\n\nThus a true machine, so far from being purposeless, is a typical\nembodiment of conscious purpose. It is true that the machine, once set\ngoing, will continue to work according to the lines embodied in its\nconstruction irrespective of the adequacy with which they effect the\nrealisation of the maker\u2019s purpose. A watch, once wound up, will\ncontinue to go, though the indication of the lapse of time may, under\nfresh circumstances, cease to meet the interests of its maker or owner;\nand again, if the construction of the watch was faulty, it will not\nproperly execute the purpose for which it was made. The machine has in\nitself no power of fresh purposive adaptability by which to modify the\npurpose it reflects, or to remedy an initial defect in its execution.\nBut this merely shows that the purpose exhibited in the machine\u2019s\nconstruction originated outside the machine itself, and that the\noriginator had not the power to carry out his purpose with complete\nconsistency. It does not in the least detract from the essentially\nteleological and purposive character of the machine _qu\u00e0_ machine.\n\nThis brings us to our second point. Just as no true machine is\npurposeless, so no true machine is self-acting. Not only are all\nmachines in the end the product of designing intelligence, but all\nmachines are dependent upon external purposive intelligence for control.\nThey require intelligence to set them going, and they require it\nequally, in one form or another, to regulate and supervise their\nworking. However complicated a piece of machinery may be, however\nintricate its provisions for self-regulation, self-adjustment,\nself-feeding, and so forth, there is always, if you look carefully\nenough, a man somewhere to work it. The obvious character of this\nreflection has unfortunately not prevented metaphysicians from drawing\nstrange inferences from their own neglect of it.\n\nCloser reflection upon the true character of machinery would thus\nsuggest a very different interpretation of the analogy between the\nuniformities of the physical order and the regular working of our\nmachines from that adopted by the \u201cmechanical\u201d view of nature, as\nelaborated into a metaphysical doctrine. It would lead us to conceive of\nthe apparently mechanical as playing everywhere the same part which it\nfulfils in our own system of social life. We should think of the\nmechanical as filling an indispensable but subordinate place in\nprocesses which, in their complete character, are essentially\nteleological and purposive. Teleological action obviously depends for\nits success upon two fundamental conditions. It requires the\nestablishment of types of reaction which remain uniform so long as their\nmaintenance satisfies the attainment of the end towards which they are\ndirected, and at the same time the power of modifying those types of\nreaction from time to time so as to meet fresh situations encountered or\ncreated in the progressive attainment of that end. In our own individual\nphysical life these two conditions are found as the power to form\nhabits, and the power to initiate spontaneously fresh response to\nvariation in the environment. In so far as our dominant interests can be\nbest followed by the uniform repetition of one type of reaction,\nattention is diverted from the execution of the reaction which becomes\nhabitual, semi-conscious, and, as we correctly say, \u201cmechanical,\u201d the\nattention being thus set free for the work of initiating the necessary\nfresh modifications of habitual action. Our various industrial and other\nmachines are devices for facilitating this same division of labour. The\nmachine, once properly constructed and set in action, executes the\nhabitual reaction, leaving the attention of its supervisor free to\nintroduce the requisite relatively novel variations of response\naccording to new situations in the environment.\n\nThere is nothing to prevent our interpreting the mechanical uniformities\nexhibited by the physical order in terms of this analogy. We should then\nhave to think of the \u201claws\u201d or \u201cuniformities\u201d in physical nature as\ncorresponding to the habitual modes of reaction of the sentient beings\nof whose inner life the physical order is phenomenal; these uniformities\nwould thus be essentially teleological in their own nature, and would\nalso stand in intimate interrelation with the spontaneous initiation of\nfresh responses to variations in the environment on the part of the same\nsentient beings. Habit and spontaneity would mutually imply each other\nin nature at large as they do in our own psychical life, and the\n\u201cmechanical\u201d would in both cases be simply the lower level to which\nteleological action approximates in proportion as attention ceases to be\nnecessary to its execution.\n\nThis conception would harmonise admirably with the result of our\nprevious inquiry into the kind of evidence by which the existence of\nuniform \u201claws of nature\u201d is established. For it would be an inevitable\nconsequence of those subjective limitations which compel us to deal in\nbulk with processes we are unable to follow in their individual detail,\nthat our observation of the physical order should reveal the broad\ngeneral types of habitual response to typical external conditions, while\nfailing to detect the subtler modifications in those responses answering\nto special variations in those conditions. Just so the uniformities\nascertained by the statistical study of human nature are simply the\nexhibition on a large scale of the leading habitual reactions of human\nbeings upon typical external situations, as disentangled from the\nnon-habitual spontaneous responses to fresh elements in the external\nsituation with which they are inseparably united in any concrete life of\nindividual intelligent purpose.\n\nThere seems no objection to this conception of \u201claws of nature\u201d as being\nthe formul\u00e6 descriptive of the habitual behaviour of a complex system of\nsentient beings, beyond that based on the allegation that these \u201claws\u201d\nare absolute, exact, and without exception. We have seen already that\nphysical science has no means of proving this allegation, and no need\nwhatever to make it, the whole doctrine of \u201crigid,\u201d \u201cunvarying\u201d\nconformity to law being a mere practical postulate falsely taken by a\ncertain school of thinkers for an axiom. We have also seen that the\nnotion of rigid unvarying law is fundamentally irreconcilable with the\nonly intelligible interpretation we were able to give to the conception\nof the real existence of the physical order. Thus we have no reason to\naccept it as true, and the fullest ground for dismissing it as false.\nBut for the unintelligent superstition with which the \u201claws of nature\u201d\nare worshipped in certain quarters, it would indeed have been\nunnecessary to deal at such length and with such reiteration with so\nsimple a matter.\n\nOne suggestion, already made in slightly different words, may be once\nmore emphasised in conclusion. Even among human beings the relative\nprominence of fresh spontaneous adaptations and habitual reactions in\nthe life of the individual fluctuates greatly with the different\nindividuals. The \u201cintelligence\u201d of different men, as gauged by their\npower of fresh adaptive modification of established habits of reaction,\nranges over a great variety of different values. If we could acquire the\nsame kind of insight into the individual purposes of non-human agents\nthat we have into those of our immediate fellows, we should presumably\nfind an even wider range of differences in this respect. In principle we\nhave no means of setting any definite limits to the range in either\ndirection. We can conceive a degree of attentive control of reaction so\ncomplete that every reaction represents a fresh stage in the realisation\nof an underlying idea, so that intelligence is everything and habit\nnothing; and again, we can conceive a state of things in which mere\nhabit is everything and intelligent spontaneity nothing. Somewhere\nbetween these ideal limits all cases of finite purposive intelligence\nmust be comprised, and it would be easy to show that neither limit can\nbe actually reached by finite intelligence, though there may be\nindefinite approximation to either.[140]\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. Introduction X.\n(Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 18), bk. ii. chaps. 7, 8 (Eng. trans., vol.\nii. pp. 66-162); E. Mach, _The Science of Mechanics_, pp. 481-504\n(Eng. trans.); K. Pearson, _Grammar of Science_, chaps. 3 (The\nScientific Law), 9 (The Laws of Motion); J. Royce, \u201cNature,\nConsciousness, and Self-consciousness\u201d (in _Studies of Good and\nEvil_); J. Stallo, _Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics_, chaps.\n1, 10-12 (metaphysical standpoint, \u201cPhenomenalist\u201d); J. Ward,\n_Naturalism and Agnosticism_, part 1, lects. 2-5.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 127:\n\n Speaking strictly, all necessity would appear to arise from the\n presence of conflicting purposes or interests in the _same_\n experience. _E.g._, the logical necessity of affirming the conclusion\n when the premisses are affirmed, implies (1) the presence of the\n general purpose to think logically; (2) the presence of some purpose\n or interest which, if gratified, would demand the affirmation of a\n result inconsistent with the previously affirmed premisses; (3) the\n repression of this affirmation by the dominant purpose (1). I believe\n that careful analysis will reveal these same elements in every genuine\n case of necessitation. _I.e._ the mere defeat of my purpose is not\n true necessitation unless it is defeated by a second interest or\n purpose which I also identify with myself. Thus all necessity would\n ultimately be self-imposed. This is not without its bearing on Ethics,\n as we shall see.\n\nFootnote 128:\n\n Compare with what follows, F. H. Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, Essay 1,\n and _infra_, Bk. IV. chap. 4.\n\nFootnote 129:\n\n Our ordinary calculations as to the behaviour of our fellow-men,\n beyond the circle of our own intimates, seem to involve a mixture of\n the two types. We base our conclusions partly on conjectures drawn\n from the observed past acts of our fellows as to their special\n interests and purposes, partly on generalisations as to the purposes\n and interests which are most widely operative in human life. Practical\n men never allow themselves to forget that the conclusions thus\n obtained are problematical in the highest degree. The whole course of\n our investigation will go to show that the notion of a deductive\n science of human nature, by which the concrete conduct of an\n individual man might be inferred with certainty from physiological and\n psychological generalities, is a ridiculous chimera. See _infra_, Bk.\n IV. chap. 4.\n\nFootnote 130:\n\n It will be recollected that the approximate constancy of such social\n statistics has been, foolishly enough, brought forward as an alleged\n disproof of moral freedom. The more vulgar forms of the necessitarian\n argument have even been pushed to the inference that, if the number of\n suicides up to December 31 has been one less than the average in some\n given year, some one _must_ kill himself before the day is out to make\n up the percentage. What must happen if the number has been one _more_\n than the average we are never told.\n\nFootnote 131:\n\n Compare Mach, _Science of Mechanics_, p. 280 ff. (Eng. trans.);\n Jevons, _Principles of Science_, chaps. 13, 14.\n\nFootnote 132:\n\n Compare Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. Introduction X., chap. 3, \u00a7 33\n (Eng. trans., vol. i. pp. 18, 90-93); bk. i. chap. 7, \u00a7 208 ff. (Eng.\n trans., vol ii. pp. 88-91).\n\nFootnote 133:\n\n See the full exposition of this view in Ward, _Naturalism and\n Agnosticism_, vol. i. lecture 4, on which the present paragraph is\n founded. Cf. J. T. Merz, _History of European Thought_, vol. i. pp.\n 437-441.\n\nFootnote 134:\n\n My remark is founded more particularly upon the methods by which\n quantitative uniformities are obtained in the investigations of\n Psychophysics. I have no direct acquaintance with first-hand\n experimentation in other spheres, but the method by which it is made\n to yield general uniformities seems to be of the same kind.\n\nFootnote 135:\n\n Cf. Mr. H. G. Wells\u2019s tale, _The New Accumulator_.\n\nFootnote 136:\n\n Compare once more the passage already quoted from Lotze, _Metaphysic_,\n i. 3. 33.\n\nFootnote 137:\n\n See _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. i. lecture 2, and compare the\n elaborate proof given by Mach, _Science of Mechanics_, pp. 9-23, that\n all the so-called demonstrations of the general theory of the lever\n are mere reductions of the more complicated to the simplest cases of a\n relation which ultimately depends for its recognition on nothing more\n cogent than the evidence of the senses.\n\nFootnote 138:\n\n For some comments upon the \u201cmechanical view\u201d in the narrower and more\n special sense, see Chapter VI. of the present Book. It may be\n convenient, for the sake of precision, to call this more special form\n of the mechanical view the \u201cmechanistic\u201d theory of nature.\n\nFootnote 139:\n\n Psychology ought probably to be excluded from the sciences for which\n the mechanical view is fundamental. But Psychology does not deal with\n any part of the physical order. See the present writers review of\n M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s \u201cGrundz\u00fcge der Psychologie\u201d in _Mind_ for April 1902;\n and cf. _infra_, Bk. IV. chaps. 1, 2.\n\nFootnote 140:\n\n Compare with the argument of this chapter, Royce, \u201cNature,\n Consciousness, and Self-consciousness,\u201d in _Studies of Good and Evil_;\n and \u201cMind and Nature,\u201d by the present writer in _International Journal\n of Ethics_, October 1902. The inveterate prejudice that \u201claws of\n nature,\u201d to be of scientific use, must be rigidly exact uniformities\n is so strong, that it may be worth while, even after the preceding\n discussion of general principles, to assist the reader by reminding\n him of the elementary fact that the most familiar quantities involved\n in our scientific formul\u00e6 (\u03c0, _e_, the vast majority of second and\n third roots, of logarithms of the natural numbers, of circular\n functions of angles, etc.) are incapable of exact evaluation. This of\n itself renders a scientific law, in the form in which it can be\n applied to the determination of actual occurrences, merely\n approximate, and thus shows that _exact_ uniformity is unnecessary for\n the practical objects of the empirical sciences.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n SPACE AND TIME\n\n\u00a7 1. Are time and space ultimately real or only phenomenal? \u00a7 2. The\n space and time of _perception_ are limited, sensibly continuous, and\n consist of a quantitative element together with a _qualitative_\n character dependent on relation to the _here_ and _now_ of immediate\n individual feeling. \u00a7 3. _Conceptual_ space and time are created\n from the perceptual data by a combined process of synthesis,\n analysis, and abstraction. \u00a7 4. They are unlimited, infinitely\n divisible, and there is valid positive ground for regarding them as\n mathematically continuous. Thus they form infinite continuous series\n of positions. They involve abstraction from all reference to the\n _here_ and _now_ of immediate feeling, and are thus homogeneous,\n _i.e._ the positions in them are indistinguishable. They are also\n commonly taken to be unities. \u00a7 5. Perceptual space and time cannot\n be ultimately real, because they involve reference to the _here_ and\n _now_ of a finite experience; conceptual space and time cannot be\n ultimately real, because they contain no principle of internal\n distinction, and are thus not individual. \u00a7 6. The attempt to take\n space and time as real leads to the difficulty about qualities and\n relations, and so to the indefinite regress. \u00a7 7. Space and time\n contain no principle of unity; there may be many space and time\n orders in the Absolute which have no spatial or temporal connection\n with each other. \u00a7 8. The antinomies of the infinite divisibility\n and extent of space and time arise from the indefinite regress\n involved in the scheme of qualities and relations, and are insoluble\n so long as the space and time construction is taken for Reality. \u00a7\n 9. The space and time order is an imperfect phenomenal manifestation\n of the logical relation between the inner purposive lives of finite\n individuals. Time is an inevitable aspect of finite experience.\n _How_ space and time are transcended in the Absolute experience we\n cannot say.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The problems which arise for the metaphysician from the fact that\nthe physical order, as it is presented to our senses, consists of\nelements having position in space and time, are among the oldest and\nmost perplexing of all the riddles suggested by the course of our\nexperience. Adequate discussion of them would demand not only far more\nspace than we are at liberty to bestow on the topic, but such a\nfamiliarity with the mathematical theory of order and series as is\nscarcely possible to any one but an original mathematician. All that we\ncan do in the present chapter is to deal very superficially with one or\ntwo of the leading problems, more with a view to indicating the nature\nof the questions which Metaphysics has to face, than of providing\ndefinite answers to them.\n\nThe fundamental problem for Metaphysics is, of course, whether space and\ntime are ultimate Realities or only appearances; that is, would the\nwhole system of Reality, as directly apprehended by an absolute\nall-containing experience, wear the forms of extension and succession in\ntime, or is it merely a consequence of the limitations of our own finite\nexperience that things come to us in this guise? It may indeed be urged\nthat the contents of the universe must form an order of some sort for\nthe absolute experience, in virtue of their systematic unity, but even\nso it is not clear that order as such is necessarily spatial or\ntemporal. Indeed, most of the forms of order with which we are\nacquainted, both in everyday life and in our mathematical studies,\nappear to be, properly speaking, both non-spatial and non-temporal.\nThus, _e.g._, it is seemingly by a mere metaphor that we speak of the\n\u201csuccessive\u201d integers of the natural number-series, the \u201csuccessive\u201d\npowers of an algebraical symbol, the \u201csuccessive\u201d approximations to the\nvalue of a continued fraction, in language borrowed from the temporal\nflow of events, the true relation involved being in the first two cases\nthe non-temporal one of logical derivation, and in the third the equally\nnon-temporal one of resemblance to an ideal standard. The full solution\nof the metaphysical problem of space and time would thus involve (1) the\ndiscrimination of spatial and temporal order from other allied forms of\norder, and (2) a decision as to the claim of this special form of order\nto be ultimately coherent and intelligible.\n\nThe problem thus presented for solution is often, and usually with\nspecial reference to the Kantian treatment of space and time in the\n_Transcendental \u00c6sthetic_, put in the form of the question whether space\nand time are subjective or objective. This is, however, at best a\nmisleading and unfortunate mode of expression which we shall do well to\navoid. The whole distinction between a subjective and an objective\nfactor in experience loses most of its significance with the abolition,\nnow effected by Psychology, of the vicious Kantian distinction between\nthe \u201cgiven\u201d in perception and the \u201cwork of the mind.\u201d When once we have\nrecognised that the \u201cgiven\u201d itself is constituted by the movement of\nselective attention, it becomes impossible any longer to distinguish it\nas an objective factor in knowledge from the subjective structure\nsubsequently raised upon it. Kant\u2019s adherence to this false\npsychological antithesis so completely distorts his whole treatment of\nthe \u201cforms of intuition,\u201d that it will be absolutely necessary in a\nbrief discussion like our own to deal with the subject in entire\nindependence of the doctrines of the _\u00c6sthetic_, which unfortunately\ncontinue to exercise a disproportionate influence on the current\nmetaphysical presentment of the problem.[141] It should scarcely be\nnecessary to point out that the metaphysical questions have still less\nto do with the psychological problems, so prominent in recent science,\nof the precise way in which we come by our perception of extension and\nsuccession. For Metaphysics the sole question is one not of the origin\nbut of the logical value of these ideas.\n\nIt is of fundamental importance for the whole metaphysical treatment of\nthe subject, to begin by distinguishing clearly between space and time\nas forms of _perception_, and space and time as _conceptual_ forms in\nwhich we construct our scientific notion of the physical order. One\nchief source of the confusions which beset the Kantian view is the\nneglect of Kant and most of his followers to make this distinction with\nsufficient clearness. We cannot insist too strongly upon the point that\nthe space and the time of which we think in our science as containing\nthe entire physical order, are not space and time as directly known to\nus in sense-perception, but are concepts elaborated out of the space and\ntime of direct perception by a complicated process of synthesis and\nanalysis, and involving abstraction from some of the most essential\nfeatures of the space and time of actual experience. The following brief\ndiscussion may serve to illustrate the general nature of the relation\nbetween the two forms of space and time, and to exhibit the leading\ndifferences between them.\n\n\u00a7 2. _Perceptual Space and Time._ Both space and time, as we are aware\nof them in immediate perception, are (1) _limited_. The space we\nactually behold as we look out before us with a resting eye is always\nterminated by a horizon which has a more or less well-defined outline;\nthe \u201cspecious present,\u201d or portion of duration of which we can be at any\ntime aware at once as an immediately presented content, has been shown\nby elaborate psychological experimentation to have a fairly well-defined\nspan. Whatever lies outside this \u201cspan of attention\u201d belongs either to\nthe no longer presented past or to the not yet presented future, and\nstands to the sensible present much as the space behind my back to the\nactually beheld space before my eyes. Of course, in either case the\nlimits of the actually presented space or time are not absolutely\ndefined. To right and left of the line of vision the visible horizon\ngradually fades off into the indistinctly presented \u201cmargin of\nconsciousness\u201d; the \u201csensible present\u201d shades away gradually at either\nend into the past and the future. Yet, though thus not absolutely\ndefined, sensible space and time are never boundless.\n\n(2) Perceptual space and time are both internally _sensibly continuous_\nor unbroken. Concentrate your attention on any lesser part of the\nactually seen expanse, and you at once find that it is itself an expanse\nwith all the characteristics of the wider expanse in which it forms a\npart. Space as actually seen is not an aggregate of _minima visibilia_\nor perceptual points in which no lesser parts can be discriminated; so\nlong as space is visually or tactually perceived at all, it is perceived\nas containing lesser parts which, on attending to them, are found to\nrepeat the characteristics of the larger space. So any part of the\n\u201cspecious present\u201d to which special attention can be directed, turns out\nitself to be a sensible duration. Perceived space is made of lesser\nspaces, perceived time of lesser times; the \u201cparts\u201d not being, of\ncourse, actually distinguished from each other in the original percept,\nbut being _capable_ of being so distinguished in consequence of varying\nmovements of attention.\n\n(3) On investigating the character of our actual perception of space and\ntime, it appears to contain two aspects, which we may call the\nquantitative and the qualitative. On the one hand, whenever we perceive\nspace we perceive a certain magnitude of extension, whenever we perceive\ntime we perceive a longer or shorter lapse of duration. Different spaces\nand different times can be quantitatively compared in respect of the\nbigness of the extension or the duration comprised in them. On the other\nhand, the percept of space or time is not one of mere extension or\nduration. It has a very different _qualitative_ aspect. We perceive\nalong with the magnitude of the extension the _form_ of its outline.\nThis perception of spatial form depends in the last resort upon\nperception of the _direction_ assumed by the bounding line or lines.\nSimilarly, in dealing with only one dimension of perceived space, we\nnever perceive _length_ (a spatial magnitude) apart from the perception\nof _direction_ (a spatial quality). The same is true of the perception\nof time. The lapses of duration we immediately perceive have all their\nspecial direction-quality; the \u201cspecious present\u201d is essentially a\nsimultaneously presented _succession_, _i.e._ a transition from before\nto after. It must be added that, in perceptual space and time, the\ndirections thus perceived have a unique relation to the perceiving\nsubject, and are thus all qualitatively distinct and irreversible.\nDirection in space is estimated as right, left, up, down, etc., by\nreference to axes through the centre of the percipient\u2019s body at right\nangles to each other, and is thus for any given moment of experience\nuniquely and unambiguously determined. Direction in time is similarly\nestimated with reference to the actual content of the \u201cfocus of\nconsciousness.\u201d What is actually focal is \u201cnow,\u201d what is ceasing to be\nfocal is \u201cpast,\u201d what is just coming to be focal is \u201cfuture\u201d in its\ndirection.[142]\n\nThis is perhaps the most fundamental and important peculiarity of the\nspace and time of actual perception. All directions in them are\nunambiguously determined by reference to the _here_ and _now_ of the\nimmediate experience of an individual subject. As a consequence, every\nindividual subject has his own special perceptual space and time;\nGeometry and Mechanics depend, to be sure, on the possibility of the\nestablishment of correspondences between these spatial and temporal\nsystems, but it is essential to remember that, properly speaking, the\nspace and time system of each individual\u2019s perception is composed of\ndirections radiating out from his unique _here_ and _now_, and is\ntherefore individual to himself.[143]\n\n\u00a7 3. _The Construction of the Conceptual Space and Time Order of\nScience._ For the purposes of practical life, no less than for the\nsubsequent object of scientific description of the physical order, it is\nindispensably necessary to establish equations or correspondences\nbetween the individual space and time systems of different percipients.\nApart from such correspondences, it would be impossible for one subject\nto translate the spatial and temporal system of any other into terms of\nhis own experience, and thus all practical intercourse for the purpose\nof communicating directions for action would come to an end. For the\ncommunication of such practical directions it is imperative that we\nshould be able mentally to reconstruct the spatial and temporal aspects\nof our experience in a form independent of reference to the special\n_here_ and _now_ of this or that individual moment of experience. Thus,\nlike the rest of our scientific constructions, the establishment of a\nsingle conceptual space and time system for the whole of the physical\norder is ultimately a postulate required by our practical needs, and we\nmust therefore be prepared to face the possibility that, like other\npostulates of the same kind, it involves assumptions which are not\nlogically defensible. The construction is valuable, so far as it does\nits work of rendering intercommunication between individuals possible;\nthat it should correspond to the ultimate structure of Reality any\nfurther than the requirements of practical life demand is superfluous.\n\nThe main processes involved in the construction of the conceptual space\nand time of descriptive science are three,\u2014synthesis, analysis,\nabstraction. (_a_) _Synthesis._ Psychologically speaking, it is\nultimately by the active movements of individual percipients that the\nsynthesis of the individual\u2019s various perceptual spaces into one is\neffected. As attention is successively directed, even while the body as\na whole remains stationary, to different parts of the whole expanse\nbefore the eye, the visual space which was originally \u201cfocal\u201d in\npresentation becomes \u201cmarginal,\u201d and the \u201cmarginal\u201d focal by a sensibly\ngradual transition. When to the movements of head and eyes which\naccompany such changes in attention there are added movements of\nlocomotion of the whole body, this process is carried further, and we\nhave the gradual disappearance of originally presented spaces from\npresentation, accompanied by the gradual emergence of spaces previously\nnot presented at all. This leads to the mental construction of a wider\nspace containing _all_ the individual\u2019s different presentation-spaces,\nthe order in which it contains them being determined by the felt\ndirection of the movements required for the transition from one to\nanother.\n\nAs we learn, through intercommunication with our fellows, of the\nexistence for their perception of perceptual extension never directly\npresented to our own senses, the process of synthesis is extended\nfurther, so as to comprise in a single spatial system all the\npresentation-spaces of all the individual percipients in an order once\nagain determined by the direction of the movements of transition from\neach to the others. Finally, as there is nothing in the principle of\nsuch a synthesis to impose limits upon its repetition, we think of the\nprocess as capable of indefinite continuance, and thus arrive at the\nconcept of a space stretching out in all directions without definite\nbounds. This unending repetition of the synthesis of perceived spaces\nseems to be the foundation of what appears in theory as the Infinity of\nSpace.\n\nPrecisely similar is the synthesis by which we mentally construct a\nsingle time system for the events of the physical order. _Now_ means for\nme the content which occupies the centre of attentive interest. As\nattention is concentrated on the different stages in the realisation of\nan interest, this centre shifts; what was central becomes first marginal\nand then evanescent, what was marginal becomes central. Hence arises the\nconception of the events of my own inner life as forming a succession of\nmoments, with a determinate order, each of which has been a _now_, or\npoint of departure for directions in perceptual time, in its turn. As\nwith space so with time, the intrasubjective intercourse of man with man\nmakes it possible for me mentally to extend this conceptual synthesis of\nmoments of time so as to include _nows_ belonging to the experience of\nothers which were already past before the first _now_ of their\nexperiences which I can synchronise with a _now_ of my own, and again\n_nows_ of their experiences relatively to which the last _now_ which\nsynchronises with one of my own is past. The indefinite repetition of\nsuch a synthesis leads, as before with space, to the thought of a\nduration reaching out endlessly into past and future, and thus gives us\nthe familiar concept of the Infinity of Time.[144]\n\n(_b_) _Analysis._ Equally important is the part played by mental\n_analysis_ in the formation of the conceptual space and time system. As\nwe have already seen, successive attention to lesser parts of a\npresented extension, or a presented lapse, reveals within each lesser\npart the same structure which belongs to the whole, and thus establishes\nthe _sensible continuity_ of space and time. In actual fact, the process\nof attending successively to smaller and yet smaller portions of space\nand time cannot, of course, be carried on indefinitely, but we can\nconceptually frame to ourselves the thought of the indefinite repetition\nof the process beyond the limits arbitrarily imposed on it by the span\nof our own attention. Thus, by an act of mental analysis, we arrive at\nthe concept of space and time as _indefinitely divisible_, or possessed\nof no ultimately unanalysable last parts, which is an indispensable\npre-requisite of Geometry and Dynamics.\n\nThis indefinite divisibility of conceptual space and time is not of\nitself enough, as is often supposed, to establish their _continuity_ in\nthe strict mathematical sense of the word; their continuity depends upon\nthe further assumption that whatever divides a series of positions in\nspace or events in time unambiguously into two mutually exclusive\nclasses, is itself a position in the space or event in the time series.\nThis assumption does not seem to be absolutely requisite for all\nscientific treatment of the problems of space and time,[145] but is\ndemanded for the systematic establishment of the correspondence between\nthe spatial and temporal series and the continuous series of the real\nnumbers. Moreover, it seems impossible to assign any positive content to\nthe notion of a something which should bisect the spatial or temporal\norder without occupying a position in that order. Hence we seem\ninevitably led by the same analytical process which conducts us to the\nconception of the spatial and temporal orders as infinite series to\nthink of them also as continuous series in the strict sense of the term.\nThe alternative conception of them as discontinuous, if not absolutely\nexcluded, does not seem to be called for by any positive motive, and is\nincompatible with the complete execution of the purposes which demand\napplication of the number-series to a spatial or temporal content.\n\n(_c_) _Abstraction._ The part played by abstraction in the formation of\nthe conceptual space and time order out of the data of perception is\noften overlooked by theorists, but is of fundamental importance, as we\nshall see immediately. We have already learned that the most significant\nfact about the time and space order of individual experience is that its\ndirections are _unique_, because they radiate out from the unique _here_\nand _now_ of immediate feeling. In the construction of the conceptual\nspace and time order we make entire abstraction from this dependence on\nthe immediate feeling of a subject. Conceptual space contains an\ninfinity of positions, but none of them is a _here_; conceptual time an\ninfinity of moments, but none of them is a _now_. As the time and space\nof the conceptual order are taken in abstraction from the differences\nbetween individual points of view, no one point in either can be\nregarded as having more claim than any other to be the natural \u201corigin\nof co-ordinates\u201d with reference to which directions are estimated. We\nshall have repeated opportunity in the remainder of this chapter to\nobserve how important are the consequences of this abstraction.\n\nAbstraction also enters in another way into the construction by which\nconceptual space and time are created. Actual perceived space and time\nare indeed never empty, but always filled with a content of \u201csecondary\u201d\nqualities. In other words, they are always one aspect of a larger whole\nof fact. Extension is never perceived apart from some further visual or\ntactual quality of the extended, temporal lapse never perceived without\nsome change in presented content, however slight. But in constructing\nthe conceptual space and time system, we abstract altogether from this\nqualitative aspect; we think solely of the variety of positions and\ndirections in time and space without taking any account of the further\nqualitative differences with which they are accompanied in concrete\nexperience. Thus we come by the notion of an _empty_ space and an\n_empty_ time as mere systems of positions into which various contents\nmay subsequently be put.\n\nStrictly speaking, the notion of an empty space or an empty time is\nunmeaning, as the simple experiment of thinking of their existence is\nsufficient to show. We cannot in thought successfully separate the\nspatial and temporal aspects of experience from the rest of the whole to\nwhich they belong and take them as subsisting by themselves, any more\nthan we can take timbre as subsisting apart from musical pitch or\ncolour-tone from saturation. We can, however, confine our attention to\nthe spatial-temporal system of positions without taking into account the\nspecial secondary properties of the extended and successive. It is from\nthis logical abstraction that the illusion arises when we imagine an\nempty set of spatial and temporal positions as having first to exist in\norder that they may be subsequently \u201cfilled\u201d with a variety of\ncontents.[146]\n\n\u00a7 4. _Characteristics of the Conceptual Time and Space Order._ The\nfollowing characteristics of the conceptual space and time created by\nthe construction we have just examined, call for special notice.\nConceptual space and time are necessarily taken, for reasons already\nexplained, to be _unlimited_, and _indefinitely divisible_. Though it\ndoes not seem inevitable that they should be _continuous_, we appear to\nbe unable to attach any positive meaning to the notion of their\ndiscontinuity, and, in the practical need for the application to them of\nthe complete number-series, we have a valid positive ground for taking\nthem as continuous. But space and time are thus resolved, in the process\nof their conceptual construction, into _continuous infinite series_ of\nwhich the terms are spatial and temporal positions or points. Unlike the\n_parts_ of perceptual space and time, these conceptual terms are not\nthemselves spaces or times, as they contain no internal multiplicity of\nstructure. Conceptual space and time are thus not wholes or aggregates\nof parts, but systems of relations between terms which possess no\nquantitative character.\n\nBetween any two terms of the spatial, or again of the temporal, series\nthere is one unique relation, which is completely determined by the\nassignment of the terms, their _distance_. In the temporal series, which\nhas only one dimension, you can only pass from any one given term to any\nother through a series of intermediate terms which is once and for all\ndetermined when the initial and final terms are given, hence nothing is\nrequired beyond the terms themselves to fix their distance. The spatial\nseries is multi-dimensional, _i.e._ you can pass from any one term in it\nto any second by an indefinite variety of routes through intermediate\nterms, but it is still true that there is one and only one such route\nwhich is completely determined when the terms in question are known,\nnamely, the straight line passing through both. This straight line\nconstitutes the unique _distance_ of the two points from each\nother.[147] Thus the genuine concept of which those of space and time\nare species is not that of _magnitude_ or _quantity_, but of _serial\norder_.\n\nFurther, and this is a point of fundamental difference between\nconceptual space and time, and the spaces and times of immediate\nperception, any one position in either order, taken by itself, is\nqualitatively indistinguishable from any other. All points of space, all\nmoments of time, are alike, or, as it is also phrased, conceptual space\nand time are _homogeneous_ throughout. It is not until you take at least\ntwo terms of the spatial or temporal series and consider the relation\nthey determine, that distinction becomes possible. This homogeneity of\nconceptual space and time is an inevitable consequence of the\nabstraction from the immediate feelings of the individual subject of\nexperience involved, as we saw, in the process of their construction. In\nour actual perception of spatial and temporal extension, that part of\nperceived space and time which stands in direct unity with immediate\nfeeling is qualitatively distinguished as the _here_ and _now_ from all\nthe rest, and thus does not depend upon the specification of a second\nspatial or temporal position for its recognisability. _Here_ is where\n_I_ am, _now_ is _this_ felt present. And similarly, every other part of\nthe actually presented space and time gets a unique qualitative\ncharacter from its special relation to this _here_ and _now_; it is\nright or left, behind or in front, before or after. When we abstract\naltogether from the unique relation with individual experience which\nthus makes the _here_ and _now_ of perception, as we do in constructing\nour conceptual space and time order, every position alike becomes the\nmere possibility of a _here_ or a _now_, and as such mere possibilities\nthe various positions are indistinguishable. Practically, this\nhomogeneity is important as the indispensable condition for the\nquantitative comparison of different portions of extension or duration.\n\nAn apparently inevitable consequence of the homogeneity of conceptual\nspace and time is the _relativity_ of spatial and temporal position. As\nwe have seen, positions in conceptual space and time are not\ndistinguishable until you take them in pairs. In other words, to fix one\nposition in space or one date you have to give its relation to another\nposition or date, and similarly to fix this you must specify a third,\nand so on indefinitely. To say _where_ A is means to say how you get to\nit from B, and B again is only known by the way it is reached from C,\nand so on without end. Logically, this is a simple consequence of the\nnature of space and time as conceptually analysed into endless series.\nTo specify any term in the series you must give the unique relation it\nbears to some other term, its logical _distance_. And, in a series which\nhas neither first nor last term, this second term cannot be defined\nexcept by its logical distance from a third. In actual perception this\ndifficulty is avoided, owing to the fact that immediate feeling gives us\nthe _here_ and _now_ from which all our directions are measured. But in\nconceptual space or time there is nothing to distinguish any one here\nwhich we may take as our \u201corigin of co-ordinates,\u201d or any one now which\nwe take as our present from any other, and hence the endless regress\nseems inevitable.\n\nIt follows, of course, that in conceptual space and time there is no\nprinciple by which to distinguish different directions. In perception\nthey can be distinguished as right and left, up and down, and so forth.\nBut since what is right to one percipient is left to another, in\nconceptual space, where complete abstraction is made from the presence\nof an individual percipient, there is neither right nor left, up nor\ndown, nor any other qualitative difference between one direction and\nanother, all such differences being _relative_ to the individual\npercipient. When we wish to introduce into conceptual space distinctions\nbetween directions, we always have to begin by arbitrarily assigning\nsome standard direction as our point of departure. Thus we take, _e.g._,\nan arbitrarily selected line A\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014B as such a standard for a given\nplane, and proceed to distinguish all other directions by the angle they\nmake with A B and the _sense_ in which they are estimated (whether as\nfrom B to A or from A to B). But both the line A B and the difference of\nsense between A B and B A can only be defined by similar reference to\nsome other standard direction, and so on through the endless regress.\n\nSimilarly with conceptual time. Here, as there is only one dimension,\nthe difficulty is less obvious, but it is no less real. In conceptual\ntime there is absolutely no means of distinguishing before from after,\npast from future. For the past means the direction of our memories, the\ndirection qualified by the feeling of \u201cno longer\u201d; the future is the\ndirection of anticipation and purposive adaptation, the direction of\n\u201cnot yet.\u201d And, apart from the reference given by immediate feeling to\nthe purposive life of an individual subject, these directions cannot be\ndiscriminated. In short, conceptual time and space are essentially\nrelative, because they are systems of relations which have no meaning\napart from qualitative differences in the terms which they relate; while\nyet again, for the purpose of the conceptual construction which yields\nthem, the terms have to be taken as having no character but that which\nthey possess in right of the relations.[148]\n\nOne other feature of the space and time construction is sufficiently\nimportant to call for special mention. Space and time are commonly\nthought of as _unities_ of some kind. All spatial positions, it is\nusually assumed, fall within one system of space-relations; all dates\nhave their place in one all-inclusive time. This character of unity\ncompletes the current conception of the spatial and temporal order. Each\nof those orders is a unity, including all possible spatial or temporal\npositions; each is an endless, infinite, continuous series of positions,\nwhich all are purely relative. There are other peculiarities, especially\nof the current concepts of space, with which it is not necessary to deal\nhere, as they are of an accidental kind, not arising out of the\nessential nature of the process by which the conception is constructed.\nThus it is probably a current assumption that the number of dimensions\nin space is three and no more, and again that the Euclidean postulate\nabout parallels is verified by its constitution. As far as perceptual\nspace is concerned, those assumptions depend, I presume, upon empirical\nverification; there seems to be no reason why they should be made for\nthe conceptual space-order, since it is quite certain that a coherent\nscience of spatial relations can be constructed without recourse to\nthem.[149]\n\n\u00a7 5. The question now is, whether the whole of this spatial and temporal\nconstruction is more than imperfect, and therefore contradictory,\nappearance. I will first state in a general form the arguments for\nregarding it as appearance, and then proceed to reinforce this\nconclusion by dealing with some special difficulties. Finally, I propose\nto ask whether we can form some positive conception of the higher order\nof Reality of which the spatial and temporal series are phenomenal.\n\nThat the space and time order is phenomenal and not ultimate, can, I\nthink, be conclusively shown by a general argument which I will first\nenunciate in principle and then develop somewhat more in detail. An\nall-comprehensive experience cannot apprehend the detail of existence\nunder the forms of space and time for the following reason. Such an\nexperience could be neither of space and time as we perceive them, nor\nof space and time as we conceptually reconstruct them. It would not be\nof perceptual space and time, because the whole character of our\nperceptual space and time depends upon the very imperfections and\nlimitations which make our experience fragmentary and imperfect.\nPerceptual space and time are for me what they are, because I see them,\nso to say, in perspective from the special standpoint of my own\nparticular _here_ and _now_. If that standpoint were altered, so that\nwhat are actually for me _there_ and _then_ became my _here_ and _now_,\nmy whole outlook on the space and time order would suffer change. But\nthe Absolute cannot look at the space and time order from the standpoint\nof my _here_ and _now_. For it is the finitude of my interests and\npurposes which confine me in my outlook to this _here_ and _now_. If my\ninterests were not bound up in the special way in which they are with\njust this special part or aspect of the life of a wider whole, if they\nwere co-extensive with the life of that whole, every place and every\ntime would be my _here_ and _now_. As it is, _here_ is where my body is,\n_now_ is this particular stage in the development of European social\nlife, because these are the things in which I am primarily _interested_.\nAnd so with all the other finite experiences in which the detail of the\nabsolute experience finds expression. Hence the absolute experience,\nbeing free from the limitations of interest which condition the finite\nexperiences, cannot see the order of existence from the special\nstandpoint of any of them, and therefore cannot apprehend it under the\nguise of the perceptual space and time system.\n\nAgain, it cannot apprehend existence under the forms of space and time\nas we conceptually reconstruct them. For Reality, for the absolute\nexperience, must be a complete individual whole, with the ground of all\nits differentiations within itself. But conceptual space and time are\nconstructed by deliberate abstraction from the relation to immediate\nexperience implied in all individuality, and consequently, as we have\njust seen, they contain no real principle of internal distinction, their\nconstituent terms being all exactly alike and indistinguishable. In\nshort, if the perceptual time and space systems of our concrete\nexperience represent individual but imperfect and finite points of view,\nthe conceptual space and time of our scientific construction represents\nthe mere abstract possibility of a finite point of view; neither gives a\npoint of view both individual and infinite, and neither, therefore, can\nbe the point of view of an absolute experience. An absolute experience\nmust be out of time and out of space, in the sense that its contents are\nnot apprehended in the form of the spatial and temporal series, but in\nsome other way. Space and time, then, must be the phenomenal appearance\nof a higher reality which is spaceless and timeless.\n\n\u00a7 6. In principle, the foregoing argument appears to me to be complete,\nbut, for the sake of readers who care to have its leading thought more\nfully developed, it may be re-stated thus. Perceptual space and time\ncannot be ultimately real as they stand. They are condemned already by\nthe old difficulty which we found in the notion of reality as made up of\nqualities in relation. Perceptual space and time are aggregates of\nlesser parts, which are themselves spaces and times; thus they are\nrelations between terms, each of which contains the same relation once\nmore in itself, and so imply the now familiar indefinite regress.[150]\nAgain, when we try in our conceptual space and time construction to\nremedy this defect by reducing space and time altogether to mere systems\nof relations, the difficulty turns out to have been merely evaded by\nsuch a process of abstraction. For, so long as we keep rigidly to our\nconceptual construction, the terms of our relations are\nindistinguishable. In purely conceptual space and time, as we have seen,\nthere is no possibility of distinguishing any one direction from any\nother, since all are qualitatively identical.\n\nIndeed, it is obvious from first principles that when the sets of terms\nbetween which a number of relations of the same type holds are\nindistinguishable, the relations cannot be discriminated. To distinguish\ndirections at all, we must, in the end, take at least our starting-point\nand one or more standard directions reckoned from it\u2014according to the\nnumber of dimensions with which we are dealing\u2014as independently given,\nthat is, as having recognisable qualitative differences from other\npossible starting-points and standard directions. (Thus, to distinguish\nbefore and after in conceptual time, you must at least assume some\nmoment of time, qualitatively recognisable from others, as the epoch\nfrom which you reckon, and must also have some recognisable qualitative\ndistinction between the direction \u201cpast\u201d and the direction \u201cfuture.\u201d)\nAnd with this reference to qualitative differences we are at once thrown\nback, as in the case of perceptual time and space, on the insoluble old\nproblem of Quality and Relation. The assumed starting-point and standard\ndirections _must_ have qualitative individuality, or they could not be\nindependently recognised and made the basis for discrimination between\nthe remaining directions and positions: yet, because of the necessary\nhomogeneity of the space and time of conceptual construction, they\n_cannot_ have any such qualitative individuality, but must be\n_arbitrarily_ assumed. They will therefore themselves be capable of\ndetermination only by reference to some other equally arbitrary\nstandard, and thus we are once more committed to the indefinite regress.\nThe practical usefulness of these constructions thus depends on the very\nfact that we are not consistent in our use of them. In all practical\napplications we use them to map out the spatial and temporal order of\nevents as seen in perspective from a standpoint which is, as regards the\nconceptual time and space order itself, arbitrary and indistinguishable\nfrom others.\n\n\u00a7 7. Instead of further elaborating this general argument, a task which\nwould be superfluous if its principle is grasped, and unconvincing if it\nis missed, I will proceed to point out one or two special ways in which\nthe essential arbitrariness of the spatial and temporal construction is\nstrikingly exemplified. To begin with, a word may be said about the\nalleged _unity_ of space and time. It is constantly taken for granted,\nby philosophers as well as by practical men, that there can be only\n_one_ spatial and one temporal order, so that all spatial relations, and\nagain all temporal relations, belong to the same system. Thus, if A has\na spatial relation to B and C to D, it is assumed that there must be\nspatial relations between A and C, A and D, and B and C, B and D.\nSimilarly if A is temporally related with B, and C with D. This view is\nmanifestly presupposed in the current conception of Nature, the\n\u201cphysical universe,\u201d the \u201cphysical order,\u201d as the aggregate of all\nprocesses in space and time. But there seems to be no real logical\nwarrant for it. In principle the alleged unity of all spatial and\ntemporal relations might be dismissed, on the strength of the one\nconsideration that space and time are not individual wholes, and\ntherefore can contain no principle of internal structural unity. This is\nmanifest from the method by which the space and time of our conceptual\nscheme have been constructed. They arose, as we saw, from the indefinite\nrepetition of a single type of relation between terms in which we were\nunable to find any ultimately intelligible principle of internal\nstructure. But unity of structure cannot be brought into that which does\nnot already possess it by such mere endless repetition. The result of\nsuch a process will be as internally incoherent and devoid of structure\nas the original data. Hence space and time, being mere repetitions of\nthe scheme of qualities in relation, cannot be true unities.\n\nThis becomes clearer if we reflect on the grounds which actually warrant\nus in assigning position in the _same_ space and the _same_ time to a\nnumber of events. For me A and B are ultimately in the same space when\nthere is a way of travelling from A to B; they are in the same time when\nthey belong to different stages in the accomplishment of the same\nsystematic purposes. Thus in both cases it is ultimately from relation\nto an identical system of purposes and interests that different sets of\npositions or events belong to one space or one time. The unity of such a\nspace or time is a pale reflection in abstract form of the unity of a\nlife of systematic purpose, which is one because it has unique\nindividual structure. It is in this way, from the individual unity of\nthe purpose and interests of my ordinary waking life, that I derive the\nright to refer its experiences to a single space and time system.\nSimilarly, it is in virtue of the inclusion of my own and my\nfellow-men\u2019s purposes in a wider whole of social systematic purpose that\nI can bring the space and time relations of their experience into one\nsystem with my own. And again, the sensible occurrences of the physical\norder belong to one space and time with the space and time relations of\nhuman experience, because of the varying ways in which they condition\nthe development of our own inner purposive life. But there are cases,\neven within our own conscious life, where this condition appears to be\nabsent, and in these cases we do not seem to be able to make\nintelligible use of the conception of a single time or a single space.\n\nTake the case of our dreams. The events of my dreams stand in spatial\nand temporal relations within the dream itself, but there would be no\nsense in asking what are the spatial relations between the places seen\nin my dreams and the places marked on the map of England; or what are\nagain the temporal relations between the events of last night\u2019s dream\nand those of this morning, or those of the dreams of last week.\nPrecisely because there is usually no systematic identity of purpose\nconnecting the dream with the waking life or with other dreams, the time\nand space of the dream have no position with respect to the time and\nspace system of waking life, nor those of one dream with relation to\nthose of another.[151] Of course, it may be said that the dream-space\nand dream-time are \u201cimaginary,\u201d but the problem cannot be got rid of by\nthe use of an epithet. To call them imaginary is merely to say that they\nare not systematically connected with the time and space of waking life,\nnot to disprove their genuineness as actual space and time\nconstructions.\n\nSimilarly, if there are intelligent purposes of which our human\npurposive life is debarred from taking account as such, as we urged that\nthere must be behind the phenomenal physical order, the time and space\nwithin which those purposes are conceived and executed would have no\nplace in _our_ spatial and temporal system. The phenomenal events of the\nphysical order would fall within our system, but not the life of inner\npurpose of which that order is the manifestation to our senses.\nUltimately, in fact, all spaces and all times could only form one\nspatial and temporal system on condition that the infinite absolute\nexperience views all its contents in spatial and temporal form; then the\nvarious space and time systems corresponding to the purposes of the\nvarious groups of finite individuals would finally, for the infinite\nindividual, form one great system of time and space relations. But we\nhave already seen that the infinite experience cannot comprehend its\ncontents in spatial or temporal forms.\n\nWe infer, then, that there may be\u2014indeed, if our interpretation of the\nphysical order is valid, there must be\u2014a plurality of spaces and times\nwithin the Real. Within any one such space or time all its members are\nspatially and temporally interrelated, but the various spaces are not\nthemselves related in space, nor the various times before or after one\nanother in time. Their relation is the purely logical one of being\nvarying modes of the expression in a finite detail of the underlying\nnature of the ultimate Reality.[152] For the absolute experience they\nmust be all at once and together, not in the sense of being in \u201cone\nspace and time,\u201d but in the sense of forming together the systematic\nembodiment of one coherent ground or principle.\n\n\u00a7 8. Similar consequences, as to the phenomenal character of space and\ntime, follow from the consideration of the familiar Kantian antinomies\nfounded upon the concept of spatial and temporal infinity. Space and\ntime must be externally boundless and internally indefinitely divisible,\nand yet again cannot be either. Freed from unessential accessories, the\nargument for either side of the antinomy may be stated thus. Space and\ntime must be boundless because all spatial and temporal existence means\nspatial and temporal relation to a second term, itself similarly related\nto a third term. For precisely the same reason both must be indefinitely\ndivisible. Yet again, they can be neither, since only the individual\nexists, and within such an interminable network of relations between\nterms which are nothing but the supporters of these relations there is\nno principle of individual structure.[153] Thus the Kantian antinomies\nare a simple consequence of the old difficulty about quality and\nrelation. Space and time must be mere relations, and the terms of those\nrelations therefore qualitatively indistinguishable; again, since they\nare relations they cannot be relations between nothings or, what is the\nsame thing, between terms with no individual character. As in all cases\nwhere the problem of relation and quality arises, it then conducts us to\nthe indefinite regress.\n\nSo long as we continue to look upon space and time as real, we have\ntherefore to choose between two equally illogical alternatives. We must\neither arbitrarily refuse to continue the indefinite regress beyond the\npoint at which its difficulties become apparent, as is done by the\nassertion that space and time have finite bounds or indivisible parts,\nor we must hold that the absolute experience actually achieves the\nsummation of an unending series. With the recognition that space and\ntime are phenomenal, the result of a process of construction forced on\nus by our practical needs, but not adequately corresponding to the real\nnature of individual existence, the difficulty disappears. Both sides of\nthe antinomy become relatively true, in the sense that for our practical\npurposes we must be content to adopt now the one and again the other;\nboth become ultimately untrue in the sense that space and time, being\nconstructions of our own, are _really_ neither finite nor infinite\nseries, but are the one or the other according to the purposes for which\nwe use our construction.\n\n\u00a7 9. If spatial and temporal position and direction must thus in the end\nbe appearance, phenomenal of some more individual reality, we have\nfinally to ask, Of what are they the appearance? It is not enough to say\n\u201cof ultimate Reality,\u201d or \u201cof the Absolute.\u201d _Ultimately_ this is, no\ndoubt, true of space and time, as it is of everything else, but we\ndesire further to know if they are not _proximately_ the appearance of\nsome special features of the inner physical life of the lesser\nindividuals which compose the Absolute. We naturally look for some third\nterm, in the nature of finite individuality, to mediate between the\nstructureless abstract generality of space and time relation, and the\nperfect individual structure of the spaceless and timeless Absolute\nIndividual. We want, in fact, to connect the spatial and temporal form\nwhich our experience wears, with some fundamental aspect of our nature,\nas beings at once individual and finite.\n\nNor is it particularly difficult to make the connection. When we\nremember that space and time, as they actually condition our perception\nand movement, are the space and time which radiate out from an unique\n_here_ and _now_ of immediate feeling, it is fairly evident that the\nspatial and temporal aspect of our experience is, as already suggested,\na consequence of that limitation of our attentive interests which\nconstitutes our finitude. It is the narrowness of my interests, or at\nleast of those which are sufficiently explicit to rise into the \u201cfocus\u201d\nof consciousness, that is reflected in the distinction of my _here_ from\nall the _theres_ which are around me. _Here_ is where my body is,\nbecause of the specially intimate connection of the realisation of my\ninterests and purposes with those events in the phenomenal physical\norder which I call the state of my body. Were my interests widened so as\nto embrace the whole scheme of the universe, I should no longer perceive\nthe contents of that universe as dispersed through space, because I\nshould no longer have as my special standpoint a _here_ to which other\nexistence would be _there_.\n\nMy special standpoint in space may thus be said to be phenomenal of my\nspecial and peculiar interests in life, the special _logical_ standpoint\nfrom which my experience reflects the ultimate structure of the\nAbsolute. And so, generally, though the conclusion can for various\nreasons not be pressed in respect of every detail of spatial appearance,\nthe spatial grouping of intelligent purposive beings is phenomenal of\ntheir inner logical affinity of interest and purpose. Groups of such\nbeings, closely associated together in space, are commonly also\nassociated in their peculiar interests, their special purposes, their\ncharacteristic attitude towards the universe. The local contiguity of\nthe members of the group is but an \u201coutward and visible sign\u201d of an\n\u201cinward and spiritual\u201d community of social aspiration. This is, of\ncourse, only approximately the case; the less the extent to which any\nsection of mankind have succeeded in actively controlling the physical\norder for the realisation of their own purposes, the more nearly is it\nthe truth that spatial remoteness and inner dissimilarity of social\npurposes coincide. In proportion as man\u2019s conquest over his non-human\nenvironment becomes complete, he devises for himself means to retain the\ninner unity of social aims and interests in spite of spatial separation.\nBut this only shows once more how completely the spatial order is a mere\nimperfect appearance which only confusedly adumbrates the nature of the\nhigher Reality behind it. Thus we may say that the \u201cabolition of\ndistance\u201d effected by science and civilisation is, as it were, a\npractical vindication of our metaphysical doctrine of the comparative\nunreality of space.\n\nSimilarly with time, though the temporal series may, in a sense, be said\nto be less of an unreality than the spatial. For it does not seem\npossible to show that spatial appearance is an _inevitable_ form of\nfinite experience. We can at least conceive of a finite experience\ncomposed entirely of successive arrangements of secondary qualities,\nsuch as sounds or smells, and the accompanying feeling-tones, though we\nhave no positive ground for affirming the existence of such a type of\nexperience. But the temporal form seems inseparable from finite\nintelligence. For the limitation of my existence to a certain portion of\ntime is clearly simply the abstract and external aspect of the fact that\nmy interests and purposes, so far as I can apprehend the meaning of my\nown life, occupy just this special place in the logical development of\nthe larger whole of social life and purpose of which my own life is a\nmember. So the position of a particular purposive act in the temporal\nseries of acts which I call the history of my own life, is the outward\nindication of the logical place filled by this particular act in the\nconnected scheme of interests which form my life on its inner side. But\nit is an inevitable consequence of the want of complete internal harmony\nwe call finitude, that the aims and interests of the finite subject\ncannot be in the same degree present to its apprehension all at once and\ntogether. In being aware of its own internal purpose or meaning, it\nmust, because it is finite and therefore not ultimately a completely\nharmonious systematic whole, be aware of that purpose as only partially\nfulfilled. And in this sense of one\u2019s own purposes as only partially\nfulfilled, we have the foundation of the time-experience, with its\ncontrast between the \u201cnow\u201d of fulfilment and the \u201cno longer\u201d and \u201cnot\nyet\u201d of dissatisfied aspiration.\n\nFor this reason, dissatisfaction, unfulfilled craving, and the\ntime-experience seem to be bound up together, and time to be merely the\nabstract expression of the yearning of the finite individual for a\nsystematic realisation of its own purpose which lies for ever beyond its\nreach as finite. If this is so, only the absolute and infinite\nindividual whose experience is throughout that of perfectly harmonious\nsystematic realisation of meaning, can be outside the time-process; to\nit, \u201cvanished and present are the same,\u201d because its whole nature is\nonce for all perfectly expressed in the detail of existence. But the\nfinite, just because its very nature as finite is to aspire to a\nperfection which is out of reach, must have its experience marked with\nthe distinction of _now_ from _by and by_, of desire from performance.\nIn this temporal character of all finite experience we may perhaps\nafterwards discern the ultimate ground of morality, as we can already\ndiscern in the unresting struggle of the finite to overcome its\nfinitude, practical evidence that time is not a form which adequately\nexpresses the nature of Reality, and must therefore be imperfect\nappearance.[154]\n\nThus we seem finally to have reached the conclusion that time and space\nare the imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical relations\nbetween the purposes of finite individuals standing in social relations\nto each other; the inner purposive life of each of these individuals\nbeing itself in its turn, as we have previously seen, the imperfect\nexpression, from a special logical \u201cpoint of view,\u201d of the structure and\nlife of the ultimate infinite individual. For the infinite individual\nitself the whole of the purposes and interests of the finite individuals\nmust form a single harmonious system. This system cannot itself be in\nthe spatial and temporal form; space and time must thus in some way\ncease to exist, as space and time, for the absolute experience. They\nmust, in that experience, be taken up, rearranged, and transcended, so\nas to lose their character of an endless chain of relations between\nother relations.\n\nPrecisely _how_ this is effected, we, from our finite standpoint, cannot\npresume to say. It is natural to draw illustrations from the \u201cspecious\npresent\u201d of perception, in which we appear to have a succession that is\nalso simultaneous; or again, from the timeless and purely logical\ncharacter science seeks to ascribe to its \u201claws of nature.\u201d But in the\n\u201cspecious present\u201d we seem obliged to attend to _one_ aspect, succession\nor simultaneity, to the exclusion of the other; probably we never\nsucceed in equally fixing both aspects at once. It thus presents us\nrather with the problem than with its solution. And again, after our\ndiscussion of the meaning of law, we cannot affirm that Nature is, for\nthe absolute experience, a system of general laws. Hence it seems well\nnot to take these illustrations for more than they are actually worth as\nindications of the merely phenomenal character of time. Metaphysics,\nlike the old scholastic theology, needs sometimes to be reminded that\nGod\u2019s thoughts are not as ours, and His ways, in a very real sense when\nPhilosophy has done its best, still past finding out.[155]\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 4\n(Space and Time), 18 (Temporal and Spatial Appearance); L. Couturat,\n_L\u2019Infini Math\u00e9matique_, pt. 2, bk. iv. chap. 4 (against the Kantian\nantinomies); H. Poincar\u00e9, _La Science et L\u2019Hypoth\u00e8se_, pp. 68-109; H.\nLotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. ii. chaps. 1-3; W. Ostwald, _Vorlesungen \u00fcber\nNaturphilosophie_, lects. 5, 8; J. Royce, _The World and the\nIndividual_, Second Series, lect. 3; B. Russell, _Foundations of\nGeometry: Is Position in Space and Time Absolute or Relative_ (_Mind_,\nJuly 1901), _Principles of Mathematics_, pt. 6, vol. i.; H. Spencer,\n_First Principles_, pt. 2, chap. 3.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 141:\n\n The student who desires to think out the problems for himself would\n probably do well to take the discussions of Locke (_Essay_, bk. ii.\n chaps. 13-15) and Hume (_Treatise of Human Nature_, bk. i. pt. 2)\n rather than that of Kant as his starting-point, as they are less\n vitiated by psychological superstitions. In recent metaphysical work\n the chapters on the subject in Mr. Bradley\u2019s _Appearance and Reality_\n will probably be found most useful. Much may be learned from Mr.\n Russell\u2019s work, _Foundations of Geometry_, with which should, however,\n be compared the largely discrepant results of his later article, \u201cIs\n Position in Space and Time Relative or Absolute?\u201d (_Mind_, July 1901).\n\nFootnote 142:\n\n We are not called upon to enter into such specially psychological\n questions as, _e.g._, whether both directions, past and future, can be\n detected within the \u201cspecious present\u201d of direct perception, or\n whether the specious present only contains the elements \u201cnow\u201d and \u201cno\n longer,\u201d the \u201cnot yet\u201d being a subsequent intellectual construction,\n as is held, _e.g._, by Mr. Bradley and Mr. Shadworth Hodgson.\n\nFootnote 143:\n\n We may indeed go still further, and say that every unique moment or\n experience has its own unique spatial and temporal system. The method\n by which I weave the perceived space-time systems of different\n experiences within my own mental life into a single conceptual system,\n is in principle the same by which the spaces and times of myself and\n other men are made into one system for the purpose of practical\n intercourse.\n\nFootnote 144:\n\n For an account of the psychological processes involved in all this,\n see, _e.g._, Stout, _Manual of Psychology_,^3 bk. iii. pt. 2, chaps.\n 3-5; bk. iv. chap. 6.\n\nFootnote 145:\n\n Thus Dedekind (_Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?_ p. xii.)\n maintains that none of the constructions of Euclid involve the\n continuity of space.\n\nFootnote 146:\n\n Of course, a physical _vacuum_ is not the same thing as _empty space_.\n For the purposes of any special science a _vacuum_ means a space not\n occupied by contents of the special kind in which that special science\n is interested. Thus, in the ordinary parlance of Physics, a _vacuum_\n means simply a space in which there is no _mass_. Whether it is\n desirable, for the purposes of physical science, to assume the\n existence of _vacuum_, is altogether a question for Physics itself,\n and to decide it in the affirmative is not to maintain the existence\n of that unmeaning abstraction, absolutely empty space. In any case, it\n may be observed that the widespread notion that motion is only\n possible in a physical _vacuum_ is a mistake, motion being perfectly\n possible in a fluid _plenum_.\n\nFootnote 147:\n\n It must be carefully noted that _distance_ as thus defined is not\n properly a _quantitative relation_, and involves no notion of\n magnitude, but only of relative place in a series. It should also be\n observed that in assuming the existence of such a unique relation\n between every pair of points, it is tacitly taken for granted that the\n number of dimensions of the spatial order is finite. In a space of an\n infinite number of dimensions, such unique relation would be\n impossible. (See Russell, _Foundations of Geometry_, p. 161 ff.) Our\n justification for making this assumption, as also for taking time to\n be of one dimension only, seems to be that it is indispensable for all\n those practical purposes which depend on our ability to create a\n science of Geometry, and that we have no positive ground for assuming\n the opposite. Thus ultimately the assumption appears to be of the\n nature of a postulate.\n\nFootnote 148:\n\n The ablest detailed account of the relativity of spatial position\n readily accessible to the English reader, will be found in Mr.\n Russell\u2019s _Foundations of Geometry_, chaps. iiiA, iv. Mr. Russell has\n since, in _Mind_ for July 1901, attempted to prove the opposite view,\n that positions in space and time are _inherently_ distinct, but\n without discussing his own previous arguments for relativity. Into the\n purely mathematical part of Mr. Russell\u2019s later contentions I am not\n competent to enter. I may, however, suggest that the question of\n Metaphysics cannot be decided merely by urging, as Mr. Russell does,\n that fewer assumptions are required to construct a geometry on the\n hypothesis of absolute than on that of relative position. The superior\n convenience of an assumption for certain special purposes is no proof\n of its ultimate intelligibility. And when Mr. Russell goes on to admit\n that points in space are _indistinguishable for us_, he seems to me to\n give up his case. For is not this to admit that, after all, the space\n with which we deal in our geometrical science is relative from\n beginning to end? How differences of quality of which we, by\n hypothesis, can know nothing, can help or hinder our scientific\n constructions, it is indeed hard to see.\n\nFootnote 149:\n\n This may be brought home even to those who, like myself, are not\n mathematicians, by the perusal of such a work as Lobatchevsky\u2019s\n _Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Parallel-Linien_, where a consistent\n geometry of triangles is constructed in entire independence of the\n postulate of parallelism. Of course, in the end it must be a mere\n question of nomenclature whether a form of serial order independent of\n these quasi-empirical restrictions is to be called \u201cspace\u201d or not.\n\nFootnote 150:\n\n It must be carefully remembered that the essential defect of the\n indefinite regress is not its interminableness, but its monotony. We\n ourselves held that Reality is an individual composed of lesser\n individuals which _repeat_ the structure of the whole, and that the\n number of these individuals need not be finite. But, in our view, the\n higher the order of individuality the more self-explanatory was its\n structure, whereas in the indefinite regress an incomprehensible\n construction is endlessly repeated _in the same form_.\n\nFootnote 151:\n\n Normally, that is; for brevity\u2019s sake I omit to note the possible case\n of a coherent dream-life continued from night to night. In principle\n there would be a difference between the case of the space and time of\n _such_ a dream-life and those of our waking hours.\n\nFootnote 152:\n\n So the events of my dreams, though not occupying any place in the\n temporal series of the events of waking life, are so far _logically_\n connected with that series as both sets of events stand in relation to\n certain identical elements of psychical temperament and disposition.\n Another interesting case is that of so-called \u201cdual personality.\u201d The\n experience of both the two alternating personalities can be arranged\n in a single temporal series only because of the way in which both sets\n are inwoven with the systematic interests of other men, whose\n personality does not alternate, or alternates with a different rhythm.\n If all mankind were subject to simultaneous alternations of\n personality, the construction of a single time-series for all our\n experiences would be impossible. In this discussion I have throughout\n followed the full and thorough treatment of the problem by Mr.\n Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 18.\n\nFootnote 153:\n\n Otherwise, conceptual space and time are, as we have seen, derivatives\n of the number-series, and we have already learned that the\n number-series leads to the problem of summing an endless series, and\n is therefore not an adequate way of representing ultimate Reality.\n (Bk. II. chap. 4, \u00a7 10). Another form of the same difficulty would be\n that conceptual space and time are applications of the numerical\n series,\u2014but application to _what_? To a material which is already\n spatial and temporal. All these puzzles are only different ways of\n expressing the essential relativity of space and time. But see the\n anti-Kantian view in, _e.g._, Couturat, _L\u2019Infini Math\u00e9matique_, pt.\n 2.\n\nFootnote 154:\n\n Compare Prof. Royce\u2019s remarks, _The World and the Individual_, Second\n Series, lect. 3, \u201cThe Temporal and the Eternal,\u201d p. 134. I should\n certainly have had to acknowledge considerable obligation to Prof.\n Royce\u2019s discussion had not the present chapter been written before I\n had an opportunity of studying it.\n\nFootnote 155:\n\n Against the plausible attempt to solve the problem by simply thinking\n of the whole physical order as forming a \u201cspecious present\u201d to the\n Absolute Experience, we may urge that the \u201cspecious present\u201d itself\n regularly consists for us of a multiplicity of detail, which we\n apprehend as simultaneous without insight into its inner unity as the\n embodiment of coherent system. Hence the direct insight of the\n Absolute Experience into its own internal meaning or structure cannot\n be adequately thought of as mere simultaneous awareness of the detail\n of existence. So long as a succession is merely apprehended as\n simultaneous, its meaning is not yet grasped.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n SOME CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION\n\n\u00a7 1. The concept of _evolution_ an attempt to interpret natural\n processes in terms of individual growth. \u00a7 2. Evolution means change\n culminating in an end which is the result of the process and is\n qualitatively new. The concept is thus teleological. \u00a7 3. Evolution,\n being teleological, is essentially either progress or degeneration.\n If it is more than illusion, there must be real _ends_ in the\n physical order. And ends can only be real as subjective interests of\n sentient beings which are actualised by the process of change. \u00a7 4.\n Thus all evolution must take place within an _individual_ subject. \u00a7\n 5. Further, the subject of evolution must be a _finite_ individual.\n All attempts to make \u201cevolution\u201d a property of the whole of Reality\n lead to the infinite regress. \u00a7 6. The distinction between\n progressive evolution and degeneration has an \u201cobjective\u201d basis in\n the metaphysical distinction between higher and lower degrees of\n individuality. \u00a7 7. In the evolutionary process, old individuals\n disappear and fresh ones originate. Hence evolution is incompatible\n with the view that Reality consists of a plurality of ultimately\n independent finite individuals.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. We saw, in the first chapter of the present Book, that evolution or\norderly development is a fundamental characteristic of the processes\nwhich compose the physical order as apprehended by the various empirical\nsciences. For the purposes of Mechanics and Mechanical Physics, indeed,\nwe have no need to look upon Nature as the scene of development; for\nthese sciences it is enough to conceive of it as a vast complex of\nchanges of configuration and transformations of energy, connected by\nregular uniformities of sequence. As soon, however, as we come to regard\nNature from the standpoint of those sciences which explicitly recognise\ndifferences of _quality_, as well as differences in position and\nquantity, among the objects with which they deal, this narrowly\nmechanistic conception of natural processes becomes inadequate. With the\nnotion of physical processes as productive of changes of quality we are\ninevitably led to think of the physical order as a world in which the\nqualitatively new is derived from, or developed out of, the previously\nfamiliar by fixed lines of deviation and under determinate conditions.\n\nNaturally enough, it is from the biological sciences, in which the study\nof organic _growth_ plays so prominent a part, that the impulse to\nconceive of physical change as development originally comes. As long ago\nas the fourth century B.C., Aristotle had taken the concept of growth or\ndevelopment as the foundation of the most influential scheme of\nmetaphysical construction yet produced in the whole history of\nspeculation. In Aristotle\u2019s view, however, the process of development\nwas regarded as strictly confined within the limits of the individual\nlife. The individual organism, beginning its existence as an undeveloped\ngerm or potentiality, gradually unfolds itself in a series of successive\nstages of growth, which culminates at the period of complete maturity.\nBut the individual germ itself is a product or secretion derived from a\npre-existing mature individual of the same type as that into which this\ngerm will ultimately grow. The number of distinct typical processes of\ngrowth is thus strictly determined, and each such process implies the\nprevious existence of its completed result. In other words, the\nboundaries between _species_ are fixed and ultimate; there can be no\nbeginning in time of the existence of a new species, and therefore no\norigination of new species by development from other types. As Aristotle\nepigrammatically puts it, \u201cIt takes a man to beget a man.\u201d\n\nA further point of weakness in the Aristotelian theory is the absence of\nany definite account of the _machinery_ by which the process of growth\nis effected. We learn, indeed, that the latent capacity of the organic\ngerm to develop according to a certain specific type is stimulated into\nactivity by influences contained in the environment, but the precise\nnature of this process of stimulation was necessarily left in obscurity,\nin consequence of the imperfect knowledge possessed by Aristotle of the\nminute character of natural processes in general.\n\nIn the evolutionary theories of modern biology, it is precisely the\nproblems of the origination of new _species_, and of the special\ncharacter of the relations between the species and its environment by\nwhich this process is conditioned, that have attracted almost exclusive\nattention. And, with the steadily increasing success of evolutionary\nhypotheses in dealing with biological problems, there has naturally\narisen a tendency to extend the application of the general concept of\nevolution far beyond the sphere in which it first originated. We have\nnow not only more or less well-accredited hypotheses of the production\nby evolution of our chemical elements, but even ambitious philosophical\nconstructions which treat the concept of evolution as the one and only\nkey to all the problems of existence. In the presence of these\nfar-reaching applications of evolutionary ideas, it becomes all the more\nnecessary to bear in mind, in our estimate of the worth of the evolution\nconcept, that its logical character remains unaltered by the extension\nof its sphere of applicability; it is still, in spite of all minor\nmodifications, essentially an attempt to interpret natural processes in\ngeneral in terms of individual growth.\n\nWe are not, of course, in the present chapter in any way concerned with\nthe details of any one particular theory as to the special conditions\nwhich determine the course of organic or other evolution. What those\nconditions in any special case are, is a question, in the first\ninstance, for that particular branch of empirical science which deals\nwith the description of the particular aspect of the processes of the\nphysical order under investigation. And though it would be a proper\nquestion for a complete Philosophy of Nature how the details of a\nwell-established scientific theory must be interpreted so as to\nharmonise with the general metaphysical implications of the physical\norder, it is for many reasons premature to raise such a question in the\npresent state of our actual knowledge of the details of evolutionary\nprocesses. All that can be done here is to ask what in general are the\nlogical implications involved in thinking of a process as an evolution\nat all, and how those implications are related to our general\ninterpretation of the physical order.\n\n\u00a7 2. Evolution obviously involves the two concepts, already criticised\nat length, of change and the dependence of the order and direction of\nchange upon determinate conditions. But an evolutionary process is never\na mere orderly sequence of changes. For instance, the changes of\nconfiguration and exchanges of energy which take place when work is done\nin a material system, conceived as composed of moving masses without any\nelement of secondary quality, are not properly to be called a process of\nevolution. They are not an evolution or development, because, so long as\nwe keep to the strictly kinetic view of natural processes as consisting\nsolely in the varying configuration of systems of mass-particles, the\nend of the process is qualitatively undistinguishable from its\nbeginning; nothing qualitatively _new_ has emerged as its result. Or\nrather, to speak with more accuracy, the process has really no _end_ and\nno unity of its own. It is only by an entirely arbitrary limitation of\nview, due to purely subjective interests of our own, that we isolate\njust this collection of mass-particles from the larger aggregate of such\nparticles which form the physical order as regarded from the strictly\nkinetic standpoint, and call it _one system_; and again, it is with\nequal arbitrariness that we determine the point of time beyond which we\nshall cease to follow the system\u2019s changes of configuration. In the\nindefinitely prolonged series of successive configurations there is no\nstage which can properly be called final. Hence from the rigidly\nmechanistic point of view of Kinetics and Kinematics there are no\nevolutions or developments in the universe, there is only continuous\nchange.\n\nDevelopment or evolution, then, definitely implies the culmination of a\nprocess of change in the establishment of a state of things which is\nrelatively _new_, and implies, further, that the relatively new state of\nthings may truly be regarded as the end or completion of this special\nprocess of change. Thus the fundamental peculiarity of all evolutionary\nideas is that they are essentially _teleological_; the changes which are\nevolutions are all changes thought of as throughout relative to an _end_\nor _result_. Except in so far as a process of change is thus essentially\nrelative to the _result_ in which it culminates, there is no sense in\ncalling it a development. We may see this even by considering the way in\nwhich the concepts of evolution and development are used in the various\ndepartments of Physics. We sometimes speak of a chemical process as\nmarked by the \u201cevolution\u201d of heat, or again we say that, if the second\nlaw of Thermo-dynamics is rigidly and universally true, the physical\nuniverse must be in a process of evolution towards a stage in which none\nof its energy will be available for work. But we can only attach a\nmeaning to such language so long as we allow ourselves to retain the\ncommon-sense point of view according to which there are real qualitative\ndifferences between what abstract Mechanics treats as equivalent forms\nof \u201cenergy.\u201d\n\nWe can speak of the evolution of heat, just because we, consciously or\nunconsciously, think of heat as being really, what it is for our senses,\nsomething qualitatively new and distinct from the other kinds of energy\nwhich are converted into it by the chemical process. So we can\nintelligibly talk of the gradual conversion of one form of energy into\nanother as an evolution only so long as we regard the various forms of\nenergy as qualitatively different, and are therefore entitled to look\nupon the complete conversion of the one into another as the\nqualitatively new result of a process which is therefore terminated by\nits complete establishment. From the standpoint of the physical theories\nwhich regard the distinction between the forms of energy as only\n\u201csubjective,\u201d there would be no sense in regarding that particular stage\nin the course of events at which one form of energy disappeared as the\n_end_ or result of a process which terminates in it, and thus such terms\nas evolution and development would lose their meaning. Only the\nestablishment of the qualitatively new can form a real _end_ or\n_result_, and so afford a logical basis for the recognition of the\nchanges in the physical order as distinct processes of development.\n\n\u00a7 3. This essentially teleological character of development is\nemphasised in the language of the biological sciences by the constant\nuse of the concepts of progress and degeneration. For biology an\nevolution is essentially a process either in the progressive or in the\nregressive direction. Every evolution is an advance to a \u201chigher\u201d or a\ndecline to a \u201clower\u201d state of development. Now progress and regress are\nonly possible where the process of change is regarded as throughout\nrelative to the _end_ to be attained by the process. Exactly how we\nconceive this end, which serves us as a standard for distinguishing\nprogress from degeneration, is a secondary question; the point of\nfundamental importance is that, except in reference to such an end,\nthere can be no distinction at all between progressive and retrogressive\nchange. Thus, unless there are really ends in the physical order which\ndetermine the processes of change that culminate in their actual\nestablishment, evolution cannot be real. If the ends, by the\nestablishment of which we estimate progress in development, are merely\narbitrary standards of our own to which nothing in external reality\ncorresponds, then the physical order must really be a mere succession of\nchanges which are in no true sense developments, and the whole concept\nof nature as marked by development will be a mere human delusion. And,\non the contrary, if there is any truth in the great scientific\nconceptions of evolution, there must be real ends in the physical order.\n\nNow, there is only one intelligible way in which we can think of a\nprocess of change as really relative to an _end_. The resultant state\nwhich we call the end of the process, as being the final stage which\ncompletes this special process, and enables us to mark off all that\nsucceeds it as belonging to a fresh process of development, must also be\nits end in the sense of being the conscious attainment of an _interest_\nor purpose underlying the whole process. It is only in so far as any\nstate of things is, for some sentient being, the realisation of a\nsubjective interest previously manifested in an earlier stage of\nexperience, that that state of things forms the real culmination of a\nprocess which is distinguished from all other processes, and stamped\nwith an individuality of its own, by the fact that it does culminate in\nprecisely this result. The conceptions of _end_ or _result_ and of\nsubjective _interest_ are logically inseparable. Hence we seem forced to\ninfer that, since evolution is an unmeaning word, unless there are\ngenuine, and not merely arbitrarily assigned, ends underlying the\nprocesses of physical nature, the concept of evolution as characteristic\nof the physical order involves the metaphysical interpretation of that\norder as consisting of the teleological acts of sentient beings, which\nwe had previously accepted on more general grounds. It would be useless\nto attempt an escape from this conclusion by drawing a distinction\nbetween two meanings of \u201cend\u201d\u2014\u201ca _last_ state\u201d and \u201cthe achievement of a\npurpose.\u201d For the whole point of the preceding argument was that nothing\ncan be an \u201cend\u201d in the former sense without also being an end in the\nlatter. Unless processes have ends which are their subjective\nfulfilment, it is only by an arbitrary convention of our own that we\nassign to them ends which are their _last_ states. And if it is only an\narbitrary convention that physical processes have ends in this sense,\nevolution itself is just such a convention and nothing more.[156]\n\n\u00a7 4. What is in principle the same argument may be put in another form,\nand the equivalence of the two forms is itself very suggestive from the\nmetaphysical point of view. Evolution or development, like all change,\nimplies the presence throughout successive stages in a process of\nsomething which is permanent and unchanging. But it implies something\nmore definite still. Whatever develops must therefore have a permanent\n_individual_ character of its own of which the successive stages in the\ndevelopment process are the gradual unfolding. Unless the earlier and\nthe later stages in a connected series of changes belong alike to the\ngradual unfolding, under the influence of surroundings, of a single\nindividual nature, there is no meaning in speaking of them as belonging\nto a process of development. Only the individual can develop, if we are\nto attribute precise meaning to our words. We speak of the evolution of\na society or a species, but if our words are not to be empty we must\nmean by such phrases one of two things. Either we must mean that the\nspecies and the society which develop are themselves individuals of a\nhigher order, no less real than the members which compose them, or our\nlanguage must be merely a way of saying that the life of each member of\nthe social or biological group exhibits development.\n\nWhen we reflect on what is really involved in our ordinary loose\nexpressions about the \u201cinheritance\u201d of this or the other physical or\nsocial trait, we shall see that the former alternative is far less\nremoved from ordinary ways of thought than might at first seem to be the\ncase. If any kind of reality corresponds to our current metaphor of the\n\u201cinheritance\u201d of qualities, the groups within which such \u201cinheritance\u201d\ntakes place must be something much more than mere aggregates of mutually\nexclusive individuals. A group within which qualities can be thus\ninherited must, as a whole, possess a marked individual nature of its\nown. Now we have already seen that all individuality is in the end\nteleological. A group of processes forms an individual life in the\ndegree to which it is the expression of a unique and coherent interest\nor aim, and no further. Hence, once more, only what is truly individual\ncan develop or evolve. And we readily see that it is precisely in so far\nas a set of processes form the expression of individual interest, that\nthe demarcation of the group as a connected whole from all previous and\nsubsequent processes possesses more than a conventional significance.\nHence only processes which are the expression of individual interest\npossess \u201cends\u201d or \u201clast states,\u201d and thus the two forms of our argument\nare in principle identical. Once more, then, the significance of\nevolutionary ideas, if they are to be more than a purely conventional\nscheme devised for the furtherance of our own practical purposes, and as\nan artificial aid to classification, is bound up with the doctrine that\nthe events of the physical order are really the expression of the\nsubjective interests of sentient subjects of experience.[157]\n\n\u00a7 5. To proceed to a further point of the utmost importance. Not only\ndoes evolution imply the presence of _individuality_ in the subject of\nthe evolutionary process; it implies its possession of _finite_\nindividuality. An infinite individual cannot have development or\nevolution ascribed to it without contradiction. Hence the Absolute, the\nUniverse, or whatever other name we prefer to give to the infinite\nindividual whole of existence, cannot develop, cannot progress, cannot\ndegenerate. This conclusion might be derived at once from reflecting\nupon the single consideration that temporal succession is involved in\nall evolution, whether progressive or retrogressive. For temporal\nsuccession is, as we have seen, an inseparable consequence of finite\nindividuality. But it will be as well to reach our result in a different\nway, by considering certain further implications of the concept of\nevolution which are manifestly only present in the case of _finite_\nindividuality.\n\nIn every process of development or evolution there are involved a pair\nof interrelated factors, the individual nature which develops, and the\nenvironment which contains the conditions under which and the stimuli in\nresponse to which it develops. The undeveloped germ is as yet a mere\npossibility, something which _will_ yet exhibit qualities not as yet\npossessed by it. In its undeveloped state, what it possesses is not the\nqualities characteristic of its later stages, but only \u201ctendencies\u201d or\n\u201cdispositions\u201d to manifest those qualities, provided that the\nenvironment provides the suitable stimulus. Hence, if either of the two\ninterrelated factors of development, the individual or the environment,\nis missing, there can be no evolution. Now, the infinite individual\nwhole of existence has no environment outside itself to supply\nconditions of development and incentives to change. Or, what is the same\nthing, since the \u201cpossible\u201d means simply that which will follow _if_\ncertain conditions are realised, there is no region of unrealised\npossibility outside the realised existence of the infinite whole. Hence\nin the infinite whole there can be no development: it cannot\nprogressively adapt itself to _new_ conditions of existence; it must\nonce and for all be in its reality all that it is in \u201cidea.\u201d The\ninfinite whole therefore evolves neither forward nor backward.\n\nThis impossibility of ascribing development to the whole of Reality is\nstrikingly illustrated by a consideration of the _impasse_ into which we\nare led when we try in practice to think of the whole universe as in\nprocess of evolution. So long as you are still in the presence of the\nfundamental distinction between the developing subject and its\nenvironment, you are logically driven, if everything is to be taken as a\nproduct of evolution, to supplement every evolutionary theory by a fresh\nevolutionary problem. To account for this special evolution (_e.g._, the\nevolution of the _vertebrata_) you have to assume an environment with\ndeterminate qualities of its own, influencing the evolution in question\nin a determinate way in consequence of these qualities. But if\neverything has been evolved, you have again to ask by what process of\nevolution this special environment came to be what it is. To solve this\nproblem you have once more to postulate a second \u201cenvironment\u201d\ndetermining, by interaction, the course of the evolution of the former.\nAnd thus you are thrown back upon the indefinite regress.\n\nUnless, indeed, you are prepared boldly to assert that, as all\ndeterminate character is the product of evolution, the universe as a\nwhole must have evolved out of nothing. (You would not escape this\ndilemma by an appeal to the very ancient notion of a \u201ccycle\u201d or\n\u201cperiodic rhythm\u201d of evolution, in virtue of which the product of a\nprocess of evolution serves in its turn as the environment for the\nreiterated evolution of its own antecedent conditions, A thus passing by\nevolution into B and B back again into A. For you would at least have to\naccept this tendency to periodic rhythm itself as an ultimate property\nof all existence, not itself resulting by evolution from something\nelse.) The dilemma thus created by the attempt to apply the concept of\nevolution to the whole of Reality, is sufficient to show that evolution\nitself is only thinkable as a characteristic of processes which fall\nwithin the nature of a system which, as a whole, does not evolve.\n\nWe may restate the same contention in the following form:\u2014All\ndevelopment means advance towards an _end_. But only that which is as\nyet in imperfect possession of its end can advance towards it. For that\nwhich already is all that it has it in its nature to be there can be no\nadvance, and hence no progressive development. Neither can such a\ncomplete individual degenerate. For even in degenerating, that which\ndegenerates is gradually realising some feature of its own nature which\nwas previously only an unrealised potentiality. Thus even degeneration\nimplies the realisation of an end or interest, and is itself a kind of\nadvance[.] As the biologists tell us, the atrophy of an organ, which we\ncall degeneration, is itself a step in the progressive adaptation of the\norganisation to new conditions of life, and, as the moralists remind us,\nin the ethical sphere a \u201cfall\u201d is, in its way, an upward step. Hence\nwhat cannot rise higher in the scale of existence also cannot sink\nlower.\n\n\u00a7 6. Evolution is thus an inseparable characteristic of the life of\nfinite individuals, and of finite individuals only. And this\nconsideration gives us the clue to the metaphysical interpretation of\nthe distinction, so significant for all evolutionary theory, between the\nprogressive and retrogressive directions of the evolution process. To a\nlarge extent it is, of course, a matter of convention what we shall\nregard as progress and what as degeneration. So long as _we_ are\nspecially interested in the attainment of any end or culminating result,\nwe call the line of development which leads up to that result\nprogressive, and the line which leads to its subsequent destruction\ndegeneration. And thus the same development may be viewed as progress or\nas degeneration, according to the special character of the interests\nwith which we study it. Thus, for instance, the successive modifications\nof the vertebrate structure which have resulted in the production of the\nhuman skeleton are naturally thought of as progressive, because our\nspecial interest in human intelligent life and character leads us to\nregard the human type as superior to its predecessors in the line of\ndevelopment. At the same time, many of these modifications consist in\nthe gradual loss of characteristics previously evolved, and are\ntherefore degenerative from the point of view of the anatomical student,\nwho is specially interested in the production of organs of increasing\ncomplexity of structure, and therefore takes the complexity of those\nstructures as _his_ standard in distinguishing progress from\nretrogression.\n\nBut the distinction is not a _purely_ conventional one. As we have seen,\ndegrees of individuality are also degrees of reality; what is more\ncompletely individual is also a completer representative of the ultimate\nstructure of the infinite individual whole, and therefore more\ncompletely real. Hence we may say that advance in individuality is\nreally, and not in a merely conventional sense, progress in development;\nloss of individuality is real degeneration. Thus we get at least the\npossibility of a true \u201cobjective\u201d basis for distinction between the\ndirections of evolutionary progress. But we must remember that it is\nonly where we are able to know something of the actual interests of\nfinite experiencing beings that we have safe grounds for judging whether\nthose interests receive more adequate embodiment in consequence of the\nchanges of structure and habit produced by evolution or not. Hence,\nwhile our insight into the inner lives of ourselves and our animal\ncongeners theoretically warrants us in pronouncing the various\ndevelopments in human social life to be genuinely progressive or\nretrogressive, and again in regarding the series of organic types which\nleads directly up to man as a true \u201cascent,\u201d our ignorance of the\nspecial character of the individual experiences of which the inorganic\nphysical order at large is the phenomenal manifestation, makes it\nimpossible for us to determine whether an \u201cevolution\u201d outside these\nlimits is really progressive or not. We have to treat \u201ccosmic evolution\u201d\nin general, outside the special line of animal development which leads\nup to man, as indifferently a \u201cprogress\u201d or a \u201cdegeneration\u201d according\nto our own arbitrary point of view, not because it is not \u201cobjectively\u201d\ndefinitely the one or the other, but because _our_ insight is not\nsufficient to discern which it is.\n\n\u00a7 7. One more point may be noted, which is of some importance in view of\ncertain metaphysical problems connected with the nature of finite\nindividuality. If evolution is more than an illusion, it seems necessary\nto hold that it is a process in the course of which finite individuals\nmay disappear and new finite individuals originate. This point is\nmetaphysically significant, because it means that the fact of evolution\nis irreconcilable with any of the philosophical theories of ancient and\nmodern times, which regard Reality as composed of a plurality of\nultimately independent finite individuals or \u201cpersonalities.\u201d[158] If\nthese philosophical theories are sound, the course of the world\u2019s\nhistory must be made up of the successive transformations of finite\nindividuals, who somehow remain unaffected and unaltered in their\ncharacter by the various external disguises they assume. The individuals\nof such a philosophy would, in fact, be as little modified by these\nchanges as the actors on a stage by their changes of costume, or the\nsouls of the \u201ctransmigration\u201d hypothesis by the bodies into which they\nsuccessively enter. And thus development would not be even a relatively\ngenuine feature of the life of finite individuals; it would be a mere\nillusion, inevitable indeed in the present condition of our acquaintance\nwith the detailed contents of existence, but corresponding to no actual\nfact of inner experience.\n\nOn the other hand, if evolution is not a pure illusion, these\nmetaphysical constructions cannot be valid. For the whole essence of the\nmodern doctrine of evolution is contained in the principle that radical\ndifferences in kind result from the accumulation of successive\nmodifications of individual structure, and once established continue to\nbe perpetuated as differences in kind. Now, such differences in kind can\nonly be interpreted metaphysically as radical differences in the\ndetermining aims and interests of the experiencing subjects constituting\nthe physical order, and we have already seen that it is precisely the\ncharacter of these dominant unique interests which forms the\nindividuality of the individual. Thus the metaphysical interpretation of\nthe evolution process seems inevitably to resolve it into a process of\nthe development of fresh and disappearance of old individual interests,\nand thus into a process of the origination and disappearance of finite\nindividuals within the one infinite individual whole.\n\nA conclusion of the same sort would be suggested by consideration of\nthose facts of our own individual development from which the wider\nevolutionary theories have, in the last resort, borrowed their ideas and\ntheir terminology. The mental growth of the individual human being is\nessentially a process of the formation of interests in things. Both our\nformal education, and our informal intellectual and moral training\neffected by the influence of social tradition and mutual intercourse,\nare processes consisting of an accumulation of minor modifications which\nultimately culminate in the establishment of more or less unique\npersonal interests in different aspects of existence. And inasmuch as\nthis process is never terminated, it is always possible for our\npreviously acquired interests to undergo such modification as renders\nthem obsolete, and substitutes novel interests in their places. So far\nas this is effected, we rightly say that we are no longer our \u201cold\nselves.\u201d A new \u201cself\u201d or centre of unique individual interests has then\ndeveloped within the former self.\n\nUsually the process stops short of the point at which all sensible\ncontinuity seems suspended, but that this point can be actually reached,\nunder exceptional conditions, is shown to superfluity by such facts as\nthose of \u201cconversion,\u201d to say nothing of the more pathological phenomena\nof \u201cmultiple personality.\u201d The same phenomena illustrate the fact that a\nnew individuality, once evolved, may stand in various relations to the\nold individual interests it displaces. It may permanently replace them,\nor, as in so many cases of \u201cconversion,\u201d may prove only temporary and\npass back again into the old individuality, or the two may alternate\nperiodically.[159] The one important point in which all these cases\nagree is simply the general one of the production in the course of\ndevelopment of a new individuality within the first individuality. It\nmay perhaps be suggested that we have in these features of individual\ngrowth a hint as to the true nature of the process we call the\norigination of new species by evolution.[160]\n\nTo recapitulate: evolution implies change determined by reference to an\nend, and thus constituted into an individual process. Such \u201cends\u201d have\nno meaning, except in so far as the processes of change are viewed as\nthe progressive attainment of individual interests, and thus evolution\nis only possible where there is finite individuality. This is the\nphilosophical justification for our previous assertion that evidence of\nstructural evolution, where it can be had, affords reasonable\npresumption that what appears to us _one thing_ is really a true\nindividual of some degree, and not a mere arbitrary grouping together on\nour part of states which possess no inner unity. Further, evolution is a\nprocess in which new individuals arise and old ones disappear. Hence its\nsignificance for Metaphysics as excluding all theories which make\nReality consist of a mere plurality of unchanging finite individuals. It\nis significant also from another point of view. Implying, as it so\nmanifestly does, the presence of individual subjects of experience\nthroughout the physical order, the concept of Nature as a realm of\nevolutionary processes is infinitely nearer to the full truth for\nMetaphysics than the purely mechanistic view of it as a mere succession\nof connected changes.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 27,\n28 (pp. 497, 499, 508 of ed. i. for criticism of concept of Progress);\nH. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. ii. chap. 8 (\u201cForms of the Course of\nNature,\u201d Eng. trans., vol. ii. pp. 109, 162); J. Royce, _The World and\nthe Individual_, Second Series, lect. 5; H. Sidgwick, _Philosophy: its\nScope and Relations_, lects. 6 and 7 (for some general consideration of\nthe bearing of evolution on Metaphysics); G. E. Underhill, \u201cThe Limits\nof Evolution\u201d (in _Personal Idealism_); J. Ward, _Naturalism and\nAgnosticism_, vol. i. lects. 7-9 (criticism of Spencer\u2019s evolutionary\nphilosophy), 10 (on _biological_ evolution).\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 156:\n\n It might be objected that, _e.g._, death is the _end_ of life in the\n sense of being its last stage, without being the attainment of the\n interests which compose our inner life. But the illustration will not\n bear examination. The processes of change within the organism, when\n viewed simply _as_ connected changes, do not cease with death; in\n fact, they have _no_ end or last state. To call a man\u2019s death his end\n only means that the purposes for which _we_ are interested in the\n study of his behaviour get complete fulfilment when we have followed\n him from the cradle to the grave. He is \u201cdone with\u201d at death, because\n _we_ have done with him. Only teleological processes can have a _last_\n stage. Note as a consequence of the significance of the concept of\n \u201cends\u201d for evolution, that whereas the purely mechanistic\n interpretation of the processes of Nature logically leads to the\n thought of them as a continuous series, the series of successive\n organic or social types is essentially discontinuous, a point well\n brought out by Professor Royce, _The World and the Individual_, Second\n Series, lects. 5, 7.\n\nFootnote 157:\n\n I need hardly remind the reader of the vast difference between the\n view inculcated above and the doctrine of \u201cends in nature\u201d as it\n figures in the old-fashioned \u201cargument from design.\u201d The old-fashioned\n teleology assumed (1) that the \u201csubjective interests\u201d manifested in\n the evolutionary process are fundamentally human. We, it held, can\n recognise what these ends are, and further, they are for the most part\n summed up in the \u201cdesign\u201d of furthering our human convenience. (2)\n That these interests exist as the reflective designs of an\n anthropomorphic Ruler of Nature. Our doctrine is consistent with\n neither assumption. It follows from our whole interpretation of the\n physical order, that we do not and cannot know what kind of subjective\n interest of finite individuals is realised by any portion of it beyond\n that constituted by our own bodies and those of our near congeners,\n and therefore are absolutely without any right to fancy ourselves the\n culminating end of all evolution. Again, a subjective interest need\n not exist in the form of a definitely preconceived design; most of our\n own interests exist as unreflective cravings and impulses. Whether any\n part of the evolutionary process is due to deliberate reflective\n design on the part of superhuman intelligences, Metaphysics, I take\n it, has no means of deciding. This would be a question for solution by\n the same empirical methods which we employ in detecting the presence\n of design in the products of human art. In any case, reflective design\n is bound up with the time-process, and cannot therefore be ascribed to\n the infinite individual.\n\nFootnote 158:\n\n Compare, _e.g._, the first of the arguments for immortality in Plato\u2019s\n _Ph\u00e6do_, p. 70 ff., and the remark in the _Republic_, with obvious\n reference to this argument, that the \u201cnumber of souls is always the\n same\u201d (611A). In Plato the doctrine is pretty certainly of Orphic\n _provenance_. Compare also the cyclic alternation of death and life in\n Heracleitus, the (Orphic) cycle of births of Empedocles, that of the\n Stoics, and in the modern world, to take only one instance, the\n \u201ceternal recurrence\u201d of Nietzsche.\n\nFootnote 159:\n\n The same phenomenon of the formation of a new individuality within the\n limits of an already existing one, is illustrated by the familiar\n facts of the moral conflict between the \u201chigher\u201d and \u201clower\u201d self.\n\nFootnote 160:\n\n Compare Royce, _The World and the Individual_, Second Series, p. 305\n ff., where a view of this kind is worked out in some detail. Prof.\n Royce\u2019s second volume unfortunately came into my hands too late to\n enable me to make all the use of it I could have wished; the same is\n the case with Mr. Underhill\u2019s essay on \u201cThe Limits of Evolution\u201d in\n _Personal Idealism_.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF DESCRIPTIVE\n SCIENCE\n\n\u00a7 1. Scientific _description_ may be contrasted with philosophical or\n teleological _interpretation_, but the contrast is not absolute. \u00a7\n 2. The primary end of all scientific description is\n intercommunication with a view to active co-operation. Hence all\n such description is necessarily restricted to objects capable of\n being experienced in the same way by a plurality of individuals. \u00a7\n 3. A second end of scientific description is the _economising_ of\n intellectual labour by the creation of _general_ rules for dealing\n with typical situations in the environment. In the course of\n evolution this object becomes partially independent of the former. \u00a7\n 4. From the interest in formulating _general_ rules arise the three\n fundamental postulates of physical science, the postulates of\n _Uniformity_, _Mechanical Law_, and _Causal Determination_. \u00a7 5. The\n mechanical view of physical Nature determined by these three\n postulates is systematically carried out only in the abstract\n science of _Mechanics_; hence the logical completion of the\n descriptive process would mean the reduction of all descriptive\n science to Mechanics. That the chemical, biological, and\n psychological sciences contain elements which cannot be reduced to\n mechanical terms, is due to the fact that their descriptions are\n inspired by \u00e6sthetic and historical as well as by primarily\n \u201cscientific\u201d interests. \u00a7 6. The analysis of such leading concepts\n of mechanical Physics as the Conservation of Mass and of Energy\n shows them to have only _relative_ validity.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In its general outlines our interpretation of the significance of\nthe physical order is now complete. We have seen reason to hold that in\nthat order we have the appearance to our human senses of a great system\nor complex of systems composed of purposive sentient beings, whose\ninterests are for the most part so widely removed from our own as to\npreclude all direct intercourse, but who are nevertheless historically\nconnected with ourselves by that unceasing process of the development of\nnew forms of individual interest which we know empirically as the\nevolution of life and intelligence on our planet. As we have tried\nthroughout the four preceding chapters to show in detail, there is no\nreal inconsistency between this general interpretation of the meaning of\nthe physical order and the working assumptions of our various empirical\nsciences. At the same time it is obvious that in executing the task of\nthe detailed description and calculation of the phenomenal course of\nevents, the empirical sciences, while not rejecting such a metaphysical\ninterpretation, ignore it; and the more conscientiously they exclude\nfrom their programme all amateur excursions into extraneous metaphysical\nspeculation, the more thoroughly is the work of description and\nmathematical formulation done. It seems advisable, therefore, to\nconclude our brief sketch of the principles of Cosmology with a short\ndiscussion of the nature of the limitations imposed on empirical\nscience, by the special character of the objects it sets before it, and\nof the way in which the existence of these limitations is revealed by\nanalysis of the most general concepts of the empirical sciences\nthemselves.\n\nIt is important, in the first place, to be quite clear as to the sense\nin which we speak of _description_ as the work of the empirical\nsciences, and as to the meaning of the contrast between such description\nand a philosophical _interpretation_ of existence. In this connection\nthere are two points which seem to call for special and repeated\nemphasis. (1) The contrast between interpretation and description is not\nan absolute one. _Complete_ description would of itself be something\nmore than mere description, and would pass into philosophical\ninterpretation. Thus a significant purposive movement is not adequately\ndescribed when, _e.g._, its direction, velocity, momentum, and duration\nhave been assigned. The complete description of such a movement would\nrequire the recognition of its meaning for the being executing it as a\nstep in the realisation of a craving or a design, and would thus merge\nin what we have called philosophical interpretation. So generally, if\nall existence is ultimately experience and all experience essentially\nteleological, such description as can be distinguished from\ninterpretation must always be incomplete from the logical standpoint,\nthough adequate to fulfil certain special purposes.\n\n(2) The descriptions of science, again, must be carefully distinguished\nfrom such descriptions as can be effected by the mere multiplication of\nunanalysed sensible detail. Scientific description, it must be\nremembered, is always description undertaken with a view to the\n_calculation_ and prediction of the course of events. This implies that\nit must be description in general terms, and, wherever possible, by the\naid of mathematical analysis. Natural processes are described by the\nempirical sciences which deal with them, not in their concrete\nindividual detail, but only in so far as they exhibit certain uniform\naspects permitting of reduction to formul\u00e6 suitable for calculation.\nSuch description is frequently spoken of as _explanation_, and is\nexpressly contrasted by this difference in nomenclature with the mere\naccumulation of sensible detail. We must not, however, allow the\ndifference in question to blind us to the essentially descriptive\ncharacter of all scientific hypotheses. It is sometimes urged that\nscientific _explanation_ must differ in its logical character from\ndescription, because the \u201csubstance,\u201d \u201cagencies,\u201d and \u201cmedia,\u201d in terms\nof which explanation is couched, are largely of a kind inaccessible to\nsense-perception. It must be remembered, however, that hypotheses as to\nsuch imperceptible objects are only valuable so far as they serve as\nconnecting-links by which we may calculate sensible events from sensible\ndata. Whatever intermediate links empirical science may find it useful\nto assume, it invariably takes the sensible occurrences of the\nphenomenal physical order as the starting-point, and again as the goal\nof its inferences.[161] All its hypothetical constructions are thus\nsubservient to the main interest of the accurate description of the\ncourse of sensible events. The only kind of \u201cexplanation\u201d which can be\nreasonably contrasted, in respect of its logical character, with\ndescription is teleological interpretation, and even here the contrast,\nas we have seen, is not final.\n\n\u00a7 2. We have to ask, then, what is the object at which scientific\ndescriptions aim? What purpose do they seek to fulfil, and how does the\nessential character of this purpose determine the logical character of\nthe descriptive process? Now, it is at once evident that all description\nhas for its immediate object one or other of two practical ends, which\nare so closely connected as to be ultimately coincident. Historically,\nit is beyond a doubt that the original purpose of all description of\nphysical events was intercommunication with a view to social\nco-operation. I have already referred to this function of description\nwith special reference to the use of causal descriptions in science, but\nmay conveniently deal with the same point rather more fully and in a\nmore general way here.\n\nIn a society of finite individuals with interrelated aims and objects,\neach of the individuals can only attain satisfaction for his own\nsubjective interests by some degree of concerted action along with the\nrest. And concerted action is only possible where the co-operating\nindividuals can reduce their various views of their common external\nenvironment to common terms, equally intelligible to all, and similarly\nindicate to each other their respective special contributions to the\ncommon task. There must be a common understanding of the difficulty to\nbe met, and of the precise part each is to play in meeting it. Thus\nintercommunication between individuals is an indispensable requisite of\nall effective practical co-operation.\n\nBut again, intercommunication is only possible by means of description\nin _general_ terms. Only in so far as there are identical elements in\nthe experiences of the various individuals can one communicate the\ncontents of his experience to another. Immediate feeling, precisely\nbecause of its unique individual character, is essentially\nincommunicable. Thus in communicating information about my own body to\nanother, I am of necessity forced to speak of my body in terms not of\nthe immediate experience I have of it in organic sensation, but of those\ncomplexes of sense-presentations which he and I alike get through our\norgans of special perception. And so the whole physical order can only\nserve as a basis of co-operation between individuals so far as it is\ndescribable in the last resort as a complex of sense-presentations\nequally accessible to the observation of all the individuals. Any kind\nof experience of nature which is uniquely peculiar to myself, and\ntherefore incapable of being got under assignable conditions by any\nother individual endowed with the same organs of perception, is\nnecessarily incommunicable, and therefore useless as a basis for\nconcerted action. Hence science is restricted by its very purpose to\ndescribe the physical order in such a way that its descriptions may be\navailable for the objects of practical art, to the description of it in\nits phenomenal aspect as a mere complex of related presentations or\npossibilities of presentation. It is no accident, but a logical\nconsequence of the conditions of intercommunication, that all scientific\ndescription must start from and end with occurrences of the phenomenal\norder which any individual may experience by conforming to the\nprescribed conditions of perception. Thus we see that it is an\nepistemological characteristic of the physical order as investigated by\nscience, that it consists exclusively of those objects which are, in\nprinciple, perceptible by more than one individual. If there are objects\nin their own nature incapable of being experienced by more than one\nindividual, such as, _e.g._, my own inner life, those objects cannot\nbelong to the physical order of science.[162]\n\n\u00a7 3. There is a second purpose of description which arises out of the\nfirst as human experiences become more reflective. Description not only\nenables me to communicate the particular situation of the moment to\nothers, and devise in concert with them means for coping with it; it\nalso enables me to formulate beforehand _general_ rules for my own\nbehaviour in recurrent situations of the same type. The need for the\npossession of such general views originates, of course, while\ndescription is still confined to its original function in assisting\nsocial co-operation. From the practical point of view of those\nindustrial arts out of which our various physical sciences have arisen,\nit is an economical advantage of the first magnitude to be able once and\nfor all to formulate a _general_ rule for dealing with the indefinitely\nnumerous occurrences of typical situations, instead of having to deal\nwith each occurrence separately as it arises.\n\nThe advantages of such general rules speedily make themselves felt in\nthe increased power and importance enjoyed by the section of society\nwhich is in possession of them, a consideration which may help us to\nunderstand why, in early stages of civilisation, such rules are commonly\njealously guarded as the hereditary secrets of close corporations.[163]\nThus it comes to be the special aim of scientific description to assist\nthe formulation of general rules for the practical manipulation of the\nobjects of the physical order. And, with the progress of reflection,\nthis originally secondary object of the descriptive process becomes to a\nlarge extent independent of the primary object of intercommunication.\nEven where I have no need or no desire for intercommunication and\nco-operation with my fellows, it becomes my interest to seek generalised\ndescriptions of typical situations in the physical order as the basis of\npractical rules for my own voluntary intervention in that order.\n\n\u00a7 4. The interest in the formulation of general rules for practical\ninterference with nature, again, necessarily dictates the form which our\nscientific descriptions will take, and is thus the source of those\npractical postulates of empirical science with which we have already\nmade some acquaintance. It compels us to assume, in the first place, as\nan indispensable condition of success in our descriptions, that there\nare situations in the physical order which may be treated with\nsufficient accuracy for our practical purposes, as recurring\nidentically; in the second place, that, so long as _we_ abstain from\nintentional intervention in the course of events, they succeed one\nanother in a fixed routine order, or, in other words, that there are no\ndepartures in nature from established routine of such a kind as to\ninterfere with our calculations; in the third place, that every event in\nthe physical order is, within the limits requisite for our successful\ndevising of means to our ends, determined by antecedent events. It is\nthus our interest in obtaining general rules for the production of\neffects in the physical order by intentional interference with it which\nis the source of the three fundamental postulates of empirical physical\nscience, the postulates of uniformity, of the omnipresence of routine or\nmechanical \u201claw,\u201d and of the causal determination of subsequent by\nantecedent events.\n\nThe dependence of physical science upon these three fundamental\npostulates thus does not prove their ultimate truth, as we have already\nshown at length in preceding chapters: it proves only that where they\ncannot be treated as approximately true, within the limits in which\ntheir falsity could be detected by sensible experiment, our special\ninterest in devising rules for the manipulation of events cannot be\ngratified. Conversely, wherever that interest can be successfully\ngratified, these postulates must be for all practical purposes\nequivalent to the truth. Hence, if we remember that the ultimate object\nof all physical science is the successful formulation of such practical\nrules for action, we can see that it is a logical consequence of the\ncharacter of the interests which dominate our scientific descriptions,\nthat the physical sciences should adopt a rigidly mechanical view of the\nphysical order. Only, in proportion as any one branch of physical\nscience succeeds in carrying out in detail this conception of the\nphysical order as an interconnected mechanism of sequences rigidly\ndetermined by laws of sequence, does it succeed in effecting the\npurposes by which all physical science has been called into existence.\nWe may thus call the mechanical conception of the physical order the\nmost general postulate of physical science. Only, we must once more take\ncare to recollect that a fundamental postulate of physical science need\nnot in the least be an ultimate truth; such a postulate is in the end\nnothing more than a way of stating the nature of the interest which\nphysical science subserves, and, as we have sufficiently seen, that\ninterest is not the purely logical one of consistent thinking, but the\npractical one of successful interference with nature.\n\n\u00a7 5. It does not, of course, follow that all the sciences which deal in\nany way with the events of the physical order can as a matter of fact\ncarry out this mechanical view of their objects with equal success. It\nis only in the various branches of abstract Mechanics that we get\nanything like complete systematic adherence to the postulates of the\nmechanical theory of physical nature as previously enumerated. For the\nphysical, chemical, and still more for the biological sciences, it\nremains an unrealised ideal\u2014and one we have no right to think ever\ncompletely realisable\u2014that all the facts of electrical and chemical, and\nagain of physiological process should be ultimately capable of reduction\nto routine uniformities upon which confident calculation and prediction\ncan be based.\n\nThus, even in Chemistry, limits are set to the successful adoption of\nthe purely mechanical point of view, by the fact that chemical\ncombination is regularly productive of _new qualities_ in the compound\nwhich could not have been predicted from a knowledge of the properties\nof its constituents, but have to be ascertained _a posteriori_ by actual\nexperiment. It is true, no doubt, that we seem to be increasingly able,\nas our chemical knowledge advances, to say in general what properties\nmay be expected to result from the combination of given elements, but\nthere is no logical ground for supposing that we shall ever be able to\nforetell _all_ the properties of an as yet unexamined compound, and in\nany case such knowledge could only be of a general sort. However much we\nmight know, in advance of the results of the combination of certain\nelements in certain proportions, it would still be impossible to predict\nwith absolute certainty the precise result of trying the combination in\na particular concrete case.\n\nStill less realisable would be the ideal of the reduction of Biology to\napplied Mechanics. It is not merely that the isolated physiological\nprocess regularly exhibits _qualitative_ aspects of a chemical or\nelectrical kind, which we have no right to reduce to mere quantitative\nchanges. Beyond this, as the very terminology of our evolutionary\nhypotheses is enough to show, it is impossible to state the facts of\nbiological evolution without introducing, under such names as \u201csexual\nselection,\u201d continual reference to a subjective factor, in the form of\nthe likes and dislikes, habits and cravings of sentient beings, and this\nselective factor, being in its own nature incapable of direct\npresentation in identical form to a plurality of experiences, is not\neven a member of the physical order. With the case of Psychology we\nshall be better able to deal in connection with the special discussions\nof the following Book. (See especially Bk. IV. chap. 1.)\n\nConsiderations of this kind seem to necessitate the following general\nview of the logical character of descriptive physical science. The only\nscience in which the postulates of description are rigidly carried out\nto their logical consequences is the science of abstract Mechanics in\nits various branches (Statics, Kinetics, etc.). Mechanics owes its power\nto follow out these postulates to its abstract character. Precisely\nbecause it regards only those aspects of the actual physical order which\nare consistent with the fundamental postulate of describability by\ngeneral formul\u00e6, Mechanics is constrained to be a purely abstract and\nhypothetical science. For since every actual process involves the\nappearance of the qualitatively novel, and since all concrete _quality_\nis in its essence unique, no actual process can be merely mechanical.\n\nThus the only way of conceiving the physical order which is logically\nconsistent with the postulates of descriptive science in their rigidity,\nis one which treats all natural changes as reducible to equations. And\nit is only in abstract Mechanics that this view is systematically\ncarried out.[164] Consequently, it is only in so far as all physical\nscience can be reduced to abstract Mechanics that we can attain the\nultimate purpose of our scientific constructions, the calculation and\nprediction of the course of occurrences by means of general formul\u00e6.\nThis conclusion, derived in the first instance from reflection on the\nlogical nature of scientific description, is fully borne out by our\nactual experience of the results of our scientific theories. Just\nbecause we cannot ultimately reduce all chemical and biological\nprocesses to mere quantitative changes in a material of uniform quality,\nwe are unable to predict with absolute confidence the precise result of\na concrete chemical experiment, and still more unable to foretell the\nprecise behaviour of a living organism.\n\nHence follow two very important results. (1) There is a real practical\njustification for the attempt, as far as possible, to treat the chemical\nand biological phenomena _as if_ they were simply more complicated\ninstances of the relations familiar to us in Mechanics. For though they\nare not really purely mechanical, it is only in so far as we can treat\nthem without appreciable error as exactly measurable that they admit in\nprinciple of calculation.\n\n(2) At the same time, there is also ample justification for the use of\nqualitative and teleological categories in Chemistry and Biology. For\nthe interests which chemical and biological knowledge subserve are not\nlimited by our need for practical rules for intervention in the course\nof nature. Over and above this original _scientific_ interest, which can\nonly be gratified by a mechanical treatment of the subject, we have an\n_\u00e6sthetic_ interest in the serial grouping of processes according to\ntheir qualitative affinities, and an _historical_ interest in tracing\nthe successive modifications which have led to the establishment of a\nrelatively stable form of human social existence. In so far as the\nchemical and biological sciences involve the recognition of qualitative\ndistinctions and the consequent use of categories which are\nnon-mechanical, it is these \u00e6sthetic and historical interests, and not\nthe primary scientific interest in the control of natural phenomena,\nwhich are subserved by their elaboration.\n\nHence, while Chemistry and Biology, even apart from the possibility of\ntheir conversion into branches of applied Mechanics, are essentially\ndescriptive sciences, the task fulfilled by them, so far as they use\nqualitative and teleological categories, is one of \u00e6sthetic and\nhistorical rather than of properly scientific description. And \u00e6sthetic\nand historical description, having another object than that of purely\nscientific description, are under no necessity to conform to the\npostulates imposed on the latter by the special character of the\ninterests it aims at satisfying. Thus we can see how the right of\nChemistry and Biology to be regarded as something more than mere applied\nMechanics, can be reconciled with Kant\u2019s profoundly true assertion that\nany branch of knowledge contains just so much _science_ as it contains\nof Mathematics. When we come, in connection with the special problems of\nthe following Book, to discuss the aims and methods of Psychology, we\nshall find in that study a still more striking example of the way in\nwhich the narrowly \u201cscientific\u201d interest may play a markedly subordinate\npart in determining the procedure of a branch of knowledge which must,\nbecause of its systematic character, be called a \u201cscience\u201d in the wider\nacceptation of the term.[165]\n\n\u00a7 6. Since it is only complete and all-embracing knowledge which can be\nin the last resort a completely self-contained and self-explaining\nsystem, we must expect to find that the concepts employed in the\nmechanical interpretation of the physical order lead us into\ncontradiction the moment we try to treat them as a complete account of\nthe concrete nature of the whole of Reality. This is shown more\nparticularly in two ways. On the one hand, the application of the\ncategories of Mechanics to the whole of Reality leads inevitably to the\nindefinite regress. On the other, in their legitimate application to a\nlesser part of existence they are all demonstrably _relative_, that is,\nthey always appear as one aspect of a fact which has other aspects, and\nwithout these other aspects would have no meaning. It is worth our while\nto consider both these points in some detail.\n\nFor the successful application of the mechanical view to the physical\norder, we need to treat that order as consisting of the changing\nconfigurations of a whole of qualitatively homogeneous related parts.\nAny departure from this point of view would involve the recognition of\ndifferences which cannot be treated as merely quantitative, as mere\nsubjects for calculation and prediction, and would thus necessitate the\nintroduction of a non-mechanical factor into our interpretation of the\nuniverse. The mechanical view, fully carried out, thus involves the\nconception of the universe as a system extended and ordered in space and\ntime, and capable of spatial and temporal change, but manifesting a\nquantitative identity throughout its changes. In the actual\nconstructions of physical science this quantitative identity is\nrepresented principally by the principles of the Conservation of Mass\nand the Conservation of Energy. Both these latter principles are thus,\nin their general form, neither axioms of knowledge nor verifiable\nempirical facts, but a part of the general mechanical postulate. There\nis no ultimate logical principle in virtue of which we are constrained\nto think of the particular quantities we denote as mass and energy as\nincapable of increase or diminution, nor again have we any experimental\nmeans of proving that those quantities are more than approximately\nconstant.[166] It is, however, a necessary condition of success in\ncalculating the course of events, that there should be _some_\nquantitative identity which remains unaffected in the various processes\nof physical change, and it is chiefly in the special forms of the\nquantitative constancy of Mass and Energy that we seem at present able\nto give definite expression to this _a priori_ postulate of mechanical\nconstruction.\n\nNow, with regard to spatial and temporal direction and position, we have\nseen already both that they are always relative, position and direction\nbeing only definable with respect to other positions and directions\narbitrarily selected to serve as standards of reference, and that, when\ntaken as ultimate realities, they involve the indefinite regress. It\nonly remains to show that the same is true of the other fundamental\nconcepts of the mechanical scheme, mass and energy. Taking the two\nseparately, we may deal first of all with the notion of _mass_. The mass\nof a material system is often loosely spoken of as its \u201cquantity of\nmatter,\u201d but requires, for the purposes of logical analysis, a more\nprecise definition. Such a definition may be given in the following way.\nIn order to explain what is meant by the constancy of the mass of a\nbody, it is necessary to consider the mutual relations of at least three\ndifferent bodies, which we will call A, B, and C. It is found that, at a\ngiven distance, in the presence of A, C receives an acceleration _m_,\nand in the presence of B a second acceleration _n_; then the mass of A\nis said to stand to that of B in the ratio _m_/_n_, which is the ratio\nof the accelerations which they respectively produce on C, and this\nratio is constant, whatever body we choose for C. Hence, if we\narbitrarily take B as our unit for the measurement of mass, the mass of\nA as determined by the foregoing experiment will be represented by the\n_number m_. By the principle of the _Conservation_ of Mass is meant the\ndoctrine that the ratio _m_/_n_ as above determined does not alter with\nthe lapse of time.[167] That is, the ratio between the accelerations\nproduced by any pair of bodies or a third body is constant and\nindependent of this third body itself. This proposition is verifiable\napproximately by direct experiment for a particular pair of bodies, but\nwhen affirmed as universally true becomes a part of the general\nmechanical postulate.\n\nNow, it is obvious from the foregoing explanation of the meaning of mass\n(1) that mass is a relative term. It is a name for a certain constant\nratio which requires no less than three distinct terms for its complete\ndefinition. Hence there would be no meaning in ascribing mass to the\nwhole physical order or \u201cuniverse.\u201d The \u201cuniverse\u201d could only have a\nmass as a whole if there were some body outside the universe, but\ncapable of interaction with it, so that we could compare the relative\naccelerations, in the presence of this body, of the whole \u201cphysical\nuniverse,\u201d and of our arbitrarily selected unit of mass. But the\n\u201cuniverse,\u201d by supposition, contains all physical existence, and there\nis therefore no such accelerating body outside it. Hence we cannot say,\nwithout an implicit contradiction, that the whole of existence possesses\nthe property of mass, nor _a fortiori_ that its mass is constant. It is\nonly subordinate parts of the universe to which the principle of the\nConservation of Mass can be intelligibly applied.\n\n(2) It is also clear that the mass of a body is only one aspect of a\nwhole of existence which possesses other aspects, not regarded in our\nmechanical constructions. The bodies which actually exhibit a constant\nratio in their accelerations have other properties over and above the\nfact of this constant ratio. They have always, in actual fact,\n_qualitative_ differences from one another and from other things, which\nwe disregard in our mechanical treatment of them because they make no\ndifference to this special property, in which for purposes of\ncalculation we are peculiarly interested. It is by the barest and most\npalpable of abstractions that, in Mechanics, we treat bodies as if they\nwere masses and nothing more. Thus the facts taken into account by the\nmechanical interpretation of nature are, so far as its reduction of\nbodies to masses is concerned, a mere aspect of a fuller reality which\nwe treat as equivalent to the whole for no better reason than the\npractical one that it suits a special object of our own that it should\nbe so equivalent, and that this object is empirically found to be\nattained by regarding it as equivalent.\n\nPrecisely the same is the case with the complementary concept of Energy.\nThe kinetic energy, or capacity of a body for doing work against\nresistance, is found experimentally to be measured by half the square of\nits velocity multiplied by its mass. It is further found by experiment\nthat, so far as we can measure, the energy of a material system not\nacted upon from without remains constant. That the constancy is absolute\nis, of course, once more not a matter for direct empirical proof, but a\npart of the postulate that the physical order shall be capable of a\nmechanical interpretation. Now we can see at once, from what has been\npreviously said of the concept of Mass, that the physical order or\n\u201cuniverse\u201d as a whole cannot be intelligibly said to possess kinetic\nenergy, whether constant or otherwise. What cannot be said to have mass\nclearly cannot have a property only explicable in terms of mass. We\nmight indeed have inferred the same consequence directly from the\ndefinition of energy as capacity for doing \u201cwork\u201d in overcoming\nresistance. The \u201cuniverse,\u201d having nothing outside itself, can have no\nsource of possible resistance to overcome, and therefore cannot be\nthought of as doing \u201cwork.\u201d Hence, once more, it is only the parts of\nthe physical order, considered as parts, to which energy can be\nascribed.\n\n(3) Again, it is even more evident in the case of energy than in the\ncase of mass, that we are dealing with one aspect singled out by\nabstraction from a whole possessed of other aspects not regarded in a\npurely mechanical construction. For (_a_) the capacity for work of an\nactual body does not always exist in the \u201ckinetic\u201d form of actual\nmotion. There are various forms of non-kinetic energy, such as, _e.g._,\nthe energy of \u201cposition\u201d of a resting body, the heat of a body of higher\ntemperature than its surroundings, which Mechanics treats as equivalent\nto \u201ckinetic\u201d energy, because they are theoretically capable of being\nconverted into it. And these forms of non-kinetic energy are\n_qualitatively_ different both from energy of actual motion and from\neach other. It is by a mere abstraction that we treat them as identical\nbecause they are, for certain special purposes, equivalent. The\nqualitative differences may make no difference with respect to a\nparticular purpose of our own, but they are none the less really there.\n\nAgain, the mechanical scheme itself is quite insufficient to explain why\nor when these different forms of energy are replaced by one another. As\nhas been well said by Professor Ward, the doctrine of the Conservation\nof Energy asserts no more than that a certain quantitative identity is\nmaintained in all exchanges of energy. But when or in what direction\nthese exchanges shall take place, the principle itself does not enable\nus to say. Thus, to take a simple example: if I know the mass of a stone\nlodged on a roof, the height of the roof from the ground, and the\nacceleration produced by gravity at the spot in question, I can\ndetermine the \u201cpotential energy\u201d of the stone. But my data tell me\nnothing as to whether this potential energy will remain for ever in its\npotential form, or whether the stone will yet be dislodged and its\nenergy converted into kinetic shape, and if so, when. The principles of\nthe mechanical interpretation of nature are thus inadequate to describe\nthe concrete course of events in so simple a case as that of the fall of\na stone. _If_ the stone falls, then by the aid of the mechanical\npostulate I can describe one aspect of the process, namely, the amount\nof kinetic energy which will be evolved; and again, _if_ certain\nprevious conditions are fulfilled, _e.g._, _if_ the support gives way,\nand _if_ the descent of the stone is not previously arrested, the\nmechanical postulate enables me to infer that the stone _will_ fall and\nwill reach the ground with just this kinetic energy. But I can never\nescape, so long as I keep within the mechanical scheme, from this\nnecessity of hypothetically assuming as given data which the mechanical\nscheme itself cannot fully determine.\n\nAll these considerations show how the very nature of the mechanical\nscheme itself justifies our previous conclusion, that it is in all its\ndetails simply the expression of a postulate created by our practical\nneed that the course of nature shall admit of calculation with\nsufficient exactitude for the devising of successful rules for\nintervention in it, but logically incapable of being without\ncontradiction regarded as the real truth about any concrete natural\nprocess. The internal evidence, derived from examination of the\nfundamental concepts of scientific Mechanism, thus confirms the view we\nhave already adopted on different grounds, that the whole physical order\nis merely the appearance of a more ultimate reality of a kind akin to\nour own sentient and purposive life. At the same time, our examination\nof mechanism may serve to throw some useful light on the often\nmisconceived antithesis between Reality and Appearance. We call the\nphysical order, as conceived by mechanical science, \u201cappearance,\u201d not\nbecause we regard it as illusory or deceptive in itself, or because it\nis not the manifestation of a true reality, but because it takes account\nonly of those particular aspects of Reality which are important and\nsignificant for certain very special purposes. What appears to us as the\nphysical order is, indeed, true Reality, and is, in fact, an integral\npart of the only Reality there is, but it appears to us in this special\nform and under these special restrictions because _we_ have arbitrarily\nexcluded every other aspect of the concrete facts from our purview by\nthe choice of our initial postulates of descriptive science. By the\nnature of the special questions we put to our world, in our physical\nscience, we determine in advance for ourselves the general character of\nthe answer we are to receive.\n\nRigidly scientific investigation, for instance, finds mechanical\ndetermination everywhere in the world, and purposive spontaneity\nnowhere, just because it has previously resolved that it will accept\n\u201cmechanical explanation\u201d and nothing else as the answer to its\nquestions. So far as we bear in mind the presence of these self-imposed\nlogical limitations throughout our mechanical science, their existence\nneed lead to no illusion or deception. The success of our mechanical\npostulates shows that, within the sphere of their logical applicability,\nthe course of the world does really conform to them, and thus the\nresults won by their application are genuine truth, so far as they go.\nIt is only when we forget the limits set to the logical applicability of\nthe mechanical postulates, by the special nature of the interests they\nsubserve, and proceed to treat them as logically indispensable\nconditions of all existence and all knowledge, that the truths of\nmechanical science are perverted into the illusions and falsehoods of a\nmechanical philosophy.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 11\n(Phenomenalism), 22 (Nature); H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. ii. chaps. 7,\n8; E. Mach, _Science of Mechanics_, chap. 2, \u00a7 5, p. 216 ff.; K.\nPearson, Grammar of Science, chaps. 7, 8; H. Poincar\u00e9, _La Science et\nL\u2019Hypoth\u00ease_, parts 3 and 4, chaps. 6-10; J. B. Stalle, _Concepts and\nTheories of Modern Physics_, chaps. 2-6, 10-12; J. Ward, _Naturalism and\nAgnosticism_, vol. i. lects. 2-6.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 161:\n\n And, again, the intermediate links themselves, however imperceptible,\n have always to be thought of as exhibiting properties identical in\n kind with those of objects given in direct presentation. As Mill said,\n a hypothesis which assumes at once an entirely unfamiliar agent and an\n equally unfamiliar mode or law of operation, would be useless. Thus\n the imperceptibles of scientific hypothesis belong essentially to the\n physical order.\n\nFootnote 162:\n\n This is the characteristic selected by Prof. M\u00fcnsterberg as the basis\n of his own distinction between \u201cphysical\u201d or \u201csuperindividual\u201d and\n \u201cpsychical\u201d or \u201cindividual\u201d objects. See _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_,\n i. 15-77.\n\nFootnote 163:\n\n Cf. Mach, _Science of Mechanics_, p. 4. Mach, however, erroneously as\n I think, makes the intercommunication a _secondary_ consequence of the\n rise of specialised industrial classes.\n\nFootnote 164:\n\n _I.e._, the _mechanical_ view of Nature, to be thoroughly\n self-consistent, must be purely _mechanistic_.\n\nFootnote 165:\n\n To put the matter more succinctly, as regards the position of\n Chemistry and Biology, we may say that while chemical and biological\n _facts_ are never merely mechanical, chemical and biological\n _science_, so far as they subserve the strictly scientific interest of\n calculation and the formulation of general rules, must always be so.\n The _facts_ only lend themselves to this special purpose in so far as\n they admit of being, without sensible error, treated _as if_ they\n conformed to the postulates of universal Mechanism. The special and\n more difficult case of psychological facts I reserve for separate\n discussion in the following Book (_infra_, Bk. IV. chap. 1).\n\n I am glad to be able to refer the reader, for a view of the logical\n worth of the mechanical postulates which appears in principle\n identical with my own, to the interesting discussion of Mr. W. R. B.\n Gibson in _Personal Idealism_, p. 144 ff.\n\nFootnote 166:\n\n Compare Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 23, note 2 to p. 331\n (1st ed.); Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. ii. chap. 7, pp. 209, 210 (Eng.\n trans., vol. ii. p. 89 ff.); Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol.\n i. pp. 84-91 (Conservation of Mass), 170-181 (Conservation of Energy).\n\nFootnote 167:\n\n If we merely desired to fix the sense of the term _mass_ without\n introducing the concept of _constant_ mass, we might of course\n consider two bodies only, A and B. Then the ratio\n\n mass of B acceleration of A in presence of B\n \u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014- = \u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\n mass of A acceleration of B in presence of A.\n\n See Mach, _Science of Mechanics_, p. 216 ff.; and Pearson, _Grammar of\n Science_, p. 302 (2nd ed.), on which the above account is based.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n BOOK IV\n\n RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY:\n THE INTERPRETATION OF LIFE\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL\n SCIENCE\n\n\u00a7 1. The various sciences which deal with the interpretation of human\n life all avail themselves of the fundamental categories of\n Psychology. Hence we must ask how the concepts of Psychology are\n related to actual experience. \u00a7 2. Psychology is a body of abstract\n descriptive formul\u00e6, not a direct transcript of the individual\n processes of real life. It presupposes the previous construction of\n the physical order. \u00a7 3. The psychological conception of conscious\n life as a succession of \u201cmental states\u201d or \u201cimages\u201d is a\n transformation of actual experience devised primarily to account for\n the experience of other subjects, and subsequently extended to my\n own. The transformation is effected by the hypothesis of\n \u201cintrojection.\u201d \u00a7\u00a7 4, 5. The logical justification of the\n psychological transformation of facts is twofold. The psychological\n scheme serves partly to fill up the gaps in our theories of\n physiological Mechanism, and also, in respect of the teleological\n categories of Psychology, to describe the course of human conduct in\n a form capable of ethical and historical appreciation. Psychology\n may legitimately employ both mechanical and teleological categories.\n \u00a7 6. The objections sometimes brought against the possibility of\n (_a_) psychological, (_b_) teleological description are untenable.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The net result of our brief examination of some of the most\nimportant cosmological concepts has been to confirm us in the\n\u201cidealistic\u201d or \u201cspiritualistic\u201d interpretation of existence to which\nour first two books in principle committed us. The reader who has\nfollowed us so far with acquiescence will now be fully prepared to admit\nthat we shall at least be nearer the truth in conceiving the universe as\ncomposed of sentient and purposive subjects of experience, akin in\nprinciple to the members of human society, than as constituted, entirely\nor in part, of mechanically interacting and interdependent elements. The\nacceptance of an idealist interpretation of the universe, however, still\nleaves us face to face with a number of problems of the gravest\nphilosophical import. We have still to ask how in particular we can most\ntruly conceive the systematic unity which is formed by the whole\nmultiplicity of apparently more or less independent subjects of\nexperience, what degree of permanence and individuality, so far as we\ncan judge, belongs to ourselves as members of that system, and what\nlight is thrown by our ethical, religious, and \u00e6sthetic aspirations and\nideals on the concrete character of the whole system and on our own\nplace in it. Again, before we can attack these momentous problems with\nany reasonable hope of success, we shall need to know which among the\ncategories employed by the various sciences dealing with mental life are\nof fundamental significance, and what is the logical relation of those\nsciences to the concrete realities of immediate experience, and to the\nconstructions of physical science. Only on the basis of a rational\ntheory as to the purposes subserved by the various mental sciences, and\nthe possible limitations imposed by those purposes on the use of the\ncorresponding categories, can we decide how far the interpretation of\nexistence as a whole in terms of Psychology, Sociology, or Ethics, is\nlegitimate.\n\nIt is clear that the complete execution of the programme indicated in\nthe previous paragraph would involve a systematic philosophical\ninterpretation of the significance of human life for which some such\nname as the _Metaphysics of Society_ or _Metaphysics of History_ would\nbe a more adequate designation than the traditional title of _Rational\nPsychology_. I have, however, retained the ancient name for this\nsubdivision of our task, mainly on the ground that our own elementary\ndiscussion will be primarily concerned with those most simple and\nuniversal psychological concepts of which the various more concrete\nsocial and historical sciences make the same constant use as chemistry\nand the other physical sciences do of the mechanical concepts of mass,\nenergy, velocity, etc. Whatever view we adopt of the precise degree of\nconnection between Psychology on the one side and the various social and\nhistorical sciences on the other, it is at least manifest that Ethics,\nSociology, History, and the rest all involve the constant use of such\npsychological categories as those of _self_, _will_, _thought_,\n_freedom_, and that thus any sound metaphysical interpretation of\nhistory and society must begin with investigation into the logical\ncharacter of the science to which these concepts belong, just as a sound\nMetaphysic of nature had to start by an examination of the postulates of\nMechanics. I suppose that there is no need to utter more than a passing\nword by way of reminder to the reader, that such an investigation\npresupposes the previous creation of a purely empirical science of\nPsychology. The business of Metaphysics with Psychology is not to\ndictate in advance how it _must_ construct its view of the world, but to\nascertain the logical character of the completed construction, and its\nrelation to the general system of human knowledge.\n\n\u00a7 2. _The Place of Psychology among the Sciences._\u2014From the\nmetaphysician\u2019s point of view, it is of the utmost importance to\nrecognise clearly and constantly that Psychology, like the other\nsciences, deals throughout not with the actual experiences of real\nsubjects, but with \u201cdata\u201d obtained by the artificial manipulation and\ntransformation of actual experience into a shape dictated by certain\nspecial interests and purposes. This is a point upon which the idealist\nmetaphysician, in particular, is peculiarly liable to go wrong when left\nto himself. Starting with the conviction that the key to the nature of\nexistence as a whole is to be found in our own direct experience of our\nsentient and purposive life, he almost inevitably tends, unless he has\ngiven particular attention to the methodology of psychological science,\nto take it for granted that the concepts and hypotheses of the\npsychologist afford a description of this experience in its concrete\ndirectness, and may therefore be treated without misgiving as a fruitful\nsource of certain knowledge about the inmost structure of the absolute\nor infinite individual itself. And even the reiterated demonstration\nthat one or another of the current categories of Psychology cannot be\npredicated of the absolute whole of reality without flagrant\ncontradiction, frequently fails to produce conviction where it is not\naccompanied by direct proof of the artificiality and remoteness from\nconcrete actuality of the psychologist\u2019s data. Hence it would be worse\nthan useless to discuss such questions as, whether the infinite\nindividual can properly be thought of as a \u201cself\u201d or an \u201cethical\nperson,\u201d or again as a \u201csociety of ethical persons,\u201d or again whether\nfinite \u201cselves\u201d are \u201ceternal\u201d or only transitory constituents of the\nworld-system, without first arriving at some definite view as to the way\nin which these psychological concepts are derived from the concrete\nactualities of experience, the special interests which lead to their\nformulation, and the restrictions imposed by those interests on the\nsphere of their valid application.\n\nThat Psychology, like all descriptive science, deals throughout with\ndata which are not concrete experience-realities, but artificial\nproducts of a process of abstraction and reconstruction, should be\nsufficiently clear from the very consideration that, like the other\nsciences, it is a body of _general_ descriptions of typical situations.\nAn actual process of knowing or acting, like every actual event, is\nalways individual, and because of its individuality defies adequate\ndescription. It is only in so far as a situation admits of being\ngeneralised by the selection of certain of its aspects or qualities as\nrepresentative of its whole reality, that it is capable of being\ndescribed at all. Even History and Biography, in which the teleological\ninterpretation of a series of events as internally united by the\nsingleness of the purpose underlying them takes the place of external\nconnection in accord with mechanical laws of sequence as the ideal of\nexplanation, are only possible on the condition that such transformation\nof the concrete realities of life as is implied in such a degree of\nabstraction and reconstruction can be carried out without detriment to\nthe special interests of the historian and the biographer. And\nPsychology is unreal and abstract even as compared with history. It\nprovides us with general formul\u00e6 which are, or should be, valuable as\naffording a means of describing certain universal features of the\nprocesses of willing and knowing which it is desirable to study in\nisolation, but it is of itself as incapable of adequately tracing the\nactual course of a real process of willing or thinking, as Mechanics is\nof following the actual course of a real individual process in\n\u201cexternal\u201d nature. In this respect the concepts and formul\u00e6 of\nscientific Psychology stand on precisely the same footing, as regards\ntheir relation to the individual and actual, as do those of scientific\nPhysics. Their truth and validity means simply that by substituting them\nfor concrete actualities we can get answers to certain special questions\nwhich we have an interest in solving, not that they are unaltered\ntranscripts of the actualities themselves.\n\nThis is perhaps most strikingly shown by observing that the very\nexistence of Psychology as a distinct branch of science presupposes that\nartificial severance of the unity of direct experience into a physical\norder and a non-physical realm external to that order, of which we have\nalready investigated the origin. Psychology has no subject-matter at all\nuntil we have first, for the practical reasons already discussed,\nconstructed the physical order by the inclusion in it of all those\nexperience-contents which are equally accessible under specified\nconditions to the observation of a plurality of subjects, and then gone\non to assign to the realm of \u201cpsychical\u201d or \u201cmental\u201d existence whatever\nexperience-contents fall outside the system so defined. And this whole\nseparation of the physical and the psychical or mental, as we have\nalready seen, has no place in the direct experience of actual life. In\nactual life, until we come to reconstruct it in thought for the purposes\nof description and calculation, there are neither material bodies nor\n\u201cimmaterial minds\u201d or \u201cconsciousnesses\u201d which are \u201cin\u201d them or \u201canimate\u201d\nthem; there are simply sentient and purposive beings and the environment\nof things to which they have to adjust themselves in the execution of\ntheir purposes. How and for what reasons this na\u00efvely realistic view of\nexistence comes to give place to the dualistic conception of a physical\nworld and a plurality of non-physical beings in relation with it, we\nhave already seen in our study of the methodology of the physical\nsciences. We have now to follow the development of the dualistic line of\nthought somewhat further, before we can see precisely what is the\ncharacter of the logical reconstruction of actual experience presupposed\nby the existence of a science of Psychology.\n\n\u00a7 3. As we have already learned, our recognition of the actuality of our\nown and our fellow-men\u2019s life of unique and incommunicable feeling\ncompelled us to admit the existence of much that, from its\nincommunicable nature, falls outside the sphere of physical reality. We\nhave now to see how Psychology, in taking this non-physical existence as\nits subject-matter, conceives of its mode of existence and its relation\nto the subject-matter of the physical sciences. In recent years, much\nlight has been thrown upon the methodological problem in question by the\nlabours of Avenarius and his followers, from whom the substance of our\naccount will be largely drawn. What Avenarius has for the first time\nmade perfectly clear is, that the psychological interpretation of our\nown experience is throughout based upon reading into that experience a\ntheory originally devised to meet a difficulty suggested by the\nexistence of our fellow-men.\n\nWe have already seen, in dealing with the subjectivist\u2019s fallacy, what\nthis difficulty is. So long as I am concerned only with the analysis of\nmy own experience, there is nothing to suggest the distinction between a\nphysical and a psychical aspect of existence. All that I require, or\nrather all that I should require had I any interest in analysing my own\nexperience independent of the need for intercommunication, is the\nsimpler and more primitive distinction between myself as one thing in\nthe world and the other things which form my environment. But the case\nis altered when I come, after the creation of the concept of a physical\norder, to analyse the experience of my fellow-men. My fellow-men, on the\none hand, belong to the physical order, and, as belonging to it, are\nknown to me as objects cognisable through my senses. On the other hand,\nit is necessary for all the purposes of practical intercourse to credit\nthem with the same kind of sentience and feeling which I directly know\nin myself. This sentience and feeling are, of course, inaccessible to\nthe perception of my own senses; I can see my fellow\u2019s eye and can hear\nhis voice, but I cannot see that he sees or hear that he hears. My\nfellow thus comes to be thought of as having a double existence; besides\nthat aspect of him in which he is simply one among other things\nperceived, or in principle perceptible, by my senses, he has another\naspect, not directly perceptible but necessarily presupposed in all\nsocial relation with him. On the side of his body he belongs entirely to\nthe physical order; but there is, associated with this bodily existence,\nanother side to him which I call his psychical aspect. Now, how must\nthis \u201cpsychical aspect\u201d be supposed to be constituted when once it has\ncome to be thus artificially separated in thought from the physical side\nof my fellow\u2019s existence? It is here that the theory of \u201cintrojection,\u201d\nas worked out by Avenarius, comes to our aid.\n\nWhen I perceive any object directly, without sophisticating myself by\ndevising psychological hypotheses about the process, what I am aware of\nis, on the one side, the thing as a constituent of my environment, and,\non the other, a variety of movements or impulses to movement in myself,\nmarked by a peculiar tone of satisfied or dissatisfied feeling, and\ndetermined by the relation in which the thing in question stands to my\nvarious interests. But when I come to explain to myself what is meant by\nmy fellow-man\u2019s assertion that he also perceives the same object, a\ndifficulty seems to arise which renders this simple analysis inadequate.\nThe perceived object, the sun for example, appears to belong to _my_\nworld of sensible things, for I too see the sun. Not so my fellow-man\u2019s\nperception of it; as I cannot \u201csee him seeing the sun,\u201d so to say, I\nfind it hard to understand how the sun, which is a thing in my sensible\nworld, can be an object for his perception, which is not in my sensible\nworld. Hence I draw the inference that while I see the _actual sun_, the\ncontent of my fellow\u2019s perception is an _image_ or _idea_ of the sun\n(cf. p. 81).\n\nBy the extension of this process of inference I come to think of the\nnon-physical aspect of my fellow\u2019s existence as consisting, as a whole,\nof a vast complex of successive ideas or images, attended with their\ncharacteristic tone of satisfied and dissatisfied feeling; as this\nseries of \u201cmental states\u201d or \u201cideas\u201d has now to be represented as in\nsome way related to the sensible physical reality I call my fellow\u2019s\nbody, I imagine it as going on \u201cwithin\u201d his skin somewhere, and thus\narrive at the conception of my fellow as a dualistic compound of a\nphysical factor, perceptible by my senses, his _body_, and a\nnon-physical factor, composed of a stream of \u201cmental images,\u201d and\nimperceptible to sense, his _mind_. One further step remains to be taken\nand the work of \u201cintrojection\u201d is complete. That step is the artificial\nre-interpretation of my own experience in terms of the distinction I\nhave been led to establish for the case of my fellow. I come to think of\nmy own conscious life in terms of the distinction between body and mind,\nand to analyse what as originally experienced was the direct reaction of\na unitary self upon the things which formed its environment into a\nsuccession of \u201cmental states\u201d or \u201cimages\u201d going on \u201cwithin\u201d a body,\ntheir relation to which will yet form a prominent scientific problem.\n\nNow, it is only when this process of \u201cintrojection\u201d has reached its\nfinal issue, and the actual life of sentient purposive intercourse with\nthe other actual things of our environment has been replaced in thought\nby the conception of a mental succession of \u201cimages\u201d or \u201ccontents of\nconsciousness,\u201d taken to \u201crefer\u201d to \u201cthings\u201d which are themselves\n\u201coutside consciousness,\u201d while the felt unity of experience has given\nway to the radical sundering of human existence into a physical and a\npsychical aspect, that we have reached the point of view from which\npsychological science takes its departure. Only when the actualities of\nexperience have been artificially transformed into \u201cmental states\u201d or\n\u201cimages\u201d of actualities by the hypothesis of \u201cintrojection,\u201d and thus\ndefinitely constituted into a non-physical order, have we the materials\nfor the construction of a special science of the \u201cpsychical side\u201d of our\nnature. Psychology, in fact, presupposes \u201cpsychical states\u201d as the\nmaterial of its studies, and \u201cpsychical states\u201d are not data of\nimmediate experience, but symbols derived from and substituted for the\nactual data of experience by an elaborately artificial method of\ntransformation. Hence we should be committing a grave fallacy in Logic\nif we were to argue that since subjects of experience are the sole real\nthings, the hypotheses of Psychology must be the final metaphysical\ntruth about the world.\n\nWhen we attempt to criticise the logical validity of the process of\n\u201cintrojection,\u201d and the scientific constructions of a Psychology built\nup on an introjectionist foundation, we cannot fail to observe certain\napparent gross breaches of logic which affect it. In the first place,\nthe fundamental assumption that my fellow\u2019s \u201cmental life\u201d is composed of\n\u201cimages\u201d of the actual things of my own experience, is clearly at\nvariance with the principle previously implied in the construction, for\npurposes of co-operation, of the physical order as composed of things\n_equally_ accessible to the perception of a plurality of individuals.\nThis discrepancy is once more done away with, when the process of\nintrojection has been completed, by the reduction of my own mental life\nto a succession of images or states of consciousness, but only at the\ncost of forgetting that the original motive to \u201cintrojection\u201d was a\nsupposed disparity between my own and my fellow\u2019s relation to the\nphysical things of my environment.\n\nHence it is not strange that Avenarius should apparently hold the whole\nintrojectionist transformation of the \u201cna\u00efvely realistic\u201d standpoint to\nbe essentially fallacious, and should close his discussion of the\nsubject with the proposition that all attempts to vary the \u201cnatural view\nof the world\u201d lead to superfluities or contradictions.[168] It does not,\nhowever, seem necessary to follow him in this unfavourable judgment.\nIndeed, if we reflect that such a thorough-going rejection of all the\nresults of introjection must involve as a consequence the repudiation of\nthe whole science of Psychology, a science which may fairly be said to\nbe at present about as fully justified by its successful growth as most\nof the physical sciences, we shall probably be inclined to hold that a\nprocess so fruitful in results _must_ have its logical justification,\nhowever artificial the assumptions upon which it rests.\n\n\u00a7 4. What, then, is the logical justification for that elaborate\ntransformation of experience which is necessary to bring it into the\nform presupposed by psychological science? In principle the question is\nnot hard to answer. The \u201cideas,\u201d \u201cmental states,\u201d and so forth, of\nPsychology are, as we have seen, _symbols_ which we substitute for\ncertain concrete actualities, and, like all symbols,[169] they only\npartially correspond to the material they symbolise. But, like other\nsymbols, they are admissible as substitutes for the things symbolised on\ntwo conditions: (1) that the individual symbol corresponds to that which\nit symbolises according to a definite and unambiguous scheme, and (2)\nthat the substitution of the symbol for the thing symbolised is required\nin order to make the latter amenable to such manipulation as is\nnecessary for the solution of some particular class of problem. Now,\nthere can be no doubt that the first of these conditions is fulfilled by\nthe translation of our actual experience into the introjectionist\nsymbols of Psychology. For in the external or \u201cphysical\u201d events which\ncorrespond to a \u201cmental state,\u201d I possess an unambiguous means of\nrecognising the actual experience for which the mental state in question\nstands in the symbolism of Psychology. If the various physical\n\u201cconditions\u201d and forms of \u201cexpression\u201d of the mental state are indicated\nwith sufficient fulness and accuracy, they enable me to identify the\ncorresponding actual experience when it occurs in my own life, or even\nto produce it experimentally for the express purpose of interpreting the\nPsychologist\u2019s symbolism. The only question, then, that can reasonably\nbe raised as to the legitimacy of psychological symbolism, is the\nquestion whether such a transformation of the actualities of immediate\nexperience is demanded for the attainment of some specific purpose or\ninterest.\n\nIt seems, I think, that the transformation is really required for more\npurposes than one. In the first place, one obvious use of psychological\nhypotheses is that, like the hypotheses of physical science, they assist\nus to calculate the course of events, in so far as it is independent of\npurposive interference of our own, and thus to form prudential rules for\nour own guidance in so interfering. This seems to be the principal use\nof those parts of Psychology which deal with the more mechanical aspects\nof mental life, _e.g._, the laws of the formation of fixed habits and\nassociations by repetition, the gradual passing of voluntary into\ninvoluntary attention, and so forth. We are interested in studying the\nlaws of habit and association, just as we are in formulating mechanical\nlaws of physical nature, because we require to guide ourselves by such\nknowledge whenever we directly and intentionally interfere in the life\nof our fellows for educational, punitive, or general social purposes.\nUnless we can forecast the way in which our fellow will continue to act,\nso far as his behaviour is not modified by fresh purposive initiative,\nwe shall be helpless to decide how we must intervene in his life to\nproduce a given desired effect. Similarly, the direct moulding of our\nown future in a desired direction would be impossible apart from such\nknowledge of what that future is likely to be without intentional\ndirection.\n\nIt may be said, of course, with justice, that, so far as Psychology\npresents us with such routine uniformities of succession, it is a mere\nsupplementary device for making good the defects in our anatomical and\nphysiological knowledge. If our physiological science were only\nsufficiently extensive and minute, we might reasonably expect to be able\nto describe the whole course of human action, so far as it is amenable\nto mechanical law, and exhibits routine uniformity in purely\nphysiological terms. Instead of talking about the \u201cassociation\u201d of\n\u201cideas\u201d or the production of a \u201chabit\u201d by repetition, we should then,\nfor instance, be able to describe in physiological terminology the\nchanges effected in a cerebral tract by the simultaneous excitement of\ntwo nervous centres, and to write the complete history of the process by\nwhich a permanent \u201cconduction-path\u201d arises from the reiteration of the\nexcitement. Such a definite substitution of physiological for\npsychological hypotheses is pretty evidently the goal which the modern\n\u201cexperimental Psychology\u201d has set before itself, and which it is\nconstantly trying to persuade itself it has reached, in respect of some\nparts at least of its subject.\n\nNor does there seem any reason to doubt that, since the physiological\ncounterpart of a routine uniformity of mental sequence must itself\nclearly be a routine uniformity, all psychological laws of uniform\nmechanical sequence might be ultimately replaced by their physiological\nequivalents, if only our knowledge of the structure and functions of the\nnervous system were sufficiently advanced. Hence Professor M\u00fcnsterberg\nis perfectly self-consistent in arguing from the premisses that the sole\nfunction of psychological science is to provide us with mechanical\nuniformities of sequence by the aid whereof to calculate the future\nbehaviour of our fellows, in so far as it is not modified by fresh\npurposive initiative, to the conclusion that the whole of Psychology is\na temporary stop-gap by which we eke out our defective Physiology, but\nwhich must sooner or later cease to be of use, and therefore cease to\nexist as Physiology advances.[170]\n\nIt would, of course, remain true, even if we were to accept this view of\nthe case without reservation, that Psychology is, in the present state\nof our knowledge, an indispensable adjunct to Physiology. For, while our\nknowledge of the physiology of the nervous system is at present too\nfragmentary and vague to be of much practical use in enabling us to\nforecast even the simplest sequences in the behaviour of our fellows,\nPsychology is, temporarily at least, in many respects in a more advanced\ncondition. Thus, if it were necessary, before we could infer the\nprobable effects of exposure to a particular stimulus on a man\u2019s\nbehaviour, to frame a workable hypothesis as to the physiological\noccurrences in the nervous system between the first reception of the\nstimulus and the issuing of the ultimate bodily reaction, we should\nstill be waiting helplessly for the means of framing the simplest\ngeneral judgments as to the probable effects of our actions on our\nsocial circle. This is because the nervous changes intervening between\nthe reception of the stimulus and the reaction can only be rendered\naccessible to observation by devices which postulate for their invention\nan extremely advanced condition of physical science in general and of\nPhysiology in particular. There is no direct method of translating the\nactual processes which we experience into an unambiguous physiological\nsymbolism, or, _vice vers\u00e2_, of testing a physiological hypothesis by\nretranslating it into facts of direct living experience. On the other\nhand, when we have given the assumed conditions of the occurrence of the\nstimulus, it is comparatively easy to observe what follows on them in\nactual life, and to translate it into the introjectionist Psychology,\nor, _vice vers\u00e2_, to test a theory couched in terms of that Psychology\nby comparison with the actualities of experience.\n\nFor this reason psychological hypotheses are, in the present state of\nknowledge, an indispensable mediating link between actual experience and\nphysiological theory, and if ever they should come to be finally\nsuperseded by purely physiological descriptions of human conduct, we may\nbe sure that the triumphant physiological theories will themselves first\nhave been won by the process of establishing psychological formul\u00e6 and\nthen seeking their physiological analogues. This is illustrated in the\nactual history of contemporary science by the extent to which the\ncerebral physiologists are dependent for their conception of the\nstructure of the nervous system on the previous results of purely\npsychological investigation. We might present the mutual relations of\nconcrete experience, Psychology and nervous Physiology, in an\nepigrammatic form, by saying that the connecting link between the\nsubject of experience and the brain of Physiology is the \u201cmind\u201d or\n\u201cconsciousness\u201d of Psychology.\n\n\u00a7 5. It is, I think, questionable whether such a view as Professor\nM\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s does full justice to the interests which prompt us to the\nconstruction of the psychological symbolism. On his theory, Psychology,\nit will be seen, is essentially a science of routine or mechanical\nuniformities of sequence, just like the various branches of mechanical\nPhysics. According to him, teleology must be ruthlessly banished from\nscientific Psychology. In other words, though all the actual processes\nof direct experience are pervaded by teleological unity of interest or\npurpose, yet in substituting our psychological symbols for the\nactualities we must deprive them of every vestige of this teleological\ncharacter. Nor is this demand that Psychology shall translate experience\ninto a series of non-purposive routine sequences an arbitrary one on\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s part. If the sole function of Psychology is to\nfacilitate calculation and prediction of the course of events, so far as\nit is _not_ controlled by purposive interference, Psychology must, of\ncourse, either follow rigidly mechanical lines in its descriptions, or\nfail of its object. But I would suggest that over and above this\nfunction of facilitating calculation and prediction at present fulfilled\nby Psychology as _locum tenens_ for a perfected Physiology, Psychology\nhas another and an entirely distinct function, in which it would be\nimpossible for it to be replaced by Physiology or by any other branch of\nstudy. This function is that of affording a set of symbols suitable for\nthe description, in abstract general terms, of the teleological\nprocesses of real life, and thus providing Ethics and History and their\nkindred studies with an appropriate terminology.\n\nIt is manifest enough that neither the ethical appreciation of human\nconduct by comparison with an ideal standard, nor the historical\ninterpretation of it in the light of the actual ends and ideals which\npervade it and give it its individuality, would be possible unless we\ncould first of all describe the events with which Ethics and History are\nconceived in teleological language. Apart from the presence throughout\nthose events of more or less conscious striving towards an ideal end,\nthere would be nothing in them for the moralist to applaud or blame, or\nfor the historian to interpret. Thus, if Ethics and History are to have\ntheir subject-matter, there must be some science which describes the\nprocesses of human life and conduct in terms of teleological relation to\nan end. Now, to what science can we go for such descriptions? From our\nprevious examination of the postulates of physical science, it is clear\nthat the requisite material cannot be afforded by any branch of physical\nscience which remains rigidly consistent with its own postulates. The\nnature of the interests in response to which the concept of the physical\norder was constructed, as we saw, required that the physical order\nshould be thought of and described in terms of rigid mechanism. Hence no\nscience which describes the processes of human life in purely physical\nterminology can indicate their purposive or teleological character in\nits descriptions. The purposive character of human conduct, if\nrecognised at all in our descriptions, must find its recognition in that\nscience which describes the aspect of human experience that is in\nprinciple excluded from the physical order. In other words, it is\nPsychology to which we have to go for such a general abstract conception\nof teleological unity as is necessary for the purposes of the more\nconcrete sciences of Ethics and History.\n\nThis function of Psychology is indeed quite familiar to the student of\nthe moral and historical sciences. In Ethics, as Professor Sidgwick has\nobserved, the whole vocabulary used to characterise human conduct, apart\nfrom the specially ethical predicates of worth, is purely psychological.\nAll the material which Ethics pronounces \u201cgood\u201d or \u201cbad,\u201d \u201cright\u201d or\n\u201cwrong\u201d\u2014\u201cacts,\u201d \u201cfeelings,\u201d \u201ctempers,\u201d \u201cdesire,\u201d etc.,\u2014it has taken over\nbodily from Psychology. And so, too, History would have nothing left to\nappreciate if a record of merely physical movements were substituted for\naccounts of events which imply at every turn the psychological\ncategories of \u201cdesire,\u201d \u201cpurpose,\u201d \u201cintention,\u201d \u201ctemptation,\u201d and the\nrest. Universally, we may say all the teleological categories of human\nthought on examination prove to be either avowedly the property of\nPsychology, or, as is the case with the concepts of biological\nevolutionism, thinly disguised borrowings from it.\n\nIf this is so, we seem to be justified in drawing certain important\ninferences. (1) It will follow that of the two distinct offices which\nPsychology at present fulfils, one belongs to it, so to say, in its own\nright and inalienably, while the other is exercised by it temporarily,\npending the majority of Cerebral Physiology. While, as we have seen,\nthose parts of psychological doctrine which are concerned with the more\nmechanical aspects of conduct may ultimately be replaced by Physiology,\nthe parts which deal with the initiation of fresh purposive adjustments,\nsuch as the psychology of attention and of feeling, are in principle\nirreducible to Physiology, and must retain a permanent value so long as\nmankind continues to be interested in the ethical and historical\nappreciation of human life.[171]\n\n(2) It will also follow that, at present and for long enough to come,\nPsychology is bound, _pace_ Professor M\u00fcnsterberg, to use both\nmechanical and teleological hypotheses and categories. Such a mixture of\ntwo different logical standpoints would no doubt be intolerable in a\nscience which owed its existence to the need of satisfying a single\ninterest of our nature. For the kind of interest which is met by\nmechanical hypotheses is baffled by the introduction of teleological\nmodes of thought, and _vice vers\u00e2_. But, according to our view, the\ninterest to which Psychology owes its creation is not single but double.\nWe have an interest in the mechanical forecasting of human action, and\nan interest in its ethical and historical interpretation, and\nPsychology, as at present constituted, has to satisfy both these\nconflicting interests at once. Hence the impossibility of confining it\neither to purely mechanical or to purely teleological categories. If,\nindeed, our Physiology had reached the point of ideal completeness, so\nthat every routine uniformity at present expressed in psychological\nterminology as the establishment of an \u201cassociation\u201d or \u201chabit\u201d could be\ntranslated into its physiological correlate, we should be able to\ndispense altogether with psychological hypotheses as aids to the\ncalculation of the course of events, and to restore logical unity to\nPsychology by confining it entirely to the task of providing Ethics and\nHistory with the teleological categories they require for the\ndescription of their subject-matter. But such a reform of method would\nbe most premature in the present condition of our physiological\nknowledge.[172]\n\n\u00a7 6. There are two points of difficulty which our discussion has so far\nfailed to deal with, but must not leave entirely unnoticed. We have\nallowed ourselves to assume (_a_) that description in psychological\nterms, and (_b_) that description in teleological terms, are possible.\nBoth these assumptions have been questioned, and it is clear that if the\nfirst is unsound there can be no science of Psychology at all, while, if\nthe second is unsound, Psychology cannot use teleological conceptions.\nHence it is absolutely necessary to attempt some justification of our\nposition on both questions.\n\nAs to (_a_), it has been argued that since only that which is accessible\non equal terms to the perception of a plurality of subjects can be\ndescribed by one subject to another, and since all objects so accessible\nto the perception of a plurality of subjects were included in our\nconstruction of the physical order, description can only be of physical\nobjects. A \u201cmental state\u201d must be in principle incapable of description,\nbecause it can only be experienced by _one_ subject.\n\nNow, if Psychology claimed to be the _direct_ description of immediate\nexperience, as it is experienced, this contention would certainly be\nfatal to its very existence. But, as we have seen, Psychology makes no\nsuch claim. Its data are not the actualities of immediate experience\nthemselves, but symbols derived from those actualities by a certain\nprocess of transformation. And though what Psychology calls its \u201cfacts\u201d\ncannot, of course, like physical facts, be directly exhibited to the\nsense-perception of a plurality of subjects, we have in the physical\nconditions and concomitants of a \u201cmental state\u201d assignable marks by\nwhich we may recognise when it occurs in our own life, the actual\nexperience of which the psychologist\u2019s \u201cmental state\u201d is the symbol.\nThus, though I cannot directly produce for inspection a sample of what\nin Psychology I call \u201cthe sensation of red,\u201d I can indirectly, by\nassigning the upper and lower limits of the wave-length corresponding to\nthe sensation, make every one understand what actual experience I am\nthinking of when I use the term.\n\n(_b_) The second difficulty need not detain us long. The view that _all_\ndescription must be exclusively mechanical, rests upon the assumption\nthat no other kind of description will answer the purpose for the sake\nof which we set out to describe things. Now, so far as description is\nundertaken for the purpose of establishing practical rules for\nintervention in the course of occurrences, this assumption is perfectly\njustified. If we are to lay down general rules for meddling in the\ncourse of events, we must of course assume that, apart from our\nmeddling, it goes on with routine regularity. And we have already seen\nthat for this very reason the mechanical interpretation of Nature is a\nfundamental postulate of physical science, so long as it confines itself\nstrictly to the work of formulating \u201claws of Nature,\u201d and does not\nattempt the task of historical appreciation. But, as we have also seen,\nthe historical appreciation of a series of events as marked by the\nprogressive execution of an underlying plan or purpose, is only possible\nwhen the events themselves have been described in essentially\nteleological terms as processes relative to ends.[173] Hence we have no\nright to contend that _all_ scientific descriptions shall be of the\nmechanical type, unless we are also prepared to maintain that the _only_\npurpose they subserve is that of the formulation of general rules for\npractice.\n\nIf the historical appreciation of events is a legitimate human interest,\nthe description of events in terms of end and purpose must also be a\nlegitimate form of description. Now, in point of fact, even the\n\u201cphysical sciences\u201d themselves, when they come to deal with the facts of\norganic life, largely desert the primary scientific ideal of the\nformation of general laws for the historical ideal of the detection of\nlines of individual development, and if our previous conclusions are\ncorrect, it is much more for the latter than for the former purpose that\nwe are interested in the construction of a science of Psychology. What a\nhuman being wants Psychology for, in the main, is not so much to help\nhim to forecast the behaviour of other men, as to assist him to\nunderstand how the successive stages of his own individual development\nand that of his \u201csocial environment\u201d are knit into a unity by the\npresence of all-pervading permanent interests and ends. The contention\nthat psychological description must, on grounds of logical method, be of\nthe mechanical type, seems therefore to repose on misconception as to\nthe uses of Psychology.\n\nThe preceding discussion may perhaps appear somewhat arid and wearisome,\nbut it was indispensable that our subsequent examination of the\nmetaphysical problems suggested by the recognition of the psychical\nrealm of existence should be based upon a definite view as to the\nconnection between psychological conceptions and the actualities of\nexperience, and such a view, in its turn, presupposes a positive theory\nof the interests to which psychological construction ministers and the\nlogical procedure by which it is affected. The general result of our\ninvestigation has gone to show negatively that Psychology is not a\ndirect transcript of real experience, but an intellectual reconstruction\ninvolving systematic abstraction from and transformation of experience,\nand positively that the reconstruction depends for its legitimacy upon\nits serviceableness for the special purposes, partly of the practical\nanticipation of events, but principally of their historical and ethical\nappreciation. The significance of those conclusions will be more\napparent in the course of the two following chapters.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014R. Avenarius, _Der Menschliche Weltbegriff_; F. H.\nBradley, \u201cA Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology\u201d (_Mind_, January\n1900); H. M\u00fcnsterberg, _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_, vol. i. chap. 2 (The\nEpistemological Basis of Psychology), 11 (Connection through the Body);\nJ. Ward, Art. \u201cPsychology\u201d in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, _ad init._\n(\u201cThe Standpoint of Psychology\u201d); _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii.\nlect. 16.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 168:\n\n See Avenarius, _Der Menschliche Weltbegriff_, p. 115 _ad fin._\n\nFootnote 169:\n\n Or rather, like all symbols which are not identical with the things\n they represent. In the latter case, as when, _e.g._, for any purpose I\n count the numbers of the natural number series themselves, beginning\n with 1, there may appear to be _complete_ correspondence. But the\n usefulness of the process depends on the fact that the 1 which I count\n and the 1 by which I count it are at least _numerically_ distinct\u2014how\n much _more_ distinction this implies I do not stay to discuss here\u2014and\n hence, I take it, it is by an abuse of language that the process is\n called \u201crepresentation of a thing by itself.\u201d\n\nFootnote 170:\n\n See _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_, vol. i. chap. 11, pp. 415-436.\n\nFootnote 171:\n\n This is strikingly illustrated by the procedure of Professor\n M\u00fcnsterberg himself. He expels selective interest from his\n psychological account of attention, in obedience to the principle that\n teleological ideas must be kept out of a descriptive science, and\n then, when confronted with the problem what it is that does decide\n what presentations shall actually be attended to, makes the selection\n a function of the sub-cortical motor-centres in the brain, thus\n reintroducing into biology the teleological categories previously\n declared inadmissible. See _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_, vol. i. chap.\n 15, pp. 525-562. I may once more note, for the benefit of the reader\n who is interested in methodology, that whereas the processes of the\n mechanical sciences are essentially continuous, the teleological\n processes of finite life as conceived by ethical and historical\n science appear, as Professor Royce has insisted, to be of the nature\n of _discontinuous_ series, _i.e._ to consist of terms _between_ which\n intermediate links cannot be interpolated. Why I cannot accept what\n appears to be Professor Royce\u2019s view, that ultimate Reality itself is\n a discontinuous series, will perhaps be clear from Chap. 3 and the\n following chapter of the present Book. But see also the Supplementary\n Note at the end of the present chapter.\n\nFootnote 172:\n\n Psychology is, of course, far from being the only branch of study\n which, in its present state, employs categories of both types. Compare\n the constant use made in biological evolutionary theories of the\n teleological ideas of, _e.g._, the \u201c_struggle_ for existence,\u201d the\n \u201csurvival of the _fittest_,\u201d \u201csexual _selection_,\u201d etc., ideas bodily\n conveyed from Sociology and Psychology. As we have just seen, the\n precisians who object to this mixture of higher and lower categories\n in Psychology are in the awkward predicament of only being able to get\n rid of it there by accentuating its presence in Physiology and\n Biology. Where they go wrong is in exaggerating the amount of logical\n unity attributable to any body of inquiries which happens, in virtue\n of being pursued by the same men and with the same accessories, to be\n called by a common name. It would require only a slight further\n exaggeration to argue that since all branches of knowledge are alike\n knowledge, they must be all either exclusively mechanical or\n exclusively teleological. There is no reason in the nature of things\n why \u201cPsychology\u201d should not at a particular period in the growth of\n knowledge cover as wide a range of inquiries, with as much internal\n variety of aim and method, as, say \u201cMathematics.\u201d\n\nFootnote 173:\n\n And they cannot be so described without the introduction of\n psychological ideas. Thus, _e.g._, in classifying a series of\n implements dating from different periods in the history of\n civilisation, so as to throw light on the evolution of some particular\n type of tool or machine, we have to take as our _fundamentum\n divisionis_ the adequacy with which the different varieties accomplish\n the kind of _work_ they were _designed_ to perform, and are thus\n committed at once to the use of the psychological concepts of purpose\n and satisfaction.\n\n-----\n\n SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER I.\n\nON THE DISCONTINUITY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL SERIES OF ETHICS AND HISTORY.\n\nWe have previously seen that every continuous series is indefinitely\ndivisible, and that consequently no two terms of such a series are\n_immediately_ coadjacent. On the other hand, any series which consists\nof terms which are immediately coadjacent, and between which\nintermediate terms of the same series cannot be inserted, is not\nindefinitely divisible, and _a fortiori_ not continuous. Applying this\nto the case of a series of psychical processes, we can see that where\nthe sequence is of a mechanical routine type it is continuous, since it\ncan be indefinitely divided into smaller fragments, each exhibiting the\nsame law of sequence as the whole. (Strictly, it ought to be added that\nthe other condition of continuity is also fulfilled, since whatever\npoint of time thus divides the sequence falls within the series itself.)\nBut where you have new teleological adaptation there is a manifest\nsolution of this continuity. The new purpose emerges at a definite point\nin the sequence: what has gone before up to this point belongs to the\nworking out of a different interest or purpose, what comes after to the\nworking out of the now freshly emerged interest. Each may form a\ncontinuous process within itself, but the transition from the one to the\nother is not continuous. There is where the old purposive series ends\nand the new one begins, a genuine case of immediate coadjacency of terms\nbetween which intermediate members cannot be interposed.\n\nIn another connection, it would, I think, be easy to show how this\nconsideration is of itself fatal to the reality of Time. My point here\nis simply to maintain that the facts just referred to do not warrant the\ninference that \u201cultimate Reality\u201d or \u201cthe Absolute\u201d is for itself a\ndiscontinuous series. My objection to this view is that the \u201cemergence\nof new selective interest\u201d is itself essentially a feature of the finite\nexperience which, because finite, appears in a temporal form. The\ndistinction between the \u201cnew\u201d and the \u201chabitual\u201d has no meaning for a\ncompleted and infinite experience, which embraces all existence in a\nperfectly harmonious form. Or, to put it in another way, the serial form\nof arrangement itself has no significance except for an experience which\nhas to advance progressively from one stage to another of partial\ninsight and comprehension. This seems as true of \u201clogical\u201d order or\nethical order of valuation according to moral worth as of merely\nnumerical order. In fact, we said in Book II. chap. 4, \u00a7 10, that the\nserial arrangement is the simplest and most general expression of that\nrelational mode of apprehension which we decided to be at once\ninevitable for finite knowledge and inadequate to express Reality. It is\non this ground that I feel obliged, as I understand the problem at\npresent, to hold that ultimate Reality is neither a continuous nor a\ndiscontinuous series, for the reason that it is not for itself a series\nat all.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE PROBLEM OF SOUL AND BODY\n\n\u00a7 1. The problem of psychophysical connection has to do with the\n correlation of scientific abstractions, not of given facts of\n experience. \u00a7 2. The \u201cconsciousness\u201d of Psychology is thus not the\n same thing as the finite individual subject of experience, and\n Reality must not be said to consist of \u201cminds\u201d in the psychologist\u2019s\n sense. Again, we must not assume _a priori_ that there can be only\n _one_ working hypothesis of psychophysical connection. \u00a7 3. The\n possible hypotheses may be reduced to three, Epiphenomenalism,\n Parallelism, and Interaction. \u00a7 4. _Epiphenomenalism_ is legitimate\n as a methodological principle in Physiology; it is untenable as a\n basis for Psychology because it implies the reduction of psychical\n facts to mechanical law. \u00a7 5. _Parallelism._ The arguments for\n Parallelism as necessarily valid to Psychophysics because of its\n congruity with the postulates of mechanical Physics, are fallacious.\n We cannot assume that Psychology must necessarily conform to these\n postulates. \u00a7 6. As a working hypothesis Parallelism is available\n for many purposes, but breaks down when we attempt to apply it to\n the case of the initiation of fresh purposive reactions. A\n teleological and a mechanical series cannot ultimately be\n \u201cparallel.\u201d \u00a7 7. We are thus thrown back on the hypothesis of\n _Interaction_ as the only one which affords a consistent scheme for\n the correlation of Physiology and Psychology. We have, however, to\n remember that what the hypothesis correlates is scientific symbols,\n not actual facts. The actuality represented by both sets of symbols\n is the same thing, though the psychological symbolism affords a\n wider and more adequate representation of it than the physiological.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Few questions have more constantly attracted the attention of\nphilosophers, especially perhaps of those philosophers who have lived\nsince the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the Western\nworld, than that of the relation between the soul or mind and the body;\nand perhaps no question has given rise to graver misconceptions for want\nof a correct insight into the true logical character of the problem\nunder discussion. Both in the half-scientific speculations of ordinary\npersons and in the more systematic theories of metaphysicians and\npsychologists, the subject is constantly approached under the totally\nerroneous preconception that the dualistic separation of human life into\na bodily and a mental part or aspect is a datum of immediate experience\nwhich we can directly verify in ourselves, and that the task of\nphilosophy is by ingenious but unverifiable hypothesis to transcend this\nchasm between given realities. From the standpoint of our previous\nchapter we can easily see that such a view fundamentally misrepresents\nthe real philosophical problem.\n\nSo long as we are concerned with human existence as we directly find it\nin our immediate experience, or assume it in our practical social\nrelations with our fellows, no question of the relation between body and\nmind can arise, because neither term of the relation is as yet before\nus. For my own immediate experience I am neither a body nor a soul, nor\nyet a composite of the two, but simply an individual subject of\nexperiences in direct intercommunion with other individuals. Under the\ninfluence of conscious or unconscious dualistic prepossessions, we often\nspeak as if it were a directly experienced fact that I can communicate\nwith my fellow-subjects only indirectly through the medium of an alien\n\u201cmaterial\u201d body, and we sometimes contrast this supposed restriction\nwith an imagined higher state of existence, in which \u201cdisembodied\nspirits\u201d may conceivably have direct intercourse with each other. But\nthe truth is, that this direct intercourse and influence of one\nintelligent and purposive individual on another is no privilege reserved\nfor our enjoyment in \u201ca better world than this\u201d; it is, as we can see if\nwe will only forget our dualistic prepossessions, the very truth about\nour actual life. In actual life, before we have contaminated our direct\nenjoyment of it with psychological prejudices, we know nothing of the\ninterposition of an inert \u201cmaterial\u201d organisation between ourselves and\nthe members of our social environment. The severance of the original\nunity of experience into a physical and a psychical aspect is entirely a\nproduct of our own abstraction-making intellect. \u201cBody\u201d and \u201csoul\u201d are\nnot given actualities of experience, but artificial mental constructions\nof our own derived from the actual \u201cfacts\u201d of life by the elaborate\nprocesses which we have just been studying.\n\nAs we have seen in constructing our concept of a mechanical physical\norder, we abstract certain elements of our direct experience from the\nwhole, and consider them under the name of our \u201cbodies\u201d as if they had a\nseparate existence; we then, by the aid of the hypothesis of\n\u201cintrojection,\u201d represent those elements of direct self-experience which\nwere omitted from the physical order as forming by themselves a second\ndistinct whole or system called the \u201csoul.\u201d When we have reached this\npoint, we are, of course, compelled to raise the question how these two\nsystems, the bodily and the mental, must be supposed to be connected.\nBut the important fact to remember is that the two systems are not facts\nof experience, but products of abstraction. Our task in discussing their\nrelation is not to transcend a _given_ dualism, but to get rid of one\nwhich we have manufactured for ourselves by the manipulation of\nexperience in the interests of certain special scientific problems.\nHence, as M\u00fcnsterberg well puts it, we have not to _find the_ connection\nwhich subsists, as an actual fact, between body and soul, but to _invent\na_ connection in keeping with the general scheme of our artificial\nphysical and psychological hypotheses.[174]\n\n\u00a7 2. As far as the interests of Metaphysics are concerned, this\nrecognition that the problem of soul and body has to do solely with\nhighly artificial products of scientific abstraction, and not with\nanything which can be called a \u201cgiven\u201d actuality, is the one principle\nof supreme importance which emerges from the discussion of the subject.\nTwo very significant inferences may at once be drawn from it. (1) We\nclearly must not call the finite subjects of experience, of whom we saw\nreason to hold that ultimate Reality is exclusively constituted, \u201cminds\u201d\nor \u201csouls\u201d in the psychologist\u2019s sense.[175] To call them so would\ninevitably be to imply that exclusion from the physical order of\n\u201cbodies\u201d apart from which the psychological concept of the \u201csoul\u201d or\n\u201cmind\u201d has no significance. Or, in other words, it would identify them\nnot with what they are for their own direct experience, but with what\nthey become for one another\u2019s theoretical reflection under the influence\nof \u201cintrojection.\u201d As we have seen, it is legitimate and necessary for\nspecial scientific purposes to treat ourselves and other individuals _as\nif_ we were such series of \u201cmental states,\u201d but it is never legitimate\nto forget that, when we do this, we are substituting a highly unreal\nsymbolism for directly experienced facts.\n\nOne consequence of confusing the symbolism with the fact may be noted in\npassing: when we have substituted the series of mental states for the\nfelt unity of actual conscious life, we go on to ask ourselves how the\nfact and its symbol\u2014the symbolic nature of which we have forgotten\u2014are\nrelated. And thus arise all the unanswerable, because fundamentally\nunmeaning, questions as to the way in which the \u201cself\u201d _has_ or _owns_\nthe succession of \u201cstates.\u201d Failing to see that the succession of states\nis simply the unitary subject itself, as it appears from the point of\nview of the \u201cintrojection\u201d hypothesis, we then find ourselves confronted\nby the alternatives of foisting upon our Psychology the useless and\nunthinkable fiction of a changeless \u201csubstratum\u201d of mental states\u2014the\nsoul-substance of the pre-Kantian psychologists\u2014or resolving real life\ninto a succession of discontinuous \u201cmental images.\u201d With the recognition\nthat Psychology never deals directly with experienced reality, but\nalways with the hypothetical products of an abstraction which is only\njustified by its usefulness for the special purposes of the\npsychologist, all these difficulties disappear.\n\n(2) Another important consequence of our principle is that we cannot\ndogmatically assert that there can be only _one_ legitimate theory of\nthe \u201cconnection between mind and body.\u201d If \u201cmind\u201d and \u201cbody\u201d were really\ngiven as distinct but connected in direct experience, it might well be\nthat there could only be one account of their connection answering to\nexperienced fact. But since the separation is itself of our own\nintellectual manufacture, as we are dealing throughout with artificial\ncreations of our own abstraction, any theory of their connection which\nis desirable for the solution of a special problem or class of problems\nwill be legitimate _for that particular class of problems_. Thus the\nphysiologist may legitimately, if it answers his special purposes, adopt\na working hypothesis which the psychologist may find untenable, and\nagain different types of psychological problem may legitimately assume\ndifferent working hypotheses.[176] I shall aim at showing in the\nimmediately following paragraphs that there is one typical\npsychophysical hypothesis which, on the whole, lends itself better than\nits rivals to the general purposes of both Physiology and Psychology,\nbut we shall see, as we proceed, that the hypotheses we reject are also\nlegitimate for the solution of important special problems. In fact, our\nchief interest, as students of Metaphysics, in the further discussion of\npsychophysical connection will be to point out the fallaciousness of the\nmetaphysical arguments which are commonly used to establish some one\nhypothesis as necessarily and exclusively true.\n\n\u00a7 3. Turning now to consider the chief types of hypothesis which have\nbeen, or are at present, actually put forward by metaphysicians and\npsychologists, we may perhaps group them under the five main heads of\n(1) Pre-established Harmony, (2) Occasionalism, (3) Epiphenomenalism,\n(4) Psychophysical Parallelism, (5) Interaction. For our purpose in the\npresent chapter the number of alternatives may be further reduced by the\nomission of the first two. Neither the Pre-established Harmony of\nLeibnitz nor the Occasionalism advocated by Geulincx and Malebranche,\nand in a one-sided form by Berkeley, is likely to find much support from\nthe philosophy of the present day. Both doctrines are, moreover,\u2014that of\nLeibnitz avowedly and that of the Occasionalists by implication,\u2014much\nmore than special psychophysical hypotheses. They are in principle\nattempts to get rid of all transeunt causality, and have been discussed\nin their general bearings in our chapter on the Causal Postulate, where\nwe satisfied ourselves that any science which recognises, as Psychology\nhas to do, the existence of finite things must also admit the principle\nof transeunt causality, at any rate as a working hypothesis.\n\nEach of the three remaining types of view has its supporters among\ncontemporary students of science and philosophy. The epiphenomenalist\ntheory is largely adopted by the workers in the physical sciences, and\nthough not much countenanced by psychologists and metaphysicians, has\nthe explicit support of Dr. Shadworth Hodgson, while some versions of\nthe parallelist doctrine, notably that of M\u00fcnsterberg, approach it very\nclosely. The parallelist hypothesis is perhaps at present the most\npopular among the psychological specialists, and is represented by\nwriters of such eminence as Wundt, M\u00fcnsterberg, Ebbinghaus, H\u00f6ffding and\nStout. Finally, Interaction has powerful champions in Bradley, Ward, and\nJames; to say nothing of its adoption by so sound a physiologist as Mr.\nMcDougall. Both the latter doctrines, again, have historical connections\nwith the great philosophical systems of the past, Parallelism with that\nof Spinoza, and Interaction with those, to mention no other names, of\nDescartes and Locke. In the philosophy of the ancient world the\npsychophysical issue can hardly be said to appear in a well-defined\nform, but we may perhaps state that Plato\u2019s psychological doctrine is\ndecidedly one of Interaction, while the view of Aristotle, though too\ncomplex to admit of very precise formulation, inclines rather towards\nParallelism.\n\n\u00a7 4. _Epiphenomenalism._ Of the three hypotheses which remain for\ndiscussion, the theory of Epiphenomenalism has the least to recommend\nit, and is open to the most serious objections. According to this view,\nall causal connections are exclusively between physical states. Bodily\nchanges succeed one another in accord with uniform laws of sequence,\nwhich it is the province of the physiologist to discover, and every\nbodily change is completely determined by bodily antecedents. Certain\nbodily conditions are further attended by corresponding \u201cstates of\nconsciousness,\u201d but those states stand in no causal connection with\nsubsequent bodily states, nor yet with one another. They are thus\nconsequences or effects, but are never causes. The whole series of\nphysical changes, from birth to death, which makes up the history of the\nhuman body, goes on precisely as it would if \u201cconsciousness\u201d were\nentirely absent. This is what is meant by the assertion that all mental\nstates are _epi_phenomena, superfluous accessories, which arise in the\ncourse of the connected series of bodily changes, but are entirely\nwithout any determining influence upon it. The doctrine may be\ndiagrammatically represented thus\n\n _a_\u2014\u2014\u03b1\n |\u256d\u2500\u2500\u256e\n _b_\u2014\u2014\u03b2\n |\u256d\u2500\u2500\u256e\n _c_\u2014\u2014\u03b3,\n\nwhere the italic letters symbolise physical and the Greek letters\npsychical states, the vertical lines indicating the course of causal\nsequence.\n\nIf a psychophysical hypothesis were ever directly applicable to the\nactualities of experience, we might, of course, dismiss Epiphenomenalism\nat once as inherently absurd. For nothing is more certain than that in\nthe actual life of direct experience our knowledge and our interests do\ndetermine the course of our actions. That what we believe and desire\ndoes make all the difference in the world to the way in which we behave,\nis one of those elementary verities out of which no scientific\nhypothesis can claim to reason us. Hence, when the defenders of the\ntheory attempt to draw practical moral and juristic consequences from\ntheir doctrines, we are within our rights in simply declining to concern\nourselves with so absurd a travesty of the simplest facts of experience.\nSo long, however, as the hypothesis is put forward simply as a working\nhypothesis for the correlation of our physiological and psychological\ntheories, the case is different. Its validity as a psychophysical theory\nmust be estimated solely by the degree in which it renders this\nsystematic correlation feasible, and is not necessarily impaired by the\nmanifest absurdities which result from mistaking the doctrine for a\ndescription of actual life.\n\nNow, if we look at the hypothesis from this point of view, we can at\nonce see that it is really legitimate for some purposes. For the purpose\nof physiological science it is obviously to our interest that we should\nbe able to deduce the later from the earlier stages of a physiological\nprocess. We have thus an interest in treating physiological changes, if\nwe can, as unconditioned by any but physiological antecedents. And every\nactual success in establishing a uniformity or \u201claw\u201d of Cerebral\nPhysiology is proof that the assumption that, for the process in\nquestion, the only determining conditions which count are physiological,\nis equivalent to the truth. The physiologist, then, is clearly justified\nin treating the psychical series as epiphenomenal, if he means no more\nby this than that he intends to deal, as a physiologist, only with\nprocesses which can be successfully resolved into uniform sequences on\nthe assumption that they involve only physiological terms. Though\nwhether any processes in the nervous system can be successfully treated\nas purely physiological sequences, nothing but the physiologist\u2019s actual\nsuccess in obtaining results from his initial postulate can decide.\n\nIf, however, the physiologist should go on, as he sometimes does, to\nmake the assertion that not only can some nervous processes be treated\n_as if_ their psychical accompaniments made no difference, but that they\nreally are what they would be without those accompaniments, or even that\n_all_ nervous process is what it would be without \u201cconsciousness,\u201d he\ncommits a gross logical fallacy. It is a mere blunder in logic to argue\nthat because the presence of certain circumstances makes no difference\nto the special result which follows on a given antecedent, the result\nwould equally follow in their absence. For it might be that in their\nremoval the very antecedents in which we are interested would disappear.\nWe are not at liberty to infer that, because the course of certain\nphysiological processes can be computed without taking their mental\ncorrelates into account, they could occur apart from those correlates.\n\nEven more serious are the consequences which follow when it is assumed\nthat _all_ mental processes without exception may be regarded as\nepiphenomenal, _i.e._ that all human action, if only our Physiology were\nsufficiently advanced, might be brought under laws of purely\nphysiological sequence. Such an assumption would lead at once to the\nfollowing dilemma: Either our Physiology must remain rigidly faithful to\nthe fundamental postulates of mechanical science, or not. If it is\nfaithful to them, its descriptions of human action must rigidly exclude\nall reference to teleological determination by reference to conceived\nand desired ends. _I.e._ we must treat human conduct as if it were\nfatally determined apart from any possible influence of human choice and\nintention, and thus stultify that whole work of historical and ethical\nappreciation which we have already seen to be the principal _raison\nd\u2019\u00eatre_ of Psychology as a science. We must revert, in fact, to a theory\nof life which is identical with the extremest forms of Pagan or\nMohammedan fatalism in everything except the name it gives to its\n_ineluctabile fatum._ Or, if we are not prepared to do this, we must\nallow Physiology itself to use the psychological categories of desire,\nselection, and choice, and thus covertly admit that human action, after\nall, cannot be described without the introduction of factors not\nincluded in the physical order. It is no doubt due to their realisation\nof this dilemma that psychologists are all but universally agreed to\nreject the epiphenomenalist hypothesis, while its popularity with\nphysiologists may be explained by observing that physiological\nuniformities can manifestly only be successfully established for those\nprocesses which can be treated _as if_ they were only physiologically\nconditioned.\n\n\u00a7 5. _Parallelism._ The hypothesis of Parallelism attempts, while\npreserving some of the characteristic features of the cruder view just\ndescribed, to avoid its unsatisfactory consequences. Agreeing with\nEpiphenomenalism in the doctrine that physiological changes must be\ntreated as determined only by physiological antecedents, Parallelism\ndenies that the events of the psychical series are mere \u201csecondary\u201d\neffects of their physiological correlates. According to it, the series\nof physical and that of psychical events are strictly \u201cparallel,\u201d but\nnot causally connected. Each event in either series has its precise\ncounterpart in the other, but the physical events do not cause the\npsychical events, nor _vice vers\u00e2_. The successive members of the\nphysical series form a connected causal sequence, independent of their\npsychical concomitants, while these latter, it is generally\nassumed,[177] form a similar chain of causally connected psychical\nstates. Thus every nervous change is determined solely by precedent\nnervous changes, and the corresponding psychical change by the\ncorresponding antecedent psychical changes. In diagrammatic shape our\nhypothesis now takes the form\n\n \u256d\u2500\u2500\u256e\n _a_ \u03b1\n | |\n _b_ \u03b2\n | |\n _c_ \u03b3\n\nUsually it is further added that the ultimate metaphysical explanation\nof this parallelism without mutual dependence must be found in the\n(Spinozistic) doctrine of _Identity_, _i.e._ the doctrine that the\nphysical and psychical series are two different \u201csides\u201d or \u201caspects\u201d of\na single reality. Some supporters of Parallelism (_e.g._, Ebbinghaus)\nconceive this single reality as a _tertium quid_, equally adequately\nexpressed by both the series, others (_e.g._, Stout) hold that its real\nnature is more adequately revealed in the mental than in the physical\nseries.\n\nThe grounds commonly adduced in favour of the parallelistic view as the\nmost satisfactory psychophysical theory, are of two kinds. As a positive\nargument it is urged that cerebral anatomy has already to some extent\nconfirmed the doctrine of correspondence between definite physical and\npsychical processes by its successful \u201clocalisation\u201d of specific sensory\nand motor processes in various cortical \u201ccentres,\u201d and may reasonably be\nexpected to accomplish further such \u201clocalisations\u201d in the future.\nStress is also laid upon the formal analogy between the psychological\nlaws of retentiveness, association, and habit, and the physiological\ntheories of the formation of \u201cconduction-paths\u201d in the brain. These\npositive contentions do not, however, take us far. The correspondences\nupon which they rest, so far as they are ascertained experimentally and\nare not mere deductions from the principle of Parallelism itself, would\nbe equally natural on a theory of Interaction, or of one-sided\ndependence of either series on the other. The real strength of the case\nfor Parallelism rests upon certain negative assumptions which are widely\nbelieved to exclude the hypothesis of causal dependence of either series\non the other. These negative assumptions appear to be in the main three.\n\n(1) It is said that, while we can without difficulty conceive how the\nlater stages of a continuous physical or psychical process can be\nconnected by causal law with its earlier stages, we are entirely unable\nto conceive how psychical events can arise from physical antecedents, or\n_vice vers\u00e2_, because of the utter disparateness of the physical and the\npsychical. The physical process, it is urged, is continuous, and so, on\nthe other side, is the psychical, but when we attempt to think of a\ncerebral change conditioning a mental change, or _vice vers\u00e2_, there is\na complete solution of continuity which we cannot bridge by any causal\nformula.\n\n(2) The doctrine of Conservation of Energy is sometimes supposed to be\nincompatible with the admission of psychical states among the\nantecedents or consequents of physical states. It is said that if\npsychical states can influence the course of nervous change, there will\nbe \u201cwork\u201d done in the organism without the expenditure of energy, and if\nthe total effect of nervous change is not exclusively physical there\nwill be loss of energy without \u201cwork\u201d being done by the organism, and in\neither case the principle of Conservation will be contravened.\n\n(3) Finally, it is maintained that it is a fundamental postulate of the\nphysical sciences, that every change of configuration in a material\nsystem such as the living organism is assumed to be, is due to\nexclusively physical antecedents, and that this postulate must therefore\nbe respected in Psychophysics. These are, so far as I can gather them\nfrom the works of the psychologists who adopt the parallelist view, the\nprincipal arguments by which their case is supported.\n\nIt is clear that if all\u2014or any\u2014of these contentions are valid, it must\nfollow that Parallelism is not only a legitimate but the only legitimate\nhypothesis for the co-ordination of physical and psychical science. I\nbelieve, however, that every one of them is fallacious, and that for the\nfollowing reasons:\u2014\n\n(1) The argument from the inconceivability of causal relation between\nthe physical and the psychical is perhaps the most effective of the\nalleged grounds for denying interaction between the psychical and the\nphysical. Yet its force is not really so great as it might appear. It is\nnot denied that we can, in simple cases, assign the conditions under\nwhich a mental state follows on a physical state (_e.g._, we can assign\nthe physical conditions of the emergence of a given sensation). But, it\nis argued, we cannot show why those conditions (_e.g._, the stimulation\nof the retina, and indirectly of the \u201coptical centres\u201d in the brain by\nlight of a given wave length) should be followed by this particular\nsensation (_e.g._, green, and not some other colour). This means that we\ncannot construct a mathematical equation connecting the character of the\nsensation with that of the stimulus, as we can to connect the earlier\nwith the later stages of a purely physical process. This is, of course,\nobvious enough. It is only by making complete abstraction from the\nappearance of new _qualities_ in the course of a process, and by\ntreating it as a purely geometrical and quantitative transformation,\nthat we can render it amenable to our equations.\n\nAs we saw in our discussion of Causality, mathematical Physics only\nsucceeds in its constructions on the condition of excluding all\n_qualitative_ change, as \u201csubjective,\u201d from its purview. But we also saw\nthere that the origination of the qualitatively new is an essential part\nof the idea of Causality, and that in reducing all change in the\nphysical world to quantitative transformation, mathematical Physics\nreally does away with the causal concept. We are, in fact, in precisely\nthe same logical position if we speak of physiological changes as\n_causing_ sensation, as when we speak of a quantitative change in the\nproportions of a chemical compound as the _cause_ of alteration in its\nqualities. The objection that the psychical effect cannot be connected\nby an equation with its alleged cause, would hold equally in any case of\nthe production of the qualitatively new, _i.e._ in every case where we\nuse the category of causality at all. And for that very reason it has no\nforce when urged as an objection to psychophysical causality in\nparticular.[178]\n\n(2) The argument from the Conservation of Energy may be more briefly\ndismissed, as its fallacious character has been fully recognised by the\nablest recent exponents of the parallelistic view, such as Dr. Stout and\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg. As Dr. Stout points out, the argument involves a\nformal _petitio principii_. The principle of Conservation of Energy has\nonly been established for what are technically known as conservative\nmaterial systems, and no absolute proof has been given, or seems likely\nto be given, that the human organism is such a conservative system.\nFurther, as has been urged by many critics, and notably by Professor\nWard, the principle of conservation, taken by itself, is simply a law of\nexchanges. It asserts that the _quantity_ of the energy of a\nconservative system remains constant under all the transformations\nthrough which it passes, but, apart from the rest of the postulates of\nmechanical science, it affords no means of deciding _what_\ntransformations of energy shall occur in the system, or _when_ they\nshall occur. Hence there would be no breach with the special principle\nof Conservation of Energy if we were to assume that psychical conditions\ncan determine the moment at which energy in the organism is transformed\n_e.g._, from the kinetic to the potential state, without affecting its\nquantity.\n\n(3) It is, however, true that it is inconsistent with the postulates of\nmechanical Physics, taken as a whole, to admit the determination of\nphysical sequences by non-physical conditions. To admit such\ndetermination would be to stultify the whole procedure of the mechanical\nsciences. For, as we have seen in our Third Book, the primary object of\nmechanical science is to reduce the course of events to rigid laws of\nuniform sequence, and thus to facilitate the formulation of practical\nrules for our own interference with it. It is therefore a legitimate\npostulate of mechanical science that\u2014for its special object\u2014desire and\nwill shall be excluded from our conception of the conditions which\ndetermine events, and the whole course of nature treated _as if_\nconditioned only by physical antecedents. If there is any department of\nexperienced reality which cannot be successfully dealt with according to\nthese postulates, then the formulation of rigid laws of uniform sequence\nis, in principle, impossible for that department, and it must be\nexcluded from the \u201cworld\u201d which mechanical science investigates.\n\nBut the fact that mechanical science can only attain its end by treating\nall physical events as independent of non-physical conditions, does not\nafford the slightest presumption that they must be treated in the same\nway for all purposes and by every branch of inquiry. Whether Psychology,\nin particular, is under the logical necessity of conforming to the\nmechanical postulates, will depend upon our view as to whether the\nobject subserved by Psychology is the same as that of the mechanical\nsciences, or different. If our purpose in psychological investigation is\nnot identical with the purposes of mechanical science, there is no sense\nin demanding that we shall hamper our procedure as psychologists by\nadherence to postulates based upon the special nature of the interests\nto which mechanical science has to minister.\n\nNow, we have already contended that the aims of Psychology only\npartially and temporarily coincide with those of the mechanical\nsciences. If we were right in holding that the principal object of\nPsychology is to provide a general terminology of which History and\nEthics can avail themselves in their appreciations of life, it follows\nat once that Psychology imperatively needs the recognition of that very\nteleological aspect of human action which is excluded on principle, and\nrightly so for the special purpose of mechanical Physics, by the\nfundamental mechanical postulates. Thus the argument that the\nparallelistic hypothesis must be the most suitable for the psychologist,\nbecause it conforms to the mechanical postulates of sciences which deal\nwith experience from a different standpoint and in a different interest,\nloses all its cogency.[179]\n\nNow that we have, as I trust, sufficiently disposed of the _a priori_\narguments for the parallelistic view, we are in a position to estimate\nit, as a psychological hypothesis, purely on its merits as evinced by\nits actual success. But first we must point out once more that the whole\nquestion is not one as to actualities, but purely as to the most\nsatisfactory way of bringing two sets of abstractions, originally\ndevised for divergent purposes, into touch with one another; and\nfurther, that _if_ the hypothesis were put forward as a final\nmetaphysical truth about the constitution of the real world, it would be\nmanifestly self-contradictory.\n\nIn the first place, Parallelism, taken for anything more than a\nconvenient working hypothesis, would involve a flagrant breach of logic.\nIt is obvious that, as Mr. Bradley has urged, you cannot infer from the\npremisses that one total state, containing both a physical and a\npsychical element, causes another complex state of the same kind, the\nconclusion that the physical aspect of the first, by itself, has caused\nthe physical, and the psychical the psychical aspect of the second. To\nget this conclusion you need a \u201cnegative instance,\u201d in which either the\nphysical or the psychical state is found apart from its correlate, but\nfollowed by the same consequent as before, and Parallelism itself denies\nthe possibility of such an instance. From the premisses that _a_ \u03b1 is\nalways followed by _b_ \u03b2, it attempts to infer, without any \u201cdissection\nof nature,\u201d that _a_ by itself was the necessary and sufficient\ncondition of _b_, and \u03b1 of \u03b2. And this is, of course, logically\nfallacious. Dr. Ward expresses the same point differently when he urges\nthat unvarying and precise concomitance _without_ causal connection is a\nlogical absurdity.\n\nThat the supporters of the hypothesis themselves are conscious of the\ndifficulty, is shown by their unanimous assertion that the psychical and\nphysical series are ultimately manifestations of one and the same\nreality. What they do not explain is how, if this is so, the two series\ncan be phenomenally so utterly disparate as to exclude mutual influence\non one another. The difficulty becomes insuperable when we reflect that\non the parallelistic view the physical series must be rigidly\nmechanical, as otherwise we shall have a breach with those mechanical\npostulates which are supposed to require the exclusion of psychical\nstates from the determining conditions of physical occurrences. Thus, if\nteleology is to be recognised anywhere in our scientific constructions,\nit must be in our conception of the psychical series. And on the whole\nthe supporters of Parallelism admit this in practice by the free use of\nteleological categories in their Psychology. But it ought by now to be\nclear to us that the nature of the identical reality cannot be expressed\nwith equal adequacy in a teleological series, and in one which is, by\nthe principles of its construction, purely mechanical. Here, again, most\nof the parallelists are really in agreement with us, for they usually in\nthe end call themselves \u201cIdealists,\u201d and assert that the \u201cmental\u201d series\nis a more faithful representation of Reality than the physical. But if\nthe two series are not on the same level in respect of their nearness to\nReality, it is hard to see how there can be exact correspondence between\nthem. This is a point to which we shall immediately have to return.[180]\n\n\u00a7 6. When we ask, however, whether Parallelism, apart from these\nquestions of ultimate philosophy, is legitimate _as a working hypothesis\nin Psychology_, the answer must be that, in certain departments of\npsychological investigation, it certainly is so. In practice, the\ndoctrine of the parallel but independent series amounts, for the most\npart, to little more than a methodological device for the division of\nlabour between the physiologist and the psychologist, the physiologist\nrestricting himself to the formulation of such uniformities as can be\nestablished between nervous processes, considered as if independent of\nexternal influence, and the psychologist doing the same for their\npsychical accompaniments. As a principle of methodical procedure,\ntherefore, in those parts of Psychology which deal with the more passive\nand, as we may say, routine-like aspects of mental life, Parallelism is\na useful and therefore a legitimate working hypothesis.\n\nThe question by which its claim to be the _best_ hypothesis must be\ndecided is, to my mind, that of its applicability to the case of the\nfresh initiation of new purposive adaptations to changes in the\norganism\u2019s environment.[181] For it is just in dealing with these cases\nthat Psychology, if it is to fulfil the purpose we have ascribed to it,\nmust most obviously discard mechanical for teleological categories.\nHence it is here, if anywhere, that a difficulty of principle must make\nitself felt when we attempt to treat the psychical and the physical\nseries as exactly parallel and corresponding. It seems to follow\nnecessarily from the conception of physical science as based upon the\nmechanical postulate, that a teleological and a mechanical series cannot\npossibly run \u201cparallel\u201d in all their details in the fashion presupposed\nby the hypothesis under consideration.\n\nIf Psychology is to be of any use in supplying Ethics and History with\nthe subject-matter of their appreciations, it is manifest that it must\nmake the assumption that desire and choice are operative in determining\nthe course of human action, and thus must\u2014at certain points at\nleast\u2014explicitly employ the categories of teleology. These categories,\nagain, cannot possibly be translated into the rigidly non-teleological\nsymbolism of a physical science, based upon the mechanical postulates,\nas every science of \u201cgeneral laws\u201d must be. It follows that \u201cexact\nparallelism _without_ mutual interference\u201d cannot, consistently with the\npurpose which Psychology subserves, be employed, even as a working\nhypothesis throughout the whole field of psychological investigation\nitself. When the attempt to extend its employment to the whole sphere of\npsychical processes is seriously made, it leads inevitably to the crude\nfatalism of the doctrine that there is no such thing as choice or action\n(free or otherwise) in the universe. In actual practice, the supporters\nof Parallelism, who reject this doctrine when it is explicitly avowed\nunder the name of Epiphenomenalism, only succeed in doing so because\nthey do not really insist on carrying out the parallelistic hypothesis\nin their Psychology. They commonly make their hypothesis prominent,\nwhile they are dealing with the comparatively passive and routine-like\naspects of mental life, association, habituation, etc., but allow\nthemselves to lose sight of it as soon as they come to treat of such\nexplicitly teleological concepts as attention and choice. Their\nprocedure is also rendered easier for them by the liberal use which\nevolutionary biologists, even while professing with their lips fidelity\nto the mechanical postulates, allow themselves to make of teleological\ncategories which are really purely psychological.\n\nIt would be an easy task, if space permitted, to show in detail how the\nfundamentally different principles underlying the construction of the\nmechanical and the teleological series involve the presence, in the\nindividual members of each series, of characters to which nothing\ncorresponds in those of the other. Thus we might ask, with Dr. Ward,\nwhat corresponds in the psychical scheme to the composition of the units\nof the physiological scheme out of their various chemical components,\nand of these, again, out of more elementary physical \u201cprime atoms\u201d?[182]\nor, from the opposite side, we might ask, what is the cerebral\nequivalent, in terms of a rigidly mechanical Physiology, of the\npsychological character of \u201cmeaning\u201d or \u201csignificance\u201d? But the\nmultiplication of these problems becomes superfluous if the reader has\nonce grasped our principle, that exact correspondence is only possible\nbetween series which are either both mechanical or both\u2014and both in the\nsame degree\u2014teleological. Between a genuinely teleological and an\nhonestly mechanical series such correspondence is logically impossible,\nbecause of the fundamental difference between their types of\nconstruction.\n\n\u00a7 7. For the reasons just produced, it is, I think, necessary to hold\nthat the oldest and simplest hypothesis of the connection between body\nand mind, that of _Interaction_, is after all the most satisfactory.\nAccording to this view, the two series cannot be thought of as\npresenting an exact correspondence, and must be thought of as causally\ninfluencing each other at different points, precisely as any two sets of\nphysical events do. If we adopt it we shall recognise in sensation a\npsychical state which has physical processes among its immediate\nantecedents, and in motor reaction similarly a physical process with\npsychical antecedents. It is scarcely to be denied that this conception\nof body and mind, as two things which stand in causal relation, is the\nhypothesis which most naturally presents itself, when once we have\nartificially broken up the unity of immediate experience into a physical\nand a psychical side, and so created the problem of psychophysical\nconnection. So natural is it, that even psychologists who accept one of\nthe other hypotheses are to be found constantly speaking of voluntary\nmovement in terms which, if they mean anything, imply causal\ndetermination of bodily by mental process, while no psychologist of any\nschool has ever succeeded in expressing the relation of sensation to\nstimulus in any other phraseology than that of Interaction. Probably the\nhypothesis would never have been exposed to hostile criticism at all,\nbut for the metaphysical objections, already dismissed by us as\nfallacious, founded upon the notion that the mechanical postulates with\nwhich Interaction conflicts are ascertained truths about the actual\nstructure of the reality with which we are in touch in immediate\nexperience.\n\nIt is clear that, from the nature of the problem to be solved, we cannot\nbe called upon to _prove_ the actual occurrence of psychophysical\ninteraction. As a working hypothesis for the interrelation of two sets\nof scientific abstractions, the theory is in principle incapable of\ndirect establishment by the \u201cappeal to facts.\u201d All that is requisite for\nits justification is to show that it is (_a_) not in principle at\nvariance with any fundamental axiom of scientific procedure, and (_b_)\nenables us to co-ordinate our scientific results in the manner most\nsuitable for the uses to which we propose to put them. Both these\nconditions are fulfilled by the hypothesis of Interaction, if our\nforegoing arguments are sound. We have seen the fallacious nature of the\nobjections brought against it on _a priori_ grounds of logical method,\nand have also seen that it is positively demanded if we are at once to\nbe faithful to the mechanical postulates upon which physical science\ndepends for its successes, and to recognise in our psychological\nconstructions that teleological character of human action which is\nall-essential for History and Ethics. In substance this is the whole\ncase for the Interaction hypothesis, and no further accession of\nstrength would result from its elaboration in detail.\n\nIt may be added that it is one great recommendation of the hypothesis of\nInteraction, that it is quite consistent with the full recognition of\nthe relative usefulness of the alternative theories, though they, as we\nhave seen, are unable to do justice to those aspects of fact which can\nonly be expressed in terms of Interaction. Thus the hypothesis of\nInteraction can readily afford to admit that, for certain purposes and\nup to a certain point, it is possible to treat physical or psychical\nprocesses _as if_ they were determined solely by physical or psychical\nconditions respectively, and even to treat some physical processes _as\nif_ the presence of their psychical concomitants made no difference at\nall to their occurrence. The reason of this is, that whereas a\nmechanical hypothesis can give no intelligible account of a purposive\nprocess at all, a teleological hypothesis can quite easily account for\nthe apparently mechanical character of some of the processes which fall\nunder it. As we have seen (Book III. chap. 3, \u00a7 6), a purposive\nreaction, once established, approximates to mechanical uniformity in the\nregularity with which it continues to be repeated, while the conditions\nare unchanged, and the end of the reaction is therefore still secured by\nits repetition.\n\nThus we can readily see that, even if we contented ourselves with the\nattempt to translate into the language of psychological science the\nprocesses which make up the life of an individual subject, many of them\nwould appear to be going on with routine uniformity. And when we\ndeliberately set ourselves to obtain uniformities by taking an average\nresult, derived from comparison of a multitude of subjects, our results\nare, of course, always mechanical in appearance, because the element of\nindividual purpose and initiative has been excluded by ourselves from\nour data in the very process of taking the average. Hence we can\nunderstand how, on the hypothesis of Interaction itself, all those\nmental processes which consist in the repetition of an already\nestablished type of reaction should come to appear mechanical, and thus\nto suggest that mechanical conception of psychical processes which is\ncommon to the epiphenomenalist and the parallelist view. Interaction,\nand Interaction alone, is thus a hypothesis capable of being applied to\nthe _whole_ field of psychological investigation.\n\nI will conclude this chapter with some considerations on the bearing of\nour result upon the special problems of Metaphysics. We have explicitly\ndefended Interaction as being no statement of actual experienced fact,\nbut a working hypothesis for the convenient correlation of two\nscientific constructions, neither of which directly corresponds to the\nactualities of experience. This means, of course, that Interaction\ncannot possibly be the final truth for Metaphysics. It cannot ultimately\nbe the \u201cfact\u201d that \u201cmind\u201d and \u201cbody\u201d are things which react upon each\nother, because, as we have seen, neither \u201cmind\u201d nor \u201cbody\u201d is an actual\ndatum of experience; for direct experience and its social relations, the\nduality subsequently created by the construction of a physical order\nsimply has no existence. Nor can it be maintained that this duality,\nthough not directly given as a datum, is a concept which has to be\nassumed in order to make experience consistent with itself, and is\ntherefore the truth. For the concept of Interaction manifestly reposes\nupon the logically prior conception of the physical as a rigidly\nmechanical system. It is because we have first constructed the notion of\nthe \u201cbody\u201d on rigidly mechanical lines that we have subsequently to\ndevise the concept of \u201cmind\u201d or \u201csoul\u201d as a means of recognising and\nsymbolising in our science the non-mechanical character of actual human\nlife. And since we have already seen that the mechanical, as such,\ncannot be real, this whole scheme of a mechanical and a non-mechanical\nsystem in causal relation with one another can only be an imperfect\nsubstitute for the Reality it is intended to symbolise. In fact, we\nmight have drawn the same conclusion from the very fact that the\npsychophysical hypothesis we have adopted is couched in terms of\nTranseunt Causality, since we have already satisfied ourselves that all\nforms of the causal postulate are more or less defective appearance.\n\nThe proposition that the psychophysical theory of the \u201cconnection\u201d of\n\u201cbody\u201d and \u201cmind\u201d is an artificial transformation, due to the needs of\nempirical science, of the actual teleological unity of human experience,\nis sometimes expressed by the statement that mind and body are really\none and the same thing. In its insistence upon the absence of the\npsychophysical duality from actual experience, this saying is correct\nenough, but it perhaps fails to express the truth with sufficient\nprecision. For, as it stands, the saying conveys no hint of the very\ndifferent levels on which the two concepts stand in respect to the\ndegree of truth with which they reproduce the purposive teleological\ncharacter of real human experience. It would perhaps be nearer the mark\nto say that, while the physiologist\u2019s object, the \u201cbody,\u201d and the\npsychologist\u2019s object, the \u201cmind,\u201d are alike conceptual symbols,\nsubstituted, from special causes, for the single subject of actual life,\nand may both be therefore said to \u201cmean\u201d or \u201cstand for\u201d the same thing,\ntheir actual content is different. For what in the language of\nphysiology I call my \u201cbody\u201d includes only those processes of actual life\nwhich approximate to the mechanical ideal sufficiently closely to be\ncapable of being successfully treated as merely mechanical, and\ntherefore brought under a scheme of general \u201claws\u201d of nature. Whereas\nwhat, as a psychologist, I call my \u201cmind\u201d or \u201csoul,\u201d though it includes\nprocesses of an approximately mechanical type, includes them only as\nsubordinate to the initiation of fresh individual reactions against\nenvironment which can only be adequately expressed by teleological\ncategories. Thus, though \u201cmind\u201d and \u201cbody\u201d in a sense mean the same\nactual thing, the one stands for a fuller and clearer view of its true\nnature than the other. In Dr. Stout\u2019s terminology their _intent_ may be\nthe same, but their content is different.[183]\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014R. Avenarius, _Der Menschliche Weltbegriff_; B.\nBosanquet, _Psychology of the Moral Self_, lect. 10; F. H. Bradley,\n_Appearance and Reality_, chap. 23; Shadworth Hodgson, _Metaphysic of\nExperience_, vol. ii. pp. 276-403; William James, _Principles of\nPsychology_, vol. i. chaps. 5 and 6; H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. iii.\nchaps. 1 and 5 (Eng. trans., vol. ii. pp. 163-198, 283-517); H.\nM\u00fcnsterberg, _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_, i. chaps. 11. (pp. 402-436),\n15 (pp. 525-562); G. F. Stout, _Manual of Psychology_,^3 Introduction,\nchap. 3; James Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii. lects. 11\nand 12 (art. \u201cPsychology\u201d in Supplement to _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, p.\n66 ff.).\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 174:\n\n Compare the following striking passage from Avenarius, _Menschliche\n Weltbegriff_, p. 75: \u201cLet an individual _M_ denote a definite whole of\n \u2018perceived things\u2019 (trunk, arms and hands, legs and feet, speech,\n movements, etc.) and of \u2018presented thoughts\u2019 as _I_, ... then when _M_\n says \u2018_I_ have a brain,\u2019 this means that a brain belongs as part to\n the whole of perceived things and presented thoughts denoted as _I_.\n And when _M_ says \u2018_I_ have thoughts,\u2019 this means that the thoughts\n themselves belong as a part to the whole of perceived things and\n presented thoughts denoted as _I_. But though thorough analysis of the\n denotation of _I_ thus leads to the result that we _have_ a brain and\n thought, it never leads to the result that the _brain has_ the\n thoughts. The thought is, no doubt, a thought of \u2018my Ego,\u2019 but not a\n thought of \u2018my brain\u2019 any more than my brain is the brain of \u2018my\n thought.\u2019 _I.e._ the brain is no habitation, seat, generator,\n instrument or organ, no support or substratum of _thought_. Thought is\n no indweller or commander, no other half or side, and also no product,\n indeed not even a physiological function or so much as a state of the\n _brain_.\u201d\n\nFootnote 175:\n\n As elsewhere in this work, I am using the terms \u201cmind\u201d and \u201csoul\u201d as\n virtually interchangeable names for the object studied by the\n psychologist. So far as there is any definite distinction of meaning\n between the terms as currently used by English writers, \u201csoul\u201d seems\n to carry with it more of the implication of substantiality and\n relative independence than \u201cmind.\u201d It might not be amiss to adopt the\n term \u201csoul\u201d as a name for the finite subject of experience as he is\n for himself in actual social life, and to confine the name \u201cmind\u201d to\n the construction which symbolises this subject for psychological\n purposes. But the popular antithesis between soul and body is perhaps\n too strongly rooted to admit of this suggestion. In earlier passages,\n _e.g._, Book II. chap. 2, \u00a7 6, I have used the term \u201cspirit\u201d in the\n sense here suggested for \u201csoul.\u201d\n\nFootnote 176:\n\n So, in dealing with astronomical problems, we are free to adopt either\n the Copernican or the Ptolemaic scheme, whichever happens to be the\n more _convenient_ for our special purpose. The superior _truth_ of the\n Copernican system seems to mean no more than that the range of its\n utility is the wider of the two. I may observe that I do not here\n employ the term \u201cutility\u201d in the narrowly practical sense of those\n philosophers who, _e.g._, condemn all speculation about the \u201cAbsolute\u201d\n on the ground of inutility. Whatever satisfies _any_ human aspiration\n is for me, so far, \u201cuseful.\u201d It follows that there is, for me, no such\n thing as the \u201cuseless knowledge\u201d which \u201cPragmatism\u201d denounces. Thus,\n if a man\u2019s peace of mind depends upon speculation about the\n \u201cAbsolute\u201d\u2014on the habits of angels, or any other topic you like (and\n this is a matter in which every man must in the end decide for\n himself)\u2014Pragmatism would appear to be false to its own principle in\n forbidding him to speculate.\n\nFootnote 177:\n\n The assumption is not always made, however. Professor M\u00fcnsterberg, who\n classes himself as a supporter of Parallelism, holds on metaphysical\n grounds that all causal connection must be between physical states.\n Hence he denies that psychical states can be causally connected with\n one another, except indirectly through the causal relations of their\n physical correlates. His doctrine is thus hardly to be distinguished\n from Epiphenomenalism, except in terminology, though he avoids the\n consequence of practical Fatalism by his insistence upon the purely\n artificial nature of both the physical and the psychical series. (His\n reason for refusing to admit causal relation between psychical states\n is that causal connection can only be established between universals,\n whereas every psychical state is _unique_. Does not this argument\n imply a confusion between the actual experience and its psychological\n symbol?)\n\nFootnote 178:\n\n Most supporters of Parallelism, it may be noted, stultify their own\n case, so far as it rests on this special contention, by admitting the\n causal determination of psychical states by one another, though, as\n psychical states are essentially qualitative, the reduction of\n causation to quantitative identity is particularly inadmissible here.\n Professor M\u00fcnsterberg is quite consistent, therefore, in denying\n psychical causality and reducing Parallelism to Epiphenomenalism.\n\nFootnote 179:\n\n The reader who has followed the argument of our Third Book will not\n need to be reminded that the world of purely mechanical processes is\n simply an ideal construction based on postulates which we make for\n their practical convenience, and in no sense a direct transcript of\n the world of actual experience.\n\nFootnote 180:\n\n The \u201cneutral Monism\u201d to which the doctrine of rigid Parallelism\n logically leads, when put forward as more than a working hypothesis,\n will, one may hope, in England at least, fail to survive the exposure\n of its illogicalities in the second volume of Professor Ward\u2019s\n _Naturalism and Agnosticism_.\n\nFootnote 181:\n\n This case includes, as will be apparent on a little reflection, not\n only the initiation of new motor reactions upon a sensation or\n percept, but also that of sensation itself as a qualitatively novel\n reaction upon physiological stimulation, and thus includes both the\n processes in which supporters of Interaction have always recognised\n the causal interconnection of the physical and the psychical.\n\nFootnote 182:\n\n It is with great pleasure that I note the coincidence of my own view\n on the impossibility of reconciling Parallelism with the recognition\n of the psychological importance of \u201cmeaning\u201d with that of Mr. Gibson\n (essay on \u201cThe Problem of Freedom,\u201d in _Personal Idealism_, p. 150\n ff.). Professor M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s declaration, that the consciousness\n investigated by Psychology \u201cknows nothing by its knowledge and wills\n nothing by its will,\u201d seems to me a confession of the bankruptcy of\n Parallelism as a basal psychological hypothesis. Still more so his\n elaborate and brilliant demonstration that the \u201cbrain\u201d with which my\n \u201cmind\u201d may be regarded as \u201cparallel\u201d is not the brain as studied and\n charted by the anatomist, _i.e._ not the brain as a physical object at\n all. See _Psychologie_, i. 415-428.\n\nFootnote 183:\n\n See his essay on \u201cError\u201d in _Personal Idealism_.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE PLACE OF THE \u201cSELF\u201d IN REALITY\n\n\u00a7 1. The \u201cself\u201d is (1) a teleological concept, (2) implies a contrasted\n not-self (where this contrast is absent from an experience there is\n no genuine sense of self); (3) but the limits which divide self and\n not-self are not fixed but fluctuating. The not-self is not a merely\n external limit, but consists of discordant elements within the\n individual, which are extruded from it by a mental construction. (4)\n The self is a product of development, and has its being in the\n time-series. (5) The self is never given complete in a moment of\n actual experience, but is an ideal construction; probably selfhood\n implies some degree of _intellectual_ development. \u00a7 2. The Absolute\n or Infinite Individual, being free from all internal discord, can\n have no not-self, and therefore cannot properly be called a self. \u00a7\n 3. Still less can it be a person. \u00a7 4. In a _society_ of selves we\n have a more genuinely self-determined individual than in the single\n self. Hence it would be nearer the truth to think of the Absolute as\n a Society, though no finite whole adequately expresses the\n Absolute\u2019s full nature. We must remember, however, (_a_) that\n probably the individuals in the Absolute are not all in _direct_\n relation, and (_b_) that in thinking of it as a Society we are not\n denying its real individuality. \u00a7 5. The self is not in its own\n nature imperishable; as to the particular problem of its continuance\n after death, no decision can be arrived at on grounds of\n Metaphysics. Neither the negative presumption drawn from our\n inability to understand the conditions of continuance, nor the lack\n of empirical evidence, is conclusive; on the other hand, there is\n not sufficient metaphysical reason for taking immortality as\n certain.\n\n\u00a7 1. We have already, in Book II. chap. 1, \u00a7 5, incidentally raised the\nquestion whether the whole spiritual system which we found ground to\nregard as the reality of the universe, can properly be spoken of as a\n\u201cself.\u201d We decided that to apply such a predicate to it was at least\nmisleading, and might prepare the way for serious intellectual\nsophistication. Our discussion of the general character of psychological\nconceptions has now made it possible for us to return to the problem\nwith reasonable hopes of being able to treat it more fully, and to\narrive at some definite conclusion as to the amount of truth embodied by\nthe notion of \u201cself.\u201d\n\nFirst of all, then, let us attempt to fix the general meaning of the\nconcept, and to single out some of its more prominent characteristics.\nIt would clearly require much more space than we can spare to enumerate\nall the senses in which the notion of \u201cself\u201d has been used in\nPsychology, and the work, when done, would not be entirely germane to\nour metaphysical purpose. What I propose to attempt here will be simply\nto consider certain aspects of the concept of \u201cself\u201d which are\nmanifestly indispensable for the purpose of ethical and historical\nappreciation, and to ask what their value is for the metaphysical\ninterpretation of existence.\n\n(1) It is manifest, to begin with, that \u201cself\u201d is a teleological\nconcept. The self whose quality is revealed in Biography and History,\nand judged in Ethics, has for its exclusive material our emotional\ninterests and purposive attitudes towards the various constituents of\nour surroundings; of these, and of nothing else, our self is made. And\nthe self, again, is one and individual, just in so far as these\ninterests and purposes can be thought of as forming the expression, in\nthe detail of succession, of a central coherent interest or purpose.\nWhere this central interest appears not to exist at all, we have no\nlogical right to speak of a succession of purposive acts as the\nexpression of a single self. Thus, though it may be necessary for some\nof the practical purposes of police administration to take bodily\nidentity as evidence of identity of self, we all recognise that what a\nman does in a state of mental alienation complete enough to abolish\ncontinuity of purpose, is not material for his biographer except in so\nfar as the knowledge of it may modify his interests and purposes on his\nreturn to sanity. And even in cases where we may acquiesce in the\nnecessity for assuming responsibility before the law for \u201cdeeds done in\nthe body,\u201d conscience acquits us of moral guilt if we honestly feel we\ncan say, \u201cI was not myself when it was done.\u201d[184] The teleological\ncharacter of the unity we ascribe to the self is further illustrated by\nthe puzzles suggested by the \u201calternate\u201d and \u201cmultiple\u201d personalities\noccasionally brought to light in the study of hypnotism and of mental\npathology. Finally, in the fairly numerous cases of \u201cconversion,\u201d where\na man, as we say, becomes a \u201cnew being\u201d or parts with his \u201cold self,\u201d we\nonly recognise him as identical with his past self in so far as we\nsucceed in thinking of his \u201cnew life\u201d as being the expression of aims\nand interests which were, at least implicitly and as \u201ctendencies,\u201d\nalready present, though concealed, in the \u201cold.\u201d\n\n(2) The self implies, and has no existence apart from, a not-self, and\nit is only in the contrast with the not-self that it is aware of itself\nas a self. This seems to me clear, as a matter of principle, though the\nconsequences of the principle are in much current speculation partly\nmisconceived, partly neglected. The most important among them, for our\npurposes, are the following. The feeling of self is certainly not an\ninseparable concomitant of all our experience. For it only arises\u2014and\nhere nothing but direct experimentation can be appealed to as\nevidence\u2014as a contrast-effect in connection with our awareness of a\nnot-self, whether as imposing restraints upon the expression of the\nself, or as undergoing modification by the self. Hence experiences from\nwhich this contrast is absent seem to exhibit no trace of genuine\n\u201cself-consciousness.\u201d[185] Feeling, where you can get it in its simple\nform, seems to be universally allowed to be an instance in point. Much\nof our perception appears to me, though I know the view is not widely\ncurrent among psychologists, to be in the same position. _E.g._,\nnormally when I am looking at an object, say for instance, a\nwhite-washed wall, I do not find that I am in any real sense \u201cconscious\nof self.\u201d The content of my awareness seems, to me at least, to be just\nthe wall in a setting of a mass of unanalysed feeling, organic and\nother, which you may, if you please, from your standpoint as an external\nobserver, call my perceiving self, but of which I am only aware _as_ the\nsetting of the perceived wall.\n\nIt is only when attention to the content of the perception becomes\ndifficult (as, _e.g._, through fatigue of the organs of sense, or\nconflict with some incompatible purpose) that I am normally aware of the\nperceived object as a not-self opposed to and restricting my self. The\nsame is, I think, true of much of our life of conscious purposive\naction. I do not find that in my intellectual pursuit of a chosen study,\nor again in my social relations to the other members of my community, I\nhave explicit awareness of the \u201cfacts\u201d of science, or the interests and\npurposes of others as a not-self with which my own interests are\ncontrasted as those of the self, except in so far as I either find these\nfacts and interests in actual collision with some aim of my own, or\nexperience the removal of such a collision. In ordinary social life, for\ninstance, I have a strong feeling of self as opposed to not-self when\nthe plans of some member of my immediate circle clash with my own, and\nagain when I succeed in winning such a recalcitrant over to my own side;\nmy self in the one case feels repression, in the other expansion. But I\ndo not think it can be said that the self-feeling arises in actual life\nwhere there is temporarily no consciousness of opposition or its\nremoval. For instance, while we are harmoniously working with other men\nfor a previously concerted end, the consciousness of self and its\ncontrasted not-self scarcely appears to enter into our experience.[186]\nThis is, I presume, why practical worldly wisdom has always regarded\n\u201cself-consciousness\u201d as a source of weakness and moral failure. While we\nare steadily engaged in the progressive execution of a purpose, we \u201close\nourselves\u201d in the work; it is only upon a check that we become\n\u201cself-conscious.\u201d\n\n(3) The next point to be noted is that there is no definite line of\ndemarcation between self and not-self. In particular, we must not fall\ninto the error of supposing that the whole _content_ of the relation\nbetween self and not-self is _social_,\u2014the self on its side consisting\nof me, and the not-self of other men. It is true, no doubt, that the\n_origin_ of the distinction is mainly social, since it is in the main\nthrough experience of what it is to have my execution of a desired act\nrepressed by others, and again to have the stumbling-blocks which have\npreviously restricted my action removed by their co-operation, that I\ncome to be definitely aware of what I want, and of the fact that it is I\nwho want it. But it would be hard to show that the distinction between\nthe self and the not-self could not originate at all except in a social\nmedium, and it is clear that the range of its applicability, when\noriginated, is not limited to the social relation. There seems, on the\none hand, to be no feature in our experience whatever which is entirely\nexcluded from entering into the constitution of what is felt as the\nself. My social intimates, my professional colleagues, my regular\noccupations, even my clothes or articles of furniture, to which I have\ngrown accustomed, may be so essential to the continuity of my\ncharacteristic interests in life that their removal would make my\ncharacter unrecognisable, or possibly even lead to insanity or death.\nAnd as thus indispensable to the teleological unity or my existence, all\nthese \u201cexternal\u201d objects seem to be capable of passing into and becoming\npart of the self.\n\nWe see an extreme instance of this in the case of the savage\ntransplanted into civilised surroundings, who fails in body and mind and\nfinally dies, without recognisable disease, simply from the\ndisappearance of the interests connected with his old surroundings; or\nthat of the clinging affectionate persons who, in the same way, fade\naway upon the loss of a beloved relative or friend. In a minor degree we\nsee the same thing in those changes of character which common speech\nhappily describe by such phrases as \u201che has never been himself since\u2014his\nwife died, since he lost that money,\u201d and so forth. In principle there\nseems to be no factor of what we should currently call the self\u2019s\nenvironment which may not in this way come to be part of the content of\nthe self.[187]\n\nOn the other side, it seems difficult to say whether there is anything\nwhich ordinarily forms part of the \u201cself\u201d which may not, under special\nconditions, become a part of what we recognise as the \u201cnot-self.\u201d Thus\nour bodily feelings and sensations, our thoughts and desires, and in\nparticular our virtuous and vicious habits, are usually reckoned as\ndefinitely belonging to our self. Yet in so far as we can think of any\ndesire or habit as an element which is discordant with the rest of our\nself, and ought not to be there,\u2014and the whole business of moral\nprogress depends on our being able to take up this attitude,\u2014we, so far,\nrelegate that element to the not-self. To will the habit or desire to be\notherwise is already, in principle, to expel it from the teleological\nunity which makes up our inner life. So again with our thoughts: in so\nfar as we can suspend our assent to a judgment, and balance reasons for\nor against accepting it into the general system of our beliefs, the\njudgment clearly belongs to the external not-self.\n\nYet it is at least conceivable that there may be intellectual as well as\nmoral habits so deeply engrained in our constitution that we cannot thus\nset them over-against the self for judgment and sentence. We must not\ndeny that there are cases in which we could not will or think\ndifferently, or even mentally entertain the possibility of thinking or\nwilling differently, without the destruction of our life\u2019s continuity of\npurpose. Again, our bodily sensations seem to belong in a very special\nway to our self. Yet in so far as we can acquire the power of\nvoluntarily observing them, or again of withdrawing attention from them,\nthey are in principle reduced to the position of elements in the\nnot-self.\n\nEven pleasure and pain do not seem to belong inalienably to the self\u2019s\nside of the contrast. _E.g._, to adapt a Platonic illustration, if I\nfeel pleasure in contemplating the vulgar or obscene, and at the same\ntime feel disgusted with myself for being so pleased, the pleasure seems\nin the act of condemnation to be recognised as no part of my \u201ctrue\u201d\nself, but an alien element obtruded on the self against its nature.\nPain, by reason of that urgency and insistency which give it its\nbiological importance, is much harder to banish from the self; but\nexperience, I think, will convince any one who cares to make the\nexperiment, that bodily pains, when not too intense (_e.g._, a\nmoderately severe toothache), can, by directing attention to their\nsensational quality, be sometimes made to appear as definitely foreign\nto the experiencing self. And the history of asceticism, ancient and\nmodern, as well as the practice of \u201cmind-curers,\u201d suggests that this\nprocess of extrusion can be carried further than we commonly suspect.\n\nOrganic or \u201ccommon\u201d sensations of general bodily condition probably form\nthe element in experience which most obstinately resists all attempts to\nsever it from the whole self and treat it as a foreign object, though in\nsome cases we certainly seem able to extrude the organic sensation from\nthe felt self by analysis of its quality and \u201clocalisation.\u201d Still, it\nmust be admitted that if there are any elements in experience which are\nabsolutely incapable of transference to the not-self, they are probably\nin the main masses of unanalysed and unanalysable organic\nsensation.[188]\n\nAll these considerations make two points very clear. (_a_) The self in\nwhich we are interested in Ethics and History is not anything with\ndefinitely fixed boundaries. The line dividing it from its complement,\nthe not-self, is one which we cannot draw according to any precise\nlogical rule; and again, what is at one time on one side of the boundary\nis at another on the other. If there is any part of our experience at\nall which must be regarded as always and essentially belonging to the\nself\u2019s side of the dividing line, it will in all probability be merely\nmasses of bodily feeling which are manifestly _not_ the whole of what\nEthics and History contemplate when they appraise the worth of a\nself.[189]\n\nFurther, a conclusion follows as to the nature of the opposition of self\nto not-self. The not-self, as the readiness with which most of the\ncontents of experience can pass from one side of the antithesis to the\nother shows, is in a sense included in at the very time that it is\nexcluded from the self. The various factors of which the not-self can,\nat different times, be composed, our fellows, the physical world,\nthoughts, habits, feelings, all agree in possessing one common\ncharacteristic; when referred to the self, they are all elements of\ndiscord within the whole of present experience, and it is on account of\nthis discordancy that we treat them as foreign to our real nature, and\ntherefore as belonging to the not-self. We may thus say with accuracy\nthat what is ascribed to the not-self is so ascribed because previously\nfound to be discrepant, and therefore excluded from the self; in other\nwords, the not-self is not an external limit which we somehow _find_ in\nexperience side by side with the self, but is _constructed_ out of\nexperience-data by the extrusion of those data which, if admitted into\nthe self, would destroy its harmony. Thus we finite beings are\nconfronted by a not-self ultimately because in our very finitude, as we\nhave seen in earlier chapters, we contain in ourselves a principle of\nstrife and disharmony. The not-self is no merely external environment,\nbut an inevitable consequence of the imperfection of internal structure\nwhich belongs to all finitude.\n\n(4) The self is essentially a thing of development, and as such has its\nbeing in the time-process. This is a point upon which it seems for many\nreasons necessary to insist. Its truth seems manifest from our previous\nconsideration of the nature of the experiences upon which the concept of\nthe self is based. As we have seen, it is primarily to our experience of\ninternal disharmony and the collision of purpose that we owe our\ndistinction between self and not-self. And such experience seems only\npossible to beings who can oppose an ideal of what ought to be, however\ndimly that ideal may be apprehended, to what is. A being who either was\nalready all that it was its nature to become, or was incapable of in\nsome way apprehending the fact that it was not so, would thus not have\nin its experience any material for the distinction between the self and\nthe foreign and hostile elements in experience. And, as we have already\nseen in our Third Book, time is the expression in abstract form of the\nfundamental nature of an experience which has as yet attained only the\npartial fulfilment of its purpose and aspirations, and is therefore\ninternally subject to that want of perfect harmony in which we have now\nsought the origin of the distinction between self and not-self. Hence we\nmay, I think, take it as certain, at least for us who accept this\naccount of the origin of the self concept, that selves are necessarily\nin time and as such are necessarily products of development.\n\nThis conclusion seems in accord with positive facts which are too well\nestablished to permit of question. It is probable that there is not a\nsingle element in what I call my present self which is not demonstrably\nthe product of my past development, physical and mental. Nor does it\nappear reasonable to contend that though the material of my existing\nself is a result of development, its form of selfhood is underived. It\nis not merely that my present self is not as my past self, but we cannot\navoid the admission that my mental life is the result of a process of\ndevelopment by which it is continuously connected with that of the\nembryo and even the spermatozoon. And thus it seems to have its\nbeginnings in experiences which are probably so little removed from\nsimple feeling as to afford no opportunity for the sense of self as\ncontrasted with not-self. Or if we maintain that the contrast cannot be\naltogether absent from even the crudest forms of experience, we still\nhave to reckon with the fact that, one stage further back in my personal\nhistory, I had no existence even as an animalcule. An embryonic self is\nat least not positively inconceivable, but where was Levi\u2019s selfhood\nwhile he was yet in the loins of his father? If we will consider what we\nmean when we say we have all had parents, it will, I think, be confessed\nthat our self must be admitted to have been actually originated in the\ncourse of development, impossible as we find it to imagine the stage of\nsuch a process.[190]\n\n(5) Finally, we must deal briefly with one more point of some\nimportance. The self, as we can now see, is never identical with\nanything that could be found completely existing at any one moment in my\nmental life. For one thing, it is thought of as having a temporal\ncontinuity which goes far beyond anything that can be immediately\nexperienced at any given moment. It stretches out both into the past and\nthe future beyond the narrow limits of the \u201csensible present.\u201d Again,\nthis temporal continuity is only an abstract expression of the inner\nsameness and continuity of aims and interests we ascribe to the self. My\nexperiences are, as we have seen, thought of as being the life of one\nself ultimately because I look on them as the harmonious expression of a\nconsistent attitude of interest in the world. And any elements in\nexperience which will not coalesce in such a harmony are, by one device\nor another, extruded from the true self and declared to be alien\nintruders from elsewhere. Now, in real life we never find this complete\nand absolute harmony of the contents of experience; there are always, if\nwe look for them, elements in our actual experience which are\ndiscordant, and conflict with the system of interests which, on the\nwhole, dominates it. Hence self, in the last resort, is seen to be an\n_ideal_ which actual experience only imperfectly realises,\u2014the ideal of\na system of purposes and interests absolutely in harmony with itself.\nAnd there must be, at least, grave doubt as to the logical\nself-consistency of this ideal, doubts which we must shortly face.\n\nFor the present the point to which I want to call attention is this.\nMust we say that any degree of felt continuity of existence is enough to\nconstitute rudimentary selfhood, or ought we to hold that there is no\ntrue self where there is not at least as much _intellectual_ development\nas is implied in the power to _remember_ the past and _anticipate_ the\nfuture, as one\u2019s own? In other words, are we to make selfhood as wide in\nits range as sentient life, or to limit it to life sufficiently rational\nto involve some distinct and explicit _recognition_ of the contrast\nbetween self and not-self? This is perhaps, in the main, a question as\nto terminology; for my own part, I confess I find the second alternative\nthe more satisfactory. I do not see that such a degree of teleological\ncontinuity as is implied in the mere feeling of pain, for instance,\ndeserves to be recognised as genuine selfhood; and there is, I think, in\nthe unrestricted use of the term self, selfhood, as applied to merely\nfeeling consciousness, a danger of ambiguity. When we have once applied\nthe terms in such a case, we are inevitably tempted to over-interpret\nthe facts of such simple mental life in order to bring them into fuller\naccord with what we know of selfhood in our own life.[191] At the same\ntime, it is clear that we have no right dogmatically to deny the\npresence of the intellectual processes involved in the recognition of\nself where our methods of observation fail to detect them.\n\n\u00a7 2. We may now approach the problem of the degree of reality which\nbelongs to the self. We have to ask, how far is the conception of self\napplicable to the individual experiences which in our Second Book we\nidentified as the contents of the system of real existence? Is the\ninfinite individual experience properly to be called a self? Again, is\nevery finite experience a self? And how must we take finite selves, if\nthey are real, to be related to each other? Lastly, perhaps, we might be\ncalled on in this connection to face the question how far an individual\nfinite self is more than a _temporary_ feature in the system of\nexistence. Our conclusions on all these points were no doubt in\nprinciple decided by the discussions of our Second Book, but it is\ndesirable to make some of them more explicit than was possible there.\n\nFirst, then, I think it is clear that the infinite experience or\n\u201cAbsolute\u201d cannot properly be called a self. This is immediately\napparent if our view as to the essential implications of self-feeling be\naccepted. We have urged that self is only apprehended as such in\ncontrast to a simultaneously apprehended not-self. And the not-self, we\nhave seen, is composed of all the discordant elements of experience, so\nfar as their discord has not been overcome. It was for this reason that\nwe held the self to be indissolubly bound up with that experience of the\nworld as a process in time, with a \u201cno longer\u201d and \u201cnot yet,\u201d which is\nthe universal characteristic of finitude. It must follow that an\nexperience which contains no discordant elements, in their character as\nunresolved discords, is not characterised by the contrast-effect which\nis the foundation of selfhood. An experience which contains the whole of\nReality as a perfectly harmonious whole can apprehend nothing as outside\nor opposed to itself, and for that very reason cannot be qualified by\nwhat we know as the sense of self.\n\nTo put the same thing in another way, \u201cself\u201d as we have seen, is\nessentially an ideal, and an ideal which is apprehended as contrasted\nwith the present actuality. Hence only beings who are aware of\nthemselves as in process of becoming more fully harmonious in their life\nof feeling and purpose than they at present are, can be aware of\nthemselves as selves. Self and imperfection are inseparable, and any\nbeing which knows nothing of the opposition between the ideal and the\nactual, the _ought_ and the _is_, must also know nothing of the feeling\nof self. Or in yet a third form of words, only creatures whose life is\nin time\u2014and therefore only finite creatures\u2014can be selves, since the\ntime-experience is an integral constituent of selfhood.\n\nOne objection which might be brought against this inference is\nsufficiently ingenious to deserve special examination. It may be urged\nthat though the experience of imperfection and thwarted purpose are\nconditions without which we in particular could not come to the\napprehension of self, they do not remain as ingredients in the\nexperience of selfhood when once it has been developed. Hence, it might\nbe said, the \u201cAbsolute\u201d may conceivably have the experience without\nhaving to acquire it through these conditions. In general principle, no\ndoubt this line of argument is sound enough. It is perfectly true that\nthe special conditions through which we come to have experience of a\ncertain quality cannot, without investigation, be taken as everywhere\nindispensable for that experience. _E.g._, even if it were proved that\nthe pessimists are right in saying that _we_ never experience pleasure\nexcept as a contrast with previous pain, it would still not follow that\nthe pleasure, as felt, _is_ the mere rebound from the pain, and has no\nfurther positive quality of its own, and it would then still be an open\nquestion whether other beings might not experience the pleasure without\nthe antecedent pain. But the principle does not seem applicable to the\ncase now under consideration, since it is our contention that the\ncontrast of the discordant factor with the rest of the experience to\nwhich it belongs is not simply an antecedent condition, but is in fact\nthe central core of the actual apprehension of self. It is not simply\nthat we do not, if our previous analysis has been correct, have the\nfeeling of self except in cases where such a contrast is present, but\nthat the feeling of self _is_ the feeling of the contrast. Hence our\nresult seems untouched by the undoubtedly sound general principle to\nwhich we have referred.\n\nThat our conclusion is so frequently opposed by philosophers who adopt a\ngenerally idealistic position, is, I believe, to be accounted for by the\nprevalence of the belief that experience, as such, is essentially\ncharacterised by consciousness of self. To experience at all, it is\ncommonly thought, is to be aware of one\u2019s _self_ as in relation to an\nenvironment of the not-self. Hence to deny that the absolute Reality is\na self is often thought to be equivalent to denying that it is an\nexperience at all and this, from the idealistic point of view, would\nmean to deny that it is real. But if our previous analysis was sound, it\nis not even true of human experience as such that it is everywhere\nconditioned by the felt contrast of self with not-self. From the point\nof view of that analysis, the contrast only exists where there is felt\ndiscord between experience as a whole and some of its constituents. The\nconception of our experience as essentially marked by a sense of self,\nmust therefore rest upon our intellectual reconstruction effected by the\ntransparent fiction of ascribing to every experience features which\nanalysis detects only in special cases and under special conditions.\nHence it is quite possible for us to unite the affirmation that all real\nexistence ultimately forms a single experience-system, with the denial\nthat that system is qualified by the contrast-effect we know as the\nsense of self. How, indeed, should that outside which there is nothing\nto afford the contrast, so distinguish itself from a purely imaginary\nother?[192]\n\n\u00a7 3. If the Absolute is not a self, _a fortiori_ it is manifest that it\ncannot be a \u201cPerson.\u201d Exactly how much is intended when the\n\u201cpersonality\u201d of the Absolute, or indeed of anything else, is affirmed,\nit would not be easy to determine. A \u201cself\u201d does not seem to be\nnecessarily a \u201cperson,\u201d since those philosophers who hold that there is\nno reality but that of selves, while admitting that the lower animals\nare selves, do not usually call them persons. But it is hard to say how\nmuch more is included in personality than in selfhood. If we bear in\nmind that personality is, in its origin, a _legal_ conception, and that\nit is usually ascribed only to human beings, or to such superhuman\nintelligences as are held capable of associating on terms of mutual\nobligation with human beings, we may perhaps suggest the following\ndefinition. A person is a being capable of being the subject of the\nspecific obligations attaching to a specific position in human society.\nAnd it becomes manifest that, if this is so, personality is, as Mr.\nBradley has said, finite or meaningless.\n\nFor a society of persons is essentially one of \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, social\npeers, with purposes mutually complementary though not identical, and\nstanding in need of each other\u2019s aid for the realisation of those\npurposes. Only those beings are personal for me whose aims and purposes\nare included along with mine in some wider and more harmonious system,\nand to whom I therefore am bound by ties of reciprocal obligation. But\nit is clear that, to ask whether the wider system which is thus the\nfoundation of our mutual rights and duties as persons, is itself a\nperson, would be ridiculous. Thus, _e.g._, there would be no sense in\nasking whether \u201chuman society\u201d\u2014the foundation of our moral\npersonality\u2014is itself a person. You might, in fact, as reasonably ask\nwhether it can be sued for trespass or assessed under schedule D for\nIncome Tax.\n\nStill more manifestly is this true of the Absolute which includes within\nit all the (conceivably infinitely numerous) groups of mutually\nrecognising persons, and all those other forms of experience which we\ncannot properly call personal. Between the whole system and its\ncomponent elements there can be no such relation of mutual\nsupplementation and completion as is the essence of genuine personality.\nIf the system, as a whole, may be said to supplement and correct our\ndefects and shortcomings, we cannot be said, in any way, to supplement\nit; the Absolute and I are emphatically not, in any true sense, \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, and the relation between us cannot therefore be thought of as\npersonal. All this is so obvious, that, as I take it, the personality of\nthe Absolute or whole of existence would find no defenders but for the\ngratuitous assumption that whatever is an individual experience or\nspiritual unity must be personal. This, as far as I can see, is to\nassume that such an individual _must_ have an external environment of\nother experience-subjects of the same degree of harmonious and\ncomprehensive individuality. And for this assumption I can, speaking for\nmyself, see no ground whatever.[193]\n\n\u00a7 4. If we cannot, then, properly say that the Absolute, or the\nUniverse,\u2014or whatever may be our chosen name for the infinite individual\nwhich is the whole of existence,\u2014is a self or person, can we say that\nthe finite individuals which compose it are one and all selves, and that\nthe Absolute is therefore a society of selves? Our answer to this\nquestion must depend, I think, upon two considerations,\u2014(_a_) the amount\nof continuity we regard as essential to a self, and (_b_) the kind of\nunity we attribute to a society.\n\n(_a_) If we regard _any_ and every degree of felt teleological\ncontinuity as sufficient to constitute a self, it is clear that we shall\nbe compelled to say that selves, and selves only, are the material of\nwhich reality is composed. For we have already agreed that Reality is\nexclusively composed of psychical fact, and that all psychical facts are\nsatisfactions of some form of subjective interest or craving, and\nconsequently that every psychical fact comprised in the whole system of\nexistence must form part of the experience of a finite individual\nsubject. Hence, if every such subject, whatever its degree of\nindividuality, is to be called a self, there will be no facts which are\nnot included somewhere in the life of one or more selves. On the other\nhand, if we prefer, as I have done myself, to regard some degree of\nintellectual development, sufficient for the _recognition_ of certain\npermanent interests as those of the self, as essential to selfhood, we\nshall probably conclude that the self is an individual of a relatively\nhigh type, and that there are consequently experiences of so imperfect a\ndegree of teleological continuity as not to merit the title of selves.\n\nAnd this conclusion seems borne out by all the empirically ascertained\nfacts of, _e.g._, the life of the lower animals, of human infants, and\nagain of adults of abnormally defective intellectual and moral\ndevelopment. Few persons, unless committed to the defence of a theory\nthrough thick and thin, would be prepared to call a worm a self, and\nmost of us would probably feel some hesitation about a new-born baby or\na congenital idiot. Again, finite societies are clearly components of\nReality, yet, as we have seen, it is probably an error to speak of a\nsociety as a self, though every true society is clearly an individual\nwith a community and continuity of purpose which enable us rightly to\nregard it as a unity capable of development, and to appreciate its\nethical worth. Hence it is, perhaps, less likely to lead to\nmisunderstandings if we say simply that the constituents of reality are\nfinite individual experiences, than if we say that they are selves. The\nself, as we have seen, is a psychological category which only\nimperfectly represents the facts of experience it is employed to\ncorrelate.\n\n(_b_) Again, if we speak of the Absolute as a society of finite\nindividuals, we ought at least to be careful in guarding ourselves\nagainst misunderstanding. Such an expression has certainly some manifest\nadvantages. It brings out both the spiritual character of the system of\nexistence and the fact that, though it contains a plurality of finite\nselves and contains them without discord, it is not properly thought of\nas a self, but as a community of many selves.\n\nAt the same time, such language is open to misconstructions, some of\nwhich it may be well to enumerate. We must not, for instance, assume\nthat all the individuals in the Absolute are necessarily in _direct_\nsocial interrelation. For social relation, properly speaking, is only\npossible between beings who are \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 at least in the sense of\nhaving interests of a sufficiently identical kind to permit of\nintercommunication and concerted cooperation for the realisation of a\ncommon interest. And our own experience teaches us that the range of\nexistence with which we ourselves stand in this kind of relation is\nlimited. Even within the bounds of the human race the social relations\nof each of us with the majority of our fellows are of an indirect kind,\nand though with the advance of civilisation the range of those relations\nis constantly being enlarged, it still remains to be seen whether a\n\u201ccosmopolitan\u201d society is a realisable ideal or not. With the non-human\nanimal world our social relations, in consequence of the greater\ndivergence of subjective interest, are only of a rudimentary kind, and\nwith what appears to us as inanimate nature, as we have already seen,\ndirect social relation seems to be all but absolutely precluded.\n\nAmong the non-human animals, again, we certainly find traces of\nrelations of a rudimentarily social kind, but once more only within\nrelatively narrow limits; the different species and groups seem in the\nmain to be indifferent to one another. And we have no means of\ndisproving the possibility that there may be in the universe an\nindefinite plurality of social groups, of an organisation equal or\nsuperior to that of our human communities, but of a type so alien to our\nown that no direct communication, not even of the elementary kind which\nwould suffice to establish their existence, is possible. We must be\nprepared to entertain the possibility, then, that the individuals\ncomposing the Absolute fall into a number of groups, each consisting of\nmembers which have direct social relations of some kind with each other,\nbut not with the members of other groups.\n\nAnd also, of course, we must remember that there may very well be\nvarieties of degree of structural complexity in the social groups\nthemselves. In some the amount of intelligent recognition on the part of\nthe individuals of their own and their fellows\u2019 common scheme of\ninterests and purposes is probably less articulate, in others, again, it\nmay be more articulate than is the case in those groups of co-operating\nhuman beings which form the only societies of which we know anything by\ndirect experience.\n\nOn the other hand, we must, if we speak of the Absolute as a society, be\ncareful to avoid the implication, which may readily arise from a false\nconception of human societies, that the unity of the Absolute is a mere\nconceptual fiction or \u201cpoint of view\u201d of our own, from which to regard\nwhat is really a mere plurality of separate units. In spite of the now\nfairly complete abandonment in words of the old atomistic theories,\nwhich treated society as if it were a mere collective name for a\nmultitude of really independent \u201cindividuals,\u201d it may be doubted whether\nwe always realise what the rejection of this view implies. We still tend\ntoo much to treat the selves which compose a society, at least in our\nMetaphysics, as if they were given to us in direct experience as\n_merely_ exclusive of one another, rather than as complementary to one\nanother. In other words, of the two typical forms of experience from\nwhich the concept of self appears to be derived, the experience of\nconflict between our subjective interests and our environment, and that\nof the removal of the discord, we too often pay attention in our\nMetaphysics to the former to the neglect of the latter. But in actual\nlife it is oftener the latter that is prominent in our relations with\nour fellow-men. _We_\u2014the category of co-operation\u2014is at least as\nfundamental in all human thought and language as _I_ and _thou_, the\ncategories of mutual exclusion. That you and I are mutually\ncomplementary factors in a wider whole of common interests, is at least\nas early a discovery of mankind as that our private interests and\nstandpoints collide.\n\nIf we speak of existence as a society, then we must be careful to\nremember that the individual unity of a society is just as real a fact\nof experience as the individual unity of the members which compose it,\nand that, when we call the Absolute a society rather than a self, we do\nnot do so with any intention of casting doubt upon its complete\nspiritual unity as an individual experience. With these restrictions, it\nwould, I think, be fair to say that if the Absolute cannot be called a\nsociety without qualification, at any rate human society affords the\nbest analogy by which we can attempt to represent its systematic unity\nin a concrete conceptual form. To put it otherwise, a genuine human\nsociety is an individual of a higher type of structure than any one of\nthe selves which compose it, and therefore more adequately represents\nthe structure of the one ultimately complete system of the Absolute.\n\nWe see this more particularly in the superior independence of Society as\ncompared with one of its own members. It is true, of course, that no\nhuman society could exist apart from an external environment, but it\ndoes not appear to be as necessary to the existence of society as to\nthat of a single self, that it should be sensible of the contrast\nbetween itself and its rivals. As we have already sufficiently seen, it\nis in the main from the experience of contrast with other human selves\nthat I come by the sense of my own selfhood. Though the contents of my\nconcept of self are not purely social, it does at least seem clear that\nI could neither acquire it, nor retain it long, except for the presence\nof other like selves which form the complement to it. But though history\nteaches how closely similar is the part played by war and other\nrelations between different societies in developing the sense of a\ncommon national heritage and purpose, yet a society, once started on its\ncourse of development, does appear to be able to a large extent to\nflourish without the constant stimulus afforded by rivalry or\nco-operation with other societies. One man on a desert land, if left\nlong enough to himself, would probably become insane or brutish; there\nseems no sufficient reason to hold that a single civilised community,\ndevoid of relations with others, could not, if its internal organisation\nwere sufficiently rich, flourish in a purely \u201cnatural\u201d environment. On\nthe strength of this higher self-sufficiency, itself a consequence of\nsuperior internal wealth and harmony, a true society may reasonably be\nheld to be a finite individual of a higher type than a single human\nself.\n\nThe general result of this discussion, then, seems to be, that neither\nin the self nor in society\u2014at any rate in the only forms of it we know\nto exist\u2014do we find the complete harmony of structure and independence\nof external conditions which are characteristic of ultimate reality.\nBoth the self and society must therefore be pronounced to be finite\nappearance, but of the two, society exhibits the fuller and higher\nindividuality, and is therefore the more truly real. We found it quite\nimpossible to regard the universe as a single self; but, with certain\nimportant qualifications, we said that it might be thought of as a\nsociety without very serious error.[194] It will, of course, follow from\nwhat has been said, that we cannot frame any finally adequate conception\nof the way in which all the finite individual experiences form the unity\nof the infinite experiences. That they must form such a perfect unity we\nhave seen in our Second Book; that the unity of a society is, perhaps,\nthe nearest analogy by which we can represent it, has been shown in the\npresent paragraph. That we have no higher categories which can\nadequately indicate the precise way in which all existence ultimately\nforms an even more perfect unity, is an inevitable consequence of the\nfact of our own finitude. We cannot frame the categories, because we, as\nfinite beings, have not the corresponding experience. To this extent, at\nleast, it seems to me that any sound philosophy must end with a modest\nconfession of ignorance.\n\n \u201cThere is in God, men say,\n A deep but dazzling darkness,\u201d\n\nis a truth which the metaphysician\u2019s natural desire to know as much as\npossible of the final truth, should not lead him to forget.\n\n\u00a7 5. This is probably the place to make some reference to the question\nwhether the self is a permanent or only a temporary form in which\nReality appears. In popular thought this question commonly appears as\nthat of the immortality (sometimes, too, of the pre-existence) of the\nsoul. The real issue is, however, a wider one, and the problem of\nimmortality only one of its subsidiary aspects. I propose to say\nsomething briefly on the general question, and also on the special one,\nthough in this latter case rather with a view to indicating the line\nalong which discussion ought to proceed, than with the aim of suggesting\na result.\n\nIt would not, I think, be possible to deny the temporary character of\nthe self after the investigations of the earlier part of this chapter. A\nself, we said, is one and the same only in virtue of teleological\ncontinuity of interest and purpose. But exactly how much variation is\nenough to destroy this continuity, and how much again may exist without\nabolishing it, we found it impossible to determine by any general\nprinciple. Yet the facts of individual development seemed to make it\nclear that new selves\u2014_i.e._ new unique forms of interest in the\nworld\u2014come into being in the time-process, and that old ones disappear.\n\nAnd again, both from mental Pathology and from normal Psychology, we\nfound it easy to cite examples of the formation and disappearance,\nwithin the life-history of a single man, of selves which it seemed\nimpossible to regard as connected by any felt continuity of interest\nwith the rest of life. In the case of multiple personality, and\nalternating personality, we seemed to find evidence that a plurality of\nsuch selves might alternate regularly, or even co-exist in connection\nwith the same body. The less striking, but more familiar, cases of the\npassing selves of our dreams, and of temporary periods in waking life\nwhere our interest and characters are modified, but not in a permanent\nway by exceptional excitements, belong in principle to the same\ncategory. In short, unless you are to be content with a beggarly modicum\nof continuity of purpose too meagre to be more than an empty name, you\nseem forced to conclude that the origination and again the disappearance\nof selves in the course of psychical events is a fact of constant\noccurrence. No doubt, the higher the internal organisation of our\ninterests and purposes, the more fixed and the less liable to serious\nmodification in the flux of circumstance our self becomes; but a self\nabsolutely fixed and unalterable was, as we saw, an unrealised and, on\nthe strength of our metaphysical certainty that only the absolute whole\nis entirely self-determined, we may add, an unrealisable ideal. We seem\ndriven, then, to conclude that the permanent identity of the self is a\nmatter of degree, and that we are not entitled to assert that the self\ncorresponding to a single organism need be either single or persistent.\nIt is possible for me, even in the period between birth and death, to\nlose my old self and acquire a new one, and even to have more selves\nthan one, and those of different degrees of individual structure, at the\nsame time. Nor can we assign any certain criterion by which to decide in\nall cases whether the self has been one and identical through a series\nof psychical events. Beyond the general assertion that the more\ncompletely occupied our various interests and purposes are, the more\npermanent is our selfhood, we are unable to go.[195]\n\nThese considerations have an important bearing on the vexed question of\na future life. If they are justified, we clearly cannot have any\npositive demonstration from the nature of the self of its\nindestructibility, and it would therefore be in vain to demand that\nphilosophy shall prove the permanence of all selves. On the other hand,\nif the permanence of a self is ultimately a function of its inner unity\nof aim and purpose, there is no _a priori_ ground for holding that the\nphysical event of death _must_ necessarily destroy this unity, and so\nthat the self _must_ be perishable at death. For Metaphysics, the\nproblem thus seems to resolve itself into a balancing of probabilities,\nand, as an illustration of the kind of consideration which has to be\ntaken into account, it may be worth while to inquire what probable\narguments may fairly be allowed to count on either side.\n\nOn the negative side, if we dismiss, as we fairly may, the unproved\nassertions of dogmatic Materialism, we have to take account of the\npossibility that a body may, for all we know, be a necessary condition\nfor the existence of an individual experience continuous in interest and\npurpose with that of our present life, and also of the alleged absence\nof any positive empirical evidence for existence after death. These\nconsiderations, however, scarcely seem decisive. As to the first, I do\nnot see how it can be shown that a body is indispensable, at least in\nthe sense of the term \u201cbody\u201d required by the argument. It is no doubt\ntrue that in the experience of any individual there must be the two\naspects of fresh teleological initiative and of already systematised\nhabitual and quasi-mechanical repetition of useful reactions already\nestablished, and further, that intercourse between different individuals\nis only possible through the medium of such a system of established\nhabits. As we have already seen, what we call our body is simply a name\nfor such a set of habitual reactions through which intercommunication\nbetween members of human societies is rendered possible. Hence, if we\ngeneralise the term \u201cbody\u201d to stand for any system of habitual reactions\ndischarging this function of serving as a medium of communication\nbetween individuals forming a society, we may fairly say that a body is\nindispensable to the existence of a self. But it seems impossible to\nshow that the possibility of such a medium of communication is removed\nby the dissolution of the particular system of reactions which\nconstitutes our _present_ medium of intercourse. The dissolution of the\npresent body _might_ mean no more than the individual acquisition of\nchanged types of habitual reaction, types which no longer serve the\npurpose of communication with the members of _our_ society, but yet may\nbe an initial condition of communication with other groups of\nintelligent beings.\n\nAs to the absence of empirical evidence, it is, of course, notorious\nthat some persons at least claim to possess such evidence of the\ncontinued existence of the departed. Until the alleged facts have been\nmade the subject of serious and unbiassed collection and examination, it\nis, I think, premature to pronounce an opinion as to their evidential\nvalue. I will therefore make only one observation with respect to some\nof the alleged evidence from \u201cnecromancy.\u201d It is manifest that the only\nkind of continuance which could fairly be called a survival of the self,\nand certainly the only kind in which we need feel any interest, would be\nthe persistence after death of our characteristic interests and\npurposes. Unless the \u201csoul\u201d continued to live for aims and interests\nteleologically continuous with those of its earthly life, there would be\nno genuine extension of our selfhood beyond the grave. Hence any kind of\nevidence for continued existence which is not at the same time evidence\nfor continuity of interests and purposes, is really worthless when\noffered as testimony to \u201cimmortality.\u201d The reader will be able to apply\nthis reflection for himself if he knows anything of the \u201cphenomena\u201d of\nthe vulgar Spiritualism.[196]\n\nWhen we turn to the positive side of the question, it seems necessary to\nremark that though the negative considerations we have just referred to\nare not of themselves enough to disprove \u201cimmortality,\u201d provided there\nis any strong ground for taking it as a fact, they would be quite\nsufficient to decide against it, unless there is positive reason for\naccepting it. That we have no direct evidence of such a state of things,\nand cannot see precisely _how_ in detail it could come about, would not\nbe good logical ground for denying its existence if it were demanded by\nsound philosophical principles. On the other hand, if there were no\nreasons for believing in it, and good, though not conclusive, probable\nreasons against it, we should be bound to come provisionally to a\nnegative conclusion.\n\nHave we then any positive grounds at all to set against the negative\nconsiderations just discussed? Pending the result of inquiries which\nhave recently been set on foot, it is hard to speak with absolute\nconfidence; still, the study of literature does, I think, warrant us in\nprovisionally saying that there seems to be a strong and widely diffused\nfeeling, at least in the Western world, that life without any hope of\ncontinuance after death would be an unsatisfactory thing. This feeling\nexpresses itself in many forms, but I think they can all be traced to\none root. Normally, as we know, the extinction of a particular\nteleological interest is effected by its realisation; our purposes die\nout, and our self so far suffers change, when their result has been\nachieved. (And incidentally this may help us to see once more that\ndissatisfaction and imperfection are of the essence of the finite self.\nThe finite self lives on the division of idea from reality, of intent\nfrom execution. If the two could become identical, the self would have\nlost the atmosphere from which it draws its life-breath.) Hence, if\ndeath, in our experience, always took the form of the dissolution of a\nself which had already seen its purposes fulfilled and its aims\nachieved, there would probably be no incentive to desire or believe in\nfuture continuance. But it is a familiar fact that death is constantly\ncoming as a violent and irrational interrupter of unrealised plans and\ninchoate work. The self seems to disappear not because it has played its\npart and finished its work, but as the victim of external accident. I\nthink that analysis would show, under the various special forms which\nthe desire for immortality takes, such as the yearning to renew\ninterrupted friendships or the longing to continue unfinished work, as\ntheir common principle, the feeling of resentment against this apparent\ndefeat of intelligent purpose by brute external accident.[197]\n\nNow, what is the logical value of this feeling as a basis for argument?\nWe may fairly say, on the one hand, that it rests on a sound principle.\nFor it embodies the conviction, of which all Philosophy is the\nelaboration, that the real world is a harmonious system in which\nirrational accident plays no part, and that, if we could only see the\nwhole truth, we should realise that there is no final and irremediable\ndefeat for any of our aspirations, but all are somehow made good. On the\nother side, we must remember that the argument from the desire for\ncontinuance to its reality also goes on to assert not only that our\naspirations are somehow fulfilled and our unfinished work somehow\nperfected, but that this fulfilment takes place in the particular way\nwhich we, with our present lights, would wish. And in maintaining this,\nthe argument goes beyond the conclusion which philosophical first\nprinciples warrant.\n\nFor it might be that, if our insight into the scheme of the world were\nless defective, we should cease to desire this special form of\nfulfilment, just as in growing into manhood we cease to desire the kind\nof life which appeared to us as children the ideal of happiness. The\nman\u2019s life-work may be the realisation of the child\u2019s dreams, but it\ndoes not realise them in the form imagined by childhood. And conceivably\nit might be so with our desire for a future life. Further, of course,\nthe logical value of the argument from feeling must to some extent\ndepend upon the universality and persistence of the feeling itself. We\nmust not mistake for a fundamental aspiration of humanity what may be\nlargely the effect of special traditions and training. Hence we cannot\ntruly estimate the worth of the inference from feeling until we know\nboth how far the feeling itself is really permanent in our own society,\nand how far, again, it exists in societies with different beliefs and\ntraditions. In itself the sentiment, _e.g._, of Christian civilisation,\ncannot be taken as evidence of the universal feeling of mankind, in the\nface of the apparently opposite feelings, _e.g._, of Brahmins and\nBuddhists.\n\nI should conclude, then, that the question of a future life must remain\nan open one for Metaphysics. We seem unable to give any valid\nmetaphysical arguments for a future life, but then, on the other hand,\nthe negative presumptions seem to be equally devoid of cogency.\nPhilosophy, in this matter, to use the fine phrase of Dr. McTaggart,\n\u201cgives us hope,\u201d[198] and I cannot, for my own part, see that it can do\nmore. Possibly, as Browning suggests in _La Saisiaz_, it is not\ndesirable, in the interests of practical life, that it should do more.\nAnd here I must leave the question with the reader, only throwing out\none tentative suggestion for his approval or rejection as he pleases.\nSince we have seen that the permanence of the self depends upon its\ndegree of internal harmony of structure, it is at least conceivable that\nits continuance as a self, beyond the limits of earthly life, may depend\non the same condition. Conceivably the self may survive death, as it\nsurvives lesser changes in the course of physical events, _if_ its unity\nand harmony of purpose are strong enough, and not otherwise. If so, a\nfuture existence would not be a heritage into which we are safe to step\nwhen the time comes, but a conquest to be won by the strenuous devotion\nof life to the acquisition of a rich, and at the same time orderly and\nharmonious, moral selfhood. And thus the belief in a future life, in so\nfar as it acts in any given case as a spur to such strenuous living,\nmight be itself a factor in bringing about its own fulfilment. It is\nimpossible to affirm with certainty that this is so, but, again, we\ncannot deny that it may be the case. And here, as I say, I must be\ncontent to leave the problem.[199]\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014B. Bosanquet, _Psychology of the Moral Self_, lect.\n5; F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 9 (The Meanings of\nSelf), 10 (The Reality of Self), 26 (The Absolute and its\nAppearances,\u2014especially the end of the chapter, pp. 499-511 of 1st ed.),\n27 (Ultimate Doubts); L. T. Hobhouse, _Theory of Knowledge_, part 3,\nchap. 5; S. Hodgson, _Metaphysic of Experience_, bk. iv. chap. 4; Hume,\n_Treatise of Human Nature_, bk. i part 4, \u00a7\u00a7 5, 6; W. James, _Principles\nof Psychology_, vol. i. chap. 10; H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. iii chaps.\n1 (especially \u00a7 245), 5; _Microcosmus_, bk. iii. c. 5; J. M. E.\nMcTaggart, _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, chap. 2 (for a detailed\nhostile examination of Dr. McTaggart\u2019s argument, which I would not be\nunderstood to endorse except on special points, see G. E. Moore in\n_Proceedings of Aristotelian Society_, N.S. vol. ii. pp. 188-211); J.\nRoyce, _The World and the Individual_, Second Series, lects. 6, 7.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 184:\n\n \u201cBodily identity\u201d itself, of course, might give rise to difficult\n problems if we had space to go into them. Here I can merely suggest\n certain points for the reader\u2019s reflection. (1) All identity appears\n in the end to be teleological and therefore psychical. I believe this\n to be the _same_ human body which I have seen before, because I\n believe that the interests expressed in its actions will be\n continuous, experience having taught me that a certain amount of\n physical resemblance is a rough-and-ready criterion of psychical\n continuity. (2) As to the ethical problem of responsibility referred\n to in the text, it is obviously entirely one of less and more. Our\n moral verdicts upon our own acts and those of others are in practice\n habitually influenced by the conviction that there are degrees of\n moral responsibility within what the immediate necessities of\n administration compel us to treat as absolute. We do not, _e.g._,\n think a man free from all moral blame for what he does when drunk, or\n undeserving of all credit for what he performs when \u201ctaken out of\n himself,\u201d _i.e._ out of the rut of his habitual interests by\n excitement, but we certainly do, when not under the influence of a\n theory, regard him as deserving of _less_ blame or credit, as the case\n may be, for his behaviour than if he had performed the acts when he\n was \u201cmore himself.\u201d On all these topics see Mr. Bradley\u2019s article in\n _Mind_ for July 1902.\n\nFootnote 185:\n\n So \u201cself-consciousness,\u201d in the bad sense, always arises from a sense\n of an incongruity between the self and some contrasted object or\n environment.\n\nFootnote 186:\n\n Though, of course, it does appear in the process of framing and\n initiating the scheme of concerted action; the other self is here\n contrasted with my own, precisely because the removal of the collision\n between my purpose and my environment is felt as coming from without.\n\nFootnote 187:\n\n It might be said that it is not these features of the environment\n themselves, but my \u201cideas\u201d of them, which thus belong to the self.\n This sounds plausible at first, but only because we are habitually\n accustomed to the \u201cintrojectionist\u201d substitution of psychological\n symbols for the actualities of life. On the question of fact, see\n Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 8, p. 88 ff. (1st ed.).\n\nFootnote 188:\n\n A colleague of my own tells me that in his case movements of the eyes\n appear to be inseparable from the consciousness of self, and are\n incapable of being extruded into the not-self in the sense above\n described. I do not doubt that there are, in each of us, bodily\n feelings of this kind which refuse to be relegated to the not-self and\n that it would be well worth while to institute systematic inquiries\n over as wide an area as possible about their precise character in\n individual cases. It appears to me, however, as I have stated above,\n that in ordinary perception these bodily feelings often are\n apprehended simply as qualifying the perceived content without any\n opposition of self and not-self. At any rate, the problem is one of\n those fundamental questions in the theory of cognition which are too\n readily passed over in current Psychology.\n\nFootnote 189:\n\n Of course, you can frame the concept of a \u201cself\u201d from which even these\n bodily feelings have been extruded, and which is thus a mere\n \u201ccognitive subject\u201d without concrete psychical quality. But as such a\n mere logical subject is certainly not the self of which we are aware\n in any concrete experience, and still more emphatically not the self\n in which the historical and ethical sciences are interested, I have\n not thought it necessary to deal with it in the text.\n\nFootnote 190:\n\n That we cannot imagine it does not appear to be any ground for denying\n its actuality. It is never a valid argument against a conclusion\n required to bring our knowledge into harmony with itself, that we do\n not happen to possess the means of envisaging it in sensuous imagery.\n\nFootnote 191:\n\n I venture to think that some of the rather gratuitous hypotheses as to\n the rational selfhood of animal species _qu\u00e0_ species put forward by\n Professor Royce in the second volume of _The World and the\n Individual_, are illustrations of this tendency to unnecessary\n over-interpretation.\n\nFootnote 192:\n\n Is it necessary to refer in particular to the suggestion that for the\n Absolute the contrast-effect in question may be between itself and its\n component manifestations or appearances? This would only be possible\n if the finite appearances were contained in the whole in some way\n which allowed them to remain at discord with one another, _i.e._ in\n some way incompatible with the systematic character which is the\n fundamental quality of the Absolute. I am glad to find myself in\n accord, on the general principle at least, with Dr. McTaggart. See the\n Third Essay in his recent _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_.\n\nFootnote 193:\n\n It would be fruitless to object that \u201csocieties\u201d can, in fact, have a\n legal corporate personality, and so can\u2014to revert to the illustration\n used above\u2014be sued and taxed. What can be thus dealt with is always a\n mere _association_ of definite individual human beings, who may or may\n not form a genuine spiritual unity. _E.g._, you might proceed against\n the Commissioners of Income Tax, but this does not prove that the\n Commissioners of Income Tax are a genuine society. On the other hand,\n the Liberal-Unionist Party probably possesses enough community of\n purpose to enable it to be regarded as a true society, but has no\n legal personality, and consequently no legal rights or obligations,\n _as a party_. Similarly, the corporation known as the Simeon Trustees\n has a legal personality with corresponding rights and duties, and it\n also stands in close relation with the evangelical party in the\n Established Church. And this party is no doubt a true ethical society.\n But the corporation is not the evangelical party, and the latter, in\n the sense in which it is a true society, is not a legal person.\n\n I may just observe that the question whether the Absolute is a self or\n a person must not be confounded with the question of the \u201cpersonality\n of God.\u201d We must not assume off-hand that \u201cGod\u201d and the Absolute are\n identical. Only special examination of the phenomena of the religious\n life can decide for us whether \u201cGod\u201d is necessarily the whole of\n Reality. If He is not, it would clearly be possible to unite a belief\n in \u201cGod\u2019s\u201d personality with a denial of the personality of the\n Absolute, as is done, _e.g._, by Mr. Rashdall in his essay in\n _Personal Idealism_. For some further remarks on the problem, see\n below, Chapter V.\n\nFootnote 194:\n\n I suppose that any doctrine which denies the ultimate reality of the\n finite self must expect to be confronted by the appeal to the alleged\n revelation of immediate experience. _Cogito, ergo sum_, is often taken\n as an immediately certain truth in the sense that the existence of\n myself is something of which I am directly aware in every moment of\n consciousness. This is, however, an entire perversion of the facts.\n Undoubtedly the fact of there being experience is one which can be\n verified by the very experiment of trying to deny it. Denial itself is\n a felt experience. But it is (_a_) probably not true that we cannot\n have experience at all without an accompanying perception of self, and\n (_b_) certainly not true that the mere feeling of self as in contrast\n with a not-self, when we do get it, is what is meant by the self of\n Ethics and History. The self of these sciences always embraces more\n than can be given in any single moment of experience, it is an ideal\n construction by which we connect moments of experience according to a\n general scheme. The value of that scheme for any science can only be\n tested by the success with which it does its work, and its truth is\n certainly not established by the mere consideration that the facts it\n aims at connecting are actual. Metaphysics would be the easiest of\n sciences if you could thus take it for granted that any construction\n which is based upon some aspect of experienced fact must be valid.\n\nFootnote 195:\n\n This is why Plato seems justified in laying stress upon the dreams of\n the wise man as evidence of his superiority (_Republic_, bk. ix. p.\n 571). His ideal wise man is one whose inner life is so completely\n unified that there is genuine continuity of purpose between his waking\n and sleeping state. Plato might perhaps have replied to Locke\u2019s query,\n that _Socrates_ waking and _Socrates_ asleep _are_ the same person,\n and their identity is testimony to the exceptional wisdom and virtue\n of Socrates.\n\n If it be thought that at least the _simultaneous_ co-existence within\n one of two selves is inconceivable, I would ask the reader to bear in\n mind that the _self_ always includes more than is at any moment given\n as actual matter of psychical fact. At any moment the self must be\n taken to consist for the most part of unrealised _tendencies_, and in\n so far as such ultimately incompatible tendencies are part of my whole\n nature, at the same time it seems reasonable to say that I have\n simultaneously more than one self. Ultimately, no doubt, this line of\n thought would lead to the conclusion that \u201cmy whole nature\u201d itself is\n only relatively a whole.\n\nFootnote 196:\n\n Compare the valuable essay by Mr. Bradley on the \u201cEvidence of\n Spiritualism\u201d in _Fortnightly Review_ for December 1885.\n\nFootnote 197:\n\n Death, however, though the most striking, is not the only illustration\n of this apparently irrational interference of accident with\n intelligent purpose. Mental and bodily disablement, or even adverse\n external fortune, may have the same effect upon the self. This must be\n taken into account in any attempt to deal with the general problem.\n\nFootnote 198:\n\n Dr. McTaggart\u2019s phrase is more exactly adequate to describe my view\n than his own, according to which \u201cimmortality\u201d is capable of\n philosophical proof. (See the second chapter of his _Studies in\n Hegelian Cosmology_.) I have already explained why I cannot accept\n this position. I believe Dr. McTaggart\u2019s satisfaction with it must be\n partly due to failure to raise the question _what it is_ that he\n declares to be a \u201cfundamental differentiation\u201d of the Absolute.\n\nFootnote 199:\n\n I ought perhaps to say a word\u2014more I do not think necessary\u2014upon the\n doctrine that immortality is a fundamental \u201cmoral postulate.\u201d If this\n statement means no more than that it would be inconsistent with the\n rationality of the universe that our work as moral agents should be\n simply wasted, and that therefore it must somehow have its\n accomplishment whether we see it in our human society or not, I should\n certainly agree with the general proposition. But I cannot see that we\n know enough of the structure of the universe to assert that this\n accomplishment is only possible in the special form of immortality. To\n revert to the illustration of the text, (1) our judgment that the\n world must be a worthless place without immortality _might_ be on a\n level with the child\u2019s notion that \u201cgrown-up\u201d life, to be worth\n having, must be a life of continual play and no work. (2) If it is\n meant, however, that it is not \u201cworth while\u201d to be virtuous unless you\n can look forward to remuneration\u2014what Hegel, according to Heine,\n called a _Trinkgeld_\u2014hereafter for not having lived like a beast, the\n proposition appears to me a piece of immoral nonsense which it would\n be waste of time to discuss.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE PROBLEM OF MORAL FREEDOM\n\n\u00a7 1. The metaphysical problem of free will has been historically created\n by extra ethical difficulties, especially by theological\n considerations in the early Christian era, and by the influence of\n mechanical scientific conceptions in the modern world. \u00a7 2-3. The\n analysis of our moral experience shows that true \u201cfreedom\u201d means\n teleological determination. Hence to be \u201cfree\u201d and to \u201cwill\u201d are\n ultimately the same thing. Freedom or \u201cself-determination\u201d is\n genuine but limited, and is capable of variations of degree. \u00a7 4.\n _Determinism_ and _Indeterminism_ both arise from the false\n assumption that the mechanical postulate of _causal_ determination\n by antecedents is an ultimate fact. The question then arises whether\n mental events are an exception to the supposed principle. \u00a7 5.\n _Determinism._ The determinist arguments stated. \u00a7 6. They rest\n partly upon the false assumption that mechanical determination is\n the one and only principle of rational connection between facts. \u00a7\n 7. Partly upon fallacious theories of the actual procedure of the\n mental sciences. Fallacious nature of the argument that complete\n knowledge of character and circumstances would enable us to predict\n human conduct. The assumed data are such as, from their own nature,\n could not be known _before the event_. \u00a7 8. _Indeterminism._ The\n psychical facts to which the indeterminist appeals do not warrant\n his conclusion, which is, moreover, metaphysically absurd, as\n involving the denial of rational connection. \u00a7 9. Both doctrines\n agree in the initial error of confounding teleological unity with\n causal determination.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The problem of the meaning and reality of moral freedom is\npopularly supposed to be one of the principal issues, if not _the_\nprincipal issue, of Metaphysics as applied to the facts of human life.\nKant, as the reader will no doubt know, included freedom with\nimmortality and the existence of God in his list of unprovable but\nindispensable \u201cpostulates\u201d of Ethics, and the conviction is still\nwidespread among students of moral philosophy that ethical science\ncannot begin its work without some preliminary metaphysical\njustification of freedom, as a postulate at least, if not as a proved\ntruth. For my own part, I own I cannot rate the practical importance of\nthe metaphysical inquiry into human freedom so high, and am rather of\nProfessor Sidgwick\u2019s opinion as to its superfluousness in strictly\nethical investigations.[200] At the same time, it is impossible to pass\nover the subject without discussion, if only for the excellent\nillustrations it affords of the mischief which results from the forcing\nof false metaphysical theories upon Ethics, and for the confirmation it\nyields of our view as to the postulatory character of the\nmechanico-causal scheme of the natural sciences. In discussing freedom\nfrom this point of view as a metaphysical issue, I would have it clearly\nunderstood that there are two important inquiries into which I do not\nintend to enter, except perhaps incidentally.\n\nOne is the _psychological_ question as to the precise elements into\nwhich a voluntary act may be analysed for the purpose of psychological\ndescription; the other the ethical and juridical problem as to the\nlimits of moral responsibility. For our present purpose both these\nquestions may be left on one side. We need neither ask how a voluntary\nact is performed\u2014in other words, by what set of symbols it is best\nrepresented in Psychology\u2014nor where in a complicated case the conditions\nrequisite for accountability, and therefore for freedom of action, may\nbe pronounced wanting. Our task is the simpler one of deciding, in the\nfirst place, what we mean by the freedom which we all regard as morally\ndesirable, and next, what general view as to the nature of existence is\nimplied in the assertion or denial of its actuality.\n\nThat the examination of the _metaphysical_ implications of freedom is\nnot an indispensable preliminary to ethical study, is fortunately\nsufficiently established by the actual history of the moral sciences.\nThe greatest achievements of Ethics, up to the present time, are\nundoubtedly contained in the systems of the great Greek moralists,\nPlato and Aristotle. It would not be too much to say that subsequent\nethical speculation has accomplished, in the department of Ethics\nproper as distinguished from metaphysical reflection upon the\nontological problems suggested by ethical results, little more than\nthe development in detail of general principles already recognised and\nformulated by these great observers and critics of human life. Yet the\nmetaphysical problem of freedom, as is well known, is entirely absent\nfrom the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy. With Plato, as the reader\nof the _Gorgias_ and the eighth and ninth books of the _Republic_ will\nbe aware, freedom means just what it does to the ordinary plain man,\nthe power to \u201cdo what one wills,\u201d and the only speculative interest\ntaken by the philosopher in the subject is that of showing that the\nchief practical obstacle to the attainment of freedom arises from\ninfirmity and inconsistency in the will itself; that, in fact, the\nunfree man is just the criminal or \u201ctyrant\u201d who wills the\nincompatible, and, in a less degree, the \u201cdemocratic\u201d creature of\nmoods and impulses, who, in popular phrase, \u201cdoesn\u2019t know what he\nwants\u201d of life.\n\nSimilarly, Aristotle, with less of spiritual insight but more attention\nto matters of practical detail, discusses the \u1f11\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, in the third\nbook of his _Ethics_, purely from the standpoint of an ideally perfect\njurisprudence. With him the problem is to know for what acts an ideally\nperfect system of law could hold a man non-responsible, and his answer\nmay be said to be that a man is not responsible in case of (1) physical\ncompulsion, in the strict sense, where his limits are actually set in\nmotion by some external agent or cause; and (2) of ignorance of the\nmaterial circumstances. In both these cases there is no responsibility,\nbecause there has been no real act, the outward movements of the man\u2019s\nlimbs not corresponding to any purpose of his own. An act which does\ntranslate into physical movement a purpose of the agent, Aristotle, like\npractical morality and jurisprudence, recognises as _ipso facto_ free,\nwithout raising any metaphysical question as to the ontological\nimplications of the recognition.\n\nHistorically, it appears that the metaphysical problem has been created\nfor us by purely non-ethical considerations. \u201cFreedom of indifference\u201d\nwas maintained in the ancient world by the Epicureans, but not on\nethical grounds. As readers of the second book of Lucretius know, they\ndenied the validity of the postulate of rigidly mechanical causality\nsimply to extricate themselves from the position into which their\narbitrary physical hypotheses had led them. If mechanical causality were\nrecognised as absolute in the physical world, and if, again, as Epicurus\nheld, the physical world was composed of atoms all falling with constant\nvelocities in the same direction, the system of things, as we know it,\ncould never have arisen. Hence, rather than give up their initial\nhypothesis about the atoms, the Epicureans credited the individual atom\nwith a power of occasional uncaused and arbitrary deviation from its\npath, as a means of bringing atoms into collision and combination. Thus\nwith them \u201cfreedom of indifference\u201d was the result of _physical_\ndifficulties.\n\nIn the Christian Church the doctrine seems to have owed its wide\u2014though\nnot universal\u2014acceptance to equally non-ethical difficulties of a\n_theological_ kind. If God \u201cforeknew from all eternity\u201d the\ntransgression of Adam and all its consequences, how could it be\ncompatible with His justice to punish Adam and all his posterity for\nfaults foreseen by Adam\u2019s Creator?[201] The difficulty of reconciling\nthe divine omniscience with the divine justice was supposed to be\navoided\u2014in truth, it was only evaded[202]\u2014by assuming that man was\ncreated with a \u201cfree will of indifference,\u201d so that obedience would have\nbeen just as easy as transgression if man had chosen to obey. In our own\ntime the problem has assumed a rather different complexion, owing to the\nenormous developments of mechanical physical science, which began with\nGalileo and Descartes. Rigid causal determination being assumed as a\nfirst principle of physical science, the question arose whether the\nassumption should not also be extended to the psychical sphere. If so\nextended, it seemed to strike at the roots of moral responsibility, by\nmaking all human acts the inevitable \u201cconsequences of circumstances over\nwhich we have no control\u201d; if not admitted, the rejection of the\nprinciple of rigid causal determination has often been thought to amount\nto the denial that there is any principle of rational connection in the\npsychical sphere. Hence, while persons specially interested in the facts\nof the moral life have frequently inclined to the more or less radical\ndenial of rational connection between the events of the psychical\nseries, others, whose special interests have lain in the direction of\nthe unification of knowledge, have still more commonly thought it\nnecessary to hold that human action is determined by antecedents in the\nsame sense and to the same degree as the occurrences of the purely\nphysical order.\n\nIt will be our object to show that these rival doctrines of\nIndeterminism and Determinism, or Necessitarianism, are alike\nirrational, alike incompatible with what in practice we understand as\nmoral freedom of action, and alike based upon the false assumption that\nrigid mechanical determination is itself an actual fact, and not a mere\npostulate of the special physical sciences, valid only so far as it is\nuseful. But before we enter upon our task, it is necessary to begin with\na statement as to the real meaning of ethical freedom itself. Until we\nknow what we mean by the kind of freedom we, as moral beings, desire and\nthink we ought to have, it will be useless to ask whether we are or are\nnot free.\n\n\u00a7 2. \u201cFree\u201d and \u201cfreedom\u201d are manifestly what are called by the\nlogicians \u201cprivative\u201d terms; they denote the absence of certain\nrestrictions. To be \u201cfree,\u201d in whatever special sense you may use the\nword, means to be free _from_ something. What, then, are the typical\nlimitations which, in practice, we resent as making us unfree? They seem\nto be, in the main, the following:\u2014(1) We are not free when our limbs\nare actually set in motion by an external physical agency, human or\nnon-human. And the reason why we are then unfree is that the resulting\nmovements of our bodies do not express a purpose of our own. They either\nexpress the purpose of some other being who moves our limbs as seems\ngood to him, or, as in the case where we are set in motion by the\n\u201cforces\u201d of the inanimate world, express no purpose at all that is\nrecognisable to us as such. And in either case _we_ have expressed no\npurpose of our own by our movements; they do not truly belong to _us_ at\nall, and there is therefore no freedom. It is not necessary that the\nresult of the movement should be one which, if it had been suggested, we\nshould have declined to entertain as a purpose of our own. We _might_\nperhaps, if left to ourselves, have done just what another man or the\nsystem of physical forces has done for us. Still, so long as the deed,\nwhatever it was, was done for us and not by us, so long as it\ncorresponded to no actual purpose of ours, it was not a free act.\n\n(2) Again, we are not truly free when we act in ignorance (not due to\nprevious free action of our own)[203] of the special circumstances. Here\nthere is, as there was not in the former case, a genuine act. We\nactually purpose to do something, but what we purpose to do is not the\ndeed which results from our movements. _E.g._, if I shoot a comrade by\nmistake for one of the enemy, it is true that _I_ purpose to shoot, and\nso far the shooting is an act, and a free act, of my own. But I did not\npurpose to shoot my comrade, and so the result, in its concreteness, is\nnot the expression of my purpose, and I consequently regard myself as\nnot fully free in doing it, and therefore not morally accountable for\nit. So far our analysis coincides with that of Aristotle, previously\nreferred to.\n\n(3) Again, I am not acting freely where the circumstances are not such\nas to admit of the formation of purpose at all. For this reason, merely\nautomatic action\u2014if there is such a thing\u2014is not genuine action, and\ntherefore not free.[204] Impulsive action without reflection, again,\ncomes under this category. It is, of course, accompanied by feelings of\nsatisfaction, and if impeded gives rise to craving, and so cannot be\ncalled simply non-purposive. But in genuinely impulsive reaction, where\nthe possibility of reflection is excluded, there can be little clear\nawareness of the concrete character of the purpose that is being put\ninto execution, and hence such action is not truly free. And in\npractical life, though we are certainly held morally responsible for\nimpulsive action, in so far as it is thought we might have modified it\nby previous habitual practice of reflection or by avoiding a situation\nwhich we had reason to think would deprive us of the power to reflect,\nwe are never held as fully accountable for the deed of impulse as for\nthe reflectively thought out and deliberately adopted purpose.[205]\n\nFurther, we feel ourselves unfree when we fail to execute our purposes,\neither from sheer inability to attend to a consistent scheme of action,\nor because we attend equally to purposes which are internally\nincompatible. This is why the \u201cdemocratic\u201d man, whose interests are an\nincoherent medley without logical unity, and the \u201ctyrannical man,\u201d or,\nas we should now say, the \u201ccriminal type,\u201d whose passions are constantly\nat war with one another and with his judgment, are regarded by Plato as\nthe typically unfree beings. To be really free, in the last resort, we\nmust have purposes which are coherent and abiding. And it is thus no\nparadox to say that unfreedom in the end means, in the main, not knowing\nyour own mind, while to be free is to know what you mean.\n\n\u00a7 3. We may now draw some important consequences from this review of the\nfacts upon which every valid interpretation of freedom has to be based.\n(1) Freedom, as Locke said in that famous chapter \u201cOn Power\u201d which is\nstill the classic discussion of the whole subject as far as English\nphilosophy is concerned, \u201cbelongs to the man, not to the will.\u201d The\nproper question to ask is, \u201cAm I free?\u201d not \u201cIs my will free?\u201d or \u201cHave\nI a free will?\u201d For \u201cfreedom\u201d and \u201cwill,\u201d as the facts enumerated above\nshow, are but the negative and the positive name for the same property,\nthe property of acting so as to put what we first possessed as our\nprivate purpose into execution in the world of sensible fact. I \u201cwill\u201d\nwhen my outward deed is thus the expression of my purpose; in the same\ncase, and in no other, I am \u201cfree.\u201d Thus to \u201cwill\u201d and to be \u201cfree\u201d are\none and the same thing; a will which was not free would be a will which\nwas not the translation into sensible fact of any one\u2019s purpose, and\nthus no will at all. Thus the question, \u201cAre we free?\u201d might be also put\nin the equivalent form, \u201cCan we ever will anything?\u201d and to the\nquestion, as thus put, experience gives a ready answer. For we certainly\ndo conceive purposes, and we certainly, in some of our movements, do\ntranslate those purposes in act. And therefore we may say that freedom\nis undoubtedly, in the only sense in which it is desired, a fact of\nimmediate experience.[206]\n\n(2) If we retain the expression \u201cfreedom to _will_\u201d by the side of the\nphrase \u201cfreedom to _act_,\u201d it can only be in a very special sense. It is\nclear that not only may my outward deed be a translation into fact of my\npresent purpose, but my present purpose itself, as a psychical event,\nmay also be a translation into fact of a former purpose. This is largely\nthe case with all results of deliberate self-training and discipline,\nand to a less degree with all acquired habits. Thus, _e.g._, the\nmovements by which I write these lines are the expression of my\npreconceived purpose to write the present paragraph, but that purpose\nitself, as an event in my history, is similarly the expression of a\nformer purpose to compose a work on Metaphysics. Thus there is a real\nsense in which we can agree with Leibnitz in criticising Locke\u2019s dictum\nthat we are free to act, but not free to will. For the mental conception\nof a purpose is itself an act, and in so far as it translates into\nexisting thoughts and feelings a previous purpose it may be said itself\nto be \u201cfreely willed.\u201d[207]\n\n(3) Freedom, in actual experience, is always limited, and, moreover,\nadmits of the most various degrees. As to the first point, it follows\nimmediately from our consideration of the circumstances which make us\nunfree. If to be fully free means that your outward deed is the full\nexpression of an inward consistent purpose, then we can see at once that\ncomplete freedom is, for all finite beings, an infinitely distant\n_ideal_. For it means (_a_) that I am not hampered in the execution of\nmy purpose by vacillation of interest or conflict of incompatible\ninterests within myself; (_b_) nor by the establishment of \u201chabitual\u201d\nreactions so nearly mechanical as to repeat themselves out of season\nunless checked by special reflection; (_c_) nor by the limits set to my\npower to \u201cact or to forbear\u201d in the physical world by the action of my\nfellows and of \u201cbrute\u201d nature.[208] Hence only an experience which is\nabsolutely devoid of internal conflict and external, partly discrepant\nenvironment, in other words, only the experience which is the infinite\nwhole, can be in all its detail entirely and absolutely free. From the\npossibilities of internal lack of unity of purpose and external\ncollision with rival purpose which are inseparable from our position as\nfinite beings, it must follow that we are never more than partially or\nrelatively free.\n\nAnd that the degree to which we are free varies with the nature of our\npurposes and their relation to the environment, is also manifest. There\nis an indefinite plurality of such degrees, ranging up from the total or\nall but total absence of freedom in the case of directly constrained\nmotion up to the case of cordial co-operation with the other members of\na relatively self-supporting social group in the conscious and\nsystematic execution of an elaborate and coherent scheme of action. To\nindicate the principal distinctions among such grades of freedom which\nare of practical importance for law and morality is the task of\nsystematic Ethics, and need not be attempted by us here. We may add that\nour investigation has made it apparent that true moral freedom, of\nwhatever degree, is no inalienable heritage into which men step by the\n\u201caccident of birth,\u201d but\u2014in the main and as an actual possession\u2014a prize\nwhich has to be won by the double discipline of self-knowledge and\nself-mastery, and of social comradeship, and may be, and is, forfeited\nby the neglect of the arts by which it was first gained. No doubt one\nman\u2019s inherited disposition may make the practice of self-control, or\nagain of social fellowship, easier to him than to another, and to this\nextent we may say that we are born with a greater or lesser \u201ccapacity\nfor freedom,\u201d but of its actual possession we have all to say, \u201cwith a\ngreat price purchased I this freedom.\u201d\n\n(4) Finally, our examination of the facts of morality enables us to\n_define_ true freedom. We are free, as we have seen, just so far as our\nexperience is the embodiment of coherent and permanent interest or\npurpose, and freedom is, like \u201cwill,\u201d simply an abstract expression for\nthe teleological unity which, in varying degrees, is an essential\nfeature of all experience. Hence we can at once see that freedom does\nnot mean \u201cabsence of rational connection\u201d or \u201cabsence of determination,\u201d\nbut does mean, as so many recent philosophers have told us, for us\nfinite beings, _self_-determination. I am most free when acting for the\nrealisation of a coherent rational purpose, not because my conduct is\n\u201cundetermined\u201d; in other words, because there is \u201cno telling\u201d what I\nshall do next, but because it is, at such times, most fully determined\nteleologically by the character of my inner purposes or interests,\u2014in\nother words, by the constitution of my _self_. The more abiding and\nlogically coherent my various purposes in action, the freer I am,\nbecause it is my _whole_ self or system of rationally connected\ninterests, and not the insistence of others, or some passing whim or\nimpulse which I may forthwith disown as no part of my \u201ctrue self,\u201d which\nis getting expression in my outward deeds. And if it were possible for a\nfinite being to become absolutely free, as we have seen that it is not,\nsuch a being would, in the very moment of its entire deliverance, become\nalso absolutely determined from within; its whole life, as manifested to\nthe outsider in the series of its deeds, would become the perfect and\nsystematic expression of a single scheme of coherent purposes.\n\n\u00a7 4. We see, then, that such a genuine but limited freedom as is really\nimplied in the existence of morality is not only compatible with, but\nactually demanded by, the principles of a sound Metaphysics. From the\nside of morality we meet with the demand that human beings shall be, in\npart at least, creatures whose outward acts shall be the genuine\nexpression of individual purpose; from the side of Metaphysics we have\nalready learned that just this teleological unity, genuine though\nimperfect, is the essential nature of every finite experience. We are\nnow to see how a problem in itself quite simple leads to insoluble\ndifficulties and to the rival absurdities of Indeterminism and\nDeterminism when it is perverted by an initial metaphysical blunder. The\ninitial mistake of both the rival theories consists simply in taking\nrigid mechanical determination of events by their antecedents in accord\nwith the principle of Causality as an actual fact, the divergence\nbetween them only concerning the extent of the sphere of existence for\nwhich such determination prevails. According to the indeterminist, the\naction of conscious beings forms a solitary exception to a principle of\ndetermination which is absolutely valid for all purely physical\nprocesses. According to the determinist, there are no exceptions to the\nprinciple, and our confessed inability to predict the course of an\nindividual life or a period of history from general laws in the same way\nin which we predict an eclipse or a display of leonids, is due merely to\nthe greater complexity of the necessary data, and the temporary\nimperfections of our mathematical methods.\n\nIt should be noted that there is no substantial disagreement between the\nmore sober representatives of the two views as to the actual facts of\nlife. The indeterminist usually admits that in practice, when you know\nenough of a man\u2019s character and of the influences brought to bear upon\nhim, you can tell with some confidence how he will conduct himself, and\nthat social intercourse, education, and penal legislation would be\nimpossible if you could not. Similarly, the determinist admits that it\nwould be very rash to treat your predictions of human behaviour in\npractice with absolute confidence, and that the unexpected does\nfrequently happen in human life. The dispute is solely about the\nphilosophical interpretation of facts as to which there is virtually\nuniversal agreement. According to the determinist interpretation, _if_\nyou were put in possession of the knowledge of a man\u2019s \u201ccharacter\u201d and\nof his \u201ccircumstances\u201d (and it is assumed that it is theoretically\npossible to have this knowledge), and had sufficient skill to grapple\nwith the mathematical problems involved, you could calculate his whole\nbehaviour in advance, from the cradle to the grave, with infallible\nprecision. According to the indeterminist, you could not do so, and your\nfailure would arise not from any theoretical impossibility of obtaining\nthe supposed data, but from their insufficiency. Our behaviour, he\nalleges, is not exclusively determined by the interaction of \u201ccharacter\u201d\nand circumstances; even with the complete knowledge of both these\nelements, human action is incalculable, because of our possession of a\n\u201cfree will of indifference\u201d or power to act indifferently according to\nor in violation of our \u201ccharacter.\u201d You can never say beforehand what a\nman will do, because of this capacity for acting, under any conditions,\nwith equal facility in either of two alternative ways.\n\nI propose to show briefly that the determinist is right in saying that\nconduct is completely determined by \u201ccharacter\u201d\u2014if the term be\nunderstood widely enough\u2014and circumstances, but wrong in holding that\nthis makes infallible prediction possible; on the other hand, that the\nindeterminist is right in denying the possibility of such prediction,\nbut wrong in the reason he gives for his denial. Infallible prediction\nis impossible, not because of the existence of \u201cfree will of\nindifference,\u201d but because the assumed data of the prediction are such\nthat you could not possibly have them until _after the event_. Finally,\nit will be pointed out that the two errors both arise from the same\nfalse metaphysical theory that the causal principle is a statement of\nreal fact.[209]\n\n\u00a7 5. _Determinism._ To begin with the view of the determinist. Human\nconduct, he says, must be, like other processes, unequivocally\ndetermined by antecedents, and these antecedents must consist of (_a_)\ncharacter and (_b_) external circumstance. For (1) to deny the causal\ndetermination of our acts by antecedents is to deny the presence of\nrational connection in the psychical sphere, and thus to pronounce not\nonly Psychology, but all the sciences which take psychical events as\ntheir material and attempt to discover rational connections between\nthem, in principle impossible. Thus the very existence of Psychology,\nEthics, and History proves the applicability of the principle of causal\ndeterminism to \u201cmental states.\u201d\n\n(2) This is still more evident if we reflect that all science consists\nin the formulation of \u201claws\u201d or \u201cuniformities,\u201d and that the formulation\nof \u201claws\u201d rests upon the principle that \u201csame result follows under same\nconditions\u201d\u2014_i.e._ upon the principle of causal determination.\n\n(3) Further, if psychical events are not so determined, then Psychology\nand the mental sciences generally are inconsistent with the general\nprinciples of the mechanical physical sciences.\n\n(4) And, as a matter of fact, we do all assume that psychical events are\ncausally determined by their antecedents. In Psychology we assume that\nour choices are determined by the strength of the _motives_ between\nwhich we choose. Hence, if you know what are the \u201cmotives\u201d present to a\nman\u2019s choice, and the relative strength of each, the determinist thinks\nthe prediction of his conduct is reduced to the purely mathematical\nproblem of the solution of an equation or set of equations. That our\npresent mathematical resources will not avail for the unequivocal\nsolution of such equations is, on this view, a mere temporary defect\nincidental to the present condition of mathematical science. In\nprinciple the equations must be soluble, or \u201cthere is no science of\nhuman action.\u201d\n\n(5) And in practical life we do all assume that it is possible to\npredict with considerable confidence the effect of typical conditions\nupon the aggregate of mankind, and also, when you have the requisite\ndata, the effect of a definite set of conditions upon an individual man.\nThus we count upon the deterrent effects of punishment, the persuasive\ninfluence of advertisement, etc.; and again, in proportion as we really\nknow our friends, we believe ourselves able to answer for their conduct\nin situations which have not as yet arisen. Why, then, should we suppose\nit theoretically impossible, if adequate data were furnished, to\ncalculate the whole career of a man or a society in advance, as the\nastronomer calculates the path of a planet from its elements? These are,\nI think, the chief of the stock arguments by which Determinism has been\ndefended. (With the purely theological argument from the absoluteness of\nthe divine foreknowledge I have already dealt in passing, and do not\npropose to refer to it again.)\n\n\u00a7 6. It is not difficult to see that the logical value of all these\narguments is nothing at all. They fall of themselves into two groups,\none based upon the general view that all rational connection, or at\nleast all such rational connection as is significant for our knowledge,\nis mechanical causal sequence, the other upon an appeal to the supposed\nactual practice of the mental sciences. We may deal with the first group\n(arguments 1 to 3) first. It is certainly not true that causal\ndetermination by antecedents is the only form of rational connection.\nFor there is manifestly another type of connection, which we have\nalready seen to be fundamental for the mental sciences, namely,\nteleological coherence. And we have learned in our preceding books that\nno truly teleological or purposive series can really be mechanically\ndetermined by uniform causal laws of sequence, though it is often\nconvenient for special purposes, as in the physical sciences, to treat\nsuch a series _as if_ it were mechanically determined. Whether this type\nof procedure will be valid in the mental sciences, depends upon the\nfurther question whether our interest in the study of mental processes\nis of the kind which would be satisfied by the formulation of a number\nof abstract uniformities or laws of sequence, and the neglect of all\nthose features of real mental life of which such laws take no account.\n\nIn the physical sciences, as we saw, this mechanical scheme was valid\nonly because we have an interest\u2014that of devising general rules for\ndealing with typical physical situations\u2014which is met by neglecting all\nthose aspects of concrete fact which the mechanical scheme excludes. But\nwe also saw that the nature of our interest in psychological\ninvestigation was predominantly (and, in the case of the study of\nvoluntary action, exclusively) of a different kind. Our interest in\nthese investigations was to obtain such a teleological representation of\npsychical processes as might be made available for the appreciative\njudgments of Ethics and History and their kindred studies. Thus, even\nadmitting the possibility of treating psychical life for some purposes,\nby abstraction from its teleological character, as if it were a\nmechanical sequence, the abstraction would be fatal for the purposes of\nthe concrete mental sciences, and is therefore inadmissible in them. A\nteleological unity in which we are interested _as_ a teleological unity\ncannot, without the stultification of our whole scientific procedure, be\ntreated in abstraction from its teleological character.\n\nThis rejoinder to the first of the determinist\u2019s arguments is at the\nsame time a refutation of the second. It is true that any science which\naims exclusively at the discovery of \u201claws\u201d or \u201cuniformities\u201d must adopt\nthe causal principle, and must resolutely shut its eyes to all aspects\nof concrete fact which cannot be resolved into mechanical sequence of\n\u201csame result\u201d on \u201csame conditions.\u201d But, as we saw in the first chapter\nof this book, the characteristic task of Psychology, except in those\nparts of it which appear to be mere temporary substitutes for the\nPhysiology of the future, is not the discovery of \u201c_laws_ of mental\nprocess,\u201d but the representation in abstract and general form of the\nteleological unity of processes which are the expression of subjective\ninterests. Psychology, then, in its most characteristic parts, is not\nbased upon the causal postulate of mechanical science, but on the\nconception of teleological continuity.\n\nOur answer to the determinist\u2019s third argument is therefore that we\nadmit the truth of the allegation that Psychology and all the more\nconcrete mental sciences which make use of the symbolism of Psychology,\nbecause essentially teleological in their view of mental process, would\nbe inconsistent with the mechanical postulates, if those postulates had\nany claim to admission into mental science as its ruling principles. We\ndeny, however, that they have any such claim to recognition. Being, as\nwe now know that they are, mere methodological rules for the elimination\nfrom our data of everything which is teleological, the mechanical\npostulates are only legitimate in Psychology so far as Psychology\ndesires mechanical results. How far that is, we have learned in the\nfirst two chapters of the present Book, and we have found that the\ninitiation of purposive action is not a process which Psychology can\nfruitfully treat as mechanical.\n\n\u00a7 7. Turning now to the determinist\u2019s allegations as to the factual\nprocedure of the mental sciences, we may make the following\nobservations:\u2014(1) As to the argument from the psychological treatment of\n\u201cmotives\u201d as the determining antecedents of choice, we say that it is\neither an empty tautology or a fallacy, according to the sense you\nplease to put on the much-abused term \u201cmotive.\u201d Choice is causally\ndetermined by the \u201cstrongest motive\u201d; what does this mean? If the\n\u201cstrongest motive\u201d simply means the line of action we do in fact choose,\nthe argument amounts to the true but irrelevant observation that we\nchoose what we do choose, and not something else. But if \u201cmotives\u201d are\nto be regarded as antecedents causally determining choice in proportion\nto their strength, as mechanical \u201cforces\u201d determine the path of a\nparticle in abstract Mechanics, we must suppose the \u201cstrength\u201d of the\nvarious \u201cmotives,\u201d like the mass of an attracting body, to be previously\nfixed, independent of the choice they determine. In other words, the\ndeterminist argument requires us to hold that alternative possibilities\nof action are already \u201cmotives\u201d apart from their relation to the purpose\nof the agent who has to choose between them, and moreover have, also in\nindependence of the purpose or \u201ccharacter\u201d of the chooser, a \u201cstrength\u201d\nwhich is in some unintelligible way a function of\u2014it would not be easy\nto say of _what_, though it is incumbent on the determinist to know. And\nthis seems no better than rank nonsense. An alternative is not a\n\u201cmotive\u201d at all, except in relation to the already existing, but not\nfully defined, purpose of some agent, and whether it is a \u201cstrong\u201d or a\n\u201cweak\u201d motive depends likewise on the character of the agent\u2019s purpose.\nThe attempt to conceive of \u201cmotives\u201d as somehow acting on a mind with an\ninherent \u201cstrength\u201d of their own, as material particles attract other\nmaterial particles proportionately to their masses, is so palpable an\nabsurdity, that nothing more than the candid statement of it is needed\nfor its complete exposure.\n\nAnd (2) there is an equal absurdity inherent in the determinist view as\nto the kind of prediction of conduct which is possible in concrete\ncases. We have seen already in our Third Book that no infallible\nprediction of the course of events in an individual case is ever\npossible. Mechanical calculation and prediction we found to be possible\nin the physical sciences simply because they deal with the average\ncharacter of a vast aggregate of processes which they never attempt to\nfollow in their concrete individual detail. And trustworthy prediction\nof human conduct by the aid of \u201ccausal laws\u201d was seen to be of the same\nkind. Your uniformities might hold good, so long as they professed to be\nnothing more than statistical averages got by neglecting the individual\npeculiarities of the special cases composing them, but nothing but\nacquaintance with individual character and purpose would justify you in\nmaking confident predictions as to the behaviour of an individual man.\n\nNow, when the determinist says, \u201cif you knew a man\u2019s character and his\ncircumstances you could predict his conduct with certainty,\u201d it is not\nthis kind of individual acquaintance which he has in view. He means that\nthe \u201ccharacter\u201d of an individual man could be reduced to a number of\ngeneral formul\u00e6 or \u201claws of mental action,\u201d and that from these \u201claws,\u201d\nby simply putting them together, you could logically deduce the man\u2019s\nbehaviour. To see how irrational this assumption is, we need only ask\nwhat is meant exactly by the \u201ccharacter\u201d which we suppose given as one\nof the elements for our supposed calculation. If it means the sum-total\nof the congenital \u201cdispositions\u201d with which we are born, then\u2014apart from\nthe difficulty of saying precisely what you mean by such a\n\u201cdisposition\u201d\u2014the determinist statement is not even approximately true.\nFor (_a_) though it may be true that a man\u2019s behaviour in a given\nsituation is an expression of his \u201ccharacter,\u201d yet the \u201ccharacter\u201d is\nnot the same thing as \u201ccongenital disposition.\u201d Disposition is the mere\nraw material of the \u201ccharacter,\u201d which is formed out of it by the\ninfluence of circumstance, the educational activity of our social\ncircle, and deliberate self-discipline on our own part. And the\n\u201ccharacter\u201d thus formed is not a fixed and unvarying quantity, given\nonce and for all at some period in the individual\u2019s development, and\nthenceforward constant; it is itself, theoretically at least, \u201cin the\nmaking\u201d throughout life, and though you may, from personal intimate\nacquaintance with an individual man, feel strongly convinced that his\n\u201ccharacter\u201d is not likely to undergo serious changes after a certain\ntime of life, this conviction can never amount to more than what we\nproperly call \u201cmoral\u201d certainty, and is never justified _except_ on the\nstrength of individual familiarity.\n\n(_b_) This leads us to our second point. If\u2014to suppose the practically\nimpossible\u2014you did know a man\u2019s \u201ccharacter\u201d with the knowledge of\nomniscience, you would clearly also know every act of his life. For his\n\u201ccharacter\u201d is nothing but the system of purposes and interests to which\nhis outward deeds give expression, and thus to know it completely would\nbe to know them completely too. But\u2014and this is what the determinist\nregularly overlooks\u2014you could not possibly have this knowledge of the\nman\u2019s \u201ccharacter\u201d until you were already acquainted with the whole of\nhis life. You could not possibly thus know \u201ccharacter\u201d as a datum given\nin advance, from which to calculate, with mathematical precision, the as\nyet unknown future acts of the man in question, because, as we have\nseen, the \u201ccharacter\u201d is, in fact, not there as a given fact _before_\nthe acts through which it is formed. Your data could at best be no more\nthan a number of \u201cdispositions\u201d or \u201ctendencies,\u201d and from such data\nthere can be no infallible prediction, because, in the first place,\n\u201cdispositions\u201d are not always developed into actual fixed habits; and,\nin the second, your data, such as they are, are incomplete, seeing that\n\u201cdispositions\u201d may, and often do, remain latent and escape detection\nuntil the emergence of a situation adapted to call them out. So that,\neven if it were true that complete knowledge of a man\u2019s original stock\nof \u201cdispositions\u201d would enable you to calculate his career from its\nelements, it would still be impossible to be sure that your knowledge of\nhis \u201cdispositions\u201d _was_ complete.\n\nThus, if a \u201cscience of human nature\u201d really means a power to calculate\nhuman conduct in advance from its elements, we must admit that there is\nnot and can be no such science. As a fact, however, what we really mean\nby a \u201cscience of human nature,\u201d when we speak of it as possible or as\npartly existent already, is something quite different. We mean either\nPsychology, individual and social, which is simply an abstract symbolism\nfor the representation of teleological process in its general nature, or\nHistory, which is the detection of coherent purpose in human action,\n_after the event_; or, again, Ethics and Politics, which are\nappreciations of such purpose by an ideal standard of _worth_. Not one\nof these sciences has ever attempted the calculation of human action in\nadvance by general laws; such forecasts of the future as we do make,\nwith rational confidence, are palpably based, wherever they are of\nvalue, on concrete experience, our own or that of others, and not upon\nthe principles of an imaginary mechanics of the human mind.\n\n\u00a7 8. _Indeterminism._ With the fallacies of the indeterminist we must\nnow deal more briefly. This is the more possible as Indeterminism,\nthough common enough in popular moralising, has never won anything like\nthe position of the rival doctrine as the professed creed of scientific\ninvestigators. The essence of the indeterminist position is the denial\nof the principle affirmed alike by the doctrine of self-determination\nand, in an unintelligent travesty, by the determinist theory that\nconduct results from the reaction of \u201ccharacter\u201d upon circumstances.\nSeeing that, if all human action is mechanically determined in advance\nby its \u201cantecedents,\u201d and is thus theoretically capable of being deduced\nfrom its \u201celements,\u201d there can be no true moral freedom, and, not seeing\nthat the essence of true freedom is teleological as opposed to\nmechanical determination, the indeterminist thinks himself compelled to\nassert that human action is, in the last resort, not \u201cdetermined\u201d even\nby human character. There is a \u201cfree will of indifference\u201d inherent in\nhuman nature, in virtue of which a man\u2019s acts, or at least those of them\nin respect of which he is morally \u201caccountable,\u201d are free, in the sense\nof being independent of his character.\n\nFreedom, according to this view, consists in the ability indifferently\nto adopt either of two alternative courses; so long as one alternative\nis closed to you (whether by your \u201ccharacter\u201d or by external\ncircumstances makes no difference according to the indeterminist), you\nare not \u201cfree\u201d and not acting as a moral and accountable being. You are\nonly acting freely in following your purpose when you could equally well\nfollow its direct opposite. The arguments by which this doctrine is\nsupported, over and above the general contention that determination by\nantecedents is incompatible with moral responsibility, are chiefly of\nthe nature of appeals to immediate feeling. Thus we are told (1) that\nwhen we act from choice and not under compulsion we always have the\nimmediate feeling that we could equally well act in the opposite sense;\nand (2) that it is a matter of direct experience that, in resisting\ntemptation, we can and do act \u201cin the line of _greatest_ resistance,\u201d\nand that the \u201cwill\u201d is therefore independent of determination by\n\u201cmotives.\u201d\n\nThe detailed discussion of the actuality of the alleged facts belongs,\nof course, to Psychology, and I do not propose to enter into it here.\nBut it should be manifest that, even admitting the facts to be as the\nindeterminist states them, they do not warrant the inference he bases on\nthem. Thus (1) it is no doubt true that I often am aware, in resolving\non a certain course of action, that I could, _if I pleased_, act\ndifferently. But the conditional clause by its presence makes all the\ndifference between teleological determination and no determination at\nall. It is, _e.g._, no genuine fact of experience that I am aware that I\ncould violate all the habits of a lifetime, practise all the crimes I\nmost abhor, and neglect all the interests to which I am most devoted. I\ncould do all this \u201cif I pleased,\u201d but before I could \u201cplease\u201d I should\nhave to become a different man; while I am the man I am, it is a\nmanifest absurdity to hold that I can indifferently express in my\nbehaviour the purposes which constitute my individuality or their\nopposites.\n\n(2) The argument from the successful resistance of temptations is\nequally fallacious. We have seen already that the determinist assumption\nagainst which it is directed, namely, that conduct is mechanically\ndetermined by the inherent \u201cstrength\u201d of \u201cmotives,\u201d is itself unmeaning.\n\u201cMotives\u201d are, if they are anything, another name for the interests\nwhich constitute our character, not external influences which \u201cwork\nupon\u201d that character, and thus their relative \u201cstrength\u201d is nothing\nindependent of character, but a new expression for the structure of the\nindividual character itself. But the counter-argument of Indeterminism\nis just as unmeaning. To talk of the \u201cconquest\u201d of temptation as the\n\u201cline of greatest resistance\u201d is to use the very same unintelligible\nmechanical analogy as the determinist uses in talking of the antecedent\n\u201cstrength\u201d of a \u201cmotive.\u201d There are, in fact, only two possible\ninterpretations of the indeterminist\u2019s contention, and neither of them\nsupports his conclusion. Either the \u201cresistance\u201d of which he speaks must\nbe measured by our actual success in resisting the suggestion to act,\nand in that case the very fact that we do not yield to the temptation\nshows that for us yielding would have been the \u201cline of greatest\nresistance\u201d; or else \u201cresistance\u201d must be measured by the extent to\nwhich the rejected alternative still persists as a psychical fact after\nits rejection. Then the alleged experience simply amounts to this, that\nwe can and sometimes do, in obedience to training or conviction, refuse\nto act upon suggestions which as psychical facts have sufficient\nintensity to remain before the mind even after our refusal. And this,\ninteresting and suggestive as it is, seems no particular reason for\ndenying the teleological determination of our conduct.[210]\n\nThe real metaphysical objection to Indeterminism however, is not that it\nis an unprovable and unnecessary hypothesis, but that it involves the\ndenial of rational connection between human actions. By declaring that\nconduct is not determined by character, it virtually asserts that it is\nchance which ultimately decides how we shall actually behave in a\nconcrete case. And chance is simply another name for the absence of\nrational connection. This is illustrated, _e.g._, by the use we make of\nthe conception of chance in the various empirical sciences. Thus, when I\nsay that it is a matter of chance what card I shall draw from the pack,\nwhat I mean is that the result depends in part upon conditions which I\ndo not know, and therefore cannot use as data for a conclusion in favour\nof one result rather than another. I do not, of course, mean that the\nresult is not conditioned at all, or that, with a sufficient knowledge\nof the conditions it might not have been calculated in advance, but\nmerely that I in particular have not this sufficient knowledge. Hence\nthe admission of chance in the relative sense of \u201cconditions not at\npresent accurately known\u201d does not conflict with the fundamental axiom\nof all thinking, the principle that all existence is a rational unity or\nscheme of some sort. In fact, since we never can know the \u201ctotality of\nthe conditions\u201d of anything, it would be true to say that there is an\nelement of chance, in this relative sense, in all concrete actualities.\n\nBut absolute chance, such as the doctrine of an indeterminate free will\nmaintains, would amount to the simple absence of any rational connection\nwhatever between the facts which are alleged to issue from such a will.\nThis is why the indeterminist view leads in the end, if consistently\ncarried out, to the same metaphysical absurdity as the determinist. From\nfailure to see that rational connection, such as is presupposed when we\nimpute praise or blame to an agent on the score of his conduct, means\nteleological determination, both the rival theories in the end deny the\nrational interconnection of human acts, the one replacing it by the\nfiction of a purposeless mechanical \u201cnecessity,\u201d the other by the equal\nfiction of a \u201cblind chance.\u201d And the two fictions are really the same\nthing under different names. For the only piece of definite information\nthat could be extracted either from the assertion that human conduct is\nmechanically determined, or that it is the result of chance, is the\nconclusion that in either case it is _not_ the expression of coherent\npurpose.\n\n\u00a7 9. It is thus obvious that Indeterminism fails, in precisely the same\nway as the opposing theory, to afford any theoretical basis for moral\nresponsibility. True, I cannot be \u201cresponsible\u201d for deeds which are the\noutcome of a purely mechanical system of antecedents, because such\ndeeds, not issuing from the purposes of my self, are in no true sense\nmine; but the same would be equally true of the results of an\nindeterminate free will. As not owing their existence to my purpose,\nthose results are in no real sense \u201cmy\u201d acts, and the choice of the name\n\u201cfree will\u201d for their unknown source only serves to disguise this\nconsequence without removing it. Only as issuing from my character, and\nas the expression of my individual interests, can acts be ascribed to me\nas \u201cmine\u201d and made the basis of moral approbation in censure of my\n\u201cself.\u201d\n\nThus we see that the determinist and the indeterminist are led alike to\nimpossible results because of the common error involved in their point\nof departure. Both start with the false assumption that the causal\ndetermination of an event by its \u201cantecedents\u201d\u2014which we have in our\nearlier books seen to be a postulate ultimately not in accord with\nreality, but permissible in so far as it permits us to obtain useful\nresults by treating events as if they were thus determined\u2014is ultimately\nreal as a feature of concrete existence. Having thus at the outset\nexcluded genuine teleological determination from their conception of the\nworld of change, both theorists are alike debarred from the correct\nunderstanding of those psychical processes for the comprehension of\nwhich teleological categories are indispensable.\n\nIn the terms of theories which treat determination as purely mechanical,\nthe factors which manifestly are the determining conditions of conduct,\nnamely, character and the alternative possibilities of action,\ninevitably come to be conceived of as the temporal \u201cantecedents\u201d of the\nact which issues from them. And when once this notion of character as a\nsort of pre-existing material upon which \u201cmotives\u201d from without operate\nhas been framed, it matters little in principle whether you take\n\u201ccharacter\u201d and \u201cmotive\u201d by themselves as the complete antecedents by\nwhich action is determined, or add a third \u201cantecedent\u201d in the form of\nan inexplicable arbitrary \u201cfree will.\u201d In either case all possibility of\na truthful representation of the freedom actually implied in moral\naccountability was surrendered when the \u201ccharacter\u201d which expresses\nitself through an act, and the \u201cmotive\u201d which is another name for that\ncharacter as particularised by reference to circumstances, were falsely\nseparated in thought from each other, and then further treated as the\ntemporal antecedents of the act in which they are expressed. In our own\ntreatment of the problem of freedom we were able to escape both sides of\nthe dilemma, because we recognised from the first that the categories of\nmechanical determination are not the expression of real fact, but\nlimitations artificially imposed upon facts for special purposes of a\nkind which have nothing in common with the ethical and historical\nappreciation of human conduct, and therefore irrelevant and misleading\nwhen applied out of their rightful sphere.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014H. Bergson, _Sur les donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de la\nconscience_; F. H. Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, Essay 1; W. R. B. Gibson,\n\u201cThe Problem of Freedom\u201d (in _Personal Idealism_); T. H. Green,\n_Prolegomena to Ethics_, bk. i. chap. 3, bk. ii. chap. 1; W. James,\n_Principles of Psychology_, vol. ii. chap. 26; _Will to Believe_ (_The\nDilemma of Determinism_); J. Locke, _Essay concerning Human\nUnderstanding_, bk. ii. chap. 21 (on _Power_); J. Martineau, _Types of\nEthical Theory_, vol. ii. bk. i. chap. 1; J. S. Mill, _Logic_, bk. vi.\nchap. 2 ff.; J. Royce, _The World and the Individual_, Second Series,\nlect. 8; H. Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, bk. i. chap. 5; _Lectures on\nthe Ethics of Green_, etc., pp. 15-29.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 200:\n\n See _Methods of Ethics_, bk. i. chap. 4, \u00a7 6 (pp. 72-76 of 5th ed.).\n\nFootnote 201:\n\n So Omar Khayy\u00e1m\u2014\n\n \u201cOh Thou, who didst with pitfall and with gin\n Beset the Road I was to wander in,\n Thou wilt not with Predestined Evil round\n Emmesh, and then impute my Fall to Sin.\u201d\n (FITZGERALD, ed. 4, stanza 80.)\n\n And our own poet\u2014\n\n \u201cThou madest man in the garden; thou temptedst man, and he fell,\u201d etc.\n\n (For the original of the stanzas on Predestination in Fitzgerald\u2019s\n Omar, see, _e.g._, the Persian text of Whinfield, quatrains 100, 126,\n 197.)\n\nFootnote 202:\n\n Evaded, because, even granting the satisfactoriness of the solution\n for the special case of Adam, there would still be the problem of\n reconciling the alleged \u201cfree will\u201d of his descendants with their\n inheritance of \u201coriginal sin.\u201d The more rigid Calvinism, with its\n insistence on the natural corruption of man\u2019s heart and the\n absoluteness of predestination, seems to secure logical consistency at\n the expense of outraging our moral convictions. Like so many popular\n theological problems, this of the conflict between God\u2019s omniscience\n and justice arises from a misconception of the issue. It is only when\n the category of time is illogically applied to the _ex hypothesi_\n perfect, and therefore timeless, nature of God that God\u2019s knowledge\n comes to be thought by as _fore_ knowledge _before the event_, and\n thus occasions the difficulty which the \u201cfree-will\u201d theory was\n intended to remove. See on this point, Royce, _The World and the\n Individual_, vol. ii. lect. 8, and compare Bradley, _Ethical Studies_,\n p. 19. Of course, the case would be altered if we thought of God as\n finite and imperfect, and therefore in time. But there would then be\n no longer any reason for believing either in His omniscience or His\n omnipotence, and so no problem would arise.\n\nFootnote 203:\n\n Remember that abstention from acting is itself action, just as in\n Logic every significant denial is really an assertion. Hence our\n proviso meets the case of wilful neglect to inform myself of the\n material circumstances.\n\nFootnote 204:\n\n The only automatic acts of which we really _know_ the psychical\n character are our own \u201csecondarily automatic\u201d or \u201chabitual\u201d acts. It\n is, of course, a problem for the casuist how far any particular\n reaction has become so completely automatic as to be no longer an\n occasion for the imputation of merit or guilt.\n\nFootnote 205:\n\n For purposes of law it may often be impossible to draw the\n distinction, and we may have to acquiesce in the rough-and-ready\n alternative between entire accountability and complete\n non-accountability. But in passing moral judgment on ourselves or\n others _in foro conscienti\u00e6_, we always recognise that accountability\n is a thing of degrees. On this point see Mr. Bradley\u2019s previously\n quoted article in _Mind_ for July 1902.\n\nFootnote 206:\n\n It must, however, be carefully noted that will in the sense in which\n it is equivalent to freedom must be taken to include what some\n writers, _e.g._, Bradley, call a \u201cstanding\u201d will\u2014_i.e._ any series of\n acts originally initiated by an idea of the resultant changes, which\n is approved of by us unconditionally. In the actual execution of such\n a series of acts many of the stages are habitual reactions which, as\n such, are not accompanied by the \u201cidea\u201d of their specific result as a\n determining condition of their occurrence. The sphere of moral freedom\n is arbitrarily restricted when it is assumed that an _actual_ volition\n is indispensable for every stage of the \u201cfree\u201d action.\n\nFootnote 207:\n\n The reader should study for himself Locke\u2019s famous chapter (_Essay_,\n bk. ii. chap. 21). Locke\u2019s treatment, hampered as it is by his\n unfortunate retention of the discussion of his first edition side by\n side with a somewhat modified re-statement, compares favourably for\n clearness and sound sense with that of most subsequent philosophers,\n notably with Kant\u2019s unintelligible attempt to reconcile the absolute\n freedom of man as \u201cnoumenon\u201d (a fictitious quality of a fictitious\n being) with his equally absolute unfreedom as \u201cphenomenon\u201d (another\n equally palpable fiction).\n\n For Leibnitz\u2019s criticism of Locke, see _Nouveaux Essais_, II. xxi.,\n particularly \u00a7\u00a7 8-25. (The English translation by Langley can only be\n used with extreme caution.) On the whole question the reader should\n also consult Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, bk. ii chap. 1; Bradley,\n _Ethical Studies_, Essay 1, and article in _Mind_ for July 1902; W. R.\n B. Gibson, \u201cThe Problem of Freedom\u201d (in _Personal Idealism)_.\n\nFootnote 208:\n\n Then, are \u201canimals\u201d free? I see no reason to deny that, since their\n life, in as its degree, must have teleological continuity to be a life\n at all, they too must possess a rudimentary degree of freedom, though\n a degree not sufficient to fit them for a place as \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f44\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 in\n human society, and therefore, for the special purposes of human\n ethical systems, negligible. Similarly, a human imbecile may possess a\n degree of freedom which is important for the educator who is\n interested in the \u201ccare of the feeble minded,\u201d and yet may rightly be\n treated for the different purposes of a penal code as simply unfree.\n\nFootnote 209:\n\n Compare with what follows, Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, Essay 1, and\n the notes appended to it. For a typical statement of the determinist\n case in its more sober form, see Mill, _System of Logic_, bk. vi.\n chap. 2. It is harder to find a reasonable statement of the opposite\n view, as most capable moral philosophers have adopted the doctrine of\n self-determination. For a defence of thoroughgoing Indeterminism, see\n James, _The Will to Believe_ (Essay on _The Dilemma of Determinism_).\n In Professor Sidgwick\u2019s statement of the indeterminist view (see,\n _e.g._, his posthumous lecture on T. H. Green\u2019s doctrine of freedom in\n _Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau_, pp. 15-28),\n Indeterminism seems to me to be qualified to the point of being in\n principle surrendered.\n\nFootnote 210:\n\n See the admirable discussion of this experience in Dr. Stout\u2019s _Manual\n of Psychology_,^3 bk. iv. chap. 10, \u00a7 7.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n SOME METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHICS\n AND RELIGION\n\n\u00a7 1. If Reality is a harmonious system, it must somehow make provision\n for the gratification of our ethical, religious, and \u00e6sthetic\n interests. \u00a7 2. But we cannot assume that ethical and religious\n postulates are necessarily _true_ in the forms in which our\n practical interests lead us to make them. \u00a7 3. Thus, while morality\n would become impossible unless on the whole there is coincidence\n between virtue and happiness, and unless social progress is a\n genuine fact, \u201cperfect virtue,\u201d \u201cperfect happiness,\u201d \u201cinfinite\n progress\u201d are logically self-contradictory concepts. \u00a7 4. But this\n does not impair the practical usefulness of our ethical ideals. \u00a7 5.\n In religion we conceive of the ideal of perfection as already\n existing in individual form. Hence ultimately no part of the\n temporal order can be an adequate object of religious devotion. \u00a7 6.\n This leads to the _Problem of Evil_. \u201cGod\u201d cannot be a finite being\n within the Absolute, because, if so, God must contain evil and\n imperfection as part of His nature, and is thus _not_ the already\n existing realisation of the ideal. \u00a7 7. This difficulty disappears\n when we identify \u201cGod\u201d with the Absolute, because in the Absolute\n evil can be seen to be mere illusory appearance. It may, however, be\n true that religious feeling, to be practically efficient, may need\n to imagine its object in an ultimately incorrect anthropomorphic\n form. \u00a7 8. The existence, within the Absolute, of finite \u201cdivine\u201d\n personalities, can neither be affirmed nor denied on grounds of\n general Metaphysics. \u00a7 9. Proofs of the \u201cbeing of God.\u201d The\n principle of the \u201contological\u201d and \u201ccosmological\u201d proofs can be\n defended against the criticism of Hume and Kant only if we identify\n God with the Absolute. The \u201cphysicotheological proof\u201d could only\n establish the reality of finite superhuman intelligences, and its\n force depends purely upon empirical considerations of evidence.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The metaphysician is perhaps at times too ready to treat experience\nas though it were constituted solely by intellectual interests; as\nthough our one concern in dealing with its deliverances, as they come to\nus, were to construct out of them a system of knowledge satisfactory to\nour demand for coherent thinking. This is, of course, a one-sided, and\ntherefore, from the standpoint of Metaphysics itself, an imperfect\nexpression of the nature of our attitude as intelligences towards the\nworld of our experience. Our moral, religious, and artistic, no less\nthan our logical, ideals represent typical forms of our general interest\nas intelligent beings in bringing harmony and order into the apparently\ndiscordant material of experience. Hence no study of metaphysical\nprinciples, however elementary, would be complete without some\ndiscussion of the light thrown by these various ideals upon the ultimate\nstructure of the system of Reality in which we and our manifold\ninterests form a part. If it is the fundamental principle of a sound\nphilosophy that all existence forms a harmonious unity, then, if we can\ndiscover what are the essential and permanent features in the demands\nmade by art, morality, and religion upon the world, we may be sure that\nthese demands are somehow met and made good in the scheme of things.\n\nFor a world which met our ethical, religious, and aesthetic demands upon\nlife with a _mere_ negative would inevitably contain aspects of violent\nand irreconcilable discord, and would thus be no true world or\nsystematic unity at all. In what follows I propose to discuss the double\nquestion, What appears to be the \u201cirreducible minimum\u201d of the demands\nwhich morality and religion make of the world, and how far the general\nconception of existence defended in our earlier chapters provides for\ntheir liquidation. The consideration of our aesthetic ideals and their\nmetaphysical significance I propose to decline, on the ground both of\nits inferior practical interest for mankind at large, and of the very\nspecial and thorough training in the psychological analysis of \u00e6sthetic\nfeeling which is, in my own judgment at least, essential for the\nsatisfactory treatment of the question.\n\n\u00a7 2. In dealing with the subject thus marked out, it will be necessary\nto begin with a word, partly of caution, partly of recapitulation of\nprevious results, as to the attitude towards the practical ideals of\nmorality and religion imposed upon the metaphysician by the special\ncharacter of his interests as a metaphysician. It will thus be apparent\nwhy I have spoken in the last paragraph of an \u201cirreducible _minimum_\u201d of\nethical and religious postulation. There is a marked tendency among\nrecent writers on philosophical topics, encouraged more specially by\nProfessor James and his followers, to urge that any and every ideal\nwhich we think valuable for the purposes of morality and religion has no\nless claim to be accepted in Metaphysics as of value for our conception\nof Reality than the fundamental principles of logical thought\nthemselves. Logical thinking, it is contended, is after all only one of\nthe functions of our nature, by the side of others such as moral\nendeavour towards the harmonising of practice with an ideal of the right\nor the good, aesthetic creation of the beautiful, and religious\nco-operation with a \u201cpower not ourselves that makes for righteousness.\u201d\nWhy, then, should the metaphysician assume that the universe is more\nspecially bound to satisfy the demands of the logical intellect than\nthose of the \u201cpractical reason\u201d of morality and religion or the\n\u201ccreative reason\u201d of art? Must we not say that the demand of the\nlogician that the world shall be intelligible stands precisely on the\nsame footing as the moralist\u2019s demand that it shall be righteous, or the\nartist\u2019s that it shall be beautiful, and that all three are no more than\n\u201cpostulates\u201d which we make, in the last resort, simply because it\nsatisfies our deepest feelings to make them? Must we not, in fact, say\nalike to the followers of Logic, of Ethics, of Religion, and of Art,\n\u201cYour claims on the world are ultimately all of the same kind; they are\nmade with equal right, and so long as any one of you is content to\nadvance his postulate as a postulate, and at his own personal risk, no\none of you has any pretension to criticise or reject the postulates of\nthe others\u201d?\n\nThe doctrine I have attempted to summarise thus briefly, I believe to be\npartly irrelevant in Metaphysics, partly mistaken, and therefore, so far\nas mistaken, mischievous. I pass lightly over the curious mental\nreservation suggested by the claim to believe as you list \u201cat your own\nrisk.\u201d As George Eliot has reminded us in _Adam Bede_, it is a\nfundamental fact of our position as members of a social order, that\nnothing in the world can be done exclusively at the risk of the doer.\nYour beliefs, so far as they receive expression at all, like all the\nrest of your conduct, inevitably affect the lives of others as well as\nyour own, and hence it is useless to urge in extenuation of a false and\nmischievous belief to which expression has been given\u2014and a belief which\ngets no kind of expression is no genuine belief at all\u2014that it was\nentertained at your \u201cpersonal risk.\u201d That no man liveth to himself is\njust as true of the metaphysician as of any other man, and he has no\nmore claim than another to disregard the truth in practice.\n\nTo pass to a more important point. It is no doubt true that the\nattainment of satisfaction for our intellectual need for a coherent way\nof thinking about existence is only one of a number of human interests.\nAnd thus we may readily grant that morality, religion, and art have a\nright to existence no less than Logic. Further, the question whether any\none of the four has a _better_ right to existence than the others seems\nto be really unmeaning. There seems to be no sense in asking whether any\ntypical and essential human aspiration has a superior claim to\nrecognition and fulfilment rather than another. But it does not seem to\nfollow that _for all purposes_ our divergent interests and attitudes are\nof equal value, and that therefore they may not legitimately be used as\nbases for mutual criticism. In particular, it does not seem to follow\nthat because Logic and morality, say, have an equal right to exist,\nthere must be an equal amount of _truth_ in the principles of Logic and\nthe postulates of Ethics. Truth, after all, is perhaps not the \u201cone\nthing needful\u201d for human life, and it is not self-evident even that\ntruth is the supreme interest of morality and religion.\n\nOn the face of things, indeed, it seems not to be so. _Prim\u00e2 facie_, it\nlooks as if the logician\u2019s ideal of truth and the moralist\u2019s ideal of\ngoodness were, in part at any rate, divergent. For it is by no means\nclear that the widest possible diffusion of true thinking and the\ngeneral attainment of the highest standard of moral goodness must\nnecessarily go together. It may even be conducive to the moral goodness\nof a community that many members of it should not think on certain\ntopics at all, or even should think erroneously about them.[211] And the\nideals of goodness and beauty, we may remind ourselves, seem to be\nsimilarly divergent. It is by no means self-evident, and might even be\nsaid to be, so far as history enables us to judge, probably untrue, that\nthe society in which the appreciation of beauty is most highly developed\nis also the society with the highest standard of goodness.\n\nNow, if truth and goodness are not simply identical, we cannot conclude\nthat the ultimate truth of a belief is proportionate to its moral\nusefulness in promoting practical goodness. And therefore the\nmetaphysician, who takes ultimate truth as _his_ standard of worth,\nwould appear to be quite within his right in refusing to admit moral\nusefulness as sufficient justification for a belief, just as the\nmoralist, from the point of view of his special standard of worth, may\nrightly decline to take the aesthetic harmoniousness of a life as\nsufficient evidence of its moral excellence. Until you have shown, what\nthe view I am here opposing appears tacitly to assume, that truth, moral\ngoodness, and beauty are one thing, you cannot rationally refuse the\nmetaphysician\u2019s claim to criticise, and if necessary to condemn as not\nfinally true, the \u201cpostulates\u201d of which Ethics is entitled to assent,\nnot that they are \u201ctrue,\u201d but that they are practically useful.\n\nAnd, of course, the same liberty must be granted to Ethics itself. The\nmoralist, I would not only admit but insist, has a perfect right to\ncriticise, from his special standpoint, the doctrines of the\nmetaphysician. It may perfectly well be that certain \u201ctruths\u201d are better\nnot generally known, in the interests of practical goodness, and the\nmoralist is fully justified in dwelling upon the fact. But when the\nmetaphysician asserts the truth of a proposition solely on the strength\nof its value for the promotion of morality, he is deserting the\ncriterion of value which he is bound in his capacity of metaphysician to\nrespect. It is quite true that logic is not the only game at which it\ninterests mankind to play, and that no one need play this special game\nunless he prefers it; but when you have once sat down to the game you\nmust play it according to its own rules, and not those of some other. If\nyou neglect this caution, you will most likely produce something which\nis neither good Metaphysics nor sound Ethics. There is every reason for\nMetaphysics to beware of a \u201cwill to believe\u201d which in practice must mean\nthat licence to indulge in uncriticised assertion which Socrates in the\n_Ph\u00e6do_ calls by the appropriate name of \u201cmisology,\u201d and identifies as\nthe psychological source of the worst forms of practical\n\u201cdisillusionment with life.\u201d[212]\n\nIt follows, if these reflections are sound, that we must not, as\nmetaphysicians, allow ourselves to assume the truth of any and every\nconviction about the nature of the world which we find personally\ninspiring and attractive, or even which we believe to have an\ninvigorating effect upon the moral practice of mankind in general. We\ncannot, on _a priori_ grounds, dismiss the suggestion that it may make\nfor practical goodness that all of us to some extent, and many of us to\na very great extent, should be dwellers in the imperfectly illuminated\nregions on the \u201cmid way boundary of light and dark.\u201d[213] On the other\nhand, it would manifestly be incompatible with the presence of any\nrational unity of structure in the experience-world that there should be\na final and absolute lack of harmony between that world, as it must be\nconceived by true thinking, and as it must be if our ethical aspirations\nare to be satisfied. Somehow and somewhere, if the world is a\nteleological unity at all, these aspirations must be provided for and\nmade good by its real structure, though possibly not in the form in\nwhich, with our present limited insight, we desire that they should be\nmet, and though, again, we may be unable ever to say precisely in _what_\nform they are met. What is simply inconceivable in a rational world is\nthat our abiding aspirations should meet with blank defeat.\n\n\u00a7 3. What, then, appears to be the \u201cindispensable minimum\u201d of accord\nbetween known truth and our \u201cethical postulates,\u201d without which the\nmoral life itself would become irrational? On the whole, I think we may\nsay that morality cannot maintain itself except upon two\nsuppositions\u2014(1) that in the main and on the whole the world is so\nordered that our moral struggle for fuller and stronger individuality of\nlife is successful; that by living the moral life our individual\ncharacter does become richer in coherent interest and more completely\nunified; and (2) that the gain thus won by our private struggles does\nnot perish with our disappearance from this mortal scene, but is handed\non to the successors who replace us in the life of the social order to\nwhich we belong. Speaking roughly, this means that unless morality is a\ndelusion, the moral life is, on the whole, the happy life, and that\nthere is such a thing as social progress. Now, both these conditions, I\nwould contend, are shown by the actual experience of mankind to be met\nby the constitution of the real world. It was by the analysis of actual\nsocial life, and not by an appeal to postulates of a transcendental\nkind, that Plato and Aristotle showed that the good man is, in the main,\neven in the present state of society, the \u201chappy\u201d man. And it is by a\nsimilar analysis that the modern thinker must convince himself, if he\nconvinces himself at all, that human societies are progressive.\n\nSo far, then, no question of ultimate metaphysical issues seems to be\ninvolved in the practical demand of the moral life. The case would, of\ncourse, be different if we were with Kant to regard it as a necessary\ndemand of Ethics that the world shall be so constituted that, in the\nend, and for every individual agent, happiness shall be exactly\nproportioned to virtue. Still more so if we went on to assert that\nmorality is a delusion unless every individual is predestined, by the\nnature of things, to the ultimate attainment of complete virtue and\ncomplete happiness. Views of this kind would manifestly have to be\ndefended by an appeal to metaphysical principles which do not find their\ncomplete justification in the empirically known structure of human\nsociety. So too the demand that human society itself shall be\nprogressive beyond all limits, cannot be shown to be justified by what\nis empirically known of the structure and the non-human environment of\nour society. And if Ethics really does postulate either the complete\ncoincidence of virtue with happiness for the individual, or the infinite\nprogress of society, it is clearly committed to the postulation of very\nfar-reaching metaphysical doctrines.\n\nFurther, it must be frankly owned that these postulates, as they stand,\nare inconsistent with the scheme of metaphysical doctrine expounded and\ndefended in the present work. For both moral goodness and moral progress\nare bound up with finite individuality and its characteristic form of\nexistence, the time-process. Of \u201cprogress\u201d this is manifest: all\nprogress is advance in time, and is advance from a relatively worse to a\nrelatively better. And with \u201cvirtue\u201d it stands no otherwise. For to be\nvirtuous is not simply to _have_ an individuality which is at once\nharmonious and rich in contents, but to _make_ such an individuality for\nourselves out of the raw material of disposition and environment. Only\nin the progress towards fuller individuality are we moral agents, and,\njust because we are finite, the complete attainment of an absolutely\nharmonious individuality is for ever beyond us. Hence absolutely perfect\nvirtue\u2014and consequently absolutely perfect happiness\u2014are incompatible\nwith our nature as genuine but finite individuals. In all finite\nindividuality there is inevitably some aspect of imperfection and\nconsequently of sadness, though sin and sadness ought to fill, and can\nbe empirically seen to fill, an increasingly subordinate place in\nproportion to the degree of individuality attained. The same reasoning\nis equally applicable to the case of any finite society.\n\nNor does this seem any ground for regarding the constitution of the\nuniverse as ethically unsatisfactory. To repeat the previously quoted\nremark of Mr. Bradley, no one has a right to call the universe morally\nunsatisfactory on the ground that it does not precisely apportion\nhappiness to virtue, unless he is prepared to show that more goodness\nwould be produced by making the correspondence exact, and to show this\nis impossible. Still more absurd would it be to censure the universe\nbecause neither _perfect_ virtue nor _perfect_ happiness is attainable.\nFor morality itself has no existence except as the creation of finite\nindividuals, and hence we cannot without absurdity censure the universe\non _moral_ grounds for containing finite individuals, and so providing\nfor the existence of morality.\n\n\u00a7 4. Would the case be altered if we had, or thought we had, grounds for\nholding that the progress of human society has fixed and knowable bounds\nset to it by the nature of things? If we could know, for instance, that\nthe physical environment of humanity is so constituted that human life\n_must_ ultimately disappear from the earth? I cannot see that it would.\nNo doubt the widespread acceptance of a belief that the end of things\nwas at hand within a calculable period, might tend to lessen our moral\nearnestness, and if the period were taken to be sufficiently short,\nmight lead to downright licence and wickedness. But so does a belief in\nthe approaching dissolution of any historic and wide-reaching social\norder; and yet the fact that societies suffer dissolution is not\ncommonly regarded as reasonable ground for an indictment against the\nuniverse. Nor is there any logical connection between such beliefs and\ntheir consequences. We cannot say that because human society is\nperishable, if it is perishable, its achievements must have been wasted\nand therefore its progress useless. The result of our achievements\nmight, in some way unknown to us, survive our extinction as a race, even\nas we can partly see that the results of the individual life are\npreserved after our death.\n\nAnd, in any case, it is beyond the power of Metaphysics to set any fixed\nlimits to the existence and progress of human society. As we have seen,\nMetaphysics gives us no reason to deny, though it does not enable us to\naffirm, that the social life begun under present conditions may be\ncontinued under unknown conditions beyond the grave. And even the\ndisappearance of physical human life within a calculable period cannot\nbe shown to follow from any principle of Metaphysics. At most we can say\nthat _if_ certain assumed physical laws, especially that of the\ndissipation of energy, are valid for all physical processes, and if\nagain, the psychical factor in living organisms is incapable of\nreversing the \u201cdown-grade\u201d tendency of energy to pass into forms\nunavailable for work, then the human society we know must come to an end\nwithin a calculable time. But whether the assumptions upon which this\nconclusion is based are or are not true, Metaphysics by itself cannot\ndetermine.\n\nWe are thus left in the following position. That on the whole the\nvirtuous life is also the happy life, and that there is genuine social\nprogress,[214] seem to be empirically known certainties. \u201cAbsolute\nperfection\u201d of the finite as finite, and \u201cinfinite progress\u201d seem alike\nexcluded as metaphysical impossibilities. But no definite limits can be\nset by Metaphysics to the possibilities of individual and social advance\ntowards greater virtue and greater happiness. As for the theories in\nPhysics which appear to threaten humanity with extinction within a\nmeasurable time, their truth is, to say the least of it, not assured,\nand we have, in our metaphysical conception of Reality as an individual\nwhole, the certainty that, whatever becomes of the human species,\nnothing of all our aspirations and achievements can be finally lost to\nthe universe, though we may be quite unable to imagine the manner of\ntheir preservation. And for the purposes of the moral struggle from a\nworse to a better, this seems to be quite as much conformity to our\naspirations as we need ask of the world. For the suggestion that our\nideals are not worth living for unless _we_ enjoy the fruit of our\nlabours in the form we in particular should like, seems nothing better\nthan an appeal to the baser Egoism.\n\n\u00a7 5. When we consider the specially _religious_ attitude of mind, we\nshall find that its demands upon the world go further than those of mere\nEthics, and are, in part, of a rather different character. It would be\nimpossible in a work like this to discuss at length the nature of the\nreligious attitude, but this much at least would probably be admitted as\nbeyond doubt. The religious attitude towards the world of experience is\ndistinguished from all others partly by the specific character of the\nemotions in which it finds its expression, partly by the intellectual\nbeliefs to which those emotions give rise. Specifically religious\nemotion, as we can detect it both in our own experience, if we happen to\npossess the religious \u201ctemperament\u201d,[215] and in the devotional\nliterature of the world, appears to be essentially a mingled condition\nof exaltation and humility arising from an immediate sense of communion\nand co-operation with a power greater and better than ourselves in which\nour ideals of good find completer realisation than they ever obtain in\nthe empirically known time-order. In the various religious creeds of the\nworld we have a number of attempts to express the nature of such a power\nand of our relation to it in more or less logically satisfactory\nconceptual terms. But it is important to remember that, though a\ntheological belief when sincerely held may react powerfully upon\nreligious feeling, the beliefs are in the last resort based upon\nimmediate feeling, and not immediate feeling upon beliefs. In this\nsense, at any rate, it is true that all genuine religious life implies\nthe practical influencing of feeling and action by convictions which go\nbeyond proved and known truth, and may therefore be said to be matters\nof faith.\n\nWhat the convictions to which we thus surrender the practical guidance\nof life are, in any individual case, seems to be largely a question of\nindividual constitution and social tradition. Not only are the\nconvictions as to the nature of the higher power represented by the\ngreat typical historical religions very various, but what we may call\nthe individual religion of different persons exhibits even greater\nvariety. There is hardly any important object of human interest which\nmay not acquire for some man the significance which belongs to the\ncompleted realisation of his highest ideals. It is no more than the\ntruth to say that a mother, a mistress, a country, or a movement, social\nor political, may be, as we often phrase it, a man\u2019s \u201creligion.\u201d\n\nAmid all this variety two general principles may be detected which are\nof primary importance to the metaphysical critic of religious\nexperience. (1) It is essential to the religious experience that its\nobject should be accepted as the really existing embodiment of an ideal.\nThis is the point in which the religious attitude of mind differs most\nstrikingly from that of mere morality. In the ethical experience the\nideal is apprehended as something which does not yet exist, but has to\nbe brought into existence by human exertion. Hence for the purely\nethical attitude of mind the world has to be thought of as essentially\nimperfect, essentially out of accord with what it ought to be in order\nto correspond to our demands on it. Thus there is not for morality, as\nwe shall directly see there must be for religion, such a thing as the\n\u201cProblem of Evil.\u201d That the world, as it comes to us in the temporal\norder, contains imperfection and evil which must be done away with, is a\npractical presupposition without which morality itself would have no\n_raison d\u2019\u00eatre_.\n\nBut in religion the case is otherwise. It is only in so far as the\nobject of our adoration, whatever it may be, is taken to be the really\nexisting embodiment of our highest ideals, that it can produce, in our\nspiritual communion with it, that combined emotion of exaltation and\nabasement, that feeling of being at once ourselves already perfect so\nfar as our will is one in its contact with our ideal, and absolutely\ncondemned and \u201csubject to wrath\u201d so far as it is not, which\ndistinguishes the religious from all other states of mind. But all real\nexistence, as we saw in our Second Book, is essentially individual.\nHence it is of the essence of religion that it looks upon the ideal as\nalready existing _in individual form_. This is why devotion to an\nabstract principle, such as nationality, socialism, democracy, humanity,\nproves so much inferior as a permanent expression of religious life, to\ndevotion to a person, however imperfect.[216]\n\n(2) It follows that mere appearance in the time-order cannot be the\nultimate object of religious devotion. For the time-order itself, as we\nhave seen, is essentially unfinished and incomplete, and no part of it,\ntherefore, can be perfectly individual. The completely individual, if it\nexists at all, must have an existence which is not temporal. Hence no\npart of the temporal order of events, as such, can be finally\nsatisfactory as an object of religious adoration. So far as it is\npossible to succeed in worshipping anything which forms part of that\norder, such as a man or a cause, this can only be done by regarding the\ntemporal facts as an imperfect appearance of a reality which, because\ncompletely and perfectly individual, is in its true nature timeless. And\nit further follows that, since all finite individuality is, as we have\nalready seen, only imperfectly individual, and because imperfect is\ntemporal, the only finally adequate object of religious devotion must be\nthe infinite individual or timeless Absolute itself.\n\nThat the great philosophical religions of the world have felt the force\nof this, is shown in history by the way in which they have inevitably\ntended to credit their various \u201cgods\u201d with omnipotence. Thus the god of\nthe Hebrew religion, as at first presented to us in its earlier records,\nis represented as limited in power by the existence of other divine\nbeings, and temporally changeable and mutable. But in the later Old\nTestament writings, the New Testament, and the subsequent constructions\nof ecclesiastical theology, we see the gradual development from these\nHebrew beginnings of an idea of a God who is \u201call in all,\u201d and limited\nneither by the existence of other divine beings with opposing aims and\ninterests, nor by the inherent resistance of \u201cmatter,\u201d to His purposes.\nSo the Zoroastrian religion, in which the limitation of the power of the\ngood being Ahura Mazda by the existence of a co-ordinate bad being,\nAngro Mainyus, was originally a fundamental tenet, is said to have\nbecome among the modern Parsis a pure monotheism.\n\n\u00a7 6. Now, it should be noted that this inevitable tendency of Religion\nitself to identify its object with ultimate Reality, conceived in its\ntimeless perfection as a complete and infinite individual whole, leads\nto the difficult metaphysical \u201cproblem of evil.\u201d For if God is the same\nthing as the Absolute, it would appear that evil itself must be, like\neverything else, a manifestation of His nature. And if so, can we say\nthat God is strictly speaking \u201cgood,\u201d or is the complete realisation of\nour ideals? It is this difficulty about evil, more than anything else,\nwhich has led many philosophers in both ancient and modern times to\ndistinguish between the Absolute and God, and to regard God as simply\none, though the highest and most perfect, among the finite individuals\ncontained in the Absolute.[217] In the following paragraphs I propose\nnot so much to offer a solution of this time-honoured puzzle, as to make\nsome suggestions which may help to put the issue at stake clearly before\nthe reader\u2019s mind.\n\nThe doctrine of the finitude of God does not appear in any way to remove\nthe difficulty about evil; in fact, it renders it, if anything, more\nacute. For evil must now appear in the universe in a double form. On the\none hand, it admittedly is taken to exist outside God, as a hostile\nfactor limiting His power of shaping the world to His purpose. But\nagain, as we have seen, every finite individual, because finite, falls\nshort of complete internal harmony of structure, and thus contains an\nelement of defect and evil within itself. Thus evil will be inherent in\nthe nature of a finite God, as well as in that of the existence supposed\nto be outside Him. We have, in fact, one more illustration of the\nprinciple that all limitation involves self-limitation from within. It\nis only by forgetting this fundamental truth that we can conceive the\npossibility of a being who is \u201cperfectly good\u201d and yet is less than the\nAbsolute.\n\nAnd even when we overlook this, our difficulties are not removed. For a\n\u201cfinite\u201d God with a further reality outside and in some way opposed to\nHis own nature, even when illogically thought of as perfectly good, must\nbe at best only such another being as ourselves, though on a larger\nscale. He, like us, must be simply a partly successful, partly\nunsuccessful, actor in a universe of which the constitution and ultimate\nupshot are either unknown or known not to satisfy our religious demand\nfor the complete individual reality of our ideal.[218] This is the view\nwhich has in history been actually adopted by religions like those of\nthe Hellenes and the Norsemen, in which the gods are regarded as\nultimately subject to an inscrutable and unethical Fate. But a finite\nbeing struggling, however successfully, against such an alien Fate is,\nafter all, a fit object only for moral respect and sympathy, not for\nreligious adoration. Such a being, however exalted, is still not that\ncomplete and harmonious individual realisation of all human aspiration\nfor which Religion yearns, and is therefore not, in the full and true\nsense, God.\n\nIf, then, a finite ethical individual, however exalted, cannot be an\nadequate object of religious devotion, how does the case stand with the\ninfinite individual whole of Reality? Can we worship the Absolute?[219]\nThis is a question which needs some careful examination before we can\nventure on a positive answer.\n\n\u00a7 7. The problem, let it be observed, is not strictly psychological.\nExperience shows that individual men can derive religious support from\nbelief in the most varied and most defective conceptions of the nature\nof the Deity. Beliefs which bring one man \u201cpeace in believing\u201d might, if\nseriously entertained, blight another man\u2019s life; one man\u2019s God may be\nanother\u2019s devil. This is, however, not the point. The real question is,\nwhether the Absolute can be made into an object of religious worship, as\nwe have seen that finite individuals cannot, without a breach of logic.\nHas it the character which, as we have seen, anything which is to\ncorrespond to our ideal of \u201cGod\u201d must logically possess?\n\nAt first sight it certainly would seem that it has. For, as we have\nseen, the Absolute contains all finite existence, and contains it as a\nperfectly harmonious system. And therefore all finite aspiration must\nsomehow be realised in the structure of the Absolute whole, though not\nnecessarily in the way in which we, as beings of limited knowledge and\ngoodness, actually wish it to be realised. The Absolute whole is thus,\nas nothing else can be, the concrete individual reality in which our\nideals have actual existence. As all our ideals themselves are but so\nmany expressions of our place in the system and our relation to the rest\nof it, so the system itself is their concrete harmonious embodiment.\n\nIt is true, as we have already seen, that our ideals may not be realised\nin the whole just in the form in which we conceive them, but it must be\nremembered that in so far as we set up our private judgment and wishes\nas standards to which the whole is bound to conform on pain of\ncondemnation, we are adopting an attitude which is at once illogical and\nirreligious. It is illogical, because it implies the assumption that\nwith fuller knowledge of the system of Reality as a whole we should\nstill desire the fulfilment of our aspirations in the special way which\nat present recommends itself to our imperfect insight. It is\nirreligious, because the demand that human desires shall be fulfilled in\nour way and not in \u201cGod\u2019s way\u201d involves the setting up of human wisdom\nagainst God\u2019s, and is thus irreconcilable with genuine union of heart\nand will with the divine order.[220]\n\nWhat then becomes, from this point of view, of the problem of evil? How\ncan the presence of moral evil in the temporal order be reconciled with\nthe thought of the Absolute whole as the complete and harmonious\nrealisation of human ideals? I need not say that the _detailed_ solution\nof the problem is out of the question. As beings whose insight is\nnecessarily limited by our own finitude, we cannot hope to see how in\ndetail everything that appears to us as evil might, with larger\nknowledge, be known as an integral constituent of a whole which, as a\nwhole, is the realisation of human aspiration, and therefore free from\nevil. But it is at least possible to make suggestions which may show\nthat the problem is a mere consequence of the inevitable defects of our\ninsight, and that it would disappear with fuller knowledge. It is not\nhard to see that there are two main reasons why the structure of the\nuniverse seems to finite insight partly evil. Our insight into the\nnature and connection of our purposes themselves is never complete; we\nare all, in part, ignorant of exactly what it is to which we aspire.\nHence our purposes in part appear to be met by existence with a negative\njust because we are only imperfectly aware of what they mean and whither\nthey tend. There is no more familiar fact than this, that even within\nthe limits of our human life growing experience is constantly teaching\nus how confused and defective our judgment at any moment as to what we\nreally want, can be. Largely, then, our ideals seem to be at variance\nwith actual existence, because we never fully know what they are.\n\nAgain, our knowledge of the effects of our acts is always imperfect in\nthe extreme. We seem to fail because we cannot see far enough to\nunderstand fully what it is we have effected. And both these causes of\nthe apparent discrepancy between the real and the ideal may be traced to\na single root. Existence appears to be in part evil, because we cannot\ntake it in at once and as a whole in its individual structure. We have\nto make acquaintance with it by piecemeal, and as a succession of\nfragmentary events in the time-series. And imperfection, we have seen,\nbelongs to the time-series. Hence we can see that evil is at once a mere\nappearance, and an appearance which is inevitable to the finite\nexperience conditioned by the temporal form. The so-called \u201cproblem\u201d is\nthus in principle insoluble only so long as we falsely think of the\ntime-order itself as a characteristic of the Absolute whole in its real\nindividuality.[221]\n\nMay we say, then, that the Absolute or whole is known in Metaphysics to\nbe \u201cgood\u201d? The answer depends upon the precise meaning we attach to the\nstatement. In the sense that it is the really existing embodiment of the\nideals we are trying amid our ignorance and confusion to realise, we\nclearly must say \u201cyes.\u201d But if we use the word \u201cgood\u201d in a narrower\nsense, to mean \u201c_ethically_ good,\u201d we can hardly say without\nqualification that the whole is good. For \u201cethical goodness\u201d belongs\nessentially to the time-order, and means the process of the gradual\nassertion of the ideal against apparent evil. To be morally good is to\nhave an ideal that is not realised in the events of the time-order as\nthey come to us in our finite experience, and to mould those events into\nconformity with the ideal. The moral life is from first to last a\nstruggle, and where the struggle is absent it is misleading to speak of\nmorality. Hence it is better not to call the Absolute \u201cmoral.\u201d\n\nBut we must remember that the Absolute is only not moral, because it is\nsomething very much more than moral, only not ethical because there is\nin it no divorce of ideal from actuality, as there is in the imperfect\nexperience of its finite members. Or, as we might say, it is something\nmore than \u201cgood\u201d precisely because it is already good. In morality, let\nit be remembered, we have, as in all the experience of finite beings, a\nprocess which is throughout directed upon a result that, once attained,\nwould transcend the process itself. Morality would not be content with\nanything less than the total abolition of the evil in the world; and\nwith the disappearance of evil, the struggle against it would itself\ndisappear in some higher form of experience. Similarly, knowledge is\nconstantly striving to exhaust the object of knowledge. So long as the\nobject is in any respect unknown, the task of knowing is incomplete; yet\nif once we could so know any object that nothing further remained to be\nknown about it, there would be no aspect of not-self in the object which\ncould distinguish it from the subject by which it is known, and\nknowledge itself would thus be done away. Thus we may see from the side\nalike of cognition and of will how the whole life of the finite being\nforms a constant endeavour to widen experience into the complete\napprehension of a content which, because infinite, could not be\napprehended without the disappearance of finitude itself. Thus does\nexperience witness to the truth of our fundamental doctrine, that the\nfinite individual repeats in itself, in an imperfect and inadequate\nform, the structure of the infinite individual of which it is an\nappearance.\n\nI do not know whether it is necessary to say more than a word with\nreference to the thoughtless objection so often urged against all\nphilosophical and religious doctrines which deny the ultimate reality of\nevil, or, what is the same thing, the existence of an independent devil.\nIf existence is already perfect, it is said, why should we seek to make\nit better at great trouble and inconvenience to ourselves by moral and\npolitical endeavour? Ought we not rather to sit with folded hands\nacquiescing lazily in \u201cthings as they are\u201d? The doubt might even be\ncarried further than this. For to \u201ctake things as they are\u201d is just as\nmuch a course of self-chosen action as any other line of conduct, and it\nmight hence be argued that abstention and moral effort are alike out of\nplace and absurd in a world where everything is \u201cperfect.\u201d\n\nThe objection, of course, turns upon a mere confusion of existence as it\nis in its individual reality, and existence as it appears to us in the\ntime-series. The argument for Quietism is based purely upon attributing\nto the essentially imperfect and incomplete series of temporal events\nthe perfection which only belongs to the timeless whole. In that perfect\nwhole our moral ideals and moral effort, as finite beings belonging to\nthe temporal order, are of course included along with everything else,\nand its perfection is therefore no ground for treating them as nugatory.\nOur own moral struggle with the apparent evil of the time-series is\nitself an integral part of the Reality which, in its complete individual\ncharacter, is already perfect, if we could but win to a point of view\nfrom which to behold it as it is. As Plotinus expresses it, \u201cour\nstriving is after good and our turning away is from evil, and thought\nwith a purpose is of good and evil, and this is a good.\u201d[222]\n\nIf we may not say without qualification that the Absolute is good, and\ncertainly must not say that it is in the proper sense \u201cethical,\u201d still\nless may we say that the Absolute is \u201cmorally indifferent.\u201d For the\nAbsolute is only not ethical because it is already all that ethical life\nconsists in striving to become. Hence the higher a finite being stands\nin the ethical scale, as judged by the double criterion of the wealth of\nits interests in the world and the degree of harmony between them, the\nmore adequately does its structure repeat that of the whole, and the\nhigher is its degree of reality. And this means that the good man\u2019s\nideals are realised in the world-order with less of modification and\nreconstruction than the bad man\u2019s. In a sense, as Professor Royce\nmaintains, even the bad man\u2019s confused and warring ideals get their\nfulfilment, since he too is aiming, however blindly, at a complete\nindividuality as the goal of all his striving. But he is seeking it\nwhere it is not to be found, in the gratification of desires which\ncannot be allowed the supreme place in the direction of life without\nleading to the distraction and mutilation of the self. As Plato puts it,\nthe bad man \u201cdoes as he pleases,\u201d and for that very reason never \u201cdoes\nwhat he wills.\u201d Hence the place of the good man in the economy of the\nuniverse is very different from that of the bad, and the world-order\nitself is the very reverse of \u201cindifferent\u201d to the distinction between\nthem.[223]\n\nMy own conclusion, then, which I offer to the reader simply as my own,\nis that anything less than the Absolute is an inadequate object of\nreligious devotion, and that the Absolute itself has the structure which\nsuch an object requires. If it should be further suggested that at any\nrate, when we come to actual experience, we find that we cannot\nrepresent the object of our worship to ourselves in an individual form\nof sufficient concreteness to stir effectual emotion and prompt to\ngenuine action without clothing it in imagination with anthropomorphic\nqualities which metaphysical criticism proves inapplicable to the\ninfinite individual, I should be inclined to reply that I admit the\nfact. And I do not think we need shrink from the conclusion that\npractical religion involves a certain element of intellectual\ncontradiction. Thus, though God is not truly God until we deny the\nexistence of any independent \u201cevil\u201d by which His nature is limited, it\nseems probable that the thought of ourselves as \u201cfellow-workers with\nGod\u201d would hardly lead to practical good works unless we also\ninconsistently allowed ourselves to imagine God as struggling against a\nhostile power and standing in need of our assistance. But this only\nshows that the practical value of religion in guiding action is not\nnecessarily dependent upon its scientific truth.\n\n\u00a7 8. Of course, it would be quite open to us to hold that there may be,\nwithin the Absolute, finite beings of superhuman power and goodness with\nwhom humanity is capable of co-operating for ethical ends. Only such\nbeings, if they exist, would not be God in the same sense in which the\nAbsolute may be called God. They might deserve and win our reverence and\nour co-operation, but because themselves finite and therefore only\nimperfectly real and individual, they could not logically take the place\nwhich belongs only to the completely and perfectly individual\nrealisation of the ideal. That would still fall partly outside them in\nthe nature, as a whole, of the system which harmoniously includes both\nourselves and them. Thus such beings would be \u201cgods\u201d in the sense of\npolytheism rather than God in that of monotheism.\n\nFurther, I can see no means of deciding _a priori_ that there could be\nonly one such being in the universe. Even supposing the series of finite\nbeings to be itself finite, it is not evident that it could contain only\none \u201cbest\u201d member. And supposing it infinite, could there be a \u201cbest\u201d\nmember at all?[224] Also it appears quite beyond the power of\nMetaphysics to find either proof or disproof of the existence and agency\nof such finite but exalted beings. We cannot say that our general\nconception of Reality is such as to negative the suggestion, and yet\nagain that general conception gives us no positive evidence in favour of\ntaking it as true. It would certainly be the grossest presumption to\nmaintain that the Absolute can contain no higher types of finite\nindividuality than those presented by human society; on the other hand,\nit would be equally presumptuous to assert that we have reasoned\nknowledge of their existence and their direct social relation with\nourselves. Hence we must, I think, be content to say that the\nhypothesis, so far as it seems to be suggested to any one of us by the\nconcrete facts of his own individual experience, is a matter for the\nlegitimate exercise of Faith.\n\n\u00a7 9. These reflections may naturally lead to some remarks, which shall\nbe made as brief as possible, about the so-called philosophical\n\u201carguments for the existence of God,\u201d which played a prominent part in\nMetaphysics before their discrediting at the hands of Kant and\nHume.[225] Kant\u2019s great achievement lies in having demonstrated that the\nwhole force of the \u201cproofs\u201d depends upon the famous ontological\nargument, best known in modern Philosophy in the form adopted by\nDescartes in the fifth _Meditation_. Descartes there argues thus:\u2014By\n\u201cGod\u201d I mean a completely perfect being. Now, existence is a perfection,\nand non-existence an imperfection. Hence I cannot think of a\nnon-existing perfect being without self-contradiction. Hence God,\nbecause by hypothesis perfect, must exist, and is the _only_ being whose\nexistence logically follows from its definition.\n\nKant\u2019s even more famous criticism of this famous inference turns upon\nthe principle which he had learned from his study of Hume, that logical\nnecessity is \u201csubjective.\u201d If I think of a logical subject as defined by\ncertain properties, he argues in effect, I am _necessitated_ to ascribe\nto it all the predicates implied in that definition. That is, I must\naffirm them or contradict myself. Hence, if \u201cexistence\u201d is originally\nincluded among the perfections by which the subject \u201cGod\u201d is defined,\nthe proposition _God exists_ is certainly necessary, but is also\ntautological, and amounts, in fact, to the mere assertion that \u201can\nexisting perfect being is an existing perfect being.\u201d But if the\n\u201cexistence\u201d spoken of in the predicate is something not included in the\ndefinition of the subject, then you cannot infer it from that\ndefinition. Now \u201creal existence\u201d is not a predicate which can be\nincluded in the definition of a concept. The predicates by which an\nimaginary hundred dollars are defined are the same as those of a real\nhundred dollars. It is not by the possession of a new predicate, but by\nbeing actually given in a concrete experience, that the real coins\ndiffer from the imaginary. Hence all propositions asserting real\nexistence are _synthetic_, (_i.e._ assert of their subject something\nwhich is not contained in the concept of it), and the real existence of\nGod or any other object can never be deduced from its definition.[226]\n\nThis Kantian criticism has itself been subjected to much criticism,\nprincipally at the hands of Hegel and those subsequent philosophers who\nhave been specially affected by the Hegelian influence. What appears to\nbe the general principle of the Hegelian criticism has been most clearly\nexpressed in English philosophy by Mr. Bradley,[227] upon whose\ndiscussion the following remarks are chiefly founded.\n\nIn estimating the worth of the ontological proof, we must distinguish\nbetween the general principle implied in it and the particular form in\nwhich it presents that principle. It is manifest that Kant is perfectly\nright when he contends that, taking existence to mean presence in the\nspace and time-order, you cannot reason from my possession of any idea\nto the existence of a corresponding object. You cannot say whatever I\nconceive must exist as I conceive it. But the principle of the\nontological proof is perhaps not necessarily condemned by its failure to\nbe thus universally applicable. The principle involved appears to be\nsimply this. The idea and the reality outside its own existence as a\nfact in the time-order which it \u201cmeans\u201d or \u201cstands for\u201d are mutually\ncomplementary aspects of a whole Reality which include them both. For\nthere is, on the one side, no \u201cidea\u201d so poor and untrue as not to have\nsome meaning or objective reference beyond its own present\nexistence.[228] And, on the other, what has no significance for any\nsubject of experience is nothing. Hence in its most general form the\nontological argument is simply a statement that reality and meaning for\na subject mutually imply one another. But it does not follow that all\nthoughts are equally true and significant. In other words, though every\nthought _means_ something beyond its own existence, different thoughts\nmay represent the structure of that which they mean with very different\ngrades of adequacy. That which my thought means may be far from being\nreal in the form in which I think it.\n\nNow, we may surely say that the more internally harmonious and\nsystematic my thought is, the more adequately it represents the true\nnature of that which it means. If thoroughly systematic coherent thought\nmay be mere misrepresentation, our whole criterion of scientific truth\nis worthless. How freely we use this ontological argument in practice\nwill be readily seen by considering the way in which, _e.g._, in the\ninterpretation and reconstruction of historical facts, the internal\ncoherency of a systematic and comprehensive interpretation is taken as\nitself the evidence of its truth.[229] Hence it may be argued that if\nthere is a systematic way of thinking about Reality which is absolutely\nand entirely internally coherent, and from its own nature must remain\nso, however the detailed content of our ideas should grow in complexity,\nwe may confidently say that such a scheme of thought faithfully\nrepresents the Reality for which it stands, so far as any thought can\nrepresent Reality. That is, while the thought would not _be_ the Reality\nbecause it still remains thought, which _means_ something beyond its own\nexistence, it would require no modification of structure but only\nsupplementation in detail to make it the truth.\n\nBut if we have anywhere thought which is thus internally coherent, and\nfrom its own nature must remain so, however knowledge may extend, we\nhave it surely in our metaphysical conception of the real as the\nabsolutely individual. Thus the ontological proof appears, in any sense\nin which it is not fallacious, to amount merely to the principle that\nsignificant thought gives us genuine knowledge; and therefore, since the\nthoroughgoing individuality of structure of its object is presupposed in\nall significant thought, Reality must be a perfect individual. That this\nperfect individual must further be \u201cGod,\u201d _i.e._ must have the special\ncharacter ascribed to it by beliefs based upon specifically religious\nemotions, does not follow. How far the \u201cGod\u201d of religion is a correct\nconception of the metaphysical Absolute, we can only learn from the\nanalysis of typical expressions of the religious experience itself. And\nit is obvious that if by \u201cGod\u201d we mean anything less than the Absolute\nwhole, the ontological proof ceases to have any cogency. It is\nimpossible to show that the possibility of significant thought implies\nthe presence of a special finite being, not empirically known to us,\nwithin the Absolute.\n\nThe \u201ccosmological\u201d proof, or \u201cargument from the contingency of the\nworld,\u201d unlike the ontological, has the appearance, at first sight, of\nstarting with given empirical fact. As summarised by Kant for purposes\nof criticism, it runs thus:\u2014\u201cIf anything at all exists, there must be\nalso an absolutely necessary being. Now, I exist myself; _ergo_, the\nabsolutely necessary being exists.\u201d To make the proof quite complete, it\nwould be necessary to show that the being whose existence is affirmed in\nthe minor premisses, to wit, myself, is not itself the \u201cabsolutely\nnecessary being,\u201d and the argument thus completed would become in\nprinciple identical with the second of the \u201cproofs\u201d given by Descartes\nin the third _Meditation_, where it is inferred that if I, a dependent\nbeing, exist, there must be a God on whom I and all things depend.[230]\nAs Kant has pointed out, the whole force of this inference rests upon\nthe previous admission of the ontological argument. By itself the\ncosmological proof only establishes the conclusion that if any dependent\nexistence is real, independent existence of some kind must be real also.\nTo convert this into a \u201cproof of the existence of _God_\u201d you must\nfurther go on to identify the \u201cindependent existence\u201d thus reached with\nthe \u201cmost real\u201d or \u201cmost perfect\u201d being of the ontological proof. For\notherwise it might be suggested, as is done by one of the speakers in\nHume\u2019s dialogue, that the series of phenomenal events itself, taken as\nan aggregate, is the \u201cnecessary existence\u201d upon which the \u201ccontingent\nexistence\u201d of each several event depends. \u201cDid I show you the particular\ncauses of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter,\nI should think it very unreasonable should you afterwards ask me what\nwas the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in\nexplaining the cause of the parts.\u201d\n\nTo avoid this objection, we must go on to maintain that only the \u201cmost\nperfect being\u201d can be an ultimately necessary being, and that its\n\u201cnecessary existence\u201d is a consequence of its character. This, as we\nhave seen, is the very assertion made in the ontological proof. Hence\nour criticisms of the ontological proof will be equally applicable to\nthe cosmological. If we combine the two, restating them in accord with\nour previous remodelling of the former, the argument will take the\nfollowing form. All propositions directly or indirectly refer to real\nexistence. Hence it would be self-contradictory to assert that nothing\nexists. But existence itself is only conceivable as individual. Hence\nthe absolutely individual must be really existent. And this is identical\nwith the general principle of our own reasoning in Book II. of the\npresent work. Clearly, if valid, it is valid simply as an argument for a\nmetaphysical Absolute; it neither proves that Absolute itself to be what\nwe mean in religion by God, nor affords any ground for asserting the\nexistence of God as a finite individual within the Absolute.[231]\n\nThe _physico-theological_ argument, also known as the argument from\n_design_, or the _teleological_ proof, differs from the preceding two in\nbeing in its current forms honestly empirical. In the shape of an\ninference from the apparent presence of order and a regard for human\ngood in the structure of nature to the existence of a wise and\nbenevolent being or beings as the author or authors of nature, it has\nbeen the most popular of all theistic arguments both in the ancient\nworld, where, according to Xenophon, it was specially insisted upon by\nSocrates, and in the modern defences of theological beliefs against\nrationalistic criticism. It must, however, be observed that the\ncriticisms of Hume and Kant are absolutely fatal to the \u201cargument from\ndesign,\u201d when it is put forward as a proof of the existence of a God of\n_infinite_ goodness and wisdom. At best, as Kant says, the observed\norder and harmony of Nature would enable us to infer a finite degree of\nwisdom and goodness in its author. The assertion of the absolute\nharmoniousness and goodness of Nature, which we require to justify the\ninference to infinite wisdom and goodness in its author, goes far beyond\nthe limits of the empirically verifiable, and can itself only be upheld\nby some form of the \u201contological proof.\u201d Hence the \u201cargument from\ndesign\u201d could at best prove a God whose wisdom and goodness are, so far\nas knowable, limited. As Hume forcibly puts the same point, if the\nempirically known facts of the partial adaptation of Nature to human\npurposes are valid, as they stand, to prove a wise and good\nintelligence, are not the equally well-ascertained facts of the partial\nwant of adaptation equally valid to prove defective goodness or\ndefective wisdom?[232]\n\nThere is a deeper metaphysical reason for this difference between the\nresults of the physico-theological and of the other \u201cproofs,\u201d which may\nbe briefly pointed out. The whole conception of the order and systematic\nunity of the world as due to preconceived \u201cdesign\u201d is only intelligible\nif we suppose the author of that \u201cdesign\u201d to be finite, and subject,\nlike ourselves, to temporal mutability. For in the notion of design\nitself are implied the severance of the mentally conceived ideal from\nthe actuality which waits to be brought into accord with it, and\nconsequently also the time-process, which we have already found to be\ncharacteristic of all finitude. Hence the physico-theological proof, by\nitself, can at best be used to establish the reality of finite \u201cgods,\u201d\nnot of \u201cGod,\u201d because it works throughout with the categories of\nfinitude.\n\nUpon the logical force of the argument, as thus limited by its initial\nassumptions, only one observation need be made. What the reasoning\nasserts is not merely that \u201cNature\u201d is in reality a system exhibiting\nindividuality and purposive interest, or even \u201cdesign,\u201d but that it\nreveals the particular design of assisting and fostering human progress.\nNow, whether this is so or not would appear to be a question of\nempirical fact only capable of determination by the methods applicable\nto other problems of the same empirical kind. Probably the lines along\nwhich it will have to be decided in the future are of the following\ngeneral kind. Evolutionary science seems clearly to have shown that in\nthe influences it knows, _e.g._, as \u201cnatural\u201d and again as \u201csexual\nselection,\u201d we have processes which lead to beneficial results without\nbeing, so far as we can see, in the least directed by the conscious\n\u201cdesign\u201d of establishing those results.[233] We should have to ask,\nthen, whether there is actual ground for holding that such influences\nare not of themselves sufficient to account for the development of human\ncivilisation, so far as it is due to factors belonging to the\n\u201cenvironment.\u201d If they are so sufficient, the \u201cphysico-theological\u201d\nargument for benevolent super-human agency in moulding the course of\nhuman development, becomes superfluous; if they are not, their failure\nis, so far, good ground for the recognition of finite \u201cdesigning\u201d\nintelligences of a non-human kind as forming a factor in our\nenvironment. In either case the question appears to be one of empirical\nfact, and to be incapable of determination in advance on general\nmetaphysical grounds.[234] Nor are we justified in assuming that \u201cdesign\nin nature,\u201d supposing it to exist, must always be directed to securing\nends which are either intelligible to us, or, if intelligible,\n\u201cbenevolent,\u201d in the sense of furthering our own special human\ninterests. And here I must be content to leave the subject.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 25,\n26; J. E. McTaggart, _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, chaps. 6, 8; J.\nRoyce, _The World and the Individual_, Second Series, lects. 9, 10.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 211:\n\n To take a couple of concrete illustrations. It may be\u2014I do not say it\n is\u2014conducive to moral goodness that there should be a general\n conviction that in the long run our individual happiness is strictly\n proportionate to our degree of virtue. But there is no means whatever\n of showing that this belief is true, and, as Mr. Bradley once\n pertinently argued against Professor Sidgwick, no philosopher is\n entitled to assert its truth on moral grounds unless he is prepared to\n maintain that he could produce more goodness and less badness by such\n an exact proportioning of happiness to merit than without it. Again,\n most of us would probably admit that ordinary moral rules, such as\n that against wilful lying, have exceptions. But we are not bound to\n hold it conducive to moral goodness that every one should be aware of\n this.\n\nFootnote 212:\n\n I have not taken into account the argument from origins, because it\n does not appear relevant. That our intellectual interest in \u201ctruth\u201d is\n historically a derivative from an interest in the \u201cuseful,\u201d \u201cscience\u201d\n an offshoot of the arts, is, as we have seen for ourselves, true\n enough, but it does not follow that the truth which is the ideal of\n the developed intellect is the same thing as the \u201cuseful\u201d from which\n it has arisen. We rejected the claims of the mechanical postulate to\n be final truth, not because of their origin in the needs of industrial\n science, but because, as tested by the standard of final\n self-consistency, they were unsatisfactory to the intellect.\n\nFootnote 213:\n\n \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c7\u03bc\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c3\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, to use the poet\u2019s phrase.\n\nFootnote 214:\n\n Not, of course, _pure_ progress. It does not require profound insight\n to discover that moral progress, like everything else, has its price,\n and that all \u201cprogressive evolution\u201d implies \u201cdegeneration\u201d as one of\n its aspects. But the moral progress of society will be genuine if, on\n the whole, our gain is\u2014from the moralist\u2019s special standpoint\u2014more\n than our loss. We have no reason to despair of our kind if the\n impartial historian, comparing the facts\u2014not the self-complacent\n fictions of popular optimism\u2014about our current social life with the\n facts\u2014not the fancies of Apologetics\u2014about social life, say, in the\n first century of the Roman Empire, can pronounce that there has been\n advance on the whole.\n\nFootnote 215:\n\n The \u201creligious\u201d temperament is apparently shown by experience to be,\n in its intenser manifestations, quite as much an idiosyncrasy of\n congenital endowment as the \u201c\u00e6sthetic.\u201d There are persons, not\n otherwise mentally defective, who seem to be almost devoid of it, just\n as there are others who have little or no sense of humour or feeling\n for beauty. As many of these persons are ethically excellent, some of\n them exceptionally so, and as again the religious temperament is often\n found strongly developed in persons of quite inferior ethical\n development, there seems to be no _direct_ connection between\n religious sensibility and moral excellence, though, of course,\n religious feeling is the most powerful of moral influences when it is\n conjoined in the same person with ethical fervour. For a masterly\n description of some typical forms of religious feeling and belief the\n reader should consult Professor James\u2019s _Varieties of Religious\n Experience_. He will find my own views as to the philosophical\n interpretation of religion, if he cares to know them, in the final\n chapter of my _Problem of Conduct_.\n\nFootnote 216:\n\n So Hegel insisted that the fundamental significance of the Christian\n religion lies neither in the historical career nor in the moral\n teaching of Jesus (which indeed contained little that had not already\n been uttered in the form of precept or principle), but in the\n recognition by the Christian community of the union of God and Man as\n a fact already realised in individual form in the person of Christ.\n See Dr. McTaggart\u2019s essay on \u201cHegelianism and Christianity\u201d in\n _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_.\n\nFootnote 217:\n\n So Plato suggested in the second book of the _Republic_, that God is\n not the cause of all that happens to us, but only of the good things\n that befall us. Perhaps, however, Plato is here consciously adapting\n his expression to current theological doctrine of which he did not\n fully approve. For a modern defence of the same conception of a finite\n God, see Dr. Rashdall\u2019s essay in _Personal Idealism_. Other reasons\n which have often led to the same view, such as the desire to think of\n God as a mutable being like ourselves, capable of being influenced in\n His attitude toward us by our attitude towards Him, seem to rest too\n much upon idiosyncrasies of private feeling to be of serious\n philosophical weight. If private feeling is to count at all, one does\n not see why that of those who would feel outraged by such a conception\n of a finite changeable God should not be allowed an equal significance\n with that of their opponents. It is a palpable mistake to treat\n private feeling, whatever its worth may be, as all on one side in this\n matter.\n\nFootnote 218:\n\n For if we once suppose that we know the universe, in which \u201cGod\u201d is\n only one finite being among others, to be so constituted as to\n correspond to this demand, it will be the whole of which \u201cGod\u201d is one\n factor, and not \u201cGod\u201d by Himself, which will become the supreme object\n of religious emotion. Thus we may say, until God is thought of as the\n individual whole, He is not fully God.\n\nFootnote 219:\n\n It should be scarcely necessary to point out that the Absolute, if it\n can be worshipped at all, can be worshipped only as conceived as fully\n individual. When it is falsely thought of as a \u201ccollection\u201d or\n \u201caggregate\u201d or \u201ctotality\u201d of independent things, it is no more divine\n than any other collection. This is the fatal objection to vulgar\n \u201cPantheism.\u201d How far any of the serious thinkers who are popularly\n charged with \u201cPantheism\u201d have countenanced this view of the Absolute\n as a mere collection, is another matter.\n\nFootnote 220:\n\n I am afraid that this essentially irreligious feeling has a great deal\n to do with the complaints sometimes urged against the Absolute as a\n poor substitute for a \u201cliving God.\u201d Partly these complaints spring, no\n doubt, from the mistaken notion that the Absolute is not a concrete\n individual but a mere \u201ccollective concept.\u201d But they seem also to be\n motived by a suspicion that a finite Deity might be more amenable than\n the Absolute to our wish to have our ideals gratified in our own\n fashion. And so far as this is the motive of them, such complaints are\n essentially impious.\n\nFootnote 221:\n\n The reader will naturally think of the famous Socratic paradox, that\n \u201cwrong doing is error,\u201d \u201cvice is ignorance.\u201d If we interpret this to\n mean that the fundamental advantage of the good man over the bad lies\n in his truer insight into what he seriously wants, it seems to be\n true.\n\nFootnote 222:\n\n _Enneads_, I. 8, 15 (quoted and translated in Whittaker, the\n _Neoplatonists_, p. 83). Plotinus had just previously made the correct\n observation that to deny the existence of evil in any and every sense\n means to deny the existence of good. (\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f34 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\n \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\n \u1f40\u03c0\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.) We might thus say, if good is to be at all, evil\n must have some kind of relative or phenomenal existence as its\n antecedent condition. But, as thus serving as a condition for the\n realisation of good, evil is itself, from a more universal point of\n view, good, and therefore its existence _as_ evil only apparent. On\n the whole question of the position of evil in the world-order, see the\n admirable essay on \u201cSin\u201d in Dr. McTaggart\u2019s _Studies in Hegelian\n Cosmology_.\n\nFootnote 223:\n\n When it is said that the Absolute, if it exists, must be morally\n indifferent, there is often a conscious or unconscious confusion of\n thought. The Absolute must certainly be \u201cindifferent\u201d in the sense\n that it does not feel the internal discord of hatred and animosity\n against any of its constituents. Deus, as Spinoza says, neminem potest\n odio habere. For the Absolute is not one of the two combatants; it is\n at once both combatants and the field of combat. But to infer that the\n Absolute, because devoid of the feelings of hatred and private\n partisanship, must be indifferent in the sense that our goodness and\n badness make no difference to our place in it, is a fallacy of\n equivocation for which unconsciousness and _bona fides_ are scarcely\n sufficient excuse.\n\nFootnote 224:\n\n Thus I do not understand why, apart from respect for the traditions of\n Christianity, Dr. Rashdall should hold that God, in his sense of the\n word, is one and not many. His argument appears to me to identify God\n with the Absolute, where it is required to maintain God\u2019s unity, and\n to distinguish them as soon as it becomes a question of proving God\u2019s\n \u201cPersonality\u201d (see his essay in _Personal Idealism_). Professor James\n appears more logical in his obvious readiness to reckon with\n polytheism as a possible consequence of his denial of God\u2019s infinity\n (_Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 524 ff.).\n\nFootnote 225:\n\n Kant\u2019s famous onslaught will be found in the _Kritik der Reinen\n Vernunft_, Transcendental Dialectic, bk. ii. div. 3 (\u201cThe Ideal of\n Pure Reason\u201d), \u00a7\u00a7 3-7. Hume\u2019s criticisms are contained in his\n posthumous _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_.\n\nFootnote 226:\n\n Kant\u2019s criticism had been in part anticipated on the first circulation\n of the _Meditations_ by both Mersenne and Gassendi. See particularly\n Gassendi\u2019s strictures on Descartes\u2019 confusion of existence with\n properties in the \u201cFifth Objections,\u201d with Descartes\u2019 unsatisfactory\n reply. Leibnitz repeated the same objection, and proposed to amend the\n Cartesian proof by a formal demonstration that God\u2019s existence is\n _possible_, _i.e._ does not imply a formal contradiction. He then\n argues\u2014If God\u2019s existence is possible, He exists (by the Cartesian\n proof). But God\u2019s existence is possible, therefore God exists. See,\n _e.g._, Leibnitz, Works, ed. Erdmann, p. 177; and Latta, _Monadology\n of Leibniz_, p. 274. Hume\u2019s comments are even more akin to Kant\u2019s.\n \u201cWhatever we conceive as existent we can also conceive as\n non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence\n implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being whose\n existence is demonstrable.\u201d (_Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_,\n part 9.)\n\nFootnote 227:\n\n _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 24.\n\nFootnote 228:\n\n No thought can be merely and absolutely false, any more than any act\n can be merely and without qualification bad. Though _words_ may be\n entirely meaningless, thoughts cannot be.\n\nFootnote 229:\n\n The appeal to experiment is no objection to the principle. For in\n making the experiment we do not, of course, get out of the circle of\n our thoughts, and the experiment only affords a criterion of truth in\n so far as it leaves us with a new thought which can only be brought\n into systematic harmony with our old ideas in one determinate way.\n Except as interpreted by thought, the experiment has no bearing on our\n knowledge.\n\nFootnote 230:\n\n This was also a favourite argument with Leibnitz, as Kant notes. For\n an acute examination of Leibnitz\u2019s use of it and the other \u201cproofs,\u201d\n see B. Russell\u2019s _Philosophy of Leibniz_ chap. 15. For Hume\u2019s\n objections to it, see the already quoted part 9 of the _Dialogue\n concerning Natural Religion_. The other \u201cproof\u201d of the _Third\n Meditation_, namely, that my possession of an idea of God, which I\n could not have derived from empirical sources, proves the reality of\n the idea\u2019s object, is only a special form of the ontological argument\n from idea to existence.\n\nFootnote 231:\n\n As thus remodelled, the double ontologico-cosmological argument might\n be attacked on two grounds\u2014(1) That it only proves, once more, that\n _if_ we admit that all propositions are concerned with real existence,\n either directly or remotely, we must admit the existence of the\n Absolute, but does not demonstrate that all propositions _are_ so\n concerned. (2) That in saying that existence is only _conceivable_ as\n individual we fall back into the Cartesian misconception of existence\n as a predicate. I should reply, (1) that the validity of the premiss\n in question cannot be denied without being confirmed in the act of\n denial. _I.e._ unless the suggested proposition that \u201csome\n propositions at least have no reference to a reality beyond their own\n presence as psychical facts in my mind,\u201d itself has the very objective\n reference in question, it has no meaning, and is therefore no genuine\n proposition; (2) that we must distinguish between the _what_ and the\n _that_ of existence. The \u201cthat\u201d of existence is not conceivable at\n all, but our position is that this inconceivable _that_ is only\n logically, not really, separable from a _what_, and that it is\n precisely this inseparability of the _that_ and the _what_ which we\n mean by \u201cindividuality.\u201d\n\nFootnote 232:\n\n _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, part 11.\n\nFootnote 233:\n\n This is quite consistent with our own view, that all real processes\n are teleological in the sense of being marked by subjective interest.\n For (_a_) not by any means all teleological process is actual \u201cdesign\u201d\n or \u201cvolition\u201d (impulse, organic craving, habit, etc., are all cases in\n point); and (_b_) actual volition need not always be volition for the\n result it actually produces. Sexual selection in man would be an\n instance of a process which may take the form of actual volition, but\n in that case is rarely, if ever, volition for that improvement of the\n stock which _de facto_ issues from it.\n\nFootnote 234:\n\n Cf. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, pp. 200, 496-497 (1st ed.).\n Professor Flint\u2019s attempted reply to the Humian and Kantian criticism\n of the theistic \u201cproofs\u201d (_Agnosticism_, chap. 4) has not induced me\n to modify any of the opinions expressed in this chapter.\n\n-----\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n\u00a7 1. Can our Absolute Experience be properly called the \u201cunion of\n Thought and Will\u201d? The Absolute is certainly the final realisation\n of our intellectual and our practical ideals. But (1) it includes\n aspects, such as, _e.g._ \u00e6sthetic feeling, pleasure, and pain, which\n are neither Thought nor Will. (2) And it cannot possess either\n Thought or Will _as such_. Both Thought and Will, in their own\n nature, presuppose a Reality which transcends _mere_ Thought and\n _mere_ Will. \u00a7 2. Our conclusion may in a sense be said to involve\n an element of Agnosticism, and again of Mysticism. But it is only\n agnostic in holding that we do not know the precise nature of the\n Absolute Experience. It implies no distrust of the validity of\n knowledge, so far as it goes, and bases its apparently agnostic\n result on the witness of knowledge itself. Similarly, it is mystical\n in transcending, not in refusing to recognise, the constructions of\n understanding and will. \u00a7 3. Metaphysics adds nothing to our\n information, and yields no fresh springs of action. It is finally\n only justified by the persistency of the impulse to speculate on the\n nature of things as a whole.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. It seems advisable, in bringing this work to a conclusion, to bring\ntogether by way of recapitulation a few important consequences of our\ngeneral principle which could not receive all the notice they deserve in\nthe course of our previous exposition. Our main contention, which it may\nbe hoped our discussion of special problems has now confirmed, was that\nthe whole of Reality ultimately forms a single infinite individual\nsystem, of which the material is psychical matter of fact, and that the\nindividuality of this system lies ultimately in a teleological unity of\nsubjective interest. Further, we saw that all subordinate reality is\nagain in its degree individual, and that the contents of the Absolute\nthus form a hierarchy of ascending orders of reality and individuality,\nand that in this way, while all finite individual existence is, as\nfinite, appearance and not ultimate Reality, appearances, themselves are\nof varied degrees of worth, and that, apart from the appearances, there\nis no reality at all. And finally, we learned that all the aspirations\nof finite individuals must be somehow met and made good in the ultimate\nReality, though not necessarily in the form in which they are\nconsciously entertained by the finite aspirant.\n\nThis last conclusion naturally suggests the question, whether it would\nbe a correct description of the ultimate Reality to call it the \u201cunion\nof Thought and Will.\u201d I will briefly indicate the reasons why such a\ndescription appears to be misleading. (1) The Absolute may no doubt be\ncalled the \u201cunion of Thought and Will,\u201d in the sense that its complete\nindividual structure corresponds at once to our logical ideal of\nsystematic interconnection, and our ethico-religious ideal of realised\nindividual purpose. But it must be added that the Absolute appears to\npossess aspects which cannot fairly be brought under either of these\nheads. \u00c6sthetic feeling, for instance, and the \u00e6sthetic judgments based\nupon it, must somehow be included as an integral aspect in the absolute\nwhole of experience; yet \u00e6sthetic feeling cannot properly be regarded\neither as thought or as will. And the same objection might be raised in\nthe case of pleasure. However closely pleasure may be connected with\nconative efforts towards the retention or renewal of the pleasant\nexperience, it seems quite clear that the \u201cpure\u201d pleasures[235] are not\nforms of conscious \u201cconation,\u201d and that even in those \u201cmixed\u201d pleasures,\nwhich depend in part for their pleasantness upon relief from the tension\nof precedent craving or desire, analysis enables us to distinguish two\nelements, that of direct pleasure in the new experience, and that of the\nfeeling of relief from the craving. Hence, if it be admitted that the\nAbsolute contains pleasure, it must also be admitted that it contains\nsomething which is neither thought nor will. The same argument would\nhold good, I think, even if we held with the pessimists, that the\nAbsolute contains a balance of pain over pleasure. For, intimate as the\nconnection is between pain and thwarted conation, it seems a\npsychological monstrosity to maintain that felt pain is always and\neverywhere an experience of the frustration of actual conscious effort;\nand unless this monstrosity can be maintained, we must recognise in pain\ntoo a fundamental experience-quality irreducible to thought or will.\nThus, at best, the description of the Absolute, as the union of thought\nand will, would be incomplete.\n\n(2) But, further, the description, if taken to mean that the Absolute\nitself has thought and will, _as such_, would be not only incomplete but\nfalse. For actual thought and actual will can easily be shown to be\nessentially finite functions, neither of which could ever reach its goal\nand become finally self-consistent, without ceasing to be mere thought\nor mere will. Thus actual thought always involves an aspect of\ndiscrepancy between its content and reference. It is always thought\n_about_ a reality which falls, in part, outside the thought itself, is\nonly imperfectly represented by the thought\u2019s content, and for that very\nreason is a not-self to the thought for which it is an object. And the\nwhole process of thinking may be described as a series of attempts on\nthe part of thought to transcend this limitation. So long as the content\nof the thought is not adequate to the reality which it thinks, so long,\nthat is, as there is anything left to know about the reality, thought\nrestlessly presses forward towards an unreached consummation. But if the\ncorrespondence _ideae cum ideato_ ever became perfect, thought\u2019s object\nwould cease to contain anything which went beyond thought\u2019s own content.\nIt would no longer be an \u201cother\u201d or \u201cnot-self\u201d to the thought which knew\nit, and thus thought and its object would have become a single thing.\nBut in this consummation thought would have lost its special character\nas an actual process, just as the object would have lost its character\nof a something, partly at least, \u201cgiven\u201d from without. Both mere thought\nand mere existence, in becoming one, would cease to have the character\nwhich belongs to them in finite experience precisely in virtue of our\nfailure completely to transcend the chasm between them.\n\nThe same is the case with will. If, indeed, by will we mean a genuine\nactual process of volition, this result is already included in our\ncriticism of the claim of thought as such to persist unchanged in the\nAbsolute. For all genuine will implies possession of and actuation by an\nidea which is entertained explicitly as an unrealised idea, and is thus\ninseparable from thought. (This, I may incidentally observe once more,\nis why we carefully avoided speaking of the \u201csubjective interest\u201d we\nfound in all experience-processes as \u201cwill.\u201d) But even if we improperly\nwiden the interpretation of the term \u201cwill\u201d to include all conative\nprocess, the general conclusion will remain the same. For all such\nprocesses imply the contrast between existence as it comes to us in the\nhere and now of actual feeling, and existence as it should be, and as we\nseek to make it, for the satisfaction of our various impulses, cravings,\nand desires. It is the felt, even when not explicitly understood,\ndiscrepancy between these two aspects of a reality, which is ultimately\none and harmonious under the discrepancy, that supplies all actual\nconative process with its motive force. And hence we seem driven to hold\nthat conation as such, _i.e._ as actual striving or effort, can find no\nplace in an experience in which the aspects of ideality and real\nexistence are once for all finally united.\n\nIf we cannot avoid speaking of such an experience in terms of our own\nintellectual, and again of our own volitional processes, we must at\nleast remember that while such language is true in the sense that the\nall-embracing harmonious experience of the Absolute is the unattainable\ngoal towards which finite intellect and finite volition are alike\nstriving, yet each in attaining its consummation, if it ever could\nattain it, would cease to be itself as we know it, and pass into a\nhigher and directer form of apprehension, in which it could no longer be\ndistinguished from the other. In the old medi\u00e6val terminology, the\nAbsolute must be said to contain actual intellect and actual volition,\nnot _formaliter_ but _eminenter_.[236]\n\n\u00a7 2. It follows from all this that, just because the absolute whole is\nneither mere thought nor mere will, nor an artificial synthesis of the\ntwo, mere truth for the intellect can never be quite the same thing as\nultimate Reality. For in mere truth we get Reality only in its\nintellectual aspect as that which affords the highest satisfaction to\nthought\u2019s demand for consistency and systematic unity in its object.\nAnd, as we have seen, this demand can never be quite satisfied by\nthought itself. For thought, to remain thought, must always be\nsomething less than the whole reality which it knows. The reality must\nalways contain a further aspect which is not itself thought, and is\nnot capable of being apprehended in the form of a thought-content. Or,\nwhat is the same thing, while all reality is individual, all the\nthought-constructions through which we know its character must remain\ngeneral. We are always trying in our thought to grasp the individual\nas such, and always failing. As individual, the reality never becomes\nthe actual content of our thought, but remains a \u201ctranscendent\u201d object\nto which thought _refers_, or which it _means_. And hence our truest\nthought can at best give us but an imperfect satisfaction for its own\ndemand of congruence, between thought\u2019s content and its object. The\nreality can never be ultimately _merely_ what it is for our thought.\nAnd this conclusion obviously lends a certain justification both to\nthe agnostic and to the mystic. It is important to understand how far\nthat justification extends.\n\nFirst, then, a word as to the limits of justifiable Agnosticism. Our\nconclusion warranted us in asserting that Reality must contain aspects\nwhich are not thought, and again must combine thought with these other\naspects in a unity which is not itself merely intellectual. In other\nwords, we had to confess that we cannot understand the concrete\ncharacter of the Infinite Experience, or, to put it in a more homely\nway, we do not know how it would feel to be \u201cGod.\u201d And if this is\nAgnosticism, we clearly shall have to own that we too are agnostics. But\nour result gave us no ground for doubting our own general conviction as\nto the place which intellect and truth hold in the Absolute. On the\nother hand, it left us with every reason for trusting that conviction.\nFor our conclusion that mere truth cannot be the same thing as ultimate\nReality was itself based upon the principle that only harmonious\nindividuality is finally real, and this is the very principle employed\nby the intellect itself whenever it judges one thought-construction\nrelatively higher and truer than another.\n\nThus _our_ Agnosticism, if it is to be called so, neither discredits our\nhuman estimate of the relative truth of different theories about the\nreal, nor lends any support to the notion that \u201cKnowledge is relative\u201d\nin the sense that there may conceivably be no correspondence between\nReality and the scheme of human knowledge as a whole. It is based not on\nthe distrust of human reason, but upon the determination to trust that\nreason implicitly, and it claims, in declaring mere truth to fall short\nof Reality, to be expressing reason\u2019s own verdict upon itself. Hence it\ndoes not, like vulgar Agnosticism, leave us in the end in pure\nuncertainty as to the ultimate structure and upshot, so to say, of the\nworld, but definitely holds that we have genuine and trustworthy\nknowledge of the type of that structure and the nature of its materials.\nAnd it is upon this positive knowledge, and not upon an uncritical\nappeal to unknown possibilities, that it rests its denial of the simple\nidentity of Reality with thought itself. For all we know, says the\ncommon Agnosticism, our thought is sheer illusion, and therefore we must\nconfess that we have in the end no notion what the reality of the world\nmay be. Thought is not illusory, says our systematic Idealism, and\ntherefore its own witness that Reality is an individual whole of\nexperience which is more than thought is a positive contribution to our\nknowledge. Between these two positions there may be a superficial\nresemblance, but there is an essential difference in principle.\n\nSo again with the mystical element in our result. In holding that all\ngenuine individuality, finite or infinite,[237] involves a type of\nimmediate felt unity which transcends reduction to the relational\ncategories of thought and will, we may fairly be said to have reached a\nconclusion which, in a sense, is mystical. But our result is not\nMysticism, if by Mysticism is meant a doctrine which seeks ultimate\nReality in mere unanalysed immediate feeling as such. The results of\nintellectual and volitional construction have not been treated by us as\nillusory and as a sort of intellectual and moral mistake. On the other\nhand, we urged that the ultimate unity of the real must transcend, and\nnot merely fall short of, the rational scheme of thought and will. And\nwe consequently insisted that our result, so far as it is a mystical\none, can only be justified by following out the constructions of the\nlogical intellect and the ethical will to their final consequence, and\nshowing that each of them itself demands completion in an individual\nReality which includes and transcends both. To quote the admirable words\nof Dr. McTaggart: \u201cA Mysticism which ignored the claims of the\nunderstanding would no doubt be doomed. None ever went about to break\nlogic, but in the end logic broke him. But there is a Mysticism which\nstarts from the standpoint of the understanding, and only departs from\nit in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate, but to\npostulate something beyond itself. To transcend the lower is not to\nignore it.\u201d And it is only in this sense that philosophy is justified in\nasserting \u201cabove all knowledge and volition one all-embracing unity,\nwhich is only not true, only not good, because all truth and all\ngoodness are but shadows of its absolute perfection.\u201d[238]\n\n\u00a7 3. The reader who has persevered to the conclusion of this volume may\nperhaps, on laying it down, experience a certain feeling of\ndissatisfaction. Our investigations, it might be complained, have added\nnothing to our stock of scientific information about the contents of the\nworld, and have supplied no fresh practical incentives towards the\nstrenuous pursuit of an elevated moral or religious ideal. I must at\nonce admit the justice of this hypothetical criticism, and dispute its\nrelevancy. Quite apart from the defects due to personal shortcomings and\nconfusions, it is inherent in the nature of metaphysical study that it\ncan make no positive addition to our information, and can of itself\nsupply no motives for practical endeavour. And the student who turns to\nour science as a substitute for empirical Physics or Psychology, or for\npractical morality, is bound to go away disappointed. The reason of this\nwe have already had occasion to see. Metaphysics has to presuppose the\ngeneral principles of the various sciences and the general forms of\npractical experience as the materials upon which it works. Its object as\na study is not to add to or to modify these materials, but to afford\nsome coherent and systematic satisfaction for the intellectual curiosity\nwhich we all feel at times as to the general nature of the whole to\nwhich these various materials belong, and the relative truth and\nclearness with which that general nature is expressed in the different\ndepartments of experience. Its aim is the organisation, not the\nenlargement of knowledge. Hence for the student whose interests lie more\nin the enlargement of human knowledge by the discovery of new facts and\nlaws, than in its organisation into a coherent whole, Metaphysics is\nprobably undesirable, or desirable only as a protection against the\nintrusion of unrecognised and uncriticised metaphysical assumptions into\nthe domain of empirical service. And similarly for the practical man\nwhose interests in life are predominantly ethical, the main, if not the\nsole, value of metaphysical study lies in its critical function of\nexposing false metaphysical assumptions, which, if acted upon, might\nimpair the vigour of spontaneous moral effort.\n\nBut for those in whom the speculative desire to form some coherent\nconception of the scheme of things to which we belong as a whole is\nstrong, Metaphysics has a higher importance. In such minds the impulse\nto reflect on the nature of existence as a whole, if debarred from\nsystematic and thorough gratification, is certain to find its outlet in\nunsystematic and uncriticised imaginative construction. Metaphysics they\nwill certainly have, and if not conscious and coherent, then unconscious\nand incoherent Metaphysics. The soul that is not at rest in itself\nwithout some \u201csight of that immortal sea which brought it hither,\u201d if\nhindered from beholding the object of its quest through the clear glass\nof rational reflection, will none the less seek to discern it amid the\ndistorting hazes and mists of superstition. It is in such seekers after\nthe Infinite that Metaphysics has its natural and proper followers, and\nfor them the study is its own justification and its own reward. If a\nwork like the present should prove of any help to such students, whether\nby offering positive suggestions which they can accept, or by assisting\nthem to know definitely why they reject its conclusions, it will perhaps\nhave achieved as much as its writer could reasonably expect.\n\n\n_Consult further_:\u2014F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 27; J.\nE. McTaggart, _Studies m Hegelian Cosmology_, chap. 9.\n\n-----\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 235:\n\n I use the epithet in its familiar Platonic sense. The \u201cpure\u201d pleasure\n is that which is not dependent, in whole or in part, for its\n pleasantness upon a previous \u1f14\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, or actual experience of craving\n or desire. I do not mean, as Plato possibly did, that a \u201cmixed\u201d\n pleasure, preceded by such \u1f14\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, is a contrast-effect without\n positive quality of its own.\n\nFootnote 236:\n\n Compare the argument of _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 26, pp.\n 469-485 (1st ed.), and the famous scholium to Prop. 17 of part 1 of\n Spinoza\u2019s _Ethics_, where it is contended that \u201cif intellect and\n volition belong to the eternal essence of God, each of these\n attributes must at least be understood in a different sense from the\n current.\u201d\n\nFootnote 237:\n\n I say \u201cfinite or infinite\u201d advisedly. The mystic\u2019s condemnation of the\n relational scheme as inadequate to express the full nature of the\n real, holds good just as much in application to actual finite\n experience as in application to the ultimate whole. We may say not\n only of \u201cGod,\u201d but of human persons, that they are much more than the\n \u201cunion of thought and will\u201d as such. And in personal human love, no\n less than in the saint\u2019s \u201cbeatific vision\u201d or the philosopher\u2019s\n \u201cintellectual love of God,\u201d we have a type of experience which may for\n some psychological purposes be analysed into a combination of\n ideational and volitional processes, but emphatically does not, in its\n concrete existence, consist of a synthesis of actual ideas and actual\n volitions. See _ante_, p. 152.\n\nFootnote 238:\n\n _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, p. 292.\n\n-----\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n INDEX\n\n\n Absolute, meaning of, 53 ff.;\n general character of, 60 ff.;\n not unknowable, 71 ff.;\n not a \u201cself,\u201d 343 ff.;\n is it a society? 100, 347 ff.;\n a spiritual individual, 98 ff.;\n not necessarily the same as \u201cGod,\u201d 399 ff.;\n not \u201cunion of thought and will,\u201d 409 ff.\n Activity not identical with conation, 55;\n and causation, 169;\n empirical nature of, 189.\n Agnosticism, 68, 69, 71, 72;\n how far justifiable, 412.\n Appearance and Reality, connection between, 105 ff.\n Aristotle, 6, 42, 97, 266, 361, 386.\n Attention, selective, 55, 66, 80;\n \u201cspan\u201d of, 226, 244.\n Avenarius, 35, 45, 80, 121, 174, 298 ff. 315.\n\n Baldwin, J. M., 206.\n Berkeley, 26, 64 ff., 75, 184, 185, 201 ff.\n Body, my own, as describable object, 282.\n Body, my own, and others, 203 ff.\n Body and Soul, theories of, 313 ff.;\n in what sense the same, 332.\n Bosanquet, B., 19, 26, 164.\n Bradley, F. H., 9, 11, 23, 26, 55, 67, 88, 90, 131, 146, 199, 227, 243,\n 259, 289, 318, 326, 335, 338, 355, 364, 370, 384, 411.\n\n Causation, 165 ff.;\n cause not identical with ground, 166;\n causation a postulate, 167 ff.;\n popular as distinguished from scientific sense, 169;\n causation and the indefinite regress, 177 ff.;\n continuity of causation, 171 ff.;\n Immanent and Transeunt Causality, 183 ff.;\n psychophysical causation, 322 ff.\n Causes, Plurality of, 180 ff.\n Chance, \u201cpure,\u201d meaning of, 231, 232;\n chance and \u201cfree-will,\u201d 378.\n Change, 158-164.\n Character and freedom, 374.\n Choice and motives, 373.\n Consciousness, a misleading term, 79.\n Consequence (_see_ Ground).\n Continuity, nature of, 171\n (_see_ Causation);\n continuity of space and time, 244, 250.\n Contradiction, principle of, 19 ff.\n Cosmology Rational, nature of, 43-49, 192-197.\n Couturat, L., 149, 260.\n\n Dedekind, 116, 149, 171.\n Degrees of Reality, 108 ff.\n Descartes, 128, 185, 318, 400 ff.\n Description, as scientific ideal, 174;\n in physical Science, 280 ff.;\n in Psychology, 308 ff.\n Determinism, 370-376.\n Discontinuity of teleological series, 311.\n Distance in space and time, 250.\n\n Ends in Nature, 272, 405, 406.\n Energy, conservation of, 292;\n kinetic and non-kinetic, 291;\n doctrine of, and psychophysical interaction, 322 ff.\n Epiphenomenalism, 317, 318-320.\n Epistemology and Metaphysics, 16.\n Evil, problem of, 391 ff., 395 ff.\n Evolution, not identical with mere change, 267;\n implies real ends, 268 ff.;\n is of finite beings only, 274 ff.;\n implies real progress and degeneration, 275;\n originates new individuals, 276.\n Experience, what, 23 ff., 33 ff.;\n \u201cpure,\u201d 35, 54.\n\n Feeling, 23 ff., 55;\n in the Absolute, 467 ff.\n Freedom, meaning of, 359 ff.\n Free-will, origins of belief in, 361 ff.\n\n Geulincx, 184, 185, 186, 317.\n Gibson, W. R. B., 288, 329, 366.\n God, proofs of being of, 400 ff.\n Ground and Consequence, meaning of principle of, 164, 165.\n\n Harmony, Pre-established, 187, 317.\n Hegel, 40 ff., 42 ff., 391, 401.\n Herbart, 39, 42, 68.\n Hobhouse, L. T., 74, 137, 138, 199.\n Hume, 29, 7, 133, 169, 172, 183, 400 ff.\n\n Identity, Psychophysical, doctrine of, 102, 321, 331, 332.\n Identity, a teleological concept, 335.\n (_See also_ Unity of Thing).\n Imitation, significance of, for personality, 206.\n Immanent Causality, 183 ff.\n Immediacy, 32.\n \u201cImmortality,\u201d 354 ff.\n Indeterminism, 376-379.\n Individuality, nature of, 57, 98 ff.;\n degrees of, 109 ff.;\n infinite and finite, 115 ff.\n Infinite Regress, 148 ff., 156;\n in space and time, 255 ff., 259;\n in causal relation, 177.\n Infinity, meaning of, 116.\n Interaction, Psychophysical, 317, 329-331.\n Introjection, meaning of, 81;\n origin of, 81, 299 ff.;\n justification of, 301 ff.\n\n James, W., 53, 91, 318, 370, 383, 390, 400.\n\n Kant, 11, 24, 39, 43, 69, 134, 188, 242 ff., 259, 359, 366, 387, 400\n ff.\n\n Law, meaning of, 218 ff.\n Laws in Nature, 196, 229.\n Leibnitz, 68, 82, 86, 91 ff., 117, 187 ff., 317, 366, 401, 404.\n Locke, 128, 136, 200, 318, 353, 365, 366.\n Lotze, 41, 42, 133, 224, 289.\n\n Mach, E., 174, 175, 192, 223, 228, 283, 290.\n Machine, nature of a, 236, 237.\n McTaggart, J. E., 345, 357, 391, 398, 413.\n Malebranche, 184, 185, 317.\n Mass, definition of, 289;\n conservation of, 290;\n a relative concept, 290, 291.\n Matter, meaning of, 198 ff.\n Mechanical view of Nature, 233 ff., 237 ff., 283 ff.;\n postulates of, 284, 292 ff.\n Mechanism, meaning of, 196, 237 ff.\n Method of Metaphysics, 38 ff.\n Mill, J. S., 24, 180 ff., 370.\n Monadism, 86, 91, 94.\n Monism, 85.\n M\u00fcnsterberg, H., 45, 67, 198, 283, 303 ff., 315, 318, 321, 324, 329.\n Mysticism, 14, 33, 153;\n in what sense justifiable, 413.\n\n Necessity and causal relation, 183.\n Newton, 128, 200.\n Nietzsche, 276.\n Number-series, 151 ff., 248-250, 259.\n\n Occasionalism, 184, 317.\n Ontology, character of, 42.\n Order, a teleological concept, 118;\n order in space and time, 251.\n Organism, nature of a, 96.\n\n Parallelism, Psychophysical, 317, 320-329.\n Pearson, K., 75, 290.\n Phenomenalism, 10, 136.\n Physical order, nature of the, 194 ff., 198, 208, 282.\n Plato, 3, 55, 77, 95, 276, 366, 386, 393, 398, 409.\n Pleasure-pain, 55, 344.\n Plotinus, 398.\n Pluralism, 86 ff.\n Position not a principle of individuation, 58;\n relativity of, 253.\n Pragmatism, 317.\n Prediction in science, 219 ff.\n Progress not infinite, 387-389.\n Psychical order, nature of the, 298 ff.\n Psychology, character of, as a science, 296 ff.\n Psychology and Physiology, 303 ff.\n Psychology, Rational, nature of, 43 ff.\n Purpose, nature of, 55 ff.\n\n Qualities, primary and secondary, 128 ff.\n Quality and relation, 140 ff.\n Quality and substance, 128 ff.\n Quality, spatial and temporal, 244.\n\n Rashdall, H., 347, 393, 400.\n Realism, Agnostic, 68, 71, 72;\n Dogmatic, 69, 72-75.\n Relation and quality, 140 ff.\n Relations and relatedness, 155.\n Religion, metaphysical presuppositions of, 389 ff.\n Responsibility and the self, 335.\n Royce, J., 13, 33, 51, 56, 76, 116, 145, 148 ff., 206, 226, 239, 263,\n 270, 277, 307, 398.\n Russell, B., 36, 58, 91, 142, 189, 243, 250, 253, 404.\n\n Self, 98, 107;\n nature of, 334-340;\n a teleological concept, 335;\n temporal character of, 341, 342.\n Self-consciousness, genuine and fictitious, 79.\n Sidgwick, H., 130, 359, 370.\n Space, perceptual, 243-245;\n conceptual genesis of, 245-249;\n infinity of, 247;\n divisibility of, 248;\n continuity of, 248, 250;\n homogeneity of, 251;\n relativity of, 251;\n is it one or many? 253, 257;\n is not ultimate, 254-257;\n antinomies of, 259 ff.;\n of what is it phenomenal? 260.\n Spencer, H., 40, 68.\n Spinoza, 62, 101 ff., 318, 399, 411.\n Stout, G. F., 33, 67, 135, 154 ff., 208, 247, 318, 324, 332, 378.\n Subjectivism, what, 75;\n fallacy of, 76-81, 204 ff.\n Substance, concept of, 128 ff.;\n and quality, 128-140.\n Sufficient Reason, principle of, 164.\n\n\n Teleological description not impossible, 309.\n Teleological series, discontinuity of, 311.\n Teleology, nature of, 55, 99, 125, 287, 371 ff.;\n in Psychology, 305 ff.;\n in Biology, 308;\n and Psychophysical Parallelism, 326 ff.\n Thought and the Absolute, 61;\n not ultimate, 409.\n Time, perceptual, 243-245;\n conceptual, genesis of, 245-249;\n infinity of, 247;\n divisibility of, 248;\n continuity of, 248, 250;\n homogeneity of, 251;\n relativity of, 251;\n is it one or many? 253, 257;\n not ultimate, 254-257;\n antinomies of, 259 ff.;\n of what is it phenomenal? 262;\n time and the self, 341, 344.\n Truth, degrees of, 214.\n\n Uniformities, statistical, 220 ff.\n Uniformity in physical nature, 222, 227.\n Unity of things teleological, 123-128.\n\n Ward, J., 45, 64, 174, 225, 228, 289 318, 324, 326-328.\n Whole and Part, category of, 96.\n Will, nature of, 61, 118;\n not ultimate, 410.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\nTwo words on the first line of p. 70 of this edition (noted below) were\nmissing (blank). They have been supplied from the 5th edition, published\nin 1920.\n\nOn p. 226, a footnote at (226.42) refers to Mr. H. G. Wells\u2019s tale, _The\nNew Accumulator_, which is certainly a reference to his 1901 tale \u201cThe\nNew Accelerator\u201d.\n\nOn p. 340, the first paragraph refers to \u2018two points\u2019, and prefaces the\nfirst with \u2018(a)\u2019. But there is no \u2018(b)\u2019 to denote the second point. It\nseems likely that \u2018(b)\u2019 should precede the next paragraph, or perhaps\nfollowing the introductory \u2018Further\u2019.\n\nThe Index reference to p. 467 for \u2018Feeling in the Absolute\u2019 cannot be\nverified. The page does not exist, and no other page can be identified\nwith certainty.\n\nErrors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been corrected, and\nare noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.\n\nThe most common error is missing punctuation: 6.14 purpose[.], 38.29\ninquiry[.], 44.12 periphery[.], 44.41 other[.], 56.47 failure[.], 58.27\ntheory[.], 62.39 \u201cpurposive[\u201d], 67.17 life[.], 67.19 subject[.], 79.46\n\u201cmatter[\u201d], 82.13 it[.], 88.40 exclusive[.], 89.41 facts[.], 99.13\npurpose[.], 108.24 admitted[.], 128.23 [\u201c]substance\u201d, 143.19 arisen[.],\n215.10 [\u201c]Nature, 224.22 purpose[.], 236.14 based[.], 251.45 series[.],\n274.16 advance[.], 320.32 _fatum_[.], 361.22 considerations[.], 390.5\n\u201ctemperament[\u201d], 410.22 thing[.]\n\nThe name of Professor Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg is spelled variably as\nM\u00fcnsterberg, Munsterberg, and occasionally with a partial umlaut. The\nspelling has been rendered as M\u00fcnsterberg to facilitate text searches at\n215.5, 305.15, 315.8, 329.40, 418.3.\n\nOther corrected errors are:\n\n xviii.11 to a[s]certain Inserted.\n xxiii.12 The concept of _[e]volution_ Restored.\n 37.9 carry out ou[t/r] programme Replaced.\n 46.46 _Grundz[u/\u00fc]ge der Psychologie_ Replaced.\n 66.44 on which it \u201cworks.[\u2019/\u201d] Replaced.\n 70.1.1 a modification of your [experience]. Restored.\n 70.1.2 to ask what [you] mean Restored.\n 82.22 to know your own meaning[./,] Replaced.\n 134.42 too diffuse and technical[,/.] Replaced.\n 136.24 does no[t] destroy Restored.\n 149.12 in our illustration 1^2, [2^3/2^2], 3^2 ... Replaced.\n 180.46 increases indefinitely[)]. Removed.\n 215.6 _Grundz[u/\u00fc]ge der Psychologie_ Replaced.\n 215.12 [\u201c]J. Ward Removed.\n 229.16 deal only with the problem[,/.] Replaced.\n 306.4 the physical order was const[r]ucted Inserted.\n 318.8 H[o/\u00f6]ffding Replaced.","title":"Elements of metaphysics","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":190534}