{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_72730/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_72730","id":"gutenberg_72730","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/72730","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Plutarch -- Religion"],"text":"THE RELIGION OF PLUTARCH\n\n\n\n\n                             THE RELIGION OF\n                                 PLUTARCH\n\n                    _A PAGAN CREED OF APOSTOLIC TIMES_\n\n                                 AN ESSAY\n\n                                    BY\n                      JOHN OAKESMITH, D.LITT., M.A.\n\n                \u0394\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ce\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n                                  ARIST., _Meta._, i. 2.\n\n                         LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.\n                        39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON\n                           NEW YORK AND BOMBAY\n                                   1902\n\n                          _All rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY NOTE\n\n\nThe following pages are practically a reprint of a volume which was\nissued for private circulation some twelve months ago, under the title\n\u201cThe Religion of Plutarch as expounded in his \u2018Ethics.\u2019\u201d The main\ndifference between the present volume and its predecessor consists in the\ntranslation or removal of various quotations from Greek and Latin sources\nwhich were given in full in the first edition of the book. The references\nto these sources have, of course, been retained. Verbal corrections\nhave been made here and there, and a few pages of new matter have been\nintroduced into the \u201cPreface.\u201d In other respects the two impressions are\nsubstantially the same.\n\nI cannot allow this opportunity to pass without expressing my gratitude\nto J. E. Sandys, Esq., Litt.D., Public Orator in the University of\nCambridge, and Examiner in Greek at the University of London, who kindly\nplaced at my disposal his own copy of the original essay, in which he\nhad made numerous suggestions on points of style, and on questions of\nscholarship in general. These suggestions have, for the most part, been\nadopted in the preparation of the present edition. My thanks are also\nowing to my colleagues in the Civil Service, especially to those in the\nGeneral Post Office, London, to whose encouragement it is largely due\nthat this essay, in its present form, is able to see the light.\n\nAs the _Athen\u00e6um_, in reviewing the original edition (_Athen\u00e6um_, 2nd\nof August, 1902), suggested that \u201cthe present essay is probably the\nforerunner of a larger and more elaborate book,\u201d it may be desirable to\nexplain that the following pages do not constitute \u201cthe larger and more\nelaborate book\u201d which the _Athen\u00e6um_ is right in forecasting.\n\n                                                           JOHN OAKESMITH.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nWhen the student of Plutarch leaves the familiar ground of the \u201cParallel\nLives,\u201d and turns, for the first time, to the less thoroughly explored\nregion of the \u201cEthics,\u201d he is struck with wonder at the many-sided\nexcellence of the writer whose special gift he has been accustomed to\nregard as consisting in the composition of biographies more remarkable\nfor the presentation of moral truths than for the accurate narration of\nhistorical facts. He learns with surprise that Plutarch has bequeathed\nto posterity a mine of information respecting the period in which he\nhimself lived, as valuable and as interesting as the view presented in\nhis \u201cLives\u201d of that higher antiquity in which his classic heroes moved\nand worked. Even the actual bulk of Plutarch\u2019s contribution to what may\nbe called \u201cgeneral literature\u201d is noteworthy. Apart from the \u201cLives,\u201d\nthe so-called \u201cCatalogue of Lamprias\u201d contains the titles of nearly two\nhundred works attributed, ostensibly by his son, to Plutarch,[1] and some\nfourscore of these have been handed down to our time under the general,\nbut somewhat misleading, title of \u201cEthica\u201d or \u201cMoralia.\u201d\n\nAmong these surviving essays are to be found contributions, of a\nsurprising vitality and freshness, to the discussion of Education,\nPolitics, Art, Literature, Music, Hygiene; serious and studied criticisms\nand appreciations of the great philosophic schools of Greece and their\nfounders; short sermons on minor morals, illustrated by vivid sketches\nof character both typical and individual; conversations on Love and\nMarriage, and on other topics perpetually interesting to civilized\nsocieties. The longest work of all, the \u201cSymposiacs,\u201d or \u201cTable Talk,\u201d\nbesides containing a wealth of material used by Plutarch and his friends\nin the discussion of current problems of scientific, literary, and social\ninterest, gives a picture of Gr\u00e6co-Roman Society in the first Christian\ncentury, which, both from its general character and from the multitude\nof details it contains on matters of fact, is of the utmost importance\nfor the accurate study of the period and its complicated problems. All\nthese various works are interpenetrated with the character of the writer\nto such a vivid degree of personality that their study, from this point\nof view alone, would probably cast more light upon Plutarch\u2019s methods\nas a writer of history than innumerable minute and difficult inquiries\ninto his \u201csources,\u201d and the manner in which he used them in writing his\n\u201cLives.\u201d\n\nFascinating, however, as is the study of the \u201cEthics\u201d in these various\naspects, it soon becomes evident that the point of paramount importance\nfor a proper appreciation of Plutarch\u2019s attitude towards life and its\nproblems in general, is to be found in the position which he assumed in\nface of the religious questions which perplexed the thinking men of his\ntime and country. What was Plutarch\u2019s view of that ancient and hereditary\nfaith which was not only the official creed of the Empire, but which was\nstill accepted as a sufficient spiritual satisfaction by many millions\nof the Empire\u2019s subjects? Was it possible that a man so steeped in the\nbest literature, so keen a student of the greatest philosophies, could\nbe a believer, to any serious extent, in those traditions which appear\nso crude and impossible in the light of our higher modern ideals? And if\nhe could think them worthy of credit, by what method of interpretation\nwas this consummation facilitated? How could he persuade himself and\nothers to find in them at once the sanction and the inspiration of\nvirtuous conduct? These are some of the questions which are constantly\nbefore the mind of the reader as he turns the pages of the \u201cEthics,\u201d and\nthey are constantly before the mind of the reader because the author is\nconstantly supplying materials for answering them. The most important\nof Plutarch\u2019s general writings are devoted to the full discussion, from\na variety of standpoints, of religious questions, not only those handed\ndown by the popular tradition, or embodied in ceremonial observances and\nlegalized worships, but also those more purely theological conceptions\npresented in the various systems of Greek Philosophy. Around Plutarch\u2019s\nReligion revolves his conception of life; his numerous contributions to\nthe discussion of other subjects of human interest unfold their full\nsignificance only when regarded in the light supplied by a knowledge of\nhis religious beliefs.\n\nSuch, at any rate, is the experience of the present writer after a close\nstudy of the \u201cEthics\u201d during several years; and it is with the hope of\ncontributing in some degree to the clearer appreciation of Plutarch\u2019s\nmanifold activities in other directions, that an investigation into his\nreligious views has been made the special object of the following pages.\n\nThe text which has been used for the purposes of this essay is that\nissued at intervals between the years 1888 and 1896 by Mr. G. N.\nBernardakis, the director of the Gymnasium at Mytilene.[2] The editor has\npostponed, for discussion in a subsequent work, many questions bearing\nupon the authority of his MSS., and the principles which he has applied\nto them in the choice of his readings; his efforts in the _editio minor_\nhaving been almost wholly confined to presenting the results of his\nlabours in the shape of a complete and coherent text. Although, as Dr.\nHolden has said, \u201cuntil the appearance of the promised _editio major_ it\nis premature to pronounce an opinion on the editor\u2019s qualifications as a\ntextual critic,\u201d[3] yet Mr. Bernardakis has exhibited so much combined\naccuracy and acumen in the preliminary discussion of various questions\nconnected with his collation of MSS., and has disposed so completely,\nas Dr. Holden admits, of the charges of inaccuracy brought against\nhim by Professor von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff of Berlin,[4] that the\nmore general student of Classical Literature may, perhaps, feel some\namount of confidence that in this edition he sees the actual work of\nPlutarch himself, and not the ingenious and daring conjectures of some\ntoo brilliant critic. This feeling of confidence will not be diminished\nby the evident anxiety displayed by Mr. W. R. Paton, an English scholar\nworking in the same field, \u201cto induce Mr. Bernardakis to assist and\ncorrect\u201d him in editing a text of the \u201cDe Cupiditate Divitiarum,\u201d[5] and\nit will be increased by the discovery that, greatly different as the text\nof Bernardakis is from that of any other previous edition, the difference\nfrequently consists in the substitution of plain sense for undiluted\nabsurdity, or total want of meaning.\n\nIndebtedness to other sources of criticism and information is, the writer\nhopes, fully acknowledged in the footnotes as occasion arises. There has\nyet been published no work in English dealing with Plutarch\u2019s \u201cEthics\u201d at\nall similar in scope and character either to Volkmann\u2019s \u201cLeben, Schriften\nund Philosophie des Plutarch von Ch\u00e6ronea,\u201d[6] or to Gr\u00e9ard\u2019s \u201cLa Morale\nde Plutarque.\u201d[7] Archbishop Trench, who speaks slightingly of Gr\u00e9ard\u2019s\ninteresting study, has himself contributed one or two \u201cLectures\u201d to some\ngeneral observations on this sphere of Plutarch\u2019s activity,[8] while the\nRev. J. P. Mahaffy has given two chapters to the subject in his \u201cGreek\nWorld under Roman Sway.\u201d[9] Chap. xiii., which is headed \u201cPlutarch and\nHis Times\u2014Public Life,\u201d is devoted partly to Apuleius, and partly to\nPlutarch himself, and exhibits, in continuous form, a number of that\nauthor\u2019s best-known and most frequently quoted statements and opinions on\nthe subjects of Politics and Religion, some ten pages being set apart for\nthe presentation and criticism of his views on the latter topic. Chap.\nxiv. is entitled \u201cPlutarch and His Times\u2014Private Life,\u201d and intersperses\nwith comments a number of extracts from the evidence furnished by\nPlutarch on various matters appertaining to the social and domestic life\nof his epoch, giving the gist of passages selected from the \u201cTable Talk,\u201d\nfrom various essays on Education, and from several tracts on Minor Morals\nand other themes of general interest.\n\nAlthough Professor Mahaffy\u2019s prolonged and extensive researches into\nevery available sphere of Greek life and thought occasionally enable\nhim to help out his author\u2019s descriptions by aptly chosen illustrations\nfrom other sources, yet, in dealing with a writer at once so voluminous\nand so full of interest as Plutarch, the historian is hampered by the\nnecessary limits of his appointed task, no less than by his own diffusive\nand gossiping style. Mr. Mahaffy\u2019s Clio has always appeared to us in the\nlight of an amiable and cultured hostess presiding at Afternoon Tea,\ngliding graciously hither and thither among her guests, and introducing\ntopics of conversation which have only a superficial interest, or\nwhich she presents only in their superficial aspects; while, perhaps\nunconsciously, conveying the impression that she reserves for discussion\namong a few chosen intimates the more profound and sacred issues of human\nlife. These two chapters on Plutarch furnish an excellent example of\nProfessor Mahaffy\u2019s method. They are entertaining in the sense that all\nwell-conducted gossip is entertaining. A trait of character is chosen\nhere; a smart saying, or a foolish one, is selected there; a piquant\nanecdote is retold elsewhere: but the searchlight is never stationary,\nand the earnest student who trusts solely to its assistance will vainly\nattempt to see Plutarch steadily and see him whole.\n\nIt is, of course, the fact, as already suggested, that, in these\nchapters, Professor Mahaffy is dealing with Plutarch only so far as he\nfurnishes material illustrative of the conception which the historian\nhas formed as to the character of the age in which his subject lived.\nThis fact is conspicuously evident in the brief account of Plutarch\u2019s\nReligion given in the ten pages from page 311 onwards, where Professor\nMahaffy accepts the belief of so many of his predecessors, that the age\nwas an age of religious decadence, and not an age of religious revival;\nand that, moreover, it was blameworthy in Plutarch that \u201che never took\npains to understand\u201d Christianity.[10] Further, it must be added, that\nthe historian\u2019s natural desire to illustrate Plutarch\u2019s times, rather\nthan to display Plutarch himself, has led him to commit serious injustice\nby his uncritical acceptance of certain spurious tracts as the genuine\nworkmanship of Plutarch.\n\nThe conclusion at which Professor Mahaffy arrives, that Plutarch was \u201ca\nnarrow and bigoted Hellene,\u201d[11] is intelligible enough to those who\naccept the view which we have endeavoured to combat in Chapter III. of\nthe following essay, a view which is simply a belated survival of the\nancient prejudice which consigns to eternal perdition the followers\nof other Religions, because they are wilfully blind to the light with\nwhich our own special Belief has been blessed in such splendour. But\nthe man who, after even the most casual study of Plutarch\u2019s utterances\non Religion, can seriously describe him as \u201cnarrow and bigoted\u201d will\nmaintain, with equal serenity, that it is the practice of the sun to\nshine at midnight. Professor Mahaffy, indeed, in using such expressions,\nis at variance with his own better judgment, inasmuch as he elsewhere\nconcedes that, \u201chad Plutarch been at Athens when St. Paul came there, he\nwould have been the first to give the Apostle a respectful hearing.\u201d[12]\n\nThe subject of Plutarch\u2019s \u201cMoralia\u201d has also been touched in a few\ncontributions to the current Literature of the Reviews. The article\non \u201cPlutarch\u201d appearing over Paley\u2019s initials in the \u201cEncyclop\u00e6dia\nBritannica,\u201d and giving a brief statement of the subjects dealt with in\nthe different tracts in the \u201cMoralia,\u201d almost entirely exhausts the short\nlist of English literary contributions to the treatment of this portion\nof Plutarch\u2019s work. Paley declared in the article in question that the\n\u201cMoralia\u201d were \u201cpractically almost unknown to most persons in Britain,\neven to those who call themselves scholars.\u201d This sweeping assertion is\nnot by any means true to-day, although it is still the case that, so far\nas the literary presentment of results is concerned, the \u201cEthics\u201d of\nPlutarch are a neglected field of research.\n\nVolkmann, in the \u201cLeben und Schriften\u201d part of his work, carefully\ndiscusses the authenticity of each tract in the generally recognized\nlist of Plutarch\u2019s writings, while in the volume dealing with the\n\u201cPhilosophie\u201d he gives an exhaustive analysis of the greater portion of\nthem. Recognizing that Plutarch had no special philosophical system of\nhis own, Volkmann endeavours to remedy this deficiency by the application\nof a systematic method of treatment with regular branches of \u201csynthetic\u201d\nand \u201canalytic\u201d investigation. The \u201csynthetic\u201d branch of Volkmann\u2019s\nmethod is devoted to a discussion of Plutarch\u2019s philosophic standpoint;\nto an examination of his polemic against the Stoics and Epicureans; and\nto the consideration of his relation to Plato, which Volkmann regards\nas the foundation of Plutarch\u2019s Philosophy. The function of Volkmann\u2019s\n\u201canalytic\u201d method is to discover how, on the philosophic basis thus\nlaid down by the \u201csynthetic\u201d method, Plutarch arranges his positive\nconclusions in a coherent relationship with his negative polemic. It\nis, according to Volkmann, a natural result of the successful operation\nof this twofold system, that the circumstances of Plutarch\u2019s life lose\ntheir external character, and attain to an essential connexion with\nhis philosophical conceptions. This last assertion is made by way of\ncriticism directed against Gr\u00e9ard\u2019s \u201cnatural and simple\u201d method of\narranging Plutarch\u2019s philosophical utterances under headings descriptive\nof the various spheres of life to which they seem appropriate\u2014\u201c_la vie\ndomestique_,\u201d \u201c_la cit\u00e9_,\u201d \u201c_le temple_,\u201d &c. Volkmann thinks that under\nthis arrangement the sense of internal unity is lost; that Plutarch\u2019s\nviews are presented in it as goodnatured and benevolent, but somewhat\nrambling, reflections on the separate aspects of human life, instead\nof being treated as the outcome of a consistent philosophy taking\nethical phenomena into systematic consideration.[13] This criticism has\nconsiderable force, though it does not detract from the truth and charm\nof M. Gr\u00e9ard\u2019s book. Volkmann himself undoubtedly errs in the opposite\ndirection. Gr\u00e9ard was quite justified in retorting on his critic, \u201c_Il\narrive m\u00eame qu\u2019en voulant \u00e9tablir trop_ rationellement _la philosophie\nde Plutarque, M. Volkmann se trouve conduit \u00e0 lui pr\u00eater une sorte de\nsyst\u00e8me, bien qu\u2019il sache comme personne que nul moins que le sage\nde Ch\u00e9ron\u00e9e n\u2019a port\u00e9 dans ses \u00e9crits une pens\u00e9e syst\u00e9matique_.\u201d[14]\nVolkmann, in our opinion, attaches far too much importance both to\nPlutarch\u2019s discipular relation to Plato, and to his polemic against the\nStoics and Epicureans. Plutarch\u2019s opposition to Plato is frequently as\nstrongly marked as his opposition to Stoics and Epicureans; and his\nindebtedness to Stoics and Epicureans is frequently as strongly marked as\nhis indebtedness to Plato.\n\nVolkmann\u2019s work had been preceded in 1854 by an interesting and\nwell-written Thesis, entitled \u201cDe Apologetica Plutarchi Ch\u00e6ronensis\nTheologia.\u201d[15] The author, C. G. Seibert, gives a brief review of Greek\nPhilosophy, with the object of showing the attitude assumed by each of\nthe great schools to the gods of the national tradition. He demonstrates\nconclusively, and Volkmann follows in his steps, that Plutarch owed\nsomething to all the Schools, to Stoics, to Peripatetics, and to\nEpicureans. Yet he, too, insists that Plutarch\u2019s attitude towards the\npopular religion was identical with that assumed by Plato\u2014_eadem ratione\n(qua Plato) Platonis discipuli theologiam tractarunt, e quibus pr\u00e6\nc\u0153teris Plutarchus magistri divini vestigia secutus est_. This, indeed,\nis the orthodox tendency in the appreciation of Plutarch, and it has\nbeen carried to the extent of claiming Plutarch as the founder of that\nspecial kind of Platonism distinguished by the epithet \u201cNew.\u201d \u201cPlutarch,\u201d\nsays Archbishop Trench, \u201cwas a Platonist with an oriental tinge, and\nthus a forerunner of the New Platonists.\u201d\u2014\u201cHe might be described with\ngreater truth than Ammonius as the Founder of Neo-Platonism,\u201d wrote Dr.\nH. W. J. Thiersch, who, however, had not freed himself from the idea\n(the truth of which even so early a writer as Dacier had doubted, and\nthe legendary character of which M. Gr\u00e9ard has proved beyond a doubt)\nthat Plutarch received consular honours at the hands of Trajan.[16]\u2014\u201cIn\nthis essay\u201d (the _De Oraculorum Defectu_), thinks Mr. W. J. Brodribb,\n\u201cPlutarch largely uses the Neo-Platonic Philosophy.\u201d[17] Even those who\ndo not insist that Plutarch is a Neo-Platonist, or a \u201cforerunner\u201d of\nNeo-Platonism, are so anxious to label him with some designation, that\nthey will hardly allow him to speak for himself. It may, perhaps, argue\npresumption on the part of an _homo incognitus nulliusque auctoritatis_\nto suggest that Plutarch faces the teaching of his predecessors with an\nindependent mind; that he is _nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri_;\nthat he tries Plato\u2019s teachings, not from Plato\u2019s point of view, but from\nhis own.[18]\n\nSuch, however, is the view maintained in the pages of the following\nessay. It seems to us that, in order to discover the principle which\ngives coherence and internal unity to Plutarch\u2019s innumerable philosophic\nutterances, it is not necessary to start with the assumption that he\nbelongs to any particular school. Philosophy is to him one of the\nrecognized sources of Religion and Morality. Tradition is another source,\nand Law or recognized custom another. Plutarch assumes that these three\nsources conjointly supply solid sanctions for belief and conduct. They\nare the three great records of human experience, and Plutarch will\nexamine all their contributions to the criticism of life with a view to\nselecting those parts from each which will best aid him and his fellow\ncitizens to lead lives of virtue and happiness. The great philosophical\nschools of Greece are regarded from this point of view\u2014from the point\nof view of a moralist and a philosopher, not from the point of view of\na Platonist, an anti-Stoic, or an anti-Epicurean. Plutarch is indebted,\nas even Volkmann himself shows, to all the Schools alike. Then why\ncall him a Platonist, or a Neo-Pythagorizing Platonist, as Zeller has\ndone? Plutarch\u2019s teaching is too full of logical inconsistencies to be\nformalized into a system of Philosophy. But the dominating principle\nof his teaching, the paramount necessity of finding a sanction and an\ninspiration for conduct in what the wisdom of the past had already\ndiscovered, is so strikingly conspicuous in all his writings that his\nlogical inconsistencies appear, and are, unimportant. It is this desire\nof making the wisdom and traditions of the past available for ethical\nusefulness which actuates his attempt to reconcile the contradictions,\nand remove the crudities and inconsistencies, in the three sources of\nreligious knowledge. This is the principle which gives his teaching\nunity, and not any external circumstances of his life, or his attitude in\nfavour of or in opposition to the tenets of any particular school.\n\nThere is no English translation of Plutarch\u2019s \u201cEthics\u201d which can claim\nanything approaching the character of an authorized version. Almost\nevery editor of Plutarch has felt it necessary to find fault with his\npredecessors\u2019 attempts to express Plutarch\u2019s meaning through the medium\nof another language. Amyot\u2019s translation is, in the opinion of the Comte\nJoseph de Maistre, repellent to \u201cladies and foreigners.\u201d Wyttenbach,\nwho makes numerous alterations of Xylander\u2019s Latin version, also says\nof Ricard\u2019s French translation, that \u201cit skips over the difficulties\nand corruptions in such a manner as to suggest that the translator was\ncontent merely to produce a version which should be intelligible to\nFrench readers.\u201d[19] Wyttenbach himself is reprehended in the following\nterms by the editor of the Didot text of the \u201cMoralia\u201d\u2014\u201cOf the Latin\nversion, in which we have made numerous corrections, it must be admitted\nthat Xylander and Wyttenbach, in dealing with corrupt passages, not\ninfrequently translated conjectures of their own, or suggested by other\nscholars, which we have been unable to adopt into the Greek Text.\u201d In\nthe preface to his English translation of the \u201cDe Iside et Osiride,\u201d\nthe Rev. Samuel Squire, Archdeacon of Bath in 1744, has some excellent\ncritical remarks on the style of previous translators of Plutarch, and he\nsomewhat pathetically describes the difficulties awaiting the author who\nendeavours to translate that writer\u2014\u201c_To enter into another man\u2019s Soul\nas it were, who lived several hundred years since, to go along with his\nthoughts, to trace, pursue, and connect his several ideas, to express\nthem with propriety in a language different from that they were conceived\nin, and lastly to give the copy the air and spirit of an original,\nis not so easy a task as it may be perhaps deemed by those who have\nnever made the attempt. The very few good translations of the learned\nauthors into our own language, will sufficiently justify the truth of\nthe observation\u2014but if any one still doubts it, let him take the first\nsection of the book before him, and make the experiment himself._\u201d M.\nGr\u00e9ard is briefer but equally emphatic\u2014\u201c_Toute traduction est une \u0153uvre\nd\u00e9licate, celle de Plutarque plus que toute autre peut-\u00eatre_.\u201d\n\nWhatever may be the cause of the perpetuation of this ungracious\ntradition of fault-finding, whether the general difficulty specified by\nArchdeacon Squire, or the more particular obstacle of a corrupt text\ndescribed by other commentators, we do not feel that we are called upon\nto make any departure from so long-established a custom. The quaint\ncharm of most of the translations forming the basis of Dr. Goodwin\u2019s\nrevision no one will be inclined to deny, although the reviser\u2019s own\nremarks make it clear that little dependence is to be placed upon their\naccuracy in any instance of difficulty.[20] The two volumes contained\nin the well-known \u201cBohn\u201d series of translations are utterly misleading,\nnot only as regards the colour which they infuse into Plutarch\u2019s style,\nbut also as regards their conspicuous incorrectness in many particular\ninstances.[21] To other translations of individual tracts reference has\nbeen occasionally made in the notes.\n\nIn view of the fact that no dependence was to be placed upon the accuracy\nof any translation yet furnished of that portion of our author\u2019s work\nwith which we were dealing, it was necessary, before undertaking this\nessay, to make full translations of considerable portions of the \u201cEthics\u201d\nfrom the text of Bernardakis; and these translations, or paraphrases\nbased upon them, are largely employed in the following pages. Mere\nreferences to the text in support of positions assumed, or statements\nmade, would have been useless and misleading in the absence of clear\nindications as to the exact interpretation placed upon the words of the\ntext. The writer cannot hope to have succeeded where, in the opinion of\ncompetent judges, there have been so many failures. But he has, at any\nrate, made a conscientious attempt to understand his author, and to give\nexpression to his view of his author\u2019s meaning, without any prejudice\nborn of the assumption that Plutarch belonged to a particular school, or\ndevoted his great powers of criticism and research to the exposition and\nillustration of the doctrines of any single philosopher.\n\n                                                           JOHN OAKESMITH.\n\nBATTERSEA, _September, 1902_.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                                      PAGE\n\n                               CHAPTER I.\n\n    _General character of Modern European Religions: their cardinal\n    appeal to Emotion\u2014Roman Religion: its sanctions chiefly\n    rational: the causes of its failure: its place as a factor\n    in Morality taken by Greek Philosophy\u2014Early Greek Morality\n    based partly on Religion, partly on Reason, which, in the form\n    of Philosophy, eventually supplies the main inspiration to\n    Goodness\u2014Gradual limitation of Philosophy to Ethics_                 1\n\n                               CHAPTER II.\n\n    _Importance of the ethical tendency in pre-Socratic Philosophy\n    generally under-estimated\u2014Development of this tendency from\n    Thales to the Sophists, and from the Sophists to the Stoics and\n    Epicureans\u2014Special influence of these two Schools, aided by the\n    failure of political interest, in establishing a practicable\n    ideal of PERSONAL virtue\u2014This ideal, conspicuous in Plutarch\u2019s\n    \u201cEthics,\u201d and inculcated by the philosophers of the early\n    Gr\u00e6co-Roman Empire generally_                                       20\n\n                              CHAPTER III.\n\n    _Ethical aspect of Gr\u00e6co-Roman Society in the period\n    of Plutarch: difficulty of obtaining an impartial view\n    of it\u2014Revival of moral earnestness concurrent with the\n    establishment of the Empire: the reforms of Augustus a\n    formal expression of actual tendencies\u2014Evidences of this in\n    philosophical and general literature\u2014The differences between\n    various Schools modified by the importance of the ethical end\n    to which all their efforts were directed\u2014Endeavour made to base\n    morality on sanctions already consecrated by the philosophies\n    and religious traditions of the Past\u2014Plutarch\u2019s \u201cEthics\u201d the\n    result of such an endeavour_                                        43\n\n                               CHAPTER IV.\n\n    _Plutarch\u2019s attitude towards Pagan beliefs marked by a\n    spirit of reverent rationalism\u2014The three recognized sources\n    of Religion: Poetry, Philosophy, and Law or Custom\u2014The\n    contribution of each to be examined by Reason with the\n    object of avoiding both Superstition and Atheism: Reason the\n    \u201cMystagogue\u201d of Religion\u2014Provisional examples of Plutarch\u2019s\n    method in the three spheres\u2014His reluctance to press rationalism\n    too far\u2014His piety partly explained by his recognition of the\n    divine mission of Rome\u2014Absence of dogmatism in his teaching_        62\n\n                               CHAPTER V.\n\n    _Plutarch\u2019s Theology\u2014His conception of God not a pure\n    metaphysical abstraction, his presentment of it not\n    dogmatic\u2014General acceptance of the attributes recognized\n    by Greek philosophy as essential to the idea of God\u2014God\n    as UNITY, ABSOLUTE BEING, ETERNITY\u2014God as INTELLIGENCE:\n    PERSONALITY of Plutarch\u2019s God intimately associated with\n    his Intelligence\u2014God\u2019s Intelligence brings him into contact\n    with humanity: by it he knows the events of the Future and\n    the secrets of the human heart\u2014From his knowledge springs\n    his Providence\u2014God as Father and Judge\u2014the DE SERA NUMINIS\n    VINDICTA\u2014Immortality of the Soul_                                   87\n\n                               CHAPTER VI.\n\n    _Plutarch\u2019s D\u00e6monology\u2014D\u00e6monology as a means of reconciliation\n    between the traditional Polytheism and Philosophic\n    Monotheism\u2014D\u00e6monlore in Greek philosophers and in the popular\n    faith\u2014Growth of a natural tendency to identify the gods of the\n    polytheistic tradition with the D\u00e6mons\u2014Emphasis thus given to\n    the philosophic conception of the Deity\u2014D\u00e6mons responsible for\n    all the crude and cruel superstitions attaching to the popular\n    gods\u2014Function of the D\u00e6mons as mediators between God and man_      120\n\n                              CHAPTER VII.\n\n    _Necessity for a Mediator between God and Man partly met by\n    Oracular Inspiration\u2014General failure of Oracles in the age of\n    Plutarch\u2014Plutarch\u2019s \u201cDelphian Essays\u201d\u2014The DE PYTHI\u00c6 ORACULIS:\n    nature of Inspiration: oracles not verbally inspired\u2014The DE\n    DEFECTU ORACULORUM\u2014Various explanations of Inspiration\u2014Plutarch\n    inclines to accept that which assumes an original Divine\n    afflatus placed under the superintendence of D\u00e6mons, whose\n    activities are subject to the operation of natural causes_         138\n\n                              CHAPTER VIII.\n\n    _Sincerity of Plutarch\u2019s belief in D\u00e6mons\u2014Function\n    of the D\u00e6mons as Mediators not confined to oracular\n    inspiration\u2014D\u00e6mons in their personal relationship with the\n    human soul\u2014The DE D\u00c6MONIO SOCRATIS\u2014This tract not a formal\n    treatise on D\u00e6monology\u2014Various explanations of the Socratic\n    \u201cD\u00e6mon\u201d\u2014Ethical value of the conception of D\u00e6mons as spiritual\n    guardians of individual men\u2014\u201cMen may rise on stepping-stones\n    of their dead selves to higher things\u201d\u2014Dangers of the\n    conception\u2014Superstition: Plutarch\u2019s general attitude towards\n    that Vice_                                                         163\n\n                               CHAPTER IX.\n\n    _Relation between Superstition and Atheism: Atheism an\n    intellectual error: Superstition an error involving the\n    passions: the DE SUPERSTITIONE\u2014Moral fervour of Plutarch\u2019s\n    attack on Superstition\u2014His comparative tolerance of\n    Atheism\u2014The greatest safeguard against both alike consists\n    in an intellectual appreciation of the Truth\u2014The DE ISIDE ET\n    OSIRIDE\u2014The Unity underlying national differences of religious\n    belief_                                                            179\n\n                               CHAPTER X.\n\n    _Conclusions respecting the general character of Plutarch\u2019s\n    Religion\u2014Monotheism and D\u00e6monology both essential parts\n    of his Theodicy\u2014His strong belief in the personality\n    of God\u2014Metaphysical weakness but Moral strength of his\n    Teaching\u2014Close connexion between his Religion and his\n    Ethics\u2014Plutarch not an \u201cEclectic,\u201d nor a Neo-Platonist\u2014Contrast\n    between Plutarch\u2019s Religion and Philosophy and the Religion\n    and Philosophy of the Neo-Platonists\u2014Christianity and\n    Neo-Platonism\u2014The struggle between them and its probable effect\n    on later religious history\u2014Conclusion_                             201\n\n\n\n\nTHE RELIGION OF PLUTARCH\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n    _General character of Modern European Religions: their cardinal\n    appeal to Emotion\u2014Roman Religion: its sanctions chiefly\n    rational: the causes of its failure: its place as a factor\n    in Morality taken by Greek Philosophy\u2014Early Greek Morality\n    based partly on Religion, partly on Reason, which, in the form\n    of Philosophy, eventually supplies the main inspiration to\n    Goodness\u2014Gradual limitation of Philosophy to Ethics._\n\n\nThe various religious revivals which the European world has witnessed\nduring the prolonged course of the Christian era; the great attempts\nwhich the modern conscience has made from time to time to bring itself\ninto a more intimate and fruitful relation with the principles that\nmake for goodness of character and righteousness of life: have, in\ngeneral, taken the form less of reasoned invocations to the cultivated\nintelligence than of emotional appeals to the natural passions and\nprepossessions of humanity. The hope of reward, the fear of punishment, a\nspontaneous love of certain moral qualities, and of certain personalities\nimagined as embodying these qualities; a heartfelt hatred of certain\nmoral defects, and of certain personalities imagined as embodying these\ndefects:\u2014such are the feelings that have formed the strength of every\nmovement which has in turn agitated the religious life of the Western\nworld from St. Paul to Wesley, from St. Augustine to Cardinal Newman.\nWhat is felt to be goodness is loved with a personal adoration which is\nconvinced that nothing in the world is of import compared with the hope\nof one day touching the mere hem of that garment of holiness, the mystic\neffluence of which has already power to irradiate life with a strange\nbeauty and meaning. Any sanction which imaginative piety or legendary\nauthority can lend to Virtue is credited, not because it makes Virtue\nnatural, intelligible, and human, but because it places her on a pedestal\nbeyond the reach of unaided mortal effort, and thus compels a still more\ndetermined recourse to emotional and supernatural sanctions in order\nto ensure her fruitful cultivation. Hence Tertullian will glory in the\nCrucifixion of Christ, because in the eyes of reason it is shameful; and\nhe will proclaim the Resurrection as certain, because reason condemns it\nas impossible.[22] Hence Augustine will believe first, postponing the\ngrave question whether belief is likely to be supported by proof.[23]\nHence that conception of saintliness which the world owes to Catholic\nChristianity, a type of character which, while maintaining a marvellous\npurity of life, is devoid of that robust intelligence without which\npurity runs into asceticism; which carries virtue to such an extravagant\npitch that its results may be more disastrous than those of extravagant\nvice, inasmuch as the latter may serve morality by demonstrating the\nrepulsiveness of iniquity, while the former tends to evil by exhibiting\nthe impossibility of goodness.[24]\n\nThis \u201c_extravagance du christianisme_\u201d[25] is, of course, utterly at\nvariance with the general character of the efforts by which either a\nGreek or a Roman directed his steps in the ways of goodness. Neither\nAristotle nor Horace, neither Plato nor Seneca, would have admitted many\nof the most lauded virtues of modern ethical systems to be virtues at\nall. Least of all would they have hailed as a virtue that passionate\nexcess of enthusiasm which makes Virtue independent of Reason, and greets\nintellectual impossibilities as the trials and tests of the \u201cvirtue\u201d of\nBelief.[26] Speaking in a general sense, and with a tacit recognition\nof certain exceptions to be noticed in their proper place, it may be\npremised that Pagan goodness of character found its inspiration, not in\nany kind of emotional enthusiasm, but in methods of thought and action\nselected and controlled by the operation of reason and intelligence.[27]\nHorace\u2019s opinion respecting the viciousness of the man who indulges in\na too excessive love of virtue is the opinion, if not of a Greek, at\nany rate of a Roman who is saturated with Greek philosophy;[28] but the\nearly character of the poet\u2019s countrymen, as evinced not less in their\nReligion than in their general outlook on life, is as little disposed\nto extravagance as the strongest advocate of _aurea mediocritas_ could\nwell desire. Roman Religion, influenced to some extent as it was by\nthe gloomy terrors of Etruscan superstition, found its value and its\nmeaning, from the gods of the Indigitamenta downwards, in the fact that\nit was an appeal to the intelligence of the citizen. That this appeal\noperated in a narrow sphere of duties and was not unaffected by mean and\nsordid considerations does not militate against its general character\nas an address to the reason rather than an invocation to the passions.\nAncient critics found for the word \u201c_Religio_\u201d a derivation which pointed\nto carefulness and regularity as qualities inherent in its essential\nmeaning;[29] and that avoidance of disordered excess, which tends to\ncompromise, was as conspicuous in early Roman religious practice as it\nwas in the sternest of Greek philosophies when transplanted to Roman\nsoil, and interpenetrated with the Roman character.[30] This spirit of\ncompromise was based upon a recognition that the actual demands of\npractical life were of greater importance than the maintenance of a\nrigid conformity to the letter of religious precepts. Virgil, who was a\nparticipant in the work of religious reform inaugurated by Augustus, and\nwho everywhere breathes a spirit of the most careful reverence towards\nthe ancient traditions of the national faith, gives emphatic expression\nto this view of the dominant claims of practical life, and of the\ntolerant attitude which Religion assumes with regard to them:\u2014\n\n    \u201cQuippe etiam festis qu\u00e6dam exercere diebus\n    Fas et jura sinunt; rivos deducere nulla\n    Relligio vetuit, segeti pr\u00e6tendere s\u00e6pem,\n    Insidias avibus moliri, incendere vepres,\n    Balantumque gregem fluvio mersare salubri.\u201d[31]\n\nThis recognition of the principle that Duty has claims which even\nReligion must concede is prominently written on every page of Roman\nHistory. It indicates the operation, in one direction, of that influence\nof Reason on Religion which, in another direction, leads to the\nadmission of a real divinity in the gods adored by foreign peoples.\nThe famous formula of Roman Religion, which appealed to the protecting\ngods of Carthage and its people to leave that city to its fate, is an\nearly anticipation of that hospitable tolerance, so strange to modern\nsects, which welcomed Greek and barbarian deities to the Roman Pantheon,\nand never persecuted from religious motives.[32] This spirit had its\napotheosis in the endeavours of the reformers of the age of Plutarch to\nestablish the triumph of Reason in a general recognition of the Unity\nof God beneath the different names which expressed Him to different\npeoples.[33]\n\nAlthough we cannot accept as actual history the particulars given\nby Dionysius Halicarnassensis respecting the manner in which\nRomulus established the principles of Roman religious and political\nadministration, considerable value may be conceded to such an account,\nbecause it is calculated to explain, from the writer\u2019s point of view, the\nexistence of certain actual characteristics of Roman civic and sacred\npolity.[34] Romulus is recorded as subjecting Religion to the selective\npower of reason and good taste. Reason decides what it is becoming for\nthe Divine Nature to be, and everything inconsistent with this salutary\nnotion is rigidly excluded from the State Religion. Romulus teaches the\nRomans that the gods are good, and that their goodness is the cause\nof man\u2019s happiness and progress; he instructs them in Temperance and\nJustice, as the bases of civic concord, and of the advantages resulting\ntherefrom; he inculcates military Fortitude as the best means of\nsecuring the undisturbed practice of the other virtues, and the social\nblessings springing from such practice; and he concludes that Virtue is\nnot a matter of chance, or the result of supernatural inspirations, but\nthe product of reasonable laws when zealously and faithfully carried\ninto practice by the citizens. Reason is here clearly represented as\nthe lawgiver of Religion, and the cause and origin of the practical\nvirtues. Dionysius may, as we have suggested, be endeavouring to explain,\nby an _ex post facto_ piece of history, the existence of certain\ncharacteristics of the Roman constitution as exhibited in its later\ndevelopments, but these features are not the less evident and essential\nparts of the system because we cannot accept any particular account of\nthe time and manner in which they were incorporated with it.\n\nFurther, the Roman administrative authority deliberately repressed the\nexhibition of religious enthusiasm as dangerous to the stability of\nthe Republic; the State could brook no rival in her affections: the\ndevotion of Regulus[35] and the suppression of the Bacchanalia bear\nequal witness to a firm insistence on the control of personal emotion\nas a cardinal principle of Roman administration.[36] The apparently\nparadoxical and casuistical position assigned in the \u201cDe Natura Deorum\u201d\nto Cotta, who believes in the national religion as a Roman while denying\nit as a philosopher, is sufficiently lucid and rational when regarded\nin the light of the religious administration of Rome, which had never\nclaimed to enslave the intelligences of men, so long as that elaborate\nritual, with which the safety of the State was involved, received due and\nreverential attention.[37]\n\nThe ancient Roman Religion, revolving round the State in this way,\nand moulding the life of every individual citizen into rigid external\nconformity with the official ideal, showed its strength in the\nproduction of a type of moral character which was perfect within the\niron limits fixed by the civic authority.[38] It was dignified, austere,\nself-controlled, self-reverent. In the absence of great temptations, such\nas assail the secret strongholds of the human heart and lie beyond the\ninfluence of any external power, the ancient _Virtus Romana_ was equal\nto all the demands which a somewhat restricted code of ethics made upon\nit. But, when a wider knowledge of the world brought with it a weakening\nof the chain which bound the citizen to the central power; when, at the\nsame time, a wider possession of the world and a richer enjoyment of\nits pleasures increased to an enormous extent the temptations directed\nagainst the purity and completeness of the moral character:[39] then it\nbecame alarmingly clear to thoughtful men that, unless the moral life\nwas to run to seed in vicious weeds of self-indulgence, it was necessary\nto invoke the aid of a subtler and stronger influence than that of the\nState, an influence capable of varying its appeal in accordance with\nthe infinitely varying moral needs of individual men.[40] It was with\nthe hope of finding inspiration of this character that Lucretius and\nCicero turned the attention of their countrymen to Greek Philosophy; it\nwas there that they wished to find an ampler and more direct sanction\nin reason for cultivating a life of virtue. Reason, which had not been\ndevoid of effect in the narrow sphere of Roman Religion, was now to be\nmade the basis of morality in general; but it was reason directed to\nthe purification and enlargement of the springs of personal conduct,\nand calling into play qualities which had lain dormant, or had been\nrestricted, during the long dominance of the State over the individual\ncitizen. To Regulus, his religion was the State; to Cicero, the State\nand its demands form but a small fraction of the moral life. A revival\nof Religion was to Cicero a revival of Philosophy; Reason, the parent\nof Philosophy, was also to be the parent of Conduct; the first of all\nvirtues is the virtue of Knowledge, of intelligent discrimination\nbetween the things that make for morality and happiness and the things\nthat make for immorality and misery.[41] Starting from this standpoint,\nCicero, though approaching Greek Philosophy more in the spirit of the\nstudent than in that of the religious reformer, though participating,\nas his Letters show, in that general carelessness on religious matters\nwhich marked Roman Society during the later years of the Republic, was,\nnevertheless, the means of giving a powerful stimulus to that movement in\nthe direction of deliberate personal morality, which became conspicuous\nin the Gr\u00e6co-Roman world of the Early Empire, and culminated under the\nfostering care of Trajan and the Antonines. It then became clear that\nCicero had not looked in vain to Greek Philosophy to save his countrymen\nfrom that moral degradation and disorder which, in his own words, it\ndemanded the most earnest endeavours of every individual citizen to check\nand restrain.[42]\n\nIn Greece, Religion and Philosophy had early enjoyed mutual relations\nof an intimate character. The force of the weighty invocations which\nthe poet of the \u201cWorks and Days\u201d[43] addresses to his dishonourable\nbrother Perses lies less in the conventional theology which alludes\nto the wrath of \u201cbroad-sighted Zeus\u201d as tracking the footsteps of the\nwicked, than in the reasoned choice which the sinner is invited to make\nbetween Injustice as leading inevitably to ruin, and Virtue leading as\ninevitably to prosperity;[44] and the claims of individual judgment,\nthe right of every man to subject everything to the test of his own\nintelligence, never found finer expression than in the verse which\nassigns the palm of moral perfection to him who has the courage to think\nfor himself.[45] Pindar, the most religious poet of antiquity, applies\nthe test of reason to the established myths of Hellas when he refuses\nto credit such legends as depict the gods in unseemly situations, or\nunder the influence of degrading passions.[46] Xenophanes thought that\nthe claims of Religion and Morality could be best advanced by cleansing\nthe moral atmosphere of the gods whose recorded lives were so flagrantly\nin opposition to the dictates of purity, reason, and honour; a strain\nof criticism which found its most striking and notorious expression in\nthe famous Second and Third Books of Plato\u2019s \u201cRepublic,\u201d but which had\nnot been without its exponents among more whole-hearted adherents of the\nnational Religion. But, meanwhile, the national Religion, as embodied,\nat least, in the national liturgy, had been coming to terms with the\ngrowing strength of Philosophy, and the vestibules of the Temple at\nDelphi were inscribed with those famous philosophical apophthegms, whose\npresence there subsequently enabled Plutarch to claim that Apollo was\nnot only a God and a Seer, but a Philosopher.[47] The popular morality\nof the days of Socrates, which supplied his cross-examinees with\nready-made answers to questions on the nature of Vice and Virtue, and\nof the vices and the virtues, was composed as much of Philosophy as\nof Religion in the narrower sense of the term.[48] The Theogonies of\nHomer and Hesiod furnished the external machinery of the supernatural\nworld, but the moral utterances of these two poets, and not of these\nonly, but of Simonides and Solon, of Theognis and the \u201cSeven Sages,\u201d\ncontained many striking lessons, and many emphatic warnings, touching the\nnecessity and advantages of a life of virtue. It became, in fact, quite\nevident, though not, of course, explicitly asserted, or perhaps even\nconsciously admitted, that the gods, as represented in the Homeric poems\nand as existing in the popular imagination, were quite impossible as a\nfoundation for Morality, though surpassingly splendid as the material\nof Art. It is hardly too much to say that, after the establishment of\nthe great philosophic schools in the fourth century, all the conscious\ninspiration to a life of Virtue, and all the consolations which it is\nthe more usual function of Religion to administer, were supplied by\nPhilosophy. Sudden conversions from Vice to Philosophy mark the history\nof the philosophic movement in Greece as religious movements have been\nmarked among other peoples and in other periods. An edifying discourse\nunder a Stoic Portico, or in an Academic School, has been as effective\nin its practical results as a religious oration by Bossuet, or a village\npreaching by Whitfield.[49] Religion and Philosophy are identified,\nbecause both are identical with Morality; the lives of some Greek\nPhilosophers furnish the nearest parallel attained in antiquity to the\nmodern ideal of saintliness.\n\nThis application of Philosophy to the spiritual requirements of the\nindividual man, this independence of supernatural sanctions for\ngoodness, was aided by the almost purely liturgical character of\nthe Greek Religion. Greek Religion made no special appeal to the\nindividual conscience with a view to awakening that sense of personal\nresponsibility for every part of one\u2019s life and conduct which is the\nvery soul and centre of Religion as understood in modern days. To attend\nthe traditional religious festivals; to fulfil the rites prescribed for\ncertain occasions by the sacerdotal laymen who represented the State on\nits religious side; to hold a vague conventional notion respecting the\nexistence of the gods and of their separate personalities; to listen\nquietly, and respond reverently, while the purple-robed, myrtle-crowned,\naltar-ministrant intoned with solemn resonance the ancient formul\u00e6\nembalming the sacred legends of some deity whose \u201cMysteries\u201d were\nspecially fostered and honoured by the State; to aid in giving effect to\nthe dreadful imprecations pronounced against those guilty of sacrilege\nor parricide; to respond, in a word, to all the external demands of the\nnational faith as a political institution: represented the religious\nduty of a good and patriotic citizen. A beautiful and impressive liturgy\nis, indeed, not without effect in surrounding with a quiet atmosphere of\ngoodness a class of minds whose temptations are mercifully proportioned\nto their weakness; but real moral worth must spring from internal\nsources, and these internal sources were not to be found in the Greek\nnational Religion. Hence a wider field for Philosophy in the lives of a\npeople whose eagerness in the pursuit of virtue was as marked, if not so\nsuccessful, as their aspirations after perfection of art and profundity\nof knowledge.\n\nWe do not ignore, in attributing this importance to Philosophy as the\ninspiration of goodness, either that fortunate class of people who, in\nPlato\u2019s beautiful expression, are \u201cgood by the divine inspiration of\ntheir own nature,\u201d[50] or that more numerous section of society who\nwere directed into a certain common conventional goodness by the moral\ninfluence of the purer myths, and who were taught, like the youth in\nBrowning\u2019s poem, \u201cwhose Father was a scholar and knew Greek,\u201d that\n\n    \u201cTheir aim should be to loathe, like Peleus\u2019 son,\n    A lie as Hell\u2019s Gate, love their wedded wife,\n    Like Hector, and so on with all the rest.\u201d[51]\n\nBut there was another side to the myths, a side less favourable to\nthe development of morals, and one which had been brought forward so\nconspicuously in the adverse criticisms of the philosophers that no\none could pretend to ignore its existence.[52] The prevailing tendency\nof Greek myth was not moral, and it was only after the most careful\npruning, such, for example, as that which Plutarch applies to it in his\neducational essays, that myth became safely available as a factor in\nethical progress. The mainsprings of Conduct, of personal and private\nMorality, are to be found in Philosophy, and so great an importance did\nPhilosophy acquire as the instrument of goodness, that that particular\nbranch of Philosophy which exercised surveillance over the realm of\nConduct became eventually recognized as Philosophy _par excellence_;\nthe overwhelming significance attached by Greek philosophers, from the\nSophists onwards, to the practical element in their teaching, led to a\nrestriction of the terms \u201cPhilosophy\u201d and \u201cPhilosopher\u201d to an almost\npurely ethical connotation. The argument in the \u201cPh\u00e6do\u201d that, without\nPhilosophy, Virtue is nothing more than a mere rough sketch, is so\nstrongly emphasized in other quarters that there is formed a general\nconviction that the sole sphere of Philosophy is the sphere of human\nconduct.[53]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n    _Importance of the ethical tendency in pre-Socratic Philosophy\n    generally under-estimated\u2014Development of this tendency from\n    Thales to the Sophists, and from the Sophists to the Stoics and\n    Epicureans\u2014Special influence of these two Schools, aided by the\n    failure of political interest, in establishing a practicable\n    ideal of PERSONAL virtue\u2014This ideal, conspicuous in Plutarch\u2019s\n    \u201cEthics,\u201d and inculcated by the philosophers of the early\n    Gr\u00e6co-Roman Empire generally._\n\n\nIt will be interesting and useful briefly to trace the growth of the\nethical tendency in Greek Philosophy, not only as a preparation for\nthe study of Plutarch\u2019s position as an ethical and religious teacher,\nbut also because the prominence of this tendency in the pre-Socratic\nsystems appears to have been greatly underestimated.[54] It has been\nfound so easy, for purposes of historical narrative, to describe a\ncertain philosophical tendency as \u201cphysical,\u201d and a certain other as\n\u201cmetaphysical,\u201d that the purely general character of these descriptions\nhas been overlooked. Thales was a natural philosopher, an astronomer,\nand, if we may trust the \u201cgeneral belief of the Greeks\u201d to which\nHerodotus alludes in his account of the crossing of the river Halys by\nCr\u0153sus, a great mechanical engineer as well.[55] But he was something\nmore than this. He was distinguished for great political insight, and was\nacknowledged to be the greatest of the group of practical philosophers\nwho were known as the Seven Sages.[56] To this group are assigned\nthose famous dicta which, whether inscribed by priests on the walls of\ntemples, or embodied by philosophers in their ethical systems, conveyed\na profound moral significance to every member of a Hellenic community.\nAlthough no special one of these sayings is ascribed to Thales by\nname, it would surely be absurd to suppose him deficient in those very\nqualities which brought fame to the men at whose head he was universally\nplaced. A man who was confessedly a trusted counsellor in Politics would\nassuredly, in those days, have had something to say on that branch of\nPolitics which was destined eventually to be separated from its parent\nstem, and to become a distinct branch of philosophical investigation.\nAnaximander cannot, at this distance of time, be directly associated\nwith the practical problems of human life, but must ever remain wrapped\nup in his \u201cinfinity,\u201d which is neither Air nor Water, nor any other\nelement, but \u201csomething that is different from all of them.\u201d[57] It is\nnot, however, without significance in this connexion, that the most\nstriking fragment of his Philosophy that has reached our times is couched\nin ethical phraseology: \u201cThat out of which existing things have their\nbirth must also, _of right_, be their grave when they are destroyed. For\nthey must, by the dispensation of time, _give a just compensation for\ntheir injustice_.\u201d[58] We are in equal ignorance of any special ethical\nteaching of Anaximenes. Heraclitus, however, has a distinctly ethical\naspect, in spite of the physical nature of most of his philosophical\nspeculations. Self-knowledge, which is alien to the multitude, who are\nunder the sway of the poets,[59] is already, in Heraclitus, the basis of\nself-control, as it is in Socrates the basis of all moral excellence.[60]\nAn ordered self-control is the highest of all virtues; even the Sun must\nnot transgress the limits of his sphere, or the Erinnyes, the Ministers\nof _Justice_, will find him out.[61] Anaxagoras, whom Sextus Empiricus\nwill one day describe as \u201cthe most _physical_\u201d of all the philosophers,\nbegan his book on Nature with the words \u201cAll things were in confusion\ntogether; then came Intelligence, and gave them order and arrangement;\u201d\nthus laying the foundation of his Natural Philosophy in a principle which\ncould not fail of early application to the sphere of Conduct.[62] The\ndenial of blind Chance, or of immutable Fate, in the realm of physical\nphenomena easily leads to its repudiation in the sphere of Ethics, and to\na recognition of the personal responsibility of the individual mind for\nthe consequences of its own decisions.[63] It was probably a conviction\nof the ethical fruitfulness of the principle thus laid down by Anaxagoras\nin the sphere of Physics which induced Aristotle, the greatest of all\nethical philosophers, to assert that its author, as compared with his\npredecessors, was a sober thinker by the side of random babblers.[64] The\nphysical investigations of Democritus were utilized by the Epicureans\nto free man from superstitious fears of another world, in order that he\nmight direct all his powers to making the best of this world, in a moral,\ninfinitely more than in a physical, sense. He specifically discussed\nVirtue, and concluded that happiness consisted in Temperance and\nSelf-Control.[65] In a book which he wrote under the significant title of\n\u201cTritogeneia,\u201d or \u201cMinerva,\u201d he appears to have applied the principle\nof Intelligence to the domain of Ethics, as Anaxagoras had applied it to\nthe realm of Physics, pointing out that there wanted three things to the\nperfection of human society\u2014\u201cto reason well, to speak well, and to do\none\u2019s duty;\u201d and that these three powers all spring from the directing\ninfluence of Intelligence. The author of the \u201cMagna Moralia\u201d says that\nPythagoras was the first to discuss Virtue, and indicates in what manner\nthe Pythagoreans attempted to apply their theory of Number to the sphere\nof Ethics. Their method was wrong, according to the \u201cMagna Moralia,\u201d\nsince there is a special and appropriate method for the analysis and\ndiscussion of the virtues, and \u201cJustice is not a number evenly even.\u201d[66]\nSuch a definition, thus crushed by way of a point-blank negative, has,\nof course, nothing but a metaphorical significance as applied to Ethics;\nbut the metaphorical conception of Justice as a perfect number will\nnot be totally devoid of inspiration to justice of conduct in the mind\nof one who loves perfection even when represented by an arithmetical\nabstraction; and if by this definition \u201cit was designed to express the\ncorrespondence between action and suffering,\u201d[67] a fruitful, though\nincomplete, ethical principle is embodied in their mathematical\nphrasing.[68] In a more general sense, Epicharmus has sung how the\nPythagorean Doctrine of Number may be applied to the domain of practice:\u2014\n\n    \u201cMan\u2019s life needs greatly Number\u2019s ordered sway:\n    His path is safe who follows Number\u2019s way.\u201d[69]\n\nBut the Pythagorean doctrine of Transmigration probably had a greater\nethical value than the metaphysical conceptions of Number which\nconstituted the Pythagorean \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1; although it is not impossible that\nthe dogma, when carelessly held or unphilosophically interpreted, might\nhave a vicious rather than a virtuous effect.[70] The \u201cGolden Verses of\nPythagoras,\u201d whether composed by any individual member of the school,\nor officially embodying the teaching of the sect, or representing the\nactual work of some philosopher not formally a Pythagorean, have been\nuniversally recognised to express a Pythagorean ideal;[71] and thus\nexhibit in the doctrine of the Italian School a far more vigorous and\nfruitful ethical tendency than any study of its official doctrines\u2014so far\nas they are available for study\u2014would lead us to suppose. And, indeed,\nthe followers of this Philosophy were conspicuous, even in Plato\u2019s time,\nfor a special manner of life, the preparation for which involved a\nstrenuous devotion to a strict and lofty ethical ideal, an ideal which\nsubsequently formed no small part of the strength of that last school of\nGreek Philosophy which nominally sheltered under the \u00e6gis of Plato.[72]\n\nAmong the philosophers of the Eleatic School we find an equally marked\ntendency in the direction of Ethics. The very basis of the anti-theistic\npropaganda of Xenophanes is that the gods in their traditional character\ndo not display those virtues which are incumbent on even ordinarily\ndecent men. To his strenuous sincerity the removal of the gods from\nthe sphere of human conduct meant the introduction of a stricter and\nbetter reasoned sanction for morality. Even Parmenides and Melissus\nand Zeno were not so absorbed in the creation of abstract metaphysical\nconceptions but that Plutarch is able to mention them together, not only\nas distinguished for their contributions to the practical wisdom of\ntheir time, but as evincing by the manner of their death their constancy\nto a lofty ethical conception of the duties of life.[73] Empedocles is\nincluded in the same category as having conferred great material and\npolitical benefits upon his fellow-citizens, to whom he also addressed a\npoem inculcating a pure and noble manner of life based on the doctrine of\nTransmigration.\n\nThis brief review of the pre-Socratic and pre-Sophistic Philosophers\nappears to indicate that, if their ethical doctrines were not formulated\nwith the scientific detail and precision of later schools, their\nspeculations had a strongly ethical cast, and tended to work out into\npractical morality in the sphere of daily conduct. In spite of the\nnumerous systems of Ethics which have been propounded in ancient and\nmodern days, a scientific basis of Morality has not yet been truly laid,\nand it was, perhaps, a recognition of the difficulties menacing attempts\nin this direction, aided by a feeling that \u201cmoral progress has not to\nwait till an unimpeachable system of Ethics has been elaborated,\u201d[74]\nwhich led the early Greek Schools to confine their utterances on Morals\nto \u201crugged maxims hewn from life,\u201d which compensated for their lack of\nscientific precision by the inspiration they applied to the work of\nactual life.\n\nIt must, however, be admitted that with the Sophists the concerns of\npractical life began to assume that predominant place in philosophical\nspeculations which they afterwards wholly usurped; and the claim of\nthe Sophists (whether or not Socrates is to be reckoned among them)\nto be regarded as the founders of Ethical Philosophy is not weakened\nby the fact that, when Philosophy and Ethics were identified,[75]\nthe term Sophist was assigned to men whose lives were in diametrical\nopposition to everything connoted by the designation philosopher.[76]\nThe Sophists of the Socratic age, whose varied teachings were lacking\nin any philosophical principle to give them unity and dignity, brought\nthe business of common life into so marked a prominence, and recognized\nConduct as so much larger a fraction of life than it had hitherto been\nconsciously recognized, that the necessity of finding a scientific basis\nfor Conduct became apparent, and a sphere was thus opened to the genius\nof Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.\n\nIt is not necessary to linger in demonstrating the important part played\nby Ethics from this point onward in the development of Greek Philosophy.\n\u201cI hold that Socrates, as all are agreed, was the first whose voice\ncharmed away philosophy from the mysterious phenomena over which Nature\nherself has cast a veil, and with which all philosophers before his time\nbusied themselves, and brought it face to face with social life, so as\nto investigate virtue and vice, and the general distinction between\nGood and Evil, and led it to pronounce its sentence that the heavenly\nbodies were either far removed from the sphere of our knowledge, or\ncontributed nothing to right living, however much the knowledge of them\nmight be attained.\u201d[77] Although this well-known passage from Cicero\u2019s\n\u201cAcademics\u201d has been criticized for the too great emphasis which it lays\non the alienation of Socrates from Natural Philosophy, and, moreover, as\nan attempt has been made to show above, it lays in like manner too much\nstress on the alienation of previous thinkers from Moral Philosophy, or,\nat any rate, from empirical Ethics, it expresses with great clearness the\nsurpassing importance which the common life of humanity, as illumined by\nthe light of virtuous ideals, was henceforward to assume as the end and\naim of philosophical investigations and discussions. The overwhelming\nimportance of Ethics in the philosophical system of Plato is directly or\nindirectly apparent in all his teaching; and where he, too, indulges in\nphysical speculations, it is with the warning that probability is all\nthat can be expected from such investigations, and that they constitute a\nwise and moderate recreation in the course of severer and more legitimate\nstudies.[78] But it must be conceded that, while no writer has composed\nmore beautiful panegyrics in praise of Virtue; while no teacher has\ndepicted its surpassing importance to humanity with greater devotion of\nspirit or subtler charm of language; yet the severity of the intellectual\nprocesses which alone lead to a comprehension of what, in the Platonic\nsystem, Virtue is, has had the effect of making Virtue herself appear\nalmost \u201ctoo bright and good for human nature\u2019s daily food;\u201d too lofty and\nafar for the common man to attain; a mere abstraction to be preserved\nas a field appropriate to the gymnastics of metaphysicians, and to be\nshielded from the harsh contact of the common world and common men by the\n_chevaux de frise_ of dialectical subtlety. Excess of Reason in Plato\nhas produced a similar result to that produced by excess of Emotion in\nmodern Religion, and it is not without Justice that a great writer of the\nnineteenth century has described Plato as \u201cputting men off with stars\ninstead of sense,\u201d and as teaching them to be anything but \u201cpractical\nmen, honest men, continent men, unambitious men, fearful to solicit\na trust, slow to accept, and resolute never to betray one.\u201d[79] The\naccessibility of Virtue to the common heart is conditioned in Plato\u2019s\nsystem by its intelligibility to the common reason. The dialectic\nprocesses by which the Ideas of the Good, the True, the Beautiful are\npursued are merely repellent to the average man, who does not care for\nMetaphysics, but wishes to be good and pure and just in his dealings\nwith his fellow-men.[80] \u201cPlato acknowledges that the morality of the\nmultitude must be utilitarian, since none other is attainable save by\nthe highly trained metaphysician.\u201d[81] Even when the multitude accept\nthe teachings of the philosopher, it is not because they are capable of\nthe knowledge of ideal truth, but because the philosopher has compelled\nthem to recognize, from utilitarian reasons, that it is better to be\nvirtuous than to be vicious. But this acknowledgment of the inability of\nthe multitude to be virtuous in the highest sense, and the assertion that\nthey must submit themselves as clay to be moulded by the philosopher, who\nalone has a knowledge of ideal goodness, do not help in a world where\nthe philosophers are not autocrats, but where every teacher must submit\nhis claims to the intelligence of the multitude. It may accordingly be\nquestioned whether Plato\u2019s Ethics have furnished inspiration for goodness\nexcept to those who have already had a predilection for virtue as an\nappanage of the highest intellect, or to those more general lovers of\nthe Beautiful whose taste is gratified by fascinating descriptions of a\nquality which, in itself, has no special charm for them, but which, when\ndepicted by this \u201cmaster of the starry spheres\u201d in its atmosphere of cold\nbut radiant splendour, has transfigured their moral life with beams that\ndo not \u201cfade into the common light of day.\u201d Plato\u2019s teaching, indeed,\nhas something monastic, exclusive, aristocratic in its import, and the\n\u201cesoteric\u201d doctrines which were taught in the grove of Academus to\nstudents already prepared by a special course of instruction to receive\nthem stand at the very opposite pole of Philosophy to those homely\nconversations which Socrates would hold with the first chance passer-by\nin the streets of a busy city. \u201cLet no one enter here who has not studied\nMathematics\u201d was a phrase which summed up in a dogmatic canon of the\nschool the views of the master touching the exclusion of the multitude\nfrom direct participation in Virtue and Philosophy.[82]\n\nAristotle brings us into a world where there is less of poetry and\nbeautiful imagery, but in which the common man can see more clearly. If\nthe landscapes are not so lovely, the roadways are better laid and the\nmilestones are more legible. The contrast has been often enough already\nelaborated. Its essence seems to lie in the recognition by Aristotle\nthat men are men, and not ideal philosophers. It hardly needed those\nfamous passages in the \u201cEthics,\u201d in which Aristotle subjects the Theory\nof Ideas to a most searching criticism, to emphasize that predilection\nfor the practical concerns of daily life, as not only the proper sphere\nof Ethics, but their foundation and material, which is conspicuous in\nthe general character of his work. Over and over again he insists that\nhappiness depends upon action, not contemplation;[83] and so convinced is\nhe that Ethics, like every other science, must start from knowledge of\nactual facts, that he denies the claim of those to be students of Moral\nPhilosophy who are inexperienced in the actions of life.[84] And it is,\nsurely, in allusion to the demand of the Platonic Philosophy that the\nmultitude shall permit themselves to be moulded by the Platonist potter\neven into that inferior form of virtue of which alone they are capable,\nthat Aristotle reverts to the famous saying of Hesiod that he is second\nbest only who \u201cobeys one who speaks well,\u201d while assigning the moral\nsupremacy to the man who makes his own practical experience of life the\nbasis of his ethical theories and the mainspring of his moral progress.\n\nThus it seems that Aristotle is the true successor of Socrates, inasmuch\nas Philosophy, which under the spells of Platonism had withdrawn again to\nthe empyrean, is charmed down once more by the Stageirite to the business\nand bosoms of mankind. To use the expressive metaphor of Aristotle\nhimself, though not, of course, in this connexion, if the creator of\nthe \u201cRepublic\u201d shines as one of \u201cthe most beautiful and the strongest\u201d\npresent at the Olympian Games, the author of the \u201cEthics\u201d is one of the\n\u201cCombatants\u201d who have been crowned, because they have descended into\nthe arena, and by right action have secured what is noble and good in\nlife.[85] After Aristotle, it was improbable that Philosophy would ever\nagain render itself obnoxious to the reproach levelled against Plato by\nsome of his contemporaries that \u201cthey went to him expecting to hear about\nthe chief good, but he put them off with a quantity of remarks about\nnumbers and things they could not understand.\u201d[86]\n\nContemporary with the work of Aristotle and his insistence upon the\nnecessity that each individual man should seek for the chief good in\nthe sphere of his own actual experience, occurred the relaxation of\nthe dominant claims of the State to the best part of the energies and\nactivities of the citizen. The change in the political condition of\nGreece consequent upon the Macedonian conquest had turned the Greek\ncitizen back upon his own soul for inspiration to guide his steps aright.\nThe philosophical tendency was thus aided by external conditions, and\nthe joint operation of both these influences established in Stoicism and\nEpicureanism the satisfaction of the moral requirements of the individual\nman as the aim and end of Philosophy.\n\nWhatever importance the leaders of the Stoics attached to Logic and\nPhysics\u2014and different philosophers formed different estimates of their\nvalue[87]\u2014all were agreed that these parts of Philosophy were only\nuseful in so far as they enabled mankind to lead a virtuous life; a life\nin harmony with nature and its laws; a life which placed them above the\ndomination of \u201c_Fear and hope and phantasy and awe, And wistful yearning\nand unsated loves, That strain beyond the limits of this life_.\u201d[88]\nThe Epicureans repudiated Dialectic,[89] and, as already stated,\nstudied Physics with a view only to freeing the mind of man from those\nsupernatural fears which hampered him in his attainment of terrestrial\nvirtue and happiness:\u2014\n\n    \u201cNam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia c\u00e6cis\n    In tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus\n    Interdum nilo qu\u00e6 sunt metuenda magis quam\n    Qu\u00e6 pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura.\n    Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necesse est\n    Non radii solis neque lucida tela diei\n    Discutiant, sed natur\u00e6 species ratioque.\u201d\n\nLucretius, whose great poem is devoted to an exposition of the physical\nside of Epicureanism, _i.e._ of the Atomic Philosophy of Democritus,[90]\nis only on the same ground with Epicurus himself when he makes it clear,\nnot merely by the general complexion of his argument, but by a large\nnumber of particular passages, and those, too, the most strikingly\nbeautiful in the poem, that the investigation of natural phenomena is to\nserve only as a means of freeing the life of humanity from those cares\nand vices which are hostile to its peace:\u2014\n\n    \u201cDenique avarities et honorum c\u00e6ca cupido\n    Qu\u00e6 miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines\n    Juris et interdum socios scelerum atque ministros\n    Noctes atque dies niti pr\u00e6stante labore\n    Ad summas emergere opes, h\u00e6c vulnera vit\u00e6\n    Non minimam partem _mortis formidine_ aluntur.\u201d\n\nThe investigation of nature with a view to eliminating the fear of\ndeath as a factor in human conduct, clearly enounced as it is in the\npoem of the Roman Epicurean, is still more emphatically expressed\nin a \u201cfundamental maxim\u201d of Epicurus himself: \u201cIf we did not allow\nourselves to be disturbed by suspicious fears of celestial phenomena;\nif the terrors of death were never in our minds; and if we would but\ncourageously discuss the limits of our nature as regards pain and desire:\nwe should then have no need to study Natural Philosophy.\u201d[91]\n\nThe exclusion of Dialectics,[92] and the subordination of Physics to\nEthics, restricted\u2014if, indeed, it were a restriction\u2014the scope of\ncharacter and intelligence to the sphere of conduct, and it is in the\nlight of this limitation that the full significance of the Epicurean\ndefinition of Philosophy lies\u2014\u201cPhilosophy is an active principle\nwhich aims at securing Happiness by Reason and Discussion.\u201d Here we\nhave in practical completion that identification of Philosophy with\nEthics towards which the whole tendency of Greek speculation had been\nconsciously or unconsciously working, and which was fully consummated in\nthe later development of the Stoic and Epicurean systems. The combined\neffect of this principle of Epicureanism, and of the contemporaneous\nfailure of political interest, was to direct attention to those less\nostentatious, but, for happiness, more effective virtues, which flourish\nin private society and in the daily intercourse of mankind. Because it\nexcluded Dialectics, and because it was excluded from Politics, the\ngospel of the Garden established an ideal of homely virtue which lay\nwithin the reach of the average man, who, like Epicurus himself, was\nrepelled by Plato\u2019s distance from life, and did not feel called upon to\ncherish impracticable schemes of ameliorating society under the dominion\nof a Demetrius the Liberator, but was willing to content himself with a\nhumbler range of duty, with being temperate and chaste in his habits,\nsimple and healthy in his tastes, cheerful and serene in his personal\nbearing, amiable and sympathetic with his friends, and cultivating\ncourteous relations in those slightly more extended social circles where\ncomity and tact take the place of the more intimate and familiar virtues\nof household life.[93]\n\nBy the method of placing in continuous order certain common and\nwell-known indications, we have endeavoured to illustrate the view that\nthe natural development of Greek Philosophy led in the direction of\nEthics, and that the natural development of Ethics led in the direction\nof a popular scheme of conduct, which, fragmentary and incomplete as\nit might be in a scientific sense, had yet the advantage that it was\nfounded upon the common daily life of the ordinary man, and placed before\nthe ordinary man in his common daily life an ideal of virtue which, by\nefforts not beyond his strength, he might realize and maintain. This type\nof character, partly the growth of the circumstances of the time, but\nstrengthened and expanded by the manner in which Epicureanism adapted\nitself to those circumstances, reacted upon the sterner conception of the\nStoic ideal of private virtue, and when we reach the revival of Religion\nand Philosophy in the Gr\u00e6co-Roman world of the Empire, it is this ideal\nwhich is the aim and end of every philosopher from Seneca to Marcus\nAurelius, from Plutarch to Apuleius, no matter what the particular label\nthey may attach to their doctrines to indicate their formal adhesion to\none of the great classical schools.[94] To take an extreme example of\na truth which will subsequently be illustrated from Plutarch, Seneca,\nwho is a Stoic of the Stoics, is full of praise for the noble and humane\nsimplicity of the Epicurean ideal of life, and in those inspiring letters\nthrough which he directs the conscience of his friend Lucilius into\nthe pure and pleasant ways of truth and virtue, it is an exceptional\noccurrence for him to conclude one of his moral lessons without quoting\nin its support the authority of the Master of the Garden. The absorbing\ninterest of Plutarch as a moral philosopher lies mainly in the fact\nthat though, as a polemical writer, he is an opponent, and not always\na fair or judicious opponent, both of the Porch and the Garden,[95]\nhe collects from any quarter any kind of teaching which he hopes to\nfind useful in inculcating that ideal of conduct which he believes most\nlikely to work out into virtue and happiness; and though his most revered\nteacher is Plato, the ideal of conduct which he inculcates is one which\nEpicurus would have wished his friend Metrodorus to appropriate and\nexemplify.[96] This ideal Plutarch thought worth preservation; it is the\nlast intelligible and practicable ideal presented to us by Paganism;\nand the attempts which Plutarch made to preserve it are interesting\nas those of a man who stood at a crisis in the world\u2019s history, and\nendeavoured to find, in the wisdom and strength and splendour of the\nPast, a sanction for purity and goodness, when a sanction for purity\nand goodness was being mysteriously formed, in comparison with which\nthe wisdom and strength and splendour of the Past were to be regarded\nbut as weakness and darkness and folly. The experiment was not without\nsuccess for a considerable time; and had Paganism been defended by\nJulian in the pliant form which Plutarch gave it, and in the spirit of\ntolerance which he infused into his defence of it, it is probable that\nthe harmonious co-operation, and perhaps the complete union, of the\nclassical tradition and the Christian faith would have been the early and\nbeneficial result.[97] With a view to observing some of the factors which\ncontributed to the success of Plutarch\u2019s work, we propose to give a brief\nglance at the ethical condition of the epoch in which it was carried on.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n    _Ethical aspect of Gr\u00e6co-Roman Society in the period\n    of Plutarch: difficulty of obtaining an impartial view\n    of it\u2014Revival of moral earnestness concurrent with the\n    establishment of the Empire: the reforms of Augustus a\n    formal expression of actual tendencies\u2014Evidences of this in\n    philosophical and general literature\u2014The differences between\n    various Schools modified by the importance of the ethical end\n    to which all their efforts were directed\u2014Endeavour made to base\n    morality on sanctions already consecrated by the philosophies\n    and religious traditions of the Past\u2014Plutarch\u2019s \u201cEthics\u201d the\n    result of such an endeavour._\n\n\nFew ages have left to posterity a character less easy to define, or more\nsubjected to the ravages of mutually destructive schools of criticism,\nthan that which gave the Religion of Christ to the Western world, and\nwitnessed the moulding of Pagan Religion and Philosophy\u2014or rather of\nPagan religions and philosophies\u2014into that systematized shape which\nthey afterwards presented against the progress of Christianity. Many\nancient and some modern apologists of Christianity have appeared to\nthink it essential to the honour and glory of their Creed that the\nworld, before its rise, should be regarded as sunk in iniquity to such a\ndepth that nothing but a Divine Revelation could serve to elevate and\npurify it.[98] It has been maintained, on the other hand, and that too\nby Christian writers, that no epoch of Western civilization has been so\nmarked, not only by the material well-being of the mass of mankind, but\n\u201cby virtue in the highest places and by moderation and sobriety in the\nranks beneath,\u201d as that during which the new Creed was generally regarded\nas a base and superstitious sort of Atheism.[99] It may be conceded that\nthe original authors of this period who have been most read in modern\ntimes have easily been construed into vigorous and effective testimony in\nsupport of the former position. The poets and rhetoricians of the Empire\nhave had their most exaggerated phrases turned into evidence against\nthe morals of their own days, and their less emphatic expressions have\nbeen regarded as hinting at the perpetration of vices too monstrous to\nbe more clearly indicated. If, by chance an author has left writings\nmarked by a lofty conception of morality, and breathing the purest and\nmost disinterested love of virtue, this very fact has been sufficient\nto justify a denial of their Pagan origin, and the assertion that the\ntrue source of their inspiration must have been Jud\u00e6a. Hence the curious\nstruggles of many intelligent men to establish a personal connexion\nbetween Paul and Seneca, and to demonstrate that the Ethics of Plutarch\nare coloured by Christian modes of thought.[100] Other authors of the\nperiod who furnish material for correcting this one-sided impression\nhave been less known to the multitude and less consulted by the learned.\nEven were the worst true that Juvenal, and Tacitus, and Martial, and\nSuetonius, and Petronius have said about Roman courts and Roman society;\neven were it not possible to supply a corrective colouring to the picture\nfrom the pages of Seneca, and Lucan, and Pliny, and Persius, and even\nJuvenal himself: yet it should be easy to remember that, just as the\nPalace of the C\u00e6sars was not the City, so the City was not the Empire.\n_Exeat aula qui volet esse pius_ is a maxim that could with advantage\nbe applied to the sphere of historical criticism as well as to that of\npractical Ethics; and if we leave the factions and scandals of the Court\nand the City under the worst of the Emperors, and follow Dion into the\nhuts of lonely herdsmen on the deserted hills of Eub\u0153a, or linger with\nPlutarch at some modest gathering of family friends in Athens or the\nvillages of B\u0153otia, we shall find innumerable examples of that virtue\nwhich the Republican poet sarcastically denies to the highest rulers.\nEven after the long reign of Christianity, vice has been centralized in\nthe great capitals of civilization; and Rome and Alexandria and Antioch\nare not without their parallels among the cities of Modern Europe. In\nAlexandria itself, the populace who could listen to discourses like those\nof Dion must have been endowed with a considerable capacity for virtue;\nthe tone of the orator, indeed, frequently reminds us of those modern\npreachers who provoke an agreeable sensation of excitement in the minds\nof their highly respectable audiences, by depicting them as involved in\nsuch wickedness as only the most daring of mankind would find courage\nto perpetrate.[101] We propose to deal elsewhere with the testimony of\nPlutarch as to the moral character of the age in which he lived, and at\npresent confine our observations to the assertion that his \u201cEthical\u201d\nwritings are crowded with examples of the purest and most genuine virtue;\nnot such virtue as shows itself on striking and public occasions only,\nbut such also as irradiates the daily life of the common people in\ntheir homes and occupations. And although he is, perhaps, in some of\nhis precepts, a little in advance of the general trend of his times,\ninculcating, in these instances, virtues which, though not unpractised\nand unknown, are still so far limited in their application that he wishes\nto draw them from their shy seclusion in some few better homes, and to\nestablish them in the broad and popular light of recognized customs;[102]\nyet it is clear to every one of the few students of his pages that the\nvirtues he depicts are the common aim of the people he meets in the\nstreets and houses of Ch\u00e6ronea, and that the failings he corrects are\nthe failings of the good people who are not too good to have to struggle\nagainst the temptations incident to humanity. The indications conveyed by\nPlutarch and Dion respecting the moral progress of obscure families and\nunknown villagers point to the widespread existence through the Empire of\nthat same strenuous longing after goodness, which had already received\nemphatic expression in the writings of philosophers and poets whose\nactivities had been confined to Rome.\n\nFor there can be no doubt that the establishment of the Empire had been\naccompanied by a strenuous moral earnestness which is in marked contrast\nto the flippant carelessness of the last days of the Republican Era. The\nnote of despair\u2014despair none the less because its external aspect was\ngay and _debonnaire_\u2014so frequently raised by Ovid and Propertius and\nTibullus; the reckless cry, _Interea, dum fata sinunt, jungamus amores;\nIam veniet tenebris Mors adoperta caput_, is the last word of a dying\nepoch.[103] These three great poets utter the swan song of the moribund\nRepublic. Their beliefs are sceptical, or frankly materialistic; they\nshut their eyes at the prospect of death to open them on the nearer\ncharms of the sensual life: devoting their days and their genius to the\npleasures of a passionately voluptuous love of women. In their higher\nmoods they turn to the Past, but with an antiquarian interest only, like\nOvid and Propertius, or, like Tibullus, to delight in the religious\ncustoms that still linger in the rural parts of Italy, the relics of a\nsimpler and devouter time. If they turn their thoughts to the Afterworld\nat all, it is to depict in glowing verses the conventional charms of the\nclassic Elysium, or to find occasion for striking description in the\nfabled woes of Ixion and Tantalus.[104] Even these descriptions change\nby a natural gradation into an appeal for more passionate devotion on\nthe part of Corinna, or Delia, or Cynthia.[105] If Propertius thinks\nof death, it is but to hope that Cynthia will show her regard for his\nmemory by visiting his tomb in her old age; to regret, with infinite\npathos, the thousands of \u201cdear dead women\u201d who have become the prey of\nthe Infernal Deities\u2014_sunt apud infernos tot milia formosarum_; to lament\nthat his deserted mistress will call in vain upon his scattered dust;\nor to postpone all consideration of such matters until age shall have\nexhausted his capacity for more passionate enjoyment. If he mentions\nthe mighty political events of his time, it is with the air of one who\nwatches a triumphal procession while resting his head on his mistress\u2019s\nshoulder.[106] But these poets, wrapped in all the physical pleasures\nwhich their age had to supply, are not ignorant of the malady from which\nit suffers; they know that their despair and their materialism are born\nof the misery of long years of sanguinary strife; and Tibullus, in one\nof the sweetest of his Elegies, utters a wish which is the Ave of the\nstorm-tossed Republic to the approaching peace of the Empire:\u2014_At nobis,\nPax alma, veni._[107]\n\n_Cum domino Pax ista venit._[108] Virgil and Horace are poets of the\nEmpire, and strike the dominant note of the new epoch. It was not the\nmere courtly complaisance of genius for its patrons that led Virgil and\nHorace to identify their muse with the religious and moral reforms of\nAugustus. It was rather a conscious recognition of the spiritual needs\nof the new age which led poets and statesmen alike to further this joint\nwork. It is the custom to regard the labours of Augustus as resulting\nin the superimposition on the social fabric of mere forms and rituals\nwhich would have been appropriate were society only a fabric, but which\nwere utterly inadequate to serve as anything better than a superficial\nornament to an expanding and developing organism.[109] But, taken\nin conjunction with the poems of Virgil and Horace, they show their\nreal character as outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual\ngrace. It is true that Horace at times attributes the disasters from\nwhich his countrymen have suffered to their disregard of the ancient\nreligious ceremonies; to their neglect of the _templa \u00e6desque labentes\ndeorum et f\u0153da nigro simulacra fumo_;[110] but in the six famous Odes\nwhich stand at the head of Book III he emphasizes the national necessity\nof chastity, fidelity, mercy, loyalty to duty; and he utters not less\nemphatic warnings against the general danger from avarice, ambition,\nluxury. The essentially religious character of the \u00c6neid is evident to\nevery reader. That is no mere formalism which inspires with moral vigour\nthe splendid melodies of the Sixth Book.[111] Although the Poet uses\nthe conventional machinery of Elysium and Tartarus to emphasize the\ncontrast between Virtue and Vice by contrasting the fates that await\nthem hereafter; yet justice, piety, patriotism, chastity, self-devotion;\nfidelity to friend and wife and client; filial and fraternal love: never\nreceived advocacy more strenuous and sincere, never were sanctioned\nby praise more eloquent, or reprehension more terrible, than in those\nimmortal verses which it is an impertinence to praise. The question\nwhich presented itself to Augustus, to his ministers and to his poets,\nwas how to re-invigorate and preserve those qualities by her practice of\nwhich Rome had become _pulcherrima rerum_. And we cannot wonder that an\nimportant part of their answer to this question lay in the direction of\nrestoring those ancient religious ceremonies and moral practices which\nhad been most conspicuously displayed when Rome was making her noblest\nefforts to accomplish her great destiny. The sanction of antiquity is\nthe most permanent of all appeals that are ever made to humanity; and,\neven in times of revolution, its authority has been invoked by those most\neager to sweep away existing institutions. _Pro magno teste vetustas\ncreditur._[112] But if Augustus and his friends appealed to antiquity, it\nwas not merely to recall the shadows of the ancient forms and customs,\nbut to revivify them with the new life of virtue that was welling up in\ntheir time, and which, in its turn, received external grace and strength\nby its embodiment in the ancestral forms.\n\nThe strong chord of moral earnestness struck by Horace and Virgil grows\nmore resonant as the new era advances, until, in literature at least,\nit attains the persistence of a dominant. Juvenal is so passionately\nmoral that he frequently renders himself liable to Horace\u2019s censure of\nthose who worship virtue too much; but, in his best moods, as in the\nfamous lines which close the Tenth Satire, he depicts the virtuous man\nin a style which is not the less earnest and sincere because it is also\ndignified and calm. Persius, whose disposition was marked by maidenly\nmodesty and gentleness, and who is also described as _frugi et pudicus_,\nshows, even when hampered by a disjointed style which only allows him to\nutter his thought in fragments, that devotion to the highest moral aims\nwhich we should expect from a writer brought up under the influences\nwhich he enjoyed;[113] and though he, too, exhibits some of the savage\nferocity of Juvenal in his strictures of vice, he yet pays, in his Fifth\nSatire, that tribute to virtue in the person of Cornutus which \u201cproves\nthe goodness of the writer and the gracefulness with which he could\nwrite.\u201d[114] Lucan, too, whose youth, like that of Persius, had the\ninestimable advantage of receiving a share of the wisdom which Cornutus\nhad gained by nights devoted to philosophic studies, exhibits a spirit\nof the loftiest morality under the rhetorical phrasing of his great\nRepublican Epic.[115] Looking back, with something of regret, to the days\nof a dominant oligarchy, he does not conceal the licentiousness which\nsociety harboured beneath the sway of the later Optimates, and he turns\nmostly to Cato as the type which he would fain accept as representative\nof the true Roman patrician:\u2014\n\n    \u201cNam cui crediderim Superos arcana daturos\n    Dicturosque magis quam sancto vera Catoni?\u201d[116]\n\nThe noble lines in which Cato refuses to consult the Libyan oracle\u2014_Non\nexploratum populis Ammona relinquens_\u2014are well known, and express a\nhighly ethical view of the divine administration of the world:\u2014\n\n    \u201cH\u00e6remus cuncti superis, temploque tacente\n    Nil facimus non sponte Dei: nec vocibus ullis\n    Numen agit: dixitque semel nascentibus auctor\n    Quicquid scire licet: steriles nec legit arenas\n    Ut caneret paucis, mersitque hoc pulvere verum.\n    Estne Dei sedes nisi terra et pontus et aer\n    Et c\u00e6lum et virtus? Superos quid qu\u00e6rimus ultra?\n    Juppiter est quodcunque vides quocunque moveris.\u201d[117]\n\nHis biting sarcasms on those who exercise the art of Magic are conceived\nin the same spirit of lofty reverence for the Divine Nature,[118] and\nhe would fain believe in the immortality of the soul as a stimulus to\nvirtue and self-abnegation in the present life.[119]\n\nThe philosophers are marked by the same strenuous seriousness as the\npoets. The letters of Seneca to Lucilius are still an Enchiridion for\nthose that love virtue, and though there were, doubtless, in the ranks of\nthe philosophers some who deserved the ferocity of Juvenal; some who laid\nthemselves open to the sarcasms of Seneca\u2019s friend, Marcellinus;[120]\nsome like Euxenus, an early teacher of Apollonius of Tyana, \u201cwho did\nnot care much to conform the actions of his life\u201d to the tenets of the\nphilosophy he professed;[121] some who resembled the Cynics who haunted\nthe streets and temple gates of Alexandria, and did nothing, as Dion\nsaid, \u201cbut teach fools to laugh at Philosophy;\u201d[122] yet it is beyond\ncontroversy that philosophers at this time were generally recognized as\nthe moral teachers of society, and contributed largely, both as domestic\nchaplains like Fronto, and evangelistic preachers like Apollonius of\nTyana, to the spread of that virtue whose praise and admiration are so\nconspicuous and sincere in the Greek and Roman writers of the period.\nThe contrast presented by the Sophists, with their artificial graces\nand their luxurious lives, only served to emphasize the worth of the\ntrue philosopher, and when a Sophist turned round upon his career, and\ndetermined to lead a virtuous life, he joined the ranks of those who\nprofessed philosophy.[123]\n\nOne of the most frequently recurrent signs of the essential love of\nvirtue exhibited by this age is the constant and strenuous insistence\nthat practice must conform to profession; and that hypocrisy is almost in\nthe condition of a cardinal vice. It may, of course, be asserted that the\npassionate eagerness displayed touching the importance of being true in\nact to the explicit utterances of Philosophy is but a sign of conscious\nweakness in well-doing; and that a truer virtue would have given effect\nto itself without all this noisy preaching. But a recognition of one\u2019s\nown feebleness has subsequently become one of the most lauded elements of\nthe saintly character, and it is given to very few to blossom gently and\nnaturally into that goodness which does neither strive nor cry. Juvenal\u2019s\ndiatribes against the Egnatii of Rome are not very different in language,\nand hardly different at all in spirit, from the attacks of New Testament\nwriters on hypocritical members of the Churches. So far as Greece was\nconcerned, this love of sincerity was but a return\u2014from a somewhat\ndistant lapse\u2014to the ideal of personal openness presented in the famous\nwords of Achilles:\u2014\n\n                              \u201cFor like hell mouth I loath\n  Who holds not in his words and thoughts one indistinguished troth.\u201d[124]\n\nAnd not only is practice regarded as the culmination of theory, the\nhabit formed upon the active principle, Philosophy, but the question\nof personal honour is involved in the harmony between creed and deed;\nand one mark of distinction between sophist and philosopher is that\nthe external apparatus of the former\u2014\u201chis contracted brows and studied\ngravity of aspect\u201d\u2014do not indicate the possession of the virtues which\nare the pride of the latter.[125]\n\nPlutarch frequently lays strenuous weight on this point;[126] Seneca,\nDion, Aurelius, Epictetus, Apuleius, are crowded with sermons on its\nimportance.[127] And if pure professions are to be carried out into\npure actions, there is a growing sense that neither may impure words\nbe indulged in, even by those whose lives are pure. Even so far as\nthe composition of light verse was concerned, a new sensitiveness\nwas making itself evident. Catullus had said in the old days that a\nchaste and pious man might legitimately write verses of a licentious\ncharacter, and the catchword had been repeated by all the society poets\ndown to Martial.[128] But, even when addressing Domitian, Martial, who\nasserts that his life is pure, begs the Emperor to regard his lightest\nepigrams with the toleration due to the licence of a court jester.\nPliny, the excellent and respectable Pliny, could not read his naughty\nhendecasyllables \u201cmerely to a few friends in my private chamber\u201d without\nsubjecting his compositions to serious criticisms in the homes of these\nfriends, criticisms which he strives to meet by a long display of great\nnames who have sinned in the same direction; but beneath this display his\nuneasiness peeps forth at every word.[129]\n\nThe moral reformation officially inaugurated by Augustus appears, in the\nlight of these indications, as corresponding to an increased tendency to\nvirtue actually leavening Gr\u00e6co-Roman society. The formal acts of the\nC\u00e6sar, the policy of his ministers, the religious sentiment of Horace\nand Virgil, the Stoic fervour of Seneca and Lucan, the martyr spirit of\nthe Thraseas and the Arrias, the tyrannizing morality of Juvenal, the\nkindly humanity of Pliny the Younger, the missionary enthusiasm of Dion,\nthe gentle persuasiveness of Plutarch, are all common indications of\nthe good that still interfused the Roman world; all point, as indeed,\nmany other signs also point, to the existence of a widespread belief\nthat virtuous ideals and virtuous actions were an inheritance of which\nmankind ought not to allow itself to be easily deprived. Philosophers\nand politicians, as they were at one in recognizing the value of this\nheritage, so they were also at one touching the general means by which\nits precious elements were to be invigorated and maintained. As we have\nalready suggested, it is a remarkable characteristic of the philosophic\nwriters of this period\u2014of Seneca and Dion, of Plutarch, and even of\nEpictetus\u2014that there is in them no pedantic adhesion to the fixed tenets\nof a particular school. The half-playful boast of Horace at one end of\nthe period\u2014_nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri_[130]\u2014is reiterated\nwith something of sarcastic emphasis in Epictetus at the other: \u201cVirtue\ndoes not consist in having understood Chrysippus.\u201d[131] Seneca gives\nexpression to this prevalent spirit of compromise with great courage\nand clearness. After quoting _suo more_ a certain _nobilis sententia_\nof Epicurus, he says: \u201cYou must not regard these expressions as peculiar\nto Epicurus; they are common property. The practice which obtains in the\nSenate should, I think, be adopted in Philosophy. When a speaker says\nsomething with which I partly agree, I ask him to compromise, and then\nI go with him.\u201d[132] Anything in the whole gathered wealth of the Past\nwhich promised support to a man in his efforts to regulate his life in\naccordance with the dictates of reason and virtue was welcomed and made\navailable for the uses of morality by the selective power of Philosophy.\nHence Plutarch levies contributions on philosophers, poets, legislators;\non Hellenic and Barbarian Religions; on Mysteries, Oracles, private\nutterances; on the whole complex civilization of the Gr\u00e6co-Roman world,\nand the civilizations which it had absorbed or dominated; on everything,\nin fact, which, from its antiquity, or its possession of national or\nindividual authority, could be made available for establishing the\npractice of virtue on the sanction of an ancient and inalienable\nfoundation. The object of the following pages is to scrutinize the\nresults of this appeal to the Past, as they are presented in the \u201cEthics\u201d\nof Plutarch, and to arrange in some kind of order the various elements of\nwhich they are composed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n    _Plutarch\u2019s attitude towards Pagan beliefs marked by a\n    spirit of reverent rationalism\u2014The three recognized sources\n    of Religion: Poetry, Philosophy, and Law or Custom\u2014The\n    contribution of each to be examined by Reason with the\n    object of avoiding both Superstition and Atheism: Reason the\n    \u201cMystagogue\u201d of Religion\u2014Provisional examples of Plutarch\u2019s\n    method in the three spheres\u2014His reluctance to press rationalism\n    too far\u2014His piety partly explained by his recognition of the\n    divine mission of Rome\u2014Absence of dogmatism in his teaching._\n\n\nThe question which meets us on the very threshold of an inquiry into\nthe religious views and moral teachings of Plutarch is that involved in\na definition of his attitude towards the popular faith. His desire to\nform a consistent body of doctrine out of its heterogeneous and chaotic\nelements is not so intense as to blind him to the difficulties of the\ntask. Poets, legislators, and philosophers have jointly contributed to\nthe formation of the \u201cancient and hereditary Faith,\u201d and Philosophy, Law,\nand Poetry, avoid reconciliation to as great a degree as, in the days of\nSolon, the famous Attic factions of the Paraloi, the Epakrioi, and the\nPedieis, to the pacification of whose internecine animosities the policy\nof that statesman was directed. The gods of the philosophers are like the\nImmortals of Pindar:\u2014\n\n    \u201cNot death they know, nor age, nor toil and pain,\n    And hear not Acheron\u2019s deep and solemn strain.\u201d[133]\n\nPhilosophy, too, rejects the Strifes, the Prayers, the Terrors, and\nthe Fears, which Homeric poesy elevates to the divine rank.[134] Its\nteachings, moreover, are often at variance with religious practices\nestablished or recognized by Law and Prescription, as when Xenophanes\nchid the Egyptians for lamenting Osiris as a mortal, while yet\nworshipping him as a god. Poets and legislators, in their turn, refuse\nto recognize the metaphysical conceptions\u2014\u201cIdeas, Numbers, Unities,\nSpirits\u201d\u2014which philosophers\u2014Platonists, Pythagoreans, and Stoics\u2014have\nput in the place of Deity.[135] This clashing of discordant elements in\nthe mass of the popular tradition is audible in Plutarch\u2019s exposition\nof his own views; a fact which is less to be wondered at when we accept\nthe hint furnished in the allusion to Osiris just quoted, and note\nthat Plutarch will not confine his efforts, as \u201carbitrator between\nthe three Factions which dispute about the nature of the Gods,\u201d to\nthe sphere of Gr\u00e6co-Roman Mythology.[136] But although he will sit in\nturn at the feet of poets, philosophers, and legislators, borrowing,\nfrom Science, Custom, Tradition alike, any teaching which promises\nethical usefulness, he frequently insists, both in general terms and in\nparticular discussions on points of practical morals, that Reason must\nbe the final judge of what is worthy of selection as the basis of moral\naction. Philosophy, in his beautiful metaphor, so full of solemn meaning\nto a Greek ear, must be our Mystagogue to Theology: we must borrow\nReason from Philosophy, and take her as our guide to the mysteries of\nReligion, reverently submitting every detail of creed or practice to her\nauthority.[137] We shall then avoid the charge that we take with our\nleft hand what our teachers\u2014our legislative, mythological, philosophic\ninstructors\u2014have offered with their right. The selecting and controlling\npower of Reason, applied to philosophical discussions, will enable us to\nattain to a becoming conception of the nature of the Deity; applied to\nthe matter of Mythology, it will enable us to reject the narratives, at\nonce discreditable and impossible, which have become current respecting\nthe traditional gods; and, in the sphere of Law and Custom, it will\nenable us correctly to interpret the legal ordinances and established\nrules connected with sacrifices and other religious celebrations.\nThe assumption which inspires all Plutarch\u2019s arguments on matters of\nReligion is that these three sources supply a rational basis for belief\nand conduct: but that superstition on the one hand, and atheistic\nmisrepresentation on the other, have done so much to obscure the true\nprinciples of belief that Philosophy must analyse the whole material over\nagain, and dissociate the rational and the pure from crude exaggerations\nand unintelligent accretions.[138] It must be admitted that he applies\nno definite rules of criticism, constructs no scientifically exact\nsystem of analysis, propounds no infallible dogmas. His canon is the\ngeneral taste and good sense of the educated man; a canon which, vague\nas it may seem, is based upon an intelligent knowledge of the practical\nneeds of life, and produces results which are applicable in a remarkable\ndegree to the satisfaction of such needs. As provisional illustrations\nof Plutarch\u2019s method in the three spheres of Philosophy, Mythology, and\nNational Custom, we may note the discussion on the nature of God in the\n\u201cDe \u0395 apud Delphos,\u201d the criticism of the great national poets of Greece\nin the \u201cQuomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat,\u201d and the remarks in\nthe \u201cDe Iside et Osiride\u201d concerning certain religious practices in the\nworship of these two Egyptian deities.\n\nIn the first-named tract the ostensible subjects of discussion are the\nnature and attributes of Apollo; but it soon becomes quite clear that the\nargument is concerned with the nature of Deity itself rather than with\nthe functions of the traditional god. \u201cWe constantly hear theologians\nasserting and repeating in verse and in prose that the nature of God\nis eternal and incorruptible, but that this nature, by the operation\nof an intelligent and inevitable law, effects certain changes in its\nown form. At one time God reduces all nature to uniformity by changing\nHis substance to fire; and, again, in a great variety of ways, under\nmany forms, enters into the phenomenal world.[139] ... Philosophers,\nin their desire to conceal these high matters from the common herd,\ncall God\u2019s transmutation into fire by two names\u2014Apollo, to express His\nunity; Ph\u0153bus, to describe His clear-shining purity. To denote God\u2019s\nsuffering the change of His nature into air and water and earth and\nstars, and the various species of plants and animals, they figuratively\ntell of \u2018tearings asunder\u2019 and \u2018dismemberings,\u2019 and in these aspects He\nis variously called Dionysus, Zagr\u00e6us, Nyktelius, and Isodaites, and His\n\u2018destructions\u2019 and \u2018disappearances,\u2019 His \u2018death\u2019 and His \u2018resurrection,\u2019\nare inventions, enigmas, and myths, fittingly expressing, for the general\near, the true nature of the changes in God\u2019s essence in the formation of\nthe world.\u201d[140] Plutarch here represents himself as the speaker; and\nwhile Ammonius, who was Plutarch\u2019s master,[141] and is always spoken\nof by him with the greatest reverence, is subsequently introduced as\ntaking a different view of the processes by which God produced the world\nof phenomena, yet neither does he depart from the rational standpoint\nin his view of the terms under discussion.[142] In allusion to these\nterms, as explained by Plutarch from the Stoical view of the Divine\nNature,[143] he says, \u201cSurely God would be a less dignified figure than\nthe child in the poem,[144] since the pastime which the child plays with\nmere sand, building castles to throw them down again, God would thus be\never playing with the universe. On the contrary, God has mysteriously\ncemented the universe together, overcoming that natural weakness in it\nwhich tends perpetually to annihilation. It is the function of some\nother god, or, rather, of some d\u00e6mon, appointed to direct nature in\nthe processes of generation and destruction, to do and suffer these\nchanges.\u201d In both these views the literal acceptation of the mythological\nnames is repudiated, and the two differ only in that the Stoics quoted\nin Plutarch\u2019s speech make the Supreme Ruler modify His essence to the\nproduction of phenomena, while Ammonius relegates that function to\na subordinate power; keeping his Platonic Demiurgus pure from these\nundignified metamorphoses. It will subsequently appear, when we come\nto deal with the D\u00e6monology of Plutarch, that the latter view is the\none he also actually accepted. The discussion, at any rate, furnishes\na capital instance of what Plutarch means by his assertion that Reason\nmust be Mystagogue to Theology. Mythological terms must be examined by\nReason before their meaning can be accepted as an element in religious\nteaching. The particular view taken of the expressions is left to the\ntaste or philosophic bent of the individual critic: to Academic or Stoic\nreasonings; the only essential is that the crude literal meaning of the\nterms shall be repudiated as discordant with a rational estimate of the\nDivine Nature.[145]\n\nIn the critical essay, \u201cQuomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat,\u201d the\nsame method is applied to the whole religious and moral teaching of the\nnational poets. However great Plutarch\u2019s admiration for Plato as man and\nphilosopher may be, his sound sense of what is practicable in common life\nprevents him from subjecting the ancient poetry of Greece, as an element\nin ethical culture, to the impossible standard of the \u201cRepublic,\u201d and\nhe therefore, on this question, opposes Stoic and Peripatetic wisdom to\nthe teaching of a Master with whose sublime views he often finds himself\nin agreement.[146] Throughout the whole work he applies the touchstone\nof common sense to all the beauties and all the barbarities of the\ntraditional legends as embodied in Epic and Tragic poetry. Reason and\ncommon sense admit the high value of imaginative literature in ethical\neducation, and reason and common sense decide what practical advice shall\nbe given to youthful students of fiction, in order that moral lessons\nmay be driven home, immoral incidents, descriptions, and characters\nmade harmless, or even beneficial, while, at the same time, even purely\n\u00e6sthetic considerations are not neglected.\n\nAt the commencement of the \u201cDe Iside et Osiride\u201d Plutarch deals fully\nwith numerous examples of religious practices coming under his third\ndescription of the sources of religious belief, that, namely, of Law\nor established Custom. He discusses their meaning in the light of a\nprinciple which he states as follows:\u2014\u201cIn the religious institutions\n(connected with the worship of Isis and Osiris) nothing has become\nestablished which, however it may appear irrational, mythical,\nsuperstitious, has not some moral or salutary reason, or some ingenious\nhistorical or physical explanation.\u201d[147] He is not always successful\nin his search after a moral meaning, or even an ingenious historical\nor physical explanation, in the customs which he subjects to analysis.\nThe rational attitude, however, is unmistakable, and these introductory\nremarks, personal as they may be to the priestess Clea, and detached from\nthe main body of the work, yet stand in a true harmony with what we shall\nhereafter see to be its essential purpose, to show, namely, that while\nPhilosophy can grasp the Highest without the intervention of myth or\ninstitution, it can also aid a pure conception of the Highest by studying\nthe myths and institutions which foreign peoples have discovered and\ncreated as intermediaries betwixt themselves and the Highest.\n\nBut in spite of the important part thus assigned to Reason in settling\ndisputed matters of faith, and arbitrating on points of national and\nindividual ethics, Plutarch makes it clear that Piety and Patriotism\nhave claims in this matter which are actually enforced by Reason in her\nselecting and purifying _r\u00f4le_. If he had seen, as his age could not see,\nand as we can see, that Reason can only be the Mystagogue to Religion\nin a very limited degree, he would probably have been patriot first and\nphilosopher afterwards, or would, perhaps, have accepted the compromise\nof Cotta, and played each part in turn as public or private necessities\ndictated. But the crux does not arise, and Plutarch\u2019s position never\nreally has the inconsistency which, carelessly considered, it appears\nto have, because he is honestly convinced that what Reason rejects in\nthe national faith, it is good for the national faith that it should\nbe deprived of. Hence it is possible to give examples of Plutarch\u2019s\nviews in this direction without assuming that he forgot what prospect\nlay in exactly the opposite direction. Hence he can quote Ammonius as\nbeautifully tender in his expressions towards those who are bound up in\nthe literal realisms of the Hellenic faith. \u201cYet must we extend gratitude\nand love to those who believe that Apollo and the Sun are the same,\nbecause they attach their idea of God to that which they most honour and\ndesire of anything they know. They now see the God as in a most beautiful\ndream: let us awaken them and summon them to take an upward flight, so\nthat they may behold his real vision and his essence, though still they\nmay revere his type, the Sun, and worship the life-giving principle in\nthat type; which, so far as can be done by a perceptible object on behalf\nof an invisible essence, by a transient image on behalf of an eternal\noriginal, scatters with mysterious splendour through the universe some\nradiance of the grace and glory that abide in His presence.\u201d[148] Not\nonly through the dramatic medium of another personality, but also when\nspeaking his own thought directly, Plutarch alludes with a sincere and\ntouching sympathy to the duties and practices of the ancient faith.\nThe first hint of consolation conveyed to his friend Apollonius on the\ndeath of his son is given in words which feelingly depict the youth as\nembodying the ancient Hellenic ideals in his attitude towards the gods,\nand his conduct towards his parents and friends.[149] The converse of\nthis attitude is indicated in many passages where he deprecates a too\ninquisitive bearing in the face of questions naturally involved in the\ndoubt clouding many ancient traditions of a religious character. The\ngreat discussion on \u201cThe Cessation of the Oracles\u201d commences with a\nreproof directed at those who \u201cwould test an ancient religious tradition\nlike a painting, by the touch\u201d and in the \u201cAmatorius\u201d full play is\nallowed to the exposition of a similar view, a view, indeed, which\ndominates the whole of this fascinating dialogue. Pemptides, one of the\nspeakers, who rails lightly at love as a disease, is willing to learn\nwhat was in the minds of those who first proclaimed that passion as a\ngod. He is answered by the most important speaker in the conversation,\na speaker whose name is not given in the report, which is represented\nas furnished by one of this speaker\u2019s sons from their father\u2019s account.\n\u201cOur father, addressing Pemptides by name, said, \u2018You are, in my opinion,\ncommencing with great rashness to discuss matters which ought not to be\ndiscussed at all, when you ask a reason for every detail of our belief\nin the gods. _Our ancient hereditary faith is sufficient, and a better\nargument than this could not be discovered or described._ But if this\nfoundation and support of all piety be shaken, and its stability and the\nhonoured beliefs that cling to it be disturbed, it will be undermined and\nno one will regard it as secure. And if you demand proofs about every\none of the gods, laying a profane hand on every temple, and bringing\nsophistical smartness to bear on every shrine, nothing will be safe from\nyour peering eyes and prying fingers. What an abyss of Atheism opens\nbeneath us, if we resolve every deity into a passion, a power, or a\nvirtuous activity!\u2019\u201d[150] This is, of course, an extreme conventional\nview, but the fact, that it is put so fully, at least argues Plutarch\u2019s\nsympathy with it, though he would not, in his own person, have pinned\nhimself down to so unqualified an expression of it. It will be noted that\nin this part of the dialogue the gods only are under discussion, whereas\nin regard to tradition on other elements in the ancient faith the same\nspeaker subsequently represents himself as neither altogether a believer\nnor a disbeliever, and he proceeds to search, in Plutarch\u2019s own special\nway, for \u201cfaint and dim emanations of truth dispersed about among the\nmythologies of the Egyptians.\u201d[151] Plutarch\u2019s lofty idea of the passion\nof Love may have induced him in this, as his strenuous moral aim did\nin so many other instances, to emphasize for the moment any particular\naspect of the ancient faith which appeared likely to furnish inspiration\nto the realization of noble ethical ideals. He is anxious, at all\nevents, that his purely rational arguments shall not carry him too far,\nas, on one occasion, after a long disquisition, the undoubted purport\nof which is to refer oracular inspiration to subterraneous fumes and\nexhalations, or, as one of the speakers says, \u201cto accident and natural\nmeans,\u201d Plutarch (\u201cLamprias\u201d here is clearly a thin disguise of Plutarch\nhimself) is disturbed and confused that he should be thought desirous of\nrefuting any \u201ctrue and religious\u201d opinions recognized with respect to the\nDeity; and he forthwith proceeds to prove that it is quite possible to\ninvestigate natural phenomena for secondary causes, while recognizing a\nfinal cause in the creative Deity.[152] Not only does Plutarch sympathize\nwith those who accept with pious simplicity the tenets of the \u201cancient\nand hereditary Faith;\u201d not only does he deprecate too severe a handling\nof religious questions; but he is also eager to support his view of a\nsubject by showing that it is not out of harmony with the traditions or\nprescriptions of the national belief. Concluding that consolatory letter\nto his wife upon the death of their little daughter, which is the most\nhumane and natural expression of sympathy left us by antiquity, he tries\nto show that those who die young will earlier feel at home in the other\nworld than those whose long life on earth has habituated their souls\nto a condition so different from that which exists \u201cbeyond the gates\nof Hades,\u201d and he says that this is a truth which becomes clearer in\nthe light of the ancient and hereditary customs.[153] No libations are\npoured for the young that are dead. They have no share in earth, nor in\nthe things of earth. The laws do not allow mourning for children of such\ntender years, \u201c_because they have gone to dwell in a better land, and\nto share a diviner lot_.\u201d And he adds, \u201cI know that these questions are\ninvolved in great uncertainty; but since to disbelieve is more difficult\nthan to believe, in external matters let us act as the laws enjoin,\nwhile within we become more chaste, and holy, and undefiled.\u201d[154] It\nmust not be overlooked that Plutarch was long a priest of the Delphian\nApollo, and that the duties of this position responded to some internal\nneed of his soul, and were not regarded by him as a merely official\ndignity, is proved by the manner in which he alludes to the subject. He\nis speaking on one occasion of the many indications which the shrine\ngives of resuming its former \u201cwealth, and splendour, and honour,\u201d and\nhe congratulates himself on the zealous and useful part he has taken\nin aiding the work of this revival.[155] He mentions two friends as\nco-workers in the sacred task, and appears also to felicitate a certain\nRoman Governor of Achaia on similar grounds. But he reverently proceeds\nto make it quite clear that it is the god himself who is the ultimate\ncause of these returning blessings. \u201cBut it is not possible that so great\na transformation should have taken place in so short a time through\nhuman activity, unless the god were present and continuing to inspire\nhis oracle,\u201d and he concludes by censuring those who, in their inability\nto discern the motive actuating the divine methods with mankind, \u201cdepart\ncondemning the god, instead of blaming us or themselves, that they\ncannot, by reason, discover the intention of the god.\u201d[156]\n\nPlutarch\u2019s attitude of more than tolerance to the \u201cancient and hereditary\nFaith,\u201d an attitude which is, of course, not inconsistent with his desire\nto place that Faith on a rational basis, is partly explicable in the\nlight of his emphatic gratitude to the existing political constitution\nof the Gr\u00e6co-Roman world. He would have been an admirable co-worker with\nM\u00e6cenas\u2014\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2[157]\u2014in carrying out the religious reforms\nof Augustus. He regarded the welfare of Society and the State, of the\nfamily and the individual citizen, as bound up with a belief in the gods\nwhose agency was so clearly visible in bringing the world to that state\nof perfection which it now enjoyed, and which promised to be eternal. No\none now even dreamed of doubting the identity of the gods of Rome with\nthose of Greece, and Plutarch carries the identification to the extent\nof including the gods of almost every people constituting the Roman\nEmpire.[158] These universal powers had the world in their providential\ncare, and Rome was the divinely chosen instrument of their beneficent\npurposes. The Emperor is the depository of the sacred governing power\nof the world.[159] When Tiberius shut himself up in Capre\u00e6, this divine\npotency never left him. And though expressions of this kind may be\ninterpreted as a merely formal recognition of the official dignity\nof the Head of the World, Plutarch\u2019s many eloquent descriptions of\nthe blessings of the _Pax Romana_ leave us in no doubt respecting the\ncharacter of his views on this subject. \u201cI welcome and approve,\u201d says\nTheon, \u201cthe present position of affairs, and the subjects about which\nwe now consult the oracle. For there now reigns among us a great peace\nand calm. War has ceased. Expulsions, seditions, tyrannies, are no\nmore, and many other diseases and disasters which tormented Greece, and\ndemanded powerful remedies, are now healed. Hence the oracle is no longer\nconsulted on matters difficult, secret, and mysterious, but on common\nquestions of everyday life. Even the most important oracles addressed\nto cities are concerned with crops and herds, and matters affecting\nthe public health.\u201d[160] In the \u201cPr\u00e6cepta Gerend\u00e6 Reipublic\u00e6\u201d he is\nstill more outspoken in his praise of the Roman administration, and in\nhis recognition of the opportunities which it gives for the culture of\nthe individual character within the limits of a greatly generous sway.\nPlutarch, as is well known, was gifted with a patriotic regard for the\nold achievements of the Hellenic name, but he recognizes with so keen\nan insight the great work being accomplished by Rome in the fostering\nof municipal institutions, and the establishment of a peace which meant\nthe undisturbed happiness of millions of obscure families,[161] that, in\nthe sphere of practical politics, he deliberately turns away from the\ngroup of inspiring ideas connected with ancient Hellenic patriotism. He\nalludes coldly, perhaps even sneeringly, to such of his contemporaries\nas fancied they could apply the ancient traditions of glory to those\nlate and unseasonable times, like little children who would try to\nwear their father\u2019s sandals;[162] counsels a complete submission to\nthe duly appointed Roman authorities; fully persuaded that within the\nlimits of their supremacy there is as much freedom as a reasonable man\ncould desire to enjoy; and honestly claims to find scope, in a little\nB\u0153otian township, for such political ambition as could be safely and\nwisely indulged.[163] It is not difficult to sneer at the prudential\nlimitation of patriotism to such petty, insignificant, and meagre efforts\nas the superintendence of bricks and mortar and the carting of municipal\nrubbish; but the wiser thing is to note that Plutarch\u2019s opposition to\nvain fancies of the revival of the ancient Hellenic splendour, except\nperhaps in such a form as a Hadrian might be inclined to revive it in\nan artificial Panhellenium, is based on the conviction that happiness\ndepends upon the free development of individual character, the\nunrestricted enjoyment of domestic peace, the undisturbed intercourse\nof social life; and he knew that the Roman sway made it possible, for\nGreeks at any rate, to enjoy these blessings to a degree never previously\nknown in their chequered history.[164] With a clear recognition of the\nhistorical causes of the political decadence of Hellenism, he regards\ncivic discord as the evil which most demands the attention of those\nwho still seek opportunities for public action, and he is particularly\ngrateful to the strong hand of Rome for controlling the internecine\nanimosities of Greek cities. \u201cConsider,\u201d says he, \u201cour position with\nregard to those blessings which are counted as the greatest that a city\ncan enjoy: Peace, Freedom, Fertility of Soil, Increase of Population,\nDomestic Concord. As regards Peace, our peoples have no present need of\npoliticians. Every Greek war, every Barbarian war, has vanished from\namong us. For Freedom, our peoples enjoy as much as their rulers allow\nthem, _and a greater share would perhaps not be any better for them_.\nFor fine seasons and plentiful harvests, for families of \u2018children like\ntheir sires,\u2019 and for gracious aid to the new-born child, the good man in\nhis prayers will invoke the gods on behalf of his fellow-citizens.\u201d[165]\nAs for civic concord, that, he says, is in our own power, and those who\ndesire a life of political activity could not do better than devote\nthemselves to the task of spreading harmony and friendship among their\nfellow-citizens. The peace which the Romans have established in the world\nmakes it possible to develop character on these social lines, and he\nrecognizes, in a pregnant comparison, that the freedom which the Greeks\nenjoy is sufficient to allow the fullest play to the development of their\nown moral character. The drama is composed and staged: the prompter\nstands behind the scene ready with the cue: but the player can give his\nown interpretation of the character he represents, though remembering\nthat a slip _may_ meet with a worse fate than mere hissing in the\naudience.[166]\n\nPlutarch is clearly of opinion that this state of things is best for his\nfellow-countrymen. He is as firmly convinced of the divine mission of\nRome as ever was Virgil or any other patriotic Roman.[167] In his tract\n\u201cDe Fortuna Romanorum,\u201d he discusses the question whether the greatness\nof Rome was due to \u03a4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7 or \u1f08\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae, or, as he expresses the antithesis\nin another place, to \u03a4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7 or \u03a0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u2014to Chance or to Providence, we\nmay translate, if we recognize that here Chance is the divine element,\nand Providence the human.[168] In other words, is the grandeur of Rome\nthe result of human virtue and forethought, or is it a direct gift of\nthe Deity to mankind? He decides in the latter sense, though conceding\nmuch to the valour of individual Romans; and his incidental expressions\nof opinion bear as much evidence to the divinely inspired and divinely\nguided character of Roman administration as is borne by his definite\nconclusion. He says that, whichever way the question is decided, it can\nonly redound to the glory of Rome to be the subject of a discussion\nwhich has hitherto been confined to the great natural phenomena of the\nuniverse\u2014the earth, the sea, the heavens, and the stars. His very words\nare curiously reminiscent of Virgil\u2019s _rerum pulcherrima, Roma_ (\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd),[169] as he tells how Time, in concert\nwith the Deity, laid the foundations of Rome, harmonizing to that end\nthe influence of Fortune and Virtue alike, thus establishing for all\nthe nations of mankind a sacred hearth, a harbour and a resting-place,\n\u201can anchorage from the wandering seas\u201d of human stress and turmoil,\na principle of eternity amid the evanescence and mutability of other\nthings. He describes with great vigour of language the instability of the\nworld under the domination of other Empires, until Rome acquired her full\nstrength and splendour, and brought peace and security and permanence\namong these warring elements.[170]\n\nBeing so satisfied with the constitution of the world, it is natural\nthat Plutarch should have nothing but reverent words for the eternal\npowers whose guidance had led to so happy a disposition of human affairs.\nHowever much Philosophy should endeavour to free the mind from the crude\nand vulgar elements in the \u201cancient and hereditary Faith,\u201d she must never\nbe tempted to profess other than the most pious belief in its fundamental\ntruth and right; and the ultimate aim of Philosophy must be to strengthen\nand revive the ancient Religion by freeing it from inconsistencies and\ncrudities which, so long as they appeared to be an essential part of the\nsystem, only existed to shock the pious and to encourage atheism.\n\nPlutarch\u2019s attitude towards the ancient Faith may thus be defined as\none of patriotic acceptance modified by philosophic criticism; not that\ncriticism which tries everything from the fixed standpoint of a set of\nrules logically irrefutable: but that which is really the spirit of\nrationalism pervading all philosophies alike. If Plutarch\u2019s attitude\nis that of a Platonist, it is that of a Platonist whose experience of\nordinary human affairs, and whose recognition of their importance in\nPhilosophy, have compelled him to modify the genuine teaching of the\nMaster into something like the spirit of compromise characterizing the\nlater Academics. His teaching is not the philosophic despotism of Plato;\nit might easily be characterized as \u201cplebeian,\u201d[171] as Epicureanism\nwas by Cicero, or \u201ccommonplace,\u201d as Aristotle has been described by\nPlatonists. It breathes that free spirit of truth which bids every man,\nwhether he is a practised philosopher or not, or even if he has not\nstudied mathematics, to give a reason for the faith that is in him:\nto apply the touchstone of his own practical experience and native\nintelligence to the domain of Ethics and Religion as to the domain of\nevery-day life, because, as a matter of fact, the domain of every-day\nlife is the domain of Religion and Ethics. The dictum of Hesiod, enforced\nby Aristotle and applied in practice by the Epicureans, and by the\nStoics, is the keynote of the teaching of Plutarch:\u2014\u201cHe is most excellent\nof all, who judges of all things for himself.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\n    _Plutarch\u2019s Theology\u2014His conception of God not a pure\n    metaphysical abstraction, his presentment of it not\n    dogmatic\u2014General acceptance of the attributes recognized\n    by Greek philosophy as essential to the idea of God\u2014God\n    as UNITY, ABSOLUTE BEING, ETERNITY\u2014God as INTELLIGENCE:\n    PERSONALITY of Plutarch\u2019s God intimately associated with\n    his Intelligence\u2014God\u2019s Intelligence brings him into contact\n    with humanity: by it he knows the events of the Future and\n    the secrets of the human heart\u2014From his knowledge springs\n    his Providence\u2014God as Father and Judge\u2014the DE SERA NUMINIS\n    VINDICTA\u2014Immortality of the Soul._\n\n\nIt will readily be understood that on no question of Religion is Plutarch\nmore willing to act as \u201cArbitrator\u201d than on that concerned with the\nNature and Attributes of the Deity. He knows and, as we have seen,\nrecognizes to the full the discordant nature of the elements which, by\nforce of circumstances, have been driven into some kind of cohesion in\nthe formation of the popular belief, and it must be admitted that his\nefforts to harmonize them into a rational consistency are not completely\nsuccessful. His own conception of the Divine nature resembles the popular\nnotion in being a compound of philosophy, myth, and legalized tradition.\nFrom Philosophy he accepts the Unity of God; from popular Mythology he\naccepts certain names of deities, and certain traditional expressions,\nwhich he understands, however, in a sense quite different from any\ninterpretation current in the popular views, while, at the same time,\nhe never uses these names and expressions without an air and attitude\nof the most pious regard. The philosophical part of his teaching on the\nnature of God is largely Greek, but by no means entirely so, and neither\nis it the teaching of any particular school of Greek philosophy. The\nDemiurgus of the Tim\u00e6us: the One and Absolute of the Pythagoreans: the\n\u03a0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, the \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 of Aristotle; the material\nimmanent World-Soul\u2014the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f55\u03bb\u1fc3\u2014of the Stoics:\u2014one and all\ncontribute qualities to the Plutarchic Deity, and show how irresistible\nthe necessity for unity had become in the spiritual, as in the political,\nworld. The metaphysical Deity thus created from these diverse elements\nis made personal by the direct ethical relation into which He is brought\nwith mankind (as in the punishment of sin), while the suggestion of\npersonality is aided by the use of the Greek popular names of the deities\nto describe the attributes of the One Supreme God. Thus it has already\nbeen noted that while Plutarch is ostensibly discussing the attributes of\nApollo he is actually defining his position with reference to abstract\nDeity. This ill-harmonizing combination of metaphysics and popular belief\nis further placed in contact with views originated by Oriental creeds,\nwith Zoroastrianism, with Manich\u00e6ism, with \u201ccertain slight and obscure\nhints of the truth, which are to be found scattered here and there in\nEgyptian Mythology,\u201d[172] the whole presenting a strange conglomeration,\nwhich appears to defy any attempt to make a consistent theology of it,\nuntil we see Plutarch\u2019s method conspicuously emerging with its twofold\naim, of proving that all these different views of God are merely\ndifferent ways of striving after belief in the same Supreme Power, and\nof inculcating a sympathetic and liberal attitude of mind, which is far\nmore conducive to unity than a detailed agreement on points of minor\nimportance.[173] This endeavour after unity is supported by a strenuous\nand sincere belief in what at first sight appears to be a principle of\ndiversity\u2014the belief, namely, in D\u00e6mons\u2014but which Plutarch uses to great\neffect in his attempts after unity, by assigning, with Pythagoras,[174]\nevery recognized tradition unworthy of the Highest to these subordinate\nbeings whose influence is everywhere felt in nature and in human life,\nand whose presence, at any rate, interpenetrates and overruns the whole\nof Plutarch\u2019s views on religion.[175]\n\nIt is no unfitting circumstance in a priest of Apollo that his noblest\nutterances respecting the nature of God should be contained in\ndiscourses connected more or less with the temples and traditions of\nthe god. In the discussion, for instance, on the syllable \u201cE\u201d written\nover the narrow entrance of the Amphictyonic Temple at Delphi, Ammonius\nis represented as expressing views of the Divine Nature which are\nunsurpassed for sublimity in any other part of Plutarch\u2019s writings, or\neven in Greek literature generally. We quote them here as embodying\nPlutarch\u2019s beliefs on the Unity, Eternity, and Absoluteness of the Divine\nNature. \u201cNot then a number, nor an arrangement, nor a conjunction or\nany other part of speech, do I think the inscription signifies. It is\nrather a complete and concise form of address, an invocation of the God,\nbringing the speaker with the very word, into a conscious recognition\nof His power. The God salutes each of us, as we approach His shrine,\nwith the great text, \u2018Know thyself,\u2019 which is His way of saying \u03c7\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b5\nto us; and we in our turn, replying to the God, say \u03b5\u1f36\u2014\u2018Thou art,\u2019 thus\nexpressing our _belief in His true and pure and incommunicable virtue of\nabsolute being_.[176]... Now we must admit that God absolutely is; not\nthat he _is_ with reference to any period of time, but with reference\nto an immovable, immutable, timeless eternity, before which there was\nnothing, after which there is nothing, in respect to which there is\nneither future nor past, than which there is nothing older or younger.\nBut being Unity, the Unity that he is _now_ is the same Unity with which\nhe occupies eternity; and nothing really exists but that which is\nendowed with the same absolute existence as he\u2014neither anything that has\ncome into existence, nor shall come into existence, nor anything which\nhad a beginning, or shall have an end. In worshipping him, therefore, we\nought assuredly to salute and address him in a manner corresponding to\nthis view of him; as, _e.g._, in the phrase already used by some ancient\nphilosophers, the phrase, \u2018Thou art one.\u2019 For the Divine principle is not\nmany, as we are, each of us compacted of countless different passions,\na mingled and varying conglomerate of assembled atoms. But Being must\nnecessarily be Unity, and Unity must be Being. It is Diversity\u2014that is,\nthe principle of discrepancy from Unity\u2014which issues to the production of\nnon-Being, whence the three names of the God are one and all appropriate.\nHe is _Apollo_ (\u1f00 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd\u03c2), because he repudiates and excludes the many\n(\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70); _Ieius_ (\u1f35\u03bf\u03c2 = \u03b5\u1f36\u03c2) because he is Unity and Solitude; and\n_Ph\u0153bus_, of course, was the name given by the ancients to anything that\nwas pure and unsullied.... Now Unity is pure and unsullied; defilement\ncomes by being mixed with other elements, as Homer says that ivory\ndipped in purple dye \u2018is defiled,\u2019 and dyers say that colours mixed are\ncolours \u2018corrupted,\u2019 the process being called \u2018corruption.\u2019 A pure and\nincorruptible substance must therefore be one and whole.\u201d[177]\u2014\u201cThe\nInscription \u03b5\u1f36 seems to me to be, as it were, at once the antithesis and\nthe completion of the inscription, \u2018Know thyself.\u2019 The one is addressed\nin reverence and wonder to the God as eternally existent, the other is a\nreminder to mortality of the frail nature that encompasseth it.\u201d[178]\n\nNowhere is the necessity which Plutarch feels for believing in one\nsupreme ruler of all the imaginable universe more apparent than in a\npassage in which he is seeking a regulating Intelligence for an admitted\nplurality of worlds, to account for whose administration a Greek of\nalmost any period would have been constrained to resort to the hypothesis\nof a plurality of gods, supreme as each individual god might be in his\nown individual world. The passage in question initiates a discussion on\nthis subject somewhat episodical to the main argument of the \u201cDe Defectu\nOraculorum.\u201d Plutarch himself is the speaker, though he represents\nhis interlocutors as addressing him by the name of Lamprias.[179] He\nis inclined to agree that there may be more worlds than one, though\nrepudiating an infinity of worlds. \u201cIt is more consonant with reason to\nassert that God has made more than one world. For He is perfectly good,\nand deficient in no virtue whatsoever, least of all in those virtues\nthat are associated with Justice and Friendship, which are the fairest\nof all virtues, and those most appropriate to the divine nature. And as\nGod is not wanting in any respect, so also He possesses no redundant or\nsuperfluous characteristics. There must exist, therefore, other gods\nand other worlds than ours, whose companionship furnishes a sphere for\nthe exercise of these social virtues. For it is not upon Himself, nor\nupon a part of Himself, but upon others, that He discharges the claims\nof justice, kindliness, goodness. Hence it is not probable that He is\nunneighboured and unfriended, or that this world of ours floats alone in\nthe emptiness of infinite space.\u201d[180] Plutarch, however, is merely on\ntentative ground here; the plurality of worlds was an abstract academic\nquestion no less in those days than in these. Admitting a plurality of\nworlds, it does not necessarily follow that each should be under the\ndominion of a separate Deity. \u201cWhat objection,\u201d he asks, in answer to the\nStoics, \u201cwhat objection is there to our asserting that all the worlds\nare beneath the sway of the Fate and Providence of Zeus, and that He\nbestows His superintendence and direction among them all, implanting in\nthem the principles and seeds and ideas of all things that are brought\nabout therein? Surely it is no more impossible that ten, or fifty, or a\nhundred worlds should be animated by the same rule of Reason, or should\nbe administered in accordance with one and the same principle of action,\nthan that a public assembly, an army, or a chorus, should obey the same\nco-ordinating power. Nay, an arrangement of this kind is in special\nharmony with the Divine Character.\u201d[181] Plutarch cannot get away from\nhis fixed belief in the absolute Unity of God, and with God\u2019s Unity, as\nwe have already seen, his Eternity and Immutability are involved. But\nPlutarch re-asserts this truth in various places and forms. In the tract\n\u201cDe Stoicorum Repugnantiis,\u201d though chiefly dealing polemically with the\ninconsistencies and self-contradictions of Chrysippus and other early\nStoics, he clearly exhibits his own views in several passages. In one\nplace[182] he asserts that even those who deny the benevolence of God, as\nthe Jews and the Syrians, do not imagine him as other than eternally and\nimmutably existent, and quotes with approval a sentence from Antipater of\nTarsus, to the effect that God is universally regarded as uncreate and\neternal. A little later in the development of the argument[183] he adopts\nthe Stoic position\u2014which Chrysippus is represented as contradicting\u2014that\nthe idea of God includes the ideas of happiness, blessedness,\nself-sufficiency, which qualities are elsewhere shown to exist absolutely\nand independently of all conceivable causes of opposition.[184] \u201cThey\nare wrong who assert that the Divine Nature is eternal because it avoids\nand repels anything that might tend to its destruction. Immutability and\nEternity must necessarily exist in the very nature of the Blessed One,\nrequiring no exertion on his part to preserve and defend them.\u201d\n\nThe intermingling of the doctrines of various philosophic sects is\ninterestingly conspicuous throughout these discussions on the nature\nof God; and not less than elsewhere in the noble observations of the\nPlatonist Ammonius, which have been quoted from the \u201cDe \u0395 apud Delphos.\u201d\nIt is equally interesting to note that all the speakers in that\ndialogue, while looking with their mind\u2019s eye far beyond any individual\nmember of the Olympian Pantheon to that divine power whose functions\ncorrespond with the essential requirements of the loftiest monotheism,\nyet use the name of Apollo as the professed nucleus of their religious\nbeliefs, and thus bring themselves into formal harmony with the demands\nof the \u201cancient and hereditary Faith.\u201d The same tendency, at once\northodox and unifying, is visible in the philosophic import attached,\nin accordance with the Stoic practice, to the popular names for the god\nin his various functions. In other tracts and essays the same aim is\nconspicuous, the same method of treatment is applied. In his fascinating\naccount of the Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris\u2014which will be dealt with\nlater from the material which it furnishes for investigating Plutarch\u2019s\nattempts to identify foreign gods with the gods of Greece\u2014he uses both\nthese divine names as a means of approach to the Divine Nature, that One\nEternal, Absolute Being, which is the real object of the philosopher\u2019s\nclarified insight\u2014\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1.[185] The true object of the\nservice of Isis, for example, is \u201cthe knowledge of that First and Supreme\nPower which is compact of Intelligence; that Power whom the goddess\n(Isis) bids her servants seek, since He abides by her side and is united\nwith her. The very name of her temple expressly promises the knowledge\nand the understanding of _Being_, inasmuch as it is called the Ision\n(\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\u2014\u1f30\u1f7c\u03bd), indicating that we shall know _Being_ if we _enter_ with piety\nand intelligence into the sacred rites of the goddess.\u201d[186]\n\nThe passage just quoted shows the intimate connexion between _Being_ and\n_Intelligence_\u2014the \u201cSupreme Power is compact of Intelligence;\u201d and we are\nleft in little doubt respecting Plutarch\u2019s views on this second aspect\nof the Divine Nature. The conception of the Deity as \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, an ancient\nabstraction in Greek philosophy, is at once strengthened and brought\nnearer to the intelligence of humanity by Plutarch\u2019s simple treatment of\nit, and by his connecting it, wherever possible, with the traditions of\nthe popular creed. God is not only Intelligence, but intelligent. \u201cThe\nDivine Nature,\u201d says he, \u201cis not blessed in the possession of silver\nand gold, nor mighty through the wielding of thunders and thunderbolts,\nbut in the enjoyment of knowledge and understanding; and of all the\nthings that Homer has said concerning the gods, this is his finest\npronouncement:\u2014\n\n                      \u2018Yet both one goddess formed\n    And one soil bred, but Jupiter precedence took in birth\n    _And had more knowledge_\u2019[187]\n\n\u2014a pronouncement in which he gives the palm for dignity and honour to\nthe sovereignty of Jove, inasmuch as he is older in knowledge and wisdom.\nAnd I am of opinion that the blessedness of that eternal life which\nbelongs to God consists in the knowledge which gives Him cognizance of\nall events; for take away knowledge of things, and the understanding of\nthem, and immortality is no longer _life_, but mere _duration_.\u201d[188]\nThe free, unfettered exercise of intelligence is therefore a function\nof the Divine Nature; but although Plutarch is clearly thinking of the\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 of Anaxagoras as embodied by Plato in his conception of the Chief\nGood, yet he succeeds in bringing the Divine Nature, by the exercise of\nintelligence, into an intimate relation with humanity which the Platonic\nDemiurgus never attains. The true successors of Plato in the realm of\nIdealism were the neo-Platonists, who maintained that \u201cthe sum total of\nthe Ideas exists in the Divine _nous_, not outside of it, \u2018like golden\nstatues,\u2019 which God must search and look up to before He can think. It\nis not to be supposed that He must needs run about in search of notions,\nperhaps not finding them at all, perhaps not recognizing them when\nfound. This is the lot of man, whose life is spent often in the search,\nsometimes in the vain search, after truth. But to the Deity all knowledge\nis always equally present.\u201d[189] The vicious weakness of Platonism,\nwhether Old or New, lies in the fact that no real reason exists why God\nshould ever leave the contemplation of \u201cworlds not realized\u201d to create\nthis world after an eternally existing pattern, in the intellectual\ncontemplation of which he was already happy.[190] The \u201cabsence of envy\u201d\nis not a philosophic reason: it is a Platonic leap over an unbridged\nchasm. The aloofness of the Epicurean gods in their _sedes quiet\u00e6_ is the\nlogical outcome of this aspect of Platonism. Plutarch gives the Divine\nIntelligence an interest in the beings He has created. Apollo (here again\nthe popular name is used for the Divine Being) knows all the difficulties\nthat trouble the public and private lives of humanity, and he knows their\nsolutions also. \u201cIn private matters we inquire of Apollo as a seer, in\npublic matters we pray to him as a god. In the philosophic nature of\nthe soul he is the author and inspirer of intellectual difficulties and\nproblems, thus creating therein that craving which has its satisfaction\nin the discovery of Truth;\u201d[191] _e.g._, \u201cwhen the oracle was given out\n_that the altar of Delos should be doubled_, the god, as Plato says,\nnot only conveyed a particular command, but also indicated his desire\nthat the Greeks should study geometry; the task assigned involving an\noperation of the most advanced geometrical character.\u201d[192] In another\nplace this paternal interest in the doings of mankind is attributed to\nthe Deity direct without the intrusion of any traditional name for a\nparticular god. \u201cIt is not, as Hesiod supposes,[193] the work of human\nwisdom, but of God\u2019s, to discriminate and distinguish predilections and\nantipathies in character before they become conspicuous to the world by\nbreaking out into gross evil-doing under the influence of the passions.\n_For God is assuredly cognizant of the natural disposition of every\nindividual man_, being, by His nature, more fitted to perceive soul than\nbody: nor does He await the outbreak of actual sin before He punishes\nviolence, profanity, obscenity.\u201d[194] Thus, although Plutarch accepts\nthe philosophic phrasing current respecting the nature of the Deity,\nhis ardent, sympathetic temperament brings down the philosophers\u2019 Deity\nfrom its majestic isolation, and makes it \u201cmeet halfway\u201d the gods of the\npopular faith, so that both may be of service to humanity, the latter\nbeing purified and elevated, the other actualized and humanized. We\ndiscern with sympathy Plutarch\u2019s attempt to satisfy the eternal craving\nof men for a mediator between themselves and the unapproachableness of\nthe Highest; and we are prepared for his exposition of the doctrines\nof D\u00e6monology. This tendency to give warmth and life to philosophic\nabstractions is occasionally visible in an unconscious attempt to\nassimilate the qualities possessed by the Deity to those displayed in\na less degree by mankind. Thus, he implicitly accepts the Platonic\nposition that Eternity is all present to God,[195] a position which is\nalso accepted by modern European Theology: but he elsewhere regards the\nDeity (formally using the name of Apollo) as a scientific observer, with\ninfallibly acute reasoning powers directed upon phenomena retained in\nan unshakable memory. His predictions of events are, therefore, really\npredictions, not statements of present facts; and the \u201crigorous certainty\nand universality\u201d which they possess are the certainty and universality\nattaching to the human discoveries of the laws of geometry and the law\nof causation, and not to a divine insight which is omniscience because\nit is always regarding events as present, whether they are actually\npast, present, or to come. \u201cApollo is a prophet, and prophecy is the art\nof ascertaining the future from the present or the past. Now nothing\nexists without a cause, and prediction, therefore, depends upon reason.\nThe present springs inevitably from the past, the future from the\npresent. The one follows naturally upon the other by a succession which\nis unbroken from beginning to end, and, accordingly, he who knows the\nnatural causes of past, present, and future events, and can connect their\nmutual relationships, can predict the future, knowing, in the words of\nHomer, \u2018things that are now, things that shall be, and things that are\nover.\u2019 The whole art of Dialectics consists in the knowledge of the\nConsequent.\u201d[196]\n\nAlready in these passages, which represent philosophers as discussing\nGod in the terms familiar in Greek philosophy, we can discern a gradual\nbreaking down of that metaphysical exclusiveness which had hitherto\nmarked the philosophic conception of the Deity. We see God again becoming\npersonal, and reverting to that interest in the affairs of mankind from\nwhich the philosophers, starting with Xenophanes, had, in their revulsion\nfrom the anthropomorphic realisms of the Epic traditions, excluded him.\nWe can already note that Plutarch believes in the \u201cgoodness\u201d of God in\na sense quite distinct from the \u201cabsence of envy\u201d distinguishing the\nPlatonic Creator, or even from the sense involved in Plato\u2019s admission\nthat the gods love the just, since one always loves that which is made\nin one\u2019s own image.[197] We can see him going further, indeed, than\nAristotle, who compares the love of men for the gods to the love of\nchildren for their parents, a love which is based upon a recognition of\ntheir goodness and superiority, and of their having been the authors\nof the greatest benefits to humanity.[198] But we are not left without\nmany explicit texts asserting the goodness of God to mankind in emphatic\nphrases. Plutarch agrees with those statesmen and philosophers who\nassert that the majesty of the Divine Nature is accompanied by goodness,\nmagnanimity, graciousness and benignity in its attitude towards\nmankind.[199] We have already seen that Justice and Love are regarded\nby Plutarch as the most beautiful of all virtues, and those most in\nharmony with the Divine Nature,[200] and many isolated sentences could\nbe quoted to demonstrate how firmly the belief in God\u2019s goodness to man\nwas fixed in Plutarch\u2019s mind. We are fortunate, however, in possessing a\nspecial tract in which the personal character of the Divine Goodness is\nso clearly exhibited that a modern translator of the tract, writing from\na \u201cTheological Institution,\u201d is able to say, \u201cI am not aware, indeed,\nthat even Christian writers who have attempted to defend the same truth\nwithin the same limits of natural theology, have been able to do anything\nbetter than to reaffirm his position, and perhaps amplify and illustrate\nhis argument.\u201d[201] The tract referred to is, of course, the famous\nproduction known as the \u201cDe Sera Numinis Vindicta.\u201d It is a bold and\nbeautiful attempt to reconcile the existence of an actively benevolent\nDeity with the long-continued, often permanent, impunity of wickedness\nin this world; an endeavour to solve the question raised, especially by\nEpicureans, but not unfraught with solicitude for philosophers of other\nschools, respecting the patent fact that human virtue and human vice have\nno natural and necessary connexion with human happiness on the one hand\nand human misery on the other. Christian translators of the piece, from\nAmyot down to the writers just quoted, have hailed it as an effective\nvindication of the ways of God to man, and Comte Joseph de Maistre, whose\nparaphrase is designed, as he says, to please \u201cladies and foreigners,\u201d\nis quite convinced that such a justification could not possibly have\nbeen written by one who was not a Christian.[202] Even Wyttenbach, whom\nde Maistre attacks for repudiating this view, is willing, with all his\nscholarly caution, to admit that Plutarch, in this tract, touches the\nexcellences of the Christian faith.[203]\n\nThe position which Plutarch sets himself to overthrow is that which is\nexpressed most concisely in the famous verses of Ennius:\u2014\n\n    \u201cEgo deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam c\u0153litum,\n    Sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus;\n    Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest\u201d\n\n\u2014a sentiment in exact harmony with the Epicurean view of the matter.[204]\nWhile, however, establishing the providence and goodness of God as\nagainst the practical Atheism of the Epicureans, it will be seen that he\nis equally temperate, and equally consistent with himself, in avoiding\nthe exaggerated zeal of those Stoics who, in their eager desire to do\nsomething for the honour of Providence, had subjected the minutest\nand commonest actions of life to the jealous watching of an arbitrary\nomniscience, so that, as Wyttenbach puts it, \u201cthat most gracious name\nof Providence was exposed to ridicule and contempt, being alternately\nregarded as a _fortune-telling old crone_, and as _a dreadful spectre to\nalarm and terrify mankind_.\u201d\n\nLet us see in what way Plutarch establishes the providential benevolence\nof God without detracting from his majesty.\n\nA company of philosophic students, Plutarch himself; Patrocleas, his\nson-in-law;[205] Timon, his brother; and Olympichos, a friend;[206] are\nfound, at the opening of the dialogue, regarding each other in silence\nbeneath a Portico of the Delphic Temple, in wonder at the discourtesy\nof an Epicurean who has suddenly disappeared from the party, after\nexpounding the doctrines of his school in the manner, doubtless, of\nVelleius in the \u201cDe Natura Deorum,\u201d though with a more limited scope\nas expressed by the famous line of Ennius already quoted. According to\nPlutarch, he had \u201cgathered together, from various sources, an undigested\nmass of confused observations, and had then scattered them in one\ncontemptuous stream of spleen and anger upon Providence.\u201d The company,\ndeprived of their legitimate opportunity for reply, determined to\ndiscuss the question of Providence as if the departed opponent were\nstill present, although it cannot be doubted that his absence, and the\nconsequent want of direct necessity to \u201cscore off\u201d him, lead to a more\nthorough and impartial discussion of the topic. Patrocleas, at any rate,\nstates the difficulty with almost Epicurean boldness. \u201cThe delay of the\nDeity in punishing the wicked seems to me to be a strange and mysterious\nthing. The wicked are so eager and active in their wickedness, that\nthey, least of all, ought to be the object of inactivity on the part of\nGod. Thucydides rightly said that the advantage of delay was on the side\nof evil-doers.[207] Present immunity from the punishment due to crime\nencourages the criminal, and depresses the innocent sufferer. Bias knew\nthat a certain reprobate of his days would be punished, but feared that\nhe would not live to see it. Those whom Aristocrates betrayed at the\nBattle of Taphrus were all dead when his treachery was punished twenty\nyears after. So with Lyciscus and the Orchomenians.[208] This delay\nencourages the wicked. The fruit of injustice ripens early and is easily\nplucked, but punishment matures long after the fruit of evil has been\nenjoyed.\u201d This demand of the natural man to see their deserts meted out\nto the wicked is reinforced in a more philosophical manner by Olympichos,\nwho maintains that delay in the punishment of sin deprives it of that\nsalutary effect which its immediate infliction would have upon the\nsinner, who regards it as accidental, and not necessarily connected with\nhis crimes. The fault of a horse is corrected if bit and lash be applied\nat once; but all the beating and backing and shouting in the world at a\nlater time will only injure his physique without improving his character.\n\u201cSo that I am quite unable to see what good is done by those Mills of\nGod[209] which are said to grind so late, since their delay brings\njustice to naught, and thus deprives vice of its restraining fear.\u201d[210]\n\nPlutarch, before replying to these weighty arguments, preaches a short\nand eloquent sermon on the text, \u201cGod moves in a mysterious way.\u201d His\nthoughts are not as our thoughts, nor His ways our ways. We must imitate\nthe philosophic caution of the Academy. Men who never saw a battle may\ntalk of military affairs, or discuss music who never played a note; \u201cbut\nit is a different thing for mere men like ourselves to peer too closely\ninto matters that concern Divine Natures; just as if unskilled laymen\nwere to try to penetrate the intention of an artist, the meaning of a\nphysician\u2019s treatment, the inner significance of a legal enactment, by\nfanciful guesses and surmises.... It is easier[211] for a mortal to\nmake no definite assertion about the gods, but just this\u2014that _He_[212]\nknows best the proper time to apply His treatment to wickedness. He\ncan truly discriminate in the character of the punishment required by\neach offence.\u201d These preliminary observations are in the proper Academic\nstyle; they are designed to indicate that the end of a discourse on such\nintricate matters can only be the modification of doubt by probability,\nnot its settlement by absolute logical certainty.[213] The assumption\nof the Platonic attitude is appropriately followed by a Plutarchic\nreading of the teaching of Plato, who is understood as asserting that\nGod, when he made Himself the universal pattern for all beautiful and\nnoble things, granted human virtue to those who are able to follow Him,\nin order that they might thus in somewise grow like unto Him.[214]\nFurther, as Plato says,[215] the universal nature took on order and\narrangement by assimilation to and participation in the Idea and in the\nVirtue of the Divine Nature. Again, according to Plato, Nature gave us\neyes that our soul might behold the order and harmony of the heavenly\nbodies, and become harmonious and ordered herself, free from flighty\npassions and roving propensities.[216] Becoming like God in this way,\nwe shall emulate the mildness and forbearance with which He treats the\nwicked; shall eradicate from our minds the brutish passion for revenge;\nand shall wait to inflict our punishments until long consideration has\nexcluded every possibility that we may repent after the deed is done. The\npurport of this argument, and of the examples which Plutarch, always rich\nin illustration, furnishes in support of it, is clearer than the need\nof attaching it to the Platonic scheme of creation. Plutarch believes\nthat \u201cGod is slow to anger\u201d; because gentleness and patience are part\nof His nature, and because by speedy punishment, He would save a few,\nbut by delaying His justice He gives help and admonition to many. God,\nmoreover, knows how much virtue He originally implanted in the heart of\nevery man. He knows the character and inclination of every guilty soul;\nand His punishments are, therefore, different from human penalties, in\nthat the latter regard the law of retaliation only, while the former\nare based on a knowledge of character which does not quench the smoking\nflax, but gives time and opportunity for a repentant return to the path\nof virtue.[217] The world, too, would have been deprived of many a\nvirtuous character, lost the advantage of many a noble deed, had prompt\npunishment for early sins been inflicted. There is, moreover, a soul of\ngood in things evil; the careers of great tyrants have been prolonged,\nand the world has been the better for the movements which their tyranny\ncompelled. Evil is a \u201cdispensation of Providence\u201d in Plutarch\u2019s eyes, as\nin those of many modern Christians. \u201cAs the gall of the hy\u00e6na, and the\nrennet of the seal, both disgusting animals in other respects, possess\nqualities useful for medicinal purposes, so upon certain peoples who need\nsevere correction God inflicts the implacable harshness of a tyrant or\nthe intolerable severity of a magistrate, and does not take away their\ntrouble and distress until they are purified of their sins.\u201d Sometimes,\ntoo, the Deity delays His vengeance in order that it may take effect in a\nmore strikingly appropriate manner.[218]\n\nBut these external punishments are not the most terrible that can be\ninflicted on the sinner. It would be difficult, even in Christian\nliterature, to find so striking a tribute to the power of conscience\nin inflicting its immaterial tortures on the criminal who has escaped\nmaterial recompense. Plutarch bases his observations on this head on a\nrepudiation of Plato\u2019s statement[219] \u201cthat punishment is a state that\nfollows upon injustice,\u201d asserting, as he finds in Hesiod, that the two\nare contemporaneous and spring up from the same soil and root; a view\nwhich he supports by many conspicuous and terrible examples from history,\nthe force of which may be summarized in the fine and truthful phrase\u2014the\nantithetical effect of which would be destroyed by translation\u2014\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b3\u03b7\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03b3\u03ae\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9.[220] The conclusion\nwhich Plutarch arrives at by considering this aspect of the case is that\n\u201cthere is no necessity for any god, or any man, to inflict punishment\non evildoers, but it is sufficient that their whole life is tormented\nand destroyed by their sense of their impiety;\u201d and that the time cannot\nbut come when the glamour and the tinselled glory of successful crime\nwill be torn away, and nothing shall remain but the base and dreadful\nmemory to torture awakening conscience with the pangs of an unquenchable\nremorse.[221]\n\nA fresh perplexity as to the goodness and justice of God is here raised\nby Timon, who cannot see that it is in harmony with these divine\nqualities that the sins of the fathers should, as Euripides complained,\nbe visited upon the children.[222] The punishment of the innocent is no\ncompensation for the escape of the guilty. God, in this case, would be\nlike Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, who ravaged Corcyra because\nthe Homeric Corcyreans had given a welcome to Odysseus, and retorted\nthe blinding of the mythical Cyclops upon the Ithacensians when they\ncomplained that his soldiers had looted their sheepfolds. \u201cWhere,\nindeed,\u201d asks Timon, \u201cis the reason and justice of this?\u201d[223] Plutarch\ncan only reply that, if the descendants of Hercules and Pindar are held\nin honour on account of the deeds of their progenitors, there is nothing\nillogical in the descendants of a wicked stock being punished. But he\nknows that he is on difficult ground, and repeats the Academic caution\nagainst too much dogmatism in these intricate matters. He falls back\nupon natural causes here, as if seeking to exonerate the Deity from\ndirect responsibility for a striking injustice. An hereditary tendency\nto physical disease is possible, and may be transmitted from ancestors\nwho lived far back in antiquity. Why should we marvel more at a cause\noperating through a long interval of time, than through a long interval\nof space? If Pericles died, and Thucydides fell sick, of a plague that\noriginated in Arabia, why is it strange that the Delphians and Sybarites\nshould be punished for the offences of their ancestors?[224] Moreover,\na city is a continuous entity with an abiding personality; just as\nchild, and boy, and man are not different persons, but are unified by\nthe consciousness of identity;\u2014nay, less marked changes take place in a\ncity than in an individual. A man would know Athens again after thirty\nyears of absence, but a far shorter period serves to obliterate the\nlikenesses of our personal acquaintance. A city rejoices in the glory\nand splendour of its ancient days; it must also bear the burden of its\nancient ignominies. And if a city has this enduring personality which\nmakes it a responsible agent throughout its existence, the members of the\nsame family are much more intimately connected. There would, therefore,\nhave been less injustice inflicted had the posterity of Dionysius been\npunished by the Syracusans than was perpetrated by their ejection of his\ndead body from their territories. For the soul of Dionysius had left his\nbody, but the sons of wicked fathers are often dominated by a good deal\nof their parents\u2019 spirit.[225]\n\nWe are conscious of some artificial straining of the argument in this\nplace, and shortly perceive that the mention of the soul of Dionysius is\nintended to prepare the way for a discussion on the immortality of the\nsoul. Plutarch cannot believe that the gods would show so much protective\ncare for man\u2014would give so many oracles, enjoin so many sacrifices and\nhonours for the dead\u2014if they knew that the souls of the dead perished\nstraightway, leaving the body like a wreath of mist or smoke, as the\nEpicureans believed.[226] He shrinks from the thought that the Deity\nwould take so much account of us, if our souls were as brief in their\nbloom as the forced and delicate plants that women grow in their fragile\nflower-pots, their short-lived Gardens of Adonis. He is convinced that\nthe belief in the after-existence of the soul stands or falls with the\nbelief in the Providence of God.[227] If there is a Providence, there\nis existence after death; and if there is existence after death, then\nthere is stronger reason for supposing that every soul receives its due\nreward or punishment for its life on Earth. But here Plutarch, after\njust touching one of the cardinal principles of Christian teaching,\nthe dogma of Heaven and Hell, starts away from the consequence which\nalmost seems inevitable, and which Christianity accepted to the full\u2014the\nbelief that our life here should be modelled in relation to the joys and\npenalties that await us in the other world. He clearly believed that\ntheir ethical effect upon life is small.[228] The rewards and punishments\nof the soul hereafter are nothing to us here. Perhaps we do not believe\nthem, and in any case we cannot be certain that they will come. This\nis the position at which Plutarch arrives in the course of rational\nargument, and he at once returns to the sphere of our present life to\nfind surer sanctions for goodness. Such punishments as are inflicted in\nthis world on the descendants of an evil race are conspicuous to all that\ncome hereafter, and deter many from wickedness. Besides, God does not\npunish indiscriminately. He has a watchful care even over the children\nof those who have been notorious for evildoing, and instead of delaying\nthe punishment in their case, early checks their hereditary disposition\nto vice by appropriate restraints born of His intimate knowledge of the\ncharacter and inclination of the human heart. But if, in spite of this, a\nman persists in the sinful courses of his ancestors, it is right that he\nshould inherit their punishment as he has inherited their crimes.\n\nThe dialogue concludes with a myth of the type of Er the Armenian, in\nwhich, after the manner of Plato, Plutarch embodies views on the state\nof the soul after death, for which no place could be found in the\nrational argumentation of mere prose. Thespesius of Soli, an abandoned\nprofligate, has an accident which plunges him into unconsciousness for\nthree days. In this period his soul visits the interstellar spaces, where\nthe souls of the dead are borne along in various motion; some wailing\nand terror-struck; others joyous and delighted; some like the full moon\nfor brightness; others with faint blemishes or black spots like snakes.\nHere, in the highest place, was Adrastea, the daughter of Zeus and\nAnanke, from whom no criminal could hope ever to escape. Three kinds of\njustice are her instruments. Poena is swift to punish, chastising those\nwhose sin can be expiated while they are still on earth. Those whose\nwickedness demands severer penalties are reserved for Justice in the\nafterworld. The third class of sinners, the irretrievably bad, are cast\nby Justice into the hands of Erinnys, \u201cthe third and most terrible of\nthe servants of Adrastea,\u201d who pursues them as they wander hither and\nthither in reckless flight, and finally thrusts them all with pitiless\nseverity into a place of unspeakable darkness.[229] In these acts of\nimmortal justice the soul is bared utterly, and her sins and crimes are\nrelentlessly exposed. All this is explained to Thespesius by a kinsman\nwho recognizes him. He is then shown various wonders of the afterworld:\nthe place of Oblivion, a deep chasm by which Dionysus and Semele had\nascended into heaven, above which the souls hovered in rapture and mirth,\ncaused by the fragrance of the odours which were breathed by a soft and\ngentle air that issued from the \u201cpleasing verdure of various herbs and\nplants\u201d which adorned the sides of this wonderful chasm. He sees the\nlight of the Tripod of the Delphic oracle, or would have seen it had he\nnot been dazzled with the excess of its brightness; and hears the voice\nof the Pythia uttering various oracles. Then follow Dantesque scenes of\nthe punishments allotted to various kinds of wickedness, among which it\nis interesting to note that hypocrisy is tortured with greater severity\nthan open vice. A lake of boiling gold, a lake of frozen lead, a lake of\niron, with attendant D\u00e6mons to perform the usual functions, are allotted\nto the punishment of avarice.[230] But the most terrible fate is that of\nthose whose punishment never ends, who are constantly retaken into the\nhands of Justice; and these, it is important to note, in the light of\nthe argument which preceded the story, are those whose posterity have\nbeen punished for their transgressions. We can see how little Plutarch is\nsatisfied with his own reasonings on this point; they are, as Wyttenbach\nsays, _acutius quam verius dicta_: the punishment of the children for\nthe sins of the fathers clearly leaves the advantage, so far as concerns\nthis world, on the side of the transgressors. Plutarch, with his firmly\npious belief in the justice and goodness of God, feels driven to assert\nthat the balance must be redressed somewhere, and he invokes the aid\nof Myth to carry him, in this case, whither Reason refuses to go; and\ntaking the myth as a whole, and in relation to the tract in which it is\nembodied, we cannot doubt that its object is to enforce that doctrine\nof rewards and punishments in the Hereafter, from which Plutarch, as\nwe have seen, shrinks when an occasion arises for pressing it from the\nstandpoint of Reason. The punishments which Thespesius has witnessed\nin his visit to the Afterworld have the effect of turning him into a\nrighteous man in this world, and Plutarch clearly hopes that the story\nwill likewise convince those who are not convinced by his reasons. We may\ngather, however, that inclined as he was to believe that the providence\nof God extended into the Afterworld, his attitude, as fixed by reason\nand probability, is summed up in the words already referred to\u2014\u201cSuch\nrewards or punishments as the soul receives for the actions of its\nprevious career are nothing to us who are yet alive, being disregarded or\ndisbelieved.\u201d[231] But whatever may be the condition of the soul after\ndeath, and its relation to the Deity in that condition, Plutarch has made\nit quite certain that he believes in the goodness of God as safeguarding\nthe interests of humanity in this world. It is clear in every part of\nthis interesting dialogue that the God whom Plutarch believes in is\na personal deity, a deity full of tender care for mankind, supreme,\nindeed, by virtue of his omnipotence and justice, but supreme also by\nvirtue of his infinite patience and mercy.[232]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\n    _Plutarch\u2019s D\u00e6monology\u2014D\u00e6monology as a means of reconciliation\n    between the traditional Polytheism and philosophic\n    Monotheism\u2014D\u00e6monlore in Greek philosophers and in the popular\n    faith\u2014Growth of a natural tendency to identify the gods of the\n    polytheistic tradition with the D\u00e6mons\u2014Emphasis thus given to\n    the philosophic conception of the Deity\u2014D\u00e6mons responsible for\n    all the crude and cruel superstitions attaching to the popular\n    gods\u2014Function of the D\u00e6mons as mediators between God and man._\n\n\nHow, then, does Plutarch reconcile this lofty conception of a Deity who\nis Unity, Eternity, and Supreme Intelligence, with the multitude of\nindividual deities which form so essential a part of the \u201chereditary\nFaith\u201d of Gr\u00e6co-Roman civilization, and which are universally admitted\nas displaying qualities discrepant from even a far lower notion of God\nthan that which Plutarch actually maintained? Further, since the Empire\nincludes other nationalities than the Greeks, and the Roman Pantheon is\nnot the exclusive habitation of native-born deities, how shall he find a\nplace in his theological scheme for the gods of other peoples, so that\nthere may be that Catholic Unity in faith which shall correspond to the\none political dominion under which the world dwells in so great a peace\nand concord?\n\nThe difficulty of reconciling Polytheism with philosophic Monotheism\nwas, of course, not new. In earlier days it had been necessary for\nphilosophers to secure their monotheistic speculations from the charge of\nAtheism by finding in their systems a dignified position for the popular\ngods. And even those philosophers who sincerely believed in the existence\nof beings corresponding to the popular conceptions felt the need of\naccounting, in some more or less specious way, for the ill deeds that\nwere traditionally attributed to so many of them. The ancient doctrine\nof D\u00e6mons, emanating from some obscure source in Antiquity,[233] had\nbeen adopted by the Pythagoreans in the latter sense,[234] while Plato,\nwho believed in none of these things, had, on one or two occasions, by\nthe use of philosophic \u201cmyth\u201d replete with more than Socratic irony,\ndescribed these beings as playing a part between God and man which might\nbe tolerantly regarded as not greatly dissimilar from that popularly\nassigned to the lesser deities of the Hellenic Olympus.[235] In the\n\u201cStatesman,\u201d the creation-myth, to which the Stranger invites the\nyounger Socrates to give his entire attention, \u201clike a child to a story,\u201d\ndescribes how the Deity himself tended men and was their protector,\nwhile D\u00e6mons had a share, after the manner of shepherds, in the\nsuperintendence of animals according to genera and herds.[236] Another\nstory which Socrates, in the \u201cBanquet,\u201d says that he heard from Diotima,\nthat wonderful person who postponed the Athenian plague for ten years,\ntells how Eros is a great D\u00e6mon; how D\u00e6mons are intermediate between\ngods and mortals; how the race of D\u00e6mons interpret and transmit to the\ngods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and interpret and transmit to\nmen the answers and commands of the gods.[237] For God, we are told, is\nnot directly associated with man; but it is through the mediation of the\nD\u00e6mons, who are many and various, that all communion and converse take\nplace between the human and the Divine.\n\nBut apart altogether from the philosophic use of D\u00e6monology, there are\nevidences that the belief in D\u00e6mons was held in some sort of loose\ncombination with the popular polytheistic faith. The Hesiodic poems were\na compendium of early Hellenic theology,[238] and Hesiod, according\nto Plutarch himself, was the first to indicate with clearness and\ndistinctness the existence of four species of rational beings\u2014gods,\n_d\u00e6mons_, heroes, and men.[239] In the passage of Hesiod referred to\n(_Works and Days_, 109 sqq.) two kinds of D\u00e6mons are described. The\ndwellers in the Golden Age are transformed, after their sleep-like death\non earth, into Terrestrial D\u00e6mons:\u2014\n\n    \u201cWhen earth\u2019s dark breast had closed this race around,\n    Great Jove as demons raised them from the ground;\n    _Earth-hovering spirits_, they their charge began,\n    The ministers of good, and guards of man.\n    Mantled with mist of darkling air they glide,\n    And compass earth and pass on every side;\n    And mark, with earnest vigilance of eyes,\n    Where just deeds live, or crook\u00e8d wrongs arise.\u201d[240]\n\nThey are virtuous, holy beings, endowed with immortality\u2014\u201cJove\u2019s\nimmortal guardians over mortal men.\u201d[241] The races of the Silver Age\nbecome Subterranean powers, blessed beings, but inferior in honour to\nthe former class, and distinctly described as mortal.[242] Hesiod says\nnothing about Evil D\u00e6mons, although the disappearance of the Brazen\nRace furnished an opportunity for their introduction into his scheme\nof supernatural beings. But once the existence of beings inferior to\nthe gods in the celestial hierarchy obtained a recognition in popular\ntradition, however vague the recognition might be, the conception would\ntend to gather strength and definiteness from the necessity, first\nexpressed by the philosophers, but doubtless widely spread among the\npeople, of safeguarding the sanctity of the gods, while at the same\ntime recognizing the substantial validity of tradition. This tendency\nwould be also probably aided by the fact that in Homer, as Plutarch\npoints out, and in the dramatists and prose writers generally, as is\nwell known, the designations of \u201cgods\u201d and \u201cd\u00e6mons\u201d were mutually\ninterchanged.[243] Plutarch, at all events, who boldly uses the D\u00e6mons\nto perform such functions, and to bear the blame for such actions, as\nwere inappropriate to the divine character, is enabled to make one of\nhis _dramatis person\u00e6_\u2014Cleombrotus, the traveller, who was specially\ndevoted to the study of such matters\u2014assert that \u201cit can be demonstrated\nby unexceptionable testimony from antiquity that there do exist beings\nof a nature intermediate between that of God and man, beings subject\nto mortal passions and liable to inevitable changes, but whom we must,\n_in accordance with the established custom of our fathers_, regard and\ninvoke as D\u00e6mons, giving them all due reverence.\u201d[244] It is natural,\ntherefore, in the light of these indications, to believe that, side by\nside with the popular gods, there existed, in the popular imagination,\nsubordinate beings of two kinds, both described as D\u00e6mons: the first\nclass comprising the good and benevolent D\u00e6mons of Hesiod, the second\nincluding D\u00e6mons of an evil character and disposition, the belief in\nwhich had developed naturally out of the Hesiodic conception, from the\nnecessity of fixing the responsibility of evil deeds on supernatural\nbeings different in nature from the purity and goodness of Deity.[245]\nSuch a classification of supernatural beings\u2014gods, D\u00e6mons, and evil\nD\u00e6mons\u2014could not, of course, be rigidly maintained; the more the good\nD\u00e6mons were discriminated from their evil brethren, the more they would\ntend to become identified with the gods of the popular tradition, and the\nline of demarcation between the divine and the d\u00e6monic nature would be\nbroken down,[246] D\u00e6mons and gods would be identified, and the splendour\nand purity of the Supreme God of all would shine out more fully when\ncontrasted with those other gods, who, after all, were only D\u00e6mons.\nSuch, at least, is the process which appears to be taking place in the\nnumerous contributions which Plutarch makes to the subject of D\u00e6monology.\nHe is evidently a sincere believer in the existence of D\u00e6mons, not a\nbeliever in the Platonic sense, and not a believer merely because he\nwishes to come to terms with popular ideas. But the final result, so it\nappears to us, is that the popular gods become identified with D\u00e6mons,\nand are prepared, even in Pagan times, to take that position which was\nassigned to them with such whole-hearted sincerity by the early Christian\nFathers;[247] to become the fiends and devils and sprites of another\ndispensation; to aid Saladin in excluding the Crusaders from the Holy\nLand; to \u201cdrink beer instead of nectar\u201d as day labourers in German\nforests; or to shine with a sinister splendour on the lives of monks and\npeasants in the rural districts of France.[248]\n\nPlutarch gives emphatic indications of his own attitude on the subject\nby drawing attention to such expressions of the earlier philosophers as\npointed to the recognition of two opposite descriptions of D\u00e6mons\u2014the\nvirtuous and the vicious. In one place, as we have seen, he admits that\nHomer does not distinguish between the terms \u201cGods\u201d and \u201cD\u00e6mons,\u201d and\nin his historical _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of D\u00e6monology in the \u201cIsis and Osiris,\u201d[249]\nhe is compelled to make a parallel admission that the Homeric epithet\nderived from D\u00e6mons is indiscriminately applied to good and bad actions.\nHe makes this admission, however, the basis of a subtle conclusion to\nthe effect that Homer wished to imply that the D\u00e6mons had a confused\nand ill-defined character, involving the existence of both good and bad\nspecimens of the race. Nothing definitely distinguishing between the\ntwo sorts of D\u00e6mons is to be obtained from Plato,[250] and Plutarch\naccordingly dwells with special emphasis upon the views of Empedocles and\nXenocrates, who maintained, the one, that D\u00e6mons who had been guilty of\nsins of commission or omission were driven about between earth and sky\nand sea and sun, until this purifying chastisement restored them to their\nnatural position in the d\u00e6monic hierarchy;[251] the other, that certain\ndisgraceful and ill-omened sacrificial observances \u201care not properly\nconnected with the worship of the _gods or of good D\u00e6mons_,[252] but that\nthere are surrounding us certain beings, great and potent, but malignant\ntoo, and hateful, who rejoice in such repulsive ceremonies, and are\nthereby restrained from the perpetration of greater evils.\u201d Democritus\nand Chrysippus are elsewhere quoted as supporters of the same view.[253]\n\nPlutarch, accordingly, faithful to his principle of making Philosophy\nMystagogue to Religion, has obtained from the philosophers a conviction\nthat there are two kinds of d\u00e6monic beings, two sets of supernatural\ncharacters with attributes inferior to those of the Divine Nature, and\nyet superior to those displayed by the human family. It has already been\nshown how naturally the good D\u00e6mons would tend to become identified\nwith the gods: a passage has just been quoted in which we can see this\nprocess of identification taking place. But Plutarch furnishes still more\nemphatic testimony to the necessity of such a consummation.\n\nThe group of philosophers gathered together at Delphi to discuss the\ncessation of the oracles have fallen into an argument on the nature of\nD\u00e6mons, and certain considerations have been introduced which indicate a\nliability to vice and death as inherent in their nature. This conclusion\nshocks one of the speakers, but the pious Cleombrotus wants to know\nin what respect D\u00e6mons will differ from gods if they are endowed with\nimmortality and immunity from sin.[254] It is most significant, however,\nthat the famous and beautiful story which Cleombrotus tells in support\nof his belief in the mortality of D\u00e6mons, the story of the death of \u201cthe\ngreat Pan,\u201d is actually concerned with an announcement of the death of\none whom the popular faith accepted as a deity.[255] Demetrius, who had\njust come from Britain, near which were many scattered desert islands,\nsome of them named after D\u00e6mons and heroes, gives an authentic account\nof the death of a D\u00e6mon in the island of Anglesea.[256] Cleombrotus\nthen shows how a belief in the nativity and mortality of the D\u00e6mons is\nnot unknown in Greek philosophy, \u201cfor the Stoics,\u201d says he, \u201cmaintain\nthis view, _not only with regard to the D\u00e6mons but also with regard to\nthe gods_\u2014holding one for the Eternal and Immutable, while regarding\nthe remainder to have been born, and to be subject to death.\u201d[257] The\nwhole course of the argument, even though the speakers are represented\nas unconscious of the fact, leads to the identification of the popular\ndeities with the D\u00e6mons. This strain of thought elsewhere loses the\nunconscious quality, and becomes as definitely dogmatic as Plutarch\u2019s\nAcademic bent of mind would allow. In the \u201cIsis and Osiris,\u201d for example,\nhe argues for the probability of the view which assigns the legends of\nthese two deities not to gods or men, but to D\u00e6mons;[258] and proceeds\nstill further to breach the partition wall between the two natures by\nintroducing into his D\u00e6monology such legends as have raised Osiris and\nIsis, on account of their virtue, from the rank of good D\u00e6mons to that of\nthe gods,[259] and describes them as receiving everywhere the combined\nhonours of gods and D\u00e6mons; and he appropriates the argument to Greek\nreligion by comparing this promotion to those of Herakles and Dionysus;\nby identifying Isis with Proserpine, and subsequently Osiris with\nDionysus.[260]\n\nBut whatever may have been the views explicitly maintained by Plutarch in\nthis connexion, it is his constant practice to shift on to the shoulders\nof the D\u00e6mons the responsibility for all those legends, ceremonies, and\npractices, which, however appropriate and necessary parts of the national\nfaith they may be, are yet inconsistent with the qualities rightly\nattributable to Deity.[261] We have already noticed his unwillingness\nto impugn the immutability of the Creator by regarding His essence as\ncapable of metamorphosis into the phenomena of the created world.[262]\n\u201cIt is,\u201d says Ammonius, \u201cthe function of some other god to do and suffer\nthese changes\u2014or, rather, of some D\u00e6mon appointed to direct Nature in\nthe processes of generation and destruction.\u201d This relationship of the\nD\u00e6mons to the supreme power as conceived by philosophy is more completely\nstated in the short tract, \u201cDe Fato,\u201d[263] where we are told that (1)\nthere is a first and supreme Providence which is the intelligence of\nthe First Deity, or, as one may regard it, His benevolent will towards\nall creatures, in accordance with which all _divine_ things universally\nreceived the most admirable and perfect order; (2) the second Providence\nis that of the second gods, who move through the sky, by which _human_\naffairs are duly ordered, including those relating to the permanence\nand preservation of the various species; (3) the third Providence may\nproperly be regarded as the superintendence of the D\u00e6mons who are\nsituated near the earth, observing and directing the actions of men. But,\nas we have already noted, this formal distinction between (2) and (3)\nis not maintained in practice. Cleombrotus, who knows more about these\nthings than most people, insists that it is not possible that the gods\ncould have been pleased with festivals and sacrifices, \u201cat which there\nare banquets of raw flesh and victims torn in pieces, as well as fastings\nand loud lamentations, and often \u2018foul language, mad shrieks, and tossing\nof dishevelled hair,\u2019\u201d but that all such dread observances must have had\nthe object of pacifying the anger of the mischievous D\u00e6mons.[264] It was\nnot to the gods that human sacrifices were welcome; it was not Artemis\nwho demanded the slaughter of Iphigenia;[265] these were the deeds of\n\u201cfierce and violent D\u00e6mons,\u201d who also perpetrated those many rapes, and\ninflicted those pestilences and famines which are anciently attributed\nto the gods. \u201cAll the rapes here, and the wanderings there, that are\ncelebrated in legends and sacred hymns, all the hidings and flights and\nservitudes, _do not belong to the gods_, but represent the chances and\nchanges incident to the careers of D\u00e6mons.\u201d It was not \u201choly Apollo\u201d who\nwas banished from Heaven to serve Admetus;\u2014but here the speech comes to\nan end with a rapid change of subject, as if Cleombrotus shrinks from\nthe assertion that a D\u00e6mon was the real hero of an episode with which\nso many beautiful and famous legends of the \u201chereditary Faith\u201d were\nconnected. When some of the most celebrated national myths concerning the\ngods are assigned to D\u00e6mons, we are not far away from the identification\nof the former with the latter, and the consequent degradation of the\ngods to the lower rank. It is true that the various speakers on the\nsubject do not, in so many words, identify the D\u00e6mons with the gods of\nthe Mythology.[266] They deprive the gods of many of their attributes,\nand give them to the D\u00e6mons; they deprive them of others, and give them\nto the One Eternal Deity. It is difficult to see how the Gods could\nmaintain their existence under this twofold tendency of deprivation,\nsupported as they might be by formal classifications which assigned\nthem a superior place. Even the Father of Gods and Men\u2014the Zeus of\nHomer\u2014turns his eyes \u201c_no very great way ahead_ from Troy to Thrace and\nthe nomads of the Danube, but the true Zeus gazes upon beauteous and\nbecoming transformations in many worlds.\u201d[267] To contrast the Zeus \u201cof\nHomer\u201d with the \u201ctrue\u201d Zeus is to do little else than to place the former\nin that subordinate rank proper not to the Divine, but to the D\u00e6monic\ncharacter. Plutarch is perfectly consistent in applying this method of\ninterpretation to the gods of other nations no less than to the gods of\nGreece. In the \u201cIsis and Osiris,\u201d he inclines to the belief that these\ngreat Egyptian Deities are themselves only D\u00e6mons, although he refuses\nto dogmatize on the point, and gives a series of more or less recognized\nexplanations of the Egyptian myth. He cannot refrain, however, from using\nso appropriate an occasion of denouncing the absurdity of the _Greeks_ in\nimputing so many terrible actions and qualities to their gods\u2014\u201cFor the\nlegends of Giants and Titans, handed down among the Greeks, the monstrous\ndeeds of Cronus, the battle between Pytho and Apollo, the flight of\nDionysus, the wanderings of Demeter, fall not behind the stories told\nof Osiris and Typhon, and other legends that one may hear recounted by\nmythologists without restraint.\u201d[268]\n\nSuch, then, is the relation in which the D\u00e6mons stand to the Divine\nnature: they are made the scapegoat for everything obscene, cruel,\nselfish, traditionally imputed to the gods; and the Supreme Deity rises\nmore conspicuously lofty for its freedom from everything that can tend\nto drag it down to the baseness of human passions. For Plutarch makes\nit very clear that it is the human element in these mixed natures that\noriginates their disorderly appetites. Although the D\u00e6mons \u201cexceed\nmankind in strength and capacity, yet the divine element in their\ncomposition is not pure and unalloyed, inasmuch as it participates in\nthe faculties of the soul and the sensations of the body, is liable\nto pleasure and pain, and to such other conditions as are involved in\nthese vicissitudes of feeling, and bring disturbance upon all in a\ngreater or less degree.\u201d[269] It is by virtue of this participation in\nthe \u201cdisturbing\u201d elements of human nature that they are fitted to play\nthat part between God and man which Plutarch, after Plato, calls the\n\u201cinterpretative\u201d and the \u201ccommunicative.\u201d[270] This enables the D\u00e6mons\nto play a loftier part than that hitherto assigned them; to respond, in\nfact, to that universal craving of humanity for some mediator between\ntheir weakness and the eternal splendour and perfection of the Highest.\nThe whole question of inspiration and revelation, both oracular and\npersonal, is bound up with the D\u00e6monic function, and to both these\nspheres of its operation, the public and the private, Plutarch gives\nthe fullest and most earnest consideration. Previous, therefore, to\ndiscussing this aspect of the D\u00e6monic character and influence, it will\nbe necessary to ascertain what were Plutarch\u2019s views on the subject of\ninspiration and prophecy, and what was his attitude to that question\nof Divination which exercised so great a fascination on the mind of\nantiquity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\n    _Necessity for a Mediator between God and Man partly met by\n    Oracular Inspiration\u2014General failure of Oracles in the age of\n    Plutarch\u2014Plutarch\u2019s \u201cDelphian Essays\u201d\u2014The DE PYTHI\u00c6 ORACULIS:\n    nature of Inspiration: oracles not verbally inspired\u2014The DE\n    DEFECTU ORACULORUM\u2014Various explanations of Inspiration\u2014Plutarch\n    inclines to accept that which assumes an original Divine\n    afflatus placed under the superintendence of D\u00e6mons, whose\n    activities are subject to the operation of natural causes._\n\n\nAn age which attempts to reinvigorate its own ethical life by draughts of\ninspiration from springs hallowed by their duration from an immemorial\nantiquity, will naturally regret that currents, which once ran full,\nnow flow no longer in their early strength, but have dwindled to\ninsignificant rills, or are dried up altogether in their courses. And\nthere is no source of religious inspiration so greatly held in honour\nas that which comes from the communication of mankind with the Divine\nBeing.[271] Visions, dreams, incantations, inspired writings, omens, and\nprophecies have been valued as means of bringing man into communication\nwith God, and as furnishing an unerring way of indicating the Divine will\nto humanity. But it would be difficult to mention any institution or\npractice having this ostensible aim which has had such absolute sway over\nthe minds of those who came within reach of its influence, as the group\nof oracles which were celebrated in the ancient Hellenic world. It is no\nwonder, therefore, that in the age of Plutarch the present silence of the\noracles was a common topic of speculation, of anxious alarm to the pious,\nof ribald sarcasm to the profane. Juvenal[272] satirically describes the\nmeaner methods which the cessation of the Oracle at Delphi has imposed\nupon those who yet wish to peer through the gloom that hides the future.\nLucan laments the loss which his degenerate time suffers from this cause:\n\u201c_non ullo secula dono Nostra carent majore Deum, quam Delphica sedes\nQuod siluit_;\u201d[273] and speculates as to the probable reason for the\nfailure of the ancient inspiration.[274] That Plutarch should have shown\nsolicitude on this aspect of the ancient faith is natural, and one cannot\nbut be grateful that the chances of time have preserved the exhaustive\ntracts in which he and his friends are represented as discussing various\nquestions connected with the inspiration of the Delphic Oracle, and the\nmanner in which this inspiration was conveyed to humanity. No extant work\ngives us so intelligible and natural an explanation of the significance\nwhich oracular institutions possessed for the ancient world, nor so\nclose an insight into the workings of the minds of educated men at one\nof the most important periods of human history, in face of one of the\nmost interesting and, perhaps, most appalling of human problems. We have\nalready made copious quotations from the two tracts in question; we now\npropose to use them mainly for the light which they cast on the question\nof oracular inspiration. We refer to the tracts known as the \u201cDe Pythi\u00e6\nOraculis\u201d and the \u201cDe Defectu Oraculorum.\u201d These two tracts (together\nwith the one entitled the \u201cDe \u0395 apud Delphos\u201d)[275] purport to be reports\nof conversations held by philosophical friends and acquaintances of\nPlutarch at the shrine of Apollo at Delphi.\n\nThe dialogue, briefly called \u201cOn the Pythian Responses,\u201d deals, as\nthe Greek title indicates, with the fact that the Pythia at Delphi no\nlonger uses verse as the instrument of her inspired utterances. It takes\nthe form of a conversation in the Delphic temple, between Philinus,\nDiogenianus, Theon, Serapion, and Boethus\u2014the first of whom reports\nthe conversation to his friend Basilocles, who has grown quite weary\nof waiting while the rest of the party conduct Diogenianus, a visitor,\non a tour of inspection among the sacred offerings in the Temple.[276]\nPhilinus[277] tells how \u201cafter the Ciceroni (\u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b7\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76) had gone\nthrough their wonted programme, disregarding our requests that they\nwould cut short their formal narratives and their explanations of most\nof the inscriptions,\u201d the conversation had turned by a series of natural\ngradations from the interesting objects, that so strongly attracted\nthe attention of visitors, to the medium through which the oracles of\nthe God had been conveyed to humanity.[278] Diogenianus had noted that\n\u201cthe majority of the oracular utterances were crowded with faults of\ninelegance and incorrectness, both of composition and metre.\u201d Serapion,\nto whom previous reference has been made, and who is here described as\n\u201cthe poet from Athens,\u201d will not admit the correctness of this impious\nindictment.[279] \u201cYou are of opinion, then,\u201d said he, \u201cthat, believing\nthese verses to be the work of the god, we may assert that they are\ninferior to those of Homer and Hesiod? Shall we not rather regard them as\nbeing the best and most beautiful of all compositions, and reconstitute,\nby the standard which they supply, our own taste and judgment, so long\ncorrupted by an evil tradition?\u201d Boethus, \u201cthe geometrician,\u201d who has\nlately joined the Epicureans, uses a neat form of the _argumentum ad\nhominem_ in refutation of Serapion, paying him a polished compliment\nat the same time.[280] \u201cYour own poems,\u201d says he, \u201cgrave, indeed,\nand philosophic in matter, are, in power and grace and finish, much\nmore after the model of Homer and Hesiod than of the Pythia;\u201d and he\ngives concise expression to the two opposing mental attitudes in which\nquestions of this kind are universally approached. \u201cSome will maintain\nthat the oracles are fine poems because they are the god\u2019s, others that\nthey cannot be the god\u2019s because they are not fine poems.\u201d Serapion\nemphatically re-asserts the former of these two views, maintaining that\n\u201cour eyes and our ears are diseased. We have become accustomed, by long\nindulgence in luxury and effeminacy, to regard sweetness as identical\nwith beauty.\u201d[281] Theon[282] is the exponent of a compromise not unknown\nin modern discussions on the \u201cInspiration of the Scriptures\u201d\u2014\u201cSince\nthese verses are inferior to those of Homer, it cannot be maintained\nthat the god is their author. He supplies the primary inspiration to\nthe prophetess, who gives expression thereto in accordance with her\nnatural aptitude and capacity. He only suggests the images, and makes\nthe light of the future shine in her soul.\u201d The conversation then turns\nupon certain events which had accompanied, or been preceded by, portents\nand wonders happening to statues and other gifts consecrated in the\nTemple. On this subject Philinus asserts his firm belief that \u201call the\nsacred offerings at Delphi are specially moved by divine forethought to\nthe indication of futurity, and that no fragment of them is dead and\nirresponsive, but all are filled with divine power.\u201d Boethus, as a newly\nconverted Epicurean, makes a mock of this view, this \u201cidentification of\nApollo with brass and stone, as if chance were not quite competent to\naccount for such coincidences,\u201d and he subsequently enlarges his view\nas follows:\u2014\u201cWhat possible condition of temporal affairs, my friend,\ncannot be assigned to natural causes? What strange and unexpected event,\noccurring by sea or by land, to cities or to individual men, could one\npredict without some chance of hitting the mark?[283] Yet you would\nhardly call this prediction; it would be merely assertion, or, rather,\nthe dissemination at random, into the abyss of infinity, of bare words\nwithout any guiding principle leading them to a particular end, words\nwhich, as they wander about, are sometimes met by chance events which\ncorrespond with them.\u201d And Boethus continues to insist that, though some\npredictions may have by accident come true, the original assertions\nwere not the less false on that account. Serapion admits that this\nmay be true about vague predictions, but maintains that such detailed\nprophecies as those he proceeds to quote from history do not owe their\naccomplishment to chance.[284]\n\nThe attention of the disputants\u2014if these calm and dignified colloquies\ncan be called disputes\u2014is here again attracted to the objects of artistic\nand historical interest surrounding them, among which the guide takes\noccasion to point out the place where formerly had reposed the iron\nspits dedicated by the courtezan Rhodopis under the circumstances\ndetailed by Herodotus.[285] Diogenianus warmly protests against such\nofferings having ever been admitted into the Temple, but Serapion draws\nhis attention to the golden statue of the more notorious Phryne, \u201cthat\ntrophy of Greek incontinence,\u201d\u2014as Crates had called it\u2014and condemns the\ninconsistency of these objections in people who see, without a protest,\nthe temple crowded with offerings made by the Greek cities for victories\nin their internecine warfare. \u201cIt were fitting,\u201d exclaims he, \u201cthat\nkings and magistrates should consecrate to the god offerings of justice,\ntemperance, and magnanimity, and not tributes of a golden and luxurious\nwealth, which the most evil livers often abound in.\u201d[286]\n\nThe concluding portion of this somewhat discursive tract is devoted to\na speech by Theon on the question with which the title only has so far\ndealt, the cessation of the oracle to use verse. Theon, as we have seen,\nbelieves that the god inspires the thought, and not the expression,\nof the Pythia, and his explanation of the change of medium is purely\nnatural, being based upon the general tendency towards prose which\nearly became evident in Greek Literature and Philosophy. Besides, the\nmatters on which the oracle is now consulted are not such as to require\nthe mystery and magnificence of verse.[287] \u201cIn these cases it would be\nabsurd to employ the diction, metre, and imagery of poetry, when what is\nrequired is a simple and concise reply. It would be like a vain Sophist\nto turn an oracle finely for the sake of show. The Pythian priestess,\nmoreover, is noble and virtuous in her own character, and when she mounts\nthe tripod and approaches the god, she is more intent on truth than\nappearance, more regardful of the god\u2019s message than of the praise or\nblame of men.\u201d[288] \u201cIn old days,\u201d continues Theon, \u201cwere not wanting\nthose who accused the oracles of uncertainty and ambiguity, and there are\nnow those who accuse them of excessive simplicity. But the ways of such\npersons are childish and silly: for just as children take more delight in\nlooking at rainbows and aureoles and comets than at the sun and moon, so\ndo these desire enigmas and allegories and metaphors to fill the heart\nof man with wonder and mystery. In their ignorance of the true reason of\nthe change (in the oracle\u2019s mode of expression), they depart, blaming\nthe god instead of charging the defect to the weakness of our human\nintellect, which cannot comprehend the purposes of the Deity.\u201d[289]\n\nIn this defence of the Deity Theon has apparently committed himself to\na view of the manner in which the process of inspiration takes place.\n\u201cThe body employs many organs, while the soul employs the body and its\nparts. The soul, in like manner, is God\u2019s instrument. Now the virtue of\nan instrument consists in imitating, subject to its natural limitations,\nthe power that makes use of it, and in exhibiting the thought of that\npower in operation. This it cannot do to the extent of reproducing the\npurity and perfection of the Divine Creator, but its work is mixed with\nalien matter. The Moon reproduces the splendour of the Sun, but in a dim\nand weak form. These images are representations of the way in which the\nPythia reproduces for the service of mankind the thoughts of God.\u201d[290]\nWe may be tempted, while reading this explanation, to assert that\nPlutarch wishes to maintain that the inspiration of the Pythia by the\nDeity is direct. But these illustrations are intended only to explain why\nthe Pythian verses are not divinely perfect. They come through a human\nsoul, which has the weakness of an instrument, and is prevented by its\nlimitations from expressing the purity and beauty of the divine thought.\nThe manner of this inspiration is more fully discussed in the following\ndialogue, the \u201cDe Defectu Oraculorum.\u201d\n\nThis tract is in the form of a letter addressed to Terentius Priscus,\nand although the person speaking as \u201cI\u201d in the dialogue is alluded\nto as \u201cLamprias\u201d[291] by the other speakers, it is clearly Plutarch\nhimself who is modestly represented under this guise. After a warning,\ncharacteristic of Plutarch both as regards its purport and the manner\nin which it is conveyed (by means of a historical reminiscence), that\nthese questions are not to be tested \u201clike a painting by the touch,\u201d the\nwriter brings a party of philosophers together at Delphi \u201cshortly before\nthe Pythian games held under Callistratus.\u201d Two of these philosophers\nare already known to us. Like the eagles or swans of the ancient legend\nthey had met at Delphi coming from opposite quarters of the globe;[292]\nDemetrius, of Tarsus, returning home from Britain, and Cleombrotus, of\nLaced\u00e6mon, from prolonged journeyings by land and sea, in Egypt and the\nEast. Cleombrotus, being possessed of a competence, employed his means\nand his leisure in travel, for the purpose of accumulating evidence to\nform the basis of that branch of philosophy whose end and aim, as he\nexpressed it, was Theology.[293] A preliminary discussion takes place\nrespecting the \u201ceverlasting lamp\u201d which Cleombrotus had been shown\nin the Temple of Ammon, a discussion involving abstract consideration\nof Mathematics and Astronomy. In this conversation, Plutarch\u2019s three\nfavourite characters, doubtlessly representing three common types of\nthe day, are again depicted in the pious belief of Cleombrotus, the\nscepticism of Demetrius, and the judicial pose of the Academic Ammonius.\nThe mention of the Temple of Ammon naturally leads Plutarch to raise the\nquestion of the present silence of that famous oracle.[294] Demetrius\ndiverts this particular topic into a general inquiry respecting the\ncomparative failure of oracles all the world over.[295] B\u0153otia, for\nexample, once so renowned in this respect, suffers from an almost total\ndrought of oracular inspiration. While Demetrius is speaking, the\nparty\u2014Demetrius, Cleombrotus, Ammonius, and Plutarch\u2014had walked from\nthe shrine towards the \u201cdoors of the Hall of the Cnidians,[296] and,\u201d\nproceeds Plutarch, \u201centering therein we came upon our friends sitting\ndown and waiting for us.\u201d Demetrius playfully suggests that their\nlistless attitude and idle expression do not indicate attention to any\nimportant subject of discussion; but Heracleon of Megara retorts sharply\nupon the grammarian that people who try to solve trifling questions of\ngrammar and philology naturally contract their brows and contort their\nfeatures;[297] but there are subjects of importance which people discuss\nwith their eyebrows composed in their natural way. \u201cSuch,\u201d amiably\nreplies Cleombrotus, \u201csuch is the subject we now propose to discuss;\u201d\nand, the two groups having joined company, he proceeds to explain the\ntopic to his hearers. His observations excite the cynic Didymus, surnamed\nPlanetiades, in a remarkable manner.[298] Striking his cynic\u2019s staff\nupon the ground, he inveighs against the wickedness of the times, and\nwonders that the Divine Providence has not gathered up its oracles on\nevery side and taken its departure long ago, like the Aidos and Nemesis\nof Hesiod. \u201cI would suggest for your discussion the question why some god\nhas not repeated the feat of Hercules and shattered the tripod, filled to\noverflowing, as it has been, with disgraceful and atheistical requests.\nSome of us have questioned the god as if he were a sophist, anxious to\nshow off his rhetorical skill. Some of us have appealed to him about\nriches and treasures; some about legacies; some about unlawful marriages.\nSurely Pythagoras was utterly wrong when he said that men were at their\nbest when approaching the gods. Do we not expose, naked and unashamed,\nto the eyes of the god such vices and diseases of the soul as we should\nshun mentioning even in the presence of an old and experienced man?\u201d[299]\nHe was going to add more, when Heracleon twitched his cloak, \u201cbut I,\u201d\nwrites Plutarch, \u201cbeing on more familiar terms with him than were the\nothers, said to him, \u2018My dear Planetiades, cease your efforts to provoke\na god who is really amiable and gentle, and who has been, as Pindar says,\n\n    \u201cAdjudged exceeding mild to mortal men.\u201d\n\nAnd whether he is the sun, or lord and father of the sun and of the whole\nperceptible world, it is not right to believe that he would deprive the\nmen of to-day of the help of his utterances, for he is the author and\nsupporter of our life, and the master of our intelligence. Nor is it\nreasonable to suppose that Providence, which, like a kind and tender\nmother, has given us all that we possess, should wish to punish us in\none single point alone\u2014by taking away from us that prophetic aid which\nwas once given to us. Just as if the wicked were not as numerous when\nthe oracles were firmly established in many parts of the earth! Sit down\nagain, and, in honour of the Pythian games, make a truce for once with\nvice, which you are always eager to chastise, and help us to find out\nthe cause of the failure of the oracles.\u2019 The only result of my remarks\nwas that Planetiades went out-of-doors in silence.[300] After a brief\nsilence, Ammonius turned to me and said, \u2018Come, Lamprias, we must be\ncareful not to deprive the god of all agency in this matter. For if we\nmaintain that the cessation of the oracles is due to any other cause\nthan the will of God, we can hardly escape the conclusion that their\nfoundation also was not His work. If the prophetic power of the oracles\nis, indeed, the work of God, we can imagine no greater or stronger power\nthan that required to destroy it. Planetiades\u2019 remarks were displeasing\nto me, particularly on account of the inconstancy which he attributes\nto God in His attitude towards men\u2019s wickedness, now punishing and now\nprotecting it, as if God were some king or tyrant excluding vicious men\nat one door while welcoming and rewarding them at another. We ought\nto start with the principle that God\u2019s action is always marked by an\nadaptation of means to ends, that He does not furnish an excess of what\nis not required, and should then observe that Greece has shared in a\nparticular degree that general depopulation which wars and revolutions\nhave effected in all parts of the world, to such an extent, indeed, that\nthe whole of Greece could now barely furnish the 3000 hoplites which\nwere Megara\u2019s contingent to Plat\u00e6a.[301] If we were to do this we should\naccurately display our own judgment; for how could the god leave his\noracles with us for the mere purpose of marking the desolation of our\nland? For who would be the better if its ancient oracle were still left\nto Tegyra, or at Ptoum, where after searching whole days you can hardly\nfind a single herdsman tending his cattle? Even this most ancient and\nfamous oracle at Delphi is related to have been for a long period reduced\nto a state of desolation and inaccessibility by a terrible monster in the\nshape of a serpent. But this desolation is not rightly explained. The\nsolitude brought the serpent, not the serpent the solitude. But when,\nin the great purpose of God, Greece again grew strong in its cities,\nand the land was replenished with mankind, the temple was served by two\npriestesses, who took alternate duties on the tripod, and a third was\nappointed to be available in case of emergency. But now there is but\none Pythia; and her we find enough for all our needs. For the prophetic\ninspiration that yet remains is sufficient to send all comers away with\ntheir requirements satisfied. Agamemnon employed nine heralds; and\neven so he was hard put to it to control the assembly of the Greeks,\nso numerous it was. But within a few days you will have an opportunity\nof observing that one voice will easily reach the ears of everybody\nin the Theatre here. In a similar manner the prophetic influence of\nthe god issued by a greater number of voices when the population was\ngreater. But as things at present are, the real cause for astonishment\nwould be that the god should allow the prophetic agency to waste like\nwater, or his voice to sound in vain like the cries of shepherds and\nsheep re-echoing among the rocky solitudes.\u2019[302] Ammonius ceased, and\nI remained silent. But Cleombrotus, turning to me, said: \u2018Was it not\nyou who, just now, maintained that it is the god himself who not only\ngives, but also takes away the oracles?\u2019 \u2018No, indeed,\u2019 replied I, \u2018on\nthe contrary, I assert that the god has taken away neither oracle nor\nsacred shrine. But just as the god bestows upon us many other things\nwhich are subject to decay and destruction by natural processes\u2014or,\nrather, the original substance, containing a principle of change and\nmovement in its own nature, often dissolves itself and reshapes itself\nwithout the intervention of the original creator\u2014so in like manner, I\nthink, the oracles undergo darkenings and declines, being included in\nthe truth of the statement that the god bestows many fair gifts on men,\nbut not one of them to last for ever; or, as Sophocles has it, \u201cthe\ngods immortal are, but not their works\u201d\u2019\u201d\u2014\u201cThe foundation of oracles\nis rightly assigned to God,\u201d continues Plutarch, \u201cbut the law of their\nexistence and its operation we must seek for in nature and in matter.\nFor it is nothing but the most childish folly to look upon God as a sort\nof ventriloquist: like the fellows once called Eurycleis and nowadays\nPythons, inserting Himself into the bodies of the prophets, using their\nmouths and vocal chords as instruments of His messages. For he who puts\nGod into this personal contact with human weaknesses and necessities,\nsins against His glory, and deprives Him of the excellence and grandeur\nof His Virtue.\u201d This strong insistence upon the splendour of the Divine\nNature is, as we know, one of the most characteristic elements of\nPlutarch\u2019s philosophy, and, so long as he can preserve this intact,\nhe is not careful of consistency in his arguments on less important\npoints of doctrine. We have seen him shrinking in conversation from\ntoo close an identification with Rationalism; and we are also prepared\nto find him giving importance to a view which introduces a supernatural\nelement even into the operation of secondary causes. Hence Cleombrotus\nis represented as saying how difficult it is to draw the line exactly\nat the direct interposition of Providence in human affairs; since those\nwho exclude God from second causes, and those who see Him everywhere,\nare equally in error. Hence the pious student of Theology is permitted\nto give a full exposition of the doctrines of D\u00e6monology as applied to\nthe question of Oracles and Inspiration. \u201cPlato delivered Philosophy\nfrom many difficulties when he discovered Matter as the substratum of\nphenomenal qualities; but those who invented the science of D\u00e6monology\nhave solved greater difficulties still.\u201d We are already familiar with\nthe nature and activities of the D\u00e6mons; it remains to see how their\nexistence is applied to the question under discussion. \u201cLet us not\nlisten,\u201d says Cleombrotus, \u201cto those who say that oracles are not\ndivinely inspired, or that religious rites and ceremonies are disregarded\nby the gods: nor, on the other hand, let us approve of the view that God\nis actively, personally, and directly concerned in these matters; but let\nus believe that the D\u00e6mons are superintendents of, and participators in,\nthe sacred sacrifices and mysteries, justly assigning these functions to\nLieutenants of the gods, as it were to Servants and Secretaries, while\nothers go about and punish great and notorious acts of injustice.\u201d[303]\nThis belief, in the opinion of Cleombrotus, furnishes an explanation\nof the silent periods of the oracles. \u201cI am not afraid to say, as many\nothers have said before me, that when the D\u00e6mons who have been appointed\nto administer prophetic shrines and oracles leave them finally, then\nthe shrines and oracles finally decline. If these guardians flee and go\nelsewhither, and then return after a long interval, the oracles, silent\nduring their absence, become again, as of old, the means of conveying\nresponses to those who come to consult them.\u201d \u201cBut,\u201d says Demetrius,\n\u201cit is impossible to assert that the oracles are silent owing to their\ndesertion by the D\u00e6mons, unless we are first reassured respecting the\nmethod by which the D\u00e6mons, when in actual superintendence of the\noracles, make them actively inspired.\u201d[304] Plutarch here introduces a\nrationalistic argument imputing prophetic inspiration to subterrestrial\nexhalations, and draws down upon himself the reproof from Ammonius that\nhe has followed up the abstraction of Divination from the gods by now\ndepriving the D\u00e6mons of that power and referring it to \u201cexhalations,\nwinds, and vapours.\u201d Plutarch, however, though adhering to Rationalism to\nthe extent of insisting on the operation of secondary causes, saves his\npiety by explicitly placing them under the superintendence of the D\u00e6mons.\n\u201cThere are two causes of generation: the Zeus of the ancient poets and\ntheologians, and the physical causes of the natural philosophers. The\nstudy of either of these sets of causes, to the exclusion of the other,\nleads to defective philosophy. But he who first made use of both these\nprinciples, combining creative Reason with created Matter, freed us\nfrom fear of criticism either on the ground of impiety or unreason. For\nwe deprive prophetic inspiration neither of God nor of Reason when we\nallow as its material the human soul, and assign as its instrument the\ninspiring exhalation.[305] The Earth, indeed, breeds these exhalations,\nbut he that implants in the earth its tempering and transforming power\u2014I\nmean the Sun\u2014is regarded as a god in our ancestral religion. Then, if we\nleave the D\u00e6mons as presidents and attendants and guardians, to secure\nthe due harmonizing of the various elements of the inspiring exhalation,\nnow slackening and now tightening it, now restraining its excessive power\nof phrensy and confusion, and gently tempering its stimulating force so\nthat it becomes harmless and painless to those under its influence\u2014if\nwe adopt these views, we shall be in perfect harmony with reason and\npossibility.\u201d[306]\n\nThe one thing that is conspicuously evident throughout these discussions\non important questions of Religion is the earnest sincerity with which\nthey are universally approached. We notice everywhere that combination\nof piety with philosophy, which is characteristic of Plutarch\u2019s own\ngenius, and which appears to be no less characteristic of the society\nin which he constantly moves. Even the Epicurean Boethus, an excellent\nman with his witty stories and courtly compliments, finds it somehow\nin his power to defend the dignity of the prophetic God against those\nwho would \u201cmix Him up with every piece of stone or brass,\u201d while those\nwho are most solicitously inclined to a pious reverence of the ancient\nfaith\u2014Serapion for a prominent example\u2014never for long forget that spirit\nof critical detachment proper to the inquiring philosopher.[307] \u201cThere\nis no one here present,\u201d says Heracleon,\u201cwho is profane and uninitiated,\nand holds views of the gods inconsistent with our own; but we must take\ncare that we ourselves do not unconsciously admit absurd and far-reaching\nhypotheses in support of our arguments.\u201d[308] But it is Plutarch himself\nwho, shunning the \u201cfalsehood of extremes,\u201d most conspicuously represents\nthis spirit of compromise. It is Theon-Plutarch who finds a middle way\nbetween the views of Boethus and those of Serapion on the subject of\nprophecy, and it is Lamprias-Plutarch who, knowing that these things\ninvolve many contentions and are open to numerous contradictions,\ncombines the belief in an original divine inspiration, with a recognition\nof the scientific importance of subsidiary causes, moving unchecked in\nthe sphere of Nature. \u201cThe power of the exhalation which inspires the\nPythia is in truth divine and d\u00e6monic, but it is not exempt from the\noperation of causes that bring silence, age, decay and destruction on\nall that lives between the earth and moon.\u201d[309] Plutarch here strikes\nwith clear emphasis a note not out of harmony with the spirit of modern\nTheology; and had he pushed this view to its logical conclusion, as the\nEpicurean Boethus[310] did, the D\u00e6mons would have disappeared, and their\nplaces would have been wholly occupied by natural causes operating under\nthe Divine impetus inspired by the great First Cause. But the necessity\nfor a _personality_, human on one aspect, Divine on the other, to stand\nbetween God and man, was too strongly felt by Plutarch to enable him\nto accept without qualification the conclusions of pure rationalism.\nThe blank between the Creator and His creatures is occupied, therefore,\npartly by natural causes, partly by the D\u00e6mons, whose existence and mode\nof operation are now involved in the working of natural causes regarded\nas under their superintendence, and now appear as supernatural agencies\nvaguely dependent upon the will of the Supreme Power.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\n    _Sincerity of Plutarch\u2019s belief in D\u00e6mons\u2014Function\n    of the D\u00e6mons as Mediators not confined to oracular\n    inspiration\u2014D\u00e6mons in their personal relationship with the\n    human soul\u2014The DE D\u00c6MONIO SOCRATIS\u2014This tract not a formal\n    treatise on Demonology\u2014Various explanations of the Socratic\n    \u201cD\u00e6mon\u201d\u2014Ethical value of the conception of D\u00e6mons as spiritual\n    guardians of individual men\u2014\u201cMen may rise on stepping-stones\n    of their dead selves to higher things\u201d\u2014Dangers of the\n    conception\u2014Superstition: Plutarch\u2019s general attitude towards\n    that Vice._\n\n\nThe evident sincerity of Plutarch\u2019s piety\u2014his attitude of more than\ntoleration towards everything consecrated by the religious tradition of\nhis age and country\u2014render it impossible for us to regard his system of\nD\u00e6monology as a mere concession made by Rationalism to Superstition.[311]\nBut it is not the less clear that Plutarch thinks he has found in the\nexistence of D\u00e6mons not only a means of communication between God and\nman, but a means of reconciliation between Philosophy and Piety, between\nBoethus and Serapion. It is a very happy circumstance for a man\u2019s\nmoral progress when he finds Religion and Reason in an agreement so\nplausible; and when Reason has in some way furnished the very means of\nagreement\u2014for was it not Plato himself to whom most people had gone for\ntheir D\u00e6monology?\u2014the resulting tendency will have the strength of two\nharmonizing influences, instead of the halting weakness of a compromise\nbetween two mutually conflicting elements.[312] Plato\u2019s D\u00e6monology is a\ntrick of fence: an ironical pose of sympathetic agreement with popular\nideas: but Plutarch does not see this, and can honestly think himself a\nPlatonist, a philosopher, even on a question whose settlement demands\nphilosophical concessions all along the line. It is true that there was\none gain for Philosophy which, in Plutarch\u2019s mind, would compensate for\neven greater sacrifices than it was actually called upon to make: the\ngain, namely, that each concession to the belief in D\u00e6mons would bring\ninto greater prominence the pure splendour and naked simplicity of the\nidea of God. As God was withdrawn not only from participation in the\nignoble adventures of the Homeric legends, but also from the direct\ninspiration of oracular and prophetic phrensy, His character would become\nmore worthy of the adoration of the Best, while His omnipotence would\nbe maintained by virtue of the controlling power exercised by Him over\nall subordinate powers. The gain for a philosophic conception of the\nDeity was so great in this direction, that we are without surprise in\nseeing Plutarch proceed still further on the same path. The D\u00e6mons by\ntheir divine alloy come into close contact with the nature of God: they\nperform many functions as interpreters of the Divine Will to humanity.\nBut by virtue of the human element in their character, they are fitted\nfor assuming a personal relationship with individual men, and for\nbecoming the instruments by means of which God enters into those ethical\nrelations with humanity which we have seen described in the \u201cDe Sera\nNuminis Vindicta.\u201d The hint for this aspect of their work and influence\nPlutarch has found in the Hesiodic people of the golden age, whose death\npromoted them to the duty of keeping watch over the actions of men. We\nhave seen him already develop this hint in an assertion that the D\u00e6mons,\nin addition to attending on shrines and religious ceremonies, are endowed\nwith punitive authority over great sinners; and the ethical value of\nthe doctrine is enforced in a passage in which the love of justice, the\nfear of dishonour, the adoration of virtue, the amenities and graces\nof civilized life, are intimately associated with the belief that good\ndeities and D\u00e6mons keep a watch upon our career.[313] This belief in\nan intimate personal relation between men and D\u00e6mons received its most\nnotorious expression in the famous philosophic tradition of the D\u00e6mon of\nSocrates, and it is naturally in a tract with this title that we have the\nfullest information respecting Plutarch\u2019s view of the personal connexion\nbetween D\u00e6mons and men. The essay, \u201cOn the D\u00e6mon of Socrates,\u201d does\nnot, however, contain an exhaustive and scientific discussion of this\ninteresting aspect of Theology similar to that given by Apuleius in his\ntract with the same designation. At first we find ourselves plunged into\nthe midst of a most dramatically told piece of history\u2014the famous Return\nof the Theban Exiles under Pelopidas after the treacherous seizure of\nthe Cadmea by the Spartans. In the pauses of the plot the Thebans\u2014averse\nfrom such studies as their character is supposed to have been\u2014discourse\non these high questions of religious philosophy, and one would almost\nguess that Plutarch\u2019s subsidiary intention was to indicate, by the\nbroken character of the discussion, the difficulty of attaining to a\ncomplete and final view of the subject. Various rational and supernatural\nexplanations of the well-known Socratic expression are suggested,\nexplanations which vary in harmony with the different types of character,\nor mental attitude, already familiar in Plutarch. Galaxidorus takes the\nextreme rationalistic view. He rebukes Philosophy for promising to pursue\nscientific methods in the investigation of \u201cthe Good and the Expedient,\u201d\nand then, in contempt of Reason, falling back upon the gods as principles\nof action, thus relying on dreams instead of demonstrations.[314]\nHe thinks the D\u00e6mon of Socrates was nothing but the \u201clast straw\u201d\nwhich inclines, in one direction or the other, a man whose close and\nexperienced study of every aspect of the case has not enabled him to come\nto a practical decision. A sneeze might be the grain which turned the\nbalance. Phidolaus will not allow so \u201cgreat a phenomenon of prophetic\ninspiration\u201d to be explained by a sneeze, a method of divination which\n\u201cis only jestingly used by common people in small matters.\u201d[315] A\nstatement of Simmias to the effect that he had heard Socrates often\ninveighing against those who asserted they had seen a divine vision,\nwhile he always listened sympathetically to those who said they had\nheard a voice, leads to a general surmise that the D\u00e6mon may have been\n\u201cnot an apparition, but the perception of a voice or the interpretation\nof a word, which had occurred to him under extraordinary circumstances,\njust as in a dream there is no actual voice, but we have fancies and\nnotions of words, and imagine that we can hear people speaking.\u201d[316]\nArchidamas, who is narrating the dialogue and its events to Caphisias,\nhere expounds his own views on the subject in the light of the foregoing\nexplanation. He thinks that the voice, or the perception of a voice,\nwhich influenced Socrates, was the speech of a D\u00e6mon, who, without the\nintermediation of audible sound, made this direct appeal to the mind of\nthe pure and passionless sage;[317] it was the influence of a superior\nintelligence and of a diviner soul, operating upon the soul of Socrates,\nwhose calm and holy temper fitted him \u201cto hear this spiritual speech\nwhich, though filling all the air around, is only heard by those whose\nsouls are freed from passion, and its perturbing influence.\u201d[318] Here\nwe have the extreme religious view placed, as usual, in contrast with\nthe sceptical rationalism of Galaxidorus, which has also been indirectly\nopposed by a narrative of the events, involving the hearing of a D\u00e6monic\nvoice, connected with the death and burial of a Pythagorean philosopher,\nLysis, from which it appears that the Pythagoreans believed that a few\nmen only were under the guardian care of the D\u00e6mons.[319] These two\nopposing views having been fully expounded by their respective defenders,\nwe should now expect the dialogue to be concluded, in the usual manner of\nPlutarch, with a compromise between the rationalistic and the religious\nattitudes. But on this occasion we are disappointed. Plutarch abandons\nthe _r\u00f4le_ of rationalist and gives himself up entirely to the view of\nD\u00e6monic influence expounded by Archidamas, taking Myth for his guide\nagain whither Philosophy refuses to go. He is careful, however, as in the\nparallel case in the \u201cDe Sera Numinis Vindicta,\u201d at once to still the\nsuspicion of the philosopher and to put the pious reader on his guard,\nby suggesting a contrast between Myth and Reason before entering on the\nnarrative, a warning which is strongly emphasized by the fact that even\nTheocritus, \u201cthe Soothsayer,\u201d can only claim for Myth, that it is not to\nbe depended upon for scientific accuracy, but only sometimes comes in\ncontact with Truth.[320] The Myth in this case describes the experiences\nin the Cave of Trophonius of the young philosopher Timarchus, a friend\nof Socrates, who desired to ascertain the true nature of the \u201cD\u00e6mon\u201d of\nthat great man. The story is told with considerable beauty of imagery, an\nexample of Plutarch\u2019s skill in which we have already seen in the similar\nstory of Thespesius of Soli. The soul of the philosopher leaves his body\nthrough the sutures of the cranium. In the subterranean regions he stays\ntwo nights and a day, receiving from an invisible spirit much information\nconcerning the afterworld and the beings who inhabit it. The main object\nof the story seems to be to establish and elucidate the ethical value\nof the doctrine of D\u00e6monology, while at the same time we note that a\nmystical significance now begins to be attached to certain principles\nlong the topic of discussion in the schools. Timarchus is informed by the\ninvisible spirit that there are four principles which operate throughout\nthe universe: the first of Life, the second of Motion, the third of\nGeneration, the fourth of Corruption. The sphere of Life is united to the\nsphere of Motion by the _Monad_ in the world of invisibility; the sphere\nof Motion is united to the sphere of Generation by _Nous_ in the Sun; the\nsphere of Generation is united to the sphere of Corruption by _Nature_ in\nthe Moon. Over each of these unions a Fate presides. The other \u201cislands\u201d\nare peopled by gods: but the Moon is inhabited by Epichthonian D\u00e6mons,\nbeing raised only a little above Styx, which is \u201cthe way to Hell.\u201d[321]\nStyx periodically seizes upon many of these souls in the Moon, and they\nare swallowed up in Hell. Other souls, at the end of their participation\nin the life of generation, are received into the Moon from below, except\nsuch as are \u201cpolluted and unpurified,\u201d these being driven away from her\nby thunder and lightning to undergo another period of generation. As in\nthe myth of Thespesius, there is a chasm through which the souls pass\nand repass to and from the life of earth. \u201cWhat,\u201d asks Timarchus, \u201care\nthese stars that dart about the chasm, some descending into its depths,\nothers arising from it?\u201d \u201cThese are D\u00e6mons,\u201d he is told; and we can\nonly conclude that they are identical with the souls already described\nas inhabiting the Moon. These D\u00e6mons are incarnated in mankind. Some\nare altogether dominated by the passions and appetites of the body,\nothers enter into it only partly, retaining the purest portion of their\nsubstance unmingled with the human frame. \u201cIt is not dragged down, but\nfloats above the top of the head of a man, who is, as it were, sinking\nin the depths, but whose soul is supported by the connexion so long as\nit is submissive to this influence, and is not controlled by its bodily\npassions. The part beneath the waves in the body is called the soul; but\nthe eternal, uncorrupted part is called the mind, by those who think it\nis within the body.\u2014Those who rightly judge, know it to be outside, and\ndescribe it as a D\u00e6mon.\u201d The point of this narrative is emphasized by\nTheanor, who expresses his belief that \u201cthere are very few men whom God\nhonours by addressing his commands directly to them. The souls of such\nmen, freed from the domination of passion and earthly desires, become\nD\u00e6mons, who act as guardian angels to certain men, whose long-continued\nstruggles after the good excite their attention, and at last obtain their\nassistance.\u201d Each of these D\u00e6mons loves to help the soul confided to its\ncare, and to save it by its inspirations. The soul who adheres to the\nD\u00e6mon, and listens to its warnings, attains a happy ending; those who\nrefuse to obey are abandoned by it, and may expect no happiness.[322]\n\u201cThe connexion which attaches the D\u00e6mon to the soul is, as it were, a\nrestraint upon the irrational part thereof. When Reason pulls the chain\nit gives rise to repentance for the sins which the soul has committed\nunder the influence of passion, shame for illicit and immoderate\nindulgences, and finally produces a tendency to submit in quiet patience\nto the better influence of the D\u00e6mon. The condition of absolute\nsubmission does not come all at once, but those who have been obedient\nto their D\u00e6mon from the very beginning constitute the class of prophets\nand god-inspired men.\u201d The D\u00e6mons have here assigned to them a protective\ncare of humanity; they assist the souls who struggle after goodness,\nand desert those who refuse to obey their injunctions. A few good men,\nspecially honoured by the deity, may themselves become D\u00e6mons, and act as\nguardian angels to others. Plutarch repeats this view more systematically\nelsewhere, giving it a more general application. \u201cIt is maintained by\nsome that ... just as water is perceived to be produced from earth, from\nwater, air, and from air, fire, in a constantly ascending process, so\nalso the better souls undergo a transformation from men to heroes, from\nheroes to d\u00e6mons, and from d\u00e6mons, some few souls, being purified through\nprolonged practice of virtue, are brought to a participation in the\ndivine nature itself.\u201d[323]\n\nThis examination of the story of Timarchus lends a strong support to\nthe statement already made respecting Plutarch\u2019s use of myth. In the\n\u201cDe Sera Numinis Vindicta\u201d we saw that he could not accept as a subject\nof rational demonstration the theory of rewards and punishments in a\nfuture life; but so convinced is he of the ethical value of that belief\nthat he has recourse to a most solemn myth, which he clearly hopes\nwill operate for goodness through the imagination if not through the\nintellect. The myth embodied in the \u201cDe D\u00e6monio Socratis\u201d has a similar\norigin and an identical aim. How important to a man in his efforts after\nGoodness to know that he is under the observation of a Being whose\nhalf-human, half-divine nature, fits him equally to feel sympathy and\nadminister aid! That is an aspect of Plutarch\u2019s teaching which requires\nno emphasis to-day.... With the Plutarchean doctrine of D\u00e6mons is also\ninvolved the sublimely moral notion of eternal endeavour after a higher\nand more perfect goodness. The human being who earnestly strives to be\ngood within the limits of his present opportunities will have a larger\nsphere of activity thrown open to him as a D\u00e6mon in the Afterworld. The\nhuman soul transfigured into the strength and splendour of this higher\nnature has work to perform which may develop such qualities as will bring\ntheir owner into closer proximity with the Highest Divine. The doctrine\nof D\u00e6mons, as expounded by Plutarch, involves the profound moral truth\nthat there is no limit to the perfectibility of human nature; and we can\nsurely forgive much that is irrational and fantastic in a scheme which\nembodies so effective an inspiration to goodness.[324]\n\nBut the value and moral dignity of any principle depend upon the method\nof its interpretation and application. That sense of personal dependence\nupon a benevolent supernatural power which Plutarch associates with\nthe teachings of D\u00e6monology may be identical with the purest and\nloftiest religion, or may degenerate into the meanest and most degrading\nsuperstition, according to its development in the mind of the individual\nbeliever. If this intercourse is regarded as spiritual only, the\ncommunion of soul with soul in the \u201csessions of sweet, silent thought,\u201d\nhigh religious possibilities issue which no form of faith can dispense\nwith. Any attempt to degrade this intercourse to material ends, or to\nappeal to it through material channels, involves recourse to magical\nrites, and superstitious practices of the grossest description. It is\nnecessary, too, that even where there is no recourse to materialistic\navenues of access to the spiritual world, the mind should cultivate a\nbelief in the benevolence of the Higher Powers so that it may maintain a\nrational dignity and fearlessness in its communion with them. Plutarch\nis aware of these clangers. He knows that D\u00e6monology, and even Theology,\nmay involve Superstition, and he takes pains to close those avenues to\nits approach, which a misunderstanding of the subject, a mistaken mental\nattitude towards it, may easily throw widely open. He seldom misses an\nopportunity of inculcating the proper attitude of mind to assume in face\nof questions of Religion, or of placing such questions in an atmosphere\nof clear and rational daylight, which is equally unlike the dim gloom of\nSuperstition, and the blinding glare of Atheism. In a word, he continues\nto make Reason his Mystagogue to Religion. Polemically, as against the\nEpicureans, he is inclined to argue that Atheism is an unmixed evil,\nsince it deprives mankind of Hope, Courage, and Pleasure, and leaves us\nno refuge in God from the sorrows and troubles of life.[325] He adds\nthat Superstition should be removed as a dimming rheum from before our\neyes; but, if that is impossible, we must not knock the eye out for the\nsake of removing the rheum, or turn the sight of Faith to the blindness\nof Atheism in order to destroy false ideas of the Deity. Although he\nadmits that there are some men for whom it is best to be in fear of God;\nalthough he knows that a much greater number combine with their honour\nand worship of the Deity a certain superstitious fear and dread of Him;\nyet he insists most strongly that these feelings are totally eclipsed\nby the hope and joy that attend their communion with God.[326] He\ndraws a beautiful picture of the happiness accompanying participation\nin divine services, asserting, in a lofty strain of religious feeling,\nthat it is from a recognition of the presence of God in these services\nthat the sense of happiness proceeds. \u201cHe that denies the Providence of\nGod has no share in this exceeding joy. For it is not abundance of wine\nand well-cooked meats that gladden our hearts in a religious festival;\nit is our good hope and belief that God Himself is graciously present\nand approving our acts.\u201d Without this conviction, he insists, the\nreligious value of the ceremony is utterly lost.[327] To approach the\ngods with cheerfulness and courage and openness is the soul of Plutarch\u2019s\nreligion, and he is faithful to this principle on the most diverse\noccasions. Fond of Literature as he is, there are many famous passages\nof classical verse which he will not permit youthful students to carry\naway into their lives as factors in ethical progress until they have\nbeen harmonized with the claims of a rational criticism. Thus he quotes\na verse of Sophocles\u2014\u201cGod is a cause of fear to prudent men\u201d\u2014and insists\nthat \u201cfear\u201d should be changed to \u201chope,\u201d lest those should be justified\nwho regard \u201cwith suspicion and dread as the cause of injury the power\nthat is the principle and origin of all good.\u201d[328] And when dealing with\nthe sanctities of domestic life he insists that one important element of\nconjugal happiness lies in the avoidance of separate worship on the part\nof the wife, and in a closing of the door on superfluous ministrations\nand the practices of foreign superstition. \u201cFor,\u201d says he, \u201cthere is no\ngod who takes delight in stolen and secret sacrifices on the part of a\nwife.\u201d[329] These passages, selected from various portions of Plutarch\u2019s\nethical teachings, show how strongly it is his practice to emphasize a\nnote of cheerful and open courage in worship as an essential part of\nreligious belief. But it is in the well-known essay \u201con Superstition\u201d\nthat he most thoroughly expounds this aspect of his philosophy, and\nno endeavour to understand Plutarch\u2019s mental attitude in face of a\nproblem which always affects humanity would be successful without a\ncareful analysis of that treatise. The \u201cDe Iside et Osiride\u201d attempts to\nsafeguard the mind from the attacks of Superstition on the side of the\nIntellect, as the \u201cDe Superstitione\u201d does on the side of the Imagination,\nand the two tracts have therefore an organic connexion which renders it\nnecessary to treat them together as expounding different aspects of the\nsame question.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\n    _Relation between Superstition and Atheism: Atheism an\n    intellectual error: Superstition an error involving the\n    passions: the DE SUPERSTITIONE\u2014Moral fervour of Plutarch\u2019s\n    attack on Superstition\u2014His comparative tolerance of\n    Atheism\u2014The greatest safeguard against both alike consists\n    in an intellectual appreciation of the Truth\u2014The DE ISIDE ET\n    OSIRIDE\u2014The Unity underlying national differences of religious\n    belief._\n\n\n\u201cThe profoundest, the most essential and paramount theme of human\ninterest,\u201d says Goethe, \u201cis the eternal conflict between Atheism and\nSuperstition.\u201d[330] Plutarch\u2019s tract, \u201cDe Superstitione,\u201d is a classical\nsermon on this text, although in his presentment of the subject the\nmutual antagonism of the two principles receives less emphasis than the\nhostility which both alike direct against the interests of true Religion.\nHe has no sympathy with any notion similar to that current since his\ndays, in many religious minds, that Superstition is but a mistaken form\nof Piety, deserving tenderness rather than reprehension, and he maintains\nthat absolute disbelief in God is less mischievous in its effects upon\nhuman conduct and character than its opposite extreme of superstitious\ndevotion. With this hint of Plutarch\u2019s point of view we proceed to a\nbrief analysis of the tract in which his view is mainly expounded.\n\nAt the very commencement he describes the two evils as springing from an\nidentical source. Ignorance of the Divine Nature has a twofold aspect:\nin people of stern dispositions it appears as Atheism; in minds of more\nyielding and submissive mould it shows itself as Superstition. Merely\nintellectual errors, such as the Epicurean Theory of Atoms and the Void,\nor the Stoic notion that virtue and vice are corporeal substances, are\nunaccompanied by any passionate mental disturbance: they are silly\nblunders, but not worth tears. But is a man convinced that wealth is\nthe highest good? or does he regard virtue as a mere empty name?\u2014these\nare errors that cannot be distinguished from moral disorders. Atheism\nis an intellectual error: Superstition a moral disorder\u2014an intellectual\nerror \u201ctouched with emotion.\u201d[331] The moral disorder of Superstition is\ndepicted in a few paragraphs of striking power, opulent with historical\nand literary allusion. The effect of the description is to leave a\nconviction of the utter inability of the superstitious man to free any\nportion of his life from the influence of his awful fear of the gods.\n\u201cHe does not dread the sea who never sails; nor he a war who never goes\nto camp; nor he a robber who keeps his home; nor he an informer who has\nno wealth; nor he envy who lives retired; nor he an earthquake who\ndwells in Gaul; nor he a thunderbolt who inhabits \u00c6thiopia. But they\nwho fear the gods fear all things\u2014land, sea, air, sky, darkness, light,\nsound, silence, dream.[332] By day as well as night they live in prey to\ndreadful dreams, and fall a ready victim to the first fortune-telling\ncheat they come upon. They dip themselves in the sea: they pass all day\nin a sitting posture: they roll themselves on dunghills: cover themselves\nwith mud: keep Sabbaths:[333] cast themselves on their faces: stand in\nstrange attitudes, and adopt strange methods of adoration.\u2014Those who\nthought it important to maintain the recognized laws of Music, used to\ninstruct their pupils to \u2018sing with a just mouth\u2019; and we maintain that\nthose who approach the gods should address them with a just mouth and a\nrighteous, lest, in our anxiety to have the tongue of the victim pure and\nfree from fault, we twist and defile our own with strange barbarian names\nand expressions, and thus disgrace the dignified piety of our national\nFaith.\u201d[334] Not only is this life full of torture to the Superstitious,\nbut their terrified imagination leaps the limits of the Afterworld, and\nadds to death the conception of deathless woes. Hell-gate yawns for\nthem; streams of flame and Stygian cataracts threaten them; the gloom is\nhorrid with spectral shapes, and piteous sights and sounds, with judges\nand executioners, and chasms crowded with a myriad woes.\n\nThe condition of the Atheist is far to be preferred. It was better for\nTiresias to be blind than it was for Athamas and Agave to see their\nchildren in the shape of lions and stags. The Atheist does not see God\nat all: the superstitious man sees Him terrible instead of benign, a\ntyrant instead of a father, harsh instead of tender. The troubles of\nactual life are assigned by the Atheist to natural causes, to defects in\nhimself or his circumstances; and he endeavours to mitigate or remove\nthem by greater care. But to the victim of Superstition his bodily\nailments, his pecuniary misfortunes, his children\u2019s deaths, his public\nfailures, are the strokes of a god or the attacks of a d\u00e6mon, and cannot\ntherefore be remedied by natural means, which would have the appearance\nof opposition to the will of God.[335] Hence light misfortunes are often\nallowed to become fatal disasters.[336] Thus, Midas was frightened to\ndeath by his dreams; Aristodemus of Messene committed suicide because\nthe soothsayers had alarmed him about a trifling omen;[337] Nicias lost\nhis life and his great army because he was afraid when a shadow crept\nover the moon. Let us pray to the gods, but let us not neglect reasonable\nhuman endeavour. \u201cWhile the Greeks were praying for Ajax, Ajax was\nputting on his armour; for God is the hope of bravery, not the pretext\nfor cowardice.\u201d[338] Participation in religious ceremonies, which should\nbe the most cheerful and happy act of life, is an additional cause of\ndread to the Superstitious, whose case is worse than that of the Atheist\nwho smiles sarcastically at the whole business. The Atheist, true, is\nguilty of impiety: but is not Superstition more open to this charge?\n\u201cI, for my part, would greatly prefer that men should say about me that\nthere was not, and never had been, such a man as Plutarch, than that\nthey should say that Plutarch is a fickle, irascible, vindictive fellow,\nwho will pay you out for not inviting him to supper, or for omitting to\ncall upon him, or for passing him in the street without speaking to him,\nby committing a violent assault upon you, giving one of your children a\nthorough caning, or turning a beast into your cornfield.\u201d[339] The fact\nof the matter is, that the Atheist believes there are no gods, while the\nsuperstitious man wishes there were none;[340] the former is an Atheist\npure and simple, while the latter is an Atheist who professes to believe\nbecause he has not the moral courage to utter his secret desires. And,\nas in the individual mind Superstition involves Atheism, so historically\nthe latter has developed out of the former. The Epicureans were Atheists,\nnot because they did not perceive the splendour and perfection of the\nuniverse, but because they desired to deliver humanity from the thraldom\nwhich Superstition had cast about it\u2014from its ridiculous passions and\nactions, its spells of speech and motion, its magic and witchcraft, its\ncharmed circles and drum-beating, its impure purifications and its filthy\ncleansings, its barbaric and unlawful penances and its self-torturings at\nholy shrines. If these practices are pleasant to the gods, mankind is no\nbetter off than if the administration of the world were in the hands of\nthe Typhons or the Giants.\n\nBut no disease is so difficult to cope with as Superstition. We must fly\nfrom it, but we must so fly from it that we do not run into the other\nextreme. \u201c_Aussi y en a il qui fuyans la Superstition, se vont ruer et\nprecipiter en la rude et pierreuse impiet\u00e9 de l\u2019atheisme, en sautant par\ndessus la vraye Religion, qui est assise au milieu entre les deux._\u201d\n\nSuch is a brief account of the contents of this famous tract. One thing\nbecomes clear from its perusal, the fact that the advantage is altogether\nregarded as on the side of Atheism. Amyot, from whose translation we\nhave taken its concluding sentence, sounds a note of serious alarm in\na prefatory note to his version: \u201c_Ce traict\u00e9 est dangereux \u00e0 lire, et\ncontient une doctrine fausse: Car il est certain que la Superstition est\nmoins mauvaise, et approche plus pres du milieu de la vraye Religion, que\nne fait l\u2019Impiet\u00e9 et Atheisme._\u201d Others have followed Amyot in his view\nof this \u201cdangerous\u201d treatise; while Plutarch has not been without his\nchampions against those who have thus accused him of irreligion.[341]\nSo far as concerns the views expounded in the treatise, it appears to us\nthat the alarm of Amyot is justified. But Amyot, who knew his Plutarch\nwell, should have observed that there is a note of rhetoric in this\nwork which is totally different from the teacher\u2019s usually quiet and\nunimpassioned method of argument. There is an emphasis, an exaggeration,\nof everything that tells against the victim of Superstition, a restraint,\na gentleness in minimizing the faults which could have been made into a\nserious indictment against Atheism. This, as we know, is not Plutarch\u2019s\nfavourite method of discussion. In ordinary circumstances an Epicurean\nwould have attacked Superstition, a Stoic would have inveighed against\nAtheism, and an Academic friend of Plutarch\u2019s would have taken the\njudicial mean. As a matter of fact, however, Plutarch\u2014and he connects\nhis own name with the argument in the most emphatic manner\u2014assumes a\nposition in this tract scarcely discrepant from the peculiarly Epicurean\nattitude. From this point of view, Wyttenbach\u2019s epithet of _vere\nPlutarcheus_ applied to the tract is incorrect, and even Wyttenbach\nadmits the possibility that Plutarch may have written another tract, \u201cin\nwhich the cause of _Superstition_ was defended against Epicurus.\u201d[342]\nHow Plutarch could have accomplished a successful defence without going\nback on all the arguments in the treatise \u201con Superstition\u201d will not\nbe clear to a modern reader. It appears to us that Plutarch, having an\nacute perception of the gross evils inherent in the many superstitious\npractices of the day, has been disturbed from his usual philosophic pose,\nand has been carried, by a feeling of almost personal resentment, to draw\na picture which was intended to be one-sided, because it was intended to\nbe alarming. Plutarch\u2019s Philosophy, his Religion, here touch the vital\ninterests of life, and come to close combat with a gigantic moral evil.\nWhat is lost in philosophic detachment is gained in moral fervour, a\nchange of balance which gives quite other than a theoretical interest\nto those many short sermons in which Plutarch is _aux prises_ with the\nsins and vices and follies of his day. The main importance of the \u201cDe\nSuperstitione\u201d is its contact with practical affairs, and its translation\nof philosophic and religious conceptions into terms of everyday life.\nPhilosophy and Religion have displayed to Plutarch the Purity, the Unity,\nthe Benevolence of God; it is a question of Ethics to expose and destroy\npractices which are repellent to this conception of the Divine Nature.\nPlutarch\u2019s way of solving that question in one direction is expounded in\nthe tract \u201cDe Superstitione.\u201d[343]\n\nWhile Plutarch, in his anxiety to safeguard the emotional aspects of\nReligion from the incursions of Superstition, departs in this tract\nfrom his ordinary attitude of intellectual moderation, he reverts\nvery markedly to his usual manner in his treatise on the two Egyptian\ndivinities, Isis and Osiris. Knowledge of the Truth is here depicted as\nthe very heart of devotion, and the pursuit of this is regarded as the\nonly means of holding a middle path between the bog of Superstition and\nthe precipice of Atheism. The main object of this treatise is to show\nhow principles of rational inquiry may be applied to religious myths, so\nthat Reason and Piety may both be satisfied with the result. Wyttenbach\nexplains this purpose in a few words of terse Latinity which might\nsafely be quoted as descriptive of Plutarch\u2019s attitude towards Religion\nin general. \u201c_Consilium scriptoris videtur fuisse, ut amicam de horum\n\u00c6gyptiorum numinum ortu et cultu saniora, quam qu\u00e6 vulgo ferrentur,\ndoceret, religionemque fabularum deliriis c\u00e6rimoniarumque ineptiis\nmirifice deformatam et apud prudentiores homines in contemtum adductam,\nistis quoad ejus fieri posset sordibus purgaret, omnique literarum et\nphilosophi\u00e6 instrumento ad histori\u00e6 fidem, natur\u00e6 rationem dignamque\ndivinitate speciem reformaret._\u201d But while serving as an example of\nPlutarch\u2019s general method of inquiry, a particular motive for the choice\nof this special myth as subject would doubtless be furnished by the great\nprevalence and popularity of the worship of Isis during the Gr\u00e6co-Roman\nEmpire of this period. Its passionate excitements were hostile to the\ncalm cultivated by the Roman in matters of Religion, and Isis had\nundergone a prolonged struggle before her temples were allowed to stand\nerect in Rome. The patrician indignation of Lucan\u2014_nos in templa tuam\nRomana accepimus Isin!_[344]\u2014expressed, however, rather the sentiment\nof the Republic than the conviction of the Empire. Juvenal alludes to\nthe _Isiac\u00e6 sacraria len\u00e6_\u2014the _fanum Isidis_\u2014the temple of the goddess\nin the Campus Martius, in terms which, however severe from the moral\nstandpoint, leave no historical doubt as to the established character of\nthe cult and its institutions. In the later romance of Apuleius, the hero\nLucius owes his re-transformation into human shape to the power of Isis,\nand makes a pilgrimage of gratitude to the very temple to which Juvenal\nmakes so scathing an allusion.\n\nThe detailed description given by Apuleius of the ceremonies connected\nwith the worship of the goddess in so important a place as Cenchre\u00e6, the\nport of Corinth, bears emphatic witness to the established popularity\nof her rites.[345] Even in Plutarch\u2019s tract the fact is everywhere\nindirectly evident. Clea, to whom it is addressed, was officially and\nintimately associated with the worship of Dionysus at Delphi, but she\nhad also been instructed from her childhood in the rites appertaining\nto the worship of Isis and Osiris.[346] It is only in accordance with\nPlutarch\u2019s well-known character that he should be anxious to explain\nanything in the Isiac ceremonies and traditions, the misunderstanding\nof which was likely to generate superstitious and licentious practices\nand lead indirectly to Atheism. And if, by explaining absurdities,\nexcising crudities, refuting false interpretations, he could at the\nsame time demonstrate the unity of God, the identity of religious basis\nlying beneath these various beliefs of other peoples, we can recognize\nin the task one eminently suited to the character and aims of Plutarch.\nIn the \u201cIsis and Osiris\u201d Plutarch has, therefore, a twofold object. He\nendeavours to explain, from a rationalistic point of view, the meaning of\nIsiac and Osirian ceremonies and legends; and he develops his theories on\nthese matters into an exposition of his attitude towards Myth in general,\nshowing that the various beliefs of other nations are not, when rightly\nunderstood, mutually destructive and opposite, but simply different ways\nof envisaging the same essential and eternal truth. We proceed to explain\nthese assertions by an examination of the treatise.\n\nPlutarch gives early indication of his point of view. \u201cThe philosophy\nof the Egyptian priests was generally concealed in myths and narratives\ncontaining dim hints and suggestions of truth.\u201d It was to indicate this\n\u201cenigmatic\u201d character of their theological wisdom that they erected\nSphinxes before their temples; that, too, is the meaning of their\ninscription on the shrine of Athene-Isis at Sais, \u201c_I am all that was,\nand all that is, and all that shall be, and my veil hath yet no mortal\nraised_.\u201d[347] It follows from this that we must on no account attach a\nliteral significance to their narratives.[348] Thus they represent the\nsun as a newborn child sitting on a lotus flower, but this is an enigma\nteaching the derivation of the solar heat from moisture.[349] \u201cIt is in\nthis way,\u201d says he, clearly indicating the twofold object he has in view\nthroughout this work, \u201cit is in this way that you are to hear and accept\ntraditions of the gods, taking their meaning from such as interpret them\n_in a spirit at once pious and philosophic_. This spirit of reverent\ninquiry must be accompanied by a constant observance of the recognized\nforms of worship, and by a conviction that no religious or other action\nis more grateful to the gods than the acceptance of true opinions\nconcerning them. This harmonious co-operation of Piety and Philosophy\nsaves equally from Atheism and its cognate evil, Superstition.\u201d[350]\n\nIt is in this spirit\u2014the spirit in which every Religion justly claims\nthat it should be approached\u2014that Plutarch gives an account of the\nEgyptian myth \u201cin the briefest possible terms, denuded of such\nparticulars as are quite useless and superfluous\u201d; denuded also, as we\nare told later, \u201cof its most blasphemous features,\u201d[351] \u201csuch as the\ndismemberment of Horus and the decapitation of Isis.\u201d Piety absolutely\nrejects these tales concerning beings who participate \u201cin that blessed\nand eternal nature which marks our conception of the Divine\u201d; although\nPhilosophy will not be equally severe on these legends, regarding\nthem not solely as unsubstantial tales and empty fictions spun, like\nspiders\u2019 webs, by poets and romancers out of their own imagination, but\nalso as indirectly reflecting the pure light of some ancient narrative\nwhose meaning has now been utterly broken up as are the sun\u2019s rays when\nreproduced in the multitudinous hues of the rainbow.[352] Plutarch\nclearly regards it as a pious duty to accept the Osirian legend as\ncontaining a substratum of truth, embodying the religious lore of the\nEgyptian priesthood, but he reserves to himself the right of interpreting\nthe expression of this truth in the light of his own philosophy. His\nattitude is identical with that assumed by the authors of the various\nexplanations of the myth which he reports as current in antiquity.\n\u201cThese interpretations,\u201d in the lively expression of Mr. Andrew Lang,\n\u201care the interpretations of civilized men, whose method is to ask\nthemselves: \u2018Now, if _I_ had told such a tale as this, or invented such\na mystery play of divine misadventures, what meaning could _I_ have\nintended to convey in what is apparently blasphemous nonsense?\u2019\u201d[353] It\nwill be seen that Plutarch does not himself finally adopt any special\ninterpretation, although he emphatically rejects those which are not\npious as well as philosophic. He is desirous rather of showing in what\nway the investigation of such questions should be approached, than of\nimposing any definite conclusion on the understanding; of cultivating an\naptitude for rational and reverent inquiry, than of establishing a final\nand inflexible dogma.\n\nHe deals first with the Euhemerists, or \u201cExanthropizers.\u201d Euhemerus of\nTegea, or, as Plutarch here calls him, Euhemerus[354] of Messene, first\ntreated with scientific precision that tendency to regard the gods as\nkings and rulers whose surpassing greatness and merit had been rewarded\nby an imaginary apotheosis. He had embodied the result of his researches,\nwhich he claims to have made during an expedition sent by Cassander to\nthe Red Sea, in a work called the \u201cSacred Record.\u201d He asserted, according\nto Lactantius, that he had seen in the Island of Panchaia (Plutarch\ncalls it _Panchon_) a column of gold with an inscription indicating\nits erection by Zeus himself, _in qua columna gesta sua perscripsit ut\nmonimentum esset posteris rerum suarum_. This \u201chumanizing\u201d of Zeus was\nextended to other deities; and Plutarch, who sarcastically denies that\nthese inscriptions had ever been seen by anybody else, whether Greek or\nBarbarian, asserts that the principles of Euhemerus had been applied to\nthe explanation of the tombs and other monuments commemorating in Egypt\nthe events embodied in the Osirian myth. Although it has been asserted\nthat Euhemerus admitted the existence of the elemental deities, such\nas the sun and the heavens, the atheistical tendency of his theory\nis evident, and the author of the tract \u201cDe Placitis Philosophorum,\u201d\nwhose bias is distinctly Epicurean and atheistic, says that Euhemerus\nabsolutely denied the existence of the gods, associating him in this\nconnexion with Diagoras the Melian, and Theodorus of Cyrene.[355]\nPlutarch himself has no doubts as to the tendency of Euhemerism. Those\nwho have recourse to these theories,\u201ctransferring great names from heaven\nto earth, almost entirely uproot and destroy the reverence and faith\nimplanted in all of us at our birth, and open wide the temple doors to\nthe profane and atheistical mob.\u201d[356]\u2014\u201cThey bring divinity to the level\nof humanity, and fair occasion of unfettered speech to the impostures of\nEuhemerus, who scattered Atheism the wide world over, degrading all the\nrecognized deities alike to the names of generals, admirals, kings of\na pretended eld.\u201d Good and great kings are rewarded with the gratitude\nof posterity, while disgrace and obloquy have been the portion of\nthose whose insolence has led them to assume the titles and temples of\ngods.[357]\n\nThe hypothesis of D\u00e6monic natures, next applied by Plutarch to the\nexplanation of the legend, we have already examined. Naturally he\nexpresses a preference for this theory over that of the Euhemerists, but\nwill still proceed to discuss with philosophic detachment the hypotheses\nof other schools, taking, as he says, the simplest first.[358] These\nare the Physical Allegorists. \u201cJust as the Greeks assert that Cronus is\nan allegorical symbol for Time, Hera for Air, the birth of Hephaistos\nfor the transformation of Air into Fire, so also among the Egyptians\nthere are those who maintain that Osiris symbolizes the Nile, Isis the\nEarth, fecundated in his embrace, Typhon the Sea, into which the Nile\nfalls to disappear and be scattered, except such part of him as has\nbeen abstracted by the Earth to make her fruitful.\u201d[359] He shows how\nthis identification of Typhon with the sea explains certain sayings,\nbeliefs, and practices of the Egyptians, but he regards it as rather\ncrude and superficial,[360] and passes on to an explanation given by\nthe more learned priests, who, with a more philosophic application of\nthe principles of allegorical interpretation, identify Osiris with the\n_Moist_ Principle of the Universe, and Typhon with the _Dry_ Principle,\nthe former being the cause of Generation, the latter being hostile to\nit.[361] The similarity of these views to early Greek speculation is\npointed out by a statement that the Egyptians held that Homer, like\nThales, had learnt from them that Water is the generative principle\nof all things, Homer\u2019s Ocean being Osiris, and his Tethys, Isis. This\nancient theory is fully discussed by Plutarch, showing how the Egyptians\napplied it to the myth, but also indicating similarities of detail and\nidentities of principle between the Egyptian and Greek mythologies.[362]\n\u201cThose who combine with these physical explanations certain points\nborrowed from astronomical speculation,\u201d are next dealt with. These\nAstronomical Allegorists maintained that Osiris is the Lunar World and\nTyphon the Solar: the Moon\u2019s light being regarded as favourable to the\nreproductiveness of plants and animals, from its greater moistening\ntendency, while the light of the Sun is parching, and so hostile to life\nand vegetation that \u201ca considerable portion of the earth is rendered\nby his heat totally uninhabitable.\u201d[363] After a brief description of\nanother class of astronomical Allegorists who regard the myth as an\nenigmatical description of Eclipses,[364] he puts the whole of these\nparticular explanations of the Physical and Astronomical Allegorists in\ntheir proper place as merely partial and distorted expressions of the\nancient and universal belief in the existence of two opposing principles,\ntwo mutually hostile influences which operate throughout the universe,\ngiving Nature its mixed and uncertain and fluctuating character.[365]\nOne of the most conspicuous features in Plutarch\u2019s Theology, as already\nexamined in these pages, is his anxiety to avoid any kind of Dualism in\nhis conception of Deity; and it is a necessary corollary of his religious\nand philosophical conviction on this point that there should be no place\nin the constitution of the world for a Being regarded as a coequal rival\nto the One Supreme Omnipotence. As Plutarch, however, himself points out,\nif nothing can be conceived as originating without a cause, and Good\ncannot be regarded as furnishing the cause of Evil, it follows that\nEvil as well as Good must have an originating principle of its own.[366]\nBut neither on the religious nor on the purely philosophic side does\nhe carry this admission to the extent of accepting an Evil personality\nor principle equivalent in power to the Deity. On the one hand, he\naccepts the doctrine of subordinate D\u00e6mons, whose evil propensities are\nultimately under the control of the Omnipotent Author of Good, inasmuch\nas they are liable to pains and penances for their infraction of the\nlaws He has imposed upon them; and on the other, he has learned from\nGreek philosophy the conception of \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, that infinite, formless\n\u201cMatter,\u201d out of which the Demiurgus, making it the nurse and receptacle\nof the ideas, had created the Universe. He insists, indeed, that the\ntwo conceptions are familiar to Greek philosophers: Empedocles opposed\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03bd to \u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; the Pythagoreans had two\nwell-known lists of contrary expressions.[367] Anaxagoras expressed the\nantithesis by \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd; Aristotle by \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. In all\nthese philosophical distinctions the inferiority of the second term is\nimplied, and Plutarch asserts this inferiority in unmistakable terms.\n\u201cThe creation and formation of this world arose out of opposing, but not\nequal, Principles, the supreme sway being the portion of the Better.\u201d[368]\n\nIt is clear from these considerations that Plutarch\u2019s own mind is\nmade up on the subject; but he cannot refrain from giving sympathetic\nconsideration to so ancient, widespread, and respectable a belief as that\ninvolved in the myth of Osiris and Typhon, of Ormuzd and Ahriman; and\nhe devotes considerable space, and displays considerable ingenuity, in\nconnecting the Egyptian and Zoroastrian beliefs with the legends of Greek\nMythology and the principles of Greek Philosophy.[369] But his object,\neven when he makes indulgent concessions to an opposite view, is never\nlost sight of, and towards the conclusion of his search for parallelisms\nand similarities, he expresses his aim in unmistakable and peculiarly\nPlutarchean language. After passing severe criticism on the impiety of\nthose who give the names of gods to the productions of Nature, asserting\nthat Dionysus is _Wine_, and Hephaistos _Flame_ (which, says he, is like\nidentifying sail and cable and anchor with the pilot, the thread with\nthe weaver, or the draught with the physician), he adds, \u201cGod is not\nlifeless, unintelligent, subject to man, as these things are. But it is\nfrom these blessings that we conclude that those who bestow them upon us\nfor our use, and give us a constant and never-failing supply thereof,\nare gods, _not different gods among different peoples, not Barbarian\ngods, nor Greek gods, not gods of the south nor gods of the north; but\njust as the sun, the moon, the earth, the sky, and the sea are common to\nall, but receive different names among different peoples, so likewise\nare different honours assigned and different invocations addressed to\nthe gods in different places according to the customs there established.\nYet is it one Reason which admonishes, and one Providence which directs,\nwhile subordinate powers have been appointed over all things. Certain\npeoples make use of sacred symbols which, with greater or less clearness,\ndirect the understanding to divine knowledge, and yet not without\ndanger, since some in their desire to shun the swamp of Superstition\nhave unconsciously slipped over the precipice of Atheism_.\u201d[370] Here we\nhave, combined in one sentence, Plutarch\u2019s belief in the Unity of God,\nhis acceptance of the theory of D\u00e6mons, his recognition of the truth of\nforeign creeds, his desire, so frequently expressed, and so consistently\nacted upon, to follow the guidance of a reverent yet inquiring philosophy\non a path which is equally distant from the two great moral evils which\nloom so large in his mental vision. Hence this tract is organically\nconnected with the treatise on Superstition; the former aims at securing\nby purely intellectual and rational processes what the latter attempts by\nappealing to the Intellect through the medium of the Imagination.[371]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\n    _Conclusions respecting the general character of Plutarch\u2019s\n    Religion\u2014Monotheism and D\u00e6monology both essential parts\n    of his Theodicy\u2014His strong belief in the personality\n    of God\u2014Metaphysical weakness but Moral strength of his\n    Teaching\u2014Close connexion between his Religion and his\n    Ethics\u2014Plutarch not an \u201cEclectic,\u201d nor a Neo-Platonist\u2014Contrast\n    between Plutarch\u2019s Religion and Philosophy and the Religion\n    and Philosophy of the Neo-Platonists\u2014Christianity and\n    Neo-Platonism\u2014The struggle between them and its probable effect\n    on later religious history\u2014Conclusion._\n\n\nWe have endeavoured in the preceding pages to ascertain, from Plutarch\u2019s\nown account of his views, the principles, the method and the character of\nhis Religion; to learn in what manner he conceives the supernatural world\nand its relation to the human mind and to human interests; to discover\nand illustrate the processes by which these results are attained; to\nnote their philosophic bearing and tendency; and to exemplify their\napplication in the sphere of practical ethics. We have seen how clearly\nhe recognizes the existence, and demonstrates the attributes, of a\nSupreme Being, and have observed how he raises the humility of mankind\nnearer to the Majesty of the Highest by admitting the activities of an\nintermediate and mediatory race of supernatural beings, whose mingled\nnature allies them equally to God and Man, and forms a channel of\ncommunication between human wants and divine benevolence. These are\nthe two fundamental truths of the religion of Plutarch. The whole of\nhis exegesis, in whatsoever direction operating, whether examining the\ndoctrines of Philosophy, the legends of popular Myth, or the traditions\nembodied in ceremonial observances, is involved with a recognition of\nthis twofold conception as the essential characteristic of a religious\nattitude of mind. Those, indeed, who have emphasized too exclusively\nthat element in Plutarch\u2019s Religion which he owes to Philosophy, have\nconcluded that his religious beliefs were purely Monotheistic: just as\na misunderstanding of his D\u00e6monology has resulted in the assertion that\nhe was trammelled in the meshes of a superstitious Polytheism.[372]\nIt could, if necessary, be plausibly argued, against those who have\nmaintained this latter view, that the elaboration of the belief in\nD\u00e6mons, and the multiplication of the functions of these lesser divine\nbeings, are factors which tend to emphasize the unity and purity of\nthe Supreme God; and that Plutarch\u2019s Monotheism is no more destroyed\nby the recognition of a D\u00e6monic Race than is the Catholic Trinity\noverthrown by the Church\u2019s acceptance of the Celestial Hierarchy of\nDionysius \u201cthe Areopagite,\u201d with its thrice-repeated triplets of Thrones,\nCherubim, Seraphim; Powers, Dominions, Mights; Angels, Archangels,\nPrincipalities. But, in the first place, Plutarch does not keep his\nReligion and his Philosophy in separate mental compartments: they are\nfused into one operation in his thought; and we should adopt a false\nmethod of interpretation were we to separate the result as expounded in\nhis writings. Further, we should obtain a totally misleading view of\nPlutarch\u2019s teaching were we to insist that he was fully conscious of\nall the conclusions that by a strict use of logic could conceivably be\ndeduced from his tenets. An examination of the opinions and beliefs which\nhe states that he actually maintained leads inevitably to the conviction\nthat his D\u00e6monology was as sincere as his Theology. There can, we think,\nbe no doubt that his reverence for the national tradition gave him as\nreal a belief in the polytheistic activities of the D\u00e6mons as his love of\nPhilosophy gave him in the Unity, Perfection and Eternity of the Deity.\nThe strength of this belief was increased by his recognition of the\nimportant part it might play, in one direction by solving perplexities\nand removing stumbling-blocks from the national tradition, in another by\nresponding to that eternal craving of humanity for a god-man, a mediator,\nwhich had already begun to receive a purer, a simpler, and a more perfect\nsatisfaction. The conscious expression, therefore, which Plutarch gives\nin his writings to the belief in D\u00e6mons, we are bound to accept as\ncorresponding with a conviction actually existing in his mind, quite as\nmuch as we admit the sincerity of his reiterated belief in a Supreme and\nUniversal Deity.\n\nBut it is one of the most interesting suspects of Plutarch\u2019s Theology\u2014not\nthe less interesting, perhaps, because it has a certain inconsistency\nwith other parts of his Religion\u2014that, even were we to confine our\ninvestigations to the philosophic elements of his idea of the Divine\nNature: even if we could totally exclude from consideration all the\nfunctions which he ascribes to the D\u00e6monic character: we should still\nfind ourselves face to face with a God different, in one of the qualities\nnow regarded as essential to a complete conception of Deity, from any\nof the theological representations current in the schools of Greek\nPhilosophy. The essential basis of all these representations is the God\nof Plato, partly regarded as the creative Demiurgus of the \u201cTim\u00e6us;\u201d\npartly as the World-Soul, that \u201cblessed god\u201d produced by the operation of\nthe Creator\u2019s \u201cIntelligence\u201d; and partly as that ultimate ideal Unity,\nthe final abstraction reached by a supreme effort of dialectic subtlety.\nThe last of these three conceptions is essentially and truly that of\nPlato; it is the native and unalloyed product of Dialectic, owing naught\nof its existence to the illustrative or ironical use of Myth, out of\nwhich the other two conceptions spring. The element of personality is\ntotally absent from this conception,[373] nor did the Stoics introduce\nthis element into their adoption of the Soul of the Universe as\nDeity.[374] But Plutarch\u2019s God is a personal God. The God of the \u201cDe Sera\nNuminis Vindicta\u201d approaches nearer to the Christian conception of God\nas a Father than the Deity as conceived by any Faith which has not been\npermeated by Christian feeling, and the God of the \u201cDe Superstitione\u201d\npresents the same characteristics as the God of the \u201cDe Sera Numinis\nVindicta.\u201d Plutarch\u2019s feeling of the intimate relation existing between\nthe Divine Knowledge and the secret weaknesses and sins, and the feeble\nstrivings after virtue in the human heart, does not require an elaborate\nand contentious process of ratiocination before we can discern its\npresence. It is the basis of his finest arguments, and the inspiration of\nhis most earnest and fruitful teachings. This weakness of Plutarch on the\nside of Metaphysics, this revolt of his nature against the coldness and\ndistance of the Deity of the Platonic Dialectic, constitutes his strength\nas a religious and moral teacher. This inconsistency makes him the type\nof certain modern theologians who will expound to a formal Congregation\nthe Eternity, Self-Existence, Necessity, and Unity of God the First\nCause, while in their private devotions their hearts and their lips turn\nnaturally to the simple and touching petitions of \u201cOur Father, which\nart in Heaven;\u201d or, while composing a sermon in which the particular\nattributes of the Persons of the Trinity and their mutual relationships\nare defined and enumerated with more than scholastic precision, will\nturn and teach their children to pray to God as the \u201cgentle Jesus.\u201d In\na similar manner, there is the Plutarch of the \u201cDe \u0395 apud Delphos,\u201d the\nPlutarch of the \u201cDe Sera Numinis Vindicta,\u201d and the Plutarch of the\nD\u00e6monology. He contributes his share to the discussions of philosophic\ntheologians; he depicts God in direct spiritual relationship with his\nhuman children; and he describes the D\u00e6mons as aiding mankind in their\ninternal struggles towards perfection of moral character. He will allow\nneither Reason nor Emotion to run away with him; he is as far removed\nfrom the dialectic severities of Plato, as he is from the superstitious\nbeliefs and practices of the later Platonists. He has no special and\npeculiar message either to the theologian in the pulpit, or to the child\nat its mother\u2019s knee. He appeals to humanity at large; to the people who\nhave work to do, and who want to get it done with honesty and dignity; to\nstudents, teachers, politicians, members of a busy society; to people who\nare liable to all the temptations, and capable of all the virtues, which\nnaturally arise in the ordinary life of highly civilized communities.\nHe analyses and illustrates such common vices as anger, avarice, envy,\nhate, flattery;[375] he penetrates and exposes such ordinary failings\nas garrulity, _gaucherie_, personal extravagance, and interfering\ncuriosity.[376] His sympathetic pen, as of one who knows the value of\nsuch things, depicts with rare charm the loveliness of friendship, and\nof affection for brother, child, and wife; while he applies a more\nreligious consolation to those who are suffering under the bitterness of\nexile, the sadness of bereavement by death.[377] To connect Plutarch\u2019s\nReligion with his Ethics at all these points of contact would carry us\nbeyond the natural limits of our present aim.[378] As an illustration of\nhis method as operating in this direction, we may recall how intimately\nPlutarch\u2019s conception of the Divine Nature is interwoven with his ethical\naim in face of so serious a moral evil as Superstition. We may also add\nthat he is consistent with himself in constructing no scientifically\naccurate system of Ethics any more than he maintains a dialectically\nimpeccable scheme of Theology. He criticizes the ethical results attained\nby various Schools of Philosophy, and selects from this one and that\none such elements as promise to give greater clearness and strength to\nhis own convictions.[379] He quotes Plato and Aristotle to show that\nReason and Passion are both necessary elements in the production of\npractical virtue. Superior power as Reason is in the constitution of\nman, she cannot act by herself towards the accomplishment of her own\nvirtuous aims. Although he refuses to agree with Aristotle that all\nVirtue is a mean between two extremes, since the virtue of Intelligence\nas employed, for example, in the contemplation of a mathematical problem,\nbeing an activity of the pure and dispassionate part of the soul, needs\nno admixture of the unreasoning element to make it effective; he yet\ninsists that the virtues of practical life demand for their realization\nthe instrumental agency of the passions, and are thus, in effect, a mean,\ncorrecting excess or defect of either of the co-operating agencies.[380]\nReferring to a favourite illustration, he maintains that the passions are\nnot to be uprooted and destroyed as Lycurgus uprooted and destroyed the\nvineyards of Thracia, but are to be treated with the fostering gentleness\nof a god who would prune the wild, trim the rank, and carefully cultivate\nthe healthy and productive portions of the plant.[381] If we wish to\navoid drunkenness we need not throw our wine away; we must temper it\nwith water. In like manner, Reason will not act \u201cby harsh and obstinate\nmethods, but by gentle means, which convey persuasion and secure\nsubmission more effectively than any sort of compulsion.\u201d[382] It is\nquite in harmony with this essentially practical view of life that he\nholds that Virtue can be taught, and that it is through the persuasion,\nand by the guidance, of Reason and Philosophy that a happy life can be\nsecured, inasmuch as their efforts are directed at counterbalancing the\nexaggerated picture which passion draws of all the circumstances of life,\nwhether they are fortunate or the reverse.[383] It is this principle\nwhich he applies to the discussion of topics of practical morality, as\nhe applies it to the discussion of questions of Religion. The practice\nof the virtues based upon this principle is most vividly exhibited in\nhis \u201cSymposiacs,\u201d a work which is of considerable value for the light it\nthrows upon the family and private habits of the Gr\u00e6co-Roman empire of\nthat age, but which is chiefly interesting because it shows to what an\nextent the simple and humane moralities of Epicureanism had permeated\nSociety, and brought a calm and gentle happiness in their train.\n\nIt may be admitted that the positive additions made by Plutarch to the\nintellectual and moral wealth of his age were small and unimportant. He\nmade no great discoveries in any of the great branches of philosophical\nactivity which had so long been the special pride and prerogative of the\nHellenic Race. There was not a tendency of Greek Philosophy with whose\nhistory and results he was not familiarly acquainted; there was not a\nSchool from which he did not borrow something for introduction into the\ntexture of his own thought. It is in this sense that he is, as he has\nbeen called, an Eclectic; but his teaching surrounds his appropriated\nthoughts with none of the weakness so often attaching to great and\noriginal utterances when torn out of the systems in which they were\noriginally embodied. Nor was his Eclecticism that spurious Eclecticism\nof the later Platonists, which imagined it had harmonized discordant\nsystems when it had tied them together with the withes of an artificial\nclassification. Plutarch\u2019s Eclecticism was unified by the Ethical\naim which constantly inspired his choice, and gave to old sayings of\nphilosophers, old lines of verse, old notions of the people, a new and\nricher significance in his application of them to the uses of practical\nlife. Thus, if Plutarch did not add to the gathered wealth of Hellas, he\ntaught his countrymen new ways of passing their ancient acquisitions into\nthe currency. There are periods in the intellectual and moral progress\nof humanity when the world is exhausted with the accumulation of its\nriches; when its appetite for acquisition is satiated; when it needs to\nfind what its possessions are, and how best they can be put to their\nlegitimate uses. At these periods the cultivation of a mental attitude\nis of greater service to humanity than the accumulation of mental\nstores. Plutarch came at such a period in the history of the Hellenic\nrace; and we, who are once again beginning to recognize that the end of\neducation should not be the mere accumulation of facts, but rather the\nstrengthening of the intellect and the formation of the character, can\nproperly estimate the value of the work accomplished by one who, on the\nside of intellect, inculcated the necessity of sympathetically watching\nfor signs of a rational basis in beliefs however _prim\u00e2 facie_ strange\nand abhorrent, and on the side of character, that a man could become\nvirtuous by learning what his faults were, and endeavouring to check them\nby practice and habit. In him Religion and Philosophy went hand in hand,\noperating on the same body of truth, and directing their energies to the\nrealization of the same end. That rational influence which we saw working\nin the sphere of early Roman Religion: which subsequently gave Roman\nMorality a source of inspiration in Greek Philosophy: which associated\nGreek Religion and Greek Philosophy as factors in Ethics, until the\nlatter became the predominating power: this influence had its final\nclassical expression in Plutarch and in the other thinkers and workers of\nhis epoch and that immediately succeeding, in Seneca, in Dion, in Marcus\nAurelius. These men avoided extravagance in Religion, as they avoided\nit in their philosophical studies and in the practical affairs of life.\nThey are the last legitimate outcome of the Greek spirit in Pagan times.\nPlutarch collected the wisdom, and fixed the emotions, of Antiquity, in a\nmanner which the best men of many Christian ages have found efficacious\nfor goodness. In his own more immediate age his spirit predominated for\na century, and was then absorbed to form a thin vein of common sense in\nthat mingled mass of Oriental mystery and Hellenic metaphysics which was\nknown as Neo-Platonism.[384]\n\nNeo-Platonism, which claimed to represent the perfect harmony of Religion\nand Philosophy, substantiated its claim by annihilating the historic\nfoundations of both, and by thus compelling Christianity to dispense\nwith the accumulated wisdom of ages in its reorganization of human\nrelationships with the eternal. In Plutarch\u2019s teaching, each element\nof the combination was at once assisted and restrained by the other,\nand the fusion was natural and effective. In Neo-Platonism, Reason,\nthe principle of Philosophy, and Emotion, the inspiration of Religion,\nwere each carried to an impossible extent of extravagance; and it was\nonly the existence of the two elements in the minds of a few strenuous\nand original characters, who were assisted in their attempts at unity\nby the refinements of an ultra-Platonic Dialectic, which secured even\nthe appearance of harmony between the discrepant conceptions which they\nborrowed from various differing and even mutually hostile schools.\nEven in Plato the conspicuousness of the Ethical element compensates\nto some extent for the abstractness of his conception of the Deity.\nBut Neo-Platonism forced the idealism of Plato to a more extravagant\nmetaphysic; and, although upon Dialectics the rational part of their\ndoctrine was nominally based, the abstractness of its processes lent\nitself to mysticism as effectively as the purely religious element which\nlost itself in the vagaries of Oriental rapture, and debased itself by\nits miraculous methods of intercourse with the spiritual world. Reason,\nin the pursuit of the One, was attenuated to Mathematics. Mathematics,\nhaving arrived at the conception of the One, and finding it without any\nqualities, gave way to the raptures of the \u201cperfect vision.\u201d\n\nHow far this twofold extravagance was due to the personality of the\nfounders of the new System, and how far to its express object of\nrivalling Christianity, is a doubtful problem. Maximus was a Tyrian;\nNumenius came from Apamea in Syria; Ammonius Saccas, the first great\nNeo-Platonist, was of Alexandria. Plotinus came from Lycopolis in Egypt,\nand was perhaps a Copt; Porphyry and Iamblichus were Syrians. Plutarch,\nas Bishop Theodoret said, was a Hellene of the Hellenes.[385] But the\nnecessity of competing with the rising Faith doubtless operated very\nstrongly in developing the mystical tendencies always tacitly inherent in\nPlatonism, and proclaimed by the Neo-Platonists at the very commencement.\nThis rivalry emphasized that out-Platonizing of Plato which culminated\nin the Alexandrian Trinity, and that competition with the Christian\nmiracles which issued in the triple folly of Magic, Theurgy, and\nTheosophy. Plutarch, knowing that the necessity of confuting an adversary\nis liable to cause exaggeration and distortion, removed his Epicurean\nfrom the scene when he wished to discuss the providential dispensation\nof human affairs. The circumstances of his time, and the bent of his own\ncharacter, which inclined him to seek points of agreement rather than to\nemphasize points of difference, saved him from the prejudices of the\n_odium theologicum_. But in the third century Christianity could not be\ndisposed of by contemptuous phrases, or equally contemptuous silence.\nThe Neo-Platonists came into direct contact with the new Religion, both\nin its literature and in its practice. Ammonius Saccas, the teacher\nwho satisfied all the yearning aspirations of Plotinus, had been a\nChristian in the days when he was young and carried a porter\u2019s knot on\nthe quays.[386] Porphyry informs us that he had met Origen, and Socrates,\nthe Church historian, asserts that Porphyry had himself been a Christian.\nThe evidence of Bishop Theodoret, which cannot be accepted as regards\nPlutarch, may easily be admitted as regards Plotinus.[387] Porphyry wrote\nfifteen books against the Christians, which were publicly burned by\nTheodosius 200 years later. He demonstrated that the prophecies of Daniel\nwere composed after the event, and in the Third Book of his _Collection\nof Oracles_, he devotes a chapter to \u201cthe foolishness of the Christians,\u201d\nand finds a place for Christ in his lowest rank of supernatural beings.\nPlutarch\u2019s thoughts were not disturbed either by anti-Christian polemic,\nor by the necessity of finding a place for Christ in his spiritual world.\n\nThe modifications which these influences wrought in that body of\nHellenic wisdom which had been the material of Plutarch\u2019s work were\nmost conspicuous in the Theology and D\u00e6monology of the Neo-Platonists.\nPlutarch had been content to state the Unity, Eternity, Absoluteness of\nGod. He needed such a conception to make the world intelligible; but\nhe defined his conception with a rare simplicity which satisfies the\npractical mind as well as meets the essential requirements of Philosophy.\nBut the Neo-Platonist theology refines and subdivides and abstracts to\nan extent which puzzles and bewilders its most earnest students, and\nremoves God infinitely further from mankind than even the Ideas of Plato\nare removed. \u201cAccording to Plotinus, God is Goodness without Love. Man\nmay love God, but God cannot love man.\u201d Even the \u201cDivine Soul,\u201d the\nthird Hypostasis of the Neo-Platonist Trinity, that which lies nearest\nthe comprehension of the common intellect, \u201cis of little intellectual\nor religious significance in the mind of Plotinus.\u201d Dogmatism would be\nunbecoming on a subject where Kirchner and Zeller are at variance, and\nwhere the French lucidity of Vacherot and Saisset casts little more\nlight than the close and careful analysis of Dr. Bigg.[388] But it is\nnecessary to a full understanding of Plutarch\u2019s position to consider\nhis relation to his successors as well as to his predecessors, and we\nare therefore compelled to a brief analysis of the Neo-Platonic Theology\nand D\u00e6monology, putting ourselves under more competent guidance than we\ncan ourselves hope to supply. \u201cThe Supreme Cause,\u201d says Dr. Bigg, \u201cGod,\nin the proper sense of the word, ... embraces in Himself a unity of\nThree Hypostases.... Hypostasis signifies the underlying cause of the\nphenomenal manifestation. Hence it can be applied to all three Persons of\nthe Platonic Trinity, while Being could only be used of the second and\nthird.\u2014Each Hypostasis is a person, but a purely intellectual person.\nAll three are one, like three mutually enfolding thoughts, and where\none is there is the All in the fullness of its power. All are eternal,\nbut the second is inferior to the first, because \u2018begotten,\u2019 and the\nthird to the second, for the same reason.\u201d \u201cGod,\u201d says M. Saisset, \u201cis\nthreefold, and yet a whole. The divine nature, conceived as absolutely\nsimple, admits of division; at the pinnacle of the scale soars Unity;\nbeneath it Intelligence, identical with Being, or the Logos; in the third\nrank, the Universal Soul, or the Spirit. We have not here three gods,\nbut three hypostases of the same God. An Hypostasis is not a substance,\nit is not an attribute, it is not a mode, it is not a relation. Unity is\nabove Intelligence and Being, it is above Reason; it is incomprehensible\nand ineffable; without Intelligence itself, it generates Intelligence;\nit gives birth to Being, and is not itself Being. Intelligence, in its\nturn, without motion or activity as it is, produces the Soul, which is\nthe principle of activity and motion. God conceived as a perfect type of\nwhich the human soul is a copy, the infinite and universal Soul, is the\nthird hypostasis. God conceived as absolute, eternal, simple, motionless\nThought, superior to space and time, is the second hypostasis.\u201d But soul\nand thought and being are terms relative to the human mind. \u201cGod is above\nthought, above Being: He is, therefore, indivisible and inconceivable. He\nis the One, the Good, grasped by Ecstasy. This is the third hypostasis.\u201d\nM. Saisset continues: \u201cSuch are the three terms which compose this\nobscure and profound Trinity. Human reason, reason still imperfectly free\nfrom the meshes of sense, stops with the conception of the Universal\nSoul, the active principle of motion; the reason of the Philosophers\nrises higher, to the Motionless Intelligence, the depository of the\nessences and types of all things; it is love and ecstasy alone that can\ncarry us to the conception of Absolute Unity.\u201d\n\nAlmost the only thing that is easy to understand in the Neo-Platonic\ntheology is its adoption of the conceptions of various schools of Greek\nPhilosophy. This Eclecticism has a superficial resemblance to that of\nPlutarch: but it is Eclecticism formally enumerating and classifying\nits results, not harmonizing and unifying them. The third hypostasis\nis the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f55\u03bb\u1fc3 of the Stoics; the second hypostasis is the\nIntelligence, the eternal, absolute, and motionless \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 of Aristotle,\nwhile the first has striking affinities with the Pythagorean One. But, by\na forced process of interpretation, all the three Hypostases are found in\nPlato. In the \u201cLaws\u201d and the \u201cPh\u00e6drus\u201d Plato stopped with the conception\nof the Third Hypostasis, the World Soul, the origin and cause of movement\nin the created world, which in the \u201cTim\u00e6us\u201d is represented as a creation\nof the Demiurgus. In the God of the \u201cBanquet\u201d and the \u201cRepublic,\u201d who is\nthe source of Being and Intelligence, Plato was anticipating the Second\nHypostasis; while in the \u201cParmenides\u201d he describes the First Hypostasis,\nthat absolute Unity which has no relation with either Being or Reason,\nor with anything else either actual or conceivable. The placing of these\nthree different conceptions of God in three different compartments of\nthought, in three different Scales of Existence, is not to unify them:\nnor is that process made any the more feasible by the invention of the\nterm Emanation, by which the Second Hypostasis proceeds from the First,\nand the Third from the Second.[389] Plutarch\u2019s Eclecticism is based\nupon the needs of the moral life: that of Neo-Platonism was actuated\nby a desire for formal harmony, and was steeped in a mysticism which\noperated in drawing the soul away from action to a divine contemplation.\nThe Perfect Vision, the revelation of the First Hypostasis, is the\nculmination of the soul\u2019s progress. The Second and Third Hypostases,\nbeing subject to relations and conditions, are susceptible of approach\nthrough the Reason; but the First Hypostasis, being unconditioned,\ncannot be grasped by Reason, which moves in the sphere of conditions and\nrelations. Hence, the Perfect Vision repudiates that Reason of which it\nis the culmination: \u201cfor thought is a kind of movement, but in the Vision\nis no movement.\u201d In the Revelation of the Perfect Vision, as well as in\nthe formal development of the Trinity, we see the influence of a desire\nto compete with Christianity.\n\nThis ecstatic contemplation of the highest conception of their Theology\nexhibited a mysticism which had a more degrading side, one which is\nspecially conspicuous in the Neo-Platonist D\u00e6monology. There also the\nMysticism is in combination with refinements of logical definition.\nPlotinus takes the floating conceptions of D\u00e6monology and makes them\nsubmit to a rigid classification in formal harmony with the tripartite\ncharacter of the Divine Nature. Divine Powers he divides into three\nclasses. The first Power is that which dwells in the world of Ideas,\napart from the perception of man and in close touch with the Divine\nIntelligence. The next is the race of visible Gods, the Stars, Nature,\nEarth: the third is that of the D\u00e6mons. The D\u00e6mons are again subdivided\ninto three ranks: Gods, Loves, and D\u00e6mons. Porphyry insists on a similar\nclassification. In one of the oracles collected by him and preserved by\nEusebius, the beings of the D\u00e6monic hierarchy are classified with equal\nstrictness, but with greater simplicity than that shown by Plotinus.\nHis highest rank corresponds with that of his Master. The second rank\ncorresponds with Plotinus\u2019 third class, but does not here undergo a\ntripartite subdivision. His third class, unlike the first, which moves in\nthe presence of God, is far away from communion with Him, and corresponds\nwith the created and visible gods in the second class of Plotinus. He\nis not always faithful to this simplicity. In the third book of his\n\u201cDe Philosophia ex Oraculis\u201d he admits another class of D\u00e6mons called\nHeroes, admitting Christ to their number. Elsewhere he divides the D\u00e6mons\ninto archangels, angels, and d\u00e6mons. Proclus will have six ranks: and\nDionysius the Areopagite, who classified this D\u00e6monlore for the Christian\nChurch, will have nine. We can equally discern here the operation of\nthat spurious Eclecticism which fits its thefts into the clamps of a\npreconceived system. The simple notion of Beings intermediate between\nGod and Man, breaking the distance between the two by participating\nin the Divine and Human nature, is rendered absurd and impossible by\nits compulsory harmonizing with the demand of the Alexandrine Trinity.\nPlotinus thought he had made Aristotle agree with Plato, but the harmony\nwas of the same character as that secured between Christianity and\nNeo-Platonism by making the Christian God-man a Neo-Platonist D\u00e6mon. The\nIdeas of Plato, the \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 of Aristotle, and the World Soul\nof the Stoics: how easy to reconcile these different conceptions of the\nDeity, if they are placed in different spheres of thought, and connected\nby the mysterious process of Emanation! The Neo-Platonist school was\ndamned by its fatal proclivity for trinities. There were three kinds\nof gods, three kinds of d\u00e6mons, and three methods of approach to the\nsupernatural world. These three methods were of course systematic, almost\nscientific, constructions. Before Porphyry there were Magic (\u03b3\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1) and\nTheosophy (\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1). That philosopher introduced a third and middle term\nTheurgy (\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03af\u03b1). Theosophy was the process by which the philosopher\nattained the Perfect Vision, arrived at the consummation of \u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Magic\nwas the process by which the evil D\u00e6mons, whom Porphyry puts under the\ndominion of Serapis and Hecate, were approached. The object of Theurgy\nwas communion with the good D\u00e6mons. Aided by Oriental fervour, we know\nthe absurdities which these systems developed in the world of practice.\nBut the development of these sciences on the theoretical side was enough\nto drag them down with their own weight. In Proclus the practical and\nthe theoretic sides of Neo-Platonism are both driven to a culmination\nwhich passes the intelligence of humanity. \u201cFrom the Incommunicable One\nspring\u2014one knows not how\u2014a host of Henads. Each has the character of\nabsolute being, yet each has distinctive qualities. The Henads run down\nin long lines; the Intelligible are followed by the Intellectual, these\nby the Overworldly, these again by the Inworldly. From the Intelligible\nsprings the family of Being, from the Intellectual that of Intelligence,\nfrom the Overworldly that of Soul, from the Inworldly that of Nature.\nThese principal \u2018chains\u2019 are mainly like brooks falling into one river;\nthat which has a body may also have a soul and an intelligence; but they\nsubdivide as they go down, there are different kinds of intelligences\nand different kinds of souls dependent on them, so that the river is\nperpetually branching off into other rivers. Yet, further, the principal\nchains have to be multiplied by the number of Henads, for each chain is a\nfamily depending on a God, and exhibiting throughout the characteristic\nof that God. It includes not only Angels, Heroes, Demons, and human\nbeings, but stones, plants, animals, which bear the signature of the\ndeity, and have sacramental virtues with respect to him.\u201d\n\nIf Proclus believed all this, we can understand his being a victim to\nthe grossest superstition, both in belief and in practice. In the life\nof Proclus, second Aristotle as he was, we see the natural culmination\nof that excess of Reason and that exaggeration of Emotion which had\nmarked the Neo-Platonic attitude from the beginning. When Justinian\nclosed the School of Athens in the Sixth Century its professors, the last\nrepresentatives of Neo-Platonism, were being hunted down as practitioners\nof magic of the meanest description. The \u201cDe Superstitione\u201d of Plutarch\nmarked a stage in the history of the human mind which the Neo-Platonists\nleft behind, and which the European world has only just attained\nagain after centuries of horrible crimes born of a sincere belief in\nwitchcraft.[390]\n\nIt is a natural subject of speculation to those who are interested in\nthe history of this period, how far the character of modern civilization\nwould have been modified, had not the free and tolerant traditions of\nGreece been clamped into the systematized absurdities of Neo-Platonism.\nThe struggle for social and political ascendancy reacted also upon the\nliberal and gentle spirit of the Man of Nazareth, whose teachings were\nthus embedded in a theological formalism which robbed them of half their\nmeaning and all their inspiration. Christianity fought the enemy with its\nown weapons, and the scientific terminology of the Neo-Platonists gave\ndefiniteness to the Christian conception of the Trinity and the celestial\nhierarchy, while the whole system of D\u00e6monology, which has played so\nsinister a part in modern civilization, was to be found entire in the\nworks of Porphyry and Proclus. It has even been asserted that the chief\nmerit of the Neo-Platonist school lay in the fact that it prepared the\neducated circles of Pagan Society for the acceptance of the Gospel, and\nlaid the foundations for the construction of Christian Theology.[391]\nBut it is conceivable that had Christianity come face to face with the\ncalm rationalism and gentle piety of Pagan Religion and Philosophy as\nthey appear in Plutarch, more of the spirit, if less of the form, of the\nold tradition might have passed into the teachings of the new Faith. We\nshould, perhaps, then have been spared the martyrdom of Christians at the\nhands of Christians, the Inquisition, and the whole terrible consequences\nof the _Odium Theologicum_. Plutarch suggested a frame of mind rather\nthan inculcated a body of dogma, and in that he resembled the founder\nof Christianity a great deal more than the most honoured theologians\nof the Church have done. But Paganism girt on its armour in direct\nhostility to the new Creed, and from these clenched antagonisms sprang\nthat accentuation of points of difference which broke the continuity of\ncivilization, and separated the modern from the classical world by a\nchasm which the efforts of four centuries have not succeeded in bridging\nover.[392] Is it not possible that Paganism, which out of the multitude\nof separate gods had evolved the idea of the One Pure and Perfect\nDeity, might also, out of the many-sided activities of the half-human,\nhalf-divine D\u00e6mons, have arrived at the belief in a single mediatory\npower, and, with a perception unblinded by polemic bitterness, have been\nprepared to merge this conception in the Divine Man of the Catholic\nChurch?[393]\n\nBut though the spirit of Plutarch was not destined in this way to pass\ndirectly on to the believer in Christianity, the time was to come when,\namong the best and purest adherents of that faith, his teachings would be\nregarded as efficacious for the sincerest goodness. \u201cThe works of Jeremy\nTaylor,\u201d says Archbishop Trench, \u201ccontain no less than two hundred and\nfifty-six allusions or direct references made by him to the writings of\nPlutarch.\u201d But direct indebtedness of this kind does not necessarily\nimply similarity of spirit, and fortunately the mental attitude of\nPlutarch is one which appears essential to human progress, and does not\ndepend upon the continuity of a tradition. \u201cPlutarch,\u201d wrote Emerson,\n\u201cwill be perpetually rediscovered from time to time as long as books\nlast.\u201d[394] He will be perpetually rediscovered because there will be a\nperpetually recurring necessity to look at life from his point of view.\nBut he will be perpetually rediscovered because he is perpetually allowed\nto disappear. There will always be those among the disciples of Religion\nand the followers of Science who maintain that there can be no truce,\nno toleration between the two, and the history of the human race will\nbe formulated into an indictment against the Superstition of the one,\nand the most terrible anathemas of the Church will be fulminated against\nthe Atheism of the other. Meanwhile those who take a middle course and\nrecognize the \u201cimmortal vitality of Philosophy and the eternal necessity\nof Religion,\u201d[395] and would leave the individual mind to select its\nappropriate support from the dogmas of the one or the discoveries of the\nother, without dressing Philosophy in the fantastic garb of Religion, as\nthe Neo-Platonists did, or turning Religion into a matter of rules and\nregulations as the Clerical Rationalists of the Eighteenth Century did,\nwill be regarded by the extremists as traitors at once to the cause of\nprogress and the cause of morality, and will be placed among the\u2014\n\n                \u201cAnime triste di coloro\n    Che visser senza infamia, e senza lodo.\n    Mischiate sono a quel cattivo coro\n    Degli Angeli, che non furon ribelli\n    N\u00e8 fur fedeli a Dio, ma per s\u00e8 foro.\u201d[396]\n\nBut so long as human nature is composite: so long as it is compelled\nto feel an interest in the home joys of earth, and is endowed with an\nimagination which soars beyond the actual realities of life to the\npossibilities that lie beyond its limits: so long will the spirit which\ndominated Plutarch operate in inducing men \u201cto borrow Reason from\nPhilosophy, making it their Mystagogue to Religion:\u201d so long will it be\nrecognized that the most subtle Dialectic and the most spiritualized\nrapture are dangerous at once to Reason and Religion unless they are\nbrought into contact with the necessities of daily life, and made to\nsubserve the ends of practical goodness in the sphere of man\u2019s natural\nand immediate interests. This recognition of Ethics as the dominating\nend of all Thought and Emotion will lead men on that firm path of\nreasonable happiness which, in Plutarch\u2019s own favourite expression,\nlies midway between the headlong precipice of Atheism and the engulfing\nquagmire of Superstition.\n\n\nFINIS.\n\nPRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] See the Heading of the Lamprian Catalogue: BERNARDAKIS. vol. vii. p.\n473.\n\n[2] PLUTARCHI CH\u00c6RONENSIS _Moralia_ recognovit GREGORIUS N. BERNARDAKIS\n(Leipzig. Teubner. 7 vols. and Appendix).\n\n[3] _Classical Review_, vol. iv. (1890), p. 306.\n\n[4] (Then of Goettingen.) See the _Pr\u00e6fatio_ to BERNARDAKIS\u2019 Second\nVolume.\n\n[5] The Treatise of PLUTARCH, _De Cupiditate Divitiarum_, edited by W. R.\nPATON. (David Nutt. 1896.) We have also consulted Mr. Paton\u2019s _Plutarchi\nPythici Dialogi tres_ (Berlin, 1893). (An emendation of Mr. Paton\u2019s is\nnoted _infra_, p. 90.)\n\n[6] _Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Ch\u00e6ronea_, von R.\nVOLKMANN (Berlin, 1869).\n\n[7] _De la Morale de Plutarque_, par OCTAVE GR\u00c9ARD (Paris, 1866).\n\n[8] _Plutarch, his Life, his Parallel Lives, and his Morals._ Five\nLectures by RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D., &c. (London, 1873).\n\n[9] _The Greek World under Roman Sway, from Polybius to Plutarch_, by J.\nP. MAHAFFY, D.D., &c. (London, 1890).\n\n[10] MAHAFFY, p. 321. How Plutarch could possibly have \u201c_taken pains\nto understand_\u201d Christianity when, in Professor Mahaffy\u2019s own words\n(p. 349), he \u201c_seems never to have heard of it_,\u201d we must leave it to\nProfessor Mahaffy to explain.\n\n[11] _Ibid._ p. 321.\n\n[12] _Ibid._ p. 349.\n\n[13] VOLKMANN, vol. ii. cap. 1.\n\n[14] GR\u00c9ARD, Preface to Third Edition, p. iii.\n\n[15] _De Apologetica Plutarchi Ch\u00e6ronensis Theologia_ (Marburg, 1854).\nSeibert refers to two other authors who had dealt with some aspects of\nhis own subject\u2014Absolute demum opusculo _Schreiteri_ commentationem _de\ndoctrina Plutarchi theologica et morali_ scriptam ... _necnon Nitzchii\nKiliensis de Plutarcho theologo et philosopho populari_ disquisitionem\n1849 editam conferre licuit.\u2014We have been unable to see a copy of either\nof these dissertations, although Trench also alludes to Schreiter\u2019s work.\nThey did not, in Seibert\u2019s opinion, render his work unnecessary; but _he_\nenjoyed the inestimable advantage of the friendship of Zeller, who helped\nhim \u201clibris consilioque.\u201d\n\n[16] _Politik und Philosophie in ihrem Verh\u00e4ltniss, &c._, by H. W. J.\nTHIERSCH (Marburg, 1853).\u2014Damals stand Plutarch, dem bereits Trajan\nconsularische Ehren bewilligt hatte, auf der h\u00f6chsten Stufe des\nAnsehens. (For M. Gr\u00e9ard\u2019s destruction of this Legend see his first\nchapter.\u2014_L\u00e9gende de Plutarque._)\n\n[17] _The Essays of Plutarch_, by W. J. BRODRIBB. _Fortnightly Review_,\nvol. 20, p. 629.\n\n[18] \u201c_He cared not for the name of any sect or leader, but pleaded\nthe cause of moral beauty in the interests of truth only._\u201d\u2014Merivale\u2019s\n\u201c_Romans under the Empire_,\u201d cap. 60, where there is an excellent, but\nunfortunately too brief, account of our author.\n\n[19] _\u0152uvres Morales de Plutarque_, traduites du grec par DOMINIC\nRICARD (1783-1795).\u2014\u201cRapproch\u00e9e un texte, la version de Ricard est,\ndans sa teneur g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, d\u2019une \u00e9l\u00e9gance superficielle et d\u2019une fid\u00e9lit\u00e9\npeu approfondie.\u201d\u2014GR\u00c9ARD. TRENCH also severely condemns some of the\ntranslations in the edition issued in Dryden\u2019s name.\n\n[20] _Plutarch\u2019s Morals_, translated from the Greek by several hands,\ncorrected and revised by W. W. GOODWIN, Ph.D. (London, 1870).\u2014\u201cIt may\nhave been a fortunate thing for some of our translators that Bentley\nwas too much occupied with the wise heads of Christ Church to notice\nthe blunders of men who could write notes saying that the Parthenon\nis a \u2018Promontory shooting into the Black Sea, where stood a chappel\ndedicated to some virgin godhead, and famous for some Victory thereabout\nobtain\u2019d.\u2019\u201d\u2014Editor\u2019s Preface.\n\n[21] Plutarch\u2019s Morals. _Theosophical Essays._ Translated by the late\nC. W. KING, M.A. (London, 1889). _Ethical Essays_ translated by A. R.\nSHILLETO, M.A. (London, 1888).\n\n[22] TERTULLIAN: _De Carne Christi_, 5.\u2014\u201cCrucifixus est Dei filius; non\npudet, quia pudendum est. Et mortuus est Dei filius; prorsus credibile\nest, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia\nimpossibile est.\u201d\n\n[23] ST. AUGUSTINE: _Confessiones_, vi. 5.\u2014\u201cEx hoc tamen quoque jam\npr\u00e6ponens doctrinam Catholicam, modestius ibi minimeque fallaciter\nsentiebam juberi _ut crederetur quod non demonstrabatur_ (sive esset\nquid demonstrandum, sed cui forte non esset, sive nec quid esset), quam\nillic temeraria pollicitatione scienti\u00e6 credulitatem irrideri; et postea\ntam multa fabulosissima et absurdissima, quia demonstrari non poterant,\ncredenda imperari.\u201d\u2014The principle inherent in the five italicized words\nis identical with that which the writer exposes as an example of the\nabsurd credulity of the Manich\u00e6ans. The difference is merely one of\ndegree.\n\n[24] Attempts have, of course, been made at various times to rationalize\na Religion whose cardinal principle is Faith. Paley and Butler are\nconspicuous examples in the history of Anglican Christianity but neither\nthe one nor the other supplied any widespread inspiration to the\nreligious life of the day. Butler, \u201cwho had made it his business, ever\nsince he thought himself capable of such sort of reasoning, to _prove_\nto himself the being and attributes of God,\u201d who \u201cfound it impossible to\ndissociate philosophy from religion in his own mind,\u201d and \u201cwould have\nagreed with South that what is nonsense upon a principle of Reason will\nnever be sense upon a principle of Religion,\u201d was yet compelled to admit\nthat \u201cit was too late for him to try to support a falling Church;\u201d and it\nis a matter of national history that Wesley, with his direct appeal to\nthe principle of \u201cjustification by _faith_,\u201d did more to reinvigorate the\nreligious life of England than all the cultured rationalists who adorned\nthe English Church in those days. And in these later days Butler has not\nescaped the charge of \u201chaving furnished, with a design directly contrary,\none of the most terrible of the persuasives to Atheism that has ever been\nproduced.\u201d (_Butler_, by the Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A.) Paley likewise\nthought it a just opinion \u201cthat whatever renders religion more rational\nrenders it more credible,\u201d and devoted his genius to the task of making\nreligion more rational, but has done little more than furnish a school\ntext-book for theological students. Further, what Christian, in his heart\nof hearts, and at those moments which he would regard as his best, does\nnot respond more readily to the sublime sentiment of Tertullian than to\nthe ratiocinations of the _Analogy_ or the _Evidences_?\n\n[25] M. CONSTANT MARTHA\u2019S _\u00c9tudes morales sur l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9_, from which\nwe have taken this just and striking phrase of Bossuet, gives an\ninteresting account of the passionate and anguished manner in which the\ncalm precepts of the famous \u201cGolden Verses of Pythagoras\u201d were applied\nby Christianity:\u2014\u201cLe philosophe, si s\u00e9v\u00e8re qu\u2019il f\u00fbt, se traitait\ntoujours en ami; ... le chr\u00e9tien au contraire, ... passe souvent par des\ninqui\u00e9tudes inconnues \u00e0 la sereine antiquit\u00e9.\u201d (_L\u2019Examen de Conscience\nchez les Anciens._)\n\n[26] \u201cBelief is a virtue, Doubt is a sin.\u201d\u2014Quoted by J. A. Froude, _Short\nStudies_, vol. i. p. 243.\n\n[27] Certain emotional aspects of Greek Religion are dealt with in the\nsubsequent analysis of Plutarch\u2019s teaching.\n\n[28] HORACE: _Epist._ i. 6, 15, 16.\n\n[29] GASTON BOISSIER: _De la Religion Romaine_, vol. i. p. 21. Cf.\nCICERO: _De Natura Deorum_, ii. 28.\n\n[30] Cf. the remark of SENECA: _Epistol\u00e6 ad Lucilium_, i. 21.\u2014\u201cQuod\nfieri in senatu solet, faciendum ego in philosophia quoque existimo.\nQuum censuit aliquis, quod ex parte mihi placeat, jubeo illum dividere\nsententiam, et sequor.\u201d\u2014For a summary of interesting examples of the\nmanner in which this spirit of compromise worked out in practical\nreligious questions, see Boissier, pp. 22, sqq.\n\n[31] VIRGIL: _Georgics_, 1. 268-272.\u2014Cf. the note of Servius on this\npassage: \u201cScimus necessitati religionem cedere.\u201d On the general character\nof Roman Religion, cf. CONSTANT DE REBECQUE: _Du Polyth\u00e9isme Romain_.\u2014\u201cOn\ndirait que les dieux ont abjur\u00e9 les erreurs d\u2019une jeunesse fougueuse pour\nse livrer aux occupations de l\u2019\u00e2ge m\u00fbr. La religion de Rome est l\u2019\u00e2ge m\u00fbr\ndes dieux, comme l\u2019histoire de Rome est la maturit\u00e9 de l\u2019esp\u00e8ce humaine.\u201d\n\n[32] MACROBIUS: _Saturnalia_, iii. 9.\u2014\u201cSi deus, si dea est, cui populus\ncivitasque Carthaginiensis est in tutela, teque maxime ille,\u201d etc.\n\n[33] PLUTARCH: _De Iside et Osiride_. (Passages subsequently quoted.) Cf.\nDION CHRYSOSTOM: _De Cognitione Dei_. (Vol. i. p. 225, Dindorf\u2019s Text.)\n\n[34] DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS: _De Antiquitatibus Romanorum_, ii.\n18.\u2014Though Livy\u2019s account of the administrative measures of Numa is\nwritten in a totally different spirit from that of Dionysius, it may\nbe noted that Numa is depicted as introducing religion as an aid to\npolitical stability.\u2014\u201cNe luxuriarentur otio animi, quos metus hostium\ndisciplinaque militaris continuerat, _omnium primum_, rem ad multitudinem\nimperitam et illis s\u00e6culis rudem efficacissimam Deorum metum injiciendum\nratus est.\u201d (LIVY, i. 19.) Cicero confesses that the auspices had been\nretained for the same reason. (_De Div._, ii. 33.)\n\n[35] The indignant phrases with which Horace scathes the degeneracy of\nhis own times in this respect clearly indicate the religious aspect of\nthe patriotic self-immolation of Regulus:\u2014\n\n    \u201cMilesne Crassi conjuge barbara\n    Turpis maritus vixit et hostium\n      (Proh curia inversique mores!)\n        Consenuit socerorum in armis\n    Sub rege Medo Marsus et Apulus\n    _Anciliorum et nominis et tog\u00e6_\n        _Oblitus \u00e6tern\u00e6que Vest\u00e6_\n        _Incolumi Jove et urbe Roma?_\u201d (_Od._, iii. 5.)\n\n[36] Cf. BOISSIER: _De la Religion Romaine_, vol. i. p. 17.\u2014\u201cNonseulement\nla religion romaine n\u2019encourage pas la d\u00e9votion, mais on peut dire\nqu\u2019elle s\u2019en m\u00e9fie. C\u2019est un peuple fait pour agir; la r\u00eaverie, la\ncontemplation mystique lui sont \u00e9trang\u00e8res et suspectes. Il est avant\ntout ami du calme, de l\u2019ordre, de la regularit\u00e9; tout ce qui excite\net trouble les \u00e2mes lui d\u00e9pla\u00eet.\u201d Boissier quotes as the remark of\nServius on _Georgics_, 3. 456, the words, \u201c_Majores religionem totam in\nexperientia collocabant_;\u201d but what Servius really wrote was, \u201c_Majores\nenim expugnantes religionem, totum in experientia collocabant_,\u201d and he\ngives an apt reference to Cato\u2019s speech on the Catilinarian conspiracy\nas reported by Sallust:\u2014\u201cNon votis neque suppliciis muliebribus auxilia\ndeorum parantur: vigilando, agendo, _bene consulendo_, prospere omnia\ncedunt.\u201d Propertius (iii. 22) boasts that Rome is free from the more\nextravagantly emotional legends of Greek mythology.\n\n[37] CICERO: _De Nat. Deor._ lib. iii.\u2014Cf. the \u201ctheory of Twofold Truth,\u201d\nwhich was \u201caccepted without hesitation by all the foremost teachers in\nItaly during the sixteenth century,\u201d who \u201cwere careful to point out, they\nwere philosophers, and not theologians.\u201d\u2014_The Skeptics of the Italian\nRenaissance_, by John Owen (p. 186, second edition).\n\n[38] CICERO: _Tusc. Disp._ i. 1.\u2014\u201cIam illa qu\u00e6 natura, non literis,\nadsecuti sunt, neque cum Gr\u00e6cia neque ulla cum gente sunt conferenda; qu\u00e6\nenim tanta gravitas, qu\u00e6 tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas,\nfides, qu\u00e6 tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum\nmajoribus nostris comparanda?\u201d\n\n[39] A situation forecast in the well-known passage of Plato\u2019s\n_Republic_, 619 C, in reference to the soul who has chosen for his lot in\nlife \u201cthe most absolute despotism he could find.\u201d\u2014\u201cHe was one of those\nwho had lived during his former life under a well-ordered constitution,\nand hence a measure of virtue had fallen to his share, _through the\ninfluence of habit, unaided by philosophy_.\u201d (Davis and Vaughan\u2019s\ntranslation.) What could more accurately describe the character of early\nRoman morality than these words?\n\n[40] It was inability to grasp this truth that explained the \u201cpatriotic\u201d\nopposition of the Elder Cato to the lectures of Carneades, Critolaus,\nand Diogenes. He was \u201cunwilling that the public policy of Rome, which\nfor the Roman youth was the supreme norm of judgment and action, and\nwas possessed of unconditional authority, should, through the influence\nof foreign philosophers, become subordinated, in the consciousness of\nthese youths, to a more universal ethical norm.\u201d UEBERWEG: _Grundriss der\nGeschichte der Philosophie_ (Morris and Porter\u2019s translation, p. 189,\nvol. i.). (Cf. M. MARTHA: _Le Philosophe Carn\u00e9ade \u00e0 Rome_.)\n\n[41] CICERO: _De Officiis_, i. 43.\u2014\u201c_Princepsque omnium virtutum illa\nsapientia quam \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Gr\u00e6ci vocant_\u2014prudentiam enim, quam Gr\u00e6ci \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd,\naliam quandam intellegimus, qu\u00e6 est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque\nscientia; illa autem sapientia quam principem dixi rerum est divinarum\net humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et\nsocietas inter ipsos\u2014ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est quod a\ncommunitate ducatur officium id esse maximum.\u201d\u2014He is here emphasizing the\nsocial duties of the individual man.\n\n[42] _De Divinatione_, ii. 2.\u2014\u201cQuod enim munus reipublic\u00e6 afferre majus\nmeliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudim\u016ds juventutem? his\npr\u00e6sertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium\nopibus refr\u00e6nenda ac co\u00ebrcenda sit.\u201d\u2014We shall venture to believe that\npersonally Cicero was not a religious man, in spite of the religious\nusefulness of his philosophic work, and also notwithstanding Trollope\u2019s\ncontention that \u201chad Cicero lived a hundred years later I should\nhave suspected him of some hidden knowledge of Christian teaching.\u201d\n(TROLLOPE\u2019S _Life of Cicero_, chapter on \u201cCicero\u2019s Religion.\u201d) Cicero\u2019s\nLetters have as much religion in them as Lord Chesterfield\u2019s\u2014and no more.\n\n[43] HEROD. ii. 53.\n\n[44] HESIOD: _Works and Days_, 280 sqq. (cf. 293-326). Here also is to be\nfound that famous description of the hard and easy roads of Virtue and of\nVice. The reward held out to progress in Virtue is that this road, too,\nbecomes pleasant and easy at last.\n\n[45] \u039f\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f43\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u1fc3. (HESIOD: _Works and\nDays_, 293.)\u2014It is not surprising that Aristotle quotes this verse with\napproval, or that it commended itself to the genius of Roman writers.\n(Cf. LIVY, xxii. 29; CICERO: _Pro Cluentio_, c. 31.)\n\n[46] Pindar: _Olymp._, 1, v. 28, sqq. (Christ\u2019s _Teubner_ Edition).\n\n[47] PLUTARCH: _De \u0395 apud Delphos_, 385 B.D.\n\n[48] See _The Ethics of Aristotle_, by Sir ALEXANDER GRANT, Essay II.\n\n[49] Horace\u2019s \u201cMutatus Polemon\u201d is well known. The details of the story\nare given in practically the same form by Diogenes Laertius, Valerius\nMaximus (vi. 6. 15), and by Lucian in his dramatic version in the _Bis\nAccusatus_ (16, 17). Philostratus\u2014_Lives of the Sophists_, i. 20\u2014gives an\nintensely _modern_ account of the conversion of the sophist Is\u00e6us. (See\nalso _Note_ on p. 28.)\n\n[50] PLATO: _Laws_, 642 C. (Jowett\u2019s translation.)\n\n[51] BROWNING\u2019S _Asolando_, \u201cDevelopment.\u201d (P. 129, first edition.)\n\n[52] For the influence of the Greek Myths in this direction, cf.\nPROPERTIUS, Book iii. 32.\n\n    \u201cIpsa Venus, quamvis corrupta libidine Martis,\n      Nec minus in c\u00e6lo semper honesta fuit,\n    Quamvis Ida palam pastorem dicat amasse\n      Atque inter pecudes accubuisse deam.\n    ...\n    Dic mihi, quis potuit lectum servare pudicum,\n      Qu\u00e6 dea cum solo vivere sola deo?\u201d\n\nSt. Augustine\u2019s criticism of the famous passage in the _Eunuchus_ of\nTerence (Act iii. sc. 5), where Ch\u00e6rea is encouraged in his clandestine\namour by a picture of Jupiter and Dana\u00eb, is, of course, painfully\njustified by the facts as reported by the dramatist. (_Confessiones_,\nlib. i.)\n\n[53] PLATO: _Ph\u00e6do_, 69 B.\n\n[54] \u201cBefore the fifth century, philosophy had been _entirely_ physical\nor metaphysical.\u201d\u2014Sir A. GRANT: _Aristotle_. (Essay already quoted.) The\nword italicized is surely too sweeping. (The thought is repeated with\nsome qualification on page 67.) Cf. DIOGENES LAERTIUS: i. 18, and i. 13.\nCICERO: _Tusc. Qu\u00e6st._, v. 4; _Acad._, i. 4, 15. ARISTOTLE speaks with\ngreater truth and moderation.\u2014_Metaph._, i. 6. The distinction between\nSocrates and previous philosophers lies not so much in the fact that they\nwere not ethical philosophers as that he was not a physical philosopher.\n\n[55] HEROD. i. 75. Cf. the amusing story told by Plutarch (_De Sollertia\nAnimalium_, 971 B, C), in which a mule laden with salt lightens its load\nin crossing a river by soaking its packages well under the water. Thales\nenters the ranks against the clever mule, and comes off easy winner by\ngiving him a load of _sponges and wool_.\n\n[56] HEROD. i. 170. Cf. PLUTARCH: _Cum Principibus Viris Philosopho esse\ndisserendum_, 779 A.\n\n[57] RITTER and PRELLER, p. 10. (Quoting SIMPLICIUS: _Physica_, 6, a.)\n\n[58] SIMPLICIUS: _Physica_. (Quoted by RITTER and PRELLER, p. 10.)\n\n[59] \u201cHeraclitus used to say that Homer, and Archilochus as well, ought\nto be expelled from the Contests and cudgelled.\u201d\u2014_D. L._, ix. 1.\n\n[60] See PLUTARCH: _Adversus Coloten_, 118 C; and STOB\u00c6US: _Anthologion_,\nv. 119, and iii. 84. (Vol. i. pp. 94 and 104.\u2014_Tauchnitz_ Edition.)\n\n[61] PLUTARCH: _De Exilio_, 604 A.\n\n[62] DIOGENES LAERTIUS, ii. 6.\n\n[63] ALEX. APHROD: _De Fato_, ii., quoted by RITTER and PRELLER, p. 28.\nCf. PSEUDO-PLUTARCH: _De Placitis Philosophorum_, 885 C, D.\n\n[64] ARISTOTLE: _Metaphysics_, i. 3.\n\n[65] RITTER and PRELLER, p. 52.\u2014Cf. UEBERWEG on Leucippus and Democritus,\n\u201cThe ethical end of man is happiness, which is attained through justice\nand culture.\u201d\n\n[66] _Magna Moralia_, i. 1, and i. 34. Cf. ARISTOTLE: _Eth. Nich._,\nv. 5.\u2014\u201cThe Pythagoreans defined the just to be simply retaliation\u2014and\nRhadamanthus (in \u00c6schylus) appears to assert that justice is this: \u2018that\nthe punishment will be equitable when a man suffers the same thing as he\nhas done.\u2019\u201d (Thomas Taylor\u2019s translation of _The Works of Aristotle_.)\n\n[67] UEBERWEG, p. 47. See also citations in last note.\n\n[68] _How_ fruitful, the whole Attic Tragedy demonstrates.\n\n[69] RITTER and PRELLER, p. 79 (from CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS).\n\n[70] Cf. MARLOWE\u2019S _Dr. Faustus_:\u2014\n\n    \u201cWhy wert thou not a creature wanting soul?\n    Or why is this immortal that thou hast?\n    Ah, Pythagoras\u2019 metempsychosis, were that true\n    This soul should fly from me, and I be changed\n    Unto some brutish beast! All beasts are happy,\n    For when they die,\n    Their souls are soon dissolved in elements;\n    But mine must live still to be plagued in hell.\u201d\n\n[71] MARTHA: _L\u2019Examen de Conscience chez les Anciens_ (\u201c\u00e9tudes morales\nsur l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9\u201d).\u2014\u201cCe po\u00e8me, attribu\u00e9 par les uns \u00e0 Pythagore lui-m\u00eame,\npar d\u2019autres \u00e0 Lysis, son disciple, par d\u2019autres encore ou \u00e0 Philola\u00fcs\nou \u00e0 Emp\u00e9docle, ne remonte pas sans doute \u00e0 une si haute antiquit\u00e9, mais\nil est certainement ant\u00e9rieur au christianisme, puisque des \u00e9crivains\nqui ont v\u00e9cu avant notre \u00e8re, entre autres le Sto\u00efcien Chrysippe, y ont\nfait quelquefois allusion ... Hierocl\u00e8s dit formellement que les _Vers\nd\u2019or_ ne sont pas l\u2019\u0153uvre d\u2019un homme, mais celle de tout le sacr\u00e9 coll\u00e8ge\npythagoricien.\u201d\u2014The author of the verses is, doubtless, unknown, but\ntheir general attribution in antiquity to a Pythagorean source is in\nharmony with the universal recognition that they cohere with the ethical\ndoctrine of the school. M. Martha subjects ancient philosophers and\ncritics to a severe reprehension on the ground that they saw in these\nverses a mere inculcation of the practice of the memory\u2014\u201cUn certain\nnombre d\u2019anciens sont tomb\u00e9s dans la plus \u00e9trange m\u00e9prise. Ils ont cru\nqu\u2019il s\u2019agissait ici d\u2019un exercice de m\u00e9moire.\u201d But, giving all the force\nwhich M. Martha assigns to the passages he quotes in support of this\nview, we must not leave out of consideration the important part which\na good memory was believed to subserve in practical ethics. See the\npseudo-Plutarchic tract _De Educatione Liberorum_, 9 F. Cf. EPICTETUS,\nlib. iii. cap x.\n\nSENECA (_De Ira_, 3, cap. 36) learned the practice inculcated by the\ngolden verses from Sextus, who was claimed as a Pythagorean (RITTER and\nPRELLER, 437).\n\n[72] PLATO: _Republic_, 600 B.\n\n[73] PLUTARCH: _Adversus Coloten_, 1126; cf. _D. L._, ix. 23. See also\nPLATO\u2019S _Parmenides_, and cf. UEBERWEG on Parmenides.\n\n[74] LESLIE STEPHEN: _The Science of Ethics_ (concluding sentence).\n\n[75] For a brief expression of this identity, see DION. CH. _De Exilio_,\nxiii. p. 249.\u2014\u201c_To seek and strive earnestly after Virtue\u2014that is\nPhilosophy._\u201d Cf. SENECA: _Epist._, i. 37; _et passim_.\n\n[76] See MARTHA: _La pr\u00e9dication morale populaire_ (\u201cLes moralistes sous\nl\u2019empire romain,\u201d pp. 240, 241).\u2014\u201cA cette \u00e9poque la philosophie \u00e9tait\nune esp\u00e8ce de religion qui imposait \u00e0 ses adeptes au moins l\u2019ext\u00e9rieur\nde la vertu. Les sophistes se reconnaissent \u00e0 leur m\u0153urs licencieuses\net \u00e0 leurs mani\u00e8res arrogantes, les philosophes \u00e0 la dignit\u00e9 de leur\nconduite et de leur maintien. On entrait dans la philosophie par une\nsorte de conversion \u00e9difiante: on ne pouvait en sortir que par une\napostasie scandaleuse.\u201d See the passages referred to by M. MARTHA, and,\nin addition, DION\u2019S account of his \u201cconversion\u201d in _Oratio_ xiii. (_De\nExilio_), and his comparisons between the sophist and the peacock, and\nthe philosopher and the owl, in _Oratio_ xii. (_De Dei Cognitione_).\n\n[77] CICERO: _Acad. Poster._, i. 4. (Reid\u2019s translation.) Cf. RITTER\nand PRELLER: sec. 204, note \u201ca\u201d on XENOPHON: _Memorabilia_, iv. 3.\n1, and i. 4. 4.\u2014\u201cSocratem quodam modo natur\u00e6 studuisse vel ex nostro\nloco luculenter cernitur, ubi deprehendis eum teleologicam qu\u00e6 dicitur\nviam ingressum, qu\u00e6 ratio transiit ad Socraticos. Inde corrigendus\nCicero _Acad. Poster._, i. 4.\u201d Cf. BENWELL\u2019S Preface to his edition of\nthe _Memorabilia_: \u201cQuam graviter de Dei providentia et de admirabili\ncorporis humani structura Socratem disserentem inducit!\u201d\u2014It must be\nconceded, however, that in Xenophon\u2019s account Socrates is described as\ndiscussing natural phenomena still with a view to ethical edification.\n(_Memorab._, iv. 3.)\n\n[78] PLATO: _Tim\u00e6us_, 59 C.\n\n[79] W. S. LANDOR: _Diogenes and Plato (Imaginary Conversations)_.\u2014\u201cDraw\nthy robe around thee; let the folds fall gracefully, and look majestic.\nThat sentence is an admirable one, but not for me. I want sense, not\nstars.\u201d Cf. Dr. MARTINEAU: _Plato (Types of Ethical Theory)_.\u2014\u201cThe\nperfection which consists in contemplation of the absolute, or the\nattempt to copy it, may be the consummation of Reason, but not of\ncharacter.\u201d\n\n[80] Cf. LANDOR: _loc. cit._\u2014\u201cThe bird of wisdom flies low, and seeks her\nfood under hedges; the eagle himself would be starved if he always soared\naloft and against the sun. The sweetest fruit grows near the ground, and\nthe plants that bear it require ventilation and lopping.\u201d\n\n[81] ARCHER-HIND: _The Ph\u00e6do of Plato_, Appendix I.\n\n[82] Cf. MARTINEAU: \u201cTypes of Ethical Theory\u201d: _Plato_, p. 97, vol.\ni.\u2014\u201cFor the soul in its own essence, and for great and good souls among\nmankind, Plato certainly had the deepest reverence; but he had no share\nin the religious sentiment of democracy which dignifies man _as man_, and\nregards with indifference the highest personal qualities in comparison\nwith the essential attributes of common humanity.\u2014He rated so high the\ndifficulty of attaining genuine insight and goodness that he thought\nit much if they could be realized even in a few; and had no hope that\nthe mass of men, overborne by the pressure of material necessity and\nunchastened desires, could be brought, under the actual conditions of\nthis world, to more than the mere beginnings of wisdom.\u201d\n\n[83] ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, i. cap. 3. Cf. i. 6 and i. 8.\n\n[84] _Ethics_, i. 3, 4, where also the verse from the _Works and Days_ is\nquoted; cf. sec. 6.\n\n[85] _Ethics_, i. 8.\n\n[86] GRANT\u2019S _Aristotle_, vol. i. p. 155.\n\n[87] See RITTER and PRELLER, sec. 392, for the authorities on this head.\n\n[88] _A Voice from the Nile_, by JAMES THOMSON. An Epicurean would have\nheartily responded to the verse following those quoted in the text from\nthis fine poem\u2014\u201cAnd therefore Gods and Demons, Heaven and Hell.\u201d\n\n[89] DIOGENES LAERTIUS (RITTER and PRELLER, 380. Cf. CIC.: _De Finibus_,\ni. 7).\n\n[90] Cf. PSEUDO-PLUTARCH: _De Placitis Philosophorum_. 877 D.\n\n[91] DIOGENES LAERTIUS, x. 142. Cf. CIC.: _De Finibus_, i. 19.\u2014\u201cDenique\netiam _morati melius erimus_ quum didicerimus _quid natura desideret_.\u201d\n(RITTER and PRELLER, p. 343).\n\n[92] Cf. the statement of SENECA (_Epist._, 89, 9).\u2014\u201cEpicurei duas\npartes philosophi\u00e6 putaverunt esse, naturalem atque moralem: rationalem\nremoverunt.\u201d\n\n[93] \u201cThrough the great weight which, both in theory and in their\nactual life with each other, was laid by the Epicureans on Friendship\n(a social development which only became possible after the dissolution\nof the bond which had so closely united each individual citizen to the\nCivil Community), Epicureanism aided in softening down the asperity\nand exclusiveness of ancient manners, and in cultivating the social\nvirtues of companionableness, compatibility, friendliness, gentleness,\nbeneficence, and gratitude, and so performed a work whose merit we should\nbe careful not to under-estimate.\u201d\u2014UEBERWEG: _Grundriss_. Cf. HORACE:\n_Sat._, I. iv. 135\u2014\u201cdulcis amicis.\u201d The other elements of the Epicurean\nideal are also realized in Horace\u2019s character, as his writings have left\nit to us.\n\n[94] This breaking away of the barriers between the teaching of various\nschools was, doubtless, largely due to the increasing importance\nwhich they universally attached to Ethics. The fact, at any rate,\nis indisputable. Every history of Greek philosophy, from the Third\nCentury onward, is freely scattered with such phrases as these from\nUeberweg:\u2014\u201cThe new Academy returned to Dogmatism. It commenced with\nPhilo of Larissa, founder of the Fourth School.... His pupil, Antiochus\nof Ascalon, founded a Fifth School, by combining the doctrines of Plato\nwith certain Aristotelian, and more particularly with certain Stoic\ntheses, thus preparing the way for the transition to Neo-Platonism.\u201d\u2014\u201cIn\nmany of the Peripatetics of this late period we find an approximation to\nStoicism.\u201d\n\n[95] As regards Epicureanism, see the _Adversus Coloten_, the _De\nlatenter vivendo_, and the _Non posse suaviter viri secundum Epicurum_.\nPlutarch\u2019s polemic against Stoicism is specially developed in the three\ntracts, _Stoicos absurdiora Poetis dicere_, _De Stoicorum Repugnantiis_,\nand _De communibus Notitiis_. Plutarch\u2019s attitude is purely critical: he\nis by no means constructive. His criticism has been severely dealt with\nby H. Bazin in his dissertation, _De Plutarcho Stoicorum Adversario_. It\nis worthy of note that Plutarch deals entirely with the founders of the\ntwo schools, not with the later developments of their teachings.\n\n[96] Thiersch, who regards Plutarch as the inaugurator of that moral\nreformation which, as we attempt to show in the next chapter, was\noperating before he was born, asserts that at the time when Plutarch\nbegan his work, the prevailing manner of life was based upon an\nEpicurean ideal. (_Der Epikureismus war die Popularphilosophie des\nTages, denn in ihr fand die herrschende Lebensweise ihren begrifflichen\nAusdruck._\u2014THIERSCH: _Politik und Philosophie in ihrem Verh\u00e4ltniss,\netc._, Marburg, 1853.) If this be so, and we willingly make the\nadmission, there was little need for reform here, although, as Seneca\nfound (_Ad Lucilium_, xxi. 9), it may have been necessary to explain to a\nmisunderstanding world what Epicureanism really was. Whatever Plutarch,\nas nominal Platonist, may polemically advance against Epicureanism, the\nideal of Epicurus and Metrodorus is realized in the conduct of the group\nof people whose manner of life is represented in the _Symposiacs_.\n\n[97] For some considerations on this subject see the concluding chapter.\n\n[98] _E.g._, Dr. August Tholuck.\u2014At the termination of an article,\n\u201c_Ueber den Einfluss des Heidenthums aufs Leben_,\u201d in which he ransacks\nclassical authors and Christian fathers for anything which may serve\nto exhibit the degradation of Pagan society, he quotes the words of\nAthanasius to give expression to the conclusion referred to in the text.\nThe whole of Champagny\u2019s brilliant and fascinating work on the C\u00e6sars is\ndominated by the same spirit, a spirit utterly inconsistent with that\nattitude of philosophical detachment in which history should be written,\n(_\u00c9tudes sur l\u2019Empire Romain_, tome iii., \u201c_Les C\u00e9sars_.\u201d) Archbishop\nTrench, too, says of our period that it \u201cwas the hour and power of\ndarkness; of a darkness which then, immediately before the dawn of a new\nday, was the thickest.\u201d (_Miracles_, p. 162.) Prof. Mahaffy, in the same\nuncritical spirit, refers to the \u201csingular\u201d and \u201cmelancholy\u201d spectacle\npresented by Plutarch in his religious work, \u201c_clinging to the sinking\nship, or rather, trying to stop the leak and declare her seaworthy_.\u201d\n(_Greeks under Roman Sway_, p. 321.)\n\n[99] See Dean Merivale, _Romans under the Empire_, vol. vii.\n\n[100] See \u201cSt. Paul and Seneca\u201d (Dissertation ii. in Lightfoot on\n\u201cPhilippians\u201d) for a full account of the question from the historical and\ncritical standpoints. The learned and impartial Bishop has no difficulty\nin proving that the resemblances between Stoicism and Christianity were\ndue to St. Paul\u2019s acquaintance with Stoic teaching, and not to Seneca\u2019s\nknowledge of the Christian faith.\n\nTheodoret, bishop of Cyrus, in Syria (consecrated A.D. 420), appears\nto have been the first to assert the operation of Christian influences\non Plutarch:\u2014\u201c_Plotinus, Plutarch, and Numenius, and the rest of their\ntribe, who lived after the Manifestation of our Saviour to the Gentiles,\ninserted into their own writings many points of Christian Theology._\u201d\n(Theodoretus, _Gr\u00e6carum affectionum curatio_\u2014Oratio ii., De Principio.)\nIn another place he makes a still more definite assertion: \u201c_Plutarch and\nPlotinus undoubtedly heard the Divine Gospel._\u201d (Oratio x., De Oraculis.)\nRualdus, in the ninth chapter of his _Vita Plutarchi_, given towards\nthe end of the first volume of the Paris edition of 1624, dare not be\nso emphatic as Theodoret:\u2014\u201c_There are, in the writings of Plutarch,\nnumerous thoughts, drawn from I cannot say what hidden source, which,\nfrom their truth and importance, could be taken for the utterances of\na Christian oracle. I do not hesitate, therefore, to say of him, as\nTertullian said of Seneca, that he is \u2018often our own man.\u2019_\u201d And he\neven goes so far as to admit that, though Plutarch never attacked the\nChristian faith, and might have read the New Testament as well as the\nOld, it is quite impossible to claim him as a believer.\u2014Brucker, in a\nslight account of Plutarch in his _Historia Critica Philosophi\u00e6_, takes\na more critical view.\u2014\u201cThe fact that Plutarch, in his numerous writings,\nnowhere alludes to the Christians, I do not know whether to attribute to\nhis sense of fairness, or even to actual favour, or whether to regard it\nas an indication of mere neglect and contempt.\u201d That Brucker is inclined\nto the alternative of contempt is shown by a comment in a footnote on\nTillemont\u2019s assertion (_Histoire des Empereurs_), that Plutarch ignored\nthe Christians, \u201cnot daring to speak well, not wishing to speak ill.\u201d \u201cIt\nappears to me,\u201d says Brucker, \u201cthat the real reason was contempt for the\nChristians, who were looked upon as illiterate.\u201d\n\nOf modern examples of this tendency one may be sufficient. In the\nintroduction to an American translation of the _De Sera Numinis\nVindicta_, the editor, after enumerating the arguments against any\nconnexion between Plutarch and Christianity, concludes:\u2014\u201cYet I cannot\ndoubt that an infusion of Christianity had somehow infiltrated itself\ninto Plutarch\u2019s ethical opinions and sentiment, _as into those of\nSeneca_.\u201d (\u201cPlutarch on the Delay of the Divine Justice,\u201d translated,\nwith an introduction and notes, by ANDREW P. PEABODY, Boston, 1885.)\n\n[101] See DION: _Ad Alexandrinos_, p. 410 (Dindorf). See also p. 402. Cf.\nPHILOSTRATUS: _Vit\u00e6 Sophistarum_, i. 6.\n\n[102] E.g., _Conjugalia Pr\u00e6cepta_, 140 A.\u2014\u201c_Those who do not associate\ncheerfully with their wives, nor share their recreations with them, teach\nthem to seek their own pleasures apart from those of their husbands._\u201d\n\n[103] TIBULLUS: _Eleg._, i. 1. Cf. PROPERTIUS: _Eleg._, iii. 15. \u201cDum nos\nfata sinunt, oculos satiemus amore: Nox tibi longa venit, nec reditura\ndies.\u201d\n\n[104] TIBULLUS: _Eleg._, i. 3. \u201cQuod si fatales iam nunc explevimus\nannos,\u201d to the end of the Elegy.\n\n[105] TIB. i. 3 (sub finem).\n\n[106] PROPERTIUS: _Eleg._, ii. 13, 28; iv. 5, 23 sqq.; iv. 4.\n\n[107] TIB., i. 10.\n\n[108] LUCAN: _Pharsalia_, i. 670.\n\n[109] The basis of the work of Augustus, and of the religious reforms\ninaugurated or developed by him, is laid in the recognition of a fact\nnoted by Balbus in CIC., _De Nat. Deorum_, lib. ii. 3. \u201cEorum imperiis\nrempublicam amplificatam qui religionibus paruissent. Et si conferre\nvolumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores\nreperiemur; religione, id est, cultu deorum, multo superiores.\u201d Cf.\nHORACE: _Od._, iii. 6, vv. 1-4; LIVY, xlv. 39.\n\n[110] HOR.: _Od._, iii. 6.\n\n[111] See BOISSIER: _Religion Romaine_, vol. i. cap. 5.\u2014_Le Sixi\u00e8me\nLivre de l\u2019En\u00e9ide_. St. Augustine must surely have felt the _religious_\ninfluence of the \u00c6neid when he experienced the emotion which he describes\nin the well-known passage in the First Book of the Confessions\u2014_plorare\nDidonem mortuam (cogebar), quia se occidit ob amorem: cum interea meipsum\nmorientem, Deus Vita mea, siccis occulis ferrem miserrimus_. (Lib. i.\ncap. xiii.)\n\n[112] OVID: _Fasti_, 4, 203; cf. _Meta._, i. sec. 8.\n\n[113] See the Life of Persius, included, with the Lives of Terence,\nHorace, Juvenal, Lucan, and Pliny the Elder, in the writings of Suetonius.\n\n[114] MACLEANE\u2019S _Persius_.\u2014Introduction.\n\n[115] PERSIUS: _Sat._, v. 62-64.\u2014_At te nocturnis juvat impallescere\nchartis, Cultor enim juvenum purgatas inseris aures Fruge Cleanthea._\n\n[116] _Pharsalia_, ix. 554-555.\n\n[117] _Pharsalia_, ix. 570. We have not been able to refrain from quoting\nthese\u2014as other\u2014well-known verses in the text. They are the highest\nexpression of the Stoic Pantheism. \u201c_Virtus_\u201d has the appearance of a\nrhetorical climax; but has it been noticed that the great modern poet of\nPantheism\u2014for what else was Wordsworth?\u2014also makes humanity the highest\nembodiment of that \u201cpresence ... Whose dwelling is the light of setting\nsuns, And the round ocean and the living air, And the blue sky, _and in\nthe mind of man_?\u201d\n\n[118] _Quis labor hic superis_, &c., vi. 490, _et passim_.\n\n[119] _Felices errore suo_, &c., i. 459.\n\n[120] Scrutabitur scholas nostras, et obiiciet philosophis congiaria,\namicas, gulam: ostendet mihi alium in adulterio, alium in popina, alium\nin aula.\u2014SENECA: _Epist._, i. 29.\n\n[121] PHILOSTRATUS, i. 7. The quaint turn of the version in the text is\nfrom BLOUNT\u2019S 1681 translation of the _Life of Apollonius_.\n\n[122] DION: _Oratio_ 32, pp. 402-3 (Dindorf).\n\n[123] See DION: _De Cognitione Dei_ (pp. 213-4) for an interesting\ncomparison between the owl and the philosopher on the one hand, and the\nsophist and the peacock on the other. (Cf. _Ad Alexandrinos_, p. 406,\nwhere the sufferings of the faithful philosopher are in implied contrast\nto the rewards that await the brilliant sophist.)\n\n[124] _Iliad_, ix. 312-3 (Chapman\u2019s translation). This actual text is\nquoted in PHILOSTRATUS\u2019 _Lives of the Sophists_ (i. 25) as a criticism on\nsome of the false and fantastic exercises of the Sophists. The \u201cdistant\nlapse\u201d referred to in the text is constantly evident in the dramas of the\nbest Athenian period. And history shows that there was a strong tendency\nin the Hellenic character agreeing with that indicated by the evidence of\nthe dramatists, notwithstanding the outcry raised when Euripides summed\nup the whole matter in his famous line in the Hippolytus (_Hipp._ 612).\n\n[125] PHILOSTRATUS: _Vit\u00e6 Sophistarum_, lib. i. sec. 24.\n\n[126] E.g., _De Stoic. Repug._, 1033 A, B; _De Audiendo_, 43 F.\n\n[127] See frequent passages in Seneca\u2019s letters to Lucilius, e.g. _Ep._\ni. 16, 20. Cf. _De Vita Beata_, cap. 18, where Seneca defends himself and\nother philosophers against the charge \u201c_aliter loqueris: aliter vivis_.\u201d\nHe will not be deterred from the pursuit of virtue by any truth human\nweakness may have to admit in the charge.\n\nThis note is well marked in both Aurelius and Epictetus (ii. 19. Cf.\nAULUS GELLIUS, xvii. 19). The praise of Ulysses at the end of the _De Deo\nSocratis_ of Apuleius is couched in the same strain.\n\n[128] CATULLUS, xvi. 4, 5; OVID: _Tristia_, ii. 353-4; MARTIAL, i. 5.\n\n[129] PLINY: _Ep._ v. 3. Plutarch, also, is legitimately offended at\nthe loose language of the founders of Stoicism (see _De Stoic. Repug._,\n1044 B), and his expressions, as are those of Pliny\u2019s friends, are quite\nin harmony with the modern attitude on the question. Apuleius defends\nhimself against a similar charge to that brought against Pliny by a\nsimilar display of great names.\u2014\u201cFecere tamen et _alii talia_\u201d (De Deo\nSocratis).\n\n[130] HORACE: _Ep._ i. 1, 14.\n\n[131] EPICTETUS: _Encheir._, 49; _Discourses_, iii. 2; i. 17.\n\n[132] SENECA: _Epist. ad Lucilium_, i. 21. Here are a few of the _egregia\ndicta_ which Seneca takes from the teachings of Epicurus, or Metrodorus,\nor _alicujus ex illa officina_.\u2014\u201c_Honesta res est l\u00e6ta paupertas_,\u201d\n\u201c_Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus_,\u201d \u201c_Philosophi\u00e6 servias\noportet ut tibi contingat vera libertas_,\u201d \u201c_Si cui sua non videntur\namplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit, tamen miser est_,\u201d \u201c_Quid est\nturpius, quam senex vivere incipiens?_\u201d \u201c_Is maxime divitiis fruitur,\nqui minime divitiis indiget_,\u201d \u201c_Immodica ira gignit insaniam_,\u201d \u201c_Sic\nfac omnia, tanquam spectet Epicurus_,\u201d \u201c_Initium est salutis, notitia\npeccati_,\u201d &c. Yet Seneca was the _acerrimus Stoicus_ of Lactantius\n(_Div. Inst._, i. 5).\n\n[133] Fragment 120 in Bergk\u2019s third edition, 144 in his fourth edition,\nand 107 in B\u00f6ckh\u2019s edition. W. Christ includes it in his selections\u2014\u1f10\u03be\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd (No. 4).\n\n[134] _Iliad_, ix. 498; xi. 3, 73; iv. 440.\n\n[135] _Amatorius_, 763 C, sqq.; cf. _De Placitis Philosoph._, lib. i.\n879-880 A. This tract cannot be quoted as authority for Plutarch\u2019s views;\nit is in several places distinctly, even grossly, anti-Platonic, and\nin other places even more distinctly Epicurean. As an example of the\nreverence with which Plutarch constantly alludes to Plato, the first\nconversation in the Eighth Book of the _Symposiacs_ may be quoted.\nThe conversation arises out of a celebration of Plato\u2019s birthday, and\nPlutarch gives a sympathetic report of the remarks of Mestrius Florus,\nwho is of opinion that those who impute the philosopher\u2019s paternity\nto Apollo do not dishonour the God. Cf. this and hundreds of other\nsimilar examples with the bitterly contemptuous expressions in the _De\nPlacitis_, 881 A, a section which concludes with an emphatic exposition\nof that Epicurean view which Plutarch exerts himself so strenuously to\nconfute in the _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_. Bernardakis \u201cstars\u201d the _De\nPlacitis_, though Zimmerman quotes it as evidence against the sincerity\nof Plutarch\u2019s piety (_Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen_, cap. 7: \u201caperte\nnegat providentiam\u201d). Wyttenbach says the _De Placitis_ was \u201ce perditis\nquibusdam germanis libris compilatum.\u201d Christopher Meiners (_Historia\nDoctrin\u00e6 de Vero Deo_, p. 246) attacks the boldness of the writer, \u201cqu\u00e2\ndeorum numen et providentiam impugnavit, qu\u00e6que a Plutarchi pietate et\nmoribus longe abhorret.\u201d Corsini seems to think that the incredible\nlabour involved in the compilation makes it worthy of Plutarch. His\nedition, with notes, translation, and dissertations, makes a very\nhandsome quarto, which is a monument of combined industry and simplicity.\nHe makes no comment on the anti-Platonic expressions alluded to above\n(CORSINUS: _Plutarchi De Placitis Philosophorum_, libri v., Florence,\n1759), nor does Mahaffy either, who regards the _De Placitis_ as genuine,\nthough he calls it jejune. I have been unable to see a copy of Beck\u2019s\n1787 edition, which Volkmann highly praises. It may be observed with\nregard to the passage referred to at the head of this note that Plutarch\nwould never have limited the contribution of philosophy to the knowledge\nof God to \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Dion Chrysostom (_De Dei Cognitione_, 393, sqq.)\nmentions the same three sources of the knowledge of the Divine nature as\nPlutarch, but also postulates a primeval and innate cognition of God.\n\n[136] Cf. the Pseudo-Plutarchic _De Placit. Phil._, 880 A.\n\n[137] \u039b\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. _De Iside et Osiride_,\n378 A, B. \u201c_Un lien pieux se formait entre le myste et son mystagogue,\nlien qui ne pouvait plus se rompre sans crime._\u201d\u2014Maury, vol. ii. cap.\nxi. For the saying of Theodorus about \u201ctaking with the left hand what is\noffered with the right,\u201d see _De Tranquillitate Animi_, 467 B.\n\n[138] _De Iside et Osiride_, and _De Superstitione_, passim.\n\n[139] Cf. DIOG. LAERT. vii. 134 (RITTER and PRELLER, sect. 404).\u2014\u201cGod, by\ntransformation of His own essence, makes the world.\u201d\u2014Grant\u2019s _Aristotle_,\nEssay vi., \u201c_The Ancient Stoics._\u201d Cf. PLUT: _De Stoic. Repugn._ 1053.\n\n[140] _De \u0395 apud Delphos_, 388 F.\n\n[141] _Quomodo Adulator_, 78 E. Cf. EUNAPIUS on _Historians of\nPhilosophy_. \u201cNo one has written any careful account of the lives of\nphilosophers, among whom we count not only Ammonius, teacher of divinest\nPlutarch, but also Plutarch himself, the darling and delight of all\nPhilosophy.\u201d Eunapius thinks that the _Parallel Lives_ were Plutarch\u2019s\nfinest work, but adds that \u201call his writings are thickly sown with\noriginal thoughts of his own, as well as with the teachings of his\nMaster.\u201d\n\n[142] 393 E.\n\n[143] Plutarch elsewhere comments upon the \u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1 of the Stoics\nin finding explanations of the various names of the popular Deities\n(_Quomodo Adolescens_, 31 E). CICERO (_De Natura Deorum_, iii. 24)\nrepresents Cotta as charging the Stoics with supporting the crudest\nsuperstitions of the popular faith by the skill which they displayed\nin finding a mysterious significance in the current names and\nlegends:-\u201cAtque h\u00e6c quidem et ejusmodi ex vetere Gr\u00e6cia fama collecta\nsunt; quibus intelligis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones.\nVestri autem non modo h\u00e6c non repellunt, verum etiam confirmant,\ninterpretando quorsum quidque pertineat.\u201d\n\n[144] _Iliad_, xv. 362-4.\n\n[145] In another place Plutarch expresses the view that the original\nCreator of the world bestowed upon the stuff of the phenomenal world a\nprinciple of change and movement by which that stuff often dissolves\nand reshapes itself under the operation of natural causes without the\nintervention of the original Creator (_De Defectu Orac._, 435-6).\n\n[146] Plutarch, in this Essay, distinctly places himself in opposition to\nPlato, whose views, for the purposes of contrast, may be summarized from\ntwo well-known passages of the Republic. In 337 B, C, the greater part\nof the myths current in the popular poets are repudiated. Then, after\nthat famous series of criticisms applied to particular passages taken\nfrom Homer and Hesiod and other poets, after his analysis of the various\nkinds of \u201cnarration,\u201d and his implicit inclusion of the great poets of\nGreece among the masters of that kind of imitative narration which a man\nwill the more indulge in, the more contemptible he is, Plato concludes\nwith that ironical description of the reception which a Homer or a Hesiod\nwould have to meet in a state founded on the Platonic ideal. \u201c_We shall\npay him reverence as a sacred, admirable, and charming personage; we\nshall pour perfumed oil upon his head and crown him with woollen fillets;\nbut we shall tell him that our laws exclude such characters as he, and\nshall send him away to some other city than ours._\u201d\u2014398 A, B (Davies and\nVaughan\u2019s translation). Plutarch, however, takes the world as it is.\nHe admits that poetry is a siren, but refuses to stop the ears of the\nyoung people who listen to her fascinating strains. Lycurgus was mad\nin thinking he could cure drunkenness by cutting down the vineyards;\nhe should rather have brought the water-springs nearer to the vines.\nIt is better to utilize the vine of poetry by checking and pruning its\n\u201cfanciful and theatrical exuberance\u201d than to uproot it altogether. We\nmust mingle the wine with the pure water of philosophy, or, to use\nanother image, poetry and philosophy must be planted in the same soil,\njust as the mandragora, which moderates the native strength of the wine,\nis planted in vineyards (_Quomodo Adolescens_, 15 E).\n\nAugust Schlemm, in his _De fontibus Plutarchi Commentationum De Aud.\nPoetis et de Fortuna_ (G\u00f6ttingen, 1893), subjects the structure of\nthe _De Audiendis_ to a very close and careful analysis, and comes to\nthe conclusion that the main sources of Plutarch\u2019s material are to be\nfound in the writings of Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers. He notes\nthat Plutarch\u2019s examples are taken from the same Homeric, verses as\nPlato\u2019s, and adds, \u201cQu\u00e6 cum ita sint, quomodo h\u00e6 Plutarchum inter et\nPlatonem similitudines ort\u00e6 sint dubium jam esse non potest. Plutarchus,\nut in eis qu\u00e6 antecedunt, ita etiam hic, usus est libro Peripatetici\ncujusdam, qui, _ut criminationes a Platone poetis factas repelleret_,\nhujus modi fictiones in natura artis poetic\u00e6 positas esse demonstravit\net commentationi su\u00e6 inseruit poetarum versus a Platone vituperatos.\u201d\nChrysippus had composed a work on _How to study Poetry_, Zeno one\nentitled _On Poetical Study_, and Cleanthes another, called _On the Poet_.\n\nThe opinion of so conscientious a scholar on Plutarch\u2019s \u201cappropriations\u201d\nis worth quoting:\u2014\u201ctenendum est ... Plutarchum non eum fuisse qui more\ncompilatorum libros aliorum ad verbum exscriberet sed id egisse ut ea qu\u00e6\nlegisset atque collegisset referret, sed ita ut modo sua intermisceret,\nmodo nonnulla omitteret vel mutaret.\u201d\n\n[147] _De Iside et Osiride_, 353 E.\n\n[148] _De \u0395 apud Delphos_, 393 D. Cf. _De Defectu_, 433 E. Ammonius\nis here evidently referring to a remark made (386 B) by \u201cone of those\npresent\u201d to the effect that \u201cpractically all the Greeks identify Apollo\nwith the Sun.\u201d The words of Ammonius quoted in the text are strikingly\nsimilar in spirit to the famous verses in the \u201cIn Memoriam:\u201d\u2014\n\n    \u201cO thou that after toil and storm\n      May\u2019st seem to have reached a purer air,\n      Whose faith has centre everywhere,\n    Nor cares to fix itself to form,\n\n    \u201cLeave thou thy sister when she prays,\n      Her early Heaven, her happy views;\n      Nor thou with shadowed hint confuse\n    A life that leads melodious days.\n\n    \u201cHer faith through form is pure as thine,\n      Her hands are quicker unto good:\n      Oh, sacred be the flesh and blood\n    To which she links a truth divine!\u201d\n\n[149] _Consolatio ad Apollonium_, 102 A.\u2014\u201cHe was a very sage and virtuous\nyouth, conspicuous for the reverence which he paid to the gods, to his\nparents, and to his friends.\u201d This is nearly the old Hellenic ideal\nas expressed, _e.g._, in the lines from the \u201cAntiope\u201d of Euripides,\npreserved by Stob\u00e6us, \u201cOn Virtue\u201d\u2014\n\n    \u201cThere be three virtues for thy practice, child:\n    Honour the gods, revere thy loving parents,\n    Respect the laws of Greece.\u201d\n\n[150] _Amatorius_, 756 B.\n\n[151] _Amatorius_, 762 A.\n\n[152] _De Defectu Orac._, 435 E.\n\n[153] _Consolatio ad Uxorem_, 612. Cf. _De Defectu Orac._, 437 A.\n\n[154] Supplying, as Bernardakis does after Wyttenbach, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u1ff6 \u1f41\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n[155] _De Pythi\u00e6 Orac._, 409 C. Cf. _De Rep. Ger._, 792 F.\n\n[156] Plutarch puts these words into the mouth of Theon, a literary\nman, and a most intimate friend of his own. But Theon is here a mere\nmodest disguise of Plutarch, just as \u201cLamprias\u201d is in the _De Defectu\nOraculorum_. The argument is, in any case, not affected\u2014the statement is\nclearly Plutarch\u2019s own. (See the note on that dialogue in a subsequent\nchapter.)\n\n[157] _De Pythi\u00e6 Orac._, 409 B.\n\n[158] The antiquarian regret of Propertius for the old simple worships of\nRome\u2014\u201cNulli cura fuit externos qu\u00e6rere divos Cum tremeret patrio pendula\nturba sacro\u201d (_Eleg._, v. 1)\u2014touched a chord which very few Romans would\nhave responded to in Plutarch\u2019s time.\n\n[159] _De Exilio_, 602 E. This recognition of the sacred character of the\nEmperor does not preclude criticisms of individual rulers, _e.g._, Nero:\n_De Sera Num. Vindicta_, 567 F; and Vespasian: _Amatorius_, 771 C.\n\n[160] _De Pythi\u00e6 Orac._, 408 B.\n\n[161] Cf. the fate of Ch\u00e6roneia under Antony, as told by Plutarch\u2019s\ngrandfather (see _Life of Antony_, 948 A, B).\n\n[162] 814 A.\n\n[163] _Pr\u00e6cepta Reip. Ger._, 813, et passim:\u2014He insists, however (814\nE, F), that subservience must not go too far, and he is also careful to\npoint out such brilliant openings for political ambition as are left by\nthe peculiar conditions of the time (805 A, B).\n\n[164] Plutarch states that the aim of his political advice is to enable\na man not only to become \u201ca useful citizen,\u201d but also \u201cto order his\ndomestic affairs with safety, honour, and justice\u201d (_De Unius in Repub._,\n&c., 826 C).\n\n[165] _Pr\u00e6cepta Reip._, 824 C.\n\n[166] _Pr\u00e6cepta Reip._, 813 F.\n\n[167] PROPERTIUS, iv. 11. \u201cH\u00e6c Di condiderant, h\u00e6c Di quoque m\u0153nia\nservant.\u201d Plutarch\u2019s essay reads like an exposition of this text of the\nRoman poet.\n\n[168] \u201cEt hoc verbo monere satis est, \u03a4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2 nomine contineri omnem\nrerum actionumque efficientiam, qu\u00e6 a Virtute disjuncta, nec in hominis\npotestate posita est; sive illa ut casus et temeritas, sive ut divina\nprovidentia informetur.\u201d\u2014WYTTENBACH. Schlemm says that this tract and\nthe _De Alexandri sive virtute sive fortuna_ are \u201cmer\u00e6 exercitationes\nrhetoric\u00e6 in quibus certam quandam philosophiam persequi in animo non\nhabebat.\u201d Yet the rhetoric of the _De Fortuna Romanorum_ is in wonderful\nharmony with Plutarch\u2019s mature opinion as deliberately expressed in the\n_De Republica Gerenda_.\n\n[169] VIRGIL: _Georgics_, ii. 534; PLUT: _De Fortuna Romanorum_, 316\nE. This may be a conscious reminiscence of Virgil\u2019s line. If Plutarch\nhad not read Virgil, he may have heard so famous a verse quoted by\nhis friends at Rome. He himself translates a passage from \u201cthe poet\nFlaccus\u201d in his _Life of Lucullus_ (518 C\u2014HORACE: _Ep._, i. 6, 45). The\nquestion of Plutarch\u2019s acquaintance with Latin is very important for\ninvestigations into the historical sources of his \u201cLives;\u201d but it lies\nbeyond our present limits. It is fully dealt with by WEISSENBERGER in his\n_Die Sprache Plutarchs_ (1895). He exculpates Plutarch from some of the\ngrosser mistakes in Latinity imputed to him by Volkmann.\n\n[170] 317 B, C.\n\n[171] CICERO: _Qu\u00e6st. Tusc._, i. 23.\n\n[172] _Amatorius_, 762 A.\n\n[173] One need scarcely go so far as Professor Lewis Campbell, who\nsays that the main result of the \u201cEthics\u201d of Plutarch is to show \u201chow\ndifficult it was for a common-sense man of the world to form distinct and\nreasonable opinions on matters of religion in that strangely complicated\ntime\u201d (_Religion in Greek Literature_, 1898). But Professor Campbell is\nalso of opinion that \u201cthe convenient distinction between gods and demons,\nwhich he (_i.e._ Plutarch) and others probably owed to their reading\nof Plato, is worth dwelling on _because it was taken up for apologetic\npurposes by the early Christian fathers_.\u201d Surely its religious value\nto an age which did not anticipate the coming of \u201cthe early Christian\nfathers\u201d makes the distinction worth study from a point of view quite\ndifferent from that represented in Christian apologetics.\n\n[174] See MAURY, vol. i. p. 352.\u2014\u201cPythagore admet l\u2019existence de d\u00e9mons\nbons et mauvais comme les hommes, et tout ce qui lui paraissait indigne\nde l\u2019id\u00e9e qu\u2019on devait se faire des dieux, il en faisait l\u2019\u0153uvre des\nd\u00e9mons et des h\u00e9ros.\u201d (For a fuller discussion of this question see the\nchapters on D\u00e6monology.)\n\n[175] Plutarch devotes so much of his work to an exposition of his views\nof the Divine character, that one feels inclined to regard him less as\na philosopher in the general sense than as a theologian. A kindly piece\nof description of his own (see _De Defectu Orac._, 410 A), in which he\nmentions Cleombrotos of Lacedemon as \u201ca man who made many journeys, not\nfor the sake of traffic, but because he wished to see and to learn,\u201d and\nsays that as a result of his travels and researches he was compiling a\npractically complete _corpus_ of philosophical material, the end and\naim of philosophy being, as he used to put it, \u201c_Theology_\u201d\u2014may be\nspoken with equal truth of Plutarch himself. We cannot, perhaps, do\nbetter than apply the term \u0398\u03b5\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 to him, and support the appellation\nwith an interesting passage from M. Maury, in which he deals with the\ndistinction between theosophs and philosophers in the early stages of\nGreek philosophy and religion:\u2014\u201cLes uns soumettant tous les faits \u00e0\nl\u2019appr\u00e9ciation rationelle, et partant de l\u2019observation individuelle,\npour expliquer la formation de l\u2019univers substituaient aux croyances\npopulaires un syst\u00e8me cr\u00e9\u00e9 par eux, et plus ou moins en contradiction\navec les opinions du vulgaire: c\u2019\u00e9taient les philosophes proprement\ndits. Les autres acceptaient la religion de leurs contemporains, ...\nils entreprenaient au nom de la sagesse divine, dont ils se donnaient\npour les interpr\u00e8tes, _non de renverser mais de r\u00e9former les notions\nth\u00e9ologiques et les formes religieuses_, de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 les mettre d\u2019accord\navec leurs principes philosophiques\u201d (MAURY, vol. i. p. 339). Cf. C. G.\nSEIBERT, _De Apologetica Plutarchi Theologia_ (1854):-\u201cFinis autem ad\nquem tendebat ipsa erat religio a majoribus accepta, qua philosophi\u00e6\nope purgata \u00e6qualium animos denuo implere studebat.\u201d He thinks Plutarch\nwas a theologian first and a philosopher after. (In the passage quoted\nabove from the _De Defectu_ it is difficult not to regard Mr. Paton\u2019s\nemendation of \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 as more in accordance\nwith the character of Cleombrotos than the \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03ac\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03c2 of\nBernardakis\u2019 text, although, of course, he was a great traveller and an\nardent student.)\n\n[176] _De E_, 392 A. Cf. PLATO: _Laches_, 240 C.\n\n[177] 393 A-D.\n\n[178] 394 C.\n\n[179] _De Defectu_, 413 D.\n\n[180] 433 D, E.\n\n[181] 426 B.\n\n[182] 1051 E.\n\n[183] 1052 E.\n\n[184] _De Defectu Orac._, 420 E.\n\n[185] \u00c6SCHYLUS: _Prometheus Vinctus_, 210.\n\n[186] _De Iside et Osiride_, 352 A. We need not here trouble with\nPlutarch\u2019s fanciful philology, almost as fanciful as that of some\nmodern Aryanists. His meaning is clear\u2014Absolute Being is the object of\nthe worship of Isis\u2014cf. MAX M\u00dcLLER: _Selected Essays_, vol. i. p. 467:\n\u201cComparative philologists have not yet succeeded in finding the true\netymology of Apollo.\u201d (Plato\u2019s derivations are given in the _Cratylus_,\n266 C.)\n\n[187] _Iliad_, xiii. 354. (Chapman\u2019s translation.)\n\n[188] _De Iside et Osiride_, 351 E.\n\n[189] _Neoplatonism_, by C. BIGG, D.D. (\u201cChief Ancient Philosophies\u201d), p.\n216.\n\n[190] Cf. the _De Placitis Philosophorum_, 881 B.\n\n[191] _De \u0395 apud Delphos_, 384 F.\n\n[192] 386 E.\n\n[193] Alluding to HESIOD\u2014_Works and Days_, 735 sq.\n\n[194] _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_, 562 B.\n\n[195] _De \u0395_, 393 A.\n\n[196] _De \u0395_, 387 B, C.\n\n[197] PLATO: _Philebus_, 39 E.\n\n[198] ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, viii. 12.\n\n[199] _De Superstitione_, 167 E.\n\n[200] _De Defectu Orac._, 423 E.\n\n[201] PLUTARCH on _The Delay of the Deity in Punishing the Wicked_:\nrevised edition, with notes, by Professors H. B. Hackett and W. S. Tyler.\n(New York, 1867.)\n\n[202] _Sur les D\u00e9lais de la Justice Divine dans la punition des\ncoupables_, par le Comte JOSEPH DE MAISTRE. (Lyons et Paris,\n1856.)\u2014\u201c_J\u2019ai pris_,\u201d says de Maistre, \u201c_j\u2019ai pris quelques libert\u00e9s\ndont j\u2019esp\u00e8re que Plutarque n\u2019aura point se plaindre_;\u201d and, speaking\nof the _jeunesse surann\u00e9e_ of Amyot\u2019s style, he adds: \u201c_Son orthographe\n\u00e9gare l\u2019\u0153il, l\u2019oreille ne supporte pas ses vers: les dames surtout et les\n\u00e9trangers le go\u00fbtent peu._\u201d Another French critic justly remarks on these\n\u201cliberties\u201d of de Maistre: \u201c_C\u2019est trop de licence. Plutarque n\u2019est pas\nun de ces \u00e9crivains qui laissent leurs pens\u00e9es en bouton_\u201d (Gr\u00e9ard, p.\n274). Yet it is upon de Maistre\u2019s \u201cparaphrase\u201d that Gr\u00e9ard bases his own\nanalysis!\n\n[203] WYTTENBACH: _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_ (_Pr\u00e6fatio_). It is pleasant\nto repeat the praise which Christian writers have poured on this tract.\n\u201c_Diese Schrift_\u201d says Volkmann, \u201c_geh\u00f6rt meines Erachtungs unbedingt\nmit zu dem sch\u00f6nsten, was aus der gesammten nachclassischen Litteratur\nder Griechen \u00fcberhaupt auf uns gekommen ist_.\u201d (VOLKMANN, vol. ii. p.\n265.) One may wonder a little, perhaps, at the limitation conveyed in\nthe _nach_ of _nachclassischen_.\u2014Trench says that some of Plutarch\u2019s\narguments \u201cwould have gone far to satisfy St. Augustine, and to meet the\ndemands of his theology.\u201d\n\n[204] The Epicurean author of the _De Placitis_, still inveighing against\n\u201cthat tall talker, Plato,\u201d is bitterly emphatic on this point.\u2014\u201c_If there\nis a God, and human affairs are administered by His Providence, how\ncomes it that bareness prospers, while the refined and good fall into\nadversity?_\u201d And he instances the murder of Agamemnon \u201c_at the hands\nof an adulterer and an adultress_,\u201d and the death of Hercules, that\nbenefactor of humanity, \u201c_done to death by Dejaniras drugs_.\u201d (881 D.)\n\n[205] _Symposiacs_, 642 C, 700 E.\n\n[206] _Symposiacs_, 654 C.\n\n[207] THUCYD., iii. 38. Cleon\u2019s famous speech on the Mytilenean question.\n\n[208] \u201cHujus rei aut omnino Lycisci ne vestigium quidem uspiam\nreperi.\u201d\u2014WYTTENBACH.\n\n[209] In allusion, of course, to the famous verse of an unknown poet:\u2014\n\n    \u1f48\u03c8\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1f70.\n\n[210] 540 E.\n\n[211] Deleting \u1f22 after \u1fe5\u03ac\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd with BERNARDAKIS. 549 F.\n\n[212] Note the change of number: \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\u2014\u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1f7c\u03c2.\n\n[213] Cf. the well-known passage in the _Tim\u00e6us_ (_Tim\u00e6us_, 29 C, D).\n\n[214] 550 D. \u201cEtsi h\u00e6c sententia disertis verbis in Platone, quod sciam,\nnon exstet, ejus tamen ubique sparsa sunt vestigia.\u201d WYTTENBACH adds:\n\u201cSummam autem hominum virtutem et beatitudinem in eo consistere, ut\nimitatione Deorum eis similes evadant, communis fere omnium Philosophorum\nfuit sententia.\u201d\n\n[215] Plutarch has another well-known passage of the _Tim\u00e6us_ in his\nmemory here.\u2014_Tim\u00e6us_, 29 D.\n\n[216] \u201cNeque hoc disertis verbis in Platone legere me memini; sed cum\nvariis locis ... confer.\u201d\u2014WYTT.\n\n[217] 551 D.\n\n[218] 553 A, 553 F.\n\n[219] _Laws_, 728 C. The reference is to HESIOD: _Works and Days_, 265,\n266, though Plutarch quotes verse 265 in a form different from the\nvulgate. GOETTLING (_Ap._ Paley) thinks Plutarch\u2019s version \u201csavours more\nof antiquity.\u201d ARISTOTLE: _Rhetoric_, iii. 9, quotes the vulgate.\n\n[220] 554 D. Literally, \u201c_they were not punished when they grew old, but\ngrew old in punishment_.\u201d\n\n[221] 555 E, F.\n\n[222] STOB\u00c6US: _Anthologion_, Tit. 79, 15.\n\n[223] 557 D. Cf. the sarcasm of the Academic COTTA in the _De Natura\nDeorum_, iii. 38: \u201cDicitis eam vim Deorum esse ut, etiam si quis morte\np\u0153nas sceleris effugerit, expetantur e\u00e6 p\u0153n\u00e6 a liberis, a nepotibus, a\nposteris. O miram \u00e6quitatem Deorum!\u201d\n\n[224] 558 F.\n\n[225] 559 E.\n\n[226] 560 C. WYTTENBACH quotes LUCRETIUS, iii. 437 and 456: \u201cErgo\ndissolvi quoque convenit omnem animai Naturam ceu fumus in altas aeris\nauras.\u201d He might have added, iii. 579, sqq.: \u201cDenique, cum corpus nequeat\nperferre animai Discidium, quin id tetro tabescat odore, Quid dubitas\nquin ex imo penitusque co\u00f6rta, Emanarit uti fumus diffusa anim\u00e6 vis?\u201d\nPlutarch is probably thinking of Plato\u2019s \u201cintelligent gardener\u201d (PH\u00c6DRUS,\n276 B), although, as Wyttenbach says, \u201c_Horti Adonidis proverbii vim\nhabent._\u201d The English reader will think of Shakespeare\u2019s beautiful lines\u2014\n\n    \u201c_Thy promises are like Adonis\u2019 gardens,_\n    _That one day bloom\u2019d, and fruitful were the next._\u201d\n\n                    _Henry VI._, Pt. 1, act i. sc. 6.\n\n[227] 560 F.\n\n[228] 561 A.\n\n[229] 564 C.\n\n[230] Cf. _Timon of Athens_, act iii. sc. 1: \u201c_Let molten coin be thy\ndamnation._\u201d\n\n[231] 561 A.\u2014In the long extract, preserved by Stob\u00e6us, from Plutarch\u2019s\n_De Anima_ (_Anthologion: Tit. 120, 28._\u2014The _Tauchnitz_ edition of 1838,\nhowever, ascribes this passage to Themistius, perhaps by confusion with\nextract No. 25), Plutarch allows his imagination to play freely with the\nfortunes of the soul in the afterworld. In a beautiful passage, Timon\ncompares death to initiation into the Great Mysteries\u2014an initiation in\nwhich gloom and weariness and perplexity and terror are followed by\nthe shining of a wondrous light, which beams on lovely meadows, whose\natmosphere resounds with sacred voices that tell us all the secret of the\nmystery, and whose paths are trod by pure and holy men. Timon concludes\nwith Heraclitus that, if the soul became assuredly convinced of the fate\nawaiting it hereafter, no power would be able to retain it on earth. But\nPlutarch himself is not convinced: he is charmed and seduced, but Reason\nholds him back from accepting as certainties the \u201cairy subtleties and\nwingy mysteries\u201d of Imagination. Under the stress of a desire to console\nhis wife for the loss of her little daughter, he reminds her that the\n\u201chereditary account\u201d and the Mysteries of Dionysus\u2014in which, he says,\nboth of them were initiated\u2014equally repudiate the notion that the soul\nis without sensation after death (_Consolatio ad Uxorem_, 611 D). In\nhis polemic against the Epicureans he chiefly emphasizes the emotional\naspect of the desire for immortality;\u2014the Epicurean denial of immortality\ndestroys \u201cthe sweetest and greatest hopes of the majority of mankind\u201d\u2014one\nof these \u201csweetest and greatest hopes\u201d being that of seeing retribution\nmeted out to those whose wealth and power have enabled them to flout\nand insult better men than themselves; it robs of its satisfaction that\nyearning of the thoughtful mind for unstinted communion with the great\nmasters of contemplation; and deprives the bereaved heart of the pleasant\ndream of meeting its loved and lost ones in another world (_Non posse\nsuav._, 1105 E). There is no doubt that Plutarch wished to believe in the\nimmortality of the soul, but the evidence is not conclusive that he did;\nat the most it is with him a \u201ccounsel of perfection,\u201d not an \u201carticle of\nfaith.\u201d\n\n[232] \u201c_It it not clear from the writings of Plutarch to what extent\nhe was a monotheist._\u201d This is the opinion of Charles W. Super, Ph.D.,\nLL.D., and it is supported by the irrefragable proof that Plutarch\n\u201c_uses \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 both with and without the article_.\u201d This judgment is\ngiven, of all places in the world, at the conclusion of a translation\n(a very indifferent one, by the way) of the _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_.\n(\u201cBetween Heathenism and Christianity:\u2014Being a Translation of Seneca\u2019s\n_De Providentia_ and Plutarch\u2019s _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_.\u201d by Charles\nW. Super, Ph.D., LL.D., Chicago, 1899.)\n\n[233] Plutarch himself is ignorant of its origin, and does not know\nwhether it was Magian, Orphic, Egyptian, or Phrygian. (_De Defectu\nOrac._, 415 A. Cf. _Isis and Osiris_, 360 E, \u201cfollowing the Theologians\nof old.\u201d) Those who believed, like Rualdus, that Plato had read the\nOld Testament (see note, page 45), had no difficulty in assigning the\ndoctrine of D\u00e6mons to a Jewish source. Wolff, speaking of the systematic\nd\u00e6monology constructed by the neo-Platonists, alludes to this passage in\nPlutarch, and says:\u2014\u201cH\u00e6c omnia artificiosa interpretatione ex Platonis\nfluxerunt fabulis; ex oriente fere nihil assumebatur. Namque Jud\u00e6i aliis\nprincipiis, ac reliqui, profecti decem d\u00e6monum genera constituerant;\nChald\u00e6i vetustiores non d\u00e6monum genera, sed septem archangelos planetis\npr\u00e6fectos colebant; nec credendum Plut., _De Defectu Orac._, 415 A.\nStudebat enim Plutarchus, _pr\u00e6sertim in Comm: de Iside et de Socratis\nd\u00e6monio, Gr\u00e6corum placita ad \u00c6gypti Asi\u00e6que revocare sapientiam_, et\nquum ab Orpheo et Atti sancta qu\u00e6dam mysteria dicerentur profecta esse,\narcanis his ritibus summam de diis doctrinam significari suspicabatur\u201d\n(Wolff, _op. cit._).\u2014Volkmann, who had carefully studied Plutarch\u2019s\nrelationship both to his philosophical predecessors and to foreign forms\nof religious faith, had previously arrived at a different conclusion\nfrom that embodied in the words italicized above.\u2014\u201cEr war darum kein\nEklektiker oder Synkretist, und was man nun gar von seiner Vorliebe f\u00fcr\nOrientalische Philosophie und Theologie gesagt hat geh\u00f6rt ledeglich in\ndas Gebiet der Fabel. Plutarchs philosophisch-allegorische Auslegung aber\nder \u00c6gyptischen Mythen von Isis und Osiris geht von der ausdr\u00fccklichen\nVoraussetzung aus _dass diese Gottheiten wesentlich Hellenische sind_\u201d\n(Volkmann, vol. ii. p. 23). But these varying views are simply two\ndifferent ways of regarding the real fact, which is that Plutarch regards\nforeign myths and Greek alike as different expressions of the conception\nof Divine Unity\u2014such Unity not being either Hellenic or Egyptian, but\nsimply absolute (see subsequent analysis of the _De Iside et Osiride_).\n\n[234] DIOGENES LAERTIUS, viii. 32. RITTER and PRELLER also refer to\nAPULEIUS\u2019 _De Deo Socratis_: \u201cAtenim Pythagoricos mirari oppido solitos,\nsi quis se negaret unquam vidisse D\u00e6monem, satis, ut reor, idoneus auctor\nest Aristoteles.\u201d (Below this passage in my edition of Apuleius (the\n_Delphin_, of 1688) appears the note \u201cIdem scribit Plutarch, in libello\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\u201d This _libellus_ I cannot identify with any\nenumerated in the catalogue of Lamprias.)\n\n[235] \u201cPlato, ne Anaxagor\u00e6 aut Socratis modo impietatis reus succumberet,\npr\u00e6terea ne sanctam animis hebetioribus religionem turbaret, intactos\nreliquit ritus publicos et communem de diis d\u00e6monibusque opinionem;\nqu\u00e6 ipse sentiat, significat quidem, sed, ut solet in rebus minus\ncertis _et a mera dialectica alienis_, obvoluta fabulis\u201d (WOLFF, _De\nD\u00e6monibus_, _loc. cit._). Is it permissible to suppose that the third\nconsideration\u2014that expressed in the italicized words\u2014operated more\nstrongly on Plato than either or both of the first two? Aristotle,\nat any rate, takes up a much firmer attitude in face of the popular\nmythology, which he regards as _fabulously introduced for the purpose\nof persuading the multitude, enforcing the laws, and benefiting human\nlife_ (_Metaphysics_, xi. (xii.) 8, T. Taylor\u2019s translation). This famous\npassage is as outspoken as Epicureanism.\n\n[236] PLATO: _Politicus_, 271 D. A similar \u201cdispensation\u201d is provided in\nthe _Laws_, 717 A.\n\n[237] PLATO: _Symposium_, 202 E.\n\n[238] HERODOTUS: ii. 53.\n\n[239] _De Defectu Orac._, 415 B.\n\n[240] HESIOD: _Works and Days_, 122-125 (Elton\u2019s translation).\n\n[241] _Works and Days_, 253. Cf. the beautiful fragment from Menander\npreserved by Plutarch, _De Tranquillitate Animi_, 474 B:\u2014\n\n    \u201cBy every man, the moment he is born,\n    There stands a guardian D\u00e6mon, who shall be\n    His _mystagogue_ through life.\u201d\n\n[242] _Works and Days_, 141-2.\n\n[243] _De Defectu Oraculorum_, 445 B.\u2014Pluto, too, though perhaps\nnot quite with the innocent purpose of Homer, gives \u201cd\u00e6mons\u201d as an\nalternative to \u201cgods\u201d\u2014_Tim\u00e6us_, Sec. 16. (A passage charged with the most\nmordant irony against the national religious tradition.)\n\n[244] _De Defectu Orac._, 416 C.\n\n[245] Cf. WOLFF: \u201cNeque discrepat hac in re communis religio: multi enim\nd\u00e6mones mali Gr\u00e6corum animos terrebant, velut Acco, Alphito, Empusa,\nLamia, Mormo, sive Mormolyce,\u201d &c.\u2014Considering the numerous references\nmade to the subject of D\u00e6monology by Greek poets and philosophers from\nHesiod and Empedocles downwards, with all of which, as is clear from\nthe citations made in our text, Plutarch is perfectly familiar, Prof.\nMahaffy\u2019s note on this point is a little mysterious.\u2014\u201cMr. Purser points\nout to me that Plutarch rather popularized than originated this doctrine,\nand himself refers it to various older philosophers.\u201d (Mahaffy, p.\n313.)\u2014It needs no very close study of Plutarch to see for one\u2019s self that\nhe does not claim to have originated the doctrine, and that he knows\nhimself to be dealing with a long-standing and widespread tradition.\n\n[246] For a similar process, cf. the quotation from Dr. JACKSON\u2019s\n_Treatise on Unbelief_, given by Sir WALTER SCOTT in _Demonology and\nWitchcraft_, p. 175, _note_: \u201cThus are the Fayries, from difference of\nevents ascribed to them, divided into good and bad, when it is but one\nand the same malignant fiend that meddles in both.\u201d\n\n[247] Cf. G\u00d6TTE: _Das Delphische Orakel: \u201cIn Zeiten, wo dasselbe keine\nBedeutung mehr hatte, wo es nur dazu dienen konnte, den finstersten\nAberglauben fortzupflanzen und zu erhalten, und die Menschen \u00fcber die\nwahre Leitung der Dinge in der Welt, \u00fcber die wahren Mittel, durch welche\nsich Jeder sein Gl\u00fcck bereitet, zu t\u00e4uschen, wurde das Orakelwesen\nvon den frommen V\u00e4tern unserer Kirche f\u00fcr die Ausgeburt des Teufels\nangesehen,\u201d &c._\u2014Cf. also, 1 Corinthians x. 20-22.\n\n[248] See, for these illustrations, SCOTT\u2019s _Demonology and Witchcraft_,\nPATER\u2019s _Apollo in Picardy_, and HEINE\u2019s _Gods in Exile_. (\u201c_Unter\nsolchen Umst\u00e4nden musste Mancher, dessen heilige Haine konfisciert waren,\nbei uns in Deutschland als Holzh\u00e4cker tagl\u00f6hnern und Bier trinken statt\nNektar._\u201d)\n\n[249] 361 A. sqq.\n\n[250] The author of the _De Placitis_ (882 B.) gives a very vague and\nslight account of the history of D\u00e6monology, probably from motives\nof Epicurean contempt, if one may judge from the curt sentence which\nconcludes his brief note:\u2014\u201cEpicurus admits none of these things.\u201d\u2014He\nmerely says that Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics asserted\nthe existence of spirits called \u201cD\u00e6mons,\u201d and adds that the same\nphilosophers also maintained the existence of Heroes some good, some\nbad. The distinction between good and bad does not apply to the D\u00e6mons.\nThe identical words of this passage in the _De Placitis_ are used by\nAthenagoras (_Legat: pro Christ._, cap. 21) to express a definite\nstatement about Thales, who is asserted to have been the first who made\nthe division into God, d\u00e6mons, heroes.\n\n[251] Plutarch has here preserved some very beautiful verses of\nEmpedocles, in which this punishment is described. Another fragment of\nverse from Empedocles (_De Exilio_, 607 C) depicts with equal force and\nbeauty the punishment by the D\u00e6mons of one who has been handed over to\nthem to atone for his crimes.\n\n[252] Here should be noted the tendency to assimilate the good D\u00e6mons to\nthe gods\u2014a tendency to which reference has already been made.\n\n[253] _De Defectu Orac._, 419 A.\n\n[254] _De Defectu Orac._, 419 A.\n\n[255] 419.\u2014Mrs. Browning could hardly have read the _De Defectu_ when\nshe stated that her fine poem \u201cThe Dead Pan\u201d was \u201cpartly founded on a\nwell-known tradition mentioned in a treatise of Plutarch (\u2018_De Oraculorum\nDefectu_\u2019), _according to which, at the hour of the Saviour\u2019s agony, a\ncry of \u2018Great Pan is dead!\u2019 swept across the waves in the hearing of\ncertain mariners,\u2014and the oracles ceased_.\u201d (It was one of the mariners\nwho uttered the cry, \u201cThe great Pan is dead!\u201d having been thrice\nrequested by a supernatural voice to do so. But such errors of detail are\nunimportant in view of the fact that the whole spirit of the story is\nmisunderstood by the poetess.)\n\n[256] So one may conjecture from the description given by Demetrius,\nwho \u201csailed to the least distant of these lonely islands, which had few\ninhabitants, and these all held sacred and inviolable by the Britons.\u201d\nPlutarch\u2019s Demetrius has been identified with \u201cDemetrius the Clerk\u201d who\ndedicated, \u201cto the gods of the imperial Palace,\u201d a bronze tablet now in\nthe Museum at York.\u2014See King\u2019s translation of the _Theosophical Essays_\nin the \u201cBohn\u201d series, p. 22.\n\n[257] 420 B.\n\n[258] 360 D.\n\n[259] 361 E. We shall see elsewhere that, just as a good D\u00e6mon may\nbe promoted to the rank of a god, so a good man may be lifted to the\nstatus of a D\u00e6mon, like Hesiod\u2019s people of the Golden Age. (_De D\u00e6monio\nSocratis_, 593 D. Cf. _De Defectu Orac._, 415 B.)\n\n[260] 361 F. 364 E.\n\n[261] Cf. APULEIUS, _De Deo Socratis_.\u2014\u201cNeque enim pro majestate De\u00fbm\nc\u00e6lestium fuerit, ut eorum quisquam vel Annibali somnium pingat,\nvel Flaminio hostiam conroget, vel Accio N\u00e6vio avem velificet, vel\nsibyll\u00e6 fatiloquia versificet, etc. Non est oper\u00e6 Diis superis ad h\u00e6c\ndescendere. Quad cuncta\u201d (he says elsewhere) \u201cc\u00e6lestium voluntate et\nnumine et auctoritate, sed D\u00e6monum obsequio et opera et ministerio fieri\narbitrandum est.\u201d\n\n[262] _De \u0395 apud Delphos_, 394 A.\n\n[263] _De Fato_, 572 F, sqq.\u2014Bernardakis \u201cstars\u201d this tract as doubtfully\nPlutarch\u2019s. But the passage quoted, at any rate, is not discrepant from\nPlutarch\u2019s views elsewhere, though expressing them more concisely, and\nwith more appearance of system than usual with him. The similarity to\nPlato\u2019s tripartite division of the heavenly powers in the _Tim\u00e6us_ is, of\ncourse, evident, but the text has a note of sincerity which is lacking in\nthe Platonic passage.\n\n[264] _De Defectu_, 417 C. (For the verse quoted in the original, cf. W.\nCHRIST\u2019s _Pindar_, p. 232.)\n\n[265] 417 D.\n\n[266] The nearest approach to this identification is made by the\nmysterious stranger whom Cleombrotus finds near the Red Sea, who appeared\nonce every year among the people living in that neighbourhood, and who\ngave the pious traveller much information concerning D\u00e6mons and their\nways; which he was well fitted to do, as he spent most of his time in\ntheir company and that of the pastoral nymphs. He said that Python (whom\nApollo slew) was a d\u00e6mon; that the Titans were d\u00e6mons; that Saturn may\nhave been a d\u00e6mon. He then adds the significant words, \u201cThere is nothing\nto wonder at if we apply to certain D\u00e6mons the traditional titles of the\ngods, since a D\u00e6mon who is assigned to a particular god, deriving from\nhim his authority and prerogatives, is usually called by the name of that\nsame god\u201d (421 E). But this somewhat daring testimony is, we are not\nsurprised to find, preceded by a hint that in these matters we are to\ndrink from a goblet of mingled fact and fancy.\u2014(421 A.)\n\n[267] _De Defectu Orac._, 426 D.\n\n[268] _Isis and Osiris_, 360 E.\n\n[269] _Isis and Osiris_, 360 F.\n\n[270] _Isis and Osiris_, 361 C. The passage in the \u201cBanquet\u201d referred to\nhas been already quoted (see p. 123).\n\n[271] It would be otiose to illustrate by examples the universal and\nsplendid fame of the Delphic oracle. One may perhaps be given which is\nnot commonly quoted. Pliny the elder, who in one passage sneeringly\nincludes the _oraculorum pr\u00e6scita_ among the _fulgurum monitus,\nauruspicum pr\u00e6dicta, atque etiam parva dictu, in auguriis sternutamenta\net offensiones pedum_, by means of which men have endeavoured to discover\nhints of divine guidance, nevertheless, in another passage, quotes two\nwise oracles as having been \u201cvelut ad castigandam hominum vanitatem a Deo\nemissa.\u201d (Lib. ii. cap. 5, and vii. cap. 47.)\u2014The political, religious,\nand moral influence of the Delphic oracle has been exhaustively dealt\nwith by Wilhelm G\u00f6tte in the work already cited (see p. 127, _note_), and\nby Bouch\u00e9-Leclerq in the third volume of his \u201c_Histoire de la Divination\ndans l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9_.\u201d On the general question of divination it would,\nperhaps, be superfluous to consult anything beyond this monumental work,\nwith its exhaustive references and its philosophic style of criticism.\n\n[272] JUVENAL: _Sat._ vi. 555.\n\n[273] LUCAN, v. 111, sq.\n\n[274]\n\n                    \u2014\u201cMuto Parnassus hiatu\n    Conticuit, pressitque Deum: seu spiritus istas\n    Destituit fauces, mundique in devia versum\n    Duxit iter: seu barbarica cum lampade Pytho\n    Arsit, in immensas cineres abiere cavernas,\n    Et Ph\u0153bi tenuere viam: seu sponte Deorum\n    Cirrha silet fatique sat est arcana futuri\n    Carmine long\u00e6v\u00e6 vobis commissa Sibyll\u00e6:\n    Seu P\u00e6an solitus templis arcere nocentes,\n    Ora quibus solvat nostro non invenit \u00e6vo.\u201d\n\n[275] The main argument of the third and shortest of the Delphic tracts\nhas been already given. A brief description of its contents is added by\nway of note, to show its connexion with the two larger tracts. The tract\ntakes the form of a letter from Plutarch to Serapion, who acts as a means\nof communication between Plutarch and other common friends. Its object is\nto ascertain why the letter \u0395 was held in such reverence at the Delphic\nshrine. A series of explanations is propounded, probably representing\nviews current on the subject, varying, as they do, from those proper\nto the common people to those which could only have been the views\nof logicians or mathematicians. Theon, a close friend of Plutarch\u2019s,\nmaintains that the syllable is the symbol of the logical attributes of\nthe God, Logic, whose basis is \u0395\u03b9 (\u201cif\u201d), being the process by which\nphilosophical truth is arrived at. \u201cIf, then, Philosophy is concerned\nwith Truth, and the light of Truth is Demonstration, and the principle\nof Demonstration is Connexion, it is with good reason that the faculty\nwhich includes and gives effect to this process has been consecrated\nby philosophers to the god whose special charge is Truth.\u201d... \u201cWhence,\nI will not be dissuaded from the assertion that this is the _Tripod of\nTruth_, namely, Reason, which recognizing that the consequent follows\nfrom the antecedent, and then taking into consideration the original\nbasis of fact, thus arrives at the conclusion of the demonstration.\nHow can we be surprised if the Pythian God, in his predilection for\nLogic, is specially attentive to this aspect of Reason, to which he sees\nphilosophers are devoted in the highest degree?\u201d This connexion of Reason\nwith Religion, a familiar process in Plutarch, is followed by a \u201clist\nof the arithmetical and mathematical praises of the letter \u0395\u201d involving\nPythagorean speculations, and the culmination of the whole piece lies\nin the splendid vindication by Ammonius of the Unity and Self-Existence\nand Eternity of the Deity. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his\nargument is the assignation to Apollo of the functions of the Supreme\nDeity: an easy method of bringing Philosophy and Mythology to terms; a\nmode of operation perhaps not unaffected by that Mithraic worship which,\non its classical side, was to culminate in Julian\u2019s famous prayer to\nHelios. The tract also furnishes, as already stated, a clear example of\nthe method by which the literal terms known in the worship of Dionysus\nand Apollo are refined from their grosser elements and idealized by\nthe subtleties of the philosophic intellect, which then accepts them\nas appropriate designations for the various functions of the God. The\npleasant seriousness, too, of all the interlocutors is worthy of note, as\npresenting a type of religious discussion of whose calmness and dignity\nthe modern world knows little. It would be interesting, for example, to\nhear a group of classical philosophers discuss the excommunication of\nProfessor Mivart by Cardinal Vaughan, or of Tolstoi by Pobedonostzeff.\n\n[276] This Diogenianus does not appear to be identical with the\nDiogenianus of Pergamos, twice mentioned in the _Symposiacs_, although\nBernardakis does not distinguish them in his Index.\n\n[277] Philinus was an intimate friend of Plutarch\u2019s (_Symposiacs_, 727\nB; _De Sollertia Animalium_, 976 B); and, except in this Dialogue and\nin the _De Soll. Anim._, appears only as taking his part in the social\nintercourse of the _Symposiacs_, and as contributing his share to the\ndiscussion of the various quaint and curious problems forming so large\na portion of the \u201cTable Talk\u201d of Plutarch and his friends. He has\nPythagorean tendencies; eats no flesh (727 B); objects to a rich and\nvaried diet, being of opinion that simple food is more easily digestible\n(660 F); explains somewhat crudely why Homer calls salt \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 (685 D);\nproves that Alexander the Great was a hard drinker (623 E); explains\nwhy Pythagoras advised his followers to throw their bedclothes into\nconfusion on getting up (728 B, C); and tells a story of a wonderful tame\ncrocodile which lay in bed like a human being (_De Soll. Anim._, 976 B).\nA very charming account of Plutarch\u2019s friends has been given by M. A.\nChenevi\u00e8re, in his \u201c_De Plutarchi familiaribus_,\u201d written as a Litt.D.\nthesis for a French University in 1886.\n\n[278] 395 A.\n\n[279] 396 D. Cf. _Symposiacs_, 628 A.\n\n[280] 396 E. Boethus, a genial and witty man, with whom, notwithstanding\nhis Epicureanism, Plutarch lives on terms of intimate social intercourse.\nIn _Symposiacs_, 673 C, Boethus, now described as an Epicurean _sans\nphrase_, entertains, in Athens, Plutarch, Sossius Senecio, and a number\nof men of his own sect. After dinner the company discuss the interesting\nquestion why we take pleasure in a dramatic representation of passions\nwhose exhibition in real life would shock and distress us. At another\ntime he appears, together with Plutarch and a few other friends, at a\ndinner given by Ammonius, then _Strategos_ at Athens for the third time,\nand explains, upon principles of Epicurean Science (_Symposiacs_, 720 F),\nwhy sounds are more audible at night than by day.\n\n[281] 396 F.\n\n[282] See note, p. 149.\n\n[283] Cf. CICERO: _De Divinatione_, ii. 50.\u2014\u201c_Quis est enim, qui totum\ndiem jaculans, non aliquando collineet? Totas noctes dormimus; neque ulla\nfere est, qua non somniemus: et miramur, aliquando id, quod somniarimus,\nevadere? Quid est tam incertum quam talorum jactus? tamen nemo est quin,\ns\u00e6pe jactans, venereum jaciat aliquando, nonnumquam etiam iterum, ac\ntertium_,\u201d _&c._ Also ii. 971.\u2014\u201c_Casus autem innumerabilibus p\u00e6ne seculis\nin omnibus plura mirabilia quam in somniorum visis effecerit._\u201d\n\n[284] 399.\n\n[285] Cf. HERODOTUS: ii. 135.\n\n[286] 401 E.\n\n[287] \u201cPyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat.\u201d\u2014CICERO: _De\nDiv._, ii. 56. Plutarch, however, is able to say, \u201cEven nowadays some\noracles are published in verse,\u201d and to cite a very interesting instance\n(_De Pyth. Orac._, 404 A).\n\n[288] 408 C, D.\n\n[289] 409 D.\n\n[290] 404 C.\n\n[291] _Lamprias._ The writer of this letter to \u201cTerentius Priscus\u201d is\naddressed by the name of \u201cLamprias\u201d in the course of the dialogue (413\nE). This Terentius is not mentioned elsewhere by Plutarch, but one may\nventure the guess that he was one of the friends whom, as in the case\nof Lucius the Etrurian, and Sylla the Carthaginian, Plutarch had met at\nRome (_Symposiacs_, 727 B). Sylla and Lucius, whom we know to have been\non intimate terms with Plutarch, are interlocutors in the dialogue _De\nFacie in Orbe Lun\u00e6_, and one of them uses the same form of address to\nthe writer of that dialogue as is employed by Ammonius in this passage\n(940 F). There is not the faintest doubt as to the genuineness of either\nof these two dialogues, and it is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that\nPlutarch, desiring perhaps to pay a compliment to a relative, veils his\nown personality in this way: \u201cOmnium familiarium et propinquorum ante\nceteros omnes Lampriam fratrem, et ejusdem nominis avum Lampriam, eos\nimprimis fuisse qui Plutarchi amicitiam memoriamque obtinuerint, nobis\napparet\u201d (_De Plutarchi Familiaribus_\u2014CHENEVI\u00c8RE). He pays a similar\ncompliment to his friend Theon, who sums up and concludes the argument\nof the _De Pythi\u00e6 Oraculis_. (For the closeness of Theon\u2019s intimacy with\nPlutarch, see especially _Consolatio ad Uxorem_, 610 B, and _Symposiacs_,\n725 F.) Cf. GR\u00c9ARD\u2019S _La Morale de Plutarque_, p. 303: \u201cPlutarque a\nses proc\u00e9d\u00e9s, qu\u2019on arrive \u00e0 conna\u00eetre. D\u2019ordinaire ils consistent \u00e0\naccorder successivement la parole aux d\u00e9fenseurs des syst\u00e8mes extr\u00e8mes\net \u00e0 r\u00e9server la conclusion au principal personnage du dialogue. Or\nce personnage est presque toujours celui qui a pos\u00e9 la th\u00e8se; et le\nplus souvent il se trouve avoir avec Plutarque lui-m\u00eame un lien de\nparent\u00e9.\u201d\u2014Plutarch delights to such an extent to bring his friends into\nhis works, that it has even been suggested that no work is authentic\nwithout this distinguishing mark. Readers of Plutarch know that one\ncharacteristic of his style is the avoidance of hiatus, and that he puts\nhimself to all kinds of trouble to secure this object. In this connexion,\nChenevi\u00e8re remarks: \u201cMirum nobis visum est quod, ne in uno quidem\nlibrorum quos hiatus causa G. Benseler Plutarcho abjudicavit, nullius\namici nomen offenditur. Scripta autem qu\u00e6 nullo hiatu f\u0153data demonstrat,\nvel amico cuidam dicata, vel nominibus amicorum sunt distincta.\u201d (The\nwork by Benseler referred to is, of course, his _De Hiatu in Oratoribus\nAtticis et Historicis Gr\u00e6cis_.)\n\n[292] Plutarch does not, of course, wish to convey the suggestion that\nApollo\u2019s shrine is still the centre of the earth, and that Britain is\nas far away in one direction as the Red Sea is in another. The oracle\u2019s\nrepulse of Epimenides, who wished to be certain on the point, indicates\nthat the question is one surrounded with difficulty, and that the wise\nman will do best to leave it alone. Bouch\u00e9-Leclerq has a startling\ncomment: \u201c_Plutarque ajoute que, de son temps, la mesure avait \u00e9t\u00e9\nverifi\u00e9e par deux voyageurs partis l\u2019un de la Grande Bretagne et l\u2019autre\ndu fond de la mer Rouge_\u201d (_La Divination_, iii. p. 80).\n\n[293] 410 A, B. Cf. note, p. 90.\n\n[294] 411 E.\n\n[295] The cessation of the oracles was only comparative. WOLFF, in his\n_De Novissima Oraculorum \u00c6tate_, examines the history of each oracle\nseparately, and comes to a conclusion that the oracles were not silent\neven in the age of Porphyry (born A.D. 232): \u201c_Nondum obmutuisse numina\nfatidica Porphyrii tempore. Vera enim ille deorum responsa censuit; qu\u00e6\nChristianis opposuit, ne soli doctrinam divinitus accepisse viderentur._\u201d\nStrabo alludes to the failure of the oracle at Dodona, and adds that\nthe rest were silent too (STRABO: vii. 6, 9). Cicero alludes with great\ncontempt to the silence of the Delphic oracles in his own times: \u201c_Sed,\nquod caput est, cur isto modo jam oracula Delphis non eduntur, non modo\nnostr\u00e2 \u00e6tate, sed jamdiu; ut modo nihil possit esse contemtius? Hoc loco\nquum urgentur evanuisse aiunt vetustate vim loci ejus, unde anhelitus\nille terr\u00e6 fieret, quo Pythia, mente incitata, oracula ederet.... Quando\nautem ista vis evanuit? An postquam homines minus creduli esse c\u0153perunt_\u201d\n(_De Div._, ii. 57). When Cicero wrote this passage he had probably\nforgotten the excellent advice which the oracle had once given him when\nhe went to Delphi to consult it (PLUT.: _Cicero_, cap. 5).\n\n[296] 412 D.\n\n[297] Some of these points of grammar which attracted the scorn of\nHeracleon were whether \u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9 loses a \u03bb in the future; and what were\nthe positives from which the comparatives \u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd and \u03b2\u03ad\u03bb\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, and the\nsuperlatives \u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd and \u03b2\u03ad\u03bb\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd were formed (412 E).\u2014\u201c_Quelques\nann\u00e9es apr\u00e8s les guerres m\u00e9diques, le pinceau de Polygnote couvrit la\nLesch\u00e9 des Cnidiens \u00e0 Delphes de sc\u00e8nes emprunt\u00e9es au monde infernal._\u201d\n(Bouch\u00e9-Leclerq: iii. 153.)\u2014It would have been more interesting to a\nmodern student if Heracleon had replied that the pictures of Polygnotus\nwere quite sufficient to keep one mentally alert, and had seized the\nopportunity to give us an exact description of the scenes depicted\nand the meaning they conveyed to the men of his time. \u201c\u2018Not all the\ntreasures,\u2019 as Homer has it, \u2018which the stone threshold of the Far-darter\nholds safe within, would now,\u2019 as Mr. Myers says, \u2018be so precious to us\nas the power of looking for one hour on the greatest work by the greatest\npainter of antiquity, the picture by Polygnotus in the Hall of the\nCnidians at Delphi, of the descent of Odysseus among the dead.\u2019\u201d\n\n[298] Didymus, \u201csurnamed Planetiades,\u201d is a picturesque figure, evidently\ndrawn from life. It is interesting to compare his attitude with that\nimposed upon the ideal cynic of Epictetus: \u201cIt is his duty then to be\nable with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on\nthe tragic stage to say, like Socrates, \u2018Men, whither are you hurrying?\nwhat are you doing, wretches? Like blind people you are wandering up and\ndown: you are going by another road, and have left the true road: you\nseek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another\nshows you where they are you do not believe him\u2019\u201d (LONG\u2019s _Epictetus_,\np. 251). Planetiades certainly endeavours to play this _r\u00f4le_ on the\noccasion in question, though he is doubtless as far below the stoic ideal\nas he is above the _soi-disant_ cynics whom Dion met at ALEXANDRIA.\n\n[299] Cf. BLOUNT: _Apollonius of Tyana_, p. 37. Blount collects a number\nof ancient and modern parallels to the thought of Plutarch here. HORACE,\n_Epist._ i. 16. 59, readily occurs to the memory. (For the Pindaric\nfragment, see W. Christ, p. 225.)\n\n[300] 413 D.\n\n[301] \u201cPlutarch does not mean to say that Greece was not able at all to\nfurnish 3000 men capable of arms, but that if burgess armies of the old\nsort were to be formed they would not be in a position to set on foot\n3000 \u2018hoplites.\u2019\u201d\u2014MOMMSEN.\n\n[302] 414 C.\n\n[303] 417 A, B. Cf. _De Facie in Orbe Lun\u00e6_, 944 C, D.\n\n[304] 431 B.\n\n[305] 436 F.\n\n[306] 437 F.\n\n[307] _De Pythi\u00e6 Orac._, 398 B.\n\n[308] _De Defectu Orac._, 418 E.\n\n[309] _De Defectu Orac._, 438 D.\n\n[310] Plutarch, in reply to Boethus the Epicurean, uses an interesting\nexample to illustrate the two opposite views maintained on this point.\n\u201cEven you yourself here are beneficially influenced, it would seem, by\nwhat Epicurus wrote and spoke three centuries ago; and yet you are of\nopinion that God could not supply a Principle of Motion or a Cause of\nFeeling, unless He took and shut Himself up in each individual thing and\nbecame an intermingled portion of its essence\u201d (398 B, C).\n\n[311] \u201cAs to Plutarch\u2019s theology, he was certainly a monotheist. He\nprobably had some vague belief in inferior deities (demons he would have\ncalled them) as holding a place like that filled by angels and evil\nspirits in the creed of most Christians; _yet it is entirely conceivable\nthat his occasional references to these deities are due merely to the\nconventional rhetoric of his age_\u201d (ANDREW P. PEABODY: Introduction to\na translation\u2014already referred to\u2014of the _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_).\nIt is a little difficult to be patient with the ignorance displayed in\nthe italicized part of this citation. That Plutarch\u2019s \u201creferences to\nthese deities\u201d are not \u201coccasional\u201d is a matter of fact; that they are\nnot \u201cdue merely to conventional rhetoric\u201d it is hoped that the analysis\nin the text\u2014incomplete as it may be in other respects\u2014has at least made\nsufficiently clear. It is, however, gratifying to find that this American\ntranslator, unlike Dr. Super, of Chicago, recognizes that Plutarch \u201cwas\ncertainly a monotheist.\u201d\n\n[312] Plutarch found the existence of the D\u00e6mons recognized in each\nof the three spheres which contributed to the formation of religious\nbeliefs\u2014in philosophy, in popular tradition, and in law. STOB\u00c6US: _Tit._\n44, 20 (\u201c_On Laws and Customs_\u201d\u2014_Tauchnitz_ edition of 1838, vol. ii.\np. 164) has an interesting quotation, headed \u201c_Preamble of the Laws of\nZaleucus_,\u201d in which the following passage occurs:\u2014\u201cIf an Evil D\u00e6mon\ncome to any man, tempting him to Vice, let him spend his time near\ntemples, and altars, and sacred shrines, fleeing from Vice as from\nan impious and cruel mistress, and let him pray the gods to deliver\nhim from her power.\u201d Zaleucus may, of course, have been embodying the\nteaching of his Pythagorean colleagues, but the fact remains that the\nbelief in the influence of D\u00e6mons on human life received the authority\nof a celebrated system of law, unless we are to be more incredulous than\nCicero himself\u2014_Quis Zaleucum leges scripsisse non dixit?_ (_Ad Atticum_,\nvi. 1).\u2014(\u201cHis code is stated to have been the first collection of written\nlaws that the Greeks possessed.\u201d\u2014_Smaller Classical Dictionary_, Smith\nand Marindin, 1898.)\n\n[313] _Adversus Coloten_, 1124 D. The religious value of the belief in\nD\u00e6monology is indicated in an interesting passage in the \u201c_De Iside et\nOsiride_\u201d in which Isis, by her sufferings, is described as \u201chaving given\na sacred lesson of consolation to men and women involved in similar\nsorrows.\u201d 361 E. (In the next sentence she and Osiris are raised from the\nd\u00e6monic rank to the divine.)\n\n[314] Accepting Bernardakis\u2019 first emendation\u2014\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2. 580 A.\n\n[315] 581 F.\u2014Phidolaus would not have been at home among Xenophon\u2019s\ntroops (_Anabasis_, iii. 2, 9).\n\n[316] 588 C, D.\n\n[317] 588 E.\n\n[318] 589 D.\n\n[319] 586 A.\n\n[320] 589 F.\n\n[321] 591 A.\n\n[322] 594.\n\n[323] _De Defectu_, 415 B, C. In the _De Facie qu\u00e6 apparet_ the connexion\nbetween mankind and the d\u00e6mons in described in similar terms to those\nemployed in the _De D\u00e6monio Socratis_. The D\u00e6mons do not spend all their\ntime on the moon; they take charge of oracles, assist at initiatory\nrites, punish evildoers, help men in battle and at sea, and for any want\nof fairness or competence in the discharge of these duties they are\npunished by being driven again to earth to enter human bodies once more\n(944 D; cf. 944 C).\n\n[324] That this truth is one which appeals to the Imagination more\ncogently than to the Reason, resembling in that respect the belief in the\nsoul\u2019s immortality, is evident to Plutarch. It is on this account that he\nillustrates it by Myth instead of arguing it by Reason, and takes every\nprecaution to prevent his readers from regarding it as a complete and\nfinal presentation of a logically irrefutable belief.\n\n[325] _Non posse suaviter_, &c., 1101 B, C.\n\n[326] 1101 D.\n\n[327] 1102 B.\n\n[328] _De Audiendis Poetis_ 34 B.\n\n[329] _Conjugalia Pr\u00e6cepta_, 140 D. Champagny sees a reference here to\nChristianity. But why not also in PLATO\u2019s _Laws_, 674 F, and 661 C?\u2014It\nis quite in harmony with Plutarch\u2019s love of openness in Religion that to\nthe general reticence displayed by the Greeks on the subject of their\nreligious Mysteries, he seems to add a personal reticence peculiarly his\nown. Considering how anxiously he hovers about the question of the soul\u2019s\nimmortality (see above, p. 118, and cf. _Consolatio ad Apollonium_, 120\nB, C: \u201c_If, as is probable, there is any truth in the sayings of ancient\npoets and philosophers ... then must you cherish fair hopes of your\ndear departed son_\u201d\u2014a passage curiously similar in form and thought to\nTACITUS, _Agric._ 46: \u201c_Si quis piorum manibus locus, si, ut sapientibus\nplacet_,\u201d _&c._), it is remarkable that only once\u2014and then under the\nstress of a bitter domestic bereavement\u2014does he specifically quote the\nMysteries (those of Dionysus) as inculcating that doctrine (_Ad Uxorem_,\n611 D). His adoption of an unknown writer\u2019s beautiful comparison of Sleep\nto the Lesser Mysteries of Death (_Consol. ad Apoll._, 107 E), and his\nrepetition of the same idea elsewhere (see above, p. 118), may also be\nindications how naturally the teaching of the Mysteries suggested the\nidea of immortality. But he most frequently alludes to the Mysteries\nas secret sources of information for the identification of nominally\ndifferent deities (_De Iside et Osiride_, 364 E), or for the assignation\nof their proper functions to the D\u00e6mons (_De Defectu_, 417 C), who are\nregarded as responsible for what Mr. Andrew Lang (\u201cMyth, Ritual, and\nReligion,\u201d _passim_) calls \u201cthe barbaric and licentious part of the\nperformances\u201d (_De Iside et Osiride_, 360 E, F). We should perhaps\nconclude, from the few indications which Plutarch gives of his views on\nthis subject, that he regarded the Mysteries in a twofold light; they\nwere a source of religious instruction, or consolation, respecting the\nfuture state of the soul, and they were also a means of explaining and\njustifying the crude legends which so largely intermingled with the purer\nelements of Greek religion. Though, as Plutarch hints, many of these\nbarbaric legends were not suited to discussion by the profane, yet the\nmind, when purified by sacred rites, and educated to the apprehension of\nsacred meanings, could grasp the high and pure significance of things\nwhich were a stumbling-block to the uninitiated, and could make them an\naid to a loftier moral life.\n\n[330] \u201c_Das eigentlich einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt- und\nMenschengeschichte, dem alle \u00fcbrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der\nConflict des Unglaubens und des Aberglaubens._\u201d\u2014GOETHE, _West\u00f6stlicher\nDivan_ (quoted by THOLUCK).\n\n[331] 165 C.\n\n[332] 165 D.\n\n[333] BERNARDAKIS adopts Bentley\u2019s emendation \u03b2\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2, which _might_\nbe an allusion to Christianity, but would more probably refer to such\na process as that already described in the words \u03b2\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03b5\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03b8\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd. We have previously discussed the general question involved\n(see p. 45), but may here add the opinion of so unprejudiced a Christian\nwriter as Archbishop Trench, \u201c_strange to say. Christianity is to him\n(Plutarch) utterly unknown._\u201d\u2014(See also note, p. 202).\n\n[334] 166 B.\n\n[335] 166 B.\n\n[336] 168 F.\n\n[337] Bello primo, Aristodemum Messeniorum regem per superstitionem\nanimum ac spes omnes despondisse, seque ipsum interfecisse, narrat etiam\nPausanias, iv. 3.\u2014WYTTENBACH.\n\n[338] 169 C. _Iliad_, vii. 193, 194.\n\n[339] 170 A. Trench quotes Seneca _Epist._, 123\u2014\u201cQuid enim interest utrum\ndeos neges, an infames?\u201d\n\n[340] 170 F.\n\n[341] To the numerous citations made by Gr\u00e9ard (p. 209), we may add an\nexpression of opinion by Dr. Tholuck, given with special reference to\nPlutarch\u2019s views on Superstition:\u2014\u201cWir haben in Alterthum einen hohen\nGeist, Plutarch, welcher dem, was das Alterthum Aberglaube nannte, viele\nBetrachtungen gewidmet hat, dem Gegenstande zwar nicht auf den Grund\ngekommen, _aber in der Betrachtuug desselben doch so tiefe religi\u00f6se\nWahrheiten ausgesprochen_, dass wir nicht umhin k\u00f6nnen, ihn hier\nausf\u00fchrlicher dem Leser vorzuf\u00fchren\u201d (_Ueber Aberglauben und Unglauben_).\n\n[342] WYTTENBACH bases this possibility on the 150th entry in the\nLamprian catalogue, \u201c_On Superstition, against Epicurus._\u201d (Entry No. 155\nin the catalogue as given in BERNARDAKIS, vol. vii. pp. 473-7.) But the\ndiscussion on this point in the _Non posse suaviter_ forms so important a\npart of that tract that the title \u201c_On Superstition, against Epicurus_\u201d\nwould be no inapt title for the whole treatise.\n\n[343] The view taken in the text as to the character of this strenuous\nand noble sermon on _Superstition_ is, of course, quite at variance with\nthe opinion of Prof. Mahaffy, who regards it as \u201cone of those sophistical\nexercises practised by every one in that age\u2014I mean, the defence of a\nparadox with subtlety and ingenuity, _taking little account of sober\ntruth in comparison with dialectical plausibility_.\u201d\u2014_Greeks under Roman\nSway_, p. 318.\n\n[344] _Pharsalia_, viii. 831.\n\n[345] APULEIUS, _Meta_: Lib. xi. Lucius (a descendant of Plutarch, by the\nway), in his pious gratitude, enters the service of the goddess who had\n_uncharmed_ him.\u2014Rursus donique, quam raso capillo, _collegi vetustissimi\net sub illis Sull\u00e6 temporibus conditi_ munia, non obumbrato vel obtecto\ncalvitio, sed quoquoversus obvio, gaudens obibam.\n\n[346] 364 E.\n\n[347] 354 C.\n\n[348] 355 B.\n\n[349] Cf. _De Pyth. Orac._, 400 A.\n\n[350] 355 D.\n\n[351] 358 E. Mr. Andrew Lang justly remarks, \u201cWhy these myths should be\nconsidered \u2018more blasphemous\u2019 than the rest does not appear\u201d (_Myth,\nRitual, and Religion_, vol. ii. pp. 116, 117).\n\n[352] 358 F. This is a difficult passage. It seems necessary to\nread \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 for \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 (cf. \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ae \u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f36\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd,\n_Amatorius_, 765 E), but even then the meaning is difficult to elicit,\nand it is not confidently claimed that the rendering in the text has\nelicited it. Three translations are appended: \u201c_For as mathematicians\nassure us that the rainbow is nothing else but a variegated image of\nthe sun, thrown upon the sight by the reflexion of his beams from the\nclouds, so ought we to look upon the present story as the representation,\nor reflexion rather, of something real as its true cause_\u201d (Plutarchi\n_De Iside et Osiride_ Liber: Gr\u00e6ce et Anglice, by SAMUEL SQUIRE,\nA.M., Cambridge, 1744).\u2014\u201c_Und so wie die Naturforscher den Regenbogen\nf\u00fcr ein Gegenbild der Sonne erkl\u00e4ren, das durch das Zur\u00fccktreten der\nErscheinung an die Wolke bunt wird, so ist hier die Sage das Gegenbild\neiner Wahrheit, welche ihre Bedeutung auf etwas anderes hin abspiegelt_\u201d\n(Plutarch _\u00fcber Isis und Osiris_ herausgegeben von G. PARTHEY, Berlin,\n1850).\u2014_Legendum \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 vel \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, ut Reisk._ \u201c_Et quemadmodum\nmathematici arcum c\u00e6lestem Solis tradunt esse imaginem variatam visus\nad nubem reflexu: Sic fabula hoc loco indicium est orationis alio\nreflectentis intellectum._\u201d\u2014WYTTENBACH.\n\n[353] _Myth, Ritual, and Religion_, vol. ii. p. 120.\n\n[354] In our spelling of this name we use the freedom of choice so\ngraciously accorded by Xylander\u2014_Si Euhemerus mavis, non repugno._\n\n[355] _De Placitis Philosophorum_, 880 D. Cf. CICERO, _De Natura\nDeorum_. i. 42. \u201cAb Euhemero autem et mortes et sepultur\u00e6 demonstrantur\ndeorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem, an penitus\ntotam sustulisse?\u201d See MAYOR\u2019s note on this passage. The references to\nLactantius and Eusebius and many others bearing on the question are\ncollected by Corsini in his first dissertation on the _De Placitis_.\nZimmerman is very indignant with Plutarch on account of the charge here\nbrought against Euhemerus and Diagoras, and has defended them against\nour author with great energy and spirit. (_Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen\nqua Euemerus Messenius et Diagoras Melius ab Atheismo contra Plutarchum\naliosque defenduntur._)\n\n[356] 360 A.\n\n[357] The language here seems curiously outspoken in view of the now\nestablished apotheosis of the Emperors.\n\n[358] 360 D.\n\n[359] 356, 357. Cf. _De D\u00e6dalis Plat\u00e6ensibus_.\n\n[360] 364 A.\n\n[361] 366 C.\n\n[362] 364 D.\n\n[363] 367 D.\n\n[364] 368 D.\n\n[365] 369 C. It is clear from a careful examination of the text that\nPlutarch gives only a critical examination of this theory: he does not\nadopt it as his own, as has frequently been asserted.\n\n[366] 369 D. \u201cIt is impossible,\u201d argued these ancient thinkers, \u201cthat\nmoral life and death, that good and evil, can flow from a single source.\nIt is impossible that a Holy God can have been the author of evil. Evil,\nthen, must be referred to some other origin: it must have had an author\nof its own.\u201d\u2014\u201c_Some Elements of Religion_,\u201d by Canon LIDDON (Lecture iv.\nsect. i.).\n\n[367] 370 E.\n\n[368] 371 A.\n\n[369] See especially the quotations from Plato in 370 F, and the\napplication of Platonic terms in the interpretation of the Isiac and\nOsirian myth in 372 E, F, 373 and 374. Hesiod, too, is made to agree\nwith this Platonic explanation of the Egyptian legend (374 C), and the\nPlatonic notion of matter is strained to allow of its being identified\nwith Isis (372 E, 374 F). In 367 C, a parallelism is pointed out between\nStoic theology and an interpretation of the myth; and in 367 E the death\nof Osiris on the 17th of the month is used to illustrate, if not to\nexplain, the Pythagorean \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 of that number.\n\nAs regards the identification of particular deities in this tract,\nreference may be made to 364 E, F and 365 A, B, where Dionysus is\nidentified with Osiris; and to 365 F, where Mnaseas of Patara is\nmentioned with approval as associating with Epaphus, not only Dionysus,\nbut Serapis and Osiris also. Anticleides is also referred to as asserting\nthat Isis was the daughter of Prometheus and the wife of Dionysus. In 372\nD, Osiris is identified with the Sun under the name of Sirius, and Isis\nwith the Moon, in 375, a fanciful philology is called in to aid a further\nidentification of Greek and Egyptian deities; but not much importance\nis attached to similarities derived in this way. In the next sentence\nIsis is stated to have been identified with Athene by the Egyptians; and\nthe general principle of identity is boldly stated in 377 C:\u2014\u201c_It is\nquite legitimate to regard these gods as common possessions and not the\nexclusive property of the Egyptians\u2014Isis and the deities that go in her\ntrain are universally known and worshipped. The names, indeed, of certain\nof them have been borrowed from the Egyptians, not so long ago; but their\ndivinity has been known and recognized for ages._\u201d\n\n[370] 378 A.\n\n[371] There is a strain of mysticism in the _De Osiride_ which is alien\nfrom the cheerful common sense which usually marks Plutarch; a remark\nwhich also applies to the _De Facie qu\u00e6 apparet in Orbe Lun\u00e6_. But the\nsame strain appears in others of his authentic tracts, though mostly\noperating through the medium of Platonic dreams and myths, _e.g._ the\nstory of Thespesius in the _Sera Num. Vindic._, and that of Timarchus in\nthe _De D\u00e6monio Socratis_. Besides, one would not ceteris paribus deny\nthe authenticity of Browning\u2019s \u201c_Childe Roland_\u201d because he had written\n\u201c_The Guardian Angel_,\u201d or that of \u201c_The Antiquary_\u201d because Scott was\nalso the author of \u201c_The Monastery_.\u201d The tract was probably composed\nafter that return from Alexandria to which Plutarch so charmingly alludes\nin _Sympos._, 678 C. Moreover, the very nature of the subject, and the\npriestly character of the lady to whom it was addressed, as well as\nthe mysterious nature of the goddess whose ministrant she was, are all\nparts of a natural inducement to mysticism. We must admit that Plutarch\nhere participates in that spirit of mysticism which, always inherent in\nPlatonism, was kept in check by his acutely practical bent, to be revived\nand exaggerated to the destruction of practical ethics in the dreams and\nabstractions of the Neo-Platonists.\n\n[372] A very slight acquaintance with Plutarch\u2019s writings will serve\nto dispose of the charge of Atheism brought against him by Zimmerman,\nthe professor of Theology in the Gymnasium of Zurich:\u2014Credo equidem\nPlutarchum inter eos fuisse qui cum Cicerone crediderint eos qui dant\nphilosophi\u00e6 operam non arbitrari Deos esse.\u2014It is true that Zimmerman\nsupports his case by quoting the pseudo-Plutarchean _De Placitis_ (Idem\nde providentia non minus male loquitur quam ipsi Epicurei), and seems\nhimself afraid to accept the conclusion of his own demonstrations:\u2014Atheum\neum fuisse non credo, sed quomodo asserere potuerit Superstitione\nAtheismum tolerabiliorem esse, simul tamen eos, quos atheos fuisse minime\nprobare potuit, Superstitioni autem inimicissimos, omnem malorum mundum\nintulisse, consociare nequeo.\u2014But the learned author is too intent on\nexculpating _Noster Euhemerus_ from Plutarch\u2019s \u201cinjustice\u201d to have\njustice to spare for Plutarch himself.\u2014(J. J. ZIMMERMAN, _Epistola ad\nNonnen_). Gr\u00e9ard quotes other authors of this charge against Plutarch (p.\n269).\u2014We cannot allow this opportunity to pass of protesting against the\nattitude of those who assumed, even in the Nineteenth Century, that it\nwas a sign either of moral depravity, or mental incapacity, in Plutarch\nnot to have been a believer in the Christian faith. Even Archbishop\nTrench, who admits, concerning such writers as our author, that \u201cmany\nwere by them enabled to live their lives after a far higher and nobler\nfashion than else they would have attained\u201d cannot rid himself of the\nnotion that had Plutarch actively opposed Christianity he would have\ncommitted an offence which our generosity might have pardoned, though our\njustice must recognize that it _needed_ pardon. \u201cPlutarch himself may\nbe entirely acquitted of any _conscious_ attempt to fight against that\ntruth which was higher than any which he had\u201d (p. 13).\u2014\u201cI have already\nmentioned that, _through no fault of his own_, he stood removed from all\nthe immediate influences of the Christian Church\u201d (p. 89). But suppose\nthe facts to have been just the opposite of those indicated in the words\nwe have italicized, it would involve the loss of all sense of historical\nperspective to draw the conclusion which would clearly have been drawn by\nTrench himself. The use of similar language by Prof. Mahaffy has already\nbeen noted. (Pref. p. xii.) The position assumed by writers who maintain\nthis view, is one quite inappropriate for historical discussion, and its\nnatural expression, if it must be expressed at all, is through the medium\nof such poetical aspirations as that breathed in the epigram of John, the\nMetropolitan of Euchaita:\u2014\n\n    \u201cIf any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall save\n    From wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,\n    Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the cause\n    Their speech supported: Thine, too, were the laws\n    Their hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blind\n    To recognize Thee Lord of human kind,\n    Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shown\n    To bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.\u201d\n\n[373] Dr. Martineau (_Types of Ethical Theory_, vol. i. p. 91) thinks\nthat \u201cwe must go a little further than Zeller, who decides that Plato\nusually conceived of God as if personal, yet was restrained by a doctrine\ninconsistent with such conception from approaching it closely or\nsetting it deliberately on any scientific ground,\u201d and devotes several\nclosely-reasoned pages to show that, although there was no room for\na personal god in Plato\u2019s philosophy, Plato himself was in distinct\nopposition to his own views as systematically expounded in his writings.\n\u201cWe may regard him as fully aware of the conditions of the problem,\nand, though unable to solve it without lesion of his dialectic, yet\ndeliberately pronouncing judgment on the side of his religious feeling.\u201d\nBut _pace tantorum virorum_ it will be admitted that the personality of\nGod is not very evident in Plato when those who understand him best can\nonly maintain that it is not essentially interwoven with his philosophy,\nhaving only an indirect and accidental existence which is not possible\n\u201cwithout lesion of his dialectic.\u201d\n\n[374] \u201cAbstractedly, the theology of the Stoics appears as a\nmaterialistic pantheism; God is represented as a fire, and the world\nas a mode of God.\u201d (GRANT, _The Ethics of Aristotle_, vol. i. p. 265.)\nIn the famous \u201chymn of Cleanthes,\u201d preserved, like so many other of\nthe great wonders of classical literature, by Stob\u00e6us, Grant sees an\nemphatic recognition of the personality of God, but it is equally natural\nto regard the hymn as a more detailed expression of that necessity of\nsubmitting to Destiny\u2014of living in accordance with nature\u2014which Cleanthes\nenounces in that other famous fragment which Epictetus would have us hold\nready to hand in all the circumstances of life:\u2014\n\n    \u201cLead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,\n    The way that I am bid by you to go:\n    To follow I am ready. If I choose not,\n    I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.\u201d\n\n\u2014EPICTETUS, _Encheir._ lii. (Long\u2019s translation.) Epictetus, indeed, and\nSeneca, late comers in the history of Stoicism, have undoubtedly attained\nto a clear recognition of the personality of God.\n\n[375] See the \u201c_De cohibenda ira_,\u201d \u201c_de cupiditate divitiarum_,\u201d \u201c_de\ninvidia et odio_,\u201d \u201c_de adulatore et amico_.\u201d\n\n[376] \u201c_De garrulitate_,\u201d \u201c_de vitioso pudore_,\u201d \u201c_de vitando aere\nalieno_,\u201d \u201c_de curiositate_.\u201d\n\n[377] \u201c_De amicorum multitudine_,\u201d and \u201c_de adulatore et amico_\u201d; \u201c_de\nfraterno amore_,\u201d \u201c_de amore prolis_\u201d; \u201c_conjugalia pr\u00e6cepta_,\u201d \u201c_de\nexilio_,\u201d \u201c_consolatio ad uxorem_,\u201d \u201c_consolatio ad Apollonium_.\u201d (\u201cI\ncan easily believe,\u201d says Emerson, \u201cthat an anxious soul may find in\nPlutarch\u2019s \u2018Letter to his Wife Timoxena,\u2019 a more sweet and reassuring\nargument on the immortality than in the Ph\u00e6do of Plato.\u201d)\n\n[378] Zeller says that \u201cthe most characteristic mark of the Plutarchian\nEthics is their connexion with religion.\u201d\u2014(_Greek Philosophy_, translated\nby Alleyne and Abbott.)\n\n[379] _De Virtute Morali_, 440 E.\n\n[380] 444 C, D. (Cf. 451.)\n\n[381] 444 D. Cf. _Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat_, 15 E.\n\n[382] 445 C.\n\n[383] \u201c_An virtus doceri possit_,\u201d \u201c_de virtute et vitio_,\u201d 101, C, D.\n\n[384] Trench follows Zeller in regarding Plutarch as a forerunner of\nthe Neo-Platonists:\u2014\u201cPlutarch was a Platonist, with an oriental tinge,\nand thus a forerunner of the new Platonists, who ever regarded him with\nthe highest honour. Their proper founder, indeed, he, more than any\nother man, deserves to be called, though clear of many of the unhealthy\nexcesses into which, at a later date, many of them ran\u201d (Trench, p. 90).\nWe hope our pages have done something towards putting Plutarch in a\ndifferent light from that which surrounds him here. As a matter of fact,\ndid the \u201cnew Platonists regard him ever with the highest honour?\u201d The\ntestimony of Eunapius we have already quoted (p. 67, note). Himerius is\nequally laudatory. \u201cPlutarch, who is the source of all the instruction\nyou convey.\u201d\u2014_Eclog\u00e6_, vii. 4. \u201cI weep for one who, I fondly hoped,\nwould be gifted with speech excelling Minucianus in force, Nicagoras in\nstateliness, Plutarch in sweetness\u201d (_Orat._ xliii. 21\u2014Monody on his\nson\u2019s death). But this is rather late in the history of Neo-Platonism.\nWhat about Plotinus, and Porphyry, and Proclus? Trench gives no\nreferences in proof of his statement, and we have been unable to find any.\n\n[385] Theodoretus: _De Oraculis_, 951.\u2014\u201c_Plutarch of Ch\u00e6ronea, a man who\nwas not Hebrew, but Greek\u2014Greek by birth and in language, and enslaved to\nGreek ideas._\u201d Cf. MOMMSEN: _The Provinces, from C\u00e6sar to Diocletian_,\nLib. viii. cap. vii.\u2014\u201cIn this Ch\u00e6ronean the contrast between the Hellenes\nand the Hellenized found expression; such a type of Greek life was not\npossible in Smyrna or in Antioch; it belonged to the soil like the honey\nof Hymettus. There were men enough of more powerful talents and of deeper\nnatures, but hardly any second author has known how, in so happy a\nmeasure, to reconcile himself serenely to necessity, and how to impress\nupon his writings the stamp of his tranquillity of spirit, and of his\nblessedness of life.\u201d\n\n[386] Dr. Bigg calls him a renegade, as the Church has called Julian\nan apostate. A comment of M. Martha\u2019s on this uncharitable practice is\nworthy of frequent repetition:\u2014\u201cAinsi donc, que l\u2019on donne \u00e0 Julien\ntous les noms qu\u2019il plaira, qu\u2019on l\u2019appelle insens\u00e9, fanatique, mais\nqu\u2019on cesse de lui infliger durement ce nom d\u2019apostat, de peur qu\u2019un\nhistorien, trop touch\u00e9 de ses malheurs, ne s\u2019avise un jour de prouver\nque l\u2019apostasie \u00e9tait excusable.\u201d (\u201c_Un chr\u00e9tien devenu pa\u00efen._\u201d\u2014_\u00c9tudes\nMorales_.)\n\n[387] See note, p. 45.\n\n[388] Though having also carefully studied both Zeller and Vacherot\n(ZELLER: _Die Philosophie der Griechen_, vol. iii.; VACHEROT: _Histoire\ncritique de l\u2019Ecole d\u2019Alexandrie_), we have specially used for the\npurposes of the text the close analysis of the various aspects of\nNeo-Platonism presented by Dr. Bigg in his \u201cNeo-Platonism,\u201d and the\ninteresting account given by M. Saisset in his article \u201cDe l\u2019Ecole\nd\u2019Alexandrie,\u201d written for the \u201cRevue des Deux Mondes,\u201d of September,\n1844, as a review of Jules Simon\u2019s work on the Alexandrian School.\u2014For\nthe Neo-Platonist D\u00e6monology we have largely consulted Wolff.\n\n[389] \u201cIn so far as the Deity is the original force, it must create\neverything. But as it is raised above everything in its nature, and needs\nnothing external, it cannot communicate itself substantially to another,\nnor make the creation of another its object. Creation cannot, as with\nthe Stoics, be regarded as the communication of the Divine Nature, as a\npartial transference of it into the derivative creature; nor can it be\nconceived as an act of will. But Plotinus cannot succeed in uniting these\ndeterminations in a clear and consistent conception. He has recourse,\ntherefore, to metaphors.\u201d\u2014ZELLER.\n\n[390] \u201cIn the year 1722, a Sheriff-depute of Sutherland, Captain David\nRoss, of Littledean, took it upon him to pronounce the last sentence of\ndeath for witchcraft which was ever passed in Scotland. The victim was an\ninsane old woman who had so little idea of her situation as to rejoice at\nthe sight of the fire which was destined to consume her.\u201d\u2014Sir W. SCOTT:\n\u201c_Demonology and Witchcraft_,\u201d cap. 9.\n\n[391] See Volkmann, vol. i. cap. i.\n\n[392] Cf. M. MARTHA, \u201cUn chr\u00e9tien devenu pa\u00efen,\u201d in his _\u00c9tudes Morales_:\n\u201cLa philosophie prit tout \u00e0 coup des allures mystiques et inspir\u00e9es,\nelle entoura de savantes t\u00e9n\u00e8bres la claire mythologie compromise par\nsa clart\u00e9; \u00e0 ses explications symboliques elle m\u00eala les pratiques\nmyst\u00e9rieuses des cultes orientaux, \u00e0 sa th\u00e9ologie subtile et confuse les\nredoutables secrets de la magie: elle eut ses initiations clandestines\net terribles, ses enthousiasmes extatiques, ses vertus nouvelles souvent\nemprunt\u00e9es au christianisme, ses bonnes \u0153uvres, ses miracles m\u00eame. En\nun mot, elle devint la th\u00e9urgie, cet art sublime et suspect qui pr\u00e9tend\npouvoir \u00e9voquer Dieu sur la terre et dans les \u00e2mes. Le christianisme\nrencontrait donc non plus un culte surann\u00e9, facile \u00e0 renverser, mais\nune religion vivante, puisant son \u00e9nergie dans sa d\u00e9faite, d\u00e9fendu par\ndes fanatiques savants dont le sombre ferveur et l\u2019\u00e9loquence illumin\u00e9e\n\u00e9taient capables d\u2019entra\u00eener aussi une arm\u00e9e de pros\u00e9lytes.\u201d\n\n[393] As it was, the later Neo-Platonists had to content themselves with\nApollonius of Tyana, instead of Jesus Christ.\u2014\u201cApollonius of Tyana, who\nwas no longer a mere philosopher, _but a being half-human, half-divine_\u201d\n(EUNAPIUS, _op. cit._).\n\n[394] See Emerson\u2019s \u201cIntroduction\u201d to Goodwin\u2019s translation of the\n\u201cMorals.\u201d\n\n[395] Saisset, _op. cit._\n\n[396] DANTE: _Inferno_, Canto iii.","title":"The religion of Plutarch : $b A pagan creed of apostolic times","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":68927}