{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_72074/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_72074","id":"gutenberg_72074","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/72074","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Idealism","Pragmatism"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Note: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Additional\nnotes will be found near the end of this ebook.\n\n\n\n\nPRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM\n\n\n\n\nAGENTS\n\n\n  AMERICA      THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n                 64 & 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK\n\n  AUSTRALASIA  THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS\n                 205 FLINDERS LANE, MELBOURNE\n\n  CANADA       THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD.\n                 ST MARTIN\u2019S HOUSE, 70 BOND STREET, TORONTO\n\n  INDIA        MACMILLAN & COMPANY, LTD.\n                 MACMILLAN BUILDING, BOMBAY\n                 309 BOW BAZAAR STREET, CALCUTTA\n\n\n\n\n                               PRAGMATISM\n                                  AND\n                                IDEALISM\n\n                                   BY\n\n                 WILLIAM CALDWELL, M.A., D.SC.[EDINR.]\n          SIR WILLIAM MACDONALD PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY,\n                      McGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL\n\n                                 LONDON\n                         ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK\n                                  1913\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nWhat is attempted in this book is an examination of the Pragmatist\nphilosophy in its relations to older and newer tendencies in the\nthought and practice of mankind.\n\nWhile a good deal has been written within the last ten years upon\nPragmatism, the issue that it represents is still an open one--to\njudge at least from recent books and reviews, and from recent official\ndiscussions. And there seems to be a favourable opportunity for a\ngeneral account of the whole subject and for an estimate of its\nsignificance.\n\nIn the opening chapter and elsewhere, both in the text and in the\nfootnotes, I have put together some things about the development and\nthe affiliations of Pragmatism, and of pragmatist tendencies, that may\nnot be altogether new to the professional student. Such a presentation,\nor general conspectus, I have found to be a necessity in the way of a\nbasis both for discussion and for rational comprehension. Taken along\nwith the original pronouncements of James and his _confr\u00e8res_ it\naffords an indication of the philosophy to which the pragmatists would\nfain attain, and of the modification of rationalistic philosophy they\nwould fain effect.\n\nThe chapter upon Pragmatism as Americanism is put forth in the\nmost tentative spirit possible, and I have thought more than once\nof withholding it. Something in this connexion, however, is, in my\nopinion, needed to cause us to regard the pragmatist philosophy as\nresting upon a very real tendency of the civilized world of to-day--a\ntendency that is affecting us all whether we like it or not.\n\nThe chapter upon Pragmatism and Anglo-Hegelian Rationalism is also\noffered with some degree of reservation and misgiving, for, like\nmany of my contemporaries, I owe nearly everything in the way of my\nintroduction to philosophy to the great Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian\nmovement. In its place, I had some months ago a more general\nchapter upon Pragmatism and Rationalism, containing the results of\nmaterial that I had been elaborating upon the development of English\nNeo-Hegelianism. At the last moment I substituted what is here offered\nupon the significant high-water output of Hegelianism represented in\nDr. Bosanquet\u2019s Edinburgh Gifford Lectures.\n\nIn regard to the note upon the Pragmatist elements in the philosophy of\nBergson I ought, perhaps, to say that I kept away from Bergson\u2019s last\ntwo books until I had written out what had been growing up in my own\nmind about the activism of Pragmatism and its relations to Idealism.\nI have found confirmation for much of my own thought in the teaching\nof this remarkable and significant thinker, and I regret the partial\nrepresentation of it that is here submitted.\n\nHaving crossed the ocean for the printing of my book, I have in some\ncases lost or misplaced references that I intended to use or to verify.\nFor this I crave the indulgence of readers and critics.\n\nI am indebted to the following gentlemen for much kind help and\ncriticism in the revision of my manuscript and proof-sheets for the\npress: my brother, the Rev. Victor Caldwell, M.A., of Patna, Ayrshire;\nProfessor John Laird of Queen\u2019s University, Belfast; Professor James\nSeth of the University of Edinburgh; Professor P.\u00a0T. Lafleur of\nM\u2019Gill University. I also owe much in this same connexion to recent\nconversations with Professors A. Lalande and D. Parodi of Paris, upon\nPragmatism and contemporary philosophy generally.\n\n\nLONDON, _September 1913_.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAP.                                                             PAGE\n     I.  INTRODUCTORY                                                  1\n\n         NOTE ON THE MEANING OF \u201cPRAGMATISM\u201d                          21\n\n    II.  PRAGMATISM AND THE PRAGMATIST MOVEMENT                       23\n\n   III.  SOME FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS                             58\n\n    IV.  PRAGMATISM AND HUMAN ACTIVITY                                93\n\n         APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV.--PHILOSOPHY AND THE\n           ACTIVITY-EXPERIENCE                                       109\n\n     V.  CRITICAL                                                    116\n\n    VI.  PRAGMATISM AS HUMANISM                                      141\n\n   VII.  PRAGMATISM AS AMERICANISM                                   168\n\n  VIII.  PRAGMATISM AND ANGLO-HEGELIAN RATIONALISM                   196\n\n    IX.  PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON        234\n\n         CONCLUDING REMARKS                                          262\n\n         INDEX                                                       267\n\n\n\n\nPRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTORY\n\n\nPragmatism has by this time received so much attention in the\nreflective literature of the day that any writer upon the subject may\nnow fairly presume upon a general acquaintance with its main principles\nand contentions. Indeed, it is probable that most thinking people may\nbe credited with the ability to have formed some sort of judgment of\ntheir own about a philosophy whose main contention is that true ideas\nare working ideas, and that truth itself, like a creed or a belief, is\nsimply a working valuation of reality. There are still, however, some\nthings to be said, at least in English, upon the place and the meaning\nof Pragmatism in the philosophical reconstruction that is generally\nfelt to be so necessary to-day.\n\nAs far as the external signs of any such vital relation between\nPragmatism and our recent academic philosophy are concerned, the reader\nmay be aware, to begin with, that there have been many important\nconcessions[1] made to pragmatists by such representative rationalists\nas Mr. Bradley and Professor Taylor, not to speak of others,[2]\nand Pragmatism has certainly had a very powerful effect upon the\nprofessional philosophy of both England and Germany, judging at least\nfrom the extent to which many of the more prominent representatives of\nphilosophy in these countries have apparently been compelled to accord\nto it at least an official recognition.[3]\n\nPragmatism, again, in consequence of the different receptions that it\nhas met with at the hands of its friends and its foes, has undergone\nvarious phases of exposition and of modification, although it has\nnot yet, nor is it on the whole likely to have, a philosophical\noutput comparable to that of Idealism. It has become more and more\nconscious of its own affiliations and relations to older, and to\nbroader doctrines, declaring itself, in the hands of Professor James\nand his friends, to be but a new name for older ways of thinking. And\nit has succeeded, in a measure, in clearing itself from liability to\nthe superficial interpretation that it met with a few years ago, when\nit was scoffed at for teaching that you may believe \u201cwhat you like,\u201d\nfor speaking, for example, as if the \u201ctheoretical\u201d consequences of\ntruth were not to be considered as well as the \u201cpractical.\u201d Although\nstill resting in the main upon an outspoken declaration of war against\nRationalism, it is no longer blind to the place and the value of\nthought or the \u201cconcept,\u201d in the matter of the interpretation of our\nexperience.\n\nPragmatism, as the theory is generally understood, rests in the main\nupon the work of three men, Professors James and Dewey of America,\nand Dr. Schiller of Oxford. The fact, along doubtless with other\nthings, that these men have ere now been spoken of as occupying a\nright, a left, and a centre in the new movement, is presumably an\nindication that it has already received its highest theoretical\nexpression--presumably in the California pamphlet of Professor James,\nor in the famous _Popular Science Monthly_ article of Peirce, canonized\nas the patron saint of the movement by James.\n\nWhether this be so or not, it has been in the main the work of James to\nset forth the meaning of Pragmatism as a philosophy of everyday life,\nas the theory of the attitude of man as man to the world in which he\nfinds himself. Dr. Schiller, again, it is claimed, has done much to set\nforth Pragmatism to the world as an essentially humanistic philosophy,\nrecognizing and providing for the rights of faith and of feeling in\ndetermining our beliefs and our theories about things. This philosophy\nhas \u201cmuch in common with what in other quarters is called Personalism.\u201d\nIt cannot, however, be differentiated so sharply as Dr. Schiller\napparently would have us believe from the many manifestations of this\nphilosophy that abound in modern times, from Fichte, and from Lotze,\ndown to men who are still living--Eucken and others. The ingenious\nProfessor Dewey, moreover, is the champion of the scientific, or the\nempirical, or the \u201cinstrumental\u201d method in philosophy, and has worked\nhard and successfully at the reform which he thinks must take place in\nlogical and philosophical conceptions when interpreted as simply tools\nor devices for the economy of our thought.\n\nWhen, in pragmatist fashion, we seek to judge of Pragmatism by this\nlast-mentioned matter of its results, by the things it has enabled its\nadvocates to accomplish, we find that we may, to begin with, speak in\nthe following terms of the work of Professor James. He has certainly\nindicated how the pragmatist method may be applied to the solution of\nsome of the ordinary difficulties of reflective thought; about, for\nexample, the nature of matter or the nature of the soul, or about the\nold opposition between the \u201cone\u201d and the \u201cmany,\u201d about such concepts\nas \u201cthing,\u201d \u201ckinds,\u201d \u201ctime,\u201d \u201cspace,\u201d the \u201cfancied,\u201d the \u201creal,\u201d and\nso on. In all such cases an answer, he holds, is obtained by putting,\nsay, the initial difficulty in the following form: \u201cWhat practical\ndifference can it make now that the world should be run by matter or by\nspirit?\u201d\n\nA fair illustration of his meaning here would be his own characteristic\nattitude, so far as the philosophy of religion is concerned, to the\nso-called \u201ctheistic\u201d proofs that have been part of the stock in trade\nof rational theology. A \u201cnecessary being\u201d and a \u201cwhole of truth\u201d\nand the \u201cAbsolute\u201d[4] are not, he would hold, what the average man\nunderstands by God; they have hardly any perceptible effect upon\nlife and conduct--the all-important matter in the thought of God as\nhe conceives it. Only those notions, he would have it, which can\nbe interpreted by the thought of the \u201cdifference\u201d they make to our\npractical conduct are real notions at all--\u201cProvidence,\u201d say, or \u201cGod\u201d\nas the guarantor of the reality and the permanence of the moral order,\nand so on. The \u201csoul,\u201d again, he would hold, \u201cis good for just so much\nand no more.\u201d And a similar thing, too, would be true about Berkeley\u2019s\n\u201cmatter,\u201d or about the \u201cmatter\u201d of the materialists.[5] This latter,\nfor instance, cannot possibly do all it is claimed to be able to do in\nthe way of an explanation of the order of the world and the phenomena\nof life.\n\nThen again, James has written a great many pages upon the so-called\ndeeper view of human nature (as inclusive of will and \u201cemotion\u201d in\naddition to mere thought) taken by Pragmatism in comparison with that\nentertained by Rationalism. We shall have occasion to return to this\npoint.\n\nHe has made it clear, too, that it was an unfair interpretation of\nPragmatism to take it as a plea for believing what you like, as was\nsaid above. Our experience, he puts it, must be consistent, the \u201cparts\nwith the parts,\u201d and the \u201cparts with the whole.\u201d Beliefs must not clash\nwith other beliefs, the mind being wedged tightly between the coercion\nof the sensible order and that of the ideal order. By \u201cconsequences,\u201d\ntoo, he contends we may mean intellectual or theoretical consequences\nas well as practical consequences.\n\nHe has also, along with his brother-pragmatists, raised the question\nof the nature of Truth, attaining to such important results as the\nfollowing: (1) there is no such thing as pure truth, or ready-made\ntruth; (2) the \u201ccopy-theory\u201d of truth is unintelligible.[6] We shall\nlater be obliged to examine the more controversial positions that (3)\ntruth is not an end in itself, but a means towards vital satisfaction;\n(4) truth is the \u201cexpedient\u201d in the way of thinking, as the right is\nthe expedient[7] in the way of acting, and so on.\n\nFurther, Professor James finds that Pragmatism leaves us with the\nmain body of our common-sense beliefs [Peirce holds practically the\nsame thing], such as the belief in \u201cfreedom\u201d--as a \u201cpromise and a\nrelief,\u201d he adds; and the belief in the religious outlook upon life,\nin so far as it \u201cworks.\u201d This is the attitude and the tenor of the\nwell-known books on The _Will to Believe_ and _The Varieties of\nReligious Experience_.[8] \u201cOur acts, our turning-places, where we\nseem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are the parts of the\nworld to which we are closest, the parts of which our knowledge is\nthe most intimate and complete. Why should we not take them at their\nface-value?\u201d And yet, as against this attitude, Professor James\nelsewhere finds himself unable to believe \u201cthat our human experience\nis the highest form of experience extant in the universe.\u201d It is the\nemergence of many such incoherences in his writings that gives to\nhis pragmatist philosophy of religion a subjective and temperamental\ncharacter, and makes it seem to be lacking in any objective basis. \u201cIf\nradically tough, the hurly-burly of the sensible facts of nature will\nbe enough for you, and you will need no religion at all. If radically\ntender, you will take up with the more monistic form of religion:\nthe pluralistic form--that is, reliance on possibilities that are\nnot necessities--will not seem to offer you security enough.\u201d[9] He\n\u201cinclines,\u201d on the whole, to \u201cMeliorism,\u201d treating satisfaction as\nneither necessary nor impossible; the pragmatist lives in \u201cthe world of\npossibilities.\u201d\n\nThese words show clearly how difficult it is to pin down Professor\nJames to any single intelligible philosophy of belief, if belief be\ninterpreted as in any sense a \u201ccommerce\u201d of the soul with objective\nrealities, as something more than a merely generous faith in the\ngradual perfection or betterment of human society.\n\n\u201cReligious experience,\u201d as he puts it in his _Pluralistic Universe_,\n\u201cpeculiarly so called, needs, in my opinion, to be carefully considered\nand interpreted by every one who aspires to reason out a more complete\nphilosophy.\u201d In this same book, it is declared, however, on the one\nhand, that \u201cwe have outgrown the old theistic orthodoxy, the God of\nour popular Christianity being simply one member of a pluralistic\nsystem\u201d; and yet, on the other hand, and with equal emphasis, that\n\u201cwe finite minds may simultaneously be conscious with one another in a\nsupernatural intelligence.\u201d[10]\n\nThe book on _The Meaning of Truth_ seems to return, in the main, to the\nAmerican doctrine of the strenuous life as the only courageous, and\ntherefore true, attitude to beliefs, as the life that contains, in the\nplenitude of its energizing, the answer to all questions. \u201cPluralism\naffords us,\u201d it openly confesses, \u201cno moral holidays, and it is unable\nto let loose quietistic raptures, and this is a serious deficiency in\nthe pluralistic philosophy which we have professed.\u201d Professor James\nhere again attacks Absolutism in the old familiar manner, as somehow\nunequal to the complexity of things, or the pulsating process of the\nworld, casting himself upon the philosophy of experience, and upon\nthe evident reality of the \u201cmany\u201d and of the endless variety of the\nrelations of things, in opposition to the abstract simplicity of the\n\u201cone,\u201d and the limited range of a merely logical, or mathematical,\nmanner of conceiving of reality. \u201cThe essential service of Humanism,\nas I conceive the situation, is to have seen that, though one part of\nexperience may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any\none of several aspects in which it may be considered, experience as\na whole is self-sustaining and leans on nothing.... \u201cIt gets rid of\nthe standing problems of Monism and of other metaphysical systems and\nparadoxes.\u201d[11]\n\nProfessor James exhibits, however, at the same time a very imperfect\nconception of philosophy, holding that it gives us, in general, \u201cno new\nrange of practical power,\u201d ignoring, as it were, the difference between\nphilosophy and poetry and religion and mere personal enthusiasm.\nAnd he leaves the whole question of the first principles of both\nknowledge and conduct practically unsettled. These things are to him\nbut conceptual tools,[12] and \u201cworking\u201d points of departure for our\nefforts, and there seems in his books to be no way of reducing them to\nany kind of system. And he makes, lastly, a most unsuccessful attempt\nat a theory of reality. Reality is to him sometimes simply a moving\nequilibrium of experience, the \u201cflux\u201d we have already referred to;\nsometimes the fleeting generations of men who have thought out for us\nall our philosophies and sciences and cults and varied experiences,\nand sometimes the \u201ccommon-sense world in which we find things partly\njoined and partly disjoined.\u201d It is sometimes, too, other things\neven than these. In a chapter of the book upon _Pragmatism_[13] it\nis stated in italics that \u201creality is, in general, what truths have\nto take account of,\u201d and that it has three parts: (1) \u201cthe flux of\nour sensations,\u201d and (2) the \u201crelations that obtain between our\nsensations, or between their copies in our minds,\u201d and (3) \u201cthe\nprevious truths of which every new inquiry takes account.\u201d Then again,\nin _A Pluralistic Universe_,[14] it is declared that \u201cthere may\nultimately never be an All-form at all, that the substance of reality\nmay never get totally collected ... and that a distributive form of\nreality, the Each-form, is logically as acceptable and empirical\nand probable as the All-form.\u201d This is the theory of the outspoken\n\u201cradical empiricism\u201d[15] which is the contention of the volume upon\n_The Meaning of Truth_, the main effort of which seems to be to show\nagain that the world is still in the process of making. It has the\nadditional drawback of bringing Pragmatism down not only to the level\nof radical empiricism, but to that of common-sense realism or dualism\n[the belief in the two independent realities of matter and mind], and\nto that of the \u201ccopy-theory\u201d[16] of truth, from which both Pragmatism\nand Radical Empiricism are especially supposed to deliver us. \u201cI will\nsay here again, for the sake of emphasis, that the existence of the\nobject ... is the only reason, in innumerable cases, why the idea does\nwork successfully.... Both Dewey and I hold firmly ... to objects\nindependent of our own judgments.\u201d[17] Much of all this is, no doubt,\nlike surrendering philosophy altogether.\n\nIn the case of Dr. Schiller, we may notice first his frequent and\nsuccessful exhibition of the extent to which human activity enters into\nthe constitution not only of \u201ctruth,\u201d but of \u201creality,\u201d of what we mean\nby reality. This is interwoven in his books with his whole philosophy\nof truth as something merely human, as \u201cdependent upon human purposes,\u201d\nas a \u201cvaluation\u201d expressive of the satisfactory, or the unsatisfactory,\nnature of the contents of \u201cprimary reality.\u201d It is interwoven, too,\nwith his doctrine that reality is essentially a \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, something that is\nstill in the making, something that human beings can somehow re-make\nand make perfect. Then this position about truth and reality is used\nby him, as by James, as a ground of attack against Absolutism, with\nits notion of a \u201cpre-existing ideal\u201d of knowledge and reality, as\nalready existing in a super-sensible world, that descends magically\ninto the passively recipient soul of man. There is no such thing, he\nclaims, as absolute truth, and the conception of an \u201cabsolute reality\u201d\nis both futile and pernicious. Absolutism, too, has an affinity\nto Solipsism,[18] the difficulties of which it can escape only by\nself-elimination.\n\nThen Absolutism is, Schiller continues, \u201cessentially irreligious,\u201d[19]\nalthough it was fostered at first in England for essentially religious\npurposes.[20] It has developed there now at last, he reminds us, a\npowerful left[21] wing which, as formerly in Germany, has opened a\nquarrel with theology. In Absolutism, the two phases of Deity--God\nas moral principle, and God as an intellectual principle--\u201cfall\napart,\u201d and absolutist metaphysic has really no connexion with genuine\nreligion. Humanism can \u201crenew Hegelianism\u201d by treating the making\nof truth as also the making of reality. Freedom is real, and may\npossibly \u201cpervade the universe.\u201d[22] All truth implies belief, and\nit is obviously one of the merits of Pragmatism to bring truth and\nreason together. Beliefs and ideas and wishes are really essential and\nintegral features in real knowing, and if knowing, as above, really\ntransforms our experience, they must be treated as \u201creal forces,\u201d which\ncannot be ignored by philosophy.[23]\n\nAgainst all this would-be positive, or constructive, philosophy we\nmust, however, record the fact that the pragmatism of Dr. Schiller\nbreaks down altogether in the matter of the recognition of a\ndistinction between the \u201cdiscovering\u201d of reality and the \u201cmaking\u201d of\nreality. And despite the ingenuity of his essay in the first edition\nof _Humanism_ upon \u201cActivity and Substance,\u201d[24] there is not in his\nwritings, any more than in those of James, any coherent or adequate\ntheory of reality. And this is the case whether we think of the\n\u201cprimary reality\u201d upon which we human beings are said to \u201creact,\u201d in\nour knowledge and in our action, or of the supreme reality of God\u2019s\nexistence, of which such an interesting speculative account is given\nin the essay referred to. Nor is there in Dr. Schiller, any more than\nin James, any adequate conception, either of philosophy as a whole,\nor of the theory of knowledge, or of the relation of Pragmatism as a\n\u201cmethod\u201d (it is modestly claimed to be only such, but the position is\nnot adhered to) to philosophy as such.[25] \u201cFor the pragmatic theory of\nknowledge initial principles are literally \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af, mere starting-points\nvariously, arbitrarily, casually selected, from which we hope to try\nto advance to something better. Little we care what their credentials\nmay be.... And as far as the future is concerned, systems of philosophy\nwill abound as before, and will be as various as ever, but they will\nprobably be more brilliant in colouring and more attractive in their\nform, for they will certainly have to be put forward and acknowledged\nas works of art that bear the impress of a unique and individual\nsoul.\u201d[26]\n\nThe main result of pragmatist considerations in the case of Professor\nDewey is perhaps that reconsideration of the problems of logic\nand knowledge in the light of the facts of genetic and functional\npsychology which has now become fairly general on the part of English\nand American students of philosophy. It is through his influence\ngenerally that pragmatists seem always to be talking about the way in\nwhich we \u201carrive at\u201d our beliefs, about ideas as \u201cinstruments\u201d for the\ninterpretation and arrangement of our experience, about the \u201cpassage\u201d\nfrom cognitive expectation to \u201cfulfilment,\u201d about ideas as \u201cplans of\naction\u201d and mental habits, about the growth and the utility of the\ntruth, about the \u201cinstrumental\u201d character of all our thinking, about\nbeliefs as more fundamental than knowledge, and so on.\n\nProfessor Dewey has also written many more or less popular, but none\nthe less highly valuable, short studies upon the application of an\ninstrumentalist conception of philosophy to education and to social\nquestions. One of his last pieces of service in this connection is a\nvolume in which he associates Pragmatism with the general revolution\neffected in the entire range of the mental and moral sciences by\nDarwinism, with the present tendency in philosophy to turn away from\nultimate questions to specific problems, and with the reform which, in\nhis opinion, is necessary in our educational ideals[27] generally.\n\nThese three leading exponents of Pragmatism may be regarded as\nmeeting the objections to philosophy urged respectively by the \u201cman\nof affairs,\u201d by the \u201cmystical, religious\u201d man, and by the \u201cman of\nscience.\u201d[28] By this it is meant that the man of affairs will find\nin James an exposition of philosophy as the study of different ways\nof looking at the world; the mystical, religious man will find\nin Schiller a treatment of philosophy as the justification of an\nessentially spiritual philosophy of life; and that the scientific man\nwill find in the writings of Dewey and his associates a treatment of\nphilosophy as nothing else than an extension into the higher regions of\nthought of the same experimental and hypothetical method with which he\nis already familiar in the physical sciences.\n\nIn this version of the work of the three leading pragmatists it\nis assumed, of course, that the pragmatist philosophy is the only\nphilosophy that can show to the average man that philosophy can really\ndo something useful--can \u201cbake bread,\u201d if you will, can give to a man\nthe food of a man. It is assumed, too, that it is the only philosophy\nwhich proceeds scientifically, that is to say, by means of observation\nand of hypotheses that \u201cwork,\u201d and by subsequent deduction and by\n\u201cverification.\u201d And again, that it is the only philosophy that gives\nto man the realities upon which he can base his aspirations or his\nfaith in distinction, that is to say, from the mere abstractions of\nRationalism in any form.\n\nBy way of a few quotations illustrative of the fundamental contentions\nof the pragmatists, we may select the following: \u201cIdeas become true\njust in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with\nother parts of our experience, to summarise them and get about among\nthem by conceptional short-cuts instead of following the interminable\nsuccession of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so\nto speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part\nof our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily,\nworking securely, simplifying, saving labour--is true for just so much,\ntrue in so far forth, true instrumentally.\u201d[29] \u201cThe true is the name\nof whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good for\ndefinite and assignable reasons.\u201d[30] From Professor Dewey: \u201cThinking\nis a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just as at\nother times we engage in other sorts of activity, as converse with a\nfriend, draw a plan for a house, take a walk, eat a dinner, purchase\na suit of clothes, etc. etc. The measure of its success, the standard\nof its validity is precisely the degree in which thinking disposes of\nthe difficulty and allows us to proceed with the more direct modes\nof experiencing, that are henceforth possessed of more assured and\ndeepened value.\u201d[31] From Dr. Schiller\u2019s book, _Studies in Humanism_:\n\u201cPragmatism is the doctrine that when an assertion claims truth, its\nconsequences are always used to test its claims; that (2) the truth\nof an assertion depends on its application; that (3) the meaning\nof a rule lies in its application; that (4) all meaning depends on\npurpose; that (5) all mental life is purposive. It [Pragmatism] must\nconstitute itself into (6) a systematic protest against all ignoring\nof the purposiveness of actual knowing, alike whether it is abstracted\nfrom for the sake of the imaginary, pure, or absolute reason of the\nrationalists, or eliminated for the sake of an equally imaginary or\npure mechanism of the naturalists. So conceived, we may describe it as\n(7) a conscious application to logic of a teleological psychology which\nimplies ultimately a voluntaristic metaphysics.\u201d\n\nFrom these citations, and from the descriptive remarks of the\npreceding two paragraphs, we may perhaps be enabled to infer that our\nAnglo-American Pragmatism has progressed from the stage of (1) a mere\nmethod of discussing truth and thinking in relation to the problem\nof philosophy as a whole, (2) that of a more or less definite and\ndetailed criticism of the rationalism that overlooks the practical,\nor purposive, character of most of our knowledge, to that of (3) a\nhumanistic or \u201cvoluntaristic\u201d or \u201cpersonalistic\u201d philosophy, with\nits many different associations and affiliations.[32] One of the\nlast developments, for example, of this pragmatist humanism is Dr.\nSchiller\u2019s association of philosophy with the metaphysics of evolution,\nwith the attempt to find the goal of the world-process and of human\nhistory in a changeless society of perfected individuals.\n\nWe shall immediately see, however, that this summary description of the\ngrowth of Pragmatism has to be supplemented by a recognition of (1)\nsome of the different phases Pragmatism has assumed on the continent of\nEurope, (2) the different phases that may be detected in the reception\nor criticism accorded to it in different countries, and (3) some of the\nresults of the pragmatist movement upon contemporary philosophy. All\nthese things have to do with the making of the complex thing that we\nthink of as Pragmatism and the pragmatist movement.\n\n\nA NOTE ON THE MEANING OF \u201cPRAGMATISM\u201d\n\n(1) \u201cThe opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by\nthe application of the following maxim for obtaining clearness of\napprehension: \u2018Consider what effects that might conceivably have\npractical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.\nThen, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of\nthe object\u2019\u201d (Baldwin\u2019s _Philosophical Dictionary_, vol. ii. p. 321).\n[We can see from this citation that the application of its formul\u00e6\nabout \u201cconsequences\u201d to metaphysics, or philosophy generally, must be\nconsidered as a part, or aspect, of the pragmatist philosophy.]\n\n(2) \u201cThe doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception expresses\nitself in practical consequences; consequences either in the shape of\nconduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected,\nif the conception be true; which consequences would be different, if\nit were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which\nthe meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second\nconception should not appear to have other consequence, then it\nmust be really only the first conception under a different name. In\nmethodology, it is certain that to trace and compare their respective\nconsequences is an admirable way of establishing the different meanings\nof different conceptions\u201d (_ibid._, from Professor James).\n\n(3) \u201cA widely current opinion during the last quarter of a century has\nbeen that _\u2018reasonableness\u2019 is not a good in itself, but only for the\nsake of something_. Whether it be so or not seems to be a synthetical\nquestion [_i.e._ a question that is not merely a verbal question, a\nquestion of words], not to be settled by an appeal to the Principle of\nContradiction [the principle hitherto relied upon by Rationalism or\nIntellectualism].... Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate\ngood lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in\nindividual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or\ncontinuous. Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence,\nthe becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming\ninstinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process\nof the growth of reasonableness\u201d (_ibid._ p. 322. From Dr. Peirce, the\nbracket clauses being the author\u2019s).\n\n(4) \u201cIt is the belief that ideas invariably strive after practical\nexpression, and that our whole life is teleological. Putting the\nmatter logically, logic formulates theoretically what is of regulative\nimportance for life--for our \u2018experience\u2019 in view of practical ends.\nIts philosophical meaning is the conviction that all facts of nature,\nphysically and spiritually, find their expressions in \u2018_will_\u2019; will\nand energy are identical. This tendency is in agreement with the\npractical tendencies of American thought and American life in so far\nas they both set a definite end before Idealism\u201d (Ueberweg-Heinze,\n_Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. iv., written and contributed by\nProfessor Matoon Monroe Curtis, Professor of Philosophy in Western\nReserve University, Cleveland, U.S.A.).\n\n(5) See also an article in _Mind_ for October 1900, vol. ix. N.S., upon\n\u201cPragmatism\u201d by the author of this book on _Pragmatism and Idealism_,\nreferred to as one of the early sources in Baldwin\u2019s _Philosophical\nDictionary_ (New York and London) and in Ueberweg-Heinze\u2019s\n_Geschichte_, Vierter Teil (Berlin, 1906).\n\nThe conclusion that I am inclined to draw from the foregoing official\nstatements (and also, say, from another official article like that\nof M. Lalande in the _Revue Philosophique_, 1906, on \u201cPragmatisme\net Pragmaticisme\u201d) is that the _term_ \u201cPragmatism\u201d is not of itself\na matter of great importance, and that there is no separate,\nintelligible, independent, self-consistent system of philosophy that\nmay be called Pragmatism. It is a general name for the Practicalism or\nVoluntarism or Humanism or the Philosophy of the Practical Reason, or\nthe Activism, or the Instrumentalism, or the Philosophy of Hypotheses,\nor the Dynamic Philosophy of life and things that is discussed in\ndifferent ways in this book upon Pragmatism and Idealism. And it is\nnot and cannot be independent of the traditional body of philosophical\ntruth in relation to which it can alone be defined.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nPRAGMATISM AND THE PRAGMATIST MOVEMENT\n\n\nIn considering some of the results of pragmatist and voluntarist\ndoctrines in the case of European writers, to whom the American-English\ntriumvirate used to look somewhat sympathetically, we may begin with\nItaly, which boasted, according to Dr. Schiller (writing in 1907),\nof a youthful band of avowed pragmatists with a militant organ, the\n_Leonardo_. \u201cFundamentally,\u201d declares Papini,[33] the leader of this\nmovement, \u201cPragmatism means an unstiffening of all our theories and\nbeliefs, by attending to their instrumental value. It incorporates and\nharmonizes various ancient tendencies, such as Nominalism, with its\nprotest against the use of general terms, Utilitarianism, with its\nemphasis upon particular aspects and problems, Positivism, with its\ndisdain of verbal and useless questions, Kantism, with its doctrine of\nthe primacy of practical reason, Voluntarism, with its treatment of\nthe intellect as the tool of the will, and Freedom, and a positive\nattitude towards religious questions. It is the tendency of taking all\nthese, and other theories, for what they are worth, being chiefly a\ncorridor-theory, with doors and avenues into various theories, and a\ncentral rallying-ground for them all.\u201d These words are valuable as one\nof the many confessions of the affiliations of Pragmatism to several\nother more or less experiential, or practical, views of philosophy.\nIt is perfectly obvious from them that Pragmatism stands, in the\nmain, for the apprehension of all truth as subservient to practice,\nas but a device for the \u201ceconomy\u201d of thought, for the grasping of the\nmultiplicity and the complexity of phenomena. It looks upon man as\nmade, in the main, for action, and not for speculation--a doctrine\nwhich even Mr. Peirce, by the way, now speaks of as \u201ca stoical maxim\nwhich to me, at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly\nas it did at thirty.\u201d[34]\n\n\u201cThe various ideal worlds are here,\u201d continues Papini, according to\nthe version of James,[35] \u201cbecause the real world fails to satisfy us.\nAll our ideal instruments are certainly imperfect. But philosophy can\nbe regenerated ... it can become pragmatic in the general sense of the\nword, a general theory of human action ... so that philosophic thought\nwill resolve itself into a comparative discussion of all the possible\nprogrammes for man\u2019s life, when man is once for all regarded as a\n_creative_ being.... As such, man becomes a kind of god, and where are\nwe to draw the limits?\u201d In an article called \u201cFrom Man to God,\u201d Papini,\nin the _Leonardo_, lets his imagination work in stretching the limits\nof this way of thinking.\n\nThese prophetic, or Promethean, utterances--and we must never forget\nthat even to the Greeks philosophy was always something of a religion\nor a life--may be paralleled by some of the more enthusiastic and\nunguarded, early utterances of Dr. Schiller about \u201cvoluntarism\u201d\nor \u201cmetaphysical personalism\u201d as the one \u201ccourageous,\u201d and the\nonly potent, philosophy; or about the \u201cstorming of the Jericho of\nrationalism\u201d by the \u201cjeers\u201d and the \u201ctrumpetings\u201d of the confident\nhumanists and their pragmatic _confr\u00e8res_. The underlying element\nof truth in them, and, for that part of it, in many of the similar\nutterances of many of our modern humanists, from Rabelais to Voltaire\nand from Shelley to Marx and Nietzsche, is, as we may see, that a true\nmetaphysic must serve, not only as a rational system for the intellect,\nbut as a \u201cdynamic\u201d[36] or motive for action and achievement, for the\nconscious activity of rational, self-conscious beings.\n\nAs for the matter of any further developments[37] of the free,\ncreative religion hinted by Papini, we had, in 1903, the solemn\ndeclaration of Professor James that \u201cthe programme of the man-god is\none of the great type programmes of philosophy,\u201d and that he himself\nhad been \u201cslow\u201d in coming to a perception of the full inwardness of\nthe idea. Then it led evidently in Italy itself to a new doctrine\nwhich was trumpeted there a year or two ago in the public press as\n\u201cFuturism,\u201d[38] in which \u201ccourage, audacity and rebellion\u201d were the\nessential elements, and which could not \u201cabide\u201d the mere mention\nof such things as \u201cpriests\u201d and \u201cideals\u201d and \u201cprofessors\u201d and\n\u201cmoralism.\u201d The extravagances of Prezzolini, who thinks of man as a\n\u201csentimental gorilla,\u201d were apparently the latest outcome of this\nanarchical individualism and practicalism. Pragmatism was converted\nby him into a sophisticated opportunism and a modern Machiavellism, a\nmethod of attaining contentment in one\u2019s life and of dominating one\u2019s\nfellow-creatures by playing upon their fancies and prejudices as does\nthe religious charlatan or the quack doctor or the rhetorician.\n\nThe reader who may care to contemplate all this radical, pragmatist\nenthusiasm for the New Reformation in a more accessible, and a less\nexaggerated, form had better perhaps consult the recent work of Mr.\nSturt of Oxford on the _Idea of a Free Church_. In this work the\nprinciples of Pragmatism are applied, first, critically and in the\nmain negatively, to the moral dogmas of traditional Christianity, and\nthen positively to the new conception of religion he would substitute\nfor all this--the development of personality in accordance with the\nclaims of family and of national life. A fair-minded criticism of\nthis book would, I think, lead to the conclusion that the changes\ncontemplated by Mr. Sturt are already part and parcel of the programme\nof liberal Christianity, whether we study this in the form of the many\nmore or less philosophical presentations of the same in modern German\ntheology, or in the form of the free, moral and social efforts of the\nvoluntary religion of America and England. In America many of the\nyounger thinkers in theology and philosophy are already writing in a\nmore or less popular manner upon Pragmatism as a philosophy that bids\nfair to harmonize \u201ctraditional\u201d and \u201cradical\u201d conceptions of religion.\nOne of these writers, for example, in a recent important commemorative\nvolume,[39] tries to show how this may be done by interpreting the\n\u201csupernatural,\u201d not as the \u201ctrans-experimental,\u201d but as the \u201cethical\u201d\nin experience, and by turning \u201cdogmatic\u201d into \u201chistorical theology.\u201d\nAnd it would not be difficult to find many books and addresses in\nwhich the same idea is expressed. The more practical wing of this same\nparty endeavours to connect Pragmatism with the whole philosophy and\npsychology of religious conversion, as this has been worked over by\nrecent investigators like Stanley Hall,[40] Starbuck,[41] and others,\nand, above all, by James in his striking volume _The Varieties of\nReligious Experience_.[42]\n\nThe fact, of course--and I shall immediately refer to it--that\nPragmatism has been hailed in France as a salutary doctrine, not\nmerely by Liberals and Evangelicals, but by devout Catholics and\nAnti-modernists, is perhaps enough to give us some pause in the matter\nof its application in the sphere of theoretical and practical religion.\nIt is useful, it would seem, sometimes to \u201cliberate\u201d the spirit of\nman, and useful, too, at other times to connect the strivings of the\nindividual with the more or less organized experiences of past ages.\n\nTurning, then, to France, it is, judging from the claims of the\npragmatists, and from some of the literature bearing upon this entire\nsubject,[43] fairly evident that there has been a kind of association\nor relationship between Pragmatism and the following tendencies in\nrecent French philosophy: (1) the \u201cfreedom\u201d and \u201cindeterminism\u201d\nphilosophy of Renouvier[44] and other members of the Neo-Critical\nschool, and of Boutroux and Bergson, who, \u201calthough differing from each\nother in many important respects,\u201d all \u201cbelong to the same movement of\nthought, the reaction against Hegelianism and the cult of science which\nhas dominated France since the decline of the metaphysics of the school\nof Cousin\u201d;[45] (2) the philosophy of science and scientific hypotheses\nrepresented by writers like Poincar\u00e9,[46] Brunschvicg, Le Roy,[47]\nMilhaud, Abel Rey,[48] and others; (3) the religious philosophy and the\nfideism of the followers of the spiritualistic metaphysic of Bergson,\nmany of whom go further than he does, and \u201cmake every effort to bring\nhim to the confessional faith\u201d;[49] and (4) the French philosophy\nof to-day that definitely bears the name of Pragmatism, that of M.\nBlondel,[50] who in 1893 wrote a suggestive work entitled _L\u2019Action_,\nand who claims to have coined the word Pragmatism, after much careful\nconsideration and discrimination, as early as 1888--many years before\nthe California pamphlet of James.\n\nThe first of these points of correspondence or relationship we can pass\nover with the remark that we shall have a good deal to say about the\nadvantage enjoyed by Pragmatism over Rationalism in the treatment of\n\u201cfreedom\u201d and the \u201cvolitional\u201d side of human nature, and also about the\ngeneral pragmatist reaction against Rationalism.\n\nAnd as for the philosophy of science, it has been shown that our\nEnglish-speaking pragmatists cannot exactly pride themselves in the\nsomewhat indiscriminate manner of James and Schiller upon the supposed\nsupport for their \u201chypothetical\u201d conception of science and philosophy\nto be found in the work of their French associates upon the logic of\nscience. \u201cThe men of great learning who were named as sponsors of this\nnew philosophy have more and more testified what reservations they\nmake, and how greatly their conclusions differ from those which are\ncurrently attributed to them.\u201d[51] Both Brunschvicg and Poincar\u00e9, in\nfact, take the greatest pains in their books to dissociate themselves\nfrom anything like the appearance of an acceptance of the doctrine of\nthe relativity of knowledge, from the signs of any lack of faith in the\nidea that science, as far as it goes, gives us a true revelation of the\nnature of reality.\n\nThen in regard to (3) the French pragmatist philosophy or religion\nwe have only to read the reports and the quotations of M. Lalande\nto see in this philosophy the operation of an uncritical dogmatism\nor a blind \u201cfideism\u201d to which very few other philosophers, either\nin France or in any other country, would care to subscribe. \u201c_La\nRevue de Philosophie_, which is directed by ecclesiastics, recently\nextolled pragmatism as a means of proving orthodox beliefs.\u201d ... \u201cThis\nsystem solves a great many difficulties in philosophy; it explains\nthe necessity of principles marvellously.\u201d ... \u201cThe existence of God,\nProvidence and Immortality are demonstrated by their happy effects upon\nour terrestrial life.\u201d ... \u201cIf we can consider the matter carefully,\nit will be seen that the Good is the useful; for not to be good in\nanything is synonymous with being bad, and everywhere the true is the\nuseful. It is in this assertion that Pragmatism consists.\u201d[52]\n\nAnd as to the fourth tendency, there is, at its outset, according\nto M. Lalande, a more rational or ethical basis for the fideism of\nM. Blondel\u2019s book upon action, which starts off with a criticism\nof philosophic dilettantism quite analogous with that which Mr.\nPeirce follows in _How to Make Our Ideas Clear_. But M. Blondel\n\u201cdoes not continue in the same manner, and his conclusion is very\ndifferent. Rejecting all philosophical formalism, _he puts his trust\nin moral experience, and consults it directly_. He thinks that moral\nexperience shows that action is not wholly self-contained, but that\nit _presupposes a reality which transcends the world in which we\nparticipate_.\u201d[53]\n\nFinally, maintains M. Blondel, \u201cwe are _unable_, as Pascal already\nsaid, _either to live, or to understand ourselves, by ourselves alone_.\nSo that, unless we mutilate our nature by renouncing all earnestness of\nlife, we are necessarily led to recognize in ourselves the presence of\nGod. Our problem, therefore, can only be solved by an act of absolute\nfaith in a positive religion [Catholicism in his case]. This completes\nthe series of acts of faith, without which no action, not even our\ndaily acts, could be accomplished, and without which we should fall\ninto absolute barrenness, both practical and intellectual.\u201d[54]\n\nNow again these words about our being unable to understand ourselves\n\u201cby ourselves alone\u201d contain an element of truth which we may\nassociate with the pragmatist tendency to believe in a socialized\n(as distinguished from an individualistic) interpretation[55] of\nour common moral life, to believe, that is to say, in a society of\npersons as the truth (or the reality) of the universe, rather than\nin an interpretation of the universe as the thinking experience of a\nsingle absolute intelligence. This, however, is also a point which we\nare obliged to defer[56] until we take up the general subject of the\nrelations between Pragmatism and Rationalism. The other words of the\nparagraph, in respect of our absolute need of faith in some positive\nreligion, are, of course, expressive again of the uncritical fideism\nto which reference has already been made. As an offset or alternative\nto the \u201cfree\u201d religion of Papini and James and to the experimental or\npractical religion of different Protestant bodies, it is enough of\nitself to give us pause in estimating the real drift[57] of Pragmatism\nin regard to religious faith and the philosophy of religion.[58]\n\nWe shall meantime take leave of French Pragmatism[59] with the\nreflection that it is thus obviously as complex and as confusing\nand confused a thing as is the Pragmatism of other countries. It is\nnow almost a generation since we began to hear of a renascence of\nspiritualism[60] and idealism in France in connexion not merely with\nthe work of philosophers like Renouvier and Lachelier and Fouill\u00e9e[61]\nand Boutroux, but with men of letters like De Vogu\u00e9, Lavisse, Faguet,\nDesjardins[62] and the rest, and some of the French Pragmatism of\nto-day is but one of the more specialized phases of the broader\nmovement.\n\nAnd as for the special question of the influence of James and his\nphilosophy upon Bergson, and of that of the possible return influence\nof Bergson upon James,[63] the evidence produced by Lalande from\nBergson himself is certainly all to the effect that both men have\nworked very largely independently of each other, although perfectly\ncognisant now and then of each other\u2019s publications. Both men, along\nwith their followers (and this is all that needs interest us), have\nobviously been under the influence of ideas that have long been in the\nair about the need of a philosophy that is \u201cmore truly empirical\u201d[64]\nthan the traditional philosophy, and more truly inclined to \u201cdiscover\nwhat is involved in our actions in the ultimate recess, when,\nunconsciously and in spite of ourselves, we _support existence and\ncling to it whether we completely understand it or not_.\u201d[65]\n\nAs for Pragmatism and pragmatist achievements in Germany, there is,\nas might well be supposed, little need of saying much. The genius\nof the country is against both; and if there is any Pragmatism in\nGermany, it must have contrived somehow to have been \u201cborn again\u201d of\nthe \u201cspirit\u201d before obtaining official recognition.[66] So much even\nmight be inferred from the otherwise generous recognition accorded to\nthe work of James by scholars and thinkers like Eucken and Stein[67]\nand the rest. Those men cannot see Pragmatism save in the broad light\nof the \u201chumanism\u201d that has always characterised philosophy, when\nproperly appreciated, and understood in the light of its true genesis.\nPragmatism has in fact been long known in Germany under the older\nnames of \u201cVoluntarism\u201d and \u201cHumanism,\u201d although it may doubtless be\nassociated there with some of the more pronounced tendencies of the\nhour, such as the recent insistence of the \u201cG\u00f6ttingen Fries School\u201d\nupon the importance of the \u201cgenetic\u201d and the \u201cdescriptive\u201d point of\nview in regard even to the matter of the supposed first principles of\nknowledge, the hypothetical and methodological conception of philosophy\ntaken by philosophical scientists like Mach and Ostwald[68] and their\nfollowers, the \u201cempiricism\u201d and \u201crealism\u201d of thinkers like the late\nDr. Avenarius[69] of Zurich.\n\nThen the so-called \u201cteleological,\u201d or \u201cpractical,\u201d character of our\nhuman thinking has also been recognized in modern German thought long\nbefore the days of Peirce and Dewey, even by such strictly academic\nthinkers as Lotze and Sigwart. The work of the latter thinker upon\nLogic, by the way, was translated into English under distinctly\nNeo-Hegelian influences. In the second portion of this work the\nuniversal presuppositions of knowledge are considered, not merely as\n_a priori_ truths, but as akin in some important respects \u201cto the\nethical principles by which we are wont to determine and guide our free\nconscious activity.\u201d[70] But even apart from this matter of the natural\nassociation of Pragmatism with the Voluntarism that has long existed in\nGerman philosophy,[71] we may undoubtedly pass to the following things\nin contemporary and recent German thought as sympathetic, in the main,\nto the pragmatist tendencies of James and Dewey and Schiller: (1) the\npractical conception of science and philosophy, as both of them a kind\nof \u201ceconomy of the attention,\u201d a sort of \u201cconceptual shorthand\u201d[72]\n(for the purposes of the \u201cdescription\u201d of our environment) that\nwe have referred to in the case of Mach and Ostwald; (2) the close\nassociation between the \u201cmetaphysical\u201d and the \u201ccultural\u201d in books like\nthose of Jerusalem[73] and Eleutheropulos;[74] (3) the sharp criticism\nof the Rationalism of the Critical Idealism by the two last-mentioned\nthinkers, and by some of the members of the new Fichte[75] School\nlike Schellwien; and last but not least, (4) the tendency to take a\npsychological[76] and a sociological[77] (instead of a merely logical)\nview of the functions of thought and philosophy, that is just as\naccentuated in Germany at the present time as it is elsewhere.\n\nJames and Schiller have both been fond of referring to the work of many\nof these last-mentioned men as favourable to a conception of philosophy\nless as a \u201ctheory of knowledge\u201d (or a \u201ctheory of being\u201d) in the old\nsense than as a _Weltanschauungslehre_ (a view of the world as whole),\na \u201cdiscussion of the various possible programmes for man\u2019s life\u201d to\nwhich reference has already been made in the case of Papini and others.\nAnd we might associate with their predilections and persuasions in\nthis regard the apparent Pragmatism also of a great scholar like\nHarnack[78] in reference to the subordination of religious dogma to\nthe realities of the religious life, or the Pragmatism of Ritschl[79]\nhimself, in regard to the subordinate place in living religion of mere\nintellectual theory, or even some of the tendencies of the celebrated\nvalue-philosophy of Rickert and Windelband[80] and M\u00fcnsterberg[81]\nand the rest. But again the main trouble about all this quasi-German\nsupport for the pragmatists is that most of these contemporary thinkers\nhave taken pains to trace the roots of their teaching back into the\ngreat systems of the past. The pragmatists, on the other hand, have\nbeen notoriously careless about the matter of the various affiliations\nof their \u201ccorridor-like\u201d and eclectic theory.\n\nThere are many reasons, however, against regarding even the\nphilosophical expression of many of the practical and scientific\ntendencies of Germany as at all favourable to the acceptance of\nPragmatism as a satisfactory philosophy from the German point of view.\nAmong these reasons are: (1) The fact that it is naturally impossible\nto find any real support in past or present German philosophy for the\nimpossible breach that exists in Pragmatism between the \u201ctheoretical\u201d\nand the \u201cpractical,\u201d and (2) the fact that Germany has only recently\npassed through a period of sharp conflict between the psychological\n(or the \u201cgenetic\u201d) and the logical point of view regarding knowledge,\nresulting in a confessed victory for the latter. And then again (3)\neven if there is a partial correspondence between Pragmatism and the\n_quasi_ economic (or \u201cpractical\u201d) conception taken of philosophy by\nsome of the younger men in Germany who have not altogether outlived\ntheir reaction against Rationalism, there are other tendencies there\nthat are far more characteristic of the spirit and of the traditions\nof the country. Among these are the New Idealism generally, the strong\nNeo-Kantian movement of the Marburg school[82] and their followers in\ndifferent places, the revived interest in Hegel[83] and in Schelling,\nthe Neo-Romanticism of Jena, with its booklets upon such topics as\n_The Culture of the Soul_, _Life with Nature_, _German Idealism_, and\nso on.[84] And then (4) there are just as many difficulties in the\nway of regarding the psychological and sociological philosophy of men\nlike Jerusalem and Eleutheropulos as anything like a final philosophy\nof knowledge, as there is in attempting to do the same thing with\nthe merely preliminary and tentative philosophy of James and his\nassociates.\n\nReturning now to America and England, although Pragmatism is eminently\nan American[85] doctrine, it would, of course, be absurd to imagine\nthat Pragmatism has carried the entire thought of the United States\nwith it.[86] It encountered there, even at the outset, at least\nsomething of the contempt and the incredulity and the hostility\nthat it met with elsewhere, and also much of the American shrewd\nindifference to a much-advertised new article. The message of James\nas a philosopher, too, was doubtless discounted (at least by the\nwell-informed) in the light of his previous brilliant work as a\ndescriptive psychologist, and also, perhaps, in the light of his\nwonderfully suggestive personality.[87]\n\nWhat actually happened in America in respect of the pragmatist movement\nwas, first of all, the sudden emergence of a magazine literature[88]\nin connexion with the Will-to-Believe philosophy of James and the\nCalifornia address, and in connexion (according to the generous\ntestimony of James) with Deweyism or \u201cInstrumentalism.\u201d Much of\nthis tiresome and hair-splitting magazine discussion of \u201cideas as\ninstruments of thought,\u201d and of the \u201cconsequences\u201d (\u201ctheoretical\u201d\nor \u201cpractical\u201d or what not) by which ideas were to be \u201ctested,\u201d was\npronounced by James, in 1906, to be largely crude and superficial.\nIt had the indirect merit, however, of yielding one or two valuable\nestimates of the many inconsistencies in Pragmatism, and of the many\ndifferent kinds of Pragmatism or instrumentalism that there seemed to\nbe, and of the value of Pragmatism as a \u201ctheory of knowledge,\u201d and as\na \u201cphilosophical generalization.\u201d The upshot of the whole preliminary\ndiscussion was (1) the discovery that, Pragmatism having arisen (as\nDewey himself put it) out of a multitude of conflicting tendencies\nin regard to what we might call the \u201capproach\u201d to philosophy, would\nprobably soon \u201cdissolve itself\u201d back again into some of the streams out\nof which it had arisen,[89] and (2) the discovery that all that this\nearly \u201cmethodological\u201d pragmatism amounted to was the harmless doctrine\nthat the meaning of any conception expressed itself in the past or\nfuture conduct or experience of actual, or possible, sentient creatures.\n\nWe shall again take occasion[90] to refer to this comparative failure\nof Pragmatism to give any systematic or unified account of the\nconsequences by which it would seek to test the truth of propositions.\nIts failure, however, in this connexion is a matter of secondary\nimportance in comparison with the great lesson[91] to be drawn from\nits idea that there can be for man no objective truth about the\nuniverse, apart from the idea of its meaning[92] or significance to his\nexperience and to his conscious activity.\n\nWhat is now taking place in America in this second decade [_i.e._ in\nthe years after 1908] of the pragmatist movement is apparently (1)\nthe sharpest kind of official rationalist condemnation of Pragmatism\nas an imperfectly proved and a merely \u201csubjective\u201d and a highly\nunsystematic philosophy; (2) the appearance of a number of instructive\nbooklets[93] upon Pragmatism and the pragmatist movement, some of them\nexpository and critical, some of them in the main sympathetic, some of\nthem condemnatory and even contemptuous, and some of them attempts at\nfurther constructive work along pragmatist lines; (3) indications here\nand there of the acceptance and the promulgation of older and newer\ndoctrines antithetic and hostile to Pragmatism--some of them possibly\nas typically American as Pragmatism itself.\n\nAs a single illustration of the partly constructive work that is\nbeing attempted in the name and the spirit of pragmatism, we may\ninstance the line of reflection entered upon by Professor Moore[94]\nin consequence of his claim that to Pragmatism the fundamental thing\nin any judgment or proposition is not so much its consequences, but\nits \u201cvalue.\u201d This claim may, no doubt, be supported by the many\ndeclarations of James and Schiller that the \u201ctrue,\u201d like the \u201cgood\u201d\nand the \u201cbeautiful,\u201d is simply a \u201cvaluation,\u201d and not the fetish that\nthe rationalists make it out to be. It is doubtful, however, as we may\ntry to indicate, whether this \u201cvalue\u201d interpretation of Pragmatism\ncan be carried out independently of the more systematic attempts at a\ngeneral philosophy of value that are being made to-day in Germany and\nAmerica and elsewhere. And then it would be a matter of no ordinary\ndifficulty to clear up the inconsistency that doubtless exists between\nPragmatism as a value philosophy and Pragmatism as a mere philosophy of\n\u201cconsequences.\u201d It is \u201cimmediate,\u201d and \u201cverifiable,\u201d and \u201cdefinitely\nappreciated\u201d consequences, rather than the higher values of our\nexperience that (up to the present time) seem to have bulked largely in\nthe argumentations of the pragmatists.\n\nAnd as an illustration of a doctrine that is both American and hostile\nto pragmatism, we may instance the New Realism[95] that was recently\nlaunched in a collective manifesto in _The Journal of Philosophy and\nScientific Methods_. This realism is, to be sure, hostile to every\nform of \u201csubjectivism\u201d or personalism, and may in a certain sense be\nregarded as the emergence into full daylight of the realism or dualism\nthat we found to be lurking[96] in James\u2019s \u201cradical empiricism.\u201d It\nis, therefore, as it were, one of the signs that Pragmatism is perhaps\nbreaking up in America into some of the more elemental tendencies out\nof which it developed--in this case the American desire for operative\n(or effective) realism and for a \u201cdirect\u201d[97] contact with reality\ninstead of the indirect contact of so many metaphysical systems.\n\nIt is only necessary to add here that it is to the credit of American\nrationalism of the Neo-Hegelian type that it has shown itself,\nnotably in the writings of Professor Royce,[98] capable, not only\nof criticising Pragmatism, but of seeking to incorporate, in a\nconstructive philosophy of the present, some of the features of the\npragmatist emphasis upon \u201cwill\u201d and \u201cachievement\u201d and \u201cpurpose.\u201d It\nis, therefore, in this respect at least in line with some of the best\ntendencies in contemporary European philosophy.\n\nLastly, there are certain tendencies of recent English philosophy with\nwhich Pragmatism has special affinities. Among these may be mentioned:\n(1) the various general and specific criticisms[99] that have been\nmade there for at least two generations on the more or less formal\nand abstract character of the metaphysic of our Neo-Kantians and our\nNeo-Hegelians; (2) the concessions that have recently been made by\nprominent rationalists to the undoubtedly purposive, or \u201cteleological,\u201d\ncharacter of our human thinking, and to the connexion of our mental\nlife with our entire practical and spiritual activity. Many of these\nconcessions are now regarded as the merest commonplaces of speculation,\nand we shall probably refer to them in our next chapter. Then there is\n(3) the well-known insistence of some of our foremost psychologists,\nlike Ward and Stout,[100] upon the reality of activity and \u201cpurpose\u201d\nin mental process, and upon the part played by them in the evolution\nof our intellectual life, and of our adjustment to the world in which\nwe find ourselves. And (4) the ethical and social idealism of such\nwell-known members of our Neo-Hegelian school as Professors Jones,\nMackenzie, and Muirhead. These scholars and thinkers are just as\ninsistent as the pragmatists upon the idea that philosophy and thought\nare, and should be, a practical social \u201cdynamic\u201d--that is to say,\n\u201cforces\u201d and \u201cmotives\u201d making for the perfection of the common life.\n(5) A great deal of the philosophy of science and of the philosophy of\naxioms and postulates to be found in British writers, from Mill and\nJevons to Karl Pearson and Mr. A. Sidgwick[101] and many others.\n\nApart from all this, however, or rather, in addition to it, it may\nbe truly said that one of the striking things about recent British\nphilosophical literature[102] is the stir and the activity that have\nbeen excited in the rationalist camp by the writings of the pragmatists\nand the \u201cpersonal idealists,\u201d and by the critics of these newer modes\nof thought. All this has led to many such re-statements of the problems\nof philosophy as are to be found in the books of men like Joachim,[103]\nHenry Jones,[104] A.\u00a0E. Taylor,[105] Boyce-Gibson,[106] Henry H.\nSturt,[107] S.\u00a0H. Mellone,[108] J.\u00a0H.\u00a0B. Joseph,[109] and others, and\neven, say, in such a representative book as that of Professor Stewart\nupon the classical theme of Plato\u2019s _Theory of Ideas_. In this work an\nattempt is made to interpret Plato\u2019s \u201cIdeas\u201d in the light of pragmatist\nconsiderations as but \u201ccategories\u201d or \u201cpoints of view\u201d which we find it\nconvenient to use in dealing with our sense experience.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nSOME FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS\n\n\nWe shall now attempt a somewhat detailed treatment of a few of the more\ncharacteristic tendencies of Pragmatism. The following have already\nbeen mentioned in our general sketch of its development and of the\nappearance of the pragmatist philosophy in Europe and America: (1) the\nattempted modification by Pragmatism of the extremes of Rationalism,\nand its dissatisfaction with the rationalism of both science and\nphilosophy; (2) its progress from the stage of a mere practical and\nexperimental theory of truth to a broad humanism in which philosophy\nitself becomes (like art, say) merely an important \u201cdynamic\u201d element\nin human culture; (3) its preference in the matter of first principles\nfor \u201cfaith\u201d and \u201cexperience\u201d and a trust in our instinctive \u201cbeliefs\u201d;\n(4) its readiness to affiliate itself with the various liberal and\nhumanistic tendencies in human thought, such as the philosophy of\n\u201cfreedom,\u201d and the \u201chypothetical method\u201d of science, modern ethical\nand social idealism, the religious reaction of recent years, the\nvoluntaristic trend in German post-Kantian philosophy, and so on. Our\nsubject in this chapter, however, is rather that of the three or four\nmore or less characteristic assumptions and contentions upon which all\nthese and the many other pragmatist tendencies may be said to rest.\n\nThe first and foremost of these assumptions is the position that all\ntruth is \u201cmade\u201d truth, \u201chuman\u201d truth, truth related to human attitudes\nand purposes, and that there is no \u201cobjective\u201d or \u201cindependent\u201d\ntruth, no truth \u201cin whose establishment the function of giving human\nsatisfaction, in marrying previous parts of experience with newer\nparts, has played no r\u00f4le.\u201d Truths were \u201cnothing,\u201d as it were,\nbefore they were \u201cdiscovered,\u201d and the most ancient truths were once\n\u201cplastic,\u201d or merely susceptible of proof or disproof. Truth is \u201cmade\u201d\njust like \u201chealth,\u201d or \u201cwealth,\u201d or \u201cvalue,\u201d and so on. Insistence, we\nmight say, upon this one note, along with the entire line of reflection\nthat it awakens in him, is really, as Dewey reminds us, the main\nburden of James\u2019s book upon _Pragmatism_. Equally characteristic is\nit too of Dewey himself who is for ever reverting to his doctrine of\nthe factitious character of truth. There is no \u201cfixed distinction,\u201d\nhe tells us, \u201cbetween the empirical values of the unreflective life\nand the most abstract process of rational thought.\u201d And to Schiller,\nagain, this same thought is the beginning of everything in philosophy,\nfor with an outspoken acceptance of this doctrine of the \u201cformation\u201d\nof all truth, Pragmatism, he thinks, can do at least two things that\nRationalism is for ever debarred from doing: (1) distinguish adequately\n\u201ctruth\u201d from \u201cfact,\u201d and (2) distinguish adequately truth from error.\nWhether these two things be, or be not, the consequences of the\ndoctrine in question [and we shall return[110] to the point] we may\nperhaps accept it as, on the whole, harmonious with the teaching of\npsychology about the nature of our ideas as mental habits, or about\nthinking as a restrained, or a guided, activity. It is in harmony,\ntoo, with the palpable truism that all \u201ctruth\u201d must be truth that\nsome beings or other who have once \u201csought\u201d truth (for some reasons\nor other) have at last come to regard as satisfying their search and\ntheir purposes. And this truism, it would seem, must remain such in\nspite of, or even along with, any meaning that there may be in the idea\nof what we call \u201cGod\u2019s truth.\u201d By this expression men understand, it\nwould seem, merely God\u2019s knowledge of truths or facts of which we as\nmen may happen to be ignorant. But then there can have been no time in\nwhich God can be imagined to have been ignorant of these or any other\nmatters. It is therefore not for Him truth as opposed to falsehood.\n\nAnd then, again, this pragmatist position about all truth being \u201cmade\u201d\ntruth would seem to be valid in view of the difficulty (Plato[111]\nspoke of it) of reconciling God\u2019s supposed absolute knowledge of\nreality with our finite and limited apprehension of the same.[112]\n\nThe main interest, however, of pragmatists in their somewhat tiresome\ninsistence upon the truism that all truth is made truth is their\nhostility (Locke had it in his day) to the supposed rationalist\nposition that there is an \u201c_a priori_\u201d and \u201cobjective\u201d truth\nindependent altogether of human activities and human purposes.[113]\nThe particular object of their aversion is what Dewey[114] talks of\nas \u201cthat dishonesty, that insincerity, characteristic of philosophical\ndiscussion, that is manifested in speaking and writing as if certain\nultimate abstractions or concepts could be more real than human\npurposes and human beings, and as if there could be any contradiction\nbetween truth and purpose.\u201d As we shall reflect at a later stage[115]\nupon the rationalist theory of truth, we may, meantime, pass over this\nhostility with the remark that it is, after all, only owing to certain\npeculiar circumstances (those, say, of its conflict with religion and\nscience and custom) in the development of philosophy that its first\nprinciples have been regarded by its votaries as the most real of\nall realities. These devotees tend to forget in their zeal that the\npragmatist way of looking upon all supposed first principles--that of\nthe consideration of their utility in and necessity as explanations of\nour common experience and its realities--is the only way of explaining\ntheir reality, even as conceptions.\n\nIt requires to be added--so much may, indeed, have already been\ninferred from the preceding chapter--that, apart from their hint about\nthe highest truth being necessarily inclusive of the highest human\npurposes, it is by no means easy to find out from the pragmatists\nwhat they mean by truth, or how they would define it. When the matter\nis pressed home, they generally confess that their attitude is in\nthe main \u201cpsychological\u201d rather than philosophical, that it is the\n\u201cmaking\u201d of truth rather than its \u201cnature\u201d or its \u201ccontents\u201d or its\nsystematic character that interests them. It is the \u201cdynamical\u201d point\nof view, as they put it, that is essential to them. And out of the\nsphere and the associations of this contention they do not really\ntravel. They will tell you what it means to hit upon this particular\nway of looking upon truth, and how stimulating it is to attempt to do\nso. And they will give you many more or less artificial and tentative,\nexternal, descriptions of their philosophy by saying that ideas are\n\u201cmade for man,\u201d and \u201cnot man for ideas,\u201d and so on. But, although they\ndeny both the common-sense view that truth is a \u201ccorrespondence\u201d with\nexternal reality, and the rationalist view that truth is a \u201ccoherent\nsystem\u201d on its own account, they never define truth any more than\ndo their opponents the rationalists. It is a \u201ccommerce\u201d and not a\n\u201ccorrespondence,\u201d they contend, a commerce[116] between certain parts\nof our experience and certain other parts, or a commerce between our\nideas and our purposes, but not a commerce with reality, for the\nmaking of truth is itself, in their eyes, the making of reality.\n\nSecondly, it is another familiar characteristic of Pragmatism that,\nalthough it fails to give a satisfying account either of truth\nor reality, the one thing of which it is for ever talking of, as\nfundamental to our entire life as men, is _belief_.[117] This is the\none thing upon which it makes everything else to hang--all knowledge\nand all action and all theory. And it is, of course, its manifest\nacceptance of belief as a fundamental principle of our human life,\nand as a true measure of reality, that has given to Pragmatism its\nreligious atmosphere.[118] It is this that has made it such a welcome\nand such a credible creed to so many disillusioned and free-thinking\npeople to-day, as well as to so many of the faithful and the orthodox.\n\u201cFor, in principle, Pragmatism overcomes the old antithesis of Faith\nand Reason. It shows, on the one hand, that faith must underlie all\nreason and pervade it, nay, that at bottom rationality itself is the\nsupremest postulate of Faith.\u201d[119] \u201cTruth,\u201d again, as James reminds\nus, \u201clives in fact for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts\nand beliefs [how literally true this is!] pass so long as nobody\nchallenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses\nthem.\u201d[120]\n\nNow it requires but the reflection of a moment to see that the various\nfacts and considerations upon which the two last quotations, and the\ngeneral devotion of Pragmatism to \u201cbelief,\u201d both repose, are all\ndistinctly in favour of the acceptability of Pragmatism at the present\ntime. There is nothing in which people in general are more interested\nat the beginning of this twentieth century than in belief. It is\nthis, for example, that explains such a thing as the great success\nto-day in our English-speaking world of such an enterprise as the\n_Hibbert Journal of Philosophy and Religion_, or the still greater\nphenomenon of the world-wide interest of the hour in the subject of\ncomparative religion. Most modern men, the writer is inclined to think,\nbelieve[121] a great deal more than they know, the chief difficulty\nabout this fact being that there is no recognized way of expressing\nit in our science or in our philosophy, or of acting upon it in our\nbehaviour in society. It is, however, only the undue prominence of\nmathematical and physical science since the time of Descartes[122]\nthat has made evidence and demonstration the main consideration of\nphilosophy instead of belief, man\u2019s true and fundamental estimate of\nreality.\n\nWe have already[123] pointed out that one of the main results of\nPragmatism is the acceptance on the part of its leading upholders\nof our fundamental beliefs about the ultimately real and about the\nrealization of our most deeply cherished purposes. In fact, reality in\ngeneral is for them, we may say--in the absence from their writings of\nany better description,--simply that which we can \u201cwill,\u201d or \u201cbelieve\nin,\u201d as the basis for action and for conscious \u201ccreative\u201d effort, or\nconstructive effort. As James himself puts it in his book on _The\nMeaning of Truth_: \u201cSince the only realities we can talk about are\nobjects believed in, the pragmatist, whenever he says \u2018reality,\u2019\nmeans in the first instance what may count for the man himself as\na reality, what he believes at the moment to be such. Sometimes\nthe reality is a concrete sensible presence.... Or his idea may be\nthat of an abstract relation, say of that between the sides and the\nhypotenuse of a triangle.... Each reality verifies and validates its\nown idea exclusively; and in each case the verification consists in the\nsatisfactorily-ending consequences, mental or physical, which the idea\nwas to set up.\u201d\n\nWe shall later have to refer to the absence from Pragmatism of\na criterion for achievement and for \u201cconsequences.\u201d And, as far\nas philosophical theories are concerned, these are all, to the\npragmatists, true or false simply in so far as they are practically\ncredible or not. James is quite explicit, for example, about Pragmatism\nitself in this regard. \u201cNo pragmatist,\u201d he holds, \u201ccan warrant the\nobjective truth of what he says about the universe; he can only\nbelieve it.\u201d[124] There is faith, in short, for the pragmatist, in\nevery act, in every phase of thought, the faith that is implied in\nthe realization of the purposes that underlie our attempted acts and\nthoughts. They eagerly accept, for example, the important doctrine of\nthe modern logician, and the modern psychologist, as to the presence of\nvolition in all \u201caffirmation\u201d and \u201cjudgment,\u201d seeing that in every case\nof affirmation there is a more or less active readjustment of our minds\n(or our bodies) to what either stimulates or impedes our activity.\n\nA third outstanding characteristic of Pragmatism is the \u201cdeeper\u201d view\nof human nature upon which, in contrast to Rationalism, it supposes\nitself to rest, and which it seeks to vindicate. It is this supposedly\ndeeper view of human nature for which it is confessedly pleading when\nit insists, as it is fond of doing, upon the connexion of philosophy\nwith the various theoretical and practical pursuits of mankind, with\nsciences like biology and psychology, and with social reform,[125]\nand so on. We have, it may be remembered, already intimated that even\nin practical America men have had their doubts about the depth of a\nphilosophy that looks upon man as made in the main for action and\nachievement instead of, let us say, the realization of his higher\nnature. Still, few of the readers of James can have altogether\nfailed to appreciate the significance of some of the many eloquent\nand suggestive paragraphs he has written upon the limitations of the\nrationalistic \u201ctemperament\u201d and of its unblushing sacrifice of the\nentire wealth of human nature and of the various pulsating interests of\nmen to the imaginary exigencies of abstract logic and \u201csystem.\u201d[126]\nTo him and to his colleagues (as to Socrates, for that part of it)\nman is firstly a being who has habits and purposes, and who can,\nto some extent, control the various forces of his nature through\n_true knowledge_, and in this very discrepancy between the real and\nthe ideal does there lie for the pragmatists the entire problem of\nphilosophy--the problem of Plato, that of the attainment of true virtue\nthrough true knowledge.\n\nDeferring, however, the question of the success of the pragmatists in\nthis matter of the unfolding of the true relation between philosophy\nand human nature, let us think of a few of the teachings of experience\nupon this truly important and inevitable relation, which no philosophy\nindeed can for one moment afford to neglect. Insistence upon these\nfacts or teachings and upon the reflections and criticisms to which\nthey naturally give rise is certainly a deeply marked characteristic of\nPragmatism.\n\nMan, as has often been pointed out, is endowed with the power of\nreflection, not so much to enable him to understand the world either\nas a whole or in its detailed workings as to assist him in the further\nevolution of his life. His beliefs and choices and his spiritual\nculture are all, as it were, forces and influences in this direction.\nIndeed, it is always the soul or the life principle that is the\nimportant thing in any individual or any people, so far as a place in\nthe world (or in \u201chistory\u201d) is concerned.\n\nPhilosophers, as well as other men, often exchange (in the words of\nLecky) the \u201clove of truth\u201d as such for the love of \u201c_the_ truth,\u201d that\nis to say, for the love of the system and the social arrangements that\nbest suit their interests as thinkers. And they too are just as eager\nas other men for discipleship and influence and honour. Knowledge with\nthem, in other words, means, as Bacon put it, \u201ccontrol\u201d; and even with\nthem it does not, and cannot, remain at the stage of mere cognition. It\nbecomes in the end a conviction or a belief. And thus the philosopher\nwith his system (even a Plato, or a Hegel) is after all but a part of\nthe universe, to be judged as such, along with other lives and other\nsystems--a circumstance hit off early in the nineteenth century by\nGerman students when they used to talk of one\u2019s being able (in Berlin)\nto see the _Welt-Geist_ (Hegel) \u201ctaking a walk\u201d in the _Thiergarten_.\n\nReality again, so far as either life or science is concerned, means for\nevery man that in which he is most fundamentally interested--ions and\nradium to the physicist of the hour, life to the biologist, God to the\ntheologian, progress to the philanthropist, and so on.\n\nFurther, mankind in general is not likely to abandon its habit of\nestimating all systems of thought and philosophy from the point of view\nof their value as keys, or aids, to the problem of the meaning and the\ndevelopment of life as a whole. There is no abstract \u201ctruth\u201d or \u201cgood\u201d\nor \u201cbeauty\u201d apart from the lives of beings who contemplate, and who\nseek to create, such things as truth and goodness and beauty.\n\nTo understand knowledge and intellect, again, we must indeed look at\nthem in their actual development in connexion with the total vital or\npersonal activity either of the average or even of the exceptional\nindividual. And instead of regarding the affections and the emotions as\ninimical to knowledge, or as secondary and inferior to it, we ought to\nremember that they rest in general upon a broader and deeper attitude\nto reality than does either the perception of the senses[127] or the\ncritical analysis of the understanding. In both of these cases is the\nknowledge that we attain to limited in the main either to what is\nbefore us under the conditions of time and space, or to particular\naspects of things that we mark off, or separate, from the totality of\nthings. As Bergson reminds us, we \u201cdesire\u201d and \u201cwill\u201d with the \u201cwhole\u201d\nof our past, but \u201cthink\u201d only with \u201cpart\u201d of it. Small wonder then that\nJames seeks to connect such a broad phenomenon as religion with many of\nthe unconscious factors (they are not all merely \u201cbiological\u201d) in the\ndepth of our personality. Some of the instincts and the phenomena that\nwe encounter there are things that transcend altogether the world that\nis within the scope of our senses or the reasoning faculties.\n\nTruth, too, grows from age to age, and is simply the formulated\nknowledge humanity has of itself and its environment. And errors\ndisappear, not so much in consequence of their logical refutation, as\nin consequence of their inutility and of their inability to control the\nlife and thought of the free man. Readers of Schopenhauer will remember\nhis frequent insistence upon this point of the gradual dissidence and\ndisappearance of error, in place of its summary refutation.\n\nOur \u201creactions\u201d upon reality are certainly part of what we mean by\n\u201creality,\u201d and our philosophy is only too truly \u201cthe history of our\nheart and life\u201d as well as that of our intellectual activity. The\nhistorian of philosophy invariably acts upon a recognition of the\npersonal and the national and the epochal influence in the evolution of\nevery philosophical system. And even the new, or the fuller conception\nof life to which a given genius may attain at some stage or other of\nhuman civilization will still inevitably, in its turn, give place to a\nnewer or a more perfect system.\n\nNow Pragmatism is doubtless at fault in seeking to create the\nimpression that Rationalism would seek to deny any, or all, of those\ncharacteristic facts of human nature. Still, it is to some extent\njustified in insisting upon their importance in view of the sharp\nconflict (we shall later refer to it) that is often supposed to exist\nbetween the theoretical and the practical interests of mankind,\nand that Rationalism sometimes seems to accept with comparative\nequanimity.[128] What Pragmatism is itself most of all seeking after is\na view of human nature, and of things generally, in which the fullest\njustice is done to the facts upon which this very real conflict[129] of\nmodern times may be said to rest.\n\nA fourth characteristic of Pragmatism is its notorious\n\u201canti-intellectualism,\u201d[130] its hostility to the merely dialectical\nuse of terms and concepts and categories,[131] to argumentation that\nis unduly detached from the facts and the needs of our concrete human\nexperience. This anti-intellectualism we prefer meantime to consider\nnot so much in itself and on its own account (if this be possible\nwith a negative creed) as in the light of the results it has had upon\nphilosophy. There is, for example, the general clearing of the ground\nthat has undoubtedly taken place as to the actual or the possible\nmeaning of many terms or conceptions that have long been current\nwith the transcendentalists, such as \u201cpure thought,\u201d the \u201cAbsolute,\u201d\n\u201ctruth\u201d in and for itself, philosophy as the \u201ccompletely rational\u201d\ninterpretation of experience, and so on. And along with this clearing\nof the ground there are (and also in consequence of the pragmatist\nmovement) a great many recent, striking concessions of Rationalism\nto practical, and to common-sense, ways of looking at things, the\nvery existence of which cannot but have an important effect upon the\nphilosophy of the near future. Among some of the more typical of these\nare the following:\n\nFrom Mr. F.\u00a0H. Bradley we have the emphatic declarations that\nthe principle of dialectical opposition or the principle of\n\u201cNon-Contradiction\u201d (formerly, to himself and his followers, the \u201crule\nof the game\u201d in philosophy) \u201cdoes not settle anything about the nature\nof reality\u201d; that \u201ctruth\u201d is an \u201chypothesis,\u201d and that \u201cexcept as a\nmeans to a foreign end it is useless and impossible\u201d; and \u201cwhen we\njudge truth by its own standard it is defective because it fails to\ninclude all the facts,\u201d[132] and because its contents \u201ccannot be made\nintelligible throughout and entirely\u201d; that \u201cno truth is idle,\u201d and\nthat \u201call truth\u201d has \u201cpractical\u201d and \u00e6sthetic \u201cconsequences\u201d; that\nthere is \u201cno such existing thing as pure thought\u201d;[133] that we cannot\nseparate truth and practice; that \u201cabsolute certainty is not requisite\nfor working purposes\u201d; that it is a \u201csuperstition[134] to think that\nthe intellect is the highest part of us,\u201d and that it is well to\nattack a one-sided \u201cintellectualism\u201d; that both \u201cintellectualism\u201d\nand \u201cvoluntarism\u201d are \u201cone-sided,\u201d and that he has no \u201cobjection to\nidentifying reality with goodness or satisfaction, so long as this\ndoes not mean merely practical satisfaction.\u201d[135] Then from this same\nauthor comes the following familiar statement about philosophy as a\nwhole: \u201cPhilosophy always will be hard, and what it promises in the\nend is no clear vision nor any complete understanding or vision, but\nits certain reward is a continual and a heightened appreciation [this\nis the result of science as well as of philosophy] of the ineffable\nmystery of life, of life in all its complexities and all its unity and\nall its worth.\u201d[136]\n\nEqually typical and equally important is the following concession from\nProfessor Taylor, although, of course, to many people it would seem no\nconcession at all, but rather the mere statement of a fact, which our\nNeo-Hegelians have only made themselves ridiculous by seeming to have\nso long overlooked: \u201cMere truth for the intellect can never be quite\nthe same as ultimate reality. For in mere truth we get reality only in\nits intellectual aspect, as that which affords a higher satisfaction to\nthought\u2019s demand for consistency and systematic unity in its object.\nAnd as we have seen, this demand can never be quite satisfied by\nthought itself.[137] For thought, to remain thought, must always be\nsomething less than the whole reality which it knows.\u201d[138]\n\nAnd we may add also from Professor Taylor the following declaration\nin respect of the notorious inability of Neo-Hegelian Rationalism\nto furnish the average man with a theory of reality in the\ncontemplation of which he can find at least an adequate motive to\nconscious effort and achievement: \u201cQuite apart from the facts, due\nto personal shortcomings and confusions, it is inherent in the\nnature of metaphysical study that it can make no positive addition\nto our information, and can itself supply no motive for practical\nendeavour.\u201d[139]\n\nMany of those findings are obviously so harmonious with some of the\nmore familiar formulas of the pragmatists that there would seem\nto be ample warrant for associating them with the results of the\npragmatist movement. This is particularly the case, it would seem,\nwith the concession of Mr. Bradley with respect of the \u201cpractical\u201d\nor \u201chypothetical\u201d conception that we ought to entertain of \u201ctruth\u201d\nand \u201cthinking,\u201d and also with the strictures passed by him upon \u201cmere\ntruth\u201d and \u201cmere intellectualism,\u201d and with Professor Taylor\u2019s position\nin respect of the inadequacy of the rationalist theory of reality, as\nin no sense a \u201cdynamic\u201d or an \u201cincentive\u201d for action. And we might well\nregard Professor Taylor\u2019s finding in respect of mere systematic truth\nor the \u201cAbsolute\u201d (for they are the same thing to him) as confirmatory\nof Dr. Schiller\u2019s important contention that \u201cin Absolutism\u201d the two\n\u201cpoles\u201d of the \u201cmoral\u201d and the \u201cintellectual\u201d character of the Deity\n\u201cfall apart.\u201d This means, we will remember, that the truth of abstract\nintellectualism is not the truth for action,[140] that absolutism\nis not able to effect or harmonize between the truth of systematic\nknowledge and moral truth--if, indeed, there be any such thing as moral\ntruth on the basis of a pure Rationalism.\n\nTo be sure, both the extent and even the reality of all this supposed\ncession of ground in philosophy to the pragmatists has been doubted\nand denied by the representatives of Rationalism. They would be\nquestioned, too, by many sober thinkers and scholars who have long\nregarded Hegelian intellectualism and pragmatist \u201cvoluntarism\u201d as\nextremes in philosophy, as inimical, both of them, to the interests\nof a true and catholic conception of philosophy. The latter, as we\nknow from Aristotle, should be inclusive of the realities both of the\nintellectual and the practical life.\n\nPragmatist criticisms of Rationalism, again, may fairly be claimed to\nhave been to a large extent anticipated by the independent findings\nof living idealist thinkers like Professors Pringle-Pattison,\nBaillie, Jones, and others, in respect of the supposed extreme claims\nof Hegelianism, as well as by similar findings and independent\nconstructive efforts on the part of the recent group of the Oxford\nPersonal Idealists.[141] That there is still a place for pragmatist\nanti-intellectualism is evidently the conclusion to be drawn from such\nthings as the present wide acceptance of the philosophy of Bergson, or\nthe recent declarations of Mr. Bradley that we are justified \u201cin the\nintelligent refusal to accept as final an theoretical criterion which\nactually so far exists,\u201d and that the \u201caction of narrow consistency\nmust be definitely given up.\u201d\n\nThe reflection ought, moreover, to be inserted here that even if\nPragmatism has been of some possible service in bringing forth from\nrationalists some of their many recent confessions of the limitations\nof an abstract intellectualism, it is not at all unlikely that\nRationalism in its turn may succeed in convicting Pragmatism of an\nundue emphasis[142] upon volition and action and upon merely practical\ntruth.\n\nWe shall now terminate the foregoing characterization of Pragmatism\nby a reference to two or three other specific things for which it\nmay, with more or less justice, be supposed to stand in philosophy.\nThese are (1) the repudiation of the \u201ccorrespondence view\u201d[143] of\nthe relation of truth to reality, (2) the rejection of the idea of\nthere being any ultimate or rigid distinction between \u201cappearance\u201d and\n\u201creality,\u201d and (3) the reaffirmation of the \u201cteleological\u201d point of\nview as characteristic of philosophy in distinction from science.\n\nAs for (1) it has already been pointed out that this idea of the\nmisleading character of the ordinary \u201ccorrespondence notion\u201d of truth\nis claimed by pragmatists as an important result of their proposal\nto test truth by the standard of the consequences involved in its\nacceptance.[144] The ordinary reader may not, to be sure, be aware\nof the many difficulties that are apt to arise in philosophy from an\napparent acceptance of the common-sense notion of truth as somehow\nsimply a duplicate or a \u201ccopy\u201d of external reality. There is the\ndifficulty, say, of our ever being able to prove such a correspondence\nwithout being (or \u201cgoing\u201d) somehow beyond both the truth and the\nreality in question, so as to be able to detect either coincidence or\ndiscrepancy. Or, we might again require some bridge between the ideas\nin our minds and the supposed reality outside them--\u201csensations\u201d say,\nor \u201cexperiences,\u201d something, in other words, that would be accepted\nas \u201cgiven\u201d and indubitable both by idealists and realists. And there\nwould be the difficulty, too, of saying whether we have to begin for\nthe purposes of all reflective study with what is within consciousness\nor with what is outside it--in matter say, or in things. And if the\nformer, how we can ever get to the latter, and _vice versa_. And\nso on with the many kindred subtleties that have divided thinkers\ninto idealists and realists and conceptualists, monists, dualists,\nparallelists, and so on.\n\nNow Pragmatism certainly does well in proposing to steer clear of all\nsuch difficulties and pitfalls of the ordinary \u201ccorrespondence notion.\u201d\nAnd as we shall immediately refer to its own working philosophy in the\nmatter, we shall meantime pass over this mere point of its rejection\nof the \u201ccorrespondence notion\u201d with one or two remarks of a critical\nnature, (1) Unfortunately for the pragmatists the rejection of the\ncorrespondence notion is just as important a feature of Idealism[145]\nas it is of Pragmatism. The latter system therefore can lay no claim\nto any uniqueness or superiority in this connexion. (2) Pragmatism, as\nwe may perhaps see, cannot maintain its position that the distinction\nbetween \u201cidea\u201d and \u201cobject\u201d is one \u201cwithin experience itself\u201d (rather\nthan a distinction between experience and something supposedly outside\nit) without travelling further in the direction of Idealism[146] than\nit has hitherto been prepared to do. By such a travelling in the\ndirection of Idealism we mean a far more thorough-going recognition\nof the part played in the making of reality by the \u201cpersonal\u201d factor,\nthan it has as yet contemplated either in its \u201cinstrumentalism\u201d or in\nits \u201cradical empiricism.\u201d (3) There is, after all, an element of truth\nin the correspondence notion to which Pragmatism fails to do justice.\nWe shall refer to this failure in a subsequent chapter[147] when again\nlooking into its theory of truth and reality.\n\nDespite these objections there is, however, at least one particular\nrespect in regard to which Pragmatism may legitimately claim some\ncredit for its rejection of the correspondence notion. This is its\ninsistence that the truth is not (as it must be on the correspondence\ntheory) a \u201cdatum\u201d or a \u201cpresentation,\u201d not something given to us by\nthe various objects and things without us, or by their supposed effects\nupon our senses and our memory and our understanding. It rather, on the\ncontrary, maintains Pragmatism, a \u201cconstruction\u201d on the part of the\nmind, an attitude of our \u201cexpectant\u201d (or \u201cbelieving\u201d) consciousness,\ninto which our own reactions upon things enter at least as much as do\ntheir supposed effects and impressions upon us. Of course the many\ndifficulties of this thorny subject are by no means cleared up by this\nmere indication of the attitude of Pragmatism, and we shall return in\na later chapter[148] to this idea of truth as a construction of the\nmind instead of a datum, taking care at the same time, however, to\nrefer to the failure of which we have spoken on the part of Pragmatism\nto recognize the element of truth that is still contained in the\ncorrespondence notion.\n\n(2) The rejection of the idea of any rigid, or ultimate distinction\nbetween \u201cappearance\u201d and \u201creality.\u201d This is a still broader rejection\nthan the one to which we have just referred, and may, therefore, be\nthought of as another more or less fundamental reason for the rejection\neither of the copy or of the correspondence theory of truth. The\nreality of things, as Pragmatism conceives it, is not something already\n\u201cfixed\u201d and \u201cdetermined,\u201d but rather, something that is \u201cplastic\u201d and\n\u201cmodifiable,\u201d something that is, in fact, undergoing a continuous\nprocess of modification, or development, of one kind or another. It\nmust always, therefore, the pragmatist would hold, be defined in terms\nof the experiences and the activities through which it is known and\nrevealed and through which it is, to some extent, even modified.[149]\n\nPragmatism, as we may remember, has been called by James \u201cimmediate\u201d\nor \u201cradical\u201d empiricism, although in one of his last books he seeks to\ngive an independent development to these two doctrines. The cardinal\nprinciple of this philosophy is that \u201cthings are what they are\nexperienced as being, or that to give a just account of anything is\nto tell what that thing is experienced to be.\u201d[150] And it is perhaps\nthis aspect of the new philosophy of Pragmatism that is most amply and\nmost attractively exhibited in the books of James. It is presented,\ntoo, with much freshness and skill in Professor Bawden\u2019s[151] book upon\nPragmatism, which is an attempt, he says, \u201cto set forth the necessary\nassumptions of a philosophy in which experience becomes self-conscious\nas a method.\u201d[152]\n\n\u201cThe new philosophy,\u201d proceeds Bawden,[153] \u201cis a pragmatic idealism.\nIts method is at once intrinsic and immanent and organic or functional.\nBy saying that its method is functional, we mean that its experience\nmust be interpreted from within. We cannot jump out of our skins ...\nwe cannot pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps. We find ourselves\nin mid-stream of the Niagara of experience, and may define what it\nis by working back and forth within the current.\u201d \u201cWe do not know\nwhere we are going, but we are on the way\u201d [the contradiction is\nsurely apparent]. Then, like James, Bawden goes on to interpret\nPragmatism by showing what things like self-consciousness, experience,\nscience, social consciousness, space, time, and causation _are_ by\nshowing how they \u201cappear,\u201d and how they \u201cfunction\u201d--\u201cexperience\u201d\nitself being simply, to him and to his friends, a \u201cdynamic system,\u201d\n\u201cself-sustaining,\u201d a \u201cwhole leaning on nothing.\u201d\n\nThe extremes of this \u201cimmediate\u201d or \u201cradical\u201d philosophy appear to\nnon-pragmatists to be reached when we read words like those just quoted\nabout the Niagara stream of our experience, and about our life as\nsimply movement and acceleration, or about the celebrated \u201cI think\u201d of\nDescartes as equally well [!] set forth under the form \u201cIt thinks,\u201d\nor \u201cthinking is going on,\u201d or about the \u201cbeing\u201d of the individual\nperson as consisting simply in a \u201cdoing.\u201d \u201cAll this we hold,\u201d says\nBawden, \u201c_to be not materialism but simply energism_.\u201d \u201cThere is no\n\u2018truth,\u2019 only \u2018truths\u2019--this is another way of putting it--and the only\ncriterion of truth is the changing one of the image or the idea which\ncomes out of our impulses or of the conflict of our habits.\u201d The end of\nall this modern flowing philosophy is, of course, the \u201cPluralism\u201d of\nJames, the universe as a society of functioning selves in which reality\n\u201cmay exist in a distributive form, or in the shape, not of an All, but\nof a set of eaches.\u201d \u201cThe essence of life,\u201d as he puts it in his famous\nessay on Bergson,[154] \u201cis its continually changing character,\u201d and we\nonly call it a \u201cconfusion\u201d sometimes because we have grown accustomed\nin our sciences and philosophies to isolate \u201celements\u201d and \u201cdifferents\u201d\nwhich in reality are \u201call dissolved in one another.\u201d[155] \u201cRelations of\nevery sort, of time, space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause,\nor what not, are just as integral members of the sensational flux as\nterms are.\u201d \u201cPluralism lets things really exist in the each form, or\ndistributively. Its type of union ... is different from the monistic\ntype of all-_einheit_. It is what I call the strung-along type, the\ntype of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation.\u201d And so on.\n\n(3) The reaffirmation of the teleological point of view. After the\nmany illustrations and references that have already been given in\nrespect of the tendencies of Pragmatism, it is perhaps hardly necessary\nto point out that an insistence upon the necessity to philosophy of the\n\u201cteleological\u201d point of view, of the consideration of both thoughts\nand things from the point of view of their purpose or utility, is a\ndeeply-marked characteristic of Pragmatism. In itself this demand can\nhardly be thought of as altogether new, for the idea of considering\nthe nature of anything in the light of its final purpose or end is\nreally as old in our European thought as the philosophy of Aristotle\nor Anaxagoras. Almost equally familiar is the kindred idea upon which\nPragmatism is inclined to felicitate itself, of finding the roots\nof metaphysic \u201cin ethics,\u201d in the facts of conduct, in the facts\nof the \u201cideal\u201d or the \u201cpersonal\u201d order which we tend[156] in human\ncivilization to impose upon what is otherwise thought of by science\nas the natural order. The form, however, of the teleological argument\nto which Pragmatism may legitimately be thought to have directed our\nattention is that of the possible place in the world of reality, and\nin the world of thought, of the effort and the free initiative of the\nindividual. This place, unfortunately (the case is quite different with\nBergson[157]), Pragmatism has been able, up to the present time, to\ndefine, in the main, only negatively--by means of its polemic against\nthe completed and the self-completing \u201cAbsolute\u201d of the Neo-Hegelian\nRationalists. What this polemic is we can best indicate by quoting from\nHegel himself a passage or a line of the reflection against which it\nis seeking to enter an emphatic and a reasoned protest, and then after\nthis a passage or two from some of our Anglo-Hegelians in the same\nconnexion.\n\n\u201cThe consummation,\u201d says Hegel, in a familiar and often-quoted passage,\n\u201cof the Infinite aim (_i.e._ of the purpose of God as omniscient and\nalmighty) consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem\nunaccomplished.\u201d[158] Now although there is a sense in which this great\nsaying must for ever be maintained to contain an element of profound\ntruth,[159] the attitude of Pragmatism in regard to it would be,\nfirstly, that of a rooted objection to its outspoken intellectualism.\nHow can the chief work of the Almighty be conceived to be merely that\nof getting rid somehow from our minds, or from his, of _our_ mental\nconfusions? And then, secondly, an equally rooted objection is taken\nto the implication that the individual human being should allow\nhimself to entertain, as possibly true, a view of the general trend\nof things that renders any notion of his playing an appreciable part\ntherein a theoretical and a practical absurdity.[160] This notion\n(or \u201cconceit,\u201d if you will) he can surrender only by ceasing to\nthink of his own consciousness of \u201ceffort\u201d and of the part played by\n\u201ceffort\u201d[161] and \u201cinvention\u201d in the entire animal and human world, and\nalso of his consciousness of duty and of the ideal in general. This\nlatter consciousness of itself bids him to realize certain \u201cnorms\u201d\nor regulative prescripts simply because they are consonant with that\nhigher will which is to him the very truth of his own nature. He\ncannot, in other words, believe that he is consciously obliged to work\nand to realize his higher nature for nothing. The accomplishment of\nends and of the right must, in other words, be rationally believed\nby him to be part of the nature of things. It is this conviction, we\nfeel sure, that animates Pragmatism in the opposition it shares both\nwith common sense and with the radical thought of our time against the\nmeaninglessness to Hegelianism, or to Absolutism,[162] many of the\nhopes and many of the convictions that we feel to be so necessary and\nso real in the life of mankind generally.\n\nAnd there are other lines of reflection among Neo-Hegelians against\nwhich Pragmatism is equally determined to make a more or less definite\nprotest, in the interest, as before, of our practical and of our moral\nactivity. We may recall, to begin with, the memorable words of Mr.\nBradley, in his would-be refutation of the charge that the ideals of\nAbsolutism \u201cto some people\u201d fail to \u201csatisfy our nature\u2019s demands.\u201d\n\u201cAm I,\u201d he indignantly asks, \u201cto understand that we are to have all we\nwant, and have it just as we want it?\u201d adding (almost in the next line)\nthat he \u201cunderstands,\u201d of course, that the \u201cviews\u201d of Absolutism, or\nthose of any other philosophy, are to be compared \u201conly with views\u201d\nthat aim at \u201ctheoretical consistency\u201d and not with mere practical\nbeliefs.[163] Now, speaking for the moment for Pragmatism, can it be\ntruly philosophical to contemplate with equanimity the idea of any\nsuch ultimate conflict as is implied in these words between the demands\nof the intellect[164] and the demands of emotion--to use the term\nmost definitely expressive of a personal, as distinct from a merely\nintellectual satisfaction?\n\nThen again there is, for example, the dictum of Dr. McTaggart, that\nthere is \u201cno reason to trust God\u2019s goodness without a demonstration\nwhich removes the matter from the sphere of faith.\u201d[165] May there not,\nwe would ask, be a view of things according to the truth of which the\nconfidence of the dying Socrates in the reasonableness and the goodness\nof God are at least as reasonable as his confession, at the same time,\nof his ignorance of the precise, or the particular, fate both of the\njust and of the unjust? And is not, too, such a position as that\nexpressed in these words of Dr. McTaggart\u2019s about a logically complete\nreason for believing in the essential righteousness of things now ruled\nout of court by some of the concessions of his brother rationalists to\nPragmatism, to which reference has already been made? It is so ruled\nout, for example, even by Mr. Bradley\u2019s condemnation as a \u201cpernicious\nprejudice\u201d of the idea that \u201cwhat is wanted for working purpose is the\nlast theoretical certainty about things.\u201d[166]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPRAGMATISM AND HUMAN ACTIVITY\n\n\nIt requires now but a slight degree of penetration to see that beneath\nthis entire matter of an apparent opposition between our \u201ctheoretical\u201d\nand our \u201cpractical\u201d satisfaction, and beneath much of the pragmatist\ninsistence upon the \u201cconsequences\u201d of ideas and of systems of thought,\nthere is the great question of the simple fact of human action and of\nits significance for philosophy. And it might truly be said that the\nraising of this question is not merely another of the more or less\ndefinitely marked features of Pragmatism, but in some respects it is\none outstanding characteristic.\n\nFor some reason or other, or for some strange combination of reasons,\nthe phenomenon that we call \u201caction\u201d[167] (the activity of man as\nan agent) and the apparently simple facts of the reality and the\nintelligibility of action have long been regarded as matters of\naltogether secondary or subordinate importance by the rationalism\nof philosophy and by the mechanical philosophy of science. This\nRationalism and this ostensibly certain and demonstrable mechanical\nphilosophy of science suppose that the one problem of human thought is\nsimply that of the nature of truth or of the nature of reality (the\nreality of the \u201cphysical\u201d world) as if either (or each) of these things\nwere an entity on its own account, an absolutely final finding or\nconsideration. That this has really been the case so far as philosophy\nis concerned is proved by the fact even of the existence of the many\ncharacteristic deliverances and concessions of Rationalism in respect\nof Pragmatism to which reference has already been made in the preceding\nchapter. And that it has also been the case so far as science is\nconcerned is proved by the existence of the many dogmatic attempts of\nmany natural philosophers from Holbach to Haeckel to apply the \u201ciron\nlaws\u201d of matter and motion to the reality of everything else under\nheaven,[168] and of everything in the heavens in spite of the frequent\nconfessions of their own colleagues with regard to the actual and the\nnecessary limits and limitations of science and of the scientific\noutlook.\n\nOnly slowly and gradually, as it were, has the consideration come into\nthe very forefront of our speculative horizon that there is for man as\na thinking being _no_ rigid _separation_ between theory and practice,\nbetween intellect and volition, between action and thought, between\nfact and act, between truth and reality.[169] There is clearly volition\nor aim, for example, in the search after truth. And there is certainly\npurpose in the attention[170] that is involved even in the simplest\npiece of perception, the selection of what interests and affects us\nout of the total field of vision or experience. And it is equally\ncertain that there is thought in action--so long, that is to say, as\naction is regarded as action and not as impulse. Again, the man who\nwills the truth submits himself to an imperative just as surely as does\nthe man who explicitly obeys the law of duty. It is thus impossible,\nas it were, even in the so-called intellectual life, to distinguish\nabsolutely between theoretical and practical considerations--\u201ctruth\u201d\nmeaning invariably the relations obtaining in some \u201csphere,\u201d or order,\nof fact which we separate off for some purpose or other from the\ninfinite whole of reality. Equally impossible is it to distinguish\nabsolutely between the theoretical and the practical in the case of the\nhighest theoretical activity, in the case, say, of the \u201ccontemplation\u201d\nthat Aristotle talks of as the most \u201cgodlike\u201d activity of man. This\nvery contemplation, as our Neo-Hegelian[171] friends are always\nreminding us, is an activity that is just as much a characteristic of\nman, as is his power of setting his limbs in motion.\n\nWe have referred to the desire of the pragmatists to represent, and\nto discover, a supposedly deeper or more comprehensive view of human\nnature than that implicitly acted upon by Intellectualism--a view that\nshould provide, as they think, for the organic unity of our active and\nour so-called reflective tendencies. This desire is surely eminently\ntypical of what we would like to think of as the rediscovery by\nPragmatism for philosophy, of the active, or the volitional, aspects of\nthe conscious life of man, and along with this important side of our\nhuman nature, the reality also of the activities and the purposes that\nare revealed in what we sometimes speak of as unconscious nature. The\nworld we know, it would hold, in the spirit and almost in the letter\nof Bergson, lives and grows by experiment,[172] and by activities and\nprocesses and adjustments. Pragmatism has doubtless, as we pointed out,\nbeen prone to think of itself as the only philosophy that can bake\nbread, that can speak to man in terms of the actual life of effort\nand struggle that he seems called upon to live in the environment in\nwhich he finds himself. And, as we have just been insisting, the main\nground of its hostility to Rationalism is the apparent tendency of the\nlatter to treat the various concepts and hypotheses that have been\ndevised to explain the world, and to render it intelligible, as if they\nwere themselves of more importance than the real persons and the real\nhappenings that constitute the world of our experience.[173]\n\nIf it were at all desirable to recapitulate to any extent those\nphenomena connected with Pragmatism that seem to indicate its\nrediscovery of the fact of action, and of the fact of its meaning\nfor philosophy, as its one outstanding characteristic, we may point\nto such considerations as the following: (1) The fact of its having\nsought to advance from the stage of a mere \u201cinstrumentalist\u201d view\nof human thought to that of an outspoken \u201chumanism\u201d or a socialized\nutilitarianism. (2) The fact of its seeking to leave us (as the outcome\nof philosophy) with all our more important \u201cbeliefs,\u201d with a general\n\u201cworking\u201d view of the world in which such things as religion and\nideals and enthusiasm are adequately recognized. Pragmatism is really,\nas we have put it, more interested in belief than in knowledge, the\nformer being to it the characteristic, the conquering attitude of man\nto the world in which he finds himself. (3) Its main object is to\nestablish a dynamical view of reality, as that which is \u201ceverywhere\nin the making,\u201d as that which signifies to every person firstly that\naspect of the life of things in which he is for the time being\nmost vitally interested.[174] (4) In the spirit of the empirical\nphilosophy generally its main anxiety is to do the fullest justice\nto all the aspects of our so-called human experience, looking upon\ntheories and systems as but points of view for the interpretation of\nthis experience, and of the great universal life that transcends it.\nAnd proceeding upon the theory that a true metaphysic must become\na true \u201cdynamic\u201d or a true incentive to human motive, it seeks the\nrelationships and affiliations that have been pointed out with all the\ndifferent liberating and progressive tendencies in the history of human\nthought. (5) It would \u201cconsult moral experience directly,\u201d finding\nin the world of our ordinary moral and social effort a spiritual\nreality[175] that raises the individual out of and above and beyond\nhimself. And it bears testimony in its own more or less imperfect\nmanner to the autonomous element[176] in our human personality that,\nin the moral life, and in such things as religious aspiration and\ncreative effort and social service, transcends the merely theoretical\ndescriptions of the world with which we are familiar in the\ngeneralizations of science and of history.\n\nWithout attempting meanwhile to probe at all deeply into this\npragmatist glorification of \u201caction\u201d and its importance to philosophy,\nlet us think of a few of the considerations that may be urged in\nsupport of this idea from sources outside those of the mere practical\ntendencies and the affiliations of Pragmatism itself.\n\nThere is first of all the consideration that it is the fact of action\nthat unites or brings together what we call \u201cdesire\u201d and what we\ncall \u201cthought,\u201d the world of our desires and emotions and the world\nof our thoughts and our knowledge. This is really a consideration of\nthe utmost importance to us when we think of what we have allowed\nourselves to call the characteristic dualism[177] of modern times, the\ndiscrepancy that seems to exist between the world of our desires and\nthe impersonal world of science--which latter world educated people\nare apt to think of as the world before which everything else must\nbend and break, or at least bow. Our point here is not merely that\nof the humiliating truth of the wisdom of the wiseacres who used to\ntell us in our youth that we will anyhow have to act in spite of all\nour unanswered questions about things, but the plain statement of the\nfact that (say or think what we will) it is in _conscious action_\nthat our desires and our thoughts _do_ come together, and that it is\nthere that they are both seen to be but partial expressions of the\none reality--the life that is in things and in ourselves, and that\nengenders in us both emotions and thoughts, even if the latter do\nsometimes seem to lie \u201ctoo deep for tears.\u201d It is with this life and\nwith the objects and aims and ends and realities that develop and\nsustain it that all our thoughts, as well as all our desires, are\nconcerned. If action, therefore, could only be properly understood, if\nit can somehow be seen in its universal or its cosmic significance,\nthere would be no discrepancy and no gap between the world of our\nideals and the world of our thoughts. We would know what we want,[178]\nand we would want and desire what we know we can get--the complete\ndevelopment of our personality.\n\nAgain there is the evidence that exists in the sciences of biology and\nanthropology in support of the important role played in both animal and\nhuman evolution by effort and choice and volition and experimentation.\n\u201cAlready in the contractibility of protoplasm and in the activities of\ntypical protozoons do we find \u2018activities\u2019 that imply[179] volition\nof some sort or degree, for there appears to be some selection of\nfood and some spontaneity of movement: changes of direction, the\ntaking of a circuitous course in avoidance of an obstruction, etc.,\nindicate this.\u201d Then again, \u201cthere are such things as the diversities\nin secondary sexual characters (the \u2018after-thoughts of reproduction\u2019\nas they are called), the endless shift of parasites, the power of\nanimals to alter their coloration to suit environment, and the complex\n\u2018internal stimuli\u2019 of the higher animals in their breeding periods\nand activities, which make us see only too clearly what the so-called\nstruggle for life has been in the animal world.\u201d...\n\nComing up to man let us think of what scientists point out as the\neffects of man\u2019s disturbing influence in nature, and then pass from\nthese on to the facts of anthropology in respect of the conquest\nof environment by what we call invention and inheritance and free\ninitiative. \u201cIn placing _invention_,\u201d says a writer of to-day in a\nrecent brilliant book, \u201cat the bottom of the scale of conditions\n[_i.e._ of the conditions of social development], I definitely break\nwith the opinion that human evolution is throughout a purely natural\nprocess.... It is pre-eminently an _artificial construction_.\u201d[180] Now\nit requires but the reflection of a moment or two upon considerations\nsuch as the foregoing, and upon the attested facts of history as to\nthe breaking up of the tyranny of habit and custom by the force of\nreflection and free action and free initiative, to grasp how really\ngreat should be the significance to philosophy of the active and the\nvolitional nature of man that is thus demonstrably at the root not only\nof our progress, but of civilization itself.\n\nIf it be objected that while there cannot, indeed, from the point\nof view of the general culture and civilization of mankind, be any\nquestion of the importance to philosophy of the active effort and\nof the _active thought_ that underlie this stupendous achievement,\nthe case is perhaps somewhat different when we try to think of the\npragmatist glorification of our human action from the point of view\nof the (physical?) universe as a whole.[181] To this reflection it\nis possible here to say but one or two things. Firstly, there is\napparently at present no warrant in science for seeking to separate\noff this human life of ours from the evolution of animal life in\ngeneral.[182] Equally little is there any warrant for separating\nthe evolution of living matter from the evolution of what we call\ninanimate matter, not to speak of the initial difficulty of accounting\nfor things like energy and radio-active matter, and the evolution and\nthe devolution that are calmly claimed by science to be involved in\nthe various \u201csystems\u201d within the universe--apart from an ordering and\nintelligent mind and will. There is therefore, so far, no necessary\npresumption against the idea of regarding human evolution as at least\nin some sense a continuation or development of the life that seems to\npervade the universe in general. And then, secondly, there is the\nfamiliar reflection that nearly all that we think we know about the\nuniverse as a whole is but an interpretation of it in terms of the life\nand the energy that we experience in ourselves and in terms of some of\nthe apparent conditions of this life and this energy. For as Bergson\nreminds us, \u201cAs thinking beings we may apply the laws of our physics to\nour world, and extend them to each of the worlds taken separately, but\nnothing tells us that they apply to the entire universe nor even that\nsuch affirmation has any meaning; for the universe is _not made_ but\nis _being made continually_. It is growing perhaps indefinitely by the\naddition of new worlds.\u201d[183]\n\nOn the ground, then, both of science and of philosophy[184] may it\nbe definitely said that this human action of ours, as apparently\nthe highest outcome of the forces of nature, becomes only too\nnaturally and only too inevitably the highest object of our reflective\nconsideration. As Schopenhauer put it long ago, the human body is the\nonly object in nature that we know \u201con the inside.\u201d And do or think\nwhat we will, it is this human life of ours and this mind of ours that\nhave peopled the world of science and the world of philosophy with\nall the categories and all the distinctions that obtain there, with\nconcepts like the \u201c(Platonic) Ideas,\u201d \u201cform,\u201d \u201cmatter,\u201d \u201cenergy,\u201d\n\u201cether,\u201d \u201catom,\u201d \u201csubstance,\u201d \u201cthe individual,\u201d \u201cthe universal,\u201d \u201cempty\nspace,\u201d \u201ceternity,\u201d \u201cthe Absolute,\u201d \u201cvalue,\u201d \u201cfinal end,\u201d and so on.\n\nThere is much doubtless in this action philosophy, and much too in the\nmatter of the reasons that may be brought forward in its support, that\ncan become credible and intelligible only as we proceed. But it must\nall count, it would seem, in support of the idea of the pragmatist\nrediscovery, for philosophy, of the importance of our creative action\nand of our creative thought. And then there are one or two additional\ngeneral considerations of which we may well think in the same connexion.\n\nPragmatism boasts, as we know, of being a highly democratic[185]\ndoctrine, of contending for the emancipation of the individual and his\ninterests from the tyranny of all kinds of absolutism, and all kinds\nof dogmatism (whether philosophical, or scientific, or social). No\nsystem either of thought or of practice, no supposed \u201cworld-view\u201d of\nthings, no body of scientific laws or abstract truths shall, as long as\nit holds the field of our attention, entirely crush out of existence\nthe concrete interests and the free self-development of the individual\nhuman being.\n\nA tendency in this direction exists, it must be admitted, in the\n\u201cdeterminism\u201d both of natural science and of Hegelianism, and of\nthe social philosophy that has emanated from the one or from the\nother. Pragmatism, on the contrary, in all matters of the supposed\ndetermination, or the attempted limitation, of the individual by what\nhas been accomplished either in Nature or in human history, would\nincline to what we generally speak of to-day as a \u201cmodernistic,\u201d\nor a \u201cliberalistic,\u201d or even a \u201crevolutionary,\u201d attitude. It would\nreinterpret and reconstruct, in the light of the present and its needs,\nnot only the concepts and the methods of science and philosophy, but\nalso the various institutions and the various social practices of\nmankind.[186]\n\nSimilarily Pragmatism would protest, as does the newer education\nand the newer sociology, against any merely _doctrinaire_ (or\n\u201cintellectualistic\u201d) conception of education and culture, substituting\nin its place the \u201cefficiency\u201d or the \u201csocial service\u201d[187] conception.\nAnd even if we must admit that this more or less practical ideal of\neducation has been over-emphasized in our time, it is still true, as\nwith Goethe, that it is only the \u201cactively-free\u201d man, the man who can\nwork out in service and true accomplishment the ideal of human life,\nwhose production should be regarded as the aim of a sound educational\nor social policy.\n\nWe shall later attempt to assign some definite reasons for the failure\nof Pragmatism to make the most of all this apparently justifiable\ninsistence upon action and upon the creative activity of the\nindividual, along with all this sympathy that it seems to evince for a\nprogressive and a liberationist view of human policy.\n\nMeantime, in view of all these considerations, we cannot avoid making\nthe reflection that it is surely something of an anomaly in philosophy\nthat a thinker\u2019s \u201cstudy\u201d doubts about his actions and about some of\nthe main instinctive beliefs of mankind (in which he himself shares)\nshould have come to be regarded--as they have been by Rationalism--as\nconsiderations of a greater importance than the actions, and the\nbeliefs, and the realities, of which they are the expression. Far be\nit from the writer to suggest that the suspension of judgment and the\nrefraining from activity,[188] in the absence of adequate reason and\nmotive, are not, and have not been of the greatest value to mankind\nin the matter of the development of the higher faculties and the\nhigher ideals of the mind. There may well be, however, for Pragmatism,\nor for any philosophy that can work it out satisfactorily, in the\nfree, creative, activity of man, in the duty that lies upon us all of\ncarrying on our lives to the highest expression, a reason and a truth\nthat must be estimated at their logical worth along with the many other\nreasons and truths of which we are pleased to think as the truth of\nthings.\n\nShort, however, of a more genuine attempt on the part of Pragmatism\nthan anything it has as yet given us in this connexion to justify this\nhigher reason and truth that are embodied in our consciousness of\nourselves as persons, as _rational agents_, all its mere \u201cpracticalism\u201d\nand all its \u201cinstrumentalism\u201d are but the workaday and the utilitarian\nphilosophy of which we have already complained in its earlier and\ncruder professions.[189]\n\nAfter some attention, then, to the matter of the outstanding critical\ndefects of Pragmatism, in its preliminary and cruder forms, we shall\nagain return to our topic of the relatively new subject-matter it has\nbeen endeavouring to place before philosophy in its insistence upon the\nimportance of action, and upon the need of a \u201cdynamic,\u201d instead of an\nintellectualistic and \u201cspectator-like\u201d theory of human personality.\n\n\nAPPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV\n\nPHILOSOPHY AND THE ACTIVITY-EXPERIENCE\n\n[In an article upon the above title in the _International Journal of\nEthics_, p. 1898, I attempted to deal with some aspects of the problem\nthat I have just raised in the preceding chapter. I venture to append\nhere some of the statements that I made then upon the importance of\naction and the \u201cactivity-experience\u201d to the philosophy of to-day. I\nam inclined to regard them (although I have not looked at them until\nthe present moment of passing this book through the press) as a kind\nof anticipation and confirmation of many of my present pages. Part\nof my excuse, however, for inserting them here is a hope that these\nreferences and suggestions may possibly be of service to the general\nreader. The extracts follow as they were printed.]\n\n\nI. It requires no very profound acquaintance with the trend of\nthe literature of general and specialized philosophy of the last\ntwenty-five years to detect a decidedly practical turn in the recent\nspeculative tendencies of philosophy and philosophers. The older\nconception of philosophy or metaphysics as an attempt to state (more\nor less systematically) the value of the world for thought is being\nslowly modified, if not altogether disappearing, into the attempt to\nexplain or to grasp the significance of the world from the stand-point\nof the moral and social activity of man. The philosophical student must\nbe to some extent conscious of the difference in respect of both tone\nand subject-matter between such books as Stirling\u2019s _Secret of Hegel_,\nE. Caird\u2019s _Critical Philosophy of Kant_ (the first editions of both\nworks), Green\u2019s _Prolegomena to Ethics_, and the most recent essays\nand books of Professors A. Seth[190] and James[191] and Ward[192]\nand Sidgwick[193] and Baldwin,[194] and of Mr. Bosanquet[195] and\nthe late Mr. Nettleship,[196] and between--to turn to Germany--the\nwritings of Erdmann and Kuno Fischer and Zeller and F.\u00a0A. Lange, and\nthose of Gizycki, Paulsen, Windelband, Eucken, Hartmann, Deussen,\nSimmel, and--in France--between the writings of Renouvier and Pillon\nand Ravaisson, the \u201cNeo-Kantianism\u201d of the _Critique Philosophique_\n(1872\u20131877), and those of Fouill\u00e9e, Weber (of Strassburg), S\u00e9ailles,\nDunan, and others, and of general writers like de Vog\u00fc\u00e9, Desjardins,\nand Bruneti\u00e8re, and of social philosophers like Bougl\u00e9, Tarde, Izoulet,\nand so on. The change of _venue_ in these writers alone, not to speak\nof the change of the interest of the educated world from such books\nas Huxley\u2019s _Hume_ and Renan\u2019s _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_ and Du Bois\nReymond\u2019s _Die Sieben Weltr\u00e4thsel_, and Tyndall\u2019s _Belfast Address_,\nto the writings of Herbert Spencer (the Sociology and the general\nessays on social evolution), Kidd, Nordau, Nietzsche, Mr. Crozier\n(his important _History of Civilization_), and Demolins,[197] and the\npredominance of investigations into general biology and comparative\npsychology and sociology over merely logical and conceptual philosophy\nseem to afford us some warrant for trying to think of what might\nbe called a newer or ethical idealism, an idealism of the will, an\nidealism of life, in contradistinction to the older or intellectual\n(epistemological, Neo-Kantian) idealism, the idealism of the intellect.\nProfessor A. Seth,[198] in his recent volume on _Man\u2019s Place in the\nCosmos_, suggests that Mr. Bradley\u2019s treatise on _Appearance and\nReality_ has closed the period of the absorption or assimilation of\nKanto-Hegelian principles by the English mind. And there is ample\nevidence in contemporary philosophical literature to show that even\nthe very men who have, with the help of Stirling and Green and Caird\nand Bradley and Wallace, \u201cabsorbed and assimilated\u201d the principles\nof critical idealism are now bent upon applying these principles to\nthe solution of concrete problems of art and life and conduct. Two\nthings alone would constitute a difference between the philosophy of\nthe last few years and that of the preceding generation: An attempt\n(strongly[199] accentuated at the present moment) to include elements\nof _feeling_ and _will_ in our final consciousness of reality, and a\ntendency (inevitable since Comte and Hegel\u2019s _Philosophy of History_)\nto extend the philosophical synthesis of the merely \u201cexternal,\u201d or\nphysical, universe so as to make it include the world of man\u2019s action\nand the world that is now glibly called the \u201csocial organism.\u201d[200] A\ngood deal of the epistemological and metaphysical philosophy of this\ncentury has been merely cosmological, and at best psychological and\nindividualistic. The philosophy of the present is, necessarily, to a\nlarge extent, sociological and collectivistic and historical. Renan\nonce prophesied that this would be so. And many other men perceived the\nsame fact and acted upon their perception of it--Goethe and Victor Hugo\nand Carlyle, for example.\n\nTo be sure, any attempt to draw lines of novel and absolute separation\nbetween writers of to-day and their immediate predecessors would be\nabsurd and impossible, just as would be the attempt to force men who\nare still living and thinking and developing, into Procrustean beds\nof system and nomenclature. The history of the philosophy of the\nlast half of this century constitutes a development as continuous\nand as logical as the philosophy of any similar period of years\nwherein men have thought persistently and truly upon the problems of\nlife and mind. There were in the \u2019sixties men like Ulrici and Lotze\n(Renouvier, too, to some extent) who divined the limitations of a\nmerely intellectual philosophy, and who saw clearly that the only way\nto effect a reconciliation between philosophy and science would be\nto apply philosophy itself to the problems of the life and thought\nof the time, just as we find, in 1893, Dr. Edward Caird writing, in\nhis _Essays on Literature and Philosophy_, that \u201cphilosophy, in face\nof the increasing complexity of modern life, has a harder task laid\nupon it than ever was laid upon it before. It must emerge from the\nregion of abstract principles and show itself able to deal with the\nmanifold results of empirical science, giving to each of them its\nproper place and value.\u201d Professor Campbell Fraser, while welcoming and\nsympathetically referring to (in his books upon Berkeley and Locke)\nthe elements of positive value in English and German idealism, has\nthroughout his life contended for the idea (expressed with greatest\ndefiniteness in his Gifford Lectures on _The Philosophy of Theism_)\nthat \u201cin man, as a self-conscious and self-determining _agent_,\u201d is\nto be found the \u201cbest key we possess to the solution of the ultimate\nproblem of the universe\u201d; while Professor Sidgwick, by virtue of his\ncaptivating and ingenious pertinacity in confining philosophical\nspeculation to the lines of the traditional English empiricism,\nand in keeping it free from the ensnaring subtleties of system and\nmethodology, has exercised a healthful and corrective influence\nagainst the extremes alike of transcendentalism and naturalism. And\nit would be rash to maintain that all the younger men in philosophy\nshow an intention to act upon the idea (expressed by Wundt, for\ninstance, in his _Ethik_) that a metaphysic should build upon the\nfacts of the moral life of man; although we find a \u201cNeo-Hegelian\u201d like\nProfessor Mackenzie[201] saying that \u201ceven the wealth of our inner\nlife depends rather on the width of our objective interests than on\nthe intensity of our self-contemplation\u201d; and an expounder of the\nethics of dialectic evolution like Professor Muirhead quoting[202] with\napproval the thought expressed by George Eliot in the words, \u201cThe great\nworld-struggle of developing thought is continually foreshadowed in the\nstruggle of the affections seeking a justification for love and hope\u201d;\nand a careful psychologist like Mr. Stout[203] deliberately penning\nthe words,[204] \u201cOur existence as conscious beings is essentially an\nactivity, and activity is a process which, by its very nature, is\ndirected towards an end, and can neither exist nor be conceived apart\nfrom this end.\u201d There are, doubtless, many philosophers of to-day who\nare convinced that philosophy is purely an intellectual matter, and\ncan never be anything else than an attempt to analyze the world for\n_thought_--an attempt to state its value in the terms of thought.\nAgainst all these and many similar considerations it would be idle to\nset up a hard and fast codification or characterization of the work of\nthe philosophy or philosophers of to-day. Still, the world will accord\nthe name of philosopher to any man--Renan, for example, or Spencer or\nHuxley or Nordau or Nietzsche--who comes before it with views upon the\nuniverse and humanity that may, for any conceivable reason, be regarded\nas fundamental. And on this showing of things, as well as from many\nindications in the work of those who are philosophers by profession,\nit may be said that the predominating note of the newer philosophy is\nits openness to the facts of the volitional and emotional and moral\nand social aspects of man\u2019s life, as things that take us further\nalong the path of truth than the mere categories of thought and their\nmanipulation by metaphysic and epistemology.\n\n\nII. The Newer Idealism does not dream of questioning the positive\nwork of the Kantian and Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian idealists. It\nknows only too well that even scientific men like Helmholtz and\nDu Bois Reymond, that \u201cpositive\u201d philosophers like Riehl and Laas\nand Feuerbach and others have, through the influence of the Kantian\nphilosophy, learned and accepted the fact of there being \u201cideal\u201d or\npsychical or \u201cmind-supplied\u201d factors in so-called external reality.\nThere are among the educated men of to-day very few Dr. Johnsons who\nridicule the psycho-physical, or the metaphysical, analysis of external\nreality, who believe in a crass and crude and self-sufficient \u201cmatter\u201d\nutterly devoid of psychical attributes or characteristics. True,\nHerbert Spencer has written words to the effect that \u201cIf the Idealist\n(Berkeley) is right, then the doctrine of Evolution is a dream\u201d; but\nthen everything in Spencer\u2019s philosophy about an \u201cactuality lying\nbehind appearances\u201d and about our being compelled \u201cto regard every\nphenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted\nupon,\u201d is against the possibility of our believing that, according to\nthat philosophy, an unconscious and non-spiritual \u201cmatter\u201d could evolve\nitself into conscious life and moral experience. The philosophers\nof to-day have indeed rejoiced to see Kant\u2019s lesson popularized by\nsuch various phases and movements of human thought as psychophysical\nresearch, art and \u00e6sthetic theory, the interest in Buddhism (with its\nidealistic theory of the knowledge of the senses), and the speculative\nbiology of Weismann and others. That people generally should see that\nmatter is, for many reasons, something more than mere matter, is to\nthe student of Kant a piece of fulfilled prophecy. And by a plea for\na return to reality and life and sociability from conceptualism and\ncriticism and speculative individualism no philosophical scholar for\none moment contemplates, as even conceivable, an overlooking of the\nidealistic interpretation of the data of the senses supplied by Locke\nand Berkeley and Hume, or of the idealistic interpretation of the data\nof science and understanding supplied by Kant\u2019s \u201cCopernican\u201d discovery.\nAny real view of the universe must now presuppose the melting down\nof crass external reality into the phenomena of sense and experience\nand the transformation of inorganic and organic nature into so many\n_planes_ or _grades_ of being expressive of the different forms\n(gravitation, cohesion, vital force, psychic force) in which cosmic\nenergy manifests itself.\n\nEqually little does the Newer Idealism question the legitimacy or the\nactual positive service of the \u201cdialectic\u201d of Hegel (as Archimedean\na leverage to humanity as was the \u201cconcept\u201d of Socrates or the\n\u201capperception\u201d of Kant) that has shown the world to be a _system_\nin which everything is related to everything else, and shown, too,\nthat all ways of looking at reality that stop short of the truths\nof personality and moral relationship are untrue and inadequate. To\nuse the words of Professor Howison, of California, in the preface to\nthe first edition of Professor Watson\u2019s[205] latest volume (a book\nthat connects the idealism of Glasgow and Oxford with the convictions\nof the youth of the \u201cPacific Coast\u201d), the \u201c_dominant tone_\u201d of the\nmilitant and representative philosophy of to-day, is \u201caffirmative and\nidealistic. The decided majority ... are animated by the conviction\nthat human thought is able to solve the riddle of life positively; to\nsolve it in accord with the ideal hopes and interests of human nature.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nCRITICAL\n\n\nEnough has perhaps now been said by way of an indication of some of the\nmain characteristics of Pragmatism, and of the matter of its relations\nto ordinary and to philosophical thinking. Its complexity and some of\nits confusions and some of its difficulties have also been referred to.\n\nAs for the affiliations and the associations of Pragmatism, it would\nseem that it rests not so much upon its own mere instrumentalism and\npracticalism as upon some of the many broader and deeper tendencies in\nancient and modern thought that have aimed at a dynamic, instead of a\nstatic, interpretation of reality.\n\nWe have suggested, too, that there are evidently things in traditional\nphilosophy and in Rationalism of which it fails to take cognizance,\nalthough it has evidently many things to give to Rationalism in the way\nof a constructive philosophy of human life.\n\nNow it would be easily possible to continue our study of Pragmatism\nalong some or all of those different lines and points of view. In\nthe matter, for example, of the affiliations and associations\nof Pragmatism, we could show that, in addition to such things\nas the \u201cnominalism\u201d and the utilitarianism, and the positivism,\nand the \u201cvoluntarism\u201d and the philosophy of hypotheses, and the\n\u201canti-intellectualism\u201d already referred to, Pragmatism has an affinity\nwith things as far apart and as different as the Scottish Philosophy\nof Common-sense, the sociological philosophy of Comte and his\nfollowers, the philosophy of Fichte with its great idea of the world\nas the \u201csensualized sphere\u201d of our duty, the \u201cexperience\u201d philosophy\nof Bacon and of the entire modern era, and so on. There is even a\n\u201cromantic\u201d element in Pragmatism, and it has, in fact, been called\n\u201cromantic utilitarianism.\u201d[206] We can understand this if we think of\nM. Berthelot\u2019s[207] association of it not only with Poincar\u00e9, but with\nNietzsche, or of Dr. Schiller\u2019s famous declaration that the genius of a\nman\u2019s logical method should be loved and reverenced by him as is \u201chis\nbride.\u201d\n\nAnd there is always in it, to be sure, the important element of\nsympathy with the religious instincts of mankind. And this is the case,\ntoo, whether these instincts are contemplated in some of the forms to\nwhich reference has already been made, or in the form, say, expressed\nby such a typical modern thinker as the late Henry Sidgwick, in his\nconviction that \u201cHumanity will not, and cannot, acquiesce in a Godless\nworld.\u201d[208]\n\nThen again we might take up the point of the relations of Pragmatism\nto doctrines new and old in the history of philosophy, to the main\npoints of departure of different schools of thought, or to fundamental\nand important positions in many of the great philosophers. The writer\nfinds that he has noticed in this connexion the doctrines of Stoicism\nand Epicureanism,[209] the \u201cprobability\u201d philosophy of Locke[210] and\nButler, and Pascal, the ethics and the natural theology of Cicero,\nthe \u201cvoluntarism\u201d of Schopenhauer,[211] Aristotle\u2019s philosophy of the\nPractical Reason,[212] Kant\u2019s philosophy of the same, the religious\nphilosophy of theologians like Tertullian, Augustine, Duns Scotus, and\nso on--to take only a few instances.[213] The view of man and his\nnature represented by all these names is, in the main, an essentially\npractical, a concrete, and a moral view as opposed to an abstract and\na rationalistic view. And of course even to Plato knowledge was only\nan element in the total spiritual philosophy of man, while his master,\nSocrates, never really seemed to make any separation between moral and\nintellectual inquiries.\n\nAnd as for positions in the great philosophers between which and\nsome of the tendencies of Pragmatism there is more than a merely\nsuperficial agreement, we might instance, for example, the tendency of\nHume[214] to reduce many of the leading categories of our thought to\nmere habits of mind, to be explained on an instinctive rather than a\nrationalistic basis; or Comte\u2019s idea of the error of separating reason\nfrom instinct;[215] or the idea of de Maistre and Bain, and many others\nthat \u201cwill\u201d is implied in the notion of \u201cexteriority\u201d; or the idea of\nDescartes[216] that the senses teach us not so much \u201cwhat is in reality\nin things,\u201d as \u201cwhat is beneficial[217] or hurtful to the composite\nwhole of mind and body\u201d; or the declaration of Kant that the chief end\nof metaphysic is God and immortality; or the idea of Spencer[218] that\nthe belief in the unqualified supremacy of reason is a superstition of\nphilosophers; or the idea of Plato in the Sophist[219] that reality is\nthe capacity for acting or of being acted upon; and so on.\n\nAs for such further confirmation of pragmatist teaching as is to be\nfound in typical modern thinking and scholars, thought of almost at\nrandom, it would be easy to quote in this connexion from writers as\ndiverse as H\u00f6ffding, Fouill\u00e9e, Simmel, Wundt, Mach, Huxley, Hobhouse,\nand many others. It might be called a typically pragmatist idea,\nfor example, on the part of Mr. L.\u00a0T. Hobhouse to hold that \u201cThe\nhigher conceptions by which idealism has so firmly held are not to be\n\u2018scientifically\u2019 treated in the sense of being explained away. What\nis genuinely higher we have ... good reason to think must also be\ntruest,\u201d and we \u201ccannot permanently acquiesce in a way of thinking what\nwould resolve it into what is lowest.\u201d[220] These last words represent\nalmost a commonplace of the thought of the day. It is held, for\nexample, by men as different and as far apart in their work, and yet as\ntypical of phases of our modern life, as Robert Browning and Sir Oliver\nLodge. The close dependence again of the doctrines of any science upon\nthe social life and the prevalent thought of the generation is also\nessentially a pragmatist idea. Its truth is recognized and insisted\nupon in the most explicit manner in the recent serviceable manifesto of\nProfessors Geddes and Thomson upon \u201cEvolution,\u201d[221] and it obviously\naffects their whole philosophy of life and mind. It figures too\nquite prominently in the valuable short _Introduction to Science_ by\nProfessor Thomson in the same series of manuals.\n\nAnother typical book of to-day, again (that of Professor Duncan on the\n_New Knowledge_ of the new physical science), definitely gives up, for\nexample, the \u201ccorrespondence\u201d[222] notion of truth, holding that it is\nmeaningless to think of reality as something outside our thought and\nour experience of which our ideas might be a possible duplicate. This\nagain we readily recognize as an essentially pragmatist contention.\nSo also is the same writer\u2019s rejection of the notion of \u201cabsolute\ntruth,\u201d[223] and his confession of the \u201cfaith\u201d that is always involved\nin the thought of completeness or system in our scientific knowledge.\n\u201cWe believe purely as an act of faith and not at all of logic,\u201d he\nsays, \u201cthat the universe is essentially determinable thousands of years\nhence, into some one system which will account for everything and which\nwill be the truth.\u201d[224]\n\nNor would it be at all difficult to find confirmation for the\npragmatist philosophy of ideas and thoughts in what we may well think\nof as the general reflective literature of our time, outside the\nsphere, as it were, of strictly rational or academic philosophy--in\nwriters like F.\u00a0D. Maurice, W. Pater, A.\u00a0W. Benn (who otherwise\ndepreciates what he calls \u201c_ophelism_\u201d), J.\u00a0H. Newman, Karl Pearson,\nCarlyle, and others.[225] Take the following, for example, quoted with\napproval from Herschel by Karl Pearson: \u201cThe grand and indeed the only\ncharacter of truth is its capability of enduring the test of universal\nexperience, and coming unchanged out of every possible form of fair\ndiscussion.\u201d[226] The idea again, for example, recently expressed in\na public article by such a widely read and cleverly perverse writer\nas Mr. Bernard Shaw,[227] that \u201cthe will that moves us is dogmatic:\nour brain is only the very imperfect instrument by which we devise\npractical means for satisfying the will,\u201d might only too naturally\nbe associated with the pragmatist-like anti-intellectualism[228] of\nBergson, or, for that part of it, with the deeper \u201cvoluntarism\u201d of\nSchopenhauer. The following quotation taken from Mr. Pater reveals\nhow great may be correspondence between the independent findings of\na finely sensitive mind like his, and the positions to which the\npragmatists are inclined in respect of the psychology of religious\nbelief. \u201cThe supposed facts on which Christianity rests, utterly\nincapable as they have become of any ordinary test, seem to me matter\nof very much the same sort of assent as we give to any assumption in\nthe strict and ultimate sense, moral. The question whether these facts\nwere real will, I think, always continue to be what I should call one\nof those _natural_ questions of the human mind.\u201d[229] Readers of\nCarlyle will easily recognize what we might call a more generalized\nstatement of this same truth of Pater\u2019s in the often-quoted words from\n_Heroes and Hero-Worship_:[230] \u201cBy religion I do not mean the church\ncreed which a man professes, the articles of faith which.... But the\nthing a man does practically believe (and this often enough _without_\nasserting it even to himself, much less to others); the thing a man\ndoes practically lay to heart and know for certain concerning his\nvital relations to the mysterious universe, and his duty and destiny\nthere.\u201d It has long seemed to the writer that a similar thing to this\nmight be written (and James has certainly written it) about a man\u2019s\n\u201cphilosophy\u201d as necessarily inclusive of his working beliefs as well\nas of his mere reasoned opinions, although it is the latter that are\ngenerally (by what right?) taken to be properly the subject-matter of\nphilosophy.[231] And it is this phase of the pragmatist philosophy that\ncould, I am inclined to think, be most readily illustrated from the\nopinions of various living and dead writers upon the general working\nphilosophy of human nature as we find this revealed in human history.\nWe are told, for example, by Mr. Hobhouse, in his monumental work upon\n_Morals in Evolution_, that in \u201cTaoism the supreme principle of things\nmay be left undefined as something that we experience in ourselves\nif we throw ourselves upon it, but which we know rather by following\nor living it than by any process of ratiocination.\u201d[232] And \u201cthis\nmystical interpretation,\u201d he adds, \u201cis not confined to Taoism, but in\none form or another lies near to hand to all spiritual religions, and\nexpresses one mode of religious consciousness, its aspiration to reach\nthe heart of things and the confidence that it has done so, and found\nrest there.\u201d\n\nWe are reminded, of course, by all such considerations of the\nphilosophy of Bergson, and of its brilliant attempt to make a synthesis\nof intuition or instinct with reflection or thought, and indeed it may\nwell be that the past difficulties of philosophy with intuition and\ninstinct are due to the fact of its error in unduly separating the\nintellect from the \u201cwill to live,\u201d and from the \u201ccreative\u201d evolution\nthat have been such integral factors in the evolution of the life of\nhumanity.\n\nThis entire matter, however, of the comparison of pragmatist doctrines\nto typical tendencies in the thought of the past and the present must\nbe treated by us as subordinate to our main purpose, that of the\nestimation of the place of Pragmatism in the constructive thought of\nthe present time. With a view to this it will be necessary to revert to\nthe criticism of Pragmatism.\n\nThe criticism that has already been made is that in the main\nPragmatism is unsystematic and complex and confusing, that it has no\nadequate theory of \u201creality,\u201d and no unified theory of philosophy, that\nit has no satisfactory criterion of the \u201cconsequences\u201d by which it\nproposes to test truth, and that it has not worked out its philosophy\nof the contribution of the individual with his \u201cactivity\u201d and his\n\u201cpurposes\u201d to \u201creality\u201d generally, and that it is in danger of being a\nfailure in the realm of ethics.[233]\n\nTo all this we shall now seek to add a few words more upon (1)\nthe pragmatist criterion of truth, (2) the weakness of Pragmatism\nin the realms of logic and theory of knowledge, (3) its failure\nto give consistent account of the nature of reality, and (4) its\nunsatisfactoriness in the realm of ethics.\n\n(1) We have already expressed our agreement with the finding of\nProfessor Pratt[234] that the pragmatist theory of truth amounts to\nno more than the harmless doctrine that the meaning of any conception\nexpresses itself in the past, present, or future conduct or experiences\nof actual, or possible, sentient creatures. Taken literally, however,\nthe doctrine that truth should be tested by consequences is not only\nharmless but also useless, seeing that Omniscience alone could bring\ntogether in thought or in imagination all the consequences of an\nassertion. Again, it is literally _false_ for the reason that the\nproof of truth is not in the first instance any kind of \u201cconsequences,\u201d\nnot even the \u201cverification\u201d of which pragmatists are so fond. If\nthe truth of which we may happen to be thinking is truth of \u201cfact,\u201d\nits proof lies in its correspondence (despite the difficulties[235]\nof the idea) with the results of observation or perception.[236]\nAnd if it be inferential truth, its proof is that of its deduction\nfrom previously established truths, or facts, upon a certain plane\nof knowledge or experience. In short, Pragmatists forget altogether\nthe logical doctrine of the existence (in the world of our human\nexperience, of course) of different established planes of reality, or\nplanes of ascertained knowledge in which all propositions that are\nnot nonsensical or trivial, are, from their very inception, regarded\nas necessarily true or false. The existence of these various planes\nof experience or of thought is in fact implied in the pragmatist\ndoctrine of the fundamental character of belief.[237] According to\nthis perfectly correct doctrine, the objectivity of truth (_i.e._\nits reality or non-reality in the world of fact or in the world of\nrational discourse) is the essential thing about it, while the idea of\nits \u201cconsequences\u201d is not. A truth is a proposition whose validity has\nalready been established by evidence or by demonstration. It has then\nafterwards the immediate \u201cutility\u201d of expressing in an intelligible\nand convenient manner the fact of certain connexions among things or\nevents. And its ultimate utility to mankind is also at the same time\nassured, humanity being by its very nature a society of persons who\nmust act, and who act, upon what they believe to be the truth or the\nreality of things. But a proposition is by no means true because it\nis useful. Constantine believed eminently in the concord-producing\nutility of certain confessions enunciated at the Council of Nice, but\nhis belief in this does not prove their truth or reality outside the\nconvictions of the faithful. Nor does the pragmatist or utilitarian\ncharacter of certain portions of the writings of the Old Testament or\nof the Koran prove the matter of their literal and factual truth in the\nordinary sense of these terms. As Hume said, \u201cWhen any opinion leads\nus into absurdities \u2019tis certainly false, but \u2019tis not certain that an\nopinion is false because it has dangerous consequences.\u201d\n\nAnd then, apart from this conspicuous absence of logic in the views\nof pragmatists upon \u201ctruth,\u201d the expression of their doctrine is so\nconfusing that it is almost impossible to extract any consistent\nmeaning out of it. They are continually confounding conceptions and\nideas and propositions, forgetful of the fact that truth resides not\nin concepts and ideas but only in propositions. While it may be indeed\ntrue, as against Rationalism, that all human conceptions whatsoever\n[and it is only in connexion with \u201cconceptions\u201d that Pragmatism is\ndefined even in such an official place as Baldwin\u2019s _Dictionary of\nPhilosophy_[238]] have, and must have, reference to actual or possible\nhuman experience or consequences, it is by no means true that the test\nof a proposition is anything other than the evidence of which we have\nalready spoken.\n\nThen the pragmatists have never adequately defined terms that are so\nessential to their purposes as \u201cpractical,\u201d \u201ctruth,\u201d \u201cfact,\u201d \u201creality,\u201d\n\u201cconsequences,\u201d and they confound, too, \u201ctheories\u201d with \u201ctruths\u201d and\n\u201cconcepts\u201d just as they confound concepts and propositions.\n\n(2) That logic and the theory of proof is thus one of the weak spots of\nPragmatism has perhaps then been sufficiently indicated. We have seen,\nin fact, the readiness of Pragmatism to confess its inability[239] to\nprove its own philosophy--that is, to prove it in the ordinary sense of\nthe term.[240] That it should have made this confession is, of course,\nonly in keeping with the fact that its interest in logic is confined to\nsuch subordinate topics as the framing and verification of hypotheses,\nthe development of concepts and judgments in the \u201cthought-process,\u201d and\nso on. Of complete proof, as involving both deduction and induction,\nit takes but the scantiest recognition. And it has made almost no\neffort to connect its discoveries in \u201cgenetic logic\u201d and in the theory\nof hypotheses with the traditional body of logical doctrine.[241] Nor,\nas may perhaps be inferred from the preceding paragraph, has it made\nany serious attempt to consider the question of the discovery of new\ntruth in relation to the more or less perfectly formulated systems and\nschemes of truth already in the possession of mankind.\n\nThe case is similar in regard to the \u201ctheory of knowledge\u201d of the\npragmatists. While they have made many important suggestions regarding\nthe relation of all the main categories and principles of our human\nthought to the theoretical and practical needs of mankind, there is in\ntheir teachings little that is satisfactory and explicit in the matter\nof the systematization of first principles,[242] and little too that is\nsatisfactory in respect of the relation of knowledge to reality. They\nsometimes admit (with James) the importance of general points of view\nlike the \u201ccausal,\u201d the \u201ctemporal,\u201d \u201cend,\u201d and \u201cpurpose,\u201d and so on. At\nother times they confess with Schiller that questions about ultimate\ntruth and ultimate reality cannot be allowed to weigh upon our\nspirits, seeing that \u201cactual knowing\u201d always starts from the \u201cexisting\nsituation.\u201d\n\nNow of course actual knowing certainly does start from the particular\ncase of the existing situation, but, as all thinkers from Aristotle to\nHume have seen, it is by no means explained by this existing situation.\nIn real knowledge this is always made intelligible by references to\npoints of view and to experiences that altogether transcend it. The\ntrue theory of knowledge, in short, involves the familiar Kantian\ndistinction between the \u201corigin\u201d and the \u201cvalidity\u201d of knowledge--a\nthing that the pragmatists seem continually and deliberately to ignore.\nSchiller, to be sure, reminds us with justice that we must endeavour\nto \u201cconnect,\u201d rather than invariably \u201ccontrast,\u201d the two terms of\nthis distinction. But this again is by no means what the pragmatists\nthemselves have done. They fail, in fact, to connect their hints about\nthe practical or experimental origin of most of our points of view\nabout reality with the problem of the validity of first principles\ngenerally.\n\nThere is a suggestion here and there in their writings that, as\nSchiller[243] puts it, there can be no coherent system of postulates\nexcept as rooted in personality, and that there are postulates at every\nstage of our development. What this statement means is that there are\n\u201cpoints of view\u201d about reality that are incidental to the stage of our\nnatural life (as beings among other beings), others to the stage of\nconscious sensations and feelings, still others to that of our desires\nand thoughts, to our aesthetic appreciation, to our moral life, and so\non. But, as I have already said, there is little attempt on the part\nof the pragmatists to distinguish these different stages or planes of\nexperience adequately from one another.\n\n(3) References have already been made to the failures of our\nAnglo-American pragmatists to attain to any intelligible and consistent\nkind of reality, whether they conceive of this latter as the sum-total\nof the efforts of aspiring and achieving human beings, or with Schiller\nas an \u201coriginal, plastic sub-stratum,\u201d or as the reality (whatever it\nis) that is gradually being brought into being by the creative efforts\nof ourselves and of beings higher or lower than ourselves in the scale\nof existence. Their deepest thought in the matter seems to be that\nthe universe (our universe?) is essentially \u201cincomplete,\u201d and that\nthe truth of God, as James puts it, \u201chas to run the gauntlet of other\ntruths.\u201d One student of this topic, Professor Leighton, has arrived\nat the conclusion that pragmatism is essentially \u201cacosmistic,\u201d[244]\nmeaning, no doubt, and with good reason, that Pragmatism has no place\nof any kind for objective order or system. Now it is just this palpable\nlack of an \u201cobjective,\u201d or rational, order that renders the whole\npragmatist philosophy liable to the charges of (1) \u201csubjectivism,\u201d\nand (2) irrationality. There are in it, as we have tried to point\nout, abundant hints of what reality must be construed to be on the\nprinciples of any workable or credible philosophy, namely something\nthat stimulates both our thought and our endeavour. And there is in\nit the great truth that in action we are not only in contact with\nreality as such, but with a reality, moreover, that transcends the\nimperfect reality of our lives as finite individuals and the imperfect\ncharacter of our limited effort and struggle. But beyond the vague\nhints that our efforts must somehow count in the final tale of reality,\nand that what the world of experience seems to be, it must somehow be\nconceived ultimately to be, there is no standing-ground in the entire\npragmatist philosophy for want of what, in plain English, must be\ntermed an intelligible theory of reality. \u201cYou see,\u201d says James, \u201chow\ndifferently people take things. The world we live in exists diffused\nand distributed in the form of an indefinitely numerous lot of eaches,\ncoherent in all sorts of ways and degrees; and the tough-minded are\nperfectly willing to take them at that valuation. They can stand the\nworld, their temper being well adapted to its insecurity.\u201d[245]\n\nThe present writer, some years ago, in an article in _Mind_,[246]\nventured to point out the absurdity of expecting the public to believe\nin a philosophy which sometimes speaks as if we could now, to-day, by\nour efforts begin to make the world something different from what it\nis or what it has been. \u201cAs far as the past facts go,\u201d so James put it\nin 1899, \u201cthere is indeed _no difference_. These facts are _bagged_\n(is not the phraseology too recklessly sporting?), are captured, and\nthe good that\u2019s in them is gained, be the atoms, be the God their\ncause.\u201d And again, \u201cTheism and materialism, so indifferent when taken\nretrospectively [?], point, when we take them prospectively, to wholly\ndifferent, practical consequences, to opposite outlooks of experience.\u201d\nAnd again, \u201cBut I say that such an alternation of feelings, reasonable\nenough in a consciousness that is _prospective_, as ours now is, and\nwhose world is partly yet to come, _would be absolutely senseless_\n(!) and irrational in a purely retrospective consciousness summing up\na world _already past_.\u201d Now on what theory of things is it that the\nfuture of the world and our future may be affected by ideal elements\nand factors (God, Freedom, Recompense, Justice) without having been so\naffected or determined in the past?[247]\n\n(4) The unsatisfactoriness of Pragmatism in the realm of ethics.\nCrucial and hopeless as is the failure of Pragmatism in the realm of\nethics, a word or two had better be said of the right of the critic to\njudge of it in this connexion. In the first place, the thinking public\nhas already expressed its distrust of a doctrine that scruples not to\navow its affinity with utilitarianism, with the idea of testing truth\nand value by mere consequences and by the idea of the useful. \u201cThe word\n\u2018expedient,\u2019\u201d wrote a correspondent to Professor James, \u201chas no other\nmeaning than that of self-interest. The pursuit of this has ended by\nlanding a number of officers of national banks in penitentiaries. A\nphilosophy that leads to such results must be unsound.\u201d\n\nThen again, Professor Dewey (now doubtless the foremost living\npragmatist) is the joint author of a book upon ethics, the most\nprominent feature of which is the application of pragmatist-like\nmethods and principles to moral philosophy. This book sums up, too, a\ngreat many previous illuminating discussions of his own upon ethical\nand educational problems, for all of which, and for its general\napplication of the principles of Humanism to the realm of morals he has\ndeservedly won the praise of Professor James himself. So we have thus\nthe warrant both of the public and of Dewey and James for seeking to\njudge Pragmatism from the point of view of moral philosophy.\n\nAnother justification for seeking to judge of Pragmatism from the point\nof view of moral philosophy is that the whole weight of its \u201chumanism\u201d\nand of its \u201cvaluation\u201d philosophy must inevitably fall upon its view\nof the moral judgment. Dr. Schiller, we have seen, is quite explicit\nin his opinion that for Humanism the roots of metaphysics \u201clie, and\nmust lie,\u201d in ethics. And this is all the more the case, as it were,\non account of the proclamation[248] by Pragmatism of the inability of\nIntellectualism to understand morality, and also on account of its\nrecurring contention in respect of the merely hypothetical character of\nall intellectual truth.\n\nNow, unfortunately for Pragmatism, the one thing that the otherwise\nilluminating book of Dewey and Tufts almost completely fails to do, as\nthe writer has already sought to indicate, is to _provide a theory of\nthe ordinary distinction between right and wrong_.[249] The only theme\nthat is really successfully pursued in this typically American book is\nthe \u201cconstant discovery, formation, and re-formation of the \u2018self\u2019 in\nthe \u2018ends\u2019 which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in\nvirtue of his membership of a \u2018social whole.\u2019\u201d But this is obviously a\nstudy in \u201cgenetic psychology,\u201d or in the psychology of ethics, but by\nno means a study in the theory of ethics. \u201cThe controlling principle,\u201d\nit characteristically tells us, \u201cof the deliberation which renders\npossible the formation of a voluntary or socialized self out of our\noriginal instinctive impulses is the love of the objects which make\nthis transformation possible.\u201d But what is it, we wish to know, that\ndistinguished the objects that make this transformation possible from\nthe objects that do not do so? The only answer that we can see in the\nbook is that anything is \u201cmoral\u201d which makes possible a \u201ctransition\nfrom individualism to efficient social personality\u201d---obviously again\na purely sociological point of view, leaving the question of the\nstandard of efficiency quite open. The whole tendency, in short, of\nthe pragmatist treatment of ethical principles is to the effect that\nstandards and theories of conduct are valuable only in so far as they\nare, to a certain extent, \u201cfruitful\u201d in giving us a certain \u201csurveying\npower\u201d in the perplexities and uncertainties of \u201cdirect personal\nbehaviour.\u201d They are all, in other words, merely relative or useful,\nand none of them is absolute and authoritative. It is this last thing,\nhowever, that is the real desideratum of ethical theory. And so far\nas practice is concerned, all that this Pragmatism or \u201cRelativism\u201d in\nmorals inevitably leads to is the conclusion that whatever brings about\na change, or a result, or a \u201cnew formation,\u201d or a new \u201cdevelopment\u201d\nof the moral situation, is necessarily moral, that \u201cgrowth\u201d and\n\u201cliberation\u201d and \u201cfruitfulness,\u201d and \u201cexperimentation\u201d are everything,\nand moral scruples and conscience simply nothing. In the celebrated\nphrase of Nietzsche, \u201cEverything is permissible and nothing is true or\nbinding.\u201d\n\nIs not, then, this would-be ethical phase of Pragmatism just too\nmodernistic, too merely practical, too merely illuminative and\nenlightening? And would it not be better for the youth of America (for\nDewey\u2019s book is in the _American Science Series_) and other countries\nto learn that _not_ everything \u201cpractical\u201d and \u201cformative\u201d and\n\u201cliberative\u201d and \u201csocializing\u201d is _moral_ in the strict sense of the\nterm?[250] In saying this I am, of course, giving but a very imperfect\nidea of the contents of a book which is, in many respects, both\nepoch-marking and epoch-making. It is, however, unfortunately, in some\nrespects, only too much in touch with \u201cpresent facts and tendencies,\u201d\nwith the regrettable tendency of the hour, for example, to justify as\nright any conduct that momentarily \u201cimproves the situation,\u201d or that\n\u201cliberates the activities\u201d of the parties concerned in it. It is not\nenough, in other words (and this is all, I am inclined to think, that\nPragmatism can do in morals), to set up a somewhat suggestive picture\nof the \u201clife of the moral man in our present transitional\u201d and would-be\n\u201cconstructive\u201d age. A moral man does not merely, in common parlance,\n\u201ckeep up with the procession,\u201d going in for its endless \u201cformations\u201d\nand \u201cre-formations.\u201d He seeks to \u201clead\u201d it, and this _leading_ of men,\nthis setting up of a standard of the legitimacy or of the illegitimacy\nof certain social experiments is just what Pragmatism cannot do in\nmorals.\n\nIt is otherwise, doubtless, with a true humanism, or with the humanism\nthat Pragmatism is endeavouring to become.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nPRAGMATISM AS HUMANISM\n\n\nIn spite of the objections that have been brought in the preceding\nchapters against Pragmatism as Instrumentalism and Practicalism, the\ngreat thing about Pragmatism as the Humanism that it is tending to\nbecome is the position that it virtually occupies in respect of the\nethical and the personal factors that enter into all our notions about\nfinal truth. To Pragmatism the importance of these factors in this\nconnexion is apparent from the outset, it being to it the merest truism\nthat by final truth we cannot mean \u201ctruth\u201d existing on its own account,\nbut rather the truth of the world as inclusive of man and his purposes.\nFor so much it stands by its very letter as well as by its spirit.\nAnd if we can find any confirmation for this attitude in some of the\nconcessions of the rationalists that have been previously mentioned, so\nmuch the better, as it were, for Pragmatism.\n\nNow it might well seem as if Pragmatism by the denial of an absolute\nor impersonal truth is so far simply another version of modern\nagnosticism, or of the older doctrine of the \u201crelativity\u201d of human\nknowledge. There is a great difference, however, between these two\nthings and Pragmatism. A mere agnostical, or relativity, philosophy\ngenerally carries with it the belief that the inmost reality of things\nis both unknowable and out of all relation alike to human purpose\nand to human knowledge. Pragmatism, on the contrary, would like to\nmaintain---if it could do so logically---that in human volition,\nwe do know something about the inward meaning of things, that the\n\u201cdevelopmental\u201d view of things is, when properly interpreted, the real\nview, that reality is at least what it comes to be in our \u201cpurposes\u201d\nand in our ideals, and not something different from this.\n\nThe main reason, however, of the inability of Pragmatism to do what it\nwould like to do in this connexion is what we have already complained\nof as its failure either to recognize, or to use, the help that could\nbe afforded to it by (1) Idealism, and by (2) the \u201cnormative\u201d[251] view\nof ethical science.\n\nIn respect of the first point, we have already suggested, for example,\nthat Pragmatism is inclined in various ways to make much of its\n\u201cradical empiricism,\u201d its contention that reality must, to begin with,\nbe construed to be what it seems to be in our actual dealings with\nit and in our actual experience of it.[252] To the biologist, as we\nput it in our fourth chapter, reality is life; to the physicist it\nis energy; to the theologian it is the unfolding of the dealings of\nGod with His creatures; to the sociologist it is the sphere of the\nevolution of the social life of humanity; to the lover of truth it\nis a \u201cpartly intelligible system.\u201d The only rational basis, however,\nfor all this constructive interpretation of reality is the familiar\nidealist position of the necessary implication of the \u201csubject\u201d in the\n\u201cobject,\u201d the fact that \u201cthings\u201d or \u201cexistences\u201d are invariably thought\nof as the elements or component parts in some working system or sphere\nof reality that is contemplated by some being or beings in reference\nto some purpose or end. On its so-called lowest plane, indeed, reality\nis conceived as the play of all the particles of matter, or of all the\nelemental forces of nature, upon each other. And on this construction\nof things the susceptibility of everything to the influence of\neverything else is no less certainly assumed than in the case of the\nworld of life itself. But, as the idealist realizes in a moment, there\nis no possibility of separating, either in thought or experimentally,\nthis supposed physical world from the so-called experiences and\nrelations and laws through which it is interpreted and described,\neven as a world of objects or of forces. This is what Parmenides saw\nages ago when he said that \u201cthought\u201d and \u201cbeing\u201d are the same thing,\nthat \u201cbeing\u201d belongs to \u201cthought,\u201d that \u201cbeing\u201d is the true object of\nthought, and that being is the \u201crational\u201d and the \u201cthinkable\u201d and not\nsomething outside thought. It is what a scientist, an expounder of\nscience, like Professor J.\u00a0A. Thompson means and partly states when he\nsays, speaking of the work of many of his fellow-scientists of the day,\n\u201cThe matter of physical science is an abstraction, whereas the matter\nof our direct experience is in certain conditions the physical basis of\nlife and the home of the soul.\u201d[253]\n\nTo the objector who again retorts that this line of reflection seems to\nrest upon a very large assumption as to the nature of the apparently\nillimitable physical universe, the idealist can but reply, firstly,\nthat we know nothing of the so-called natural world save through the\nso-called spiritual or psychical world,[254] and secondly, that even\nthe most complete description of the world from the point of view\nof science would, of course, still leave the world of our mental\nexperiences entirely unexplained. It is surely, therefore, so far, much\nmore logical to use this last world as at least the partial explanation\nof the former rather than _vice versa_.\n\nAnd as for the \u201cnormative\u201d view of ethics and the help it affords to\nPragmatism in its contention in respect of final truth, it may be said,\nto begin with, that it is in the ethical life that what we call the\ntruth of things becomes the basis of an ideal of personal achievement.\nIt is not merely of man\u2019s well-known transformation and utilization of\nthe forces of nature that we are at present thinking, but of the fact\nthat in the moral life man \u201csuperposes,\u201d as has been said, an order\nof his own upon the so-called natural order of things, transforming\nit into a spiritual order. This superposition, if we will, this\ntransformation, is revealed unmistakably in the history of the facts of\nconduct.\n\nIn the recent elaborate researches in sociological ethics of Hobhouse\nand Westermarck[255] we read, for example, of facts like the gradual\n\u201cblunting of the edges of barbarian ideas,\u201d and the recognition of the\n\u201cprincipal moral obligations\u201d in the early oriental civilizations,\nthe existence of the \u201cdoctrine of forgiveness,\u201d and of \u201cdisinterested\nretributive kindly emotion,\u201d the acceptance and redistribution\nby Confucius of the traditional standards of Chinese ethics, the\n\u201ctransformation\u201d by the Hebrew prophets of the \u201claw of a barbarous\npeople into the spiritual worship of one God,\u201d of a God of \u201csocial\njustice,\u201d of \u201cmercy,\u201d and finally of \u201clove.\u201d Both these writers, in\nview of such facts and of other facts of a kindred nature, arrive at\nthe conclusion that the supreme authority assigned to the moral law\nis not altogether an illusion, that there is after all the \u201c_great\npermanent fact of the moral consciousness persisting through all stages\nof development_, that whether we believe or disbelieve in God, or\nreligion, or nature, or what not, there remain for all of us certain\nthings to do which affect us with a greater or less degree of mental\ndiscomfort.\u201d\n\nNow as we think of it, there is something that Pragmatism fails to see\nin respect of this undoubted transformation of the merely physical\nbasis of our life that takes place, or that has taken place, in the\nmoral life of humanity. While firmly holding in its moral philosophy\n(we can see this in the typical work of Dewey and Tufts[256]) to its\nfar-reaching principle that our entire intellectual life has been\nworked out in the closest kind of relation to our practical needs,\nPragmatism has nevertheless failed to see that in the highest reaches\nof our active life the controlling ideas (\u201cjustice,\u201d \u201chumanity,\u201d\n\u201ccourage,\u201d and so on) have a value independently of any consequences\nother than those of their realization in the purposes and in the\ndispositions of men. Or, more definitely, it is just because moral\nideas, like any ideas, cannot fail to work themselves out into our\nactions and into our very dispositions and character, that it becomes\nof the utmost importance to conceive of the truth they embody as having\na value above all consequences and above all ordinary utility. If\nsought ever and always for its own sake, the highest kind of truth and\ninsight, the truth that we apprehend in our highest intuitions and in\nour highest efforts, will inevitably tend to the creation of a realm\nof \u201cvalue,\u201d a realm of personal worth and activity that we cannot but\nregard as the highest reality,[257] or the highest plane of experience\nof which we are conscious. In this thought, then, in the thought of the\nreality of the life and work of human beings who have given all for\ntruth and goodness and love, there is surely at least a partial clue to\nthe value of the great idea after which Pragmatism is blindly groping\nin its contention of the importance even to metaphysics of the notion\nof our human, \u201cpurposive\u201d activity.\n\nIndeed, when we think of the matter carefully it is doubtful whether\nthe human mind would ever even have attained to the notion of ideal\ntruth, with the correlative thought of the shortcomings or the limits\nof our ordinary knowledge, if it had not been for the moral life and\nthe serious problem it sets before us as men--that of the complete\nsatisfaction or the complete assertion of our human personality. We\nseek truth in the first instance because we wish to act upon certainty\nor upon adequate certainty, and because we feel that we must be\ndetermined by what appeals to our own convictions and motives, by\nwhat has become part of our own life and consciousness. It is only\nin fact because we will it, and because we want it, that the \u201cideal\u201d\nexists--the ideal of anything, more certain knowledge about something,\nfor example, or gratified curiosity, or satisfied desire, and so on.\nIn every case, say, of the pursuit of an ideal we desire something or\nsome state of things that does not yet exist. The actual, if indeed\n(which is doubtful) we can think of the actual merely as such, does\nnot engender the notion of the ideal, although there is possibly a\nsuggestion of the \u201cideal\u201d in the \u201cmeaning\u201d that we cannot, even in\nsense perception,[258] attach to the actual.\n\nEven science, as we call it, is very far from being a mere description\nof the actual, it is an ideal \u201cconstruction\u201d or \u201cinterpretation\u201d of\nthe same in the interest, not of mere utility, but of the wonder\nand the curiosity and the intellectual and aesthetical satisfaction\nof our entire personality, of our disinterested love of the highest\ntruth.[259]\n\nA striking example of the part played by moral and personal factors\nin the evolution of truth may easily be found, as has already been\nsuggested, in some of the circumstances connected with the evolution of\nthe Platonic philosophy in the mind of its creator. Plato\u2019s constant\nuse of the dialogue form of exposition is of itself an expression of\nthe fact that philosophy was always to him a living and a personal\nthing, the outcome of an intellectual emotion of the soul in its\nefforts after true knowledge and spiritual perfection. It speaks also\nof Plato\u2019s essentially social conception of philosophy, as a creation\narising out of the contact of mind with mind, in the search after\nwisdom and virtue and justice. And there is little doubt that his own\ndiscontent with the social conditions of his time and with the false\nwisdom of the sophists was a powerful impulse in his mind in the\ndevelopment of that body of intellectual and ethical truth for all time\nthat is to be found in his works. The determining consideration, again,\nin the arguments for immortality in the _Phaedo_ is not so much the\nimperfect physical and theoretical philosophy on which they are partly\nmade to repose as the tremendous conviction of Plato of the supreme\nimportance of right conduct, of his belief in the principle of the\n\u201cbest.\u201d\n\nPlato has a way, too, of talking of truth as a kind of \u201caddition\u201d[260]\nto being and science, as a \u201cbeing\u201d that \u201cshares\u201d somehow in the \u201cidea\nof the Good\u201d--a tendency that, despite the imperfect hold of the Greek\nmind upon the fact and the conception of personality, we may also look\nupon as a confirmation of the pragmatist notion of the necessity of\nethical and personal factors in a complete theory of truth.\n\nA still more important instance of the importance of moral and\npractical factors to a final philosophy of things is to be found in the\nlasting influence of the great Hebrew teachers upon both the ancient\nand the modern world, although the mere mention of this topic is apt\nto give offence to some of our Neo-Hellenists[261] and to thinkers\nlike Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The remarkable thing about the Hebrew\nseers is their intuition of God as \u201cthe living source of their life\nand strength and joy,\u201d not as a mere first principle of thought, not\nas the substance of things, not as the mere \u201cend of patient search and\nstriving,\u201d but as the \u201c_first principle of life and feeling_.\u201d[262]\nAnd their work for the world lay in the bringing to an end of the\nentire mythology and cosmology of the age of fable and fancy, and the\nsubstitution for all this of the worship of one God, as something\ndistinct and different from all the cults of polytheism, as a great\nsocial and ethical achievement, as a true religion that loved justice\nand social order because it loved God. \u201cIn Hebrew poetry,\u201d[263] says\na recent authority upon this subject, \u201call things appear in action.\nThe verb is the predominating element in the sentence. And though the\nshades of time distinctions are blurred, the richness of the language\nthrows the precise complexion of the act into clear, strong light.\u201d If\nthis be so, there is, of course, no wonder that this people elaborated\nfor mankind a living and practical, a \u201cpragmatist\u201d (if we will) view\nof the world, which is so rich by way of its very contrast both to\nGreek and to modern scientific conceptions. With the enumeration of\ntwo specific instances from this same writer of the Hebrew perception\nof the importance of practical and personal factors to a true grasp\nof certain fundamental ideas, we may safely leave this great source\nof some of the leading ideas of our western world to take care of\nitself. \u201cThe Hebrew counterpart to the Greek ideal of \u1f41 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c2,\n\u2018the finely-polished gentleman,\u2019 is _h\u0101s\u00eed_, the adjective derived\nfrom _hesed_, that is \u2018the man of love.\u2019 As God is love, the good man\nis likewise a lover both of God and of his fellow-men. His love is\nindeed the pure reflection of God\u2019s--tender and true and active as\nHis is. For in no other ancient religion are the fear and love of God\nso indissolubly wedded to moral conduct.\u201d[264] And secondly, speaking\nof immortality, Professor Gordon says, \u201cThe glad hope of immortality\nrests, not on speculative arguments from the nature of the soul, but\non the sure ground of religious experience. Immortality is, in fact, a\nnecessary implicate of personal religion. The man that lives with God\nis immortal as He is.\u201d[265]\n\nIf the reader be inclined to interject here that all that this\npragmatist talk about the importance of action obviously amounts\nto is simply the position that the highest truth must somehow take\nrecognition of our beliefs as well as of our knowledge, we can but\nreply that he is literally so far in the right. Our point, however,\nfor Pragmatism would here be that belief rests not merely upon the\nintellect, but upon the intellect in conjunction with the active and\nthe ethical nature of man. It is mainly because we feel ourselves to\nbe active and legislative and creative, mainly because we partly are\nand partly hope to be, as the phrase has it, that we believe as well\nas seek continually to know. Hence the rightness and the soundness\nof Pragmatism in its contention; the truth is not so much a datum\n(something given) as a construction,[266] or a thing that is made and\ninvented by way of an approximation to an ideal.\n\nThat it is this almost in the literal sense of these words is evident\nfrom the fact of the slow and gradual accumulation of truth and\nknowledge about themselves and their environment by the fleeting\ngenerations of men. And even to-day the truth is not something that\nexists in nature or in history or in some privileged institution, or in\nthe teaching of some guild of masters, but rather only in the attitude\nof mind and heart of the human beings who continue to seek it and to\nwill it and to live it when and where they may. Truth includes, too,\nthe truth of the social order, of civilization[267]--this last costly\nwork being just as much the creation of the mind and the behaviour of\nmen as is knowledge itself. And there can, it would seem, be but slight\nobjection to an admission of the fact that it is only in so far as\nthe truth has been conceived as inclusive of the truth of human life\nas well as of that of the world of things that humanity as a whole\nseems to have any abiding interest in its existence, even where, as\nin _Omar Khayy\u00e0m_ and in other writings, the idea of its discovery is\ngiven up as impossible. Only, in other words, as the working out of the\nimplications of desire does thought live, and the completest thought is\nat bottom but the working out of the deepest desire.[268]\n\nThese two elements of our life, thought and desire, have had indeed a\nparallel development in the life of mankind. What we call the predicate\nof thought bespeaks invariably an underlying (or personal) reaction\nor attitude towards the so-called object of thought.[269] When desire\nceases, as it does sometimes in the case of a disappointed man, or the\npessimist, or the agnostic, or the mystic, thought too ceases. Even\nthe philosophical mood, as likewise the expression of a desire, is as\nsuch comparable to other motives or desires, such as the scientific or\nthe practical or the emotional, and subject, too, like them, to the\nvarious \u201cconflicts\u201d of personality.[270] The free speculative thought\nor activity that, with the Greeks, we sometimes think of as the highest\nattribute of our human nature, is itself but the highest phase of that\nfree creative[271] activity which we have found to underlie the moral\nlife and all the various constructions of mankind, inclusive of the\nwork of civilization itself.\n\nLastly, there is, as we know, ample warrant in the past and the\npresent reflections of men of science upon the apparent limits[272]\nand limitations of our knowledge of our environment to justify the\ncorrectness of the pragmatist insistence upon the ethical and the\npersonal factors that enter into truth. Reference having already been\nmade to these limits, there is perhaps little need of pursuing this\ntopic any further, either so far as the facts themselves are concerned\nor so far as their admission by scientists and others is concerned.\nHow any supposed mere physical order can ever come _to know itself as\nsuch_, either in the minds of men or in the minds of beings other than\nmen, is of course the crowning difficulty of what we call a physical\nphilosophy--a difficulty that transcends altogether the many familiar\nand universally admitted difficulties in respect of topics like the\norigin of motion and the origin of life, and the infinite number of\nadjustments and adaptations involved in the development of the world\nof things and men with which we are acquainted. Obviously, to say the\nvery least, only when some explanation of consciousness and feeling\nand thought is added on to our knowledge of Nature (fragmentary as\nis the latter at best) will the demands of thought and of desire for\nunity in our knowledge be satisfied or set at rest. Now, of course,\nto religious thought all this costly explanation, all this completion\nand systematization of our knowledge are revealed, in the main, only\nto a faith in God and to a consequent faith in the final \u201cperfection\u201d\nof our human life as the gradual evolution of a divine kingdom. And\nwhile Pragmatism cannot, especially in its cruder or more popular\nform, be credited with anything like a rational justification of the\nreligious point of view about reality and of the vision it opens up,\nit may, nevertheless, in virtue of its insistence upon such things as\n(1) the rationality of the belief that accompanies all knowledge, (2)\nthe supposedly deeper phenomena of the science of human nature to which\nreference has already been made, and (3) the great spiritual reality\nthat is present to the individual in the moral life, and that lifts him\n\u201cout of himself,\u201d and that makes it impossible for him to \u201cunderstand\nhimself by himself alone,\u201d[273] justifiably lay claim to the possession\nof a thorough working sympathy with the religious view of the world.\n\nWith the direction of the attention of the reader to two important\ncorollaries or consequences of the \u201cpluralism\u201d and the \u201cdynamic\nidealism\u201d of Pragmatism this chapter may well be brought to a\ntermination.\n\nOne of the most obvious corollaries of nearly everything that has been\nput forward by us in the foregoing chapters as pragmatist doctrine\nor pragmatist tendency, is the marked distance at which[274] it all\nseems to stand from the various entanglements of the false philosophy\nof \u201csubjective,\u201d or \u201csolipsistic\u201d idealism. In other words, while we\nhave ventured to censure Pragmatism for its inability to recognize\nthe elemental truth[275] in Idealism, we must now record it as a merit\nof Pragmatism that it does not, like so much modern philosophy, take\nits start with the \u201ccontents\u201d of the consciousness of the individual\nas the one indubitable beginning, the one _inconcussum quid_ for all\nspeculation. This starting-point has often, as we know, been taken\n(even by students of philosophy) to be the very essence of Idealism,\nbut it is not so. Although there is indeed no \u201cobject\u201d without a\n\u201csubject,\u201d no \u201cmatter\u201d without \u201cmind,\u201d neither mind nor matter is\nlimited to _my_ experience of the same.[276] It is impossible for me to\ninterpret, or even to express, to myself the contents of my experience\nwithout using the terms and the conceptions that have been invented\nby minds and by personalities other than my own without whom I could\nnot, and do not, grow up into what I call my \u201cself-consciousness.\u201d[277]\nWe have all talked of ourselves (as we know from experience and\nfrom psychology) in the third person as objects for a common social\nexperience long before we learn to use the first personal pronoun. And\nas for the adult, his \u201cego\u201d or self has a meaning and a reality only\nin relation to, and in comparison with, the other selves of whom he\nthinks as his associates. An \u201cego\u201d implies invariably also an \u201calter\u201d\nan \u201cother,\u201d and thus our deepest thought about the universe is always,\nactually and necessarily, both personal and social. Even in art, and in\nreligion, and in philosophy, it is the communion of mind with mind, of\nsoul with soul, that is at once our deepest experience and our deepest\ndesire.\n\nI do not suggest for one moment that Pragmatism is the only philosophy\n(if indeed we may call it a philosophy at all) that is necessarily\ncommitted to Pluralism,[278] nor am I, of course, blind to the\ndifficulties that Pluralism, as over against Monism, presents to many\nthinking minds. But I do here say that if Pragmatism be true, as it\nis in the main (at least as an \u201capproach\u201d to philosophy), it follows\nthat the reality with which we are in contact in all our thoughts\nand in all our theorizing is not any or all of the \u201ccontents\u201d of\nthe consciousness of the individual thinker, but rather the common,\npersonal life of activity and experience and knowledge and emotion that\nwe as individuals share with other individuals. This life is that of\nan entire \u201cworld of intersubjective intercourse,\u201d[279] of a communion\nof thought, and feeling, and effort in which, as persons, we share the\ncommon life of persons, and are members one of another.[280]\n\nTruth itself, in fact, as may be seen, of course, from the very\nconnexion of the word truth with other words like \u201ctry\u201d[281] and\n\u201cutter\u201d (and in its root with words like \u201cware\u201d and \u201cverihood\u201d), is\na social possession, implying both seekers and finders, listeners and\nverifiers as well as speakers and thinkers. Its existence implies a\nuniverse of discourse, as the logicians put it, in which thoughts\nand conceptions are elaborated and corrected, not merely by a kind\nof self-analysis[282] and internal development, but by the test of\nthe action to which they lead and of the \u201cresponses\u201d they awaken\nin the lives and thoughts of other persons. And it is this very\nsociological[283] and \u201cpluralistic\u201d character of Pragmatism that, along\nwith its tendency to \u201caffirmation\u201d in the matter of the reality of the\nreligious life, has helped to render it (as far as it goes) such a\nliving and such a credible philosophy to-day.\n\nAnother consequence of the dynamic idealism and the \u201cradical\nempiricism\u201d of Pragmatism is the \u201cimmediacy\u201d of our contact with\nreality, for which it is naturally inclined to stand in the matter\nof what we may call the philosophy of perception. What this new\n\u201cimmediacy\u201d and this new directness of our contact with reality\nwould mean to philosophical and scientific thought can be fully\nappreciated only by those who have made the effort of years to live in\na \u201cthought world,\u201d in which the first reality is what the logicians\nterm \u201cmediation\u201d[284] or inference, a world of thoughts without the\nreality of a really effective thinker, or the reality of a world of\nreal action--a world from which it is somehow impossible to escape\neither honestly or logically. It would be a return, of course, on\nthe part of the thinker to the direct sense of life with which we\nare familiar in instinct and in all true living and in all real\nthought,[285] in all honest effort and accomplishment, and yet not a\n\u201creturn\u201d in any of the impossible senses in which men have often (and\nwith a tragic earnestness) sought to return to Nature[286] and to the\nuncorrupted reality of things. And we have not indeed done justice to\nthe \u201cinstrumentalism\u201d and the \u201chypothetical\u201d treatment of ideas and of\nsystems of thought for which Pragmatism and Humanism both stand until\nwe see that so far from its being (almost in any sense) the duty of the\nthinker to justify, to his philosophy, this _direct contact_ with the\n_infinite life_ of the world, that has been the common possession of\ncountless mortals who have lived their life, it is, on the contrary,\nhis duty to justify (to himself and to his public) the various\nthought-systems of metaphysic, by setting forth the various points of\ndeparture and the various points of contact they have in the reality of\nthe life of things.[287]\n\nWe spoke at the close of our fourth chapter of the strange irony that\nmay be discovered in the fate of philosophers who have come to attach\na greater importance to their own speculations and theories than\nto the great reality (whatever it may be, or whatever it may prove\nitself to be) of which all philosophy is but an imperfect (although a\nnecessary) explanation. And the reader has doubtless come across the\ncynical French definition of metaphysics as the \u201cart of losing one\u2019s\nway systematically\u201d[288] (_l\u2019art de s\u2019\u00e9garer avec m\u00e9thode_). In view\nof all this, and in view of all the inevitable pain and difficulty of\nthe solitary thinkers of all time, it is indeed not the least part of\nthe service of Pragmatism and Humanism, and of the \u201cvitalistic\u201d and\n\u201cvoluntaristic\u201d philosophy with which it may be naturally associated\nto-day, to have compelled even metaphysicians to _feel_ that it is the\nliving reality of the world that we _know_ and that we _experience_,\nthat is first, last, and foremost the real subject-matter of philosophy.\n\nWith the real sceptic, then, with David Hume, we may indeed be\n\u201cdiffident\u201d of our \u201cdoubts\u201d and at the same time absolutely \u201cfree\u201d and\nunprejudiced in our hold upon, and in our treatment of, metaphysical\nsystems as, all of them, but so many more or less successful attempts\nto state and explain, in terms appreciable by the understanding and\nthe reason, the character and the reality of the infinite life with\nwhich we are in contact in our acts and in our thoughts and in our\naspirations. Of the _reality_ of that life we can never be sceptical,\nfor it is the life that we know in that \u201cworld of inter-subjective\u201d\nintercourse that, according to Pragmatism and Humanism, is implied even\nin sense-perception and in our daily experience.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nPRAGMATISM AS AMERICANISM\n\n\nIn adopting the title he has chosen for the heading of this chapter the\nwriter feels that he has laid himself open to criticism from several\ndifferent points of view. What has philosophy as the universal science\nto do with nationalism or with any form of national characteristics?\nThen even if Pragmatism be discovered to be to some extent\n\u201cAmericanism\u201d in the realm of thought, is this finding, or criticism,\na piece of appreciation or a piece of depreciation? And again, is\nit possible for any individual to grasp, and to understand, and to\ndescribe such a living and such a far-reaching force as the Americanism\nof to-day?\n\nThe following things may be said by way of a partial answer to these\nreflections: (1) There are American characteristics in Pragmatism, and\nsome of them may profitably be studied by way of an attempt to get all\nthe light we can upon its essential nature. Their presence therein has\nbeen detected and recognized by critics, both American and foreign,\nand reference has already been made to some of them in this book. (2)\nThere is no universal reason in philosophy apart from its manifestation\nin the thoughts and the activities of peoples who have made or who\nare making their mark upon human history. It may well be that the\ncommon reason of mankind has as much to learn from Americanism in the\ndepartment of theory as it has already been obliged to learn from this\nsame quarter in the realm of practice. (3) One of the most important\nphases of our entire subject is precisely this very matter of the\napplication of philosophy to \u201cpractice,\u201d of the inseparability, to put\nit directly, of \u201ctheory\u201d and \u201cpractice.\u201d It would surely, therefore, be\nthe strangest kind of conceit (although signs of it still exist here\nand there)[289] to debar philosophy from the study of such a practical\nthing as the Americanism of to-day. To connect the two with any degree\nof success would certainly not be to depreciate Pragmatism, but to\nstrengthen it by relating it to a spirit that is affecting the entire\nlife and thought of mankind.\n\nOne or two other important considerations should also be borne in\nmind. It goes without saying that there are in the United States and\nelsewhere any number of Americans who see beyond both contemporary\nPragmatism and contemporary Americanism, and to whom it would be,\ntherefore, but a partial estimate of Pragmatism to characterize it\nas \u201cAmericanism.\u201d So much, to be sure, might be inferred from some\nthings that have already been said in respect of the reception and the\nfate of Pragmatism in its own country. Again, it is one of the errors\nof the day to think of Americanism as in the main merely a belief in\n\u201cpracticality\u201d and \u201cefficiency.\u201d To those who know it, Americanism is\npractical idealism, and its aims, instead of being merely materialistic\nand mechanical, are idealistic to the point of being Utopian. The\nAmerican belief in work is not really a belief in work for its\nown sake, but rather a faith in the endless possibilities open to\nintelligent energy with resources at its command. Lastly, it will here\ncertainly not be necessary either to think or to speak (even if it were\npossible to do so) of _all_ American characteristics.[290]\n\nAmong the American-like characteristics in Pragmatism that have already\nmade themselves apparent in the foregoing chapters are its insistence\nupon \u201caction\u201d and upon the free creative effort of the individual,\nits insistence upon the man-made (or the merely human) character of\nmost of our vaunted truths, its instrumentalism, its radicalism,[291]\nits empiricism (that is to say, its endless faith in experience),\nits democratic character, and its insistence upon the necessity to\nphilosophy of a broad, tolerant, all-inclusive view of human nature.\nSo, too, are its insistence upon the basal character of belief,[292]\nand upon the importance of a creed or a philosophy that really \u201cworks\u201d\nin the lives of intelligent men, its feeling of the inadequacy of a\nmerely scholastic or dialectical philosophy, and even its _quasi_\n\u201cpractical\u201d interpretation of itself in the realms of philosophy and\nreligion and ethics--its confession of itself as a \u201ccorridor-theory,\u201d\nas a point of approach to all the different systems in the history\nof thought. In addition to these characteristics we shall attempt\nnow to speak, in the most tentative spirit, firstly, of some of the\ncharacteristics of American university life of which Pragmatism may\nperhaps be regarded as a partial expression or reflex, and then\nafter this, of such broadly-marked and such well-known American\ncharacteristics as the love of the concrete (in preference to the\nabstract), the love of experiment and experimentation, an intolerance\nof doctrinairism and of mere book-learning, the general democratic\noutlook on life and thought, the composite or amalgam-like character\nof the present culture of the United States, the sociological interest\nthat characterizes its people, and so on. All these things are clearly\nto be seen in Pragmatism as a would-be philosophical system, or as a\npreliminary step in the evolution of such a system.\n\nOwing very largely to the \u201celective\u201d system that still prevails in the\nuniversities of the United States, Philosophy is there (to an extent\nsomewhat inconceivable to the student of the European continent) in\nthe most active competition with other studies, and the success of a\nprofessor of philosophy is dependent on the success of his method of\npresenting his subject to students who all elect studies believed by\nthem to be useful or interesting or practically important. It has long\nseemed to the writer that there is abundant evidence in the writings of\nthe pragmatists of this inevitable attempt to make philosophy a \u201clive\u201d\nsubject in competition, say, with the other two most popular subjects\nin American colleges, viz. economics and biology. The importance to the\nthought of to-day of biological and economic considerations is one of\nthe things most emphatically insisted upon by Professor Dewey in nearly\nall his recent writings.[293] And both he and James--the fact is only\ntoo evident--have always written under the pressure of the economic and\nsociological interest of the American continent. And even Schiller\u2019s\nHumanism has become, as we have seen, very largely the metaphysics of\nthe \u201cevolutionary process,\u201d a characterization which we make below[294]\nas a kind of criticism of the philosophy of Bergson. Our present point,\nhowever, is merely that, owing to the generally competitive character\nof the intellectual life there, this biological influence is felt more\nacutely in America than elsewhere.\n\nThe one outstanding characteristic again of every approved academic\nteacher in the United States is his method of handling his subject,\njust as the one thing that is claimed for Pragmatism by its upholders\nis that it is particularly a \u201cmethodology\u201d of thought rather than a\ncomplete philosophy. To the university constituency of the United\nStates a professor without an approved and successful method is as good\nas dead, for no one would listen to him. The most manifest sign, to be\nsure, of the possession of such an effective method on the part of the\nuniversity lecturer is the demonstration of skill in the treatment of\nhis subject, in the \u201capproach\u201d that he makes to it for the beginner,\nin his power of setting the advanced student to work upon fruitful\nproblems, and of giving him a complete \u201corientation\u201d in the entire\nfield under consideration. And then in addition to this he must be\nable to indicate the practical and the educational value of what he is\nteaching.\n\nIn his review of James\u2019s classical work upon Pragmatism, Dewey, while\nindicating a number of debatable points in the pragmatist philosophy,\ndeclares emphatically his belief in that philosophy as a method of\n\u201corientation.\u201d The title again of Peirce\u2019s famous pamphlet was _How\nto make Ideas Clear_--a phrase of itself suggestive enough of the\ninquiring mind of the young student when oppressed by apparently\nconflicting and competing points of view. \u201cWe are acquainted with a\nthing,\u201d says James, \u201cas soon as we have learned how to behave towards\nit, or how to meet the behaviour we accept from it.\u201d In one of his\nbooks he talks about physics, for example, as giving us not so much\na theory about things as a \u201cpractical acquaintance\u201d with bodies;\n\u201cthe power to take hold of them and handle them,\u201d indicating at the\nsame time his opinion that this way of regarding knowledge should\nbe extended to philosophy itself. All of this will serve as a proof\nor illustration of the essentially \u201cpractical\u201d and \u201cmethodological\u201d\nconception of philosophy taken by the pragmatists. Papini refers, we\nremember, to the pragmatist philosophy as a power of \u201ccommanding our\nmaterial,\u201d of \u201cmanipulating\u201d for practical purposes the different\n\u201cthought-constructions\u201d of the history of philosophy. And those who\nhave any familiarity with the early pragmatist magazine literature\nknow that the pragmatists used to be fond of asking themselves such\npreliminary and \u201claboratory-like\u201d inquiries as the following: \u201cWhat\nis truth _known as_?\u201d \u201cWhat is philosophy _known as_?\u201d \u201cWhat are the\ndifferent \u2018thought-levels\u2019 upon which we seem to move in our ordinary\nexperience?\u201d They never exactly seem to \u201cdefine\u201d philosophy for you,\npreferring to indicate what it can _do_ for you, and so on.\n\nTurning now to the matter of American characteristics that are broader\nand deeper than the merely academic, we may find an illustration,\nfor example, of the American practicality and the love of the\nconcrete (instead of the abstract or the merely general) in the\nfollowing declaration of Professor James that \u201cthe whole originality\nof Pragmatism, the whole point in it, is its use of the _concrete_\nway of seeing. It begins with _concreteness_ and returns and ends\nwith it.\u201d Of the American love of novelty and of interest we may\nfind an illustration in the determination of Pragmatism \u201cnever to\ndiscuss a question that has absolutely no interest and no meaning to\nany one.\u201d Of Pragmatism as an exemplification of the American love\nof experiment, and of experimentation, with a view to definite and\nappreciable \u201creturns,\u201d we may give the following: \u201cIf you fully believe\nthe pragmatic method you cannot look on any such word, _i.e._ \u2018God,\u2019\n\u2018Matter,\u2019 \u2018Reason,\u2019 \u2018The Absolute,\u2019 \u2018Energy,\u2019 and such \u2018solving\u2019\nnames, as closing your quest. You must bring out in each word its\npractical cash value, set it at work within the stream of your\nexperience. It appears less as a solution then than as a programme for\nmore work and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which\nexisting realities _may be changed_.\u201d Of the American intolerance for\nmere scholarship and book-learning, and of the American inability\nto leave any discovery or any finished product alone without some\nattempt to \u201cimprove\u201d upon it or to put it to some new use, we may\ncite the following: \u201cWhen may a truth go into cold storage in the\nencyclopaedias, and when shall it come out for battle?\u201d\n\nAnother very strongly marked characteristic of American life is the\nthoroughly eclectic and composite character of its general culture\nand of the general tone of its public life. American daily life has\nbecome, as it were, a kind of social solvent, a huge melting-pot for\nthe culture and the habits and the customs of peoples from all over\nthe earth. This also may be thought of as reflected in the confessedly\ncomplex and amalgam-like character of Pragmatism, in its boast and\nprofession of being a synthesis and a fusion of so many different\ntendencies of human thought. As a juxtaposition, or kind of compound\nsolution, of such a variety of things as the affirmations of religion,\nthe hypothetical method of science, realism, romanticism, idealism,\nutilitarianism, and so on, it reminds us only too forcibly of the\nendless number of social groups and traditions, the endless number of\ninterests and activities and projects to be seen and felt in any large\nAmerican city.\n\nStill another general characteristic of American life of which we may\nwell think in connexion with Pragmatism is the sociological interest\nof the country, the pressure of which upon the pragmatists and their\nwritings has already been referred to. The social problem in America\nhas now become[295] the one problem that is present with everybody, and\npresent most of all, perhaps, with the European immigrant, who has for\nvarious reasons hoped that he had left this problem behind him. The\neffect of this upon Pragmatism is to be seen, not merely in the very\nliving hold that it is inclined to take of philosophy and philosophical\nproblems,[296] but in the fact of its boast of being a \u201cway of living\u201d\nas well as a \u201cway of thinking.\u201d We have examined this idea in our\nremarks upon the ethics of Pragmatism.\n\nOf course the outstanding temperamental American characteristic that\nis most clearly seen in Pragmatism is the great fact of the inevitable\nbent of the American mind to action and to accomplishment,--its\npositive inability to entertain any idea, or any set of ideas upon\nany subject whatsoever, without experiencing at the same time the\ninclination to use these ideas for invention and contrivance,[297] for\norganization and exploitation. Any one who has lived in the United\nStates must in fact have become so habituated and so accustomed to\nthink of his thought and his knowledge and his capacities in terms\nof their possible social utility, that he simply cannot refrain from\njudging of any scheme of thought or of any set of ideas in the same\nlight. Anywhere, to be sure, in the United States will they allow a man\nto think all he pleases about anything whatsoever--even pre-Socratic\nphilosophy, say, or esoteric Buddhism. And there is nothing indeed of\nwhich the country is said, by those who know it best, to stand so much\nin need as the most persistent and the most profound thought about all\nimportant matters. But such thought, it is always added, must prove to\nbe constructive and positive in character, to be directed not merely to\nthe solution of useless questions or of questions which have long ago\nbeen settled by others.\n\nWe shall now endeavour to think of the value[298] to philosophy and to\nthe thought and practice of the world (the two things are inseparable)\nof some or all of these general and special characteristics which we\nhave sought to illustrate in Pragmatism.\n\nWe might begin by suggesting the importance to the world of the\nproduction and development of a man of genius like James,[299] whose\nfresh and living presentation of the problems of philosophy (as seen\nby a psychologist) has brought the sense of a lasting and far-reaching\nobligation upon his fellow-students everywhere. In no more favourable\nsoil could James have grown up into the range and plenitude of his\ninfluence than in that of America and of Harvard University,[300] that\ngreat nursing-ground of the finest kind of American imperialism. The\ngreat thing, of course, about James was his invasion, through the\nactivities of his own personality,[301] of the realm of philosophical\nrationalism by the fact and the principle of active personality. His\nwhole general activity was a living embodiment of the principle of\nall humanism, that personality and the various phases of personal\nexperience are of more importance to philosophy in the way of theory\nthan any number of supposedly self-coherent, rational or abstract\nsystems, than any amount of reasoning that is determined solely by the\nideal of conceptual consistency.\n\nThen again, it might be held that the entire academic world of to-day\nhas a great deal to learn from the conditions under which all subjects\n(philosophy included) are taught and investigated in the typical\nAmerican university of the day. We have referred to the fact that the\nAmerican professor or investigator faces the work of instruction and\nresearch in an environment replete with all modern facilities and\nconveniences.[302] The very existence of this environment along with\nthe presence throughout his country of university men and workers\nfrom all over the world with all their obvious merits and defects as\n\u201csocial types\u201d prevent him in a hundred ways from that slavery to\nsome one school of thought, to some one method of research that is so\noften a characteristic of the scholar of the old world. The entire\ninformation and scholarship in any one science (say, philosophy) is\nworth to him what he can make of it, here and now, for himself and for\nhis age and for his immediate environment. He simply cannot think of\nany idea or any line of reflection, in his own or in any other field,\nwithout thinking at the same time of its \u201cconsequences,\u201d immediate,\nsecondary, and remote. This inability is an instance of the working\nof the pragmatist element in scholarship and in thought with all its\nadvantages and disadvantages.[303]\n\nAnd it is true too, it might be held, even upon the principles of\nIdealism that the mere facts of knowledge (for they are as endless in\nnumber as are the different points of view from which we may perceive\nand analyse phenomena) are \u201cworth\u201d[304] to-day very largely only what\nthey have meant and what they may yet mean to human life, to human\nthought, to civilization. While there is certainly no useless truth\nand no utterly unimportant fact, it is quite possible to burden and\nhamper the mind of youth with supposed truths and facts that have\nlittle or no relevancy to any coherent or any real point of view about\nhuman knowledge and human interests either of the past or the present.\nIt is merely, for example, in the light of the effects that they\nhave had upon the life and thought of humanity[305] that the great\nphilosophical systems of the past ought (after the necessary period of\npreliminary study on the part of the pupil) to be presented to students\nin university lectures. A teacher who cannot set them forth in this\nspirit is really not a teacher at all--a man who can make his subject\nlive again in the thought of the present.[306]\n\nIf the limits of our space and our subject permitted of the attempt, we\nmight easily continue the study of the pragmatist element in American\nscholarship from the point of view of the whole general economy of a\nuniversity as a social institution, and from that of the benefit that\nhas accrued to the modern world from the many successful attempts at\nthe organization of knowledge from an international point of view, that\nhave come into being under American initiative.[307]\n\nLastly it is surely impossible to exaggerate the value to philosophy\nof the so-called \u201cdemocratic,\u201d[308] open-minded attitude of Pragmatism\nthat is seen in its unprejudiced recognition of such things as the\nordinary facts of life, the struggle that constitutes the life of the\naverage man, the fragmentary and partial[309] character of most of our\nknowledge, and so on. All this contrasts in the most favourable way\nwith the scholastic and the Procrustean attitude to facts that has so\nlong characterized philosophical rationalism from Leibniz and Wolff to\nthe Kantians and to the Neo-Kantians and the Neo-Hegelians of our own\ntime. Thanks partly to this direct and democratic attitude of mind on\nthe part of the pragmatists and humanists, and thanks too to the entire\npsychological and sociological movement of modern times, the points\nof view of the different leading thinkers of different countries are\nbeginning to receive their fitting recognition in the general economy\nof human thought to be compared with each other, and with still other\npossible points of view.\n\nNo one, it seems to me, can read the books of James without feeling\nthat philosophy can again, as the universal science indeed, \u201cbegin\nanywhere\u201d in a far less restricted sense than that in which Hegel\ninterpreted this ingenious saying of his in respect of the freedom of\nhuman thinking.[310]\n\nAs for the inevitable drawbacks and limitations of the very Americanism\nwhich we have been endeavouring to discover in Pragmatism, it cannot,\nto begin with, be entirely without an element of risk to philosophy,\nand to the real welfare of a country, that the highest kind of insight\nshould be brought too ruthlessly into competition with the various\nspecialized studies, and the various utilitarian[311] pursuits of\nmodern times, and with popular tendencies generally. The public,\nfor many reasons, should not be too readily encouraged to think of\nphilosophy as merely \u201ca\u201d study like other studies and pursuits, to be\nbaited with the idea of its utility and its profitable consequences.\nPhilosophy, on the contrary, is the universal study that gives to all\nother studies and pursuits their relative place and value. If left too\nmuch to be a mere matter of choice on the part of the young and the\nunthinking, it will soon find itself in the neglected position of the\nwisdom that utters her voice at the street corners. It must be secured\nan integral, and even a necessary place in the world of instruction--a\ncondition that is still the case, it is to be remembered, in\nCatholic[312] as distinguished from many so-called \u201cliberal\u201d and\n\u201cProtestant\u201d seats of learning.\n\nIt is possible indeed, as we have already suggested, that the\nrecognition of an aristocratic or a Catholic element in learning would,\nin some respects, be of more true use in the schools of America than a\nmere pragmatist philosophy of life and education. And it is therefore\nnot to be wondered at that Americans themselves should already have\nexpressed something of a distrust for a philosophy and an educational\npolicy that are too akin to the practical commercialism of the\nhour.[313]\n\nThen again, despite the large element of truth that there is in the\nidea of philosophy \u201cdiscovering\u201d (rather than itself \u201cbeing\u201d) the true\n\u201cdynamic\u201d or \u201cmotive-awakening\u201d view of the system of things in which\nwe live, philosophy itself was never intended to bear the entire weight\nand strain that are put upon it by the pragmatists. In their enthusiasm\nthey would make out of it, as we have seen, a religion (and a new one\nat that!) and a social philosophy, as well as the theory of knowledge\nand the \u201capproach\u201d to reality that we are accustomed to look for in a\nsystem of philosophy.\n\nIt is only in periods of transition and reconstruction, like the\npresent age, when men have become acutely sensible of the limitations\nof traditional views of things, that they are inclined in their\ndisappointment to look to scientific and professional thinkers for\ncreeds that shall take the place of what they seem for the moment to\nbe losing. It is in such times chiefly that philosophy flourishes, and\nthat it is apt to acquire an undue importance by being called upon to\ndo things that of itself it cannot do. Among the latter impossibilities\nis to be placed, for example, the idea of its being able to offer\n(almost in any sense) a substitute for the direct experience[314]\nof the common life, or for the realities of our affections and our\nemotions, or for the ideals engendered by the common life.\n\nOwing partly to the limitations of the Intellectualism that has\nhitherto characterized so much of the culture and the educational\npolicy of the last century there are still everywhere scores of people\nunder the illusion that the truth of life will be revealed to them\nin the theory of some book, in the new views or the new gospel of\nsome emancipated and original thinker. In this vain hope of theirs\nthey are obviously forgetful of even the pragmatist truth that all\ntheories are but a kind of transformation, or abstract expression,\nof the experiences of real life and of real living. And part of the\ntrouble with the pragmatists is that they themselves have unwittingly\nministered to this mistaken attitude of mind by creating the impression\nthat their theory of taking the kingdom of Heaven by storm, by the\nviolence of their postulations and of their plea for a \u201cworking view\u201d\nof things, is indeed the new gospel of which men have long been in\nsearch. The race, however, is not always to the swift and the eager,\nnor the kingdom to those who are loudest in their cryings of \u201cLord,\nLord.\u201d And as a friend of mine aptly applied it as against all\npracticalism and Pragmatism, \u201cthere remaineth a rest to the people of\nGod.\u201d[315] The ordinary man, it should be borne in mind, does not in a\ncertain sense really need philosophy. Its audience is with the few, and\nit is to do it but scant service to think of making it attractive to\nthe many by the obliteration of most of its distinctive characteristics\nand difficulties, and by the failure to point out its inherent\nlimitations. It is not by any means, as we have been indicating, a\nsubstitute either for life, or for positive religion. Nor can it ever\nhave much of a message, even for the few, if they imagine themselves,\non account of their wisdom, to be elevated above the needs of the\nordinary discipline of life.\n\nThen again, there is surely an element of considerable danger in\nthe American-like depreciation of doctrine and theory which we\nhave noticed in two or three different connexions on the part of\nPragmatism. In the busy, necessitous life of the United States this\ndepreciation[316] is sometimes said to be visible in the great\nsacrifice of life[317] and energy that is continually taking place\nthere owing to an unduly literal acceptance on the part of every one\nof the idea that each individual has a sort of divine right to seek\nand to interpret his experience for himself. In Pragmatism it might be\nsaid to be illustrated in the comparative weakness in the essentials\nof logic and ethics to which we have already referred, in the matter\nof a sound theory of first principles. And also in its failure to take\nany really critical recognition[318] of the question of its theoretical\nand practical affiliations to tendencies new and old, many or most of\nwhich have long ago been estimated at their true worth and value. Then\nthere is its comparatively superficial interpretation[319] of what is\nknown in the thought of the day as \u201cDarwinism\u201d and \u201cEvolutionism\u201d and\nthe endless belief of the unthinking in \u201cprogress,\u201d and its failure\nto see that its very Americanism[320] and its very popularity are\nthings that are deserving of the most careful study and criticism.\nWhat have the pragmatists left in their hands of their theory, if its\nmere \u201cmethodology\u201d and its \u201cefficiency-philosophy\u201d and its would-be\nenthusiasm were eliminated from it?\n\nLike Americanism in general (which began, of course, as a revolutionary\nand a \u201cliberationist\u201d policy), Pragmatism is inclined in some ways\nto make too much of peoples\u2019 rights and interests, and too little\nof their duties and privileges and of their real needs and their\nfundamental, human instincts. It is in the understanding alone of these\nlatter things that true wisdom and true satisfaction[321] are to be\nfound. And like the American demand for pleasure and for a good time\ngenerally, Pragmatism is in many respects too much a mere philosophy\nof \u201cpostulations\u201d and \u201cdemands,\u201d too much a mere formulation of the\neager and impetuous demands of the emancipated man and woman of the\ntime---as forgetful as they of many of the deeper[322] facts of life\nand of the economy of our human civilization. In demanding that the\n\u201cconsequences\u201d of all pursuits (even those of study and philosophy)\nshall be \u201csatisfying,\u201d and that philosophy shall satisfy our active\nnature, it forgets the sense of disillusionment that comes to all rash\nand mistaken effort. It certainly does not follow that a man is going\nto get certain things from the world and from philosophy merely because\nhe demands them any more than does the _discovery_ and the _possession_\nof happiness follow from the \u201cright\u201d[323] of the individual to seek\nit in his own best way. Nor is it even true that man is called upon\nto \u201cact\u201d to anything like the extent contemplated by an unduly\nenthusiastic Americanism and an unduly enthusiastic Pragmatism. The\nwriter is glad to be able to append in this connexion a quotation taken\nby an American critic of Pragmatism from Forberg in his criticism of\nthe action-philosophy of Fichte: \u201cAction, action, is the vocation of\nman! Strictly speaking, this principle is false. Man is not called upon\nto act, but to act justly. If he cannot act without acting unjustly he\nhad better remain inactive.\u201d\n\nIt would not be difficult to match this quotation, or perhaps to\nsurpass it, with something from Carlyle in respect of the littleness of\nman\u2019s claims, not merely for enjoyment, but even for existence; but we\nwill pass on.\n\nPragmatism, as we have suggested, certainly falls too readily into\nline with the tendency of the age to demand means and instruments and\nutilities and working satisfactions, instead of ends and purposes and\nvalues, to demand pleasure and enjoyment instead of happiness and\nblessedness. Instead of allowing itself to do this it should have\nundertaken a criticism both of the so-called \u201cwants\u201d of the age, and\nof the soundness of its own views in respect of the truth and the\nhappiness that are proper to man as man. There is a fine epigram of\nGoethe\u2019s in respect of the limitations of the revolutionary and the\nliberationist attitude of those who would seek to \u201cfree\u201d men without\nfirst trying to understand them, and to help them to their true inward\ndevelopment.\n\n  Aile Freiheits-Apostel, sie waren mir immer zuwider.\n  Willkur suchte doch nur jeder am Ende f\u00fcr sich.\n  Willst du viele befrein, so wag\u2019 es vielen zu dienen.\n  Wie gef\u00e4hrlich das sey, willst du es wissen?\n\n                                            Versuch\u2019s.[324]\n\nUntil Pragmatism then makes it clear that it is the free rational\nactivity, and the higher spiritual nature of man that is to it the\nnorm of all our thought, and all our activity, and the true test of\nall \u201cconsequences,\u201d it has not risen to the height of the distinctive\nmessage that it is capable of giving to the thought of the present\ntime. Unqualified by some of the ideal considerations to which we have\nattempted, in its name, and in its interest, to give an expression, it\nwould not be, for example, a philosophy that could be looked upon by\nthe great East as the last word of our Western wisdom or our Western\nexperience. It will be well, however, to say nothing more in this\nconnexion until we have looked at the considerations that follow (in\nour next chapter) upon the lofty, but impersonal, idealisation of the\nlife and thought of man attempted by our Anglo-Hegelian Rationalism,\nand until we have reflected, too, upon the more feasible form of\nIdealism attempted in the remarkable philosophy of Bergson,[325] the\ngreatest of all the pragmatists.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nPRAGMATISM AND ANGLO-HEGELIAN RATIONALISM\n\n\nThe form of Anglo-German Rationalism or Intellectualism which I shall\nventure to select for the purposes of consideration from the point\nof view of Pragmatism and Humanism is the first volume of the recent\n_Gifford Lectures_ of Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, who has long been regarded\nby the philosophical public of Great Britain as one of the most\ncharacteristic members of a certain section of our Neo-Hegelian school.\nI shall first give the barest outline of the argument and contentions\nof \u201cThe Principle of Individuality and Value,\u201d and then venture upon\nsome paragraphs of what shall seem to me to be relevant criticism.\n\nDr. Bosanquet\u2019s initial position is a conception of philosophy, and\nits task which is for him and his book final and all-determining.\nTo him Philosophy is (as it is to some extent to Hegel) \u201clogic\u201d or\n\u201cthe spirit of totality.\u201d It is \u201cessentially of the concrete and the\nwhole,\u201d as Science is of the \u201cabstract and the part.\u201d Although the\nbest thing in life is not necessarily \u201cphilosophy,\u201d philosophy in\nthis sense of \u201clogic\u201d is the clue to \u201creality and value and freedom,\u201d\nthe key to everything, in short, that we can, or that we should, or\nthat we actually do desire and need. It [philosophy] is \u201ca rendering\nin coherent thought of what lies at the heart of actual life and\nlove.\u201d His next step is to indicate \u201cthe sort of things,\u201d or the sort\nof \u201cexperiences,\u201d or the sort of \u201cfacts\u201d that philosophy needs as its\nmaterial, if it would accomplish its task as \u201cuniversal logic.\u201d This he\ndoes (1) negatively, by the rejection of any form of \u201cimmediateness,\u201d\nor \u201csimple apprehension,\u201d such as the \u201csolid fact,\u201d the \u201csense of\nbeing,\u201d or the \u201cunshareable self\u201d of which we sometimes seem to\nhear, or such as the \u201cna\u00efve ideas\u201d of \u201ccompensating justice,\u201d[326]\n\u201cethics[327] which treats the individual as isolated\u201d and\n\u201cteleology\u201d[328] as \u201cguidance by finite minds,\u201d as the data (or as part\nof the data) of philosophy; and (2) positively, by declaring that his\nsubject-matter throughout will be \u201cthe principle of \u2018individuality,\u2019\nof \u2018self-completeness,\u2019 as the clue to reality.\u201d This \u201cindividuality\u201d\nor \u201cself-completeness\u201d is then set forth in a quasi-Platonic manner as\nthe \u201cuniversal,\u201d the real \u201cuniversal\u201d being (he insists) the \u201cconcrete\nuniversal,\u201d the \u201cwhole,\u201d that is to say, \u201cthe logical system of\nconnected members,\u201d that is to him the \u201cideal of all thought.\u201d We must\nthink of this \u201cindividuality,\u201d therefore, either as \u201ca living world,\ncomplete and acting out of itself, a positive, self-moulding cosmos,\u201d\nor \u201cas a definite _striving of the universe_\u201d[!][329]\n\nThe next question (so far as our partial purposes are concerned) that\nDr. Bosanquet asks is, \u201cWhat help do we get from the notion of a\n\u2018mind\u2019 which \u2018purposes\u2019 or \u2018desires\u2019 things in appreciating the work\nof factors in the universe, or of the universe as [_ex-hypothesi_]\nself-directing and self-experiencing whole?\u201d The answer is spread\nover several chapters, and is practically this, that although there\nis undoubtedly a \u201cteleology\u201d in the universe (in the shape of the\n\u201cconjunctions and results of the co-operation of men,\u201d or of \u201cthe\nharmony of geological and biological evolution\u201d), and although \u201cminds\nsuch as ours play a part in the work of direction, we cannot judge of\nthis work in question in any human manner.\u201d The real test of teleology\nor value is \u201cwholeness,\u201d \u201ccompleteness,\u201d \u201cindividuality\u201d [the topic\nof the book], and it is made quite clear that it is the \u201cAbsolute\u201d\nwho is \u201creal\u201d and \u201cindividual\u201d _and not we_. We are, indeed, in our\nlives \u201c_carried to the Absolute without a break_,\u201d[330] and our\nnature \u201c_is only in process of being communicated to us_.\u201d[331] \u201cWe\nshould not think of ourselves after the pattern of separate things\nor personalities in the legal sense, nor even as selves in the sense\nof isolation and exclusion of others.\u201d \u201cIndividuality\u201d being this\n\u201clogical self-completeness,\u201d there can be only one \u201cIndividual,\u201d and\nthis one Individual is the one criterion of \u201cvalue,\u201d or \u201creality,\u201d\nor \u201cexistence,\u201d \u201cimportance\u201d and \u201c_reality_ [!]\u201d being sides of\nthe one \u201ccharacteristic\u201d [_i.e._ \u201cthinkableness\u201d as a whole]. Dr.\nBosanquet confesses in his seventh chapter that this idea of his of\n\u201cindividuality,\u201d or \u201creality,\u201d is essentially the Greek idea that it\nis only the \u201cwhole nature\u201d of things that gives them their reality or\nvalue.\n\nWe are then assured, towards the close of this remarkable book, that\n\u201cfreedom\u201d (the one thing that we mortals value as the greatest of all\n\u201cgoods\u201d) is \u201c_the inherent effort of mind considered as a [!] world_,\nand that the \u201dAbsolute\u201c [the \u201duniversal\u201d of logic, Plato\u2019s \u201cIdea\u201d] is\nthe \u201chigh-water mark of our effort,\u201d and that each \u201cself\u201d is \u201cmore\nlike _a rising and a falling tide_ than an isolated pillar with a\nfixed circumference.\u201d The great fact of the book, the fact upon which\nits accomplished author rests when he talks in his Preface of his\nbelief, \u201cthat in the main the work [of philosophy] has been done,\u201d is\nthe daily \u201ctransmutation of experience according to the level of the\nmind\u2019s energy and self-completeness,\u201d the continued and the continuous\n\u201cself-interpretation [of \u2018experience\u2019] through the fundamental\nprinciple of individuality.\u201d\n\nNow it is quite obvious that according to many of the considerations\nthat have been put forward as true in the foregoing chapters, this\nphilosophy of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s which treats the \u201cconcept,\u201d or the\n\u201cuniversal\u201d as an end in itself (as the _one answer_ to all possible\ndemands for a \u201cteleology\u201d) and as an \u201cindividual,\u201d \u201c_a perfected and\nself-perfecting [!] individual_,\u201d can be regarded as but another\ninstance of the abstract Rationalism against which Pragmatism and\nHumanism have entered their protests. It is untrue, therefore, to the\nreal facts of knowledge and the real facts of human nature. It will be\nsufficient to state that the considerations of which we are thinking\nare (in the main) the positions that have been taken in respect\nof such things as: (1) the claim that a true metaphysic must serve\nnot merely as an intellectual \u201csystem\u201d but as a \u201cdynamic,\u201d and as a\n\u201cmotive\u201d for action and achievement; (2) the fact of the \u201cinstrumental\u201d\ncharacter of thought and of ideas, and of all systems (of science or\nof philosophy or of politics) that fail to include as part of their\ndata the various ideals of mankind; (3) the idea that all truth and\nall thought imply a belief in the existence of objects and persons\nindependent of the mere mental states or activities of the thinking\nindividual, and that belief rather than knowledge is, and always has\nbeen, man\u2019s fundamental and working estimate of reality; (4) the fact\nthat our human actions and re-actions upon reality are a part of what\nwe mean by \u201creality,\u201d and that these actions and re-actions of ours\nare real and not imaginary; (5) the attitude in general of Pragmatism\nto Rationalism; (6) the various concessions that have been made by\nrepresentative rationalists to the pragmatist movement.\n\nDr. Bosanquet\u2019s theory of reality has already impressed some of\nhis most competent critics as utterly inadequate as a motive or an\nincentive to the efforts and endeavours of men as we know them in\nhistory and in actual life, and we shall immediately return to this\ntopic. And although there are many signs in his Lectures that he is\nhimself quite aware of the probability of such an impression, his\nbook proceeds upon the even tenor of its way, following wherever his\nargument may lead him, irrespective entirely of the truth contained\nin the facts and the positions we have just recounted and reaffirmed.\nIt lends itself, therefore, only too naturally to our present use\nof it as a highly instructive presentation of many, or most, of the\ntendencies of Rationalism and Intellectualism, against which Pragmatism\nand Humanism would fain protest. At the same time there is in it, as we\nhope to show, a fundamental element[332] of truth and of fact without\nwhich there could be no Pragmatism and no Humanism, and indeed no\nphilosophy at all.\n\nA broad, pervading inconsistency[333] in \u201cIndividuality and Value\u201d\nwhich militates somewhat seriously against the idea of its being\nregarded as a tenable philosophy, is the obvious one between the\nposition (1) that true reality is necessarily individual, and the\nposition (2) that reality is to be found in the \u201cuniversal\u201d (or the\n\u201cconcept\u201d) of logic.[334] It would, however, perhaps be unfair to\nexpect Dr. Bosanquet to effect a harmony between these two positions\nthat Aristotle (who held them both) was himself very largely unable to\ndo. There is, in other words, a standing and a lasting contradiction\nbetween any and all philosophy which holds that it is _reason_ [or\n_logic_] _alone that attains to truth_ and reality, and the apparently\nnatural and inevitable tendency of the human mind [it is represented\nin Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s own procedure] to seek after \u201creality\u201d in the\n\u201cindividual\u201d thing, or person, or being, and in the perfecting of\n\u201cindividuality\u201d in God (or in a kingdom of perfected individuals).\n\nThe positive errors, however, which we would venture to refer to as\neven more fatal to Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s book than any of its incidental\ninconsistencies are those connected with the following pieces of\nprocedure on his part: (1) his manifest tendency to treat the\n\u201cuniversal\u201d as if it were an entity on its own account with a sort of\ndevelopment and \u201cvalue\u201d and \u201cculmination\u201d of its own;[335] (2) his\ntendency to talk and think as if a \u201ccharacteristic\u201d or a \u201cpredicate\u201d\n(_i.e._ the \u201ccharacteristic\u201d or \u201cquality\u201d that some experiencing being\nor some thinker attributes to reality) could be treated as anything\nat all _apart from the action and the reaction of this \u201cexperient\u201d_\n(or \u201cthinker\u201d) _conceived as an agent_; (3) the tendency to talk of\n\u201cminds\u201d[336] _rather than persons_, as \u201cpurposing\u201d and \u201cdesiring\u201d\nthings; (4) his tendency to talk as if \u201cteleology\u201d were \u201cwholeness\u201d;\n(5) his tendency to regard (somewhat in the manner of Spinoza) \u201cselves\u201d\nand \u201cpersons\u201d as like \u201crising and falling tides,\u201d and of the self as a\n\u201cworld of content\u201d[337] engaged in certain \u201ctransformations\u201d; and (6)\nhis tendency to think and speak _as if demonstration_ [\u201cmediation\u201d is\nperhaps his favourite way of thinking of the logical process] _were an\nend in itself, as if we lived to think, instead of thinking to live_.\n\nIn opposition to all this it may be affirmed firstly that every\n\u201cconception\u201d of the human mind is but the more or less clear\nconsciousness of a _disposition to activity_, and is representative,\nnot so much of the \u201cfeatures\u201d of objects which might appear to be\ntheir \u201ccharacteristics\u201d from a purely theoretical point of view, as of\nthe different ways in which objects have seemed to men to subserve\nthe needs of their souls and bodies. The study of the development of\nthe \u201cconcept\u201d in connexion with the facts of memory and with the slow\nevolution of language, and with the \u201csocialized percepts\u201d of daily life\nwill all tend to confirm this position. The phenomena of religion,\nfor example, and all the main concepts of all the religions are to be\nstudied _not merely as intellectual phenomena_, as solutions of some of\nthe many difficulties of modern Agnosticism, or of modern Rationalism,\nor of modern Criticism, but as an expressive of the _modes of behaviour\nof human beings_ (with all their needs and all their ideals) towards\nthe universe in which they find themselves, and towards the various\nbeings, seen and unseen, which this universe symbolises to them. These\nphenomena and these conceptions are unintelligible, in short, apart\nfrom the various activities and cults and social practices and social\nexperiences and what not, with which they have dealt from first to last.\n\nThen it is literally impossible to separate in the manner of Dr.\nBosanquet the \u201cpredicate\u201d of thought from the active relations\nsustained by things towards each other, or towards the human beings who\nseek to interpret these active relations for any or for all \u201cpurposes,\u201d\nDr. Bosanquet\u2019s idea, however, of the relation of \u201cmind\u201d to \u201cmatter,\u201d\nto use these _symbols_ for the nonce (for they are but such), is in\nthe main purely \u201crepresentational\u201d[338] or intellectualistic.[339] To\nhim \u201cmind\u201d seems to reflect either a \u201cbodily content\u201d or some other\nkind of \u201ccontent\u201d[340] that seems to exist for a \u201cspectator\u201d of the\nworld, or for the \u201cAbsolute,\u201d _rather than for the man himself as an\nagent_, who of course _uses_ his memories of himself, or his \u201cideal\u201d of\nhimself, _for renewed effort and activity_. One of the most important\nconsequences of this unduly intellectualistic view of mind is that Dr.\nBosanquet seems (both theoretically and practically) unable to see the\nplace of \u201cmind,\u201d as \u201cpurpose,\u201d in ordinary life,[341] or of the place\nof mind in evolution,[342] giving us in his difficult but important\nchapter on the \u201crelation of mind and body\u201d a version of things that\napproaches only too perilously close to Parallelism or Dualism, or\neven to Materialism.[343] And along with this quasi-\u201crepresentational\u201d\nor \u201ccopy-like\u201d theory of mind there are to be associated his\nrepresentational and intellectualistic views of the \u201cself\u201d[344] and\nthe \u201cuniversal\u201d[345] and \u201cspirit.\u201d[346]\n\nThere are, doubtless, hints in Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s pages of a more\n\u201cdynamic\u201d view of mind or of a deeper view[347] than this merely\n\u201crepresentational\u201d view, but they are not developed or worked into the\nmain portion of his argument, which they would doubtless very largely\ntransform. This is greatly to be regretted, for we remember that even\nHegel seemed to notice the splitting-up of the real for our human\npurposes which takes place in the ordinary judgment. And of course, as\nwe have noticed, all \u201cpurpose\u201d is practical and theoretical at one and\nthe same time.\n\nThen, thirdly, it is persons, and not \u201cminds,\u201d who desire and purpose\nthings, \u201cmind\u201d being a concept invented by the spectator of activity\nin a person other than himself, which (from the analogy of his own\nconscious activity and experience) he believes to be purposive.[348]\nDr. Bosanquet\u2019s use, too, of the expression \u201cmind\u201d invariably\nleaves out of the range of consideration the phenomena of desire\nand volition--intelligible, both of them, only by reference to an\nend that is to be understood from within, and not from outside of\nthe personality, from the point of view of the mere spectator. The\nphenomena of desire and volition are just as integral ingredients of\nour lives as persons as are our cognitive states.\n\nFourthly, it is doubtful whether the treatment of teleology as\n\u201cwholeness\u201d (or its sublimation in \u201cIndividuality and Value\u201d into\n\u201cwholeness\u201d) is much of an explanation of this difficult topic, or\nindeed whether it is any explanation at all. Dr. Bosanquet, in fact,\nconfesses that teleology is a conception which \u201c_loses its distinctive\nmeaning_ as we deepen its philosophical interpretation, and that it has\nvery little meaning when applied to the universe as a whole\u201d [a thing\nthat is apparent to any Kantian student]. \u201cIt is impossible seriously,\u201d\nhe says, \u201cto treat a mind _which is the universe_[!] as a workman of\nlimited resources, aiming at some things and obliged to accept others\nas means to these.\u201d And it is equally impossible, he holds, to apply\n\u201cto the universe\u201d the distinction of \u201cwhat is purpose for its own sake\nand what is not so.\u201d In fact, Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s treatment of teleology is\nthus mainly negative, as including not only this rejection[349] of the\nnotion in reference to the \u201cuniverse as a whole,\u201d but its rejection,\ntoo, in reference to the purposes of our human life;[350] although he\nadmits (as of course he must) that the conception of end or purpose\nis drawn from some of the features (\u201cthe simplest features,\u201d he says)\nof our \u201cfinite life,\u201d or \u201cfinite consciousness.\u201d If the notion were\n\u201cto be retained at all,\u201d he says, \u201cit could only be a name for some\nprinciple which would help to tell us what has _value quite independent\nof being or not being, the purpose of some mind_.\u201d[351] Now, of course,\naccording to the Pragmatism and Humanism that we have been considering\nin this book, no intelligent person could take any conceivable interest\nin such a useless fancy as a teleology of this kind. Thus teleology is\nreally blotted out altogether of existence in this volume, and with its\ndisappearance there must go also the notion of any value that might be\nintelligibly associated with the idea of the attainment of purposes or\nends by the human beings with whom we are acquainted in our ordinary\ndaily life.\n\nWe shall below[352] refer to the fact that this rejection of teleology\nand value is one that must be regarded as fatal to ethics or to\nAbsolutism in the realm of ethics. It requires, too, to be added here\nthat even the most unprejudiced reading of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s work must\ncreate in the mind of the reader the conviction that its author is\naltogether unfair to the views of those who believe in the existence\nof definite manifestations of purpose in human life.[353] He talks as\nif those who uphold this idea or this fact are committed either to the\nabsurd notion that man is \u201cthe end of the universe,\u201d or to the equally\nabsurd notion that \u201cart, thought, society, history, in which mind\nbegins to transcend its finiteness should be ascribed to the directive\nabilities of units in a plurality, precisely apart from the world\ncontent and the underlying solidarity of spirits, the medium through\nwhich all great things are done.\u201d\n\nWith a view of bringing our discussion of these striking _Gifford\nLectures_ within the scope of the general subject of this book\nthe following might be regarded as their leading, fundamental\ncharacteristics to which the most serious kind of exception might well\nbe taken: (1) its \u201cabstractionism\u201d[354] and its general _injustice to\nfact_ due to its initial and persistent \u201cconviction\u201d[355] [strange to\nsay, this is the very word used by Bosanquet] that the real movement\nin things is a \u201clogical\u201d movement; (2) its fallacious conception of\nthe task of philosophy as mainly the obligation to think the world\n\u201cwithout contradiction\u201d; (3) its obvious tendency in the direction\nof the \u201csubjective idealism\u201d[356] that has been the bane of so much\nmodern philosophy and that is discarded altogether[357] by Pragmatism\nand Humanism; (4) its retention of many of the characteristic\npolemical[358] faults of Neo-Hegelianism and its manifestation of\na similar spirit of polemical unfairness[359] on the part of their\naccomplished author; (5) its implication in several really hopeless\ncontradictions in addition to the broad contradiction already referred\nto; (6) its failure [a common Neo-Hegelian failing] to do justice to\nthe spirit and (in certain important regards) the letter of Kant; (7)\nits essential non-moralism or its apparently anti-ethical character.\n\nAs for the first of these charges, the \u201cabstractionism\u201d of\n\u201cIndividuality and Value,\u201d coming as it does on the top of the general\nperversity of the book, is really a very disastrous thing for\nphilosophy. While we may pardon an enthusiastic literary Frenchman[360]\nfor saying that, \u201c_The fact is, you see, that a fine book is the\nend for which the world was made_,\u201d there is hardly any excuse for\na philosopher like Dr. Bosanquet coming before the world with the\nappearance of believing that the richly differentiated universe that\nwe know only in part, exists for the benefit of the science that he\nrepresents, for the dialectic of the metaphysician, to enable the\n\u201cuniversal\u201d to \u201cbecome more differentiated\u201d and \u201cmore individualized,\u201d\nto become \u201cmore representative\u201d _of the \u201cwhole.\u201d_[361] We might\ncompare, says Dr. Bosanquet, in a striking and an enthralling[362]\npassage, \u201cthe Absolute to Dante\u2019s mind as uttered in the _Divine\nComedy_ ... as including in a single, whole poetic experience a\nworld of space and persons, ... things that, to any ordinary mind,\nfall apart.\u201d Now even apart from the highly interesting question\nof the manifestly great and far-reaching influence of Dante over\nDr. Bosanquet, and apart, too, from the notable modesty of Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s confession as to the \u201cimperfect\u201d character of the simile\njust reproduced, no one to-day can think of attaching any ultimate\nimportance to \u201cDante\u2019s mind\u201d without thinking of the extent to which\nthis truly great man[363] was under the influence, not only of his\nown passions and of the general \u201cproblem\u201d of his own life, but of\nsuch specialized influences as, for example (1) the mediaeval dualism\nbetween the City of God and the Empire of the World, (2) Aristotle\u2019s\nunfortunate separation of the \u201cintellectual\u201d and the \u201cpractical\u201d\nvirtues, (3) the evil as well as the good of the dogmatic theology of\nthe fathers of the Church. Goethe is of infinitely more value to us\nmen of the twentieth century than Dante. And one of the very things\nGoethe is most calculated to teach us is precisely this very matter of\nthe limitations of the cultural ideal of the Middle Ages and of the\nentire Renaissance period that succeeded it.[364] We should never,\ntherefore, think for a moment of taking Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s intellectual\nabstractionism about the \u201cuniversal\u201d literally without thinking at the\nsame time of its limitations, and of its sources in Plato and in Hegel\nand in Neo-Hegelian rationalism, and of remembering with Hegel himself,\n\u201cafter all, the movement of the notion _is a sort of illusion_.\u201d\n\nThen, secondly, to attempt to think in philosophy or any other science\n_merely in accordance with the Principle of \u201cNon-Contradiction\u201d_ will\nnever[365] take us beyond the few initial positions of fact or of\nprinciple (God, \u201csubstance,\u201d pure being, matter, identity, final cause,\nfreedom, force, the will, the idea a perfect being, or what not) with\nwhich we happen for one reason or another to start in our reflections.\nNor will this procedure account, of course, for these initial\nassumptions or facts.\n\nThirdly, in virtue of its implication in the \u201csolipsism\u201d and the\n\u201crepresentationalism\u201d of Subjective Idealism, Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s\n\u201cAbsolute\u201d is inferior (both so far as fact and theory are concerned)\nto the Pluralism and the possible Theism of Pragmatism and Humanism to\nwhich we have already made partial references.[366]\n\nFourthly, it is only natural that, on account of these, its many\npolemical mannerisms, \u201cIndividuality and Value\u201d has already made upon\nsome of its critics the impression of being a book that refuses to see\nthings as they are--in the interests of their forced adaptation to the\npurposes of a preconceived philosophical theory.\n\nFifthly, there is certainly a sufficient number of contradictions\nin \u201cIndividuality and Value\u201d to prevent it from being regarded as\na consistent and a workable (_i.e._ really explanatory) account of\nour experience as we actually know it. Of these contradictions we\nthink the following may well be enumerated here: (1) That between Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s professed principle of accepting as real only that which is\n\u201cmediated\u201d or established by proof, and the arbitrariness he displays\nin announcing convictions like the following: \u201cThat what really matters\nis not the preservation of separate minds as such, but the qualities\nand achievement which, as trustees of the universe, they elicit from\nthe resources assigned them.\u201d (2) The contradiction between his belief\nin the conservation of \u201cvalues\u201d without the conservation of the\nexistence of the individuals who \u201celicit\u201d these \u201cvalues,\u201d or who are,\nas he puts it, the \u201ctrustees\u201d for the \u201cuniverse.\u201d (3) That between what\nhe logically wants (his \u201cconcrete individual\u201d) and what he gives us\n(an impersonal \u201csystem\u201d). (4) The contradiction between the completed\npersonal life in God (or in a perfected society of individuals) that\nmost of us (judging from the great religions of the world) want as\nhuman beings, and the impersonal \u201cconceptual\u201d experience of his book.\n(5) The contradiction that exists between his intellectualism and\nhis commendable belief in \u201cgreat convictions\u201d and \u201creally satisfying\nemotions and experiences.\u201d (6) The standing contradiction between his\n\u201csolipsistic\u201d view of reality (his reduction of the universe to the\nconceptual experience of a single self-perfecting individual), and the\nfacts of history in support of the idea of the \u201cnew,\u201d or the \u201ccreative\u201d\ncharacter of the contributions of countless individuals and groups of\nindividuals, to the evolution of the life of the world, or the life\nof the infinite number of worlds that make up what we think of as the\nuniverse. (7) The remarkable contradiction between Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s\ncalm rejection in his argumentation of all \u201cna\u00efve ideas\u201d and his own\nna\u00efve or Greek-like faith in reason, in the substantial existence of\nthe concept or the idea over and above the phenomena and the phenomenal\nexperiences which it is used to intepret.\n\nLastly, as for the matter of the _non-moralism or the essentially\nanti-ethical character of_ \u201cIndividuality and Value,\u201d this is a\ncharacteristic of the book that should, as such, be partly apparent\nfrom what has already been said, in respect of its main argument and\nits main contentions, and in respect of the apparent contributions of\nPragmatism and Humanism to philosophy generally. The abstractionism\nof the book, and the absence in it of any real provision for the\nrealities of purpose and of accomplishment (and even of \u201cmovement\u201d and\n\u201cprocess\u201d in any real sense of these words), are all obviously against\nthe interests of ethics and of conduct, as purposive, human action. So,\ntoo, are the findings of the critics that Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s \u201cAbsolute\u201d is\nnot a reality (for, with Professor Taylor and others, man _must_[367]\nhave an Absolute, or a God, in _whom he can believe as real_) that\ninspires to action and to motive on the part of ordinary human beings.\nAnd it is also fatal to the ethical interests of his book that he does\nnot see with the pragmatists that our human actions and reactions must\nbe regarded as part of what we mean by \u201creality.\u201d And so on.\n\nApart, however, from these and other hostile pre-suppositions the\nfollowing would seem to be the chief reasons for pronouncing, as\nunsatisfactory, the merely incidental treatment that is accorded in\n\u201cIndividuality and Value\u201d to ethics and to the ethical life.\n\n(1) It is not \u201cconduct\u201d or the _normative_[368] voluntary actions of\nhuman beings (in a world or society of real human beings) requiring\n\u201cjustice\u201d and \u201cguidance\u201d and \u201chelp\u201d that is discussed in these\nLectures, but abstractions like \u201cdesire,\u201d or \u201cordinary desire,\u201d or\n\u201cthe selective conations of finite minds,\u201d or \u201cthe active form of a\ntotality of striving\u201d or [worst of all] the \u201cself _as it happens to\nbe_,\u201d that are discussed there.\n\n(2) Even if conduct, as of course an \u201corganic totality\u201d in its way,\nbe faced for the nonce in \u201cIndividuality and Value,\u201d it is invariably\nbranded and thought of by Dr. Bosanquet as \u201cna\u00efve morality,\u201d[369] and\nit is forthwith promptly transformed and transmuted, in the most open\nand unabashed manner in the interests and exigencies of (1) logical\ntheory, (2) aesthetics and aesthetic products [perhaps Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s\ndeepest or most emotional interest], and (3) metaphysical theory of a\nhighly abstract character.\n\n(3) The conception of ethics as a \u201cnormative science\u201d and of conduct as\nfree and autonomous,[370] and as the voluntary affirmation of a norm or\nstandard or type or ideal, is conspicuous by its absence.\n\n(4) There is really no place either in Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s \u201cconcrete\nuniversal\u201d or in his fugitive pages upon ethics for the reality of the\ndistinction between good and evil (as \u201cwilled\u201d in actions or as present\nin dispositions and tendencies). Good and evil[371] are for him,\n\u201ccontents\u201d either for himself as a spectator of man\u2019s actions, or for\nthe \u201cconcrete universal,\u201d or the \u201cwhole,\u201d or the completed \u201cindividual\u201d\nof his too consummate book.\n\n(5) Like nearly all forms of Absolutism (Hegelianism, Neo-Hegelianism,\nSpinozism, Hobbism) Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s ethics (or the vestigial ethics\nwith which he leaves us) comes perilously near to what is known as\nDeterminism[372] or Fatalism or even Materialism.\n\nAs for the first of the preceding five points, it is perfectly evident\nthat any discussion of the various psychological phenomena that are\ndoubtless involved in conduct can be regarded as but a preliminary step\nto the discussion of the real problems of ethics--that of the actions\nand habits and standards of persons who are the subjects of rights\nand duties and who affirm certain actions to be right, and certain\nother actions to be wrong. The point, however, about Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s\npsychological abstractionism, especially when it rises to the height\nof writing as if the \u201cself\u201d as the \u201cactive form of a totality of\nstriving,\u201d or the \u201cself as it happens to be,\u201d were the same thing\nas the \u201cpersonal self\u201d with which we alone are mainly concerned in\nethics, is that it is but another instance of the old \u201cspectator\u201d[373]\nfallacy that we have already found to underlie his whole treatment\nof the \u201cself\u201d and of \u201cpurpose\u201d and of \u201cstriving.\u201d Such a philosophy,\nor point of view, is quite foreign to ethics, because it is only in\nthe ethical life that we think of ourselves as \u201cpersons,\u201d as beings\nplaying a part, as actors or players upon the great stage of life. By\nnot facing the ethical life directly, from within, instead of from\nwithout, Dr. Bosanquet has entirely failed to understand it. And if he\nhad attempted this internal consideration of \u201cpersonality,\u201d his whole\nmetaphysic of \u201cindividuality\u201d and of the great society of beings who\ninhabit (or who may be thought of as inhabiting) this universe, would\nhave been very different from what it is.\n\nThen as for the second and third points, it is surely evident from the\nfootnotes that have been appended in connexion with the matter of his\ntransformation of the facts of ethics in the interests of other things\nlike logic, and aesthetics, and metaphysics, that there is indeed,\nin Bosanquet, no recognition of what must be called the genuine, or\nindependent reality of the moral life, or of the moral ideal as a\nforce in human nature. And as for the fourth point, students of modern\nethics are naturally by this time perfectly familiar with the tendency\nof Rationalism to make evil action and the \u201cevil self\u201d simply the\naffirmation of a \u201clogically incoherent\u201d point of view. It exists in an\nEnglish writer like Wollaston[374] as well as in a German philosopher\nlike Hegel. This tendency is indeed a piece of sophistry and illusion\nbecause the distinction between good and evil, and the distinction\nbetween right and wrong (perhaps the better and the more crucial\nformulation of the two--for us moderns at least) is unintelligible\napart from the fact or the idea of the existence of moral agents, who\nmake (in their volition, and in the judgments that accompany or precede\ntheir volitions) a \u201cnorm,\u201d or rule, or line between the ethically\npermissible and the ethically unpermissible. The rationalism that makes\nthese distinctions merely a matter of \u201clogic,\u201d overlooks the fact that\nin actual life men must be warded off from wrong-doing (and they are\nin many cases actually so warded off by their consciences and by other\nthings, like the love of home, or the love of honour, or the love of\nGod) by something stronger than the mere idea of a possible theoretical\nmistake.\n\nAs for the fifth point of the Determinism or the Necessitarianism that\nhangs like a sword of Damocles over the entire ethic of Dr. Bosanquet,\nthe nature of this should be perfectly apparent from many of the\nstatements and considerations that have been brought forward as typical\nof his entire line of thought. He teaches a \u201cpassivism\u201d[375] and an\n\u201cintellectualism\u201d that are just as pronounced and just as essential to\nhis thought as they are to the great system of his master, Hegel, in\nwhose ambitious philosophy of spirit man\u2019s whole destiny is unfolded\nwithout the possibility of his playing himself any appreciable part in\nthe impersonal, dialectic movement in which it is made to consist.\n\nIt is now necessary to speak definitely and outspokenly of the\nelement of supreme truth and value in Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s unique book,\nof the positive contribution it makes to philosophy and to natural\ntheology.[376] This is, in a word, its tribute to the permanent element\nof truth and reality in the idealistic philosophy. And he testifies\nto this in his _\u201cbelief\u201d that in the main the work of philosophy has\nbeen done_, and \u201cthat what is now needed is to recall and concentrate\nthe modern mind from its distraction rather than to invent wholly new\ntheoretic conceptions.\u201d This declaration is of itself a position of\nconsiderable importance, however widely one is obliged to differ from\nits author as to what exactly it is that has already been demonstrated\nand accomplished \u201cin philosophy.\u201d If there has really been \u201cnothing\ndone\u201d in philosophy since the time of Socrates, if philosophy is\nto-day no true antithesis of, and corrective to science, then there\nis possible neither Pragmatism, nor Humanism, nor any other, possibly\nmore fundamental, philosophy. There can, as Dr. Bosanquet puts it,\n\u201cindeed be _no progress if no definite ground is ever to be recognized\nas gained_.\u201d This then is the first thing of transcendent importance\nin \u201cIndividuality and Value,\u201d its insistance upon the fundamentally\ndifferent estimate of reality given by philosophy in distinction\nfrom science and its merely hypothetical treatment of reality. This\n\u201cdifference\u201d is, of course, but natural, seeing that to philosophy\nthere are no things or phenomena without minds, or persons or beings to\nwhom they appear as things and phenomena.\n\nThe second great thing of \u201cIndividuality and Value\u201d is its insistence\nupon the need to all philosophy of a recognized grasp of the principle\nof \u201cMeaning.\u201d[377] What this instance implies to Dr. Bosanquet is,\nthat \u201c_at no point in our lives_ [either] as [agents or] thinkers\nare we to accept any supposed element of fact or circumstance as\nhaving _any significance_\u201d apart from the great \u201cwhole\u201d or the great\n\u201creality,\u201d with which we believe ourselves to be in contact in our\ndaily experience, when interpreted in the light of our consciousness\nof ourselves as persons. In the letter of the book his interpretation\nof the great \u201cwhole,\u201d or the great reality, of life is by no means\nas broad and as deep as the one at which we have just hinted in\nattempting to describe his position. But overriding altogether the\nmere intellectualism of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s interpretation, is the fact\nof the _dynamic idealism_ for which he virtually stands,[378] in\nvirtue of the great and the simple effort of his lectures[379] to find\n\u201cvalue\u201d in \u201cour daily experience with its _huge obstinate plurality of\nindependent facts_.\u201d He would start, as we mentioned (at the beginning\nof this chapter), with what he believes to be \u201cthe daily transformation\nof our experience as verified within what we uncritically take as our\nprivate consciousness, so far as its weakness may permit,\u201d and \u201cas\nverified on a larger scale when we think of _such splendid creations as\nthe State and fine art and religion_,\u201d and when we think, too, of \u201c_the\nmode of our participation in them_.\u201d Now again nothing could indeed be\nmore nobly true (in idea) of the great work of the philosopher than the\nproper theory and description of this \u201cdaily transformation\u201d of our\nlives, out of the life of \u201csense\u201d and the life of selfishness, into the\nspiritual communion[380] that is the essence of all right thinking and\nall right living.\n\nBut we may go further than all this and signalize one or two things\nin Dr. Bosanquet that we venture to construe as a kind of unconscious\ntestimony, on his part, to the very humanism for which we have been\ncontending throughout.\n\nThe things to which we refer are, firstly, his use of the word\n\u201cbelief\u201d[381] in speaking of his opinion that the work of philosophy\nhas in the main been accomplished, and, second, his fine and really\npraiseworthy[382] confession that his lectures, whatever they may\nhave done or may not have done, at least \u201ccontain the record of a very\nstrong conviction.\u201d Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s departure, in the letter of his\nargumentation, from the spirit of these declarations only accentuates\nwhat we regard as the regrettable failure and abstractionism of his\nwhole official (or professed) philosophy.\n\nHis use of the word belief[383] shows that it is, after all his\nprofessional homage to \u201cmediation\u201d and to the necessary abstractions\nof logic and system, _belief and not knowledge_ that is to him the\nfinal and \u201cworking\u201d estimate of truth and of reality. And the same\nconclusion follows from the second matter of the confession of which\nwe have spoken, that his entire argumentation is but the expression of\na strong conviction.[384] It is again, therefore, we would insist a\n_spiritual conviction_, and not a conceptual system that is actually\nand necessarily the moving force of _his_ entire intellectual activity.\nAnd, we would add to his own face, it is a conviction moreover that\n\u201c_works_,\u201d and not a \u201clogical whole\u201d or a mere conceptual ideal, that\nhe must (as a philosopher) engender in the mind of his average reader\nabout reality. His \u201clogical whole\u201d and his \u201cindividuality as logical\ncompleteness,\u201d \u201cwork\u201d with him [Professor Bosanquet] for the reason\nthat he is primarily an intellectual worker, a worker in the realm of\nmind. But reality (as the whole world of human work and human effort\nis there to tell us) is more than an intellectual system. And what is\na conviction to him is not necessarily a conviction that works with\nthe ordinary man, who knows reality better than he does, or who knows\nit (like himself) in his desires and in his beliefs rather than in the\nterms and conceptions that are the mere tools of the intellect and the\nspecialist. For, taking his book as a whole, we may say about it that\nthe dissolution of reality into a conceptual system that is effected\nthere is at best but another convincing proof of the truth of the\nwords of the great David Hume,[385] that the understanding, \u201c_when it\nacts alone_, and according to its most general principles, _entirely\nsubverts itself_, and leaves not the slightest degree of evidence in\nany proposition, either in philosophy or common life.\u201d\n\n\nNOTE\n\nIt is necessary for me to append a few words as to the possible\nconnexion between the foregoing criticism of the first volume of Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s _Gifford Lectures_ and the subject-matter of the second\nvolume, which appeared while I was preparing the manuscript of this\nbook for the press. I have been able only to inspect its contents\nand to inform myself about the ways in which it has impressed some\nof its representative critics. What I have thus learned does not,\nin my opinion, make it necessary for me to unsay or to rewrite what\nI have said in this chapter. My desire was to indicate the kind\nof criticism that the pragmatists and the humanists, as far as I\nunderstand them, would be inclined to make of Absolutism as represented\nin the _Principle of Individuality and Value_ as the last significant\nAnglo-Hegelian output. This, I think, I have done, and the reader may\nbe desirably left to himself to settle the question of the relation\nof the first of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s books to its companion volume that\nappeared in the following calendar year. I cannot, however, be so\nwilfully blind to the existence of this second great \u201cGifford\u201d book\nof his as to appear to ignore the fact, that on its very face and\nsurface it seems to do many of the things that I have allowed myself\nto signalize as things that Absolutism and Anglo-Hegelianism have not\ndone, or have done but imperfectly. Its very title, _The Value and\nDestiny of the Individual_, and the titles of many of its chapters,\nand the reception accorded to it in such instructive reviews as\nthose of Professor Sir Henry Jones and Professor Muirhead (in the\nJuly numbers of the _Hibbert Journal_ and _Mind_ respectively),\nare to my mind convincing proof that it is by far the most serious\nAnglo-Hegelian attempt of the passing generation to deal with many of\nthe objections that have been brought against Rationalistic Idealism\nby the pragmatists and the voluntarists, by the defenders of faith and\nfeeling and experience, and (before all these recent people) by many\nindependent idealist writers of our time in England and elsewhere.\nIn the interest of truth and of the thinking public generally, I\nappend the mere titles of some of the chapters and divisions of Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s second volume: \u201cThe Value of Personal Feeling, and the\nGrounds of the Distinctness of Persons,\u201d \u201cThe Moulding of Souls,\u201d \u201cThe\nMiracle of Will,\u201d the \u201cHazards and Hardships of Finite Selfhood,\u201d\nthe \u201cStability and Security of Finite Selfhood,\u201d \u201cThe Religious\nConsciousness,\u201d \u201cThe Destiny of the Finite Self,\u201d \u201cThe Gates of the\nFuture.\u201d There is in all the rich content that is thus indicated,\nand in all the high and deep discussion of \u201cthe ideas of a lifetime\u201d\nthat it includes, a veritable mine of philosophical reflection\nfor the reader who desires to think in a connected, or Hegelian,\nmanner about things--a mine, too, that is at least indicative of the\nwide territory both of fact and of principle upon which pragmatist\nphilosophy must enter before it can become a true philosophy. I cannot\nfind, however--this was surely not to be expected in a thinker of Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s power--that the principles of argumentation that determined\nthe nature and contents of the earlier volume have undergone any\nmodification in its success or successor; indeed, what is here offered,\nand discovered by the reader and the critics, is but a continuation and\napplication of the same dialectic principles to \u201cfinite beings, that\nis, in effect to human souls.\u201d If any one will take upon himself the\ntask of estimating the success or the non-success of the enterprise\nhe will travel through a piece of philosophical writing that is as\ncomprehensive and as coherent, and as elevating in its tone, as\nanything that has appeared from the Neo-Hegelian camp. The things that\nI chiefly feel and believe about it are, firstly, that its account of\nthe facts of life and thought are, again, all determined by certain\npresuppositions about conceivability and about the principles of\ncontradiction and negation; secondly, that it is still the same \u201cwhole\u201d\nof logic that is to it the test of all reality and individuality; and,\nthirdly, that it is, again, a great pity that Dr. Bosanquet should not\nhave acted upon some sort of recognition of the relation of his own\ndialectical principles to those of his master Hegel, or to those of\nsome of his Neo-Hegelian predecessors in England and America. Although\nit is almost an impertinence on the part of one who has just made the\nacquaintance of this outstanding volume to speak in any detail of its\ncontents, I can indicate part of my meaning by pointing out that it\nis throughout such things as \u201cfinite mind,\u201d the \u201cfinite mind\u201d that is\n\u201cbest understood by approaching it from the side of the continuum\u201d [the\n\u201cwhole\u201d], the \u201cfinite mind\u201d that is \u201cshaped by the universe,\u201d that\nis \u201ctorn between existence and self-transcendence,\u201d \u201cappearance,\u201d an\n\u201cexternality which is the object of mind,\u201d the \u201cpositive principle of\ntotality or individuality manifesting itself in a number of forms,\u201d\n\u201cgood\u201d and \u201cevil as attitudes concerning a creature\u2019s whole being,\u201d\n\u201cvolition\u201d in terms of the \u201cprinciple that there is for every situation\na larger and more effective point of view than the given\u201d--that are\ndiscussed, and not the real persons who have _what they call_ \u201cminds\u201d\nand \u201cvolitions\u201d and \u201cattitudes,\u201d and who invent all these principles\nand distinctions to describe the world of their experience and the\nworld of their thoughts. As against him Pragmatism and Humanism\nwould, I think, both insist that the first reality for all thought\nand speculation is not the \u201clogical whole\u201d that underlies, in the\nmind of the thinker, the greater number of all his categories and\ndistinctions, but the life and the lives of the persons in a world of\ninter-subjective intercourse, wherein these points of view are used\nfor different purposes. And I cannot see how Dr. Bosanquet is entitled\nto scorn all those who hold to the idea of the reality of the lives of\nthe persons who are agents and thinkers in this personal realm, which\nis for us the highest reality of the universe, as believers in the\n\u201cexclusiveness of personality,\u201d although I would certainly agree with\nhim that our experience, when properly interpreted, carries us beyond\nthe subjectivism and the individualism of some forms of Pragmatism or\nPluralism. The reader who is anxious to know about the real value of\nthe Hegelianism upon which Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s philosophy reposes should\nconsult the work of Croce upon the \u201cliving\u201d and the \u201cdead\u201d elements\nin Hegel\u2019s System. It has recently been translated into English. Dr.\nBosanquet, like many Hegelians, seems to me to overlook almost entirely\nthe important elements in the philosophy of Kant--of some of which\nI speak of in the next chapter as developed in the spiritualistic\nphilosophy of Bergson.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nPRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON[386]\n\n\nThe pragmatist elements in the philosophy of Bergson of which\nit is, perhaps, legitimate for us to speak here are (1) his\n\u201cAnti-Intellectualism,\u201d and (2) his \u201cActivism\u201d or \u201cActionism.\u201d The\nlatter culminates in his freedom-philosophy and his spiritualism. I\nshall comment shortly upon these two things, and then suggest one or\ntwo general criticisms of his philosophy as a whole.\n\nBergson\u2019s anti-intellectualism rests ultimately upon his contention\nthat the human intellect is related in the main to the needs of action,\nthat the brain is an organ of action rather than an organ of thought,\nthat our intelligence is at home only in the realm of the physical and\nthe mathematical sciences,[387] that contrivance and invention and the\npractical comprehension of the \u201cmaterial\u201d are its proper activities,\nand that for these latter purposes it splits up the world of the senses\nand the understanding into a discontinuous aggregate of physical units,\nwhich it then proceeds to reconstruct in a spatial and temporal order.\nWe perceive in Nature, he holds, what interests[388] us in the way of\nour vital needs; our intellect is adapted, not for the understanding\nor the purely rational (\u201cabstract\u201d) comprehension of \u201ccausality\u201d and\nthe \u201clife of things,\u201d but for the maintenance and furtherance of our\nown lives, and for the creation of the instruments and agencies (signs,\nlanguage, tools, imagined sequences and laws, essences, causes, the\n\u201cdescriptions\u201d of science, the special senses, the convolutions of the\nbrain, etc.) that minister to this. Science is to-day still penetrated\nthrough and through with primitive metaphysics, with the metaphysics of\nanimism, with a belief in separate things like forces, atoms, elements,\nor what not--indicative all of them of its attempt to \u201cdivide up\u201d the\nreal that it may command it for theoretical and practical purposes. We\ncan see this in the \u201cstructural psychology\u201d[389] of the day and its\nanalysis of our mental life into \u201celements,\u201d in respect of the number\nand character of which there are lasting differences of opinion among\nthe masters of the science--into \u201cimpressions,\u201d and \u201caffections,\u201d and\nsensations, images, memories, ideas, and so on. And we can see it, too,\nin the erroneous attempts sometimes made by psychologists to treat\nthese entities as if they had clearly defined temporal and spatial\ncharacteristics or qualities.\n\nThe supreme mistake of philosophy, according to Bergson, has been to\nimport into the domain of speculation a method of thinking that was\noriginally destined for action. It has forgotten that nearly all the\nleading conceptions of common sense and of science and of \u201canalysis\u201d\nhave been invented, not for final and general, but for relative and\nparticular purposes. And it has fallen too readily under the influence\nof a certain traditional view of the relations between metaphysics\nand science--the view, namely, that philosophy should just take\nthe findings of science and of common-sense about the world as its\ninitial material, subjecting them, of course, to a certain preliminary\nreinterpretation, but finally reconstructing them, almost as they\nwere, into a system.[390] The one thing, in short, that philosophy\nhas failed to understand is the life and the movement and the process\nof the world, as an infinitely more important fact than the endless\nterms and conceptions and entities (\u201cwill,\u201d \u201creason,\u201d \u201cIdeas,\u201d etc.)\ninto which it has been analysed. We might sum up the whole by saying\nthat Bergson\u2019s anti-intellectualism is simply a protest, not against\nthe use, but only against the \u201csystematic misuse\u201d[391] of general\nconceptions that have been current in science and philosophy \u201csince the\ntime of Socrates,\u201d a protest, however, that in his case is not merely\ngeneral and negative, but particularised and positive.[392]\n\nLike any and all anti-intellectualism, Bergson\u2019s anti-intellectualism\nis liable to serious misinterpretation, and it is currently\nmisinterpreted and misrepresented as \u201cirrationalism.\u201d His intention,\nhowever, is not to destroy and to condemn philosophy and reasoning, and\nto exalt mere intuition and faith, but rather to \u201cliberate\u201d[393] our\nhuman consciousness of ourselves and of the world from the dogmatism\nof what he regards to be the utilitarian intellect, from the many\nhopeless contradictions and antinomies and puzzles of the mere analytic\nunderstanding. Philosophy, in particular, he would free from the last\ntraces and symptoms of scientific rationalism, although fully aware of\nthe fact that our modern philosophy had its very departure from the\nrationalism of the great founders of modern science like Kepler and\nGalileo and the rest.\n\nHe would strike at the roots of all this confident rationalism or\nscientific philosophy by opening up a broader and a deeper view of\ntruth than that afforded to the merely piece-meal and utilitarian view.\n\nAs for the Actionism and the action philosophy of Bergson, this is\nperhaps more in line than any other tendency of the day with the\nnew life and the new thought of the twentieth century, although\n(like Pragmatism) it stands in need of correction or revision by the\nprinciples of a sound ethical philosophy, by the Idealism that is not,\nand cannot be, the mere creation of to-day or yesterday. In essence it\nis, to begin with, but an extension to the mind as a whole and to all\nits so-called special faculties (\u201csensation,\u201d \u201cperception,\u201d \u201cmemory,\u201d\n\u201cideation,\u201d \u201cjudgment,\u201d \u201cthinking,\u201d \u201cemotion,\u201d and the rest) of the\n\u201cdynamic,\u201d[394] instead of the older, static point of view that the\nrecent science of our time has applied to matter and to life, and that\nPragmatism and the \u201chypothetical method\u201d have sought to apply to all\nthe ordinary conceptions and constructions that exist in the different\ndomains of the different sciences.[395] It is also, from our point of\nview, as we may see, an attempt at the expression, in the terms of\na comparatively simple philosophy, of many of the considerations in\nrespect of knowledge and conduct that have been brought forward in the\npreceding pages of this book. We have already dwelt in different ways,\nfor example, upon the fact that there is no perception or sensation\nwithout an organic reaction on the part of the percipient or the\nsentient being, that an idea is in a sense a motor attitude (a way\nof comprehending particulars or particular facts in relation to our\npurposes and our ends), that a logical judgment represents a \u201cdivision\u201d\nof the real, or of the processes of Nature, for some purpose or other,\nthat our whole mental life is purposive, that there is no \u201cpure\u201d\ncognition without attendant emotion and[396] volition, that it is in\naction that desire and thought come together, that our whole knowledge\nof the world is necessarily a knowledge of it in terms of our purposes\nand our highest attitudes, and so on. All of this is, as it were, an\nindication of the psychological and the logical considerations upon\nwhich Bergson bases his positive,[397] activistic, philosophy of mind.\n\nIt is to be remembered in Bergson\u2019s interest that when we speak of his\nActionism[398] we do not mean a narrowing down[399] on his part of\nthe activities of the soul to physical labour and to mere utilitarian\neffort, but its capacity, also, for that creative activity which he\ntakes to be the very keynote of personal life and the evolutionary\nprocess.\n\nAs for the freedom-philosophy with which Bergson\u2019s Actionism is to be\nassociated, this is worked out by him, firstly, in the most perfect\ncorrespondence with what he believes to be the facts of life and\nmind; and, secondly, in terms of that anti-rationalism (or hostility\nto the merely scientific intellect) which is his working theory of\nknowledge. His views upon this subject have also been depreciated and\nmisunderstood by some of his opponents who attack what they call his\n\u201cintuitional\u201d treatment of the freedom-question--his insistence upon\nthe direct intuition of our life that we have when we act consciously,\nand when we are \u201cmost ourselves\u201d--when we act out \u201cfreely\u201d our own\nnature. To him the primary fact for any human being is the life-impulse\nthat is both instinctive and reflective, that is certainly far more\nof a fundamental reality than any of those entities or concepts\n(\u201ccells,\u201d \u201catoms,\u201d \u201cforces,\u201d \u201claws,\u201d or what not) which, with Kant, he\nclearly sees to be the creation of the intellect for its descriptive\nand practical purposes. This life is \u201cfree\u201d in the sense that we are\nnot \u201cdetermined\u201d by any or all of those forces and laws to which our\nintellect subjects everything else, but which it cannot apply to the\nlife that is more than mere matter, that is a real becoming and a real\nprocess, a real creation and development.\n\nThe \u201cspiritualism,\u201d again, of his interpretation of this life and\nactivity rests, to begin with, upon his opinion that the very inception\nof the activity, and the adjustment, and the selection in which the\nsimplest life-effort, and the simplest perception of a living being\nconsist, indicate the presence and the operation of a controlling\nagency,[400] or mind, or principle of spiritual \u201cchoice\u201d that is not,\nand cannot be, explained on the principles of a mechanical science\nor philosophy. This principle is, in a word, the life-force, or the\ncreative activity, the _\u00e9lan vital_ of which we read so much in his\nbooks, that has \u201cseized upon matter,\u201d vitalizing it into force and\nenergy, into the \u201cplay\u201d upon each other of all the varied activities\nand grades and forms of the will to live, and into the various forms of\nsocialized and co-operative living on the part of animals and men. We\nshall immediately remark upon the matter of the apparent limitations\nof this spiritual philosophy of life, or reality, that is here but\nindicated or stated.\n\nOne of its essential features, so far as we are at present concerned,\nis his claim that his introduction of a spiritual principle into the\nlife-force, or the creative activity that has expressed itself in the\nvarious grades and forms of life, both animal and human, is not a\nphase of the old philosophy[401] or theology of \u201cfinal causes\u201d or of a\npredetermined[402] \u201cteleology.\u201d To this old finalism or teleology[403]\nthe life of organic nature (the \u201corgans\u201d and \u201ccells,\u201d the \u201cinstinctive\u201d\nactions, and the \u201cadjustments\u201d of animals, and so on) were all due to\nthe work of a pre-existing, calculating intelligence operating upon\nmatter; whereas to him they are but different expressions or creations\nof the life-force that is as little predetermined in organic evolution,\nas it is in the realm of the activities interpreted for us (in part)\nby the newer physics and the newer chemistry--in the processes, for\nexample, that are exemplified in the generation of a star out of a\nnebula. This entire treatment, however, of the notion of purpose in\nnature is a matter of great difficulty in the philosophy of Bergson,\nand his own thought (as I shall presently state) is apt to strike us\nas just as hypothetical as some of the views he attempts to combat.\nIt raises, too, the question of the valuation of his philosophy as a\nwhole, and of its relation to the great thinker who still stands in the\nvery centre of the entire modern movement from Copernicus to Comte and\nDarwin--Immanuel Kant.[404]\n\nWe shall best get at the matter of the fuller developments of the\nphilosophy of Bergson that are of interest to us at present, by\nindicating some of the results that would accrue from it to the\nconstructive philosophy in which we are interested as the outcome of\nPragmatism and Idealism. Among these would be, firstly, a new and a\nfresh, and yet a perfectly rational apprehension of the fact of the\nnecessarily abstract and hypothetical[405] character of the analyses\nto which our world is subjected by the science and by the technic and\nthe supposed \u201ceconomy\u201d of our present culture.[406] Then an equally\nnew and equally rational (or \u201crationally grounded\u201d) conviction of\nthe inadequacy of the physical and the scientific categories to the\ncomprehension and the explanation of life and of the life of the\nspirit. Thirdly, a confirmation of many of the tendencies to which\nthe Pragmatism and the Voluntarism and the Humanism of the last\ncentury have given a more or less one-sided and imperfect formulation.\nAmong such confirmed tendencies are (\u03b1) the attempt they have all\nmade to attain to a deeper[407] view of human nature than the view\nhitherto taken by rationalism and intellectualism, (\u03b2) their emphasis\nupon the freedom and the initiative[408] of the individual and\nupon the necessity, on the part of philosophy, of a \u201cdynamic\u201d or\n\u201cmotive-awakening\u201d[409] theory of reality, (\u03b3) their insistence[410]\nsimilarly upon the necessity to our thought of a _direct contact_ with\nreality, and upon the impossibility of our beginning in philosophy\nwithout assumptions of one kind or another, (\u03b4) their refusal to make\nany ultimate separation[411] between the intellect and the will,\nbetween the highest thought and the highest emotion, (\u03b5) their tendency\nto regard belief[412] rather than knowledge as our fundamental\nestimate of truth and reality.\n\nA fourth constructive result, however, of the philosophy of Bergson\nwould be not the mere confirmation of any number of pragmatist and\nhumanist tendencies, but their integration, and their transformation\ninto the evidences and the manifestation of a new spiritual philosophy\nof life and of the universe generally. It is this possible _quasi_\nintegration and transformation of so many of the tendencies of\nPragmatism and Voluntarism and of the Philosophy of Science of the day,\nthat makes Bergson the greatest of all the pragmatists--although the\nterm hardly occurs in his main writings, and although he breathes from\nfirst to last the air of an idealism[413] and a spiritualism that is\nabove and beyond all the mere instrumentalism, and the mere empiricism\nand the ethical opportunism of Pragmatism.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe following are some of the difficulties and counter-considerations\nthat stand in the way of the intelligibility and the supposed\nnovelty of the philosophy of Bergson. (1) It is in some respects\nbut a biological philosophy after all, a would-be philosophical\ninterpretation of the \u201cevolutionary process\u201d which takes many things\nfor granted and ignores many difficulties. Some of these things are\nthe life-force itself, the _\u00e9lan de vie_, the vital aspects that he\nsees in the forces of nature, the \u201ceternal movement\u201d of which he\nis always speaking as the only reality and as the very life of the\nuniverse, the whole \u201cadaptation\u201d philosophy that characterises his own\nteleology despite his attacks on \u201cmechanism\u201d and on \u201cfinalism,\u201d and\nso on. One is tempted, indeed, to think that in much of all this he\nforgets his own doctrine of the hypothetical character of science and\nphilosophy, and that, in his very anxiety to escape from mechanism and\nfrom rationalism, and Paleyism, he credits Nature with a contingency\nand a \u201cfreedom\u201d[414] that corresponds in their way to the chaos, of\nwhich the Greeks thought as a necessary background to the cosmos. He\nseems, in other words, to deify into a kind of eternal \u201cbecoming\u201d and a\n_quasi_ free and creative \u201cduration,\u201d his own (necessary) inability to\ngrasp the system of things.\n\nThen, secondly, there is a veritable crop of difficulties that arise\nout of his contention that our intellect is adapted \u201conly to matter.\u201d\nWhat, for example, of the various non-utilitarian[415] intuitions\nof art and morality and religion, that are as undoubtedly facts of\nour conscious experience as is our comprehension and utilisation of\n\u201cmatter\u201d for the various purposes of civilisation?[416] If it be\nliterally true that our understanding is \u201cincapacitated\u201d for the\ncomprehension of life and of the creative activities of the soul, a\nnew set of categories and a higher form of intelligence (than the\nmerely material) must be elaborated for this special purpose. And if\nthis higher form of intelligence be the \u201cintuition\u201d of which Bergson\nundoubtedly makes so much, then he must be more careful than he often\nis in suggesting that intuition and a philosophy of our intuitions\n\u201cmust go _counter to the intellect_.\u201d[417] His theory of art reduces\nitself, for example, in the main to the negative contention that\nspiritual perception is always simply \u201canti-mechanical,\u201d[418] simply\nthe power of seeing things in another way than that of the engineer or\nthe craftsman, the _homo faber_.\n\nThirdly, there are many dualisms or oppositions in his doctrine or\nexpressed teaching, reducible all of them to the one great Cartesian\ndualism between the mind and the matter that are said by him to\nintersect in memory, and in perception, and in the life of the\nspirit generally--the opposition, for example, between instinct and\nintelligence, that between intelligence and intuition,[419] between the\n\u201cmechanical\u201d and the \u201corganic,\u201d between the \u201cupward\u201d and the \u201cdownward\u201d\nmovements that he attributes to the life-force. And there is a striking\ninconsistency between his apparent acceptance of the teaching of Kant\nin respect of the limitations of the physical and the temporal way of\nlooking at things (ourselves included and our actions) and his belief\nin an eternal \u201cduration,\u201d[420] or movement, or process of which he\nis always speaking as the very life and texture of everything. This\n\u201creal\u201d or \u201cpure\u201d \u201cduration\u201d is a thing that troubles all students of\nhis philosophy; it seems to make Bergson believe in what James talked\nof as a \u201cstrung-along\u201d universe. And there is an inconsistency between\nthe supremacy that he seems willing to accord to mind and spirit in the\ncase of the new individuals who are always being born into the world,\nand the absence of a similar supremacy (or determining r\u00f4le) in the\ncase of the mind or spirit without whose existence and operation the\nuniverse is unthinkable.[421]\n\nAs for the latter contradiction, we may note in his favour that he\ntalks, at least once or twice, of \u201cGod\u201d as \u201cunceasing life\u201d[422] and\n\u201cactive freedom,\u201d and I am inclined to take this master thought as\npossibly a kind of foundation for his rich and suggestive philosophy\nof life and reality. But there is in his writings nothing like the\nthorough-going attempt that we find in the philosophy of Aristotle[423]\nto ground the motion and the life of the world in God as its final\ncause and its ultimate explanation. Equally little is there in Bergson\na thorough-going attempt to work out the Idealism[424] upon which his\nwhole system reposes--his initial conception of objects as \u201cimages,\u201d\nor \u201cideas\u201d for a consciousness, or for the life-force, or for the\ndifferent \u201ccentres of activity\u201d with which he peoples the worlds.\n\nFourthly, there is the drawback from the point of view of social\nphilosophy about the thought of Bergson to which we have already made\nreference--that it lacks somehow the ethical and the social idealism\nthat would warrant us in thinking of it as a worthy rival or substitute\nfor the philosophy of history of the great idealists of the past and\nthe present. It is necessary to speak here with the utmost caution if\nwe would avoid doing injustice[425] to Bergson. We cannot mean, for\nexample, that he does not do justice[426] to the social factor in human\ndevelopment of which we have heard so much, perhaps too much, from the\nsociologists.[427] We might mean, however, and we do in a sense mean\nthat he has not made as much as he might have done of this factor,\nby developing for the thought of to-day the reality of that world of\n\u201cspiritual communion\u201d and \u201cinter-subjective intercourse\u201d of which we\nhave spoken more than once.\n\nThen we might also contend that Bergson has not as yet, in his\nphilosophy of human life, taken much cognizance of the deeper[428]\nexperiences of life, of the specifically ethical and religious feelings\nand thoughts of men. With the pragmatists he is unduly optimistic\nabout the free expansive development of the individual. Against this\nobjection it may be replied, that he has so thoroughly assimilated\ninto the very texture of his thought and feeling some of the finest\nthings in the spiritualism and the idealism of the reflective thought\nof France[429] that we would not, if we could, wish the germinal or\nfructifying elements in his system to be different from what they are.\nHis \u201csocial\u201d message is perhaps after all the best thing that it can\nbe--the need of the inward spiritualization of the life and thought of\nthe individual.\n\nLastly, in addition to the fine traditional spiritualism and\nlibertarianism of French philosophy, we may think of the voluntarism\nof Kant and Schopenhauer as also militating somewhat against the idea\nof Bergson\u2019s originality[430] in philosophy. Despite this it is still\npossible to regard him as one of important, modern, exponents of just\nthat development of the Kantian philosophy that became imperative after\nDarwinism. He has indeed inaugurated for us that reading of the \u201ctheory\nof knowledge\u201d in terms of the \u201ctheory of life\u201d[431] which is his true\nand real continuation of the critical work of Kant. Hypothetical\nalthough it may be in many respects, it moves (owing to his thorough\nabsorption in the many facts and theories of the biology of recent\nyears) in an atmosphere that is altogether above the confines of the\nphysical and the mathematical[432] sciences with which alone Kant was\n(in the main) directly acquainted. It is time that, with the help he\naffords in his free handling of the facts of life and of the supposed\nfacts and theories of science, we should transform the exiguous\n\u201cepistemology\u201d[433] of the past generation into the more perfect hold\nupon \u201ccriticism\u201d and upon the life of things that is represented in his\nthought.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUDING REMARKS\n\n\nEnough has now been said in the foregoing pages about Pragmatism and\nthe philosophy of Actionism in relation to Rationalism, and to the\nPersonalism and the Humanism that they would substitute for it and for\nAbsolutism. Indications have been given too of the shortcomings and\nthe defects of this very Personalism or Humanism, and of some of the\ndifferent lines along which it would require to be reconsidered and\ndeveloped to constitute a satisfactory philosophy. In addition to some\nof the greater names in the history of philosophy, I have referred--in\nthe footnotes and elsewhere--to the thoughts and the works of living\nwriters who might be profitably studied by the reader in this connexion.\n\nPragmatism is in some respects but a sociological or an anthropological\ndoctrine significant of the rediscovery by our age of the doctrine\nof man, and of its desire to accord to this doctrine the importance\nthat is its due. It represented, to begin with (in its Instrumentalism\nchiefly), the discontent of a dying century with the weight of its own\ncreations in the realm of science and theory along with a newer and\nfresher consciousness of the fact that there can be no rigid separation\nof philosophy from the general thought and practice of mankind. And\neven if we accept this idea of the supremacy of the doctrine of man\nover both philosophy and science, this does not mean that we exalt the\nworker and the prophet over all knowledge, but simply that philosophy\nmust have a theory of reality that provides for their existence and\nfunction alongside of those of the thinker or the student as such. The\ntrue philosophy is in fact the true doctrine of man.\n\nAnother lesson that we may learn from Pragmatism and Humanism is\nthe truth of the contention that there can be no philosophy without\nassumptions of one kind or another, without facts and intuitions and\nimmediate experiences. A philosophy itself is an act or a creation,\nrepresentative of the attention of the thinker to certain aspects of\nhis experience and of the experience of the world which he shares with\nother thinkers and with other agents. And, as Bergson has reminded\nus, it is often the great intuition underlying the attention and the\nthought of a philosopher that is of more worth to the world than the\ndialectic, or the logic, through the aid of which it is set forth and\nelaborated. This latter he may frequently have inherited or absorbed\nfrom the schools of his time.\n\nThe reason why the idealists and the dialecticians of our time have\nso often fought shy of beginning with the immediate or the \u201cgiven,\u201d\nis partly that they are not yet in their thoughts perfectly free of\nsome taint or tincture of the supposed realism or dualism of the\ncommon-sense philosophy or the correspondence view of truth. They\nseem to have the fear that if they admit a given element of fact\nin speculation they will unconsciously be admitting that there is\nsomething outside thought and immediate experience in the true sense\nof these terms. In this fear they are forgetful of the great lesson of\nIdealism that there is nothing \u201coutside\u201d thought and consciousness,\nno \u201cobject\u201d without a \u201csubject,\u201d that the world is \u201cphenomenal\u201d of a\ngreat experience, which they and other men are engaged in interpreting,\nand of which we may all become directly conscious. And while to God\nthe end of all experiences and processes is known from the beginning,\nor apart from the mere time and space limitations that affect us as\nfinite beings, it is still true that for us as men and as thinkers the\nreality of things is not \u201cgiven\u201d apart from the contribution to it that\nwe ourselves make in our responsive and in our creative activity. In\ncontending, therefore, for the reality, in every philosophy, of this\nassumption of ourselves and of the working value of our thought and\nof our activity, Pragmatism has been contending in its own fashion\nfor the great doctrine of the sovereignty of the spirit which (when\nproperly interpreted) is the one thing that can indeed recall the\nmodern mind out of its endless dispersion and distraction, and out of\nits reputed present indifference. It is in the placing of this great\nreality before the world, or, rather, of the view of human nature that\nmakes it a possibility, and in intelligibility, that (in my opinion)\nthe significance of Pragmatism consists, along with that of the various\ndoctrines with which it may be naturally associated. There are many\nindications in the best thought and practice of our time that humanity\nis again awakening to a creative and a self-determinative view of\nitself, of its experience, and of its powers. Of the presuppositions\nand the conditions under which this idea may be regarded as true and\nintelligible I have already spoken. Its proper interpretation, however,\nalong with the exposition of the metaphysic upon which it must be\nmade to repose, is at least part of the work of the philosophy of the\nfuture--if philosophy is true to its task of leading and guiding the\nthought of mankind.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] See, for example, the concessions and the fresh statements of the\nproblem of philosophy, and the \u201cclearing of the ground,\u201d etc., referred\nto on p. 76 and p. 74. Also p. 27 in reference to the stir and the\nactivity that have been excited by the pragmatist controversy. See also\np. 230, in the eighth chapter, in reference to some things in such a\ntypical intellectualist as Professor Bosanquet that may be construed as\na concession to Pragmatism and Humanism.\n\n[2] Dr. Edward Caird affirmed in his memoir of his brother (Principal\nJohn Caird) that idealists admit some pragmatist charges.\n\n[3] Professor Stein, a contemporary European authority, to whom we\nshall again refer below, says, for example, in his well-known articles\nin the _Archiv f\u00fcr Philosophie_ (1908), in reference to Pragmatism,\nthat we have had nothing like it [as a \u2018movement\u2019] \u201csince Nietzsche\u201d\n(\u201cDer Pragmatismus,\u201d p. 9).\n\n[4] See Chapter VIII., where I discuss the natural theology that bases\nitself upon these supposed principles of a \u201cwhole of truth\u201d and the\n\u201cAbsolute.\u201d\n\n[5] This statement I think would be warranted by the fact of the\ntendency of the newer physical science of the day to substitute an\nelectrical, for the old material, or corpuscular, conception of matter,\nor by the admission, for example, of a contemporary biologist of\nimportance (Verworn, _General Physiology_, p. 39) that \u201call attempts\nto explain the psychical by the physical must fail. The actual problem\nis ... not in explaining psychical by physical phenomena but rather in\nreducing to its psychical elements physical, like all other psychical\nphenomena.\u201d\n\n[6] See p. 81, and p. 150.\n\n[7] See Chapter V. pp. 136, 138, where we examine, or reflect upon, the\nethics of Pragmatism.\n\n[8] The importance of these volumes in the matter of the development,\nin the minds of thinking people everywhere, of a dynamic and an organic\n(instead of the older rationalistic and intellectualistic) conception\nof religion and of the religious life cannot possibly be overestimated.\nOf course it is only right to add here that such a dynamic and organic\nview of religion is the property not only of Professor James and his\nassociates, but also of the army of workers of to-day in the realms of\ncomparative religion and anthropology.\n\n[9] _Pragmatism_, p. 300.\n\n[10] Or an admission like the following in the _Meaning of Truth_\n(p. 243): \u201cIt may be that the truest of all beliefs shall be that in\ntranssubjective realities.\u201d\n\n[11] _Meaning of Truth_, p. 124, 5.\n\n[12] See p. 40 and p. 149.\n\n[13] _Pragmatism_, pp. 244\u2013245.\n\n[14] _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 34.\n\n[15] In respect of James\u2019 later doctrine of \u201cradical empiricism\u201d we\nmay quote, for the sake of intelligibility, from Professor Perry\n(his friend and literary executor) the following: \u201cJames\u2019 empiricism\nmeans, then, first, that ideas are to be tested by direct knowledge,\nand, second, that knowledge is limited to what can be presented.\nThere is, however, a third consideration which is an application of\nthese, and the means of avoiding a difficulty which is supposed to\nbe fatal to them. This is what James calls \u2018radical empiricism,\u2019 the\ndiscovery that \u2018the relations between things, conjunctive as well as\ndisjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience,\nneither more nor less so, than the things themselves.\u2019 \u2018Adjacent\nminima of experience\u2019 are united by the \u2018persistent identity of\ncertain units, or emphases, or points, or objects, or members ... of\nthe experience-continuum.\u2019 Owing to the fact that the connexions of\nthings are thus found along with them, it is unnecessary to introduce\nany substance below them, or any subject above them, to hold things\ntogether\u201d (_Present Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 365). In regard to\nthis radical empiricism, I am obliged, as a Kantian, to say that, to my\nmind, it represents the reduction of all Pragmatism and Empiricism to\nan impossibility--to the fatuous attempt (exploded for ever by Hume) to\nattempt to explain knowledge and experience _without first principles_\nof some kind or another. It is a \u201cnew Humism,\u201d a thing which no one\nwho has penetrated into the meaning of Hume\u2019s _Treatise_ can possibly\nadvocate. A philosophy without first principles, or a philosophy that\nreduces the relations between experiences to mere \u201cbits\u201d of experience,\nis indeed no philosophy at all.\n\n[16] See p. 82 and p. 154.\n\n[17] The Preface, pp. xv., xix.\n\n[18] See p. 159 and p. 212.\n\n[19] As for Dr. Schiller\u2019s charge that Absolutism is essentially\n\u201cirreligious\u201d in spite of the fact of its having been (in England)\nreligious at the outset, the best way of meeting this is to insist that\nit is mainly in its form, rather than its content, that Absolutism is\n(or was) irreligious in both Germany and England.\n\n[20] British students of philosophy are quite well aware that it was\nthe religious and the spiritual motive that seemed to weigh most\nwith Hutchison Stirling and John Caird and Green in their attempts\n(thirty years ago) to introduce German transcendental philosophy to\ntheir fellow-countrymen. Stirling was impressed with the idea of a\nworking correspondence between Hegelianism and Calvinism. John Caird\u2019s\nanimus was against the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer and of Mansel,\nand he found inspiration in this connexion in Hegel\u2019s treatment of\nKant\u2019s theory of the limitations of the understanding. And to Green\nthe attractive thing about Kant was his vindication of a \u201cspiritual\nprinciple\u201d in \u201cnature,\u201d and in \u201cknowledge,\u201d and in \u201cconduct,\u201d a\nprinciple which rendered absurd the naturalism of the evolutionary\nphilosophy. Friends of this spiritualistic interpretation of German\nCritical Rationalism find its richest and fullest expression in\nthe books of Edward Caird upon the _Evolution of Religion_ and the\n_Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_.\n\n[21] The idea of a left wing is generally associated in the minds of\nBritish students with the destructive criticism of Mr. Bradley in\n_Appearance and Reality_, in which many, or most, of our ordinary\nways of regarding reality (our beliefs in \u201cprimary\u201d and \u201csecondary\u201d\nqualities of matter, in \u201cspace\u201d and \u201ctime,\u201d in \u201ccausation,\u201d \u201cactivity,\u201d\na \u201cself,\u201d in \u201cthings in themselves,\u201d etc.) are convicted of \u201cfatal\ninconsistencies.\u201d See, however, Professor Pringle-Pattison\u2019s\ninstructive account of his book in _Man\u2019s Place in the Cosmos_,\nbringing out the positive side. The \u201cleft\u201d is represented too, now, in\nDr. Bosanquet\u2019s _Individuality and Value_, which we examine below as\nthe last striking output of British transcendentalism or absolutism.\nSee in this entire connexion Professor James Seth\u2019s recent account of\nthe \u201cIdealist Answers to Hume\u201d in his _English Philosophy and Schools\nof Philosophy_.\n\n[22] See p. 244. I find a confirmation of this idea in what a biologist\nlike Professor Needham treats of as the \u201cautogenetic nature of\nresponses\u201d (_General Biology_, p. 474) in animals.\n\n[23] See the _Studies in Humanism_ for all the positions referred to,\nor quoted, or paraphrased, in these two paragraphs.\n\n[24] This is an important essay. It reminds the modern reader, for one\nthing, of the importance of the natural theology of Aristotle. It is\nan anticipation, too, in its way, of the tendency of modern physics to\nsubstitute a dynamic for a static conception of matter, or atoms, or\nsubstance. In it Dr. Schiller points out how Aristotle\u2019s doctrine of\na perfect and self-perfecting Activity [an \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 that is not mere\nchange or motion, but a perfect \u201clife\u201d involving the disappearance of\n\u201ctime\u201d and imperfection] is in a sense the solution of the old [Greek]\nand the modern demand for the substance or essence of things. We shall\ntake occasion (in speaking of the importance to Philosophy of the\nconcept of activity, and in speaking of the Philosophy of Bergson) to\nuse the same idea, to which Dr. Schiller has given an expression in\nthis essay, of God as the eternal or the perfect life of the world.\n\n[25] For a favourable estimate of the services of Dr. Schiller in\nregard to Pragmatism and Humanism the reader may consult the articles\nof Captain Knox in the _Quarterly Review_, 1909.\n\n[26] _Studies in Humanism_, p. 19. The remarks made in this paragraph\nwill have to be modified, to some extent, in view of the recent\n(1911) appearance of the third edition of Dr. Schiller\u2019s _Riddles of\nthe Sphinx_. This noteworthy book contains, to say the very least,\na great deal in the way of a positive ontology, or theory of being,\nand also many quite different rulings in respect of the nature of\nmetaphysic and of the matter of its relation to science and to common\nsense. It rests, in the main, upon the idea of a perfect society of\nperfected individuals as at once the true reality and the end of the\nworld-process--an idea which exists also, at least in germ, in the\npluralistic philosophy of Professor James; and we shall indeed return\nto this practical, or sociological, philosophy as the outcome, not only\nof Pragmatism, but also of Idealism, as conceived by representative\nliving thinkers. Despite, however, these many positive and constructive\nmerits of this work of Dr. Schiller\u2019s, it is for many reasons not\naltogether unfair to its spirit to contend that his philosophy is\nstill, in the main, that of a humanistic pragmatism in which both\n\u201ctheory\u201d and \u201cpractice\u201d are conceived as experimentally and as\nhypothetically as they are by Professor Dewey.\n\n[27] See p. 106.\n\n[28] See Professor Bawden\u2019s book upon Pragmatism.\n\n[29] _Pragmatism_, p. 58.\n\n[30] _Ibid._ 76.\n\n[31] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 2.\n\n[32] I endeavour to indicate what this Humanism and Personalism may be\nin my sixth chapter.\n\n[33] _Journ. of Phil. Psychol._, 1906, p. 338.\n\n[34] From vol. ii. (p. 322) of Baldwin\u2019s _Dictionary of Philosophy_.\nDr. C.\u00a0S. Peirce, formerly a teacher of mathematics and philosophy at\nJohns Hopkins University, was made by James into the father or patron\nsaint of Pragmatism. James confesses to have been stimulated into\nPragmatism by the teachings of Peirce.\n\n[35] _Journ. of Phil. Psy._, 1906, p. 340.\n\n[36] See pp. 78, 148; and in reference to the last striking\npresentation of Absolutism, p. 230.\n\n[37] See Bourdeau, _Pragmatisme et Modernisme_, and W. Riley in the\n_Journ. of Phil. Psy._, April and May 1911; the James article, _Journ.\nof Phil._, 1906; _Journ. of Phil._, 1907, pp. 26\u201337, on Papini\u2019s\n\u201cIntroduction to Pragmatism\u201d; _The Nation_ (N.Y.), November 1907, on\n\u201cPapini\u2019s view of the \u2018daily tragedy\u2019 of life.\u201d\n\n[38] Reported to have been inaugurated by a Franco-Italian poet,\nMartinetti. Of the question of any possible connexion between this\n\u201cFuturism\u201d with the present Art movement bearing the same name I know\nnothing definite.\n\n[39] I refer to the recent volume dedicated by some of his old pupils\nto Professor Garman--a celebrated teacher of philosophy in one of the\nolder colleges of the United States.\n\n[40] The two large volumes on the _Psychology of Adolescence_.\n\n[41] The _Psychology of Religion_.\n\n[42] Even such a book--and it is no doubt in its way a genuine and a\nnoteworthy book--as Harold H. Begbie\u2019s _Twice-born Men_ is pointed to\nby this wing as another instance of the truth of pragmatist principles\nin the sphere of experimental religion. Schopenhauer, by the way,\nwas inclined to estimate the efficacy of a religion by its power\nof affecting the will, of converting men so that they were able to\novercome the selfish will to live. See my _Schopenhauer\u2019s System in its\nPhilosophical Significance_.\n\n[43] See, for example, the declaration of James and Schiller (in the\nprefaces to their books and elsewhere) in respect of their attitudes\nto the work of men like Renouvier, Poincar\u00e9, Milhaud, Wilbois, Le\nRoy, Blondel, Pradines, the valuable reports of M. Lalande to the\n_Philosophical Review_ (1906\u20137\u20138), the articles of Woodbridge Riley\nin the _Journal of Philosophy_ (1911) upon the continental critics\nof Pragmatism, the books of Bourdeau, Hebert, Rey, Tonquedoc, Armand\nSabatier, Schinz, Picard, Berthelot, those of Poincar\u00e9, Renouvier,\nPradines, and the rest, the older books upon nineteenth-century French\nphilosophy by men like Fouill\u00e9e, Levy-Bruhl, etc. There are also\nvaluable references upon the French pragmatists in Father Walker\u2019s\n_Theories of Knowledge_ (in the Stoneyhurst Series), and in Professor\nInge\u2019s valuable little book upon _Faith and its Psychology_.\n\n[44] The outstanding representative in France during the entire second\nhalf of the nineteenth century of \u201cNeo-Criticism\u201d or \u201cNeo-Kantianism,\u201d\na remarkable and comprehensive thinker, to whose influence, for\nexample, James attributed a part of his mental development. His review,\nthe _Critique Philosophique_, was a worthy (idealist) rival of the\nmore positivistically inclined, and merely psychological, review of\nRibot, the _Revue Philosophique_. French Neo-Kantianism, holding, as\nRenouvier does, that Kant\u2019s ethics is the keystone of his system,\nis not in general inclined to the \u201cpositivism\u201d or the \u201cscientific\u201d\nphilosophy of some of the German Neo-Kantians. The critical work of\nRenouvier proposes some very ingenious and systematic rearrangements\nof Kant\u2019s philosophy of the categories, and his freedom-philosophy\nmust certainly have done a good deal (along with the work of others)\nto create the atmosphere in which Bergson lives and moves to-day.\nWith Renouvier, Neo-Kantianism merges itself too in the newer\nphilosophy of \u201cPersonalism,\u201d and he wrote, indeed, an important book\nupon this very subject (_Le Personnalisme_, 1902). In this work, we\nfind a criticism of rationalism that anticipates Pragmatism, the\nauthor explicitly contending for a substitution of the principle of\n\u201crational belief\u201d instead of the \u201cfalse principle\u201d of demonstrable or\n_a priori_ \u201cevidence.\u201d Consciousness, he teaches, is the foundation\nof existence, and \u201cpersonality\u201d the first \u201ccausal principle\u201d of the\nworld (although admitting \u201ccreation\u201d to be beyond our comprehension).\nHe examines critically, too, the notions of the \u201cAbsolute\u201d and of the\n\u201cUnconditioned,\u201d holding that they should not be substantiated into\nentities. \u201cBelief\u201d is involved in \u201cevery act,\u201d he teaches--also another\npragmatist doctrine. And like his great predecessor Malebranche,\nand like our English Berkeley, he teaches that God is our \u201cnatural\nobject,\u201d the true \u201cother\u201d of our life. The philosophy of Personalism,\nthe foundations of which are laid in this work, is further developed\nby Renouvier in a comprehensive work which he published in 1899,\nin conjunction with M. Prat, on _The New Monadology_ (_La Nouvelle\nMonadologie_). This is one of the most complete presentations of a\nphilosophy of \u201cPluralism\u201d that is at the same time a \u201cTheism\u201d--to be\nassociated, in my opinion, say, with the recent work of Dr. James Ward\nupon the _Realm of Ends_, referred to on p. 162.\n\n[45] _Philos. Rev._ (1906), article by Lalande.\n\n[46] H. Poincar\u00e9 (talked of in recent scientific circles as one of the\ngreatest mathematicians of history) is (he died about a year ago),\nso far as our present purpose is concerned, one of the important\nscientific writers of the day upon the subject of the \u201clogic of\nhypotheses,\u201d and of the \u201chypothetical method\u201d in science--the method\nwhich the pragmatists are so anxious to apply to philosophy. He seems\n(see his _La Science et l\u2019Hypoth\u00e8se_, as well as the later book, _La\nValeur de la Science_, referred to by Lalande in his professional\nreports to the _Philosophical Review_) to accept to some extent the\nidea of the \u201chypothetical\u201d character of the constructions of both the\nmathematical and the physical sciences, believing, however, at the same\ntime that we must not be \u201cunduly sceptical\u201d about their conclusions,\nrevealing as they do something of the \u201cnature of reality.\u201d He discusses\namong other topics the theory of \u201cenergetics\u201d of which we speak below\nin the case of Ostwald. He insists, too, upon the idea that the real\nis known only by \u201cexperience,\u201d and that this \u201cexperience\u201d includes the\ncomparison of the thoughts of many minds. And yet he believes to some\nextent in the Kantian theory of the _a priori_ element in knowledge\n(see _La Science_, etc., p. 64). It is, however, quite unnecessary for\nme to presume to enter into the large subject of the precise nature of\n\u201chypotheses\u201d in the mathematical and the physical sciences.\n\n[47] A professor of mathematics in Paris and an ardent Bergsonian, and\nalong with Laberthonni\u00e8re one of the prominent Catholic defenders of\nPragmatism and Modernism, author of a book on _Dogmatism and Criticism_\n(_Dogme et Critique_). Not having had the time to examine this book, as\nsomewhat removed from my immediate subject, I append for the benefit\nof the reader the following statements and quotations from the useful\nbook _Faith and its Psychology_, by Professor Inge of Cambridge. It\nis easy to see that the positions represented therein would give rise\nto controversy as to the historicity or fact of Christianity. \u201cLe Roy\ngives us some examples of this Catholic Pragmatism. When we say \u2018God is\npersonal,\u2019 we mean \u2018behave in our relations with God as you do in your\nrelations with a human person.\u2019 When we say, \u2018Jesus is risen from the\ndead,\u2019 we mean \u2018treat him as if he were your contemporary.\u2019... His main\ntheses may be summed up in his own words. \u2018The current intellectualist\nconception renders insoluble most of the objections which are now\nraised against the idea of dogma. A doctrine of the primacy of action,\non the contrary, permits us to solve the problem without abandoning\nanything of the rights of thought or of the exigencies of dogma.\u2019\u201d Le\nRoy, by the way, has published a book upon the philosophy of Bergson,\nwhich is said to be the best book upon the subject. It has been\ntranslated into English.\n\n[48] M. Abel Rey, author of a work on the _Theory of Physical Science\nin the hands of Contemporary Scientists_ (_La Th\u00e9orie de la physique\nchez les physiciens contemporains_). In this book (I have not had the\ntime to examine it carefully) M. Rey examines the theories and methods\nof Newton, and also of modern thinkers like Mach and Ostwald, reaching\nthe conclusion that the philosophy with which physical science is most\ncompatible is a \u201cmodified form of Positivism,\u201d which bears a striking\nresemblance to \u201cPragmatism\u201d and the \u201cphilosophy of experience.\u201d The\nEnglish reader will find many useful references to Rey in the pages of\nFather Leslie J. Walker\u2019s _Theories of Knowledge_, in the \u201cStoneyhurst\nPhilosophical Series.\u201d\n\n[49] _Ibidem._\n\n[50] It was impossible to procure a copy of this work of M. Blondel. I\nhave tried to do so twice in Paris.\n\n[51] M. Lalande in the _Philosophical Review_ (1906), p. 246.\n\n[52] _Ibid._ pp. 245\u2013246.\n\n[53] I am inclined to attach a great importance to this idea (Kant\nobviously had it) of \u201cconsulting moral experience directly,\u201d provided\nonly that the \u201cmoral\u201d in our experience is not too rigidly separated\nfrom the intellectual. And it would so far, therefore, be only to the\ncredit of Pragmatism if we could associate it with a rational effort\nto do justice to our moral experience, as indeed possibly presupposing\na \u201creality\u201d that transcends the limits of our mere individuality, a\nreality that transcends, too, the subjective idealism that figures but\ntoo prominently in modern philosophy. See my eighth chapter, p. 223,\nwhere I criticize Dr. Bosanquet for not consulting moral experience\ndirectly.\n\n[54] _Phil. Rev._, 1906, p. 243.\n\n[55] See p. 160.\n\n[56] See p. 200 _et. ff._\n\n[57] See p. 64.\n\n[58] For a later statement upon the philosophy of religion in France\nsee a report for the _Phil. Rev._ (vol. xvi. p. 304), by Le Roy.\nThis whole matter is, of course, a subject in itself of the greatest\ntheoretical and practical importance. It is enough for our purpose\nto have indicated the different ways in which Pragmatism and the\n\u201cWill-to-Believe\u201d philosophy have been received in France, and the\ndifferent issues raised by this reception. The reader who would\ncare to look at a constructive, philosophical view (by the _doyen_\nof French philosophy professors) of the whole issue between the\npragmatist or \u201cvoluntarist\u201d point of view in religion and the older\n\u201cintellectual\u201d view, cannot do better than consult _Science and\nReligion in Contemporary Philosophy_, by E. Boutroux, a book that is\napparently studied everywhere at present in France. Its spirit and\nsubstance may be indicated by the following quotations, which follow\nafter some pages in which M. Boutroux exposes the error of \u201cthe radical\ndistinction between theory and practice.\u201d \u201cThe starting point of\nscience is an abstraction, _i.e._ an element extracted from the given\nfact and considered separately. We cannot expect man to be satisfied\nwith the abstract when the concrete is at his disposal. That would be\n\u2018something like offering a printed bill of fare as the equivalent for a\nsolid meal.\u2019 _Man uses science but he lives religion._ The part cannot\nreplace the whole; the symbol cannot suppress reality.\u201d... \u201cNot only\nis science unable to replace religion, but she cannot dispense with\nthe subjective reality upon which the latter is grounded. It is pure\nScholastic realism to imagine that the objective and the impersonal\nsuffice apart from the subjective in our experience. Between the\nsubjective and the objective no demarcation is given which justifies\nfrom the philosophical standpoint the divisions which science imagines\nfor her own convenience.\u201d (p. 329).\n\n[59] Since writing these words, I have made (thanks firstly to Dr.\nSchiller\u2019s review in _Mind_, July 1911) the acquaintance of the\nimportant work of M. Pradines upon the _Conditions of Action_. In\nthe central conception of this work, that action is \u201call-including\u201d\nand that all knowledge is a form of action, I find an important\ndevelopment of much that the pragmatists have long been endeavouring\nto express, and also in particular a development of the celebrated\naction philosophy of M. Blondel. I am inclined, with Dr. Schiller,\nto regard the volumes of M. Pradines as apparently the high-water\nmark of French pragmatist philosophy in the general sense of the\nterm, although I cannot but at the same time hail with approval their\noccasional sharp criticism of Pragmatism as to some extent \u201cscepticism\nand irrationalism.\u201d I am inclined to think, too, that the ethical\nphilosophy of M. Pradines has some of the same defects that I shall\nventure to discuss later in dealing with the application (mainly by\nDewey) of Pragmatism to moral theory. Of course his _Conditions of\nAction_ is by no means as original a production as Blondel\u2019s book upon\n_Action_.\n\n[60] Fouill\u00e9e speaks in his book upon the _Idealist Movement and the\nReaction against Positive Science_ of the year 1851, as the time of the\ntriumph of \u201cforce,\u201d of \u201cNaturalism\u201d (Zola, Goncourt, etc.), and of the\nrevival of Idealism by Lachelier, Renouvier, and Boutroux.\n\n[61] See the celebrated work of A. Fouill\u00e9e, _La Psychologie des\nid\u00e9es-forces_ (Paris, 1890). I confess to having been greatly impressed\nby this book when I first made its acquaintance. In particular, I can\nthink of an idea in Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s book that anticipates even Bergson,\nnamely the fact that every idea or sensation is an effort that is\nfurthered or impeded. But Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s works out in this book the active\nof the volitional side of nearly every mental power and of the mental\nlife itself, refusing to separate \u201cmind\u201d and \u201cbodily activity.\u201d It\nreally anticipates a great deal of the whole French philosophy and\npsychology of action, including the work of Blondel and Bergson.\n\n[62] M. Paul Desjardins (at present a professor of \u201cletters\u201d at S\u00e9vres)\nwas influential in Paris about 1892\u201393 as the founder of a _Union pour\nl\u2019Action morale_, which published a monthly bulletin. This society\nstill exists, but under the name (and the change is indeed highly\nsignificant of what Pragmatism in general really needs) _L\u2019Union pour\nla v\u00e9rit\u00e9 morale et sociale_. I append a few words from one of the\nbulletins I received from M. Desjardins. They are indicative of the\nspiritualizations of thought and action for which the old society\nstood. \u201cIl ne s\u2019agit de rien moins que de renverser enti\u00e8rement\nl\u2019\u00e9chelle de nos jugements, de nos attaches, de mettre en haut ce\nqui \u00e9tait en bas, et en bas ce qui \u00e9tait en haut. Il s\u2019agit d\u2019une\nconversion totale, en somme....\u201d \u201cLa r\u00e8gle commune c\u2019est la m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9\nd\u2019\u00e2me, ou m\u00eame ce qu\u2019on pourrait appeler _l\u2019ath\u00e9isme pratique_. En\neffet, Dieu \u00e9tant, par rapport \u00e0 notre conscience, la Volont\u00e9 que le\nbien se r\u00e9alise, ou la R\u00e8gle vivante, on devient pratiquement, ath\u00e9e,\nf\u00fbt-on d\u2019ailleurs tr\u00e8s persuad\u00e9 par les preuves philosophiques de\nl\u2019existence de Dieu, lorsqu\u2019on perd la notion de cette Volont\u00e9 immuable\navec laquelle la n\u00f4tre se confond activement _d\u00e8s qu\u2019elle m\u00e9rite le nom\nde volont\u00e9 libre_, etc.\u201d In this last sentence there is a distinctly\npragmatist note in the sense of the action philosophy of Blondel and\nBergson and the rest.\n\n[63] See also the recent book by Flournoy on the _Philosophy of James_\n(Paris, 1911), in which this interesting special subject is discussed\nas well as the important difference between James and Bergson.\n\n[64] Rey in his _Philosophie Moderne_, 1908, speaks of the \u201cgleaning of\nthe practical factors of rationalistic systems\u201d as the \u201cnew line\u201d in\nFrench philosophy (_Journ. of Phil._, 1911, p. 226).\n\n[65] From the Lalande article already mentioned.\n\n[66] This can be seen, for example, in the Preface to _Die Philosophie\ndes Als Ob_, the quasi-Pragmatist book recently edited by Vaihinger,\nthe famous commentator on Kant. \u201cWe must distinguish in Pragmatism,\u201d it\nis there stated, \u201cwhat is valuable from the uncritical exaggerations.\nUncritical Pragmatism is an epistemological Utilitarianism of the\nworst sort; what helps us to make life tolerable is true, etc.... Thus\nPhilosophy becomes again an _ancilla theologiae_; nay, the state of\nmatters is even worse than this; it becomes a _meretrix theologorum_.\u201d\nThis, by the way, is a strange and a striking book, and is perhaps the\nlast conspicuous instance from Germany of the vitality, and of the\ndepths of the roots of some of the principles of the pragmatists. The\nvery appearance of the name of Vaihinger in connexion with it (as the\neditor) must be a considerable shock to rationalists and to Kantians,\nwho have long looked upon Vaihinger as one of the authoritative\nnames in German Transcendentalism. Here, however, he seems to agree\nwith those who treat Kant\u2019s ethical philosophy of postulates as the\nreal Kant, making him out, further, as the author of a far-reaching\nphilosophy of the \u201chypotheses\u201d and the \u201cfictions\u201d that we must use in\nthe interpretation of the universe. With Dr. Schiller, who reviews this\nwork in _Mind_ (1912), I am inclined to think that it travels too far\nin the direction of an entirely hypothetical conception of knowledge,\nout-pragmatising the pragmatists apparently. The student who reads\nGerman will find it a veritable magazine of information about nearly\nall the thinkers of the time who have pragmatist or quasi-pragmatist\nleanings. All the names, for example, of the German and French writers\nto whom I refer in this second chapter are mentioned there [I had,\nof course, written my book before I saw Vaihinger], along with many\nothers. It is as serious an arraignment of abstract rationalism as is\nto be found in contemporary literature, and edited, as I say, by the\nNestor of the Kant students of our time.\n\n[67] Especially in the open-minded and learned articles in the _Archiv\nf\u00fcr Philosophie_, 1907, Band xiv., Professor Stein (of Bern) is known\nas one of the most enthusiastic and voluminous writers upon Social\nPhilosophy in Germany. His best-known work is an encyclopedic book upon\nthe social question in the light of philosophy (_Die soziale Frage im\nLichte der Philosophie_, 1903). His tendency here is realistic and\nnaturalistic and evolutionistic, and he thinks (for a philosopher) far\ntoo much of men like Herbert Spencer and Mach and Ostwald. What one\nmisses in Stein is a discussion of the social question in relation to\nsome of the deeper problems of philosophy, such as we find in men of\nour own country like Mackenzie and Bosanquet, and Ritchie, and Jones,\nand others. His work, however (it has been translated into Russian\nand French), is a complete literary presentation of the subject, and\na valuable source of information. See my review notices of it in the\n_Phil. Rev._ vol. xiv.\n\n[68] Mach and Ostwald both represent (for the purposes of our study)\nthe association that undoubtedly exists between Pragmatism and the\ntendency of all the physical and natural sciences to form \u201chypotheses\u201d\nor conceptions, that are to them the best means of \u201cdescribing\u201d or\n\u201cexplaining\u201d (for any purpose) either facts, or the connexions between\nfacts. Mach (professor of the history and theory of the sciences in\nVienna) is a \u201cphenomenalist\u201d and \u201cmethodologist\u201d who attacks all _a\npriorism_, treating the matter of the arrangement of the \u201cmaterial\u201d\nof a science under the idea of the \u201cmost economic expenditure\u201d of our\n\u201cmental energy.\u201d One of the best known of his books is his _Analysis\nof the Sensations_ (translated, along with his _Popular Science\nLectures_, in the \u201cOpen Court Library\u201d of Chicago). In this work he\ncarries out the idea of his theory of knowledge as a question of the\nproper relation of \u201cfacts\u201d to \u201csymbols.\u201d \u201cThing, body, matter,\u201d he says\n(p. 6), \u201care all nothing apart from their so-called attributes.\u201d \u201cMan\npossesses in its highest form the power of consciously and arbitrarily\ndetermining his point of view.\u201d In his _Introduction_, he attempts to\nshow how \u201cthe ego and the relation of bodies to the ego give rise\u201d to\n\u201cproblems\u201d in the relations simply of \u201ccertain complexes\u201d of \u201csensation\nto each other.\u201d While it is undoubtedly to the credit of Mach that he\nsees the \u201csubjective,\u201d or the \u201cmental,\u201d factor in facts and things and\nobjects, it must be said that he ignores altogether the philosophical\nproblems of the ego, or the \u201cself,\u201d as something more than a mere\nobject among objects.\n\nOstwald is one of the founders of the theory of \u201cEnergetics,\u201d the\ntheory of the school that believes in substituting a dynamical\nphilosophy, for the older, atomic, or mechanical philosophy of matter\nand motion. He put this philosophy forward in 1895 as the last gift of\nthe nineteenth to the twentieth century. He suggests how this idea of\nenergetics may be applied also to psychical processes, in so far as\nthese may be understood by conceptions that have proved to be useful in\nour interpretation of the physical world. Our \u201cconsciousness would thus\ncome to be looked upon as a property of a peculiar kind of energy of\nthe nerves.\u201d The whole idea is a piece of phenomenalistic positivism,\nand although Ostwald makes an attempt (somewhat in the manner of\nHerbert Spencer) to explain the \u201cforms,\u201d or the categories, of\nexperience as simply \u201cnorms\u201d or \u201crules\u201d that have been handed on from\none generation to another, he does not occupy himself with ultimate\nphilosophical questions about the nature either of matter or of energy.\nHis _Natural Philosophy_ has recently been translated into English\n(Holt & Co., 1910). Its Pragmatism lies in the fact of his looking\nupon concepts and classification as \u201cnot questions\u201d of the so-called\n\u201cessence\u201d of the thing, \u201cbut rather as pertaining to purely practical\narrangements for an easier and more successful mastery of scientific\nproblems\u201d (p. 67). He also takes a pragmatist, or \u201cfunctional,\u201d\nconception of the mental life towards the close of this book. Professor\nOstwald lectured some years ago in the United States, and his lectures\nwere attended by students of philosophy and students of science.\nProfessor (now President) Hibben has written an interesting account of\nhis theory in its philosophical bearings in the _Philosophical Review_,\nvol. xii.\n\n[69] The philosophy of Avenarius (born in Paris, but died as Professor\nof Inductive Philosophy in Zurich) is called \u201cEmpirical Criticism,\u201d\nwhich differs from Idealism by taking a more realistic attitude to\nordinary human experience. There is an excellent elementary account\nof Avenarius in _Mind_ for 1897 by Carstanjen of Zurich. Avenarius\ngoes back in some respects to the teaching of Comte as to the need of\ninterpreting all philosophical theories in the terms of the social\nenvironment out of which they come.\n\n[70] _Logic_, vol. ii. p. 17. English translation by Miss Dendy.\nIn this same section of his work, Lotze talks of the demands of\nour thought as \u201cpostulates\u201d whose claims rest in the end upon our\nwill--_auf unserm Wollen_.\n\n[71] To be traced to Fichte\u2019s well-known initial interpretation of Kant\nfrom the standpoint of the Practical Reason of the second \u201cCritique,\u201d\nand to Schelling\u2019s late \u201cpositive\u201d philosophy, and to Schopenhauer, the\nwill philosopher _par excellence_. See my _Schopenhauer\u2019s System in its\nPhilosophical Significance_.\n\n[72] As an illustration of this \u201cconceptual shorthand,\u201d I take the\nfollowing lines from Professor Needham\u2019s book upon _General Biology_\n(p. 222) in respect of \u201cclassification\u201d and its relative and changing\ncharacter. \u201cWhatever our views of relationship, the series in which we\narrange organisms are based upon the likenesses and differences we find\nto exist among them. This is classification. We associate organisms\ntogether under group names because, being so numerous and so diverse,\nit is only thus that our minds can deal with them. Classification\nfurnishes the handles by which we move all our intellectual luggage.\nWe base our groupings on what we know of the organisms. Our system of\nclassification is therefore liable to change with every advance of\nknowledge.\u201d\n\n[73] Professor Jerusalem (the translator of James\u2019s _Pragmatism_ into\nGerman) is known as one of the German discoverers of Pragmatism.\nHis _Introduction to Philosophy_ (translated by Professor Sanders,\nMacmillan & Co., N.Y., 1910) is an admirable, easy, and instructive\nintroduction to philosophy from a pragmatist point of view. It has\ngone through four editions in Germany. It is quite free from any taint\nof irrationalism and has sections upon the \u201ctheory of knowledge\u201d and\nthe \u201ctheory of being.\u201d Its spirit may be inferred from the following\nquotations. \u201cMy philosophy is characterized by the empirical view\npoint, the genetic method, and the biological and the social methods\nof interpreting the human mind\u201d (the Preface). \u201cPhilosophy is the\nintellectual effort which is undertaken with a view to combining\nthe common experiences of life and the results of scientific\ninvestigation into a harmonious and consistent world theory; a world\ntheory, moreover, which is adapted to satisfy the requirements of the\nunderstanding and the demands of the heart. There was a time when\nmen believed that such a theory could be constructed from the pure\nforms of thought, without much concern for the results of detailed\ninvestigation. But that time is for ever past\u201d (pp. 1 and 2).\n\n[74] Author of a work on _Philosophy and Social Economy_ (_Philosophie\nund Wirthschaft_), in which the fundamental idea is that philosophy is\nessentially nothing more or less than a \u201cconception of life\u201d or a view\nof the world in general, and that the older rationalistic philosophy\nwill therefore have to be modified in view of modern discoveries and\nmodern ways of looking at things. It has, of course, the limitations\nof such a point of view, in so far as its author seems to forget\nthat philosophy must _lead_ human life and not merely _follow_ it.\nMy present point is merely to mention of the existence and work of\nthis man as one of the continental thinkers who have anticipated the\nessentially social conception of philosophy taken by the pragmatists.\n\n[75] It is easy to see the influence of Fichte\u2019s will philosophy and\npractical idealism in Schellwien\u2019s books (_Philosophie und Leben_,\n_Wille und Erkenntniss_, _Der Geist der neuern Philosophie_). He\nspeaks of the primacy of the will (in point of time only, of course),\nor of the \u201cunconscious\u201d in the life of man, allowing, however, that\nman gradually transforms this natural life in the life of \u201ccreative\nactivity\u201d that is his proper life. He states (in the _Spirit of the New\nPhilosophy_) the pragmatist idea that \u201cbelief\u201d (p. 32) or the \u201cfeeling\u201d\nthat we have of the ultimate \u201cunity\u201d of \u201csubject and object,\u201d precedes\n(also in point of \u201ctime\u201d) knowledge, pointing out, however, in the\nsame place the limitations of belief. These latter, he supposes, to be\novercome in the higher knowledge that we have in creative activity--an\nidea which, I think, may be associated to some extent with the position\nof Blondel.\n\n[76] In the _Phil. Rev._ (xvi. p. 250) Dr. Ewald speaks of this work\nof this psychologizing school as existing alongside of the renewed\ninterest in Fichte and Schelling and Hegel. It is an attempt to revive\nthe teaching of Fries, a Kantian (at Jena) who attempted to establish\nthe Critique of Pure Reason upon a psychological basis, believing\nthat psychology, \u201cbased on internal experience,\u201d must form the basis\nof all philosophy. It stands squarely upon the fact that all logical\nlaws and \u201ccategories,\u201d even the highest and most abstract, in order to\n\u201ccome to consciousness in man,\u201d must be given to him as \u201cpsychological\nprocesses\u201d--a position which is certainly true as far as it goes, and\nwhich supports, say, the genetic psychological attitude of Professor\nDewey. Its attitude has been sharply criticized in some of his books\nby Dr. Ernst Cassirer of Berlin, a well-known upholder of a more\nrationalistic form of Neo-Kantianism.\n\n[77] Dr. Simmel of Berlin (like Stein) is a prominent representative\nof this school (even in a recent striking book that he wrote upon the\nphilosophy of Kant). He has written, for example, a most erudite work\nupon the _Philosophy of Money_, and this at the same time with all his\nuniversity work as a fascinating and learned lecturer upon both ancient\nand modern philosophy.\n\n[78] Without attempting to enter upon the matter of Harnack\u2019s\nphilosophy as a Neo-Kantian of the school of Ritschl, I am thinking\nsimply of things like the following from his book on the _Essence of\nChristianity_. \u201cIt is to man that religion pertains, to man, as one\nwho in the midst of all change and progress himself never changes\u201d (p.\n8). \u201cThe point of view of the philosophical theorists in the strict\nsense of the word will find no place in these lectures. Had they been\ndelivered sixty years ago it would have been our endeavour to try to\narrive by speculative reasoning at some general conception of religion,\nand then to define the Christian religion accordingly. But we have\nrightly become sceptical about the value of this procedure. _Latet\ndolus in generalibus._ We know to-day that life cannot be spanned by\ngeneral conceptions\u201d (p. 9). See also his protest (on p. 220) against\nthe substitution of a \u201cHellenistic\u201d view of religion for religion\nitself--a protest that is, according to Pfleiderer in his _Development\nof Theology_ (p. 298), a marked characteristic of Harnack\u2019s whole\n_History of Dogma_.\n\n[79] I am thinking of Ritschl\u2019s sharp distinction between \u201ctheoretical\nknowledge\u201d and \u201creligious faith\u201d (which rises to judgments of value\nabout the world that transcend even moral values), and of his idea that\nthe \u201ctruth\u201d of faith is practical, and must be \u201clived.\u201d Pfleiderer says\n(in his _Development of Theology_, p. 184) that Ritschl\u2019s \u201cconception\nof religion is occupied with judgments of value [_Werturtheile_],\n_i.e._ with conceptions of our relation to the world which are of\nmoment solely according to their value in awakening feelings of\npleasure and pain, as our dominion over the world is furthered or\nchecked.\u201d His \u201cacceptance of the idea of God as [with Kant] a practical\n\u2018belief,\u2019 and not an act of speculative cognition,\u201d is also to some\nextent a pragmatist idea in the sense in which, in this book, I reject\npragmatist ideas. Ritschl seems to have in the main only a strongly\npractical interest in dogmatics holding that \u201conly the things vital\nare to be made vital in the actual service of the church.\u201d He goes the\nlength of holding that \u201ca merely philosophical view of the world has\nno place in Christian theology,\u201d holding that \u201cmetaphysical inquiry\u201d\napplied to \u201cnature\u201d and to \u201cspirit,\u201d as \u201cthings to be analysed, for\nthe purpose of finding _out what they are in themselves_, can from the\nnature of the case have no great value for Christian theology.\u201d Of\ncourse he is right in holding that the \u201cproofs for the existence of\nGod, conducted by the purely metaphysical method, do not lead to the\nforces whose representation is given in Christianity, but merely to\nconceptions of a world-unity, which conceptions are neutral as regards\nall religion\u201d (_The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl_, Swing. Longmans,\nGreen & Co., 1901). I think this last quotation from Ritschl may be\nused as an expression of the idea of the pragmatists, that a true and\ncomplete philosophy must serve as a \u201cdynamic\u201d to human endeavour and to\nhuman motive.\n\n[80] See the reference to Windelband in the footnote upon p. 150.\n\n[81] I am thinking of M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s contention in his _Grundz\u00fcge_\nand his other books, that the life of actual persons can never be\nadequately described by the objective sciences, by psycho-physics, and\nso on, and of his apparent acceptance of the distinction of Rickert\nbetween the \u201cdescriptive\u201d and the \u201cnormative\u201d sciences (logic, ethics,\naesthetics, and so on).\n\n[82] The leaders of this school are the two influential thinkers and\nteachers Cohen and Natorp, the former the author of a well-known book\nupon Kant\u2019s _Theory of Experience_ (1871), formerly much used by\nEnglish and American students, and the latter the author of an equally\nfamous book upon Plato\u2019s _Theory of Ideas_, which makes an interesting\nattempt to connect Plato\u2019s \u201cIdeas\u201d with the modern notion of the law of\na phenomenon. Cohen has given forth recently an important development\nof the Kantian philosophy in his two remarkable books upon the _Logic\nof Pure Knowledge_ and the _Ethic of the Pure Will_. These works\nexercise a great influence upon the entire liberal (Protestant and\nJewish) thought of the time in Germany. They teach a lofty spiritualism\nand idealism in the realm of ethics, which transcends altogether\nanything as yet attempted in this direction by Pragmatism.\n\n[83] See the instructive reports to the _Philosophical Review_ by\nDr. Ewald of Vienna upon Contemporary Philosophy in Germany. In the\n1907 volume he speaks of this renewed interest, \u201con a new basis,\u201d in\nthe work of the great founders of transcendentalism as an \u201cimportant\nmovement partly within and partly outside of Neo-Kantianism,\u201d as\n\u201ca movement heralded by some and derided by others as a reaction,\u201d\nas the \u201cfulfilment of a prophecy by von Hartmann that after Kant\nwe should have Fichte, and after Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.\u201d The\nrenewed interest in Schelling, and with it the revival of an interest\nin university courses in the subject of the Philosophy of Nature\n(see the recent work of Driesch upon the _Science and Philosophy of\nthe Organism_) is all part of the recent reaction in Germany against\nPositivism.\n\n[84] We may associate, I suppose, the new German journal _Logos_, an\ninternational periodical for the \u201cPhilosophie der Kultur,\u201d with the\nsame movement.\n\n[85] See Chapter VII. upon \u201cPragmatism as Americanism.\u201d\n\n[86] See an article in the _Critical Review_ (edited by the late\nProfessor Salmond, of Aberdeen), by the author upon \u201cRecent Tendencies\nin American Philosophy.\u201d The year, I think, was either 1904 or 1905.\n\n[87] See p. 180.\n\n[88] Without pretending to anything like a representative or an\nexhaustive statement in the case of this magazine literature, I may\nmention the following: Professor Perry of Harvard, in his valuable\narticles for the _Journal of Philosophy and Psychology_, 1907, vol.\niv., upon \u201cA Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization,\u201d\nand a \u201cReview of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge\u201d; Professor\nArmstrong in vol. v. of the same journal upon the \u201cEvolution of\nPragmatism\u201d; and Professor Lovejoy in the 1908 vol. upon the \u201cThirteen\nPragmatisms.\u201d These are but a few out of the many that might be\nmentioned. The reader who is interested in looking for more such must\nsimply consult for himself the _Philosophical Review_, and _Mind_,\nand the _Journal of Philosophy and Psychology_, for some years after,\nsay, 1903. There is a good list of such articles in a German Doctor\nThesis by Professor MacEachran of the University of Alberta, entitled\n_Pragmatismus eine neue Richtung der Philosophie_, Leipzig, 1910. There\nis also a history of pragmatist articles in the 1907 (January) number\nof the _Revue des Sciences, Philosophiques et Theologiques._\n\n[89] That this has really taken place can be clearly seen, I think, if\nwe inspect the official programmes of the Proceedings of the American\nPhilosophical Association for the last year or two.\n\n[90] P. 144.\n\n[91] See p. 149.\n\n[92] See Chapter VI., p. 149, upon the doctrine and the fact of\n\u201cMeaning.\u201d\n\n[93] Professor Pratt, _What is Pragmatism?_ (Macmillan & Co.,\n1909); H.\u00a0H. Bawden, _The Principles of Pragmatism, a Philosophical\nInterpretation of Experience_, Boston, 1910 (a useful book presenting\nwhat may be called a \u201cphenomenological\u201d account of Pragmatism); Moore,\n_Pragmatism and Its Critics_.\n\n[94] _In Pragmatism and Its Critics_ (Univ. of Chicago Press).\n\n[95] The manifesto has now become a book. _The New Realism_\n(Macmillan). For a useful account of the New Realism and the Old see\nProfessor Perry, _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, Part V.\n\n[96] The following are my reasons for saying that the \u201cNew Realism\u201d was\nalready to some extent lurking in the \u201cradical empiricism\u201d of James.\n(1) Although teaching unmistakably the \u201cactivity\u201d of mind, James seemed\nto think this activity \u201cselective\u201d rather than \u201ccreative\u201d (falling in\nthis idea behind his much-admired Bergson). (2) Despite this belief in\nthe activity of the mind, he had the way of regarding consciousness\nas (to some extent) the mind\u2019s \u201ccontent\u201d--an attitude common to all\nempirical psychologists since Hume and the English associationists.\nAnd from this position (legitimate so far from the psychological point\nof view) he went on to the idea (expressed in a troublesome form in\nthe article, \u201cDoes Consciousness exist?\u201d) that consciousness is _not\nan entity or substance_--of course it is not in the ordinary sense of\n\u201centity.\u201d (3) Then from this he seemed to develop the idea that the\nvarious \u201celements\u201d that enter into consciousness to be transformed\ninto various \u201crelationships\u201d do not suffer any substantial change in\nthis quasi-subjective \u201cactivity.\u201d Therefore, as Professor Perry puts\nit (_Present Tendencies_, p. 353), \u201cthe elements or terms which enter\ninto consciousness and become its content may now be regarded as _the\nsame elements which, in so far as otherwise related, compose physical\nnature_ [italics mine]. The elements themselves, the \u2018_materia prima_,\u2019\nor stuff of pure experience, are neither psychical nor physical.\u201d It\nis in this last absurd sentence [simply a piece of quasi-scientific\nanalysis, the error of which Critical Idealism would expose in a\nmoment] that the roots, I think, of \u201cnew realism\u201d are to be found--a\ndoctrine whose unmitigated externalism is the negation of all\nphilosophy.\n\n[97] See p. 164 and p. 230.\n\n[98] I refer to his Aberdeen \u201cGifford Lectures\u201d on \u201cThe World and The\nIndividual,\u201d and to a well-known address of his upon \u201cThe Eternal\nand the Practical\u201d in the _Proceedings of the American Philosophical\nAssociation_. In this latter pamphlet he shows that Pragmatism and the\nphilosophy of Consequences are impossible without \u201cthe Eternal\u201d and\nwithout Idealism.\n\n[99] The criticisms of which I am thinking are (to select but a few\nfrom memory) Green\u2019s well-known admission in respect of Hegelianism,\nthat it would have \u201cto be done all over again\u201d; Mr. Bradley\u2019s admission\nthat he is \u201cnot a Hegelian\u201d and (recently) that he has \u201cseen too much\nof metaphysics\u201d to place any serious weight upon its reasonings;\nJowett\u2019s complaint (in the \u201clife\u201d by Campbell) that the Oxford\nHegelianism of his day was teaching students to place an undue reliance\nupon \u201cwords\u201d and \u201cconcepts\u201d in the place of facts and things; Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s admission (many years ago) that, of course, \u201cgods and men\u201d\nwere more than \u201cbloodless categories\u201d; Professor Pringle Pattison\u2019s\ncriticism of Hegel in his _Hegelianism and Personality_; Professor\nBaillie\u2019s criticisms at the end of his _Logic of Hegel_; Mr. Sturt\u2019s\ncriticism of Neo-Hegelianism in his _Idola Theatri_, etc.\n\n[100] See the following, for example, from Professor Stout: \u201cEvery\nagreeable or disagreeable sensation has a conative or quasi-conative\naspect\u201d (_Manual of Psychology_, p. 233). Also: \u201cPerception is never\nmerely cognitive\u201d (_ibid._ p. 242); it has a \u201cconative character and a\nfeeling tone,\u201d etc.\n\n[101] A. Sidgwick\u2019s \u201cApplied Axioms\u201d (_Mind_, N.S. xiv. p. 42). This is\nextremely useful, connecting the recent pragmatist movement with the\nwork of the English logicians. See in the same connexion the articles\nof Captain Knox in the _Quarterly Review_ (April 1909) on \u201cPragmatism.\u201d\n\n[102] During the last ten years _Mind_ has contained articles on\nthe pragmatist controversy by nearly all our prominent academic\nauthorities: Dr. Bradley, Dr. McTaggart, Professor Taylor, Professor\nHoernle, Dr. Schiller, Dr. Mellone, Dr. Boyce-Gibson, Mr. Hobhouse, and\nso on.\n\n[103] Particularly in his valuable book on _Truth_ in which the\nweakness of the Hegelian conception of truth is set forth along with\nthat of other views.\n\n[104] In _Idealism as a Practical Creed_, in his _Browning as a\nReligious and Philosophical Teacher_, and elsewhere.\n\n[105] In his _Elements of Metaphysic_, and in many of his recent\nreviews; in his review, for example, of Professor Bosanquet\u2019s\n_Individuality and Value_, in the _Review of Theology and Philosophy_,\nand in his Mind (July 1912) review of Professor Ward\u2019s _Realm of Ends_.\n\n[106] In his book upon the _Philosophy of Eucken_, in _God With Us_,\nand elsewhere.\n\n[107] In _Idola Theatri_ (an important criticism of Neo-Hegelian\nwriters), and elsewhere.\n\n[108] In _Essays in Philosophical Construction_, and in his book upon\nLogic.\n\n[109] In his _Introduction to Logic_.\n\n[110] See p. 154.\n\n[111] \u201cIf God has this perfect authority and perfect knowledge, His\nauthority cannot rule us, nor His knowledge know us, or any human\nthing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our\nknowledge know anything which is divine; so by parity of reason they,\nbeing gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of\nmen\u201d (_Parmenides_, 134, Jowett\u2019s _Plato_, vol. iv.).\n\n[112] This is, of course, a very old difficulty, involved in the\nproblem of the supposed pre-knowledge of God. Bradley deals with\nit in the _Mind_ (July 1911) article upon \u201cSome Aspects of Truth.\u201d\nHis solution (as Professor Dawes Hicks notices in the _Hibbert\nJournal_, January 1912) is the familiar Neo-Hegelian finding, that as\na \u201cparticular judgment\u201d with a \u201cunique context\u201d my truth is \u201cnew,\u201d\nbut \u201cas an element in an eternal reality\u201d it was \u201cwaiting for me.\u201d\nReaders of Green\u2019s _Prolegomena_ are quite ready for this finding.\nPragmatists, of course, while insisting on the man-made character\nof truth, have not as yet come in sight of the difficulties of the\ndivine foreknowledge--in relation to the free purposes and the free\ndiscoveries of mortals.\n\n[113] There is, it seems to me, a suggestion of this rationalist\nposition in the fact, for example, that Mr. Bertrana Russell begins his\nrecent booklet upon _The Problems of Philosophy_ with the following\ninquiry about knowledge: \u201cIs there any knowledge in the world which\nis so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?\u201d I mean that\nthe initial and paramount importance attached here to this question\nconveys the impression that the supreme reality for philosophy is still\nsome independently certain piece of knowledge. I prefer, with the\npragmatists and the humanists, to think of knowledge as concerned with\nthe purposes of persons as intelligent beings, or with the realities\nrevealed in the knowing process. Although there are passages in his\nbook that show Mr. Russell to be aware of the selves and the psychical\nelements and processes that enter into knowing, they do not affect his\nprevailingly rationalistic and impersonal conception of knowledge and\nphilosophy.\n\n[114] In his sympathetic and characteristic review of James\u2019s\n\u201cPragmatism\u201d in the _Journ. of Philos._, 1908.\n\n[115] See p. 203 (the _note_), and p. 263, where I suggest that no\nphilosophy can exist, or can possibly begin, without some direct\ncontact with reality, without the experience of some person or persons,\nwithout assumptions of one kind or another.\n\n[116] See p. 162.\n\n[117] In this attitude Pragmatism is manifestly in a state of rebellion\nagainst \u201cPlatonism,\u201d if we allow ourselves to think of Pragmatism\nas capable of confronting Plato. Plato, as we know, definitely\nsubordinates \u201cbelief\u201d to \u201cknowledge\u201d and \u201ctruth.\u201d \u201cAs being is to\nbecoming,\u201d he says, \u201cso is truth to belief\u201d (_Timaeus_, Jowett\u2019s\ntranslation). To Plato belief is a conjectural, or imaginative,\nestimate of reality; it deals rather with \u201cappearance\u201d or \u201cbecoming\u201d\nthan with \u201creality.\u201d \u201cTrue being\u201d he thinks of as revealed in\nthe Ideas, or the rational entities that are his development and\ntransformation of the \u201cdefinition\u201d of Socrates. Against all this\nrationalism Pragmatism (it is enough meantime merely to indicate the\nfact) would have us return to the common-sense, or the religious,\nposition that it is invariably what we believe in that determines our\nnotion of reality.\n\n[118] Cf. p. 159.\n\n[119] From Dr. Schiller\u2019s _Humanism_.\n\n[120] _Pragmatism_, p. 207.\n\n[121] It is this dissatisfaction at once with the abstractions of\nscience and of rationalism and with the contradictions that seem to\nexist between them all and the facts of life and experience as we feel\nthem that constitutes _the great dualism_, or _the great opposition of\nmodern times_. I do not wish to emphasize this dualism, nor do I wish\nto set forth faith or belief in opposition to reason when I extract\nfrom both Pragmatism and Idealism the position that it is belief\nrather than knowledge that is our fundamental estimate of reality. I\ndo not believe, as I indicate in the text above, that this dualism is\nultimate. It has come about only from an unfortunate setting of some\nparts of our nature, or of our experience in opposition to the whole\nof our nature, or the whole of our experience. That the opposition,\nhowever, between reason and faith still exists in many quarters, and\nthat it is and has been _the_ opposition of modern times, and that\nthe great want of our times is a rational faith that shall recall the\nworld of to-day out of its endless \u201cdistraction\u201d (the word is Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s), I am certainly inclined to maintain. In proof of this\nstatement it is enough to recall things like the words of Goethe about\nthe conflict of belief and unbelief as the unique theme of the history\nof the world, or the \u201cethical headache which was literally a splitting\nheadache,\u201d that Mr. Chesterton finds in the minds of many of our great\nVictorian writers. I shall take leave of it here with three references\nto its existence taken from the words or the work of living writers.\nThe first shall be the opposition which Mr. Bertrand Russell finds in\nhis _Philosophical Essays_ (in the \u201cFree Man\u2019s Worship\u201d) between the\n\u201cworld which science presents for our belief\u201d and the \u201clofty thoughts\nthat ennoble his little day.\u201d The second shall be the inconsistency\nthat exists in Mr. Hugh S.\u00a0R. Elliot\u2019s book upon _Modern Science and\nthe Illusions of Professor Bergson_, between his initial acceptance of\nthe mechanical, evolutionary system of modern science and his closing\nacceptance of feeling and poetry and love as the \u201cdeepest forms of\nhappiness.\u201d The third shall be the declaration of Professor Sir Henry\nJones of Glasgow (in the _Hibbert Journal_, 1903) that \u201cone of the\ncharacteristics of our time is the contradiction that exists between\nits practical faith in morality and its theoretical distrust of the\nconceptions on which they rest.\u201d\n\n[122] See p. 203 (note).\n\n[123] See p. 7.\n\n[124] From _Pragmatism and its Misunderstanders_.\n\n[125] See p. 173.\n\n[126] \u201cYou will be surprised to learn, then, that Messrs. Schiller\u2019s\nand Dewey\u2019s theories have suffered a hailstorm of contempt and\nridicule. All rationalism has risen up against them. In influential\nquarters, Mr. Schiller in particular has been treated like an impudent\nschool-boy who deserves a spanking. I should not mention this but for\nthe fact that it throws so much light upon _that rationalist temper\nto which I have opposed the temper of pragmatism. Pragmatism is\nuncomfortable away from facts. Rationalism is comfortable only in the\npresence of abstractions._ This pragmatist talk about truths in the\nplural, about their utility and satisfactoriness, about the success\nwith which they \u2018work,\u2019 etc., suggests to the typical intellectualist\nmind a sort of coarse, lame, second-rate makeshift article of truth\u201d\n(James, _Pragmatism_, pp. 66\u201367; italics mine). The words about\nRationalism being comfortable only in the world of abstractions are\nsubstantiated by the procedure of Bosanquet, to whom I refer in Chapter\nVIII., or by the procedure of Mr. Bertrand Russell, referred to on p.\n169.\n\n[127] See p. 235 in the Bergson chapter where it is suggested that\nperception is limited to what interests us for vital or for practical\npurposes.\n\n[128] Cf. p. 92.\n\n[129] See p. 65.\n\n[130] See p. 234 upon the \u201canti-intellectualism\u201d in the philosophy of\nBergson.\n\n[131] See p. 4 and p. 237.\n\n[132] From \u201cTruth and Copying,\u201d _Mind_, No. 62.\n\n[133] From \u201cTruth and Practice,\u201d in _Mind_. Cf. \u201cThis denial of\ntranscendence, this insistence that all ideas, and more especially\nsuch ideas as those of God, are true and real just so far as they\nwork, is to myself most welcome\u201d (Bradley, in _Mind_, 1908, p. 227,\n\u201cAmbiguity of Pragmatism\u201d). Mr. Bradley has of recent years made so\nmany such concessions, and has philosophized with such an admirable\ndegree of independence, and has (also admirably) attached so much\nweight to his own _experience_ of \u201cmetaphysics,\u201d and of other things\nbesides, that many thinkers like Knox and Dewey and Schiller have been\ndiscussing whether he can any longer be regarded as a rationalist. One\ncould certainly study, profitably, the whole evolution of philosophy\nin England during the last forty years by studying Mr. Bradley\u2019s\ndevelopment. He never was, of course, a Hegelian in the complete sense\n(who ever was?), and he has now certainly abandoned an abstract,\nformalistic Rationalism.\n\nBy way of an additional quotation or two from Mr. Bradley, typical of\nhis advance in the direction of the practical philosophy for which\nPragmatism stands, we may append the following: \u201cI long ago pointed\nout that theory takes its origin from practical collision [the main\ncontention of Professor Dewey and his associates]. _If Pragmatism\nmeans this, I am a pragmatist_\u201d (from an article in _Mind_ on the\n\u201cAmbiguity of Pragmatism\u201d--italics mine). \u201cWe may reject the limitation\nof knowledge to the mere world of events which happen, and may deny\nthe claim of this world to be taken as an ultimate foundation. Reality\nor the Good will be the satisfaction of all the wants of our nature,\nand _theoretical truth will be the perception of ideas which directly\nsatisfy one of those wants, and so invariably make part of the general\nsatisfaction_. This is a doctrine which, to my mind, commends itself as\ntrue, though it naturally would call for a great deal of explanation\u201d\n(from _Mind_, July 1904, p. 325). And, as typical of the kind of final\nphilosophy to which the philosophical reconstruction of the future\nmust somehow attain out of the present quarrel between Pragmatism and\nRationalism, the following: \u201cIf there were no force in the world but\nthe vested love of God, if the wills in the past were one in effort and\nin substance with the one Will, if in that Will they are living still\nand still are so loving, and if again by faith, suffering, and love my\nwill is made really one with theirs, here indeed we should have found\nat once our answer and our refuge. But with this we should pass surely\nbeyond the limits of any personal individualism\u201d (from _Mind_, July\n1904, p. 316). Dr. Schiller, by the way, has a list of such concessions\nto Pragmatism on the part of Mr. Bradley in _Mind_, 1910, p. 35.\n\n[134] Cf. the saying of Herbert Spencer (_Autobiography_, i. 253) that\na \u201cbelief in the unqualified supremacy of reason [is] the superstition\nof philosophers.\u201d\n\n[135] See p. 147.\n\n[136] \u201cTruth and Practice,\u201d _Mind_, No. 51.\n\n[137] It would be easy to quote to the same effect from other Hegelian\nstudents, or, for that part of it, from Hegel himself.\n\n[138] _Elements of Metaphysics_, p. 411.\n\n[139] _Ibid._ p. 414.\n\n[140] Cf. p. 14.\n\n[141] See the well-known volume _Personal Idealism_, edited by Mr.\nSturt.\n\n[142] Cf. pp. 147 and 193.\n\n[143] By this notion is meant the common-sense idea that truth in all\ncases \u201ccorresponds\u201d to fact, my perception of the sunset to the real\nsunset, my \u201cidea\u201d of a \u201ctrue\u201d friend to a real person whose outward\nacts \u201ccorrespond to\u201d or \u201cfaithfully reflect\u201d his inner feelings. See\nthe first chapter of Mr. Joachim\u2019s book upon _The Nature of Truth_,\nwhere this notion is examined and found wanting. It is probably\nthe oldest notion of truth, and yet one that takes us readily into\nphilosophy from whatever point of view we examine it. It was held by\nnearly all the Greek philosophers before the time of the Sophists,\nwho first began to teach that truth is what it \u201cappears to be\u201d--the\n\u201crelativity\u201d position that is upheld, for example, by Goethe, who said\nthat \u201cWhen I know my relation to myself and to the outer world I call\nthis truth. And thus every man can have his own truth, and yet truth is\nalways the same.\u201d The common-sense view was held also by St. Augustine\nin the words, \u201cThat is true what is really what it seems to be (_verum\nest quod ita est, ut videtur_),\u201d by Thomas Aquinas as the \u201cadequacy\nof the intellect to the thing,\u201d in so far as the intellect says that\nthat is which really is, or that that is not which is not (_adaequatio\nintellectus et rei_), by Suarez, by Goclen, who made it a conformity\nof the judgment with the thing. Its technical difficulties begin to\nappear, say in Hobbes, who held that truth consists in the fact of the\nsubject and the predicate being a name of the same thing, or even in\nLocke, who says: \u201cTruth then seems to me in the proper import of the\nword to signify nothing but the joining or separating of signs, as the\nthings signified by them, do agree, or disagree, one with another\u201d\n(_Essay_, iv. 5. 2). How can _things_ \u201cagree\u201d or \u201cdisagree\u201d with one\nanother? And an \u201cidea\u201d of course is, anyhow, not a \u201cthing\u201d with a shape\nand with dimensions that \u201ccorrespond\u201d to \u201cthings,\u201d any more than is a\n\u201cjudgment\u201d a relation of two \u201cideas\u201d \u201ccorresponding\u201d to the \u201crelations\u201d\nof two \u201cthings.\u201d\n\n[144] \u201cThe mind is not a \u2018mirror\u2019 which passively reflects what it\nchances to come upon. It initiates and tries; and its correspondence\nwith the \u2018outer world\u2019 means that its effort successfully meets the\nenvironment in behalf of the organic interest from which it sprang.\nThe mind, like an antenna, feels the way for the organism. It gropes\nabout, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and many\nfailures; but it is always urged into taking the _initiative_ by the\npressure of interest, and doomed to success or failure in some hour\nof trial when it meets and engages the environment. Such is mind, and\nsuch, according to James, _are all its operations_\u201d (Perry, _Present\nPhilosophical Tendencies_, p. 351). Or the following: \u201cI hope that,\u201d\nsaid James in the \u201clectures\u201d embodied in _Pragmatism_ (New York, 1908)\n... \u201cthe concreteness and closeness to facts of pragmatism ... may be\nwhat approves itself to you as its most satisfactory peculiarity. It\nonly follows here the example of the sister sciences, interpreting\nthe unobserved by the observed. It brings old and new harmoniously\ntogether. _It converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation\nof \u2018correspondence\u2019 between our minds and reality, into that of a rich\nand active commerce_ (that any one may follow in detail and understand)\n_between particular thoughts of ours and the great universe of other\nexperiences in which they play their parts and have their uses_\u201d (p.\n68; italics mine).\n\n[145] \u201cOn any view like mine to speak of truth as in the end copying\nreality, would be senseless\u201d (Bradley in _Mind_, July 1911, \u201cOn some\nAspects of Truth\u201d).\n\n[146] See p. 143 and p. 265.\n\n[147] See p. 127 and p. 133.\n\n[148] See pp. 148\u20139.\n\n[149] See p. 162.\n\n[150] _What is Pragmatism?_ (Pratt), p. 21.\n\n[151] _Principles of Pragmatism_, Houghton Mifflin, 1910.\n\n[152] _Ibid._, Preface. This last sentence, by the way, may be\ntaken as one of the many illustrations that may be given of the\ncrudities and difficulties of some of the literature of Pragmatism.\nIt shows that Pragmatism may sometimes be as guilty of abstractionism\nas is Rationalism itself. It is not \u201cexperience\u201d that becomes\n\u201cself-conscious,\u201d but only \u201cpersons.\u201d And, similarly, it is only\n\u201cpersons\u201d who pursue \u201cends\u201d and \u201csatisfy\u201d desires, and who may be\nsaid to have a \u201cmethod.\u201d Professor Bawden, of course, means that it\nis to the credit of Pragmatism that it approaches experience just as\nit finds it, and that its chief method is the interpretation of the\nsame experience--an easy thing, doubtless, to profess, but somewhat\ndifficult to carry out.\n\n[153] _Principles of Pragmatism_, Houghton Mifflin, 1910, pp. 44\u201345.\n\n[154] P. 253.\n\n[155] P. 256.\n\n[156] See p. 146.\n\n[157] See p. 240 _et ff._\n\n[158] Wallace\u2019s _Logic of Hegel_, p. 304.\n\n[159] There is a sentence in one of Hawthorne\u2019s stories to the effect\nthat man\u2019s work is always illusory to some extent, while God is the\nonly worker of realities. I would not go as far as this, believing,\nas I do, with the pragmatists, that man is at least a fellow-worker\nwith God. But I do find Pragmatism lacking, as 1 indicate elsewhere,\nin any adequate recognition of the work of God, or the Absolute in the\nuniverse.\n\n[160] I am thinking of such considerations as are suggested in the\nfollowing sentences from Maeterlinck: \u201cAs we advance through life, it\nis more and more brought home to us that nothing takes place that is\nnot in accord with some curious, preconceived design; and of this we\nnever breathe a word, we scarcely let our minds dwell upon it, but of\nits existence, somewhere above our heads, we are absolutely convinced\u201d\n(_The Treasure of the Humble_, p. 17). \u201cBut this much at least is\nabundantly proved to us, that in the work-a-day lives of the very\nhumblest of men spiritual phenomena manifest themselves--mysterious,\ndirect workings, that bring soul nearer to soul\u201d (_ibid._ 33). \u201cIs it\nto-day or to-morrow that moulds us? Do we not all spend the greater\npart of our lives under the shadow of an event that has not yet come\nto pass?\u201d (_ibid._ 51). I do not of course for one moment imply that\nthe facts of experience referred to in such sentences as these should\nbe received at any higher value than their face value, for there are\nindeed many considerations to be thought of in connexion with this\nmatter of the realization of our plans and our destiny as individuals.\nBut I do mean that the beliefs to which men cling in this respect are\njust as much part of the subject-matter of philosophy as other beliefs,\nsay the belief in truth as a whole, or the beliefs investigated by the\nSociety for Psychical Research. And there may conceivably be a view of\nhuman nature upon which the beliefs in question are both natural and\nrational.\n\n[161] See p. 101.\n\n[162] See p. 198 on Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s dismissal of the problem of\nteleology from the sphere of reasoned philosophy.\n\n[163] _Appearance and Reality_, p. 561.\n\n[164] See p. 155.\n\n[165] I think that I have taken this phrase from _Some Dogmas of\nReligion_.\n\n[166] From \u201cTruth and Copying,\u201d _Mind_, No. 62.\n\n[167] By action in this chapter and elsewhere in this book, I do not\nmean the mere exhibition or expenditure of physical energy. I mean\nhuman activity in general, inclusive of the highest manifestations of\nthis activity, such as the search for truth, contemplation, belief,\ncreative activity of one kind or another, and so on. There is no belief\nand no contemplation that is not practical as well as theoretical,\nno truth that fails to shape and to mould the life of the person who\nentertains it. I quite agree with Maeterlinck, and with Bergson and\nothers, that the soul is to some extent limited by the demands of\naction and speech, and by the duties and the conventions of social\nlife, but I still believe in the action test for contemplations and\nthoughts and beliefs and ideas, however lofty. It is only the thoughts\nthat we can act out, that we can consciously act upon in our present\nhuman life, and that we can persuade others to act upon, that are\nvaluable to ourselves and to humanity. It is to their discredit that so\nmany men and so many thinkers entertain, and give expression to, views\nabout the universe which renders their activities as agents and as\nthinkers and as seekers quite inexplicable.\n\n[168] There are, of course, no heavens in the old mediaeval and\nAristotelian sense after the work of Copernicus and Galileo in the\nphysical sciences, and of Kant in the realm of mind.\n\n[169] Professor Moore well points out (_Pragmatism and its Critics_,\np. 13) that the \u201cchallenge\u201d of the idea that our thinking has \u201ctwo\nfoundations: one, as the method of purposing--its \u2018practical\u2019 function;\nthe other as merely the expression of the specific and independent\ninstinct to know--its \u2018intellectual\u2019 function,\u201d marks the \u201cbeginnings\nof the pragmatic movement.\u201d The idea of two kinds of thought goes\nback to Aristotle and is one of the most famous distinctions of\nthought. It dominated the entire Middle Ages, and it is still at the\nroot of the false idea that \u201cculture\u201d can be separated from work and\nservice for the common good. I am glad, as I indicate in the text, a\nfew lines further on, that the idealists are doing their share with\nthe pragmatists in breaking it up. In America there is no practical\ndistinction between culture and work. See my chapter on Pragmatism as\nAmericanism.\n\n[170] The importance of this consideration about the \u201cattention\u201d that\nis (as a matter of fact and a matter of necessity) involved in all\n\u201cperception,\u201d cannot possibly be exaggerated. We perceive in childhood\nand throughout life in the main what interests us, and what affects\nour total and organic activity. It is, that is to say, our motor\nactivity, and its direction, that determine what we see and perceive\nand experience. And in the higher reaches of our life, on the levels of\nart and religion and philosophy, this determining power becomes what we\ncall our reason and our will and our selective attention. Perception,\nin other words, is a kind of selective activity, involving what we\ncall impulse and effort and will. Modern philosophy has forgotten this\nin its treatment of our supposed perception of the world, taking this\nto be something _given_ instead of something that is _constructed_ by\nour activity. Hence its long struggle to overcome both the apparent\nmaterialism of the world of the senses, and the gap, or hiatus, that\nhas been created by Rationalism between the world as we think it, and\nthe world as it really is.\n\n[171] _E.g._ Professor Bosanquet, in his 1908 inaugural lecture at\nSt. Andrews upon _The Practical Value of Moral Philosophy_. \u201cTheory\ndoes indeed belong to Practice. _It is a form of conation_\u201d (p. 9). It\n\u201cshould no doubt be understood as Theoria, or _the entire unimpeded\nlife of the soul_\u201d (p. 11; italics mine).\n\n[172] This is surely the teaching of the new physics in respect of the\nradio-active view of matter. I take up this point again in the Bergson\nchapter.\n\n[173] See p. 238.\n\n[174] See p. 143 or p. 229 (note).\n\n[175] See p. 34 in Chapter II. in reference to the idea of M. Blondel.\n\n[176] See p. 147 and p. 265.\n\n[177] See p. 65, note 3.\n\n[178] See p. 192, note 3.\n\n[179] Needham, _General Biology_, 1911. For the mention of this book\nas a reliable recent manual I am indebted to my colleague, Professor\nWilley of McGill University.\n\n[180] Marett, _Anthropology_, p. 155.\n\n[181] Cf. _supra_, p. 101.\n\n[182] So much may, I suppose, be inferred from the contentions\n(explicit and implicit) of all biologists and evolutionists. Human\nlife they all seem to regard as a kind of continuity or development of\nthe life of universal nature, whether their theory of the origin of\nlife be that of (1) \u201cspontaneous generation,\u201d (2) \u201ccosmozoa\u201d (germs\ncapable of life scattered throughout space), (3) \u201cPreyer\u2019s theory\nof the continuity of life,\u201d (4) \u201cPfl\u00fcger\u2019s theory of the chemical\ncharacteristics of proteid,\u201d or (5) the conclusion of Verworn himself,\n\u201cthat existing organisms are derived in uninterrupted descent from\nthe first living substance that originated from lifeless substance\u201d\n(_General Physiology_, p. 315).\n\n[183] _Creative Evolution_, pp. 245\u20135.\n\n[184] It is, I think, an important reflection that it is precisely\nin this very reality of \u201caction\u201d that science and philosophy come\ntogether. That all the sciences meet in the concept, or the fact, of\naction is, of course, quite evident from the new knowledge of the new\nphysics. Professor M\u2019Dougall has recently brought psychology into line\nwith the natural sciences by defining its subject-matter as the actions\nor the \u201cbehaviour\u201d of human beings and animals. And it is surely not\ndifficult to see that--as I try to indicate--it is in human behaviour\nthat philosophy and science come together. Another consideration in\nrespect of the philosophy of action that has long impressed me is\nthis. If there is one realm in which, more than anywhere else, our\ntraditional rationalism and our traditional empiricism really came\ntogether in England, it is the realm of social philosophy, the realm\nof human activity. It was the breaking down of the entire philosophy\nof sensations in the matter of the proof of utilitarianism that caused\nJohn Stuart Mill to take up the \u201csocial philosophy\u201d in respect to which\nthe followers of positivism joined hands with the idealists.\n\n[185] See p. 185.\n\n[186] See p. 27.\n\n[187] See Chapter VII. p. 179.\n\n[188] I am thinking of Pyrrho and Arcesilaus and some of the Greek\nsceptics and of their \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae and \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1.\n\n[189] See p. 26.\n\n[190] _Man\u2019s Place in the Cosmos_, a book consisting of essays and\nreviews published by the author during the last four or five years.\nThey all advocate \u201chumanism in opposition to naturalism,\u201d or \u201cethicism\nin opposition to a too narrow intellectualism.\u201d\n\n[191] _The Will to Believe_, 1897.\n\n[192] \u201cProgress in Philosophy,\u201d art. _Mind_, 15, p. 213.\n\n[193] _Practical Ethics_; Essays.\n\n[194] _Mental Development--Social and Ethical Interpretations_ (a work\ncrowned by the Royal Academy of Denmark). We can see in this book how\na psychologist has been led into a far-reaching study of social and\nethical development in order to gain an understanding of the growth of\neven the individual mind. We may indeed say that the individualistic\nintellectualism of the older psychology is now no more. It was too\n\u201cabstract\u201d a way of looking at mind. Professor Royce, it is well known,\nhas given, from the stand-point of a professed metaphysician, a cordial\nwelcome to the work of Professor Baldwin. In an important review of\nMr. Stout\u2019s two admirable volumes on _Analytic Psychology_ (_Mind_,\nJuly, 1897), Professor Royce has insisted strongly upon the need of\nsupplementing introspection by the \u201cinterpretation of the reports and\nthe conduct of other people\u201d if we would know much about \u201cdynamic\u201d\npsychology. It is this \u201cdynamic\u201d psychology--the \u201cdynamics\u201d of the\nwill and of the \u201cfeelings\u201d--that I think constitutes such an important\nadvance upon the traditional \u201cintellectual\u201d and \u201cindividualistic\u201d\npsychology.\n\n[195] _The Psychology of the Moral Self._ Macmillan, 1897. I have\ntried, in a short notice of this book in the _Philosophical Review_\n(March, 1898), to indicate the importance of some of its chief\ncontentions.\n\n[196] _Philosophical Lectures and Remains_, edited by Professor Bradley.\n\n[197] Editor of _La Science Sociale_. His recent work on the\n_Superiority of the Anglo-Saxons_ (_\u00c0 quoi tient la sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 des\nAnglo-Saxons?_)--a chapter in the study of the conditions of race\nsurvival--ran through seventeen editions in a few months, and set the\nwhole press of France and Germany (other countries following suit) into\ncommotion, as well as calling forth _pronunciamientos_ from most of the\nprominent editors and critics of France,--men like Jules Lema\u00eetre, Paul\nBourget, Marcel Prevost, Fran\u00e7ois Copp\u00e9e, \u00c9douard Rod, G. Valbert, etc.\n\n[198] Now Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison.\n\n[199] In different ways by all of the following English writers:\nProfessor A. Seth (\u201cIt is not in knowledge, then, as such, but in\nfeeling and action that reality is given,\u201d _Man\u2019s Place_, etc., p. 122,\netc. etc.), by Mr. Bradley (_Appearance and Reality_), by Mr. Balfour\n(in his _Foundations of Belief_), and by Professor James. Professor\nEucken, of Jena, in his different books, also insists strongly upon the\nidea that it is not in knowledge as such, but in the totality of our\npsychical experience that the principles of philosophy must be sought.\nPaulsen, in his _Einleitung in die Philosophie_, and Weber, in his\n_History of Philosophy_ (books in general use to-day), both advocate\na kind of philosophy of the will, the idea that the world is to be\nregarded as a striving on the part of wills after a partly unconscious\nideal. Simmel, in an important article in the _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique\net de Morale_, IV. 2, expresses the idea (which it would be well to\nrecognize generally at the present time) that truth is not something\nobjectively apart from us, but rather the name we give to conceptions\nthat have proved to be the guides to useful actions, and so become part\nof the psychical heritage of human beings. Professor Ribot, of Paris,\nhas written more extensively upon the will and the feelings than upon\nthe intellect,--a fact in keeping with the scientific demands of our\nday.\n\n[200] See, _e.g._, an article by Fouill\u00e9e in the _Revue Philosophique_,\nXXI. 5, with the very title \u201cN\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019une interpr\u00e9tation\npsychologique et sociologique du monde.\u201d Fouill\u00e9e finds there, as he\ndoes elsewhere, that will is the principle that enables us to unify the\nphysical with the psychical world,--an illustration of the fact that\nthe two characteristics I am referring to are really one. A present\ninstance of the introduction of the element of will (the will of man,\neven) is to be seen in the contention of such a book as M. Lucien\nArr\u00e9at\u2019s _Les Croyances de Demain_ (1898). According to _Mind_, M.\nArr\u00e9at proposes to substitute the idea that man can by his efforts\nbring about the supremacy of justice for the traditional idea that\njustice reigns in the universe.\n\n[201] _Manual of Ethics_, according to Mr. Stout, _International\nJournal of Ethics_, October 1894. There are many similar sentences and\nideas in the book.\n\n[202] _Elements of Ethics_, p. 232.\n\n[203] Now Professor of Logic in St. Andrews.\n\n[204] _International Journal of Ethics_, October 1894, p. 119.\n\n[205] I think that I must here have meant Professor Watson\u2019s\n_Christianity and Idealism_.\n\n[206] And apart from the idealism and the ethical philosophy of which\nI speak, in the next chapter, as necessary to convert Pragmatism\ninto the Humanism it would like to become, Pragmatism is really a\nkind of romanticism, the reaction of a personal enthusiasm against\nthe abstractions of a classical rationalism in philosophy. There is\nan element of this romanticism in James\u2019s heroic philosophy of life,\nalthough I would prefer to be the last man in the world to talk against\nthis heroic romanticism in any one. It is the great want of our time,\nand it is the thing that is prized most in some of the men whom this\nephemeral age of ours still delights to honour. It was exhibited\nboth in Browning and in George Meredith, for example. Of the former\nMr. Chesterton writes in his trenchant, clean-sweeping little book\non _The Victorian Age in Literature_, p. 175: \u201cWhat he really was\nwas a romantic. He offered the cosmos as an adventure rather than a\nscheme.\u201d The same thing could be said about James\u2019s \u201cWill to Believe\u201d\nPhilosophy. Meredith, although far less of an idealist than Browning,\nwas also an optimist by temperament rather than by knowledge or by\nconviction--hence the elevation of his tone and style in spite of his\nbelated naturalism.\n\n[207] In _Un Romantisme utilitaire_ (Paris, Alcan, 1911), chiefly a\nstudy of the Pragmatism of Nietzsche and Poincar\u00e9.\n\n[208] I am indebted for this saying of one of my old teachers to Mr.\nC.\u00a0F.\u00a0G. Masterman, in his essay upon Sidgwick in that judicious\nand interesting book upon the transition from the nineteenth to the\ntwentieth century, _In Peril of Change_.\n\n[209] Stoicism and Epicureanism, as the matter is generally put,\nboth substitute the practical good of man as an individual for the\nwisdom or the theoretical perfection that were contemplated by Plato\nand Aristotle as the highest objects of human pursuit. For Cicero,\ntoo, the chief problems of philosophy were in the main practical, the\nquestion whether virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, the problem\nof practical certainty as opposed to scepticism, the general belief in\nProvidence and in immortality, and so on. And Lucretius thinks of the\nmain service of philosophy as consisting in its power of emancipating\nthe human mind from superstition. All this is quite typical of the\nessentially practical nature of the Roman character, of its conception\nof education as in the main discipline and duty, of its distrust of\nGreek intellectualism, and of its preoccupation with the necessities of\nthe struggle for existence and for government, of its lack of leisure,\nand so on. I do not think that the very first thing about Pragmatism\nis its desire to return to a practical conception of life, although a\ntendency in this direction doubtless exists in it.\n\n[210] The idea that our \u201cdemonstrable knowledge is very short, if\nindeed we have any at all, although our certainty is as great as our\nhappiness, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be\u201d\n(_Essay_, iv. 2\u201314); or Locke\u2019s words: \u201cI have always thought the\nactions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts.\u201d\n\n[211] Schopenhauer, for example, used to be fond of repeating that his\nown philosophy (which took will to be the fundamental reality) was on\nits very face necessarily more of an ethic than a system like that of\nSpinoza, for example, which could only be called an ethic by a sort of\n_lucus a non lucendo_.\n\n[212] The Practical Reason to Aristotle is the reason that has to do\nwith the pursuit of aims and ends, in distinction from the reason\nthat has to do with knowledge, and the \u201cuniversal\u201d and science. This\ntwofold distinction has given many problems to his students and to his\ncommentators, and to succeeding generations. It is responsible for the\nentire medi\u00e6val and Renaissance separation of the intellectual life\nand the intellectual virtues from the practical life and the practical\nvirtues.\n\n[213] It might be added here that Logic has always recognized the\nvalidity, to some extent, of the argument \u201cfrom consequences\u201d of which\nPragmatism makes so much. The form of argumentation that it calls the\nDilemma is a proof of this statement. A chain of reasoning that leads\nto impossible consequences, or that leads to consequences inconsistent\nwith previously admitted truths, is necessarily unsound. That this test\nof tenable or untenable consequences has often been used in philosophy\nin the large sense of the term must be known only too well to the\nwell-informed reader. As Sidgwick says in his _Method of Ethics_:\n\u201cThe truth of a philosopher\u2019s premises will always be tested by the\nacceptability of his conclusions; if in any important point he is found\nin flagrant conflict with common opinion, his method will be declared\ninvalid.\u201d Reid used the argument from consequences in his examination\nof the sceptical philosophy of Hume. It is used with effect in Mr.\nArthur Balfour\u2019s _Foundations of Belief_ in regard to the supposed\nnaturalism of physical science. Edmund Burke applied it to some extent\nto political theories, or to the abstract philosophical theories upon\nwhich some of them were supposedly based.\n\n[214] Pragmatism has been called by some critics a \u201cnew-Humism\u201d on the\nground of its tendency to do this very thing that is mentioned here in\nrespect of Hume. But the justice or the injustice of this appellation\nis a very large question, into which it is needless for us to enter\nhere.\n\n[215] Cf. \u201cIntelligence is the aptitude to modify conduct in conformity\nto the circumstances of each case\u201d (_The Positive Philosophy_,\nMartineau, i. 465).\n\n[216] _Principles of Philosophy_, Part II. iii. It is also an eminently\npragmatist idea on the part of Descartes to hold that \u201cI should find\nmuch more truth in the reasoning of each individual with reference to\nthe affairs in which he is personally interested, and the issue of\nwhich must presently punish him if he has judged amiss, than in those\nconducted by a man of letters in his study, regarding speculative\nmatters that are of no practical moment\u201d (_Method_, Veitch\u2019s edition,\np. 10).\n\n[217] _Principles of Philosophy_, Part II. iii. p. 233.\n\n[218] See _Principles of Psychology_, ch. ii., \u201cAssumption of\nMetaphysicians,\u201d and also elsewhere in his Essays.\n\n[219] \u201cAny power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight\nwas held by us to be the definition of existence\u201d (Sophist, Jowett\u2019s\n_Plato_, iv. p. 465).\n\n[220] _The Theory of Knowledge_, Preface, p. ix.\n\n[221] \u201cThe independence of the doctrines of any science from the social\nlife, the prevalent thought of the generation in which they arise, is\nindeed a fiction, a superstition of the scientist which we would fain\nshatter beyond all repair; but the science becomes all the sounder for\nrecognizing its origins and its resources, its present limitations and\nits need of fresh light from other minds, from different social moulds\u201d\n(pp. 215\u2013216).\n\n[222] See p. 81.\n\n[223] Cf. p. 13.\n\n[224] _The New Knowledge_, p. 255.\n\n[225] It would indeed be easy to quote from popular writers of the day,\nlike Mr. Chesterton or Mr. A.\u00a0C. Benson or Mr. H.\u00a0G. Wells, to show\nthat a knowledge of the existence of Pragmatism as a newer experimental\nor \u201csociological\u201d philosophy is now a commonplace of the day. Take\nthe following, for example, from Mr. Wells\u2019s _Marriage_ (p. 521):\n\u201cIt was to be a pragmatist essay, a sustained attempt to undermine\nthe confidence of all that scholastic logic-chopping which still\nlingers like the _sequelae_ of a disease in our University philosophy\n... a huge criticism and cleaning up of the existing methods of\nformulation as a preliminary to the wider and freer discussion of those\nreligious and social issues our generation still shrinks from.\u201d \u201cIt is\ngrotesque,\u201d he said, \u201cand utterly true that the sanity and happiness of\nall the world lies in its habits of generalization.\u201d\n\n[226] I cannot meantime trace, or place, this quotation, although I\nremember copying it out of something by Karl Pearson.\n\n[227] In the _Literary Digest_ for 1911.\n\n[228] See p. 234.\n\n[229] From a letter to Mrs. Humphry Ward, quoted in A.\u00a0C. Benson\u2019s\n_Walter Pater_, p. 200.\n\n[230] Lecture I. towards the beginning.\n\n[231] See p. 62 and p. 197. It should be remembered that our reasoned\nopinions rest upon our working beliefs.\n\n[232] Vol. ii. p. 86.\n\n[233] See the reference in Chapter II. p. 26 to the opportunistic ethic\nof Prezzolini.\n\n[234] In _What is Pragmatism?_ Macmillan & Co.\n\n[235] Cf. p. 81.\n\n[236] Professor Pratt makes an attempt in his book on _What is\nPragmatism?_ (pp. 75\u20136\u20137) to show that the true meaning of the\n\u201ccorrespondence theory\u201d is not inconsistent with Pragmatism or that\nPragmatism is not inconsistent with this truth.\n\n[237] Cf. _supra_, p. 64.\n\n[238] See the Note on p. 21.\n\n[239] Cf. _supra_, p. 67.\n\n[240] Papini, in fact (in 1907), went the length of saying that you\ncannot even _define_ Pragmatism, admitting that it appeals only to\ncertain kinds of persons.\n\n[241] For a serviceable account, in English, of the differences between\nthe pragmatist philosophy of hypotheses and the more fully developed\nphilosophy of science of the day, see Father Walker\u2019s _Theories of\nKnowledge_, chapter xiii., upon \u201cPragmatism and Physical Science.\u201d\n\n[242] Cf. _supra_, p. 10 and p. 15. And this failure to systematize\nbecomes, it should be remembered, all the more exasperating, in view of\nthe prominence given by the pragmatists to the supreme principles of\n\u201cend\u201d and \u201cconsequences.\u201d\n\n[243] In the \u201cAxioms as Postulates\u201d essay in _Personal Idealism_.\n\n[244] Bourdeau makes the same charge, saying that all pragmatists have\nthe illusion that \u201creality is unstable.\u201d Professor Stout has something\nsimilar in view in referring to Dr. Schiller\u2019s \u201cprimary reality\u201d in\nthe _Mind_ review of _Studies in Humanism_. It is only the reality\nwith which we have to do (reality \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 as an Aristotelian might\nsay) that is \u201cin the making\u201d: for God there can be no such distinction\nbetween process and product. But it is quite evident that Pragmatism\ndoes not go far enough to solve, or even to see, such difficulties. It\nconfines itself in the main to the contention that man must think of\nhimself as a maker of reality to some extent--a contention that I hold\nto be both true and useful, as far as it goes.\n\n[245] _Pragmatism_, p. 264.\n\n[246] \u201cPragmatism,\u201d October 1900.\n\n[247] The same line of reflection will be found in James\u2019s\n_Pragmatism_, p. 96.\n\n[248] Professor Moore has a chapter in his book (_Pragmatism and its\nCritics_) devoted to the purpose of showing the necessary failure of\nAbsolutism (or of an Intellectualism of the absolutist order) in the\nrealm of ethics, finding in the experimentalism and the quasi-Darwinism\nof Pragmatism an atmosphere that is, to say the least, more favourable\nto the realities of our moral experience. While I cannot find so much\nas he does in the hit-and-miss ethical philosophy of Pragmatism, I\nquite sympathize with him in his rejection of Absolutism or Rationalism\nas a basis for ethics. The following are some of his reasons for this\nrejection: (1) The \u201cpurpose\u201d that is involved in the ethical life must,\naccording to Absolutism, be an all-inclusive and a fixed purpose,\nallowing of no \u201cadvance\u201d and no \u201cretreat\u201d---things that are imperative\nto the idea of the _reality_ of our efforts. (2) Absolutism does not\nprovide for human responsibility; to it all actions and purposes are\nthose of the Absolute. (3) The ethical ideal of Absolutism is too\n\u201cstatic.\u201d (4) Absolutism does not provide any material for \u201cnew goals\nand new ideals.\u201d See pp. 218\u2013225 in my eighth chapter, where I censure,\nin the interest of Pragmatism and Humanism, the ethical philosophy of\nProfessor Bosanquet.\n\n[249] See p. 224, where I arrive at the conclusion that the same thing\nmay be said of the Absolutism of Dr. Bosanquet.\n\n[250] Students of that important nineteenth-century book upon Ethics,\nthe _Methods of Ethics_, by Henry Sidgwick, will remember that Sidgwick\nexpressly states it as a grave argument against Utilitarianism that it\nis by no means confirmed by the study of the actual origin of moral\ndistinctions. As we go back in history we do not find that moral\nprescriptions have merely a utilitarian value.\n\n[251] What I understand by the \u201cnormative idea of ethical science\u201d\nwill become more apparent as I proceed. I may as well state, however,\nthat I look upon the distinction between the \u201cdescriptive\u201d ideals of\nscience and the \u201cnormative\u201d character of the ideals of the ethical and\nthe socio-political sciences as both fundamental and far-reaching.\nThere are _two_ things, as it were, that constitute what we might\ncall the subject-matter of philosophy---\u201cfacts\u201d and \u201cideals\u201d; or,\nrather, it is the synthesis and reconciliation of these two orders of\nreality that constitute the supreme problem of philosophy. It is with\nthe description of facts and of the laws of the sequences of things\nthat the \u201cmethodology\u201d of science and of Pragmatism is in the main\nconcerned. And it is because Pragmatism has hitherto shown itself\nunable to rise above the descriptive and hypothetical science of the\nday to the ideals of the normative sciences (ethics, aesthetics, etc.)\nthat it is an imperfect philosophy of reality as we know it, or of the\ndifferent orders of reality.\n\n[252] Cf. Professor Ward in _Naturalism and Agnosticism_ (vol. ii. p.\n155): \u201cWhat each one immediately deals with in his own experience is, I\nrepeat, objective reality in the most fundamental sense.\u201d\n\n[253] _Introduction to Science_, p. 137.\n\n[254] \u201cBut if the primitive Amoebae gave rise \u2018in the natural course of\nevents\u2019 to higher organisms and these to higher, until there emerged\nthe supreme Mammal, _who by and by had a theory of it all_, then the\nprimitive Amoebae which had in them the promise and the potency of all\nthis _were very wonderful Amoebae indeed_. There must have been more in\nthem than met the eye! _We must stock them, with initiatives at least.\nWe are taking a good deal as \u2018given.\u2019_\u201d [Italics mine.]--J.\u00a0H. Thomson,\n_Introduction to Science_, p. 137.\n\n[255] See Westermarck, vol. i. pp. 74, 93, 117, and chapter iii.\ngenerally. The sentence further down in respect of the permanent\nfact of the moral consciousness is from Hobhouse, vol. ii. p. 54. As\ninstances of the latter, Hobhouse talks of things like the \u201cpurity\nof the home, truthfulness, hospitality, help\u201d, etc., in Iran, of the\ndoctrine of Non-Resistance in Lao Tsze, of the high conception of\npersonal righteousness revealed in the _Book of the Dead_, of the\ncontributions of monotheism to ethics, etc. etc.\n\n[256] Cf. p. 167.\n\n[257] It may, I suppose, be possible to exaggerate here and to fall to\nsome extent into what Mr. Bradley and Nietzsche and others have thought\nof as the \u201cradical vice of all goodness\u201d--its tendency to forget that\nother things, like beauty and truth, may also be thought of as absolute\n\u201cvalues,\u201d as revelations of the divine. What I am thinking of here is\nsimply the realm of fact that is implied, say, in the idea of Horace,\nwhen he speaks of the upright man being undismayed even by the fall of\nthe heavens (_impavidum ferient ruinae_) or by the idea of the Stoic\nsage that the virtuous man was as necessary to Jupiter as Jupiter could\nbe to him, or by the idea (attributed to Socrates) that if the rulers\nof the universe do not prefer the just man to the unjust it is better\nto die than to live. If against all this sort of thing one is reminded\nby realism of the \u201csplendid immoralism\u201d of Nature, of its apparent\nindifference to all good and ill desert, I can but reply, as I have\ndone elsewhere in this book, that the Nature of which physical science\nspeaks is an \u201cabstraction\u201d and an unreality, and that it matters,\ntherefore, very little whether such a Nature is, or is not, indifferent\nto morality. We know, however, of no Nature apart from life, and mind,\nand consciousness, and thought, and will. It is God, and not Nature,\nwho makes the sun to shine on the just and the unjust.\n\n[258] By this \u201cmeaning\u201d is to be understood firstly the effects\nupon our appetitive and conative tendencies of the various specific\nitems (whether sensation, or affections, or emotions, or what not)\nof our experience, the significance, that is to say, to our total\ngeneral activity of all the particular happenings and incidents of\nour experience. Psychologists all tell us of the vast system of\n\u201cdispositions\u201d with which our psychophysical organism is equipped at\nbirth, and through the help of which we interpret the sensations and\noccurrences of our experience. And in addition to these dispositions\nwe have, in the case of the adult, the coming into play of the many\nassociations and memories that are acquired during the experiences of\na single lifetime. It is these various associations that interpret\nto us the present and give it meaning. In a higher sense we might\ninterpret \u201cmeaning\u201d as expressive of the higher predicates, like the\ngood and the beautiful and the true, that we apply to some things in\nthe world of our socialized experience. And in the highest sense we\nmight interpret it as the significance that we attach to human history\nas distinguished from the mere course of events--the significance upon\nwhich the philosophy of history reposes. See Eucken in the article upon\nthe _Philosophy of History_ in the \u201csystematic\u201d volume of Hinneberg\u2019s\n_Kultur der Gegenwart_.\n\n[259] See our second chapter upon the different continental and British\nrepresentatives of the hypothetical treatment of scientific laws and\nconceptions that is such a well-marked tendency of the present time. By\nno one perhaps was this theory put more emphatically than by Windelband\n(of Strassburg) in his _Pr\u00e4ludien_ (1884) and in his _Geschichte\nund Naturwissenschaft_ (1894). In the latter he contrasts the real\nindividuals and personalities with which the historians deal with the\nimpersonal abstractions of natural science. I fully subscribe to this\ndistinction, and think that it underlies a great deal of the thought of\nrecent times.\n\n[260] See \u201ctruth and real existence\u201d in the _Republic_, 508 D--Jowett\u2019s\nrendering of \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd (\u201cover which truth and real existence\nare shining\u201d). Also further in the same place, \u201cThe cause of science\nand of truth,\u201d \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. In 389 E we read\nthat a \u201chigh value must be set on truth.\u201d Of course to Plato \u201ctruth\u201d\nis also, and perhaps even primarily, real existence, as when he says\n(_Rep._ 585), \u201cthat which has less of truth will also have less of\nessence.\u201d But in any case truth always means more for him than \u201cmere\nbeing,\u201d or existence, or \u201cappearance,\u201d it is the highest form of being,\nthe object of \u201cscience,\u201d the great discovery of the higher reason.\n\n[261] To Professor Bosanquet, for example; see below, p. 213, note 2.\n\n[262] _The Poetry of the Old Testament_, Professor A.\u00a0R. Gordon.\n\n[263] _Ibid._ p. 4.\n\n[264] _The Poetry of the Old Testament_, p. 160.\n\n[265] _Ibid._ pp. 183\u2013184.\n\n[266] It is this false conception of truth as a \u201cdatum\u201d or \u201ccontent\u201d\nthat wrecks the whole of Mr. Bradley\u2019s argument in _Appearance and\nReality_. See on the contrary the following quotation from Professor\nBoyce Gibson (Eucken\u2019s _Philosophy of Life_, p. 109) in respect of the\nattitude of Eucken towards the idea of truth as a personal ideal. \u201cThe\nultimate criterion of truth is not the clearness and the distinctness\nof our thinking, nor its correspondence with a reality external to it,\nnor any other intellectualistic principle. It is spiritual fruitfulness\nas invariably realized by the personal experient, invariably realized\nas springing freshly and freely from the inexhaustible resources which\nour freedom gains from its dependence upon God.\u201d\n\n[267] It is part of the greatness of Hegel, I think, to have sought to\ninclude the truth of history and of the social order in the truth of\nphilosophy, or in spiritual truth generally. His error consists in not\nallowing for the fresh revelations of truth that have come to the world\nthrough the insight of individuals and through the actions and the\ncreations of original men.\n\n[268] There is a sentence in the Metaphysics of which I cannot\nbut think at this point, and which so far at least as the\nrationalist-pragmatist issue is concerned is really one of the deepest\nand most instructive ideas in the whole history of philosophy. It is\none of Aristotle\u2019s troublesome additional statements in reference\nto something that he has just been discussing--in this case the\n\u201cobject of desire\u201d and the \u201cobject of thought.\u201d And what he adds in\nthe present instance is this (Bk. xii. 7): \u201c_The primary objects of\nthese two things are the same_\u201d--\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac--rendered\nby Smith and Ross \u201c_the primary objects of thought and desire are\nthe same_.\u201d The translation, of course, is a matter of some slight\ndifficulty, turning upon the proper interpretation of \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1, \u201cthe\nfirst things,\u201d although, of course, the student soon becomes familiar\nwith what Aristotle means by \u201cfirst things,\u201d and \u201cfirst philosophy,\u201d\nand \u201cfirst in nature,\u201d and \u201cfirst for us,\u201d and so on. Themistius in his\ncommentary on this passage (_Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca_, vol.\nv. i-vi; _Themistius in Metaphysica_, 1072 and 17\u201330) puts it that \u201cin\nthe case of immaterial existences the desirable and the intelligible\nare the same--in primis vero principiis materiae non immixtis _idem\nest desiderabile atque intelligibile_.\u201d I am inclined to use this\ngreat idea of the identity of the desirable and the intelligible--for\nconscious, intelligent beings as the fundamental principle of the\ntrue Humanism of which Pragmatism is in search. It is evidently in\nthis identity that Professor Bosanquet also believes in when he says:\n\u201cI am persuaded that if we critically understand what we really want\nand need, we shall find it established by a straightforward argument\u201d\n(Preface to _Individuality and Value_. See the eighth chapter of this\nbook). It is certainly true that the constructive philosophy of which\nwe are in search to-day must leave no gap between thought and desire.\n\n[269] I find an illustration or a confirmation of this thought in the\nfollowing piece of insight of Mr. Chesterton in regard to the \u201cgood,\u201d\nwhich is no doubt a \u201cpredicate\u201d of our total thought and feeling and\nvolition. \u201cOr, in other words, man cannot escape from God, _because\ngood is God in man; and insists on omniscience_\u201d (_Victorian Age in\nLiterature_, p. 246--italics mine). A belief in goodness is certainly a\nbelief in an active goodness greater than our own; and it does raise a\ndesire for a comprehension of things.\n\n[270] The reader will find a good deal in Professor Baldwin\u2019s _Social\nand Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development_ upon the relation\nof truth and thought to desire, and also upon the social, or the\npragmatist or the experimental test of beliefs.\n\n[271] See Chapter IX., in reference to Bergson\u2019s \u201ccreative activity.\u201d\n\n[272] The reader who is anxious to obtain a working idea of the limits\nof knowledge from a scientific point of view had better consult\nsuch pieces of literature as Sir Oliver Lodge\u2019s recent examination\nof Haeckel\u2019s _Riddle of the Universe_, Professor Ward\u2019s _Naturalism\nand Agnosticism_, Merz\u2019s _History of European Thought during the\nNineteenth Century_, or Verworn\u2019s _General Physiology_ (with its\ninteresting account of the different theories of the origin of life,\nand its admission that after all we know matter only through mind and\nsensation). Perusal of the most recent accessible literature upon this\nwhole subject will reveal the fact that these old questions about the\norigin of life and motion, and about the nature of evolution, are still\nas unsettled as they were in the last half of the last century. It is\nnot merely, however, of the actual limits of science at any one time\nthat we are obliged, as human beings, to think, but of the limits of\nscience in view of the fact that our knowledge comes to us _in part_,\nunder the conditions of space and time, and under the conditions of the\nlimits of our senses and of our understanding. Knowledge is certainly\nlimited in the light of what beings other than ourselves may know, and\nin the light of what we would _like_ to know about the universe of life\nand mind.\n\nI do not think that this whole question of the limits of our knowledge\nis such a burning question to-day as it was some years ago, there\nbeing several reasons for this. One is that we live in an age of\nspecialization and discursiveness and \u201ctechnic.\u201d It is quite difficult\nto meet with people who think that they may know, some day, everything,\nfrom even some single point of view. And then the wide acceptance of\nthe hypothetical or the pragmatist conception of knowledge has caused\nus to look upon the matter of the limits of science and knowledge as\na relative one, as always related to, and conditioned by, certain\npoints of view and certain assumptions. We are not even warranted, for\nexample, in thinking of mind and matter as separate in the old way, nor\ncan we separate the life of the individual from the life of the race,\nnor the world from God, nor man from God, and so on. See an article by\nthe writer (in 1898 in the _Psy. Rev._) upon \u201cProfessor Titchener\u2019s\nView of the Self,\u201d dealing with the actual, and the necessary limits,\nof the point of view of Structural Psychology in regard to the \u201cself.\u201d\nAlso Professor Titchener\u2019s reply to this article in a subsequent number\nof the same review, and my own rejoinder.\n\n[273] See Chapter II. p. 35.\n\n[274] Despite what we spoke of in Chapter V. as its \u201csubjectivism,\u201d p.\n134.\n\n[275] That is to say, the simple truth that there is no \u201cobject\u201d\nwithout a \u201csubject,\u201d no \u201cphysical\u201d world without a world of \u201cpsychical\u201d\nexperiences on the part of some beings or some being. If our earth\nexisted before animated beings appeared upon it, it was only as a part\nof some other \u201csystem\u201d which we must think of as the object of some\nmind or intelligence.\n\n[276] See p. 235, note 2, in the Bergson chapter, where it is suggested\nthat to Bergson human perceptions do not, of course, exhaust matter.\n\n[277] Among the many other good things in Mr. Marett\u2019s admirable\n_Anthropology_ (one of the freshest works upon the subject, suggestive\nof the need, evidently felt in Oxford as well as elsewhere, of studying\nphilosophy and letters, and nearly everything else in the mental and\nmoral sciences, from the point of view of social anthropology) are the\nclearness and the relevancy of illustration in his insistence upon the\nimportance of the \u201csocial factor\u201d over all our thoughts of ourselves as\nagents and students in the universe of things.\u201d Payne shows us (p. 146)\n\u201creason for believing _that the collective \u2018we\u2019 precedes \u2018I\u2019_ in the\norder of linguistic evolution. To begin with, in America and elsewhere,\n\u2018we\u2019 may be inclusive and mean \u2018all of us,\u2019 or selective, meaning\n\u2018some of us only.\u2019 Hence a missionary must be very careful, and if he\nis preaching, must use the inclusive \u2018we\u2019 in saying \u2018we have sinned,\u2019\nwhereas, in praying, he must use the selective \u2018we,\u2019 or God would be\nincluded in the list of sinners. Similarly \u2018I\u2019 has a collective form\namongst some American languages; and this is ordinarily employed,\nwhereas the corresponding selective form is used only in special cases.\nThus, if the question be \u2018Who will help?\u2019 the Apache will reply,\n\u2018I-amongst-others,\u2019 \u2018I-for-one\u2019; but if he were recounting his personal\nexploits, he says _sheedah_, \u2018I-by-myself,\u2019 to show they were wholly\nhis own. Here we seem to have _group-consciousness holding its own\nagainst individual self-consciousness, as being for primitive folk on\nthe whole the more normal attitude of mind_.\u201d It is indeed to be hoped\nthat, in the future, philosophy, by discarding its abstractionism and\nits (closely allied) solipsism, will do its share in making this \u201cgroup\nconsciousness,\u201d this consciousness of our being indeed \u201cfellow-workers\u201d\nwith all men, once again a property of our minds and our thoughts.\n\n[278] One of Professor James\u2019s last books is called _A Pluralistic\nUniverse_, and both he and Professor Dewey have always written under\nthe pressure of the sociological interest of modern times. In short, it\nis obvious that the \u201creality\u201d underlying the entire pragmatist polemic\nagainst the hypothetical character of the reading of the world afforded\nus by the sciences, is the social and personal life that is the deepest\nthing in our experience.\n\n[279] This idea of a \u201cworld of inter-subjective intercourse,\u201d although\nnow a commonplace of sociology, was first expressed for the writer in\nthe first series of the _Gifford Lectures_ of Professor James Ward\nupon \u201cNaturalism and Agnosticism,\u201d in chapters xv. and xvi. The first\nof these chapters deals with \u201cExperience and Life,\u201d and the second\nwith the \u201cinter-subjective intercourse\u201d that is really presupposed in\nthe so-called individual experience of which the old psychology used\nto make so much. The reader who wishes to follow out a development of\nthis idea of a \u201cworld of inter-subjective intercourse\u201d cannot do better\nthan follow the argument of Professor Ward\u2019s second series of _Gifford\nLectures_ (\u201cThe Realm of Ends,\u201d or \u201cPluralism and Theism\u201d), in which he\nwill find a Humanism and Theism that is at least akin to the theodicy,\nor the natural theology, of which we might suppose Pragmatism to be\nenamoured. The double series of these Lectures might well be referred\nto as an instance of the kind of classical English work in philosophy\nof which we have spoken as not falling into the extremes either of\nPragmatism or of Rationalism. The strong point of the \u201cRealm of Ends,\u201d\nfrom the point of view of this book upon Pragmatism and Idealism, is\nthat it moves from first to last in the reality of that world to which\nthe science and the philosophy of the day both seem to point the way.\nIn opposition to \u201csubjectivism\u201d it teaches a Humanism and a Pluralism\nthat we recognise as an expression of the realities of the world of our\ncommon life and our common efforts, and from this Humanism it proceeds\nto a Theism which its author seeks to defend from many of the familiar\ndifficulties of Naturalism. Were the writer concerned with the matter\nof the development and the elaboration of the philosophy that seems to\nhave precipitated itself into his mind after some years of reflection\non the issues between the realists and the idealists, between the\nrationalists and the pragmatists, he would have to begin by saying\nthat its outlines are at least represented for him in the theistic and\npluralistic philosophy of Professor Ward.\n\n[280] According to Professor Dawes Hicks in the _Hibbert Journal_\nfor April 1913, there is a great deal in the articles of Professor\nAlexander on \u201cCollective Willing and Truth\u201d that supports some of\nthe positions I am here attempting to indicate, as part of the\noutcome of the pragmatist-rationalist controversy. \u201cBoth goodness\nand truth depend, in the first place, on the recognition by one man\nof consciousness in others, and, secondly, upon intersubjective\nintercourse\u201d (p. 658).\n\n[281] I owe this reference (which I have attempted to verify) to a\nsuggestive and ingenious book (_The New Word_, by Mr. Allen Upward)\nlent to me by a Montreal friend. Skeat, in his Dictionary, gives as the\nmeaning of truth, \u201c_firm, established, certain, honest, faithful_,\u201d\nconnecting it with A.S. _tr\u00e9ou_, _tryw_ (\u201cpreservation of a compact\u201d),\nTeut. _trewa_, saying that the \u201croot\u201d is \u201cunknown.\u201d I suppose that\nsimilar things might be said about the Greek word \u1f10\u03c4\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd in its\ndifferent forms, which Liddel and Scott connect with \u201cSans., _satyas_\n(_verus_), O. Nor. _Sannr_, A.S. _s\u00f3th_ (sooth).\u201d All this seems to\njustify the idea of the social confirmation of truth for which I am\ninclined to stand, and the connexion of intellectual truth with ethical\ntruth, with the truth of human life. I agree with Lotze that truths do\nnot float above, or over, or between, things, but that they exist only\nin the thought of a thinker, in so far as he thinks, or in the action\nof a living being in the moment of his action--the _Microcosmos_ as\nquoted in Eisler, article \u201c_Wahrheit_\u201d in the _W\u00f6rterbuch_. The Truth\nfor man would be the coherence of his knowledge and his beliefs, and\nthere is no abstract truth, or truth in and for itself, no impersonal\n\u201cwhole\u201d of truth.\n\n[282] As in the Hegelian dialectic.\n\n[283] There is another important thing to think of in connexion with\nthis sociological character of Pragmatism. It is a characteristic\nthat may be used to overcome what we have elsewhere talked of as\nits \u201csubjectivism\u201d and its \u201cindividualism,\u201d and its revolutionary\ntendencies. It is, we might urge, a social and a collective standard\nof truth that Pragmatism has in view when it thinks of \u201cconsequences\u201d\nand of the test of truth. Lalande takes up this idea in an article in\nthe _Revue Philosophique_ (1906) on \u201cPragmatisme et Pragmaticisme,\u201d\npointing out that Dr. Peirce would apparently tend to base his\npragmatism on the subordination of individual to collective thought.\nDr. Schiller too, I think, contemplates this social test of truth in\nhis would-be revival of the philosophy of Protagoras--that man is the\nmeasure of reality--for man.\n\n[284] See below, p. 197, where we speak of this \u201cmediation\u201d as the\nfirst fact for Professor Bosanquet as a prominent \u201cNeo-Hegelian\u201d\nrationalist.\n\n[285] I have been asked by a friendly critic if I would include\n\u201cinference\u201d in this \u201creal thought.\u201d I certainly would, because in\nall real inference we are, or ought to be, concerned with a real\nsubject-matter, a set of relations among realities of one kind\nor another. Possibly all students in all subjects (especially in\nphilosophy) have lost time in following out a set of inferences in and\nfor themselves. But such a procedure is justified by the increased\npower that we get over the real subject-matter of our thought. When\nthought cannot be thus checked by the idea of such increased power, it\nis idle thought.\n\n[286] I am thinking, of course, of the entire revolutionary and radical\nsocial philosophy that harks back (in theory at least) to the \u201cSocial\nContract\u201d and to the State of Nature philosophy of Rousseau and his\nassociates and predecessors.\n\n[287] See p. 184 of Chapter VII., where I speak of the ability to do\nthis as the invariable possession of the successful American teacher of\nphilosophy.\n\n[288] An equivalent of it, of course, exists in many sayings, in many\ncountries, in the conception of the task of the metaphysician as that\nof \u201ca blind man in a dark room hunting for a black cat which--is\nnot there,\u201d reproduced by Sir Ray Lankester in the recent book of\nH.\u00a0S.\u00a0R. Eliot, _Modern Science and the Illusions of Bergson_. There is\ngenerally an error or a fallacy in such descriptions of philosophy--in\nthis Lankester story the error that the secret of the world is a kind\nof \u201cthing in itself\u201d out of all relation to everything we know and\nexperience--the very error against which the pragmatists are protesting.\n\n[289] Mr. Bertrand Russell, for example, seems to me to have the\nprejudice that philosophy is at its best only when occupied with\nstudies which (like the mathematics of his affections) are as remote as\npossible from human life. \u201cReal life is,\u201d he says, \u201cto most men a long\nsecond-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible;\nbut the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical\nlimitations, no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid\nedifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect form from which\nall great work springs. Remote from human passions, remote even from\nthe pitiful facts of nature, the generations have gradually created\nan ordered cosmos where pure thought can dwell as in its natural\nhome, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from\nthe dreary exile of the actual world.\u201d I cannot--as I have indicated\nelsewhere in regard to Mr. Russell--see for one moment how there is any\njustification for looking upon this \u201cordered cosmos\u201d of mathematical\nphysics as anything other than an abstraction from the real world with\nwhich we are acquainted. It is the creation of only one of our many\nhuman interests. And I cannot see that the thought that occupies itself\nwith this world is any nobler than the thought that occupies itself\nwith the more complex worlds of life, and of birth and death, and of\nknowledge and feeling and conduct. Mr. Russell might remember, for one\nthing, that there have been men (Spinoza among them) who have attempted\nto treat of human passions under the light of ascertainable laws,\nand that it is (to say the very least) as legitimate for philosophy\nto seek for reason and law in human life, and in the evolution of\nhuman history, as in the abstract world of physical and mathematical\nscience. Can, too, a mathematical philosophy afford any final haven\nfor the spirit of man, without an examination of the _mind_ of the\nmathematician and of the nature of the concepts and symbols that\nhe uses in his researches? There is a whole world of dispute and\ndiscussion about all these things.\n\n[290] I have in view in fact only (or mainly) such American\ncharacteristics as may be thought of in connexion with the newer\nintellectual and social atmosphere of the present time, the\natmosphere that impresses the visitor and the resident from the old\nworld, the atmosphere to the creation of which he himself and his\nfellow-immigrants have contributed, as well as the native-born American\nof two generations ago--to go no further back. I mean that anything\nlike a far-reaching analysis or consideration of the great qualities\nthat go to make up the \u201csoul\u201d of the United States is, of course,\naltogether beyond the sphere of my attention for the present. I fully\nsubscribe, in short, to the truth of the following words of Professor\nSantayana, one of the most scholarly and competent American students\n(both of philosophy and of life) of the passing generation: \u201cAmerica\nis not simply a young country with an old mentality; it is a country\nwith two mentalities, one a survival of the beliefs and standards of\nthe fathers, the other an expression of the instincts, practice, and\ndiscoveries of the younger generation. In all the higher things of\nthe mind--in religion, literature, in the moral emotions, it is the\nhereditary spirit that still prevails, so much so, that Mr. Bernard\nShaw finds that America is a hundred years behind the times.\u201d--\u201cThe\nGenteel Tradition in American Philosophy,\u201d in _Winds of Doctrine_ (p.\n187).\n\n[291] A contemporary American authority, Professor Bliss Perry, in\nhis book upon _The American Mind_ naturally singles out radicalism\nas one of the well-marked characteristics of Americans. Among the\nother characteristics of which he speaks are those of the \u201clove of\nexaggeration,\u201d \u201cidealism,\u201d \u201coptimism,\u201d \u201cindividualism,\u201d \u201cpublic\nspirit.\u201d I refer, I think, to nearly all these things in my pages,\nalthough of course I had not the benefit of Professor Perry\u2019s book in\nwriting the present chapter.\n\n[292] I am certainly one of those who insist that we must think of\nAmerica as (despite some appearances to the contrary--appearances\nto be seen also, for example, in the West of Canada) fundamentally\na religious country. It was founded upon certain great religious\nideas that were a highly important counterpart to some of the\neighteenth-century fallacies about liberty and equality that exercised\ntheir influence upon the fathers of the republic.\n\n[293] He has recently published a volume dealing especially with the\ncontributions of Biology and Darwinism to philosophy.\n\n[294] See p. 252.\n\n[295] The crucial characteristics of the Presidential campaign of 1912\nclearly showed this.\n\n[296] We can see this in the many valuable studies and addresses of\nProfessor Dewey upon educational and social problems.\n\n[297] It is this fact, or the body of fact and tendency upon which\nit rests, that causes Americans and all who know them or observe\nthem, to think and speak of the _apparently_ purely \u201ceconomic\u201d or\n\u201cbusiness-like\u201d character of the greater part of their activities.\nLet me quote Professor Bliss Perry here ... \u201c_the overwhelming\npreponderance of the unmitigated business-man face_ [italics mine],\nthe consummate monotonous commonness of the pushing male crowd\u201d (p.\n158). \u201cThere exists, in other words, _in all classes of American\nsociety to-day_, just as there existed during the Revolution, during\nthe \u2018transcendental\u2019 movement, in the Civil War, an immense mass of\nunspiritualised, unvitalised American manhood and womanhood\u201d (p. 160).\n\n[298] And this despite of what I have called elsewhere the comparative\nfailure of Pragmatism to give a rational, and tenable account of\n\u201cpersonality\u201d and of the \u201cself.\u201d\n\n[299] At the moment of his death (_scribens est mortuus_) James was\nundoubtedly throughout the world the most talked-about English-speaking\nphilosopher, and nowhere more so than in Germany, the home of the\ntranscendentalism that he so doughtily and brilliantly attacked.\nStein says, for example, in his article upon \u201cPragmatism\u201d (_Archiv\nf\u00fcr Philosophie_, 14, 1907, II. Ab.), that we \u201chave had nothing like\nit since Schopenhauer.\u201d I have often thought that James and his work,\nalong with the life and work of other notable American thinkers (and\nalong with the \u201clead\u201d that America now certainly has over at least\nEngland in some departments of study, like political and economic\nscience, experimental psychology, and so on), are part of the debt\nAmerica owed, some decades ago, to the Old World in the matter of the\ntraining of many of her best professors--a debt she has long since\ncancelled and overpaid. Readers, by the way, who desire more authentic\ninformation about James and his work than the present writer is either\ncapable, or desirous, of giving in this book, may peruse either the\nrecent work of Professor Perry of Harvard upon _Present Philosophical\nTendencies_, or the work of M. Flournoy already spoken of. Boutroux has\na fine appreciation of the value of James\u2019s philosophical work in the\nwork to which I have already referred. And there was naturally a crop\nof invaluable articles upon James in the American reviews shortly after\nhis death.\n\n[300] Think alone, for example, of what James says he learnt there\nfrom a teacher like Agassiz: \u201cThe hours I spent with Agassiz so taught\nme the difference between all possible abstractionists and all livers\nin the light of the world\u2019s concrete fulness that I have never been\nable to forget it.\u201d--From an article upon James in the _Journal of\nPhilosophy_, ix. p. 527.\n\n[301] While this book was passing through the press my eye fell upon\nthe following words of Professor Santayana in respect of this very\npersonality of James: \u201cIt was his personal spontaneity, similar to that\nof Emerson, and his personal vitality similar to that of nobody else.\nConviction and ideas came to him, so to speak, from the subsoil. He had\na prophetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments of the age, with the\nmoods of the dumb majority. His way of thinking and feeling represents\nthe true America, and represented in a measure the whole ultra-modern\nradical world\u201d (_Winds of Doctrine_, p. 205).\n\n[302] Including, say, the facilities of a completely indexed and\nauthenticated estimate of the work that has been done in different\ncountries upon his particular subject. It is easy to see that the habit\nand the possibility of work in an environment such as this [and again\nand again its system and its facilities simply stagger the European]\nis a thing of the greatest value to the American professor so far as\nthe idea of his own best possible contribution to his age is concerned.\nShould he merely do over again what others have done? Or shall he\ntry to work in a really new field? Or shall he give himself to the\nwork of real teaching, to the training of competent men, or to the\n\u201corganization\u201d of his subject with his public? It must be admitted,\nI think, that the average American professor is a better teacher and\nguide in his subject than his average colleague in many places in\nEurope. Hence the justifiable discontent of many American students with\nwhat they occasionally find abroad in the way of academic facilities\nfor investigation and advanced study.\n\n[303] The latter (it is perhaps needless to state) have long been\nperfectly evident to all American teachers of the first rank in the\nshape, say, of the worthless \u201cresearch\u201d that is often represented in\ntheses and studies handed in for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,\nor for other purposes. Anything that seems to be \u201cwork done,\u201d anything\nthat has attained to some \u201cconsequences\u201d or other, has often been\npublished as studies and researches, and this despite the valuable\nthings that are to be associated with the idea of the pragmatist\nelement in American scholarship. The faults, too, of the undue\nspecialization that still obtains in many American institutions is\nalso, as I have indicated, becoming more and more apparent to American\nauthorities.\n\n[304] I cannot see why idealists should have been so slow to accord\nto Pragmatism the element of truth in this idea, and to admit that it\nconnects the pragmatist philosophy of \u201cconsequences\u201d with the idealist\n\u201cvalue-philosophy.\u201d\n\n[305] The greater part, for example, of our British teaching and\nwriting about Kant and Hegel has taken little or no recognition of\nthe peculiar intellectual and social atmosphere under which Criticism\nand Transcendentalism became intelligible and influential in Germany\nand elsewhere, or of the equally important matter of the very\ndifferent ways in which the Kantian and the Hegelian philosophies\nwere interpreted by different schools and different tendencies of\nthought. A similar thing might, I think, too, be said of the unduly\n\u201cintellectualistic\u201d manner in which the teachings of Plato and\nAristotle have often been presented to our British students--under the\ninfluence partly of Hegelianism and partly of the _doctrinairism_ and\nthe intellectualism of our academic Humanism since the time of the\nRenaissance. Hence the great importance in Greek philosophy of such a\nrecent work as that of F.\u00a0M. Cornford upon the relation of Religion\nto Philosophy (_From Religion to Philosophy_, Arnold, 1912), or of\nProfessor Burnet\u2019s well-known _Early Greek Philosophy_.\n\n[306] As suggestive of the scant respect for authorities felt by the\nactive-minded American student, I may refer to the boast of Papini that\nPragmatism appeals to the virile and the proud-spirited who do not wish\nto accept their thought from the past.\n\n[307] I am thinking of such events as the \u201cWorld\u2019s Parliament of\nReligions\u201d (in Chicago in 1893), the recent international conferences\nupon \u201cethical instruction in different countries,\u201d upon \u201cracial\nproblems,\u201d upon \u201cmissions,\u201d etc. It would be idle to think that such\nattempts at the organisation of the knowledge and the effort of\nthe thinking people in the world are quite devoid of philosophical\nimportance. One has only to study, say, von Hartmann, or modern social\nreform, to be convinced of the contrary.\n\n[308] I trust I may be pardoned if I venture to suggest that in\nopposition to the democratic attitude of Pragmatism to the ordinary\nfacts of life, and to the ordinary (but often heroic) life of ordinary\nmen, the view of man and the universe that is taken in such an\nimportant idealistic book as Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s _Individuality and Value_\nis doubtless unduly aristocratic or intellectualistic. It speaks\nrather of the Greek view of life than of the modern democratic view.\nAs an expression of the _quasi_ democratic attitude of James even in\nphilosophy, we may cite the following: \u201cIn this real world of sweat and\ndirt, it seems to me that when a view of things is noble, that ought to\ncount as a presumption its truth, as a philosophical disqualification.\nThe Prince of Darkness may be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but\nwhatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman.\nHis menial services are needed in the dust of our human trials.\u201d\n[Having rewritten this quotation two or three times, I have lost the\nreference to its place in James\u2019s writings. It is one of the three\nbooks upon Pragmatism and Pluralism.]\n\n[309] We may quote, I think, the following passage from Professor\nPerry to show that the open-mindedness of James was not merely a\ntemperamental and an American characteristic in his case, but a\nquality or attitude that rested upon an intellectual conviction in\nrespect of the function of ideas. \u201cSince it is their office [_i.e._\nthe office of ideas] to pave the way for direct knowledge, or to be\ntemporarily substituted for it, then efficiency is conditioned by\ntheir _unobtrusiveness, by the readiness with which they subordinate\nthemselves_. The commonest case of an idea in James\u2019s sense is the\nword, and the most notable example of his pragmatic or empirical\nmethod is his own scrupulous avoidance of verbalism. It follows that\nsince ideas are in and of themselves of no cognitive value, since\nthey are essentially instrumental, they _are always on trial_, and\n\u2018liable to modification in the course of future experience.\u2019\u201d--_Present\nPhilosophical Tendencies_, p. 364 (italics mine).\n\n[310] It is known to all students that some of the more important\nwritings of this prince of thinkers cannot be intelligibly approached\nwithout a long preliminary study of the peculiar \u201cdressing up,\u201d or\ntransformation, to which he subjects the various facts of life and\nexistence. And the same thing is true (to a more modified extent) of\nthe writings of Kant.\n\n[311] See the wise remark, in this very connexion, of the possible\nservice of philosophy to-day, of Dr. Bosanquet, reproduced upon p. 226.\nAnd then, again, we must remember that an unduly pragmatist view of\nlife would tend to make people impervious to ideas that transcend the\nrange and the level of their ordinary interests and activities.\n\n[312] Cf. the following from Professor Pace\u2019s Preface to _Introduction\nto Philosophy_, by Charles A. Dubray. \u201cIn Catholic colleges, importance\nhas always been attached to the study of philosophy both as a means\nof culture and as a source of information regarding the great truths\nwhich are influential in supporting Christian belief and in shaping\ncharacter.\u201d Of course these same words might be used as descriptive of\nwhat Professor Santayana calls the \u201colder tradition\u201d in _all_ American\ncolleges. It is interesting, by the way, to note also the pragmatist\ntouch in the same Preface to this Catholic manual. \u201cBut if this\ntraining is to be successful, philosophy must be presented, not as a\ncomplex of abstruse speculations on far-off inaccessible topics, but as\na system of truths that enter with vital consequence into our ordinary\nthinking and our everyday conduct.\u201d\n\n[313] See p. 136.\n\n[314] See above, p. 34 and p. 165.\n\n[315] It is not, however, \u201crest\u201d that the pragmatists want, even in\nheaven, but renewed opportunities for achievement. \u201c\u2018_There shall\nbe news_,\u2019 W. James was fond of saying with rapture, quoting from\nthe unpublished poem of a new friend, \u2018there shall be _news in\nheaven_.\u2019\u201d--Professor Santayana in _Winds of Doctrine_, p. 209.\n\n[316] In using this expression I am acutely conscious of its\nlimitations and of its misleading character. There is nothing in which\nAmericans so thoroughly believe as _knowledge_ and _instruction_ and\n_information_. A belief in education is in fact _the one prevailing\nreligion of the country_--the one thing in which _all_ classes, without\nany exception, unfeignedly _believe_, and for which the entire country\nmakes enormous sacrifices.\n\n[317] In using this expression I am not blind to such outstanding\ncharacteristics of American life as (1) the enormous amount of\npreventive philanthropy that exists in the United States; (2) the\nwell-known system of checks in the governmental machinery of the\ncountry; (3) the readiness with which Americans fly to legislation for\nthe cure of evils; (4) the American sensitiveness to pain and their\nhesitation about the infliction of suffering or punishment, etc. Nor\ndo I forget the sacrifice of life entailed by modern necessities and\nmodern inventions in countries other than America. I simply mean that\nowing to the constant stream of immigration, and to the spirit of\nyouthfulness that pervades the country, the willingness of people to\nmake experiments with themselves and their lives is one of the many\nremarkable things about the United States.\n\n[318] See p. 117.\n\n[319] And this despite the enormous amount of work that has been done\nby American biologists upon the \u201cfactors\u201d of evolution, and upon a true\ninterpretation of Darwinism and of Weismannism and of the evolutionary\ntheory generally.\n\n[320] Even Professor James, for example, dismissed (far too readily,\nin my opinion) as a \u201csociological romance\u201d a well-known book\n(published both in French and in English) by Professor Schinz entitled\n_Anti-Pragmatism_. Although in some respects a superficial and\nexaggerated piece of work, this book did discover certain important\nthings about Pragmatism and about its relation to American life.\n\n[321] It is probably a perception of this truth that has led Dr.\nBosanquet to express the opinion that the whole pragmatist issue may\nbe settled by an examination of the notion of \u201csatisfaction.\u201d He\nmust mean, I think, that satisfaction is impossible to man without\na recognition of many of the ideal factors that are almost entirely\nneglected by the pragmatists--except by Bergson, if it be fair to call\nhim a pragmatist.\n\n[322] Bourdeau, for example, has suggested that its God is not really\nGod, but merely an old domestic servant destined to do us personal\nservices---help us to carry our trunk and our cross in the midst of\nsweat and dirt. He is not a gentleman even. \u201cNo wonder,\u201d he adds, \u201cit\nwas condemned at Rome.\u201d See his _Pragmatisme et Modernisme_, p. 82.\n\n[323] I am thinking here of the words in the Constitution of the\nState of California (they are printed in Mr. Bryce\u2019s _American\nCommonwealth_--at least in the earlier editions) to the effect that it\nis the natural right of all men to seek and to \u201c_obtain_ [!]\u201d happiness.\n\n[324] \u201c_Epigramme_,\u201d Venice, 1790. [\u201cI could never abide any of those\nfreedom-gospellers. All that they ever wanted was to get things running\nso as to suit themselves. If you are anxious to set people free, just\nmake a beginning by trying to serve them. The simplest attempt will\nteach you how dangerous this effort may be.\u201d]\n\n[325] See Chapter IX.\n\n[326] On what grounds does Professor Bosanquet think of \u201ccompensating\njustice\u201d as a na\u00efve idea? It is on the contrary one of the highest and\ndeepest, and one of the most comprehensive to which the human mind has\never attained--giving rise to the various theogonies and theodicies and\nreligious systems of mankind. It is at the bottom, for example, of the\ntheodicy and the philosophy of Leibniz, the founder of the Rationalism\nof the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe.\n\n[327] Could any system of ethics which took such an impossible and such\na belated conception of the individual be regarded as ethics at all?\n\n[328] I do not think that this is a fair preliminary description of\nthe problem of teleology. A person who believes in the realization\nof purpose in some experiences with which he thinks himself to be\nacquainted does not plead for the guidance of the universe by finite\nminds, but simply for a view of it that shall include the truth of\nhuman purposes. And of course there may be in the universe beings other\nthan ourselves who also realize purposes.\n\n[329] Italics and exclamation mine.\n\n[330] Italics mine. There is a large element of truth in this great\nidea of Professor Bosanquet\u2019s, connecting [for our purposes] his\nphilosophy with the theism and the personalism for which we are\ncontending as the only true and real basis for Humanism.\n\n[331] Readers who remember Green\u2019s _Prolegomena to Ethics_ will\nremember that it is one of the difficulties of that remarkable, but\none-sided, production (exposed, I think, with many other defects in\nProfessor Taylor\u2019s brilliant, but unduly intellectualistic _Problem\nof Conduct_) that it also seems to teach a kind of \u201cDeterminism\u201d\nin ethics, in what our nature is unduly communicated to us by the\nAbsolute, or the \u201cEternal Consciousness.\u201d This whole way of looking at\nthings must largely be abandoned to-day.\n\n[332] See below, p. 226.\n\n[333] It is, I am inclined to think, the existence of this\ncontradiction in Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s Lectures that will cause the average\nintelligent person to turn away from them as not affording an adequate\naccount of the reality of the world of persons and things with which\nhe knows himself to be directly and indirectly acquainted. Another\nway of stating the same thing would be to say that Absolutism fails\nto take any adequate recognition of that most serious contradiction\n(or \u201cdefect\u201d) in our experience of which we have already spoken as\nthe great dualism of modern times, the opposition between reason and\nfaith an opposition that is not relieved either by the greatest of\nthe continually increasing discoveries of science, or by any, or all,\nof the systems of all the thinkers. Hegelianism in general assures us\nthat from the point of view of a \u201chigher synthesis\u201d this opposition\ndoes not exist or that it is somehow \u201ctranscended.\u201d And its method of\neffecting this synthesis is to convert the opposition between faith\nand reason into the opposition between what it calls \u201cUnderstanding\u201d\nand what it calls \u201cReason\u201d [an opposition that is to some extent a\nfictitious one, \u201creason\u201d being, to begin with, but another name for\nour power of framing general conceptions or notions, and not therefore\ndifferent from \u201cunderstanding\u201d]. It removes, that is to say, the\nopposition between two different phases or aspects of our experience\nby denying the existence of one of them altogether. It changes the\nopposition between knowledge and faith into an opposition between an\nalleged lower and an alleged higher way of _knowing_. This alleged\nhigher way of knowing, however, is, when we look into it, but the old\nideal of the perfect demonstration of _all the supposed contents_ of\nour knowledge (principles and facts alike) that has haunted modern\nphilosophy from the time of Descartes. It is an unattainable ideal\nbecause no philosophy in the world can begin without some assumption\n(either of \u201cfact\u201d or of principle), and because our knowledge of\nthe world comes to us in a piecemeal fashion--under the conditions\nof time and space. A fact prior to all the issues of the demand of\nRationalism for a supposedly perfect demonstration is the _existence\nof the conscious beings_ (Dr. Bosanquet himself, for example) who\nseek this supposed certainty in order that they may act better--in\nignorance of the fact that complete initial certainty on our part as\nto all the issues and aspects of our actions would tend to destroy\nthe personal character of our choice as moral agents, as beings who\nmay occasionally act beyond the given and the calculable, and set up\nprecedents and ideals for ourselves and for others--for humanity. It is\nthis underlying faith then in the reality of our moral and spiritual\nnature that we would alone oppose (and only in a relative sense) to\nthe supposed certainties of a completely rational, or _a priori_,\ndemonstration, the whole contention of humanism being that it is in the\ninterests of the former reality that the latter certainties exist. The\napparent opposition between faith and reason would be surmounted by a\nphilosophy that should make consciousness of ourselves _as persons_ the\nprimal certainty, and all other forms of consciousness or of knowledge\nsecondary and tributary, as it were, to this.\n\n[334] I am aware that there is a difference between the \u201cuniversal\u201d\nof ordinary formal logic and Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s (or Hegel\u2019s) \u201cconcrete\nuniversal,\u201d but it is needless for me to think of it here. Dr.\nBosanquet uses in his Lectures the phrase \u201clogical universal\u201d for his\n\u201cconcrete universal\u201d or his principle of positive coherence. It is\nalways logical coherence that he has in view.\n\n[335] \u201cFor everywhere it is creative Logic, the nature of the whole\nworking in the detail, which constitutes experience, and is appreciable\nin so far as experience has value.\u201d Now Logic of itself does not thus\n\u201cwork\u201d or \u201cdo\u201d anything. It is men or persons who do things by the help\nof logic and reasoning and other things--realities and forces, etc.\n\n[336] Cf. p. 31. \u201cWe are minds,\u201d he says, \u201c_i.e._ living microcosms,\nnot with hard and fast limits, but determined by our range and powers\nwhich fluctuate very greatly.\u201d My point simply is that this is too\nintellectualistic a conception of man\u2019s personality. We have minds, but\nwe are not minds.\n\n[337] See p. 192. \u201cBut as the self is essentially a world of content\nengaged in certain transformations\u201d; and p. 193, \u201ca conscious being\n... is a world ... in which the Absolute begins to reveal its proper\nnature.\u201d How can a \u201cworld of content\u201d [that is to say, the \u201csphere of\ndiscourse\u201d of what some person is thinking for some purpose or other]\nbe \u201cengaged\u201d in certain transformations? It is the _person_, or the\nthinker, who is transforming the various data of his experience for his\npurposes as a man among men. It is time that philosophy ceased to make\nitself ridiculous by calmly writing down such abstractions as if they\nwere facts.\n\n[338] Cf. \u201cMind as the significance and interpretation of reality,\u201d p.\n27.\n\n[339] \u201cMind has nothing of its own but the active form of totality,\neverything positive it draws from Nature.\u201d\n\n[340] This again is an abstraction, and how on earth can it be said\nthat \u201cmind\u201d and conscious life \u201creflect\u201d merely certain abstractions\n(or creations) of their own? They have invented such terms as \u201ccontent\u201d\nfor certain purposes, and their own being and nature is therefore more\nthan these terms. Mind is not a \u201ccontent\u201d; it makes all other things\n\u201ccontents\u201d for itself.\n\n[341] It has even there, according to Dr. Bosanquet, only its purely\ntheoretic function of working after its own perfection in the way of\nattaining to a logical \u201cuniversal.\u201d \u201cThe peculiarity of mind for us,\nis to be a world of experience working itself out towards harmony and\ncompleteness.\u201d This is simply not true.\n\n[342] \u201cFinite consciousness, whether animal or human, did not make its\nbody.\u201d\n\n[343] \u201cThus there is nothing in mind _which the physical counterpart\ncannot represent_.\u201d (Italics mine.)\n\n[344] \u201cWhat we call the individual, then, is not a fixed essence, but a\nliving world of content representing a certain range of externality.\u201d\nP. 289.\n\n[345] \u201cThe _system of the universe_, as was said in an earlier\nLecture, might be described as _a representative system_. Nature, or\nexternality[!] lives in the lives of conscious beings. (Italics mine.)\n\n[346] \u201cSpirit is a light, a focus, a significance[!] which can only be\nby contact with a \u2018nature\u2019 an external world.\u201d\n\n[347] \u201cFor, on the other hand, it has been urged and we feel,\nthat it is _thought which constructs and sustains the fabric of\nexperience_, and that it is thought-determinations which invest\neven sense-experience _with its value_ and _its meaning_. . . . The\nultimate tendency of thought, we have seen, is not to generalise, but\nto _constitute a world_,\u201d p. 55. Again, \u201cthe true office of thought,\nwe begin to see, _is to build up_, _to inspire with meaning_, _to\nintensify_, _to vivify_. The object which thought, in the true sense,\nhas worked upon, is not a relic of decaying sense, _but is a living\nworld_, analogous to a perception of the beautiful, in which every\nthought-determination adds fresh point and deeper bearing to every\nelement of the whole,\u201d p. 58. And on p. 178 he says that he sees\nno objection to an idealist recognising the \u201cuse made of\u201d \u201claws\u201d\nand \u201c_dispositions_\u201d in recent psychology. [How one wishes that Dr.\nBosanquet had really worked into his philosophy the idea that every\nmental \u201celement\u201d is in a sense a \u201cdisposition\u201d to _activity_!] Some\nof these statements of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s have almost a pragmatist ring\nabout them, a suggestion of a _living_ and dynamic (rather than a\nmerely intellectualistic) conception of thought. They may therefore be\nassociated by the reader with the concessions to Pragmatism by other\nrationalists of which we spoke in an early chapter (see p. 74).\n\n[348] See Chapter III. p. 90.\n\n[349] I must say that apart from any questions in detail about\nthis rejection of teleology by Dr. Bosanquet, there is something\ninexplicable about it to me. He cannot retain his own great notion of\n\u201cwholeness\u201d without the idea of \u201cend,\u201d because \u201cwholeness\u201d is a demand\nof thought that is guided by some idea of purpose or end.\n\n[350] See p. 90.\n\n[351] Italics mine.\n\n[352] P. 225.\n\n[353] See p. 90.\n\n[354] Having already given instances of this abstractionism in the\ncase of such things as the \u201cself\u201d and the \u201cuniversal\u201d and \u201cspirit,\u201d it\nwill suffice to point out here in addition (1) its tendency to talk of\n\u201cexperience\u201d and \u201cexperiences\u201d _as if there could be such things apart\nfrom the prior real existence of the experients or the experiencing\npersons_ with whom we are acquainted in our daily life, and (2) its\ntendency to talk of getting at \u201cthe heart of actual life and love\u201d in a\n\u201csystem\u201d which leaves no place for the real existence of either gods or\nmen who live and love. And then I trust that it may not be regarded as\nan impertinence to allege as another puzzling piece of abstractionism\non the part of Dr. Bosanquet, that he has allowed himself to speak and\nthink in his book as if his theory of the \u201cconcrete universal\u201d were\npractically a new thing in the thought of our time--apart altogether,\nthat is to say, from the important work in this same direction of other\nNeo-Hegelian writers, and apart, too, from the unique work of Hegel in\nthe same connexion.\n\n[355] See below, p. 230.\n\n[356] This is revealed in the main in its exposition of the world\nas the logical system of a single complete individual experience--a\ntendency that students of philosophy know to exist in Neo-Hegelianism\ngenerally from Green to Bradley. I admit that this tendency is\nliterally a different thing from solipsism in the ordinary sense, as\nthe inability of a particular finite person to prove to himself that\nany person or thing exists except himself. It is still, however, it\nseems to me, possible to regard as solipsistic the tendency to set\nforth the universe as the experience, or the thought, of a single\nexperient or a single thinker, even although the impersonalism of Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s logical \u201cwhole\u201d conflicts somewhat with the individuality\nof his Absolute.\n\n[357] Cf. p. 160.\n\n[358] The well-known inability of Mr. Bradley, for example, to be\ncontent with the reality of any portion or any phase of reality that\nfalls short of what he regards as absolute reality, and with the merely\nrelative meaning that he attaches to any category of the \u201cfinite.\u201d\nAlso the well-known Neo-Hegelian tendency to make an opponent forge\nthe weapon by which he is to be dislodged from any particular point\nof view. In the case of Dr. Bosanquet this tendency takes the form\nof making out any one who holds to a belief in the real existence of\nfinite conscious persons to hold the absurd position of believing in\n\u201can impervious and isolated self,\u201d a thing, of course, that no one who\nknows anything about biology or ethics, or social psychology, really\ndoes.\n\n[359] As another instance of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s unintentional unfairness\nto his opponents, I would note his positive injustice to Theism as\nsuch. What many of us think of (however imperfectly) and believe in\nas God is invariably to him \u201ca theistic Demiurge in his blankness and\nisolation.\u201d I do not believe in such an abstract Demiurge any more\nthan I believe in the separate, isolated self that he conjures up to\nhis mind when he thinks of personality. The problem of the twentieth\ncentury may well be what Dr. Ward has signalised as the relation of God\nto the \u201cAbsolute\u201d of the Hegelian metaphysicians, but this suggestion\nsimply means to me the discovery on the part of philosophers of terms\nand concepts more adequate to the Supreme Being than either the\nAbsolute, or the external deity rejected by Dr. Bosanquet.\n\n[360] St\u00e9phane Mallarm\u00e9, according to Nordau in _Degeneration_, p. 103.\n\n[361] And the general reader must remember that the \u201cwhole\u201d is always\n(with all due respect to his high dialectic ability and his high\ntemper of mind and his scholarship) a kind of _ignis fatuus_ in Dr.\nBosanquet\u2019s book, a kind of shadow thrown by the lamps and the tools of\nhis own choosing in his Quixotic search. The \u201cwhole\u201d is the \u201cperfected\nindividuality\u201d of the individual who sets out to find truth in this\ngreat world of ours with all its _real possibilities_ of gain and loss.\nIt is the completion of the \u201csystem\u201d of truth to which the truth-seeker\nwould fain reduce the entire universe, that becomes for him (for the\ntime being) the mere \u201csubject-matter\u201d of his thought. It is, that is\nto say, in both cases, a purely formal conception--an abstraction,\nalthough to Dr. Bosanquet it is the reality implied in the very\nexistence and activity of the individual thinker. But the latter is\nthe case to him only because he looks upon man as _existing to think_\ninstead of as _thinking to exist_.\n\n[362] That is to say, for the scholar and the lover of Dante and\nDante\u2019s world.\n\n[363] For he was not merely a \u201cmind,\u201d reflecting \u201cItaly\u201d and \u201cminds\u201d\nand \u201cexperiences.\u201d\n\n[364] And that, we might add, is still kept alive by some of our\nhumanists and educators of to-day as the ideal for both primary and\nsecondary education.\n\n[365] This is a thing that the beginner is taught in lectures\nintroductory to the study of the philosophy of Kant--in regard to\nKant\u2019s relation to the barren, dogmatic formalism of Wolff--a one-sided\ninterpreter of the philosophy of Leibniz. I am quite aware that Dr.\nBosanquet does not merely use the Principle of Non-Contradiction in\nthe aggressive, or polemical, manner of Mr. Bradley in _Appearance and\nReality_. The principle of positive coherence at which he aims, begins,\nto some extent, where Mr. Bradley stopped. But it is still the idea of\nconsistency or inconsistency, with certain presuppositions of his own,\nthat rules his thinking; it determines, from the very outset of his\nLectures, what he accepts and what he rejects.\n\n[366] See p. 152 and p. 156, note 2.\n\n[367] I use this word \u201cmust\u201d in a logical as well as in an ethical\nsense, seeing that all judgment implies a belief in the reality of a\nworld of persons independent of the mere fact of \u201cjudgment\u201d as a piece\nof mental process.\n\n[368] See p. 145.\n\n[369] On p. 345 the words are: \u201c_When we consider the na\u00efve or\nelementary life of morality and religion_\u201d; and on p. 346: \u201c_The\nna\u00efve, or simple self of every-day morality and religion_,\u201d and the\nmarginal heading of the page upon which these words occur is \u201c_The\nna\u00efve good self compared to grasp of a fundamental principle alone_.\u201d\nCould anything more clearly indicate what the Kantians call a confusion\nof categories [in the case in point the categories of \u201cgoodness\u201d and\nthe categories of \u201ctruth\u201d] or what Aristotle calls a \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, the unconscious treatment of one order of facts by the\nterms and conceptions of another order of facts. To Dr. Bosanquet\nas the Neo-Hellenist that he is in his professed creed, badness is\npractically stupidity, and \u201clack of unification of life,\u201d and \u201cfailure\nof theoretical grasp.\u201d This confusion between goodness and wisdom is\nagain indicated on p. 347 in the words: \u201c_A man is good in so far as\nhis being is \u2018unified at\u2019 all in any sphere of wisdom or activity_.\u201d\n[This is simply not true, and its falsity is a more unforgivable\nthing in the case of Dr. Bosanquet than it is in the case of the\npragmatists who also tend to make the \u2018moral\u2019 a kind of \u2018unification\u2019\nor \u2018effectiveness\u2019 in \u2018purpose.\u2019] As a proof of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s\ntransformation of the facts of the ethical life in the interest of\nlogical theory, we can point to p. 334: \u201c_Our actions and ideas issue\nfrom our world as a conclusion from its premises, or as a poem from its\nauthor\u2019s spirit_,\u201d or to p. 53, where it is definitely stated that the\n\u201c_self, as it happens to be_,\u201d cannot, in any of its \u201cthree aspects,\u201d\n\u201c_serve as a test of reality_.\u201d To do the latter, it must, in his\nopinion, follow the law of the \u201cuniversal,\u201d _i.e._ _become a logical\nconception_. Now of course (1) _it is not the self \u201cas it happens to\nbe\u201d_ that is chiefly dealt with in ethics, but rather the _self as\nit ought to be_. And (2) the ethical self, or the \u201cperson,\u201d does not\nfollow the \u201claw of the universal\u201d [a logical law] but the law of right\nand wrong [an ethical law]. As a proof of the subordination of the\nfacts of conduct to the facts of aesthetics, we may take the words on\np. 348 where aesthetic excellence is said to be \u201c_goodness in the wider\nor_ (\u2018_shall we say_\u2019) _in the narrower sense_.\u201d Now the distinction\nbetween ethics and aesthetics is not one of degree, but one of kind.\n\nAnd as another illustration of his tendency to transform ethical facts\nin the light of a metaphysical, or a logical, theory [they are the\nsame thing to him] we may quote the emphatic declaration on p. 356:\n\u201c_Our effort has been to bring the conception of moral_ and individual\ninitiative _nearer to the idea of logical determination_,\u201d or the\nequally outspoken declaration on p. 353: \u201c_But metaphysical theory,\nviewing the self in its essential basis_ of moral solidarity with the\nnatural and social world ... _cannot admit_ that the independence\nof the self, _though a fact, is more than a partial fact_.\u201d Or the\nwords at the top of this same page: \u201cThe primary principle _that\nshould govern the whole discussion_ is this, that the attitude of\nmoral judgment and responsibility for decisions _is only one among\nother attitudes_ and spheres of experience.\u201d These last words alone\nwould prove definitely the non-ethical character of \u201cIndividuality\nand Value.\u201d The ethical life is to its author only a \u201c_quatenus\nconsideratur_,\u201d only a possible point of view, only an aspect of\nreality, only an aspect, therefore, of a \u201clogical system.\u201d Now if the\nethical life of the world is to count for anything at all, it may be\nsaid that the ethical life is no mere aspect of the life of the self,\nand no mere aspect of the life of the world, seeing that \u201cnature\u201d in\nthe sense of mere \u201cphysical nature\u201d does not come into the sphere of\nmorality at all. It is rather the activity of the \u201cwhole self,\u201d or\nthe \u201cnormative\u201d reflection of the self as a whole upon all the merely\npartial or subordinate aspects of its activity, upon bodily life,\neconomic life, intellectual activity, and so on that constitutes the\nworld of morality.\n\n[370] See p. 147, and p. 244.\n\n[371] Good and evil to Dr. Bosanquet are two quasi-rational systems\nin active antagonism as claiming to attach different \u201cprinciples and\npredicates\u201d to identical data. The essence of their antagonism to Dr.\nBosanquet is not, however, that evil is contemplated, as it must be\nsooner or later, in repentance for example as _wrong_, but rather that\nthe \u201cevil\u201d is an imperfect \u201c_logical_ striving (p. 351) of the self\n_after unity_\u201d which is in \u201ccontradiction with a _fuller_ and sounder\nstriving\u201d after the same. The evil self is to him merely the vehicle of\na logical contradiction in the self.\n\n[372] This is seen in his admission (on p. 351) that the \u201cbad will\u201d no\nless than the \u201cgood will\u201d is a logical necessity, when taken along with\nhis doctrine about mind and body, his doctrine of the \u201cdependence\u201d (p.\n318) of the finite individual upon the external mechanical world. Dr.\nBosanquet, of course, thinks that even in this apparent Determinism\nhe is justifiably supplementing the ordinary ideas about the \u201cself\u201d\nas \u201ccreative\u201d and \u201coriginative\u201d (p. 354), by the wider recognition\nthat I am more or less completely doing the work of the \u201cuniverse\u201d\nas a \u201cmember\u201d in a \u201cgreater self.\u201d And he adds in the same sentence\nthe words that \u201c_I am in a large measure continuous with the greater_\n(p. 355) _self_,\u201d and \u201c_dyed with its colours_\u201d--a further step in\nDeterminism, as it were, and a step which, with the preceding one to\nwhich we have just referred, no critic can fail to connect with the\nDeterminism that we have already found to be implicated in his doctrine\nof the \u201cself,\u201d and in his general doctrine that the \u201cexternal\u201d must be\nfrankly accepted as a factor in the universe.\n\n[373] By the \u201cspectator\u201d fallacy we mean his tendency to talk and think\nof the self as it is for a spectator or student, looking at matters\nfrom the outside, and not as the self is for the man himself.\n\n[374] Wollaston is the English ethical philosopher who, according to\nLeslie Stephen\u2019s account, thought, after thirty years of meditation,\nthat the only reason he had for not breaking his wife\u2019s head with a\nstick was, that this would be tantamount to a denial that his wife was\nhis wife.\n\n[375] See _Idola Theatri_ by Henry Sturt (the editor of the well-known\n\u201cPersonal Idealism\u201d volume) of Oxford--a book that enumerates and\nexamines many of the fallacies of the Neo-Hegelian school. Mr. Sturt\u2019s\nfirst chapter is entitled the \u201cPassive Fallacy,\u201d which he calls, with\nsome degree of justice, the prime mistake of the idealistic philosophy,\nmeaning by this the \u201cignoring\u201d of the \u201ckinetic\u201d and the \u201cdynamic\u201d\ncharacter of our experience.\n\n[376] It is Natural Theology that is the subject proper of the _Gifford\nLectures_.\n\n[377] See p. 149 of Chapter VI.\n\n[378] With, we might almost say, the pragmatists and the humanists.\n\n[379] This is really their main distinguishing characteristic and merit.\n\n[380] See p. 162.\n\n[381] \u201cIndeed, I do not conceal my belief that in the main the work has\nbeen done.\u201d--_Preface._\n\n[382] I think that the confession is a praiseworthy one in view of the\nfact of the prejudice of Rationalism, that philosophy has nothing to do\nwith convictions but only with knowledge.\n\n[383] By belief I have understood throughout this book simply man\u2019s\nworking sense for reality, and I am inclined to think that this is\nalmost the best definition that could be given of it--our working sense\nfor reality. It is at least, despite its apparent evasiveness, most in\nharmony with the pragmatist-humanist inclusion of will elements and\nfeeling elements in our knowledge and in our apprehension of reality.\nIt is also in harmony with the conception of reality which may, in my\nopinion, be extracted from both Pragmatism and Idealism--that reality\nis what it proves itself to be in the daily transformation of our\nexperience. By the retention of the term \u201cworking\u201d in this attempted\ndefinition I express my agreement with the idea that action, and the\nwillingness to act, is an essential element in belief. The outstanding\npositions in the definitions of belief that are generally given in\nphilosophical dictionaries are, firstly, that belief is a conviction\nor subjective apprehension of truth or reality in distinction from\ndemonstrable knowledge or direct evidence; and, secondly, that feeling\nelements and action elements enter into it. I am inclined to think that\nthe sharp antithesis between belief and knowledge, or the tendency of\nphilosophical books to emphasise the difference between belief and\nknowledge, is a characteristic, or consequence, of our modern way\nof looking at things, of our break with the unfortunate, medieval\nconception of faith and of the higher reason. The study of the facts\neither of the history of religion or of the history of science, will\nconvince us, I think, that it is always belief, and that it still\nis belief (as the working sense for reality), that is man\u2019s measure\nof reality, our knowledge about the universe being at all times\nbut a more or less perfect working out of our beliefs and of their\nimplications--of our sense of the different ways in which the world\naffects us, and of the ways in which we are affected towards it. Nor do\nI think, as I have indicated in different places, that \u201creality\u201d can\nbe defined apart from belief, reality being that in which we believe\nfor all purposes, theoretical and practical and emotional. In the\nconception of reality as a world of intersubjective intercourse in\nwhich beings, or persons at different stages of development, share in a\ncommon spiritual life, we have attained so far (and only so far) to the\ntruth that is common to an idealism of the type of Dr. Bosanquet\u2019s, and\nto pragmatist-humanism when properly developed and interpreted. There\nare, I find, upon thinking of the matter, any number of philosophers\nand thinkers who interpret belief, in the larger sense of the term,\nas our complete and final estimate of reality, and as therefore not\nexclusive of, but inclusive of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the\nterm.\n\n[384] He even says in the Abstract of his first lecture upon the\n\u201cCentral Experiences,\u201d that Lord Gifford\u2019s desire that his lecturers\nshould \u201ctry to communicate\u201d a \u201cgrave experience\u201d is the demand that\n\u201cintroduces us to the double task of philosophy. It [philosophy] needs\nthe best of logic, but also the best of life, and neither can be had in\nphilosophy without the other.\u201d\n\n[385] _Treatise upon Human Nature_, sect. vii. (Green and Grose, i.\n547).\n\n[386] I had originally the idea of calling this chapter by the more\nmodest title of a note upon \u201cpragmatist elements\u201d in the teaching of\nBergson. I have allowed myself to call it a chapter partly for the sake\nof symmetry, and partly because the footnotes and the criticism (of his\nIdealism) have carried it beyond the limits of a note. I find, too, (as\nI have partly indicated in my preface) in the teaching of Bergson so\nmany things that make up almost the very body of truth and fact upon\nwhich Pragmatism, and Humanism, and Idealism all repose (or ought to\nrepose) that I quote them directly in my footnotes. They indicate to\nme the scope and the territory of my entire subject. And they are a\nconfirmation to me of much that I had myself arrived at before I read a\nline of Bergson.\n\n[387] \u201cOur intelligence, as it leaves the hands of nature, has for its\nchief object the unorganised solid\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, p. 162); \u201cof\nimmobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea\u201d (_ibid._ 164).\n\u201cThe aspect of life that is accessible to the intellect--as indeed to\nour senses, of which our intellect is the extension--is that which\noffers a hold to action\u201d (_ibid._ 170). \u201cWe see that the intellect, so\nskilful in dealing with the inert, is awkward the moment it touches\nthe living. Whether it wants to treat the life of the body or the\nlife of the mind, it proceeds with the rigour, the stiffness, and the\nbrutality of the instrument _not designed_ for such use. The history\nof hygiene or of pedagogy teaches us much in this matter. When we\nthink of the cardinal, urgent, and constant need we have to preserve\nour bodies and to raise our souls, of the special facilities given to\neach of us in this field to experiment continually on ourselves and on\nothers, of the palpable injury by which the wrongness of a medical or\na pedagogical practice is made manifest and punished at once, we are\namazed at the stupidity and especially at the persistence of errors.\nWe may easily find their origin in the natural obstinacy _with which\nwe treat the living like the lifeless_, and think all reality, however\nfluid, under the form of the sharply-defined solid. _We are at ease\nonly in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. The intellect\nis characterised by a natural inability to comprehend life_\u201d (_Creative\nEvolution_, p. 174). (Italics mine.)\n\n[388] \u201cI look and I think I see, I listen and I think I hear, I examine\nmyself and I think I am reading the very depths of my heart. But what\nI see and hear of the outer world is purely and simply a _selection\nmade by my senses to serve as a light to my conduct_; what I know of\nmyself is what comes to the surface, what participates in my actions.\nMy senses and my consciousness, therefore, give me no more than a\n_practical simplification_ of reality in the vision they furnish me\nof myself and of things, the differences that are useless to man are\nobliterated, the resemblances that are useful to him are emphasised;\nways are traced out for me in advance along which my activity is to\ntravel. These ways are the ways which all mankind has trod before\nme. Things have been classified with a view to the use I can derive\nfrom them\u201d (_Laughter_, p. 151). \u201cLife implies the acceptance of the\n_utilitarian_ side of things in order to respond to them by appropriate\nreactions; all other impressions must be dimmed or else reach us vague\nand blurred\u201d (_ibid._ p. 131). These last words give us a glimpse of a\nvery important part of Bergson\u2019s teaching--his idea, namely (Voltaire\nhas it in his _Microm\u00e9gas_), that \u201cmatter\u201d is greater than our\nperceptions, that our perceptions reveal to us only those aspects of\nthe physical universe with which we are practically concerned.\n\n[389] Some years ago psychologists began to distinguish a \u201cstructural\u201d\nfrom a \u201cfunctional\u201d psychology, meaning by the former what is otherwise\ncalled Psycho-Physics or (to some extent) Experimental Psychology.\n\n[390] Cf. \u201cAt first sight it may seem prudent to leave the\nconsideration of facts to positive science, to let physics and\nchemistry busy themselves with matter, the biological and psychological\nsciences _with life_. The task of the philosopher is then clearly\ndefined. _He takes facts and laws_ from the _scientist\u2019s hand_, and\nwhether he tries to go beyond them in order to reach their deeper\ncauses, or whether he thinks it impossible to go further, and even\nproves it by the analysis of scientific knowledge, in both cases he\nhas for _the facts and relations, handed over by science, the sort of\nrespect that is due to a final verdict_. To this knowledge he adds a\ncritique of the faculty of knowing, and also, if he thinks proper, a\nmetaphysic; but the _matter_ of knowledge he regards as the affair of\nscience, and not of philosophy\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, pp. 204\u20135). [All\nthis represents only too faithfully what even some of our Neo-Kantians\nhave been saying, and teaching, although there is an error in their\nwhole procedure here.]\n\n[391] Schopenhauer\u2019s phrase. See my book upon _Schopenhauer\u2019s System_.\n\n[392] It is chiefly in _Matter and Memory_ (in which, by the way, there\nare pages and pages of criticism of the rationalism of philosophy that\nare as valuable as anything we have in philosophy since the time of\nDescartes--Kant not excepted) that we are to look for the detailed\nphilosophy of sensation and of perception, and the detailed philosophy\nof science upon which this protest of Bergson\u2019s against the excesses\nof \u201cconceptualism\u201d rests. I indicate, too, at different places in this\nchapter some of the other special considerations upon which it rests.\nThe gist of the whole is to be found, perhaps, in his contention that\nour science and our philosophy of the past centuries have both regarded\n\u201cperception\u201d as teaching us (somehow) what things _are_ independently\nof their effect upon us, and of their place in the moving equilibrium\nof things--the truth being on the contrary (with Pragmatism and\nHumanism) that our knowledge has throughout a necessary relation to\nourselves and to our place in the universe, and to our liberation from\nmatter in the life of the spirit.\n\n[393] He expresses this idea in the following way in the Introduction\nto _Matter and Memory_: \u201cPsychology has for its object the study\nof the human mind for practical utility,\u201d whereas in \u201cmetaphysics\u201d\nwe see \u201cthis same mind striving (the idea, as we say elsewhere, is\nnot free from difficulty) to transcend the conditions of useful\naction and to come back to itself _as to a pure creative energy_.\u201d\nOr in the following sentences from his _Creative Evolution_: \u201cWe\nmust remember that philosophy, as we define it, _has not yet become\ncompletely conscious of itself_. Physics understands its role when it\npushes matter into the direction of spatiality; but has metaphysics\nunderstood its role when it has simply trodden the steps of physics,\nin the chimerical hope of going farther in the same direction? _Should\nnot its own task be, on the contrary, to remount the incline that\nphysics descends, to bring matters back to its origins, and to build\nup progressively a cosmology which would be, so to speak, a reversed\npsychology._ All that which seems _positive_ to the physicist and\nto the geometrician would become, from this new point of view, an\ninterruption or inversion of the true positivity which _would have to\nbe defined in psychological terms_\u201d (pp. 219\u201320, italics mine).\n\n[394] As an indication of what the acceptance of the dynamic instead\nof the static view of matter on the part of Bergson means, I cite the\nphrase (or the conception) on p. 82 of _Matter and Memory_, the effect\nthat \u201c_matter is here as elsewhere the vehicle of an action_,\u201d or the\neven more emphatic declaration on p. 261 of _Creative Evolution_,\n\u201c_There are no things, there are only actions_.\u201d It is impossible, of\ncourse, that these mere extracts can convey to the mind of the casual\nreader the same significance that they obtain in their setting in the\npages of Bergson, although it is surely almost a matter of common\nknowledge about his teaching, that one of the first things it does is\nto begin with the same activistic or \u201cactionistic\u201d view of nature and\nmatter that seems to be the stock in trade of the physics of our time\nsince the discoveries pertaining to radio-activity, etc. Being only\na layman in such matters, I may be excused for quoting from a recent\nbooklet (whose very presence in the series in which it appears is to\npeople like myself a guarantee of its scientific reliability) in which\nI find this same activistic view of matter that I find in Bergson.\n\u201cWhat are the processes by which the primary rock material is shifted?\nThere is the wind that, etc. etc.... There are the streams and rivers\nthat, etc.... There is the sea constantly wearing away, etc.... Then\nthere are \u2018subtle\u2019 physical and \u2018chemical\u2019 forces. And the action\nof plants.... Hence by various mechanical, organic, and chemical\nprocesses the materials originally scattered through the rocks of the\nearth\u2019s crust, and floating in the air or water, are collected into\nlayers and form beds of sand, clay, limestone, salt, and the various\nmineral fuels, including peat and coal\u201d (_The Making of the Earth_, by\nProfessor Gregory, F.R.S., of Glasgow University: Williams and Norgate).\n\nIt is only right to state here, or to remind the reader in this matter\nof a \u201cdynamic\u201d view of matter, that Bergson not only dissipates matter\ninto force or energy or activity (as do the physicists of to-day),\nbut also actually credits the world of matter and life with a kind of\nconsciousness (and why not be courageous about it?) in which what I\nhave already called the \u201csusceptibility of everything to everything\nelse,\u201d or the _action_ of everything upon everything else, becomes\ncredible and intelligible. \u201c_No doubt, also, the material universe\nitself, defined as the totality of images, is a kind of consciousness\nin which everything compensates and neutralises everything else, a\nconsciousness of which all the potential parts, balancing each other\nby a reaction which is always equal to the action, reciprocally hinder\neach from standing out_\u201d (_Matter and Memory_, p. 313).\n\n[395] See Chapter III., and also the references to Mach, Ostwald,\nPoincar\u00e9, and others, in the second chapter and elsewhere.\n\n[396] \u201cThere is no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are\nnot to be discovered, more, no instinct that is not surrounded with a\nfringe of intelligence\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, p. 143).\n\n[397] \u201cWe will not dwell here upon a point we have dealt with in former\nworks. Let us merely recall that a theory [the theory of contemporary\nphysiological psychology] such as that according to which consciousness\nis attached to certain neurons, and is thrown off from their work\nlike a phosphorescence, may be accepted by the scientist for the\ndetail of analysis; _it is a convenient mode of expression. But it is\nnothing else. In reality, a living being is a centre of action._ It\nrepresents a certain sum of contingency entering into the world, that\nis to say, a certain quantity of possible action--a quantity variable\nwith individuals and especially with species. The nervous system of\nan animal marks out the flexible lines on which its action will run\n(although the potential energy is accumulated in the muscles rather\nthan in the nervous system itself); its nervous centres indicate, by\ntheir development and their configuration, the more or less extended\nchoice it will have among more or less numerous and complicated\nactions. Now, since the awakening of consciousness in a living creature\nis the more complete, the greater the latitude of choice allowed to it\nand the larger the amount of action bestowed upon it, it is clear that\nthe development of consciousness will appear to be dependent on that of\nthe nervous centres. On the other hand, every state of consciousness\nbeing, in one aspect of it, a question put to the motor activity and\neven the beginning of a reply, there is no psychical event that does\nnot imply the entry into play of the cortical mechanisms. Everything\nseems, therefore, to happen _as if_ consciousness sprang from the\nbrain, and _as if_ the detail of conscious activity were modelled on\nthat of the cerebral activity. In reality consciousness does not spring\nfrom the brain, but brain and consciousness correspond because equally\nthey measure ... the quantity of _choice_ that the living being has at\nits disposal\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, pp. 266\u20137).\n\n[398] \u201cInstead of starting from _affection_ [or \u2018sensation\u2019 in the\nold sense of the haphazard sensation] of which we can say nothing,\nsince there is no reason why it should be what it is rather than\nanything else, we start from _action_, that is to say, from our power\nof effecting changes in things, a faculty attested by consciousness,\nand towards which all the powers of the organised body are seen to\nconverge. So we place ourselves at once in the midst of extended images\n[to Bergson as an idealist things are at the same time images or ideas\nfor a consciousness in other things, or in us, or in beings other\nthan ourselves], and in this material universe we perceive centres of\nindetermination characteristic of life\u201d (_Matter and Memory_, p. 67).\n\n[399] Cf. the words in the Preface to _Matter and Memory_: \u201c_The whole\npersonality, which, normally narrowed down by action, expands with the\nunscrewing of the vice in which it has allowed itself to be squeezed_,\u201d\nor the words in the same place about the task of metaphysics being the\nattempt of the \u201c_mind striving to transcend the conditions of useful\naction_.\u201d\n\n[400] We refer elsewhere in this chapter to Bergson\u2019s idea that living\nbeings are \u201ccentres of indetermination,\u201d that is to say, creatures who\nhold their place in nature and that of their species by \u201cpersisting\nin their own being\u201d (the language of Spinoza) by acting and reacting\nupon some of the many forces of nature that act upon them, and by\navoiding the action of other forces and other animals. \u201cThey allow to\npass through them,\u201d he says, \u201cso to speak, those external influences\nwhich are indifferent to them; the others isolated become \u2018perceptions\u2019\nby their very isolation\u201d (_Matter and Memory_, pp. 28, 29). We also\nrefer to Bergson\u2019s idea that the life-force has expressed itself along\ndifferent grades of being (mineral, animal, and so on). Both these\nideas are a partial explanation of what we mean by the presence of\na spiritual activity in both inanimate and animate nature. So also\nis Bergson\u2019s idea that the purely mechanical explanation either of\nnature or of life is but a device of the intellect for the purposes of\ndescription. More specifically it is expressed, too, in his idea that\n\u201cOur representation of matter is the measure of our possible action\nupon bodies; it results from the discarding of what has no interest for\nour needs, or more generally for our functions\u201d (_Matter and Memory_,\np. 30), or that \u201cConsciousness\u201d is just this choice of \u201cattaining to\u201d\nor attending to \u201ccertain parts and certain aspects of those parts\u201d of\nthe \u201cmaterial universe\u201d (_ibid._ p. 31), or that \u201csense-perception\u201d is\nan \u201celementary question to my motor activity.\u201d \u201cThe truth is that my\nnervous system, interposed between the objects which affect my body\nand those which I can influence, is a mere conductor, transmitting,\nsending back, or inhibiting movement. This conductor is composed of\nan enormous number of threads which stretch from the periphery to the\ncentre, and from the centre to the periphery. As many threads pass from\nthe periphery to the centre, so many points of space are there able\nto make an appeal to my will, and to put, so to speak, _an elementary\nquestion to my motor activity. Every such question is what is termed a\nperception_\u201d (_ibid._ 40, 41; italics mine). Or, as he puts it, on p.\n313, \u201cNo doubt the choice of perception from among images in general\nis the effect of a _discernment which foreshadows spirit_.... But to\ntouch the reality of spirit we must place ourselves at the _point\nwhere an individual consciousness_, continuing and retaining the past\nin a present enriched by it, _thus escapes the law of necessity_, the\nlaw which ordains that the past shall ever follow itself in a present\nwhich merely repeats it in another form, and that all things shall\never be flowing away. _When we pass from pure perception to memory, we\ndefinitely abandon matter for spirit._\u201d\n\n[401] Bergson is always able to detect the relapses even of \u201cmechanism\u201d\nand of the mechanical philosophy of science into \u201cfinalism,\u201d as\nwhen he says on p. 72 of his _Creative Evolution_, \u201cTo sum up, if\nthe accidental variations that bring about evolution are insensible\nvariations, some good genius must be appealed to--the genius of the\nfuture species--in order to preserve and accumulate these variations,\nfor \u201cselection\u201d will not look after this. If, on the other hand, the\naccidental variations are sudden, then, for the previous function to go\non, or for a new function to take its place, all the changes that have\nhappened together must be complementary. So we have to fall back on the\ngood genius again to obtain the convergence of simultaneous changes,\nas before to be assured of the continuity of direction of successive\nvariations.\u201d\n\n[402] We must remember that to Bergson evolution has taken place along\ndifferent lines--those of Automatism (in plant-life), Instinct (in\nanimal life), and Intelligence (in human life and the higher animals),\nand that along none of those lines are we to fall into the errors\neither of materialism, or of \u201cDarwinism\u201d (the belief in \u201caccidental\nvariations\u201d), or of the \u201cdesign-philosophy,\u201d or even of theories like\n\u201cneo-Lamarckianism\u201d or neo-vitalism. To him all these philosophies are\nbut imperfect and hypothetical attempts to grasp \u201cmovement\u201d and \u201clife\u201d\nwhich both \u201c_transcend finality, if we understand by finality the\nrealisation of an idea conceived or conceivable in advance_\u201d (_Creative\nEvolution_, p. 236).\n\n[403] \u201cPaleyism\u201d or \u201cMiltonism\u201d are still good names for the thing, I\nhave read in some competent book upon Evolution.\n\n[404] See below, p. 261.\n\n[405] To Bergson concepts are just as hypothetical in the realm of\nscience, as they are to thinkers like Mach and Poincar\u00e9, and Professor\nWard of Cambridge. See the following, for example, from _Matter and\nMemory_ (p. 263): \u201cWe shall never explain by means of particles,\nwhatever these may be, the simple properties of matter; at most we can\nthus follow out into corpuscles as artificial as the _corpus_, the body\nitself--the actions and reactions of this body with regard to all the\nothers. This is precisely the object of chemistry. It studies bodies\nrather than _matter_; and so we understand why it stops at the atom,\nwhich is still endowed with the general properties of matter. But the\nmateriality of the atom dissolves more and more under the eyes of the\nphysicist. We have no reason, for instance, for representing the atom\nto ourselves as a solid, rather than as a liquid or gaseous, nor for\npicturing the reciprocal action of atoms by shocks rather than in any\nother way.\u201d Or, the following characteristic passage from the same book\n(p. 280) in respect of the hypothetical character of the concepts of\n\u201cpure _time_\u201d and \u201cpure _space_\u201d: \u201cHomogeneous _space_ and homogeneous\n_time_ are then neither properties of things nor essential conditions\nof our faculty of knowing them; they express, in an abstract form,\nthe double work of solidification and of division, which we effect on\nthe moving continuity of the real in order to obtain there a fulcrum\nfor our action, in order to fix within it starting-points for our\noperation, in short, to introduce into it real changes. They are the\n_diagrammatic designs_ of our eventual action upon matter.\u201d\n\n[406] Like his celebrated contemporary Eucken, and like many other\nthinkers of their time, Bergson is profoundly convinced of the\none-sidedness of the so-called scientific culture of our day, and of\nthe error of any and all conceptions of education and of social policy\nthat are based upon it. Although I refer below to the limitations of\nhis view that the intellect is adapted only to matter and to mechanical\nconstruction, I append the following quotation as symptomatic of\nhis value as a spiritual teacher in our scientific age: \u201cAs regards\nhuman intelligence (_Creative Evolution_, pp. 145\u20136) it has not been\nsufficiently noted that mechanical invention has been from the first\nits essential feature, _that even to-day our social life gravitates\naround the manufacture and use of artificial instruments_.... This\nwe hardly realise, _because it takes longer to change ourselves than\nto change our tools_.... In thousands of years, when seen from the\ndistance, _only the broad lines of our present age will be visible_,\nour wars and our revolutions will count for little, even supposing they\nare remembered at all, but the steam-engine, and the procession of\ninventions of every kind that accompanied it, will perhaps be spoken of\nas we speak of the bronze or of the chipped stone of prehistoric times;\nit will serve to define an age.\u201d\n\n[407] I find this in Bergson\u2019s whole attribution of much of our\n\u201cperceptual\u201d and \u201cscientific\u201d knowledge of things to the \u201cneeds of\naction,\u201d and in the detailed reasons that we attempt on pp. 236\u2013238 to\nindicate for his polemic against rationalism.\n\n[408] This confirmation I find in Bergson\u2019s whole philosophy of\nperception and sensation referred to on p. 236, and in his idea of a\nliving being as a \u201ccentre of action\u201d or \u201ca centre of indetermination.\u201d\nIn fact it is obvious that he is one of the very greatest of the\nupholders of the \u201cfreedom\u201d of the life of the individual, and of the\nfact that each new individual contributes something new of its own to\nthe sum-total of existence, to the life of its species, and to the life\nof the world. Of course there is no more an explanation in his teaching\nof the causes of \u201cvariation\u201d or the differences at birth between the\noff-spring of men and of animals, than there is in the philosophy of\nDarwin.\n\n[409] The idea of this necessity is confirmed in Bergson\u2019s whole\nphilosophy of man\u2019s life as a life of action, as a constant surmounting\nof obstacles, as a life that reacts in its own way upon the life\nof nature, upon the life of the human species as such, upon the\ninfinite life and energy and \u201clove\u201d of God--if we may soar to this\ngreat thought. See, for example, what he writes in explanation of\nthe \u201cdiscordance\u201d of which he speaks thus: \u201cOur freedom, in the very\nmovements by which it is affirmed, creates the growing habits that\nwill stifle it if it fails to renew itself by a constant effort: it\nis dogged by automatism. The letter kills the spirit. And our most\nardent enthusiasm, as soon as it is externalised into action, is so\nnaturally congealed into the cold calculation of interest or vanity,\nthe one takes so easily the shape of the other, that we might confuse\nthem together, doubt our sincerity, deny goodness and love.\u201d The\nexplanatory words are the following. [They are quite typical of the\nkind of philosophy of life that Bergson thinks of as alone worthy of\nthe name of a philosophy of the living. And the reference to \u201clove,\u201d\nas the highest \u201cdynamic\u201d force in this world of ours, occurs at their\nclose.] \u201cThe profound cause of this discordance lies in an irremediable\ndifference of rhythm. Life is general, is mobility itself; particular\nmanifestations of life accept this mobility reluctantly, and constantly\nlag behind. It is always going ahead; they want to mark time. Evolution\nin general would fain go on in a straight line; each special evolution\nis a kind of circle. Like eddies of dust raised by the wind as it\npasses, the living turn on themselves, borne up by the great blast of\nlife. They are therefore relatively stable, and counterfeit immobility\nso well that we treat each of them as a _thing_ rather than as a\n_progress_, forgetting that the very permanence of their form is only\nthe outline of a movement. At times, however, in a fleeting vision,\nthe invisible breath that bears them is materialised before our eyes.\nWe have this _sudden illumination before certain forms of maternal\nlove_, so striking and in most animals so touching, observable even in\nthe solicitude of the plant for its seed. This _love, in which some\nhave seen the great mystery of life, may possibly deliver us life\u2019s\nsecret_. It shows us each generation leaning over the generation that\nshall follow. It allows us a glimpse of the fact that the living being\nis above all a thoroughfare, and that the essence of life is in the\nmovement by which life is transmitted\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, pp.\n134\u20135; italics mine). It is surely needless to point out how much truer\nto human nature, truer therefore to an important part of reality, this\nlife-philosophy is than the abstractionism of Professor Bosanquet in\nthe preceding chapter.\n\n[410] This insistence is, I think, amply confirmed by the very\nfact of the _immediate_ contact with life and reality indicated\nin the quotation that is given in the preceding note upon the\n\u201cmotive-awakening,\u201d or the \u201cdynamic\u201d character of the philosophy of\nBergson. It is also confirmed in his manifest insistence upon the one\nfact that all philosophy must assume (and has for ever assumed) the\nfact of life, the fact of the life and thought of God that underlies\nall our life and all our thought.\n\n[411] This position of the pragmatists is certainly confirmed by\nBergson\u2019s entire doctrine of the brain and of the intellect--that\ntheir main service is, in the first instance, to interpret the\n\u201clife\u201d of things, its relation to our own will and to our practical\nactivity. I have suggested, too, in this chapter that it is obviously a\ncharacteristic, or a consequence, of the philosophy of Bergson that our\nhighest thought about ourselves and about the world should be relative\nto, and provocative, of our highest emotion.\n\n[412] It is only with some degree of care and reservation that I wish\nto refer to any apparent confirmation of this idea by Bergson. And, as\nalways, I object to the idea of any ultimate separation or \u201cdualism\u201d\nbetween faith and knowledge--faith being implied in all \u201cknowledge.\u201d\nThere is no opposition in Bergson, or in the principles of his\nphilosophy, between faith and knowledge; it is rather his idea that\n\u201cthe faculty of _seeing_ should be made one with the act of _willing_\u201d\n(_Creative Evolution_, 250; his italics), and that \u201cphilosophy\u201d should\n\u201cproceed, _with the powers of conceptual thought alone, to the ideal\nreconstruction of all things, even of life_\u201d (_C.E._ xi.; italics\nmine). My reasons for finding in his writings a confirmation of the\nidea that it is indeed our rational and spiritual faith, rather than\nour demonstrable knowledge, that is to us the measure of truth and\nreality, are such considerations as the following (in addition to\nthose of the clauses just quoted), his close association between the\nintellectual and the \u201cvolitional,\u201d his general faith in \u201ccreative\nevolution,\u201d in the idea that our \u201cconsciousness\u201d means for us \u201cnew\nchoices\u201d and (real) \u201cnew possibilities,\u201d his faith in the higher\nintuitions of the mind, in the spiritual nature of man, his belief that\nthe building up of the true philosophy of the future will involve \u201cthe\ncollective and progressive effort of many thinkers, of many observers\nalso, completing, correcting, and improving one another\u201d (_C.E._ xiv.),\netc. etc.\n\n[413] See below, p. 257, note 1.\n\n[414] See p. 14 in reference to Dr. Schiller\u2019s suggestion that\n\u201cfreedom\u201d may \u201cpervade the universe.\u201d\n\n[415] \u201cFrom time to time, however, in a fit of absent-mindedness,\nnature raises up souls that are more detached from life.... Were this\ndetachment complete, did the soul no longer cleave to action by any of\nits perceptions, it would be the soul of an artist such as the world\nhas never yet seen\u201d (_Laughter_, p. 154).\n\n[416] Cf. p. 235.\n\n[417] Cf. \u201cWe must break with scientific habits which are adapted to\nthe fundamental requirements of thought, _we must do violence to the\nmind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect_. But that is\njust the function of philosophy\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, p. 31).\n\n[418] \u201cSo art, whether it be painting or sculpture, poetry or music,\nhas no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols,\nthe conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short,\neverything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to\nface with reality itself\u201d (_Laughter_, p. 157). It is true that if\nwe read further on this page, and elsewhere in Bergson, we will be\nable to see that there is for him in art and in the spiritual life a\nkind of intelligence and knowledge. But it is difficult to work out\nan expression or a characterisation of this intelligence and this\nknowledge. \u201cArt,\u201d he says, \u201cis only a more direct vision of reality.\u201d\nAnd again: \u201cRealism is in the work when idealism is in the soul, and\nit is only through ideality that we can resume contact with reality\u201d\n(_ibid._).\n\n[419] It is only fair to Bergson to remember that he is himself aware\nof the appearances of this dualism in his writings, that he apologises\nas it were for them, intending the distinction to be, not absolute, but\nrelative. \u201cLet us say at the outset that the distinctions we are going\nto make will be too sharply drawn, just because we wish to define in\ninstinct what is instinctive, and in intelligence what is intelligent,\n_whereas all concrete instinct is mingled with intelligence, as all\nreal intelligence is penetrated by instinct. Moreover_ [this is quite\nan important expression of Bergson\u2019s objection to the old \u201cfaculty\u201d\npsychology], _neither intelligence nor instinct lends itself to rigid\ndefinition; they are tendencies and not things_. Also it must not be\nforgotten that ... we are considering intelligence and _instinct as\ngoing out of life_ which deposits them along its course\u201d (_Creative\nEvolution_, p. 143).\n\n[420] He talks in the _Creative Evolution_ of a \u201creal time\u201d and a \u201cpure\nduration\u201d of a real duration that \u201cbites\u201d into things and leaves on\nthem the mark of its tooth, of a \u201cceaseless upspringing of something\nnew,\u201d of \u201cour progress in pure duration,\u201d or a \u201cmovement which creates\nat once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things\u201d\n(p. 217). I have no hesitation in saying that all this is unthinkable\nto me, and that it might indeed be criticised by Rationalism as\ninconsistent with our highest and most real view of things.\n\n[421] He admits himself that \u201cIf our analysis is correct, it is\nconsciousness, or rather supra-consciousness that is at the origin of\nlife\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, p. 275).\n\n[422] \u201cNow, if the same kind of action is going on everywhere, whether\nit is that which is striving to remake itself, I simply express this\nprobable similitude when I speak of a centre _from which worlds shoot\nout as rockets in a fireworks display_--provided, however, _that I do\nnot present_ [there is a great idea here, a true piece of \u2018Kantianism\u2019]\nthis centre as a _thing_, but as a continuity of shooting out. God thus\ndefined _has nothing of the already made. He is unceasing life, action,\nfreedom._ Creation so conceived is not a mystery; we experience it in\nourselves when we act freely\u201d (_Creative Evolution_, p. 262).\n\n[423] See p. 155, note 1.\n\n[424] It is somewhat difficult, and it is not necessary for our\npurposes, to explain what might be meant by the \u201cIdealism\u201d of\nBergson--at least in the sense of a cosmology, a theory of the \u201creal.\u201d\nIt is claimed for him, and he claims for himself that he is in a\nsense both an \u201cidealist\u201d and a \u201crealist,\u201d believing at once (1) that\nmatter is an \u201cabstraction\u201d (an unreality), and (2) that there is more\nin matter than the qualities revealed by our perceptions. [We must\nremember that he objects to the idea of qualities in things in the old\nstatic sense. \u201c_There are no things; there are only actions._\u201d] What we\nmight mean by his initial idealism is the following: \u201c_Matter, in our\nview_, is an aggregate of images. And by \u2018image\u2019 we mean [_Matter and\nMemory_, the Introduction] a certain existence which is more than that\nwhich the idealist calls a _representation_, but less than that which\nthe realist calls a _thing_--an existence placed half-way between the\n\u2018thing\u2019 and the \u2018representation.\u2019 This conception of matter is simply\nthat of common sense.\u201d ... \u201cFor common sense, then, the object exists\nin itself, and, on the other hand, the object is in itself pictorial,\nas we perceive it: _image it is, but a self-existing image_.\u201d Now, this\nvery idea of a \u201cself-existing image\u201d implies to me the whole idealism\nof philosophy, and Bergson is not free of it. And, of course, as we\nhave surely seen, his \u201ccreative-evolution\u201d philosophy is a stupendous\npiece of idealism, but an idealism moreover to which the science of the\nday is also inclining.\n\n[425] There is so much that is positive and valuable in his teaching,\nthat he is but little affected by formal criticism.\n\n[426] Cf. \u201cWe have now enumerated a few of the essential features of\nhuman intelligence. But we have hitherto considered the individual in\nisolation, without taking account of social life. _In reality man is\na being who lives in society._ If it be true [even] that the human\nintellect aims at fabrication, we must add that, for that as well as\nother purposes, it is associated with _other intellects_. Now it is\ndifficult to imagine a society whose members do not communicate by\nsigns,\u201d etc. etc. (_Creative Evolution_, p. 166). Indeed all readers\nof Bergson know that he is constantly making use of the social factor\nand of \u201cco-operation\u201d by way of accounting for the general advance\nof mankind. It may be appropriate in this same connexion to cite the\nmagnificent passage towards the close of _Creative Evolution_ in which\nhe rises to the very heights of the idea [Schopenhauer and Hartmann had\nit before him, and also before the socialists and the collectivists]\nof humanity\u2019s being possibly able to surmount even the greatest of the\nobstacles that beset it in its onward path: \u201cAs the smallest grain of\ndust [_Creative Evolution_, pp. 285\u20136] is bound up with our entire\nsolar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent\nwhich is materiality itself, so all organised beings, from the humblest\nto the highest, ... do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse\nof the movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All the living\nhold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal\ntakes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of\nhumanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside\nand before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge to beat down\nevery resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even\ndeath.\u201d\n\n[427] Cf. p. 160 and p. 262.\n\n[428] He comes in sight of some of them, as he often does of so many\nthings. \u201cIt is as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call,\nas we will [_C.E._, p. 281], man or superman, had sought to realise\nhimself, and had succeeded only by abandoning a part of himself on\nthe way. The losses are represented by the rest of the animal world,\nand even by the vegetable world, at least in what these have that is\npositive and above the accidents of evolution.\u201d\n\n[429] From what has been said in this chapter about Bergson, and from\nthe remarks that were made in the second chapter about Renouvier and\nthe French Critical Philosophy, the reader may perhaps be willing\nto admit that our Anglo-American Transcendental philosophy would\nperhaps not have been so abstract and so rationalistic had it devoted\nmore attention, than it has evidently given, to some of the more\nrepresentative French thinkers of the nineteenth century.\n\n[430] We must remember that nowhere in his writings does Bergson claim\nany great originality for his many illuminative points of view. He\nis at once far too much of a catholic scholar (in the matter of the\nhistory of philosophy, say), and far too much of a scientist (a man\nin living touch with the realities and the theories of the science of\nthe day) for this. His findings about life and mind are the outcome\nof a broad study of the considerations of science and of history and\nof criticism. By way, for example, of a quotation from a scientific\nwork upon biology that seems to me to reveal some apparent basis in\nfact (as seen by naturalists) for the \u201ccreative evolution\u201d upon which\nBergson bases his philosophy, I append the following: \u201cWe have gone\nfar enough to see that the development of an organism from an egg is a\n_truly wonderful process_. We need but go back again and look at the\nmarvellous simplicity of the egg to be convinced of it. Not only do\ncells _differentiate_, but cell-groups _act together like well-drilled\nbattalions_, cleaving apart here, fusing together there, forming\nprotective coverings or communicating channels, _apparently creating\nout of nothing_, a whole set of nutritive and reproductive organs, all\nin orderly and progressive sequence, producing in the end that orderly\ndisposed cell aggregate, that individual life unit which we know as\nan earthworm. Although _the forces involved are beyond our ken_, the\ngrosser processes are evident\u201d (Needham, _General Biology_, p. 175;\nitalics mine). Of course it is evident from his books that Bergson\ndoes not take much account of such difficult facts and topics as the\nmistakes of instinct, etc. And I have just spoken of his optimistic\navoidance of some of the deeper problems of the moral and spiritual\nlife of man.\n\n[431] \u201cThis amounts to saying that the _theory of knowledge_ and\n_theory of life_ seem to us inseparable [_Creative Evolution_, p.\nxiii.; italics Bergson\u2019s]. A theory of life that is not accompanied\nby a criticism of knowledge is obliged to accept, as they stand, the\nconcepts which the understanding puts at its disposal: it can but\nenclose the facts, willing or not, in pre-existing frames which it\nregards as ultimate. It thus obtains a symbolism which is convenient,\nperhaps even necessary to positive science, but not a direct vision of\nits object.\u201d\n\n[432] I more than agree with Bergson that our whole modern philosophy\nsince Descartes has been unduly influenced by physics and mathematics.\nAnd I deplore the fact that the \u201cNew Realism\u201d which has come upon us\nby way of a reaction (see p. 53) from the subjectivism of Pragmatism,\nshould be travelling apparently in this backward direction--away,\nto say the very least, from some of the things clearly seen even by\nbiologists and psychologists. See p. 144.\n\n[433] As I have indicated in my Preface, I am certainly the last person\nin the world to affect to disparage the importance of the thin end of\nthe wedge of Critical Idealism introduced into the English-speaking\nworld by Green and the Cairds, and their first followers (like the\nwriters in the old Seth-Haldane, _Essays on Philosophical Criticism_).\nTheir theory of knowledge, or \u201cepistemology,\u201d was simply everything\nto the impoverished condition of our philosophy at the time, but, as\nBergson points out, it still left many of us [the fault perhaps was our\nown, to some extent] in the position of \u201ctaking\u201d the scientific reading\nof the world _as so far true_, and of thinking that we had done well in\nphilosophy when we simply partly \u201ctransformed\u201d it. The really important\nthing was to see _with this epistemology_ that the scientific reading\nof the world is not in any sense initial \u201cfact\u201d for philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  Absolutism, 13, chap. viii.\n\n  Action, 91 _n._, 105, chap. iv.\n\n  Activity-Experience, 105, 109\n\n  Alexander, S., 163\n\n  Anti-Intellectualism, 73, 239\n\n  Appearance and Reality, 84\n\n  Arcesilaus, 155\n\n  Aristotle, 155\n\n  Armstrong (Prof.), 49 _n._\n\n  Attention, 119\n\n  Augustine, 107\n\n  Avenarius, 41\n\n\n  Bain, 120\n\n  Baldwin, J.\u00a0M., 156, 110 _n._\n\n  Bawden (Prof.), 17, 85\n\n  Belief, 64, 65, 229 _n._, 251\n\n  Bergson, 72, 104, 126\n\n  Berthelot, 117\n\n  Blondel, 32, 34\n\n  Bosanquet, B., 110, 185, chap. viii.\n\n  Bourdeau, 26, 133 _n._, 193\n\n  Boyce-Gibson (Prof.), 154\n\n  Bradley, F.\u00a0H., 74, 75, 91\n\n  Browning, R., 117\n\n  Brunschvig, 30\n\n  Bryce, James, 193\n\n  Butler, 119\n\n\n  Caird, E., 112\n\n  Carlyle, 125\n\n  Chesterton, W.\u00a0K., 117, 156\n\n  Cohen, 48 _n._\n\n  Common-sense Beliefs, 7\n\n  Common-sense Philosophy, 117\n\n  Comte, 120\n\n  Contemplation, 96\n\n  Cornford, 184\n\n  Curtis (Prof. M.\u00a0M.), 22\n\n\n  Dawes-Hicks (Prof.), 163\n\n  De Maistre, 170\n\n  Descartes, 66, 121\n\n  Desjardins, P., 37\n\n  Dewey, J., 16, 17, 37, 62, 147, 173, 175\n\n  Du Bois Reymond, 110\n\n  Duncan (Prof.), 122\n\n  Duns Scotus, 119\n\n\n  Eleutheropulos, 43\n\n  Elliot, H.\u00a0S.\u00a0R., 66\n\n  Epicureanism, 118\n\n  Eucken, 39, 154\n\n  Ewald (Dr.), 44, 48\n\n\n  Flournoy, 180\n\n  Fouill\u00e9e, 37 _n._\n\n  Fraser, A.\u00a0C., 112\n\n  Futurism, 26\n\n\n  Geddes, P., 123\n\n  Goethe, 195, 215\n\n  Gordon, A., 152\u20133\n\n  Green, T.\u00a0H., 199\n\n  Gregory (Prof.), 24\n\n\n  Inge (Dean), 29, 31\n\n  Invention, 192\n\n\n  James, W., 3, 4, 24, 35, 39, 45, 50, 65, 135, 182, 192 _n._\n\n  Jerusalem, W., 43\n\n  Joachim, 56\n\n  Jones, Sir H., 56\n\n  Joseph, 57\n\n\n  Kant, 119, 121, 247\n\n  Kant and Hegel, 183\n\n  Knox (Capt.), 15\n\n\n  Lalande, A., 29, 33, 164\n\n  Lankester (Sir R.), 167\n\n  Lecky, 70\n\n  Leighton (Prof.), 133\n\n  Le Roy, 31\n\n  Locke, 61, 119\n\n  Lovejoy (Prof.), 49\n\n\n  MacEachran (Prof.), 49 _n._\n\n  Mach, 40\n\n  Mackenzie, J.\u00a0S., 112\n\n  Maeterlinck, 90\n\n  Mallarm\u00e9, 214\n\n  Marett, 160\n\n  Mastermann, G.\u00a0F.\u00a0G., 118\n\n  M\u2019Dougall, 104\n\n  McTaggart, J.\u00a0M.\u00a0E., 92\n\n  Meaning, 21, 51, 149\n\n  Mellone, 57\n\n  Merz, 157\n\n  M\u00fcnsterberg, 46\n\n\n  Natorp, 48\n\n  Needham (Prof.), 101, 260\n\n  New Realism, 53\n\n  Nietzsche, 118, 139, 151\n\n\n  Ostwald, 40, 41\n\n\n  Pace (Prof.), 187\n\n  Paleyism, 247\n\n  Papini, 24, 135\n\n  Pascal, 119\n\n  Pater, W., 124\n\n  Peirce, 3, 22\n\n  Perry (Prof.), 53, 185\n\n  Perry, Bliss, 171, 179\n\n  Plato, 57, 61, 121, 150, 151\n\n  Pluralism, 87\n\n  Poincar\u00e9, 30\n\n  Pradines, 36 _n._\n\n  Pragmatism, and American philosophy, 49, chap. vii.;\n    and British thought, 54;\n    and French thought, 28;\n    and German thought, 38;\n    and Italian thought, 23;\n    a democratic doctrine, 105;\n    its ethics, 136;\n    its pluralism, 162;\n    its sociological character, 164, 262;\n    its theory of knowledge, 131;\n    its theory of truth, 127;\n    its theory of reality, 135\n\n  Pratt (Prof.), 51, 127\n\n\n  Radical Empiricism, 85\n\n  Renan, 110\n\n  Renouvier, 29\n\n  Rey, 31\n\n  Riley, W., 26 _n._\n\n  Ritzsche, 45\n\n  Royce, J., 54\n\n  Russell, B., 61, 66 _n._, 169\n\n\n  Santayana, 171, 181, 190\n\n  Schellwien, 44\n\n  Schiller, F.\u00a0C.\u00a0S., 12, 14, 16, 132, 133\n\n  Schinz, 192 _n._\n\n  Schopenhauer, 28, 119, 151, 260\n\n  Seth, James, 14 _n._\n\n  Seth-Haldane, 260\n\n  Shaw, Bernard, 124\n\n  Sidgwick, H., 56, 118, 119 _n._, 140\n\n  Sigwart, 42\n\n  Simmel, 44\n\n  Spencer, 41 _n._\n\n  Starbuck, 28\n\n  Stoicism, 118\n\n  Stout, G.\u00a0F., 55\n\n  Subjective Idealism, 259\n\n\n  Taylor, A.\u00a0E., 57, 77, 78, 199 _n._, 219\n\n  Teleology, 88, 198\n\n  Tertullian, 119\n\n  Theism, 215 _n._\n\n  Themistius, 155\n\n  Thompson, J.\u00a0H., 144\n\n  Titchener, 157\n\n  Truth, 59, 81, 163\n\n  Tufts, 147\n\n  Tyndall, 110\n\n\n  Vaihinger, 39\n\n\n  Walker, L.\u00a0J., 31\n\n  Ward, James, 30, 55, 143, 162\n\n  Wells, H.\u00a0G., 123\n\n  Westermarck, 145\n\n  Windelband, 46, 150\n\n  Wollaston, 224\n\n\n           _Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Notes\n\n\nInconsistent punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were not changed.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation\nmarks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left\nunbalanced.\n\nThe index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page\nreferences.","title":"Pragmatism and idealism","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":83511}