{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_72255/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_72255","id":"gutenberg_72255","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/72255","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Religious","Church history -- Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600","Philosophy -- History","Philosophy, Ancient","Theology, Doctrinal"],"text":"THE HIBBERT LECTURES\n\n1888\n\n\nThe Hibbert Trustees cannot add this volume to their series without a few\nlines of grateful acknowledgment. It is impossible to forget either the\ncourteous readiness with which the accomplished author undertook the task\noriginally, or the admirable qualities he brought to it. When he died\nwithout completing the MS. for the press, the anxiety of the Trustees\nwas at once relieved by the kind effort of his family to obtain adequate\nassistance. The public will learn from the Preface how much had to be\ndone, and will join the Trustees in grateful appreciation of the services\nof the gentlemen who responded to the occasion. That Dr. Hatch\u2019s friend,\nDr. Fairbairn, consented to edit the volume, with the valuable aid of Mr.\nBartlet and Professor Sanday, was an ample pledge that the want would\nbe most efficiently met. To those gentlemen the Trustees are greatly\nindebted for the learned and earnest care with which the laborious\nrevision was made.\n\n\n\n\n                      _THE HIBBERT LECTURES, 1888._\n\n                                   THE\n                         INFLUENCE OF GREEK IDEAS\n                                AND USAGES\n                                 UPON THE\n                            CHRISTIAN CHURCH.\n\n                               BY THE LATE\n                            EDWIN HATCH, D.D.\n      READER IN ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.\n\n                                EDITED BY\n                          A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D.\n               LATE PRINCIPAL OF MANSFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD.\n\n                              [Illustration]\n\n                          WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,\n               14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON.\n                                  1914.\n\n                     RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED,\n                 BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E.,\n                           AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe fittest introduction to these Lectures will be a few words of\nexplanation.\n\nBefore his death, Dr. Hatch had written out and sent to press the first\neight Lectures. Of these he had corrected six, while the proofs of the\nseventh and eighth, with some corrections in his own hand, were found\namong his papers. As regards these two, the duties of the editor were\nsimple: he had only to correct them for the press. But as regards the\nremaining four Lectures, the work was much more arduous and responsible.\nA continuous MS., or even a connected outline of any one of the Lectures,\ncould not be said to exist. The Lectures had indeed been delivered a\nyear and a half before, but the delivery had been as it were of selected\npassages, with the connections orally supplied, while the Lecturer\ndid not always follow the order of his notes, or, as we know from the\nLectures he himself prepared for the press, the one into which he meant\nto work his finished material. What came into the editor\u2019s hands was\na series of note-books, which seemed at first sight but an amorphous\nmass or collection of hurried and disconnected jottings, now in ink,\nnow in pencil; with a multitude of cross references made by symbols and\nabbreviations whose very significance had to be laboriously learned; with\nabrupt beginnings and still more abrupt endings; with pages crowded with\nsuccessive strata, as it were, of reflections and references, followed by\npages almost or entirely blank, speaking of sections or fields meant to\nbe further explored; with an equal multitude of erasures, now complete,\nnow incomplete, now cancelled; with passages marked as transposed or as\nto be transposed, or with a sign of interrogation which indicated, now\na suspicion as to the validity or accuracy of a statement, now a simple\nsuspense of judgment, now a doubt as to position or relevance, now a\nsimple query as of one asking, Have I not said this, or something like\nthis, before? In a word, what we had were the note-books of the scholar\nand the literary workman, well ordered, perhaps, as a garden to him who\nmade it and had the clue to it, but at once a wilderness and a labyrinth\nto him who had no hand in its making, and who had to discover the way\nthrough it and out of it by research and experiment. But patient, and,\nI will add, loving and sympathetic work, rewarded the editor and his\nkind helpers. The clue was found, the work proved more connected and\ncontinuous than under the conditions could have been thought to be\npossible, and the result is now presented to the world.\n\nA considerable proportion of the material for the ninth Lecture had been\ncarefully elaborated; but some of it, and the whole of the material for\nthe other three, was in the state just described. This of course added\neven more to the responsibilities than to the labours of the editor. In\nthe body of the Lectures most scrupulous care has been taken to preserve\nthe author\u2019s _ipsissima verba_, and, wherever possible, the structure and\nform of his sentences. But from the very necessities of the case, the\nhand had now and then to be allowed a little more freedom; connecting\nwords, headings, and even here and there a transitional sentence or\nexplanatory clause, had to be added; but in no single instance has a\nword, phrase or sentence been inserted in the text without warrant\nfrom some one part or another of these crowded note-books. With the\nfoot-notes it has been different. One of our earliest and most serious\ndifficulties was to find whence many of the quotations, especially in the\nninth Lecture, came. The author\u2019s name was given, but often no clue to\nthe book or chapter. We have been, I think, in every case successful in\ntracing the quotation to its source. Another difficulty was to connect\nthe various references with the paragraph, sentence or statement, each\nwas meant to prove. This involved a new labour; the sources had to be\nconsulted alike for the purposes of verification and determination of\nrelevance and place. The references, too, in the note-books were often of\nthe briefest, given, as it were, in algebraics, and they had frequently\nto be expanded and corrected; while the search into the originals led now\nto the making of excerpts, and now to the discovery of new authorities\nwhich it seemed a pity not to use. As a result, the notes to Lecture IX.\nare mainly the author\u2019s, though all as verified by other hands; but the\nnotes to Lecture X., and in part also XI., are largely the editor\u2019s. This\nis stated in order that all responsibility for errors and inaccuracies\nmay be laid at the proper door. It seemed to the editor that, while he\ncould do little to make the text what the author would have made it if\nit had been by his own hand prepared for the press, he was bound, in the\nregion where the state of the MSS. made a discreet use of freedom not\nonly possible but compulsory, to make the book as little unworthy of the\nscholarship and scrupulous accuracy of the author as it was in his power\nto do.\n\nThe pleasant duty remains of thanking two friends who have greatly\nlightened my labours. The first is Vernon Bartlet, M.A.; the second,\nProfessor Sanday. Mr. Bartlet\u2019s part has been the heaviest; without him\nthe work could never have been done. He laboured at the MSS. till the\nbroken sentences became whole, and the disconnected paragraphs wove\nthemselves together; and then he transcribed the black and bewildering\npages into clear and legible copy for the printer. He had heard the\nLectures, and had happily taken a few notes, which, supplemented\nfrom other sources, proved most helpful, especially in the way of\ndetermining the order to be followed. He has indeed been in every way a\nmost unwearied and diligent co-worker. To him we also owe the Synopsis\nof Contents and the Index. Professor Sanday has kindly read over all\nthe Lectures that have passed under the hands of the editor, and has\nfurnished him with most helpful criticisms, suggestions, and emendations.\n\nThe work is sent out with a sad gratitude. I am grateful that it has been\npossible so far to fulfil the author\u2019s design, but sad because he no\nlonger lives to serve the cause he loved so well. This is not the place\nto say a word either in criticism or in praise of him or his work. Those\nof us who knew him know how little a book like this expresses his whole\nmind, or represents all that in this field he had it in him to do.\n\nThe book is an admirable illustration of his method; in order to be\njudged aright, it ought to be judged within the limits he himself has\ndrawn. It is a study in historical development, an analysis of some of\nthe formal factors that conditioned a given process and determined a\ngiven result; but it deals throughout solely with these formal factors\nand the historical conditions under which they operated. He never\nintended to discover or discuss the transcendental causes of the process\non the one hand, or to pronounce on the value or validity of the result\non the other. His purpose, like his method, was scientific; and as an\nattempt at the scientific treatment of the growth and formulation of\nideas, of the evolution and establishment of usages within the Christian\nChurch, it ought to be studied and criticised. Behind and beneath\nhis analytical method was a constructive intellect, and beyond his\nconclusions was a positive and co-ordinating conception of the largest\nand noblest order. To his mind every species of mechanical Deism was\nalien; and if his method bears hardly upon the traditions and assumptions\nby which such a Deism still lives in the region of early ecclesiastical\nhistory, it was only that he might prepare the way for the coming of a\nfaith and a society that should be worthier of the Master he loved and\nthe Church he served.\n\n                                                          A. M. FAIRBAIRN.\n\nOXFORD, _July, 1890_.\n\n\n\n\nSYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS.\n\n\n                                                                      PAGE\n                               LECTURE I.\n\n                              INTRODUCTORY.\n\n  The Problem:\n\n    How the Church passed from the Sermon on the Mount to the Nicene\n      Creed; the change in spirit coincident with a change in soil    1, 2\n\n    The need of caution: two preliminary considerations                  2\n\n      1. A religion relative to the whole mental attitude of an age:\n           hence need to estimate the general attitude of the Greek\n           mind during the first three centuries A.D.                 3, 4\n\n      2. Every permanent change in religious belief and usage rooted\n           in historical conditions: roots of the Gospel in Judaism,\n           but of fourth century Christianity\u2014the key to historical\u2014in\n           Hellenism                                                  4, 5\n\n  The Method:\n\n    Evidence as to _process_ of change scanty, but ample and\n      representative as to ante-Nicene Greek thought and\n      post-Nicene Christian thought. Respects in which evidence\n      defective                                                       5-10\n\n    Two resulting tendencies:\n\n      1. To overrate the value of the surviving evidence.\n\n      2. To under-estimate opinions no longer accessible or known\n           only through opponents                                       10\n\n  Hence method, the correlation of antecedents and consequents       11-13\n\n    Antecedents: sketch of the phenomena of Hellenism               13, 14\n\n    Consequents: changes in original Christian ideas and usages         14\n\n  Attitude of mind required                                             15\n\n    1. Demand upon attention and imagination                        15, 16\n\n    2. Personal prepossessions to be allowed for                    17, 18\n\n    3. Need to observe under-currents, e.g.\n\n      (_a_) The dualistic hypothesis, its bearing on baptism and\n              exorcism                                              19, 20\n\n      (_b_) The nature of religion, e.g. its relation to conscience     21\n\n  History as a scientific study: the true apologia in religion       21-24\n\n                               LECTURE II.\n\n                            GREEK EDUCATION.\n\n  The first step a study of environment, particularly as literary.\n    The contemporary Greek world an educated world in a special\n    literary sense                                                   25-27\n\n    I. Its _forms_ varied, but all literary:\n\n      Grammar                                                        28-30\n\n      Rhetoric                                                       30-32\n\n      A \u201clecture-room\u201d Philosophy                                    32-35\n\n    II. Its _influence_ shown by:\n\n      1. Direct literary evidence                                    35-37\n\n      2. Recognized and lucrative position of the teaching\n           profession                                                37-40\n\n      3. Social position of its professors                           40-42\n\n      4. Its persistent survival up to to-day in general education,\n           in special terms and usages                               42-48\n\n  Into such an artificial habit of mind Christianity came           48, 49\n\n                              LECTURE III.\n\n                      GREEK AND CHRISTIAN EXEGESIS.\n\n  To the Greek the mystery of writing, the reverence for antiquity,\n    the belief in inspiration, gave the ancient poets a unique\n    value                                                           50, 51\n\n  Homer, his place in moral education; used by the Sophists in\n    ethics, physics, metaphysics, &c.                                52-57\n\n  Apologies for this use culminate in allegory, especially among\n    the Stoics                                                       57-64\n\n  The Allegoric temper widespread, particularly in things religious.\n\n    Adopted by Hellenistic Jews, especially at Alexandria; Philo     65-69\n\n    Continued by early Christian exegesis in varied schools,\n      chiefly as regards the Prophets, in harmony with Greek\n      thought, and as a main line of apologetic                      69-74\n\n  Application to the New Testament writings by the Gnostics and\n    the Alexandrines                                                75, 76\n\n  Its aid as solution of the Old Testament problem, especially in\n    Origen                                                           77-79\n\n  Reactions both Hellenic and Christian: viz. in\n\n    1. The Apologists\u2019 polemic against Greek mythology              79, 80\n\n    2. The Philosophers\u2019 polemic against Christianity                   80\n\n    3. Certain Christian Schools, especially the Antiochene         81, 82\n\n  Here hampered by dogmatic complications                               82\n\n  Use and abuse of allegory\u2014the poetry of life                      82, 83\n\n  Alien to certain drifts of the modern spirit, viz.\n\n    1. Historic handling of literature                                  84\n\n    2. Recognition of the living voice of God                       84, 85\n\n                               LECTURE IV.\n\n                      GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.\n\n  The period one of widely diffused literary culture.\n\n    The Rhetorical Schools, old and new                              86-88\n\n  Sophistic largely pursued the old lines of Rhetoric, but also\n    philosophized and preached professionally                        88-94\n\n    Its manner of discourse; its rewards                             94-99\n\n  Objections of earnest men; reaction led by Stoics like Epictetus  99-105\n\n  Significance for Christianity                                        105\n\n  Primitive Christian \u201cprophesying\u201d _v._ later \u201cpreaching.\u201d\n\n    Preaching of composite origin: its essence and form, e.g.\n      in fourth century, A.D.: preachers sometimes itinerant       105-113\n\n  Summary and conclusions                                          113-115\n\n                               LECTURE V.\n\n                   CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.\n\n  Abstract ideas among the Greeks, who were hardly aware of the\n    different degrees of precision possible in mathematics and\n    philosophy                                                     116-118\n\n    Tendency to define strong with them, apart from any criterion;\n      hence _dogmas_                                               118-120\n\n  Dogmatism, amid decay of originality: reaction towards doubt;\n    yet Dogmatism regnant                                          120-123\n\n  \u201cPalestinian Philosophy,\u201d a complete contrast                   123, 124\n\n  Fusion of these in the Old Catholic Church achieved through\n    an underlying kinship of ideas                                125, 126\n\n    Explanations of this from both sides                           126-128\n\n    Philosophical Judaism as a bridge, e.g., in allegorism and\n      cosmology                                                   128, 129\n\n  Christian philosophy partly apologetic, partly speculative.\n\n    Alarm of Conservatives: the second century one of transition\n    and conflict                                                   130-133\n\n  The issue, compromise, and a certain habit of mind              133, 134\n\n  Summary answer to the main question                                  134\n\n  The Greek mind seen in:\n\n    1. The tendency to define                                          135\n\n    2. The tendency to speculate                                       136\n\n    3. The point of emphasis, i.e. Orthodoxy                           137\n\n  Further development in the West. But Greece the source of the\n    true _damnosa hereditas_                                      137, 138\n\n                               LECTURE VI.\n\n                       GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.\n\n  The average morality of the age: its moral philosophy           139, 140\n\n  An age of moral reformation                                      140-142\n\n    1. Relation of ethics to philosophy and life                       142\n\n       Revived practical bent of Stoicism; Epictetus               143-147\n\n       A moral gymnastic cultivated                                    147\n\n         (1) _Askesis_ (\u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): Philo, Epictetus, Dio\n             Chrysostom                                            148-150\n\n         (2) The \u201cphilosopher\u201d or moral reformer                   150-152\n\n    2. The contents of ethical teaching, marked by a religious\n         reference. Epictetus\u2019 two maxims, \u201cFollow Nature,\u201d\n         \u201cFollow God\u201d                                              152-155\n\n  Christian ethics show agreement amid difference; based upon\n    the Divine command; idea of sin: agreement most emphasized\n    at first, i.e. the importance of conduct                      158, 159\n\n    1. Tone of earliest Christian writings: the \u201cTwo Ways:\u201d\n         Apostolical Constitutions, Bk. i.                         159-162\n\n    2. Place of discipline in Christian life: Puritan ideal\n         _v._ later _corpus permixtum_                             162-164\n\n  Further developments due to Greece:\n\n    1. A Church within the Church: _askesis_, Monasticism          164-168\n\n    2. Resulting deterioration of average ethics: Ambrose of\n         Milan                                                    168, 169\n\n  Complete victory of Greek ethics seen in the basis of modern\n    society                                                       169, 170\n\n                              LECTURE VII.\n\n                      GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.\n\n                             I. THE CREATOR.\n\n  The idea of One God, begotten of the unity and order of the\n    world, and connected with the ideas of personality and mind.\n    Three elements in the idea\u2014Creator, Moral Governor, Absolute\n    Being                                                          171-174\n\n  Growth of idea of a beginning: Monism and Dualism               174, 175\n\n    1. Monism of the Stoics: _natura naturata_ and _naturans_:\n         a beginning not necessarily involved                      175-177\n\n    2. Dualism, Platonic: creation recognized                      177-180\n\n  Syncretistic blending of these as to process: _Logos_ idea\n    common. Hence Philo\u2019s significance: God as Creator:\n    Monistic and Dualistic aspects; his terms for the\n    Forces in their plurality and unity: after all, God\n    is Creator, even Father, of the world                          180-188\n\n  Early Christian idea of a single supreme Artificer took permanent\n    root; but questions as to mode emerged, and the first answers\n    were tentative                                                 188-190\n\n    1. Evolutional type; supplemented by idea of a lapse           190-194\n\n    2. Creational type accepted                                        194\n\n  There remained:\n\n      (i.) The ultimate relation of matter to God: Dualistic\n             solutions: Basilides\u2019 Platonic theory the basis\n             of the later doctrine, though not at once\n             recognized                                            194-198\n\n     (ii.) The Creator\u2019s contact with matter: Mediation\n             hypothesis: the _Logos_ solution                      198-200\n\n    (iii.) Imperfection and evil: Monistic and Dualistic\n             answers, especially Marcion\u2019s                        200, 201\n\n  But the Divine Unity overcomes all: position of Iren\u00e6us, &c.,\n    widely accepted: Origen\u2019s cosmogony a theodicy. Prevalence\n    of the simpler view seen in Monarchianism                      202-207\n\n  Results                                                         207, 208\n\n                              LECTURE VIII.\n\n                      GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.\n\n                         II. THE MORAL GOVERNOR.\n\n  A.\u2014_The Greek Idea._\n\n    1. Unity of God and Unity of the world: will and order             209\n\n       Order, number, necessity and destiny: intelligent force\n         and law                                                   209-211\n\n       The Cosmos as a city-state (\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2)                         211, 212\n\n    2. New conceptions of the Divine Nature: _Justice_ and\n         _Goodness_ in connection with Providence                  213-215\n\n       Thus about the Christian era we find Destiny and Providence,\n         and a tendency to synthesis\u2014through two stages\u2014in the use\n         of the term God                                           215-217\n\n    3. The problem of evil emerges: attempts at solution.\n\n       (_a_) Universality of Providence denied (Platonic and Oriental) 217\n\n       (_b_) Reality of apparent evils denied (Stoic)              217-220\n\n       This not pertinent to moral evil, hence:\n\n       (_c_) Theory of human freedom                              220, 221\n\n       Its relation to Universality of Providence: the Stoical\n         theodicy exemplified in Epictetus                         221-223\n\n  B.\u2014_The Christian Idea._\n\n    Primitive Christianity a contrast: two main conceptions.\n\n    1. Wages for work done                                             224\n\n    2. Positive Law\u2014God a Lawgiver and Judge                           225\n\n  Difficulties in fusing the two types.\n\n     (i.) Forgiveness and Law                                          226\n\n          Marcion\u2019s ditheism                                      227, 228\n\n          Solution in Iren\u00e6us, Tertullian, &c.: result             228-230\n\n    (ii.) The Moral Governor and Free-will.\n\n          Marcion\u2019s dualistic view of moral evil                  230, 231\n\n          Justin Martyr, Tatian, Iren\u00e6us                          231, 232\n\n          Tertullian and the Alexandrines                              232\n\n          Origen\u2019s comprehensive theodicy by aid of Stoicism\n            and Neo-Platonism                                      233-237\n\n                               LECTURE IX.\n\n                      GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.\n\n                     III. GOD AS THE SUPREME BEING.\n\n  Christian Theology shaped by Greece, though on a Jewish basis   238, 239\n\n         A.\u2014_The Idea and its Development in Greek Philosophy._\n\n  Parallel to Christian speculation in three stages.\n\n    1. Transcendence of God.\n\n       History of the idea before and after Plato                  240-243\n\n       Its two forms, transcendent proper and supra-cosmic             244\n\n       Blending with religious feeling, e.g. in Philo             244, 245\n\n    2. Revelation of the Transcendent.\n\n       Through intermediaries:\n\n          (i.) Mythological                                            246\n\n         (ii.) Philosophical, e.g. in Philo                       246, 247\n\n    3. Distinctions in the nature of God.\n\n       Philo\u2019s Logos                                              247, 248\n\n         Conceived both monistically and dualistically in\n           relation to God                                             249\n\n         But especially under metaphor of generation                   250\n\n        B.\u2014_The Idea and its Development in Christian Theology._\n\n    1. Here the idea of Transcendence is at first absent           250-252\n\n       Present in the Apologists                                  252, 253\n\n       But God as transcendent (_v._ supra-cosmic) first\n         emphasized by Basilides and the Alexandrines              254-256\n\n    2. Mediation (= Revelation) of the Transcendent, a vital\n         problem                                                  256, 257\n\n       Theories of modal _manifestation_                          257, 258\n\n       Dominant idea that of modal _existence_:\n\n          (i.) As manifold: so among certain Gnostics                  258\n\n         (ii.) As constituting a unity                                 259\n\n       Its Gnostic forms                                          259, 260\n\n       Relation of the _logoi_ to the _Logos_, especially in\n         Justin                                                    260-262\n\n       The issue is the Logos doctrine of Iren\u00e6us                 262, 263\n\n    3. Distinctions in the nature of God based on the Logos.\n\n          (i.) Theories as to the _genesis_ of the Logos,\n               analogous to those as to the world                 263, 264\n\n       Theories guarding the \u201csole monarchy,\u201d thus endangered,\n         culminate in Origen\u2019s idea of eternal generation          265-267\n\n         (ii.) Theories of the _nature_ of the Logos determined\n               by either the supra-cosmic or transcendental\n               idea of God                                        267, 268\n\n       Origen marks a stage\u2014and but a stage\u2014in the controversies  268, 269\n\n  Greek elements in the subsequent developments.\n\n    _Ousia_; its history                                           269-272\n\n      Difficulty felt in applying it to God                       273, 274\n\n      As also with _homoousios_: need of another term             274, 275\n\n    _Hypostasis_: its history                                      275-277\n\n      Comes to need definition by a third term (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd)         277, 278\n\n      Resum\u00e9 of the use of these terms; the reign of dogmatism     278-280\n\n  Three underlying assumptions\u2014a legacy of the Greek spirit       280, 281\n\n    1. The importance of metaphysical distinctions.\n\n    2. Their absolute truth.\n\n    3. The nature of God\u2019s perfection.\n\n  Conclusion                                                           282\n\n                               LECTURE X.\n\n          THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES.\n\n               A.\u2014_The Greek Mysteries and Related Cults._\n\n  Mysteries and religious associations side by side with ordinary\n    Greek religion.\n\n    1. The Mysteries, e.g. at Eleusis                             283, 284\n\n         (i.) Initial Purification, through confession and\n              lustration (baptism)                                 285-287\n\n        (ii.) Sacrifices, with procession, &c.                    287, 288\n\n       (iii.) Mystic Drama, of nature and human life               288-290\n\n    2. Other religious associations: condition of entrance,\n         sacrifice and common meal                                290, 291\n\n       Wide extent of the above                                   291, 292\n\n                   B.\u2014_The Mysteries and the Church._\n\n  Transition to the Christian Sacraments; influence, general and\n    special                                                        292-294\n\n    1. Baptism:\n\n       Its primitive simplicity                                   294, 295\n\n       Later period marked by:\n\n         (i.) Change of _name_                                    295, 296\n\n        (ii.) Change of _time_ and conception                     296, 297\n\n       Minor confirmations of the parallelism                      298-300\n\n    2. The Lord\u2019s Supper:\n\n       Stages of extra-biblical development, e.g. in Didach\u00e9,\n         Apost. Const., the \u201caltar,\u201d its offerings as \u201cmysteries\u201d  300-303\n\n  Culmination of tendency in fifth century in Dionysius            303-305\n\n  The tendency strongest in the most Hellenic circles, viz.\n    Gnostics                                                      305, 306\n\n    Secrecy and long catechumenate                                306, 307\n\n    Anointing                                                     307, 308\n\n    Realistic change of conception                                308, 309\n\n  Conclusion                                                           309\n\n                               LECTURE XI.\n\n       THE INCORPORATION OF CHRISTIAN IDEAS, AS MODIFIED BY GREEK,\n                        INTO A BODY OF DOCTRINE.\n\n  \u201cFaith\u201d in Old Testament = trust\u2014trust in a person.\n\n          In Greek philosophy = intellectual conviction           310, 311\n\n          In Philo, these blend into trust in God\u2014in His\n            veracity, i.e. in the Holy Writings                   311, 312\n\n  Contemporary longing for certainty based on fact                     312\n\n  Here we have the germs of (1) the Creed, (2) the New Testament\n    Canon                                                              313\n\n    1. At first emphasis on its ethical purpose and revealed basis;\n         then the latent intellectual element emerges, though not\n         uniformly                                                     315\n\n       The baptismal formula becomes a test.\n\n         Expansion by \u201capostolic teaching\u201d                        316, 317\n\n         The \u201cApostles\u2019 Creed\u201d and the Bishops                     317-319\n\n    2. Related question as to sources of the Creed and the\n         materials for its interpretation.\n\n       Value of _written_ tradition: influence of Old Testament\n         and common idea of prophecy: apostolicity as limit       319, 320\n\n       Marcion and the idea of a Canon                            320, 321\n\n       \u201cFaith\u201d assumes the sense it had in Philo                       321\n\n    3. But the speculative temper remained active upon the \u201crule\n         of faith:\u201d \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 alongside \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2, especially at\n         Alexandria: Origen                                        321-323\n\n  Hence tendency to:\n\n    (1) Identify a fact with speculations upon it                 323, 324\n\n    (2) Check individual speculations in favour of those of the\n          majority                                                 324-326\n\n  Results:\n\n     (i.) Such speculations formulated and inserted in the Creed,\n            formally as interpretations: belief changed, but not\n            the importance attached to it                         327, 328\n\n    (ii.) Distinction between \u201cmajority\u201d and \u201cminority\u201d views at\n            a meeting, on points of metaphysical speculation           329\n\n  Resum\u00e9 of the stages of belief                                  329, 330\n\n  Underlying conceptions to be noted                              330, 331\n\n    (1) Philosophic regard for exact definition.\n\n    (2) Political belief in a majority.\n\n    (3) Belief in the finality of the views of an age so ascertained.\n\n  Development, if admitted, cannot be arrested                         332\n\n  Place of speculation in Christianity                            332, 333\n\n                              LECTURE XII.\n\n           THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BASIS OF CHRISTIAN UNION:\n                    DOCTRINE IN THE PLACE OF CONDUCT.\n\n  Association at first voluntary, according to the genius of\n    Christianity                                                  334, 335\n\n    Its basis primarily moral and spiritual: Holiness its\n      characteristic: the \u201cTwo Ways,\u201d Apost. Const. (Bk. i.),\n      the Elchasaites                                              335-337\n\n    Also a common Hope: its changing form                         337, 338\n\n  Coincident relaxation of bonds of discipline and change in\n    idea of the Church                                            338, 339\n\n  Growing stress also upon the intellectual element               339, 340\n\n    Causes for this, primary and collateral                       340, 341\n\n      (1) Importance given to Baptism realistically conceived:\n            its relation to the ministrant                        341, 342\n\n      (2) Intercommunion: the necessary test at first moral\n            (e.g. Didach\u00e9), subsequently a doctrinal formula       343-345\n\n  This elevation of doctrine due to causes internal to the\n    Christian communities: but an external factor enters with\n    case of Paul of Samosata: its results                          345-347\n\n  Lines of reaction against this transformation:\n\n      (1) Puritan or conservative tendency: Novatianism           347, 348\n\n      (2) Formation of esoteric class with higher moral ideal:\n            Monachism                                             348, 349\n\n  Conclusion:\n\n    The Greek spirit still lives in Christian Churches: the\n      vital question is its relation to Christianity              349, 350\n\n    Two theories\u2014permanence of the primitive, assimilative\n      development: no logical third                               350, 351\n\n    On either theory, the Greek element may largely go                 351\n\n  The problem pressing: our study a necessary preliminary and\n    truly conservative                                                 352\n\n  New ground here broken: a pioneer\u2019s forecast: the Christianity\n    of the future                                                 352, 353\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE I.\n\nINTRODUCTORY.\n\n\nIt is impossible for any one, whether he be a student of history or no,\nto fail to notice a difference of both form and content between the\nSermon on the Mount and the Nicene Creed. The Sermon on the Mount is the\npromulgation of a new law of conduct; it assumes beliefs rather than\nformulates them; the theological conceptions which underlie it belong to\nthe ethical rather than the speculative side of theology; metaphysics\nare wholly absent. The Nicene Creed is a statement partly of historical\nfacts and partly of dogmatic inferences; the metaphysical terms which it\ncontains would probably have been unintelligible to the first disciples;\nethics have no place in it. The one belongs to a world of Syrian\npeasants, the other to a world of Greek philosophers.\n\nThe contrast is patent. If any one thinks that it is sufficiently\nexplained by saying that the one is a sermon and the other a creed,\nit must be pointed out in reply that the question why an ethical\nsermon stood in the forefront of the teaching of Jesus Christ, and a\nmetaphysical creed in the forefront of the Christianity of the fourth\ncentury, is a problem which claims investigation.\n\nIt claims investigation, but it has not yet been investigated. There\nhave been inquiries, which in some cases have arrived at positive\nresults, as to the causes of particular changes or developments in\nChristianity\u2014the development, for example, of the doctrine of the\nTrinity, or of the theory of a Catholic Church. But the main question to\nwhich I invite your attention is antecedent to all such inquiries. It\nasks, not how did the Christian societies come to believe one proposition\nrather than another, but how did they come to the frame of mind which\nattached importance to either the one or the other, and made the assent\nto the one rather than the other a condition of membership.\n\nIn investigating this problem, the first point that is obvious to an\ninquirer is, that the change in the centre of gravity from conduct\nto belief is coincident with the transference of Christianity from a\nSemitic to a Greek soil. The presumption is that it was the result of\nGreek influence. It will appear from the Lectures which follow that\nthis presumption is true. Their general subject is, consequently, The\nInfluence of Greece upon Christianity.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe difficulty, the interest, and the importance of the subject make it\nincumbent upon us to approach it with caution. It is necessary to bear\nmany points in mind as we enter upon it; and I will begin by asking your\nattention to two considerations, which, being true of all analogous\nphenomena of religious development and change, may be presumed to be true\nof the particular phenomena before us.\n\n1. The first is, that the religion of a given race at a given time is\nrelative to the whole mental attitude of that time. It is impossible to\nseparate the religious phenomena from the other phenomena, in the same\nway that you can separate a vein of silver from the rock in which it is\nembedded. They are as much determined by the general characteristics of\nthe race as the fauna and flora of a geographical area are determined\nby its soil, its climate, and its cultivation; and they vary with the\nchanging characteristics of the race as the fauna and flora of the\ntertiary system differ from those of the chalk. They are separable\nfrom the whole mass of phenomena, not in fact, but only in thought.\nWe may concentrate our attention chiefly upon them, but they still\nremain part of the whole complex life of the time, and they cannot be\nunderstood except in relation to that life. If any one hesitates to\naccept this historical induction, I will ask him to take the instance\nthat lies nearest to him, and to consider how he could understand the\nreligious phenomena of our own country in our own time\u2014its doubts, its\nhopes, its varied enterprises, its shifting enthusiasms, its noise, its\nlearning, its estheticism, and its philanthropies\u2014unless he took account\nof the growth of the inductive sciences and the mechanical arts, of\nthe expansion of literature, of the social stress, of the commercial\nactivity, of the general drift of society towards its own improvement.\n\nIn dealing, therefore, with the problem before us, we must endeavour to\nrealize to ourselves the whole mental attitude of the Greek world in the\nfirst three centuries of our era. We must take account of the breadth\nand depth of its education, of the many currents of its philosophy, of\nits love of literature, of its scepticism and its mysticism. We must\ngather together whatever evidence we can find, not determining the\nexistence or measuring the extent of drifts of thought by their literary\nexpression, but taking note also of the testimony of the monuments of art\nand history, of paintings and sculptures, of inscriptions and laws. In\ndoing so, we must be content, at any rate for the present and until the\nproblem has been more fully elaborated, with the broader features both\nof the Greek world and of the early centuries. The distinctions which\nthe precise study of history requires us to draw between the state of\nthought of Greece proper and that of Asia Minor, and between the age of\nthe Antonines and that of the Severi, are not necessary for our immediate\npurpose, and may be left to the minuter research which has hardly yet\nbegun.\n\n2. The second consideration is, that no permanent change takes place in\nthe religious beliefs or usages of a race which is not rooted in the\nexisting beliefs and usages of that race. The truth which Aristotle\nenunciated, that all intellectual teaching is based upon what is\npreviously known to the person taught,[1] is applicable to a race as\nwell as to an individual, and to beliefs even more than to knowledge.\nA religious change is, like a physiological change, of the nature of\nassimilation by, and absorption into, existing elements. The religion\nwhich our Lord preached was rooted in Judaism. It came \u201cnot to destroy,\nbut to fulfil.\u201d It took the Jewish conception of a Father in heaven,\nand gave it a new meaning. It took existing moral precepts, and gave\nthem a new application. The meaning and the application had already been\nanticipated in some degree by the Jewish prophets. There were Jewish\nminds which had been ripening for them; and so far as they were ripe for\nthem, they received them. In a similar way we shall find that the Greek\nChristianity of the fourth century was rooted in Hellenism. The Greek\nminds which had been ripening for Christianity had absorbed new ideas and\nnew motives; but there was a continuity between their present and their\npast; the new ideas and new motives mingled with the waters of existing\ncurrents; and it is only by examining the sources and the volume of the\nprevious flow that we shall understand how it is that the Nicene Creed\nrather than the Sermon on the Mount has formed the dominant element in\nAryan Christianity.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe method of the investigation, like that of all investigations, must\nbe determined by the nature of the evidence. The special feature of the\nevidence which affects the method is, that it is ample in regard to the\ncauses, and ample also in regard to the effects, but scanty in regard to\nthe process of change.\n\nWe have ample evidence in regard to the state of Greek thought during\nthe ante-Nicene period. The writers shine with a dim and pallid light\nwhen put side by side with the master-spirits of the Attic age; but their\nlesser importance in the scale of genius rather adds to than diminishes\nfrom their importance as representatives. They were more the children of\ntheir time. They are consequently better evidence as to the currents of\nits thought than men who supremely transcended it. I will mention those\nfrom whom we shall derive most information, in the hope that you will\nin course of time become familiar, not only with their names, but also\nwith their works. Dio of Prusa, commonly known as Dio Chrysostom, \u201cDio of\nthe golden mouth,\u201d who was raised above the class of travelling orators\nto which he belonged, not only by his singular literary skill, but also\nby the nobility of his character and the vigour of his protests against\npolitical unrighteousness. Epictetus, the lame slave, the Socrates of his\ntime, in whom the morality and the religion of the Greek world find their\nsublimest expression, and whose conversations and lectures at Nicopolis,\ntaken down, probably in short-hand, by a faithful pupil, reflect\nexactly, as in a photograph, the interior life of a great moralist\u2019s\nschool. Plutarch, the prolific essayist and diligent encyclop\u00e6dist,\nwhose materials are far more valuable to us than the edifices which he\nerects with them. Maximus of Tyre, the eloquent preacher, in whom the\ncold metaphysics of the Academy are transmuted into a glowing mysticism.\nMarcus Aurelius, the imperial philosopher, in whose mind the fragments\nof many philosophies are lit by hope or darkened by despair, as the\nclouds float and drift in uncertain sunlight or in gathered gloom before\nthe clearing rain. Lucian, the satirist and wit, the prose Aristophanes\nof later Greece. Sextus Empiricus, whose writings\u2014or the collection\nof writings gathered under his name\u2014are the richest of all mines for\nthe investigation of later Greek philosophy. Philostratus, the author\nof a great religious romance, and of many sketches of the lives of\ncontemporary teachers. It will hardly be an anachronism if we add to\nthese the great syncretist philosopher, Philo of Alexandria; for, on\nthe one hand, he was more Greek than Jew, and, on the other, several of\nthe works which are gathered together under his name seem to belong to\na generation subsequent to his own, and to be the only survivors of the\nJud\u00e6o-Greek schools which lasted on in the great cities of the empire\nuntil the verge of Christian times.\n\nWe have ample evidence also as to the state of Christian thought in the\npost-Nicene period. The Fathers Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus,\nGregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Jerusalem, the decrees of general and\nlocal Councils, the apocryphal and pseudonymous literature, enable us to\nform a clear conception of the change which Greek influences had wrought.\n\nBut the evidence as to the mode in which the causes operated within the\nChristian sphere before the final effects were produced is singularly\nimperfect. If we look at the literature of the schools of thought which\nultimately became dominant, we find that it consists for the most part\nof some accidental survivals.[2] It tells us about some parts of the\nChristian world, but not about others. It represents a few phases of\nthought with adequate fulness, and of others it presents only a few\nfossils. In regard to Palestine, which in the third and fourth centuries\nwas a great centre of culture, we have only the evidence of Justin\nMartyr. In regard to Asia Minor, which seems to have been the chief\ncrucible for the alchemy of transmutation, we have but such scanty\nfragments as those of Melito and Gregory of Neoc\u00e6sarea. The largest and\nmost important monuments are those of Alexandria, the works of Clement\nand Origen, which represent a stage of singular interest in the process\nof philosophical development. Of the Italian writers, we have little\nthat is genuine besides Hippolytus. Of Gallican writers, we have chiefly\nIren\u00e6us, whose results are important as being the earliest formulating\nof the opinions which ultimately became dominant, but whose method is\nmainly interesting as an example of the dreary polemics of the rhetorical\nschools. Of African writers, we have Tertullian, a skilled lawyer,\nwho would in modern times have taken high rank as a pleader at the\nbar or as a leader of Parliamentary debate; and Cyprian, who survives\nchiefly as a champion of the sacerdotal hypothesis, and whose vigorous\npersonality gave him a moral influence which was far beyond the measure\nof his intellectual powers. The evidence is not only imperfect, but also\ninsufficient in relation to the effects that were produced. Writers of\nthe stamp of Justin and Iren\u00e6us are wholly inadequate to account for\neither the conversion of the educated world to Christianity, or for the\nforms which Christianity assumed when the educated world had moulded it.\n\nAnd if we look for the literature of the schools of thought which were\nultimately branded as heretical, we look almost wholly in vain. What the\nearliest Christian philosophers thought, we know, with comparatively\ninsignificant exceptions, only from the writings of their opponents. They\nwere subject to a double hate\u2014that of the heathen schools which they\nhad left, and that of the Christians who were saying \u201cNon possumus\u201d to\nphilosophy.[3] The little trust that we can place in the accounts which\ntheir opponents give of them is shown by the wide differences in those\naccounts. Each opponent, with the dialectical skill which was common at\nthe time, selected, paraphrased, distorted, and re-combined the points\nwhich seemed to him to be weakest. The result is, naturally, that the\naccounts which the several opponents give are so different in form and\nfeature as to be irreconcilable with one another.[4] It was so also with\nthe heathen opponents of Christianity.[5] With one important exception,\nwe cannot tell how the new religion struck a dispassionate outside\nobserver, or why it was that it left so many philosophers outside its\nfold. Then, as now, the forces of human nature were at work. The tendency\nto disparage and suppress an opponent is not peculiar to the early ages\nof Christianity. When the associated Christian communities won at length\ntheir hard-fought battle, they burned the enemy\u2019s camp.\n\nThis fact of the scantiness and inadequacy of the evidence as to the\nprocess of transformation has led to two results which constitute\ndifficulties and dangers in our path.\n\n1. The one is the tendency to overrate the value of the evidence that has\nsurvived. When only two or three monuments of a great movement remain,\nit is difficult to appreciate the degree in which those monuments are\nrepresentative. We tend at almost all times to attach an exaggerated\nimportance to individual writers; the writers who have moulded the\nthoughts of their contemporaries, instead of being moulded by them, are\nalways few in number and exceptional. We tend also to attach an undue\nimportance to phrases which occur in such writers; few, if any, writers\nwrite with the precision of a legal document, and the inverted pyramids\nwhich have been built upon chance phrases of Clement or Justin are\nmonuments of caution which we shall do well to keep before our eyes.\n\n2. The other is the tendency to under-estimate the importance of the\nopinions that have disappeared from sight, or which we know only in the\nform and to the extent of their quotation by their opponents. If we were\nto trust the histories that are commonly current, we should believe that\nthere was from the first a body of doctrine of which certain writers were\nthe recognized exponents; and that outside this body of doctrine there\nwas only the play of more or less insignificant opinions, like a fitful\nguerilla warfare on the flanks of a great army. Whereas what we really\nfind on examining the evidence is, that out of a mass of opinions which\nfor a long time fought as equals upon equal ground, there was formed a\nvast alliance which was strong enough to shake off the extremes at once\nof conservatism and of speculation, but in which the speculation whose\nmonuments have perished had no less a share than the conservatism of\nwhich some monuments have survived.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis survey of the nature of the evidence enables us to determine the\nmethod which we should follow. We can trace the causes and we can see\nthe effects; but we have only scanty information as to the intermediate\nprocesses. If the evidence as to those processes existed in greater mass,\nif the writings of those who made the first tentative efforts to give\nto Christianity a Greek form had been preserved to us, it might have\nbeen possible to follow in order of time and country the influence of\nthe several groups of ideas upon the several groups of Christians. This\nmethod has been attempted, with questionable success, by some of those\nwho have investigated the history of particular doctrines. But it is\nimpossible to deprecate too strongly the habit of erecting theories upon\nhistorical quicksands; and I propose to pursue the surer path to which\nthe nature of the evidence points, by stating the causes, by viewing\nthem in relation to the effects, and by considering how far they were\nadequate in respect of both mass and complexity to produce those effects.\n\nThere is a consideration in favour of this method which is in entire\nharmony with that which arises from the nature of the evidence. It\nis, that the changes that took place were gradual and at first hardly\nperceptible. It would probably be impossible, even if we were in\npossession of ampler evidence, to assign a definite cause and a definite\ndate for the introduction of each separate idea. For the early years of\nChristianity were in some respects like the early years of our lives. It\nhas sometimes been thought that those early years are the most important\nyears in the education of all of us. We learn then, we hardly know how,\nthrough effort and struggle and innocent mistakes, to use our eyes and\nour ears, to measure distance and direction, by a process which ascends\nby unconscious steps to the certainty which we feel in our maturity. We\nare helped in doing go, to an incalculable degree, by the accumulated\nexperience of mankind which is stored up in language; but the growth is\nour own, the unconscious development of our own powers. It was in some\nsuch unconscious way that the Christian thought of the earlier centuries\ngradually acquired the form which we find when it emerges, as it were,\ninto the developed manhood of the fourth century. Greek philosophy helped\nits development, as language helps a child; but the assimilation of it\ncan no more be traced from year to year than the growth of the body can\nbe traced from day to day.\n\nWe shall begin, therefore, by looking at the several groups of facts of\nthe age in which Christianity grew, and endeavour, when we have looked at\nthem, to estimate their influence upon it.\n\nWe shall look at the facts which indicate the state of education: we\nshall find that it was an age that was penetrated with culture, and that\nnecessarily gave to all ideas which it absorbed a cultured and, so to\nspeak, scholastic form.\n\nWe shall look at the facts which indicate the state of literature: we\nshall find that it was an age of great literary activity, which was proud\nof its ancient monuments, and which spent a large part of its industry in\nendeavouring to interpret and to imitate them.\n\nWe shall look at the facts which indicate the state of philosophy: we\nshall find that it was an age in which metaphysical conceptions had come\nto occupy relatively the same place which the conceptions of natural\nscience occupy among ourselves; and that just as we tend to look upon\nexternal things in their chemical and physical relations, so there was\nthen, as it were, a chemistry and physics of ideas.\n\nWe shall look at the facts which indicate the state of moral ideas:\nwe shall find that it was an age in which the ethical forces of human\nnature were struggling with an altogether unprecedented force against\nthe degradation of contemporary society and contemporary religion, and\nin which the ethical instincts were creating the new ideal of \u201cfollowing\nGod,\u201d and were solving the old question whether there was or was not an\nart of life by practising self-discipline.\n\nWe shall look at the facts which indicate the state of theological\nideas: we shall find that it was an age in which men were feeling after\nGod and not feeling in vain, and that from the domains of ethics,\nphysics, metaphysics alike, from the depths of the moral consciousness,\nand from the cloud-lands of poets\u2019 dreams, the ideas of men were trooping\nin one vast host to proclaim with a united voice that there are not many\ngods, but only One, one First Cause by whom all things were made, one\nMoral Governor whose providence was over all His works, one Supreme Being\n\u201cof infinite power, wisdom, and goodness.\u201d\n\nWe shall look at the facts which indicate the state of religion: we shall\nfind that it was an age in which the beliefs that had for centuries\nbeen evolving themselves from the old religions were showing themselves\nin new forms of worship and new conceptions of what God needed in the\nworshipper; in which also the older animalism was passing into mysticism,\nand mysticism was the preparation of the soul for the spiritual religion\nof the time to come.\n\nWe shall then, in the case of each great group of ideas, endeavour to\nascertain from the earliest Christian documents the original Christian\nideas upon which they acted; and then compare the later with the earlier\nform of those Christian ideas; and finally examine the combined result\nof all the influences that were at work upon the mental attitude of the\nChristian world and upon the basis of Christian association.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI should be glad if I could at once proceed to examine some of these\ngroups of facts. But since the object which I have in view is not so\nmuch to lead you to any conclusions of my own, as to invite you to walk\nwith me in comparatively untrodden paths, and to urge those of you who\nhave leisure for historical investigations to explore them for yourselves\nmore fully than I have been able to do\u2014and since the main difficulties of\nthe investigation lie less in the facts themselves than in the attitude\nof mind in which they are approached\u2014I feel that I should fail of my\npurpose if I did not linger still upon the threshold to say something of\nthe \u201cpersonal equation\u201d that we must make before we can become either\naccurate observers or impartial judges. There is the more reason for\ndoing so, because the study of Christian history is no doubt discredited\nby the dissonance in the voices of its exponents. An ill-informed writer\nmay state almost any propositions he pleases, with the certainty of\nfinding listeners; a well-informed writer may state propositions which\nare as demonstrably true as any historical proposition can be, with the\ncertainty of being contradicted. There is no court of appeal, nor will\nthere be until more than one generation has been engaged upon the task to\nwhich I am inviting you.\n\n1. In the first place, it is necessary to take account of the demand\nwhich the study makes upon the attention and the imagination of the\nstudent. The scientific, that is the accurate, study of history is\ncomparatively new. The minute care which is required in the examination\nof the evidence for the facts, and the painful caution which is required\nin the forming of inferences, are but inadequately appreciated. The study\nrequires not only attention, but also imagination. A student must have\nsomething analogous to the power of a dramatist before he can realize the\nscenery of a vanished age, or watch, as in a moving panorama, the series\nand sequence of its events. He must have that power in a still greater\ndegree before he can so throw himself into a bygone time as to be able to\nenter into the motives of the actors, and to imagine how, having such and\nsuch a character, and surrounded by such and such circumstances, he would\nhimself have thought and felt and acted. But the greatest demand that\ncan be made upon either the attention or the imagination of a student is\nthat which is made by such a problem as the present, which requires us\nto realize the attitude of mind, not of one man, but of a generation of\nmen, to move with their movements, to float upon the current of their\nthoughts, and to pass with them from one attitude of mind into another.\n\n2. In the second place, it is necessary to take account of our own\npersonal prepossessions. Most of us come to the study of the subject\nalready knowing something about it. It is a comparatively easy task for a\nlecturer to present, and for a hearer to realize, an accurate picture of,\nfor example, the religion of Mexico or of Peru, because the mind of the\nstudent when he begins the study is a comparatively blank sheet. But most\nof us bring to the study of Christian history a number of conclusions\nalready formed. We tend to beg the question before we examine it.\n\nWe have before us, on the one hand, the ideas and usages of early\nChristianity; on the other hand, the ideas and usages of imperial Greece.\n\nWe bring to the former the thoughts, the associations, the sacred\nmemories, the happy dreams, which have been rising up round us, one by\none, since our childhood. Even if there be some among us who in the\nmaturity of their years have broken away from their earlier moorings,\nthese associations still tend to remain. They are not confined to those\nof us who not only consciously retain them, but also hold their basis to\nbe true. They linger unconsciously in the minds of those who seem most\nresolutely to have abandoned them.\n\nWe bring to the latter, most of us, a similar wealth of associations\nwhich have come to us through our education. The ideas with which we\nhave to deal are mostly expressed in terms which are common to the early\ncenturies of Christianity, and to the Greek literature of five centuries\nbefore. The terms are the same, but their meaning is different. Those\nof us who have studied Greek literature tend to attach to them the\nconnotation which they had at Athens when Greek literature was in its\nmost perfect flower. We ignore the long interval of time, and the new\nconnotation which, by an inevitable law of language, had in the course of\ncenturies clustered round the old nucleus of meaning. The terms have in\nsome cases come down by direct transmission into our own language. They\nhave in such cases gathered to themselves wholly new meanings, which,\nuntil we consciously hold them up to the light, seem to us to form part\nof the original meaning, and are with difficulty disentangled.\n\nWe bring to both the Christian and the Greek world the inductions\nrespecting them which have been already made by ourselves and by\nothers. We have in those inductions so many moulds, so to speak, into\nwhich we press the plastic statements of early writers. We assume the\nprimitiveness of distinctions which for the most part represent only\nthe provisional conclusions of earlier generations of scholars, and\nstages in our own historical education; and we arrange facts in the\ncategories which we find ready to hand, as Jewish or Gentile, orthodox\nor heretical, Catholic or Gnostic, while the question of the reality of\nsuch distinctions and such categories is one of the main points which our\ninquiries have to solve.\n\n3. In the third place, it is necessary to take account of the\nunder-currents, not only of our own age, but of the past ages with which\nwe have to deal. Every age has such under-currents, and every age tends\nto be unconscious of them. We ourselves have succeeded to a splendid\nheritage. Behind us are the thoughts, the beliefs, the habits of mind,\nwhich have been in process of formation since the first beginning of\nour race. They are inwrought, for the most part, into the texture of\nour nature. We cannot transcend them. To them the mass of our thoughts\nare relative, and by them the thoughts of other generations tend to be\njudged. The importance of recognizing them as an element in our judgments\nof other generations increases in proportion as those generations recede\nfrom our own. In dealing with a country or a period not very remote, we\nmay not go far wrong in assuming that its inheritance of ideas is cognate\nto our own. But in dealing with a remote country, or a remote period of\ntime, it becomes of extreme importance to allow for the difference, so\nto speak, of mental longitude. The men of earlier days had other mental\nscenery round them. Fewer streams of thought had converged upon them.\nConsequently, many ideas which were in entire harmony with the mental\nfabric of their time, are unintelligible when referred to the standard of\nour own; nor can we understand them until we have been at the pains to\nfind out the underlying ideas to which they were actually relative.\n\nI will briefly illustrate this point by two instances:\n\n(_a_) We tend to take with us, as we travel into bygone times, the\ndualistic hypothesis\u2014which to most of us is no hypothesis, but an\naxiomatic truth\u2014of the existence of an unbridged chasm between body and\nsoul, matter and spirit. The relation in our minds of the idea of matter\nto the idea of spirit is such, that though we readily conceive matter\nto act upon matter, and spirit upon spirit, we find it difficult or\nimpossible to conceive a direct action either of matter upon spirit or\nof spirit upon matter. When, therefore, in studying, for example, the\nancient rites of baptism, we find expressions which seem to attribute a\nvirtue to the material element, we measure such expressions by a modern\nstandard, and regard them as containing only an analogy or a symbol. They\nbelong, in reality, to another phase of thought than our own. They are an\noutflow of the earlier conception of matter and spirit as varying forms\nof a single substance.[6] \u201cWhatever acts, is body,\u201d it was said. Mind is\nthe subtlest form of body, but it is body nevertheless. The conception\nof a direct action of the one upon the other presented no difficulty. It\nwas imagined, for instance, that demons might be the direct causes of\ndiseases, because the extreme tenuity of their substance enabled them to\nenter, and to exercise a malignant influence upon, the bodies of men. So\nwater, when exorcized from all the evil influences which might reside\nin it, actually cleansed the soul.[7] The conception of the process\nas symbolical came with the growth of later ideas of the relation of\nmatter to spirit. It is, so to speak, a rationalizing explanation of a\nconception which the world was tending to outgrow.\n\n(_b_) We take with us in our travels into the past the underlying\nconception of religion as a personal bond between God and the individual\nsoul. We cannot believe that there is any virtue in an act of worship in\nwhich the conscience has no place. We can understand, however much we may\ndeplore, such persecutions as those of the sixteenth century, because\nthey ultimately rest upon the same conception: men were so profoundly\nconvinced of the truth of their own personal beliefs as to deem it of\nsupreme importance that other men should hold those beliefs also. But we\nfind it difficult to understand why, in the second century of our era, a\ngreat emperor who was also a great philosopher should have deliberately\npersecuted Christianity. The difficulty arises from our overlooking the\nentirely different aspect under which religion presented itself to a\nRoman mind. It was a matter which lay, not between the soul and God, but\nbetween the individual and the State. Conscience had no place in it.\nWorship was an ancestral usage which the State sanctioned and enforced.\nIt was one of the ordinary duties of life.[8] The neglect of it, and\nstill more the disavowal of it, was a crime. An emperor might pity the\noffender for his obstinacy, but he must necessarily either compel him to\nobey or punish him for disobedience.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is not until we have thus realized the fact that the study of history\nrequires as diligent and as constant an exercise of the mental powers as\nany of the physical sciences, and until we have made what may be called\nthe \u201cpersonal equation,\u201d disentangling ourselves as far as we can from\nthe theories which we have inherited or formed, and recognizing the\nexistence of under-currents of thought in past ages widely different\nfrom those which flow in our own, that we shall be likely to investigate\nwith success the great problem that lies before us. I lay stress upon\nthese points, because the interest of the subject tends to obscure its\ndifficulties. Literature is full of fancy sketches of early Christianity;\nthey are written, for the most part, by enthusiasts whose imagination\nsoars by an easy flight to the mountain-tops which the historian can\nonly reach by a long and rugged road; they are read, for the most part,\nby those who give them only the attention which they would give to a\nshilling hand-book or to an article in a review. I have no desire, and I\nam sure that you have no desire, to add one more to such fancy sketches.\nThe time has come for a precise study. The materials for such a study\nare available. The method of such a study is determined by canons which\nhave been established in analogous fields of research. The difficulties\nof such a study come almost entirely from ourselves, and it is a duty to\nbegin by recognizing them.\n\nFor the study is one not only of living interest, but also of supreme\nimportance. Other history may be more or less antiquarian. Its ultimate\nresult may be only to gratify our curiosity and to add to the stores\nof our knowledge. But Christianity claims to be a present guide of our\nlives. It has been so large a factor in the moral development of our\nrace, that we cannot set aside its claim unheard. Neither can we admit it\nuntil we know what Christianity is. A thousand dissonant voices are each\nof them professing to speak in its name. The appeal lies from them to its\ndocuments and to its history. In order to know what it is, we must first\nknow both what it professed to be and what it has been. The study of the\none is the complement of the other; but it is with the latter only that\nwe have at present to do. We may enter upon the study with confidence,\nbecause it is a scientific inquiry. We may hear, if we will, the solemn\ntramp of the science of history marching slowly, but marching always to\nconquest. It is marching in our day, almost for the first time, into\nthe domain of Christian history. Upon its flanks, as upon the flanks of\nthe physical sciences, there are scouts and skirmishers, who venture\nsometimes into morasses where there is no foothold, and into ravines from\nwhich there is no issue. But the science is marching on. \u201cVestigia nulla\nretrorsum.\u201d It marches, as the physical sciences have marched, with the\nfirm tread of certainty. It meets, as the physical sciences have met,\nwith opposition, and even with contumely. In front of it, as in front of\nthe physical sciences, is chaos; behind it is order. We may march in its\nprogress, not only with the confidence of scientific certainty, but also\nwith the confidence of Christian faith. It may show some things to be\nderived which we thought to be original; and some things to be compound\nwhich we thought to be incapable of analysis; and some things to be\nphantoms which we thought to be realities. But it will add a new chapter\nto Christian apologetics; it will confirm the divinity of Christianity by\nshowing it to be in harmony with all else that we believe to be divine;\nits results will take their place among those truths which burn in the\nsouls of men with a fire that cannot be quenched, and light up the\ndarkness of this stormy sea with a light that is never dim.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE II.\n\nGREEK EDUCATION.\n\n\nThe general result of the considerations to which I have already invited\nyour attention is, that a study of the growth and modifications of the\nearly forms of Christianity must begin with a study of their environment.\nFor a complete study, it would be necessary to examine that environment\nas a whole. In some respects all life hangs together, and no single\nelement of it is in absolute isolation. The political and economical\nfeatures of a given time affect more or less remotely its literary and\nphilosophical features, and a complete investigation would take them all\ninto account. But since life is short, and human powers are limited,\nit is necessary in this, as in many other studies, to be content with\nsomething less than ideal completeness. It will be found sufficient in\npractice to deal only with the proximate causes of the phenomena into\nwhich we inquire; and in dealing, as we shall mainly do, with literary\neffects, to deal also mainly with those features of the age which were\nliterary also.\n\nThe most general summary of those features is, that the Greek world of\nthe second and third centuries was, in a sense which, though not without\nsome just demur, has tended to prevail ever since, an educated world. It\nwas reaping the harvest which many generations had sown. Five centuries\nbefore, the new elements of knowledge and cultured speech had begun to\nenter largely into the simpler elements of early Greek life. It had\nbecome no longer enough for men to till the ground, or to pursue their\nseveral handicrafts, or to be practised in the use of arms. The word\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2, which in earlier times had been applied to one who was skilled\nin any of the arts of life, who could string a bow or tune a lyre or\neven trim a hedge, had come to be applied, if not exclusively, yet at\nleast chiefly, to one who was shrewd with practical wisdom, or who knew\nthe thoughts and sayings of the ancients. The original reasons, which\nlay deep in the Greek character, for the element of knowledge assuming\nthis special form, had been accentuated by the circumstances of later\nGreek history. There seems to be little reason in the nature of things\nwhy Greece should not have anticipated modern Europe in the study of\nnature, and why knowledge should not have had for its chief meaning in\nearlier times that which it is tending to mean now, the knowledge of\nthe phenomena and laws of the physical world. The tendency to collect\nand colligate and compare the facts of nature appears to be no less\ninstinctive than the tendency to become acquainted with the thoughts\nof those who have gone before us. But Greece on the one hand had lost\npolitical power, and on the other hand possessed in her splendid\nliterature an inalienable heritage. She could acquiesce with the greater\nequanimity in political subjection, because in the domain of letters she\nwas still supreme with an indisputable supremacy. It was natural that she\nshould turn to letters. It was natural also that the study of letters\nshould be reflected upon speech. For the love of speech had become to\na large proportion of Greeks a second nature. They were a nation of\ntalkers. They were almost the slaves of cultivated expression. Though the\npublic life out of which orators had grown had passed away with political\nfreedom, it had left behind it a habit which in the second century of\nour era was blossoming into a new spring. Like children playing at\n\u201cmake-believe,\u201d when real speeches in real assemblies became impossible,\nthe Greeks revived the old practice of public speaking by addressing\nfictitious assemblies and arguing in fictitious courts. In the absence\nof the distractions of either keen political struggles at home or wars\nabroad, these tendencies had spread themselves over the large surface of\ngeneral Greek society. A kind of literary instinct had come to exist. The\nmass of men in the Greek world tended to lay stress on that acquaintance\nwith the literature of bygone generations, and that habit of cultivated\nspeech, which has ever since been commonly spoken of as education.\n\nTwo points have to be considered in regard to that education before it\ncan be regarded as a cause in relation to the main subject which we are\nexamining: we must look first at its forms, and secondly at its mass.\nIt is not enough that it should have corresponded in kind to certain\neffects; it must be shown to have been adequate in amount to account for\nthem.\n\nI. The education was almost as complex as our own. If we except only the\ninductive physical sciences, it covered the same field. It was, indeed,\nnot so much analogous to our own as the cause of it. Our own comes by\ndirect tradition from it. It set a fashion which until recently has\nuniformly prevailed over the whole civilized world. We study literature\nrather than nature because the Greeks did so, and because when the Romans\nand the Roman provincials resolved to educate their sons, they employed\nGreek teachers and followed in Greek paths.\n\nThe two main elements were those which have been already indicated,\nGrammar and Rhetoric.[9]\n\n1. By Grammar was meant the study of literature.[10] In its original\nsense of the art of reading and writing, it began as early as that art\nbegins among ourselves. \u201cWe are given over to Grammar,\u201d says Sextus\nEmpiricus,[11] \u201cfrom childhood, and almost from our baby-clothes.\u201d But\nthis elementary part of it was usually designated by another name,[12]\nand Grammar itself had come to include all that in later times has\nbeen designated Belles Lettres. This comprehensive view of it was of\nslow growth; consequently, the art is variously defined and divided.\nThe division which Sextus Empiricus[13] speaks of as most free from\nobjection, and which will sufficiently indicate the general limits of\nthe subject, is into the technical, the historical, and the exegetical\nelements. The first of these was the study of diction, the laying down of\ncanons of correctness, the distinction between Hellenisms and Barbarisms.\nUpon this as much stress was laid as was laid upon academic French in the\nage of Boileau. \u201cI owe to Alexander,\u201d says Marcus Aurelius,[14] \u201cmy habit\nof not finding fault, and of not using abusive language to those who\nutter a barbarous or awkward or unmusical phrase.\u201d \u201cI must apologize for\nthe style of this letter,\u201d says the Christian Father Basil two centuries\nafterwards, in writing to his old teacher Libanius; \u201cthe truth is, I\nhave been in the company of Moses and Elias, and men of that kind, who\ntell us no doubt what is true, but in a barbarous dialect, so that your\ninstructions have quite gone out of my head.\u201d[15] The second element of\nGrammar was the study of the antiquities of an author: the explanation\nof the names of the gods and heroes, the legends and histories, which\nwere mentioned. It is continued to this day in most notes upon classical\nauthors. The third element was partly critical, the distinguishing\nbetween true and spurious treatises, or between true and false readings;\nbut chiefly exegetical, the explanation of an author\u2019s meaning. It is\nspoken of as the prophetess of the poets,[16] standing to them in the\nsame relation as the Delphian priestess to her inspiring god.\n\nThe main subject-matter of this literary education was the poets.\nThey were read, not only for their literary, but also for their moral\nvalue.[17] They were read as we read the Bible. They were committed to\nmemory. The minds of men were saturated with them. A quotation from Homer\nor from a tragic poet was apposite on all occasions and in every kind of\nsociety. Dio Chrysostom, in an account of his travels, tells how he came\nto the Greek colony of the Borysthenit\u00e6, on the farthest borders of the\nempire, and found that even in those remote settlements almost all the\ninhabitants knew the Iliad by heart, and that they did not care to hear\nabout anything else.[18]\n\n2. Grammar was succeeded by Rhetoric\u2014the study of literature by the study\nof literary expression and quasi-forensic argument. The two were not\nsharply distinguished in practice, and had some elements in common. The\nconception of the one no less than of the other had widened with time,\nand Rhetoric, like Grammar, was variously defined and divided. It was\ntaught partly by precept, partly by example, and partly by practice. The\nprofessor either dictated rules and gave lists of selected passages of\nancient authors, or he read such passages with comments upon the style,\nor he delivered model speeches of his own. The first of these methods\nhas its literary monument in the hand-books which remain.[19] The second\nsurvives as an institution in modern times, and on a large scale, in the\nUniversity \u201clecture,\u201d and it has also left important literary monuments\nin the _Scholia_ upon Homer and other great writers. The third method\ngave birth to an institution which also survives in modern times. Each\nof these methods was followed by the student. He began by committing\nto memory both the professor\u2019s rules and also selected passages of\ngood authors: the latter he recited, with appropriate modulations and\ngestures, in the presence of the professor. In the next stage, he made\nhis comments upon them. Here is a short example which is embedded in\nEpictetus:[20] the student reads the first sentence of Xenophon\u2019s\n_Memorabilia_, and makes his criticism upon it:\n\n    \u201c\u2018I have often wondered what in the world were the grounds on\n    which....\u2019\n\n    Rather ... \u2018the ground on which....\u2019 It is neater.\u201d\n\nFrom this, or concurrently with this, the student proceeded to\ncompositions of his own. Beginning with mere imitation of style, he was\ngradually led to invent the structure as well as the style of what he\nwrote, and to vary both the style and the subject-matter. Sometimes he\nhad the use of the professor\u2019s library;[21] and though writing in his\nnative language, he had to construct his periods according to rules of\nart, and to avoid all words for which an authority could not be quoted,\njust as if he were an English undergraduate writing his Greek prose.\nThe crown of all was the acquisition of the art of speaking extempore.\nA student\u2019s education in Rhetoric was finished when he had the power\nto talk off-hand on any subject that might be proposed. But whether he\nrecited a prepared speech or spoke off-hand, he was expected to show the\nsame artificiality of structure and the same pedantry of diction. \u201cYou\nmust strip off all that boundless length of sentences that is wrapped\nround you,\u201d says Charon to the rhetorician who is just stepping into his\nboat, \u201cand those antitheses of yours, and balancings of clauses, and\nstrange expressions, and all the other heavy weights of speech (or you\nwill make my boat too heavy).\u201d[22]\n\nTo a considerable extent there prevailed, in addition to Belles Lettres\nand Rhetoric, a teaching of Philosophy. It was the highest element in\nthe education of the average Greek of the period. Logic, in the form\nof Dialectic, was common to Philosophy and Rhetoric. Every one learnt\nto argue: a large number learnt, in addition, the technical terms of\nPhilosophy and the outlines of its history. Lucian[23] tells a tale of a\ncountry gentleman of the old school, whose nephew went home from lecture\nnight after night, and regaled his mother and himself with fallacies\nand dilemmas, talking about \u201crelations\u201d and \u201ccomprehensions\u201d and \u201cmental\npresentations,\u201d and jargon of that sort; nay, worse than that, saying,\n\u201cthat God does not live in heaven, but goes about among stocks and stones\nand such-like.\u201d As far as Logic was concerned, it was almost natural\nto a Greek mind: Dialectic was but the conversation of a sharp-witted\npeople conducted under recognized rules. But it was a comparatively new\nphase of Philosophy that it should have a literary side. It had shared\nin the common degeneracy. It had come to take wisdom at second-hand.\nIt was not the evolution of a man\u2019s own thoughts, but an acquaintance\nwith the recorded thoughts of others. It was divorced from practice. It\nwas degraded to a system of lectures and disputations. It was taught\nin the same general way as the studies which preceded it. But lectures\nhad a more important place. Sometimes the professor read a passage from\na philosopher, and gave his interpretation of it; sometimes he gave a\ndiscourse of his own. Sometimes a student read an essay of his own, or\ninterpreted a passage of a philosopher, in the presence of the professor,\nand the professor afterwards pronounced his opinion upon the correctness\nof the reasoning or the interpretation.[24] The Discourses of Epictetus\nhave a singular interest in this respect, apart from their contents; for\nthey are in great measure notes of such lectures, and form, as it were,\na photograph of a philosopher\u2019s lecture-room.\n\nAgainst this degradation of Philosophy, not only the Cynics, but almost\nall the more serious philosophers protested. Though Epictetus himself was\na professor, and though he followed the current usages of professorial\nteaching, his life and teaching alike were in rebellion against it. \u201cIf\nI study Philosophy,\u201d he says, \u201cwith a view only to its literature, I am\nnot a philosopher, but a _litt\u00e9rateur_; the only difference is, that I\ninterpret Chrysippus instead of Homer.\u201d[25] They sometimes protested not\nonly against the degradation of Philosophy, but also against the whole\nconception of literary education. \u201cThere are two kinds of education,\u201d\nsays Dio Chrysostom,[26] \u201cthe one divine, the other human; the divine is\ngreat and powerful and easy; the human is mean and weak, and has many\ndangers and no small deceitfulness. The mass of people call it education\n(\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd), as being, I suppose, an amusement (\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd), and think\nthat a man who knows most literature\u2014Persian and Greek and Syrian and\nPh\u0153enician\u2014is the wisest and best-educated man; and then, on the other\nhand, when they find a man of this sort to be vicious and cowardly and\nfond of money, they think the education to be as worthless as the man\nhimself. The other kind they call sometimes education, and sometimes\nmanliness and high-mindedness. It was thus that the men of old used to\ncall those who had this good kind of education\u2014men with manly souls, and\neducated as Herakles was\u2014sons of God.\u201d And not less significant as an\nindication not only of the reaction against this kind of education but\nalso of its prevalence, is the deprecation of it by Marcus Aurelius: \u201cI\nowe it to Rusticus,\u201d he says,[27] \u201cthat I formed the idea of the need\nof moral reformation, and that I was not diverted to literary ambition,\nor to write treatises on philosophical subjects, or to make rhetorical\nexhortations ... and that I kept away from rhetoric and poetry and\nfoppery of speech.\u201d\n\nII. I pass from the forms of education to its extent. The general\ndiffusion of it, and the hold which it had upon the mass of men, are\nshown by many kinds of evidence.\n\n1. They are shown by the large amount of literary evidence as to scholars\nand the modes of obtaining education. The exclusiveness of the old\naristocracy had broken down. Education was no longer in the hands of\n\u201cprivate tutors\u201d in the houses of the great families. It entered public\nlife, and in doing so left a record behind it. It may be inferred from\nthe extant evidence that there were grammar-schools in almost every town.\nAt these all youths received the first part of their education. But it\nbecame a common practice for youths to supplement this by attending the\nlectures of an eminent professor elsewhere. They went, as we might say,\nfrom school to a University.[28] The students who so went away from\nhome were drawn from all classes of the community. Some of them were\nvery poor, and, like the \u201cbettelstudenten\u201d of the medi\u00e6val Universities,\nhad sometimes to beg their bread.[29] \u201cYou are a miserable race,\u201d says\nEpictetus[30] to some students of this kind; \u201cwhen you have eaten your\nfill to-day, you sit down whining about to-morrow, where to-morrow\u2019s\ndinner will come from.\u201d Some of them went because it was the fashion.\nThe young sybarites of Rome or Athens complained bitterly that at\nNicopolis, where they had gone to listen to Epictetus, lodgings were bad,\nand the baths were bad, and the gymnasium was bad, and \u201csociety\u201d hardly\nexisted.[31] Then, as now, there were home-sick students, and mothers\nweeping over their absence, and letters that were looked for but never\ncame, and letters that brought bad news; and young men of promise who\nwere expected to return home as living encyclop\u00e6dias, but who only raised\ndoubts when they did return home whether their education had done them\nany good.[32] Then, as now, they went from the lecture-room to athletic\nsports or the theatre; \u201cand the consequence is,\u201d says Epictetus,[33]\n\u201cthat you don\u2019t get out of your old habits or make moral progress.\u201d Then,\nas now, some students went, not for the sake of learning, but in order to\nbe able to show off. Epictetus draws a picture of one who looked forward\nto airing his logic at a city dinner, astonishing the \u201calderman\u201d who sat\nnext to him with the puzzles of hypothetical syllogisms.[34] And then,\nas now, those who had followed the fashion by attending lectures showed\nby their manner that they were there against their will. \u201cYou should sit\nupright,\u201d says Plutarch,[35] in his advice to hearers in general, \u201cnot\nlolling, or whispering, or smiling, or yawning as if you were asleep, or\nfixing your eyes on the ground instead of on the speaker.\u201d In a similar\nway Philo,[36] also speaking of hearers in general, says: \u201cMany persons\nwho come to a lecture do not bring their minds inside with them, but go\nwandering about outside, thinking ten thousand things about ten thousand\ndifferent subjects\u2014family affairs, other people\u2019s affairs, private\naffairs, ... and the professor talks to an audience, as it were, not of\nmen but of statues, which have ears but hear not.\u201d\n\n2. A second indication of the hold which education had upon the age\nis the fact that teaching had come to be a recognized and lucrative\nprofession. This is shown not so much by the instances of individual\nteachers,[37] who might be regarded as exceptional, as by the fact of\nthe recognition of teachers by the State and by municipalities.\n\nThe recognition by the State took the double form of endowment and of\nimmunities from public burdens.\n\n(_a_) Endowments probably began with Vespasian, who endowed teachers\nof Rhetoric at Rome with an annual grant of 100,000 sesterces from the\nimperial treasury. Hadrian founded an Athen\u00e6um or University at Rome,\nlike the Museum or University at Alexandria, with an adequate income,\nand with a building of sufficient importance to be sometimes used as a\nSenate-house. He also gave large sums to the professors at Athens: in\nthis he was followed by Antoninus Pius: but the first permanent endowment\nat Athens seems to have been that of Marcus Aurelius, who founded two\nchairs in each of the four great philosophical schools of Athens, the\nAcademic, the Peripatetic, the Epicurean, and the Stoic, and added\none of the new or literary Rhetoric, and one of the old or forensic\nRhetoric.[38]\n\n(_b_) The immunities of the teaching classes began with Julius C\u00e6sar,\nand appear to have been so amply recognized in the early empire that\nAntoninus Pius placed them upon a footing which at once established and\nlimited them. He enacted that small cities might place upon the free list\nfive physicians, three teachers of rhetoric, and three of literature;\nthat assize towns might so place seven physicians, three teachers of\nrhetoric, and three of literature; and that metropolitan cities might so\nplace ten physicians, five teachers of rhetoric, and five of literature;\nbut that these numbers should not be exceeded. These immunities were a\nform of indirect endowment.[39] They exempted those whom they affected\nfrom all the burdens which tended in the later empire to impoverish the\nmiddle and upper classes. They were consequently equivalent to the gift\nfrom the municipality of a considerable annual income.\n\n3. A third indication of the hold of education upon contemporary society\nis the place which its professors held in social intercourse. They were\nnot only a recognized class; they also mingled largely, by virtue of\ntheir profession, with ordinary life. If a dinner of any pretensions\nwere given, the professor of Belles Lettres must be there to recite\nand expound passages of poetry, the professor of Rhetoric to speak\nupon any theme which might be proposed to him, and the professor of\nPhilosophy to read a discourse upon morals. A \u201csermonette\u201d from one of\nthese professional philosophers after dinner was as much in fashion\nas a piece of vocal or instrumental music is with us.[40] All three\nkinds of professors were sometimes part of the permanent retinue of a\ngreat household. But the philosophers were even more in fashion than\ntheir brother professors. They were petted by great ladies. They became\n\u201cdomestic chaplains.\u201d[41] They were sometimes, indeed, singularly like\nthe chaplains of whom we read in novels of the last century. Lucian, in\nhis essay \u201cOn Persons who give their Society for Pay,\u201d has some amusing\nvignettes of their life. One is of a philosopher who has to accompany\nhis patroness on a tour: he is put into a waggon with the cook and the\nlady\u2019s-maid, and there is but a scanty allowance of leaves thrown in\nto ease his limbs against the jolting.[42] Another is of a philosopher\nwho is summoned by his lady and complimented, and asked as an especial\nfavour, \u201cYou are so very kind and careful: will you take my lapdog\ninto the waggon with you, and see that the poor creature does not want\nfor anything?\u201d[43] Another is of a philosopher who has to discourse on\ntemperance while his lady is having her hair braided: her maid comes in\nwith a _billet-doux_, and the discourse on temperance is suspended until\nshe has written an answer to her lover.[44] Another is of a philosopher\nwho only gets his pay in doles of two or three pence at a time, and\nis thought a bore if he asks for it, and whose tailor or shoemaker is\nmeanwhile waiting to be paid, so that even when the money comes it seems\nto do him no good.[45] It is natural to find that Philosophy, which had\nthus become a profession, had also become degenerate. It afforded an easy\nmeans of livelihood. It was natural that some of those who adopted it\nshould be a disgrace to their profession. And although it would be unsafe\nto take every description of the great satirist literally, yet it is\ndifficult to believe that there is not a substantial foundation of truth\nin his frequent caricatures. The fact of their frequency, and also the\nfact that such men as he describes could exist, strengthen the inference\nwhich other facts enable us to draw, as to the large place which the\nprofessional philosophers occupied in contemporary society. The following\nis his picture of Thrasycles:[46]\n\n    \u201cHe comes along with his beard spread out and his eyebrows\n    raised, talking solemnly to himself, with a Titan-like look in\n    his eyes, with his hair thrown back from his forehead, the very\n    picture of Boreas or Triton, as Zeuxis painted them. This is\n    the man who in the morning dresses himself simply, and walks\n    sedately, and wears a sober gown, and preaches long sermons\n    about virtue, and inveighs against the votaries of pleasure:\n    then he has his bath and goes to dinner, and the butler offers\n    him a large goblet of wine, and he drinks it down with as much\n    gusto as if it were the water of Lethe: and he behaves in\n    exactly the opposite way to his sermons of the morning, for he\n    snatches all the tit-bits like a hawk, and elbows his neighbour\n    out of the way, and he peers into the dishes with as keen an\n    eye as if he were likely to find Virtue herself in them; and he\n    goes on preaching all the time about temperance and moderation,\n    until he is so dead-drunk that the servants have to carry him\n    out. Nay, besides this, there is not a man to beat him in the\n    way of lying and braggadocio and avarice: he is the first of\n    flatterers and the readiest of perjurers: chicanery leads the\n    way, and impudence follows after: in fact, he is clever all\n    round, doing to perfection whatever he touches.\u201d\n\n4. But nothing could more conclusively prove the great hold which these\nforms of education had upon their time than the fact of their persistent\nsurvival. It might be maintained that the prominence which is given to\nthem in literature, their endowment by the State, and their social\ninfluence, represented only a superficial and passing phase. But when\nthe product of one generation spreads its branches far and wide into\nthe generations that succeed, its roots must be deep and firm in the\ngeneration from which it springs. No lasting element of civilization\ngrows upon the surface. Greek education has been almost as permanent as\nChristianity itself, and for similar reasons. It passed from Greece into\nAfrica and the West. It had an especial hold first on the Roman and then\nupon the Celtic and Teutonic populations of Gaul; and from the Gallican\nschools it has come, probably by direct descent, to our own country and\nour own time.\n\nTwo things especially have come:\n\n(i.) The place which literature holds in general education. We educate\nour sons in grammar, and in doing so we feed them upon ancient rather\nthan upon English literature, by simple continuation of the first branch\nof the medi\u00e6val _trivium_, which was itself a continuation of the Greek\nhabit which has been described above.\n\n(ii.) The other point, though less important in itself, is even more\nimportant as indicating the strength of the Greek educational system. It\nis that we retain still its technical terms and many of its scholastic\nusages, either in their original Greek form or as translated into Latin\nand modified by Latin habits, in the schools of the West.\n\nThe designation \u201cprofessor\u201d comes to us from the Greek sophists, who drew\ntheir pupils by promises: to \u201cprofess\u201d was to \u201cpromise,\u201d and to promise\nwas the characteristic of the class of teachers with whom in the fourth\ncentury B.C. Greek education began. The title lost its original force,\nand became the general designation of a public teacher, superseding the\nspecial titles, \u201cphilosopher,\u201d \u201csophist,\u201d \u201crhetorician,\u201d \u201cgrammarian,\u201d\nand ending by being the synonym of \u201cdoctor.\u201d[47]\n\nThe practice of lecturing, that is of giving instruction by reading\nan ancient author, with longer or shorter comments upon his meaning,\ncomes to us from the schools in which a passage of Homer or Plato or\nChrysippus was read and explained. The \u201clecture\u201d was probably in the\nfirst instance a student\u2019s exercise: the function of the teacher was to\nmake remarks or to give his judgment upon the explanation that was given:\nit was not so much _legere_ as _pr\u00e6legere_, whence the existing title of\n\u201cpr\u00e6lector.\u201d[48]\n\nThe use of the word \u201cchair\u201d to designate the teacher\u2019s office, and of the\nword \u201cfaculty\u201d to denote the branch of knowledge which he teaches, are\nsimilar survivals of Greek terms.[49]\n\nThe use of academical designations as titles is also Greek: it was\nwritten upon a man\u2019s tombstone that he was \u201cphilosopher\u201d or \u201csophist,\u201d\n\u201cgrammarian\u201d or \u201crhetorician,\u201d as in later times he would be designated\nM.A. or D.D.[50] The most interesting of these designations is that of\n\u201csophist.\u201d The long academical history of the word only ceased at Oxford\na few years ago, when the clauses relating to \u201csophist\u00e6 generales\u201d were\nerased as obsolete from the statute-book.\n\nThe restriction of the right to teach, and the mode of testing a man\u2019s\nqualifications to teach, have come to us from the same source. The former\nis probably a result of the fact which has been mentioned above, that\nthe teachers of liberal arts were privileged and endowed. The State\nguarded against the abuse of the privilege, as in subsequent times for\nsimilar reasons it put limitations upon the appointment of the Christian\nclergy. In the case of some of the professors at Athens who were endowed\nfrom the imperial chest, the Emperors seem to have exercised a certain\nright of nomination, as in our own country the Crown nominates a \u201cRegius\nProfessor;\u201d[51] but in the case of others of those professors, the\nnomination was in the hands of \u201cthe best and oldest and wisest in the\ncity,\u201d that is, either the Areopagus, or the City Council, or, as some\nhave thought, a special Board.[52] Elsewhere, and apparently without\nexception in later times, the right of approval of a teacher was in the\nhands of the City Council, the ordinary body for the administration of\nmunicipal affairs.[53] The authority which conferred the right might also\ntake it away: a teacher who proved incompetent might have his licence\nwithdrawn.[54] The testing of qualifications preceded the admission to\noffice. It was sometimes superseded by a sort of _cong\u00e9 d\u2019\u00e9lire_ from the\nEmperor;[55] but in ordinary cases it consisted in the candidate\u2019s giving\na lecture or taking part in a discussion before either the Emperor\u2019s\nrepresentative or the City Council.[56] It was the small beginning of\nthat system of \u201cexamination\u201d which in our own country and time has grown\nto enormous proportions. The successful candidate was sometimes escorted\nto his house, as a mark of honour, by the proconsul and the \u201cexaminers,\u201d\njust as in Oxford, until the present generation, a \u201cgrand compounder\u201d\nmight claim to be escorted home by the Vice-chancellor and Proctors.[57]\nIn the fourth century appear to have come restrictions not only upon\nteaching, but also upon studying: a student might probably go to a\nlecture, but he might not formally announce his devotion to learning by\nputting on the student\u2019s gown without the leave of the professors, as in\na modern University a student must be formally enrolled before he can\nassume the academical dress.[58]\n\nThe survival of these terms and usages, as indicating the strength\nof the system to which they originally belonged, is emphasized by the\nfact that for a long interval of time there are few, if any, traces of\nthem.[59] They are found in full force in Gaul in the fifth and sixth\ncenturies: they are found again when education began to revive on a large\nscale in the tenth century; they then appear, not as new creations, but\nas terms and usages which had lasted all through what has been called\n\u201cthe Benedictine era,\u201d[60] without special nurture and without literary\nexpression, by the sheer persistency of their original roots.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis is the feature of the Greek life into which Christianity came to\nwhich I first invite your attention. There was a complex system of\neducation, the main elements in which were the knowledge of literature,\nthe cultivation of literary expression, and a general acquaintance with\nthe rules of argument. This education was widely diffused, and had a\ngreat hold upon society. It had been at work in its main outlines for\nseveral centuries. Its effect in the second century of our era had been\nto create a certain habit of mind. When Christianity came into contact\nwith the society in which that habit of mind existed, it modified, it\nreformed, it elevated, the ideas which it contained and the motives\nwhich stimulated it to action; but in its turn it was itself profoundly\nmodified by the habit of mind of those who accepted it. It was impossible\nfor Greeks, educated as they were with an education which penetrated\ntheir whole nature, to receive or to retain Christianity in its primitive\nsimplicity. Their own life had become complex and artificial: it had\nits fixed ideas and its permanent categories: it necessarily gave to\nChristianity something of its own form. The world of the time was a\nworld, I will not say like our own world, which has already burst its\nbonds, but like the world from which we are beginning to be emancipated\u2014a\nworld which had created an artificial type of life, and which was\ntoo artificial to be able to recognize its own artificiality\u2014a world\nwhose schools, instead of being the laboratories of the knowledge\nof the future, were forges in which the chains of the present were\nfashioned from the knowledge of the past. And if, on the one hand, it\nincorporated Christianity with the larger humanity from which it had at\nfirst been isolated, yet, on the other hand, by crushing uncultivated\nearnestness, and by laying more stress on the expression of ideas than\nupon ideas themselves, it tended to stem the very forces which had given\nChristianity its place, and to change the rushing torrent of the river of\nGod into a broad but feeble stream.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE III.\n\nGREEK AND CHRISTIAN EXEGESIS.\n\n\nTwo thousand years ago, the Greek world was nearer than we are now to\nthe first wonder of the invention of writing. The mystery of it still\nseemed divine. The fact that certain signs, of little or no meaning in\nthemselves, could communicate what a man felt or thought, not only to\nthe generation of his fellows, but also to the generations that came\nafterwards, threw a kind of glamour over written words. It gave them\nan importance and an impressiveness which did not attach to any spoken\nwords. They came in time to have, as it were, an existence of their own.\nTheir precise relation to the person who first uttered them, and their\nliteral meaning at the time of their utterance, tended to be overlooked\nor obscured.\n\nIn the case of the ancient poets, especially Homer, this glamour of\nwritten words was accompanied, and perhaps had been preceded, by two\nother feelings.\n\nThe one was the reverence for antiquity. The voice of the past sounded\nwith a fuller note than that of the present. It came from the age of the\nheroes who had become divinities. It expressed the national legends and\nthe current mythology, the primitive types of noble life and the simple\nmaxims of awakening reflection, the \u201cwisdom of the ancients,\u201d which has\nsometimes itself taken the place of religion. The other was the belief\nin inspiration. With the glamour of writing was blended the glamour of\nrhythm and melody. When the gods spoke, they spoke in verse.[61] The\npoets sang under the impulse of a divine enthusiasm. It was a god who\ngave the words: the poet was but the interpreter.[62] The belief was not\nmerely popular, but was found in the best minds of the imperial age.\n\u201cWhatever wise and true words were spoken in the world about God and the\nuniverse, came into the souls of men not without the Divine will and\nintervention through the agency of divine and prophetic men.\u201d[63] \u201cTo\nthe poets sometimes, I mean the very ancient poets, there came a brief\nutterance from the Muses, a kind of inspiration of the divine nature and\ntruth, like a flash of light from an unseen fire.\u201d[64]\n\nThe combination of these three feelings, the mystery of writing, the\nreverence for antiquity, the belief in inspiration, tended to give the\nwritings of the ancient poets a unique value. It lifted them above\nthe common limitations of place and time and circumstance. The verses\nof Homer were not simply the utterances of a particular person with a\nparticular meaning for a particular time. They had a universal validity.\nThey were the voice of an undying wisdom. They were the Bible of the\nGreek races.[65]\n\nWhen the unconscious imitation of heroic ideals passed into a conscious\nphilosophy of life, it was necessary that that philosophy should be\nshown to be consonant with current beliefs, by being formulated, so to\nspeak, in terms of the current standards; and when, soon afterwards, the\nconception of education, in the sense in which the term has ever since\nbeen understood, arose, it was inevitable that the ancient poets should\nbe the basis of that education. Literature consisted, in effect, of the\nancient poets. Literary education necessarily meant the understanding of\nthem. \u201cI consider,\u201d says Protagoras, in the Platonic dialogue which bears\nhis name,[66] \u201cthat the chief part of a man\u2019s education is to be skilled\nin epic poetry; and this means that he should be able to understand what\nthe poets have said, and whether they have said it rightly or not, and\nto know how to draw distinctions, and to give an answer when a question\nis put to him.\u201d The educators recognized in Homer one of themselves: he,\ntoo, was a \u201csophist,\u201d and had aimed at educating men.[67] Homer was the\ncommon text-book of the grammar-schools as long as Greek continued to\nbe taught, far on into imperial times. The study of him branched out in\nmore than one direction. It was the beginning of that study of literature\nfor its own sake which still holds its ground. It was continued until\nfar on in the Christian era, partly by the schools of textual critics,\nand partly by the successors of the first sophists, who sharpened their\nwits by disputations as to Homer\u2019s meaning, posing difficulties and\nsolving them: of these disputations some relics survive in the _Scholia_,\nespecially such as are based upon the _Questions_ of Porphyry.[68]\nBut in the first conception, literary and moral education had been\ninseparable. It was impossible to regard Homer simply as literature.\nLiterary education was not an end in itself, but a means. The end was\nmoral training. It was imagined that virtue, no less than literature,\ncould be taught, and Homer was the basis of the one kind of education\nno less than of the other. Nor was it difficult for him to become so.\nFor though the thoughts of men had changed, and the new education was\nbringing in new conceptions of morals, Homer was a force which could\neasily be turned in new directions. All imaginative literature is plastic\nwhen it is used to enforce a moral; and the sophists could easily preach\nsermons of their own upon Homeric texts. There was no fixed traditional\ninterpretation; and they were but following a current fashion in drawing\ntheir own meanings from him. He thus became a support, and not a rival.\nThe _Hippias Minor_ of Plato furnishes as pertinent instances as could be\nmentioned of this educational use of Homer.\n\nThe method lasted as long as Greek literature. It is found in full\noperation in the first centuries of our era. It was explicitly\nrecognized, and most of the prominent writers of the time supply\ninstances of its application. \u201cIn the childhood of the world,\u201d says\nStrabo,[69] \u201cmen, like children, had to be taught by tales;\u201d and Homer\ntold tales with a moral purpose. \u201cIt has been contended,\u201d he says\nagain,[70] \u201cthat poetry was meant only to please:\u201d on the contrary, the\nancients looked upon poetry as a form of philosophy, introducing us early\nto the facts of life, and teaching us in a pleasant way the characters\nand feelings and actions of men. It was from Homer that moralists drew\ntheir ideals: it was his verses that were quoted, like verses of the\nBible with us, to enforce moral truths. There is in Dio Chrysostom[71] a\ncharming \u201cimaginary conversation\u201d between Philip and Alexander. \u201cHow is\nit,\u201d said the father, \u201cthat Homer is the only poet you care for: there\nare others who ought not to be neglected?\u201d \u201cBecause,\u201d said the son, \u201cit\nis not every kind of poetry, just as it is not every kind of dress, that\nis fitting for a king; and the poetry of Homer is the only poetry that I\nsee to be truly noble and splendid and regal, and fit for one who will\nsome day rule over men.\u201d And Dio himself reads into Homer many a moral\nmeaning. When, for example,[72] the poet speaks of the son of Kronos\nhaving given the staff and rights of a chief that he might take counsel\nfor the people, he meant to imply that not all kings, but only those who\nhave a special gift of God, had that staff and those rights, and that\nthey had them, moreover, not for their own gratification, but for the\ngeneral good; he meant, in fact, that no bad man can be a true master\neither of himself or of others\u2014no, not if all the Greeks and all the\nbarbarians join in calling him king.\n\nIt was not only the developing forms of ethics that were thus made to\nfind a support in Homer, but all the varying theories of physics and\nmetaphysics, one by one. The Heracliteans held, for example, that when\nHomer spoke of\n\n    \u201cOcean, the birth of gods, and Tethys their mother,\u201d\n\nhe meant to say that all things are the offspring of flow and\nmovement.[73] The Platonists held that when Zeus reminded Hera of the\ntime when he had hung her trembling by a golden chain in the vast concave\nof heaven, it was God speaking to matter which he had taken and bound by\nthe chains of laws.[74] The Stoics read into the poets so much Stoicism,\nthat Cicero says, in good-humoured banter, that you would think the old\npoets, who had really no suspicion of such things, to have been Stoical\nphilosophers.[75] Sometimes Homer was treated as a kind of encyclop\u00e6dia.\nXenophon, in his _Banquet_,[76] makes one of the speakers, who could\nrepeat Homer by heart, say that \u201cthe wisest of mankind had written about\nalmost all human things;\u201d and there is a treatise by an unknown author of\nimperial times which endeavours to show in detail that he contains the\nbeginning of every one of the later sciences, historical, philosophical,\nand political.[77] When he calls men deep-voiced and women high-voiced,\nhe shows his knowledge of the distinctions of music. When he gives to\neach character its appropriate style of speech, he shows his knowledge\nof rhetoric. He is the father of political science, in having given\nexamples of each of the three forms of government\u2014monarchy, aristocracy,\ndemocracy. He is the father of military science, in the information which\nhe gives about tactics and siege-works. He knew and taught astronomy and\nmedicine, gymnastics and surgery; \u201cnor would a man be wrong if he were to\nsay that he was a teacher of painting also.\u201d\n\nThis indifference to the actual meaning of a writer, and the habit\nof reading him by the light of the reader\u2019s own fancies, have a\ncertain analogy in our own day in the feeling with which we sometimes\nregard other works of art. We stand before some great masterpiece of\npainting\u2014the St. Cecilia or the Sistine Madonna\u2014and are, as it were,\ncarried off our feet by the wonder of it. We must be cold critics if\nwe simply ask ourselves what Raffaelle meant by it. We interpret it\nby our own emotions. The picture speaks to us with a personal and\nindividual voice. It links itself with a thousand memories of the past\nand a thousand dreams of the future. It translates us into another\nworld\u2014the world of a lost and impossible love, the dreamland of achieved\naspirations, the tender and half-tearful heaven of forgiven sins: we\nare ready to believe, if only for a moment, that Raffaelle meant by it\nall that it means to us; and for what he did actually mean, we have but\nlittle care.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBut these tendencies to draw a moral from all that Homer wrote, and to\nread philosophy into it, though common and permanent, were not universal.\nThere was an instinct in the Greek mind, as there is in modern times,\nwhich rebelled against them. There were literalists who insisted that\nthe words should be taken as they stood, and that some of the words as\nthey stood were clearly immoral.[78] There were, on the other hand,\napologists who said sometimes that Homer reflected faithfully the\nchequered lights and shadows of human life, and sometimes that the\nexistence of immorality in Homer must clearly be allowed, but that if\na balance were struck between the good and the evil, the good would\nbe found largely to predominate.[79] There were other apologists who\nmade a distinction between the divine and the human elements: the poets\nsometimes spoke, it was said, on their own account: some of their poetry\nwas inspired, and some was not: the Muses sometimes left them: \u201cand they\nmay very properly be forgiven if, being men, they made mistakes when the\ndivinity which spoke through their mouths had gone away from them.\u201d[80]\n\nBut all these apologies were insufficient. The chasm between the older\nreligion which was embodied in the poets, and the new ideas which were\nmarching in steady progress away from the Homeric world, was widening\nday by day. A reconciliation had to be found which had deeper roots. It\nwas found in a process of interpretation whose strength must be measured\nby its permanence. The process was based upon a natural tendency. The\nunseen working of the will which lies behind all voluntary actions, and\nthe unseen working of thought which by an instinctive process causes some\nof those actions to be symbolical, led men in comparatively early times\nto find a meaning beneath the surface of a record or representation of\nactions. A narrative of actions, no less than the actions themselves,\nmight be symbolical. It might contain a hidden meaning. Men who retained\ntheir reverence for Homer, or who at least were not prepared to break\nwith the current belief in him, began to search for such meanings.\nThey were assisted in doing so by the concomitant development of the\n\u201cmysteries.\u201d The mysteries were representations of passages in the\nhistory of the gods which, whatever their origin, had become symbolical.\nIt is possible that no words of explanation were spoken in them; but they\nwere, notwithstanding, habituating the Greek mind both to symbolical\nexpression in general, and to the finding of physical or religious\nor moral truths in the representation of fantastic or even immoral\nactions.[81]\n\nIt is uncertain when this method of interpretation began to be applied\nto ancient literature. It was part of the general intellectual movement\nof the fifth century B.C. It is found in one of its forms in Hecat\u00e6us,\nwho explained the story of Cerberus by the existence of a poisonous snake\nin a cavern on the headland of T\u00e6naron.[82] It was elaborated by the\nsophists. It was deprecated by Plato. \u201cIf I disbelieved it,\u201d he makes\nSocrates say,[83] in reference to the story of Boreas and Oreithyia, \u201cas\nthe philosophers do, I should not be unreasonable: then I might say,\ntalking like a philosopher, that Oreithyia was a girl who was caught by\na strong wind and carried off while playing on the cliffs yonder; ...\nbut it would take a long and laborious and not very happy lifetime to\ndeal with all such questions: and for my own part I cannot investigate\nthem until, as the Delphian precept bids me, I first Know myself.\u201d Nor\nwill he admit allegorical interpretation as a sufficient vindication of\nHomer:[84] \u201cThe chaining of Hera, and the flinging forth of Heph\u00e6stus\nby his father, and all the fightings of gods which Homer has described,\nwe shall not admit into our state, whether with allegories or without\nthem.\u201d But the direct line of historical tradition of the method seems\nto begin with Anaxagoras and his school.[85] In Anaxagoras himself the\nallegory was probably ethical: he found in Homer a symbolical account of\nthe movements of mental powers and moral virtues: Zeus was mind, Athen\u00e9\nwas art. But the method which, though it is found in germ among earlier\nor contemporary writers, seems to have been first formulated by his\ndisciple Metrodorus, was not ethical but physical.[86] By a remarkable\nanticipation of a modern science, possibly by a survival of memories of\nan earlier religion, the Homeric stories were treated as a symbolical\nrepresentation of physical phenomena. The gods were the powers of nature:\ntheir gatherings, their movements, their loves, and their battles, were\nthe play and interaction and apparent strife of natural forces. The\nmethod had for many centuries an enormous hold upon the Greek mind; it\nlay beneath the whole theology of the Stoical schools; it was largely\ncurrent among the scholars and critics of the early empire.[87]\n\nIts most detailed exposition is contained in two writers, of both of whom\nso little is personally known that there is a division of opinion whether\nthe name of the one was Heraclitus or Heraclides,[88] and of the other\nCornutus or Phornutus;[89] but both were Stoics, both are most probably\nassigned to the early part of the first century of our era, and in both\nof them the physical is blended with an ethical interpretation.\n\n1. Heraclitus begins by the definite avowal of his apologetic purpose.\nHis work is a vindication of Homer from the charge of impiety. \u201cHe would\nunquestionably be impious if he were not allegorical;\u201d[90] but as it is,\n\u201cthere is no stain of unholy fables in his words: they are pure and free\nfrom impiety.\u201d[91] Apollo is the sun; the \u201cfar-darter\u201d is the sun sending\nforth his rays: when it is said that Apollo slew men with his arrows,\nit is meant that there was a pestilence in the heat of summer-time.[92]\nAthen\u00e9 is thought: when it is said that Athen\u00e9 came to Telemachus, it\nis meant only that the young man then first began to reflect upon the\nwaste and profligacy of the suitors: a thought, shaped like a wise old\nman, came, as it were, and sat by his side.[93] The story of Proteus\nand Eidothea is an allegory of the original formless matter taking many\nshapes:[94] the story of Ares and Aphrodite and Heph\u00e6stus is a picture of\niron subdued by fire, and restored to its original hardness by Poseidon,\nthat is by water.[95]\n\n2. Cornutus writes in vindication not so much of the piety of the\nancients as of their knowledge: they knew as much as men of later times,\nbut they expressed it at greater length and by means of symbols. He rests\nhis interpretation of those symbols to a large extent upon etymology.\nThe science of religion was to him, as it has been to some persons in\nmodern days, an extension of the science of philology. The following\nare examples: Hermes (from \u1f10\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u201cto speak\u201d) is the power of speech\nwhich the gods sent from heaven as their peculiar and distinguishing\ngift to men. He is called the \u201cconductor,\u201d because speech conducts one\nman\u2019s thought into his neighbour\u2019s soul. He is the \u201cbright-shiner,\u201d\nbecause speech makes dark things clear. His winged feet are the symbols\nof \u201cwinged words.\u201d He is the \u201cleader of souls,\u201d because words soothe\nthe soul to rest; and the \u201cawakener from sleep,\u201d because words rouse\nmen to action. The serpents twined round his staff are a symbol of the\nsavage natures that are calmed by words, and their discords gathered into\nharmony.[96] The story of Prometheus (\u201cforethought\u201d), who made a man from\nclay, is an allegory of the providence and forethought of the universe:\nhe is said to have stolen fire, because it was the forethought of men\nfound out its use: he is said to have stolen it from heaven, because\nit came down in a lightning-flash: and his being chained to a rock is\na picture of the quick inventiveness of human thought chained to the\npainful necessities of physical life, its liver gnawed at unceasingly by\npetty cares.[97]\n\nTwo other examples of the method may be given from later writers, to show\nthe variety of its application.\n\nThe one is from Sallust, a writer of the fourth century of our era. He\nthus explains the story of the judgment of Paris. The banquet of the gods\nis a picture of the vast supra-mundane Powers, who are always in each\nother\u2019s society. The apple is the world, which is thrown from the banquet\nby Discord, because the world itself is the play of opposing forces; and\ndifferent qualities are given to the world by different Powers, each\ntrying to win the world for itself; and Paris is the soul in its sensuous\nlife, which sees not the other Powers in the world, but only Beauty, and\nsays that the world is the property of Love.[98]\n\nThe other is from a writer of a late but uncertain age. He deals only\nwith the Odyssey. Its hero is the picture of a man who is tossed upon\nthe sea of life, drifted this way and that by adverse winds of fortune\nand of passion: the companions who were lost among the Lotophagi are\npictures of men who are caught by the baits of pleasure and do not return\nto reason as their guide: the Sirens are the pleasures that tempt and\nallure all men who pass over the sea of life, and against which the only\ncounter-charm is to fill one\u2019s senses and powers of mind full of divine\nwords and actions, as Odysseus filled his ears with wax, that, no part of\nthem being left empty, pleasure may knock at their doors in vain.[99]\n\nThe method survived as a literary habit long after its original purpose\nfailed. The mythology which it had been designed to vindicate passed from\nthe sphere of religion into that of literature; but in so passing, it\ntook with it the method to which it had given rise. The habit of trying\nto find an _arri\u00e8re pens\u00e9e_ beneath a man\u2019s actual words had become so\ninveterate, that all great writers without distinction were treated as\nwriters of riddles. The literary class insisted that their functions were\nneeded as interpreters, and that a plain man could not know what a great\nwriter meant. \u201cThe use of symbolical speech,\u201d said Didymus, the great\ngrammarian of the Augustan age, \u201cis characteristic of the wise man, and\nthe explanation of its meaning.\u201d[100] Even Thucydides is said by his\nbiographer to have purposely made his style obscure that he might not be\naccessible except to the truly wise.[101] It tended to become a fixed\nidea in the minds of many men that religious truth especially must be\nwrapped up in symbol, and that symbol must contain religious truth. The\nidea has so far descended to the present day, that there are, even now,\npersons who think that a truth which is obscurely stated is more worthy\nof respect, and more likely to be divine, than a truth which \u201che that\nruns may read.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe same kind of difficulty which had been felt on a large scale in the\nGreek world in regard to Homer, was felt in no less a degree by those\nJews who had become students of Greek philosophy in regard to their\nown sacred books. The Pentateuch, in a higher sense than Homer, was\nregarded as having been written under the inspiration of God. It, no\nless than Homer, was so inwrought into the minds of men that it could\nnot be set aside. It, no less than Homer, contained some things which,\nat least on the surface, seemed inconsistent with morality. To it, no\nless than to Homer, was applicable the theory that the words were the\nveils of a hidden meaning. The application fulfilled a double purpose: it\nenabled educated Jews, on the one hand, to reconcile their own adoption\nof Greek philosophy with their continued adhesion to their ancestral\nreligion, and, on the other hand, to show to the educated Greeks with\nwhom they associated, and whom they frequently tried to convert, that\ntheir literature was neither barbarous, nor unmeaning, nor immoral. It\nmay be conjectured that, just as in Greece proper the adoption of the\nallegorical method had been helped by the existence of the mysteries, so\nin Egypt it was helped by the large use in earlier times of hieroglyphic\nwriting, the monuments of which were all around them, though the writing\nitself had ceased.[102]\n\nThe earliest Jewish writer of this school of whom any remains have come\ndown to us, is reputed to be Aristobulus (about B.C. 170-150).[103] In\nan exposition of the Pentateuch which he is said to have addressed\nto Ptolemy Philometor, he boldly claimed that, so far from the Mosaic\nwritings being outside the sphere of philosophy, the Greek philosophers\nhad taken their philosophy from them. \u201cMoses,\u201d he said, \u201cusing the\nfigures of visible things, tells us the arrangements of nature and the\nconstitutions of important matters.\u201d The anthropomorphisms of the Old\nTestament were explained on this principle. The \u201chand\u201d of God, for\nexample, meant His power, His \u201cfeet,\u201d the stability of the world.\n\nBut by far the most considerable monument of this mode of interpretation\nconsists of the works of Philo. They are based throughout on the\nsupposition of a hidden meaning. But they carry us into a new world. The\nhidden meaning is not physical, but metaphysical and spiritual. The seen\nis the veil of the unseen, a robe thrown over it which marks its contour,\n\u201cand half conceals and half reveals the form within.\u201d\n\nIt would be easy to interest you, perhaps even to amuse you, by quoting\nsome of the strange meanings which Philo gives to the narratives of\nfamiliar incidents. But I deprecate the injustice which has sometimes\nbeen done to him by taking such meanings apart from the historical\ncircumstances out of which allegorical interpretation grew, and\nthe purpose which it was designed to serve. I will give only one\npassage, which I have chosen because it shows as well as any other the\ncontemporary existence of both the methods of interpretation of which\nI have spoken\u2014that of finding a moral in every narrative, and that of\ninterpreting the narrative symbolically: the former of these Philo calls\nthe literal, the latter the deeper meaning. The text is Gen. xxviii. 11,\n\u201cHe took the stones of that place and put them beneath his head;\u201d the\ncommentary is:[104]\n\n    \u201cThe words are wonderful, not only because of their allegorical\n    and physical meaning, but also because of their literal\n    teaching of trouble and endurance. The writer does not think\n    that a student of virtue should have a delicate and luxurious\n    life, imitating those who are called fortunate, but who are in\n    reality full of misfortunes, eager anxieties and rivalries,\n    whose whole life the Divine Lawgiver describes as a sleep\n    and a dream. These are men who, after spending their days in\n    doing injuries to others, return to their homes and upset\n    them\u2014I mean, not the houses they live in, but the body which\n    is the home of the soul\u2014by immoderate eating and drinking,\n    and at night lie down in soft and costly beds. Such men are\n    not the disciples of the sacred word. Its disciples are real\n    men, lovers of temperance and sobriety and modesty, who make\n    self-restraint and contentment and endurance the corner-stones,\n    as it were, of their lives: who rise superior to money and\n    pleasure and fame: who are ready, for the sake of acquiring\n    virtue, to endure hunger and thirst, heat and cold: whose\n    costly couch is a soft turf, whose bedding is grass and leaves,\n    whose pillow is a heap of stones or a hillock rising a little\n    above the ground. Of such men, Jacob is an example: he put a\n    stone for his pillow: a little while afterwards (v. 20), we\n    find him asking only for nature\u2019s wealth of food and raiment:\n    he is the archetype of a soul that disciplines itself, one who\n    is at war with every kind of effeminacy.\n\n    \u201cBut the passage has a further meaning, which is conveyed in\n    symbol. You must know that the divine place and the holy\n    ground is full of incorporeal Intelligences, who are immortal\n    souls. It is one of these that Jacob takes and puts close\n    to his mind, which is, as it were, the head of the combined\n    person, body and soul. He does so under the pretext of going to\n    sleep, but in reality to find repose in the Intelligence which\n    he has chosen, and to place all the burden of his life upon it.\u201d\n\nIn all this, Philo was following not a Hebrew but a Greek method.\nHe expressly speaks of it as the method of the Greek mysteries. He\naddresses his hearers by the name which was given to those who were being\ninitiated. He bids them be purified before they listen. And in this way\nit was possible for him to be a Greek philosopher without ceasing to be a\nJew.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe earliest methods of Christian exegesis were continuations of the\nmethods which were common at the time to both Greek and Gr\u00e6co-Jud\u00e6an\nwriters. They were employed on the same subject-matter. Just as the\nGreek philosophers had found their philosophy in Homer, so Christian\nwriters found in him Christian theology. When he represents Odysseus as\nsaying,[105] \u201cThe rule of many is not good: let there be one ruler,\u201d he\nmeans to indicate that there should be but one God; and his whole poem\nis designed to show the mischief that comes of having many gods.[106]\nWhen he tells us that Heph\u00e6stus represented on the shield of Achilles\n\u201cthe earth, the heaven, the sea, the sun that rests not, and the moon\nfull-orbed,\u201d[107] he is teaching us the divine order of creation\nwhich he learned in Egypt from the books of Moses.[108] So Clement of\nAlexandria interprets the withdrawal of Oceanus and Tethys from each\nother to mean the separation of land and sea;[109] and he holds that\nHomer, when he makes Apollo ask Achilles, \u201cWhy fruitlessly pursue him, a\ngod,\u201d meant to show that the divinity cannot be apprehended by the bodily\npowers.[110] Some of the philosophical schools which hung upon the skirts\nof Christianity mingled such interpretations of Greek mythology with\nsimilar interpretations of the Old Testament. For example, the writer\nto whom the name Simon Magus is given, is said to have \u201cinterpreted in\nwhatever way he wished both the writings of Moses and also those of the\n(Greek) poets;\u201d[111] and the Ophite writer, Justin, evolves an elaborate\ncosmogony from a story of Herakles narrated in Herodotus,[112] combined\nwith the story of the garden of Eden.[113] But the main application was\nto the Old Testament exclusively. The reasons given for believing that\nthe Old Testament had an allegorical meaning were precisely analogous\nto those which had been given in respect to Homer. There were many\nthings in the Old Testament which jarred upon the nascent Christian\nconsciousness. \u201cFar be it from us to believe,\u201d says the writer of the\nClementine Homilies,[114] \u201cthat the Master of the universe, the Maker of\nheaven and earth, \u2018tempts\u2019 men as though He did not know\u2014for who then\ndoes foreknow? and if He \u2018repents,\u2019 who is perfect in thought and firm\nin judgment? and if He \u2018hardens\u2019 men\u2019s hearts, who makes them wise?\nand if He \u2018blinds\u2019 them, who makes them to see? and if He desires \u2018a\nfruitful hill,\u2019 whose then are all things? and if He wants the savour of\nsacrifices, who is it that needeth nothing? and if He delights in lamps,\nwho is it that set the stars in heaven?\u201d\n\nOne early answer to all such difficulties was, like a similar answer\nto difficulties about the Homeric mythology, that there was a human as\nwell as a divine element in the Old Testament: some things in it were\ntrue, and some were false: and \u201cthis was indeed the very reason why the\nMaster said, \u2018Be genuine money-changers,\u2019[115] testing the Scriptures\nlike coins, and separating the good from the bad.\u201d But the answer did\nnot generally prevail. The more common solution, as also in the case of\nHomer, was that Moses had written in symbols in order to conceal his\nmeaning from the unwise; and Clement of Alexandria, in an elaborate\njustification of this method, mentions as analogies not only the older\nGreek poetry, but also the hieroglyphic writing of the Egyptians.[116]\nThe Old Testament thus came to be treated allegorically. A large part\nof such interpretation was inherited. The coincidences of mystical\ninterpretation between Philo and the Epistle of Barnabas show that\nsuch interpretations were becoming the common property of Jews and\nJud\u00e6o-Christians.[117] But the method was soon applied to new data.\nExegesis became apologetic. Whereas Philo and his school had dealt mainly\nwith the Pentateuch, the early Christian writers came to deal mainly with\nthe prophets and poetical books; and whereas Philo was mainly concerned\nto show that the writings of Moses contained Greek philosophy, the\nChristian writers endeavoured to show that the writings of the Hebrew\npreachers and poets contained Christianity; and whereas Philo had been\ncontent to speak of the writers of the Old Testament, as Dio Chrysostom\nspoke of the Greek poets, as having been stirred by a divine enthusiasm,\nthe Christian writers soon came to construct an elaborate theory that the\npoets and preachers were but as the flutes through which the Breath of\nGod flowed in divine music into the souls of men.[118]\n\nThe prophets, even more than the poets, lent themselves easily to this\nallegorical method of interpretation. The _nabi_ was in an especial sense\nthe messenger of God and an interpreter of His will. But his message\nwas often a parable. He saw visions and dreamed dreams. He wrote, not\nin plain words, but in pictures. The meaning of the pictures was often\npurposely obscure. The Greek word \u201cprophet\u201d sometimes properly belonged,\nnot to the _nabi_ himself, but to those who, in his own time or in after\ntime, explained the riddle of his message. When the message passed into\nliterature, the interpretation of it became linked with the growing\nconception of the foreknowledge and providence of God: it was believed\nthat He not only knew all things that should come to pass, but also\ncommunicated His knowledge to men. The _nabi_, through whom He revealed\nHis will as to the present, was also the channel through whom He revealed\nHis intention as to the future. The prophetic writings came to be read\nin the light of this conception. The interpreters wandered, as it were,\nalong vast corridors whose walls were covered with hieroglyphs and\npaintings. They found in them symbols which might be interpreted of their\nown times. They went on to infer the divine ordering of the present from\nthe coincidence of its features with features that could be traced in the\nhieroglyphs of the past. A similar conception prevailed in the heathen\nworld. It lay beneath the many forms of divination. Hence Tertullian[119]\nspeaks of Hebrew prophecy as a special form of divination, \u201cdivinatio\nprophetica.\u201d So far from being strange to the Greek world, it\nwas accepted. Those who read the Old Testament without accepting\nChristianity, found in its symbols prefigurings, not of Christianity, but\nof events recorded in the heathen mythologies. The Shiloh of Jacob\u2019s song\nwas a foretelling of Dionysus: the virgin\u2019s son of Isaiah was a picture\nof Perseus: the Psalmist\u2019s \u201cstrong as a giant to run his course\u201d was a\nprophecy of Herakles.[120]\n\nThe fact that this was an accepted method of interpretation enabled\nthe Apologists to use it with great effect. It became one of the chief\nevidences of Christianity. Explanations of the meaning of historical\nevents and poetical figures which sound strange or impossible to modern\nears, so far from sounding strange or impossible in the second century,\ncarried conviction with them. When it was said, \u201cThe government shall be\nupon his shoulder,\u201d it was meant that Christ should be extended on the\ncross;[121] when it was said, \u201cHe shall dip his garment in the blood of\nthe grape,\u201d it was meant that his blood should be, not of human origin,\nbut, like the red juice of the grape, from God;[122] when it was said\nthat \u201cHe shall receive the power of Damascus,\u201d it was meant that the\npower of the evil demon who dwelt at Damascus should be overcome, and the\nprophecy was fulfilled when the Magi came to worship Christ.[123] The\nconvergence of a large number of such interpretations upon the Gospel\nhistory was a powerful argument against both Jews and Greeks. I need\nnot enlarge upon them. They have formed part of the general stock of\nChristian teaching ever since. But I will draw your attention to the fact\nthat the basis of this use of the Old Testament was not so much the idea\nof prediction as the prevalent practice of treating ancient literature as\nsymbolical or allegorical.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe method came to be applied to the books which were being formed\ninto a new volume of sacred writings, side by side with the old. It was\nso applied, in the first instance, not by the Apologists, but by the\nGnostics. It was detached from the idea of prediction. It was linked\nwith the idea of knowledge as a secret. This extension of the method was\ninevitable. The earthly life of Christ presented as many difficulties\nto the first Christian philosophers as the Old Testament had done.\nThe conception of Christ as the Wisdom and the Power of God seemed\ninconsistent with the meanness of a common human life; and that life\nresolved itself into a series of symbolic representations of superhuman\nmovements, and the record of it was written in hieroglyphs. When Symeon\ntook the young child in his arms and said the _Nunc dimittis_, he was a\npicture of the Demiurge who had learned his own change of place on the\ncoming of the Saviour, and who gave thanks to the Infinite Depth.[124]\nThe raising of Jairus\u2019 daughter was a type of Achamoth, the Eternal\nWisdom, the mother of the Demiurge, whom the Saviour led anew to the\nperception of the light which had forsaken her. Even the passion on the\nCross was a setting forth of the anguish and fear and perplexity of the\nEternal Wisdom.[125]\n\nThe method was at first rejected with contumely. Iren\u00e6us and Tertullian\nbring to bear upon it their batteries of irony and denunciation. It was\na blasphemous invention. It was one of the arts of spiritual wickedness\nagainst which a Christian must wrestle. But it was deep-seated in the\nhabits of the time; and even while Tertullian was writing, it was\nestablishing a lodgment inside the Christian communities which it has\nnever ceased to hold. It did so first of all in the great school of\nAlexandria, in which it had grown up as the reconciliation of Greek\nphilosophy and Hebrew theology. The methods of the school of Philo were\napplied to the New Testament even more than to the Old. When Christ\nsaid, \u201cThe foxes have holes, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay\nhis head,\u201d he meant that on the believer alone, who is separated from\nthe rest, that is from the wild beasts of the world, rests the Head of\nthe universe, the kind and gentle Word.[126] When he is said to have fed\nthe multitude on five barley-loaves and two fishes, it is meant that\nhe gave mankind the preparatory training of the Law, for barley, like\nthe Law, ripens sooner than wheat, and of philosophy, which had grown,\nlike fishes, in the waves of the Gentile world.[127] When we read of the\nanointing of Christ\u2019s feet, we read of both his teaching and his passion;\nfor the feet are a symbol of divine instruction travelling to the ends\nof the earth, or, it may be, of the Apostles who so travelled, having\nreceived the fragrant unction of the Holy Ghost; and the ointment, which\nis adulterated oil, is a symbol of the traitor Judas, \u201cby whom the Lord\nwas anointed on the feet, being released from his sojourn in the world:\nfor the dead are anointed.\u201d[128]\n\nBut it may reasonably be doubted whether the allegorical method would\nhave obtained the place which it did in the Christian Church if it had\nnot served an other than exegetical purpose. It is clear that after the\nfirst conflicts with Judaism had subsided, the Old Testament formed a\ngreat stumbling-block in the way of those who approached Christianity on\nits ideal side, and viewed it by the light of philosophical conceptions.\nIts anthropomorphisms, its improbabilities, the sanction which it seemed\nto give to immoralities, the dark picture which it sometimes presented of\nboth God and the servants of God, seemed to many men to be irreconcilable\nwith both the theology and the ethics of the Gospel. An important section\nof the Christian world rejected its authority altogether: it was the\nwork, not of God, but of His rival, the god of this world: the contrast\nbetween the Old Testament and the New was part of the larger contrast\nbetween matter and spirit, darkness and light, evil and good.[129] Those\nwho did not thus reject it were still conscious of its difficulties.\nThere were many solutions of those difficulties. Among them was that\nwhich had been the Greek solution of analogous difficulties in Homer.\nIt was adopted and elaborated by Origen expressly with an apologetic\npurpose. He had been trained in current methods of Greek interpretation.\nHe is expressly said to have studied the books of Cornutus.[130] He\nfound in the hypothesis of a spiritual meaning as complete a vindication\nof the Old Testament as Cornutus had found of the Greek mythology. The\ndifficulties which men find, he tells us, arise from their lack of the\nspiritual sense. Without it he himself would have been a sceptic.\n\n    \u201cWhat man of sense,\u201d he asks,[131] \u201cwill suppose that the\n    first and the second and the third day, and the evening and\n    the morning, existed without a sun and moon and stars? Who\n    is so foolish as to believe that God, like a husbandman,\n    planted a garden in Eden, and placed in it a tree of life,\n    that might be seen and touched, so that one who tasted of the\n    fruit by his bodily lips obtained life? or, again, that one\n    was partaker of good and evil by eating that which was taken\n    from a tree? And if God is said to have walked in a garden in\n    the evening, and Adam to have hidden under a tree, I do not\n    suppose that any one doubts that these things figuratively\n    indicate certain mysteries, the history being apparently but\n    not literally true.... Nay, the Gospels themselves are filled\n    with the same kind of narratives. Take, for example, the story\n    of the devil taking Jesus up into a high mountain to show him\n    from thence the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them:\n    what thoughtful reader would not condemn those who teach that\n    it was with the eye of the body\u2014which needs a lofty height\n    that even the near neighbourhood may be seen\u2014that Jesus beheld\n    the kingdoms of the Persians, and Scythians, and Indians, and\n    Parthians, and the manner in which their rulers were glorified\n    among men?\u201d\n\nThe spirit intended, in all such narratives, on the one hand to reveal\nmysteries to the wise, on the other hand to conceal them from the\nmultitude. The whole series of narratives is constructed with a purpose,\nand subordinated to the exposition of mysteries. Difficulties and\nimpossibilities were introduced in order to prevent men from being drawn\ninto adherence to the literal meaning. Sometimes the truth was told by\nmeans of a true narrative which yielded a mystical sense: sometimes, when\nno such narrative of a true history existed, one was invented for the\npurpose.[132]\n\nIn this way, as a rationalizing expedient for solving the difficulties\nof Old Testament exegesis, the allegorical method established for itself\na place in the Christian Church: it largely helped to prevent the Old\nTestament from being discarded: and the conservation of the Old Testament\nwas the conservation of allegory, not only for the Old Testament, but\nalso for the New.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAgainst the whole tendency of symbolical interpretation there was more\nthan one form of reaction in both the Greek and the Christian world.\n\n1. It was attacked by the Apologists in its application to Greek\nmythology. With an inconsequence which is remarkable, though not\nsingular, they found in it a weapon of both defence and offence. They\nused it in defence of Christianity, not only because it gave them\nthe evidence of prediction, but also because it solved some of the\ndifficulties which the Old Testament presented to philosophical minds.\nThey used it, on the other hand, in their attack upon Greek religion.\nAllegories are an after-thought, they said sometimes, a mere pious\ngloss over unseemly fables.[133] Even if they were true, they said\nagain, and the basis of Greek belief were as good as its interpreters\nalleged it to be, it was a work of wicked demons to wrap round it a veil\nof dishonourable fictions.[134] The myth and the god who is supposed\nto be behind it vanish together, says Tatian: if the myth be true,\nthe gods are worthless demons; if the myth be not true, but only a\nsymbol of the powers of nature, the godhead is gone, for the powers of\nnature are not gods since they constrain no worship.[135] In a similar\nway, in the fourth century, Eusebius treats it as a vain attempt of a\nyounger generation to explain away (\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9) the mistakes of their\nfathers.[136]\n\n2. It was attacked by the Greek philosophers in its application to\nChristianity. There are some persons, says Porphyry,[137] who being\nanxious to find, not a way of being rid of the immorality of the Old\nTestament, but an explanation of it, have recourse to interpretations\nwhich do not hold together nor fit the words which they interpret,\nwhich serve not so much as a defence of Jewish doctrines as to bring\napprobation and credit for their own. It is a delusive evasion of your\ndifficulties, said in effect Celsus;[138] you find in your sacred books\nnarratives which shock your moral sense; you think that you get rid of\nthe difficulty by having recourse to allegory; but you do not: in the\nfirst place, your scriptures do not admit of being so interpreted; in the\nsecond place, the explanation is often more difficult than the narrative\nwhich it explains. The answer of Origen is weak: it is partly a _Tu\nquoque_: Homer is worse than Genesis, and if allegory will not explain\nthe latter, neither will it the former: it is partly that, if there had\nbeen no secret, the Psalmist would not have said, \u201cOpen thou mine eyes,\nthat I may see the wondrous things of thy law.\u201d\n\n3. The method had opponents even in Alexandria itself. Origen[139] more\nthan once speaks of those who objected to his \u201cdigging wells below the\nsurface;\u201d and Eusebius mentions a lost work of the learned Nepos of\nArsino\u00ea, entitled \u201cA Refutation of the Allegorists.\u201d[140] But it found\nits chief antagonist in the school of interpretation which arose at\nthe end of the fourth century at Antioch. The dominant philosophy of\nAlexandria had been a fusion of Platonism with some elements of both\nStoicism and revived Pythagoreanism: that of Antioch was coming to be\nAristotelianism. The one was idealistic, the other realistic: the one was\na philosophy of dreams and mystery, the other of logic and system: to\nthe one, Revelation was but the earthy foothold from which speculation\nmight soar into infinite space; to the other, it was \u201ca positive fact\ngiven in the light of history.\u201d[141] Allegorical interpretation was the\noutcome of the one; literal interpretation of the other. The precursor\nof the Antiochene school, Julius Africanus, of Emmaus, has left behind\na letter which has been said \u201cto contain in its two short pages more\ntrue exegesis than all the commentaries and homilies of Origen.\u201d[142]\nThe chief founder of the school was Lucian, a scholar who shares with\nOrigen the honour of being the founder of Biblical philology, and whose\nlifetime, which was cut short by martyrdom in 311, just preceded the\ngreat Trinitarian controversies of the Nicene period. His disciples came\nto be leaders on the Arian side: among them were Eusebius of Nicomedia\nand Arius himself. The question of exegesis became entangled with the\nquestion of orthodoxy. The greatest of Greek interpreters, Theodore of\nMopsuestia, followed, a hundred years afterwards, in the same path; but\nin his day also questions of canons of interpretation were so entangled\nwith questions of Christology, and the Christology of the Antiochene\nschool was so completely outvoted at the great ecclesiastical assemblies\nby the Christology of the Alexandrian school, that his reputation for\nscholarship has been almost wholly obscured by the ill-fame of his\nleanings towards Nestorianism. It has been one of the many results of the\ncontroversies into which the metaphysical tendencies of the Greeks led\nthe churches of the fourth and fifth centuries, to postpone almost to\nmodern times the acceptance of \u201cthe literal grammatical and historical\nsense\u201d as the true sense of Scripture.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe allegorical method of interpretation has survived the circumstances\nof its birth and the gathered forces of its opponents. It has filled\na large place in the literature of Christianity. But by the irony of\nhistory, though it grew out of a tendency towards rationalism, it has\ncome in later times to be vested like a saint, and to wear an aureole\nround its head. It has been the chief instrument by which the dominant\nbeliefs of every age have constructed their strongholds.[143] It was\nharmless so long as it was free. It was the play of innocent imagination\non the surface of great truths. But when it became authoritative, when\nthe idea prevailed that only that poetical sense was true of which the\nmajority approved, and when moreover it became traditional, so that one\ngeneration was bound to accept the symbolical interpretations of its\npredecessors, it became at once the slave of dogmatism and the tyrant of\nsouls. Outside its relation to dogmatism, it has a history and a value\nwhich rather grow than diminish with time. It has given to literature\nbooks which, though of little value for the immediate purpose of\ninterpretation, are yet monuments of noble and inspiring thoughts. It has\ncontributed even more to art than to literature. The poetry of life would\nhave been infinitely less rich without it. For though without it Dante\nmight have been stirred to write, he would not have written the _Divine\nComedy_; and though without it Raffaelle would have painted, he would not\nhave painted the St. Cecilia; and though without it we should have had\nGothic cathedrals, we should not have had that sublime symbolism of their\nstructure which is of itself a religious education. It survives because\nit is based upon an element in human nature which is not likely to pass\naway: whatever be its value in relation to the literature of the past, it\nis at least the expression in relation to the present that our lives are\nhedged round by the unknown, that there is a haze about both our birth\nand our departure, and that even the meaner facts of life are linked to\ninfinity.\n\nBut two modern beliefs militate against it.\n\n1. The one belief affects all literature, religious and secular alike. It\nis that the thoughts of the past are relative to the past, and must be\ninterpreted by it. The glamour of writing has passed away. A written word\nis no more than a spoken word; and a spoken word is taken in the sense in\nwhich the speaker used it, at the time at which he used it. There have\nbeen writers of enigmas and painters of emblems, but they have formed\nan infinitesimal minority. There have been those who, as Cicero says\nof himself in writing to Atticus, have written allegorically lest open\nspeech should betray them; but such cryptograms have only a temporary and\ntransient use. The idea that ancient literature consists of riddles which\nit is the business of modern literature to solve, has passed for ever\naway.\n\n2. The other belief affects specially religious literature. It is that\nthe Spirit of God has not yet ceased to speak to men, and that it is\nimportant for us to know, not only what He told the men of other days,\nbut also what He tells us now. Interpretation is of the present as well\nas of the past. We can believe that there is a Divine voice, but we find\nit hard to believe that it has died away to an echo from the Judean\nhills. We can believe in religious as in other progress, but we find it\nhard to believe that that progress was suddenly arrested fifteen hundred\nyears ago. The study of nature and the study of history have given us\nanother maxim for religious conduct and another axiom of religious\nbelief. They apply to that which is divine within us the inmost secret of\nour knowledge and mastery of that which is divine without us: _man, the\nservant and interpreter of nature, is also, and is thereby, the servant\nand interpreter of the living God_.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE IV.\n\nGREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.\n\n\nIt is customary to measure the literature of an age by its highest\nproducts, and to measure the literary excellence of one age as compared\nwith that of another by the highest products of each of them. We look,\nfor example, upon the Periclean age at Athens, or the Augustan age at\nRome, or the Elizabethan age in our own country, as higher than the\nages respectively of the Ptolemies, the C\u00e6sars, or the early Georges.\nThe former are \u201cgolden;\u201d the latter, \u201csilver.\u201d Nor can it be doubted\nthat from the point of view of literature in itself, as distinguished\nfrom literature in its relation to history or to social life, such a\nstandard of measurement is correct. But the result of its application\nhas been the doing of a certain kind of injustice to periods of history\nin which, though the high-water mark has been lower, there has been a\nwide diffusion of literary culture. This is the case with the period with\nwhich we are dealing. It produced no writer of the first rank. It was\nartificial rather than spontaneous. It was imitative more than original.\nIt was appreciative rather than constructive. Its literature was born,\nnot of the enthusiasm of free activity, but rather of the passivity\nwhich comes when there is no hope. But as to a student of science the\nafter-glow is an object of study no less than the noon-day, so to a\nstudent of the historical development of the world the silver age of a\nnation\u2019s literature is an object of study no less than its golden age.\n\nIts most characteristic feature was one for which it is difficult to find\nany more exact description than the paradoxical phrase, \u201ca _viva-voce_\nliterature.\u201d It had its birth and chief development in that part of the\nEmpire in which Christianity and Greek life came into closest and most\nfrequent contact. It was the product of the rhetorical schools which\nhave been already described. In those schools the professor had been\nin the habit of illustrating his rules and instructing his students by\nmodel compositions of his own.[144] Such compositions were in the first\ninstance exercises in the pleading of actual causes, and accusations or\ndefences of real persons. The cases were necessarily supposed rather\nthan actual, but they had a practical object in view, and came as close\nas possible to real life. The large growth of the habit of studying\nRhetoric as a part of the education of a gentleman, and the increased\ndevotion to the literature of the past, which came partly from the felt\nloss of spontaneity and partly from national pride,[145] caused these\ncompositions in the rhetorical schools to take a wider range.[146] They\nbegan on the one hand to be divorced from even a fictitious connection\nwith the law-courts, and on the other to be directly imitative of the\nstyles of ancient authors. From the older Rhetoric, the study of forensic\nlogic and speech with a view to the actual practice in the law-courts,\nwhich necessarily still went on, there branched out the new Rhetoric,\nwhich was sometimes specially known as Sophistic.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSophistic proceeded for the most part upon the old lines. Its literary\ncompositions preserved the old name, \u201cexercises\u201d (\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9), as though\nthey were still the rehearsals of actual pleadings. They were divided\ninto two kinds, _Theses_ and _Hypotheses_, according as a subject was\nargued in general terms or names were introduced.[147] The latter were\nthe more common. Their subjects were sometimes fictitious, sometimes\ntaken from real history. Of the first of these there is a good example\nin Lucian\u2019s _Tyrannicide_: the situation is, that a man goes into the\ncitadel of a town for the purpose of killing a tyrant: not finding the\ntyrant, the man kills the tyrant\u2019s son: the tyrant coming in and seeing\nhis son with the sword in his body, stabs himself: the man claims the\nreward as a tyrannicide. Of the second kind of subjects, there are such\ninstances as \u201cDemosthenes defending himself against the charge of having\ntaken the bribe which Demades brought,\u201d[148] and \u201cThe Athenians wounded\nat Syracuse beg their comrades who are returning to Athens to put them\nto death.\u201d[149] The Homeric cycle was an unfailing mine of subjects: the\nPersian wars hardly less so. \u201cWould you like to hear a sensible speech\nabout Agamemnon, or are you sick of hearing speeches about Agamemnon,\nAtreus\u2019 son?\u201d asks Dio Chrysostom in one of his Dialogues.[150] \u201cI\nshould not take amiss even a speech about Adrastus or Tantalus or\nPelops, if I were likely to get good from it,\u201d is the polite reply. In\nthe treatment of both kinds of subjects, stress was laid on dramatic\nconsistency. The character, whether real or supposed, was required to\nspeak in an appropriate style.[151] The \u201cexercise\u201d had to be recited\nwith an appropriate intonation.[152] Sometimes the dramatic effect was\nheightened by the introduction of two or more characters: for example,\none of the surviving _pi\u00e8ces_ of Dio Chrysostom[153] consists of a\nwrangle in tragic style, and with tragic diction, between Odysseus and\nPhiloctetes.\n\nThis kind of Sophistic has an interest in two respects, apart from its\nrelation to contemporary life. It gave birth to the Greek romance, which\nis the progenitor of the medi\u00e6val romance and of the modern novel:[154]\na notable example of such a sophistical romance in Christian literature\nis the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions; in non-Christian literature,\nPhilostratus\u2019s Life of Apollonius of Tyana. It gave birth also to the\nwritings in the style of ancient authors which, though commonly included\nin the collected works of those authors, betray their later origin\nby either the poverty of their thought or inadvertent neologisms of\nexpression: for example, the Eryxias of Plato.[155]\n\nBut though Sophistic grew mainly out of Rhetoric, it had its roots also\nin Philosophy. It was sometimes defined as Rhetoric philosophizing.[156]\nIt threw off altogether the fiction of a law-court or an assembly, and\ndiscussed in continuous speech the larger themes of morality or theology.\nIts utterances were not \u201cexercises\u201d but \u201cdiscourses\u201d (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2).[157]\nIt preached sermons. It created not only a new literature, but also a\nnew profession. The class of men against whom Plato had inveighed had\nbecome merged in the general class of educators: they were specialized\npartly as grammarians, partly as rhetoricians: the word \u201csophist,\u201d to\nwhich the invectives had failed to attach a permanent stigma, remained\npartly as a generic name, and partly as a special name for the new class\nof public talkers. They differed from philosophers in that they did\nnot mark themselves off from the rest of the world, and profess their\ndevotion to a higher standard of living, by wearing a special dress.[158]\nThey were a notable feature of their time. Some of them had a fixed\nresidence and gave discourses regularly, like the \u201cstated minister\u201d of\na modern congregation: some of them travelled from place to place. The\naudience was usually gathered by invitation. There were no newspaper\nadvertisements in those days, and no bells; consequently the invitations\nwere personal. They were made sometimes by a \u201ccard\u201d or \u201cprogramme,\u201d\nsometimes by word of mouth: \u201cCome and hear me lecture to-day.\u201d[159]\nSometimes a messenger was sent round; sometimes the sophist would go\nround himself and knock at people\u2019s doors and promise them a fine\ndiscourse.[160]\n\nThe audience of a travelling sophist was what might be expected among a\npeople who lived very much out of doors. When a stranger appeared who\nwas known by his professional dress, and whose reputation had preceded\nhim, the people clustered round him\u2014like iron filings sticking to a\nmagnet, says Themistius.[161] If there was a resident sophist, the two\nwere pitted together; just as if, in modern times, a famous violinist\nfrom Paris or Vienna might be asked to play at the next concert with the\nleading violinist in London. It was a matter not only of professional\nhonour, but also of obligation. A man could not refuse. There is a story\nin Plutarch[162] about a sophist named Niger who found himself in a town\nin Galatia which had a resident professor. The resident made a discourse.\nNiger had, unfortunately, a fish-bone in his throat and could not easily\nspeak; but he had either to speak or to lose his reputation: he spoke,\nand an inflammation set in which killed him. There is a much longer story\nin Philostratus[163] of Alexander Peloplato going to Athens to discourse\nin a friendly contest with Herodes Atticus. The audience gathered\ntogether in a theatre in the Ceramicus, and waited a long time for\nHerodes to appear: when he did not come, they grew angry and thought that\nit was a trick, and insisted on Alexander coming forward to discourse\nbefore Herodes arrived. And when Herodes did arrive, Alexander suddenly\nchanged his style\u2014sang tenor, so to speak, instead of bass\u2014and Herodes\nfollowed him, and there was a charming interchange of compliments: \u201cWe\nsophists,\u201d said Alexander, \u201care all of us only slices of you, Herodes.\u201d\n\nSometimes they went to show their skill at one of the great festivals,\nsuch as that of Olympia. Lucian[164] tells a story of one who had\nplucked feathers from many orators to make a wonderful discourse\nabout Pythagoras. His object was to gain the glory of delivering it\nas an extempore oration, and he arranged with a confederate that its\nsubject should be the subject selected for him by the audience. But\nthe imposture was too barefaced: some of the hearers amused themselves\nby assigning the different passages to their several authors; and the\nsophist himself at last joined in the universal laughter. And Dio\nChrysostom[165] draws a picture of a public place at Corinth during the\nIsthmian games, which he alleges to be as true of the time of Diogenes as\nof his own: \u201cYou might hear many poor wretches of sophists shouting and\nabusing one another, and their disciples, as they call them, squabbling,\nand many writers of books reading their stupid compositions, and many\npoets singing their poems, and many jugglers exhibiting their marvels,\nand many soothsayers giving the meaning of prodigies, and ten thousand\nrhetoricians twisting law-suits, and no small number of traders driving\ntheir several trades.\u201d\n\nOf the manner of the ordinary discourse there are many indications. It\nwas given sometimes in a private house, sometimes in a theatre, sometimes\nin a regular lecture-room. The professor sometimes entered already robed\nin his \u201cpulpit-gown,\u201d and sometimes put it on in the presence of his\naudience. He mounted the steps to his professorial chair, and took his\nseat upon its ample cushion.[166] He sometimes began with a preface,\nsometimes he proceeded at once to his discourse. He often gave the\nchoice of a subject to his audience.[167] He was ready to discourse\non any theme; and it was part of his art either to force the choice of\na subject, or so to turn the subject as to bring in something which he\nhad already prepared. \u201cHis memory is incredible,\u201d says Pliny of Is\u00e6us;\n\u201che repeats by heart what he appears to say extempore; but he does not\nfalter even in a single word.\u201d[168] \u201cWhen your audience have chosen a\nsubject for you,\u201d says Lucian,[169] in effect, in his satirical advice\nto rhetoricians, \u201cgo straight at it and say without hesitation whatever\nwords come to your tongue, never minding about the first point coming\nfirst and the second second: the great thing is to go right on and not\nhave any pauses. If you have to talk at Athens about adultery, bring in\nthe customs of the Hindoos and Persians: above all, have passages about\nMarathon and Cyn\u00e6girus\u2014that is indispensable. And Athos must always be\nturned into sea, and the Hellespont into dry land, and the sun must be\ndarkened by the clouds of Median arrows ... and Salamis and Artemisium\nand Plat\u00e6a, and so forth, must come in pretty frequently; and, above\nall, those little Attic words I told you about must blossom on the\nsurface of your speech\u2014\u1f05\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1 (_atta_) and \u03b4\u03ae\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd (_depouthen_)\u2014must be\nsprinkled about freely, whether they are wanted or not: for they are\npretty words, even when they do not mean anything.\u201d\n\nIt was a disappointment if he was not interrupted by applause. \u201cA\nsophist is put out in an extempore speech,\u201d says Philostratus,[170] \u201cby\na serious-looking audience and tardy praise and no clapping.\u201d \u201cThey are\nall agape,\u201d says Dio Chrysostom,[171] \u201cfor the murmur of the crowd ...\nlike men walking in the dark, they move always in the direction of the\nclapping and the shouting.\u201d \u201cI want your praise,\u201d said one of them to\nEpictetus.[172] \u201cWhat do you mean by my praise?\u201d asked the philosopher.\n\u201cOh, I want you to say Bravo! and Wonderful!\u201d replied the sophist.\nThese were the common cries; others were not infrequent\u2014\u201cDivine!\u201d\n\u201cInspired!\u201d \u201cUnapproachable!\u201d[173] They were accompanied by clapping\nof the hands and stamping of the feet and waving of the arms. \u201cIf your\nfriends see you breaking down,\u201d says Lucian in his satirical advice to\na rhetorician,[174] \u201clet them pay the price of the suppers you give\nthem by stretching out their arms and giving you a chance of thinking\nof something to say in the interval between the rounds of applause.\u201d\nSometimes, of course, there were signs of disapproval. \u201cIt is the mark of\na good hearer,\u201d says Plutarch,[175] \u201cthat he does not howl out like a dog\nat everything of which he disapproves, but at any rate waits until the\nend of the discourse.\u201d\n\nAfter the discourse, the professor would go round: \u201c\u2018What did you think\nof me to-day?\u2019\u201d says one in Epictetus.[176] \u201c\u2018Upon my life, sir, I\nthought you were admirable.\u2019 \u2018What did you think of my best passage?\u2019\n\u2018Which was that?\u2019 \u2018Where I described Pan and the Nymphs.\u2019 \u2018Oh, it\nwas excessively well done.\u2019\u201d Again, to quote another anecdote from\nEpictetus:[177] \u201c\u2018A much larger audience to-day, I think,\u2019 says the\nprofessor. \u2018Yes: much larger.\u2019 \u2018Five hundred, I should guess.\u2019 \u2018Oh,\nnonsense; it could not have been less than a thousand.\u2019 \u2018Why that is more\nthan Dio ever had: I wonder why it was: they appreciated what I said,\ntoo.\u2019 \u2018Beauty, sir, can move even a stone.\u2019\u201d\n\nThey made both money and reputation. The more eminent of them were among\nthe most distinguished men of the time. They were the pets of society,\nand sometimes its masters.[178] They were employed on affairs of state\nat home and on embassies abroad.[179] They were sometimes placed on\nthe free list of their city, and lived at the public expense. They\nwere sometimes made senators\u2014raised, as we might say, to the House of\nLords\u2014and sometimes governors of provinces.[180] When they died, and\nsometimes before their death, public statues were erected in their\nhonour.[181] The inscriptions of some of them are recorded by historians,\nand some remain: \u201cThe Queen of Cities to the King of Eloquence,\u201d was\ninscribed on the statue of Proh\u00e6resius at Rome.[182] \u201cOne of the Seven\nWise Men, though he had not fulfilled twenty-five years,\u201d is inscribed\non an existing base of a statue at Attaleia;[183] and, beneath a\nrepresentation of crowning, the words, \u201cHe subjects all things to\neloquence,\u201d are found on a similar base at Parion.[184]\n\nThey naturally sometimes gave themselves great airs. There are many\nstories about them. Philostratus tells one of the Emperor Antoninus Pius\non arriving at Smyrna going, in accordance with imperial custom, to spend\nthe night at the house which was at once the best house in the city and\nthe house of the most distinguished man. It was that of the sophist\nPolemo, who happened on the Emperor\u2019s arrival to be away from home;\nbut he returned from his journey at night, and with loud exclamations\nagainst being kept out of his own, turned the Emperor out of doors.[185]\nThe common epithet for them is \u1f00\u03bb\u03b1\u03b6\u03ce\u03bd\u2014a word with no precise English\nequivalent, denoting a cross between a braggart and a mountebank.\n\nBut the real grounds on which the more earnest men objected to them were\nthose upon which Plato had objected to their predecessors: their making a\ntrade of knowledge, and their unreality.\n\n1. The making of discourses, whether literary or moral, was a thriving\ntrade.[186] The fees given to a leading sophist were on the scale of\nthose given to a _prima donna_ in our own day.[187] But the objection\nto it was not so much the fact of its thriving, as the fact of its being\na trade at all. \u201cIf they do what they do,\u201d says Dio Chrysostom,[188]\n\u201cas poets and rhetoricians, there is no harm perhaps; but if they do it\nas philosophers, for the sake of their own personal gain and glory, and\nnot for the sake of benefiting you, there is harm.\u201d The defence which\nThemistius[189] makes for himself is more candid than effective: \u201cI do\nmake money,\u201d he says; \u201cpeople give me sometimes one _mina_, sometimes\ntwo, sometimes as much as a talent: but, since I must speak about myself,\nlet me ask you this\u2014Did any one ever come away the worse for having heard\nme? Mark, I charge nothing: it is a voluntary contribution.\u201d\n\n2. The stronger ground of objection to them was their unreality. They\nhad lost touch with life. They had made philosophy itself seem unreal.\n\u201cThey are not philosophers, but fiddlers,\u201d said the sturdy old Stoic\nMusonius.[190] It is not necessary to suppose that they were all\ncharlatans. There was then, as now, the irrepressible young man of good\nmorals who wished to air his opinions. But the tendency to moralize had\nbecome divorced from practice. They preached, not because they were in\ngrim earnest about the reformation of the world, but because preaching\nwas a respectable profession, and the listening to sermons a fashionable\ndiversion. \u201cThe mass of men,\u201d says Plutarch,[191] \u201cenjoy and admire a\nphilosopher when he is discoursing about their neighbours; but if the\nphilosopher, leaving their neighbours alone, speaks his mind about things\nthat are of importance to the men themselves, they take offence and vote\nhim a bore; for they think that they ought to listen to a philosopher in\nhis lecture-room in the same bland way that they listen to tragedians\nin the theatre. This, as might be expected, is what happens to them in\nregard to the sophists; for when a sophist gets down from his pulpit and\nputs aside his MSS., in the real business of life he seems but a small\nman, and under the thumb of the majority. They do not understand about\nreal philosophers that both seriousness and play, grim looks and smiles,\nand above all the direct personal application of what they say to each\nindividual, have a useful result for those who are in the habit of giving\na patient attention to them.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAgainst this whole system of veneering rhetoric with philosophy, there\nwas a strong reaction. Apart from the early Christian writers, with whom\n\u201csophist\u201d is always a word of scorn, there were men, especially among\nthe new school of Stoics, who were at open war with its unreality.[192]\nI will ask you to listen to the expostulation which the great moral\nreformer Epictetus addresses to a rhetorician who came to him:\n\n    \u201cFirst of all, tell yourself what you want to be and then act\n    accordingly. For this is what we see done in almost all other\n    cases. Men who are practising for the games first of all decide\n    what they mean to be, and then proceed to do the things that\n    follow from their decision.... So then when you say, Come\n    and listen to my lecture, first of all consider whether your\n    action be not thrown away for want of an end, and then consider\n    whether it be not a mistake, on account of your real end being\n    a wrong one. Suppose I ask a man, \u2018Do you wish to do good by\n    your expounding, or to gain applause?\u2019 Thereupon straightway\n    you hear him saying, \u2018What do I care for the applause of the\n    multitude?\u2019 And his sentiment is right: for in the same way,\n    applause is nothing to the musician _qu\u00e2_ musician, or to the\n    geometrician _qu\u00e2_ geometrician.\n\n    \u201cYou wish to do good, then,\u201d I continue; \u201cin what particular\n    respect? tell me, that I too may hasten to your lecture-room.\n    But can a man impart good to others without having previously\n    received good himself?\n\n    \u201cNo: just as a man is of no use to us in the way of\n    carpentering unless he is himself a carpenter.\n\n    \u201cWould you like to know, then, whether you have received good\n    yourself? Bring me your convictions, philosopher. (Let us take\n    an example.) Did you not the other day praise so-and-so more\n    than you really thought he deserved? Did you not flatter that\n    senator\u2019s son?\u2014and yet you would not like your own sons to be\n    like him, would you?\n\n    \u201cGod forbid!\n\n    \u201cThen why did you flatter him and toady to him?\n\n    \u201cHe is a clever young fellow, and a good student.\n\n    \u201cHow do you know that?\n\n    \u201cHe admires my lectures.\n\n    \u201cYes; that is the real reason. But don\u2019t you think that\n    these very people despise you in their secret hearts? I mean\n    that when a man who is conscious that he has neither done\n    nor thought any single good thing, finds a philosopher who\n    tells him that he is a man of great ability, sincerity, and\n    genuineness, of course he says to himself, \u2018This man wants to\n    get something out of me!\u2019 Or (if this is not the case with\n    you), tell me what proof he has given of great ability. No\n    doubt he has attended you for a considerable time: he has heard\n    you discoursing and expounding: but has he become more modest\n    in his estimate of himself\u2014or is he still looking for some one\n    to teach him?\n\n    \u201cYes, he is looking for some one to teach him.\n\n    \u201cTo teach him how to live? No, fool; not how to live, but how\n    to talk: which also is the reason why he admires you....\n\n    \u201c[The truth is, you like applause: you care more for that than\n    for doing good, and so you invite people to come and hear you.]\n\n    \u201cBut does a _philosopher_ invite people to come and hear him?\n    Is it not that as the sun, or as food, is its own sufficient\n    attraction, so the philosopher also is his own sufficient\n    attraction to those who are to be benefited by him? Does a\n    physician invite people to come and let him heal them?...\n    (Imagine what a genuine philosopher\u2019s invitation would be)\u2014\u2018I\n    invite you to come and be told that you are in a bad way\u2014that\n    you care for everything except what you should care for\u2014that\n    you do not know what things are good and what evil\u2014and that\n    you are unhappy and unfortunate.\u2019 A nice invitation! and yet\n    if that is not the result of what a philosopher says, he and\n    his words alike are dead. (Musonius) Rufus used to say, \u2018If\n    you have leisure to praise me, my teaching has been in vain.\u2019\n    Accordingly he used to talk in such a way that each individual\n    one of us who sat there thought that some one had been telling\n    Rufus about him: he so put his finger upon what we had done, he\n    so set the individual faults of each one of us clearly before\n    our eyes.\n\n    \u201cThe philosopher\u2019s lecture-room, gentlemen, is a surgery: when\n    you go away you ought to have felt not pleasure but pain. For\n    when you come in, something is wrong with you: one man has put\n    his shoulder out, another has an abscess, another a headache.\n    Am I\u2014the surgeon\u2014then, to sit down and give you a string of\n    fine sentences, that you may praise me\u2014and then go away\u2014the man\n    with the dislocated arm, the man with the abscess, the man with\n    the headache\u2014just as you came? Is it for this that young men\n    come away from home, and leave their parents and their kinsmen\n    and their property, to say \u2018Bravo!\u2019 to you for your fine moral\n    conclusions? Is this what Socrates did\u2014or Zeno\u2014or Cleanthes?\n\n    \u201cWell, but is there no such class of speeches as exhortations?\n\n    \u201cWho denies it? But in what do exhortations consist? In\n    being able to show, whether to one man or to many men, the\n    contradiction in which they are involved, and that their\n    thoughts are given to anything but what they really mean.\n    For they mean to give them to the things that really tend\n    to happiness, but they look for those things elsewhere than\n    where they really are. (That is the true aim of exhortation):\n    but to show this, is it necessary to place a thousand chairs,\n    and invite people to come and listen, and dress yourself up\n    in a fine gown, and ascend the pulpit\u2014and describe the death\n    of Achilles? Cease, I implore you, from bringing dishonour,\n    as far as you can, upon noble words and deeds. There can\n    be no stronger exhortation to duty, I suppose, than for a\n    speaker to make it clear to his audience that he wants to get\n    something out of them! Tell me who, after hearing you lecture\n    or discourse, became anxious about or reflected upon himself?\n    or who, as he went out of the room, said, \u2018The philosopher put\n    his finger upon my faults: I must not behave in that way again\u2019?\n\n    \u201cYou cannot: the utmost praise you get is when a man says to\n    another, \u2018That was a beautiful passage about Xerxes,\u2019 and\n    the other says, \u2018No, I liked best that about the battle of\n    Thermopyl\u00e6.\u2019\n\n    \u201cThis is a philosopher\u2019s sermon!\u201d[193]\n\nI have dwelt on this feature of the Greek life of the early Christian\ncenturies, not with the view of giving a complete picture of it, which\nwould be impossible within the compass of a lecture, but rather with the\nview of establishing a presumption, which you will find amply justified\nby further researches, that it was sufficient, not only in its quality\nand complexity, but also in its mass, to account for certain features of\nearly Christianity.\n\nIn passing from Greek life to Christianity, I will ask you, in the\nfirst instance, to note the broad distinction which exists between what\nin the primitive churches was known as \u201cprophesying,\u201d and that which\nin subsequent times came to be known as \u201cpreaching.\u201d I lay the more\nstress upon the distinction for the accidental reason that, in the first\nreaction against the idea that \u201cprophecy\u201d necessarily meant \u201cprediction,\u201d\nit was maintained\u2014and with a certain reservation the contention was\ntrue\u2014that a \u201cprophet\u201d meant a \u201cpreacher.\u201d The reservation is, that\nthe prophet was not merely a preacher but a spontaneous preacher. He\npreached because he could not help it, because there was a divine breath\nbreathing within him which must needs find an utterance. It is in this\nsense that the prophets of the early churches were preachers. They were\nnot church officers appointed to discharge certain functions. They were\nthe possessors of a _charisma_, a divine gift which was not official but\npersonal. \u201cNo prophecy ever came by the will of man; but men spake from\nGod, being moved by the Holy Ghost.\u201d They did not practise beforehand how\nor what they should say; for \u201cthe Holy Ghost taught them in that very\nhour what they should say.\u201d Their language was often, from the point of\nview of the rhetorical schools, a barbarous patois. They were ignorant\nof the rules both of style and of dialectic. They paid no heed to\nrefinements of expression. The greatest preacher of them all claimed to\nhave come among his converts, in a city in which Rhetoric flourished, not\nwith the persuasiveness of human logic, but with the demonstration which\nwas afforded by spiritual power.\n\nOf that \u201cprophesying\u201d of the primitive churches it is not certain that\nwe possess any monument. The Second Epistle of Peter and the Epistle of\nJude are perhaps representatives of it among the canonical books of the\nNew Testament. The work known as the Second Epistle of Clement is perhaps\na representative of the form which it took in the middle of the second\ncentury; but though it is inspired by a genuine enthusiasm, it is rather\nmore artistic in its form than a purely prophetic utterance is likely to\nhave been.\n\nIn the course of the second century, this original spontaneity of\nutterance died almost entirely away. It may almost be said to have died a\nviolent death. The dominant parties in the Church set their faces against\nit. The survivals of it in Asia Minor were formally condemned. The\nMontanists, as they were called, who tried to fan the lingering sparks of\nit into a flame, are ranked among heretics. And Tertullian is not even\nnow admitted into the calendar of the Saints, because he believed the\nMontanists to be in the right.\n\nIt was inevitable that it should be so. The growth of a confederation\nof Christian communities necessitated the definition of a basis of\nconfederation. Such a definition, and the further necessity of guarding\nit, were inconsistent with that free utterance of the Spirit which\nhad existed before the confederation began. Prophesying died when the\nCatholic Church was formed.\n\nIn place of prophesying came preaching. And preaching is the result\nof the gradual combination of different elements. In the formation of\na great institution it is inevitable that, as time goes on, different\nelements should tend to unite. To the original functions of a bishop,\nfor example, were added by degrees the functions\u2014which had originally\nbeen separate\u2014of teacher.[194] In a similar way were fused together, on\nthe one hand, teaching\u2014that is, the tradition and exposition of the\nsacred books and of the received doctrine; and, on the other hand,\nexhortation\u2014that is, the endeavour to raise men to a higher level of\nmoral and spiritual life. Each of these was a function which, assuming\na certain natural aptitude, could be learned by practice. Each of them\nwas consequently a function which might be discharged by the permanent\nofficers of the community, and discharged habitually at regular intervals\nwithout waiting for the fitful flashes of the prophetic fire. We\nconsequently find that with the growth of organization there grew up\nalso, not only a fusion of teaching and exhortation, but also the gradual\nrestriction of the liberty of addressing the community to the official\nclass.\n\nIt was this fusion of teaching and exhortation that constituted the\nessence of the homily: its form came from the sophists. For it was\nnatural that when addresses, whether expository or hortatory, came to\nprevail in the Christian communities, they should be affected by the\nsimilar addresses which filled a large place in contemporary Greek life.\nIt was not only natural but inevitable that when men who had been trained\nin rhetorical methods came to make such addresses, they should follow\nthe methods to which they were accustomed. It is probable that Origen\nis not only the earliest example whose writings have come down to us,\nbut also one of the earliest who took into the Christian communities\nthese methods of the schools. He lectured, as the contemporary teachers\nseem to have lectured, every day: his subject-matter was the text of the\nScriptures, as that of the rhetoricians and sophists by his side was\nHomer or Chrysippus: his addresses, like those of the best professors,\nwere carefully prepared: he was sixty years of age, we are told, before\nhe preached an extempore sermon.[195]\n\nWhen the Christian communities emerge into the clearer light of the\nfourth century, the influence of the rhetorical schools upon them begins\nto be visible on a large scale and with permanent effects. The voice of\nthe prophet had ceased, and the voice of the preacher had begun. The\ngreatest Christian preachers of the fourth century had been trained to\nrhetorical methods, and had themselves taught rhetoric. Basil and Gregory\nNazianzen studied at Athens under the famous professors Himerius and\nProh\u00e6resius: Chrysostom studied under the still more famous Libanius,\nwho on his death-bed said of him that he would have been his worthiest\nsuccessor \u201cif the Christians had not stolen him.\u201d[196] The discourses\ncame to be called by the same names as those of the Greek professors.\nThey had originally been called _homilies_\u2014a word which was unknown\nin this sense in pre-Christian times, and which denoted the familiar\nintercourse and direct personal addresses of common life. They came to be\ncalled by the technical terms of the schools\u2014discourses, disputations,\nor speeches.[197] The distinction between the two kinds of terms is\nclearly shown by a later writer, who, speaking of a particular volume\nof Chrysostom\u2019s addresses, says, \u201cThey are called \u2018speeches\u2019 (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9),\nbut they are more like homilies, for this reason, above others, that he\nagain and again addresses his hearers as actually present before his\neyes.\u201d[198] The form of the discourses tended to be the same: if you\nexamine side by side a discourse of Himerius or Themistius or Libanius,\nand one of Basil or Chrysostom or Ambrose, you will find a similar\nartificiality of structure, and a similar elaboration of phraseology.\nThey were delivered under analogous circumstances. The preacher sat in\nhis official chair: it was an exceptional thing for him to ascend the\nreader\u2019s _ambo_, the modern \u201cpulpit:\u201d[199] the audience crowded in front\nof him, and frequently interrupted him with shouts of acclamation. The\ngreater preachers tried to stem the tide of applause which surged round\nthem: again and again Chrysostom begs his hearers to be silent: what\nhe wants is, not their acclamations, but the fruits of his preaching\nin their lives.[200] There is one passage which not only illustrates\nthis point, but also affords a singular analogy to the remonstrance of\nEpictetus which was quoted just now:\n\n    \u201cThere are many preachers who make long sermons: if they are\n    well applauded, they are as glad as if they had obtained a\n    kingdom: if they bring their sermon to an end in silence,\n    their despondency is worse, I may almost say, than hell. It is\n    this that ruins churches, that you do not seek to hear sermons\n    that touch the heart, but sermons that will delight your ears\n    with their intonation and the structure of their phrases, just\n    as if you were listening to singers and lute-players. And we\n    preachers humour your fancies, instead of trying to crush them.\n    We act like a father who gives a sick child a cake or an ice,\n    or something else that is merely nice to eat\u2014just because he\n    asks for it; and takes no pains to give him what is good for\n    him; and then when the doctors blame him says, \u2018I could not\n    bear to hear my child cry.\u2019.... That is what we do when we\n    elaborate beautiful sentences, fine combinations and harmonies,\n    to please and not to profit, to be admired and not to instruct,\n    to delight and not to touch you, to go away with your applause\n    in our ears, and not to better your conduct. Believe me, I\n    am not speaking at random: when you applaud me as I speak, I\n    feel at the moment as it is natural for a man to feel. I will\n    make a clean breast of it. Why should I not? I am delighted\n    and overjoyed. And then when I go home and reflect that the\n    people who have been applauding me have received no benefit,\n    and indeed that whatever benefit they might have had has been\n    killed by the applause and praises, I am sore at heart, and I\n    lament and fall to tears, and I feel as though I had spoken\n    altogether in vain, and I say to myself, What is the good of\n    all your labours, seeing that your hearers don\u2019t want to reap\n    any fruit out of all that you say? And I have often thought of\n    laying down a rule absolutely prohibiting all applause, and\n    urging you to listen in silence.\u201d[201]\n\nAnd there is a passage near the end of Gregory Nazianzen\u2019s greatest\nsermon, in which the human nature of which Chrysostom speaks bursts forth\nwith striking force: after the famous peroration in which after bidding\nfarewell one by one to the church and congregation which he loved, to the\nseveral companies of his fellow-workers, and to the multitudes who had\nthronged to hear him preach, he turns to the court and his opponents the\nArian courtiers\u2014\n\n    \u201cFarewell, princes and palaces, the royal court and\n    household\u2014whether ye be faithful to the king I know not, ye\n    are nearly all of you unfaithful to God.\u201d (There was evidently\n    a burst of applause, and he interrupts his peroration with an\n    impromptu address.) \u201cYes\u2014clap your hands, shout aloud, exalt\n    your orator to heaven: your malicious and chattering tongue has\n    ceased: it will not cease for long: it will fight (though I am\n    absent) with writing and ink: but just for the moment we are\n    silent.\u201d (Then the peroration is resumed.) \u201cFarewell, O great\n    and Christian city....\u201d[202]\n\nI will add only one more instance of the way in which the habits of\nthe sophists flowed into the Christian churches. Christian preachers,\nlike the sophists, were sometimes peripatetic; they went from place to\nplace, delivering their orations and making money by delivering them.\nThe historians Socrates and Sozomen[203] tell an instructive story of\ntwo Syrian bishops, Severianus of Gabala and Antiochus of Ptolemais\n(St. Jean d\u2019Acre). They were both famous for their rhetoric, though\nSeverianus could not quite get rid of his Syrian accent. Antiochus went\nto Constantinople, and stayed there a long time, preaching frequently\nin the churches, and making a good deal of money thereby. On his return\nto Syria, Severianus, hearing about the money, resolved to follow his\nexample: he waited for some time, exercised his rhetoric, got together a\nlarge stock of sermons, and then went to Constantinople. He was kindly\nreceived by the bishop, and soon became both a great popular preacher and\na favourite at court. The fate of many preachers and court favourites\novertook him: he excited great jealousy, was accused of heresy and\nbanished from the city; and only by the personal intercession of the\nEmpress Eudoxia was he received back again into ecclesiastical favour.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSuch are some of the indications of the influence of Greek Rhetoric\nupon the early churches. It created the Christian sermon. It added to\nthe functions of church officers a function which is neither that of\nthe exercise of discipline, nor of administration of the funds, nor\nof taking the lead in public worship, nor of the simple tradition of\nreceived truths, but that of either such an exegesis of the sacred books\nas the Sophists gave of Homer, or such elaborated discourses as they\nalso gave upon the speculative and ethical aspects of religion. The\nresult was more far-reaching than the creation of either an institution\nor a function. If you look more closely into history, you will find that\nRhetoric killed Philosophy. Philosophy died, because for all but a small\nminority it ceased to be real. It passed from the sphere of thought and\nconduct to that of exposition and literature. Its preachers preached,\nnot because they were bursting with truths which could not help finding\nexpression, but because they were masters of fine phrases and lived in\nan age in which fine phrases had a value. It died, in short, because it\nhad become sophistry. But sophistry is of no special age or country. It\nis indigenous to all soils upon which literature grows. No sooner is\nany special form of literature created by the genius of a great writer\nthan there arises a class of men who cultivate the style of it for the\nstyle\u2019s sake. No sooner is any new impulse given either to philosophy or\nto religion than there arises a class of men who copy the form without\nthe substance, and try to make the echo of the past sound like the voice\nof the present. So it has been with Christianity. It came into the\neducated world in the simple dress of a Prophet of Righteousness. It won\nthat world by the stern reality of its life, by the subtle bonds of its\nbrotherhood, by its divine message of consolation and of hope. Around\nit thronged the race of eloquent talkers who persuaded it to change its\ndress and to assimilate its language to their own. It seemed thereby\nto win a speedier and completer victory. But it purchased conquest at\nthe price of reality. With that its progress stopped. There has been an\nelement of sophistry in it ever since; and so far as in any age that\nelement has been dominant, so far has the progress of Christianity been\narrested. Its progress is arrested now, because many of its preachers\nlive in an unreal world. The truths they set forth are truths of\nutterance rather than truths of their lives. But if Christianity is to\nbe again the power that it was in its earliest ages, it must renounce\nits costly purchase. A class of rhetorical chemists would be thought of\nonly to be ridiculed: a class of rhetorical religionists is only less\nanomalous because we are accustomed to it. The hope of Christianity is,\nthat the class which was artificially created may ultimately disappear;\nand that the sophistical element in Christian preaching will melt, as a\ntransient mist, before the preaching of the prophets of the ages to come,\nwho, like the prophets of the ages that are long gone by, will speak only\n\u201cas the Spirit gives them utterance.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE V.\n\nCHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nThe power of generalizing and of forming abstract ideas exists, or at\nleast is exercised, in varying degrees among different races and at\ndifferent times. The peculiar feature of the intellectual history of\nthe Greeks is the rapidity with which the power was developed, and the\nstrength of the grasp which it had upon them.\n\nThe elaboration of one class of such ideas, those of form and quantity,\nled to the formation of a group of sciences, the mathematical sciences,\nwhich hold a permanent place. The earliest and most typical of these\nsciences is geometry. In it, the attention is drawn away from all the\nother characteristics of material things, and fixed upon the single\ncharacteristic of their form. The forms are regarded in themselves. The\nprocess of abstraction or analysis reaches its limit in the point, and\nfrom that limit the mind, making a new departure, begins the process of\nconstruction or synthesis. Complex ideas are formed by the addition of\none simple idea to another, and having been so formed can be precisely\ndefined. Their constituent elements can be distinctly stated, and a clear\nboundary drawn round the whole. They can be so marked off from other\nideas that the idea which one man has formed can be communicated to and\nrepresented in another man\u2019s mind. The inferences which, assuming certain\n\u201caxioms\u201d to be true and certain \u201cpostulates\u201d to be granted, are made by\none man, are accepted by another man or at once disproved. There is no\nquestion of mere probability, nor any halting between two opinions. The\ninferences are not only true but certain.\n\nThe result is, that there are not two sciences of geometry, but one: all\nwho study it are agreed as to both its definitions and its inferences.\n\nThe elaboration of another class of abstract ideas, those of quality,\nmarched at first by a parallel road. To a limited extent such a parallel\nmarch is possible. The words which are used to express sensible\nqualities suggest the same ideas to different minds. They are applied by\ndifferent minds to the same objects. But the limits of such an agreement\nare narrow. When we pass from the abstract ideas of qualities, or\ngeneralizations as to substances, which can be tested by the senses, to\nsuch ideas as those, for example, of courage or justice, law or duty,\nthough the words suggest, on the whole, the same ideas to one man as to\nanother, not all men would uniformly apply the same words to the same\nactions. The phenomena which suggest such ideas assume a different form\nand colour as they are regarded from different points of view. They enter\ninto different combinations. They are not sharply marked out by lines\nwhich would be universally recognized. The attention of different men\nis arrested by different features. There is consequently no universally\nrecognized definition of them. Nor is such a definition possible. The\nideas themselves tend to shade off into their contraries. There is a\nfringe of haze round each of them. The result is that assertions about\nthem vary. There is not one system of philosophy only; there are many.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBetween these two classes of generalizations and abstractions, those\nof quantity and those of quality or substance, many Greek thinkers do\nnot appear to have made any clear distinction. Ideas of each class\nwere regarded as equally capable of being defined; the canons of\ninference which were applicable to the one were conceived to be equally\napplicable to the other: and the certainty of inference and exactness\nof demonstration which were possible in regard to the ideal forms of\ngeometry, were supposed to be also possible in regard to the conceptions\nof metaphysics and ethics.[204]\n\nThe habit of making definitions, and of drawing deductions from them,\nwas fostered by the habit of discussion. Discussion under the name of\ndialectic, which implies that it was but a regulated conversation, had\na large place, not only in the rhetorical and philosophical schools, but\nalso in ordinary Greek life. It was like a game of cards. The game, so\nto speak, was conducted under strict and recognized rules; but it could\nnot proceed unless each card had a determined and admitted value. The\ndefinition of terms was its necessary preliminary; and dialectic helped\nto spread the habit of requiring definitions over a wider area and to\ngive it a deeper root.\n\nThere was less divergence in the definitions themselves than there was\nin the propositions that were deduced from them. That is to say, there\nwas a verbal agreement as to definitions which was not a real agreement\nof ideas: the same words were found on examination to cover different\nareas of thought. But whether the difference lay in the definitions\nthemselves or in the deductions made from them, there was nothing to\ndetermine which of two contrary or contradictory propositions was true.\nThere was no universally recognized standard of appeal, or _criterion_,\nas it was termed. Indeed, the question of the nature of the criterion\nwas one of the chief questions at issue. Consequently, assertions about\nabstract ideas and wide generalizations could only be regarded as the\naffirmations of a personal conviction. The making of such an affirmation\nwas expressed by the same phrase which was used for a resolution of\nthe will\u2014\u201cIt seems to me,\u201d or \u201cIt seems (good) to me\u201d (\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9): the\naffirmation itself, by the corresponding substantive, _dogma_ (\u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1).\nBut just as the resolutions of the will of a monarch were obeyed by his\nsubjects, that is, were adopted as resolutions of the will of other\npersons, so the affirmations of a thinker might be assented to by those\nwho listened to him, that is, might become affirmations of other persons.\nIn the one case as in the other, the same word _dogma_ was employed.[205]\nIt thus came to express (1) a decree, (2) a doctrine. The latter use\ntended to predominate. The word came ordinarily to express an affirmation\nmade by a philosopher which was accepted as true by those who, from the\nfact of so accepting it, became his followers and formed his school.\nThe acquiescence of a large number of men in the same affirmation gave\nto such an affirmation a high degree of probability; but it did not\ncause it to lose its original character of a personal conviction, nor\ndid it afford any guarantee that the coincidence of expression was also\na coincidence of ideas either between the original thinker and his\ndisciples, or between the disciples themselves.[206]\n\nWithin these limits of its original and proper use, and as expressing a\nfact of mind, the word has an indisputable value. But the fact of the\npersonal character of a _dogma_ soon became lost to sight. Two tendencies\nwhich grew with a parallel growth dominated the world in place of the\nrecognition of it. It came to be assumed that certain convictions of\ncertain philosophers were not simply true in relation to the philosophers\nthemselves, and to the state of knowledge in their time, but had a\nuniversal validity: subjective and temporary convictions were thus\nelevated to the rank of objective and eternal truths. It came also to\nbe assumed that the processes of reason so closely followed the order\nof nature, that a system of ideas constructed in strict accordance with\nthe laws of reasoning corresponded exactly with the realities of things.\nThe unity of such a system reflected, it was thought, the unity of the\nworld of objective fact. It followed that the truth or untruth of a given\nproposition was thought to be determined by its logical consistency or\ninconsistency with the sum of previous inferences.\n\nThese tendencies were strongly accentuated by the decay of original\nthinking. Philosophy in later Greece was less thought than literature.\nIt was the exegesis of received doctrines. Philosophers had become\nprofessors. The question of what was in itself true had become entangled\nwith the question of what the Master had said. The moral duty of\nadherence to the traditions of a school was stronger than the moral\nduty of finding the truth at all hazards. The literary expression\nof a doctrine came to be more important than the doctrine itself.\nThe differences of expression between one thinker and another were\nexaggerated. Words became fetishes. Outside the schools were those who\nwere litt\u00e9rateurs rather than philosophers, and who fused different\nelements together into systems which had a greater unity of literary\nform than of logical coherence. But these very facts of the literary\ncharacter of philosophy, and of the contradictions in the expositions of\nit, served to spread it over a wider area. They tended on the one hand to\nbring a literary acquaintance with philosophy into the sphere of general\neducation, and on the other hand to produce a propaganda. Sect rivalled\nsect in trying to win scholars for its school. The result was that the\nordinary life of later Greece was saturated with philosophical ideas, and\nthat the discordant theories of rival schools were blended together in\nthe average mind into a syncretistic dogmatism.\n\nAgainst this whole group of tendencies there was more than one reaction.\nThe tendency to dogmatize was met by the tendency to doubt; and the\ntendency to doubt flowed in many streams, which can with difficulty\nbe traced in minute detail, but whose general course is sufficiently\ndescribed for the ordinary student in the _Academics_ of Cicero. In the\nsecond and third centuries of our era there had come to be three main\ngroups of schools. \u201cSome men,\u201d writes Sextus Empiricus,[207] \u201csay that\nthey have found the truth; some say that it is impossible for truth to\nbe apprehended; some still search for it. The first class consists of\nthose who are specially designated Dogmatics, the followers of Aristotle\nand Epicurus, the Stoics, and some others: the second class consists of\nthe followers of Clitomachus and Carneades, and other Academics: the\nthird class consists of the Sceptics.\u201d They may be distinguished as the\nphilosophy of assertion, the philosophy of denial, and the philosophy of\nresearch.[208] But the first of these was in an overwhelming majority.\nThe Dogmatics, especially in the form either of pure Stoicism or of\nStoicism largely infused with Platonism, were in possession of the field\nof educated thought. It is a convincing proof of the completeness with\nwhich that thought was saturated with their methods and their fundamental\nconceptions, that those methods and conceptions are found even among\nthe philosophers of research who claimed to have wholly disentangled\nthemselves from them.[209]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe philosophy of assertion, the philosophy of denial, and the philosophy\nof research, were all alike outside the earliest forms of Christianity.\nIn those forms the moral and spiritual elements were not only supreme\nbut exclusive. They reflected the philosophy, not of Greece, but of\nPalestine. That philosophy was almost entirely ethical. It dealt with\nthe problems, not of being in the abstract, but of human life. It was\nstated for the most part in short antithetical sentences, with a symbol\nor parable to enforce them. It was a philosophy of proverbs. It had no\neye for the minute anatomy of thought. It had no system, for the sense of\nsystem was not yet awakened. It had no taste for verbal distinctions. It\nwas content with the symmetry of balanced sentences, without attempting\nto construct a perfect whole. It reflected as in a mirror, and not\nunconsciously, the difficulties, the contradictions, the unsolved enigmas\nof the world of fact.\n\nWhen this Palestinian philosophy became more self-conscious than it had\nbeen, it remained still within its own sphere, the enigmas of the moral\nworld were still its subject-matter, and it became in the Fathers of the\nTalmud on the one hand fatalism, and on the other casuistry.\n\nThe earliest forms of Christianity were not only outside the sphere of\nGreek philosophy, but they also appealed, on the one hand, mainly to\nthe classes which philosophy did not reach, and, on the other hand, to\na standard which philosophy did not recognize. \u201cNot many wise men after\nthe flesh\u201d were called in St. Paul\u2019s time: and more than a century\nafterwards, Celsus sarcastically declared the law of admission to the\nChristian communities to be\u2014\u201cLet no educated man enter, no wise man,\nno prudent man, for such things we deem evil; but whoever is ignorant,\nwhoever is unintelligent, whoever is uneducated, whoever is simple,\nlet him come and be welcome.\u201d[210] It proclaimed, moreover, that \u201cthe\nphilosophy of the world was foolishness with God.\u201d It appealed to\nprophecy and to testimony. \u201cInstead of logical demonstration, it produced\nliving witnesses of the words and wonderful doings of Jesus Christ.\u201d The\nphilosophers from the point of view of \u201cworldly education\u201d made sport of\nit: Celsus[211] declared that the Christian teachers were no better than\nthe priests of Mithra or of Hekat\u00e9, leading men wherever they willed with\nthe maxims of a blind belief.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is therefore the more remarkable that within a century and a half\nafter Christianity and philosophy first came into close contact,\nthe ideas and methods of philosophy had flowed in such mass into\nChristianity, and filled so large a place in it, as to have made it no\nless a philosophy than a religion.\n\nThe question which arises, and which should properly be discussed before\nthe influences of particular ideas are traced in particular doctrines,\nis, how this result is to be accounted for as a whole. The answer must\nexplain both how Christianity and philosophy came into contact, and how\nwhen in contact the one exercised upon the other the influence of a\nmoulding force.\n\nThe explanation is to be found in the fact that, in spite of the apparent\nand superficial antagonism, between certain leading ideas of current\nphilosophy and the leading ideas of Christianity there was a special and\nreal kinship. Christianity gave to the problems of philosophy a new\nsolution which was cognate to the old, and to its doubts the certainty\nof a revelation. The kinship of ideas is admitted, and explanations of\nit are offered by both Christian writers and their opponents. \u201cWe teach\nthe same as the Greeks,\u201d says Justin Martyr,[212] \u201cthough we alone are\nhated for what we teach.\u201d \u201cSome of our number,\u201d says Tertullian,[213]\n\u201cwho are versed in ancient literature, have composed books by means\nof which it may be clearly seen that we have embraced nothing new or\nmonstrous, nothing in which we have not the support of common and public\nliterature.\u201d Elsewhere[214] the same writer founds an argument for the\ntoleration of Christianity on the fact that its opponents maintained it\nto be but a kind of philosophy, teaching the very same doctrines as the\nphilosophers\u2014innocence, justice, endurance, soberness, and chastity: he\nclaims on that ground the same liberty for Christians which was enjoyed\nby philosophers.\n\nThe general recognition of this kinship of ideas is even more\nconclusively shown by the fact that explanations of it were offered on\nboth the one side and the other.\n\n(_a_) It was argued by some Christian apologists that the best doctrines\nof philosophy were due to the inworking in the world of the same Divine\nWord who had become incarnate in Jesus Christ. \u201cThe teachings of Plato,\u201d\nsays Justin Martyr,[215] \u201care not alien to those of Christ, though not in\nall respects similar.... For all the writers (of antiquity) were able\nto have a dim vision of realities by means of the indwelling seed of the\nimplanted Word.\u201d It was argued by others that philosophers had borrowed\nor \u201cstolen\u201d their doctrines from the Scriptures. \u201cFrom the divine\npreachings of the prophets,\u201d says Minucius Felix,[216] \u201cthey imitated the\nshadow of half-truths.\u201d \u201cWhat poet or sophist,\u201d says Tertullian,[217]\n\u201chas not drunk at the fountain of the prophets? From thence it is,\ntherefore, that philosophers have quenched the thirst of their minds, so\nthat it is the very things which they have of ours which bring us into\ncomparison with them.\u201d \u201cThey have borrowed from our books,\u201d says Clement\nof Alexandria,[218] \u201cthe chief doctrines they hold, both on faith and\nknowledge and science, on hope and love, on repentance and temperance\nand the fear of God:\u201d and he goes in detail through many doctrines,\nspeculative as well as ethical, either to show that they were borrowed\nfrom revelation, or to uphold the truer thesis that philosophy was no\nless the schoolmaster of the Greeks than the Law was of the Jews to bring\nthem to Christ.\n\n(_b_) It was argued, on the other hand, by the opponents of Christianity\nthat it was a mere mimicry of philosophy or a blurred copy of it. \u201cThey\nweave a web of misunderstandings of the old doctrine,\u201d says Celsus,[219]\n\u201cand sound them forth with a loud trumpet before men, like hierophants\nbooming round those who are being initiated in mysteries.\u201d Christianity\nwas but a misunderstood Platonism. Whatever in it was true had been\nbetter expressed before.[220] Even the striking and distinctive saying\nof the Sermon on the Mount, \u201cWhosoever shall smite thee on thy right\ncheek, turn to him the other also,\u201d was but a coarser and more homely way\nof saying what had been extremely well said by Plato\u2019s Socrates.[221]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt was through this kinship of ideas that Christianity was readily\nabsorbed by some of the higher natures in the Greek world. The two\nclasses of ideas probably came into contact in philosophical Judaism.\nFor it is clear on the one hand that the Jews of the dispersion had a\nliterature, and on the other hand that that literature was clothing\nitself in Greek forms and attracting the attention of the Greek world.\nSome of that literature was philosophical. In the Sibylline verses, the\npoem of Phocylides, and the letters of Heraclitus, there is a blending of\ntheology and ethics: in some of the writings which are ascribed to Philo,\nbut which in reality bridge the interval between Philo and the Christian\nFathers, there is a blending of theology and metaphysics. None of them\nare \u201cvery far from the kingdom of God.\u201d The hypothesis that they paved\nthe way for Christian philosophy is confirmed by the fact that in the\nfirst articulate expressions of that philosophy precisely those elements\nare dominant which were dominant in Jewish philosophy. Two such elements\nmay specially be mentioned: (1) the allegorical method of interpretation\nwhich was common to both Jews and Greeks, and by means of which both the\nGnostics who were without, and the Alexandrians who were within, the pale\nof the associated communities, were able to find their philosophy in the\nOld Testament as well as in the New; (2) the cosmological speculations,\nwhich occupied only a small space in the thoughts of earlier Greek\nthinkers, but which were already widening to a larger circle on the\nsurface of Greek philosophy, and which became so prominent in the first\nChristian philosophies as to have thrust aside almost all other elements\nin the current representations of them.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Christian philosophy which thus rose out of philosophical Judaism\nwas partly apologetic and partly speculative. The apologetic part of\nit arose from the necessity of defence. The educated world tended to\nscout Christianity when it was first presented to them, as an immoral\nand barbarous atheism. It was necessary to show that it was neither the\none nor the other. The defence naturally fell into the hands of those\nChristians who were versed in Greek methods; and they not less naturally\nsought for points of agreement rather than of difference, and presented\nChristian truths in a Greek form. The speculative part of it arose from\nsome of its elements having found an especial affinity with some of the\nnew developments of Pythagoreanism and Platonism. Inside the original\ncommunities were men who began to build great edifices of speculation\nupon the narrow basis of one or other of the pinnacles of the Christian\ntemple; and outside those communities were men who began to coalesce into\ncommunities which had the same moral aims as the original communities,\nand which appealed in the main to the same authorities, but in which\nthe simpler forms of worship were elaborated into a thaumaturgic ritual,\nand the solid facts of Scripture history evaporated into mist. They were\nlinked on the one hand with the cults of the Greek mysteries, and on the\nother with philosophical idealism. The tendency to conceive of abstract\nideas as substances, with form and real existence, received in them its\nextreme development. Wisdom and vice, silence and desire, were real\nbeings: they were not, as they had been to earlier thinkers, mere thin\nvapours which had floated upwards from the world of sensible existences,\nand hung like clouds in an uncertain twilight. The real world was indeed\nnot the world of sensible existences, of thoughts and utterances about\nsensible things, but a world in which sensible existences were the\nshadows and not the substance, the waves and not the sea.[222]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt was natural that those who held to the earlier forms of Christianity\nshould take alarm. \u201cI am not unaware,\u201d says Clement of Alexandria, in\nsetting forth the design of his _Stromateis_,[223] \u201cof what is dinned\nin our ears by the ignorant timidity of those who tell us that we\nought to occupy ourselves with the most necessary matters, those in\nwhich the Faith consists: and that we should pass by the superfluous\nmatters that lie outside them, which vex and detain us in vain over\npoints that contribute nothing to the end in view. There are others\nwho think that philosophy will prove to have been introduced into life\nfrom an evil source, at the hands of a mischievous inventor, for the\nruin of men.\u201d \u201cThe simpler-minded,\u201d says Tertullian,[224] \u201cnot to say\nignorant and unlearned men, who always form the majority of believers,\nare frightened at the Economy\u201d [the philosophical explanation of the\ndoctrine of the Trinity]. \u201cThese men,\u201d says a contemporary writer,[225]\nof some of the early philosophical schools at Rome, \u201chave fearlessly\nperverted the divine Scriptures, and set aside the rule of the ancient\nfaith, and have not known Christ, seeking as they do, not what the divine\nScriptures say, but what form of syllogism may be found to support their\ngodlessness; and if one advances any express statement of the divine\nScripture, they try to find out whether it can form a conjunctive or a\ndisjunctive hypothetical. And having deserted the holy Scriptures of God,\nthey study geometry, being of the earth and speaking of the earth, and\nignoring Him who comes from above. Some of them, at any rate, give their\nminds to Euclid: some of them are admiring disciples of Aristotle and\nTheophrastus: as for Galen, some of them go so far as actually to worship\nhim.\u201d\n\nThe history of the second century is the history of the clash and\nconflict between these new mystical and philosophical elements of\nChristianity and its earlier forms. On the one hand were the majority\nof the original communities, holding in the main the conception of\nChristianity which probably finds its best contemporary exposition in the\nfirst two books of the Apostolical Constitutions, a religion of stern\nmoral practice and of strict moral discipline, of the simple love of\nGod and the unelaborated faith in Jesus Christ. On the other hand were\nthe new communities, and the new members of the older communities, with\ntheir conception of knowledge side by side with faith, and with their\ntendency to speculate side by side with their acceptance of tradition.\nThe conflict was inevitable. In the current state of educated opinion it\nwould have been as impossible for the original communities to ignore the\nexistence of philosophical elements either in their own body, or in the\nnew communities which were growing up around them, as it would be for the\nChristian churches of our own day to ignore physical science. The result\nof the conflict was, that the extreme wing of each of the contending\nparties dropped off from the main body. The old-fashioned Christians, who\nwould admit of no compromise, and maintained the old usages unchanged,\nwere gradually detached as Ebionites, or Nazar\u00e6ans. The old orthodoxy\nbecame a new heresy. In the lists of the early hand-books they are ranked\nas the first heretics. The more philosophical Gnostics also passed one\nby one outside the Christian lines. Their ideas gradually lost their\nChristian colour. They lived in another, but non-Christian, form. The\ntrue Gnostic, though he repudiates the name, is Plotinus. The logical\ndevelopment of the thoughts of Basilides and Justin, of Valentinus and\nthe Naassenes, is to be found in Neo-Platonism\u2014that splendid vision\nof incomparable and irrecoverable cloudland in which the sun of Greek\nphilosophy set.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe struggle really ended, as almost all great conflicts end, in a\ncompromise. There was apparently so complete a victory of the original\ncommunities and of the principles which they embodied, that their\nopponents seem to vanish from Christian literature and Christian history.\nIt was in reality a victory in which the victors were the vanquished.\nThere was so large an absorption by the original communities of the\nprinciples of their opponents as to destroy the main reason for a\nseparate existence. The absorption was less of speculations than of the\ntendency to speculate. The residuum of permanent effect was mainly a\ncertain habit of mind. This is at once a consequence and a proof of the\ngeneral argument which has been advanced above, that certain elements of\neducation in philosophy had been so widely diffused, and in the course of\ncenturies had become so strongly rooted, as to have caused an instinctive\ntendency to throw ideas into a philosophical form, and to test assertions\nby philosophical canons. The existence of such a tendency is shown in\nthe first instance by the mode in which the earliest \u201cdefenders of the\nfaith\u201d met their opponents; and the supposition that it was instinctive\nis a legitimate inference from the fact that it was unconscious. For\nTatian,[226] though he ridicules Greek philosophy and professes to have\nabandoned it, yet builds up theories of the Logos, of free-will, and\nof the nature of spirit, out of the elements of current philosophical\nconceptions. Tertullian, though he asks,[227] \u201cWhat resemblance is there\nbetween a philosopher and a Christian, between a disciple of Greece\nand a disciple of heaven?\u201d expresses Christian truths in philosophical\nterms, and argues against his opponents\u2014for example, against Marcion\u2014by\nmethods which might serve as typical examples of the current methods of\ncontroversy between philosophical schools. And Hippolytus,[228] though\nhe reproves another Christian writer for listening to Gentile teaching,\nand so disobeying the injunction, \u201cGo not into the way of the Gentiles,\u201d\nis himself saturated with philosophical conceptions and philosophical\nliterature.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe answer, in short, to the main question which has been before us is\nthat Christianity came into a ground which was already prepared for\nit. Education was widely diffused over the Greek world, and among all\nclasses of the community. It had not merely aroused the habit of inquiry\nwhich is the foundation of philosophy, but had also taught certain\nphilosophical methods. Certain elements of the philosophical temper had\ncome into existence on a large scale, penetrating all classes of society\nand inwrought into the general intellectual fibre of the time. They had\nproduced a certain habit of mind. When, through the kinship of ideas,\nChristianity had been absorbed by the educated classes, the habit of\nmind which had preceded it remained and dominated. It showed itself\nmainly in three ways:\n\n1. The first of these was the tendency to define. The earliest Christians\nhad been content to believe in God and to worship Him, without\nendeavouring to define precisely the conception of Him which lay beneath\ntheir faith and their worship. They looked up to Him as their Father in\nheaven. They thought of Him as one, as beneficent, and as supreme. But\nthey drew no fence of words round their idea of Him, and still less did\nthey attempt to demonstrate by processes of reason that their idea of Him\nwas true. But there is an anecdote quoted with approval by Eusebius[229]\nfrom Rhodon, a controversialist of the latter part of the second century,\nwhich furnishes a striking proof of the growing strength at that time\nof the philosophical temper. It relates the main points of a short\ncontroversy between Rhodon and Apelles. Apelles was in some respects in\nsympathy with Marcion, and in some respects followed the older Christian\ntradition. He refused to be drawn into the new philosophizing current;\nand Rhodon attacked him for his conservatism. \u201cHe was often refuted for\nhis errors, which indeed made him say that we ought not to inquire too\nclosely into doctrine; but that as every one had believed, so he should\nremain. For he declared that those who set their hopes on the Crucified\nOne would be saved, if only they were found in good works. But the most\nuncertain thing of all that he said was what he said about God. He held\nno doubt that there is One Principle, just as we hold too: but when I\nsaid to him, \u2018Tell us how you demonstrate that, or on what grounds you\nare able to assert that there is One Principle,\u2019 ... he said that he did\nnot know, but that that was his conviction. When I thereupon adjured him\nto tell the truth, he swore that he was telling the truth, that he did\nnot know _how_ there is one unbegotten God, but that nevertheless so\nhe believed. Then I laughed at him and denounced him, for that, giving\nhimself out to be a teacher, he did not know how to prove what he taught.\u201d\n\n2. The second manifestation of the philosophical habit of mind was the\ntendency to speculate, that is, to draw inferences from definitions,\nto weave the inferences into systems, and to test assertions by their\nlogical consistency or inconsistency with those systems. The earliest\nChristians had but little conception of a system. The inconsistency of\none apparently true statement with another did not vex their souls. Their\nbeliefs reflected the variety of the world and of men\u2019s thoughts about\nthe world. It was one of the secrets of the first great successes of\nChristianity. There were different and apparently irreconcilable elements\nin it. It appealed to men of various mould. It furnished a basis for\nthe construction of strangely diverse edifices. But the result of the\nascendency of philosophy was, that in the fourth and fifth centuries\nthe majority of churches insisted not only upon a unity of belief in\nthe fundamental facts of Christianity, but also upon a uniformity of\nspeculations in regard to those facts. The premises of those speculations\nwere assumed; the conclusions logically followed: the propositions which\nwere contrary or contradictory to them were measured, not by the greater\nor less probability of the premises, but by the logical certainty of the\nconclusions; and symmetry became a test of truth.\n\n3. The new habit of mind manifested itself not less in the importance\nwhich came to be attached to it. The holding of approved opinions was\nelevated to a position at first co-ordinate with, and at last superior\nto, trust in God and the effort to live a holy life. There had been\nindeed from the first an element of knowledge in the conception of the\nmeans of salvation. The knowledge of the facts of the life of Jesus\nChrist necessarily precedes faith in him. But under the touch of Greek\nphilosophy, knowledge had become speculation: whatever obligation\nattached to faith in its original sense was conceived to attach to it\nin its new sense: the new form of knowledge was held to be not less\nnecessary than the old.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Western communities not only took over the greater part of the\ninheritance, but also proceeded to assume in a still greater degree the\ncorrespondence of ideas with realities, and of inferences about ideas\nwith truths about realities. It added such large groups to the sum of\nthem, that in the dogmatic theology of Latin and Teutonic Christendom\nthe content is more Western than Eastern. But the conception of such\na theology and its underlying assumptions are Greek. They come from\nthe Greek tendency to attach the same certainty to metaphysical as to\nphysical ideas. They are in reality built upon a quicksand. There is no\nmore reason to suppose that God has revealed metaphysics than that He has\nrevealed chemistry. The Christian revelation is, at least primarily, a\nsetting forth of certain facts. It does not in itself afford a guarantee\nof the certainty of the speculations which are built upon those facts.\nAll such speculations are _dogmas_ in the original sense of the word.\nThey are simply personal convictions. To the statement of one man\u2019s\nconvictions other men may assent: but they can never be quite sure that\nthey understand its terms in the precise sense in which the original\nframer of the statement understood them.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe belief that metaphysical theology is more than this, is the chief\nbequest of Greece to religious thought, and it has been a _damnosa\nhereditas_. It has given to later Christianity that part of it which is\ndoomed to perish, and which yet, while it lives, holds the key of the\nprison-house of many souls.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VI.\n\nGREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.\n\n\nIt has been common to construct pictures of the state of morals in the\nfirst centuries of the Christian era from the statements of satirists\nwho, like all satirists, had a large element of caricature, and from the\ndenunciations of the Christian apologists, which, like all denunciations,\nhave a large element of exaggeration. The pictures so constructed are\nmosaics of singular vices, and they have led to the not unnatural\nimpression that those centuries constituted an era of exceptional\nwickedness. It is no doubt difficult to gauge the average morality of\nany age. It is questionable whether the average morality of civilized\nages has largely varied: it is possible that if the satirists of our own\ntime were equally outspoken, the vices of ancient Rome might be found to\nhave a parallel in modern London; and it is probable, not on merely _\u00e0\npriori_ grounds, but from the nature of the evidence which remains, that\nthere was in ancient Rome, as there is in modern London, a preponderating\nmass of those who loved their children and their homes, who were good\nneighbours and faithful friends, who conscientiously discharged their\ncivil duties, and were in all the current senses of the word \u201cmoral\u201d\nmen.[230]\n\nIt has also been common to frame statements of the moral philosophy\nwhich dominated in those centuries, entirely from the data afforded by\nearlier writers, and to account for the existence of nobler elements\nin contemporary writers by the hypothesis that Seneca, Epictetus, and\nMarcus Aurelius, had come into contact with Christian teachers. In the\ncase of Seneca, the belief in such contact went so far as to induce a\nwriter in an imitative age to produce a series of letters which are\nstill commonly printed at the end of his works, and which purport to be\na correspondence between him and St. Paul. It is difficult, no doubt,\nto prove the negative proposition that such writers did not come into\ncontact with Christianity; but a strong presumption against the idea that\nsuch contact, if it existed, influenced to any considerable extent their\nethical principles, is established by the demonstrable fact that those\nprinciples form an integral part of their whole philosophical system, and\nthat their system is in close logical and historical connection with that\nof their philosophical predecessors.[231]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt will be found on a closer examination that the age in which\nChristianity grew was in reality an age of moral reformation. There\nwas the growth of a higher religious morality, which believed that God\nwas pleased by moral action rather than by sacrifice.[232] There was\nthe growth of a belief that life requires amendment.[233] There was a\nreaction in the popular mind against the vices of the great centres\nof population. This is especially seen in the large multiplication of\nreligious guilds, in which purity of life was a condition of membership:\nit prepared the minds of men to receive Christian teaching, and forms not\nthe least important among the causes which led to the rapid dissemination\nof that teaching: it affected the development of Christianity in\nthat the members of the religious guilds who did so accept Christian\nteaching, brought over with them into the Christian communities many of\nthe practices of their guilds and of the conceptions which lay beneath\nthem. The philosophical phase of the reformation began on the confines\nof Stoicism and Cynicism. For Cynicism had revived. It had almost faded\ninto insignificance after Zeno and Chrysippus had formed its nobler\nelements into a new system, and left only its \u201cdog-bark\u201d[234] and its\nsqualor. But when the philosophical descendants of Zeno and Chrysippus\nhad become fashionable _litt\u00e9rateurs_, and had sunk independence of\nthought and practice in a respectability and \u201cworldly conformity\u201d which\nthe more earnest men felt to be intolerable, Cynicism revived, or rather\nthe earlier and better Stoicism revived, to re-assert the paramount\nimportance of moral conduct, and to protest against the unnatural\nalliance between philosophy and the fashionable world.\n\nIt is to this moral reformation within the philosophical sphere that\nI wish especially to draw your attention. Its chief preacher was\nEpictetus. He was ranked among the Stoics; but his portrait of an ideal\nphilosopher is the portrait of a Cynic.[235] In him, whether he be\ncalled Stoic or Cynic, the ethics of the ancient world find at once\ntheir loftiest expression and their most complete realization: and it\nwill be an advantage, instead of endeavouring to construct a composite\nand comprehensive picture from all the available materials, to limit our\nview mainly to what Epictetus says, and, as far as possible, to let his\nsermons speak for themselves.\n\nThe reformation affected chiefly two points: (1) the place of ethics in\nrelation to philosophy and life; (2) the contents of ethical teaching.\n\n1. The Stoics of the later Republic and of the age of the C\u00e6sars had\ncome to give their chief attention to logic and literature. The study of\nethics was no longer supreme; and it had changed its character. Logic,\nwhich in the systems of Zeno and Chrysippus had been only its servant,\nwas becoming its master: it was both usurping its place and turning it\ninto casuistry. The study of literature, of what the great masters of\nphilosophy had taught, was superseding the moral practice which such\nstudy was intended to help and foster. The Stoics of the time could\nconstruct ingenious fallacies and compose elegant moral discourses; but\nthey were ceasing to regard the actual \u201cliving according to nature\u201d\nas the main object of their lives. The revival of Cynicism was a\nre-assertion of the supremacy of ethics over logic, and of conduct over\nliterary knowledge. It was at first crude and repulsive. If the Stoics\nwere \u201cthe preachers of the _salon_,\u201d the Cynics were \u201cthe preachers of\nthe street.\u201d[236] They were the mendicant friars of imperial times. They\nwere earnest, but they were squalid. The earnestness was of the essence,\nthe squalor was accidental. The former was absorbed by Stoicism and gave\nit a new impulse: the latter dropped off as an excrescence when Cynicism\nwas tested by time. Epictetus was not carried as far as the Cynics\nwere in the reaction against Logic. The Cynics would have postponed\nthe study of it indefinitely. Moral reformation is more pressing, they\nsaid.[237] Epictetus holds to the necessity of the study of Logic as a\nprophylactic against the deceitfulness of arguments and the plausibility\nof language. But he deprecates the exaggerated importance which had come\nto be attached to it. The students of his day were giving an altogether\ndisproportionate attention to the weaving of fallacious arguments and\nthe mere setting of traps to catch men in their speech. He would restore\nLogic to its original subordination. Neither it nor the whole dogmatic\nphilosophy of which it was the instrument was of value in itself. And\nmoreover, whatever might be the place of such knowledge in an abstract\nsystem and in an ideal world, it was impossible to disregard the actual\nconditions of the world as it is. The state of human nature is such, that\nto linger upon the threshold of philosophy is to induce a moral torpor.\nThe student who aims at shaping his reason into harmony with nature has\nto begin, not with unformed and plastic material, which he can fashion to\nhis will by systematic rules of art, but with his nature as it is shaped\nalready, almost beyond possibility of unshaping, by pernicious habits,\nand beguiling associations of ideas, and false opinions about good and\nevil. While you are teaching him logic and physics, the very evils which\nit is his object to remedy will be gathering fresh strength. The old\nfamiliar names of \u201cgood\u201d and \u201cevil,\u201d with all the false ideas which they\nsuggest, will be giving birth at every moment to mistaken judgments and\nwrong actions, to all the false pleasures and false pains which it is the\nvery purpose of philosophy to destroy. He must begin, as he must end,\nwith practice. He must accept precepts and act upon them before he learns\nthe theory of them. His progress in philosophy must be measured by his\nprogress, not in knowledge, but in moral conduct.\n\nThis view, which Epictetus preaches again and again with passionate\nfervour, will be best stated in his own words:[238]\n\n    \u201cA man who is making progress, having learnt from the\n    philosophers that desire has good things for its object and\n    undesire evil things,\u2014having learnt moreover that in no\n    other way can contentment and dispassionateness come to a man\n    than by his never failing of the object of his desire and\n    never encountering the object of undesire,\u2014banishes the one\n    altogether, or at least postpones it, while he allows the\n    other to act only in regard to those things which are within\n    the province of the will. For he knows that if he strives not\n    to have things that are without the province of the will, he\n    will some time or other encounter some such things and so be\n    unhappy. But if what moral perfection professes is to cause\n    happiness and dispassionateness and peace of mind, then of\n    course progress towards moral perfection is progress towards\n    each one of the things which moral perfection professes to\n    secure. For in all cases progress is the approaching to that to\n    which perfection finally brings us.\n\n    \u201cHow is it, then, that while we admit this to be the definition\n    of moral perfection, we seek and show off progress in other\n    things? What is the effect of moral perfection?\n\n    \u201c\u2018Peace of mind?\u2019\n\n    \u201cWho then is making progress towards it? He who has read many\n    treatises of Chrysippus? Surely moral perfection does not\n    consist in this\u2014in understanding Chrysippus: if it does, then\n    confessedly progress towards moral perfection is nothing else\n    than understanding a good deal of Chrysippus. But as it is,\n    while we admit that moral perfection effects one thing, we make\n    progress\u2014the approximation to perfection\u2014effect another.\n\n    \u201c\u2018This man,\u2019 some one tells us, \u2018can now read Chrysippus even\n    by himself.\u2019\n\n    \u201c\u2018You are most assuredly making splendid progress, my friend,\u2019\n    he tells him.\n\n    \u201cProgress indeed! why do you make game of him? Why do you lead\n    him astray from the consciousness of his misfortunes? Will you\n    not show him what the effect of moral perfection is, that he\n    may learn where to look for progress towards it?\n\n    \u201cLook for progress, my poor friend, in the direction of the\n    effect which you have to produce. And what is the effect which\n    you have to produce? Never to be disappointed of the object\n    of your desire, and never to encounter the object of your\n    undesire: never to miss the mark in your endeavours to do and\n    not to do: never to be deceived in your assent and suspension\n    of assent. The first of these is the primary and most necessary\n    point: for if it is with trembling and reluctance that you seek\n    to avoid falling into evil, how can you be said to be making\n    progress?\n\n    \u201cIt is in these respects, then, that I ask you to show me\n    your progress. If I were to say to an athlete, \u2018Show me your\n    muscles,\u2019 and he were to say, \u2018See here are my dumb-bells,\u2019 I\n    should reply, \u2018Begone with your dumb-bells! What I want to see\n    is, not them, but their effect.\u2019 (And yet that is just what you\n    do:) \u2018Take the treatise _On Effort_\u2019 (you say), \u2018and examine me\n    in it.\u2019 Slave! that is not what I want to know; but rather how\n    you endeavour to do or not to do\u2014how you desire to have and not\n    to have\u2014how you form your plans and purposes and preparations\n    for action\u2014whether you do all this in harmony with nature or\n    not. If you do so in accordance with nature, show me that you\n    do so, and I will say that you are making progress; but if not,\n    begone, and do not merely interpret books, but write similar\n    ones yourself besides. And what will you gain by it? Don\u2019t you\n    know that the whole book costs five shillings, and do you think\n    the man who interprets the book is worth more than the book\n    itself costs?\n\n    \u201cNever, then, look for the effect (of philosophy) in one place,\n    and progress towards that effect in another.\n\n    \u201cWhere, then, is progress to be looked for? If any one of you,\n    giving up his allegiance to things outside him, has devoted\n    himself entirely to his will\u2014to cultivating and elaborating\n    it so as to make it at last in harmony with nature, lofty,\n    free, unthwarted, unhindered, conscientious, self-respectful:\n    if he has learned that one who longs for or shuns what is not\n    in his power can neither be conscientious nor free, but must\n    be carried along with the changes and gusts of things\u2014must be\n    at the mercy of those who can produce or prevent them: if,\n    moreover, from the moment when he rises in the morning he keeps\n    watch and guard over these qualities of his soul\u2014bathes like\n    a man of honour, eats like a man who respects himself\u2014through\n    all the varying incidents of each successive hour working out\n    his one great purpose, as a runner makes all things help his\n    running, and a singing-master his teaching:\u2014this man is making\n    progress in very truth\u2014this man is one who has not left home in\n    vain.\n\n    \u201cBut if, on the other hand, he is wholly bent upon and labours\n    at what is found in books, and has left home with a view to\n    acquiring that, I tell him to go home again at once, and not\n    neglect whatever business he may have there: for the object\n    which has brought him away from home is a worthless one. This\n    only (is worth anything), to study to banish from one\u2019s life\n    sorrows and lamentations and \u2018Alas!\u2019 and \u2018Wretched me!\u2019 and\n    misfortune and failure\u2014and to learn what death really is, and\n    exile and imprisonment and the hemlock-draught, so as to be\n    able to say in the prison, \u2018My dear Crito, if so it please the\n    gods, so let it be.\u2019\u201d\n\nThis new or revived conception of philosophy as the science of human\nconduct, as having for its purpose the actual reformation of mankind,\nhad already led to the view that in the present state of human nature\nthe study and practice of it required special kinds of effort. It was\nnot only the science but also the art of life.[239] It formed, as such,\nno exception to the rule that all arts require systematic and habitual\ntraining. Just as the training of the muscles which is necessary to\nperfect bodily development is effected by giving them one by one an\nartificial and for the time an exaggerated exercise, so the training of\nthe moral powers was effected, not by reading the rules and committing\nthem to memory, but by giving them a similarly artificial and exaggerated\nexercise. A kind of moral gymnastic was necessary. The aim of it was to\nbring the passions under the control of reason, and to bring the will\ninto harmony with the will of God.\n\n(1) This special discipline of life was designated by the term which\nwas in use for bodily training, _askesis_ (\u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2).[240] It is\nfrequently used in this relation in Philo. He distinguishes three\nelements in the process of attaining goodness\u2014nature, learning,\ndiscipline.[241] He distinguishes those who discipline themselves in\nwisdom by means of actual works, from those who have only a literary\nand intellectual knowledge of it.[242] He holds that the greatest and\nmost numerous blessings that a man can have come from the gymnastic of\nmoral efforts.[243] Its elements are \u201creading, meditation, reformation,\nthe memory of noble ideals, self-restraint, the active practice of\nduties:\u201d[244] in another passage he adds to these _prayer_, and the\nrecognition of the indifference of things that are indifferent.[245]\nIn the second century, when the idea of moral reformation had taken a\nstronger hold, this moral discipline was evidently carried out under\nsystematic rules. It was not left to a student\u2019s option. He must undergo\nhardships, drinking water rather than wine, sleeping on the ground rather\nthan on a bed; and sometimes even subjecting himself to austerities,\nbeing scourged and bound with chains. There was sometimes no ostentation\nof endurance. Marcus Aurelius says that he owed it to Rusticus that he\ndid not show off with a striking display either his acts of benevolence\nor his moral exercises.[246] \u201cIf you drink water,\u201d says Epictetus in his\nStudent\u2019s Manual,[247] \u201cdon\u2019t take every opportunity of saying, I drink\nwater.... And if you resolve to exercise yourself in toil and hardship,\ndo it for yourself alone, and not for the world outside. Don\u2019t embrace\nstatues (in public, to cool yourself); but if ever your thirst become\nextreme, fill your mouth with cold water and put it out again\u2014_and tell\nno one_.\u201d Epictetus himself preferred that men should be disciplined, not\nby bodily hardships, but by the voluntary repression of desire. The true\n\u201cascetic\u201d is he who disciplines himself against all the suggestions of\nevil desire:[248] \u201can object of desire comes into sight: wait, poor soul;\ndo not straightway be carried off your feet by it: consider, the contest\nis great, the task is divine; it is for kingship, for freedom, for calm,\nfor undisturbedness. Think of God: call Him to be your helper and to\nstand by your side, as sailors call upon Castor and Pollux in a storm:\nfor yours is a storm, the greatest of all storms, the storm of strong\nsuggestions that sweep reason away.\u201d In a similar way Lucian\u2019s friend\nNigrinus condemns those who endeavour to fashion young men to virtue by\ngreat bodily hardships rather than by a mingled discipline of body and\nmind: and Lucian himself says that he knew of some who had died under the\nexcessive strain.[249]\n\nThis moral gymnastic, it was thought, was often best practised away from\na man\u2019s old associations. Consequently some philosophers advised their\nstudents to leave home and study elsewhere. They went into \u201cretreat,\u201d\neither in another city or in solitude. Against this also there was a\nreaction. In a forcible oration on the subject, Dio Chrysostom argues, as\na modern Protestant might argue, against the monastic system.[250] \u201cC\u0153lum\nnon animum mutant,\u201d he says, in effect, when they go from city to city.\nEverywhere a man will find the same hindrances both within and without:\nhe will be only like a sick man changing from one bed to another. The\ntrue discipline is to live in a crowd and not heed its noise, to train\nthe soul to follow reason without swerving, and not to \u201cretreat\u201d from\nthat which seems to be the immediate duty before us.\n\nThe extent to which moral discipline and the system of \u201cretreats\u201d went\non is uncertain, because they soon blended, as we shall see, with\nChristianity, and flowed with it in a single stream.\n\n(2) But out of the ideas which they expressed, and the ideals which they\nheld forth, there grew up a class of men which has never since died\nout, who devoted themselves \u201cboth by their preaching and living\u201d to the\nmoral reformation of mankind. Individual philosophers had had imitators,\nand Pythagoras had founded an ascetic school, but neither the one nor\nthe other had filled a large place in contemporary society. With the\nrevived conception of philosophy as necessarily involving practice, it\nwas necessary that those who professed philosophy should be marked out\nfrom the perverted and degenerate world around them, in their outer as\nwell as in their inner life. \u201cThe life of one who practises philosophy,\u201d\nsays Dio Chrysostom, \u201cis different from that of the mass of men: the very\ndress of such a one is different from that of ordinary men, and his bed\nand exercise and baths and all the rest of his living. A man who in none\nof these respects differs from the rest must be put down as one of them,\nthough he declare and profess that he is a philosopher before all Athens\nor Megara or in the presence of the Laced\u00e6monian kings.\u201d[251]\n\nThe distinction was marked in two chief ways:\n\n(1) A philosopher let his beard grow, like the old Spartans. It was a\nprotest against the elaborate attention to the person which marked the\nfashionable society of the time.\n\n(2) A philosopher wore a coarse blanket, usually as his only dress. It\nwas at once a protest against the prevalent luxury in dress and the badge\nof his profession. \u201cWhenever,\u201d says Dio Chrysostom, \u201cpeople see one in\na philosopher\u2019s dress, they consider that he is thus equipped not as a\nsailor or a shepherd, but with a view to men, to warn them and rebuke\nthem, and to give not one of them any whit of flattery nor to spare any\none of them, but, on the contrary, to reform them as far as he possibly\ncan by talking to them and to show them who they are.\u201d[252]\n\nThe frequency with which this new class of moral reformers is mentioned\nin the literature of the time shows the large place which it filled.\n\n2. The moral reformation affected the contents of ethical teaching\nchiefly by raising them from the sphere of moral philosophy to that of\nreligion. In Epictetus there are two planes of ethical teaching. The one\nis that of orthodox and traditional Stoicism: in the other, Stoicism is\ntransformed by the help of religious conceptions, and the forces which\nled to the practice of it receive the enormous impulse which comes from\nthe religious emotions. The one is summed up in the maxim, Follow Nature;\nthe other in the maxim, Follow God.\n\nOn the lower plane the purpose of philosophy is stated in various\nways, each of which expresses the same fact. It is the bringing of the\nwill into harmony with nature. It consists in making the \u201cdealing with\nideas\u201d what it should be, that is, in dealing with them according to\nnature.[253] It is the thorough study of the conceptions of good and\nevil, and the right application of them to particular objects.[254] It\nis the endeavour to make the will unthwarted in its action,[255] to\ntake sorrow and disappointment out of a man\u2019s life,[256] and to change\nits disturbed torrent into a calm and steady stream. The result of the\npractice of philosophy is happiness.[257] The means of attaining that\nresult are marked out by the constitution of human nature itself and the\ncircumstances which surround it. That nature manifests itself in two\nforms, desires to have or not to have, efforts to do or not to do.[258]\nThe one is stimulated by the presentation to the mind of an object which\nis judged to be \u201cgood,\u201d the other by that of one which is judged to be\n\u201cfitting.\u201d The one mainly concerns the individual man in himself, the\nother concerns him in his relations with other men. The \u201cstate according\nto nature\u201d of desire is that in which it never fails of gratification,\nthe corresponding state of effort is that in which it never fails of its\nmark. Both the one and the other are determined by landmarks which nature\nitself has set in the circumstances that surround us. The natural limits\nof desire are those things that are in our power: the direction of\neffort is determined by our natural relations.\n\nFor example:[259]\n\n    \u201cBear in mind that you are a son. What is involved in being a\n    son? To consider all that he has to be his father\u2019s property,\n    to obey him in all things, never to disparage him to any one,\n    never to say or do anything to harm him, to stand out of his\n    way and give place to him in all things, to help him by all\n    means in his power.\n\n    \u201cNext remember that you are also a brother: the doing of\n    what is fitting in this capacity involves giving way to him,\n    yielding to his persuasion, speaking well of him, never setting\n    up a rival claim to him in those things that are beyond the\n    control of the will, but gladly letting them go that you may\n    have the advantage in those things which the will controls.\n\n    \u201cNext, if you are a senator of any city, remember that you are\n    a senator: if a youth, that you are a youth: if an old man,\n    that you are an old man: if a father, that you are a father.\n    For in each of these cases the consideration of the name you\n    bear will suggest to you what is fitting to be done in relation\n    to it.\u201d\n\nThis view of right moral conduct as being determined by the natural\nrelations in which one man stands to another, and as constituting what is\nFitting in regard to those relations, had overspread the Roman world. But\nin that world the philosophical theory which lay behind the conception\nof the Fitting was less prominent than the conception itself, and two\nother terms, both of which were natural and familiar to the Roman mind,\ncame into use to express it. The one was borrowed from the idea of the\nfunctions which men have to discharge in the organization of civil\ngovernment, the other from the idea of a debt. The former of these,\n\u201c_officium_,\u201d has not passed in this sense outside the Latin language:\nthe latter, \u201c_debitum_,\u201d is familiar to us under its English form \u201cduty.\u201d\n\nOn the higher plane of his teaching Epictetus expresses moral philosophy\nin terms of theology. Human life begins and ends in God. Moral conduct\nis a sublime religion. I will ask you to listen to a short _cento_ of\npassages, strung loosely together, in which his teaching is expressed:\u2014\n\n    \u201c\u2018We also are His offspring.\u2019 Every one of us may call himself\n    a son of God.[260] Just as our bodies are linked to the\n    material universe,[261] subject while we live to the same\n    forces, resolved when we die into the same elements,[262] so by\n    virtue of reason our souls are linked to and continuous with\n    Him, being in reality parts and offshoots of Him.[263] There is\n    no movement of which He is not conscious, because we and He are\n    part of one birth and growth;[264] to Him \u2018all hearts are open,\n    all desires known;\u2019[265] as we walk or talk or eat, He Himself\n    is within us, so that we are His shrines, living temples and\n    incarnations of Him.[266] By virtue of this communion with Him\n    we are in the first rank of created things:[267] we and He\n    together form the greatest and chiefest and most comprehensive\n    of all organizations.[268]\n\n    \u201cIf we once realize this kinship, no mean or unworthy thought\n    of ourselves can enter our souls.[269] The sense of it forms\n    a rule and standard for our lives. If God be faithful, we\n    also must be faithful: if God be beneficent, we also must be\n    beneficent. If God be highminded, we also must be highminded,\n    doing and saying whatever we do and say in imitation of and\n    union with Him.[270]\n\n    \u201cWhy did He make us?\n\n    \u201cHe made us, first of all, to complete His conception of the\n    universe: He had need for such completion of some beings who\n    should be intelligent.[271] He made us, secondly, to behold and\n    understand and interpret His administration of the universe:\n    to be His witnesses and ministers.[272] He made us, thirdly,\n    to be happy in ourselves: like a true Father and Guardian, he\n    has placed good and evil in those things which are within our\n    own power.[273] What He says to each one of us is, \u2018If thou\n    wilt have any good, take it from within thyself.\u2019[274] To this\n    end He has given us freedom of will; there is no power in\n    heaven or earth that can bar our freedom.[275] We cry out in\n    our sorrow, \u2018O Lord God, grant that I may not feel sorrow;\u2019\n    and all the time He has given us the means of not feeling\n    it.[276] He has given us the power of bearing and turning to\n    account whatever happens, the spirit of manliness and fortitude\n    and high-mindedness, so that the greater the difficulty, the\n    greater the opportunity of adorning our character by meeting\n    it. If, for example, fever comes, it brings from Him this\n    message, \u2018Give me a proof that your moral training has been\n    real.\u2019 There is a time for learning, and a time for practising\n    what we have learnt: in the lecture-room we learn: and then\n    God brings us to the difficulties of real life and says to us,\n    \u2018It is time now for the real contest.\u2019 Life is in reality an\n    Olympic festival: we are God\u2019s athletes, to whom He has given\n    an opportunity of showing of what stuff we are made.[277]\n\n    \u201cWhat is our duty to Him?\n\n    \u201cIt is simply to follow Him:[278] to be of one mind with\n    Him:[279] to acquiesce in His administration:[280] to accept\n    what His bounty gives, to resign ourselves to the absence of\n    what He withholds.[281] The only thought of a good man is,\n    remembering who he is, and whence he came, and to Whom he\n    owes his being, to fill the place which God has assigned to\n    him,[282] to will things to be as they are, and to say what\n    Socrates used to say, \u2018If this be God\u2019s will, so be it.\u2019[283]\n    Submission must be thy law: thou must dare to lift up your eyes\n    to God and say, \u2018Employ me henceforth for what service Thou\n    wilt: I am of one mind with Thee: I am Thine: I ask not that\n    Thou shouldest keep from me one thing of all that Thou hast\n    decreed for me.\u2019[284]\n\n        \u2018Lead Thou me, God, and Thou, O Fate,\n        Thy appointment I await:\n        Only lead me, I shall go\n        With no flagging steps nor slow:\n        Even though I degenerate be,\n        And consent reluctantly,\n        None the less I follow Thee.\u2019[285]\n\n    \u201cWe can only do this when we keep our eyes fixed on Him,\n    joined in close communion with Him, absolutely consecrated to\n    His commandments. If we will not do it, we suffer loss. There\n    are penalties imposed, not by a vindictive tyranny, but by\n    a self-acting law. If we will not take what He gives under\n    the conditions under which He gives it, we reap the fruit of\n    wretchedness and sorrow, of jealousy and fear, of thwarted\n    effort and unsatisfied desire.[286]\n\n    \u201cAbove all, we must bide His time. He has given to every one\n    of us a post to keep in the battle of life, and we must not\n    leave it until He bids us.[287] His bidding is indicated\n    by circumstances. When He does not give us what our bodies\n    need, when He sends us where life according to nature is\n    impossible, He, the Supreme Captain, is sounding the bugle for\n    retreat,[288] He, the Master of the Great Household, is opening\n    the door and saying to us, \u2018Come.\u2019[289] And when He does so,\n    instead of bewailing your misfortunes, obey and follow: come\n    forth, not murmuring, but as God\u2019s servant who has finished\n    His work, conscious that He has no more present need of\n    you.[290]\n\n    \u201cThis, therefore, should take the place of every other\n    pleasure, the consciousness of obeying God. Think what it is to\n    be able to say, \u2018What others preach, I am doing: their praise\n    of virtue is a praise of me: God has sent me into the world to\n    be His soldier and witness, to tell men that their sorrows and\n    fears are vain, that to a good man no evil can happen whether\n    he live or die. He sends me at one time here, at another time\n    there: He disciplines me by poverty and by prison, that I\n    may be the better witness to mankind. With such a ministry\n    committed to me, can I any longer care in what place I am, or\n    who my companions are, or what they say about me: nay, rather,\n    does not my whole nature strain after God, His laws and His\n    commandments?\u2019\u201d[291]\n\nBetween the current ethics of the Greek world and the ethics of the\nearliest forms of Christianity were many points both of difference and of\ncontact.\n\nThe main point of difference was that Christianity rested morality\non a divine command. It took over the fundamental idea of the Jewish\ntheocracy.[292] Its ultimate appeal was not to the reasonableness of\nthe moral law in itself, but to the fact that God had enacted it. Greek\nmorality, on the contrary, was \u201cindependent.\u201d The idea that the moral\nlaws are laws of God is, no doubt, found in the Stoics; but they are so\nin another than either the Jewish or the Christian sense: they are laws\nof God, not as being expressions of His personal will, but as being laws\nof nature, part of the whole constitution of the world.\n\nConsequent upon the conception of the moral law as a positive enactment\nof God, the breach of moral law was conceived as sin. Into the early\nChristian conception of sin several elements entered. It was probably not\nin the popular mind what it was in the mind of St. Paul, still less what\nit became in the mind of St. Augustine. But one element was constant. It\nwas a trespass against God. As such, it was on the one hand something\nfor which God must be appeased, and on the other hand something which\nHe could forgive. To the Stoics it was shortcoming, failure, and loss:\nthe chief sufferer was the man himself: amendment was possible for the\nfuture, but there was no forgiveness for the past.\n\nBeyond these and other points of difference there was a wide area of\nagreement. The former became accentuated as time went on: it was by\nvirtue of the latter that in the earliest ages the minds of many persons\nhad been predisposed to accept Christianity, and that, having accepted\nit, they tended to fuse some elements of the new teaching with some\nelements of the old. The agreement is most conspicuous in those respects\nwhich were the chief aims of the contemporary moral reformation; and\nabove all in the importance which was attached to moral conduct. This\nimportance was overshadowed in the later Christian communities by the\nimportance which came to be attached to doctrine: its existence in the\nearliest communities is shown by two classes of proofs.\n\n1. The first of these proofs is the place which moral conduct holds\nin the earliest Christian writers. The documents which deal with the\nChristian life are almost wholly moral. They enforce the ancient code of\nthe Ten Words. They raise those Ten Words from being the lowest and most\nnecessary level of a legal code, to being the expression of the highest\nmoral ideal, expanding and amplifying them so as to make them embrace\nthoughts and desires as well as words and actions. The most interesting\nof such documents is that which is known as the \u201cTwo Ways.\u201d[293] It has\nrecently acquired a fresh significance by having been found as part of\nthe Teaching of the Apostles. It is there prefixed to the regulations\nfor ceremonial and discipline which constitute the new part of that\nwork. It proves to be a manual of instruction to be taught to those who\nwere to be admitted as members of a Christian community. It may thus be\nconsidered to express the current ideal of Christian practice. In the\n\u201cWay of Life\u201d which it sets forth, doctrine has no place. It is summed\nup in the two commandments: \u201cFirst, thou shalt love God who made thee;\nsecondly, thy neighbour as thyself: whatsoever things thou wouldest not\nhave done to thyself, do not thou to another.\u201d[294] These commandments\nare amplified in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount. \u201cThou shalt not\nforswear thyself: thou shalt not bear false witness: thou shalt not\nspeak evil: thou shalt not bear malice: thou shalt not be double-minded\nnor double-tongued, for double-tonguedness is a snare of death. Thy\nspeech shall not be false or hollow, but filled to the full with deed.\nThou shalt not be covetous, nor rapacious, nor a hypocrite, nor evilly\ndisposed, nor haughty: thou shalt not take mischievous counsel against\nthy neighbour. Thou shalt not hate any man, but some thou shalt rebuke,\nand for some thou shalt pray, and some thou shalt love more than thine\nown soul.[295]... My child, be not a murmurer, for murmuring is on\nthe path to blasphemy: nor self-willed nor evil-minded, for from all\nthese things blasphemies are born. But be thou meek, for the meek shall\ninherit the earth: be long-suffering, and pitiful, and guileless, and\nquiet, and kind, and trembling continually at the words which thou hast\nheard.[296]... Thou shalt not hesitate to give, nor in giving shalt thou\nmurmur; for thou shalt know who is the good paymaster of what thou hast\nearned. Thou shalt not turn away him that needeth, but thou shalt share\nall things with thy brother and shalt not say that they are thine own;\nfor if ye be fellow-sharers in that which is immortal, how much more in\nmortal things.\u201d[297]\n\nAnother such document is the first book of the collection known as the\nApostolical Constitutions: it begins at once with an exhortation to\nmorality.\n\n\u201cListen to holy teaching, ye who lay hold on His promise, in accordance\nwith the command of the Saviour, in harmony with his glorious utterances.\nTake heed, ye sons of God, to do all things so as to be obedient to God\nand to be well-pleasing in all things to the Lord our God. For if any one\nfollow after wickedness and do things contrary to the will of God, such a\none will be counted as a nation that transgresses against God. Abstain\nthen from all covetousness and unrighteousness.\u201d[298]\n\n2. The second proof is afforded by the place which discipline held in\ncontemporary Christian life. The Christians were drawn together into\ncommunities. Isolation was discouraged and soon passed away. To be a\nChristian was to be a member of a community. The basis of the community\nwas not only a common belief, but also a common practice. It was the task\nof the community as an organization to keep itself pure. The offences\nagainst which it had to guard were not only the open crimes which fell\nwithin the cognizance of public law, but also and more especially sins\nof moral conduct and of the inner life. The qualifications which in\nlater times were the ideal standard for church officers, were also in\nthe earliest times the ideal standard for ordinary members. \u201cIf any man\nwho has sinned sees the bishop and the deacons free from fault, and the\nflock abiding pure, first of all he will not venture to enter into the\nassembly of God, being smitten by his own conscience: but if, secondly,\nsetting lightly by his sin he should venture to enter, he will forthwith\nbe taken to task ... and either be punished, or being admonished by the\npastor will be drawn to repentance. For looking round upon the assembly\none by one, and finding no blemish either in the bishop or in the ranks\nof the people under him, with shame and many tears he will go out in\npeace, pricked in heart, and the flock will have been cleansed, and\nhe will cry with tears to God and will repent of his sin, and will\nhave hope: and the whole flock beholding his tears will be admonished\nthat he who has sinned and repented is not lost.\u201d[299] In other cases\nexpulsion was a solemn and formal act: the sinful member was cast into\nouter darkness: re-admission was accompanied with the same rites as the\noriginal admission. In other words, the earliest communities endeavoured,\nboth in the theory which they embodied in their manuals of Christian\nlife, and in the practice which they enforced by discipline, to realize\nwhat has since been known as the Puritan ideal. Each one of them was a\ncommunity of saints. \u201cPassing their days upon earth, they were in reality\ncitizens of heaven.\u201d[300] The earthly community reflected in all but\nits glory and its everlastingness the life of the \u201cnew Jerusalem.\u201d Its\nbishop was the visible representative of Jesus Christ himself sitting\non the throne of heaven, with the white-robed elders round him: its\nmembers were the \u201celect,\u201d the \u201choly ones,\u201d the \u201csaved.\u201d \u201cWithout were\nthe dogs, and the sorcerers, and the murderers, and the idolators, and\nevery one that loveth and maketh a lie:\u201d within were \u201cthey which were\nwritten in the Lamb\u2019s book of life.\u201d To be a member of the community was\nto be in reality, and not merely in conception, a child of God and heir\nof everlasting salvation: to be excluded from the community was to pass\nagain into the outer darkness, the realm of Satan and eternal death.\n\nOver these earliest communities and the theory which they embodied there\npassed, in the last half of the second century and the first half of the\nthird, an enormous change. The processes of the change and its immediate\ncauses are obscure. The interests of contemporary writers are so absorbed\nwith the struggles for soundness of doctrine, as to leave but little room\nfor a record of the struggles for purity of life. In the last stages of\nthose struggles, the party which endeavoured to preserve the ancient\nideal was treated as schismatical. The aggregate of visible communities\nwas no longer identical with the number of those who should be saved. The\ndominant party framed a new theory of the Church as a _corpus permixtum_,\nand found support for it in the Gospels themselves. Morality became\nsubordinated to belief in Christianity by the same inevitable drift by\nwhich practice had been superseded by theory in Stoicism.\n\nIn both the production of this change and its further developments Greece\nplayed an important part. The net result of the active forces which it\nbrought to bear upon Christianity was, that the attention of a majority\nof Christian men was turned to the intellectual as distinguished from\nthe moral element in Christian life. And when the change was effected,\nit operated in two further ways, which have survived in large and varied\nforms to the present day.\n\n1. The idea of moral reformation had from the first seized different\nmen with a varying tenacity of grasp.[301] There were some men who had\na higher moral ideal than others: there were some whose natures were\nstronger: there were some to whom moral life was not the perfection of\nhuman citizenship, but the struggle of the spirit to disentangle itself\nfrom its material environment, and to rise by contemplation to fellowship\nwith God. There are proofs of the existence in the very earliest\nChristian communities of those who endeavoured to live on a higher plane\nthan their fellows. Abstinence from marriage and from animal food were\nurged and practised as \u201ccounsels of perfection.\u201d In some communities\nthere was an attempt to make such counsels of perfection obligatory. In\nthe majority of communities, though they were part of \u201cthe whole yoke\nof the Lord,\u201d[302] and were specially enjoined at certain times upon\nall church members, they were not of universal or constant obligation.\nThose who habitually practised them were recognized as a church within\nthe Church. The practice of them was known by a name which we have seen\nto be common in the Greek philosophical schools. It was relative to the\nconception of life as an athletic contest. It was that of bodily training\nor gymnastic exercise (\u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2).[303]\n\nThe secession of the Puritan party left much of this element still\nwithin the great body of confederated communities. At the end of the\nthird century it became important both within them and without. It was\nincreased, partly by the growing influence of the ideas which found\ntheir highest expression outside Christianity in Neo-Platonism; partly\nby the growing complexity of society itself, the strain and the despair\nof an age of decadence; partly also by the necessity of finding a new\noutlet, when Christianity became a legal religion, for the passionate\nlove of God which had led men to a sometimes ecstatic martyrdom. It was\njoined by the parallel tendency among professors of philosophy. It soon\ntook a new form. Hitherto those who followed counsels of perfection\nlived in ordinary society, undistinguished except by their conduct from\ntheir fellow-men. The ideal \u201cGnostic\u201d of Clement of Alexandria takes\nhis part in ordinary human affairs, \u201cacting the drama of life which God\nhas given him to play, knowing both what is to be done and what is to\nbe endured.\u201d[304] But early in the fourth century the practice of the\nascetic life in Christianity came to be shown in the same outward way,\nbut with a more marked emphasis, as the similar practice in philosophy.\nIt was indeed known as philosophy.[305] It was most akin to Cynicism,\nwith which it had sometimes already been confused, and its badges were\nthe badges of Cynicism, the rough blanket and the unshorn hair. To wear\nthe blanket and to let the hair grow was to profess divine philosophy,\nthe higher life of self-discipline and sanctity. It was to claim to\nstand on a higher level and to be working out a nobler ideal than\naverage Christians. The practice soon received a further development.\nJust as ordinary philosophers had sometimes found life in society to be\nintolerable and had gone into \u201cretreat,\u201d so the Christian philosophers\nbegan to withdraw altogether from the world, and to live their lives\nof self-discipline and contemplation in solitude. The retention of\nthe old names shows the continuity of the practice. They were still\npractising discipline, \u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, or philosophy, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1. So far as\nthey retired from society, they were still said \u201cto go into retreat,\u201d\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, whence the current appellation of \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03af, \u201canchorets.\u201d\nThe place of their retreat was a \u201cschool of discipline,\u201d \u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, or\na \u201cplace for reflection,\u201d \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd.[306] To these were soon added\nthe new names which were relative to the fact that moral discipline was\nusually practised in solitude. Those who retired from the world were\n\u201csolitaries,\u201d \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u03af, and the place of their retirement was a \u201cplace\nfor solitude,\u201d \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd. When the practice was once firmly rooted in\nChristian soil, it was largely developed in independent ways for which\nGreece was not primarily responsible, and which therefore cannot properly\nbe described here; but the independence and enormous overgrowth of these\nlater forms cannot wipe away the memory of the fact that to Greece, more\nthan to any other factor, was due the place and earliest conception of\nthat sublime individualism which centred all a man\u2019s efforts on the\ndevelopment of his spiritual life, and withdrew him from his fellow-men\nin order to bring him near to God.\n\n2. It was inevitable that when the Puritan party had left the main body,\nand when the most spiritually-minded of those who remained detached\nthemselves from the common life of their brethren, there should be a\ndeterioration in the average moral conceptions of the Christian Churches.\nIt was also inevitable that those conceptions should be largely shaped by\nGreek influences. The Pauline ethics vanished from the Christian world.\nFor the average members of the churches were now the average citizens\nof the empire, educated by Greek methods, impregnated with the dominant\nethical ideas. They accepted Christian ideas, but without the enthusiasm\nwhich made them a transforming force. As in regard to metaphysics, so\nalso in regard to ethics, the frame of mind which had been formed by\neducation was stronger than the new ideas which it absorbed. The current\nideals remained, slightly raised: the current rules of conduct continued,\nwith modifications. Instead of the conceptions of righteousness and\nholiness, there was the old conception of virtue: instead of the code of\nmorals which was \u201cbriefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt\nlove thy neighbour as thyself,\u201d there was the old enumeration of duties.\nAt the end of the fourth century the new state of things was formally\nrecognized by ecclesiastical writers. Love was no more \u201cthe hand-book of\ndivine philosophy:\u201d[307] the chief contemporary theologian of the West,\nAmbrose of Milan, formulated the current theory in a book which is the\nmore important because it not merely expresses the ideas of his time\nand seals the proof of their prevalence, but also became the basis of\nthe moral philosophy of the Middle Ages. But the book is less Christian\nthan Stoical.[308] It is a _rechauff\u00e9e_ of the book which Cicero had\ncompiled more than three centuries before, chiefly from Pan\u00e6tius. It is\nStoical, not only in conception, but also in detail. It makes virtue the\nhighest good. It makes the hope of the life to come a subsidiary and not\na primary motive. Its ideal of life is happiness: it holds that a happy\nlife is a life according to nature, that it is realized by virtue, and\nthat it is capable of being realized here on earth. Its virtues are the\nancient virtues of wisdom and justice, courage and temperance. It tinges\neach of them with a Christian, or at least with a Theistic colouring;\nbut the conception of each of them remains what it had been to the Greek\nmoralists. Wisdom, for example, is Greek wisdom, with the addition that\nno man can be wise who is ignorant of God: justice is Greek justice, with\nthe addition that its subsidiary form of beneficence is helped by the\nChristian society.\n\nThe victory of Greek ethics was complete. While Christianity was being\ntransformed into a system of doctrines, the Stoical jurists at the\nimperial court were slowly elaborating a system of personal rights.\nThe ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, which the earliest Christian\ncommunities endeavoured to carry into practice, have been transmuted by\nthe slow alchemy of history into the ethics of Roman law. The basis of\nChristian society is not Christian, but Roman and Stoical. A fusion of\nthe Roman conception of rights with the Stoical conception of relations\ninvolving reciprocal actions, is in possession of practically the whole\nfield of civilized society. The transmutation is so complete that the\nmodern question is not so much whether the ethics of the Sermon on\nthe Mount are practicable, as whether, if practicable, they would be\ndesirable. The socialistic theories which formulate in modern language\nand justify by modern conceptions such an exhortation as \u201cSell that\nthou hast and give to the poor,\u201d meet with no less opposition within\nthan without the Christian societies. The conversion of the Church to\nChristian theory must precede the conversion of the world to Christian\npractice. But meanwhile there is working in Christianity the same higher\nmorality which worked in the ancient world, and the maxim, Follow God,\nbelongs to a plane on which Epictetus and Thomas \u00e0 Kempis meet.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VII.\n\nGREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.\n\nI. THE CREATOR.\n\n\nSlowly there loomed through the mists of earlier Greek thought the\nconsciousness of one God.\n\nIt came with the sense of the unity of the world. That sense had not\nalways been awakened. The varied phenomena of earth and sea and sky had\nnot always been brought under a single expression. The groups into which\nthe mind tended to arrange them were conceived as separate, belonging\nto different kingdoms and controlled by independent divinities. It\nwas by the unconscious alchemy of thought, working through successive\ngenerations, that the separate groups came to be combined into a whole\nand conceived as forming a universe.\n\nIt came also with the sense of the order of the world. The sun which day\nby day rose and set, the moon which month by month waxed and waned, the\nstars which year by year came back to the same stations in the sky, were\nlike a marshalled army moving in obedience to a fixed command. There\nwas order, not only above but also beneath. The sea, which for all its\nstorms and murmurings, could not pass its bounds, the earth upon which\nseed-time and harvest never failed, but spring after spring the buds\nburst into blossom, and summer after summer the blossom ripened into\nfruit, were part of the same great system. The conception was that not\nmerely of a universe, but of a universe moving in obedience to a law. The\nearliest form of the conception is probably that of Anaxagoras, which was\nformulated by a later writer in the expression, \u201cThe origins of matter\nare infinite, the origin of movement and birth is one.\u201d[309]\n\nThis conception of an ordered whole was intertwined, as it slowly\nelaborated itself, with one or other of two kindred conceptions, of which\none had preceded it and the other grew with it.\n\nThe one was the sense of personality. By a transference of ideas which\nhas been so universal that it may be called natural, all things that move\nhave been invested with personality. The stars and rivers were persons.\nMovement meant life, and life meant everywhere something analogous to\nhuman life. It was by an inevitable application of the conception that\nwhen the sum of movements was conceived as a whole, it should be also\nconceived that behind the totality of the phenomena and the unity of\ntheir movements there was a single Person.\n\nThe other was the conception of mind. It was a conception which had but\nslowly disentangled itself from that of bodily powers. It was like the\npreaching of a revelation, and almost as fruitful, when Epicharmus\nproclaimed:[310] \u201cIt is not the eye that sees, but the mind: it is not\nthe ear that hears, but the mind: all things except mind are blind and\ndeaf.\u201d It was the mind that not only saw but thought, and that not only\nthought but willed. It alone was the real self: and the Person who is\nbehind nature or within it was like the personality which is behind the\nbodily activities of each one of us: His essence was mind.\n\nThere was one God. The gods of the old mythology were passing away, like\na splendid pageantry of clouds moving across the horizon to be absorbed\nin the clear and infinite heaven. \u201cBut though God is one,\u201d it was\nsaid,[311] \u201cHe has many names, deriving a name from each of the spheres\nof His government.... He is called the Son of Kronos, that is of Time,\nbecause He continues from eternity to eternity; and Lightning-God, and\nThunder-God, and Rain-God, from the lightnings and thunders and rains;\nand Fruit-God, from the fruits (which he sends); and City-God, from the\ncities (which he protects); and the God of births, and homesteads, and\nkinsmen, and families, of companions, and friends, and armies.... God, in\nshort, of heaven and earth, named after all forms of nature and events\nas being Himself the cause of all.\u201d \u201cThere are not different gods among\ndifferent peoples,\u201d says Plutarch,[312] \u201cnor foreign gods and Greek gods,\nnor gods of the south and gods of the north; but just as sun and moon\nand sky and earth and sea are common to all mankind, but have different\nnames among different races, so, though there be one Reason who orders\nthese things and one Providence who administers them ... there are\ndifferent honours and appellations among different races; and men use\nconsecrated symbols, some of them obscure and some more clear, so leading\ntheir thoughts on the path to the Divine: but it is not without risk; for\nsome men, wholly missing their foothold, have slipped into superstition,\nand others, avoiding the slough of superstition, have in their turn\nfallen over the precipice of atheism.\u201d\n\nIn the conception of God as it thus uncoiled itself in Greek history,\nthree strands of thought are constantly intertwined\u2014the thought of a\nCreator, the thought of a Moral Governor, and the thought of a Supreme\nor Absolute Being. It is desirable to trace the history of each of these\nthoughts, as far as possible, separately, and to consider their separate\neffects upon the development of Christian theology. The present Lecture\nwill deal mainly with the first: the two following Lectures with the\nother two.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt was at a comparatively late stage in its history that Greek thought\ncame to the conception of a beginning of all things. The conception was\nfirst formulated by Anaximander, in the sixth century B.C.[313] The\nearlier conception was that of a chaos, out of which gods and all things\nalike proceeded. The first remove from that earlier conception was\nhylozoism, the belief that life and matter were the same. The conception\nof mind was not yet evolved. When it was evolved, two lines of thought\nbegan to diverge. The one, following the conception of human personality\nas absolutely single, conceived of both reason and force as inherent in\nmatter: it is the theory which is known as _Monism_. The other, following\nthe conception of human personality as a separable compound, body and\nsoul, conceived of reason and force as external to matter: it is the\ntheory which is known as _Dualism_. These two theories run through all\nsubsequent Greek philosophy.\n\n1. The chief philosophical expression of Monism was Stoicism. The Stoics\nfollowed the Ionians in believing that the world consists of a single\nsubstance. They followed Heraclitus in believing that the movements\nand modifications of that substance are due neither to a blind impulse\nfrom within nor to an arbitrary impact from without. It moved, he had\nthought, with a kind of rhythmic motion, a fire that was kindling and\nbeing quenched with regulated limits of degree and time.[314] The\nsubstance is one, but immanent and inherent in it is a force that acts\nwith intelligence. The antithesis between the two was expressed by the\nStoics in various forms. It was sometimes the bare and neutral contrast\nof the Active and the Passive. For the Passive was sometimes substituted\nMatter, a term which, signifying, as it originally does, the timber which\na carpenter uses for the purposes of his craft, properly belongs to\nanother order of ideas; and for the Active was frequently substituted\nthe term _Logos_, which, signifying as it does, on the one hand, partly\nthought and partly will, and, on the other hand, also the expression of\nthought in a sentence and the expression of will in a law, has no single\nequivalent in modern language. But the majority of Stoics used neither\nthe colourless term the Active, nor the impersonal term the _Logos_. The\n_Logos_ was vested with personality: the antithesis was between matter\nand God. This latter term was used to cover a wide range of conceptions.\nThe two terms of the antithesis being regarded as expressing modes of\na single substance, separable in thought and name but not in reality,\nthere was a natural drift of some minds towards regarding God as a mode\nof matter, and of others towards regarding matter as a mode of God. The\nformer conceived of Him as the _natura naturata_: \u201cJupiter est quodcunque\nvides quodcunque moveris.\u201d[315] The latter conceived of Him as the\n_natura naturans_. This became the governing conception. He is the sum of\nan infinite number of rational forces which are continually striving to\nexpress themselves through the matter with which they are in union. He\nis through them and in them working to realize an end. The teleological\nidea controls the whole conception. He is always moving with purpose and\nsystem, and always thereby producing the world. The products are all\ndivine, but not all equally divine. In His purest essence, He is the\nhighest form of mind in union with the most attenuated form of matter.\nIn the lowest form of His essence, He is the cohesive force which holds\ntogether the atoms of a stone. Between these two poles are infinite\ngradations of being. Nearest of all to the purest essence of God is the\nhuman soul. It is in an especial sense His offspring: it is described by\nthe metaphors of an emanation or outflow from Him, of a sapling which is\nseparate from and yet continues the life of its parent tree, of a colony\nin which some members of the mother state have settled.[316]\n\nIf all this were expressed in modern terms, and by the help of later\nconceptions, it would probably be most suitably gathered into the\nproposition that the world is the self-evolution of God. Into such a\nconception the idea of a beginning does not necessarily enter: it is\nconsistent with the idea of an eternal process of differentiation: that\nwhich is, always has been, under changed and changing forms: the theory\nis cosmological rather than cosmogonical: it rather explains the world as\nit is than gives an account of its origin.\n\n2. The chief philosophical expression of Dualism was Platonism. Plato\nfollowed Anaxagoras in believing that mind is separate from matter and\nacts upon it: he went beyond him in founding upon this separation a\nuniversal distinction between the real and the phenomenal, and between\nGod and the world. God was regarded as being outside the world. The world\nwas in its origin only potential being (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd). The action of God upon\nit was that of a craftsman upon his material, shaping it as a carpenter\nshapes wood, or moulding it as a statuary moulds clay. In so acting, He\nacted with reason, following out thoughts in His mind. Sometimes His\nreason, or His mind, is spoken of as being itself the fashioner of the\nworld.[317] Each thought shows itself in a group of material objects.\nSuch objects, so far as they admit of being grouped, may be viewed as\nimitations or embodiments of a form or pattern, existing either as a\nthought in the mind of the Divine Workman, or as a force proceeding from\nHis mind and acting outside it. As the conception of these forms was\ndeveloped more and more, they tended to be regarded in the latter light\nrather than in the former. They were cosmic forces which had the power\nof impressing themselves upon matter. They were less types than causes.\nThey came midway between God and the rude material of the universe, so\nthat its changing phenomena were united with an unchanging element. They\nwere themselves grouped in a vast gradation, reaching its highest point\nin the Form of Perfection, which was higher than the Form of Being. The\nhighest and most perfect of types is conceived as the most powerful and\nmost active of forces. In the elaborate cosmology of the _Tim\u00e6us_, it\nis further conceived as a person. The creative energy of God is spoken\nof as the _Demiurgus_, who himself made an ideal world, and employed\nsubordinate agents in the construction of the actual world. The matter\nupon which the Demiurgus or his agents work is sometimes conceived as\npotential being,[318] the bare capacity of receiving qualities and forms,\nand sometimes as chaotic substance which was reduced to order.[319] The\nagents were gods who, having been themselves created, were bidden to\ncreate living beings, capable of growth and decay.[320] The distinction\nbetween the two spheres of creation, that of a world in which nothing was\nimperfect since it was the work of a Perfect Being, and that of a world\nwhich was full of imperfections as being the work of created beings,\ncame, as we shall see, to be of importance in some phases of Christian\nthought.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt was inevitable, in the syncretism which results when an age of\nphilosophical reflection succeeds an age of philosophical origination,\nthat these two great drifts of thought should tend in some points to\napproach each other. The elements in them which were most readily fused\ntogether were the theories of the processes by which the actual world\ncame into being, and of the nature of the forces which lay behind those\nprocesses. In Stoicism, there was the theory of the one Law or _Logos_\nexpressing itself in an infinite variety of material forms: in Platonism,\nthere was the theory of the one God, shaping matter according to an\ninfinite variety of patterns. In the one, the processes of nature were\nthe operations of active forces, containing in themselves the law of\nthe forms in which they exhibit themselves, self-developing seeds, each\nof them a portion of the one _Logos_ which runs through the whole.[321]\nIn the other, they were the operations of the infinitely various and\neternally active energy of God, moving always in the direction of His\nthoughts, so that those thoughts might themselves be conceived as the\ncauses of the operations.[322] In both the one theory and the other,\nthe processes were sometimes regarded in their apparent multiplicity,\nand sometimes in their underlying unity: and in both also the unity was\nexpressed sometimes by the impersonal term _Logos_, and sometimes by the\npersonal term God.\n\nBut while the monism of the Stoics, by laying stress upon the antithesis\nbetween the two phases of the one substance, was tending to dualism,\nthe dualism of the Platonists, by laying stress upon the distinction\nbetween the creative energy of God and the form in the mind of God which\nHis energy embodied in the material universe, was tending to introduce\na third factor into the conception of creation. It became common to\nspeak, not of two principles, but of three\u2014God, Matter, and the Form,\nor Pattern.[323] Hence came a new fusion of conceptions. The Platonic\nForms in the mind of God, conceived, as they sometimes were, as causes\noperating outside Him, were more or less identified with the Stoical\n_Logoi_, and, being viewed as the manifold expressions of a single\n_Logos_, were expressed by a singular rather than a plural term, the\n_Logos_ rather than the _Logoi_ of God.\n\nIt is at this point that the writings of Philo become of special\nimportance. They gather together, without fusing into a symmetrical\nsystem, the two dominant theories of the past, and they contain the\nseeds of nearly all that afterwards grew up on Christian soil. It is\npossible that those writings cover a much larger period of time than is\ncommonly supposed, and that if we could find a key to their chronological\narrangement, we should find in them a perfect bridge from philosophical\nJudaism to Christian theology. And even without such a key we are able to\nsee in them a large representation of the processes of thought that were\ngoing on, and can better understand by the analogies which they offer\nboth the tentative theories and those that ultimately became dominant in\nthe sphere of Christianity. It is consequently desirable to give a brief\naccount of the view which they present.\n\nThe ultimate cause of the world is to be found in the nature of God. As\nin Plato, though perhaps in a different sense, God is regarded as good.\nBy His goodness He was impelled to make the world: He was able to make it\nby virtue of His power. \u201cIf any one wished to search out the reason why\nthe universe was made, I think that he would not be far from the mark if\nhe were to say, what, in fact, one of the ancients said, that the Father\nand Maker is good, and that being good He did not grudge the best kind of\nnature to matter (\u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3) which of itself had nothing excellent, though\nit was capable of becoming all things.\u201d[324] And again: \u201cMy soul once\ntold me a more serious story (than that of the Greek mythology), when\nseized, as it often was, with a divine ecstasy.... It told me that in\nthe one really existing God there are two chief and primary faculties,\nGoodness and Power, and that by Goodness He begat the universe, and\nby Power He governs it.\u201d[325] God is thus the Creator, the Fashioner\nand Maker of the world, its Builder and Artificer.[326] But when the\nconception of His relation to the world is more precisely examined, it\nis found to be based upon a recognition of a sharp distinction between\nthe world of thought and that of sense; and to be monistic in regard to\nthe one, dualistic in regard to the other. God is mind. From Him, as\nfrom a fountain, proceed all forms of mind and reason. Reason, whether\nunconscious in the form of natural law, or conscious in the form of\nhuman thought, is like a river that flows forth from Him and fills the\nuniverse.[327] In man the two worlds meet. The body is fashioned by the\nArtificer from the dust of the earth: \u201cThe soul came from nothing that\nis created, but from the Father and Leader of all things. For what He\nbreathed into Adam was nothing else than a divine breath, a colony from\nthat blissful and happy nature, placed here below for the benefit of\nour race; so that granting man to be mortal in respect of his visible\npart, yet in respect of that which is invisible he is the heir of\nimmortality.\u201d[328] And again: \u201cThe mind is an offshoot from the divine\nand happy soul (of God), an offshoot not separated from Him, for nothing\ndivine is cut off and disjoined, but only extended.\u201d[329] And again,\nin expounding the words, \u201cThey have forsaken me, the fountain of life\u201d\n(Jeremiah ii. 13), he says: \u201cOnly God is the cause of soul and life,\nespecially of rational soul and reasonable life; but He Himself is more\nthan life, being the ever-flowing fountain of life.\u201d[330]\n\nThis is monistic. But the theory of the origin of the sensible world is\ndualistic. The matter upon which He acted was outside Him. \u201cIt was in\nitself without order, without quality, without soul, full of difference,\ndisproportion, and discord: it received a change and transformation\ninto what was opposite and best, order, quality, animation, identity,\nproportion, harmony, all that is characteristic of a better form.\u201d[331]\nHe himself did not touch it. \u201cOut of it God begat all things, Himself\nnot touching it: for it was not right that the all-knowing and blessed\nOne should touch unlimited and confused matter: but He used the unbodied\nForces whose true name is the Forms (\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03b9), that each class of things\nshould receive its fitting shape.\u201d[332] These unbodied Forces, which are\nhere called by the Platonic name of Forms, are elsewhere spoken of in\nStoical language as Reasons (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9), sometimes in Pythagorean language\nas Numbers or Limits, sometimes in the language of the Old Testament\nas Angels, and sometimes in the language of popular mythology as\nD\u00e6mons.[333] The use of the two names Force and Form, with the synonyms\nwhich are interchanged with each of them, expresses the two sides of the\nconception of them. They are at once the agents or instruments by means\nof which God fashioned the world, and also the types or patterns after\nwhich He fashioned it.[334]\n\nIn both respects they are frequently viewed, not in the plurality of\ntheir manifestations, but in the unity of their essence. On the one\nhand, they collectively form the world which the Divine Architect of\nthe great City of the Universe fashioned in His mind before His thought\nwent outside Him to stamp with its impress the chaotic and unformed\nmass. The place of this world is the _Logos_, the Reason or Will or\nWord of God: more precisely, it constitutes that _Logos_ in a special\nform of its activity:[335] for in the building of an ordinary city the\nideal which precedes it \u201cis no other than the mind of the architect,\nplanning to realize in a visible city the city of his thought.... The\narchetypal seal, which we call the ideal world, is itself the archetypal\npattern, the Form of Forms, the Reason of God.\u201d[336] On the other hand,\nthe Reason of God is sometimes viewed not as a Form but as a Force. It\nis His creative energy.[337] It is the instrument by which He made all\nthings.[338] It is the \u201criver of God\u201d that is \u201cfull of waters,\u201d and that\nflows forth to \u201cmake glad the city of God,\u201d the universe.[339] From it,\nas from a fountain, all lower Forms and Forces flow. By another and even\nsublimer figure, it, the eldest born of the \u201cI am,\u201d robes itself with the\nworld as with a vesture, the high-priest\u2019s robe, embroidered by all the\nForces of the seen and unseen worlds.[340]\n\nBut in all this, Philo never loses sight of the primary truth that the\nworld was made not by inferior or opposing beings, but by God. It is the\nexpression of His Thought. His Thought went forth from Him, impressing\nitself in infinite Forms and by means of infinite Forces: but though His\nThought was the charioteer, it is God Himself who gives the orders.[341]\nBy a different conception of the genesis of the world, and one that is\nof singular interest in view of the similar conceptions which we shall\nfind in some Gnostic schools, God is the Father of the world:[342] and\nthe metaphor of Fatherhood is expanded into that of a marriage: God is\nconceived as the Father, His Wisdom as the Mother: \u201cand she, receiving\nthe seed of God, with fruitful birth-pangs brought forth this world, His\nvisible son, only and well-beloved.\u201d[343]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe have now the main elements of the current conceptions out of which the\nphilosophers of early Christianity constructed new fabrics.\n\nChristianity had no need to borrow from Greek philosophy either the idea\nof the unity of God, or the belief that He made the world. Its ultimate\nbasis was the belief in one God. It rode in upon the wave of the reaction\nagainst polytheism. The Scriptures to which it appealed began with the\nsublime declaration, \u201cIn the beginning God created the heavens and the\nearth.\u201d It accepted that declaration as being both final and complete. It\nsaw therein the picture of a single supreme Artificer: and it elaborated\nthe picture by the aid of anthropomorphic conceptions: \u201cBy His almighty\npower He fixed firm the heavens, and by His incomprehensible wisdom He\nset them in order: He separated the earth from the water that encompassed\nit ... and last of all He formed man with His sacred and spotless hands,\nthe impress of His own image.\u201d[344]\n\nThe belief that the one God was the Creator of heaven and earth came,\nthough not without a struggle, to be a foremost and permanent element\nin the Christian creed. The various forms of ditheism which grew up\nwith it and around it, finding their roots in its unsolved problems and\ntheir nutriment in the very love of God which it fostered, gradually\nwithered away. But in proportion as the belief spread widely over the\nGreek world, the simple Semitic cosmogony became insufficient. The\nquestions of the mode of creation, and of the precise relation of God\nto the material world, which had grown with the growth of monotheism as\na philosophical doctrine, were asked not less instinctively, and with\nan even keener-sighted enthusiasm, when monotheism became a religious\nconviction. They came not from curiosity, but as the necessary outgrowth\namong an educated people of that which, not less now than then, is the\ncrucial question of all theistic philosophy: How, if a good and almighty\nGod made the world, can we account for imperfection and failure and pain?\n\nThese questions of the mode of creation and of the relation of God to\nthe material world, and the underlying question which any answer to\nthem must at the same time solve, fill a large place in the history of\nthe first three centuries. The compromise which ultimately resulted has\nformed the basis of Christian theology to the present day.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe first answers were necessarily tentative. Thinkers of all schools,\nwithin the original communities and outside them, introduced conceptions\nwhich were afterwards discarded. One group of philosophers, treating the\nfacts of Christianity as symbols, like the tableaux of the mysteries,\nframed cosmogonies which were symbolical also, and fantastic in\nproportion as they were symbolical. Another group of philosophers,\ndealing rather with the ideal than with the actual, framed cosmogonies in\nwhich abstract ideas were invested with substance and personality. The\nphilosophers of all schools were met, not only by the common sense of the\nChristian communities, but also by caricature. Their opponents, after the\nmanner of controversialists, accentuated their weak points, and handed on\nto later times only those parts of the theories which were most exposed\nto attack, and which were also least intelligible except in relation\nto the whole system. But so far as the underlying conceptions can be\ndisentangled from the details, they may be clearly seen to have drifted\nin the direction of the main drifts of Greek philosophy.\n\n1. There was a large tendency to account for the world by the hypothesis\nof evolution. In some way it had come forth from God. The belief\nexpressed itself in many forms. It was in all cases syncretist. The\nsame writers frequently made use of different metaphors; but all the\nmetaphors assumed vast grades and distances between God in Himself and\nthe sensible world. One metaphor was that of an outflow, as of a stream\nfrom its source.[345] Other metaphors were taken from the phenomena of\nvegetable growth, the evolution of a plant from a seed, or the putting\nforth of leaves by a tree.[346] The metaphors of other writers were taken\nfrom the phenomena of human generation:[347] they were an elaboration of\nthe conception of God as the Father of the world. They were sometimes\npressed: there was not only a Father, but also a Mother of the world,\nWisdom or Silence or some other abstraction. In one elaborate system it\nwas held that, though God Himself was unwedded, all the powers that came\nforth from Him came forth in pairs, and all existing things were the\noffspring of their union.[348] That which came forth was also conceived\nin various ways. The common expression in one group of philosophers is\n_\u00e6on_ (\u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd), a term which is of uncertain origin in this application. In\nother groups of philosophers the expressions are relative to the metaphor\nof growth and development, and repeat the Stoical term _seed_. In the\nsyncretism of Marcus the several expressions are gathered together,\nand made more intelligible by the use of the synonym _logoi_;[349] the\nthoughts of God were conceived as active forces, embodying themselves\nin material forms. In the conception of one school of thinkers, the\ninvisible forces of the world acted in the same way that the art of a\ncraftsman acts upon his materials.[350] In the conception of another\nschool, the distinction between intellectual and material existence\ntended to vanish. The powers which flowed forth from God were at once\nintellectual and material, corresponding to the monistic conception\nof God Himself. They were subtler and more active forms of matter\nacting upon its grosser but plastic forms. In the conception of another\nschool, God is the unbegotten seed of which the Tree of Being is the\nleaves and fruit,[351] and the fruit again contains in itself infinite\npossibilities of renewing the original seed.[352]\n\nThe obvious difficulty which the actual world, with its failures and\nimperfections, presents to all theories of evolution which assume the\nexistence of a good and perfect God, was bridged over by the hypothesis\nof a lapse. The \u201cfall from original righteousness\u201d was carried back\nfrom the earthly Paradise to the sphere of divinity itself. The theory\nwas shaped in various ways, some of which are expressed by almost\nunintelligible symbols. That of the widely-spread school of Valentinus\nwas, that the Divine Wisdom herself had become subject to passion, and\nthat, having both ambition and desire, she had produced from herself a\nshapeless mass, in ignorance that the Unbegotten One alone can, without\nthe aid of another, produce what is perfect. Out of this shapeless mass,\nand the passions that came forth from her, arose the material world and\nthe Demiurgus who fashioned it.[353] Another theory was that of revolt\nand insurrection among the supernal powers.[354] Both theories simply\npushed the difficulty farther back: they gave no solution of it: they\nwere opposed as strongly by philosophers outside Christianity as they\nwere by polemical theologians within it:[355] they helped to pave the way\nfor the Augustinian theology of succeeding centuries, but they did not\nthemselves win permanent acceptance either in philosophy or in theology,\nin either the Eastern or the Western world.\n\n2. Side by side with these hypotheses of evolution was a tendency, which\nultimately became supreme, to account for the world by the hypothesis of\ncreation. It was the result of the action of God upon already existing\nmatter. It was not evolved, but ordered or shaped. God was the Builder or\nFramer: the universe was a work of art.[356]\n\nBut this, no less than the monistic hypothesis, contained grave\ndifficulties, arising partly from the metaphysical conception of God,\nand partly from the conception of moral evil. Three main questions were\ndiscussed in connection with it: (i.) What was the ultimate relation of\nmatter to God? (ii.) How did God come into contact with it so as to shape\nit? (iii.) How did a God who was almighty as well as beneficent come to\ncreate what is imperfect and evil?\n\n(i.) The dualistic hypothesis assumed a co-existence of matter and God.\nThe assumption was more frequently tacit than explicit. The difficulty\nof the assumption varied according to the degree to which matter was\nregarded as having positive qualities. There was a universal belief\nthat beneath the qualities of all existing things lay a substratum or\nsubstance on which they were grafted, and which gave to each thing\nits unity. But the conception of the nature of this substance varied\nfrom that of gross and tangible material to that of empty and formless\nspace. The metaphysical conception of substance tended to be confused\nwith the physical conception of matter. Matter was sometimes conceived\nas a mass of atoms not coalescing according to any principle or order\nof arrangement:[357] the action of the Creator upon them was that of\na general changing a rabble of individuals into an organized army. It\nwas sometimes conceived as a vast shapeless but plastic mass, to which\nthe Creator gave form, partly by moulding it as a potter moulds clay,\npartly by combining various elements as a builder combines his materials\nin the construction of a house.[358] Both these conceptions of matter\ntended to regard it as more or less gross. It was plastic in the hands\nof the Divine Workman, but still possessed the quality of resistance.\nWith Basilides, the conception of matter was raised to a higher plane.\nThe distinction of subject and object was preserved, so that the action\nof the Transcendent God was still that of creation and not of evolution;\nbut it was \u201cout of that which was not\u201d that He made things to be. That\nwhich He made was expressed by the metaphor of a seed which contained\nin itself possibilities, not only of growth, but of different kinds of\ngrowth. Three worlds were involved in it: the world of spirit, and the\nworld of matter, and between the two the world of life. The metaphor\nis sometimes explained by the help of the Aristotelian conception of\n_genera_ and _species_.[359] The original seed which God made is the\nultimate _summum genus_. The process by which all things came into being\nfollowed in inverse order the process of our knowledge. The steps by\nwhich our ideas ascend, by an almost infinite stairway of subordinated\ngroups, from the visible objects of sense to the highest of all\nabstractions, the Absolute Being and the Absolute Unity, are the steps\nby which that Absolute Being and Absolute Unity, who is God, evolved\nor made the world from that which was not. The basis of the theory was\nPlatonic, though some of the terms were borrowed from both Aristotle and\nthe Stoics. It became itself the basis of the theory which ultimately\nprevailed in the Church. The transition appears in Tatian. In him, God is\nthe author, not only of the form or qualities, but also of the substance\nor underlying ground of all things.[360] \u201cThe Lord of the universe\nbeing Himself the substance of the whole, not yet having brought any\ncreature into being, was alone: and since all power over both visible and\ninvisible things was with Him, He Himself by the power of His word gave\nsubstance to all things with Himself.\u201d This theory is found in another\nform in Athenagoras:[361] he makes a point in defence of Christianity\nthat, so far from denying the existence of God, it made Him the Author\nof all existence, He alone being unborn and imperishable. It is found\nalso in Theophilus,[362] who, however, does not lay stress upon it. But\nits importance was soon seen. It had probably been for a long time the\nunreasoned belief of Hebrew monotheism: the development of the Platonic\nconception within the Christian sphere gave it a philosophical form: and\nearly in the third century it had become the prevailing theory in the\nChristian Church. God had created matter. He was not merely the Architect\nof the universe, but its Source.[363]\n\nBut the theory did not immediately win its way to acceptance. It rather\nset aside the moral difficulties than solved them. It was attacked by\nthose who felt those difficulties strongly. There are two chief literary\nrecords of the controversy: one is the treatise of Tertullian against\nHermogenes, the other is a dialogue of about the same date which is\nascribed to an otherwise unknown Maximus.[364] Both treatises are\ninteresting as examples not only of contemporary polemics, but of the\ninsoluble difficulties which beset any attempt to explain the origin\nof moral evil on metaphysical grounds. The attempt was soon afterwards\npractically abandoned. The solution of the moral difficulties was\nfound in the doctrine of Free-will: the solution of the metaphysical\ndifficulties was found in the general acceptance of the belief that God\ncreated all things out of nothing.\n\n(ii.) How, under any conception of matter, short of its having been\ncreated by God, did God come into contact with it so as to give it\nqualities and form? The difficulty of the question became greater as the\ntide of thought receded from anthropomorphism. The dominant idea was\nthat of mediation. Sometimes, as in Philo, the mediation was regarded\nfrom the point of view of the plurality and variety of the effects, and\nthe agents were conceived as being more than one in number. They were\nthe angels of the Hebrews, the d\u00e6mons of the Greeks. Those who appealed\nto Scripture saw an indication of this in the use of the plural in the\nfirst chapter of Genesis, \u201cLet _us_ make man.\u201d[365] Another current of\nspeculation flowed in the channel, which had been first formed by the\n_Tim\u00e6us_ of Plato, of supposing a single Creator and Ruler of the world\nwho, in subordination to the transcendent God, fashioned the things that\nexist. In some schools of thought this theory was combined with the\ntheory of creation by the Son.[366] The uncontrolled play of imagination\nin the region of the unknown constructed more than one strange\nspeculation which it is not necessary to revive.\n\nThe view into which the Christian consciousness ultimately settled\ndown had meanwhile been building itself up out of elements which were\npartly Jewish and partly Greek. On the one hand, there had long been\namong the Jews a belief in the power of the _word_ of God: and the\nbelief in His wisdom had shaped itself into a conception of that wisdom\nas a substantive force. On the other hand, the original conception of\nGreek philosophy that Mind or Reason had marshalled into order the\nconfused and warring elements of the prim\u00e6val chaos, had passed into the\nconception of the _Logos_ as a mode of the activity of God. These several\nelements, which had a natural affinity for each other, had already been\ncombined by Philo, as we have seen, into a comprehensive system: and in\nthe second century they were entering into new combinations both outside\nand inside the Christian communities.[367] The vagueness of conception\nwhich we have found in Philo is found also in the earliest expressions\nof these combinations. It is not always clear whether the _Logos_\nis regarded as a mode of God\u2019s activity, or as having a substantive\nexistence. In either view, God was regarded as the Creator; His supremacy\nwas as absolute as His unity: there was no rival, because in either view\nthe Logos was God.\n\n(iii.) How could a God who was at once beneficent and almighty create\na world which contained imperfection and moral evil? The question was\nanswered, as we have seen, on the monistic theory of creation by the\nhypothesis of a lapse. It was answered on the dualistic theory, sometimes\nby the hypothesis of evil inherent in matter, and sometimes by the\nhypothesis of creation by subordinate and imperfect agents.\n\nThe former of these hypotheses came rather from the East than from\nGreece; but it harmonized with and was supported by the Greek conception\nof matter as the seat of formlessness and disorder.\n\nThe latter hypothesis is an extension of the Platonic distinction between\nthe perfect world which God created directly through the operation of His\nown powers, and the world of mortal and imperfect existences the creation\nof which He entrusted to inferior agents. In the Platonic conception, God\nHimself, in a certain mode of His activity, was the Creator (Demiurgus),\nand the inferior agents were beings whom He had created.[368] In the\nconception which grew up early in the second century, and which was first\nformulated by Marcion, the Creator was detached from the Supreme God, and\nconceived as doing the work of the inferior agents. He was subordinate\nto the Supreme God and ultimately derived from Him:[369] but looming\nlarge in the horizon of finite thought, He seemed to be a rival and an\nadversary. The contradictions, the imperfections, the inequalities of\nboth condition and ability, which meet us in both the material and the\nmoral world, were solved by the hypothesis of two worlds in conflict,\neach of them moving under the impulse of a separate Power. The same\nsolution applied also to the contrast of the Old and New Testaments. It\nhad been already thought that the God of the Jews was different from the\nFather of Jesus Christ; but, with an exaggerated Paulinism, Marcion made\nso deep a chasm between the Law and the Gospel, the Flesh and the Spirit,\nthat the two were regarded as inherently hostile, and the work of the\nSaviour was regarded as bringing back into the world from which he had\nbeen shut out the God of love and grace.[370]\n\nThe objection to all this was that, in spite of its reservations and\nsafeguards, it tended to ditheism. The philosophical difficulties\nof monotheism were enormous, but the knot was not to be cut by the\nhypothesis of either a co-existent and resisting matter or an independent\nand rival God. The enormous wave of belief in the Divine Unity, which\nhad gathered its strength from the whole sea of contemporary thought,\nswept away the barriers in its path. The moral difficulty was solved, as\nwe shall see in the next Lecture, by the conception of free-will: the\nmetaphysical difficulties of the contact of God with matter were solved,\npartly by the conception that God created matter, and partly by the\nconception that He moulded it into form by His Logos, who is also His\nSon, eternally co-existent with Him.\n\nThe first patristic statement of this view is in Iren\u00e6us; it stands in\nthe forefront of his theology: and it seems to have been so generally\naccepted in the communities of which he was cognizant, that he states it\nas part of the recognized \u201crule of truth:\u201d the following is only one of\nseveral passages in which he so states it:[371]\n\n    \u201cThere is one Almighty God who created all things by His Word\n    and fashioned them, and caused that out of what was not all\n    things should be: as saith the Scripture, By the Word of\n    the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by\n    the Breath of His mouth: and again, All things were made by\n    Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made.\n    There is no exception: the Father made _all_ things by Him,\n    whether visible or invisible, objects of sense or objects of\n    intelligence, things temporal or things eternal. He made them\n    not by angels or by any powers separated from His Thought: for\n    God needs none of all these beings: but it is by His Word and\n    His Spirit that He makes and disposes and governs and presides\n    over all things. This God who made the world, this God who\n    fashioned man, this God of Abraham, and God of Isaac, and God\n    of Jacob, above whom there is no other God, nor Beginning nor\n    Power nor Fulness: this God, as we shall show, is the Father of\n    our Lord Jesus Christ.\u201d\n\nThe same view is expressed with equal prominence and emphasis by\na disciple of Iren\u00e6us, who shows an even stronger impress of the\nphilosophical speculations of his time:[372]\n\n    \u201cThe one God, the first and sole and universal Maker and\n    Lord, had nothing coeval with him, not infinite chaos, not\n    measureless water, or solid earth, or dense air, or warm fire,\n    or subtle breath, nor the azure cope of the vast heaven: but He\n    was one, alone by Himself, and by His will He made the things\n    that are, that before were not, except so far as they existed\n    in His foreknowledge.... This supreme and only God begets\n    Reason first, having formed the thought of him, not reason as a\n    spoken word, but as an internal mental process of the universe.\n    Him alone did He beget from existing things: for the Father\n    himself constituted existence, and from it came that which was\n    begotten. The cause of the things that came into being was the\n    Reason, bearing in himself the active will of Him who begat\n    him, and not being without knowledge of the Father\u2019s thought\n    ... so that when the Father bade the world come into being,\n    the Reason brought each thing to perfection one by one, thus\n    pleasing God.\u201d\n\nThis creed of Iren\u00e6us and his school became the basis of the theology\nof later Christendom. It appealed, as time went on, to a widening\nsphere, and summed up the judgment of average Christians on the main\nphilosophical questions of the second century. The questions were not\nseriously re-opened. The idealists of Alexandria, no less than the\nrhetoricians of Gaul, accepted, with all its difficulties, the belief\nthat there was one God who revealed Himself to mankind by the Word by\nwhom He had created them, and that this Word was manifested in Jesus\nChrist. But the Alexandrians were concerned less with the metaphysical\nthan with the moral difficulties; and their view of those difficulties\nmodified also their view of creation. The cosmogony of Origen was a\ntheodicy. His aim was less to show in detail how the world came into\nexistence, than to \u201cjustify the ways of God to man.\u201d He proceeded\nstrictly on the lines of the older philosophies, justifying in this\npart of his theology even more than in other respects the criticism of\nPorphyry,[373] that though in his manner of life he was a Christian,\nin his opinions about God he was a Greek. He followed the school of\nPhilo in believing that the original creation was of a world of ideal\nor \u201cintelligible\u201d existences, and that the cause of creation was the\ngoodness of God.[374] He differed from, or expanded, the teaching of\nthat school in believing that the Word or Wisdom of God, by whom He\nmade the world, was not impersonal, but His Son, and that both the\nexistence of the Son and the creation of the ideal world had been from\nall eternity.[375] For it is impious to think that God ever existed\nwithout His Wisdom, possessing the power to create but not the will; and\nit is inconceivable either that Wisdom should ever have been without\nthe conception of the world that was to be, or that there should ever\nhave been a time at which God was not omnipotent from having no world\nto govern.[376] The relation of each to the world is stated in varying\nways: one mode of statement is, that from the Father and the Son, thus\neternally co-existent, came the actual world; the Father caused it to\nbe, the Son caused it to be rational:[377] another is, that the whole\nworld, visible and invisible, was made by the agency of the only begotten\nSon, who conveyed a share in himself to certain parts of the things so\ncreated and caused them thereby to become rational creatures.[378] This\nvisible world, which, as also Philo and the Platonists had taught, is a\ncopy of the ideal world, took its beginning in time: but it is not the\nfirst, nor will it be the last, of such worlds.[379] The matter of it\nas well as the form was created by God.[380] It was made by Him, and to\nHim it will return. The Stoical theory had conceived of the universe\nas analogous to a seed which expands to flower and fruit and withers\naway, but leaves behind it a similar seed which has a similar life and a\nsimilar succession: so did one universal order spring from its beginning\nand pass through its appointed period to the end which was like the\nbeginning in that after it all things began anew. Origen\u2019s theory was a\nmodification of this: it recognized an absolute beginning and an absolute\nend: both the beginning and the end were God: poised as it were between\nthese two divine eternities were the worlds of which we are part. In\nthem, all rational creatures were originally equal and free: they are\nequal no longer because they have variously used their freedom: and the\nhypothesis of more worlds than one is a complement, on the one hand of\nthe hypothesis of human freedom, on the other hand of the hypothesis of\nthe divine justice, because it accounts for the infinite diversities of\ncondition, and gives scope for the discipline of reformation.\n\nLarge elements of this theory dominated in the theology of the Eastern\nChurches during the fourth century. But ultimately those parts of it\nwhich distinguished it from the theory of Iren\u00e6us faded away. The mass\nof Christians were content with a simpler creed. More than one question\nremained unsolved; and the hypothesis of creation by a rival God was\npart of the creed of a Church which flourished for several centuries\nbefore it faded away, and it also left its traces in many inconsistent\nusages within the circle of the communities which rejected it. But the\nbelief in the unity of God, and in the identity of the one God with the\nCreator of the world, was never again seriously disturbed. The close of\nthe controversy was marked by its transference to a different, though\nallied, area. It was no longer Theological but Christological. The\nexpression \u201cMonarchy,\u201d which had been used of the sole government of\nthe one God, in distinction from the divided government of many gods,\ncame to be applied to the sole government of the Father, in distinction\nfrom the \u201ceconomy\u201d of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. In this\nnew area of controversy the old conceptions re-appear. The monistic and\ndualistic theories of the origin of the world lie beneath the two schools\nof Monarchianism, in one of which Christ was conceived as a mode of God,\nand in the other as His exalted creature. In the determination of these\nChristological controversies Greek philosophy had a no less important\ninfluence than it had upon the controversies which preceded them: and\nwith some elements of that determination we shall be concerned in a\nfuture Lecture.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe may sum up the result of the influence of Greece on the conception\nof God in His relation to the material universe, by saying that it\nfound a reasoned basis for Hebrew monotheism. It helped the Christian\ncommunities to believe as an intellectual conviction that which they\nhad first accepted as a spiritual revelation. The moral difficulties\nof human life, and the Oriental influences which were flowing in large\nmass over some parts of the Christian world, tended towards ditheism.\nBut the average opinion of thinking men, which is the ultimate solvent\nof all philosophical theories, had for centuries past been settling down\ninto the belief in the unity of God. With a conviction which has been as\npermanent as it was of slow growth, it believed that the difficulties\nin the hypothesis of the existence of a Power limited by the existence\nof a rival Power, are greater even than the great difficulties in the\nbelief in a God who allows evil to be. The dominant Theistic philosophy\nof Greece became the dominant philosophy of Christianity. It prevailed\nin form as well as in substance. It laid emphasis on the conception\nof God as the Artificer and Architect of the universe rather than as\nits immanent Cause. But though the substance will remain, the form may\nchange. Platonism is not the only theory that is consistent with the\nfundamental thesis that \u201cof Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all\nthings:\u201d and it is not impossible that, even after this long lapse of\ncenturies, the Christian world may come back to that conception of Him\nwhich was shadowed in the far-off ages, and which has never been wholly\nwithout a witness, that He is \u201cnot far off but very nigh;\u201d that \u201cHe is in\nus and we in Him;\u201d that He is changeless and yet changing in and with His\ncreatures; and that He who \u201crested from His creation,\u201d yet so \u201cworketh\nhitherto\u201d that the moving universe itself is the eternal and unfolding\nmanifestation of Him.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VIII.\n\nGREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.\n\nII. THE MORAL GOVERNOR.\n\n\nA. THE GREEK IDEA.\n\n1. The idea of the unity of God had grown, as we have already seen,\nin a common growth with the idea of the unity of the world. But it\ndid not absorb that idea. The dominant element in the idea of God was\npersonality: in the idea of the world it was order. But personality\nimplied will, and will seemed to imply the capacity to change; whereas in\nthe world, wherever order could be traced, it was fixed and unvarying.\n\nThe order was most conspicuous in the movements of the heavenly bodies.\nIt could be expressed by numbers. The philosopher of numbers was the\nfirst to give to the world the name _Cosmos_, the \u201corder\u201d as of a\nmarshalled army.[381] The order being capable of being expressed by\nnumbers, partook of the nature of numerical relations. Those relations\nare not only fixed, but absolutely unalterable. That a certain ratio\nshould be otherwise than what it is, is inconceivable. Hence the same\nphilosopher of numbers who had first conceived of the _Cosmos_,\nconceived of it also as being \u201cinvested with necessity,\u201d and the\nmetaphysicians who followed him framed the formula, \u201cAll things are by\nnecessity.\u201d[382]\n\nThis conception linked itself with an older idea of Greek religion. The\nlength of a man\u2019s life and his measure of endowments had been spoken of\nas his \u201cshare\u201d or \u201cportion.\u201d Sometimes the assigning of this portion to\na man was conceived as the work of Zeus or the other gods: sometimes\nthe gods themselves had their portions like men; and very commonly the\nportion itself was viewed actively, as though it were the activity of a\nspecial being. It was sometimes personal, sometimes impersonal: it was,\nin any case, inevitable.[383] Through its character of inevitableness, it\nfused with the conception of the unalterableness of physical order. Hence\nthe proposition, \u201cAll things are by necessity,\u201d soon came to be otherwise\nexpressed, \u201cAll things are by destiny.\u201d[384]\n\nOver against the personal might of Zeus there thus came to stand the\ndark and formless fixity of an impersonal Destiny.[385] The conception\nwas especially elaborated by the Stoics. In the older mythology from\nwhich it had sprung, its personifications had been spoken of sometimes\nas the daughters of Zeus and Themis, and sometimes as the daughters\nof Night.[386] The former expressed its certainty and perfect order;\nthe other, the darkness of its working. The former element became more\nprominent. It was an \u201ceternal, continuous and ordered movement.\u201d[387]\nIt was \u201cthe linked chain of causes.\u201d[388] The idea of necessity passed\ninto that of intelligent and inherent force: the idea of destiny was\ntransmuted into that of law.\n\nThis sublime conception, which has become a permanent possession of the\nhuman race, was further elaborated into the picture of the world as a\ngreat city. The Greek \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2, the state, whose equivalent in modern times\nis not civil but ecclesiastical, was an ideal society, the embodied type\nof a perfect constitution or organization (\u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1).[389] Its parts were\nall interdependent and relative to the whole, the whole was flawless\nand supreme, working out without friction the divine conception which\nwas expressed in its laws. The world was such an ideal society.[390]\nIt consisted of gods and men: the former were its rulers; the latter,\nits citizens. The moral law was a reason inherent in human nature,\nprescribing what men should do, and forbidding what they should not\ndo: human laws were but appendages of it.[391] In this sense man was a\n\u201ccitizen of the world.\u201d[392] To each individual man, as to every other\ncreated being, the administrators had assigned a special task. \u201c_Thou_ be\nSun: thou hast the power to go on thy circuit and make the year and the\nseasons, to make fruits grow and ripen, to stir and lull the winds, to\nwarm the bodies of men: go thy way, make thy circuit, and so fulfil thy\nministry alike in small things and in great.... _Thou_ hast the power to\nlead the army to Ilium: be Agamemnon. _Thou_ hast the power to fight in\ncombat with Hector: be Achilles.\u201d To this function of administration the\ngods were limited. The constitution of the great city was unchangeable.\nThe gods, like men, were, in the Stoical conception, bound by the\nconditions of things.\n\n    \u201cThat which is best of all things and supreme,\u201d says Epictetus,\n    \u201chave the gods placed in our power\u2014the faculty of rightly\n    dealing with ideas: all other things are out of our power. Is\n    it that they would not? I for my part think that if they had\n    been able they would have placed the other things also in our\n    power; but they absolutely could not.... For what says Zeus?\n    \u2018Epictetus, if it had been possible, I would have made thy\n    body and thy possessions free and unhindered. But as it is,\n    forget not that thy body is not thine, but only clay deftly\n    kneaded. And since I could not do this, I gave thee a part of\n    myself, the power of making or not making effort, the power\n    of indulging or not indulging desire; in short, the power of\n    dealing with all the ideas of thy mind.\u2019\u201d[393]\n\n2. Side by side with this conception of destiny were growing up new\nconceptions of the nature of the gods. The gods of wrath were passing\naway. The awe of the forces of nature, of night and thunder, of the\nwhirlwind and the earthquake, which had underlain the primitive\nreligions, was fading into mist. The meaner conceptions which had\nresulted from a vividly realized anthropomorphism, the malice and spite\nand intrigue which make some parts of the earlier mythology read like\nthe _chronique scandaleuse_ of a European court, were passing into the\nregion of ridicule and finding their expression only in burlesque. Two\ngreat conceptions, the elements of which had existed in the earliest\nreligion, gradually asserted their supremacy. The gods were just, and\nthey were also good. They punished wicked deeds, not by an arbitrary\nvengeance, but by the operation of unfailing laws. The laws were the\nexpression of the highest conceivable morality. Their penalties were\npersonal to the offender, and the sinner who did not pay them in this\nlife paid them after death. The gods were also good. The idea of their\nkindness, which in the earlier religion had been a kindness only for\nfavoured individuals, widened out to a conception of their general\nbenevolence.[394] The conception of their forethought, which at first had\nonly been that of wise provision in particular cases, linked itself with\nthe Stoical teleology.[395] The God who was the Reason of the world, and\nimmanent in it, was working to an end. That end was the perfection of the\nwhole, which was also the perfection of each member of the whole. In the\nsphere of human life, happiness and perfection, misery and imperfection,\nare linked together. The forethought or \u201cProvidence\u201d of God was thus\nbeneficent in regard both to the universe itself and to the individual.\nIt worked by self-acting laws. \u201cThere are,\u201d says Epictetus,[396]\n\u201cpunishments appointed as it were by law to those who disobey the divine\nadministration. Whoever thinks anything to be good that is outside the\nrange of his will, let that man feel envy and unsatisfied longing; let\nhim be flattered, let him be unquiet; whoever thinks anything to be evil\nthat is outside the range of his will, let him feel pain and sorrow, let\nhim bemoan himself and be unhappy.\u201d And again: \u201cThis is the law\u2014divine\nand strong and beyond escape\u2014which exacts the greatest punishments from\nthose who have sinned the greatest sins. For what says it? The man who\nlays claim to the things that do not concern him, let him be a braggart,\nlet him be vainglorious: the man who disobeys the divine administration,\nlet him be mean-spirited, let him be a slave, let him feel grief, and\njealousy, and pity; in short, let him bemoan himself and be unhappy.\u201d[397]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere were thus at the beginning of the Christian era two concurrent\nconceptions of the nature of the superhuman forces which determine the\nexistence and control the activity of all created things, the conceptions\nof Destiny and of Providence. The two conceptions, though apparently\nantagonistic, had tended, like all conceptions which have a strong hold\nupon masses of men, to approach each other. The meeting-point had been\nfound in the conception of the fixed order of the world as being at once\nrational and beneficent. It was rational because it was the embodiment of\nthe highest reason; and it was beneficent because happiness is incident\nto perfection, and the highest reason, which is the law of the perfection\nof the whole, is also the law of the perfection of the parts. There\nwere two stages in this blending of the two conceptions into one: the\nidentification, first of Destiny with Reason;[398] and, secondly, of\nDestiny or Reason with Providence.[399] The former of these is found in\nHeraclitus, but is absent from Plato, who distinguishes what comes into\nbeing by necessity, from what is wrought by mind: the elaboration of\nboth the former and the latter is due to the Stoics, growing logically\nout of their conception of the universe as a single substance moved\nby an inherent law. It was probably in many cases a change rather of\nlanguage than of idea when Destiny or Reason or Providence was spoken\nof as God;[400] and yet sometimes, whether by the lingering of an\nancient belief or by an intuition which transcended logic, the sense of\npersonality mingles with the idea of physical sequence, and all things\nthat happen in the infinite chain of immutable causation are conceived\nas happening by the will of God.\n\n3. But over against the conception of a perfect Reason or Providence\nadministering the world, was the fact of the existence of physical pain\nand social inequality and moral failure. The problems which the fact\nsuggested filled a large place in later Greek philosophy, and were solved\nin many ways.\n\nThe solution was sometimes found in the denial of the universality\nof Providence. God is the Author only of good: evil is due to other\ncauses.[401] This view, which found its first philosophical expression\nin the _Tim\u00e6us_ of Plato, was transmitted, through some of the Platonic\nschools, to the later syncretist writers who incorporated Platonic\nelements. In its Platonic form it assumed the existence of inferior\nagents who ultimately owed their existence to God, but whose existence as\nauthors of evil He permitted or overlooked. In some later forms the view\nlinked itself with Oriental conceptions of matter as inherently evil.\n\nThe solution was more commonly found in a denial of the reality of\napparent evils. They were all either forms of good, or incidental to its\noperation or essential to its production. This was the common solution of\nthe Stoics. It had many phases. One view was based upon the teleological\nconception of nature. The world is marching on to its end: it realizes\nits purpose not directly but by degrees: there are necessary sequences\nof its march which seem to us to be evil.[402] Another view, akin to the\npreceding, was based upon the conception of the world as a whole. In its\nvast economy there are subordinations and individual inconveniences. Such\nsubordinations and inconveniences are necessary parts of the plan. The\npain of the individual is not an evil, but his contribution to the good\nof the whole. \u201cWhat about my leg being lamed, then?\u201d says Epictetus,[403]\naddressing himself in the character of an imaginary objector. \u201cSlave!\ndo you really find fault with the world on account of one bit of a leg?\nwill you not give that up to the universe? will you not let it go? will\nyou not gladly surrender it to the Giver?\u201d The world, in other words, was\nregarded as an _economy_ (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1), like that of a city, in which there\nare apparent inequalities of condition, but in which such inequalities\nare necessary to the constitution of the whole.[404]\n\n    \u201cWhat is meant, then,\u201d asks Epictetus, \u201cby distinguishing the\n    things that happen to us as \u2018according to nature\u2019 and \u2018contrary\n    to nature\u2019? The phrases are used as if we were isolated. For\n    example, to a foot to be \u2018according to nature\u2019 is to be clean;\n    but if you consider it as a _foot_, a member of the body, and\n    not as isolated, it will be its duty both to walk in mud, and\n    to tread on thorns\u2014nay, sometimes even to be cut off for the\n    benefit of the whole body; if it refuse, it is no longer a\n    foot. We have to form a similar conception about ourselves.\n    What are you? A man. If you regard yourself as isolated, it is\n    \u2018according to nature\u2019 to live until old age, to be rich, to be\n    in good health; but if you regard yourself as a _man_, a part\n    of a certain whole, it is your duty, on account of that whole,\n    sometimes to be ill, sometimes to take a voyage, sometimes to\n    run into danger, sometimes to be in want, and, it may be, to\n    die before your time. Why then are you discontented? Do you not\n    know that, as in the example a discontented foot is no longer a\n    foot, so neither are you a man. For what is a man? A member of\n    a city, first the city which consists of gods and men, and next\n    of the city which is so called in the more proximate sense, the\n    earthly city, which is a small model of the whole. \u2018Am I, then,\n    now,\u2019 you say, \u2018to be brought before a court: is so-and-so to\n    fall into a fever: so-and-so to go on a voyage: so-and-so to\n    die: so-and-so to be condemned?\u2019 Yes; for it is impossible,\n    considering the sort of body we have, with this atmosphere\n    round us, and with these companions of our life, that different\n    things of this kind should not befall different men.[405]\n\n    \u201cIt is on this account that the philosophers rightly tell us\n    that if a perfectly good man had foreknown what was going\n    to happen to him, he would co-operate with nature in both\n    falling sick and dying and being maimed, being conscious that\n    this is the particular portion that is assigned to him in the\n    arrangement of the universe, and that the whole is supreme over\n    the part, and the city over the citizen.\u201d[406]\n\nThis Stoical solution, if the teleological conception which underlies it\nbe assumed, may have been adequate as an explanation both of physical\npain and of social inequality. But it was clearly inadequate as an\nexplanation of misery and moral evil. And the sense of misery and moral\nevil was growing. The increased complexity of social life revealed the\ndistress which it helped to create, and the intensified consciousness\nof individual life quickened also the sense of disappointment and moral\nshortcoming. The solution of the difficulties which these facts of life\npresented, was found in a belief which was correlative to the growing\nbelief in the goodness of God, though logically inconsistent with the\nbelief in the universality of His Providence. It was, that men were the\nauthors of their own misery. Their sorrows, so far as they were not\npunitive or remedial, came from their own folly or perversity. They\nbelonged to a margin of life which was outside the will of the gods or\nthe ordinances of fate. The belief was repeatedly expressed by Homer,\nbut does not appear in philosophy until the time of the Stoics: it is\nfound in both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and the latter also quotes it\nas a belief of the Pythagoreans.[407] Out of it came the solution of a\nproblem not less important than that from which it had itself sprung. The\nconception that men were free to bring ruin upon themselves, led to the\nwider conception that they were altogether free. There emerged for the\nfirst time into prominence the idea which has filled a large place in all\nlater theology and ethics, that of the freedom of the will. The freedom\nwhich was denied to external nature was asserted of human nature. It was\nwithin a man\u2019s own power to do right or wrong, to be happy or miserable.\n\n    \u201cOf all things that are,\u201d says Epictetus,[408] \u201cone part is in\n    our control, the other out of it; in our control are opinion,\n    impulse to do, effort to obtain, effort to avoid\u2014in a word,\n    our own proper activities; out of our control are our bodies,\n    property, reputation, office\u2014in a word, all things except our\n    proper activities. Things in our control are in their nature\n    free, not liable to hindrance in the doing or to frustration of\n    the attainment; things out of our control are weak, dependent,\n    liable to hindrance, belonging to others. Bear in mind, then,\n    that if you mistake what is dependent for what is free, and\n    what belongs to others for what is your own, you will meet with\n    obstacles in your way, you will be regretful and disquieted,\n    you will find fault with both gods and men. If, on the\n    contrary, you think that only to be your own which is really\n    your own, and that which is another\u2019s to be, as it really is,\n    another\u2019s, no one will thwart you, you will find fault with\n    no one, you will reproach no one, you will do no single thing\n    against your will, no one will harm you, you will not have an\n    enemy.\u201d\n\nThe incompatibility of this doctrine with that of the universality\nof Destiny or Reason or Providence\u2014the \u201cantinomy of the practical\nunderstanding\u201d\u2014was not always observed.[409] The two doctrines marched on\nparallel lines, and each of them was sometimes stated as though it had no\nlimitations. The harmony of them, which is indicated by both Cleanthes\nand Chrysippus, and which underlies a large part of both the theology and\nthe ethics of Epictetus, is in effect this: The world marches on to its\nend, realizing its own perfection, with absolute certainty. The majority\nof its parts move in that march unconsciously, with no sense of pleasure\nor pain, no idea of good or evil. To man is given the consciousness of\naction, the sense of pleasure and pain, the idea of good and evil, and\nfreedom of choice between them. If he chooses that which is against the\nmovement of nature, he chooses for himself misery; if he chooses that\nwhich is in accordance with that movement, he finds happiness. In either\ncase the movement of nature goes on, and the man fulfils his destiny:\n\u201c_Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt._\u201d[410] It is a man\u2019s true\nfunction and high privilege so to educate his mind and discipline his\nwill, as to think that to be best which is really best, and that to be\navoided which nature has not willed: in other words, to acquiesce in the\nwill of God, not as submitting in passive resignation to the power of one\nwho is stronger, but as having made that will his own.[411]\n\nIf a man realizes this, instead of bemoaning the difficulties of life,\nhe will not only ask God to send them, but thank Him for them. This is\nthe Stoical theodicy. The life and teaching of Epictetus are for the most\npart a commentary upon it.\n\n    \u201cLook at the powers you have; and when you have looked at\n    them, say, \u2018Bring me, O God, what difficulty Thou wilt; for\n    I have the equipment which Thou hast given me, and the means\n    for making all things that happen contribute to my adornment.\u2019\n    Nay, but that is not what you do: you sit sometimes shuddering\n    at the thought of what may happen, sometimes bewailing and\n    grieving and groaning over what does happen. Then you find\n    fault with the gods! For what but impiety is the consequence\n    of such degeneracy? And yet God has not merely given you these\n    powers by which we may bear whatever happens without being\n    lowered or crushed by it, but also, like the good King and true\n    Father that He is, has given to this part of you the capacity\n    of not being thwarted, or forced, or hindered, and has made it\n    absolutely your own, not even reserving to Himself the power of\n    thwarting or hindering it.\u201d[412]\n\n    \u201cWhat words are sufficient to praise or worthily describe the\n    gifts of Providence to us? If we were really wise, what should\n    we have been doing in public or in private but sing hymns to\n    God, and bless Him and recount His gifts (\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2)? Digging\n    or ploughing or eating, ought we not to be singing this hymn to\n    God, \u2018Great is God for having given us these tools for tilling\n    the ground; great is God for having given us hands to work with\n    and throat to swallow with, for that we grow unconsciously\n    and breathe while we sleep\u2019? This ought to be our hymn for\n    everything: but the chiefest and divinest hymn should be for\n    His having given us the power of understanding and of dealing\n    rationally with ideas. Nay\u2014since most of you are utterly blind\n    to this\u2014ought there not to be some one to make this his special\n    function, and to sing the hymn to God for all the rest? What\n    else can a lame old man like me do but sing hymns to God? If I\n    were a nightingale, I should do the work of a nightingale; if a\n    swan, the work of a swan; but being as I am a rational being,\n    I must sing hymns to God. This is my work: this I do: this\n    rank\u2014as far as I can\u2014I will not leave; and I invite you to join\n    with me in this same song.\u201d[413]\n\n\nB. THE CHRISTIAN IDEA.\n\nIn primitive Christianity we find ourselves in another sphere of ideas:\nwe seem to be breathing the air of Syria, with Syrian forms moving round\nus, and speaking a language which is not familiar to us. For the Greek\ncity, with its orderly government, we have to substitute the picture\nof an Eastern sheyk, at once the paymaster of his dependents and their\njudge. Two conceptions are dominant, that of wages for work done, and\nthat of positive law.\n\n1. The idea of moral conduct as work done for a master who will in due\ntime pay wages for it, was a natural growth on Semitic soil. It grew up\namong the _fellahin_, to whom the day\u2019s work brought the day\u2019s wages,\nand whose work was scrutinized before the wages were paid. It is found\nin many passages of the New Testament, and not least of all in the\ndiscourses of our Lord. The ethical problems which had vexed the souls\nof the writers of Job and the Psalms, are solved by the teaching that\nthe wages are not all paid now, but that some of them are in the keeping\nof the Father in heaven. The persecuted are consoled by the thought,\n\u201cGreat are your wages in heaven.\u201d[414] Those who do their alms before men\nreceive their wages in present reputation, and have no wages stored up\nfor them in heaven.[415] The smallest act of casual charity, the giving\nof a cup of cold water, will not go without its wages.[416] The payment\nwill be made at the return of the Son of Man, whose \u201cwages are with\nhim to give to every man according as his work is.\u201d[417] So fundamental\nis the conception that \u201che that cometh to God must believe,\u201d not only\n\u201cthat He is,\u201d but also that He \u201cpays their due to them that seek after\nHim.\u201d[418] So also in the early Christian literature which moved still\nwithin the sphere of Syrian ideas. In the \u201cTwo Ways,\u201d what is given in\ncharity should be given without murmuring, for God will repay it:[419]\nin the Epistle of Barnabas, the conception of the paymaster is blended\nwith that of the judge.[420] \u201cThe Lord judges without respect of persons:\nevery one shall receive according as he has done: if he be good, his\nrighteousness shall go before him: if he be wicked, the wages of his\nwickedness are before his face.\u201d\n\n2. God is at once the Lawgiver and the Judge. The underlying conception\nis that of an Oriental sovereign who issues definite commands, who is\ngratified by obedience and made angry by disobedience, who gives presents\nto those who please him and punishes those with whom he is angry. The\npunishments which he inflicts are vindictive and not remedial. They are\nthe manifestation of his vengeance against unrighteousness. They are\nexternal to the offender. They follow on the offence by the sentence of\nthe judge, and not by a self-acting law. He sends men _into_ punishment.\n\nThe introduction into this primitive Christianity of the ethical\nconceptions of Greek philosophy, raised difficulties which were long in\nbeing solved, if indeed they can be said to have been solved even now.\nThe chief of these difficulties were, (i.) the relation of the idea of\nforgiveness to that of law; (ii.) the relation of the conception of a\nMoral Governor to that of free-will.\n\n(i.) The Christian conception of God on its ethical side was dominated by\nthe idea of the forgiveness of sins. God was a Sovereign who had issued\ncommands: He was a Householder who had entrusted His servants with powers\nto be used in His service. As Sovereign, He could, at His pleasure,\nforgive a breach of His orders: as Householder, He could remit a debt\nwhich was due to Him from His servants. The special message of the Gospel\nwas, that God was willing to forgive men their transgressions, and to\nremit their debts, for the sake of Jesus Christ. The corresponding Greek\nconception had come to be dominated by the idea of order. The order was\nrational and beneficent, but it was universal. It could not be violated\nwith impunity. The punishment of its violation came by a self-acting law.\nThere was a possibility of amendment, but there was none of remission.\nEach of these conceptions is consistent with itself: each by itself\nfurnishes the basis of a rational theology. But the two conceptions\nare apparently irreconcilable with each other; and the history of a\nlarge part of early Christian theology is the history of endeavours to\nreconcile them. The one conception belonged to a moral world, controlled\nby a Personality who set forces in motion; the other to a physical world,\ncontrolled by a force which was also conceived as a Personality. Stated\nin Christian terms, the one resolved itself into the proposition, God is\ngood; the other into the proposition, God is just. The two propositions\nseemed at first to be inconsistent with each other: on the one hand, the\ninfinite love of God excluding the idea of punishment; on the other hand,\nHis immutable righteousness excluding the idea of forgiveness.[421] The\ndifficulty seemed insoluble, except upon the hypothesis of the existence\nof two Gods. The ditheism was sometimes veiled by the conception that the\nsecond God had been created by the first, and was ultimately subordinate\nto Him. In the theology of Marcion, which filled a large place in the\nChristianity of both the second and the third centuries, ditheism was\npresented as the only solution of this and all the other contrasts of\nwhich the world is full, and of which that of Law and Grace is the most\ntypical example.[422] The New Testament was the revelation of the good\nGod, the God of love; the Old Testament was that of the just God, the God\nof wrath. Redemption was the victory of forgiveness over punishment, of\nthe God who was revealed by Jesus Christ over the God who was manifested\nin the Law.\n\nThe ditheistic hypothesis was itself more difficult than the difficulties\nwhich it explained. The writers who opposed it were helped, not only by\nthe whole current of evangelical tradition, but also by the dominant\ntendencies of both philosophy and popular religion. They insisted that\njustice and goodness were not only compatible but necessarily co-existent\nin the Divine nature. Goodness meant not indiscriminating beneficence;\njustice meant not inexorable wrath: goodness and justice were combined\nin the power of God to deal with every man according to his deserts,\nincluding in the idea of deserts that of repentance.\n\nThe solution is found in Iren\u00e6us, who argues that in the absence of\neither of the two attributes, God would cease to be God:\n\n    \u201cIf the God who judges be not also good, so as to bestow\n    favours on those on whom He ought, and to reprove those whom\n    He should, He will be as a Judge neither wise nor just. On the\n    other hand, if the good God be only good, and not also able to\n    test those on whom He shall bestow His goodness, He will be\n    outside goodness as well as outside justice, and His goodness\n    will seem imperfect, inasmuch as it does not save all, as it\n    should do if it be not accompanied with judgment. Marcion,\n    therefore, by dividing God into two, the one a God who judges,\n    and the other a God who is good, on both sides puts an end to\n    God.\u201d[423]\n\nIt is found in Tertullian, who, after arguing on _\u00e0 priori_ grounds that\nthe one attribute implies the other, passes by an almost unconscious\ntransition from physical to moral law: just as the \u201cjustice\u201d of God\nin its physical operation controlled His goodness in the making of\nan orderly world, so in its moral operation it has, since the Fall,\nregulated His dealings with mankind.\n\n    \u201cNothing is good which is unjust; all that is just is good....\n    The good is where the just is. From the beginning of the world\n    the Creator has been at once good and just. The two qualities\n    came forth together. His goodness formed the world, His justice\n    harmonized it. It is the work of justice that there is a\n    separation between light and darkness, between day and night,\n    between heaven and earth, between the greater and the lesser\n    lights.... As goodness brought all things into being, so did\n    justice distinguish them. The whole universe has been disposed\n    and ordered by the decision of His justice. Every position and\n    mode of the elements, the movement and the rest, the rising and\n    the setting of each one of them, are judicial decisions of the\n    Creator.... When evil broke out, and the goodness of God came\n    henceforward to have an opponent to contend with, the justice\n    also of God acquired another function, that of regulating the\n    operation of His goodness according to the opposition to it:\n    the result is that His goodness, instead of being absolutely\n    free, is dispensed according to men\u2019s deserts; it is offered to\n    the worthy, it is denied to the unworthy, it is taken away from\n    the unthankful, it is avenged on all its adversaries. In this\n    way this whole function of justice is an agency for goodness:\n    in condemning, in punishing, in raging with wrath, as you\n    Marcionites express it, it does good and not evil.\u201d[424]\n\nIt is found in the Clementines,[425] the \u201cRecognitions\u201d going so far as\nto make the acceptance of it an element in \u201csaving knowledge:\u201d \u201cit is\nnot enough for salvation to know that God is good; we must know also that\nHe is just.\u201d[426] It is elaborated by both Clement of Alexandria[427] and\nOrigen; but in the latter it is linked closely with other problems, and\nhis view will be best considered in relation to them.[428] The Christian\nworld in his time was settling down into a general acceptance of the\nbelief that goodness and justice co-existed, each limiting the other in\nthe mind of God: the general effect of the controversy was to emphasize\nin Christianity the conception of God as a Moral Governor, administering\nthe world by laws which were at once beneficent and just.\n\n(ii.) But this problem of the relation of goodness to justice passed, as\nthe corresponding problem in Greek philosophy passed, into the problem of\nthe relation of a good God to moral evil. The difficulties of the problem\nwere increased in its Christian form by the conception of moral evil as\nguilt rather than as misery, and by the emphasis which was laid on the\nidea of the Divine foreknowledge.\n\nThe problem was stated in its plainest form by Marcion:\n\n    \u201cIf God is good, and prescient of the future, and able to avert\n    evil, why did He allow man, that is to say His own image and\n    likeness, nay more, His own substance, to be tricked by the\n    devil and fall from obedience to the law into death? For if\n    He had been good, and thereby unwilling that such an event\n    should happen, and prescient, and thereby not ignorant that\n    it would happen, and powerful, and thereby able to prevent\n    its happening, it would certainly not have happened, being\n    impossible under these three conditions of divine greatness.\n    But since it did happen, the inference is certain that\n    God must be believed to be neither good nor prescient nor\n    powerful.\u201d[429]\n\nThe hypothesis of the existence of two Gods, by which Marcion solved this\nand other problems of theology, was consistently opposed by the great\nmass of the Christian communities. The solution which they found was\nalmost uniformly that of the Stoics: evil is necessary for the production\nof moral virtue: there is no virtue where there is no choice: and man\nwas created free to choose. It was found, in short, in the doctrine of\nfree-will.\n\nThis solution is found in Justin Martyr:\n\n    \u201cThe nature of every created being is to be capable of vice and\n    virtue: for no one of them would be an object of praise if it\n    had not also the power of turning in the one direction or the\n    other.\u201d[430]\n\nIt is found in Tatian:\n\n    \u201cEach of the two classes of created things (men and angels) is\n    born with a power of self-determination, not absolutely good by\n    nature, for that is an attribute of God alone, but brought to\n    perfection through freedom of voluntary choice, in order that\n    the bad man may be justly punished, being himself the cause of\n    his being wicked, and that the righteous man may be worthily\n    praised for his good actions, not having in his exercise of\n    moral freedom transgressed the will of God.\u201d[431]\n\nIt is found in Iren\u00e6us:\n\n    \u201cIn man as in angels, for angels also are rational beings, God\n    has placed the power of choosing, so that those who have obeyed\n    might justly be in possession of what is good; and that those\n    who have not obeyed may justly not be in possession of what is\n    good, and may receive the punishment which they deserve.... But\n    if it had been by nature that some were bad and others good,\n    neither would the latter be deserving of praise for being good,\n    inasmuch as they were so constituted; nor the others of blame\n    for being bad, inasmuch as they were born so. But since in fact\n    all men are of the same nature, able on the one hand to hold\n    fast and to do what is good, and again on the other hand to\n    reject it and not do it, it is right for them to be in the one\n    case praised for their choice of the good and their adherence\n    to it, and in the other case blamed and punished for their\n    rejection of it, both among well-governed men and much more in\n    the sight of God.\u201d[432]\n\nIt is found in Theophilus[433] and Athenagoras,[434] and, as a more\nelaborate theory, in Tertullian and the philosophers of Alexandria.\nJust as Epictetus and the later Stoics had made freedom of will to be\nthe specially divine part of human nature, so Tertullian[435] answers\nMarcion\u2019s objection, that if God foreknew that Adam would fall He should\nnot have made him free, by the argument that the goodness of God in\nmaking man necessarily gave him the highest form of existence, that such\nhighest form was \u201cthe image and likeness of God,\u201d and that such image and\nlikeness was freedom of will. And just as Epictetus and the later Stoics\nhad conceived of life as a moral discipline, and of its apparent evils as\nnecessary means of testing character, so the Christian philosophers of\nAlexandria conceive of God as the Teacher and Trainer and Physician of\nmen, of the pains of life as being disciplinary, and of the punishments\nof sin as being not vindictive but remedial.[436]\n\nThere was still a large margin of unsolved difficulties. The hypothesis\nof the freedom of the will, as it had hitherto been stated, assumed that\nall beings who possessed it were equal in both their circumstances and\ntheir natural aptitudes. It took no account of the enormous difference\nbetween one man and another in respect of either the external advantages\nor disadvantages of their lives, or the strength and weakness of their\ncharacters. The difficulty was strongly felt by more than one school of\nChristian philosophers, the more so because it applied, not only to the\ndiversities among mankind, but also to the larger differences between\nmankind as a whole and the celestial beings who rose in their sublime\ngradations above it.\n\n    \u201cVery many persons, especially those who come from the school\n    of Marcion and Valentinus and Basilides, object to us that it\n    is inconsistent with the justice of God in making the world\n    to assign to some creatures an abode in the heavens, and not\n    merely a better abode, but also a loftier and more honourable\n    position; to grant to some principality, to others powers,\n    to others dominations; to confer upon some the noblest seats\n    of the heavenly tribunals, to cause others to shine out with\n    brighter rays, and to flash forth the brilliance of a star; to\n    give to some the glory of the sun, and to others the glory of\n    the moon, and to others the glory of the stars; to make one\n    star differ from another star in glory.... In the second place,\n    they object to us about terrestrial beings that a happier lot\n    of birth has come to some men than to others; one man, for\n    example, is begotten by Abraham and born according to promise;\n    another is the son of Isaac and Rebekah, and, supplanting his\n    brother even in the womb, is said even before he is born to\n    be beloved of God. One man is born among the Hebrews, among\n    whom he finds the learning of the divine law; another among\n    the Greeks, themselves also wise and men of no small learning;\n    another among the Ethiopians, who are cannibals; another among\n    the Scythians, with whom parricide is legal; another among the\n    Taurians, who offer their guests in sacrifice.\n\n    \u201cThey consequently argue thus: If this great diversity of\n    circumstances, this varied and different condition of birth\u2014a\n    matter in which free-will has no place\u2014is not caused by a\n    diversity in the nature of the souls themselves, a soul of an\n    evil nature being destined for an evil nation, and a soul of a\n    good nature for a good one, what other conclusion can be drawn\n    than that all this is the result of chance and accident? And\n    if that conclusion be admitted, it will no longer be credible\n    either that the world was made by God or that it is governed by\n    His providence: and consequently neither will the judgment of\n    God upon every man\u2019s doings seem a thing to be looked for.\u201d[437]\n\nIt is to this phase of the controversy that the ethical theology of\nOrigen is relative. In that theology, Stoicism and Neo-Platonism are\nblended into a complete theodicy: nor has a more logical superstructure\never been reared on the basis of philosophical theism.\n\nIt is necessary to show the coherence of his view as a whole, and it is\nadvisable, in doing so, to use chiefly his own words:[438]\n\n    \u201cThere was but one beginning of all things, as there will be\n    but a single end. The diversities of existence which have\n    sprung from a single beginning will be absorbed in a single\n    end.[439] The causes of those diversities lie in the diverse\n    things themselves.[440] They were created absolutely equal;\n    for, on the one hand, God had no reason in Himself for causing\n    inequalities;[441] and, on the other hand, being absolutely\n    impartial, He could not give to one being an advantage which\n    He did not give to another.[442] They were also, by a similar\n    necessity, created with the capacity of being diverse; for\n    spotless purity is of the essence of none save God; in all\n    created beings it must be accidental, and consequently liable\n    to lapse.[443] The lapse, when it takes place, is voluntary;\n    for every being endowed with reason has the power of exercising\n    it, and this power is free;[444] it is excited by external\n    causes, but not coerced by them.[445] For to lay the fault on\n    external causes and put it away from ourselves by declaring\n    that we are like logs or stones, dragged by forces that act\n    upon them from without, is neither true nor reasonable. Every\n    created rational being is thus capable of both good and\n    evil; consequently of praise and blame; consequently also of\n    happiness and misery; of the former if it chooses holiness\n    and clings to it, of the latter if by sloth and negligence it\n    swerves into wickedness and ruin.[446] The lapse, when it has\n    taken place, is not only voluntary but also various in degree.\n    Some beings, though possessed of free-will, never lapsed: they\n    form the order of angels. Some lapsed but slightly, and form\n    in their varying degrees the orders of \u2018thrones, dominations,\n    princedoms, virtues, powers.\u2019 Some lapsed lower, but not\n    irrecoverably, and form the race of men.[447] Some lapsed to\n    such a depth of unworthiness and wickedness as to be opposing\n    powers; they are the devil and his angels.[448] In the temporal\n    world which is seen, as well as in the eternal worlds which\n    are unseen, all beings are arranged according to their merits;\n    their place has been determined by their own conduct.[449]\n\n    \u201cThe present inequalities of circumstance and character are\n    thus not wholly explicable within the sphere of the present\n    life. But this world is not the only world. Every soul has\n    existed from the beginning; it has therefore passed through\n    some worlds already, and will pass through others before it\n    reaches the final consummation. It comes into this world\n    strengthened by the victories or weakened by the defeats of its\n    previous life. Its place in this world as a vessel appointed to\n    honour or to dishonour is determined by its previous merits or\n    demerits. Its work in this world determines its place in the\n    world which is to follow this.[450]\n\n    \u201cAll this takes place with the knowledge and under the\n    oversight of God. It is an indication of His ineffable wisdom\n    that the diversities of natures for which created beings are\n    themselves responsible are wrought together into the harmony\n    of the world.[451] It is an indication not only of His wisdom\n    but of His goodness that, while no creature is coerced into\n    acting rightly, yet when it lapses it meets with evils and\n    punishments. All punishments are remedial. God calls what are\n    termed evils into existence to convert and purify those whom\n    reason and admonition fail to change. He is thus the great\n    Physician of souls.[452] The process of cure, acting as it\n    does simply through free-will, takes in some cases an almost\n    illimitable time. For God is long-suffering, and to some souls,\n    as to some bodies, a rapid cure is not beneficial. But in the\n    end all souls will be thoroughly purged.[453] All that any\n    reasonable soul, cleansed of the dregs of all vices, and with\n    every cloud of wickedness completely wiped away, can either\n    feel or understand or think, will be wholly God: it will no\n    longer either see or contain anything else but God: God will\n    be the mode and measure of its every movement: and so God will\n    be \u2018all.\u2019 Nor will there be any longer any distinction between\n    good and evil, because evil will nowhere exist; for God is all\n    things, and in Him no evil inheres. So, then, when the end has\n    been brought back to the beginning, that state of things will\n    be restored which the rational creation had when it had no need\n    to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; all sense\n    of wickedness will have been taken away; He who alone is the\n    one good God becomes to the soul \u2018all,\u2019 and that not in some\n    souls but \u2018in all.\u2019 There will be no longer death, nor the\n    sting of death, nor any evil anywhere, but God will be \u2018all in\n    all.\u2019\u201d[454]\n\nOf this great theodicy, only part has been generally accepted. The Greek\nconceptions which underlie it, and which preceded it, have survived, but\nin other forms. Free-will, final causes, probation, have had a later\nhistory in which Greece has had no share. The doctrine of free-will\nhas remained in name, but it has been so mingled on the one hand with\ntheories of human depravity, and on the other with theories of divine\ngrace, that the original current of thought is lost in the marshes into\nwhich it has descended. The doctrine of final causes has been pressed to\nan almost excessive degree as proving the existence and the providence of\nGod; but His government of the human race has been often viewed rather as\nthe blundering towards an ultimate failure than as a complete vindication\nof His purpose of creation. The Christian world has acquiesced in the\nconception of life as a probation; but while some of its sections have\nconceived of this life as the only probation, and others have admitted a\nprobation in a life to come, none have admitted into the recognized body\nof their teaching Origen\u2019s sublime conception of an infinite stairway of\nworlds, with its perpetual ascent and descent of souls, ending at last in\nthe union of all souls with God.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE IX.\n\nGREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.\n\nIII. GOD AS THE SUPREME BEING.\n\n\nIt was in the Gentile rather than in the Jewish world that the theology\nof Christianity was shaped. It was built upon a Jewish basis. The Jewish\ncommunities of the great cities and along the commercial routes of the\nempire had paved the way for Christianity by their active propaganda of\nmonotheism. Christianity won its way among the educated classes by virtue\nof its satisfying not only their moral ideals, but also their highest\nintellectual conceptions. On its ethical side it had, as we have seen,\nlarge elements in common with reformed Stoicism; on its theological\nside it moved in harmony with the new movements of Platonism.[455] And\nthose movements reacted upon it. They gave a philosophical form to the\nsimpler Jewish faith, and especially to those elements of it in which the\nteaching of St. Paul had already given a foothold for speculation. The\nearlier conceptions remained; but blending readily with the philosophical\nconceptions that were akin to them, they were expanded into large\ntheories in which metaphysics and dialectics had an ample field. The\nconception, for example, of the one God whose kingdom was a universal\nkingdom and endured throughout all ages, blended with, and passed into,\nthe philosophical conception of a Being who was beyond time and space.\nThe conception that \u201cclouds and darkness were round about Him,\u201d blended\nwith, and passed into, the philosophical conception of a Being who was\nbeyond not only human sight but human thought. The conception of His\ntranscendence obtained the stronger hold because it confirmed the prior\nconception of His unity; and that of His incommunicability, and of the\nconsequent need of a mediator, gave a philosophical explanation of the\ntruth that Jesus Christ was His Son.\n\n\nA. THE IDEA AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.\n\nBut the theories which in the fourth century came to prevail, and which\nhave formed the main part of speculative theology ever since, were the\nresult of at least two centuries of conflict. At every stage of the\nconflict the conceptions of one or other of the forms of Greek philosophy\nplayed a decisive part; and the changing phases of the conflict find a\nremarkable parallel in some of the philosophical schools.\n\nThe conflict may be said to have had three leading stages, which are\nmarked respectively by the dominance of speculations as to (1) the\ntranscendence of God, (2) His revelation of Himself, (3) the distinctions\nin His nature.\n\n(1) _The Transcendence of God._\u2014Nearly seven hundred years before\nthe time when Christianity first came into large contact with Greek\nphilosophy, the mind of a Greek thinker, outstripping the slow inferences\nof popular thought, had leapt to the conception of God as the Absolute\nUnity. He was the ultimate generalization of all things, expressed as the\nultimate abstraction of number:[456] He was not limited by parts or by\nbodily form: \u201call of Him is sight, all of Him is understanding, all of\nHim is hearing.\u201d But it is probable that the conception in its first form\nwas rather of a material than of an ideal unity:[457] the basis of later\nmetaphysics was first securely laid by a second form of the conception\nwhich succeeded the first half-a-century afterwards. The conception was\nthat of Absolute Being. Only the One really _is_: it was not nor will\nbe: it _is_ now, and is everywhere entire, a continuous unity, a perfect\nsphere which fills all space, undying and immovable. Over against it\nare the Many, the innumerable objects of sense: they are not, but only\nseem to be: the knowledge that we seem to have of them is not truth,\nbut illusion. But the conception, even in this second form, was more\nconsistent with Pantheism than with Theism. It was lifted to the higher\nplane on which it has ever since rested by the Platonic distinction\nbetween the world of sense and the world of thought. God belonged to the\nlatter, and not to the former. Absolute Unity, Absolute Being, and all\nthe other terms which expressed His unique supremacy, were gathered up in\nthe conception of Mind; for mind in the highest phase of its existence\nis self-contemplative: the modes of its expression are numerous, and\nperhaps infinite: but it can itself go behind its modes, and so retire,\nas it were, a step farther back from the material objects about which its\nmodes employ themselves. In this sense God is transcendent (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2), beyond the world of sense and matter. \u201cGod therefore is Mind, a\nform separate from all matter, that is to say, out of contact with it,\nand not involved with anything that is capable of being acted on.\u201d[458]\n\nThis great conception of the transcendence of God filled a large place\nin later Greek philosophy, even outside the Platonic schools.[459]\nThe history of it is beyond our present purpose; but we shall better\nunderstand the relation of Christian theology to current thought if we\ntake three expressions of the conception at the time when that theology\nwas being formed\u2014in Plutarch, in Maximus of Tyre, and in Plotinus.\n\nPlutarch says:\n\n    \u201cWhat, then, is that which really exists? It is the Eternal,\n    the Uncreated, the Undying, to whom time brings no change. For\n    time is always flowing and never stays: it is a vessel charged\n    with birth and death: it has a before and after, a \u2018will be\u2019\n    and a \u2018has been:\u2019 it belongs to the \u2018is not\u2019 rather than to\n    the \u2018is.\u2019 But God is: and that not in time but in eternity,\n    motionless, timeless, changeless eternity, that has no before\n    or after: and being One, He fills eternity with one Now, and so\n    really \u2018is,\u2019 not \u2018has been,\u2019 or \u2018will be\u2019, without beginning\n    and without ceasing.\u201d[460]\n\nMaximus of Tyre says:\n\n    \u201cGod, the Father and Fashioner of all things that are, He who\n    is older than the sun, older than the sky, greater than time\n    and lapse of time and the whole stream of nature, is unnamed by\n    legislators, and unspoken by the voice and unseen by the eyes:\n    and since we cannot apprehend His essence, we lean upon words\n    and names and animals, and forms of gold and ivory and silver,\n    and plants and rivers and mountain-peaks and springs of waters,\n    longing for an intuition of Him, and in our inability naming\n    by His name all things that are beautiful in this world of\n    ours.\u201d[461]\n\nAnd again:\n\n    \u201cIt is of this Father and Begetter of the universe that Plato\n    tells us: His name he does not tell us, for he knew it not: nor\n    does he tell us His colour, for he saw Him not; nor His size,\n    for he touched Him not. Colour and size are felt by the touch\n    and seen by the sight: but the Deity Himself is unseen by\n    the sight, unspoken by the voice, untouched by fleshly touch,\n    unheard by the hearing, seen only\u2014through its likeness to Him,\n    and heard only\u2014through its kinship with Him, by the noblest and\n    purest and clearest-sighted and swiftest and oldest element of\n    the soul.\u201d[462]\n\nPlotinus similarly, in answer to the old problem, \u201chow from the One,\nbeing such as we have described Him, anything whatever has substance,\ninstead of the One abiding by Himself,\u201d replies:\n\n    \u201cLet us call upon God Himself before we thus answer\u2014not with\n    uttered words, but stretching forth our souls in prayer to\n    Him, for this is the only way in which we can pray, alone to\n    Him who is alone. We must, then, gaze upon Him in the inner\n    part of us, as in a temple, being as He is by Himself, abiding\n    still and beyond all things (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd). Everything that\n    moves must have an object towards which it moves. But the One\n    has no such object; consequently we must not assert movement\n    of Him.... Let us not think of production in time, when we\n    speak of things eternal.... What then was produced was produced\n    without His moving: ... it had its being without His assenting\n    or willing or being moved in anywise. It was like the light\n    that surrounds the sun and shines forth from it, though the sun\n    is itself at rest: it is reflected like an image. So with what\n    is greatest. That which is next greatest comes forth from Him,\n    and the next greatest is \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2; for \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 sees Him and needs Him\n    alone.\u201d[463]\n\nBut the conception of transcendence is capable of taking two forms.\nIt may be that of a God who passes beyond all the classes into which\nsensible phenomena are divisible, by virtue of His being pure Mind,\ncognizable only by mind; or it may be that of a God who exists _extra\nflammantia moenia mundi_, filling the infinite space which surrounds\nand contains all the spheres of material existence. The one God is\ntranscendent in the proper sense of the term; the other is supra-cosmic.\nIn either case He is said to be unborn, undying, uncontained; and since\nthe same terms are thus used to express the elements of both forms of the\nconception, it is natural that these forms should readily pass into each\nother, and that the distinction between them should not always be present\nto a writer\u2019s mind or perceptible in his writings. But the conception in\none or other of its forms fills a large place in later Greek philosophy.\nIt blended in a common stream with the new currents of religious feeling.\n[The process is well illustrated by Philo.]\n\n    The words \u201cI am _thy_ God\u201d are used not in a proper but in a\n    secondary sense. For Being, _qu\u00e2_ Being, is out of relation:\n    itself is full of itself and sufficient for itself, both\n    before the birth of the world and equally so after it.[464]\n    He transcends all quality, being better than virtue, better\n    than knowledge, and better even than the good itself and the\n    beautiful itself.[465] He is not in space, but beyond it; for\n    He contains it. He is not in time, for He is the Father of the\n    universe, which is itself the father of time, since from its\n    movement time proceeds.[466] He is \u201cwithout body, parts or\n    passions\u201d: without feet, for whither should He walk who fills\n    all things: without hands, for from whom should He receive\n    anything who possesses all things: without eyes, for how should\n    He need eyes who made the light.[467] He is invisible, for\n    how can eyes that are too weak to gaze upon the sun be strong\n    enough to gaze upon its Maker.[468] He is incomprehensible: not\n    even the whole universe, much less the human mind, can contain\n    the conception of Him:[469] we know _that_ He is, we cannot\n    know _what_ He is:[470] we may see the manifestations of Him\n    in His works, but it were monstrous folly to go behind His\n    works and inquire into His essence.[471] He is hence unnamed:\n    for names are the symbols of created things, whereas His only\n    attribute is to _be_.[472]\n\n(2) _The Revelation of the Transcendent._\u2014Side by side with this\nconception of the transcendence of God, and intimately connected with\nit, was the idea of beings or forces coming between God and men. A\ntranscendent God was in Himself incommunicable: the more the conception\nof His transcendence was developed, the stronger was the necessity for\nconceiving of the existence of intermediate links.[473]\n\ni. A basis for such a conception was afforded in the popular mythology\nby the belief in demons\u2014spirits inferior to the gods, but superior to\nmen. The belief was probably \u201ca survival of the primitive psychism which\npeopled the whole universe with life and animation.\u201d[474] There was an\nenormous contemporary development of the idea of demons or genii. They\nare found in Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, Maximus, and Celsus. In the\nlatter some are good, some bad, most of them of mixed nature; to them is\ndue the creation of all things except the human soul; they are the rulers\nof day and night, of the sunlight and the cold.[475]\n\nii. A philosophical basis for the theory was afforded by the Platonic\n_Ideai_ or Forms, and the Stoical _Logoi_ or Reasons. We have already\nseen the place which those Forms, viewed also as Forces, and those\nReasons, viewed also as productive Seeds, filled in the later Greek\ncosmologies and cosmogonies. They were not less important in relation\nto the theory of the transcendence of God. The Forms according to which\nHe shaped the world, the Forces by which He made and sustains it, the\nReasons which inhere in it and, like laws, control its movements, are\noutflows from and reflexions of His nature, and communicate a knowledge\nof it to His intelligent creatures. In the philosophy of Philo, these\nphilosophical conceptions are combined with both the Greek conception\nof D\u00e6mons and the Hebrew conception of Angels. The four conceptions,\nForms, _Logoi_, D\u00e6mons, and Angels, pass into one another, and the\nexpressions which are relative to them are interchangeable. The most\ncommon expression for them is _Logoi_, and it is more commonly found in\nthe singular, _Logos_.\n\n(3) _The Distinctions in the Nature of God._\u2014The _Logos_ is able to\nreveal the nature of God because it is itself the reflexion of that\nnature. It is able to reveal that nature to intelligent creatures because\nthe human intelligence is itself an offshoot of the Divine. As the eye of\nsense sees the sensible world, which also is a revelation of God,[476]\nsince it is His thought impressed upon matter, so the reason sees the\nintelligible world, the world of His thoughts conceived as intelligible\nrealities, existing separate from Him.\n\n    \u201cThe wise man, longing to apprehend God, and travelling along\n    the path of wisdom and knowledge, first of all meets with the\n    divine Reasons, and with them abides as a guest; but when\n    he resolves to pursue the further journey, he is compelled\n    to abstain, for the eyes of his understanding being opened,\n    he sees that the object of his quest is afar off and always\n    receding, an infinite distance in advance of him.\u201d[477] \u201cWisdom\n    leads him first into the antechamber of the Divine Reason, and\n    when he is there he does not at once enter into the Divine\n    Presence; but sees Him afar off, or rather not even afar off\n    can he behold Him, but only he sees that the place where he\n    stands is still infinitely far from the unnamed, unspeakable,\n    and incomprehensible God.\u201d[478]\n\nWhat he sees is not God Himself but the likeness of Him, \u201cjust as those\nwho cannot gaze upon the sun may yet gaze upon a reflexion of it.\u201d[479]\nThe _Logos_, reflecting not only the Divine nature, but also the Divine\nwill and the Divine goodness, becomes to men a messenger of help; like\nthe angel to Hagar, it brings advice and encouragement;[480] like the\nangel who redeemed Jacob (Gen. xlviii. 16), it rescues men from all kinds\nof evil;[481] like the angel who delivered Lot from Sodom, it succours\nthe kinsmen of virtue and provides for them a refuge.[482]\n\n    \u201cLike a king, it announces by decree what men ought to do; like\n    a teacher, it instructs its disciples in what will benefit\n    them; like a counsellor, it suggests the wisest plans, and so\n    greatly benefits those who do not of themselves know what is\n    best; like a friend, it tells many secrets which it is not\n    lawful for the uninitiated to hear.\u201d[483]\n\nAnd standing midway between God and man, it not only reflects God\ndownwards to man, but also reflects man upwards to God.\n\n    \u201cIt stands on the border-line between the Creator and the\n    creation, not unbegotten like God, not begotten like ourselves,\n    and so becomes not only an ambassador from the Ruler to His\n    subjects, but also a suppliant from mortal man yearning after\n    the immortal.\u201d[484]\n\nThe relation of the _Logos_ to God, as distinguished from its functions,\nis expressed by several metaphors, all of which are important in view of\nlater theology. They may be gathered into two classes, corresponding to\nthe two great conceptions of the relation of the universe to God which\nwere held respectively by the two great sources of Philo\u2019s philosophy,\nthe Stoics and the Platonists. The one class of metaphors belongs to\nthe monistic, the other to the dualistic, conception of the universe.\nIn the former, the _Logos_ is evolved from God; in the other, created\nby Him.[485] The chief metaphors of the former class are those of a\nphantom, or image, or outflow: the _Logos_ is projected by God as a man\u2019s\nshadow or phantom was sometimes conceived as thrown off by his body,[486]\nexpressing its every feature, and abiding as a separate existence after\nthe body was dead; it is a reflexion cast by God upon the space which He\ncontains, as a parhelion is cast by the sun;[487] it is an outflow as\nfrom a spring.[488] The chief metaphor of the second class is that of a\nson; the _Logos_ is the first-begotten of God;[489] and by an elaboration\nof the metaphor which reappears in later theology, God is in one passage\nspoken of as its Father, Wisdom as its Mother.[490] It hence tends\nsometimes to be viewed as separate from God, neither God nor man, but\n\u201cinferior to God though greater than man.\u201d[491] The earlier conception\nhad already passed through several forms: it had begun with that which\nwas itself the greatest leap that any one thinker had yet made, the\nconception that Reason made the world: the conception of Reason led to\nthe conception of God as Personal Reason: out of that grew the thought of\nGod as greater than Reason and using it as His instrument: and at last\nhad come the conception of the Reason of God as in some way detached\nfrom Him, working in the world as a subordinate but self-acting law. It\nwas natural that this should lead to the further conception of Reason\nas the offspring of God and Wisdom, the metaphor of a human birth being\ntransferred to the highest sphere of heaven.\n\n\nB. THE IDEA AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.\n\n(1) _The Transcendence of God._\u2014All the conceptions which we have seen\nto exist in the sphere of philosophy were reproduced in the sphere\nof Christianity. They are sometimes relative to God, in contrast to\nthe world of sensible phenomena: phenomena come into being, God is\nunbegotten and without beginning: phenomena are visible and tangible,\nGod is unseen and untouched. They are sometimes relative to the idea\nof perfection: God is unchangeable, indivisible, unending. He has no\nname: for a name implies the existence of something prior to that\nto which a name is given, whereas He is prior to all things. These\nconceptions are all negative: the positive conceptions are that He is\nthe infinite depth (\u03b2\u03cd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2) which contains and embosoms all things, that\nHe is self-existent, and that He is light. \u201cThe Father of all,\u201d said one\nschool of philosophers,[492] \u201cis a primal light, blessed, incorruptible,\nand infinite.\u201d \u201cThe essence of the unbegotten Father of the universe is\nincorruptibility and self-existing light, simple and uniform.\u201d[493]\n\nFrom the earliest Christian teaching, indeed, the conception of the\ntranscendence of God is absent. God is near to men and speaks to them: He\nis angry with them and punishes them: He is merciful to them and pardons\nthem. He does all this through His angels and prophets, and last of all\nthrough His Son. But he needs such mediators rather because a heavenly\nBeing is invisible, than because He is transcendent. The conception which\nunderlies the earliest expression of the belief of a Christian community\nis the simple conception of children.\n\n    \u201cWe give Thee thanks, Holy Father, for Thy holy name which Thou\n    hast caused to dwell in our hearts, and for the knowledge and\n    faith and immortality which Thou hast made known to us through\n    Jesus Christ, Thy servant. To Thee be glory for ever. Thou,\n    Almighty Master, hast created all things for Thy name\u2019s sake,\n    hast given food and drink to men for their enjoyment, that\n    they may give thanks to Thee: and upon us hast Thou bestowed\n    spiritual food and drink and eternal life through Thy servant.\n    Before all things we give Thee thanks for that Thou art mighty:\n    to Thee be glory for ever.\u201d[494]\n\nIn the original sphere of Christianity there does not appear to have been\nany great advance upon these simple conceptions. The doctrine upon which\nstress was laid was, that God is, that He is one, that He is almighty\nand everlasting, that He made the world, that His mercy is over all\nHis works.[495] There was no taste for metaphysical discussion: there\nwas possibly no appreciation of metaphysical conceptions. It is quite\npossible that some Christians laid themselves open to the accusation\nwhich Celsus brings, of believing that God is only cognizable through\nthe senses.[496] They were influenced by Stoicism, which denied all\nintellectual existences, and regarded spirit itself as material.[497]\nThis tendency resulted in Adoptian Christology.[498]\n\nBut most of the philosophical conceptions above described were adopted\nby the Apologists, and through such adoption found acceptance in the\nassociated Christian communities. They are for the most part stated,\nnot as in a dogmatic system, but incidentally. For example, Justin\nthus protests against a literal interpretation of the anthropomorphic\nexpressions of the Old Testament:\n\n    \u201cYou are not to think that the unbegotten God \u2018came down\u2019 from\n    anywhere or \u2018went up.\u2019 For the unutterable Father and Lord of\n    all things neither comes to any place nor walks nor sleeps nor\n    rises, but abides in His own place wherever that place may be,\n    seeing keenly and hearing keenly, not with eyes or ears, but\n    with His unspeakable power, so that He sees all things and\n    knows all things, nor is any one of us hid from Him: nor does\n    He move, He who is uncontained by space and by the whole world,\n    seeing that He was before the world was born.\u201d[499]\n\nAnd Athenagoras thus sums up his defence of Christianity against the\ncharge of atheism:\n\n    \u201cI have sufficiently demonstrated that they are not atheists\n    who believe in One who is unbegotten, eternal, unseen,\n    impassible, incomprehensible and uncontained: comprehended by\n    mind and reason only, invested with ineffable light and beauty\n    and spirit and power, by whom the universe is brought into\n    being and set in order and held firm, through the agency of his\n    own _Logos_.\u201d[500]\n\nTheophilus replies thus to his heathen interlocutor who asked him to\ndescribe the form of the Christian God:\n\n    \u201cListen, my friend: the form of God is unutterable and\n    indescribable, nor can it be seen with fleshly eyes: for\n    His glory is uncontained, His size is incomprehensible, His\n    loftiness is inconceivable, His strength is incomparable,\n    His wisdom is unrivalled, His goodness beyond imitation, His\n    beneficence beyond description. If I speak of Him as light, I\n    mention His handiwork: if I speak of Him as reason, I mention\n    His government: if I speak of Him as spirit, I mention His\n    breath: if I speak of Him as wisdom, I mention His offspring:\n    if I speak of Him as strength, I mention His might: if I speak\n    of Him as providence, I mention His goodness: if I speak of\n    His kingdom, I mention His glory.\u201d[501]\n\nIt is not easy to determine in regard to many of these expressions\nwhether they are relative in the writer\u2019s mind to a supra-cosmic or to a\ntranscendental conception of God. The case of Tertullian clearly shows\nthat they are compatible with the former conception no less than with\nthe latter; for though he speaks of God as \u201cthe great Supreme, existing\nin eternity, unborn, unmade, without beginning, and without end,\u201d[502]\nyet he argues that He is material; for \u201chow could one who is empty have\nmade things that are solid, and one who is void have made things that are\nfull, and one who is incorporeal have made things that have body?\u201d[503]\nBut there were some schools of philosophers in which the transcendental\ncharacter of the conception is clearly apparent. The earliest of such\nschools, and the most remarkable, is that of Basilides. It anticipated,\nand perhaps helped to form, the later developments of Neo-Platonism.\nIt conceived of God as transcending being. He was absolutely beyond\nall predication. Not even negative predicates are predicable of Him.\nThe language of the school becomes paradoxical and almost unmeaning in\nthe extremity of its effort to express the transcendence of God, and\nat the same time to reconcile the belief in His transcendence with the\nbelief that He is the Creator of the world. \u201cWhen there was nothing,\nneither material, nor essential, nor non-essential, nor simple, nor\ncompound, nor unthought, nor unperceived, nor man, nor angel, nor god,\nnor absolutely any of the things that are named or perceived or thought,\n... God who was not (\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f62\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2), without thought, without perception,\nwithout will, without purpose, without passion, without desire, willed\nto make a world. In saying \u2018willed,\u2019 I use the word only because some\nword is necessary, but I mean without volition, without thought, and\nwithout perception; and in saying \u2018world,\u2019 I do not mean the extended and\ndivisible world which afterwards came into being, with its capacity of\ndivision, but the seed of the world.\u201d[504] This was said more briefly,\nbut probably with the same meaning, by Marcus: There is no conception and\nno essence of God.[505]\n\nThese exalted ideas of His transcendence, which had especially thriven\non Alexandrian soil, were further elaborated at the end of the second\ncentury by the Christian philosophers of the Alexandrian schools, who\ninherited the wealth at once of regenerated Platonism, of Gnosticism, and\nof theosophic Judaism. Clement anticipated Plotinus in conceiving of God\nas being \u201cbeyond the One and higher than the Monad itself,\u201d[506] which\nwas the highest abstraction of current philosophy.[507] There is no name\nthat can properly be named of Him: \u201cneither the One, nor the Good, nor\nMind, nor Absolute Being, nor Father, nor Creator, nor Lord.\u201d No science\ncan attain unto Him; \u201cfor all science depends on antecedent principles;\nbut there is nothing antecedent to the Unbegotten.\u201d[508] Origen\nexpressly protests against the conceptions of God which regarded Him as\nsupra-cosmic rather than transcendent,[509] and as having a material\nsubstance though not a human form.[510] His own conception is that of a\nnature which is absolutely simple and intelligent, or which transcends\nboth intelligence and existence. Being absolutely simple, He has no more\nor less, no before or after, and consequently has no need of either space\nor time. Being absolutely intelligent, His only attribute is to know and\nto be known. But only \u201clike knows like.\u201d He is to be apprehended through\nthe intelligence which is made in His image: the human mind is capable\nof knowing the Divine by virtue of its participation in it. But in the\nstrict sense of the word He is beyond our knowledge: our knowledge is\nlike the vision of a spark as compared with the splendour of the sun.[511]\n\n(2) _Revelation or Mediation of the Transcendent._\u2014But as in Greek\nphilosophy, so also in Christian theology, the doctrine whether of a\nsupra-cosmic or of a transcendent God necessitated the further question,\nHow could He pass into the sphere of the phenomenal? The rougher sort\nof objectors ridiculed a God who was \u201csolitary and destitute\u201d in his\nunapproachable uniqueness:[512] the more serious heathen philosophers\nasked, If like knows like, how can your God know the world? and the mass\nof Christian philosophers,[513] both within and without the associated\ncommunities, felt this question, or one of the questions that are cognate\nto it, to be the cardinal point of their theology.[514]\n\nThe tentative answers were innumerable. One early group of them\nmaintained the existence of a capacity in the Supreme Being to manifest\nHimself in different forms. The conception had some elements of Stoical\nand some of popular Greek theology, in both of which anthropomorphism\nhad been possible.[515] It came to an especial prominence in the\nearlier stages of the Christological controversies, as an explanation\nof the nature of Jesus Christ. It lay beneath what is known as Modal\nMonarchianism, the theory that Christ was a temporary mode of the\nexistence of the one God. It was simply His will to exist in one mode\nrather than in another.[516]\n\n    \u201cOne and the same God,\u201d said Noetus, \u201cis the Creator and Father\n    of all things, and, because it was His good pleasure, He\n    appeared to righteous men of old. For when He is not seen He is\n    invisible, and when He is seen He is visible: He is uncontained\n    when He wills not to be contained, and contained when He is\n    contained.... When the Father had not been born, He was rightly\n    styled Father: when it was His good pleasure to undergo birth,\n    He became on being born His own son, not another\u2019s.\u201d[517]\n\nBut the dominant conception was in a line with that of both Greek\nphilosophy and Greek religion. From the Supreme God came forth, or in Him\nexisted, special forms and modifications by which He both made the world\nand revealed Himself to it.\n\n(i.) The speculations as to the nature of these forms varied partly with\nthe large underlying variations in the conception of God as supra-cosmic\nor as transcendental, and partly with the greater or less development of\nthe tendency to give a concrete shape to abstract ideas. They varied also\naccording as the forms were viewed in relation to the universe, as its\ntypes and formative forces; or in relation to the Supreme Being and His\nrational creatures, as manifestations of the one and means of knowledge\nto the other. The variations are found to exist, not only between one\nschool of philosophers and another, but also in the same school. For\nexample, Tertullian distinguishes between two schools of Valentinians,\nthat of Valentinus himself and that of his great, though independent,\nfollower Ptolemy.[518] The former regarded the \u00c6ons as simply modes\nof God\u2019s existence, abiding within His essence: the latter, in common\nwith the great majority of the school, looked upon them as \u201cpersonal\nsubstances\u201d which had come forth from God and remained outside Him. And\nagain, most philosophers of the same school made a genealogy of \u00c6ons, and\nfurnished their opponents thereby with one of their chief handles for\nridicule: but Colorbasus regarded the production of the \u00c6ons as a single\nmomentary act.[519] Sometimes, however, the expressions, which came from\ndifferent sources, were blended.\n\nAlmost all these conceptions of the means by which God communicated\nHimself to the world were relative to the conception of Him as Mind. It\nis as inherent a necessity for thought to reveal itself as it is for\nlight to shine. Following the tendency of current psychology to regard\nthe different manifestations of mind as relative to different elements\nin mind itself, some schools of philosophers gave a separate personality\nto each supposed element in the mind of God. There came forth thought\nand reflexion, voice and name, reasoning and intention:[520] or from\nthe original Will and Thought came forth Mind and Truth (Reality) as\nvisible forms and images of the invisible qualities (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd) of the\nFather.[521]\n\n(ii.) But side by side with this tendency to individualize and\nhypostatize the separate elements or modes of the Divine Mind, there\nwas a tendency to regard the mind of God as a unity existing either as\na distinct element in His essence or objective to Him. On one theory,\nmind is the only-begotten of God.[522] He alone knows God and wishes to\nreveal Him. On another theory, mind is born from the unborn Father, and\nfrom Mind are born _Logos_ and Prudence, Wisdom and Force, and thence\nin their order all the long series of Powers by whom the universe was\nformed.[523] Another theory, that of Marcus, probably contains the key\nto some of the others; the meaning of the conception of Mind as the\nonly-begotten of God, is that Mind is the revelation of God to Himself:\nHis self-consciousness is, so to speak, projected out of Him. It is at\nonce a revelation and a creation\u2014the only immediate revelation and the\nonly immediate creation. The Father, \u201cresolving to bring forth that which\nis ineffable in Him, and to endow with form that which is invisible,\nopened His mouth and sent forth the _Logos_\u201d which is the image of Him,\nand revealed Him to Himself.[524] The _Logos_, or Word, which was so sent\nforth was made up of distinct utterances: each utterance was an _\u00e6on_, a\n_logos_, a root and seed of being: in other words, each was a part and\nphase of God\u2019s nature which expressed and reflected itself in a part and\nphase of the world, so that collectively the _logoi_ are equivalent to\nthe _Logos_, who is the image and reflection of God.\n\nThe theory is not far distant from that which is found in the earlier\nApologists, and which passed through more than one phase before it won\nits way to general acceptance. The leading point in both is the relation\nof the individual _logoi_ to the _Logos_. We have already become\nacquainted with the syncretism which had blended the Platonic _ideas_\nwith the Stoical _logoi_, the former being regarded as forces as well\nas forms, and the latter being not only productive forces, but also the\nlaws of those forces; and which had viewed them both in their unity,\nrather than in their plurality, as expressions of a single _Logos_. We\nhave also seen that the solution of the problem, How could God create?\nwas found in the doctrine that He created by means of His _Logos_,\nwho impressed himself in the innumerable forms of created things. The\nsolution of the metaphysical difficulty, How can a transcendent God know\nand be known? was found to lie in the solution which had already been\ngiven to the cosmogonical difficulty, How could God come into contact\nwith matter?[525] The Forces were also Reasons: they were activities and\nalso thoughts: in men they woke to consciousness: and the mind of man\nknew the mind of God, as like knows like, by virtue of containing within\nit \u201ca seed of the _Logos_,\u201d a particle of the divine _Logos_ itself. That\ndivine _Logos_ \u201cof which the whole human race is partaker,\u201d \u201cwhich had\nat one time appeared in the form of fire, and at another in the form of\nangels, now by the will of God, on behalf of the human race, had become\na man, and endured to suffer all that the d\u00e6mons effected that he should\nsuffer at the hands of the foolish Jews.\u201d[526] The difference between\nChrist and other men was thought to be, that other men have only a \u201cseed\nof the _Logos_,\u201d whereas in him the whole _Logos_ was manifest: and the\ndifference between Christians and philosophers was, that the latter lived\nby the light of a part only of the divine _Logos_, whereas the former\nlived by the knowledge and contemplation of the whole _Logos_.[527]\n\nWithin half a century after these tentative efforts,[528] and largely\nhelped by the dissemination of the Fourth Gospel, which had probably at\nfirst only a local influence, the mass of Christians were tending to\nacquiesce not only in the belief of the transcendental nature of God, but\nalso in the belief that, in some way which was not yet closely defined,\nJesus Christ was the _Logos_ by whom the world had been made, and who\nrevealed the unknown Father to men.\n\nThe form in which the belief is stated by Iren\u00e6us is the following:\n\n    \u201cNo one can know the Father except by the Word of God, that is\n    by the Son revealing Him: nor can any one know the Son except\n    by the good pleasure of the Father. But the Son performs the\n    good pleasure of the Father: for the Father sends, and the Son\n    is sent and comes. And His Word knows that the Father is, as\n    far as concerns us, invisible and unlimited: and since He is\n    ineffable, He himself declares Him to us: and, on the other\n    hand, it is the Father alone who knows His own Word: both these\n    truths has the Lord made known to us. Wherefore the Son reveals\n    the knowledge of the Father by manifesting Himself: for the\n    manifestation of the Son is the knowledge of the Father: for\n    all things are manifested by the Word.... The Father therefore\n    has revealed Himself to all by making His Word visible to all:\n    and conversely the Word showed to all the Father and the Son,\n    since He was seen by all. And therefore the righteous judgment\n    of God comes upon all who, though they have seen as others,\n    have not believed as others. For by means of the creation\n    itself the Word reveals God the Creator; by means of the world,\n    the Lord who is the Fashioner of the world; and by means of His\n    handiwork (man), the Workman who formed it; and by the Son,\n    that Father who begat the Son.\u201d[529]\n\n(3) _The Distinctions in the Nature of God, or the Mediation and\nMediator._\u2014It was by a natural process of development that Christian\nphilosophers, while acquiescing in the general proposition that Jesus\nChrist was the _Logos_ in human form, should go on to frame large\ntheories as to the nature of the _Logos_. It was an age of definition and\ndialectic. It was no more possible for the mass of educated men to leave\na metaphysical problem untouched, than it is possible in our own days\nfor chemists to leave a natural product unanalyzed. Two main questions\nengaged attention: (i.) what was the genesis, (ii.) what was the nature,\nof the _Logos_. In the speculations which rose out of each of these\nquestions, the influence of Greek thought is even more conspicuous than\nbefore.\n\n(i.) The question of the genesis of the _Logos_ was mainly answered by\ntheories which were separated from one another by the same broad line of\ndistinction which separated theories as to the genesis of the world.\n\nThe philosophers of the school of Basilides, who, as we have seen, had\nbeen the first to formulate the doctrine of an absolute creation, that\nis, of a creation of all things out of nothing, conceived that whatever\nin their theory corresponded to the _Logos_ was equally included with all\nother things in the original seed. Hence came the definite proposition,\nwhich played a large part in the controversies of the fourth century,\nthat the _Logos_ was made \u201cout of the things that were not.\u201d[530]\n\nBut the majority of theories expressed under various metaphors the idea,\nwhich was relative to the other theory of creation, that in some way the\n_Logos_ had come forth from God. The rival hypotheses as to the nature\nof creation were reconciled by the hypothesis that, though the world\nwas created out of nothing, it was so created by the _Logos_, who was\nnot created by God, but came forth from Him. The metaphors were chiefly\nthose of the \u201cputting forth\u201d (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae, _prolatio_), as of the leaves or\nfruit of a plant, and of the begetting of a son. They were in use before\nthe doctrine of the _Logos_ had established itself, and some of them\nwere originally relative, not to the _Logos_, but to other conceptions\nof mediation between God and the world. They were supplemented by the\nmetaphors, which also were in earlier use, of the flowing of water from a\nspring, and of the radiation of light.[531] That there was not originally\nany important distinction between them, is shown both by the express\ndisclaimer of Iren\u00e6us and by the fact of their use in combination in the\nsame passages of the same writers. The combination was important. The\nmetaphors supplemented each other. Each of them contained an element\nin the theory which ultimately expressed the settled judgment of the\nChristian world.\n\nThe main difficulty which they presented was that of an apparent\ninconsistency with the belief in the unity of God. The doctrine of the\n\u201csole monarchy\u201d of God, which had been strongly maintained against those\nwho explained the difficulties of the world by the hypothesis of two Gods\nin conflict, seemed to be running another kind of danger in the very\nranks of its defenders. The _Logos_ who reflected God and revealed Him\nto rational creatures, who also contained in himself the form and forces\nof the material world, must be in some sense God. In Athenagoras there\nis a pure monism: \u201cGod is Himself all things to Himself, unapproachable\nlight, a perfect universe, spirit, force, _logos_.\u201d[532] But in other\nwriters the idea of development or generation, however lightly the\nmetaphor might be pressed, seemed to involve an existence of the _Logos_\nboth outside God and posterior to Him.[533] He was the \u201cfirst-born,\u201d\nthe \u201cfirst offspring of God,\u201d the \u201cfirst force after the Father of all\nand the Lord God;\u201d for \u201cas the beginning, before all created things,\nGod begat from Himself a kind of rational Force, which is called by the\nHoly Spirit (i.e. the Old Testament) sometimes \u2018the Glory of the Lord,\u2019\nsometimes \u2018Son,\u2019 sometimes \u2018Wisdom,\u2019 sometimes \u2018Angel,\u2019 sometimes \u2018God,\u2019\nsometimes \u2018Lord and _Logos_,\u2019 sometimes he speaks of himself as \u2018Captain\nof the Lord\u2019s host:\u2019 for he has all these appellations, both from his\nministering to the Father\u2019s purpose and from his having been begotten by\nthe Father\u2019s pleasure.\u201d[534] It follows that \u201cthere is, and is spoken of,\nanother God and Lord beneath the Maker of the universe.\u201d[535] The theory\nthus formulated tended to ditheism and was openly accused of it.[536] It\nwas saved from the charge by the gradual formulating of two distinctions,\nboth of which came from external philosophy, one of them being an\ninheritance from Stoicism, the other from Neo-Platonism.[537] The one\nwas that the generation or development had taken place within the sphere\nof Deity itself: the generation had not taken place by the severing\nof a part from the whole, as though the Divine nature admitted of a\ndivision,[538] but by distinction of function or by multiplication, as\nmany torches may be lit from one without diminishing the light of that\none.[539] The other was that the generation had been eternal. In an early\nstatement of the theory it was held that it had taken place in time: it\nwas argued that \u201cGod could not have been a Father before there was a Son,\nbut there was a time when there was not a Son.\u201d[540] But the influence of\nthe other metaphors in which the relation was expressed overpowered the\ninfluences which came from pressing the conception of paternity. Light,\nit was argued, could never have been without its capacity to shine.[541]\nThe Supreme Mind could never have been without His Thought. The Father\nEternal was always a Father, the Son was always a Son.[542]\n\n(ii.) The question of the nature of the eternally-begotten _Logos_ was\nanswered variously, according as the supra-cosmic or the transcendental\nidea of God was dominant in a writer\u2019s mind.[543] To Justin Martyr,\nGod is conceived as supra-cosmic. He abides \u201cin the places that are\nabove the heavens:\u201d the \u201cfirst-begotten,\u201d the _Logos_, is the \u201cfirst\nforce after the Father:\u201d he is \u201ca second God, second numerically but\nnot in will,\u201d doing only the Father\u2019s pleasure.[544] It is uncertain\nhow far the idea of personality entered into this view. There is a\nsimilar uncertainty in the view of Theophilus, who introduced the\nStoical distinction between the two aspects of the _Logos_, thought\nand speech\u2014\u201cratio\u201d and \u201coratio;\u201d[545] while Tertullian still speaks of\n\u201cvirtus\u201d side by side with these.\n\nIt was only gradually that the subject was raised to the higher plane,\nfrom which it never afterwards descended, by the spread and dominance\nof the transcendental as distinguished from the supra-cosmic conception\nof God. It came, as we have already seen, mainly from the schools of\nAlexandria. It is in Basilides, in whom thought advanced to the belief\nthat God transcended not merely phenomena but being, that the conception\nof a quasi-physical influence emanating from Him is seen to be first\nexpressly abandoned.[546] But the place of the later doctrine in the\nChristian Church is mainly due to Origen. He uses many of the same\nexpressions as Tertullian, but with another meaning. The Saviour is God,\nnot by partaking, but by essence.[547] He is begotten of the very essence\nof the Father. The generation is an outflow as of light from light.\n\nBut the controversies did not so much end with Origen as begin with him.\nFrom that time they were mostly internal to Christianity. But their\nelements were Greek in origin. The conceptions which were introduced into\nthe sphere of Christian thought were the current ones of philosophy. In\nChristian theology that philosophy has survived.\n\nBut although it would be beyond our present purpose to describe the\nChristological controversies which followed the final dominance in the\nChurch of the transcendental idea of God, it is within that purpose to\npoint out the Greek elements, confining ourselves as far as possible to\nthe later Greek uses of the terms.\n\n_Ousia_ (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) is used in at least three distinct senses: the\ndistinction is clearly phrased by Aristotle.[548]\n\n(_a_) It is used as a synonym of _hyl\u00ea_, to designate the material part\nof a thing. The use is most common among the Stoics. In their monistic\nconception of the universe, the visible world was regarded as the\n_ousia_ of God.[549] In the same way Philo speaks of the blood as the\nmaterial vehicle, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2, of the vital force.[550] Hence in both\nphilosophical and Christian cosmologies, _ousia_ was sometimes used as\ninterchangeable with _hyl\u00ea_, to denote the matter out of which the world\nwas made.\n\n(_b_) It is used of matter embodied in a certain form: this has since\nbeen distinguished as the _substantia concreta_. In Aristotle, a sensible\nmaterial thing, a particular man or a particular horse, which in a\npredication must always be the subject and cannot be a predicate, is an\n_ousia_ in the strictest sense.[551]\n\n(_c_) It is used of the common element in the classes into which sensible\nmaterial things may be grouped: this has since been distinguished as the\n_substantia abstracta_: in the language of Aristotle, it was the form\n(\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2), or ideal essence (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26v \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9).[552] This sense branched\nout into other senses, according as the term was used by a realist or a\nnominalist: to the former it was the common essence which exists in the\nindividual members of a class (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd),[553] and not outside\nthem (since \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f57 \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1);[554] or\nwhich exists outside them, and by participation in which they are what\nthey are: this latter is Plato\u2019s conception of \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2,[555] and of its\nequivalent \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1.\n\nTo a nominalist, on the other hand, _ousia_ is only the common name\nwhich is predicable in the same sense to a number of individual\nexistences.[556]\n\nThe Platonic form of realism grew out of a distinction between the real\nand the phenomenal, which in its turn it tended to accentuate. The\nvisible world of concrete individuals was regarded as phenomenal and\ntransitory: the invisible world of intelligible essences was real and\npermanent: the one was _genesis_, or \u201cbecoming;\u201d the other, _ousia_, or\n\u201cbeing.\u201d[557] The distinction played a large part in the later history\nof Platonism:[558] and whereas in the view of Aristotle the species, or\nsmaller class, as being nearer to the concrete individuals, was more\n_ousia_ than the genus, or wider class, in the later philosophy, on the\ncontrary, that was _ousia_ in its highest sense which was at the farthest\nremove from the concrete, and filled the widest sphere, and contained\nthe largest number of other classes in itself: it was the _summum\ngenus_.[559] Hence Plotinus says that in respect of the body we are\nfarthest from _ousia_, but that we partake of it in respect of our soul;\nand our soul is itself a compound, not pure _ousia_, but _ousia_ with an\nadded difference, and hence not absolutely under our control.[560]\n\nOf these two meanings of _ousia_, namely \u201cspecies\u201d and \u201cgenus,\u201d the\nformer expressing the whole essence of a class-name or concept, the\nlatter part of the essence, the former tended to prevail in earlier,\nthe latter in later Greek philosophy. In the one, the knowledge of the\n_ousia_ was completely unfolded in the definition, so that a definition\nwas itself defined as \u201ca proposition which expresses the _ousia_:\u201d[561]\nin the latter, it was only in part so unfolded, so that it is necessary\nfor us to know not only the _ousia_ of objects of thought, for example,\nwhether they fall within or without the class \u201cbody,\u201d but also the\nspecies (\u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7).[562]\n\nBut in the one meaning as in the other, the members of the same class, or\nthe sub-classes of the same wider class, were spoken of as _homoousioi_:\nfor example, there was an argument that animals should not be killed for\nfood, on the ground that they belong to the same class as men, their\nsouls being _homoousioi_ with our own:[563] so men are _homoousioi_ with\none another, and Abraham washed the feet of the three strangers who came\nto him, thinking them to be men \u201cof like substance\u201d with himself.[564]\n\nThe difficulty of the whole conception in its application to God was\nfelt and expressed. Some philosophers, as we have already seen, denied\nthat such an application was possible. The tide of which Neo-Platonism\nwas the most prominent wave placed God beyond _ousia_. Origen meets\nCelsus\u2019s statement of that view by a recognition of the uncertainty which\nflowed from the uncertain meaning of the term.[565] The Christological\ncontroversies of the fourth century were complicated to no small extent\nfrom the existence of a neutral and conservative party, who met the\ndogmatists on both sides with the assertion that neither _ousia_ nor\n_hypostasis_ was predicable of God.[566] And, in spite of the acceptance\nof the Nicene formula, the great Christian mystic who most fully\nrepresents Neo-Platonism within the Christian Church, ventured more than\na century later on to recur to the position that God has no _ousia_, but\nis _hyperousios_.[567] Even those who maintained the applicability of the\nterm to God, denied the possibility of defining it when so applied to\nHim. In this they followed Philo: \u201cThose who do not know the _ousia_ of\ntheir own soul, how shall they give an accurate account of the soul of\nthe universe?\u201d[568] But in spite of these difficulties, the conservative\nfeeling against the introduction of metaphysical terms into theology,\nand the philosophical doctrine of absolute transcendence, were overborne\nby the practical necessity of declaring that He _is_, and by the\ncorollary that since He is, there must be an _ousia_ of Him.\n\nBut when the conception of the one God as transcending numerical\nunity became dominant in the Christian Church, the term _homoousios_\n(\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2) was not unnaturally adopted to express the relation of God\nthe Father to God the Son. It accentuated the doctrine that the Son\nwas not a creature (\u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1); and so of the term as applied to the Holy\nSpirit. Those who maintained that the Holy Spirit was a creature, thereby\nmaintained that He was severed from the essence of the Father.[569] The\nterm occurs first in the sphere of Gnosticism, and expresses part of one\nof the two great conceptions as to the origin of the world.[570] It was\nrejected in its application to the world, but accepted within the sphere\nof Deity as an account of the origin of His plurality. But _homoousios_,\nthough true, was insufficient. It expressed the unity, but did not give\nsufficient definition to the conception of the plurality. It was capable\nof being used by those who held the plurality to be merely modal or\nphenomenal.[571] It thus led to the use of another term, of which it is\nnecessary to trace the history.\n\nThe term _ousia_ in most of its senses had come to be convertible with\ntwo other terms, _hypostasis_ (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) and _hyparxis_ (\u1f55\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03be\u03b9\u03c2). The\nlatter of these played but a small part in Christian theology, and may be\ndisregarded here.[572] The term _hypostasis_ is the conjugate of the verb\n\u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, which had come into use as a more emphatic form than \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. It\nfollowed almost all the senses of _ousia_. Thus it was contrasted with\nphenomenal existence not merely in the Platonic but in the conventional\nsense; e.g. of things that take place in the sky, some are appearances,\nsome have a substantial existence, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.[573] It also,\nlike _ousia_, is used of that which has an actual as compared with a\npotential existence;[574] also of that which has an objective existence\nin the world, and not merely exists in the thinking subject.[575] Hence\nwhen things came into being, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 was said \u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9.[576] Moreover,\nin one of its chief uses, namely that in which it designated the\npermanent element in objects of thought, the term \u1f40\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 had sometimes\nbeen replaced by the term \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.[577] When, therefore, the use of\n_ousia_ in its Neo-Platonic sense prevailed, there arose a tendency to\ndifferentiate the two terms, and to designate that which in Aristotle had\nbeen \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 by the term \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. This is expressed by Athanasius\nwhen he says: \u201cOusia signifies community,\u201d while \u201chypostasis has property\nwhich is not common to the hypostases of the same ousia;\u201d[578] and even\nmore clearly by Basil.[579]\n\nThere was the more reason for the growth of the distinction, because the\nterm _homoousios_ lent itself more readily to a Sabellian Christology.\nThis was anticipated by Iren\u00e6us in his polemic against the Valentinian\nheresy of the emission of \u00c6ons. _Ousiai_, in the sense of genera and\nspecies, might be merely conceptions in the mind: the alternative\nwas that of their having an existence of their own.[580] So that\n_hypostasis_ came in certain schools of thought to be the term for the\n_substantia concreta_, the individual, the \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 of Galen.[581]\nThe distinction, however, was far from being universally recognized. The\nclearest and most elaborate exposition of it is contained in a letter\nof Basil to his brother Gregory, who was evidently not quite clear upon\nthe point.[582] The result was, that just as \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 had been used\nto express one of the senses of \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, so a new term came into use to\ndefine more precisely the sense of \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Its origin is probably to\nbe traced to the interchange of documents between East and West, which\nleading to a difficulty in regard to this use of \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, ended in the\nintroduction of a third term.\n\nSo long as \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 and \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 had been convertible terms, the one\nLatin word _substantia_, the etymological equivalent of \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, had\nsufficed for both. When the two words became differentiated in Greek, it\nbecame advisable to mark the difference. However, the word _essentia_,\nthe natural equivalent for \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, jarred upon a Latin ear.[583]\nConsequently _substantia_ was claimed for \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, while for \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 a\nfresh equivalent had to be sought. This was found in _persona_, whose\nantecedents may be those of \u201ca character in a play,\u201d or of \u201cperson\u201d\nin the juristic sense, a possible party to a contract, in which case\nTertullian may have originated this usage.[584] Such Western practice\nwould tend to stimulate the employment of the corresponding Greek term\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, whose use hitherto seems to have been subordinate to that of\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.[585] And, finally, the philosophic terms \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and _natura_\ncame into use. In the second century \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 had been distinct from \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\nand identical with Reason.[586] But in the fourth century it came to be\nidentified with \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1,[587] and afterwards again distinguished from it,\nwhereas the Monophysites identified it with \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\nTo sum up, then. We have in Greek four terms, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and in Latin three, _substantia_, _persona_, _natura_, the two\nseries not being actually parallel even to the extent to which they\nare so in appearance. Times have changed since Tertullian\u2019s[588] loose\nand vague usage caused no remark; when Jerome, thinking as a Latin,\nhesitates to speak of \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, by which he understood _tres\nsubstantias_, and complains that he is looked upon as a heretic in the\nEast in consequence. There is a remarkable saying of Athanasius which is\ncapable of a wider application than he gave it: it runs as follows:[589]\n\u201cThey seemed to be ignorant of the fact that when we deal with words\nthat require some training to understand them, different people may\ntake them in senses not only differing but absolutely opposed to each\nother.\u201d[590] Thus there was an indisposition to accept \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1. The phrase\nwas not understanded of the people.[591] A reaction took place against\nthe multiplicity of terms; but the simple and unstudied language of the\nchildhood of Christianity, with its awe-struck sense of the ineffable\nnature of God, was but a fading memory, and on the other hand the\ntendency to trust in and insist upon the results of speculation was\nstrong. Once indeed the Catholic doctrine was formulated, then, though\nnot till then, the majority began to deprecate investigations as to the\nnature of God.\n\nBut I do not propose to dwell upon the sad and weary history of the way\nin which for more than a century these metaphysical distinctions formed\nthe watchwords of political as well as of ecclesiastical parties\u2014of the\nstrife and murder, the devastation of fair fields, the flame and sword,\ntherewith connected. For all this, Greek philosophy was not responsible.\nThese evils mostly came from that which has been a permanently disastrous\nfact in Christian history, the interference of the State, which gave the\ndecrees of Councils that sanction which elevated the resolutions of the\nmajority upon the deepest subjects of human speculation to the factitious\nrank of laws which must be accepted on pain of forfeiture, banishment or\ndeath.\n\nPhilosophy branched off from theology. It became its handmaid and its\nrival. It postulated doctrines instead of investigating them. It had\nto show their reasonableness or to find reasons for them. And for ages\nafterwards philosophy was dead. I feel as strongly as you can feel\nthe weariness of the discussions to which I have tried to direct your\nattention. But it is only by seeing how minute and how purely speculative\nthey are, that we can properly estimate their place in Christian\ntheology. Whether we do or do not accept the conclusions in which the\ngreater part of the Christian world ultimately acquiesced, we must at\nleast recognize that they rest upon large assumptions. Three may be\nindicated which are all due to the influence of Greek philosophy.[592]\n\n(1) It is assumed that metaphysical distinctions are important.\n\nI am far from saying that they are not: but it is not less important\nto recognize that much of what we believe rests upon this assumption\nthat they are. There is otherwise no justification whatever for drawing\nmen\u2019s thoughts away from the positive knowledge which we may gain both\nof ourselves and of the world around us, to contemplate, even at far\ndistance, the conception of Essence.\n\n(2) The second is the assumption that these metaphysical distinctions\nwhich we make in our minds correspond to realities in the world around\nus, or in God who is beyond the world and within it.\n\nAgain, I am far from saying that they do not; but it is at least\nimportant for us to recognize the fact that, in speaking of the essence\nof either the world or God, we are assuming the existence of something\ncorresponding to our conception of essence in the one or the other.[593]\n\n(3) The third assumption is that the idea of perfection which we transfer\nfrom ourselves to God, really corresponds to the nature of His being.\n\nIt is assumed that rest is better than motion, that passionlessness is\nbetter than feeling, that changelessness is better than change. We know\nthese things of ourselves: we cannot know them of One who is unlike\nourselves, who has no body that can be tired, who has no imperfection\nthat can miss its aim, with whom unhindered movement may conceivably be\nperfect life.\n\nI have spoken of these assumptions because, although it would be\ndifficult to over-estimate the importance of the conceptions by which\nGreek thought lifted men from the conception of God as a Being with\nhuman form and human passions, to the lofty height on which they can\nfeel around them an awful and infinite Presence, the time may have come\nwhen\u2014in face of the large knowledge of His ways which has come to us\nthrough both thought and research\u2014we may be destined to transcend the\nassumptions of Greek speculation by new assumptions, which will lead us\nat once to a diviner knowledge and the sense of a diviner life.[594]\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE X.\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES.\n\n\nA. THE GREEK MYSTERIES AND RELATED CULTS.\n\nSide by side in Greece with the religion which was openly professed\nand with the religious rites which were practised in the temples, not\nin antagonism to them, but intensifying their better elements and\nelaborating their ritual, were the splendid rites which were known as the\nMysteries. Side by side also with the great political communities, and\nsheltered within them by the common law and drawn together by a stronger\nthan political brotherhood, were innumerable associations for the\npractice of the new forms of worship which came in with foreign commerce,\nand for the expression in a common worship of the religious feelings\nwhich the public religion did not satisfy. These associations were known\nas \u03b8\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f14\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 or \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2.\n\nI will speak first of the mysteries, and then of the associations for the\npractice of other cults.\n\n1. The mysteries were probably the survival of the oldest religions of\nthe Greek races and of the races which preceded them. They were the\nworship not of the gods of the sky, Zeus and Apollo and Athen\u00e9, but of\nthe gods of the earth and the under-world, the gods of the productive\nforces of nature and of death.[595]\n\nThe most important of them were celebrated at Eleusis, near Athens, and\nthe scattered information which exists about them has been made more\nimpressive and more intelligible to us by excavations, which have brought\nto light large remains of the great temple\u2014the largest in Greece\u2014in\nwhich they were celebrated. It had been a cult common to the Ionian\ntribes, probably borrowed from the earlier races among whom they had\nsettled. It was originally the cult of the powers which produce the\nharvest, conceived as a triad of divinities\u2014a god and two goddesses,\nPluto, Demeter and Kor\u00e9, of whom the latter became so dominant in the\nworship, that the god almost disappeared from view, and was replaced\nby a divinity, Iacchus, who had no place in the original myth.[596]\nIts chief elements were the initiation, the sacrifice, and the scenic\nrepresentation of the great facts of natural life and human life, of\nwhich the histories of the gods were themselves symbols.[597]\n\n(i.) The main underlying conception of initiation was, that there were\nelements in human life from which the candidate must purify himself\nbefore he could be fit to approach God. There was a distinction\nbetween those who were not purified, and those who, in consequence of\nbeing purified, were admitted to a diviner life and to the hope of a\nresurrection. The creation of this distinction is itself remarkable.\nThe race of mankind was lifted on to a higher plane when it came to be\ntaught that only the pure in heart can see God. The rites of Eleusis were\noriginally confined to the inhabitants of Attica: but they came in time\nto be open to all Greeks, later to all Romans, and were open to women as\nwell as to men.[598] The bar at the entrance came to be only a moral bar.\n\nThe whole ceremonial began with a solemn proclamation: \u201cLet no one enter\nwhose hands are not clean and whose tongue is not prudent.\u201d In other\nmysteries it was: \u201cHe only may enter who is pure from all defilement,\nand whose soul is conscious of no wrong, and who has lived well and\njustly.\u201d[599]\n\nThe proclamation was probably accompanied by some words or sights\nof terror. When Nero went to Eleusis and thought at first of being\ninitiated, he was deterred by it. Here is another instance of exclusion,\nwhich is not less important in its bearing upon Christian rites.\nApollonius of Tyana was excluded because he was a magician (\u03b3\u03cc\u03b7\u03c2)\nand not pure in respect of \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u2014he had intercourse with other\ndivinities than those of the mysteries, and practised magical rites.[600]\n\nWe learn something from the parody of the mysteries in Lucian\u2019s romance\nof the pseudo-prophet Alexander. In it Alexander institutes a celebration\nof mysteries and torchlights and sacred shows, which go on for three\nsuccessive days. On the first there is a proclamation of a similar\nkind to that at Athens. \u201cIf any Atheist or Christian or Epicurean has\ncome as a spy upon the festival, let him flee; let the initiation of\nthose who believe in the god go on successfully.\u201d Then forthwith at the\nvery beginning a chasing away takes place. The prophet himself sets\nthe example, saying, \u201cChristians, away!\u201d and the whole crowd responds,\n\u201cEpicureans, away!\u201d Then the show begins\u2014the birth of Apollo, the\nmarriage of Coronis, the coming of \u00c6sculapius, are represented; the\nceremonies proceed through several days in imitation of the mysteries and\nin glorification of Alexander.[601]\n\nThe proclamation was thus intended to exclude notorious sinners from the\nfirst or initial ceremonial.[602] The rest was thrown upon a man\u2019s own\nconscience. He was asked to confess his sins, or at least to confess the\ngreatest crime that he had ever committed. \u201cTo whom am I to confess it?\u201d\nsaid Lysander to the mystagogoi who were conducting him. \u201cTo the gods.\u201d\n\u201cThen if you will go away,\u201d said he, \u201cI will tell them.\u201d\n\nConfession was followed by a kind of baptism.[603] The candidates for\ninitiation bathed in the pure waters of the sea. The manner of bathing\nand the number of immersions varied with the degree of guilt which they\nhad confessed. They came from the bath new men. It was a \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, a\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd, a laver of regeneration. They had to practise certain forms of\nabstinence: they had to fast; and when they ate they had to abstain from\ncertain kinds of food.[604]\n\n(ii.) The purification was followed by a sacrifice\u2014which was known\nas \u03c3\u03c9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u2014a sacrifice of salvation: and in addition to the great\npublic sacrifice, each of the candidates for initiation sacrificed a\npig for himself.[605] Then there was an interval of two days before\nthe more solemn sacrifices and shows began. They began with a great\nprocession\u2014each of those who were to be initiated carrying a long lighted\ntorch, and singing loud p\u00e6ans in honour of the god.[606] It set out from\nAthens at sunrise and reached Eleusis at night. The next day there was\nanother great sacrifice. Then followed three days and nights in which\nthe initiated shared the mourning of Demeter for her daughter, and broke\ntheir fast only by drinking the mystic \u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u1f7c\u03bd\u2014a drink of flour and water\nand pounded mint, and by eating the sacred cakes.[607]\n\n(iii.) And at night there were the mystic plays: the scenic\nrepresentation, the drama in symbol and for sight. Their torches were\nextinguished: they stood outside the temple in the silence and the\ndarkness. The doors opened\u2014there was a blaze of light\u2014and before them\nwas acted the drama of Demeter and Kor\u00e9\u2014the loss of the daughter, the\nwanderings of the mother, the birth of the child. It was a symbol of the\nearth passing through its yearly periods. It was the poetry of Nature.\nIt was the drama which is acted every year, of summer and winter and\nspring. Winter by winter the fruits and flowers and grain die down into\nthe darkness, and spring after spring they come forth again to new life.\nWinter after winter the sorrowing earth is seeking for her lost child;\nthe hopes of men look forward to the new blossoming of spring.\n\nIt was a drama also of human life. It was the poetry of the hope of a\nworld to come. Death gave place to life. It was a _purgatio anim\u00e6_, by\nwhich the soul might be fit for the presence of God. Those who had been\nbaptized and initiated were lifted into a new life. Death had no terrors\nfor them. The blaze of light after darkness, the symbolic scenery of the\nlife of the gods, were a foreshadowing of the life to come.[608]\n\nThere is a passage in Plutarch which so clearly shows this, that I will\nquote it.[609]\n\n    \u201cWhen a man dies, he is like those who are being initiated\n    into the mysteries. The one expression, \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u1fb6\u03bd\u2014the other,\n    \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, correspond.... Our whole life is but a succession of\n    wanderings, of painful courses, of long journeys by tortuous\n    ways without outlet. At the moment of quitting it, fears,\n    terrors, quiverings, mortal sweats, and a lethargic stupor,\n    come over us and overwhelm us; but as soon as we are out of\n    it, pure spots and meadows receive us, with voices and dances\n    and the solemnities of sacred words and holy sights. It is\n    there that man, having become perfect and initiated\u2014restored\n    to liberty, really master of himself\u2014celebrates, crowned with\n    myrtle, the most august mysteries, holds converse with just\n    and pure souls, looking down upon the impure multitude of the\n    profane or uninitiated, sinking in the mire and mist beneath\n    him\u2014through fear of death and through disbelief in the life to\n    come, abiding in its miseries.\u201d\n\nThere was probably no dogmatic teaching\u2014there were possibly no words\nspoken\u2014it was all an acted parable.[610] But it was all kept in silence.\nThere was an awful individuality about it. They saw the sight in common,\nbut they saw it each man for himself. It was his personal communion with\nthe divine life. The glamour and the glory of it were gone when it was\npublished to all the world.[611] The effect of it was conceived to be a\nchange both of character and of relation to the gods. The initiated were\nby virtue of their initiation made partakers of a life to come. \u201cThrice\nhappy they who go to the world below having seen these mysteries: to them\nalone is life there, to all others is misery.\u201d[612]\n\n2. In time, however, new myths and new forms of worship were added. It\nis not easy to draw a definite line between the mysteries, strictly so\ncalled, and the forms of worship which went on side by side with them.\nNot only are they sometimes spoken of in common as mysteries, but there\nis a remarkable syncretist painting in a non-Christian catacomb at Rome,\nin which the elements of the Greek mysteries of Demeter are blended with\nthose of Sabazius and Mithra, in a way which shows that the worship was\nblended also.[613] These forms of worship also had an initiation: they\nalso aimed at a pure religion. The condition of entrance was: \u201cLet no\none enter the most venerable assembly of the association unless he be\npure and pious and good.\u201d Nor was it left to the individual conscience:\na man had to be tested and examined by the officers.[614] But the\nmain element in the association was not so much the initiation as the\nsacrifice and the common meal which followed it. The offerings were\nbrought by individuals and offered in common: they were offered upon\nwhat is sometimes spoken of as the \u201choly table.\u201d They were distributed\nby the servants (the deacons), and the offerer shared with the rest in\nthe distribution. In one association, at Xanthos in Lycia, of which the\nrules remain on an inscription, the offerer had the right to half of\nwhat he had brought. The feast which followed was an effort after real\nfellowship.[615] There was in it, as there is in Christian times, a sense\nof communion with one another in a communion with God.\n\nDuring the earliest centuries of Christianity, the mysteries, and the\nreligious societies which were akin to the mysteries,[616] existed on\nan enormous scale throughout the eastern part of the Empire. There\nwere elements in some of them from which Christianity recoiled, and\nagainst which the Christian Apologists use the language of strong\ninvective.[617] But, on the other hand, the majority of them had the\nsame aims as Christianity itself\u2014the aim of worshipping a pure God,\nthe aim of living a pure life, and the aim of cultivating the spirit\nof brotherhood.[618] They were part of a great religious revival which\ndistinguishes the age.[619]\n\n\nB. THE MYSTERIES AND THE CHURCH.\n\nIt was inevitable when a new group of associations came to exist side\nby side with a large existing body of associations, from which it was\ncontinually detaching members, introducing them into its own midst with\nthe practices of their original societies impressed upon their minds,\nthat this new group should tend to assimilate, with the assimilation\nof their members, some of the elements of these existing groups.[620]\nThis is what we find to have been in fact the case. It is possible that\nthey made the Christian associations more secret than before. Up to a\ncertain time there is no evidence that Christianity had any secrets.\nIt was preached openly to the world. It guarded worship by imposing\na moral bar to admission. But its rites were simple and its teaching\nwas public. After a certain time all is changed: mysteries have arisen\nin the once open and easily accessible faith, and there are doctrines\nwhich must not be declared in the hearing of the uninitiated.[621]\nBut the influence of the mysteries, and of the religious cults which\nwere analogous to the mysteries, was not simply general; they modified\nin some important respects the Christian sacraments of Baptism and\nthe Eucharist\u2014the practice, that is, of admission to the society by a\nsymbolical purification, and the practice of expressing membership of the\nsociety by a common meal. I will ask you to consider first Baptism, and\nsecondly the Lord\u2019s Supper, each in its simplest form, and then I will\nattempt to show how the elements which are found in the later and not in\nthe earlier form, are elements which are found outside Christianity in\nthe institutions of which I have spoken.\n\n1. Baptism. In the earliest times, (1) baptism followed at once upon\nconversion; (2) the ritual was of the simplest kind, nor does it appear\nthat it needed any special minister.\n\nThe first point is shown by the Acts of the Apostles; the men who\nrepented at Pentecost, those who believed when Philip preached in\nSamaria, the Ethiopian eunuch, Cornelius, Lydia, the jailor at Philippi,\nthe converts at Corinth and Ephesus, were baptized as soon as they were\nknown to recognize Jesus Christ as the Messiah.[622] The second point is\nalso shown by the Acts. It was a baptism of water.\n\nA later, though still very early stage, with significant modifications,\nis seen in the \u201cTeaching of the Apostles:\u201d[623] (1) no special minister\nof baptism is specified, the vague \u201che that baptizeth\u201d (\u1f41 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd)\nseeming to exclude a limitation of it to an officer; (2) the only\nelement that is specified is water; (3) previous instruction is implied,\nbut there is no period of catechumenate defined; (4) a fast is enjoined\nbefore baptism.\n\nThese were the simple elements of early Christian baptism. When it\nemerges after a period of obscurity\u2014like a river which flows under the\nsand\u2014the enormous changes of later times have already begun.\n\n(i.) The first point of change is the change of _name_.\n\n(_a_) So early as the time of Justin Martyr we find a name given\nto baptism which comes straight from the Greek mysteries\u2014the name\n\u201cenlightenment\u201d (\u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9).[624] It came to be the constant\ntechnical term.[625]\n\n(_b_) The name \u201cseal\u201d (\u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03c2), which also came both from the\nmysteries[626] and from some forms of foreign cult, was used partly of\nthose who had passed the tests and who were \u201cconsignati,\u201d as Tertullian\ncalls them,[627] partly of those who were actually sealed upon the\nforehead in sign of a new ownership.[628]\n\n(_c_) The term \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd is applied to baptism,[629] and with it comes\na whole series of technical terms unknown to the Apostolic Church, but\nwell known to the mysteries, and explicable only through ideas and usages\npeculiar to them. Thus we have words expressive either of the rite\nor act of initiation, like \u03bc\u03cd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,[630] \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae,[631] \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,[632]\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03af\u03b1;[633] of the agent or minister, like \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2;[634] of\nthe subject, like \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,[635] \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03c5\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bc\u03c5\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c2, or, with\nreference to the unbaptized, \u1f00\u03bc\u03cd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.[636] In this terminology we\ncan more easily trace the influence of the mysteries than of the New\nTestament.[637]\n\n(ii.) The second point is the change of _time_, which involves a change\nof _conception_. (_a_) Instead of baptism being given immediately upon\nconversion, it came to be in all cases postponed by a long period of\npreparation, and in some cases deferred until the end of life.[638]\n(_b_) The Christians were separated into two classes, those who had\nand those who had not been baptized. Tertullian regards it as a mark\nof heretics that they have not this distinction: who among them is a\ncatechumen, who a believer, is uncertain: they are no sooner hearers than\nthey \u201cjoin in the prayers;\u201d and \u201ctheir catechumens are perfect before\nthey are fully instructed (_edocti_).\u201d[639] And Basil gives the custom\nof the mysteries as a reason for the absence of the catechumens from the\nservice.[640] (_c_) As if to show conclusively that the change was due to\nthe influence of the mysteries, baptized persons were, as we have seen,\ndistinguished from unbaptized by the very term which was in use for the\nsimilar distinction in regard to the mysteries\u2014initiated and uninitiated,\nand the minister is \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2, and the persons being baptized are\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9. I dwell upon these broad features, and especially on\nthe transference of names, because it is necessary to show that the\nrelation of the mysteries to the sacrament was not merely a curious\ncoincidence; and what I have said as to the change of name and the change\nof conception, might be largely supplemented by evidence of parallelism\nin the benefits which were conceived to attach to the one and the other.\nThere are many slighter indications serving to supplement what has been\nalready adduced.\n\n(\u03b1) As those who were admitted to the inner sights of the mysteries had\na formula or pass-word (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd or \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1), so the catechumens had\na formula which was only entrusted to them in the last days of their\ncatechumenate\u2014the baptismal formula itself and the Lord\u2019s Prayer.[641]\nIn the Western rites the _traditio symboli_ occupies an important place\nin the whole ceremony. There was a special rite for it. It took place\na week or ten days before the great office of Baptism on Easter-eve.\nOtherwise the Lord\u2019s Prayer and the Creed were kept secret and kept so\nas mysteries; and to the present day the technical name for a creed is\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd or pass-word.\n\n(\u03b2) Sometimes the baptized received the communion at once after baptism,\njust as those who had been initiated at Eleusis proceeded at once\u2014after a\nday\u2019s fast\u2014to drink of the mystic \u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u1f7c\u03bd and to eat of the sacred cakes.\n\n(\u03b3) The baptized were sometimes crowned with a garland, as the initiated\nwore a mystic crown at Eleusis. The usage was local, but lasted at\nAlexandria until modern times. It is mentioned by Vansleb.[642]\n\n(\u03b4) Just as the divinities watched the initiation from out of the\nblaze of light, so Chrysostom pictures Christian baptism in the blaze\nof Easter-eve;[643] and Cyril describes the white-robed band of the\nbaptized approaching the doors of the church where the lights turned\ndarkness into day.\n\n(\u03b5) Baptism was administered, not at any place or time, but only in the\ngreat churches, and only as a rule once a year\u2014on Easter-eve, though\nPentecost was also a recognized season. The primitive \u201cSee here is water,\nwhat doth hinder me to be baptized?\u201d passed into a ritual which at every\nturn recalls the ritual of the mysteries. I will abridge the account\nwhich is given of the practice at Rome so late as the ninth century.[644]\nPreparation went on through the greater part of Lent. The candidates were\nexamined and tested: they fasted: they received the secret symbols, the\nCreed and the Lord\u2019s Prayer. On Easter-eve, as the day declined towards\nafternoon, they assembled in the church of St. John Lateran. The rites\nof exorcism and renunciation were gone through in solemn form, and the\nrituals survive. The Pope and his priests come forth in their sacred\nvestments, with lights carried in front of them, which the Pope then\nblesses: there is a reading of lessons and a singing of psalms. And\nthen, while they chant a litany, there is a procession to the great bath\nof baptism, and the water is blessed. The baptized come forth from the\nwater, are signed with the cross, and are presented to the Pope one by\none, who vests them in a white robe and signs their foreheads again with\nthe cross. They are arranged in a great circle, and each of them carries\na light. Then a vast array of lights is kindled; the blaze of them, says\na Greek Father, makes night continuous with dawn. It is the beginning of\na new life. The mass is celebrated\u2014the mystic offering on the Cross is\nrepresented in figure; but for the newly baptized the chalice is filled,\nnot with wine, but with milk and honey, that they may understand, says\nan old writer, that they have entered already upon the promised land.\nAnd there was one more symbolical rite in that early Easter sacrament,\nthe mention of which is often suppressed\u2014a lamb was offered on the\naltar\u2014afterwards cakes in the shape of a lamb.[645] It was simply the\nritual which we have seen already in the mysteries. The purified crowd at\nEleusis saw a blaze of light, and in the light were represented in symbol\nlife and death and resurrection.\n\n2. Baptism had felt the spell of the Greek ritual: not less so had\nthe Lord\u2019s Supper. Its elements in the earliest times may be gathered\naltogether apart from the passages of the New Testament, upon which,\nhowever clearly we may feel, no sensible man will found an argument, and\nwhich, taken by themselves, possibly admit of more than one meaning.\n\nThe extra-biblical accounts are:\n\n(1) \u201cThe Teaching of the Apostles;\u201d[646] which implies:\n\n(_a_) Thanksgiving for the wine. \u201cWe thank Thee, our Father, for the holy\nvine of David Thy servant, which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus\nChrist Thy Servant. To Thee be glory for ever.\u201d\n\n(_b_) Thanksgiving for the broken bread. \u201cWe thank Thee, our Father, for\nthe life which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus Thy Servant. To\nThee be glory for ever.\u201d\n\nAfter the thanksgiving they ate and drank: none could eat or drink until\nhe had been baptized into the name of the Lord. After the partaking there\nwas another thanksgiving and a prayer of supplication.\n\n(2) There is a fragmentary account which has been singularly overlooked,\nin the Apostolical Constitutions,[647] which carries us one stage\nfurther. After the reading and the teaching, the deacon made a\nproclamation which vividly recalls the proclamation at the beginning of\nthe Mysteries. \u201cIs there any one who has a quarrel with any? Is there any\none with bad feeling\u201d (\u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9)?\n\n(3) The next stage is found in the same book of the Apostolical\nConstitutions.[648] The advance consists in the fact that the catechumens\nand penitents go out, just as those who were not yet initiated and those\nwho were impure were excluded from the Greek Mysteries.\n\nThis marked separation of the catechumens and the baptized, which\nwas possibly strengthened by the philosophic distinction between \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 and \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, lasted until, under influences which it\nwould be beyond our present purpose to discuss, the prevalence of infant\nbaptism caused the distinction no longer to exist.[649]\n\n(4) In a later stage there is a mention of the holy table as an altar,\nand of the offerings placed upon the table of which the faithful partook,\nas mysteries.[650]\n\n(_a_) The conception of the table as an altar is later than the middle\nof the second century.[651] It is used in the Apostolic Fathers of\nthe Jewish altar. It is used by Ignatius in a Christian sense, but\nalways metaphorically.[652] It may be noted that though the Apostolic\nConstitutions (Bk. ii.) speak of a \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, they do not speak of a\n\u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd.[653] This use of \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd is probably not earlier than\nEusebius.[654]\n\n(_b_) The conception of the elements as \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 is even later;[655] but\nonce established, it became permanent, like the Latin term \u201csacramentum.\u201d\n\n(5) The conception of a priest\u2014into which I will not now enter\u2014was\ncertainly strengthened by the mysteries and associations.\n\nThe full development or translation of the idea is found in the great\nmystical writer of the end of the fifth century, in whom every Christian\nordinance is expressed in terms which are applicable only to the\nmysteries. The extreme tendency which he shows is perhaps personal to\nhim; but he was in sympathy with his time, and his influence on the\nChurch of the after-time must count for a large factor in the history\nof Christian thought. There are few Catholic treatises on the Eucharist\nand few Catholic manuals of devotion into which his conceptions do not\nenter.[656]\n\nI will here quote his description of the Communion itself: \u201cAll the other\ninitiations are incomplete without this. The consummation and crown\nof all the rest is the participation of him who is initiated in the\nthearchic mysteries. For though it be the common characteristic of all\nthe hierarchic acts to make the initiated partakers of the divine light,\nyet this alone imparted to me the vision through whose mystic light, as\nit were, I am guided to the contemplation (\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c8\u03af\u03b1\u03bd) of the other sacred\nthings.\u201d The ritual is then described. The sacred bread and the cup of\nblessing are placed upon the altar. \u201cThen the sacred hierarch (\u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2)\ninitiates the sacred prayer and announces to all the holy peace: and\nafter all have saluted each other, the mystic recital of the sacred lists\nis completed. The hierarch and the priests wash their hands in water;\nhe stands in the midst of the divine altar, and around him stand the\npriests and the chosen ministers. The hierarch sings the praises of the\ndivine working and consecrates the most divine mysteries, (\u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1), and by means of the symbols which are sacredly set forth,\nhe brings into open vision the things of which he sings the praises.\nAnd when he has shown the gifts of the divine working, he himself comes\ninto a sacred communion with them, and then invites the rest. And\nhaving both partaken and given to the others a share in the thearchic\ncommunion, he ends with a sacred thanksgiving; and while the people bend\nover what are divine symbols only, he himself, always by the thearchic\nspirit, is led in a priestly manner, in purity of his godlike frame of\nmind (\u1f10\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2), through blessed and spiritual\ncontemplation, to the holy realities of the mysteries.\u201d[657]\n\nOnce again I must point out that the elements\u2014the conceptions which\nhe has added to the primitive practices\u2014are identical with those in\nthe mysteries. The tendency which he represented grew: the Eucharistic\nsacrifice came in the East to be celebrated behind closed doors: the\nbreaking of bread from house to house was changed into so awful a mystery\nthat none but the hierophant himself might see it. The idea of prayer and\nthought as offerings was preserved by the Neo-Platonists.\n\nThere are two minor points which, though interesting, are less\ncertain and also less important. (_a_) It seems likely that the use\nof \u03b4\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u2014tablets commemorating benefactors or departed saints\u2014was a\ncontinuation of a similar usage of the religious associations.[658] (_b_)\nThe blaze of lights at mysteries may have suggested the use of lights at\nthe Lord\u2019s Supper.[659]\n\nIt seems fair to infer that, since there were great changes in the\nritual of the sacraments, and since the new elements of these changes\nwere identical with elements that already existed in cognate and largely\ndiffused forms of worship, the one should be due to the other.\n\nThis inference is strengthened when we find that the Christian\ncommunities which were nearest in form and spirit to the Hellenic\nculture, were the first in which these elements appear, and also those\nin which they assumed the strongest form. Such were the Valentinians,\nof whom Tertullian expressly speaks in this connection.[660] We read of\nSimon Magus that he taught that baptism had so supreme an efficacy as to\ngive by itself eternal life to all who were baptized. The \u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u1fc6\u03c2\nwas expanded to its full extent, and it was even thought that to the\nwater of baptism was added a fire which came from heaven upon all who\nentered into it. Some even introduced a second baptism.[661]\n\nSo also the Marcosians and some Valentinian schools believed in a baptism\nthat was an absolute sundering of the baptized from the corruptible world\nand an emancipation into a perfect and eternal life. Similarly, some\nother schools added to the simple initiation rites of a less noble and\nmore sensuous order.[662]\n\nIt was but the old belief in the effect of the mysteries thrown into a\nChristian form. So also another Gnostic school is said to have not only\ntreated the truths of Christianity as sacred, but also to have felt about\nthem what the initiated were supposed to feel about the mysteries\u2014\u201cI\nswear by Him who is above all, by the Good One, to keep these mysteries\nand to reveal them to no one;\u201d and after that oath each seemed to feel\nthe power of God to be upon him, as it were the pass-word of entrance\ninto the highest mysteries.[663] As soon as the oath had been taken, he\nsees what no eye has seen, and hears what no ear has heard, and drinks of\nthe living water\u2014which is their baptism, as they think, a spring of water\nspringing up within them to everlasting life.\n\nAgain, it is probably through the Gnostics that the period of preparation\nfor baptism was prolonged. Tertullian says of the Valentinians that their\nperiod of probation is longer than their period of baptized life, which\nis precisely what happened in the Greek practice of the fourth century.\n\nThe general inference of the large influence of the Gnostics on baptism,\nis confirmed by the fact that another element, which certainly came\nthrough them, though its source is not certain and is more likely to\nhave been Oriental than Greek, has maintained a permanent place in most\nrituals\u2014the element of anointing. There were two customs in this matter,\none more characteristic of the East, the other of the West\u2014the anointing\nwith (1) the oil of exorcism before baptism and after the renunciation of\nthe devil, and (2) the oil of thanksgiving, which was used immediately\nafter baptism, first by the presbyter and then by the bishop, who then\nsealed the candidate on the forehead. The very variety of the custom\nshows how deep and yet natural the action of the Gnostic systems, with\nthe mystic and magic customs of the Gnostic societies or associations,\nhad been on the practices and ceremonies of the Church.[664]\n\nBut beyond matters of practice, it is among the Gnostics that there\nappears for the first time an attempt to realize the change of the\nelements to the material body and blood of Christ. The fact that they\nwere so regarded is found in Justin Martyr.[665] But at the same time,\nthat the change was not vividly realized, is proved by the fact that,\ninstead of being regarded as too awful for men to touch, the elements\nwere taken by the communicants to their homes and carried about with them\non their travels. But we read of Marcus that in his realistic conception\nof the Eucharistic service the white wine actually turned to the colour\nof blood before the eyes of the communicants.[666]\n\nThus the whole conception of Christian worship was changed.[667] But it\nwas changed by the influence upon Christian worship of the contemporary\nworship of the mysteries and the concurrent cults. The tendency to\nan elaborate ceremonial which had produced the magnificence of those\nmysteries and cults, and which had combined with the love of a purer\nfaith and the tendency towards fellowship, was based upon a tendency of\nhuman nature which was not crushed by Christianity. It rose to a new\nlife, and though it lives only by a survival, it lives that new life\nstill. In the splendid ceremonial of Eastern and Western worship, in the\nblaze of lights, in the separation of the central point of the rite from\ncommon view, in the procession of torch-bearers chanting their sacred\nhymns\u2014there is the survival, and in some cases the galvanized survival,\nof what I cannot find it in my heart to call a _pagan_ ceremonial;\nbecause though it was the expression of a less enlightened faith, yet it\nwas offered to God from a heart that was not less earnest in its search\nfor God and in its effort after holiness than our own.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE XI.\n\nTHE INCORPORATION OF CHRISTIAN IDEAS, AS MODIFIED BY GREEK, INTO A BODY\nOF DOCTRINE.\n\n\nThe object which I have in view in this Lecture is to show the transition\nby which, under the influence of contemporary Greek thought, the\nword Faith came to be transferred from simple trust in God to mean\nthe acceptance of a series of propositions, and these propositions,\npropositions in abstract metaphysics.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Greek words which designate belief or faith are used in the Old\nTestament chiefly in the sense of trust, and primarily trust in a person.\nThey expressed confidence in his goodness, his veracity, his uprightness.\nThey are as much moral as intellectual. They implied an estimate of\ncharacter. Their use in application to God was not different from their\nuse in application to men. Abraham trusted God. The Israelites also\ntrusted God when they saw the Egyptians dead upon the seashore. In the\nfirst instance there was just so much of intellectual assent involved\nin belief, that to believe God involved an assent to the proposition\nthat God exists. But this element was latent and implied rather than\nconscious and expressed. It is not difficult to see how, when this\nproposition came to be conscious and expressed, it should lead to other\npropositions. The analysis of belief led to the construction of other\npropositions besides the bare original proposition that God is. Why do\nI trust God? The answer was: Because He is wise, or good, or just. The\npropositions followed: I believe that God is wise, that He is good, that\nHe is just. Belief in God came to mean the assent to certain propositions\nabout God.[668]\n\nIn Greek philosophy the words were used rather of intellectual conviction\nthan of moral trust, and of the higher rather than of the lower forms\nof conviction. Aristotle distinguishes faith from impression\u2014for a man,\nhe says, may have an impression and not be sure of it. He uses it both\nof the convictions that come through the senses and of those that come\nthrough reason.\n\nThere is in Philo a special application of this philosophical use, which\nled to even more important results. He blends the sense in which it is\nfound in the Old Testament with that which is found in Greek philosophy.\nThe mass of men, he says, trust their senses or their reason. The good\nman trusts God. Just as the mass of men believe that their senses and\ntheir reason do not deceive them, so the latter believes that God\ndoes not deceive him. To trust God was to trust His veracity. But the\noccasions on which God spoke directly to a man were rare, and what He\nsaid when He so spoke commanded an unquestioning acceptance. He more\ncommonly spoke to men through the agency of messengers. His angels\nspoke to men, sometimes in visions of the night, sometimes in open\nmanifestation by day. His prophets spoke to men. To believe God, implied\na belief in what He said indirectly as well as directly. It implied the\nacceptance of what His prophets said, that is to say, of what they were\nrecorded to have said in the Holy Writings. Belief in this sense is not\na vague and mystical sentiment, the hazy state of mind which precedes\nknowledge, but the highest form of conviction. It transcends reason in\ncertainty. It is the full assurance that certain things are so, because\nGod has said that they are so.[669]\n\nIn this connection we may note the way in which the Christian communities\nwere helped by the current reaction against pure speculation\u2014the longing\nfor certainty. The mass of men were sick of theories. They wanted\ncertainty. The current teaching of the Christian teachers gave them\ncertainty. It appealed to definite facts of which their predecessors\nwere eye-witnesses. Its simple tradition of the life and death and\nresurrection of Jesus Christ was a necessary basis for the satisfaction\nof men\u2019s needs. Philosophy and poetry might be built upon that tradition;\nbut if the tradition were shown to be only cloudland, Christian\nphilosophy was no more than Stoicism.\n\nWe have thus to see how, under the new conditions, faith passed beyond\nthe moral stage, or simple trust in a person, to the metaphysical\nstage, or belief in certain propositions or technical definitions\nconcerning Him, His nature, relations and actions. In this latter we may\ndistinguish two correlated and interdependent phases or forms of belief,\nthe one more intellectual and logical, the other more historical and\nconcrete, namely, (1) the conviction that God being of a certain nature\nhas certain attributes; (2) the conviction that, God being true, the\nstatements which He makes through His prophets and ministers are also\ntrue.[670] The one of these forms of belief was elaborated into what we\nknow as the Creed; the other, into the Canon of the New Testament.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe shall first deal with these phases or forms of belief, and then with\nthe process by which the metaphysical definitions became authoritative.\n\n1. In the first instance the intellectual element of belief was\nsubordinated to the ethical purpose of the religion. Belief was not\ninsisted upon in itself and for itself, but as the ground of moral\nreformation. The main content of the belief was \u201cthat men are punished\nfor their sins and honoured for their good deeds:\u201d[671] the ground of\nthis conviction was the underlying belief that God is, and that He\nrewards and punishes. The feature which differentiated Christianity\nfrom philosophy was, that this belief as to the nature of God had\nbeen made certain by a revelation. The purpose of the revelation was\nsalvation\u2014regeneration and amendment of life. By degrees stress came to\nbe laid on this underlying element. The revelation had not only made\nsome propositions certain which hitherto had been only speculative,\nit had also added new propositions, assertions of its distinctive or\ndifferentiating belief. But it is uncertain, except within the narrowest\nlimits, what those assertions were. There are several phrases in the\nNew Testament and in sub-apostolic writings which read like references\nto some elementary statements or rule.[672] But none of them contain or\nexpress a recognized standard. Yet the standard may be gathered partly\nfrom the formula of admission into the Christian community, partly from\nthe formul\u00e6 in which praise was ascribed to God. The most important\nof these, in view of its subsequent history, is the former. But the\nformula is itself uncertain; it existed at least in two main forms.\nThere is evidence to show that the injunction to baptize in the name of\nthe three Persons of the Trinity, which is found in the last chapter of\nSt. Matthew, was observed.[673] It is the formula in the Teaching of\nthe Apostles.[674] But there is also evidence, side by side with this\nevidence as to the use of the Trinitarian formula, of baptism into the\nname of Christ, or into the death of Christ.[675]\n\nThe next element in the uncertainty which exists is as to how far the\nformula, either in the one case or the other, was conceived to involve\nthe assent to any other propositions except those of the existence of\nthe divine Persons or Person mentioned in the formula. Even this assent\nwas implied rather than explicit. It is in the Apologists that the\ntransition from the implicit was made. The teaching of Jesus Christ\nbecame to them important, especially in Justin Martyr.[676] The step by\nwhich it became explicit is of great importance, but we have no means\nof knowing when or how it was made.[677] It is conceivable that it was\nfirst made homiletically, in the course of exhortation to Christian\nduty.[678] When the intellectual contents of the formula did become\nexplicit, the formula became a test. Concurrently with its use as a\nstandard or test of belief, was probably the incorporation in it of so\nmuch of Christian teaching as referred to the facts of the life of Jesus\nChrist. But the facts were capable of different interpretations, and\ndifferent propositions might be based upon them. In the first instance,\nspeculation was free. Different facts had a different significance. The\nsame facts of the life were interpreted in different ways. There was an\nagreement as to the main principle that the Christian societies were\nsocieties for the amendment of life. It is an almost ideal picture which\nthe heathen Celsus draws of the Christians differing widely as to their\nspeculations, and yet all agreeing to say, \u201cThe world is crucified to\nme, and I unto the world.\u201d[679] The influence of Greek thought, partly\nby the allegorizing of history, partly by the construction of great\nsuperstructures of speculation upon slender bases, made the original\nstandard too elastic to serve as the basis and bond of Christian society.\nWhen theories were added to fact, different theories were added. It is at\nthis point that the fact became of special importance that the Gospel had\nbeen preached by certain persons, and that its content was the content\nof that preaching. It was not a philosophy which successive generations\nmight modify. It went back to the definite teaching of a historical\nperson. It was of importance to be sure what that teaching was. It was\nagreed to recognize apostolic teaching as the authoritative vehicle and\ninterpretation of Christ\u2019s. All parties appealed to it.[680] But there\nhad been more than one apostle. The teaching was consequently that, not\nof one person, but of many.\n\nHere was the main point of dispute. All parties within the Church agreed\nas to the need of a tribunal, but each party had its own. Each made its\nappeal to a different apostle. But since, though many in number, they\nwere teachers, not of their own opinions, but of the doctrine which they\nhad received from Jesus Christ, the more orthodox or Catholic tendency\nfound it necessary to lay stress upon their unity. They were spoken of\nin the plural, \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9.[681] While the Gnostics built upon one\napostle or another,[682] the Catholics built upon an apostolic consensus.\nTheir tradition was not that of Peter or of James, but of the twelve\napostles. The \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 was \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, an attribute which implies a uniform\ntradition.[683]\n\nIt was at this point that organization and confederation became\nimportant: the bishops of the several churches were regarded as the\nconservators of the tradition:[684] while the bishops of the apostolic\nchurches settled down to a general agreement as to the terms of the\napostolic tradition.[685] In distinction from the Gnostic standards,\nthere came to be a standard which the majority of the churches\u2014the middle\nparty in the Church\u2014accepted. It is quite uncertain when the rule came\nto be generally accepted, or in what form it was accepted. But it is\nin the main preserved for us\u2014with undoubtedly later accretions\u2014in the\nApostles\u2019 Creed. Tertullian\u2019s contention is that this rule is not only\napostolic and binding, but also adequate\u2014a complete representation of\napostolic teaching\u2014that there were no necessary truths outside it.[686]\nThe additions were made by the gradual working of the common sense,\nthe common consciousness, of the Christian world. They were approved\nby the majority; they were accepted by the sees which claimed to have\nbeen founded by the apostles. The earliest form is that which may be\ngathered from several writers as having been generally accepted in Rome\nand the West: it is a bare statement. \u201cI believe in God Almighty, and in\nJesus Christ His Son our Lord, who was born of a virgin, crucified under\nPontius Pilate, the third day rose again from the dead, sitteth on the\nright hand of the Father, from whence he is coming to judge the living\nand dead; and in the Holy Spirit.\u201d The term Son came to be qualified in\nvery early times by \u201conly begotten;\u201d and after \u201cthe Holy Spirit,\u201d \u201cthe\nHoly Church, the remission of sins, and the resurrection of the flesh,\u201d\nwere added.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n2. Side by side with this question of the standard or authentic minimum\nof traditional teaching, and growing necessarily with it and out of\nit, was the question of the sources from which that teaching could be\ndrawn, and of the materials by which the standard might be interpreted.\nThe greater part of apostolic teaching had been oral. The tradition\nwas mostly oral. But as the generations of men receded farther from\nthe apostolic age, and as the oral tradition which was delivered came\nnecessarily to vary, it became more and more uncertain what was the true\nform and content of the tradition. Written records came to be of more\nimportance than oral tradition. They had at first only the authority\nwhich attached to tradition. Their elevation to an independent rank\nwas due to the influence of the Old Testament. There had been already\na series of revelations of God to men, which having once been oral had\nbecome written. The revelation consisted of what was then known as the\nScriptures, and what we now know as the Old Testament. The proofs of\nChristianity consisted to a large extent in its consonance with those\nScriptures. But the term Holy Scriptures was less strictly used than\nis sometimes supposed. The hedge round them had gaps, and there were\npatches lying outside what has since come to be its line. It was partly\nthe indefiniteness of the Old Testament canon which caused the term\nScripture to be applied to some writings of the apostolic age. But the\nquestion, Which writings? was only answered gradually. The spirit of\nprophecy had only gradually passed away. It was the common ground for\nthe reception of the Old Testament and the New Testament; as the spirit\nof prophecy was common to both, it was but natural that both should have\nthe same attributes. But prophecy was not in the first instance conceived\nas having suddenly ceased in the Church. The term Scripture (\u1f21 \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae)\nis applied to the Shepherd of Hermas by Iren\u00e6us.[687] The delimitation\nof the body of writings that could be so denoted was connected with\nthe necessity of being sure about the _apostolical_ teaching\u2014the\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.[688] The term Scripture was applied to the recorded sayings\nof Jesus Christ (the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1) without demur.[689] It came to be applied\nalso to the records which the apostles had left of the facts of the life\nof Christ. Then, finally, it tended more gradually to be applied to the\nwritings of the apostles and of apostolic men.\n\nBut questions arose in regard to all these classes, which were not\nimmediately answered. There were several recensions current both of the\nsayings of Jesus Christ and of the memoirs of the apostles. There were\nmany writings attributed to apostles and apostolic men which were of\ndoubtful authority. But the determination was slow, and the date when a\ngeneral settlement was made is uncertain.[690] There is no distinction\nbetween canonical and uncanonical books either in Justin Martyr or in\nIren\u00e6us. The first Biblical critic was Marcion: the controversy with his\nfollowers, which reaches its height in Tertullian, forced on the Church\nthe first serious consideration of the question,\u2014Which recensions of the\nwords and memoirs of Christ, and which of the letters and other writings\nof the apostles and apostolic men, should be accepted? There came to be\na recognized list of the writings of the new revelations, as there came\nto be\u2014though it is doubtful whether there had yet come to be\u2014a list of\nthe writings of the earlier revelations to the Jews. Writings on the\nrecognized list came in as the voices of the Holy Ghost.[691] They were,\nas the writings of the prophets had been, the revelation of the Father\nto His children. Hence faith or belief came to take in the Christian\nworld the sense that it had in Philo\u2014of assent not only to the great\nconceptions which were contained in the notion of God, but also to the\ndivine revelation which was recorded in the two Testaments.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n3. It might have been well if the Christian Church had been content to\nrest with this first stage in the transformation of the idea of belief,\nand to take as its intellectual basis only the simple statements of\nthe primitive creed interpreted by the New Testament. But the conflict\nof speculations which had compelled the middle party in the Christian\nchurches to adopt a standard of belief and a limitation of the sources\nfrom which the belief might be interpreted, had also had the effect of\nbringing into the Church the philosophical temper.[692] In the creed of\nthe end of the second century, the age of Tertullian, there are already\nphilosophical ideas\u2014the creation of the world out of nothing, the Word,\nthe relation of the Creator to the world, of the Word or Son to the\nFather, and of both to men. The Creed, as given in the treatise against\nPraxeas, is equally elaborate.[693] With that Creed\u2014traditional as he\nbelieved it to be\u2014Tertullian himself was satisfied. He deprecates the\n\u201ccuriositas\u201d of the brethren no less than the \u201cscrupulositas\u201d of the\nheretics. He denies the applicability of the text, \u201cSeek and ye shall\nfind,\u201d to research into the content of Christian doctrine: it relates\nonly to the traditional teaching: when a man has found that, he has all\nthat he needs: further \u201cseeking\u201d is incompatible with having found. In\nother words, as among modern Ultramontanes, faith must rest not on search\nbut on tradition (authority).[694] The absolute freedom of speculation\nwas checked, but the tendency to speculate remained, and it had in the\n\u201crule of faith\u201d a vantage-ground within the Church. There grew up\nwithin the lines that had been marked out a tendency which, accepting\nthe rule of faith, and accepting also, with possibly slight variations,\nthe canonical Scriptures, tried to build theories out of them: \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\ntook its place side by side with \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2.[695] It grew up in several parts\nof Christendom. In Cappadocia, in Asia, in Edessa, in Palestine, in\nAlexandria, were different small groups of men who within the recognized\nlines were working out philosophical theories of Christianity.[696] We\nknow most about Alexandria. There was a recognized school\u2014on the type\nof the existing philosophical schools\u2014for the study of philosophical\nChristianity. Its first great teacher was Clement. He was the first to\nconstruct a large philosophy of Christian doctrine, with a recognition\nof the conventional limits, but by the help and in the domain of Greek\nthought. But he is of less importance than his great disciple Origen. In\nthe _De Principiis_ of the latter we have the first complete system of\ndogma; and I recommend the study of it, of its omissions as well as of\nits assertions, of the strange fact that the features of it which are in\nstrongest contrast to later dogmatics are in fact its most archaic and\nconservative elements.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is not to my present purpose to state the results of these\nspeculations. The two points to which I wish to draw your attention in\nreference to this tendency to philosophize, are these:\n\n(1) The distinction between what was either an original and ground\nbelief or a historical fact of which a trustworthy tradition had come\ndown, and speculations in regard to such primary beliefs and historical\nfacts, tended to disappear in the strong philosophical current of the\ntime. It did not disappear without a struggle. Tertullian, among others,\ngives indications of it. The doctrine of the Divine Word had begun in his\ntime to make its way into the Creed: it was known as the \u201cdispensation\u201d\n(_\u0153conomia_). \u201cThe simpler-minded men,\u201d he remarks, \u201cnot to say ignorant\nand uneducated, who always constitute the majority of believers\u2014since\nthe rule of faith itself transfers us from the belief in polytheism to\nthe belief in one only true God\u2014not understanding that though God be\none, yet His oneness is to be understood as involving a dispensation,\nare frightened at this idea of dispensation.\u201d[697] But the ancient\nconservatism was crushed. It came to be considered as important to have\nthe right belief in the speculation as it confessedly was to have it in\nthe fact.\n\n(2) The result of the fading away of this distinction, and of the\nconsequent growth in importance of the speculative element, was a\ntendency to check individual speculations, and to fuse all speculation\nin the average speculations of the majority. The battle of the second\ncentury had been a battle between those who asserted that there was a\nsingle and final tradition of truth, and those who claimed that the Holy\nSpirit spoke to them as truly as He had spoken to men in the days of\nthe apostles. The victorious opinion had been that the revelation was\nfinal, and that what was contained in the records of the apostles was\nthe sufficient sum of Christian teaching: hence the stress laid upon\n_apostolic_ doctrine.\n\nThe battle of the third century was between those who claimed, as\nMarcion claimed, that inspired documents were to be taken in their\nliteral sense, and those who claimed that they needed a philosophical\ninterpretation,[698]\u2014that while these monuments of the apostolic age\nrequired interpretation,[699] yet they were of no private interpretation,\nand that theories based upon them must be the theories of the apostolical\nchurches. In other words, the contention that Christianity rested upon\nthe basis of a traditional doctrine and a traditional standard, was\nnecessarily supplemented by the contention that the doctrine and standard\nmust have a traditional interpretation. A rule of faith and a canon were\ncomparatively useless, and were felt to be so, without a traditionally\nauthoritative interpretation. The Gnostics were prepared to accept all\nbut this. They also appealed to tradition and to the Scriptures.[700] So\nfar it was an even battle: each side in such a controversy might retort\nupon the other, and did so.[701] If it were allowed to each side to\nargue on the same bases and by the same methods, each side might claim\na victory. A new principle had to be introduced\u2014the denial of the right\nof private interpretation. In regard both to the primary articles of\nbelief and to the majority of apostolic writings, no serious difference\nof opinion had existed among the apostolical churches. It was otherwise\nwith the speculations that were based upon the rule of faith and the\ncanon. They required discussion. The Christological ideas that were\ngrowing up on all sides had much in common with the Gnostic opinions.\nThey needed a limitation and a check. The check was conterminous with the\nsources of the tradition itself; the meaning of the canon, as well as the\ncanon itself, was deposited with the bishops of apostolical churches;\nand their method of enforcing the check was the holding of meetings and\nthe framing of resolutions. Such meetings had long been held to ensure\nunity on points of discipline. They came now to be held to ensure unity\non that which had come to be no less important\u2014the interpretation of the\nrecognized standard of belief. They were meetings of bishops. Bishops had\nadded to their original functions the function of teachers (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9)\nand interpreters of the will of God (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9).[702] Accordingly meetings\nof bishops were held, and through the operation of political rather than\nof religious causes their decisions were held to be final. Two important\nresults followed.\n\n(i.) The first result was the formulating of the speculations in definite\npropositions, and the insertion of such propositions in the Creed. The\ntheory was that such insertions were of the nature of definitions and\ninterpretations of the original belief. The mass of communities have\nnever wandered from the belief that they rest upon an original revelation\npreserved by a continuous tradition. But a definition of what has\nhitherto been undefined is necessarily of the nature of an addition.\nPerhaps the earliest instance which has come down to us of such an\nexpansion of the Creed, is in the letter sent by Hymen\u00e6us, Bishop of\nJerusalem, and his colleagues to Paul of Samosata.[703] The faith which\nhad been handed down from the beginning is \u201cthat God is unbegotten, one,\nwithout beginning, unseen, unchangeable, whom no man hath seen nor can\nsee, whose glory and greatness it is impossible for human nature to trace\nout adequately; but we must be content to have a moderate conception of\nHim: His Son reveals Him ... as he himself says, \u2018No man knoweth the\nFather save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son revealeth Him.\u2019 We\nconfess and proclaim His begotten Son, the only begotten, the image of\nthe invisible God, the first-born of every creature, the wisdom and word\nand power of God, being before the worlds, God not by foreknowledge but\nby essence and substance.\u201d\n\nThey had passed into the realm of metaphysics. The historical facts of\nthe earlier creed were altogether obscured. Belief was belief in certain\nspeculations. The conception of the nature of belief had travelled round\na wide circuit. It will be noted that there had been a change in the\nmeaning of the word which has lasted until our own day. The belief in the\nveracity of a witness, or in facts of which we are cognizant through our\nsenses, or the primary convictions of our minds\u2014in which I may include\nthe belief in God\u2014admit of a degree of certainty which cannot attach to\nthe belief in deductions from metaphysical premises.[704] Belief came\nto mean, not the highest form of conviction, but something lower than\nconviction, and it tends to have that meaning still. But with this change\nin the nature of belief, there had been no change in the importance which\nwas attached to it. The acceptance of these philosophical speculations\nwas as important as the belief in God and in Jesus Christ, the Son of\nGod. The tendency developed, and we find it developing all through the\nfourth century. In the Nicene Council the tendency was politically more\nimportant, but it was not theologically different from what had gone\nbefore. The habit of defining and of making inferences from definitions,\ngrew the more as the philosophers passed over into the Christian lines,\nand logicians and metaphysicians presided over Christian churches.\nThe speculations which were then agreed upon became stamped as a body\nof truth, and with the still deeper speculations of the Councils of\nConstantinople and Chalcedon, the resolutions of the Nicene Fathers have\ncome to be looked upon as almost a new revelation, and the rejection of\nthem as a greater bar to Christian fellowship than the rejection of the\nNew Testament itself.\n\n(ii.) The second result was the creation of a distinction between what\nwas accepted by the majority at a meeting and what was accepted only\nby a minority. The distinction had long been growing. There had been\nparties in the Christian communities from the first. And the existence\nof such parties was admissible.[705] They broke the concord of the\nbrethren, but they did not break the unity of the faith. Now heretics\nand schismatics were identified; difference in speculative belief was\nfollowed by political penalty. The original contention, still preserved\nin Tertullian,[706] that every man should worship God according to his\nown conviction, that one man\u2019s religion neither harms nor helps another\nman, was exchanged for the contention that the officers of Christian\ncommunities were the guardians of the faith. Controversy on these lines,\nand with these assumptions, soon began to breed its offspring of venom\nand abuse. But I will not pain your ears by quoting, though I have them\nat hand, the torrents of abuse which one saint poured upon another,\nbecause the one assented to the speculations of a majority, and the other\nhad speculations of his own.[707]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt was by these stages, which passed one into the other by a slow\nevolution, that the idea of trust in God, which is the basis of all\nreligion, changed into the idea of a creed, blending theory with fact,\nand metaphysical speculation with spiritual truth.\n\nIt began by being (1) a simple trust in God; then followed (2) a simple\nexpansion of that trust into the assent to the proposition that God\nis good, and (3) a simple acceptance of the proposition that Jesus\nChrist was His Son; then (4) came in the definition of terms, and each\ndefinition of terms involved a new theory; finally, (5) the theories were\ngathered together into systems, and the martyrs and witnesses of Christ\ndied for their faith, not outside but inside the Christian sphere; and\ninstead of a world of religious belief, which resembled the world of\nactual fact in the sublime unsymmetry of its foliage and the deep harmony\nof its discords, there prevailed the most fatal assumption of all, that\nthe symmetry of a system is the test of its truth and a proof thereof.\n\nI am far from saying that those theories are not true. The point to which\nI would draw attention is, first, that they are speculations; secondly,\nthat their place in Christian thought arises from the fact that they are\nthe speculations of a majority at certain meetings. The importance which\nattaches to the whole subject with which we are dealing, lies less in the\nhistory of the formation of a body of doctrine, than in the growth and\npermanence of the conceptions which underlie that formation.\n\n(1) The first conception comes from the antecedent belief which was\nrooted in the Greek mind, that, given certain primary beliefs which are\nadmitted on all sides to be necessary, it is requisite that a man should\ndefine those beliefs[708]\u2014that it is as necessary that a man should be\nable to say with minute exactness what he means by God, as that he should\nsay, I believe in God. It is purely philosophical. A philosopher cannot\nbe satisfied with unanalyzed ideas.\n\n(2) The second conception comes rather from politics than from\nphilosophy. It is the belief in a majority of a meeting. It is the\nconception that the definitions and interpretations of primary beliefs\nwhich are made by the majority of church officers assembled under certain\nconditions, are in all cases and so certainly true, that the duty of the\nindividual is, not to endeavour, by whatever light of nature or whatever\nillumination of the Holy Spirit may be given to him, to understand them,\nbut to acquiesce in the verdict of the majority. The theory assumes that\nGod never speaks to men except through the voice of the majority. It is\na large assumption. It is a transference to the transcendental sphere in\nwhich the highest conceptions of the Divine Nature move, of what is a\nconvenient practical rule for conducting the business of human society:\n\u201cLet the majority decide.\u201d I do not say that it is untrue, or that it has\nnot some arguments in its favour; but I do venture to point out that the\nfact of its being an assumption must at least be recognized.\n\n(3) The third conception is, that the definitions and interpretations of\nprimary beliefs which were made by the majority, or even by the unanimous\nvoice of a church assembly, in a particular age, and which were both\nrelative to the dominant mental tendencies of that age and adequately\nexpressed them, are not only true but final. It is a conceivable view\nthat once, and once only, did God speak to men, and that the revelation\nof Himself in the Gospels is a unique fact in the history of the\nuniverse. It is also a conceivable view that God is continually speaking\nto men, and that now, no less than in the early ages of Christianity,\nthere is a divine Voice that whispers in men\u2019s souls, and a divine\ninterpretation of the meaning of the Gospel history. The difficulty is\nin the assumption which is sometimes made, that the interpretation of\nthe divine Voice was developed gradually through three centuries, and\nthat it was then suddenly arrested. The difficulty has sometimes been\nevaded by the further assumption that there was no development of the\ntruth, and that the Nicene theology was part of the original revelation\u2014a\ntheology divinely communicated to the apostles by Jesus Christ himself.\nThe point of most importance in the line of study which we have been\nfollowing together, is the demonstration which it affords that this\nlatter assumption is wholly untenable. We have been able to see, not\nonly that the several elements of what is distinctive in the Nicene\ntheology were gradually formed, but also that the whole temper and frame\nof mind which led to the formation of those elements were extraneous to\nthe first form of Christianity, and were added to it by the operation of\ncauses which can be traced. If this be so, the assumption of the finality\nof the Nicene theology is the hypothesis of a development which went\non for three centuries, and was then suddenly and for ever arrested.\nSuch a hypothesis, even if it be _\u00e0 priori_ conceivable, would require\nan overwhelming amount of positive testimony. Of such testimony there\nis absolutely none. But it may be that the time has come in which,\ninstead of travelling once more along the beaten tracks of these ancient\ncontroversies as to particular speculations, we should rather consider\nthe prior question of the place which speculation as such should occupy\nin the economy of religion and of the criterion by which speculations\nare to be judged. We have to learn also that although for the needs of\nthis life, for the solace of its sorrow, for the development of its\npossibilities, we must combine into societies and frame our rules of\nconduct, and possibly our articles of belief, by striking an average, yet\nfor the highest knowledge we must go alone upon the mountain-top; and\nthat though the moral law is thundered forth so that even the deaf may\nhear, the deepest secrets of God\u2019s nature and of our own are whispered\nstill in the silence of the night to the individual soul.\n\nIt may be that too much time has been spent upon speculations about\nChristianity, whether true or false, and that that which is essential\nconsists not of speculations but of facts, and not in technical accuracy\non questions of metaphysics, but in the attitude of mind in which we\nregard them. It would be a cold world in which no sun shone until the\ninhabitants thereof had arrived at a true chemical analysis of sunlight.\nAnd it may be that the knowledge and thought of our time, which is\ndrawing us away from the speculative elements in religion to that\nconception of it which builds it upon the character and not only upon the\nintellect, is drawing us thereby to that conception of it which the life\nof Christ was intended to set forth, and which will yet regenerate the\nworld.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE XII.\n\nTHE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BASIS OF CHRISTIAN UNION: DOCTRINE IN THE PLACE\nOF CONDUCT.\n\n\nI spoke in the last Lecture of the gradual formation under Greek\ninfluence of a body of doctrine. I propose to speak in the present\nLecture of that enormous change in the Christian communities by which\nan assent to that body of doctrine became the basis of union. I shall\nhave to speak less of the direct influence of Greece than in previous\nLectures: but it is necessary to show not only the separate causes and\nthe separate effects, but also their general sum in the changed basis of\nChristian communion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere is no adequate evidence that, in the first age of Christianity,\nassociation was other than voluntary. It was profoundly individual.\nIt assumed for the first time in human history the infinite worth of\nthe individual soul. The ground of that individual worth was a divine\nsonship. And the sons of God were brethren. They were drawn together by\nthe constraining force of love. But the clustering together under that\nconstraining force was not necessarily the formation of an association.\nThere was not necessarily any organization.[709] The tendency to\norganization came partly from the tendency of the Jewish colonies in the\ngreat cities of the empire to combine, and to a far greater extent from\nthe large tendency of the Greek and Roman world to form societies for\nboth religious and social purposes.\n\nBut though there is no evidence that associations were in the first\ninstance universal, there is ample evidence that, when once they began\nto be formed, they were formed on a basis which was less intellectual\nthan moral and spiritual. An intellectual element existed: but it\nexisted as an element, not by itself but as an essential ingredient\nin the whole spiritual life. It was not separable from the spiritual\nelement. Of the same spiritual element, \u201cfaith\u201d and \u201cworks\u201d were two\nsides. The associations, like the primitive clusters which were not\nyet crystallized into associations, were held together by faith and\nlove and hope, and fused, as it were, by a common enthusiasm. They were\nbaptized, not only into one body, but also by one spirit, by the common\nbelief in Jesus Christ as their Saviour, by the overpowering sense of\nbrotherhood, by the common hope of immortality. Their individual members\nwere the saints, that is, the holy ones. The collective unity which they\nformed\u2014the Church of God\u2014was holy. It was regarded as holy before it\nwas regarded as catholic. The order of the attributes in the creed is\nhistorically correct\u2014the holy Catholic Church. The pictures which remain\nof the earliest Christian communities show that there was a real effort\nto justify their name. The earliest complete picture of a Christian\ncommunity is that of the \u201cTwo Ways.\u201d There are fragments elsewhere.\nFrom the Acts of the Apostles and the canonical Epistles, and the\nextra-canonical writings of the sub-apostolic age, it is possible to put\ntogether a mosaic.\n\nBut in the \u201cTwo Ways\u201d we have a primitive manual of Christian teaching,\nand the teaching is wholly moral. It professes to be a short exposition\n(\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u1f74) of the two commandments of love to God and love to one\u2019s\nneighbour. The exposition is partly a quotation from and partly an\nexpansion of the Sermon on the Mount. \u201cBless those that curse you, and\npray for your enemies.\u201d \u201cIf any one give thee a blow on the one cheek,\nturn to him the other also.\u201d \u201cGive to every one that asketh thee, and\nask not back.\u201d \u201cThou shalt not be double-minded nor double-tongued.\u201d\n\u201cThou shalt not be covetous nor grasping.\u201d \u201cThou shalt not be angry nor\nenvious.\u201d \u201cThou shalt not be lustful nor filthy-tongued.\u201d \u201cBut thou shalt\nbe meek and long-suffering and quiet and guileless and considerate.\u201d[710]\nThe ideal was not merely moral, but it was also that of an internal\nmorality, of a new heart, of a change of character.\n\nThe book which is probably nearest in date, and which is certainly\nmost alike in character to this simple manual, is the first book of\nthe collection of documents known as the Apostolical Constitutions. It\npictures the aim of the Christian life as being to please God by obeying\nHis will and keeping His commandments. \u201cTake heed, O sons of God, to\ndo everything in obedience to God, and to become well-pleasing in all\nthings to the Lord our God.\u201d[711] \u201cIf thou wilt please God, abstain from\nall that He hates, and do none of those things that are displeasing to\nHim.\u201d[712] Individual Christians are spoken of as servants and sons of\nGod, as fellow-heirs and fellow-partakers with His Son, as believers,\ni.e., as the phrase is expanded, \u201cthose who have believed on His unerring\nreligion.\u201d[713] The rule of life is the Ten Commandments, expanded as\nChrist expanded them, so as to comprehend sins of thought as well as of\ndeed. It was a fellowship of a common ideal and a common enthusiasm of\ngoodness, of neighbourliness and of mutual service, of abstinence from\nall that would rouse the evil passions of human nature, of the effort to\ncrush the lower part of us in the endeavour to reach after God.[714]\n\nIt is even possible that the baptismal formula may have consisted, not in\nan assertion of belief, but in a promise of amendment; for a conservative\nsect made the candidate promise\u2014\u201cI call these seven witnesses to witness\nthat I will sin no more, I will commit adultery no more, I will not\nsteal, I will not act unjustly, I will not covet, I will not hate, I will\nnot despise, nor will I have pleasure in any evil.\u201d[715]\n\nThe Christian communities were based not only on the fellowship of a\ncommon ideal, but also on the fellowship of a common hope. In baptism\nthey were born again, and born to immortality. There was the sublime\nconception that the ideal society which they were endeavouring to\nrealize would be actually realized on earth. The Son of Man would come\nagain, and the regenerated would die no more. The kingdoms of this world\nwould become the kingdom of the Messiah. The lust and hate, the strife\nand conflict, the iniquity and vice, which dominated in current society,\nwould be cast out for ever; and over the new earth there would be the\narching spheres of a new heaven, into which the saints, like the angels,\nmight ascend. But as the generations passed, and all things continued as\nthey had been, and the sign of the Son of Man sent no premonitory ray\nfrom the far-off heaven, this hope of a new earth, without changing its\nforce, began to change its form. It was no longer conceived as sudden,\nbut as gradual. The nations of the world were to be brought one by one\ninto the vast communion. There grew up the magnificent conception of a\nuniversal assembly, a \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1.[716] There would be a universal\nreligion and a universal society, and not until then would the end come:\nit would be a transformed and holy world.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe first point which I will ask you to note is, that this very\ntransformation of the idea of a particular religion into that of a\nuniversal religion\u2014this conception of an all-embracing human society,\nnaturally, if unconsciously, carried with it a relaxation of the\nbonds of discipline. The very earnestness which led men to preach the\nGospel and to hasten the Kingdom, led them also to gather into the\nnet fish of every kind. There was always a test, but the rigour of the\ntest was softened. The old Adam asserted itself. There were social\ninfluences, and weakness of character in the officers, and a condonation\nby the community. It became less and less practicable to eject every\noffender against the Christian code. It was against this whole tendency\nthat Montanism was a rebellion\u2014not only against the officialism of\nChristianity, but also against its worldliness.[717] The earlier\nconception of that code, in which it embraced sins of thought, came to\nbe narrowed. The first narrowing was the limitation to open sins. The\nChristian societies fell under the common law which governs all human\norganizations, that no cognizance can be taken of the secret thoughts of\nthe heart. The second limitation was, that even when a man had committed\nan open sin, and had been therefore excluded from the community, he might\nbe re-admitted. The limitation was not accepted without a controversy\nwhich lasted over a great part of two centuries, and which at one time\nthreatened to rend the whole Christian communities into fragments. The\nChurch was gradually transformed from being a community of saints\u2014of men\nwho were bound together by the bond of a holy life, separated from the\nmass of society, and in antagonism to it\u2014to a community of men whose\nmoral ideal and moral practice differed in but few respects from those of\ntheir Gentile neighbours. The Church of Christ, which floated upon the\nwaves of this troublesome world was a Noah\u2019s ark, in which there were\nunclean as well as clean.\n\nSide by side with this diminution in the strictness of the moral tests\nof admission and of continued membership, was a growth in the importance\nof the intellectual elements, of which I spoke in a previous Lecture.\nThe idea of holiness and purity came to include in early times the\nidea of sound doctrine. Hegesippus,[718] in speaking of a church as a\nvirgin, gives as his reason, not its moral purity, but the fact that\nit was not corrupted by foolish doctrines. The growth, both within the\nChurch and on its outskirts, of opinions which were not the opinions of\nthe majority\u2014the tendency of all majorities to assert their power\u2014the\nflocking into the Christian fold of the educated Greeks and Romans, who\nbrought with them the intellectual habits of mind which dominated in\nthe age\u2014gave to the intellectual element an importance which it had not\npreviously possessed. Knowledge, which had always been in some sort an\nelement in Christianity, though not as a basis of association, came to\nassert its place side by side with love. Agreement in opinion, which\nhad been the basis of union in the Greek philosophical schools, and\nlater in the Gnostic societies, now came to form a new element in the\nbond of union within and between the Churches.[719] But the practical\nnecessity, when once an intellectual element was admitted, of giving\nsome limitations to that element by establishing a rule of faith and\na standard list of apostolic documents, caused stress to be laid at\nonce upon the intellect and the region within which it moved. It was,\nthat is to say, necessary to ensure that the intellectual element was\nof the right kind, and this of itself gave emphasis to the new temper\nand tendency. The profession of belief in Christ which had been in the\nfirst instance subordinate to love and hope, and which had consisted in\na simple recognition of him as the Son of God, became enucleated and\nelaborated into an explicit creed; and assent to that creed became the\ncondition, or, so to speak, the contract of membership. The profession of\nfaith must be in the words of the Christian rule.[720] The teaching of\nthe catechumens was no longer that which we find in the \u201cTwo Ways\u201d\u2014the\ninculcation of the higher morality; it was the _traditio symboli_, the\nteaching of the pass-word and of its meaning. The creed and teaching were\nthe creed and teaching of the average members of the communities. In\nreligion, as in society, it is the average that rules. The law of life is\ncompromise.\n\nThere were two collateral causes which contributed to the change and gave\nemphasis to it.\n\n(1) The one arose from the importance which was attached to baptism.\nThere is no doubt that baptism was conceived to have in itself an\nefficacy which in later times has been rarely attached to it. The\nexpressions which the more literary ages have tended to construe\nmetaphorically were taken literally. It was a real washing away of sins;\nit was a real birth into a new life; it was a real adoption into a divine\nsonship. The _renunciatio diaboli_\u2014the abjuring of false gods and their\nwicked worship\u2014was also an important element.[721] These elements were\nindeed even more strongly emphasized by certain Gnostic societies than\nby the more orthodox writers; but they directly suggested a question\nwhich soon became vital, viz. whether all baptism had this efficacy. Was\nthe mere act or ceremonial enough, or did it depend on the place where,\nthe person by whom, and the ritual with which it was administered? In\nparticular, the question of the minister of baptism became important.\nIt came to be doubted whether baptism had its awful efficacy, if the\nbaptizer were cut off from the general society of Christians on the\nground of either his teaching or his practice. It became important to\nensure that those who baptized held the right faith, lest the baptism\nthey administered should be invalid, and should carry with it all the\nevil consequences of a vitiated baptism. The rules which were laid down\nwere minute. There were grave controversies as to the precise amount of\ndifference of opinion which vitiated baptism, and the very fact of the\ncontroversies about opinion accentuated the stress which was laid upon\nsuch opinion. It drew away attention from a man\u2019s character to his mental\nattitude towards the general average of beliefs.\n\n(2) There was another feature of early Christian life which probably\ncontributed more than anything else to strengthen this tendency. It was\nthe habit of intercourse and intercommunion. Christians, like Jews,\ntravelled widely\u2014more for trade and commerce than for pleasure. The new\nbrotherhood of Christians, like the ancient brotherhood of the Jews,\ngave to all the travelling brethren a welcome and hospitality. A test\nhad been necessary in the earliest times in regard to the prophets and\nteachers. It is mentioned in the Teaching of the Apostles. But the\ntest was of moral rather than of intellectual teaching. \u201cWhoever comes\nto you and teaches you all these things\u201d (i.e. the moral precepts of\nthe \u201cTwo Ways\u201d), \u201creceive him. But in case he who teaches, himself\nturns and teaches you another teaching[722] so as to destroy (this\nteaching), listen not to him: but if he teaches you so as to add to your\nrighteousness and knowledge of the Lord, receive him as the Lord.\u201d[723]\nSo of the prophets: \u201cNot every one who speaks in the spirit is a prophet,\nbut only he who has the moral ways of the Lord (\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u039a\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5):\nby these ways shall be known the false prophet and the true prophet....\nEvery prophet who teaches the truth, if he does not what he teaches, is a\nfalse prophet.\u201d[724] So also of the travelling brethren: \u201cLet every one\nwho comes in the name of the Lord be received; afterwards ye shall test\nhim and find out.... If he wish to settle among you and is a craftsman,\nlet him work and so eat. If he be not a craftsman, provide some way\nof his living among you as a Christian, but not being idle. If he be\nunwilling so to do, he is \u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\u2014making a gain of godliness.\u201d[725]\n\nThe test here also is a test of character and not of belief. But when\nthe intellectual elements had asserted a prominence in Christianity,\nand when the acceptance of the baptismal formula had been made a test\nof admission to a Christian community, it gradually became a custom to\nmake the acceptance of that formula also a condition of admission to\nhospitality.[726] It was, so to speak, a _tessera_ or pass-word. By being\na pass-word to hospitality, it became also a form which a man might\neasily strain his conscience to accept, and in religion no less than in\npolitics there are no such strenuous upholders of current opinion as\nthose who are hypocrites. The importance of the formula as a passport\nattached not only to individuals, but also to whole communities.[727]\nThe fact that the Teaching of the Apostles makes the test personal and\nindividual, shows that in the country and at the time when that book was\nwritten the later system had not yet begun to prevail. This later system\nwas for a community to furnish its travelling members with a circular\nletter of recommendation. Such a letter served as a passport. The\ntravelling Christian who brought it received an immediate and ungrudging\nhospitality. But when churches had wide points of difference, they would\nnot receive each other\u2019s letters. The points of difference which thus\nled to the renunciation of fellowship, related in the first instance\nto discipline or practice. They came to relate to belief. Points of\ndoctrine, no less than points of discipline, came to be discussed at the\nmeetings of the representatives of the churches in a district, concerning\nwhich I spoke in the last Lecture. Doctrine came to be thus co-ordinate\nwith character as the basis on which the churches joined together in\nlocal or general confederations, and accepted each other\u2019s certificates.\nThe hierarchical tendency grew with it and out of it. The position of\nthe bishops, which had grown out of the assumed desirability of guarding\nthe tradition of truth, tended to emphasize that tradition. It gave to\ntradition not only a new importance, but also a new sanction. It rested\nbelief upon living authority. Men were no longer free to interpret for\nthemselves.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis elevation of doctrine to a co-ordinate position with life in\nthe Christian communities was the effect of causes internal to those\ncommunities. Those causes were in themselves the effects of other causes,\nthe influence of which I have traced in previous Lectures: but in their\ndirect operation within the churches they were altogether internal. But\nthat which gave importance to their operation was not internal, but\nexternal. It was the interposition of the State. The first instance of\nthat interposition was in the days of Aurelian, in the case of Paul of\nSamosata. The principle which was then established has been of enormous\nimportance to the Christian communities ever since. It is clear that\nconfederation of churches was so far established in Syria in the middle\nof the third century, that the bishops of a district claimed a right to\ninterfere in the affairs of a neighbouring church. There was not yet\nthe complete confederation, on the basis of the organization of the\nEmpire, which we find after the Nicene Council; it was a question only\nof neighbourhood. The Bishop of Antioch, Paul of Samosata, who was a\nstatesman as well as a theologian, had a difference of opinion with the\nleading bishops of Syria on one of the new questions of the metaphysical\ntheology, which was forcing its way into the Christian churches.\nMeetings were held, at the first of which there appears to have been a\ncompromise. At the second, Paul was condemned. He was formally deposed\nfrom his see. He refused to recognize the authority of the meeting, and\nprobably with the support of his people, remained in possession of the\nchurch-buildings. An appeal as of \u201ccivil right\u201d was made by his opponents\nto the Emperor. The answer of the Emperor determined the principle\nalready referred to. The tenant of the buildings held them on condition\nof being a Christian. The Emperor did not determine what Christianity\nwas. But he determined that whatever was taught by the bishops of Italy\nmight be properly taken as the standard. This determined Roman policy,\nand it went far to determine Christian doctrine for the future.\n\nWhen Christianity came to be recognized by the State, Constantine\nadopted the plan of assembling the bishops on his own authority, and\nof giving whatever sanction the State could give to their resolutions.\nHe said in effect, \u201cI, as Emperor, cannot determine what Christian\ndoctrine is, but I will take the opinion of the majority, and I will\nso far recognize that opinion that no one shall have the privileges of\nChristians, a right to hold property and an exemption from civil burdens,\nwho does not assent to that opinion.\u201d The succeeding Christian Emperors\nfollowed in his track. The test of being a Christian was conformity\nto the resolutions of the Councils. One who accepted them received\nimmunity and privileges. One who did not was liable to confiscation, to\nbanishment, to death. I need hardly draw out for you, who know what human\nnature is, the importance which those resolutions of the Councils assumed.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAgainst this whole transformation of the basis of union there were two\ngreat lines of reaction.\n\n1. The one was the reaction of the Puritan party in the Church\u2014the\nconservative party, which was always smouldering, and sometimes burst\nforth into flame. The most important of such reactionary outbursts were\nthose of the Novatians in the third century, and of the Donatists in the\nfourth. I will speak now only of the former. Its first cause was the\naction of the Roman bishop, Callistus, who allowed the return to the\nChurch of those who had been excluded on account of sins of the flesh,\nand of return to idolatry. The policy was continued. In 250, a determined\nstand was made against it. The election of a bishop who belonged to the\nlax party forced on a schism. The schism was strong. It had sympathizers\nall over the Christian world\u2014in Egypt, in Armenia, in Asia Minor, in\nItaly and Spain. It involved the whole theory of the Church\u2014the power\nof the Keys. It lasted long. It was so strong that the State had to\nrecognize it. It did not die out until at least five centuries after its\nbirth. It lingered on in detached communities, but it ceased to be a\npower. The majority, with the support not only of the State, but also of\nhuman nature, dominated the Christian world.\n\n2. The other reaction was stronger and even more permanent. It consisted\nof the formation within the Christian community of an inner class, who\nframed for themselves and endeavoured to realize a higher than the\ncommon ideal. They stood to the rest of the community as the community\nitself stood to the rest of the world. The tendency itself came, as I\nhave tried to point out in a previous Lecture,[728] mainly from the\nGreek philosophical schools, and was fostered to a large extent by the\ninfluence on the main body of Christians of the philosophic parties upon\nits borders. But it asserted its place as a permanent element in the\nChristian world mainly as a reaction against the change of the basis of\nthe Christian communities, and the lowering of the current standard of\ntheir morality. Henceforward there was, side by side with the \u03c4\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd and the \u03c4\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, a third rank, \u03c4\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd. The\nideal has been obscured by its history: but that ideal was sublime. It\nwas impracticable and undesirable; and yet sometimes in human life room\nmust be found for impossible ideals. And the blurred and blotted picture\nof it which has survived to our own times, cannot take the place of the\nhistorical fact that it began as a reaction against Christianity as it\nwas and as it is\u2014an effort to regenerate human society. But Monachism,\nby the very fact of its separation, did not leaven the Church and raise\nthe current morality. The Church became, not an assembly of devout men,\ngrimly earnest about living a holy life\u2014its bishops were statesmen;\nits officers were men of the world; its members were of the world,\nbasing their conduct on the current maxims of society, held together\nby the loose bond of a common name, and of a creed which they did not\nunderstand. In such a society, an intellectual basis is the only possible\nbasis. In such a society also, in which officialism must necessarily\nhave an important place, the insistence on that intellectual basis comes\nfrom the instinct of self-preservation. But it checked the progress of\nChristianity. Christianity has won no great victories since its basis\nwas changed. The victories that it has won, it has won by preaching, not\nGreek metaphysics, but the love of God and the love of man. Its darkest\npages are those which record the story of its endeavouring to force its\ntransformed Greek metaphysics upon men or upon races to whom they were\nalien. The only ground of despair in those who accept Christianity now,\nis the fear\u2014which I for one cannot entertain\u2014that the dominance of the\nmetaphysical element in it will be perpetual.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI have now brought these Lectures to a close. The net result is the\nintroduction into Christianity of the three chief products of the Greek\nmind\u2014Rhetoric, Logic, and Metaphysics. I venture to claim to have shown\nthat a large part of what are sometimes called Christian doctrines,\nand many usages which have prevailed and continue to prevail in the\nChristian Church, are in reality Greek theories and Greek usages changed\nin form and colour by the influence of primitive Christianity, but in\ntheir essence Greek still. Greece lives; not only its dying life in the\nlecture-rooms of Universities, but also with a more vigorous growth in\nthe Christian Churches. It lives there, not by virtue of the survival\nwithin them of this or that fragment of ancient teaching, and this or\nthat fragment of an ancient usage, but by the continuance in them of\ngreat modes and phases of thought, of great drifts and tendencies, of\nlarge assumptions. Its ethics of right and duty, rather than of love\nand self-sacrifice; its theology, whose God is more metaphysical than\nspiritual\u2014whose essence it is important to define; its creation of a\nclass of men whose main duty in life is that of moral exhortation, and\nwhose utterances are not the spontaneous outflow of a prophet\u2019s soul, but\nthe artistic periods of a rhetorician; its religious ceremonial, with\nthe darkness and the light, the initiation and the solemn enactment of\na symbolic drama; its conception of intellectual assent rather than of\nmoral earnestness as the basis of religious society\u2014in all these, and the\nideas that underlie them, Greece lives.\n\nIt is an argument for the divine life of Christianity that it has been\nable to assimilate so much that was at first alien to it. It is an\nargument for the truth of much of that which has been assimilated, that\nit has been strong enough to oust many of the earlier elements. But\nthe question which forces itself upon our attention as the phenomena\npass before us in review, is the question of the relation of these\nGreek elements in Christianity to the nature of Christianity itself.\nThe question is vital. Its importance can hardly be over-estimated. It\nclaims a foremost place in the consideration of earnest men. The theories\nwhich rise out of it are two in number. It is possible to urge, on the\none hand, that Christianity, which began without them\u2014which grew on a\nsoil whereon metaphysics never throve\u2014which won its first victories over\nthe world by the simple moral force of the Sermon on the Mount, and by\nthe sublime influence of the life and death of Jesus Christ, may throw\noff Hellenism and be none the loser, but rather stand out again before\nthe world in the uncoloured majesty of the Gospels. It is possible to\nurge that what was absent from the early form cannot be essential, and\nthat the Sermon on the Mount is not an outlying part of the Gospel,\nbut its sum. It is possible to urge, on the other hand, that the tree\nof life, which was planted by the hand of God Himself in the soil of\nhuman society, was intended from the first to grow by assimilating to\nitself whatever elements it found there. It is possible to maintain that\nChristianity was intended to be a development, and that its successive\ngrowths are for the time at which they exist integral and essential. It\nis possible to hold that it is the duty of each succeeding age at once to\naccept the developments of the past, and to do its part in bringing on\nthe developments of the future.\n\nBetween these two main views it does not seem possible to find a logical\nbasis for a third. The one or the other must be accepted, with the\nconsequences which it involves. But whether we accept the one or the\nother, it seems clear that much of the Greek element may be abandoned.\nOn the former hypothesis, it is not essential; on the latter, it is an\nincomplete development and has no claim to permanence. I believe the\nconsideration of this question, and practical action on the determination\nof it, to be the work that lies before the theologians of our generation.\nI claim for the subject which we have been considering an exceptional\nimportance, because it will enable us, if on the one hand we accept\nthe theory that the primitive should be permanent, to disentangle the\nprimitive from the later elements, and to trace the assumptions on\nwhich these later elements are based; and if on the other hand we adopt\nthe theory of development, it will enable us, by tracing the lines\nof development, to weld the new thoughts of our time with the old by\nthat historical continuity which in human societies is the condition\nof permanence. I am not unaware that there are many who deprecate the\nanalysis of Christian history, and are content to accept the deposit.\nThere has been a similar timidity in regard to the Bible. It seemed a\ngeneration ago as though the whole fabric of belief depended on the\nacceptance of the belief that Genesis is the work of a single author. The\ntimidity has virtually ceased. The recognition of the fact that the Book\nof Genesis was not made, but grew, so far from having been a danger to\nreligion, has become a new support of the faith. So it will be with the\nanalysis of Christian doctrine and of Christian history; and therefore I\nam earnest in urging its study. For though the Lectures are ended, the\nstudy of the subject has only begun. I have ventured as a pioneer into\ncomparatively unexplored ground: I feel that I shall no doubt be found\nto have made the mistakes of a pioneer; but I feel also the certainty of\na pioneer\u2014who after wandering by devious paths through the forest and\nthe morass, looks out from the height which he has reached upon the fair\nlandscape\u2014and speaking as one who has so stood and so looked, I am sure\nthat you will find the country to be in the main what I have described\nit to be, and that you will find also that it is but the entrance to a\nstill fairer landscape beyond. For though you may believe that I am but\na dreamer of dreams, I seem to see, though it be on the far horizon\u2014the\nhorizon beyond the fields which either we or our children will tread\u2014a\nChristianity which is not new but old, which is not old but new, a\nChristianity in which the moral and spiritual elements will again hold\ntheir place, in which men will be bound together by the bond of mutual\nservice, which is the bond of the sons of God, a Christianity which\nwill actually realize the brotherhood of men, the ideal of its first\ncommunities.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bc\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03cb\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 (Arist. _Anal. post._ i. 1, P. 71). John Philoponus, in his\nnote on the passage, points out that emphasis is laid upon the word\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, in antithesis to sensible knowledge, \u1f21 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03cb\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (_Schol._ ed. Brandis, p. 196 _b_).\n\n[2] Tertullian (_adv. Valentin._ c. 5) singles out four writers of the\nprevious generation whom he regards as standing on an equal footing:\nJustin, Miltiades, Iren\u00e6us, Proculus. Of these, Proculus has entirely\nperished; of Miltiades, only a few fragments remain; Justin survives\nin only a single MS. (see A. Harnack, _Texte und Untersuchungen_, Bd.\ni. 1, _die Ueberlieferung der griechischen Apologeten des zweiten\nJahrhunderts_); and the greater part of Iren\u00e6us remains only in a Latin\ntranslation.\n\n[3] Marcion, in the sad tone of one who bitterly felt that every man\u2019s\nhand was against him, addresses one of his disciples as \u201cmy partner in\nhate and wretchedness\u201d (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03af\u03c0\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, Tert. _adv.\nMarc._ 4. 9).\n\n[4] Examples are the accounts of Basilides in Clement of Alexandria\nand Hippolytus, compared with those in Iren\u00e6us and Epiphanius; and the\naccounts of the Ophites in Hippolytus, compared with those of Iren\u00e6us and\nEpiphanius. The literature of the subject is considerable: see especially\nA. Hilgenfeld, _die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenthums_ (e.g. p. 202);\nR. A. Lipsius, _zur Quellenkritik des Epiphanios_; and A. Harnack, _zur\nQuellenkritik der Geschichte des Gnosticismus_.\n\n[5] The very names of most of the heathen opponents are lost: Lactantius\n(5. 4) speaks of \u201cplurimos et multis in locis et non modo Gr\u00e6cis sed\netiam Latinis litteris.\u201d But for the ordinary student, Keim\u2019s remarkable\nrestoration of the work of Celsus from the quotations of Origen, with\nits wealth of illustrative notes, compensates for many losses (Th. Keim,\n_Celsus\u2019 Wahres Wort_, Z\u00fcrich, 1873).\n\n[6] This was the common view of the Stoics, probably following Anaxagoras\nor his school; cf. Plutarch [Aetius], _de Plac. Philos._ 4. 3 (Diels,\n_Doxographi Gr\u00e6ci_, p. 387). It was stated by Chrysippus, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 ... \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae (Chrysipp. _Fragm. ap. Nemes. de Nat. Hom._\n33); by Zeno, in _Cic. Academ._ 1. 11. 39; by their followers, Plutarch\n[Aetius], _de Plac. Philos._ 1. 11. 4 (Diels, p. 310), \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1; so by Seneca, _Epist._ 117. 2, \u201cquicquid\nfacit corpus est;\u201d so among some Christian writers, e.g. Tertullian, _de\nAnima_, 5.\n\n[7] The conception underlies the whole of Tertullian\u2019s treatise, _de\nBaptismo_: it accounts for the rites of exorcism and benediction of both\nthe oil and the water which are found in the older Latin service-books,\ne.g. in what is known as the Gelasian Sacramentary, i. 73 (in Muratori,\n_Liturgia Romana vetus_, vol. i. p. 594), \u201cexaudi nos omnipotens Deus\net _in hujus aqu\u00e6 substantiam immitte virtutem_ ut abluendus per eam et\nsanitatem simul et vitam mereatur \u00e6ternam.\u201d This prayer is immediately\nfollowed by an address to the water, \u201cexorcizo te creatura aqu\u00e6 per Deum\nvivum ... adjuro te per Jesum Christum filium ejus unicum dominum nostrum\nut efficiaris in eo qui in te baptizandus erit fons aqu\u00e6 salientis in\nvitam \u00e6ternam, regenerans eum Deo Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto....\u201d\nSo in the Gallican Sacramentary published by Mabillon (_de Liturgia\nGallicana libri tres_, p. 362), \u201cexorcizo te fons aqu\u00e6 perennis per\nDeum sanctum et Deum verum qui te in principio ab arida separavit et\nin quatuor fluminibus terram rigore pr\u00e6cepit: sis aqua sancta, aqua\nbenedicta, _abluens sordes et dimittens peccata_....\u201d\n\n[8] These conceptions are found in Xenophon\u2019s account of Socrates, who\nquotes more than once the Delphic oracle, \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03af\u03b1 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, Xen. _Mem._ 1. 3. 1, and again 4. 3.\n16: in Epictet. _Ench._ 31, \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9: repeatedly in Plutarch, e.g. _de Defect. Orac._\n12, p. 416, _de Comm. Notit._ 31. 1, p. 1074: in the _Aureum Carmen_ of\nthe later Pythagoreans, \u1f00\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u1ff3 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03c4\u03af\u03bc\u03b1 (_Frag. Philos. Gr\u00e6c._ i. p. 193): and in the Neoplatonist Porphyry\n(_ad Marcell._ 18, p. 286, ed. Nauck), \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1. The intellectual opponents of\nChristianity laid stress upon its desertion of the ancestral religion;\ne.g. C\u00e6cilius in Minucius Felix, _Octav._ 5, \u201cquanto venerabilius ac\nmelius....majorum excipere disciplinam, religiones traditas colere;\u201d and\nCelsus in Origen, _c. Cels._ 5. 25, 35; 8. 57.\n\n[9] The following is designed to be a short account, not of all the\nelements of later Greek education, but only of its more prominent and\nimportant features: nothing has been said of those elements of the\n\u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 which constituted the medi\u00e6val _quadrivium_. The\nworks bearing on the subject will be found enumerated in K. F. Hermann,\n_Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquit\u00e4ten_, Bd. iv. p. 302, 3te aufl.\ned. Blumner: the most important of them is Grasberger, _Erziehung und\nUnterricht im classischen Alterthum_, Bd. i. and ii. W\u00fcrzburg, 1864: the\nshortest and most useful for an ordinary reader is Ussing, _Erziehung und\nJugendunterricht bei den Griechen und R\u00f6mern_, Berlin, 1885.\n\n[10] _Litteratura_ is the Latin for \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae: Quintil. 2. 1. 4.\n\n[11] _Adv. Gramm._ 1. 44.\n\n[12] \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, which was taught by the \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c2, whereas\n\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 was taught by the \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. The relation between the two\narts is indicated by the fact that in the Edict of Diocletian the fee of\nthe former is limited to fifty denarii, while that of the latter rises to\ntwo hundred; _Edict. Dioclet._ ap. Haenel, _Corpus Legum_, No. 1054, p.\n178.\n\n[13] _Adv. Gramm._ 1. 91 sqq., cf. _ib._ 250. This is quoted as being\nmost representative of the period with which these Lectures have mainly\nto do. With it may be compared the elaborate account given by Quintilian,\n1. 4 sqq.\n\n[14] 1. 10.\n\n[15] The substance of Basil\u2019s letter, _Ep._ 339 (146), tom. iii. p. 455.\nThere is a charming irony in Libanius\u2019s answer, _Ep._ 340 (147), _ibid._\n\n[16] \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2, Sext. Emp. _adv. Gramm._ 1. 279.\n\n[17] Strabo, 1. 2. 3, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03ae\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03c8\u03b9\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n[18] Dio Chrys. _Orat._ xxxvi. vol. ii p. 51, ed. Dind.\n\n[19] These are printed in Walz, _Rhetores Gr\u00e6ci_, vol. i.: the account\nhere followed is mainly that of the _Progymnasmata_ of Theo of Smyrna\n(circ. A.D. 130). There is a letter of Dio Chrysostom, printed among his\nspeeches, _Orat._ xvii. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, ed. Dind. i, 279, consisting\nof advice to a man who was beginning the study of Rhetoric late in life,\nwhich, without being a formal treatise, gives as good a view as could be\nfound of the general course of training.\n\n[20] _Diss._ 3. 23. 20.\n\n[21] Philostr. _V. S._ 2. 21. 3, of Proclus.\n\n[22] Lucian, _Dial. Mort._ 10. 10.\n\n[23] _Hermotim._ 81.\n\n[24] There is a good example of the former of these methods in Maximus\nof Tyre, _Dissert._ 33, where \u00a7 1 is part of a student\u2019s essay, and\nthe following sections are the professor\u2019s comments; and of the latter\nin Epictetus, _Diss._ 1. 10. 8, where the student is said \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n_legere_, the professor \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, _pr\u00e6legere_.\n\n[25] _Enchir._ 49: see also _Diss._ 3. 21, quoted below, p. 102.\n\n[26] _Orat._ iv. vol. i. p. 69, ed. Dind.\n\n[27] i. 7.\n\n[28] This higher education was not confined to Rome or Athens, but was\nfound in many parts of the empire: Marseilles in the time of Strabo was\neven more frequented than Athens. There were other great schools at\nAntioch and Alexandria, at Rhodes and Smyrna, at Ephesus and Byzantium,\nat Naples and Nicopolis, at Bordeaux and Autun. The practice of resorting\nto such schools lasted long. In the fourth century and among the\nChristian Fathers, Basil and Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine and Jerome, are\nrecorded to have followed it: the general recognition of Christianity did\nnot seriously affect the current educational system: \u201cThrough the whole\nworld,\u201d says Augustine (_de utilitate credendi_, 7, vol. viii. 76, ed.\nMigne), \u201cthe schools of the rhetoricians are alive with the din of crowds\nof students.\u201d\n\n[29] There is an interesting instance, at a rather later time, of\nthe poverty of two students, one of whom afterwards became famous,\nProh\u00e6resius and Heph\u00e6stion: they had only one ragged gown between them,\nso that while one went to lecture, the other had to stay at home in bed\n(Eunap. _Proh\u00e6res._ p. 78).\n\n[30] _Diss._ 1. 9. 19.\n\n[31] _Ib._ 2, 21. 12; 3. 24. 54.\n\n[32] _Ib._ 2. 21. 12, 13, 15; 3. 24. 22, 24.\n\n[33] _Ib._ 3. 16. 14, 15.\n\n[34] _Ib._ 1. 26. 9.\n\n[35] _De audiendo_, 13, vol. ii. p. 45. The passage is abridged above.\n\n[36] _Quis rer. div. heres._ 3, vol. i. p. 474.\n\n[37] For example, Verrius Flaccus, the father of the system of \u201cprize\nessays,\u201d who received an annual salary of 100,000 sesterces from Augustus\n(Suet. _de illustr. Gramm._ 17). The inscriptions of Asia Minor furnish\nseveral instances of teachers who had left their homes to teach in other\nprovinces of the Empire, and had returned rich enough to make presents to\ntheir native cities.\n\n[38] The evidence for the above paragraph, with ample accounts of\nadditional facts relative to the same subject, but unnecessary for\nthe present purpose, will be found in F. H. L. Ahrens, _de Athenarum\nstatu politico et literario inde ab Achaici f\u0153deris interitu usque\nad Antoninorum tempora_, G\u00f6ttingen, 1829; K. O. M\u00fcller, _Quam curam\nrespublica apud Gr\u00e6cos et Romanos literis doctrinisque colendis et\npromovendis impenderit_, G\u00f6ttingen (Programm zur S\u00e4cularfeier), 1837;\nP. Seidel, _de scholarum qu\u00e6 florente Romanorum imperio Athenis\nexstiterunt conditione_, Glogau, 1838; C. G. Zumpt, _Ueber den Bestand\nder philosophischen Schulen in Athen und die Succession der Scholarchen_,\nBerlin (Abhandl. der Akademie der Wissenschaften), 1843; L. Weber,\n_Commentatio de academia literaria Atheniensium_, Marburg, 1858. There is\nan interesting Roman inscription of the end of the second century A.D.\nwhich almost seems to show that the endowments were sometimes diverted\nfor the benefit of others besides philosophers: it is to an _athlete_,\nwho was at once \u201ccanon of Serapis,\u201d and entitled to free commons at\nthe museum, \u03bd\u03b5\u03c9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac[\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03a3\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4]\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u039c\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03af\u1ff3\n[\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5]\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd, _Corpus Inscr. Gr\u00e6c._ 5914.\n\n[39] The edict of Antoninus Pius is contained in L. 6, \u00a7 2, D. _de\nexcusat._ 27. l: the number of philosophers is not prescribed, \u201cquia\nrari sunt qui philosophantur:\u201d and if they make stipulations about\npay, \u201cinde iam manifesti fient non philosophantes.\u201d The nature of the\nimmunities is described, _ibid._ \u00a7 8: \u201ca ludorum publicorum regimine, ab\n\u00e6dilitate, a sacerdotio, a receptione militum, ab emtione frumenti, olei,\net neque judicare neque legatos esse neque in militia numerari nolentes\nneque ad alium famulatum cogi.\u201d The immunities were sometimes further\nextended to the lower classes of teachers, e.g. the _ludi magistri_\nat Vipascum in Portugal: cf. H\u00fcbner and Mommsen in the _Ephemeris\nEpigraphica_, vol. iii. pp. 185, 188. For the regulations of the later\nempire, see _Cod. Theodos._ 14. 9, _de studiis liberalibus urbis Rom\u00e6\net Constantinopolitan\u00e6_; and for a good popular account of the whole\nsubject, see G. Boissier, _L\u2019instruction publique dans l\u2019empire Romain_,\nin the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, mars 15, 1884.\n\n[40] Lucian\u2019s _Convivium_ is a humorous and satirical description\nof such a dinner. The philosopher reads his discourse from a small,\nfinely-written manuscript, c. 17. The _Deipnosophist\u00e6_ of Athen\u00e6us,\nand the _Qu\u00e6stiones Conviviales_ of Plutarch, are important literary\nmonuments of the practice.\n\n[41] An interesting corroboration of the literary references is afforded\nby the mosaic pavement of a large villa at Hamm\u00e2m Grous, near Milev,\nin North Africa, where \u201cthe philosopher\u2019s apartment,\u201d or \u201cchaplain\u2019s\nroom\u201d (_filosophi locus_), is specially marked, and near it is a lady\n(the mistress of the house?) sitting under a palm-tree. (The inscription\nis given in the _Corpus Inscr. Lat._ vol. viii. No. 10890, where\nreference is made to a drawing of the pavement in Rousset, _Les Bains de\nPompeianus_, Constantine, 1879).\n\n[42] Lucian, _de merc. cond._ 32.\n\n[43] _Ib._ 34.\n\n[44] _Ib._ 36.\n\n[45] _Ib._ 38.\n\n[46] _Timon_, 50, 51.\n\n[47] _Profiteri_, _professio_, are the Latin translations of\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03af\u03b1: the latter words are found as early as\nAristotle in connection with the idea of teaching, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03c2, Arist.\n_Eth. N._ 10. 10, p. 1180 _b_, and apparently \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03adv\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 is\nused absolutely for \u201cprofessors\u201d in _Soph. Elench._ 13, p. 172 _a_.\nThe first use of _profiteri_ in an absolute sense in Latin is probably\nin Pliny, e.g. _Ep._ 4. 11. 1, \u201caudistine V. Licinianum in Sicilia\nprofiteri,\u201d \u201cis teaching rhetoric.\u201d\n\n[48] See note on p. 33: an early use of _pr\u00e6legere_ in this sense is\nQuintil. 1. 8. 13.\n\n[49] _Facultas_ is the translation of \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 in its meaning of an art or\na branch of knowledge, which is found in Epictetus and elsewhere, e.g.\n_Diss._ 1. 8. tit., 8, 15, chiefly of logic or rhetoric: a writer of the\nend of the third century draws a distinction between \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\nand classes rhetoric under the former: Menander, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd, in\nWalz, _Rhett. Gr._ vol. ix. 196.\n\n[50] Instances of this practice are: (1) _grammaticus_, in Hispania\nTarraconensis, _Corpus Inscr. Lat._ ii. 2892, 5079; _magister artis\ngrammatic\u00e6_, at Saguntum, _ibid._ 3872; _magister grammaticus Gr\u00e6cus_,\nat Cordova, _ibid._ 2236; _grammaticus Gr\u00e6cus_, at Trier, _Corpus Inscr.\nRhenan._ 801: (2) _philosophus_, in Greece, _Corpus Inscr. Gr\u00e6c._ 1253;\nin Asia Minor, _ibid._ 3163 (dated A.D. 211), 3198, 3865, _add._ 4366 _t_\n2; in Egypt, _ibid._ 4817; sometimes with the name of the school added,\ne.g. at Ch\u00e6ronea, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u03a0\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, _ibid._ 1628; at Brundisium,\n_philosophus Epicureus_, _ibid._ 5783.\n\n[51] Marcus Aurelius himself nominated Theodotus to be \u201cRegius Professor\nof Rhetoric,\u201d but he entrusted the nomination of the Professors of\nPhilosophy to Herodes Atticus, Philostrat. _V. S._ 2. 3, p. 245; and\nCommodus nominated Polydeuces, _ibid._ 2. 12, p. 258.\n\n[52] Lucian, _Eunuchus_, 3, after mentioning the endowment of the chairs,\nsays, \u1f14\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n_\u03c8\u03ae\u03c6\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd_, which last words have been variously understood: see\nthe treatises mentioned above, note 1, p. 38, especially Ahrens, p. 74,\nZumpt, p. 28. In the case of Libanius, there was a \u03c8\u03ae\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 (Liban. _de\nfort. sua_, vol. i. p. 59), which points to an assimilation of Athenian\nusage in his time to that which is mentioned in the following note.\n\n[53] This was fixed by a law of Julian in 362, which, however, states it\nas a concession on the part of the Emperor: \u201cquia singulis civitatibus\nadesse ipse non possum, jubeo quisquis docere vult non repente nec\ntemere prosiliat ad hoc munus sed judicio ordinis probatus decretum\ncurialium mereatur, optimorum conspirante consilio,\u201d _Cod. Theodos._\n13. 3. 5; but the nomination was still sometimes left to the Emperor\nor his chief officer, the prefect of the city. This has an especial\ninterest in connection with the history of St. Augustine: a request was\nsent from Milan to the prefect of the city at Rome for the nomination of\na _magister rhetoric\u00e6_: St. Augustine was sent, and so came under the\ninfluence of St. Ambrose, S. Aug. _Confess._ 5. 13.\n\n[54] This is mentioned in a law of Gordian: \u201cgrammaticos seu oratores\ndecreto ordinis probatos, si non se utiles studentibus pr\u00e6beant, denuo\nab eodem ordine reprobari posse incognitum non est,\u201d _Cod. Justin._\n10. 52. 2. A professor was sometimes removed for other reasons besides\nincompetency, e.g. Proh\u00e6resius was removed by Julian for being a\nChristian, Eunap. _Proh\u00e6res._ p. 92.\n\n[55] Alexander of Aphrodisias, _de Fato_, 1, says that he obtained his\nprofessorship on the _testimony_, \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, of Severus and\nCaracalla.\n\n[56] The existence of a competition appears in Lucian, _Eunuchus_, 3, 5:\nthe fullest account is that of Eunapius, _Proh\u00e6res._ pp. 79 sqq.\n\n[57] Eunapius, _ibid._ p. 84.\n\n[58] Olympiodorus, ap. Phot. _Biblioth._ 80; S. Greg. Naz. _Orat._ 43\n(20). 15, vol. i. p. 782; Liban. _de fort. sua_, vol. i. p. 14. The\nadmission was probably the occasion of some academical sport: the novice\nwas marched in mock procession to the baths, whence he came out with\nhis gown on. It was something like initiation into a religious guild or\norder. There was a law against any one who assumed the philosopher\u2019s\ndress without authority, \u201cindebite et insolenter,\u201d _Cod. Theodos._ 13. 3.\n7.\n\n[59] The last traces are in the Christian poets: for example, in Sidonius\nApollinaris (\u2020 482), _Carm._ xxiii. 211, ed. Luetjohann, \u201cquicquid\nrhetoric\u00e6 institutionis, quicquid grammaticalis aut pal\u00e6str\u00e6 est;\u201d in\nEnnodius (\u2020 521), _Carm._ ccxxxiv. p. 182, ed. Vogel, and in _Ep._ 94,\nwhich is a letter of thanks to a grammarian for having successfully\ninstructed the writer\u2019s nephew; in Venantius Fortunatus (\u2020 603), who\nspeaks of himself as \u201cParvula grammatic\u00e6 lambens refluamina gutt\u00e6,\nRhetorici exiguum pr\u00e6libans gurgitis haustum,\u201d _V. Martini_, i. 29,\n30, ed. Leo; but there are traces in the same poets of the antagonism\nbetween classical and Christian learning which ultimately led to the\ndisappearance of the former, e.g. Fortunatus speaks of Martin as \u201cdoctor\napostolicus vacuans ratione sophistas,\u201d _V. Martini_, i. 139.\n\n[60] \u201cLa p\u00e9riode b\u00e9n\u00e9dictine,\u201d Leon Maitre, _Les \u00e9coles \u00e9piscopales et\nmonastiques de l\u2019Occident_, p. 173.\n\n[61] \u201cDict\u00e6 per carmina sortes,\u201d Hor. _A. P._ 403. But it may be inferred\nfrom the title of Plutarch\u2019s treatise, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c7\u03c1\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f14\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, that the practice had ceased in the second century.\n\n[62] Cf. e.g.. Pindar, _Frag._ 127 (118), \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03bf \u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03c9 \u03b4\u2019\n\u1f10\u03b3\u03ce; and, in later times, \u00c6lius Aristides, vol. iii. p. 22, ed. Cant.\n\n[63] Dio Chrysostom, _Orat._ i. vol. i. p. 12, ed. Dind.\n\n[64] Id. _Orat._ xxxvi. vol. ii. p. 59: \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c0\u03bf\u03cd \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03ce\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03b3\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ac\u03bc\u03c8\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[65] It was a natural result of the estimation in which he was held\nthat he should sometimes have been regarded as being not only inspired,\nbut divine: the passages which refer to this are collected in G.\nCuper, _Apotheosis vel consecratio Homeri_ (in vol. ii. of Polenus\u2019s\nSupplement to Gronovius\u2019s Thesaurus), which is primarily a commentary\non the bas-relief by Archelaus of Priene, now in the British Museum\n(figured, e.g. in Overbeck, _Geschichte der griechischen Plastik_, ii.\n333). The idea has existed in much more recent times, not indeed that\nhe was divine, but that so much truth and wisdom could not have existed\noutside Jud\u00e6a. There is, for example, a treatise by G. Croesus, entitled,\n\u03bf\u03bc\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 _sive historia Hebr\u00e6orum ab Homero Hebraicis nominibus\nac sententiis conscripta in Odyssea et Iliade_, Dordraci, 1704, which\nendeavours to prove both that the name Homer is a Hebrew word, that the\nIliad is an account of the conquest of Canaan, and that the Odyssey is a\nnarrative of the wanderings of the children of Israel up to the death of\nMoses.\n\n[66] Plat. _Protag._ 72, p. 339 _a_.\n\n[67] _Ibid._ 22, p. 317 _b_: \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1ff6 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. For detailed information as to the relation between the\nearly sophists and Homer, reference may be made to a dissertation by\nW. O. Friedel, _de sophistarum studiis Homericis_, printed in the\n_Dissertationes philologic\u00e6 Halenses_, Halis, 1873.\n\n[68] Cf. H. Schrader, _\u00fcber die porphyrianischen Ilias Scholien_,\nHamburg, 1872.\n\n[69] Strab, 1. 2. 8.\n\n[70] Id. 1. 2. 3.\n\n[71] Dio Chrys. _Orat._ 2, vol. i. pp. 19, 20.\n\n[72] Dio Chrys. _Orat._ 1, vol. i. p. 3.\n\n[73] Plat. _The\u00e6t._ 9, p. 152 _d_, quoting Hom. _Il._ 14. 201-302. In\nlater times, the same verse was quoted as having suggested and supported\nthe theory of Thales, Iren\u00e6us, 2.14; Theodoret, _Gr\u00e6c. Affect. Cur._ 2. 9.\n\n[74] Celsus in Origen, _c. Cels._ 6. 42, referring to Hom. _Il._ 15. 18\nsqq.\n\n[75] Cic. _N. D._ 1. 15: \u201cut etiam veterrimi p\u0153t\u00e6, qui h\u00e6c ne quidem\nsuspicati sint, Stoici fuisse videantur.\u201d\n\n[76] Xen. _Sympos._ 4. 6; 3. 5.\n\n[77] Ps-Plutarch, _de vita et poesi Homeri_, vol. v. pp. 1056 sqq.,\nchapters 148, 164, 182, 192, 216.\n\n[78] The earliest expression of this feeling is that of Xenophanes, which\nis twice quoted by Sextus Empiricus, _adv. Gramm._ 1. 288, _adv. Phys._\n9. 193:\n\n    \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd \u1f4d\u03bc\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b8\u2019 \u1f29\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\n    \u1f45\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af.\n\n[79] Plutarch, _de aud. poet._ c. 4, pp. 24, 25.\n\n[80] Lucian, _Jupit. confut._ 2.\n\n[81] The connection of allegory with the mysteries was recognized:\nHeraclitus Ponticus, c. 6, justifies his interpretation of Apollo as\nthe sun, \u1f10k \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9:\nps-Demetrius Phalereus, _de interpret._ c. 99, 101, _ap._ Walz,\n_Rhett. Gr._ ix. p. 47, \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 ... \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03bf\u03b2\u03b5\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u03b9 ... \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f14\u03ba\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c1\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd: so Macrobius,\nin _Somn. Scip._ 1. 2, after an account of the way in which the poets\nveiled truths in symbols, \u201csic ipsa mysteria figurarum cuniculis\noperiuntur ne vel h\u00e6c adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura pr\u00e6beat.\u201d That\na physical explanation lay behind the scenery of the mysteries is stated\nelsewhere, e.g. by Theodoret, _Gr\u00e6c. Affect. Cur._ i. vol. iv. p. 721,\nwithout being connected with the allegorical explanation of the poets.\n\n[82] Pausan. 3. 25. 4-6.\n\n[83] Plat. _Ph\u00e6dr._ p. 229 _c_.\n\n[84] Plat. _Resp._ p. 378 _d_.\n\n[85] Diogenes Laertius, 2. 11, quotes Favorinus as saying that\nAnaxagoras was the first who showed that the poems of Homer had virtue\nand righteousness for their subject. If the later traditions (Georg.\nSyncellus, _Chronogr._ p. 149 _c_) could be trusted, the disciples of\nAnaxagoras were the authors of the explanations which Plato attributes\nto \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f4d\u03bc\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03af, and which tried by a fanciful etymology to\nprove that Athen\u00e9 was vo\u1fe6v \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd (Plat. _Cratyl._ 407 _b_).\n\n[86] Diog. Laert. 2. 11: Tatian, _Orat. ad Gr\u00e6cos_, c. 21, \u039c\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u039b\u03b1\u03bc\u03c8\u03b1\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f49\u03bc\u03ae\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03ae\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd. A later tradition used the name of Pherecydes:\nIsidore, sun of Basilides, in Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 6, p. 767.\n\n[87] On the general subject of allegorical interpretation, especially\nin regard to Homer, reference may be made to N. Schow in the edition\nof Heraclitus Ponticus mentioned below; L. H. Jacob, _Dissertatio\nphilosophica de allegoria Homerica_, Hal\u00e6, 1785; C. A. Lobeck,\n_Aglaophamus_, pp. 155, 844, 987; Gr\u00e4fenhan, _Geschichte der klassischen\nPhilologie_, Bd. i. p. 211. It has been unnecessary for the present\npurpose to make the distinction which has sometimes (e.g. Lauer,\n_Litterarischer Nachlass_, ed. Wichmann, Bd. ii. p, 105) been drawn\nbetween allegory and symbol.\n\n[88] The most recent edition is Heracliti _Allegori\u00e6 Homeric\u00e6_, ed. E.\nMehler, Leyden, 1851: that of N. Schow, G\u00f6ttingen, 1782, contains a Latin\ntranslation, a good essay on Homeric allegory, and a critical letter\nby Heyne. It seems probable that the treatise is really anonymous, and\nthat the name Heraclitus was intended to be that of the philosopher of\nEphesus: see Diels, _Doxoyraphi Gr\u00e6ci_, p. 95 _n_.\n\n[89] The most recent, and best critical, edition is by C. Lang, ed. 1881,\nin Teubner\u2019s series. More help is afforded to an ordinary student by that\nwhich was edited from the notes of de Villoison by Osann, G\u00f6ttingen, 1844.\n\n[90] c. 1, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f20\u03c3\u03ad\u03b2\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd: he defines allegory,\nc. 5, \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[91] c. 2.\n\n[92] c. 8.\n\n[93] c. 61.\n\n[94] c. 66.\n\n[95] c. 69.\n\n[96] c. 16.\n\n[97] c. 18.\n\n[98] Sallust, _de diis et mundo_, c. 4, in Mullach, _Fragmenta\nPhilosophorum Gr\u00e6corum_, vol. iii. p. 32.\n\n[99] _Incerti Scriptoris Gr\u00e6ci Fabul\u00e6 aliquot Homeric\u00e6 de Ulixis\nerroribus ethice explicat\u00e6_, ed. J. Columbus, Leiden, 1745.\n\n[100] Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 5. 8, p. 673.\n\n[101] Marcellinus, _Vita Thucydidis_, c. 35, \u1f00\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1f74\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c7\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[102] The analogy is drawn by Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 5, chapters 4 and 7.\n\n[103] It is impossible not to mention Aristobulus: he is quoted by\nClement of Alexandria (_Strom._ 1. 15, 22; 5. 14; 6. 3), and extracts\nfrom him are given by Eusebius (_Pr\u00e6p. Evang._ 8. 10; 13. 12); but\nthe genuineness of the information that we possess about him is much\ncontroverted and has given rise to much literature, of which an account\nwill be found in Sch\u00fcrer, _Geschichte des j\u00fcdischen Volkes_, 2er Th. p.\n760; Drummond, _Philo-Jud\u00e6us_, i. 242.\n\n[104] Philo, _de somniis_, i. 20, vol. i. p. 639.\n\n[105] Hom. _Il._ 2. 204.\n\n[106] Ps-Justin (probably Apollonius, see Dr\u00e4seke, in the _Jahrb. f.\nprotestant. Theologie_, 1885, p. 144), c. 17.\n\n[107] Hom. _Il._ 18. 483.\n\n[108] Ps-Justin, c. 28.\n\n[109] Hom. _Il._ 14. 206; Clem. Al. _Strom._ 5. 14, p. 708.\n\n[110] _Il._ 22. 8; Clem. Al. _Strom._ 5. 14, p. 719; but it sometimes\nrequired a keen eye to see the Gospel in Homer. For example, in _Odyss._\n9. 410, the Cyclopes say to Polyphemus:\n\n    \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u1f74 \u03bc\u03ae \u03c4\u03af\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b5 \u03b2\u03b9\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f36\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\n    \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03cc\u03bd \u03b3\u2019 \u03bf\u1f54 \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ad\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\nClement (_Strom._ 5. 14) makes this to be an evident \u201cdivination\u201d of\nthe Father and the Son. His argument is, apparently, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03bc\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2; but\n\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2: therefore the \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03cc\u03c2, which = \u03bc\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 = (by a \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5) the Son of God.\n\n[111] Hippol. _Philosophumena_, 6. 14.\n\n[112] Herod. 4. 8-10.\n\n[113] Hippol. 5. 21.\n\n[114] _Clementin. Hom._ 2. 43, 44.\n\n[115] _Ib._ 2. 51.\n\n[116] Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 5. 4, p. 237.\n\n[117] These are given by J. G. Rosenm\u00fcller, _Historia Interpretationis\nlibrorum sacrorum in ecclesia Christiana_, vol. i. p. 63.\n\n[118] Athenag. _Legat._ c. 19: ps-Justin (Apollonius), _Cohort. ad.\nGr\u00e6c._ c. 8, uses the analogous metaphor of a harp of which the Divine\nSpirit is the _plectrum_.\n\n[119] Tertull. _adv. Marc._ 3. 5.\n\n[120] Justin M. _Apol._ i. 54.\n\n[121] _Ib._ i. 35.\n\n[122] _Ib._ i. 32.\n\n[123] _Ib._ _Tryph._ 78.\n\n[124] Iren. 1. 8. 4, of the Valentinians.\n\n[125] _Ib._ 1. 8. 2.\n\n[126] Clem. Al. _Strom._ 1. 3, p. 329.\n\n[127] _Ib._ 6. 11, p. 787.\n\n[128] Id. _P\u00e6dag._ 2. 8, p. 76.\n\n[129] This was the contention of Marcion, whose influence upon the\nChristian world was far larger than is commonly supposed. By far the best\naccount of him, in both this and other respects, is that of Harnack,\n_Dogmengeschichte_, 1er Th. B. i. c. 5.\n\n[130] Euseb. _H. E._ 6. 19. 8.\n\n[131] Origen, _de princip._ 1. 16.\n\n[132] _Ib._ c. 15.\n\n[133] Clement. _Recogn._ 10. 36.\n\n[134] Clement. _Hom._ 6. 18.\n\n[135] Tatian, _Orat. ad. Gr\u00e6c._ 21.\n\n[136] Euseb. _Pr\u00e6p. Evang._ 2. 6, vol. iii. p 74: \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 became a\ntechnical term in this sense; cf. Gr\u00e4fenhan, _Geschichte des klass.\nPhilologie im Alterthum_, vol. i. p. 215.\n\n[137] Porphyr. ap. Euseb. _H. E._ 6. 19. 5.\n\n[138] Origen, _c. Cels._ 4. 48-50.\n\n[139] Origen, _in Gen. Hom._ 13. 3, vol. ii. p. 94; _in Joann. Hom._ 10.\n13, vol. iv. p. 178.\n\n[140] Euseb. _H. E._ 7. 24.\n\n[141] Kihn, _Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten_,\nFreib. im Breisg. 1880, p. 7.\n\n[142] J. G. Rosenm\u00fcller, _Hist. Interpret._ iii. p. 161. The letter is\nprinted, with the other remains of Julius Africanus, in Routh, _Reliqui\u00e6\nSacr\u00e6_, vol. ii.\n\n[143] See the chapter on \u201cScripture and its Mystical Interpretation\u201d in\nNewman\u2019s \u201cEssay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,\u201d especially p.\n324 (2nd ed.), \u201cIt may almost be laid down as an historical fact that the\nmystical interpretation and orthodoxy will stand or fall together.\u201d\n\n[144] I have endeavoured to confine the above account to what is true\nof _Greek_ Rhetoric: the accounts which are found in Roman writers,\nespecially in Quintilian, though in the main agreeing with it, differ in\nsome details. The best modern summary of Greek usages is that of Kayser\u2019s\nPreface to his editions of Philostratus (Z\u00fcrich, 1844; Leipzig, 1871,\nvol. ii.).\n\n[145] E. Rohde, _der griechische Roman und seine Vorl\u00e4ufer_, Leipzig,\n1876, p. 297.\n\n[146] There is a distinction between \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 and \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd, and\nboth are distinguished from \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 in Philostratus, _V. S._ 2. 20,\np. 103. Elsewhere Philostratus speaks of a sophist as being \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u201ctoo much of a _litterateur_ to\nbe a good lawyer, and too much of a lawyer to be a good _litterateur_,\u201d\n2. 23. 4, p. 108.\n\n[147] \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is defined by Hermogenes as \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03b2\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b6\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\n_Progymn._ 11, Walz, i. p. 50: \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 as \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b6\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, Sext.\nEmp. _adv. Geom._ 3. 4: so \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f44v\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, Philostr. _V.S._\npro\u0153m. The distinction is best formulated by Quintilian, 3. 5. 5, who\ngives the equivalent Latin terms, \u201cinfinit\u00e6 (qu\u00e6stiones) sunt qu\u00e6 remotis\npersonis et temporibus et locis c\u00e6terisque similibus in utramque partem\ntractantur quod Gr\u00e6ci \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd dicunt, Cicero propositum ... finit\u00e6 autem\nsunt ex complexu rerum personarum temporum c\u00e6terorumque: h\u00e6 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 a\nGr\u00e6cis dicuntur, causs\u00e6 a nostris, in his omnis qu\u00e6stio videtur circa res\npersonasque consistere.\u201d\n\n[148] Philostr. _V.S._ 1. 25. 7, 16.\n\n[149] _Ib._ 2. 5. 3.\n\n[150] Dio Chrysost. lvi. vol. ii. p. 176.\n\n[151] \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u0390\u03b1, for which see Theon. _Progymnasmata_, c. 10, ed.\nSpengel, vol. ii. 115: Quintil. 3. 8. 49; 9. 2. 29. The word \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\nwas sometimes applied, e.g. Philostr. _V.S._ 1. 21. 5, of Scopelianus,\nwhose action in subjects taken from the Persian wars was so vehement that\na partizan of one of his rivals accused him of beating a tambourine,\n\u201cYes, I do,\u201d he said; \u201cbut my tambourine is the shield of Ajax.\u201d\n\n[152] \u201cThey made their voice sweet with musical cadences, and modulations\nof tone, and echoed resonances:\u201d Plut. _de aud._ 7, p. 41. So at Rome\nFavorinus is said to have \u201ccharmed even those who did not know Greek by\nthe sound of his voice, and the significance of his look, and the cadence\nof his sentences:\u201d Philostr. _V. S._ 1. 7, p. 208.\n\n[153] _Orat._ lix.\n\n[154] Rohde, pp. 336 sqq.\n\n[155] This trained habit of composing in different styles is of\nimportance in relation to Christian as well as to non-Christian\nliterature. A good study of the latter is afforded by Arrian, whose\n\u201cchameleon-like style\u201d (Kaibel, _Dionysios von Halikarnass und die\nSophistik_, Hermes, Bd. xx. 1875, p. 508) imitates Thucydides, Herodotus,\nand Xenophon, by turns.\n\n[156] Philostratus, V. S. 1. P. 202, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd _\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd_\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74 _\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd_. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u1f03 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c0\u03c9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1f7c\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9: _ib._ p. 4, \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 _\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03be\u1f7a\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f11\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2_.\n\n[157] On the distinction, see Kayser\u2019s preface to his editions of\nPhilostratus, p. vii.\n\n[158] Philostratus, _V. S._ 2. 3, p. 245, says that the famous sophist\nAristocles lived the earlier part of his life as a Peripatetic\nphilosopher, \u201csqualid and unkempt and ill-clothed,\u201d but that when he\npassed into the ranks of the sophists he brushed off his squalor,\nand brought luxury and the pleasures of music into his life. On the\nphilosopher\u2019s dress, see below, Lecture VI. p. 151.\n\n[159] Epictetus, _Diss._ 3. 21. 6; 3. 23. 6, 23, 28: so Pliny, _Epist._\n3. 18 (of invitations to recitations), \u201cnon per codicillos (cards of\ninvitation), non per libellos (programmes, probably containing extracts),\nsed \u2018si commodum esset,\u2019 et \u2018si valde vacaret\u2019 admoniti.\u201d Cf. Lucian,\n_Hermotimus_, 11, where a sophist is represented as hanging up a\nnotice-board over his gateway, \u201cNo lecture to-day.\u201d\n\n[160] Philostratus, _V.S._ 2. 10. 5, says that the enthusiasm at Rome\nabout the sophist Adrian was such that when his messenger (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5) appeared on the scene with a notice of lecture, the\npeople rose up, whether from the senate or the circus, and flocked to the\nAthen\u00e6um to hear him. Synesius, _Dio_ (in Dio Chrys. ed. Dind, vol. ii.\n342), speaks of \u03b8\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10v \u1f04\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03ad\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[161] _Orat._ 23, p. 360, ed. Dind.\n\n[162] _De sanit. pr\u00e6c._ 16, p. 131.\n\n[163] _V. S._ 2. 5. 3.\n\n[164] _Pseudolog._ 5 sqq.\n\n[165] _Orat._ viii. vol. i. 145.\n\n[166] Epict. _Diss._ 3. 23. 35, \u1f10\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03c8\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u1ff3 \u1f22 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b2\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd: but Pliny, _Epist._ 2. 3. 2, says of Is\u00e6us, \u201csurgit,\n_amicitur_, incipit,\u201d as though he robed himself in the presence of the\naudience.\n\n[167] Pliny, _Epist._ 2. 3, says of Is\u00e6us: \u201cpr\u00e6fationes ters\u00e6, graciles,\ndulces: graves interdum et erect\u00e6. Poscit controversias plures,\nelectionem auditoribus permittit, s\u00e6pe etiam partes.\u201d Philostratus,\n_V.S._ 1. 24. 4, tells a story of Mark of Byzantium going into Polemo\u2019s\nlecture-room and sitting down among the audience: some one recognized\nhim, and the whisper went round who he was, so that, when Polemo asked\nfor a subject, all eyes were turned to Mark. \u201cWhat is the use of looking\nat a rustic like that?\u201d said Polemo, referring to Mark\u2019s shaggy beard;\n\u201c_he_ will not give you a subject.\u201d \u201cI will both give you a subject,\u201d\nsaid Mark, \u201cand will discourse myself.\u201d Plutarch, _de audiendo_, 7, p.\n42, advises those who go to a \u201cfeast of words\u201d to propose a subject\nthat will be useful, and not to ask for a discourse on the bisection of\nunlimited lines.\n\n[168] Plin. _Epist._ 2. 3. 4; cf. Philostr. _V.S._ 1. 20. 2. His disciple\nDionysius of Miletus had so wonderful a memory, and so taught his pupils\nto remember, as to be suspected of sorcery: Philostr. _V.S._ 1. 22. 3.\n\n[169] _Rhet. pr\u00e6c._ 18.\n\n[170] _V.S._ 2. 26. 3.\n\n[171] _Orat._ xxxiii. vol. i. p. 422.\n\n[172] Epict. _Diss._ 3. 23. 24.\n\n[173] Plut. _de audiendo_, 15, p. 46, speaks of the strange and\nextravagant words which had thus come into use, \u2018\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c2\u2019 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u2018\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\u2019\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u2018\u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2,\u2019 the old words, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u2018\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2\u2019 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u2018\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2\u2019 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u2018\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2,\u2019 being no longer strong enough.\n\n[174] _Rhet. pr\u00e6c._ 21.\n\n[175] _De audiendo_, 4, p. 39.\n\n[176] _Diss._ 3. 23. 11.\n\n[177] _Diss._ 3. 23. 19.\n\n[178] \u1f10\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03ac\u03bd\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f08\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd, says Eunapius of the sophist Julian, _Vit.\nJulian_, p. 68.\n\n[179] Philostr. _V. S._ 1. 21. 6, of Scopelianus, \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f74 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7 \u03be\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9: _ib._ 1. 24, 2, of Mark of Byzantium: 1. 25. 1, 5, of\nPolemo: 2. 5. 2, of Alexander Peloplaton.\n\n[180] Philostr. _V. S._ 1. 22, of Dionysius of Miletus, \u1f08\u03b4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03b8\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03be\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f31\u03c0\u03c0\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u039c\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c3\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2: so of Polemo, _ib._ 1. 25. 3.\n\n[181] The inscription of one of the statues which are mentioned by\nPhilostratus, _V. S._ 1. 23, 2, as having been erected to Lollianus at\nAthens, was found a few years ago near the Propyl\u00e6a: Dittenberger, C. I.\nA. vol. iii. No. 625: see also Welcker, _Rhein. Mus._ N. F. i. 210, and a\nmonograph by Kayser, _P. Hordeonius Lollianus_, Heidelberg, 1841. It is\nfollowed by the epigram:\n\n    \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03af \u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n      \u039b\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd.\n    \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f54\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n      \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c1\u03b7\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f54\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9.\n\nPhilostratus, _V. S._ 1. 25. 26, discredits the story that Polemo died\nat Smyrna, because there was no monument to him there; whereas if he had\ndied there, \u201cnot one of the wonderful temples of that city would have\nbeen thought too great for his burial.\u201d\n\n[182] \u1f21 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u1fec\u03c9\u03bc\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd, Eunap. _Vit.\nProh\u00e6res._ p. 90.\n\n[183] \u039c\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03c0\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\n\u1f14\u03c4\u03b7, _Bulletin de correspondence Hell\u00e9nique_, 1886. p. 157.\n\n[184] \u1f45\u03c3 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, _Mittheilungen des deutsches arch\u00e6ol.\nInstitut_, 1884, p. 61.\n\n[185] Philostratus, _V. S._ 1. 25. 3, p. 228, narrates the incident with\ngraphic humour, and adds two anecdotes which show that the Emperor was\nrather amused than annoyed by it. It was said of the same sophist that\n\u201che used to talk to cities as a superior, to kings as not inferior, and\nto gods as an equal,\u201d _ibid._ 4.\n\n[186] Dio Cassius, 71. 35. 2, \u03c0\u03b1\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u1f35\u03bd\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[187] For example, the father of Herodes Atticus gave Scopelianus a\nfee of twenty-five talents, to which Atticus himself added another\ntwenty-five: Philostr. _V. S._ 1. 21. 7, p. 222.\n\n[188] Dio Chrysost. _Orat._ xxxii. p. 403: so Seneca, _Epist._ 29, says\nof them, \u201cphilosophiam honestius neglexissent quam vendunt:\u201d Maximus of\nTyre, _Diss._ 33. 8, \u1f00\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2, \u1f64\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1.\n\n[189] _Orat._ xxiii. p. 351. The whole speech is a plea against the\ndisrepute into which the profession had fallen.\n\n[190] _ap._ Aul. Gell. 5. 1. 1.\n\n[191] _De audiendo_, 12, p. 43.\n\n[192] It is clear that the word \u201csophist\u201d had under the Early Empire, as\nin both earlier and later times, two separate streams of meaning. It was\nused as a title of honour, e.g. Lucian, _Rhet. Pr\u00e6c._ 1, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c2; Philostr. _V. S._ 2. 31. 1, when\n\u00c6lian was addressed as \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c2, he was not elated \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2; Eunap. _Vit. Liban._ p. 100, when emperors offered\nLibanius great titles and dignities, he refused them, \u03c6\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1. But the disparagement of the class to whom the word was\napplied runs through a large number of writers, e.g. Dio Chrys. _Orat._\niv. vol. i. 70, \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc7; _ib._ viii. vol. i 151,\nthey croak like frogs in a marsh; _ib._ x. vol. i. 166, they are the\nwretchedest of men, because, though ignorant, they think themselves\nwise; _ib._ xii. vol. i. 214, they are like peacocks, showing off their\nreputation and the number of their disciples as peacocks do their tails.\nEpict. _Diss._ 2. 20. 23; M. Aurel. 1. 16; 6. 30. Lucian, _Fugitiv._ 10,\ncompares them to hippocentaurs, \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Maximus Tyr. _Diss._ 33. 8, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c0\u03b7\u03bb\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Among the Christian\nFathers, especial reference may be made to Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 1,\nchapters 3 and 8, pp. 328, 343.\n\n[193] Epict. _Diss._ 3. 23.\n\n[194] The functions are clearly separable in the _Teaching of the\nApostles_, 15, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 [sc. \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9] \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f51\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd; but they are combined\nin the second book of the _Apostolical Constitutions_, pp. 16, 49, 51,\n58, 84, ed. Lagarde.\n\n[195] Euseb. _H. E._ 6. 36. 1.\n\n[196] Sozom. _H. E._ 8. 2.\n\n[197] Eusebius, _H. E._ 6. 36. 1, speaks of Origen\u2019s sermons as\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, whereas the original designation was \u1f41\u03bc\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03b9. So in Latin,\nAugustine uses the term _disputationes_ of Ambrose\u2019s sermons, _Confess._\n5. 13, vol. i, 118, and of his own _Tract._ lxxxix. _in Johann. Evang._\nc. 5, vol. iii, pars 2, p. 719.\n\n[198] Phot. _Biblioth._ 172.\n\n[199] Sozomen. _H. E._ 8. 5. Augustine makes a fine point of the analogy\nbetween the church and the lecture-room (_schola_): \u201ctanquam vobis\npastores sumus, sed sub illo Pastore vobiscum oves sumus. Tanquam vobis\nex hoc loco doctores sumus sed sub illo Magistro in hac schola vobiscum\ncondiscipuli sumus:\u201d _Enarrat. in Psalm._ cxxvi. vol. iv. 1429, ed. Ben.\n\n[200] _Adv. Jud._ 7. 6, vol. i. 671; _Conc._ vii. _adv. eos qui ad lud.\ncirc. prof._ vol. i. 790; _Hom._ ii. _ad pop. Antioch._ c. 4, vol. ii.\n25; _adv. eos qui ad Collect. non occur._ vol. iii. 157; _Hom._ liv. _in\ncap._ xxvii. _Genes._ vol. iv. 523; _Hom._ lvi. _in cap._ xxix. _Genes._\nvol. iv. 541.\n\n[201] S. Chrys. _Hom._ xxx. _in Act. Apost._ c. 3, vol. ix. 238.\n\n[202] Greg. Naz. _Orat._ xlii.\n\n[203] Socrates, _H. E._ 6. 11; Sozomen, _H. E._ 8. 10.\n\n[204] An indication of this may be seen in the fact that words which\nhave come down to modern times as technical terms of geometry were\nused indifferently in the physical and moral sciences, e.g. _theorem_\n(\u03b8\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1), Philo, _Leg. alleg._ 3. 27 (i. 104), \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6: Epict. _Diss._ 2. 17. 3; 3. 9. 2; 4. 8. 12,\n&c., of the doctrines of moral philosophy: sometimes co-ordinated or\ninterchanged with \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1, e.g. Philo, _de fort._ 3 (ii. 877), \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd: Epictet. _Diss._ 4. 1.\n137, 139, and as a variant _Ench._ 52. 1. So _definition_ (\u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2)\nis itself properly applicable to the marking out of the boundaries of\nenclosed land. So also \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 was not limited to ideal or \u201cnecessary\u201d\nmatter, but was used of all explanations of the less by the more evident;\ne.g. Musonius, _Frag. ap. excerpt. e Joann. Damasc._, in Stob. _Ecl._\nii. 751, ed. Gaisf., after defining it, gives as an example a proof that\npleasure is not a good.\n\n[205] \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1, Dio Chrys. vol. i. p. 46, ed. Dind.\n\n[206] The use of the word in Epictetus is especially instructive: \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\nfill a large place in his philosophy. They are the inner judgments of the\nmind (\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2, _Diss._ 4. 11. 7) in regard to both intellectual\nand moral phenomena. They are especially relative to the latter. They\nare the convictions upon which men act, the moral maxims which form the\nultimate motives of action and the resolution to act or not act in a\nparticular case. They are the most personal and inalienable part of us.\nSee especially, _Diss._ 1. 11. 33, 35, 38; 17. 26; 29. 11, 12; 2. 1. 21,\n32; 3. 2. 12; 9. 2; _Ench._ 45. Hence \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u201cto speak from\nconviction,\u201d is opposed to \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u201cto speak with the lip\nonly,\u201d _Diss._ 3. 16. 7. If a man adopts the \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 of another person,\ne.g. of a philosopher, so as to make it his own, he is said, \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9, \u201cto feel in unison with the conviction,\u201d _Diss._ 1. 3. 1.\nSextus Empiricus, _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 1. 13, distinguishes two philosophical\nsenses of \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1, (1) assent to facts of sensation, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9, (2) assent to the inferences of the several sciences: in\neither sense it is (_a_) a strictly personal feeling, and (_b_) a firm\nconviction, not a mere vague impression: it was in the latter of the two\nsenses that the philosophers of research laid it down as their maxim, \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd: they did away, not with \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, but with assertions\nabout them, _ibid._ 1. 19, 22: their attitude in reference to \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\nwas simply \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9, \u201cI abstain from giving a definition of them,\u201d\n_ibid._ 1. 197, 198.\n\n[207] Sext. Empir. _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 1. 3.\n\n[208] _Ibid._ 4, \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03ca\u03ba\u03ae, \u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae.\n\n[209] For example, Sextus Empiricus, in spite of his constant formula,\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9, maintains the necessity of having definable conceptions, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, and he argues\nthat it is impossible for a man to have an \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 of God because He has\nno admitted \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 3. 2, 3.\n\n[210] Origen, _c. Cels._ 3. 44: see also the references given in Keim,\n_Celsus\u2019 wahres Wort_, pp. 11, 40.\n\n[211] Origen, _c. Cels._ 1. 9.\n\n[212] _Apol._ i. 20.\n\n[213] _De testim. anim\u00e6_, 1.\n\n[214] _Apol._ 46.\n\n[215] _Apol._ 2. 13.\n\n[216] _Octav._ 34.\n\n[217] _Apol._ 47.\n\n[218] _Strom._ 2. 1.\n\n[219] Origen, _c. Cels._ 3. 16.\n\n[220] Origen, _c. Cels._ 5. 65; 6. 1, 7, 15, 19: see also the references\nin Keim, p. 77.\n\n[221] _Ibid._ 7. 58. So Minucius Felix, in Keim, p. 157.\n\n[222] The above slight sketch of some of the leading tendencies which\nhave been loosely grouped together under the name of Gnosticism has\nbeen left unelaborated, because a fuller account, with the distinctions\nwhich must necessarily be noted, would lead us too far from the main\ntrack of the Lecture: some of the tendencies will re-appear in detail in\nsubsequent Lectures, and students will no doubt refer to the brilliant\nexposition of Gnosticism in Harnack, _Dogmengeschichte_, i. pp. 186-226,\ned. 2.\n\n[223] _Strom._ 1. 1: almost the whole of the first book is valuable as a\nvindication of the place of culture in Christianity.\n\n[224] _Adv. Prax._ 3.\n\n[225] Quoted by Euseb. _H. E._ 5. 28. 13.\n\n[226] _Orat. ad Gr\u00e6c._ 2.\n\n[227] _Apol._ 46.\n\n[228] _Refut. omn. h\u00e6res._ 5. 18.\n\n[229] _H. E._ 5. 13.\n\n[230] The evidence for the above statements has not yet been fully\ngathered together, and is too long to be given even in outline here: the\nstatements are in full harmony with the view of the chief modern writer\non the subject, Friedl\u00e4nder, _Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte\nRoms_, see especially Bd. iii. p. 676, 5te aufl.\n\n[231] This is sufficiently shown by the fact, which is in other respects\nto be regretted, that in most accounts of Stoicism the earlier and later\nelements are viewed as constituting a homogeneous whole.\n\n[232] \u201cHow am I to eat?\u201d said a man to Epictetus: \u201cSo as to please God,\u201d\nwas the reply (_Diss._ 1. 13). The idea is further developed in Porphyry,\nwho says: \u201cGod wants nothing\u201d (281. 15): the God who is \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd is\n\u1f04\u03cb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2; hence all \u1f14\u03bd\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd is to Him \u1f00\u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, and should therefore not be\noffered to Him, not even the spoken word (163. 15).\n\n[233] M. Aurelius owed to Rusticus the idea that life required \u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nand \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 (i. 7 and ii. 13).\n\n[234] \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, Philostr. 587.\n\n[235] The title of _Diss._ 3. 22, in which the ideal philosopher is\ndescribed, is \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u039a\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n[236] H. Schiller, _Geschichte der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit_, Bd. i. 452.\n\n[237] _Diss._ 1. 17. 4, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, the interpolated\nremark of a student when Epictetus has begun a lecture upon Logic: the\naddition, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, seems to show that the phrase was a customary one.\n\n[238] _Diss._ 1. 4.\n\n[239] Sext. Emp. iii. 239.\n\n[240] The Stoics defined wisdom as \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd, and\nphilosophy as \u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2, Plutarch (Aetius), _plac. phil._\n1. 2; Galen, _Hist. Phil._ 5; Diels, _Doxogr. Gr._ pp. 273, 602.\n\n[241] _De Abraham._ 11 (ii. 9); _de Joseph._ 1 (ii. 41); _de pr\u0153m. et\np\u0153n._ 8, 11 (ii. 416, 418). Philo is quoted because his writings are in\nsome respects as faithful a photograph of current scholastic methods as\nthose of Epictetus. It is also possible that some of the writings that\nstand under Philo\u2019s name belong to the same period.\n\n[242] _Quod det. potior._ 12 (i. 198, 199): so _de congr. erud. caus._ 13\n(i. 529); _de mut. nom._ 13 (i. 591).\n\n[243] _De congr. erud. caus._ 28 (i. 542).\n\n[244] _Leg. alleg._ 3. 6 (i. 91).\n\n[245] _Quis rer. div. heres._ 51 (i. 509).\n\n[246] M. Aurel. 1. 7.\n\n[247] _Enchir._ 47: cf. _Diss._ 3. 14. 4. In _Diss._ 3. 12. 17, part of\nthe above is given as a quotation from Apollonius of Tyana.\n\n[248] _Diss._ 2. 18. 27; cf. 3. 2. 1; 3. 12. 1; 4. 1. 81.\n\n[249] _Nigrin._ 27.\n\n[250] _Orat._ xx. vol. i. pp. 288 sqq. (Dind.), \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[251] Vol. ii. p 240.\n\n[252] Vol. ii. p. 246.\n\n[253] _Ench._ 4, 13, 30.\n\n[254] The \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd is an important element in the philosophy\nof Epictetus. Every object that is presented to the mind by either the\nsenses or imagination tends to range itself in the ranks of either good\nor evil, and thereby to call forth desire or undesire: in most men this\nassociation of particular objects with the ideas of good or evil, and\nthe consequent stirring of desire, is unconscious, being the result of\neducation and habit: it is the task of the philosopher to learn to attach\nthe idea of good to what is really good, so that desire shall never go\nforth to what is either undesirable or unattainable: this is the \u201cright\ndealing with ideas.\u201d _Diss._ 1. 28. 11; 1. 30. 4; 2. 1. 4; 2. 8. 4; 2.\n19. 32; 3. 21. 23; 3. 22. 20, 103.\n\n[255] \u1f10\u03c6\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03b3\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, _Diss._ 1. 2. 6; 1. 22. 2,\n7; 2. 11. 4, 7; 3. 17. 9, 12, 16; 4. 1. 41, 44: \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 are the ideas\nformed in the mind by association and blending.\n\n[256] _Diss._ 1. 1. 31; 1. 4. 18; 1. 17. 21; and elsewhere.\n\n[257] _Diss._ 1. 4. 23.\n\n[258] The distinction between (1) \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, the desire to have or\nnot to have, and (2) \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae, \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae, the effort to do or not to do, is of\nsome importance in the history of psychology. It probably runs back to\nthe Platonic distinction between \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f72\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[259] _Diss._ 2. 10.\n\n[260] 1. 9. 6, 13.\n\n[261] 1. 14. 6.\n\n[262] 3. 13. 15.\n\n[263] 1. 14. 6; 1. 17. 27; 2. 8. 11.\n\n[264] 1. 14. 6.\n\n[265] 2. 14. 11.\n\n[266] 2. 8. 12-14.\n\n[267] 1. 9. 5; 2. 8. 11.\n\n[268] 1. 9. 4.\n\n[269] 1. 3. 1.\n\n[270] 2. 14. 13.\n\n[271] 1. 6. 13: cf. 1. 29. 29.\n\n[272] 1. 9. 4; 1. 17. 15; 1. 29. 46, 56; 2. 16. 33; 4. 7. 7.\n\n[273] 3. 24. 2, 3.\n\n[274] 3. 24. 3.\n\n[275] 4. 1. 82, 90, 100.\n\n[276] 2. 16. 13.\n\n[277] 1. 24. 1, 2; 1. 29. 33, 36, 46; 3. 10. 7; 4. 4. 32.\n\n[278] 1. 12. 5, 8; 1. 20. 15.\n\n[279] \u1f15\u03b3\u03bf\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7, 2. 16. 42; 2. 19. 26.\n\n[280] \u03b5\u1f50\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, 1. 12. 8; 2. 23. 29, 42.\n\n[281] 4. 1. 90, 98.\n\n[282] 3. 24. 95.\n\n[283] 1. 29. 18; 4. 4. 21.\n\n[284] 2. 16. 42.\n\n[285] _Enchir._ 52: _Diss._ 4. 1. 131; 4. 4. 34: a quotation from\nCleanthes.\n\n[286] 2. 16. 46; 3. 11. 1; 3. 24. 42; 4. 4. 32.\n\n[287] 1. 9. 16.\n\n[288] 1. 29. 29.\n\n[289] 2. 13. 14.\n\n[290] 3. 24. 97; cf. 3. 5. 8-10, 4. 10. 14 sqq.\n\n[291] 3. 24. 110-114.\n\n[292] \u039a\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, _Barn._ 2. 6, and note, in Gebhardt and Harnack\u2019s\nedition.\n\n[293] See especially Harnack, _die Apostellehre und die J\u00fcdischen Beiden\nWege_, Leipzig, 1886.\n\n[294] _Teaching of the Apostles_, 1. 4.\n\n[295] _Teaching of the Apostles_, 2. 2-7.\n\n[296] _Ibid._ 3. 6-8.\n\n[297] _Ibid._ 4. 7, 8.\n\n[298] _Const. Apost._ 1. 1, p. 1, ed. Lagarde. This may be supplemented\nby the conception of Christianity as a new law in Barnabas ii. 6,\nJustin _passim_, Clem. Alex. _E. T._ i 97, 120, 470: see Thomasius,\n_Dogmengesch_, i. 110 sqq.\n\n[299] _Const. Apost._ 2. 11, p. 22.\n\n[300] _Ep. ad Diogn._ 5.\n\n[301] Side by side with the average ethics were the Pauline ethics, which\nhad found a certain lodgment in some.\n\n[302] _Teaching of the Apostles_, 6. 2.\n\n[303] Of a type of Gnosticism, Harnack, _Dogmengesch_. 202.\n\n[304] _Strom._ 7. 11.\n\n[305] e.g. Euseb. _Dem. Ev._ 3. 6: \u201cNot only old men under Jesus Christ\npractise this mode of _philosophy_, but it would be hard to say how many\nthousands of women throughout the whole world, priestesses, as it were,\nof the God of the universe, having embraced the highest wisdom, rapt with\na passion for heavenly knowledge, have renounced the desire of children\naccording to the flesh, and giving their whole care to their soul, have\ngiven themselves up wholly to the Supreme King and God of the universe,\nto practise (\u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9) perfect purity and virginity.\u201d So also id. _de\nVit. Constant._ 4. 26, 29; Sozom. 6. 33, of the Syrian monks.\n\n[306] \u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, Socrat. i. 11; distinguished from \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, _ibid._\n4. 23, as the smaller from the larger: \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, Evagr. i. 21.\n\n[307] Clem. Alex. _P\u00e6dag._ 3. 11.\n\n[308] P. Ewald, _der Einfluss der stoisch-ciceronianischen Moral auf ...\nAmbrosius_, Leipzig, 1881; Dr\u00e4seke in the _Rivista di filologia_, Ann. v.\n1875-6.\n\n[309] Theophrastus ap. Simplic. _in phys._ f. 6 (Diels, _Doxographi\nGr\u00e6ci_, P. 479).\n\n[310] \u03bd\u03cc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c9\u03c6\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c6\u03bb\u03ac, quoted in Plut. _de\nfort._ 3, p. 98, _de Alex. magn. fort._ 3, p. 336, and elsewhere: cf.\nLucret. 3. 36; Cic. _Tusc. Disp._ 1. 20.\n\n[311] Pseudo-Arist. _de mundo_, 7, p. 401 _a_.\n\n[312] _De Isid. et Osir._ 67, p. 378.\n\n[313] Theophrast. ap. Simplic. _in phys._ f. 6 (Diels, p. 476), \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u1f54\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2: so Hippol. _Philosoph._ 1. 6.\n\n[314] Heraclit. ap. Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 5. 14, \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f26\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f00\u03b5\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f01\u03c0\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b2\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1.\n\n[315] Lucan, _Phars._ 9. 579.\n\n[316] \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, M. Anton. 2. 4: \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1, Epict. _Diss._ 1. 14. 6; 2.\n8. 11; M. Anton. 5. 27: \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03b1, Philo, _de mund. opif._ 46 (i. 32).\nThe co-ordination of these and cognate terms in Philo is especially\nimportant in view of their use in Christian theology: _de mund. opif._\n51 (i. 35), \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1fa0\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03bc\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03cd\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ce\u03c2: he considers\nthe term \u1f10\u03ba\u03bc\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd to be more appropriate to theology, \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f22 \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f41\u03c3\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u039c\u03c9\u03c5\u03c3\u1fc6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03bc\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c2, _de mutat. nom._ 39 (i. 612): and he is\ncareful to guard against an inference that \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 implies a breach\nof continuity between the divine and the human soul, \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f26\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, _quod det. pot. insid._ 24 (i. 209).\n\n[317] _Phileb._ 16, p. 28 _e_, \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd: in the\npost-Platonic _Epinomis_, p. 986 _c_, \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[318] The best account of Plato\u2019s complex, because progressive, theory\nof matter is that of Siebeck, _Plato\u2019s Lehre von der Materie_, in his\n_Untersuchungen der Philosophie der Griechen_, Freiburg im Breisg. 1888.\nThe conception of it which was current in the Platonist schools, and\nwhich is therefore important in relation to Christian philosophy, is\ngiven in the _Placita_ of Aetius, ap. Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 11 (Diels, p. 308),\nand Hippol. _Philosoph._ 1. 19.\n\n[319] Plat. _Tim._ p. 30, \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u1f7c\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c4\u03ac\u03ba\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f24\u03b3\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[320] In _Tim._ P. 41, the \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd are addressed at length by \u1f41 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 (= \u1f41 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2): the most pertinent words are, \u1f35\u03bd\u2019 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f96 \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u1f96, \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b6\u03ce\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. The\nwhole theory is summed up by Professor Jowett in the Introduction to his\ntranslation of the _Tim\u00e6us_ (Plato, vol. ii. p. 470): \u201cThe Creator is\nlike a human artist who frames in his mind a plan which he executes by\nmeans of his servants. Thus the language of philosophy, which speaks of\nfirst and second causes, is crossed by another sort of phraseology, \u2018God\nmade the world because he was good, and the demons ministered to him.\u2019\u201d\n\n[321] \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af, frequently in Stoical writings, e.g. in the\ndefinition of the \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd, which is the base of all things, as\ngiven in the _Placita_ of Aetius, reproduced by Plutarch, Eusebius, and\nStob\u00e6us, Diels, p. 306, \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c2 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. The best account of this\nimportant element in later Stoicism is in Heinze, _die Lehre vom Logos in\nder griechischen Philosophie_, 1872, pp. 110 sqq.\n\n[322] Hence the definition which Aetius gives: \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f51\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd _\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, ap. Plut. _de plac. philos._ 1. 10; Euseb.\n_pr\u00e6p. evang._ 15. 45; with additions and differences in Stob. _Ecl._ 1.\n12 (Diels, p. 308).\n\n[323] The three \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af are expressed by varying but identical terms: God,\nMatter, and the Form (\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1), or the By Whom, From What, In view of What\n(\u1f51\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57, \u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f57, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f45), in the _Placita_ of Aetius, 1. 3. 21, ap. Plut.\n_de placit. phil._ 1. 3, Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 10 (Diels, p. 288), and in\nTim\u00e6us Locrus, _de an. mundi_ 2 (Mullach F P G 2. 38): God, Matter, and\nthe Pattern (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1), Hippol. _Philosoph._ 1. 19, Herm. _Irris. Gent.\nPhil._ 11: the Active (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd), Matter, and the Pattern, Alexand.\nAphrod. ap. Simplic. _in phys._ f. 6 (Diels, p. 485), where Simplicius\ncontrasts this with Plato\u2019s own strict dualism.\n\n[324] _De mundi opif._ 5 (i. 5): cf. Plat. _Tim._ p. 30 (of God), \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f26\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u2019\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f64\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f41\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7.\n\n[325] _De cherub._ 9 (i. 144): cf. _ib._ 35 (i. 162).\n\n[326] The most frequent word is \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2, but several others are\nused, e.g. \u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, _de confus. ling._ 38 (i. 434); \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, _ibid._;\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, _de plant Noe_, 1 (i. 329); \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c2, _ibid._ 31 (i.\n348), \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, _Leg. alleg._ 1. 8\n(i. 47). The distinctions which became important in later controversies\ndo not appear in the writings which are probably Philo\u2019s own, but are\nfound in those which probably belong to his school: the most explicit\nrecognition of them is _de somn._ 1. 13 (i. 632), \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f24\u03b3\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f03 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f26\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f64\u03bd: cf. also _de\nmonarch._ 3 (ii. 216), \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[327] _De somn._ 2. 37 (i. 691).\n\n[328] _De mundi opif._ 46 (i. 32): cf. _ib._ 51 (i. 35): _quod deus\nimmut._ 10 (i. 279), and elsewhere.\n\n[329] _Quod det. pot. ins._ 24 (i. 208, 209).\n\n[330] _De profug._ 36 (i. 575).\n\n[331] _De mundi opif._ 5 (i. 5): this is the most explicit expression of\nhis theory of the nature of matter. It may be supplemented by _de plant\nNoe_, 1 (i. 329), \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f04\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f24\u03c1\u03be\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf: _quis rer. div. her._ 27 (i. 492): _de somn._ 2. 6 (i.\n665): \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 is the more usual word, but \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 is sometimes found, e.g.\n_de plant Noe_, 2 (i. 330): the conception underlying either word is\nmore Stoical than Platonic, i.e. it is rather that of matter having\nthe property of resistance than that of potential matter or empty\nspace: hence in _de profug._ 2 (i. 547), \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd is contrasted, in strictly Stoical phraseology, with\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[332] _De sacrif._ 13 (ii. 261).\n\n[333] The terms \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 and \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03b9 are common. Instances of the other terms\nare the following: angels, _de confus. ling._ 8 (1. 408), \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f14\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2: _de somn._ i. 19 (i. 638),\n\u1f00\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f14\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2: _Leg. alleg._ 3. 62 (i. 122),\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6: \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2, _de gigant._ 2. 2 (i. 263),\n\u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f00\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u039c\u03c9\u03cb\u03c3\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd: so, in\nidentical words, _de somn._ 1. 22 (i. 642): \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u1f76 and \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1, _quis rer.\ndiv. heres._ 31 (i. 495), \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\n\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2: _de mund. opif._ 9 (i. 7), \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u1fd6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2: cf. _de monarch._ 6 (ii. 219), \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[334] The clearest instance of the identification is probably in _de\nmonarch._ 6 (ii. 218, 219), where God tells Moses that so far from\nHimself being cognizable, not even the powers that minister to Him are\ncognizable in their essence; but that as seals are known from their\nimpressions, \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bc\u1f72 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ca\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[335] _De mund. opif._ 6 (i. 5), \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2: _vit. Mos._ 3. 13 (ii. 154),\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f67\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03ac\u03b3\u03b7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2: so\n_de confus. ling._ 34 (i. 431): cf. the Stoical definition of \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 in\nEpictet. _Diss._ 1. 20. 5, as \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n[336] _De mund. opif._ 4 (i. 4): the same conception is expressed in less\nfigurative language in _Leg. alleg._ 1. 9 (i. 47), \u03c0\u03c1\u1f76\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f26\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[337] \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, _de mund. \u03bfpif._ 5 (i. 5); \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\n_de profug._ 18 (i. 560).\n\n[338] _Leg. alleg._ 1. 9 (i. 47), \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\u03c5\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u1ff3\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3, \u1fe5\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9, \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 (i.e. both heaven and earth) \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6: _quod\ndeus immut._ 12 (i. 281), \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03ad\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u1fa7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03b3\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf: more expressly, it is the instrument, \u1f44\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, _Leg. alleg._\n3. 31 (i. 106), _de cherub_. 35 (i. 162).\n\n[339] _De somn._ 2. 37 (i. 691).\n\n[340] _De profug._ 20 (i. 562), _de migrat. Abr._ 18 (i. 452): cf.\nWisdom, 18. 24.\n\n[341] _De profug._ 19 (i. 561).\n\n[342] \u1f41 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1, _de migrat. Abrah._ 9 (i. 443); \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2, _de somn._ 1. 13 (i. 632), and elsewhere.\n\n[343] _De ebriet._ 8 (i. 361).\n\n[344] 1 Clem. Rom. 33. 3, 4: but it is a noteworthy instance of the\ncontrast between this simple early belief and the developed theology\nwhich had grown up in less than a century later, that Iren\u00e6us, _lib._ 4,\n_pr\u00e6f._ _c._ 4, explains the \u2018hands\u2019 to mean the Son and Spirit: \u201chomo\n... per manus ejus plasmatus est, hoc est per Filium et Spiritum quibus\net dixit Faciamus hominem.\u201d\n\n[345] Derivatio: Iren. 1. 24. 3, of Basilides (or rather one of the\nschools of Basilidians).\n\n[346] This is probably the metaphor involved in the common word \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae,\ne.g. Hippol. 6. 38, of Epiphanes.\n\n[347] The conception of the double nature of God, male and female, is\nfound as early as Xenocrates, Aetius ap. Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 2. 29 (Diels,\np. 304); and commonly among the Stoics, e.g. in the verses of Valerius\nSoranus, which are quoted by Varro, and after him by S. Augustine, _de\ncivit. Dei_, 7. 9:\n\n    Jupiter omnipotens regum rex ipse deusque\n    Progenitor genitrixque deum, deus unus et omnia.\n\nSo Philodemus, _de piet._ 16, ed. Gomp. p. 83 (Diels, p. 549), quotes\n\u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd, \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u1fc6\u03bb\u03c5\u03c2; and Eusebius, _pr\u00e6p. Evang._ 3. 9, p. 100_b_,\nquotes the Orphic verse:\n\n    \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c3\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf, \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03b7.\n\n[348] The Valentinians in, e.g., Hippol. 6. 29; 10. 13: so of Simon\nMagus, _ib._ 6. 12, \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03af\u03b6\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 _\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b6\u03c5\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2_ \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2.\n\n[349] Hippol. 6. 43 (of Marcus), \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 _\u03b1\u1f30\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 _\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 _\u1fe5\u03af\u03b6\u03b1\u03c2_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 _\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 _\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n_\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2_ \u1f60\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b5.\n\n[350] Hippol. 5. 19 (of the Sethiani), \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f45 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u1fc3 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f21\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7.\n\n[351] Hippol. 8. 8 (of the Docet\u00e6), \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd: _ibid._ c. 9,\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf, \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c3\u03c5\u03ba\u1fc6, \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. A\nsimilar metaphor was used by the Simonians, Hippol. 6. 9 sqq., but it is\ncomplicated with the metaphor of invisible and visible fire (heat and\nflame). It is adopted by Peter in the Clementines, _Hom._ 2. 4, where God\nis the \u1fe5\u03af\u03b6\u03b1, man the \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2.\n\n[352] _Ibid._ 8. 8, ... \u1f41 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1fa7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03b8\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2.\n\n[353] The chief authorities for this theory, which was expressed in\nlanguage that readily lent itself to caricature, are the first seven\nchapters of the first book of Iren\u00e6us, and Hippolytus 6. 32 sqq.\n\n[354] This was especially the view of the Perat\u00e6, Hippol. 5. 13.\n\n[355] Notably by Plotinus, _Enn._ ii. 9. 2-5.\n\n[356] The conception appears in Justin Martyr, _Apol._ i 10, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 _\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9_ \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2: _ib._ c. 59, \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c8\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9: but Justin, though he\navowedly adopts the conception from Plato, claims that Plato adopted it\nfrom Moses.\n\n[357] Plutarch, _de anim. procreat._ 5. 3, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u2019 \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2: _ibid._ \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f26\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2: cf. M\u00f6ller, _Kosmologie_, p. 39.\n\n[358] Wisdom, 11. 18, \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2: Justin M.\n_Apol._ 1. 10. 59 (quoted in note, p. 194): Athenag. _Legat_. 15, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f41 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b7\u03bb\u03cc\u03c2, \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b7\u03bb\u03cc\u03c2, \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2, \u1f51\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f21 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[359] Hippol. 7. 22 (of Basilides), \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03cc \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f43 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f43 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1ff4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, \u1f35\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd. Cf. _ib._ 10. 14.\n\n[360] _Orat. ad Gr\u00e6c._ 5 (following the text of Schwartz).\n\n[361] _Suppl. pro Christ._ 4.\n\n[362] _Ad Autol._ 2. 5 and 10; but in the former of these passages he\nadds, \u03c4\u03af \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[363] The most important passage is Hermas, _Mand._ 1, which is\nexpressed in strictly philosophical language, \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba _\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2_ \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (the\npassage is quoted as Scripture by Iren\u00e6us, 4. 20. 2 = Eusebius, _H. E._\n5. 8. 7: Origen, _de princip._ 1. 3. 3, vol. i. p. 61, 2. 1. 5, p. 79,\nand elsewhere): this must be read by the light of the distinctions which\nare clearly expressed by Athenagoras, _Legat._ 4 and 19, where \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f42\u03bd =\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, which is \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd: \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f42\u03bd = \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, which is \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c5\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd: the meaning of \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f42\u03bd appears from the\nexpression, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f42\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd, whence it is clear that \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bc\u1f74 \u1f42\u03bd = \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f44\u03bd, or potential being (see M\u00f6ller, _Kosmologie_,\np. 123). In some of the other passages in which similar phrases occur,\nit is not clear whether the conception is more than that of an artist\nwho, by impressing form on matter, causes things to exist which did not\nexist before: 2 Maccab. 7. 28, \u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2: 2\nClem. i. 8, \u1f10\u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f20\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2: Clementin. _Hom._ 3, 32, \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3,\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9, \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b9\u03bb\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9, \u03b8\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f85\u03b4\u1fc3\n\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9: Hippolyt. in _Genes._ 1, \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1fc3 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u1fb3 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03ba \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd. In Theophilus, these expressions are interchanged with\nthat of \u1f21 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 in such a way as to suggest their identity: 1.\n4; 2. 10, \u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd: 2. 4, \u03c4\u03af \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03be \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd ... \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd. In the later books of the Clementine Homilies, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f42\u03bd = void\nspace: the whole passage, 17. 8, gives a clear and interesting exposition.\n\n[364] In Euseb. _Pr\u00e6p. Evang._ 7. 22, and elsewhere; reprinted in Routh,\n_Reliqui\u00e6 Sacr\u00e6_, ii. 87.\n\n[365] Justin M. _Tryph._ 62; Iren. 1. 24, 25; Hippol. 7. 16, 20: so\nPhilo. _de profug._ 13 (i. 556), where, after quoting the passage of\nGenesis, he proceeds, following the Platonic theory, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f41\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f37\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[366] The Perat\u00e6 in Hippol. 5. 17.\n\n[367] The Jew through whom Celsus sometimes speaks says, \u201cIf your _Logos_\nis the Son of God, we also assent to the same.\u201d Origen, _c. Cels._ 2. 31.\n\n[368] Cf. Origen, _c. Cels._ 4. 54.\n\n[369] Hippol. _c. Noet._ 11.\n\n[370] It is not the least of the many contributions of Professor Harnack\nto early Christian history that he has vindicated Marcion from the\nexcessive disparagement which has resulted from the blind adoption of the\nvituperations of Tertullian: see especially his _Dogmengeschichte_. Bd.\ni. pp. 226 sqq., 2te aufl.\n\n[371] 1. 22: cf. 4. 20.\n\n[372] Hippol. 10. 32, 33.\n\n[373] ap. Euseb. _H. E._ 6. 19.\n\n[374] _De princip._ 2. 9. 1, 6.\n\n[375] _De princip._ 1. 2. 2.\n\n[376] _Ibid._ 1. 2. 2, 10.\n\n[377] _Ibid._ 1. 3. 5, 6, 8.\n\n[378] _Ibid._ 2. 6. 3.\n\n[379] _Ibid._ 3. 5. 3.\n\n[380] _Ibid._ 2. 9. 4.\n\n[381] Aetius ap. Plut. _de plac. phil._ 2. 1. 1 (Diels, p. 327),\n\u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f60\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[382] Aetius, _ibid._ 1. 25 (Diels, p. 321), \u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3\u00b7 \u03a0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0394\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[383] For the numerous passages which prove these statements,\nreference may be made to N\u00e4gelsbach, _Homerische Theologie_, 2. 2. 3;\n_Nachhomerische Theologie_, 3. 2. 2.\n\n[384] Aetius, _ut supra_, 1. 27 (Diels, p. 322), \u1f29\u03c1\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd: the identification of\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 and \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 is also made by Parmenides and Democritus in a\ncontinuation of the passage quoted above. But in much later times a\ndistinction was sometimes drawn between the two words, \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 being used\nof the subjective necessity of a proposition of which the contradictory\nis unthinkable: Alex. Aphrodis _Qu\u00e6st. Nat._ 2. 5 (p. 96, ed. Spengel),\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34 \u03b3\u03b5 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd; but, on the other hand, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd.\n\n[385] N\u00e4gelsbach, _Nachhomerische Theologie_, p. 142.\n\n[386] Hesiod, _Theog._ 218, 904.\n\n[387] Chrysippus, ap. Theodoret. _Gr. affect. curat._ 6. 14, \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f01\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd: so, in other words, ap.\nAul. Gell. 6. 2. 3.\n\n[388] Aetius ap. Plut. _de placit. philos._ 1. 28, \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f31\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd: Philo, _de mut. nom._ 23 (i. 598), \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f31\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd: Cic. _de divin._ 1. 55, \u2018ordinem\nseriemque causarum cum causa caus\u00e6 nexa rem ex se gignat.\u2019\n\n[389] The Stoical definition of a \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2 was \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 4. 26; cf. Arius Didymus,\nap. Diels, p. 464.\n\n[390] The idea is found in almost all Stoical writers: Plutarch; _de\nAlex. Magn. virt._ 6, speaks of \u1f21 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2: Chrysippus ap. Ph\u00e6dr. Epicur. _de\nnat. Deorum_, ed. Petersen, p. 19: Muson. _Frag._ 5, ed. Peerlk. p. 164\n(from Stob. _Flor._ 40), \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f23 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd: Epict. _Diss._ 1. 9. 4; 2. 13. 6; 3. 22. 4; 3. 24. 10: most fully\nin Arius Didymus ap. Euseb. _Pr\u00e6p. Evang._ 15. 15. 4, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f31\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[391] Philo, _de Josepho_, 6 (ii. 46), \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f67\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5.\n\n[392] Epict. _Diss._ 3. 22. 5.\n\n[393] Epict. _Diss._ 1. 1. 10; cf. Seneca, _de Provid._ 5. 7, \u2018non potest\nartifex mutare materiam.\u2019 But Epictetus sometimes makes it a question,\nnot of possibility, but of will, e.g. _Diss._ 4. 3. 10.\n\n[394] The data for the long history of the moral conceptions of Greek\nreligion which are briefly indicated above are far too numerous to\nbe given in a note: the student is referred to N\u00e4gelsbach, _Die\nNachhomerische Theologie_, i. 17-58. One may note the list of titles\napplied to God, e.g. in Dio Chrysostom, and the diminishing use of\n\u1f31\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[395] Epict. _Diss._ 1. 6.\n\n[396] _Diss._ 3. 11. 1.\n\n[397] _Diss._ 3. 24. 42, 43.\n\n[398] Destiny is Reason: Heraclitus ap. Aet. _Placit._ in Plut. _de\nplacit. philos._ 1. 28. 1; Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 5. 15 (Diels, p. 323), \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1: Chrysippus,\n_ibid._ \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9: Zeno ap. Ar. Did. _Epit.\nphys._ 20, in Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 11. 5 (Diels, p. 458), \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f43\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f11\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[399] Destiny, or Reason, is Providence: Chrysippus, in the quotation\ngiven in the preceding note: Zeno ap. Aet. _Placit._ in Stob. _Ecl._ 1.\n5. 15 (Diels, p. 322).\n\n[400] Destiny, Reason, Providence, is God, or the Will of God: Chrysippus\nin Plut. _de Stoic. repug._ 34. 5, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f21 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u00b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03c1\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76, \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u1f74\u2019 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f4d\u03bc\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd [sc. \u1f41 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f23\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9:\nid. _de commun. not._ 34. 5, o\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd: Arius Didymus, _Epit._ ap. Euseb.\n_Pr\u00e6p. Ev._ 15. 15 (Diels, p. 464): Philodemus, _de piet._ frag. ed.\nGompertz, p. 83 (Diels, p. 549). The more exact statement is in the\nsummary of Aetius ap. Plut. _de placit. philos._ 1. 7. 17, Stob. _Ecl._\n1. 2. 29 (Diels, p. 306), where God is said to comprehend within Himself\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03bf\u1f53\u03c2 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. The\nloftiest form of the conception is expressed by Lucan, _Pharsal._ 2.\n10, \u2018se quoque lege tenens:\u2019 God is not the slave of Fate or Law, but\nvoluntarily binds Himself by it.\n\n[401] Plat. _Rep._ 2, pp. 379, 380; _Tim._ p. 41. Philo, _de mund.\nopif._ 24 (i. 17), _de confus. ling._ 35 (i. 432), \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u1f72\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f41\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c8\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ae\u03bd: _de profug._ 13 (i. 556), \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3: so\nalso in the (probably) post-Philonean _de Abraham._ 28 (ii. 22). The\nother phase of the conception is stated by Celsus, not as a philosophical\nsolution of the difficulty, but as one which might be taught to the\nvulgar, \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f70 \u1f55\u03bb\u1fc3\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[402] This is one of the solutions offered by Chrysippus: the concrete\nform of the difficulty, with which he dealt, was \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, and his answer was that diseases come \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u2018non per naturam sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias,\u2019\nAul. Gell. 7 (6). 1. 9. So also in the long fragment of Philo in Euseb.\n_Pr\u00e6p. Ev._ 8. 13 (Philo, ii. 648, 644), \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f11\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[403] _Diss._ 1. 12. 24.\n\n[404] Chrysippus, _de Diis_, 2, ap. Plut. _de Stoic. repug._ 35, \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[405] _Diss._ 2. 5. 24.\n\n[406] _Diss._ 2. 10. 5.\n\n[407] Aul. Gell. 7 (6). 2. 12-15.\n\n[408] _Ench._ 1.\n\n[409] E.g. Sext. Empir. _Pyrr._ 3. 9.\n\n[410] Seneca, _Ep._ 107. 11: a free Latin rendering of one of the verses\nof Cleanthes quoted from Epictetus in Lecture VI. p. 157.\n\n[411] Seneca, _Dial._ 1. 5. 8: quid est boni viri? pr\u00e6bere se fato.\ngrande solatium est cum universo rapi. quicquid est quod nos sic vivere,\nsic mori jussit, eadem necessitate et deos adligat. inrevocabilis humana\npariter ac divina cursus vehit. ille ipse omnium conditor et rector\nscripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. semper paret, semel jussit.\n\n[412] Epict. _Diss._ 1. 6. 37-40.\n\n[413] _Ibid._ 1. 16. 15-21.\n\n[414] S. Matthew, 5. 12; S. Luke, 6. 23.\n\n[415] _Ibid._ 6. 1.\n\n[416] _Ibid._ 10. 42; S. Mark, 9. 41.\n\n[417] Revelation, 22. 12: so Barnab. 21. 3: \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n[418] Hebrews, 11. 6.\n\n[419] _Didach\u00e9_, 4. 7, \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03af\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2.\n\n[420] Barnab. 4. 12.\n\n[421] These conceptions of the earliest Christian philosophers are\nstated, in order to be modified, by Origen, _de princ._ 2. 5. 1:\nexistimant igitur bonitatem affectum talem quemdam esse quod bene fieri\nomnibus debeat etiam si indignus sit is cui beneficium datur nec bene\nconsequi mereatur.... Justitiam vero putarunt affectum esse talem qui\nunicuique prout meretur retribuat ... ut secundum sensum ipsorum justus\nmalis non videatur bene velle sed velut odio quodam ferri adversus eos.\n\n[422] The title of Marcion\u2019s chief work was \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u2018Contrasts\u2019: the\nextent to which his opinions prevailed is shown both by contemporary\ntestimony, e.g. Justin M. _Apol._ 1. 26, \u1f43\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c6\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, Iren. 3.\n3. 4, and also by the fact that the Churches into which his adherents\nwere organized flourished side by side with the Catholic Churches for\nmany centuries (there is an inscription of one of them, dated A.D. 318,\nin Le Bas et Waddington, vol. iii. No. 2558, and they had not died out\nat the time of the Trullan Council in A.D. 692, _Conc. Quinisext._ c.\n95): the importance which was attached to him is shown by the large place\nwhich he occupies in early controversies, Justin Martyr, Iren\u00e6us, the\nClementines, Origen, Tertullian, being at pains to refute him.\n\n[423] Iren. 3. 25. 2.\n\n[424] Tert. c. _Marc._ 2. 11, 12.\n\n[425] _Homil._ 4. 13; 9. 19; 18. 2, 3.\n\n[426] _Recogn._ 3. 37.\n\n[427] Especially _P\u00e6dag._ 1. 8, 9.\n\n[428] See below, p. 233.\n\n[429] ap. Tert. _c. Marc._ 2. 5.\n\n[430] _Apol._ 2. 7.\n\n[431] Tatian, _Orat. ad Gr\u00e6c._ 7.\n\n[432] Iren. 4. 37.\n\n[433] _Ad Autol._ 2. 27.\n\n[434] _Legat._ 31.\n\n[435] _c. Marc._ 2. 5.\n\n[436] E.g. Clem. Alex. _P\u00e6dag._ 1. 1, Origen, _de princ._ 2. 10. 6; _c.\nCels._ 6. 56: so also Tert. _Scorp._ 5.\n\n[437] Origen, _de princ._ 2. 9. 5.\n\n[438] The passage which follows is, with the exception of one extract\nfrom the _contra Celsum_, a catena of extracts from the _de principiis_.\n\n[439] _De princ._ 1. 6. 2.\n\n[440] 1. 8. 2; 2. 9. 7.\n\n[441] 2. 9. 6.\n\n[442] 1. 8. 4.\n\n[443] 1. 5. 5; 1. 6. 2.\n\n[444] 3. 1. 4.\n\n[445] 3. 1. 5.\n\n[446] 1. 5. 2, 5.\n\n[447] 1. 6. 2.\n\n[448] 1. 6. 3.\n\n[449] 3. 3. 5; 3. 5. 3.\n\n[450] 3. 1. 20, 21: but sometimes beings of higher merit are assigned to\na lower grade, that they may benefit those who properly belong to that\ngrade, and that they themselves may be partakers of the patience of the\nCreator, 2. 9. 7.\n\n[451] 1. 2. 1.\n\n[452] _c. Cels._ 6. 56; _de princ._ 2. 10.\n\n[453] _De princ._ 3. 1. 14, 17.\n\n[454] 3. 6. 3.\n\n[455] Cf. Justin, _Dial. c. Tryph._ 2.\n\n[456] The more common conception of the earliest Greek philosophy was\nthat of \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03b7\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, Aetius\nap. Stob. _Ecl. Phys._ 2. 29.\n\n[457] The form in which it is given by Sextus Empiricus, in whose time\nthe distinction was clearly understood, implies this: \u1f13\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03b9\u1fc6 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9, _Pyrrh. Hypotyp._ 225.\n\n[458] This is a post-Platonic summary of Plato\u2019s conception; into the\ninner development, and consequently varying expressions, of it in Plato\u2019s\nown writings it is not necessary to enter here. It is more important\nin relation to the history of later Greek thought to know what he was\nsupposed to mean than what he meant. The above is taken from the summary\nof Aetius in Plut. _de plac. philos._ 1. 7, Euseb. _Pr\u00e6p. evang._ 14. 16\n(Diels, _Doxographi Gr\u00e6ci_, p. 304). The briefest and most expressive\nstatement of the transcendence of God (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd) in Plato\u2019s own writings\nis probably _Republic_, p. 509, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[459] It was a struggle between this and Stoicism.\n\n[460] Plutarch, _de Ei ap. Delph._ 18; cf. Ocellus Lucanus in the\nAugustan Age, ap. Diels, 187, Mullach, i. p. 383 sq. The universe has no\nbeginning and no end: it always was and always will be (1. 1. p. 388).\nIt comprises, however, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd and \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, the former above the\nmoon, the latter below, so that the course of the moon marks the limit\nbetween the changing and changeless, the \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 and the \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 (2. 1, p. 394, 2. 23, p. 400).\n\n[461] Max. Tyr. _Diss._ 8. 9.\n\n[462] Max. Tyr. 17. 9.\n\n[463] Plotinus, _Enneades_, 5. 1. 6; cf. 1. 1. 8, where \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is\n\u1f00\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, distinguished from \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74 (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1). We\nare between the two, having a share of both. The \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 of the soul\nconsists in \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd, 1. 2. 3; the love of beauty should\nascend from that of the body to that of character and laws, of arts and\nsciences, \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f42\u03bd, \u03ba\u03ac\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\n\u03b2\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, 1. 2. 2.\n\n[464] _De mut. nom._ 4; i. 582, ed. Mangey.\n\n[465] _De mund. op._ 2; i. 2.\n\n[466] _De post. Cain_, 5; i. 228, 229.\n\n[467] _Quod deus immut._ 12; i. 281.\n\n[468] _De Abrah._ 16; ii. 12.\n\n[469] i. 224, 281, 566; ii. 12, 654; _Frag. ap Joan. Dam._ ii. 654.\n\n[470] _De pr\u0153m. et p\u0153n._ 7; ii. 415.\n\n[471] _De post. Cain_, 48; i. 258.\n\n[472] _De mut. nom._ 2; i. 580; cf. 630, 648, 655; ii. 8-9, 19, 92-93,\n597. Cf. in general Heinze, _Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen\nPhilosophie_, Oldenburg, 1872, pp. 206, 207, n. 6.\n\n[473] The necessity for such intermediate links is not affected by the\nquestion how far, outside the Platonic schools, there was a belief in a\nreal transcendence of God, or only in His existence outside the solar\nsystem. In this connection, note the allegory in the _Ph\u00e6drus_. The\nEpicureans coarsely expressed the transcendence of God by the expression,\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1fc4\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, Sext. Emp. _Pyrrh._ p. 114, \u00a7 5; cf. Ocellus Lucanus,\ncited above, p. 242. Hippolytus describes Aristotle\u2019s _Metaphysics_ as\ndealing with things beyond the moon, 7. 19, p. 354; cf. Origen\u2019s idea\nof the heavens in _de princ._ ii. 3, 7, and Celsus\u2019 objection that\nChristians misunderstand Plato by confusing his heaven with the Jewish\nheavens. Origen, _c. Cels._ vi. 19; cf. Keim, p. 84.\n\n[474] Benn, _Greek Philosophers_, 2. 252.\n\n[475] Cf. Hesiod in Sext. Emp. ix. 86. Similarly, Thales, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 (Diels, 301); Pythagoras, Empedocles\nin Hippolytus, \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd (Diels, 558); Plato and the\nStoics (Diels, 307), e.g. Plutarch, Epictetus, 1. 14. 12; 3. 13. 15\n(Diels, 1307); Athenagoras, 23; Philo, ii. 635; Frag. ap. Eus. _Pr\u00e6p.\nEvan._ 8. 13; see references in Keim\u2019s _Celsus_, p. 120; cf. Wachsmuth,\n_Die Ansichten der Stoiker \u00fcber Mantik u. D\u00e4monen_, Berlin, 1860.\n\n[476] Philo, _de confus. ling._ 20 (i. 419).\n\n[477] _De post. Cain._ 6 (i. 229).\n\n[478] _De somn._ 1. 11 (i. 630).\n\n[479] _Ibid._ 1. 41 (i. 656).\n\n[480] _De profug._ 1 (i. 547); so _de Cherub._ 1 (i. 139).\n\n[481] _Leg. Alleg._ 3. 62 (i. 122).\n\n[482] _De somn._ 1. 15 (i. 633).\n\n[483] _Ibid._ 1. 33 (i. 649).\n\n[484] _Quis rer. div. her._ 42 (i. 501).\n\n[485] _De sacrif. Abel. et Cain._ 18 (i. 175), \u1f41 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u1f7a \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6: _de decem orac._ 11 (ii. 188), commenting on the\nexpression of the LXX. in Exodus xx. 18, \u1f41 \u03bb\u03b1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd, he\njustifies it on the ground \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f02\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u1fc3 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u1fe5\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019\n\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1, \u1f05\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u1f64\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9: _de mund. opif._ 6 (i. 5), \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f02\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[486] The word \u03c3\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 seems to be used, in relation to the _Logos_, not\nof the shadow cast by a solid object in the sunlight, but rather, as\nin Homer, _Odyss._ 10. 495, and frequently in classical writers, of a\nghost or phantom: hence God is the \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1, the substance of which\nthe _Logos_ is the unsubstantial form, _Leg. Alleg._ 3. 31 (i. 106):\nhence also \u03c3\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 is used as convertible with \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03ce\u03bd (_ibid._), in its sense\nof either a portrait-statue or a reflexion in a mirror: in _de confus.\nling._ 28 (i. 427), the _Logos_ is the _eternal_ \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03ce\u03bd of God.\n\n[487] _De somn._ 1. 41 (i. 656).\n\n[488] _Quod det. pot. ins._ 23 (i. 207).\n\n[489] _De agric._ 12 (i. 308): _de confus. ling._ 28 (i. 427): spoken of\nas \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c2, _ibid._ 14 (i. 414).\n\n[490] _De profug._ 20 (i. 562): so God is spoken of as the husband of\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 in _de Cherub._ 14 (i. 148). But in _de ebriet._ 8 (i. 361), God is\nthe Father, Knowledge the Mother, not of the _Logos_ but of the universe.\n\n[491] _Quod a Deo mit. somn._ i. 683.\n\n[492] i.e. Sethiani ap. Iren. 1. 30. 1.\n\n[493] Ptolem\u00e6us, _ad Flor._ 7.\n\n[494] _Teaching of the Twelve Apostles_, 10. 2-4.\n\n[495] Cf. the Ebionites, Alogi, and the _Clementines_.\n\n[496] Origen, _c. Cels._ 7. 36; cf. _de princ._ 1. 1. 7.\n\n[497] _Con. Cels._ 7. 37, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2; cf. Keim, p. 100. See also Orig. _in Gen._ vol.\nii, p. 25 (Delarue), and Eus. _H. E._ iv. 26, for a view ascribed to\nMelito.\n\n[498] Harnack, _Dogmengesch._ p. 160.\n\n[499] _Dial. c. Tryph._ c. 127.\n\n[500] _Legatio_, 10.\n\n[501] _Ad Autolycum._ 1. 3; cf. Minuc. Felix, _Octavius_, 18, and\nNovatian, _de Trin._ 1. 2.\n\n[502] _Adv. Marc._ 1. 3.\n\n[503] _Adv. Prax._ 7.\n\n[504] ap. Hippol. 7. 21, p. 358.\n\n[505] \u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, _ibid._ 6. 42, p. 302; cf. 12 ff., pp. 424\nff., for Mono\u00efmus, and also Ptolem\u00e6us, _ad Floram_, 7.\n\n[506] _P\u00e6dag._ 1. 8.\n\n[507] M\u00f6ller, _Kosmologie_, p. 26, cf. 124, 129, 130.\n\n[508] _Strom._ 5. 12.\n\n[509] _c. Cels._ 6. 19 sqq.\n\n[510] _De princ._ 1. 1. 2, 5, 7.\n\n[511] _Ibid._ 1. 1, _passim_; cf. 4. 1. 36.\n\n[512] e.g. Min. Felix, c. 10; cf. Keim, _Celsus_, 158.\n\n[513] The older sort, who clung to tradition pure and simple, were\ndubious of the introduction of dialectic methods into Christianity: see\nEus. v. 28; cf. v. 13. \u201cExpavescunt ad \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd,\u201d Tert. _adv. Prax._ 3.\nCf. Weingarten, p. 25.\n\n[514] Pant\u00e6nus, when asked by outside philosophers, \u201cHow can God know\nthe world, if like knows like?\u201d replied (Routh, _Rel. Sac._ i. p. 379):\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd ... for if he _made_ all things by His\nwill, no one can deny that He knows His own will, and hence knows what\nHis will has made. Cf. Julius Africanus (Routh, ii. 239), \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd.\n\n[515] \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f43 \u0398\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03bc\u1f76 \u1f43 \u03b5\u1f30\u03bc\u03af, as used by the Naassenes, ap. Hipp.\n5. 7.\n\n[516] Cf. Harnack, art. in _Encycl. Brit._ \u201cSabellius.\u201d\n\n[517] Hipp. 9. 10; Schmid, _Dogmeng._ 47, _n._\n\n[518] Tert. _c. Valent._ 4; cf., \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 of Ptol. ap. Iren. 1. 12. 1.\n\n[519] ap. Iren. 1. 12. 3.\n\n[520] Hipp. 6. 12.\n\n[521] Ptolemy ap. Iren. 1. 12. 1; cf. Hipp. _c. Noet._ 10, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f26\u03bd.\n\n[522] ap. Iren. 1. 2. 1, 5 (Valentinians).\n\n[523] ap. Iren. 1. 24. 3 (Basilides): cf. Clem. Al. _Protrep._ 10, the\nLogos is the Son of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\n\n[524] Iren. 1. 14. 1, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ae\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7.\n\n[525] As compared with Philo, who emphasizes the Logos in relation to the\nwork of creation, Justin lays stress on the Logos as Revealer, making\nknown to us the will of God: cf. \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, _Tryph._ 61.\n\n[526] Justin, _Apol._ i. 63.\n\n[527] _Apol._ ii. 8.\n\n[528] It would be beyond our present purpose to go into Christology. It\nwill be sufficient to indicate three theories: (1) Modal Monarchianism;\n(2) Dynamical Monarchianism; (3) Logos theory. Cf. Harnack, _Dogmeng._ i.\n161, 220, for Gnostic Christology.\n\n[529] Iren. 4. 6. 3, 5, 6; cf. Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 7. 2.\n\n[530] Cf. Hipp. 7. 21, 22; Schmid, _Dogm._ 52.\n\n[531] Tert. _Apol._ 51; Hipp. _c. Noet._ p. 62.\n\n[532] _Leg._ 16; cf. Clem. Al. _Strom._ 5. 1; cf. Theophilus, 2, 22, for\ndistinction of \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 as well as \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, denied by Clement\n(loc. cit.), but repeated in Tert. _adv. Prax._ 5; cf. Hipp. _c. Noet._\n10. See Zahn\u2019s note in Ign. _ad Magn._ 8. 2, on \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u1f7c\u03bd in relation to\neternal generation.\n\n[533] Philo applied the phrase \u201cSon of God\u201d to the world: cf. Keim,\n_Celsus_, 95.\n\n[534] Justin, _Dial. c. Tryph._ 61 A, cf. 62 E, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1; and\nHipp. _c. Noet._ 8, 10, 16; Tatian, c. 5; Iren\u00e6us ap. Schmid, p. 31.\n\n[535] Justin, _Dial. c Tryph._ 56 C, p. 180.\n\n[536] Hipp. 9. 12; Callistus, while excommunicating the Sabellians (cf.\nSchmid, 48; Weing. 31), also called Hippolytus and his party ditheists.\nFor Callistus\u2019 own view, cf. _ibid._ 9. 11. See Schmid, p, 50; also p. 45\nfor Praxeas ap. Tert.\n\n[537] The Gnostic controversies in regard to the relation to God of the\nPowers who were intermediate between Him and the world, had helped to\nforge such intellectual instruments.\n\n[538] Justin, _c. Tryph._ 128: \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u1fc7 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2; cf. Plotinus ap. Harn.\n_Dogm._ 493: \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd in Tatian, 5, is different;\ncf. Hipp. _c. Noet._ 10.\n\n[539] Justin, _Dial. c. Tryph._ 61 C, where the metaphor of \u201cspeech\u201d is\nalso employed.\n\n[540] ap. Tert. _c. Hermog._ 3.\n\n[541] For metaphor of light, cf. Mono\u00efmus ap. Hipp. 8. 12; also Tatian,\nc. 5.\n\n[542] There is uncertainty as to eternal generation in Justin; see\nEngelhardt, p. 118. It is not in Hippolytus, _c. Noet._ 10. Though\nimplied in Iren\u00e6us (Harn. p. 495), it is in Origen that this solution\nattains clear expression, e.g. _de princ._ 1. 2 ff., though his view\nis not throughout steady and uniform. Emanation seemed to him to imply\ndivision into parts. But he hovers between the Logos as thought and as\nsubstance. For Clement and Origen in this connection, see Harnack, pp.\n579, 581.\n\n[543] God unchangeable in Himself comes into contact with human affairs:\n\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3, _c. Cels._ 4. 14. His Word changes according\nto the nature of the individuals into whom he comes, _c. Cels._ 4. 18.\n\n[544] Justin, _Apol._ i. 22. 23. 32, _c. Try._ 5.\n\n[545] _ad Autolyc._ ii. 22.\n\n[546] He held that side by side with God existed, not \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, but \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1,\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2: see Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 5. 1.\n\n[547] Cf. Harnack, _Dogmeng._ p. 580.\n\n[548] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, _Metaph._ 6. 10, p.\n1035 _a_, \u201c_ousia_ is matter, form, and the compound of matter and form.\u201d\n\n[549] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd,\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, Diog. L. 7. 148: so in M.\nAnton. e.g. 4, 40, \u1f15\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd,\nparaphrased in the well-known lines of Pope:\n\n    \u201cAll are but parts of one stupendous Whole,\n    Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.\u201d\n\n[550] \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, _Quod det. pot. insid._ 25, i. 209.\n\n[551] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\n\u1f23 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c4\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c4\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f35\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, _Categ._ 5, p. 2 _a_: but in the\n_Metaphysics_ a different point of view is taken, and the term \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 is used in the following sense, i.e. of the form, e.g. 6, 11, p.\n1037.\n\n[552] Frequently in the _Metaphysics_, e.g. 6. 7, p. 1032 _b_, 7. 1, p.\n1042 _a_.\n\n[553] Arist. _Metaph._ 6. 11, p. 1037 _a_.\n\n[554] _Ibid._ 12. 5, p. 1079 _b_.\n\n[555] e.g. _Parmen._ p. 132 _e_. \u03bf\u1f57 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f96, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[556] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03c4\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, Suidas, _s.\nv._\n\n[557] \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7 ... \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f37\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 ... \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9,\nPlat. _Sophist._ p. 246.\n\n[558] e.g. it is stated by Celsus and adopted by Origen: Origen, _c.\nCels._ 7. 45 sq.\n\n[559] \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1, \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f26\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, Porphyr. _Eisag._ 2. 24.\n\n[560] \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c1\u03c1\u03c9 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f43 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1. \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f54\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, Plotin. _Enn._ 6. 8. 12.\n\n[561] Arist. _Anal. post._ 2. 3, p. 90 _b_; _Top._ 5. 2, p. 130 b;\n_Metaph._ 6. 4, p. 1030 _b_.\n\n[562] Sext. Empir. _Pyrrh. Hypotyp._ 3. 1. 2.\n\n[563] \u03b5\u1f34 \u03b3\u03b5 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2, Porphyr. _de\nAbstin._ 1. 19.\n\n[564] \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b9\u03c8\u03b1\u03bd, _Clement. Hom._\n20. 7, p. 192.\n\n[565] _c. Cels._ 6. 64.\n\n[566] e.g. in S. Athanas. _ad Afr. episc._ 4, vol. i. 714.\n\n[567] Dionys. Areop. _de div. nom._ 5.\n\n[568] Philo, _Leg. Alleg._ 1. 30, vol. i. 62; cf. _de post. Cain._ 8,\nvol. i. 229: there is a remarkable Christian application of this in a\ndialogue between a Christian and a Jew who was curious as to the Trinity,\nHieronymi Theologi Gr\u00e6ci, _Dialogus de sancta Trinitate_, in Gallandi,\n_Vet. Patr. Bibl._ vol. vii., reprinted in Migne, _Patrol. Gr._ vol. xl.\n845.\n\n[569] \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc3\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2, Athan. _ad Antioch._, 3, vol.\ni. 616.\n\n[570] Cf. Harnack, i. 191, 219, 476 sqq., 580. In the Valentinian\nsystem, the spiritual existence which Achamoth brought forth was of\nthe same essence as herself, Iren. 1. 5. 1. In that of Basilides, the\nthree-fold sonship which was in the seed which God made, was \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, Hippolytus, 7. 22: so as regards \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f13\u03bd in\nEpiphanes (Valentinian?), ap. Iren. 1. 11. 3 (Hipp. 6. 38), it \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9 as \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7. Cf. _Clem. Hom._ 20.7; Iren.\nap. Harn. 481, \u201cejusdem substanti\u00e6;\u201d Tert. _Apol._ 21, \u201cex unitate\nsubstanti\u00e6;\u201d Harn. 488, 491.\n\n[571] It was expressly rejected at the Council of Antioch in connection\nwith Paul of Samosata; and Basil, _Ep._ 9, says that Dionysius of\nAlexandria gave it up because of its use by the Sabellians: cf. _Ep._ 52\n(300).\n\n[572] It is found, e.g., in Athan. _ad Afr. episc._ 4, vol. i. 714, \u1f21 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f55\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03be\u03af\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9. The distinction is found in Stoical\nwriters, e.g. Chrysippus says that the present time \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9, the past and\nfuture \u1f51\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Diels, _Doxogr. Gr\u00e6ci._ 462. 1.\n\n[573] Diels, _ibid._ 372; cf. 363, where it is contrasted with \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1.\n\n[574] Sext. Empir. p. 192, \u00a7 226.\n\n[575] Diels, 318.\n\n[576] Ib. 469. 20: so \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, p. 469, 26.\n\n[577] Epict. 1. 14. 2.\n\n[578] Ath. _Dial. de Trin._ 2: \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9, while\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f25\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03ba \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd. He elsewhere identifies it with \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd in _Ath. et Cyril.\nin Expos. orthod. fid._: \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd. Still the\nidentity of the two terms was allowed even after they were tending\nto be differentiated: cf. Athan. _ad Afr. Ep._ 4, vol. i. 714, \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd. So\n_ad Antioch._, 6. (i. 617), he tolerates the view that there was only one\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 in the Godhead, on the ground that \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 might be regarded\nas synonymous with \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1. Cf. objection at Council of Sardica, against\nthree \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in the Godhead, instead of one \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, of Father, Son\nand Spirit.\n\n[579] Cf. Harn. _Dogm._ 693.\n\n[580] \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, Sext. Empir. _de Pyrrh._ 2. 219.\n\n[581] Ed. K\u00fchn, 5. 662.\n\n[582] _Ep._ 210; Harn. _Dogm._ 693.\n\n[583] Cf. Quintilian, who ascribes it in turn to Plautus and to Sergius\nFlavius, 2. 14. 2; 3. 6. 23; 8. 3. 33: Seneca, _Ep._ 58. 6, to Cicero,\nand more recently Fabianus. For _substantia_, cf. Quint. 7. 2. 5, \u201cnam et\nsubstantia ejus sub oculos cadit.\u201d\n\n[584] Cf. Harnack, 489, 543; for its use by Sabellius, &c., ib. 679; also\nOrig. _de princ._ 1. 2. 8.\n\n[585] E.g. _Ath. et Cyr. in Expos. orth. fid._, \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd. In Epictetus, 1. 2. 7, 14, 28, it denotes individuality of\ncharacter, that which distinguishes one man from another.\n\n[586] In Ath. _ad. Ant._ 7. 25, \u1f21 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f45\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is distinguished\nfrom \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd: so 7. 75, \u1f21 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u0390\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03ce\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd. For \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 in Philo, see _Leg. All._ 3. 30 (i. 105).\n\n[587] Leontius of Byzantium says that both \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 and \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, _Pat.\nGr\u00e6c._ lxxxvi. 1193.\n\n[588] E.g. _adv. Prax._ 2 (E. T. ii. 337), where he makes the\ndistinctions within the \u0153conomia of the Godhead to be _gradu_, _forma_,\n_specie_, with a unity of _substantia_, _status_, _potestas_; cf. Bp.\nKaye, in E. T. ii. p. 407.\n\n[589] _De Sententia Dionys._ 18, quoted in _Dict. of Christ. Biog._ under\nHomoousios.\n\n[590] Thus the Roman Dionysius, in a fragment against the Sabellians\n(Routh, _Reliq._ iii. pp. 373, 374), objects to the division of the\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03af\u03b1 into \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 _\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2.\n\n[591] \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u1ff6\u03bd, Athan. _de Synod._ 8 (i. 577).\n\n[592] [As this summing up never underwent the author\u2019s final revision,\nand the notes which follow stand in his MS. parallel with the\ncorresponding portion of the Lecture as originally delivered, it has been\nthought well to place them here.\u2014ED.]\n\n(1) The tendency to abstract has combined with the tendency to regard\nmatter as evil or impure, in the production of a tendency to form rather\na negative than a positive conception of God. The majority of formularies\ndefine God by negative terms, and yet they have claimed for conceptions\nwhich are negative a positive value.\n\n(2) We owe to Greek philosophy\u2014to the hypothesis of the chasm between\nspirit and matter\u2014the tendency to interpose powers between the Creator\nand His creation. It may be held that the attempt to solve the insoluble\nproblem, how God, who is pure spirit, made and sustains us, has darkened\nthe relations which it has attempted to explain by introducing abstract\nmetaphysical conceptions.\n\n[593] It may be noted that even in the later Greek philosophy there was\na view, apparently identical with that of Bishop Berkeley, that matter\nor substance merely represented the sum of the qualities. Origen, _de\nPrinc._ 4. 1. 34.\n\n[594] These Lectures are the history of a genesis: it would otherwise\nhave been interesting to show in how many points theories which have\nbeen thought out in modern times revive theories of the remote past of\nChristian antiquity.\n\n[595] For what follows, reference in general may be made to Keil,\n_Attische Culte aus Inschriften, Philologus_, Bd. xxiii. 212-259,\n592-622: and Weingarten, _Histor. Zeitschrift_, Bd. xlv. 1881, p. 441\nsqq. as well as to the authorities cited in the notes.\n\n[596] Foucart, _Le culte de Pluton dans la religion \u00e9leusinienne,\nBulletin de Correspondance Hell\u00e9nique_, 1883, pp. 401 sqq.\n\n[597] The successive stages or acts of initiation are variously described\nand enumerated, but there were at least four: \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u2014the preparatory\npurification; \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u2014the initiatory rites and sacrifices; \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\nor \u03bc\u03cd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u2014the prior initiation; and \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, the higher or greater\ninitiation, which admitted to the \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd, or holiest act of\nthe ritual. Cf. Lobeck, _Aglaoph._ pp. 39 ff.\n\n[598] An interesting inscription has recently come to light, which shows\nthat the public slaves of the city were initiated at the public expense.\nFoucart, l.c. p. 394.\n\n[599] Cf. Origen, _c. Cels._ 3. 59.\n\n[600] Philostratus, _Vita Apoll._ 4. 18, p. 138.\n\n[601] _Alex._ 38.\n\n[602] Cf. Lobeck, _Aglaoph._ pp. 39 ff. and 89 ff.; Welcker, _Griech.\nG\u00f6tterl._ ii. 530-532. \u201cThe first and most important condition required\nof those who would enter the temple at Lindus is that they be pure in\nheart and not conscious of any crime.\u201d\u2014Professor W. M. Ramsay in _Ency.\nBrit._ s. v. \u201cMysteries.\u201d For purification before admission to the\nworship of a temple, see, in _C.I.A._ iii. Pt. i. 73. 74, instances of\nregulation prescribed at the temple of M\u00ean Tyrannus at Laurium in Attica,\ne.g. \u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f00\u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, various periods of purification being\nspecified. Cf. Reinach, _Trait\u00e9 d\u2019\u00c9pigr. Grecque_, p. 133, on the inscr.\nof Andania in Messenia, B.C. 91; the mysteries of the Cabiri in Le Bas\nand Foucart, _Inscr. du Peloponn\u00e8se_, ii. \u00a7 5, p. 161; and Sauppe, _die\nMysterieninschr. von Andania_.\n\n[603] Tertullian, _de Baptismo_, 5, \u201cNam et sacris quibusdam per lavacrum\ninitiantur ... ipsos etiam deos suos lavationibus efferunt;\u201d Clem. Alex.\n_Strom._ Bk. 5. 4: \u201cThe mysteries are not exhibited incontinently to all,\nbut only after certain purifications and previous instructions.\u201d _Ibid._\n5. 11: \u201cIt is not without reason that in the mysteries that obtain among\nthe Greeks, _lustrations hold the first place_, as also the laver among\nthe Barbarians. After these are the minor mysteries, which have some\nfoundation of instruction and of preliminary preparation for what is\nto come after; and the great mysteries, in which nothing remains to be\nlearned of the universe, but only to contemplate and comprehend nature\nand things.\u201d We have thus a sort of baptism and catechumenate.\n\n[604] The fast lasted nine days, and during it certain kinds of food were\nwholly forbidden. Cf. Lobeck, _Aglaoph._ pp. 189-197.\n\n[605] There was a lesser and a greater initiation: \u201cIt is a regulation\nof law that those who have been admitted to the lesser should again\nbe initiated into the greater mysteries.\u201d Hippol. 5, 8: see the whole\nchapter, as also cc. 9, 20.\n\n[606] Cf. Clem. Alex. _Protrept._ 12: \u201cO truly sacred mysteries! O\nstainless light! My way is lighted with torches and I survey the\nheavens and God: I am become holy whilst I am initiated. The Lord is\nthe hierophant, and seals while illuminating him who is initiated,\u201d &c.\nIb. 2: \u201cTheir (Demeter\u2019s and Proserpine\u2019s) wanderings, and seizure, and\ngrief, Eleusis celebrates by torchlight processions;\u201d and again p. 32. So\n\u00c6lius Aristid. i. p. 454 (ed. Canter), \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c3\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cd\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[607] \u201cI have fasted, I have drunk the cup,\u201d &c. Clem. Alex. _Protrept._\n2.\n\n[608] Cf. \u00c6lius Aristid. i. 454, on the burning of the temple at Eleusis.\nThe gain of the festival was not for this life only, but that hereafter\nthey would not lie in darkness and mire like the uninitiated.\n\n[609] Fragm. ap. Stob. _Florileg._ 120. Lenormant, _Cont. Rev._ Sept.\n1880, p. 430.\n\n[610] Synes. _Orat._ p. 48 (ed. Petav.), \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. But the \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u1f76\npossibly gave some private instruction to the groups of \u03bc\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 who were\ncommitted to them.\n\n[611] Cf. Lenormant, _Cont. Rev._ Sept. 1880, p. 414 sq.\n\n[612] Soph. _frag._ 719, ed. Dind.: so in effect Pindar, _frag. thren._\n8; Cic. _Legg._ 2. 14. 36; Plato, _Gorg._ p. 493 B, _Ph\u00e6do._ 69 C (the\nlot of the uninitiated). They were bound to make their life on earth\ncorrespond to their initiation; see Lenormant, _ut sup._ p. 429 sqq. In\nlater times it was supposed actually to make them better; Sopatros in\nWalz, _Rhet. Gr._ viii. 114.\n\n[613] See Garrucci, _Les Myst\u00e8res du Syncretisme Phrygien dans les\nCatacombes Romaines de Pr\u00e6textat_, Paris, 1854.\n\n[614] There was a further and larger process before a man was \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2.\nTert. _adv. Valent._ c. 1, says that it took five years to become \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[615] The most elaborate account is that of the Arval feast at Rome: cf.\nHenzen, _Acta fratrum Arvalium_.\n\n[616] \u03bc\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 is used of members of a religious association at Teos\n(Inscr. in _Bullet. de Corresp. Hell\u00e9nique_, 1880, p. 164), and of the\nRoman Monarchians in Epiph. 55. 8; cf. Harnack, _Dogm._ 628.\n\n[617] Clem. Alex. _Protrep._ 2; Hippol. 1, _pro\u0153m._ Cf. Philo, _de\nsacrif._ 12 (ii. 260), \u03c4\u03af \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f66 \u03bc\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[618] They also had the same sanction\u2014the fear of _future punishments_,\ncf. Celsus in Orig. 8. 48. Origen does not controvert this statement,\nbut appeals to the greater moral effect of Christianity as an argument\nfor its truth. They possibly also communicated divine knowledge. There\nis an inscription of Dionysiac artists at Nysa, of the time of the\nAntonines, in honour of one who was \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 of the temples at Pergamos,\nas \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd and \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03c1\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd. _Bull. de Corr. Hell\u00e9n._\n1885, p. 124, 1. 4; cf. Porphyry in Eusebius, _Pr\u00e6p. Ev._ 5. 14.\n\n[619] This revival had many forms, cf. Harnack, _Dogm._ p. 101.\n\n[620] Similar practices existed in the Church and in the new religions\nwhich were growing up. Justin Martyr speaks of the way in which, under\nthe inspiration of demons, the supper had been imitated in the Mithraic\nmysteries: \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039c\u03af\u03b8\u03c1\u03b1 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2: _Apol._ 1. 66. Tertullian points to the\nfact as an instance of the power of the devil (_de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ 40): \u201cqui\nipsas quoque res sacramentorum divinorum idolorum mysteriis \u00e6mulatur.\u201d He\nspecifies, inter alia, \u201cexpositionem delictorum de lavacro repromittit\n... celebrat et panis oblationem.\u201d Celsus, too, speaks of the \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\nand the \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76 of Mithras and others: Orig. _c. Cels._ 6. 22.\n\n[621] The objection which Celsus makes (_c. Cels._ 1. 1; Keim, p. 3) to\nthe secrecy of the Christian associations would hardly have held good\nin the apostolic age. Origen admits (_c. Cels._ 1. 7) that there are\nexoteric and esoteric doctrines in Christianity, and justifies it by\n(1) the philosophies, (2) the mysteries. On the rise of this conception\nof Christian teaching as something to be hidden from the mass, cf. the\nValentinians in Tert. _c. Valent._ 1, where there is a direct parallel\ndrawn between them and the mysteries: also the distinction of men into\ntwo classes\u2014\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 and \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 or \u1f51\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af\u2014among the Gnostics: Harn.\n_Dogm._ 222, cf. Hipp. 1, _pro\u0153m._, p. 4, who condemns \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 of the heretics, adding, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad\u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03c5\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Yet this very secrecy\nwas naturalized in the Church. Cf. Cyril Hier. _Catech._ vi. 30;\nAug. in _Psalm_ ciii., _Hom._ xcvi. in _Joan._; Theodoret, _Qu\u00e6st._\nxv. _in Num._, and _Dial._ ii. (_Inconfusus_); Chry. _Hom._ xix. _in\nMatt._ Sozomen\u2019s (1. 20. 3) reason for not giving the Nicene Creed is\nsignificant alike as regards motive and language: \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c6\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03c0\u1fc4\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03c5\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b2\u03af\u03b2\u03bb\u1ff3 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n[622] Acts ii, 38, 41; viii. 12, 13, 36, 38; x. 47, 48; xvi. 15, 33;\nxviii. 8; xix. 5.\n\n[623] c. 7.\n\n[624] _Apol._ 1. 61; cf. Otto, vol. i. p. 146, n. 14; Engelhardt, p. 102.\n\n[625] Clem. Alex. _P\u00e6dag._ 1. 6; Can. Laod. 47, Bruns, p. 78; Greg. Naz.\n_Orat._ xl. pp. 638, 639. Hence \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 = those being prepared for\nbaptism, \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 = the baptized. Cf. Cyr. Hier. _Catech._ 13. 21,\np. 193 _et passim_.\n\n[626] Lobeck, _Aglaoph._ p. 36, cf. 31 ff.\n\n[627] _Apol._ 8: talia initiatus et consignatus = \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03c5\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. See Otto, vol. i. p. 141; cf. _ad Valent._ 1.\n\n[628] For the seal in baptism, cf. Clem. Al. _Strom._ 2. 3; _Quis\ndives_, 42, ap. Euseb. _Hist._ 3. 23; Euseb. _Vita Const._ 1. 4.\n62; Cyr. Hier. _Catech._ 5; Greg. Naz. _Orat._ 40, p. 639; Orig.\n_c. Cels._ 6. 27. For the use of imagery and the terms relating to\nsealing\u2014illumination\u2014initiation\u2014from the mysteries, Clem. Al. _Protrep._\n12. The effect of baptism is illumination, perfection, _P\u00e6dag._ 1. 6;\nhence sins before and after baptism, i.e. enlightenment, are different,\n_Strom._ 2. 13. Early instances of \u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u1f76\u03c2 are collected in Gebhardt on 2\nClem. pp. 168, 169; cf. also Cyr. Hier. _Catech._ 18. 33, p. 301.\n\n[629] Greg. Naz. _Orat._ 39, p. 632; Chrys. _Hom._ 85 _in Joan._ xix. 34;\nSozomen, ii. 8, 6.\n\n[630] Sozomen, i. 3. 5.\n\n[631] Dion. Areop. _Eccles. Hierar._ 3, p. 242.\n\n[632] Clem. Alex. _P\u00e6dag._ 1. 6, p. 93; Athan. _Cont. Ar._ 3, p. 413 C.;\nGreg. Naz. _Orat._ 40, p. 648; Dion. Areop. _Eccles. Hier._ 3, 242.\n\n[633] Chrys. _Hom._ 99, vol. v.; Theod. _in Cantic._ 1.\n\n[634] Dion. Areop. _Eccles. Hier._ 1. 1; _Mys. Theol._ 1. 1.\n\n[635] Chrys. _Hom._ 1 _in Act._ p. 615; _Hom._ 21 _ad popul. Antioch_;\nSozomen, ii. 17. 9.\n\n[636] Sozomen, i. 3. 5; ii. 7. 8; iv. 20. 3; vi. 38. 15; vii 8. 7, _et\npassim_. These examples do not by any means exhaust or even adequately\nrepresent the obligations in the sphere of language, and of the ideas\nit at once denotes and connotes, which the ecclesiastical theory and\npractice of baptism lies under to the mysteries; but they may help to\nindicate the degree and nature of the obligation.\n\n[637] For the sphere of the influence of the mysteries on the language\nand imagery of the New Testament, see 1 Cor. ii. 6 ff.; cf. Heb. vi. 4.\n\n[638] _Apost. Const._ 8. 32. Cf. passages quoted from Clem. Alex. and\nothers, _supra_, p. 287, note 1; p. 295, notes 2 and 5. See Bingham, vol.\niii. pp. 443-446.\n\n[639] _De pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ 41. Cf. Epiphan. 41. 3; _Apost. Const._ 8. 12.\n\n[640] \u1f03 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c5\u03ae\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, _de Spir. Sanct._ 27;\ncf. Orig. _c. Cels._ 3. 59 _ad fin._ and 60, e.g. \u201cthen and not before\ndo we invite them to participation in our mysteries,\u201d and \u201cinitiating\nthose already purified into the sacred mysteries.\u201d Cf. _Dict. Christian\nAntiquities_, s. v. _Disciplina Arcani_.\n\n[641] See p. 293, note 1; also _Dict. Christian Antiquities_, s. vv.\n_Baptism_, _Catechumens_, especially p. 318, and _Creed_.\n\n[642] _Histoire de l\u2019\u00e9glise d\u2019Alexandrie_, p. 12: Paris, 1677.\n\n[643] _De baptismo Christi_, 4. ii. 374, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03ad\u03b6\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c6\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9. Cyril, _Pr\u00e6fatio ad Catech._ 15.\n\n[644] Mabillon. _Com. pr\u00e6v. ad. ord. Rom._; _Museum Ital._ II. xcix.\n\n[645] It was one of the points to which the Greeks objected in the\ndiscussions of the ninth century.\n\n[646] c. 9.\n\n[647] Bk. ii. 57, p. 87; cf. viii. 5, p. 239, lines 18, 19.\n\n[648] viii. 11. 12, p. 248.\n\n[649] Origen, _c. Cels._ 3. 59. Persons who have partaken of the\nEucharist are \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 (Chrys. _de compunct. ad Demet._ 1. 6. i. p.\n132), and \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03c5\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 (id. _Hom._ vi. _de beat. Phil._ c. 3. i. p. 498,\nand in _Ep. ad Hebr._ cap. x., _Hom._ xvii. 4, vol. xii. 169). Degrees\nand distinctions came to be recognized within the circle of the very\ninitiated themselves, _Apost. Const._ vii. 44, viii. 13.\n\n[650] The earlier offerings were those of Iren\u00e6us, 4. 17. 5, where he\nspeaks of Christ \u201csuis discipulis dans consilium, primitias Deo offerre\nex suis creaturis;\u201d and again the Church offers \u201cprimitias suorum munerum\nin Novo Testamento ei qui alimenta nobis pr\u00e6stat.\u201d The table in the\nheathen temple was important; upon it were placed the offerings: Th.\nHomolle in _Bulletin de Corresp. Hell\u00e9n._ 1881, p. 118. For the Eucharist\nitself as a mystery, cf. \u03c6\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74, Chrys. _de sacerdot._ 3. 4,\nvol. i. 382. He argues for silence on the ground that they are mysteries,\n_de bapt. Christ._ 4. ii. 375. Cf. Greg. Naz. _Orat._ 44, p. 713; Conc.\nLaod. 7, Bruns, p. 74.\n\n[651] Found in Chrys. e.g. _Hom. in Ep._ ii. _ad Corinth._ v. c. 3, vol.\nx. 470: \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf \u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03b3\u1fc7.\n\n[652] _Ad Ephes._ 5; see Lightfoot\u2019s note. Cf. _Trall._ 7; _Philad._ 4;\n_Mag._ 7; _Rom._ 2.\n\n[653] _Ap. Const._ ii. 57, p. 88. But see for \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd in a highly\nfigurative sense, iii. 6, iv. 3.\n\n[654] _H. E._ x. 4, 44.\n\n[655] Isid. Pelus. _Epist._ 3. 340, p. 390, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u1fc6\u03bb\u03b8\u03b5 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c3\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2; also 4. 181, p. 516, \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03bc\u1fc2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1. Cf. Chrys. _de comp. ad Demet._ 1. 6, vol. i.\np. 131; Theodoret, _dial._ 2, vol. iv. 125. There was a sacred formula.\nBasil says that no saint has written down the formula of consecration:\n_de Spir. Sancto_, 66, vol. iv. pp. 54, 55. After saying that some\ndoctrines and usages of the Church have come down in writing, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03ba\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03cc\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1, he\ninstances the words of the Eucharistic invocation as among the later; \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f01\u03b3\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n[656] In Dionysius Areop. (s. v. \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2, ed. Corderius, i. 839),\nthe bishops are \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03af, \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03af, \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u03af,\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03af, \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af; the priests are \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af; the deacons,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af; the Eucharist is \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 (c. 4). The deacon,\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 (c. 5, \u00a7 3, p. 233), i.e. dips them in the\nwater; the priest, \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, i.e. leads the baptized\nby the hand into the church; the bishop, \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u1fd6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1ff3 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[657] Dion. Areop. _Eccles. Hier._ c. 3, par. 1, \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2, pp. 187, 188.\n\n[658] For in the decree mentioned in a previous note (p. 292, n. 2),\namong other honours to T. \u00c6lius Alcibiades, he is to be \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03c0\u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[659] Cf. for the use of lights in worship, the money accounts, from a\nBerlin papyrus, of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus at Arsino\u00ea, A.D.\n215, in Hermes, Bd. xx. p. 430.\n\n[660] _Adv. Valent._ 1. Hippolytus (1, _pro\u0153m_; 5. 23, 24) says the\nheretics had mysteries which they disclosed to the initiated only after\nlong preparation, and with an oath not to divulge them: so the Naassenes,\n5. 8, and the Perat\u00e6, 5. 17 (ad fin.), whose mysteries \u201care delivered\nin silence.\u201d The Justinians had an oath of secrecy before proceeding to\nbehold \u201cwhat eye hath not seen\u201d and \u201cdrinking from the living water,\u201d 5.\n27.\n\n[661] E.g. Marcus, in connection with initiation into the higher\nmysteries Hipp. 6. 41, and the Elkasaites as cleansing from gross sin, 9.\n15.\n\n[662] Eus. _H.E._ iv. 7.\n\n[663] Hipp. 5. 27, of the Justinians. Cf. Hilgenfeld, _Ketzergesch._ p.\n270.\n\n[664] For the Eastern custom, see Cyril Hier. _Catech. Myst._ ii. 3,\n4, p. 312: the candidate is anointed all over _before_ baptism with\nexorcised oil, which, by invocation of God and prayer, purifies from the\nburning traces of sin, but also puts to flight the invisible powers of\nthe evil one. Cf. _Apost. Const._ vii. 22, 41, iii. 15, 16; the _Coptic\nConstitutions_, c. 46 (ed. Tattam), cf. Boetticher\u2019s Gr. translation in\nBunsen\u2019s _Anal. Ante-Nic._ ii 467; _Clem. Recog._ 3. 67; Chrys. _Hom._\n6. 4, _in Ep. ad Col._ xi. 342, \u1f00\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03b8\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03b2\u03b7\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, here also before baptism and all over; Dionys. Areop.\n_Eccles. Hier._ 2. 7; Basil, _de Spir. Sanct._ 66, vol. iv. 55. For\nearlier Western as distinct from Eastern thought on the subject, cf.\nTert. _de bapt._ 6 and 7; _de resurr. carnis._ 8; _adv. Marc._ i. 14;\nCyprian, _Ep._ 70. For the later Western usage, introduced from the East,\nsee _Conc. Rom._ 402, c. 8, ed. Bruns. pt. ii. 278; _Ordo_ 6, _ad fac.\nCatech._ in Mart\u00e8ne, _de ant. eccl. rit._ i. p. 17; Theodulfus Aurel. _de\nord. bapt._ 10; unction of the region of the heart before and behind,\nsymbolizing the Holy Spirit\u2019s unction with a view to both prosperity and\nadversity (Sirmond, vol. ii. 686); Isid. Hisp. _de off. eccl._ 2. 21;\nCatechumens _exorcizantur, sales accipiunt et unguntur_, the salt being\nmade _ut eorum gustu condimentum sapienti\u00e6 percipiant, neque desipiant a\nsapore Christi_ (Migne, lxxxiii. col. 814, 815); C\u00e6s. Arelat. _serm._ 22.\n\n[665] _Apol._ 1. 66.\n\n[666] ap. Hipp. 6. 39.\n\n[667] Tert. _ad Scap._ 2, holds that sacrifice may consist of simple\nprayer.\n\n[668] Cf. Celsus\u2019 idea of faith: Orig. _c. Cels._ 3. 39; Keim, p. 39.\n\n[669] Philo\u2019s view of faith is well expressed in two striking passages,\n_Quis rer. div. Heres_, 18, i. 485; and _de Abrah._ 46, ii. 39.\n\n[670] Cf. \u201cHe that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is\na rewarder of them that seek Him,\u201d Heb. xi. 6; and \u201cHe that is of God\nheareth God\u2019s words,\u201d John viii. 47.\n\n[671] It was one of Celsus\u2019 objections to Christianity that its preachers\nlaid more stress on belief than on the intellectual grounds of belief:\nOrig. _c. Cels._ 1. 9. Origen\u2019s answer, which is characteristic rather\nof his own time than expressive of the belief of the apostolic age, is\nthat this was necessary for the mass of men, who have no leisure or\ninclination for deep investigation (1. 10), and in order not to leave men\naltogether without help (1. 12).\n\n[672] E.g. Rom. vi. 17, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b4\u03cc\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2; 2 John, 9, \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6; 2 Tim. i. 13, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5 \u1f51\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f67\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f10\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f24\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2; 1 Tim. vi. 12, \u1f61\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd; Jude 3,\n\u1f21 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f01\u03b3\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2. Polycrates, ap. Eus. _H. E._ 5.\n24, \u1f41 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f7c\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2: see passages collected in Gebhardt and Harnack\u2019s\n_Patres Apost._ Bd. i. th. 2 (Barnabas), p. 133.\n\n[673] Cf. Schmid, _Dogmeng._ p. 14, Das Taufsymbol.\n\n[674] c. 7. 4.\n\n[675] See Acts viii. 16, xix. 5, with which compare Rom. vi. 1-11, Acts\nxxii. 16. _Didach\u00e9_, 9. 5, \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u039a\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5; and _Apost.\nConst._ Bk. ii. 7, p. 20, \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039a\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\n\u1f38\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f04\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd; cf. 148, 7, and elsewhere, in composite\nform. Against this Cyprian wrote, in _Ep._ 73, _ad Jubaianum_, 16-18; cf.\nHarnack, _Dogmeng._ 176.\n\n[676] Cf. von Engelhardt, _Das Christenthum Justins_, p. 107.\n\n[677] Cf. Harnack, _Dogmeng._ p. 130 ff.\n\n[678] Cf. Clement\u2019s account of Basilides\u2019 conception of faith in contrast\nto his own, _Strom._ 5. 1.\n\n[679] Orig. _c. Cels._ 5. 65.\n\n[680] Cf. Ptolem\u00e6us _ad Floram_, c. 7, ed. Pet.\n\n[681] See instances in Harn. _Dogm._ p. 134.\n\n[682] Thus Basilides, ap. Hippol. 7. 20, preferred to follow a tradition\nfrom Matthias, who was said to have been specially instructed by the\nSaviour. The Naassenes, ib. 10. 9, traced their doctrine to James, the\nBrother of the Lord. Valentinus, Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 7. 17, was said\nto be a hearer of Theudas, who was a pupil of Paul. Hippol. 1, _pro\u0153m_,\nargued against all heretics that they had taken nothing from Holy\nScripture, and had not preserved the \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f01\u03b3\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. Cf. Tert. _c.\nMarc._ 1. 21. But see the very remarkable statement of Origen as to the\ncause of heresies, _c. Cels._ 3. 12; cf. Clem. Al. _Strom._ 7. 17.\n\n[683] Cf. Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 7. 17, \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 ... \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and the\ncontention of Tert. _de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ 32, Sicut apostoli non diversa inter\nse docuissent, ita et apostolici non contraria apostolis edidissent;\nHarnack, pp. 183 ff., especially note 2, pp. 134-136. Eusebius, _H. E._\n4. 7, mentions that very many contemporary church writers had written\nin behalf \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b7\u03c2, against Basilides,\nespecially Agrippa Castor.\n\n[684] Adamantius (Origen, ed. Delarue, i. 809) says that the Marcionites\nhad \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03c7\u03b1\u03af.\n\n[685] For the \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, especially of \u201cecclesi\u00e6\napostolic\u00e6,\u201d cf. Tert. _de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ cc. 21. 36; Iren. 3. 1-3; Orig.\n_de princ._; _pr\u00e6f._ 2: for the \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f7c\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, Iren. 1. 9. 4; Tert.\n_adv. Marc._ 1. 21 (regula sacramenti); _de Virg. vel._ 1; _adv. Prax._\n2; _de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ cc. 3. 12. 42; _de monog._ 2. In general, see\nWeingarten, _Zeittafeln_, s. 17. 19.\n\n[686] _De pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ cc. 25. 26.\n\n[687] 4. 20.\n\n[688] See Overbeck, _die Anf\u00e4nge der patrist. Literatur_, in the _Hist.\nZeitschrift_, N.F. Bd. xii. 417-472.\n\n[689] Cf. Hegesippus, ap. Eus. _H.E._ 4. 22. 3, \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u039a\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, for this practical\nco-ordination; see Gebhardt and Harnack on 2 Clement, p. 132, for\nexamples; also Harnack, _Dogm._ 131.\n\n[690] Cf. Weingarten, _Zeittafeln_, p. 19, where he cites the Muratorian\nfragment, Origen (ap. Eus. _H.E._ 6. 25), and Athanasius, in the last of\nwhom he traces the first use of the term \u201ccanon\u201d in our sense. But we\nmust carefully distinguish the _idea_ of a canon and the _contents_ of\nthe canon. It is uncertain whence the idea of a canon of Scripture came,\nwhether from the ecclesiastical party or from the Gnostics; and if from\nthe latter, whether it was from Basilides, or Valentinus, or Marcion.\nMost likely the last. Harnack, _Dogm._ 215 ff.; cf. 237-240 for Marcion\nas the first Biblical critic.\n\n[691] Harnack, pp. 317 f.\n\n[692] Tertullian, though in his treatise _de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ he abandons\nargument with the Gnostics, yet in his _adv. Marc._ 1. 22, relaxes that\nline of argument, and enters into formal discussion.\n\n[693] c. 2.\n\n[694] Tert. _de pr\u00e6scr. h\u00e6r._ cc. 8, 18.\n\n[695] Theories were framed as to the relation of \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2; e.g.\nthe former was conceived to relate to the Spirit, the latter to the Son,\nwhich Clem. Alex. denies (_Strom._ 5. 1).\n\n[696] See Harnack, 549.\n\n[697] _Adv. Prax._ 3.\n\n[698] Which had been the contention of the heretics whom Tertullian\nopposed: _de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ cc. 16, 17.\n\n[699] Origen (_de princ._, _pr\u00e6f._ 3) follows in the line of those who\nrested upon apostolic teaching, but gives a foothold for philosophy by\nsaying (1) that the Apostles left the grounds of their statements to be\ninvestigated; (2) that they affirmed the existence of many things without\nstating the manner and origin of their existence.\n\n[700] Valentinus accepted the whole canon (integro instrumento), and the\nmost important work of Basilides was a commentary on the Gospel: Tert.\n_de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ 38.\n\n[701] Tert. _de pr\u00e6sc. h\u00e6r._ 18. It is important to contrast the\narguments of Tertullian with those of Clement of Alexandria, and of both\nwith the practice which circumstances rendered necessary. In _Strom._ 7.\n16 and 17, Clement makes Scripture the criterion between the Church and\nthe heretics, though he assumes that all orthodox teaching is apostolic\nand uniform.\n\n[702] The combination is first found in _Apost. Const._ Bk. ii. pp. 14,\n10. 16, 25. 51. 17, 20. 58, 22.\n\n[703] Routh, _Rel. Sacr._ iii. p. 290; Harnack, p. 644.\n\n[704] Cf. the definitions of faith in Clem. Al. _Strom._ 2. cc. 2 and 3.\n\n[705] \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is used in Clem. Al. _Strom._ 7. 15, of the true system\nof Christian doctrine: \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2: as in Sext. Empir.\n(_Pyrrh._ p. 13, \u00a7 16) it meant only adherence to a system of dogmas (no\nstandard implied).\n\n[706] _Ad Scap._ 2.\n\n[707] Philosophers had abused each other. Theologians followed in\ntheir track. The \u201ccart-loads of abuse they emptied upon one another\u201d\n(\u1f45\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03be\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c6\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03ba\u03ad\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, Lucian, _Eunuch._ 2) are\nparalleled in, e.g. Gregory of Nyssa.\n\n[708] See Lecture V. p. 135.\n\n[709] Socrates, _H. E._ p. 177, \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, of the corporate\nunity of a philosophical school.\n\n[710] _Didach\u00e9_, cc. 1-3.\n\n[711] _Apost. Const._ p. 1. 15-17.\n\n[712] _Ib._ 5. 20-22.\n\n[713] _Ib._ 1. 6.\n\n[714] \u201cWe Christians are remarkable,\u201d says Tertullian (_Ad Scap._\n2), \u201conly for the reformation of our former vices.\u201d The plea of the\nApologists was based on the fact that the Christians led blameless lives:\n_de caus\u00e2 innocenti\u00e6 consistam_, Tert. _Apol._ c. 4.\n\n[715] The Elchasaites, ap. _Hipp._ 9. 15.\n\n[716] Weingarten, _Zeittafeln_, p. 12. See also Lightfoot, _Ignatius_,\nvol. ii. pp. 310-312.\n\n[717] Weingarten, p. 17.\n\n[718] Eusebius, _H. E._ 4. 22, 4.\n\n[719] The very terms heresy and heterodox bear witness to the action of\nthe Greek philosophical schools on the Christian Church: \u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is used\nin Sext. Empir. _Pyrrh._ p. 13, of any system of dogmas, or the principle\nwhich is distinctive of a philosophical school: cf. Diels, _Doxogr. Gr._\npp. 276, 573, 388. In Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 7. 15, it is used to denote\nthe orthodox system. \u1f19\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 is used of the dogmatics from point of\nview of a sceptic: Sext. Empir. _adv. Math._ p. 771, \u00a7 40. Josephus uses\nit of the men of the other schools or parties as distinguished from the\nEssenes, _de Bell. Jud._ 2. 8. 5. For the place of opinion in Gnostic\nsocieties, with its curious counterpart in laxity of discipline, see\nTert. _de pr\u00e6sc._ 42-44. He speaks of the Valentinians, _adv. Val._, as\n\u201cfrequentissimum plane collegium inter h\u00e6reticos.\u201d Cf. Harnack, 190 ff.,\nalso 211. The very cultivation of the _Gnosis_ means the supremacy of the\nintellect.\n\n[720] Tertullian, _de Spectaculis_, c. 4. If \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 was important as\nan element in salvation side by side with \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2\u2014or if \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 included\n\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\u2014then also the rejection of the right faith was a bar to salvation:\nhence heresy was regarded as involving eternal death: Tert. _de pr\u00e6sc._ 2.\n\n[721] Tert. _de Spect._ c. 4.\n\n[722] \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c7\u03ae, here expressly used of the moral precepts in c. 2. 1.\n\n[723] c. 11. 1, 2.\n\n[724] c. 11. 8, 10; cf. Herm. _Mand._ 11. 7 and 16.\n\n[725] c. 12. 1, 3-5.\n\n[726] The _jura_, i.e. the _communicatio pacis et appellatio\nfraternitatis et contesseratio hospitalitatis_, were controlled (_regit_)\nby the tradition of the creed (_unius sacramenti traditio_), Tert. _de\npr\u00e6sc._ 20.\n\n[727] _Communicamus cum ecclesiis apostolicis, quod nulla doctrina\ndiversa; hoc est testimonium veritatis_, Tert. _ibid._ 21.\n\n[728] Lect. vi. p. 164 sq.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX,\n\nCONTAINING THE CHIEF TOPICS, PROPER NAMES, AND TECHNICAL TERMS, REFERRED\nTO IN THE LECTURES.\n\n_Italicized subdivisions of a title are elsewhere treated in more detail\nas separate titles_\n\n\n  Abstract ideas, Greek tendency to, 116-118.\n\n  \u00c6on, common Gnostic idea, 190;\n    two ways of viewing the \u00c6ons, 258 fin., 259.\n\n  Africanus, Julius, as an exegete, 81.\n\n  Alexandrine School, its philosophy, 81;\n    on moral probation, 232;\n    on God\u2019s transcendence, 255.\n    See also _Philo_ and _Origen_.\n\n  Allegorism, 58 ff.;\n    connection with the \u201cmysteries,\u201d 59, cf. 66;\n    ethical, 60;\n    physical, 61;\n    the Stoics, 61-63;\n    later exponents, 64;\n    The temper widespread in religion, 65;\n      Hellenistic Jews, 65 ff., e.g. Aristobulus and Philo, 66-69, 72,\n        128;\n      early Christian exegesis, especially Gnostic, 69 ff.;\n      compared with Philo\u2019s, 72;\n      prophecy its main subject, 72-74;\n      an O. T. Apologetic, 77-79;\n    Reactions, 79-82;\n      dogmatic complication, 82;\n      irony of its history, _ib._;\n      use and abuse, 83;\n      its place in modern life, 83-85.\n\n  Alogi, 252, n. \u00b2.\n\n  Ambrose of Milan, his ethics Stoic, 169.\n\n  Antiochene School, its exegesis, 81, 82.\n\n  Apologists mark transition, e.g. 126-131;\n    idea of creation, 196;\n    free-will, 231;\n    transcendence of God, 252, 253;\n    _Logos_ doctrine, 261-263, 267, 268.\n\n  Apostolic doctrine, idea of, 316, 317;\n    \u201cApostles\u2019 Creed,\u201d 317-319.\n\n  _Apostolical Constitutions_, Bk. i., its ethical type of teaching,\n        161, cf. 132, 336;\n    Bk. ii., on place of discipline, 162, 163;\n    Bks. ii. and viii., on Lord\u2019s Supper, 301.\n\n  Aristobulus, his allegorism, 66 fin.\n\n  Aristotle, his use of _ousia_, 269, 270;\n    of _pistis_, 311.\n\n  _Askesis_ (\u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), Greek, 148 ff.;\n    in Philo, 148;\n    reduced to system, e.g. \u201cretreats,\u201d 148-150, Christian, 164 ff.;\n    its germ, 164, 165;\n    ran parallel to Greek, 166, 167;\n    Monachism, 167, 168.\n\n  Association at first voluntary, 334, 335.\n\n  Associations, Greek religious, 290 ff.\n    Syncretistic, akin to \u201cmysteries,\u201d 290, 291;\n      purity of life required, 141;\n      mixed elements, 291, 292;\n      effects on Christianity, 292-295, cf. 141.\n\n  Athenagoras on absolute creation, 196;\n    transcendence of God, 253;\n    his Monism, 265.\n\n\n  Baptism and dualism, 19.\n    Primitive simplicity, 294, 295;\n      its formula, 315;\n      its ethical character among the Elchasaites, 337;\n      later change in name, 295, 296;\n      in time, 296, 297;\n      minor features\u2014\u201c_symbolum_,\u201d lights, &c., 298, 299;\n      late ritual, 299, 300;\n      Gnostic realism, 306;\n      and unction, 307.\n    Its importance, 341, 342.\n\n  Basilides characterized, 9, n. \u00b2;\n    his view of creation, 195, 196;\n      of transcendence, 254, 255;\n    genesis of the _Logos_, 263.\n\n  Bishops, and the \u201crule of faith,\u201d 317, 318;\n    speculative interpretation by consensus, 326, 327;\n    results, 327 ff.\n\n\n  Canon of N. T., development of the idea, 319-321.\n\n  Catholic Church, its genesis, 11, 132;\n    put an end to \u201cprophesying,\u201d 107;\n    a fusion of Christianity and Greek philosophy, 125;\n    unconsciously Hellenized, 132-135;\n    as a \u201c_corpus permixtum_,\u201d 164.\n\n  Celsus, his and Porphyry\u2019s polemic against Christian allegorism, 80;\n    on relation of Christianity and philosophy, 127, 128, cf. 11 init.\n\n  Christianity, primitive:\n    the New Law, 158-162;\n    its ethical idea of God, 224, 225;\n    its theological basis, 238, 239, 251, 252.\n\n  Church, its early character, 335;\n    holiness, 335-337;\n    hope, 337, 338.\n\n  Clement of Alexandria, his allegorism, 70;\n    appeal to hieroglyphics, 71;\n    and N. T. allegories, 76;\n    on Christianity and philosophy, 127;\n    on the Conservatives, 130, 131.\n\n  _Clementines, the_: their Old Testament criticism, 71;\n    God just and good, 229, 230.\n\n  Consecration of the elements: the formula secret, 302, n. \u2076.\n\n  Conservatism: Clement and Tertullian on it, 130, 131;\n    in Ebionites and Elchasaites, 252, 337;\n    often not recognized as such (cf. Ebionites), e.g. in Origen, 323;\n    the simpler sort, 324;\n    Paul of Samosata, 327, cf. 345, 346;\n    in Puritanism, 347, 348;\n    Monachism, 348, 349.\n\n  Creed, the, 313 ff.;\n    its germs, 313, 314;\n    the baptismal formula, 314, 315;\n    becomes a test, 315;\n    expanded, 315, 316;\n    by \u201cApostolic teaching,\u201d 316, 317;\n    the \u201cApostles\u2019 Creed\u201d of the Bishops (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae),\n        317-319.\n\n  Cyprian characterized, 8.\n\n\n  D\u00e6mons, 246, especially n. \u00b3.\n\n  Definition among the Greeks, 118;\n    influence on Catholic Church, 135, 330, 331.\n\n  Development not arrested, 332, 351, 352.\n\n  Dialectic, Greek, 118 fin.\n\n  _Didach\u00e9, the_: the \u201cTwo Ways\u201d emphasizes conduct, 160, 161, 335, 336;\n    and the idea of wages, 225;\n    its simple theology, 251, 252;\n    Baptism, 294, 295, cf. 315;\n    the Lord\u2019s Supper, 300, 301;\n    intercommunion based on moral test, 343, 344.\n\n  Dio Chrysostom characterized, 6;\n    on \u201c_askesis_,\u201d 150.\n\n  Dionysius Areopagites sums up the influence of the \u201cmysteries,\u201d 303,\n        304.\n\n  Discipline, early Christian, 162 ff.;\n    in _Apost. Const._ Bk. ii., 162, 163;\n    its Puritan ideal, 163;\n    later \u201c_corpus permixtum_\u201d idea, 164.\n\n  Dogma (\u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1), its original sense, 119, 120;\n    later Dogmatism, 121-123;\n    the age of Dogmatism, 280.\n\n  Dualism and Baptism, 19;\n    and Stoicism, _ib._;\n    its basis, 175;\n    Platonic, 177;\n    variously expressed, 178-180;\n    later modified, 181;\n    in Christian theories of creation, 194, 195;\n    transition in Tatian, 195.\n\n\n  Ebionites become \u201cheretics,\u201d 132;\n    as Conservatives, 252, n. \u00b2.\n\n  Education, Greek, 26 ff.;\n    its forms literary, 27;\n    mainly Grammar and Rhetoric, 28 ff.;\n    the poets its main study, 30;\n    also a _litt\u00e9rateur_ philosophy, 32 ff.;\n    spite of protest, 34;\n    its extent, 35 ff.\n\n  Epictetus characterized, 6;\n    as moral reformer, 142 ff.;\n    his attitude, 143, 144;\n    quoted, 144-147;\n    on \u201c_askesis_,\u201d 149;\n    his two planes of ethics, 152:\n    \u201cfollow Nature,\u201d 152-155;\n    \u201cfollow God,\u201d 155-158.\n\n  Essentia: its bad Latinity a source of disuse, 277, especially n. \u00b3.\n\n  Ethics, Greek, 139 ff.\n    Average morality, 139;\n    philosophic ethics, 140;\n    moral reformation in first centuries A.D., 140, 141;\n    in religious guilds and philosophy, 141;\n    its relation to Logic and Literature, 142, 143;\n    in Epictetus, 143 ff.;\n    moral gymnastic, 147;\n    _askesis_, 148 ff.;\n    the \u201cphilosopher,\u201d 150 ff.;\n    contents of ethical teaching, e.g. in Epictetus, 152 ff.\n\n  Ethics, Christian, 158-170.\n    Compared with Greek, 158;\n    its basis and characteristic idea (sin), 158, 159;\n    agreement upon value of conduct, 159;\n    the \u201cTwo Ways,\u201d 160, 161;\n    _Apost. Const._ Bk. i., 161;\n    _discipline_, earlier and later, 162-164;\n    Christian _askesis_, 164-168;\n    deterioration of average ethics, 168, 169;\n    victory of Greek ethics in Roman Law of Rights, 169, 170.\n\n  Evolutionary ideas among the Gnostics, as regards creation, 177,\n        190-193;\n    revelation, 257 ff.;\n    genesis of the _Logos_, 263 ff.\n\n  Exorcism in relation to Monism, 20, especially n.;\n    in Baptism, 307, 308, n. \u00b9.\n\n\n  Faith (\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2), history of its usage, 310 ff.;\n    in Old Testament, 310, 331;\n    Greek philosophy, 311;\n    Philo, 311, 312.\n    Christian form issuing in the _Creed_, 313 ff.;\n      relation to New Testament Canon, 319 ff.\n    Further speculative development, 321, 322;\n      \u201c_gnosis_\u201d by the side of \u201c_pistis_,\u201d 323 ff. and 339-341;\n      check found in consensus of Bishops, 326;\n    expansion of Creed, 327;\n    contrasted uses of term \u201cbelief,\u201d 328;\n    majority and minority views, 229;\n    recapitulation, 330.\n\n  Fitting, the, as a Stoic category, 153, 154;\n    root of \u201c_officium_\u201d and \u201c_debitum_,\u201d 154, 155.\n\n\n  \u201cGeneration, eternal,\u201d 267;\n    essential, 268;\n    Origen\u2019s contributions, _ib._\n\n  _Gnosis_ (\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) as a tendency, 129, 130;\n    side by side with \u201c_pistis_\u201d in Catholicism, 130-134, cf. 323 ff.\n        and 339-341;\n    as well as in Neo-Platonism, 133.\n\n  Gnosticism between two fires, 9;\n    allegorizes the Old Testament, 70;\n    also the Gospel, 75.\n    Its cosmogonies, 190;\n      evolutional types, 190-198;\n      hypothesis of a lapse, 198;\n      opposition from without and within, 193 fin.;\n    Basilides on matter and God, 195, 196.\n    Idea of transcendence, 251:\n      e.g. Basilides and Marcus, 254.\n    Modalism, 257 ff.\n    Connecting link with the Mysteries, 305 ff.;\n      e.g. _unction_ and sacramental realism, 306, 308, 309.\n    Attitude to tradition and the Scriptures, 325.\n\n  Grammar in Greek education, 28 ff.\n\n  \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, and \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 28 fin.;\n    its elements, 29, 30.\n\n  Guilds: see _Associations_.\n\n\n  Hellenism characterized, 13, 14.\n\n  Heresy, original use of term, 340, n. \u00b3.\n\n  Hippolytus, 6;\n    his theory of creation, 203.\n\n  History, its difficulties and rewards, 22-24.\n\n  Homer in Greek thought, 51 ff.;\n    in Christian theology, 69, 70.\n\n  Homily, the, 109-113.\n\n  _Homoousios_ (\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2) shared senses of \u201c_ousia_,\u201d 272;\n    first used of God by the Gnostics, 274;\n    its ambiguity, 274-276.\n\n  _Hyparxis_ (\u1f55\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) = \u201c_hypostasis_,\u201d 275, especially n. \u00b2.\n\n  _Hypostasis_ (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), relation to \u201c_ousia_,\u201d 275;\n    gradually specialized = \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 276 f.;\n    further defined by aid of \u201c_pros\u00f4pon_\u201d (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd) through use of\n        \u201c_persona_,\u201d 277, 278;\n    usage often doubtful, 278.\n\n\n  \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2 and cognate terms for ministrants, 303, n. \u00b9.\n\n  Immortality in the Mysteries, 289, 290.\n\n  Initiation (\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae): its stages, 284, n. \u00b3;\n    its idea, 285.\n    Proclamation, 285, 286;\n      confession and baptism (\u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd), 287;\n      sacrifice, procession, &c., 287, 288;\n      mystic drama, its nature, 288-290.\n\n  Inspiration in Greece, connected with rhythm, 51.\n\n  Iren\u00e6us, 8:\n    his theory of creation, 202, 203;\n    on Justice and Goodness in God, 228;\n    on free-will, 231;\n    his _Logos_ doctrine, 262, 263, cf. 266, n. \u00b9, 267, n. \u2074;\n    view of the Eucharistic elements, 302, n. \u00b9.\n\n\n  Judaism as basis of Christian theology, 238, 239.\n\n  Justin Martyr, 8;\n    on Christianity and philosophy, 126;\n    on free-will, 231;\n    on God\u2019s transcendence, 253;\n    _Logos_ doctrine, 261, 262;\n    genesis of the _Logos_, 266;\n    nature of the _Logos_, 267, 268.\n\n\n  _Logoi_ (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9), Stoical (= laws), 180;\n    compared with Platonic \u201cideas,\u201d 181, 182, cf. 180;\n    appear in Philo\u2019s \u201cforces,\u201d 185;\n    their sum the _Logos_, 176, 180, 182.\n\n  _Logos_, the, in Philo, 247 ff.;\n    relation to God, 249, 250;\n    and \u201c_logoi_,\u201d 259-261;\n    growth of _Logos_ doctrine, 261-263;\n    genesis of the _Logos_, 263, 264;\n    \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 and \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, 265, n. \u00b9;\n    nature of the _Logos_, 267, 268.\n\n  Lucian and the Antiochene exegesis, 81, 82.\n\n\n  Marcion, his ditheistic tendency, 227, 230;\n    his idea of a Canon, 321;\n    his literal method, 325.\n\n  Marcus: syncretistic grouping of metaphors under term \u201c_logoi_,\u201d 190;\n    God\u2019s transcendence, 255.\n\n  Maximus of Tyre, 6;\n    quoted for God\u2019s transcendence, 242.\n\n  Mediation of God\u2019s transcendence: see _Logos_.\n\n  Metaphysics and revelation, 137, 138.\n\n  Modalism, its two types, 257 ff.\n\n  Monachism: parallel of Greek and Christian, 167, 168;\n    a reaction, 348, 349.\n\n  Monarchianism a witness to older \u201cMonarchia,\u201d 206, 207.\n\n  Monism, in baptism and exorcism, 20;\n    its basis, 175;\n    Stoic, 175-177;\n    self-evolution of God, 177.\n\n  Montanism: a survival of \u201cprophecy,\u201d 107;\n    a reaction, 339.\n\n  Mysteries: their connection with allegory, 66;\n    Greek, 283;\n    _initiation_ at Eleusis, 284 ff.;\n    together with religious _guilds_ affect Christianity, 292 ff.;\n    generally, 293;\n    specially as to _Baptism_, 294 ff.;\n    and _Lord\u2019s Supper_, 300 ff.;\n    culmination of influence, 303-305;\n    Gnostics a bridge, 305 ff.\n    General result, 309.\n\n  \u03bc\u03cd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2, 296, 297.\n\n\n  Natura: see \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n  \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2, 158, cf. 159-162 (especially note).\n\n  Novatianism a Puritan reaction, 347, 348.\n\n\n  Ocellus Lucanus on idea of transcendence (supra-cosmic), 242, n. \u00b9.\n\n  Origen, 8:\n    his apologetic use of allegorism, 77, 78;\n    defence of it, 80;\n    his cosmogony a theodicy, 204-206;\n    its grand scale, 233-237;\n    shapes _Logos_ doctrine, 267 (especially n. \u2074), 268;\n    his _De principiis_ the first dogmatic system, 323.\n\n  _Ousia_ (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1), three Aristotelian senses [(i.) = _hyl\u00ea_; (ii.) =\n        _substantia concreta_; (iii.) = _subst. abstracta_], 269, 270.\n    Its later history in Platonic realism, 271, 272.\n    Difficulties in its application to God, 273 f.;\n      not popularly understood, 279.\n\n\n  Paul of Samosata, his case, 345, 346, cf. 326.\n\n  _Persona_ appropriated for _hypostasis_, 277, 278.\n\n  Philo and Philonian writings a valuable bridge, 7, 128, 182;\n    his allegorism, 67-69;\n    his \u201cliteral\u201d _v._ \u201cdeeper\u201d sense compared with Christian exegesis,\n        72;\n    God the ultimate cause, 182, 183;\n    monistic elements, 183, 184;\n    dualistic, 184, 185;\n    his \u201cforces,\u201d in plurality, 185, 186;\n    and unity, 186, 187;\n    but God is Creator or Father, 187, 188;\n    God\u2019s transcendence, 244 ff.;\n    intermediaries, 247;\n    distinctions in God\u2019s nature, 247 ff.\n\n  Philosophy in Greek education, 32 ff.;\n    as a profession, 40 ff.;\n    its \u201c_damnosa hereditas_,\u201d 138;\n    its decay amid dogma, and legacy to Christendom, 280, 281.\n\n  Philosopher, the, as moral reformer, 150;\n    outward marks, 151.\n\n  Platonism and Christianity, 81, 129;\n    its theological affinity, 238;\n    Plato author of transcendence proper, 240, 241, and n. \u00b9;\n    God\u2019s transcendence, 241-243;\n    d\u00e6mons, 246.\n\n  Plotinus on transcendence, 243;\n    genesis of _Logos_, 266, n. \u2075.\n\n  Plutarch, 6;\n    quoted for transcendence, 242;\n    immortality through \u201cinitiation,\u201d 289.\n\n  Poetry, its place in the Greek mind, 51 ff.\n\n  Political analogies in the Church, 331.\n\n  Preaching and \u201cprophesying,\u201d 105 ff.;\n    of composite origin, 107-109;\n    the \u201chomily,\u201d 109-113.\n\n  Prophecy and divination, 72, 73;\n    and apologetic, 74;\n    died with formation of Catholic Church, 107.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, how used, 278, especially n. \u00b9;\n    see _hypostasis_.\n\n  Ptolem\u00e6us, on God\u2019s transcendence, 251;\n    his idea of \u201c\u00c6ons,\u201d 258 fin., 259.\n\n  Puritanism in early Church, 347, 348.\n\n  Pythagoreanism and Christianity, 81, 129.\n\n\n  Religion, its political aspect to the Roman, 21;\n    connected with usage (\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2), 21, n.\n\n  Revelation and metaphysics, 137, 138.\n\n  Rhetoric, Greek, 87, 88.\n\n  \u201cRule of Faith:\u201d see _Faith_.\n\n\n  \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2, its later usage, 26.\n\n  Sophistic, its genesis, 87, 88;\n    mainly on lines of the older Rhetoric, 88-90;\n    popularized in \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, 91;\n    and itinerant, 92-94;\n    manner of discourse, 94-97;\n    its rewards, 97, 98;\n    and airs, 99.\n    Objections, 99-101;\n      reaction led by Stoics like Epictetus, 101-105.\n\n  Speculation, its true place in Christianity, 332, 333.\n\n  State, its interference with doctrine, 279 f., 345-347.\n\n  Stoicism: its view of substance, 19, n.;\n    and the moral reformation, 141 ff.;\n    its ethics in Ambrose, 169;\n    ethical affinities with Christianity, 238;\n    d\u00e6mons, 246.\n\n  _Substantia_ at first = _hypostasis_, then _ousia_, 277, cf. 278.\n\n  Supper, the Lord\u2019s:\n    extra-biblical developments, 300 ff.;\n    in _Didach\u00e9_, 300, 301;\n    _Apost. Const._ Bks. ii. and viii, 301;\n    the \u201caltar,\u201d its \u201cmysteries,\u201d the sacred formula, 302 and n. \u2076;\n    \u201cpriest,\u201d 303;\n    culmination in Dionysius, 303, 304;\n    realism first among Gnostics, 308, 309.\n\n  _Symboli traditio_, 298:\n    cf. _contesseratio_, 344.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03c2, of baptism, 295.\n\n\n  Tatian:\n    his view of creation, 196;\n    free-will, 231;\n    on genesis of _Logos_, 266, n. \u00b9 and n. \u2075, 267, n. \u00b3.\n\n  Teaching profession, 37 ff.;\n    endowed, 38;\n    excused public burdens, 39.\n\n  \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae, \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9: see _initiation_, cf. 296.\n\n  Tertullian, 8;\n    his Stoic view of substance, 19, n., 20, n., cf. 254;\n    on Christianity and philosophy, 126, 127;\n    the Conservatives, 131, 257, n. \u00b9;\n    on creation, 197;\n    on God as just and good, 229;\n    on free-will, 232;\n    transcendence in him supra-cosmic, 254;\n    genesis of the _Logos_, 265, n. \u00b9;\n    nature of the _Logos_, 268;\n    on ecclesiastical tradition and speculation, 322.\n\n  Theodore of Mopsuestia as exegete, 82.\n\n  Theophilus on creation, 196;\n    God\u2019s transcendence, 253;\n    on genesis of _Logos_, 265, n. \u00b9, cf. 268.\n\n  Transcendence, as of absolute Unity, Being, Mind, 240;\n    in Plutarch and Maximus, 242;\n    Plotinus, 243;\n    its two forms, 244;\n    Philo, 244, 245.\n    Absent from earliest Christian teaching, 251 f.;\n      appears in Apologists, 252, 253;\n    Gnostics, 254 f.;\n    Alexandrines, 255 f.;\n      mediation of, 256 ff., especially 257, n. \u00b2.\n\n\n  Unction of (1) exorcism, (2) thanksgiving, 307, 308, especially n. \u00b9.\n\n\n  \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (= _natura_), later use = _ousia_, 278;\n    sometimes = _hypostasis_, ib.\n\n  \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, of baptism, 295.\n\n\n  Writing as mysterious, 50.\n\n[Illustration]\n\n                     RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED,\n                 BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E.,\n                           AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.","title":"The influence of Greek ideas and usages upon the Christian church","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":112170}