{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_7297/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_7297","id":"gutenberg_7297","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7297","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Hinduism","Vedanta"],"text":"THE\n\nVED\u00c2NT\u00c2-S\u00dbTRAS\n\nWITH THE COMMENTARY BY\n\nR\u00c2M\u00c2NUJA\n\nTRANSLATED BY\n\nGEORGE THIBAUT\n\nPART III\n\nSacred Books of the East, Volume 48\n\n[1904]\n\n\n\n[Scanned in by Srinivasan Sriram (as part of the sripedia.org initiative).\nOCRed and proofed at Distributed Proofing by other volunteers; Juliet\nSutherland, project manager. Formatting and additional proofreading at\nSacred-texts.com by J.B. Hare. This text is in the public domain worldwide.\nThis file may be used for any non-commercial purpose provided this notice\nis left intact.]\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nVED\u00c2NTA-S\u00dbTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY OF R\u00c2M\u00c2NUJA.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nADHY\u00c2YA I\n\nP\u00e2da I\n\nP\u00e2da II\n\nP\u00e2da III\n\nP\u00e2da IV\n\n\nADHY\u00c2YA II\n\nP\u00e2da I\n\nP\u00e2da II\n\nP\u00e2da III\n\nP\u00e2da IV\n\n\nADHY\u00c2YA III\n\nP\u00e2da I\n\nP\u00e2da II\n\nP\u00e2da III\n\nP\u00e2da IV\n\n\nADHY\u00c2YA IV\n\nP\u00e2da I\n\nP\u00e2da II\n\nP\u00e2da III\n\nP\u00e2da IV\n\n\nINDEXES BY DR. M. WINTERNITZ:--\n\nIndex of Quotations\n\nIndex of Sanskrit Words\n\nIndex of Names and Subjects\n\nCorrigenda\n\nTransliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the\nSacred Books of the East\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nIn the Introduction to the first volume of the translation of the\n'Ved\u00e2nta-S\u00fbtras with Sankara's Commentary' (vol. xxxiv of this Series) I\nhave dwelt at some length on the interest which R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja's Commentary\nmay claim--as being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may\nbe called the Theistic Ved\u00e2nta, and as supplying us, on the other, with\nmeans of penetrating to the true meaning of B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana's Aphorisms. I do\nnot wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja's work in\neither of these aspects; an adequate treatment of them would, moreover,\nrequire considerably more space than is at my disposal. Some very useful\nmaterial for the right understanding of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuju's work is to be found\nin the 'Analytical Outline of Contents' which Messrs. M. Rang\u00e2k\u00e2rya and\nM. B. Varadar\u00e2ja Aiyang\u00e2r have prefixed to the first volume of their\nscholarly translation of the Sr\u00eebh\u00e2shya (Madras, 1899).\n\nThe question as to what the St\u00fbras really teach is a critical, not a\nphilosophical one. This distinction seems to have been imperfectly\nrealised by several of those critics, writing in India, who have\nexamined the views expressed in my Introduction to the translation of\nSankara's Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with 'philosophic\nincompetency,' 'hopeless theistic bias due to early training,' and the\nlike, simply because he, on the basis of a purely critical investigation,\nconsiders himself entitled to maintain that a certain ancient document\nsets forth one philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere\nexpressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the\nsystems of Sankara and R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja; not because I have no definite opinions\non this point, but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry\nwould be purposeless if not objectionable.\n\nThe question as to the true meaning of the S\u00fbtras is no doubt of some\ninterest; although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be\nover-estimated. Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this\nproblem I have found little of solid value. The main arguments which I\nhave set forth, not so much in favour of the adequacy of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja's\ninterpretation, as against the validity of Sankar\u00e2k\u00e2rya's understanding\nof the S\u00fbtras, appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any\nmeans consider the problem a hopeless one; but its solution will not be\nadvanced, in any direction, but by those who will be at the trouble of\nsubmitting the entire body of the S\u00fbtras to a new and detailed\ninvestigation, availing themselves to the full of the help that is to be\nderived from the study of all the existing Commentaries.\n\nThe present translation of the Sr\u00eebh\u00e2shya claims to be faithful on the\nwhole, although I must acknowledge that I have aimed rather at making it\nintelligible and, in a certain sense, readable than scrupulously\naccurate. If I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even\nfurther in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion,\nbe more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the\ntranslators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to\nthrow their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the\nwestern reader than literal renderings from technical Sanskrit must\nneeds be in many passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of\nthe plan now advocated--among which the most obvious is the temptation\nit offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than\nregard for clearness would absolutely require. And I am conscious of\nhaving failed in this respect in more than one instance. In other cases\nI have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding of the\nauthor's meaning. The fact is, that as yet the time has hardly come for\nfully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the\nSr\u00eebh\u00e2shya, the authors of which wrote with reference--in many cases\ntacit--to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which\nis only just beginning to be studied, and comprehended in part, by\nEuropean scholars.\n\nIt gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help which I have received\nfrom various quarters in preparing this translation. Pandit Gang\u00e2dhara\nS\u00e2strin, C. I. E., of the Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying\nkindness and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of his own\non difficult sections of the text. Pandit Sv\u00e2min R\u00e2ma Misra S\u00e2strin has\nrendered me frequent assistance in the earlier portion of my task. And\nto Mr. A. Venis, the learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College,\nI am indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of a\npeculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can I conclude without\nexpressing my sense of obligation to Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose\ninvaluable 'Concordance to the Principal Upanishads' lightens to an\nincalculable degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work\nbearing on the Ved\u00e2nta.\n\n\n\n\nVED\u00c2NTA-S\u00dbTRAS\n\nWITH\n\nR\u00c2M\u00c2NUJA'S SR\u00ceBH\u00c2SHYA\n\nFIRST ADHY\u00c2YA.\n\nFIRST P\u00c2DA.\n\nMAY my mind be filled with devotion towards the highest Brahman, the\nabode of Lakshmi who is luminously revealed in the Upanishads; who in\nsport produces, sustains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only\naim is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly worship him.\n\nThe nectar of the teaching of Par\u00e2sara's son (Vy\u00e2sa),--which was brought\nup from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads--which restores\nto life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of\nthe fire of transmigratory existence--which was well guarded by the\nteachers of old--which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold\nopinions,--may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented\nto them in my words.\n\nThe lengthy explanation (vritti) of the Brahma-s\u00fbtras which was composed\nby the Reverend Bodh\u00e2yana has been abridged by former teachers;\naccording to their views the words of the S\u00fbtras will be explained in\nthis present work.\n\n\n\n\n1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.\n\nIn this S\u00fbtra the word 'then' expresses immediate sequence; the word\n'therefore' intimates that what has taken place (viz. the study of the\nkarmak\u00e2nda of the Veda) constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into\nBrahman). For the fact is that the enquiry into (lit.'the desire to\nknow') Brahman--the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and\npermanent--follows immediately in the case of him who, having read the\nVeda together with its auxiliary disciplines, has reached the knowledge\nthat the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has\nconceived the desire of final release.\n\nThe compound 'brahmajij\u00f1\u00e2s\u00e2' is to be explained as 'the enquiry of\nBrahman,' the genitive case 'of Brahman' being understood to denote the\nobject; in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the\ngenitive case, P\u00e2nini II, 3, 65. It might be said that even if we\naccepted the general meaning of the genitive case--which is that of\nconnexion in general--Brahman's position (in the above compound) as an\nobject would be established by the circumstance that the 'enquiry'\ndemands an object; but in agreement with the principle that the direct\ndenotation of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take\nthe genitive case 'of Brahman' as denoting the object.\n\nThe word 'Brahman' denotes the hightest Person (purushottama), who is\nessentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes\nof auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence. The term 'Brahman'\nis applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness\n(brihattva, from the root 'brih'); but primarily denotes that which\npossesses greatness, of essential nature as well as of qualities, in\nunlimited fulness; and such is only the Lord of all. Hence the word\n'Brahman' primarily denotes him alone, and in a secondary derivative\nsense only those things which possess some small part of the Lord's\nqualities; for it would be improper to assume several meanings for the\nword (so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing).\nThe case is analogous to that of the term 'bhagavat [FOOTNOTE 4:1].' The\nLord only is enquired into, for the sake of immortality, by all those\nwho are afflicted with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that\nBrahman which, according to the S\u00fbtra, constitutes the object of enquiry.\nThe word 'jij\u00f1\u00e2s\u00e2' is a desiderative formation meaning 'desire to know.'\nAnd as in the case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing,\nthe S\u00fbtra means to enjoin knowledge--which is the object of the desire\nof knowledge. The purport of the entire S\u00fbtra then is as follows: 'Since\nthe fruit of works known through the earlier part of the M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 is\nlimited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of\nBrahman--which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the\nM\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2--is unlimited and permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be\nknown, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.'--The\nsame meaning is expressed by the Vrittik\u00e2ra when saying 'after the\ncomprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into\nBrahman.' And that the enquiry into works and that into Brahman\nconstitute one body of doctrine, he (the Vrittik\u00e2ra) will declare later\non 'this S\u00e2r\u00eeraka-doctrine is connected with Jaimini's doctrine as\ncontained in sixteen adhy\u00e2yas; this proves the two to constitute one\nbody of doctrine.' Hence the earlier and the later M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 are separate\nonly in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each;\nin the same way as the two halves of the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-s\u00fbtras,\nconsisting of six adhy\u00e2yas each, are separate [FOOTNOTE 5:1]; and as each\nadhy\u00e2ya is separate. The entire M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-s\u00e2tra--which begins with the\nS\u00fbtra 'Now therefore the enquiry into religious duty' and concludes with\nthe S\u00fbtra '(From there is) no return on account of scriptural statement'--\nhas, owing to the special character of the contents, a definite order of\ninternal succession. This is as follows. At first the precept 'one is to\nlearn one's own text (sv\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya)' enjoins the apprehension of that\naggregate of syllables which is called 'Veda,' and is here referred to\nas 'sv\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya.' Next there arises the desire to know of what nature the\n'Learning' enjoined is to be, and how it is to be done. Here there come\nin certain injunctions such as 'Let a Brahnmana be initiated in his\neighth year' and 'The teacher is to make him recite the Veda'; and\ncertain rules about special observances and restrictions--such as\n'having performed the up\u00e2karman on the full moon of Sravana or\nPraushthapada according to prescription, he is to study the sacred\nverses for four months and a half--which enjoin all the required details.\n\nFrom all these it is understood that the study enjoined has for its\nresult the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, on\nthe part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a\ngood family, leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul; who\npractises certain special observances and restrictions; and who learns\nby repeating what is recited by the teacher.\n\nAnd this study of the Veda is of the nature of a samsk\u00e2ra of the text,\nsince the form of the injunction 'the Veda is to be studied' shows that\nthe Veda is the object (of the action of studying). By a samsk\u00e2ra is\nunderstood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other\neffect; and that the Veda should be the object of such a samska\u00e2ra is\nquite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge of the four\nchief ends of human action--viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and\nfinal release--and of the means to effect them; and since it helps to\neffect those ends by itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition\n(apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise).\n\nThe injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims only at the\napprehension of the aggregate of syllables (constituting the Veda)\naccording to certain rules; it is in this way analogous to the recital\nof mantras.\n\nIt is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended through reading\nspontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving\ncertain purposes. A person, therefore, who has formed notions of those\nthings immediately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the\nVeda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself to the study\nof the Mim\u00e2msa, which consists in a methodical discussion of the\nsentences constituting the text of the Veda, and has for its result the\naccurate determination of the nature of those things and their different\nmodes. Through this study the student ascertains the character of the\ninjunctions of work which form part of the Veda, and observes that all\nwork leads only to non-permanent results; and as, on the other hand, he\nimmediately becomes aware that the Upanishad sections--which form part\nof the Veda which he has apprehended through reading--refer to an\ninfinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, he applies himself to\nthe study of the S\u00e2r\u00eeraka-M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2, which consists in a systematic\ndiscussion of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts, and has for its result the accurate\ndetermination of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory,\nwhile the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something permanent, the\nVedanta-texts declare in many places--'And as here the world acquired by\nwork perishes, so there the world acquired by merit perishes' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 1,6); 'That work of his has an end' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 10); 'By\nnon-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 10);\n'Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); 'Let a\nBr\u00e2hmana, after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by\nworks, acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made cannot be\ngained by what is made. To understand this, let the pupil, with fuel in\nhis hand, go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.\nTo that pupil who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is\naltogether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman\nthrough which he knows the imperishable true Person' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12,\n13). 'Told' here means 'he is to tell.'--On the other hand, 'He who\nknows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who sees\nthis does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'He becomes a self-ruler'\n(Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Knowing him he becomes immortal here' (Taitt. \u00c2r.\nIII, 12, 7); 'Having known him he passes over death; there is no other\npath to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15); 'Having known as separate his Self and\nthe Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6).\n\nBut--an objection here is raised--the mere learning of the Veda with its\nauxiliary disciplines gives rise to the knowledge that the heavenly\nworld and the like are the results of works, and that all such results\nare transitory, while immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman.\nPossessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release may at\nonce proceed to the enquiry into Brahman; and what need is there of a\nsystematic consideration of religious duty (i.e. of the study of the\nPurva Mim\u00e2ms\u00e2)?--If this reasoning were valid, we reply, the person\ndesirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the\nS\u00e2r\u00eeraka M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2, since Brahman is known from the mere reading of the\nVeda with its auxiliary disciplines.--True. Such knowledge arises indeed\nimmediately (without deeper enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this\nimmediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a systematic\ndiscussion of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts must he undertaken in order that their\nsense may be fully ascertained--We agree. But you will have to admit\nthat for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry\ninto religious duty!\n\n[FOOTNOTE 4:1. 'Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the divinity;\nsecondarily any holy person.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 5:1. The first six books of the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-s\u00fbtras give\nrules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice; while the last six\nbooks teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified\nforms.]\n\n\n\n\nTHE SMALL P\u00dbRVAPAKSHA.\n\nBut--a further objection is urged--as that which has to precede the\nsystematic enquiry into Brahman we should assign something which that\nenquiry necessarily presupposes. The enquiry into the nature of duty,\nhowever, does not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the\nVedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts,\neven if he is not acquainted with works.--But in the Vedanta-texts there\nare enjoined meditations on the Udg\u00eetha and the like which are matters\nauxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible for him who is\nnot acquainted with those works!--You who raise this objection clearly\nare ignorant of what kind of knowledge the S\u00e2r\u00eeraka M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 is concerned\nwith! What that s\u00e2stra aims at is to destroy completely that wrong\nknowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, liable to birth, old\nage, and death, and all the numberless other evils connected with\ntransmigratory existence--evils that spring from the view, due to\nbeginningless Nescience, that there is plurality of existence; and to\nthat end the s\u00e2stra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity\nof the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of works--which is\nbased on the assumption of plurality of existence--is not only useless\nbut even opposed. The consideration of the Udg\u00eetha and the like, which\nis supplementary to works only, finds a place in the Ved\u00e2nta-texts, only\nbecause like them it is of the nature of knowledge; but it has no direct\nconnexion with the true topic of those texts. Hence some prerequisite\nmust be indicated which has reference to the principal topic of the\ns\u00e2stra.--Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works;\nfor scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with\nworks added. The S\u00fbtra-writer himself says further on 'And there is need\nof all works, on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and\nthe like' (Ve. S\u00fb. III, 4, 26). And if the required works were not known,\none could not determine which works have to be combined with knowledge\nand which not. Hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary\nprerequisite.--Not so, we reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is\nexclusively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence and\nantagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists just in the\ncessation of Nescience; how then can works--to which there attach\nendless differences connected with caste, \u00e2srama, object to be\naccomplished, means and mode of accomplishment, &c.--ever supply a means\nfor the cessation of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of\nthe view that difference exists? That works, the results of which are\ntransitory, are contrary to final release, and that such release can be\neffected through knowledge only, scripture declares in many places;\ncompare all the passages quoted above (p. 7).\n\nAs to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works,\nwe remark that--as follows from the essential contrariety of knowledge\nand works, and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the\nwords of scripture--pious works can contribute only towards the rise of\nthe desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they clear the internal\norgan (of knowledge), but can have no influence on the production of the\nfruit, i.e. knowledge itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs\nas follows Br\u00e2hmanas desire to know him by the study of the Veda, by\nsacrifice, by gifts,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).\n\nAccording to this passage, the desire only of knowledge springs up\nthrough works; while another text teaches that calmness, self-restraint,\nand so on, are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself.\n(Having become tranquil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and\ncollected, he is to see the Self within the Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).)\n\nThe process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man has been cleaned\nof all impurities through works performed in many preceding states of\nexistence, without a view to special forms of reward, there arises in\nhim the desire of knowledge, and thereupon--through knowledge itself\noriginated by certain scriptural texts--'Being only, this was in the\nbeginning, one only without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, I, 2); 'Truth,\nKnowledge, the Infinite, is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Without parts,\nwithout actions, calm, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19);\n'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI,\n9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, 'Hearing,' 'reflection,' and\n'meditation,' are helpful towards cognising the sense of these Vedic\ntexts. 'Hearing' (sravana) means the apprehension of the sense of\nscripture, together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who\npossesses the true insight, viz. that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts establish the\ndoctrine of the unity of the Self. 'Reflection' (mananam) means the\nconfirmation within oneself of the sense taught by the teacher, by means\nof arguments showing it alone to be suitable. 'Meditation'\n(nididhy\u00e2sanam) finally means the constant holding of thai sense before\none's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic beginningless\nimagination of plurality. In the case of him who through 'hearing,'\n'reflection,' and meditation,' has dis-dispelled the entire imagination\nof plurality, the knowledge of the sense of Ved\u00e2nta-texts puts an end to\nNescience; and what we therefore require is a statement of the\nindispensable prerequisites of such 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and so on.\nNow of such prerequisites there are four, viz. discrimination of what is\npermanent and what is non-permanent; the full possession of calmness of\nmind, self-restraint and similar means; the renunciation of all\nenjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the\ndesire of final release.\n\nWithout these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; and they are\ntherefore known, from the very nature of the matter, to be necessary\nprerequisites. To sum up: The root of bondage is the unreal view of\nplurality which itself has its root in Nescience that conceals the true\nbeing of Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that account\ncut short, together with its root, by mere knowledge. Such knowledge is\noriginated by texts such as 'That art thou'; and work is of no help\neither towards its nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i.e.\nrelease). It is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of\nknowledge, which arises owing to an increase of the element of goodness\n(sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the elements of passion\n(rajas) and darkness (tamas) which are the root of all moral evil. This\nuse is referred to in the text quoted above, 'Br\u00e2hmanas wish to know him,'\n&c. As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards the\nknowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the\nlatter knowledge the four means mentioned above.\n\n\n\n\nTHE SMALL SIDDH\u00c2NTA.\n\nTo this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release\nconsists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation\nresults entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has\nhere to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which the\nVed\u00e2nta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to\nNescience. Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which\noriginates from the sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of\nmeditation (up\u00e2sana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its\nantecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind: for such\nknowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from\nany special injunction, and moreover we do not observe that the\ncessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our\nadversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way.\nThe Ved\u00e2nta-texts do not, he will say, produce that knowledge which\nmakes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is\nnot dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced,\ndoes not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality\nby no means subverts my opinion; for, to mention an analogous instance,\nthe double appearance of the moon--presenting itself to a person\naffected with a certain weakness of vision--does not come to an end as\nsoon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason.\nMoreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is\npowerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i.e.\nNescience, has once been cut But this defence we are unable to admit. It\nis impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i.e. the\ntexts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even\nwhen there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise\nof knowledge), information given by competent persons, the presence of\ncharacteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and\nthe like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous\nimagination. Nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has\nbeen apprehended, the view of plurality may continue owing to some small\nremainder of beginningless imagination. For as this imagination which\nconstitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is\nnecessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not\ntake place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is\nno other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say that the\nview of plurality, which is the effect of that imagination, continues\neven after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some\none seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the\nnon-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance\nthat the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which\ndoes not admit of being sublated by knowledge, is not removed, although\nthat which would sublate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand,\neffects, such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can\nbe sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it\nwere true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the\nimagination of plurality, the rise of knowledge would really never be\nbrought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual\ngrowth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite\nstrength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the\ncomparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence we conclude that the\nknowledge which the Ved\u00e2nta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge\nother than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by\n'dhy\u00e2na,' 'up\u00e2san\u00e2' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms.\n\nWith this agree scriptural texts such as 'Having known it, let him\npractise meditation' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'He who, having searched out\nthe Self, knows it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self as Om'\n(Mu. Up. II, 2, 6); 'Having known that, he is freed from the jaws of\ndeath' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'Let a man meditate on the Self only as his\nworld' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15); 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to her\nreflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That we must\nsearch out, that we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1).\n\n(According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different\ns\u00e2kh\u00e2s) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the\ninjunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the Bri.\nUp.; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and\nsecond passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 'having searched\nout' (vij\u00f1\u00e2ya; anuvidya) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of)\nthe apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving\nmeditation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true\npurport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses 'let him practise\nmeditation' (praj\u00f1\u00e2m kurv\u00eeta) and 'he knows it.' In the same way the\nclause 'the Self is to be heard' is a mere anuv\u00e2da, i.e. a mere\nreference to what is already established by other means; for a person\nwho has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about\nmatters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own\naccount applies himself to methodical 'hearing,' in order definitely to\nascertain these matters; 'hearing' thus is established already. In the\nsame way the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere anuv\u00e2da\nof reflection which is known as a means of confirming what one has\n'heard.' It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin.\nIn agreement with this a later S\u00fbtra also says, 'Repetition more than\nonce, on account of instruction' (Ve. S\u00fb. IV, I, I). That the knowledge\nintended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature\nof meditation, we conclude from the circumstance that the terms\n'knowing' and'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in\nthe earlier and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following\npassages: 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'he who knows\nthis shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of\ncountenance' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1; 6). And 'He does not know him, for he\nis not complete,' and 'Let men meditate on him as the Self (Bri. Up. I,\n4, 7). And 'He who knows what he knows,' and 'Teach me the deity on\nwhich you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 6; 2, 2).\n\n'Meditation' means steady remembrance, i.e. a continuity of steady\nremembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the\nscriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of\nrelease, 'on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened'\n(Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of the same character (form)\nas seeing (intuition); for the passage quoted has the same purport as\nthe following one, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are\nsolved, and all the works of that man perish when he has been seen who\nis high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this being so, we conclude that\nthe passage 'the Self is to be seen' teaches that 'Meditation' has the\ncharacter of 'seeing' or 'intuition.' And that remembrance has the\ncharacter of 'seeing' is due to the element of imagination\n(representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set forth at\nlength by the V\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra. 'Knowledge (vedana) means meditation (up\u00e2sana),\nscripture using the word in that sense'; i.e. in all Upanishads that\nknowledge which is enjoined as the means of final release is Meditation.\nThe V\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra then propounds a p\u00fbrvapaksha (prim\u00e2 facie view), 'Once he\nis to make the meditation, the matter enjoined by scripture being\naccomplished thereby, as in the case of the pray\u00e2jas and the like'; and\nthen sums up against this in the words 'but (meditation) is established\non account of the term meditation'; that means--knowledge repeated more\nthan once (i.e. meditation) is determined to be the means of Release.--\nThe V\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra then goes on 'Meditation is steady remembrance, on the\nground of observation and statement.' That means--this knowledge, of the\nform of meditation, and repeated more than once, is of the nature of\nsteady remembrance.\n\nSuch remembrance has been declared to be of the character of 'seeing,'\nand this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of\nimmediate presentation (pratyakshat\u00e2). With reference to remembrance,\nwhich thus acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the\nmeans of final release, scripture makes a further determination, viz. in\nthe passage Ka. Up. I, 2, 23, 'That Self cannot be gained by the study\nof the Veda (\"reflection\"), nor by thought (\"meditation\"), nor by much\nhearing. Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self\nreveals its being.' This text says at first that mere hearing,\nreflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the Self, and then\ndeclares, 'Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained.' Now a\n'chosen' one means a most beloved person; the relation being that he by\nwhom that Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the Lord\n(bhagav\u00e2n) himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain\nthe Self, he himself declares in the following words, 'To those who are\nconstantly devoted and worship with love I give that knowledge by which\nthey reach me' (Bha. G\u00ee. X, 10), and 'To him who has knowledge I am dear\nabove all things, and he is dear to me' (VII, 17). Hence, he who\npossesses remembrance, marked by the character of immediate presentation\n(s\u00e2ksh\u00e2tk\u00e2ra), and which itself is dear above all things since the\nobject remembered is such; he, we say, is chosen by the highest Self,\nand by him the highest Self is gained. Steady remembrance of this kind\nis designated by the word 'devotion' (bhakti); for this term has the\nsame meaning as up\u00e2san\u00e2 (meditation). For this reason scripture and\nsmriti agree in making the following declarations, 'A man knowing him\npasses over death' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'Knowing him thus he here becomes\nimmortal' (Taitt. \u00c2r. III, 12,7); 'Neither by the Vedas, nor by\nausterities, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou\nhast seen me. But by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and\nseen in truth, O Arjuna, and also be entered into' (Bha. G\u00ee. XI, 53, 54);\n'That highest Person, O P\u00e2rtha, may be obtained by exclusive devotion'\n(VIII, 22).\n\nThat of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on are means will be\ndeclared later on (Ve. S\u00fb. III, 4, 26). Although sacrifices and the like\nare enjoined with a view to the origination of knowledge (in accordance\nwith the passage 'They desire to know,' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), it is only\nknowledge in the form of meditation which--being daily practised,\nconstantly improved by repetition, and continued up to death--is the\nmeans of reaching Brahman, and hence all the works connected with the\ndifferent conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only\nfor the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra\ndeclares in Ve. S\u00fb. IV, 1, 12; 16; III, 4, 33, and other places. The\nV\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra also declares that steady remembrance results only from\nabstention, and so on; his words being 'This (viz. steady remembrance =\nmeditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness of mind\n(vimoka), repetition (abhy\u00e2sa), works (kriy\u00e2), virtuous conduct\n(kaly\u00e2na), freedom from dejection (anavas\u00e2da), absence of exultation\n(anuddharsha); according to feasibility and scriptural statement.' The\nV\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra also gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka)\nmeans keeping the body clean from all food, impure either owing to\nspecies (such as the flesh of certain animals), or abode (such as food\nbelonging to a K\u00e2nd\u00e2la or the like), or accidental cause (such as food\ninto which a hair or the like has fallen). The scriptural passage\nauthorising this point is Ch. Up. VII, 26, 'The food being pure, the\nmind becomes pure; the mind being pure, there results steady remembrance.'\nFreeness of mind (vimoka) means absence of attachment to desires. The\nauthoritative passage here is 'Let him meditate with a calm mind' (Ch.\nUp. III, 14, 1). Repetition means continued practice. For this point the\nBh\u00e2shya-k\u00e2ra quotes an authoritative text from Smriti, viz.: 'Having\nconstantly been absorbed in the thought of that being' (sad\u00e2\ntadbh\u00e2vabh\u00e2vitah; Bha. G\u00ee. VIII, 6).--By 'works' (kriy\u00e2) is understood\nthe performance, according to one's ability, of the five great\nsacrifices. The authoritative passages here are 'This person who\nperforms works is the best of those who know Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1,\n4); and 'Him Br\u00e2hmanas seek to know by recitation of the Veda, by\nsacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).--By\nvirtuous conduct (kaly\u00e2n\u00e2ni) are meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness,\nliberality, gentleness, absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are\n'By truth he is to be obtained' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 5) and 'to them belongs\nthat pure Brahman-world' (Pr. Up. I, 16).--That lowness of spirit or\nwant of cheerfulness which results from unfavourable conditions of place\nor time and the remembrance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term\n'dejection'; the contrary of this is 'freedom from dejection.' The\nrelevant scriptural passage is 'This Self cannot be obtained by one\nlacking in strength' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 4).--'Exultation' is that\nsatisfaction of mind which springs from circumstances opposite to those\njust mentioned; the contrary is 'absence of exultation.' Overgreat\nsatisfaction also stands in the way (of meditation). The scriptural\npassage for this is 'Calm, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).--What the\nV\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra means to say is therefore that knowledge is realised only\nthrough the performance of the duly prescribed works, on the part of a\nperson fulfilling all the enumerated conditions.\n\nAnalogously another scriptural passage says 'He who knows both knowledge\nand non-knowledge together, overcoming death by non-knowledge reaches\nthe Immortal through knowledge' (\u00ces. Up. II). Here the term\n'non-knowledge' denotes the works enjoined on the different castes and\n\u00e2sramas; and the meaning of the text is that, having discarded by such\nworks death, i.e. the previous works antagonistic to the origination of\nknowledge, a man reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge.\nThe non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of\novercoming death can only mean that which is other than knowledge, viz.\nprescribed works. The word has the same sense in the following passage:\n'Firm in traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning on\nthe knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death by non-knowledge'\n(Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 12).--Antagonistic to knowledge (as said above) are all\ngood and evil actions, and hence--as equally giving rise to an\nundesirable result--they may both be designated as evil. They stand in\nthe way of the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the\nelements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to the element\nof goodness which is the cause of the rise of knowledge. That evil works\nstand in the way of such origination, the following scriptural text\ndeclares: 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do\nan evil deed' (Ka. Up. III, 8). That passion and darkness veil the\nknowledge of truth while goodness on the other hand gives rise to it,\nthe Divine one has declared himself, in the passage 'From goodness\nsprings knowledge' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIV, 17). Hence, in order that knowledge\nmay arise, evil works have to be got rid of, and this is effected by the\nperformance of acts of religious duty not aiming at some immediate\nresult (such as the heavenly world and the like); according to the text\n'by works of religious duty he discards all evil.' Knowledge which is\nthe means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the works prescribed for\nthe different \u00e2sramas; and hence the systematic enquiry into works (i.\ne. the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2)--from which we ascertain the nature of the works\nrequired and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of\nmere works--forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic enquiry into\nBrahman. Moreover the discrimination of permanent and non-permanent\nthings, &c. (i.e. the tetrad of 'means' mentioned above, p. 11) cannot\nbe accomplished without the study of the M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2; for unless we\nascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means, modes of\nprocedure and qualification (on the part of the agent) we can hardly\nunderstand the true nature of works, their fruits, the transitoriness or\nnon-transitoriness of the latter, the permanence of the Self, and\nsimilar matters. That those conditions (viz. nity\u00e2nityavastuviveka,\nsama, dama, &c.) are 'means' must be determined on the basis of viniyoga\n('application' which determines the relation of principal and\nsubordinate matters--angin and anga); and this viniyoga which depends on\ndirect scriptural statement (sruti), inferential signs (linga), and so\non, is treated of in the third book of the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-s\u00fbtras. And\nfurther we must, in this connexion, consider also the meditations on the\nUdg\u00eetha and similar things--which, although aiming at the success of\nworks, are of the nature of reflections on Brahman (which is viewed in\nthem under various forms)--and as such have reference to knowledge of\nBrahman. Those works also (with which these meditations are connected)\naim at no special results of their own, and produce and help to perfect\nthe knowledge of Brahman: they are therefore particularly connected with\nthe enquiry into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose an\nunderstanding of the nature of works is admitted by every one.\n\n\n\n\nTHE GREAT P\u00dbRVAPAKSHA.\n\nTHE ONLY REALITY IS BRAHMAN.\n\nBrahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all difference,\nconstitutes the only reality; and everything else, i.e. the plurality of\nmanifold knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and acts of knowledge\ndepending on those two, is only imagined on (or 'in') that Brahman, and\nis essentially false.\n\n'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only\nwithout a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The higher knowledge is that by\nwhich the Indestructible is apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5); 'That which\ncannot be seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet,\nthe permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the imperishable\nwhich the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6);\n'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He\nwho is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without\ntaint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'By whom it is not thought, by him it is\nthought; he by whom it is thought knows it not. It is not known by those\nwho know it, known by those who do not know it' (Ke. Up. II, 3); 'Thou\nmayest not see the seer of sight; thou mayest not think the thinker of\nthought' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1);\n'All this is that Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 7); 'There is here no diversity\nwhatever' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees\nany difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10); 'For where there is duality as\nit were, there one sees the other'; 'but where the Self has become all\nof him, by what means, and whom, should he see? by what means, and whom,\nshould he know?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'the effect is a name merely\nwhich has its origin in speech; the truth is that (the thing made of\nclay) is clay merely' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4); 'for if he makes but the\nsmallest distinction in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up. II, 7);--\nthe two following Ved\u00e2nta-s\u00fbtras: III, 2, 11; III, 2, 3--the following\npassages from the Vishnu-pur\u00e2na: 'In which all difference vanishes,\nwhich is pure Being, which is not the object of words, which is known by\nthe Self only--that knowledge is called Brahman' (VI, 7, 53); 'Him whose\nessential nature is knowledge, who is stainless in reality'; 'Him who,\nowing to erroneous view, abides in the form of things' (I, 2, 6); 'the\nReality thou art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world!--\nwhatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is knowledge; but\nowing to their erroneous opinion the non-devout look on it as the form\nof the world. This whole world has knowledge for its essential nature,\nbut the Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material things are\ndriven round on the ocean of delusion. Those however who possess true\nknowledge and pure minds see this whole world as having knowledge for\nits Self, as thy form, O highest Lord!' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.).--'Of\nthat Self, although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the\nknowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality; those who maintain\nduality hold a false view' (II, 14, 31); 'If there is some other one,\ndifferent from me, then it can be said, \"I am this and that one is\nanother\"' (II, 13, 86); 'As owing to the difference of the holes of the\nflute the air equally passing through them all is called by the names of\nthe different notes of the musical scale; so it is with the universal\nSelf' (II, 14, 32); 'He is I; he is thou; he is all: this Universe is\nhis form. Abandon the error of difference. The king being thus\ninstructed, abandoned the view of difference, having gained an intuition\nof Reality' (II, 16, 24). 'When that view which gives rise to difference\nis absolutely destroyed, who then will make the untrue distinction\nbetween the individual Self and Brahman?' (VI, 7, 94).--The following\npassages from the Bhagavad-G\u00eet\u00e2: 'I am the Self dwelling within all\nbeings' (X, 20); 'Know me to be the soul within all bodies' (XIII, 2);\n'Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is without me' (X, 39).--\nAll these and other texts, the purport of which clearly is instruction\nas to the essential nature of things, declare that Brahman only, i.e.\nnon-differenced pure intelligence is real, while everything else is\nfalse.\n\nThe appearance of plurality is due to avidy\u00e2.\n\n'Falsehood' (mithy\u00e2tva) belongs to what admits of being terminated by\nthe cognition of the real thing--such cognition being preceded by\nconscious activity (not by mere absence of consciousness or knowledge).\nThe snake, e.g. which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false;\nfor it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is imagined in\n(or 'on') the rope. In the same way this entire world, with its\ndistinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter, and so on, is,\nowing to an imperfection, wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose\nsubstance is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it\nmay be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real Brahman. What\nconstitutes that imperfection is beginningless Nescience (avidy\u00e2), which,\nhiding the truth of things, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot\nbe defined either as something that is or as something that is not.--'By\nthe Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the Untrue is the\ncovering' (Ch, Up. VIII, 3, 1); 'Know M\u00e2ya to be Prakriti, and the great\nLord him who is associated with M\u00e2ya' (Svet. Up. IV, 10); 'Indra appears\nmanifold through the M\u00e2y\u00e2s' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'My M\u00e2ya is hard to\novercome' (Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 14); 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless\nM\u00e2y\u00e2 awakes' (Gau. K\u00e2. I, 16).--These and similar texts teach that it is\nthrough beginningless M\u00e2y\u00e2 that to Brahman which truly is pure\nnon-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself, and that it\nsees diversity within itself. As has been said, 'Because the Holy One is\nessentially of the nature of intelligence, the form of all, but not\nmaterial; therefore know that all particular things like rocks, oceans,\nhills and so on, have proceeded from intelligence [FOOTNOTE 22:1] But\nwhen, on the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelligence\nin its own proper form, without any imperfections; then no differences--\nthe fruit of the tree of wishes--any longer exist between things.\nTherefore nothing whatever, at any place or any time, exists apart from\nintelligence: intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by\nthose whose minds are distracted by the effects of their own works.\nIntelligence pure, free from stain, free from grief, free from all\ncontact with desire and other affections, everlastingly one is the\nhighest Lord--V\u00e2sudeva apart from whom nothing exists. I have thus\ndeclared to you the lasting truth of things--that intelligence only is\ntrue and everything else untrue. And that also which is the cause of\nordinary worldly existence has been declared to you' (Vi. Pu. II, 12,\n39, 40, 43-45).\n\nAvidy\u00e2 is put an end to by true Knowledge.\n\nOther texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end through the\ncognition of the essential unity of the Self with Brahman which is\nnothing but non-differenced intelligence. 'He does not again go to death;'\n'He sees this as one;' 'He who sees this does not see death' (Ch. Up.\nVI, 27); 'When he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is\ninvisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the\nfearless' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all\ndoubts are solved and all his works perish when he has been beheld who\nis high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes\nBrahman only' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Knowing him only a man passes over\ndeath; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). In these and\nsimilar passages, the term 'death' denotes Nescience; analogously to the\nuse of the term in the following words of Sanatsuj\u00e2ta, 'Delusion I call\ndeath; and freedom from delusion I call immortality' (Sanatsuj. II, 5).\nThe knowledge again of the essential unity and non-difference of Brahman--\nwhich is ascertained from decisive texts such as 'The True, knowledge,\nthe Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Knowledge, bliss is\nBrahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28)--is confirmed by other passages, such as\n'Now if a man meditates on another deity, thinking the deity is one and\nhe another, he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'Let men meditate\nupon him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,\n7); 'Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou me, O holy deity?'; 'What I\nam that is he; what he is that am I.'--This the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra himself will\ndeclare 'But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us\napprehend (the Lord)' (Ve. S\u00fb. IV, 1, 3). Thus the V\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra also, 'It\nis the Self--thus one should apprehend (everything), for everything is\neffected by that.' And to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of\nBrahman essentially false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an\nend, is only reasonable.\n\nScripture is of greater force than Perception\n\nBut, an objection is raised--how can knowledge, springing from the\nsacred texts, bring about a cessation of the view of difference, in\nmanifest opposition to the evidence of Perception?--How then, we rejoin,\ncan the knowledge that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about,\nin opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea of the)\nsnake?--You will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a\nconflict between two forms of perception, while in the case under\ndiscussion the conflict is between direct perception and Scripture which\nis based on perception. But against this we would ask the question how,\nin the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we decide as to\nwhich of the two is refuted (sublated) by the other. If--as is to be\nexpected--you reply that what makes the difference between the two is\nthat one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not: we\npoint out that this distinction holds good also in the case of Scripture\nand perception being in conflict. It is not considerations as to the\nequality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or\nindependent, and so on, that determine which of the two sublates the\nother; if that were the case, the perception which presents to us the\nflame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cognition\narrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames.\nWherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different\nmeans of knowledge we assign the position of the 'sublated one' to that\nwhich admits of being accounted for in some other way; while that\ncognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and\ncannot be accounted for in another way, is the 'sublating one [FOOTNOTE\n25:1].' This is the principle on which the relation between 'what\nsublates' and 'what is sublated' is decided everywhere. Now apprehension\nof Brahman--which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free,\nself-luminous--is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken\ntradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the least,\nimperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative; the state of\nbondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by\nPerception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and\ntherefore may be non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to\nconclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the apprehension\nof Brahman. And that imperfection of which Perception--through which we\napprehend a world of manifold distinctions--may be assumed to be\ncapable, is so-called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless\nwrong imagination of difference.--Well then--a further objection is\nraised--let us admit that Scripture is perfect because resting on an\nendless unbroken tradition; but must we then not admit that texts\nevidently presupposing the view of duality, as e.g. 'Let him who desires\nthe heavenly world offer the Jyotishtoma-sacrifice'--are liable to\nrefutation?--True, we reply. As in the case of the Udg\u00e2tri and\nPratihartri breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) in\nsuccession [FOOTNOTE 26:1], so here also the earlier texts (which refer\nto duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later texts which\nteach final release, and are not themselves sublated by anything else.\n\nThe texts which represent Brahman as devoid of qualities have greater\nforce\n\nThe same reasoning applies to those passages in the Ved\u00e2nta-texts which\ninculcate meditation on the qualified Brahman, since the highest Brahman\nis without any qualities.--But consider such passages as 'He who\ncognises all, who knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is\nrevealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet.\nUp. VI, 8); 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 1, 5); how can these passages, which clearly aim at defining the\nnature of Brahman, be liable to refutation?--Owing to the greater weight,\nwe reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman as devoid of qualities.\n'It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8);\n'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'That\nwhich is free from qualities,' 'that which is free from stain'--these\nand similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being changeless, eternal\nintelligence devoid of all difference; while the other texts--quoted\nbefore--teach the qualified Brahman. And there being a conflict between\nthe two sets of passages, we--according to the M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 principle\nreferred to above--decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid\nof qualities are of greater force, because they are later in order\n[FOOTNOTE 27:1] than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities.\nThus everything is settled. The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman\nas devoid of qualities.\n\nBut--an objection is raised--even the passage 'The True, knowledge,\ninfinite is Brahman' intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true\nbeing, knowledge, infinity!--Not so, we reply. From the circumstance\nthat all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows\nthat they convey the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this\nyou urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even\nif directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities; we\nmust remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language\nwhich appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence\nconveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive\nwords denote one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses\na thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these\nattributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of\nthe individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is\nlost.--But from your view of the passage it would follow that the\nseveral words are mere synonyms!--Give us your attention, we reply, and\nlearn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle\nsynonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole\nsentence [FOOTNOTE 27:2] we conclude that the several words, applied to\none thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is\ncontrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have\nmeaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details\nare as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is contrary in nature\nto all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set\naside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the\nTaittiriya-text). The word 'true' (or 'truly being') has the purport of\ndistinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the\nabodes of change; the word 'knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all\nnon-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not\nself-luminous); and the word 'infinite' distinguishes it from whatever\nis limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this 'distinction' some\npositive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman\nitself as opposed to everything else; just as the distinction of white\ncolour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white,\nnot an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus _have_\na meaning, have _one_ meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they\nconvey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from\neverything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is\nself-luminous and free from all difference. On this interpretation of\nthe text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as\n'Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.'\nTexts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III,\n1); 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'Self\nalone was this in the beginning' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 1), &c., describe\nBrahman as the cause of the world; and of this Brahman the Taittir\u00eeya\npassage 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' gives the strict\ndefinition.\n\nIn agreement with the principle that all s\u00e2kh\u00e2s teach the same doctrine\nwe have to understand that, in all the texts which speak of Brahman as\ncause, Brahman must be taken as being 'without a second', i.e. without\nany other being of the same or a different kind; and the text which aims\nat defining Brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this\ncharacteristic of Brahman, viz. its being without a second. The\nstatement of the Ch\u00e2ndogya as to Brahman being without a second must\nalso be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are\nconcerned; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak\nof Brahman as being without qualities and without stain. We therefore\nconclude that the defining Taittir\u00eeya-text teaches Brahman to be an\nabsolutely homogeneous substance.\n\nBut, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows\nthat the words 'true being,' 'knowledge,' &c., have to be viewed as\nabandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in\nnature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly\ndenote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied\nmeaning, lakshan\u00e2)!--What objection is there to such a proceeding? we\nreply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than\nthat of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is\ngenerally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is\noneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated).--But we never\nobserve that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied\nsense!--Is it then not observed, we reply, that _one_ word is to be\ntaken in its implied meaning if otherwise it would contradict the\npurport of the whole sentence? And if the purport of the sentence, which\nis nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been\nascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an\nimplied sense--just as we had taken one--and thus make them fit in with\nthe general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who explain to\nus the sense of imperative sentences, teach that in imperative sentences\nbelonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not\ntheir directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms\nhave their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences which enjoin\nsomething not established by other means; and hence in ordinary speech\nthe effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other\nwords also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote\nmatters connected with the action, have their primary meaning only if\nconnected with an action not established by other means; while if\nconnected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied,\nmeaning only [FOOTNOTE 30:1]. Perception reveals to us non-differenced\nsubstance only\n\nWe have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture\nand Perception and the other instruments of knowledge, Scripture is of\ngreater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed\nto exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a\nnon-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.--But how can it be\nsaid that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds--\nand accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as 'Here is a jar,'\n'There is a piece of cloth'--causes the apprehension of mere Being? If\nthere were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one\nand the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only--\nas takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for\nsome time.--True. We therefore have to enquire in what way, in the\njudgment 'here is a jar,' an assertion is made about being as well as\nsome special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be\nfounded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition\noccupying different moments of time, while the perceptional cognition\ntakes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide\nwhether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from\nother things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the\nformer alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes\nthe apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in addition,\nthe remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the things from which the\ngiven thing differs). Hence difference is not apprehended by Perception;\nand all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on\nerror only.\n\nDifference--bheda--does not admit of logical definition\n\nThe Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing\nas 'difference.' Difference cannot in the first place be the essential\nnature (of that which differs); for from that it would follow that on\nthe apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once\narise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also\njudgments as to its difference from everything else.--But, it may be\nobjected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is\napprehended, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things'\ndepends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this\nremembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is\nnot formed!--Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains\nthat 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to\nassume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him,\nessential nature and difference are the same, i.e. nothing but essential\nnature: the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on\ncounterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His\nview really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 'different' (in the\njudgment 'the jar is different') are synonymous, just as the words\n'hasta' and 'kara' are (both of which mean 'hand').\n\nNor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to be an attribute\n(dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that\n'difference' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from essential\nnature; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this\nlatter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first\ndifference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in\ninfinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further\nimply that difference is apprehended on the apprehension of a thing\ndistinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at\nthe same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the\napprehension of difference; and this would constitute a logical seesaw.--\n'Difference' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are\nconfirmed in our view that perception reveals mere 'Being' only.\n\nMoreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as 'Here is a\njar,' 'There is a piece of cloth,' 'The jar is perceived,' 'The piece of\ncloth is perceived,' that which constitutes the things is Being\n(existence; satt\u00e2) and perception (or 'consciousness'; anubh\u00fbti). And we\nobserve that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of\ncognition: this pure Being alone, therefore, is _real_. The differences,\non the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is\nanalogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a\nsubstrate is real, while the non-continuous things (which by wrong\nimagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in\nthe ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal.\n\nBut--our adversary objects--the instance is not truly analogous. In the\ncase of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the\nsnake's being sublated (b\u00e2dhita) by the cognition of the true nature of\nthe substrate 'This is a rope, not a snake'; it does not result from the\nnon-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope\ndoes not follow from its persistence, but from the fact of its being not\nsublated (by another cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the\nnon-reality of jars and pieces of cloth?--All are agreed, we reply, that\nwe observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference\n(vy\u00e2vritti, literally 'separation,' 'distinction'). The point to decide\nis of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment\n'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other\nthings? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other\nthings are sublated (b\u00e2dhita). Individual difference (vy\u00e2vritti) thus\nmeans the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects\nof cognition, and it proves the non-reality of whatever has\nnon-continuous existence; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the\nrope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure\nBeing is non-real.--This admits of being expressed in technical form.\n'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope\nin the snake-rope; jars and similar things are non-real because they are\nnon-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for\nits substrate.\n\nFrom all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real\nbeing; it alone is.\n\nBeing and consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprak\u00e2sa.\n\nBut, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness,\nit is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference'\nor 'plurality').--Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as\n'difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not\nthe object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It\ncannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness.\nHence Consciousness itself is 'Being'--that which is.--This\nconsciousness is self-proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it\nproved through something else, it would follow that like jars and\nsimilar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for\nconsciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which\nits knowledge would be established); for it shines forth (prak\u00e2sate)\nthrough its own being. While it exists, consciousness--differing therein\nfrom jars and the like--is never observed not to shine forth, and it\ncannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on something\nelse.--You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the\nfollowing view:--even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object\nonly which shines forth--a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar\nis perceived. When a person forms the judgment 'This is a jar,' he is\nnot at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and\nis not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is\nthe reason which brings about the 'shining forth' of jars and other\nobjects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the\nobject to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another\ncondition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of\nconsciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the\nobject is (not permanent, but) occasional only [FOOTNOTE 34:1]. And\nshould this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying\nthat consciousness--which is essentially of the nature of intelligence--\nis something non-intelligent like material things, we ask you to define\nthis negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be\ncharacteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to understand by it\nthe invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we\npoint out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of\npleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at\nall, they never are non-perceived (i.e. they exist in so far only as we\nare conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness\nof consciousness itself--just as the tip of a finger, although touching\nother things, is incapable of touching itself.\n\nAll this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy,\nwithout any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is,\nthat in perceiving colour and other qualities of things, we are not\naware of a 'shining forth' as an attribute of those things, and as\nsomething different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of an\nattribute of things called 'light,' or 'shining forth,' be proved in any\nway, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through\nconsciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness,\ntherefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some\nother act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved\nby itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows--\nConsciousness is, with regard to its attributes and to the empirical\njudgments concerning it, independent of any other thing, because through\nits connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and\nthe empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle\nthat of two things that which through its connexion with the other is\nthe cause of the attributes of--and the empirical judgments about--the\nlatter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We\nsee e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like,\nproduces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend\nfor its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is\nitself the cause of its own 'shining forth,' as well as of the\nempirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like.\n\nConsciousness is eternal and incapable of change.\n\nThis self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not\ncapable of any form of non-existence--whether so--called antecedent\nnon-existence or any other form. This follows from its being\nself-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established\nconsciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or\nanything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of\nits own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as 'being,' for that\nwould contradict its being; if it is, i.e. if its non-existence is not,\nhow can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so\nif not being; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish a\nproof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non-existence of\nconsciousness be apprehended through anything else; for consciousness\ncannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge\nproving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making\nconsciousness its object--'this is consciousness'; but consciousness, as\nbeing self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is\nimplied in the word 'this,' and hence its previous non-existence cannot\nbe proved by anything lying outside itself.\n\nAs consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it\nfurther cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other\nstates of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it.\n\nAs consciousness is beginningless, it further does not admit of any\nplurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of\nsomething which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality\n(this something being 'beginninglessness' which is contrary to the\nquality of having a beginning--which quality invariably accompanies\nplurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to\nbe without a beginning.--And moreover difference, origination, &c., are\nobjects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence\ncannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being\nessentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of\nconsciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness\nis free from difference of any kind.\n\nThe apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject\nis due to the unreal ahamk\u00e2ra.\n\nFrom this it further follows that there is no substrate of\nconsciousness--different from consciousness itself--such as people\nordinarily mean when speaking of a 'knower.' It is self-luminous\nconsciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower.' This\nfollows therefrom also that consciousness is not non-intelligent (jada);\nfor non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood\n(an\u00e2tmatva); hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness,\nconsciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.\n\nBut, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses\nitself in the judgment 'I know,' proves that the quality of being a\n'knower' belongs to consciousness!--By no means, we reply. The\nattribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less\nthan the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver.\nConsciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself:\nthe attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it--an\nerror analogous to that expressed in the judgment 'I am a man,' which\nidentifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter\nthat bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower'\nmeans to be the agent in the action of knowing; and this is something\nessentially changeful and non-intelligent (jada), having its abode in\nthe ahamk\u00e2ra, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the\nother hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless\n'witness' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being?\nThat agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also\nthat, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof,\non seeing, i.e. consciousness.\n\nThat the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the\nidea of 'I' is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and\nsimilar states, the idea of the 'I' is absent, while the consciousness\nof the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent\nand an object of the idea of 'I,' it would be difficult to avoid the\nconclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely\noutward ('being for others only, not for itself') and destitute of\nSelfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of 'I,'\nand known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the\nresults of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is\nacknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instruments of\nknowledge; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the\nknower whom we understand by the term 'I,' is the 'witnessing' inward\nSelf. The non-intelligent ahamk\u00e2ra thus merely serves to manifest the\nnature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its\nabode; for it is the proper quality of manifesting agents to manifest\nthe objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror,\ne.g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face\nor the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the\ngeneric character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far\nas all those things abide in them.--In this way, then, there arises the\nerroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know.'--Nor must\nyou, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous\nconsciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahamk\u00e2ra, which\nrather is itself manifested by consciousness; for we observe that the\nsurface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight\nfalling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly\nseen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of network; the\nlight of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and\nwhich at the same time is itself manifested by the rays.\n\nIt thus appears that the 'knowing agent,' who is denoted by the 'I,' in\nthe judgment 'I know,' constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the\nnature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the\nconsciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and\nfinal release: in those states this special form of consciousness passes\naway, and the Self appears in its true nature, i.e. as pure\nconsciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep\nreflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of myself.'\n\nSumming up of the p\u00fbrvapaksha view.\n\nAs the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows.--Eternal,\nabsolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure\nnon-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing\nto error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into\nmanifold distinctions--knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of\nknowledge. And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of\nthe Ved\u00e2nta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error,\ni.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of\nBrahman, whose nature is mere intelligence--free, pure, eternal.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 22:1. In agreement with the use made of this passage by the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin, vij\u00f1\u00e2na must here be understood in the sense of avidy\u00e2.\nVij\u00f1\u00e2nasabdena vividham j\u00f1\u00e2yate-neneti karanavyutpatty\u00e2-vidy\u00e2-bhidhiyate.\nSru. Pra.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 25:1. The distinction is illustrated by the different views\nPerception and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of\nthe lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and\nthe same: but on the ground of the observation that the different\nparticles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession, we infer\nthat there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we\naccept the Inference as valid, and as sublating or refuting the\nimmediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits\nof being accounted for 'otherwise,' viz. on the ground of the many\ndistinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye\nmistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of\nbeing explained in another way.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 26:1. The reference is to the point discussed P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb. VI,\n5, 54 (Jaim. Ny\u00e2. M\u00e2l\u00e2 Vistara, p. 285).]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 27:1. The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later\nin order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because\ndenial presupposes that which is to be denied.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 27:2. The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from\nits constituent words having the same case-ending.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 30:1. The theory here referred to is held by some of the\nM\u00eem\u00e2msakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning,\ni.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which\nenjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of\ncertain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that\nsuch ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer\na soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told\nby the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative\npossesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which\nmay be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other\nmotives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established\nalready, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man\nwho, e.g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart\nfrom the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech\nare therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this\nconclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all\nthe words entering into an imperative clause.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 34:1. Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only,\nand as such must have a cause.]\n\n\n\n\nTHE GREAT SIDDH\u00c2NTA.\n\nThis entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow\nand vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical\nalternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular\nqualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person\nrevealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the\nimpression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the\nnature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them,\nand into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods\ndepending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge.\nThe theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through\ntexts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound\nreasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.\n\n\n\n\nThere is no proof of non-differenced substance.\n\nTo enter into details.--Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance\ndevoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a\nproof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for\ntheir object things affected with difference.--Should any one taking his\nstand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a\nsubstance free from all difference (does not require any further means\nof proof but) is immediately established by one's own consciousness; we\nreply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of\nthe Self, that all consciousness implies difference: all states of\nconsciousness have for their object something that is marked by some\ndifference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this.' And\nshould a state of consciousness--although directly apprehended as\nimplying difference--be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be\ndevoid of difference, this determination could be effected only by means\nof some special attributes additional to the quality of mere Being; and\nowing to these special qualities on which the determination depends,\nthat state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by\ndifference. The meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only\nbe that of a thing affected with certain differences some other\ndifferences are denied; but manifestly this would not prove the\nexistence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any\nrate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for\nthe knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the\nillumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the\nstates of deep sleep, swoon, &c., consciousness is affected with\ndifference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail.\nMoreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong\ndifferent attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, &c.\n), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general.\nAnd even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes\nplace a discussion of different views, and you yourself attempt to prove\nyour theory by means of the differences between those views and your own.\nIt therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference\nwell established by valid means of proof.\n\n\n\n\nSabda proves difference.\n\nAs to sound (speech; sabda) it is specially apparent that it possesses\nthe power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference.\nSpeech operates with words and sentences. Now a word (pada) originates\nfrom the combination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two\nelements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word\nitself can convey only a sense affected with difference. And further,\nthe plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings; the sentence\ntherefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special\ncombination of things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to\ndenote a thing devoid of all difference.--The conclusion is that sound\ncannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.\n\n\n\n\nPratyaksha--even of the nirvikalpaka kind--proves difference.\n\nPerception in the next place--with its two subdivisions of\nnon-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka)\nperception--also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of\ndifference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things\naffected with difference; for it relates to that which is distinguished\nby generic difference and so on. But also non-determinate perception has\nfor its object only what is marked with difference; for it is on the\nbasis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by\ngeneric character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate\nperception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object\nin so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference.\nApprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever\nto take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all\napprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction\n'This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some\nspecial feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped\ndewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-determinate\nand determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the\nfirst individual among a number of things belonging to the same class,\nwhile the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on,\nindividuals. On the apprehension of the first individual cow the\nperceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape\nwhich constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to\nthe present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in\nthe case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception\nof the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is\ndetermined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the\nperception, of the generic character of a class--manifested in a certain\noutward shape--which connects this act of perception with the earlier\nperception (of the first individual); such determination being\nascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such\nextension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other\nhand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and\nperception of the latter kind thence is 'non-determinate.' That it is\nsuch is not due to non-apprehension of structure, colour, generic\ncharacter and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of\nsensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first\nindividual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be\nperceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the\napprehension of the first individual there is already perception of\nstructure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In\nthe case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we\napprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the\nstructure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the\ngeneric character, and hence the perception is 'determinate.' From all\nthis it follows that perception never has for its object that which is\ndevoid of all difference.\n\n\n\n\nThe bhed\u00e2bheda view is untenable.\n\nThe same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and\nabsence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhed\u00e2bheda view).\nTake the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realise here the\nnon-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? The 'such and\nsuch' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a dewlap, the\n'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the\nnon-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate\nconsciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as\nseparate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the\nfact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us\nsay the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such\nand such.' In general, wherever we cognise the relation of\ndistinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two\nclearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different.\nSomethings--e.g. staffs and bracelets--appear sometimes as having a\nseparate, independent existence of their own; at other times they\npresent themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or\nbeings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other\nentities--e.g. the generic character of cows--have a being only in so\nfar as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present\nthemselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both\ncases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing\ndistinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely\ndifferent. The difference between the two classes of entities is only\nthat staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being\napprehended in separation from other things, while the generic\ncharacteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The\nassertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by\nimmediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form\nof consciousness, the one namely--admitted by every one--which is\nexpressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.'--This same\npoint is clearly expounded by the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra in II, 2, 33.\n\n\n\n\nInference also teaches difference.\n\nPerception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference,\ninference also is in the same case; for its object is only what is\ndistinguished by connexion with things known through perception and\nother means of knowledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as\nto the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid\nof difference could not be established by any of them since the\ninstruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same\nobject, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains\nthe existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of\ndifferences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without\nknowing what he does; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts\nthat his own mother never had any children.\n\n\n\n\nPerception does not reveal mere being.\n\nIn reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of\npure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object;\nand that 'difference' cannot be defined because it does not admit of\nbeing set forth in definite alternatives; we point out that these\ncharges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of\nperception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and\nthat generic character and so on--as being relative things--give at once\nrise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the\nthings in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of\nknowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds\ngood, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another\nthing at the same time gives rise to a judgment about itself; the same\nmay therefore be admitted with regard to difference [FOOTNOTE 44:1].\n\nFor this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical\nseesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive\ncognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment\nthe generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference\nof the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character\nof the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in\na second moment.\n\nMoreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being judgments\nclearly referring to different objects--such as 'Here is a jar,' 'There\nis a piece of cloth'--would be devoid of all meaning. And if through\nperception we did not apprehend difference--as marked by generic\ncharacter, &c., constituting the structure or make of a thing, why\nshould a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a\nbuffalo? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions,\nwhy should we not remember, in the case of each particular cognition,\nall the words which are connected with all our cognitions? And further,\nif the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only,\nthe later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was\napprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of\ncognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of\ncognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is\nadmitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that\nperception has for its objects things affected with difference.\n\nIf all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything\nwould be apprehended by one act of cognition; and from this it would\nfollow that there are no persons either deaf or blind!\n\nNor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only; for\nwhat it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other\nqualities (viz. extension, &c.), which inhere in the thing together with\ncolour. Nor does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things\npalpable. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their\nobject; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or\ntaste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to\napprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere\nBeing free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has\nthe same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the\nfunction of a mere anuv\u00e2da, i.e. it would merely make statements about\nsomething, the knowledge of which is already established by some other\nmeans. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i.e.\nBrahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the\ninstruments of knowledge; and thus there would cling to it all the\nimperfections indicated by yourself--non-intelligent nature,\nperishableness and so on.--From all this we conclude that perception has\nfor its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting\nitself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or\nstructure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing\nelse but its particular structure follows) from the fact that we do not\nperceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as\nconstituting the object of the cognition that several individuals\npossess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently\naccounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as\nmoreover even those who hold generic character to be something different\nfrom structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure,\nwe adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but\nstructure. By 'structure' we understand special or distinctive form; and\nwe acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different\nclasses of things. And as the current judgments as to things being\ndifferent from one another can be explained on the basis of the\napprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is\nobserved to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such\nan additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further\nconclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (j\u00e2ti).--\nBut if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately\nfollow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter\nis apprehended! Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment\nof difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as\nto generic character. For 'the generic character' of a cow, e.g., means\njust the exclusion of everything else: as soon as that character is\napprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures\nbelonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on\nalso) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only\nthat the idea of non-difference comes to an end.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 44:1. Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has\ncolour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so\ndifference manifests itself as well as the things that differ.]\n\n\n\n\nPlurality is not unreal.\n\nNext as to the assertion that all difference presented in our\ncognition--as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like--is unreal because\nsuch difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether\nerroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between\npersistence and non-persistence on the one hand, and the relation\nbetween what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where two\ncognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds\ngood, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces\nof cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are\nseparate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a\nthing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its\nexistence is cognised, we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions,\nand then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes\nto an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some\nplace and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some\nother place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the\none cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing\nabsent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places\nalso? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of\nnon-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is\ncontradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated\ncognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is\nseen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in\nanother place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood,\nand hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason\nfor unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because\nit persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further\nproof.\n\n\n\n\nBeing and consciousness are not one.\n\nHence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the\ndistinction between consciousness and its objects--which rests just on\nthis relation of object and that for which the object is--is proved by\nperception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is\nalso disposed of.\n\n\n\n\nThe true meaning of Svayamprak\u00e2satva.\n\nWe next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness\n(above, p. 33). The contention that consciousness is not an object holds\ngood for the knowing Self at the time when it illumines (i.e.\nconstitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule\nas to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For\ncommon observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become\nthe object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on\nthe person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again\nthat a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of\nhis own cognition--as appears from judgments such as 'At one time I knew.'\nIt cannot therefore be said 'If it is consciousness it is self-proved'\n(above p. 33), nor that consciousness if becoming an object of\nconsciousness would no longer be consciousness; for from this it would\nfollow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others--\nbecause being objects of consciousness--are not themselves consciousness.\nMoreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of\nthe thoughts of others, there would be no apprehension of the connexion\nof words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of\nall human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible\nfor pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the\nreason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning. The\ngeneral proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object\nis in fact quite untenable. The essential 'nature of consciousness or\nknowledge--consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself,\nthrough its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to\ngive another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own\nobject by its own being [FOOTNOTE 48:1].\n\nNow these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of\nconsciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the\nobject of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in\nthe latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand,\ndo not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of\nconsciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated\nabove. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence\nof its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the\nconclusion that consciousness is not consciousness; for there are\nthings--e.g. sky-flowers--which are not objects of consciousness and at\nthe same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that\na sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an\nobject of consciousness, but to its non-existence!--Well then, we\nrejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not\nbeing contradictory to Nescience (i.e. of their being jada), is their\nnot being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse\nto their being objects of consciousness!--But if consciousness is an\nobject of consciousness, we conclude that it also is non-contradictory\nof Nescience, like a jar!--At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive\neven on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Consciousness is\nnon-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an object of\nconsciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a\ngeneral principle that something which is an object of consciousness\ncannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.'\n\n[FOOTNOTE 48:1. The comment of the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions\nruns, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term\n'anubh\u00fbti' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such knowledge as\nis not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With\nreference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars\nalso and similar things know or are conscious because they also shine\nforth' (viz. in so far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like\nthe text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,'\nnot to itself, but to the knowing person). There are other attributes\nof the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are\nrevealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge\ndifferent from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own\nbeing.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of\nknowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state of\nconsciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge\n(representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded; but the text\nadds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') on purpose, in\norder to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented\nby another state--a point denied by the opponent. 'At the present\nmoment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to\nthe present time.' Without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the\ndefinition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to\nanother person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first\ndefinition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain\nthe svayamprak\u00e2satva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a\nsecond definition is given. The two clauses 'to its own substrate' and\n'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition\nalso. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs, wheels,\nand such like implements also; hence the text adds 'its own object.'\n(Staffs, wheels, &c. have no 'objects.') Knowledge depending on sight\ndoes not bring about an object depending on hearing; to exclude this\nnotion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the\nwords 'its own.' The clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense\norgans, which reveal objects not by their own being, but in so far as\nthey give rise to knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and\n'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as\nin the first.]\n\n\n\n\nConsciousness is not eternal.\n\nIt was further maintained by the p\u00fbrvapakshin that as consciousness is\nself-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that\nthis disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove\nsomething not proved by something else that is equally unproved;\ncomparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind\nman! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent\nnon-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to\nmake us apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to make us\napprehend it, viz. consciousness itself!--But how can consciousness at\nthe time when it is, make us apprehend its own previous non-existence\nwhich is contradictorily opposed to it?--Consciousness, we rejoin, does\nnot necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same\ntime with itself; were it so it would follow that neither the past nor\nthe future can be the object of consciousness. Or do you mean that there\nis an absolute rule that the Antecedent non-existence of consciousness,\nif proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we\nask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule? And\nif it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous\nnon-existence, not its negation!--The fact, however, is that no person\nin his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of\nconsciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of\nperceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this\nlimitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are\nactually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend\nto cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we\nobserve that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis\napprehend such things also as are not present at the time of\napprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the\nmeans of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not\nwithout the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge\nis connected with its object in that way that it is not without\nsomething that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the\ninstrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form\nin which the object presents itself as connected with some place and\ntime.--This disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no\nexternal object; for it is observed that remembrance is related to such\nthings also as have perished.--Possibly you will now argue as follows.\nThe antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by\nperception, for it is not something present at the time of perception.\nIt further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge, since\nthere is no characteristic mark (linga) on which an inference could be\nbased: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably\naccompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we\nmeet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent\nnon-existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of\nknowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be\nestablished at all.--If, we reply, you thus, altogether setting aside\nthe force of self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take\nyour stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must\nrequest you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby\nto prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid\nnon-perception (anupalabdhi).\n\nMoreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves its object, be\nit a jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself,\nnot at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or\nsubsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due\nto the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that\nconsciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as\nnon-limited in time, the object also--the jar--would be apprehended\nunder the same form, i.e. it would be eternal. And if self-established\nconsciousness were eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal;\nbut this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential consciousness and\nother forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time,\nthey would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited, and\nthese objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in\nnature to their respective forms of consciousness.\n\n\n\n\nThere is no consciousness without object.\n\nNor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this\nkind is ever known. Moreover, the self-luminousness of consciousness has,\nby our opponent himself, been proved on the ground that its essential\nnature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminousness\nof consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature\nwhich consists in the lighting up of objects. And as moreover, according\nto our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another\nconsciousness, it would follow that (having neither an object nor itself\nbeing an object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.\n\nNor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, swoon,\nsenselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, devoid of any\nobject, manifests itself. This view is negatived by 'valid\nnon-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness were present in\nthose states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of\nwaking from sleep or recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there\nis no such remembrance.--But it is not an absolute rule that something\nof which we were conscious must be remembered; how then can the absence\nof remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness?--Unless, we\nreply, there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite\nobliterates all impressions--as e.g. the dissolution of the body--the\nabsence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous\nconsciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of\nconsciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance; it is\nalso proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from\nsleep, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.'--Nor may it\nbe said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance\nwould necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the\ndistinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of\nthe 'I'; for the non-consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of\nsome one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other\nthing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in\nquestion the consciousness of the 'I' does persist, will moreover be\nshown further on.\n\nBut, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep\nsleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference?--\nTrue, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the\nSelf, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on.\nAt present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure\nconsciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate. Nor can we\nadmit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the\nconsciousness of the Self; for we shall prove that the latter has a\nsubstrate.\n\nIt thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of\nconsciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness\nitself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself\nmay be an object of consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged\nimpossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means.\nHerewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness\ncan be proved.\n\n\n\n\nConsciousness is capable of change.\n\nAgainst the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness\nat the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other\nchanges (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this\nconclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent\nnon-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end,\nalthough it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of\n'Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your\nown view Nescience also (which is not 'Being') does not originate, is\nthe substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise\nof knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all\nunreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is\nreal? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a\nsense to the distinction expressed by the word 'Being' [FOOTNOTE 54:1].\n\nNor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within\nitself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self\nis divided from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is\navowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from\nthe Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask\nwhether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with\norigination! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is\nnot real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one.\nYou further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the\ndifference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted\nknowledge; an analogous case being furnished by the difference of acts\nof cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft.\nAnd if you assert that of this knowing--which is essentially knowing\nonly--nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and\nthat these objects--just because they are objects of knowledge--cannot\nbe attributes of knowing; we point out that both these remarks would\napply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of\n'knowing', which are acknowledged by yourself, and established by valid\nmeans of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged\nattributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they\nare essentially distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing', we\nunderstand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own\nsubstrate (i.e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i.e.\nthe existence of knowledge) merely; by self-luminousness (or\n'self-illuminatedness') we understand the shining forth or being\nmanifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms\n'shining forth', 'illumining', 'being manifest' in both these\ndefinitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and\nspeech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or\nnon-intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all time';\noneness means 'being defined by the number one'. Even if you say that\nthese attributes are only negative ones, i.e. equal to the absence of\nnon-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that\nthey are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a\nnature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as\nattributes of consciousness--whether of a positive or a negative\nkind--in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning\nproceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the\nlike.\n\nWe moreover must admit the following alternative: consciousness is\neither proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it\npossesses attributes; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory,\nlike a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 54:1. The S\u00e2nkara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of\nreal and unreal division, because according to his theory all\ndistinction is unreal.]\n\n\n\n\nConsciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious self.\n\nLet it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhih) itself. Proof\nof what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If no definite answer can be\ngiven to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as\n'proof'; for 'proof' is a relative notion, like 'son.' You will perhaps\nreply 'Proof to the Self'; and if we go on asking 'But what is that\nSelf'? you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us before.'\nTrue, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if\nit is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light,'\n'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how\ncan this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the\nthing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character\nof consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders\nthings capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and\nspeech. This consciousness (anubh\u00fbti), which is also termed j\u00f1\u00e2na,\navagati, samvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self\nand related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the\ntestimony of his own Self--as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I\nknow the jar,' 'I understand this matter,' 'I am conscious of (the\npresence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of\nconsciousness you yourself admit; for you have proved thereby its\nself-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents\nitself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it\nwould be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself\nthe agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of\naction is the agent.\n\nFor we clearly see that this agent (the subject of consciousness) is\npermanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not\ndiffering herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some\ntime, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject\nis proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly\napprehended by me.' The non-permanency of consciousness, on the other\nhand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, 'I\nknow at present,' 'I knew at a time,' 'I, the knowing subject, no longer\nhave knowledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and (the\nconscious subject) be one? If consciousness which changes every moment\nwere admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be\nimpossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw\nyesterday; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by\nanother. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious\nsubject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for\nthe fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject\npersisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely\nconsciousness. Its expression is 'I myself perceived this thing on a\nformer occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a\nconscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness; for consciousness,\nyou say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a\npure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have\nalready refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have\nabsolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of\nus should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And\nwe have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove\nthat mere consciousness is the only reality.--But, another objection is\nraised, should the relation of the Self and the 'I' not rather be\nconceived as follows:--In self-consciousness which expresses itself in\nthe judgment 'I know,' that intelligent something which constitutes the\nabsolutely non-objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the\nSelf; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is\nestablished through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the\n_I_--in 'I know'--and this is something different from pure\nintelligence, something objective or external?\n\nBy no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the relation of\nattribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious,\nas implied in the thought 'I know.'\n\nConsider also what follows.--'If the _I_ were not the Self, the\ninwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness\nof the _I_ which separates the inward from the outward.\n\n'\"May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of\nendless delight?\" This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of\nrelease to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a\nsettled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the\nsame man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. \"When I\nmyself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different\nfrom me;\" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.\n\n'Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness\nat all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self;\nwhen that connexion is dissolved, consciousness itself cannot be\nestablished, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when\nthere is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain\nthat the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.'\n\nThis scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?'\n(Bri. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti also, 'Him who knows this they call the\nknower of the body' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIII, 1). And the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra also, in the\nsection beginning with 'Not the Self on account of scriptural statement'\n(II, 3, 17), will say 'For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3,\n18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.\n\nWhat is established by consciousness of the 'I' is the I itself, while\nthe not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I; hence to say that\nthe knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness,\n'I know,' is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own\nmother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this 'I,' the knowing\nsubject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is\nself-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for\none's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential\nnature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is\nanalogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the\ncircumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it\ndoes not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness\ndepends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of\nluminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things\nalso. To explain.--The one substance tejas, i.e. fire or heat, subsists\nin a double form, viz. as light (prabh\u00e2), and as luminous matter.\nAlthough light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in\nitself nothing but the substance tejas, not a mere quality like e.g.\nwhiteness; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses\ncolour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those\nof qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining\npower, it is the substance tejas, not anything else (e.g. a quality).\nIllumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other\nthings. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because\nit always has the substance tejas for its substrate, and depends on it.\nThis must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is\nreally nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the\nsubstance tejas; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in\nthe end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp\nconsisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be\napprehended as a whole; for no reason can be stated why those particles\nshould regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four\nfingers breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves\nuniformly in all directions--upwards, sideways, and downwards. The fact\nis that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew\nevery moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the\nsuccessive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and\nwick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely\nconsumed.\n\nAnalogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelligent (kid-r\u00fbpa),\nand has intelligence (kaitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially\nintelligent means to be self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts\ndeclaring this, compare e.g. 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor\noutside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has\nneither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri.\nUp. IV, 5, 13); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no\ndestruction of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); 'He\nwho knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4); 'Who\nis that Self? That one who is made of knowledge, among the pr\u00e2nas,\nwithin the heart, the light, the person' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'For it is\nhe who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person\nwhose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the\nknower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows,' 'The seer does not\nsee death nor illness nor pain' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'That highest\nperson not remembering this body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII,\n12, 3); 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the\nperson; when they have readied the person, sink into him' (Pr. Up. VI,\n5); 'From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self\nconsisting of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra also will\nrefer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the\nself-luminous Self is a knower, i.e. a knowing subject, and not pure\nlight (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where\nthere is light it must belong to something, as shown by the light of a\nlamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians\nmoreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness,' 'knowledge,' &c.,\nare relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such\nas 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who\nknows.\n\nWith reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the Self,\nbecause it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent (jada), we ask what\nyou understand by this absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply\n'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i.e. of the thing\nwhich is ajada)'; we point out that this definition would wrongly\ninclude lamps also, and similar things; and it would moreover give rise\nto a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute,\ndifferent from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define\najadatva as 'being of that nature that light is always present, without\nany exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain,\nand similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on,\nalthough being throughout of the nature of light, are non-intelligent\nfor the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to\nsomething else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in\nreply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself?\nKnowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the 'I':\nthere is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 'I know,'\nand the judgment 'I am pleased.' Non-intelligence in the sense of\nappearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness; and hence\nit follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-jada 'I' which is\nproved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of\nlight depends altogether on its connection with the knowing 'I': it is\ndue to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to\nthat conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The\nSelf is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I.'\n\n\n\n\nThe view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the\nahamk\u00e2ra, cannot be maintained.\n\nWe turn to a further point. You maintain that consciousness which is in\nreality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to\nerror, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears\nas silver; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an\nerroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place\napart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were\nas you describe them, the conscious 'I' would be cognised as co-ordinate\nwith the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the\nshining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But\nthe fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something\napart, constituting a distinguishing attribute of the I, just as the\nstick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment 'I am\nconscious' reveals an 'I' distinguished by consciousness; and to declare\nthat it refers only to a state of consciousness--which is a mere\nattribute--is no better than to say that the judgment 'Devadatta carries\na stick' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the\nidea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of\nhim only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error\nexpressing itself in judgments such as 'I am stout,' and is on that\naccount false; for from this it would follow that the consciousness\nwhich is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents\nitself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that\nconsciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublatcd by that\ncognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the\nknowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublatcd.\nYou further maintain that the character of being a knower, i.e. the\nagent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self;\nthat being a knower is something implying change, of a non-intelligent\nkind (jada), and residing in the ahamk\u00e2ra which is the abode of change\nand a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakriti); that being an agent\nand so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is\nobjective; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object\nof the notion of the 'I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the\nbody, not a real Self but something external and non-intelligent. But\nall this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body,\nnon-intelligent, an effect of Prakriti, an object of knowledge,\nsomething outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a\nknowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent\nbeings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness,\noutwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses\nthe opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inwardness, and so on; for\nthe same reason the ahamk\u00e2ra also--which is of the same substantial\nnature as the body--is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamk\u00e2ra is\nno more a knower than it is something subjective; otherwise there would\nbe an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the\nahamk\u00e2ra, which is an object of knowledge, so knowership also cannot be\nascribed to it; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be\nmaintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to\nbe a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as\nthe knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of\nthe Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in\nthe S\u00fbtra, II, 3, 17; and in II, 3, 18 the term 'j\u00f1a' (knower) will show\nthat it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of\nknowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the\nsubstrate of the (quality of) knowledge--just as gems and the like are\nthe substrate of light--gives rise to no contradiction whatever.\n\nKnowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of\ncontraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called\nkshetraj\u00f1a--condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence\nof work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts\nitself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the\ndifferent senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as\ndue to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self\npossesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however,\nessential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging.\nThis changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self\nwhose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the non-intelligent\nahamk\u00e2ra. But, you will perhaps say, the ahamk\u00e2ra, although of non-\nintelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to\nintelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in\nreturn, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take\nplace? Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamk\u00e2ra, or does\nthe ahamk\u00e2ra become a reflection of consciousness? The former\nalternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness\nthe quality of being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained\nabove, the non-intelligent ahamk\u00e2ra can never become a knower. Moreover,\nneither consciousness nor the ahamk\u00e2ra are objects of visual perception.\nOnly things seen by the eye have reflections.--Let it then be said that\nas an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of\nbeing a knower is imparted to the ahamk\u00e2ra through its contact with\nIntelligence.--This view too is inadmissible; for as you do not allow\nreal knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of\nknowership cannot be imparted to the ahamk\u00e2ra by contact with\nIntelligence; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of\nit be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essentially non-\nintelligent ahamk\u00e2ra. Nor can we accept what you say about\n'manifestation.' Neither the ahamk\u00e2ra, you say, nor Intelligence is\nreally a knowing subject, but the ahamk\u00e2ra manifests consciousness\nabiding within itself (within the ahamk\u00e2ra), as the mirror manifests the\nimage abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahamk\u00e2ra\nevidently cannot 'manifest' the self-luminous Self. As has been said\n'That the non-intelligent ahamk\u00e2ra should manifest the self-luminous\nSelf, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.'\nThe truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous\nconsciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the\nnon-intelligent ahamk\u00e2ra--which itself depends for its light on\nconsciousness--manifests consciousness, whose essential light never\nrises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever\nknows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The\nrelation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between consciousness and\nthe ahamk\u00e2ra for the further reason also that there is a contradiction\nin nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not\nto be consciousness. As has been said, 'One cannot manifest the other,\nowing to contradictoriness; and if the Self were something to be\nmanifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar.' Nor\nis the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams\n(above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams while manifesting the\nhand, are at the same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness,\nwhile manifesting the ahamk\u00e2ra, is at the same time itself manifested by\nthe latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at\nall. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed\n(reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and\nhence are perceived more clearly; but this is due altogether to the\nmultitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.\n\nWhat could, moreover, be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the Self\nconsisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the ahamk\u00e2ra?\nIt cannot be origination; for you acknowledge that what is self-\nestablished cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be\n'illumination' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot--\naccording to you--be the object of another consciousness. For the same\nreason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of\nconsciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It\nwould either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known\nwith the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the\napprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between\nthe organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass.\nOr it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind\nof the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-\nrestraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending\nthe highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that\nconsciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be\nmaintained that the 'I' assists the means whereby that consciousness is\neffected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any\nobstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to\nthe way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which\nimpedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case\nunder discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is\nnothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of\nthe knowledge of consciousness and which could be removed by the\nahamk\u00e2ra.--There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience!\nNot so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the ahamk\u00e2ra cannot be\nadmitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can\nconsciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience\nwould have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.\n\nIn pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of\nknowledge--the so-called 'witnessing' principle (s\u00e2kshin)--Nescience\ncannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience\nbecause there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge,\nand for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of\nNescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of\nNescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness\nbeing viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence\nknowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness.\nFor knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own\nobjects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this\nwould be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be\ndestroyed by any one.--If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as\nthat which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show\nlater on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.--On\nthe other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-\nexistence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of\nknowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as\npromoting the means of the knowledge of the Self.--From all this it\nfollows that the ahamk\u00e2ra cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of\nconsciousness.'\n\nNor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential\nnature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter\nhave their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in\nthe case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them).\nThe essential nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they\npromote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the\nnature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it\neven true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the\ncause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays\nof light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the\nface within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And\nit is evident that the ahamk\u00e2ra is not capable of producing an\nirregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness\nwhich is self-luminous.--And--with regard to the second analogous\ninstance alleged by you--the fact is that the species is known through\nthe individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the\ngeneral principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not\nbecause the individual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason,\neither real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness\nof consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahamk\u00e2ra,\nand the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of\nthat cannot therefore belong to the ahamk\u00e2ra. Hence, what constitutes\nthe inward Self is not pure consciousness but the 'I' which proves\nitself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, 'inwardness'\ncould not be established for consciousness.\n\n\n\n\nThe conscious subject persists in deep sleep.\n\nWe now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep\nsleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no\nconsciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear\npresentation of the 'I'; but all the same the Self somehow presents\nitself up to the time of waking in the one form of the 'I,' and the\nlatter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure consciousness assumed\nby you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case;\nfor a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his\nstate of consciousness during sleep in the form, 'I was pure\nconsciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything\nelse, witnessing Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From\nthis form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self. i.e.\nthe 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you\nurge against this that the reflection has the following form: 'As now I\nfeel pleasure, so I slept then also'; for the reflection is distinctly\n_not_ of that kind. [FOOTNOTE 68:1] Nor must you say that owing to the\nnon-permanency of the 'I' its perception of pleasure during sleep\ncannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the 'I' is permanent\nas appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep\nrecalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, 'I did such\nand such a thing,' 'I observed this or that,' 'I said so or so.'--But,\nyou will perhaps say, he also reflects, 'For such and such a time I was\nconscious of nothing!'--'And what does this imply?' we ask.--'It implies\na negation of everything!'--By no means, we rejoin. The words 'I was\nconscious' show that the knowing 'I' persisted, and that hence what is\nnegated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in 'of\nnothing' included everything, it would also negative the pure\nconsciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment\n'I was conscious of nothing,' the word 'I' clearly refers to the 'I,' i.\ne. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the\nwords 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of\nthat 'I'; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means\nof this very judgment that knowledge--which is expressly denied--existed\nat the time, and that the persisting knowing Self did not exist, you may\naddress your proof to the patient gods who give no reply!--But--our\nopponent goes on to urge--I form the following judgment also: 'I then\nwas not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the 'I'\ndid not persist during deep sleep!--You do not know, we rejoin, that\nthis denial of the persistence of the 'I' flatly contradicts the state\nof consciousness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of\nmyself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself!--But what then is\ndenied by the words 'of myself?--This, we admit, is a reasonable\nquestion. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment\nis not the knowing 'I' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste,\ncondition of life, &c. which belong to the 'I' at the time of waking. We\nmust distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under\ndiscussion. The object of the '(me) myself' is the 'I' distinguished by\nclass characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the\nobject of the word 'I' (in the judgment) is that 'I' which consists of a\nuniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is\nthen not quite distinct. The judgment 'I did not know myself' therefore\nmeans that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of\nhis special characteristics, and so on.--It is, moreover, your own view\nthat in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing\nprinciple with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (s\u00e2kshin) we\nunderstand some one who knows about something by personal observation\n(s\u00e2ksh\u00e2t); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly,\nin scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not\nmere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend\nP\u00e2nini also agrees when teaching that the word 's\u00e2kshin' means one who\nknows in person (P\u00e2. S\u00fb. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but\nthe 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then\nshould this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which\nitself appears to the Self appears as the 'I,' and it thus follows that\nalso in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth\nappears as the 'I.'\n\n[FOOTNOTE 68:1. I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure\nrefers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of\nreflection.]\n\n\n\n\nThe conscious subject persists in the state of release.\n\nTo maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the\nstate of final release is again altogether inappropriate. It in fact\namounts to the doctrine--only expressed in somewhat different words--\nthat final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' is not a\nmere attribute of the Self so that even after its destruction the\nessential nature of the Self might persist--as it persists on the\ncessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self.\nSuch judgments as 'I know', 'Knowledge has arisen in me', show, on the\nother hand, that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of\nthe Self.--Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind--\nwhether such pain be real or due to error only--puts himself in relation\nto pain--'I am suffering pain'--naturally begins to reflect how he may\nonce for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy\na state of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having\narisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other\nhand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the\nloss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as\nsomebody began to tell him about 'release'. And the result of this would\nbe that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole\nscriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative\ncharacter.--Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of\nrelease there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves\nyour case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the\nidea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity\ntermed 'pure light!'--What constitutes the 'inward' Self thus is the 'I',\nthe knowing subject.\n\nThis 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an\n'I'; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever\nbeing appears to itself appears as an 'I'; both parties in the present\ndispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such\nappearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I', does\nnot appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emancipated Self\ndoes thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an 'I'. Nor does\nthis appearance as an 'I' imply in any way that the released Self is\nsubject to Nescience and implicated in the Sams\u00e2ra; for this would\ncontradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness\nof the 'I' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience\n(ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition\nof something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a\nperson suffering from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of\nwhat is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is\nmistaken for silver). Now the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of\nthe Self; how then can the consciousness of the 'I,' i.e. the\nconsciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in\nNescience, or, in the Sams\u00e2ra? The fact rather is that such\nconsciousness destroys Nescience, and so on, because it is essentially\nopposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the\nrishi V\u00e2madeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had\ntotally destroyed all Nescience, enjoyed the consciousness of the\npersonal 'I'; for scripture says, 'Seeing this the rishi V\u00e2madeva\nunderstood,_I_ was Manu and the Sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And the\nhighest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience\nand denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous\nway; cp. 'Let me make each of these three deities,' &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3,\n3); 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He thought,\nshall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. \u00c2r. II, 4, 1, 1); and again, 'Since I\ntranscend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible,\ntherefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest\nPerson' (Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 18); 'I am the Self, O G\u00fbd\u00e2kesa.' (Bha. G\u00ee. X, 20);\n'Never was I not' (Bha. G\u00ee. II, 12); 'I am the source and the\ndestruction of the whole world' (Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 6); 'I am the source of\nall; from me proceeds everything' (Bha. G\u00ee. X, 8); 'I am he who raises\nthem from the ocean of the world of death' (Bha. G\u00ee. XII, 7); 'I am the\ngiver of seed, the father' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIV, 4); 'I know the things past'\n(Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 26).--But if the 'I' (aham) constitutes the essential\nnature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of\negoity (ahamk\u00e2ra) to belong to the sphere of objects, 'The great\nelements, the ahamk\u00e2ra, the understanding (buddhi), and the Unevolved'\n(Bha. G\u00ee. XIII, 5)?--As in all passages, we reply, which give\ninformation about the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the 'I',\nwe conclude that the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of the inward\nSelf. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares the ahamk\u00e2ra--a\nspecial effect of the Unevolved--to be comprised within the sphere of\nthe Objective, he means that principle which is called ahamk\u00e2ra, because\nit causes the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which belongs\nto the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the ahamk\u00e2ra also designated as\npride or arrogance, which causes men to slight persons superior to\nthemselves, and is referred to by scripture in many places as something\nevil. Such consciousness of the 'I' therefore as is not sublated by\nanything else has the Self for its object; while, on the other hand,\nsuch consciousness of the 'I' as has the body for its object is mere\nNescience. In agreement with this the Reverend Par\u00e2sara has said, 'Hear\nfrom me the essential nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of\nSelfhood to what is not the Self.' If the Self were pure consciousness\nthen pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being a knowing\nsubject, would present itself in the body also, which is a Not-self\nwrongly imagined to be a Self. The conclusion therefore remains that the\nSelf is nothing but the knowing 'I'. Thus it has been said, 'As is\nproved by perception, and as also results from reasoning and tradition,\nand from its connexion with ignorance, the Self presents itself as a\nknowing 'I'. And again,'That which is different from body, senses, mind,\nand vital airs; which does not depend on other means; which is permanent,\npervading, divided according to bodies-that is the Self blessed in\nitself.' Here 'not dependent on other means' means 'self-luminous'; and\n'pervading' means 'being of such a nature as to enter, owing to\nexcessive minuteness, into all non-sentient things.'\n\n\n\n\nIn cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scripture is not\nstronger. The True cannot be known through the Untrue.\n\nWith reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, which\ndepends on the view of plurality, is based on some defect and hence\nadmits of being otherwise accounted for--whence it follows that it is\nsublated by Scripture; we ask you to point out what defect it is on\nwhich Perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.--'\nThe beginningless imagination of difference' we expect you to reply.--\nBut, we ask in return, have you then come to know by some other means\nthat this beginningless imagination of difference, acting in a manner\nanalogous to that of certain defects of vision, is really the cause of\nan altogether perverse view of things?--If you reply that this is known\njust from the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we\npoint out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove the\ndefectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that\nScripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference; and at\nthe same time you prove the latter point through the former. Moreover,\nif Perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on\nthe imagination of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case--for\nit is based on the very same view.--If against this you urge that\nScripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception in so far\nas it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality\napprehended through Perception, and thus is later in order than\nPerception; we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of\nScripture having once been recognised, the circumstance of its being\nlater is of no avail. For if a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes\nfor a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man, whom\nhe considers to be in error himself, tells him 'This is no snake, do not\nbe afraid.' And that Scripture _is_ founded on something defective is\nknown at the very time of hearing Scripture, for the reflection (which\nfollows on hearing) consists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness\nof Brahman--a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality\napprehended through the first hearing of the Veda.--We further ask, 'By\nwhat means do you arrive at the conclusion that Scripture cannot\npossibly be assumed to be defective in any way, while defects may be\nascribed to Perception'? It is certainly not Consciousness--self-proved\nand absolutely devoid of all difference--which enlightens you on this\npoint; for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, and\nincapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-perception be the\nsource of your conviction; for as it is founded on what is defective it\ngives perverse information. Nor again the other sources of knowledge;\nfor they are all based on sense-perception. As thus there are no\nacknowledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must give it up.\nBut, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means of the ordinary empirical\nmeans and objects of knowledge!--What, we ask in reply, do you\nunderstand by 'empirical'?--What rests on immediate unreflective\nknowledge, but is found not to hold good when tested by logical\nreasoning!--But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If\nlogical reasoning refutes something known through some means of\nknowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative!--Now you\nwill possibly argue as follows: 'Scripture as well as Perception is\nfounded on Nescience; but all the same Perception is sublated by\nScripture. For as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one\nand without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior\ncognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, remains as\nthe sole Reality.'--But here too you are wrong, since we must decide\nthat something which rests on a defect is unreal, although it may remain\nunrefuted. We will illustrate this point by an analogous instance. Let\nus imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of\nvision, without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some\nremote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men provided with sound\neyes. As we assume all of these cave dwellers to be afflicted with the\nsame defect of vision, they, all of them, will equally see and judge\nbright things, e.g. the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these\npeople there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their\nprimitive cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its\nobject, viz., the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise; the defect\nof vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality.--\nAnd so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based\non Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz.\nBrahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself.--This\nconclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. 'The Brahman\nunder dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has\nsprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phenomenal world is.'\n'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge; as the world\nis.' 'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise\nof which has the Untrue for its cause; as the world is.'\n\nYou will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming\nconsciousness--such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's\ndreams--are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real\nthings, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence\nthere is no reason why Scripture--although unreal in so far as based on\nNescience--should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is\nreal, viz. Brahman.--The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The\nconscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal; it is only their\nobjects that are false; these objects only, not the conscious states,\nare sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks 'the cognitions\nof which I was conscious in my dream are unreal'; what men actually\nthink is 'the cognitions are real, but the things are not real.' In the\nsame way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces\nin the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true, and\nhence the cause of love and fear; for such states of consciousness also\nare not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the\nobject, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and\nhence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination\nwhich, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man\nthough not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is\nthe representation of the imagined poison, for it may be the cause of\nactual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is\nreal, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real\nface. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from\ntheir having a beginning and actual effects.--Nor would it avail you to\nobject that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of\nthem cannot be real. For ideas require only _some_ substrate in general;\nthe mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an\nappearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect.\nThe thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is\nnon-sublated, and therefore real.\n\nNor can you quote in favour of your view--of the real being known\nthrough the unreal--the instance of the stroke and the letter. The\nletter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character)\ndoes not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal;\nfor the stroke itself is real.--But the stroke causes the idea of the\nletter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this\n'being a letter' is untrue!--Not so, we rejoin. If this 'being a letter'\nwere unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter;\nfor we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and\nindefinable constitutes a means.--Let then the idea of the letter\nconstitute the means!--In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the\nreal does not spring from the unreal; and besides, it would follow\ntherefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one,\ni.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only.\nMoreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is\n_not_ the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the\nsight of one stroke; for one stroke may easily be conceived as _not_\nbeing _any_ letter.--But, in the same way as the word 'Devadatta'\nconventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke\napprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular\nletter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be\nthe cause of the idea of a particular letter!--Quite so, we reply, but\non this explanation the real is known through the real; for both stroke\nand conventional power of symbolisation are real. The case is analogous\nto that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a\nbuffalo; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing\ndepicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said\n(with a view to proving the p\u00fbrvapaksha by another analogous instance)\nthat we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the\ncase of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the\napprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (n\u00e2da).\nFor sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far\nonly as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifesting itself in\nvarious tones, with the different things indicated by those various\ntones [FOOTNOTE 77:1]. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the\nground of the uniformity of sound; for only particular significant\nsounds such as 'ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really\n'sound.'--All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the\nknowledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture,\nif Scripture--as based on Nescience--is itself untrue.\n\nOur opponent may finally argue as follows:--Scripture is not unreal in\nthe same sense as a sky-flower is unreal; for antecedently to the\ncognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that\n_is_, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At\nthis latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman,\ndevoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intelligence; as long on\nthe other hand as it is such a means, Scripture _is_; for then we judge\n'Scripture is.'--But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true),\nthe judgment 'Scripture is' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on\nfalse Scripture being false likewise, the object of that knowledge, i.e.\nBrahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist\nbeing mistaken for smoke is false, it follows that the object of that\ncognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown\nthat (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior\nsublative cognition; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the\none expressed in the judgment 'the Reality is a Void.' And if you say\nthat this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to\nyourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our\njudgment (viz. 'the Reality is a Void') it may truly be said that all\nfurther negation is impossible.--But there is no need to continue this\ndemolition of an altogether baseless theory.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 77:1. And those manifestations of sound by means of various\ntones are themselves something real.]\n\n\n\n\nNo scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.\n\nWe now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e.g.\n'Being only was this in the beginning,' are meant to teach that there\ntruly exists only one homogeneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from\nall difference.--This we cannot allow. For the section in which the\nquoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that\nby the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the\nhighest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial\nand also the operative cause of the world; that it is all-knowing,\nendowed with all powers; that its purposes come true; that it is the\ninward principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and that\ndistinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self\nof the entire world; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu\nthat this Brahman constitutes his Self also ('Thou art that'). We have\nfully set forth this point in the Ved\u00e2rtha-samgraha and shall establish\nit in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called\n\u00e2rambhana-adhikarana.--In the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge\nis that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1,\n5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakriti,\nand then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness,\nsubtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperishableness, creativeness with\nregard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain\nthat also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman', does not\nprove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the\nco-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so\nfar only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For\n'co-ordination' (s\u00e2m\u00e2n\u00e2dhikaranya, lit.'the abiding of several things in\na common substrate') means the reference (of several terms) to one\nthing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of\nseveral terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms,'\nTrue','Knowledge','Infinite', in their primary sense, i. e. as denoting\nqualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary\nto those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of\ncauses for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is\nhowever that difference between the two alternatives that in the former\ncase the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case\ntheir denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' (lakshan\u00e2).\nNor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge,\n&c.(which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshan\u00e2),\nconstitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one\nnon-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport\nonly); for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended\nthrough one term, the employment of further terms would be purposeless.\nThis view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would\nnot allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one\nthing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former\nalternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one\nthing implies a distinction in the thing to which the attributes belong,\nand that from this it follows that the several terms denote several\nthings--a result which also could not be reconciled with\n'co-ordination'; for what 'co-ordination' aims at is just to convey the\nidea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the\ngrammarians define 'coordination' as the application, to one thing, of\nseveral words, for the application of each of which there is a different\nmotive.\n\nYou have further maintained the following view:--In the text 'one only\nwithout a second', the phrase 'without a second' negatives all duality\non Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must\ntherefore, according to the principle that all S\u00e2kh\u00e2s convey the same\ndoctrine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at\nsetting forth an absolutely non-dual substance. Of Brahman thus\nindirectly defined as a cause, the text 'The True, knowledge, infinite\nis Brahman,' contains a direct definition; the Brahman here meant to be\ndefined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the\ntext would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman\nto be without qualities and blemish.--But this also cannot be admitted.\nWhat the phrase 'without a second' really aims at intimating is that\nBrahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the\nexistence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That\nBrahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on,\n'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it sent forth fire,'\nand so on.--But how are we to know that the mere phrase 'without a\nsecond' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in\ngeneral?--As follows, we reply. The clause 'Being only this was in the\nbeginning, one only,' teaches that Brahman when about to create\nconstitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some\nfurther operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally\npresents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added\nclause 'without a second' is meant to negative such an additional cause.\nIf it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the\neternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You\nin this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the--S\u00e2kh\u00e2s\ncontaining the same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the\nqualities attributed in all--S\u00e2kh\u00e2s to Brahman as cause should be taken\nover into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration\nteaches us that also the text 'True, knowledge', &c., teaches Brahman to\npossess attributes; for this passage has to be interpreted in agreement\nwith the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor does this imply a\nconflict with the texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities;\nfor those texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on\nPrakriti.--Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare\nindeed that knowledge is the essential nature of Brahman, but this does\nnot mean that mere knowledge constitutes the fundamental reality. For\nknowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only\nwhich is the substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps,\nand gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is a knowing subject\nall scriptural texts declare; cp. 'He who is all knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1,\n9); 'It thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'This divine being thought' (Ch. Up.\nVI, 3, 2); 'He thought, let me send forth the worlds' (Ait. \u00c2r. II,4, 1,\n2); 'He who arranges the wishes--as eternal of those who are not eternal,\nas thinker of (other) thinkers, as one of many' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13);\n'There are two unborn ones--one who knows, one who does not know--one\nstrong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Let us know Him, the highest\nof Lords, the great Lord, the highest deity of deities, the master of\nmasters, the highest above the god, the lord of the world, the adorable\none' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'Of him there is known no effect (body) or\ninstrument; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is\nrevealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, as knowledge,\nstrength, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That is the Self, free from\nsin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose\nwishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). These\nand other texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is\nknowledge, there belong many excellent qualities--among which that of\nbeing a knowing subject stands first, and that Brahman is free from all\nevil qualities. That the texts referring to Brahman as free from\nqualities, and those which speak of it as possessing qualities, have\nreally one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the\npassages quoted above; the earlier part of which--'free from sin,' up to\n'free from thirst'--denies of Brahman all evil qualities, while its\nlatter part--'whose wishes are true,' and so on--asserts of its certain\nexcellent qualities. As thus there is no contradiction between the two\nclasses of texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of\nthem has for its object something that is false.--With regard to the\nconcluding passage of the Taittiriya-text, 'from whence all speech,\ntogether with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it [FOOTNOTE 82:1],'\nwe point out that with the passage 'From terror of it the wind blows,'\nthere begins a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the\nnext section 'one hundred times that human bliss,' &c., makes statements\nas to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied\nsouls; the concluding passage 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman\nfrom whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to\nreach it,' hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite\nnature of Brahman's auspicious qualities. Moreover, a clause in the\nchapter under discussion--viz. 'he obtains all desires, together with\nBrahman the all-wise' (II, 1)--which gives information as to the fruit\nof the knowledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the\nqualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are the\nauspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects of desire; the man\nwho knows Brahman obtains, together with Brahman, all qualities of it.\nThe expression 'together with' is meant to bring out the primary\nimportance of the qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-\nvidy\u00e2 (Ch. Up. VIII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of the same\ncharacter (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman its qualities are the\nchief matter of meditation, just as these qualities are the principal\npoint in Brahman reached by the Devotee) is proved by the text\n'According to what a man's thought is in this world, so will he be after\nhe has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). If it be said that the\npassage 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought', 'not\nunderstood by those who understand' (Ke. Up. II, 3), declares Brahman\nnot to be an object of knowledge; we deny this, because were it so,\ncertain other texts would not teach that final Release results from\nknowledge; cp. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II,\n1, 1); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman.' And, moreover, the text\n'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing; he\nwho knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing' (Taitt\nUp. II, 6, 1), makes the existence and non-existence of the Self\ndependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has\nBrahman for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural texts\nenjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of final Release. This\nknowledge is, as we already know, of the nature of meditation, and what\nis to be meditated on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from\nthe Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows:--) We are informed by the\npassage 'from whence speech together with mind turns away, being unable\nto reach it', that the infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences\ncannot be defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, and\nfrom this we conclude the Kena text to mean that Brahman is not thought\nand not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely\nlimited nature; Brahman in truth being unlimited. If the text did not\nmean this, it would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that\nBrahman is _not_ thought and _not_ understood, and other parts, that it\n_is_ thought and _is_ understood.\n\nNow as regards the assertion that the text 'Thou mayest not see the seer\nof seeing; thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III,\n5, 2), denies the existence of a seeing and thinking subject different\nfrom mere seeing and thinking--This view is refuted by the following\ninterpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who has formed the\nerroneous opinion that the quality of consciousness or knowledge does\nnot constitute the essential nature of the knower, but belongs to it\nonly as an adventitious attribute, and tells him 'Do not view or think\nthe Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self to have\nseeing and thinking for its essential nature.'--Or else this text may\nmean that the embodied Self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker\nof thinking should be set aside, and that only the highest Self--the\ninner Self of all beings--should be meditated upon.--Otherwise a\nconflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self,\nsuch as 'whereby should he know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).\n\nYour assertion that the text 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1)\nproves pure Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is\nalready disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge\n(consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman\nbeing in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we\nunderstand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as\n'consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean 'consciousness--the\nessential character of which is bliss--is Brahman.' On this identity of\nthe two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so\nmuch insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages\nteach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is\nat the same time a knowing subject; so other passages, speaking of\nBrahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere\nbliss but a subject enjoying bliss; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman'\n(Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II,\n9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a\nconscious subject.\n\nWe now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our\nopponent, negative the existence of plurality.--'Where there is duality\nas it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'There is not any plurality here; from\ndeath to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);\n'But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom,\nshould he see?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c.--But what all these texts deny\nis only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world\nwhich depends on its being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and\nhaving Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They\ndo not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which\ndepends on its intention to become manifold--a plurality proved by the\ntext 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our\nopponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality\ncontained in other passages this last text refers to something not real;\nfor it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at\nfirst teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as\nsuggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to\nBrahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine!\n\nNor is it true that the text 'If he makes but the smallest \"antaram\" (i.\ne. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up.\nII, 7) implies that he who sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear.\nFor the other text 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm\nmind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman'\n(Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality\nof Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that\npeace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as\nspringing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and\nthus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman\nconstituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of\ngods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause\nof peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view\nsurely cannot be a _cause_ of fear!--But how then is it that the Taitt.\ntext declares that 'there is fear for him'?--That text, we reply,\ndeclares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of\nfearlessness ('when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is\ninvisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has obtained\nfearlessness'); its latter part therefore means that fear takes place\nwhen there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the\ngreat Rishi says 'When V\u00e2sudeva is not meditated on for an hour or even\na moment only; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that\nis change.'\n\nThe S\u00fbtra III, 2, ii does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a\nBrahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing\nattributes--as we shall show in its place. And the S\u00fbtra IV, 2, 3\ndeclares that the things seen in dreams are mere 'M\u00e2y\u00e2' because they\ndiffer in character from the things perceived in the waking state; from\nwhich it follows that the latter things are real.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 82:1. Which passage appears to refer to a nirguna brahman,\nwhence it might be inferred that the connected initial passage--'Satyam\nj\u00f1anam,' &c.--has a similar purport.]\n\n\n\n\nNor do Smriti and Pur\u00e2na teach such a doctrine.\n\nNor is it true that also according to Smriti and Pur\u00e2nas only non-\ndifferenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal.--'He who\nknows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the\nworlds' (Bha. G\u00ee. X, 3); 'All beings abide in me, I abide not in them.\nNay, the beings abide not in me--behold my lordly power. My Self\nbringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them' (Bha.\nG\u00ee. IX, 4, 5); 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world;\nhigher than I there is nothing else: on me all this is strung as pearls\non a thread' (Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 6, 7); 'Pervading this entire Universe by a\nportion (of mine) I abide' (Bha. G\u00ee. X, 42); 'But another, the highest\nPerson, is called the highest Self who, pervading the three worlds\nsupports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and\nam higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the\nVeda celebrated as the supreme Person' (Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 17, 18).\n\n'He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications,\nproperties and imperfections; he transcends all investing (obscuring)\ninfluences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the\ninterstices of the world is filled by him; all auspicious qualities\nconstitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a\nsmall part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he\nbestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength,\ndominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in\nhim, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high\nand low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest and\nmanifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-powerful, highest\nLord. The knowledge by which that perfect, pure, highest, stainless\nhomogeneous (Brahman) is known or perceived or comprehended--that is\nknowledge: all else is ignorance' (Vishnu Pur\u00e2na VI, 5, 82-87).--'To\nthat pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which no term is\napplicable, the cause of all causes, the name \"Bhagavat\" is suitable.\nThe letter bha implies both the cherisher and supporter; the letter ga\nthe leader, mover and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six\nattributes--dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom, dispassion.\nThat in him--the universal Self, the Self of the beings--all beings\ndwell and that he dwells in all, this is the meaning of the letter va.\nWisdom, might, strength, dominion, glory, without any evil qualities,\nare all denoted by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the\nname of V\u00e2sudeva who is the highest Brahman--and of no one else. This\nword which denotes persons worthy of reverence in general is used in its\nprimary sense with reference to V\u00e2sudeva only; in a derived sense with\nregard to other persons' (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, 72 ff.); 'Where all these\npowers abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form: that is\nthe great form of Hari. That form produces in its sport forms endowed\nwith all powers, whether of gods or men or animals. For the purpose of\nbenefiting the worlds, not springing from work (karman) is this action\nof the unfathomable one; all-pervading, irresistible' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 69-\n71); 'Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all-pervading,\nimperishable, free from all evil, named Vishnu, the highest abode' (Vi.\nPu. I, 22,53); 'He who is the highest of the high, the Person, the\nhighest Self, founded on himself; who is devoid of all the\ndistinguishing characteristics of colour, caste and the like; who is\nexempt from birth, change, increase, decay and death; of whom it can\nonly be said that he ever is. He is everywhere and in him everything\nabides; hence he is called V\u00e2sudeva by those who know. He is Brahman,\neternal, supreme, imperishable, undecaying; of one essential nature and\never pure, as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman,\ncomprising within its nature the Evolved and the Unevolved; and also\nexisting in the form of the Person and in that of time' (Vi. Pu. I, 2,\n10-14); 'The Prakriti about which I told and which is Evolved as well as\nUnevolved, and the Person--both these are merged in the highest Self.\nThe highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord; as Vishnu he\nis praised in the Vedas and the Ved\u00e2nta-texts' (Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39).\n'Two forms are there of that Brahman, one material, the other immaterial.\nThese two forms, perishable and imperishable, are within all things: the\nimperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable one this whole\nworld. As the light of a fire burning in one place spreads all around,\nso the energy of the highest Brahman constitutes this entire world' (Vi.\nPu. I, 23,53-55). 'The energy of Vishnu is the highest, that which is\ncalled the embodied soul is inferior; and there is another third energy\ncalled karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omnipresent energy of\nthe embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly\nexistence. Obscured by Nescience the energy of the embodied soul is\ncharacterised in the different beings by different degrees of\nperfection' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 61-63).\n\nThese and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is essentially free\nfrom all imperfection whatsoever, comprises within itself all auspicious\nqualities, and finds its pastime in originating, preserving, reabsorbing,\npervading, and ruling the universe; that the entire complex of\nintelligent and non-intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their\ndifferent estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of\nthe highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which co-ordinate it\nwith Brahman by means of terms such as sar\u00eera (body), r\u00fbpa (form), tanu\n(body), amsa (part), sakti (power), vibh\u00fbti (manifestation of power),\nand so on;--that the souls which are a manifestation of Brahman's power\nexist in their own essential nature, and also, through their connexion\nwith matter, in the form of embodied souls (kshetraj\u00f1a);--and that the\nembodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience in the form of good and\nevil works, do not recognise their essential nature, which is knowledge,\nbut view themselves as having the character of material things.--The\noutcome of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying\nplurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifestation of\nhis power, as something real.\n\nWhen now the text, in the sloka 'where all difference has vanished' (Vi.\nPu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although connected with the\ndifferent effects of Prakriti, such as divine, human bodies, and so on,\nyet is essentially free from all such distinctions, and therefore not\nthe object of the words denoting those different classes of beings, but\nto be defined as mere knowledge and Being; to be known by the Self and\nnot to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of Yoga (yogayuj);\nthis must in no way be understood as denying the reality of the world.--\nBut how is this known?--As follows, we reply. The chapter of the Pur\u00e2na\nin which that sloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be\nthe remedy of all the afflictions of the Sams\u00e2ra; thereupon explains the\ndifferent stages of Yoga up to the so-called praty\u00e2h\u00e2ra (complete\nrestraining of the senses from receiving external impressions); then, in\norder to teach the attainment of the 'perfect object' (subh\u00e2sraya)\nrequired for dh\u00e2ran\u00e2, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu,\npossesses two forms, called powers (sakti), viz. a denned one (m\u00fbrta)\nand an undefined one (am\u00fbrta); and then teaches that a portion of the\n'defined' form, viz. the embodied soul (kshetraj\u00f1a), which is\ndistinguished by its connexion with matter and involved in Nescience--\nthat is termed 'action,' and constitutes a third power--is not perfect.\nThe chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined form which\nis free from Nescience called action, separated from all matter, and\npossessing the character of pure knowledge, is also not the 'perfect\nobject,' since it is destitute of essential purity; and, finally,\ndeclares that the 'perfect object' is to be found in that defined form\nwhich is special to Bhagavat, and which is the abode of the three powers,\nviz. that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined\nform which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary\n(apara) power, and Nescience in the form of work--which is called the\nthird power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of\nthe highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined\nform (which is the 'perfect object') is proved by certain Ved\u00e2nta-texts,\nsuch as 'that great person of sun-like lustre' (Svet. Up. III, 8). We\nhence must take the sloka, 'in which all differences vanish,' &c., to\nmean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not\ncapable of constituting the 'perfect object.' Analogously two other\npassages declare 'Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner\nin Yoga, the second (form) of Vishnu is to be meditated upon by Yogins-\nthe highest abode.' 'That in which all these powers have their abode,\nthat is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material)\nVisva form.'\n\nIn an analogous manner, Par\u00e2sara declares that Brahm\u00e2, Katurmukha,\nSanaka, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot\nconstitute the 'perfect object' because they are involved in Nescience;\nafter that goes on to say that the beings found in the Sams\u00e2ra are in\nthe same condition--for they are essentially devoid of purity since they\nreach their true nature, only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has\narisen in them--; and finally teaches that the essential individual\nnature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishnu, constitutes the 'perfect\nobject.' 'From Brahm\u00e2 down to a blade of grass, all living beings that\ndwell within this world are in the power of the Sams\u00e2ra due to works,\nand hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them\nobjects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and\nstand within the sphere of the Sams\u00e2ra; knowledge arises in them only\nlater on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge\ndoes not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them\nthrough something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses\nessential knowledge,' &c. &c.--All this proves that the passage 'in\nwhich all difference vanishes' does not mean to deny the reality of the\nworld.\n\nNor, again, does the passage 'that which has knowledge for its essential\nnature' (Vi. Pu. 1,2,6) imply that the whole complex of things different\nfrom knowledge is false; for it declares only that the appearance of the\nSelf--the essential nature of which is knowledge--as gods, men, and so\non, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl\nas silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver\nin the world is unreal!--But if, on the ground of an insight into the\noneness of Brahman and the world--as expressed in texts where the two\nappear in co-ordination--a text declares that it is an error to view\nBrahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material\nthings, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is\nfalse!--By no means, we rejoin. As our s\u00e1stra distinctly teaches that\nthe highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, is free from all imperfections\nwhatsoever, comprises within himself all auspicious qualities, and\nreveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's\nreality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness\nof two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of\neither of the two), and is non-contradictory, we shall prove further on.\nHence also the sloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of\nthe world.\n\n'That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live,\ninto which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is\nBrahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain\nthat Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world.\nAfter this we learn from a Pur\u00e2na text ('He should make the Veda grow by\nmeans of Itih\u00e2sa and Pur\u00e2na; the Veda fears that a man of little reading\nmay do it harm') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itih\u00e2sa and\nPur\u00e2na. By this 'making to grow' we have to understand the elucidation\nof the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts,\npromulgated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents,\nand by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic\ntruth. Such 'making to grow' must needs be undertaken, since the purport\nof the entire Veda with all its S\u00e2kh\u00e2s cannot be fathomed by one who has\nstudied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we\ncannot arrive at any certitude.\n\nThe Vishnu Pur\u00e2na relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of\nVedic matters strengthened by the holy Par\u00e2sara, who through the favour\nof Pulastya and Vasishtha had obtained an insight into the true nature\nof the highest divinity, began to question Par\u00e2sara, 'I am desirous to\nhear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again\noriginate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate\nand inanimate things; how and into what it has been resolved, and into\nwhat it will in future be resolved?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 1). The questions\nasked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of\nthe manifestation of its power, and the different results of\npropitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category,\nthe question 'whence proceed animate and inanimate things?' relates to\nthe efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause\n'of what the world consists' is to be taken as implying a question as to\nwhat constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation,\nsustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in\nthe words 'and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this\nclause is founded thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the\nworld as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler; and is not\nfounded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world\npervaded. The phrase 'consists of' (-maya) does not refer to an effect\n(so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which\nthis world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be\nneedless. Nor does the--maya express, as it sometimes does-e.g. in the\ncase of prana-maya [FOOTNOTE 92:1], the own sense of the word to which it\nis attached; for in that case the form of the reply 'and the world is\nHe' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vishnu) would be\ninappropriate; the reply would in that case rather be 'Vishnu only.'\nWhat 'maya' actually denotes here is abundance, prevailingness, in\nagreement with P\u00e2nini, V, 4, 21, and the meaning is that Brahman\nprevails in the world in so far as the entire world constitutes its body.\nThe co-ordination of the two words 'the world' and 'He' thus rests on\nthat relation between the two, owing to which the world is the body of\nBrahman, and Brahman the Self of the world. If, on the other hand, we\nmaintained that the s\u00e2stra aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one\nsubstance free from all difference, there would be no sense in all those\nquestions and answers, and no sense in an entire nastra devoted to the\nexplanation of that one thing. In that case there would be room for one\nquestion only, viz. 'what is the substrate of the erroneous imagination\nof a world?' and for one answer to this question, viz. 'pure\nconsciousness devoid of all distinction!'--And if the co-ordination\nexpressed in the clause 'and the world is he' was meant to set forth the\nabsolute oneness of the world and Brahman, then it could not be held\nthat Brahman possesses all kinds of auspicious qualities, and is opposed\nto all evil; Brahman would rather become the abode of all that is impure.\nAll this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed in\nthat clause is to be understood as directly teaching the relation\nbetween a Self and its body.--The sloka, 'From Vishnu the world has\nsprung: in him he exists: he is the cause of the subsistence and\ndissolution of this world: and the world is he' (Vi. Pu. I, 1, 35),\nstates succinctly what a subsequent passage--beginning with 'the highest\nof the high' (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10)--sets forth in detail. Now there the\nsloka,'to the unchangeable one' (I, 2, 1), renders homage to the holy\nVishnu, who is the highest Brahman in so far as abiding within his own\nnature, and then the text proceeds to glorify him in his threefold form\nas Hiranyagarbha, Hari, and Sankara, as Pradh\u00e2na, Time, and as the\ntotality of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form. Here\nthe sloka, 'Him whose essential nature is knowledge' (I, 2, 6),\ndescribes the aspect of the highest Self in so far as abiding in the\nstate of discrete embodied souls; the passage cannot therefore be\nunderstood as referring to a substance free from all difference. If the\ns\u00e2stra aimed at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold\nworld has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non-differenced\nintelligence, there would be room neither for the objection raised in I,\n3, I ('How can we attribute agency creative and otherwise to Brahman\nwhich is without qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless?') nor for the\nrefutation of that objection, 'Because the powers of all things are the\nobjects of (true) knowledge excluding all (bad) reasoning, therefore\nthere belong to Brahman also such essential powers as the power of\ncreating, preserving, and so on, the world; just as heat essentially\nbelongs to fire [FOOTNOTE 94:1].' In that case the objection would rather\nbe made in the following form: 'How can Brahman, which is without\nqualities, be the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the\nworld?' and the answer would be, 'Creation by Brahman is not something\nreal, but something erroneously imagined.'--The purport of the objection\nas it stands in the text is as follows: 'We observe that action creative\nand otherwise belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness,\nand so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of karman; how then\ncan agency creative, and so on, be attributed to Brahman which is devoid\nof qualities, perfect, not under the influence of karman, and incapable\nof any connexion with action?' And the reply is, 'There is nothing\nunreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of the nature described\nabove, and different in kind from all things perceived, should possess\nmanifold powers; just as fire, which is different in kind from water and\nall other material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other\nqualities.' The slokas also, which begin with the words 'Thou alone art\nreal' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert that the whole world is\nunreal, but only that, as Brahman is the Self of the world, the latter\nviewed apart from Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm,\n'thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable things are\npervaded.' This means--because all things movable and immovable are\npervaded by thee, therefore all this world has thee for its Self, and\nhence 'there is none other than thee' and thus thou being the Self of\nall art alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set forth,\nthe text rightly says, 'this all-pervasiveness of thine is thy\ngreatness'; otherwise it would have to say, 'it is thy error.' Were this\nlatter view intended, words such as 'Lord of the world,' 'thou,' &c.,\ncould not, moreover, be taken in their direct sense, and there would\narise a contradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter, viz.\nthe praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty boar had uplifted\nin play the entire earth.--Because this entire world is thy form in so\nfar as it is pervaded as its Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge;\ntherefore those who do not possess that devotion which enables men to\nview thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world as consisting\nonly of gods, men, and other beings; this is the purport of the next\nsloka, 'this which is seen.'--And it is an error not only to view the\nworld which has its real Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so\non, but also to consider the Selfs whose true nature is knowledge as\nbeing of the nature of material beings such as gods, men, and the like;\nthis is the meaning of the next sloka, 'this world whose true nature is\nknowledge.'--Those wise men, on the other hand, who have an insight into\nthe essentially intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by\ndevotion--the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal Self--,\nthey view this entire world with all its manifold bodies--the effects of\nprimeval matter--as thy body--a body the Self of which is constituted by\nknowledge abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning of the\nfollowing sloka: 'But those who possess knowledge,' &c.--If the\ndifferent slokas were not interpreted in this way, they would be mere\nunmeaning reiterations; their constitutive words could not be taken in\ntheir primary sense; and we should come into conflict with the sense of\nthe passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the purport of the\nentire s\u00e2stra. The passage, further, 'Of that Self although it exists in\none's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind' (Vi. Pu. II,\n14, 31 ff.), refers to that view of duality according to which the\ndifferent Selfs--although equal in so far as they are all of the essence\nof knowledge--are constituted into separate beings, gods, men, &c., by\ntheir connexion with different portions of matter all of which are\nmodifications of primary matter, and declares that view to be false. But\nthis does not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between\nmatter on the one hand and Self on the other: what the passage means is\nthat the Self which dwells in the different material bodies of gods, men,\nand so on, is of one and the same kind. So the Holy one himself has said,\n'In the dog and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same';\n'Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same' (Bha. G\u00ee. V, 18, 19).\nAnd, moreover, the clause 'Of the Self although existing in one's own\nand in other bodies' directly declares that a thing different from the\nbody is distributed among one's own and other bodies.\n\nNor does the passage 'If there is some other (para) different (anya)\nfrom me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate the oneness of the Self; for\nin that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning\nonly (viz. 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'). The word 'para'\nthere denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, and the word\n'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure\nintelligence: the sense of the passage thus is 'If there is some Self\ndistinct from mine, and of a character different from mine which is pure\nknowledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character and he of a\ndifferent character'; but this is not the case, because all Selfs are\nequal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge.--Also the\nsloka beginning 'Owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' (Vi.\nPu. II, 14, 32) only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs\nis owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in\ndifferent material bodies; and does not teach the oneness of all Selfs.\nThe different portions of air, again, passing through the different\nholes of the flute--to which the many Selfs are compared--are not said\nto be one but only to be equal in character; they are one in character\nin so far as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different\nnames of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them\nbecause they pass out by the different holes of the instrument. For an\nanalogous reason the several Selfs are denominated by different names,\nviz. gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts of the\nsubstance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far only as they\nconsist of one kind of substance; but are not absolutely one; those\ndifferent portions of air, therefore, which constitute the notes of the\nscale are likewise not absolutely one. Where the Pur\u00e2na further says 'He\n(or \"that\") I am and thou art He (or \"that\"); all this universe that has\nSelf for its true nature is He (or \"that\"); abandon the error of\ndistinction' (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word 'that' refers to the\nintelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all Selfs,\nand the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that\nintelligence is the character of the beings denoted 'I' and 'Thou';\n'abandon therefore,' the text goes on to say, 'the illusion that the\ndifference of outward form, divine and so on, causes a corresponding\ndifference in the Selfs.' If this explanation were not accepted (but\nabsolute non-difference insisted upon) there would be no room for the\nreferences to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.\n\nAccordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the\ninstruction he had received, 'he abandoned the view of difference,\nhaving recognised the Real.'--But on what ground do we arrive at this\ndecision (viz. that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach\nabsolute non-duality)?--On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic\nof the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self and the\nbody--for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the\nsection, 'as the body of man, characterised by hands, feet, and the like,'\n&c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).--For analogous reasons the sloka 'When that\nknowledge which gives rise to distinction' &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94)\nteaches neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of the\nindividual Self and the highest Self. And that the embodied soul and the\nhighest Self should be essentially one, is no more possible than that\nthe body and the Self should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture\nsays, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of\nthem eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up.\nIII, 1, 1). 'There are two drinking their reward in the world of their\nown works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those\nwho know Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). And\nin this s\u00e2stra also (i.e. the Vishnu Pur\u00e2na) there are passages of\nanalogous import; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 'He transcends the\ncausal matter, all effects, all imperfections such as the gunas' &c.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; I, 2, 21; II,\n1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scripture, which in several\nplaces refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over\nagainst each other, cp. e.g. 'He who dwells in the Self and within the\nSelf, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the\nSelf from within' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent\nSelf (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self (IV, 3, 35).\nNor can the individual Self become one with the highest Self by freeing\nitself from Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; for\nthat which admits of being the abode of Nescience can never become quite\nincapable of it. So the Pur\u00e2na says, 'It is false to maintain that the\nindividual Self and the highest Self enter into real union; for one\nsubstance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.'\nAccordingly the Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2 declares that the released soul attains\nonly the same attributes as the highest Self. 'Abiding by this knowledge,\nthey, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, do neither come\nforth at the time of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general\ndestruction' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Pur\u00e2na says, 'That Brahman leads\nhim who meditates on it, and who is capable of change, towards its own\nbeing (\u00e2tmabh\u00e2va), in the same way as the magnet attracts the iron' (Vi.\nPu. VI, 7, 30). Here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means\n'imparts to him a nature like his own' (not 'completely identifies him\nwith itself'); for the attracted body does not become essentially one\nwith the body attracting.\n\nThe same view will be set forth by the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra in IV, 4, 17; 21, and I,\n3, 2. The Vritti also says (with reference to S\u00fb. IV, 4, 17) 'with the\nexception of the business of the world (the individual soul in the state\nof release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light'; and the\nauthor of the Dramidabh\u00e2shya says, 'Owing to its equality (s\u00e2yujya) with\nthe divinity the disembodied soul effects all things, like the divinity.'\nThe following scriptural texts establish the same view, 'Those who\ndepart from hence, after having known the Self and those true desires,\nfor them there is freedom in all the worlds' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6); 'He\nwho knows Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He obtains\nall desires together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1);\n'Having reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about in\nthese worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes'\n(Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5); 'There he moves about' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3);\n'For he is flavour; for only after having perceived a flavour can any\none perceive pleasure' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'As the flowing rivers go to\ntheir setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he who knows, freed\nfrom name and form, goes to the divine Person who is higher than the\nhigh' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil,\nreaches the highest oneness, free from stain' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3).\n\nThe objects of meditation in all the vidy\u00e2s which refer to the highest\nBrahman, are Brahman viewed as having qualities, and the fruit of all\nthose meditations. For this reason the author of the S\u00fbtras declares\nthat there is option among the different vidy\u00e2s--cp. Ve. S\u00fb. III, 3, II;\nIII., 3, 59. In the same way the V\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra teaches that the qualified\nBrahman only is the object of meditation, and that there is option of\nvidy\u00e2s; where he says '(Brahman) connected (with qualities), since the\nmeditation refers to its qualities.' The same view is expressed by the\nBh\u00e2shyak\u00e2ra in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases himself on\nthe knowledge of Being.'--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes\nBrahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9) have the same purport, for they must be\ntaken in connexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him\nwho knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he goes to the divine\nPerson who is higher than the high'; 'Free from stain he reaches the\nhighest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8; III, 1,3); 'Having approached the\nhighest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3,\n4). Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form, and\nall the distinctions founded thereon, and has assumed the uniform\ncharacter of intelligence, it may be said that he is of the character of\nBrahman.--Our Pur\u00e2na also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91),\n'Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, viz. the\nhighest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed from all kinds of\nimagination,' states that that Self which through meditation on Brahman,\nis freed from all imagination so as to be like Brahman, is the object to\nbe attained. (The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-\ncalled karma-bh\u00e2van\u00e2, brahma-bh\u00e2van\u00e2 and a combination of the two. See\nVi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 'The embodied Self is the user of\nthe instrument, knowledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release--\nwhereby his object is attained--he may leave off.' This means that the\nDevotee is to practise meditation on the highest Brahman until it has\naccomplished its end, viz. the attainment of the Self free from all\nimagination.--The text continues, 'Having attained the being of its\nbeing, then he is non-different from the highest Self; his difference is\nfounded on Nescience only.' This sloka describes the state of the\nreleased soul. 'Its being' is the being, viz. the character or nature,\nof Brahman; but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature; because\nin this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the\nsloka would contradict what had been said before. The meaning is: when\nthe soul has attained the nature of Brahman, i.e. when it has freed\nitself from all false imagination, then it is non-different from the\nhighest Self. This non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the\nhighest Self, having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The\ndifference of the soul--presenting itself as the soul of a god, a man,\n&c.--from the highest Self is not due to its essential nature, but rests\non the basis of Nescience in the form of work: when through meditation\non Brahman this basis is destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an\nend, and the soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another\ntext says, 'The difference of things of one nature is due to the\ninvesting agency of outward works; when the difference of gods, men,\n&c., is destroyed, it has no longer any investing power' (Vi. Pu. II,\n14, 33).--The text then adds a further explanation, 'when the knowledge\nwhich gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who\nthen will produce difference that has no real existence?' The manifold\ndifference is the distinction of gods, men, animals, and inanimate\nthings: compare the saying of Saunaka:'this fourfold distinction is\nfounded on false knowledge.' The Self has knowledge for its essential\nnature; when Nescience called work--which is the cause of the manifold\ndistinctions of gods, men, &c.--has been completely destroyed through\nmeditation on the highest Brahman, who then will bring about the\ndistinction of gods, & c., from the highest Self--a distinction which in\nthe absence of a cause cannot truly exist.--That Nescience is called\nkarman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the Pur\u00e2na (st.\n61--avidy\u00e2 karmasamj\u00f1a).\n\nThe passage in the Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2, 'Know me to be the kshetraj\u00f1a' (XIII,\n2), teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest Self is the\ninward ruler of all; taken in any other sense it would be in conflict\nwith other texts, such as 'All creatures are the Perishable, the\nunchanging soul is the Imperishable; but another is the highest Person'\n(Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as\ninward Ruler he is the Self of all: 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all\ncreatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all' (XV, 15).\nand 'I am the Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20).\nThe term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of\nbody, &c., up to the Self.--Because he is the Self of all, the text\nexpressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there\nis any one separate from him,'There is not anything which is without me'\n(X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a\nglorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood\naccordingly. The passage immediately following is 'Whatever being there\nis, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung\nfrom a portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by a portion\nof mine I do abide' (X, 41; 42).\n\nAll this clearly proves that the authoritative books do _not_ teach the\ndoctrine of one non-differenced substance; that they do _not_ teach that\nthe universe of things is false; and that they do _not_ deny the\nessential distinction of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things, and\nthe Lord.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 92:1. 'Pr\u00e2namaya' is explained as meaning 'prana' only.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 94:1. The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is 'As in\nordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) certain\nspecial powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be\naccounted for; so to Brahman also,' &c.]\n\n\n\n\nThe theory of Nescience cannot be proved.\n\nWe now proceed to the consideration of Nescience.--According to the view\nof our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of\nRuler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect,\nfictitiously superimposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous\nReality; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience,\nwhich invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot\nbe denned either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must\nnecessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such\nas 'Hidden by what is untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because\notherwise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman--which is\ntaught by texts such as 'Thou are that'--cannot be established. This\nNescience is neither 'being,' because in that case it could not be the\nobject of erroneous cognition (bhrama) and sublation (b\u00e2dha); nor is it\n'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object of\napprehension and sublation [FOOTNOTE 102:1]. Hence orthodox Philosophers\ndeclare that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite\ncategories.\n\nNow this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place\nwe ask, 'What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the\ngreat error of plurality of existence?' You cannot reply 'the individual\nsoul'; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is\nfictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say 'Brahman'; for\nBrahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence\ncontradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by\nknowledge.\n\n'The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature: if\nNescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge,\ninvests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it?'\n\n'What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure\nknowledge!'--'Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the\nnature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.--And\nif there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is\nan object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching,\nimplies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.'\n\nTo explain the second of these slokas.--If you maintain that what\nsublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's\nessential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the\ntruth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur; for as both these\nkinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light,\nwhich is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no\nreason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is\ncontradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it\notherwise--that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through\nthe cognition that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in\nconsequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no\nright to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes\nBrahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to\nmaintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience.--Moreover\n(and this explains the third sloka), according to your own view Brahman,\nwhich is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another\nconsciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its\nobject. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge\n(Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence\ncannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which\nby themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature\nare not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for\nthe termination of that non-knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the\nknowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose\nessential nature is established by its own consciousness, is\ncontradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not\ndepend, for the termination of that non-knowledge, on some other\nknowledge.--If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the\nfalsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-\nknowledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other\nthan Brahman is contradictory to the non-knowledge of the true nature of\nBrahman, or to that non-knowledge which consists in the view of the\nreality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible;\nbecause the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a\ndifferent object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and\ntherefore cannot be contradictory to it; for knowledge and non-knowledge\nare contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same\nobject. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the\nknowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-\nknowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world; the\nformer knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while\nthe non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it.--\nAgainst this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-\nknowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman\nbeing dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the\ncognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman; while the\ntrue nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness.--\nBut this too we refuse to admit. If non-duality constitutes the true\nnature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there\nis room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-knowledge\nwhich consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-\nknowledge.--Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the\nessential nature) of Brahman!--This too we refuse to admit; for you\nyourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free\nfrom attributes which are objects of Consciousness.--From all this it\nfollows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the\nsubstrate of Nescience: the theory, in fact, involves a flat\ncontradiction.\n\nWhen, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is\nhomogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you\nthereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing\nlight to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or\nelse destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light\n(consciousness) cannot originate, the 'hiding' or 'making to disappear'\nof light can only mean its destruction.--Consider the following point\nalso. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without\nobject and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an\nimperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected\nwith innumerous substrata and innumerous objects.--Is then, we ask, that\nimperfection residing within consciousness something real or something\nunreal?--The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by\nyourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative; for if we did we\nshould have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject,\nor an object of knowledge, or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be 'Knowing,'\nas you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing;\nand that 'Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imperfection, cannot\nbe held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the\nM\u00e2dhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void [FOOTNOTE 106:1].\n\nAnd if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those\ntwo are fictitious, i.e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental\nimperfection, and are thus driven into a _regressuss in infinitum_.--To\navoid this difficulty, it might now be said that real consciousness\nitself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection.--But\nif Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the\nbasis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an\nadditional avidy\u00e2 to account for the vorld. Moreover, as Brahman is\neternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever\ntake place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from\nBrahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error.\n\nWhat, to come to the next point, do you understand by the\ninexplicability (anirvakaniyat\u00e2) of Nescience? Its difference in nature\nfrom that which _is_, as well as that which _is not_! A thing of such\nkind would be inexplicable indeed; for none of the means of knowledge\napply to it. That is to say--the whole world of objects must be ordered\naccording to our states of consciousness, and every state of\nconsciousness presents itself in the form, either of something existing\nor of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of\nstates of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the\nobject can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then\nanything whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness\nwhatever.\n\nAgainst this our opponent may now argue as follows:--There is, after all,\nsomething, called avidy\u00e2, or aj\u00f1\u00e2na, or by some other name, which is a\npositive entity (bh\u00e2va), different from the antecedent non-existence of\nknowledge; which effects the obscuration of the Real; which is the\nmaterial cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold\nexternal and internal things; and which is terminated by the cognition\nof the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For\nthis avidy\u00e2 is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference.\nBrahman, in so far as limited by this avidy\u00e2, is the material cause of\nthe erroneous superimposition--upon the inward Self, which in itself is\nchangeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this\nsuperimposition--of that plurality which comprises the ahamk\u00e2ra, all\nacts of knowledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of\nthis defect (i.e. avidy\u00e2) there are produced, in this world superimposed\nupon Reality, the manifold special superimpositions presenting\nthemselves in the form of things and cognitions of things--such as\nsnakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and\nthe like. Avidy\u00e2 constitutes the material cause of this entire false\nworld; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That\nthis avidy\u00e2 or aj\u00f1\u00e2na (non-knowledge) is an object of internal\nPerception, follows from the fact that judgments such as 'I do not know',\n'I do not know either myself or others,' directly present themselves to\nthe mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-\nknowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge--for such\nabsence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof\n(anupalabdhi); it rather is a state which presents its object directly,\nand thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment 'I\nam experiencing pleasure.' Even if we admit that 'absence of something'\n(abh\u00e2va) can be the object of perception, the state of consciousness\nunder discussion cannot have absence of knowledge in the Self for its\nobject. For at the very moment of such consciousness knowledge exists;\nor if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of\nknowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is\nthere or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence\nof knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of\nnon-knowledge? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the\nabsence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the\nlatter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it\npresupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as\nan attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz.\nknowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of\nknowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the\nspecial means of proof called 'abh\u00e2va' (i.e. anupalabdhi). If, on the\nother hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a\npositive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as\nthere is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by\nnon-knowledge, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge;\nand we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of\nconsciousness expressed by 'I am non-knowing,' has for its object a non-\nknowledge which is a positive entity.--But, a Nescience which is a\npositive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature\nconsists in the lighting up of the truth of things! Not so, we reply.\nWitnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of\nthings, but Nescience; for otherwise the lighting up (i.e. the\nconsciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has\nfor its object non-knowledge (Nescience), does not put an end to that\nnon-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between kaitanya and\naj\u00f1ana).--But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity,\nNescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far\nas it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the\nparticular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their\nproof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience,\nwhich is defined by the 'I' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, 'I do\nnot know myself'), become the object of witnessing Consciousness?--There\nis no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of\nConsciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while\nthe mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all\nthose things which, as being non-intelligent (jada), can be proved only\nin so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such\nmediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (ajada) inner\nSelf which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in\nall cases (including the case 'I do not know myself'), since witnessing\nConsciousness always gives definition to Nescience.--From all this it\nfollows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend\nNescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive\nentity, is also proved by Inference, viz. in the following form: All\nknowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded\nby something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-\nexistence of knowledge; which hides the object of knowledge; which is\nterminated by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as knowledge;\nbecause knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not\nillumined before;--just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines\nthings.--Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that\ndarkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or\nelse the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence\ndarkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving\nNescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered\na positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense,\nand secondly, from its being perceived as having colour.\n\nTo all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor\nPerception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity,\nNescience, as implied in judgments such as 'I am non-knowing,' 'I know\nneither myself nor others.' The contradiction which was urged above\nagainst the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-existence of\nknowledge, presents itself equally in connexion with non-knowledge\nviewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents\nitself--the inner Reality is either known or not known as that which\ngives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its\nsubstrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for\nNescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the\ncognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand,\nit be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience\nin the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate\nor of the object of Nescience?--Let it then be said that what is\ncontradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature\nof the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of aj\u00f1\u00e2na) we\nhave only an obscure presentation of the nature of the Self; things\nbeing thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the\nsubstrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the consciousness\nof aj\u00f1\u00e2na on the other.--Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side\nalso. Even if aj\u00f1\u00e2na means antecedent non-existence of knowledge, we can\nsay that knowledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for\nits object the Self presented obscurely only; and thus there is no\ndifference between our views--unless you choose to be obstinate!\n\nWhether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent\nnon-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word\nindicates, viz. non-knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of\nknowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is\ncontradictory to knowledge; and in any of these cases we have to admit\nthat non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge.\nEven though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require\nthe knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered\nunder the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the\ncognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in\nits own nature but merely as 'non-knowledge,' and it therefore\npresupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our view does,\naccording to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge.\nNow antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and\nis an undoubted object of consciousness; the right conclusion therefore\nis that what we are conscious of in such judgments as 'I am non-knowing,'\n&c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both\nadmit.\n\nIt, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is\nconstituted by eternal free self-luminous intelligence, the\nconsciousness of Nescience; for what constitutes its essence is\nconsciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although\nhaving consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious\nof non-knowledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden; we ask\nin return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden.\nYou will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we\nask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose\nvery nature consists in consciousness of Self, i.e. self-illumination?\nIf you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be\nin the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we\npoint out that as according to you light cannot be considered us an\nattribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would--\nillumination coming from an external agency--follow that the very nature\nof Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already\nremarked.--Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-\nknowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature\nhides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other\nhand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness\non the part of Brahman; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw.\nYou will perhaps say [FOOTNOTE 111:1] that it hides Brahman in so far\nonly as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the\nconsciousness of aj\u00f1\u00e2na takes place on the part of a Brahman whose\nnature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the 'hiding' of Brahman's\nnature loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to\nthe nature of ajn\u00e2na; for if Brahman may be conscious of ajn\u00e2na (without\na previous obscuration of its nature by ajn\u00e2na) it may as well be held\nto be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is\nconsidered to be an effect of ajn\u00e2na.\n\nHow, further, do you conceive this consciousness of ajn\u00e2na on Brahman's\npart? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else? In the former\ncase this consciousness would result from Brahman's essential nature,\nand hence there would never be any Release. Or else, consciousness of\najn\u00e2na constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure\nconsciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is\nterminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some\nterminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's\nessential nature itself.--On the second alternative we ask what that\nsomething else should be. If you reply 'another ajn\u00e2na,' we are led into\na _regressus in infinitum_.--Let it then be said [FOOTNOTE 112:1] that\najn\u00e2na having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its\nconsciousness. This, we rejoin, would imply that ajn\u00e2na acting like a\ndefect of the eye by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then\najn\u00e2na could not be sublated by knowledge. Let us then put the case as\nfollows:--Ajn\u00e2na, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same\ntime effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and\nBrahman's nature being hidden; in this way the _regressus in infinitum_\nand other difficulties will be avoided.--But this also we cannot admit;\nfor Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a\nwitnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden.--Let then\nBrahman be hidden by some other cause!--This, we rejoin, would take away\nfrom ajn\u00e2na its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead\nto an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness,\nwithout its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess--what\nyet it is maintained to possess--the uniform character of consciousness\nof Self.--If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidy\u00e2, does it then not\nshine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent? On the former\nalternative the not shining forth of Brahman--whose nature is mere light--\nreduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative\nwe ask, 'of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which\npart do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?' To that\nsubstance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction,\nthere cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light\ncannot abide in it together.--Let us then say that Brahman, which is\nhomogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by\navidy\u00e2, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were.--But how, we ask, are\nwe to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature\nis pure light? When an object of light which has parts and\ndistinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it\nappears distinctly; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when\nsome of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing\nwhich do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and\nhence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light; in those parts\non the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the\nobject is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where\nthere is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects,\nindistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their\ndistinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is\nnot an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the\nessential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which\nconsists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be\nconceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidy\u00e2.\n\nWe, moreover, must ask the following question: 'Is this indistinctness\nwhich you consider an effect of avidy\u00e2 put an end to by the rise of true\nknowledge or not?' On the latter alternative there would be no final\nrelease. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is.\n'It is of an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature\nthen exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If\nit does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect\nof avidy\u00e2, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then\nRelease discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-\neternal.--And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no\ndefinable substrate for it we have shown above.--He, moreover, who holds\nthe theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult\nto prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate; for, if\nthe cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place\neven in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this\nwould be the theory of a general Void.\n\nThe assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved\nby Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set\nforth!--True; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed\nfor proving aj\u00f1\u00e2na is a so-called contradictory one (i.e. it proves the\ncontrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is\nnot desired and what is different from aj\u00f1\u00e2na (for what it proves is\nthat there is a certain _knowledge_, viz. that all knowledge resting on\nvalid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with\nregard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non-\nknowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this\nargumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent\nexistence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to\nbe trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent\nnon-knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the\nnon-knowledge (which you try to prove by inference) being an object of\nconsciousness, and thus the whole supposition of aj\u00f1\u00e2na as an entity\nbecomes useless.\n\nThe proving instance, moreover, adduced by our opponent, has no proving\npower; for the light of a lamp does not possess the property of\nillumining things not illumined before. Everywhere illumining power\nbelongs to knowledge only; there may be light, but if there is not also\nKnowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only\ncauses of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power.\nThe function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely\nauxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the\norgan of sight which gives rise to knowledge; and it is only with a view\nto this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally\nascribed to the lamp.--But in using the light of the lamp as a proving\ninstance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power\nequal to that of light; we introduced it merely with reference to the\nillumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of\nwhat obscures its object!--We refuse to accept this explanation.\nIllumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is\nantagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i.e. the rendering\nthem capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech; and this\nbelongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow\nthe power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors\nalso, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most\neminent factors of that kind; and as in their case there exists no\ndifferent thing to be terminated by their activity, (i.e. nothing\nanalogous to the aj\u00f1\u00e2na to be terminated by knowledge), this whole\nargumentation is beside the point.\n\nThere are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclusion of the\np\u00fbrvapakshin.--Of the aj\u00f1\u00e2na under discussion, Brahman, which is mere\nknowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is aj\u00f1\u00e2na; as shown by\nthe case of the non-knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and\nsimilar cases; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject.--\nThe aj\u00f1\u00e2na under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it\nis aj\u00f1\u00e2na; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c.; for such non-\nknowledge hides the object.--Aj\u00f1\u00e2na is not terminated by knowledge,\nbecause it does not hide the object of knowledge; whatever non-knowledge\nis terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide the object of knowledge;\nas e.g. the non-knowledge of the shell.--Brahman is not the substrate of\naj\u00f1\u00e2na, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject; like\njars and similar things.--Brahman is not hidden by aj\u00f1\u00e2na, because it is\nnot the object of knowledge; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the\nobject of knowledge; so e.g. shells and similar things.--Brahman is not\nconnected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it\nis not the object of knowledge; whatever is connected with non-knowledge\nto be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge; as e.g. shells\nand the like. Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its\nantecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of\nknowledge; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof; like that\nvalid knowledge which proves the aj\u00f1\u00e2na maintained by you.--Knowledge\ndoes not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of\nsome specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of destroying\nthings is--whether it be knowledge or aj\u00f1\u00e2na--strengthened by some\nspecific power; as e.g. the knowledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as\nthe aj\u00f1\u00e2na consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot).\n\nAj\u00f1\u00e2na which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed\nby knowledge; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and\nsimilar things.\n\nBut, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections,\nwhich are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are\ndestroyed by sublative acts of cognition!--Not so, we reply. Those\naffections are not destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by\nthemselves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the\ncessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a\nmomentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in\nimmediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not\notherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the\nstream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would\ngive rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that\nthere would be consciousness of many distinct feelings of fear (and this\nwe know not to be the case).--In conclusion we remark that in defining\nright knowledge as 'that which has for its antecedent another entity,\ndifferent from its own antecedent non-existence,' you do not give proof\nof very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has it to predicate of\nan entity that it is different from nonentity?--For all these reasons\nInference also does not prove an aj\u00f1\u00e2na which is a positive entity. And\nthat it is not proved by Scripture and arth\u00e2patti, will be shown later\non. And the reasoning under S\u00fb. II, 1, 4. will dispose of the argument\nwhich maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be\nfalse.\n\nWe thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its\nobject a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature.--Nor can such an\ninexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous\napprehension and sublation (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is\nactually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and\nsublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states\nof consciousness, something which is apprehended neither by them nor any\nother state of consciousness.--'But in the case of the shell, &c.,\nsilver is actually apprehended, and at the same time there arises the\nsublating consciousness \"this silver is not real,\" and it is not\npossible that one thing should appear as another; we therefore are\ndriven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually\napprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be\ndefined neither as real nor as unreal.'--This also we cannot allow,\nsince this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as\nanother. For apprehension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition,\nall result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not\nreasonable to assume something altogether non-perceived and groundless.\nThe silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something\n'inexplicable,' but as something real; were it apprehended under the\nformer aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of\nsublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to\nseize it. For these reasons you (the anirva-kaniyatva-v\u00e2din) also must\nadmit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.\n\nThose also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under\ndiscussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance)\nmust--whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it--admit that their\ntheory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-\ncalled asatkhy\u00e2ti-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing;\nthe \u00e2tmakhy\u00e2ti-view, that the Self--which here means 'cognition'--\nappears as a thing; and the akhy\u00e2ti-view, that the attribute of one\nthing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as\none, and--on the view of the non-existence of the object--that the non-\nexisting appears as existing [FOOTNOTE 118:1].\n\nMoreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new\ninexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination.\nThis cause cannot be the perception of the silver; for the perception\nhas the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the\norigination of the silver. And should you say that the perception,\nhaving arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes\nit its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent\nreasoning!--Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the\nsense-organ.--This, too, is inadmissible; for a defect abiding in the\npercipient person cannot produce an objective effect.--Nor can the\norgans of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver; for they\nare causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the\nsense-organs in so far as modified by some defect; for they also can\nonly produce modifications in what is effected by them, i.e. cognition.\nAnd the hypothesis of a beginningless, false aj\u00f1\u00e2na constituting the\ngeneral material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted\nabove.\n\nHow is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing (which you\nassume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us\nthe object of the idea and word 'silver,' and not of some other idea and\nterm, e.g. of a jar?--If you reply that this is due to its similarity to\nsilver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting\nthemselves to our mind should be that of 'something resembling silver.'\nShould you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver\nbecause it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask\nwhether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former\nalternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what\nis unreal; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot\nbelong to what is real.\n\nBut we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-\nfounded theory.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 102:1. 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of\nBrahman, and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous\ncognition: it thus cannot be 'being,' i.e. real. Nor can it be\naltogether unreal, 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the\nobject either of mental apprehension or of sublation.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 106:1. If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself\nof the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should\nhave to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness--which is contrary to the\nfundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the\nother hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the\nimperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i.e. unreal,\nwe are landed in the view of universal unreality.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 111:1. Allowing the former view of the question only.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 112:1. Adopting the latter view only; see preceding note.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 118:1. For a full explanation of the nature of these 'khy\u00e2tis,'\nsee A. Venis' translation of the Ved\u00e2nta Siddh\u00e2nta Mukt\u00e2vali (Reprint\nfrom the Pandit, p. 130 ff.).]\n\n\n\n\nAll knowledge is of the Real.\n\n'Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its\nobject what is real; for Sruti and Smriti alike teach that everything\nparticipates in the nature of everything else. In the scriptural account\nof creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said\nthat each of these elements was made tripartite; and this tripartite\nconstitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red\ncolour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white\ncolour from water, the black colour from earth--in this way Scripture\nexplains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all\nthings are composed of elements of all things. The Vishnu Pur\u00e2na, in its\naccount of creation, makes a similar statement: \"The elements possessing\nvarious powers and being unconnected could not, without combination,\nproduce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined,\ntherefore, with one another, and entering into mutual associations--\nbeginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the\ngross elements--they formed an egg,\" &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50; 52). This\ntripartiteness of the elements the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra also declares (Ve. S\u00fb. III,\n1, 3). For the same reason Sruti enjoins the use of Put\u00eeka sprouts when\nno Soma can be procured; for, as the M\u00eem\u00e2msakas explain, there are in\nthe Put\u00eeka plant some parts of the Soma plant (P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb.); and for the\nsame reason n\u00eev\u00e2ra grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains.\nThat thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part\nof that other thing; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in shells,\n&c., there is contained some silver, and so on. That one thing is\ncalled \"silver\" and another \"shell\" has its reason in the relative\npreponderance of one or the other element. We observe that shells are\nsimilar to silver; thus perception itself informs us that some elements\nof the latter actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that\nowing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is apprehended, not\nthe shell-element, and then the percipient person, desirous of silver,\nmoves to pick up the shell. If, on the other hand, his eye is free from\nsuch defect, he apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from\naction. Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one. In the\nsame way the relation of one cognition being sublated by another\nexplains itself through the preponderant element, according as the\npreponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or in its\ntotality, and does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its\nobject the false thing and another the true thing. The distinctions made\nin the practical thought and business of life thus explain themselves on\nthe basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else.'\n\nIn dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with the merit or\ndemerit of living beings, things of a special nature, subsisting for a\ncertain time only, and perceived only by the individual soul for which\nthey are meant. In agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to\nthe state of dreaming, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses,\nno roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and roads. There are no\ndelights, no joys, no bliss; then he creates delights, joys, and bliss.\nThere are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes,\nand rivers. For he is the maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). The meaning of\nthis is, that although there are then no chariots, &c., to be perceived\nby other persons, the Lord creates such things to be perceived by the\ndreaming person only. 'For he is the maker'; for such creative agency\nbelongs to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all his\nwishes and plans to come true. Similarly another passage, 'That person\nwho is awake in those who are asleep, shaping one lovely sight after\nanother, that indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is\ncalled the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes\nbeyond it' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).--The S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra also, after having in two\nS\u00fbtras (III, 2, 1; 2) stated the hypothesis of the individual soul\ncreating the objects appearing in dreams, finally decides that that\nwonderful creation is produced by the Lord for the benefit of the\nindividual dreamer; for the reason that as long as the individual soul\nis in the sams\u00e2ra state, its true nature--comprising the power of making\nits wishes to come true--is not fully manifested, and hence it cannot\npractically exercise that power. The last clause of the Katha text ('all\nworlds are contained in it,' &c.) clearly shows that the highest Self\nonly is the creator meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his\nchamber should go in his body to other countries and experience various\nresults of his merit or demerit--being at one time crowned a king,\nhaving at another time his head cut off, and so on--is possible in so\nfar as there is created for him another body in every way resembling the\nbody resting on the bed.\n\nThe case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains itself as\nfollows. The visual rays issuing from the eye are in contact with the\nbile contained in the eye, and thereupon enter into conjunction with the\nshell; the result is that the whiteness belonging to the shell is\noverpowered by the yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended;\nthe shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt. The bile and its\nyellowness is, owing to its exceeding tenuity, not perceived by the\nbystanders; but thin though it be it is apprehended by the person\nsuffering from jaundice, to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues\nfrom his own eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by\nthe action of the impression produced on the mind by that apprehension,\nit is apprehended even in the distant object, viz. the shell.--In an\nanalogous way the crystal which is placed near the rose is apprehended\nas red, for it is overpowered by the brilliant colour of the rose; the\nbrilliancy of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its\nclose conjunction with the transparent substance of the crystal.--In the\nsame way the cognition of water in the mirage is true. There always\nexists water in connexion with light and earth; but owing to some defect\nof the eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious influence of\nmerit and demerit, the light and the earth are not apprehended, while\nthe water _is_ apprehended.--In the case again of the firebrand swung\nround rapidly, its appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through\nthe circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction with all\npoints of the circle described without our being able to apprehend the\nintervals. The case is analogous to that of the perception of a real\nwheel; but there is the difference that in the case of the wheel no\nintervals are apprehended, because there are none; while in the case of\nthe firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity of the movement.\nBut in the latter case also the cognition is true.--Again, in the case\nof mirrors and similar reflecting surfaces the perception of one's own\nface is likewise true. The fact is that the motion of the visual rays\n(proceeding from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by\nthe mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person's own face,\nsubsequently to the apprehension of the surface of the mirror; and as in\nthis case also, owing to the rapidity of the process, there is no\napprehension of any interval (between the mirror and the face), the face\npresents itself as being in the mirror.--In the case of one direction\nbeing mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be\nwhere the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i.\ne. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other\ndirection (for a point which is to the north of me is to the south of\nanother point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements\nof direction; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus\nlikewise true. Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either\nthrough pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal\naffection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the\ndouble, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating,\nbecomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus\napprehends the moon in her proper place; the other which moves somewhat\nobliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the\nmoon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place.\nAlthough, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished\nby connection with two places at the same time--an apprehension due to\nthe double apparatus of vision--yet, owing to the difference of\napprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object\napprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a\ndouble moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is\nviewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the\napprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended\nin her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the\napparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished\nby connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness\nof apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e.\nthe moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the\ntrue object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which\nocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually\nseen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute\none visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some\ndefect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus--this we infer from\nthe effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes\nplace only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper\nplace, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time\nquite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual\napparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to\na doubleness of the object of apprehension.\n\nWe have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of\nother views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length\nby other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What\nneed is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the\nvalidity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and--\nwhat is vouched for by sacred tradition--the existence of a highest\nBrahman--free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence,\ncomprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing,\nimmediately realising all its purposes--, what should they not be able\nto prove? That holy highest Brahman--while producing the entire world as\nan object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their\nrespective good and ill deserts--creates certain things of such a nature\nas to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or\nunpleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are\ncreated in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and\nto persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction--viz. of\nthings that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are\nnot so--which makes the difference between what is called 'things\nsublating' and 'things sublated.'--Everything is explained hereby.\n\n\n\n\nNeither Scripture nor Smriti and Pur\u00e2na teach Nescience.\n\nThe assertion that Nescience--to be defined neither as that which is nor\nas that which is not--rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In\npassages such as 'hidden by the untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word\n'untrue' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is\ndifferent from 'rita,' and this latter word--as we see from the passage\n'enjoying the rita' (Ka. Up. 1,3, 1)--denotes such actions as aim at no\nworldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and\nthus enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'anrita' therefore\ndenotes actions of a different kind, i.e. such as aim at worldly results\nand thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman; in agreement\nwith the passage 'they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are\ncarried away by anrita' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). Again, in the text 'Then\nthere was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 1), the terms\n'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in\ntheir distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that\nintelligent and non-intelligent beings, which at the time of the\norigination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6),\nare, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective\ntotality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term\n'darkness' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to\nsomething 'not definable either as being or non-being': the terms\n'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different mode; of being at\ndifferent times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective\ntotality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural\npassage, viz, 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable\n(akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one\nwith the highest divinity.' True, the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle\ncondition of primeval matter (prakriti), which forms the totality of non-\nintelligent things; but this very Prakriti is called M\u00e2y\u00e2--in the text\n'Know Prakriti to be M\u00e2y\u00e2,' and this proves it be something\n'undefinable': Not so, we reply; we meet with no passages where the word\n'M\u00e2y\u00e2' denotes that which is undefinable. But the word 'M\u00e2y\u00e2' is\nsynonymous with 'mithy\u00e2,' i.e. falsehood, and hence denotes the\nUndefinable also. This, too, we cannot admit; for the word 'M\u00e2y\u00e2' does\nnot in all places refer to what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such\nthings as the weapons of Asuras and R\u00e2kshasas, which are not 'false' but\nreal. 'M\u00e2y\u00e2,' in such passages, really denotes that which produces\nvarious wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Prakriti is\ncalled M\u00e2y\u00e2. This appears from the passage (Svet. Up. IV, 9) 'From that\nthe \"m\u00e2yin\" creates all this, and in that the other one is bound up by\nm\u00e2y\u00e2.' For this text declares that Prakriti--there called M\u00e2y\u00e2--produces\nmanifold wonderful creations, and the highest Person is there called\n'm\u00e2yin' because he possesses that power of m\u00e2y\u00e2; not on account of any\nignorance or nescience on his part. The latter part of the text\nexpressly says that (not the Lord but) another one, i.e. the individual\nsoul is bound up by m\u00e2y\u00e2; and therewith agrees another text, viz. 'When\nthe soul slumbering in beginningless M\u00e2y\u00e2 awakes' (Gaud. K\u00e2.). Again, in\nthe text 'Indra goes multiform through the M\u00e2y\u00e2s' (Ri. Samh. VI, 47, 18),\nthe manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this agrees what\nthe next verse says, 'he shines greatly as Tvashtri': for an unreal\nbeing does not shine. And where the text says 'my M\u00e2y\u00e2 is hard to\novercome' (Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 14), the qualification given there to M\u00e2y\u00e2, viz.\n'consisting of the gunas,' shows that what is meant is Prakriti\nconsisting of the three gunas.--All this shows that Scripture does not\nteach the existence of a 'principle called Nescience, not to be defined\neither as that which is or that which is not.'\n\nNor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise\nthe scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning.\nFor if the text 'Thou art that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the\nindividual soul and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason,\nfounded on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by the word\n'that'--which is all-knowing, &c.--Nescience, which is contradictory to\nBrahman's nature.--Itih\u00e2sa and Pur\u00e2na also do not anywhere teach that to\nBrahman there belongs Nescience.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, the Vishnu Pur\u00e2na, in the sloka, 'The stars\nare Vishnu,' &c. (II, 12, 38), first refers to Brahman as one only, and\ncomprising all things within itself; thereupon states in the next sloka\nthat this entire world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c.,\nis sprung out of the 'aj\u00f1\u00e2na' of Brahman, which in itself is pure 'j\u00f1\u00e2na,'\ni.e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung\nfrom aj\u00f1\u00e2na by referring to the fact that Brahman, while abiding in its\nown nature, is free from all difference (sl. 40); proves in the next two\nslokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of\nthis world; sums up, in the following sloka, the unreality of all that\nis different from Brahman; then (43) explains that action is the root of\nthat aj\u00f1\u00e2na which causes us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold;\nthereupon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman's nature to be\nfree from all distinction and imperfection (44); and finally teaches\n(45) that Brahman so constituted, alone is truly real, while the so-\ncalled reality of the world is merely conventional.--This is not, we\nreply, a true representation of the drift of the passage. The passage at\nthe outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of the\nworld given before, there will now be given a succinct account of\nanother aspect of the world not yet touched upon. This account has to be\nunderstood as follows. Of this universe, comprising intelligent and non-\nintelligent beings, the intelligent part--which is not to be reached by\nmind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the Self only,\nand, owing to its purely intelligential character, not touched by the\ndifferences due to Prakriti--is, owing to its imperishable nature,\ndenoted as that which is; while the non-intelligent, material; part\nwhich, in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes\nmanifold changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which is\nnot. Both parts, however, form the body of V\u00e2sudeva, i.e. Brahman, and\nhence have Brahman for their Self. The text therefore says (37), 'From\nthe waters which form the body of Vishnu was produced the lotus-shaped\nearth, with its seas and mountains': what is meant is that the entire\nBrahma-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which\nVishnu is the soul. This relation of soul and body forms the basis of\nthe statements of co-ordination made in the next sloka (38), 'The stars\nare Vishnu,' &c.; the same relation had been already declared in\nnumerous previous passages of the Pur\u00e2na ('all this is the body of Hari,'\n&c.). All things in the world, whether they are or are not, are\nVishnu's body, and he is their soul. Of the next sloka, 'Because the\nLord has knowledge for his essential nature,' the meaning is 'Because of\nthe Lord who abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential\nnature is knowledge only--while bodies divine, human, &c., have no part\nin it--, therefore all non-intelligent things, bodies human and divine,\nhills, oceans, &c., spring from his knowledge, i.e. have their root in\nthe actions springing from the volitions of men, gods, &c., in whose\nvarious forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And since\nnon-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the\nactions of the individual souls, it may be called 'non-being,' while the\nsouls are 'being.'--This the next sloka further explains 'when knowledge\nis pure,' &c. The meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the\ndistinction of things are destroyed, then all the distinctions of bodies,\nhuman or divine, hills, oceans, &c.--all which are objects of fruition\nfor the different individual souls--pass away.' Non-intelligent matter,\nas entering into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called\n'non-being'; while souls, the nature of which consists in permanent\nknowledge, are called 'being.' On this difference the next sloka insists\n(41). We say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform\nnature, not connected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and\nwhich hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence;\nwhile we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly\npasses over into different states, each later state being out of\nconnexion with the earlier state. The constant changes to which non-\nintelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next sloka, 'Earth\nis made into a jar,' &c. And for this reason, the subsequent sloka goes\non to say that there _is_ nothing but knowledge. This fundamental\nknowledge or intelligence is, however, variously connected with manifold\nindividual forms of being due to karman, and hence the text adds: 'The\none intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds\ndiffer, owing to the difference of their own acts' (sl 43, second half).\nIntelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c., which constitutes\nthe intelligent element of the world, and unintelligent matter--these\ntwo together constitute the world, and the world is the body of V\u00e2sudeva;\nsuch is the purport of sloka 44.--The next sloka sums up the whole\ndoctrine; the words 'true and untrue' there denote what in the preceding\nverses had been called 'being' and 'non-being'; the second half of the\nsloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman.\n\nNow all these slokas do not contain a single word supporting the\ndoctrine of a Brahman free from all difference; of a principle called\nNescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which\nis nor as that which is not; and of the world being wrongly imagined,\nowing to Nescience. The expressions 'that which is' and 'that which is\nnot' (sl 35), and 'satya' (true) and 'asatya' (untrue; sl 45), can in no\nway denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By\n'that which is not' or 'which is untrue,' we have to understand not what\nis undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is\nchangeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent\nmatter. This also appears from the instance adduced in sl 42: the jar is\nsomething perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated\nby true knowledge. 'Non-being' we may call it, in so far as while it is\nobserved at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other\nmoment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction\nbetween two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at\ndifferent times; and hence there is no reason to call it something\nfutile (tuchcha) or false (mithy\u00e2), &c.\n\n\n\n\nScripture does not teach that Release is due to the knowledge of a non-\nqualified Brahman.--the meaning of 'tat tvam asi.'\n\nNor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of\navidy\u00e2 to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all\ndifference. Such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the\nfollowing: 'I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness;\nknowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other path to go' (Svet.\nUp. III, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person--none is\nlord over him, his name is great glory--they who know him become\nimmortal' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2. Up. I, 8-11). For the reason that Brahman is\ncharacterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release\nresults from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those\ntexts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting\nforth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.\n\nIn texts, again, such as 'Thou art that,' the co-ordination of the\nconstituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity\nof a non-differenced substance: on the contrary, the words 'that' and\n'thou' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word 'that'\nrefers to Brahman omniscient, &c., which had been introduced as the\ngeneral topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section,\nsuch as 'It thought, may I be many'; the word 'thou,' which stands in co-\nordination to 'that,' conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having\nfor its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter.\nThis is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is\nmeant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such\ndoubleness of form (or character) were abandoned, there could be no\ndifference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms,\nand the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it\nwould further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be\ntaken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor\nis there any need of our assuming implication (lakshan\u00e2) in sentences\n[FOOTNOTE 130:1] such as 'this person is that Devadatta (known to me\nfrom former occasions)'; for there is no contradiction in the cognition\nof the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and\nthe present on the other, the contradiction that arises from difference\nof place being removed by the accompanying difference of time. If the\ntext 'Thou art that' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would,\nmoreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz.\n'It thought, may I be many'; and, further, the promise (also made in the\nsame section) that by the knowledge of one thing all things are to be\nknown could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not\npossible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of\n'tat' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge,\nwhich is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within\nitself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience; and that\nit should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which\nspring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination\n('thou art that') were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong\nnotion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms 'that'\nand 'thou' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the\none hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the\ndifferent attributes (directly expressed by the two terms); and thus\nimplication and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to\nthis interpretation as well. And there would be even further\ndifficulties. When we form the sublative judgment 'this is not silver,'\nthe sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. 'this\nis a shell': in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would\nnot be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be\nassumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further,\nthere is really no possibility of sublation, since the word 'that' does\nnot convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate.\nTo this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously\nconcealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that'\nto present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously\nto the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object\nof consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object\neither of an error or its sublation.--Nor can we allow you to say that,\npreviously to sublation, the substrate was non-concealed in so far as\n(i. e. was known as) the object of error, for in its 'non-concealed'\naspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect\nshines forth there is no room either for error or sublation.--The\noutcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real\nattribute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is\nfor a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or\nsublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man\nthere should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only\npossible on condition of a real additional attribute--e.g. the man's\nprincely birth--being hidden at the time; and the cessation of that\nerror is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely\nbirth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man: this latter\nfact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it\nsublates no error.--If, on the other hand, the text is understood to\nrefer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words\n('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denotation; and, the text thus\nmaking a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects,\nthe fundamental principle of 'co-ordination' is preserved, On this\ninterpretation the text further intimates that Brahman--free from all\nimperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities--is\nthe internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power.\nIt moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the\nprevious part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all\nthings being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having\nfor its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross\nstate is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in\ntheir subtle state. And this interpretation finally avoids all conflict\nwith other scriptural passages, such as 'Him the great Lord, the highest\nof Lords' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'His high power is revealed as manifold'\n(ibid. VI, 8); 'He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose\npurposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on.\n\nBut how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on your interpretation\nof the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original\nassertion with regard to the other?--The question does not arise, we\nreply; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all,\nthe truth which it states having already been established by the\npreceding clause, 'In that all this world has its Self.' This clause\ndoes make an original statement--in agreement with the principle that\n'Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other\nmeans'--that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world\ntogether with all individual souls, that 'that,' i.e. Brahman is the\nSelf of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage,\n'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling\nand their rest in that which is'; a statement which is illustrated by an\nearlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. 'All this is\nBrahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning,\nending, and breathing in Brahman' (Ch. Up. III. 14, 1). Similarly other\ntexts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as\nthe whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings\nconstitutes Brahman's body. Compare 'Abiding within, the ruler of beings,\nthe Self of all'; 'He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth,\nwhom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the\nearth within--he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. He who\ndwells in the Self,'&c. (Bri. Up. III, 7,3; 22); 'He who moving within\nthe earth, and so on--whose body is death, whom death does not know, he\nis the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, N\u00e5r\u00e2yana'\n(Sub\u00e2l. Up. VII, 1); 'Having created that he entered into it; having\nentered it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also in the\nsection under discussion the passage 'Having entered into them with this\nliving Self let me evolve names and forms,' shows that it is only\nthrough the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman,\nthat all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with\nthe words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in\nconnexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 'sat' denotes the individual\nsoul) it follows that the individual soul also has Brahman for its Self,\nowing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it.--From all this it\nfollows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-\nintelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes\nBrahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman\nderives its substantial being only from constituting Brahman's body, any\nterm denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has\nits proper consummation in Brahman only: in other words all terms\nwhatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different\nthings which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use\nof speech and etymology.--The text 'that art thou' we therefore\nunderstand merely as a special expression of the truth already\npropounded in the clause 'in that all this has its Self.'\n\nThis being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the\nabsolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the\ndoctrine of bhed\u00e2bheda (co-existing difference and non-difference), and\nthose who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up\nall those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal\nSelf. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is\nonly one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity\nrefer?'--The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance.'--But,\nwe reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature\nof Brahman [FOOTNOTE 134:1], and there is nothing left to be determined\nby the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman.--But\nthose texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference!--This, we\nreply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating\nuniversal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-\nordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and\nthus contradict the theory of absolute oneness.--The bhed\u00e2bheda view\nimplies that owing to Brahman's connexion with limiting adjuncts\n(up\u00e2dhi) all the imperfections resulting therefrom--and which avowedly\nbelong to the individual soul--would manifest themselves in Brahman\nitself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is\nconstituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising\nwithin itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that\ndoctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other hand, the theory\nbe held in that form that 'bhed\u00e2bheda' belongs to Brahman by its own\nnature (not only owing to an up\u00e2dhi), the view that Brahman by its\nessential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections\nno less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in\nconflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with\nBrahman free from all imperfections.--For those finally who maintain\nabsolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has\nno meaning whatsoever--for things absolutely different can in no way be\none--and this implies the abandonment of all Ved\u00e2nta-texts together.\n\nThose, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine,\nproclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of\nBrahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity\nof the world with Brahman. For as genus (j\u00e2ti) and quality (guna), so\nsubstances (dravya) also may occupy the position of determining\nattributes (viseshana), in so far namely as they constitute the body of\nsomething else. Enunciations such as 'the Self (soul) is, according to\nits works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,'\nshow that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to\nbe taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is\nalso in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of\n'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to\nsubstances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as 'the\nox is broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white.' And as material bodies\nbearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far\nonly as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination\nsuch as 'the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are\nin every way appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is\nthus only the relation of 'mode' in which one thing stands to another,\nnot the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of\nan exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination\nwith substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of\nsubsisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that\nthose substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances--\nas when from danda, 'staff,' we form dandin, 'staff-bearer'; in the case,\non the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being\napprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of\nattributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-\nordination.--But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in\nsentences such as 'the Self is born, as god, man, animal,' &c., the body\nof a man, god, &c., stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode,\nin the same way as in sentences such as 'the ox is broken-horned,' 'the\ncloth is white,' the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the\nrelation of modes to the substances ('cow,' 'cloth') to which they are\ngrammatically co-ordinated; then there would necessarily be simultaneous\ncognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i.e. of the\nbody and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the\ngeneric character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is\nnot the case; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal\nbody together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form\n'the Self is a man,' is therefore an 'implied' one only (the statement\nnot admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense).--This is not\nso, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous\nto that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in\nwhich they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and\ntheir final cause (prayojana), and they are modes of the Self. That the\nSelf only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self\nseparates itself from the body the latter perishes; that the Self alone\nis their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to the end\nthat the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed; and that they\nare modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere\nattributes of the Self manifesting itself as god, man, or the like.\nThese are just the circumstances on account of which words like 'cow'\nextend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to\ncomprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as\nin the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position\nis expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative\nforms--such as dandin (staff-bearer), kundalin (adorned with earrings).\nIn the case of bodies divine, human, &c., on the other hand, the\nessential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which\nconstitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic\nlanguage express the relation subsisting between the two, in the form of\nco-ordination, 'This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class\ncharacteristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due\nto the fact of both being objects of visual perception; the Self, on the\nother hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while\nthe body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is\nhard to understand how that which is capable of being apprehended by\nitself can be a mere mode of something else: for that the body's\nessential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is\nproved--just as in the case of class characteristics and so on--by its\nhaving the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to\nit in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are\ninvariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their\nbeing apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise.\nEarth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these\nqualities are not perceived by the eye; in the same way the eye which\nperceives the body does not perceive that essential characteristic of\nthe body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self; the reason\nof the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the\nSelf. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that\nessential nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential\nnature on which the judgment of co-ordination ('the Self is a man, god,'\n&c.) is based. And as words have the power of denoting the relation of\nsomething being a mode of the Self, they denote things together with\nthis relation.--But in ordinary speech the word 'body' is understood to\nmean the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to\nthe Self!--Not so, we reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode\nof the Self; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things,\nthe word 'body' is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as\n'whiteness,' 'generic character of a cow,' 'species,''quality,' are used\nin a distinctive sense (although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a\nwhite thing, of which it is the prak\u00e2ra, and so on). Words such as\n'god,' 'man,' &c., therefore do extend in their connotation up to the\nSelf. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with\naggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity,\ndivine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and\nhence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls extend\nin their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent\nand non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman,\nand have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-\nordination with the terms denoting Brahman.--This point has been\ndemonstrated by me in the Ved\u00e2rthasamgraha. A S\u00fbtra also (IV, 1, 3) will\ndeclare the identity of the world and Brahman to consist in the relation\nof body and Self; and the V\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra too says 'It is the Self--thus\neverything should be apprehended.'\n\n[FOOTNOTE 130:1. Which are alleged to prove that s\u00e2m\u00e2n\u00e2dhikaranya is to\nbe explained on the basis of lakshan\u00e2.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 134:1. Such as 'The True, knowledge,' &c.]\n\n\n\n\nSummary statement as to the way in which different scriptural texts are\nto reconciled.\n\nThe whole matter may be summarily stated as follows. Some texts declare\na distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent\nbeings, and Brahman, in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the\nsouls the enjoying subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. 'From\nthat the Lord of M\u00e2y\u00e2 creates all this; in that the other one is bound\nup through that M\u00e2y\u00e2' (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'Know Prakriti to be M\u00e2y\u00e2, and\nthe great Lord the ruler of M\u00e2y\u00e2' (10); 'What is perishable is the\nPradh\u00e2na, the immortal and imperishable is Hara: the one God rules the\nPerishable and the Self' (Svet Up. I, 10)--In this last passage the\nclause 'the immortal and imperishable is Hara,' refers to the enjoying\nindividual soul, which is called 'Hara,' because it draws (harati)\ntowards itself the pradh\u00e2na as the object of its enjoyment.--' He is the\ncause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither\nparent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'The master of the pradh\u00e2na and of\nthe individual souls' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'The ruler of all, the lord of\nthe Selfs, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. XI, 3);\n'There are two unborn ones, one knowing, the other not knowing, one a\nruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet. Up. 1, 9); 'The eternal among the\nnon-eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who though one\nfulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'Knowing the enjoyer,\nthe object of enjoyment and the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 12); 'One of them\neats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Svet. Up. IV,\n6); 'Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed by him\nhe reaches Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'There is one unborn female\nbeing, red, white, and black, uniform but producing manifold offspring.\nThere is one unborn male being who loves her and lies by her; there is\nanother who leaves her after he has enjoyed her' (Svet. Up. IV, 5). 'On\nthe same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on account of his\nimpotence; but when he sees the other Lord contented and knows his glory,\nthen his grief passes away' (Svet. Up. IV, 9).--Smriti expresses itself\nsimilarly.--'Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this Nature;\nother than this and higher know that Nature of mine which constitutes\nthe individual soul, by which this world is supported' (Bha. G\u00ec. VII, 4,\n5). 'All beings at the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again\nat the beginning of a Kalpa do I send them forth. Resting on my own\nNature again and again do I send forth this entire body of beings, which\nhas no power of its own, being subject to the power of nature' (Bha. G\u00ee.\nIX, 7, 8); 'With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable and\nthe immovable, and for this reason the world ever moves round' (Bha. G\u00ee.\nIX, 10); 'Know thou both Nature and the Soul to be without beginning'\n(XIII, 19); 'The great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo,\nand thence there is the origin of all beings' (XIV, 3). This last\npassage means--the womb of the world is the great Brahman, i.e. non-\nintelligent matter in its subtle state, commonly called Prakriti; with\nthis I connect the embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this\ncontact of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will,\nthere ensues the origination of all beings from gods down to lifeless\nthings.\n\nNon-intelligent matter and intelligent beings--holding the relative\npositions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects, and appearing\nin multifarious forms--other scriptural texts declare to be permanently\nconnected with the highest Person in so far as they constitute his body,\nand thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus constituting\ntheir Self. Compare the following passages: 'He who dwells in the earth\nand within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth\nis, and who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,\nthe immortal,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23); 'He who moves within the\nearth, whose body the earth is, &c.; he who moves within death, whose\nbody death is,' &c.(Sub\u00e2la Up. VII, 1). In this latter passage the word\n'death' denotes what is also called 'darkness,' viz. non-intelligent\nmatter in its subtle state; as appears from another passage in the same\nUpanishad,'the Imperishable is merged in darkness.' And compare also\n'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' (Taitt. \u00c2r.\nIII, 24).\n\nOther texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self to whom non-\nintelligent and intelligent beings stand in the relation of body, and\nhence of modes, subsists in the form of the world, in its causal as well\nas in its effected aspect, and hence speak of the world in this its\ndouble aspect as that which is (the Real); so e.g. 'Being only this was\nin the beginning, one only without a second--it desired, may I be many,\nmay I grow forth--it sent forth fire,' &c., up to 'all these creatures\nhave their root in that which is,' &c., up to 'that art thou, O\nSvetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 2-8); 'He wished, may I be many,' &c., up to 'it\nbecame the true and the untrue' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). These sections also\nrefer to the essential distinction of nature between non-intelligent\nmatter, intelligent beings, and the highest Self which is established by\nother scriptural texts; so in the Ch\u00e2ndogya passage, 'Let me enter those\nthree divine beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names\nand forms'; and in the Taitt. passage, 'Having sent forth that he\nentered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat, knowledge and\n(what is) without knowledge, the true and the untrue,' &c. These two\npassages evidently have the same purport, and hence the soul's having\nits Self in Brahman--which view is implied in the Ch. passage--must be\nunderstood as resting thereon that the souls (together, with matter)\nconstitute the body of Brahman as asserted in the Taitt. passage ('it\nbecame knowledge and that which is without knowledge,' i.e. souls and\nmatter). The same process of evolution of names and forms is described\nelsewhere also, 'All this was then unevolved; it became evolved by form\nand name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). The fact is that the highest Self is in\nits causal or in its 'effected' condition, according as it has for its\nbody intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle or\ntheir gross state; the effect, then, being non-different from the cause,\nand hence being cognised through the cognition of the cause, the result\nis that the desired 'cognition of all things through one' can on our\nview be well established. In the clause 'I will enter into these three\ndivine beings with this living Self,' &c., the term 'the three divine\nbeings' denotes the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, and as the\ntext declares that the highest Self evolved names and forms by entering\ninto matter by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it\nfollows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self as qualified\nby individual Selfs, the latter again being qualified by non-sentient\nmatter. A term which denotes the highest Self in its causal condition\nmay therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting\nthe highest Self in its 'effected' state, both terms being used in their\nprimary senses. Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non-\nintelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutes\neffect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause\n(up\u00e2d\u00e2na). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the essential\nconstituent elements of the great aggregate of things. Of some parti-\ncoloured piece of cloth the material cause is threads white, red, black,\n&c.; all the same, each definite spot of the cloth is connected with one\ncolour only white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even\nin the 'effected' condition of the cloth. Analogously the combination of\nnon-sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord constitutes the\nmaterial cause of the world, but this does not imply any confusion of\nthe essential characteristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment,\nand the universal ruler, even in the world's 'effected' state. There is\nindeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as the threads are\ncapable of existing apart from one another, and are only occasionally\ncombined according to the volition of men, so that the web sometimes\nexists in its causal, sometimes in its effected state; while non-\nsentient matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body of\nthe highest Self, and thus have a being only as the modes of that--on\nwhich account the highest Self may, in all cases, be denoted by any term\nwhatsoever. But the two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists\na distinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the\nconstituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus, it follows that\nthe highest Brahman, although entering into the 'effected' condition,\nremains unchanged--for its essential nature does not become different--\nand we also understand what constitutes its 'effected' condition, viz.\nits abiding as the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in\ntheir gross condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming an\neffect means entering into another state of being.\n\nThose texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of qualities,\nexplain themselves on the ground of Brahman being free from all touch of\nevil. For the passage, Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5--which at first negatives all\nevil qualities 'free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief,\nfrom hunger and thirst', and after that affirms auspicious qualities\n'whose wishes and purposes come true'--enables us to decide that in\nother places also the general denial of qualities really refers to evil\nqualities only.--Passages which declare knowledge to constitute the\nessential nature of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of\nBrahman--which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic to all evil, a\nmass of auspicious qualities--the essential nature can be defined as\nknowledge (intelligence) only--which also follows from the 'self-\nluminousness' predicated of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as 'He\nwho is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is revealed as\nmanifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8);\n'Whereby should he know the knower' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14), teach the\nhighest Self to be a knowing subject. Other texts, again, such as 'The\nTrue, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), declare\nknowledge to constitute its nature, as it can be denned through\nknowledge only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as 'He desired, may\nI be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'It thought, may I be many; it evolved\nitself through name and form' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), teach that Brahman,\nthrough its mere wish, appears in manifold modes. Other texts, again,\nnegative the opposite view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not\nhaving their Self in Brahman. 'From death to death goes he who sees here\nany plurality'; 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);\n'For where there is duality as it were' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14). But these\ntexts in no way negative that plurality of modes--declared in passages\nsuch as 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--which springs from Brahman's\nwill, and appears in the distinction of names and forms. This is proved\nby clauses in those 'negativing' texts themselves, 'Whosoever looks for\nanything elsewhere than in the Self', 'from that great Being there has\nbeen breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6, 10).--On\nthis method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the\nessential distinction and separation of non-sentient matter, sentient\nbeings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the\nworld to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in\nany way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form\nthe body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal\ncondition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of\nnames and forms while in their 'effected' gross state they are subject\nto that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any\nopening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience,\nor distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (up\u00e2dhi)--such and\nsimilar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict\nScripture.\n\nThere is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare\nthe essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their\nmutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that\nother texts again represent them as standing in the relation of cause\nand effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this\nby an analogous case from the Karmak\u00e2nda. There six separate oblations\nto Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originative\ninjunctions; these are thereupon combined into two groups (viz. the new\nmoon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those\ngroups, and finally a so-called injunction of qualification enjoins the\nentire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a\ncertain wish. In a similar way certain Ved\u00e2nta-texts give instruction\nabout matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities ('Perishable is\nthe pradh\u00e2na, imperishable and immortal Hara,' &c., Svet Up. I, 10; and\nothers); then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their\ndifferent states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the\nlatter is their Self ('Whose body the earth is,' &c.); and finally\nanother group of texts teaches--by means of words such as 'Being,'\n'Brahman,' 'Self,' denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs--\nthat the one highest Self in its causal and effected states comprises\nwithin itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation\n('Being only this was in the beginning'; 'In that all this has its Self;\n'All this is Brahman').--That the highest Self with matter and souls for\nits body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more\nobjectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested\nwith a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul--as when we\nsay 'This is a happy soul.'\n\n\n\n\nNescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as\nthe universal self.\n\nThe doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of\nBrahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld; for as bondage is\nsomething real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can\nany one assert that bondage--which consists in the experience of\npleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of\nvarious kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions--is\nsomething false, unreal? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be\nobtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the\ndevout meditation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the\ncognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of\nthings directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only\neffect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts\nsuch as 'But different is the highest Person' (Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 17), and\n'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate' (Svet. Up. I, 6),\nteach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different\nfrom the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i.e.\nfinal release. And, further, as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge\nwhich you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for\nanother act of cognition to put an end to it.--But may it not be said\nthat this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole\naggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away\nitself, because being of a merely instantaneous nature?--No, we reply.\nSince its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike\nfictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of\ndestroying that avidy\u00e2 which is the cause of the fiction of its\ndestruction!--Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman\nitself is the destruction of that cognition!--From this it would follow,\nwe reply, that such 'terminating' knowledge would not arise at all; for\nthat the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not\noriginate!--Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising\nsubject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of\neverything that is different from Brahman?--That cognising subject is\nhimself something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman!--This may not be,\nwe reply: he himself would in that case be something to be negatived,\nand hence an object of the 'terminating' cognition; he could not\ntherefore be the subject of cognition!--Well, then, let us assume that\nthe essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject!--Do you\nmean, we ask in reply, that Brahman's being the knowing subject in that\n'terminating' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that\nit is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In the latter case\nthat superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist,\nbecause they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a\nfurther terminating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would\npossess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject\nknowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of\nknowing subjects. If, on the other band, the essential nature of Brahman\nitself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with\nthe one held by us. [FOOTNOTE 146:1] And if you should say that the\nterminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things\nseparate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is\nto be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less\nabsurd than if you were to say 'everything on the surface of the earth\nhas been cut down by Devadatta with one stroke'--meaning thereby that\nDevadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the\nthings cut down!--The second alternative, on the other hand--according\nto which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower\nsuperimposed upon it--would imply that that subject is the agent in an\nact of knowledge resulting in his own destruction; and this is\nimpossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be\nsaid that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very\nnature of Brahman itself [FOOTNOTE 147:1], it would follow that we can\nassume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidy\u00e2\nas the root of that erroneous view.--All this confirms our theory, viz.\nthat since bondage springs from ajn\u00e2na in the form of an eternal stream\nof karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind\nmaintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due\ndaily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste\nand \u00e2srama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying\nthought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of\npropitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited\nand non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not\naiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person,\nbring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby\nthe unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the\nSelf of all--these are points not to be known without an insight into\nthe nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described--\nwhich is preceded by the abandonment of mere works--cannot be reached.\nFor these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon _after_\nthe enquiry into the nature of works.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 146:1. According to which Brahman is not j\u00f1\u00e2nam, but j\u00f1\u00e2tri.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 147:1. And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's\nhighest aim.]\n\n\n\n\nThe Ved\u00e2ntin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture,\nneed not be disconcerted by the M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-theory of all speech having\ninforming power with regard to actions only.\n\nHere another prim\u00e2 facie view [FOOTNOTE 148:1] finally presents itself.\nThe power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but\nby observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such\nspeech and action always implies the idea of something to be done\n(k\u00e2rya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to\nbe done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things\nto be done. From this it follows that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts cannot claim the\nposition of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman,\nwhich is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.--Against\nthis view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive\nof accomplished facts--as e.g. that a son is born to somebody--the idea\nof a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of\ncertain outward signs--such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance--\nwhich are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the\npossible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in\nnumber, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth\nhaving taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one,\n&c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the\ndenotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be\nascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word\nfrom the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical\npart of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the\nfact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words\nknown to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some\nparticular constituent of that group may be.--Nor, again, when a person,\nafraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is observed to dismiss his fear\non being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we\ndetermine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-\nexistence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account\nfor the cessation of his fear--he may think, e.g., 'this is a thing\nincapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness'--the\nparticular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to\ndetermine.--The truth is that from the fact of all activity being\ninvariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that\nthe meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All\nwords thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a\nsentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence\nit is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting\ntheir own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words\nof the sentence.--(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not\nthe idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it;\nfor) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action\nonly through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is\nevident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even\npresent (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does\nnot prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means\ntowards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of\nmine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he\ndoes not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of\nthings to be done; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda\nalso can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a\nposition to give information about the attainment of an infinite and\npermanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is\n(not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on\nthe other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result\n('Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the k\u00e2turm\u00e2sya-sacrifices,'\nand so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into\nBrahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and\npermanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent,\nis an altogether unjustified proceeding.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--To set aside the universally known\nmode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to\nassert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those\nthings to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which\nmen paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight\nregard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in\nthe following way. The father and mother and other people about him\npoint with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well\nas at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to\nthe end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms\nthey use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again\nmake him understand that such and such words refer to such and such\nthings. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of\nthemselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time\nobserving neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any\nperson arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion\nthat the application of such and such words to such and such things is\nbased on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by\nhis elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first,\nhave their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the\nmeanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain\nmeanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.\n\nAnd there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things\ncan easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some\nexpressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing\nwell, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing\nwell.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various\ngestures, and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent, follows\nhim and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he\ntherefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a\nmeaning.--We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in\nrelation to things to be done is baseless. The Ved\u00e2nta-texts tell us\nabout Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on\nBrahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to\nundertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.\n\nWe further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating\nonly to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken.\nFor 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be\nmeditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we\nmust try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Br\u00e2hmana having\nknown him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'What is within that\nsmall ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 1,1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon'\n(Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. X, 7)--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action,\nviz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman\nattains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is\nmeant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such\nmeditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established\nthereby only--that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation.\nThere are analogous instances in the Karmak\u00e2nda of the Veda. When an\narthav\u00e2da-passage describes the heavenly vorld as a place where there is\nno heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to\nthose texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of\nthe heavenly world. Where another arthav\u00e2da says that 'those who perform\ncertain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm\nestablishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for\nthose acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform\nthe r\u00e2tri-sattras' (P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a\nperson threatening a Br\u00e2hmana is to be punished with a fine of one\nhundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the\nprohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Br\u00e2hmana'(P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb. III,\n4, 17).\n\nWe, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words\ndepending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not\neven the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are\nquite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done\n'(k\u00e2rya). You understand by 'k\u00e2rya' that which follows on the existence\nof action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by\naction is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of\naction is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action\n(according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to\nobtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of\nsome pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be\naccomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and\nbegins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at\nby action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending\non activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to\nobjects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment\ndepending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.--Nor can it\nbe said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is\n'agreeable' (anuk\u00fbla) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable\nto man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is\n'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain\nis that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable\n(pratik\u00fbla), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is\nagreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that\na person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor\npleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor\ndoes it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential\nnature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve\nof undertaking it.--Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by\naction as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary (sesha),\nwhile itself it holds the position of something principal to be\nsubserved by other things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no\nproper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a sesha is that\nwhich is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to\nsomething else, and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin;\nfor on this definition the action is not a sesha, and hence that which\nis to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And\nmoreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action\nproceeding with a view to--i. e. aiming at--something else; for it is\njust this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition, and\nmoreover we observe that also the seshin (or 'pradh\u00e2na') is capable of\naction proceeding with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does\nsomething for--let us say, keeps or feeds--his servant. This last\ncriticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the\nmaster in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own\nadvantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a\nview to himself.--And as, further, we have no adequate definition of\n'k\u00e2rya,' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is\ncorrelative to k\u00e2rya, and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha.--\nNor, finally, may we define 'that which is aimed at by action' as that\nwhich is the final end (prayojana) of action; for by the final end of an\naction we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes\nthe action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus\n'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is\ndesired, k\u00e2rya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and\nstands to action in the relation of principal matter (pradh\u00e2na or\nseshin).\n\n(Let it then be said that the 'niyoga,' i.e. what is commonly called the\nap\u00fbrva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces\nthe sensible result--constitutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of\nthe action.--But) the ap\u00fbrva also can, as it is something different from\nthe direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain,\nbe viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects, and as\nsomething itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very\nreason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the\naction itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing\nto be effected by the action-which is expressed by means of optative and\nimperative verbal forms such as yajeta, 'let him sacrifice'--is, in\naccordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as\nsvargak\u00e2mah, 'he who is desirous of heaven', understood to be the means\nof bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the\n(sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an\naltogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (ap\u00fbrva) effect of it which (later\non) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called 'ap\u00fbrva'\ncan therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of\nbringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to\nassert that the ap\u00fbrva, which is assumed to the end of firmly\nestablishing the independent character of the effect of the action first\nrecognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of\nrealising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of\nthe action (yajta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargak\u00e2mah'\n(desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an\nindependent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise\nan independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation\nof pain, or the means to bring about these two results.--What, moreover,\ndo you understand by the ap\u00fbrva being a final end (prayojana)?-You will\nperhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'--Is then the ap\u00fbrva\na pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!--Well, let us then\ndefine the ap\u00fbrva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by\nthat name!--But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the\nfirst place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any\npleasure springing from consciousness of your ap\u00fbrva, which could in any\nway be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the\nobjects of the senses.--Well, let us say then that as authoritative\ndoctrine gives us the notion of an ap\u00fbrva as something beneficial to man,\nwe conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.--But, we ask, what is the\nauthoritative doctrine establishing such an ap\u00fbrva beneficial to man?\nNot, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has\nfor its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in\nthe next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the\nmeans to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor\nagain the Smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional\nobligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an ap\u00fbrva only\non the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the ap\u00fbrva as intimated by\nVedic texts containing terms such as svargak\u00e2mah. And we, moreover, do\nnot observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this\nlife, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called ap\u00fbrva, in\naddition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the\nwork and are enjoyed here below, as e.g. abundance of food or freedom\nfrom sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the ap\u00fbrva being a\npleasure. The arthav\u00e2da-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying\ncertain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not\nanywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called ap\u00fbrva.\n\nFrom all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which\nis expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the\nmeaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the\neffort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz.\nthe action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of\npleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other\ndivinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that\nthrough the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is\naccomplished, we shall show later on, under S\u00fb. III, 2, 37--It is thus\nfinally proved that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts give information about an\naccomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on\nBrahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand,\nScripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the k\u00e2turm\u00e2sya-\nsacrifices, as something imperishable, we have to understand this\nimperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely\nteaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.\n\nWe thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere\nworks is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman\nis infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an\nenquiry into Brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate\ndetermination of Brahman's nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of\n'Enquiry.'\n\nWhat then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should\nbe enquired into?--To this question the second S\u00fbtra gives a reply.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 148:1. This view is held by the Pr\u00e2bh\u00e2kara M\u00eem\u00e2msakas.]\n\n\n\n\n2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c., of this (world proceed).\n\nThe expression 'the origin', &c., means 'creation, subsistence, and\nreabsorption'. The 'this' (in 'of this') denotes this entire world with\nits manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and\ncomprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahm\u00e2 down\nto blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former\nactions) in definite places and at definite times. 'That from which,' i.\ne. that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is\nantagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses\ninfinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on;\nwho is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the\ncreation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed--he is\nBrahman: such is the meaning of the S\u00fbtra.--The definition here given of\nBrahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhrigu V\u00e2runi went to\nhis father Varuna, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman', &c., up to 'That from\nwhich these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that\ninto which they enter at their death, try to know that: that is Brahman.'\n\nA doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of\nBrahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage?--It is not\npossible, the P\u00fbrvapakshin contends. The attributes stated in that\npassage--viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on--do\nnot properly indicate Brahman; for as the essence of an attribute lies\nin its separative or distinctive function, there would result from the\nplurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman\nitself.--But when we say 'Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young,\nhas reddish eyes,' &c., we also make a statement as to several\nattributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only;\nsimilarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is\none Brahman only!--Not so, we reply. In Devadatta's case we connect all\nattributes with one person, because we know his unity through other\nmeans of knowledge; otherwise the distinctive power of several\nattributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of\nseveral substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case\nunder discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement\nas to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the\ndistinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the\nidea of several Brahmans.--But we maintain that the unity of the term\n'Brahman' intimates the unity of the thing 'Brahman'!--By no means, we\nreply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about\nthem, is told 'a cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated\nhorns, or no horns,' the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of\nentire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several\nindividual cows, although the term 'cow' is one only; and in the same\nway we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahmans. For this reason,\neven the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the\nthing, the definition of which is desired.--Nor again are the\ncharacteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the\nworld, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks\n(upalakshana), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously\nknown in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of\nsomething already known from a certain point of view, being known in a\ndifferent aspect--as when it is said 'Where that crane is standing, that\nis the irrigated field of Devadatta.'--But may we not say that from the\ntext 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an\nidea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c.,\nof the world may be taken as collateral indications (pointing to\nsomething already known in a certain way)?--Not so, we reply; either of\nthese two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect\nof Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence\ndeprives both of their force.--Brahman cannot therefore be known through\nthe characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion.\n\nTo this prim\u00e2 facie view we make the following reply. Brahman can be\nknown on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of\nthe world--these characteristics occupying the position of collateral\nmarks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that,\napart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of\nBrahman is known; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is\nknown to us as possessing supreme greatness (brihattva) and power of\ngrowth (brimhana)--this being the meaning of the root brimh (from which\n'Brahman' is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis\nof etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the\nworld are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under\ndiscussion, the relative pronoun--which appears in three forms, (that)\n'from whence,' (that) 'by which,' (that) 'into which'--refers to\nsomething which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on,\nof the world. This previous knowledge rests on the Ch. passage, 'Being\nonly this was in the beginning,' &c., up to 'it sent forth fire'--which\ndeclares that the one principle denoted as 'being' is the universal\nmaterial, and instrumental cause. There the clause 'Being only this was\nin the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general\nmaterial cause; the word 'without a second' negatives the existence of a\nsecond operative cause; and the clauses 'it thought, may I be many, may\nI grow forth', and 'it sent forth fire', establish that one being (as\nthe cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that\nBrahman is that which is the root of the world's origination,\nsubsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently\nindicate Brahman as that entity which is their material and operative\ncause; and as being the material and the operative cause implies\ngreatness (brihattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as\nomniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known; and as\nhence origination, &c., of the world are marks of something already\nknown, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of\nanother aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid.--Nor is there really\nany objection to the origination, &c., of the world being taken as\ncharacteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive\nattributes. For taken as attributes they indicate Brahman as something\ndifferent from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes\nwhich do not contradict each other may serve quite well as\ncharacteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not\notherwise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way\ninvolving plurality of the thing defined; for as those attributes are at\nonce understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them\nwithin that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession\nof mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed\nto each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual\ncows to which they severally belong; but the origination, &c., of the\nworld are processes separated from each other by difference of time only,\nand may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman\nin succession.--The text 'from whence these beings', &c., teaches us\nthat Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, and of\nthis Brahman thus known the other text 'The True, knowledge, the\nInfinite is Brahman', tells us that its essential nature marks it off\nfrom everything else. The term 'True' expresses Brahman in so far as\npossessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes\nit from non-intelligent matter, the abode of change, and the souls\nimplicated in matter; for as both of these enter into different states\nof existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned\nbeing. The term 'knowledge' expresses the characteristic of permanently\nnon-contracted intelligence, and thus distinguishes Brahman from the\nreleased souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state.\nAnd the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all\nlimitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature; and as\nBrahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both\nto the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of\nInfinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and\nattributes are not unsurpassable, and who are distinct from the two\nclasses of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. 'true\nbeing' and 'knowledge').--The entire text therefore defines Brahman--\nwhich is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c., of the\nworld--as that which is in kind different from all other things; and it\nis therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force\nbecause mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that\na knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic\nmarks--such as its being the cause of the origination, &c., of the world,\nfree from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on.\n\nTo those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is\na substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second\nS\u00fbtra can be acceptable; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the\nfirst S\u00fbtra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology,\nsomething of supreme greatness; and according to the second S\u00fbtra it is\nthe cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world.\nThe same remark holds good with regard to all following S\u00fbtras, and the\nscriptural texts on which they are based--none of them confirm the\ntheory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does\nReasoning prove such a theory; for Reasoning has for its object things\npossessing a 'proving' attribute which constantly goes together with an\nattribute 'to be proved.' And even if, in agreement with your view, we\nexplained the second S\u00fbtra as meaning 'Brahman is that whence proceeds\nthe error of the origination, &c., of the world', we should not thereby\nadvance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you\nteach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which\nwitnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing\nconsciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the\nessence of pure light or intelligence is that, distinguishing itself\nfrom the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is\ndifferent from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and\nspeech (vyavah\u00e2ra). All this implies the presence of difference--if\nthere were no difference, light or intelligence could not be what it is,\nit would be something altogether void, without any meaning.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'origination and so on.'\n\nAn objection to the purport of the preceding S\u00fbtras here presents itself.--\nThe assertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c., of the\nworld, must be known through the Ved\u00e2nta-texts is unfounded; for as\nBrahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary\nreasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative\ntexts.--To this objection the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n3. Because Scripture is the source (of the knowledge of Brahman).\n\nBecause Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not\nan object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known\nthrough Scripture only; therefore the text 'Whence these creatures are\nborn,' &c., has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true\nnature of Brahman.--But, our opponent points out, Scripture cannot be\nthe source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known\nthrough other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture\nhas meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources\nof knowledge.--But what, to raise a prim\u00e2 facie counter objection, are\nthose other sources of knowledge? It cannot, in the first place, be\nPerception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense-\norgans or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception\nof the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as\nPerception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the\ninternal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of\ntheir respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact\nwith the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of\nthe special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of\nbeing conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can\ninternal perception give rise to such knowledge; for only purely\ninternal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance,\nand it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from\nthe outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga; for\nalthough such perception--which springs from intense imagination--\nimplies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more\nthan a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not\ntherefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of\napplying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if,\nafter all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of\nerror.--Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the\nobservation of special cases or of the kind which rests on\ngeneralizations (cp. Ny\u00e2ya S\u00fb. I, 1,5,). Not inference of the former\nkind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying\nbeyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind,\nbecause we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably\naccompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious\nof, and constructing, the universe of things.--But there _is_ such a\nfeature, viz. the world's being an effected thing; it being a matter of\ncommon experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an\nagent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instrumental\ncause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing\nproduced. It further is matter of experience that whatever consists of\nnon-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent\nprinciple. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars\nand similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health,\nwhich consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent\nprinciple. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its\nconsisting of parts.--Against this argumentation also objections may be\nraised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this dependence on\nan intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that the origination and\nsubsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the\nintelligent principle; for in that case your example would not help to\nprove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a\nperson's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person\nalone; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all\nthose souls which in any way share the fruition of that body--the wife,\ne.g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made\nup of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way\nof so-called intimate relation (sama-v\u00e2ya), and this requires a certain\ncombination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The\nexistence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark\nthe process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea,\nmountains, &c.--all of which are included in the class of things\nconcerning which you wish to prove something--, and we therefore miss a\nuniform kind of existence common to all those things.--Let us then\nunderstand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an\nintelligent principle, the fact of the motion of the former depending on\nthe latter!--This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those\ncases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees,\n&c., are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want\nto prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent\nprinciple). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion\ndepends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no\nproof.--Another alternative, moreover, here presents itself. As we both\nadmit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical\nhypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of\nthe world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such\nagency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess\nthe knowledge of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all\nintelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes,\nsuch as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and\nthe like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and\nthe like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the\npresent time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time\nwhen this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact\nthat intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the\nunseen principle--called 'ap\u00fbrva,' or by similar names--which resides in\nthe form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any\nway preclude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct\ninsight into powers is nowhere required for undertaking work: what _is_\nrequired for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the\nthings endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have\nsome kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making\npots and jars on the strength of the direct knowledge they possess of\nthe implements of their work--the wheel, the staff, &c.--without\ntroubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those\nimplements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply themselves\nto their work (to be effected by means of sacrifices, &c.), if only they\nare assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers\npossessed by sacrifices and the like.--Moreover, experience teaches that\nagents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be\ninferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and\nthe material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the\nother hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced,\nnor can their material and other causes ever be known; we therefore have\nno right to infer for them intelligent producers. Hence the quality of\nbeing an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the\nexistence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is\nfound in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the\ncauses of which, is possible at all.--Experience further teaches that\nearthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents\npossessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power\nof a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on; the quality of being\nan effect therefore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent\nof the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of\nattributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, and\nthose other attributes that belong--to the highest Soul, whose existence\nyou wish to establish.--Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an\nabandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known\nthrough other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature\nwhich maybe suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are opposed by\nthose other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case\nunder discussion, however, the thine; to be inferred is something not\nguaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of\nconstructing the entire universe; here there is nothing to interfere\nwith the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on\nthe basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it.--The\nconclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of\na Lord does not admit of proof.\n\nAgainst all this the P\u00fbrvapakshin now restates his case as follows:--It\ncannot be gainsaid that the world is something effected, for it is made\nup of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. 'The\nearth, mountains, &c., are things effected, because they consist of\nparts; in the same way as jars and similar things.' 'The earth, seas,\nmountains, &c., are effects, because, while being big; (i.e. non-atomic),\nthey are capable of motion; just as jars and the like.' 'Bodies, the\nworld, &c., are effects, because, while being big, they are solid\n(m\u00fbrtta); just as jars and the like.'--But, an objection is raised, in\nthe case of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this\nattribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining\nthat the thing is an effect--so as to enable us to say 'this thing is\neffected, and that thing is not'; and, on the other hand, we do observe\nit as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that\nthere should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about,\nand of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the\nbringing about of the effect presupposes).--Not so, we reply. In the\ncase of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge\nand power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of\nthe effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know\nit to be an effect and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge\nof the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things\nproduced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of\ntheir maker; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly\npalace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes\nfrom the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an\neffected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect's\nmanifold knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and the\nworld have once been recognised to be effects, we infer--as their maker--\nsome special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their\nnature and skill to construct them.--Pleasure and pain, moreover, by\nwhich men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a\nnon-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results\nunless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also\ncompels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual\nsoul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non-\nintelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may\nbe favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of\nproducing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And\nto quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the\nseed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and\nstupidity which may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would\napply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all\nthese cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be\nguided by an intelligent principle.)--Nor may we assume, as a 'less\ncomplicated hypothesis,' that the guiding principle in the construction\nof the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by\nboth parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those\nsouls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or\nplace (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-\nconstructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for\nconcluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of\nsuch power; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make\nit impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his\nexistence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes\na causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the\nsame time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and\nruling all things in the universe.--The contention that from the world\nbeing an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power\nand so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to\nthe special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence,\nomniscience, &c.), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the\ninferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there\nexist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving\ncollateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no\ncausal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by\nsome agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of\nthat agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no\nway presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent\nwith regard to things other than the particular effect; for such\nincapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any\ncausal relation. If the origination of the effect can be accounted for\non the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his\nknowledge of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be\nunreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant)\nincapabilities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because\nthose incapabilities, &c., are observed to exist together with his\nspecial capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover\nwhether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things\nother than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the\nbringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other\nthings or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded\nbecause no agent, a potter e.g., is quite ignorant of all other things\nbut his own special work; and the second alternative is inadmissible\nbecause there is no definite rule indicating that there should be\ncertain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all\nagents [FOOTNOTE 168:1], and hence exceptions would arise with regard to\nevery special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows\nthat the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is\nobserved in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes\ntowards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise)\nis not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i.e. a Lord,\ncreator of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish\nqualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord).\n\nA further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience\nteaches that potters and so on direct their implements through the\nmediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a\nbodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of\nthe universe.--But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience,\nthat evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or\ndrawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what\nway the volition of a bodiless Lord can put other bodies in motion; for\nvolition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the\nbody but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we ascribe to the\nLord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed\nwith power and knowledge is just the presence of effects.--But volitions,\neven if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to\nembodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs!--This\nobjection also is founded on a mistaken generalization: the fact rather\nis that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation\nfrom the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that--as the individual\nsouls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence\non merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously\nand wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are--inference\ndirectly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent\nagent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and\nwisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body,\nand through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this\nentire universe so variously and wonderfully planned. As Brahman may\nthus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the\ntext quoted under the preceding S\u00fbtra cannot be taken to convey\ninstruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that\nmaterial and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct\nfrom each other, as e.g. the clay and the potter with his implements;\nand since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e.g.\nether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on\nthese grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the\nuniversal material and instrumental cause of the entire world.\n\nAgainst all this we now argue as follows:--The Ved\u00e2nta-text declaring\nthe origination, &c., of the world does teach that there is a Brahman\npossessing the characteristics mentioned; since Scripture alone is a\nmeans for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing\nbecause it consists of parts; and that, as all effects are observed to\nhave for their antecedents certain appropriate agents competent to\nproduce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and\nconstruct the universe, and standing towards it in the relation of\nmaterial and operative cause--this would be a conclusion altogether\nunjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c.,\nalthough things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor\ncan it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all those things\nhave one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to\none single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by\ndifference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again\nmay you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that\nindividual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful\nuniverse, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for\nthe world--which manifestly is a product--it would be illegitimate to\nassume more than one such principle. For we observe that individual\nbeings acquire more and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an\nincrease of religious merit; and as we may assume that through an\neventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves\nfor producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a\nhighest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor\nalso can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at\nonce; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the\nother hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in\nsuccession; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed\nbecause they are effects, there is no reason why this production and\ndestruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary\nexperience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of\none intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving\nreason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not\ninvariably connected with what it is desired to prove; there, further,\nis the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to\nthe subject about which something has to be proved; and lastly there is\nthe fault of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what\nhas to be proved--for experience does not exhibit to us one agent\ncapable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to\nprove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you\nprove only what is proved already (not contested by any one).--Moreover,\nif you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the\ntotality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient\nand omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all\nthings in so far as produced together, or in so far as produced in\nsuccession? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not\nestablished (for experience does not show that all things are produced\ntogether); and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what\nis contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that\nthings produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to\nprove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter\ninto conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict\nScripture, which says that 'the potter is born' and 'the cartwright is\nborn' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover,\nas we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on,\nare connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of\nsattva (goodness) and the other primary constituents of matter, we must\nconclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes.\nSattva and so on--which constitute the distinctive elements of the\ncausal substance--are the causes of the various nature of the effects.\nNow those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as\nthe internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes\nmodifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to\nkarman. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different\neffects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent\nwith karman, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects; and\nmoreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various\neffects presuppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that it\nis (not the various knowledge, &c., but) the mere wish of the agent that\ncauses the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being\nspecialised by its particular object, must be based on sattva and so on,\nand hence is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it follows\nthat individual souls only can be causal agents: no legitimate inference\nleads to a Lord different from them in nature.--This admits of various\nexpressions in technical form. 'Bodies, worlds, &c., are effects due to\nthe causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are'; 'the Lord is\nnot a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls\nhave none'; 'the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as\nthe released souls have none.' (This last argumentation cannot be\nobjected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of\nbodies; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by\nmeans of which they enter into gross bodies).--'Time is never devoid of\ncreated worlds; because it is time, just like the present time (which\nhas its created world).'\n\nConsider the following point also. Does the Lord produce his effects,\nwith his body or apart from his body? Not the latter; for we do not\nobserve causal agency on the part of any bodiless being: even the\nactivities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body,\nand although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its\nproducing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor\nagain is the former alternative admissible; for in that case the Lord's\nbody would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative\nwould imply that something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once\nadmit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and\nthen there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is\ninadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body,\ndifferent from it (which would account for the origination of the body).\nNor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a\nbodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained\nthat the Lord can be assumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other\nbody; for this leads us into a _regressus in infinitum._--Should we,\nmoreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged\nin effort or not?--The former is inadmissible, because he is without a\nbody. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making\nan effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i.\ne. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in\nmere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion\n(i.e. the world) qualities not known from experience; and moreover the\nattribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving\ninstances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged\nin mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to\nbe in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is\nin agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is\nthe only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the\nLord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us\nof is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether\nunsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic\nto all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is\ncognised by the other means of knowledge: that to such a being there\nshould attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in\nnature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus\naltogether excluded.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of\nthe instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation\nnor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the\ntheory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created\nthings; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we\nshall show later on under S\u00fb. I, 4, 23, and S\u00fb. II, 3, 1.\n\nThe conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the\nsphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture\nonly, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., _does_ give\nauthoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic\nqualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikarana of\n'Scripture being the source.'\n\nA new objection here presents itself.--Brahman does not indeed fall\nwithin the province of the other means of knowledge; but all the same\nScripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for\nBrahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation\nfrom activity, but is something fully established and accomplished\nwithin itself.--To this objection the following S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 168:1. A certain potter may not possess the skill and\nknowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may\npossess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want\nof skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of\nproducing effects of some other kind.]\n\n\n\n\n4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to\nBrahman) exists on account of the connexion (of Scripture with the\nhighest aim of man).\n\nThe word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised. _That_, i.e. the\nauthoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on\naccount of samanvaya, i.e. connexion with the highest aim of man--that\nis to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i.e. have for\ntheir subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For\nsuch is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which\nconstitutes the Upanishads--'That from whence these beings are\nborn'(Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). 'Being only this was in the beginning, one,\nwithout a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words\nwhich are capable of giving information about accomplished things known\nthrough the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and\nwhich connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the\norigination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is\nantagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that,\nowing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation\nof activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman.\n\nFor all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the\nknowledge of their own special objects: their action does not adapt\nitself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the\nmeans of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with\nactivity or cessation of activity all aim is absent; for in such cases\nwe observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i.e. the\nbenefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact--such as 'a\nson is born to thee.' 'This is no snake'--evidently have an aim, viz. in\nso far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.\n\nAgainst this view the P\u00fbrvapakshin now argues as follows. The Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts do not impart knowledge of Brahman; for unless related to activity\nor the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of\nall purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have\ntheir aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished\nthings and facts; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim\nat some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the\nVeda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a\npractical purpose: the employment of sentences not having such a purpose\nis in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the\nattainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be\neffected by some action or abstention from action. 'Let a man desirous\nof wealth attach himself to the court of a prince'; 'a man with a weak\ndigestion must not drink much water'; 'let him who is desirous of the\nheavenly world offer sacrifices'; and so on. With regard to the\nassertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things--'a\nson is born to thee' and so on--are connected with certain aims of man,\nviz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the\nattainment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e.\ng. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact.--You\nwill reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to\nman as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by\nhis knowledge of the thing.--It then appears, we rejoin, that man's\npurpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual\nthing; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with\ncertain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of\nthings. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose;\nthey determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity,\nor else some form of knowledge. No sentence, therefore, can have for its\npurport an accomplished thing, and hence the Ved\u00e2nta-texts do not convey\nthe knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.\n\nAt this point somebody propounds the following view. The Ved\u00e2nta-texts\n_are_ an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman, because as a\nmatter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really\nmean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous\nknowledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing\nto beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be\nfreed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution\nof the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction.--But\nwhich texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its\npure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent\nworld with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of\nknowledge?--Texts such as the following: 'One should not see (i. e.\nrepresent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the\nthinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); for this means that we should\nrealise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the\ndistinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed\naccomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an\nobject to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from\nthe apparent world.\n\nThis view (the M\u00eem\u00e2msaka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that\ninjunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign\nthe injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the\ninjunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to\ncarry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying\nout the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person\nto whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined\n(but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either\nof cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide\nwhat, in the case under discussion (i.e. the alleged injunction set\nforth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to\nwhom the injunction addresses itself, and whether it be of the nature of\na cause or of a result.--Let it then be said that what constitutes the\nqualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman\n(on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed).--This,\nwe rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously\nestablished; while in other cases the nimitta is something so\nestablished, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the\nfollowing injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to\nmake the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were admitted to be\na cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of\nBrahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have\nto be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way\nas the Agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts.--\nNor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result; for\nthen, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non-\npermanent, like the heavenly world.--What, in the next place, would be\nthe 'object to be accomplished' of the injunction? You may not reply\n'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something\nthat can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form\n(such as denote actions that can be accomplished, as e.g. y\u00e2ga,\nsacrifice).--Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman,\nin so far as free from the world!--But, we rejoin, even if this be\naccepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of\nthe injunction--that it cannot be for the second reason just stated--but\nits final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the\nthing to be realised--Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world?--\nNot Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your\nassumption it would follow that it is not eternal.--Well then, the\ndissolution of the world!--Not so, we reply; for then it would not be\nBrahman that is realised.--Let it then be said that the dissolution of\nthe world only is the object of the injunction!--This, too, cannot be,\nwe rejoin; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore\nbe the object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means\nfinal release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the\ndissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that\ndissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would\nbe carried out by the dissolution of the world; and this would be a case\nof vicious mutual dependence.--We further ask--is the world, which is to\nbe put an end to, false or real?--If it is false, it is put an end to by\nknowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply\nto this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it\ngives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from\nthe texts which declare the highest truth: hence there is no need of\nadditional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts\nsublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction\nitself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless.--If, on\nthe other hand, the world is true, we ask--is the injunction, which puts\nan end to the world, Brahman itself or something different from Brahman?\nIf the former, the world cannot exist at all: for what terminates it,\nviz. Brahman, is something eternal; and the injunction thus being\neternal itself Cannot be accomplished by means of certa n actions.--Let\nthen the latter alternative be accepted!--But in that case, the niyoga\nbeing something which is accomplished by a set of performances the\nfunction of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the\nperforming person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the\nniyoga thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from\nBrahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to\nput an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the\nniyoga, consequently there is no release.\n\nFurther, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument\n(karana) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure\n(itikartavyat\u00e2) can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga, and\nunless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate,--\nBut why is there no 'mode of procedure'?--For the following reasons. A\nmode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If\npositive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the\ninstrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either\nof these alternatives. Not for the former; for there exists in our case\nnothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest\neffect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the\nvisible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought\nabout. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the\ninstrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect;\nfor owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument\nitself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established.\nNor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman\nthat brings about the means for the dissolution of the world; for, as we\nhave already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final\nRelease, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus\nthere is nothing left to be effected by special means.--And if finally\nthe mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to\nthis its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the\ninstrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no\npossibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of\nBrahman, in so far as free from the world.\n\nHere another prim\u00e2 facie view of the question is set forth.--It must be\nadmitted that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge,\nsince they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing\n'to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is established, viz.\nby means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something 'to be\ndone'). This is the purport of texts such as the following: 'The Self is\nto be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon' (Bri.\nUp. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out'\n(Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man meditate upon him as the Self' (Bri. Up.\nI, 4, 7); 'Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4,\n15).--These injunctions have meditation for their object, and meditation\nagain is defined by its own object only, so that the injunctive word\nimmediately suggests an object of meditation; and as such an object\nthere presents itself, the 'Self' mentioned in the same sentence. Now\nthere arises the question, What are the characteristics of that Self?\nand in reply to it there come in texts such as 'The True, knowledge,\ninfinite is Brahman'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without\na second.' As these texts give the required special information, they\nstand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are\nmeans of right knowledge; and in this way the purport of the Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts includes Brahman--as having a definite place in meditation which\nis the object of injunction. Texts such as 'One only without a second'\n(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'That is the true, that is the Self (Ch. Up. VI, 8,\n7); 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19), teach that\nthere is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that everything else is\nfalse. And as Perception and the other means of proof, as well as that\npart of Scripture which refers to action and is based on the view of\nplurality, convey the notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction\nbetween plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that the\nidea of plurality arises through beginningless avidy\u00e2, while absolute\nUnity alone is real. And thus it is through the injunction of meditation\non Brahman--which has for its result the intuition of Brahman--that man\nreaches final release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of\nnon-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions that spring\nfrom Nescience. Nor is this becoming one with Brahman to be accomplished\nby the mere cognition of the sense of certain Ved\u00e2nta-texts; for this is\nnot observed--the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists\neven after the cognition of the sense of those texts--, and, moreover,\nif it were so, the injunction by Scripture of hearing, reflecting, &c.,\nwould be purposeless.\n\nTo this reasoning the following objection might be raised.--We observe\nthat when a man is told that what he is afraid of is not a snake, but\nonly a rope, his fear comes to an end; and as bondage is as unreal as\nthe snake imagined in the rope it also admits of being sublated by\nknowledge, and may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end\nto by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts. If final\nrelease were to be brought about by injunctions, it would follow that it\nis not eternal--not any more than the heavenly world and the like; while\nyet its eternity is admitted by every one. Acts of religious merit,\nmoreover (such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the causes\nof certain results in so far as they give rise to a body capable of\nexperiencing those results, and thus necessarily produce the so-called\nsams\u00e2ra-state (which is opposed to final release, and) which consists in\nthe connexion of the soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release,\ntherefore, is not something to be brought about by acts of religious\nmerit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'For the soul as long as it\nis in the body, there is no release from pleasure and pain; when it is\nfree from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touch it' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 12, 1). This passage declares that in the state of release, when\nthe soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either pleasure or\npain--the effects of acts of religious merit or demerit; and from this\nit follows that the disembodied state is not to be accomplished by acts\nof religious merit. Nor may it be said that, as other special results\nare accomplished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is to\nbe accomplished by the injunction of meditation; for that state is\nessentially something _not_ to be effected. Thus scriptural texts say,\n'The wise man who knows the Self as bodiless among the bodies, as\npersisting among non-persisting things, as great and all-pervading; he\ndoes not grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That person is without breath,\nwithout internal organ, pure, without contact' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2).--\nRelease which is a bodiless state is eternal, and cannot therefore be\naccomplished through meritorious acts.\n\nIn agreement herewith Scripture says, 'That which thou seest apart from\nmerit (dharma) and non-merit, from what is done and not done, from what\nexists and what has to be accomplished--tell me that' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14).--\nConsider what follows also. When we speak of something being\naccomplished (effected-s\u00e2dhya) we mean one of four things, viz. its\nbeing originated (utpatti), or obtained (pr\u00e2pti), or modified (vikriti),\nor in some way or other (often purely ceremonial) made ready or fit\n(samskriti). Now in neither of these four senses can final Release be\nsaid to be accomplished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman\nitself it is eternal. It cannot be attained: for Brahman, being the Self,\nis something eternally attained. It cannot be modified; for that would\nimply that like sour milk and similar things (which are capable of\nchange) it is non-eternal. Nor finally can it be made 'ready' or 'fit.'\nA thing is made ready or fit either by the removal of some imperfection\nor by the addition of some perfection. Now Brahman cannot be freed from\nany imperfection, for it is eternally faultless; nor can a perfection be\nadded to it, for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the\nsense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by polishing it; for\nas it is absolutely changeless it cannot become the object of any action,\neither of its own or of an outside agent. And, again, actions affecting\nthe body, such as bathing, do not 'purify' the Self (as might possibly\nbe maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (ahamkartri) which is the\nproduct of avidy\u00e2, and connected with the body; it is this same\nahamkartri also that enjoys the fruits springing from any action upon\nthe body. Nor must it be said that the Self _is_ the ahamkartri; for the\nSelf rather is that which is conscious of the ahamkartri. This is the\nteaching of the mantras: 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other\nlooks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); 'When he is in union with\nthe body, the senses, and the mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer'\n(Ka. Up. I, 3,4); 'The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the\nSelf within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings,\nthe witness, the perceiver, the only one, free from qualities' (Svet. Up.\nVI, 11); 'He encircled all, bright, bodiless, scatheless, without\nmuscles, pure, untouched by evil' (\u00cesa. Up. 8).--All these texts\ndistinguish from the ahamkartri due to Nescience, the true Self,\nabsolutely perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore--\nwhich _is_ the Self--cannot be brought about in any way.--But, if this\nis so, what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts?--It is of\nuse, we reply, in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way\nof Release. Thus scriptural texts declare: 'You indeed are our father,\nyou who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pra. Up. VI, 8);\n'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes\ngrief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Ch. Up.\nVII, 1, 3); 'To him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkum\u00e2ra\nshowed the other bank of Darkness' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). This shows that\nwhat is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely\nthe cessation of impediments in the way of Release. This cessation\nitself, although something effected, is of the nature of that kind of\nnonexistence which results from the destruction of something existent,\nand as such does not pass away.--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he\nbecomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Having known him he passes beyond\ndeath' (Svet. Up. III,8), declare that Release follows immediately on\nthe cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the intervention of\ninjunctions.--Nor can it be maintained that Brahman is related to action\nin so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge\nor of meditation; for scriptural texts deny its being an object in\neither of these senses. Compare 'Different is this from what is known,\nand from what is unknown' (Ke. Up. II, 4); 'By whom he knows all this,\nwhereby should he know him?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That do thou know as\nBrahman, not that on which they meditate as being this' (Ke. Up. II, 4).\nNor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all;\nfor it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing\nfrom avidy\u00e2. Scripture does not objectivise Brahman in any definite form,\nbut rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby\nputs an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by Nescience, of\nknowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Compare\nthe text 'You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a\nthinker of thought,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2).--Nor, again, must it be\nsaid that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the injunctions of\nhearing and so on are purposeless; for their function is to cause the\norigination of the comprehension of the texts, in so far as they divert\nfrom all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to\nyield to distractions.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that a\ncessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take\nplace; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it cannot possibly\npersist after the rise of knowledge. For the same reason it is a mistake\nto maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the\ndeath of the body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake\nshould come to an end, it is required only that the rope should be\nrecognised as what it is, not that a snake should be destroyed. If the\nbody were something real, its destruction would be necessary; but being\napart from Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come to an\nend, in him true knowledge has not arisen; this we infer from the effect\nof such knowledge not being observed in him. Whether the body persist or\nnot, he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment.--\nThe general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is not something\nto be accomplished by injunctions of meditation, Brahman is not proved\nto be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions;\nbut is rather proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as 'Thou art that';\n'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'This Self is Brahman.'\n\nThis view (the holder of the dhy\u00e2na-vidhi theory rejoins) is untenable;\nsince the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere\ncomprehension of the meaning of texts. Even if bondage were something\nunreal, and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being\nsomething direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the indirect\ncomprehension of the sense of texts. When a man directly conscious of a\nsnake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a\nsnake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition\ncontrary to that of a snake, and due to the information received; but\nthe information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that\nit rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception, by means\nof his senses, of what the thing before him really is. Having at first\nstarted back in fear of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain\nby means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, and having\naccomplished this is freed from fear. It would not be correct to say\nthat in this case words (viz. of the person informing) produce this\nperceptional knowledge; for words are not a sense-organ, and among the\nmeans of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct\nknowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the special case of\nVedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge, owing to the\nfact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection\nthrough the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and\nhas been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, reflection, and\nmeditation; for in other cases also, where special impediments in the\nway of knowledge are being removed, we never observe that the special\nmeans of knowledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside\ntheir proper limited sphere.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that\nmeditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts;\nfor this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence--when the meaning of the\ntexts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation; and\nwhen meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the\nmeaning of the texts!--Nor can it be said that meditation and the\ncomprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects; for if\nthis were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful\ntowards meditation: meditation on one thing does not give rise to\neagerness with regard to another thing!--For meditation which consists\nin uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised, the cognition of the\nsense of texts, moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite; for\nknowledge of Brahman--the object of meditation--cannot originate from\nany other source.--Nor can it be said that that knowledge on which\nmeditation is based is produced by one set of texts, while that\nknowledge which puts an end to the world is produced by such texts as\n'thou art that,' and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge the\nsame object as the latter, or a different one? On the former alternative\nwe are led to the same vicious reciprocal dependence which we noted\nabove; and on the latter alternative it cannot be shown that meditation\ngives rise to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge.\nMoreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising an object of\nmeditation, a meditating subject and so on, it really cannot in any\nperceptible way be helpful towards the origination of the comprehension\nof the sense of texts, the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman\nfree from all plurality: he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience\ncomes to an end through the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts\nreally implies that the injunctions of hearing, reflection, and\nmeditation are purposeless.\n\nThe conclusion that, since direct knowledge cannot spring from texts,\nNescience is not terminated by the comprehension of the meaning of texts,\ndisposes at the same time of the hypothesis of the so-called 'Release in\nthis life' (j\u00eevanmukti). For what definition, we ask, can be given of\nthis 'Release in this life'?--'Release of a soul while yet joined to a\nbody'!--You might as well say, we reply, that your mother never had any\nchildren! You have yourself proved by scriptural passages that 'bondage'\nmeans the being joined to a body, and 'release' being free from a body!--\nLet us then define j\u00eevanmukti as the cessation of embodiedness, in that\nsense that a person, while the appearance of embodiedness persists, is\nconscious of the unreality of that appearance.--But, we rejoin, if the\nconsciousness of the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness,\nhow can you say that j\u00eevanmukti means release of a soul while joined to\na body? On this explanation there remains no difference whatsoever\nbetween 'Release in this life' and Release after death; for the latter\nalso can only be defined as cessation of the false appearance of\nembodiedness.--Let us then say that a person is 'j\u00eevanmukta' when the\nappearance of embodiedness, although sublated by true knowledge, yet\npersists in the same way as the appearance of the moon being double\npersists (even after it has been recognised as false).--This too we\ncannot allow. As the sublating act of cognition on which Release depends\nextends to everything with the exception of Brahman, it sublates the\ngeneral defect due to causal Nescience, inclusive of the particular\nerroneous appearance of embodiedness: the latter being sublated in this\nway cannot persist. In the case of the double moon, on the other hand,\nthe defect of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is _not_\nthe object of the sublative art of cognition, i.e. the cognition of the\noneness of the moon, and it therefore remains non-sublated; hence the\nfalse appearance of a double moon may persist.--Moreover, the text 'For\nhim there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body; then\nhe will be released' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2), teaches that he who takes his\nstand on the knowledge of the Real requires for his Release the putting\noff of the body only: the text thus negatives jivanmukti. \u00c2pastamba also\nrejects the view of jivanmukti, 'Abandoning the Vedas, this world and\nthe next, he (the Samny\u00e2sin) is to seek the Self. (Some say that) he\nobtains salvation when he knows (the Self). This opinion is contradicted\nby the s\u00e2stras. (For) if Salvation were obtained when the Self is known,\nhe should not feel any pain even in this world. Hereby that which\nfollows is explained' (Dh. S\u00fb. II, 9, 13-17).--This refutes also the\nview that Release is obtained through mere knowledge.--The conclusion to\nbe drawn from all this is that Release, which consists in the cessation\nof all Plurality, cannot take place as long as a man lives. And we\ntherefore adhere to our view that Bondage is to be terminated only by\nmeans of the injunctions of meditation, the result of which is direct\nknowledge of Brahman. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that\nRelease, if brought about by injunctions, must therefore be something\nnon-eternal; for what is effected is not Release itself, but only the\ncessation of what impedes it. Moreover, the injunction does not directly\nproduce the cessation of Bondage, but only through the mediation of the\ndirect cognition of Brahman as consisting of pure knowledge, and not\nconnected with a world. It is this knowledge only which the injunction\nproduces.--But how can an injunction cause the origination of knowledge?--\nHow, we ask in return, can, on your view, works not aiming at some\nimmediate result cause the origination of knowledge?--You will perhaps\nreply 'by means of purifying the mind' (manas); but this reply may be\ngiven by me also.--But (the objector resumes) there is a difference. On\nmy view Scripture produces knowledge in the mind purified by works;\nwhile on your view we must assume that in the purified mind the means of\nknowledge are produced by injunction.--The mind itself, we reply,\npurified by knowledge, constitutes this means.--How do you know this?\nour opponent questions.--How, we ask in return, do you know that the\nmind is purified by works, and that, in the mind so purified of a person\nwithdrawn from all other objects by hearing, reflection and meditation,\nScripture produces that knowledge which destroys bondage?--Through\ncertain texts such as the following: 'They seek to know him by sacrifice,\nby gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'He is to be\nheard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He\nknows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9).--Well, we reply,\nin the same way our view--viz. that through the injunction of meditation\nthe mind is cleared, and that a clear mind gives rise to direct\nknowledge of Brahman--is confirmed by scriptural texts such as 'He is to\nbe heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5);\n'He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He is\nnot apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'But by a\npure mind' (?); 'He is apprehended by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind'\n(Ka. Up. II, 6, 9). Nor can it be said that the text 'not that which\nthey meditate upon as this' (Ke. Up. I, 4) negatives meditation; it does\nnot forbid meditation on Brahman, but merely declares that Brahman is\ndifferent from the world. The mantra is to be explained as follows:\n'What men meditate upon as this world, that is not Brahman; know Brahman\nto be that which is not uttered by speech, but through which speech is\nuttered.' On a different explanation the clause 'know that to be\nBrahman' would be irrational, and the injunctions of meditation on the\nSelf would--be meaningless.--The outcome of all this is that unreal\nBondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects,\nobjects of knowledge, &c., is put an end to by the injunctions of\nmeditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman.\n\nNor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no\ncontradiction between difference and non-difference; for difference and\nnon-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and\nheat, or light and darkness.--Let us first hear in detail what the\nholder of this so-called bhed\u00e2bheda view has to say. The whole universe\nof things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are\nconscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time:\nthey are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and\ndifferent in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed\nis a contradiction between light and darkness and so on; for these\ncannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in\ndifferent abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand,\nobserved in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual; on\nthe contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two\naspects--'this jar is clay', 'this cow is short-horned.' The fact is\nthat experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor\ncan it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction\nbecause as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference; for\nthe same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c., at\nthe same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare.\nThere is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only\nshould belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different,\nand difference to what is different.--But one aspect only belongs to\neach thing, because it is thus that things are perceived!--On the\ncontrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just because it is _thus_\nthat they are perceived. No man, however wide he may open his eyes, is\nable to distinguish in an object--e.g. a jar or a cow--placed before him\nwhich part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic\ncharacter of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his\nthought finds its true expression in the following judgments: 'this jar\nis clay'; 'this cow is short-horned.' Nor can it be maintained that he\nmakes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea\nof persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of\ndiscontinuance (difference); for as a matter of fact there is no\nperception of these two elements in separation. A man may look ever so\nclose at a thing placed before him, he--will not be able to perceive a\ndifference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general,\nelement in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, element.'\nJust as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing,\nso the effect plus cause, and the individual _plus_ generic character,\nalso give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance\nmakes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as\nit is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and\ncharacter.--Each thing thus being cognised as endowed with a twofold\naspect, the theory of cause and effect, and generic character and\nindividual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination\nand the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment 'this pot is clay' is\ntaken to express the relation of difference, _plus_ non-difference, we\nshall have analogously to infer from judgments such as 'I am a man', 'I\nam a divine being' that the Self and the body also stand in the\nbhed\u00e2bheda-relation; the theory of the co-existence of difference and\nnon-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his\nhearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house!--This, we reply,\nis the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true\nnature of co-ordination as establishing the bhed\u00e2bheda-relation. The\ncorrect principle is that all reality is determined by states of\nconsciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination,\nhowever, of the identity of the Self and the body is sublated by all the\nmeans of proof which apply to the Self: it is in fact no more valid than\nthe imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove\nthe non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand,\nwhich is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never\nobserved to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the bhed\u00e2bheda-\nrelation.\n\nFor the same reasons the individual soul (j\u00eeva) is not absolutely\ndifferent from Brahman, but stands to it in the bhed\u00e2bheda-relation in\nso far as it is a part (amsa) of Brahman. Its non-difference from\nBrahman is essential (sv\u00e2bh\u00e2vika); its difference is due to limiting\nadjuncts (aup\u00e2dhika). This we know, in the first place, from those\nscriptural texts which declare non-difference--such as 'Thou art that'\n(Ch. Up. VI); 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23);\n'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); and the passage from the\nBrahmas\u00fbkta in the Samhitopanishad of the \u00c2tharvanas which, after having\nsaid that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, 'The fishermen are\nBrahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers; man and\nwoman are born from Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in\nthe second place, from those texts which declare difference: 'He who,\none, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal\nintelligent beings' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn, one\nknowing, the other not-knowing; one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I,\n9); 'Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities\nof action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another' (Svet.\nUp. V, 12); 'The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the\nqualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence and the release of\nthe sams\u00e2ra' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords\nof the organs' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit,\nwithout eating the other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'He who dwelling\nin the Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he\nknows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,\n21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,\n35); 'Having known him he passes beyond death' (Svet. Up. III, 8).--On\nthe ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest\nSelf must needs be assumed to stand in the bhed\u00e2bheda-relation. And\ntexts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9),\nwhich teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into\nBrahman itself; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become\nall for him, whereby should he see another' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13), which\nforbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something\ndifferent (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is\nessential (while difference is merely aup\u00e2dhika).\n\nBut, an objection is raised, the text 'He reaches all desires together\nin the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in\nthe state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same\nview is expressed in two of the S\u00fbtras, viz. IV, 4, 17; 21.--This is not\nso, we reply; for the text, 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up.\nIII, 7, 23), and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in\nthe Self. The Taittir\u00eeya-text quoted by you means that man reaches\nBrahman with all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all\nobjects of desire; if it were understood differently, it would follow\nthat Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the S\u00fbtra IV, 4,\n17 meant that the released soul is separate from Brahman it would follow\nthat it is deficient in lordly power; and if this were so the S\u00fbtra\nwould be in conflict with other S\u00fbtras such as IV, 4, 1.--For these\nreasons, non-difference is the essential condition; while the\ndistinction of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to\ntheir limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense-organs, and\nthe body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent; but through\nits adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by\njars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a\nreprehensible mutual dependence--Brahman in so far as divided entering\ninto conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman\nbeing caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts\nand Brahman's connexion with them are due to action (karman), and the\nstream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which\na soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works,\nand work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts: and as\nthis connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time,\nno fault can be found with our theory.--The non-difference of the souls\nfrom each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is\ndue to the Up\u00e2dhis. These Up\u00e2dhis, on the other hand, are at the same\ntime essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other\nand Brahman; for there are no other Up\u00e2dhis (to account for their\ndistinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again\nhave to assume further Up\u00e2dhis, and so on _in infinitum_. We therefore\nhold that the Up\u00e2dhis are produced, in accordance with the actions of\nthe individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from\nBrahman.\n\nTo this bhed\u00e2bheda view the P\u00fbrvapakshin now objects on the following\ngrounds:--The whole aggregate of Ved\u00e2nta-texts aims at enjoining\nmeditation on a non-dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence,\nand bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while on the\nother hand the karma-section of the Veda, and likewise perception and\nthe other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of\nthings. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as\nthe view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless\nNescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real.--\nThe tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory\nbecause both are proved by our consciousness, cannot be upheld. If one\nthing has different characteristics from another there is distinction\n(bheda) of the two; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-\ndistinction (abheda); who in his senses then would maintain that these\ntwo-suchness and non-suchness--can be found together? You have\nmaintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and\ngenus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual; and\nthat, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non-difference and\ndifference are not irreconcileable. But that this view also is untenable,\na presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do\nyou mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and\nthe non-difference in the other? or that difference _and_ non-difference\nbelong to the thing possessing two aspects?--On the former alternative\nthe difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the\ngenus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect.\nAnd should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one\nthing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which\ntakes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We\nhave moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and\nits opposite are absolutely contradictory.--On the second alternative we\nhave two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be\nthe substrate of those aspects; but this assumption of a triad of\nentities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non-\ndifference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects\nconstitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing\nwhich is their substrate, we ask in return--How can two aspects which\nhave a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing,\nintroduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes\n(viz. difference and non-difference)? And much less even are they able\nto do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is\ntheir substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the\nthing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct\nentities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their\ndifference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a _regressus\nin infinitum._--Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of\nits generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as\nthe admittedly uniform idea of an individual; for wherever a state of\nconsciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such' it\nimplies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the\nattribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion the genus\nconstitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs:\nthe idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.\n\nFor these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in\nthe bhed\u00e2bheda-relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on\nScripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless\nNescience.--But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections\nspringing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c., would cling to Brahman\nitself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as 'He who is\nall-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'That Self free from all evil' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 1, 5). Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider\nto be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits nothing but\nBrahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring\nfrom contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as\nBrahman is without parts, indivisible, the up\u00e2dhis cannot divide or\nsplit it so as to connect themselves with a part only; but necessarily\nconnect themselves with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it.--\nHere the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman\ndetermined by an up\u00e2dhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of\natomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, is itself\nof atomic size; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the\nimperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place\nthat is determined by the up\u00e2dhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman\nwhich is not limited by the up\u00e2dhi.--In reply to this we ask--Do you\nmean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part\nof Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct; or some\nparticular part of Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is\nconnected with an atomic up\u00e2dhi; or Brahman in its totality as connected\nwith an up\u00e2dhi; or some other intelligent being connected with an up\u00e2dhi,\nor finally the up\u00e2dhi itself?--The first alternative is not possible,\nbecause Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply that the\nindividual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one\nthing into two.--On the second alternative it would follow that, as a\npart of Brahman would be connected with the up\u00e2dhi, all the\nimperfections due to the up\u00e2dhis would adhere to that part. And further,\nif the up\u00e2dhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the\nparticular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow\nthat when the up\u00e2dhi moves the part with, which it is connected would\nconstantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place\nat every moment. If, on the contrary, the up\u00e2dhi possessed the power of\nattraction, the whole Brahman--as not being capable of division--would\nbe attracted and move with the up\u00e2dhi. And should it be said that what\nis all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well\nthen the up\u00e2dhi only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties\nstated above. Moreover, if all the up\u00e2dhis were connected with the parts\nof Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being\nnothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And\nshould it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they\nare constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as\nsoon as the up\u00e2dhi of one individual soul is moving, the identity of\nthat soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be\nconstituted by different parts of Brahman).--On the third alternative\n(the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the up\u00e2dhi enters\ninto the condition of individual soul, and there remains no non-\nconditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be\none only.--On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something\naltogether different from Brahman, and the difference of the soul from\nBrahman thus ceases to depend on the up\u00e2dhis of Brahman.--And the fifth\nalternative means the embracing of the view of the K\u00e2rv\u00e2ka (who makes no\ndistinction between soul and matter).--The conclusion from all this is\nthat on the strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit\nthat all difference is based on Nescience only. Hence, Scripture being\nan authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for\nits end action and the cessation of action, the Ved\u00e2nta-texts must be\nallowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's nature,\nin so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions\nof meditation.\n\nThis view is finally combated by the M\u00eem\u00e2msaka. Even if, he says, we\nallow the Ved\u00e2nta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are\nsupplementary to injunctions of meditation, they cannot be viewed as\nvalid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring\nto Brahman, we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in\nso far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation,\nor as independent sentences? In the former case the purport of the\nsyntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation, and it cannot therefore\naim at giving instruction about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the\ntexts about Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot have\nthe purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of\ninstructive power. Nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of\ncontinued remembrance, and as such requires to be defined by the object\nremembered; and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for\nsomething to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as 'All this is\nthat Self', 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c., which set\nforth the nature and attributes of Brahman and--forming a syntactic\nwhole with the injunctions--are a valid means of knowledge with regard\nto the existence of the matter they convey. For the fact is that the\ndemand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be\nremembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not true), as in\nthe case of injunctions such as 'Let him meditate upon mind as Brahman'\n(Ch. Up. III, 18, 1): the real existence of the object of meditation is\ntherefore not demanded.--The final conclusion arrived at in this\np\u00fbrvapaksha is therefore as follows. As the Ved\u00e2nta-texts do not aim at\nprompting to action or the cessation of action; as, even on the\nsupposition of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation,\nthe only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of\nmeditation; and as, even if they are viewed as independent sentences,\nthey accomplish the end of man (i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge\nmerely--being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or\nsick persons; it does not lie within their province to establish the\nreality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture cannot be viewed\nas a valid means for the cognition of Brahman.\n\nTo this prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra replies, 'But this on account of\nconnexion.' 'Connexion' is here to be taken in an eminent sense, as\n'connexion with the end of man.' That Brahman, which is measureless\nbliss and therefore constitutes the highest end of man, is connected\nwith the texts as the topic set forth by them, proves Scripture to be a\nvalid means for the cognition of Brahman. To maintain that the whole\nbody of Ved\u00e2nta-texts-which teach us that Brahman is the highest object\nto be attained, since it consists of supreme bliss free of all blemish\nwhatsoever--is devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not\naim at action or the cessation of action; is no better than to say that\na youth of royal descent is of no use because he does not belong to a\ncommunity of low wretches living on the flesh of dogs!\n\nThe relation of the different texts is as follows. There are individual\nsouls of numberless kinds-gods, Asuras, Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidy\u00e2dharas,\nKinnaras, Kimpurushas, Yakshas, R\u00e2kshasas, Pis\u00e2kas, men, beasts, birds,\ncreeping animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on--\ndistinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different sources\nof nourishment and support and different objects of enjoyment. Now all\nthese souls are deficient in insight into the true nature of the highest\nreality, their understandings being obscured by Nescience operating in\nthe form of beginningless karman; and hence those texts only are fully\nuseful to them which teach that there exists a highest Brahman--which\nthe souls in the state of release may cognise as non-different from\nthemselves, and which then, through its own essential nature, qualities,\npower and energies, imparts to those souls bliss infinite and\nunsurpassable. When now the question arises--as it must arise--, as to\nhow this Brahman is to be attained, there step in certain other Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts--such as He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Bri. Up. II, 1,\n1), and 'Let a man meditate on the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. 1, 4,\n15)--and, by means of terms denoting 'knowing' and so on, enjoin\nmeditation as the means of attaining Brahman. (We may illustrate this\nrelation existing between the texts setting forth the nature of Brahman\nand those enjoining meditation by two comparisons.) The case is like\nthat of a man who has been told 'There is a treasure hidden in your\nhouse'. He learns through this sentence the existence of the treasure,\nis satisfied, and then takes active steps to find it and make it his own.--\nOr take the case of a young prince who, intent on some boyish play,\nleaves his father's palace and, losing his way, does not return. The\nking thinks his son is lost; the boy himself is received by some good\nBrahman who brings him up and teaches him without knowing who the boy's\nfather is. When the boy has reached his sixteenth year and is\naccomplished in every way, some fully trustworthy person tells him,\n'Your father is the ruler of all these lands, famous for the possession\nof all noble qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour\nand so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his lost\nchild. Hearing that his father is alive and a man so high and noble, the\nboy's heart is filled with supreme joy; and the king also, understanding\nthat his son is alive, in good health, handsome and well instructed,\nconsiders himself to have attained all a man can wish for. He then takes\nsteps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited.\n\nThe assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished\nthing gratifies men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing,\nwithout being a means of knowledge with regard to its real existence--so\nthat it would be comparable to the tales we tell to children and sick\npeople--, can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that a thing\nhas no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea of the thing does not\ngratify. The pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is\ndue to the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true; if they\nwere to find out that the matter present to their thought is untrue\ntheir pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And thus in the\ncase of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we thought that these texts\ndo not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahman, the mere idea of\nBrahman to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.\n\nThe conclusion therefore is that texts such as 'That from whence these\nbeings are born' &c. do convey valid instruction as to the existence of\nBrahman, i.e. that being which is the sole cause of the world, is free\nfrom all shadow of imperfection, comprises within itself all auspicious\nqualities, such as omniscience and so on, and is of the nature of\nsupreme bliss.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion'.\n\n\n\n\n5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking) that which is not founded on\nScripture (i.e. the Pradh\u00e2na) is not (what is taught by the texts\nreferring to the origination of the world).\n\nWe have maintained that what is taught by the texts relative to the\norigination of the world is Brahman, omniscient, and so on. The present\nS\u00fbtra and the following S\u00fbtras now add that those texts can in no way\nrefer to the Pradh\u00e2na and similar entities which rest on Inference only.\n\nWe read in the Ch\u00e2ndogya, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one\nonly, without a second.--It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--\nIt sent forth fire' (VI, 2, 1 ff.)--Here a doubt arises whether the\ncause of the world denoted by the term 'Being' is the Pradh\u00e2na. assumed\nby others, which rests on Inference, or Brahman as defined by us.\n\nThe P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains that the Pradh\u00e2na is meant. For he says, the\nCh\u00e2ndogya text quoted expresses the causal state of what is denoted by\nthe word 'this', viz. the aggregate of things comprising manifold\neffects, such as ether, &c., consisting of the three elements of\nGoodness, Passion and Darkness, and forming the sphere of fruition of\nintelligent beings. By the 'effected' state we understand the assuming,\non the part of the causal substance, of a different condition; whatever\ntherefore constitutes the essential nature of a thing in its effected\nstate the same constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also.\nNow the effect, in our case, is made up of the three elements Goodness,\nPassion and Darkness; hence the cause is the Pradh\u00e2na which consists in\nan equipoise of those three elements. And as in this Pradh\u00e2na all\ndistinctions are merged, so that it is pure Being, the Ch\u00e2ndogya text\nrefers to it as 'Being, one only, without a second.' This establishes\nthe non-difference of effect and cause, and in this way the promise that\nthrough the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known admits of\nbeing fulfilled. Otherwise, moreover, there would be no analogy between\nthe instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it, and the\nmatter to be illustrated thereby. The texts speaking of the origination\nof the world therefore intimate the Pradh\u00e2na taught by the great Sage\nKapila. And as the Ch\u00e2ndogya passage has, owing to the presence of an\ninitial statement (pratij\u00f1\u00e2) and a proving instance, the form of an\ninference, the term 'Being' means just that which rests on inference,\nviz. the Pradh\u00e2na.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the words of the S\u00fbtra. That which\ndoes not rest on Scripture, i.e. the Pradh\u00e2na, which rests on Inference\nonly, is not what is intimated by the texts referring to the origination\nof the world; for the text exhibits the root '\u00eeksh'--which means 'to\nthink'--as denoting a special activity on the part of what is termed\n'Being.' 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.' 'Thinking'\ncannot possibly belong to the non-sentient Pradh\u00e2na: the term 'Being'\ncan therefore denote only the all-knowing highest Person who is capable\nof thought. In agreement with this we find that, in all sections which\nrefer to creation, the act of creation is stated to be preceded by\nthought. 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds. He sent forth these\nworlds' (Ait. \u00c2r. II, 4, 1, 2); 'He thought he sent forth Pr\u00e2na' (Pr. Up.\nVI, 3); and others.--But it is a rule that as a cause we must assume\nonly what corresponds to the effect!--Just so; and what corresponds to\nthe total aggregate of effects is the highest Person, all-knowing, all-\npowerful, whose purposes realise themselves, who has minds and matter in\ntheir subtle state for his body. Compare the texts 'His high power is\nrevealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet.\nUp. VI, 8); 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9);\n'He of whom the Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the\nbody, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all things'\n(Sub\u00e2l. Up. VII).--This point (viz. as to the body of the highest\nPerson) will be established under S\u00fb. II, 1, 4. The present S\u00fbtra\ndeclares that the texts treating of creation cannot refer to the\nPradh\u00e2na; the S\u00fbtra just mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is\nthe P\u00fbrvapakshin right in maintaining that the Ch\u00e2ndogya passage is of\nthe nature of an Inference; for it does not state a reason (hetu--which\nis the essential thing in an Inference). The illustrative instance (of\nthe lump of clay) is introduced merely in order to convince him who\nconsiders it impossible that all things should be known through one\nthing--as maintained in the passage 'through which that is heard which\nwas not heard,' &c.,--that this _is_ possible after all. And the mention\nmade in the text of 'seeing' clearly shows that there is absolutely no\nintention of setting forth an Inference.\n\nLet us assume, then, the P\u00fbrvapakshin resumes, that the 'seeing' of the\ntext denotes not 'seeing' in its primary, direct sense--such as belongs\nto intelligent beings only; but 'seeing' in a secondary, figurative\nsense which there is ascribed to the Pradh\u00e2na in the same way as in\npassages immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water--'the\nfire saw'; 'the water saw' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). The transference, to non-\nexistent things, of attributes properly belonging to sentient beings is\nquite common; as when we say 'the rice-fields look out for rain'; 'the\nrain delighted the seeds.'--This view is set aside by the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n6. If it be said that (the word 'seeing') has a secondary (figurative)\nmeaning; we deny this, on account of the word 'Self' (being applied to\nthe cause of the world).\n\nThe contention that, because, in passages standing close by, the word\n'seeing' is used in a secondary sense, the 'seeing' predicated of the\nSat ('Being') is also to be taken in a secondary sense, viz. as denoting\n(not real thought but) a certain condition previous to creation, cannot\nbe upheld; for in other texts met with in the same section (viz. 'All\nthis has that for its Self; that is the True, that is the Self', Ch. Up.\nVI, 8, 7), that which first had been spoken of as Sat is called the\n'Self'. The designation 'Self' which in this passage is applied to the\nSat in its relation to the entire world, sentient or non-sentient, is in\nno way appropriate to the Pradh\u00e2na. We therefore conclude that, as the\nhighest Self is the Self of fire, water, and earth also, the words fire,\n&c. (in the passages stating that fire, &c. thought) denote the highest\nSelf only. This conclusion agrees with the text 'Let me enter into these\nthree beings with this living Self, and evolve names and forms', for\nthis text implies that fire, water, &c. possess substantial being and\ndefinite names only through the highest Self having entered into them.\nThe thought ascribed in the text to fire, water, &c. hence is thought in\nthe proper sense, and the hypothesis that, owing to its connexion with\nthese latter texts, the thought predicated of 'Being' ('it thought,' &c.\n) should be thought in a figurative sense only thus lapses altogether.\n\n\n\n\nThe next following S\u00fbtra confirms the same view.\n\n7. Because release is taught of him who takes his stand on it.\n\nSvetaketu, who is desirous of final release, is at first--by means of\nthe clause 'Thou art that'--instructed to meditate on himself as having\nhis Self in that which truly is; and thereupon the passage 'for him\nthere is delay' only as long as 'I shall not be released, then I shall\nbe united' teaches that for a man taking his stand upon that teaching\nthere will be Release, i.e. union with Brahman--which is delayed only\nuntil this mortal body falls away. If, on the other hand, the text would\nteach that the non-intelligent Pradh\u00e2na is the general cause, it could\nnot possibly teach that meditation on this Pradh\u00e2na being a man's Self\nis the means towards his Release. A man taking his stand on such\nmeditation rather would on death be united with a non-sentient principle,\naccording to the scriptural saying, 'According as his thought is in this\nworld, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14,\n1). And Scripture, which is more loving than even a thousand parents,\ncannot possibly teach such union with the Non-sentient, which is\nacknowledged to be the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its\nthreefold form. Moreover, those who hold the theory of the Pradh\u00e2na\nbeing the cause of the world do not themselves maintain that he who\ntakes his stand upon the Pradh\u00e2na attains final release.\n\n\n\n\nThe Pradh\u00e2na is not the cause of the world for the following reason also:\n\n8. And because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.\n\nIf the word 'Sat' denoted the Pradh\u00e2na as the cause of the world, we\nshould expect the text to teach that the idea of having his Self in that\n'Sat' should be set aside by Svetaketu as desirous of Release; for that\nidea would be contrary to Release. So far from teaching this, the text,\nhowever, directly inculcates that notion in the words 'Thou art that.'--\nThe next S\u00fbtra adds a further reason.\n\n\n\n\n9. And on account of the contradiction of the initial statement.\n\nThe Pradh\u00e2na's being the cause of the world would imply a contradiction\nof the initial statement, viz. that through the knowledge of one thing\nall things are to be known. Now, on the principle of the non-difference\nof cause and effect, this initial statement can only be fulfilled in\nthat way that through the knowledge of the 'Sat', which is the cause,\nthere is known the entire world, whether sentient or non-sentient, which\nconstitutes the effect. But if the Pradh\u00e2na were the cause, the\naggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it--for sentient\nbeings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle, and there would\nthus arise a contradiction.--The next S\u00fbtra supplies a further reason.\n\n\n\n\n10. On account of (the individual soul) going to the Self.\n\nWith reference to the 'Sat' the text says, 'Learn from me the true\nnature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the Sat,\nhe is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say he sleeps (svapiti),\nbecause he is gone to his own (sva-ap\u00eeta)' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). This text\ndesignates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered into,\nor being merged or reabsorbed in, the Self. By reabsorption we\nunderstand something being merged in its cause. Now the non-intelligent\nPradh\u00e2na cannot be the cause of the intelligent soul; hence the soul's\ngoing to its Self can only mean its going to _the_, i.e. the universal,\nSelf. The term 'individual soul' (j\u00eeva) denotes Brahman in so far as\nhaving an intelligent substance for its body, Brahman itself\nconstituting the Self; as we learn from the text referring to the\ndistinction of names and forms. This Brahman, thus called j\u00eeva., is in\nthe state of deep sleep, no less than in that of a general pralaya, free\nfrom the investment of names and forms, and is then designated as mere\n'Being' (sat); as the text says, 'he is then united with the Sat'. As\nthe soul is in the state of deep sleep free from the investment of name\nand form, and invested by the intelligent Self only, another text says\nwith reference to the same state,' Embraced by the intelligent Self he\nknows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,\n21). Up to the time of final release there arise in the soul invested by\nname and form the cognitions of objects different from itself. During\ndeep sleep the souls divest themselves of names and forms, and are\nembraced by the 'Sat' only; but in the waking state they again invest\nthemselves with names and forms, and thus bear corresponding distinctive\nnames and forms. This, other scriptural texts also distinctly declare,\n'When a man lying in deep sleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one\nwith that pr\u00e2na alone;--from that Self the pr\u00e2nas proceed, each towards\nits place' (Kau. Up. 111,3); 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether\na lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a mosquito, that they become\nagain' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 3).--Hence the term 'Sat' denotes the highest\nBrahman, the all-knowing highest Lord, the highest Person. Thus the\nVrittik\u00e2ra also says, 'Then he becomes united with the Sat--this is\nproved by (all creatures) entering into it and coming back out of it.'\nAnd Scripture also says, 'Embraced by the intelligent Self.'--The next\nS\u00fbtra gives an additional reason.\n\n\n\n\n11. On account of the uniformity of view.\n\n'In the beginning the Self was all this; there was nothing else\nwhatsoever thinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent\nforth these worlds' (Ait. \u00c2r. II, 4, 1, 1); 'From that Self sprang ether,\nfrom ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth' (Taitt.\nUp. II, 1); 'From this great Being were breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c.--\nThese and similar texts referring to the creation have all the same\npurport: they all teach us that the Supreme Lord is the cause of the\nworld. We therefore conclude that in the Ch. passage also the Sat,\nwhich is said to be the cause of the world, is the Supreme Lord.\n\n\n\n\n12. And because it is directly stated in Scripture.\n\nThe text of the same Upanishad directly declares that the being denoted\nby the word 'Sat' evolves, as the universal Self, names and forms; is\nall-knowing, all-powerful, all-embracing; is free from all evil, &c.;\nrealises all its wishes and purposes. 'Let me, entering those beings\nwith this living; Self, evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'All\nthese creatures have their root in the Sat, they dwell in the Sat, they\nrest in the Sat' (VI, 8, 4); 'All this has that for its Self; it is the\nTrue, it is the Self (VI, 8, 7); 'Whatever there is of him here in the\nworld, and whatever is not, all that is contained within it' (VIII, 1,\n3); 'In it all desires are contained. It is the Self free from sin, free\nfrom old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes\ncome true, whose purposes come true' (VIII, 1, 5).--And analogously\nother scriptural texts, 'Of him there is no master in the world, no\nruler; not even a sign of him. He is the cause, the lord of the lords of\nthe organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI,\n9). 'The wise one who, having created all forms and having given them\nnames, is calling them by those names' (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who\nentered within is the ruler of all beings, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ar.\nIII, 24); 'The Self of all, the refuge, the ruler of all, the Lord of\nthe souls' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. XI); 'Whatsoever is seen or heard in this world,\ninside or outside, pervading that all N\u00e2r\u00e2yana abides' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. XI);\n'He is the inner Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, the\nonly god N\u00e2r\u00e2yana.'--These and other texts which declare the world to\nhave sprung from the highest Lord, can in no way be taken as\nestablishing the Pradh\u00e2na. Hence it remains a settled conclusion that\nthe highest Person, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c.,\nis the single cause of the whole Universe, and is that Brahman which\nthese S\u00fbtras point out as the object of enquiry.\n\nFor the same reasons the theory of a Brahman, which is nothing but non-\ndifferenced intelligence, must also be considered as refuted by the\nS\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra, with the help of the scriptural texts quoted; for those texts\nprove that the Brahman, which forms the object of enquiry, possesses\nattributes such as thinking, and so on, in their real literal sense. On\nthe theory, on the other hand, of a Brahman that is nothing but\ndistinctionless intelligence even the witnessing function of\nconsciousness would be unreal. The S\u00fbtras propose as the object of\nenquiry Brahman as known from the Ved\u00e2nta-texts, and thereupon teach\nthat Brahman is intelligent (S\u00fb. I, 1, 5 ff.) To be intelligent means to\npossess the quality of intelligence: a being devoid of the quality of\nthought would not differ in nature from the Pradh\u00e2na. Further, on the\ntheory of Brahman being mere non-differenced light it would be difficult\nto prove that Brahman is self-luminous. For by light we understand that\nparticular thing which renders itself, as well as other things, capable\nof becoming the object of ordinary thought and speech; but as a thing\ndevoid of all difference does not, of course, possess these two\ncharacteristics it follows that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot\nmay be.--Let it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all\ndistinction does not actually possess these characteristics, yet it has\nthe potentiality of possessing them!--But if it possesses the attribute\nof potentiality, it is clear that you abandon your entire theory of a\nsubstance devoid of all distinction!--Let us then admit, on the\nauthority of Scripture, that the universal substance possesses this one\ndistinguishing attribute of self-luminousness.--Well, in that case you\nmust of course admit, on the same authority, all those other qualities\nalso which Scripture vouches for, such as all-knowingness, the\npossession of all powers, and so on.--Moreover, potentiality means\ncapability to produce certain special effects, and hence can be\ndetermined on the ground of those special effects only. But if there are\nno means of knowing these particular effects, there are also no means of\ncognising potentiality.--And those who hold the theory of a substance\ndevoid of all difference, have not even means of proof for their\nsubstance; for as we have shown before, Perception, Inference, Scripture,\nand one's own consciousness, are all alike in so far as having for their\nobjects things marked by difference.--It therefore remains a settled\nconclusion that the Brahman to be known is nothing else but the highest\nPerson capable of the thought 'of becoming many' by manifesting himself\nin a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient creatures.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'seeing'.\n\nSo far the S\u00fbtras have declared that the Brahman which forms the object\nof enquiry is different from the non-intelligent Pradh\u00e2na, which is\nmerely an object of fruition for intelligent beings. They now proceed to\nshow that Brahman--which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted by\nsupreme bliss--is different from the individual soul, which is subject\nto karman, whether that soul be in its purified state or in the impure\nstate that is due to its immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless\nsufferings, springing from the soul's contact with Prakriti (Pradh\u00e2na).\n\n\n\n\n13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest Self) on account of\nmultiplication.\n\nWe read in the text of the Taittir\u00eeyas, 'Different from this Self, which\nconsists of Understanding, is the other inner Self which consists of\nbliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).--Here the doubt arises whether the Self\nconsisting of bliss be the highest Self, which is different from the\ninner Self subject to bondage and release, and termed 'j\u00eeva.' (i.e.\nliving self or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self,\ni.e. the j\u00eeva.--It _is_ that inner Self, the P\u00fbrvapakshin contends. For\nthe text says 'of that this, i.e. the Self consisting of bliss, is the\ns\u00e2r\u00eera Self'; and s\u00e2r\u00eera means that which is joined to a body, in other\nwords, the so-called j\u00eeva.--But, an objection is raised, the text\nenumerates the different Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of\nbliss, to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, which was,\nat the outset, stated to be the cause of the world (II, 1), and in the\nend teaches that the Self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world\n(II, 6). And that the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since\nScripture says of him that 'he thought,' we have already explained.--\nThat cause of the world, the P\u00fbrvapakshin rejoins, is not different from\nthe j\u00eeva; for in the text of the Ch\u00e2ndogyas that Being which first is\ndescribed as the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in\nco-ordination with the j\u00eeva ('having entered into them with that living\nSelf' and 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu'). And the purport of co-\nordination is to express oneness of being, as when we say, 'This person\nhere is that Devadatta we knew before.' And creation preceded by thought\ncan very well be ascribed to an intelligent j\u00eeva. The connexion of the\nwhole Taittir\u00eeya-text then is as follows. In the introductory clause,\n'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest,' the true nature of the j\u00eeva,\nfree from all connexion with matter, is referred to as something to be\nattained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The\nTrue, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The attainment of the j\u00eeva in\nthis form is what constitutes Release, in agreement with the text, 'So\nlong as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain; but\nwhen he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches\nhim' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all\navidy\u00e2, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained,\nis thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to\nlead up to this--just as a man points out to another the moon by first\npointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen--the\ntext at first refers to the body ('Man consists of food'); next to the\nvital breath with its five modifications which is within the body and\nsupports it; then to the manas within the vital breath; then to the\nbuddhi within the manas--'the Self consisting of breath'; 'the Self\nconsisting of mind' (manas); 'the Self consisting of understanding'\n(vij\u00f1\u00e2na). Having thus gradually led up to the j\u00eeva, the text finally\npoints out the latter, which is the innermost of all ('Different from\nthat is the inner Self which consists of bliss'), and thus completes the\nseries of Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self\nconsisting of bliss is that same j\u00eeva-self which was at the outset\npointed out as the Brahman to be attained.--But the clause immediately\nfollowing, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss'),\nindicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss!--\nBy no means (the P\u00fbrvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its\ndifferent characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head,\nwings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a preceding clause the\nbody consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings,\nand tail--these members not being something different from the body, but\nthe body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are\nimagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of\nbliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted Brahman is said to\nbe the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the\nSelf consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, 'Different from\nthis Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self--Brahman.' But\nthere is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses\nstands as follows: After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the\nsection ('He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and defined as\ndifferent in nature from everything else ('The True, knowledge'), the\ntext designates it by the term 'Self,' &c. ('From that Self sprang\nether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the\ninnermost Self of all, enumerates the pranamaya and so on--designating\nthem in succession as more and more inward Selfs--, and finally leads up\nto the \u00e2nandamaya as the innermost Self('Different from this, &c., is the\nSelf consisting of bliss'). From all which it appears that the term\n'Self' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning.--\nBut, in immediate continuation of the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the\nsupport,' the text exhibits the following sloka: 'Non-existing becomes\nhe who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him\nwe know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-existence of\nthe Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of\nBrahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly\narise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which,\nin the form of joy, satisfaction, &c., is known to every one. Hence the\nsloka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from\nthat Self.--This objection, the P\u00fbrvapakshin rejoins, is unfounded. In\nthe earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding slokas, each of\nthem following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support\nof a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food,\nwe read, 'This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the sloka,\n'From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all\nthese slokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called 'tail,'\nbut the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.); and\nfrom this it follows that also the sloka, 'Non-existing becomes he,'\ndoes not refer to the 'tail' only as something other than the Self of\nbliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a\ndoubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of\nthat Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the\ncircumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to\nits being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that\nthe Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a\nhead and other members; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess\nthe quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be\na tail.--Let it then be said that the expression, 'Brahman is the tail,'\nis merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all\nthings imagined through avidy\u00e2!--But, the P\u00fbrvapakshin rejoins, we may\nas well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so\non, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman,\ni.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the\nSelf as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all\npain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge,\nthe Infinite is Brahman') had already been separated from all changeful\nmaterial things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is\nnothing but absolute bliss, the term '\u00e2nandamaya' therefore has to be\ninterpreted as meaning nothing more than '\u00e2nanda'; just as pr\u00e2namaya\nmeans pr\u00e2na.\n\nThe outcome of all this is that the term '\u00e2nandamaya' denotes the true\nessential nature--which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss--of the\njiva that appears as distinguished by all the manifold individualising\nforms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the j\u00eeva\nor pratyag-\u00e2tman, i.e. the individual soul.\n\nAgainst this prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra contends that the Self\nconsisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication.'--\nThe section which begins with the words,'This is an examination of bliss,'\nand terminates with the sloka, 'from whence all speech turns back'\n(Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed,\nby successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a hundred; now\nsuch supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which\nenjoys only a small share of very limited happiness, mixed with endless\npain and grief; and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the\nhighest Self, which differs from all other Selfs in so far as being\nradically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature. The text\nsays, 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding (vij\u00f1\u00e2na)\nthere is the inner Self consisting of bliss'. Now that which consists of\nunderstanding (vij\u00f1\u00e2na) is the individual soul (j\u00eeva), not the internal\norgan (buddhi) only; for the formative element, 'maya,' ('consisting of';\nin vij\u00f1\u00e2namaya) indicates a difference (between vij\u00f1\u00e2na and vij\u00f1\u00e2namaya).\nThe term 'pr\u00e2na-maya' ('consisting of breath') we explain to mean\n'pr\u00e2na' only, because no other explanation is possible; but as\nvij\u00f1\u00e2namaya may be explained as,--j\u00eeva, we have no right to neglect\n'maya' as unmeaning. And this interpretation is quite suitable, as the\nsoul in the states of bondage and release alike is a 'knowing' subject.\nThat moreover even in 'pr\u00e2namaya', and so on, the affix 'maya' may be\ntaken as having a meaning will be shown further on.--But how is it then\nthat in the sloka which refers to the vij\u00f1\u00e2namaya, 'Understanding\n(vij\u00f1\u00e2na) performs the sacrifice', the term 'vij\u00f1\u00e2na' only is used?--The\nessential nature, we reply, of the knowing subject is suitably called\n'knowledge', and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself\nwhich is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally see that\nwords which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing\nalso convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself. This\nalso accounts for the fact that the sloka ('Vij\u00f1\u00e2na performs the\nsacrifice, it performs all sacred acts') speaks of vij\u00f1\u00e2na as being the\nagent in sacrifices and so on; the buddhi alone could not be called an\nagent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other\nSelfs (the pr\u00e2namaya and so on) which are mentioned before the\nvij\u00f1\u00e2namaya; for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence,\nand the latter only can be an agent. With the same view the text further\non (II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent by\nmeans of their different characteristic attributes, says in the end\n'knowledge and non-knowledge,' meaning thereby that which possesses the\nattribute of knowledge and that which does not. An analogous case is met\nwith in the so-called antary\u00e2mi-br\u00e2hmana (Bri. Up. III. 7). There the\nK\u00e2nvas read, 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vij\u00f1\u00e2na; III, 7, 16), but\ninstead of this the M\u00e2dhyandinas read 'he who dwells in the Self,' and\nso make clear that what the K\u00e2nvas designate as 'knowledge' really is\nthe knowing Self.--That the word vij\u00f1\u00e2na, although denoting the knowing\nSelf, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as something\nsubstantial. We hence conclude that he who is different from the Self\nconsisting of knowledge, i.e. the individual Self, is the highest Self\nwhich consists of bliss.\n\nIt is true indeed that the sloka, 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice,\n'directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing Self; all the same we\nhave to understand that what is meant is the latter, who is referred to\nin the clause, 'different from this is the inner Self which consists of\nknowledge.' This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the\nSelf which consists of food (II, 2); for that sloka refers to food only,\n'From food are produced all creatures,' &c., all the same the preceding\nclause 'this man consists of the essence of food' does not refer to food,\nbut to an effect of it which consists of food. Considering all this the\nS\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra himself in a subsequent S\u00fbtra (I, 1, 18) bases his view on the\ndeclaration, in the scriptural text, of difference.--We now turn to the\nassertion, made by the P\u00fbrvapakshin, that the cause of the world is not\ndifferent from the individual soul because in two Ch\u00e2ndogya passages it\nis exhibited in co-ordination with the latter ('having entered into them\nwith this living Self,' 'Thou art that'); and that hence the\nintroductory clause of the Taitt. passage ('He who knows Brahman reaches\nthe Highest') refers to the individual soul--which further on is called\n'consisting of bliss,' because it is free from all that is not pleasure.--\nThis view cannot be upheld; for although the individual soul is\nintelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this\ninfinite and wonderful Universe--a process described in texts such as\n'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--It sent forth fire,' &c.\nThat even the released soul is unequal to such 'world business' as\ncreation, two later S\u00fbtras will expressly declare. But, if you deny that\nBrahman, the cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul,\nhow then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in\nthe Ch\u00e2ndogya texts?--How, we ask in return, can Brahman, the cause of\nall, free from all shadow of imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c.\n&c., be one with the individual soul, all whose activities--whether it be\nthinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else--depend on karman,\nwhich implies endless suffering of various kind?--If you reply that this\nis possible if one of two things is unreal, we ask--which then do you\nmean to be unreal? Brahman's connexion with what is evil?--or its\nessential nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic\nto all evil?--You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact of Brahman,\nwhich is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil, being the\nsubstrate of beginningless Nescience, there presents itself the false\nappearance of its being connected with evil. But there you maintain what\nis contradictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute perfection\nand antagonism to all evil; on the other it is the substrate of\nNescience, and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is\ninvolved in endless pain; for to be connected with evil means to be the\nsubstrate of Nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced\nthereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman is connected with\nall this and at the same time antagonistic to it!--Nor can we allow you\nto say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is\nsomething false. For whatever is false belongs to that group of things\ncontrary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which the\nVed\u00e2nta-texts are studied. To be connected with what is hurtful to man,\nand to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self-\ncontradictory.--But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to\ndo? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition\nof one thing everything will be known ('by which that which is not heard\n_is_ heard,' &c., Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3); thereupon declares that Brahman is\nthe sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'),\nand possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its\nintentions ('it thought, may I be many'); and then finally, by means of\nthe co-ordination, 'Thou art that' intimates that Brahman is one with\nthe individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering!\nNothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the\nsubstrate of Nescience and all that springs from it!--Not even for the\npurpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in\nitself is senseless and contradictory!--Let us then say that Brahman's\nconnexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal!--\nScripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the\nassaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that\nthe assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and\nhappiness are unreal figments, due to error! This is excellent comfort\nindeed!--To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both\naspects of Brahman--viz. on the one hand its entering into the\ndistressful condition of individual souls other than non-differenced\nintelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed\nwith all perfections, &c.--are alike unreal!--Well, we reply, we do not\nexactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of\ntexts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything\nwill be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for\nin that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the\ncognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the\ncognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised\nin the cognition of one thing; in so far it can be said that everything\nis known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the\nreal shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the\nsubstrate.--Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the\nmeaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing\neverything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real,\nwhile everything else is unreal.--If this were so, we rejoin, the text\nwould not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard, the non-known is\nknown'; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known' (not\n'known as false') 'the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning\nwere that only the one non-differenced substance understood to be the\ncause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, 'As by one lump\nof clay everything made of clay is known,' would not be suitable; for\nwhat is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of\nclay its (real) effects are known. Nor must 'you say that in the\nillustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth; for\nas the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset\nthat things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the\nrope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if\nit were something well known (and the clause, 'as by one lump of clay,'\n&c., undoubtedly _does_ refer to something well known), in order to\nrender the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any\nmeans of knowledge--assisted or non-assisted by ratiocination--that\nwould prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the\ncognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will\nbe discussed at length under II, 1.--'Being only this was in the\nbeginning, one, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I\ngrow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'Let me now enter those three beings\nwith this living Self and evolve names and forms'; 'All these creatures,\nmy son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest\nin the True,' &c.; these passages declare in succession that that which\nreally is is the Self of this world; that previous to creation there is\nno distinction of names and forms; that for the creation of the world\nBrahman, termed 'the True' (or 'Real'), requires no other operative\ncause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution,\npossible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of\nendless movable and immovable things; that in accordance with this\nresolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular\norder, of an infinite number of manifold beings; that by Brahman\nentering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul--which has\nits Self in Brahman--there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent,\nof all their particular names and forms; and that everything different\nfrom Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by\nthat, rests on that. All the different points--to be learned from\nScripture only--which are here set forth agree with what numerous other\nscriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all\nevil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful; that all\nits wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is the cause of all\nbliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed. To maintain then that\nthe word 'that,' which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e.\na Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at conveying\ninstruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning\nas the incoherent talk of a madman.\n\nThe word 'thou' again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by\nits implication in the course of transmigratory existence, and the\nproper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were\nmeant to suggest a substance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in\nthe case of a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by\nNescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, we have already\nexplained above.--All this being thus, your interpretation would involve\nthat the proper meaning of the two words 'that' and 'thou'--which refer\nto one thing--would have to be abandoned, and both words would have to\nbe taken in an implied sense only.\n\nAgainst this the P\u00fbrvapakshin now may argue as follows. Several words\nwhich are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense, and as\nthis is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes,\nthis part of their connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only\nthe unity of one substance; implication (lakshan\u00e2), therefore, does not\ntake place. When we say 'blue (is) (the) lotus' we employ two words with\nthe intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim\nat expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and\nthe generic character of a lotus. If this latter point was aimed at, it\nwould follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two\naspects of the thing, viz. its being blue and its being a lotus; but\nthis is not possible, for the thing (denoted by the two terms) is not\ncharacterised by (the denotation of) the word 'lotus,' in so far as\nitself characterised by blueness; for this would imply a reciprocal\ninherence (samav\u00e2ya) of class-characteristics and quality [FOOTNOTE 219:1].\nWhat the co-ordination of the two words conveys is, therefore, only the\noneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness, and at\nthe same time by the class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when\nwe say 'this (person is) that Devadatta' the co-ordination of the words\ncannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his\nconnexion with a past time and a distant place is one with Devadatta in\nso far as distinguished by his connexion with the present time and a\nnear place; what it means to express is only that there is oneness on\nthe part of a personal substance--which substance is characterised by\nconnexion with both places and moments of time. It is true indeed that\nwhen we at first hear the one word 'blue' we form the idea of the\nattribute of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of\nco-ordination (expressed in 'blue is the lotus'), this idea no longer\npresents itself, for this would imply a contradiction; but all the same\n'implication' does not take place. The essence of co-ordination consists,\nin all cases, therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in\nthe words co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be charged\nwith 'implication,' it cannot be objected to.\n\nAll this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all sentences\nwhatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things\nknown to be denoted by those words. Words such as 'blue,' standing in co-\nordination with others, express that some matter possessing the\nattribute of blueness, &c., as known from the ordinary use of language,\nis connected with some other matter. When, e.g., somebody says 'bring\nthe blue lotus,' a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of\nblueness. And when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with\npassion lives in the Vindhya-forest,' we again understand that what is\nmeant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several\nwords. Analogously we have to understand, as the thing intimated by\nVed\u00e2nta-texts in the form of coordination, Brahman as possessing such\nand such attributes.--It is an error to assume that, where a sentence\naims at setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as\nqualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute; the\ncase rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all\nattributes. For co-ordination means the application, to one thing, of\nseveral words having different reasons of application; and the effect of\nco-ordination is that one and the same thing, because being connected--\npositively or negatively--with some attribute other than that which is\nconveyed by one word, is also known through other words. As e.g. when it\nis said that 'Devadatta (is) dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not\nstupid, not poor, of irreproachable character.' Where two co-ordinate\nwords express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing,\none of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense, while the\nother retains its primary meaning, as e.g. in the case of the sentence,\n'The V\u00e2h\u00eeka man is an ox.' But in the case of the 'blue lotus' and the\nlike, where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two\nattributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing\nbeing characterised by two attributes.--Possibly our opponent will here\nmake the following remark. A thing in so far as defined by its\ncorrelation to some one attribute is something different from the thing\nin so far as defined by its correlation to some second attribute; hence,\neven if there is equality of case affixes (as in 'n\u00eelam utpalam'), the\nwords co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness, and cannot,\ntherefore, express the oneness of a thing qualified by several\nattributes; not any more than the juxtaposition of two words such as\n'jar' and 'cloth'--both having the same case-ending--can prove that\nthese two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, therefore,\nrather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it\npresents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of\n(words denoting) its attributes.--This would be so, we reply, if it were\nonly the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes\nthat is in the way of its unity. But this is not the case; for what\nstands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several\nattributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing. Such\nincapability is, in the case of the generic character of a jar and that\nof a piece of cloth, proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no\ncontradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus; not any\nmore than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears,\nor than there is between the colour, taste, smell, &c., of one and the\nsame thing. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact\nof one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co-\nordination--the essence of which is that, owing to a difference of\ncauses of application, several words express one and the same thing. For\nif there were nothing but essential unity of being, what reason would\nthere be for the employment of several words? If the purport of the\nattributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the thing, but\nmerely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute would suffice for such\nsuggestion, and anything further would be meaningless. If, on the other\nhand, it were assumed that the use of a further 'suggestive' attribute\nis to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, such\ndifference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing (which you\nmaintain to be free from all difference).--Nor is there any shade even\nof 'implication' in the judgment, 'This person is that Devadatta'; for\nthere is absolutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who was\nconnected with some distant place, and the present Devadatta, who is\nconnected with the place before us. For this very reason those who\nmaintain the permanency of things prove the oneness of a thing related\nto two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition\n('this is that'); if there really were a contradiction between the two\nrepresentations it would follow that all things are (not permanent but)\nmomentary only. The fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing\nbeing connected with two places is removed by the difference of the\ncorrelative moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion that co-\nordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several\nattributes.\n\nFor this very reason the Vedic passage, 'He buys the Soma by means of a\ncow one year old, of a tawny colour, with reddish-brown eyes' (arunay\u00e2,\nekah\u00e2yany\u00e2, pi\u00f1g\u00e2kshy\u00e2), must be understood to enjoin that the purchase\nis to be effected by means of a cow one year old, possessing the\nattributes of tawny colour, &c. This point is discussed P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb. III,\n1, 12.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin there argues as follows: We admit that the word\n'arunay\u00e2' ('by means of a tawny one') denotes the quality of tawniness\ninclusive of the thing possessing that quality; for qualities as well as\ngeneric character exist only in so far as being modes of substances. But\nit is not possible to restrict tawny colour to connexion with a cow one\nyear old, for the injunction of two different things (which would result\nfrom such restriction; and which would necessitate the sentence to be\nconstrued as----) 'He buys by means of a cow one year old, and that a\nred one' is not permissible [FOOTNOTE 222:1]. We must therefore break up\nthe sentence into two, one of which is constituted by the one word\n'arunay\u00e2'--this word expressing that tawny colour extends equally to all\nthe substances enjoined in that section (as instrumental towards the end\nof the sacrifice). And the use of the feminine case-termination of the\nword is merely meant to suggest a special instance (viz. the cow) of all\nthe things, of whatever gender, which are enjoined in that section.\nTawniness must not therefore be restricted to the cow one year old only.--\nOf this p\u00fbrvapaksha the S\u00fbtra disposes in the following words: 'There\nbeing oneness of sense, and hence connexion of substance and quality\nwith one action, there is restriction.'--The fact that the two words\n'arunay\u00e2' and 'ekah\u00e2yany\u00e2'--which denote a substance, viz. a cow one\nyear old, distinguished by the quality of possessing tawny colour--stand\nin co-ordination establishes that they have one sense; and is the\nsubstance, viz. the cow, and the quality, viz. tawny colour--which the\nword 'arunay\u00e2' denotes as standing in the relation of distinguishing\nattribute and thing distinguished thereby--can thus, without any\ncontradiction, be connected with the one action called 'the buying of\nthe Soma', tawny colour is restricted to the cow one year old which is\ninstrumental with regard to the purchase. If the connexion of tawniness\nwith the action of buying were to be determined from syntactical\nconnexion--in the same way as there is made out the connexion of the cow\none year old with that action--then the injunctory sentence would indeed\nenjoin two matters (and this would be objectionable). But such is not\nthe case; for the one word 'aruny\u00e2' denotes a substance characterised by\nthe quality of tawniness, and the co-ordination in which 'arunay\u00e2'\nstands to 'ekah\u00e2yany\u00e2' makes us apprehend merely that the thing\ncharacterised by tawniness also is one year old, but does not make a\nspecial statement as to the connexion of that quality with the thing.\nFor the purport of co-ordination is the unity of a thing distinguished\nby attributes; according to the definition that the application to one\nthing of several words possessing different reasons of application,\nconstitutes co-ordination. For the same reason, the syntactical unity\n(ekav\u00e2kyatvam) of sentences such as 'the cloth is red' follows from all\nthe words referring to one thing. The function of the syntactical\ncollocation is to express the connexion of the cloth with the action of\nbeing; the connexion of the red colour (with the cloth) on the other\nhand is denoted by the word 'red' only. And what is ascertained from co-\nordination (s\u00e2m\u00e2n\u00e2dhikaranya) is only that the cloth is a substance to\nwhich a certain colour belongs. The whole matter may, without any\ncontradiction, be conceived as follows. Several words--having either the\naffixes of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case--which\ndenote one or two or several qualities, present to the mind the idea of\nthat which is characterised by those qualities, and their co-ordination\nintimates that the thing characterised by all those attributes is one\nonly; and the entire sentence finally expresses the connexion in which\nthe thing with its attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb.\nThis may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the co-\nordination of words possessing different case-endings, as e.g. 'There\nstands Devadatta, a young man of a darkish complexion, with red eyes,\nwearing earrings and carrying a stick' (where all the words standing in\napposition to Devadatta have the nominative termination); 'Let him make\na stage curtain by means of a white cloth' (where 'white' and 'cloth'\nhave instrumental case-endings), &c. &c. We may further illustrate the\nentire relation of co-ordinated words to the action by means of the\nfollowing two examples: 'Let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means\nof firewood': here we take in simultaneously the idea of an action\ndistinguished by its connexion with several things. If we now consider\nthe following amplified sentence, 'Let a skilful cook prepare, in a\nvessel of even shape, boiled rice mixed with milk, by means of sticks of\ndry kh\u00e2dira wood,' we find that each thing connected with the action is\ndenoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words; but as soon as each thing\nis apprehended, it is at one and the same moment conceived as something\ndistinguished by several attributes, and as such connects itself with\nthe action expressed by the verb. In all this there is no contradiction\nwhatever.--We must further object to the assertion that a word denoting\na quality which stands in a sentence that has already mentioned a\nsubstance denotes the quality only (exclusive of the substance so\nqualified), and that hence the word 'arunay\u00e2' also denotes a quality\nonly. The fact is that neither in ordinary nor in Vedic language we ever\nmeet with a word which--denoting a quality and at the same time standing\nin co-ordination with a word denoting a substance--denotes a _mere_\nquality. Nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a\nsentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes a mere quality:\nfor in a sentence such as 'the cloth (is) white,' where a substance is\nmentioned in the first place, the quality-word clearly denotes (not mere\nwhiteness but) something which possesses the quality of whiteness. When,\non the other hand, we have a collocation of words such as 'patasya\nsuklah' ('of the cloth'--gen.; 'white' nom.), the idea of a cloth\ndistinguished by whiteness does not arise; but this is due not to the\nfact of the substance being mentioned first, but to the fact of the two\nwords exhibiting different case-terminations. As soon as we add to those\ntwo words an appropriate third one, e.g. 'bh\u00e2gah' (so that the whole\nmeans 'The white part of a cloth'), the co-ordination of two words with\nthe same case-termination gives rise to the idea of a thing\ndistinguished by the attribute of whiteness.--Nor can we agree to the\ncontention that, as the buying of the Soma is exclusively concluded by\nthe cow one year old (as instrumental in the purchase), the quality of\ntawniness (denoted by the word 'arunay\u00e2') cannot connect itself with the\naction expressed by the verb; for a word that denotes a quality and\nstands in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance which has no\nqualities opposed in nature to that quality, denotes a quality abiding\nin that substance, and thus naturally connects itself with the action\nexpressed by the verb. And since, as shown, the quality of tawniness\nconnects itself with its substance (the cow) on the mere basis of the\nform of the words, it is wrong (on the part of the P\u00fbrvapakshin to\nabandon this natural connexion and) to establish their connexion on the\nground of their being otherwise incapable of serving as means of the\npurchase.\n\nAll this confirms our contention, viz. that the co-ordination of 'thou'\nand 'that' must be understood to express oneness, without, at the same\ntime, there being given up the different attributes denoted by the two\nwords. This however is not feasible for those who do not admit a highest\nSelf free from all imperfection and endowed with all perfections, and\ndifferent from that intelligent soul which is conditioned by Nescience,\ninvolved in endless suffering and undergoing alternate states of purity\nand impurity.--But, an objection is raised, even if such a highest Self\nbe acknowledged, it would have to be admitted that the sentence aims at\nconveying the oneness of that which is distinguished by the different\nattributes denoted by the words co-ordinated, and from this it follows\nthat the highest Self participates in all the suffering expressed by the\nword 'thou'!--This is not so, we reply; since the word 'thou' also\ndenotes the highest Self, viz. in so far as it is the inner Ruler\n(antary\u00e2min) of all souls.--The connected meaning of the text is as\nfollows. That which is denoted as 'Being,' i.e. the highest Brahman\nwhich is the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c.,\nresolved 'to be many'; it thereupon sent forth the entire world,\nconsisting of fire, water, &c.; introduced, in this world so sent forth,\nthe whole mass of individual souls into different bodies divine, human,\n&c., corresponding to the desert of each soul--the souls thus\nconstituting the Self of the bodies; and finally, itself entering\naccording to its wish into these souls--so as to constitute their inner\nSelf--evolved in all these aggregates, names and forms, i.e. rendered\neach aggregate something substantial (vastu) and capable of being\ndenoted by a word. 'Let me enter into these beings with this living Self\n(j\u00eevena \u00e2tmana) means 'with this living _me_,' and this shows the living\nSelf, i.e. the individual soul to have Brahman for its Self. And that\nthis having Brahman for its Self means Brahman's being the inner Self of\nthe soul (i.e. the Self inside the soul, but not identical with it),\nScripture declares by saying that Brahman entered into it. This is\nclearly stated in the passage Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He sent forth all this,\nwhatever there is. Having sent forth he entered into it. Having entered\nit he became _sat_ and _tyat_.' For here 'all this' comprises beings\nintelligent as well as non-intelligent, which afterwards are\ndistinguished as _sat_ and _tyat_, as knowledge (vij\u00f1\u00e2na) and non-\nknowledge. Brahman is thus said to enter into intelligent beings also.\nHence, owing to this evolution of names and forms, all words denote the\nhighest Self distinguished by non-intelligent matter and intelligent\nsouls.--Another text, viz. Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7,'All this has its Self in\nthat,' denotes by 'all this' the entire world inclusive of intelligent\nsouls, and says that of this world that (i.e. Brahman) is the Self.\nBrahman thus being the Self with regard to the whole universe of matter\nand souls, the universe inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of\nBrahman.--Other scriptural texts teach the same doctrine; cp. 'Entered\nwithin, the ruler of beings, the Self of all' (Taitt. \u00c2r. III, 24);'He\nwho dwelling in the earth is within the earth--whose body is the earth,'\n& c., up to 'he who dwelling within the Self is within the Self, whom\nthe Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self\nfrom within, he is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal' (Bri. Up.\nIII, 7, 3-22; M\u00e2dhyand. S\u00e2.); 'He who moves within the earth, of whom\nthe earth is the body, &c.--who moves within the Imperishable, of whom\nthe Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know; he\nthe inward ruler of all beings, free from evil, the divine, the one god,\nN\u00e2rayana' (Sub\u00e2. Up. VII). All these texts declare that the world\ninclusive of intelligent souls is the body of the highest Self, and the\nlatter the Self of everything. Hence those words also that denote\nintelligent souls designate the highest Self as having intelligent souls\nfor his body and constituting the Self of them; in the same way as words\ndenoting non-sentient masses of matter, such as the bodies of gods, men,\n& c., designate the individual souls to which those bodies belong. For\nthe body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of a mode\n(prak\u00e2ra); and as words denoting a mode accomplish their full function\nonly in denoting the thing to which the mode belongs, we must admit an\nanalogous comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denote a\nbody. For, when a thing is apprehended under the form 'this is such,'\nthe element apprehended as 'such' is what constitutes a mode; now as\nthis element is relative to the thing, the idea of it is also relative\nto the thing, and finds its accomplishment in the thing only; hence the\nword also which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the\nthing. Hence words such as 'cow', 'horse', 'man', which denote a mode,\nviz. a species, comprise in their meaning also that mass of matter which\nexhibits the characteristics of the species, and as that mass of matter\nconstitutes the body and therefore is a mode of a soul, and as that soul\nagain, so embodied, is a mode of the highest Self; it follows that all\nthese words extend in their signification up to the highest Self. The\nmeaning of all words then is the highest Self, and hence their co-\nordination with words directly denoting that highest Self is a primary\n(not merely 'implied') one.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, we indeed observe that words denoting\nspecies or qualities stand in co-ordination to words denoting substances,\n'the ox is short-horned,' 'the sugar is white'; but where substances\nappear as the modes of other substances we find that formative affixes\nare used, 'the man is dandin, kundalin' (bearing a stick; wearing\nearrings).--This is not so, we reply. There is nothing to single out\neither species, or quality, or substance, as what determines co-\nordination: co-ordination disregards such limitations. Whenever a _thing_\n(whether species, or quality, or substance) has existence as a _mode_\nonly--owing to its proof, existence and conception being inseparably\nconnected with something else--the words denoting it, as they designate\na substance characterised by the attribute denoted by them,\nappropriately enter into co-ordination with other words denoting the\nsame substance as characterised by other attributes. Where, on the other\nhand, a substance which is established in separation from other things\nand rests on itself, is assumed to stand occasionally in the relation of\nmode to another substance, this is appropriately expressed by the use of\nderived forms such as 'dandin, kundalin.' Hence such words as 'I,' 'thou,'\n&c., which are different forms of appellation of the individual soul,\nat bottom denote the highest Self only; for the individual souls\ntogether with non-sentient matter are the body--and hence modes--of the\nhighest Self. This entire view is condensed in the co-ordination 'Thou\nart that.' The individual soul being thus connected with the highest\nSelf as its body, its attributes do not touch the highest Self, not any\nmore than infancy, youth, and other attributes of the material body\ntouch the individual soul. Hence, in the co-ordination 'Thou art that,'\nthe word 'that' denotes the highest Brahman which is the cause of the\nworld, whose purposes come true, which comprises within itself all\nblessed qualities, which is free from all shadow of evil; while the word\n'thou' denotes the same highest Self in so far as having for its body\nthe individual souls together with their bodies. The terms co-ordinated\nmay thus be taken in their primary senses; there is no contradiction\neither with the subject-matter of the section, or with scripture in\ngeneral; and not a shadow of imperfection such as Nescience, and so on,\nattaches to Brahman, the blameless, the absolutely blessed. The co-\nordination with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of\nBrahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brahman; and hence we\nhold that different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i.e. the\nindividual soul, is the Self consisting of bliss, i.e. the highest Self.\n\nNor is there any force in the objection that as the Self of bliss is\nsaid to be 's\u00e2rira,' i.e. embodied-viz. in the clause 'of him the\nembodied Self is the same' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 6)--it cannot be different\nfrom the individual soul. For throughout this section the recurring\nclause 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one,'\nrefers to the highest Self, calling that the 'embodied' one. The clause\n'From that same Self sprang ether' (II, 1) designates the highest\nBrahman-which is different from the individual soul and is introduced as\nthe highest cause of all things created--as the 'Self'; whence we\nconclude that all things different from it--from ether up to the Self of\nfood constitute its body. The Sub\u00e2la-upanishad moreover states quite\ndirectly that all beings constitute the body of the highest Self: 'He of\nwhom the earth is the body, of whom water is the body, of whom fire is\nthe body, of whom wind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of whom\nthe Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he the inner\nSelf of all, the divine one, the one god N\u00e2r\u00e2yana.' From this it follows\nthat what constitutes the embodied Self of the Self of food is nothing\nelse but the highest Self referred to in the clause 'From that same Self\nsprang ether.' When, then, the text further on says with regard to the\nSelf of breath, 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the\npreceding one' (II, 3), the meaning can only be that what constitutes\nthe embodied Self of the 'preceding' Self of food, viz. the highest Self\nwhich is the universal cause, is also the embodied Self of the Self\nconsisting of breath. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the\nSelf consisting of mind and the Self consisting of knowledge. In the\ncase, finally, of the Self consisting of bliss, the expression 'the\nsame' (esha eva) is meant to convey that that Self has its Self in\nnothing different from itself. For when, after having understood that\nthe highest Self is the embodied Self of the vij\u00f1\u00e2namaya also, we are\ntold that the embodied Self of that vij\u00f1\u00e2namaya is also the embodied\nSelf of the \u00e2nandamaya, we understand that of the \u00e2nandamaya--which we\nknow to be the highest Self on the ground of 'multiplication'--its own\nSelf is the Self. The final purport of the whole section thus is that\neverything different from the highest Self, whether of intelligent or\nnon-intelligent nature, constitutes its body, while that Self alone is\nthe non-conditioned embodied Self. For this very reason competent\npersons designate this doctrine which has the highest Brahman for its\nsubject-matter as the 's\u00e2r\u00eeraka,' i. e. the doctrine of the 'embodied'\nSelf.--We have thus arrived at the conclusion that the Self of bliss is\nsomething different from the individual Self, viz. the highest Self.\n\nHere the P\u00fbrvapakshin raises the following objection.--The Self\nconsisting of bliss (\u00e2nandamaya) is not something different from the\nindividual soul, because the formative element--maya denotes something\nmade, a thing effected. That this is the meaning of--maya in \u00e2nandamaya\nwe know from P\u00e2nini IV, 3, 144.--But according to P\u00e2. V, 4, 21,--maya\nhas also the sense of 'abounding in'; as when we say 'the sacrifice is\nannamaya,' i.e. abounds in food. And this may be its sense in\n'\u00e2nandamaya' also!--Not so, the P\u00fbrvapakshin replies. In 'annamaya,' in\nan earlier part of the chapter,--maya has the sense of 'made of',\n'consisting of'; and for the sake of consistency, we must hence ascribe\nthe same sense to it in '\u00e2nandamaya.' And even if, in the latter word,\nit denoted abundance, this would not prove that the \u00e2nandamaya is other\nthan the individual soul. For if we say that a Self 'abounds' in bliss,\nthis implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small part of\npain; and to be 'mixed with pain' is what constitutes the character of\nthe individual soul. It is therefore proper to assume, in agreement with\nits previous use, that '\u00e2nandamaya' means 'consisting of bliss.' In\nordinary speech as well as in Vedic language (cp. common words such as\n'mrinmaya,' 'hiranmaya'; and Vedic clauses such as 'parnamayijuh\u00fbh')\n-maya as a rule means 'consisting of,' and this meaning hence presents\nitself to the mind first. And the individual soul _may_ be denoted as\n'made of bliss'; for in itself it is of the essence of bliss, and its\nSams\u00e2ra state therefore is something 'made of bliss.' The conclusion\ntherefore is that, owing to the received meaning of -maya, the\n\u00e2nandamaya is none other than the individual soul.--To this prim\u00e2 facie\nview the next S\u00fbtra refers and refutes it.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 219:1. I.e. we should not in that case be able to decide\nwhether the quality (i.e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i.e.,\nhere, the lotus), or vice versa.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 222:1. For it would imply so-called v\u00e2kyabheda, 'split of the\nsentence,' which arises when one injunctory clause is made to enjoin two\ndifferent things.]\n\n\n\n\n14. If, on account of its being a word denoting an effect, (\u00e2nandamaya\nbe said) not (to denote the highest Self); (we say) no, on account of\nabundance.\n\nWe deny the conclusion of the P\u00fbrvapakshin, on the ground of there being\nabundance of bliss in the highest Brahman, and 'abundance' being one of\nthe possible meanings of -maya.--Since bliss such as described in the\nTaitt. Up.--bliss which is reached by successively multiplying by\nhundred all inferior kinds of bliss--cannot belong to the individual\nsoul, we conclude that it belongs to Brahman; and as Brahman cannot be\nan effect, and as -maya, may have the sense of 'abounding in,' we\nconclude that the \u00e2nandamaya is Brahman itself; inner contradiction\nobliging us to set aside that sense of -maya which is recommended by\nregard to 'consequence' and frequency of usage. The regard for\nconsistency, moreover, already has to be set aside in the case of the\n'pr\u00e2namaya'; for in that term -maya cannot denote 'made of.' The\n'pr\u00e2namaya' Self can only be called by that name in so far as air with\nits five modifications has (among others) the modification called pr\u00e2na,\ni.e. breathing out, or because among the five modifications or functions\nof air pr\u00e2na is the 'abounding,' i.e. prevailing one.--Nor can it be\ntruly said that -maya is but rarely used in the sense of 'abounding in':\nexpressions such as 'a sacrifice abounding in food' (annamaya), 'a\nprocession with many carriages' (sakatamay\u00ee), are by no means uncommon.--\nNor can we admit that to call something 'abounding in bliss' implies the\npresence of _some_ pain. For 'abundance' precludes paucity on the part\nof that which is said to abound, but does not imply the presence of what\nis contrary. The presence or absence of what is contrary has to be\nascertained by other means of proof; and in our case we do ascertain the\nabsence of what is contrary to bliss by such means, viz. the clause\n'free from evil,' &c. Abundance of bliss on the part of Brahman\ncertainly implies a relation to paucity on the part of some other bliss;\nand in accordance with this demand the text says 'That is one measure of\nhuman bliss,' &c. (II, 8, 1). The bliss of Brahman is of measureless\nabundance, compared to the bliss of the individual soul.--Nor can it be\nmaintained that the individual soul may be viewed as being an effect of\nbliss. For that a soul whose essential nature is knowledge and bliss\nshould in any way be changed into something else, as a lump of clay is\nmade into a pot, is an assumption contradicted by all scripture, sacred\ntradition, and reasoning. That in the Sams\u00e2ra state the soul's bliss and\nknowledge are contracted owing to karman will be shown later on.--The\nSelf of bliss therefore is other than the individual soul; it is Brahman\nitself.\n\nA further reason for this conclusion is supplied by the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n15. And because he is declared to be the cause of thatra.\n\n'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss existed\nnot in the ether? He alone causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). This means--\nHe alone is the cause of bliss on the part of the individual souls.--\nSome one is here designated as the cause of bliss enjoyed by the souls;\nand we thus conclude that the causer of bliss, who must be other than\nthe souls to which bliss is imparted, is the highest Self abounding in\nbliss.\n\nIn the passage quoted the term 'bliss' denotes him who abounds in bliss,\nas will be shown later on.--A further reason is given in the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n16. And because that (Brahman) which is referred to in the mantra is\ndeclared (to be the \u00e2nandamaya).\n\nThat Brahman which is described in the mantra, 'True Being, knowledge,\ninfinite is Biahman,' is proclaimed as the Self abounding in bliss. And\nthat Brahman is the highest Brahman, other than the individual soul; for\nthe passage 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' refers to Brahman\nas something to be obtained by the individual soul, and the words 'On\nthis the following verse is recorded' show that the verse is related to\nthat same Brahman. The mantra thus is meant to render clear the meaning\nof the Br\u00e2hmana passage. Now the Brahman to be reached by the meditating\nDevotee must be something different from him. The same point is rendered\nclear by all the following Br\u00e2hmana passages and mantras: 'from that\nsame Self sprang ether,' and so on. The Self abounding in bliss\ntherefore is other than the individual soul.\n\nHere an opponent argues as follows:--We indeed must acknowledge that the\nobject to be reached is something different from the meditating Devotee;\nbut the fact is that the Brahman described in the mantra does not\nsubstantially differ from the individual soul; that Brahman is nothing\nbut the soul of the Devotee in its pure state, consisting of mere non-\ndifferenced intelligence, free from all shade of Nescience. To this pure\ncondition it is reduced in the mantra describing it as true Being,\nknowledge, infinite. A subsequent passage, 'that from which all speech,\nwith the mind, turns away, unable to reach it' (II. 9), expresses this\nsame state of non-differentiation, describing it as lying beyond mind\nand speech. It is this therefore to which the mantra refers, and the\nSelf of bliss is identical with it.--To this view the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n17. Not the other, on account of impossibility.\n\nThe other than the highest Self, i.e. the one called j\u00eeva, even in the\nstate of release, is not that Self which the mantra describes; for this\nis not possible. For to a Self of that kind unconditioned intelligence\n(such as is, in the mantra, ascribed to Brahman; cp. the term\n'vipaskit\u00e2') cannot belong. Unconditioned intelligence is illustrated by\nthe power of all one's purposes realising themselves; as expressed in\nthe text 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.' Intelligence\n(vipaskittvam, i.e. power of insight into various things) does indeed\nbelong to the soul in the state of release; but as in the Sams\u00e2ra state\nthe same soul is devoid of such insight, we cannot ascribe to it non-\nconditioned intelligence. And if the released soul is viewed as being\nmere non-differenced intelligence, it does not possess the capacity of\nseeing different things, and hence cannot of course possess vipaskittva\nin the sense stated above. That, however, the existence of a substance\ndevoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of knowledge, we\nhave already shown before. Again, if the clause 'from whence speech\nreturns,' &c., were meant to express that speech and mind return from\nBrahman, this could not mean that the Real is devoid of all difference,\nbut only that mind and speech are not means for the knowledge of Brahman.\nAnd from this it would follow that Brahman is something altogether empty,\nfutile. Let us examine the context. The whole section, beginning with\n'He who knows Brahman reaches Brahman,' declares that Brahman is all-\nknowing, the cause of the world, consisting of pure bliss, the cause of\nbliss in others; that through its mere wish it creates the whole\nuniverse comprising matter and souls; that entering into the universe of\ncreated things it constitutes their Self; that it is the cause of fear\nand fearlessness; that it rules V\u00e2yu \u00c2ditya and other divine beings;\nthat its bliss is ever so much superior to all other bliss; and many\nother points. Now, all at once, the clause 'from whence speech returns'\nis said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to Brahman, and\nthat thus there are no means whatever of knowing Brahman! This is idle\ntalk indeed! In the clause '(that) from which speech returns,' the\nrelative pronoun 'from which' denotes bliss; this bliss is again\nexplicitly referred to in the clause 'knowing the bliss of Brahman'--the\ngenitive 'of Brahman' intimating that the bliss belongs to Brahman; what\nthen could be the meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a\nknowledge of Brahman, if Brahman had at the same time to be conceived as\ntranscending all thought and speech? What the clause really means rather\nis that if one undertakes to state the definite amount of the bliss of\nBrahman--the superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive\nmultiplications with hundred--mind and speech have to turn back\npowerless, since no such definite amount can be assigned. He who knows\nthe bliss of Brahman as not to be defined by any definite amount, does\nnot fear anything.--That, moreover, the all-wise being referred to in\nthe mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of release, is\nrendered perfectly clear by what--in passages such as 'it desired,' &c.--\nis said about its effecting, through its mere volition, the origination\nand subsistence of the world, its being the inner Self of the world, and\nso on.\n\n\n\n\n18. And on account of the declaration of difference.\n\nThe part of the chapter--beginning with the words 'From that same Self\nthere sprang ether'--which sets forth the nature of the Brahman referred\nto in the mantra, declares its difference from the individual soul, no\nless than from the Selfs consisting of food, breath, and mind, viz. in\nthe clause 'different from this which consists of knowledge, is the\nother inner Self which consists of bliss.'--Through this declaration of\ndifference from the individual soul we know that the Self of bliss\nreferred to in the mantra is other than the individual soul.\n\n\n\n\n19. And on account of desire, there is no regard to what is inferred (i.\ne. matter).\n\nIn order that the individual soul which is enthralled by Nescience may\noperate as the cause of the world, it must needs be connected with non-\nsentient matter, called by such names as pradh\u00e2na, or \u00e2num\u00e2nika (that\nwhich is inferred). For such is the condition for the creative energy of\nBrahm\u00e2 and similar beings. Our text, on the other hand, teaches that the\ncreation of the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things results\nfrom the mere wish of a being free from all connexion with non-sentient\nmatter, 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth;' 'He sent forth\nall, whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). We thus understand that that\nSelf of bliss which sends forth the world does not require connexion\nwith non-sentient matter called \u00e2num\u00e2nika, and hence conclude that it is\nother than the individual soul.--A further reason is stated in the next\nS\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n20. And Scripture teaches the joining of this (i.e. the individual soul)\nwith that (i.e. bliss) in that (i.e. the \u00e2nandamaya).\n\n'A flavour he is indeed; having obtained a flavour this one enjoys\nbliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). This text declares that this one, i.e. the so-\ncalled individual soul, enjoys bliss through obtaining the \u00e2nandamaya,\nhere called 'flavour.' Now to say that any one is identical with that by\nobtaining which he enjoys bliss, would be madness indeed.--It being thus\nascertained that the Self of bliss is the highest Brahman, we conclude\nthat in passages such as 'if that bliss were not in the ether' (Taitt.\nUp. II, 7). and 'knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28), the\nword '\u00e2nanda' denotes the '\u00e2nandamaya'; just as vij\u00f1\u00e2na means the\nvij\u00f1\u00e2namaya. It is for the same reason (viz. of \u00e2nanda meaning the same\nas \u00e2nandamaya) that the clause 'he who knows the bliss of Brahman'\nexhibits Brahman as being connected with \u00e2nanda, and that the further\nclause 'he who knows this reaches the Self of bliss,' declares the\nreaching of the Self of bliss to be the fruit of the knowledge of bliss.\nIn the subsequent anuv\u00e2ka also, in the clauses 'he perceived that food\nis Brahman,' 'he perceived that breath is Brahman,' &c. (III, i; 2, &c.),\nthe words 'food,' 'breath,' and so on, are meant to suggest the Self\nmade of food, the Self made of breath, &c., mentioned in the preceding\nanuv\u00e2ka; and hence also in the clause 'he perceived that bliss is\nBrahman,' the word 'bliss' must be understood to denote the Self of\nbliss. Hence, in the same anuv\u00e2ka, the account of the fate after death\nof the man who knows concludes with the words 'having reached the Self\nof bliss' (III, 10,5). It is thus finally proved that the highest\nBrahman--which in the previous adhikarana had to be shown to be other\nthan the so-called Pradh\u00e2na--is also other than the being called\nindividual soul.--This concludes the topic of the \u00e2nandamaya.\n\nA new doubt here presents itself.--It must indeed be admitted that such\nindividual souls as possess only a moderate degree of merit are unable\nto accomplish the creation of the world by their mere wish, to enjoy\nsupreme bliss, to be the cause of fearlessness, and so on; but why\nshould not beings like \u00c2ditya and Praj\u00e2pati, whose merit is\nextraordinarily great, be capable of all this?--Of this suggestion the\nnext S\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n21. The one within (the sun and the eye); on account of his qualities\nbeing declared.\n\nIt is said in the Ch\u00e2ndogya: 'Now that person bright as gold, who is\nseen within the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold,\ngolden altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like\nblue lotus; his name is Ut, for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He\nalso who knows this rises above all evil. Rik and S\u00e2man are his joints.-\nSo much with reference to the devas.--Now with reference to the body.--\nNow that person who is seen within the eye, he is Rik, he is S\u00e2man,\nUktha, Yajus, Brahman. The form of this person (in the eye) is the same\nas of that person yonder (in the sun), the joints of the one are the\njoints of the other, the name of the one is the--name of the other' (Ch.\nUp. I, 7).--Here there arises the doubt whether that person dwelling\nwithin the eye and the sun be the individual soul called \u00c2ditya, who\nthrough accumulation of religious merit possesses lordly power, or the\nhighest Self other than that soul.\n\nThat individual soul of high merit, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains. For the\ntext states that that person has a body, and connexion with a body\nbelongs to individual souls only, for it is meant to bring the soul into\ncontact with pleasure and pain, according to its deserts. It is for this\nreason that Scripture describes final Release where there is no\nconnexion with works as a state of disembodiedness. 'So long as he is in\nthe body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain. But when he is free\nfrom the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII,\n12, 1). And a soul of transcendent merit may possess surpassing wisdom\nand power, and thus be capable of being lord of the worlds and the\nwishes (I, 6, 8). For the same reason such a soul may be the object of\ndevout meditation, bestow rewards, and by being instrumental in\ndestroying evil, be helpful towards final release. Even among men some\nare seen to be of superior knowledge and power, owing to superior\nreligious merit; and this holds good with regard to the Siddhas and\nGandharvas also; then with regard to the devas; then with regard to the\ndivine beings, beginning with Indra. Hence, also, one among the divine\nbeings, beginning with Brahm\u00e2, may in each kalpa reach, through a\nparticularly high degree of merit, vast lordly power and thus effect the\ncreation of the world, and so on. On this supposition the texts about\nthat which constitutes the cause of the world and the inward Self of the\nworld must also be understood to refer to some such soul which, owing to\nsuperiority of merit, has become all-knowing and all-powerful. A so-\ncalled highest Self, different from the individual souls, does not\ntherefore exist. Where the texts speak of that which is neither coarse\nnor fine nor short, &c., they only mean to characterise the individual\nsoul; and those texts also which refer to final Release aim only at\nsetting forth the essential nature of the individual soul and the means\nof attaining that essential nature.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The person who is\nperceived within the sun and within the eye, is something different from\nthe individual soul, viz. the highest Self; because there are declared\nqualities belonging to that. The text ascribes to him the quality of\nhaving risen above, i.e. being free from all evil, and this can belong\nto the highest Self only, not to the individual soul. For to be free\nfrom all evil means to be free from all influence of karman, and this\nquality can belong to the highest Self only, differing from all\nindividual souls which, as is shown by their experience of pleasure and\npain, are in the bonds of karman. Those essential qualities also which\npresuppose freedom from all evil (and which are mentioned in other Vedic\npassages), such as mastery over all worlds and wishes, capability of\nrealising one's purposes, being the inner Self of all, &c., belong to\nthe highest Self alone. Compare passages such as 'It is the Self free\nfrom evil, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and\nthirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true' (Ch. Up. VIII,\n1, 5); and 'He is the inner Self of all, free from evil, the divine one,\nthe one god N\u00e2r\u00e2yana' (Sub\u00e2. Up.). Attributes such as the attribute of\nbeing the creator of the whole universe--which presupposes the power of\nrealising one's wishes--(cp. the passage 'it desired, may I be many');\nthe attribute of being the cause of fear and fearlessness; the attribute\nof enjoying transcending bliss not limited by the capabilities of\nthought and speech and the like, are essential characteristics of that\nonly which is not touched by karman, and they cannot therefore belong to\nthe individual soul.--Nor is there any truth in the contention that the\nperson within the sun, &c., cannot be a being different from individual\nsouls because it possesses a body. For since a being which possesses the\npower of realising all its desires can assume a body through its mere\nwish, it is not generally true that embodiedness proves dependence on\nkarman.--But, it may be said, by a body we understand a certain\ncombination of matter which springs from the primal substance (prakriti)\nwith its three constituents. Now connexion with such a body cannot\npossibly be brought about by the wish of such souls even as are free\nfrom all evil and capable of realising their desires; for such connexion\nwould not be to the soul's benefit. In the case, on the other hand, of a\nsoul subject to karman and not knowing its own essential nature, such\nconnexion with a body necessarily takes place in order that the soul may\nenjoy the fruit of its actions--quite apart from the soul's desire.--\nYour objection would be well founded, we reply, if the body of the\nhighest Self were an effect of Prakriti with its three constituents; but\nit is not so, it rather is a body suitable to the nature and intentions\nof that Self. The highest Brahman, whose nature is fundamentally\nantagonistic to all evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge\nand bliss--whereby it differs from all other souls--possesses an\ninfinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence, and,\nanalogously, a divine form suitable to its nature and intentions, i.e.\nadorned with infinite, supremely excellent and wonderful qualities--\nsplendour, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, loveliness, youthfulness, and\nso on. And in order to gratify his devotees he individualises that form\nso as to render it suitable to their apprehension--he who is a boundless\nocean as it were of compassion, kindness and lordly power, whom no\nshadow of evil may touch---he who is the highest Self, the highest\nBrahman, the supreme soul, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana!--Certain texts tell us that the\nhighest Brahman is the sole cause of the entire world: 'From which these\nbeings originate' (Taitt. Up.); 'Being only was this in the beginning'\n(Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self only was this in the beginning' (Ai. Up. I,\n1); 'N\u00e2r\u00e2yana alone existed, not Brahm\u00e2 nor Siva.' Other texts define\nhis nature: 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1,\n1); 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III. 9. 28); and others\nagain deny of Brahman all connexion with evil qualities and inferior\nbodies sprung from Prakriti, and all dependence on karman, and proclaim\nhis glorious qualities and glorious forms: 'Free from qualities' (?);\n'Free from taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'Free from old age, from death and\ngrief, from hunger and thirst, realising his wishes and purposes' (Ch.\nUp. VIII, 1, 5); 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one\nis seen like to him or superior: his high power is revealed as manifold,\nas inherent action of force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That\nhighest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities' (Svet. Up. VI,\n7); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is\nof him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'Having created all\nforms and given names to them the wise one goes on calling them by those\nnames' (Taitt. \u00c2r. III, 12, 7); 'I know that great Person of sunlike\nlustre beyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'All moments originated\nfrom the Person shining like lightning' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. I, 6).--This\nessential form of his the most compassionate Lord by his mere will\nindividualises as a shape human or divine or otherwise, so as to render\nit suitable to the apprehension of the devotee and thus satisfy him.\nThis the following scriptural passage declares, 'Unborn he is born in\nmany ways' (Gau. K\u00e2. III, 24); and likewise Smriti. 'Though unborn I,\nthe imperishable Self, the Lord of the beings, presiding over my Nature,\nmanifest myself by my M\u00e2ya for the protection of the Good and the\ndestruction of the evil doers '(Bha. G\u00ee. IV, 6. 8). The 'Good' here are\nthe Devotees; and by 'M\u00e2ya' is meant the purpose, the knowledge of the\nDivine Being--; in agreement with the Naighantukas who register 'M\u00e2ya'\nas a synonym of j\u00f1\u00e2na (knowledge). In the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata also the form\nassumed by the highest Person in his avat\u00e2ras is said not to consist of\nPrakriti, 'the body of the highest Self does not consist of a\ncombination of material elements.'--For these reasons the Person within\nthe Sun and the eye is the highest Self which is different from the\nindividual soul of the Sun, &c.\n\n\n\n\n22. And on account of the declaration of difference (the highest Self\nis) other (than the individual souls of the sun, &c.).\n\nThere are texts which clearly state that the highest Self is different\nfrom \u00c2ditya and the other individual souls: 'He who, dwelling within\nAditya (the sun), is different from \u00c2ditya, whom \u00c2ditya does not know,\nof whom \u00c2ditya is the body, who rules \u00c2ditya from within; who dwelling\nwithin the Self is different from the Self,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 9 ff.\n); 'Of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not\nknow; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death does\nnot know; he is the inner self of all beings, free from evil, divine,\nthe one God N\u00e2r\u00e2yana' (Sub. Up. VII). These texts declare all individual\nsouls to be the body of the sinless highest Self which is said to be the\ninward principle of all of them.--It is thereby completely proved that\nthe highest Self is something different from all individual souls such\nas \u00c2ditya, and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of the 'one within.'\n\nThe text, 'That from which these beings are born,' teaches that Brahman\nis the cause of the world; to the question thence arising of what nature\nthat cause of the world is, certain other texts give a reply in general\nterms (' Being only this was in the beginning'; 'It sent forth fire';\n'The Self only this was in the beginning,' &c.); and thereupon it is\nshown on the basis of the special nature of that cause as proved by the\nattributes of 'thought' and 'bliss,' that Brahman is different from the\npradh\u00e2na and the individual souls. The remaining part of this P\u00e2da now\nis devoted to the task of proving that where such special terms as Ether\nand the like are used in sections setting forth the creation and\ngovernment of the world, they designate not the thing-sentient or non-\nsentient--which is known from ordinary experience, but Brahman as proved\nso far.\n\n\n\n\n23. Ether (is Brahman), on account of the characteristic marks.\n\nWe read in the Ch\u00e2ndogya (I, 9), 'What is the origin of this world?'\n'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings spring from the ether only,\nand return into the ether. Ether is greater than these; ether is their\nrest.' Here there arises the doubt whether the word 'ether' denotes the\nwell-known element or Brahman.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former\nalternative. For, he says, in the case of things to be apprehended\nthrough words we must accept that sense of the word which, proved by\netymology, is immediately suggested by the word. We therefore conclude\nfrom the passage that the well-known Ether is the cause of the entire\naggregate of things, moving or non-moving, and that hence Brahman is the\nsame as Ether.--But has it not been shown that Brahman is something\ndifferent from non-sentient things because its creative activity is\npreceded by thought?--This has been asserted indeed, but by no means\nproved. For the proper way to combine the different texts is as follows.\nHaving been told that 'that from which these beings are born is Brahman',\nwe desire to know more especially what that source of all beings is, and\nthis desire is satisfied by the special information given by the text,\n'All these things spring from the ether.' It thus being ascertained that\nthe ether only is the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world, we\nconclude that also such general terms as 'Being' ('Being only was this\nin the beginning') denote the particular substance called 'ether.' And\nwe further conclude that in passages such as 'the Self only was all this\nin the beginning', the word 'Self (\u00e2tman) also denotes the ether; for\nthat word is by no means limited to non-sentient things--cp., e.g., the\nphrase, 'Clay constitutes the Self of the jar'--, and its etymology also\n(\u00e2tman from \u00e2p, to reach) shows that it may very well be applied to the\nether. It having thus been ascertained that the ether is the general\ncause or Brahman, we must interpret such words as 'thinking' (which we\nmeet with in connexion with the creative activity of the general cause)\nin a suitable, i.e. secondary, or metaphorical sense. If the texts\ndenoted the general cause by general terms only, such as 'Being', we\nshould, in agreement with the primary sense of 'thinking', and similar\nterms, decide that that cause is an intelligent being; but since, as a\nmatter of fact, we ascertain a particular cause on the basis of the word\n'ether', our decision cannot be formed on general considerations of what\nwould suit the sense.--But what then about the passage, 'From the Self\nthere sprang the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), from which it appears\nthat the ether itself is something created?--All elementary substances,\nwe reply, such as ether, air, and so on, have two different states, a\ngross material one, and a subtle one. The ether, in its subtle state, is\nthe universal cause; in its gross state it is an effect of the primal\ncause; in its gross state it thus springs from itself, i.e. ether in the\nsubtle state. The text, 'All these beings spring from ether only' (Ch.\nUp. I, 9, 1), declares that the whole world originates from ether only,\nand from this it follows that ether is none other than the general cause\nof the world, i.e. Brahman. This non-difference of Brahman from the\nempirically known ether also gives a satisfactory sense to texts such as\nthe following: 'If this ether were not bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);\n'Ether, indeed, is the evolver of names and forms' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1,\nand so on).--It thus appears that Brahman is none other than the well-\nknown elemental ether.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The word 'ether' in the\ntext under discussion denotes the highest Self with its previously\nestablished characteristics--which is something quite different from the\nnon-sentient elemental ether. For the qualities which the passage\nattributes to ether, viz. its being the one cause of the entire world,\nits being greater than all, and the rest of all, clearly indicate the\nhighest Self. The non-intelligent elemental ether cannot be called the\ncause of all, since intelligent beings clearly cannot be its effects;\nnor can it be called the 'rest' of intelligent beings, for non-sentient\nthings are evil and antagonistic to the true aim of man; nor can it be\ncalled 'greater' than all, for it is impossible that a non-sentient\nelement should possess all excellent qualities whatever and thus be\nabsolutely superior to everything else.--Nor is the P\u00fbrvapakshin right\nwhen maintaining that, as the word 'ether' satisfies the demand for a\nspecial cause of the world, all other texts are to be interpreted in\naccordance herewith. The words, 'All these beings indeed spring from the\nether only,' merely give expression to something generally known, and\nstatements of this nature presuppose other means of knowledge to prove\nthem. Now these other means required are, in our case, supplied by such\ntexts as 'Being only was this in the beginning,' and these, as we have\nshown, establish the existence of Brahman. To Brahman thus established,\nthe text mentioning the ether merely refers as to something well known.\nBrahman may suitably be called 'ether' (\u00e2k\u00e2sa), because being of the\nnature of light it shines (\u00e2k\u00e2sate) itself, and makes other things shine\nforth (\u00e2k\u00e2sayati). Moreover, the word 'ether' is indeed capable of\nconveying the idea of a special being (as cause), but as it denotes a\nspecial non-intelligent thing which cannot be admitted as the cause of\nthe intelligent part of the world we must deny all authoritativeness to\nthe attempt to tamper, in the interest of that one word, with the sense\nof other texts which have the power of giving instruction as to an\nentirely new thing (viz. Brahman), distinguished by the possession of\nomniscience, the power of realising its purposes and similar attributes,\nwhich we ascertain from certain complementary texts-such as 'it thought,\nmay I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it desired, may I be many, may I\ngrow forth.' We also point out that the agreement in purport of a number\nof texts capable of establishing the existence of a wonderful being\npossessing infinite wonderful attributes is not lightly to be\ndisregarded in favour of one single text vhich moreover (has not the\npower of intimating something not known before, but) only makes a\nreference to what is already established by other texts.--As to the\naverment that the word 'Self' is not exclusively limited to sentient\nbeings, we remark that that word is indeed applied occasionally to non-\nsentient things, but prevailingly to that which is the correlative of a\nbody, i.e. the soul or spirit; in texts such as 'the Self only was this\nin the beginning,' and 'from the Self there sprang the ether,' we must\ntherefore understand by the 'Self,' the universal spirit. The denotative\npower of the term 'atman,' which is thus proved by itself, is moreover\nconfirmed by the complementary passages 'it desired, may I send forth\nthe worlds', 'it desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.'--We thus\narrive at the following conclusion: Brahman, which--by the passage\n'Being only this was in the beginning'--is established as the sole cause\nof the world, possessing all those manifold wonderful attributes which\nare ascertained from the complementary passages, is, in the text under\ndiscussion, referred to as something already known, by means of the term\n'ether.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of' ether.'\n\n\n\n\n24. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).\n\nWe read in the Ch\u00e2ndogya (I, 10; ii), 'Prastotri, that deity which\nbelongs to the Prast\u00e2va,' &c.; and further on, 'which then is that deity?\nHe said--Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone, and from\nbreath they arise. This is the deity belonging to the Prast\u00e2va. If\nwithout knowing that deity you had sung forth, your head would have\nfallen off.' Here the word 'breath,' analogously to the word 'ether'\ndenotes the highest Brahman, which is different from what is commonly\ncalled breath; we infer this from the fact that special characteristics\nof Brahman, viz. the whole world's entering into and rising from it, are\nin that text referred to as well-known things. There indeed here arises\na further doubt; for as it is a matter of observation that the existence,\nactivity, &c., of the whole aggregate of creatures depend on breath,\nbreath--in its ordinary acceptation--may be called the cause of the\nworld. This doubt is, however, disposed of by the consideration that\nbreath is not present in things such as stones and wood, nor in\nintelligence itself, and that hence of breath in the ordinary sense it\ncannot be said that 'all beings enter into it,' &c. We therefore\nconclude that Brahman is here called 'breath' in so far as he bestows\nthe breath of life on all beings. And the general result of the\ndiscussion carried on in connexion with the last two S\u00fbtras thus is that\nthe words 'ether' and 'breath' denote something other than what is\nordinarily denoted by those terms, viz. the highest Brahman, the sole\ncause of this entire world, free from all evil, &c. &c.--Here terminates\nthe adhikarana of 'breath.'\n\nThe subsequent S\u00fbtras up to the end of the P\u00e2da demonstrate that the\nbeing which the texts refer to as 'Light' or 'Indra'--terms which in\nordinary language are applied to certain other well-known beings--, and\nwhich is represented as possessing some one or other supremely exalted\nquality that is invariably connected with world-creative power, is no\nother than the highest Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n25. The light (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet.\n\nWe read in the Ch\u00e2ndogya. (III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines\nabove this heaven, higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond\nwhich there are no other worlds, that is the same light which is within\nman.'--Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the brightly shining thing here\ncalled 'light' is the well-known light of the sun and so on, viewed as a\ncausal universal principle (Brahman); or the all-knowing, &c., highest\nPerson of infinite splendour, who is different in nature from all\nsentient and non-sentient beings, and is the highest cause.--The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin maintains that the reference is to ordinary light. For, he\nsays, the passage does not mention a particular characteristic attribute\nwhich can belong to the highest Self only--while such attributes _were_\nmet with in the texts referring to Ether and Breath--, and as thus there\nis no opening for a recognition of the highest Self, and as at the same\ntime the text identifies 'light' with the intestinal heat of living\nbeings, we conclude that the text represents the well-known ordinary\nlight as Brahman, the cause of the world--which is possible as causal\nagency is connected with extreme light and heat.--This prim\u00e2 facie view\nthe S\u00fbtra sets aside. The light which the text states to be connected\nwith heaven and possessing supreme splendour can be the highest Person\nonly, since a preceding passage in the same section--' All the beings\nare one foot of it, three feet are the Immortal in heaven'--refers to\nall beings as being a foot of that same being which is connected with\nheaven. Although the passage, 'That light which shines above,' &c., does\nnot mention a special attribute of the highest Person, yet the passage\npreviously quoted refers to the highest Person as connected with heaven,\nand we therefore recognise that Person as the light connected with\nheaven, mentioned in the subsequent passage.\n\nNor does the identification, made in a clause of the text, of light with\nthe intestinal heat give rise to any difficulty; for that clause is\nmeant to enjoin meditation on the highest Brahman in the form of\nintestinal heat, such meditation having a special result of its own.\nMoreover, the Lord himself declares that he constitutes the Self of the\nintestinal fire, 'Becoming the Vaisv\u00e2nara-fire I abide in the body of\nliving creatures' (Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 14).\n\n\n\n\n26. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the\nmetre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus the direction of\nthe mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus it is seen.\n\nThe previous section at first refers to the metre called G\u00e2yatr\u00ee, 'The\nG\u00e2yatr\u00ee indeed is everything' (III, 12, 1), and then introduces--with\nthe words 'this is also declared by a Rik_ verse'--the verse, 'Such is\nthe greatness of it (viz. the G\u00e2yatr\u00ee),' &c. Now, as this verse also\nrefers to the metre, there is not any reference to the highest Person.--\nTo this objection the second part of the S\u00fbtra replies. The word\n'G\u00e2yatr\u00ee' does not here denote the metre only, since this cannot\npossibly be the Self of all; but the text declares the application of\nthe idea of G\u00e2yatr\u00ee to Brahman, i.e. teaches, to the end of a certain\nresult being obtained, meditation on Brahman in so far as similar to\nG\u00e2yatr\u00ee. For Brahman having four feet, in the sense indicated by the rik_,\nmay be compared to the G\u00e2yatr\u00ee with its four (metrical) feet. The\nG\u00e2yatr\u00ee (indeed has as a rule three feet, but) occasionally a G\u00e2yatr\u00ee\nwith four feet is met with; so, e.g., 'Indras sak\u00eepatih | valena p\u00eeditah |\nduskyavano vrish\u00e2 | samitsu s\u00e2sahih.' We see that in other passages also\nwords primarily denoting metres are employed in other senses; thus, e.g.,\nin the samvargavidy\u00e2 (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8), where Vir\u00e2j (the name of a\nmetre of ten syllables) denotes a group of ten divine beings.\n\nFor this conclusion the next S\u00fbtra supplies a further argument.\n\n\n\n\n27. And thus also, because (thus only) the designation of the beings,\nand so on, being the (four) feet is possible.\n\nThe text, moreover, designates the G\u00e2yatr\u00ee as having four feet, after\nhaving referred to the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart; now\nthis has a sense only if it is Brahman, which here is called G\u00e2yatr\u00ee.\n\n\n\n\n28. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (recognised) on account of the\ndifference of designation; (we say) not so, on account of there being no\ncontradiction in either (designation).\n\nIn the former passage, 'three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven,'\nheaven is referred to as the abode of the being under discussion;\nwhile in the latter passage, 'that light which shines above this heaven,'\nheaven is mentioned as marking its boundary. Owing to this discrepancy,\nthe Brahman referred to in the former text is not recognised in the\nlatter.--This objection the S\u00fbtra disposes of by pointing out that owing\nto the essential agreement of the two statements, nothing stands in the\nway of the required recognition. When we say, 'The hawk is on the top of\nthe tree,' and 'the hawk is above the top of the tree,' we mean one and\nthe same thing.--The 'light,' therefore, is nothing else but the most\nglorious and luminous highest Person. Him who in the former passage is\ncalled four-footed, we know to have an extraordinarily beautiful shape\nand colour--(cp., e.g., 'I know that great Person of sunlike colour\nbeyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 9))--, and as hence his brilliancy\nalso must be extraordinary, he is, in the text under discussion, quite\nappropriately called 'light.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'light.'\n\nIt has been shown that the being endowed with supreme brilliance, called\n'Light,' which the text mentions as something well known, is the highest\nPerson. The S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra will now show that the being designated as Indra\nand Pr\u00e2na, which the text enjoins as an object of meditation, for the\nreason that it is the means for attaining immortality--a power which is\ninseparable from causal power--, is likewise the highest Person.\n\n\n\n\n29. Pr\u00e2na is Brahman, on account of connexion.\n\nWe read in the Pratardana-vidy\u00e2 in the Kaush\u00eetaki-br\u00e2hmana that\n'Pratardana, the son of Divod\u00e2sa, came, by fighting and strength, to the\nbeloved abode of Indra.' Being asked by Indra to choose a boon he\nrequests the God to bestow on him that boon which he himself considers\nmost beneficial to man; whereupon Indra says, 'I am pr\u00e2na (breath), the\nintelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality.' Here the\ndoubt arises whether the being called Pr\u00e2na and Indra, and designating\nitself as the object of a meditation most beneficial to man, is an\nindividual soul, or the highest Self.--An individual soul, the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin maintains. For, he says, the word 'Indra' is known to\ndenote an individual God, and the word 'Pr\u00e2na,' which stands in\ngrammatical co-ordination with Indra, also applies to individual souls.\nThis individual being, called Indra, instructs Pratardana that\nmeditation on himself is most beneficial to man. But what is most\nbeneficial to man is only the means to attain immortality, and such a\nmeans is found in meditation on the causal principle of the world, as we\nknow from the text, 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not\ndelivered; then he will be perfect' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2). We hence\nconclude that Indra, who is known as an individual soul, is the causal\nprinciple, Brahman.\n\nThis view is rejected by the S\u00fbtra. The being called Indra and Pr\u00e2na is\nnot a mere individual soul, but the highest Brahman, which is other than\nall individual souls. For on this supposition only it is appropriate\nthat the being introduced as Indra and Pr\u00e2na should, in the way of\ngrammatical co-ordination, be connected with such terms as 'blessed,'\n'non-ageing,' 'immortal.' ('That Pr\u00e2na indeed is the intelligent Self,\nblessed, non-ageing, immortal,' Kau. Up. III, 9.)\n\n\n\n\n30. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the\nspeaker denoting himself; (we say, not so), because the multitude of\nconnexions with the inner Self (is possible only) in that (speaker if\nviewed as Brahman).\n\nAn objection is raised.--That the being introduced as Indra and Pr\u00e2na\nshould be the highest Brahman, for the reason that it is identical with\nhim who, later on, is called 'blessed,' 'non-ageing,' 'immortal'--this we\ncannot admit. 'Know me only, I am pr\u00e2na, meditate on me as the\nintelligent Self, as life, as immortality'--the speaker of these words\nis Indra, and this Indra enjoins on Pratardana meditation on his own\nperson only, the individual character of which is brought out by\nreference to certain deeds of strength such as the slaying of the son of\nTvashtri ('I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri,' &c.). As thus the\ninitial part of the section clearly refers to an individual being, the\nterms occurring in the concluding part ('blessed,' 'non-ageing,'\n'immortal') must be interpreted so as to make them agree with what\nprecedes.--This objection the S\u00fbtra disposes of. 'For the multitude of\nconnexions with the Self'--i.e. the multitude of things connected with\nthe Self as its attributes--is possible only 'in that,' i.e. in that\nspeaker viewed as the highest Brahman. 'For, as in a car, the\ncircumference of the wheel is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on\nthe nave, thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the\nsubjects on the pr\u00e2na. That pr\u00e2na indeed is the intelligent Self,\nblessed, non-ageing, immortal.' The 'objects' (bh\u00fbtam\u00e2tr\u00e2h) here are the\naggregate of non-sentient things; the 'subjects' (praj\u00f1\u00e2m\u00e2tr\u00e2h) are the\nsentient beings in which the objects are said to abide; when thereupon\nthe texts says that of these subjects the being called Indra and Pr\u00e2na\nis the abode, and that he is blessed, non-ageing, immortal; this\nqualification of being the abode of this Universe, with all its non-\nsentient and sentient beings, can belong to the highest Self only, which\nis other than all individual souls.\n\nThe S\u00fbtra may also be explained in a somewhat different way, viz. 'there\nis a multitude of connexions belonging to the highest Self, i.e. of\nattributes special to the highest Self, in that, viz. section.' The text\nat first says, 'Choose thou that boon for me which thou deemest most\nbeneficial to man'--to which the reply is, 'Meditate on me.' Here Indra-\npr\u00e2na is represented as the object of a meditation which is to bring\nabout Release; the object of such meditation can be none but the highest\nSelf.--'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a\ngood deed; and him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds he\nmakes do a bad deed.' The causality with regard to all actions which is\nhere described is again a special attribute of the highest Self.--The\nsame has to be said with regard to the attribute of being the abode of\nall, in the passage about the wheel and spokes, quoted above; and with\nregard to the attributes of bliss, absence of old age and immortality,\nreferred to in another passage quoted before. Also the attributes of\nbeing 'the ruler of the worlds, the lord of all,' can belong to the\nhighest Self only.--The conclusion therefore is that the being called\nIndra and Pr\u00e2na is none other but the highest Self.--But how then can\nIndra, who is known to be an individual person only, enjoin meditation\non himself?--To this question the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n31. The instruction (given by Indra about himself) (is possible) through\ninsight based on Scripture, as in the case of V\u00e2madeva.\n\nThe instruction which, in the passages quoted, Indra gives as to the\nobject of meditation, i.e. Brahman constituting his Self, is not based\non such an insight into his own nature as is established by other means\nof proof, but on an intuition of his own Self, mediated by Scripture.\n'Having entered into them with this living Self let me evolve names and\nforms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'In it all that exists has its Self (Ch. Up.\nVI, 8, 7); Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'\n(Taitt. Ar. III, 21); 'He who dwelling in the Self is different from the\nSelf,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22)--from these and similar texts Indra has\nlearned that the highest Self has the indiviual souls for its body, and\nthat hence words such as 'I' and 'thou,' which denote individual beings,\nextend in their connotation up to the highest Self; when, therefore, he\nsays, 'Know me only', and 'Meditate on me', he really means to teach\nthat the highest Self, of which his own individual person is the body,\nis the proper object of meditation. 'As in the case of V\u00e2madeva.' As the\nRishi V\u00e2madeva perceiving that Brahman is the inner Self of all, that\nall things constitute its body, and that the meaning of words denoting a\nbody extends up to the principle embodied, denotes with the word 'I' the\nhighest Brahman to which he himself stands in the relation of a body,\nand then predicates of this 'I' Manu S\u00fbrya and other beings--'Seeing\nthis the Rishi. V\u00e2madeva understood, I am Manu, I am S\u00fbrya' (Bri. Up. I,\n4, 10). Similarly Prahl\u00e2da says, 'As the Infinite one abides within all,\nhe constitutes my \"I\" also; all is from me, I am all, within me is all.'\n(Vi. Pu. I, 19, 85.) The next S\u00fbtra states, in reply to an objection,\nthe reason why, in the section under discussion, terms denoting the\nindividual soul, and others denoting non-sentient things are applied to\nBrahman.\n\n\n\n\n32. If it be said (that Brahman is not meant) on account of\ncharacteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we\nsay no, on account of the threefoldness of meditation; on account of\n(such threefold meditation) being met (in other texts also); and on\naccount of (such threefold meditation) being appropriate here (also).\n\nAn objection is raised. 'Let none try to find out what speech is, let\nhim know the speaker'; 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri; I\ndelivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves'; these passages\nstate characteristic marks of an individual soul (viz. the god Indra).--\n'As long as Pr\u00e2na dwells in this body, so long there is life'; 'Pr\u00e2na\nalone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body, it makes\nit rise up.'--These passages again mention characteristic attributes of\nthe chief vital air. Hence there is here no 'multitude of attributes\nbelonging to the Self.'--The latter part of the S\u00fbtra refutes this\nobjection. The highest Self is called by these different terms in order\nto teach threefoldness of devout meditation; viz. meditation on Brahman\nin itself as the cause of the entire world; on Brahman as having for its\nbody the totality of enjoying (individual) souls; and on Brahman as\nhaving for its body the objects and means of enjoyment.--This threefold\nmeditation on Brahman, moreover, is met with also in other chapters of\nthe sacred text. Passages such as 'The True, knowledge, infinite is\nBrahman,' 'Bliss is Brahman,' dwell on Brahman in itself. Passages again\nsuch as 'Having created that he entered into it. Having entered it he\nbecame _sat_ and _tyat_, defined and undefined,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6),\nrepresent Brahman as having for its body the individual souls and\ninanimate nature. Hence, in the chapter under discussion also, this\nthreefold view of Brahman is quite appropriate. Where to particular\nindividual beings such as Hiranyagarbha, and so on, or to particular\ninanimate things such as prakriti, and so on, there are attributed\nqualities especially belonging--to the highest Self; or where with words\ndenoting such persons and things there are co-ordinated terms denoting\nthe highest Self, the intention of the texts is to convey the idea of\nthe highest Self being the inner Self of all such persons and things.--\nThe settled conclusion, therefore, is that the being designated as Indra\nand Pr\u00e2na is other than an individual soul, viz. the highest Self.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND P\u00c2DA.\n\nTHE contents of the first P\u00e2da may be summed up as follows:--It has been\nshown that a person who has read the text of the Veda; who further,\nthrough the study of the Karma-M\u00eem\u00e2msa, has acquired a full knowledge of\nthe nature of (sacrificial and similar) works, and has recognised that\nthe fruits of such works are limited and non-permanent; in whom there\nhas arisen the desire for the highest aim of man, i.e. Release, which,\nas he has come to know in the course of reading the Ved\u00e2nta portions of\nscripture, is effected by meditation on the nature of Brahman--such\nmeditation having an infinite and permanent result; who has convinced\nhimself that words are capable of conveying information about\naccomplished things (not only about things to be done), and has arrived\nat the conclusion that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts are an authoritative means of\nknowledge with regard to the highest Brahman;--that such a person, we\nsay, should begin the study of the S\u00e2r\u00eeraka-M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 which indicates the\nmethod how Brahman is to be known through the Ved\u00e2nta-texts.\n\nWe next have shown that the text 'That from which these creatures are\nborn,' &c., conveys the idea of the highest Brahman as that being which\nin sport, as it were, creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this\nentire universe, comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously\nconstituted animated beings--moving and non-moving--, of objects of\nenjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoyment, and of abodes of\nenjoyment; and which is the sole cause of all bliss. We have established\nthat this highest Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot\nbe the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is to be known\nthrough scripture only. We have pointed out that the position of\nscripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the\nfact that all the Ved\u00e2nta-texts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman,\nwhich, although not related to any injunctions of action or abstention\nfrom action, by its own essential nature constitutes the highest end of\nman. We have proved that Brahman, which the Ved\u00e2nta-texts teach to be\nthe sole cause of the world, must be an intelligent principle other than\nthe non-sentient pradh\u00e2na, since Brahman is said to think. We have\ndeclared that this intelligent principle is other than the so-called\nindividual soul, whether in the state of bondage or that of release;\nsince the texts describe it as in the enjoyment of supreme bliss, all-\nwise, the cause of fear or fearlessness on the part of intelligent\nbeings, the inner Self of all created things, whether intelligent or non-\nintelligent, possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so\non.--We have maintained that this highest Being has a divine form,\npeculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of Prakriti, and not due to\nkarman.--We have explained that the being which some texts refer to as a\nwell-known cause of the world--designating it by terms such as ether or\nbreath, which generally denote a special non-sentient being--is that\nsame highest Self which is different from all beings, sentient or non-\nsentient.--We have declared that, owing to its connexion with heaven,\nthis same highest Self is to be recognised in what the text calls a\n'light,' said to possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special\ncharacteristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we\nrecognise through insight derived from scripture, that same highest\nPerson is denoted by terms such as Indra, and so on; as the text\nascribes to that 'Indra' qualities exclusively belonging to the highest\nSelf, such, e.g., as being the cause of the attainment of immortality.--\nAnd the general result arrived at was that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts help us to\nthe knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or the highest Person, or\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana--of whom it is shown that he cannot possibly be the object of\nthe other means of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited\nnumber of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from all other\nbeings whatsoever.\n\nNow, although Brahman is the only object of the teaching of the Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts, yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they\naim at setting forth (not Brahman), but some particular being comprised\nwithin either the pradh\u00e2na or the aggregate of individual souls. The\nremaining P\u00e2das of the first Adhy\u00e2ya therefore apply themselves to the\ntask of dispelling this notion and proving that what the texts in\nquestion aim at is to set forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman.\nThe second P\u00e2da discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure\nreferences to the individual soul; the third P\u00e2da those which contain\nclear references to the same; and the fourth P\u00e2da finally those texts\nwhich appear to contain even clearer intimations of the individual soul,\nand so on.\n\n\n\n\n1. Everywhere; because there is taught what is known.\n\nWe read in the Ch\u00e2ndogya, 'Man is made of thought; according to what his\nthought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life.\nLet him form this thought: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath,\nwhose form is light,' &c. (III, 14). We here understand that of the\nmeditation enjoined by the clause 'let him form this thought' the object\nis the being said to consist of mind, to have breath for its body, &c. A\ndoubt, however, arises whether the being possessing these attributes be\nthe individual soul or the highest Self.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the\nformer alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instruments of the\nindividual soul; while the text 'without breath, without mind,'\ndistinctly denies them to the highest Self. Nor can the Brahman\nmentioned in a previous clause of the same section ('All this indeed is\nBrahman') be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in the\npassage under discussion; for Brahman is there referred to in order to\nsuggest the idea of its being the Self of all--which idea constitutes a\nmeans for bringing about that calmness of mind which is helpful towards\nthe act of meditation enjoined in the clause 'Let a man meditate with\ncalm mind,' &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the meditation\nconveyed by the clause 'let him form this thought' demands an object,\nBrahman, although mentioned in another passage, only admits of being\nconnected with the passage under discussion; for the demand for an\nobject is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c., which is\nmentioned in that very passage itself; in order to supply the object we\nhave merely to change the case-terminations of the words 'manomayah\npr\u00e2nasar\u00eerah,' &c. It having thus been determined that the being made of\nmind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the Brahman\nmentioned in the concluding passage of the section ('That is Brahman')\nis also the individual soul, there called Brahman in order to glorify it.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The being made of mind\nis the highest Self; for the text states certain qualities, such as\nbeing made of mind, &c., which are well known to denote, in all Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts, Brahman only. Passages such as 'He who is made of mind, the guide\nof the body of breath' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 7); 'There is the ether within\nthe heart, and in it there is the Person, consisting of mind, immortal,\ngolden' (Taitt. Up. I. 6, 1); 'He is conceived by the heart, by wisdom,\nby the mind. Those who know him are immortal' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9); 'He is\nnot apprehended by the eye nor by speech, but by a purified mind' (Mu.\nUp. III, 1, 8); 'The breath of breath' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 183); 'Breath\nalone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body it makes\nit rise up' (Kau. Up. III, 3); 'All these beings merge into breath alone,\nand from breath they arise' (Ch. Up. I, 11, 5)--these and similar texts\nrefer to Brahman as consisting of mind, to be apprehended by a purified\nmind, having breath for its body, and being the abode and ruler of\nbreath. This being so, we decide that in the concluding passage, 'my\nSelf within the heart, that is Brahman,' the word 'Brahman' has to be\ntaken in its primary sense (and does not denote the individual soul).\nThe text which declares Brahman to be without mind and breath, merely\nmeans to deny that the thought of Brahman depends on a mind (internal\norgan), and that its life depends on breath.\n\nOr else we may interpret the Vedic text and the S\u00fbtra as follows. The\npassage 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with a calm mind on\nthis world as originating, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' conveys\nthe imagination of meditation on Brahman as the Self of all. The\nsubsequent clause 'Let him form the thought,' &c., forms an additional\nstatement to that injunction, the purport of which is to suggest certain\nattributes of Brahman, such as being made of mind. So that the meaning\nof the whole section is 'Let a man meditate on Brahman, which is made of\nmind, has breath for its body, &c., as the Self of the whole world.'--\nHere a doubt presents itself. Does the term 'Brahman' in this section\ndenote the individual soul or the highest Self?--The individual soul,\nthe P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains, for that only admits of being exhibited in\nco-ordination with the word 'all.' For the word 'all' denotes the entire\nworld from Brahm\u00e2 down to a blade of grass; and the existence of Brahm\u00e2\nand other individual beings is determined by special forms of karman,\nthe root of which is the beginningless Nescience of the individual soul.\nThe highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is all-knowing, all-\npowerful, free from all evil and all shadow of Nescience and similar\nimperfections, cannot possibly exist as the 'All' which comprises within\nitself everything that is bad. Moreover we find that occasionally the\nterm 'Brahman' is applied to the individual soul also; just as the\nhighest Lord (paramesvara) may be called 'the highest Self' (param\u00e2tman)\nor 'the highest Brahman.' That 'greatness' (brihattva; which is the\nessential characteristic of 'brahman') belongs to the individual soul\nwhen it has freed itself from its limiting conditions, is moreover\nattested by scripture: 'That (soul) is fit for infinity' (Svet. Up. V,\n9). And as the soul's Nescience is due to karman (only), the text may\nvery well designate it--as it does by means of the term 'tajjal\u00e2n'--as\nthe cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world.\nThat is to say--the individual soul which, in its essential nature, is\nnon-limited, and therefore of the nature of Brahman, owing to the\ninfluence of Nescience enters into the state of a god, or a man, or an\nanimal, or a plant.\n\nThis view is rejected by the S\u00fbtra. 'Everywhere,' i.e. in the whole\nworld which is referred to in the clause 'All this is Brahman' we have\nto understand the highest Brahman--which the term 'Brahman' denotes as\nthe Self of the world--, and not the individual soul; 'because there is\ntaught what is known,' i.e. because the clause 'All this is Brahman'--\nfor which clause the term 'tajjal\u00e2n' supplies the reason--refers to\nBrahman as something generally known. Since the world springs from\nBrahman, is merged in Brahman, and depends on Brahman for its life,\ntherefore--as the text says--'All this has its Self in Brahman'; and\nthis shows to us that what the text understands by Brahman is that being\nfrom which, as generally known from the Ved\u00e2nta texts, there proceed the\ncreation, and so on, of the world. That the highest Brahman only, all-\nwise and supremely blessed, is the cause of the origin, &c., of the\nworld, is declared in the section which begins. 'That from which these\nbeings are born,' &c., and which says further on, 'he knew that Bliss is\nBrahman, for from bliss these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III, 6); and\nanalogously the text 'He is the cause, the lord of lords of the organs,'\n&c. (Svet. Up. VI, 9), declares the highest Brahman to be the cause of\nthe individual soul. Everywhere, in fact, the texts proclaim the\ncausality of the highest Self only. As thus the world which springs from\nBrahman, is merged in it, and breathes through it, has its Self in\nBrahman, the identity of the two may properly be asserted; and hence the\ntext--the meaning of which is 'Let a man meditate with calm mind on the\nhighest Brahman of which the world is a mode, which has the world for\nits body, and which is the Self of the world'--first proves Brahman's\nbeing the universal Self, and then enjoins meditation on it. The highest\nBrahman, in its causal condition as well as in its so-called 'effected'\nstate, constitutes the Self of the world, for in the former it has for\nits body all sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, and\nin the latter the same beings in their gross condition. Nor is there any\ncontradiction between such identity with the world on Brahman's part,\nand the fact that Brahman treasures within itself glorious qualities\nantagonistic to all evil; for the imperfections adhering to the bodies,\nwhich are mere modes of Brahman, do not affect Brahman itself to which\nthe modes belong. Such identity rather proves for Brahman supreme lordly\npower, and thus adds to its excellences. Nor, again, can it rightly be\nmaintained that of the individual soul also identity with the world can\nbe predicated; for the souls being separate according to the bodies with\nwhich they are joined cannot be identical with each other. Even in the\nstate of release, when the individual soul is not in any way limited, it\ndoes not possess that identity with the world on which there depends\ncausality with regard to the world's creation, sustentation, and\nreabsorption; as will be declared in S\u00fbtra IV, 4, 17. Nor, finally, does\nthe P\u00fbrvapakshin improve his case by contending that the individual soul\nmay be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world because it (viz. the\nsoul) is due to karman; for although the fact given as reason is true,\nall the same the Lord alone is the cause of the Universe.--All this\nproves that the being to which the text refers as Brahman is none other\nthan the highest Self.\n\nThis second alternative interpretation of the S\u00fbtra is preferred by most\ncompetent persons. The Vrittik\u00e2ra, e.g. says, 'That Brahman which the\nclause \"All this is Brahman\" declares to be the Self of all is the Lord.'\n\n\n\n\n2. And because the qualities meant to be stated are possible (in\nBrahman).\n\nThe qualities about to be stated can belong to the highest Self only.\n'Made of mind, having breath for its body,' &c. 'Made of mind' means to\nbe apprehended by a purified mind only. The highest Self can be\napprehended only by a mind purified by meditation on that Self, such\nmeditation being assisted by the seven means, viz. abstention, &c. (see\nabove, p. 17). This intimates that the highest Self is of pure goodness,\nprecluding all evil, and therefore different in nature from everything\nelse; for by the impure minded impure objects only can be apprehended.--\n'Having the vital breath for its body' means--being the supporter of all\nlife in the world. To stand in the relation of a body to something else,\nmeans to abide in that other thing, to be dependent on it, and to\nsubserve it in a subordinate capacity, as we shall fully show later on.\nAnd all 'vital breath' or 'life' stands in that relation to the highest\nSelf. 'Whose form is light'; i.e. who is of supreme splendour, his form\nbeing a divine one of supreme excellence peculiar to him, and not\nconsisting of the stuff of Prakriti.--'Whose purposes are true'; i.e.\nwhose purposes realise themselves without any obstruction. 'Who is the\n(or \"of the\") Self of ether'; i.e. who is of a delicate and transparent\nnature, like ether; or who himself is the Self of ether, which is the\ncausal substance of everything else; or who shines forth himself and\nmakes other things shine forth.--'To whom all works belong'; i.e. he of\nwhom the whole world is the work; or he to whom all activities belong.--\n'To whom all wishes belong'; i.e. he to whom all pure objects and means\nof desire and enjoyment belong. 'He to whom all odours and tastes\nbelong'; i.e. he to whom there belong, as objects of enjoyment, all\nkinds of uncommon, special, perfect, supremely excellent odours and\ntastes; ordinary smells and tastes being negatived by another text, viz.\n'That which is without sound, without touch, without taste,' &c. (Ka. Up.\nI, 3, 15).--'He who embraces all this'; i.e. he who makes his own the\nwhole group of glorious qualities enumerated.--'He who does not speak,'\nbecause, being in possession of all he could desire, he 'has no regard\nfor anything'; i.e. he who, in full possession of lordly power, esteems\nthis whole world with all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass,\nand hence abides in silence.--All these qualities stated in the text can\nbelong to the highest Self only.\n\n\n\n\n3. But, on account of impossibility, not the embodied soul.\n\nThose who fully consider this infinite multitude of exalted qualities\nwill recognise that not even a shadow of them can belong to the\nindividual soul--whether in the state of bondage or that of release--\nwhich is a thing as insignificant as a glow-worm and, through its\nconnexion with a body, liable to the attacks of endless suffering. It is\nnot possible therefore to hold that the section under discussion should\nrefer to the individual soul.\n\n\n\n\n4. And because there is (separate) denotation of the object and the\nagent.\n\nThe clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him'\ndenotes the highest Brahman as the object to be obtained, and the\nindividual soul as that which obtains it. This shows that the soul which\nobtains is the person meditating, and the highest Brahman that is to be\nobtained, the object of meditation: Brahman, therefore, is something\ndifferent from the attaining soul.\n\n\n\n\n5. On account of the difference of words.\n\nThe clause 'That is the Self of me, within the heart' designates the\nembodied soul by means of a genitive form, while the object of\nmeditation is exhibited in the nominative case. Similarly, a text of the\nV\u00e2jasaneyins, which treats of the same topic, applies different terms to\nthe embodied and the highest Self, 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain,\nor a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden\nPerson is within the Self' (Sat. Br. X, 6, 3, 2). Here the locative form,\n'within the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and the nominative, 'that\ngolden Person,' the object to be meditated on.--All this proves the\nhighest Self to be the object of meditation.\n\n\n\n\n6. And on account of Smriti.\n\n'I dwell within the hearts of all, from me come memory and knowledge, as\nwell as their loss'; 'He who free from delusion knows me to be the\nhighest Person'; 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all\nBeings, driving round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted\non a machine; to him fly for refuge' (Bha. Gi. XV, 15, 19; XVIII, 61).\nThese Smriti-texts show the embodied soul to be the meditating subject,\nand the highest Self the object of meditation.\n\n\n\n\n7. Should it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on\naccount of the smallness of the abode, and on account of the denotation\nof that (viz. minuteness of the being meditated on); we say no, because\n(Brahman) has thus to be meditated upon, and because (in the same\npassage) it is said to be like ether.\n\nIt might be contended that, as the text 'he is my Self within the heart'\ndeclares the being meditated on to dwell within a minute abode, viz. the\nheart; and as moreover another text--'smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.,\ndeclares it to be itself of minute size, that being cannot be the\nhighest Self, but only the embodied soul. For other passages speak of\nthe highest Self as unlimited, and of the embodied soul as having the\nsize of the point of a goad (cp. e.g. Mu. Up. I, 1, 6, and Svet. Up. V,\n8).--This objection the S\u00fbtra rebuts by declaring that the highest Self\nis spoken of as such, i.e. minute, on account of its having to be\nmeditated upon as such. Such minuteness does not, however, belong to its\ntrue nature; for in the same section it is distinctly declared to be\ninfinite like ether--'greater than the earth, greater than the sky,\ngreater than heaven, greater than all these worlds' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 3).\nThis shows that the designation of the highest Self as minute is for the\npurpose of meditation only.--The connexion of the whole section then is\nas follows. The clause 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with\ncalm mind on this world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman,'\nenjoins meditation on Brahman as being the Self of all, in so far as it\nis the cause of the origin and destruction of all, and entering into all\nbeings as their soul gives life to them. The next clause, 'Man is made\nof thought; according as his thought is in this world, so will he be\nwhen he has departed this life,' declares the attainment of the desired\nobject to depend on the nature of the meditation; and the following\nclause, 'Let him therefore form the following thought,' thereupon\nrepeats the injunction with a view to the declaration of details. The\nclause 'He who consists of mind,' &c., up to 'who is never surprised,'\nthen states the nature and qualities, of the being to be meditated upon,\nwhich are to be comprised in the meditation. Next, the clause 'He is my\nSelf,' up to 'the kernel of a canary seed,' declares that the highest\nPerson, for the purpose of meditation, abides in the heart of the\nmeditating devotee; representing it as being itself minute, since the\nheart is minute. After this the clause 'He also is my Self,' up to 'who\nis never surprised,' describes those aspects of the being meditated upon\nas within the heart, which are to be attained by the devotee. Next, the\nwords 'this my Self within the heart is that Brahman' enjoins the\nreflection that the highest Brahman, as described before, is, owing to\nits supreme kindness, present in our hearts in order thereby to refresh\nand inspirit us. Then the clause 'When I shall have departed from hence\nI shall obtain him' suggests the idea that there is a certainty of\nobtaining him on the basis of devout meditation; and finally the clause\n'He who has this faith has no doubt' declares that the devotee who is\nfirmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way described, will\nattain it beyond any doubt.--From all this it appears that the\n'limitation of abode,' and the 'minuteness' ascribed to Brahman, are\nmerely for the purpose of meditation.\n\n\n\n\n8. Should it be said that there is attainment of fruition (of pleasure\nand pain); we reply, not so, on account of difference.\n\nBut, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies, like the\nindividual soul, it follows that, like the latter, it is subject to the\nexperience of pleasure and pain, such experience springing from\nconnexion with bodies!--Of this objection the S\u00fbtra disposes by\nremarking 'not so, on account of difference (of reason).' For what is\nthe cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere\ndwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of\ngood and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of\nthe highest Self to which all evil is foreign. Compare the scriptural\ntext 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on\nwithout eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).--Here finishes the adhikarana of\n'what is known everywhere.'\n\nWell then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we must conclude that\nwherever fruition is referred to, the embodied soul only is meant!--Of\nthis view the next adhikarana disposes.\n\n\n\n\n9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of there being taken all\nthat is movable and immovable.\n\nWe read in the Kathavall\u00ee (I, 3, 25), 'Who then knows where he is to\nwhom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a\ncondiment?' A doubt here arises whether the 'eater', suggested by the\nwords 'food' and 'condiment,' is the individual soul or the highest Self.--\nThe individual soul, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains; for all enjoyment\npresupposes works, and works belong to the individual soul only.--Of\nthis view the S\u00fbtra disposes. The 'eater' can be the highest Self only,\nbecause the taking, i. e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and\nimmovable things can be predicated of that Self only. 'Eating' does not\nhere mean fruition dependent on work, but rather the act of reabsorption\nof the world on the part of the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, who is\nthe cause of the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the\nuniverse. This appears from the fact that Vishnu is mentioned in the\nsame section, 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the\nhighest place of Vishnu' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). Moreover the clause 'to whom\ndeath is a condiment' shows that by the Brahmans and Kshattriyas,\nmentioned in the text, we have to understand the whole universe of\nmoving and non-moving things, viewed as things to be consumed by the\nhighest Self. For a condiment is a thing which, while itself being eaten,\ncauses other things to be eaten; the meaning of the passage, therefore,\nis that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were,\nthere is at the same time eaten whatever is flavoured or made palatable\nby death, and that is the entire world of beings in which the Brahmans\nand Kshattriyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course is\ndestruction or reabsorption, and hence such enjoyment--meaning general\nreabsorption--can belong to the highest Self only.\n\n\n\n\n10. And on account of the topic of the whole section.\n\nMoreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of the entire section.\nCp. 'The wise who knows the Self as great and omnipresent does not\ngrieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor\nby understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him\nthe Self can be gained; the Self chooses him as his own' (I, 2, 23).--\nMoreover, the clause (forming part of the text under discussion),'Who\nknows him (i.e. the being which constitutes the topic of the section)\nwhere he is?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self of\nwhich it had previously been said that it is hard to know unless it\nassists us with its grace.\n\nTo this conclusion a new objection presents itself.--Further on in the\nsame Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with the following text: 'There are two,\ndrinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the\ncave, dwelling on the highest summit; those who know Brahman call them\nshade and light, likewise those householders who perform the Trinakiketa-\nsacrifice.' Now this text clearly refers to the individual soul which\nenjoys the reward of its works, together with an associate coupled to it.\nAnd this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of knowledge\n(buddhi). For the drinking of 'rita' is the enjoyment of the fruit of\nworks, and such enjoyment does not suit the highest Self. The buddhi, or\nthe vital breath, on the other hand, which are instruments of the\nenjoying embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion with the\nenjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is thus seen to refer to\nthe embodied soul coupled with some associate, we infer, on the ground\nof the two texts belonging to one section, that also the 'eater'\ndescribed in the former text is none other than the individual soul.--To\nthis objection the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n11. The 'two entered into the cave' are the two Selfs; on account of\nthis being seen.\n\nThe two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward, are neither\nthe embodied soul together with the vital breath, nor the embodied soul\ntogether with the buddhi; it is rather the embodied Self and the highest\nSelf which are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i.e. it is\nseen that in that section the individual Self and the highest Self only\nare spoken of as entered into the cave. To the highest Self there refers\nI, 2, 12, 'The wise who by meditation on his Self recognises the Ancient\nwho is difficult to see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in\nthe cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and\nsorrow far behind.' And to the individual soul there refers I, 4, 7,\n'Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the\ndeities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born\nvariously through the elements.' Aditi here means the individual soul\nwhich enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works; which is associated with\nthe vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e. whose enjoyment is\ndependent on the different sense-organs; which abides in the hollow of\nthe heart; and which, being connected with the elementary substances,\nearth, and so on, is born in various forms--human, divine, &c.--That the\ntext speaks of the two Selfs as drinking their reward (while actually\nthe individual soul only does so) is to be understood in the same way as\nthe phrase 'there go the umbrella-bearers' (one of whom only carries the\numbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground that both are\nagents with regard to the drinking, in so far as the 'drinking'\nindividual soul is caused to drink by the highest Self.\n\n\n\n\n12. And on account of distinctive qualities.\n\nEverywhere in that section we meet with statements of distinctive\nattributes of the two Selfs, the highest Self being represented as the\nobject of meditation and attainment, and the individual Self as the\nmeditating and attaining subject. The passage 'When he has known and\nunderstood that which is born from Brahman, the intelligent, to be\ndivine and venerable, then he obtains everlasting peace' (I, 1, 17)\nrefers to the meditating individual soul which recognises itself as\nbeing of the nature of Brahman. On the other hand, I, 3, 2, 'That which\nis a bridge for sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those\nwho wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the N\u00e2kiketa, may we be\nable to know that,' refers to the highest Self as the object of\nmeditation; 'N\u00e2kiketa' here meaning that which is to be reached through\nthe N\u00e2kiketa-rite. Again, the passage 'Know the Self to be sitting in\nthe chariot and the body to be the chariot' (I, 3, 3) refers to the\nmeditating individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, 'But he who has\nunderstanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the mind, he\nreaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu.'\nrefers to the embodied and the highest Selfs as that which attains and\nthat which is to be attained. And in the text under discussion also (I,\n3, 1), the two Selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade, the\none being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.\n\nBut, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, I, 1, 20, 'That\ndoubt which there is when a man is dead--some saying, he is; others, he\nis not,' clearly asks a question as to the true nature of the individual\nsoul, and we hence conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole\nchapter.--Not so, we reply. That question does not spring from any doubt\nas to the existence or non-existence of the soul apart from the body;\nfor if this were so the two first boons chosen by N\u00e2kiketas would be\nunsuitable. For the story runs as follows: When the sacrifice offered by\nthe father of N\u00e2kiketas--at which all the possessions of the sacrificer\nwere to be given to the priests--is drawing towards its close, the boy,\nfeeling afraid that some deficiency on the part of the gifts might\nrender the sacrifice unavailing, and dutifully wishing to render his\nfather's sacrifice complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly\nasks his father, 'And to whom will you give me'? The father, irritated\nby the boy's persistent questioning, gives an angry reply, and in\nconsequence of this the boy goes to the palace of Yama, and Yama being\nabsent, stays there for three days without eating. Yama on his return is\nalarmed at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for it\nallows him to choose three boons. N\u00e2kiketas, thereupon, full of faith\nand piety, chooses as his first boon that his father should forgive him.\nNow it is clear that conduct of this kind would not be possible in the\ncase of one not convinced of the soul having an existence independent of\nthe body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the knowledge of a\nsacrificial fire, which has a result to be experienced only by a soul\nthat has departed from the body; and this choice also can clearly be\nmade only by one who knows that the soul is something different from the\nbody. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon the clearing up of\nhis doubt as to the existence of the soul after death (as stated in v.\n20), it is evident that his question is prompted by the desire to\nacquire knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self--which\nknowledge has the form of meditation on the highest Self--, and by means\nthereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which consists in\nobtaining the highest Brahman. The passage, therefore, is not concerned\nmerely with the problem as to the separation of the soul from the body,\nbut rather with the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage\nwhatever--the same problem, in fact, with which another scriptural\npassage also is concerned, viz. 'When he has departed there is no more\nknowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12). The full purport of N\u00e2kiketas' question,\ntherefore, is as follows: When a man qualified for Release has died and\nthus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt as to his\nexistence or non-existence--a doubt due to the disagreement of\nphilosophers as to the true nature of Release; in order to clear up this\ndoubt I wish to learn from thee the true nature of the state of Release.--\nPhilosophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to what\nconstitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is constituted by\nconsciousness only, and that Release consists in the total destruction\nof this essential nature of the Self. Others, while holding the same\nopinion as to the nature of the Self, define Release as the passing away\nof Nescience (avidy\u00e2). Others hold that the Self is in itself non-\nsentient, like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain\ndistinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release then\nconsists in the total removal of all these qualities, the Self remaining\nin a state of pure isolation (kaivalya). Others, again, who acknowledge\na highest Self free from all imperfection, maintain that through\nconnexion with limiting adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an\nindividual soul; Release then means the pure existence of the highest\nSelf, consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts. Those,\nhowever, who understand the Ved\u00e2nta, teach as follows: There is a\nhighest Brahman which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is\nantagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite knowledge\nand blessedness, which comprises within itself numberless auspicious\nqualities of supreme excellence, which is different in nature from all\nother beings, and which constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this\nBrahman, the individual souls--whose true nature is unlimited knowledge,\nand whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the supreme Self--\nare modes, in so far, namely, as they constitute its body. The true\nnature of these souls is, however, obscured by Nescience, i.e. the\ninfluence of the beginningless chain of works; and by _Release_ then we\nhave to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is the\nnatural state of the individual souls, and which follows on the\ndestruction of Nescience.--When N\u00e2kiketas desires Yama graciously to\nteach him the true nature of Release and the means to attain it, Yama at\nfirst tests him by dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release,\nand by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But having in this\nway recognised the boy's thorough fitness, he in the end instructs him\nas to the kind of meditation on the highest Self which constitutes\nknowledge of the highest Reality, as to the nature of Release--which\nconsists in reaching the abode of the highest Self--, and as to all the\nrequired details. This instruction begins, I, 2, 12, 'The Ancient one\nwho is difficult to see,' &c., and extends up to I, 3, 9. 'and that is\nthe highest place of Vishnu.'--It thus is an established conclusion that\nthe 'eater' is no other than the highest Self.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the eater.'\n\n\n\n\n13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest Self) on account of\nsuitability.\n\nThe Chandogas have the following text: 'The Person that is seen within\nthe eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is\nBrahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1). The doubt here arises whether the person\nthat is here spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self,\nor some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the embodied\nSelf, or the highest Self.--It is the reflected Self, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nmaintains; for the text refers to the person seen as something well\nknown, and the expression, 'is seen,' clearly refers to something\ndirectly perceived. Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may\nbe referred to as something well known, as it is in special connexion\nwith the eye: people, by looking into the open eye of a person,\ndetermine whether the living soul remains in him or is departing. Or\nelse we may assume that the Person seen within the eye is some\nparticular divine being, on the strength of the scriptural text, Bri. Up.\nV, 5, 2, 'He (the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him\n(the person within the eye).' Any of these beings may quite suitably be\nreferred to as something well known.--Of these alternatives the S\u00fbtra\ndisposes by declaring that the Person within the eye is the highest Self.\nFor the text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye, 'They\ncall him Samyadv\u00e2ma, for all blessings go towards him. He is also V\u00e2man\u00ee,\nfor he leads all blessings. He is also Bh\u00e2man\u00ee, for he shines in all\nworlds.' And all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest\nSelf only.\n\n\n\n\n14. And on account of the statement as to abode, and so on.\n\nAbiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are predicated by\nscripture of the highest Self only, viz. in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18, 'He who\ndwells within the eye, who rules the eye within.' We therefore recognise\nthat highest Self in the text, 'That Person which is seen within the eye.'\nThe argument founded on reference to 'something well known' thus suits\nthe highest Self very well; and also the clause which denotes immediate\nperception ('is seen') appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is\ndirectly intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of mind\n(Yoga).\n\n\n\n\n15. And on account of the text referring only to what is characterised\nby pleasure.\n\nThe Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person, for the\nfollowing reason also. The topic of the whole section is Brahman\ncharacterised by delight, as indicated in the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is\nBrahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV,10, 5). To that same Brahman\nthe passage under discussion ('The Person that is seen in the eye')\nrefers for the purpose of enjoining first a place with which Brahman is\nto be connected in meditation, and secondly some special qualities--such\nas comprising and leading all blessings--to be attributed to Brahman in\nmeditation.--The word 'only' in the S\u00fbtra indicates the independence of\nthe argument set forth.\n\nBut--an objection is raised--between the Brahman introduced in the\npassage 'Ka is Brahman,'&c., and the text under discussion there\nintervenes the vidy\u00e2 of the Fires (Ch. Up. IV, 11-13), and hence Brahman\ndoes not readily connect itself with our passage. For the text says that\nafter the Fires had taught Upakosala the knowledge of Brahman ('Breath\nis Brahman, Ka is Brahman,' &c.), they taught him a meditation on\nthemselves ('After that the G\u00e2rhapatya fire taught him,' &c., Ch. Up.\nIV, 11, 1). And this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere\nsubordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the text declares that\nit has special fruits of its own--viz. the attainment of a ripe old age\nand prosperous descendants, &c.--which are not comprised in the results\nof the knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in nature.--To\nthis we make the following reply. As both passages (viz. IV, 10, 5,\n'Breath is Brahman,' &c.; and IV, 15, 1, 'this is Brahman') contain the\nword Brahman, and as from the words of the Fires, 'the teacher will tell\nyou the way,' it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is not complete\nbefore that way has been taught, we determine that the knowledge of the\nFires which stands between the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman\nis a mere subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from the\nfact that the G\u00e2rhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakosala only after he\nhas been introduced into the knowledge of Brahman. Upakosala moreover\ncomplains that he is full of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself\nto be conscious of all the sufferings incidental to human life-birth,\nold age, death, &c.--which result from man being troubled by manifold\ndesires for objects other than the attainment of Brahman; when therefore\nthe Fires conclude their instruction by combining in saying, 'This, O\nfriend, is the knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we\nimpart to thee,' it is evident that the vidy\u00e2 of the Fires has to be\ntaken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of the Self whose only\nfruit is Release. And from this it follows that the statement of the\nresults of the Agnividy\u00e2 has to be taken (not as an injunction of\nresults-phalavidhi--but) merely as an arthav\u00e2da (cp. P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb. IV, 3,\n1). It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions such fruits\nof the Agnividy\u00e2 as would be opposed to final Release; all the fruits\nmentioned suit very well the case of a person qualified for Release. 'He\ndestroys sin' (Ch. Up. IV, 11, 2; 12, 2; 13, 2), i.e. he destroys all\nevil works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman. 'He obtains\nthe world,' i. e. all impeding evil works having been destroyed he\nobtains the world of Brahman. 'He reaches his full age,' i.e. he fully\nreaches that age which is required for the completion of meditation on\nBrahman. 'He lives long,' i.e. he lives unassailed by afflictions until\nhe reaches Brahman. 'His descendants do not perish,' i.e. his pupils,\nand their pupils, as well as his sons, grandsons, &c., do not perish; i.\ne. they are all knowers of Brahman, in agreement with what another text\ndeclares to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman--'In his family no one\nis born ignorant of Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). 'We guard him in this\nworld and the other,' i.e. we Fires guard him from all troubles until he\nreaches Brahman.--The Agnividy\u00e2 thus being a member of the Brahmavidy\u00e2,\nthere is no reason why the Brahman introduced in the earlier part of the\nBrahmavidy\u00e2 should not be connected with the latter part--the function\nof this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation (Brahman being\nmeditated on as the Person within the eye), and some special qualities\nof Brahman to be included in the meditation.--But (an objection is\nraised) as the Fires tell Upakosala 'the teacher will tell you the way,'\nwe conclude that the teacher has to give information as to the way to\nBrahman only; how then can his teaching refer to the place of meditation\nand the special qualities of Brahman?--We have to consider, we reply, in\nwhat connexion the Fires address those words to Upakosala. His teacher\nhaving gone on a journey without having imparted to him the knowledge of\nBrahman, and Upakosala being dejected on that account, the sacred fires\nof his teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakosala had tended\nthem, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him the general knowledge\nof the nature of Brahman and the subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But\nremembering that, as scripture says, 'the knowledge acquired from a\nteacher is best,' and hence considering it advisable that the teacher\nhimself should instruct Upakosala as to the attributes of the highest\nBrahman, the place with which it is to be connected in meditation and\nthe way leading to it, they tell him 'the teacher will tell you the way,'\nthe 'way' connoting everything that remains to be taught by the\nteacher. In agreement herewith the teacher--having first said, 'I will\ntell you this; and as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil\nclings to one who knows it'--instructs him about Brahman as possessing\ncertain auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding\nwithin the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman.--It is thus a\nsettled conclusion that the text under discussion refers to that Brahman\nwhich was introduced in the passage 'Ka is Brahman,' and that hence the\nPerson abiding within the eye is the highest Self.\n\nBut--an objection is raised--how do you know that the passage 'Ka\n(pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' really refers to the\nhighest Brahman, so as to be able to interpret on that basis the text\nabout the Person within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to\ntake the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a meditation on Brahman\nviewed under the form of elemental ether and of ordinary worldly\npleasure. This interpretation would, moreover, be in agreement with\nother similarly worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin\nmeditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as 'Name is Brahman',\n'Mind is Brahman.'\n\n\n\n\n16. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman.\n\nBecause the clause 'What is Ka the same is Kha' speaks of ether as\ncharacterised by pleasure, the ether which is denoted by 'Kha' is no\nother than the highest Brahman. To explain. On the Fires declaring\n'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakosala says, 'I\nunderstand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand Ka and Kha.'\nThe meaning of this is as follows. The Fires cannot speak of meditation\non Brahman under the form of breath and so on, because they are engaged\nin giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age, death, &c.,\nand desirous of final Release. What they declare to me therefore is\nmeditation on Brahman itself. Now here Brahman is exhibited in co-\nordination with certain well-known things, breath and so on. That\nBrahman should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable,\neither from the point of view of Brahman having the attribute of\nsupporting the world, or on account of Brahman being the ruler of breath,\nwhich stands to it in the relation of a body. Hence Upakosala says, 'I\nunderstand that breath is Brahman.' With regard to pleasure and ether,\non the other hand, there arises the question whether they are exhibited\nin the relation of qualifying attributes of Brahman on the ground of\ntheir forming the body of Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or\nwhether the two terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to\nconvey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being constituted by\nsupreme delight. On the former alternative the declaration of the Fires\nwould only state that Brahman is the ruler of the elemental ether and of\nall delight depending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion\nof Brahman's true nature; on the latter alternative the Fires would\ndeclare that unlimited delight constitutes Brahman's true nature. In\norder to ascertain which of the two meanings has to be taken, Upakosala\ntherefore says, 'I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The Fires,\ncomprehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, 'What is Ka the same\nis Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,' which means that the bliss which\nconstitutes Brahman's nature is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore\nwhich has breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body,\nis of the nature of unlimited bliss; the text therefore adds, 'They\ntaught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as ether.' What the text,\n'Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' teaches thus is Brahman as consisting\nof unlimited bliss, and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text\nabout the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore is the\nhighest Self.\n\n\n\n\n17. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the\nUpanishads.\n\nOther scriptural texts give an account of the way--the first station of\nwhich is light--that leads up to the highest Person, without any\nsubsequent return, the soul of him who has read the Upanishads, and has\nthus acquired a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now\nthis same way is described by the teacher to Upakosala in connexion with\nthe instruction as to the Person in the eye, 'They go to light, from\nlight to day,' &c. This also proves that the Person within the eye is\nthe highest Self.\n\n\n\n\n18. Not any other, on account of non-permanency of abode, and of\nimpossibility.\n\nAs the reflected Self and the other Selfs mentioned by the P\u00fbrvapakshin\ndo not necessarily abide within the eye, and as conditionless\nimmortality and the other qualities (ascribed in the text to the Person\nwithin the eye) cannot possibly belong to them, the Person within the\neye cannot be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected\nSelf it cannot be said that it permanently abides within the eye, for\nits presence there depends on the nearness to the eye of another person.\nThe embodied Self again has its seat within the heart, which is the root\nof all sense-organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the\ndifferent senses; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And with\nregard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests with his rays in him,\ni.e. the eye': this implies that the divine being may preside over the\norgan of sight although itself abiding in another place; it does not\ntherefore abide in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and\nsimilar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selfs. The Person\nseen within the eye therefore is the highest Self.\n\nWe have, under S\u00fb. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the abiding within\nthe eye and ruling the eye, which is referred to in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18\n('He who dwells in the eye,' &c.), can belong to the highest Self only,\nand have on that basis proved that the Self within the eye is the\nhighest Self.--Here terminates the adhikarana of that 'within.'--The\nnext S\u00fbtra now proceeds to prove that assumption.\n\n\n\n\n19. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses with respect to the\ngods, with respect to the worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the\nattributes of that are designated.\n\nThe V\u00e2jasaneyins, of the K\u00e2nwa as well as the M\u00e2dhyandina branch, have\nthe following text: 'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth,\nwhom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the\nearth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The text\nthereupon extends this teaching as to a being that dwells in things, is\nwithin them, is not known by them, has them for its body and rules them;\nin the first place to all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun,\nthe regions, moon, stars, ether, darkness, light; and next to all\nmaterial beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge,\nseed--closing each section with the words, 'He is thy Self, the ruler\nwithin, the Immortal.' The M\u00e2dhyandinas, however, have three additional\nsections, viz. 'He who dwells in all worlds,' &c.; 'he who dwells in all\nVedas,' &c.; 'He who dwells in all sacrifices'; and, moreover, in place\nof 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vij\u00f1\u00e0na) they read 'He who dwells in\nthe Self.'--A doubt here arises whether the inward Ruler of these texts\nbe the individual Self or the highest Self.\n\nThe individual Self, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains. For in the\nsupplementary passage (which follows upon the text considered so far)\nthe internal Ruler is called the 'seer' and 'hearer,' i.e. his knowledge\nis said to depend on the sense-organs, and this implies the view that\nthe 'seer' only (i.e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler; and\nfurther the clause 'There is no other seer but he' negatives any other\nseer.\n\nThis view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The Ruler within, who is spoken of\nin the clauses marked in the text by the terms 'with respect of the gods,'\n'with respect of the worlds,' &c., is the highest Self free from all\nevil, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana. The S\u00fbtra purposely joins the two terms 'with respect to\nthe gods' and 'with respect to the worlds' in order to intimate that, in\naddition to the clauses referring to the gods and beings (bh\u00fbta)\nexhibited by the K\u00e2nva-text, the M\u00e2dhyandina-text contains additional\nclauses referring to the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of\nin both these sets of passages is the highest Self; for attributes of\nthat Self are declared in the text. For it is a clear attribute of the\nhighest Self that being one only it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all\ndivine beings, and so on. Udd\u00e2laka asks, 'Dost thou know that Ruler\nwithin who within rules this world and the other world and all beings?\n&c.--tell now that Ruler within'; and Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya replies with the long\npassus, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c., describing the Ruler within\nas him who, abiding within all worlds, all beings, all divinities, all\nVedas, and all sacrifices, rules them from within and constitutes their\nSelf, they in turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which\ncan belong to none else but the highest Person, who is all-knowing, and\nall whose purposes immediately realise themselves. That it is the\nhighest Self only which rules over all and is the Self of all, other\nUpanishad-texts also declare; cp. e.g. 'Entered within, the ruler of\ncreatures, the Self of all'; 'Having sent forth this he entered into it.\nHaving entered it he became sat and tyat,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6).\nSimilarly the text from the Sub\u00e2la-Up., which begins, 'there was not\nanything here in the beginning,' and extends up to 'the one God,\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana,' shows that it is the highest Brahman only which rules all, is\nthe Self of all, and has all beings for its body. Moreover, essential\nimmortality (which the text ascribes to the Ruler within) is an\nattribute of the highest Self only.--Nor must it be thought that the\npower of seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is dependent\non sense-organs; it rather results immediately from its essential\nnature, since its omniscience and power to realise its purposes are due\nto its own being only. In agreement herewith scripture says, 'He sees\nwithout eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps\nand hastes' (Svet. Up. III, 19). What terms such as 'seeing' and\n'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as produced by the\neye and ear, but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound. In the\ncase of the individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is\nobscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the\nmediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the highest Self, on the\nother hand, it springs from its own nature.--Again, the clause 'there is\nno other seer but he' means that there is no seer other than the seer\nand ruler described in the preceding clauses. To explain. The clauses\n'whom the earth does not know,' &c., up to 'whom the Self does not know'\nmean to say that the Ruler within rules without being perceived by the\nearth, Self, and the other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by\nthe subsequent clauses, 'unseen but a seer', 'unheard but a hearer,' &c.\nAnd the next clauses, 'there is no other seer but he,' &c., then mean to\nnegative that there is any other being which could be viewed as the\nruler of that Ruler. Moreover, the clauses 'that is the Self of thee,'\n'He is the Self of thee' exhibit the individual Self in the genitive\nform ('of thee'), and thus distinguish it from the Ruler within, who is\ndeclared to be their Self.\n\n\n\n\n20. And not that which Smriti assumes, on account of the declaration of\nqualities not belonging to that; nor the embodied one.\n\n'That which Smriti assumes' is the Pradh\u00e2na; the 'embodied one' is the\nindividual soul. Neither of these can be the Ruler within, since the\ntext states attributes which cannot possibly belong to either. For there\nis not even the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of\nseeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and immortality\nshould belong either to the non-sentient Pradh\u00e2na or to the individual\nsoul.--The last two S\u00fbtras have declared that the mentioned qualities\nbelong to the highest Self, while they do not belong to the individual\nsoul. The next S\u00fbtra supplies a new, independent argument.\n\n\n\n\n21. For both also speak of it as something different.\n\nBoth, i.e. the M\u00e2dhyandinas as well as the K\u00e2nvas, distinguish in their\ntexts the embodied soul, together with speech and other non-intelligent\nthings, from the Ruler within, representing it as an object of his rule.\nThe M\u00e2dhyandinas read, 'He who dwells in the Self, whom the Self does\nnot know,' &c.; the K\u00e2nvas, 'He who dwells within understanding', &c.\nThe declaration of the individual Self being ruled by the Ruler within\nimplies of course the declaration of the former being different from the\nlatter.\n\nThe conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is a being\ndifferent from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self free from all\nevil, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the internal Ruler'.\n\n\n\n\n22. That which possesses the qualities of invisibility, &c., on account\nof the declaration of attributes.\n\nThe \u00c2tharvanikas read in their text, 'The higher knowledge is that by\nwhich that Indestructible is apprehended. That which is invisible,\nunseizable, without origin and qualities, &c., that it is which the wise\nregard as the source of all beings'; and further on, 'That which is\nhigher than the high Imperishable' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5, 6; II, 1, 2). The\ndoubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the qualities\nof imperceptibility, &c., and that which is higher than the\nIndestructible, should be taken to denote the Pradh\u00e2na and the soul of\nthe S\u00e2nkhyas, or whether both denote the highest Self.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin\nmaintains the former alternative. For, he says, while in the text last\ndiscussed there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being,\nviz. in the clause 'unseen but a seer', no similar attribute is stated\nin the former of the two texts under discussion, and the latter text\nclearly describes the collective individual soul, which is higher than\nthe imperishable Pradh\u00e2na, which itself is higher than all its effects.\nThe reasons for this decision are as follows:--Colour and so on reside\nin the gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements, earth,\nand so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are expressly negatived,\nsuch negation suggests a non-sentient thing cognate to earth, &c., but\nof a subtle kind, and such a thing is no other than the Pradh\u00e2na. And as\nsomething higher than this Pradh\u00e2na there are known the collective souls\nonly, under whose guidance the Pradh\u00e2na gives birth to all its effects,\nfrom the so-called Mahat downwards to individual things. This\ninterpretation is confirmed by the comparisons set forth in the next\nsloka, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants\nspring from the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living\nman, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible.' The\nsection therefore is concerned only with the Pradh\u00e2na and the individual\nsoul.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. That which possesses\ninvisibility and the other qualities stated in the text, and that which\nis higher than the high Indestructible, is no other than the highest\nSelf. For the text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self\nonly, viz. in I, 1, 9, 'He who knows all, cognises all,' &c. Let us\nshortly consider the connexion of the text. The passage beginning 'the\nhigher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended'\ndeclares an indestructible being possessing the attributes of\ninvisibility and so on. The clause 'everything arises here from the\nIndestructible' next declares that from that being all things originate.\nNext the sloka, 'He who knows all and cognises all,' predicates of that\nIndestructible which is the source of all beings, omniscience, and\nsimilar qualities. And finally the text, 'That which is higher than the\nhigh Indestructible,' characterises that same being--which previously\nhad been called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all-\nknowing, &c.--as the highest of all. Hence it is evident that in the\ntext 'higher than the high Indestructible' the term 'Indestructible'\ndoes not denote the invisible, &c. Indestructible, which is the chief\ntopic of the entire section; for there can of course be nothing higher\nthan that which, as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c., is itself\nhigher than anything else. The 'Indestructible' in that text therefore\ndenotes the elements in their subtle condition.\n\n\n\n\n23. Not the two others, on account of distinction and statement of\ndifference.\n\nThe section distinguishes the indestructible being, which is the source\nof all, &c., from the Pradh\u00e2na as well as the individual soul, in so far,\nnamely, as it undertakes to prove that by the cognition of one thing\neverything is known; and it moreover, in passages such as 'higher than\nthe high Indestructible,' explicitly states the difference of the\nindestructible being from those other two.--The text first relates that\nBrahm\u00e2 told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the foundation of the\nknowledge of all, to his eldest son Atharvan: this introduces the\nknowledge of Brahman as the topic of the section. Then, the text\nproceeds, in order to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been\nhanded down through a succession of teachers to Angiras, Saunaka\napproached Angiras respectfully and asked him: 'What is that through\nwhich, if known, all this is known?' i.e. since all knowledge is founded\non the knowledge of Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman.\nAngiras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must acquire two\nkinds of knowledge, both of them having Brahman for their object: an\nindirect one which springs from the study of the s\u00e2stras, viz. the Veda,\nSiksh\u00e2, Kalpa, and so on, and a direct one which springs from\nconcentrated meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the\nmeans of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of devout meditation\n(bhakti), as characterised in the text 'He whom the Self chooses, by him\nthe Self can be gained' (III, 2, 3). The means again towards this kind\nof knowledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition,\nassisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means (sec above, p.\n17); in agreement with the text, 'Him the Brahmattas seek to know by the\nstudy of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri.\nUp. IV, 4, 22).--Thus the Reverend Par\u00e2sara also says, 'The cause of\nattaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is twofold, according\nas it is based on sacred tradition or springs from discrimination.' The\nMundaka-text refers to the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage\n'the lower knowledge is the Rig-veda,' &c., up to 'and the dharma-\ns\u00e2stras'; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition of Brahman;\nwhile the higher kind of knowledge, which is called 'up\u00e2san\u00e2,' has the\ncharacter of devout meditation (bhakti), and consists in direct\nintuition of Brahman, is referred to in the clause 'the higher knowledge\nis that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' The text next\nfollowing, 'That which is invisible, &c., then sets forth the nature of\nthe highest Brahman, which is the object of the two kinds of knowledge\npreviously described. After this the passage 'As the spider sends forth\nand draws in its thread' declares that from that indestructible highest\nBrahman, as characterised before, there originates the whole universe of\nthings, sentient and non-sentient. The next soka (tapas\u00e2 k\u00eeyate, &c.)\nstates particulars about this origination of the universe from Brahman.\n'Brahman swells through brooding'; through brooding, i.e. thought--in\nagreement with a later text, 'brooding consists of thought'--Brahman\nswells, i.e. through thought in the form of an intention, viz. 'may I\nbecome many,' Brahman becomes ready for creation. From it there springs\nfirst 'anna,' i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part of\nall enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles of all\nelements. From this 'anna' there spring successively breath, mind, and\nall other effected things up to work, which is the means of producing\nreward in the form of the heavenly world, and Release. The last sloka of\nthe first chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as\nomniscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman for creation,\nand then declares that from the indestructible highest Brahman there\nsprings the effected (k\u00e2rya) Brahman, distinguished by name and form,\nand comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment.--The\nfirst sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest\nBrahman is absolutely real ('That is true'), and then admonishes those\nwho desire to reach the indestructible highest Self, which possesses all\nthe blessed qualities stated before and exists through itself, to turn\naway from other rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works\ndepending on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by\npoets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men according to caste and\n\u00e2srama. The section 'this is your path' (I, 2, 1) up to 'this is the\nholy Brahma-world gained by your good works' (I, 2, 6) next states the\nparticular mode of performing those works, and declares that an omission\nof one of the successive works enjoined in Druti and Smriti involves\nfruitlessness of the works actually performed, and that something not\nperformed in the proper way is as good as not performed at all. Stanzas\n7 and ff. ('But frail in truth are those boats') declare that those who\nperform this lower class of works have to return again and again into\nthe Sams\u00e2ra, because they aim at worldly results and are deficient in\ntrue knowledge. Stanza 8 ('but those who practise penance and faith')\nthen proclaims that works performed by a man possessing true knowledge,\nand hence not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of\nBrahman; and stanzas 12 a, 13 ('having examined all these worlds')\nenjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on the part of a man who\nhas turned away from _mere_ works, as the means of reaching Brahman; and\ndue recourse to a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such\nknowledge.--The first chapter of the second section of the Upanishad (II,\n1)then clearly teaches how the imperishable highest Brahman, i.e. the\nhighest Self--as constituting the Self of all things and having all\nthings for its body--has all things for its outward form and emits all\nthings from itself. The remainder of the Upanishad ('Manifest, near,' &c.\n) teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable and higher\nthan the soul, which itself is higher than the Unevolved; which dwells\nin the highest Heaven; and which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is\nto be meditated upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this\nmeditation has the character of devout faith (bhakti); and how the\ndevotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his reward\nintuition of Brahman, which renders him like Brahman.\n\nIt thus clearly appears that 'on account of distinction and statement of\ndifference' the Upanishad does not treat of the Pradh\u00e2na and the soul.\nFor that the highest Brahman is different from those two is declared in\npassages such as 'That heavenly Person is without body; he is both\nwithout and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure,\nhigher than what is higher than the Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); for the\nlast words mean 'that imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility\nand similar qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual\nsouls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle elements.' The\nterm 'akshara' (imperishable) is to be etymologically explained either\nas that which pervades (asnute) or that which does not pass away (a-\nksharati), and is on either of these explanations applicable to the\nhighest Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or\nbecause it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called akshara),\nfree from all passing away or decaying.--Here terminates the adhikarana\nof 'invisibility and so on.'\n\n\n\n\n24. And on account of the description of its form.\n\n'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the regions his ears,\nhis speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the\nuniverse; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of\nall things' (II, 1, 4)--the outward form here described can belong to\nnone but the highest Self; that is, the inner Self of all beings. The\nsection therefore treats of the highest Self.\n\n\n\n\n25. Vaisv\u00e2nara (is the highest Self), on account of the distinctions\nqualifying the common term.\n\nThe Chandogas read in their text, 'You know at present that Vaisv\u00e2nara\nSelf, tell us that,' &c., and further on, 'But he who meditates on the\nVaisv\u00e2nara Self as a span long,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 11, 6; 18, 1). The\ndoubt here arises whether that Vaisv\u00e2nara Self can be made out to be the\nhighest Self or not. The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative.\nFor, he says, the word Vaisv\u00e2nara is used in the sacred texts in four\ndifferent senses. It denotes in the first place the intestinal fire, so\nin Bri. Up, V, 9, 'That is the Vaisv\u00e2nara fire by which the food that is\neaten is cooked, i.e. digested. Its noise is that which one hears when\none covers one's ears. When man is on the point of departing this life\nhe does not hear that noise.'--It next denotes the third of the elements,\nso in Ri_. Samh. X, 88, 12, 'For the whole world the gods have made the\nAgni Vaisv\u00e2nara a sign of the days.'--It also denotes a divinity, so Ri_.\nSamh. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vaisv\u00e2nara, for he is the\nking of the kings,' &c. And finally it denotes the highest Self, as in\nthe passage, 'He offered it in the Self, in the heart, in Agni\nVaisv\u00e2nara'; and in Pra. Up. I, 7, 'Thus he rises as Vaisv\u00e2nara,\nassuming all forms, as breath of life, as fire.'--And the characteristic\nmarks mentioned in the introductory clauses of the Chandogya-text under\ndiscussion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of these\nmeanings of the word Vaisv\u00e2nara.\n\nAgainst this prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra declares itself. The term\n'Vaisv\u00e2nara' in the Ch\u00e2ndogya-text denotes the highest Self, because the\n'common' term is there qualified by attributes specially belonging to\nthe highest Self. For the passage tells us how Aupamanyava and four\nother great Rhshis, having met and discussed the question as to what was\ntheir Self and Brahman, come to the conclusion to go to Udd\u00e2laka because\nhe is reputed to know the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self. Udd\u00e2laka, recognising their\nanxiety to know the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self, and deeming himself not to be fully\ninformed on this point, refers them to Asvapati Kaikeya as thoroughly\nknowing the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self; and they thereupon, together with Udd\u00e2laka,\napproach Asvapati. The king duly honours them with presents, and as they\nappear unwilling to receive them, explains that they may suitably do so,\nhe himself being engaged in the performance of a religious vow; and at\nthe same time instructs them that even men knowing Brahman must avoid\nwhat is forbidden and do what is prescribed. When thereupon he adds that\nhe will give them as much wealth as to the priests engaged in his\nsacrifice, they, desirous of Release and of knowing the Vais\u00e2nara Self,\nrequest him to explain that Self to them. Now it clearly appears that as\nthe Rishis are said to be desirous of knowing--that Brahman which is the\nSelf of the individual souls ('what is our Self, what is Brahman'), and\ntherefore search for some one to instruct them on that point, the\nVaisv\u00e2nara Self--to a person acquainted with which they address\nthemselves--can be the highest Self only. In the earlier clauses the\nterms used are 'Self' and 'Brahman,' in the later 'Self' and 'Vaisv\u00e2nara';\nfrom this it appears also that the term 'Vaisv\u00e2nara,' which takes the\nplace of 'Brahman,' denotes none other but the highest Self. The results,\nmoreover, of the knowledge of the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self, which are stated in\nsubsequent passages, show that the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self is the highest\nBrahman. 'He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'; 'as\nthe fibres of the Ish\u00eek\u00e2 reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus\nall his sins are burned' (V, 18, I; 24, 3).\n\nThe next S\u00fbtra supplies a further reason for the same conclusion.\n\n\n\n\n26. That which the text refers to is an inferential mark--thus.\n\nThe text describes the shape of Vaisv\u00e2nara, of whom heaven, &c., down to\nearth constitute the several limbs; and it is known from Scripture and\nSmriti that such is the shape of the highest Self. When, therefore, we\nrecognise that shape as referred to in the text, this supplies an\ninferential mark of Vaisv\u00e2nara being the highest Self.--The 'thus' (iti)\nin the S\u00fbtra denotes a certain mode, that is to say, 'a shape of such a\nkind being recognised in the text enables us to infer that Vaisv\u00e2nara is\nthe highest Self.' For in Scripture and Smriti alike the highest Person\nis declared to have such a shape. Cp. e.g. the text of the \u00c1tharvanas.\n'Agni is his head, the sun and moon his eyes, the regions his cars, his\nspeech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the Universe;\nfrom his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things'\n(Mu. Up. II, I, 4). 'Agni' in this passage denotes the heavenly world,\nin agreement with the text 'that world indeed is Agni.' And the\nfollowing Smrriti texts: 'He of whom the wise declare the heavenly world\nto be the head, the ether the navel, sun and moon the eyes, the regions\nthe ears, the earth the feet; he whose Self is unfathomable is the\nleader of all beings'; and 'of whom Agni is the mouth, heaven the head,\nthe ether the navel, the earth the feet, the sun the eye, the regions\nthe ear; worship to him, the Self of the Universe!'--Now our text\ndeclares the heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the\nother limbs of Vaisv\u00e2nara. For Kaikeya on being asked by the Rishis to\ninstruct them as to the Vasv\u00e2nara Self recognises that they all know\nsomething about the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self while something they do not know\n(for thus only we can explain his special questions), and then in order\nto ascertain what each knows and what not, questions them separately.\nWhen thereupon Aupamanyava replies that he meditates on heaven only as\nthe Self, Kaikeya, in order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven\nis the whole Vaisv\u00e2nara Self, teaches him that heaven is the head of\nVaisv\u00e2nara, and that of heaven which thus is a part only of Vaisv\u00e2nara,\nSutejas is the special name. Similarly he is thereupon told by the other\nRishis that they meditate only on sun, air, ether, and earth, and\ninforms them in return that the special names of these beings are 'the\nomniform,' 'he who moves in various ways,' 'the full one,''wealth and\n'firm rest,' and that these all are mere members of the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self,\nviz. its eyes, breath, trunk, bladder, and feet. The shape thus\ndescribed in detail can belong to the highest Self only, and hence\nVaisv\u00e2nara is none other but the highest Self.\n\nThe next S\u00fbtra meets a further doubt as to this decision not yet being\nwell established.\n\n\n\n\n27. Should it be said that it is not so, on account of the word, &c.,\nand on account of the abiding within; we say, no; on account of\nmeditation being taught thus, on account of impossibility; and because\nthey read of him as person.\n\nAn objection is raised. Vaisv\u00e2nara cannot be ascertained to be the\nhighest Self, because, on the account of the text and of the abiding\nwithin, we can understand by the Vaisv\u00e2nara in our text the intestinal\nfire also. The text to which we refer occurs in the Vaisv\u00e2nara-vidy\u00e2 of\nthe V\u00e2jasaneyins, 'This one is the Agni Vaisv\u00e2nara,' where the two words\n'Agni' and 'Vaisv\u00e2nara' are exhibited in co-ordination. And in the\nsection under discussion the passage, 'the heart is the G\u00e2rhapatya fire,\nthe mind the Anv\u00e2h\u00e2rya-pakana fire, the mouth the \u00c2havan\u00eeya fire' (Ch.\nUp. V, 18, 2), represents the Vaisv\u00e2nara in so far as abiding within the\nheart and so on as constituting the triad of sacred fires. Moreover the\ntext, 'The first food which a man may take is in the place of Soma. And\nhe who offers that first oblation should offer it to Pr\u00e2na' (V, 19, 1),\nintimates that Vaisv\u00e2nara is the abode of the offering to Pr\u00e2na. In the\nsame way the V\u00e2jasaneyins declare that Vaisv\u00e2nara abides within man, viz.\nin the passage 'He who knows this Agni Vaisv\u00e2nara shaped like a man\nabiding within man.' As thus Vaisv\u00e2nara appears in co-ordination with\nthe word 'Agni,' is represented as the triad of sacred fires, is said to\nbe the abode of the oblation to Breath, and to abide within man, he must\nbe viewed as the intestinal fire, and it is therefore not true that he\ncan be identified with the highest Self only.\n\nThis objection is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. It is not so 'on account of\nmeditation (on the highest Self) being taught thus,' i.e. as the text\nmeans to teach that the highest Brahman which, in the manner described\nbefore, has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon as\nqualified by the intestinal fire which (like other beings) constitutes\nBrahman's body. For the word 'Agni' denotes not only the intestinal fire,\nbut also the highest Self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire.--\nBut how is this to be known?--'On account of impossibility;' i.e.\nbecause it is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the\nthree worlds for its body. The true state of the case therefore is that\nthe word Agni, which is understood to denote the intestinal fire, when\nappearing in co-ordination with the term Vaisv\u00e2nara represented as\nhaving the three worlds for his body, denotes (not the intestinal fire,\nbut) the highest Self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the\nbody of the Self. Thus the Lord also says, 'As Vaisv\u00e2nara fire I abide\nin the body of living creatures and, being assisted by breath inspired\nand expired, digest the fourfold food' (Bha G\u00ee. XIV, 15). 'As Vaisv\u00e2nara\nfire' here means 'embodied in the intestinal fire.'--The Ch\u00e2ndogya text\nunder discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self embodied in the\nVaisv\u00e2nara fire.--Moreover the V\u00e2jasaneyins read of him, viz. the\nVaisv\u00e2nara, as man or person, viz. in the passage 'That Agni Vaisv\u00e2nara\nis the person' (Sa. Br\u00e2. X, 6, 1, 11). The intestinal fire by itself\ncannot be called a person; unconditioned personality belongs to the\nhighest Self only. Compare 'the thousand-headed person' (Ri. Samh.), and\n'the Person is all this' (Sve. Up. III, 15).\n\n\n\n\n28. For the same reasons not the divinity and the element.\n\nFor the reasons stated Vaisv\u00e2nara can be neither the deity Fire, nor the\nelemental fire which holds the third place among the gross elements.\n\n\n\n\n29. Jaimini thinks that there is no objection to (the word 'Agni')\ndirectly (denoting the highest Self).\n\nSo far it has been maintained that the word 'Agni,' which stands in co-\nordination with the term 'Vaisv\u00e2nara,' denotes the highest Self in so\nfar as qualified by the intestinal fire constituting its body; and that\nhence the text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self.\nJaimini, on the other hand, is of opinion that there is no reasonable\nobjection to the term 'Agni,' no less than the term: 'Vaisv\u00e2nara,' being\ntaken _directly_ to denote the highest Self. That is to say--in the same\nway as the term 'Vaisv\u00e2nara,' although a common term, yet when qualified\nby attributes especially belonging to the highest Self is known to\ndenote the latter only as possessing the quality of ruling all men; so\nthe word 'Agni' also when appearing in connexion with special attributes\nbelonging to the highest Self denotes that Self only. For any quality on\nthe ground of which 'Agni' may be etymologically explained to denote\nordinary fire--as when e.g. we explain 'agni' as he who 'agre nayati'--\nmay also, in its highest non-conditioned degree, be ascribed to the\nsupreme Self. Another difficulty remains. The passage (V, 18, 1) 'yas tv\netam evam pr\u00e2desam\u00e2tram abhivim\u00e2nam,' &c. declares that the non-limited\nhighest Brahman is limited by the measure of the pradesas, i.e. of the\ndifferent spaces-heaven, ether, earth, &c.--which had previously been\nsaid to constitute the limbs of Vaisv\u00e2nara. How is this possible?\n\n\n\n\n30. On account of definiteness; thus \u00c2smarathya opines.\n\nThe teacher \u00c2smarathya is of opinion that the text represents the\nhighest Self as possessing a definite extent, to the end of rendering\nthe thought of the meditating devotee more definite. That is to say--the\nlimitation due to the limited extent of heaven, sun, &c. has the purpose\nof rendering definite to thought him who pervades (abhi) all this\nUniverse and in reality transcends all measure (vim\u00e2na).--A further\ndifficulty remains. For what purpose is the highest Brahman here\nrepresented like a man, having a head and limbs?--This point the next\nS\u00fbtra elucidates.\n\n\n\n\n31. On account of meditation, B\u00e2dari thinks.\n\nThe teacher B\u00e2dari thinks that the representation in the text of the\nsupreme Self in the form of a man is for the purpose of devout\nmeditation. 'He who in this way meditates on that Vaisv\u00e2nara Self as\n\"pr\u00e2desam\u00e2tra\" and \"abhivim\u00e2na,\" he eats food in all worlds, in all\nbeings, in all Selfs.' What this text enjoins is devout meditation for\nthe purpose of reaching Brahman. 'In this way' means 'as having a human\nform.' And 'the eating' of food in all worlds, &c. means the gaining of\nintuitional knowledge of Brahman which abides everywhere and is in\nitself of the nature of supreme bliss. The special kind of food, i.e.\nthe special objects of enjoyment which belong to the different Selfs\nstanding under the influence of karman cannot be meant here; for those\nlimited objects have to be shunned by those who desire final release. A\nfurther question arises. If Vaisv\u00e2nara is the highest Self, how can the\ntext say that the altar is its chest, the grass on the altar its hairs,\nand so on? (V, 18, 2.) Such a statement has a sense only if we\nunderstand by Vaisv\u00e2nara the intestinal fire.--This difficulty the next\nS\u00fbtra elucidates.\n\n\n\n\n32. On account of imaginative identification, thus Jaimini thinks; for\nthus the text declares.\n\nThe teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the altar is stated to be the\nchest of Vaisv\u00e2nara, and so on, in order to effect an imaginative\nidentification of the offering to Pr\u00e2na which is daily performed by the\nmeditating devotees and is the means of pleasing Vaisv\u00e2nara, having the\nheaven and so on for his body, i.e. the highest Self, with the Agnihotra-\noffering. For the fruit due to meditation on the highest Self, as well\nas the identity of the offering to breath with the Agnihotra, is\ndeclared in the following text, 'He who without knowing this offers the\nAgnihotra--that would be as if removing the live coals he were to pour\nhis libation on dead ashes. But he who offers this Agnihotra with a full\nknowledge of its purport, he offers it in all worlds, in all beings, in\nall Selfs. As the fibres of the Ish\u00eek\u00e2 reed when thrown into the fire\nare burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.' (V, 24, 1-3.)\n\n\n\n\n33. Moreover, they record him in that.\n\nThey (i.e. the V\u00e2jasaneyins) speak of him, viz. Vaisv\u00e2nara who has\nheaven for his head, &c.--i.e. the highest Self--as within that, i.e.\nthe body of the devotee, so as to form the abode of the oblation to\nPr\u00e2na; viz. in the text,'Of that Vaisv\u00e2nara Self the head is Sutejas,'\nand so on. The context is as follows. The clause 'He who meditates on\nthe Vaisv\u00e2nara Self as pr\u00e2desam\u00e2tra,' &c. enjoins meditation on the\nhighest Self having the three worlds for its body, i.e. on Vaisv\u00e2nara.\nThe following clause 'he eats food in all worlds' teaches that the\nattaining of Brahman is the reward of such meditation. And then the text\nproceeds to teach the Agnihotra offered to Pr\u00e2na, which is something\nsubsidiary to the meditation taught. The text here establishes an\nidentity between the members--fire, sun, &c.--of the Vaisv\u00e2nara enjoined\nas object of meditation (which members are called Sutejas, Visvar\u00fbpa, &c.\n), and parts--viz. head, eye, breath, trunk, bladder, feet--of the\nworshipper's body. 'The head is Sutejas'--that means: the head of the\ndevotee is (identical with) heaven, which is the head of the highest\nSelf; and so on up to 'the feet,' i.e. the feet of the devotee are\nidentical with the earth, which constitutes the feet of the highest Self,\nThe devotee having thus reflected on the highest Self, which has the\nthree worlds for its body, as present within his own body, thereupon is\ntold to view his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth as identical\nwith the altar, grass and the other things which are required for the\nAgnihotra; further to identify the oblation to Pr\u00e2na with the Agnihotra,\nand by means of this Pr\u00e2na-agnihotra to win the favour of Vaisv\u00e2nara, i.\ne. the highest Self. The final--conclusion then remains that Vaisv\u00e2nara\nis none other than the highest Self, the supreme Person.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'Vaisv\u00e2nara.'\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. The abode of heaven, earth, &c. (is the highest Self), on account of\nterms which are its own.\n\nThe followers of the Atharva-veda have the following text, 'He in whom\nthe heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, the mind also, with all the\nvital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words; he is\nthe bank (setu) of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). The doubt here\narises whether the being spoken of as the abode of heaven, earth, and so\non, is the individual soul or the highest Self.\n\nThe P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he remarks, in\nthe next sloka, 'where like spokes in the nave of a wheel the arteries\nmeet, he moves about within, becoming manifold,' the word 'where' refers\nback to the being which in the preceding sloka had been called the abode\nof heaven, earth, and so on, the clause beginning with 'where' thus\ndeclaring that that being is the basis of the arteries; and the next\nclause declares that same being to become manifold or to be born in many\nways. Now, connexion with the arteries is clearly characteristic of the\nindividual soul; and so is being born in many forms, divine and so on.\nMoreover, in the very sloka under discussion it is said that that being\nis the abode of the mind and the five vital airs, and this also is a\ncharacteristic attribute of the individual soul. It being, on these\ngrounds, ascertained that the text refers to the individual soul we must\nattempt to reconcile therewith, as well as we can, what is said about\nits being the abode of heaven, earth, &c.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. That which is described\nas the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is none other than the highest\nBrahman, on account of a term which is 'its own,' i.e. which specially\nbelongs to it. The clause we have in view is 'he is the bank of the\nImmortal.' This description applies to the highest Brahman only, which\nalone is, in all Upanishads, termed the cause of the attainment of\nImmortality; cp. e.g. 'Knowing him thus a man becomes immortal; there is\nno other path to go' (Sve. Up. III, 8). The term 'setu' is derived from\n_si_, which means to bind, and therefore means that which binds, i.e.\nmakes one to attain immortality; or else it may be understood to mean\nthat which leads towards immortality that lies beyond the ocean of\nsams\u00e2ra, in the same way as a bank or bridge (setu) leads to the further\nside of a river.--Moreover the word 'Self (\u00e2tman) (which, in the text\nunder discussion, is also applied to that which is the abode of heaven,\nearth, &c.), without any further qualification, primarily denotes\nBrahman only; for '\u00e2tman' comes from _\u00e2p_, to reach, and means that\nwhich 'reaches' all other things in so far as it rules them. And further\non (II, 2, 7) there are other terms, 'all knowing,' 'all cognising,'\nwhich also specially belong to the highest Brahman only. This Brahman\nmay also be represented as the abode of the arteries; as proved e.g. by\nMah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. (XI, 8-12), 'Surrounded by the arteries he hangs ... in the\nmiddle of this pointed flame there dwells the highest Self.' Of that\nSelf it may also be said that it is born in many ways; in accordance\nwith texts such as 'not born, he is born in many ways; the wise know the\nplace of his birth.' For in order to fit himself to be a refuge for\ngods, men, &c. the supreme Person, without however putting aside his\ntrue nature, associates himself with the shape, make, qualities and\nworks of the different classes of beings, and thus is born in many ways.\nSmriti says the same: 'Though being unborn, of non-perishable nature,\nthe Lord of all beings, yet presiding over my Prakriti I am born by my\nown mysterious power' (Bha. G\u00ee. IV, 6). Of the mind also and the other\norgans of the individual soul the highest Self is strictly the abode;\nfor it is the abode of everything.--The next S\u00fbtra supplies a further\nreason.\n\n\n\n\n2. And on account of its being declared that to which the released have\nto resort.\n\nThe Person who is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is also\ndeclared by the text to be what is to be reached by those who are\nreleased from the bondage of Sams\u00e2ra existence. 'When the seer sees the\nbrilliant maker and Lord as the Person who has his source in Brahman,\nthen possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil, and, free\nfrom passion, reaches the highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3). 'As the\nflowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a\nwise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is\nhigher than the high' (III, 2, 8). For it is only those freed from the\nbondage of Sams\u00e2ra who shake off good and evil, are free from passion,\nand freed from name and form.\n\nFor the Sams\u00e2ra state consists in the possession of name and form, which\nis due to connexion with non-sentient matter, such connexion springing\nfrom good and evil works. The Person therefore who is the abode of\nheaven, earth, &c., and whom the text declares to be the aim to be\nreached by those who, having freed themselves from good and evil, and\nhence from all contact with matter, attain supreme oneness with the\nhighest Brahman, can be none other than this highest Brahman itself.\n\nThis conclusion, based on terms exclusively applicable to the highest\nBrahman, is now confirmed by reference to the absence of terms specially\napplicable to the individual soul.\n\n\n\n\n3. Not that which is inferred, on account of the absence of terms\ndenoting it, and (so also not) the bearer of the Pr\u00e2nas (i. e. the\nindividual soul).\n\nAs the section under discussion does not treat of the Pradh\u00e2na, there\nbeing no terms referring to that, so it is with regard to the individual\nsoul also. In the text of the S\u00fbtra we have to read either anum\u00e2nam, i.\ne. 'inference,' in the sense of 'object of inference,' or else \u00e2num\u00e2nam,\n'object of inference'; what is meant being in both cases the Pradhana\ninferred to exist by the S\u00e2nkhyas.\n\n\n\n\n4. On account of the declaration of difference.\n\n'On the same tree man sits immersed in grief, bewildered by \"an\u00ees\u00e2\"; but\nwhen he sees the other one, the Lord, contented, and his glory; then his\ngrief passes away' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 2). This, and similar texts, speak\nof that one, i.e. the one previously described as the abode of heaven,\nearth, &c., as different from the individual soul.--The text means--the\nindividual soul grieves, being bewildered by her who is not '\u00eesa,' i.e.\nPrakriti, the object of fruition. But its grief passes away when it sees\nhim who is other than itself, i.e. the beloved Lord of all, and his\ngreatness which consists in his ruling the entire world.\n\n\n\n\n5. On account of the subject-matter.\n\nIt has been already shown, viz. under I, 2, 21, that the highest Brahman\nconstitutes the initial topic of the Upanishad. And by the arguments set\nforth in the previous S\u00fbtras of the present P\u00e2da, we have removed all\nsuspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the body of the\nUpanishad.\n\n\n\n\n6. And on account of abiding and eating.\n\n'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them\neats the sweet fruit; without eating, the other looks on' (Mu. Up. III,\n1, 1). This text declares that one enjoys the fruit of works while the\nother, without enjoying, shining abides within the body. Now this\nshining being which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the\nbeing previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and\ncharacterised as all knowing, the bridge of immortality, the Self of all;\nit can in no way be the individual Self which, lamenting, experiences\nthe results of its works. The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the\nabode of heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest Self.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'heaven, earth, and so on.'\n\n\n\n\n7. The bh\u00fbman (is the highest Self), as the instruction about it is\nadditional to that about serenity.\n\nThe Chandogas read as follows: 'Where one sees nothing else, hears\nnothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness (bh\u00fbman). Where one\nsees something else, hears something else, knows something else, that is\nthe Little' (Ch. Up. VII, 23, 24).\n\nThe term 'bh\u00fbman' is derived from _bahu_ (much, many), and primarily\nsignifies 'muchness.' By 'much' in this connexion, we have however to\nunderstand, not what is numerous, but what is large, for the text uses\nthe term in contrast with the 'Little' (alpa), i.e. the 'Small.' And the\nbeing qualified as 'large,' we conclude from the context to be the Self;\nfor this section of the Upanishad at the outset states that he who knows\nthe Self overcomes grief (VII, 1, 3), then teaches the knowledge of the\nbh\u00fbman, and concludes by saying that 'the Self is all this' (VII, 25, 2).\n\nThe question now arises whether the Self called bh\u00fbman is the individual\nSelf or the highest Self.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former view.\nFor, he says, to Narada who had approached Sanatkum\u00e2ra with the desire\nto be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning with\n'name' and ending with 'breath,' are enumerated as objects of devout\nmeditation; N\u00e2rada asks each time whether there be anything greater than\nname, and so on, and each time receives an affirmative reply ('speech is\ngreater than name,' &c.); when, however, the series has advanced as far\nas Breath, there is no such question and reply. This shows that the\ninstruction about the Self terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude\nthat breath in this place means the individual soul which is associated\nwith breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the clauses 'Breath is\nfather, breath is mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 1), show that breath here is\nsomething intelligent. And this is further proved by the clause 'Slayer\nof thy father, slayer of thy mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 2; 3), which\ndeclares that he who offends a father, a mother, &c., as long as there\nis breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves reproach;\nwhile no blame attaches to him who offers even the grossest violence to\nthem after their breath has departed. For a conscious being only is\ncapable of being hurt, and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a\nbeing only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the case of such\nliving beings as have no vital breath (viz. plants), suffering results,\nor does not result, according as injury is inflicted or not, we must for\nthis reason also decide that the breath spoken of in the text as\nsomething susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It consequently\nwould be an error to suppose, on the ground of the comparison of Pr\u00e2na\nto the nave of a wheel in which the spokes are set, that Pr\u00e2na here\ndenotes the highest Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being\ninjured. That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place, if\nwe understand by Pr\u00e2na the individual soul, for the whole aggregate of\nnon-sentient matter which stands to the individual soul in the relation\nof object or instrument of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the\nindividual soul. And this soul, there called Pr\u00e2na, is what the text\nlater on calls Bh\u00fbman; for as there is no question and reply as to\nsomething greater than Pr\u00e2na, Pr\u00e2na continues, without break, to be the\nsubject-matter up to the mention of bh\u00fbman. The paragraphs intervening\nbetween the section on Pr\u00e2na (VII, 15) and the section on the bh\u00fbman\n(VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The Pr\u00e2na section closes\nwith the remark that he who fully knows Pr\u00e2na is an ativ\u00e2din, i.e. one\nwho makes a final supreme declaration. In the next sentence then, 'But\nthis one in truth is an ativ\u00e2din who makes a supreme statement by means\nof the True,' the clause 'But this one is an ativ\u00e2din' refers back to\nthe previously mentioned person who knows the Pr\u00e2na, and the relative\nclause 'who makes,' &c., enjoins on him the speaking of the truth as an\nauxiliary element in the meditation on Pr\u00e2na. The next paragraph, 'When\none understands the truth then one declares the truth,' intimates that\nspeaking the truth stands in a supplementary relation towards the\ncognition of the true nature of the Pr\u00e2na as described before. For the\naccomplishment of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin\nreflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the due\nperformance of sacred duties. In order that such duties may be\nundertaken, the next paragraphs then teach that bliss constitutes the\nnature of the individual soul, previously called Pr\u00e2na, and finally that\nthe Bh\u00fbman, i.e. the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object\nof inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is that the\ntrue nature of the individual soul, freed from Nescience, is abundant\nbliss--a conclusion which perfectly agrees with the initial statement\nthat he who knows the Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore,\nwhich has the attribute of being 'bh\u00fbman,' is the individual Self. This\nbeing so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when the text\ndescribes the glory and power of the individual Self, it uses the term\n'I'; for 'I' denotes just the individual Self: 'I am below, I am above,\n&c., I am all this' (VII, 25, 1). This conclusion having been settled,\nall remaining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The being characterised\nin the text as 'bh\u00fbman' is not the individual Self, but the highest Self,\nsince instruction is given about the bh\u00fbman in addition to 'serenity'\n(sampras\u00e2da). 'Sampras\u00e2da' denotes the individual soul, as we know from\nthe following text, 'Now that \"serenity\", having risen from out this\nbody, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form'\n(Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). Now in the text under discussion instruction is\ngiven about a being called 'the True,' and possessing the attribute of\n'bh\u00fbman,' as being something additional to the individual soul; and this\nbeing called 'the True' is none other than the highest Brahman. Just as\nin the series of beings beginning with name and ending with breath, each\nsuccessive being is mentioned in addition to the preceding one--\nwherefrom we conclude that it is something really different from what\nprecedes; so that being also which is called 'the True,' and which is\nmentioned in addition to the individual Self called Pr\u00e2na, is something\ndifferent from the individual Self, and this being called 'the True' is\nthe same as the Bh\u00fbman; in other words, the text teaches that the Bh\u00fbman\nis the highest Brahman called 'the True.' This the Vrittik\u00e2ra also\ndeclares: 'But the Bh\u00fbman only. The Bh\u00fbman is Brahman, because in the\nseries beginning with name instruction is given about it subsequently to\nthe individual Self.'\n\nBut how do we know that the instruction as to 'the True' is in addition\nto, and refers to something different from, the being called Pr\u00e2na?--The\ntext, after having declared that he who knows the Pr\u00e2na is an ativ\u00e2din,\ngoes on, 'But really that one is an ativ\u00e2din who makes a supreme\ndeclaration by means of the True.' The 'but' here clearly separates him\nwho is an ativ\u00e2din by means of the True from the previous ativ\u00e2din, and\nthe clause thus does not cause us to recognise him who is ativ\u00e2din by\nmeans of Pr\u00e2na; hence 'the True' which is the cause of the latter\nativ\u00e2din being what he is must be something different from the Pr\u00e2na\nwhich is the cause of the former ativ\u00e2din's quality.--But we have\nmaintained above that the text enjoins the speaking of 'the True' merely\nas an auxiliary duty for him who knows Pr\u00e2na; and that hence the Pr\u00e2na\ncontinues to be the general subject-matter!--This contention is\nuntenable, we reply. The conjunction 'but' shows that the section gives\ninstruction about a new ativ\u00e2din, and does not merely declare that the\nativ\u00e2din previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is different\nwith texts such as 'But that one indeed is an Agnihotrin who speaks the\ntruth'; there we have no knowledge of any further Agnihotrin, and\ntherefore must interpret the text as enjoining truthfulness as an\nobligation incumbent on the ordinary Agnihotrin. In the text under\ndiscussion, on the other hand, we have the term 'the True', which makes\nus apprehend that there is a further ativ\u00e2din different from the\npreceding one; and we know that that term is used to denote the highest\nBrahman, as e.g. in the text, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is\nBrahman.' The ativ\u00e2din who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore,\nmust be viewed as different from the preceding ativ\u00e2din; and a\ndifference thus established on the basis of the meaning and connexion of\nthe different sentences cannot be set aside. An ativ\u00e2din ('one who in\nhis declaration goes beyond') is one who maintains, as object of his\ndevotion, something which, as being more beneficial to man, surpasses\nother objects of devotion. The text at first declares that he who knows\nPr\u00e2na, i.e. the individual soul, is an ativ\u00e2din, in so far as the object\nof his devout meditation surpasses the objects from name up to hope; and\nthen goes on to say that, as that object also is not of _supreme_\nbenefit to man, an ativ\u00e2din in the full sense of the term is he only who\nproclaims as the object of his devotion the highest Brahman, which alone\nis of supreme unsurpassable benefit to man. 'He who is an ativ\u00e2din by\nthe True,' i.e. he who is an ativ\u00e2din characterised by the highest\nBrahman as the object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil\nentreats, 'Sir, may I be an ativ\u00e2din with the True!' and the teacher\nreplies, 'But we must desire to know the True!'--Moreover, the text, VII,\n26, I, 'Pr\u00e2na springs from the Self,' declares the origination from the\nSelf of the being called Pr\u00e2na; and from this we infer that the Self\nwhich is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section, in the\nclause 'He who knows the Self passes beyond death,' is different from\nthe being called Pr\u00e2na.--The contention that, because there is no\nquestion and answer as to something greater than Pr\u00e2na, the instruction\nabout the Self must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction\nabout Pr\u00e2na, is by no means legitimate. For that a new subject is\nintroduced is proved, not only by those questions and answers; it may be\nproved by other means also, and we have already explained such means.\nThe following is the reason why the pupil does not ask the question\nwhether there is anything greater than Pr\u00e2na. With regard to the non-\nsentient objects extending from name to hope--each of which surpasses\nthe preceding one in so far as it is more beneficial to man--the teacher\ndoes not declare that he who knows them is an ativ\u00e2din; when, however,\nhe comes to the individual soul, there called Pr\u00e2na, the knowledge of\nwhose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he expressly says that\n'he who sees this, notes this, understands this is an ativ\u00e2din' (VII, 15,\n4). The pupil therefore imagines that the instruction about the Self is\nnow completed, and hence asks no further question. The teacher on the\nother hand, holding that even that knowledge is not the highest,\nspontaneously continues his teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he\nonly is an ativ\u00e2din who proclaims the supremely and absolutely\nbeneficial being which is called 'the True,' i.e. the highest Brahman.\nOn this suggestion of the highest Brahman the pupil, desirous to learn\nits true nature and true worship, entreats the teacher, 'Sir, may I\nbecome an ativ\u00e2din by the True!' Thereupon the teacher--in order to help\nthe pupil to become an ativ\u00e2din,--a position which requires previous\nintuition of Brahman--enjoins on him meditation on Brahman which is the\nmeans to attain intuition ('You must desire to know the True!'); next\nrecommends to him reflection (manana) which is the means towards\nmeditation ('You must desire to understand reflection'); then--taking it\nfor granted that the injunction of reflection implies the injunction of\n'hearing' the sacred texts which is the preliminary for reflecting--\nadvises him to cherish faith in Brahman which is the preliminary means\ntowards hearing ('You must desire to understand faith'); after that\ntells him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on\nBrahman ('You must desire to understand reliance'); next admonishes him,\nto apply himself to 'action,' i.e. to make the effort which is a\npreliminary requisite for all the activities enumerated ('You must\ndesire to understand action'). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil\nto enter on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss\nconstitutes the nature of that Brahman which is the aim of all his\neffort ('You must desire to understand bliss'); and bids him to realise\nthat the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is supremely large and\nfull ('You must endeavour to understand the \"bh\u00fbman,\" i.e. the supreme\nfulness of bliss'). And of this Brahman, whose nature is absolute bliss,\na definition is then given as follows,' Where one sees nothing else,\nhears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is bh\u00fbman.' This means--\nwhen the meditating devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman,\nwhich consists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from it,\nsince the whole aggregate of things is contained within the essence and\noutward manifestation (vibh\u00fbti) of Brahman. He, therefore, who has an\nintuitive knowledge of Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its\nvibh\u00fbti--which also is called aisvarya, i.e. lordly power--and\nconsisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there _is_ nothing\napart from Brahman; and sees, i.e. feels no pain since all possible\nobjects of perception and feeling are of the nature of bliss or pleasure;\nfor pleasure is just that which, being experienced, is agreeable to\nman's nature.--But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that\nthis very world is perceived as something different from Brahman, and as\nbeing of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited pleasure; how then\ncan it be perceived as being a manifestation of Brahman, as having\nBrahman for its Self, and hence consisting of bliss?--The individual\nsouls, we reply, which are under the influence of karman, are conscious\nof this world as different from Brahman, and, according to their\nindividual karman, as either made up of pain or limited pleasure. But as\nthis view depends altogether on karman, to him who has freed himself\nfrom Nescience in the form of karman, this same world presents itself as\nlying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its qualities and\nvibh\u00fbti, and hence as essentially blissful. To a man troubled with\nexcess of bile the water he drinks has a taste either downright\nunpleasant or moderately pleasant, according to the degree to which his\nhealth is affected; while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste\nfor a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that some\nplaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care for it; when on the\nother hand he apprehends it as meant to give him delight, the thing\nbecomes very dear to him. In the same way the world becomes an object of\nsupreme love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its Self,\nand being a mere plaything of Brahman--of Brahman, whose essential\nnature is supreme bliss, and which is a treasure-house, as it were, of\nnumberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence. He who has\nreached such intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels\nno pain. This the concluding passages of the text set forth in detail,\n'He who sees, perceives and understands this, loves the Self, delights\nin the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes a Self\nruler, he moves and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But\nthose who have a different knowledge from this, they are ruled by others,\nthey live in perishable worlds, they do not move in all the worlds\naccording to their liking.' 'They are ruled by others,' means 'they are\nin the power of karman.' And further on, 'He who sees this does not see\ndeath, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this sees everything and\nobtains everything everywhere.'\n\nThat Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been shown in detail\nunder I, 1, 12 ff.--The conclusion from all this is that, as the text\napplies the term 'bh\u00fbman' to what was previously called the Real or True,\nand which is different from the individual soul there called Pr\u00e2na, the\nbh\u00fbman is the highest Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n8. And on account of the suitability of the attributes.\n\nThe attributes also which the text ascribes to the bh\u00fbman suit the\nhighest Self only. So immortality ('The Bh\u00fbman is immortal,' VII, 24, 1);\nnot being based on something else ('it rests in its own greatness');\nbeing the Self of all ('the bh\u00fbman is below,' &c., 'it is all this');\nbeing that which produces all ('from the Self there springs breath,' &c.\n). All these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.--\nThe P\u00fbrvapakshin has pointed to the text which declares the 'I' to be\nthe Self of all (VII, 25, 1); but what that text really teaches is\nmeditation on Brahman under the aspect of the 'I.' This appears from the\nintroductory clause 'Now follows the instruction with regard to the I.'\nThat of the 'I,' i.e. the individual Self, also the highest Self is the\ntrue Self, scripture declares in several places, so e.g. in the text\nabout the inward Ruler (Bri. Up. III, 7). As therefore the individual\nsoul finds its completion in the highest Self only, the word 'I' also\nextends in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruction\nabout the 'I' which is given in the text has thus for its object\nmeditation on the highest Self in so far as having the individual Self\nfor its body. As the highest Self has all beings for its body and thus\nis the Self of all, it is the Self of the individual soul also; and this\nthe text declares in the passage beginning 'Now follows the instruction\nabout the Self,' and ending 'Self is all this.' In order to prove this\nthe text declares that everything originates from the highest Self which\nforms the Self of the individual soul also, viz. in the passage 'From\nthe Self of him who sees this, perceives this, knows this, there springs\nbreath,' &c.--that means: breath and all other beings spring from the\nhighest Self which abides within the Self of the meditating devotee as\nits inner ruler. Hence, the text means to intimate, meditation should be\nperformed on the 'I,' in order thus firmly to establish the cognition\nthat the highest Self has the 'I,' i.e. the individual soul for its body.\n\nIt is thus an established conclusion that the bh\u00fbman is the highest Self.\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'fulness.'\n\n\n\n\n9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of its supporting that\nwhich is the end of ether.\n\nThe V\u00e2jasaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions asked by G\u00e2rg\u00ee,\nread as follows: 'He said, O G\u00e2rg\u00ee, the Br\u00e2hmanas call that the\nImperishable. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, it\nis not red, not fluid, it is without a shadow,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8).\nA doubt here arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradh\u00e2na, or the\nindividual soul, or the highest Self.--The Pradh\u00e2na, it may be\nmaintained in the first place. For we see that in passages such as\n'higher than that which is higher than the Imperishable' the term\n'Imperishable' actually denotes the Pradh\u00e2na; and moreover the qualities\nenumerated, viz. not being either coarse or fine, &c., are\ncharacteristic of the Pradh\u00e2na.--But, an objection is raised, in texts\nsuch as 'That knowledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended' (Mu.\nUp. I, 1, 5), the word 'Imperishable' is seen to denote the highest\nBrahman!--In cases, we reply, where the meaning of a word may be\ndetermined on the basis either of some other means of proof or of\nScripture, the former meaning presents itself to the mind first, and\nhence there is no reason why such meaning should not be accepted.--But\nhow do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in the ordinary\nsense?--From the description, we reply, given of it in the text, 'That\nabove the heavens,' &c. There it is said that all created things past,\npresent and future rest on ether as their basis; ether cannot therefore\nbe taken as that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the\nsphere of things created. We therefore must understand by 'ether' matter\nin its subtle state, i.e. the Pradh\u00e2na; and the Imperishable which\nthereupon is declared to be the support of that Pradh\u00e2na, hence cannot\nitself be the Pradh\u00e2na.--Nor is there any force in the argument that a\nsense established by some other means of proof presents itself to the\nmind more immediately than a sense established by Scripture; for as the\nword 'akshara' (i.e. the non-perishable) intimates its sense directly\nthrough the meaning of its constituent elements other means of proof\nneed not be regarded at all.\n\nMoreover Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya had said previously that the ether is the cause and\nabode of all things past, present and future, and when G\u00e2rg\u00ee thereupon\nasks him in what that ether 'is woven,' i.e. what is the causal\nsubstance and abode of ether, he replies 'the Imperishable.' Now this\nalso proves that by the 'Imperishable' we have to understand the\nPradh\u00e2na which from other sources is known to be the causal substance,\nand hence the abode, of all effected things whatsoever.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The 'Imperishable' is\nthe highest Brahman, because the text declares it to support that which\nis the end, i. e. that which lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter\n(avy\u00e2kritam). The ether referred to in G\u00e2rg\u00ee's question is not ether in\nthe ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter,\nand hence the 'Imperishable' which is said to be the support of that\n'unevolved' cannot itself be the 'unevolved,' i.e. cannot be the\nPradh\u00e2na. Let us, then, the P\u00fbrvapakshin resumes, understand by the\n'Imperishable,' the individual soul; for this may be viewed as the\nsupport of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of the\nelements in their subtle condition; and the qualities of non-coarseness,\n&c., are characteristic of that soul also. Moreover there are several\ntexts in which the term 'Imperishable' is actually seen to denote the\nindividual soul; so e.g. 'the non-evolved' is merged in the\n'Imperishable'; 'That of which the non-evolved is the body; that of\nwhich the Imperishable is the body'; 'All the creatures are the\nPerishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperishable' (Bha. G\u00ce.\nXV, 16).\n\nTo this alternative prim\u00e2 facie view the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n10. And this (supporting) (springs) from command.\n\nThe text declares that this supporting of ether and all other things\nproceeds from command. 'In the command of that Imperishable sun and moon\nstand, held apart; in the command of that Imperishable heaven and earth\nstand, held apart,' &c. Now such supreme command, through which all\nthings in the universe are held apart, cannot possibly belong to the\nindividual soul in the state either of bondage or of release. The\ncommanding 'Imperishable' therefore is none other than the supreme\nPerson.\n\n\n\n\n11. And on account of the exclusion of (what is of) another nature (than\nBrahman).\n\nAnother nature, i. e. the nature of the Pradh\u00e2na, and so on. A\nsupplementary passage excludes difference on the part of the\nImperishable from the supreme Person. 'That Imperishable, O G\u00e2rg\u00ee, is\nunseen but seeing; unheard but hearing; unthought but thinking; unknown\nbut knowing. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but\nit, nothing that thinks but it, nothing that knows but it. In that\nImperishable, O G\u00e2rg\u00ee, the ether is woven, warp and woof.' Here the\ndeclaration as to the Imperishable being what sees, hears, &c. excludes\nthe non-intelligent Pradh\u00e2na; and the declaration as to its being all-\nseeing, &c. while not seen by any one excludes the individual soul. This\nexclusion of what has a nature other than that of the highest Self thus\nconfirms the view of that Self being meant.--Or else the S\u00fbtra may be\nexplained in a different way, viz. 'On account of the exclusion of the\nexistence of another.' On this alternative the text 'There is nothing\nthat sees but it,' &c., is to be understood as follows: 'while this\nImperishable, not seen by others but seeing all others, forms the basis\nof all things different from itself; there is no other principle which,\nunseen by the Imperishable but seeing it, could form _its_ basis,' i.e.\nthe text would exclude the existence of any other thing but the\nImperishable, and thus implicitly deny that the Imperishable is either\nthe Pradh\u00e2na or the individual Self.--Moreover the text 'By the command\nof that Imperishable men praise those who give, the gods follow the\nSacrficer, the fathers the Darv\u00ee-offering,' declares the Imperishable to\nbe that on the command of which there proceed all works enjoined by\nScripture and Smriti. such as sacrificing, giving, &c., and this again\nshows that the Imperishable must be Brahman, the supreme Person. Again,\nthe subsequent _passus_, 'Whosoever without knowing that Imperishable,'\n&c., declares that ignorance of the Imperishable leads to the Sams\u00e2ra,\nwhile knowledge of it helps to reach Immortality: this also proves that\nthe Imperishable is the highest Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana\nof 'the Imperishable.'\n\n\n\n\n12. On account of his being designated as the object of seeing, he (i.e.\nthe highest Self) (is that object).\n\nThe followers of the Atharva-veda, in the section containing the\nquestion asked by Satyak\u00e2ma, read as follows: 'He again who meditates\nwith this syllable Aum of three M\u00e2tr\u00e2s on the highest Person, he comes\nto light and to the sun. As a snake frees itself from its skin, so he\nfrees himself from evil. He is led up by the S\u00e2man verses to the Brahma-\nworld; he sees the person dwelling in the castle who is higher than the\nindividual souls concreted with bodies and higher (than those)' (Pra. Up.\nV, 2). Here the terms 'he meditates' and 'he sees' have the same sense,\n'seeing' being the result of devout meditation; for according to the\nprinciple expressed in the text (Ch. Up. III, 14) 'According as man's\nthought is in this world,' what is reached by the devotee is the object\nof meditation; and moreover the text exhibits the same object, viz. 'the\nhighest Person' in connexion with both verbs.\n\nThe doubt here presents itself whether the highest Person in this text\nbe the so-called four-faced Brahm\u00e2, the Lord of the mundane egg who\nrepresents the individual souls in their collective aspect, or the\nsupreme Person who is the Lord of all.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the\nformer view. For, he argues, on the introductory question, 'He who here\namong men should meditate until death on the syllable Om, what would he\nobtain by it?' The text first declares that he who meditates on that\nsyllable as having one M\u00e2tr\u00e2, obtains the world of men; and next, that\nhe who meditates on it as having two M\u00e2tr\u00e2s obtains the world of the\natmosphere. Hence the Brahma-world, which the text after that represents\nas the object reached by him who meditates on Om as having three\nsyllables, must be the world of Brahm\u00e2 Katurmukha who is constituted by\nthe aggregate of the individual souls. What the soul having reached that\nworld sees, therefore is the same Brahm\u00e2 Katurmukha; and thus only the\nattribute 'etasm\u00e2j' j\u00eevaghan\u00e2t par\u00e2t param' is suitable; for the\ncollective soul, i. e. Brahm\u00e2 Katurmukha, residing in the Brahma-world\nis higher (para) than the distributive or discrete soul (j\u00eeva) which is\nconcreted (ghan\u00ee-bh\u00fbta) with the body and sense-organs, and at the same\ntime is higher (para) than these. The highest Person mentioned in the\ntext, therefore, is Brahm\u00e2a Katurmukha; and the qualities mentioned\nfurther on, such as absence of decay, &c., must be taken in such a way\nas to agree with that Brahm\u00e2.\n\nTo this prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra replies that the object of seeing is\nHe, i.e. the highest Self, on account of designation. The text clearly\ndesignates the object of seeing as the highest Self. For the concluding\nsloka, which refers to that object of seeing, declares that 'by means of\nthe Omk\u00e2ra he who knows reaches that which is tranquil, free from decay,\nimmortal, fearless, the highest'--all which attributes properly belong\nto the highest Self only, as we know from texts such as 'that is the\nImmortal, that is the fearless, that is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, i).\nThe qualification expressed in the clause 'etasm\u00e2j_ _j\u00eeva.--ghan\u00e2t,' &c.\nmay also refer to the highest Self only, not to Brahm\u00e2 Katurmukha; for\nthe latter is himself comprehended by the term 'j\u00eevaghana.' For that\nterm denotes all souls which are embodied owing to karman; and that\nKaturmukha is one of those we know from texts such as 'He who first\ncreates Brahm\u00e2' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). Nor is there any strength in the\nargument that, since the Brahma-world mentioned in the text is known to\nbe the world of Katurmukha, as it follows next on the world of the\natmosphere, the being abiding there must needs be Katurmukha. We rather\nargue as follows--as from the concluding clause 'that which is tranquil,\nfree from decay,' &c., we ascertain that the object of intuition is the\nhighest Brahman, the Brahma-world spoken of as the abode of the seeing\ndevotee cannot be the perishable world of Brahm\u00e2 Katurmukha. A further\nreason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says about 'him\nwho is freed from all evil being led up by the S\u00e2man verses to the world\nof Brahman'; for the place reached by him who is freed from all evil\ncannot be the mere abode of Katurmukha. Hence also the concluding sloka\nsays with reference to that Brahma-world 'that which the wise teach':\nwhat the wise see and teach is the abode of the highest, of Vishnu; cp.\nthe text 'the wise ever see that highest abode of Vishnu.' Nor is it\neven strictly true that the world of Brahm\u00e2 follows on the atmosphere,\nfor the svarga-world and several others lie between the two.\n\nWe therefore shortly explain the drift of the whole chapter as follows.\nAt the outset of the reply given to Satyak\u00e2ma there is mentioned, in\naddition to the highest (para) Brahman, a lower (apara) Brahman. This\nlower or effected (k\u00e2rya) Brahman is distinguished as twofold, being\nconnected either with this terrestrial world or yonder, non-terrestrial,\nworld. Him who meditates on the Pranava as having one syllable, the text\ndeclares to obtain a reward in this world--he reaches the world of men.\nHe, on the other hand, who meditates on the Pranava as having two\nsyllables is said to obtain his reward in a super-terrestrial sphere--he\nreaches the world of the atmosphere. And he finally who, by means of the\ntrisyllabic Pranava which denotes the highest Brahman, meditates on this\nvery highest Brahman, is said to reach that Brahman, i. e. the supreme\nPerson.--The object of seeing is thus none other than the highest Self.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of the 'object of seeing.'\n\n\n\n\n13. The small (ether) (is Brahman), on account of the subsequent\n(arguments).\n\nThe Chandogas have the following text, 'Now in that city of Brahman\nthere is the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now\nwhat is within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be\nunderstood' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1).--The question here arises whether that\nsmall ether (space) within the lotus of the heart be the material\nclement called ether, or the individual Self, or the highest Self.--The\nfirst view presenting itself is that the element is meant, for the\nreason that the word 'ether' is generally used in that sense; and\nbecause the clause 'what is within that small ether' shows that the\nether mentioned constitutes the abode of something else that is to be\nenquired into.--This view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The small ether\nwithin the heart is the highest Brahman, on account of the subsequent\nreasons, contained in clauses of the same section. The passage 'That\nSelf which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free\nfrom grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes and purposes come\ntrue' (VIII, 7, 1) ascribes to that small ether qualities--such as\nunconditioned Selfhood, freedom from evil, &c.--which clearly show that\nether to be the highest Brahman. And this conclusion is confirmed by\nwhat other texts say about him who knows the small ether attaining the\npower of realising his own wishes,'Those who depart from hence having\ncome to know the Self and those real wishes, for them there is freedom\nin all worlds'; and 'whatever object he desires, by his mere will it\ncomes to him; having obtained it he is happy' (Ch, Up. VIII, 1, 6; 2, 9).\nIf moreover the ether within the heart were the elemental ether, the\ncomparison instituted in the passage 'As large as that (elemental) ether\nis, so large is this ether within the heart' would be wholly\ninappropriate. Nor must it be said that that comparison rests on the\nlimitation of the ether within the heart (so that the two terms compared\nwould be the limited elemental ether within the heart, and the universal\nelemental ether); for there still would remain the inappropriate\nassertion that the ether within the heart is the abode of heaven, earth\nand all other things.--But, an objection is raised, also on the\nalternative of the small ether being the highest Brahman, the comparison\nto the universal elemental ether is unsuitable; for scripture explicitly\nstates that the highest Self is (not as large but) larger than\neverything else, 'larger than the earth, larger than the sky,' &c. (Ch.\nUp. III, 14, 3). Not so, we reply; what the text says as to the ether\nwithin the heart being as large as the universal ether is meant (not to\nmake a conclusive statement as to its extent but only) to negative that\nsmallness of the ether which is established by its abiding within the\nheart. Similarly we say 'the sun moves with the speed of an arrow'; the\nsun indeed moves much faster than an arrow, but what our assertion means\nis merely that he does not move slowly.--But, a further doubt is started,\nthe passage 'That Self which is free from sin,' &c. does not appear to\nrefer back to the small ether within the heart. For the text makes a\ndistinction between that ether and that within that ether which it\ndeclares to be the due object of search and enquiry. This latter object\ntherefore is the topic of discussion, and when the text says later on\n'That Self, free from sin, &c. is to be searched out' we must understand\nit to refer to the same object of search.--This would be so, we reply,\nif the text did not distinguish the small ether and that which abides\nwithin it; but as a matter of fact it does distinguish the two. The\nconnexion is as follows. The text at first refers to the body of the\ndevotee as the city of Brahman, the idea being that Brahman is present\ntherein as object of meditation; and then designates an organ of that\nbody, viz. the small lotus-shaped heart as the palace of Brahman. It\nthen further refers to Brahman--the all knowing, all powerful, whose\nlove towards his devotees is boundless like the ocean--as the small\nether within the heart, meaning thereby that Brahman who for the benefit\nof his devotees is present within that palace should be meditated upon\nas of minute size, and finally--in the clause 'that is to be searched\nout'--enjoins as the object of meditation that which abides in that\nBrahman, i.e. on the one hand, its essential freedom from all evil\nqualities, and on the other the whole treasure of its auspicious\nqualities, its power of realising its wishes and so on. The 'that' (in\n'that is to be searched out') enjoins as objects of search the small\nether, i.e. Brahman itself as well as the qualities abiding within it.--\nBut how, it may be asked, do you know that the word 'that' really refers\nto both, viz. the highest Brahman, there called 'small ether,' and the\nqualities abiding in it, and that hence the clause enjoins an enquiry\ninto both these entities?--Listen, attentively, we reply, to our\nexplanation! The clause 'As large as this ether is, so large is this\nether within the heart' declares the exceeding greatness of the small\nether; the clause 'Both heaven and earth are contained within it' up to\n'lightning and stars' declares that same small ether to be the abode of\nthe entire world; and the clause 'And whatever there is for him in this\nworld, and whatever there is not, all that is contained within it'\ndeclares that whatever objects of enjoyment there are for the devotee in\nthis world, and whatever other objects there are not for him, i.e. are\nmerely wishes but not obtained by him, all those objects are contained\nwithin that same small ether. The text next declares that that small\nether, although dwelling within the heart which is a part of the body,\nis not affected by the body's old age and decay, for being extremely\nminute it is not capable of change; and adds 'that true being is the\nBrahman-city,' i.e. that Reality which is the cause of all is the city\ncalled Brahman, i.e. the abode of the entire Universe. The following\nclause 'in it all desires are contained' again referring to the small\nether ('in it') declares that in it all desires, i.e. all desirable\nqualities are contained. The text next proceeds to set forth that the\nsmall ether possesses Selfhood and certain desirable auspicious\nqualities-this is done in the passage 'It is the Self free from sin' &c.\nup to 'whose purposes realise themselves.' The following section--'And\nas here on earth' down to 'for them there is freedom in all the worlds'--\ndeclares that those who do not know those eight qualities and the Self,\ncalled 'small ether,' which is characterised by them, and who perform\nactions aiming at objects of enjoyment different from that Self, obtain\nperishable results only, and do not attain the power of realising their\nwishes; while those on the other hand who know the Self called 'small\nether' and the qualities abiding within it, through the grace of that\nvery same highest Self, obtain all their wishes and the power of\nrealising their purposes. On the ground of this connected consideration\nof the whole chapter we are able to decide that the text enjoins as the\nobject of search and enquiry both the highest Brahman and the whole body\nof auspicious qualities abiding within it. This the V\u00e2kyak\u00e2ra also\nrenders clear in the passage beginning 'In the text \"what is within\nthat\" there is designation of wishes (i.e. desirable qualities).'--For\nall these reasons the small ether is the highest Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n14. On account of the going and of the word; for thus it is seen; and\n(there is) an inferential sign.\n\n'As people who do not know the country walk again and again over a gold\ntreasure' &c., 'thus do all these creatures day after day go into _that_\nBrahma-world' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). The circumstance, here stated, of\nall individual souls going to a place which the qualification _'that'_\nconnects with the subject-matter of the whole chapter, i.e. the small\nether; and the further circumstance of the goal of their going being\ncalled the Brahma-world, also prove that the small ether is none other\nthan the highest Brahman.--But in what way do these two points prove\nwhat they are claimed to prove?--'For thus it is seen'; the S\u00fbtra adds.\nFor we see it stated in other texts, that all individual souls go daily\nto Brahman, viz. in the state of deep sleep, 'All these creatures having\nbecome united with the True do not know that they are united with the\nTrue'; 'Having come back from the True they know not that they have come\nback from the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 10, 2). And in the same way we\nsee that the word 'Brahma-world' denotes the highest Brahman; so e.g.\n'this is the Brahma-world, O King' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 32).--The S\u00fbtra\nsubjoins a further reason. Even if the going of the souls to Brahman\nwere not seen in other texts, the fact that the text under discussion\ndeclares the individual souls to abide in Brahman in the state of deep\nsleep, enjoying freedom from all pain and trouble just as if they were\nmerged in the pralaya state, is a sufficient 'inferential sign' to prove\nthat the 'small ether' is the highest Brahman. And similarly the term\n'Brahma-world' as exhibited in the text under discussion, if understood\nas denoting co-ordination (i.e. 'that world which is Brahman'), is\nsufficient to prove by itself that the 'small ether'--to which that term\nis applied--is the highest Brahman; it therefore is needless to appeal\nto other passages. That this explanation of 'Brahma-world' is preferable\nto the one which understands by Brahma-world 'the world of Brahman' is\nproved by considerations similar to those by which the P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fbtras\nprove that 'Nish\u00e2da-sthapati' means a headman who at the same time is a\nNish\u00e2da.--Another explanation of the passage under discussion may also\nbe given. What is said there about all these creatures daily 'going into\nthe Brahma-world,' may not refer at all to the state of deep sleep, but\nrather mean that although 'daily going into the Brahman-world,' i. e.\nalthough at all time moving above the small ether, i. e. Brahman which\nas the universal Self is everywhere, yet all these creatures not knowing\nBrahman do not find, i.e. obtain it; just as men not knowing the place\nwhere a treasure is hidden do not find it, although they constantly pass\nover it. This constant moving about on the part of ignorant creatures on\nthe surface, as it were, of the small ether abiding within as their\ninward Ruler, proves that small ether to be the highest Brahman. That\nthe highest Brahman abides within as the inner Self of creatures which\ndwell in it and are ruled by it, we are told in other texts also, so e.g.\nin the Antary\u00e2min-br\u00e2hmana. 'He who dwells in the Self, within the Self,\nwhom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the\nSelf within; unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing' (Bri. Up. III, 7,\n22; 23).--On this interpretation we explain the last part of the S\u00fbtra\nas follows. Even if other texts did not refer to it, this daily moving\nabout on the part of ignorant creatures, on the ether within the heart--\nwhich the comparison with the treasure of gold shows to be the supreme\ngood of man--, is in itself a sufficient proof for the small ether being\nBrahman.\n\n\n\n\n15. And on account of there being observed in that (small ether),\nsupporting which is a greatness of that (i. e. Brahman).\n\nIn continuation of the passage 'It is the Self free from Sin,' &c.,\nwhich refers to the small ether, the text says: 'it is a bank, a\nlimitary support, that these worlds may not be confounded.' What the\ntext here says about the small ether supporting the world proves it to\nbe the highest Brahman; for to support the world is the glory of Brahman.\nCompare 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of\nall things. He is a bank and a boundary, so that these worlds may not be\nconfounded' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'By the command of that Imperishable,\nO G\u00e2rg\u00ee, heaven and earth stand, held apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9). Now\nthis specific greatness of the highest Brahman, which consists in its\nsupporting the world, is also observed in the small ether--which proves\nthe latter to be none other than Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n16. And on account of the settled meaning.\n\nThe word 'ether,' moreover, is known to have, among other meanings, that\nof Brahman. Compare 'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if\nthat ether were not bliss?' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'All these beings take\ntheir rise from the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). It has to be kept in view\nthat in the text under discussion the meaning 'Brahman' is supported by\nwhat is said about the qualities of the small ether--viz. freedom from\nsin, &c.--and hence is stronger than the other meaning--, according to\nwhich \u00e2k\u00e2sa signifies the elemental ether.\n\nSo far the S\u00fbtras have refuted the view of the small ether being the\nelement. They now enter on combating the notion that the small ether may\npossibly be the individual soul.\n\n\n\n\n17. If it be said that on account of reference to the other one he is\nmeant; we say no, on account of impossibility.\n\nAn objection is raised to the argumentation that, on account of\ncomplementary passages, the small ether must be explained to mean the\nhighest Self.\n\nFor, the objector says, a clear reference to him who is 'other' than the\nhighest Self, i.e. to the individual soul, is contained in the following\npassage (VIII, 12, 3): 'Thus does that serenity (sampras\u00e2da), having\nrisen from this body and approached the highest light, appear in its own\nform.' 'That is the Self,' he said. 'That is the immortal, the fearless,\nthis is Brahman' (VIII, 7, 3?). We admit that for the different reasons\nstated above the ether within the heart cannot be the elemental ether;\nbut owing to the force of the intimations conveyed by the complementary\npassages just quoted, we must adopt the view that what is meant is the\nindividual soul. And as the word '\u00e2k\u00e2sa' may be connected with prak\u00e2sa\n(light), it may be applied to the individual soul also.--This view is\nset aside by the S\u00fbtra. The small ether cannot be the individual soul\nbecause the qualities attributed in the text to the former, viz. freedom\nfrom sin, &c., cannot possibly belong to the individual soul.\n\n\n\n\n18. Should it be said that from a subsequent passage (it appears that\nthe individual Soul is meant); rather (the soul) in so far as its true\nnature has become manifest.\n\nThe P\u00fbrvapakshin now maintains that we ascertain from a subsequent\ndeclaration made by Praj\u00e2pati that it is just the individual Soul that\npossesses freedom from sin and the other qualities enumerated. The whole\nteaching of Praj\u00e2pati, he says, refers to the individual Soul only.\nIndra having heard that Praj\u00e2pati had spoken about a Self free from sin,\nold age, &c., the enquiry into which enables the soul to obtain all\nworlds and desires, approaches Praj\u00e2pati with the wish to learn the true\nnature of that Self which should be enquired into. Praj\u00e2pati thereupon,\nwishing to test the capacity of his pupil for receiving true instruction,\ngives him successive information about the embodied soul in the state of\nwaking, dream and dreamless sleep. When he finds that Indra sees no good\nin instruction of this kind and thus shows himself fit to receive\ninstruction about the true nature of the disembodied Self, he explains\nto him that the body is a mere abode for a ruling Self; that that\nbodiless Self is essentially immortal; and that the soul, as long as it\nis joined to a body due to karman, is compelled to experience pleasure\nand pain corresponding to its embodied state, while it rises above all\nthis when it has freed itself from the body (VIII, 12, 1). He then\ncontinues: 'Thus that serenity having risen from this body and\napproached the highest light, appears in its own form'; thus teaching\nhim the true nature, free from a body, of the individual soul. He next\ninforms him that the 'highest light' which the soul reaches is the\nsupreme Person ('That is the supreme Person'), and that the soul having\nreached that highest light and freed itself from what obscured its own\ntrue nature, obtains in the world of Brahman whatever enjoyments it\ndesires, and is no longer connected with a body springing from karman\nand inseparable from pain and pleasure, or with anything else that\ncauses distress. ('He moves about there laughing,' &c.). He next\nillustrates the connexion with a body, of the soul in the Sams\u00e2ra state,\nby means of a comparison: 'Like as a horse attached to a cart,' &c.\nAfter that he explains that the eye and the other sense-organs are\ninstruments of knowledge, colour, and so on, the objects of knowledge,\nand the individual Self the knowing subject; and that hence that Self is\ndifferent from the body and the sense-organs ('Now where the sight has\nentered' up to 'the mind is his divine eye'). Next he declares that,\nafter having divested itself of the body and the senses, the Self\nperceives all the objects of its desire by means of its 'divine eye,' i.\ne. the power of cognition which constitutes its essential nature ('He by\nmeans of the divine eye,' &c.). He further declares that those who have\ntrue knowledge know the Self as such ('on that Self the devas meditate');\nand in conclusion teaches that he who has that true knowledge of the\nSelf obtains for his reward the intuition of Brahman--which is suggested\nby what the text says about the obtaining of all worlds and all desires\n('He obtains all worlds and all desires,' &c., up to the end of the\nchapter).--It thus appears that the entire chapter proposes as the\nobject of cognition the individual soul free from sin, and so on. The\nqualities, viz. freedom from guilt, &c., may thus belong to the\nindividual Self, and on this ground we conclude that the small ether is\nthe individual Self.\n\nThis view the second half of the S\u00fbtra sets aside. The two sections,\nthat which treats of the small ether and that which contains the\nteaching of Praj\u00e2pati, have different topics. Praj\u00e2pati's teaching\nrefers to the individual soul, whose true nature, with its qualities\nsuch as freedom from evil, &c., is at first hidden by untruth, while\nlater on, when it has freed itself from the bondage of karman, risen\nfrom the body, and approached the highest light, it manifests itself in\nits true form and then is characterised by freedom from all evil and by\nother auspicious qualities. In the section treating of the small ether,\non the other hand, we have to do with the small ether, i.e. the highest\nBrahman, whose true nature is never hidden, and which therefore is\nunconditionally characterised by freedom from evil, and so on.--\nMoreover, the dahar\u00e2k\u00e2sa-section ascribes to the small ether other\nattributes which cannot belong to the individual Self even 'when its\ntrue nature has manifested itself.' The small ether is there called a\nbank and support of all worlds; and one of its names,'satyam,' is\nexplained to imply that it governs all sentient and non-sentient beings.\nAll this also proves that the small ether is none other than the highest\nSelf. That the individual soul, 'even when its true nature is manifest,'\ncannot be viewed as a bank and support of the worlds, &c., we shall show\nunder IV, 4.\n\nBut if this is so, what then is the meaning of the reference to the\nindividual soul which is made in the section treating of the small ether,\nviz. in the passage, 'Now that serene being, which after having risen\nfrom this body,' &c. (VIII, 3, 4)?\n\nTo this question the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n19. And the reference has a different meaning.\n\nThe text in question declares that the released individual soul when\nreaching the highest light, i.e. Brahman, which is free from all sin,\nand so on, attains its true nature, which is characterised by similar\nfreedom from sin, and so on. Now this reference to the individual soul,\nas described in the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati, has the purpose of giving\ninstruction (not about the qualities of the individual soul, but) about\nthe nature of that which is the cause of the qualities of the individual\nsoul, i.e. the qualities specially belonging to the supreme Person. The\nreason why, in the section containing the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati,\ninformation is given as to the true nature of the released individual\nsoul is that such knowledge assists the doctrine referring to the small\nether. For the individual Self which wishes to reach Brahman must know\nhis own true nature also, so as to realise that he, as being himself\nendowed with auspicious qualities, will finally arrive at an intuition\nof the highest Brahman, which is a mass of auspicious qualities raised\nto the highest degree of excellence. The cognition of the soul's own\ntrue nature is itself comprised in the result of the meditation on\nBrahman, and the results which are proclaimed in the teaching of\nPraj\u00e2pati ('He obtains all worlds and all wishes'; 'He moves about there\nlaughing,' &c.) thus really are results of the knowledge of the small\nether.\n\n\n\n\n20. If it be said, owing to the scriptural declaration of smallness;\nthat has been explained.\n\nThe text describes the ether within the heart as being of small compass,\nand this agrees indeed with the individual soul which elsewhere is\ncompared to the point of an awl, but not with Brahman, which is greater\nthan everything.--The reply to this objection has virtually been given\nbefore, viz. under I, 2, 7, where it is said that Brahman may be viewed\nas of small size, for the purpose of devout meditation.\n\nIt thus remains a settled conclusion that the small ether is none other\nbut the highest Person who is untouched by even a shadow of imperfection,\nand is an ocean of infinite, supremely exalted, qualities--knowledge,\nstrength, lordly power, &c. The being, on the other hand, which in the\nteaching of Praj\u00e2pati is described as first having a body due to karman--\nas we see from passages such as 'they strike it as it were, they cut it\nas it were'--and as afterwards approaching the highest light, and then\nmanifesting its essential qualities, viz. freedom from sin, &c., is the\nindividual soul; not the small ether (or Brahman).\n\nThe next S\u00fbtra supplies a further reason for this conclusion.\n\n\n\n\n21. And on account of the imitation of that.\n\nThe individual soul, free from bondage, and thus possessing the\nqualities of freedom from sin, &c., cannot be the small ether, i.e. the\nhighest Brahman, because it is stated to 'imitate,' i.e. to be equal to\nthat Brahman. The text making that statement is Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, 'When\nthe seer (i.e. the individual soul) sees the brilliant maker, the Lord,\nthe Person who has his source in Brahman; then becoming wise and shaking\noff good and evil, he reaches the highest equality, free from passions.'\nThe being to which the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati refers is the 'imitator,' i.\ne. the individual soul; the Brahman which is 'imitated' is the small\nether.\n\n\n\n\n22. The same is declared by Smriti also.\n\nSmriti also declares that the transmigrating soul when reaching the\nstate of Release 'imitates,' i.e. attains supreme equality of attributes\nwith the highest Brahman. 'Abiding by this knowledge they, attaining to\nequality of attributes with me, are not born again at the time of\ncreation, nor are they affected by the general dissolution of the world'\n(Bha. G\u00ee. XIV, 2).\n\nSome maintain that the last two S\u00fbtras constitute a separate adhikarana\n(head of discussion), meant to prove that the text Mu. Up. II, 2, 10\n('After him the shining one, everything shines; by the light of him all\nthis is lighted'), refers to the highest Brahman. This view is, however,\ninadmissible, for the reason that with regard to the text quoted no\np\u00fbrvapaksha can arise, it having been proved under I, 2, 21 ff., and 1,3,\n1, ff., that the whole section of which that text forms part is\nconcerned with Brahman; and it further having been shown under I, 1, 24\nff., that Brahman is apprehended under the form of light.--The\ninterpretation moreover does not fit in with the wording of the S\u00fbtras.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of the 'small one.'\n\n\n\n\n23. On account of the term, the one measured.\n\nWe read in the Kathavall\u00ee 'The Person of the size of a thumb stands in\nthe middle of the Self, as lord of the past and the future, and\nhenceforward fears no more'; 'That Person of the size of a thumb is like\na light without smoke,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 4, 1; 13). And 'The Person not\nlarger than a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of\nmen' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 17). A doubt here arises whether the being measured\nby the extent of a span be the individual soul or the highest Self.--The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, another scriptural\ntext also declares the individual soul to have that measure, 'the ruler\nof the vital airs moves through his own works, of the size of a thumb,\nbrilliant like the sun, endowed with purposes and egoity' (Svet. Up. V,\n7; 8). Moreover, the highest Self is not anywhere else, not even for the\npurpose of meditation, represented as having the size of a thumb. It\nthus being determined that the being of the length of a thumb is the\nindividual Self, we understand the term 'Lord,' which is applied to it,\nas meaning that it is the Lord of the body, the sense-organs, the\nobjects and the instruments of fruition.--Of this view the S\u00fbtra\ndisposes, maintaining that the being a thumb long can be none but the\nhighest Self, just on account of that term. For lordship over all things\npast and future cannot possibly belong to the individual Self, which is\nunder the power of karman.--But how can the highest Self be said to have\nthe measure of a thumb?--On this point the next S\u00fbtra satisfies us.\n\n\n\n\n24. But with reference to the heart, men being qualified.\n\nIn so far as the highest Self abides, for the purpose of devout\nmeditation, in the heart of the devotee--which heart is of the measure\nof a thumb--it may itself be viewed as having the measure of a thumb.\nThe individual soul also can be said to have the measure of a thumb only\nin so far as dwelling within the heart; for scripture directly states\nthat its real size is that of the point of a goad, i.e. minute. And as\nmen only are capable of devout meditation, and hence alone have a claim\non scripture, the fact that the hearts of other living creatures also,\nsuch as donkeys, horses, snakes, &c., have the same size, cannot give\nrise to any objection.--The discussion of this matter will be completed\nlater on [FOOTNOTE 326:1].\n\n\n\n\n25. Also beings above them (i.e. men), B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana thinks, on account of\npossibility.\n\nIn order to prove that the highest Brahman may be viewed as having the\nsize of a thumb, it has been declared that the scriptural texts\nenjoining meditation on Brahman are the concern of men. This offers an\nopportunity for the discussion of the question whether also other\nclasses of individual souls, such as devas, are qualified for knowledge\nof Brahman. The P\u00fbrvapakshin denies this qualification in the case of\ngods and other beings, on the ground of absence of capability. For, he\nsays, bodiless beings, such as gods, are incapable of the accomplishment\nof meditation on Brahman, which requires as its auxiliaries the seven\nmeans enumerated above (p. 17)--This must not be objected to on the\nground of the devas, and so on, having bodies; for there is no means of\nproof establishing such embodiedness. We have indeed proved above that\nthe Ved\u00e2nta-texts may intimate accomplished things, and hence are an\nauthoritative means for the cognition of Brahman; but we do not meet\nwith any Ved\u00e2nta-text, the purport of which is to teach that the devas,\nand so on, possess bodies. Nor can this point be established through\nmantras and arthav\u00e2da texts; for these are merely supplementary to the\ninjunctions of actions (sacrificial, and so on), and therefore have a\ndifferent aim. And the injunctions themselves prove nothing with regard\nto the devas, except that the latter are that with a view to which those\nactions are performed. In the same way it also cannot be shown that the\ngods have any desires or wants (to fulfil or supply which they might\nenter on meditation of Brahman). For the two reasons above we therefore\nconclude that the devas, and so on, are not qualified for meditation on\nBrahman.--This view is contradicted by the S\u00fbtra. Such meditation is\npossible in the case of higher beings also B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana thinks; on account\nof the possibility of want and capacity on their part also. Want and\nwish exist in their case since they also are liable to suffering,\nspringing from the assaults, hard to be endured, of the different kinds\nof pain, and since they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found\nin the highest Brahman, which is untouched by the shadow even of\nimperfection, and is a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest\nperfection. 'Capability', on the other hand, depends on the possession\nof a body and sense-organs of whatever degree of tenuity; and that the\ndevas, from Brahma downward, possess a body and sense-organs, is\ndeclared in all the Upanishads, in the chapters treating of creation and\nthe chapters enjoining meditation. In the Ch\u00e2ndogya, e.g. it is related\nhow the highest Being having resolved on creation, evolved the aggregate\nof non-sentient matter with its different kinds, and then produced the\nfourfold multitude of living creatures, each having a material body\ncorresponding to its karman, and a suitable name of its own. Similarly,\nall the other scriptural accounts of creation declare that there are\nfour classes of creatures--devas, men, animals, and non-moving beings,\nsuch as plants--and the difference of these classes depends on the\nindividual Selfs being joined to various bodies capacitating them to\nexperience the results of their works, each in that one of the fourteen\nworlds--beginning with the world of Brahm\u00e2--which is the suitable place\nfor retribution. For in themselves, apart from bodies, the individual\nSelfs are not distinguished as men, gods, and so on. In the same way the\nstory of the devas and Asuras approaching Praj\u00e2pati with fuel in their\nhands, staying with him as pupils for thirty-two years, &c. (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 7 ff.), clearly shows that the devas possess bodies and sense-\norgans. Analogously, mantras and arthav\u00e2das, which are complementary to\ninjunctions of works, contain unmistakeable references to the corporeal\nnature of the gods ('Indra holding in his hand the thunderbolt'; 'Indra\nlifted the thunderbolt', &c.); and as the latter is not contradicted by\nany other means of proof it must be accepted on the authority stated.\nNor can it be said that those mantras and arthav\u00e2das are really meant to\nexpress something else (than those details mentioned above), in so far,\nnamely, as they aim at proclaiming or glorifying the action with which\nthey are connected; for those very details subserve the purpose of\nglorification, and so on, and without them glorification is not possible.\nFor we praise or glorify a thing by declaring its qualities; if such\nqualities do not exist all glorification lapses. It cannot by any means\nbe maintained that anything may be glorified by the proclamation of its\nqualities, even if such qualities do not really exist. Hence the\narthav\u00e2das which glorify a certain action, just thereby intimate the\nreal existence of the qualities and details of the action. The mantras\nagain, which are prescribed in connexion with the actions, serve the\npurpose of throwing light on the use to be derived from the performance\nof the actions, and this they accomplish by making statements as to the\nparticular qualities, such as embodiedness and the like, which belong to\nthe devas and other classes of beings. Otherwise Indra, and so on, would\nnot be remembered at the time of performance; for the idea of a divinity\npresents itself to the mind only in connexion with the special\nattributes of that divinity. In the case of such qualities as are not\nestablished by other means of proof, the primary statement is made by\nthe arthav\u00e2da or the mantra: the former thereby glorifies the action,\nand the latter proclaims it as possessing certain qualities or details;\nand both these ends are accomplished by making statements as to the gods,\n&c., possessing certain qualities, such as embodiedness and the like.\nIn the case, again, of certain qualities being already established by\nother means of proof, the mantras and arthav\u00e2das merely refer to them\n(as something already known), and in this way perform their function of\nglorification and elucidation. And where, thirdly, there is a\ncontradiction between the other means of knowledge and what mantras and\narthav\u00e2das state (as when, e.g. a text of the latter kind says that 'the\nsacrificial post is the sun'), the intention of the text is\nmetaphorically to denote, by means of those apparently unmeaning terms,\ncertain other qualities which are not excluded by the other means of\nknowledge; and in this way the function of glorification and elucidation\nis again accomplished. Now what the injunction of a sacrificial action\ndemands as its supplement, is a statement as to the power of the\ndivinity to whom the sacrifice is offered; for the performance which\nscripture enjoins on men desirous of certain results, is itself of a\nmerely transitory nature, and hence requires some agent capable of\nbringing about, at some future time, the result desired as, e.g. the\nheavenly world. 'V\u00e2yu is the swiftest god; he (the sacrificer)\napproaches V\u00e2yu with his own share; the god then leads him to\nprosperity' (Taitt. Samh. I, 2, 1); 'What he seeks by means of that\noffering, may he obtain that, may he prosper therein, may the gods\nfavourably grant him that' (Taitt. Br. III, 5, 10, 5); these and similar\narthav\u00e2das and mantras intimate that the gods when propitiated by\ncertain sacrificial works, give certain rewards and possess the power to\ndo so; and they thus connect themselves with the general context of\nscripture as supplying an evidently required item of information.\nMoreover, the mere verb 'to sacrifice' (yaj), as denoting worship of the\ngods, intimates the presence of a deity which is to be propitiated by\nthe action called sacrifice, and thus constitutes the main element of\nthat action. A careful consideration of the whole context thus reveals\nthat everything which is wanted for the due accomplishment of the action\nenjoined is to be learned from the text itself, and that hence we need\nnot have recourse to such entities as the 'unseen principle' (ap\u00fbrva),\nassumed to be denoted by, or to be imagined in connexion with, the\npassages enjoining certain actions. Hence the dharmas\u00e2stras, itih\u00e2sas,\nand pur\u00e2nas also, which are founded on the different br\u00e2hmanas, mantras\nand arthav\u00e2das, clearly teach that Brahma and the other gods, as well as\nthe Asuras and other superhuman beings, have bodies and sense-organs,\nconstitutions of different kinds, different abodes, enjoyments, and\nfunctions.--Owing to their having bodies, the gods therefore are also\nqualified for meditation on Brahman.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 326:1. The 'pramit\u00e2dhikarana' is resumed in S\u00fbtra 41.]\n\n\n\n\n26. If it be said that there results a contradiction to work; we deny\nthis, on account of the observation of the assumption of several\n(bodies).\n\nAn objection here presents itself. If we admit the gods to have bodies,\na difficulty arises at the sacrifices, as it is impossible that one and\nthe same corporeal Indra--who is at the same time invited by many\nsacrificers 'come, O Indra', 'come, O Lord of the red horses,' &c.--\nshould be present at all those places. And that the gods, Agni and so on,\nreally do come to the sacrifices is proved by the following scriptural\ntext: 'To whose sacrifice do the gods go, and to whose not? He who first\nreceives the gods, sacrifices to them on the following day' (Taitt. Samh.\nI, 6, 7, 1). In refutation of this objection the Su\u00fbtra points out that\nthere is seen, i.e. recorded, the assumption of several bodies at the\nsame time, on the part of beings endowed with special powers, such as\nSaubhari.\n\n\n\n\n27. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) with regard to\nwords; we say no, since beings originate from them (as appears) from\nperception and inference.\n\nWell then let us admit that there is no difficulty as far as sacrifices\nare concerned, for the reason stated in the preceding S\u00fbtra. But another\ndifficulty presents itself with regard to the words of which the Veda\nconsists. For if Indra and the other gods are corporeal beings, it\nfollows that they are made up of parts and hence non-permanent. This\nimplies either that the Vedic words denoting them--not differing therein\nfrom common worldly words such as Devadatta--are totally devoid of\nmeaning during all those periods which precede the origination of the\nbeings called Indra and so on, or follow on their destruction; or else\nthat the Veda itself is non-permanent, non-eternal.--This objection is\nnot valid, the S\u00fbtra points out, for the reason that those beings, viz.\nIndra and so on, again and again originate from the Vedic words. To\nexplain. Vedic words, such as Indra and so on, do not, like the word\nDevadatta and the like, denote, on the basis of convention, one\nparticular individual only: they rather denote by their own power\nparticular species of beings, just as the word 'cow' denotes a\nparticular species of animals. When therefore a special individual of\nthe class called Indra has perished, the creator, apprehending from the\nVedic word 'Indra' which is present to his mind the class\ncharacteristics of the beings denoted by that word, creates another\nIndra possessing those very same characteristics; just as the potter\nfashions a new jar, on the basis of the word 'jar' which is stirring in\n_his_ mind.--But how is this known?--'Through perception and inference,'\ni.e. through Scripture and Smriti. Scripture says, e.g. 'By means of the\nVeda Praj\u00e2pati evolved names and forms, the being and the non-being';\nand 'Saying \"bh\u00fbh\" (earth) he created the earth; saying \"bhuvah\" he\ncreated the air,' and so on; which passages teach that the creator at\nfirst bethinks himself of the characteristic make of a thing, in\nconnexion with the word denoting it, and thereupon creates an individual\nthing characterised by that make. Smriti makes similar statements;\ncompare, e. g. 'In the beginning there was sent forth by the creator,\ndivine speech--beginningless and endless--in the form of the Veda, and\nfrom it there originated all creatures'; and 'He, in the beginning,\nseparately created from the words of the Veda the names and works and\nshapes of all things'; and 'The names and forms of beings, and all the\nmultiplicity of works He in the beginning created from the Veda.' This\nproves that from the corporeality of the gods, and so on, it follows\nneither that the words of the Veda are unmeaning nor that the Veda\nitself is non-eternal.\n\n\n\n\n28. And for this very reason eternity (of the Veda).\n\nAs words such as Indra and Vasishtha, which denote gods and Rishis,\ndenote (not individuals only, but) classes, and as the creation of those\nbeings is preceded by their being suggested to the creative mind through\nthose words; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of being\nreconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and k\u00e2ndas\n(sections) of the sacred text having 'makers' and about Rishis seeing\nthe hymns; cp. such passages as 'He chooses the makers of mantras';\n'Reverence to the Rishis who are the makers of mantras'; 'That is Agni;\nthis is a hymn of Visv\u00e2mitra.' For by means of these very texts\nPraj\u00e2pati presents to his own mind the characteristics and powers of the\ndifferent Rishis who make the different sections, hymns, and mantras,\nthereupon creates them endowed with those characteristics and powers,\nand appoints them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c. The\nRishis being thus gifted by Praj\u00e2pati with the requisite powers, undergo\nsuitable preparatory austerities and finally _see_ the mantras, and so\non, proclaimed by the Vasishthas and other Rishis of former ages of the\nworld, perfect in all their sounds and accents, without having learned\nthem from the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict between\nthe eternity of the Veda and the fact that the Rishis are the _makers_\nof its sections, hymns, and so on. A further objection is raised. Let it\nbe admitted that after each pralaya of the kind called 'contingent'\n(naimittika), Praj\u00e2pati may proceed to create new Indras, and so on, in\nthe way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the Indras, and so on,\nof preceding periods. In the case, on the other hand, of a pralaya of\nthe kind called elemental (pr\u00e2kritika), in which the creator, Praj\u00e2pati\nhimself, and words--which are the effects of the elemental ahank\u00e2ra--\npass away, what possibility is there of Praj\u00e2pati undertaking a new\ncreation on the basis of Vedic words, and how can we speak of the\npermanency of a Veda which perishes? He who maintains the eternity of\nthe Veda and the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven\nto the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being without a\nbeginning (i.e. not preceded by a pralaya).--Of this difficulty the next\nS\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n29. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no\ncontradiction, even in the renovation (of the world); as appears from--\nSruti and Smriti.\n\nOn account of the sameness of names and forms, as stated before, there\nis no difficulty in the way of the origination of the world, even in the\ncase of total pralayas. For what actually takes place is as follows.\nWhen the period of a great pralaya draws towards its close, the divine\nsupreme Person, remembering the constitution of the world previous to\nthe pralaya, and forming the volition 'May I become manifold' separates\ninto its constituent elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and\nobjects of enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been merged in\nhim so as to possess a separate existence (not actual but) potential\nonly, and then emits the entire world just as it had been before, from\nthe so-called Mahat down to the Brahman-egg, and Hiranyagarbha\n(Praj\u00e2pati). Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the same\norder and arrangement they had had before, and having taught them to\nHiranyagarbha, he entrusts to him the new creation of the different\nclasses of beings, gods, and so on, just as it was before; and at the\nsame time abides himself within the world so created as its inner Self\nand Ruler. This view of the process removes all difficulties. The\nsuperhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that\nintelligent agents having received in their minds an impression due to\nprevious recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters,\nand so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of\nsuccession. This holds good both with regard to us men and to the\nhighest Lord of all; there however is that difference between the two\ncases that the representations of the Veda which the supreme Person\nforms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression\npreviously made.\n\nTo the question whence all this is known, the S\u00fbtra replies 'from\nScripture and Smriti.' The scriptural passage is 'He who first creates\nBrahm\u00e2 and delivers the Vedas to him' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to\nSmriti we have the following statement in Manu, 'This universe existed\nin the shape of darkness, &c.--He desiring to produce beings of many\nkinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters and\nplaced his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg equal to the sun\nin brilliancy; in that he himself was born as Brahm\u00e2, the progenitor of\nthe whole world' (Manu I, 5; 8-9). To the same effect are the texts of\nthe Paur\u00e2nikas, 'From the navel of the sleeping divinity there sprung up\na lotus, and in that lotus there was born Brahma fully knowing all Vedas\nand Ved\u00e2ngas. And then Brahm\u00e2 was told by him (the highest Divinity),\n'Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one'; and the following\npassage, 'From the highest N\u00e2r\u00e2yana there was born the Four-faced one.'--\nAnd in the section which begins 'I will tell the original creation,' we\nread 'Because having created water (n\u00e2ra) I abide within it, therefore\nmy name shall be N\u00e2r\u00e2yana. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and as I\nam sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and in that lotus there\nis born the Four-faced one, and I tell him \"Do thou, Great-minded one,\ncreate all beings.\"'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the deities.'\n\n\n\n\n30. On account of the impossibility (of qualification for the\nmadhuvidy\u00e2, &c.) (Jaimini maintains the non-qualification (of gods,\n&c.).)\n\nSo far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on, are qualified\nfor the knowledge of Brahman. But a further point here presents itself\nfor consideration, viz. whether the gods are qualified or not to\nundertake those meditations of which they themselves are the objects.\nThe S\u00fbtra states as a p\u00fbrvapaksha view held by Jaimini, that they are\nnot so qualified, for the reason that there are no other \u00c2dityas, Vasus,\nand so on, who could be meditated on by the \u00c2dityas and Vasus themselves;\nand that moreover for the \u00c2dityas and Vasus the qualities and position\nof those classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering\nthat they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidy\u00e2 (Ch. Up. III)\nrepresents as objects of devout meditation certain parts of the sun\nwhich are being enjoyed by the different classes of divine beings, Vasus,\n\u00c2dityas, and so on--the sun being there called 'madhu.' i.e. honey or\nnectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain nectar to be\nbrought about by certain sacrificial works to be known from the Rig-veda,\nand so on; and as the reward of such meditation the text names the\nattainment of the position of the Vasus, \u00c2dityas, and so on.\n\n\n\n\n31. And on account of (meditating on the part of the gods) being in the\nLight.\n\n'Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as immortal time'\n(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16). This text declares that the meditation of the gods\nhas for its object the Light, i.e. the highest Brahman. Now this express\ndeclaration as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to\nmeditations on Brahman which are common to men and gods, implies a\ndenial of the gods being qualified for meditations on other objects. The\nconclusion therefore is that the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for\nmeditations on the Vasus and other classes of deities.\n\n\n\n\n32. But B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana (maintains) the existence (of qualification); for\nthere is (possibility of such).\n\nThe Reverend B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana thinks that the \u00c2dityas, Vasus, and so on, are\nalso qualified for meditations on divinities. For it is in their case\nalso possible that their attainment of Brahman should be viewed as\npreceded by their attainment of Vasu-hood or \u00c2ditya-hood, in so far,\nnamely, as they meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They\nmay be Vasus and \u00c2dityas in the present age of the world, but at the\nsame time be desirous of holding the same position in future ages also.\nIn the Madhuvidy\u00e2 we have to distinguish two sections, concerned\nrespectively with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The\nformer section, extending from the beginning up to 'when from thence he\nhas risen upwards,' enjoins meditation on Brahman in its condition as\neffect, i.e. as appearing in the form of creatures such as the Vasus,\nand so on; while the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal\nBrahman viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The purport\nof the whole vidy\u00e2 is that he who meditates on Brahman in this its\ntwofold form will in a future age of the world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will\nfinally attain Brahman in its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest\nBrahman. From the fact that the text, 'And indeed to him who thus knows\nthe Brahma-upanishad, the sun does not rise and does not set; for him\nthere is day once and for all,' calls the whole Madhuvidy\u00e2 a 'Brahma'--\nupanishad, and that the reward declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood,\nand so on, leading up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are\nentitled to infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz. on\nthe different parts of the sun viewed as objects of enjoyment for the\nVasus, and so on, really are meant as meditations on Brahman as abiding\nin those different forms. Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is\nthus seen to be possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really\nconstitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the\nappropriateness of the text discussed above, 'On him the gods meditate\nas the light of lights.' The Vrittik\u00e2ra expresses the same opinion, 'For\nthere is possibility with regard to the Madhu-vidy\u00e2, and so on, Brahman\nonly being the object of meditation everywhere.'--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'honey.'\n\nThe S\u00fbtras now enter on a discussion of the question whether the S\u00fbdras\nalso are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.\n\nThe P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified; for qualification,\nhe says, depends on want and capacity, and both these are possible in\nthe case of S\u00fbdras also. The S\u00fbdra is not indeed qualified for any works\ndepending on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such knowledge he\nis debarred; but he possesses qualification for meditation on Brahman,\nwhich after all is nothing but a certain mental energy. The only works\nprerequisite for meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man\nas a member of a caste or \u00e2srama, and these consist, in the S\u00fbdra's case,\nin obedience to the higher castes. And when we read 'therefore the S\u00fbdra\nis not qualified for sacrifices,' the purport of this passage is only to\nmake a confirmatory reference to something already settled by reason,\nviz. that the S\u00fbdra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices\nwhich cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with the sacred fires\n(and not to deny the S\u00fbdra's competence for devout meditation).--But how\ncan meditation on Brahman be undertaken by a man who has not studied the\nVedas, inclusive of the Ved\u00e2nta, and hence knows nothing about the\nnature of Brahman and the proper modes of meditation?--Those also, we\nreply, who do not study Veda and Ved\u00e2nta may acquire the requisite\nknowledge by hearing Itih\u00e2sas and Pur\u00e2nas; and there are texts which\nallow S\u00fbdras to become acquainted with texts of that kind; cp. e.g. 'one\nis to make the four castes to hear texts, the Br\u00e2hmana coming first.'\nMoreover, those Pur\u00e2nas and Itih\u00e2sas make mention of S\u00fbdras, such as\nVidura, who had a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads themselves,\nviz. in the so-called Samvarga-vidy\u00e2, show that a S\u00fbdra is qualified for\nthe knowledge of Brahman; for there the teacher Raikva addresses\nJ\u00e2nasruti, who wishes to learn from him, as S\u00fbdra, and thereupon\ninstructs him in the knowledge of Brahman (Ch. Up. IV, 2, 3). All this\nproves that S\u00fbdras also have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.\n\nThis conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence of capability. It\nis impossible that the capability of performing meditations on Brahman\nshould belong to a person not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due\nmodes of meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the requisite\npreliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of the Veda,\nsacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does not impart qualification\nto a person destitute of the required capability. And this absence of\ncapability is due, in the S\u00fbdra's case, to absence of legitimate study\nof the Veda. The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect\nthemselves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge (i.e. religious\nceremonies and the like) that belong to the three higher castes, for\nthese castes actually possess the knowledge (required for the\nsacrifices), owing to their studying the Veda in agreement with the\ninjunction which prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same\ninjunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves with the\nknowledge and means of knowledge belonging to others (than members of\nthe three higher castes). And the same naturally holds good with regard\nto the injunctions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such\nknowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic injunction of\nstudy supplies a means for meditation on Brahman, it follows that the\nS\u00fbdra for whom that injunction is not meant is incapable of such\nmeditation. Itih\u00e2sas and Pur\u00e2nas hold the position of being helpful\nmeans towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or support the\nVeda, not independently of the Veda. And that S\u00fbdras are allowed to hear\nItih\u00e2sas and Pur\u00e2nas is meant only for the end of destroying their sins,\nnot to prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of Vidura and\nother S\u00fbdras having been 'founded on Brahman,' explains itself as\nfollows:--Owing to the effect of former actions, which had not yet\nworked themselves out, they were born in a low caste, while at the same\ntime they possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge acquired\nby them in former births had not yet quite vanished.\n\n(On these general grounds we object to S\u00fbdras being viewed as qualified\nfor meditation on Brahman.) The S\u00fbtra now refutes that argument, which\nthe P\u00fbrvapakshin derives from the use of the word 'S\u00fbdra' in the\nSamvarga-vidy\u00e2.\n\n\n\n\n33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated by his (J\u00e2nasruti's)\nresorting to him (Raikva) on hearing a disrespectful speech about\nhimself.\n\nFrom what the text says about J\u00e2nasruti Pautr\u00e2yana having been taunted\nby a flamingo for his want of knowledge of Brahman, and having thereupon\nresorted to Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it appears\nthat sorrow (suk) had taken possession of him; and it is with a view to\nthis that Raikva addresses him as S\u00fbdra. For the word S\u00fbdra,\netymologically considered, means one who grieves or sorrows (sokati).\nThe appellation 's\u00fbdra' therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being\na member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from a consideration\nof the whole story. J\u00e2nasruti Pautr\u00e2yana was a very liberal and pious\nking. Being much pleased with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in\nhim the desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings, assuming the\nshape of flamingoes, flew past him at night time, when one of them\naddressed the other, 'O Bhall\u00e2ksha. the light of J\u00e2nasruti has spread\nlike the sky; do not go near that it may not burn thee.' To this praise\nof J\u00e2nasruti the other flamingo replied, 'How can you speak of him,\nbeing what he is, as if he were Raikva \"sayuktv\u00e2n\"?' i.e. 'how can you\nspeak of J\u00e2nasruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva, who knows\nBrahman and is endowed with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who\nknows Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. Janasruti may be\nvery pious, but as he does not know Brahman what quality of his could\nproduce splendour capable of burning me like the splendour of Raikva?'\nThe former flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its companion\nreplies, 'He in whose work and knowledge there are comprised all the\nworks done by good men and all the knowledge belonging to intelligent\ncreatures, that is Raikva.' J\u00e2nasruti, having heard this speech of the\nflamingo--which implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the\nknowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as possessing that\nknowledge--at once sends his door-keeper to look for Raikva; and when\nthe door-keeper finds him and brings word, the king himself repairs to\nhim with six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with\nmules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he meditates, i.e.\nthe highest deity. Raikva, who through the might of his Yoga-knowledge\nis acquainted with everything that passes in the three worlds, at once\nperceives that J\u00e2nasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of\nthe flamingo, which had been provoked by the king's want of knowledge of\nBrahman, and is now making an effort due to the wish of knowing Brahman;\nand thus recognises that the king is fit for the reception of that\nknowledge. Reflecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be\nfirmly established in this pupil even without long attendance on the\nteacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to the utmost of his\ncapability, he addresses him: 'Do thou take away (ap\u00e2hara) (these\nthings), O S\u00fbdra; keep (the chariot) with the cows for thyself.' What he\nmeans to say is, 'By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me,\nthe knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee, who, through the\ndesire for such knowledge, art plunged in grief'--the address 'O S\u00fbdra'\nintimating that Raikva knows J\u00e2nasruti to be plunged in grief, and on\nthat account fit to receive instruction about Brahman. J\u00e2nasruti\nthereupon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as much wealth\nas he possibly can, and moreover his own daughter. Raikva again\nintimates his view of the pupil's fitness for receiving instruction by\naddressing him a second time as 'S\u00fbdra,' and says, 'You have brought\nthese, O S\u00fbdra; by this mouth only you made me speak,' i.e. 'You now\nhave brought presents to the utmost of your capability; by this means\nonly you will induce me, without lengthy service on your part, to utter\nspeech containing that instruction about Brahman which you desire.'--\nHaving said this he begins to instruct him.--We thus see that the\nappellation 's\u00fbdra' is meant to intimate the grief of J\u00e2nasruti--which\ngrief in its turn indicates the king's fitness for receiving instruction;\nand is not meant to declare that J\u00e2nasruti belongs to the lowest caste.\n\n\n\n\n34. And on account of (J\u00e2nasruti ) kshattriya-hood being understood.\n\nThe first section of the vidy\u00e2 tells us that J\u00e2nasruti bestowed much\nwealth and food; later on he is represented as sending his door-keeper\non an errand; and in the end, as bestowing on Raikva many villages--\nwhich shows him to be a territorial lord. All these circumstances\nsuggest J\u00e2nasruti's being a Kshattriya, and hence not a member of the\nlowest caste.--The above S\u00fbtra having declared that the kshattriya-hood\nof J\u00e2nasruti is indicated in the introductory legend, the next S\u00fbtra\nshows that the same circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend.\n\n\n\n\n35. On account of the inferential sign further on, together with\nKaitraratha.\n\nThe kshattriya-hood of J\u00e2nasruti is further to be accepted on account of\nthe Kshattriya Abhiprat\u00e2rin Kaitraratha, who is mentioned further on in\nthis very same Samvargavidy\u00e2 which Raikva imparts to J\u00e2nasruti.--But why?--\nAs follows. The section beginning 'Once a Brahmak\u00e2rin begged of Saunaka\nK\u00e2peya and Abhiprat\u00e2rin K\u00e2kshaseni while being waited on at their meal,'\nand ending 'thus do we, O Brahmak\u00e2rin, meditate on that being,' shows\nK\u00e2peya, Abhiprat\u00e2rin, and the Brahmak\u00e2rin to be connected with the\nSamvarga-vidy\u00e2. Now Abhiprat\u00e2rin is a Kshattriya, the other two are\nBr\u00e2hmanas. This shows that there are connected with the vidy\u00e2, Br\u00e2hmanas,\nand from among non-Br\u00e2hmanas, a Kshattriya only, but not a S\u00fbdra. It\ntherefore appears appropriate to infer that the person, other than the\nBr\u00e2hmana Raikva, who is likewise connected with this vidy\u00e2, viz.\nJ\u00e2nasruti, is likewise a Kshattriya, not a S\u00fbdra.--But how do we know\nthat Abhiprat\u00e2rin is a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya? Neither of these\ncircumstances is stated in the legend in the Samvarga-vidy\u00e2! To this\nquestion the S\u00fbtra replies, 'on account of the inferential mark.' From\nthe inferential mark that Saunaka K\u00e2peya and Abhiprat\u00e2rin K\u00e2kshaseni are\nsaid to have been sitting together at a meal we understand that there is\nsome connexion between Abhiprat\u00e2rin and the K\u00e2peyas. Now another\nscriptural passage runs as follows: 'The K\u00e2peyas made Kaitraratha\nperform that sacrifice' (T\u00e2nd Br\u00e2. XX, 12, 5), and this shows that one\nconnected with the K\u00e2peyas was a Kaitraratha; and a further text shows\nthat a Kaitraratha is a Kshattriya. 'from him there was descended a\nKaitraratha who was a prince.' All this favours the inference that\nAbhiprat\u00e2rin was a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya.\n\nSo far the S\u00fbtras have shown that there is no inferential mark to prove\nwhat is contradicted by reasoning, viz. the qualification of the S\u00fbdras.\nThe next S\u00fbtra declares that the non-qualification of the S\u00fbdra proved\nby reasoning is confirmed by Scripture and Smriti.\n\n\n\n\n36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications, and on\naccount of the declaration of their absence.\n\nIn sections the purport of which is to give instruction about Brahman\nthe ceremony of initiation is referred to, 'I will initiate you; he\ninitiated him' (Ch. Up. IV, 4). And at the same time the absence of such\nceremonies in the case of S\u00fbdras is stated: 'In the S\u00fbdra there is not\nany sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 126); and 'The\nfourth caste is once born, and not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 4).\n\n\n\n\n37. And on account of the procedure, on the ascertainment of the non-\nbeing of that.\n\nThat a S\u00fbdra is not qualified for knowledge of Brahman appears from that\nfact also that as soon as Gautama has convinced himself that J\u00e2b\u00e2la, who\nwishes to become his pupil, is not a S\u00fbdra, he proceeds to teach him the\nknowledge of Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n38. And on account of the prohibition of hearing, studying, and\nperformance of (Vedic) matter.\n\nThe S\u00fbdra is specially forbidden to hear and study the Veda and to\nperform the things enjoined in it. 'For a S\u00fbdra is like a cemetery,\ntherefore the Veda must not be read in the vicinity of a S\u00fbdra;'\n'Therefore the S\u00fbdra is like a beast, unfit for sacrifices.' And he who\ndoes not hear the Veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand and\nperform what the Veda enjoins. The prohibition of hearing thus implies\nthe prohibition of understanding and whatever depends on it.\n\n\n\n\n39. And on account of Smriti.\n\nSmriti also declares this prohibition of hearing, and so on. 'The ears\nof him who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac; if\nhe pronounces it his tongue is to be slit; if he preserves it his body\nis to be cut through.' And 'He is not to teach him sacred duties or vows.\n'--It is thus a settled matter that the S\u00fbdras are not qualified for\nmeditations on Brahman.\n\nWe must here point out that the non-qualification of S\u00fbdras for the\ncognition of Brahman can in no way be asserted by those who hold that a\nBrahman consisting of pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the\nsole reality; that everything else is false; that all bondage is unreal;\nthat such bondage may be put an end to by the mere cognition of the true\nnature of Reality--such cognition resulting from the hearing of certain\ntexts; and that the cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final\nRelease. For knowledge of the true nature of Reality, in the sense\nindicated, and the release resulting from it, may be secured by any one\nwho learns from another person that Brahman alone is real and that\neverything else is falsely superimposed on Brahman. That the cognition\nof such truth can be arrived at only on the basis of certain Vedic texts,\nsuch as 'Thou art that,' is a restriction which does not admit of proof;\nfor knowledge of the truth does not depend on man's choice, and at once\nsprings up in the mind even of an unwilling man as soon as the\nconditions for such origination are present. Nor can it be proved in any\nway that bondage can be put an end to only through such knowledge of the\ntruth as springs from Vedic texts; for error comes to an end through the\nknowledge of the true nature of things, whatever agency may give rise to\nsuch knowledge. True knowledge, of the kind described, will spring up in\nthe mind of a man as soon as he hears the non-scriptural declaration,\n'Brahman, consisting of non-differenced intelligence, is the sole\nReality; everything else is false,' and this will suffice to free him\nfrom error. When a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what\nwas mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell, the error of a\nS\u00fbdra no less than of a Br\u00e2hmana comes to an end; in the same way a\nS\u00fbdra also will free himself from the great cosmic error as soon as the\nknowledge of the true nature of things has arisen in his mind through a\nstatement resting on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. Nor\nmust you object to this on the ground that men knowing the Veda do not\ninstruct S\u00fbdras, and so on, because the text, 'he is not to teach him\nsacred things,' forbids them to do so; for men who have once learned--\nfrom texts such as 'Thou art that'--that Brahman is their Self, and thus\nare standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move no longer in\nthe sphere of those to whom injunctions and prohibitions apply, and the\nprohibition quoted does not therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman\nmay thus spring up in the mind of S\u00fbdras and the like, owing to\ninstruction received from one of those men who have passed beyond all\nprohibition. Nor must it be said that the instance of the shell and the\nsilver is not analogous, in so far, namely, as the error with regard to\nsilver in the shell comes to an end as soon as the true state of things\nis declared; while the great cosmic error that clouds the S\u00fbdra's mind\ndoes not come to an end as soon as, from the teaching of another man, he\nlearns the truth about Reality. For the case of the S\u00fbdra does not\nherein differ from that of the Br\u00e2hmana; the latter also does not at\nonce free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it avail to\nplead that the sacred texts originate the demanded final cognition in\nthe mind of the Br\u00e2hmana as soon as meditation has dispelled the\nobstructive imagination of plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped\nby meditation, the non-Vedic instruction given by another person\nproduces the required cognition in the mind of the S\u00fbdra. For meditation\nmeans nothing but a steady consideration of the sense which sentences\ndeclaratory of the unity of Brahman and the Self may convey, and the\neffect of such meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such\nunity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of meditation aims at\nsomething visible (i.e. an effect that can be definitely assigned,\nwhence it follows that the S\u00fbdra also is qualified for it, while he\nwould not be qualified for an activity having an 'adrishta,' i.e.\nsupersensuous, transcendental effect). The recital of the text of the\nVeda also and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing about\ncognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the origination of the _desire_\nof knowledge. The desire of knowledge may arise in a S\u00fbdra also (viz. in\nsome other way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-Vedic\ninstruction, obstructive imaginations having previously been destroyed\nby meditation. And thus in his case also non-real bondage will come to\nan end.--The same conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road.\nThe mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception and\ninference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the S\u00fbdra the theory\nthat there is an inward Reality constituted by non-differenced self-\nluminous intelligence, that this inward principle witnesses Nescience,\nand that owing to Nescience the entire apparent world, with its manifold\ndistinctions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is\nsuperimposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by uninterrupted\nmeditation on this inner Reality, free himself from all imaginations\nopposed to it, arrive at the intuitive knowledge of the inner principle,\nand thus obtain final release. And this way being open to release, there\nis really no use to be discerned in the Ved\u00e2nta-texts, suggesting as\nthey clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is not\nabsolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infinite\ntranscendent attributes, being endowed with manifold powers, connected\nwith manifold creations, and so on. In this way the qualification of\nS\u00fbdras for the knowledge of Brahman is perfectly clear. And as the\nknowledge of Brahman may be reached in this way not only by S\u00fbdras but\nalso by Br\u00e2hmanas and members of the other higher castes, the poor\nUpanishad is practically defunct.--To this the following objection will\npossibly be raised. Man being implicated in and confused by the\nbeginningless course of mundane existence, requires to receive from\nsomewhere a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error and\nthe Reality being something quite different, and thus only there arises\nin him a desire to enter on an enquiry, proceeding by means of\nperception, and so on. Now that which gives the required suggestion is\nthe Veda, and hence we cannot do without it.--But this objection is not\nvalid. For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers and\ntroubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philosophical\ninvestigation of Reality, proceeding by means of Perception and\nInference, springs up quite apart from the Veda, owing to the\nobservation that there are various sects of philosophers. S\u00e2nkhyas, and\nso on, who make it their business to carry on such investigations. And\nwhen such desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in the\nway allowed by the S\u00e2nkaras themselves) lead on to the theory that the\nonly Reality is intelligence eternal, pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non-\nchanging, and that everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon.\nThat this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to be\nlearned from scripture is admitted; for according to your opinion also\nscripture sublates everything that is not Brahman and merely\nsuperimposed on it. Nor should it be said that we must have recourse to\nthe Upanishads for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in\nthe way of perception and inference is at the same time of the nature of\nbliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelligent is seen of itself to be\nof that nature, since it is different from everything that is not of\nthat nature.--There are, on the other hand, those who hold that the\nknowledge which the Ved\u00e2nta-texts enjoin as the means of Release is of\nthe nature of devout meditation; that such meditation has the effect of\nwinning the love of the supreme Spirit and is to be learned from\nscripture only; that the injunctions of meditation refer to such\nknowledge only as springs from the legitimate study of the Veda on the\npart of a man duly purified by initiation and other ceremonies, and is\nassisted by the seven means (see above, p. 17); and that the supreme\nPerson pleased by such meditation bestows on the devotee knowledge of\nhis own true nature, dissolves thereby the Nescience springing from\nworks, and thus releases him from bondage. And on this view the proof of\nthe non-qualification of the S\u00fbdra, as given in the preceding S\u00fbtras,\nholds good.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the exclusion of the\nS\u00fbdras.'\n\nHaving thus completed the investigation of qualification which had\nsuggested itself in connexion with the matter in hand, the S\u00fbtras return\nto the being measured by a thumb, and state another reason for its being\nexplained as Brahman--as already understood on the basis of its being\ndeclared the ruler of what is and what will be.\n\n\n\n\n40. On account of the trembling.\n\nIn the part of the Katha-Upanishad which intervenes between the passage\n'The Person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self (II,\n4, 12), and the passage 'The Person of the size of a thumb, the inner\nSelf' (II, 6, 17), we meet with the text 'whatever there is, the whole\nworld, when gone forth, trembles in its breath. A great terror, a raised\nthunderbolt; those who knew it became immortal. From fear of it fire\nburns, from fear the sun shines, from fear Indra and V\u00e2yu, and Death as\nthe fifth run away' (II, 6, 2; 3). This text declares that the whole\nworld and Agni, S\u00fbrya, and so on, abiding within that Person of the size\nof a thumb, who is here designated by the term 'breath,' and going forth\nfrom him, tremble from their great fear of him. 'What will happen to us\nif we transgress his commandments?'--thinking thus the whole world\ntrembles on account of great fear, as if it were a raised thunderbolt.\nIn this explanation we take the clause 'A great fear, a raised\nthunderbolt,' in the sense of '(the world trembles) from great fear,' &c.,\nas it is clearly connected in meaning with the following clause: 'from\nfear the fire burns,' &c.--Now what is described here is the nature of\nthe highest Brahman; for that such power belongs to Brahman only we know\nfrom other texts, viz.: 'By the command of that Imperishable, O G\u00e2rg\u00ee,\nsun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9); and 'From fear of it the\nwind blows, from fear the sun rises; from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea\nDeath runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1).--The next S\u00fbtra supplies\na further reason.\n\n\n\n\n41. On account of light being seen (declared in the text).\n\nBetween the two texts referring to the Person of the size of a thumb,\nthere is a text declaring that to that Person there belongs light that\nobscures all other light, and is the cause and assistance of all other\nlight; and such light is characteristic of Brahman only. 'The sun does\nnot shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and\nmuch less this fire. After him, the shining one, everything shines; by\nhis light all this is lighted' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 15)--This very same sloka\nis read in the \u00c2tharvana (i.e. Mundaka) with reference to Brahman.\nEverywhere, in fact, the texts attribute supreme luminousness to Brahman\nonly. Compare: 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself\nin his own shape' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3); 'Him the gods meditate on as\nthe light of lights, as immortal time' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,16); 'Now that\nlight which shines above this heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7).--It is thus\na settled conclusion that the Person measured by a thumb is the highest\nBrahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who is measured' (by a\nthumb).\n\n\n\n\n42. The ether, on account of the designation of something different, and\nso on.\n\nWe read in the Ch\u00e2ndogya. 'The ether is the evolver of forms and names.\nThat within which these forms and names are (or \"that which is within--\nor without--these forms and names\") is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self'\n(VIII, 14). A doubt here arises whether the being here called ether be\nthe released individual soul, or the highest Self.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin\nadopts the former view. For, he says, the released soul is introduced as\nsubject-matter in an immediately preceding clause,'Shaking off all as a\nhorse shakes his hair, and as the moon frees himself from the mouth of\nR\u00e2hu; having shaken off the body I obtain, satisfied, the uncreated\nworld of Brahman' Moreover, the clause 'That which is without forms and\nnames' clearly designates the released soul freed from name and form.\nAnd 'the evolver of names and forms' is again that same soul\ncharacterised with a view to its previous condition; for the individual\nsoul in its non-released state supported the shapes of gods, and so on,\nand their names. With a view, finally, to its present state in which it\nis free from name and form, the last clause declares 'that is Brahman,\nthe Immortal'. The term 'ether' may very well be applied to the released\nsoul which is characterised by the possession of non-limited splendour.--\nBut, as the text under discussion is supplementary to the section\ndealing with the small ether within the heart (VIII, 1, 1 ff.), we\nunderstand that that small ether is referred to here also; and it has\nbeen proved above that that small ether is Brahman!--Not so, we reply.\nThe text under discussion is separated from the section treating of the\nsmall ether within the heart, by the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati. and that\nteaching is concerned with the characteristics of the individual soul in\nits different conditions up to Release; and moreover the earlier part of\nthe section under discussion speaks of the being which shakes off evil,\nand this undoubtedly is the released individual soul introduced in the\nteaching of Praj\u00e2pati. All this shows that the ether in our passage\ndenotes the released individual soul.\n\nThis view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The ether in our passage is the\nhighest Brahman, because the clause 'Ether is the evolver of forms and\nnames' designates something other than the individual soul. The ether\nwhich evolves names and forms cannot be the individual soul either in\nthe state of bondage or that of release. In the state of bondage the\nsoul is under the influence of karman, itself participates in name and\nform, and hence cannot bring about names and forms. And in its released\nstate it is expressly said not to take part in the world-business (Ve.\nS\u00fb. IV, 4, 17), and therefore is all the less qualified to evolve names\nand forms. The Lord, on the other hand, who is the ruling principle in\nthe construction of the Universe is expressly declared by scripture to\nbe the evolver of names and forms; cp. 'Entering into them with this\nliving Self, let me evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'Who is\nall-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born this\nBrahman, name, form, and matter' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), &c. Hence the ether\nwhich brings about names and forms is something different from the soul\nfor which name and form are brought about; it is in fact the highest\nBrahman. This the next clause of the text confirms, 'That which is\nwithin those forms and names'; the purport of which is: because that\nether is within names and forms, not being touched by them but being\nsomething apart, therefore it is the evolver of them; this also\nfollowing from his being free from evil and endowed with the power of\nrealising his purposes. The 'and so on' in the S\u00fbtra refers to the\nBrahma-hood, Self-hood, and immortality mentioned in the text ('That is\nthe Brahman, the Immortal, the Self'). For Brahma-hood, i.e. greatness,\nand so on, in their unconditioned sense, belong to the highest Self only.\nIt is thus clear that the ether is the highest Brahman.--Nor is the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin right in maintaining that a clause immediately preceding\n('shaking off all evil') introduces the individual soul as the general\ntopic of the section. For what the part of the text immediately\npreceding the passage under discussion does introduce as general topic,\nis the highest Brahman, as shown by the clause 'I obtain the Brahma-\nworld.' Brahman is, it is true, represented there as the object to be\nobtained by the released soul; but as the released soul cannot be the\nevolver of names and forms, &c., we must conclude that it is Brahman\n(and not the released soul), which constitutes the topic of the whole\nsection. Moreover (to take a wider view of the context of our passage)\nthe term 'ether' prompts us to recognise here the small ether (mentioned\nin the first section of the eighth book) as the general topic of the\nbook; and as the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati is meant to set forth (not the\nindividual soul by itself but) the nature of the soul of the meditating\ndevotee, it is proper to conclude that the text under discussion is\nmeant finally to represent, as the object to be obtained, the small\nether previously inculcated as object of meditation. In conclusion we\nremark that the term 'ether' is nowhere seen to denote the individual\nSelf.--The ether that evolves names and forms, therefore, is the highest\nBrahman.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, there is no other Self different from the\nindividual Self; for scripture teaches the unity of all Selfs and denies\nduality. Terms such as 'the highest Self,' 'the highest Brahman,' 'the\nhighest Lord,' are merely designations of the individual soul in the\nstate of Release. The Brahma-world to be attained, therefore, is nothing\ndifferent from the attaining individual soul; and hence the ether also\nthat evolves names and forms can be that soul only.--To this objection\nthe next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n43. On account of difference in deep sleep and departing.\n\nWe have to supply 'on account of designation' from the preceding S\u00fbtra.\nBecause the text designates the highest Self as something different from\nthe individual Self in the state of deep sleep as well as at the time of\ndeparture, the highest Self is thus different. For the V\u00e2jasaneyaka,\nafter having introduced the individual Self in the passage 'Who is that\nSelf?--He who consisting of knowledge is among the pr\u00e2nas,' &c. (_Bri_.\nUp. IV, 3, 7), describes how, in the state of deep sleep, being not\nconscious of anything it is held embraced by the all-knowing highest\nSelf, embraced by the intelligent Self it knows nothing that is without,\nnothing that is within' (IV, 3, 21). So also with reference to the time\nof departure, i.e. dying 'Mounted by the intelligent Self it moves along\ngroaning' (IV, 3, 35). Now it is impossible that the unconscious\nindividual Self, either lying in deep sleep or departing from the body,\nshould at the same time be embraced or mounted by itself, being all-\nknowing. Nor can the embracing and mounting Self be some other\nindividual Self; for no such Self can be all-knowing.--The next S\u00fbtra\nsupplies a further reason.\n\n\n\n\n44. And on account of such words as Lord.\n\nThat embracing highest Self is further on designated by terms such as\nLord, and so on. 'He is the Lord of all, the master of all, the ruler of\nall. He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.\nHe is the lord of all, the king of beings, the protector of beings. He\nis a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded.\nBr\u00e2hmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda. He who knows him\nbecomes a Muni. Wishing for that world only, mendicants leave their\nhomes' (IV, 4, 22). 'This indeed is the great unborn Self, the strong,\nthe giver of wealth,--undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is\nBrahman' (IV, 4, 24; 25). Now all the qualities here declared, viz.\nbeing the lord of all, and so on, cannot possibly belong to the\nindividual Self even in the state of Release; and we thus again arrive\nat the conclusion that the ether evolving forms and names is something\ndifferent from the released individual soul. The declarations of general\nUnity which we meet with in the texts rest thereon, that all sentient\nand non-sentient beings are effects of Brahman, and hence have Brahman\nfor their inner Self. That this is the meaning of texts such as 'All\nthis is Brahman,' &c., we have explained before. And the texts denying\nplurality are to be understood in the same way.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the designation of something different, and so on.'\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. If it be said that some (mention) that which rests on Inference; we\ndeny this because (the form) refers to what is contained in the simile\nof the body; and (this the text) shows.\n\nSo far the S\u00fbtras have given instruction about a Brahman, the enquiry\ninto which serves as a means to obtain what is the highest good of man,\nviz. final release; which is the cause of the origination, and so on, of\nthe world; which differs in nature from all non-sentient things such as\nthe Pradh\u00e2na, and from all intelligent beings whether in the state of\nbondage or of release; which is free from all shadow of imperfection;\nwhich is all knowing, all powerful, has the power of realising all its\npurposes, comprises within itself all blessed qualities, is the inner\nSelf of all, and possesses unbounded power and might. But here a new\nspecial objection presents itself. In order to establish the theory\nmaintained by Kapila, viz. of there being a Pradh\u00e2na and individual\nsouls which do _not_ have their Self in Brahman, it is pointed out by\nsome that in certain branches of the Veda there are met with certain\npassages which appear to adumbrate the doctrine of the Pradh\u00e2na being\nthe universal cause. The S\u00fbtras now apply themselves to the refutation\nof this view, in order thereby to confirm the theory of Brahman being\nthe only cause of all.\n\nWe read in the Katha-Upanishad, 'Beyond the senses there are the objects,\nbeyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the\nintellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great\nthere is the Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved there is the Person. Beyond\nthe Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up.\nI, 3, 11). The question here arises whether by the 'Unevolved' be or be\nnot meant the Pradh\u00e2na, as established by Kapila's theory, of which\nBrahman is not the Self.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former\nalternative. For, he says, in the clause 'beyond the Great is the\nUnevolved, beyond the Unevolved is the Person,' we recognise the\narrangement of entities as established by the S\u00e2nkhya-system, and hence\nmust take the 'Unevolved' to be the Pradh\u00e2na. This is further confirmed\nby the additional clause 'beyond the Person there is nothing,' which (in\nagreement with S\u00e2nkhya principles) denies that there is any being beyond\nthe soul, which itself is the twenty-fifth and last of the principles\nrecognised by the S\u00e2nkhyas. This prim\u00e2 facie view is expressed in the\nformer part of the S\u00fbtra, 'If it be said that in the s\u00e2kh\u00e2s of some that\nwhich rests on Inference, i.e. the Pradh\u00e2na, is stated as the universal\ncause.'\n\nThe latter part of the S\u00fbtra refutes this view. The word 'Unevolved'\ndoes not denote a Pradh\u00e2na independent of Brahman; it rather denotes the\nbody represented as a chariot in the simile of the body, i.e. in the\npassage instituting a comparison between the Self, body, intellect, and\nso on, on the one side, and the charioteer, chariot, &c. on the other\nside.--The details are as follows. The text at first--in the section\nbeginning 'Know the Self to be the person driving,' &c., and ending 'he\nreaches the end of the journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu'\n(I, 3, 3-9)--compares the devotee desirous of reaching the goal of his\njourney through the sams\u00e2ra, i.e. the abode of Vishnu, to a man driving\nin a chariot; and his body, senses, and so on, to the chariot and parts\nof the chariot; the meaning of the whole comparison being that he only\nreaches the goal who has the chariot, &c. in his control. It thereupon\nproceeds to declare which of the different beings enumerated and\ncompared to a chariot, and so on, occupy a superior position to the\nothers in so far, namely, as they are that which requires to be\ncontrolled--'higher than the senses are the objects,' and so on. Higher\nthan the senses compared to the horses--are the objects--compared to\nroads,--because even a man who generally controls his senses finds it\ndifficult to master them when they are in contact with their objects;\nhigher than the objects is the mind-compared to the reins--because when\nthe mind inclines towards the objects even the non-proximity of the\nlatter does not make much difference; higher than the mind (manas) is\nthe intellect (buddhi)--compared to the charioteer--because in the\nabsence of decision (which is the characteristic quality of buddhi) the\nmind also has little power; higher than the intellect again is the\n(individual) Self, for that Self is the agent whom the intellect serves.\nAnd as all this is subject to the wishes of the Self, the text\ncharacterises it as the 'great Self.' Superior to that Self again is the\nbody, compared to the chariot, for all activity whereby the individual\nSelf strives to bring about what is of advantage to itself depends on\nthe body. And higher finally than the body is the highest Person, the\ninner Ruler and Self of all, the term and goal of the journey of the\nindividual soul; for the activities of all the beings enumerated depend\non the wishes of that highest Self. As the universal inner Ruler that\nSelf brings about the meditation of the Devotee also; for the S\u00fbtra (II,\n3, 41) expressly declares that the activity of the individual soul\ndepends on the Supreme Person. Being the means for bringing about the\nmeditation and the goal of meditation, that same Self is the highest\nobject to be attained; hence the text says 'Higher than the Person there\nis nothing--that is the goal, the highest road.' Analogously scripture,\nin the antary\u00e2min-Br\u00e2hmana, at first declares that the highest Self\nwithin witnesses and rules everything, and thereupon negatives the\nexistence of any further ruling principle 'There is no other seer but he,'\n&c. Similarly, in the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2, 'The abode, the agent, the\nvarious senses, the different and manifold functions, and fifth the\nDivinity (i.e. the highest Person)' (XVIII, 14); and 'I dwell within the\nheart of all; memory and perception, as well as their loss, come from\nme' (XV, 15). And if, as in the explanation of the text under discussion,\nwe speak of that highest Self being 'controlled,' we must understand\nthereby the soul's taking refuge with it; compare the passage Bha. G\u00ee.\nXVIII, 61-62, 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling\nthem round as if mounted on a machine; to Him go for refuge.'\n\nNow all the beings, senses, and so on, which had been mentioned in the\nsimile, are recognised in the passage 'higher than the senses are the\nobjects,' &c., being designated there by their proper names; but there\nis no mention made of the body which previously had been compared to the\nchariot; we therefore conclude that it is the body which is denoted by\nthe term 'the Unevolved.' Hence there is no reason to see here a\nreference to the Pradh\u00e2na as established in the theory of Kapila. Nor do\nwe recognise, in the text under discussion, the general system of Kapila.\nThe text declares the objects, i.e. sounds and so on, to be superior to\nthe senses; but in Kapila's system the objects are not viewed as the\ncauses of the senses. For the same reason the statement that the manas\nis higher than the objects does not agree with Kapila's doctrine. Nor is\nthis the case with regard to the clause 'higher than the buddhi is the\ngreat one, the Self; for with Kapila the 'great one' (mahat) is the\nbuddhi, and it would not do to say 'higher than the great one is the\ngreat one.' And finally the 'great one,' according to Kapila, cannot be\ncalled the 'Self.' The text under discussion thus refers only to those\nentities which had previously appeared in the simile. The text itself\nfurther on proves this, when saying 'That Self is hidden in all beings\nand does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their\nsharp and subtle intellect. A wise man should keep down speech in the\nmind, he should keep that within knowledge (which is) within the Self;\nhe should keep knowledge within the great Self, and that he should keep\nwithin the quiet Self.' For this passage, after having stated that the\nhighest Self is difficult to see with the inner and outer organs of\nknowledge, describes the mode in which the sense-organs, and so on, are\nto be held in control. The wise man should restrain the sense-organs and\nthe organs of activity within the mind; he should restrain that (i.e.\nthe mind) within knowledge, i.e. within the intellect (buddhi), which\nabides within the Self; he should further restrain the intellect within\nthe great Self, i.e. the active individual Self; and that Self finally\nhe should restrain within the quiet Self, i.e. the highest Brahman,\nwhich is the inner ruler of all; i.e. he should reach, with his\nindividual Self so qualified, the place of Vishnu, i.e. Brahman.--But\nhow can the term 'the Unevolved' denote the evolved body?--To this\nquestion the next S\u00fbtra furnishes a reply.\n\n\n\n\n2. But the subtle (body), on account of its capability.\n\nThe elements in their fine state are what is called the 'Unevolved,' and\nthis entering into a particular condition becomes the body. It is the\n'Unevolved' in the particular condition of the body, which in the text\nunder discussion is called the 'Unevolved.' 'On account of its\ncapability,' i.e. because Unevolved non-sentient matter, when assuming\ncertain states and forms, is capable of entering on activities promoting\nthe interest of man. But, an objection is raised, if the 'Unevolved' is\ntaken to be matter in its subtle state, what objection is there to our\naccepting for the explanation of our text that which is established in\nthe S\u00e2nkhya-system? for there also the 'Unevolved' means nothing else\nbut matter in its subtle state.\n\n\n\n\nTo this the next S\u00fbtra replies--\n\n3. (Matter in its subtle state) subserves an end, on account of its\ndependence on him (viz. the Supreme Person).\n\nMatter in its subtle state subserves ends, in so far only as it is\ndependent on the Supreme Person who is the cause of all. We by no means\nwish to deny unevolved matter and all its effects in themselves, but in\nso far only as they are maintained not to have their Self in the Supreme\nPerson. For the fact is that they constitute his body and He thus\nconstitutes their Self; and it is only through this their relation to\nhim that the Pradh\u00e2na, and so on, are capable of accomplishing their\nseveral ends. Otherwise the different essential natures of them all\ncould never exist,--nor persist, nor act. It is just on the ground of\nthis dependence on the Lord not being acknowledged by the S\u00e2nkhyas that\ntheir system is disproved by us. In Scripture and Smriti alike, wherever\nthe origination and destruction of the world are described, or the\ngreatness of the Supreme Person is glorified, the Pradh\u00e2na and all its\neffects, no less than the individual souls, are declared to have their\nSelf in that Supreme Person. Compare, e.g. the text which first says\nthat the earth is merged in water, and further on 'the elements are\nmerged in the Mahat, the Mahat in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the\nImperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with\nthe highest divinity.' And 'He of whom the earth is the body,' &c. up to\n'he of whom the Unevolved is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the\nbody; of whom death is the body; he the inner Self of all beings, free\nfrom all evil, the divine one, the one God N\u00e2r\u00e2yana.' And Earth, water,\nfire, air, ether, mind, intellect, egoity--thus eightfold is my nature\ndivided. Lower is this nature; other than this and higher know that\nnature of mine which has become the individual soul by which this world\nis supported. Remember that all beings spring from this; I am the origin\nand the dissolution of the whole Universe. Higher than I there is none\nelse; all this is strung on me as pearls on a thread' (Bha. G\u00ee VII, 4-7).\nAnd 'the Evolved is Vishnu, and the Unevolved, he is the Person and time.--\nThe nature (prakriti) declared by me, having the double form of the\nEvolved and the Unevolved, and the soul-both these are merged in the\nhighest Self. That Self is the support of all, the Supreme Person who\nunder the name of Vishnu is glorified in the Vedas and the Ved\u00e2nta books.'\n\n\n\n\n4. And on account of there being no statement of its being an object of\nknowledge.\n\nIf the text meant the Non-evolved as understood by the S\u00e2nkhyas it would\nrefer to it as something to be known; for the S\u00e2nkhyas, who hold the\ntheory of Release resulting from the discriminative knowledge of the\nEvolved, the Non-evolved, and the soul, admit that all these are objects\nof knowledge. Now our text does not refer to the Un-evolved as an object\nof knowledge, and it cannot therefore be the Pradh\u00e2na assumed by the\nS\u00e2nkhyas.\n\n\n\n\n5. Should it be said that (the text) declares (it); we say, not so; for\nthe intelligent Self (is meant), on account of subject-matter.\n\n'He who has meditated on that which is without sound, without touch,\nwithout form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell,\nwithout beginning, without end, beyond the Great, unchangeable; is freed\nfrom the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3,15), this scriptural text,\nclosely following on the text under discussion, represents the\n'Unevolved' as the object of knowledge!--Not so, we reply. What that\nsloka represents as the object of meditation is (not the Unevolved but)\nthe intelligent Self, i.e. the Supreme Person. For it is the latter who\nforms the general subject-matter, as we infer from two preceding\npassages, viz. 'He who has knowledge for his charioteer, and who holds\nthe reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, the highest\nplace of Vishnu'; and 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not\nshine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and\nsubtle intellect.' For this reason, also, the clause 'Higher than the\nperson there is nothing' cannot be taken as meant to deny the existence\nof an entity beyond the 'purusha' in the S\u00e2nkhya sense. That the highest\nSelf possesses the qualities of being without sound, &c., we moreover\nknow from other scriptural texts, such as Mu. Up. I, 1, 6 'That which is\nnot to be seen, not to be grasped,' &c. And the qualification 'beyond\nthe Great, unchangeable' is meant to declare that the highest Self is\nbeyond the individual Self which had been called 'the Great' in a\nprevious passage 'beyond the intellect is the Great Self.'\n\n\n\n\n6. And of three only there is this mention and question.\n\nIn the Upanishad under discussion there is mention made of three things\nonly as objects of knowledge--the three standing to one another in the\nrelation of means, end to be realised by those means, and persons\nrealising,--and questions are asked as to those three only. There is no\nmention of, nor question referring to, the Unevolved.--Nakiketas\ndesirous of Release having been allowed by Death to choose three boons,\nchooses for his first boon that his father should be well disposed\ntowards him--without which he could not hope for spiritual welfare. For\nhis second boon he chooses the knowledge of the Nakiketa-fire, which is\na means towards final Release. 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire-\nsacrifice which leads to heaven; tell it to me, full of faith. Those who\nlive in the heaven-world reach Immortality--this I ask as my second boon.'\nThe term 'heaven-world' here denotes the highest aim of man, i.e.\nRelease, as appears from the declaration that those who live there enjoy\nfreedom from old age and death; from the fact that further on (I, 1, 26)\nworks leading to perishable results are disparaged; and from what Yama\nsays in reply to the second demand 'He who thrice performs this N\u00e2kiketa-\nrite overcomes birth and death.' As his third boon he, in the form of a\nquestion referring to final release, actually enquires about three\nthings, viz. 'the nature of the end to be reached, i.e. Release; the\nnature of him who wishes to reach that end; and the nature of the means\nto reach it, i.e. of meditation assisted by certain works. Yama, having\ntested Nakiketas' fitness to receive the desired instruction, thereupon\nbegins to teach him. 'The Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has\nentered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the\nabyss; having known him as God, by means of meditation on his Self, the\nwise one leaves joy and sorrow behind.' Here the clause 'having known\nthe God,' points to the divine Being that is to be meditated upon; the\nclause 'by means of meditation on his Self points to the attaining agent,\ni.e. the individual soul as an object of knowledge; and the clause\n'having known him the wise ones leave joy and sorrow behind' points to\nthe meditation through which Brahman is to be reached. Nakiketas,\npleased with the general instruction received, questions again in order\nto receive clearer information on those three matters, 'What thou seest\nas different from dharma and different from adharma, as different from\nthat, from that which is done and not done, as different from what is\npast or future, tell me that'; a question referring to three things, viz.\nan object to be effected, a means to effect it, and an effecting agent--\neach of which is to be different from anything else past, present, or\nfuture [FOOTNOTE 362:1]. Yama thereupon at first instructs him as to the\nPranava, 'That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances\nproclaim, desiring which men become religious students; that word I tell\nthee briefly--it is Om'--an instruction which implies praise of the\nPranava, and in a general way sets forth that which the Pranava\nexpresses, e.g. the nature of the object to be reached, the nature of\nthe person reaching it, and the means for reaching it, such means here\nconsisting in the word 'Om,' which denotes the object to be reached\n[FOOTNOTE 362:2]. He then continues to glorify the Pranava (I, a,\n16-17), and thereupon gives special information in the first place about\nthe nature of the attaining subject, i.e., the individual soul, 'The\nknowing Self is not born, it dies not,' &c. Next he teaches Nakiketas as\nto the true nature of the object to be attained, viz. the highest\nBrahman or Vishnu, in the section beginning 'The Self smaller than\nsmall,' and ending 'Who then knows where he is?' (I, 2, 20-25). Part of\nthis section, viz. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda,' &c., at the\nsame time teaches that the meditation through which Brahman is attained\nis of the nature of devotion (bhakti). Next the sloka I, 3, 1 'There are\nthe two drinking their reward' shows that, as the object of devout\nmeditation and the devotee abide together, meditation is easily\nperformed. Then the section beginning 'Know the Self to be him who\ndrives in the chariot,' and ending 'the wise say the path is hard' (I,\n3, 3-14), teaches the true mode of meditation, and how the devotee\nreaches the highest abode of Vishnu; and then there is a final reference\nto the object to be reached in I, 3,15, 'That which is without sound,\nwithout touch,' &c. It thus appears that there are references and\nquestions regarding those three matters only; and hence the 'Un-evolved'\ncannot mean the Pradh\u00e2na of the S\u00e2nkhyas.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 362:1. The commentary proposes different ways of finding those\nthree objects of enquiry in the words of Nakiketas. According to the\nfirst explanation, 'that which is different from dharma' is a means\ndiffering from all ordinary means; 'adharma' 'not-dharma' is what is not\na means, but the result to be reached: hence 'that which is different\nfrom adharma' is a result differing from all ordinary results. 'What is\ndifferent from that' is an agent different from 'that'; i.e. an ordinary\nagent, and so on. (Sru. Prak\u00e2s. p. 1226.)]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 362:2. The syllable 'Om,' which denotes Brahman, is a means\ntowards meditation (Brahman being meditated upon under this form), and\nthus indirectly a means towards reaching Brahman.]\n\n\n\n\n7. And as in the case of the 'Great.'\n\nIn the case of the passage 'Higher than the intellect is the Great Self,'\nwe conclude from the co-ordination of 'the Great' with the Self that\nwhat the text means is not the 'Great' principle of the Sankhyas;\nanalogously we conclude that the 'Unevolved,' which is said to be higher\nthan the Self, cannot be the Pradh\u00e2na of Kapila's system.\n\n\n\n\n8. On account of there being no special characteristic; as in the case\nof the cup.\n\nIn the discussion of the following passages also we aim only at refuting\nthe system of the Sankhyas; not at disproving the existence and nature\nof Prakriti, the 'great' principle, the aham\u00e2ra, and so on, viewed as\ndependent on Brahman. For that they exist in this latter relation is\nproved by Scripture as well as Smriti.--A text of the followers of the\nAtharvan runs as follows: 'Her who produces all effects, the non-knowing\none, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one--she is known (by\nthe Lord) and ruled by him, she is spread out and incited and ruled by\nhim, gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. A cow she is\nwithout beginning and end, a mother producing all beings; white, black,\nand red, milking all wishes for the Lord. Many babes unknown drink her.\nthe impartial one; but one God only, following his own will, drinks her\nsubmitting to him. By his own thought and work the mighty God strongly\nenjoys her, who is common to all, the milkgiver, who is pressed by the\nsacrifices. The Non-evolved when being counted by twenty-four is called\nthe Evolved.' This passage evidently describes the nature of Prakriti,\nand so on, and the same Upanishad also teaches the Supreme Person who\nconstitutes the Self of Prakriti, and so on. 'Him they call the twenty-\nsixth or also the twenty-seventh; as the Person devoid of all qualities\nof the S\u00e2nkhyas he is known by the followers of the Atharvan [FOOTNOTE\n364:1].'--Other followers of the Atharvan read in their text that there\nare sixteen originating principles (prakriti) and eight effected things\n(vik\u00e2ra; Garbha Up. 3).--The Svet\u00e2svataras again set forth the nature of\nPrakriti, the soul and the Lord as follows. 'The Lord supports all this\ntogether, the Perishable and the Imperishable, the Evolved and the\nUnevolved; the other one is in bondage, since he is an enjoyer; but\nhaving known the God he is free from all fetters. There are two unborn\nones, the one knowing and a Lord, the other without knowledge and lordly\npower; there is the one unborn female on whom the enjoyment of all\nenjoyers depends; and there is the infinite Self appearing in all shapes,\nbut itself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Brahman.\nThe Perishable is the Pradh\u00e2na, the Immortal and Imperishable is Hara;\nthe one God rules the Perishable and the Self. From meditation on him,\nfrom union with him, from becoming one with him there is in the end\ncessation of all M\u00e2ya' (Svet. Up. I, 8-10). And 'The sacred verses, the\nofferings, the sacrifices, the vows, the past, the future, and all that\nthe Vcdas declare--from that the Ruler of M\u00e2ya creates all this; and in\nthis the other one is bound up through M\u00e2ya. Know then Prakriti to be\nM\u00e2ya and the great Lord the ruler of M\u00e2ya; with his members this whole\nworld is filled' (Svet. Up. V, 9-10). And, further on, 'The master of\nPradh\u00e2na and the soul, the lord of the gunas, the cause of the bondage,\nexistence, and release of worldly existence' (VI, 16). Thus likewise in\nSmriti, 'Do thou know both Nature and the soul to be without beginning,\nand know all effects and qualities to have sprung from Nature. Nature is\ndeclared to be the cause of the activity of causes and effects, whilst\nthe soul is the cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain. For\nthe soul abiding in Nature experiences the qualities derived from Nature,\nthe reason being its connexion with the qualities, in its births in good\nand evil wombs' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIII, 19-21). And 'Goodness, Passion, and\nDarkness--these are the qualities which, issuing from nature, bind in\nthe body the embodied soul, the undecaying one' (XIV, 5). And 'All\nbeings at the end of a kalpa return into my Nature, and again, at the\nbeginning of a kalpa, do I send them forth. Presiding over my own nature\nagain and again do I send forth this vast body of beings which has no\nfreedom of its own, being subject to Nature.--With me as ruler Nature\nbrings forth all moving and non-moving things, and for this reason the\nworld does ever go round' (Bha. G\u00ee. IX, 7, 8, 10). What we therefore\nrefuse to accept are a Prakriti, and so on, of the kind assumed by\nKapila, i.e. not having their Self in Brahman.--We now proceed to\nexplain the S\u00fbtra.\n\nWe read in the Svet\u00e2svatara-Upanishad 'There is one aj\u00e2, red, white, and\nblack, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. One aja loves\nher and lies by her; another leaves her after having enjoyed her.' A\ndoubt arises here whether this mantra declares a mere Prakriti as\nassumed in Kapila's system, or a Prakriti having its Self in Brahman.\n\nThe P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he points out,\nthe text refers to the non-originatedness of Prakriti, calling her aj\u00e2,\ni.e. unborn, and further says that she by herself independently produces\nmanifold offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the\nS\u00fbtra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special\ncircumstance determining the acceptance of the Prakriti as assumed by\nthe S\u00e2nkhyas, i.e. independent of Brahman; for that she is aj\u00e2, i. e.\nnot born, is not a sufficiently special characteristic. The case is\nanalogous to that of the 'cup.' In the mantra 'There is a cup having its\nmouth below and its bottom above' (Bri. Up. II, 2, 3), the word kamasa\nconveys to us only the idea of some implement used in eating, but we are\nunable to see what special kind of kamasa is meant; for in the case of\nwords the meaning of which is ascertained on the ground of their\nderivation (as 'kamasa' from 'kam,' to eat or drink), the special sense\nof the word in any place cannot be ascertained without the help of\nconsiderations of general possibility, general subject-matter, and so on.\nNow in the case of the cup we are able to ascertain that the cup meant\nis the head, because there is a complementary passage 'What is called\nthe cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the head'; but if\nwe look out for a similar help to determine the special meaning of aj\u00e2,\nwe find nothing to convince us that the aja, i. e. the 'unborn'\nprinciple, is the Prakriti of the S\u00e2nkhyas. Nor is there anything in the\ntext to convey the idea of that aj\u00e2 having the power of independent\ncreation; for the clause 'giving birth to manifold offspring' declares\nonly that she creates, not that she creates unaided. The mantra does not\ntherefore tell us about an 'unborn' principle independent of Brahman.--\nThere moreover is a special reason for understanding by the aj\u00e2\nsomething that depends on Brahman. This the following S\u00fbtra states.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 364:1. These quotations are from the Kulik\u00e2-Upanishad (transl.\nby Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as given\nabove follows the readings adopted by R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja and explained in the--\nSruta-Prak\u00e2sik\u00e2.]\n\n\n\n\n9. But she begins with light; for thus some read in their text.\n\nThe 'but' has assertory force. 'Light' in the S\u00fbtra means Brahman, in\naccordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as 'On\nhim the gods meditate, the light of lights' (Bri. Up. X, 4, 16); 'That\nlight which shines beyond heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7). 'She begins with\nlight' thus means 'she has Brahman for her cause.'--'For thus some read\nin their text,' i.e. because the members of one S\u00e2kh\u00e2, viz the\nTaittiriyas read in their text that this 'aj\u00e2' has Brahman for her cause.\nThe Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r\u00e2yana-Upanishad (of the Taittir\u00eeyas) at first refers to\nBrahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation.\n'Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self placed in the\nhollow of this creature'; next declares that all the worlds and Brahma\nand the other gods originated from that Self; and then says that there\nsprung from it also this aj\u00e2 which is the cause of all 'The one aj\u00e2\n(goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to numerous offspring of\nthe same shape, one aja (he-goat) loves and lies by her; another one\nforsakes her after having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire\nsection evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of\nthings other than Brahman originating from Brahman and thus having its\nSelf in it; hence we conclude that also the aj\u00e2 which gives birth to\nmanifold creatures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by\nkarman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is,\nno less than vital airs, seas, mountains, &c., a creature of Brahman,\nand hence has its Self in Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation\nof the Svet\u00e2svatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mah\u00e2n\u00e2rayana-text,\nas determined by the complementary passages, and thus arrive at the\nconclusion that the aj\u00e2 in the former text also is a being having its\nSelf in Brahman. That this is so, moreover, appears from the\nSvet\u00e2svatara itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have\nafter the introductory question, 'Is Brahman the cause?' the passage\n'The sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person\nwhose Self is the divinity, hidden in its own qualities' (I, 1, 3);\nwhich evidently refers to the aj\u00e2 as being of the nature of a power of\nthe highest Brahman. And as further on also (viz. in the passages 'From\nthat the M\u00e2yin creates all this, and in this the other is bound up\nthrough M\u00e2ya'; 'Know then Prakriti to be M\u00e2y\u00e2 and the Great Lord the\nruler of M\u00e2y\u00e2'; and 'he who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the\nvery same being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of proof\nfor the assertion that the mantra under discussion refers to an\nindependent Prakriti as assumed by the S\u00e2nkhyas.\n\nBut a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted by aj\u00e2 begins\nwith, i.e. is caused by Brahman, how can it be called aj\u00e2, i.e. the non-\nproduced one; or, if it is non-produced, how can it be originated by\nBrahman? To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n10. And on account of the teaching of formation (i.e. creation) there is\nno contradiction; as in the case of the honey.\n\nThe 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. There is no\ncontradiction between the Prakriti being aj\u00e2 and originating from light.\nOn account of instruction being given about the formation (kalpana), i.e.\ncreation of the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement\nwith the use of the verb klip in the text, 'as formerly the creator made\n(akalpayat) sun and moon.'\n\nIn our text the sloka 'from that the Lord of M\u00e2y\u00e2 creates all this'\ngives instruction about the creation of the world. From that, i.e. from\nmatter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided, the Lord\nof all creates the entire Universe. From this statement about creation\nwe understand that Prakriti exists in a twofold state according as it is\neither cause or effect. During a pralaya it unites itself with Brahman\nand abides in its subtle state, without any distinction of names and\nforms; it then is called the 'Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At\nthe time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal themselves in\nPrakriti Goodness and the other gunas, it divides itself according to\nnames and forms, and then is called the 'Evolved,' and so on, and,\ntransforming itself into fire, water, and earth, it appears as red,\nwhite, and black. In its causal condition it is aj\u00e2, i.e. unborn, in its\neffected condition it is 'caused by light, i.e. Brahman'; hence there is\nno contradiction. The case is analogous to that of the 'honey.' The sun\nin his causal state is one only, but in his effected state the Lord\nmakes him into honey in so far namely as he then, for the purpose of\nenjoyment on the part of the Vasus and other gods, is the abode of\nnectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the Rik and\nthe other Vedas; and further makes him to rise and to set. And between\nthese two conditions there is no contradiction. This is declared in the\nMadhuvidy\u00e2 (Ch. Up. III), from 'The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,'\ndown to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor\nsets; being one he stands in the centre'--'one' here means 'of one\nnature.'--The conclusion therefore is that the Svet\u00e2svatara mantra under\ndiscussion refers to Prakriti as having her Self in Brahman, not to the\nPrakriti assumed by the S\u00e2nkhyas.\n\nOthers, however, are of opinion that the one aj\u00e2 of which the mantra\nspeaks has for its characteristics light, water, and earth. To them we\naddress the following questions. Do you mean that by what the text\nspeaks of as an aj\u00e2, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to\nunderstand those three elements only; or Brahman in the form of those\nthree elements; or some power or principle which is the cause of the\nthree elements? The first alternative is in conflict with the\ncircumstance that, while fire, water, and earth are several things, the\ntext explicitly refers to _one_ Aj\u00e2. Nor may it be urged that fire,\nwater, and earth, although several, become one, by being made tripartite\n(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3); for this making them tripartite, does not take away\ntheir being several; the text clearly showing that each several element\nbecomes tripartite, 'Let me make each of these three divine beings\ntripartite.'--The second alternative again divides itself into two\nalternatives. Is the one aj\u00e2 Brahman in so far as having passed over\ninto fire, water, and earth; or Brahman in so far as abiding within\nitself and not passing over into effects? The former alternative is\nexcluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality (which\ncannot be reconciled with the _one_ aj\u00e2). The second alternative is\ncontradicted by the text calling that aj\u00e2 red, white, and black; and\nmoreover Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised\nby fire, water, and earth. On the third alternative it has to be assumed\nthat the text denotes by the term 'aj\u00e2' the three elements, and that on\nthis basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but\nbetter than this assumption it evidently is to accept the term 'aj\u00e2' as\ndirectly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from\nscripture.\n\nNor can we admit the contention that the term 'aj\u00e2' is meant to teach\nthat Prakriti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat; for such a\nview would be altogether purposeless. Where--in the passage 'Know the\nSelf to be him who drives in the chariot'--the body, and so on, are\ncompared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set forth the means\nof attaining Brahman; where the sun is compared to honey, the object is\nto illustrate the enjoyment of the Vasus and other gods; but what\nsimilar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view\nPrakriti as a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely\nuseless; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti is a non-intelligent\nprinciple, the causal substance of the entire material Universe, and\nconstituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for\nthe final release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it\nfrom all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to good sense,\nmetaphorically to transfer to Prakriti such as described the nature of a\nshe-goat--which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few\ncreatures only, enters only occasionally into connexion with others, is\nof small use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others,\nand is capable of abandoning those connected with her. Nor does it\nrecommend itself to take the word aj\u00e2 (understood to mean 'she-goat')\nin a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aja'\nwhich occurs twice in the same mantra.--Let then all three terms be\ntaken in the same metaphorical sense (aja meaning he-goat).--It would be\naltogether senseless, we reply, to compare the soul which absolutely\ndissociates itself from Prakriti ('Another aja leaves her after having\nenjoyed her') to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion\nwith what he has abandoned, or with anything else.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the cup.'\n\n\n\n\n11. Not from the mention of the number even, on account of the diversity\nand of the excess.\n\nThe V\u00e2jasaneyins read in their text 'He in whom the five \"five-people\"\nand the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I, who know,\nbelieve him to be Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17). The doubt here arises\nwhether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in\nKapila's doctrine, or not.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former view,\non the ground that the word 'five-people,' qualified by the word 'five,'\nintimates the twenty-five categories of the S\u00e2nkhyas. The compound 'five-\npeople' (pa\u00f1kajan\u00e2h) denotes groups of five beings, just as the term\npa\u00f1ka-p\u00fblyah denotes aggregates of five bundles of grass. And as we want\nto know how many such groups there are, the additional qualification\n'five' intimates that there are five such groups; just as if it were\nsaid 'five five-bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five\nbundles each.' We thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty-\nfive things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to\nfinal release, we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the\nS\u00e2nkhya-smriti which are here referred to as objects to be known by\npersons desirous of release. For the followers of Kapila teach that\n'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect. There\nare seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal substances\nas well as effects. There are sixteen effects. The soul is neither a\ncausal substance nor an effect' (S\u00e2n. K\u00e2. 3). The mantra therefore is\nmeant to intimate the categories known from the S\u00e2nkhya.--To this the\nS\u00fbtra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed\nto be implied in the expression 'the five five-people,' it does not\nfollow that the categories of the S\u00e2nkhyas are meant. 'On account of the\ndiversity,' i.e. on account of the five-people further qualified by the\nnumber five being different from the categories of the S\u00e2nkhyas. For in\nthe text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest,' the 'in\nwhom' shows the five-people to have their abode, and hence their Self,\nin Brahman; and in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,'\nthe 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised\nto be Brahman. The five five-people must therefore be different from the\ncategories of the S\u00e2nkhya-system. 'And on account of the excess.'\nMoreover there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and\nabove the S\u00e2nkhya categories, consisting in the Self denoted by the\nrelative pronoun 'in whom,' and in the specially mentioned Ether. What\nthe text designates therefore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal\nLord in whom all things abide--such as he is described in the text\nquoted above, 'Therefore some call him the twenty-sixth, and others the\ntwenty-seventh.' The 'even' in the S\u00fbtra is meant to intimate that the\n'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories, since\nthere is no pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case of\nthe categories of the S\u00e2nkhyas there are no generic characteristics or\nthe like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in\nfives. Nor must it be urged against this that there is a determining\nreason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the S\u00e2nkhyas\nform natural groups comprising firstly, the five organs of action;\nsecondly, the five sense-organs; thirdly, the five gross elements;\nfourthly, the subtle parts of those elements; and fifthly, the five\nremaining tattvas; for as the text under discussion mentions the ether\nby itself, the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross\nelements is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 'five\npeople' as denoting a group consisting of five constituent members, but,\nin agreement with P\u00e2n. II, 1, 50, as merely being a special name. There\nare certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of\nthese beings the additional word 'pa\u00f1ka' predicates that they are five\nin number. The expression is thus analogous to the term 'the seven seven-\nrishis' (where the term 'seven-rishis' is to be understood as the name of\na certain class of rishis only).--Who then are the beings called 'five-\npeople?'--To this question the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the complementary passage.\n\nWe see from a complementary passage, viz. 'They who know the breath of\nbreath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the\nmind of mind,' that the 'five-people' are the breath, and eye, and so on,\nall of which have their abode in Brahman.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, while the mantra 'in whom the five five-\npeople,' &c., is common to the K\u00e2nvas and the M\u00e2dhyandinas, the\ncomplementary passage 'they who know the breath of breath,' &c., in the\ntext of the former makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason\nto say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath, eye, and so\non.\n\nTo this objection the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the text) of some.\n\nIn the text of some, viz. the K\u00e2nvas, where food is not mentioned, the\nfive-people are recognised to be the five senses, owing to the phrase\n'of lights' which is met with in another complementary passage. In the\nmantra, 'him the gods worship as the light of lights,' which precedes\nthe mantra about the 'five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the light of\nlights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of\nwhich depends on Brahman. The mantra leaves it undetermined what these\nlights are; but from what follows about the 'five-people,' &c., we learn\nthat what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their\nrespective objects. In 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' (in\nthe genitive case) denotes the sense-organ of touch, as that organ is\nconnected with air, and as the vital breath (which would otherwise\nsuggest itself as the most obvious explanation of pr\u00e2na) does not\nharmonise with the metaphorical term 'light.' 'Of the eye' refers to the\norgan of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing. 'Of food'\ncomprises the senses of smell and taste together: it denotes the sense\nof smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth, which\nmay be 'food,' and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also\nexplained as that by means of which eating goes on (adyate). 'Of mind'\ndenotes mind, i. e. the so-called internal organ. Taste and smell thus\nbeing taken in combination, we have the required number of five, and we\nthus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on\ntheir objects, together with the internal organ, i.e. mind. The meaning\nof the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses--\ncalled 'five-people'--and the elements, represented by the Ether, have\ntheir basis in Brahman; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in\nBrahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five\ncategories assumed by the S\u00e2nkhyas.--The general Conclusion is that the\nVed\u00e2nta-texts, whether referring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth\nthe categories established in Kapila's system.\n\n\n\n\n14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the\ncause with regard to Ether, and so on.\n\nHere the philosopher who holds the Pradh\u00e2na to be the general cause\ncomes forward with another objection. The Ved\u00e2nta-texts, he says, do not\nteach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only, and you\ntherefore have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the\nworld. In one place it is said that our world proceeded from 'Being',\n'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other\nplaces the world is said to have sprung from 'Non-being', 'Non-being\nindeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, i); and 'Non-being\nonly was this in the beginning; it became Being' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1).\nAs the Ved\u00e2nta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements\nregarding the creator, we cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the\nsole cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do enable us to\nconclude that the Pradh\u00e2na only is the universal cause. For the text\n'Now all this was then undeveloped' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the\nworld was merged in the undeveloped Pradh\u00e2na. and the subsequent clause,\n'That developed itself by form and name,' that from that Undeveloped\nthere resulted the creation of the world. For the Undeveloped is that\nwhich is not distinguished by names and forms, and this is none other\nthan the Pradh\u00e2na. And as this Pradh\u00e2na is at the same time eternal, as\nfar as its essential nature is concerned, and the substrate of all\nchange, there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of\ncreation calling it sometimes 'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while,\non the other hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be\napplied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped having thus been\nascertained, such expressions as 'it _thought_, may I be many,' must be\ninterpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation. The terms\n'Self' and 'Brahman' also may be applied to the Pradh\u00e2na in so far as it\nis all-pervading (atman from \u00e2pnoti), and preeminently great (brihat).\nWe therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the\nVed\u00e2nta-texts give information is the Pradh\u00e2na.\n\nThis view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The word _and_ is used in the sense\nof _but_. It is possible to ascertain from the Ved\u00e2nta-texts that the\nworld springs from none other than the highest Brahman, which is all-\nknowing, lord of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of\nabsolutely realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares\nBrahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. By 'Brahman as\ndescribed' is meant 'Brahman distinguished by omniscience and other\nqualities, as described in the S\u00fbtra \"that from which the origination,\nand so on, of the world proceed,\" and in other places.' That Brahman\nonly is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and so on, i.e.\nthe being which is declared to be the cause in passages such as 'From\nthat Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'that sent forth fire'(Ch.\nUp. VI, 2, 3), is none other than Brahman possessing omniscience and\nsimilar qualities. For the former of these texts follows on the passage\n'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches all desires\ntogether with the intelligent Brahman,' which introduces Brahman as the\ngeneral subject-matter--that Brahman being then referred to by means of\nthe connecting words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 'that\nsent forth fire') refers back to the omniscient Brahman introduced in\nthe clause 'that thought, may I be many.' This view is confirmed by a\nconsideration of all the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude\nthat Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--But the text 'Non-being\nindeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something\nthat is not'; how then can you say that we infer from the Ved\u00e2nta-texts\nas the general cause of the world a Brahman that is all-knowing,\nabsolutely realises its purposes, and so on?--To this question the next\nS\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n15. From connexion.\n\nThe fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss, &c., connects\nitself also with the passage 'Non-being was this in the beginning'\n(Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of the text which precedes that\npassage (viz. 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding is\nthe Self consisting of Bliss;--he wished, may I be many;--he created all\nwhatever there is. Having created he entered into it; having entered it\nhe became sat and tyat') clearly refers to Brahman consisting of Bliss,\nwhich realises its purposes, creates all beings, and entering into them\nis the Self of all. When, therefore, after this we meet with the sloka\n('Non-being this was in the beginning') introduced by the words 'On this\nthere is also this sloka'--which shows that the sloka is meant to throw\nlight on what precedes; and when further or we have the passage 'From\nfear of it the wind blows' &c., which, referring to the same Brahman,\npredicates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on; we\nconclude with certainty that the sloka about 'Non-being' also refers to\nBrahman. As during a pralaya the distinction of names and forms does not\nexist, and Brahman also then does not exist in so far as connected with\nnames and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term 'Non-being.' The\ntext 'Non-being only this was in the beginning' explains itself in the\nsame way.--Nor can we admit the contention that the text 'Now all this\nwas then undeveloped 'refers to the Pradh\u00e2na as the cause of the world;\nfor the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but Brahman in so\nfar as its body is not yet evolved. For the text continues 'That same\nbeing entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails;' 'When\nseeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by\nname;' 'Let men meditate upon him as Self;' where the introductory words\n'that same being' refer back to the Undeveloped--which thus is said to\nenter into all things and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known\nfrom another text also (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2) that it is the all-creative\nhighest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves names and\nforms. The text 'Having entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self\nof all' moreover shows that the creative principle enters into its\ncreatures for the purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot\nbe attributed to the non-sentient Pradh\u00e2na. The Undeveloped therefore is\nBrahman in that state where its body is not yet developed; and when the\ntext continues 'it developed itself by names and forms' the meaning is\nthat Brahman developed itself in so far as names and forms were\ndistinguished in the world that constitutes Brahman's body. On this\nexplanation of the texts relating to creation we further are enabled to\ntake the thought, purpose, &c., attributed to the creative principle, in\ntheir primary literal sense. And, we finally remark, neither the term\n'Brahman' nor the term 'Self in any way suits the Pradh\u00e2na, which is\nneither absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into\nthings created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains a settled\nconclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--Here terminates\nthe adhikarana of '(Brahman's) causality.'\n\n\n\n\n16. Because it denotes the world.\n\nThe S\u00e2nkhya comes forward with a further objection. Although the\nVed\u00e2nta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the\nworld, they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that\ncould be the cause of the world, apart from the Pradh\u00e2na and the soul as\nestablished by the S\u00e2nkhya-system. For the Kaush\u00eetakins declare in their\ntext, in the dialogue of B\u00e2l\u00e2ki and Aj\u00e2tasatru, that none but the\nenjoying (individual) soul is to be known as the cause of the world,\n'Shall I tell you Brahman? He who is the maker of those persons and of\nwhom this is the work (or \"to whom this work belongs\") he indeed is to\nbe known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). B\u00e2l\u00e2ki at the outset proposes Brahman as\nthe object of instruction, and when he is found himself not to know\nBrahman, Aj\u00e2tasatru instructs him about it, 'he indeed is to be known.'\nBut from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects\nthe being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman we have here\nto understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of Prakriti, not any\nother being. For no other being is connected with work; work, whether\nmeritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor\nmust you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be\nexplained as meaning the object of activity, so that the sense of the\nclause would be 'he of whom this entire world, as presented by\nperception and the other means of knowledge, is the work.' For in that\ncase the separate statements made in the two clauses, 'who is the maker\nof those persons' and 'of whom this is the work,' would be devoid of\npurport (the latter implying the former). Moreover, the generally\naccepted meaning of the word 'karman,' both in Vedic and worldly speech,\nis work in the sense of good and evil actions. And as the origination of\nthe world is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the\ndesignation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual\nsoul. The meaning of the whole passage therefore is 'He who is the cause\nof the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun,\nand so on, and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of\nthe individual souls; and to whom there belongs karman, good and evil,\nto which there is due his becoming such a cause; _he_ indeed is to be\nknown, _his_ essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from\nPrakriti.' And also in what follows, 'The two came to a person who was\nasleep. He pushed him with a stick,' &c., what is said about the\nsleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to the\nindividual soul being the topic of instruction. Further on also the text\ntreats of the individual soul only, 'As the master feeds with his\npeople, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious\nSelf feed with the other Selfs.' We must consider also the following\npassage--which contains the explanation given by Ajatasatru to B\u00e2l\u00e2ki,\nwho had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep\nsleep--' There are the arteries called Hitas. In these the person is;\nwhen sleeping he sees no dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of\nthe sense-organs) becomes one with this pr\u00e2na alone. Then speech goes to\nhim with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes,\nthen, as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from\nthat Self the pr\u00e2nas proceed each towards its place, from the pr\u00e2nas the\ngods, from the gods the worlds.' The individual soul which passes\nthrough the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, and is that into\nwhich there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the\nother organs, is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it\n(viz. the aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that pr\u00e2na.' Pr\u00e2na\nhere means the individual soul in so far as supporting life; for the\ntext continues 'when _that_ one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor\nthe Lord (both of whom might be proposed as explanations of pr\u00e2na) can\nbe said to be asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin pr\u00e2ne' might be\nexplained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the individual\nsoul,' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs, speech and so\non, become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul.'\nThe word 'pr\u00e2na' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet\nall the same the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital\nbreath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman mentioned at the\noutset therefore is none other than the individual soul, and there is\nnothing to prove a lord different from it. And as the attributes which\nthe texts ascribe to the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are\nattributes of intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that\nwhat constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradh\u00e2na\nguided by the intelligent soul.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra disposes of, by saying 'because (the\nwork) denotes the world.' It is not the insignificant individual soul--\nwhich is under the influence of its good and evil works, and by\nerroneously imputing to itself the attributes of Prakriti becomes the\ncause of the effects of the latter--that is the topic of our text; but\nrather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow of imperfection\nsuch as Nescience and the like, who is a treasure of all possible\nauspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection, who is the\nsole cause of this entire world. This is proved by the circumstance that\nthe term 'work' connected with 'this' (in 'of whom this (is) the work')\ndenotes the Universe which is an effect of the Supreme Person. For the\nword 'this' must, on account of its sense, the general topic of the\nsection and so on, be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes\nthe entire world, as presented by Perception and the other means of\nknowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings. That the term\n'work' does not here denote good and evil actions, appears from the\nfollowing consideration of the context. B\u00e2l\u00e2ki at first offers to teach\nBrahman ('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth on\nvarious persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being Brahman.\nAjatasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting\nforth Brahman, and finally, in order to enlighten B\u00e2l\u00e2ki, addresses him\n'He, O B\u00e2l\u00e2ki, who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the\ndifferent personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and connected with\nkarman in the form of good and evil actions, are known already by B\u00e2l\u00e2ki,\nthe term 'karman'--met with in the next clause--is clearly meant to\nthrow light on some Person so far not known to B\u00e2l\u00e2ki, and therefore\nmust be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general, but\nrather the entire Universe in so far as being the outcome of activity.\nOn this interpretation only the passage gives instruction about\nsomething not known before. Should it be said that this would be the\ncase also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true\nessential nature of the soul, indicated here by its connexion with\nkarman, we reply that this would involve the (objectionable) assumption\nof so-called implication (lakshan\u00e2), in so far namely as what the clause\nwould directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul as free\nfrom karman but rather) the connexion of the soul with karman. Moreover\nif the intention of the passage were this, viz. to give instruction as\nto the soul, the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to\nkarman, the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom\nkarman belongs, he is to be known;' while in the text as it actually\nstands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning. The\nmeaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons'\nand 'of whom this is the work' is as follows. He who is the creator of\nthose persons whom you called Brahman, and of whom those persons are the\ncreatures; he of whom this entire world is the effect, and before whom\nall things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being\nproduced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, the Supreme Person,\nis the object to be known. The meaning implied here is--although the\norigination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual\nsouls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for\ntheir own retributive experience, but experience only what the Lord has\ncreated to that end in agreement with their works. The individual soul,\nhence, cannot stand in creative relation to those persons.--What the\ntext under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is\nthe highest Brahman which is known from all Ved\u00e2nta-texts as the\nuniversal cause.\n\n\n\n\n17. Should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential\nmarks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that this\nhas been explained before.\n\nWith reference to the plea urged by the P\u00fbrvapakshin that, owing to\ninferential marks pointing to the individual soul, and the circumstance\nof mention being made of the chief vital air, we must decide that the\nsection treats of the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest\nSelf, the S\u00fbtra remarks that this argumentation has already been\ndisposed of, viz. in connexion with the Pratardana vidy\u00e2. For there it\nwas shown that when a text is ascertained, on the ground of a\ncomprehensive survey of initial and concluding clauses, to refer to\nBrahman, all inferential marks which point to other topics must be\ninterpreted so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text\nBrahman is introduced at the outset 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' it is\nfurther mentioned in the middle of the section, for the clause 'of whom\nthis is the work' does not refer to the soul in general but to the\nhighest Person who is the cause of the whole world; and at the end again\nwe hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations on\nBrahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the conquest of all evil.\n'Having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings,\nsovereignty and supremacy--yea, he who knows this.' The section thus\nbeing concerned with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and\nto the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall in with\nBrahman. In the same way it was shown above that the references to the\nindividual soul and the chief vital air which are met with in the\nPratardana vidy\u00e2 really explain themselves in connexion with a threefold\nmeditation on Brahman. As in the passage 'Then with this pr\u00e2na alone he\nbecomes one' the two words 'this' and 'pr\u00e2na' may be taken as co-\nordinated and it hence would be inappropriate to separate them (and to\nexplain 'in the pr\u00e2na which abides in this soul'), and as the word\n'pr\u00e2na' is ascertained to mean Brahman also, we must understand the\nmention of pr\u00e2na to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman in so\nfar as having the pr\u00e2na for its body. But how can the references to the\nindividual soul be put in connexion with Brahman?--This point is taken\nup by the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n18. But Jaimini thinks that it has another purport, on account of the\nquestion and answer; and thus some also.\n\nThe 'but' is meant to preclude the idea that the mention made of the\nindividual soul enables us to understand the whole section as concerned\nwith that soul.--The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the mention made\nof the individual soul has another meaning, i.e. aims at conveying the\nidea of what is different from the individual soul, i.e. the nature of\nthe highest Brahman. 'On account of question and answer.' According to\nthe story told in the Upanishad, Aj\u00e2tasatru leads B\u00e2l\u00e2ki to where a\nsleeping man is resting, and convinces him that the soul is different\nfrom breath, by addressing the sleeping person, in whom breath only is\nawake, with names belonging to pr\u00e2na [FOOTNOTE 383:1] without the sleeper\nbeing awaked thereby, and after that rousing him by a push of his staff.\nThen, with a view to teaching B\u00e2l\u00e2ki the difference of Brahman from the\nindividual soul, he asks him the following questions: 'Where, O B\u00e2l\u00e2ki,\ndid this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence did he thus come back?'\nTo these questions he thereupon himself replies, 'When sleeping he sees\nno dream, then he becomes one in that pr\u00e2na alone.--From that Self the\norgans proceed each towards its place, from the organs the gods, from\nthe gods the worlds.' Now this reply, no less than the questions,\nclearly refers to the highest Self as something different from the\nindividual Self. For that entering into which the soul, in the state of\ndeep sleep, attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity, being\nfree from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain that accompany\nthe states of waking and of dream; and that from which it again returns\nto the fruition of pleasure and pain; that is nothing else but the\nhighest Self. For, as other scriptural texts testify ('Then he becomes\nunited with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'Embraced by the intelligent\nSelf he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' Bri, Up.\nIV, 3, 21), the abode of deep sleep is the intelligent Self which is\ndifferent from the individual Self, i.e. the highest Self. We thus\nconclude that the reference, in question and answer, to the individual\nsoul subserves the end of instruction being given about what is\ndifferent from that soul, i.e. the highest Self. We hence also reject\nthe P\u00fbrvapakshin's contention that question and answer refer to the\nindividual soul, that the veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep,\nand that the well-known clause as to the pr\u00e2na must be taken to mean\nthat the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the individual soul\ncalled pr\u00e2na. For the veins are the abode, not of deep sleep, but of\ndream, and, as we have shown above, Brahman only is the abode of deep\nsleep; and the text declares that the individual soul, together with all\nits ministering organs, becomes one with, and again proceeds from,\nBrahman only--which the text designates as Pr\u00e2na.--Moreover some, viz.\nthe V\u00e2jasaneyins in this same colloquy of B\u00e2l\u00e2ki and Aj\u00e2tasatru as\nrecorded in their text, clearly distinguish from the vij\u00f1\u00e2na-maya, i.e.\nthe individual soul in the state of deep sleep, the highest Self which\nthen is the abode of the individual soul. 'Where was then the person,\nconsisting of intelligence, and from whence did he thus come back?--When\nhe was thus asleep, then the intelligent person, having through the\nintelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence,\nlies in the ether that is within the heart.' Now the word 'ether' is\nknown to denote the highest Self; cf. the text 'there is within that the\nsmall ether'(Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1). This shows us that the individual soul\nis mentioned in the V\u00e2jasaneyin passage to the end of setting forth what\nis different from it, viz. the pr\u00e2j\u00f1a Self, i.e. the highest Brahman.\nThe general conclusion therefore is that the Kaush\u00eetaki-text under\ndiscussion proposes as the object of knowledge something that is\ndifferent from the individual soul, viz. the highest Brahman which is\nthe cause of the whole world, and that hence the Ved\u00e2nta-texts nowhere\nintimate that general causality belongs either to the individual soul or\nto the Pradh\u00e2na under the soul's guidance. Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'denotation of the world.'\n\n[FOOTNOTE 383:1. The names with which the king addresses the sleeper are\n_Great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, king._ The Sru. Pra. comments\nas follows: _Great one_; because according to Sruti Pr\u00e2na is the oldest\nand best. _Clad in white raiment_; because Sruti says that water is the\nraiment of Pr\u00e2na; and elsewhere, that what is white belongs to water.\n_Soma_; because scripture says 'of this pr\u00e2na water is the body, light\nthe form, viz. yonder moon.' _King_; for Sruti says 'Pr\u00e2na indeed is the\nruler.']\n\n\n\n\n19. On account of the connected meaning of the sentences.\n\nIn spite of the conclusion arrived at there may remain a suspicion that\nhere and there in the Upanishads texts are to be met with which aim at\nsetting forth the soul as maintained in Kapila's system, and that hence\nthere is no room for a being different from the individual soul and\ncalled Lord. This suspicion the S\u00fbtra undertakes to remove, in connexion\nwith the Maitreyi-br\u00e2hmana, in the Brihadaranyaka. There we read 'Verily,\na husband is dear, not for the love of the husband, but for the love of\nthe Self a husband is dear, and so on. Everything is dear, not for the\nlove of everything, but for the love of the Self everything is dear. The\nSelf should be seen, should be heard, should be reflected on, should be\nmeditated upon. When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected upon,\nmeditated upon, then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the\ndoubt arises whether the Self enjoined in this passage as the object of\nseeing, &c., be the soul as held by the S\u00e2nkhyas, or the Supreme Lord,\nall-knowing, capable of realising all his purposes, and so on. The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin upholds the former alternative. For, he says, the beginning\nno less than the middle and the concluding part of the section conveys\nthe idea of the individual soul only. In the beginning the individual\nsoul only is meant, as appears from the connexion of the Self with\nhusband, wife, children, wealth, cattle, and so on. This is confirmed by\nthe middle part of the section where the Self is said to be connected\nwith origination and destruction, 'a mass of knowledge, he having risen\nfrom these elements vanishes again into them. When he has departed there\nis no more consciousness.' And in the end we have 'whereby should he\nknow the knower'; where we again recognise the knowing subject, i.e. the\nindividual soul, not the Lord. We thus conclude that the whole text is\nmeant to set forth the soul as held by the S\u00e2nkhyas.--But in the\nbeginning there is a clause, viz. 'There is no hope of immortality by\nwealth,' which shows that the whole section is meant to instruct us as\nto the means of immortality; how then can it be meant to set forth the\nindividual soul only?--You state the very reason proving that the text\nis concerned with the individual soul only! For according to the S\u00e2nkhya-\nsystem immortality is obtained through the cognition of the true nature\nof the soul viewed as free from all erroneous imputation to itself of\nthe attributes of non-sentient matter; and the text therefore makes it\nits task to set forth, for the purpose of immortality, the essential\nnature of the soul free from all connexion with Prakriti, 'the _Self_\nshould be heard,' and so on. And as the souls dissociated from Prakriti\nare all of a uniform nature, all souls are known through the knowledge\nof the soul free from Prakriti, and the text therefore rightly says that\nthrough the Self being known everything is known. And as the essential\nnature of the Self is of one and the same kind, viz. knowledge or\nintelligence, in all beings from gods down to plants, the text rightly\nasserts the unity of the Self 'that Self is all this'; and denies all\notherness from the Self, on the ground of the characteristic attributes\nof gods and so on really being of the nature of the Not-self, 'he is\nabandoned by everything,' &c. The clause, 'For where there is duality as\nit were,' which denies plurality, intimates that the plurality\nintroduced into the homogeneous Self by the different forms--such as of\ngods, and so on--assumed by Prakriti, is false. And there is also no\nobjection to the teaching that 'the Rig-veda and so on are breathed\nforth from that great being (i.e. Prakriti); for the origination of the\nworld is caused by the soul in its quality as ruler of Prakriti.--It\nthus being ascertained that the whole Maitrey\u00ee-br\u00e2hmana is concerned\nwith the soul in the S\u00e2nkhya sense, we, according to the principle of\nthe unity of purport of all Ved\u00e2nta-texts, conclude that they all treat\nof the S\u00e2nkhya soul only, and that hence the cause of the world is to be\nfound not in a so-called Lord but in Prakriti ruled and guided by the\nsoul.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The whole text refers\nto the Supreme Lord only; for on this supposition only a satisfactory\nconnexion of the parts of the text can be made out. On being told by\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya that there is no hope of immortality through wealth,\nMaitrey\u00ee expresses her slight regard for wealth and all such things as\ndo not help to immortality, and asks to be instructed as to the means of\nimmortality only ('What should I do with that by which I do not become\nimmortal? What my lord knows tell that clearly to me'). Now the Self\nwhich Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya, responding to her requests, points out to her as the\nproper object of knowledge, can be none other than the highest Self; for\nother scriptural texts clearly teach that the only means of reaching\nimmortality is to know the Supreme Person--'Having known him thus man\npasses beyond death'; 'Knowing him thus he becomes immortal here, there\nis no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). The knowledge of the true\nnature of the individual soul which obtains immortality, and is a mere\nmanifestation of the power of the Supreme Person, must be held to be\nuseful towards the cognition of the Supreme Person who brings about\nRelease, but is not in itself instrumental towards such Release; the\nbeing the knowledge of which the text declares to be the means of\nimmortality is therefore the highest Self only. Again, the causal power\nwith regard to the entire world which is expressed in the passage, 'from\nthat great Being there were breathed forth the Rig veda,' &c., cannot\npossibly belong to the mere individual soul which in its state of\nbondage is under the influence of karman and in the state of release has\nnothing to do with the world; it can in fact belong to the Supreme\nPerson only. Again, what the text says as to everything being known by\nthe knowledge of one thing ('By the seeing indeed of the Self,' &c.) is\npossible only in the case of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self\nof all. What the P\u00fbrvapakshin said as to everything being known through\nthe cognition of the one individual soul, since all individual souls are\nof the same type--this also cannot be upheld; for as long as there is a\nknowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient\nthings, there is no knowledge of everything. And when the text\nenumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this Kshatra class,'\n&c.), and then concludes 'all this is that Self'--where the 'this' denotes\nthe entire Universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through\nPerception, Inference, and so on--universal unity such as declared here\nis possible only through a highest Self which is the Self of all. It is\nnot, on the other hand, possible that what the word 'this' denotes, i.e.\nthe whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, should be\none with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is, whether\nconnected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the same\nspirit the passage, 'All things abandon him who views all things\nelsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault with him who views anything\napart from the universal Self. The qualities also which in the earlier\nMaitrey\u00ee-br\u00e2hmana (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under\ndiscussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot belong to\nany one else but the highest Self. That Self therefore is the topic of\nthe Br\u00e2hmana.\n\nWe further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire\nBr\u00e2hmana treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the\noutset represented as the object of enquiry, this being inferred from\nits connexion with husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause 'for the\nlove (literally, _for the _desire) of the Self refers to the individual\nSelf, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in any case)\nthat Self with the Self referred to in the subsequent clause, 'the Self\nindeed is to be seen,' &c.; the connexion having to be conceived in that\nway that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves\nthe cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 'For the desire\nof the Self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired\nby the Self.' But if it is first said that husband, wife, &c., are dear\nbecause they fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly\nbe said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired into;\nfor what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally is to be enquired\ninto and searched for are the dear objects but not the true nature of\nhim to whom those objects are dear, apart from the objects themselves.\nIt would certainly be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband,\nwife, &c., are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual\nsoul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must enquire into\nthe true nature of that soul apart from all the objects of its desire.\nOn the contrary, it having been declared that husband, wife, &c., are\ndear not on account of husband, wife, &c., but on account of the Self,\nthey should not be dropped, but included in the further investigation,\njust because they subserve the Self. And should our opponent (in order\nto avoid the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory connexion between\nthe different clauses) maintain that the clause, 'but everything is dear\nfor the love of the Self,' is not connected with the following clause,\n'the Self is to be seen,' &c., we point out that this would break the\nwhole connexion of the Brahm\u00e2na. And if we allowed such a break, we\nshould then be unable to point out what is the use of the earlier part\nof the Brahm\u00e2na. We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in\nsuch a way as to make it clear why all search for dear objects--husband,\nwife, children, wealth, &c.--should be abandoned and the Self only\nshould be searched for. This explanation is as follows. After having\nstated that wealth, and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which\nconsists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that the\npleasant experiences which we derive from wealth, husband, wife, &c..\nand which are not of a permanent nature and always alloyed with a great\ndeal of pain, are caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c., themselves,\nbut rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss. He\ntherefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other\nbeings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he--the\nhighest Self--is to be constituted the object of knowledge. The clauses,\n'not for the wish of the husband a husband is dear,' &c., therefore must\nbe understood as follows--a husband, a wife, a son, &c., are not dear to\nus in consequence of a wish or purpose on their part, 'may I, for my own\nend or advantage be dear to him,' but they are dear to us for the wish\nof the Self, i.e. to the end that there may be accomplished the desire\nof the highest Self--which desire aims at the devotee obtaining what is\ndear to him. For the highest Self pleased with the works of his devotees\nimparts to different things such dearness, i.e. joy-giving quality as\ncorresponds to those works, that 'dearness' being bound in each case to\na definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in accordance with\nthe scriptural text, 'For he alone bestows bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).\nThings are not dear, or the contrary, to us by themselves, but only in\nso far as the highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, 'The same\nthing which erst gave us delight later on becomes the source of grief;\nand what was the cause of wrath afterwards tends to peace. Hence there\nis nothing that in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.'\n\nBut, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed, even if the\nSelf in the clause 'for the desire of the Self' were accepted as\ndenoting the individual Self, yet the clause 'the Self must be seen'\nwould refer to the highest Self only. For in that case also the sense\nwould be as follows--because the possession of husband, wife, and other\nso-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom they are dear, not\nwith a view of bringing about what is desired by them (viz. husband,\nwife, &c.), but rather to the end of bringing about what is desired by\nhimself; therefore that being which is, to the individual soul,\nabsolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must be\nconstituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects as husband,\nwife, wealth, &c., the nature of which depends on various external\ncircumstances and the possession of which gives rise either to limited\npleasure alloyed with pain or to mere pain.--But against this we remark\nthat as, in the section under discussion, the words designating the\nindividual Self denote the highest Self also, [FOOTNOTE 391:1], the term\n'Self' in both clauses, 'For the desire of the Self' and 'The Self is to\nbe seen,' really refers to one and the same being (viz. the highest\nSelf), and the interpretation thus agrees with the one given above.--In\norder to prove the tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the\nsame time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made use of by\nother teachers also, the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra sets forth the two following S\u00fbtras.\n\n\n\n\n20. (It is) a mark indicating that the promissory statement is proved;\nthus \u00c2smarathya thinks.\n\nAccording to the teacher \u00c2smarathya the circumstance that terms denoting\nthe individual soul are used to denote Brahman is a mark enabling us to\ninfer that the promissory declaration according to which through the\nknowledge of one thing everything is known is well established. If the\nindividual soul were not identical with Brahman in so far as it is the\neffect of Brahman, then the knowledge of the soul--being something\ndistinct from Brahman--would not follow from the knowledge of the\nhighest Self. There are the texts declaring the oneness of Brahman\nprevious to creation, such as 'the Self only was this in the beginning'\n(Ait. \u00c2r. II, 4, 1, 1), and on the other hand those texts which declare\nthat the souls spring from and again are merged in Brahman; such as 'As\nfrom a blazing fire sparks being like unto fire fly forth a thousandfold,\nthus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, and return\nthither also' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 1). These two sets of texts together make\nus apprehend that the souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are\nits effects. On this ground a word denoting the individual soul denotes\nthe highest Self as well.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 391:1. If it be insisted upon that the Self in 'for the desire\nof the Self' is the individual Self, we point out that terms denoting\nthe individual Self at the same time denote the highest Self also. This\ntenet of his R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja considers to be set forth and legitimately proved\nin S\u00fbtra 23, while S\u00fbtras 21 and 22 although advocating the right\nprinciple fail to assign valid arguments.]\n\n\n\n\n21. Because (the soul) when it will depart is such; thus Audulomi thinks.\n\nIt is wrong to maintain that the designation of Brahman by means of\nterms denoting the individual soul is intended to prove the truth of the\ndeclaration that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known,\nin so far namely as the soul is an effect of Brahman and hence one with\nit. For scriptural texts such as 'the knowing Self is not born, it dies\nnot' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), declare the soul not to have originated, and it\nmoreover is admitted that the world is each time created to the end of\nthe souls undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds;\notherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the creation would\nbe inexplicable. If moreover the soul were a mere effect of Brahman, its\nRelease would consist in a mere return into the substance of Brahman,--\nanalogous to the refunding into Brahman of the material elements, and\nthat would mean that the injunction and performance of acts leading to\nsuch Release would be purportless. Release, understood in that sense,\nmoreover would not be anything beneficial to man; for to be refunded\ninto Brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own causal\nsubstance, i.e. clay, means nothing else but complete annihilation. How,\nunder these circumstances, certain texts can speak of the origination\nand reabsorption of the individual soul will be set forth later on.--\nAccording to the opinion of the teacher Audulomi, the highest Selfs\nbeing denoted by terms directly denoting the individual soul is due to\nthe soul's becoming Brahman when departing from the body. This is in\nagreement with texts such as the following, 'This serene being having\nrisen from this body and approached the highest light appears in its\ntrue form' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4); 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the\nsea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from name and\nform goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high' (Mu. Up. III,\n2, 8).\n\n\n\n\n22. On account of (Brahman's) abiding (within the individual soul); thus\nK\u00e2sakritsna (holds).\n\nWe must object likewise to the view set forth in the preceding S\u00fbtra,\nviz. that Brahman is denoted by terms denoting the individual soul\nbecause that soul when departing becomes one with Brahman. For that view\ncannot stand the test of being submitted to definite alternatives.--Is\nthe soul's not being such, i.e. not being Brahman, previously to its\ndeparture from the body, due to its own essential nature or to a\nlimiting adjunct, and is it in the latter case real or unreal? In the\nfirst case the soul can never become one with Brahman, for if its\nseparation from Brahman is due to its own essential nature, that\nseparation can never vanish as long as the essential nature persists.\nAnd should it be said that its essential nature comes to an end together\nwith its distinction from Brahman, we reply that in that case it\nperishes utterly and does not therefore become Brahman. The latter view,\nmoreover, precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man, and so on.--\nIf, in the next place, the difference of the soul from Brahman depends\non the presence of real limiting adjuncts, the soul is Brahman even\nbefore its departure from the body, and we therefore cannot reasonably\naccept the distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes Brahman\nonly when it departs. For on this view there exists nothing but Brahman\nand its limiting adjuncts, and as those adjuncts cannot introduce\ndifference into Brahman which is without parts and hence incapable of\ndifference, the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts, and hence\nthe soul is Brahman even before its departure from the body.--If, on the\nother hand, the difference due to the adjuncts is not real, we ask--what\nis it then that becomes Brahman on the departure of the soul?--Brahman\nitself whose true nature had previously been obscured by Nescience, its\nlimiting adjunct!--Not so, we reply. Of Brahman whose true nature\nconsists in eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence, the true nature\ncannot possibly be hidden by Nescience. For by 'hiding' or 'obscuring'\nwe understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the essential\nnature of a thing. Where, therefore, light itself and alone constitutes\nthe essential nature of a thing, there can either be no obscuration at\nall, or if there is such it means complete annihilation of the thing.\nHence Brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times, there\nexists no difference on account of which it could be said to _become_\nBrahman at the time of the soul's departure; and the distinction\nintroduced in the last S\u00fbtra ('when departing') thus has no meaning. The\ntext on which Audulomi relies, 'Having risen from this body,' &c., does\nnot declare that that which previously was not Brahman becomes such at\nthe time of departure, but rather that the true nature of the soul which\nhad previously existed already becomes manifest at the time of departure.\nThis will be explained under IV, 4, 1.\n\nThe theories stated in the two preceding S\u00fbtras thus having been found\nuntenable, the teacher K\u00e2sakritsna states his own view, to the effect\nthat words denoting the j\u00eeva are applied to Brahman because Brahman\nabides as its Self within the individual soul which thus constitutes\nBrahman's body. This theory rests on a number of well-known texts,\n'Entering into them with this living (individual) soul let me evolve\nnames and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He who dwelling within the Self,\n&c., whose body the Self is,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'He who moves\nwithin the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body,' &c;\n'Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all.' That the term\n'j\u00eeva' denotes not only the j\u00eeva itself, but extends in its denotation\nup to the highest Self, we have explained before when discussing the\ntext, 'Let me evolve names and forms.' On this view of the identity of\nthe individual and the highest Self consisting in their being related to\neach other as body and soul, we can accept in their full and unmutilated\nmeaning all scriptural texts whatever--whether they proclaim the\nperfection and omniscience of the highest Brahman, or teach how the\nindividual soul steeped in ignorance and misery is to be saved through\nmeditation on Brahman, or describe the origination and reabsorption of\nthe world, or aim at showing how the world is identical with Brahman.\nFor this reason the author of the S\u00fbtras, rejecting other views, accepts\nthe theory of K\u00e2sakritsna. Returning to the Maitrey\u00ee-br\u00e2hmana we proceed\nto explain the general sense, from the passage previously discussed\nonwards. Being questioned by Maitrey\u00ee as to the means of immortality,\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya teaches her that this means is given in meditation on the\nhighest Self ('The Self is to be seen,' &c.). He next indicates in a\ngeneral way the nature of the object of meditation ('When the Self is\nseen,' &c.), and--availing himself of the similes of the drum, &c.--of\nthe government over the organs, mind, and so on, which are instrumental\ntowards meditation. He then explains in detail that the object of\nmeditation, i.e. the highest Brahman, is the sole cause of the entire\nworld; and the ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends\nall activity with regard to the objects of the senses ('As clouds of\nsmoke proceed,' &c.; 'As the ocean is the home of all the waters'). He,\nnext, in order to stimulate the effort which leads to immortality, shows\nhow the highest Self abiding in the form of the individual Self, is of\none uniform character, viz. that of limitless intelligence ('As a lump\nof salt,' &c.), and how that same Self characterised by homogeneous\nlimitless intelligence connects itself in the Sams\u00e2ra state with the\nproducts of the elements ('a mass of knowledge, it rises from those\nelements and again vanishes into them'). He then adds, 'When he has\ndeparted, there is no more knowledge'; meaning that in the state of\nRelease, where the soul's unlimited essential intelligence is not\ncontracted in any way, there is none of those specific cognitions by\nwhich the Self identifying itself with the body, the sense-organs, &c.,\nviews itself as a man or a god, and so on. Next--in the passage, 'For\nwhere there is duality as it were'--he, holding that the view of a\nplurality of things not having their Self in Brahman is due to ignorance,\nshows that for him who has freed himself from the shackles of ignorance\nand recognises this whole world as animated by Brahman, the view of\nplurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence of any\nexistence apart from Brahman. He then proceeds, 'He by whom he knows all\nthis, by what means should he know Him?' This means--He, i.e. the\nhighest Self, which abiding within the individual soul as its true Self\nbestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul knows all this\nthrough the highest Self; by what means should the soul know Him? In\nother words, there is no such means of knowledge: the highest Self\ncannot be fully understood by the individual soul. 'That Self,' he\ncontinues, 'is to be expressed as--not so, not so!' That means--He, the\nhighest Lord, different in nature from everything else, whether sentient\nor non-sentient, abides within all beings as their Self, and hence is\nnot touched by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely. He\nthen concludes, 'Whereby should he know the Knower? Thus, O Maitrey\u00ee,\nthou hast been instructed. Thus far goes Immortality'; the purport of\nthese words being--By what means, apart from the meditation described,\nshould man know Him who is different in nature from all other beings,\nwho is the sole cause of the entire world, who is the Knower of all, Him\nthe Supreme Person? It is meditation on Him only which shows the road to\nImmortality. It thus appears that the Maitrey\u00ee-br\u00e2hmana is concerned\nwith the highest Brahman only; and this confirms the conclusion that\nBrahman only, and with it Prakriti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of\nthe world.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the connexion of\nsentences.'\n\n\n\n\n23. (Brahman is) the material cause on account of this not being in\nconflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.\n\nThe claims raised by the atheistic S\u00e2nkhya having thus been disposed of,\nthe theistic S\u00e2nkhya comes forward as an opponent. It must indeed be\nadmitted, he says, that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts teach the cause of the world\nto be an all-knowing Lord; for they attribute to that cause thought and\nsimilar characteristics. But at the same time we learn from those same\ntexts that the material cause of the world is none other than the\nPradh\u00e2na; with an all-knowing, unchanging superintending Lord they\nconnect a Pradh\u00e2na, ruled by him, which is non-intelligent and undergoes\nchanges, and the two together only they represent as the cause of the\nworld. This view is conveyed by the following texts, 'who is without\nparts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet.\nUp. VI, 18); 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV,\n4, 25); 'He knows her who produces all effects, the non-knowing one, the\nunborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one. Ruled by him she is\nspread out, and incited and guided by him gives birth to the world for\nthe benefit of the souls. A cow she is without beginning and end, a\nmother producing all beings' (see above, p. 363). That the Lord creates\nthis world in so far only as guiding Prakriti, the material cause, we\nlearn from the following text, 'From that the Lord of M\u00e2ya creates all\nthis. Know M\u00e2ya to be Prakriti and the Lord of M\u00e2ya the great Lord'\n(Svet. Up. IV, 9, 10). And similarly Smriti, 'with me as supervisor\nPrakriti brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable'\n(Bha. G\u00ce. IX, 10). Although, therefore, the Pradh\u00e2na is not expressly\nstated by Scripture to be the material cause, we must assume that there\nis such a Pradh\u00e2na and that, superintended by the Lord, it constitutes\nthe material cause, because otherwise the texts declaring Brahman to be\nthe cause of the world would not be fully intelligible. For ordinary\nexperience shows us on all sides that the operative cause and the\nmaterial cause are quite distinct: we invariably have on the one side\nclay, gold, and other material substances which form the material causes\nof pots, ornaments, and so on, and on the other hand, distinct from them,\npotters, goldsmiths, and so on, who act as operative causes. And we\nfurther observe that the production of effects invariably requires\nseveral instrumental agencies. The Ved\u00e2nta-texts therefore cannot\npossess the strength to convince us, in open defiance of the two\ninvariable rules, that the one Brahman is at the same time the material\nand the operative cause of the world; and hence we maintain that Brahman\nis only the operative but not the material cause, while the material\ncause is the Pradh\u00e2na guided by Brahman.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra combats. Prakriti, i.e. the material\ncause, not only the operative cause, is Brahman only; this view being in\nharmony with the promissory declaration and the illustrative instances.\nThe promissory declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all\nthings through the knowledge of one, 'Did you ever ask for that\ninstruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard?' &c. (Ch, Up.\nVI, 1, 3). And the illustrative instances are those which set forth the\nknowledge of the effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause,\n'As by one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of clay; as\nby one nugget of gold, &c.; as by one instrument for paring the nails,'\n&c. (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4). If Brahman were merely the operative cause of the\nworld, the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the\nknowledge of Brahman; not any more than we know the pot when we know the\npotter. And thus scriptural declaration and illustrative instances would\nbe stultified. But if Brahman is the general material cause, then the\nknowledge of Brahman implies the knowledge of its effect, i.e. the world,\nin the same way as the knowledge of such special material causes as a\nlump of clay, a nugget of gold, an instrument for paring the nails,\nimplies the knowledge of all things made of clay, gold or iron--such as\npots, bracelets, diadems, hatchets, and so on. For an effect is not a\nsubstance different from its cause, but the cause itself which has\npassed into a different state. The initial declaration thus being\nconfirmed by the instances of clay and its products, &c., which stand in\nthe relation of cause and effect, we conclude that Brahman only is the\nmaterial cause of the world. That Scripture teaches the operative and\nthe material causes to be separate, is not true; it rather teaches the\nunity of the two. For in the text, 'Have you asked for that \u00e2desa (above,\nand generally, understood to mean \"instruction\"), by which that which is\nnot heard becomes heard?' the word '\u00e2desa' has to be taken to mean _ruler_,\nin agreement with the text, 'by the command--or rule--of that\nImperishable sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9), so that the\npassage means, 'Have you asked for that Ruler by whom, when heard and\nknown, even that which is not heard and known, becomes heard and known?'\nThis clearly shows the unity of the operative (ruling or supervising)\ncause and the material cause; taken in conjunction with the subsequent\ndeclaration of the unity of the cause previous to creation, 'Being only,\nthis was in the beginning, one only,' and the denial of a further\noperative cause implied in the further qualification 'advit\u00eeyam,' i.e.\n'without a second.'--But how then have we to understand texts such as\nthe one quoted above (from the K\u00fblika-Upanishad) which declare Prakriti\nto be eternal and the material cause of the world?--Prakriti, we reply,\nin such passages denotes Brahman in its causal phase when names and\nforms are not yet distinguished. For a principle independent of Brahman\ndoes not exist, as we know from texts such as 'Everything abandons him\nwho views anything as apart from the Self; and 'But where for him the\nSelf has become all, whereby should he see whom?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6;\n15). Consider also the texts, 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1);\nand 'All this has its Self in that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); which declare\nthat the world whether in its causal or its effected condition has\nBrahman for its Self. The relation of the world to Brahman has to be\nconceived in agreement with scriptural texts such as 'He who moves\nwithin the earth,' &c., up to 'He who moves within the Imperishable';\nand 'He who dwells within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who dwells within\nthe Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23). The highest Brahman, having the whole\naggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, ever is the\nSelf of all. Sometimes, however, names and forms are not evolved, not\ndistinguished in Brahman; at other times they are evolved, distinct. In\nthe latter state Brahman is called an effect and manifold; in the former\nit is called one, without a second, the cause. This causal state of\nBrahman is meant where the text quoted above speaks of the cow without\nbeginning and end, giving birth to effects, and so on.--But, the text,\n'The great one is merged in the Unevolved, the Unevolved is merged in\nthe Imperishable,' intimates that the Unevolved originates and again\npasses away; and similarly the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata says, 'from that there sprung\nthe Non-evolved comprising the three gunas; the Non-evolved is merged in\nthe indivisible Person.'--These texts, we reply, present no real\ndifficulty. For Brahman having non-sentient matter for its body, that\nstate which consists of the three gunas and is denoted by the term\n'Unevolved' is something effected. And the text, 'When there was\ndarkness, neither day nor night,' states that also in a total pralaya\nnon-sentient matter having Brahman for its Self continues to exist in a\nhighly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands to Brahman the\ncause of the world in the relation of a mode (prak\u00e2ra), and it is\nBrahman viewed as having such a mode that the text from the K\u00fbl.\nUpanishad refers to. For this reason also the text, 'the Imperishable is\nmerged in darkness, darkness becomes one with the highest God,' declares\nnot that darkness is completely merged and lost in the Divinity but only\nthat it becomes one with it; what the text wants to intimate is that\nstate of Brahman in which, having for its mode extremely subtle matter\nhere called 'Darkness,' it abides without evolving names and forms. The\nmantra, 'There was darkness, hidden in darkness,' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 129,\n3), sets forth the same view; and so does Manu (I, 5), 'This universe\nexisted in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive\nmarks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed as it were\nin deep sleep.' And, as to the text, 'from that the Lord of M\u00e2ya creates\neverything,' we shall prove later on the unchangeableness of Brahman,\nand explain the scriptural texts asserting it.\n\nAs to the contention raised by the P\u00fbrvapakshin that on the basis of\ninvariable experience it must be held that one and the same principle\ncannot be both material and operative cause, and that effects cannot be\nbrought about by one agency, and that hence the Ved\u00e2nta-texts can no\nmore establish the view of Brahman being the sole cause than the command\n'sprinkle with fire' will convince us that fire may perform the office\nof water; we simply remark that the highest Brahman which totally\ndiffers in nature from all other beings, which is omnipotent and\nomniscient, can by itself accomplish everything. The invariable rule of\nexperience holds good, on the other hand, with regard to clay and\nsimilar materials which are destitute of intelligence and hence\nincapable of guiding and supervising; and with regard to potters and\nsimilar agents who do not possess the power of transforming themselves\ninto manifold products, and cannot directly realise their intentions.--\nThe conclusion therefore remains that Brahman alone is the material as\nwell as the operative cause of the Universe.\n\n\n\n\n24. And on account of the statement of reflection.\n\nBrahman must be held to be both causes for that reason also that texts\nsuch as 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'It thought,\nmay I be many, may I grow forth,' declare that the creative Brahman\nforms the purpose of its own Self multiplying itself. The text clearly\nteaches that creation on Brahman's part is preceded by the purpose 'May\nI, and no other than I, become manifold in the shape of various non-\nsentient and sentient beings.'\n\n\n\n\n25. And on account of both being directly declared.\n\nThe conclusion arrived at above is based not only on scriptural\ndeclaration, illustrative instances and statements of reflection; but in\naddition Scripture directly states that Brahman alone is the material as\nwell as operative cause of the world. 'What was the wood, what the tree\nfrom which they have shaped heaven and earth? You wise ones, search in\nyour minds, whereon it stood, supporting the worlds.--Brahman was the\nwood, Brahman the tree from which they shaped heaven and earth; you wise\nones, I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.'--Here a\nquestion is asked, suggested by the ordinary worldly view, as to what\nwas the material and instruments used by Brahman when creating; and the\nanswer--based on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in\nascribing all possible powers to Brahman which differs from all other\nbeings--declares that Brahman itself is the material and the instruments;--\nwhereby the ordinary view is disposed of.--The next S\u00fbtra supplies a\nfurther reason.\n\n\n\n\n26. On account of (the Self) making itself.\n\nOf Brahman which the text had introduced as intent on creation, 'He\nwished, may I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), a subsequent text says, 'That\nitself made its Self (II, 7), so that Brahman is represented as the\nobject as well as the agent in the act of creation. It being the Self\nonly which here is made many, we understand that the Self is material\ncause as well as operative one. The Self with names and forms non-\nevolved is agent (cause), the same Self with names and forms evolved is\nobject (effect). There is thus nothing contrary to reason in one Self\nbeing object as well as agent.\n\nA new doubt here presents itself.--'The True, knowledge, infinite is\nBrahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28);\n'Free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, free from\nhunger and thirst' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,5); 'Without parts, without action,\ntranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'This great\nunborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25)--from all these\ntexts it appears that Brahman is essentially free from even a shadow of\nall the imperfections which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings,\nand has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss and\nknowledge. How then is it possible that this Brahman should form the\npurpose of becoming, and actually become, manifold, by appearing in the\nform of a world comprising various sentient and non-sentient beings--all\nof which are the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions?\nTo this question the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n27. Owing to modification.\n\nThis means--owing to the essential nature of modification (parin\u00e2ma).\nThe modification taught in our system is not such as to introduce\nimperfections into the highest Brahman, on the contrary it confers on it\nlimitless glory. For our teaching as to Brahman's modification is as\nfollows. Brahman--essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform\ngoodness, differing in nature from all beings other than itself, all-\nknowing, endowed with the power of immediately realising all its\npurposes, in eternal possession of all it wishes for, supremely blessed--\nhas for its body the entire universe, with all its sentient and non-\nsentient beings--the universe being for it a plaything as it were--and\nconstitutes the Self of the Universe. Now, when this world which forms\nBrahman's body has been gradually reabsorbed into Brahman, each\nconstituent element being refunded into its immediate cause, so that in\nthe end there remains only the highly subtle, elementary matter which\nScripture calls Darkness; and when this so-called Darkness itself, by\nassuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called\nsomething separate from Brahman, of which it constitutes the body, has\nbecome one with Brahman; then Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle\nbody forms the resolve 'May I again possess a world-body constituted by\nall sentient and non-sentient beings, distinguished by names and forms\njust as in the previous aeon,' and modifies (parin\u00e2mayati) itself by\ngradually evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which\nreabsorption had taken place.\n\nAll Ved\u00e2nta-texts teach such modification or change on Brahman's part.\nThere is, e.g., the text in the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka which declares that the\nwhole world constitutes the body of Brahman and that Brahman is its Self.\nThat text teaches that earth, water, fire, sky, air, heaven, sun, the\nregions, moon and stars, ether, darkness, light, all beings, breath,\nspeech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge form the body of Brahman which\nabides within them as their Self and Ruler. Thus in the K\u00e2nva-text; the\nM\u00e2dhyandina-text reads 'the Self' instead of 'knowledge'; and adds the\nworlds, sacrifices and vedas. The parallel passage in the Sub\u00e2la-\nUpanishad adds to the beings enumerated as constituting Brahman's body\nin the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka, buddhi, ahamk\u00e2ra, the mind (kitta), the Un-\nevolved (avyakta), the Imperishable (akshara), and concludes 'He who\nmoves within death, of whom death is the body, whom death does not know,\nhe is the inner Self of all, free from all evil, divine, the one god\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana. The term 'Death' here denotes matter in its extremely subtle\nform, which in other texts is called Darkness; as we infer from the\norder of enumeration in another passage in the same Upanishad, 'the\nUnevolved is merged in the Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness.'\nThat this Darkness is called 'Death' is due to the fact that it obscures\nthe understanding of all souls and thus is harmful to them. The full\ntext in the Sub\u00e2la-Up. declaring the successive absorption of all the\nbeings forming Brahman's body is as follows, 'The earth is merged in\nwater, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether, the ether in the\nsense-organs, the sense-organs in the tanm\u00e2tras, the tanm\u00e2tras in the\ngross elements, the gross elements in the great principle, the great\nprinciple in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the Imperishable; the\nImperishable is merged in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with the\nhighest Divinity.' That even in the state of non-separation (to which\nthe texts refer as 'becoming one') non-sentient matter as well as\nsentient beings, together with the impressions of their former deeds,\npersists in an extremely subtle form, will be shown under II, 1, 35. We\nhave thus a Brahman all-knowing, of the nature of supreme bliss and so\non, one and without a second, having for its body all sentient and non-\nsentient beings abiding in an extremely subtle condition and having\nbecome 'one' with the Supreme Self in so far as they cannot be\ndesignated as something separate from him; and of this Brahman Scripture\nrecords that it forms the resolve of becoming many--in so far, namely,\nas investing itself with a body consisting of all sentient and non-\nsentient beings in their gross, manifest state which admits of\ndistinctions of name and form--and thereupon modifies (parin\u00e2ma) itself\ninto the form of the world. This is distinctly indicated in the\nTaittir\u00eeya-Upanishad, where Brahman is at first described as 'The True,\nknowledge, infinite,' as 'the Self of bliss which is different from the\nSelf of Understanding,' as 'he who bestows bliss'; and where the text\nfurther on says, 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth. He\nbrooded over himself, and having thus brooded he sent forth all whatever\nthere is. Having sent forth he entered it. Having entered it he became\nsat and tyat, defined and undefined, supported and non-supported,\nknowledge and non-knowledge, real and unreal.' The 'brooding' referred\nto in this text denotes knowing, viz. reflection on the shape and\ncharacter of the previous world which Brahman is about to reproduce.\nCompare the text 'whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. Up. I, 1,\n9). The meaning therefore is that Brahman, having an inward intuition of\nthe characteristics of the former world, creates the new world on the\nsame pattern. That Brahman in all kalpas again and again creates the\nsame world is generally known from Sruti and Smriti. Cp. 'As the creator\nformerly made sun and moon, and sky and earth, and the atmosphere and\nthe heavenly world,' and 'whatever various signs of the seasons are seen\nin succession, the same appear again and again in successive yugas and\nkalpas.'\n\nThe sense of the Taittir\u00eeya-text therefore is as follows. The highest\nSelf, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss,\nhas for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings--instruments of\nsport for him as it were--in so subtle a form that they may be called\nnon-existing; and as they are his body he may be said to consist of them\n(tan-maya). Then desirous of providing himself with an infinity of\nplaythings of all kinds he, by a series of steps beginning with Prakriti\nand the aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in their\ngross state, so modifies himself as to have those elements for his body--\nwhen he is said to consist of them--and thus appears in the form of our\nworld containing what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all\nintelligent and non-intelligent things, from gods down to plants and\nstones. When the text says that the Self having entered into it became\nsat and tyat, the meaning is that the highest Self, which in its causal\nstate had been the universal Self, abides, in its effected state also,\nas the Self of the different substances undergoing changes and thus\nbecomes this and that. While the highest Self thus undergoes a change--\nin the form of a world comprising the whole aggregate of sentient and\nnon-sentient beings--all imperfection and suffering are limited to the\nsentient beings constituting part of its body, and all change is\nrestricted to the non-sentient things which constitute another part. The\nhighest Self is _effected_ in that sense only that it is the ruling\nprinciple, and hence the Self, of matter and souls in their gross or\nevolved state; but just on account of being this, viz. their inner Ruler\nand Self, it is in no way touched by their imperfections and changes.\nConsisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his\nuniform nature, engaged in the sport of making this world go round. This\nis the purport of the clause 'it became the real and the unreal':\nalthough undergoing a change into the multiplicity of actual sentient\nand non-sentient things, Brahman at the same time was the Real, i.e.\nthat which is free from all shadow of imperfection, consisting of\nnothing but pure knowledge and bliss. That all beings, sentient and non-\nsentient, and whether in their non-evolved or evolved states, are mere\nplaythings of Brahman, and that the creation and reabsorption of the\nworld are only his sport, this has been expressly declared by Dvaip\u00e2yana,\nPar\u00e2sara and other Rishis,'Know that all transitory beings, from the\nUnevolved down to individual things, are a mere play of Hari'; 'View his\naction like that of a playful child,' &c. The S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra will distinctly\nenounce the same view in II, 1, 33. With a similar view the text 'from\nthat the Lord of M\u00e2ya sends forth all this; and in that the other is\nbound by M\u00e2y\u00e2' (Svet. Up. IV, 9), refers to Prakriti and soul, which\ntogether constitute the body of Brahman, as things different from\nBrahman, although then, i.e. at the time of a pralaya, they are one with\nBrahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not admit of their\nbeing conceived as separate; this it does to the end of suggesting that\neven when Brahman undergoes the change into the shape of this world, all\nchanges exclusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode of\nBrahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the individual souls\nwhich also are modes of Brahman. The text has to be viewed as agreeing\nin meaning with 'that Self made itself.' Of a similar purport is the\naccount given in Manu, 'He being desirous to send forth from his body\nbeings of many kinds, first with a thought created the waters and placed\nhis seed in them' (I, 8).\n\nIt is in this way that room is found for those texts also which proclaim\nBrahman to be free from all imperfection and all change. It thus remains\na settled conclusion that Brahman by itself constitutes the material as\nwell as the operative cause of the world.\n\n\n\n\n28. And because it is called the womb.\n\nBrahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world for\nthat reason also that certain texts call it the womb, 'the maker, the\nLord, the Person, Brahman, the womb' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); 'that which\nthe wise regard as the womb of all beings' (I, 1, 6). And that 'womb'\nmeans as much as material cause, appears from the complementary passage\n'As a spider sends forth and draws in its threads' (I, 1, 7)--\n\n\n\n\n29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained.\n\nHereby, i.e. by the whole array of arguments set forth in the four p\u00e2das\nof the first adhy\u00e2ya; all those particular passages of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts\nwhich give instruction as to the cause of the world, are explained as\nmeaning to set forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in\nnature from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent. The repetition\nof the word 'explained' is meant to indicate the termination of the\nadhy\u00e2ya.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ADHY\u00c2YA\n\nFIRST P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. If it be said that there would result the fault of there being no\nroom for (certain) Smritis: (we reply) 'no,' because there would result\nthe fault of want of room for other Smritis.\n\nThe first adhy\u00e2ya has established the truth that what the Ved\u00e2nta-texts\nteach is a Supreme Brahman, which is something different as well from\nnon-sentient matter known through the ordinary means of proof, viz.\nPerception and so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected\nwith or separated from matter; which is free from even a shadow of\nimperfection of any kind; which is an ocean as it were of auspicious\nqualities and so on; which is the sole cause of the entire Universe;\nwhich constitutes the inner Self of all things. The second adhy\u00e2ya is\nnow begun for the purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot\nbe impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought forward. The\nS\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra at first turns against those who maintain that the Vedanta-\ntexts do not establish the view indicated above, on the ground of that\nview being contradicted by the Smriti of Kapila, i. e. the S\u00e2nkhya-\nsystem.\n\nBut how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does not set forth a\ncertain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with Smriti?\nFor that Smriti if contradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account,\nis already settled in the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 ('But where there is\ncontradiction Smriti is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3).--Where, we reply,\na matter can be definitely settled on the basis of Scripture--as e.g. in\nthe case of the Vedic injunction, 'he is to sing, after having touched\nthe Udumbara branch' (which clearly contradicts the Smriti injunction\nthat the whole branch is to be covered up)--Smriti indeed need not be\nregarded. But the topic with which the Ved\u00e2nta-texts are concerned is\nhard to understand, and hence, when a conflict arises between those\ntexts and a Smriti propounded by some great Rishi, the matter does not\nadmit of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore unreasonable\nto undertake to prove by Smriti that Scripture does not set forth a\ncertain doctrine. That is to say--we possess a Smriti composed with a\nview to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness, by the\ngreat Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smriti, Itih\u00e2sa and Pur\u00e2na alike\nrefer as a person worthy of all respect (compare e. g. 'the Rishi Kapila,'\nSvet. Up. V, 2), and who moreover (unlike Brihaspati and other Smriti--\nwriters) fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly\nhappiness which are set forth in the karmak\u00e2nda of the Veda, such as the\ndaily oblations to the sacred fires, the New and Full Moon offerings and\nthe great Soma sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect\nknowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-minded, can hardly\nascertain the sense of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts without the assistance of such\na Smriti, and as to be satisfied with that sense of the Ved\u00e2nta which\ndiscloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the\nadmission that the whole S\u00e2nkhya Smriti, although composed by an able\nand trustworthy person, really is useless; we see ourselves driven to\nacknowledge that the doctrine of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts cannot differ from\nthe one established by the S\u00e2nkhyas. Nor must you object that to do so\nwould force on us another unacceptable conclusion, viz. that those\nSmritis, that of Manu e.g., which maintain Brahman to be the universal\ncause, are destitute of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate\npractical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested\nfunction of supporting the teaching of the karmak\u00e2nda of the Veda. The\nS\u00e2nkhya Smriti, on the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting\nforth of theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not\naccepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever.--On this ground\nthe S\u00fbtra sets forth the prim\u00e2 facie view, 'If it be said that there\nresults the fault of there being no room for certain Smritis.'\n\nThe same S\u00fbtra replies 'no; because there would result the fault of want\nof room for other Smritis.' For other Smritis, that of Manu e.g., teach\nthat Brahman is the universal cause. Thus Manu says, 'This (world)\nexisted in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine Self\nexistent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, the great\nelements and the rest, appeared with irresistible power, dispelling the\ndarkness. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body,\nfirst with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them'\n(Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-git\u00e2, 'I am the origin and the\ndissolution of the whole Universe' (VII, 6). 'I am the origin of all;\neverything proceeds from me' (X, 8). Similarly, in the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata, to\nthe question 'Whence was created this whole world with its movable and\nimmovable beings?' the answer is given, 'N\u00e2r\u00e2yana assumes the form of\nthe world, he the infinite, eternal one'; and 'from him there originates\nthe Unevolved consisting of the three gunas'; and 'the Unevolved is\nmerged in the non-acting Person.' And Par\u00e2sara says, 'From Vishnu there\nsprang the world and in him it abides; he makes this world persist and\nhe rules it--he is the world.' Thus also \u00c2pastamba, 'The living beings\nare the dwelling of him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is\nspotless'; and 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he\nis eternal, permanent.' (Dharmas\u00fb. I, 8, 22, 4; 23, 2).--If the question\nas to the meaning of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts were to be settled by means of\nKapila's Smriti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable\nconclusion that all the Smritis quoted are of no authority. It is true\nthat the Ved\u00e2nta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying\noutside the sphere of Perception and the other means of knowledge, and\nthat hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda\nrequire some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the Ved\u00e2nta.\nBut what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the\nconclusion that the very numerous Smritis which closely follow the\ndoctrine of the Ved\u00e2nta, are composed by the most competent and\ntrustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant;\nand it is for this reason that Kapila's Smriti which contains a doctrine\nopposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The support required is\nelucidation of the sense conveyed by Scripture, and this clearly cannot\nbe effected by means of a Smriti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of\nany avail to plead, as the P\u00fbrvapakshin does, that Manu and other\nSmritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating\nthe acts of religious duty enjoined in the karmak\u00e2nda. For if they\nenjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the Supreme\nPerson but do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person\nhimself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also not capable of\nimpressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves. That it is the\ncharacter of all religious acts to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit,\nSmriti distinctly declares, 'Man attains to perfection by worshipping\nwith his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed; and by whom all\nthis is stretched out' (Bha. G\u00ee. XVIII, 46); 'Let a man meditate on\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana, the divine one, at all works, such as bathing and the like; he\nwill then reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' (Daksha-\nsmriti); and 'Those men with whom, intent on their duties, thou art\npleased, O Lord, they pass beyond all this M\u00e2ya and find Release for\ntheir souls' (Vi. Pu.). Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smritis\nhave a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming at final\nRelease but) bringing about certain results included in transmigratory\nexistence, whether here on earth or in a heavenly world; for the\nessential character of those works also is to please the highest Person.\nAs is said in the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2 (IX, 23, 24); 'Even they who devoted to\nother gods worship them with faith, worship me, against ordinance. For I\nam the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in\ntruth and hence they fall,' and 'Thou art ever worshipped by me with\nsacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of pitris and of gods, enjoyest\nall the offerings made to either.' Nor finally can we admit the\ncontention that it is rational to interpret the Ved\u00e1nta-texts in\naccordance with Kapila's Smriti because Kapila, in the Svet\u00e2svatara text,\nis referred to as a competent person. For from this it would follow that,\nas Brihaspati is, in Sruti and Smriti, mentioned as a pattern of\nconsummate wisdom, Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the\nopenly materialistic and atheistic Smriti composed by that authority.\nBut, it may here be said, the Ved\u00e2nta-texts should after all be\ninterpreted in agreement with Kapila's Smriti, for the reason that\nKapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga)\narrived at an insight into truth.--To this objection the next S\u00fbtra\nreplies.\n\n\n\n\n2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth on the part) of others.\n\nThe 'and' in the S\u00fbtra has the force of 'but,' being meant to dispel the\ndoubt raised. There are many other authors of Smritis, such as Manu, who\nthrough the power of their meditation had attained insight into the\nhighest truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the purport\nof their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world ('whatever\nManu said that was medicine'). Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in\nthe way of Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts\nScripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be used to modify\nthe sense of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts.--Here finishes the adhikarana treating\nof 'Smriti.'\n\n\n\n\n3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.\n\nBy the above refutation of Kapila's Smriti the Yoga-smriti also is\nrefuted.--But a question arises, What further doubt arises here with\nregard to the Yoga system, so as to render needful the formal extension\nto the Yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the S\u00e2nkhya?--\nIt might appear, we reply, that the Ved\u00e2nta should be supported by the\nYoga-smriti, firstly, because the latter admits the existence of a Lord;\nsecondly, because the Ved\u00e2nta-texts mention Yoga as a means to bring\nabout final Release; and thirdly, because Hiranyagarbha, who proclaimed\nthe Yoga-smriti is qualified for the promulgation of all Ved\u00e2nta-texts.--\nBut these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the\nYoga holds the Pradh\u00e2na, which is independent of Brahman, to be the\ngeneral material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere\noperative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which\nYoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation,\nand as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does\nnot have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the\nworld nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to\nBrahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point,\nHiranyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be\noverpowered by the inferior gunas, i.e. passion and darkness; and hence\nthe Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Pur\u00e2nas,\npromulgated by him, which are founded on rajas and tamas. The Yoga\ncannot, therefore, be used for the support of the Ved\u00e2nta.--Here\nfinishes the adhikarana of 'the refutation of the Yoga.'\n\n\n\n\n4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that; and its being\nsuch (appears) from Scripture.\n\nThe same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and\nSmriti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smriti but) on\nsimple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an\neffect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the\nS\u00e2nkhya Smriti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason.\nPerception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its\nsentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure\nnature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain\nfor its very essence; and such a world totally differs in nature from\nthe Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of\nsupreme lordly power, antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken\nuniform blessedness. This difference in character of the world from\nBrahman is, moreover, not only known through Perception, and so on, but\nis seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself; compare 'Knowledge\nand non-knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); 'Thus are these objects placed\non the subjects, and the subjects on the pr\u00e2na' (Kau. Up. III, 9); 'On\nthe same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own\nimpotence' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound\nbecause he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); and so on; all which texts\nrefer to the effect, i.e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the\nessence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-\ndifferent in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are\nnon-different in character from their material causes--clay and gold.\nThe world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it\ndiffers in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the\nS\u00e2nkhya Smriti, the Pradh\u00e2na which resembles the actual world in\ncharacter must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although\nnot dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects,\nmust all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the\ndifferent means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a\ndecisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by\ntarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which\nin the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either\ninto the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary)\nfactors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the\nspecial details of the matter under consideration: this kind of\ncognitional activity is also called \u00fbha. All means of knowledge equally\nstand in need of tarka; Scripture however, the authoritative character\nof which specially depends on expectancy (\u00e2k\u00e2nksh\u00e2), proximity\n(sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyat\u00e2), throughout requires to be\nassisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says,'He who\ninvestigates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and\nnone other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of the sense of\nScripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain\ntopics such as the Self must be 'reflected on' (mantavya).--Now here it\nmight possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to\nbe the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence\nexists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way\nas the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is\nin the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of\njars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists; and\nit is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of\nintelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent\nbeings depends.--But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of\nintelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes\nthe hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the\npower, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a\nthing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect\nis never and nowhere _seen_ to be produced by it, you may as well\nproclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess\neminent procreative power! Moreover, to prove at first from the Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this\nthat pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom\nthe existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on the other\nhand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom\nthat the Ved\u00e2nta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the\nworld, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause\nand effect should exist between things different in character is just\nwhat cannot be proved.--What sameness of character, again, of causal\nsubstance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the\nabsence of such sameness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be\nthe material cause of the world? It cannot be complete sameness of all\nattributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which\nafter all requires _some_ difference) could not be established. For we\ndo not observe that in pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump\nof clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to\nthe causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there\nshould be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is\nactually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which\nhave the attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of the case\nrather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and\na cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the\ncausal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its\neffects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish\ngold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold-\nbracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and\nthe world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic\nto all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the\nworld's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman\ncannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world.\n\nBut, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different\nessential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause\nand effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails,\nteeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things; the sentient scorpion\nsprings from non-sentient dung; and non-sentient threads proceed from\nthe sentient spider.--This objection, we reply, is not valid; for in the\ninstances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non-\nsentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the\nbody which produces nails, &c.).\n\nBut, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many\nplaces that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess\nintelligence; compare 'to him the earth said'; 'the water desired'; 'the\npr\u00e2nas quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence\nwent to Brahman.' And the writers of the Pur\u00e2nas ako attribute\nconsciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after\nall no essential difference in nature between sentient and so-called non-\nsentient beings.--To this objection the P\u00fbrvapakshin replies in the next\nS\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account\nof distinction and entering.\n\nThe word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts\nsuch as 'to him the earth said,' the terms 'earth' and so on, denote the\ndivinities presiding over earth and the rest.--How is this known?--'\nThrough distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by\nthe distinctive term 'divinities'; so e.g. 'Let me enter into those\nthree divinities' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are\ncalled divinities; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with\neach other as to pre-eminence,' and 'all these divinities having\nrecognised pre-eminence in pr\u00e2na.' The 'entering' of the S\u00fbtra refers to\nAit. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered into the mouth;\nAditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c., where the text\ndeclares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs\nas their superintendents.\n\nWe therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non-\nintelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman,\ncannot be the effect of Brahman; and that therefore, in agreement with\nSmriti confirmed by reasoning, the Ved\u00e2nta-texts must be held to teach\nthat the Pradh\u00e2na is the universal material cause. This prim\u00e2 facie view\nis met by the following S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n6. But it is seen.\n\nThe 'but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the present S\u00fbtra).\nThe assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world\nbecause the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded;\nsince it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature\nstand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is\nobserved that from honey and similar substances there originate worms\nand other little animals.--But it has been said above that in those\ncases there is sameness of nature, in so far as the relation of cause\nand effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both!--\nThis assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that\nequality of character between cause and effect which you have in view.\nFor, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in\nsome point or other only it would follow that, as all things have\ncertain characteristics in common, anything might originate from\nanything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for\nthe relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in\nthe effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause\nfrom other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not\nhold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from\nhoney and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the\nworld also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate\nfrom the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey,\nscorpions from dung, &c., we do _not_ observe--what indeed we _do_\nobserve in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made\nof gold--that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal\nsubstance from other things persist in the effects also.\n\n\n\n\n7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing; we say no, there\nbeing a mere denial.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature\nfrom the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are\nseparate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i.\ne. Brahman; and this again implies that the world originates from what\nhas no existence!--Not so, we reply. For what the preceding S\u00fbtra has\nlaid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause\nand effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the\neffect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We\nby no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so\nas to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For\nsuch is the case with the honey and the worms also. There is difference\nof characteristics, but--as in the case of gold and golden bracelets--\nthere is oneness of substance.--An objection is raised.\n\n\n\n\n8. On account of such consequences in reabsorption (the Ved\u00e2nta-texts\nwould be) inappropriate.\n\nThe term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of\nBrahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on--among which it is the first\nas appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states\n'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'The Self only was this in the\nbeginning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of\ncause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the world all being\nin Brahman, the different states of the world would connect themselves\nwith Brahman, and the latter would thus be affected by all the\nimperfections of its effect; in the same way as all the attributes of\nthe bracelet are present in the gold also. And the undesirable\nconsequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated\nin different Ved\u00e2nta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the\nsame substance; cp. 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'Free\nfrom sin, free from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Of him\nthere is known neither cause nor effect' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of these\ntwo one eats the sweet fruit' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self that is not a\nLord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); 'On account of\nhis impotence he laments, bewildered' (Svet. Up. IV, 7).--Nor can we\naccept the explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its\neffected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body;\nand as all imperfections inhere in that body only, they do not touch\nBrahman in either its causal or effected state. For it is not possible\nthat the world and Brahman should stand to each other in the relation of\neffect and cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to\nconnexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. It is not, we\nsay, possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together\nshould constitute the body of Brahman. For a body is a particular\naggregate of earth and the other elements, depending for its subsistence\non vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an abode to\nthe sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain\nretributive of former works: such is in Vedic and worldly speech the\nsense connected with the term 'body.' But numerous Vedic texts--'Free\nfrom sin, from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1); 'Without eating the\nother one looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'Grasping without hands, hasting\nwithout feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' (Svet. Up.\nIII, 19); 'Without breath, without mind' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)--declare\nthat the highest Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its\nfruits, is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, and has\nno life dependent on breath: whence it follows that he cannot have a\nbody constituted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings. Nor can\neither non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as grass,\ntrees, &c., or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state\nbe viewed as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot\nconstitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle state combined\ninto earth and the other gross elements (which again would be required\nfor a body). And sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are\nof course incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute a\nbody. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the\nabode of fruition, and that Brahman may possess a body in this latter\nsense; for there are abodes of fruition, such as palaces and the like,\nwhich are not considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the\nlast definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly\nabiding in which a being enjoys pain and pleasure; for if a soul enters\na body other than its own, that body is indeed the abode in which it\nenjoys the pains and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted\nto be in the proper sense of the word the _body_ of the soul thus\nentered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, who is in the\nenjoyment of self-established supreme bliss, it can in no way be\nmaintained that he must be joined to a body, consisting of all sentient\nand non-sentient beings, for the purpose of enjoyment.--That view also\naccording to which a 'body' means no more than a _means_ of enjoyment is\nrefuted hereby.\n\nYou will now possibly try another definition, viz. that the body of a\nbeing is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of\nwhich depend on the will of that being, and that hence a body may be\nascribed to the Lord in so far as the essential nature, subsistence, and\nactivity of all depend on him.--But this also is objectionable; since in\nthe first place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on\nthe will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further, an\ninjured body does not obey in its movements the will of its possessor;\nand since the persistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul\nthat tenanted it. Dancing puppets and the like, on the other hand, are\nthings the nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the will\nof intelligent beings, but we do not on that account consider them to be\nthe bodies of those beings. As, moreover, the nature of an eternal\nintelligent soul does not depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be\nits body under the present definition.--Nor again can it be said that\nthe body of a being is constituted by that which is exclusively ruled\nand supported by that being and stands towards it in an exclusive\nsubservient relation (sesha); for this definition would include actions\nalso. And finally it is a fact that several texts definitely declare\nthat the Lord is without a body, 'Without hands and feet he grasps and\nhastens' &c.\n\nAs thus the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between\nBrahman and the world, and as if it did subsist, all the imperfections\nof the world would cling to Brahman; the Ved\u00e2nta--texts are wrong in\nteaching that Brahman is the material cause of the world.\n\nTo this prim\u00e2 facie view the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.\n\nThe teaching of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts is not inappropriate, since there are\ninstances of good and bad qualities being separate in the case of one\nthing connected with two different states. The 'but' in the S\u00fbtra\nindicates the impossibility of Brahman being connected with even a\nshadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows. As Brahman has all\nsentient and non-sentient things for its body, and constitutes the Self\nof that body, there is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being\nconnected with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential\ncharacteristics of which are expansion on the one hand and contraction\non the other; for this expansion and contraction belong (not to Brahman\nitself, but) to the sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections\nadhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good qualities\nbelonging to the Self do not extend to the body; in the same way as\nyouth, childhood, and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings,\nsuch as gods or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self;\nwhile knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self only,\nnot to the body. On this understanding there is no objection to\nexpressions such as 'he is born as a god or as a man' and 'the same\nperson is a child, and then a youth, and then an old man' That the\ncharacter of a god or man belongs to the individual soul only in so far\nas it has a body, will be shown under III, 1, 1.\n\nThe assertion made by the P\u00fbrvapakshin as to the impossibility of the\nworld, comprising matter and souls and being either in its subtle or its\ngross condition, standing to Brahman in the relation of a body, we\ndeclare to be the vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing\nfrom the idle fancies of persons who have never fully considered the\nmeaning of the whole body of Ved\u00e2nta-texts as supported by legitimate\nargumentation. For as a matter of fact all Ved\u00e2nta-texts distinctly\ndeclare that the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual,\nstands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare e.g.the\nantary\u00e2min-br\u00e2hmana, in the K\u00e2nva as well as the M\u00e2dhyandina-text, where\nit is said first of non-sentient things ('he who dwells within the earth,\nwhose body the earth is' &c.), and afterwards separately of the\nintelligent soul ('he who dwells in understanding,' according to the\nK\u00e2nvas; 'he who dwells within the Self,' according to the M\u00e2dhyandinas)\nthat they constitute the body of the highest Self. Similarly the Sub\u00e2la-\nUpanishad declares that matter and souls in all their states constitute\nthe body of the highest Self ('He who dwells within the earth' &c.), and\nconcludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those beings ('He\nis the inner Self of all' &c.). Similarly Smriti, 'The whole world is\nthy body'; 'Water is the body of Vishnu'; 'All this is the body of Hari';\n'All these things are his body'; 'He having reflected sent forth from\nhis body'--where the 'body' means the elements in their subtle state. In\nordinary language the word 'body' is not, like words such as _jar_,\nlimited in its denotation to things of one definite make or character,\nbut is observed to be applied directly (not only secondarily or\nmetaphorically) to things of altogether different make and\ncharacteristics--such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed\nanimals, and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition of the\nword that is in agreement with general use. The definitions given by the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin--'a body is that which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of\nactions' &c.--do not fulfil this requirement; for they do not take in\nsuch things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be the body\nof the Lord. And further they do not take in those bodily forms which\nthe Lord assumes according to his wish, nor the bodily forms released\nsouls may assume, according to 'He is one' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 36, 2); for\nnone of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the results of\nactions. And further, the bodily forms which the Supreme Person assumes\nat wish are not special combinations of earth and the other elements;\nfor Smriti says, 'The body of that highest Self is not made from a\ncombination of the elements.' It thus appears that it is also too narrow\na definition to say that a body is a combination of the different\nelements. Again, to say that a body is that, the life of which depends\non the vital breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz\nin respect of plants; for although vital air is present in plants, it\ndoes not in them support the body by appearing in five special forms.\nNor again does it answer to define a body as either the abode of the\nsense-organs or as the cause of pleasure and pain; for neither of these\ndefinitions takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on\nAhaly\u00e2 and other persons in accordance with their deeds. We are thus led\nto adopt the following definition--Any substance which a sentient soul\nis capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes,\nand which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the\nbody of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed, &c.,\ncontrol and so on are not actually perceived because the power of\ncontrol, although existing, is obstructed; in the same way as, owing to\nsome obstruction, the powers of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually\nperceived. A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment in which\nthe soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved shortly after; it\n(thus strictly speaking is not a body at all but) is spoken of as a body\nbecause it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously\nconstituted a body. In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient\nbeings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are\ncompletely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are\nabsolutely subordinate to him. Texts which speak of the highest Self as\n'bodiless among bodies' (e.g. Ka. Up. I. 2, 22), only mean to deny of\nthe Self a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture declares\nthat the Universe is his body. This point will be fully established in\nsubsequent adhikaranas also. The two preceding S\u00fbtras (8 and 9) merely\nsuggest the matter proved in the adhikarana beginning with II, 1, 21.\n\n\n\n\n10. And on account of the objections to his view.\n\nThe theory of Brahman being the universal cause has to be accepted not\nonly because it is itself free from objections, but also because the\npradh\u00e2na theory is open to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For\non this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted\nfor. The S\u00e2nkhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to\nPrakriti the attributes of the latter are fictitiously superimposed upon\nthe soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free\nfrom all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the\nempirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of\nthat approximation or nearness of Prakriti which causes the\nsuperimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakriti.\nDoes that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakriti or some change\nin Prakriti? or does it mean some change in the soul?--Not the latter;\nfor the soul is assumed to be incapable of change.--Nor again a change\nin Prakriti; for changes in Prakriti are supposed, in the system, to be\nthe effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And\nif, finally, the nearness of Prakriti means no more than its existence,\nit follows that even the released soul would be liable to that\nsuperimposition (for Prakriti exists always).--The S\u00e2nkhya is thus\nunable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This\nsame point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special\nrefutation of the S\u00e2nkhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)\n\n\n\n\n11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.\n\nThe theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause\nmust be accepted, and the theory of the Pradh\u00e2na must be abandoned,\nbecause all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved\nby the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kan\u00e2da, Akshap\u00e2da,\nJina, Kapila and Pata\u00f1jali respectively are all mutually contradictory.\n\n\n\n\n12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different\nway; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is\nnot got rid of.\n\nLet us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth\nby Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the\nsame we may arrive at the Pradh\u00e2na theory through other lines of\nreasoning by which the objections raised against the theory are refuted.--\nBut, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests\nexclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other\ntime or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more\nskilful than you in reasoning; and thus there is no getting over the\nobjection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The\nconclusion from all this is that, with regard to supersensuous matters,\nScripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied\nonly to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, 'He\nwho supports the teaching of the Rishis and the doctrine as to sacred\nduty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows\nsacred duty' (Manu XII, 106). The teaching of the S\u00e2nkhyas which\nconflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of\nconfirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda.--Here finishes the\nsection treating of 'difference of nature.'\n\n\n\n\n13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised\n(within the Veda) are explained.\n\nNot comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised\nwithin (countenanced by) the Veda. The S\u00fbtra means to say that by the\ndemolition given above of the S\u00e2nkhya doctrine which is not comprised\nwithin the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position,\nviz. the theories of Kan\u00e2da, Akshap\u00e2da, Jina, and Buddha, must likewise\nbe considered as demolished.\n\nHere, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that,\nsince all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the\ngeneral cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal\nsubstance is ill-founded.--They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that\nextent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and\nthey are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms\nwhich by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or\nnon-void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence,\nbeing either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the\nreverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those\ntheories to be ill-founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.--Here\nfinishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non-comprised (within\nthe Veda).'\n\n\n\n\n14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows\nnon-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul); we reply--it may\nbe as in ordinary life.\n\nThe S\u00e2nkhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he\nsays, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an\neffect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings\nin either their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the\ndifference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such\ndifference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes\nan enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing\na body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to\nembodiedness, no less than the individual soul does.--But we have, under\nI, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lord's being liable to experiences of\npleasure and pain!--By no means! There you have shown only that the\nLord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the\nobject of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure\nand pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like\nan individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that,\nlike that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we\nobserve that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in\nthe changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c., yet\nexperience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal\ncondition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this\nScripture says, 'As long as he possesses a body there is for him no\nescape from pleasure and pain; but when he is free of the body then\nneither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus,\nthe theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does\nnot allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual\nsoul; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely\nhomogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode\nof all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a\nlump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing\nfashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradh\u00e2na being\nthe general cause is the more valid one.\n\nTo this objection the S\u00fbtra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in\nordinary life.' The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and\nthe individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences\npleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due\nto the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form\nof good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers\nto that body only which is originated by karman; for other texts ('He is\nonefold, he is threefold'; 'If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He\nmoves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII,\n2, 1; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage\nof karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a\nshadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which\nis essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its\ngross and its subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected\nwith karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind.--'As in\nordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either\nobserve or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or\npain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does\nnot follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he\nhimself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or\ntransgression of his commands. The author of the Dramida-bh\u00e2shya gives\nexpression to the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although\nstaying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of\ndiscomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his\nbody being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort,\nrules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all\npossible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the Lord of\ncreation, to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were, is\nnot touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of\nBrahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy\nall possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should undergo\nchanges like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts\ndeclare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection.--Others\ngive a different explanation of this S\u00fbtra. According to them it refutes\nthe p\u00fbrvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the\ndistinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be\naccounted for--proving the possibility of such distinction by means of\nthe analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But\nthis interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that\ncreation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or\na limiting adjunct (up\u00e2dhi) no such prim\u00e2 facie view can arise. For on\ntheir theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the\npower or Nescience or up\u00e2dhi inhering in the causal substance, and the\npower or Nescience or up\u00e2dhi is the object of enjoyment; and as the two\nare of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view\nof Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that prim\u00e2\nfacie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those\nphilosophers; for S\u00fbtra II, 1, 35 teaches that the individual souls and\ntheir deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the\ndistinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal).\nBut even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt\nas to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not\narise; for the distinction of the two groups will, on that view, be\nanalogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the\none substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of\nthe one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a\nchange there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman\n(which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to\ntransform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient)\nobjects of enjoyment.\n\n\n\n\n15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows\nfrom what begins with the word \u00e2rambhana.\n\nUnder II, 1, 7 and other S\u00fbtras the non-difference of the effect, i.e.\nthe world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this\nbasis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded.\nThe present S\u00fbtra now raises a prim\u00e2 facie objection against that very\nnon-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.\n\nOn the point in question the school of Kan\u00e2da argues as follows. It is\nin no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the\ncause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas: the\nideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of\ncloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the\nsame kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument; nobody\napplies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth,' or vice vers\u00e2. A\nthird argument rests on the difference of effects: water is not fetched\nfrom the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There,\nfourthly, is the difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the\neffect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the cause\nhas the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly\nwith a broad basis; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we\nsay 'The jar has gone to pieces.' There, sixthly, is a numerical\ndifference: the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the\nseventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing\nagent (which would result from cause and effect being identical); for if\nthe effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the\nactivity of the agent?--Let us then say that, although the effect _exists_\n(at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful\ntowards the effect.--But in that case the activity of the agent would\nhave to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything\nwould exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and\nnon-eternal things!--Let us then say that the effect, although always\nexisting, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the\nactivity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be purposeless,\nand there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!--\nThis view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another\nmanifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a _regressus in\ninfinitum_. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another\nmanifestation (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is\neternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation\nis said to originate, we lapse into the asatk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da (according to\nwhich the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if\nthe activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that\nthe activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar\nthings. For things which admittedly possess manifesting power, such as\nlamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular\nobjects to be manifested by them: we do not see that a lamp lit for\nshowing a jar does _not_ at the same time manifest waterpots and other\nthings. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in\nso far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which\npreviously did _not_ exist; and thus the theory of the previous\nexistence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite\ncauses having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects; clay\ne.g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can\nbecome an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the\nhypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (determining the\ndefinite effect which will result from the cause).\n\nBut, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the\nprevious non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the\nactivity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence\nbefore it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to\noperate elsewhere than on the effect; and as this 'elsewhere' comprises\nwithout distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's\nactivity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also (not\nonly to cloth).--Not so, the Vaiseshika replies. Activity applied to a\ncertain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which\ninheres in that cause.\n\nNow, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is\nnon-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as\nan effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical\nthought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the\ncausal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things\nsuch as jars, the so-called effect, i.e. the jar or pot, rests\naltogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars,\nwaterpots, &c., viewed as different from their causal substance, viz.\nclay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on\nempirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal; while\nthe causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the\nentire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i.e. Brahman\nwhich is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on\nthe empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while\nreality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows\nthat there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause; the\neffect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our\ntheory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver\nerroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-\nreality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while\nthe non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved; for as a matter of\nfact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of\njars, viz. clay, only that is real while the reality of everything apart\nfrom clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that\nreasoning rests, we reply--on the fact that the clay only is continuous,\npermanent, while everything different from it is discontinuous, non-\npermanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the\ncontinuously existing rope only--which forms the substrate of the\nimagined snake--is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which\nis non-continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the permanently\nenduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous\neffects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is\nreal, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as\ne.g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected\nthing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to\ndestruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that\nwhich is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is\nfalse, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the\nanirvakan\u00eeyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see\nabove, p. 102 ff.).--We further ask, 'Is a causal substance, such as\nclay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it\npassed over into some special modified condition?' The former\nalternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the\ncause originates effects at all times; and the latter must equally be\nrejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state\nwould oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different\nstate (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one,\n&c., so that a _regressus in infinitum_ would result.--Let it then be\nsaid that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed\nunchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place\n(this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect).--But this\nalso we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal\nsubstance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed\ncondition; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again.--\nNor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk\nfrom clay, gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived; that this\nperception is not sublated with regard to time and place--while, on the\nother hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated--and\nthat hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that\nthe effect _does_ originate from the cause. For this argumentation does\nnot stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the\nmere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-ornament? or is it the\ngold coins (used for making ornaments) which originate? or is it the\ngold, as forming the substrate of the coins [FOOTNOTE 434:1]? The mere\ngold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no\neffect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could\napply itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity\nwith regard to itself.--But, an objection is raised, the svastika-\nornament is perceived as different from the gold!--It is not, we reply,\ndifferent from the gold; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other\nthing but gold is perceived.--But the existence of another thing is\nproved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word,\nand so on!--By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which\nhave reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no\nless than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence\nhave no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the\nsecond place, is the _gold coin_ originative of the svastika-ornament;\nfor we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the\nthreads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated\nby the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin; for the gold\nin so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the\nsvastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their\ncausal substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the\nentire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal; for\nit also is an effect.\n\nIn order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything\napart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption\nof things such as clay, gold, &c., being real, and have thereby proved\nthe non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal\nsubstances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are;\nfor they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.\n\n'In that all this has its Self; it is the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7);\n'There is here no plurality; from death to death goes he who sees here\nplurality as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'For where there is duality\nas it were, there one sees another; but when for him the Self only has\nbecome all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see?' (Bri. Up.\nII, 4, 13); 'Indra goes manifold by means of his m\u00e2y\u00e2s' (Bri. Up. II, 5,\n19);--these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different\nfrom Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated\nby Scripture can be in conflict with Perception; for in the way set\nforth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception\nreally has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if\nthere is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture,\nto which no imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final\nposition among the means of knowledge; and which, although dependent on\nPerception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of\nwords, yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it\nfollows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is\nunreal.\n\nNor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the\nfalsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-\nreal. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls:\nBrahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all\nliving bodies; as we know from many texts: 'Having entered into them\nwith this living Self (Ch. Up. VI, 3); 'The one god hidden within all\nbeings' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'The one god entered in many places'; 'That\nSelf hidden in all beings does not shine forth' (Ka. Up. I, 3,12);\n'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.--But\nif you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living\nbodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect\nthe consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation\naffecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and\nthat there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released\nsouls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant,\nand so on.\n\nNow, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non-duality of Brahman\ngive the following explanation. The many individual souls are the\nreflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and\nso on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on\nwhich the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the\nsame way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in\nmirrors, crystals, sword-blades, &c., remain distinct owing to their\nlimiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another\nlarge, one being bright, another dim, and so on.--But you have said that\nscriptural texts such as 'Having entered with this living Self show that\nthe souls are not different from Brahman!--They are indeed not different\nin reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an\nimagined difference.--To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to\nBrahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no\nroom for imagination of any kind! Nor also to the individual souls; for\nthis would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul\ndepending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul! Not\nso, the advaita-v\u00e2din replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the\nexistence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain; their\nrelation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual\ndependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the\ncase of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, the very\nnature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be\nestablished, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a\nwhole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of\na magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different\nfrom Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they\nare liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts--in the same\nway as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the\ndimness of the mirror--they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may\nbe viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the\nreflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error;\nfor otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release.\nAnd as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the\nquestion as to its cause is not to be raised.\n\nThis, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the\ntrue nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the\nadmiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality.\nFor if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of\nNescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously\nimagined, form; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience.\nIf, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is\nthe soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in\nit, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (jada) is the abode of\nNescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge\na third aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which is pure\nintelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on\nBrahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the\nabode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature\nbeing however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect; we must\nnegative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous\nnature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience.\nThe soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience,\nand you therefore define nothing.--Moreover, the theory of Nescience\nabiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of\nestablishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it\nreally is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood\nthe destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains\nRelease and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be\nreleased.--But Nescience persists because other souls are not released!--\nWell then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not\ndestroyed!--But we assume a different Nescience for each soul; that soul\nwhose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience\nis not destroyed will remain in Bondage!--You now argue on the\nassumption of a special avidy\u00e2 for each soul. But what about the\ndistinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to\nthe nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former\nalternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is\npure, non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alternative the\nassumption of avidy\u00e2 to account for the distinction of souls would be\npurposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives\narise--Does this avidy\u00e2 which gives rise to the fictitious distinction\nof souls belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?--If you say 'to\nBrahman', your view coincides with mine.--Well then, 'to the souls'!--\nBut have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the\npurpose of accounting for the distinction of souls?--Let us then view\nthe matter as follows--those several avidy\u00e2s which are assumed for the\npurpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to\nthose same avidy\u00e2s the distinction of souls is due.--But here you reason\nin a manifest circle: the avidy\u00e2s are established on the basis of the\ndistinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when\nthe avidy\u00e2s are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and\nsprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and\nplants each several seed gives rise to a different plant; while in the\ncase under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing\nthe several avidy\u00e2s on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to\nbe due to those avidy\u00e2s. And if you attempt to give to the argument a\nsomewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidy\u00e2s abiding\nin the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we\npoint out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and\nmoreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences\nof deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The\nsame reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which\neffects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the\navidy\u00e2s abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a\nbeginningless flow of avidy\u00e2s, it follows that there is also a\nbeginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those\navidy\u00e2s, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is\nsupposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be\nestablished. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something\nunreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such\ndefects as mutual dependence which touch real things only; we remark\nthat in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the\nhighest Brahman itself.--But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has\nfor its essence pure cognition!--Is Nescience then to be dealt with by\nrational arguments? If so, it will follow that, on account of the\narguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not\ncling to the individual souls. We further put the following question--\nWhen the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to\nthe rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or\ndoes it not perish? In the former case Release is nothing else but\ndestruction of the essential nature of the soul; in the latter case the\nsoul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since\nit continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.--You have further\nmaintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits\nof being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and\nso on, of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors,\ncrystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point\nrequires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and\nother imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.)\npass away?--When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass\naway!--Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of\nthose imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by\nanalogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from\nthis it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected\nimage is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the\nsoul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.--\nConsider the following point also. The destruction of a non-advantageous\n(apurush\u00e2rtha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that\ndisadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman--which\ncorresponds to the thing reflected--that is conscious of the\nimperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which\ncorresponds to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the two\nformer alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and\nthe soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on\nthe other--on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not\nhold good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is\nconscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts; for neither of the\ntwo is a being capable of consciousness. And, moreover, Brahman's being\nconscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience.\nAnd the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other\nknowing subject _but_ Brahman and the soul.--It would, moreover, be\nnecessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka)\nwith regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience\nitself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be\nthe soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved\nbeing presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the\nexistence of the soul is that which _is formed_ by Nescience, just as\nshell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the\nfictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is\nthe abode of Nescience.--If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of\nNescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of)\nthe individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman\nshould give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares,\nis preceded by 'seeing' on his part, and to the differentiation of names\nand forms. If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely\nhomogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience;\nand thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.\n\nFor similar reasons the theory of the distinction of M\u00e2ya and Nescience\nmust also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses M\u00e2y\u00e2, i.e.\nillusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And\nwithout being conscious of others the lord of M\u00e2y\u00e2 is unable to delude\nthem by his M\u00e2y\u00e2; and M\u00e2y\u00e2 herself cannot bring about the consciousness\nof others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude\nothers, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.--\nPerhaps you will say that the M\u00e2y\u00e2 of Brahman causes him to be conscious\nof souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion.\nBut if M\u00e2y\u00e2 causes Brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated\nintelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements--\nto become conscious of other beings, then M\u00e2y\u00e2 is nothing but another\nname for Nescience.--Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of\nthe cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, M\u00e2y\u00e2\nwhich presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and\nthus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is _not_\navidy\u00e2.--But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is\nknown, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be\nnothing else but avidy\u00e2. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings\napart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none\nbut a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!--\nLet us then define avidy\u00e2 as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of\nunreal things. M\u00e2y\u00e2 then, as not being the cause of such a\ndisadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of\navidy\u00e2!--But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the\nmoon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not\ndisadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidy\u00e2; and if, on\nthe other hand, M\u00e2y\u00e2 which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it\npresents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of\ndisadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would\nbe permanently connected with Brahman's nature.--Well, if it were so,\nwhat harm would there be?--The harm would be that such a view implies\nthe theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts\ninculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were,\n&c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should\nhe see, and whom should he see?'--But those texts set forth the Real;\nM\u00e2y\u00e2 on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency\nis not in real conflict with the texts!--Brahman, we reply, has for its\nessential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or\naffected with, unreal M\u00e2y\u00e2, without avidy\u00e2. Of what use, we further ask,\nshould an eternal non-real M\u00e2y\u00e2 be to Brahman?--Brahman by means of it\ndeludes the individual souls!--But of what use should such delusion be\nto Brahman?--It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!--But of what\nuse is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?--Do we not then\nsee in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full\nhappiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?--The cases are\nnot parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind\nwould take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements\nunreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself,\nunreal of such a play!--The arguments set forth previously also prove\nthe impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul\nconsidered as the abode of avidy\u00e2, apart from Brahman considered as the\nabode of M\u00e2y\u00e2.\n\nWe thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of\nBrahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with\nbeginningless avidy\u00e2, and owing to this avidy\u00e2 is conscious of plurality\nwithin itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of\navidy\u00e2 belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the\ndistinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman\naffected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that\nNescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true\nexistence: the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of\nteachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such\nfiction can be explained by means of the avidy\u00e2 of one intelligent being.\nThe case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and\npupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are\nfictitiously shaped out of the avidy\u00e2 of the one dreaming subject. For\nthe same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many\navidy\u00e2s. For those also who hold that avidy\u00e2 belongs to the individual\nsouls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of\none's own self and other persons, is real; and if it is unreal it can be\naccounted for by the avidy\u00e2 of one subject. This admits of being stated\nin various technical ways.--The distinctions of bondage and of one's own\nself and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidy\u00e2; for\nthey are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.--Other\nbodies also have a Self through me only; for they are bodies like this\nmy body.--Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidy\u00e2; for\nthey are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations,\nas this my body is.--The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing\nbut _me_; for they are of intelligent nature; what is _not me_ is seen\nto be of non-intelligent nature; as e.g. jars.--It thus follows that the\ndistinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and\nreleased, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by\nthe avidy\u00e2 of one intelligent subject.\n\nThe fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not able to account\nfor the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an\ninfinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should\nattain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained\nrelease; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be\nrationally accounted for.--But the souls are 'infinite'; this accounts\nfor there being souls not yet released!--What, pray, do you understand\nby this 'infinity' of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted?\nThis we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not\nbe able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord\nsurely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is\nnot all-knowing.--But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's\nnot knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that\nhe is not all-knowing!--Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely\nseparate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a\nnumber, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen\nvessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it\nmoreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-\nintelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further\nfollows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we\nunderstand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds\nthat there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is\nconsidered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said\nto be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means\nnothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is\nsubstantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and\nspatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things\nwhich differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially\nlimited--such as earthen vessels, and so on--which are also limited in\npoint of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including\nBrahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space\nand time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural\ntexts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever\n('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and similar texts), and\nmoreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to\norigination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else\nbut a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so\non.\n\nThe dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to\nour doctrine that this entire world, from Brahm\u00e2 down to a blade of\ngrass, springs from the avidy\u00e2 attached to Brahman which in itself is\nabsolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of\npleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from\nthe fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the\ndistinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman,\nwhose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous\nelements, owing to the influence of avidy\u00e2 illusorily manifests itself\n(vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there\nexists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world\nis 'non-different' from Brahman.\n\nTo this the Dvaitav\u00e2din, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The\ndoctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-\nilluminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidy\u00e2 and hence sees\nplurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of\nright knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e.\ncessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of\nBrahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded.\nThis and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the\nhypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin.\nNor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their\ncauses are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the\neffect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no\nvalid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real\nbecause it persists, while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and\nwaterpots--are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that\nthe fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not\nsublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any\nsoundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing\nto its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined\neither as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being\nperishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-\npermanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it\nis sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with\nreference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is\nperceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and\ntime _other_ than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves\nonly that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time,\nbut not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form,\nviz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not\nsublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self\nis.--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot\noriginate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect\nmay originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring\nconditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the\nassertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter\ninto connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the\ncause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.--\nBut from this it follows that the cause must have been previously\nconnected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally\nunmodified!--Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions\nof time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other\ncause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault\nthen can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a\nspecial state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c.,\nproducing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause\npossesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency\nis actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.--Further\nthere is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot\nbelong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined\ngold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the\nlike; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected\nwith the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess\noriginative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect\ndifferent from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the\nsvastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence\nof different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different\nthings. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of\nshell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is\nperceived during the whole period intervening between its origination\nand destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that\ntime and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that\nperception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived\nsvastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to\nthe fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and\nhence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the\nreality of the effect.--And the attempts to prove the unreality of the\nworld by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a\nprevious part of this work.\n\nWe further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on\nall bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this\nit would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and\npleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and\nothers, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is\nconscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again\nmust you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of\nall pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos,\nwhich are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs;\nfor the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego.\nThe organ of egoity (ahamk\u00e2ra), on the other hand, which is the same as\nthe internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it\nis of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body\nand the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.--Nor is there\nany proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from\nthe avidy\u00e2 of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent,\neffects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of\navidy\u00e2 is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of\nproof must be held to be real.--Nor again can you uphold the assertion\nthat all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we\nobserve that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-\nintelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of\nintelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among\nthem, of pleasures and pains.--You have further maintained 'Through me\nonly all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious\ncreations of _my_ avidy\u00e2; _I_ alone constitute the whole aggregate of\nintelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have\nattempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but\nthe random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of\nhis own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure\nintelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is\naltogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different\nfrom pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all\neffort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless,\nfor the Veda also is the effect of avidy\u00e2, and the effort spent on it\ntherefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver\nwrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of\nview, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the\neffect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence.\nKnowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end\nto bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious\nproduct of avidy\u00e2; or because it is itself of the nature of avidy\u00e2; or\nbecause it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of\navidy\u00e2; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends\non teachers who are the mere creatures of avidy\u00e2; it is thus no better\nthan knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end\nto, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again\nfrom a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-\ndifferenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by\nknowledge, which is the effect of avidy\u00e2; or since it is to be attained\nby knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidy\u00e2;\nor because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of\navidy\u00e2. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false;\nas e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata\nMorgana).\n\nNor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence,\nshine forth by itself, so as not to need--for its cognition--other means\nof knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to\nbe borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of\nparticular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular\ncognising subjects--this also has been proved previously. And the\ndifferent arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-\ndifferenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just\nnow as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidy\u00e2.\n\nNor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-\ndifferenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidy\u00e2, and implicates itself in\nthe error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide\nonly in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general.\nNor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess\nillumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light\n(enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established\nknowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to\nsome particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove\nthe self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non-\ndifferenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and\nobject such 'svayamprak\u00e2sat\u00e2' could not possibly belong. With regard\nagain to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real\neffects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that\nalthough you allow to such effects, being non-sublatcd as it were, a\nkind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'--vy\u00e2vah\u00e2rika),\nyou yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but\nproducts of avidy\u00e2; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on\nthe other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving\nthat in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may\nyou plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by\nScripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and\nhence of the essence of avidy\u00e2, it is in no better case than the\ninstances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to\nbe attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when\nonce attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this\nreasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that\nsome principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis,\nthe fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that\nprinciple is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a\nuniversal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning\nleading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we\nare not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover,\nfor texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge,\nbliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the\nground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from\nmere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts\n(which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise\nand say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the\nprinciple of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus\nsublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than\nthe texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the\nVoid being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation;\nfor it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting\non a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between\nPerception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general\nunreality, founded on the Ved\u00e2nta. The proper conclusion therefore is\nthat all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and\nare themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to\nspecial objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which\nthemselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real\nand free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able\nto account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and\nthings false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought,\nwhether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light\n(illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular\nobject, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced\nBeing, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing\nsubject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether\nreferring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis\nof empirical thought.\n\nAgainst our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real\nsubstrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhy\u00e2sa), for the reason\nthat no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may\ntake place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an\nerror may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the\nabode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself\nare unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now\nargue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is\nunreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for\nerror) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a\nfact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the\ndefect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal; and if\nwe pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all\nthese factors as well. There is really no difference between the two\ncases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.\n\nYou further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs,\nit would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must\nhave been released before this, none being left in the state of bondage;\nand that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and\nreleased remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the\nfact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if\nthe souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite\nnumber like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these\ninstances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also\ninfinite in number.--But do we not actually see that all these things\nhave definite numbers, 'Here are ten jars; a thousand beans,' &c.?--True,\nbut those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so\non, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other\nlimiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this\nsense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls\nshould be released; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).--\nNor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual\nsouls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-\nintelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the\ncircumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each\nother, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of\nthings belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars\ndoes not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.--You\nfurther maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls\nit follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of\nthis limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its\ninfinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things\nsubstantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time\nand place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of\ntheir connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in\ndependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with _all_\nspace and _all_ time results from such other means of proof, and hence\nthere is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to\nspace and time, and its limitation in point of substance--which is due\nto the existence of other souls).--But mere substantial limitation, as\nmeaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that\nBrahman is not infinite!--Well, then you yourself are in no better case;\nfor you admit that Brahman is something different from avidy\u00e2. From this\nadmission it follows that Brahman also is something 'different', and\nthus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling\nto your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed\nthat Brahman differs in nature from avidy\u00e2, then Brahman's nature itself\nis constituted by avidy\u00e2, and the text defining Brahman as 'the True,\nknowledge, infinite' is contrary to sense.--If the reality of\n'difference' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction\nbetween the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates\nof different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof\nof infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of\nlimitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation;\nabsence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a\nhare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other\nhand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and\nBrahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.--\nWe thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as\ndifferent from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world,\nis different from Brahman.\n\nAgainst this view the S\u00fbtra now declares itself as follows.--The non-\ndifference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from\n'what begins with the word \u00e2rambhana'--which proves such non-difference;\n'what begins with the word \u00e2rambhana' means those clauses at the head of\nwhich that word is met with, viz. 'v\u00e2k\u00e2rambhanam vik\u00e2ro n\u00e2madheyam\nmrittikety eva satyam'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only,\nwithout a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent\nforth fire'; 'having entered with this living Self; 'In the True, my son,\nall these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True\nthey rest'; 'In that all that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is\nthe Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 1-8)--it is these\nclauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other\nchapters, that the S\u00fbtra refers to. For these texts prove the non-\ndifference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and\nsentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind\nthe idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and\nof the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil,\n'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is\nheard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein\nthere is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the\ngeneral cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The\npupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe,\nraises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through\nanother,'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon,\nin order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause,\nquotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from\nthe cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay\nthere is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as\njars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay,\nare known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is\nnot different from it.'In order to meet the objection that according to\nKan\u00e2da's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the\ncause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the\neffect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience,\n'v\u00e2k\u00e2rambhanam vik\u00e2ro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'. \u00c2rambhanam must\nhere be explained as that which is taken or touched (\u00e2-rabh = \u00e2-labh;\nand '\u00e2lambhah sparsahimsayoh'); compare P\u00e2nini III, 3, 113, as to the\nform and meaning of the word. 'V\u00e2k\u00e2,' 'on account of speech,' we take to\nmean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as\nthe fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech,'Fetch water\nin the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the\nmaterial clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters\ninto contact with) an effect (vik\u00e2ra), i.e. a particular make or\nconfiguration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the\nshape of a belly, and a special name (n\u00e2madheya), viz. _pitcher_, and so\non, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the\nend that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay\nreceives a new configuration and a new name. [FOOTNOTE 455:1] Hence jars\nand other things of clay are clay (mrittik\u00e2), i.e. are of the substance\nof clay, only; this _only_ is true (satyam), i.e. known through\nauthoritative means of proof; _only_ (eva), because the effects are not\nknown as different substances. One and the same substance therefore,\nsuch as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only\nas it assumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and\nthe same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and\ngives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of\nlife--youth, old age, &c.--which he has reached.--The fact of our saying\n'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by\nthe P\u00fbrvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from\nthe cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that\norigination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one\nand the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance\nis in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and\ndifferent activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed\nas depending on the activity of an agent. The objections again which are\nconnected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not\nacknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the\nadmission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the\neffect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.--But it is a\ncontradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is\noriginated!--This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows\nnothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A\nsubstance enters into different states in succession; what passes away\nis the substance in its previous states, what originates is the\nsubstance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its\nstates has being, there is nothing irrational in the satk\u00e2rya theory.--\nBut the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in\nthe asatk\u00e2rya theory!--If he, we retort, who holds the asatk\u00e2rya theory\nis of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself\noriginate, he is similarly landed in the satk\u00e2rya theory; and if he\nholds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a\n_regressus in infinitum_. According to us, on the other hand, who hold\nthat states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from\nthat of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on,\nbelong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this\ntheory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being\na jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two\nhalves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance\ngiving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of\nplurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty.\n\nWe now consider the whole Ch\u00e2ndogya-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somyedam\nagra \u00e2s\u00eed ekam ev\u00e2dvit\u00eeyam.' This means--That which is Being, i.e. this\nworld which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a\nmanifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of\nthe distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being\nendowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the\nquestion, the world was also 'without a second.' This proves the non-\ndifference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause\nalso,' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the\ncreation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to\ndifferentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable\nand immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the\neffect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i.e.\nthe highest Brahman.\n\nAnd as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with\nall its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the\nworld can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on\nanother guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on\nthe part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold\nworld, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible;\nthe text continues,'That deity thought--Let me now enter those three\nbeings with this living Self (j\u00eeva \u00e2tman) and distinguish names and\nforms'--which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things\n(for this is meant by the \"three beings\") to possess various names and\nforms, by entering into them by means of the g\u00eeva, which is of the\nnature of my Self.'The possession of names and forms must thus be\nunderstood to be effected by the j\u00eeva entering into matter as its Self.\nThere is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the\nhighest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together\nwith the j\u00eevas. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having\nentered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient\nbeings).'And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient\nbeings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state,\nconstitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand\nthe highest Brahman constitutes their Self--this is proved by the\nantary\u00e2min-br\u00e2hmana and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised\nabove. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter\ntogether with the j\u00eevas, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so\nfar only as it (i.e. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for\nits body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in\nthe beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and\nall imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body,\nand Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a\ntreasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be\nfurther elucidated under II, 1, 22.--The Ch\u00e2ndogya-text then further\nteaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in\nBrahman 'in that all this has its Self; and further inculcates this\ntruth in 'Thou art that.'\n\nTexts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of\nthe general cause and its effect: 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Ch. Up.\nIII, 14, 1); 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,\nthen all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That Self is all this'\n(Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman indeed is all this' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); 'The\nSelf only is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative\ndifference: 'Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere\nthan in the Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is not any plurality here'\n(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any\nplurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage 'For\nwhere there is duality as it were, one sees the other; but when for him\nthe Self has become all, whereby then should he sec and whom?'(Bri. Up.\n11,4, 13)--in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who\ndoes not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows--intimates\nthat non-difference only is real.\n\nIt is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with\n\u00e2rambhana, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e.\nthe highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and\nnon-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prak\u00e2ra), is\ndenoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes\nconstituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state,\nwhen--just owing to that subtle state--they are incapable of being\n(conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form:\nBrahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the\nbody of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings\nin their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being\nthought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then\nis in its 'effected' state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to\nbe non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. And that in\nthe effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as\nconstituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied\ntherein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the\ndifference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved\nby hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.\n\nThose on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and\neffect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality, are\nunable to prove what they wish to prove; for the True and the False\ncannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either\nthat Brahman is false or that the world is real.--Those again who (like\nBh\u00e2skara) hold the effect also to be real--the difference of the soul\nand Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference\nis essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of\nBrahman and matter being essential--enter into conflict with all those\ntexts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as\nthe soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all\nevil, &c., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter\nundergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them,\nnothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman--as being\nindivisible--must be undivided while entering into connexion with the\nup\u00e2dhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if\nthey say that it is only the power (sakti), not Brahman itself, which\nundergoes a change; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power\nare non-different.\n\nOthers again (Y\u00e2davaprak\u00e2sa) hold that the general cause, i.e. Brahman,\nis pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an\nenjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed\nwith all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance\nabides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of\npleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by\ndreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient\nmatter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the\nsubstance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or\nas the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so\non, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of\nconstituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a\nruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an\nenjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on\nthose attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the\nattributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different\neffects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the\nsubstance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and\nthe ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is'\nconstitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one\nin so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one\nsubstance only, viz. 'that which is,' that appears in different\nconditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from\nBrahman.--But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture,\nSmriti, Itih\u00e2sa, Pur\u00e2na and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smriti, Itih\u00e2sa\nand Pur\u00e2na alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman--a\nbeing that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful,\ninstantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not\nlimited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss.\nNor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which\nthe Lord is a part only. For 'This which is \"being\" only was in the\nbeginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I\ngrow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'Verily, in the beginning this was\nBrahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the\nmost excellent Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas--Indra,\nVaruna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu, \u00ees\u00e2na' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11);\n'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing\nwhatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait.\n\u00c1r. II, 4, 1, 1, 2); 'There was in truth N\u00e2r\u00e2yana only, not Brahm\u00e2, not\n\u00ces\u00e2na, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor\nAgni, nor Soma, nor S\u00fbrya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged\nin meditation' &c. (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2. Up. I, 1)--these and other texts prove that\nthe highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana. For as the terms\n'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of\nthe same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by\nthe term 'N\u00e2r\u00e2yana,' it follows that they all mean N\u00e2r\u00e2yana. That the\nLord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also,\n'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities--he is\nthe cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him\nneither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smriti,\n'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahm\u00e2)--desirous to produce from his\nown body beings of many kind--first with a thought created the waters\nand placed his seed in them' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itih\u00e2sas and Pur\u00e2nas also\ndeclare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'N\u00e2r\u00e2yana, of\nwhom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous\nto create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two\ndivisions.' 'From Vishnu the world originated and in him it abides.'\n\nNor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such\n'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all\n'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's\nconnexion with all his auspicious qualities--knowledge, bliss, and so\non--is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and\nhence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts--viz. 'His\nhigh power (sakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his\nknowledge, strength and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-\nknowing, all-cognising' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), and others--to the end of\nproving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the\n_potentialities_ (sakti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the\nSvet\u00e2svatara-text the word 'essential' independently qualifies\n'knowledge, strength, and action' no less than 'sakti'; and your\nexplanation would necessitate so-called implication (lakshan\u00e2). Nor\nagain can it be said that in words such as sarvj\u00f1a (all-knowing), the\nformative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in\nother words such as p\u00e2kaka (cook); for grammar does not teach that all\nthese (krit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only.\nIt rather teaches (cp. P\u00e2nini III, 2, 54) that a few krit-affixes only\nhave this limited meaning; and in the case of p\u00e2kaka and similar words\nwe must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other\nexplanation open to us.--If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a\npart of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be\nsuperior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this\nwould be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make\nstatements about the Lord, cp. e.g. 'Him the highest great lord of\nlords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior' (Svet. Up. VI, 7,\n8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the\ngeneral whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would\nimply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be\nthe general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts; for jars\nand platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their\nbeing in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of\nclay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is\nfully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the\nLord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in and being\nparts of, him.--But from your principles we might with equal right draw\nthe inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the\nLord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations\nsuch as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being is an\nattribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By\nthe 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable\nfor some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its\nsuitability for an effect of an opposite nature.--Should it on the other\nhand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable)\nconsequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if\n(to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and\nso on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult\nto show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and\nthe same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as\n'being,' there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of\neverything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all\ngood and evil (i.e. every one would have conscious experience of\neverything) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons\nnon-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.--Here the\nfollowing doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on,\nwe observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to\ndifferent states of one and the same being; in the case of clay, wood,\ngold, &c., on the other hand, we observe that different ideas and terms\nare applied to different things. On what ground then do you determine\nthat in the case of causes and effects, such as e.g. clay and jars, it\nis mere difference of state on which the difference of ideas and terms\nis based?--To this question the next S\u00fbtra gives a reply.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 434:1. In other words--is the golden ornament originated by\nthe mere formless substance, gold; or by the form belonging to that\nspecial piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c.), out of which the ornament is\nfashioned; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that\nspecial form? The rukaka of the text has to be taken in the sense of\nnishka.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 455:1. The meaning of the four words constituting the clause\ntherefore would be, 'On account of speech (i.e. for the sake of the\naccomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water,\nwhich are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously\nmentioned substance clay) an effect and a name; i.e. for the sake of, &c.,\nclay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.'The\nCommentary remarks that' \u00e2rambhanam 'cannot be taken in the sense of\nup\u00e2d\u00e2na; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is\noriginated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only; and on the\nparin\u00e2ma doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by\nBrahman.]\n\n\n\n\n16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect.\n\nThis means--because gold which is the cause is perceived in the\nexistence of its effects, such as earrings and the like; i.e. on account\nof the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment 'this\nearring is gold.' We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of\nclay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the\neffect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth: the word\n'effect' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which has passed\nover into a different condition. He also who holds the effect to be a\nnew thing acknowledges that the effect is connected with a different\nstate, and as this different state suffices to account for the\ndifference of ideas and words, we are not entitled to assume a new\nsubstance which is not perceived. Nor must it be said that the\nrecognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic nature (the two\n_things_ being different, but having the same generic nature); for we\nperceive no new substance which could be the abode of the generic\ncharacter. What we actually perceive is one and the same substance\npossessing the generic characteristics of gold, first in the causal\nstate and then in the effected state. Nor again can it be said that even\non the supposition of difference of substance, recognition of the cause\nin the effect results from the continuity of the so-called intimate\ncause (samav\u00e2yi-k\u00e2raina). For where there is difference of substances\nwe do not observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the\nrecognition (of one substance) in the other substance residing in that\nabode.-But in the case of certain effects, as e.g. scorpions and other\nvermin which originate from dung, that recognition of the causal\nsubstance, i.e. dung (to which you refer as proving the identity of\ncause and effect), is not observed to take place!--You misstate the\ncase, we reply; here also we _do_ recognise in the effect that substance\nwhich is the primal cause, viz. earth.--But in smoke, which is the\neffect of fire, we do not recognise fire!--True! but this does not\ndisprove our case. Fire is only the operative cause of smoke; for smoke\noriginates from damp fuel joined with fire. That smoke is the effect of\ndamp fuel is proved thereby, as well as that both have smell (which\nshows them to be alike of the substance of earth).--As thus the identity\nof the substance is perceived in the effect also, we are entitled to\nconclude that the difference of ideas and terms rests on difference of\nstate only. The effect, therefore, is non-different from the\ncause.--This is so for the following reason also.\n\n\n\n\n17. And on account of the existence of that which is posterior.\n\nOn account of the existence of the posterior, i.e. the effect existing\nin the cause--for this reason also the effect is non-different from the\ncause. For in ordinary language as well as in the Veda the effect is\nspoken of in terms of the cause; as when we say, 'all these things--jars,\nplatters, &c.--were clay only this morning'; or when the Veda says,\n'Being only was this in the beginning.'\n\n\n\n\n18. If it be said 'not, on account of the designation of the (effect as\nthe) non-existent; we reply, not so, on account (of such designation\nbeing due to) another attribute, (as appears) from the complementary\npassage, from Reasoning, and from another Vedic text.\n\nThe assertion that ordinary speech as well as the Veda acknowledges the\nexistence of the effect in the cause cannot be upheld 'on account of the\ndesignation of (the effect as) the non-existent.' For the Veda says,\n'Non-being only was this in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); 'Non-\nbeing indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 6. 1); 'In the\nbeginning truly this was not anything whatever.' And in ordinary\nlanguage we say 'In the morning all this--jars, platters, and so on,--\nwas not.'--This objection the S\u00fbtra proceeds to refute. 'Not so, on\naccount of such designation being due to another attribute.' The\ndesignation of the effected substance as the non-existent is due to the\neffect having at an earlier time a different quality, i.e. a different\nconstitution; not to its being, as you think, absolutely non-existing.\nThe quality different from the quality of existence is non-existence;\nthat is to say, of the world designated as _this_, the quality of\nexistence is constituted by name and form, while the quality of non-\nexistence consists in the subtle state opposed to name and form.--But\nhow is this known?--'From the complementary passage, from Reasoning, and\nfrom another text.' The complementary passage is the one following on\nthe last text quoted above, viz. 'that Non-existent formed the resolve\n\"may I be\". The resolve referred to in this complementary text serving\nas an inferential sign to determine that the Non-existence spoken of is\nother than absolute Non-existence, we, on the basis of the observation\nthat all the three texts quoted treat of the same matter, conclude that\nin the other two texts also the Non-existent has to be understood in the\nsame sense. 'From Reasoning.' Reasoning shows Being and Non-being to be\nattributes of things. The possession, on the part of clay, of a certain\nshape, a broad base, a belly-shaped body, and so on, is the cause of our\nthinking and saying 'the jar exists,' while the connexion, on the part\nof the clay, with a condition opposed to that of a jar is the cause of\nour thinking and saying 'the jar does not exist.' A condition of the\nlatter kind is e. g.--the clay's existing in the form of two separate\nhalves of a jar, and it is just this and similar conditions of the clay\nwhich account for our saying that the jar does not exist. We do not\nperceive any non-existence of the jar different from the kind of non-\nexistence described; and as the latter sufficiently accounts for all\ncurrent ideas and expressions as to non-existence, there is no occasion\nto assume an additional kind of non-existence.--And also 'from another\ntext.' The text meant is that often quoted, 'Being only was this in the\nbeginning.' For there the view of the absolute non-being of the effect\nis objected to, 'But how could it be thus?' &c., and then the decision\nis given that from the beginning the world was 'being.' This matter is\nclearly set forth in the text 'This was then undistinguished; it became\ndistinguished by name and form' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).\n\nThe next two S\u00fbtras confirm the doctrine of the non-difference of the\neffect from the cause by two illustrative instances.\n\n\n\n\n19. And like a piece of cloth.\n\nAs threads when joined in a peculiar cross-arrangement are called a\npiece of cloth, thus acquiring a new name, a new form, and new functions,\nso it is with Brahman also.\n\n\n\n\n20. And as the different vital airs.\n\nAs the one air, according as it undergoes in the body different\nmodifications, acquires a new name, new characteristics, and new\nfunctions, being then called pr\u00e2na, ap\u00e2na, and so on; thus the one\nBrahman becomes the world, with its manifold moving and non-moving\nbeings.--The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause,\nis thus fully established.\n\nHere terminates the '\u00e2rambhana' adhikarana.\n\n\n\n\n21. From the designation of the 'other' (as non-different from Brahman)\nthere result (Brahman's) not creating what is beneficial, and other\nimperfections.\n\n'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman'--these and similar texts which\ndeclare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been\nsaid before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the\nindividual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these\ntexts really imply that the 'other one,' i.e. the soul, is Brahman,\nthere will follow certain imperfections on Brahman's part, viz. that\nBrahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its\npurposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to\nitself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the\nlike. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either\noriginating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other\nnatural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational\nindependent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial\nto himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world\nfrom Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare\nBrahman to be different from the soul; for were there such difference,\nthe doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should\nit be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference\ndue to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean\nessential non-difference, we must ask the following question--does the\nnon-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is\nessentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's\nomniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it,\nthen Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul--which is non-\ndifferent from Brahman--as its own pains; and from this there\nnecessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brahman does not create\nwhat is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If,\nagain, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to\nNescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference\nrefer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging\nto the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their\nrespective results. Should the aj\u00f1ana, on the other hand, belong to\nBrahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-\nilluminedness, cannot possibly be conscious of aj\u00f1ana and the creation\nof the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman\nis obscured by aj\u00f1ana, we point to all the difficulties, previously set\nforth, which follow from this hypothesis--to obscure light means to make\nit cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the\nessential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view\nof Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be\nuntenable.--This prim\u00e2 facie view the next S\u00fbtra refutes.\n\n\n\n\n22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of\ndifference.\n\nThe word 'but' sets aside the prim\u00e2 facie view. To the individual soul\ncapable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional,\ni.e. from it there is different, Brahman.--On what ground?--'Owing to\nthe declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different\nfrom the soul in the following texts:--'He who dwells in the Self and\nwithin the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the\nbody, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the\nimmortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowing as separate the Self and the\nMover, blessed by him he gains Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'He is the\ncause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls)\n(Svet Up. VI, 9); 'One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the\nother looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'There are two, the one knowing, the\nother not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler'\n(Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the pr\u00e2j\u00f1a. Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21);\n'Mounted by the pr\u00e2j\u00f1a. Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35); 'From that the ruler\nof m\u00e2y\u00e2 sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through m\u00e2y\u00e2\n(Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'the Master of the Pradh\u00e2na and the souls, the lord\nof the gunas' (Svet. Up. VI, 16);'the eternal among eternals, the\nintelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of\nmany' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the\nUnevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know; who moves\nwithin the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the\nImperishable does not know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the\nbody, whom Death does not know; he is the inner Self of all beings, free\nfrom evil, the divine one, the one God, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana'; and other similar\ntexts.\n\n\n\n\n23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is\nimpossibility of that.\n\nIn the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient\nthings such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c., which are of an extremely\nlow constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature\nwith Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic\nto all that is evil, &c. &c.; so it is also impossible that the\nindividual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere\nwretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know\nfrom the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious\nqualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in\ncoordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on\npassages such as 'of whom the Self is the body,' that as the j\u00eeva\nconstitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the j\u00eeva as its\nSelf, Brahman has the j\u00eeva for its mode; and with this doctrine the co-\nordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it--\nas we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under S\u00fb. I, 4, 22. Brahman in all its\nstates has the souls and matter for its body; when the souls and matter\nare in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition; when, on\nthe other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross\nstate, it is 'effected' and then called world. In this way the co-\nordination above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-\ndifferent from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no\nconfusion of the different characteristic qualities; for liability to\nchange belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient\nsouls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman: hence\nthe doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in\nthe state of non-separation-described in texts such as, 'Being only this\nwas in the beginning'--the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist\nin a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must\nnecessarily be admitted; for that the souls at that time also persist in\na subtle form is shown under S\u00fbtras II, I, 34; 35. Non-division, at that\ntime, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and\nforms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary\nto reason.\n\nThose, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in\nS\u00fbtra 22, as the difference between the j\u00eeva in its state of bondage and\nthe j\u00eeva in so far as free from avidy\u00e2, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman,\nimplicate themselves in contradictions. For the jiva., in so far as free\nfrom avidy\u00e2, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause\nof all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all--it in fact possesses\nnone of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the\ndifference of the released soul; for according to the view in question\nall those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can\nthe S\u00fbtra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the\nindividual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by avidy\u00e2--a distinction\nanalogous to that which a man in the state of avidy\u00e2 makes between the\nshell and the silver; for it is the task of the Ved\u00e2nta to convey a\nknowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of\nenquiry in the first S\u00fbtra ('Now then the enquiry into Brahman') and\nwhich is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what\nthey at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised\nagainst the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of Smriti and\nReasoning.--The two S\u00fbtras II, 1, 8; 9 really form a complementary\nstatement to what is proved in the present adhikarana; for their purport\nis to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other\nin the relation of cause and effect. And the S\u00fbtra II, 1, 7 has\nreference to what is contained in the previous adhikarana.\n\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'designation of the other.'\n\n\n\n\n24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of\nemployment; we say, not so; for as in the case of milk.\n\nWe have so far determined that it is in no way unreasonable to hold that\nthe highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its\npurposes, &c., has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body,\nand hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from\neverything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to\nhold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its\nmere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe.--But,\nit may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents\nof limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies\nin order to effect their purposes; but how should it follow therefrom\nthat the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without\nsuch instrumental agencies is in any way irrational?--As, we reply, it\nis observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the\ncapability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain\ninstruments, some slow-witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman,\nbeing destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the\nworld. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters,\nweavers, &c., who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of\nactually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although\nthey may fully possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of\nsuch skill are not capable of production, even with the help of\nimplements; those having the capacity produce by means of the\ninstruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also,\nalthough possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating\nthe world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But\nbefore creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as\nwe know from texts such as 'Being only this was in the beginning';\n'there was N\u00e2rayana alone.' Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be\nrendered plausible; and hence the prim\u00e2 facie view set forth in the\nearlier part of the S\u00fbtra, 'Should it be said that (it is) not; on\naccount of the observation of employment (of instruments).'\n\nThis view is set aside by the latter part of the S\u00fbtra, 'not so; for as\nin the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable\nof producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g.\nand water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour\nmilk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analogously\nBrahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may\nactually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the S\u00fbtra\nis meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally\nknown, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and\nsimilar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the\nend of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the\nprocess and give to the sour milk a certain flavour.\n\n\n\n\n25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in (their) world.\n\nAs the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in his own world,\nwhatever they require by their mere volition, so the Supreme Person\ncreates by his mere volition the entire world. That the gods about whose\npowers we know from the Veda only (not through perception) are here\nquoted as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate\nthe comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which is also known\nthrough the Veda.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the observation of\nemployment.'\n\n\n\n\n26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect),\nand stultification of (Brahman's) being devoid of parts.\n\n'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'This indeed was in the\nbeginning not anything'; 'The Self alone indeed was this in the\nbeginning'--these and other texts state that in the beginning Brahman\nwas one only, i.e. without parts--that means: Brahman, in its causal\nstate, was without parts because then all distinction of matter and\nsouls had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman thereupon having\nformed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of\nmaterial things--ether, air, and so on--and the aggregate of souls from\nBrahm\u00e2 down to blades of grass. This being so, it must be held that the\nentire highest Brahman entered into the effected state; that its\nintelligent part divided itself into the individual souls, and its non-\nintelligent part into ether, air, and so on. This however stultifies all\nthose often-quoted texts which declare Brahman in its causal state to be\ndevoid of parts. For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so\nfar as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state, and\nthe effect by Brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross\nstate; the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided, since also that\nelement in Brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect.\nIf, on the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become many,\nand it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering\ninto the effected state. On the ground of these unacceptable results we\nconclude that Brahman cannot be the cause.--This objection the next\nS\u00fbtra disposes of.\n\n\n\n\n27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman's possession of various\npowers) being founded upon the word.\n\nThe 'but' sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no\ninappropriateness; 'on account of Scripture.' Scripture declares on the\none hand that Brahman is not made up of parts, and on the other that\nfrom it a multiform creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by\nScripture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture actually says.--\nBut then Scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things\naltogether self-contradictory; like as if somebody were to tell us\n'Water with fire'!--The S\u00fbtra therefore adds 'on account of its being\nfounded on the word.' As the possession, on Brahman's part, of various\npowers (enabling it to emit the world) rests exclusively on the\nauthority of the word of the Veda and thus differs altogether from other\nmatters (which fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge\nalso), the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason. Brahman\ncannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from\nexperience.\n\n\n\n\n28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers).\n\nIf attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed\nto other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-\nsentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the\nintelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But\nthat such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of\nthe essential nature of things. This the S\u00fbtra expresses in 'for (there\nare) manifold (powers).' We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which\nare of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on:\nthere is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest\nBrahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life\nshould possess innumerous powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus\nPar\u00e2sara also--in reply to a question founded on ordinary observation--\nviz. 'How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of\nqualities, pure, &c.?'--declares 'Numberless powers, lying beyond the\nsphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for\ncreation, and so on; just as heat belongs to fire.' Similarly, Scripture\nsays, 'what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built\nheaven and earth?' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 81); and 'Brahman was that wood,\nBrahman was that tree', and so on.--Objections founded on ordinary\ngeneralisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature\nfrom all other things.\n\n\n\n\n29. And on account of the defects of his view also.\n\nOn his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the\nPradh\u00e2na or something similar, the imperfections observed in ordinary\nthings would attach themselves to the Pradh\u00e2na also, since it does not\ndiffer in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion therefore\nis that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can\nbe held to be the general cause.\n\nThe Pradh\u00e2na, moreover, is without parts; how then is it possible that\nit should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the 'great principle,'\nand so on?--But there _are_ parts of the Pradh\u00e2na, viz. Goodness,\nPassion, and Darkness!--This we reply necessitates the following\ndistinction. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness\nconstitute the Pradh\u00e2na? or is the Pradh\u00e2na the effect of those three?\nThe latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according\nto which the Pradh\u00e2na is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number\nof tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three gunas also have\nno parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former\nalternative, the gunas not being composed of parts must be held to\naggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of\nspace, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot\nresult.--The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the\ngeneral cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of\nparts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction,\nand hence do not possess the power of originating effects.\n\n\n\n\n30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers, because that is seen.\n\nThe highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things\nis endowed with all powers; for scriptural texts show it to be such,\n'His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, and so his\nknowledge, force, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another\ntext first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from\neverything else, 'Free from sin, from old age, from death and grief,\nfrom hunger and thirst', and then goes on to represent it as endowed with\nall powers, 'realising all its wishes, realising all its intentions', &c.\n(Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also 'He, consisting of mind, having prana\nfor his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes,' &c. (Ch. Up.\nIII, 14, 2).\n\n\n\n\n31. Not, on account of the absence of organs; this has been explained\n(before).\n\nAlthough the one Brahman is different from all other beings and endowed\nwith all powers, we yet infer from the text 'Of him there is known no\neffect and no instrument,' that as it is destitute of instruments it\ncannot produce any effect.--To this objection an answer has already been\ngiven in II, 1, 27; 28, 'on account of its being founded on the word,'\nand 'for there are manifold (powers).' That for which the sacred word is\nthe only means of knowledge, and which is different from all other\nthings, is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental\nmeans of which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture says\n'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he\nhastens and grasps' (Svet. Up. III, 19).--Here terminates the adhikarana\nof 'the consequence of the entire (Brahman).'\n\n\n\n\n32. (Brahman is) not (the cause); on account of (the world) having the\nnature of what depends on a motive.\n\nAlthough the Lord, who before creation is alone, is endowed with all\nkinds of powers since he differs in nature from all other beings, and\nhence is by himself capable of creating the world; we all the same\ncannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world; for\nthis manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive,\nand the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In the case of all\nthose who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the\neffect to be accomplished, there exists a motive in the form of\nsomething beneficial either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to\nwhose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally\nfulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world any object\nnot attained before. Nor again is the second alternative possible. For a\nbeing, all whose wishes are fulfilled, could concern itself about others\nonly with a view to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create\na world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind--birth, old age, death,\nhell, and so on;--if it created at all, pity would move it to create a\nworld altogether happy. Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be\nthe cause of the world.--This prim\u00e2 facie view is disposed of in the\nnext S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.\n\nThe motive which prompts Brahman--all whose wishes are fulfilled and who\nis perfect in himself--to the creation of a world comprising all kinds\nof sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is\nnothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great\nking, ruling this earth with its seven dv\u00eepas, and possessing perfect\nstrength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no\nother motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the\nview that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation,\nsustentation, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by\nhis mere will.\n\n\n\n\n34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard; for so\n(Scripture) declares.\n\nIt must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all\nother beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, and hence possesses\npowers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold\nworld, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But\nthe assumption of his having actually created the world would lay him\nopen to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings\nof high, middle, and low station--gods, men, animals, immovable beings;\nand to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making\nhis creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind.--The reply to\nthis is 'not so, on account of there being regard'; i.e. 'on account of\nthe inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent\nbeings, gods, and so on, about to be created.'--Sruti and Smriti alike\ndeclare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of\ndifferent kinds--divine, human, animal, and so on--depends on the karman\nof those souls; compare 'He who performs good works becomes good, he who\nperforms bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by\nbad deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5). In the same way the reverend Par\u00e2sara\ndeclares that what causes the difference in nature and status between\ngods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls\nabout to enter into a new creation--'He (the Lord) is the operative\ncause only in the creation of new beings; the material cause is\nconstituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being\nto be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause; it is its own\npotentiality which leads its being into that condition of being (which\nit is to occupy in the new creation).' Potentiality here means karman.\n\n\n\n\n35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinction of deeds'; we\nsay, 'not so, on account of beginninglessness'; this is reasonable, and\nit is also observed.\n\nBut before creation the individual souls do not exist; since Scripture\nteaches non-distinction 'Being only this was in the beginning.' And as\nthen the souls do not exist, no karman can exist, and it cannot\ntherefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman.--Of\nthis objection the S\u00fbtra disposes by saying 'on account of\nbeginninglessness,' i.e. although the individual souls and their deeds\nform an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non-distinction of them\n'is reasonable' (i.e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous\nto creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle\ncondition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being\ndesignated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then\nalso they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that\nthe distinctions in the new creation are due to karman), it would\nmoreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and\nnot requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being\nwithout a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture,'The\nintelligent one is not born and dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); so also\nthe fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, 'As the\ncreator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, 'Now all this\nwas then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (Bri. Up. I,\n4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were\ndeveloped, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the\nbeginning. Smriti also says, 'Dost thou know both Prakriti and the soul\nto be without beginning?' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIII, 19.)--As Brahman thus differs\nin nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other\nmotive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in\naccordance with the different karman of the individual souls, Brahman\nalone can be the universal cause.\n\n\n\n\n36. And because all the attributes are proved (to be present in Brahman).\n\nAs all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been\nor will be shown to be absent in the Pradh\u00e2na, the atoms, and so on, can\nbe shown to be present in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that\nBrahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates the adhikarana\nof 'that which has the nature of depending on a motive.'\n\n\n\n\nSECOND P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of\nconstruction, and on account of activity.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras have so far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman\nis the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and have refuted\nthe objections raised by others. They now, in order to safeguard their\nown position, proceed to demolish the positions held by those very\nadversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons,\nunaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments, would\nimagine them possibly to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat\nshaken in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another p\u00e2da therefore is\nbegun to the express end of refuting the theories of others. The\nbeginning is made with the theory of Kapila, because that theory has\nseveral features, such as the view of the existence of the effect in the\ncause, which are approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is\nmore likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous view of its\nbeing the true doctrine. The S\u00fbtras I, 1, 5 and ff. have proved only\nthat the Vedic texts do not set forth the S\u00e2nkhya view, while the task\nof the present p\u00e2da is to demolish that view itself: the S\u00fbtras cannot\ntherefore be charged with needless reiteration.\n\nThe outline of the S\u00e2nkhya doctrine is as follows. 'There is the\nfundamental Prakriti, which is not an effect; there are the seven\neffects of Prakriti, viz. the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects\nof those effects; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakriti nor\neffect'--such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The\nentity called 'fundamental Prakriti' is constituted by the three\nsubstances called Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, (when) in a state of\ncomplete equipoise, none of the three being either in defect or in\nexcess; the essential nature of those three consists respectively in\npleasure, pain, and dullness; they have for their respective effects\nlightness and illumination, excitement and mobility, heaviness and\nobstruction; they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses,\nand to be defined and distinguished through their effects only. Prakriti,\nconsisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas is one, itself\nnon-sentient but subserving the enjoyment and final release of the many\nsentient beings, eternal, all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of\nanything, but the one general cause. There are seven Principles which\nare the effects of Prakriti and the causal substances of everything else;\nthese seven are the Mahat, the ahank\u00e2ra, the subtle matter (tanm\u00e2tra) of\nsound, the subtle matter of touch, the subtle matter of colour, the\nsubtle matter of taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahank\u00e2ra is\nthreefold, being either modified (vaik\u00e2rika), or active (taijasa), or\nthe originator of the elements (bh\u00fbt\u00e2di).\n\nThe vaik\u00e2rika is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense--\norgans; the bh\u00fbt\u00e2di is of tamas--nature, and the cause of those subtle\nmatters (tanm\u00e2tra) which in their turn are the cause of the gross\nelements; the taijasa is of the nature of ragas, and assists the other\ntwo. The five gross elements are the ether and so on; the five\nintellectual senses are hearing and so on; the five organs of action are\nspeech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ (manas) these\nare the sixteen entities which are mere effects.--The soul, not being\ncapable of any change, is not either the causal matter or the effect of\nanything. For the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of\nmere intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different in\neach body. Being incapable of change and non-active, it can neither be\nan agent nor an enjoyer; but although this is so, men in their confusion\nof mind, due to the closeness to each other of Prakriti and the soul,\nerroneously attribute to Prakriti the intelligence of the soul, and to\nthe soul the activity of Prakriti--just as the redness of the rose\nsuperimposes itself on the crystal near it,--and thus consider the soul\nto be an 'I' and an enjoyer. Fruition thus results from ignorance, and\nrelease from knowledge of the truth. This their theory the S\u00e2nkhyas\nprove by means of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition.\nNow with regard to those matters which are proved by perception, we\nVed\u00e2ntins have no very special reason for dissenting from the S\u00e2nkhyas;\nand what they say about their authoritative tradition, claiming to be\nfounded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has been\npretty well disproved by us in the first adhy\u00e2ya. If, now, we further\nmanage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the Pradh\u00e2na\nas the cause of the--world, we shall have disestablished their whole\ntheory. We therefore proceed to give this refutation.\n\nOn this point the S\u00e2nkhyas reason as follows. It must necessarily be\nadmitted that the entire world has one cause only; for if effects were\nassumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an\nultimate cause. Assume that parts such as e.g. threads produce a whole\n(i.e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way of their\nbeing joined together by means of their six sides, which are parts of\nthe threads. You must then further assume that the threads themselves\nare in the same way produced by their parts, having a similar\nconstitution. And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the\natoms; these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by\nbeing joined together with their six sides, for otherwise solid\nextension (prathiman) could not be brought about. And then the atoms\nalso as being wholes, consisting of parts [FOOTNOTE 482:1], must be\nviewed as produced by their parts, and these again by their parts and so\non, so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order therefore to\nestablish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis\nof the general cause being constituted by one substance, which possesses\nthe power of transforming itself in various different ways, without at\nthe same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which forms the\ngeneral substrate for an infinity of different effects, from the Mahat\ndownwards. This one general cause is the Pradh\u00e2na constituted by the\nequipoise of the three gunas. The reasons for the assumption of this\nPradh\u00e2na are as follows:--'On account of the limitedness of particular\nthings; of connexion (anvaya); of activity proceeding from special power;\nand of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect--the Non-\nevolved (Pradh\u00e2na) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe'\n(vaisvar\u00fbpya) (S\u00e2nkhya K\u00e2. I, 15; 16).--The term 'vaisvar\u00fbpya' denotes\nthat which possesses all forms, i.e. the entire world with its variously\nconstituted parts--bodies, worlds, and so on. This world, which on\naccount of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has\nfor its cause the Unevolved (avyakta = Prakriti), which is of the same\nnature as the world. Why so? Because it is an effect; for we perceive\nthat every effect is different from its special cause--which has the\nsame nature as the effect--and at the same time is non-different. Such\neffected things as e.g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from\ntheir causes, i.e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as the\neffects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the manifold-natured\nworld originates from the Pradh\u00e2na which has the same nature, and is\nagain merged in it: the world thus has the Pradh\u00e2na alone for its cause.\nThis Pradh\u00e2na is constituted by the equipoise of the three gunas, and\nthus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i.e.\nthe world; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and\ndullness, which consist of sattva, rajas, and tamas respectively. The\ncase is analogous to that of a jar consisting of clay; of that also the\ncause is none other than the substance clay. For in every case\nobservation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same\nnature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination\nof the effect. That the general cause can be found only in the unevolved\nPradh\u00e2na, which consists of the three gunas in a state of equipoise and\nis unlimited with regard to space as well as time, follows from the\nlimitedness of the particular things, viz. the Mahat, the ahank\u00e2ra, and\nso on. These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence\nincapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this\nworld, consisting of the three gunas, has for its only cause the\nPradh\u00e2na, which is constituted by those three gunas in a state of\nequipoise.\n\nAgainst this argumentation the S\u00fbtra says, 'Not that which is inferred,\non account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of\nactivity.'--'Inference' means 'that which is inferred,' i.e. the\nPradh\u00e2na. The Pradh\u00e2na postulated by you is not capable of constructing\nthis manifold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelligent\nit is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature.\nWhatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects; as e.\ng. wood and the like by themselves are not capable of constructing a\npalace or a carriage. As it is matter of observation that non-\nintelligent wood, not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its\nnature, cannot produce effects; and as it is observed that if guided by\nsuch an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects; the\nPradh\u00e2na, which is not ruled by an intelligent agent, cannot be the\ngeneral cause. The 'and' in the S\u00fbtra is meant to add as a further\nargument that 'presence' (anvaya) has no proving force. For whiteness\npresent in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality\nof being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be\nsaid that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect,\nmay not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like\nwhich are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the\nquality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called\nsattva, rajas, and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are\nproved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are\nattributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so\non are the causes of the lightness, light, &c.. belonging to substances\nsuch as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the\nessential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be\npresent in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other\nsubstances are. It is for this reason that they are known as 'gunas.'\nYou have further said that the world's having one cause only must be\npostulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the\nsattva, rajas, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not\nassume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause.\nFor your Pradh\u00e2na consists in the equipoise of the three gunas; there\nare thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than\nothers. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three\ngunas being unlimited. For if the three gunas are all alike unlimited,\nand therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of\nthem, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In\norder to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to\nassume limitation of the gunas.\n\nNor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly\nperceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an\nintelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived\nwith equal clearness) are in favour of our view. This the next S\u00fbtra\ndeclares.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 482:1. As follows from their having six sides.]\n\n\n\n\n2. If it be said--like milk or water; there also (intelligence guides).\n\nWhat has been said--the S\u00e2nkhya rejoins--as to the impossibility of the\nPradh\u00e2na not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this\nvariously constituted world, is unfounded; for the Pradh\u00e2na may be\nsupposed to act in the same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning\ninto sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of\nchanges: it does not therefore depend on anything else. In the same way\nwe observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds\nspontaneously proceeds to transform itself into the various saps and\njuices of different plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple\ntrees, lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way the\nPradh\u00e2na, of whose essential nature it is to change, may, without being\nguided by another agent, abide in the interval between two creations in\na state of homogeneousness, and then when the time for creation comes\nmodify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium\non the part of the gunas. As has been said '(the Pradh\u00e2na acts), owing\nto modification, as water according to the difference of the abodes of\nthe several gunas' (S\u00e2nkhya K\u00e2. I, 16). In this way the Unevolved acts\nindependently of anything else.\n\nTo this reasoning the S\u00fbtra replies 'there also.' Also, in the instances\nof milk and water, activity is not possible in the absence of an\nintelligent principle, for these very cases have already been referred\nto as proving our position. The S\u00fbtra II, 1, 24 (where the change of\nmilk into sour milk is instanced) meant to prove only that a being\ndestitute of other visible instruments of action is able to produce its\nown special effect, but not to disprove the view of all agency\npresupposing an intelligent principle. That even in water and so on an\nintelligent principle is present is proved by scriptural texts, 'he who\ndwells in water' and so on.\n\n\n\n\n3. And because from the independence (of the Pradh\u00e2na) there would\nfollow the non-existence of what is different (from creation, i.e. of\nthe pralaya condition).\n\nThat the Pradh\u00e2na which is not guided by an intelligent principle is not\nthe universal cause is proved also by the fact that, if we ascribe to it\na power for change independent of the guidance of a Lord capable of\nrealising all his purposes, it would follow that the pralaya state,\nwhich is different from the state of creation, would not exist; while on\nthe other hand the guidance of the Pradh\u00e2na by a Lord explains the\nalternating states of creation and pralaya as the effects of his\npurposes. Nor can the S\u00e2nkhya retort that our view gives rise to similar\ndifficulties in so far, namely, as the Lord, all whose wishes are\neternally accomplished, who is free from all imperfection, &c. &c.,\ncannot be the originator of either creation or pralaya, and as the\ncreation of an unequal world would lay him open to the charge of\nmercilessness. For, as explained before, even a being perfect and\ncomplete may enter on activity for the sake of sport; and as the reason\nfor a particular creation on the part of an all-knowing Lord may be his\nrecognition of Prakriti having reached a certain special state, it is\nthe deeds of the individual souls which bring about the inequalities in\nthe new creation.--But if this is so, all difference of states is caused\nexclusively by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls; and what\nposition remains then for a ruling Lord? Prakriti, impressed by the good\nand evil deeds of the souls, will by herself modify herself on such\nlines as correspond to the deserts of the individual souls; in the same\nway as we observe that food and drink, if either vitiated by poison or\nreinforced by medicinal herbs and juices, enter into new states which\nrender them the causes of either pleasure or pain. Hence all the\ndifferences between states of creation and pralaya, as also the\ninequalities among created beings such as gods, men, and so on, and\nfinally the souls reaching the condition of Release, may be credited to\nthe Pradh\u00e2na, possessing as it does the capability of modifying itself\ninto all possible forms!--You do not, we reply, appear to know anything\nabout the nature of good and evil works; for this is a matter to be\nlearned from the Sastra. The Sastra is constituted by the aggregate of\nwords called Veda, which is handed on by an endless unbroken succession\nof pupils learning from qualified teachers, and raised above all\nsuspicion of imperfections such as spring from mistake and the like. It\nis the Veda which gives information as to good and evil deeds, the\nessence of which consists in their pleasing or displeasing the Supreme\nPerson, and as to their results, viz. pleasure and pain, which depend on\nthe grace or wrath of the Lord. In agreement herewith the Dramid\u00e2k\u00e2rya\nsays, 'From the wish of giving rise to fruits they seek to please the\nSelf with works; he being pleased is able to bestow fruits, this is the\npurport of the S\u00e2stra.' Thus Sruti also says, 'Sacrifices and pious\nworks which are performed in many forms, all that he bears (i.e. he\ntakes to himself); be the navel of the Universe' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. I, 6).\nAnd in the same spirit the Lord himself declares,'From whom there\nproceed all beings, by whom all this is pervaded--worshipping him with\nthe proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. G\u00ee. XVIII, 46); and\n'These evil and malign haters, lowest of men, I hurl perpetually into\ntransmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (Bha. G\u00ee. XVI, 19). The divine\nSupreme Person, all whose wishes are eternally fulfilled, who is all-\nknowing and the ruler of all, whose every purpose is immediately\nrealised, having engaged in sport befitting his might and greatness and\nhaving settled that work is of a twofold nature, such and such works\nbeing good and such and such being evil, and having bestowed on all\nindividual souls bodies and sense-organs capacitating them for entering\non such work and the power of ruling those bodies and organs; and having\nhimself entered into those souls as their inner Self abides within them,\ncontrolling them as an animating and cheering principle. The souls, on\ntheir side, endowed with all the powers imparted to them by the Lord and\nwith bodies and organs bestowed by him, and forming abodes in which he\ndwells, apply themselves on their own part, and in accordance with their\nown wishes, to works either good or evil. The Lord, then, recognising\nhim who performs good actions as one who obeys his commands, blesses him\nwith piety, riches, worldly pleasures, and final release; while him who\ntransgresses his commands he causes to experience the opposites of all\nthese. There is thus no room whatever for objections founded on\ndeficiency, on the Lord's part, of independence in his dealings with men,\nand the like. Nor can he be arraigned with being pitiless or merciless.\nFor by pity we understand the inability, on somebody's part, to bear the\npain of others, coupled with a disregard of his own advantage. When pity\nhas the effect of bringing about the transgression of law on the part of\nthe pitying person, it is in no way to his credit; it rather implies the\ncharge of unmanliness (weakness), and it is creditable to control and\nsubdue it. For otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise\none's enemies is something to be blamed. What the Lord himself aims at\nis ever to increase happiness to the highest degree, and to this end it\nis instrumental that he should reprove and reject the infinite and\nintolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning\nand endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part of individual\nbeings to transgress his laws. For thus he says: 'To them ever devoted,\nworshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain\nto me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the\ndarkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha.\nG\u00ee. X, 10, 11).--It thus remains a settled conclusion that the Pradh\u00e2na,\nwhich is not guided by an intelligent principle, cannot be the general\ncause.--Here a further objection is raised. Although Prakriti, as not\nbeing ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of that kind of\nactivity which springs from effort, she may yet be capable of that kind\nof activity which consists in mere transformation. For we observe\nparallel cases; the grass and water e.g. which are consumed by a cow\nchange on their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Prakriti\nmay on her own account transform herself into the world.--To this the\nnext S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n4. Nor like grass and so on; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere.\n\nThis argumentation does not hold good; for as grass and the like do not\ntransform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle,\nyour proving instance is not established.--But why is it not established?--\n'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' If grass, water and so on changed\ninto milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then\nindeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an\nintelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we\nconclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass\neaten by the cow into milk.--This point has been set forth above under\nS\u00fbtra 3; the present S\u00fbtra is meant to emphasise and particularise it.\n\n\n\n\n5. And if you say--as the man and the stone; thus also.\n\nHere the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of\nmere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradh\u00e2na is destitute of\nall power of thought; yet the non-sentient Pradh\u00e2na may begin to act\nowing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel\ninstances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing\nto the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but\npossesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence.\nAnd through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same\nway the creation of the world may result from the connexion of Prakriti\nand the soul. As has been said, 'In order that the soul may know the\nPradh\u00e2na and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like\nthat of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (S\u00e2nkhya K\u00e2.\n21). This means--to the end that the soul may experience the Pradh\u00e2na,\nand for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradh\u00e2na enters on\naction at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul.\n\nTo this the S\u00fbtra replies 'thus also.' This means--the inability of the\nPradh\u00e2na to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame\nman is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other\npowers--he can see the road and give instructions regarding it; and the\nblind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instructions\nand directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the\nattribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other\nhand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As,\nmoreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradh\u00e2na is something\neternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the\nother hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no\nbondage and no release.\n\n\n\n\n6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and\nsubordinate) matter.\n\nYou S\u00e2nkhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a\ncertain relation between principal and subordinate entities which\ndepends on the relative inferiority and superiority of the gunas--\n'according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas'\n(S\u00e2nkhya K\u00e2. I, 16).\n\nBut, as in the pralaya state the three gunas are in a state of equipoise,\nnone of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of\nsuperiority and subordination cannot then exist, and hence the world\ncannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even\nin the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow\ntherefrom that creation is eternal.\n\n\n\n\n7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on\naccount of (the Pradh\u00e2na) being destitute of the power of a knowing\nsubject.\n\nEven if the Pradh\u00e2na were inferred by some reasoning different from the\narguments so far refuted by us, our objections would remain in force\nbecause, anyhow, the Pradh\u00e2na is devoid of the power of a cognising\nsubject. The Pradh\u00e2na thus cannot be established by any mode of\ninference.\n\n\n\n\n8. And even if it be admitted; on account of the absence of a purpose.\n\nEven if it were admitted that the Pradh\u00e2na is established by Inference,\nthe S\u00e2nkhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the\nPradh\u00e2na is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in\nthe passage, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradh\u00e2na and become\nisolated' (S\u00e2nkhya K\u00e2. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradh\u00e2na is fruition\nand final release on the part of the soul; but both these are impossible.\nFor, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless,\nand spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of\nfruition which consists in consciousness of Prakriti, nor of Release\nwhich consists in separation from Prakriti. If, on the other hand, it be\nheld that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere\nnearness of Prakriti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of\npleasure and pain, which are special modifications of Prakriti, it\nfollows that, as Prakriti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish\nemancipation.\n\n\n\n\n9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.\n\nThe S\u00e2nkhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.--\nThe S\u00e2nkhyas hold that while Prakriti is for the sake of another and the\nobject of knowledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying\nand knowing agent, and conscious of Prakriti; that the soul reaches\nisolation through the instrumentality of Prakriti only, and that as its\nnature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all\nactivity and isolation belong to that nature; that for this reason the\naccomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong\nto Prakriti only; and that, owing to Prakriti's proximity to the\nunchanging non-active soul, Prakriti, by a process of mutual\nsuperimposition (adhy\u00e2sa), works towards the creation of a world and\nsubserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation.--'Since\nthe aggregate of things is for the sake of another; since there is an\nopposite of the three gunas and the rest; since there is superintendence;\nsince there is an experiencing subject; and since there is activity for\nthe sake of isolation; the soul exists' (S\u00e2nkhya K\u00e2. 17); 'And from that\ncontrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral,\ncognising and inactive' (18).--And after having stated that the activity\nof the Pradh\u00e2na is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text\nsays, 'therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it\nmigrate; it is Prakriti which, abiding in various beings, is bound and\nreleased and migrates' (62). And 'From this connexion therewith (i.e.\nwith the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent; and although\nall agency belongs to the gunas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent.\nIn order that the soul may know the Pradh\u00e2na and become isolated, the\nconnexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind;\nand thence creation springs' (20, 21).--Now to that which is eternally\nunchanging, non-active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness\nand an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can\nsuch a being be subject to error resting on superimposition; for error\nand superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other\nhand, they also cannot belong to Prakriti, since they are attributes of\nintelligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution,\non the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to\nanother thing; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and\nmoreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like\nshould take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakriti.--\nThey may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the\nsoul!--Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere\nproximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4.\nAnd if it is maintained that it is Prakriti only that migrates, is bound\nand released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is\neternally released? That she does so the S\u00e2nkhyas distinctly assert, 'By\nmanifold means Prakriti, helpful and endowed with the gunas, without any\nbenefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is\nthankless and not composed of the gunas' (S\u00e2nkhya K\u00e2. 60).--The S\u00e2nkhyas\nfurther teach that Prakriti, on being seen by any soul in her true\nnature, at once retires from that soul--'As a dancer having exhibited\nherself on the stage withdraws from the soul, so Prakriti withdraws from\nthe soul when she has manifested herself to it' (59); 'My opinion is\nthat there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakriti, who knowing \"I\nhave been seen\" does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this\ndoctrine also is inappropriate. For, as the soul is eternally released\nand above all change, it never sees Prakriti, nor does it attribute to\nitself her qualities; and Prakriti herself does not see herself since\nshe is of non-intelligent nature; nor can she wrongly impute to herself\nthe soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she\nherself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change\nwhich consists in seeing or knowing.--Let it then be said that the\n'seeing' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakriti to the soul!--\nBut this also does not help you; for, as said above, from that there\nwould follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal proximity.\nMoreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation\nwhich does not form an element of its unchanging nature.--Moreover, if\nyou define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause\nof Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage--so\nthat bondage and release would both be permanent.--Let it then be said\nthat what causes bondage is wrong seeing--while intuition of the true\nnature of things is the cause of Release!--But as both these kinds of\nseeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place\npermanently. And if, on the other hand, the proximity of Soul and\nPrakriti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity\nwould have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on _ad\ninfinitum_.--Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define\nproximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakriti!--As\nthe true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that\nbondage and release would be alike permanent.--On account of all these\ncontradictory views the system of the S\u00e2nkhyas is untenable.\n\nWe finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same\ntime prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there\nis an eternally unchanging Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced\nintelligence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experiences\nunreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than\nthe S\u00e2nkhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be\nsubject to adhy\u00e2sa, and so on. There is, however, the following\ndifference between the two theories. The S\u00e2nkhyas, in order to account\nfor the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on,\nassume a plurality of souls. The Ved\u00e2ntins, on the other hand, do not\nallow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational.\nThe assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Ved\u00e2ntins)\nbetween the two doctrines, in so far as the Ved\u00e2ntins hold Prakriti to\nbe something unreal, while the S\u00e2nkhyas consider it to be real, is\nunfounded; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing,\ncannot possibly be conscious of anything different from itself, whether\nit be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there\narise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the\nobject of knowledge, of refutation, and so on.\n\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of construction.'\n\n\n\n\n10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.\n\nWe have shown that the theory of the Pradh\u00e2na being the universal cause\nis untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from\ninner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms\nconstituting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same\nway as the big and long from the short and the atomic' 'Is untenable'\nmust be supplied from the preceding S\u00fbtra; 'or' has to be taken in the\nsense of 'and.' The sense of the S\u00fbtra is--in the same way as the big\nand long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the\nshort and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is\nuntenable, so everything else which they (the Vaiseshikas) maintain is\nuntenable; or, in other words--as the theory of the world originating\nfrom atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is\nlikewise untenable.--Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of\ncloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means\nof the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously the atoms\nalso must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining\nby means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction\nof parts (and hence filled no space), a group of even a thousand atoms\nwould not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different\nkinds of extension--minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.--would\nnever emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also\nhave distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and\nthose parts again are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.--\nBut, the Vaiseshika may object, the difference between a mustard seed\nand a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent parts on the one\nhand, and their multitude on the other. If, now, it be held that the\natom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the\nmountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their\ninequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that there\nis a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not\nthemselves consist of parts).--Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not\npossess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than\nthe extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard\nseed nor mountain would ever be brought about.--But what, then, are we\nto do to get out of this dilemma?--You have only to accept the Vedic\ndoctrine of the origination of the world.\n\nOthers explain the above S\u00fbtra as meant to refute an objection against\nthe doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit\nthe arrangement of the S\u00fbtras, and would imply a meaningless iteration.\nThe objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been\ndisposed of in the preceding p\u00e2da, and the present p\u00e2da is devoted to\nthe refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being\nviewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was\nshown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the S\u00fbtra, therefore, is\nnone other than what we stated above.--But what are those other\nuntenable views to which the S\u00fbtra refers?--To this question the next\nS\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n11. On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being\n(of the origination of the world).\n\nThe atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive\nformation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the\naggregation of atoms--such aggregation resulting from the motion of the\natoms. The primary motion of the atoms--which are the cause of the\norigination of the entire world--is assumed to be brought about by the\nunseen principle (adrishta), 'The upward flickering of fire, the sideway\nmotion of air, the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas\nare caused by the unseen principle.'--Is then, we ask, this primary\nmotion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them, or by an\nadrishta residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the\nunseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the\nindividual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could,\nthe consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the\nworld. Nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of\nmotion originating in the atoms.--Let it then be assumed that motion\noriginates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls\nin which the adrishta abides!--If this were so, we reply, it would\nfollow that the world would be permanently created, for the adrishta, of\nthe souls forms an eternal stream.-But the adrishta requires to be\nmatured in order to produce results. The adrishtas of some souls come to\nmaturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were\nperformed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only;\nand others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It\nis owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the\norigination of the world does not take place at all times.--But this\nreasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to\nestablish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring\nfrom the manifold actions performed at different times, without any\nprevious agreement, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should\nreach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time\n(so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours\naccount for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same\ntime, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a\ndvipar\u00e2rdha.--Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to\ntheir conjunction with (souls whose) adrishta possesses certain specific\nqualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere\ninference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown\nunder I, 1. The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any\naction on the part of the atoms.\n\n\n\n\n12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samav\u00e2ya, there results a\n_regressus in infinitum_ from equality.\n\nThe Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the\nacknowledgment of samav\u00e2ya.--Why so?--Because the samav\u00e2ya also, like\npart, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to\nestablish it, and that something else again requires some further thing\nto establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain.\nThe Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samav\u00e2ya relation, defining it as\n'that connexion which is the cause of the idea \"this is here,\" in the\ncase of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to\neach other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now,\nif such a samav\u00e2ya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact\nthat things observed to be inseparably connected--as, e.g., class\ncharacteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which\nthey belong--are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to\nbe searched for why the samav\u00e2ya, which is of the same nature as those\nthings (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the\nthings connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further\nreason has to be postulated, and so on, _in infinitum_. Nor can it be\nsaid that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the\nessential nature of samav\u00e2ya (so that no further reason need be demanded\nfor its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to\nassume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities,\nand so on (which would render the assumption of a samav\u00e2ya needless for\nthem also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen\nentity such as the samav\u00e2ya is, and then to assume for it such and such\nan essential nature.--These objections apply to the samav\u00e2ya whether it\nbe viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next S\u00fbtra urges a further\nobjection against it if viewed as eternal.\n\n\n\n\n13. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.\n\nThe samav\u00e2ya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to\nwhich the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive\nat the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.\n\n\n\n\n14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse\n(takes place); as it is observed.\n\nFrom the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz. of earth or water or\nfire or air--possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow\nthat the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts--and this is\nthe reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms,\nviz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things\npossessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed\nthat they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal\nnature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in\naccordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any\nattributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with\nactual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess\ncolour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.--Let it then,\nin order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not\npossess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the\nnext S\u00fbtra refers.\n\n\n\n\n15. And as there are objections in both cases.\n\nA difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and\nother sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute\nof those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on\nthe qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that\ncase be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be\nheld that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the\ndifficulty stated in the preceding S\u00fbtra. Objections thus arising in\nboth cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable.\n\n\n\n\n16. And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded.\n\nKapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of it's being in\nconflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, yet recommends itself to\nthe adherents of the Veda on some accounts--as e.g. its view of the\nexistence of the effect in the cause. Kan\u00e2da's theory, on the other hand,\nof which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof,\ncannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest\nend of man.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the big and long'.\n\n\n\n\n17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-\nestablishment of that.\n\nWe so far have refuted the Vaiseshikas, who hold the doctrine of atoms\nconstituting the general cause. Now the followers of Buddha also teach\nthat the world originates from atoms, and the S\u00fbtras therefore proceed\nto declare that on their view also the origination, course, and so on,\nof the world cannot rationally be accounted for. These Bauddhas belong\nto four different classes. Some of them hold that all outward things,\nwhich are either elements (bh\u00fbta) or elemental (bhautika), and all\ninward things which are either mind (kitta) or mental (kaitta),--all\nthese things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth, water, fire\nand air--are proved by means of Perception as well as Inference. Others\nhold that all external things, earth, and so on, are only to be inferred\nfrom ideas (vij\u00f1\u00e2na). Others again teach that the only reality are ideas\nto which no outward things correspond; the (so-called) outward things\nare like the things seen in dreams. The three schools mentioned agree in\nholding that the things admitted by them have a momentary existence only,\nand do not allow that, in addition to the things mentioned, viz.\nelements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain\nfurther independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on.--Others\nfinally assert a universal void, i.e. the non-reality of everything.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the\nreal existence of external things. Their opinion is as follows. The\natoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour, taste, touch and\nsmell; the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste\nand touch; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and\ntouch; and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only,\ncombine so as to constitute earth, water, fire and air; and out of the\nlatter there originate the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and\nobjects of sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the form\nof the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body, is\nwhat constitutes the so-called Self. On the agencies enumerated there\nrests the entire empiric world.--On this view the S\u00fbtra remarks, 'Even\non the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of\nthat'. That aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and\nof which the atoms are the cause; and that further aggregate which\nconsists of bodies, sense-organs and objects, and of which the elements\nare the cause--on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold\ncauses can there be proved establishment of that, i.e. can the\norigination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally\nestablished. If the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are\nheld to have a momentary existence only, when, we ask, do the atoms\nwhich perish within a moment, and the elements, move towards combination,\nand when do they combine? and when do they become the 'objects of states\nof consciousness'? and when do they become the abodes of the activities\nof appropriation, avoidance and so on (on the part of agents)? and what\nis the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter into contact\nthrough the sense-organs? and which cognising Self cognises which\nobjects, and at what time? and which Self proceeds to appropriate which\nobjects, and at what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and\nthe object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has\nperished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject\ncognise what has been apprehended through the senses of another? and how\nis one subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised? And\nshould it be said that each stream of cognitions is one (whereby a kind\nof unity of the cognising subject is claimed to be established), yet\nthis affords no sufficient basis for the ordinary notions and activities\nof life, since the stream really is nothing different from the\nconstituent parts of the stream (all of which are momentary and hence\ndiscrete).--That in reality the Ego constitutes the Self and is the\nknowing subject, we have proved previously.\n\n\n\n\n18. If it be said that (this) is to be explained through successive\ncausality; we say 'no,' on account of their not being the causes of\naggregation.\n\n'If it be said that through the successive causality of Nescience and so\non, the formation of aggregates and other matters may be satisfactorily\naccounted for.' To explain. Although all the entities (acknowledged by\nthe Bauddhas) have a merely momentary existence, yet all that is\naccounted for by avidy\u00e2. Avidy\u00e2 means that conception, contrary to\nreality, by which permanency, and so on, are ascribed to what is\nmomentary, and so on. Through avidy\u00e2 there are originated desire,\naversion, &c., which are comprised under the general term 'impression'\n(samsk\u00e2ra); and from those there springs cognition (vij\u00f1\u00e2na) which\nconsists in the 'kindling' of mind; from that mind (kitta) and what is\nof the nature of mind (kaitta) and the substances possessing colour, and\nso on, viz. earth, water, &c. From that again the six sense-organs,\ncalled 'the six abodes'; from that the body, called 'touch' (sparsa);\nfrom that sensation (vedan\u00e2), and so on. And from that again avidy\u00e2, and\nthe whole series as described; so that there is an endlessly revolving\ncycle, in which avidy\u00e2, and so on, are in turn the causes of the links\nsucceeding them. Now all this is not possible without those aggregates\nof the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on;\nand thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is\nproved.\n\nTo this the second half of the S\u00fbtra replies 'Not so, on account of\n(their) not being the causes of aggregation'.--This cannot rationally be\nassumed, because avidy\u00e2, and so on, cannot be operative causes with\nregard to the aggregation of earth and the other elements and elemental\nthings. For avidy\u00e2, which consists in the view of permanency and so on,\nbelonging to what is non-permanent, and desire, aversion and the rest,\nwhich are originated by avidy\u00e2 cannot constitute the causes of (other)\nmomentary things entering into aggregation; not any more than the\nmistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things\nsuch as shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who views a\nmomentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment; who\nthen is the subject in whom the so-called samsk\u00e2ras, i.e. desire,\naversion, and so on, originate? Those who do not acknowledge one\npermanent substance constituting the abode of the samsk\u00e2ras have no\nright to assume the continuance of the samsk\u00e2ras.\n\n\n\n\n19. And on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the\norigination of the subsequent one.\n\nFor the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be\naccounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the\ntime when the subsequent momentary existence originates, the preceding\nmomentary existence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a\ncausal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non-existence had\ncausal power, anything might originate at any time at any place.--Let it\nthen be said that what constitutes a cause is nothing else but existence\nin a previous moment.--But, if this were so, the previous momentary\nexistence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things\nwhatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the\nsubsequent moment-cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c.!--Let us\nthen say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of\nthose things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the\nsame species.--But from this again it would follow that one jar existing\nin the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in\nany place, existing in the following moment!--Perhaps you mean to say\nthat one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how then\nare we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing?--\nWell then I say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a\ncertain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only\nwhich exists at the very same place!--Very good, then you hold that a\nplace is something permanent! (while yet your doctrine is that there is\nnothing permanent).--Moreover as, on your theory, the thing which has\nentered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no\nlonger exist at the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be\nthe object of a cognition.\n\n\n\n\n20. There not being (a cause), there results contradiction of the\nadmitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness.\n\nIf it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not\nexist, then--as we have pointed out before--anything might originate\nanywhere and at any time. And not only would the origination of the\neffect thus remain unexplained, but an admitted principle would also be\ncontradicted. For you hold the principle that there are four causes\nbringing about the origination of a cognition, viz. the adhipati-cause,\nthe sahak\u00e2ri-cause, the \u00e2lambhana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. The\nterm adhipati denotes the sense-organs.--And if, in order to avoid\nopposition to an acknowledged principle, it be assumed that the\norigination of a further momentary jar takes place at the time when the\nprevious momentary jar still exists, then it would follow that the two\nmomentary jars, the causal one and the effected one, would be perceived\ntogether; but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived. And,\nfurther, the doctrine of general momentariness would thus be given up.\nAnd should it be said that (this is not so, but that) momentariness\nremains, it would follow that the connexion of the sense-organ with the\nobject and the cognition are simultaneous.\n\n\n\n\n21. There is non-establishment of pratisankhy\u00e2 and apratisankhy\u00e2\ndestruction, on account of non-interruption.\n\nSo far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been\nrefuted. The present S\u00fbtra now goes on to declare that also the absolute\n(niranvaya) destruction of that which is cannot rationally be\ndemonstrated. Those who maintain the momentariness of all things teach\nthat there are two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind, which\nconsists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences,\nand is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies\nsuch as the blow of a hammer (breaking a jar, e.g.); and the other of a\nsubtle kind, not capable of being perceived, and taking place in a\nseries of similar momentary existences at every moment. The former is\ncalled pratisankhy\u00e2-destruction; the latter apratisankhy\u00e2-destruction.--\nBoth these kinds of destruction are not possible.--Why?--On account of\nthe non-interruption, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the\ncomplete destruction of that which is. The impossibility of such\ndestruction was proved by us under II, 1, 14, where we showed that\norigination and destruction mean only the assumption of new states on\nthe part of one and the same permanent substance, and therefrom proved\nthe non-difference of the effect from the cause.--Here it may possibly\nbe objected that as we see that a light when extinguished passes away\nabsolutely, such absolute destruction may be inferred in other cases\nalso. But against this we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay\nbeing smashed we perceive that the material, i.e. clay, continues to\nexist, and that therefrom destruction is ascertained to be nothing else\nbut the passing over of a real substance into another state. The proper\nassumption, therefore, is that the extinguished light also has passed\nover into a different state, and that in that state it is no longer\nperceptible may be explained by that state being an extremely subtle one.\n\n\n\n\n22. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either\ncase.\n\nIt has been shown that neither origination from nothing, as held by the\nadvocates of general momentariness, is possible; nor the passing away\ninto nothing on the part of the thing originated. The acknowledgment of\neither of these views gives rise to difficulties. If the effect\noriginates from nothing, it is itself of the nature of nothing; for it\nis observed that effects share the nature of what they originate from.\nPitchers and ornaments, e.g. which are produced from clay and gold\nrespectively, possess the nature of their causal substances. But you\nhold yourself that the world is not seen to be of the nature of\nnothingness; and certainly it is not observed to be so.--Again, if that\nwhich is underwent absolute destruction, it would follow that after one\nmoment the entire world would pass away into nothingness; and\nsubsequently the world again originating from nothingness, it would\nfollow that, as shown above, it would itself be of the nature of\nnothingness (i.e. there would no longer be a _real_ world).--There being\nthus difficulties on both views, origination and destruction cannot take\nplace as described by you.\n\n\n\n\n23. And in the case of space also, on account of there being no\ndifference.\n\nIn order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we\nhave disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called\npratisankhy\u00e2 and apratisankhy\u00e2 mean reduction of an existing thing to\nnothing. This gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of\nEther (space) being likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the\nBauddhas hold it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non-\nentity, because, like those things which are admitted to be positive\nexistences, i.e. earth, and so on, it is proved by consciousness not\ninvalidated by any means of proof. For the formation of immediate\njudgments such as 'here a hawk flies, and there a vulture,' implies our\nbeing conscious of ether as marking the different places of the flight\nof the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that Space is nothing\nelse but the non-existence (abh\u00e2va) of earth, and so on; for this view\ncollapses as soon as set forth in definite alternatives. For whether we\ndefine Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth,\nand so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their absolute non-\nexistence--on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of\nSpace. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and\nsubsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as\nthe idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things\nexisting at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.\n\nIf, in the second place, we define it as the mutual non-existence of\nearth, and so on, it will follow that, as such mutual non-existence\ninheres in the things only which stand towards each other in the\nrelation of mutual non-existence, there is no perception of Space in the\nintervals between those things (while as a matter of fact there is). And,\nin the third place, absolute non-existence of earth, and so on, cannot\nof course be admitted. And as non-existence (abh\u00e2va) is clearly\nconceived as a special state of something actually existing, Space even\nif admitted to be of the nature of abh\u00e2va, would not on that account be\na futile non-entity (something 'tukcha' or 'nirup\u00e2khya').\n\n\n\n\n24. And on account of recognition.\n\nWe return to the proof of the, previously mooted, permanence of things.\nThe 'anusmriti' of the S\u00fbtra means cognition of what was previously\nperceived, i.e. recognition. It is a fact that all things which were\nperceived in the past may be recognised, such recognition expressing\nitself in the form 'this is just that (I knew before).' Nor must you say\nthat this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact of\nthe thing now perceived being similar to the thing perceived before, as\nin the case of the flame (where a succession of flames continually\nproduced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame); for you do not\nadmit that there is one permanent knowing subject that could have that\nerroneous idea. What one person has perceived, another cannot judge to\nbe the same as, or similar to, what he is perceiving himself. If\ntherefore you hold that there is an erroneous idea of oneness due to the\nperception of similarity residing in different things perceived at\ndifferent times, you necessarily must acknowledge oneness on the part of\nthe cognising subject. In the case of the flame there is a valid means\nof knowledge to prove that there really is a succession of similar\nflames, but in the case of the jar, we are not aware of such a means,\nand we therefore have no right to assume that recognition is due to the\nsimilarity of many successive jars.---Perhaps you will here argue as\nfollows. The momentariness of jars and the like is proved by Perception\nas well as Inference. Perception in the first place presents as its\nobject the present thing which is different from non-present things, in\nthe same way as it presents the blue thing as different from the yellow;\nit is in this way that we know the difference of the present thing from\nthe past and the future. Inference again proceeds as follows--jars and\nthe like are momentary because they produce effects and have existence\n(sattva); what is non-momentary, such as the horn of a hare, does not\nproduce effects and does not possess existence. We therefore conclude\nfrom the existence of the last momentary jar that the preceding jar-\nexistences also are perishable, just because they are momentary\nexistences like the existence of the last jar.--But both this perception\nand this inference have already been disproved by what was said above\nabout the impossibility of momentary existences standing to one another\nin the relation of cause and effect. Moreover, that difference of the\npresent object from the non-present object which is intimated by\nPerception does not prove the present object to be a different _thing_\n(from the past object of Perception), but merely its being connected with\nthe present time. This does not prove it to be a different thing, for\nthe same thing can be connected with different times. The two reasons\nagain which were said to prove the momentariness of jars are invalid\nbecause they may be made to prove just the contrary of what they are\nalleged to prove. For we may argue as follows--From existence and from\ntheir having effects it follows that jars, and so on, are permanent; for\nwhatever is non-permanent, is non-existent, and does not produce effects,\nas e.g. the horn of a hare. The capacity of producing effects can in\nfact be used only to prove non-momentariness on the part of jars, and so\non; for as things perishing within a moment are not capable of acting,\nthey are not capable of producing effects. Further, as it is seen in the\ncase of the last momentary existence that its destruction is due to a\nvisible cause (viz. the blow of a hammer or the like), the proper\nconclusion is that also the other momentary jars (preceding the last\none) require visible causes for their destruction; and (as no such causes\nare seen, it follows that) the jar is permanent and continuous up to the\ntime when a destructive cause, such as the blow of a hammer, supervenes.\nNor can it be said that hammers and the like are not the causes of\ndestruction, but only the causes of the origination of a new series of\nmomentary existences dissimilar to the former ones--in the case of the\njar, e.g. of a series of momentary fragments of a jar; for we have\nproved before that the destruction of jars, and so on, means nothing but\ntheir passing over into a different condition, e.g. that of fragments.\nAnd even if destruction were held to be something different from the\norigination of fragments, it would yet be reasonable to infer, on the\nground of immediate succession in time, that the cause of the\ndestruction is the blow of the hammer.\n\nHence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency of things as\nproved by the fact of recognition. He who maintains that recognition\nwhich has for its object the oneness of a thing connected with\nsuccessive points of time has for its objects different things, might as\nwell say that several cognitions of, let us say, blue colour have for\ntheir object something different from blue colour. Moreover, for him who\nmaintains the momentariness of the cognising subject and of the objects\nof cognition, it would be difficult indeed to admit the fact of\nInference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general\npropositions. He would in fact not be able to set forth the reason\nrequired to prove his assertion that things are momentary; for the\nspeaker perishes in the very moment when he states the proposition to be\nproved, and another person is unable to complete what has been begun by\nanother and about which he himself does not know anything.\n\n\n\n\n25. Not from non-entity, this not being observed.\n\nSo far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the\nVaibh\u00e2shikas as well as the Sautr\u00e2ntikas--both which schools maintain\nthe reality of external things.--Now the Sautr\u00e2ntika comes forward and\nopposes one of the arguments set forth by us above, viz. that, on the\nview of general momentariness, nothing can ever become an object of\ncognition, since the thing which enters into connexion with the sense-\norgan is no longer in existence when the cognition originates.--It is\nnot, he says, the persistence of the thing up to the time of cognition\nwhich is the cause of its becoming an object of cognition. To be an\nobject of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the\norigination of cognition. Nor does this definition imply that the sense-\norgans also are the objects of cognition. For a cause of cognition is\nheld to be an object of cognition only in so far as it imparts to the\ncognition its own form (and this the sense-organs do not). Now even a\nthing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition, and\non the basis of that form, blue colour, and so on, the thing itself is\ninferred. Nor can it be said (as the Yog\u00e2k\u00e2ras do) that the form of\nsubsequent cognitions is due to the action of previous cognitions (and\nnot to the external thing); for on this hypothesis it could not be\nexplained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour\nthere all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour. The manifold\ncharacter of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold\ncharacter of real thing.--To this we reply 'not from non-entity; this\nnot being observed.' The special forms of cognition, such as blue colour,\nand so on, cannot be the forms of things that have perished, and\ntherefore are not in Being, since this is not observed. For it is not\nobserved that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its\nattributes pass over into another thing. (Nor can it be said that the\nthing that perished leaves in cognition a reflection of itself, for)\nreflections also are only of persisting things, not of mere attributes.\nWe therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result\nfrom the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing\npersisting at the time of cognition.--The S\u00fbtras now set forth a further\nobjection which applies to both schools.\n\n\n\n\n26. And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active\npeople also.\n\nThus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from\nthe non-existent, causeless cognition, and so on, it would follow that\npersons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is\na fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of\nthings not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all\nexistences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing, or special\nattributes of it, such as after-effects (through which Svarga and the\nlike are effected) or knowledge (through which Release is effected) do\nnot persist, and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort.\nAnd as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause, even\nperfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this\nand in the next life, including final release. Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the aggregates.'\n\n\n\n\n27. Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.\n\nHere now come forward the Yog\u00e2k\u00e2ras, who hold that cognitions (ideas)\nonly are real. There is no reasonable ground, they say, for the view\nthat the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things,\nsince ideas themselves--no less than the things assumed by others--have\ntheir distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this manifold nature\nof ideas is sufficiently explained by so-called v\u00e2san\u00e2. V\u00e2san\u00e2 means a\nflow of ideas (states of consciousness--pratyaya) of different character.\nWe observe, e.g., that a cognition which has the form of a jar (i.e. the\nidea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar,\nand is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar, and this\nagain by a similar cognition, and so on; this is what we call a stream\nor flow of ideas.--But how, then, is it that internal cognitions have\nthe forms of external things, mustard-grains, mountains, and so on?--\nEven if real things are admitted, the Yog\u00e2k\u00e2ra replies, their becoming\nobjects of thought and speech depends altogether on the light of\nknowledge, for otherwise it would follow that there is no difference\nbetween the objects known by oneself and those known by others. And that\ncognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have forms (distinctive\ncharacteristics) must needs be admitted; for if they were without form\nthey could not shine forth. Now we are conscious only of one such form,\nviz. that of the cognition; that this form at the same time appears to\nus as something external (i.e. as the form of an outward thing) is due\nto error. From the general law that we are conscious of ideas and things\ntogether only, it follows that the thing is not something different from\nthe idea.\n\nAs, moreover, the fact of one idea specially representing one particular\nthing only, whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth or anything else,\nrequires for its explanation an equality in character of the idea and\nthe thing, those also who hold the existence of external things must\nneeds assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the thing; and\nas this suffices for rendering possible practical thought and\nintercourse, there is nothing authorising us to assume the existence of\nthings in addition to the ideas. Hence cognitions only constitute\nreality; external things do not exist.\n\nTo this the S\u00fbtra replies, 'Not non-existence, on account of\nconsciousness.' The non-existence of things, apart from ideas, cannot be\nmaintained, because we are conscious of cognitions as what renders the\nknowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to\nparticular _things_. For the consciousness of all men taking part in\nworldly life expresses itself in forms such as 'I know the jar.'\nKnowledge of this kind, as everybody's consciousness will testify,\npresents itself directly as belonging to a knowing subject and referring\nto an object; those therefore who attempt to prove, on the basis of this\nvery knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit\nsubjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in\ndetail in our refutation of those crypto-Bauddhas who take shelter under\na pretended Vedic theory.--To maintain, as the Yog\u00e2k\u00e2ras do, that the\ngeneral rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the\nnon-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self-contradiction;\nfor 'going together' can only be where there are different things. To\nhold that it is a general rule that of the idea--the essential nature of\nwhich is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into\ncommon thought and intercourse--we are always conscious together with\nthe thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different\nfrom the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to\nyou, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanently\npersisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions\nform a series in which each member colours or affects the next one\n(v\u00e2san\u00e2); for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely\nperished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen? We conclude\ntherefore that the manifoldness of cognitions is due solely to the\nmanifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas)\nas rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with\nby ordinary thought and speech, and the specific character of each\ncognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a\nparticular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction\n(samyoga), since knowledge (cognition) also is a substance. Just as\nlight (prabh\u00e2), although a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation\nof an attribute (guna), so knowledge stands in the relation of an\nattribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance.--From\nall this it follows that external things are not non-existent.\n\nThe next S\u00fbtra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the\nbaselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to\nthe cognitions of a dreaming person.\n\n\n\n\n28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.\n\nOwing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said\nthat, like them, the cognitions of the waking state also have no things\nto correspond to them. For dream-cognitions are originated by organs\nimpaired by certain defects, such as drowsiness, and are moreover\nsublated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the cognitions of\nthe waking state are of a contrary nature. There is thus no equality\nbetween the two sets.--Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real\ncontent, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your\ninferential cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other\nhand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that no\ncognition is devoid of such content; for all of them are alike\ncognitions, just like the inferential cognition.\n\n\n\n\n29. The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception.\n\nThe existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things is not\npossible, because such are nowhere perceived. For we nowhere perceive\ncognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to\nobjects. That even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we\nhave explained in the discussion of the different khy\u00e2tis (above, p.\n118).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'perception.'\n\n\n\n\n30. And on account of its being unproved in every way.\n\nHere now come forward the M\u00e2dhyamikas who teach that there is nothing\nbut a universal Void. This theory of a universal Nothing is the real\npurport of Sugata's doctrine; the theories of the momentariness of all\nexistence, &c., which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things,\nwere set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual\ncapacities of his pupils.--Neither cognitions nor external objects have\nreal existence; the Void (the 'Nothinj') only constitutes Reality, and\nfinal Release means passing over into Non-being. This is the real view\nof Buddha, and its truth is proved by the following considerations. As\nthe Nothing is not to be proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For\na cause has to be assigned for that only which _is_. But what _is_ does\nnot originate either from that which is or that which is not. We never\nobserve that which is to originate from Being; for things such as jars,\nand so on, do not originate as long as the lump of clay, &c., is non-\ndestroyed. Nor can Being originate from Non-being; for if the jar were\nsupposed to originate from Non-being, i.e. that non-being which results\nfrom the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be of the\nnature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown that nothing can\noriginate either from itself or from anything else. For the former\nhypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation\npresupposing the thing to be explained; and moreover no motive can be\nassigned for a thing originating from itself. And on the hypothesis of\nthings originating from other things, it would follow that anything\nmight originate from anything, for all things alike are _other_ things.\nAnd as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction. Hence\nthe _Nothing_ constitutes Reality: origination, destruction, Being, Non-\nbeing, and so on, are mere illusions (bhr\u00e2nti). Nor must it be said that\nas even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume\nsomething real to serve as a substrate; for in the same way as an\nillusion may arise even when the defect, the abode of the defect, and\nthe knowing subject are unreal, it also may arise even when the\nsubstrate of the illusion is unreal. Hence the _Nothing_ is the only\nreality.--To this the S\u00fbtra replies, 'And on account of its being in\neveryway unproved'--the theory of general Nothingness which you hold\ncannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or\nanything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you\ncan be established. For the terms _being_ and _non-being_ and the ideas\nexpressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular\nstates of actually _existing_ things only. If therefore you declare\n'everything is nothing,' your declaration is equivalent to the\ndeclaration, 'everything is being,' for your statement also can only\nmean that everything that _exists_ is capable of abiding in a certain\ncondition (which you call 'Nothing'). The absolute Nothingness you have\nin mind cannot thus be established in any way. Moreover, he who tries to\nestablish the tenet of universal Nothingness can attempt this in so far\nonly as,--through some means of knowledge, he has come to know\nNothingness, and he must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means.\nFor if it were not true it would follow that everything is real. The\nview of general Nothingness is thus altogether incapable of proof.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'unprovedness in every way.'\n\n\n\n\n31. Not so, on account of the impossibility in one.\n\nThe Bauddhas have been refuted. As now the Jainas also hold the view of\nthe world originating from atoms and similar views, their theory is\nreviewed next.--The Jainas hold that the world comprises souls (j\u00eeva),\nand non-souls (aj\u00eeva), and that there is no Lord. The world further\ncomprises six substances (dravya), viz. souls (j\u00eeva), merit (dharma),\ndemerit (adharma), bodies (pudgala), time (k\u00e2la), and space (\u00e2k\u00e2sa). The\nsouls are of three different kinds-bound (in the state of bondage),\nperfected by Yoga (Yogasiddha), and released (mukta). 'Merit' is that\nparticular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the motion of\nall things moving; 'demerit' is that all-pervading substance which is\nthe cause of stationariness, 'Body' is that substance which possesses\ncolour, smell, taste, and touch. It is of two kinds, atomic or\ncompounded of atoms; to the latter kind belong wind, fire, water, earth,\nthe bodies of living creatures, and so on. 'Time' is a particular atomic\nsubstance which is the cause of the current distinction of past, present,\nand future. 'Space' is one, and of infinite extent. From among these\nsubstances those which are not atomic are comprehended under the term\n'the five astik\u00e2yas (existing bodies)'--the astik\u00e2ya of souls, the\nastik\u00e2ya of merit, the astik\u00e2ya of demerit, the astik\u00e2ya of matter, the\nastik\u00e2ya of space. This term 'astik\u00e2ya' is applied to substances\noccupying several parts of space.--They also use another division of\ncategories which subserves the purpose of Release; distinguishing souls,\nnon-souls, influx (\u00e2srava), bondage, nijara, samvara, and Release.\n_Release_ comprises the means of Release also, viz. perfect knowledge,\ngood conduct, and so on. The soul is that which has knowledge, seeing,\npleasure, strength (v\u00eerya) for its qualities. Non-soul is the aggregate\nof the things enjoyed by the souls. 'Influx' is whatever is instrumental\ntowards the souls having the fruition of objects, viz. the sense-organs,\nand so on.--Bondage is of eight different kinds, comprising the four\ngh\u00e2tikarman, and the four agh\u00e2tikarman. The former term denotes whatever\nobstructs the essential qualities of the soul, viz. knowledge,\nintuition, strength, pleasure; the latter whatever causes pleasure,\npain, and indifference, which are due to the persistence of the wrong\nimagination that makes the soul identify itself with its body.--'Decay'\nmeans the austerities (tapas), known from the teaching of the Arhat,\nwhich are the means of Release.--Samvara is such deep meditation\n(Sam\u00e2dhi) as stops the action of the sense-organs.--Release, finally, is\nthe manifestation of the Self in its essential nature, free from all\nafflictions such as passion, and so on.--The atoms which are the causes\nof earth and the other compounds, are not, as the Vaiseshikas and others\nhold, of four different kinds, but have all the same nature; the\ndistinctive qualities of earth, and so on, are due to a modification\n(parin\u00e2ma) of the atoms. The Jainas further hold that the whole complex\nof things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as being existent and\nnon-existent, permanent and non-permanent, separate and non-separate. To\nprove this they apply their so-called sapta-bhang\u00ee-ny\u00e2ya ('the system of\nthe seven paralogisms')--'May be, it is'; 'May be, it is not'; 'May be,\nit is and is not'; 'May be, it is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is\nnot predicable'; 'May be, it is not, and is not predicable'; 'May be, it\nis and is not, and is not predicable.' With the help of this they prove\nthat all things--which they declare to consist of substance (dravya),\nand pary\u00e2ya--to be existing, one and permanent in so far as they are\nsubstances, and the opposite in so far as they are pary\u00e2yas. By pary\u00e2ya\nthey understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of\nthe nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove\nexistence, non-existence, and so on.--With regard to this the S\u00fbtra\nremarks that no such proof is possible,'Not so, on account of the\nimpossibility in one'; i.e. because contradictory attributes such as\nexistence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one\nthing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and\nparticular states qualifying it--and (by the Jainas), called\npary\u00e2ya--are different things (pad\u00e2rtha), one substance cannot be\nconnected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a\nsubstance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should\nat the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e.\nnon-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in\nits being the abode of those particular states which are called\norigination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an\nopposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference\n(bhinnatva) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory\nattributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence\npossibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference;\nnot any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo\ncan belong to one animal. We have explained this matter at length,\nwhen--under S\u00fbtra I, 1--refuting the bhed\u00e2bheda-theory. Time we are\nconscious of only as an attribute of substances (not as an independent\nsubstance), and the question as to its being and non-being, and so on,\ndoes not therefore call for a separate discussion. To speak of time as\nbeing and non-being in no way differs from generic characteristics\n(j\u00e2ti), and so on, being spoken of in the same way; for--as we have\nexplained before--of j\u00e2ti and the like we are conscious only as\nattributes of substances.--But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask\nthe Ved\u00e2ntin), how can you maintain that Brahman, although one only, yet\nat the same time is the Self of all?--Because, we reply, the whole\naggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of\nthe Supreme Person, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. And that the body\nand the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally\ndifferent nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of his\nbody), we have explained likewise.--Moreover, as your six substances,\nsoul, and so on, are not one substance and one pary\u00e2ya, their being one\nsubstance, and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also\nnot one, and so on.--And if it should be said that those six substances\nare such (viz. one and several, and so on), each owing to its own\npary\u00e2ya and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid\ncontradicting your own theory of everything being of an ambiguous\nnature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual\nnon-existence cannot after all be identical.--Hence the theory of the\nJainas is not reasonable. Moreover it is liable to the same objections\nwhich we have above set forth as applying to all theories of atoms\nconstituting the universal cause, without the guidance of a Lord.\n\n\n\n\n33. And likewise non-entireness of the Self.\n\nOn your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the Self. For\nyour opinion is that souls abide in numberless places, each soul having\nthe same size as the body which it animates. When, therefore, the soul\npreviously abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter\ninto a body of smaller size, e. g. that of an ant, it would follow that\nas the soul then occupies less space, it would not remain entire, but\nwould become incomplete.--Let us then avoid this difficulty by assuming\nthat the soul passes over into a different state--which process is\ncalled pary\u00e2ya,--which it may manage because it is capable of\ncontraction and dilatation.--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n34. Nor also is there non-contradiction from pary\u00e2ya; on account of\nchange, and so on.\n\nNor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul\nassuming a different condition through contraction or dilatation. For\nthis would imply that the soul is subject to change, and all the\nimperfections springing from it, viz. non-permanence, and so on, and\nhence would not be superior to non-sentient things such as jars and the\nlike.\n\n\n\n\n35. And on account of the endurance of the final (size), and the\n(resulting) permanency of both; there is no difference.\n\nThe final size of the soul, i.e. the size it has in the state of Release,\nis enduring since the soul does not subsequently pass into another body;\nand both, i.e. the soul in the state of Release and the size of that\nsoul, are permanent (nitya). From this it follows that that ultimate\nsize is the true essential size of the soul and also belongs to it\npreviously to Release. Hence there is no difference of sizes, and the\nsoul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies. The \u00c2rhata\ntheory is therefore untenable.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the\nimpossibility in one.'\n\n\n\n\n36. (The system) of the Lord (must be disregarded), on account of\ninappropriateness.\n\nSo far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila, Kan\u00e2da, Sugata,\nand the Arhat must be disregarded by men desirous of final beatitude;\nfor those doctrines are all alike untenable and foreign to the Veda. The\nS\u00fbtras now declare that, for the same reasons, the doctrine of Pasupati\nalso has to be disregarded. The adherents of this view belong to four\ndifferent classes--K\u00e2p\u00e2las, K\u00e2l\u00e2mukhas, P\u00e2supatas, and Saivas. All of\nthem hold fanciful theories of Reality which are in conflict with the\nVeda, and invent various means for attaining happiness in this life and\nthe next. They maintain the general material cause and the operative\ncause to be distinct, and the latter cause to be constituted by Pasupati.\nThey further hold the wearing of the six so-called 'mudr\u00e2' badges and\nthe like to be means to accomplish the highest end of man.\n\nThus the K\u00e2p\u00e2las say, 'He who knows the true nature of the six mudr\u00e2s,\nwho understands the highest mudr\u00e2, meditating on himself as in the\nposition called bhag\u00e2sana, reaches Nirv\u00e2na. The necklace, the golden\nornament, the earring, the head-jewel, ashes, and the sacred thread are\ncalled the six mudr\u00e2s. He whose body is marked with these is not born\nhere again.'--Similarly the K\u00e2l\u00e2mukhas teach that the means for\nobtaining all desired results in this world as well as the next are\nconstituted by certain practices--such as using a skull as a drinking\nvessel, smearing oneself with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh\nof such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar and\nusing it as a platform for making offerings to the gods, and the like.\n'A bracelet made of Rudr\u00e2ksha-seeds on the arm, matted hair on the head,\na skull, smearing oneself with ashes, &c.'--all this is well known from\nthe sacred writings of the Saivas. They also hold that by some special\nceremonial performance men of different castes may become Br\u00e2hmanas and\nreach the highest \u00e2srama: 'by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony\n(d\u00eeksh\u00e2) a man becomes a Br\u00e2hmana at once; by undertaking the k\u00e2p\u00e2la\nrite a man becomes at once an ascetic.'\n\nWith regard to these views the S\u00fbtra says 'of pati, on account of\ninappropriateness.' A 'not' has here to be supplied from S\u00fbtra 32. The\nsystem of Pasupati has to be disregarded because it is inappropriate, i.\ne. because the different views and practices referred to are opposed to\none another and in conflict with the Veda. The different practices\nenumerated above, the wearing of the six mudr\u00e2s and so on, are opposed\nto each other; and moreover the theoretical assumptions of those people,\ntheir forms of devotion and their practices, are in conflict with the\nVeda. For the Veda declares that N\u00e2r\u00e2yana who is the highest Brahman is\nalone the operative and the substantial cause of the world, 'N\u00e2r\u00e2yana is\nthe highest Brahman, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana is the highest Reality, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana is the\nhighest light, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana is the highest Self'; 'That thought, may I be\nmany, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He desired, may I be many,\nmay I grow forth' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), and so on. In the same way the\ntexts declare meditation on the Supreme Person, who is the highest\nBrahman, to be the only meditation which effects final release; cp. 'I\nknow that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness. A man who\nknows him passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up.\nIII, 8). And in the same way all texts agree in declaring that the works\nsubserving the knowledge of Brahman are only those sacrificial and other\nworks which the Veda enjoins on men in the different castes and stages\nof life: 'Him Br\u00e2hmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by\nsacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. Wishing for that world only,\nmendicants wander forth from their homes' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 22). In some\ntexts enjoining devout meditation, and so on, we indeed meet with terms\nsuch as Praj\u00e2pati, Siva, Indra, \u00c2k\u00e2sa, Pr\u00e2na, &c., but that these all\nrefer to the supreme Reality established by the texts concerning\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana--the aim of which texts it is to set forth the highest Reality\nin its purity--, we have already proved under I, 1, 30. In the same way\nwe have proved under S\u00fb. I, 1, 2 that in texts treating of the creation\nof the world, such as 'Being only this was in the beginning,' and the\nlike, the words _Being_, _Brahman_, and so on, denote nobody else but\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana, who is set forth as the universal creator in the account of\ncreation given in the text, 'Alone indeed there was N\u00e2r\u00e2yana, not Brahm\u00e2,\nnot Is\u00e2na--he being alone did not rejoice' (Mahopanishad I).--As the\nPasupati theory thus teaches principles, meditations and acts\nconflicting with the Veda, it must be disregarded.\n\n\n\n\n37. And on account of the impossibility of rulership.\n\nThose who stand outside the Veda arrive through inference at the\nconclusion that the Lord is a mere operative cause. This being so, they\nmust prove the Lord's being the ruler (of the material cause) on the\nbasis of observation. But it is impossible to prove that the Lord is the\nruler of the Pradh\u00e2na in the same way as the potter e.g. is the ruler of\nthe clay. For the Lord is without a body, while the power of ruling\nmaterial causes is observed only in the case of embodied beings such as\npotters. Nor may you have recourse to the hypothesis of the Lord being\nembodied; for--as we have shown under I, 1, 3--there arise difficulties\nwhether that body, which as body must consist of parts, be viewed as\neternal or as non-eternal.\n\n\n\n\n38. If you say, as in the case of the organs; we deny this, on account\nof enjoyment and so on.\n\nIt may possibly be said that, in the same way as the enjoying\n(individual) soul, although in itself without a body, is seen to rule\nthe sense-organs, the body, and so on, the great Lord also, although\nwithout a body, may rule the Pradh\u00e2na. But this analogy cannot be\nallowed 'on account of enjoyment,' and so on. The body's being ruled by\nthe soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and evil\nworks, and has for its end the requital of those works. Your analogy\nwould thus imply that the Lord also is under the influence of an unseen\nprinciple, and is requited for his good and evil works.--The Lord cannot\ntherefore be a ruler.\n\n\n\n\n39. Finiteness or absence of omniscience.\n\n'Or' here has the sense of 'and.' If the Lord is under the influence of\nthe adrishta, it follows that, like the individual soul, he is subject\nto creation, dissolution, and so on, and that he is not omniscient. The\nPasupati theory cannot therefore be accepted.--It is true that the S\u00fbtra,\n'but in case of conflict (with Scripture) it is not to be regarded' (P\u00fb.\nM\u00ee. S\u00fb. I, 3, 3), has already established the non-acceptability of all\nviews contrary to the Veda; the present adhikarana, however, raises this\nquestion again in order specially to declare that the Pasupati theory _is_\ncontrary to the Veda. Although the P\u00e2supata and the Saiva systems\nexhibit some features which are not altogether contrary to the Veda, yet\nthey are unacceptable because they rest on an assumption contrary to the\nVeda, viz. of the difference of the general, instrumental and material\ncauses, and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'Pasupati.'\n\n\n\n\n40. On account of the impossibility of origination.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz. that the\nPa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra tantra--which sets forth the means of attaining supreme\nbeatitude, as declared by the Lord (Bhagavat)--may also be destitute of\nauthority, in so far, namely, as belonging to the same class as the\ntantras of Kapila and others. The above S\u00fbtra raises the doubt.\n\nThe theory of the Bh\u00e2gavatas is that from V\u00e2sudeva, who is the highest\nBrahman and the highest cause, there originates the individual soul\ncalled Sankarshana; from Sankarshana the internal organ called Pradyumna;\nand from Pradyumna the principle of egoity called Aniruddha. Now this\ntheory implies the origination of the individual soul, and this is\ncontrary to Scripture. For scriptural texts declare the soul to be\nwithout a beginning--cp. 'the intelligent one is not born and does not\ndie' (Ka. Up. II, 18), and other texts.\n\n\n\n\n41. And there is not (origination) of the instrument from the agent.\n\n'The internal organ called Pradyumna originates from Sankarshana,' i. e.\nthe internal organ originates from the individual soul which is the\nagent. But this is inadmissible, since the text 'from him there is\nproduced breath, mind, and all sense-organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) declares\nthat the mind also springs from none else but the highest Brahman. As\nthe Bh\u00e2gavata doctrine thus teaches things opposed to Scripture, its\nauthoritativeness cannot be admitted.--Against these objections the next\nS\u00fbtra declares itself.\n\n\n\n\n42. Or, if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on,\nthere is no contradiction to that (i.e. the Bh\u00e2gavata doctrine).\n\nThe 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained. By 'that which is\nknowledge and so on' [FOOTNOTE 524:1] we have to understand the highest\nBrahman. If Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are of the nature of\nthe highest Brahman, then truly there can be no objection to a body of\ndoctrine which sets forth this relation. The criticism that the\nBh\u00e2gavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the individual soul, is\nmade by people who do not understand that system. What it teaches is\nthat the highest Brahman, there called V\u00e2sudeva, from kindness to those\ndevoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render\nitself accessible to its devotees. Thus it is said in the Paushkara-\nsamhit\u00e2, 'That which enjoins that Brahmanas have to worship, under its\nproper names, the fourfold nature of the Self; that is the authoritative\ndoctrine.' That this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature means\nworship of the highest Brahman, called V\u00e2sudeva, is declared in the\nS\u00e2tvata-samhit\u00e2, 'This is the supreme s\u00e2stra, the great Brahmopanishad,\nwhich imparts true discrimination to Brahmawas worshipping the real\nBrahman under the name of V\u00e2sudeva.' That highest Brahman, called\nV\u00e2sudeva, having for its body the complete aggregate of the six\nqualities, divides itself in so far as it is either the 'Subtle'\n(s\u00fbkshma), or 'division' (vy\u00fbha), or 'manifestation' (vibhava), and is\nattained in its fulness by the devotees who, according to their\nqualifications, do worship to it by means of works guided by knowledge.\n'From the worship of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vy\u00fbha, and\nfrom the worship of the vy\u00fbha one attains to the \"Subtile\" called\nV\u00e2sudeva, i.e. the highest Brahman'--such is their doctrine. By the\n'vibhava' we have to understand the aggregate of beings, such as Rama,\nKrishna, &c., in whom the highest Being becomes manifest; by the 'vy\u00fbha'\nthe fourfold arrangement or division of the highest Reality, as V\u00e2sudeva,\nSankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; by the 'Subtle' the highest\nBrahman itself, in so far as it has for its body the mere aggregate of\nthe six qualities--as which it is called 'V\u00e2sudeva.' Compare on this\npoint the Paushkara, 'That body of doctrine through which, by means of\nworks based on knowledge, one fully attains to the imperishable highest\nBrahman, called V\u00e2sudeva,' and so on, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and\nAniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the highest Brahman\nvoluntarily assumes. Scripture already declares, 'Not born he is born in\nmany ways,' and it is this birth--consisting in the voluntary assumption\nof bodily form, due to tenderness towards its devotees--which the\nBh\u00e2gavata system teaches; hence there lies no valid objection to the\nauthoritativeness of that system. And as Sankarshana. Pradyumna, and\nAniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal\norgans and organs of egoity, there can be no objection to their being\nthemselves denoted by those latter terms, viz. individual soul, and so\non. The case is analogous to that of Brahman being designated, in some\ntexts, by terms such as ether, breath, and the like.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 524:1. Or 'by that which is knowledge and cause.']\n\n\n\n\n43. And on account of contradiction.\n\nThe origination of the j\u00eeva is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the\nbooks of the Bh\u00e2gavatas also. Thus in the Parama-samhit\u00e2 'The nature of\nPrakriti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of\nanother, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three\ngunas and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all\nagents. With her the soul (purusha) is connected in the way of\ninseparable association; that soul is known to be truly without\nbeginning and without end.' And as all Samhitas make similar statements\nas to the eternity of the soul, the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra doctrine manifestly\ncontroverts the view of the essential nature of the jiva being something\nthat originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as well as in\ncommon life the soul is spoken of as being born, dying, &c., will be\nexplained under S\u00fb. II, 3, 17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the\nBh\u00e2gavata system also denies the origination of the soul, and that hence\nthe objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are\nwithout any force. Another objection is raised by some. S\u00e2ndilya, they\nargue, is said to have promulgated the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra doctrine because he\ndid not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda and\nits auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra is\nopposed to the Veda.--his objection, we reply, springs from nothing else\nbut the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest\nknowledge of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered the\nhosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When the Veda says,\n'Morning after morning those speak untruth who make the Agnihotra\noffering before sunrise,' it is understood that the censure there passed\non the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering\nafter sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the 'bh\u00fbma-vidy\u00e2' (Ch. Up.\nVII, 2). There at the beginning N\u00e2rada says, 'I know the Rig-veda, the\nYajur-veda, the S\u00e2ma-veda, the \u00c2tharvana as the fourth, the Itih\u00e2sa-\npur\u00e2na as the fifth,' and so on, enumerating all the various branches of\nknowledge, and finally summing up 'with all this I know the mantras only,\nI do not know the Self.' Now this declaration of the knowledge of the\nSelf not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the\nknowledge of the Bh\u00fbman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify\nthis latter knowledge, which is about to be expounded. Or else N\u00e2rada's\nwords refer to the fact that from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines\nhe had not obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous to\nthis is the case of S\u00e2ndilya's alleged objection to the Veda. That the\nBh\u00e2gavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense\nof the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared\nin the Paramasamhita,'I have read the Vedas at length, together with all\nthe various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot\nsee a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to\nblessedness, whereby I might reach perfection'; and 'The wise Lord Hari,\nanimated by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential\nmeaning of all the Ved\u00e2nta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.' The\nincontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord who is known from the\nVed\u00e2nta-texts, i.e. V\u00e2sudeva, called there the highest Brahman--who is\nantagonistic to all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is\nan ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted qualities, such as infinite\nintelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes come true--perceiving\nthat those devoted to him, according as they are differently placed in\nthe four castes and the four stages of life, are intent on the different\nends of life, viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final\nrelease; and recognising that the Vedas--which teach the truth about his\nown nature, his glorious manifestations, the means of rendering him\npropitious and the fruits of such endeavour--are difficult to fathom by\nall beings other than himself, whether gods or men, since those Vedas\nare divided into Rik, Yajus, S\u00e2man, and Atharvan; and being animated by\ninfinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity; with a view to enable his\ndevotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas, himself composed the\nPa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra-s\u00e2stra. The author of the S\u00fbtras (Vy\u00e2sa)--who first composed\nthe S\u00fbtras, the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments\nestablishing the Ved\u00e2nta doctrine, and then the Bh\u00e2rata-samhit\u00e2 (i.e.\nthe Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata) in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support\nthereby the teaching of the Veda--himself says in the chapter called\nMokshadharma, which treats of knowledge, 'If a householder, or a\nBrahmak\u00e2rin, or a hermit, or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what\ndeity should he worship?' and so on; explains then at great length the\nPa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra system, and then says, 'From the lengthy Bh\u00e2rata story,\ncomprising one hundred thousand slokas, this body of doctrine has been\nextracted, with the churning-staff of mind, as butter is churned from\ncurds--as butter from milk, as the Brahmana from men, as the \u00c2ranyaka\nfrom the Vedas, as Amrita from medicinal herbs.--This great Upanishad,\nconsistent with the four Vedas, in harmony with S\u00e2nkhya and Yoga, was\ncalled by him by the name of Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra. This is excellent, this is\nBrahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing with the Rik, the\nYajus, the S\u00e2man, and the Atharv\u00e2n-giras, this doctrine will be truly\nauthoritative.' The terms S\u00e2nkhya and Yoga here denote the concentrated\napplication of knowledge and of works. As has been said, 'By the\napplication of knowledge on the part of the S\u00e2nkhya, and of works on the\npart of the Yogins.' And in the Bh\u00eeshmaparvan we read, 'By Brahmanas,\nKshattriyas, Vaisyas and S\u00fbdras, M\u00e2dhava is to be honoured, served and\nworshipped--he who was proclaimed by Sankarshana in agreement with the\nS\u00e2tvata law.'--How then could these utterances of B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana, the\nforemost among all those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be\nreconciled with the view that in the S\u00fbtras he maintains the non-\nauthoritativeness of the S\u00e2tvata doctrine, the purport of which is to\nteach the worship of, and meditation on, V\u00e2sudeva, who is none other\nthan the highest Brahman known from the Ved\u00e2nta-texts?\n\nBut other passages in the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata, such as 'There is the S\u00e2nkhya,\nthe Yoga, the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra, the Vedas, and the Pasupata doctrine; do all\nthese rest on one and the same basis, or on different ones?' and so on,\ndeclare that the S\u00e2nkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard,\nwhile yet in the S\u00e2r\u00eeraka S\u00fbtras those very same doctrines are formally\nrefuted. Why, therefore, should not the same hold good in the case of\nthe Bh\u00e2gavata doctrine?--Not so, we reply. In the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata also\nB\u00e2darayana applies to the S\u00e2nkhya and other doctrines the same style of\nreasoning as in the S\u00fbtras. The question, asked in the passage quoted,\nmeans 'Do the S\u00e2nkhya, the Yoga, the Pasupata, and the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra set\nforth one and the same reality, or different ones? If the former, what\nis that reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doctrines, and,\nas reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either\nsuch or such, one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as\nauthoritative, and the question then arises which is to be so\nacknowledged?'--The answer to the question is given in the passage\nbeginning, 'Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The\npromulgator of the S\u00e2nkhya is Kapila,' &c. Here the human origin of the\nS\u00e2nkhya, Yoga, and P\u00e2supata is established on the ground of their having\nbeen produced by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Pasupati. Next the clause\n'Apar\u00e2ntatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas' intimates the non-\nhuman character of the Vedas; and finally the clause 'Of the whole\nPa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra, N\u00e2r\u00e2yana himself is the promulgator' declares that N\u00e2r\u00e2yana\nhimself revealed the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra doctrine. The connected purport of these\ndifferent clauses is as follows. As the systems of human origin set\nforth doctrines mutually contradictory, and, moreover, teach what is in\nconflict with the matter known from the Veda--which, on account of its\nnon-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other\nimperfections--they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to\nanything not depending on human action and choice. Now the matter to be\nknown from the Veda is N\u00e2r\u00e2yana, who is none other than the highest\nBrahman. It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different\nsystems--the pradh\u00e2na, the soul (purusha), Pasupati, and so on--have to\nbe viewed as real only in so far as N\u00e2r\u00e2yana, i.e. the highest Brahman,\nas known from the Ved\u00e2nta-texts, constitutes their Self. This the text\ndirectly declares in the passage, 'In all those doctrines it is seen, in\naccordance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayawa is the\nonly basis.' This means--'To him who considers the entities set forth in\nthose systems with the help of argumentation, it is evident that\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana alone is the basis of all those entities.' In other words, as\nthe entities set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who\nremembers the teaching of texts such as 'all this indeed is Brahman,'\n'N\u00e2r\u00e2yana is all,' which declare Brahman to be the Self of all, comes to\nthe conclusion that N\u00e2r\u00e2yana alone is the basis of those entities. As\nthus it is settled that the highest Brahman, as known from the Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts, or N\u00e2r\u00e2yana, himself is the promulgator of the entire Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra,\nand that this system teaches the nature of N\u00e2r\u00e2yana and the proper way\nof worshipping him, none can disestablish the view that in the\nPa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra all the other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the\nMah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata says, 'Thus the S\u00e2nkhya-yoga and the Veda and the \u00c2ranyaka,\nbeing members of one another, are called the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra,' i.e. the\nS\u00e2nkhya, the Yoga, the Vedas, and the \u00c2ranyakas, which are members of\none another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth\none Truth, together are called the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra.--The S\u00e2nkhya explains the\ntwenty-five principles, the Yoga teaches certain practices and means of\nmental concentration, and the \u00c2ranyakas teach that all the subordinate\nprinciples have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental\nconcentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman,\nand that the rites and works which are set forth in the Veda are means\nto win the favour of Brahman--thus giving instruction as to Brahman's\nnature. Now all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly\nset forth in the Pa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra by the highest Brahman, i.e. N\u00e2r\u00e2yana,\nhimself. The S\u00e2r\u00eeraka S\u00e2stra (i.e. the Ved\u00e2nta) does not disprove the\nprinciples assumed by the S\u00e2nkhyas, but merely the view of their not\nhaving Brahman for their Self; and similarly in its criticism on the\nYoga and P\u00e2supata systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being\na mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as to the relative\nposition of higher and lower entities, and certain practices not\nwarranted by the Veda; but it does not reject the Yoga itself, nor again\nthe lord P\u00e2supati. Hence Smriti says,' The S\u00e2nkhya, the Yoga, the\nPa\u00f1kar\u00e2tra, the Vedas, and the Psupata doctrine--all these having their\nproof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.' The essential\npoints in all these doctrines are to be adopted, not to be rejected\nabsolutely as the teaching of Jina. or Sugata is to be rejected. For, as\nsaid in the Smriti text quoted above, in all those doctrines it is seen,\naccording to tradition and reasoning, that the lord N\u00e2r\u00e2yana is the only\nbasis.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of\norigination.'\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. Not Ether; on account of the absence of scriptural statement.\n\nWe have demonstrated that the S\u00e2nkhya-system and other systems standing\noutside the Veda are untenable since they rest on fallacious reasoning\nand are self-contradictory. In order to prove that our own view is\naltogether free from all objections of this kind, we shall now explain\nin detail the mode in which this world, with all its sentient and non-\nsentient beings, is produced by Brahman, whom we hold to be the general\ncreator.\n\nThe first doubt here presenting itself is whether Ether be something\nproduced or not.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains that it is not produced,\nsince there is no scriptural statement to that effect. A scriptural\nstatement may be expected with regard to what is possible; but what is\nimpossible--as e.g. the origination of a sky-flower or of Ether--cannot\npossibly be taught by Scripture. For the origination of Ether, which is\nnot made up of parts and is all pervasive, cannot be imagined in any way.\nFor this very reason, i.e. the impossibility of the thing, the Chandogya,\nin its account of creation, mentions the origination of fire, water, &c.\nonly (but not of Ether)--'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,'\n'It sent forth fire,' and so on. When therefore the Taittir\u00eeya, the\nAtharvana, and other texts tell us that Ether did originate--'From that\nSelf sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From him is born breath, mind,\nand all organs of sense, Ether, air, light, water,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1,\n4)--such statements are contrary to sense, and hence refute themselves.--\nTo this the S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n2. But there is.\n\nBut there is origination of Ether. For Scripture, which is concerned\nwith matters transcending sense perception, is able to establish the\ntruth even of the origination of Ether, although this be not proved by\nother means of knowledge. And in a matter known from Scripture a\ncontradictory inference, such as that Ether cannot originate because it\nis without parts, is not of sufficient force. That the non-\noriginatedness of the Self also does not rest on its being without parts\nwill be shown further on.--Here the P\u00fbrvapakshin raises an objection.\n\n\n\n\n3. It has a secondary sense, on account of impossibility and of the text.\n\nIt is reasonable to assume that in passages such as 'From that Self\nthere sprang Ether.' the origination of Ether is not to be taken in its\nliteral sense; for according to the Ch\u00e2ndogya-text 'it sent forth fire.'\nBrahman engaged in creation first produces fire, and fire thus having\nthe first place, the text cannot possibly mean to say that Ether also\nwas produced. Moreover, there is another text, viz.'V\u00e2yu and antariksha\n(i.e. Ether), this is the Immortal,' according to which Ether is\nimmortal, i. e. non-produced.--But how can one and the same word viz. it\n'sprang' (i.e. originated), be taken in a metaphorical sense with\nreference to Ether, and in its literal sense with reference to fire, and\nso on?--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n4. There may be (a double sense) of the one (word), as in the case of\nthe word 'Brahman.'\n\nSince in the clause 'from that Self there sprang Brahman,' the word\n'sprang' cannot be taken in its literal senbe, it may be used there in a\nsecondary sense; while the same word as connected with the subsequent\nclauses 'from V\u00e2yu Agni,' &c., may have its primary sense. This would be\nanalogous to the use of the word Brahman in Mu. Up. I, 1. There in the\nclause 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and matter' (9). the\nword _Brahman_ is used in a secondary sense, i.e. denotes the Pradh\u00e2na;\nwhile in the same chapter, in the clause 'Brahman swells by means of\nbrooding' (8), the same word denotes Brahman in its primary sense. It is\ntrue indeed that in this latter case the word 'Brahman' occurs twice;\nwhile in the Taitt. text the word 'sambh\u00fbta' occurs once only, and has\nto be carried over from the first clause into the subsequent ones; but\nthis makes no difference, for, in the case of such carrying over of a\nword, no less than in the case of actual repetition, the general\ndenotation of the word is repeated.--The next S\u00fbtra refutes this\nobjection.\n\n\n\n\n5. The non-abandonment of the promissory statement (results) from non-\ndifference.\n\nIt is not appropriate to assume, from deference to the Ch\u00e2ndogya-text, a\nsecondary meaning for those other texts also which declare Ether to have\noriginated. For the Ch\u00e2ndogyaitself virtually admits the origination of\nEther; in so far, namely, as the clause 'that by which the non-heard is\nheard,' &c., declares that through the knowledge of Brahman everything\nis known. This declaration is not abandoned, i.e. is adhered to, only if\nthe Ether also is an effect of Brahman and thus non-different from it.\n\n\n\n\n6. (As follows also) from (other) texts.\n\nThat Ether is an originated thing follows from other clauses also in the\nCh\u00e2ndogya: 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second'\naffirms the oneness of everything before creation, and 'In that all this\nhas its Self implies that everything is an effect of, and hence non-\ndifferent from, Brahman.--Nor does the statement as to the creation of\nfire, 'it sent forth fire,' exclude the creation of Ether. For the first\nplace which there is assigned to fire rests only thereon that no mention\nis made of the creation of Ether, and this has no force to negative the\ncreation of Ether as positively stated in other texts.\n\n\n\n\n7. But the division (origination) extends over all effects; as in\nordinary life.\n\nThe 'but' has the sense of 'and.' As the clause 'In that all this has\nits Self' and similar ones directly state that Ether also is a creation\nof Brahman, the division, i.e. the origination of Ether from Brahman, is\nimplicitly declared thereby. As in ordinary life. When in ordinary life\nsomebody has said 'all these men are the sons of Devadatta,' it is known\nthat any particulars which may afterwards be given about the descent of\nsome of them are meant to apply to all.--In accordance with this our\nconclusion we interpret the text 'Air and Ether, this is the Immortal,'\nas asserting only that air and Ether continue to exist for a long time,\nas the Devas do.\n\n\n\n\n8. Hereby air is explained.\n\nThe same argumentation explains the origination of air also. That a\nspecial S\u00fbtra is devoted to the origination of air--instead of disposing\nin one S\u00fbtra of Ether and air--is for the sake of S\u00fbtra 10, which states\nthat 'hence (i.e. from air) there originated fire.'\n\n\n\n\n9. But there is non-origination of that which is (only); on account of\nimpossibility.\n\nThe 'but' has an affirmative sense. There is non-origination of that\nwhich is, i.e. of Brahman only; of whatever is different from Brahman\nnon-origination cannot possibly be established. This means--the\norigination of Ether and air has been proved only in order to illustrate\na general truth. Only that which _is_, i.e. Brahman, which is the\ngeneral cause, cannot originate. Whatever is other than Brahman, i. e.\nthe entire world comprising the Unevolved, the great principle (mahat),\nahank\u00e2ra, the tanm\u00e2tras, the sense-organs, the Ether, the air, and so on,\ncannot possibly be shown to be non-originated, since its being an effect\nis proved by the text declaring that everything is known through one\nthing, and in other ways.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Ether.'\n\n\n\n\n10. Fire (is produced) thence, for thus Scripture declares.\n\nIt has been stated that everything different from Brahman is the effect\nof Brahman. The doubt now arises whether the more remote effects of\nBrahman originate, each of them, only from that substance which is their\nimmediately antecedent cause or from Brahman in the form of that\nsubstance.--The decision is that they originate from those substances\nonly; for the text 'from air fire' directly states the origination of\nfire from air.\n\n\n\n\n11. Water (from fire).\n\nWater also originates 'thence,' i. e from fire; for so the texts declare\n'From fire water' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'that sent forth water' (Ch. Up.\nVI, 2, 3).\n\n\n\n\n12. Earth (from water).\n\nEarth originates from water; for so the texts declare 'From water earth'\n(Taitt Up. II. 1, 1). 'It (water) sent forth food' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3).\nBut how can the word 'food' denote earth?--To this the next S\u00fbtra\nreplies.\n\n\n\n\n13. Earth on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other texts.\n\nThat the word 'food' denotes the earth is to be inferred from the fact\nthat the section in which the word occurs has for its subject-matter the\ncreation of the elements; as everything eatable is a product of the\nearth, the term denoting the effect is there applied to denote the cause.\nIn the same chapter, where the colour of the elements is mentioned ('The\nred colour of a flame is the colour of fire, the white one that of water,\nthe black one that of food '), the collocation of words clearly shows\nthat 'food' means something of the same kind as fire and water, viz. the\nelements of earth. And there are other texts also which treat of the\nsame topic and declare the origination of earth from water, cp. Taitt.\nUp. II, 1, 'from fire sprang water, from water earth.' All this proves\nthat the term 'food' denotes earth, and that hence earth originates from\nwater.\n\nFire and the other substances, the origination of which has been\ndetailed, are mentioned merely as instances, and it must be understood\nthat also other entities, such as the 'Mahat,' and so on, originate only\nfrom the immediately preceding cause, in agreement with scriptural\nstatements. And texts such as 'From him is born breath, mind, and all\norgans of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of\nall' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and\nfood' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'From that Self there sprang ether' (Taitt. Up.\nII, 1, 1); 'It (i.e. that which is) sent forth fire' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3)--\n(which seems to teach the direct origination from Brahman of the\ndifferent elements, and so on)--may be interpreted on the understanding\nof Brahman being their mediate cause also.--This prim\u00e2 facie view the\nnext S\u00fbtra disposes of.\n\n\n\n\n14. But he; from the inferential mark supplied by their reflection.\n\nThe 'but' indicates the setting aside of the prim\u00e2 facie view raised. Of\nall effected things, the _Mahat_, and so on, the highest Person himself,\nin so far as embodied in the immediately preceding substance, is the\ndirect cause.--How is this known?--'From the inferential mark supplied\nby the reflection of them.' By 'reflection' the S\u00fbtra means the resolve\nexpressed in the recurring phrase, 'May I be many'; 'That fire thought,\nmay I be many'; 'That water thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;\n4). As these texts declare that there was thought in the form of a\nresolve of self-multiplication--which thought can belong to a Self only,\nwe conclude that also the Mahat, the ahank\u00e2ra, the Ether, and so on,\naccomplish the sending forth of their respective effects only after\nsimilar thought, and such thought can belong only to the highest Brahman\nembodied in the Mahat, ahank\u00e2ra, and so on. That the highest Brahman is\nembodied in all beings and constitutes their Self, is directly stated in\nthe antary\u00e2min-br\u00e2hmana, 'He who abiding in the earth; abiding in water;\nabiding in fire,' &c. &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3 ff.); and likewise in the\nSub\u00e2la-Up, 'Whose body is the earth,' &c. &c., up to 'Whose body is the\nUnevolved.' The P\u00fbrvapakshin had maintained that the creation, from\nBrahman, of breath, and so on, which is declared in texts such as 'From\nhim are born breath, mind,' &c., may be understood as a mediate creation.\nThis point is taken up by the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n15. But the order of succession (which is stated) in reverse order (of\nthe true one) is possible, (only if the origination of all effects is)\nthence (i.e. from Brahman).\n\nThe 'but' has an asseverative sense. The direct origination from Brahman\nof all effects--which in passages such as the one quoted by the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin is stated in a form the reverse of the (true) order of\norigination according to which the Unevolved, the Mahat, the ahank\u00e2ra,\nEther, and so on, succeed each other--is possible only on the\nsupposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman\nitself in the form of a special causal substance. To understand the\ncausality of Brahman as a merely mediate one would be to contradict all\nthose statements of immediate origination. Texts such as the one quoted\nthus confirm the conclusion that everything originates from Brahman\ndirectly.\n\n\n\n\n16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which are mentioned) between\n(breath and the elements) (are stated) in order of succession, owing to\nan inferential mark of this; we say, not so, on account of non-\ndifference.\n\n'Knowledge' in the S\u00fbtra denotes the means of knowledge, i.e. the sense-\norgans.--An objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under\nthe preceding S\u00fbtra. We cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion\nthat the passage from the Mundka Up. 'from him is born breath, mind,' &c.,\ndeclares the immediate origination from Brahman of all things, and that\nhence the passage confirms the view, first suggested by the inferential\nmark of 'thought' (see above, S\u00fb. 14), that everything springs from\nBrahman direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain order\nof succession, and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were\nsuccessively created. In the second half of the text we recognise the\nseries of ether, air, fire, &c., which is known to us from other texts,\nand from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we\nconclude that knowledge and mind--which are mentioned between breath on\nthe one side and the elements on the other--must be viewed as created in\nthat order. The text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination\nof everything from Brahman. To this the S\u00fbtra replies, 'Not so, on\naccount of non-difference.' The first words of the text 'from him is\nborn' connect themselves equally with breath, and knowledge, and mind,\nand the scries of elements beginning with ether; and the meaning of the\nwhole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from\nBrahman, not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced.\nIt moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of\nsuccession, because the order stated contradicts the order established\nby other scriptural passages; such as the one beginning 'the earth is\nmerged in water,' and ending 'darkness becomes one.' We hence hold to\nthe conclusion that all effects originate from Brahman only, in so far\nas embodied in the Unevolved, and so on, and that the terms 'fire' and\nso on denote Brahman, which is the Self of all those substances.--But to\ninterpret all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their\nspecial denotative power as established by etymology!--To this objection\nthe next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the\nterms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i.e. of primary\ndenotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman); since (their denotative\npower) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).\n\nThe 'but' sets aside the objection raised. (The prim\u00e2 facie view here is\nas follows.) As Brahman, which has all things for its modes, is not the\nobject of Perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to\nthe apprehension of the things only which are Brahman's modes, and as\nhence, previously to the study of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts, the idea of that to\nwhich the modes belong (i.e. of Brahman) does not arise, and as the\nknowledge of all words finally denoting Brahman depends on the existence\nof the idea of that to which the modes belong (i. e. Brahman); all the\nindividual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote\nspecial things. In other words, as the terms 'fire' and so on have\ndenotative power with regard to particular things only, their denotative\npower with regard to Brahman is secondary, indirect only.--Of this view\nthe S\u00fbtra disposes by saying 'that which abides in the moving and the\nnon-moving,' &c. The meaning is--the terms which abide in, i.e. are\nconnected with, the different moving and non-moving things, and hence\ndenote those things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power\nwhich is not 'bh\u00e2kta,' i.e. secondary or figurative, but primary and\ndirect. 'Why so?' Because the denotative power of all words is dependent\non the being of Brahman. For this we know from the scriptural passage\nwhich tells how names and forms were evolved by Brahman.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'fire.'\n\n\n\n\n18. Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement, and on account of\nthe eternity (which results) from them.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras so far have stated that this entire world, from Ether\ndownwards, originates from the highest Brahman. It now becomes a matter\nfor discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same\nway or not.--It does so originate, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains. For on\nthis assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all\nthings through the cognition of one thing holds good, and moreover\nScripture declares that before creation everything was one. Moreover,\nthere are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the\nsame way as Ether and other created things.\n\n'Praj\u00e2pati sent forth all creatures'; 'All these creatures have their\nroot in the True, they abide in the True, they rest on the True' (Ch. Up.\nVI, 8, 6); 'From whence these beings are produced' (Taitt. Up. III, 1,\n1). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of\nsentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must\nthis be objected to on the ground than from the fact that Brahman is\neternal, and the other fact that texts such as 'That art them' teach the\nsoul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is\neternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also\nthat the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as\n'in that all this has its Self' and 'all this indeed is Brahman\n'intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual\nsoul also originates no less than Ether and the rest.--To this the S\u00fbtra\nreplies, 'Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement.' The Self is\nnot produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination; cp.\n'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18);\n'There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non-\nintelligent and weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is\nlearned from the same texts, cp. 'There is one eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka.\nUp. II,5, 13); 'Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one; he is\nnot killed though the body is killed' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18).--For these\nreasons the soul is not produced.\n\nBut how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one\nthing everything is known?-There is no difficulty here, since the soul\nalso is an effect, and since effect and cause are non-different.--But\nthis implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so\non!--Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due\nto a substance passing over into some other state; and from this point\nof view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference,\nthat the 'other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a\ndifferent kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as\nEther and so on. The 'otherness' on which the soul depends consists in\nthe contraction and expansion of intelligence; while the change on which\nthe origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential\nnature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We\nhave shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz.\nobjects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that origination\nand so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the\nsubjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic\nqualities of the objects and likewise those of the subjects--viz.\nliability to pain and suffering--do not belong to the Ruler; that the\nlatter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, immediately\nrealising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the\nhighest Lord of all; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all\ntheir states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their\nSelf. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prak\u00e2ra) the sentient and\nnon-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods\nthose beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of\nreceiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman\nthen is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its\nbody is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they\nhave separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its\neffected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state\ninto the effected state, the aggregate of non-sentient things which in\nthe causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential\nchange of nature--implying the possession of distinct names and so on--\nso as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient\nbeings; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the\nsouls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion\nof intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the\ndifferent rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling\nelement of the world, i.e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and\nnon-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is,\nat alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their\nalternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus\nundergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the\ncausal condition passes over into a different condition.\n\nIt is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in\npassing over into a different state that the Chandogya says that through\nthe knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by\nthe case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of\nclay). Texts such as 'Praj\u00e2pati sent forth the creatures,' which declare\nthe origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls\nare by turns associated with or dissociated from bodies--the effect of\nwhich is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts\nagain which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency\n('He is not born and does not die,' &c.) mean to say that the soul does\nnot, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of\nessential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is\nto declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of\nalternate expansion and contraction of intelligence--cp. 'That is the\ngreat unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV,\n4, 25); 'the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); such texts have\nfor their subject the highest Lord.--All this also explains how Brahman,\nwhich is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient\nbeings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only previous to\ncreation; the statement is possible because at that time the\ndifferentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes\nthe difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of\ndifferentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the\ntext, 'Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by\nform and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).--Those also who hold that the\nindividual soul is due to Nescience; and those who hold it to be due to\na real limiting adjunct (up\u00e2dhi); and those who hold that Brahman, whose\nessential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of\nenjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler; can all of\nthem explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the\npralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by\nnames and forms; for according to them also (there is no absolute unity\nat any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the\npotentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying\nsubjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pralaya\ncondition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two S\u00fbtras, II, 1, 33;\n35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream\nof their works are eternal.\n\nThere is, however, the following difference between those several views.\nThe first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the\nillusive influence of beginningless Avidy\u00e2. According to the second view,\nthe effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that\nBrahman itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other entity\nbut Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself\nassumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant\nconsequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of\nBrahman which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject; for as\nBrahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non-\ndifferent from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject.--\nAccording to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its\nbody all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or\ntheir gross state, is always--in its effected as well as in its causal\ncondition free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limitless ocean as\nit were of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and\nall change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-\nsentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the Self.'\n\n\n\n\n19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower.\n\nIt has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the\nsoul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's\nessential nature. Is that essential nature constituted by mere\nintelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold; or is the soul as Kan\u00e2da thinks,\nessentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence\nis merely an adventitious quality of it; or is it essentially a knowing\nsubject?--The soul is mere intelligence, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains; for\nthe reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antary\u00e2min-\nbr\u00e2hmana the clause which in the M\u00e2dhyandina-text runs as follows, 'he\nwho abides in the Self,' is in the text of the K\u00e2nvas represented by the\nclause 'he who abides in knowledge.' Similarly the text 'knowledge\nperforms the sacrifice and all sacred acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, I) shows\nthat it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active Self.\nAnd Smriti texts convey the same view, as e.g. 'it in reality is of the\nnature of absolutely spotless intelligence.' A second P\u00fbrvapakshin\ndenies the truth of this view. If, he says, we assume that the Self's\nessential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a\nknowing subject, it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must\nbe consciousness at all places and at all times. On that doctrine we,\nfurther, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition\n(i.e. the sense-organs, &c.); nor for the fact that in the states of\ndeep sleep, swoon and so on, the Self although present is not observed\nto be conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise\nas soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised. We therefore\nconclude that neither intelligence or consciousness, nor being a knowing\nagent, constitutes the essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a\nmere adventitious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of the\nSelf must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere.\nNor is there any valid reason for holding that the Self moves to any\nplace; for as it is assumed to be present everywhere the actual\naccomplishment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed to\nthe moving of the body only.--Scripture also directly declares that in\nthe state of deep sleep there is no consciousness, 'I do not indeed at\nthe present moment know myself, so as to be able to say \"that am I,\" nor\ndo I know those beings.' Similarly Scripture declares the absence of\nconsciousness in the state of final release, 'when he has departed there\nis no consciousness' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); where the Self is spoken of\nas having knowledge for its essential nature, the meaning only is that\nknowledge constitutes its specific quality, and the expression is\ntherefore not to be urged in its literal sense.\n\nAgainst all this the S\u00fbtra declares 'for this very reason a knower.'\nThis Self is essentially a knower, a knowing subject; not either mere\nknowledge or of non-sentient nature.--Why?--'For this very reason,' i.e.\non account of Scripture itself. 'For this reason' refers back to the 'on\naccount of Scripture' in the preceding S\u00fbtra. For in the Ch\u00e2ndogya,\nwhere the condition of the released and the non-released soul is\ndescribed, the text says 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the\nSelf--with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices-the devas who are\nin the world of Brahman--whose desires are true, whose purposes are true--\nnot remembering the body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5;\n1, 5; 12, 3). And elsewhere 'The seer does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII,\n26, 2). Similarly we read in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka, in reply to the question\n'Who is that Self?'--'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the\nPr\u00e2nas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,\n7); 'By what should one know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That\nperson knows.' And 'for he is the knower, the hearer, the smeller, the\ntaster, the perceiver, the thinker, the agent--he the person whose Self\nis knowledge'; and 'thus these sixteen parts of that seer' (Pra. Up. IV,\n9; VI, 5). To the objection that if being a cognising subject\nconstituted the essential nature of the Self it would follow that as the\nSelf is omnipresent, there would be consciousness always and everywhere,\nthe next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n20. On account of (its) passing out, moving and returning.\n\nThe Self is not omnipresent, but on the contrary, of atomic size (anu).--\nHow is this known?--Since Scripture says that it passes out, goes and\nreturns. Its passing out is described in the following passage 'by that\nlight this Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull,\nor through other parts of the body' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Its going in\nthe following text 'all those who pass away out of this world go to the\nmoon,' and its returning in the text 'from that world he comes again\ninto this world, for action.' All this going, and so on, cannot be\nreconciled with the soul being present everywhere.\n\n\n\n\n21. And on account of the latter two (being effected) through the Self.\n\nThe 'and' has affirming power. The 'passing out' might somehow be\nreconciled with a non-moving Self (such as the omnipresent Self would\nbe) if it were taken in the sense of the Self separating from the body;\nbut for the going and returning no analogous explanation is possible.\nThey, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self itself (which,\nthen, cannot be omnipresent and non-moving).\n\n\n\n\n22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on account of\nscriptural statement of (what is) not that; we say no, on account of the\nother one being the topic.\n\nThe passage 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pr\u00e2nas, the\nperson consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the\ntopic of discussion the personal Self, and further on in the same\nchapter we read 'the unborn Self, the great one' (IV, 4, 22). The\npersonal Self, being expressly called _great_, cannot, therefore, be\natomic!--Not so, we reply. 'Since the other one is the topic.' In the\nsecond text quoted that Self which is other than the personal Self--i.e.\nthe highest Self (pr\u00e2j\u00f1a) constitutes the topic. In the beginning of the\nchapter, indeed, the individual Self is introduced, but later on,\nbetween the two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself\nwith the highest Self, 'he by whom there is known the Self of\nintelligence' (pratibuddha \u00e2tm\u00e2; IV, 4, 13). It is this latter Self\nwhich, in 22 is called _great_, not the individual Self.\n\n\n\n\n23. And on account of the very word, and of measure.\n\nScripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual Self, 'By\nthought is to be known that atomic Self into which Breath has entered\nfivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).--By the term 'unm\u00e2na' in the S\u00fbtra we\nhave to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances.\nScripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self by reference to\nthings which are like atoms in size, 'The individual soul is to be known\nas part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred\ntimes, and yet it is to be infinite' (Svet. Up. V, 9); 'that lower one\nis seen of the measure of the point of a goad' (V, 8). For these reasons\nalso the individual Self must be viewed as atomic.--But this conflicts\nwith the fact that sensation extends over the whole body!--This\nobjection the next S\u00fbtra refutes by means of an analogous instance.\n\n\n\n\n24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.\n\nAs a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body\nonly, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body;\nthus the Self also, although dwelling in one part of the body only, is\nconscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body.\n\n\n\n\n25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation\nof abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the\nSelf), viz. in the heart.\n\nThere is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at\nany rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know\nof no such part in the case of the soul!--Not so, we reply. Scripture\ninforms us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the\nheart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.'\nAnd in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who\nis within the heart, surrounded by the Pr\u00e2nas, the Person of light,\nconsisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).--The parallel case of\nthe sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self\nabides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not\nbound to any special place.--In the next S\u00fbtra the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra proceeds to\nstate how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one\nspot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.\n\n\n\n\n26. Or on account of its quality as light.\n\nThe 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self\nextends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge\nor consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one\nplace--such as gems, the sun, and so on--is seen to extend to many\nplaces, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades\nthe entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend\nbeyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have\nalready explained under the first S\u00fbtra.--But it has been said that the\nSelf is _mere_ knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality--\nwhich is something different from the essential nature of a thing?--This\nthe next S\u00fbtra explains.\n\n\n\n\n27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture\ndeclares.\n\nJust as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct\nfrom earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a\nknowing subject--which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I\nknow'--is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also\nprove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'\n\n\n\n\n28. On account of the separate statement.\n\nScripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something\ndistinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not\nknown any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,\n30).--It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in\nknowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice'\n(Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free\nfrom stain,'Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a\nknower). This point the next S\u00fbtra elucidates.\n\n\n\n\n29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality\n(viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the\nintelligent (pr\u00e2j\u00f1a) Self.\n\nThe 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality\nof knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the\npassages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the\nessential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self\nis occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality.\nCompare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);\n'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss\nis the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That\nis one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid\nof nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).--Or else the analogous case to which\nthe S\u00fbtra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated\nby the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the\nInfinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential\nquality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the\nintelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu.\nUp. I, 1, 9).\n\n\n\n\n30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists\nwherever the Self is; this being observed.\n\nSince knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is,\nthere is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute.\nSimilarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones,\nare designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the\ngeneric character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the\nessential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact\nthat quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and'\nof the S\u00fbtra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply\nto the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that\nlike knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that\nknowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected\nwith the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in\ndeep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the\ncase of virile power and so on.\n\nThe 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be\nthat while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is\nmanifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection\nto viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in\nthe case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the\nvirile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then\nare not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing\nyouth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential\nto the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven\nelementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and\nsemen) is an essential, property of the body. That even in deep sleep\nand similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above.\nConsciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in\ndreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a\nsubject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self,\nwe have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a\nknowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is\nof atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no\nconsciousness' (samj\u00f1\u00e2; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the\nreleased Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that\nSelf there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so\non, which in the Sams\u00e2ra state is caused by the connexion of the Self\nwith the elements--as described in the preceding passage, 'that great\nbeing having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.'\nFor the text as to the absence of samj\u00f1\u00e2 after death must be interpreted\nin harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released\nsoul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain;\nthe seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (Ch.\nUp. VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body into which he was born--\nseeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3; 5).\n\nThe S\u00fbtras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a\nknower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.\n\n\n\n\n32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or\nelse limitative restriction to either.\n\nOn the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and\nmere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-\nconsciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else\nthat there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two,\ni.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.--If\nthe omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause\nof all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of\nSelfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as\nthe cause of both--i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness--and this\nwould mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous\nconsciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the\ncause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be\nunconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non-\nconsciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of\nanything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived\ndistribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself,\nsince we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally\nconsciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.--The view,\nfinally (held by the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self\ndepending on its organs (mind, senses, &c.; while the omnipresent Self\nis, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jada), results in the same\ndifficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are\nomnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and\nmoreover it would follow that the adrishtas (due to the actions of the\ndifferent bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all\nSelfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).\n\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the _knower_.'\n\n\n\n\n33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a\npurport.\n\nIt has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and\natomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being\nitself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the\nnon-sentient gunas. The prim\u00e2 facie answer is that the individual Self\nis not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self declare\nthat the Self does not act, while the gunas do act. Thus, e.g. in the\nKathavall\u00ee, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all\nthe attributes of Prakriti, such as being born, ageing and dying ('he is\nnot born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the\nagent in acts such as killing and the like, 'If the slayer thinks that\nhe slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not\nunderstand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (I, 2,\n19). This means--if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not\nknow the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the\nessential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on\nthe Self's part to ascribe to itself agency. 'By the attributes (guna)\nof Prakriti, actions are wrought all round.' He who is deluded by self-\nconceit thinks 'I am the agent'; 'when the seer beholds no other agent\nthan the gunas'; 'Prakriti is said to be the cause of all agency of\ncauses and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of\npleasure and pain' (Bha. G\u00ee. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).--The soul,\ntherefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakriti--To\nthis the S\u00fbtra replies, 'an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a\nmeaning.' The Self only is an agent, not the gunas, because thus only\nScripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as 'he who\ndesires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' 'He who desires Release is\nto meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who\nwill enjoy the fruit of the action--whether the heavenly world, or\nRelease, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the\ninjunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an\nintelligent being--to which it actually is addressed). The term 's\u00e2stra'\n(scriptural injunction) moreover comes from s\u00e2s, to command, and\ncommanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel\nto action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of\nthe being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradh\u00e2na cannot be made to\nconceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit\nthat none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at\nthe same time the agent. Thus the P\u00fbrva Mimamsa declares 'the fruit of\nthe injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The P\u00fbrvapakshin had\ncontended that the text 'if the slayer thinks, &c.,' proves the Self not\nto be the agent in the action of slaying; but what the text really means\nis only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from\nSmriti, which was alleged as proving that the gunas only possess active\npower, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere\nof the samsara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature\nbut to its contact with the different gunas. The activity of the gunas,\ntherefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the\nsame sense Smriti says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the\nguwas, in its births, in good and evil wombs' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIII, 21).\nSimilarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that 'he who through an untrained\nunderstanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of\nperverted mind does not see'; the meaning being that, since it appears\nfrom a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five\nfactors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be\nan agent has no true insight.\n\n\n\n\n34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about.\n\nThe text beginning 'And as a great king,' &c., declares that 'the Self\ntaking the pranas moves about in its own body, according to its\npleasure' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18), i.e. it teaches that the Self is active\nin taking to itself the pr\u00e2nas and moving about in the body.\n\n\n\n\n35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in\nactions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.\n\nBecause in the text 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all\nworks' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated as the agent in all\nworldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to\nbe an agent. And should it be said that the word 'knowledge' in that\ntext denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point\nout that in that case there would be a change of grammatical expression,\nthat is to say, as the buddhi is the instrument of action, the text\nwould exhibit the instrumental case instead of the nominative case 'by\nknowledge, and so on' (vij\u00f1\u00e2nena instead of vij\u00f1\u00e2nam).\n\n\n\n\n36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of\nconsciousness.\n\nThe S\u00fbtra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self\nnot being an agent. S\u00fbtra 32 has declared that if the Self were all-\npervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination\nwith regard to consciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent\nbut all activity belonged to Prakriti it would follow that as Prakriti\nis a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in\nenjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of\nnone; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them\nin equal proximity to all parts of the Pradh\u00e2na. For the same reason it\ncould not be maintained that the distribution of results between the\ndifferent souls depends on the different internal organs which are\njoined to the souls; for if the souls are omnipresent, no soul will be\nexclusively connected with any particular internal organ.\n\n\n\n\n37. On account of the inversion of power.\n\nIf the internal organ were the agent, then--since it is impossible that\na being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the\naction--the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ,\nand would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were\nso, there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the Self;\nfor they expressly teach that 'the person (i.e. the soul) exists, on\naccount of the fact of enjoyment.'\n\n\n\n\n38. And on account of the absence of sam\u00e2dhi.\n\nIf the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that\nfinal state of meditation, called sam\u00e2dhi, which is the instrument of\nRelease. But that state consists therein that the meditating being\nrealises its difference from Prakriti, and this is a conception which\nPrakriti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification)\ncannot form. The Self alone, therefore, is the agent. But this would\nimply that the activity of the Self is never at rest! Of this difficulty\nthe next S\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.\n\nThe Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such\nas the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and\ndoes not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter,\nalthough having his axe and other implements ready at hand, works or\ndoes not work just as he pleases. If the internal organ, on the contrary,\nwere essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non-\nintelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for\naction, such as the desire for enjoyment.\n\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the agent.'\n\n\n\n\n40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture.\n\nIs the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it\ndepend on the highest Self? It is free; for if it were dependent on the\nhighest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions\nwould be unmeaning. For commandments can be addressed to such agents\nonly as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action,\naccording to their own thought and will.\n\nThis prim\u00e2 facie view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra. The activity of the\nindividual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For\nScripture teaches this. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the\nSelf of all'; 'who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom\nthe Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from\nwithin, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' Smriti\nteaches the same, 'I dwell within the heart of all; memory and knowledge\nas well as their loss come from me'(Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 15); 'The Lord, O\nArjuna, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his\nmysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. G\u00ee.\nXVIII, 61).--But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural\ninjunctions and prohibitions!--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on\naccount of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and\nprohibitions and the rest.\n\nThe inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards\nin the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual\nsoul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission\n(anumati); action is not possible without permission on the part of the\nhighest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on\nthe volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and prohibitions are not\ndevoid of meaning. The 'and the rest' of the S\u00fbtra is meant to suggest\nthe grace and punishments awarded by the Lord.--The case is analogous to\nthat of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these\nwishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so\nwithout the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given\nis after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or\nanything) properly belongs to him only.--That, in the case of evil\nactions, allowance of the action on the part of one able to stop it does\nnot necessarily prove hardheartedness, we have shown above when\nexplaining the S\u00e2nkhya doctrine.--But there is a scriptural text.--'He\n(the Lord) makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a\ngood deed, and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these\nworlds do a bad deed' (Kau. Up. III, 8)--which means that the Lord\nhimself causes men to do good and evil actions, and this does not agree\nwith the partial independence claimed above for the soul.--The text\nquoted, we reply, does not apply to all agents, but means that the Lord,\nwishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting so as fully\nto please the highest Person, engenders in their minds a tendency\ntowards highly virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to him;\nwhile on the other hand, in order to punish those who are resolved on\nlines of action altogether displeasing to him, he engenders in their\nminds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are\nobstacles in the way of the attainment of the Lord. Thus the Lord\nhimself says, 'I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me;\nknowing this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted,\nworshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain\nto me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the\ndarkness born of ignorance, with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha.\nG\u00ee. X, 8; 10-11). And further on the Lord--after having described\n'demoniac' people, in the passus beginning 'they declare the world to be\nwithout a Truth, without a resting-place, without a Ruler,' and ending\n'malignantly hating me who abides in their own bodies and those of\nothers'--declares, 'These evil and malign haters, most degraded of men,\nI hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (XVI, 8-\n19).\n\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'that which depends on the Highest.'\n\n\n\n\n42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the declarations of difference\nand otherwise; some also record (that Brahman is of) the nature of\nslaves, fishermen, and so on.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as\nsuch dependent on the highest Person. The following question now arises--\nIs the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman? or is it\nnothing else than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of\nerror? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct\n(up\u00e2dhi)? or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman?--The doubt on this point is\ndue to the disagreement of the scriptural texts.--But this whole matter\nhas already been decided under S\u00fb. II, 1, 22.--True. But as a difficulty\npresents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts--\nsome asserting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul\nand Brahman--the matter is here more specially decided by its being\nproved that the soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision\nremains unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two S\u00fbtras\nreferred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman and that\nBrahman is 'additional' to the soul, are without a proper basis.\n\nLet it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from\nBrahman, since texts such as 'There are two, the one knowing, the other\nnot knowing, both unborn, the one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I,\n9) declare their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference of\na being which is knowing and another which is not knowing, if taken\nliterally, convey a contradiction--as if one were to say, 'Water the\nground with fire'!-and must therefore be understood in some secondary\nmetaphorical sense. To hold that the individual soul is a part of\nBrahman does not explain matters; for by a 'part' we understand that\nwhich constitutes part of the extension of something. If, then, the soul\noccupied part of the extension of Brahman, all its imperfections would\nbelong to Brahman. Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take\n'part' to mean a _piece_ (khanda); for Brahman does not admit of being\ndivided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties connected with the\nformer interpretation would present themselves here also. That something\nabsolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the\nlatter cannot in fact be proved.\n\nOr else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected by error\n(bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such as 'Thou art that';\n'this Self is Brahman.' Those texts, on the other hand, which declare\nthe difference of the two merely restate what is already established by\nperception and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are shown, by\nthose texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not\nestablished by other means, to lie--like perception and the other means\nof knowledge themselves--within the sphere of Nescience.\n\nOr let it be assumed, in the third place, that the individual soul is\nBrahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct (up\u00e2dhi). For\nit is on this ground that Scripture teaches the Self to be Brahman. And\nthat up\u00e2dhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on\nthat view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be\nimpossible.\n\nAgainst all these views the S\u00fbtra declares that the soul is a part of\nBrahman; since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise,'\ni.e. declarations of unity. To the former class belong all those texts\nwhich dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature, the\nruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the ignorant, the independent\nand the dependent, the pure and the impure, that which is endowed with\nholy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind,\nthe lord and the dependent. To the latter class belong such texts as\n'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Some persons even record\nthat Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on. The\n\u00c2tharvanikas, that is to say, have the following text,' Brahman are the\nslaves. Brahman are these fishers,' and so on; and as Brahman there is\nsaid to comprise within itself all individual souls, the passage teaches\ngeneral non-difference of the Self. In order, then, that texts of both\nthese classes may be taken in their primary, literal sense, we must\nadmit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact\nthat the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other\nmeans of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account\nare mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence\nof which they would have no original proving force of their own, and\nwould be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that\nthe soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is\nsubordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it,\nstands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its\ngrace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth,\npleasure and final release--all this and what is effected thereby, viz.\nthe distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the\ncognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not\nestablished by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts\ndeclaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of\ndifferences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and\nhence have for their purport to teach things that are false.--[Nor will\nit do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not\nestablished by other means of knowledge but is erroneous.] 'Brahman\nconceives the thought of differentiating itself, forms the resolution of\nbecoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements,\nenters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and\nnames, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from\nexperiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides\nwithin and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its j\u00eeva-\ncondition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally\naccomplishes its release from the sams\u00e2ra and the body of sacred\ndoctrine by which this release is effected'--all this the Veda indeed\ndeclares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a\nBrahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal!--\nwhile at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature\nof which is absolutely pure intelligence! Truly, if such were the\npurport of the Veda, what more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a\nperson out of his mind!\n\nNor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in\nso far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in\nconflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the\nsoul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does\nnot become double as it were--a ruler on the one hand and a ruled\nsubject on the other--because he is determined by the house in which he\nis, or by something else.\n\nIn order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul,\nwe must therefore admit that the soul is a _part_ of Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n43. And on account of the mantra.\n\n'One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it\nare the Immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6)--on account of this\nmantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word\n'foot' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses\nthe plural form 'all beings.' In the S\u00fbtra (42) the word 'part' is in\nthe singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason\nin II, 3, 18 also the word 'atman' is in the singular. For that the\nindividual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal,\nis declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils\nthe desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up.\nII, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs\nrests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature\nof Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics\ndistinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so\nfar as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the\nS\u00fbtra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs.\n\n\n\n\n44. Moreover it is so stated in Smriti.\n\nSmriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest\nPerson, 'An eternal part of myself becomes the individual soul (j\u00eeva) in\nthe world of life' (Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 7). For this reason also the soul must\nbe held to be a part of Brahman.\n\nBut if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul\nare Brahman's also! To this objection the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.\n\nThe 'but' discards the objection. 'Like light and so on.' The individual\nsoul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous\nthing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic\ncharacteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of\nthings so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in\nwhich those attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied\nbeing. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place\n(desa) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshna) is\na part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those\nanalysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the _distinguishing_\nclement or part of it, and the _distinguished_ element or part. Now\nalthough the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished\nthereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we\nobserve them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no\ncontradiction between the individual and the highest Self--the former of\nwhich is a viseshana of the latter--standing to each other in the\nrelation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of\nessentially different nature. This the S\u00fbtra declares 'not so is the\nhighest,' i.e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the\nindividual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from\nthat of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual\nsoul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character--due to\nthe individual soul being the distinguishing clement and the highest\nSelf being the substance distinguished thereby--to which all those texts\nrefer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which\ndeclare non-difference are based on the circumstance that attributes\nwhich are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the\nsubstance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid.\nThat in declarations such as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman,'\nthe words _thou_ and _Self_, no less than the words _that_ and _Brahman_,\ndenote Brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body,\nand that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the\nsame thing, has been explained previously.\n\n\n\n\n46. And Smriti texts declare this.\n\nThat the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part\nand whole, the former being like the light and the latter like the\nluminous body, or the former being like the power and the latter like\nthat in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body and\nthe latter like the soul; this Par\u00e2sara also and other Smriti writers\ndeclare, 'As the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads\nall around, thus this whole world is the power (sakti) of the highest\nBrahman.' The 'and' in the S\u00fbtra implies that scriptural texts also ('of\nwhom the Self is the body' and others) declare that the individual Self\nis a part of Brahman in so far as it is its body.\n\nBut if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of\nBrahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and alike knowing subjects, what is\nthe reason that, as Scripture teaches, some of them are allowed to read\nthe Veda and act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded\ntherefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on, while others\nare excluded from these privileges?--This question is answered by the\nnext S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n47. Permission and exclusion (result) from connexion with a body; as in\nthe case of light and so on.\n\nAlthough all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they\nare parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and so on, the permissions and\nexclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual\nsoul is joined to some particular body, pure or impure, whether of a\nBr\u00e2hmana or Kshattriya or Vaisya or S\u00fbdra, and so on. 'As in the case of\nfire and so on.' All fire is of the same kind, and yet one willingly\nfetches fire from the house of a Br\u00e2hmana, while one shuns fire from a\nplace where dead bodies are burnt. And from a Br\u00e2hmana one accepts food\nwithout any objection, while one refuses food from a low person.\n\n\n\n\n48. And on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion.\n\nAlthough the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of\nessentially the same character, they are actually separate, for each of\nthem is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason\nthere is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of\nenjoyment and experience. The S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra introduces this reference to an\nadvantage of his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views\nof the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected by a limiting\nadjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the\nexperiences of the individual Self and the highest Self, and of the\nseveral individual Selfs, are not mixed up.\n\nBut may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman deluded, the\ndistinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means\nof the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience?--This\nthe next S\u00fbtra negatives.\n\n\n\n\n49. And it is a mere apparent argument.\n\nThe argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose\nnature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is\ndifferentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of\nthat essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we\nhave shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but\nlight means destruction of that light.--If we accept as the reading of\nthe S\u00fbtra '\u00e2bh\u00e2s\u00e2h' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons\nset forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious.\nThe 'and' of the S\u00fbtra is meant to point out that that doctrine,\nmoreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be\ndifferent from the Mover'(Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones,\none a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the\nsweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to\nup\u00e2dhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the\nconclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the\ntheory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts\nconnect themselves is one only.\n\nBut this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being\nBrahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that\nview we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to\nthe beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the\nlimiting adjuncts!--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n50. On account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.\n\nAs the adrishtas also which are the causes of the series of up\u00e2dhis have\nfor their substrate Brahman itself, there is no reason for their\ndefinite allotment (to definite individual souls), and hence again there\nis no definite separation of the spheres of experience. For the limiting\nadjuncts as well as the adrishtas cannot by their connexion with Brahman\nsplit up Brahman itself which is essentially one.\n\n\n\n\n51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on.\n\nFor the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of\npurposes and so on which are the causes of the, different adrishtas. (For\nthey also cannot introduce plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally\none.)\n\n\n\n\n52. Should it be said (that that is possible) owing to the difference of\nplace; we deny this, on account of (all up\u00e2dhis) being within (all\nplaces).\n\nAlthough Brahman is one only and not to be split by the several limiting\nadjuncts with which it is connected, yet the separation of the spheres\nof enjoyment is not impossible since the places of Brahman which are\nconnected with the up\u00e2dhis are distinct.--This the S\u00fbtra negatives on\nthe ground that, as the up\u00e2dhis move here and there and hence all places\nenter into connexion with all up\u00e2dhis, the mixing up of spheres of\nenjoyment cannot be avoided. And even if the up\u00e2dhis were connected with\ndifferent places, the pain connected with some particular place would\naffect the whole of Brahman which is one only.--The two S\u00fbtras II, 3, 32\nand 37 have stated an objection against those who, without taking their\nstand on the Veda, held the view of an all-pervading soul. The S\u00fbtras II,\n3, 50 and ff., on the other hand, combat the view of those who, while\nbasing their doctrine on the Veda, teach the absolute unity of the Self.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the part.'\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. Thus the pr\u00e2nas.\n\nAfter having taught that Ether and all the other elements are effects,\nand hence have originated, the S\u00fbtras had shown that the individual soul,\nalthough likewise an effect, does not originate in the sense of\nundergoing a change of essential nature; and had in connexion therewith\nclearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists.\nThey now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the\ninstruments of the individual soul, viz. the organs and the vital breath.\n\nThe point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the\nindividual soul is an effect, or as ether and the other elements are. As\nthe soul is, thus the pr\u00e2nas are, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains. That means--\nas the soul is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced--For\nthe latter point no less than the former is directly stated in Scripture;\nthe wording of the S\u00fbtra 'thus the pr\u00e2nas' being meant to extend to the\ncase of the pr\u00e2nas also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse\nwas had in the case of the soul.--But what is the scriptural text you\nmean?\n\n'Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they say, what was\nthat? Those Rishis indeed were that Non-being, thus they say. And who\nwere those Rishis? The pr\u00e2nas indeed were those Rishis.' This is the\npassage which declares that before the origination of the world the\nRishis existed. As 'pr\u00e2n\u00e2h' is in the plural, we conclude that what is\nmeant is the organs and the vital air. Nor can this text be interpreted\nto mean only that the pr\u00e2nas exist for a very long time (but are not\nuncreated); as we may interpret the texts declaring V\u00e2yu and the\natmosphere (antariksha) to be immortal: 'V\u00e2yu and the atmosphere are\nimmortal'; 'V\u00e2yu is the deity that never sets' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 3; I, 5,\n22). For the clause 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning'\ndeclares that the pr\u00e2nas existed even at the time when the entire world\nwas in the pralaya state. Those texts, then, which speak of an\norigination of the pr\u00e2nas must be explained somehow, just as we did with\nthe texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.\n\nTo this the Siddh\u00e2ntin replies, 'the pr\u00e2nas also originate in the same\nway as ether, and so on.'--Why?--Because we have scriptural texts\ndirectly stating that before creation everything was one, 'Being only\nthis was in the beginning,' 'The Self only was this in the beginning.'\nAnd moreover, the text 'from that there is produced the pr\u00e2na and the\nmind and all organs'(Mu. Up. II, 3, 1) declares that the organs\noriginated; they therefore cannot have existed before creation. Nor is\nit permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare\nthe origination of the sense-organs--as we may do in the case of the\ntexts declaring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts\ndirectly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or affirming their\neternity, while we _have_ such texts in the case of the individual soul.\nIn the text quoted by the P\u00fbrvapakshin, 'Non-being indeed was this in\nthe beginning,' &c., the word pr\u00e2na can denote the highest Self only;\nfor from texts such as 'All these beings indeed enter into breath alone,\nand from breath they arise'(Ch. Up. I, 11, 5), the word pr\u00e2na is known\nto be one of the designations of the highest Self. And as to the clause\n'the pr\u00e2nas indeed are those Rishis,' we remark that the term Rishi may\nproperly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but not to the non-\nintelligent organs.\n\nBut how then is the plural form 'the Rishis are the pr\u00e2nas' to be\naccounted for? This the next S\u00fbtra explains.\n\n\n\n\n2. (The scriptural statement of the plural) is secondary, on account of\nimpossibility; and since (the highest Self) is declared before that.\n\nThe plural form exhibited by the text must be taken (not in its literal,\nbut) in a secondary figurative sense, since there is no room there for a\nplurality of things. For Scripture declares that previous to creation\nthe highest Self only exists.\n\n\n\n\n3. On account of speech having for its antecedent that.\n\nFor the following reason also the word 'pr\u00e2na,' in the text quoted, can\ndenote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the names which have for their object\nall things apart from Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire\nuniverse of things--ether, and so on--which is the object of speech. But,\nas according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated; it was\nthereupon differentiated by names and forms,' then (i.e. before the\ndifferentiation of individual things), no things having name and form\nexisted, there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of\naction and sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs\nthemselves existed.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the origination\nof the pr\u00e2nas.'\n\n\n\n\n4. (They are seven) on account of the going of the seven and of\nspecification.\n\nThe question here arises whether those organs are seven only, or eleven--\nthe doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of\nscriptural texts.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former alternative.--\nOn what grounds?--'On account of going, and of specification.' For the\ntext refers to the 'going,' i.e. to the moving about in the different\nworlds, together with the soul when being born or dying, of seven pr\u00e2nas\nonly, 'seven are these worlds in which the pr\u00e2nas move which rest in the\ncave, being placed there as seven and seven' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)--where\nthe repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to\nwhich the pr\u00e2nas are attached. Moreover those moving pr\u00e2nas are\ndistinctly specified in the following text, 'when the five instruments\nof knowledge stand still, together with the mind (manas), and when the\nbuddhi does not move, that they call the highest \"going\"' (gati--Ka. Up.\nII, 6, 10). The 'highest going' here means the moving towards Release,\nall movement within the body having come to an end. As thus the text\ndeclares that at the time of birth and death seven pr\u00e2nas only accompany\nthe soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concentration,\nthose pr\u00e2nas are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge (j\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2ni),\nwe conclude that the pr\u00e2nas are the seven following instruments of the\nsoul--the organs of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the\nbuddhi and the manas. In various other passages indeed, which refer to\nthe pr\u00e2nas, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up to fourteen, speech,\nthe hands, the feet, the anus, the organ of generation, the ahank\u00e2ra and\nthe kitta being added to those mentioned above; cp. e.g. 'there are\neight grahas' (Bri. Up. III, 2, i); 'Seven are the pr\u00e2nas of the head,\ntwo the lower ones '(Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 5). But as the text says\nnothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul, we assume\nthat they are called pr\u00e2nas in a metaphorical sense only, since they all,\nmore or less, assist the soul.--This view the next S\u00fbtra sets aside.\n\n\n\n\n5. But the hands and so on also; (since they assist the soul) abiding\n(in the body). Hence (it is) not so.\n\nThe organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the hands and the rest\nalso contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides\nin the body, i.e. the soul, and have their separate offices, such as\nseizing, and so on. Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that\nthe hands and the rest are not organs. Buddhi, ahank\u00e2ra and kitta, on\nthe other hand, are (not independent organs but) mere designations of the\nmanas, according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding\n(adhyavas\u00e2ya), or misconception (abhim\u00e2na), or thinking (kint\u00e2). The\norgans therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in the passage\n'Ten are these pr\u00e2nas in man, and \u00c2tman is the eleventh' (Bri. Up. II, 4,\nii), the word \u00c2tman denotes the manas. The number _eleven_ is confirmed\nby scriptural and Smriti passages, cp. 'the ten organs and the one' (Bha.\nG\u00ee. XIII, 5); 'ten are the vaik\u00e2rika beings, the manas is the eleventh,'\nand others. Where more organs are mentioned, the different functions of\nthe manas are meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected\nwith special effects of the organs, such as accompanying the soul, and\nthe like.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the going of the seven.'\n\n\n\n\n6. And (they are) minute.\n\nAs the text 'these are all alike, all infinite' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 13),\ndeclares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we conclude that the\npr\u00e2nas are all-pervading.--To this the S\u00fbtra replies, that they are\nminute; for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body, all\nthe pr\u00e2nas pass out after it' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2), proves those pr\u00e2nas to\nbe of limited size, and as when passing out they are not perceived by\nbystanders, they must be of minute size--The text which speaks of them\nas infinite is a text enjoining meditation ('he who meditates on them as\ninfinite'), and infinity there means only that abundance of activities\nwhich is an attribute of the pr\u00e2na to be meditated on.\n\n\n\n\n7. And the best.\n\nBy 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air (mukhya pr\u00e2na),\nwhich, in the colloquy of the pr\u00e2nas, is determined to be the best\nbecause it is the cause of the preservation of the body. This chief\nvital air the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains to be something non-created, since\nScripture (Ri. Samh. V, 129, 2), 'By its own law the One was breathing\nwithout wind,' shows that an effect of it, viz. the act of breathing,\nexisted even previously to creation, at the time of a great pralaya; and\nbecause texts declaring it to have been created--such as 'from him is\nborn breath' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)--may be interpreted in the same way as\nthe texts declaring that the soul is something created (sec p. 540 ff.).--\nTo this the reply is that, since this view contradicts scriptural\nstatements as to the oneness of all, previous to creation; and since the\nMundaka-text declares the pr\u00e2na to have been created in the same way as\nearth and the other elements; and since there are no texts plainly\ndenying its createdness, the chief vital air also must be held to have\nbeen created. The words 'the One was breathing without wind' by no means\nrefer to the vital breath of living creatures, but intimate the\nexistence of the highest Brahman, alone by itself; as indeed appears\nfrom the qualification 'without wind.'--That the vital breath, although\nreally disposed of in the preceding S\u00fbtras, is specially mentioned in\nthe present S\u00fbtra, is with a view to the question next raised for\nconsideration.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the\npr\u00e2nas.'\n\n\n\n\n8. Neither air nor function, on account of its being stated separately.\n\nIs this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second of the\nelements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or is it air that has\nassumed some special condition?--The first alternative may be adopted,\non account of the text 'pr\u00e2na is air.'--Or, since mere air is not called\nbreath, while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which\nconsists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold that breath is a\nmotion of air.--Of both these views the S\u00fbtra disposes by declaring 'not\nso, on account of separate statement.' For in the passage 'From him\nthere is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs, ether and air,' &c,\nbreath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For the same reason\nbreath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air; for the text\ndoes not mention any functions of fire and the other elements, side by\nside with these elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath\nalso cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function of air).\nThe text 'pr\u00e2na is air,' on the other hand, intimates (not that breath\nis identical with air, but) that breath is air having assumed a special\nform, not a thing altogether different from it, like fire. In ordinary\nlanguage, moreover, the word _breath_ does not mean a mere motion but a\nsubstance to which motion belongs; we say,'the breath moves to and fro\nin inhalation and exhalation.'\n\nIs breath, which we thus know to be a modification of air, to be\nconsidered as a kind of elementary substance, like fire, earth, and so\non? Not so, the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n9. But like the eye and the rest, on account of being taught with them,\nand for other reasons.\n\nBreath is not an element, but like sight and the rest, a special\ninstrument of the soul. This appears from the fact that the texts\nmention it together with the recognised organs of the soul, the eye, and\nso on; so e.g. in the colloquy of the pr\u00e2nas. And such common mention is\nsuitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class.--The\n'and for other reasons' of the S\u00fbtra refers to the circumstance of the\nprincipal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised\nunder the term 'pr\u00e2na'; cp. 'that principal breath' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 7);\n'that central breath' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21).--But if the chief breath is,\nlike the eye and the other organs, an instrument of the soul, there must\nbe some special form of activity through which it assists the soul, as\nthe eye e.g. assists the soul by seeing. But no such activity is\nperceived, and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category\nas the organs of sensation and action!--To this objection the next S\u00fbtra\nreplies.\n\n\n\n\n10. And there is no objection on account of its not having an activity\n(karana); for (Scripture) thus declares.\n\nThe karana of the S\u00fbtra means kriy\u00e2, action. The objection raised on the\nground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity\nhelpful to the soul, is without force, since as a matter of fact\nScripture declares that there is such an activity, in so far as the\nvital breath supports the body with all its organs. For the text (Ch. Up.\nV, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure of speech, and so\non, the body and the other organs maintained their strength, while on\nthe departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once\nbecame weak and powerless.--The conclusion therefore is that the breath,\nin its fivefold form of pr\u00e2na, ap\u00e2na, and so on, subserves the purposes\nof the individual soul, and thus occupies the position of an instrument,\nno less than the eye and the other organs.\n\nBut as those five forms of breath, viz. pr\u00e2na, ud\u00e2na, &c., have\ndifferent names and functions they must be separate principles (and\nhence there is not _one_ principal breath)! To this the next S\u00fbtra\nreplies.\n\n\n\n\n11. It is designated as having five functions like mind.\n\nAs desire, and so on, are not principles different from mind, although\nthey are different functions and produce different effects--according to\nthe text, 'Desire, purpose, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness,\nabsence of firmness, shame, reflection, fear--all this is mind' (Bri. Up.\nI, 5, 3); so, on the ground of the text, 'pr\u00e2na, ap\u00e2na, vy\u00e2na, ud\u00e2na,\nsam\u00e2na--all this is pr\u00e2na' (ibid.), ap\u00e2na and the rest must be held to\nbe different functions of pr\u00e2na only, not independent principles.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of what is 'a modification of air.'\n\n\n\n\n12. And (it is) minute.\n\nThis pr\u00e2na also is minute, since as before (i.e. as in the case of the\norgans) the text declares it to pass out of the body, to move, and so on,\n'him when he passes out the pr\u00e2na follows after' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). A\nfurther doubt arises, in the case of pr\u00e2na, owing to the fact that in\nother texts it is spoken of as of large extent, 'It is equal to these\nthree worlds, equal to this Universe' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22); 'On pr\u00e2na\neverything is founded'; 'For all this is shut up in pr\u00e2na.' But as the\ntexts declaring the passing out, and so on, of the pr\u00e2na, prove it to be\nof limited size, the all-embracingness ascribed to pr\u00e2na in those other\ntexts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and\nbreathing creatures depends on breath.--Here terminates the adhikarana\nof 'the minuteness of the best.'\n\n\n\n\n13. But the rule (over the pr\u00e2nas) on the part of Fire and the rest,\ntogether with him to whom the pr\u00e2na belong (i.e. the soul), is owing to\nthe thinking of that (viz. the highest Self); on account of scriptural\nstatement.\n\nIt has been shown that the pr\u00e2nas, together with the main pr\u00e2na,\noriginate from Brahman, and have a limited size. That the pr\u00e2nas are\nguided by Agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a\nprevious occasion, viz. under S\u00fb. II, 1, 5. And it is known from\nordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul,\nwhich uses them as means of experience and fruition. And this is also\nestablished by scriptural texts, such as 'Having taken these pr\u00e2nas he\n(i.e. the soul) moves about in his own body, according to his\npleasure'(Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). The question now arises whether the rule\nof the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the pr\u00e2nas depends\non them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some other being.--\nOn them only, since they depend on no one else!--Not so, the S\u00fbtra\ndeclares. The rule which light, and so on, i.e. Agni and the other\ndivinities, together with him to whom the pr\u00e2nas belong i.e. the soul,\nexercise over the pr\u00e2nas, proceeds from the thinking of that, i.e. from\nthe will of the highest Self.--How is this known?--'From scriptural\nstatement.' For Scripture teaches that the organs, together with their\nguiding divinities and the individual soul, depend in all their doings\non the thought of the highest Person. 'He, who abiding within Fire,\nrules Fire from within.--He, who abiding within the air--within the Self--\nwithin the eye, and so on' (Bri. Up III, 7); 'From fear of it the wind\nblows, from fear of it the sun rises, from fear of it Agni and Indra,\nyea Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of\nthat Imperishable one, sun and moon stand, held apart'(Bri Up III, 8, 9).\n\n\n\n\n14. And on account of the eternity of this.\n\nAs the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by the highest\nSelf, is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his\nessential nature, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the\nsoul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the\nhighest Self. The text, 'Having sent forth this he entered into it,\nhaving entered into it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), shows\nthat the entering on the part of the highest Person into all things, so\nas to be their ruler, is connected with his essential nature. Similarly\nSmriti says, 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do\nabide' (Bha. G\u00ee. X, 42).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the rule of\nFire and the rest.'\n\n\n\n\n15. They, with the exception of the best, are organs, on account of\nbeing so designated.\n\nAre all principles called pr\u00e2nas to be considered as 'organs'\n(indriy\u00e2ni), or is the 'best,' i.e. the chief pr\u00e2na, to be excepted?--\nAll of them, without exception, are organs; for they all are called\npr\u00e2nas equally, and they all are instruments of the soul.--Not so, the\nS\u00fbtra replies. The 'best' one is to be excepted, since only the prawas\nother than the best are designated as organs. Texts such as 'the organs\nare ten and one' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIII, 5) apply the term 'organ' only to the\nsenses of sight and the rest, and the internal organ.\n\n\n\n\n16. On account of scriptural statement of difference, and on account of\ndifference of characteristics.\n\nTexts such as 'from him is born pr\u00e2na, and the internal organ, and all\norgans' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital breath separately from the\norgans, and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs. The\npassage indeed mentions the internal organ (manas) also as something\nseparate; but in other passages the manas is formally included in the\norgans, 'the (five) organs with mind as the sixth' (Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 7).\nThat the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the\nrest, is a matter of observation. For in the state of deep sleep the\nfunction of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and so\non, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive of the manas,\nis to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of\nbreath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for the reason that\nthe subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs\nthemselves are called pr\u00e2nas. Thus Scripture says, 'they all became the\nform of that (breath), and therefore they are called after him pr\u00e2nas'\n(Bri. Up. I, 5, 21). 'They became its form' means--they became its body,\ntheir activity depended on it.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the\n_organs_.'\n\n\n\n\n17. But the making of names and forms (belongs) to him who renders\ntripartite, on account of scriptural teaching.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in\ntheir collective aspect (samashti) and the activity of the individual\nsouls proceed from the highest Self; and they have also further\nconfirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their\norgans depends on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to\nthe creation of the world in its discrete aspect (vyashti), which\nconsists in the differentiation of names and forms (i.e. of individual\nbeings). Is this latter creation the work of Hiranyagarbha only, who\nrepresents the collective aggregate of all individual souls; or,\nfundamentally, the work of the highest Brahman having Hiranyagarbha for\nits body--just as the creation of water e.g. is the work of the highest\nBrahman having sire for its body?--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former\nalternative. For, he says, the text 'Having entered with this living-\nsoul-self (anena j\u00eeven\u00e2t-man\u00e2), let me differentiate names and forms'\n(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), declares the j\u00eeva-soul to be the agent in\ndifferentiation. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed, not\nin the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself (svena\nr\u00fbpena), but 'by this soul-self,' i.e. by a part of the highest Self, in\nthe form of the individual soul.--But on this interpretation the first\nperson in 'vy\u00e2karav\u00e2ni' (let me enter), and the grammatical form of\n'having entered,' which indicates the agent, could not be taken in their\nliteral, but only in an implied, sense--as is the case in a sentence\nsuch as 'Having entered the hostile army by means of a spy, I will\nestimate its strength' (where the real agent is not the king, who is the\nspeaker, but the spy).--The cases are not analogous, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nreplies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence\nthe king is agent by implication only. But in the case under discussion\nthe soul is a part, and hence contributes to constitute the essential\nnature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and\ndifferentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the\ninstrumental case ('with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of\nassociation ('together with this soul-self'); for if a case can be taken\nin its primary sense, it is not proper to understand it in a sense which\nhas to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case,\nj\u00eevena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that\nof the instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts\nof entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most\nsuitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the\n_instrumental_ case--karana--on this basis). Nor can it be said that the\nactivity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the\ndifferentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past\nparticiple (pravisya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that\nthe two actions--of entering and differentiating--belong to the same\nagent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares\nin its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the\ntext by means of the clause 'with _that_ living Self refers to it as\nsomething outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the\naction of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hiranyagarbha.\nSmriti texts also ascribe to him this activity; cp.'he in the beginning\nmade, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the\ngods and the rest, and of actions.'\n\nAgainst this view the S\u00fbtra declares itself. The differentiation of\nnames and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i.e. the highest\nBrahman; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the\ntext 'That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings\nwith this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms--let me make\neach of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned\nhave one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong\nto Brahma (Hiranyagarbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that\negg itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these\nelements have been rendered tripartite; and Smriti says that Brahm\u00e2\nhimself originated in that egg, 'in that egg there originated Brahm\u00e2,\nthe grandfather of all the worlds.' As thus the action of rendering\ntripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation\nof names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's\nonly.--But how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in?--\nThe co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self,' shows that the term\n'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body;\njust as in the clauses 'that fire thought'; 'it sent forth water';\n'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having\nfire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names\nand forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body\nHiranyagarbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this\nview the first person (in 'let me differentiate') and the agency\n(conveyed by the form of 'pravisya') may, without any difficulty, be\ntaken in their primary literal senses; and the common agency, implied in\nthe connexion of pravisya and vy\u00e2karav\u00e2ni, is accounted for. The view\nhere set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hiranyagarbha also\nexplains how the accounts of Hiranyagarbha's (Brahm\u00e2's) creative\nactivity can say that he differentiated names and forms.\n\nThe whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought,' therefore has the\nfollowing meaning--'Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire,\nWater, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul\n(as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e.\nlet me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and\ngive them names; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not\nyet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to\nparticular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit\nthem for creation.'--The settled conclusion then is, that the\ndifferentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman\nonly.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentiation of names\nand forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite,\ndoes not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For\nthe rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul. For\nthe text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a process of\ntripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by\nBrahm\u00e2. 'Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached\nman become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of\nin three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion\nflesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the\npreceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes\non in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to\nthe world created by Brahm\u00e2, 'the red colour of burning fire is the\ncolour of fire,' &c. And the text moreover states the original\ntripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and\nforms: 'That divinity having entered into these three beings\ndifferentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered\ntripartite.'--To this objection the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also\naccording to the text.\n\nThe view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage\n'each of these he made tripartite,' refers to a time subsequent to the\ncreation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahm\u00e2, cannot be\nupheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage 'earth\nwhen eaten is disposed of in three ways,' &c., flesh is declared to be\nmore subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be\nassumed--in agreement with the nature of the causal substance--that\nflesh is made of water and manas of fire [FOOTNOTE 581:1]. And similarly\nwe should have to assume that urine--which is the grossest part of\nwater drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)--is of the nature of earth, and breath, which\nis its subtlest part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible;\nfor as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of\nin three ways, flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy\nnature. In the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two\nothers,' i.e. water and fire, 'according to the text.' That means--the\nthree parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be taken to\nbe all of them modifications of water, and the three parts of fire when\nconsumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire. Thus\nfeces, flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth; urine, blood\nand breath transformations of water; bones, marrow and speech\ntransformations of fire.\n\nThis moreover agrees with the subsequent statement (VI, 5, 4), 'For,\ntruly, mind consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire.' The\nprocess of tripartition referred to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the\nsame as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of\nfood when eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) assumption\nmade, and were it thence concluded that mind, breath and speech--as\nbeing the subtlest created things--are made of fire, this would flatly\ncontradict the complementary text quoted above ('mind consists of earth,'\n&c.). When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when eaten,\nare transformed in a threefold way, it refers to elements which had\nalready been rendered tripartite; the process of tripartition must\ntherefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg.\nWithout such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise\nto any effects; such capability they acquire only by being mutually\nconjoined, and that is just the process of tripartition. In agreement\nherewith Smriti says, 'Separate from each other, without connexion,\nthose elements with their various powers were incapable of producing\ncreatures. Bul having combined completely, entered into mutual\nconjunction, abiding one within the other, the principles--from the\nhighest Mahat down to individual things--produced the mundane egg.'--\nWhen the text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) 'The divinity having entered\ninto those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and\nforms; he made each of these tripartite,' the order in which the text\nmentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted\nby the order demanded by the sense [FOOTNOTE 583:1].--The text then\nproceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition, by means of burning\nfire, the sun and lightning, which indeed are things contained within\nthe mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took place\nbefore the egg, with all its contents, was created); but this is done\nfor the information of Svetaketu, who himself is a being within the\nmundane egg, and has to be taught with reference to things he knows.\n\nBut, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the matter the\nelements--earth, water and fire--which are eaten and drunk, are already\ntripartite, each of them containing portions of all, and thus are of a\nthreefold nature, how can they be designated each of them by a simple\nterm--_earth_, _water_, _fire_?--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 581:1. I.e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food)\nwhen eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition\nwhich is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the\nformer tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth\nof water and fire.]\n\n[FOOTNOTE 583:1. That means--in reality the tripartition of the elements\ncame first, and after that the creation of individual beings.]\n\n\n\n\n19. But on account of their distinctive nature there is that designation,\nthat designation.\n\nEach element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to the primary\ntripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails--\nso that each element has a distinctive character of its own--a definite\ndesignation is given to each.--The repetition (of 'that designation') in\nthe S\u00fbtra indicates the completion of the adhy\u00e2ya.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the fashioning of names and forms.'\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ADHY\u00c2YA.\n\nFIRST P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped, (as appears) from\nquestion and explanation.\n\nThat the Ved\u00e2nta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation, on\nthe part of all men desirous of Release, the highest Brahman, which is\nthe only cause of the entire world, which is not touched by even a\nshadow of imperfection, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely\nexalted qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other\nbeings--this is the point proved in the two previous adhy\u00e2yas; there\nbeing given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised\nagainst the Ved\u00e2nta doctrine on the basis of Smriti and reasoning, to\nrefute the views held by other schools, to show that the different\nVed\u00e2nta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove that the Self\nis the object of activities (enjoined in injunctions of meditation, and\nso on). In short, those two adhy\u00e2yas have set forth the essential nature\nof Brahman. The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to\nenquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together with the means\nof attainment. The third adhy\u00e2ya is concerned with an enquiry into\nmeditation--which is the means of attaining to Brahman; and as the\nmotive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all\ndesire for what is other than the thing to be obtained, and by the\ndesire for that thing, the points first to be enquired into are the\nimperfections of the individual soul--moving about in the different\nworlds, whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in\nthe state of swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brahman\nis raised above all these imperfections. These are the topics of the\nfirst and second p\u00e2das of the adhy\u00e2ya.\n\nThe first question to be considered is whether the soul, when moving\nfrom one body into another, is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of\nthe elements from which the new body is produced, or not. The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative; for, he says, wherever\nthe soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments.\nOther reasons supporting this prim\u00e2 facie view will be mentioned and\nrefuted further on.--The S\u00fbtra states the view finally accepted, 'In\nobtaining another \"of that\" it goes enveloped.' The 'of that' refers\nback to the form, i.e. body, mentioned in II, 4, 17. The soul when\nmoving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the\nelements. This is known 'from question and explanation,' i.e. answer.\nQuestion and answer are recorded in the 'Knowledge of the five fires'\n(Ch. Up. V, 3-10), where Prav\u00e2hana, after having addressed to Svetaketu\nseveral other questions, finally asks 'Do you know why in the fifth\nlibation water is called man?' In answer to this last question the text\nthen explains how the Devas, i.e. the pr\u00e2nas attached to the soul, offer\ninto the heavenly world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation\ncalled sraddh\u00e2; how this sraddh\u00e2 changes itself into a body con sisting\nof amrita, which body is called moon; how the same pr\u00e2nas offer this\nbody of amrita in Parjanya, imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so\noffered becomes rain; how the same pr\u00e2nas throw that rain on to the\nearth, also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes food;\nhow this food is then offered into man, also compared to fire, where it\nbecomes seed; and how, finally, this seed is offered into woman, also\ncompared to a fire, and there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on,\n'Thus in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavakas,' i.e. to be\ndesignated by the term _man_. And this means that the water which, in a\nsubtle form, was throughout present in the previous oblations also, now,\nin that fifth oblation, assumes the form of a man.--From this question\nand answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment,\ntogether with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs.--But\nthe words, 'water becomes purushavakas,' only intimate that water\nassumes the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only invests\nthe soul during its wanderings; how then can it be held that the soul\nmoves invested by the rudiments of all elements?--To this question the\nnext S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n2. But on account of (water) consisting of the three elements; on\naccount of predominance.\n\nWater alone could not produce a new body; for the text Ch. Up. VI, 3, 4,\n'Each of these he made tripartite,' shows that all the elements were'\nmade tripartite to the end of producing bodies. That the text under\ndiscussion mentions water only, is due to the predominance of water; and\nthat among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates, we\ninfer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the\npredominating element in the body.\n\n\n\n\n3. And on account of the going of the pr\u00e2nas.\n\nThat the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements\nfollows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said\nto be followed by the pr\u00e2nas, 'when he thus passes out, the chief pr\u00e2na\nfollows after him,' &c. (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). Compare also Smriti: 'It\ndraws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the sixth. When\nthe Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and passes out of another, he takes\nwith him those organs and then moves on, as the wind takes the odours\nfrom their abodes (the flowers)' (Bha. G\u00ee. XV, 8). But the pr\u00e2nas cannot\nmove without a substrate, and hence we must admit that the rudiments of\nthe elements--which are their substrate--are also moving.\n\n\n\n\n4. If it be said (that it is not so) on account of scriptural statement\nas to going to Agni and the rest; we say no, on account of the secondary\nnature (of the statement).\n\nBut the text, 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire,' &c.\n(Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). declares that when a person dies his organs go\ninto fire, and so on; they cannot therefore accompany the soul. Hence\nthe text which asserts the latter point must be explained in some other\nway!--Not so, the S\u00fbtra replies. The text stating that the organs go to\nfire, and so on, cannot be taken in its literal sense; for it continues,\n'the hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hair of the head into\ntrees' (which manifestly is not true, in its literal sense). The going\nof speech, the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean that\nthe different organs approach the divinities (Agni and the rest) who\npreside over them.\n\n\n\n\n5. Should it be said, on account of absence of mention in the first\n(reply); we say no, for just that (is meant), on the ground of fitness.\n\nAn objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under III, 1, 1; on\nthe ground that in the first oblation, described in Ch. Up. V, 4, 2, as\nbeing made into the heavenly world, water is not mentioned at all as the\nthing offered. The text says, 'on that altar the gods offer sraddh\u00e2';\nand by sraddh\u00e2 (belief) everybody understands a certain activity of mind.\nWater therefore is not the thing offered.--Not so, we reply. It is\nnothing else but water, which there is called sraddh\u00e2. For thus only\nquestion and answer have a sense. For the question is, 'Do you know why\nin the fifth libation water is called man?' and at the outset of the\nreply sraddh\u00e2 is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the\nheavenly world viewed as a fire. If here the word sraddh\u00e2 did not denote\nwater, question and answer would refer to different topics, and there\nwould be no connexion. The form in which the final statement is\nintroduced (iti tu pa\u00f1kamy\u00e2m, &c., 'but thus in the fifth oblation,' &c.),\nmoreover, also intimates that sraddh\u00e2 means water. The word 'iti,'\n_thus_, here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the\nquestion, 'Do you know _how_?' &c. Sraddh\u00e2 becomes moon, rain, food,\nseed, embryo in succession, and _thus_ the water comes to be called man.\nMoreover, the word sraddh\u00e2 is actually used in the Veda in the sense of\n'water'; 'he carries water, sraddh\u00e2 indeed is water' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6,\n8, 1). Aad what the text says as to king Soma (the moon) originating\nfrom sraddh\u00e2 when offered, also shows that sraddh\u00e2 must mean water.\n\n\n\n\n6. 'On account of this not being stated by Scripture'; not so, on\naccount of those who perform sacrifices and so on being understood.\n\nBut, a further objection is raised, in the whole section under\ndiscussion no mention at all is made of the soul; the section cannot\ntherefore prove that the soul moves, enveloped by water. The text speaks\nonly of different forms of water sraddh\u00e2 and the rest.--This, the S\u00fbtra\npoints out, is not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices being\nunderstood. For further on in the same chapter it is said, that those\nwho, while destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, practise sacrifices,\nuseful works and alms, reach the heavenly world and become there of the\nessence of the moon (somar\u00e2j\u00e2nah); whence, on the results of their good\nworks being exhausted, they return again and enter on a new embryonic\nstate (Ch. Up. V, 10). Now in the preceding section (V, 9) it is said\nthat they offer sraddh\u00e2 in the heavenly world, and that from that\noblation there arises the king Soma--an account which clearly refers to\nthe same process as the one described in V, 10. We herefrom infer that\nwhat is meant in V, 9 is that that being which was distinguished by a\nbody of sraddh\u00e2, becomes a being distinguished by a body of the nature\nof the moon. The word body denotes that the nature of which it is to be\nthe attribute of a soul, and thus extends in its connotation up to the\nsoul. The meaning of the section therefore is that it is the soul which\nmoves enveloped by water and the other rudimentary elements.--But the\nphrase 'him the gods eat' (V, 10, 4) shows that the king Soma cannot be\nthe soul, for that cannot be eaten!--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n7. Or it is metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the Self. For\nthus Scripture declares.\n\nHe who performs sacrifices, and so on, and thus does not know the Self,\nis here below and in yonder world a mere means of enjoyment for the\ndevas. He serves them here, by propitiating them with sacrifices, and so\non; and when the gods, pleased with his service, have taken him up into\nyonder world, he there is a common means of enjoyment for them (since\nthey are gratified by the presence of a faithful servant). That those\nnot knowing the Self serve and benefit the gods, Scripture explicitly\ndeclares, 'He is like a beast for the devas' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Smriti\nalso declares, that while those who know the Self attain to Brahman,\nthose who do not know it are means of enjoyment for the devas, 'To the\ngods go the worshippers of the gods, and they that are devoted to me go\nto me' (Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 23). When Scripture speaks of the soul being eaten\nby the gods, it therefore only means that the soul is to them a source\nof enjoyment. That eating the soul means no more than satisfaction with\nit, may also be inferred from the following scriptural passage, 'The\ngods in truth do not eat nor do they drink; by the mere sight of that\namrita they are satisfied.'--It thus remains a settled conclusion that\nthe soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of the elements.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'the obtaining of another body.'\n\n\n\n\n8. On the passing away of the works, with a remainder, according to\nScripture and Smriti; as it went and not so.\n\nThe text declares that those who only perform sacrifices and useful\nworks ascend by the road of the fathers, and again return to the earth\nwhen they have fully enjoyed the fruit of their works, 'having dwelt\nthere y\u00e2vat samp\u00e2tam, they return by the same way' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5).\nThe question here arises whether the descending soul carries a certain\nremainder (anusaya) of its works or not.--It does not, since it has\nenjoyed the fruit of all its works. For by 'anusaya' we have to\nunderstand that part of the karman which remains over and above the part\nretributively enjoyed; but when the fruit of the entire karman has been\nenjoyed, there is no such remainder. And that this is so we learn from\nthe phrase 'y\u00e2vat samp\u00e2tam ushitv\u00e2,' which means 'having dwelt there as\nlong as the karman lasts' (sampatanty anena svargalokam iti samp\u00e2tah).\nAnalogously another text says, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed\nhe does on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to\naction' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6).--Against this prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra\ndeclares 'with a remainder he descends, on account of what is seen, i.e.\nscriptural text, and Smriti.' The scriptural text is the one 'Those\nwhose conduct has been good' (V, 10, 7), which means that among the\nsouls that have returned, those whose karman is good obtain a good birth\nas Br\u00e2hmanas or the like, while those whose karman is bad are born again\nas low creatures-dogs, pigs, K\u00e2nd\u00e2las, and the like. This shows that the\nsouls which have descended are still connected with good or evil karman.\nSmriti also declares this: 'Men of the several castes and orders, who\nalways stand firm in the works prescribed for them, enjoy after death\nthe rewards of their works, and by virtue of a remnant (of their works)\nthey are born again in excellent countries, castes and families, endowed\nwith beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, wealth, good conduct,\nhappiness and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish'\n(Gautama Dha. S\u00fb. XI, 29); 'Afterwards when a man returns to this world\nhe obtains, by virtue of a remainder of works, birth in a good family,\nbeauty of form, beauty of complexion, strength, aptitude for learning,\nwisdom, wealth, and capacity for fulfilling his duties. Therefore,\nrolling like a wheel (from the one to the other), in both worlds he\ndwells in happiness' (\u00c2past. Dha. S\u00fb. II, 1, 2, 3). The clause 'as long\nas his works last' (y\u00e2vat-samp\u00e2tam) refers to that part of his works\nonly which was performed with a view to reward (as promised for those\nworks by the Veda); and the same holds true with regard to the passage\n'whatever work man does here on earth' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6). Nor is it\npossible that works, the fruit of which has not yet been enjoyed, and\nthose the result of which has not been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies,\nshould be destroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works. Hence\nthose who have gone to that world return with a remnant of their works,\n'as they went and not so'--i.e. in the same way as they ascended and\nalso in a different way. For the ascent takes place by the following\nstages--smoke, night, the dark half of the moon, the six months of the\nsun's southern progress, the world of the fathers, ether, moon. The\ndescent, on the other hand, goes from the place of the moon, through\nether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud. The two journeys are alike in so far as\nthey pass through ether, but different in so far as the descent touches\nwind, and so on, and does not touch the world of the fathers, and other\nstages of the ascent.\n\n\n\n\n9. 'On account of conduct'; not so, since (karana) connotes works; thus\nK\u00e2rshn\u00e2jini thinks.\n\nIn the phrases 'those whose works were good' (raman\u00eeya-karan\u00e2h), and\n'those whose works were bad' (kap\u00fby\u00e2-karan\u00e2h), the word karana does not\ndenote good and evil works (i.e. not such works as the Veda on the one\nhand enjoins as leading to certain rewards, and on the other prohibits,\nthreatening punishment), for, in Vedic as well as ordinary language, the\nterm karana is generally used in the sense of \u00e2k\u00e2ra, i.e. general\nconduct. In ordinary speech such words as \u00e2k\u00e2ra, s\u00eela, vritta are\nconsidered synonymous, and in the Veda we read 'whatever works (karm\u00e2ni)\nare blameless, those should be regarded, not others. Whatever our good\nconduct (su-karit\u00e2ni) was, that should be observed by thee, nothing\nelse' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2)--where 'works' and 'conduct' are\ndistinguished. Difference in quality of birth therefore depends on\nconduct, not on the remainder of works performed with a view to certain\nresults.--This prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra sets aside, 'not so, because\nthe scriptural term karana connotes works; thus the teacher K\u00e2rshn\u00e2jini\nthinks.' For mere conduct does not lead to experiences of pleasure and\npain; pleasure and pain are the results of _works_ in the limited sense.\n\n\n\n\n10. 'There is purposelessness'; not so, on account of the dependence on\nthat.\n\nBut if conduct has no result, it follows that good conduct, as enjoined\nin the Smritis, is useless!--Not so, we reply; for holy works enjoined\nby the Veda depend on conduct, in so far as a man of good conduct only\nis entitled to perform those works. This appears from passages such as\nthe following: 'A man who is not pure is unfit for all religious work,'\nand 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.'\nK\u00e2rshn\u00e2jini's view thus is, that the karana of the text implies karman.\n\n\n\n\n11. But only good and evil works, thus B\u00e2dari thinks.\n\nAs the verb \u00e2-kar takes karman for its object (punyam karm\u00e2 karati, &c.),\nand as the separate denotation (i.e. the use of apparently equivalent\nwords, viz. \u00e2kar and karman) can be accounted for on the ground that one\nof them refers to works established by manifest texts, and the other to\ntexts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct; and as,\nwhen the primary meaning is possible, no secondary meaning must be\nadopted; nothing else but good and evil works (in the Vedic sense) are\ndenoted by the word karana: such is the opinion of the teacher B\u00e2dari.\nThis opinion of B\u00e2dari, the author of the S\u00fbtra states as representing\nhis own. On the other hand, he adopts the view of K\u00e2rshnajini in so far\nas he considers such items of virtuous _conduct_ as the Sandhy\u00e2--which\nare enjoined by scriptural texts, the existence of which is inferred on\nthe basis of conduct as enjoined by Smriti--to have the result of\nqualifying the agent for the performance of other works.--The conclusion\ntherefore is that the souls descend, carrying a remnant of their works.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the passing of works.'\n\n\n\n\n12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices (the ascent) is declared\nby Scripture.\n\nIt has been said that those who perform only sacrifices, and so on, go\nto the moon and thence return with a remainder of their works. The\nquestion now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go\nto the moon. The phrase 'who do not perform sacrifices' denotes evil-\ndoers of two kinds, viz. those who do not do what is enjoined, and those\nwho do what is forbidden.--These also go to the moon, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nmaintains; for the text contains a statement to that effect, 'All who\ndepart from this world go to the moon' (Ka. Up. I, 2)--where it is said\nthat all go, without any distinction. So that those who perform good\nworks and those who perform evil works, equally go to the moon.--This\nthe next S\u00fbtra negatives.\n\n\n\n\n13. But of the others having enjoyed in Samyamana, there is ascent and\ndescent; as such a course is declared.\n\nOf the others, i.e. those who do not perform sacrifices, and so on,\nthere is ascent to the moon and descent from there, only after they have\nin the kingdom of Yama suffered the punishments due to their actions.\nFor the text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of Yama, and\nhave to go to him, 'He who thinks, this is the world there is no other,\nfalls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6); 'the son of\nVivasvat, the gathering place of men' (Rik Samh. X, 14, 1); 'King Yama,'\nand other texts.\n\n\n\n\n14. Smriti texts also declare this.\n\nThat all beings are under the sway of Yama, Par\u00e2sara also and other\nSmriti writers declare, 'And all these pass under the sway of Yama.'\n\n\n\n\n15. Moreover there are seven.\n\nThe Smritis moreover declare that there are seven hells, called Raurava,\nand so on, to which evil-doers have to go.--But how do they, if moving\nabout in those seven places, reach the palace of Yama?\n\n\n\n\n16. On account of his activity there also, there is no contradiction.\n\nAs their going to those seven places also is due to the command of Yama,\nthere is no contradiction.--Thus those also who do not perform\nsacrifices, and so on, after having gone to the world of Yama, and there\nundergone punishments according to the nature of their works, later on\nascend to the moon and again descend from there.--Of this conclusion the\nnext S\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n17. But, of knowledge and work--as these are the leading topics.\n\nThe 'but' sets aside the view developed so far. It cannot be admitted\nthat those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, reach the moon;\nbecause the path of the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for\nthe enjoyment of the fruits 'of knowledge and work.'That is to say--as\nthose who do not perform sacrifices cannot ascend by the path of the\ngods, since they are destitute of knowledge; so they also cannot go by\nthe path of the fathers, since they are destitute of meritorious works.\nAnd that these two paths are dependent respectively on knowledge and\nworks, we know from the fact that these two are the leading topics. For\nknowledge forms the leading topic with regard to the path of the gods,\n'Those who know this, and those who in the forest follow faith and\nausterities, go to light,' &c.; and works have the same position with\nregard to the path of the fathers, \"they who living in a village perform\nsacrifices, &c. go to the smoke,\" &c. The text, 'all those who depart\nfrom this world go to the moon,' must therefore be interpreted to mean\n'all those who perform sacrifices go to the moon.'--But if evil-doers do\nnot go to the moon, the fifth oblation cannot take place, and no new\nbody can be produced. For the text says, 'In the fifth oblation water is\ncalled man,' and, as we have shown, that fifth oblation presupposes the\nsoul's going to the moon. In order, therefore, to understand how in\ntheir case also a new embodiment is possible, it must needs be admitted\nthat they also ascend to the moon.--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n18. Not in the case of the third (place), as it is thus perceived.\n\nThe third 'place' does not, for the origination of a new body, depend on\nthe fifth oblation. The term,'the third place,' denotes mere evil-doers.\nThat these do not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the\nfifth oblation, is seen from Scripture. For, in answer to the question\n'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text says, 'On\nneither of these two ways are those small creatures continually\nreturning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. This is the third place.\nTherefore that world never becomes full.' As this passage states that in\nconsequence of 'the third place' (i.e. the creatures forming a third\nclass) not ascending to and descending from the heavenly world that\nworld never becomes full, it follows that that third place does not, for\nthe origination of bodies, depend on the fifth oblation. The clause, 'in\nthe fifth oblation,' moreover, merely states that the connexion of water\nwith the fifth fire is the cause of the water 'being called man' (i. e.\nbecoming an embryo), but does not deny the origination of embryos in\nother ways; for the text contains no word asserting such a limitation.\n\n\n\n\n19. It moreover is recorded, in the world.\n\nSmriti, moreover, states that the bodies of some specially meritorious\npersons, such as Draupad\u00ee, Dhrishtadyumna and others, were formed\nindependently of the fifth oblation' (i.e. sexual union).\n\n\n\n\n20. And on account of its being seen.\n\nAnd it is seen in Scripture also, that the bodies of some beings\noriginate independently of the fifth oblation: 'Of all beings there are\nindeed three origins only, that which springs from an egg, that which\nsprings from a living being, that which springs from a germ' (Ch. Up. VI,\n3, 1). It is observed that from among these beings those springing from\na germ and those springing from heat originate without that fifth\noblation.--But the text quoted does not refer to the creatures springing\nfrom heat; for it says that there are three origins only!--To this the\nnext S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n21. The third term includes that which springs from heat.\n\nCreatures sprung from heat are included in the third term--viz. that\nwhich springs from a germ--which is exhibited in the text quoted. The\nsettled conclusion therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the\nmoon.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'those who do not perform\nsacrifices.'\n\n\n\n\n22. There is entering into similarity of being with those, there being a\nreason.\n\nThe text describes the manner in which those who perform sacrifices, and\nso on, descend from the moon as follows: 'They return again that way as\nthey came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then having become\nair they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist,' &c. The\ndoubt here arises whether the soul when reaching ether, and so on,\nbecomes ether in the same sense as here on earth it becomes a man or\nother being, or merely becomes similar to ether, and so on.--The former\nview is the true one; for as the soul in the sraddh\u00e2 state becomes the\nmoon, so it must likewise be held to _become_ ether, and so on, there\nbeing no reason for a difference in the two cases.--This prim\u00e2 facie\nview the S\u00fbtra sets aside. The descending soul enters into similarity of\nbeing with ether, and so on; since there is a reason for this. When the\nsoul becomes a man or becomes the moon, there is a reason for that,\nsince it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoyment of pain and\npleasure. But there is no similar reason for the soul becoming ether,\nand so on, and hence the statement that the soul becomes ether, and so\non, can only mean that, owing to contact with them, it becomes similar\nto them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'entering into similarity of\nbeing.'\n\n\n\n\n23. Not very long; on account of special statement.\n\nDoes the soul in its descent through ether, and so on, stay at each\nstage for a not very long time, or is there nothing to define that time?--\nIt stays at each stage for an indefinite time, there being nothing to\ndefine the time.--\n\nNot so, the S\u00fbtra decides. For there is a special statement, i.e. the\ntext says that when the soul has become rice or grain or the like, the\npassing out of that stage is beset with difficulties. From this we infer\nthat as there is no such statement concerning the earlier stages, the\nsoul stays at each of them for a short time only.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the not very long time.'\n\n\n\n\n24. Into (plants) animated by other souls, because the statement is as\nin the previous cases.\n\nThe text declares that 'he descending souls are born as rice, corn,'\n&c., 'they are born here as rice, corn, herbs, trees,' &c. The question\nhere is whether the souls cling to plants animated by other souls which\nhave those plants for their bodies; or whether the descending souls\nthemselves are born with those plants for their bodies.--The latter view\nis the right one; for the text says, 'they are born as rice, grain,' and\nso on, and this expression is of the same kind as when we say 'he is\nborn as a man, as a deva,' and so on. The text therefore means that the\nsouls are embodied in the different plants.--This view the S\u00fbtra\nrejects. The souls merely cling to those plants which constitute the\nbodies of other souls; 'since the statement is as in the previous\ncases,' i.e. because the text only says that the souls become plants as\nit had previously been said that they become ether, and so on. Where the\ntext means to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying\nsoul (i.e. of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose of retributive\nenjoyment), it refers to the deeds which lead to such enjoyment; so e.\ng. in the passage, 'Those whose works have been good obtain a good\nbirth,' & c. But in the text under discussion there is no such reference\nto karman. For those works--viz. sacrifices and the like--which were\nundertaken with a view to reward, such as enjoyment of the heavenly\nworld, are, in the case of the descending souls, completely wiped out by\nthe enjoyment of the heavenly world (which precedes the descent of the\nsouls); and those works on the other hand, the action of which has not\nyet begun, lead to the embodiments mentioned further on ('Those whose\nworks are good'). And in the interval between those two conditions no\nnew karman originates. When, therefore, the text says that the souls are\nborn as plants, the statement cannot be taken in its literal sense.\n\n\n\n\n25. It is unholy. Not so, on the ground of Scripture.\n\nThe conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted, since there is a\nreason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an\nenjoying soul. Such works as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the\nenjoyment of the heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply\ninjury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agn\u00eeshomau.\nAnd such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not\nharm any creature.' Nor can it be said that the injunctions of\nsacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not\nharming any creature.--For the two injunctions refer to different things.\nThe injunction to kill the goat for Agn\u00eeshomau intimates that the\nkilling of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice,\nwhile the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has\ndisastrous consequences. Should it be said that the prohibition of\nharming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat\nwhich proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to such\nactions as spring from natural passion or desire (r\u00e2ga); we remark that\nin the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural\ndesire. Injunctions such as 'He who desires the heavenly world is to\nsacrifice', teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons\ndesirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having thus\nlearned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action\nfrom the natural desire of the result. This applies to the killing of\nthe goat also which is offered to Agn\u00eeshomau; man learns from Scripture\nthat such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the\nresult, and then performs those actions from natural desire. The case in\nno way differs from that of harm done in ordinary life--where the agent\nalways is prompted by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the\nconclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself.\nThe same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation. Men\nlearn from Scripture that through the performance of the special duties\nof their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply\nthemselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness, and\ntherefore such works also are mixed with evil. Hence the souls of those\nwho have performed sacrifices, and so on, which contain an element of\nevil, at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to\nbe enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-moving things\nsuch as plants, experience the fruit of that part of their actions which\nis of a harmful nature. That embodiment in non-moving beings is the\nresult of evil deeds Smriti declares: 'Owing to those defects of work\nwhich are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving being.' From all\nthis it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of\nenjoying the fruits of their works.--To this the S\u00fbtra replies--it is\nnot so, on account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares that\nthe killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly\nworld, and therefore is not of the nature of harm. This is declared in\nthe text, 'The animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine\nbody goes to the heavenly world'; 'with a golden body it ascends to the\nheavenly world.' An action which is the means of supreme exaltation is\nnot of the nature of harm, even if it involves some little pain; it\nrather is of beneficial nature.--With this the mantra also agrees: 'Thou\ndost not die, thou goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men\ngo, not evil-doers, there the divine Savitri may lead thee.' An act\nwhich has a healing tendency, although it may cause a transitory pain,\nmen of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial.\n\n\n\n\n26. After that conjunction with him who performs the act of generation.\n\nThe declaration that the descending souls _become_ rice plants, and so\non, cannot be taken literally for that reason also, that the text\nafterwards declares them to _become_ those who perform the act of\ngeneration: 'Whoever the being may be that eats the food and begets\noffspring, that being he (i.e. the soul that has descended) becomes.'\nNow the meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters\ninto conjunction with the creature which eats the grain; and hence we\nhave to interpret the previous text, as to the soul's becoming a plant,\nin the same way.\n\n\n\n\n27. From the yoni the body.\n\nOnly after having reached a yoni the soul, affected with a remnant of\nits works, obtains a new body, and only in a body there can be the\nenjoyment of pleasure and pain. When, therefore, previous to that the\nsoul is said to reach ether, wind, and so on, this can only mean that it\nenters into conjunction with them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of\n'that animated by another soul.'\n\n\n\n\nSECOND P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. In the intermediate sphere the creation (is effected by the soul);\nfor (Scripture) says (so).\n\nSo far it has been shown that the soul in the waking state suffers\naffliction since, in accordance with its deeds, it goes, returns, is\nborn, and so on. Next an enquiry is instituted into its condition in the\nstate of dream. With reference to the state of dreaming Scripture says,\n'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he\ncreates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings, no happiness,\nno joys; then he himself creates blessings, happiness, joys, and so on.\nFor he is the creator' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). A doubt here arises whether\nthis creation of chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual\nsoul, or by the Lord.--'The creation in the intermediate state' is due\nto the individual soul only. 'The intermediate state' means the sphere\nof dreams, in agreement with the passage 'There is a third intermediate\nstate, the place of dreams' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 1). And that creation is\neffected by the soul only; for what is referred to in the passages 'he\ncreates,' 'For he is the maker,' is none other but the dreaming soul.\n\n\n\n\n2. And some (state the soul to be) the shaper; and sons, and so on.\n\nAnd the followers of one s\u00e2kh\u00e2 state in their text that the dreaming\nsoul is the shaper of its desires: 'He, the person who is awake in those\nwho sleep, shaping one desired thing (k\u00e2ma) after the other.' The term\n'k\u00e2ma' there denotes not mere desires, but such things as sons and the\nlike which are objects of desire. For sons and so on are introduced as\n'k\u00e2mas' in previous passages: 'Ask for all k\u00e2mas according to thy wish';\n'Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years' (Ka. Up. I, 1, 25;\n23). The individual soul thus creates chariots, and so on, in its dreams.\nThat the soul has the power of realising all its wishes is known from\nthe declaration of Praj\u00e2pati. It is therefore able to create, even in\nthe absence of special instruments.--This view is set aside by the next\nS\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n3. But it is mere M\u00e2y\u00e2; on account of the true nature (of the soul) not\nbeing fully manifested.\n\nThe things appearing in dreams-chariots, lotus tanks, and so on--are\nabsolute M\u00e2y\u00e2, i.e. things created by the Supreme Person. For the term\n'M\u00e2y\u00e2' denotes wonderful things, as appears from passages such as 'She\nwas born in the race of Janaka, appearing like the wonderful power of\nthe divine being in bodily shape' (devam\u00e2y\u00e2). The sense of the passage\n'there are no chariots,' &c. then is--there are no chariots and horses\nto be perceived by any other person but the dreaming one; and then 'he\ncreates chariots,' &c.--i. e. the Supreme Person creates things to be\nperceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain time only. Those\nthings therefore are of a wonderful nature (but not illusions). And the\ncreation of such wonderful things is possible for the Supreme Person who\ncan immediately realise all his wishes; but not for the individual soul.\nThe latter also, indeed, fundamentally possesses that power; but as in\nthe Sams\u00e2ra state the true nature of the soul is not fully manifested,\nit is then incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations. The text\n'the person shaping one desired thing after the other' declares the\nSupreme Person to be the creator, for the clauses immediately preceding\nand following that text (viz. 'He who is awake in those who sleep'; and\n'that is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal;\nall worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond'--Ka. Up. II, 5,\n8) mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the Supreme Person.\nAnd the Bri. Up. text, 'For he is the maker,' must therefore, in\nagreement with the Katha-text, also be understood as declaring that it\nis the Supreme Person only that creates the things seen in a dream.--But\nif it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all imperfections,\nand so on, why then does this not manifest itself?--To this the next\nS\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n4. But owing to the wish of the highest it is hidden; for from that are\nits bondage and the opposite state.\n\nThe _but_ sets the objection aside. Owing to the wish of the highest, i.\ne. the Supreme Person, the essential nature of the individual soul is\nhidden. The Supreme Person hides the true, essentially blessed, nature\nof the soul which is in a state of sin owing to the endless chain of\nkarman. For this reason we find it stated in Scripture that the bondage\nand release of the soul result from the wish of the Supreme Person only\n'when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that invisible, incorporeal,\nundefined, unsupported; then he has gone to fearlessness '; 'for he\nalone causes blessedness'; 'from fear of it the wind blows' (Taitt. Up.\nII, 7, 8).\n\n\n\n\n5. Or that (results) also from connexion with the body.\n\nThe obscuration of the soul's true nature results either from the soul's\nconnexion with the body or from its connexion with the power of matter\nin a subtle state. As long as the creation lasts, the soul is obscured\nby its connexion with matter in the form of a body; at the time of a\npralaya, on the other hand, by its connexion with matter of so\nexceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit of differentiation by means of\nname and form. As thus its true nature is not manifest, the soul is\nunable to create, in dreams, chariots, lotus tanks, and so on, by its\nmere wish. And what the texts say about a being that is awake in those\nwho sleep and is the abode of all worlds ('in that all the worlds abide,\nand no one goes beyond it'--Ka. Up. II, 4, 9) can apply to the Supreme\nPerson only. The things seen by an individual soul in its dreams\ntherefore are specially created by the Supreme Person, and are meant by\nhim to be a retribution--whether reward or punishment--for deeds of\nminor importance: they therefore last for the time of the dream only,\nand are perceived by that one soul only.\n\n\n\n\n6. And it is suggestive, according to Scripture; this the experts also\ndeclare.\n\nThe things seen in dreams are not created by the wish of the individual\nsoul for this reason also, that according to Scripture dreams are\nprophetic of future good or ill fortune. 'When a man engaged in some\nwork undertaken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream, he may\ninfer success from his dream vision.' Those also who understand the\nscience of dreams teach that dreams foreshadow good and evil fortune.\nBut that which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality;\nand as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for himself\nonly such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence the creation\nwhich takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'the intermediate state.'\n\n\n\n\n7. The absence of that takes place in the n\u00e2d\u00ees and in the Self,\naccording to scriptural statement.\n\nNext the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into. Scripture says,\n'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, so that he sees no\ndream, then he lies asleep in those n\u00e2d\u00ees' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 3); 'When\nhe is in profound sleep and is conscious of nothing, there are seventy-\ntwo thousand veins called hita which from the heart spread through the\npericardium. Through them he moves forth and rests in the pericardium'\n(Bri. Up. II, 1, 19). 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with\nthe True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). These texts declare the veins, the\npericardium, and Brahman to be the place of deep sleep; and hence there\nis a doubt whether each of them in turns, or all of them together, are\nthat place. There is an option between them, since they are not in\nmutual dependence, and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same time\nbe in several places!--To this the S\u00fbtra replies--the absence of dreams,\ni.e. deep sleep takes place in the veins, in the pericardium, and in the\nhighest Self together; since these three are declared by Scripture. When\ndifferent alternatives may be combined, on the ground of there being\ndifferent effects in each case, it is improper to assume an option which\nimplies sublation of some of the alternatives. And in the present case\nsuch combination is possible, the veins and the pericardium holding the\nposition of a mansion, as it were, and a couch within the mansion, while\nBrahman is the pillow, as it were. Thus Brahman alone is the immediate\nresting-place of the sleeping soul.\n\n\n\n\n8. Hence the awaking from that.\n\nSince Brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep, Scripture is\nable to declare that the souls awake from that, i.e. Brahman; compare\n'Having come back from the True they do not know that they come from the\nTrue' (Ch. Up. VI, 10, 2), and other texts.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the absence of that.'\n\n\n\n\n9. But the same, on account of work, remembrance, text, and injunction.\n\nDoes the same person who had gone to sleep rise again at the time of\nwaking, or a different one?--Since the soul in deep sleep frees itself\nfrom all limiting adjuncts, unites itself with Brahman, and thus being\nin no way different from the released soul, is no longer in any way\nconnected with its previous body, organs, and so on; the person rising\nfrom sleep is a different one.--This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside, saying\n'but the same.' For there remains the work, i.e. the good and evil deeds\npreviously done by the sleeper, for which the same person has to undergo\nretribution before the knowledge of truth arises. There is next\nremembrance--'I, the waking person, am the same as I who was asleep.'\nScripture also declares this: 'Whatever these creatures are here,\nwhether a lion, or tiger, or wolf, &c., that they become again' (Ch. Up.\nVI, 10, 2). And, lastly, the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for\nthe sake of final Release would be purportless if the person merged in\ndeep sleep attained Release. Nor can it be said that the sleeping soul\nis free from all limiting adjuncts and manifests itself in its true\nnature (so as not to be different from the released soul). For with\nregard to the sleeping person the text says,'In truth he thus does not\nknow himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is\ngone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (Ch. Up. VIII, ii, 1);\nwhile, on the other hand, the texts, 'Having approached the highest\nlight he manifests himself in his true nature; he moves about there\nlaughing, playing, delighting himself; 'He becomes a Self-ruler; he\nmoves about in all the worlds according to his wish'; 'The seeing one\nsees everything, and attains everything everywhere' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3;\nVII, 25, 2; 26, 2), declare that the released soul is all-knowing, and\nso on. What is true about the sleeping person is that he is still\ncomprised within the Sams\u00e2ra, but for the time having put off all\ninstruments of knowledge and action and become incapable of knowledge\nand enjoyment repairs to the place of utter rest, i.e. the highest Self,\nand having there refreshed himself, again rises to new enjoyment of\naction.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'work, remembrance, text, and\ninjunction.'\n\n\n\n\n10. In the swooning person there is half-combination; this being the\nremaining (hypothesis).\n\nWith regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned, the question arises\nwhether that state of swoon is one of the other states, viz. deep sleep\nand so on, or whether it is a special condition of its own.--The former\nalternative must be accepted. For the term 'swoon' may be explained as\ndenoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged state, and there\nis no authority for assuming an altogether different new state.--This\nview the S\u00fbtra sets aside. The condition of a swooning person consists\nin reaching half, viz. of what leads to death; for this is the only\nhypothesis remaining. A swoon cannot be either dreaming or being awake;\nfor in a swoon there is no consciousness. And as it is different in\ncharacter as well as in the occasions giving rise to it from deep sleep\nand death, it cannot be either of those two states; for there are\nspecial circumstances occasioning a swoon, such as a blow on the head.\nThe only possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in\nwhich there is made a half-way approach to death. For while death\nconsists in the complete cessation of the soul's connexion with the body\nor organs of any kind, a swoon consists in the soul's remaining\nconnected with the subtle body and organs only. Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the swooning person.'\n\n\n\n\n11. Not on account of place even (is there any imperfection) of the\nHighest; for everywhere (it is described) as having twofold\ncharacteristics.\n\nThe different states of the individual soul have been discussed, to the\nend that an insight into their imperfections may give rise to\nindifference towards all worldly enjoyments. Next now, in order to give\nrise to the desire of attaining to Brahman, the S\u00fbtras proceed to\nexpound how Brahman's nature is raised above all imperfections and\nconstituted by mere blessed qualities. The following point requires to\nbe considered first. Do those imperfections which cling to the\nindividual soul in consequence of its different states--viz. the waking\nstate, dreams, deep sleep, swoon, departure from the body--affect also\nthe highest Brahman which as its inner Ruler abides within the soul in\nthose different states, or not?--They do affect it, since Brahman abides\nwithin the bodies which are in those different states.--But S\u00fbtras such\nas I, 2, 8 have already declared that the highest Brahman, because not\nsubject to the influence of karman, is free from all imperfections; how\nthen can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is connected\nwith this or that place?--In the following way. As was shown under III,\n2, 6, works give rise to imperfection and suffering in so far as they\ncause the connexion of the soul with a body. The efficient cause therein\nis the imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body; for otherwise\nthe works themselves would directly give rise to pain, and what then\nwould be the use of the connexion with a body? Hence, even in the case\nof a being not subject to karman, its connexion with various unholy\nbodies will cause imperfection and suffering. And even when such a being\nvoluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule them, connexion\nwith imperfections is unavoidable; no less than to be immersed in blood\nand purulent matter, even if done voluntarily, will make a man unclean.\nAlthough therefore Brahman is the sole cause of the world and a treasure-\nhouse of all blessed qualities, yet it is affected by the imperfections\nspringing therefrom that, as declared by Scripture, it abides within\nmatter, bodies, and their parts, and thus is connected with them (cp.\n'he who abides within earth, within the soul, within the eye, within the\nseed,' &c., Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).\n\nOf this prim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra disposes by saying--'Not even from\nplace, such as earth, soul, &c., is there possible for the highest Self\na shadow even of imperfection; since everywhere in Scripture as well as\nSmriti Brahman is described as having characteristics of a double kind;\nviz. on the one hand freedom from all imperfections, and on the other\npossession of all blessed qualities. For Scripture says that the Supreme\nPerson is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from\ngrief, free from hunger and thirst; that all his wishes realise\nthemselves, that all its purposes realise themselves' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,\n5)--And Smriti says, 'He comprises within himself all blessed qualities,\nby a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported. In him\nthere are combined energy, strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all\nother noble qualities. He is the Highest of the high, no pain or other\nimperfections affect him, the Lord of all, high or low. From all evil he\nis free, he whose name is Vishnu, the highest abode.' These and other\npassages teach that Brahman possesses the double characteristics stated\nabove.\n\n\n\n\n12. Should it be said 'on account of difference'; not so, because with\nreference to each the text says what is not that.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, we observe, that the individual soul also,\nalthough in reality possessing the same twofold attributes, viz. freedom\nfrom all evil and so on, as we learn from the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati (Ch.\nUp. VIII, 7), yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that\nit is connected with bodies, divine, human, and so on, and thus\nundergoes a variety of conditions. Analogously we cannot avoid the\nconclusion that the inner Ruler also, although in reality possessing\nthose same twofold attributes, is also affected by imperfection, because\nthrough its connexion with those different bodies it likewise undergoes\na variety of conditions.--This objection the S\u00fbtra sets aside in the\nwords, 'not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not\nthat,' i.e. what is contrary. For where the text says that the inner\nRuler dwells within the earth, within the soul, within the eye, and so\non, it concludes each clause by saying, 'that is thy Self, the inner\nRuler, the immortal one,' i.e. declares the inner Ruler to be immortal,\nand thus denies of him any imperfections due to his connexion with the\nbodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them. The true\n(perfect) nature of the individual soul, on the other hand, is obscured\nas long as it is connected with a body, as we have explained under III,\n2, 5.--But, as the P\u00fbrvapakshin has pointed out, even if the highest\nSelf voluntarily enters into bodies, it cannot escape connexion with the\nimperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies.--Not\nso, we reply. The fact is, that not even non-sentient things are,\nessentially or intrinsically, bad; but in accordance with the nature of\nthe works of those beings which are under the rule of karman, one thing,\nowing to the will of the Supreme Person, causes pain to one man at one\ntime and pleasure at another time, and causes pleasure or pain to one\nperson and the opposite to another person. If the effects of things\ndepended on their own nature only, everything would at all times be\nproductive for all persons, either of pleasure only or of pain only. But\nthis is not observed to be the case. In agreement herewith Smriti says,\n'Because one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy and\nwrath, the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself. As the same thing\nwhich erst gave rise to love causes pain later on, and that which once\ncaused anger now causes satisfaction, nothing is in itself of the nature\neither of pleasure or of pain.' To the soul therefore which is subject\nto karman the connexion with different things is the source of\nimperfection and suffering, in agreement with the nature of its works;\nwhile to the highest Brahman, which is subject to itself only, the same\nconnexion is the source of playful sport, consisting therein that he in\nvarious ways guides and rules those things.\n\n\n\n\n13. Some also (teach) thus.\n\nMoreover, the followers of one s\u00e2kh\u00e2 explicitly teach that the connexion\nwith one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of\ndisadvantage, while for the highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind,\nbut constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a\nLord and Ruler, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree.\nOne of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu.\nUp. III, 1, 1).--But the text, 'Having entered by means of that j\u00eeva-\nself I will differentiate names and forms,' teaches that the\ndifferentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the\nelements of the j\u00eeva-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this implies that\nBrahman also, as the Self of the individual soul, possesses definite\nshapes, divine, human, and so on, and is to be denominated by the\ncorresponding names. Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to\nwhich injunctions and prohibitions are addressed--such as 'a Br\u00e2hmana is\nto sacrifice'--and hence necessarily is under the power of karman.--To\nthis the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n14. For (Brahman is) without form merely, since it is the principal\nagent with regard to that.\n\nBrahman, although by entering into bodies, human, divine, and so on, it\nbecomes connected with various forms, yet is in itself altogether devoid\nof form, and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in\nthe case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.--Why?--Because as it is\nthat which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the\nrelation of a superior (pradh\u00e2na). For the text, 'The Ether (Brahman)\nindeed is the accomplisher of names and forms; that which is without\nthese two is Brahman,' teaches that Brahman, although entering into all\nbeings, is not touched by name and form, but is that which brings about\nname and form.--But, an objection is raised, if Brahman is the inner\nruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body, how can it be\nsaid that it is altogether destitute of form?--There is a difference, we\nreply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in\nwhich it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to\nwhich the body gives rise; but as Brahman does not share those pleasures\nand pains, it has no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and\nprohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman. The\nhighest Brahman therefore is like a being without form, and hence,\nalthough abiding within all things, free from all imperfection and\nendowed with all blessed qualities.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, texts such as 'the True, knowledge,\ninfinite is Brahman' suggest a Brahman whose nature is constituted\nexclusively by non-differentiated light; while at the same time a\nBrahman endowed with qualities--such as omniscience, being the cause of\nthe world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of immediately\nrealising its wishes and purposes--is expressly negatived by texts such\nas 'not so, not so' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6), and therefore must be held to\nbe false. How then can it be maintained that Brahman possesses the\n'twofold characteristics' mentioned under S\u00fbtra 11?--To this the next\nS\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n15. And in the same way as (a Brahman) consisting of light; (the texts\nthus) not being devoid of meaning.\n\nIn order that texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'\nmay not be devoid of meaning, we have to admit that light (intelligence)\nconstitutes the essential nature of Brahman. But analogously we have\nalso to admit that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'; for\notherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all imperfections, all-\nknowing, the cause of the world, and so on, would in their turn be\ndevoid of meaning.\n\n\n\n\n16. And (the text) says so much only.\n\nMoreover the text 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' only\nteaches that Brahman has light for its essential nature, and does not\nnegative those other attributes of Brahman--omniscience, being the cause\nof the world, &c.--which are intimated by other texts. What is the\nobject of the negation in 'not so, not so' will be shown further on.\n\n\n\n\n17. (This Scripture) also shows, and it is also stated in Smriti.\n\nThat Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free\nfrom all imperfections, the whole body of Ved\u00e2nta-texts clearly declares:\n'That highest great lord of lords, that highest deity of deities'; 'He\nis the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him\nneither parent nor lord '; 'There is no effect and no cause known of him,\nno one is seen like unto him or higher. His high power is revealed as\nmanifold, as essential action of knowledge and strength' (Svet. Up. VI,\n7-9); 'He who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu.\nI, 1,9); 'From fear of him the wind blows, from fear of him the sun\nmoves'; 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'That from\nwhich all speech with the mind turns away, not having reached it,\nknowing the bliss of that Brahman man fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9);\n'He who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault,\nwithout taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19).--And Smriti: 'He who knows me to be\nunborn and without a beginning, the Supreme Lord of the worlds';\n'Pervading this entire universe, by one part of mine I do abide'; 'With\nme as supervisor Prakriti brings forth the universe of the movable and\nthe immovable, and for this reason the world does ever move round'; 'But\nanother is the Supreme Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who\npervading the three worlds supports them--the eternal Lord' (Bha. G\u00ee. X,\n3; 42; IX, 10; XV, 17); 'The all-working, all-powerful one, rich in\nknowledge and strength, who becomes neither less nor more, who is self-\ndependent, without beginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness\nnor exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire; the blameless one, raised\nabove all, without support, imperishable.'--As thus Brahman in whatever\nplace it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics,' the imperfections\ndependent on those places do not touch it.\n\n\n\n\n18. For this very reason comparisons, such as reflected images of the\nsun and the like.\n\nBecause Brahman, although abiding in manifold places, ever possesses the\ntwofold characteristics, and hence does not share the imperfections due\nto those places, scriptural texts illustrate its purity in the midst of\ninferior surroundings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water,\nmirrors, and the like. Compare e.g., 'As the one ether is rendered\nmanifold by jars and the like, or as the one sun becomes manifold in\nseveral sheets of water; thus the one Self is rendered manifold by\nabiding in many places. For the Self of all beings, although one, abides\nin each separate being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time,\nas the moon reflected in water.'\n\n\n\n\n19. But because it is not apprehended like water, there is no equality.\n\nThe 'but' indicates an objection.--The highest Self is not apprehended\nin earth and other places in the same way as the sun or a face is\napprehended in water or a mirror. For the sun and a face are erroneously\napprehended as abiding in water or a mirror; they do not really abide\nthere. When, on the other hand, Scripture tells us that the highest Self\ndwells in the earth, in water, in the soul, &c., we apprehend it as\nreally dwelling in all those places. That the imperfections caused by\nwater and mirrors do not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due\nto the fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the water\nand the mirror. Hence there is no real parallelism between the thing\ncompared (the highest Self) and the thing to which it is compared (the\nreflected image).\n\n\n\n\n20. The participation (on Brahman's part) in increase and decrease, due\nto its abiding within (is denied); on account of the appropriateness of\nboth (comparisons), and because thus it is seen.\n\nThe comparison of the highest Self to the reflected sun and the rest is\nmeant only to deny of the Self that it participates in the imperfections--\nsuch as increase, decrease, and the like--which attach to the earth and\nthe other beings within which the Self abides.--How do we know this?--\nFrom the circumstance that on this supposition both comparisons are\nappropriate. In the scriptural text quoted above Brahman is compared to\nether, which although one becomes manifold through the things--jars and\nso on--within it; and to the sun, which is multiplied by the sheets of\nwater in which he is reflected. Now the employment of these comparisons--\nwith ether which really does abide within the jars and so on, and with\nthe sun which in reality does not abide in the water--is appropriate\nonly if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest Self does not\nparticipate in the imperfections inherent in earth and so on. Just as\nether, although connecting itself separately with jars, pots, and so on,\nwhich undergo increase and decrease, is not itself touched by these\nimperfections; and just as the sun, although seen in sheets of water of\nunequal extent, is not touched by their increase and decrease; thus the\nhighest Self, although abiding within variously-shaped beings, whether\nnon-sentient like earth or sentient, remains untouched by their various\nimperfections--increase, decrease, and so on--remains one although\nabiding in all of them, and ever keeps the treasure of its blessed\nqualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity.--The comparison of\nBrahman with the reflected sun holds good on the following account. As\nthe sun is not touched by the imperfections belonging to the water,\nsince he does not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason\nfor his sharing those imperfections, thus the highest Self, which really\nabides within earth and the rest, is not affected by their imperfections;\nfor as the nature of the highest Self is essentially antagonistic to all\nimperfection, there is no reason for its participating in the\nimperfection of others.--'And as this is seen.' This means--Since we\nobserve in ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between\ntwo things for the reason that although they do not possess all\nattributes in common, they yet have some attribute in common. We say, e.\ng. 'this man is like a lion.'--The conclusion from all this is that the\nhighest Self, which is essentially free from all imperfections and a\ntreasure as it were of all blessed qualities, in no way suffers from\ndwelling within the earth and the rest.\n\nAn objection is raised. In the Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka, in the chapter beginning\n'There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial,' the\nwhole material world, gross and subtle, is at first referred to as\nconstituting the form of Brahman, and next a special form of Brahman is\nmentioned: 'And what is the form of that Person? Like a saffron-coloured\nraiment,' &c. But thereupon the text proceeds, 'Now follows the teaching--\nnot so, not so; for there is not anything else higher than this \"not so.\n\" 'This passage, referring to all the previously mentioned forms of\nBrahman by means of the word 'so,' negatives them; intimating thereby\nthat Brahman is nothing else than pure Being, and that all distinctions\nare mere imaginations due to Brahman not knowing its own essential\nnature. How then can Brahman possess the twofold characteristics?--To\nthis the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n21. For the text denies the previously declared so-muchness; and\ndeclares more than that.\n\nIt is impossible to understand the text 'not so, not so' as negativing\nthose distinctions of Brahman which had been stated previously. If the\ntext meant that, it would be mere idle talk. For none but a person not\nin his right mind would first teach that all the things mentioned in the\nearlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of Brahman--as\nwhich they are not known by any other means of proof--and thereupon\ndeliberately negative his own teaching. Although among the things\nmentioned there are some which, in themselves, are known through other\nmeans of proof, yet they are not thus known to be modes of Brahman, and\nothers again are known neither in themselves nor as modes of Brahman.\nThe text therefore cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known,\nbut gives fundamental instruction about them. Hence the later passage\ncannot be meant as a sheer negation, but must be taken as denying the\npreviously described 'so-muchness' of Brahman; i.e. the passage denies\nthat limited nature of Brahman which would result from Brahman being\nviewed as distinguished by the previously stated attributes only. The\nword _so_ refers to that limited nature, and the phrase _not so_\ntherefore means that Brahman is not distinguished by the previously\nstated modes _only_. This interpretation is further confirmed by the\nfact that after that negative phrase further qualities of Brahman are\ndeclared by the text: 'For there is not anything higher than this _not\nso_. Then comes the name, the _True of the True_; for the pr\u00e2nas are the\nTrue, and he is the True of them.' That means: Than that Brahman which\nis expressed by the phrase 'not so' there is no other thing higher, i.e.\nthere is nothing more exalted than Brahman either in essential nature or\nin qualities. And of that Brahman the name is the 'True of the True.'\nThis name is explained in the next clause, 'for the pr\u00e2nas,' &c. The\nterm pr\u00e2nas here denotes the individual souls, so called because the\npr\u00e2nas accompany them. They are the 'True' because they do not, like the\nelements, undergo changes implying an alteration of their essential\nnature. And the highest Self is the 'True of the True' because while the\nsouls undergo, in accordance with their karman, contractions and\nexpansions of intelligence, the highest Self which is free from all sin\nknows of no such alternations. He is therefore more eminently _true_\nthan they are. As thus the complementary passage declares Brahman to be\nconnected with certain qualities, the clause 'not so, not so' (to which\nthat passage is complementary) cannot deny that Brahman possesses\ndistinctive attributes, but only that Brahman's nature is confined to\nthe attributes previously stated.--Brahman therefore possesses the\ntwofold characteristics. That the clause 'not so' negatives Brahman's\nbeing fully described by the attributes previously mentioned, was above\nproved on the ground that since Brahman is not the object of any other\nmeans of proof, those previous statements cannot refer to what is\nalready proved, and that the final clause cannot therefore be meant to\ndeny what the previous clauses expressly teach. The next S\u00fbtra now\nconfirms this circumstance of Brahman not lying within the sphere of the\nother means of proof.\n\n\n\n\n22. That (is) unmanifested; for (this Scripture) declares.\n\nBrahman is not manifested by other means of proof; for Scripture says,\n'His form is not to be seen, no one beholds him with the eye' (Ka. Up.\nII, 6, 9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III,\n1, 8).\n\n\n\n\n23. Also in perfect conciliation, according to Scripture and Smriti.\n\nMoreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment,\ni.e. in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition\nof Brahman takes place, not in any other state. This Scripture and\nSmriti alike teach. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by\nunderstanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses by him the\nSelf can be gained. The Self chooses him as his own' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23);\n'When a man's nature has become purified by the serene light of\nknowledge, then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts' (Mu. Up.\nIII, 1, 9). Smriti: 'Neither by the Vedas, nor austerities, nor gifts,\nnor by sacrifice, but only by exclusive devotion, may I in this form be\nknown and beheld in truth and also entered into' (Bha. G\u00ee. XI, 53,54).\nThe scriptural text beginning 'Two are the forms of Brahman,' which\ndeclares the nature of Brahman for the purposes of devout meditation,\ncannot therefore refer to Brahman's being characterised by two forms, a\nmaterial and an immaterial, as something already known; for apart from\nScripture nothing is known about Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n24. And there is non-difference (of the intention of Brahman's\ndistinguishing attributes), as in the case of light; and the light (is)\nintuited as constituting Brahman's essential nature by repetition of the\npractice (of meditation).\n\nThat the clause 'not so' negatives not Brahman's possessing two forms, a\nmaterial and an immaterial one, but only Brahman's nature being\nrestricted to those determinations, follows therefrom also that in the\nvision of V\u00e2madeva and others who had attained to intuition into\nBrahman's nature, the fact of Brahman having all material and immaterial\nbeings for its attributes is apprehended in non-difference, i.e. in the\nsame way as the fact of light (i.e. knowledge) and bliss constituting\nBrahman's essential nature. Compare the text 'Seeing this the Rishi\nV\u00e2madeva understood, I am Manu and the sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And\nthat light and bliss constitute Brahman's nature was perceived by\nV\u00e2madeva and the rest through repeated performance of the practice of\ndevout meditation. In the same way then, i.e. by repeated meditation,\nthey also became aware that Brahman has all material and immaterial\nthings for its distinguishing modes.--The next S\u00fbtra sums up the proof\nof Brahman's possessing twofold characteristics.\n\n\n\n\n25. Hence (Brahman is distinguished) by what is infinite; for thus the\ncharacteristics (hold good).\n\nBy the arguments stated it is proved that Brahman is distinguished by\nthe infinite multitude of blessed qualities. And this being so, it\nfollows that Brahman possesses the twofold characteristics.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'that which has twofold characteristics.'\n\n\n\n\n26. But on account of twofold designation, as the snake and its coils.\n\nIt has been shown in the preceding adhikarana that the entire non-\nsentient universe is the outward form of Brahman. For the purpose of\nproving Brahman's freedom from all imperfection, an enquiry is now begun\ninto the particular mode in which the world may be conceived to\nconstitute the form of Brahman. Is the relation of the two like that of\nthe snake and its coils; or like that of light and the luminous body,\nboth of which fall under the same genus; or like that of the individual\nsoul and Brahman, the soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that\nreason a part (amsa) of Brahman?--On the assumption of this last\nalternative, which is about to be established here, it has been already\nshown under two preceding S\u00fbtras (I, 4, 23; II, 1, 14), that from\nBrahman, as distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their\nsubtle form, there originates Brahman as distinguished by all those\nbeings in their gross form.\n\nWhich then of the alternatives stated above is the true one?--The\nmaterial world is related to Brahman as the coils to the snake, 'on\naccount of twofold designation.' For some texts declare the identity of\nthe two: 'Brahman only is all this'; 'The Self only is all this.' Other\ntexts again refer to the difference of the two: 'Having entered into\nthese three deities with this j\u00eeva-self, let me differentiate names and\nforms.' We therefore consider all non-sentient things to be special\nforms or arrangements of Brahman, as the coils are of a coiled-up snake\nor a coiled-up rope.\n\n\n\n\n27. Or else like light and its abode, both being fire.\n\nThe _or_ sets aside the other two alternatives. If Brahman itself only\nappeared in the form of non-sentient things--as the snake itself only\nconstitutes the coils--both sets of texts, those which declare\ndifference as well as those which declare the unchangeableness of\nBrahman, would be contrary to sense. We therefore, adopting the second\nalternative, hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of\nlight and that in which it abides, i.e. the luminous body. The two are\ndifferent, but at the same time they are identical in so far as they\nboth are fire (tejas). In the same way the non-sentient world\nconstitutes the form of Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n28. Or else in the manner stated above.\n\nThe _but_ sets aside the two preceding alternatives. One substance may\nindeed connect itself with several states, but the former of the two\nalternatives implies that Brahman itself constitutes the essential\nnature of non-sentient matter, and thus there is no escape from the\nobjections already stated under S\u00fbtra 27. Let then the second\nalternative be adopted according to which Brahma-hood (brahmatva)\nconstitutes a genus inhering in Brahman as well as in non-sentient\nmatter, just as fire constitutes the common genus for light and luminous\nbodies. But on this view Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic\ncharacter inhering in the Lord (isvara), sentient souls and non-sentient\nmatter, just as the generic character of horses (asvatva) inheres in\nconcrete individual horses; and this contradicts all the teaching of\nSruti and Smriti (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete\nentity). We therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in\nthe same relation as the one previously proved for the individual soul\nin S\u00fbtra II, 3, 43; 46; viz. that it is an attribute incapable of being\nrealised apart from Brahman and hence is a part (amsa) of the latter.\nThe texts referring to the two as non-different may thus be taken in\ntheir primary sense; for the part is only a limited place of that of\nwhich it is a part. And the texts referring to the two as different may\nalso be taken in their primary sense; for the distinguishing attribute\nand that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different. Thus\nBrahman's freedom from all imperfection is preserved.--Lustre is an\nattribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part\nof the gem; the same relation also holds good between generic character\nand individuals having that character, between qualities and things\nhaving qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way souls as\nwell as non-sentient matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts.\n\n\n\n\n29. And on account of denial.\n\nTexts such as 'This is that great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri.\nUp. IV, 4, 25), 'By the old age of the body that does not age' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 1, 5), deny of Brahman the properties of non-sentient matter. From\nthis it follows that the relation of the two can only be that of\ndistinguishing attribute and thing distinguished, and hence of part and\nwhole. Brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in\ntheir subtle state is the cause; distinguished by the same beings in\ntheir gross state is the effect: the effect thus is non-different from\nthe cause, and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is\nlikewise known. All these tenets are in full mutual agreement. Brahman's\nfreedom from defects also is preserved; and this and Brahman's being the\nabode of all blessed qualities prove that Brahman possesses the 'twofold\ncharacteristics.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the coils of the\nsnake.'\n\n\n\n\n30. (There is something) higher than that; on account of the\ndesignations of bridge, measure, connexion, and difference.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras now proceed to refute an erroneous view based on some\nfallacious arguments, viz. that there is a being higher even than the\nhighest Brahman, the supreme cause, material as well as operative, of\nthe entire world--a refutation which will confirm the view of Brahman\nbeing free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless\ntranscendentally exalted qualities.--There is some entity higher than\nthe Brahman described so far as being the cause of the world and\npossessing the twofold characteristics. For the text 'That Self is a\nbank (or bridge), a boundary' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1) designates the Self\nas a bank or bridge (setu). And the term 'setu' means in ordinary\nlanguage that which enables one to reach the other bank of a river; and\nfrom this we conclude that in the Vedic text also there must be meant\nsomething to be reached. The text further says that that bridge is to be\ncrossed: 'He who has crossed that bridge, if blind,' &c.; this also\nindicates that there must be something to be reached by crossing. Other\ntexts, again, speak of the highest Brahman as something measured, i.e.\nlimited. 'Brahman has four feet (quarters), sixteen parts.' Such\ndeclarations of Brahman being something limited suggest the existence of\nsomething unlimited to be reached by that bridge. Further there are\ntexts which declare a connexion of the bridge as that which is a means\ntowards reaching, and a thing connected with the bridge as that to be\nreached: 'the highest bridge of the Immortal' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'he is\nthe bridge of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). For this reason also\nthere is something higher than the Highest.--And other texts again\nexpressly state that being beyond the Highest to be something different:\n'he goes to the divine Person who is higher than the Highest' (Mu. Up.\nIII, 2, 8); 'by this Person this whole universe is filled; what is\nhigher than that is without form and without suffering' (Svet. Up. III,\n9-10). All this combined shows that there is something higher than the\nhighest Brahman.--The next S\u00fbtra disposes of this view.\n\n\n\n\n31. But on account of resemblance.\n\nThe 'but' sets aside the p\u00fbrvapaksha. There is no truth in the assertion\nthat from the designation of the Highest as a bridge (or bank) it\nfollows that there is something beyond the Highest. For Brahman in that\ntext is not called a bank with regard to something to be reached thereby;\nsince the additional clause 'for the non-confounding of these worlds'\ndeclares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as it binds\nto itself (setu being derived from _si_, to bind) the whole aggregate of\nsentient and non-sentient things without any confusion. And in the\nclause 'having passed beyond that bridge' the _passing beyond_ means\n_reaching_; as we say, 'he passes beyond the Vedanta,' meaning 'he has\nfully mastered it.'\n\n\n\n\n32. It subserves the purpose of thought; as in the case of the feet.\n\nWhere the texts speak of Brahman as having four quarters, and sixteen\nparts, or say that 'one quarter of him are all these beings' (Ch. Up.\nIII, 12, 6), they do so for the purpose of thought, i.e. meditation,\nonly. For as texts such as 'the Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'\nteach Brahman, the cause of the world, to be unlimited, it cannot in\nitself be subject to measure. The texts referring to measure therefore\naim at meditation only, in the same way as texts such as 'Speech is one\nfoot (quarter) of him, breath another, the eye another, the mind\nanother' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2).--But how can something that in itself is\nbeyond all measure, for the purpose of meditation, be spoken of as\nmeasured? To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n33. Owing to difference of place, as in the case of light, and so on.\n\nOwing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted by special\nplaces, such as speech, and so on, Brahman in so far as connected with\nthese adjuncts may be viewed as having measure; just as light and the\nlike although spread everywhere may be viewed as limited, owing to its\nconnexion with different places--windows, jars, and so on.\n\n\n\n\n34. And on account of possibility.\n\nNor is there any truth in the assertion that, because texts such as 'he\nis the bridge of the Immortal' intimate a distinction between that which\ncauses to reach and the object reached, there must be something to be\nreached different from that which causes to reach; for the highest Self\nmay be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being reached; cp.\n'The Self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the Self\nchooses by him the Self can be gained' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 23).\n\n\n\n\n35. Thus, from the denial of anything else.\n\nNor can we allow the assertion that there is something higher than the\nhighest because certain texts ('the Person which is higher than the\nhighest'; 'beyond the Imperishable there is the highest,' &c.) refer to\nsuch a difference. For the same texts expressly deny that there is\nanything else higher than the highest--'than whom there is nothing else\nhigher, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger' (Svet. Up. III, 9).\nSo also other texts: 'For there is nothing else higher than this \"not\nso\"' (i.e. than this Brahman designated by the phrase 'not so'; Bri. Up.\nII, 3, 6); 'Of him none is the Lord, his name is great glory' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r.\nUp. I, 10).\n\nBut what then is the entity referred to in the text 'tato yad\nuttarataram '? (Svet. Up. III, 10)?--The passage immediately preceding\n(8), 'I know that great person, &c.; a man who knows him passes over\ndeath,' had declared that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to\nimmortality; and the clause (9), 'Higher than whom there is nothing else,'\nhad confirmed this by declaring that Brahman is the Highest and that\nthere is no other thing higher. In agreement herewith we must explain\nstanza 10 as giving a reason for what had been said, 'Because that which\nis the highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without form\nand without suffering, therefore (tatah) those who know him become\nimmortal,' &c. On any other explanation stanza 10 would not be in\nharmony with stanza 8 where the subject is introduced, and with what is\ndeclared in stanza 9.--Analogously in the text 'He goes to the divine\nPerson who is higher than the highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8) 'the highest'\nmeans the aggregate soul (samash\u00e2-purusha), which in a previous passage\nhad been said to be 'higher than the high Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); and\nthe 'higher' refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent\nqualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.\n\n\n\n\n36. The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (understood) from the\ndeclaration of extent.\n\nThat omnipresence which is possessed 'by that,' i.e. by Brahman, and\nwhich is known 'from declarations of extent,' and so on, i.e. from texts\nwhich declare Brahman to be all-pervading, is also known from texts such\nas 'higher than that there is nothing.' Declarations of extent are e.g.\nthe following: 'By this Person this whole Universe is filled' (Svet. Up.\nIII. 9); 'whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside\nand outside by N\u00e2r\u00e2yana' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up.); 'The eternal, pervading,\nomnipresent, which the Wise consider as the source of all beings' (Mu.\nUp. I, 1, 6). The 'and the rest' in the S\u00e2tra comprises passages such as\n'Brahman indeed is all this,' 'The Self indeed is all this,' and the\nlike. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is absolutely supreme.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the Highest.'\n\n\n\n\n37. From thence the reward; on account of possibility.\n\nIt has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout\nmeditation, that the soul in all its states is imperfect, while the\nSupreme Person to be reached by it is free from imperfections, the owner\nof blessed qualities and higher than everything else. Being about to\ninvestigate the nature of meditation, the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra now declares that\nthe meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. Release,\nwhich consists in attaining to the highest Person, from that highest\nPerson only: and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed\nby the Veda--whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world--come from\nthe highest Person only. The S\u00fbtra therefore says generally, 'from\nthence the reward.'--'Why so?'--'Because that only is possible.'\n\nFor it is he only--the all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous one--\nwho being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and the like, as well\nas by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms\nof enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists\nin attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is non-\nintelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result\nconnected with a future time.\n\n\n\n\n38. And on account of scriptural declaration.\n\nThat he bestows all rewards--whether in the form of enjoyment or Release--\nScripture also declares 'This indeed is the great, the unborn Self, the\neater of food, the giver of wealth' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24); and 'For he\nalone causes delight' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).--Next a prim\u00e2 facie view is\nstated.\n\n\n\n\n39. For the same reasons Jaimini (thinks it to be) religious action.\n\nFor the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural declaration, the\nteacher Jaimini thinks that religious works, viz. sacrifices, gifts,\nofferings, and meditation, of themselves bring about their rewards. For\nwe observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like,\nand charitable gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly\nor indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about their rewards\nimmediately, they may do so mediately, viz. by means of the so-called\n_ap\u00fbrva_. This follows also from the form of the Vedic injunctions, such\nas 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' As such\ninjunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object\ndesired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world and the like, there is\nno other way left than to assume that the result (which is seen not to\nspring directly from the sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of\nthe ap\u00fbrva.\n\n\n\n\n40. But the former, B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana (thinks), on account of the designation\n(of deities) as the cause.\n\nThe reverend B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana maintains the previously declared awarding of\nrewards by the Supreme Person since the scriptural texts referring to\nthe different sacrifices declare that the deities only, Agni, V\u00e2yu, and\nso on, who are propitiated by the sacrifices--which are nothing else but\nmeans to propitiate deities--are the cause of the rewards attached to\nthe sacrifices. Compare texts such as 'Let him who is desirous of\nprosperity offer a white animal to V\u00e2yu. For V\u00e2yu is the swiftest god.\nThe man thus approaches V\u00e2yu with his proper share, and V\u00e2yu leads him\nto prosperity.' And the whole instruction which the texts give, as to\nthe means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those\nresults, is required on account of the injunctions only, and hence it\ncannot be doubted that it has reference to the injunctions. The\napparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the\ntext only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof\nwill assent to that apparatus, as stated by the text, being set aside\nand an ap\u00fbrva about which the text says nothing being fancifully assumed.\nAnd that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the\nthing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which on\nthe basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised\nas the meaning of the root-element of such words as 'yajeta,' viz. the\nsacrifice (y\u00e2ga), which consists in the propitiation of a divine being,\nand not some additional supersensuous thing such as the ap\u00fbrva, we have\nalready proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as 'V\u00e2yu is the swiftest\ngod' teach that V\u00e2yu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards. And\nthat it is fundamentally the highest Self--as constituting the inner\nSelf of V\u00e2yu and other deities--which is pleased by offerings, and\nbestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as 'Offerings and\npious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the Universe. He is\nAgni and V\u00e2yu, he is Sun and Moon' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in\nthe antary\u00e2min-br\u00e2hmana, 'He who dwells in V\u00e2yu, of whom V\u00e2yu is the\nbody'; 'He who dwells in Agni,' &c. Smriti expresses itself similarly,\n'Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form,\nof him do I make that faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he\nendeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires--those\nindeed being ordained by me' (Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 21-22); 'For I am the\nenjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices' (IX, 24)--where Lord means him\nwho bestows the reward for the sacrifices. 'To the gods go the\nworshippers of the gods, and those devoted to me go to me' (VII, 23). In\nordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire wealth in\nvarious forms, and by means of this propitiate their king, either\ndirectly or through his officials and servants; and the king thereupon\nis seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their\nservices and presents. The Ved\u00e2nta-texts, on the other hand, give\ninstruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other\nmeans of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who is free from all shadow\neven of imperfection, and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted\nqualities in their highest state of perfection; on sacrifices, gifts,\noblations, which are helpful towards the propitiation of that Person; on\npraise, worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him; and on\nthe rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows, viz. temporal happiness\nand final Release.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'reward.'\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. What is understood from all the Ved\u00e2nta-texts (is one), on account of\nthe non-difference of injunction and the rest.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing\nthe desire of meditation-concluding with the fact that Brahman bestows\nrewards. Next the question is introduced whether the vidy\u00e2s (i.e. the\ndifferent forms of meditation on Brahman which the Ved\u00e2nta-texts enjoin)\nare different or non-different, on the decision of which question it\nwill depend whether the qualities attributed to Brahman in those vidy\u00e2s\nare to be comprised in one act of meditation or not.--The first\nsubordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation--\nas e.g. the vidy\u00e2 of Vaisv\u00e2nara--which is met with in the text of\nseveral s\u00e2kh\u00e2s, constitutes one vidy\u00e2 or several.--The vidy\u00e2s are\nseparate, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains; for the fact that the same matter\nis, without difference, imparted for a second time, and moreover stands\nunder a different heading--both which circumstances necessarily attend\nthe text's being met with in different s\u00e2kh\u00e2s--proves the difference of\nthe two meditations. It is for this reason only that a restrictive\ninjunction, such as the one conveyed in the text, 'Let a man tell this\nscience of Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying\nfire on their head' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10)--which restricts the impaiting\nof knowledge to the \u00c2tharvanikas, to whom that rite is peculiar--has any\nsense; for if the vidy\u00e2s were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a\npart of the vidy\u00e2, would be valid for the members of other s\u00e2kh\u00e2s also,\nand then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning.--\nThis view is set aside by the S\u00fbtra, 'What is understood from all the\nVed\u00e2nta-texts' is one and the same meditation, 'because there is non-\ndifference of injunction and the rest.' By injunction is meant the\ninjunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots--such\nas up\u00e2s\u00eeta 'he should meditate,' vidy\u00e2t 'he should know.' The and the\nrest' of the S\u00fbtra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the\ncircumstances mentioned in the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-s\u00fbtras (II, 4, 9). Owing to\nall these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the\nsame vidy\u00e2 is recognised in other s\u00e2kh\u00e2s also. In the Ch\u00e2andogya (V, 12,\n2) as well as in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka we meet with one and the same\ninjunction (viz. 'He should meditate on Vaisv\u00e2nara'). The form\n(character, r\u00fbpa) of the meditations also is the same, for the form of a\ncognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases\nthe same, viz. Vaisv\u00e2nara. The name of the two vidy\u00e2s also is the same,\nviz. the knowledge of Vaisv\u00e2nara. And both vidy\u00e2s are declared to have\nthe same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish\nthe identity of vidy\u00e2s even in different s\u00e2kh\u00e2s.--The next S\u00fbtra refers\nto the reasons set forth for his view by the P\u00fbrvapakshin and refutes\nthem.\n\n\n\n\n2. If it be said (that the vidy\u00e2s are not one) on account of difference,\nwe deny this, since even in one (vidy\u00e2 there may be repetition).\n\nIf it be said that there is no oneness of vidy\u00e2, because the fact of the\nsame matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in\na different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we\nreply that even in one and the same vidy\u00e2 some matter may be repeated\nwithout any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if,\nnamely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising\nperson is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading\ncan only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and\nhence separation of the two vidy\u00e2s. But where the cognising persons are\ndifferent (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different\ns\u00e2kh\u00e2s), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself\nas subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does\nnot imply difference of matter enjoined.--The next S\u00fbtra refutes the\nargument founded on a rite enjoined in the Mundaka.\n\n\n\n\n3. For (the sirovrata) concerns the mode of the study of the Veda; also\non account of (that rite) being a heading in the sam\u00e2k\u00e2ra; and the\nrestriction is like that of the libations.\n\nWhat the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the\nhead,' does not intimate a difference of vidy\u00e2s. For that vow does not\nform part of the vidy\u00e2. The restriction refers only to a peculiarity of\nthe _study_ of the Veda on the part of the \u00c2tharvanikas, being meant to\nestablish that they should possess that special qualification which the\nrite produces; but it does not affect the vidy\u00e2 itself. This is proved\nby the subsequent clause, 'a man who has not performed that rite may not\n_read_ the text,' which directly connects the rite with the studying of\nthe text. And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the\n\u00c2tharvanikas, called 's\u00e2m\u00e2kara,' that rite is referred to as a rite\nconnected with the Veda (not with the special vidy\u00e2 set forth in the\nMundaka), viz. in the passage, 'this is explained already by the Veda-\nobservance' (which extends the details of the sirovrata, there called\nveda-vrata, to other observances). By the _knowledge of Brahman_\n(referred to in the Mundaka-text 'let a man tell this science of Brahman\nto those only,' &c.), we have therefore to understand knowledge of the\nVeda in general. And that restriction is 'like that of the\nlibations'--i. e. it is analogous to the restriction under which the\nsava-libations, beginning with the Saptas\u00fbrya-libation, and terminating\nwith the Sataudana-libation, are offered in the one fire which is used\nby the followers of the Atharvan, and not in the ordinary three fires.\n\n\n\n\n4. Scripture also declares this.\n\nScripture also shows that (identical) meditation is what all the Ved\u00e2nta-\ntexts intimate. The Ch\u00e2ndogya (VIII, 1, 1 ff.) declares that that which\nis within the small space in the heart is to be enquired into, and then\nin reply to the question what the thing to be enquired into is, says\nthat it is the highest Self possessing the eight attributes, freedom\nfrom all evil and the rest, which is to be meditated upon within the\nheart. And then the Taittiriya-text, referring to this declaration in\nthe Ch\u00e2ndogya, says, 'Therein is a small space, free from all grief;\nwhat is within that is to be meditated upon' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. X, 23), and\nthus likewise enjoins meditation on the highest Self possessing the\neight qualities. And this is possible only if, owing to unity of vidya,\nthe qualities mentioned in the first text are included also in the\nmeditation enjoined in the second text.--Having thus established the\nunity of meditations, the S\u00fbtras proceed to state the practical effect\nof such unity.\n\n\n\n\n5. (Meditation) thus being equal, there is combination (of gunas); on\naccount of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves\ninjunction.\n\nThe meditation in all Ved\u00e2nta-texts thus being the same, the qualities\nmentioned in one text are to be combined with those mentioned in another;\n'on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves\ninjunction.' We find that in connexion with certain injunctions of\nmeditation--such as the meditation on Vaisv\u00e2nara, or the small ether\nwithin the heart--the text of some individual Ved\u00e2nta-book mentions\ncertain secondary matters (qualities, guna) which subserve that\nmeditation; and as these gunas are connected with the meditation they\nare to be comprised in it, so that they may accomplish their aim, i.e.\nof subserving the meditation. For the same reason therefore we have to\nenclose in the meditation gunas mentioned in other Ved\u00e2nta-texts; for\nbeing also connected with the meditation they subserve it in the same\nway.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is intimated by all\nVed\u00e2nta-texts.\n\n\n\n\n6. If it be said that there is difference on account of the text; we say\nno; on account of non-difference.\n\nSo far it has been shown that the non-difference of injunction, and so\non, establishes the unity of meditations, and that owing to the latter\nthe special features of meditation enjoined in different texts have to\nbe combined. Next, an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of\ncertain particular meditations there actually exists, or not, that non-\ndifference of injunction which is the cause of meditations being\nrecognised as identical. A meditation on the Udg\u00eetha is enjoined in the\ntext of the Chandogas, as well as in that of the V\u00e2jasaneyins (Ch. Up. I,\n2; Bri. Up. I, 3); and the question arises whether the two are to be\nviewed as one meditation or not. The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former\nalternative. For, he says, there is no difference of injunction, and so\non, since both texts enjoin as the object of meditation the Udg\u00eetha\nviewed under the form of Pr\u00e2na; since there is the same reward promised\nin both places, viz. mastering of one's enemies; since the form of\nmeditation is the same, the Udg\u00eetha being in both cases viewed under the\nform of Pr\u00e2na; since the injunction is the same, being conveyed in both\ncases by the same verbal root (vid, to know); and since both meditations\nhave the same technical name, viz. udg\u00eetha-vidy\u00e2. The S\u00fbtra states this\nview in the form of the refutation of an objection raised by the\nadvocate of the final view. We do not admit, the objector says, the\nunity maintained by you, since the texts clearly show a difference of\nform. The text of the V\u00e2jasaneyins represents as the object of\nmeditation that which is the agent in the act of singing out the Udg\u00eetha;\nwhile the text of the Chandogas enjoins meditation on what is the object\nof the action of singing out (i. e. the Udg\u00eetha itself). This\ndiscrepancy establishes difference in the character of the meditation,\nand as this implies difference of the object enjoined, the mere non-\ndifference of injunction, and so on, is of no force, and hence the two\nmeditations are separate ones.--This objection the P\u00fbrvapakshin impugns,\n'on account of non-difference.' For both texts, at the outset, declare\nthat the Udg\u00eetha is the means to bring about the conquest of enemies\n(Let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udg\u00eetha'\n(Bri. Up.); 'The gods took the Udg\u00eetha, thinking they would with that\novercome the Asuras'--Ch. Up.). In order therefore not to stultify this\ncommon beginning, we must assume that in the clause 'For them that\nbreath sang out' (Bri. Up.), the Udg\u00eetha, which really is the object of\nthe action of singing, is spoken of as the agent. Otherwise the term\nudg\u00eetha in the introductory passage ('by means of the Udg\u00eetha') would\nhave to be taken as by implication denoting the agent (while directly it\nindicates the instrument).--Hence there is oneness of the two vidy\u00e2s.--\nOf this view the next S\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n7. Or not, on account of difference of subject-matter; as in the case of\nthe attribute of being higher than the high, and so on.\n\nThere is no unity of the two vidy\u00e2s, since the subject-matter of the two\ndiffers. For the tale in the Ch\u00e2ndogya-text, which begins 'when the\nDevas and the Asuras struggled together,' connects itself with the\npranava (the syllable Om) which is introduced as the object of\nmeditation in Ch\u00e1nd. I, 1, 1, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as\nthe Udg\u00eetha'; and the clause forming part of the tale,'they meditated on\nthat chief breath as Udg\u00eetha.' therefore refers to a meditation on the\npranava which is a part only of the Udg\u00eetha. In the text of the V\u00e2ja-\nsaneyins; on the other hand, there is nothing to correspond to the\nintroductory passage which in the Ch\u00e2ndogya-text determines the subject-\nmatter, and the text clearly states that the meditation refers to the\nwhole Udg\u00eetha (not only the pranava). And this difference of leading\nsubject-matter implies difference of matter enjoined, and this again\ndifference of the character of meditation, and hence there is no unity\nof vidy\u00e2s. Thus the object of meditation for the Chandogas is the\npranava viewed under the form of Pr\u00e2na; while for the V\u00e2jasaneyins it is\nthe Udg\u00e2tri (who sings the Udg\u00eetha), imaginatively identified with Pr\u00e2na.\nNor does there arise, on this latter account, a contradiction between\nthe later and the earlier part of the story of the V\u00e2jasaneyins. For as\na meditation on the Udg\u00e2tri necessarily extends to the Udg\u00eetha, which is\nthe object of the activity of singing, the latter also helps to bring\nabout the result, viz. the mastering of enemies.--There is thus no unity\nof vidy\u00e2, although there may be non-difference of injunction, and so on.--\n'As in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high,' &c. In\none and the same s\u00e2kh\u00e2 there are two meditations, in each of which the\nhighest Self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of the pranava (Ch.\nUp. I, 6; I, 9), and in so far the two vidy\u00e2s are alike. But while the\nformer text enjoins that the pranava has to be viewed under the form of\na golden man, in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the\nattributes of being higher than the high, and owing to this difference\nof attributes the two meditations must be held separate (a_ fortiori_,\nthen, those meditations are separate which have different objects of\nmeditation).\n\n\n\n\n8. If that be declared on account of name; (we object, since) that is\nalso (where the objects of injunction differ).\n\nIf the oneness of the vidy\u00e2s be maintained on the ground that both have\nthe same name, viz. udg\u00eetha-vidy\u00e2, we point out that oneness is found\nalso where the objects enjoined are different. The term agnihotra is\napplied equally to the permanent agnihotra and to that agnihotra which\nforms part of the sacrifice called 'Kundap\u00e2yin\u00e2m ayanam'; and the term\nudg\u00eetha is applied equally to the many different meditations described\nin the first prap\u00e2thaka of the Ch\u00e2ndogya.\n\n\n\n\n9. And (this is) appropriate, on account of the extension.\n\nSince the pranava, which is a part of the udg\u00eetha, is introduced as the\nsubject of meditation in the first prap\u00e2thaka of the Ch\u00e2ndogya, and\nextends over the later vidy\u00e2s also, it is appropriate to assume that\nalso in the clause 'the gods took the udg\u00eetha'--which stands in the\nmiddle--the term udg\u00eetha denotes the pranava. Expressions such as 'the\ncloth is burned' show that frequently the whole denotes the part.--The\nconclusion from all this is that in the Ch\u00e2ndogya the object of\nmeditation is constituted by the pranava--there termed udg\u00eetha--viewed\nunder the form of pr\u00e2na; while in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka the term udg\u00eetha\ndenotes the whole udg\u00eetha, and the object of meditation is he who\nproduces the udg\u00eetha, i.e. the udg\u00e2tri, viewed under the form of pr\u00e2na.\nAnd this proves that the two vidy\u00e2s are separate.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'difference.'\n\n\n\n\n10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.\n\nThe Ch\u00e2ndogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike record a meditation on Prana;\nthe object of meditation being Prana as possessing the qualities of\nbeing the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other\nqualities such as being the richest, and so on (Ch. Up. V, 1; Bri. Up.\nVI, 1). In the text of the Kaush\u00eetakins, on the other hand, there is a\nmeditation on Pr\u00e2na which mentions the former qualities ('being the\nbest' and 'being the oldest'), but not the latter ('being the richest,'\nand so on). This, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference\nbetween the objects of meditation, and hence between the meditations\nthemselves.--This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside 'on account of non-\ndifference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of\nmeditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to\nbe meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on\nPr\u00e2na of the Kaush\u00eetakins; 'since there is non-difference of everything,'\ni.e. since the text of the Kaush\u00eetakins also exhibits the very same\nmethod, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove,\nviz. that Pr\u00e2na is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is\nrequired that Pr\u00e2na should be viewed as possessing also the quality of\nbeing the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be\ncomprised in the meditation of the Kaush\u00eetakins also. Hence there is no\ndifference of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-\ndifference of everything.'\n\nIn the same way as the meditation on Pr\u00e2na as the oldest and best cannot\nbe accomplished without Pr\u00e2na being also meditated upon as the richest,\nand so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in\nthe meditation on Pr\u00e2na of the Kaush\u00eetakins, although they are not\nexpressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without\nwhich the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included\nin all meditations on Brahman--this is the point to be proved next.\n\n\n\n\n11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the\nqualities.\n\nThe point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities\nof Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman.--\nSince there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those\nqualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing\nthat meditation, only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned\nshould be included!--This prim\u00e2 facie view is negatived by the S\u00fbtra.\nThe clause, 'on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from\nthe preceding S\u00fbtra. As the 'subject of the qualities,' i.e. Brahman is\nthe same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from\ntheir subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all\nmeditations.--But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy\nfor its head' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all\nmeditations on Brahman!--This the next S\u00fbtra negatives.\n\n\n\n\n12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not\nestablished, for if there were difference (of members) there would be\nincrease and decrease.\n\nThe declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established\nfor all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy\nfor its head' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities\nof Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation\nof Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i.e. if Brahman\nreally possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it\nwould be liable to increase and decrease, and this would be in conflict\nwith texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'--But if\nthis reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belonging to\nBrahman such as lordly power, generosity, compassion, and so on--all of\nwhich are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they\nbelong-would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman\nwhere they are not expressly mentioned; and this could not possibly be\ndone, as those qualities are infinite in number.--This difficulty the\nnext S\u00fbtra removes.\n\n\n\n\n13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.\n\nThose other qualities which are 'equal to the thing,' i. e. which are\nattributes determining the essential character of the thing, and\ntherefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be\nincluded in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this\nclass belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity,\ninfinity, and so on. For of Brahman--which by texts such as 'that from\nwhich all these beings,' &c. had been suggested as the cause of the\nworld--the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the True,\nknowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'bliss is Brahman,' and others; and\nhence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the\nobject of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on,\nhave to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional\nqualities, on the other hand, as e.g. compassion, which indeed cannot\nexist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary\nelements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations\nonly where they are specially mentioned.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, if 'having joy for its head' and the like\nare not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a\nfigurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this\nrepresentation introduced? For if something is represented as something\nelse, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e.g. the sacred\ntext compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body and\norgans to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting\nthe subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i.e. the body,\nthe senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be\ndiscerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its\nhead, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.--The next S\u00fbtra disposes\nof this difficulty.\n\n\n\n\n14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.\n\nAs no other purpose can be assigned, the text must be supposed to\nrepresent Brahman as having joy for its head, and so on, for the purpose\nof meditation. In order to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is\nenjoined in the text 'he who knows (i.e. meditates on) Brahman reaches\nthe Highest,' the text represents the Brahman consisting of bliss as\nmade up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and compares these to the head, the\nwings, and so on. The Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the\nSelfs mentioned in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in\na definite shape; just as in the preceding sections the Self of food,\nthe Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been represented in\ndefinite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and so on. As thus the\nqualities of having joy for its head, &c. are merely secondary marks of\nthe Self of bliss, they are not necessarily included in each meditation\nthat involves the idea of that Self.\n\n\n\n\n15. And on account of the term 'Self.'\n\nThat this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause\n'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term\n'Self is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and\ntail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a\nmetaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.--But, in the\npreceding sections, the term _Self_ had been applied to what is _not_ of\nthe nature of Self--the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of\nmind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase\n'the Self of bliss' the term Self denotes a true _Self_?--To this the\nnext S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of\nthe subsequent passage.\n\nIn the clause,'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self\ncan refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i.e. as in\nother passages--'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought,\nlet me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones--the term 'Self denotes\nthe highest Self only.--But whereby is this proved?--'By the subsequent\npassagel, i.e. by the passage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow\nforth,'--which refers to the Self of bliss.\n\n\n\n\n17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of\nascertainment.\n\nBut as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected\nwith what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath,\nand so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the\nsubsequent passage!--It _is_ possible, the S\u00fbtra replies, 'on account of\nascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there\noriginated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self,\nand that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self\nof breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in\nthe Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the\nsame time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the\nhighest Self. The term Self thus connects itself from the beginning with\nthings which are not true Selfs, because the highest Self is as it were\nviewed in them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest.'\n\n\n\n\n18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has\nto be done.\n\nThe S\u00fbtra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation\non breath. Both texts--the Ch\u00e2ndogya as well as the V\u00e2jasaneyaka-declare\nthat water constitutes a dress for prana, and refer to the rinsing of\nthe mouth with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean\nto enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on pr\u00e2na as\nhaving water for its dress.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the former view;\nfor, he says, the V\u00e2jasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse,'\nwhile there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation; and\nwhat the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to\nremain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing.\nAnd as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already\nestablished by Smriti and custom, we must conclude that the text means\nto enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to\nthe meditation on pr\u00e2na.--To this the S\u00fbtra replies that what the text\nenjoins is the new' thing, i.e. the previously non-established\nmeditation on water as forming the dress of pr\u00e2na. 'On account of the\nstatement of what has to be done,' i.e. on account of the statement of\nwhat is not established--for only on the latter condition Scripture has\na meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the V\u00e2jasaneyaka-text\nclearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming\na dress for pr\u00e2na; and as rinsing is already established by Smriti and\ncustom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on\nbreath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also\nexplains why the Ch\u00e2ndogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but\nmerely the clothing of breath with water.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done.'\n\n\n\n\n19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.\n\nIn the book of the V\u00e2jasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya, we meet with a\nmeditation on Brahman called S\u00e2ndilyavidy\u00e2; and there is also a S\u00e2ndilya-\nvidy\u00e2 in the Brihad\u00e2ranyaka. The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds that these two\nmeditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities--such\nas Brahman being the lord of all--which are not mentioned in the former;\nthe objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations\nthemselves are different.--This the S\u00fbtra negatives. The object of\nmeditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as\n'consisting of mind,' and so on; and the additional qualities stated in\nthe Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka, such as the rulership of Brahman,'do not differ'\nfrom those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all\nits purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in\ncharacter.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal.'\n\n\n\n\n20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.\n\nIn the Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is to be meditated\nupon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye; and\nthen the text mentions two secret names of Brahman--_aham_ and _ahar_.\nHere the P\u00fbrvapakshin holds that both these names are to be comprehended\nin each of the two meditations 'On account of connexion,' i.e. on\naccount of the object of meditation, i.e. Brahman being one only,\nalthough connected with different abodes, it is 'thus elsewhere also,' i.\ne. the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the\nS\u00e2ndilya-vidy\u00e2s, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding in\nthe sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and hence the two\nsecret names apply to Brahman in both its abodes.--This view the next\nS\u00fbtra negatives.\n\n\n\n\n21. Or not so, on account of difference.\n\nThis is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon in two different\nabodes, the meditations are separate. In both the S\u00e2ndilya-vidy\u00e2s, on\nthe other hand, Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the\nheart.\n\n\n\n\n22. The text also declares this.\n\nThat the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which\nabides in the eye are not to be combined, the text itself moreover shows\nby specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of\nthe other. For such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where\nthe qualities are not of themselves established, i.e. where the two\nthings are naturally different.--Here terminates the adhikarana of\n'connexion,'\n\n\n\n\n23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the\nsky.\n\nIn the Taittiriyaka and in the khilas of the R\u00e2n\u00e2yan\u00eeyas we have the\nfollowing passage: 'Gathered together are the powers among which Brahman\nis the oldest; Brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the\nsky. Brahman was born as the first of all beings; who may rival that\nBrahman?' which declares that Brahman gathered together all the most\nancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and so on. And as these\nattributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation, we\nmust infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on\nBrahman.--This prim\u00e2 facie view is controverted by the S\u00fbtra. The\nholding together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in connexion\nwith any special meditation, is not to be included in all meditations\nwhatever, but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same\nground,' i.e. according to difference of place. _Where_ those qualities\nhave to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility. The\nattribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a\nmeditation on Brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart,\nand hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the\nattribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And when we\nfind that in meditations on Brahman as abiding within a small place it\nis said that Brahman is greater than the earth, or that the ether within\nthe heart is as great as the universal ether, these attributes cannot be\ntaken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations,\nbut must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for\nmeditation.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'holding together.'\n\n\n\n\n24. And although (they both be) meditations on man; on account of others\nnot being recorded.\n\nIn the Taittiriyaka as well as the Ch\u00e2ndogya we meet with a meditation\non man (purusha-vidy\u00e2), in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully\nidentified with the parts of the human body.--Here the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nmaintains that these two meditations are identical; for, he says, both\nmeditations have the same name (purusha-vidy\u00e2), and the same character\nas stated above; and as the Taittir\u00eeyaka mentions no fruit of the\nmeditation, the fruit declared in the Ch\u00e2ndogya holds good for the\nTaittir\u00eeyaka also, and thus there is no difference of fruit.--This view\nthe S\u00fbtra negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on man,\nyet they are separate 'on account of the others not being recorded,' i.e.\non account of the qualities recorded in one s\u00e2kh\u00e2 not being recorded in\nthe other. For the Taittir\u00eeyaka mentions the three libations, while the\nCh\u00e2ndogya does not, and so on. The character of the two meditations thus\ndiffers. And there is a difference of result also. For an examination of\nthe context in the Taittir\u00eeyaka shows that the purusha-vidy\u00e2 is merely a\nsubordinate part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text\ndeclares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of Brahman; while\nthe Ch\u00e2ndogya meditation is an independent one, and has for its reward\nthe attainment of long life. The two meditations are thus separate, and\nhence the details of one must not be included in the other.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'the meditation on man.'\n\n\n\n\n25. On account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on.\n\nThe text of the \u00c2tharvanikas exhibits at the beginning of their\nUpanishad some mantras, 'Pierce the sukra, pierce the heart.' The\nfollowers of the S\u00e2ma-veda read at the beginning of their rahasya-\nbr\u00e2hmana 'O God Savitri, promote the sacrifice.' The K\u00e2thakas and the\nTaittir\u00eeyakas have 'May Mitra be propitious to us, may Varuna be\npropitious.' The S\u00e2ty\u00e2yanins have 'Thou art a white horse, a tawny and a\nblack one!' The Kaush\u00eetakins have a Br\u00e2hmana referring to the Mahavrata-\nceremony, 'Indra having slain Vritra became great.' The Kaush\u00eetakins\nalso have a Mah\u00e2vrata-br\u00e2hmana. 'Praj\u00e2pati is the year; his Self is that\nMah\u00e2vrata.' The V\u00e2jasaneyins have a Br\u00e2hmana referring to the Pravargya,\n'The gods sat down for a sattra-celebration.' With reference to all this\na doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred\nto in the Br\u00e2hmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the\nUpanishads or not.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin affirms this, on the ground that as\nthe mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of\nthe meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally\npresents itself. Such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as\nthe pravargya may indeed--on the basis of direct statement (sruti),\ninferential mark (linga), and syntactical connexion (v\u00e2kya), which are\nstronger than mere proximity--be understood to be connected with certain\nactions; but, on the other hand, mantras such as 'May Varuna be\npropitious' have no application elsewhere, and are suitable\nintroductions to meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the\nmeditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all\nmeditations.--This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside 'on account of the\ndifference of sense of piercing, and so on.' The inferential marks\ncontained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'; 'I\nshall speak the right, I shall speak the true,' show that the mantras\nhave an application in connexion with certain magical practices, or else\nthe study of the Veda, and the like, and do not therefore form part of\nmeditations. That is to say--in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the\nheart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra'\nbelongs to some magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of\nmantras such as 'I shall speak the right,' &c., that also mantras such\nas 'May Mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the Veda,\nand do not therefore form part of meditations. That mantras of this kind\nand Br\u00e2hmana passages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed\nat the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having, like the latter,\nto be studied in the forest.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of\n'piercing and the like.'\n\n\n\n\n26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has to be combined with\nthe obtaining), as it is supplementary to statements of obtaining; as in\nthe case of the kusas, the metres, the praise, and the singing. This has\nbeen explained.\n\nThe Chandogas read in their text 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes\nhis hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the\nmouth of R\u00e2hu, I obtain the world of Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 13). The\n\u00c2tharvanikas have 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil, free from\npassion, reaches the highest oneness.' The S\u00e2ty\u00e2yanins have 'His sons\nobtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he\nhas done.' The Kaush\u00eetakins 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.\nHis beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil\nhe has done.' Two of these texts mention only the shaking off, on the\npart of him who knows, of his good and evil works; one mentions only the\nobtainment of these works, on the part of friends and enemies; and one\nmentions both these occurrences.--Now both the occurrences, although\nmentioned in several meditations, must be considered elements of all\nmeditations: for whoever, on the basis of a knowledge of Brahman,\nreaches Brahman, necessarily leaves behind all his good and evil works,\nand those works unless thus left behind cannot be obtained by others.\nMeditation on those two matters therefore enters as an element into all\nmeditations. The doubtful point, however, is whether there is option\nbetween the meditation on the abandonment of works, and that on the\nobtainment of works by others, and that on both these events; or whether\nin each case all these meditations are to be combined.--There is option,\nthe P\u00fbrvapakshin holds; for the reason that the texts make different\ndeclarations on this point. For, if the meditations had to be combined,\nthere would be in each case meditation on both the matters mentioned;\nand as such double meditation is established by the Kaushitakin text, it\nwould follow that the statements of the other texts are without meaning.\nThus the only motive for the declarations made in different places can\nbe to allow option. Nor must this conclusion be controverted on the\nground that declarations of the same matter, made in different places,\nare made with reference to the difference of students severally reading\nthe several texts; for this holds good in those cases only where\nidentical statements are made in different texts; while in the case\nunder discussion two s\u00e2kh\u00e2s mention the abandonment of works, and one\ntheir passing over to other persons. Nor can you account for the\ndifference of statement on the ground of difference of vidy\u00e2s; for you\nyourself maintain that the meditations in question form part of all\nmeditations.--This view the S\u00fbtra impugns, 'but where the getting rid of\nis mentioned,' &c. Where a text mentions either the abandonment only of\nworks or only their being obtained by others, both these matters must\nnecessarily be combined, since the statement as to the works being\nobtained forms a supplement to the statement of their being abandoned.\nFor the former statement declares the place to which the good and evil\nworks, got rid of by him who knows Brahman, are transferred.--This\nsupplementary relation of two statements the S\u00fbtra illustrates by some\nparallel cases. A clause in the text of the S\u00e2ty\u00e2yanins, 'the kusas are\nthe children of the udumbara tree,' forms a defining supplement to a\nmore general statement in the text of the Kaush\u00eetakins, 'the kusas are\nthe children of the tree.' The clause, 'the metres of the gods are prior,'\ndefines the order of the metres which in other texts mentioning 'the\nmetres of the gods and Asuras' had been left undefined, and therefore\nforms a supplement to those texts. Analogous is the relation of the\nclause, 'he assists the stotra of the shodasin when the sun has half\nrisen,' to the less definite statement 'he assists with gold the stotra\nof the shodasin;' and the relation of the clause, 'the adhvaryu is not\nto sing,' to the general injunction 'all the priests join in the singing.'\nUnless we admit that one statement, which defines some other more\ngeneral statement, may stand to the latter in a supplementary relation,\nwe are driven to assume an optional proceeding, and this is\nobjectionable as long as there is any other way open; according to a\nprinciple laid down in the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 (X, 8, 15). As the clauses\nreferring to the abandonment of the works, and those referring to their\nbeing taken up by others, thus form one connected whole, there is no\nsuch thing as mere abandonment and mere taking up, and hence there can\nbe no option between the two. That the text of the Kaush\u00eetakins mentions\nboth thus explains itself, on the ground that the several declarations\nof what is really only one and the same matter are directed to different\nhearers.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'getting rid of.'\n\n\n\n\n27. At departing; there being nothing to be reached. For thus others\n(also declare).\n\nThe further question arises whether the putting off of all good and evil\ndeeds takes place only at the time when the soul leaves the body, or\nalso after it has departed and is on its journey to the world of Brahman.\nThe P\u00fbrvapakshin holds the latter view, for, he says, the texts declare\nboth. The Kaush\u00eetakins say that the soul shakes off its good and evil\ndeeds when it crosses the river Viraj\u00e2 in the world of Brahman; while\nthe T\u00e2ndins say 'Shaking off all evil, and shaking off the body,' &c.,\nwhich shows that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul\nleaves the body. And when the S\u00e2ty\u00e2yanaka says that 'his sons obtain his\ninheritance, his friends his good deeds,' and so on, this also intimates\nthat the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body.\nWe therefore must conclude that a part of the deeds is left behind at\nthe moment of death, and the remainder on the journey to the world of\nBrahman.--This view the S\u00fbtra controverts. All the good and evil deeds\nof the dying man are left behind, without remainder, at the time when\nthe soul parts from the body. For after the soul of him who knows has\ndeparted from the body, 'there is nothing to be reached,' i.e. there are\nno further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and\nevil deeds, different from the obtaining of Brahman, which is the fruit\nof knowledge. Thus others 'also declare that, subsequently to the soul's\ndeparture from the body, there is no enjoyment of any pain or pleasure\ndifferent from the obtaining of Brahman. 'But when he is free of the\nbody, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him'; 'Thus does that\nserene being, rising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as\nit has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1; 3); 'For him\nthere is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he\nwill be perfect' (VI, 14, 2).\n\n\n\n\n28. As it is desired; on account of there being no contradiction of\neither.\n\nThe time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus having been\ndetermined on the basis of the reason of the thing, the several words of\nthe passages must be construed as it is desired, i.e. so as not to\ncontradict either, i.e. either the declaration of scripture or the\nreason of the thing. Thus in the text of the Kaush\u00eetakins the later\nclause, 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds,' must be taken as coming\nbefore the earlier passage 'having entered on that path of the gods.'--\nHere the P\u00fbrvapakshin raises a new objection.\n\n\n\n\n29. There is meaning of the soul's going (only) on the twofold\nhypothesis; for otherwise there is contradiction.\n\nIt is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil works being\nleft behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body, and\nanother part later on, and the effacement of works thus taking place in\na double way, that a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of\nthe soul proceeding on the path of the gods. For otherwise there would\nbe a contradiction. For if all the works perished at the time of the\nsoul's departure from the body, the subtle body also would perish, and\nif this were so, no going on the part of the mere Self would be possible.\nIt is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul's departure\nfrom the body all works should perish without a remainder.--To this the\nnext S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n30. (That assumption) is justified; on account of the perception of\nthings which are marks of that; as in ordinary experience.\n\nThe assumption of all the works perishing at the time of 'departure'\ninvolves no contradiction; since we perceive, in the sacred texts,\nmatters which are marks of connexion with a body even on the part of the\nsoul which has divested itself of all its works and become manifest in\nits true nature. Compare 'Having approached the highest light he\nmanifests himself in his true form'; 'He moves about there laughing,\nplaying, and rejoicing'; 'He becomes a self-ruler, he moves about in all\nworlds according to his will'; 'He becomes one, he becomes three,' &c.\n(Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2). All these texts refer to the\nsoul's connexion with a body. The soul therefore, joined to the subtle\nbody, may proceed on the path of the gods, even after all its works have\npassed away. But how can the subtle body persist, when the works which\noriginate it have passed away? Through the power of knowledge, we reply.\nKnowledge does not indeed by itself originate the subtle body, but it\npossesses the power of making that body persist, even after the gross\nbody--which is the instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains\nand pleasures--and all works have passed away, so as thereby to make the\nsoul capable of moving on the path of the gods, and thus to obtain\nBrahman which is the fruit of knowledge. 'As in ordinary life.' As in\nordinary life, a tank, which may have been made with a view to the\nirrigation of rice-fields and the like, is maintained and used for the\npurpose of drawing drinking-water, and so on, even after the intentions\nwhich originally led to its being made have passed away.--Here an\nobjection is raised. It may be admitted, that at the time when a man\npossessing true knowledge dies, all his works pass away without a\nremainder, and that the subtle body only remains, enabling him to move\ntowards Brahman; but it cannot be held that the soul in that state does\nnot experience pain and pleasure; for we know from sacred tradition that\nVasishtha, Av\u00e2ntara-tamas, and others, who had reached intuition of the\nhighest truth, entered after death on other embodiments, and experienced\npain and pleasure due to the birth of sons, various calamities, and so\non.--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n31. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of their\nworks) as long as the office lasts.\n\nWe do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest\nthemselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works; we\nlimit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on\nthe path, the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasishtha, on\nthe other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices, do not\nimmediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with\nlight, since the duties undertaken by them are not completely\naccomplished. In the case of beings of this kind, who owing to\nparticular deeds have been appointed to particular offices, the effect\nof the works which gave rise to the office does not pass away before\nthose offices are completely accomplished; for the effect of a work is\nexhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result. In the case\nof those persons, therefore, the effects of the works which gave rise to\ntheir office continue to exist as long as the office itself, and hence\nthey do not after death enter on the path beginning with light.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'passing away.'\n\n\n\n\n32. There is no restriction (since) all (have to go on that path).\n(Thus) there is non-contradiction of sacred text and Smriti.\n\nThe question here is whether Brahman is to be reached on the path of the\ngods by those only who take their stand on those meditations which, like\nthe Upakosala-vidy\u00e2, describe that path, or by all who practise any of\nthe meditations on Brahman. The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds the former view,\nsince there is no proof to show that in other vidy\u00e2s the going on that\npath is not mentioned, and since those other vidy\u00e2s-such as the texts\n'and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerities,'and'\nthose who in the forest worship faith, the True' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1; Bri.\nUp. VI, 2, 15)--suggest to the mind the idea of the knowledge of Brahman.\nThis the S\u00fbtra negatives. There is no restriction to that limited class\nof devotees, since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path.\nFor on this latter assumption only text and inference, i.e. scripture\nand authoritative tradition, are not contradicted. As to scripture, the\nCh\u00e2ndogya and the V\u00e2jasaneyaka alike, in the Pa\u00f1k\u00e2gni-vidy\u00e2, declare\nthat all those who practise meditation go on that path. In the\nV\u00e2jasaneyaka the words 'who know this' refer to those who practise the\nmeditation on the five fires, while the following words 'those who in\nthe forest meditate on faith and the True' refer to those who meditate\non Brahman; and the text then goes on to say that all those devotees go\nto Brahman, on the path of the gods. Texts such as 'the True, knowledge,\ninfinite is Brahman,' and 'the True must be enquired into,' prove that\nthe term 'the True' denotes Brahman; and as in the Ch\u00e2ndogya the term\n'tapas' occurs in the corresponding place, we conclude that both these\nterms, viz. _the True_ and tapas, denote nothing else but Brahman.\nMeditation on Brahman, preceded by faith, is mentioned elsewhere also;\nin the text which begins 'The True must be enquired into' we read\nfurther on 'Faith must be enquired into' (Ch. Up. VII, 18, 16; 19).\nSmriti also declares that all those who know Brahman proceed on the path\nof the gods, 'Fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six\nmonths of the sun's northern progress--proceeding by that road those who\nknow Brahman go to Brahman' (Bha. G\u00ee. VIII, 24). And there are many\nother Sruti and Smriti passages of this kind. The conclusion therefore\nis that the Upakosalavidy\u00e2 and similar texts merely refer to that going\nof the soul which is common to all vidy\u00e2s.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'non-restriction.'\n\n\n\n\n33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable are to be comprised (in all\nmeditations). There being equality (of the Brahman to be meditated on)\nand (those conceptions) existing (in Brahman); as in the case of what\nbelongs to the upasad. This has been explained.\n\nWe read in the Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka (III, 8, 9),'O G\u00e2rg\u00ee, the Br\u00e2hmanas call\nthat the Akshara. It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. And in the\nAtharvana (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) we have 'The higher knowledge is that by\nwhich the Akshara is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,'\n&c. The doubt here arises whether all the qualities there predicated of\nBrahman--called akshara, i.e. the Imperishable--and constituting\nsomething contrary in nature to the apparent world, are to be included\nin all meditations on Brahman, or only those where the text specially\nmentions them. The P\u00fbrvapakshin advocates the latter view; for, he says,\nthere is no authority for holding that the qualities which characterise\none meditation are characteristic of other meditations also; and such\nnegative attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not--as\npositive qualities such as bliss do--contribute to the apprehension of\nthe true nature of Brahman. What those two texts do is merely to deny of\nBrahman, previously apprehended as having bliss, and so on, for its\nessential qualities, certain qualities belonging to the empirical world,\nsuch as grossness, and so on; for all negation must refer to an\nestablished basis.--This view the S\u00fbtra refutes. The ideas of absence of\ngrossness, and so on, which are connected with Brahman viewed as the\nAkshara, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman. For the\nimperishable (akshara) Brahman is the same in all meditations, and\nqualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception of its\nessential nature. The apprehension of a thing means the apprehension of\nits specific character. But mere bliss, and so on, does not suggest the\nspecific character of Brahman, since those qualities belong also to the\nindividual soul. What is specifically characteristic of Brahman is bliss,\nand so on, in so far as fundamentally opposed to all evil and\nimperfection. The individual soul, on the other hand, although\nfundamentally free from evil, yet is capable of connexion with evil. Now\nbeing fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the\nopposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the\nempirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of Brahman\nmust think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge,\nand so on, in so far as distinguished by absence of grossness and the\nlike, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on,\nmust therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman.--The S\u00fbtra\ngives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary\nmatters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra\n'Agnir vai hotram vetu,' although given in the S\u00e2ma-veda, yet has to be\nrecited in the Yajur-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands\nin a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the\nfour-days 'sacrifice called Jamadagnya; those offerings are the\nprincipal matter to which the subordinate matter--the mantra--has to\nconform. This point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the P\u00fbrva\nM\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-s\u00fbtras III, 3, 9.--But this being admitted, it would follow that\nas Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and\nsecondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such\nqualities as 'doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like,' which\nare mentioned in connexion with special meditations only, would\nindiscriminately have to be included in all meditations.--With reference\nto this the next S\u00fbtra says.\n\n\n\n\n34. So much; on account of reflection.\n\nOnly so much, i.e. only those qualities which have to be included in all\nmeditations on Brahman, without which the essential special nature of\nBrahman cannot be conceived, i.e. bliss, knowledge, and so on,\ncharacterised by absence of grossness and the like. Other qualities,\nsuch as doing all works and the like, although indeed following their\nsubstrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the idea of the Imperishable.'\n\n\n\n\n35. Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to\nwhich the aggregate of material things belongs (since) otherwise the\ndifference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for; we say--no;\nas in the case of instruction\n\nIn the Brihad-aranyaka (III, 4; 5) the same question is asked twice in\nsuccession ('Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the\nSelf who is within all'), while Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya gives a different answer to\neach ('He who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c.; 'He who overcomes\nhunger and thirst,' &c.). The question here is whether the two\nmeditations, suggested by these sections, are different or not. They are\ndifferent, since the difference of reply effects a distinction between\nthe two vidy\u00e2s. The former reply declares him who is the maker of\nbreathing forth, and so on to be the inner Self of all; the latter\ndescribes him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence appears\nthat the former passage refers to the inner (individual) Self which is\ndifferent from body, sense-organs, internal organ and vital breath;\nwhile the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner Self,\nviz. the highest Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the\nindividual soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be\nspoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this kind of\ninwardness is indeed only a relative one, we nevertheless must accept it\nin this place; for if, desirous of taking this 'being the inner Self of\nall' in its literal sense, we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the\ndifference of the two replies could not be accounted for. The former\nreply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the highest Self\ncannot be conceived as breathing forth, and so on; and the latter reply,\nwhich declares the Self to be raised above hunger, &c., evidently refers\nto the highest Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the S\u00fbtra:\n'The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs the\naggregate of material things, i.e. the individual soul as being the\ninner Self of all; otherwise we could not account for the difference of\nthe two replies.'--The last words of the S\u00fbtra negative this--'not so,'\ni.e. there is no difference of vidy\u00e2s, since both assertions and replies\nrefer to the highest Self. The question says in both places, 'the\nBrahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all,'\nand this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that\nin some places the term _Brahman_ is, in a derived sense, applied to the\nindividual soul also; but the text under discussion, for distinction's\nsake, adds the qualification 'the Brahman which is manifest' (s\u00e2ksh\u00e2t).\nThe quality of 'aparokshatva' (i.e. being that which does not transcend\nthe senses but lies openly revealed) also, which implies being connected\nwith all space and all time, suits Brahman only, which from texts such\nas 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' is known to be infinite.\nIn the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all can belong\nto the highest Self only, which texts such as 'He who dwelling within\nthe earth,' &c., declare to be the inner ruler of the universe. The\nreplies to the two questions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The\nunconditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in the\nclause 'he who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c., can belong to the\nhighest Self only, not to the individual soul, since the latter\npossesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep. Ushasta\nthereupon, being not fully enlightened, since causality with regard to\nbreathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also,\nagain asks a question, in reply to which Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya clearly indicates\nBrahman, 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight,' &c., i.e. thou must\nnot think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of\nbreathing the individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to\nthose activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz. seeing, hearing,\nthinking, and knowing; for in the state of deep sleep, swoon, and so on,\nthe soul possesses no such power. And moreover another text also--'Who\ncould breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether?' (Taitt. Up. II,\n7)--declares that the highest Self only is the cause of the breathing of\nall living beings. In the same way the answer to the second question can\nrefer to the highest Self only, which alone can be said to be raised\nabove hunger, thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind\nup with the same phrase, 'Everything else is of evil.' The iteration of\nquestion and reply serves the purpose of showing that the same highest\nBrahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst,\nand so on.--The S\u00fbtra subjoins a parallel instance. 'As in the case of\ninstruction.' As in the vidy\u00e2 of that which truly is (Ch. Up. VI, 1 ff.),\nquestion and reply are iterated several times, in order to set forth the\nvarious greatness and glory of Brahman.--Thus the two sections under\ndiscussion are of the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the\none Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all life and\nraised beyond all imperfections; and hence they constitute one\nmeditation only.--To this a new objection is raised. The two sections\nmay indeed both refer to the highest Brahman; nevertheless there is a\ndifference of meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be\nmeditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to the other as\nraised above all defects; this difference of character distinguishes the\ntwo meditations. And further there is a difference of interrogators; the\nfirst question being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola.\n\n\n\n\n36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts distinguish; as in\nother cases.\n\nThere is no difference of vidy\u00e2 because both questions and answers have\none subject-matter, and because the one word that possesses enjoining\npower proves the connexion of the two sections. Both questions have for\ntheir topic Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all; and in the second\nquestion the word 'eva' ('just,' 'very') in 'Tell me just that Brahman,'\n&c., proves that the question of Kahola has for its subject the Brahman,\nto the qualities of which the question of Ushasta had referred. Both\nanswers again refer to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self of all. The\nidea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in\nthe second section only, 'Therefore a Brahmana, after he has done with\nlearning, is to wish to stand by real strength.' The object of\nmeditation being thus ascertained to be one, there must be effected a\nmutual interchange of the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i.e. Ushasta's\nconception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by\nthe interrogating Kahola also; and vice versa the conception of Kahola\nas to Brahman being beyond hunger, thirst, and so on, must be\nentertained by Ushasta also. This interchange being made, the difference\nof Brahman, the inner Self of all, from the individual soul is\ndetermined by both sections. For this is the very object of\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya's replies: in order to intimate that the inner Self of all\nis different from the individual soul, they distinguish that Self as the\ncause of all life and as raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. Hence\nBrahman's being the inner Self of all is the only quality that is the\nsubject of meditation; that it is the cause of life and so on are only\nmeans to prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated on\nindependently.--But if this is so, to what end must there be made an\ninterchange, on the part of the two interrogators, of their respective\nideas?--Brahman having, on the ground of being the cause of all life,\nbeen ascertained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different from\nthe individual soul, Kahola renews the question, thinking that the inner\nSelf of all must be viewed as different from the soul, on the ground of\nsome special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner Self\npossesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul, viz.\nbeing in essential opposition to all imperfection. The interchange of\nideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea\nof the individual nature of the object of meditation.--'As elsewhere,' i.\ne. as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is, the repeated\nquestions and replies only serve to define one and the same Brahman, not\nto convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on\nunder new aspects.--But a new objection is raised--As there is, in the\nSad-vidy\u00e2 also, a difference between the several questions and answers,\nhow is that vidy\u00e2 known to be one?--To this question the next S\u00fbtra\nreplies.\n\n\n\n\n37. For one and the same (highest divinity), called the 'truly being,'\nand so on (is the subject of that meditation).\n\nFor the highest divinity, called there _that which is_--which was\nintroduced in the clause 'that divinity thought,' &c.--is intimated by\nall the following sections of that chapter. This is proved by the fact\nthat the attributes--'that_ which truly _is' and so on--which were\nmentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are\nfinally summed up in the statement, 'in that all this has its Self, that\nis the True, that is the Self.'\n\nSome interpreters construe the last two S\u00fbtras as constituting two\nadhikaranas. The former S\u00fbtra, they say, teaches that the text, 'I am\nthou, thou art I,' enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest Self\nas interchangeable. But as on the basis of texts such as 'All this is\nindeed Brahman,' 'all this has its Self in Brahman,' 'Thou art that,'\nthe text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there\nis one universal Self, the teaching which it is by those interpreters\nassumed to convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation\ntherefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness of the\nindividual and the highest Self will moreover be discussed under IV, I,\n3. Moreover, there is no foundation for a special meditation on Brahman\nas the individual soul and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from\nthe meditation on the Self of all being one.--The second S\u00fbtra, they say,\ndeclares the oneness of the meditation on the True enjoined in the text,\n'whosoever knows this great wonderful first-born as the True Brahman'\n(_Bri_. Up. V, 4), and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent\npassage (V, 5. 2), 'Now what is true, that is the \u00c2ditya, the person\nthat dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.' But this\nalso is untenable. For the difference of abode mentioned in the latter\npassage (viz. the abode in the sun and in the eye) establishes difference\nof vidy\u00e2, as already shown under S\u00fb. III, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to\nassume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have\na character of their own in so far as they view the True as embodied in\nsyllables, and so on, and which are declared to be connected with a\nspecial result ('he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it'), should\nbe identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent\ncharacter of its own and a result of its own ('he conquers these\nworlds'). Nor can it be said that the declaration of a fruit in 'he\ndestroys evil and leaves it' refers merely to the fruit (not of the\nentire meditation but) of a subordinate part of the meditation; for\nthere is nothing to prove this. The proof certainly cannot be said to\nlie in the fact of the vidy\u00e2s being one; for this would imply reasoning\nin a circle, viz. as follows--it being settled that the vidy\u00e2s are one,\nit follows that the fruit of the former meditation only is the main one,\nwhile the fruits of the two later meditations are subordinate ones; and--\nit being settled that those two later fruits are subordinate ones, it\nfollows that, as thus there is no difference depending on connexion with\nfruits, the two later meditations are one with the preceding one.--All\nthis proves that the two S\u00fbtras can be interpreted only in the way\nmaintained by us.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'being within.'\n\n\n\n\n38. Wishes and the rest, here and there; (as is known from the abode,\nand so on).\n\nWe read in the Ch\u00e2ndogya (VIII, I, 1), 'There is that city of Brahman,\nand in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether,' &c.;\nand in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of\nknowledge,' and so on. A doubt here arises whether the two texts\nconstitute one meditation or not.--The two meditations are separate, the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin maintains; for they have different characters. The\nCh\u00e2ndogya represents as the object of meditation the ether as\ndistinguished by eight different attributes, viz. freedom from all evil\nand the rest; while, according to the V\u00e2jasaneyaka, the being to be\nmeditated on is he who dwells within that ether, and is distinguished by\nattributes such as lordship, and so on.--To this we reply that the\nmeditations are not distinct, since there is no difference of character.\nFor desires and so on constitute that character 'here and there,' i.e.\nin both texts nothing else but Brahman distinguished by attributes, such\nas having true wishes, and so on, forms the subject of meditation. This\nis known 'from the abode and so on,' i.e. the meditation is recognised\nas the same because in both texts Brahman is referred to as abiding in\nthe heart, being a bridge, and so on. Lordship and the rest, which are\nstated in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka, are special aspects of the quality of being\ncapable to realise all one's purposes, which is one of the eight\nqualities declared in the Ch\u00e2ndogya, and as such prove that all the\nattributes going together with that quality in the Ch\u00e2ndogya are valid\nfor the V\u00e2jasaneyaka also. The character of the two vidy\u00e2s therefore\ndoes not differ. The connexion with a reward also does not differ, for\nit consists in both cases in attaining to Brahman; cp. Ch. Up. VIII, 12,\n3 'Having approached the highest light he is manifested in his own form,'\nand Bri. Up. V, 4, 24 'He becomes indeed the fearless Brahman.' That,\nin the Ch\u00e2ndogya-text, the term _ether_ denotes the highest Brahman, has\nalready been determined under I, 3, 14. As in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka, on the\nother hand, he who abides in the ether is recognised as the highest Self,\nwe infer that by the ether in which he abides must be understood the\nether within the heart, which in the text 'within there is a little\nhollow space (sushira)' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. XI, 9) is called sushira. The two\nmeditations are therefore one. Here an objection is raised. It cannot be\nmaintained that the attributes mentioned in the Ch\u00e2ndogya have to be\ncombined with those stated in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka (lordship, rulership, &c.\n), since even the latter are not truly valid for the meditation. For the\nimmediately preceding passage, 'By the mind it is to be perceived that\nthere is here no plurality: from death to death goes he who sees here\nany plurality; as one only is to be seen that eternal being, not to be\nproved by any means of proof,' as well as the subsequent text, 'that\nSelf is to be described by No, no,' shows that the Brahman to be\nmeditated upon is to be viewed as devoid of attributes; and from this we\ninfer that the attributes of lordship and so on, no less than the\nqualities of grossness and the like, have to be denied of Brahman. From\nthis again we infer that in the Ch\u00e2ndogya also the attributes of\nsatyak\u00e2matva and so on are not meant to be declared as Brahman's true\nqualities. All such qualities--as not being real qualities of Brahman--\nhave therefore to be omitted in meditations aiming at final release.--\nThis objection the next S\u00fbtra disposes of.\n\n\n\n\n39. On account of emphasis there is non-omission.\n\nAttributes, such as having the power of immediately realising one's\npurposes, and so on, which are not by other means known to constitute\nattributes of Brahman, and are in the two texts under discussion, as\nwell as in other texts, emphatically declared to be attributes of\nBrahman, as constituting the object of meditations undertaken with a\nview to final release, cannot be omitted from those meditations, but\nmust be comprised within them. In the Ch\u00e2ndogya. the passage, 'Those who\ndepart from hence, after having cognised the Self and those self-\nrealising desires, move about at will in all those worlds,' enjoins the\nknowledge of Brahman as distinguished by the power of realising its\ndesires and similar qualities, while the text, 'Those who depart from\nhere not having cognised the Self, &c., do _not_ move about at will,' &c.,\nfinds fault with the absence of such knowledge, and in this way\nemphasises the importance of the possession of it. In the same way the\nrepeated declarations as to Brahman's ruling power ('the lord of all,\nthe king of all beings,' &c.) show that stress is to be laid upon the\nquality indicated. It truly cannot be held that Scripture, which in\ntender regard to man's welfare is superior to a thousand of parents,\nshould, deceitfully, give emphatic instruction as to certain qualities--\nnot known through any other means of knowledge--which fundamentally\nwould be unreal and hence utterly to be disregarded, and thus throw men\ndesirous of release, who as it is are utterly confused by the\nrevolutions of the wheel of Sams\u00e2ra, into even deeper confusion and\ndistress. That the text, 'there is not any diversity here; as one only\nis to be seen that eternal being,' teaches a unitary view of the world\nin so far as everything is an effect of Brahman and thus has Brahman for\nits Self, and negatives the view of plurality--established antecedently\nto Vedic teaching--as excluding Brahman's being the universal Self, we\nhave explained before. In the clause 'not so, not so' the so refers back\nto the world as established by other means of proof, and the clause thus\ndeclares that Brahman who is the Self of all is different in nature from\nthe world. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage, 'He is\nincomprehensible, for he is not comprehended, he is undecaying,' &c.;\nwhich means--as he is different in nature from what is comprehended by\nthe other means of proof he is not grasped by those means; as he is\ndifferent from what suffers decay he does not decay, and so on. And\nanalogously, in the Chandogya, the text 'by the old age of the body he\ndoes not age' &c. first establishes Brahman's being different in nature\nfrom everything else, and then declares it to be satyak\u00e2ma, and so on.--\nBut, an objection is raised, the text, 'Those who depart from hence,\nhaving cognised the Self and those true desires, move about at will in\nall worlds. Thus he who desires the world of the fathers,' &c., really\ndeclares that the knowledge of Brahman as possessing the power of\nimmediately realising its wishes has for its fruit something lying\nwithin the sphere of transmigratory existence, and from this we infer\nthat for him who is desirous of release and of reaching Brahman the\nobject of meditation is not to be found in Brahman in so far as\npossessing qualities. The fruit of the highest knowledge is rather\nindicated in the passage, 'Having approached the highest light it\nmanifests itself in its own form'; and hence the power of realising its\nwishes and the rest are not to be included in the meditation of him who\nwishes to attain to Brahman.--To this objection the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n40. In the case of him who has approached (Brahman); just on that\naccount, this being declared by the text.\n\nWhen the soul, released from all bonds and manifesting itself in its\ntrue nature, has approached, i.e. attained to Brahman; then just on that\naccount, i.e. on account of such approach, the text declares it to\npossess the power of moving about at will in all worlds. 'Having\napproached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form. He\nis the highest Person. He moves about there laughing, playing,' &c. This\npoint will be proved in greater detail in the fourth adhy\u00e2ya. Meanwhile\nthe conclusion is that such qualities as satyak\u00e2matva have to be\nincluded in the meditation of him also who is desirous of release; for\nthe possession of those qualities forms part of the experience of the\nreleased soul itself.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes and the\nrest'\n\n\n\n\n41. There is non-restriction of determination, because this is seen; for\nthere is a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction.\n\nThere are certain meditations connected with elements of sacrificial\nactions; as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udg\u00eetha.'\nThese meditations are subordinate elements of the sacrificial acts with\nwhich they connect themselves through the udg\u00eetha and so on, in the same\nway as the quality of being made of parna wood connects itself with the\nsacrifice through the ladle (made of parna wood), and are to be\nundertaken on that very account. Moreover the statement referring to\nthese meditations, viz. 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith,\nwith the Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,' does not allow the\nassumption of a special fruit for these meditations (apart from the\nfruit of the sacrificial performance); while in the case of the ladle\nbeing made of parna wood the text mentions a special fruit ('he whose\nladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound'). The\nmeditations in question are therefore necessarily to be connected with\nthe particular sacrificial performances to which they belong.--This view\nthe S\u00fbtra refutes, 'There is non-restriction with regard to the\ndeterminations.' By 'determination' we have here to understand the\ndefinite settling of the mind in a certain direction, in other words,\nmeditation. The meditations on the udg\u00eetha and so on are not definitely\nconnected with the sacrificial performances; 'since that is seen,' i.e.\nsince the texts themselves declare that there is no such necessary\nconnexion; cp. the text, 'therefore both perform the sacrificial work,\nhe who thus knows it (i. e. who possesses the knowledge implied in the\nmeditations on the sacrifice), as well as he who does not know'--which\ndeclares that he also who does not know the meditations may perform the\nwork. Were these meditations auxiliary elements of the works, there\ncould be no such absence of necessary connexion (as declared in this\ntext). It thus being determined that they are not auxiliary elements, a\nspecial result must be assigned to the injunction of meditation, and\nthis we find in the greater strength which is imparted to the sacrifice\nby the meditation, and which is a result different from the result of\nthe sacrifice itself. The _greater strength_ of the performance consists\nherein, that its result is not impeded, as it might be impeded, by the\nresult of some other performance of greater force. This result, viz.\nabsence of obstruction, is something apart from the general result of\nthe action, such as the reaching of the heavenly world, and so on. This\nthe S\u00fbtra means when saying, 'for separate is non-obstruction.' As thus\nthose meditations also which refer to auxiliary members of sacrifices\nhave their own results, they may or may not be combined with the\nsacrifices, according to wish. Their case is like that of the godohana\nvessel which, with the view of obtaining a certain special result, may\nbe used instead of the kamasa.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-\nrestriction of determination.'\n\n\n\n\n42. Just as in the case of the offerings. This has been explained.\n\nIn the daharavidy\u00e2 (Ch. Up. VIII, 1 ff.) the text, 'those who depart\nhaving known here the Self, and those true desires,' declares at first a\nmeditation on the small ether, i.e. the highest Self, and separately\ntherefrom a meditation on its qualities, viz. true desires, and so on.\nThe doubt here arises whether, in the meditation on those qualities, the\nmeditation on the highest Self--as that to which the qualities belong--\nis to be repeated or not.--It is not to be repeated, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nmaintains; for the highest Self is just that which is constituted by the\nqualities--freedom from all evil, and so on--and as that Self so\nconstituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of\nrepeating the meditation on account of the qualities.--This view the\nS\u00fbtra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self\nindeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other\nqualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation; yet\nthere is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as\nviewed as possessing those qualities; and moreover, the clause 'free\nfrom evil, from old age,' &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as\npossessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in\nits essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of the\nmeditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case\nis analogous to that of 'the offerings.' There is a text 'He is to offer\na purod\u00e2sa on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme\nruler, to Indra the self-ruler.' This injunction refers to one and the\nsame Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on; but as,\nthrough connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra\ndiffer, the oblation of the purod\u00e2sa has to be repeated. This is\ndeclared in the S\u00e2nkarshana, 'The divinities are different on account of\nseparation.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'offerings.'\n\n\n\n\n43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks; for that (proof) is\nstronger. This also is declared (in the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2).\n\nThe Taittir\u00eeyaka contains another daharavidy\u00e2, 'The thousand-headed god,\nthe all-eyed one,' &c. (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether\nthis vidy\u00e2, as being one with the previously introduced vidy\u00e2, states\nqualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidy\u00e2, or\nqualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as\nenjoined in all the Ved\u00e2nta-texts.--The former is the case, the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the\npreceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as\nthe subject-matter. 'There is the small lotus placed in the middle of\nthe town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode of the Highest;\nwithin that there is a small space, free from sorrow--what is within\nthat should be meditated upon' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus\nof the heart is mentioned only in section X, the 'N\u00e2r\u00e2yana-section'\n('the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned\ndownwards,' XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with\nthe object of meditation to which the daharavidy\u00e2 refers.--Against this\nview the S\u00fbtra declares itself, 'on account of the majority of\nindicatory marks'; i.e. there are in the text several marks proving that\nthat section is meant to declare characteristics of that which\nconstitutes the object of meditation in all meditations on the highest\nbeing. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the\nImperishable, Siva, Sambhu. the highest Brahman, the highest light, the\nhighest entity, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the\nsame names, and then declared to be N\u00e2r\u00e2yana. There are thus several\nindications to prove that N\u00e2r\u00e2yana is none other than that which is the\nobject of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman,\nwhich has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By 'linga' (inferential\nmark) we here understand clauses (v\u00e2kya) which contain a specific\nindication; for such clauses have, according to the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2,\ngreater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakarana). The\nargumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus\nflower,' &c., proves that section to stand in a dependent relation to\nthe daharavidy\u00e2, is without force; for it being proved by a stronger\nargument that the section refers to that which is the object of\nmeditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as\ndeclaring that in the daharavidy\u00e2 also the object of meditation is\nN\u00e2r\u00e2yana. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the\nsection begins (sahasrasirsham, &c.) are to be connected with the\n'meditating' enjoined in the previous section; for the 'meditating' is\nthere enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad up\u00e2sitavyam'),\nand with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be construed. Moreover,\nthe subsequent clause ('all this is N\u00e2r\u00e2yana,' &c., where the nominative\ncase is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense\nof nominatives.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the plurality of\nindicatory marks.'\n\n\n\n\n44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i.e. the altar made of\nbricks) on account of subject-matter, and hence there is action; as in\nthe case of the m\u00e2nasa cup.\n\nIn the V\u00e2jasaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there are references to\ncertain altars built of mind, 'built of mind, built of speech,' &c. The\ndoubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which\nmetaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of\nthe nature of action, on account of their connexion with a performance\nwhich itself is of the nature of action; or merely of the nature of\nmeditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of\nmeditation. The S\u00fbtra maintains the former view. Since those things\n'built of mind, and so on,' are, through being _built_ (or _piled _up),\nconstituted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to\nconnect themselves; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance\nis enjoined, and as the general subject-matter of the section is the\nfire-altar built of bricks--introduced by means of the clause 'Non-being\nthis was in the beginning'---which is invariably connected with a\nperformance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial\nperformance--we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c., which the\ntext mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves\nof the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the\naltar built of bricks. [FOOTNOTE 668:1]. An analogous case is presented\nby the so-called _mental_ cup. On the tenth, so-called aviv\u00e2kya, day of\nthe Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days, there takes place the\nmental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are\nrehearsed in imagination only; the offering of that cup is thus really\nof the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in\nan actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the\ncharacter of an action.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 668:1. So that for the actual outward construction of a brick\naltar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction\nof an imaginary altar.]\n\n\n\n\n45. And on account of the transfer.\n\nThat the altar built of thought is an optional substitute for the altar\nbuilt of bricks, and of the nature of an action, appears therefrom also\nthat the clause 'of these each one is as great as that previous one,'\nexplicitly transfers to the altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the\nprevious altar made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal\neffects there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so on,\ntherefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial performance which\nthey help to accomplish, and hence themselves of the nature of action.--\nAgainst this view the next S\u00fbtra declares itself.\n\n\n\n\n46. But it is a meditation only, on account of assertion and what is\nseen.\n\nThe altars built of mind, and so on, are not of the nature of action,\nbut of meditation only, i.e. they belong to a performance which is of\nthe nature of meditation only. For this is what the text asserts, viz.\nin the clauses 'they are built of knowledge only,' and 'by knowledge\nthey are built for him who thus knows.' As the energies of mind, speech,\nsight, and so on, cannot be piled up like bricks, it is indeed a matter\nof course that the so-called altars constructed of mind, and so on, can\nbe mental constructions only; but the text in addition specially\nconfirms this by declaring that those altars are elements in an activity\nof purely intellectual character, and hence themselves mere creatures of\nthe intellect. Moreover there is seen in the text a performance\nconsisting of thought only to which those fires stand in a subsidiary\nrelation, 'by the mind they were established on hearths, by the mind\nthey were built up, by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat; by the\nmind they chanted, and by the mind they recited; whatever rite is\nperformed at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial rite there is, that, as\nconsisting of mind, was performed by the mind only, on those (fire-\naltars) composed of mind, built up of mind.' From this declaration, that\nwhatever sacrificial rite is actually performed in the case of fire-\naltars built of bricks is performed mentally only in the case of altars\nbuilt of mind, it follows that the entire performance is a mental one\nonly, i.e. an act of meditation.--But, an objection is raised, as the\nentire passus regarding the altars of mind does not contain any word of\ninjunctive power, and as the text states no special result (from which\nit appears to follow that the passus does not enjoin a new independent\nperformance), we must, on the strength of the fact that the leading\nsubject-matter is an actual sacrificial performance as suggested by the\naltars built of brick, give up the idea that the altars built of mind,\n&c., are mental only because connected with a performance of merely\nmental nature.--This objection the next S\u00fbtra refutes.\n\n\n\n\n47. And on account of the greater strength of direct statement, and so\non, there is no refutation.\n\nThe weaker means of proof, constituted by so-called leading subject-\nmatter, cannot refute what is established by three stronger means of\nproof--direct statement, inferential mark, and syntactical connexion--\nviz. that there is an independent purely mental performance, and that\nthe altars made of mind are parts of the latter. The direct statement is\ncontained in the following passage, 'Those fire-altars indeed are built\nof knowledge,'--which is further explained in the subsequent passage,\n'by knowledge alone these altars are built for him who knows this'--the\nsense of which is: the structures of mind, and so on, are built in\nconnexion with a performance which consists of knowledge (i.e.\nmeditation).--The inferential mark is contained in the passage, 'For him\nall beings at all times build them, even while he is asleep.' And the\nsyntactical connexion (v\u00e2kya) consists in the connexion of the two words\nevamvide (for him who knows this), and kinvanti (they build)--the sense\nbeing: for him who accomplishes the performance consisting of knowledge\nall beings at all times build those altars. The proving power of the\npassage above referred to as containing an indicatory mark (linga) lies\ntherein that a construction mentally performed at all times by all\nbeings cannot possibly connect itself with a sacrificial performance\nthrough the brick-altar, which is constructed by certain definite agents\nand on certain definite occasions only, and must therefore be an element\nin a mental performance, i.e. a meditation.--The next S\u00fbtra disposes of\nthe objection that the text cannot possibly mean to enjoin a new mental\nperformance, apart from the actual performance, because it contains no\nword of injunctive force and does not mention a special result.\n\n\n\n\n48. On account of connexions and the rest, as in the case of the\nseparateness of other cognitions. And this is seen (elsewhere also); as\ndeclared (in the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2).\n\nThat the text enjoins a meditative performance different from the actual\nperformance of which the brick-altar is a constituent element, follows\nfrom the reasons proving separation, viz. _the connexions_. i.e. the\nthings connected with the sacrifice, such as the Soma cups, the hymns,\nthe recitations, and so on. What is meant is that the special mention of\nthe cups, and so on, made in the passage 'by the mind the Soma cups were\ndrawn thereat,' proves the difference of the performance.--The 'and the\nrest' of the S\u00fbtra comprises the previously stated arguments, viz.\ndirect statement, and so on. 'As other meditations,' i.e. the case is\nanalogous to that of other meditations such as the meditation on the\nsmall ether within the heart, which are likewise proved by textual\nstatement, and so on, to be different and separate from actual outward\nsacrificial performances.--The existence of a separate meditative act\nhaving thus been ascertained, the requisite injunction has to be\nconstrued on the basis of the text as it stands.\n\nSuch construction of injunctions on the basis of texts of arthav\u00e2da\ncharacter is seen in other places also; the matter is discussed in P\u00fb.\nM\u00ee. S\u00fbtras III, 5, 21.--The result of the meditative performance follows\nfrom the passage 'of these (altars made of mind, and so on) each is as\ngreat as that former one (i.e. the altar built of bricks)'--for this\nimplies that the same result which the brick-altar accomplishes through\nthe sacrifice of which it forms an element is also attained through the\naltars made of mind, and so on, through the meditations of which they\nform parts.--The next S\u00fbtra disposes of the argumentation that, as this\nformal transfer of the result of the brick-altar to the altars built of\nmind, and so on, shows the latter to possess the same virtues as the\nformer, we are bound to conclude that they also form constituent\nelements of an actual (not merely meditative) performance.\n\n\n\n\n49. Not so, on account of this being observed on account of similarity\nalso; as in the case of Death; for (the person in yonder orb) does not\noccupy the worlds (of Death).\n\nFrom a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not necessarily\nfollow that things of different operation are equal, and that hence\nthose altars of mind, and so on, must connect themselves with an actual\noutward performance. For it is observed that such assimilation rests\nsometimes on a special point of resemblance only; so in the text, 'The\nperson in yonder orb is Death indeed,'--where the feature of resemblance\nis the destroying power of the two; for the person within yonder orb\ndoes certainly not occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death.\nAnalogously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the altars made\nof mind are treated as, in a certain respect, equivalent to the altar\nbuilt of bricks, does not authorise us to connect those altars with the\nsacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the\ntext says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks,\nthis only means that the same result which is attained through the brick-\naltar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained\nthrough the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance\ninto which it enters.\n\n\n\n\n50. And by a subsequent (Br\u00e2hmana) also the 'being of such a kind' of\nthe word (is proved). But the connexion is on account of plurality.\n\nThe subsequent Br\u00e2hmana (Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves that the text\ntreating of the altars made of mind, and so on, enjoins a meditation\nonly. For that Br\u00e2hmana (which begins 'This brick-built fire-altar is\nthis world; the waters are its enclosing-stones,' &c.) declares further\non 'whosoever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is the\nspace-filler,' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a\nmeditation with a special result of its own. And further on (X, 6) there\nis another meditation enjoined, viz. one on Vaisv\u00e2nara. All this shows\nthat the Agnirahasya book (Sat. Br. X) is not solely concerned with the\ninjunction of outward sacrificial acts.--But what then is the reason\nthat such matters as the mental (meditative) construction of fire-altars\nwhich ought to be included in the Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka are included in the\nAgnirahasya?--'That connexion is on account of plurality,' i.e. the\naltars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred text, dealt with in\nproximity to the real altar made of bricks, because so many details of\nthe latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'option with the previous one.'\n\n\n\n\n51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body.\n\nIn all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating\nsubject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of\nmeditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises\nwhether the meditating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and\nenjoying Self, subject to transmigration; or as that Self which\nPraj\u00e2pati describes (Ch. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self free from all sin and\nimperfection.--Some hold the former view, on the ground that the\nmeditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within\na body, it _is_ a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring\nabout the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A\nperson who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters\non some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result,\npossess characteristics different from those of a knowing, doing, and\nenjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him\nas long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of\naccomplishing those ends; in the latter state he must be viewed as an\nordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something\ndifferent. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person\nengaged in meditation.--But, an objection is raised, the text 'as the\nthought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed\nthis life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) _does_ declare a difference (between the\nagent engaged in sacrificial action, and the meditating subject), and\nfrom this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as\nhaving a nature free from all evil, and so on.--Not so, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nreplies; for the clause, 'howsoever they meditate on him,' proves that\nthat text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of\nthe meditating subject).--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the\nbeing of that; as in the case of intuition.\n\nIt is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having\nthe ordinary characteristics of knowing, acting, &c.; it rather\npossesses those characteristic properties--freedom from evil, and so on--\nwhich distinguish the state of Release from the Sams\u00e2ra state. At the\ntime of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature\nas the released Self. 'For it is of the being of that,' i.e. it attains\nthe nature of that--as proved by the texts, 'as the thought of a man is\nin this world, so he will be when he has departed,' and 'howsoever he\nmeditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that\nthese texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without\ndeclaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee); for the\npersonal Self constitutes the body of Brahman which is the object of\nmeditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of\nmeditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a\nmeditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual\nSelf, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities\nmentioned in the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati. And hence the individual Self is,\nin such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but)\nunder that form which it has to attain (i.e. the pure form which belongs\nto it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition'--i.e. as\nin the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intuition of Brahman has for\nits object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the\nindividual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature.\nIn the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of\nthe Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as 'Let him who\nis desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice,' enjoins the performance of\nthe sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached; while the\nconception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a\nknowing subject, and so on--which are separate from the body--has the\nfunction of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results\nwhich will come about at some future time. So much only (i.e. the mere\ncognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required\nfor works (as distinguished from meditations).--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'being in the body.'\n\n\n\n\n53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of\nsacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) s\u00e2kh\u00e2s, but rather\n(belong) to all s\u00e2kh\u00e2s.\n\nThere are certain meditations connected with certain constituent\nelements of sacrifices-as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om\n(as) the Udg\u00eetha '(Ch. Up. I, 1, 1); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold\nSaman as the five worlds' (Ch. Up. II, 2, 1), &c. The question here\narises whether those meditations are restricted to the members of those\ns\u00e2kh\u00e2s in whose texts they are mentioned; or to be connected with the\nUdg\u00eetha, and so on, in all s\u00e2kh\u00e2s. There is here a legitimate ground for\ndoubt, in so far as, although the general agreement of all Ved\u00e2nta-texts\nis established, the Udg\u00eetha, and so on, are different in each Veda since\nthe accents differ in the different Vedas--The P\u00fbrvapakshin declares\nthat those meditations are limited each to its particular s\u00e2kh\u00e2; for, he\nsays, the injunction 'Let him meditate on the Udg\u00eetha' does indeed,\nverbally, refer to the Udg\u00eetha in general; but as what stands nearest to\nthis injunction is the special Udg\u00eetha of the s\u00e2kh\u00e2, in whose text this\ninjunction occurs, and which shares the peculiarities of accent\ncharacteristic of that s\u00e2kh\u00e2, we decide that the meditation is enjoined\non members of that s\u00e2kh\u00e2 only.--The S\u00fbtra sets this opinion aside. The\ninjunction of meditations of this type is valid for all s\u00e2kh\u00e2s, since\nthe text expressly connects them with the Udg\u00eetha in general. They\ntherefore hold good wherever there is an Udg\u00eetha. The individual\nUdg\u00eethas of the several s\u00e2kh\u00e2s are indeed distinguished by different\naccentuation; but the general statement, 'Let him meditate on the\nUdg\u00eetha.' suggests to the mind not any particular Udg\u00eetha, but _the_\nUdg\u00eetha in general, and hence there is no reason to restrict the\nmeditation to a particular s\u00e2kh\u00e2. From the principle moreover that all\ns\u00e2kh\u00e2s teach the same doctrine, it follows that the sacrifice enjoined\nin the different s\u00e2kh\u00e2s is one only; and hence there is no reason to\nhold that the Udg\u00eetha suggested by the injunction of the meditation is a\nparticular one. For the Udg\u00eetha is only an element in the sacrifice, and\nthe sacrifice is one and the same. The meditations are not therefore\nlimited to particular s\u00e2kh\u00e2s.\n\n\n\n\n54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras and the rest.\n\nThe 'or' here has the sense of 'and.' The 'and the rest' comprises\ngeneric characteristics, qualities, number, similarity, order of\nsuccession, substances, and actions. As there is nothing contrary to\nreason in mantras and the rest, although mentioned in the text of one\ns\u00e2kh\u00e2 only, finding, on the basis of such means of proof as direct\nstatement, and so on, their application in all s\u00e2kh\u00e2s, since the\nsacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all s\u00e2kh\u00e2s; so\nthere is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion\nbeing undertaken by members of all s\u00e2kh\u00e2s.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'what is connected with constituent elements of the\nsacrifice.'\n\n\n\n\n55. There is pre-eminence of plenitude, as in the case of the sacrifice;\nfor thus Scripture shows.\n\nThe sacred text (Ch. Up. V, 12 ff.) enjoins a meditation on Vaisv\u00e2nara,\nthe object of which is the highest Self, as having for its body the\nentire threefold world, and for its limbs the heavenly world, the sun,\nthe wind, and so on. The doubt here arises whether separate meditations\nhave to be performed on the highest Being in its separate aspects, or in\nits aggregate as well as in its distributed aspect, or in its aggregate\naspect only.--In its separate aspects, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains; since\nat the outset a meditation of that kind is declared. For on the Rishis\nin succession telling Asvapati the objects of their meditation, viz. the\nsky, the sun, and so on, Asvapati explains to them that these\nmeditations refer to the head, eye, and so on, of the highest Being, and\nmentions for each of these meditations a special fruit. And the\nconcluding explanation 'he who worships Vaisv\u00e2nara as a span long, &c.,'\nis merely meant to gather up into one, as it were, the preceding\nmeditations on the parts of Vaisv\u00e2nara.--Another P\u00fbrvapakshin holds that\nthis very concluding passage enjoins a further meditation on Vaisv\u00e2nara\nin his collective aspect, in addition to the previously enjoined\nmeditations on his limbs; for that passage states a separate result, 'he\neats food in all worlds,' &c. Nor does this destroy the unity of the\nwhole section. The case is analogous to that of the meditation on\n'plenitude' (bh\u00fbman; Ch. Up. VII, 23). There, in the beginning,\nseparate meditations are enjoined on name, and so on, with special\nresults of their own; and after that a meditation is enjoined on bh\u00fbman,\nwith a result of its own, 'He becomes a Self-ruler,' &c. The entire\nsection really refers to the meditation on bh\u00fbman; but all the same\nthere are admitted subordinate meditations on name, and so on, and a\nspecial result for each.--These views are set aside by the S\u00fbtra, 'There\nis pre-eminence of plenitude,' i.e. there is reason to assume that\nVaisv\u00e2nara in his fulness, i.e. in his collective aspect, is meant;\nsince we apprehend unity of the entire section. From the beginning of\nthe section it is manifest that what the Rishis desire to know is the\nVais\u00e2nara Self; it is that Self which Asvapati expounds to them as\nhaving the Universe for his body, and in agreement therewith the last\nclause of his teaching intimates that the intuition of Brahman (which is\nnone other than the Vaisv\u00e2nara Self)--which is there characterised as\nthe food of all worlds, all beings, all Selfs--is the fruit of the\nmeditation on Vaisv\u00e2nara. This summing up proves the whole section to\ndeal with the same subject. And on the basis of this knowledge we\ndetermine that what the text says as to meditations on the separate\nmembers of the Vais\u00e2nara Self and their special results is merely of the\nnature of explanatory comment (anuv\u00e2da) on parts of the meditation on\nthe collective Self.--This decision is arrived at as in the case of the\nsacrifice. For to the injunction of certain sacrifices--such as 'Let a\nman, on the birth of a son, offer a cake on twelve potsherds to\nVaisv\u00e2nara'--the text similarly adds remarks on parts of the oblation,\n'there is an oblation on eight potsherds,' and so on.--The meditation\ntherefore has to be performed on the entire Vaisv\u00e2nara Self only, not on\nits parts. This, moreover, Scripture itself intimates, in so far, namely,\nas declaring the evil consequences of meditation on parts of the Self\nonly, 'your head would have fallen off if you had not come to me'; 'you\nwould have become blind,' and so on. This also shows that the reference\nto the text enjoining meditations on name, &c., proves nothing as to our\npassage. For there the text says nothing as to disadvantages connected\nwith those special meditations; it only says that the meditation on\nplenitude (bh\u00fbman) has a more excellent result. The section, therefore,\nalthough really concerned with enjoining the meditation on the bh\u00fbman,\nat the same time means to declare that the special meditations also are\nfruitful; otherwise the meditation on the bh\u00fbman could not be\nrecommended, for the reason that it has a more excellent result than the\npreceding meditations.--The conclusion, therefore, is that the text\nenjoins a meditation on the collective Vaisv\u00e2nara Self only.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'the pre-eminence of plenitude.'\n\n\n\n\n56. (The meditations are) separate, on account of the difference of\nwords, and so on.\n\nThe instances coming under this head of discussion are all those\nmeditations on Brahman which have for their only result final Release,\nwhich consists in attaining to Brahman--such as the meditation on that\nwhich is, the meditation on the bh\u00fbman, the meditation on the small\nspace within the heart, the Upakosala meditation, the S\u00e2ndilya\nmeditation, the meditation on Vaisv\u00e2nara, the meditation on the Self of\nbliss, the meditation on the Imperishable, and others--whether they be\nrecorded in one s\u00e2kh\u00e2 only or in several s\u00e2kh\u00e2s. To a different category\nbelong those meditations which have a special object such as Pr\u00e2na, and\na special result.--The doubt here arises whether the meditations of the\nformer class are all to be considered as identical, or as separate--The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin holds that they are all one; for, he says, they all have\none and the same object of meditation, viz. Brahman. For the nature of\nall cognition depends on the object cognised; and the nature of the\nmeditations thus being one, the meditations themselves are one.--This\nview the S\u00fbtra controverts. The meditations are different, on account of\nthe difference of terms and the rest. The 'and the rest' comprises\nrepetition (abhy\u00e2sa), number (samkhy\u00e2), quality (guna), subject-matter\n(prakriy\u00e2), and name (n\u00e2madheya; cp. P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb. II, 2, 1 ff.). We meet\nin those meditations with difference of connexion, expressing itself in\ndifference of words, and so on; which causes difference on the part of\nthe meditations enjoined. The terms enjoining meditation, 'he knows,'\n'he is to meditate' (veda; up\u00e2s\u00eeta), and so on, do indeed all of them\ndenote a certain continuity of cognition, and all these cognitions have\nfor their object Brahman only, but all the same those cognitions differ\nin so far as they have for their object Brahman, as variously qualified\nby special characteristics mentioned in the meditation; in one\nmeditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the world, in another as\nfree from all evil, and so on. We therefore arrive at the decision that\nclauses which describe special forms of meditation having for their\nresult the attainment to Brahman, and are complete in themselves, convey\nthe idea of separate independent meditations, and thus effect separation\nof the vidy\u00e2s. This entire question was indeed already decided in the\nP\u00fbrva Mim\u00e2msa-s\u00fbtras (II, 2, 1), but it is here argued again to the end\nof dispelling the mistaken notion that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts aim at\nknowledge only, and not at the injunction of activities such as\nmeditation. The meditations, therefore, are separate ones.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'difference of words and the rest.'\n\n\n\n\n57. Option, on account of the non-difference of result.\n\nIt has been proved that the meditation on that which truly is, the\nmeditation on the small ether within the heart, and so on--all of which\nhave for their result the attainment to Brahman--are separate\nmeditations. The question now arises whether all these meditations\nshould be combined by each meditating devotee, on account of such\ncombination being useful to him; or whether, in the absence of any use\nof such combination, they should be undertaken optionally.--They may be\ncombined, the P\u00fbrvapakshin holds; since it is observed that different\nscriptural matters are combined even when having one and the same result.\nThe Agnihotra, the Daisap\u00fbrnam\u00e2sa oblation, and other sacrifices, all of\nthem have one and the same result, viz. the possession of the heavenly\nworld; nevertheless, one and the same agent performs them all, with a\nview to the greater fulness of the heavenly bliss aimed at. So the\ndifferent meditations on Brahman also may be cumulated with a view to\ngreater fulness of intuition of Brahman.--This view the S\u00fbtra rejects.\nOption only between the several meditations is possible, on account of\nthe non-difference of result. For to all meditations on Brahman alike\nScripture assigns one and the same result, viz. intuitive knowledge of\nBrahman, which is of the nature of supreme, unsurpassable bliss. 'He who\nknows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), &c. The\nintuitive knowledge of Brahman constitutes supreme, unsurpassable bliss;\nand if such intuition may be reached through one meditation, of what use\ncould other meditations be? The heavenly world is something limited in\nrespect of place, time, and essential nature, and hence a person\ndesirous of attaining to it may cumulate works in order to take\npossession of it to a greater extent, and so on. But an analogous\nproceeding cannot be resorted to with regard to Brahman, which is\nunlimited in every sense. All meditations on Brahman tend to dispel\nNescience, which stands in the way of the intuition of Brahman, and thus\nequally have for their result the attaining to Brahman; and hence there\nis option between them. In the case, on the other hand, of those\nmeditations which aim at other results than Brahman, there may either be\nchoice between the several meditations, or they may be cumulated--as one\nmay also do in the case of sacrifices aiming at the attainment of the\nheavenly world;--for as those results are not of an infinite nature one\nmay aim at realising them in a higher degree. This the next S\u00fbtra\ndeclares.\n\n\n\n\n58. But meditations aiming at objects of desire may, according to one's\nliking, be cumulated or not; on account of the absence of the former\nreason.\n\nThe last clause means--on account of their results not being of an\ninfinite nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'option.'\n\n\n\n\n59. They belong to the constituent members, as the bases.\n\nA doubt arises whether meditations such as the one enjoined in the text,\n'Let him meditate on the syllable Om as the Udg\u00eetha,' which are\nconnected with constituent elements of the sacrifice such as the Udg\u00eetha,\ncontribute towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and hence must\nbe performed at the sacrifice as part of it; or whether they, like the\ngodohana vessel, benefit the agent apart from the sacrifice, and\ntherefore may be undertaken according to desire.--But has it not been\nalready decided under III, 3, 42 that those meditations are generally\nbeneficial to man, and not therefore restricted to the sacrifices?--True;\nit is just for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that\nobjections are now raised against it on the ground of some inferential\nmarks (linga) and reasoning. For there it was maintained on the strength\nof the text 'therefore he does both' that those meditations have results\nindependent of the sacrifice. But there are several reasons favouring\nthe view that those meditations must be connected with the sacrifices as\nsubordinate members, just as the Udg\u00eetha and the rest to which the\nmeditations refer.\n\nTheir case is by no means analogous to that of the godohana vessel, for,\nwhile in the case of the latter, the text expressly declares the\nexistence of a special result, 'For him who is desirous of cattle he is\nto bring water in a godohana,' the texts enjoining those meditations do\nnot state special results for them. For clauses such as 'he is to\nmeditate on the Udg\u00eetha' intimate only that the Udg\u00eetha is connected\nwith the meditation; while their connexion with certain results is known\nfrom other clauses, such as 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith,\nwith the Upanishad, that is more vigorous' (according to which the\nresult of such meditations is only to strengthen the result of the\nsacrifices). And when a meditation of this kind has, on the ground of\nits connexion with the Udg\u00eetha or the like--which themselves are\ninvariably connected with sacrifices--been cognised to form an element\nof a sacrifice, some other passage which may declare a fruit for that\nmeditation can only be taken as an arthav\u00e2da; just as the passage which\ndeclares that he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna wood does not\nhear an evil sound. In the same way, therefore, as the Udg\u00eetha and so on,\nwhich are the bases of those meditations, are to be employed only as\nconstituent parts of the sacrifices, so the meditations also connected\nwith those constituent parts are themselves to be employed as\nconstituent parts of the sacrifices only.\n\n\n\n\n60. And on account of injunction.\n\nThe above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact of injunction, i.e.\nthereby that clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udg\u00eetha' enjoin\nthe meditation as standing to the Udg\u00eetha in the relation of a\nsubordinate member. Injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions\nsuch as 'he is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who desires\ncattle'; for the latter state a special qualification on the part of him\nwho performs the action, while the former do not, and hence cannot claim\nindependence.\n\n\n\n\n61. On account of rectification.\n\nThe text 'from the seat of the Hotri he sets right the wrong Udg\u00eeha'\nshows that the meditation is necessarily required for the purpose of\ncorrecting whatever mistake may be made in the Udg\u00eetha. This also proves\nthat the meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance.\n\n\n\n\n62. And on account of the declaration of a quality being common (to all\nthe Vedas).\n\nThe text 'By means of that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds.\nWith _Om_ the Adhvaryu gives orders, with _Om_ the Hotri recites, with _Om_\nthe Udg\u00e2tri sings,' which declares the pranava--which is a 'quality' of\nthe meditation, in so far as it is its basis--to be common to the three\nVedas, further shows that the meditation has to be employed in connexion\nwith the sacrifice. For the meditation is connected with the Udg\u00eetha,\nand the Udgitha is an integral part of all sacrificial performances\nwhatever.\n\nOf the prim\u00e2 facie view thus far set forth the next S\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n63. Rather not, as the text does not declare their going together.\n\nIt is not true that the meditations on the Udg\u00eetha and the rest are\nbound to the sacrifices in the same way as the Udg\u00eetha, and so on,\nthemselves are; for Scripture does not declare that they go together\nwith, i.e. are subordinate constituents of the Udg\u00eetha, and so on. The\nclause 'Let him meditate on the Udg\u00eetha' does not indeed itself state\nanother qualification on the part of the agent (i.e. does not state that\nthe agent in entering on the meditation is prompted by a motive other\nthan the one prompting the sacrifice); but the subsequent clause,\n'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that\nbecomes more vigorous,' intimates that knowledge is the means to render\nthe sacrificial work more efficacious, and from this it follows that the\nmeditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting a result other than\nthe result of the sacrifice. And hence the meditation cannot be viewed\nas a subordinate member of the Udg\u00eetha, which itself is a subordinate\nmember of the sacrifice. It rather has the Udg\u00eetha for its basis only.\nHe only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified for the\nmeditation, since the latter aims at greater efficaciousness of the\nsacrifice; but this does not imply that the meditation necessarily goes\nwith the sacrifice. By the greater vigour of the sacrifice is meant its\nnon-obstruction by some other sacrificial work of greater strength, its\nproducing its effect without any delay.--The case of a statement such as\n'he whose ladle is of parna wood hears no evil sound' is different.\nThere the text does not declare that the quality of consisting of parna\nwood is the direct means of bringing about the result of no evil sound\nbeing heard; hence there is no valid reason why that quality should not\nbe subordinate to the ladle, which itself is subordinate to the\nsacrifice; and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere\nsubordinate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits (other than the\ngeneral fruit of the sacrifice), the declaration as to no evil sound\nbeing heard is to be viewed as a mere arthav\u00e2da (i.e. a mere additional\nstatement meant further to glorify the result of the sacrifice--of which\nthe ladle made of parna wood is a subordinate instrument).\n\n\n\n\n64. And because (Scripture) shows it.\n\nA scriptural text, moreover, shows that the meditation is necessary for,\nand restricted to, the sacrificial performance. For the text 'A Brahman\npriest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the\nofficiating priests'--which declares that all priests are saved through\nthe knowledge of the Brahman--has sense only on the understanding that\nthat knowledge is not restricted to the Udj\u00e2tri, and so on (i.e. not to\nthose priests who are engaged in carrying out the details of the\nsacrifices which are the 'bases' of the meditations).--The conclusion,\ntherefore, is that those meditations are not restricted to the\nsacrifices, subordinate members of which serve as their 'bases.'--This\nterminates the adhikarana of 'like the bases.'\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. The benefit to man results from thence, on account of scriptural\nstatement; thus B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana thinks.\n\nWe have concluded the investigation into the oneness or diverseness of\nmeditations--the result of which is to indicate in which cases the\nspecial points mentioned in several meditations have to be combined, and\nin which not. A further point now to be investigated is whether that\nadvantage to the meditating devotee, which is held to accrue to him from\nthe meditation, results from the meditation directly, or from works of\nwhich the meditations are subordinate members.--The Reverend B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana\nholds the former view. The benefit to man results from thence, i.e. from\nthe meditation, because Scripture declares this to be so. 'He who knows\nBrahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'I know that great\nPerson of sun-like lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him truly\npasses over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'As\nthe flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their\nform, thus a man who possesses knowledge, freed from name and form, goes\nto the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).--\nAgainst this view the P\u00fbrvapakshin raises an objection.\n\n\n\n\n2. On account of (the Self) standing in a complementary relation, they\nare arthav\u00e2das, as in other cases; thus Jaimini opines.\n\nWhat has been said as to Scripture intimating that a beneficial result\nis realised through the meditations by themselves is untenable. For\ntexts such as 'he who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' do not teach\nthat the highest aim of man is attained through knowledge; their purport\nrather is to inculcate knowledge of Truth on the part of a Self which is\nthe agent in works prescribed. Knowledge, therefore, stands in a\ncomplementary relation to sacrificial works, in so far as it imparts to\nthe acting Self a certain mystic purification; and the texts which\ndeclare special results of knowledge, therefore, must be taken as mere\narthav\u00e2das. 'As in the case of other things; so Jaimini thinks,' i.e. as\nJaimini holds that in the case of substances, qualities, and so on, the\nscriptural declaration of results is of the nature of arthav\u00e2da.--But it\nhas been shown before that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts represent as the object to\nbe attained, by those desirous of Release, on the basis of the knowledge\nimparted by them, something different from the individual Self engaged\nin action; cp. on this point S\u00fb. I, 1, 15; I, 3, 5; I, 2, 3; I, 3, 18.\nAnd S\u00fb. II, 1, 22 and others have refuted the view that Brahman is to be\nconsidered as non-different from the personal soul, because in texts\nsuch as 'thou art that' it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter.\nAnd other S\u00fbtras have proved that Brahman must, on the basis of numerous\nscriptural texts, be recognised as the inner Self of all things material\nand immaterial. How then can it be said that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts merely\nmean to give instruction as to the true nature of the active individual\nsoul, and that hence all meditation is merely subservient to sacrificial\nworks?--On the strength of numerous inferential marks, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nreplies, which prove that in the Ved\u00e2nta-texts all meditation is really\nviewed as subordinate to knowledge, and of the declarations of co-\nordination of Brahman and the individual soul (which must be taken to\nimply that the two are essentially of the same nature), we cannot help\nforming the conclusion that the real purport of the Ved\u00e2nta-texts is to\ntell us of the true nature of the individual soul in so far as different\nfrom its body.--But, again it is objected, the agent is connected no\nless with ordinary worldly works than with works enjoined by the Veda,\nand hence is not invariably connected with sacrifices (i.e. works of the\nlatter type); it cannot, therefore, be maintained that meditations on\nthe part of the agent necessarily connect themselves with sacrifices in\nso far as they effect a purification of the sacrificer's mind!--There is\na difference, the P\u00fbrvapakshin rejoins. Worldly works can proceed also\nif the agent is non-different from the body; while an agent is qualified\nfor sacred works only in so far as he is different from the body, and of\nan eternal non-changing nature. Meditations, therefore, properly connect\nthemselves with sacrifices, in so far as they teach that the agent\nreally is of that latter nature. We thus adhere to the conclusion that\nmeditations are constituents of sacrificial actions, and hence are of no\nadvantage by themselves.--But what then are those inferential marks\nwhich, as you say, fully prove that the Ved\u00e2nta-texts aim at setting\nforth the nature of the individual soul?--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n3. On account of (such) conduct being seen.\n\nIt is seen, viz in Scripture, that those who knew Brahman busied\nthemselves chiefly with sacrifices.--Asvapati Kaikeya had a deep\nknowledge of the Self; but when three Rishis had come to him to receive\ninstruction regarding the Self, he told them 'I am about, to perform a\nsacrifice, Sirs' (Ch. Up. V, II). Similarly we learn from Smriti that\nJanaka and other princes deeply versed in the knowledge of Brahman\napplied themselves to sacrificial works, 'By works only Janaka and\nothers attained to perfection'; 'He also, well founded in knowledge,\noffered many sacrifices.' And this fact--that those who know Brahman\napply themselves to works chiefly--shows that knowledge (or meditation)\nhas no independent value, but serves to set forth the true nature of the\nactive Self, and thus is subordinate to work.--An even more direct proof\nis set forth in the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n4. On account of direct scriptural statement.\n\nScripture itself directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works,\n'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that\nis more vigorous'. Nor can it be said that this text refers, on the\nground of leading subject-matter (prakarana), to the Udg\u00eetha only; for\ndirect scriptural statement (suti) is stronger than subject-matter, and\nthe words 'whatever he does with knowledge' clearly refer to knowledge\nin general.\n\n\n\n\n5. On account of the taking hold together.\n\nThe text 'then both knowledge and work take hold of him' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,\n2) shows that knowledge and work go together, and this going together is\npossible only if, in the manner stated, knowledge is subordinate to work.\n\n\n\n\n6. On account of injunction for such a one.\n\nThat knowledge is subordinate to works follows therefrom also that works\nare enjoined on him only who possesses knowledge. For texts such as 'He\nwho has learnt the Veda from a family of teachers,' &c. (Ch. Up. VIII,\n15), enjoin works on him only who has mastered the sacred texts so as\nfully to understand their meaning--for this is the sense of the term\n'learning' (adhyayana). Hence the knowledge of Brahman also is enjoined\nwith a view to works only: it has no independent result of its own.\n\n\n\n\n7. On account of definite rule.\n\nAnother argument for our conclusion is that the text 'Doing works here\nlet a man desire to live a hundred years,' &c. (Is. Up. II), expressly\nenjoins lifelong works on him who knows the Self. The general conclusion,\ntherefore, is that knowledge (meditation) is merely auxiliary to works.\nOf this view the next S\u00fbtra finally disposes.\n\n\n\n\n8. But on account of the teaching of the different one, Badar\u00e2yana's\n(view is valid); as this is seen.\n\nKnowledge by itself benefits man; since Scripture teaches that the\nobject of knowledge is the highest Brahman which, as it is of an\nabsolutely faultless and perfect nature, is other than the active\nindividual soul.\n\nBadar\u00e2yana, therefore, holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of\nits own. Let the inferential marks (referred to by the P\u00fbrvapakshin) be;\nthe direct teaching of the texts certainly refers to a being different\nfrom the Self that acts; for we clearly see that their object is the\nhighest creative Brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities,\nwhich cannot possibly be attributed to the individual Self whether in\nthe state of Release or of bondage: 'Free from evil, free from old age,'\n&c. &c. In all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any\nreference to the wretched individual soul, as insignificant and weak as\na tiny glow-worm, implicated in Nescience and all the other evils of\nfinite existence. And the fruit of that knowledge of the highest Person\nthe texts expressly declare, in many places, to be immortality--which\nconsists in attaining to Him. The view of knowledge by itself\nbenefitting man therefore is well founded.--The S\u00fbtras proceed to\ndispose of the so-called inferential marks.\n\n\n\n\n9. But the declarations are equal.\n\nThe argument that knowledge must be held subordinate to work because we\nlearn from Scripture that those who know Brahman perform sacrificial\nworks, will not hold good; since, on the other hand, we also see that\nmen knowing Brahman abandoned all work; cp. texts such as 'The Rishis\ndescended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda?\nfor what purpose should we sacrifice?' As it thus appears that those who\nknow Brahman give up works, knowledge cannot be a mere auxiliary to\nworks.--But how can it be accounted for that those who know Brahman both\ndo and do not perform works?--Works may be performed in so far as\nsacrifices and the like, if performed by one not having any special wish,\nstand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of Brahman; hence there\nis no objection to texts enjoining works. And as, on the other hand,\nsacrifices and such-like works when aiming at results of their own are\nopposed to the knowledge of Brahman which has Release for its only\nresult, there is all the less objection to texts which suggest the non-\nperformance of works. If, on the other hand, knowledge were subordinate\nto works, works could on no account be dispensed with.--Against the\nassertion that Scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate\nto works the next S\u00fbtra declares itself.\n\n\n\n\n10. (It is) non-comprehensive.\n\nThe scriptural declaration does not refer to all meditations, but only\nto the meditation on the Udg\u00eetha. In the clause 'what he does with\nknowledge,' the 'what' is in itself indefinite, and therefore must be\ndefined as connecting itself with the Udg\u00eetha mentioned in the previous\nclause, 'Let him meditate on the Udg\u00eetha.' The sentence cannot be\nconstrued to mean 'whatever he does is to be done with knowledge,' but\nmeans 'that which he does with knowledge becomes more vigorous,' and _that\nwhich is_ done with knowledge that is the Udg\u00eetha. The next S\u00fbtra\nrefutes the argument set forth in S\u00fbtra 5.\n\n\n\n\n11. There is distribution, as in the case of the hundred.\n\nAs knowledge and work have different results, the text 'of him knowledge\nand work lay hold' must be understood in a distributive sense, i.e. as\nmeaning that knowledge lays hold of him to the end of bringing about its\nown particular result, and that so likewise does work. 'As in the case\nof a hundred,' i.e. as it is understood that, when a man selling a field\nand a gem is said to receive two hundred gold pieces, one hundred are\ngiven for the field and one hundred for the gem.\n\n\n\n\n12. Of him who has merely read the Veda.\n\nNor is there any force in the argument that knowledge is only auxiliary\nto work because works are enjoined on him who possesses knowledge. For\nthe text which refers to the man 'who has read the Veda' enjoins works\non him who has merely _read_ the texts, and _reading_ there means\nnothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called\nVeda, without any insight into their meaning. A man who has thus\nmastered the words of the Veda apprehends therefrom that it makes\nstatements as to works having certain results, and then on his own\naccount applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those\ndeclarations; he who is desirous of work applies himself to the\nknowledge of works; he who is desirous of Release applies himself to the\nknowledge of Brahman. And even if the injunction of _reading_ were\nunderstood as prompting to the understanding of the text also, all the\nsame, knowledge would not be a subsidiary to works. For _knowledge_, in\nthe sense of the Upanishads, is something different from mere cognition\nof sense. In the same way as the performance of such works as the\nJyotishtoma sacrifice is something different from the cognition of the\ntrue nature of those works; so that vidy\u00e2, which effects the highest\npurpose of man, i. e. devout meditation (dhy\u00e2na, up\u00e2san\u00e2), is something\ndifferent from the mere cognition of the true nature of Brahman.\nKnowledge of that kind has not the most remote connexion even with works.\n\n\n\n\n\n13. Not so, on account of non-specification.\n\nNor is it true that the text 'Doing works here,' &c., is meant to divert\nhim who knows the Self from knowledge and restrict him to works. For\nthere is no special reason to hold that that text refers to works as\nindependent means of a desirable result: it may as well be understood to\nrefer to works merely subordinate to knowledge. As he who knows the Self\nhas to practise meditation as long as he lives, he may also have to\npractise, for the same period, works that are helpful to meditation.\nHaving thus refuted the objection on the ground of the reason of the\nmatter, the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra proceeds to give his own interpretation of the\ntext.\n\n\n\n\n14. Or the permission is for the purpose of glorification.\n\nThe _or_ has assertive force. The introductory words of the Upanishad,\n'Hidden in the Lord is all this,' show knowledge to be the subject-\nmatter; hence the permission of works can aim only at the glorification\nof knowledge. The sense of the text therefore is--owing to the power of\nknowledge a man although constantly performing works is not stained by\nthem.\n\n\n\n\n15. Some also, by proceeding according to their liking.\n\nIn some s\u00e2kh\u00e2s, moreover, we read that he who possesses the knowledge of\nBrahman may, according to his liking, give up the state of a householder,\n'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world?'\n(Bri. Up. V, 4, 22.) This text also proves knowledge not to be\nsubsidiary to works; for if it were so subsidiary, it would not be\npossible for him who knows Brahman to give up householdership (with all\nthe works obligatory on that state) according to his liking.\n\n\n\n\n16. And destruction.\n\nThere is moreover a Ved\u00e2nta-text which declares the knowledge of Brahman\nto destroy work-good and evil--which is the root of all the afflictions\nof transmigratory existence: 'The knot of the heart is broken, all\ndoubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is\nhigh and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). This also contradicts the view of\nknowledge being subordinate to works.\n\n\n\n\n17. And of him who is chaste; for in Scripture (this is declared).\n\nThe knowledge of Brahman belongs to those who have to observe chastity,\nand men living in that state have not to perform the Agnihotra, the\nDarsap\u00fbrnam\u00e2sa, and similar works. For this reason also knowledge cannot\nbe subsidiary to works.--But, it may be objected, there is no such\ncondition of life; for texts such as 'he is to perform the Agnihotra as\nlong as he lives,' declare men to be obliged to perform sacrifices and\nthe like up to the end of their lives, and Smriti texts contradicting\nScripture have no authority.--To meet this the S\u00fbtra adds 'for in\nScripture.' The three stages of life are recognised in Scripture only;\ncp. texts such as 'Those who in the forest practise penance and faith'\n(Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth\nfrom their homes' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). The text as to the lifelong\nobligatoriness of the Agnihotra is valid for those only who do not\nretire from worldly life.\n\n\n\n\n18. A reference (only) Jaimini (holds them to be), on account of absence\nof injunction; for (Scripture) forbids.\n\nThe argument for the three stages of life, founded on their mention in\nVedic texts, has no force, since all those references are only of the\nnature of anuv\u00e2da. For none of those texts contain injunctive forms. The\ntext 'There are three branches of sacred observance,' &c. (Ch. Up. II,\n23, 1), is meant to glorify the previous meditation on Brahman under the\nform of the pranava, as appears from the concluding clause 'he who is\nfirmly grounded in Brahman obtains immortality'; it therefore cannot\nmean to enjoin the three conditions of life as valid states. In the same\nway the text 'And those who in the forest practise penance and faith'\nrefers to the statements previously made as to the path of the gods, and\ncannot therefore be meant to make an original declaration as to another\ncondition of life. Scripture moreover expressly forbids that other\ncondition, 'a murderer of men is he who removes the fire,' &c. There are\ntherefore no conditions of life in which men are bound to observe\nchastity. This is the opinion of the teacher Jaimini.\n\n\n\n\n19. It is to be accomplished, B\u00e2darayana holds, on account of scriptural\nstatement of equality.\n\nB\u00e2dar\u00e2yana is of opinion that, in the same way as the condition of\nhouseholdership, those other conditions of life also are obligatory;\nsince in the section beginning 'there are three branches of sacred duty'\nall the three conditions of life are equally referred to, with a view to\nglorifying him who is firmly grounded in Brahman. The reference there\nmade to the condition of the householder necessarily presupposes that\ncondition to be already established and obligatory, and the same\nreasoning then holds good with regard to the other conditions mentioned.\nNor must it be said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning\nof the section--sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, Brahmakarya--all\nof them belong to the state of the householder (in which case the text\nwould contain no reference to the other conditions of life); for on that\nsupposition the definite reference to a threefold division of duties,\n'Sacrifice, &c. are the first, austerity the second, Brahmakarya the\nthird,' would be unmeaning. The proper explanation is to take the words'\nsacrifice, study, and charity' as descriptive of the condition of the\nhouseholder; the word 'austerity' as descriptive of the duties of the\nVaikh\u00e2nasa and the wandering mendicant, who both practise mortification;\nand the word 'Brahmakarya' as referring to the duties of the Brahmakarin.\nThe term 'Brahmasamstha' finally, in the concluding clause, refers to\nall the three conditions of life, as men belonging to all those\nconditions may be founded on Brahman. Those, the text means to say, who\nare destitute of this foundation on Brahman and only perform the special\nduties of their condition of life, obtain the worlds of the blessed;\nwhile he only who at the same time founds himself on Brahman attains to\nimmortality.--In the text 'and those who in the forest,' &c. the mention\nmade of the forest shows that the statement as to the path of the gods\nhas for its presupposition the fact that that stage of life which is\nespecially connected with the forest is one generally recognised.--So\nfar it has been shown that the other stages of life are no less\nobligatory than that of the householder, whether we take the text under\ndiscussion as containing merely a reference to those stages (as\nestablished by independent means of proof) or as directly enjoining them.\nThe next S\u00fbtra is meant to show that the latter view is after all the\nright one.\n\n\n\n\n20. Or an injunction, as in the case of the carrying.\n\nAs the second part of the text 'Let him approach carrying the firewood\nbelow the ladle; for above he carries it for the gods' (which refers to\na certain form of the Agnihotra), although having the form of an anuv\u00e2da,\nyet must be interpreted as an injunction, since the carrying of firewood\nabove is not established by any other injunction; so the text under\ndiscussion also must be taken as an injunction of the different stages\nof life (which are not formally enjoined elsewhere). No account being\ntaken of the text of the J\u00e2b\u00e2las, 'Having completed his studentship he\nis to become a householder,' &c., it is thus a settled conclusion that\nthe texts discussed, although primarily concerned with other topics,\nmust at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several\nconditions of life. From this it follows that the text enjoining the\nperformance of the Agnihotra up to the end of life, and similar texts,\nare not universally binding, but concern those only who do not retire\nfrom worldly life.--The final conclusion therefore is that as the\nknowledge of Brahman is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity\n(which does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like), it\nis not subordinate to works, but is in itself beneficial to man.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'benefit to man.'\n\n\n\n\n21. If it be said that they are mere glorification, on account of their\nreference; not so, on account of the newness.\n\nThe following point is next enquired into. Are texts such as 'That\nUdg\u00eetha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the supreme\nplace, the eighth' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 3) meant to glorify the Udg\u00eetha as a\nconstituent element of the sacrifice, or to enjoin a meditation on the\nUdg\u00eetha as the best of all essences, and so on? The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds\nthe former view, on the ground that the text declares the Udg\u00eetha to be\nthe best of all essences in so far as being a constituent element of the\nsacrifice. The case is analogous to that of texts such as 'the ladle is\nthis earth, the \u00e2havan\u00eeya is the heavenly world,' which are merely meant\nto glorify the ladle and the rest as constituent members of the\nsacrifice.--This view the latter part of the S\u00fbtra sets aside 'on\naccount of newness.' Texts, as the one referring to the Udg\u00eetha, cannot\nbe mere glorifications; for the fact of the Udg\u00eetha being the best of\nessences is not established by any other means of proof, and the text\nunder discussion cannot therefore be understood as a mere anuv\u00e2da, meant\nfor glorification. Nor is there, in proximity, any injunction of the\nUdg\u00eetha on account of connexion with which the clause declaring the\nUdg\u00eetha to be the best of all essences could naturally be taken as an\nanuv\u00e2da (glorifying the thing previously enjoined in the injunctive\ntext); while there is such an injunction in connexion with the (anuv\u00e2da)\ntext 'The ladle is this earth,' and so on. We thus cannot but arrive at\nthe conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a meditation on the\nUdg\u00eetha as being the best of all essences, and so on--the fruit of such\nmeditation being an increase of vigour and efficacy on the part of the\nsacrifice.\n\n\n\n\n22. And on account of the words denoting becoming.\n\nThat the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows\nfrom the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or\norigination--'he is to meditate' and the like; for all such forms have\ninjunctive force. All these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special\nforms of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of mere\nglorification.'\n\n\n\n\n23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the Upanishads) are for\nthe purpose of the P\u00e2riplava; not so, since (certain stories) are\nspecified.\n\nWe meet in the Ved\u00e2nta-texts with certain stories such as 'Pratardana\nthe son of Divod\u00e2sa came to the beloved abode of Indra,' &c., and\nsimilar ones. The question here arises whether the stories are merely\nmeant to be recited at the Asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of\na special kind.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains that as the text' they tell\nthe stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so-\ncalled p\u00e2riplava performance, they cannot be assumed to be mainly\nconcerned with knowledge.--This view the S\u00fbtra negatives, on the ground\nthat not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the\np\u00e2riplava. The texts rather single out special stories only as suitable\nfor that performance; on the general injunction quoted above there\nfollows an injunction defining _which_ stories are to be told, 'King\nManu, the son of Vivasvat,' &c. The stories told in the Ved\u00e2nta-texts do\nnot therefore form parts of the p\u00e2riplava performance, but are connected\nwith injunctions of meditations.\n\n\n\n\n24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with\ninjunctions).\n\nThat those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby\nalso that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such\nas 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is\nanalogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow\nsubserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of\nrecitation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the p\u00e2riplava.'\n\n\n\n\n25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire\nand so on.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras return, from their digression into the discussion of two\nspecial points, to the question as to those whose condition of life\ninvolves chastity. The above S\u00fbtra declares that as persons of that\nclass are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with\nmeditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality;' 'those\nwho in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a\nknowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i.e. a knowledge of the\nAgnihotra, the Darsap\u00fbrnam\u00e2sa, and all those other sacrifices which\nrequire the preliminary establishnlent of the sacred fires, but a\nknowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special\ncondition of life.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of\nthe fire.'\n\n\n\n\n26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural\nstatement of sacrifices and the rest; as in the case of the horse.\n\nIf knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the\nlike, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of\naccomplishing this in the case of householders also; and the mention\nmade of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as 'Br\u00e2hmanas seek to know\nhim by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,\n22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge,\nsince the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on\nthe desire of knowledge.--Of this view the S\u00fbtra disposes. In the case\nof householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory,\nknowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as\nthe one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary\nto knowledge. 'They seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said\nonly if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge\nis brought about; just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword,'\nbecause the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill.\nWhat we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been\nrepeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from\nthe mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted\nby such terms as dhy\u00e2na or up\u00e2sana, i.e. meditation; which is of the\nnature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive\nclearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought\n(pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect,\nand being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such\nmeditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme\nPerson, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of\nsacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This\nis what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means.\nThe conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge\nhas for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent\nand occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means\nof locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge,\nalthough itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the\ndifferent works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice,\ngiving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be\nperformed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the\nthoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is\npervaded-worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection'\n(Bha. G\u00ee. XVIII, 5; 46).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need\nof all.'\n\n\n\n\n27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the\nsenses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must\nnecessarily be accomplished.\n\nThe question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and\nso on, or not. The P\u00fbrvapakshin says he must not, since the performance\nof works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action,\nand since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.--This\nview the S\u00fbtra sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in\noutward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise\ncalmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by\nScripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows\nthis, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected,\nshould see the Self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). As calmness of mind\nand the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration\nof mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must\nnecessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between\nworks on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an\nabsolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application.\nActivity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of\nworks enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as\nhave no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case\nof works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are\nimpossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions\nof the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by\nScripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence,\nthrough his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions\nobstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of\nmind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on.\n\n\n\n\n28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life;\non account of this being seen.\n\nIn the meditation on pr\u00e2na, according to the V\u00e2jasaneyins and the\nCh\u00e2ndogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who\nknows the pr\u00e2na. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri.\nUp. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission\nof all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of pr\u00e2na, in\nall circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.--The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions\nbeing stated in the text.--This the S\u00fbtra sets aside 'in the case of\ndanger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of\nfood of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself--\nthe knowledge of which of course is higher than that of pr\u00e2na--only when\ntheir life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how\nUshasta K\u00e2kr\u00e2yana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once,\nwhen in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that\nwhat the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows pr\u00e2na,\ncan refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order\nto preserve life.\n\n\n\n\n29. And on account of non-sublation.\n\nThe conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that\nthus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin, for those who\nknow Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination\nof knowledge of Brahman. Cp.' when the food is pure the mind becomes\npure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2).\n\n\n\n\n30. This is said in Smriti also.\n\nThat for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of\nfood of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, Smriti also\ndeclares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is\nstained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'\n\n\n\n\n31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according\nto liking.\n\nThe above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage\nprohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is\na passage in the Samhit\u00e2 of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brahmawa does not\ndrink spirituous liquor, thinking \"may I not be stained by sin.\"'--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food.'\n\n\n\n\n32. The works of the \u00e2sramas also, on account of their being enjoined.\n\nIt has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the\nknowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be\nperformed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his\n\u00e2srama, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand\nin subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the\ncontradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.--Of this view\nthe S\u00fbtra disposes, 'The works of the \u00e2sramas also.' The works belonging\nto each \u00e2srama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more\nthan to live according to the \u00e2srama; for they are specifically enjoined\nby texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra';\nthis implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same\nworks are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears\nfrom the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by\nthe study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next S\u00fbtra\ndeclares.\n\n\n\n\n33. And on account of co-operativeness.\n\nThese works are to be performed also on account of their being co-\noperative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the\ndesire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose\ndoes not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the\nAgnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and\nanother text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.--Nor does this\nimply a difference of works--this the next S\u00fbtra declares.\n\n\n\n\n34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential\nsigns.\n\nThere is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i.e. whether\nthey be viewed as duties incumbent on the \u00e2srama or as auxiliary to\nknowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For\nScripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the\nsame terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of\nproof to establish difference of works.\n\n\n\n\n35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.\n\nTexts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that\nsacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being\noverpowered,' i.e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed\nby evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after\nday have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge\narises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the\nworks are the same in either case.--Here terminates the adhikarana of\n'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).\n\n\n\n\n36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.\n\nIt has been declared that the members of the four \u00e2sramas have a claim\nto the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each\n\u00e2srarna promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who,\non account of poverty and so on, stand outside the \u00e2sramas are qualified\nfor the knowledge of Brahman, or rtot.--They are not, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nholds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the\nspecial duties of each \u00e2srama; while those who do not belong to an\n\u00e2srama are not concerned with \u00e2srama duties.--This view the S\u00fbtra\nrejects. Those also who do not stand within any \u00e2srama are qualified for\nknowledge, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because the texts declare that\nmen such as Raikva, Bh\u00eeshma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to\n\u00e2srama were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no\nmeans be maintained that it is \u00e2srama duties only that promote knowledge;\nfor the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (Bri. Up. IV,\n4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which\nare not confined to the \u00e2sramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the\nsame way as in the case of those bound to chastity--who, as the texts\nshow, may possess the knowledge of Brahman--knowledge is promoted by\npractices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so--it is concluded--in\nthe case of those also who do not belong to any abrama knowledge may be\npromoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any \u00e2srama,\nsuch as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so\non.\n\n\n\n\n37. Smriti also states this.\n\nSmriti also declares that men not belonging to an \u00e2srama grow in\nknowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Br\u00e2hmana\nmay become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends\nall creatures is called a Br\u00e2hmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).\n\n\n\n\n38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of\nduty).\n\nThe above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but\nScripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices\nnot exclusively prescribed for the \u00e2sramas, 'By penance, abstinence,\nfaith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).\n\n\n\n\n39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential\nmark.\n\nBetter than to be outside the \u00e2sramas is the condition of standing\nwithin an \u00e2srama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who\ncan should be within an \u00e2srama, which state is the more holy and\nbeneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for\nSmriti says, 'A Br\u00e2hmana is to remain outside the \u00e2sramas not even for\none day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or\nwhose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the\nmisfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an \u00e2srama).--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'\n\n\n\n\n40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that,\naccording to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from\nthe absence of the forms of that.\n\nThe doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state\nof life of a Naishthika, Vaikh\u00e2nasa or P\u00e2rivr\u00e2jaka are qualified for the\nknowledge of Brahman or not.--They are so, since in their case, no less\nthan in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be\nassisted by charity and other practices not confined to \u00e2sramas.--This\nprim\u00e2 facie view the S\u00fbtra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he\nwho has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot\nbecome not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-\u00e2srama condition; since\nscriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c.,\nstate 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the\ndiscontinuance of the special duties of their \u00e2srama. Compare texts such\nas 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence';\n'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who\nhave lapsed from their \u00e2srama are not qualified for meditation on\nBrahman. This view of his the S\u00fbtrak\u00e2ra strengthens by a reference to\nthe opinion of Jaimini.--But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin,\nhas lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression\nby some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on\nBrahman?--To this point the next S\u00fbtra refers.\n\n\n\n\n41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of\nqualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring\nto such lapse.\n\nThose expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating\nof qualification (P\u00fb. M\u00ee. S\u00fb. VI) are not possible in the case of him\nwho has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations\ndo not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such\nlapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika\nlapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any\nexpiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony\nreferred to in the P\u00fbrva Mim\u00e2ms\u00e2 therefore applies to the case of other\nBrahmak\u00e2rins only.\n\n\n\n\n42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of\nexpiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.\n\nSome teachers are of opinion that even on the part of Naishthikas and\nthe rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which\ncan be atoned for by expiatory observances; in the same way as in the\ncase of the eating of forbidden food the same pr\u00e2yaskitta may be used by\nthe ordinary Brahmak\u00e2rin and by Naishthikas and the rest. This has been\nstated by the Smriti writer, 'For the others also (i.e. the Naishthikas\nand so on) the same (rules and practices as those for the Upakurv\u00e2na)\nhold good, in so far as not opposed to their \u00e2srama.'\n\n\n\n\n43. But in either case (such men) stand outside; on account of Smriti\nand custom.\n\nWhether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major\noffence, in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of\nthose qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. For Smriti, i.e. the text\nquoted above, 'I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of\nBrahman as he is, could become pure again,' declares that expiations are\npowerless to restore purity. And custom confirms the same conclusion;\nfor good men shun those Naishthikas who have lapsed, even after they\nhave performed pr\u00e2yaskittas, and do not impart to them the knowledge of\nBrahman, The conclusion, therefore, is that such men are not qualified\nfor knowing Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who has\nbecome that.'\n\n\n\n\n44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture declares a fruit--\nthus \u00c2treya thinks.\n\nA doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of\nthe sacrifice as the Udg\u00eetha, and so on, are to be performed by the\nsacrificer (for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered), or by the\nofficiating priests. \u00c2treya advocates the former view; on the ground of\nScripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the\nsmall ether within the heart, fruit and meditation belong to the same\nperson, and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the\nUdg\u00eetha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the\nmeditation also is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not\ncompetent for such meditation, for the reason that like the godohana\nvessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice (which latter\nthe priests only can perform). For the godohana vessel serves to bring\nwater, and this of course none else can do but the Adhvaryu; while a\nmeditation on the Udg\u00eetha as being the essence of all essences can very\nwell be performed by the Sacrificer--true though it be that the Udg\u00eetha\nitself can be performed by the Udg\u00e2tri priest only.--Against this view\nthe next S\u00fbtra declares itself.\n\n\n\n\n45. (They are) the priest's work, Audulomi thinks; since for that he is\nengaged.\n\nThe teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the Udg\u00eetha\nand the like is the work of the priest, since it is he who is engaged\nfor the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit, i.e.\nof the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts. Injunctions\nreferring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the\npriests; he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire\nsacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that hence all\nactivities comprised within it--mental as well as bodily--belong to the\npriests. Capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion\nin this case. For although the meditations in question aim directly at\nthe benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice), yet\nsince they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are\nqualified for the sacrifice, and since the sacrifice with all its\nsubordinate elements has to be performed by the priests, and since the\ntext 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous'\ndeclares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are\nbenefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those meditations also are\nthe exclusive duty of the priests. In the case of the meditations on the\nsmall ether, &c., on the other hand, the text says nothing as to their\nhaving to be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accordance\nwith the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer,'\nthat the agent there is the person to whom Scripture assigns the fruit.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord (of the sacrifice).'\n\n\n\n\n46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as\nin the case of injunction and so on; (the term _mauna_ denoting)\naccording to an alternative meaning a third something.\n\n'Therefore let a Br\u00e2hmana after he has done with learning wish to stand\nby a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and\nlearning (he is) a Muni' (Bri. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this\ntext enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the\nchildlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established.--\nThe Purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as 'Muni-hood'\nand 'learning' both connote knowledge, the word 'Muni' merely refers\nback to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done\nwith learning.' For the text presents no word of injunctive force with\nregard to Muni-hood.--This view the S\u00fbtra controverts. 'For him who is\nsuch,' i.e. for those who possess knowledge, 'there is an injunction of\na different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and\nthe rest.' By the _injunctions_ in the last clause we have to understand\nthe special duties of the different \u00e2sramas, i.e. sacrifices and the\nlike, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like;\nand by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the\nsacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the S\u00fbtra then is as\nfollows--in the same way as texts such as 'him Br\u00e2hmanas seek to know\nthrough the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so\non,' and 'Quiet, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices\nand so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards\nknowledge; and as texts such as 'the Self is to be heard, to be pondered\nupon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) mention hearing and pondering as helpful\ntowards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a\nchildlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different\nauxiliaries of knowledge.--'Muni-hood' does _not_ denote the same thing\nas 'learning'--this the S\u00fbtra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a\nthird,' i.e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote\npersons such as Vy\u00e2sa distinguished by their power of profound\nreflection (manana), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing\ndifferent from _learning_ and the 'childlike state.' Hence, although the\nphrase 'then a Muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive\npower, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz.\n'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something\npreviously established. Such munihood is also something different from\nmere _reflection_ (manana); it is the reiterated representation before\nthe mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus\nbecoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore\nis as follows. A Br\u00e2hmana is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he\nis to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of\nBrahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected\nthrough the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the\nLord; for this Smriti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities,\nand so on, can I be so seen--; but by devotion exclusive I may be known'\n(Bha. G\u00ee. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest\ndevotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by\nthe study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is\nto be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a\nchildlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And\nafter that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so\nexclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of\nknowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three\nmeans reached true knowledge he--the text goes on to say--having done\nwith amauna and mauna is a Br\u00e2hmana. Amauna, i.e. non-mauna, denotes all\nthe auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna: employing these and\nmauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text\nfurther says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become\nsuch, i.e. a true Br\u00e2hmana. The entire text thus evidently means to\nenjoin on any one standing within any \u00e2srama learning, a childlike state,\nand mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and\nthe other special duties of the \u00e2sramas.--But, an objection is raised,\nif knowledge, aided by p\u00e2nditya, and so on, and thus being auxiliary to\nthe action of the special duties of the \u00e2sramas, is thus declared to be\nthe means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the\nCh\u00e2ndogya's declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is\nthroughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder [FOOTNOTE 711:\n1]?--To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n[FOOTNOTE 711:1. Ch. Up. VIII, 13.]\n\n\n\n\n47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is\nwinding up with the householder.\n\nAs knowledge belongs to the members of all \u00e2sramas it belongs to the\nhouseholder also, and for this reason the Upanishad winds up with the\nlatter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not\nof the householder only, but) of the members of all \u00e2sramas. Analogously\nin the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the clause 'A Br\u00e2hmana\nhaving risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the\ndesire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties\nbelonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then\nthe subsequent clause 'therefore let a Br\u00e2hmana having done with\nlearning,' &c., enjoins p\u00e2nditya, b\u00e2lya, and mauna (not as incumbent on\nthe p\u00e2rivr\u00e2jaka only, but) as illustrating the duties of all \u00e2sramas.--\nThis the next S\u00fbtra explicitly declares.\n\n\n\n\n48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the\ncondition of the Muni.\n\nThe injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of mauna\npreceded by p\u00e2rivr\u00e2jya (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to\nillustrate the duties of all \u00e2sramas. For the duties of the other\n\u00e2sramas are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the\nhouseholder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are\nthree branches of sacred duty--he who is founded on Brahman goes to\nimmortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members\nof all \u00e2sramas.--It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the\ntext under discussion enjoins p\u00e2nditya, b\u00e2lya, and mauna as being\nauxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the\n\u00e2sramas, such as sacrifices and the rest.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries.'\n\n\n\n\n49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the connexion.\n\nIn the text discussed above we meet with the word 'b\u00e2lya,' which may\nmean either 'being a child' or 'being and doing like a child.' The\nformer meaning is excluded, as that particular age which is called\nchildhood cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter meaning,\nhowever, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text means to say that he who\naims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child, as e.g.\nits wilful behaviour, or only its freedom from pride and the like.--The\nformer, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains. For the text gives no specification,\nand texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on the man desirous\nof knowledge) are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be\nin all points like a child.--This view the S\u00fbtra disposes of. 'Not\nmanifesting itself.' That aspect of a child's nature which consists in\nthe child not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so\non), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own. 'On account of\nconnexion,' i.e. because thus only the 'balya' of the text gives a\npossible sense. The other characteristic features of 'childhood' the\ntexts declare to be opposed to knowledge, 'He who has not turned away\nfrom wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive, or whose mind is\nnot at peace, he can never attain the Self by knowledge' (Ka. Up. I, 2,\n24); 'When food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26,\n2), and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-manifestation.'\n\n\n\n\n50. What belongs to this world, there being no obstruction at hand; as\nthis is seen.\n\nKnowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having for its fruit\neither exaltation within the sphere of the Sams\u00e2ra, or final Release.\nWith regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only\nimmediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it\nabout; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such works or at some\nlater time.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds the former view. A man reaches\nknowledge through his good deeds only, as the Lord himself declares,\n'Four kinds of men doing good works worship me,' &c.(Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 16);\nand when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the\nresult, i.e. knowledge, should be delayed.--This view the S\u00fbtra disposes\nof. 'What is comprised in this world,' i.e. meditation, the result of\nwhich is worldly exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to\nwhich it is due, in case of there being no other works of greater\nstrength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if there is an\nobstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs up later on only. 'For\nthis is seen,' i.e. Scripture acknowledges the effects of such\nobstruction; for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge, with\nfaith, with the Upanishad that is more vigorous,' means that works\njoined with the knowledge of the Udg\u00eetha, and so on, produce their\nresults without obstruction (which implies that the action of other\nworks is liable to be obstructed).--Here terminates the adhikarana of\n'what belongs to this world.'\n\n\n\n\n51. In the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has\nRelease for its result; that condition being ascertained, that condition\nbeing ascertained.\n\nSo likewise in the case of the origination, through works of very great\nmerit, of such knowledge as has for its result final Release, the time\nis not definitely fixed; for here also there is ascertained the same\ncondition, viz. the termination of the obstruction presented by other\nworks. A further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that\nsuch works as give rise to knowledge leading to final Release are\nstronger than all other works, and therefore not liable to obstruction.\nBut this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of\na man knowing Brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of\noverpowering strength.--The repetition of the last words of the S\u00fbtra\nindicates the completion of the adhy\u00e2ya.--Here terminates the adhikarana\nof 'what has Release for its result.'\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ADHY\u00c2YA\n\nFIRST P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more\nthan once).\n\nThe third adhy\u00e2ya was concerned with the consideration of meditation,\ntogether with its means. The S\u00fbtras now enter on a consideration of the\nresults of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the\nnature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of\nknowledge of Brahman inculcated in Ved\u00e2nta-texts, such as 'He who knows\nBrahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond\ndeath,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of\nScripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once.--\nOnce suffices, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins\nnothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the\nact. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of\nbeating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a\nvisible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must,\nlike the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for\nknowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the\nJyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the Ved\u00e2nta-texts\nare alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through\nwhom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz.\nreligious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown\nunder III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by\nperforming the act of knowledge once only, as the Jyotishtoma is\nperformed once.--This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside. The meaning of\nScripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of\nteaching,' i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed by means\nof the term 'knowing' (vedana), which is synonymous with meditating\n(dhy\u00e2na, up\u00e2sana). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the\nfact that the verbs vid, up\u00e2s, dhy\u00e2i are in one and the same text used\nwith reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e.\ng. 'Let him meditate (up\u00e2s\u00eeta) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he\nwho knows (veda) this shines, warms,' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 18). In the same\nway the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to by means of vid, 'He\nwho knows (veda) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on\nby means of up\u00e2s,'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV,\n1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who\nknows Brahman reaches the Highest'--viz. 'the Self should be seen, be\nheard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhy\u00e2sitavya)'--'Then he\nsees him meditating (dhy\u00e2yam\u00e2na) on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III,\n1, 8), and others--use the verb dhy\u00e2i to express the meaning of vid. Now\ndhy\u00e2i means to think of something not in the way of mere representation\n(smriti), but in the way of _continued_ representation. And up\u00e2s has the\nsame meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with\nuninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore\nconclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhy\u00e2i and\nup\u00e2s, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows\nBrahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.\n\n\n\n\n2. And on account of an inferential mark.\n\nInferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that\nknowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued\nrepresentation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'\n\n\n\n\n3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the\ntexts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).\n\nThe following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be\nmeditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as\nthe Self of the latter?--The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he\nsays, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has\nbeen proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be\nmeditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an\nunreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according\nto the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is\nin this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up.\nIII, 14, 1). This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be\nmeditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the\nmeditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest\nBrahman is the Self of the individual soul--this is the proper form of\nmeditation.--Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged\nthis to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am\nindeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'--But how can the Devotees\nclaim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?--Because\nthe texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from\ncontradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the\nSelf, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who\nrules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the\nimmortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have\ntheir root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;--in that all\nthat exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman'\n(Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)--all these texts teach that all sentient and non-\nsentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through\nhim, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of\nall of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that\nthe individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a\nSelf, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god--I am a\nman'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self\njustifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On\nthe presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence\nall words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such\nstatements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and\nthou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and\nhighest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently\ncontradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative\nthe view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a\nman meditates upon another divinity, thinking \"the divinity is one and I\nanother,\" he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon\nHim as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from\nthe Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those\ntexts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being\ndifferent entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as\ndifferent'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference\nin so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it\nimplies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the\nhighest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the\nlatter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of\nthe texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is\ndifferent from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul\nconstitutes the body of Brahman.--It thus remains a settled conclusion\nthat Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the\nmeditating Devotee.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under\nthe aspect of Self.'\n\n\n\n\n4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of\nthe Devotee).\n\n'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who\nmeditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)--with regard to these\nand similar meditations on outward symbols (prat\u00eeka) of Brahman there\narises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as\nof the nature of Self or not. The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds the former view.\nFor, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other\ninjunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen,\nconstitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.--This view the S\u00fbtra\nsets aside. A prat\u00eeka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of\nSelf; for the prat\u00eeka is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What,\nin those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the prat\u00eeka only, not\nBrahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its\naspect. For by a meditation on a prat\u00eeka we understand a meditation in\nwhich something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of\nBrahman, and as the prat\u00eeka--the object of meditation--is not the Self\nof the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.--But an objection is\nraised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation;\nfor where Brahman _may_ be viewed as the object of meditation, it is\ninappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power\nsuch as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is\nBrahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.--This objection the\nnext S\u00fbtra disposes of.\n\n\n\n\n5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.\n\nThe view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the\nlike; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is\nsomething superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to\nBrahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be\nlowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is\nexalting.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'\n\n\n\n\n6. And the ideas of \u00c2ditya and the rest on the member; on account of\nthis being rational.\n\n'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udg\u00eetha' (Ch.\nUp. I, 3, 1).--With regard to this and similar meditations connected\nwith subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the\ndoubt whether the idea of \u00c2ditya and so on has to be superimposed on the\nsubordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udg\u00eetha, or vice vers\u00e2 (i.\ne. whether \u00c2ditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the\nUdg\u00eetha, or vice vers\u00e2).--The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds the former view. For\nthe general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the\naspect of the higher, and the Udg\u00eetha and so on, which are parts of the\nsacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to\nthe divinities who do not accomplish any result.--Of this view the S\u00fbtra\ndisposes. The ideas of \u00c2ditya and so on are to be superimposed on the\n'members,' i.e. the Udg\u00eetha and so on, which are constituent members of\nthe sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established.\nFor it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are\ncapable of bringing about their results. The Udg\u00eetha and the rest\ntherefore are to be viewed under the aspect of \u00c2ditya and so on.--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of \u00c2ditya and so on.'\n\n\n\n\n7. Sitting; on account of possibility.\n\nIt has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which\nthe Ved\u00e2nta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release\nand which is called meditation (dhy\u00e2na; up\u00e2sana) has to be frequently\nrepeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question\nnow arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.--There being\nno special restrictive rule, the P\u00fbrvapakshin holds that the Devotee may\ncarry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.--This\nview the S\u00fbtra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee\nin a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful\nconcentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort,\nand lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on\nsome support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.\n\n\n\n\n8. And on account of meditation.\n\nSince, as intimated by the text,'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the\nmental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires\nas its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is\nunderstood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the\nideas of other things.\n\n\n\n\n9. And with reference to immobility.\n\nAnd it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other\ninanimate things--the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains--may be\nspoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhy\u00e2yati) as it were,' and so\non. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating\nperson also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting\nposture only.\n\n\n\n\n10. And Smriti texts say the same.\n\nSmriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having\nplaced his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat,\nconcentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. G\u00ee. VI, 11-12).\n\n\n\n\n11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of\nthere being no difference.\n\nAs the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the\nonly requisite of such places and times is that they should favour\nconcentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply\nhimself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the\nmind' (Svet. Up. II, 10).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the\nsitting one.'\n\n\n\n\n12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.\n\nThe question now arises whether the meditation described which is the\nmeans of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be\ncontinued day after day, until death.--The view that it is accomplished\nwithin one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is\ndisposed of by the S\u00fbtra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For\nScripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in\nthe whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death,\n'Acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.'--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death.'\n\n\n\n\n13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the\ndestruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.\n\nHaving, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the S\u00fbtras now\nbegin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on\nthe knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins\ndo not cling to him but pass away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus\nleaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Ch. Up. IV, 14, 3);\n'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,\n23); 'As the fibres of the Ish\u00eek\u00e2 reed when thrown into the fire are\nburnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3); 'All his works\nperish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).--\nThe doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all\nsins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not.--It is not\npossible, the P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work\nthe fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in\nmillions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non-\nclinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to\npassages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may\ntherefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can\nit be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that\nthe destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such\nexpiation; for knowledge--as we see from texts such as 'He who knows\nBrahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman'--\nis enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non-\nclinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as\narthav\u00e2da passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of\nBrahman.--This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge,\nthe non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the\npower of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power of knowledge to be\nsuch that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor\nis this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed\nperishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to\nproduce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their\naim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of\ndestroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their\nown evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the\npart of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to\ndifferent matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in\nfact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power\nof fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By\nknowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its\nobstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause\nthat disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in\nunfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man\nunfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions\nof the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the\nother hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has\nonce originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on\nthe part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme\ndearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the\ncharacteristic power of propitiating the Lord--the object of knowledge--\nand thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous\ncommission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same\ntime obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part,\nwhich otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the\norigination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not\nclinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to\nsuch sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has\nnot turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that\nmeditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished\nwithout the Devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil\nconduct.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that.'\n\n\n\n\n14. Of the other also there is thus non-clinging; but at death.\n\nIt has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and subsequent sins\ndo not cling and are destroyed. The same holds good also with regard to\nthe other, i.e. to good works--they also, owing to knowledge, do not\ncling and are destroyed; for there is the same antagonism between\nknowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture moreover expressly\ndeclares this. Thus we read, 'Day and night do not pass that bank--\nneither good nor evil deeds. All sins turn back from it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4,\n1); 'He shakes off his good and evil deeds' (Kau. Up. I, 4). In the\nformer of these texts good works are expressly designated as 'sin'\nbecause their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims\nat Release; there is some reason for doing this because after all good\nworks are enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men, and\nthey hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge.--But even to\nhim who possesses the knowledge of Brahman, the fruits of good deeds--\nsuch as seasonable rain, good crops, &c.--are desirable because they\nenable him to perform his meditations in due form; how then can it be\nsaid that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them?--Of this\npoint the S\u00fbtra disposes by means of the clause 'but on death.' Good\nworks which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation\nperish only on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the\nDevotee).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the other.'\n\n\n\n\n15. But only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun;\non account of that being the term.\n\nA new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good and evil works\nare destroyed by the origination of knowledge, or only those the effects\nof which have not yet begun to operate.--All works alike, the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin says; for the texts-as e.g. 'all sins are burned'--declare\nthe fruits of knowledge to be the same in all cases; and the fact of the\nbody continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be\naccounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted, just as in the\ncase of the revolution of a potter's wheel.--This view the S\u00fbtra sets\naside. Only those previous works perish the effects of which have not\nyet begun to operate; for the text 'For him there is delay as long as he\nis not delivered from the body' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2) expressly states\nwhen the delay of the body's death will come to an end (the body\nmeanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the\nan\u00e2rabdhak\u00e2rya works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus\naccounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's\npleasure or displeasure caused by--good or evil deeds.--Here terminates\nthe adhikarana of 'the works the operation of which has not yet begun.'\n\n\n\n\n16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they tend) to that effect\nonly; this being seen.\n\nIt might here be said that special works incumbent on the several\n\u00e2sramas, as e. g. the Agnihotra, need not be undertaken by those who are\nnot desirous of their results, since these works also fall under the\ncategory of good works the result of which does not 'cling.'--This view\nthe S\u00fbtra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be performed,\nsince there is no possibility of their results not clinging; for him who\nknows, those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect. This we\nlearn from Scripture itself: 'Him Br\u00e2hmanas seek to know by the study of\nthe Veda, by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.' This passage\nshows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to knowledge, and as\nknowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised\nday after day until death, the special duties of the \u00e2srama also, which\nassist the rise of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise,\nthose duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and\nknowledge would not arise.--But if good works such as the Agnihotra only\nserve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge, and if good works\nprevious to the rise of knowledge perish, according to the texts 'Having\ndwelt there till their works are consumed' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5) and\n'having obtained the end of his deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), to what then\napplies the text 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends upon\nhis good works'?--This point is taken up by the next S\u00fbtra.\n\n\n\n\n17. According to some (a class of good works) other than these, of both\nkinds.\n\nThe text quoted above from one s\u00e2kh\u00e2 ('His friends enter upon his good\ndeeds') refers to good works other than the Agnihotra and the rest, the\nonly object of which is to give rise to knowledge, viz. to all those\nmanifold good works, previous or subsequent to the attaining to\nknowledge, the results of which are obstructed by other works of greater\nstrength. Those texts also which declare works not to cling or to be\ndestroyed through knowledge refer to this same class of works.--The next\nS\u00fbtra recalls the fact, already previously established, that the results\nof works actually performed may somehow be obstructed.\n\n\n\n\n18. For (there is the text) 'whatever he does with knowledge.'\n\nThe declaration made in the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that\nis more vigorous,' viz. that the knowledge of the Udg\u00eetha has for its\nresult non-obstruction of the result of the sacrifice, implies that the\nresult of works actually performed _may_ be obstructed. We thus arrive\nat the conclusion that the text of the S\u00e2ty\u00e2yanins,' his friends enter\nupon his good works,' refers to those good works of the man possessing\nknowledge the results of which were somehow obstructed (and hence did\nnot act themselves out during his lifetime, so that on his death they\nmay be transferred to others).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the\nAgnihotra and the rest.'\n\n\n\n\n19. But having destroyed by fruition the other two sets he becomes one\nwith Brahman.\n\nThere now arises the doubt whether the good and evil works other than\nthose the non-clinging and destruction of which have been declared, that\nis to say those works the results of which have begun to act, come to an\nend together with that bodily existence in which knowledge of Brahman\noriginates, or with the last body due to the action of the works last\nmentioned, or with another body due to the action of the an\u00e2rabdhak\u00e2rya.--\nThe second of these alternatives is the one to be accepted, for there is\na text declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance of the\nSelf from the current bodily existence: 'For him there is delay so long\nas he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with\nBrahman' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2).--This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside. Having\ndestroyed the other good and evil works the results of which had begun\nto operate by retributive experience he, subsequently to the termination\nof such retributive enjoyment, becomes one with Brahman. If those good\nand evil works are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within\nthe term of one bodily existence, they come to an end together with the\ncurrent bodily existence; if they require several bodily existences for\nthe full experience of their results, they come to an end after several\nexistences only. This being so, the deliverance spoken of in the text\nquoted by the P\u00fbrvapakshin means deliverance from those works when\ncompletely destroyed by retributive enjoyment, not deliverance from\nbodily existence about which the text says nothing. All those works, on\nthe other hand, good and evil, which were performed before the rise of\nknowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate--works\nwhich have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to\nconstitute an infinite quantity--are at once destroyed by the might of\nthe rising knowledge of Brahman. And works performed subsequently to the\nrise of such knowledge do not 'cling.' And, as Scripture teaches, the\nfriends of the man possessing true knowledge take over, on his death,\nhis good works, and his enemies his evil deeds. Thus there remains no\ncontradiction.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the destruction of\nthe others.'\n\n\n\n\nSECOND P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. Speech with mind, on account of this being seen and of scriptural\nstatement.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras now begin an enquiry into the mode of the going to Brahman of\nhim who knows. At first the soul's departure from the body is considered.\nOn this point we have the text, 'When a man departs from hence his\nspeech is combined (sampadyate) with his mind, his mind with his breath,\nhis breath with fire, fire with the highest deity' (Ch. Up. VI, 6, 1).\nThe doubt here arises whether the speech's being combined with the mind,\nreferred to in the text, means that the function of speech only is\nmerged in mind, or the organ of speech itself.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin holds\nthe former view; for, he says, as mind is not the causal substance of\nspeech, the latter cannot be merged in it; while the scriptural\nstatement is not altogether irrational in so far as the functions of\nspeech and other organs are controlled by the mind, and therefore may be\nconceived as being withdrawn into it.--This view the S\u00fbtra sets aside.\nSpeech itself becomes combined with mind; since that is seen. For the\nactivity of mind is observed to go on even when the organ of speech has\nceased to act.--But is this not sufficiently accounted for by the\nassumption of the mere function of speech being merged in mind?--To this\nthe S\u00fbtra replies 'and on account of the scriptural word.' The text says\ndistinctly that speech itself, not merely the function of speech,\nbecomes one with the mind. And when the function of speech comes to an\nend, there is no other means of knowledge to assure us that the function\nonly has come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have an\nindependent existence. The objection that speech cannot become one with\nmind because the latter is not the causal substance of speech, we meet\nby pointing out that the purport of the text is not that speech is\nmerged in mind, but only that it is combined or connected with it.\n\n\n\n\n2. And for the same reason all follow after.\n\nBecause speech's becoming one with mind means only conjunction with the\nlatter, not merging within it; there is also no objection to what\nScripture says as to all other organs that follow speech being united\nwith mind.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'speech.'\n\n\n\n\n3. That mind in breath, owing to the subsequent clause.\n\nThat mind, i.e. mind united with all the organs unites itself with\nbreath; not merely the function of mind. This appears from the clause\nfollowing upon the text quoted above, 'mind (unites itself) with breath.'\nHere, however, a further doubt suggests itself. The text 'Mind is made\nof earth' declares earth to be the causal substance of mind, and the\ntext 'that (viz. water) sent forth earth' declares water to be the\ncausal substance of earth; while the further text 'breath is made of\nwater' shows water to be the causal substance of breath. Considering\ntherefore that in the text 'mind becomes united with breath' the term\n_breath_ is naturally understood to denote the causal substance of\nbreath, i.e. water, the appropriate sense to be given to the statement\nthat mind is united with water is that mind is completely refunded into\nits own causal substance--so that the 'being united' would throughout be\nunderstood 'as being completely merged.'--The reply to this, however,\nis, that the clauses 'Mind is made of food, breath is made of water,'\nonly mean that mind and breath are nourished and sustained by food and\nwater, not that food and water are the causal substances of mind and\nbreath. The latter indeed is impossible; for mind consists of ahamk\u00e2ra,\nand as breath is a modification of ether and other elements, the word\n_breath_ may suggest water.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'mind.'\n\n\n\n\n4. That (is united) with the ruler, on account of the going to it, and\nso on.\n\nAs from the statements that speech becomes united with mind and mind\nwith breath it follows that speech and mind are united with mind and\nbreath only; so we conclude from the subsequent clause 'breath with\nfire' that breath becomes united with fire only.--Against this prim\u00e2\nfacie view the S\u00fbtra declares 'that breath becomes united with the ruler\nof the organs, i.e. the individual soul, on account of the going to it,\nand so on.' That breath goes to the individual soul, the following text\ndeclares, 'At the time of death all the pr\u00e2nas go to the Self of a man\nabout to expire' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38), Similarly Scripture mentions the\ndeparture of pr\u00e2na together with the soul, 'after him thus departing the\nprawa departs'; and again its staying together with the soul, 'What is\nthat by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall\nstay?' (Pr. Up. VI, 3). We therefore conclude that the text 'breath with\nfire' means that breath joined with the individual soul becomes united\nwith fire. Analogously we may say in ordinary life that the Yamuna is\nflowing towards the sea, while in reality it is the Yamuna joined with\nthe Gang\u00e2 which flows on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ruler.'\n\n\n\n\n5. With the elements, this being stated by Scripture.\n\nThere arises the further question whether breath joined with the soul\nunites itself with fire only or with all the elements combined.--With\nfire, so much only being declared by Scripture!--This view the S\u00fbtra\nsets aside. Breath and soul unite themselves with all the elements; for\nScripture declares the soul, when moving out, to consist of all the\nelements--'Consisting of earth, consisting of water, consisting of fire.\n'--But this latter text explains itself also on the assumption of breath\nand soul unitrng themselves in succession with fire and the rest, one at\na time!--This the next S\u00fbtra negatives.\n\n\n\n\n6. Not with one; for both declare this.\n\nNot with one; because each element by itself is incapable of producing\nan effect. Such incapability is declared by Scripture and tradition\nalike. The text 'Having entered these beings with this j\u00eeva soul let me\nreveal names and forms--let me make each of these three tripartite' (Ch.\nUp. VI, 3) teaches that the elements were rendered tripartite in order\nto be capable of evolving names and forms; and of similar import is the\nfollowing Smriti text, 'Possessing various powers these (elements),\nbeing separate from one another, were unable to produce creatures\nwithout combining. But having entered into mutual conjunction they, from\nthe Mahat down to individual beings, produce the Brahma egg.' From this\nit follows that in the clause 'breath is united with fire' the word _fire_\ndenotes fire mixed with the other elements. Breath and soul therefore\nare united with the aggregate of the elements.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the elements.'\n\n\n\n\n7. And it is common up to the beginning of the way; and the immortality\n(is that which is obtained), without having burned.\n\nIs this departure of the soul common to him who knows and him who does\nnot know?--It belongs to him only who does not know, the P\u00fbrvapakshin\nholds. For Scripture declares that for him who knows there is no\ndeparture, and that hence he becomes immortal then and there\n(irrespective of any departure of the soul to another place), 'when all\ndesires which once dwelt in his heart are undone, then the mortal\nbecomes immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). This\nview the S\u00fbtra sets aside. For him also who knows there is the same way\nof passing out up to the beginning of the path, i.e. previously to the\nsoul's entering the veins. For another text expressly declares that the\nsoul of him also who knows passes out by way of a particular vein:\n'there are a hundred and one veins of the heart; one of them penetrates\nthe crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality,\nthe others serve for departing in different directions' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6,\n5). Scripture thus declaring that the soul of him who knows passes out\nby way of a particular vein, it must of course be admitted that it _does_\npass out; and as up to the soul's entering the vein no difference is\nmentioned, we must assume that up to that moment the departure of him\nwho knows does not differ from that of him who does not know. A\ndifference however is stated with regard to the stage of the soul's\nentering the vein, viz. Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2, 'By that light the Self\ndeparts, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other\nparts of the body.' As this text must be interpreted in agreement with\nthe text relative to the hundred and one veins, the departure by way of\nthe head must be understood to belong to him who knows, while the other\nmodes of departing belong to other persons. The last clause of the S\u00fbtra\n'and the immortality, without having burned' replies to what the\nP\u00fbrvapakshin said as to the soul of him who knows being declared by\nScripture to attain to immortality then and there. The immortality\nreferred to in the text 'when all desires of his heart are undone'\ndenotes that non-clinging and destruction of earlier and later sins\nwhich comes to him who knows, together with the rise of knowledge,\nwithout the connexion of the soul with the body, and the sense-organs\nbeing burned, i.e. dissolved at the time.--'He reaches Brahman' in the\nsame text means that in the act of devout meditation the devotee has an\nintuitive knowledge of Brahman.\n\n\n\n\n8. Since, up to the union with that (i.e. Brahman) the texts describe\nthe Sams\u00e2ra state.\n\nThe immortality referred to must necessarily be understood as not\nimplying dissolution of the soul's connexion with the body, since up to\nthe soul's attaining to Brahman the texts describe the Sams\u00e2ra state.\nThat attaining to Brahman takes place, as will be shown further on,\nafter the soul--moving on the path the first stage of which is light--\nhas reached a certain place. Up to that the texts denote the Sams\u00e2ra\nstate of which the connexion with a body is characteristic. 'For him\nthere is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he\nwill be united' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2); 'Shaking off all evil as a horse\nshakes his hairs, and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of R\u00e2hu;\nhaving shaken off the body I obtain self, made and satisfied, the\nuncreated world of Brahman' (VIII, 13).\n\n\n\n\n9. And the subtle (body persists), on account of a means of knowledge,\nit being thus observed (in Scripture).\n\nThe bondage of him who knows is not, at that stage, dissolved, for this\nreason also that the subtle body continues to persist.--How is this\nknown?--Through a means of knowledge, viz. because it is thus seen in\nScripture. For Scripture states that he who knows, when on the path of\nthe gods, enters into a colloquy with the moon and others, 'he is to\nreply,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3 ff.). This implies the existence of a body,\nand thence it follows that, at that stage, the subtle body persists. The\nstate of bondage therefore is not yet dissolved.\n\n\n\n\n10. Hence not in the way of destruction of bondage.\n\nIt thus appears that the text 'when all desires which once entered his\nheart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains\nBrahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7), does not mean such immortality as would\nimply complete destruction of the state of bondage.\n\n\n\n\n11. And to that very (subtle body) (there belongs) the warmth, this only\nbeing reasonable.\n\nIt is observed that when a man is about to die there is some warmth left\nin some part or parts of the gross body. Now this warmth cannot really\nbelong to the gross body, for it is not observed in other parts of that\nbody (while yet there is no reason why it should be limited to some\npart); but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body which may\nabide in some part of the gross body (and into which the warmth of the\nentire gross body has withdrawn itself). We therefore conclude that this\npartial perception of warmth is due to the departing subtle body. This\nconfirms the view laid down in S\u00fbtra 7.--The next S\u00fbtra disposes of a\nfurther doubt raised as to the departure of the soul of him who knows.\n\n\n\n\n12. If it be said that on account of the denial (it is not so); we deny\nthis. From the embodied soul; for (that one is) clear, according to some.\n\nThe contention that the soul of him who knows departs from the body in\nthe same way as other souls do cannot be upheld, since Scripture\nexpressly negatives such departure. For Bri. Up. IV, 4, at first\ndescribes the mode of departure on the part of him who does not possess\ntrue knowledge ('He taking to himself those elements of light descends\ninto the heart' up to 'after him thus departing the Pr\u00e2na departs');\nthen refers to his assuming another body ('he makes to himself another,\nnewer and more beautiful shape'); then concludes the account of him who\ndoes not possess true knowledge ('having attained the end of these works\nwhatever he does here, he again returns from that world to this world of\naction. So much for the man who desires'); and thereupon proceeds\nexplicitly to deny the departure from the body of him who possesses true\nknowledge, 'But he who does not desire, who is without desire, free from\ndesire, who has obtained his desire, who desires the Self only, of him\n(tasya) the pr\u00e2nas do not pass forth,--being Brahman only he goes into\nBrahman.' Similarly a previous section also, viz. the one containing the\nquestions put by \u00c5rtabh\u00e2ga, directly negatives the view of the soul of\nhim who knows passing out of the body. There the clause 'he again\nconquers death' introduces him who knows as the subject-matter, and\nafter that the text continues: 'Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya, he said, when that person\ndies, do the pr\u00e2nas pass out of him (asm\u00e2t) or not?--No, said\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya, they are gathered up in him (atraiva), he swells, inflated\nthe dead lies' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 10-11). From these texts it follows\nthat he who knows attains to immortality _here_ (without his soul\npassing out of the body and moving to another place).--This view the\nS\u00fbtra rejects. 'Not so; from the embodied soul.' What those texts deny\nis the moving away of the pr\u00e2nas from the embodied individual soul, not\nfrom the body. 'Of him (tasya) the pr\u00e2nas do not pass forth'--here the\n'of him' refers to the subject under discussion, i.e. the embodied soul\nwhich is introduced by the clause 'he who does not desire,' not to the\nbody which the text had not previously mentioned. The sixth case (tasya)\nhere denotes the embodied soul as that which is connected with the\npr\u00e2nas ('the pr\u00e2nas belonging to that, i.e. the soul, do not pass out'),\nnot as that from which the passing out takes its start.--But why should\nthe 'tasya' not denote the body as the point of starting ('the pr\u00e2nas\ndo not pass forth from that (tasya), viz. the body')?--Because, we reply,\nthe soul which is actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with\nthe pr\u00e2nas (as indicated by tasya) suggests itself to the mind more\nimmediately than the body which is not mentioned at all; if therefore\nthe question arises as to the starting-point of the passing forth of the\npr\u00e2nas the soul is (on the basis of the text) apprehended as that\nstarting-point also (i.e. the clause 'the pr\u00e2nas of him do not pass\nforth' implies at the same time 'the pr\u00e2nas do not pass forth from him,\ni.e. from the soul'). Moreover, as the pr\u00e2nas are well known to be\nconnected with the soul and as hence it would serve no purpose to state\nthat connexion, we conclude that the sixth case which expresses\nconnexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-point in\nparticular. And no dispute on this point is really possible; since\n'according to some' it is 'clear' that what the text means to express is\nthe embodied soul as the starting-point of the pr\u00e2nas. The _some_ are\nthe M\u00e2dhyandinas, who in their text of the Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka read 'na\ntasm\u00e2t pr\u00e2na utkr\u00e2manti'--'the pr\u00e2nas do not pass forth _from _him' (the\n'tasya' thus being the reading of the K\u00e2nva S\u00e2kh\u00e2 only).--But, an\nobjection is raised, there is no motive for explicitly negativing the\npassing away of the pr\u00e2nas from the soul; for there is no reason to\nassume that there should be such a passing away (and the general rule is\nthat a denial is made of that only for which there is a presumption).--\nNot so, we reply. The Ch\u00e2ndogya-text 'For him there is delay only as\nlong as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united'\ndeclares that the soul becomes united with Brahman at the time of its\nseparation from the body, and this suggests the idea of the soul of him\nwho knows separating itself at that very time (i.e. the time of death)\nfrom the pr\u00e2nas also. But this would mean that the soul cannot reach\nunion with Brahman by means of proceeding on the path of the gods, and\nfor this reason the Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka ('of him the pr\u00e2nas do not pass\nforth') explicitly declares that the pr\u00e2nas do not depart from the soul\nof him who knows, before that soul proceeding on the path of the gods\nattains to union with Brahman.\n\nThe same line of refutation would have to be applied to the arguments\nfounded by our opponent on the question of \u00c2rtabh\u00e2ga, if that question\nbe viewed as referring to him who possesses true knowledge. The fact\nhowever is that that passage refers to him who does _not_ possess that\nknowledge; for none of the questions and answers of which the section\nconsists favours the presumption of the knowledge of Brahman being under\ndiscussion. The matters touched upon in those questions and answers are\nthe nature of the senses and sense objects viewed as graha and atigraha;\nwater being the food of fire; the non-separation of the pr\u00e2nas from the\nsoul at the time of death; the continuance of the fame--there called\n_name_--of the dead man; and the attainment, on the part of the soul of\nthe departed, to conditions of existence corresponding to his good or\nevil deeds. The passage immediately preceding the one referring to the\nnon-departure of the pr\u00e2nas merely means that death is conquered in so\nfar as it is a fire and fire is the food of water; this has nothing to\ndo with the owner of true knowledge. The statement that the pr\u00e2nas of\nthe ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not depart means\nthat at the time of death the pr\u00e2nas do not, like the gross body,\nabandon the j\u00eeva, but cling to it like the subtle body and accompany it.\n\n\n\n\n13. Smriti also declares this.\n\nSmriti also declares that the soul of him who knows departs by means of\nan artery of the head. 'Of those, one is situated above which pierces\nthe disc of the sun and passes beyond the world of Brahman; by way of\nthat the soul reaches the highest goal' (Y\u00e2j\u00f1. Smri. III, 167).--Here\nterminates the adhikarana of 'up to the beginning of the road.'\n\n\n\n\n14. With the Highest; for thus it says.\n\nIt has been shown that at the time of departure from the body the soul\ntogether with the organs and pr\u00e2nas unites itself with the subtle\nelements, fire and the rest; and the notion that the soul of him who\nknows forms an exception has been disposed of. The further question now\narises whether those subtle elements move on towards producing their\nappropriate effects, in accordance with the works or the nature of\nmeditation (of some other soul with which those elements join\nthemselves), or unite themselves with the highest Self.--The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin holds that, as in the case of union with the highest Self,\nthey could not give rise to their peculiar effects, i.e. the experience\nof pleasure and pain, they move towards some place where they can give\nrise to their appropriate effects.--Of this view the S\u00fbtra disposes.\nThey unite themselves with the highest Self; for Scripture declares\n'warmth in the highest Being' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 6). And the doings of\nthose elements must be viewed in such a way as to agree with Scripture.\nAs in the states of deep sleep and a pralaya, there is, owing to union\nwith the highest Self, a cessation of all experience of pain and\npleasure; so it is in the case under question also.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'union with the Highest.'\n\n\n\n\n15. Non-division, according to statement.\n\nIs this union with the highest Self to be understood as ordinary\n'merging,' i.e. a return on the part of the effected thing into the\ncondition of the cause (as when the jar is reduced to the condition of a\nlump of clay), or as absolute non-division from the highest Self, such\nas is meant in the clauses preceding the text last quoted, 'Speech is\nmerged in mind'? &c.--The former view is to be adopted; for as the\nhighest Self is the causal substance of all, union with it means the\nreturn on the part of individual beings into the condition of that\ncausal substance.--This view the S\u00fbtra rejects. Union here means non-\ndivision, i.e. connexion of such kind that those subtle elements are\naltogether incapable of being thought and spoken of as separate from\nBrahman. This the text itself declares, since the clause 'warmth in the\nhighest Being' is connected with and governed by the preceding clause\n'Speech is merged in mind.' This preceding clause intimates a special\nkind of connexion, viz. absolute non-separation, and there is nothing to\nprove that the dependent clause means to express something different;\nnor is there any reason why at the time of the soul's departure those\nelements should enter into the causal condition; nor is there anything\nsaid about their again proceeding from the causal substance in a new\ncreation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-separation.'\n\n\n\n\n16. A lighting up of the point of the abode of that; having the door\nilluminated by that (the soul), owing to the power of its knowledge and\nthe application of remembrance of the way which is an element of that\n(viz. of knowledge), being assisted by him who abides within the heart,\n(passes out) by way of the hundred and first artery.\n\nSo far it has been shown that, up to the beginning of the journey, the\nsouls of them as well who possess true knowledge as of those who do not,\npass out of the body in the same way. Now a difference is stated in the\ncase of those who have true knowledge. We have on this point the\nfollowing text: 'There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart; one\nof them penetrates the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man\nreaches immortality; the others serve for departing in different\ndirections' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). The doubt here arises whether he who\nknows departs by this hundred and first artery in the top of the head,\nwhile those who do not know depart by way of the other arteries; or\nwhether there is no definite rule on this point.--There is no definite\nrule, the P\u00fbrvapakshin holds. For as the arteries are many and\nexceedingly minute, they are difficult to distinguish, and the soul\ntherefore is not able to follow any particular one. The text therefore\n(is not meant to make an original authoritative statement as to\ndifferent arteries being followed by different souls, but) merely refers\nin an informal way to what is already settled (viz. by the reason of the\nthing), i.e. the casual departure of any soul by any artery.--This view\nthe S\u00fbtra rejects 'By way of the hundred and first.' The soul of him who\npossesses true knowledge departs only by way of the hundred and first\nartery in the crown of the head. Nor is that soul unable to distinguish\nthat particular artcry. For, through the power of his supremely clear\nknowledge which has the effect of pleasing the Supreme Person, and\nthrough the application of remembrance of the way--which remembrance is\na part of that knowledge--the soul of him who knows wins the favour of\nthe Supreme Person who abides within the heart, and is assisted by him.\nOwing to this the abode of that, i.e. the heart which is the abode of\nthe soul, is illuminated, lit up at its tip, and thus, through the grace\nof the Supreme Soul, the individual soul has the door (of egress from\nthe body) lit up and is able to recognise that artery. There is thus no\nobjection to the view that the soul of him who knows passes out by way\nof that particular artery only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the\nabode of that.'\n\n\n\n\n17. Following the rays.\n\nScripture teaches that the soul of him who knows, after having passed\nforth from the heart by way of the hundred and first artery, follows the\nrays of the sun and thus reaches the disc of the sun: 'when he departs\nfrom this body he goes upwards by these rays only' (eva) (Ch. Up. VIII,\n6, 5). The idea here suggests itself that the going of the soul cannot\nbe exclusively bound' to those rays, since when a man dies during the\nnight it _cannot_ follow tae rays of the sun. Hence the text quoted\nabove can refer only to a part of the actual cases.--This view the S\u00fbtra\nrejects. The soul moves upwards, following the rays only; the text\nexpressly asserting this by means of the 'eva'--which would be out of\nplace were there any alternative. Nor is there any strength in the\nargument that the soul of him who dies at night cannot follow the rays\nas there are none. For in summer the experience of heat at night-time\nshows that there are present rays then also; while in winter, as\ngenerally in bad weather, that heat is overpowered by cold and hence is\nnot perceived (although actually present). Scripture moreover states\nthat the arteries and rays are at all times mutually connected: 'As a\nvery long highway goes to two villages, so the rays of the sun go to\nboth worlds, to this one and to the other. They stretch themselves forth\nfrom the sun and enter into these arteries'; they stretch themselves\nforth from these arteries and enter into yonder sun' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6,\n2).--As thus there are rays at night also, the souls of those who know\nreach Brahman by way of the rays only.--Here terminates the adhikarana\nof 'the following up the rays.'\n\n\n\n\n18. Should it be said, not in the night; we say, no; because the\nconnexion persists as long as the body does. Scripture also declares\nthis.\n\nIt is now enquired into whether the soul of him who, while having true\nknowledge, dies at night reaches Brahman or not. Although, as solar rays\nexist at night, the soul may move on at night also following those rays;\nyet, since dying at night is spoken of in the S\u00fbtras as highly\nobjectionable, we conclude that he who dies at night cannot accomplish\nthe highest end of man, viz. attainment to Brahman. The S\u00fbtras eulogize\ndeath occurring in daytime and object to death at night-time: 'Day-time,\nthe bright half of the month and the northern progress of the sun are\nexcellent for those about to die; the contrary times are unfavourable.'\nAccording to this, their different nature, dying in day-time may be\nassumed to lead to a superior state of existence, and dying at night to\nan inferior state. He who dies at night cannot therefore ascend to\nBrahman.--This view the S\u00fbtra refutes: 'Because, in the case of him who\nknows, the connexion with works exists as long as the body does.' This\nis to say--since those works which have not yet begun to produce their\nresults and which are the cause of future inferior states of existence\nare destroyed by the contact with knowledge, while at the same time\nlater works do not 'cling' (also owing to the presence of true\nknowledge), and those works which have begun to act come to an end with\nthe existence of the last body; there is no reason why he who knows\nshould remain in bondage, and hence he reaches Brahman even if dying at\nnight-time. Scripture also declares this, 'for him there is delay only\nas long as he is not freed from the body, then he will be united.' The\ntext which praises the advantages of night-time, the light half of the\nmonth, &c., therefore must be understood as referring to those who do\nnot possess true knowledge.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'night.'\n\n\n\n\n19. For the same reason also during the southern progress of the sun.\n\nThe reasoning stated above also proves that the owner of true knowledge\nwho may happen to die during the southern progress of the sun reaches\nBrahman. A further doubt, however, arises here. The text 'He who dies\nduring the sun's southern progress reaches the greatness of the Fathers\nand union with the moon' (Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. Up. 25) declares that he who dies\nduring the southern progress reaches the moon; and the other text 'when\nthis ceases they return again the same way' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16) states\nthat he returns again to the earth. We further know that Bh\u00eeshma and\nothers, although fully possessing the knowledge of Brahman, put off\ntheir death until the beginning of the northern progress. All this seems\nto prove that he who dies during the southern progress does not reach\nBrahman.--This doubt we dispose of as follows. Those only who do not\npossess true knowledge return from the moon; while he who has such\nknowledge does not return even after he has gone to the moon. For a\ncomplementary clause in the Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r\u00e2yana Up., 'from there he reaches the\ngreatness of Brahman,' shows that the abode in the moon forms for him,\nwho having died during the southern progress wishes to reach Brahman, a\nmere stage of rest. And even if there were no such complementary passage,\nit would follow from the previously stated absence of any reason for\nbondage that the going of the wise man's soul to the moon in no way\nprecludes his reaching Brahman. Bh\u00eeshma and others who through the power\nof Yoga were able to choose the time of their death put it off until the\nbeginning of the northern progress in order to proclaim before the world\nthe excellence of that season and thus to promote pious faith and\npractice.--But we also meet with an authoritative statement made with\nreference to wise men about to die, as to difference of time of death\nbeing the cause of a man either returning or not returning to this world,\n'I will declare at which time the Yogins departing return not, and also\nthe time at which they return. The sire, the light, the day, the bright\nfortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress--the knowers of\nBrahman departing there go to Brahman. The smoke, the night, the dark\nfortnight, the six months of the southern progress--the Yogin departing\nthere having reached the light of the moon returns again. These are held\nto be the perpetual paths of the world--the white and the black; by the\none man goes not to return, by the other he returns again' (Bha. G\u00ee.\nVIII, 23-26).--To this point the next S\u00fbtra refers.\n\n\n\n\n20. And those two (paths) are, with a view to the Yogins, mentioned as\nto be remembered.\n\nThe text quoted does not state an injunction for those about to die, of\na special time of death; but there are rather mentioned in it those two\nmatters belonging to Smriti and therefore to be remembered, viz. the two\npaths--the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers--with a view to\nthose who know and practise Yoga; the text intimating that Yogins should\ndaily think of those paths which are included in Yoga meditation. In\nagreement herewith the text concludes, 'Knowing these two paths no Yogin\nis ever deluded. Hence in all times, O Arjuna, be engaged in Yoga' (Bha.\nG\u00ee. VIII, 27). Through the terms 'the fire, the light,' 'the smoke, the\nnight,' &c. the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers are\nrecognised. Where, in the beginning, the text refers to 'the time when,'\nthe word 'time' must be understood to denote the divine beings ruling\ntime, since Fire and the rest cannot be time. What the Bha. G\u00ee. aims at\ntherefore is to enjoin on men possessing true knowledge the remembrance\nof that path of the Gods originally enjoined in the text, 'they go to\nlight' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 10); not to determine the proper time of dying\nfor those about to die.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the southern\nprogress.'\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. On the path beginning with light, that being known.\n\nThe S\u00fbtras now go on to determine the road which the soul of the wise\nman follows, after having--assisted by the Person within the heart--\npassed out of the body by way of one particular artery. Now of that road\nvarious accounts are given in Scripture. There is a detailed account in\nthe Ch\u00e2ndogya. (IV, 15), 'now whether people perform obsequies for him\nor not,' &c. Another account is given in the eighth book of the same\nUpanishad, 'then he moves upwards by those very rays' (VIII, 6, 5).\n\nThe Kaush\u00eetakins again give a different account: 'He having reached the\npath of the Gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3).\nDifferent again in the Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka: 'Those who thus know this and\nthose who in the forest meditate on faith and the True,' &c. (Bri. Up.\nVI, 2, 15). The same Upanishad, in another place (V, 10), gives a\ndifferent account: 'When the person goes away from this world he comes\nto the wind,' &c.--A doubt here arises whether all these texts mean to\ngive instruction as to one and the same road--the first stage of which\nis light--having to be followed by the soul of the wise man; or whether\nthey describe different roads on any of which the soul may proceed.--The\nP\u00fbrvapakshin holds the latter view; for he says the roads described\ndiffer in nature and are independent one of the other.--This view the\nS\u00fbtra disposes of. All texts mean one and the same road only, viz. the\none beginning with light, and the souls proceed on that road only. For\nthat road is known, i.e. is recognised in all the various descriptions,\nalthough it is, in different texts, described with more or less fulness.\nWe therefore have to proceed here as in the case of the details (guna)\nwhich are mentioned in different meditations referring to one and the\nsame object, i.e. we have to combine the details mentioned in different\nplaces into one whole. The two Ch\u00e2andogya-texts--the one in the\nUpakosalavidy\u00e2 and the one in the Vidy\u00e2 of the five fires--describe\nexactly the same road. And in the Vidy\u00e2 of the five fires as given in\nthe Brihad-\u00e2ranyaka the same road, beginning with light, is also\ndescribed, although there are differences in minor points; we therefore\nrecognise the road described in the Ch\u00e2ndogya. And in the other texts\nalso we everywhere recognise the divinities of certain stages of the\nroad, Agni, \u00c2ditya, and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that\nwhich begins with light.'\n\n\n\n\n2. From the year to V\u00e2yu; on account of non-specification and\nspecification.\n\nIn their description of the path beginning with light the Chandogas\nmention the year between the months and the sun, 'from the months to the\nyear, from the year to the sun' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); while the\nV\u00e2jasaneyins mention, in that very place, the world of the Gods,'from\nthe months to the world of the Gods, from the world of the Gods to the\nsun' (Bri. Up. VI, 2. 15). Now, as the two paths are identical, we have\nto supplement each by the additional item given in the other (and the\nquestion then arises whether the order of the stages be 1. months, 2.\nyear, 3. world of the Gods, 4. sun; or 1. months, 2. world of the Gods,\n3. year, 4. sun). The year and the world of the Gods are equally\nentitled--to the place after the months in so far as textual declaration\ngoes; for both texts say 'from the months.' But we observe that the\nadvance is throughout from the shorter periods of time to the longer\nones ('from the day to the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight\nto the six months of the northern progress'), and as therefore the year\nnaturally presents itself to the mind immediately after the six months,\nwe decide that the order is--months, year, world of the Gods, sun.--In\nanother place (Bri. Up. V, 10) the V\u00e2jasaneyins mention the wind as the\nstage preceding the sun ('the wind makes room for him--he mounts upwards;\nhe comes to the sun'). The Kaush\u00eetakins, on the other hand, place the\nworld of the wind subsequent to light, referred to by them as the world\nof Agni ('Having entered on the path of the Gods he comes to the world\nof Agni, to the world of the wind,' &c., Kau. Up. I, 3). Now in this\nlatter text the fact of the world of the wind following upon light is to\nbe inferred only from the succession of the clauses ('to the world of\nAgni'--'to the world of the wind'), while the 'upwards' in the text of\nthe V\u00e2jasaneyins is a direct statement of succession given by the text\nitself; and as this latter order of succession has greater force than\nthe former, we have to place, in the series of stages, the world of V\u00e2yu\ndirectly before the world of the sun. But above we have determined that\nthe same place (after the year and before the sun) has to be assigned to\nthe world of the Gods also; and hence a doubt arises whether the world\nof the Gods and V\u00e2yu are two different things--the soul of the wise man\npassing by them in optional succession--or one and the same thing--the\nsoul coming, after the year, to V\u00e2yu who is the world of the Gods.--They\nare different things, the P\u00fbrvapakshin says; for they are generally\nknown to be so. And there are definite indications in the text that the\nworld of the Gods as well as V\u00e2yu is to be placed immediately before the\nsun--this being indicated for V\u00e2yu by the 'upwards' referred to above,\nand for the world of the Gods by the ablative case (devalok\u00e2t) in the\nCh\u00e2nd. text, 'from the world of the Gods he goes to the sun'--and as\nthus there is no difference between the two, we conclude that the soul\npasses by them in either order it may choose.--This view the S\u00fbtra\nnegatives: 'From the year to V\u00e2yu.' The soul, having departed from the\nyear, comes to V\u00e2yu. This is proved 'by non-specification and\nspecification.' For the term 'the world of the Gods' is a term of\ngeneral meaning, and hence can denote V\u00e2yu in so far as being the world\nof the Gods; while on the other hand the term V\u00e2yu specifically denotes\nthat divine being only. The Kaush\u00eetakins speak of 'the world of V\u00e2yu';\nbut this only means 'V\u00e2yu who at the same time is a world.' That V\u00e2yu\nmay be viewed as the world of the Gods is confirmed by another\nscriptural passage, viz. 'he who blows (V\u00e2yu) is the houses of the Gods.\n'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'V\u00e2yu.'\n\n\n\n\n3. Beyond lightning there is Varuna, on account of connexion.\n\nAccording to the text of the Kaush\u00eetakins the soul goes on to the world\nof V\u00e2yu, to the world of Varuna, to the world of Indra, to the world of\nPraj\u00e2pati, to the world of Brahman. The doubt here arises whether Varuna\nand the divinities of the following stages are to be inserted in the\nseries after V\u00e2yu, in agreement with the order of enumeration in the\ntext of the Kaush\u00eetakins; or at the end of the whole series as stated in\nthe Ch\u00e2ndogya. Up. (IV, 15, 5), Varuna thus coming after lightning.--The\ndecision is in favour of the latter view because Varuna, the god of\nwaters, is naturally connected with lightning which dwells within the\nclouds.--This terminates the adhikarana of 'Varuna.'\n\n\n\n\n4. Conductors, this being indicated.\n\nThe decision here is that light, V\u00e2yu, and the rest mentioned in the\ntexts as connected with the soul's progress on the path of the Gods are\nto be interpreted not as mere marks indicating the road, nor as places\nof enjoyment for the soul, but as divinities appointed by the Supreme\nPerson to conduct the soul along the stages of the road; for this is\nindicated by what the Chandogya. says with regard to the last stage, viz.\nlightning, 'There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.' What\nhere is said as to that person not human, viz. that he leads the soul,\nis to be extended to the other beings also, light and the rest.--But if\nthat not human person leads the souls from lightning to Brahman, what\nthen about Varuna, Indra, and Praj\u00e2pati, who, as was decided above, are\nin charge of stages beyond lightning? Do they also lead the soul along\ntheir stages?\n\n\n\n\n5. From thence by him only who belongs to lightning, the text stating\nthat.\n\nThe only leader from lightning up to Brahman is the not-human person\nconnected with lightning; for the text states this directly. Varuna,\nIndra, and Praj\u00e2pati take part in the work in so far only as they may\nassist the person connected with lightning.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the conductors.'\n\n\n\n\n6. (Him who meditates on) the effected Brahman, (thus opines) B\u00e2dari;\nbecause for him going is possible.\n\nThe following question now presents itself for consideration. Does the\ntroop of conducting divinities, Agni and the rest, lead on those who\nmeditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha; or those only who\nmeditate on the highest Brahman; or those who meditate on the highest\nBrahman and those who meditate on the individual Self as having Brahman\nfor its Self?--The teacher B\u00e2dari is of opinion that the divinities lead\non those only who meditate on the effected Brahman. For he only who\nmeditates on Hiranyagarbha can move; while a person meditating on the\nhighest Brahman which is absolutely complete, all-knowing, present\neverywhere, the Self of all, cannot possibly be conceived as moving to\nsome other place in order to reach Brahman; for him Brahman rather is\nsomething already reached. For him the effect of true knowledge is only\nto put an end to that Nescience which has for its object Brahman, which,\nin reality, is eternally reached. He, on the other hand, who meditates on\nHiranyagarbha may be conceived as moving in order to reach his object,\nwhich is something abiding within a special limited place. It is he\ntherefore who is conducted on by Agni and the other escorting deities.\n\n\n\n\n7. And on account of (Brahman) being specified.\n\nThe text 'a person not human leads them to the worlds of Brahman' (Bri.\nUp. VI. 2, 15) by using the word 'world,' and moreover in the plural,\ndetermines the specification that the not-human person leads those only\nwho meditate on Hiranyagarbha, who dwells within some particular world.\nMoreover, the text 'I enter the hall of Praj\u00e2pati, the house' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 14) shows that he who goes on the path beginning with light aims\nat approaching Hiranyagarbha. But if this is so, there is a want of\nappropriate denotation in the clause, 'There is a person not human, he\nleads them to Brahman'; if Hiranyagarbha is meant, the text should say\n'He leads them to Brahm\u00e2 (Brahm\u00e2nam).'\n\n\n\n\n8. But on account of nearness there is that designation.\n\nHiranyagarbha is the first created being (as declared by the text 'he\nwho creates Brahma'); he thus stands near to Brahman, and therefore may\nbe designated by the same term (viz. Brahman). This explanation is\nnecessitated by the reasons set forth in the preceding S\u00fbtras (which\nshow that the real highest Brahman cannot be meant).--But, if the soul\nadvancing on the path of the Gods reaches Hiranyagarbha only, texts such\nas 'This is the path of the Gods, the path of Brahman; those who proceed\non that path do not return to the life of man' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 6), and\n'moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality' (VIII, 6, 6), are\nwrong in asserting that that soul attains to immortality and does not\nreturn; for the holy books teach that Hiranyagarbha, as a created being,\npasses away at the end of a dvipar\u00e2rdha-period; and the text 'Up to the\nworld of Brahman the worlds return again' (Bha. G\u00ee. VIII, 16) shows that\nthose who have gone to Hiranyagarbha necessarily return also.\n\n\n\n\n9. On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahma), together with\nits ruler, (the souls go) to what is higher than that; on account of\nscriptural declaration.\n\nOn the passing away of the effected world of Brahma, together with its\nruler Hiranyagarbha, who then recognises his qualification for higher\nknowledge, the soul also which had gone to Hiranyagarbha attains to true\nknowledge and thus reaches Brahman, which is higher than that, i.e.\nhigher than the effected world of Brahm\u00e2. This is known from the texts\ndeclaring that he who proceeds on the path of light reaches immortality\nand does not return; and is further confirmed by the text, 'They all,\nreaching the highest immortality, become free in the world of Brahman\n(Brahm\u00e2) at the time of the great end' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6).\n\n\n\n\n10. And on account of Smriti.\n\nThis follows from Smriti also, which declares 'when the pralaya has come\nand the end of the Highest, they all together with Brahman enter the\nhighest place.'--For all these reasons B\u00e2dari holds that the troop of\nthe conducting deities, beginning with Light, leads the souls of those\nonly who meditate on the effected Brahman, i e. Hiranyagarbha.\n\n\n\n\n11. The Highest, Jaimini thinks; on account of primariness of meaning.\n\nThe teacher Jaimini is of opinion that those deities lead on the souls\nof those only who meditate on the highest Brahman. For in the text 'a\nperson not human leads them to Brahman' the word Brahman is naturally\ntaken in its primary sense (i.e. the highest Brahman); the secondary\nsense (i.e. the effected Brahman) can be admitted only if there are\nother valid reasons to refer the passage to the effected Brahman. And\nthe alleged impossibility of the soul's going is no such valid reason;\nfor although Brahman no doubt is present everywhere, Scripture declares\nthat the soul of the wise frees itself from Nescience only on having\ngone to some particular place. That the origination of true knowledge\ndepends on certain conditions of caste, \u00e2srama, religious duty, purity\nof conduct, time, place, and so on, follows from certain scriptural\ntexts, as e.g. 'Br\u00e2hmanas desire to know him through the study of the\nVeda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); in the same way it follows from the text\ndeclaring the soul's going to Brahman that the final realisation of that\nhighest knowledge which implies the cessation of all Nescience depends\non the soul's going to some particular place. The arguments founded on\ntexts alleged to declare that the soul of the wise does not pass out of\nthe body at all we have refuted above. The argument that the\nspecification implied in the text which mentions _Brahman-worlds_\nclearly points to the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha, is equally\ninvalid. For the compound 'the Brahman-world' is to be explained as'the\nworld which is Brahman'; just as according to the P\u00fbrva M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 the\ncompound 'Nish\u00e2da-sthapati' denotes a sthapati who is a Nish\u00e2da (not a\nsthapati of the Nish\u00e2das). A thing even which is known as one only may\nbe designated by a plural form, as in a mantra one girdle is spoken of\nas 'the fetters of Aditi.' And as to the case under discussion, we know\non the authority of Scripture, Smriti, Itih\u00e2sa, and Pur\u00e2na, that the\nwonderful worlds springing from the mere will of a perfect and\nomnipresent being cannot be but infinite.\n\n\n\n\n12. And because Scripture declares it.\n\nAnd Scripture moreover directly declares that the soul which has\ndeparted by way of the artery in the upper part of the head and passed\nalong the path of the Gods reaches the highest Brahman: 'This serene\nbeing having risen from the body, having reached the highest light\nmanifests itself in its own shape' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--Against the\ncontention that the text 'I enter the hall of Praj\u00e2pati, the house'\nshows that he who proceeds on the path beginning with light aims at the\neffected Brahman, the next S\u00fbtra argues.\n\n\n\n\n13. And there is no aiming at the effected (Brahman).\n\nThe aim of the soul is not at Hiranyagarbha, but at the highest Brahman\nitself. For the complementary sentence 'I am the glorious among\nBr\u00e2hmanas' shows that what the soul aims at is the condition of the\nuniversal Self, which has for its antecedent the putting off of all\nNescience. For this appears from the preceding text, 'As a horse shakes\nhis hairs and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of R\u00e2hu; having\nshaken off the body may I obtain--the uncreated Brahman-world' declares\nthat the Brahman-world, which is the thing to be reached, is something\nnon-created, and explicitly states that reaching that world implies\nfreedom from all bondage whatsoever.--It is for these reasons that\nJaimini holds that the deities speeding the soul on its way lead on him\nonly who has the highest Brahman for the object of his meditation.\n\n\n\n\nNow the Reverend B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana declares his own view, which constitutes the\nfinal conclusion in this matter.\n\n14. Those not depending on symbols he leads, thus B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana thinks;\nthere being a defect in both cases; and he whose thought is that.\n\nB\u00e2dar\u00e2yana is of opinion that the deities lead those not depending on\nsymbols, i.e. all meditating devotees other than those depending on\nsymbols. That is to say, the view that those are led who meditate on the\neffected Brahman cannot be upheld; nor is there an exclusive rule that\nthose only should be led on who meditate on the highest Brahman. The\ntruth is that those are led who meditate on the highest Brahman, and\nalso those who meditate on the Self (soul) as different from matter\n(Prakriti) and having Brahman for its true Self. Souls of both these\nkinds are led on to Brahman. Those on the other hand whose object of\nmeditation is such things as name and so on, which fall within what is a\nmere effect of Brahman--such things being viewed either under the aspect\nof Brahman, just as some valiant man may be viewed under the aspect of a\nlion (which view expresses itself in the judgment 'Devadatta is a lion\n'); or by themselves (without reference to Brahman)--all those are not\nled on to Brahman. Why so?' Because there is a defect in both cases,' i.\ne. in both the views rejected by B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana. The view that those are led\nwho meditate on the effected Brahman is in conflict with texts such as\n'having risen from this body and reached the highest light' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 12, 3)--for the nature of the fruit depends on the nature of the\nmeditation; and the view that those only are led to the highest Brahman\nwho meditate on the highest Brahman, would stultify texts such as the\none which expressly declares Agni and the rest of the deities to lead on\nthose who possess the knowledge of the five fires ('Those who know this,\nviz. the Vidy\u00e2 of the five fires, and those who in the forest meditate\non faith and austerity go to light--there is a person not human, he\nleads them to Brahman,' Ch. Up. V, 10). Both these views thus being\ndefective, we adhere to the conclusion that the deities lead on to\nBrahman the two classes of souls mentioned above.--This the S\u00fbtra\nfurther declares in the words 'he whose thought is that' (tatkratuh),\nthe sense of which is that he whose thought is that reaches that, i.e.\nthat the nature of what is reached depends on the nature of the\nmeditation. This argument is founded on the text, 'According to what his\nthought is (yath\u00e2-kratuh) in this world, so will he be when he has\ndeparted this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14), which implies the principle that\nwhat a soul after death attains is according to its thought and\nmeditation in this life; and moreover we have direct scriptural\nstatements to the effect that those who possess the knowledge of the\nfive fires proceed on the path of the Gods, and that those who proceed\non that path reach Brahman and do not return. Analogous reasoning proves\nthat meditation on the soul as free from matter and having Brahman for\nits true Self also leads to the highest Brahman. In the case of those,\non the other hand, who rely on the symbols (in which they meditatively\ncontemplate Brahman), beginning with name and terminating with pr\u00e2na.\n('He who meditates on name as Brahman,' Ch. Up. VII, 1 ff.), the\nmeditation is not proved by texts of the two kinds previously mentioned\nto lead to Brahman; it rather is contaminated by an element not of the\nnature of intelligence, and hence--according to the principle that the\nresult of a meditation is the same in nature as the meditation itself--\nthe soul of the inferior devotee practising such meditation does not\nproceed by the path of light and does not reach Brahman.--That this\ndistinction is declared by Scripture itself, the next S\u00fbtra shows.\n\n\n\n\n15. And Scripture declares the difference.\n\nThe text, 'He who meditates on name as Brahman, for him there is\nmovement as he wishes as far as name extends,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 1 ff.),\ndeclares that those who meditate on the series of symbols beginning with\nname and ending with pr\u00e2na attain to a result of limited nature and not\ndepending on any particular path. Those therefore who meditate on the\nIntelligent either as mixed with the Non-intelligent or by itself,\nviewing it either under the aspect of Brahman or as separated from\nBrahman, are not led on by the conducting deities. On the other hand, it\nremains a settled conclusion that the deities speed on their way those\nwho meditate on the highest Brahman and on the soul as separated from\nPrakriti and having Brahman for its true Self.--Here terminates the\nadhikarana of 'the effected.'\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH P\u00c2DA.\n\n1. (On the soul's) having approached (the highest light) there is\nmanifestation; (as we infer) from the word 'own.'\n\nThe S\u00fbras now proceed to consider the _kind_ of superior existence\n(aisvarya) which the released souls enjoy.--The text says, 'Thus does\nthat serene being, having risen from the body and having approached the\nhighest light, manifest itself in its own form' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).\nDoes this passage mean that the soul having approached the highest light\nassumes a new body, to be brought about then, as e.g. the body of a deva;\nor that it only manifests its own natural character?--The text must be\nunderstood in the former sense, the P\u00fbrvapakshin holds. For otherwise\nthe scriptural texts referring to Release would declare what is of no\nadvantage to man. We do not observe that its own nature is of any\nadvantage to the soul. In the state of dreamless sleep the body and the\nsense-organs cease to act, and you may say the pure soul then abides by\nitself, but in what way does this benefit man? Nor can it be said that\nmere cessation of pain constitutes the well-being of the soul which has\napproached the highest light, and that in this sense manifestation of\nits own nature may be called Release; for Scripture clearly teaches that\nthe released soul enjoys an infinity of positive bliss, 'One hundred\ntimes the bliss of Praj\u00e2pati is one bliss of Brahman and of a sage free\nfrom desires'; 'for having tasted a flavour he experiences bliss' (Taitt.\nUp. II, 7). Nor can it be said that the true nature of the soul is\nconsciousness of the nature of unlimited bliss which, in the Sams\u00e2ra\ncondition, is hidden by Nescience and manifests itself only when the\nsoul reaches Brahman. For, as explained previously, intelligence which\nis of the nature of light cannot be hidden; hiding in that case would be\nneither more nor less than destruction. Nor can that which is mere light\nbe of the nature of bliss; for bliss is pleasure, and to be of the\nnature of pleasure is to be such as to agree with the Self. But, if the\nSelf is mere light, where is the being by which light is to be\napprehended as agreeable to its own nature? (i.e. where is the knowing\nsubject conscious of bliss?) He, therefore, who holds the Self to be\nmere light, can in no way prove that it is of the nature of bliss. If,\nmoreover, that which the soul effects on approaching the highest light\nis merely to attain to its own true nature, we point out that that\nnature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence the\ndeclaration that 'it manifests (accomplishes) itself in its own nature'\nwould be purportless. We hence conclude that on approaching the highest\nlight the soul connects itself with a new form only then brought about.\nOn this view the term 'accomplishes itself is taken in its direct sense,\nand the expression 'in its own shape' also is suitable in so far as the\nsoul accomplishes itself in a nature specially belonging to it and\ncharacterised by absolute bliss.--This view the S\u00fbtra rejects. That\nspecial condition into which the soul passes on having, on the path of\nthe Gods, approached the highest light is a manifestation of its own\ntrue nature, not an origination of a new character. For this is proved--\nby the specification implied in the term 'own,' in the phrase 'in its\nown nature.' If the soul assumed a new body, this specification would be\nwithout meaning; for, even without that, it would be clear that the new\nbody belongs to the soul.--Against the assertion that the soul's own\ntrue nature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence a\ndeclaration of that nature 'accomplishing itself would be unmeaning, the\nnext S\u00fbtra declares itself.\n\n\n\n\n2. The released one; on account of the promise.\n\nWhat the text says about the soul accomplishing itself in its own form\nrefers to the released soul which, freed from its connexion with works\nand what depends thereon, i.e. the body and the rest, abides in its true\nessential nature.--That essential nature no doubt is something eternally\naccomplished, but as in the Sams\u00e2ra state it is obscured by Nescience in\nthe form of Karman; the text refers to the cessation of such obscuration\nas 'accomplishment.'--How is this known?--'From the promise,'i.e. from\nthe fact that the text promises to set forth such cessation. For\nPraj\u00e2pati when saying again and again, 'I will explain that further to\nyou,' does so with a view to throw light on the individual soul--first\nintroduced in the clause 'that Self which is free from sin, &c.' (VIII,\n7, 1)--in so far as freed from all connexion with the three empirical\nconditions of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and released from\nthe body which is due to Karman and the cause of joy and sorrow. When,\ntherefore, he concludes 'that serene being, i.e. the soul, having risen\nfrom this body and having approached the highest light accomplishes\nitself in its true form,' we understand that such 'accomplishment' means\nthe final release, i.e. the cessation of all bondage, which is gained by\nthe soul, previously connected with Karman, as soon as it approaches the\nhighest light.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin had said that as in the state of deep\nsleep the manifestation of the true nature of the soul is seen in no way\nto benefit man, Scripture, if declaring that Release consists in a\nmanifestation of the true nature of the soul, would clearly teach\nsomething likewise not beneficial to man; and that hence the\n'accomplishment in its own form' must mean the soul's entering on such a\nnew condition of existence as would be a cause of pleasure, viz. the\ncondition of a deva or the like. To this the next S\u00fbtra replies.\n\n\n\n\n3. The Self, on account of subject-matter.\n\nThe subject-matter of the whole section shows that by the Self\nmanifesting itself in its own form there is meant the Self as possessing\nthe attributes of freedom from all evil and sin and so on. For the\nteaching of Praj\u00e2pati begins as follows: 'the Self which is free from\nsin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst,\nwhose desires and thoughts spontaneously realise themselves.' And that\nthis Self which forms the subject-matter of the entire section is the\nindividual Self we have shown under I, 3, 19. The manifestation of the\ntrue nature of the soul when reaching the highest light therefore means\nthe manifestation of that Self which has freedom from sin and so on for\nits essential attributes-that nature being in the Sams\u00e2ra state obscured\nthrough Nescience. When therefore at the moment of Release those\nessential qualities assert themselves, the case is one of manifestation\nof what already exists, not one of origination. Thus the reverend\nSaunaka says, 'As the lustre of the gem is not created by the act of\npolishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not created by\nthe putting off of imperfections. As the well is not the cause of the\nproduction of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which\nalready exists--for whence should that originate which is not?--thus\nknowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested\nthrough the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for\nthey are eternal.' Intelligence, therefore, bliss, and the other\nessential qualities of the soul which were obscured and contracted by\nKarman, expand and thus manifest themselves when the bondage due to\nKarman passes away and the soul approaches the highest light. On this\nview of 'manifestation' there remains no difficulty.--Here terminates\nthe adhikarana of 'on approaching manifestation.'\n\n\n\n\n4. In non-division; because that is seen.\n\nIs the soul, when it has reached the highest light and freed itself from\nall bondage, conscious of itself as separate from the highest Self or as\nnon-separate in so far as being a mere 'mode' (prak\u00e2ra) of that Self?--\nThe former view is the right one. For Scriptural and Smriti texts alike\ndeclare that the released soul stands to the highest Self in the\nrelation of fellowship, equality, equality of attributes, and all this\nimplies consciousness of separation. Compare 'He attains all desires\ntogether with the all-knowing Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'When the\nseer sees the shining maker, the Lord, the Person who has his source in\nBrahman; then, possessing perfect knowledge, and shaking off good and\nevil, free from all passions he reaches the highest equality' (Mu. Up.\nIII, 1, 3); 'Taking their stand upon this knowledge they, attaining to\nan equality of attributes with me, are neither born at the time of a\ncreation nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIV,\n2).--Against this view the S\u00fbtra declares itself 'in non-division.' The\nreleased soul is conscious of itself as non-divided from the highest\nBrahman. 'For this is seen,' i.e. for the soul having reached Brahman\nand freed itself from the investment of Nescience sees itself in its\ntrue nature. And this _true nature_ consists herein that the souls have\nfor their inner Self the highest Self while they constitute the body of\nthat Self and hence are _modes_ (prak\u00e2ra) of it. This is proved by all\nthose texts which exhibit the soul and Brahman in co-ordination--'Thou\nart that' 'this Self is Brahman'; 'In that all this has its Self'; 'All\nthis in truth is Brahman'; and by other texts, such as 'He who dwells\nwithin the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the\nbody,' &c.; and 'He who abides within, the ruler of creatures, he is thy\nSelf; as explained by us under S\u00fbtra I, 4, 22. The consciousness of the\nreleased soul therefore expresses itself in the following form: 'I am\nBrahman, without any division.' Where the texts speak of the soul's\nbecoming equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the meaning\nis that the nature of the individual soul--which is a mere mode of\nBrahman--is equal to that of Brahman, i.e. that on putting off its body\nit becomes equal to Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul\n'attains all its desires together with Brahman' intimates that the soul,\ntogether with Brahman of which it is a mode, is conscious of the\nattributes of Brahman. The different texts are thus in no conflict. Nor,\non this view of the soul being non-divided from Brahman in so far as\nbeing its mode, is there any difficulty on account of what is said about\nthe soul under S\u00fb. IV, 4, 8; or on account of the doctrines conveyed in\nII, 1, 22; III, 4, 8.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-division,\non account of its being seen.'\n\n\n\n\n5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus Jaimini thinks; on account\nof suggestion and the rest.\n\nOwing to the fact that different texts give different accounts, the\nquestion now arises of what character that essential nature of the Self\nis in which it manifests itself on reaching Brahman. Is that nature\nconstituted by freedom from evil and sin and the rest (i.e. the\nattributes enumerated Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); or by mere intelligence\n(vij\u00f1\u00e2na); or by both, there being no opposition between intelligence\nand those other attributes?--The teacher Jaimini holds that the soul\nmanifests itself in its Brahman character, i.e. in a character\nconstituted by freedom from sin, and so on. These latter attributes are,\nin the text of the 'small lotus,' mentioned as belonging to Brahman (Ch.\nUp. VIII, 1, 5), and may hence be referred to as the 'Brahman' character.\nAnd that this Brahman character is the character of the released soul\nalso follows from 'suggestion and the rest.' For freedom from all evil\nand the rest are, in the teaching of Praj\u00e2pati, referred to as\nattributes of the soul (VIII, 7, 1). The 'and the rest' of the S\u00fbtra\nrefers to the activities of the released soul--laughing, playing,\nrejoicing, and so on (mentioned in VIII, 12, 3)--which depend on the\npower belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas and\nwishes. It is for these reasons that Jaimini holds that mere\nintelligence does not constitute the true nature of the released soul.\n\n\n\n\n6. In the sole nature of intelligence; as that is its Self. Thus\nAudulomi thinks.\n\nIntelligence (consciousness; kaitanya) alone is the true nature of the\nsoul, and hence it is in that character only that the released soul\nmanifests itself; this is the view of the teacher Audulomi. That\nintelligence only constitutes the true being of the soul, we learn from\nthe express statement 'As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside,\nbut is altogether a mass of taste; so this Self has neither inside nor\noutside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13).\nWhen, therefore, the text attributes to the soul freedom from evil and\nthe rest, it does not mean to predicate of it further positive qualities,\nbut only to exclude all the qualities depending on avidy\u00e2--change,\npleasure, pain, and so on--For these reasons Audulomi holds that the\nreleased soul manifests itself as mere intelligence.--Next the teacher\nB\u00e2dar\u00e2yana determines the question by propounding his own view.\n\n\n\n\n7. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as\nproved) by suggestion, B\u00e2darayana holds absence of contradiction.\n\nThe teacher B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana is of opinion that even thus, i.e. although the\ntext declares the soul to have mere intelligence for its essential\nnature, all the same the previously stated attributes, viz. freedom from\nall sin, and so on, are not to be excluded. For the authority of a\ndefinite statement in the Upanishads proves them to exist ('That Self\nwhich is free from sin,' &c.); and of authorities of equal strength one\ncannot refute the other. Nor must you say that the case is one of\nessential contradiction, and that hence we necessarily must conclude\nthat freedom from sin, and so on (do not belong to the true nature of\nthe soul, but) are the mere figments of Nescience (from which the\nreleased soul is free). For as there is equal authority for both sides,\nwhy should the contrary view not be held? (viz. that the soul is\nessentially free from sin, &c., and that the kaitanya is non-essential.)\nFor the principle is that where two statements rest on equal authority,\nthat only which suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be\ninterpreted in a different way (i.e. different from what it means on the\nface of it), so as not to conflict with the other. But while admitting\nthis we deny that the text which describes the Self as a mass of mere\nknowledge implies that the nature of the Self comprises nothing whatever\nbut knowledge.--But what then is the purport of that text?--The meaning\nis clear, we reply; the text teaches that the entire Self, different\nfrom all that is non-sentient, is self-illumined, i.e. not even a small\npart of it depends for its illumination on something else. The fact,\nvouched for in this text, of the soul in its entirety being a mere mass\nof knowledge in no way conflicts with the fact, vouched for by other\ntexts, of its possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on,\nwhich inhere in it as the subject of those qualities; not any more than\nthe fact of the lump of salt being taste through and through--which fact\nis known through the sense of taste--conflicts with the fact of its\npossessing such other qualities as colour, hardness, and so on, which\nare known through the eye and the other sense-organs. The meaning of the\nentire text is as follows--just as the lump of salt has throughout one\nand the same taste, while other sapid things such as mangoes and other\nfruit have different tastes in their different parts, rind and so on; so\nthe soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self-illuminedness.--\nHere terminates the adhikarana of 'that which is like Brahman.'\n\n\n\n\n8. By the mere will; Scripture stating that.\n\nConcerning the released soul Scripture states, 'He moves about there,\nlaughing, playing, rejoicing, be it with women, or chariots, or\nrelatives' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). The doubt here arises whether the\nsoul's meeting with relatives and the rest presupposes an effort on its\npart or follows on its mere will--as things spring from the mere will of\nthe highest Person.--An effort is required; for we observe in ordinary\nlife that even such persons as kings and the like who are capable of\nrealising all their wishes do not accomplish the effects desired without\nsome effort.--Against this view the S\u00fbtra says 'by the mere will.' For,\nin a previous passage, Scripture expressly says, 'He who desires the\nworld of the Fathers, by his mere will the Fathers rise to receive him,'\n&c. (VIII, 2, 1). And there is no other text declaring the need of effort\nwhich would oblige us to define and limit the meaning of the text last\nquoted.\n\n\n\n\n9. And for this very reason without another ruler.\n\nSince the released soul realises all its wishes, it does not stand under\nanother ruler. For to be under a ruler means to be subject to injunction\nand prohibition, and to be such is opposed to being free in the\nrealisation of all one's wishes. Hence Scripture says, 'he is a Self-\nruler' (Ch. Up. VII, 25).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes.'\n\n\n\n\n10. The absence, B\u00e2dari holds; for thus Scripture says.\n\nA doubt arises whether the Released has a body and sense-organs, or not;\nor whether he has them or not just as he pleases. The teacher B\u00e2dari\nholds that body and sense-organs are absent; since the text declares\nthis. The text--'as long as he is embodied there is no freedom from\npleasure and pain; but when he is free from the body then neither\npleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1)--declares that\npleasure and pain are necessarily connected with embodiedness; and the\ntext--'having risen from this body and reached the highest light he\nmanifests himself in his own shape' (VIII, 12, 3)--declares that the\nReleased one is without a body.\n\n\n\n\n11. The presence, Jaimini holds; because the text declares manifoldness.\n\nThe teacher Jaimini holds that the Released one has a body and senses;\nbecause the text declares manifoldness--'He is onefold, he is threefold,\nhe is fivefold, he is sevenfold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). The Self which is\none and indivisible cannot be manifold, and the various forms of\nmanifoldness of which the text speaks therefore must depend on the body.\nThe text which speaks of the absence of a body refers to the absence of\nthat body only which is due to Karman; for this latter body only is the\ncause of pleasure and pain. Next the Reverend B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana decides this\npoint by the declaration of his own view.\n\n\n\n\n12. For this reason B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana (holds him to be) of both kinds; as in\nthe case of the twelve days' sacrifice.\n\n'For this reason,' i.e. for the reason that the text refers to the wish\nof the Released, the Reverend B\u00e2dar\u00e2yana is of opinion that the Released\nmay, at his liking, be with or without a body. This satisfies both kinds\nof texts. The case is analogous to that of the twelve days' sacrifice\nwhich, on the basis of twofold texts--'Those desirous of prosperity are\nto celebrate the dv\u00e2das\u00e2ha,' and 'The priest is to offer the dv\u00e2das\u00e2ha\nfor him who desires offspring'--belongs, according to difference of wish,\neither to the sattra or the ah\u00eena class of sacrifices.--The next S\u00fbtra\ndeclares that the body and the sense-organs of the Released are not\nnecessarily created by the Released himself.\n\n\n\n\n13. In the absence of a body, as in the state of dream; that being\npossible.\n\nAs in the absence of a body and other instruments of enjoyment created\nby himself, the Released may undergo experiences of pleasure by means of\ninstruments created by the highest Person, the Released, although\ncapable of realising all his wishes, may not himself be creative. As in\nthe state of dream the individual soul has experiences depending on\nchariots and other implements created by the Lord ('He creates chariots,\nhorses,' &c., Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10); thus the released soul also may have\nexperience of different worlds created by the Lord engaged in playful\nsport.\n\n\n\n\n14. When there is a body, as in the waking state.\n\nWhen, on the other hand, the released soul possesses a body created by\nits own will, then it enjoys its various delights in the same way as a\nwaking man does.--In the same way as the highest Person creates out of\nhimself, for his own delight, the world of the Fathers and so on; so he\nsometimes creates such worlds for the enjoyment of the released souls.\nBut sometimes, again, the souls using their own creative will-power\nthemselves create their own worlds, which however are included within\nthe sphere of sport of the highest Person (so that the souls in enjoying\nthem do not pass beyond the intuition of Brahman).\n\nBut it has been taught that the soul is of atomic size; how then can it\nconnect itself with many bodies?--To this question the next S\u00fbtra\nreplies.\n\n\n\n\n15. The entering is as in the case of a lamp; for thus Scripture\ndeclares.\n\nJust as a lamp, although abiding in one place only, enters through the\nlight proceeding from it into connexion with many places; so the soul\nalso, although limited to one place, may through its light-like\nconsciousness enter into several bodies. It may do this as well as in\nthis life the soul, although abiding in one spot of the body only, viz.\nthe heart, pervades the whole body by means of its consciousness and\nthus makes it its own. There is however the following difference between\nthe two cases. The non-released soul has its intellectual power\ncontracted by the influence of Karman, and hence is incapable of that\nexpansive pervasion without which it cannot identify itself with other\nbodies. The released soul, on the other hand, whose intellectual power\nis non-contracted is capable of extending as far as it likes, and thus\nto make many bodies its own. For Scripture declares, 'That living soul\nis to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair\ndivided a hundred times, and yet it is capable of infinity' (Svet. Up. V,\n9). The non-released soul is ruled by Karman, the released one only by\nits will--this is the difference.--But, a new difficulty is raised,\nScripture declares that when the soul reaches Brahman all its inner and\nouter knowledge is stopped: 'Embraced by the highest Self the soul knows\nnothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21).\nHow then can it be said to know all things?--To this the next S\u00fbtra\nreplies.\n\n\n\n\n16. It refers either to dreamless sleep or to union (sampatti); for this\nis manifested.\n\nTexts as the one last quoted do not refer to the released soul, but\neither to deep sleep or to 'union' (sampatti), i.e. the time of dying;\nthe latter in accordance with the text 'then his speech is united\n(sampadyate) with his mind,--heat with the highest divinity' (Ch. Up. VI,\n15, 1). In both those states the soul attains to the highest Self and is\nunconscious. That in the states of deep sleep and dying the soul is\nunconscious and that the released soul is all-knowing, Scripture reveals.\nThe text 'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does\nhe know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no\ngood in this' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11, 1) declares that the soul is\nunconscious in the state of deep sleep; and a subsequent text in the\nsame section declares the released soul to be all-knowing, 'He seeing\nthese pleasures with the divine eye, i.e. the mind, rejoices' (VIII, 12,\n5). The same is clearly stated in the text,'He who sees this sees\neverything, and obtains everything everywhere' (VII, 2, 6, 2). That at\ndeath there is unconsciousness appears from the text, 'having risen from\nthese elements he vanishes again in them. When he has departed there is\nno more knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). From all this it follows that\nthe text as to the soul being held in embrace by the pr\u00e2j\u00f1a Self refers\neither to deep sleep or death.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-\nbeing.'\n\n\n\n\n17. With the exception of world-energy; on account of leading subject-\nmatter and of non-proximity.\n\nThe doubt here presents itself whether the power of the released soul is\na universal power such as belongs to the Supreme Person, extending to\nthe creation, sustentation, and so on, of the worlds; or is limited to\nthe intuition of the Supreme Person.--The P\u00fbrvapakshin maintains the\nformer view. For he says Scripture declares that the soul reaches\nequality with the Supreme Person: 'Free from stain he reaches the\nhighest equality' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and moreover Scripture ascribes\nto the released soul the power of realising all its thoughts. And these\ntwo conditions are not fulfilled unless the soul possess the special\npowers of the Lord with regard to the government, &c., of the world.--To\nthis the S\u00fbtra replies, 'with the exception of world-energy.' The\nreleased soul, freed from all that hides its true nature, possesses the\npower of intuitively beholding the pure Brahman, but does not possess\nthe power of ruling and guiding the different forms of motion and rest\nbelonging to animate and inanimate nature.--How is this known?--'From\nsubject-matter.' For it is with special reference to the highest Brahman\nonly that the text mentions ruling and controlling power over the entire\nworld. 'That from whence these beings are born, that through which they\nlive when born, that into which they enter at death, endeavour to know\nthat; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). If such universal ruling\nand controlling power belonged to the released soul as well, it would\nnot be used--as the text actually uses it--for defining Brahman; for all\ndefinition rests on special individual attributes. Analogously many\nother texts speak of universal ruling and controlling power with\nexclusive reference to the Supreme Person--'Being only this was in the\nbeginning, &c.--it thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2); 'In the\nbeginning this was Brahman, one only--it created the most excellent\nKshattra,' &c. (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11); 'In the beginning all this was Self,\none only--it thought, let me send forth these worlds' (Ait. \u00c2r. II, 4, 1,\n1); 'There was Narayana alone, not Brahm\u00e2, and so on.' 'He who dwelling\nwithin the earth,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).--This also follows 'from\nnon-proximity'; for in all those places which speak of world-controlling\npower the context in no way suggests the idea of the released soul, and\nhence there is no reason to ascribe such power to the latter.\n\n\n\n\n18. If it be said that this is not so, on account of direct teaching; we\nreply not so, on account of the texts declaring that which abides within\nthe spheres of those entrusted with special functions.\n\nBut, an objection is raised, certain texts directly declare that the\nreleased soul also possesses 'world-energy.' Compare 'He becomes a self-\nruler; he moves in all worlds according to his wishes' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,\n2); 'He moves through these worlds, enjoying any food he wishes, and\nassuming any shape he wishes' (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5). We cannot\ntherefore accept the restriction laid down in the last S\u00fbtra.--Not so,\nthe latter half of the present S\u00fbtra declares, 'on account of the texts\ndeclaring that which abides in the spheres of those entrusted with\nspecial functions.' The meaning of the texts quoted is that the released\nsoul participates in the enjoyments connected with the spheres of\nHiranyagarbha and other beings which are entrusted with special\nfunctions. The soul whose knowledge is no longer obstructed by Karman\nfreely enjoys all the different worlds in which the power of Brahman\nmanifests itself and thus is fully satisfied.--But if the released soul,\nno less than the soul implicated in the Sams\u00e2ra, experiences enjoyments\nbelonging to the sphere of change, it follows that the sum of its\nenjoyments is finite and limited, and that hence the released soul is no\nbetter off than the soul in the state of bondage!--Of this doubt the\nnext S\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n19. That which is not within change; for thus Scripture declares the\nabiding (of the soul).\n\nThat which is not within change, i.e. the highest Brahman which is free\nfrom all change and of an absolutely perfect and blessed nature--this,\ntogether with the manifestations of its glory, is what forms the object\nof consciousness for the released soul. The worlds which are subject to\nchange thus form objects for that soul's experience, in so far as they\nform part of Brahman's manifestation. For Scripture declares that the\nreleased soul thus abides within, i.e. is conscious of the changeless\nhighest Brahman, 'when he finds freedom from fear and an abode in that\nwhich is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he obtains\nthe fearless' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). And that the world is contained within\nBrahman as its manifestation is declared in the text, 'In that all the\nworlds abide, and no one goes beyond' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8). The meaning of\nthe text stating that the Released freely move in all worlds, and\nsimilar texts, therefore is only that the released soul while conscious\nof Brahman with its manifestations experiences also the enjoyments,\nlying within the sphere of change, which abide in the world of\nHiranyagarbha and similar beings; not that it possesses the world-\nenergies--creative, ruling, and so on--which are the distinctive\nattribute of the highest Lord.\n\n\n\n\n20. And thus Perception and Inference show.\n\nThat the energies connected with the rule of the entire world are\nexclusive attributes of the highest Person, Scripture and Smriti alike\ndeclare. Compare scriptural texts such as 'From fear of him the wind\nblows,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable\none sun and moon stand, held apart' (Bri. Up. III, 9); 'He is the lord\nof all, the king of all beings, the protector of all beings' (Bri. Up.\nIV, 4, 22). And Smriti texts such as 'With me as Supervisor, Prakriti\nbrings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this\nreason the world ever moves round'; 'Pervading this entire Universe by a\nportion of mine I do abide' (Bha. G\u00ee. IX, 10; X, 42). Scripture and\nSmriti likewise declare that of the bliss which is enjoyed by the\nreleased soul the highest Person alone is the cause--'For he alone\ncauses blessedness' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'He who serves me with\nunswerving devotion, surpasses these qualities and is fitted for\nbecoming one with Brahman. For I am the abode of Brahman, of infinite\nimmortality, of everlasting virtue, and of absolute bliss' (Bha. G\u00ee. XIV,\n26-27). The exalted qualities of the soul--freedom from evil and sin and\nso on--which manifest themselves in the state of Release no doubt belong\nto the soul's essential nature; but that the soul is of such a nature\nfundamentally depends on the Supreme Person, and on him also depends the\npermanency of those qualities; they are permanent in so far as the Lord\nhimself on whom they depend is permanent. It is in the same way that all\nthe things which constitute the means of enjoyment and sport on the part\nof the Lord are permanent in so far as the Lord himself is permanent. It\nthus appears that the equality to the Lord which the released soul may\nclaim does not extend to the world-ruling energies.\n\n\n\n\n21. And on account of the indication of the equality of enjoyment only.\n\nThe previous conclusion is confirmed by the further fact that the text\ndirectly teaches the released soul to be equal to Brahman in so far only\nas enjoying direct insight into the true nature of Brahman. 'He reaches\nall objects of desire, together with the all-knowing Brahman' (Taitt. Up.\nII, 1, 1).--The conclusion thus is that we have to shape our ideas as to\nthe powers of the released soul in accordance with what the texts say as\nto the Lord only possessing the power of ruling and controlling the\nentire world, and that hence the latter power cannot be attributed to\nthe soul.--But if the powers of the released soul altogether depend on\nthe Lord, it may happen that He, being independent in all his doings,\nmay will the released soul to return into the Sawsara.--Of this doubt\nthe next S\u00fbtra disposes.\n\n\n\n\n22. Non-return, according to Scripture; non-return, according to\nScripture.\n\nWe know from Scripture that there is a Supreme Person whose nature is\nabsolute bliss and goodness; who is fundamentally antagonistic to all\nevil; who is the cause of the origination, sustentation, and dissolution\nof the world; who differs in nature from all other beings, who is all-\nknowing, who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his purposes;\nwho is an ocean of kindness as it were for all who depend on him; who is\nall-merciful; who is immeasurably raised above all possibility of any\none being equal or superior to him; whose name is the _highest Brahman_.\nAnd with equal certainty we know from Scripture that this Supreme Lord,\nwhen pleased by the faithful worship of his Devotees--which worship\nconsists in daily repeated meditation on Him, assisted by the\nperformance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and \u00e2srama--\nfrees them from the influence of Nescience which consists of karman\naccumulated in the infinite progress of time and hence hard to overcome;\nallows them to attain to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct\nintuition of His own true nature: and after that does not turn them back\ninto the miseries of Sams\u00e2ra. The text distinctly teaching this is 'He\nwho behaves thus all his life through reaches the world of Brahman and\ndoes not return' (Ch. Up. VIII, 15). And the Lord himself declares\n'Having obtained me great-souled men do not come into rebirth, the\nfleeting abode of misery; for they have reached the highest perfection.\nUp to the world of Brahma the worlds return again, O Arjuna; but having\nattained to me, O son of Kunti, there is no rebirth' (Bha. Gi. VIII, 1,\n5-16). As, moreover, the released soul has freed itself from the bondage\nof karman, has its powers of knowledge fully developed, and has all its\nbeing in the supremely blissful intuition of the highest Brahman, it\nevidently cannot desire anything else nor enter on any other form of\nactivity, and the idea of its returning into the Sams\u00e2ra therefore is\naltogether excluded. Nor indeed need we fear that the Supreme Lord when\nonce having taken to himself the Devotee whom he greatly loves will turn\nhim back into the Sams\u00e2ra. For He himself has said, 'To the wise man I\nam very dear, and dear he is to me. Noble indeed are all these, but the\nwise man I regard as my very Self. For he, with soul devoted, seeks me\nonly as his highest goal. At the end of many births the wise man goes to\nme, thinking all is V\u00e2sudeva. Such great-souled men are rarely met with'\n(Bha. G\u00ee. VII, 17-19).--The repetition of the words of the S\u00fbtra\nindicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine. Thus everything is\nsettled to satisfaction.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'with the\nexception of the world-energies.'\n\nHere terminates the fourth p\u00e2da of the fourth adhy\u00e2ya of the commentary\non the S\u00e2r\u00eeraka M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2, composed by the reverend teacher R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja. This\ncompletes the fourth adhy\u00e2ya, and the whole work; and the entire body of\ndoctrine is thus brought to a conclusion.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS\n\namsa, part,\n\nakshara, the Imperishable,\n\nakhy\u00e2ti, the view that the attribute of one thing appears as that of\nanother,\n\nAgnirahasya, chapter in the V\u00e2jasaneyaka (Sat. Bra. X),\n\nAgnividy\u00e2, knowledge of the Fires (i.e. Ch. Up. IV, 11-13),\n\nagnihotra,\n\nagh\u00e2tikarman,\n\nanga, subordinate matter,\n\nangin, principal matter,\n\najada, intelligent,\n\najadatva, intelligence,\n\naj\u00e2,'the unborn' principle, goat,\n\naj\u00f1\u00e2na, non-knowledge, Nescience,\n\najiva, non-soul,\n\nanu, of atomic size,\n\natigraha,\n\nativ\u00e2din, one who makes a final supreme declaration,\n\nAditi, the individual soul,\n\nadrishta, supersensuous, transcendental, the unseen principle\n\nadvit\u00eeya, without a second,\n\nadvaita-v\u00e2din,\n\nadvaitin, he who holds the view of non-duality,\n\nadharma, demerit,\n\nadhikarana, chapter, passim.\n\nadhipati, sense-organ,\n\nadhyayana, learning,\n\nadhyavas\u00e2ya, the deciding,\n\nadhy\u00e2sa, superimposition,\n\nanavas\u00e2da, freedom from dejection,\n\nan\u00e2tmatva, absence of selfhood,\n\nan\u00e2rabdhak\u00e2rya, (works) the effects of which have not yet begun,\n\naniruddha, principle of egoity,\n\nanirvakaniyat\u00e2, inexplicability,\n\nanirvakaniyatv\u00e2,\n\nanirvakaniyat\u00e2-vadin,\n\nan\u00ees\u00e2,\n\nanuk\u00fbla, agreeable,\n\nanuddharsha, absence of exultation,\n\nanupalabdhi, non-perception,\n\nanubh\u00fbti, consciousness,\n\nanumati, favour, permission,\n\nanum\u00e2na, inference,\n\nanuv\u00e2da, reference to what is established by other means, explanatory\ncomment,\n\nanusaya, remainder,\n\nanusmriti, recognition,\n\nanrita, untrue,\n\nantahkarana, internal organ,\n\nantaram, difference, interval, break,\n\nantariksha, ether, atmosphere,\n\nantary\u00e2min, the inner Ruler,\n\nantaryami-br\u00e2hmana,\n\nanna, food,\n\nanvaya, connexion, presence,\n\napara, secondary, lowest,\n\naparokshatva, being that which does not transcend the senses,\n\nap\u00e2na,\n\napurush\u00e2rtha, non-advantageous,\n\nap\u00fbrva, unprecedented, new, the supersensuous result of an action which\nlater on produces the sensible result,\n\napratisahkhy\u00e2,\n\nabh\u00e2va, absence of something, non-existence,\n\nabhim\u00e2na, misconception,\n\nabhivim\u00e2na,\n\nabheda, non-distinction,\n\nam\u00fbrta, undefined,\n\namrita,\n\namauna, non-mauna (see mauna),\n\narthav\u00e2da, an additional statement,\n\narth\u00e2patti,\n\navagati, consciousness,\n\navat\u00e2ra, incarnation,\n\navidy\u00e2, Nescience,\n\naviv\u00e2kya, (day of Soma sacrifice),\n\navyakta, the Unevolved,\n\navy\u00e2kritam, unevolved matter,\n\nasvatva, generic character of horses,\n\nasatk\u00e2rya,\n\nasatk\u00e2ryav\u00e2da, the theory that the effect does not exist before its\norigination,\n\nasatkhy\u00e2ti, the view that the non-existing appears as existing,\n\nasatya, untrue,\n\nastik\u00e2ya, existing body,\n\nahamkartri, organ of Egoity,\n\nahamk\u00e2ra, the 'I,' egoity,\n\naham, 'I,' a secret name of Brahman,\n\nahar, a secret name of Brahman,\n\nah\u00eena, class of sacrifices,\n\n\u00e2k\u00e2nksh\u00e2, expectancy,\n\n\u00e2k\u00e2sa, ether,\n\n\u00e2k\u00e2ra, conduct,\n\n\u00e2tmakhy\u00e2ti, the view that the Self appears as a thing,\n\natman, Self,\n\n\u00e2tmabh\u00e2va, own being,\n\n\u00c2ditya, Sun,\n\n\u00e2desa, instruction,\n\n\u00e2nanda, bliss,\n\n\u00e2nandamaya, consisting of bliss,\n\n\u00e2num\u00e2na, object of inference,\n\n\u00e2num\u00e2nika, to be inferred,\n\n\u00e2bh\u00e2sa, appearance,\n\n\u00e2rambhana that which is taken or touched,\n\n\u00e2rambhana-adhikarana,\n\n\u00c2rhata, a Jaina,\n\n\u00e2lambhana,\n\n\u00e2srama, stage of life,\n\n\u00e2srava, influx,\n\nitikartavyat\u00e2, mode of procedure,\n\nindriya, sense-organ,\n\n\u00eeksh, to think,\n\n\u00eesvara, the Lord,\n\nutpatti, being originated,\n\nud\u00e2na,\n\nudg\u00e2tri,\n\nudg\u00eetha,\n\nudg\u00eetha-vidy\u00e2,\n\nunmana, measure,\n\nupakurv\u00e2na, a Brahmak\u00e2rin who has completed his course of study and\nbecomes a householder,\n\nUpakosala-vidy\u00e2,\n\nupalakshana, secondary mark,\n\nupasad, certain offerings,\n\nup\u00e2d\u00e2na, material cause,\n\nup\u00e2dhi, limiting adjunct,\n\nup\u00e2s, to meditate,\n\nup\u00e2sana, meditation,\n\nup\u00e2sana, meditation,\n\n\u00fbha, a kind of cognitional activity,\n\nrita,\n\nekav\u00e2kyatva, syntactical unity,\n\naisvarya, lordly power, superior existence,\n\nom, omk\u00e2ra, the syllable Om, aup\u00e2dhika, limiting adjuncts,\n\nkarana, instrument, activity, action, the instrumental case,\n\nkarmak\u00e2nda,\n\nkarman, action, works, good and evil deeds,\n\nkarma-bh\u00e2van\u00e2,\n\nkarma-m\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2,\n\nkalpa, world period,\n\nkalpaka, the shaping agent,\n\nkalpana, formation, i.e.creation,\n\nkaly\u00e2na, virtuous conduct,\n\nk\u00e2p\u00e2la, skull,\n\nk\u00e2ma, desired thing,\n\nk\u00e2rya, thing to be done,\n\nk\u00e2la, time,\n\nKundap\u00e2yin\u00e2m ayanam,\n\nkriti, action,\n\nkaivalya, isolation,\n\nkriy\u00e2, action, works,\n\nkshetraj\u00f1a, embodied soul,\n\nkhanda, a piece,\n\nkhy\u00e2ti,\n\ngati, the going,\n\nguna, quality, attribute, secondary matter, details,\n\ngodohana, a sacrificial vessel,\n\ngraha,\n\nghan\u00ee-bh\u00fbta, concreted,\n\ngh\u00e2tikarman,\n\nkfaturmukha, four-faced,\n\nkamasa, cup,\n\nkarana, conduct, works,\n\nkitta, mind,\n\nkid-r\u00fbpa, essentially intelligent,\n\nkinta, thinking,\n\nkaitanya, intelligence,\n\nkaitta, mental,\n\ngada, non-intelligent,\n\ng\u00e2ti, generic character,\n\ngiva, individual soul,\n\ng\u00eeva \u00e2tm\u00e2, living Self,\n\ngivaghana,\n\ngivanmukta, released in this life,\n\ng\u00eevanmukti, release in this life,\n\ng\u00f1a., knower,\n\ng\u00f1\u00e2tri, knower,\n\ng\u00f1\u00e2na., knowledge, consciousness, pl. forms of knowledge,\n\ntajjalan,\n\ntatkratuh, according to what his thought is,\n\ntattva of the S\u00e2nkhyas,\n\ntat tvam asi,\n\ntanu, body,\n\ntan-maya, consisting of that,\n\ntanm\u00e2tra, the subtle matter,\n\ntapas, austerity,\n\ntamas, darkness,\n\ntarka, ratiocination,\n\ntukch, futile,\n\ntejas, fire or heat,\n\ntaijasa, active,\n\ntyat, that,\n\ndama,\n\ndahara-vidy\u00e2,\n\ndahar\u00e2k\u00e2sa, small ether,\n\nd\u00eeksh\u00e2, initiatory ceremony,\n\ndevam\u00e2y\u00e2,\n\ndesa, place,\n\ndosha, imperfection, a\u00bb.\n\ndravya, substance,\n\ndv\u00e2das\u00e2ha, the twelve days' sacrifice,\n\ndvipar\u00e2rdha,\n\ndv\u00eepa, island,\n\ndvaita, duality,\n\ndvaitav\u00e2din, (the Vaiseshika) who holds the view of duality,\n\ndharma, attribute,\n\ndhy\u00e2na, devout meditation,\n\ndhyana-vidhi,\n\ndhyai, to meditate or to know,\n\nn\u00e2d\u00ee, vein,\n\nn\u00e2da, tone,\n\nn\u00e2madheya, name,\n\nnitya, permanent,\n\nnity\u00e2nityavastuviveka,\n\nnididhy\u00e2sana, meditation,\n\nnididhy\u00e2sitavya, to be meditated upon,\n\nnimitta, cause,\n\nniyoga, i.e. ap\u00fbrva, supersensuous result of an action which later on\nproducts the sensible result,\n\nniranvaya, absolute,\n\nnirup\u00e2khya, non-entity,\n\nnirjara, decay,\n\nnirvikalpaka, non-determinate,\n\nNish\u00e2da-sthapati,\n\nniv\u00e2ra, wild rice,\n\nnaimittika, contingent,\n\nnaishhthika, a perpetual religious student observing the vow of\nchastity,\n\npa\u00f1kaganah, 'five-people,'\n\npa\u00f1k\u00e2gni-vidy\u00e2,\n\npada, word,\n\npad\u00e2rtha, a thing,\n\npara, highest,\n\nparam\u00e2tman, higher Self,\n\nparamesara, highest Lord,\n\nparinama, modification,\n\npary\u00e2ya, particular states of substances\n\np\u00e2\u00f1ditya, learning,\n\np\u00e2riplava, a performance of the Asvamedha sacrifice,\n\np\u00e2rivrajaka, an ascetic,\n\np\u00e2rivr\u00e2jya, the wandering about as a mendicant,\n\nputika, a plant,\n\npudgala, body,\n\npurusha soul,\n\npurushavakas, to he designated by the term 'man,'\n\npurusha-vidy\u00e2,\n\npurushottama, the highest Person,\n\np\u00fbrvapaksha, prim\u00e2 facie view,\n\np\u00fbrvapakshin, he who holds the prim\u00e2 facie view, passim.\n\nprakarana, leading subject-matter,\n\nprak\u00e2ra, mode,\n\nprak\u00e2s, to shine forth,\n\nprak\u00e2sa, light,\n\nprakriti, primeval matter, originating principle, nature,\n\nprakriy\u00e2, subject-matter,\n\npraj\u00f1amatrah, subjects,\n\npranava, the syllable Om,\n\nPratardana-vidy\u00e2 (i.e. Kau. Up III),\n\npratik\u00fbla, disagreeable,\n\nprat\u00eej\u00f1\u00e2, initial statement,\n\npratlbuddha atma, the Self of intelligence,\n\npratisankhya,\n\nprat\u00eeka, symbol,\n\npratyaksha, perception, presentative thought,\n\npratyakshat\u00e2, immediate presentation,\n\npratyag-\u00e2tman, the individual soul,\n\npratyaa, consciousness,\n\npraty\u00e2h\u00e2ra, complete restraining of the senses from receiving external\nimpressions,\n\nprathiman, solid extension,\n\npradesa, space,\n\npradyumna, the internal organ,\n\npradh\u00e2na, principal matter, non-sentient principle,\n\npradh\u00e2na, a superior,\n\nprabh\u00e2, light,\n\nprayojana, final cause,\n\npralaya, destruction of the world,\n\npr\u00e2g\u00f1a, knowing, conscious, intelligent, the personal Self, the highest\nSelf,\n\npr\u00e2na, breath, breathing out; soul; Breath, a name of Brahman,\n\npr\u00e2na, pl. organs and vital breath,\n\npr\u00e2namaya, consisting of breath,\n\npr\u00e2n\u00e2gnihotra,\n\npr\u00e2desam\u00e2tra,\n\npr\u00e2pti, the being obtained,\n\npr\u00e2yaskitta, expiatory rite,\n\nprerakatva, prompting quality,\n\nphala, result,\n\nphalavidhi, injunction of results,\n\nb\u00e2dha, sublation,\n\nb\u00e2dhita, sublated,\n\nb\u00e2lya, childlike state,\n\nbuddhi, internal organ, intellect,\n\nbrimh, root from which 'Brahman' is derived,\n\nbrimhana, growth,\n\nbrihat, great,\n\nbrihattva, greatness,\n\nbrahmakarya, chastity,\n\nbrahmagign\u00e2s\u00e2, enquiry into Brahman,\n\nbrahmatva, Brahma-hood,\n\nbrahman,\n\nbrahma-bh\u00e2van\u00e2,\n\nbrahmavidy\u00e2, knowledge of Brahman,\n\nbrahmasamstha, founded on Brahman,\n\nbhakti, devotion, devout meditation,\n\nbhagavat, the Lord, then a holy person,\n\nbhag\u00e2sana,\n\nbh\u00e2kta, secondary or figurative,\n\nbh\u00e2va, entity,\n\nbhinna, separate,\n\nbhinnatva, difference,\n\nbh\u00fbta, beings,\n\nbh\u00fbta, element,\n\nbh\u00fbtam\u00e2tr\u00e2h, objects,\n\nbh\u00fbt\u00e2di, originator of the elements,\n\nbh\u00fbman,'muchness,' fulness of bliss,\n\nbh\u00fbma-vidy\u00e2 (Ch. Up. VII, 2),\n\nbheda, difference,\n\nbhed\u00e2bheda, view that there is difference and absence of difference at\nthe same time,\n\nbhautika, elemental,\n\nbhrama, erroneous cognition, error,\n\nbhr\u00e2nti, illusion,\n\nmadhu, 'honey,' the sun,\n\nmadhuividy\u00e2,\n\nmanana, reflection,\n\nmanas, internal organ, mind,\n\nmantavya, to be reflected on,\n\nmantra,\n\n-maya, consisting of, made of,\n\nMahat, the Great Principle (of the S\u00e2nkhya),\n\nmah\u00e2vrata-br\u00e2hmana,\n\nm\u00e2tr\u00e2, mora (metrical unit),\n\nm\u00e2nasa, mental (offering of a Soma cup),\n\nm\u00e2y\u00e2,\n\nm\u00e2yin, possessing m\u00e2y\u00e2,\n\nmithy\u00e2, false,\n\nmithy\u00e2tva, falsehood,\n\nmukta, released,\n\nmukhya pr\u00e2na, chief vital air,\n\nmudr\u00e2, a badge,\n\nmuni,\n\nm\u00fbrta, defined,\n\nmauna, Muni-hood, state of a Muni,\n\nyath\u00e2kratub, according as his thought is,\n\nyushmad-artha, the objective element,\n\nyoga, mystic concentration of mind,\n\nyogayug, practitioner of Yoga,\n\nyogasiddha, perfected by Yoga,\n\nyogyat\u00e2, compatibility,\n\nyoni, female organ of generation,\n\nrajas, passion,\n\nrahasya-br\u00e2hmana,\n\nr\u00e2ga, passion,\n\nrukaka = nishka,\n\nr\u00fbpa, form, character,\n\nlakshan\u00e2, implied meaning, implication,\n\nlinga, inferential mark,\n\nvastu, substance,\n\nv\u00e2kya, syntactical connexion,\n\nv\u00e2kyabheda, split of a sentence,\n\nv\u00e2yu, wind,\n\nv\u00e2asan\u00e2, a flow of ideas, states of consciousness,\n\nvik\u00e2ra, effected thing, effect,\n\nvikriti, being Modified,\n\nvij\u00f1\u00e2na, understanding, knowledge, idea,\n\nvij\u00f1\u00e2namaya, consisting of understanding, (the soul in deep sleep).\n\nvid, to know or to meditate,\n\nvidy\u00e2, form of meditation on Brahman,\n\nviniyoga, application,\n\nvipaskit, intelligent,\n\nvipaskittva, intelligence,\n\nvibhava, manifestation,\n\nvibh\u00fbti, manifestation of power,\n\nvimoka, freeness of mind,\n\nvivrit, to manifest itself,\n\nviveka, abstention,\n\nviseshana, determining attribute,\n\nvishaya, object,\n\nvirya, strength,\n\nvritta, conduct,\n\nvedana, knowledge,\n\nvedan\u00e2, sensation,\n\nveda-vrata,\n\nvaik\u00e2rika, modified,\n\nvaikh\u00e2nasa, hermit,\n\nvaisvar\u00fbpya, many-natured universe,\n\nvaisv\u00e2nara-vidy\u00e2\n\nvyavah\u00e2ra, speech,\n\nvyashti, discrete aspect (of the world),\n\nvy\u00e2na,\n\nvy\u00e2vah\u00e2rika, conventional,\n\nvy\u00e2vritti, individual difference,\n\nvy\u00fbha, division,\n\nsakti, power, potentiality,\n\nsabda, sound,\n\nsama,\n\nsarira, body,\n\ns\u00e2kh\u00e2,\n\nS\u00e2ndilya-vidy\u00e2,\n\ns\u00e2rira, joined to a body,\n\ns\u00e2riraka (doctrine) of the embodied (self),\n\ns\u00e2stra, science, scriptural injunction,\n\nsirovrata, vow of (carrying fire on the) head,\n\nsila, conduct,\n\nsubh\u00e2sraya, perfect object,\n\nsudra (etymology),\n\nsesha, supplementary,\n\nseshin, principal matter to be subserved by other things,\n\nsraddhi, faith, belief,\n\nsravana, hearing,\n\nsruti, scriptural statement, rg,\n\nsamyamana,\n\nsamyoga, conjunction,\n\nsamvara, a kind of deep meditation,\n\nsamvargavidy\u00e2\n\nsamvid, consciousness,\n\nsams\u00e2ra,\n\nsamsk\u00e2ra, impression,\n\nsamskriti, the being made ready,\n\nsamkarshana, the individual soul,\n\nsamrkhy\u00e2, number,\n\nsamj\u00f1\u00e2, consciousness,\n\nsat, Being,\n\nsatk\u00e2rya,\n\nsattra class of sacrifices,\n\nsattva, goodness,\n\nsatya, true,\n\nsatyak\u00e2ma, realising its desire,\n\nsatyak\u00e2matva, power of realising one's desire,\n\nsad-vidy\u00e2, meditation on that which truly is (Kb. Up. VI, i ff.),\n\nsanniclhi, proximity,\n\nsapta-bhangi-ny\u00e2ya, the system of the seven paralogisms,\n\nsamanantara,\n\nsamanvaya, connexion,\n\nsamav\u00e2ya, intimate relation, reciprocal inherence,\n\nsamav\u00e2yi-karana, intimate cause,\n\nsamashti, collective aspect (of the world),\n\nsamashti-purusha, the aggregate soul,\n\nsam\u00e2k\u00e2ra, a book of the \u00c2tharvanikas,\n\nsam\u00e2dhi, meditation,\n\nsam\u00e2na,\n\nsarnpatti, union,\n\nsampad, to be combined,\n\nsamp\u00e2ta, y\u00e2vat samp\u00e2tam,\n\nsampras\u00e2da, serenity,\n\nsambh\u00fbta,\n\nsayuktv\u00e2n,\n\nsarvaj\u00f1a, all-knowing,\n\nsavikalpaka, determinate,\n\nsahak\u00e2rin,\n\ns\u00e2ksh\u00e2t, manifest,\n\ns\u00e2ksh\u00e2tk\u00e2ra, immediate presentation,\n\ns\u00e2kshin, the witnessing principle,\n\ns\u00e2dhya, effected,\n\ns\u00e2m\u00e2n\u00e2dhikaranya, co-ordination,\n\ns\u00e2yugya, equality,\n\nsiddhi, proof, definite well-established knowledge,\n\nsukarita, good conduct,\n\nsushira, a hollow place,\n\ns\u00fbkshma, the Subtle,\n\nsetu, bank or bridge,\n\nsomar\u00e2jan,\n\nsparsa, touch,\n\nsmriti, representation,\n\nsvayamprak\u00e2sa, self-proved,\n\nsvayamprak\u00e2satva, self-luminousness,\n\nsvayamprak\u00e2sat\u00e2,\n\nsvarga, heaven,\n\nsvastika,\n\nsvaclhyaya, one's own text,\n\nsv\u00e2dhy\u00e2ya, essential, rgr.\n\nHara,\n\nhita, arteries so called,\n\nhetu, reason,","title":"The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja: Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":279330}