{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_7319/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_7319","id":"gutenberg_7319","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7319","summary":null,"tags":["Atheism","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality"],"text":"Produced by Freethought Archives\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD:\n\nOR\n\nFREETHOUGHTS OPPOSED TO SUPERNATURAL IDEAS\n\n\nBy Baron D'holbach\n\n\n\"Freethinker's Library\" Series\n\nLondon: W. Stewart & Co.\n\n\n\nA Translation Of Baron D'holbach's \"Le Bon Sens\"\n\n\nTranscriber's note: this e-text is based on an undated English translation\nof \"Le Bon Sens\" published c. 1900. The name of the translator was not\nstated.\n\n\n\n     \"_Atheism_ leaves men to Sense, to Philosophy, to Laws, to\n     Reputation, all which may be guides to moral Virtue, tho'\n     Religion were not: but Superstition dismounts all these, and\n     erects an absolute Monarchy in the Minds of Men.  Therefore,\n     Atheism did never perturb States; but Superstition hath been\n     the confusion of many.  The causes of Superstition are\n     pleasing and sensual rights, and Ceremonies; Excess of\n     Pharisaical and outside holiness, Reverence to Traditions\n     and the stratagems of Prelates for their own Ambition and\n     Lucre.\"--_Lord Bacon._\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n1. APOLOGUE\n\n2. What is Theology?\n\n3. What is Theology?\n\n4. Man is not born with any ideas of Religion\n\n5. It is not necessary to believe in a God\n\n6. Religion is founded on credulity\n\n7. All religion is an absurdity\n\n8. The idea of God is impossible\n\n9. On the Origin of Superstition\n\n10. On the Origin of all Religion\n\n11. Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters\n\n12. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous\n\n13. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous\n\n14. No Religion, if not ages of Stupidity and Barbarism\n\n15. All Religion was produced by the desire of domination\n\n16. What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain\n\n17. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God\n\n18. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God\n\n19. The existence of God is not proved\n\n20. It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit\n\n21. Spirituality is an absurdity\n\n22. Whatever exists is derived from Matter\n\n23. What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology?\n\n24. Less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than adore a spiritual Deity\n\n25. A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action\n\n26. What is God?\n\n27. Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology\n\n28. To adore God, is to adore a fiction\n\n29. Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God\n\n30. Believing not safer than not believing in God\n\n31. Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy\n\n32. Belief in God is a prejudice ov successive generations\n\n33. On the Origin of Prejudices\n\n34. On the effects of Prejudices\n\n35. Theology must be instilled before the age of reason\n\n36. The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God\n\n37. Nature may be explained by natural causes\n\n38. Nature may be explained by natural causes\n\n39. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself\n\n40. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself\n\n41. Motion is essential to Matter: no Spiritual Mover\n\n42. The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God\n\n43. Neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance\n\n44. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God\n\n45. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God\n\n46. Absurd to adore a divine intelligence\n\n47. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him\n\n48. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him\n\n49. Absurd to say that the human race is the object of the Universe\n\n50. God is not made for Man, nor Man for God\n\n51. Untrue that the object of the Universe was to render Man happy\n\n52. What is called Providence is a word without meaning\n\n53. This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man\n\n54. The world is not governed by an intelligent being\n\n55. God cannot be considered immutable\n\n56. Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes\n\n57. The consolations of Theology and paradise are imaginary\n\n58. Another romantic reverie\n\n59. Vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human defects\n\n60. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power\n\n61. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power\n\n62. Theology's God a monster of absurdity and injustice\n\n63. All Religion inspires contemptible fears\n\n64. Religion, the same as the most somber and servile Superstition\n\n65. The love of God is impossible\n\n66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being\n\n67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions\n\n68. The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections\n\n69. The perfection of God and the pretended creation of angels\n\n70. Theology preaches Omnipotence of its God, yet makes impotent\n\n71. Per all religious systems, God is capricious and foolish\n\n72. It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God\n\n73. The foreknowledge of God proves his cruelty\n\n74. Absurdity of the stories concerning Original Sin, and Satan\n\n75. The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests\n\n76. God has no right to punish man\n\n77. It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God a mystery\n\n78. Ought we look for consolation, from the author of our misery?\n\n79. God who punishes the faults which he might have prevented\n\n80. What is called Free Will is an absurdity\n\n81. But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish\n\n82. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will\n\n83. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will\n\n84. God, if there were a God, would not be free\n\n85. According to Theology, man is not free a single instant\n\n86. There is no evil, and no sin, but must be attributed to God\n\n87. The prayers prove dissatisfaction of the divine will\n\n88. Absurd to imagine repair of misfortune in another world\n\n89. Theology justifies the evil permitted by its God\n\n90. Jehovah, exterminations prove an unjust and barbarous God\n\n91. Is God a generous, equitable, and tender father?\n\n92. Man's life, deposes against goodness of a pretended God\n\n93. We owe no gratitude to what is called _Providence_\n\n94. It is folly to suppose that Man is the favourite of God\n\n95. A comparison between Man and brutes\n\n96. There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants\n\n97. A refutation of the excellence of Man\n\n98. An oriental Tale\n\n99. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God\n\n100. What is the Soul?\n\n101. The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition\n\n102. It is evident that Man dies _in toto_\n\n103. Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul\n\n104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes\n\n105. It is false that Materialism degrades\n\n106. It is false that Materialism degrades\n\n107. Idea of future life only useful to priest's trade\n\n108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling\n\n109. All religious principles are derived from the imagination\n\n110. Religion a system to reconciles contradictions by mysteries\n\n111. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests\n\n112, Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests\n\n113. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests\n\n114. An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion\n\n115. Religion is unnecessary, as it is unintelligible\n\n116. All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds\n\n117. Opinion of a famous Theologian\n\n118. The God of the Deists is not less contradictory\n\n119. Aged belief in a Deity does not prove the existence of God\n\n120. All Gods are savage: all Religions are monuments of ignorance\n\n121. All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism\n\n122. The more a religion is ancient and general, the more suspect\n\n123. Scepticism in religious matters from very superficial study\n\n124. Revelations examined\n\n125. Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself or spoke to Men\n\n126. There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed\n\n127. Strange that God spoke differently to different sects\n\n128. Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles\n\n129. Absurdity of all miracles\n\n130. Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal on miracles\n\n131. Every new revelation is necessarily false\n\n132. Blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles\n\n133. Fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries\n\n134. Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense\n\n135. Faith irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason preferable to Faith\n\n136. To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms the religious are reduced\n\n137. Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man\n\n138. Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds\n\n139. That one Religion has greater pretensions to truth an absurdity\n\n140. Religion is unnecessary to Morality\n\n141. Religion the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions\n\n142. Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion\n\n143. Religion does not restrain the passions of kings\n\n144. Origin of \"the divine right of kings\"\n\n145. Religion is fatal to political ameliorations\n\n146. Christianity preaching implicit obedience to despotism\n\n147. One object of religious principles: eternize the tyranny of kings\n\n148. Fatal it is to persuade kings they are responsible to God alone\n\n149. A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom\n\n150. Tyranny finds Religion a weak obstacle to the despair of the people\n\n151. Religion favours the wickedness of princes\n\n152. What is an enlightened Sovereign?\n\n153. Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood\n\n154. The quackery of priests\n\n155. Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils\n\n156. Every Religion is intolerant\n\n157. The evils of a state Religion\n\n158. Religion legitimates and authorizes crime\n\n159. The argument, that evils attributed to Religion are faults of men\n\n160. Religion is incompatible with Morality\n\n161. The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable\n\n162. A society of Saints would be impossible\n\n163. Human nature is not depraved\n\n164. Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission\n\n165. The remission of sins was invented for the interest of priests\n\n166. Who fear God?\n\n167. Hell is an absurd invention\n\n168. The bad foundation of religious morals\n\n169. Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!!\n\n170. Confession, priestcraft's gold mine\n\n171. Supposition of the existence of a God unnecessary to Morality\n\n172. Supernatural Morality are fatal to the public welfare\n\n173. The union of Church and State is a calamity\n\n174. National Religions are ruinous\n\n175. Religion paralyses Morality\n\n176. Fatal consequences of Devotion\n\n177. The idea of a future life is not consoling to man\n\n178. An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man\n\n179. An Atheistical king far preferable to a religious king\n\n180. Philosophy produces Morality\n\n181. Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct\n\n182. Reason leads man to Atheism\n\n183. Fear alone makes Theists\n\n184. Can we, and ought we, to love God?\n\n185. God and Religion are proved to be absurdities\n\n186. The existence of God, has not yet been demonstrated\n\n187. Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers\n\n188. Presumption, and badness, more in priests, than in Atheists\n\n189. Prejudices last but for a time\n\n190. What if priests the apostles of reason\n\n191. If Philosophy were substituted for Religion!\n\n192. Recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves nothing\n\n193. It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society\n\n194. Refutation of the opinion, that Religion necessary for the vulgar\n\n195. Logical systems are not adapted to the capacity of the vulgar\n\n196. On the futility and danger of Theology\n\n197. On the evils produced by implicit faith\n\n198. On the evils produced by implicit faith\n\n199. All Religions were established by impostors, in days of ignorance\n\n200. All Religions borrow from one another ridiculous ceremonies\n\n201. Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path\n\n202. Theology explains nothing\n\n203. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress\n\n204. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress\n\n205. Religion is an extravagance and a calamity\n\n206. Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes\n\n\n\n\nPUBLISHER'S NOTE\n\n\nThe chief design in reprinting this translation, is to preserve \"_the\nstrongest atheistical work_\" for present and future generations of English\nFreethinkers.\n\nThe real author was, unquestionably, Paul Thyry; Baron D'Holbach, and not\nJohn Meslier, to whom this work has been wrongly attributed, under the\ntitle of \"Le Bon Sens\" (Common Sense).\n\nIn 1770, Baron D'Holbach published his masterpiece, \"Systeme de la\nNature,\" which for a long time passed as the posthumous work of M. de\nMirabaud. That text-book of \"Atheistical Philosophy\" caused a great\nsensation, and two years later, 1772, the Baron published this excellent\nabridgment of it, freed from arbitrary ideas; and by its clearness of\nexpression, facility, and precision of style, rendered it most suitable\nfor the average student.\n\n\"Le Bon Sens\" was privately printed in Amsterdam, and the author's name\nwas kept a profound secret; hence, Baron D'Holbach escaped persecution.\n\n\n\n\nTHE AUTHOR'S PREFACE\n\n\nWhen we examine the opinions of men, we find that nothing is more\nuncommon, than common sense; or, in other words, they lack judgment\nto discover plain truths, or to reject absurdities, and palpable\ncontradictions. We have an example of this in Theology, a system revered\nin all countries by a great number of men; an object regarded by them\nas most important, and indispensable to happiness. An examination of\nthe principles upon which this pretended system is founded, forces us\nto acknowledge, that these principles are only suppositions, imagined\nby ignorance, propagated by enthusiasm or knavery, adopted by timid\ncredulity, preserved by custom which never reasons, and revered solely\nbecause not understood.\n\nIn a word, whoever uses common sense upon religious opinions, and will\nbestow on this inquiry the attention that is commonly given to most\nsubjects, will easily perceive that Religion is a mere castle in the\nair. Theology is ignorance of natural causes; a tissue of fallacies\nand contradictions. In every country, it presents romances void of\nprobability, the hero of which is composed of impossible qualities. His\nname, exciting fear in all minds, is only a vague word, to which, men\naffix ideas or qualities, which are either contradicted by facts, or\ninconsistent.\n\nNotions of this being, or rather, _the word_ by which he is designated,\nwould be a matter of indifference, if it did not cause innumerable ravages\nin the world. But men, prepossessed with the opinion that this phantom is\na reality of the greatest interest, instead of concluding wisely from its\nincomprehensibility, that they are not bound to regard it, infer on the\ncontrary, that they must contemplate it, without ceasing, and never lose\nsight of it. Their invincible ignorance, upon this subject, irritates\ntheir curiosity; instead of putting them upon guard against their\nimagination, this ignorance renders them decisive, dogmatic, imperious,\nand even exasperates them against all, who oppose doubts to the reveries\nwhich they have begotten.\n\nWhat perplexity arises, when it is required to solve an insolvable\nproblem; unceasing meditation upon an object, impossible to understand,\nbut in which however he thinks himself much concerned, cannot but excite\nman, and produce a fever in his brain. Let interest, vanity, and ambition,\nco-operate ever so little with this unfortunate turn of mind, and society\nmust necessarily be disturbed. This is the reason that so many nations\nhave often been the scene of extravagances of senseless visionaries, who,\nbelieving their empty speculations to be eternal truths, and publishing\nthem as such, have kindled the zeal of princes and their subjects, and\nmade them take up arms for opinions, represented to them as essential to\nthe glory of the Deity. In all parts of our globe, fanatics have cut each\nother's throats, publicly burnt each other, committed without a scruple\nand even as a duty, the greatest crimes, and shed torrents of blood. For\nwhat? To strengthen, support, or propagate the impertinent conjectures of\nsome enthusiasts, or to give validity to the cheats of impostors, in the\nname of a being, who exists only in their imagination, and who has made\nhimself known only by the ravages, disputes, and follies, he has caused.\n\nSavage and furious nations, perpetually at war, adore, under divers names,\nsome God, conformable to their ideas, that is to say, cruel, carnivorous,\nselfish, blood-thirsty. We find, in all the religions, \"a God of armies,\"\na \"jealous God,\" an \"avenging God,\" a \"destroying God,\" a \"God,\" who\nis pleased with carnage, and whom his worshippers consider it a duty to\nserve. Lambs, bulls, children, men, and women, are sacrificed to him.\nZealous servants of this barbarous God think themselves obliged even to\noffer up themselves as a sacrifice to him. Madmen may everywhere be seen,\nwho, after meditating upon their terrible God, imagine that to please him\nthey must inflict on themselves, the most exquisite torments. The gloomy\nideas formed of the deity, far from consoling them, have every where\ndisquieted their minds, and prejudiced follies destructive to happiness.\n\nHow could the human mind progress, while tormented with frightful\nphantoms, and guided by men, interested in perpetuating its ignorance and\nfears? Man has been forced to vegetate in his primitive stupidity: he has\nbeen taught stories about invisible powers upon whom his happiness was\nsupposed to depend. Occupied solely by his fears, and by unintelligible\nreveries, he has always been at the mercy of priests, who have reserved to\nthemselves the right of thinking for him, and of directing his actions.\n\nThus, man has remained a slave without courage, fearing to reason, and\nunable to extricate himself from the labyrinth, in which he has been\nwandering. He believes himself forced under the yoke of his gods, known\nto him only by the fabulous accounts given by his ministers, who, after\nbinding each unhappy mortal in the chains of prejudice, remain his\nmasters, or else abandon him defenceless to the absolute power of tyrants,\nno less terrible than the gods, of whom they are the representatives.\n\nOppressed by the double yoke of spiritual and temporal power, it has been\nimpossible for the people to be happy. Religion became sacred, and men\nhave had no other Morality, than what their legislators and priests\nbrought from the unknown regions of heaven. The human mind, confused\nby theological opinions, ceased to know its own powers, mistrusted\nexperience, feared truth and disdained reason, in order to follow\nauthority. Man has been a mere machine in the hands of tyrants and\npriests. Always treated as a slave, man has contracted the vices of\nslavery.\n\nSuch are the true causes of the corruption of morals. Ignorance and\nservitude are calculated to make men wicked and unhappy. Knowledge,\nReason, and Liberty, can alone reform and make men happier. But every\nthing conspires to blind them, and to confirm their errors. Priests cheat\nthem, tyrants corrupt and enslave them. Tyranny ever was, and ever will\nbe, the true cause of man's depravity, and also of his calamities. Almost\nalways fascinated by religious fiction, poor mortals turn not their eyes\nto the natural and obvious causes of their misery; but attribute their\nvices to the imperfection of their natures, and their unhappiness to the\nanger of the gods. They offer to heaven vows, sacrifices, and presents, to\nobtain the end of sufferings, which in reality, are attributable only to\nthe negligence, ignorance, and perversity of their guides, to the folly of\ntheir customs, and above all, to the general want of knowledge. Let men's\nminds be filled with true ideas; let their reason be cultivated; and there\nwill be no need of opposing to the passions, such a feeble barrier, as the\nfear of gods. Men will be good, when they are well instructed; and when\nthey are despised for evil, or justly rewarded for good, which they do to\ntheir fellow citizens.\n\nIn vain should we attempt to cure men of their vices, unless we begin by\ncuring them of their prejudices. It is only by showing them the truth,\nthat they will perceive their true interests, and the real motives that\nought to incline them to do good. Instructors have long enough fixed men's\neyes upon heaven; let them now turn them upon earth. An incomprehensible\ntheology, ridiculous fables, impenetrable mysteries, puerile ceremonies,\nare to be no longer endured. Let the human mind apply itself to what is\nnatural, to intelligible objects, truth, and useful knowledge.\n\nDoes it not suffice to annihilate religious prejudice, to shew, that\nwhat is inconceivable to man, cannot be good for him? Does it require any\nthing, but plain common sense, to perceive, that a being, incompatible\nwith the most evident notions--that a cause continually opposed to\nthe effects which we attribute to it--that a being, of whom we can say\nnothing, without falling into contradiction--that a being, who, far\nfrom explaining the enigmas of the universe, only makes them more\ninexplicable--that a being, whom for so many ages men have vainly\naddressed to obtain their happiness, and the end of sufferings--does it\nrequire, I say, any thing but plain, common sense, to perceive--that the\nidea of such a being is an idea without model, and that he himself is\nmerely a phantom of the imagination? Is any thing necessary but common\nsense to perceive, at least, that it is folly and madness for men to hate\nand damn one another about unintelligible opinions concerning a being of\nthis kind? In short, does not every thing prove, that Morality and Virtue\nare totally incompatible with the notions of a God, whom his ministers\nand interpreters have described, in every country, as the most capricious,\nunjust, and cruel of tyrants, whose pretended will, however, must serve as\nlaw and rule the inhabitants of the earth?\n\nTo discover the true principles of Morality, men have no need of theology,\nof revelation, or of gods: They have need only of common sense. They have\nonly to commune with themselves, to reflect upon their own nature, to\nconsider the objects of society, and of the individuals, who compose\nit; and they will easily perceive, that virtue is advantageous, and vice\ndisadvantageous to themselves. Let us persuade men to be just, beneficent,\nmoderate, sociable; not because such conduct is demanded by the gods, but,\nbecause it is pleasant to men. Let us advise them to abstain from vice\nand crime; not because they will be punished in another world, but because\nthey will suffer for it in this.--_These are,_ says Montesquieu, _means\nto prevent crimes--these are punishments; these reform manners--these are\ngood examples._\n\nThe way of truth is straight; that of imposture is crooked and dark.\nTruth, ever necessary to man, must necessarily be felt by all upright\nminds; the lessons of reason are to be followed by all honest men. Men are\nunhappy, only because they are ignorant; they are ignorant, only because\nevery thing conspires to prevent their being enlightened; they are wicked\nonly because their reason is not sufficiently developed.\n\nBy what fatality then, have the first founders of all sects given to\ntheir gods ferocious characters, at which nature revolts? Can we imagine\na conduct more abominable, than that which Moses tells us his God showed\ntowards the Egyptians, where that assassin proceeds boldly to declare, in\nthe name and by the order of _his God_, that Egypt shall be afflicted\nwith the greatest calamities, that can happen to man? Of all the different\nideas, which they give us of a supreme being, of a God, creator and\npreserver of mankind, there are none more horrible, than those of the\nimpostors, who represented themselves as inspired by a divine spirit, and\n\"Thus saith the Lord.\"\n\nWhy, O theologians! do you presume to inquire into the impenetrable\nmysteries of a being, whom you consider inconceivable to the human mind?\nYou are the blasphemers, when you imagine that a being, perfect according\nto you, could be guilty of such cruelty towards creatures whom he has\nmade out of nothing. Confess, your ignorance of a creating God; and cease\nmeddling with mysteries, which are repugnant to _Common Sense_.\n\n\n\nDETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS GIVEN IN THE FRENCH EDITION\n\n\n  Section\n\n  1.  APOLOGUE\n\n  2, 3.  What is Theology?\n\n  4.  Man is not born with any ideas of Religion\n\n  5.  It is not necessary to believe in a God\n\n  6.  Religion is founded on credulity\n\n  7.  All religion is an absurdity\n\n  8.  The idea of God is impossible\n\n  9.  On the Origin of Superstition\n\n  10.  On the Origin of all Religion\n\n  11.  Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters\n\n  12, 13.  Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous\n\n  14.  There would never have been any Religion, if there had not been\n       ages of Stupidity and Barbarism\n\n  15.  All Religion was produced by the desire of domination\n\n  16.  What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain\n\n  17, 18.  It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God\n\n  19.  The existence of God is not proved\n\n  20.  It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit\n\n  21.  Spirituality is an absurdity\n\n  22.  Whatever exists is derived from Matter\n\n  23.  What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology?\n\n  24.  It would be less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than to adore\n       a spiritual Deity\n\n  25.  A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action\n\n  26.  What is God?\n\n  27.  Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology\n\n  28.  To adore God, is to adore a fiction\n\n  29.  Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God, and the impossibility\n       of knowing the Divine essence\n\n  30.  Believing in God is neither safer nor less criminal than not\n       believing in him\n\n  31.  Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy\n\n  32.  Belief in God is a prejudice established by successive generations\n\n  33.  On the Origin of Prejudices\n\n  34.  On the effects of Prejudices\n\n  35.  The Religious principles of modern Theology could not be believed\n       if they were not instilled into the mind before the age of reason\n\n  36.  The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God\n\n  37, 38.  Nature may be explained by natural causes\n\n  39, 40.  The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself\n\n  41.  Additional proofs that motion is essential to Matter, and that\n       consequently it is unnecessary to imagine a Spiritual Mover\n\n  42.  The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God\n\n  43.  Nevertheless, neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance\n\n  44, 45.  The order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God\n\n  46.  A Spirit cannot be intelligent it is absurd to adore a divine\n       intelligence\n\n  47, 48.  All the qualities, which Theology gives to its God are contrary\n           to the Essence which is attributed to him\n\n  49.  It is absurd to say that the human race is the object and end\n       of the formation of the Universe\n\n  50.  God is not made for Man, nor Man for God\n\n  51.  It is not true that the object of the formation of the Universe\n       was to render Man happy\n\n  52.  What is called Providence is a word without meaning\n\n  53.  This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man\n\n  54.  The world is not governed by an intelligent being\n\n  55.  God cannot be considered immutable\n\n  56.  Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes.\n       What is a God that cannot change any thing?\n\n  57.  The consolations of Theology and the hope of paradise and of\n       a future life, are imaginary\n\n  58.  Another romantic reverie\n\n  59.  It is in vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human\n       defects: either this God is not free, or else he is more wicked\n       than good\n\n  60, 61.  It is impossible to believe that there exists a God of\n           infinite goodness and power\n\n  62.  Theology makes its God a monster of absurdity, injustice,\n       malice, and atrocity\n\n  63.  All Religion inspires contemptible fears\n\n  64.  There is no difference between Religion, and the most somber\n       and servile Superstition\n\n  65.  To judge from the ideas which Theology gives of the Deity, the\n       love of God is impossible\n\n  66.  An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being\n\n  67.  Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions\n\n  68.  The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections\n\n  69.  The perfection of God is not rendered more evident by the\n       pretended creation of angels\n\n  70.  Theology preaches the Omnipotence of its God, yet constantly\n       makes him appear impotent\n\n  71.  According to all religious systems, God would be the most\n       capricious and most foolish of beings\n\n  72.  It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God\n\n  73.  The foreknowledge attributed to God would give men a right\n       to complain of his cruelty\n\n  74.  Absurdity of the theological stories concerning Original Sin,\n       and concerning Satan\n\n  75.  The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests\n\n  76.  If God has been unable to render human nature incapable of sin,\n       he has no right to punish man\n\n  77.  It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God ought to be a mystery\n       for man\n\n  78.  Ought the unfortunate look for consolation, to the sole author\n       of their misery\n\n  79.  A God, who punishes the faults which he might have prevented,\n       is a mad tyrant, who joins injustice to folly\n\n  80.  What is called Free Will is an absurdity\n\n  81.  But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish\n\n  82, 83.  Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will\n\n  84.  God himself, if there were a God, would not be free: hence the\n       inutility of all Religion\n\n  85.  According to the principles of Theology, man is not free a\n       single instant\n\n  86.  There is no evil, no disorder, and no sin, but must be attributed\n       to God: consequently God has no right either to punish or recompence\n\n  87.  The prayers offered to God sufficiently prove dissatisfaction of\n       the divine will\n\n  88.  It is the height of absurdity to imagine, that the injuries and\n       misfortunes, endured in this world, will be repaired in another world\n\n  89.  Theology justifies the evil and the wickedness, permitted by its God,\n       only by attributing to him the principle, that \"Might makes Right,\"\n       which is the violation of all Right\n\n  90.  The absurd doctrine of Redemption, and the frequent exterminations\n       attributed to Jehovah, impress one with the idea of an unjust and\n       barbarous God\n\n  91.  Can a being, who has called us into existence merely to make us\n       miserable, be a generous, equitable, and tender father?\n\n  92.  Man's life, and all that occurs, deposes against the liberty of Man,\n       and against the justice and goodness of a pretended God\n\n  93.  It is not true, that we owe any gratitude to what is called\n       _Providence_\n\n  94.  It is folly to suppose that Man is the king of nature, the favourite\n       of God, and unique object of his labours\n\n  95.  A comparison between Man and brutes\n\n  96.  There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants\n\n  97.  A refutation of the excellence of Man\n\n  98.  An oriental Tale\n\n  99.  It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God, or to think\n       that this universe is only made for Man\n\n  100.  What is the Soul?\n\n  101.  The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition; and the existence\n        of an _immortal_ Soul still more absurd\n\n  102.  It is evident that Man dies _in toto_\n\n  103.  Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul\n\n  104.  On the absurdity of the supernatural causes, to which Theologians\n        are constantly having recourse\n\n  105, 106.  It is false that Materialism degrades\n\n  107.  The idea of a future life is only useful to those, who trade on\n        public credulity\n\n  108.  It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling\n\n  109.  All religious principles are derived from the imagination.\n        God is a chimera; and the qualities, attributed to him,\n        reciprocally destroy one another\n\n  110.  Religion is but a system imagined in order to reconcile\n        contradictions by the aid of mysteries\n\n  111, 112, 113.  Absurdity and inutility of all Mysteries, which were only\n                  invented for the interests of Priests\n\n  114.  An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion\n\n  115.  What proves, that Religion is unnecessary, is, that it is\n        unintelligible\n\n  116.  All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds,\n        all opposite to one another, and all equally foolish\n\n  117.  Opinion of a famous Theologian\n\n  118.  The God of the Deists is not less contradictory, nor less chimerical\n        than the God of the Christians\n\n  119.  It by no means proves the existence of God to say, that, in every\n        age, all nations have acknowledged some Deity or other\n\n  120.  All Gods are of a savage origin: all Religions are monuments of\n        the ignorance, superstition, and ferocity of former times: modern\n        Religions are but ancient follies, re-edited with additions and\n        corrections\n\n  121.  All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism\n\n  122.  The more a religious opinion is ancient and general, the more it\n        ought to be suspected\n\n  123.  Mere scepticism in religious matters, can only be the effect of\n        a very superficial examination\n\n  124.  Revelations examined\n\n  125.  Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself to Men, or ever\n        spoke to them?\n\n  126.  There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed\n\n  127.  If God has spoken, is it not strange that he should have spoken\n        so differently to the different religious sects?\n\n  128.  Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles\n\n  129.  Absurdity of all miracles\n\n  130.  Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal concerning the manner in which\n        we must judge of miracles\n\n  131.  Every new revelation is necessarily false\n\n  132.  The blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles, and\n        _against_ the divine origin attributed to Christianity\n\n  133.  The fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries,\n        by no means prove the truth of Religion\n\n  134.  Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense\n\n  135.  Faith is irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason is preferable\n        to Faith\n\n  136.  To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms every one is reduced, who\n        would substitute Faith for Reason!\n\n  137.  Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man, what is\n        of the greatest importance to himself\n\n  138.  Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds\n\n  139.  To teach, that any one Religion has greater pretensions to truth\n        than another, is an absurdity, and cause of tumult\n\n  140.  Religion is unnecessary to Morality\n\n  141.  Religion is the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions\n\n  142.  Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion\n\n  143.  Religion does not restrain the passions of kings\n\n  144.  Origin of \"the divine right of kings,\" the most absurd, ridiculous,\n        and odious, of usurpations\n\n  145.  Religion is fatal to political ameliorations: it makes despots\n        licentious and wicked, and their subjects abject and miserable\n\n  146.  Christianity has propagated itself by preaching implicit obedience\n        to despotism\n\n  147.  One object of religious principles is to eternize the tyranny\n        of kings\n\n  148.  How fatal it is to persuade kings that they are responsible for\n        their actions to God alone\n\n  149.  A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom\n\n  150.  Tyranny sometimes finds the aegis of Religion a weak obstacle\n        to the despair of the people\n\n  151.  Religion favours the wickedness of princes by delivering them\n        from fear and remorse\n\n  152.  What is an enlightened Sovereign?\n\n  153.  Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood\n\n  154.  The quackery of priests\n\n  155.  Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils\n\n  156.  Every Religion is intolerant\n\n  157.  The evils of a state Religion\n\n  158.  Religion legitimates and authorizes crime\n\n  159.  Refutation of the argument, that the evils attributed to Religion\n        are but the bad effects of human passions\n\n  160.  Religion is incompatible with Morality\n\n  161.  The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable\n\n  162.  A society of Saints would be impossible\n\n  163.  Human nature is not depraved\n\n  164.  Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission\n\n  165.  The dogma of the remission of sins was invented for the interest\n        of priests\n\n  166.  Who fear God?\n\n  167.  Hell is an absurd invention\n\n  168.  The bad foundation of religious morals\n\n  169.  Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!!\n\n  170.  Confession, priestcraft's gold mine, and the destruction of the\n        true principles of Morality\n\n  171.  The supposition of the existence of a God is by no means necessary\n        to Morality\n\n  172.  Religion and its supernatural Morality are fatal to the\n        public welfare\n\n  173.  The union of Church and State is a calamity\n\n  174.  National Religions are ruinous\n\n  175.  Religion paralyses Morality\n\n  176.  Fatal consequences of Devotion\n\n  177.  The idea of a future life is not consoling to man\n\n  178.  An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man, and has\n        better motives for doing good\n\n  179.  An Atheistical king would be far preferable to a religious king\n\n  180.  Philosophy produces Morality\n\n  181.  Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct\n\n  182.  Reason leads man to Atheism\n\n  183.  Fear alone makes Theists\n\n  184.  Can we, and ought we, to love God?\n\n  185.  God and Religion are proved to be absurdities by the different\n        ideas formed of them\n\n  186.  The existence of God, which is the basis of Religion, has not yet\n        been demonstrated\n\n  187.  Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers\n\n  188.  Pride, presumption, and badness, are more often found in priests,\n        than in Atheists\n\n  189.  Prejudices last but for a time: no power is durable which is not\n        founded upon truth\n\n  190.  What an honourable power ministers of the Gods would obtain,\n        if they became the apostles of reason and the defenders of liberty!\n\n  191.  What a glorious and happy revolution it would be for the world,\n        if Philosophy were substituted for Religion!\n\n  192.  The recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves\n        nothing against the reasonableness of unbelief\n\n  193.  It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society\n\n  194.  Refutation of the often repeated opinion, that Religion is necessary\n        for the vulgar\n\n  195.  Logical and argumentative systems are not adapted to the capacity\n        of the vulgar\n\n  196.  On the futility and danger of Theology\n\n  197, 198.  On the evils produced by implicit faith\n\n  199.  History teaches us, that all Religions were established by\n        impostors, in days of ignorance\n\n  200.  All Religions, ancient or modern, have borrowed from one\n        another ridiculous ceremonies\n\n  201.  Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path\n\n  202.  Theology explains nothing\n\n  203, 204.  Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress\n\n  205.  It cannot be too often repeated and proved, that Religion is an\n        extravagance and a calamity\n\n  206.  Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes\n\n\n\n\nGOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD\n\n\n\n\nAPOLOGUE\n\n\n\n\n1.\n\nThere is a vast empire, governed by a monarch, whose strange conduct is\nto confound the minds of his subjects. He wishes to be known, loved,\nrespected, obeyed; but never shows himself to his subjects, and everything\nconspires to render uncertain the ideas formed of his character.\n\nThe people, subjected to his power, have, of the character and laws of\ntheir invisible sovereign, such ideas only, as his ministers give them.\nThey, however, confess, that they have no idea of their master; that his\nways are impenetrable; his views and nature totally incomprehensible.\nThese ministers, likewise, disagree upon the commands which they pretend\nhave been issued by the sovereign, whose servants they call themselves.\nThey defame one another, and mutually treat each other as impostors and\nfalse teachers. The decrees and ordinances, they take upon themselves\nto promulgate, are obscure; they are enigmas, little calculated to be\nunderstood, or even divined, by the subjects, for whose instruction they\nwere intended. The laws of the concealed monarch require interpreters;\nbut the interpreters are always disputing upon the true manner of\nunderstanding them. Besides, they are not consistent with themselves; all\nthey relate of their concealed prince is only a string of contradictions.\nThey utter concerning him not a single word that does not immediately\nconfute itself. They call him supremely good; yet many complain of his\ndecrees. They suppose him infinitely wise; and under his administration\neverything appears to contradict reason. They extol his justice; and the\nbest of his subjects are generally the least favoured. They assert, he\nsees everything; yet his presence avails nothing. He is, say they, the\nfriend of order; yet throughout his dominions, all is in confusion and\ndisorder. He makes all for himself; and the events seldom answer\nhis designs. He foresees everything; but cannot prevent anything. He\nimpatiently suffers offence, yet gives everyone the power of offending\nhim. Men admire the wisdom and perfection of his works; yet his works,\nfull of imperfection, are of short duration. He is continually doing and\nundoing; repairing what he has made; but is never pleased with his work.\nIn all his undertakings, he proposes only his own glory; yet is never\nglorified. His only end is the happiness of his subjects; and his\nsubjects, for the most part want necessaries. Those, whom he seems to\nfavour are generally least satisfied with their fate; almost all appear\nin perpetual revolt against a master, whose greatness they never cease to\nadmire, whose wisdom to extol, whose goodness to adore, whose justice to\nfear, and whose laws to reverence, though never obeyed!\n\nThis EMPIRE is the WORLD; this MONARCH GOD; his MINISTERS are the PRIESTS;\nhis SUBJECTS MANKIND.\n\n\n\n\n2.\n\nThere is a science that has for its object only things incomprehensible.\nContrary to all other sciences, it treats only of what cannot fall under\nour senses. Hobbes calls it the _kingdom of darkness_. It is a country,\nwhere every thing is governed by laws, contrary to those which mankind are\npermitted to know in the world they inhabit. In this marvellous region,\nlight is only darkness; evidence is doubtful or false; impossibilities\nare credible: reason is a deceitful guide; and good sense becomes madness.\nThis _science_ is called _theology_, and this theology is a continual\ninsult to the reason of man.\n\n\n\n\n3.\n\nBy the magical power of \"ifs,\" \"buts,\" \"perhaps's,\" \"what do we know,\"\netc., heaped together, a shapeless and unconnected system is formed,\nperplexing mankind, by obliterating from their minds, the most clear ideas\nand rendering uncertain truths most evident. By reason of this systematic\nconfusion, nature is an enigma; the visible world has disappeared, to give\nplace to regions invisible; reason is compelled to yield to imagination,\nwho leads to the country of her self-invented chimeras.\n\n\n\n\n4.\n\nThe principles of every religion are founded upon the idea of a GOD. Now,\nit is impossible to have true ideas of a being, who acts upon none of our\nsenses. All our ideas are representations of sensible objects. What then\ncan represent to us the idea of God, which is evidently an idea without an\nobject? Is not such an idea as impossible, as an effect without a cause?\nCan an idea without an archetype be anything, but a chimera? There are,\nhowever, divines, who assure us that the idea of God is innate; or that\nwe have this idea in our mother's womb. Every principle is the result of\nreason; all reason is the effect of experience; experience is acquired\nonly by the exercise of our senses: therefore, religious principles are\nnot founded upon reason, and are not innate.\n\n\n\n\n5.\n\nEvery system of religion can be founded only upon the nature of God and\nman; and upon the relations, which subsist between them. But to judge\nof the reality of those relations, we must have some idea of the divine\nnature. Now, the world exclaims, the divine nature is incomprehensible to\nman; yet ceases not to assign attributes to this incomprehensible God, and\nto assure us, that it is our indispensable duty to find out that God, whom\nit is impossible to comprehend.\n\nThe most important concern of man is what he can least comprehend. If God\nis incomprehensible to man, it would seem reasonable never to think of\nhim; but religion maintains, man cannot with impunity cease a moment to\nthink (or rather dream) of his God.\n\n\n\n\n6.\n\nWe are told, that divine qualities are not of a nature to be comprehended\nby finite minds. The natural consequence must be, that divine qualities\nare not made to occupy finite minds. But religion tells us, that the poor\nfinite mind of man ought never to lose sight of an inconceivable being,\nwhose qualities he can never comprehend. Thus, we see, religion is the\nart of turning the attention of mankind upon subjects they can never\ncomprehend.\n\n\n\n\n7.\n\nReligion unites man with God, or forms a communication between them; yet\ndo they not say, God is infinite? If God be infinite, no finite being can\nhave communication or relation with him. Where there is no relation, there\ncan be no union, communication, or duties. If there be no duties between\nman and his God, there is no religion for man. Thus, in saying God is\ninfinite, you annihilate religion for man, who is a finite being. The idea\nof infinity is to us an idea without model, without archetype, without\nobject.\n\n\n\n\n8.\n\nIf God be an infinite being, there cannot be, either in the present or\nfuture world, any relative proportion between man and his God. Thus, the\nidea of God can never enter the human mind. In supposition of a life, in\nwhich man would be much more enlightened, than in this, the idea of the\ninfinity of God would ever remain the same distance from his finite mind.\nThus the idea of God will be no more clear in the future, than in the\npresent life. Thus, intelligences, superior to man, can have no more\ncomplete ideas of God, than man, who has not the least conception of him\nin his present life.\n\n\n\n\n9.\n\nHow has it been possible to persuade reasonable beings, that the thing,\nmost impossible to comprehend, was most essential to them? It is because\nthey have been greatly terrified; because, when they fear, they cease\nto reason; because, they have been taught to mistrust their own\nunderstanding; because, when the brain is troubled, they believe every\nthing, and examine nothing.\n\n\n\n\n10.\n\nIgnorance and fear are the two hinges of all religion. The uncertainty in\nwhich man finds himself in relation to his God, is precisely the motive\nthat attaches him to his religion. Man is fearful in the dark--in moral,\nas well as physical darkness. His fear becomes habitual, and habit makes\nit natural; he would think that he wanted something, if he had nothing to\nfear.\n\n\n\n\n11.\n\nHe, who from infancy has habituated himself to tremble when he hears\npronounced certain words, requires those words and needs to tremble. He is\ntherefore more disposed to listen to one, who entertains him in his fears,\nthan to one, who dissuades him from them. The superstitious man wishes to\nfear; his imagination demands it; one might say, that he fears nothing so\nmuch, as to have nothing to fear.\n\nMen are imaginary invalids, whose weakness empirics are interested to\nencourage, in order to have sale for their drugs. They listen rather to\nthe physician, who prescribes a variety of remedies, than to him, who\nrecommends good regimen, and leaves nature to herself.\n\n\n\n\n12.\n\nIf religion were more clear, it would have less charms for the ignorant,\nwho are pleased only with obscurity, terrors, fables, prodigies, and\nthings incredible. Romances, silly stories, and the tales of ghosts and\nwizards, are more pleasing to vulgar minds than true histories.\n\n\n\n\n13.\n\nIn point of religion, men are only great children. The more a religion is\nabsurd and filled with wonders, the greater ascendancy it acquires over\nthem. The devout man thinks himself obliged to place no bounds to his\ncredulity; the more things are inconceivable, they appear to him divine;\nthe more they are incredible, the greater merit, he imagines, there is in\nbelieving them.\n\n\n\n\n14.\n\nThe origin of religious opinions is generally dated from the time, when\nsavage nations were yet in infancy. It was to gross, ignorant, and\nstupid people, that the founders of religion have in all ages addressed\nthemselves, when they wished to give them their Gods, their mode of\nworship, their mythology, their marvellous and frightful fables. These\nchimeras, adopted without examination by parents, are transmitted, with\nmore or less alteration, to their children, who seldom reason any more\nthan their parents.\n\n\n\n\n15.\n\nThe object of the first legislators was to govern the people; and the\neasiest method to effect it was to terrify their minds, and to prevent\nthe exercise of reason. They led them through winding bye-paths, lest they\nmight perceive the designs of their guides; they forced them to fix their\neyes in the air, for fear they should look at their feet; they amused them\non the way with idle stories; in a word, they treated them as nurses do\nchildren, who sing lullabies, to put them to sleep, and scold, to make\nthem quiet.\n\n\n\n\n16.\n\nThe existence of a God is the basis of all religion. Few appear to doubt\nhis existence; yet this fundamental article utterly embarrasses every mind\nthat reasons. The first question of every catechism has been, and ever\nwill be, the most difficult to resolve. (In the year 1701, the\nholy fathers of the oratory of Vendome maintained in a thesis, this\nproposition--that, according to St. Thomas, the existence of God is not,\nand cannot be, a subject of faith.)\n\n\n\n\n17.\n\nCan we imagine ourselves sincerely convinced of the existence of a being,\nwhose nature we know not; who is inaccessible to all our senses; whose\nattributes, we are assured, are incomprehensible to us? To persuade me\nthat a being exists or can exist, I must be first told what that being is.\nTo induce me to believe the existence or the possibility of such a\nbeing, it is necessary to tell me things concerning him that are not\ncontradictory, and do not destroy one another. In short, to fully convince\nme of the existence of that being, it is necessary to tell me things that\nI can understand.\n\n\n\n\n18.\n\nA thing is impossible, when it includes two ideas that mutually destroy\none another, and which can neither be conceived nor united in thought.\nConviction can be founded only upon the constant testimony of our senses,\nwhich alone give birth to our ideas, and enable us to judge of their\nagreement or disagreement. That, which exists necessarily, is that, whose\nnon-existence implies a contradiction. These principles, universally\nacknowledged, become erroneous, when applied to the existence of a\nGod. Whatever has been hitherto said upon the subject, is either\nunintelligible, or perfect contradiction, and must therefore appear absurd\nto every rational man.\n\n\n\n\n19.\n\nAll human knowledge is more or less clear. By what strange fatality have\nwe never been able to elucidate the science of God? The most civilized\nnations, and among them the most profound thinkers, are in this respect no\nmore enlightened than the most savage tribes and ignorant peasants; and,\nexamining the subject closely, we shall find, that, by the speculations\nand subtle refinements of men, the divine science has been only more and\nmore obscured. Every religion has hitherto been founded only upon what is\ncalled, in logic, _begging the question_; it takes things for granted, and\nthen proves, by suppositions, instead of principles.\n\n\n\n\n20.\n\nMetaphysics teach us, that God is a _pure spirit_. But, is modern theology\nsuperior to that of the savages? The savages acknowledge a _great spirit_,\nfor the master of the world. The savages, like all ignorant people,\nattribute to _spirits_ all the effects, of which their experience cannot\ndiscover the true causes. Ask a savage, what works your watch? He will\nanswer, _it is a spirit_. Ask the divines, what moves the universe? They\nanswer, _it is a spirit_.\n\n\n\n\n21.\n\nThe savage, when he speaks of a spirit, affixes, at least, some idea to\nthe word; he means thereby an agent, like the air, the breeze, the breath,\nthat invisibly produces discernible effects. By subtilizing every thing,\nthe modern theologian becomes as unintelligible to himself as to others.\nAsk him, what he understands by a spirit? He will answer you, that it is\nan unknown substance, perfectly simple, that has no extension, that has\nnothing common with matter. Indeed, is there any one, who can form the\nleast idea of such a substance? What then is a spirit, to speak in the\nlanguage of modern theology, but the absence of an idea? The idea of\n_spirituality_ is an idea without model.\n\n\n\n\n22.\n\nIs it not more natural and intelligible to draw universal existence from\nthe matter, whose existence is demonstrated by all the senses, and whose\neffects we experience, which we see act, move, communicate motion, and\nincessantly generate, than to attribute the formation of things to an\nunknown power, to a spiritual being, who cannot derive from his nature\nwhat he has not himself, and who, by his spiritual essence, can create\nneither matter nor motion? Nothing is more evident, than that the idea\nthey endeavour to give us, of the action of mind upon matter, represents\nno object. It is an idea without model.\n\n\n\n\n23.\n\nThe material _Jupiter_ of the ancients could move, compose, destroy,\nand create beings, similar to himself; but the God of modern theology is\nsterile. He can neither occupy any place in space, nor move matter, nor\nform a visible world, nor create men or gods. The metaphysical God is fit\nonly to produce confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes.\n\n\n\n\n24.\n\nSince a God was indispensably requisite to men, why did they not worship\nthe Sun, that visible God, adored by so many nations? What being had\ngreater claim to the homage of men, than the day-star, who enlightens,\nwarms, and vivifies all beings; whose presence enlivens and regenerates\nnature, whose absence seems to cast her into gloom and languor? If any\nbeing announced to mankind, power, activity, beneficence, and duration, it\nwas certainly the Sun, whom they ought to have regarded as the parent of\nnature, as the divinity. At least, they could not, without folly, dispute\nhis existence, or refuse to acknowledge his influence.\n\n\n\n\n25.\n\nThe theologian exclaims to us, that God wants neither hands nor arms to\nact; that _he acts by his will_. But pray, who or what is that God, who\nhas a will, and what can be the subject of his divine will?\n\nAre the stories of witches, ghosts, wizards, hobgoblins, etc., more absurd\nand difficult to believe than the magical or impossible action of mind\nupon matter? When we admit such a God, fables and reveries may claim\nbelief. Theologians treat men as children, whose simplicity makes them\nbelieve all the stories they hear.\n\n\n\n\n26.\n\nTo shake the existence of God, we need only to ask a theologian to\nspeak of him. As soon as he has said a word upon the subject, the\nleast reflection will convince us, that his observations are totally\nincompatible with the essence he ascribes to his God. What then is God?\nIt is an abstract word, denoting the hidden power of nature; or it is a\nmathematical point, that has neither length, breadth, nor thickness. David\nHume, speaking of theologians, has ingeniously observed, _that they have\ndiscovered the solution of the famous problem of Archimedes--a point in\nthe heavens, whence they move the world_.\n\n\n\n\n27.\n\nReligion prostrates men before a being, who, without extension, is\ninfinite, and fills all with his immensity; a being, all-powerful, who\nnever executes his will; a being, sovereignly good, who creates only\ndisquietudes; a being, the friend of order, and in whose government all\nis in confusion and disorder. What then, can we imagine, can be the God of\ntheology?\n\n\n\n\n28.\n\nTo avoid all embarrassment, we are told, \"that it is not necessary to know\nwhat God is; that we must adore him; that we are not permitted to extend\nour views to his attributes.\" But, before we know that we must adore a\nGod, must we not know certainly, that he exists? But, how can we assure\nourselves, that he exists, if we never examine whether the various\nqualities, attributed to him, do really exist and agree in him? Indeed,\nto adore God, is to adore only the fictions of one's own imagination, or\nrather, it is to adore nothing.\n\n\n\n\n29.\n\nIn view of confounding things the more, theologians have not declared what\ntheir God is; they tell us only what he is not. By means of negations and\nabstractions, they think they have composed a real and perfect being. Mind\nis that, which is _not_ body. An infinite being is a being, who is _not_\nfinite. A perfect being is a being, who is _not_ imperfect. Indeed, is\nthere any one, who can form real ideas of such a mass of absence of ideas?\nThat, which excludes all idea, can it be any thing but nothing?\n\nTo pretend, that the divine attributes are beyond the reach of human\nconception, is to grant, that God is not made for man. To assure us, that,\nin God, all is infinite, is to own that there can be nothing common to him\nand his creatures. If there be nothing common to God and his creatures,\nGod is annihilated for man, or, at least, rendered useless to him. \"God,\"\nthey say, \"has made man intelligent, but he has not made him omniscient;\"\nhence it is inferred, that he has not been able to give him faculties\nsufficiently enlarged to know his divine essence. In this case, it\nis evident, that God has not been able nor willing to be known by his\ncreatures. By what right then would God be angry with beings, who were\nnaturally incapable of knowing the divine essence? God would be evidently\nthe most unjust and capricious of tyrants, if he should punish an Atheist\nfor not having known, what, by his nature, it was impossible he should\nknow.\n\n\n\n\n30.\n\nTo the generality of men, nothing renders an argument more convincing\nthan fear. It is therefore, that theologians assure us, _we must take the\nsafest part_; that nothing is so criminal as incredulity; that God will\npunish without pity every one who has the temerity to doubt his existence;\nthat his severity is just, since madness or perversity only can make\nus deny the existence of an enraged monarch, who without mercy avenges\nhimself on Atheists. If we coolly examine these threatenings, we shall\nfind, they always suppose the thing in question. They must first prove the\nexistence of a God, before they assure us, it is safest to believe, and\nhorrible to doubt or deny his existence. They must then prove, that it is\npossible and consistent, that a just God cruelly punishes men for having\nbeen in a state of madness, that prevented their believing the existence\nof a being, whom their perverted reason could not conceive. In a word,\nthey must prove, that an infinitely just God can infinitely punish the\ninvincible and natural ignorance of man with respect to the divine nature.\nDo not theologians reason very strangely? They invent phantoms, they\ncompose them of contradictions; they then assure us, it is safest not\nto doubt the existence of these phantoms they themselves have invented.\nAccording to this mode of reasoning, there is no absurdity, which it would\nnot be more safe to believe, than not to believe.\n\nAll children are born Atheists; they have no idea of God. Are they then\ncriminal on account of their ignorance? At what age must they begin to\nbelieve in God? It is, you say, at the age of reason. But at what time\nshould this age commence? Besides, if the profoundest theologians lose\nthemselves in the divine nature, which they do not presume to comprehend,\nwhat ideas must man have of him?\n\n\n\n\n31.\n\nMen believe in God only upon the word of those, who have no more idea of\nhim than themselves. Our nurses are our first theologians. They talk\nto children of God as if he were a scarecrow; they teach them from the\nearliest age to join their hands mechanically. Have nurses then more true\nideas of God than the children whom they teach to pray?\n\n\n\n\n32.\n\nReligion, like a family estate, passes, with its incumbrances, from\nparents to children. Few men in the world would have a God, had not\npains been taken in infancy to give them one. Each would receive from his\nparents and teachers the God whom they received from theirs; but each,\nagreeably to his disposition, would arrange, modify, and paint him in his\nown manner.\n\n\n\n\n33.\n\nThe brain of man, especially in infancy, is like soft wax, fit to receive\nevery impression that is made upon it. Education furnishes him with almost\nall his ideas at a time, when he is incapable of judging for himself. We\nbelieve we have received from nature, or have brought with us at birth,\nthe true or false ideas, which, in a tender age, had been instilled into\nour minds; and this persuasion is one of the greatest sources of errors.\n\n\n\n\n34.\n\nPrejudice contributes to cement in us the opinions of those who have been\ncharged with our instruction. We believe them much more experienced than\nourselves; we suppose they are fully convinced of the things which they\nteach us; we have the greatest confidence in them; by the care they have\ntaken of us in infancy, we judge them incapable of wishing to deceive us.\nThese are the motives that make us adopt a thousand errors, without other\nfoundation than the hazardous authority of those by whom we have been\nbrought up. The prohibition likewise of reasoning upon what they teach us,\nby no means lessens our confidence; but often contributes to increase our\nrespect for their opinions.\n\n\n\n\n35.\n\nDivines act very wisely in teaching men their religious principles before\nthey are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, or their left\nhand from their right. It would be as difficult to instill into the mind\nof a man, forty years old, the extravagant notions that are given us of\nthe divinity, as to eradicate them from the mind of him who had imbibed\nthem from infancy.\n\n\n\n\n36.\n\nIt is observed, that the wonders of nature are sufficient to lead us to\nthe existence of a God, and fully to convince us of this important truth.\nBut how many are there in the world who have the time, capacity, or\ndisposition, necessary to contemplate Nature and meditate her progress?\nMen, for the most part, pay no regard to it. The peasant is not struck\nwith the beauty of the sun, which he sees every day. The sailor is not\nsurprised at the regular motion of the ocean; he will never draw from it\ntheological conclusions. The phenomena of nature prove the existence of a\nGod only to some prejudiced men, who have been early taught to behold the\nfinger of God in every thing whose mechanism could embarrass them. In the\nwonders of nature, the unprejudiced philosopher sees nothing but the\npower of nature, the permanent and various laws, the necessary effects of\ndifferent combinations of matter infinitely diversified.\n\n\n\n\n37.\n\nIs there any thing more surprising than the logic of these divines, who,\ninstead of confessing their ignorance of natural causes, seek beyond\nnature, in imaginary regions, a cause much more unknown than that nature,\nof which they can form at least some idea? To say, that God is the author\nof the phenomena of nature, is it not to attribute them to an occult\ncause? What is God? What is a spirit? They are causes of which we have no\nidea. O wise divines! Study nature and her laws; and since you can\nthere discover the action of natural causes, go not to those that are\nsupernatural, which, far from enlightening, will only darken your ideas,\nand make it utterly impossible that you should understand yourselves.\n\n\n\n\n38.\n\nNature, you say, is totally inexplicable without a God. That is to say,\nto explain what you understand very little, you have need of a cause which\nyou understand not at all. You think to elucidate what is obscure, by\ndoubling the obscurity; to solve difficulties, by multiplying them. O\nenthusiastic philosophers! To prove the existence of a God, write complete\ntreatises of botany; enter into a minute detail of the parts of the human\nbody; launch forth into the sky, to contemplate the revolution of the\nstars; then return to the earth to admire the course of waters; behold\nwith transport the butterflies, the insects, the polypi, and the organized\natoms, in which you think you discern the greatness of your God. All these\nthings will not prove the existence of God; they will prove only, that you\nhave not just ideas of the immense variety of matter, and of the effects,\nproducible by its infinitely diversified combinations, that constitute the\nuniverse. They will prove only your ignorance of nature; that you have no\nidea of her powers, when you judge her incapable of producing a multitude\nof forms and beings, of which your eyes, even with the assistance of\nmicroscopes, never discern but the smallest part. In a word, they will\nprove, that, for want of knowing sensible agents, or those possible\nto know, you find it shorter to have recourse to a word, expressing an\ninconceivable agent.\n\n\n\n\n39.\n\nWe are gravely and repeatedly told, that, _there is no effect without\na cause_; that, _the world did not make itself_. But the universe is\na cause, it is not an effect; it is not a work; it has not been made,\nbecause it is impossible that it should have been made. The world has\nalways been; its existence is necessary; it is its own cause. Nature,\nwhose essence is visibly to act and produce, requires not, to discharge\nher functions, an invisible mover, much more unknown than herself. Matter\nmoves by its own energy, by a necessary consequence of its heterogeneity.\nThe diversity of motion, or modes of mutual action, constitutes alone the\ndiversity of matter. We distinguish beings from one another only by the\ndifferent impressions or motions which they communicate to our organs.\n\n\n\n\n40.\n\nYou see, that all is action in nature, and yet pretend that nature, by\nitself, is dead and without power. You imagine, that this all, essentially\nacting, needs a mover! What then is this mover? It is a spirit; a being\nabsolutely incomprehensible and contradictory. Acknowledge then, that\nmatter acts of itself, and cease to reason of your spiritual mover,\nwho has nothing that is requisite to put it in action. Return from\nyour useless excursions; enter again into a real world; keep to _second\ncauses_, and leave to divines their _first cause_, of which nature has no\nneed, to produce all the effects you observe in the world.\n\n\n\n\n41.\n\nIt can be only by the diversity of impressions and effects, which bodies\nmake upon us, that we feel them; that we have perceptions and ideas\nof them; that we distinguish one from another; that we assign them\nproperties. Now, to see or feel an object, the object must act upon our\norgans; this object cannot act upon us, without exciting some motion in\nus; it cannot excite motion in us, if it be not in motion itself. At\nthe instant I see an object, my eyes are struck by it; I can have no\nconception of light and vision, without motion, communicated to my\neye, from the luminous, extended, coloured body. At the instant I smell\nsomething, my sense is irritated, or put in motion, by the parts that\nexhale from the odoriferous body. At the moment I hear a sound, the\ntympanum of my ear is struck by the air, put in motion by a sonorous body,\nwhich would not act if it were not in motion itself. Whence it evidently\nfollows, that, without motion, I can neither feel, see, distinguish,\ncompare, judge, nor occupy my thoughts upon any subject whatever.\n\nWe are taught, that _the essence of a thing is that from which all its\nproperties flow_. Now, it is evident, that all the properties of bodies,\nof which we have ideas, are owing to motion, which alone informs us of\ntheir existence, and gives us the first conceptions of them. I cannot be\ninformed of my own existence but by the motions I experience in myself. I\nam therefore forced to conclude, that motion is as essential to matter as\nextension, and that matter cannot be conceived without it.\n\nShould any person deny, that motion is essential and necessary to matter;\nthey cannot, at least, help acknowledging that bodies, which seem dead and\ninert, produce motion of themselves, when placed in a fit situation to\nact upon one another. For instance; phosphorus, when exposed to the air,\nimmediately takes fire. Meal and water, when mixed, ferment. Thus dead\nmatter begets motion of itself. Matter has then the power of self-motion;\nand nature, to act, has no need of a mover, whose pretended essence would\nhinder him from acting.\n\n\n\n\n42.\n\nWhence comes man? What is his origin? Did the first man spring, ready\nformed, from the dust of the earth? Man appears, like all other beings, a\nproduction of nature. Whence came the first stones, the first trees, the\nfirst lions, the first elephants, the first ants, the first acorns? We\nare incessantly told to acknowledge and revere the hand of God, of an\ninfinitely wise, intelligent and powerful maker, in so wonderful a work as\nthe human machine. I readily confess, that the human machine appears to me\nsurprising. But as man exists in nature, I am not authorized to say that\nhis formation, is above the power of nature. But I can much less conceive\nof this formation, when to explain it, I am told, that a pure spirit, who\nhas neither eyes, feet, hands, head, lungs, mouth nor breath, made man by\ntaking a little clay, and breathing upon it.\n\nWe laugh at the savage inhabitants of Paraguay, for calling themselves\nthe descendants of the moon. The divines of Europe call themselves the\ndescendants, or the creation, of a pure spirit. Is this pretension any\nmore rational? Man is intelligent; thence it is inferred, that he can be\nthe work only of an intelligent being, and not of a nature, which is void\nof intelligence. Although nothing is more rare, than to see man make use\nof this intelligence, of which he seems so proud, I will grant that he is\nintelligent, that his wants develop this faculty, that society especially\ncontributes to cultivate it. But I see nothing in the human machine, and\nin the intelligence with which it is endued, that announces very precisely\nthe infinite intelligence of the maker to whom it is ascribed. I see that\nthis admirable machine is liable to be deranged; I see, that his wonderful\nintelligence is then disordered, and sometimes totally disappears; I\ninfer, that human intelligence depends upon a certain disposition of the\nmaterial organs of the body, and that we cannot infer the intelligence of\nGod, any more from the intelligence of man, than from his materiality. All\nthat we can infer from it, is, that God is material. The intelligence of\nman no more proves the intelligence of God, than the malice of man proves\nthe malice of that God, who is the pretended maker of man. In spite of all\nthe arguments of divines, God will always be a cause contradicted by its\neffects, or of which it is impossible to judge by its works. We shall\nalways see evil, imperfection and folly result from such a cause, that is\nsaid to be full of goodness, perfection and wisdom.\n\n\n\n\n43.\n\n\"What?\" you will say, \"is intelligent man, is the universe, and all it\ncontains, the effect of _chance_?\" No; I repeat it, _the universe is not\nan effect_; it is the cause of all effects; every being it contains is\nthe necessary effect of this cause, which sometimes shews us its manner of\nacting, but generally conceals its operations. Men use the word _chance_\nto hide their ignorance of true causes, which, though not understood, act\nnot less according to certain laws. There is no effect without a cause.\nNature is a word, used to denote the immense assemblage of beings, various\nmatter, infinite combinations, and diversified motions, that we behold.\nAll bodies, organized or unorganized, are necessary effects of certain\ncauses. Nothing in nature can happen by chance. Every thing is subject\nto fixed laws. These laws are only the necessary connection of certain\neffects with their causes. One atom of matter cannot meet another _by\nchance_; this meeting is the effect of permanent laws, which cause every\nbeing necessarily to act as it does, and hinder it from acting otherwise,\nin given circumstances. To talk of the _fortuitous concourse of atoms_, or\nto attribute some effects to chance, is merely saying that we are ignorant\nof the laws, by which bodies act, meet, combine, or separate.\n\nThose, who are unacquainted with nature, the properties of beings, and\nthe effects which must necessarily result from the concurrence of certain\ncauses, think, that every thing takes place by chance. It is not chance,\nthat has placed the sun in the centre of our planetary system; it is by\nits own essence, that the substance, of which it is composed, must occupy\nthat place, and thence be diffused.\n\n\n\n\n44.\n\nThe worshippers of a God find, in the order of the universe, an invincible\nproof of the existence of an intelligent and wise being, who governs it.\nBut this order is nothing but a series of movements necessarily produced\nby causes or circumstances, which are sometimes favourable, and sometimes\nhurtful to us: we approve of some, and complain of others.\n\nNature uniformly follows the same round; that is, the same causes produce\nthe same effects, as long as their action is not disturbed by other\ncauses, which force them to produce different effects. When the operation\nof causes, whose effects we experience, is interrupted by causes, which,\nthough unknown, are not the less natural and necessary, we are confounded;\nwe cry out, _a miracle!_ and attribute it to a cause much more unknown,\nthan any of those acting before our eyes.\n\nThe universe is always in order. It cannot be in disorder. It is our\nmachine, that suffers, when we complain of disorder. The bodies, causes,\nand beings, which this world contains, necessarily act in the manner in\nwhich we see them act, whether we approve or disapprove of their effects.\nEarthquakes, volcanoes, inundations, pestilences, and famines are effects\nas necessary, or as much in the order of nature, as the fall of heavy\nbodies, the courses of rivers, the periodical motions of the seas, the\nblowing of the winds, the fruitful rains, and the favourable effects, for\nwhich men praise God, and thank him for his goodness.\n\nTo be astonished that a certain order reigns in the world, is to be\nsurprised that the same causes constantly produce the same effects. To\nbe shocked at disorder, is to forget, that when things change, or are\ninterrupted in their actions, the effects can no longer be the same. To\nwonder at the order of nature, is to wonder that any thing can exist; it\nis to be surprised at any one's own existence. What is order to one being,\nis disorder to another. All wicked beings find that every thing is in\norder, when they can with impunity put every thing in disorder. They find,\non the contrary, that every thing is in disorder, when they are disturbed\nin the exercise of their wickedness.\n\n\n\n\n45.\n\nUpon supposition that God is the author and mover of nature, there could\nbe no disorder with respect to him. Would not all the causes, that he\nshould have made, necessarily act according to the properties, essences,\nand impulses given them? If God should change the ordinary course of\nnature, he would not be immutable. If the order of the universe, in\nwhich man thinks he sees the most convincing proof of the existence,\nintelligence, power and goodness of God, should happen to contradict\nitself, one might suspect his existence, or, at least, accuse him of\ninconstancy, impotence, want of foresight and wisdom in the arrangement of\nthings; one would have a right to accuse him of an oversight in the choice\nof the agents and instruments, which he makes, prepares, and puts in\naction. In short, if the order of nature proves the power and intelligence\nof the Deity, disorder must prove his weakness, instability, and\nirrationality.\n\nYou say, that God is omnipresent, that he fills the universe with his\nimmensity, that nothing is done without him, that matter could not act\nwithout his agency. But in this case, you admit, that your God is the\nauthor of disorder, that it is he who deranges nature, that he is the\nfather of confusion, that he is in man, and moves him at the moment he\nsins. If God is every where, he is in me, he acts with me, he is deceived\nwith me, he offends God with me, and combats with me the existence of God!\nO theologians! you never understand yourselves, when you speak of God.\n\n\n\n\n46.\n\nIn order to have what we call intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas,\nthoughts, and wishes; to have ideas, thoughts, and wishes, it is necessary\nto have organs; to have organs, it is necessary to have a body; to act\nupon bodies, it is necessary to have a body; to experience disorder, it is\nnecessary to be capable of suffering. Whence it evidently follows, that a\npure spirit can neither be intelligent, nor affected by what passes in the\nuniverse.\n\nDivine intelligence, ideas, and views, have, you say, nothing common with\nthose of men. Very well. How then can men judge, right or wrong, of these\nviews; reason upon these ideas; or admire this intelligence? This would be\nto judge, admire, and adore that, of which we can have no ideas. To adore\nthe profound views of divine wisdom, is it not to adore that, of which we\ncannot possibly judge? To admire these views, is it not to admire without\nknowing why? Admiration is always the daughter of ignorance. Men admire\nand adore only what they do not comprehend.\n\n\n\n\n47.\n\nAll those qualities, ascribed to God, are totally incompatible with a\nbeing, who, by his very essence, is void of all analogy with human beings.\nIt is true, the divines imagine they extricate themselves from this\ndifficulty, by exaggerating the human qualities, attributed to the\nDivinity; they enlarge them to infinity, where they cease to understand\nthemselves. What results from this combination of man with God? A mere\nchimera, of which, if any thing be affirmed, the phantom, combined with so\nmuch pains, instantly vanishes.\n\nDante, in his poem upon _Paradise_, relates, that the Deity appeared\nto him under the figure of three circles, forming an iris, whose lively\ncolours generated each other; but that, looking steadily upon the dazzling\nlight, he saw only his own figure. While adoring God, it is himself, that\nman adores.\n\n\n\n\n48.\n\nOught not the least reflection suffice to prove, that God can have none\nof the human qualities, all ties, virtues, or perfections? Our virtues and\nperfections are consequences of the modifications of our passions. But\nhas God passions as we have? Again: our good qualities consist in our\ndispositions towards the beings with whom we live in society. God,\naccording to you, is an insulated being. God has no equals--no\nfellow-beings. God does not live in society. He wants the assistance of no\none. He enjoys an unchangeable felicity. Admit then, according to your own\nprinciples, that God cannot have what we call virtues, and that man cannot\nbe virtuous with respect to him.\n\n\n\n\n49.\n\nMan, wrapped up in his own merit, imagines the human race to be the sole\nobject of God in creating the universe. Upon what does he found this\nflattering opinion? We are told: that man is the only being endued with\nintelligence, which enables him to know the Deity, and to render him\nhomage. We are assured, that God made the world only for his own glory,\nand that it was necessary that the human species should come into this\nplan, that there might be some one to admire his works, and glorify him\nfor them. But, according to these suppositions, has not God evidently\nmissed his object? 1st. Man, according to yourselves, will always labour\nunder the completest impossibility of knowing his God, and the most\ninvincible ignorance of his divine essence. 2ndly. A being, who has no\nequal, cannot be susceptible of glory; for glory can result only from the\ncomparison of one's own excellence with that of others. 3rdly. If God be\ninfinitely happy, if he be self-sufficient, what need has he of the homage\nof his feeble creatures? 4thly. God, notwithstanding all his endeavours,\nis not glorified; but, on the contrary, all the religions in the world\nrepresent him as perpetually offended; their sole object is to reconcile\nsinful, ungrateful, rebellious man with his angry God.\n\n\n\n\n50.\n\nIf God be infinite, he has much less relation with man, than man with\nants. Would the ants reason pertinently concerning the intentions,\ndesires, and projects of the gardener? Could they justly imagine, that a\npark was planted for them alone, by an ostentatious monarch, and that the\nsole object of his goodness was to furnish them with a superb residence?\nBut, according to theology, man is, with respect to God, far below what\nthe vilest insect is to man. Thus, by theology itself, which is wholly\ndevoted to the attributes and views of the Divinity, theology appears a\ncomplete folly.\n\n\n\n\n51.\n\nWe are told, that, in the formation of the universe, God's only object was\nthe happiness of man. But, in a world made purposely for him, and governed\nby an omnipotent God, is man in reality very happy? Are his enjoyments\ndurable? Are not his pleasures mixed with pains? Are many persons\nsatisfied with their fate? Is not man continually the victim of physical\nand moral evils? Is not the human machine, which is represented as a\nmaster-piece of the Creator's skill, liable to derangement in a thousand\nways? Should we be surprised at the workmanship of a mechanic, who should\nshew us a complex machine, ready to stop every moment, and which, in a\nshort time, would break in pieces of itself?\n\n\n\n\n52.\n\nThe generous care, displayed by the Deity in providing for the wants,\nand watching over the happiness of his beloved creatures, is called\n_Providence_. But, when we open our eyes, we find that God provides\nnothing. Providence sleeps over the greater part of the inhabitants of\nthis world. For a very small number of men who are supposed to be happy,\nwhat an immense multitude groan under oppression, and languish in misery!\nAre not nations forced to deprive themselves of bread, to administer to\nthe extravagances of a few gloomy tyrants, who are no happier than their\noppressed slaves?\n\nAt the same time that our divines emphatically expatiate upon the goodness\nof Providence, while they exhort us to repose our confidence in her, do\nwe not hear them, at the sight of unforeseen catastrophes, exclaim, that\n_Providence sports with the vain projects of man_, that she frustrates\ntheir designs, that she laughs at their efforts, that profound wisdom\ndelights to bewilder the minds of mortals? But, shall we put confidence in\na malignant Providence, who laughs at, and sports with mankind? How will\none admire the unknown ways of a hidden wisdom, whose manner of acting is\ninexplicable? Judge of it by effects, you will say. We do; and find, that\nthese effects are sometimes useful, and sometimes hurtful.\n\nMen think they justify Providence, by saying, that, in this world, there\nis much more good than evil to every individual of mankind. Supposing the\ngood, we enjoy from Providence, is to the evil, as a _hundred to ten_;\nwill it not still follow, that, for a hundred degrees of goodness,\nProvidence possesses ten of malignity; which is incompatible with the\nsupposed perfection of the divine nature.\n\nAlmost all books are filled with the most flattering praises of\nProvidence, whose attentive care is highly extolled. It would seem as\nif man, to live happily here below, needed not his own exertions. Yet,\nwithout his own labour, man could subsist hardly a day. To live, he is\nobliged to sweat, toil, hunt, fish, and labour without intermission.\nWithout these second causes, the first cause, at least in most countries,\nwould provide for none of our wants. In all parts of the globe, we see\nsavage and civilized man in a perpetual struggle with Providence. He is\nnecessitated to ward off the strokes directed against him by Providence,\nin hurricanes, tempests, frosts, hail-storms, inundations, droughts, and\nthe various accidents, which so often render useless all his labours. In a\nword, we see man continually occupied in guarding against the ill offices\nof that Providence, which is supposed to be attentive to his happiness.\n\nA bigot admired divine Providence for wisely ordering rivers to pass\nthrough those places, where men have built large cities. Is not this man's\nreasoning as rational, as that of many learned men, who incessantly\ntalk of _final causes_, or who pretend that they clearly perceive the\nbeneficent views of God in the formation of all things?\n\n\n\n\n53.\n\nDo we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests herself in the\npreservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If it\nis she, who governs the world, we find her as active in destroying, as\nin forming; in exterminating, as in producing. Does she not every moment\ndestroy, by thousands, the very men, to whose preservation and welfare\nwe suppose her continually attentive? Every moment she loses sight of\nher beloved creature. Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes she\nannihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimes\nshe desolates them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man.\nShe arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates his\nexistence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the universe?\n\nIf we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providence\ntowards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that far\nfrom resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather those\nunnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates of their\nlicentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they are born, and who,\ncontent with having borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice of\nfortune.\n\nThe Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations, who\ntreat them as barbarians, and refuse to worship God; because, they\nsay, _if he often does good, he often does evil_. Is not this manner of\nreasoning more just and conformable to experience, than that of many men,\nwho are determined to see, in their God, nothing but goodness, wisdom, and\nforesight, and who refuse to see that the innumerable evils, of which this\nworld is the theatre, must come from the same hand, which they kiss with\ndelight?\n\n\n\n\n54.\n\nCommon sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge of a cause,\nbut by its effects. A cause can be reputed constantly good, only when it\nconstantly produces good. A cause, which produces both good and evil, is\nsometimes good, and sometimes evil. But the logic of theology destroys all\nthis. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we behold\nin this world, prove to us the existence of a cause infinitely good; and\nthis cause is God. Although this world is full of evils; although disorder\noften reigns in it; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate;\nwe must be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent and\nimmutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign believe.\n\nEvery thing that passes in the world, proves to us, in the clearest\nmanner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge of\nthe intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the means, which he\nemploys to attain his proposed object. The object of God, is the happiness\nof a man. Yet, a like necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings,\nwho are born only to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of man\nis filled with joy and bitterness; good is every where attended with evil;\norder gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction.\nIf you say, that the designs of God are mysterious and that his ways are\nimpenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is impossible to judge\nwhether God be intelligent.\n\n\n\n\n55.\n\nYou pretend, that God is immutable! What then produces a continual\ninstability in this world, which you make his empire? Is there a state,\nsubject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that of this unknown\nmonarch? How can we attribute to an immutable God, sufficiently powerful\nto give solidity to his works, a government, in which every thing is in\ncontinual vicissitude? If I imagine I see a God of uniform character in\nall the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a God can I see in\ntheir continual misfortunes? You tell me, it is our sins, which compel\nhim to punish. I answer, that God, according to yourselves, is then not\nimmutable, since the sins of men force him to change his conduct towards\nthem. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be\nconstantly the same?\n\n\n\n\n56.\n\nThe universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it enjoy and\nsuffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in a\ndisagreeable manner. These effects are necessary; they result necessarily\nfrom causes, which act only according to their properties. These effects\nnecessarily please, or displease, by a consequence of nature. This same\nnature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things, and to seek,\ndesire, and procure others. In a world, where every thing is necessary,\na God, who remedies nothing, who leaves things to run in their necessary\ncourse,--is he any thing but destiny, or necessity personified? It is a\ndeaf and useless God, who can effect no change in general laws, to which\nhe is himself subject. Of what importance is the infinite power of a\nbeing, who will do but very little in my favour? Where is the infinite\ngoodness of a being, indifferent to happiness? Of what service is the\nfavour of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even a\nfinite one?\n\n\n\n\n57.\n\nWhen we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the government of\na good God, we are told, by way of consolation, that the present world\nis only a passage, designed to conduct man to a happier one. The divines\nassure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, they\nshut our mouths, by saying, that God could communicate to his creatures\nneither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved for\nhimself alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence of\nanother life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who,\nby supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of surviving\nthemselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durable\nhappiness. 2ndly. How can we conceive that a God, who knows every thing,\nand must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures,\nshould want so many experiments, in order to be sure of their\ndispositions? 3rdly. According to the calculations of their chronologists,\nour earth has existed six or seven thousand years. During that time,\nnations have experienced calamities. History exhibits the human species\nat all times tormented and ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by\nwars, inundations, famines, plagues, etc. Are such long trials then likely\nto inspire us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?\nDo such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the\nfuture state, his goodness is preparing for us? 4thly. If God is so kindly\ndisposed, as he is asserted to be, without giving men infinite happiness,\ncould he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of which\nfinite beings are susceptible here below? To be happy, must we have an\n_infinite_ or _divine_ happiness? 5thly. If God could not make men happier\nthan they are here below, what will become of the hope of a _paradise_,\nwhere it is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffable\nbliss? If God neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the only\nresidence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he can or\nwill avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea? Epicurus\nobserved: \"either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or\nhe can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he\nhas both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the power, this\nshews weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God. If he has the\npower, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary\nto his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and\nmalignant, and consequently cannot be God. If he be both willing and able\n(which alone is consonant to the nature of God) whence comes evil, or\nwhy does he not prevent it?\" Reflecting minds are still waiting for a\nreasonable solution of these difficulties; and our divines tell us, that\nthey will be removed only in a future life.\n\n\n\n\n58.\n\nWe are told of a pretended _scale of beings_. It is supposed, that God\nhas divided his creatures into different classes, in which each enjoys\nthe degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible. According to this\nromantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial angels, all\nbeings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature. Experience\nexplicitly contradicts this sublime reverie. In this world, all sensible\nbeings suffer and live in the midst of dangers. Man cannot walk without\nhurting, tormenting, or killing a multitude of sensible beings, which are\nin his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a multitude of\nevils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may lead him to destruction. During\nthe whole course of his life, he is exposed to pains; he is not sure, a\nmoment, of his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and which\nhe regards as the greatest gift of the Divinity.\n\n\n\n\n59.\n\nThe world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which it is\nsusceptible: since it is not God who made it, it must have great qualities\nand great defects. But we answer, that, as the world must necessarily have\ngreat defects, it would have been more conformable to the nature of a\ngood God, not to have created a world, which he could not make completely\nhappy. If God was supremely happy, before the creation of the world, and\ncould have continued to be supremely happy, without creating the world,\nwhy did he not remain at rest? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist? Of\nwhat importance is his existence to God? Nothing, or something? If man's\nexistence is not useful or necessary to God, why did God make man? If\nman's existence is necessary to God's glory, he had need of man; he was\ndeficient in something before man existed. We can pardon an unskilful\nworkman for making an imperfect work; because he must work, well or ill,\nupon penalty of starving. This workman is excusable, but God is not.\nAccording to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men? He\nhas, you say, every thing requisite to make man happy. Why then does he\nnot do it? Confess, that your God has more malice than goodness, unless\nyou admit, that God, was necessitated to do what he has done, without\nbeing able to do it otherwise. Yet, you assure us, that God is free. You\nsay also, that he is immutable, although it was in _Time_ that he began\nand ceased to exercise his power, like the inconstant beings of this\nworld. O theologians! Vain are your efforts to free your God from defects.\nThis perfect God has always some human imperfections.\n\n\n\n\n60.\n\n\"Is not God master of his favours? Can he not give them? Can he not take\nthem away? It does not belong to his creatures to require reasons for\nhis conduct. He can dispose of the works of his own hands as he pleases.\nAbsolute sovereign of mortals, he distributes happiness or misery,\naccording to his good pleasure.\" Such are the solutions given by\ntheologians to console us for the evils which God inflicts upon us.\nWe reply, that a God, who is infinitely good, cannot be _master of his\nfavours_, but would by his nature be obliged to bestow them upon his\ncreatures; that a being, truly beneficent, cannot refrain from doing good;\nthat a being, truly generous, does not take back what he has given; and\nthat every man, who does so, dispenses with gratitude, and has no right to\ncomplain of finding ungrateful men.\n\nHow can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians ascribe to\nGod, be reconciled with religion, which supposes a covenant, or mutual\nengagements between God and men? If God owes nothing to his creatures,\nthey, on their part, can owe nothing to their God. All religion is founded\nupon the happiness that men think they have a right to expect from the\nDeity, who is supposed to say to them: _Love me, adore me, obey me: and I\nwill make you happy_. Men, on their part, say to him: _Make us happy, be\nfaithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you,\nand obey your laws_. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures,\ndistributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting his\ngifts, does not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of all\nreligion? Cicero has justly observed, that _if God is not agreeable to\nman, he cannot be his God_. Goodness constitutes deity; this goodness can\nbe manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon as he is\nunhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity. An infinite\ngoodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive. If God be\ninfinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures. The unhappiness\nof a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded goodness. Under an\ninfinitely good and powerful God, is it possible to conceive that a single\nman should suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invincible\narguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness.\n\n\n\n\n61.\n\nAccording to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life are\nchastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God. But why are\nmen guilty? If God is omnipotent, does it cost him more to say: \"Let every\nthing in the world be in order; let all my subjects be good, innocent, and\nfortunate,\" than to say: \"Let every thing exist\"? Was it more difficult\nfor this God to do his work well, than badly? Religion tells us of a\nhell; that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness,\nGod reserves infinite torments for the majority of men. Thus after having\nrendered mortals very unhappy in this world, religion tells them, that God\ncan render them still more unhappy in another! The theologian gets over\nthis, by saying, that the goodness of God will then give place to his\njustice. But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty,\nis not an infinite goodness. Besides, can a God, who, after having been\ninfinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable\nbeing? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a God filled\nwith implacable fury?\n\n\n\n\n62.\n\nDivine justice, as stated by our divines, is undoubtedly a quality very\nproper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity. According to the ideas\nof modern theology, it is evident, that God has created the majority of\nmen, with the sole view of putting them in a fair way to incur eternal\npunishment. Would it not have been more conformable to goodness, reason,\nand equity, to have created only stones or plants, and not to have created\nsensible beings; than to have formed men, whose conduct in this world\nmight subject them to endless punishment in the other? A God perfidious\nand malicious enough to create a single man, and then to abandon him to\nthe danger of being damned, cannot be regarded as a perfect being; but\nas an unreasonable, unjust, and ill-natured. Very far from composing\na perfect God, theologians have formed the most imperfect of beings.\nAccording to theological notions, God would resemble a tyrant, who, having\nput out the eyes of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them up\nin a dungeon, where, for his amusement, he would, incognito, observe their\nconduct through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour all those,\nwho, while walking about, should hit against each other; but who would\nmagnificently reward the few whom he had not deprived of sight, in\navoiding to run against their comrades. Such are the ideas, which the\ndogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity!\n\nAlthough men are continually repeating that their God is infinitely good;\nyet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe nothing of the\nkind. How can we love what we do not know? How can we love a being, whose\ncharacter is only fit to throw us into inquietude and trouble? How can we\nlove a being, of whom all that is said tends to render him an object of\nutter detestation?\n\n\n\n\n63.\n\nMany people make a subtle distinction between true religion and\nsuperstition. They say, that the latter is only a base and inordinate fear\nof the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence in his God,\nand loves him sincerely; whereas, the superstitious man sees in him only\nan enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents him to himself as\na distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits, lavish of his\nchastisements. But, in reality, does not all religion give us the same\nideas of God? At the same time that we are told, that God is infinitely\ngood, are we not also told, that he is very easily provoked, that he\ngrants his favours to a few people only, and that he furiously chastises\nthose, to whom he has not been pleased to grant favours?\n\n\n\n\n64.\n\nIf we take our ideas of God from the nature of things, where we find a\nmixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good and evil of which\nwe experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimes\ngood, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of exciting our\nlove, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty. There is then no\nreal difference between natural religion, and the most gloomy and servile\nsuperstition. If the theist sees God only in a favourable light; the bigot\nviews him in the most hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful,\nthat of the other is melancholy; but both are equally delirious.\n\n\n\n\n65.\n\nIf I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears to inspire aversion.\nDevotees, who tell us, that they sincerely love their God, are either\nliars or fools, who see their God only in profile. It is impossible to\nlove a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with terror, and whose\njudgments make us tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upon\na God, who is reputed to be barbarous enough to damn us? Let not divines\ntalk to us of a filial, or respectful fear, mixed with love, which men\nought to have for their God. A son can by no means love his father, when\nhe knows him to be cruel enough to inflict upon him studied torments for\nthe least faults he may commit. No man upon earth can have the least spark\nof love for a God, who reserves chastisements, infinite in duration and\nviolence, for ninety-nine hundredths of his children.\n\n\n\n\n66.\n\nThe inventors of the dogma of eternal hell-torments have made of that God,\nwhom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in men is\nthe last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind must revolt at the bare\nrecital of the torments, inflicted on the greatest criminal; but cruelty\nis much more apt to excite indignation, when void of motives. The most\nsanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas, the Neros, the Domitians, had, at\nleast, some motives for tormenting their victims. These motives were,\neither their own safety, or the fury of revenge, or the design of\nfrightening by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity of making\na display of their power, and the desire of satisfying a barbarous\ncuriosity. Can a God have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims\nof his wrath, he would punish beings, who could neither endanger his\nimmoveable power, nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other\nhand, the punishments of the other life would be useless to the living,\nwho cannot be witnesses of them. These punishments would be useless to the\ndamned, since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and the\ntime of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise of\nhis eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself,\nand insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the whole human\nrace;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I do\nnot say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, without\nemolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thing\nto fear? Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your own\nprinciples, your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men.\n\nPerhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments.\nI answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite; that\nthe offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a God, who\nis unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences of his\ncreatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good, can neither be\ninfinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite duration, solely for\nthe pleasure of eternal torments.\n\nNothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery, or the\nblindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal punishments.\nIf there is a God, whom we can offend or blaspheme, there are not upon\nearth greater blasphemers than those, who dare to say, that this same God\nis a tyrant, perverse enough to delight, during eternity, in the useless\ntorments of his feeble creatures.\n\n\n\n\n67.\n\nTo pretend, that God can be offended at the actions of men, is to\nannihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us, in other\nrespects, of this being. To say, that man can trouble the order of the\nuniverse; that he can kindle the thunder in the hands of his God; that\nhe can defeat his projects, is to say, that man is stronger than his God,\nthat he is the arbiter of his will, that it depends upon him to change\nhis goodness into cruelty. Theology continually pulls down, with one hand,\nwhat it erects with the other. If all religion is founded upon a God,\nwho is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable\ncontradiction.\n\nAll religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of the\nDeity. But no sooner do they display his conduct, than we see nothing\nbut imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and folly. God, it is said,\ncreated the world for himself; and yet, hitherto, he has never been able\nto make himself suitably honoured by it. God created men in order to have,\nin his dominions, subjects to render him their homage; and yet, we see men\nin continual revolt against him.\n\n\n\n\n68.\n\nThey incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we demand\nproofs of them, they point to his works, in which, they assure us, these\nperfections are written in indelible characters. All these works are,\nhowever, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is ever regarded as the\nmost marvellous work, as the master-piece of the Deity, is full of\nimperfections, which render him disagreeable to the eyes of the almighty\nBeing, who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting and\nodious to its author, that he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But,\nif the fairest of God's works is imperfect, how can we judge of the\ndivine perfections? Can a work, with which the author himself is so little\npleased, induce us to admire the ability of its Maker? Man, considered\nin a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless\nevils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of faults;\nyet we are unceasingly told, that he is the most beautiful work of the\nmost perfect of beings.\n\n\n\n\n69.\n\nIn creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that heretofore God\nhas not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs of his perfection.\nDo we not see, in many religions, that angels, have even attempted to\ndethrone him? God proposed the happiness of angels and men; yet, he has\nnever been able to render happy either angels or men;--the pride, malice,\nsins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will of\nthe perfect Creator.\n\n\n\n\n70.\n\nAll religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that _God does what\nhe can, and man what he will_. Every system of religion presents to us\nan unequal combat between the Deity on one part, and his creatures on the\nother, in which the former never comes off to his honour. Notwithstanding\nhis omnipotence, he cannot succeed in rendering the works of his hands\nsuch as he would have them. To complete the absurdity, there is a\nreligion, which pretends, that God himself has died to redeem mankind; and\nyet, men are not farther from any thing, than they are from what God would\nhave them.\n\n\n\n\n71.\n\nNothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes the Divinity\nact in every country. Did he really exist, we should see in him the most\ncapricious, and senseless being. We should be compelled to believe, that\nGod made the world only to be the theatre of his disgraceful wars with\nhis creatures; that he created angels, men, and demons, only to make\nadversaries, against whom he might exercise his power. He renders men free\nto offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects, too obstinate to\nsubmit; and all this merely for the pleasure of being angry, appeased,\nreconciled, and of repairing the disorder they have made. Had the Deity at\nonce formed his creatures such as he would have them, what pains would he\nnot have spared himself, or, at least, from what embarrassments would he\nnot have relieved his theologians!\n\nEvery religion represents God as busy only in doing himself evil. He\nresembles those empirics, who inflict upon themselves wounds, to have an\nopportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy of their ointment.\nBut we see not, that the Deity has hitherto been able radically to cure\nhimself of the evil, which he suffers from man.\n\n\n\n\n72.\n\nGod is the author of all; and yet, we are assured that evil does not come\nfrom God. Whence then does it come? From man. But, who made man? God. Evil\nthen comes from God. If he had not made man as he is, moral evil or sin\nwould not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore\nchargeable to God. If man has power to do evil, or to offend God, we are\nforced to infer, that God chooses to be offended; that God, who made man,\nhas resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would be an effect\ncontrary to the cause, from which he derives his being.\n\n\n\n\n73.\n\nMan ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing beforehand\nwhatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns to his glory,\nnor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man. If God foreknows\nthe future, must he not have foreseen the fall of his creatures? If he\nresolved in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because it\nwas his will that this fall should take place, otherwise it could not have\nhappened. If God's foreknowledge of the sins of his creatures had been\nnecessary or forced, one might suppose, that he has been constrained by\nhis justice to punish the guilty; but, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing,\nand the power of predetermining every thing, did it not depend upon God\nnot to impose upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispense\nwith creating beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing,\nand rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree? Of what consequence is it,\nwhether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an anterior decree,\nan effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree, an effect of\nhis justice? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter the fate of the\nunhappy? Would they not have the same right to complain of a God, who,\nbeing able to omit their creation, has notwithstanding created them,\nalthough he plainly foresaw that his justice would oblige him, sooner or\nlater, to punish them?\n\n\n\n\n74.\n\n\"Man,\" you say, \"when he came from the hand of God, was pure, innocent,\nand good; but his nature has been corrupted, as a punishment for sin.\"\nIf man, when just out of the hands of his God, could sin, his nature was\nimperfect. Why did God suffer him to sin, and his nature to be corrupted?\nWhy did God permit him to be seduced, well knowing that he was too feeble\nto resist temptation? Why did God create _satan_, an evil spirit, a\ntempter? Why did not God, who wishes so much good to the human race,\nannihilate once for all so many evil genii, who are naturally enemies of\nour happiness; or rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victories\nand fatal influence over mankind, he must have foreseen? In fine, by what\nstrange fatality in all religions of the world, has the evil principle\nsuch a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity?\n\n\n\n\n75.\n\nThere is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour to the heart\nof an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this pious man thought\nhe must announce to his audience, that he had, thank heaven, at last\ndiscovered, by dint of meditation, a sure way of rendering all men happy.\n\"The devil,\" said he, \"tempts men only to have in hell companions of his\nmisery. Let us therefore apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heaven\nand hell; let us prevail upon him to pray to God, at the head of the whole\nchurch, to consent to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him to\nfavour, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put an\nend to his malicious projects against mankind.\" Perhaps the honest monk\ndid not see, that the devil is at least as useful as God to the ministers\nof religion. They have too much interest in their dissensions, to be\ninstrumental in an accommodation between two enemies, upon whose combats\ntheir own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be tempted\nand to sin, and the ministry of priests will be useless. Manicheism is\nevidently the hinge of every religion; but unhappily, the devil, invented\nto clear the deity from the suspicion of malice, proves to us, every\nmoment, the impotence or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary.\n\n\n\n\n76.\n\nThe nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption. God\ncould not communicate to him _impeccability_, which is an inalienable\nattribute of his divine perfection. But if God could not make man\nimpeccable, why did he give himself the pains to make man, whose nature\nmust necessarily be corrupted, and who must consequently offend God? On\nthe other hand, if God himself could not make human nature impeccable, by\nwhat right does he punish men for not being impeccable? It can be only\nby the right of the strongest; but the right of the strongest is called\nviolence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justest of beings.\nGod would be supremely unjust, should he punish men for not sharing with\nhim his divine perfections, or for not being able to be gods like him.\n\nCould not God, at least, have communicated to all men that kind of\nperfection, of which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good,\nor render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not that God done the\nsame favour, or given the same dispositions to all beings of our species?\nWhy does the number of the wicked so much exceed the number of the good?\nWhy, for one friend, has God ten thousand enemies, in a world, which it\ndepended entirely upon him to people with honest men? If it be true, that,\nin heaven, God designs to form a court of saints, of elect, or of men who\nshall have lived upon earth conformably to his views, would he not have\nhad a more numerous, brilliant, and honourable assembly, had he composed\nit of all men, to whom, in creating them, he could grant the degree of\ngoodness, necessary to attain eternal happiness? Finally, would it not\nhave been shorter not to have made man, than to have created him a being\nfull of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually exposed to cause\nhis own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty?\n\nInstead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only angels\nvery docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free; some have\nsinned; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty by revolting\nagainst their master. Could not God have created only angels of the good\nkind? If God has created angels, who have not sinned, could he not have\ncreated impeccable men, or men who should never abuse their liberty? If\nthe elect are incapable of sinning in heaven, could not God have made\nimpeccable men upon earth?\n\n\n\n\n77.\n\nDivines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance which\nseparates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of God a mystery\nto us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master. Is this answer\nsatisfactory? Since my eternal happiness is at stake, have I not a right\nto examine the conduct of God himself? It is only in hope of happiness\nthat men submit to the authority of a God. A despot, to whom men submit\nonly through fear, a master, whom they cannot interrogate, a sovereign\ntotally inaccessible, can never merit the homage of intelligent beings.\nIf the conduct of God is a mystery, it is not made for us. Man can neither\nadore, admire, respect, nor imitate conduct, in which every thing is\ninconceivable, or, of which he can often form only revolting ideas; unless\nit is pretended, that we ought to adore every thing of which we are forced\nto be ignorant, and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes for\nthat reason an object of admiration. Divines! You never cease telling us,\nthat the designs of God are impenetrable; that _his ways are not our\nways, nor his thoughts our thoughts_; that it is absurd to complain of\nhis administration, of the motives and springs of which we are totally\nignorant; that it is presumption to tax his judgments with injustice,\nbecause we cannot comprehend them. But when you speak in this strain, do\nyou not perceive, that you destroy with your own hands all your profound\nsystems, whose only end is to explain to us the ways of the divinity,\nwhich, you say, are impenetrable? Have you penetrated his judgments, his\nways, his designs? You dare not assert it, and though you reason about\nthem without end, you do not comprehend them any more than we do. If, by\nchance, you know the plan of God, which you wish us to admire, while\nmost people find it so little worthy of a just, good, intelligent, and\nreasonable being, no longer say, this plan is impenetrable. If you are as\nignorant of it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously\nconfess, they comprehend nothing in it, or that they see in it nothing\ndivine. Cease to persecute for opinions, of which you understand nothing\nyourselves; cease to defame each other for dreams and conjectures, which\nevery thing seems to contradict. Talk to us of things intelligible and\nreally useful to men; and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable ways of\nGod, about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves.\n\nBy continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom, forbidding\nus to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God before the tribunal\nof our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge our master, divines\nteach us nothing but the embarrassment they are in, when it is required to\naccount for the conduct of a God, whose conduct they think marvellous only\nbecause they are utterly incapable of comprehending it themselves.\n\n\n\n\n78.\n\nPhysical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin. Diseases,\nfamines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to chastise wicked\nmen. Thus, they make no scruple of attributing these evils to the severity\nof a just and good God. But, do not these scourges fall indiscriminately\nupon the good and bad, upon the impious and devout, upon the innocent and\nguilty? How, in this proceeding, would they have us admire the justice\nand goodness of a being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so many\nwretches, whose brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes,\nsince they forget, that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of the\nevents of this world. This being the case, ought they not to impute their\nsufferings to him, into whose arms they fly for comfort? Unfortunate\nfather! Thou consolest thyself in the bosom of Providence, for the loss of\na dear child, or beloved wife, who made thy happiness. Alas! Dost thou not\nsee, that thy God has killed them? Thy God has rendered thee miserable,\nand thou desirest thy God to comfort thee for the dreadful afflictions he\nhas sent thee!\n\nThe chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded in\ndestroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, dear, and natural ideas,\nthat the devout, unable to accuse God of malice, accustom themselves to\nregard the several strokes of fate as indubitable proofs of celestial\ngoodness. When in affliction, they are ordered to believe that God loves\nthem, that God visits them, that God wishes to try them. Thus religion has\nattained the art of converting evil into good! A profane person said with\nreason--_If God Almighty thus treats those whom he loves, I earnestly\nbeseech him never to think of me_.\n\nMen must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who is\ncalled so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercing\nafflictions are marks of his favour! Would an evil genius, a demon,\nbe more ingenious in tormenting his enemies, than the God of goodness\nsometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon his dearest\nfriends?\n\n\n\n\n79.\n\nWhat shall we say of a father, who, we are assured, watches without\nintermission over the preservation and happiness of his weak and\nshort-sighted children, and who yet leaves them at liberty to wander at\nrandom among rocks, precipices, and waters; who rarely hinders them from\nfollowing their inordinate appetites; who permits them to handle, without\nprecaution, murderous arms, at the risk of their life? What should we\nthink of the same father, if, instead of imputing to himself the evil that\nhappens to his poor children, he should punish them for their wanderings\nin the most cruel manner? We should say, with reason, that this father is\na madman, who unites injustice to folly. A God, who punishes faults, which\nhe could have prevented, is a being deficient in wisdom, goodness, and\nequity. A foreseeing God would prevent evil, and thereby avoid having to\npunish it. A good God would not punish weaknesses, which he knew to be\ninherent in human nature. A just God, if he made man, would not punish\nhim for not being made strong enough to resist his desires. _To punish\nweakness is the most unjust tyranny._ Is it not calumniating a just God,\nto say, that he punishes men for their faults, even in the present life?\nHow could he punish beings, whom it belonged to him alone to reform, and\nwho, while they have not _grace_, cannot act otherwise than they do?\n\nAccording to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his present\nstate of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since, without divine grace,\nhe is never able to do good. Now, if the nature of man, left to itself,\nor destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines him to evil, or renders\nhim incapable of good, what becomes of the free-will of man? According to\nsuch principles, man can neither merit nor demerit. By rewarding man for\nthe good he does, God would only reward himself; by punishing man for the\nevil he does, God would punish him for not giving him grace, without which\nhe could not possibly do better.\n\n\n\n\n80.\n\nTheologians repeatedly tell us, that man is free, while all their\nprinciples conspire to destroy his liberty. By endeavouring to justify\nthe Divinity, they in reality accuse him of the blackest injustice. They\nsuppose, that without grace, man is necessitated to do evil. They affirm,\nthat God will punish him, because God has not given him grace to do good!\n\nLittle reflection will suffice to convince us, that man is necessitated\nin all his actions, that his free will is a chimera, even in the system of\ntheologians. Does it depend upon man to be born of such or such parents?\nDoes it depend upon man to imbibe or not to imbibe the opinions of his\nparents or instructors? If I had been born of idolatrous or Mahometan\nparents, would it have depended upon me to become a Christian? Yet,\ndivines gravely assure us, that a just God will damn without pity all\nthose, to whom he has not given grace to know the Christian religion!\n\nMan's birth is wholly independent of his choice. He is not asked whether\nhe is willing, or not, to come into the world. Nature does not consult\nhim upon the country and parents she gives him. His acquired ideas, his\nopinions, his notions true or false, are necessary fruits of the education\nwhich he has received, and of which he has not been the director. His\npassions and desires are necessary consequences of the temperament given\nhim by nature. During his whole life, his volitions and actions are\ndetermined by his connections, habits, occupations, pleasures, and\nconversations; by the thoughts, that are involuntarily presented to his\nmind; in a word, by a multitude of events and accidents, which it is out\nof his power to foresee or prevent. Incapable of looking into futurity,\nhe knows not what he will do. From the instant of his birth to that of\nhis death, he is never free. You will say, that he wills, deliberates,\nchooses, determines; and you will hence conclude, that his actions are\nfree. It is true, that man wills, but he is not master of his will or\nhis desires; he can desire and will only what he judges advantageous to\nhimself; he can neither love pain, nor detest pleasure. It will be\nsaid, that he sometimes prefers pain to pleasure; but then he prefers\na momentary pain with a view of procuring a greater and more durable\npleasure. In this case, the prospect of a greater good necessarily\ndetermines him to forego a less considerable good.\n\nThe lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate him; he\nis not then master of loving, or not loving the object of his tenderness;\nhe is not master of his imagination or temperament. Whence it evidently\nfollows, that man is not master of his volitions and desires. \"But man,\"\nyou will say, \"can resist his desires; therefore he is free.\" Man resists\nhis desires, when the motives, which divert him from an object, are\nstronger than those, which incline him towards it; but then his resistance\nis necessary. A man, whose fear of dishonour or punishment is greater than\nhis love of money, necessarily resists the desire of stealing.\n\n\"Are we not free, when we deliberate?\" But, are we masters of knowing or\nnot knowing, of being in doubt or certainty? Deliberation is a necessary\neffect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences of our actions. When\nwe are sure, or think we are sure, of these consequences, we necessarily\ndecide, and we then act necessarily according to our true or false\njudgment. Our judgments, true or false, are not free; they are necessarily\ndetermined by the ideas, we have received, or which our minds have formed.\n\nMan is not free in his choice; he is evidently necessitated to choose what\nhe judges most useful and agreeable. Neither is he free, when he suspends\nhis choice; he is forced to suspend it until he knows, or thinks he knows,\nthe qualities of the objects presented to him, or, until he has weighed\nthe consequences of his actions. \"Man,\" you will say, \"often decides in\nfavour of actions, which he knows must be detrimental to himself; man\nsometimes kills himself; therefore he is free.\" I deny it. Is man master\nof reasoning well or ill? Do not his reason and wisdom depend upon the\nopinions he has formed, or upon the conformation of his machine? As\nneither one nor the other depends upon his will, they are no proof of\nliberty. \"If I lay a wager, that I shall do, or not do a thing, am I\nnot free? Does it not depend upon me to do it or not?\" No, I answer; the\ndesire of winning the wager will necessarily determine you to do, or not\nto do the thing in question. \"But, supposing I consent to lose the wager?\"\nThen the desire of proving to me, that you are free, will have become a\nstronger motive than the desire of winning the wager; and this motive\nwill have necessarily determined you to do, or not to do, the thing in\nquestion.\n\n\"But,\" you will say, \"I feel free.\" This is an illusion, that may be\ncompared to that of the fly in the fable, who, lighting upon the pole of\na heavy carriage, applauded himself for directing its course. Man, who\nthinks himself free, is a fly, who imagines he has power to move the\nuniverse, while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it.\n\nThe inward persuasion that we are free to do, or not to do a thing, is but\na mere illusion. If we trace the true principle of our actions, we shall\nfind, that they are always necessary consequences of our volitions and\ndesires, which are never in our power. You think yourself free, because\nyou do what you will; but are you free to will, or not to will; to desire,\nor not to desire? Are not your volitions and desires necessarily excited\nby objects or qualities totally independent of you?\n\n\n\n\n81.\n\n\"If the actions of men are necessary, if men are not free, by what right\ndoes society punish criminals? Is it not very unjust to chastise beings,\nwho could not act otherwise than they have done?\" If the wicked act\nnecessarily according to the impulses of their evil nature, society,\nin punishing them, acts necessarily by the desire of self-preservation.\nCertain objects necessarily produce in us the sensation of pain; our\nnature then forces us against them, and avert them from us. A tiger,\npressed by hunger, springs upon the man, whom he wishes to devour; but\nthis man is not master of his fear, and necessarily seeks means to destroy\nthe tiger.\n\n\n\n\n82.\n\n\"If every thing be necessary, the errors, opinions, and ideas of men\nare fatal; and, if so, how or why should we attempt to reform them?\" The\nerrors of men are necessary consequences of ignorance. Their ignorance,\nprejudice, and credulity are necessary consequences of their inexperience,\nnegligence, and want of reflection, in the same manner as delirium or\nlethargy are necessary effects of certain diseases. Truth, experience,\nreflection, and reason, are remedies calculated to cure ignorance,\nfanaticism and follies. But, you will ask, why does not truth produce this\neffect upon many disordered minds? It is because some diseases resist all\nremedies; because it is impossible to cure obstinate patients, who refuse\nthe remedies presented to them; because the interest of some men, and the\nfolly of others, necessarily oppose the admission of truth.\n\nA cause produces its effect only when its action is not interrupted by\nstronger causes, which then weakens or render useless, the action of the\nformer. It is impossible that the best arguments should be adopted by men,\nwho are interested in error, prejudiced in its favour, and who decline all\nreflection; but truth must necessarily undeceive honest minds, who seek\nher sincerely. Truth is a cause; it necessarily produces its effects, when\nits impulse is not intercepted by causes, which suspend its effects.\n\n\n\n\n83.\n\n\"To deprive man of his free will,\" it is said, \"makes him a mere machine,\nan automaton. Without liberty, he will no longer have either merit or\nvirtue.\" What is merit in man? It is a manner of acting, which renders\nhim estimable in the eyes of his fellow-beings. What is virtue? It is a\ndisposition, which inclines us to do good to others. What can there be\ncontemptible in machines, or automatons, capable of producing effects so\ndesirable? Marcus Aurelius was useful to the vast Roman Empire. By what\nright would a machine despise a machine, whose springs facilitate its\naction? Good men are springs, which second society in its tendency to\nhappiness; the wicked are ill-formed springs, which disturb the order,\nprogress, and harmony of society. If, for its own utility, society\ncherishes and rewards the good, it also harasses and destroys the wicked,\nas useless or hurtful.\n\n\n\n\n84.\n\nThe world is a necessary agent. All the beings, that compose it, are\nunited to each other, and cannot act otherwise than they do, so long as\nthey are moved by the same causes, and endued with the same properties.\nWhen they lose properties, they will necessarily act in a different way.\nGod himself, admitting his existence, cannot be considered a free\nagent. If there existed a God, his manner of acting would necessarily\nbe determined by the properties inherent in his nature; nothing would be\ncapable of arresting or altering his will. This being granted, neither our\nactions, prayers, nor sacrifices could suspend, or change his invariable\nconduct and immutable designs; whence we are forced to infer, that all\nreligion would be useless.\n\n\n\n\n85.\n\nWere not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves, they would\nsee, that, according to their hypothesis, man cannot be reputed free an\ninstant. Do they not suppose man continually dependent on his God? Are we\nfree, when we cannot exist and be preserved without God, and when we cease\nto exist at the pleasure of his supreme will? If God has made man out of\nnothing; if his preservation is a continued creation; if God cannot, an\ninstant, lose sight of his creature; if whatever happens to him, is an\neffect of the divine will; if man can do nothing of himself; if all the\nevents, which he experiences, are effects of the divine decrees; if he\ndoes no good without grace from on high, how can they maintain, that a man\nenjoys a moment's liberty? If God did not preserve him in the moment\nof sin, how could man sin? If God then preserves him, God forces him to\nexist, that he may sin.\n\n\n\n\n86.\n\nThe Divinity is frequently compared to a king, whose revolted subjects are\nthe greater part of mankind; and it is said, he has a right to reward the\nsubjects who remain faithful to him, and to punish the rebellious. This\ncomparison is not just in any of its parts. God presides over a machine,\nevery spring of which he has created. These springs act agreeable to the\nmanner, in which God has formed them; he ought to impute it to his own\nunskilfulness, if these springs do not contribute to the harmony of the\nmachine, into which it was his will to insert them. God is a created king,\nwho has created to himself subjects of every description; who has formed\nthem according to his own pleasure whose will can never find resistance.\nIf God has rebellious subjects in his empire, it is because God has\nresolved to have rebellious subjects. If the sins of men disturb the order\nof the world, it is because it is the will of God that this order should\nbe disturbed.\n\nNobody dares to call in question the divine justice; yet, under the\ngovernment of a just God, we see nothing but acts of injustice and\nviolence. Force decides the fate of nations, equity seems banished from\nthe earth; a few men sport, unpunished, with the peace, property, liberty,\nand life of others. All is disorder in a world governed by a God who is\nsaid to be infinitely displeased with disorder.\n\n\n\n\n87.\n\nAlthough men are for ever admiring the wisdom, goodness, justice, and\nbeautiful order of Providence, they are, in reality, never satisfied with\nit. Do not the prayers, continually addressed to heaven, shew, that men\nare by no means satisfied with the divine dispensations? To pray to God\nfor a favour, shews diffidence of his watchful care; to pray to him to\navert or put an end to an evil, is to endeavour to obstruct the course\nof his justice; to implore the assistance of God in our calamities, is to\naddress the author himself of these calamities, to represent to him, that\nhe ought, for our sake, to rectify his plan, which does not accord with\nour interest.\n\nThe Optimist, or he who maintains that _all is well_, and who incessantly\ncries that we live in _the best world possible_, to be consistent, should\nnever pray; neither ought he to expect another world, where man will be\nhappier. Can there be a better world than _the best world possible_? Some\ntheologians have treated the Optimists as impious, for having intimated\nthat God could not produce a better world, than that in which we live.\nAccording to these doctors, it is to limit the power of God, and to\noffer him insult. But do not these divines see, that it shews much less\nindignity to God, to assert that he has done his best in producing this\nworld, than to say, that, being able to produce a better, he has had\nmalice enough to produce a very bad one? If the Optimist, by his system,\ndetracts from the divine power, the theologian, who treats him as a\nblasphemer, is himself a blasphemer, who offends the goodness of God in\nespousing the cause of his omnipotence.\n\n\n\n\n88.\n\nWhen we complain of the evils, of which our world is the theatre, we are\nreferred to the other world, where it is said, God will make reparation\nfor all the iniquity and misery, which, for a time, he permits here below.\nBut if God, suffering his eternal justice to remain at rest for a long\ntime, could consent to evil during the whole continuance of our present\nworld, what assurance have we, that, during the continuance of another\nworld, divine justice will not, in like manner, sleep over the misery of\nits inhabitants?\n\nThe divines console us for our sufferings by saying, that God is patient,\nand that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure. But do\nthey not see, that patience is incompatible with a just, immutable, and\nomnipotent being? Can God then permit injustice, even for an instant? To\ntemporize with a known evil, announces either weakness, uncertainty,\nor collusion. To tolerate evil, when one has power to prevent it, is to\nconsent to the commission of evil.\n\n\n\n\n89.\n\nDivines every where exclaim, that God is infinitely just; but that _his\njustice is not the justice of man_. Of what kind or nature then is\nthis divine justice? What idea can I form of a justice, which so often\nresembles injustice? Is it not to confound all ideas of just and unjust,\nto say, that what is equitable in God is iniquitous in his creatures?\nHow can we receive for our model a being, whose divine perfections are\nprecisely the reverse of human?\n\n\"God,\" it is said, \"is sovereign arbiter of our destinies. His supreme\npower, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do with the works\nof his own hands according to his good pleasure. A worm, like man, has no\nright even to complain.\" This arrogant style is evidently borrowed from\nthe language, used by the ministers of tyrants, when they stop the mouths\nof those who suffer from their violences. It cannot then be the language\nof the ministers of a God, whose equity is highly extolled; it is not made\nto be imposed upon a being, who reasons. Ministers of a just God! I will\ninform you then, that the greatest power cannot confer upon your God\nhimself the right of being unjust even to the vilest of his creatures. A\ndespot is not a God. A God, who arrogates to himself the right of doing\nevil, is a tyrant; a tyrant is not a model for men; he must be an object\nexecrable to their eyes.\n\nIs it not indeed strange, that in order to justify the Divinity, they make\nhim every moment the most unjust of beings! As soon as we complain of his\nconduct, they think to silence us by alleging, that _God is master_; which\nsignifies, that God, being the strongest, is not bound by ordinary rules.\nBut the right of the strongest is the violation of all rights. It seems\nright only to the eyes of a savage conqueror, who in the heat of his fury\nimagines, that he may do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims,\nwhom he has conquered. This barbarous right can appear legitimate only to\nslaves blind enough to believe that everything is lawful to tyrants whom\nthey feel too weak to resist.\n\nIn the greatest calamities, do not devout persons, through a ridiculous\nsimplicity, or rather a sensible contradiction in terms, exclaim, that\n_the Almighty is master_. Thus, inconsistent reasoners, believe, that the\n_Almighty_ (a Being, one of whose first attributes is goodness,) sends you\npestilence, war, and famine! You believe that the _Almighty_, this good\nbeing, has the will and right to inflict the greatest evils, you can bear!\nCease, at least, to call your God _good_, when he does you evil; say not,\nthat he is just, say that he is the strongest, and that it is impossible\nfor you to ward off the blows of his caprice.\n\n_God_, say you, _chastises only for our good_. But what real good can\nresult to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged by wars,\ncorrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually crushed under\nthe iron sceptre of a succession of merciless tyrants, annihilated by the\nscourges of a bad government, whose destructive effects are often felt for\nages? If chastisements are good, then they cannot have too much of a good\nthing! _The eyes of faith_ must be strange eyes, if with them they see\nadvantages in the most dreadful calamities, in the vices and follies with\nwhich our species are afflicted.\n\n\n\n\n90.\n\nWhat strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have, who are taught\nto believe, that their God, in view of reconciling to himself the human\nrace, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of their fathers, has put to\ndeath his own son, who was innocent and incapable of sinning? What should\nwe say of a king, whose subjects should revolt, and who, to appease\nhimself, should find no other expedient than to put to death the heir of\nhis crown, who had not participated in the general rebellion? \"It is,\"\nthe Christian will say, \"through goodness to his subjects, unable of\nthemselves to satisfy divine justice, that God has consented to the cruel\ndeath of his son.\" But the goodness of a father to strangers does not\ngive him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son. All\nthe qualities, which theology ascribes to God, reciprocally destroy one\nanother. The exercise of one of his perfections is always at the expense\nof the exercise of another.\n\nHas the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian?\nThe pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven; _Jehovah_ causes the\npestilence to descend upon his innocent people; seventy thousand subjects\nare exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch, whom the goodness of\nGod resolved to spare.\n\n\n\n\n91.\n\nNotwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all religions\ndelight to blacken the Divinity, men cannot consent to accuse him of\niniquity. They fear, that, like the tyrants of this world, truth will\noffend him, and redouble upon them the weight of his malice and tyranny.\nThey hearken therefore to their priests, who tell them, that their God\nis a tender father; that this God is an equitable monarch whose object in\nthis world is to assure himself of the love, obedience and respect of\nhis subjects; who gives them liberty of acting only to afford them\nan opportunity of meriting his favours, and of acquiring an eternal\nhappiness, which he does not owe them. By what signs can men discover\nthe tenderness of a father, who has given life to the greater part of his\nchildren merely to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitter\nexistence? Is there a more unfortunate present, than that pretended\nliberty, which, we are told, men are very liable to abuse, and thereby to\nincur eternal misery?\n\n\n\n\n92.\n\nBy calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part has not the\nDeity forced them to act? Thrown into the world without their consent,\nprovided with a temperament of which they are not masters, animated by\npassions and desires inherent in their nature, exposed to snares which\nthey have not power to escape, hurried away by events which they could not\nforesee or prevent, unhappy mortals are compelled to run a career, which\nmay lead them to punishments horrible in duration and violence.\n\nTravellers inform us, that, in Asia, a Sultan reigned, full of fantastical\nideas, and very absolute in his whims. By a strange madness, this prince\nspent his time seated at a table, upon which were placed three dice and a\ndice-box. One end of the table was covered with pieces of silver, designed\nto excite the avarice of his courtiers and people. He, knowing the\nfoible of his subjects, addresses them as follows: _Slaves, I wish your\nhappiness. My goodness proposes to enrich you, and make you all happy. Do\nyou see these treasures? Well, they are for you; strive to gain them; let\neach, in his turn, take the box and dice; whoever has the fortune to throw\nsixes, shall be master of the treasure. But, I forewarn you, that he who\nhas not the happiness to throw the number required, shall be precipitated\nfor ever into a dark dungeon, where my justice demands that he be burned\nwith a slow fire._ Upon this discourse of the monarch, the company look at\neach other affrighted. No one wishes to expose himself to so dangerous\na chance. _What!_ says the enraged Sultan, _does no one offer to play? I\ntell you then you must; My glory requires that you should play. Play then;\nobey without replying._ It is well to observe, that the dice of the despot\nare so prepared, that out of a hundred thousand throws, there is but one,\nwhich can gain the number required. Thus the generous monarch has the\npleasure of seeing his prison well filled, and his riches seldom ravished\nfrom him. Mortals! this SULTAN is your GOD; his TREASURE IS HEAVEN; his\nDUNGEON IS HELL, and it is you who hold the DICE!\n\n\n\n\n93.\n\nDivines repeatedly assure us, that we owe Providence infinite gratitude\nfor the numberless blessings it bestows. They loudly extol the happiness\nof existence. But, alas! how many mortals are truly satisfied with their\nmode of existence? If life has sweets, with how much bitterness is it not\nmixed? Does not a single chagrin often suffice suddenly to poison the most\npeaceable and fortunate life? Are there many, who, if it were in their\npower would begin again, at the same price, the painful career, in which,\nwithout their consent, destiny has placed them?\n\nThey say, that existence is a great blessing. But is not this existence\ncontinually troubled with fears, and maladies, often cruel and little\ndeserved? May not this existence, threatened on so many sides, be torn\nfrom us any moment? Where is the man, who has not been deprived of a dear\nwife, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss every moment intrudes\nupon his thoughts? There are few, who have not been forced to drink of the\ncup of misfortune; there are few, who have not desired their end. Finally,\nit did not depend upon us to exist or not to exist. Should the bird then\nbe very grateful to the fowler for taking him in his net and confining him\nin his cage for his diversion?\n\n\n\n\n94.\n\nNotwithstanding the infirmities and misery which man is forced to undergo,\nhe has, nevertheless, the folly to think himself the favourite of his God,\nthe object of all his cares, the sole end of all his works. He imagines,\nthat the whole universe is made for him; he arrogantly calls himself the\n_king of nature_, and values himself far above other animals. Mortal! upon\nwhat canst thou found thy haughty pretensions? It is, sayest thou, upon\nthy soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties, which enable thee\nto exercise an absolute empire over the beings, which surround thee. But,\nweak sovereign of the world; art thou sure, one moment, of the continuance\nof thy reign? Do not the smallest atoms of matter, which thou despisest,\nsuffice to tear thee from thy throne, and deprive thee of life? Finally,\ndoes not the king of animals at last become the food of worms? Thou\nspeakest of thy soul! But dost thou know what a soul is? Dost thou not\nsee, that this soul is only the assemblage of thy organs, from which\nresults life? Wouldst thou then refuse a soul to other animals, who live,\nthink, judge, and compare, like thee; who seek pleasure, and avoid pain,\nlike thee; and who often have organs, which serve them better than thine?\nThou boastest of thy intellectual faculties; but do these faculties, of\nwhich thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals? Dost\nthou often make use of that reason, in which thou gloriest, and to\nwhich religion commands thee not to listen? Are those brutes, which thou\ndisdainest, because they are less strong or less cunning than thou art,\nsubject to mental pains, to a thousand frivolous passions, to a thousand\nimaginary wants, to which thou art a continual prey? Are they, like thee,\ntormented by the past, alarmed at the future? Confined solely to the\npresent, does not what you call their _instinct_, and what I call their\n_intelligence_, suffice to preserve and defend them, and to supply them\nwith all they want? Does not this instinct, of which thou speakest with\ncontempt, often serve them better than thy wonderful faculties? Is not\ntheir peaceful ignorance more advantageous to them, than those extravagant\nmeditations and worthless researches, which render thee unhappy, and\nfor which thy zeal urges thee even to massacre the beings of thy noble\nspecies? Finally, have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubled\nimagination, which makes them fear, not only death, but likewise eternal\ntorments?\n\nAugustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put his sons to death,\nexclaimed: _It is much better to be Herod's hog, than his son_. As much\nmay be said of man. This dear child of Providence runs far greater risks\nthan all other animals; having suffered much in this world, does he not\nimagine, that he is in danger of suffering eternally in another?\n\n\n\n\n95.\n\nWhere is the precise line of distinction between man and the animals whom\nhe calls brutes? In what does he differ essentially from beasts? It is,\nwe are told, by his intelligence, by the faculties of his mind, and by his\nreason, that man appears superior to all other animals, who, in all their\nactions, move only by physical impulses, in which reason has no share.\nBut finally, brutes, having fewer wants than man, easily do without his\nintellectual faculties, which would be perfectly useless in their mode of\nexistence. Their instinct is sufficient; while all the faculties of man\nscarcely suffice to render his existence supportable, and to satisfy the\nwants, which his imagination and his prejudices multiply to his torment.\n\nBrutes are not influenced by the same objects, as man; they have not the\nsame wants, desires, nor fancies; and they very soon arrive to maturity,\nwhile the mind of man seldom attains to the full enjoyment and free\nexercise of its faculties and to such a use of them, as is conducive to\nhis happiness.\n\n\n\n\n96.\n\nWe are assured, that the human soul is a simple substance. It should\nthen be the same in every individual, each having the same intellectual\nfaculties; yet this is not the case. Men differ as much in the qualities\nof the mind, as in the features of the face. There are human beings\nas different from one another, as man is from a horse or a dog. What\nconformity or resemblance do we find between some men? What an infinite\ndistance is there between the genius of a Locke or a Newton, and that of a\npeasant, Hottentot, or Laplander?\n\nMan differs from other animals only in his organization, which enables\nhim to produce effects, of which animals are not capable. The variety,\nobservable in the organs of individuals of the human species suffices to\nexplain the differences in what is called their intellectual faculties.\nMore or less delicacy in these organs, warmth in the blood, mobility\nin the fluids, flexibility or stiffness in the fibres and nerves, must\nnecessarily produce the infinite diversity, which we observe in the minds\nof men. It is by exercise, habit and education, that the mind is\nunfolded and becomes superior to that of others. Man, without culture and\nexperience, is as void of reason and industry, as the brute. A stupid man\nis one, whose organs move with difficulty, whose brain does not easily\nvibrate, whose blood circulates slowly. A man of genius is he, whose\norgans are flexible, whose sensations are quick, whose brain vibrates\nwith celerity. A learned man is he, whose organs and brain have been long\nexercised upon objects to which he is devoted.\n\nWithout culture, experience, or reason, is not man more contemptible and\nworthy of hatred, than the vilest insects or most ferocious beasts? Is\nthere in nature a more detestable being, than a Tiberius, a Nero, or a\nCaligula? Have those destroyers of the human race, known by the name of\nconquerors, more estimable souls than bears, lions, or panthers? Are there\nanimals in the world more detestable than tyrants?\n\n\n\n\n97.\n\nThe superiority which man so gratuitously arrogates to himself over other\nanimals, soon vanishes in the light of reason, when we reflect on human\nextravagances. How many animals shew more mildness, reflection, and\nreason, than the animal, who calls himself reasonable above all others?\nAre there among men, so often enslaved and oppressed, societies as\nwell constituted as those of the ants, bees, or beavers? Do we ever\nsee ferocious beasts of the same species mangle and destroy one another\nwithout profit? Do we ever see religious wars among them? The cruelty\nof beasts towards other species arises from hunger, the necessity of\nnourishment; the cruelty of man towards man arises only from the vanity of\nhis masters and the folly of his impertinent prejudices. Speculative men,\nwho endeavour to make us believe, that all in the universe was made for\nman, are much embarrassed, when we ask, how so many hurtful animals can\ncontribute to the happiness of man? What known advantage results to\nthe friend of the gods, from being bitten by a viper, stung by a gnat,\ndevoured by vermin, torn in pieces by a tiger, etc.? Would not all these\nanimals reason as justly as our theologians, should they pretend that man\nwas made for them?\n\n\n\n\n98.\n\nAN EASTERN TALE.\n\nAt some distance from Bagdad, a hermit, renowned for his sanctity, passed\nhis days in an agreeable solitude. The neighbouring inhabitants, to obtain\nan interest in his prayers, daily flocked to his hermitage, to carry him\nprovisions and presents. The holy man, without ceasing, gave thanks to God\nfor the blessings, with which providence loaded him. \"O Allah!\" said he,\n\"how ineffable is thy love to thy servants. What have I done to merit the\nfavours, that I receive from thy bounty? O Monarch of the skies! O Father\nof nature! what praises could worthily celebrate thy munificence, and thy\npaternal care! O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of men!\"\nPenetrated with gratitude, the hermit made a vow to undertake, for the\nseventh time, a pilgrimage to Mecca. The war which then raged between the\nPersians and Turks, could not induce him to defer his pious enterprise.\nFull of confidence in God, he sets out under the inviolable safeguard of\na religious habit. He passes through the hostile troops without any\nobstacle; far from being molested, he receives, at every step, marks of\nveneration from the soldiers of the two parties. At length, borne down\nwith fatigue, he is obliged to seek refuge against the rays of a scorching\nsun; he rests under the cool shade of a group of palm-trees. In this\nsolitary place, the man of God finds not only an enchanting retreat, but\na delicious repast. He has only to put forth his hand to gather dates\nand other pleasant fruits; a brook affords him the means of quenching his\nthirst. A green turf invites him to sleep; upon waking he performs the\nsacred ablution, and exclaims in a transport of joy: \"O Allah! how great\nis thy goodness to the children of men!\" After this perfect refreshment,\nthe saint, full of strength and gaiety, pursues his way; it leads him\nacross a smiling country, which presents to his eyes flowery hillocks,\nenamelled meadows, and trees loaded with fruit. Affected by this sight, he\nceases not to adore the rich and liberal hand of providence, which appears\nevery where providing for the happiness of the human race. Going a little\nfarther, the mountains are pretty difficult to pass; but having once\narrived at the summit, a hideous spectacle suddenly appears to his view.\nHis soul is filled with horror. He discovers a vast plain laid waste\nwith fire and sword; he beholds it covered with hundreds of carcases,\nthe deplorable remains of a bloody battle, lately fought upon this field.\nEagles, vultures, ravens and wolves were greedily devouring the dead\nbodies with which the ground was covered. This sight plunges our pilgrim\ninto a gloomy meditation. Heaven, by special favour, had enabled him to\nunderstand the language of beasts. He heard a wolf, gorged with human\nflesh, cry out in the excess of his joy: \"O Allah! how great is thy\ngoodness to the children of wolves. Thy provident wisdom takes care to\ncraze the minds of these detestable men, who are so dangerous to our\nspecies. By an effect of thy Providence, which watches over thy creatures,\nthese destroyers cut one another's throats, and furnish us with sumptuous\nmeals. O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves!\"\n\n\n\n\n99.\n\nA heated imagination sees in the universe only the blessings of heaven;\na calmer mind finds in it both good and evil. \"I exist,\" say you; but is\nthis existence always a good? \"Behold,\" you say, \"that sun, which lights;\nthis earth, which for you is covered with crops and verdure; these\nflowers, which bloom to regale your senses; these trees, which bend under\nthe weight of delicious fruits; these pure waters, which run only to\nquench your thirst; those seas, which embrace the universe to facilitate\nyour commerce; these animals, which a foreseeing nature provides for your\nuse.\" Yes; I see all these things, and I enjoy them. But in many climates,\nthis beautiful sun is almost always hidden; in others, its excessive heat\ntorments, creates storms, produces frightful diseases, and parches the\nfields; the pastures are without verdure, the trees without fruit, the\ncrops are scorched, the springs are dried up; I can only with difficulty\nsubsist, and now complain of the cruelties of nature, which to you\nalways appears so beneficent. If these seas bring me spices, and useless\ncommodities, do they not destroy numberless mortals, who are foolish\nenough to seek them? The vanity of man persuades him, that he is the\nsole center of the universe; he creates for himself a world and a God;\nhe thinks himself of sufficient consequence to derange nature at his\npleasure. But, concerning other animals, he reasons like an atheist. Does\nhe not imagine, that the individuals different from his own are automatons\nunworthy of the blessings of universal providence, and that brutes cannot\nbe objects of his justice or goodness? Mortals regard the happy or unhappy\nevents, health or sickness, life or death, plenty or want, as rewards or\npunishments for the right use or abuse of the liberty, with which they\nerroneously imagine themselves endowed. Do they reason in the same manner\nconcerning the brutes? No. Although they see them, under a just God, enjoy\nand suffer, equally subject to health and sickness, live and die, like\nthemselves, it never occurs to them to ask by what crime, these beasts\ncould have incurred the displeasure of their Creator? Have not men,\nblinded by their religious prejudices, in order to free themselves from\nembarrassment, carried their folly so far as to pretend that beasts have\nno feeling?\n\nWill men never renounce their foolish pretensions? Will they never\nacknowledge that nature is not made for them? Will they never see that\nnature has placed equality among all beings she has produced? Will they\nnever perceive that all organized beings are equally made to be born and\ndie, enjoy and suffer? Finally, far from having any cause to be puffed\nup with their mental faculties, are they not forced to grant, that these\nfaculties often make them more unhappy than beasts, in which we find\nneither opinions, prejudices, vanities, nor follies, which every moment\ndecide the welfare of man?\n\n\n\n\n100.\n\nThe superiority which men arrogate over other animals, is chiefly founded\nupon their opinion, that they have the exclusive possession of an immortal\nsoul. But ask them what this soul is, and they are puzzled. They will say,\nit is an unknown substance--a secret power distinct from their bodies--a\nspirit, of which they have no idea. Ask them how this spirit, which they\nsuppose to be like their God wholly void of extension, could combine\nitself with their material bodies, and they will tell you, they know\nnothing about it; that it is to them a mystery; that this combination is\nan effect of the omnipotence of God. These are the ideas that men form of\nthe hidden, or rather imaginary substance, which they consider as the main\nspring of all their actions!\n\nIf the soul is a substance essentially different from the body, and\ncan have no relation to it, their union would be, not a mystery, but an\nimpossibility. Besides, this soul being of a nature different from the\nbody, must necessarily act in a different manner; yet we see that this\npretended soul is sensible of the motions experienced by the body, and\nthat these two substances, essentially different, always acts in concert.\nYou will say that this harmony is also a mystery. But I will tell you,\nthat I see not my soul, that I know and am sensible of my body only, that\nit is this body which feels, thinks, judges, suffers, and enjoys; and\nthat all these faculties are necessary results of its own mechanism, or\norganization.\n\n\n\n\n101.\n\nAlthough it is impossible for men to form the least idea of the soul, or\nthe pretended spirit, which animates them; yet they persuade themselves\nthat this unknown soul is exempt from death. Every thing proves to them,\nthat they feel, that they think, that they acquire ideas, that they enjoy\nand suffer, only by means of the senses, or material organs of the body.\nAdmitting even the existence of this soul, they cannot help acknowledging,\nthat it depends entirely upon the body, and undergoes, all its\nvicissitudes; and yet it is imagined, that this soul has nothing, in\nits nature, similar to the body; that it can act and feel without the\nassistance of the body; in a word, that this soul, freed from the body,\nand disengaged from its senses, can live, enjoy, suffer, experience\nhappiness, or feel excruciating torments. Upon such a tissue of\nabsurdities is built the marvellous opinion of the _immortality of the\nsoul_. If I ask, what are the motives for believing the soul immortal,\nthey immediately answer, that it is because man naturally desires to be\nimmortal: but, because you desire a thing ardently, can you infer that\nyour desire will be fulfilled? By what strange logic can we dare affirm,\nthat a thing cannot fail to happen, because we ardently desire it? Are\ndesires, begotten by the imagination, the measure of reality? The impious,\nyou say, deprived of the flattering hope of another life, wish to be\nannihilated. Very well: may they not then as justly conclude, from _their_\ndesire, that they shall be annihilated, as you may conclude from _your_\ndesire, that you shall exist for ever.\n\n\n\n\n102.\n\nMan dies, and the human body after death is no longer anything but a mass\nincapable of producing those motions, of which the sum total constituted\nlife. We see, that it has no longer circulation, respiration, digestion,\nspeech, or thought. It is pretended, that the soul is then separated from\nthe body; but to say, that this soul, with which we are unacquainted, is\nthe principle of life, is to say nothing, unless that an unknown power is\nthe hidden principle of imperceptible movements. Nothing is more natural\nand simple, than to believe, that the dead man no longer lives: nothing\nis more extravagant, than to believe, that the dead man is still alive. We\nlaugh at the simplicity of some nations, whose custom is to bury provision\nwith the dead, under an idea that it will be useful and necessary to them\nin the other life. Is it then more ridiculous or absurd to suppose, that\nmen will eat after death, than to imagine, that they will think, that they\nwill be actuated by agreeable or disagreeable ideas, that they will enjoy\nor suffer, and that they will experience repentance or delight, after the\norgans, adapted to produce sensations or ideas, are once dissolved. To say\nthat the souls of men will be happy or unhappy after death, is in other\nwords to say, that men will see without eyes, hear without ears, taste\nwithout palates, smell without noses, and touch without hands. And\npersons, who consider themselves very reasonable, adopt these ideas!\n\n\n\n\n103.\n\nThe dogma of the immortality of the soul supposes the soul to be a simple\nsubstance; in a word, a spirit. But I ask again, what is a spirit? \"It\nis,\" say you, \"a substance void of extension, incorruptible, having\nnothing common with matter.\" If so, how is your soul born, and how does it\ngrow, how does it strengthen or weaken itself, how does it get disordered\nand grow old, in the same progression as your body?\n\nTo all these questions you answer, that these are mysteries. If so, you\ncannot understand them. If you cannot understand them, why do you decide\nabout a thing, of which you are unable to form the least idea? To believe\nor affirm any thing, it is necessary, at least, to know in what it\nconsists. To believe in the existence of your immaterial soul, is to\nsay, that you are persuaded of the existence of a thing, of which it is\nimpossible for you to form any true notion; it is to believe in words\nwithout meaning. To affirm that the thing is as you say, is the height of\nfolly or vanity.\n\n\n\n\n104.\n\nAre not theologians strange reasoners? Whenever they cannot divine the\n_natural_ causes of things, they invent what they call _supernatural_;\nsuch as spirits, occult causes, inexplicable agents, or rather _words_,\nmuch more obscure than the _things_ they endeavour to explain. Let us\nremain in nature, when we wish to account for the phenomena of nature; let\nus be content to remain ignorant of causes too delicate for our organs;\nand let us be persuaded, that, by going beyond nature, we shall never\nsolve the problems which nature presents.\n\nEven upon the hypothesis of theology, (that is, supposing an all-powerful\nmover of matter,) by what right would theologians deny, that their God\nhas power to give this matter the faculty of thought? Was it then more\ndifficult for him to create combinations of matter, from which thought\nmight result, than spirits who could think? At least, by supposing matter,\nwhich thinks, we should have some notions of the subject of thought, or of\nwhat thinks in us; whereas, by attributing thought to an immaterial being,\nit is impossible to form the least idea of it.\n\n\n\n\n105.\n\nIt is objected against us, that materialism makes man a mere machine,\nwhich is said to be very dishonourable. But, will it be much more\nhonourable for man, if we should say, that he acts by the secret impulses\nof a spirit, or by a certain _I know not what_, that animates him in a\nmanner totally inexplicable.\n\nIt is easy to perceive, that the supposed superiority of _spirit_ over\nmatter, or of the soul over the body, has no other foundation than men's\nignorance of this soul, while they are more familiarized with _matter_,\nwith which they imagine they are acquainted, and of which they think they\ncan discern the origin. But the most simple movements of our bodies are to\nevery man, who studies them, as inexplicable as thought.\n\n\n\n\n106.\n\nThe high value, which so many people set upon spiritual substance, has no\nother motive than their absolute inability to define it intelligibly. The\ncontempt shewn for _matter_ by our metaphysicians, arises only from the\ncircumstance, that familiarity begets contempt. When they tell us, that\n_the soul is more excellent and noble than the body_, they say what they\nknow not.\n\n\n\n\n107.\n\nThe dogma of another life is incessantly extolled, as useful. It\nis maintained, that even though it should be only a fiction, it is\nadvantageous, because it deceives men, and conducts them to virtue. But\nis it true, that this dogma makes men wiser and more virtuous? Are the\nnations, who believe this fiction, remarkable for purity of morals? Has\nnot the visible world ever the advantage over the invisible? If those, who\nare trusted with the instruction and government of men, had knowledge and\nvirtue themselves, they would govern them much better by realities, than\nby fictions. But crafty, ambitious and corrupt legislators, have every\nwhere found it better to amuse with fables, than to teach them truths,\nto unfold their reason, to excite them to virtue by sensible and real\nmotives, in fine, to govern them in a rational manner. Priests undoubtedly\nhad reasons for making the soul immaterial; they wanted souls to people\nthe imaginary regions, which they have discovered in the other life.\nMaterial souls would, like all bodies, have been subject to dissolution.\nNow, if men should believe, that all must perish with the body, the\ngeographers of the other world would evidently lose the right of guiding\nmen's souls towards that unknown abode; they would reap no profits from\nthe hope with which they feed them, and the terrors with which they\noppress them. If futurity is of no real utility to mankind, it is, at\nleast, of the greatest utility to those, who have assumed the office of\nconducting them thither.\n\n\n\n\n108.\n\n\"But,\" it will be said, \"is not the dogma of the immortality of the soul\ncomforting to beings, who are often very unhappy here below? Though it\nshould be an error, is it not pleasing? Is it not a blessing to man to\nbelieve, that he shall be able to enjoy hereafter a happiness, which\nis denied him upon earth?\" Thus, poor mortals! you make your wishes the\nmeasure of truth; because you desire to live for ever, and to be happier,\nyou at once conclude, that you shall live for ever, and that you shall be\nmore fortunate in an unknown world, than in this known world, where you\noften find nothing but affliction! Consent therefore to leave, without\nregret, this world which gives the greater part of you much more torment\nthan pleasure. Submit to the order of nature, which demands that you, as\nwell as all other beings, should not endure for ever.\n\nWe are incessantly told, that religion has infinite consolations for the\nunfortunate, that the idea of the soul's immortality, and of a happier\nlife, is very proper to elevate man, and to support him under adversity,\nwhich awaits him upon earth. It is said, on the contrary, that materialism\nis an afflicting system, calculated to degrade man; then it puts him\nupon a level with the brutes, breaks his courage, and shows him no other\nprospect than frightful annihilation, capable of driving him to despair\nand suicide, whenever he is unhappy. The great art of theologians is to\nblow hot and cold, to afflict and console, to frighten and encourage.\n\nIt appears by theological fictions, that the regions of the other life are\nhappy and unhappy. Nothing is more difficult than to become worthy of the\nabode of felicity; nothing more easy than to obtain a place in the abode\nof torment, which God is preparing for the unfortunate victims of\neternal fury. Have those then, who think the other life so pleasant and\nflattering, forgotten, that according to them, that life is to be attended\nwith torments to the greater part of mortals? Is not the idea of total\nannihilation infinitely preferable to the idea of an eternal existence,\nattended with anguish and _gnashing of teeth_? Is the fear of an end more\nafflicting, than that of having had a beginning! The fear of ceasing to\nexist is a real evil only to the imagination, which alone begat the dogma\nof another life.\n\nChristian ministers say that the idea of a happier life is joyous.\nAdmitted. Every person would desire a more agreeable existence than that\nhe enjoys here. But, if paradise is inviting, you will grant, that hell is\nfrightful. Heaven is very difficult, and hell very easy to be merited. Do\nyou not say, that a _narrow_ way leads to the happy regions, and a _broad_\nway to the regions of misery? Do you not often say, that _the number of\nthe elect is very small, and that of the reprobate very large_? Is not\nGrace, which your God grants but to a very few, necessary to salvation?\nNow, I assure you, that these ideas are by no means consoling; that I had\nrather be annihilated, once for all, than to burn for ever; that the\nfate of beasts is to me more desirable than that of the damned; that the\nopinion which relieves me from afflicting fears in this world, appears to\nme more joyous, than the uncertainty arising from the opinion of a God,\nwho, master of his grace, grants it to none but his favourites, and\npermits all others to become worthy of eternal torment. Nothing but\nenthusiasm or folly can induce a man to prefer improbable conjectures,\nattended with uncertainty and insupportable fears.\n\n\n\n\n109.\n\nAll religious principles are the work of pure imagination, in which\nexperience and reason have no share. It is extremely difficult to combat\nthem, because the imagination, once prepossessed by chimeras, which\nastonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning. To combat religion and\nits phantoms with the arms of reason, is like using a sword to kill gnats;\nas soon as the blow is struck, the gnats and chimeras come hovering round\nagain, and resume in the mind the place, from which they were thought to\nhave been for ever banished.\n\nWhen we reject, as too weak, the proofs given of the existence of a God,\nthey instantly oppose to the arguments, which destroy that existence,\nan _inward sense_, a deep persuasion, an invincible inclination, born in\nevery man, which holds up to his mind, in spite of himself, the idea of an\nalmighty being, whom he cannot entirely expel from his mind, and whom he\nis compelled to acknowledge, in spite of the strongest reasons that can\nbe urged. But whoever will analyse this _inward sense_, upon which such\nstress is laid, will perceive, that it is only the effect of a rooted\nhabit, which, shutting their eyes against the most demonstrative proofs,\nsubjects the greater part of men, and often even the most enlightened, to\nthe prejudices of childhood. What avails this inward sense, or this deep\npersuasion, against the evidence, which demonstrates, that _whatever\nimplies a contradiction cannot exist_?\n\nWe are gravely assured, that the non-existence of God is not demonstrated.\nYet, by all that men have hitherto said of him, nothing is better\ndemonstrated, than that this God is a chimera, whose existence is totally\nimpossible; since nothing is more evident, than that a being cannot\npossess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable, as\nthose, which every religion upon earth attributes to the Divinity. Is not\nthe theologian's God, as well as that of the deist, a cause incompatible\nwith the effects attributed to it? Let them do what they will, it is\nnecessary either to invent another God, or to grant, that he, who, for so\nmany ages, has been held up to the terror of mortals, is at the same time\nvery good and very bad, very powerful and very weak, unchangeable and\nfickle, perfectly intelligent and perfectly void of reason, of order\nand permitting disorder, very just and most unjust, very skilful and\nunskilful. In short, are we not forced to confess, that it is impossible\nto reconcile the discordant attributes, heaped upon a being, of whom\nwe cannot speak without the most palpable contradictions? Let any\none attribute a single quality to the Divinity, and it is universally\ncontradicted by the effects, ascribed to this cause.\n\n\n\n\n110.\n\nTheology might justly be defined the _science of contradictions_. Every\nreligion is only a system, invented to reconcile irreconcilable notions.\nBy the aid of habit and terror, man becomes obstinate in the greatest\nabsurdities, even after they are exposed in the clearest manner. All\nreligions are easily combated, but with difficulty extirpated. Reason\navails nothing against custom, which becomes, says the proverb, _a second\nnature_. Many persons, in other respects sensible, even after having\nexamined the rotten foundation of their belief, adhere to it in contempt\nof the most striking arguments. Whenever we complain of religion, its\nshocking absurdities, and impossibilities, we are told that we are not\nmade to understand the truths of religion; that reason goes astray, and is\ncapable of leading us to perdition; and moreover, that _what is folly\nin the eyes of man, is wisdom in the eyes of God_, to whom nothing\nis impossible. In short, to surmount, by a single word, the most\ninsurmountable difficulties, presented on all sides by theology, they get\nrid of them by saying, these are _mysteries_!\n\n\n\n\n111.\n\nWhat is a mystery? By examining the thing closely, I soon perceive, that\na mystery is nothing but a contradiction, a palpable absurdity, a manifest\nimpossibility, over which theologians would oblige men humbly to shut\ntheir eyes. In a word, a mystery is whatever our spiritual guides cannot\nexplain.\n\nIt is profitable to the ministers of religion, that people understand\nnothing of what they teach. It is impossible to examine what we do not\ncomprehend; when we do not see, we must suffer ourselves to be led. If\nreligion were clear, priests would find less business.\n\nWithout mysteries there can be no religion; mystery is essential to it;\na religion void of mysteries, would be a contradiction in terms. The God,\nwho serves as the foundation of _natural religion_, or _deism_, is himself\nthe greatest of mysteries.\n\n\n\n\n112.\n\nEvery revealed religion is filled with mysterious dogmas, unintelligible\nprinciples, incredible wonders, astonishing recitals, which appear to have\nbeen invented solely to confound reason. Every religion announces a hidden\nGod, whose essence is a mystery; consequently, the conduct, ascribed to\nhim, is no less inconceivable than his essence. The Deity has never spoken\nonly in an enigmatical and mysterious manner, in the various religions,\nwhich have been founded in different regions of our globe; he has\neverywhere revealed himself only to announce mysteries; that is, to\ninform mortals, that he intended they should believe contradictions,\nimpossibilities, and things to which they were incapable of affixing any\nclear ideas.\n\nThe more mysterious and incredible a religion is, the more power it has\nto please the imagination of men. The darker a religion is, the more it\nappears divine, that is, conformable to the nature of a hidden being, of\nwhom they have no ideas. Ignorance prefers the unknown, the hidden, the\nfabulous, the marvellous, the incredible, or even the terrible, to what is\nclear, simple, and true. Truth does not operate upon the imagination in so\nlively a manner as fiction, which, in other respects, everyone is able to\narrange in his own way. The vulgar like to listen to fables. Priests and\nlegislators, by inventing religions and forging mysteries have served the\nvulgar people well. They have thereby gained enthusiasts, women and fools.\nBeings of this stamp are easily satisfied with things, which they are\nincapable of examining. The love of simplicity and truth is to be\nfound only among the few, whose imagination is regulated by study and\nreflection.\n\nThe inhabitants of a village are never better pleased with their parson,\nthan when he introduces Latin into his sermon. The ignorant always\nimagine, that he, who speaks to them of things they do not understand, is\na learned man. Such is the true principle of the credulity of the people,\nand of the authority of those, who pretend to guide nations.\n\n\n\n\n113.\n\nTo announce mysteries to men, is to give and withhold; it is to talk in\norder not to be understood. He, who speaks only obscurely, either seeks to\namuse himself by the embarrassment, which he causes, or finds his interest\nin not explaining himself too clearly. All secrecy indicates distrust,\nimpotence, and fear. Princes and their ministers make a mystery of their\nprojects, for fear their enemies should discover and render them abortive.\nCan a good God amuse himself by perplexing his creatures? What interest\nthen could he have in commanding his ministers to announce riddles and\nmysteries?\n\nIt is said, that man, by the weakness of his nature, is totally incapable\nof understanding the divine dispensations, which can be to him only a\nseries of mysteries; God cannot disclose to him secrets, necessarily above\nhis reach. If so, I answer again, that man is not made to attend to the\ndivine dispensations; that these dispensations are to him by no means\ninteresting; that he has no need of mysteries, which he cannot understand;\nand consequently, that a mysterious religion is no more fit for him, than\nan eloquent discourse is for a flock of sheep.\n\n\n\n\n114.\n\nThe Deity has revealed himself with so little uniformity in the different\ncountries of our globe, that in point of religion, men regard one another\nwith hatred and contempt. The partisans of the different sects think\neach other very ridiculous and foolish. Mysteries, most revered in one\nreligion, are objects of derision to another. God, in revealing himself\nto mankind, ought at least, to have spoken the same language to all, and\nsaved their feeble minds the perplexity of inquiring which religion really\nemanated from him, or what form of worship is most acceptable in his\nsight.\n\nA universal God ought to have revealed a universal religion. By what\nfatality then are there so many different religions upon earth? Which is\nreally right, among the great number of those, each of which exclusively\npretends to be the true one? There is great reason to believe, that no\nreligion enjoys this advantage. Division and disputes upon opinions are\nindubitable signs of the uncertainty and obscurity of the principles, upon\nwhich they build.\n\n\n\n\n115.\n\nIf religion were necessary at all, it ought to be intelligible to all. If\nthis religion were the most important concern of men, the goodness of God\nwould seem to demand, that it should be to them of all things the most\nclear, evident, and demonstrative. Is it not then astonishing, that this\nthing so essential to the happiness of mortals, is precisely that, which\nthey understand least, and about which, for so many ages, their teachers\nhave most disputed? Priests have never agreed upon the manner of\nunderstanding the will of a God, who has revealed himself.\n\nThe world, may be compared to a public fair, in which are several\nempirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the passengers by decrying\nthe remedies sold by his brothers. Each shop has its customers, who\nare persuaded, that their quacks possess the only true remedies; and\nnotwithstanding a continual use of them, they perceive not the inefficacy\nof these remedies, or that they are as infirm as those, who run after the\nquacks of a different shop.\n\nDevotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy. The\ndevout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by the\napplication of remedies. The wise man abstains from them entirely; he pays\nattention to his diet, and in other respects leaves nature to her course.\n\n\n\n\n116.\n\nTo a man of sense, nothing appears more ridiculous, than the opinions,\nwhich the partisans of the different religions with equal folly entertain\nof each other. A Christian regards the _Koran_, that is, the divine\nrevelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing but a tissue of impertinent\nreveries, and impostures insulting to the divinity. The Mahometan, on the\nother hand, treats the Christian as an _idolater_ and a _dog_. He sees\nnothing but absurdities in his religion. He imagines he has a right to\nsubdue the Christian, and to force him, sword in hand, to receive the\nreligion of his divine prophet. Finally, he believes, that nothing is\nmore impious and unreasonable, than to worship a man, or to believe in the\nTrinity. The _protestant_ Christian who without scruple worships a man,\nand firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the _trinity_,\nridicules the _catholic_ Christian for believing in the mystery of\n_transubstantiation_; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous,\nbecause he kneels to worship some bread, in which he thinks he sees God.\nChristians of every sect regard, as silly stories, the incarnations\nof _Vishnu_, the God of the Indies; they maintain, that the only true\n_incarnation_ is that of _Jesus_, son of a carpenter. The deist, who\ncalls himself the follower of a religion, which he supposes to be that of\nnature, content with admitting a God, of whom he has no idea, makes a jest\nof all the mysteries, taught by the various religions in the world.\n\n\n\n\n117.\n\nIs there any thing more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious, than the\ncreation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though immutable, operates\ncontinual changes in the world? Is any thing more incompatible with every\nnotion of common sense, than to believe, that a supremely good, wise,\nequitable and powerful being presides over nature, and by himself directs\nthe movements of a world, full of folly, misery, crimes and disorders,\nwhich by a single word, he could have prevented or removed? In fine,\nwhenever we admit a being as contradictory as the God of theology, how can\nwe reject the most improbable fables, astonishing miracles, and profound\nmysteries.\n\n\n\n\n118.\n\nThe Deist exclaims: \"Abstain from worshipping the cruel and capricious God\nof theology; mine is a being infinitely wise and good; he is the father of\nmen, the mildest of sovereigns; it is he who fills the universe with his\nbenefits.\" But do you not see that every thing in this world contradicts\nthe good qualities, which you ascribe to your God? In the numerous family\nof this tender father, almost all are unhappy. Under the government of\nthis just sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress. Among\nthose blessings you extol, and which only enthusiasm can see, I behold a\nmultitude of evils, against which you obstinately shut your eyes. Forced\nto acknowledge, that your beneficent God, in contradiction with himself,\ndistributes good and evil with the same hand, for his justification you\nmust, like the priest, refer me to the regions of another life. Invent,\ntherefore, another God; for yours is no less contradictory than that of\ntheologians.\n\nA good God, who does evil, or consents to the commission of evil; a\nGod full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is often oppressed; a\nperfect God, who produces none but imperfect and miserable works; are not\nsuch a God and his conduct as great mysteries, as that of the incarnation?\n\nYou blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be persuaded,\nthat the God of the universe could change himself into a man, and die upon\na cross in a corner of Asia. The mystery of the incarnation appears to you\nvery absurd. You think nothing more ridiculous, than a God, who transforms\nhimself into bread, and causes himself daily to be eaten in a thousand\ndifferent places. But are all these mysteries more contradictory to\nreason than a God, the avenger and rewarder of the actions of men? Is man,\naccording to you, free, or not free? In either case, your God, if he has\nthe shadow of equity, can neither punish nor reward him. If man is free,\nit is God, who has made him free; therefore God is the primitive cause of\nall his actions; in punishing him for his faults, he would punish him for\nhaving executed what he had given him liberty to do. If man is not free to\nact otherwise than he does, would not God be most unjust, in punishing man\nfor faults, which he could not help committing.\n\nThe minor, or secondary, absurdities, with which all religions abound, are\nto many people truly striking; but they have not the courage to trace\nthe source of these absurdities. They see not, that a God full of\ncontradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities, has only served\nto disorder men's imaginations, and to produce an endless succession of\nchimeras.\n\n\n\n\n119.\n\nThe theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny the existence of\nGod, by saying, that all men, in all ages and countries, have acknowledged\nsome divinity or other; that every people have believed in an invisible\nand powerful being, who has been the object of their worship and\nveneration; in short, that there is no nation, however savage, who are not\npersuaded of the existence of some intelligence superior to human nature.\nBut, can an error be changed into truth by the belief of all men? The\ngreat philosopher Bayle has justly observed, that \"general tradition, or\nthe unanimous consent of mankind, is no criterion of truth.\"\n\nThere was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved round the\nearth, but this error was detected. There was a time, when nobody believed\nthe existence of the antipodes, and when every one was persecuted, who\nhad temerity enough to maintain it. At present, every informed man firmly\nbelieves it. All nations, with the exception of a few men who are less\ncredulous than the rest, still believe in ghosts and spirits. No sensible\nman now adopts such nonsense. But the most sensible people consider it\ntheir duty to believe in a universal spirit!\n\n\n\n\n120.\n\nAll the gods, adored by men, are of savage origin. They have evidently\nbeen imagined by stupid people, or presented, by ambitious and crafty\nlegislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations, who had neither capacity\nnor courage to examine the objects, which through terror they were made to\nworship.\n\nBy closely examining God, we are forced to acknowledge, that he evidently\nbears marks of a savage nature. To be savage is to acknowledge no right\nbut force; it is to be cruel beyond measure; to follow only one's own\ncaprice; to want foresight, prudence, and reason. Ye nations, who call\nyourselves civilized! Do you not discern, in this hideous character, the\nGod, on whom you lavish your incense? Are not the descriptions given\nyou of the divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous,\nrevengeful, sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man, who has\nnot cultivated his reason? O men! You adore only a great savage, whom\nyou regard, however, as a model to imitate, as an amiable master, as a\nsovereign full of perfection.\n\nReligious opinions are ancient monuments of ignorance, credulity,\ncowardice, and barbarism of their ancestors. Every savage is a child\nfond of the marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines nothing.\nIgnorant of nature, he attributes to spirits, enchantments, and to\nmagic, whatever appears to him extraordinary. His priests appear to him\nsorcerers, in whom he supposes a power purely divine, before whom his\nconfounded reason humbles itself, whose oracles are to him infallible\ndecrees which it would be dangerous to contradict.\n\nIn religion, men have, for the most part, remained in their primitive\nbarbarity. Modern religions are only ancient follies revived, or presented\nunder some new form. If the savages of antiquity adored mountains, rivers,\nserpents, trees, and idols of every kind; if the EGYPTIANS paid homage to\ncrocodiles, rats, and onions, do we not see nations, who think themselves\nwiser than they, worship bread, into which they imagine, that through\nthe enchantments of their priests, the divinity has descended. Is not the\nBread-God the idol of many Christian nations, who, in this respect, are as\nirrational, as the most savage?\n\n\n\n\n121.\n\nThe ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have ever disclosed\nthemselves in religious practices, either cruel or extravagant. A spirit\nof barbarity still survives, and penetrates the religions even of the\nmost polished nations. Do we not still see human victims offered to\nthe divinity? To appease the anger of a God, who is always supposed as\nferocious, jealous and vindictive, as a savage, do not those, whose manner\nof thinking is supposed to displease him, expire under studied torments,\nby the command of sanguinary laws? Modern nations, at the instigation of\ntheir priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of barbarous\nnations; at least, we find, that it has ever entered the heads of savages\nto torment for opinions, to search the thoughts, to molest men for the\ninvisible movements of their brains?\n\nWhen we see learned nations, such as the English, French, German, etc.,\ncontinue, notwithstanding their knowledge, to kneel before the barbarous\nGod of the Jews; when we see these enlightened nations divide into\nsects, defame, hate, and despise one another for their equally ridiculous\nopinions concerning the conduct and intentions of this unreasonable God;\nwhen we see men of ability foolishly devote their time to meditate the\nwill of this God, who is full of caprice and folly, we are tempted to cry\nout: O men, you are still savage!!!\n\n\n\n\n122.\n\nWhoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity, negligence, and\nstupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions the more, as he finds\nthem generally established. Men, for the most part, examine nothing: they\nblindly submit to custom and authority. Their religious opinions, above\nall others, are those which they have the least courage and capacity to\nexamine: as they comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to be\nsilent, or at least are soon destitute of arguments. Ask any man, whether\nhe believes in a God? He will be much surprised that you can doubt it. Ask\nhim again, what he understands by the word _God_. You throw him into\nthe greatest embarrassment; you will perceive immediately, that he is\nincapable of affixing any real idea to this word, he incessantly repeats.\nHe will tell you, that God is God. He knows neither what he thinks of it,\nnor his motives for believing in it.\n\nAll nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God? By no means.\nBut division upon an opinion proves not its evidence; it is rather a sign\nof uncertainty and obscurity. Does the same man always agree with himself\nin the notions he forms of his God? No. His idea varies with the changes,\nwhich he experiences;--another sign of uncertainty. Men always agree in\ndemonstrative truths. In any situation, except that of insanity, every one\nknows that two and two make four, that the sun shines, that the whole\nis greater than its part; that benevolence is necessary to merit the\naffection of men; that injustice and cruelty are incompatible with\ngoodness. Are they thus agreed when they speak of God? Whatever they\nthink, or say of him, is immediately destroyed by the effects they\nattribute to him.\n\nAsk several painters to represent a chimera, and each will paint it in a\ndifferent manner. You will find no resemblance between the features, each\nhas given it a portrait, that has no original. All theologians, in giving\nus a picture of God, give us one of a great chimera, in whose features\nthey never agree, whom each arranges in his own way, and who exists only\nin their imaginations. There are not two individuals, who have, or can\nhave, the same ideas of their God.\n\n\n\n\n123.\n\nIt might be said with more truth, that men are either skeptics or\natheists, than that they are convinced of the existence of God. How can we\nbe assured of the existence of a being, whom we could never examine,\nand of whom it is impossible to conceive any permanent idea? How can\nwe convince ourselves of the existence of a being, to whom we are\nevery moment forced to attribute conduct, opposed to the ideas, we had\nendeavoured to form of him? Is it then possible to believe what we cannot\nconceive? Is not such a belief the opinions of others without having\nany of our own? Priests govern by faith; but do not priests themselves\nacknowledge that God is to them incomprehensible? Confess then, that a\nfull and entire conviction of the existence of God is not so general, as\nis imagined.\n\nScepticism arises from a want of motives sufficient to form a judgment.\nUpon examining the proofs which seem to establish, and the arguments which\ncombat, the existence of God, some persons have doubted and withheld their\nassent. But this uncertainty arises from not having sufficiently examined.\nIs it possible to doubt any thing evident? Sensible people ridicule an\nabsolute scepticism, and think it even impossible. A man, who doubted his\nown existence, or that of the sun, would appear ridiculous. Is this more\nextravagant than to doubt the non-existence of an evidently impossible\nbeing? Is it more absurd to doubt one's own existence, than to hesitate\nupon the impossibility of a being, whose qualities reciprocally destroy\none another? Do we find greater probability for believing the existence of\na spiritual being, than the existence of a stick without two ends? Is the\nnotion of an infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permits\nan infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a square\ntriangle? Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result only\nfrom a superficial examination of theological principles, which are in\nperpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative principles.\n\nTo doubt, is to deliberate. Scepticism is only a state of indetermination,\nresulting from an insufficient examination of things. Is it possible for\nany one to be sceptical in matters of religion, who will deign to revert\nto its principles, and closely examine the notion of God, who serves\nas its basis? Doubt generally arises either from indolence, weakness,\nindifference, or incapacity. With many people, to doubt is to fear the\ntrouble of examining things, which are thought uninteresting. But religion\nbeing presented to men as their most important concern in this and the\nfuture world, skepticism and doubt on this subject must occasion perpetual\nanxiety and must really constitute a bed of thorns. Every man who has not\ncourage to contemplate, without prejudice, the God upon whom all religion\nis founded, can never know for what religion to decide: he knows not what\nhe should believe or not believe, admit or reject, hope or fear.\n\nIndifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism. This\nindifference is founded upon the absolute assurance, or at any rate upon\nthe probable belief, that religion is not interesting. A persuasion that\na thing which is pretended to be important is not so, or is only\nindifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of the thing, without which\nit would be impossible to have this persuasion. Those who call themselves\nsceptics in the fundamental points of religion, are commonly either\nindolent or incapable of examining.\n\n\n\n\n124.\n\nIn every country, we are assured, that a God has revealed himself. What\nhas he taught men? Has he proved evidently that he exists? Has he informed\nthem where he resides? Has he taught them what he is, or in what his\nessence consists? Has he clearly explained to them his intentions and\nplan? Does what he says of this plan correspond with the effects, which\nwe see? No. He informs them solely, that _he is what he is_; that he is\na _hidden God_; that his ways are unspeakable; that he is exasperated\nagainst all who have the temerity to fathom his decrees, or to consult\nreason in judging him or his works.\n\nDoes the revealed conduct of God answer the magnificent ideas which\ntheologians would give us of his wisdom, goodness, justice, and\nomnipotence? By no means. In every revelation, this conduct announces a\npartial and capricious being, the protector of favourite people, and the\nenemy of all others. If he deigns to appear to some men, he takes care to\nkeep all others in an invincible ignorance of his divine intentions. Every\nprivate revelation evidently announces in God, injustice, partiality and\nmalignity.\n\nDo the commands, revealed by any God, astonish us by their sublime reason\nor wisdom? Do they evidently tend to promote the happiness of the people,\nto whom the Divinity discloses them? Upon examining the divine commands,\none sees in every country, nothing but strange ordinances, ridiculous\nprecepts, impertinent ceremonies, puerile customs, oblations, sacrifices,\nand expiations, useful indeed to the ministers of God, but very\nburthensome to the rest of the citizens. I see likewise, that these laws\noften tend to make men unsociable, disdainful, intolerant, quarrelsome,\nunjust, and inhuman, to those who have not received the same revelations,\nthe same ordinances, or the same favours from heaven.\n\n\n\n\n125.\n\nAre the precepts of morality, announced by the Deity, really divine,\nor superior to those which every reasonable man might imagine? They are\ndivine solely because it is impossible for the human mind to discover\ntheir utility. They make virtue consist in a total renunciation of nature,\nin a voluntary forgetfulness of reason, a holy hatred of ourselves.\nFinally, these sublime precepts often exhibit perfection in a conduct,\ncruel to ourselves, and perfectly useless to others.\n\nHas a God appeared? Has he himself promulgated his laws? Has he spoken to\nmen with his own mouth? I am told, that God has not appeared to a whole\npeople; but that he has always manifested himself through the medium\nof some favourite personages, who have been intrusted with the care of\nannouncing and explaining his intentions. The people have never been\npermitted to enter the sanctuary; the ministers of the gods have alone had\nthe right to relate what passes there.\n\n\n\n\n126.\n\nIf in every system of divine revelation, I complain of not seeing either\nthe wisdom, goodness, or equity of God; if I suspect knavery, ambition, or\ninterest; it is replied, that God has confirmed by miracles the mission of\nthose, who speak in his name. But was it not more simple for him to appear\nin person, to explain his nature and will? Again, if I have the curiosity\nto examine these miracles, I find, that they are improbable tales, related\nby suspected people, who had the greatest interest in giving out that they\nwere the messengers of the Most High.\n\nWhat witnesses are appealed to in order to induce us to believe incredible\nmiracles? Weak people, who existed thousands of years ago, and who, even\nthough they could attest these miracles, may be suspected of being duped\nby their own imagination, and imposed upon by the tricks of dexterous\nimpostors. But, you will say, these miracles are written in books,\nwhich by tradition have been transmitted to us. By whom were these books\nwritten? Who are the men who have transmitted them? They are either the\nfounders of religions themselves, or their adherents and assigns. Thus,\nin religion, the evidence of interested parties becomes irrefragable and\nincontestable.\n\n\n\n\n127.\n\nGod has spoken differently to every people. The Indian believes not a word\nof what He has revealed to the Chinese; the Mahometan considers as fables\nwhat He has said to the Christian; the Jew regards both the Mahometan and\nChristian as sacrilegious corrupters of the sacred law, which his God had\ngiven to his fathers. The Christian, proud of his more modern revelation,\nindiscriminately damns the Indian, Chinese, Mahometan, and even the\nJew, from whom he receives his sacred books. Who is wrong or right? Each\nexclaims, _I am in the right!_ Each adduces the same proofs: each mentions\nhis miracles, diviners, prophets, and martyrs. The man of sense tells\nthem, they are all delirious; that God has not spoken, if it is true\nthat he is a spirit, and can have neither mouth nor tongue; that without\nborrowing the organ of mortals, God could inspire his creatures with what\nhe would have them learn; and that, as they are all equally ignorant what\nto think of God, it is evident that it has not been the will of God to\ninform them on the subject.\n\nThe followers of different forms of worship which are established, accuse\none another of superstition and impiety. Christians look with abhorrence\nupon the Pagan, Chinese, and Mahometan superstition. Roman Catholics\ntreat, as impious, Protestant Christians; and the latter incessantly\ndeclaim against the superstition of the Catholics. They are all right.\nTo be impious, is to have opinions offensive to the God adored; to be\nsuperstitious, is to have of him false ideas. In accusing one another of\nsuperstition, the different religionists resemble humpbacks, who reproach\none another with their deformity.\n\n\n\n\n128.\n\nAre the oracles, which the Divinity has revealed by his different\nmessengers, remarkable for clearness? Alas! no two men interpret them\nalike. Those who explain them to others are not agreed among themselves.\nTo elucidate them, they have recourse to interpretations, to commentaries,\nto allegories, to explanations: they discover _mystical sense_ very\ndifferent from the _literal sense_. Men are every where wanted to explain\nthe commands of a God, who could not, or would not, announce himself\nclearly to those, whom he wished to enlighten.\n\n\n\n\n129.\n\nThe founders of religion, have generally proved their missions by\nmiracles. But what is a miracle? It is an operation directly opposite to\nthe laws of nature. But who, according to you, made those laws? God. Thus,\nyour God, who, according to you, foresaw every thing, counteracts\nthe laws, which his wisdom prescribed to nature! These laws were then\ndefective, or at least in certain circumstances they did not accord with\nthe views of the same God, since you inform us that he judged it necessary\nto suspend or counteract them.\n\nIt is said, that a few men, favoured by the Most High, have received power\nto perform miracles. But to perform a miracle, it is necessary to have\nability to create new causes capable of producing effects contrary to\nthose of common causes. Is it easy to conceive, that God can give men the\ninconceivable power of creating causes out of nothing? Is it credible,\nthat an immutable God can communicate to men power to change or rectify\nhis plan, a power, which by his essence an immutable being cannot save\nhimself? Miracles, far from doing much honour to God, far from proving\nthe divinity of a religion, evidently annihilate the God idea. How can\na theologian tell us, that God, who must have embraced the whole of his\nplan, who could have made none but perfect laws, and who cannot alter\nthem, is forced to employ miracles to accomplish his projects, or can\ngrant his creatures the power of working prodigies to execute his divine\nwill? An omnipotent being, whose will is always fulfilled, who holds in\nhis hand his creatures, has only to _will_, to make them believe whatever\nhe desires.\n\n\n\n\n130.\n\nWhat shall we say of religions that prove their divinity by miracles? How\ncan we credit miracles recorded in the sacred books of the Christians,\nwhere God boasts of hardening the hearts and blinding those whom he wishes\nto destroy; where he permits malicious spirits and magicians to work\nmiracles as great as those of his servants; where it is predicted, that\n_Antichrist_ shall have power to perform prodigies capable of shaking the\nfaith even of the elect? In this case, by what signs shall we know whether\nGod means to instruct or ensnare us? How shall we distinguish whether\nthe wonders, we behold, come from God or devil? To remove our perplexity,\nPascal gravely tells us, that _it is necessary to judge the doctrine by\nthe miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine; that the doctrine proves\nthe miracles, and the miracles the doctrine_. If there exist a vicious and\nridiculous circle, it is undoubtedly in this splendid reasoning of one of\nthe greatest defenders of Christianity. Where is the religion, that does\nnot boast of the most admirable doctrine, and which does not produce\nnumerous miracles for its support?\n\nIs a miracle capable of annihilating the evidence of a demonstrated truth?\nAlthough a man should have the secret of healing all the sick, of making\nall the lame to walk, of raising in all the dead of a city, of ascending\ninto the air, of stopping the course of the sun and moon, can he thereby\nconvince me, that two and two do not make four, that one makes three, and\nthat three make only one; that a God, whose immensity fills the universe,\ncould have been contained in the body of a Jew; that the ETERNAL can\ndie like a man; that a God, who is said to be immutable, provident, and\nsensible, could have changed his mind upon his religion, and reformed his\nown work by a new revelation?\n\n\n\n\n131.\n\nAccording to the very principles either of natural or revealed theology,\nevery new revelation should be regarded as false; every change in\na religion emanated from the Deity should be reputed an impiety and\nblasphemy. Does not all reform suppose, that, in his first effort, God\ncould not give his religion the solidity and perfection required? To say,\nthat God, in giving a first law, conformed to the rude ideas of the people\nwhom he wished to enlighten, is to pretend that God was neither able nor\nwilling to render the people, whom he was enlightening, so reasonable as\nwas necessary in order to please him.\n\nChristianity is an impiety, if it is true that Judaism is a religion which\nhas really emanated from a holy, immutable, omnipotent, and foreseeing\nGod. The religion of Christ supposes either defects in the law which God\nhimself had given by Moses, or impotence or malice in the same God, who\nwas either unable or unwilling to render the Jews such as they ought to\nhave been in order to please him. Every new religion, or reform of\nancient religions, is evidently founded upon the impotence, inconstancy,\nimprudence, or malice of the Divinity.\n\n\n\n\n132.\n\nIf history informs me, that the first apostles, the founders or reformers\nof religions, wrought great miracles; history also informs me, that these\nreformers and their adherents were commonly buffeted, persecuted, and put\nto death, as disturbers of the peace of nations. I am therefore tempted to\nbelieve, that they did not perform the miracles ascribed to them;\nindeed, such miracles must have gained them numerous partisans among the\neye-witnesses, who ought to have protected the operators from abuse. My\nincredulity redoubles, when I am told, that the workers of miracles\nwere cruelly tormented, or ignominiously executed. How is it possible to\nbelieve, that missionaries, protected by God, invested with his divine\npower, and enjoying the gift of miracles, could not have wrought such a\nsimple miracle, as to escape the cruelty of their persecutors?\n\nPriests have the art of drawing from the persecutions themselves, a\nconvincing proof in favour of the religion of the persecuted. But a\nreligion, which boasts of having cost the lives of many martyrs, and\ninforms us, that its founders, in order to extend it, have suffered\npunishments, cannot be the religion of a beneficent, equitable and\nomnipotent God. A good God would not permit men, intrusted with announcing\nhis commands, to be ill-treated. An all-powerful God, wishing to found a\nreligion, would proceed in a manner more simple and less fatal to the most\nfaithful of his servants. To say that God would have his religion sealed\nwith blood, is to say that he is weak, unjust, ungrateful, and sanguinary;\nand that he is cruel enough to sacrifice his messengers to the views of\nhis ambition.\n\n\n\n\n133.\n\nTo die for religion proves not that the religion is true, or divine; it\nproves, at most, that it is supposed to be such. An enthusiast proves\nnothing by his death, unless that religious fanaticism is often stronger\nthan the love of life. An impostor may sometimes die with courage; he then\nmakes, in the language of the proverb, _a virtue of necessity_.\n\nPeople are often surprised and affected at sight of the generous courage\nand disinterested zeal, which has prompted missionaries to preach their\ndoctrine, even at the risk of suffering the most rigorous treatment. From\nthis ardour for the salvation of men, are drawn inferences favourable to\nthe religion they have announced. But in reality, this disinterestedness\nis only apparent. He, who ventures nothing should gain nothing. A\nmissionary seeks to make his fortune by his doctrine. He knows that, if he\nis fortunate enough to sell his commodity, he will become absolute master\nof those who receive him for their guide; he is sure of becoming the\nobject of their attention, respect, and veneration. Such are the true\nmotives, which kindle the zeal and charity of so many preachers and\nmissionaries.\n\nTo die for an opinion, proves the truth or goodness of that opinion\nno more than to die in battle proves the justice of a cause, in which\nthousands have the folly to devote their lives. The courage of a martyr,\nelated with the idea of paradise, is not more supernatural, than the\ncourage of a soldier, intoxicated with the idea of glory, or impelled\nby the fear of disgrace. What is the difference between an Iroquois, who\nsings while he is burning by inches, and the martyr ST. LAURENCE, who upon\nthe gridiron insults his tyrant?\n\nThe preachers of a new doctrine fail, because they are the weakest;\napostles generally practise a perilous trade. Their courageous death\nproves neither the truth of their principles nor their own sincerity,\nany more than the violent death of the ambitious man, or of the robber,\nproves, that they were right in disturbing society, or that they thought\nthemselves authorised in so doing. The trade of a missionary was always\nflattering to ambition, and formed a convenient method of living at the\nexpense of the vulgar. These advantages have often been enough to efface\nevery idea of danger.\n\n\n\n\n134.\n\nYou tell us, theologians! that _what is folly in the eyes of men, is\nwisdom before God, who delights to confound the wisdom of the wise_. But\ndo you not say, that human wisdom is a gift of heaven? In saying this\nwisdom displeases God, is but folly in his sight, and that he is pleased\nto confound it, you declare that your God is the friend only of ignorant\npeople, and that he makes sensible people a fatal present for which this\nperfidious tyrant promises to punish them cruelly at some future day. Is\nit not strange, that one can be the friend of your God, only by declaring\none's self the enemy of reason and good sense?\n\n\n\n\n135.\n\nAccording to the divines, _faith is an assent without evidence_. Whence it\nfollows, that religion requires us firmly to believe inevident things, and\npropositions often improbable or contrary to reason. But when we reject\nreason as a judge of faith, do we not confess, that reason is incompatible\nwith faith? As the ministers of religion have resolved to banish reason,\nthey must have felt the impossibility of reconciling it with faith, which\nis visibly only a blind submission to priests, whose authority seems to\nmany persons more weighty than evidence itself, and preferable to the\ntestimony of the senses.\n\n\"Sacrifice your reason; renounce experience; mistrust the testimony of\nyour senses; submit without enquiry to what we announce to you in the name\nof heaven.\" Such is the uniform language of priests throughout the world;\nthey agree upon no point, except upon the necessity of never reasoning\nupon the principles which they present to us as most important to our\nfelicity!\n\nI will _not_ sacrifice my reason; because this reason alone enables me\nto distinguish good from evil, truth from falsehood. If, as you say, my\nreason comes from God, I shall never believe that a God, whom you call\ngood, has given me reason, as a snare, to lead me to perdition. Priests!\ndo you not see, that, by decrying reason, you calumniate your God, from\nwhom you declare it to be a gift.\n\nI will _not_ renounce experience; because it is a guide much more sure\nthan the imagination or authority of spiritual guides. Experience\nteaches me, that enthusiasm and interest may blind and lead them astray\nthemselves; and that the authority of experience ought to have much more\ninfluence upon my mind, than the suspicious testimony of many men, who I\nknow are either very liable to be deceived themselves, or otherwise are\nvery much interested in deceiving others.\n\nI _will_ mistrust my senses; because I am sensible they sometimes mislead\nme. But, on the other hand, I know that they will not always deceive me.\nI well know, that the eye shews me the sun much smaller than it really\nis; but experience, which is only the repeated application of the senses,\ninforms me, that objects always appear to diminish, as their distance\nincreases; thus I attain to a certainty, that the sun is much larger than\nthe earth; thus my senses suffice to rectify the hasty judgments, which\nthey themselves had caused.\n\nIn warning us to mistrust the testimony of our senses, the priests\nannihilate the proofs of all religion. If men may be dupes of their\nimagination; if their senses are deceitful, how shall we believe the\nmiracles, which struck the treacherous senses of our ancestors? If my\nsenses are unfaithful guides, I ought not to credit even the miracles\nwrought before my eyes.\n\n\n\n\n136.\n\nYou incessantly repeat that _the truths of religion are above reason_. If\nso, do you not perceive, that these truths are not adapted to reasonable\nbeings? To pretend that reason can deceive us, is to say, that truth\ncan be false; that the useful can be hurtful. Is reason any thing but a\nknowledge of the useful and true? Besides, as our reason and senses are\nour only guides in this life, to say they are unfaithful, is to say, that\nour errors are necessary, our ignorance invincible, and that, without the\nextreme of injustice, God cannot punish us for following the only guides\nit was his supreme will to give.\n\nTo say, we are obliged to believe things above our reason, is ridiculous.\nTo assure us, that upon some objects we are not allowed to consult reason,\nis to say, that, in the most interesting matter, we must consult only\nimagination, or act only at random. Our divines say, we must sacrifice our\nreason to God. But what motives can we have to sacrifice our reason to a\nbeing, who makes us only useless presents, which he does not intend us to\nuse? What confidence can we put in a God, who, according to our divines\nthemselves, is malicious enough to harden the heart, to strike with\nblindness, to lay snares for us, to _lead us into temptation?_ In fine,\nwhat confidence can we put in the ministers of this God, who, to guide us\nmore conveniently, commands us to shut our eyes?\n\n\n\n\n137.\n\nMen are persuaded, that religion is to them of all things the most\nserious, while it is precisely what they least examine for themselves. In\npursuit of an office, a piece of land, a house, a place of profit; in any\ntransaction or contract whatever, every one carefully examines all,\ntakes the greatest precaution, weighs every word of a writing, is guarded\nagainst every surprise. Not so in religion; every one receives it at a\nventure, and believes it upon the word of others, without ever taking the\ntrouble to examine.\n\nTwo causes concur to foster the negligence and carelessness of men, with\nregard to their religious opinions. The first is the despair of overcoming\nthe obscurity, in which all religion is necessarily enveloped. Their first\nprinciples are only adapted to disgust lazy minds, who regard them as a\nchaos impossible to be understood. The second cause is, that every one\nis averse to being too much bound by severe precepts, which all admire in\ntheory, but very few care to practice with rigour. The religion of many\npeople is like old family ties, which they have never taken pains to\nexamine, but which they deposit in their archives to have recourse to them\noccasionally.\n\n\n\n\n138.\n\nThe disciples of Pythagoras paid implicit faith to the doctrine of their\nmaster; _he has said it_, was to them the solution of every problem. The\ngenerality of men are not more rational. In matters of religion, a curate,\na priest, an ignorant monk becomes master of the thoughts. Faith relieves\nthe weakness of the human mind, to which application is commonly painful;\nit is much more convenient to depend upon others, than to examine for\none's self. Inquiry, being slow and difficult, equally, displeases the\nstupidity of the ignorant, and the ardour of the enlightened. Such is\nundoubtedly the reason why Faith has so many partisans.\n\nThe more men are deficient in knowledge and reason, the more zealous they\nare in religion. In theological quarrels, the populace, like ferocious\nbeasts, fall upon all those, against whom their priest is desirous of\nexciting them. A profound ignorance, boundless credulity, weak intellect,\nand warm imagination, are the materials, of which are made bigots,\nzealots, fanatics, and saints. How can the voice of reason be heard by\nthem who make it a principle never to examine for themselves, but to\nsubmit blindly to the guidance of others? The saints and the populace are,\nin the hands of their directors, automatons, moved at pleasure.\n\n\n\n\n139.\n\nReligion is an affair of custom and fashion. _We must do as others do._\nBut, among the numerous religions in the world, which should men choose?\nThis inquiry would be too painful and long. They must therefore adhere\nto the religion of their fathers, to that of their country, which, having\nforce on its side, must be the best.\n\nIf we judge of the intentions of Providence by the events and revolutions\nof this world, we are compelled to believe, that He is very indifferent\nabout the various religions upon earth. For thousands of years, paganism,\npolytheism, idolatry, were the prevailing religions. We are now assured,\nthat the most flourishing nations had not the least idea of God; an idea,\nregarded as so essential to the happiness of man. Christians say, all\nmankind lived in the grossest ignorance of their duties towards God, and\nhad no notions of him, but what were insulting to his Divine Majesty.\nChristianity, growing out of Judaism, very humble in its obscure origin,\nbecame powerful and cruel under the Christian emperors, who, prompted by\nholy zeal, rapidly spread it in their empire by means of fire and sword,\nand established it upon the ruins of paganism. Mahomet and his successors,\nseconded by Providence or their victorious arms, in a short time banished\nthe Christian religion from a part of Asia, Africa, and even Europe; and\nthe _gospel_ was then forced to yield to the _Koran_.\n\nIn all the factions or sects, which, for many ages have distracted\nChristianity, _the best argument has been always that of the strongest\nparty_; arms have decided which doctrine is most conducive to the\nhappiness of nations. May we not hence infer, either that the Deity feels\nlittle interested in the religion of men, or that he always declares in\nfavour of the opinions, which best suit the interest of earthly powers; in\nfine, that he changes his plan to accommodate their fancy?\n\nRulers infallibly decide the religion of the people. The true religion\nis always the religion of the prince; the true God is the God, whom the\nprince desires his people to adore; the will of the priests, who govern\nthe prince, always becomes the will of God. A wit justly observed, that\n_the true religion is always that, on whose side are the prince and the\nhangman._ Emperors and hangmen long supported the gods of Rome against the\nGod of Christians; the latter, having gained to his interest the emperors,\ntheir soldiers, and their hangmen, succeeded in destroying the worship of\nthe Roman gods. The God of Mahomet has dispossessed the God of Christians\nof a great part of the dominions, which he formerly occupied.\n\nIn the eastern part of Asia, is a vast, flourishing, fertile, populous\ncountry, governed by such wise laws, that the fiercest conquerors have\nadopted them with respect. I mean China. Excepting Christianity, which was\nbanished as dangerous, the people there follow such superstitions as\nthey please, while the _mandarins_, or magistrates, having long known the\nerrors of the popular religion, are vigilant to prevent the _bonzes_ or\npriests from using it as an instrument of discord. Yet we see not,\nthat Providence refuses his blessing to a nation, whose chiefs are so\nindifferent about the worship that is rendered to him. On the contrary,\nthe Chinese enjoy a happiness and repose worthy to be envied, by the many\nnations whom religion divides, and often devastates.\n\nWe cannot reasonably propose to divest the people of their follies; but we\nmay perhaps cure the follies of those who govern the people, and who\nwill then prevent the follies of the people from becoming dangerous.\nSuperstition is to be feared only when princes and soldiers rally round\nher standard; then she becomes cruel and sanguinary. Every sovereign, who\nis the protector of one sect or religious faction, is commonly the tyrant\nof others, and becomes himself the most cruel disturber of the peace of\nhis dominions.\n\n\n\n\n140.\n\nIt is incessantly repeated, and many sensible persons are induced to\nbelieve, that religion is a restraint necessary to men; that without\nit, there would no longer exist the least check for the vulgar; and that\nmorality and religion are intimately connected with it. \"The fear of\nthe Lord,\" cries the priest, \"is the beginning of wisdom. The terrors of\nanother life are _salutary_, and are proper to curb the passions of men.\"\n\nTo perceive the inutility of religious notions, we have only to open our\neyes and contemplate the morals of those nations, who are the most\nunder the dominion of religion. We there find proud tyrants, oppressive\nministers, perfidious courtiers, shameless extortioners, corrupt\nmagistrates, knaves, adulterers, debauchees, prostitutes, thieves, and\nrogues of every kind, who have never doubted either the existence of an\navenging and rewarding God, the torments of hell, or the joys of paradise.\nWithout the least utility to the greater part of mankind, the ministers\nof religion have studied to render death terrible to the eyes of their\nfollowers. If devout Christians could but be consistent, they would pass\ntheir whole life in tears, and die under the most dreadful apprehensions.\nWhat can be more terrible than death, to the unfortunate who are told,\n_that it is horrible to fall into the hands of the living God; that we\nmust work out our salvation with fear and trembling!_ Yet we are assured,\nthat the death of the Christian is attended with infinite consolations, of\nwhich the unbeliever is deprived. The good Christian, it is said, dies in\nthe firm hope of an eternal happiness which he has strived to merit. But\nis not this firm assurance itself a presumption punishable in the eyes of\na severe God? Ought not the greatest saints to be ignorant whether they\nare _worthy of love or hatred?_ Ye Priests! while consoling us with the\nhope of the joys of paradise; have you then had the advantage to see your\nnames and ours inscribed _in the book of life?_\n\n\n\n\n141.\n\nTo oppose the passions and present interests of men the obscure notions of\na metaphysical, inconceivable God,--the incredible punishments of another\nlife,--or the pleasures of the heaven, of which nobody has the least\nidea,--is not this combating realities with fictions? Men have never any\nbut confused ideas of their God: they see him only in clouds. They\nnever think of him when they are desirous to do evil: whenever ambition,\nfortune, or pleasure allures them, God's threatenings and promises are\nforgotten. In the things of this life, there is a degree of certainty,\nwhich the most lively faith cannot give to the things of another life.\n\nEvery religion was originally a curb invented by legislators, who wished\nto establish their authority over the minds of rude nations. Like nurses\nwho frighten children to oblige them to be quiet, the ambitious used the\nname of the gods to frighten savages; and had recourse to terror in order\nto make them support quietly the yoke they wished to impose. Are then the\nbugbears of infancy made for riper age? At the age of maturity, no man\nlonger believes them, or if he does, they excite little emotion in him,\nand never alter his conduct.\n\n\n\n\n142.\n\nAlmost every man fears what he sees much more than what he does not see;\nhe fears the judgments of men of which he feels the effects, more than\nthe judgments of God of whom he has only fluctuating ideas. The desire\nof pleasing the world, the force of custom, the fear of ridicule, and\nof censure, have more force than all religious opinions. Does not the\nsoldier, through fear of disgrace, daily expose his life in battle, even\nat the risk of incurring eternal damnation?\n\nThe most religious persons have often more respect for a varlet, than for\nGod. A man who firmly believes, that God sees every thing, and that he is\nomniscient and omnipresent, will be guilty, when alone, of actions,\nwhich he would never do in presence of the meanest of mortals. Those,\nwho pretend to be the most fully convinced of the existence of God, every\nmoment act as if they believed the contrary.\n\n\n\n\n143.\n\n\"Let us, at least,\" it will be said, \"cherish the idea of a God, which\nalone may serve as a barrier to the passions of kings.\" But, can we\nsincerely admire the wonderful effects, which the fear of this God\ngenerally produces upon the minds of princes, who are called his images?\nWhat idea shall we form of the original, if we judge of it by the copies!\n\nSovereigns, it is true, call themselves the representatives of God, his\nvicegerents upon earth. But does the fear of a master, more powerful than\nthey are, incline them seriously to study the welfare of the nations, whom\nProvidence has intrusted to their care? Does the pretended terror, which\nought to be inspired into them by the idea of an invisible judge, to whom\nalone they acknowledge themselves accountable for their actions, render\nthem more equitable, more compassionate, more sparing of blood and\ntreasure of their subjects, more temperate in their pleasures, more\nattentive to their duties? In fine, does this God, by whose authority\nkings reign, deter them from inflicting a thousand evils upon the people\nto whom they ought to act as guides, protectors, and fathers? Alas! If we\nsurvey the whole earth, we shall see men almost every where governed by\ntyrants, who use religion merely as an instrument to render more stupid\nthe slaves, whom they overwhelm under the weight of their vices, or whom\nthey sacrifice without mercy to their extravagancies.\n\nFar from being a check upon the passions of kings, Religion, by its\nvery principles, frees them from all restraint. It transforms them into\ndivinities, whose caprice the people are never permitted to resist. While\nit gives up the reins to princes, and on their part breaks the bonds of\nthe social compact, it endeavours to chain the minds and hands of their\noppressed subjects. Is it then surprising, that the gods of the earth\nimagine every thing lawful for them, and regard their subjects only as\ninstruments of their caprice or ambition?\n\nIn every country, Religion has represented the Monarch of nature as a\ncruel, fantastical, partial tyrant, whose caprice is law; the Monarch God,\nis but too faithfully imitated by his representatives upon earth. Religion\nseems every where invented solely to lull the people in the lap of\nslavery, in order that their masters may easily oppress them, or render\nthem wretched with impunity.\n\n\n\n\n144.\n\nTo guard against the enterprises of a haughty pontiff who wished to\nreign over kings, to shelter their persons from the attempts of credulous\nnations excited by the priests, several European princes have pretended to\nhold their crowns and rights from God alone, and to be accountable only\nto him for their actions. After a long contest between the civil and\nspiritual power, the former at length triumphed; and the priests, forced\nto yield, acknowledged the divine right of kings and preached them to the\npeople, reserving the liberty of changing their minds and of preaching\nrevolt, whenever the divine rights of kings clashed with the divine rights\nof the clergy. It was always at the expense of nations, that peace was\nconcluded between kings and priests; but the latter, in spite of treaties,\nalways preserved their pretensions.\n\nTyrants and wicked princes, whose consciences continually reproach them\nwith negligence or perversity, far from fearing their God, had rather deal\nwith this invisible judge who never opposes any thing, or with his priests\nwho are always condescending to the rulers of the earth, than with their\nown subjects. The people, reduced to despair, might probably _appeal_ from\nthe divine right of their chiefs. Men when oppressed to the last degree,\nsometimes become turbulent; and the divine rights of the tyrant are then\nforced to yield to the natural rights of the subjects.\n\nIt is cheaper dealing with gods than men. Kings are accountable for their\nactions to God alone; priests are accountable only to themselves. There is\nmuch reason to believe, that both are more confident of the indulgence of\nheaven, than of that of earth. It is much easier to escape the vengeance\nof gods who may be cheaply appeased, than the vengeance of men whose\npatience is exhausted.\n\n\"If you remove the fear of an invisible power, what restraint will you\nimpose upon the passions of sovereigns?\" Let them learn to reign; let them\nlearn to be just; to respect the rights if the people; and to acknowledge\nthe kindness of the nations, from whom they hold their greatness and\npower. Let them learn to fear men, and to submit to the laws of equity.\nLet nobody transgress these laws with impunity; and let them be equally\nbinding upon the powerful and the weak, the great and the small, the\nsovereign and the subjects.\n\nThe fear of gods, Religion, and the terrors of another life, are the\nmetaphysical and supernatural bulwarks, opposed to the impetuous passions\nof princes! Are these bulwarks effectual? Let experience resolve the\nquestion. To oppose Religion to the wickedness of tyrants, is to wish,\nthat vague, uncertain, unintelligible speculations may be stronger than\npropensities which every thing conspires daily to strengthen.\n\n\n\n\n145.\n\nThe immense service of religion to politics is incessantly boasted; but, a\nlittle reflection will convince us, that religious opinions equally blind\nboth sovereigns and people, and never enlighten them upon their true\nduties or interests. Religion but too often forms licentious, immoral\ndespots, obeyed by slaves, whom every thing obliges to conform to their\nviews.\n\nFor want of having studied or known the true principles of administration,\nthe objects and rights of social life, the real interests of men and\ntheir reciprocal duties, princes, in almost every country, have become\nlicentious, absolute, and perverse; and their subjects abject, wicked, and\nunhappy. It was to avoid the trouble of studying these important objects,\nthat recourse was had to chimeras, which, far from remedying any thing,\nhave hitherto only multiplied the evils of mankind, and diverted them from\nwhatever is most essential to their happiness.\n\nDoes not the unjust and cruel manner in which so many nations are\ngoverned, manifestly furnish one of the strongest proofs, not only of\nthe small effect produced by the fear of another life, but also of the\nnon-existence of a Providence, busied with the fate of the human race? If\nthere existed a good God, should we not be forced to admit, that in this\nlife he strangely neglects the greater part of mankind? It would seem,\nthat this God has created nations only to be the sport of the passions and\nfollies of his representatives upon earth.\n\n\n\n\n146.\n\nBy reading history with attention, we shall perceive that Christianity,\nat first weak and servile, established itself among the savage and free\nnations of Europe only intimating to their chiefs, that its religious\nprinciples favoured despotism and rendered them absolute. Consequently,\nwe see barbarous princes suddenly converted; that is, we see them adopt,\nwithout examination, a system so favourable to their ambition, and use\nevery art to induce their subjects to embrace it. If the ministers of this\nreligion have since often derogated from their favourite principles, it\nis because the theory influences the conduct of the ministers of the Lord,\nonly when it suits their temporal interests.\n\nChristianity boasts of procuring men a happiness unknown to preceding\nages. It is true, the Greeks knew not the _divine rights_ of tyrants or\nof the usurpers of the rights of their country. Under paganism, it never\nentered the head of any man to suppose, that it was against the will of\nheaven for a nation to defend themselves against a ferocious beast, who\nhad the audacity to lay waste their possessions. The religion of the\nChristians was the first that screened tyrants from danger, by laying down\nas a principle that the people must renounce the legitimate defence\nof themselves. Thus Christian nations are deprived of the first law\nof nature, which orders man to resist evil, and to disarm whoever is\npreparing to destroy him! If the ministers of the church have often\npermitted the people to revolt for the interest of heaven, they have never\npermitted them to revolt for their own deliverance from real evils or\nknown violences.\n\nFrom heaven came the chains, that were used for fettering the minds of\nmortals. Why is the Mahometan every where a slave? Because his prophet\nenslaved him in the name of the Deity, as Moses had before subdued the\nJews. In all parts of the earth, we see, that the first legislators were\nthe first sovereigns and the first priests of the savages, to whom they\ngave laws.\n\nReligion seems invented solely to exalt princes above their nations, and\nrivet the fetters of slavery. As soon as the people are too unhappy here\nbelow, priests are ready to silence them by threatening them with the\nanger of God. They are made to fix their eyes upon heaven, lest they\nshould perceive the true causes of their misfortunes, and apply the\nremedies which nature presents.\n\n\n\n\n147.\n\nBy dint of repeating to men, that the earth is not their true country;\nthat the present life is only a passage; that they are not made to be\nhappy in this world; that their sovereigns hold their authority from God\nalone, and are accountable only to him for the abuse of it; that it is not\nlawful to resist them, etc., priests have eternized the misgovernment of\nkings and the misery of the people; the interests of nations have been\nbasely sacrificed to their chiefs. The more we consider the dogmas and\nprinciples of religion, the more we shall be convinced, that their sole\nobject is the advantage of tyrants and priests, without regard to that of\nsocieties.\n\nTo mask the impotence of its deaf gods, religion has persuaded mortals,\nthat iniquities always kindle the wrath of heaven. People impute to\nthemselves alone the disasters that daily befal them. If nations sometimes\nfeel the strokes of convulsed nature, their bad governments are but\ntoo often the immediate and permanent causes, from whence proceed\nthe continual calamities which they are forced to endure. Are not\nthe ambition, negligence, vices, and oppressions of kings and nobles,\ngenerally the causes of scarcity, beggary, wars, pestilences, corrupt\nmorals, and all the multiplied scourges which desolate the earth?\n\nIn fixing men's eyes continually upon heaven; in persuading them, that\nall their misfortunes are effects of divine anger; in providing none but\nineffectual and futile means to put an end to their sufferings, we might\njustly conclude, that the only object of priests was to divert nations\nfrom thinking about the true sources of their misery, and thus to render\nit eternal. The ministers of religion conduct themselves almost like those\nindigent mothers, who, for want of bread, sing their starved children to\nsleep, or give them playthings to divert their thoughts from afflicting\nhunger.\n\nBlinded by error from their very infancy, restrained by the invisible\nbonds of opinion, overcome by panic terrors, their faculties blunted\nby ignorance, how should the people know the true causes of their\nwretchedness? They imagine that they can avert it by invoking the gods.\nAlas! do they not see, that it is, in the name of these gods, that they\nare ordered to present their throats to the sword of their merciless\ntyrants, in whom they might find the obvious cause of the evils under\nwhich they groan, and for whom they cease not to implore, in vain, the\nassistance of heaven?\n\nYe credulous people! In your misfortunes, redouble your prayers,\nofferings, and sacrifices; throng to your temples; fast in sack-cloth and\nashes; bathe yourselves in your own tears; and above all, completely ruin\nyourselves to enrich your gods! You will only enrich their priests. The\ngods of heaven will be propitious, only when the gods of the earth shall\nacknowledge themselves, men, like you, and shall devote to your welfare\nthe attention you deserve.\n\n\n\n\n148.\n\nNegligent, ambitious, and perverse Princes are the real causes of public\nmisfortunes. Useless, unjust Wars depopulate the earth. Encroaching and\ndespotic Governments absorb the benefits of nature. The rapacity of Courts\ndiscourages agriculture, extinguishes industry, produces want, pestilence\nand misery. Heaven is neither cruel nor propitious to the prayers of the\npeople; it is their proud chiefs, who have almost always hearts of stone.\n\nIt is destructive to the morals of princes, to persuade them that they\nhave God alone to fear, when they injure their subjects, or neglect their\nhappiness. Sovereigns! It is not the gods, but your people, that you\noffend, when you do evil. It is your people and yourselves that you\ninjure, when you govern unjustly.\n\nIn history, nothing is more common than to see Religious Tyrants; nothing\nmore rare than to find equitable, vigilant, enlightened princes. A\nmonarch may be pious, punctual in a servile discharge of the duties of his\nreligion, very submissive and liberal to his priests, and yet at the same\ntime be destitute of every virtue and talent necessary for governing. To\nprinces, Religion is only an instrument destined to keep the people\nmore completely under the yoke. By the excellent principles of religious\nmorality, a tyrant who, during a long reign, has done nothing but oppress\nhis subjects, wresting, from them the fruits of their labour, sacrificing\nthem without mercy to his insatiable ambition,--a conqueror, who has\nusurped the provinces of others, slaughtered whole nations, and who,\nduring his whole life, has been a scourge to mankind,--imagines his\nconscience may rest, when, to expiate so many crimes, he has wept at the\nfeet of a priest, who generally has the base complaisance to console and\nencourage a robber, whom the most hideous despair would too lightly punish\nfor the misery he has caused upon earth.\n\n\n\n\n149.\n\nA sovereign, sincerely devout, is commonly dangerous to the state.\nCredulity always supposes a contracted mind; devotion generally absorbs\nthe attention, which a prince should pay to the government of his people.\nObsequious to the suggestions of his priests, he becomes the sport of\ntheir caprices, the favourer of their quarrels, and the instrument and\naccomplice of their follies, which he imagines to be of the greatest\nimportance. Among the most fatal presents, which religion has made the\nworld, ought to be reckoned those devout and zealous monarchs, who, under\nan idea of working for the welfare of their subjects, have made it\na sacred duty to torment, persecute, and destroy those, who thought\ndifferently from themselves. A bigot, at the head of an empire, is one of\nthe greatest scourges. A single fanatical or knavish priest, listened to\nby a credulous and powerful prince, suffices to put a state in disorder.\n\nIn almost all countries, priests and pious persons are intrusted with\nforming the minds and hearts of young princes, destined to govern nations.\nWhat qualifications have instructors of this stamp! By what interests can\nthey be animated? Full of prejudices themselves, they will teach their\npupil to regard superstition, as most important and sacred; its chimerical\nduties, as most indispensable, intolerance and persecution, as the true\nfoundation of his future authority. They will endeavour to make him a\nparty leader, a turbulent fanatic, a tyrant; they will early stifle his\nreason, and forewarn him against the use of it; they will prevent truth\nfrom reaching his ears; they will exasperate him against true talents, and\nprejudice him in favour of contemptible ones; in short, they will make him\na weak devotee, who will have no idea either of justice or injustice, nor\nof true glory, nor of true greatness, and who will be destitute of the\nknowledge and virtues necessary to the government of a great nation. Such\nis the plan of the education of a child, destined one day to create the\nhappiness or misery of millions of men!\n\n\n\n\n150.\n\nPriests have ever shewn themselves the friends of despotism, and the\nenemies of public liberty: their trade requires abject and submissive\nslaves, who have never the audacity to reason. In an absolute government,\nwho ever gains an ascendancy over the mind of a weak and stupid prince,\nbecomes master of the state. Instead of conducting the people to\nsalvation, priests have always conducted them to servitude.\n\nIn consideration of the supernatural titles, which religion has forged for\nthe worst of princes, the latter have commonly united with priests, who,\nsure of governing by opinion the sovereign himself, have undertaken to\nbind the hands of the people and to hold them under the yoke. But the\ntyrant, covered with the shield of religion, in vain flatters himself that\nhe is secure from every stroke of fate; opinion is a weak rampart against\nthe despair of the people. Besides, the priest is a friend of the tyrant\nonly while he finds his account in tyranny; he preaches sedition, and\ndemolishes the idol he has made, when he finds it no longer sufficiently\nconformable to the interest of God, whom he makes to speak at his will,\nand who never speaks except according to his interests.\n\nIt will no doubt be said, that sovereigns, knowing all the advantages\nwhich religion procures them, are truly interested in supporting it with\nall their strength. If religious opinions are useful to tyrants, it is\nvery evident, that they are useful to those, who govern by the laws of\nreason and equity. Is there then any advantage in exercising tyranny? Are\nprinces truly interested in being tyrants? Does not tyranny deprive them\nof true power, of the love of the people, and of all safety? Ought not\nevery reasonable prince to perceive, that the despot is a madman, and\nan enemy to himself? Should not every enlightened prince beware of\nflatterers, whose object is to lull him to sleep upon the brink of the\nprecipice which they form beneath him?\n\n\n\n\n151.\n\nIf sacerdotal flatteries succeed in perverting princes and making them\ntyrants; tyrants, on their part, necessarily corrupt both the great and\nthe humble. Under an unjust ruler, void of goodness and virtue, who knows\nno law but his caprice, a nation must necessarily be depraved. Will this\nruler wish to have, about his person, honest, enlightened, and virtuous\nmen? No. He wants none but flatterers, approvers, imitators, slaves, base\nand servile souls, who conform themselves to his inclinations. His court\nwill propagate the contagion of vice among the lower ranks. All will\ngradually become corrupted in a state, whose chief is corrupt. It was long\nsince said, that \"Princes seem to command others to do whatever they do\nthemselves.\"\n\nReligion, far from being a restraint upon sovereigns, enables them to\nindulge without fear or remorse, in acts of licentiousness as injurious to\nthemselves, as to the nations whom they govern. It is never with impunity,\nthat men are deceived. Tell a sovereign, that he is a god; he will very\nsoon believe that he owes nothing to any one. Provided he is feared, he\nwill care very little about being loved: he will observe neither rules,\nnor relations with his subjects, nor duties towards them. Tell this\nprince, that he is _accountable for his actions to God alone_, and he will\nsoon act as if he were accountable to no one.\n\n\n\n\n152.\n\nAn enlightened sovereign is he, who knows his true interests; who knows,\nthat they are connected with the interests of his nation; that a prince\ncannot be great, powerful, beloved, or respected, while he commands only\nunhappy slaves; that equity, beneficence, and vigilance will give him\nmore real authority over his people, than the fabulous titles, said to be\nderived from heaven. He will see, that Religion is useful only to priests,\nthat it is useless to society and often troubles it, and that it ought to\nbe restrained in order to be prevented from doing injury. Finally, he will\nperceive, that, to reign with glory, he must have good laws and inculcate\nvirtue, and not found his power upon impostures and fallacies.\n\n\n\n\n153.\n\nThe ministers of religion have taken great care to make of their God, a\nformidable, capricious, and fickle tyrant. Such a God was necessary to\ntheir variable interests. A God, who should be just and good, without\nmixture of caprice or perversity; a God, who had constantly the qualities\nof an honest man, or of a kind sovereign, would by no means suit his\nministers. It is useful to priests, that men should tremble before their\nGod, in order that they may apply to them to obtain relief from their\nfears. \"No man is a hero before his valet de chambre.\" It is not\nsurprising, that a God, dressed up by his priests so as to be terrible\nto others, should rarely impose upon them, or should have but very little\ninfluence upon their conduct. Hence, in every country, their conduct is\nvery much the same. Under pretext of the glory of their God, they every\nwhere prey upon ignorance, degrade the mind, discourage industry, and sow\ndiscord. Ambition and avarice have at all times been the ruling passions\nof the priesthood. The priest every where rises superior to sovereigns and\nlaws; we see him every where occupied with the interests of his pride,\nof his cupidity, and of his despotic, revengeful humour. In the room\nof useful and social virtues, he everywhere substitutes expiations,\nsacrifices, ceremonies, mysterious practices, in a word, inventions\nlucrative to himself and ruinous to others.\n\nThe mind is confounded and the reason is amazed upon viewing the\nridiculous customs and pitiful means, which the ministers of the gods have\ninvented in every country to purify souls, and render heaven favourable.\nHere they cut off part of a child's prepuce, to secure for him divine\nbenevolence; there, they pour water upon his head, to cleanse him of\ncrimes, which he could not as yet have committed. In one place, they\ncommand him to plunge into a river, whose waters have the power of washing\naway all stains; in another, he is forbidden to eat certain food, the use\nof which will not fail to excite the celestial wrath; in other countries,\nthey enjoin upon sinful man to come periodically and confess his faults to\na priest, who is often a greater sinner than himself, etc., etc., etc.\n\n\n\n\n154.\n\nWhat should we say of a set of empirics, who, resorting every day to a\npublic place, should extol the goodness of their remedies, and vend them\nas infallible, while they themselves were full of the infirmities, which\nthey pretend to cure? Should we have much confidence in the recipes of\nthese quacks, though they stun us with crying, \"take our remedies, their\neffects are infallible; they cure every body; except us.\" What should we\nafterwards think, should those quacks spend their lives in complaining,\nthat their remedies never produced the desired effect upon the sick,\nwho take them? In fine, what idea should we form of the stupidity of the\nvulgar, who, notwithstanding these confessions, should not cease to pay\ndearly for remedies, the inefficacy of which every thing tends to prove?\nPriests resemble these alchymists, who boldly tell us, they have the\nsecret of making gold, while they have scarcely clothes to cover their\nnakedness.\n\nThe ministers of religion incessantly declaim against the corruption of\nthe age, and loudly complain of the little effect of their lessons, while\nat the same time they assure us, that religion is the _universal remedy_,\nthe true _panacea_ against the wickedness of mankind. These priests are\nvery sick themselves, yet men continue to frequent their shops, and to\nhave faith in their divine antidotes, which, by their own confession,\nnever effect a cure!\n\n\n\n\n155.\n\nReligion, especially with the moderns, has tried to identify itself with\nMorality, the principles of which it has thereby totally obscured. It has\nrendered men unsociable by duty, and forced them to be inhuman to everyone\nwho thought differently from themselves. Theological disputes, equally\nunintelligible to each of the enraged parties, have shaken empires, caused\nrevolutions, been fatal to sovereigns, and desolated all Europe. These\ncontemptible quarrels have not been extinguished even in rivers of blood.\nSince the extinction of paganism, the people have made it a religious\nprinciple to become outrageous, whenever any opinion is advanced which\ntheir priests think contrary to _sound doctrine_. The sectaries of a\nreligion, which preaches, in appearance, nothing but charity, concord, and\npeace, have proved themselves more ferocious than cannibals or savages,\nwhenever their divines excited them to destroy their brethren. There is\nno crime, which men have not committed under the idea of pleasing the\nDivinity, or appeasing his wrath.\n\nThe idea of a terrible God, whom we paint to ourselves as a despot, must\nnecessarily render his subjects wicked. Fear makes only slaves, and slaves\nare cowardly, base, cruel, and think every thing lawful, in order to\ngain the favour or escape the chastisements of the master whom they fear.\nLiberty of thinking alone can give men humanity and greatness of soul.\nThe notion of a tyrant-god tends only to make them abject, morose,\nquarrelsome, intolerant slaves.\n\nEvery religion, which supposes a God easily provoked, jealous, revengeful,\npunctilious about his rights or the etiquette with which he is treated;--a\nGod little enough to be hurt by the opinions which men can form of him;--a\nGod unjust enough to require that we have uniform notions of his conduct;\na religion which supposes such a God necessarily becomes restless,\nunsociable, and sanguinary; the worshippers of such a God would never\nthink, that they could, without offence, forbear hating and even\ndestroying every one, who is pointed out to them, as an adversary of\nthis God; they would think, that it would be to betray the cause of\ntheir celestial Monarch, to live in friendly intercourse with rebellious\nfellow-citizens. If we love what God hates, do we not expose ourselves to\nhis implacable hatred?\n\nInfamous persecutors, and devout men-haters! Will you never discern the\nfolly and injustice of your intolerant disposition? Do you not see, that\nman is no more master of his religious opinions, his belief or unbelief,\nthan of the language, which he learns from infancy? To punish a man for\nhis errors, is it not to punish him for having been educated differently\nfrom you? If I am an unbeliever, is it possible for me to banish from my\nmind the reasons that have shaken my faith? If your God gives men leave\nto be damned, what have you to meddle with? Are you more prudent and wise,\nthan this God, whose rights you would avenge?\n\n\n\n\n156.\n\nThere is no devotee, who does not, according to his temperament, hate,\ndespise, or pity the adherents of a sect, different from his own.\nThe _established_ religion, which is never any other than that of the\nsovereign and the armies, always makes its superiority felt in a very\ncruel and injurious manner by the weaker sects. As yet there is no true\ntoleration upon earth; men every where adore a jealous God, of whom each\nnation believes itself the friend, to the exclusion of all others.\n\nEvery sect boasts of adoring alone the true God, the universal God, the\nSovereign of all nature. But when we come to examine this Monarch of the\nworld, we find that every society, sect, party, or religious cabal, makes\nof this powerful God only a pitiful sovereign, whose care and goodness\nextend only to a small number of his subjects, who pretend that they\nalone have the happiness to enjoy his favours, and that he is not at all\nconcerned about the others.\n\nThe founders of religions, and the priests who support them, evidently\nproposed to separate the nations, whom they taught, from the other\nnations; they wished to separate their own flock by distinguishing marks;\nthey gave their followers gods, who were hostile to the other gods; they\ntaught them modes of worship, dogmas and ceremonies apart; and above\nall, they persuaded them, that the religion of others was impious and\nabominable. By this unworthy artifice, the ambitious knaves established,\ntheir usurpation over the minds of their followers, rendered them\nunsociable, and made them regard with an evil eye all persons who had not\nthe same mode of worship and the same ideas as they had. Thus it is, that\nReligion has shut up the heart and for ever banished from it the affection\nthat man ought to have for his fellow-creature. Sociability, indulgence,\nhumanity, those first virtues of all morality, are totally incompatible\nwith religious prejudices.\n\n\n\n\n157.\n\nEvery national religion is calculated to make man vain, unsociable, and\nwicked; the first step towards humanity is to permit every one peaceably\nto embrace the mode of worship and opinions, which he judges to be right.\nBut this conduct cannot be pleasing to the ministers of religion, who wish\nto have the right of tyrannizing over men even in their thoughts.\n\nBlind and bigoted princes! You hate and persecute heretics, and order them\nto execution, because you are told, that these wretches displease God. But\ndo you not say, that your God is full of goodness? How then can you expect\nto please him by acts of barbarity, which he must necessarily disapprove?\nBesides, who has informed you, that their opinions displease your God?\nYour priests? But, who assures you, that your priests are not themselves\ndeceived or wish to deceive you? The same priests? Princes! It is\nthen upon the hazardous word of your priests, that you commit the most\natrocious crimes, under the idea of pleasing the Divinity!\n\n\n\n\n158.\n\nPascal says, \"that man never does evil so fully and cheerfully, as when he\nacts from a false principle of conscience.\" Nothing is more dangerous than\na religion, which lets loose the ferocity of the multitude, and justifies\ntheir blackest crimes. They will set no bounds to their wickedness, when\nthey think it authorized by their God, whose interests, they are told, can\nmake every action legitimate. Is religion in danger?--the most civilized\npeople immediately becomes true savages, and think nothing forbidden. The\nmore cruel they are, the more agreeable they suppose they are to their\nGod, whose cause they imagine cannot be supported with too much warmth.\n\nAll religions have authorized innumerable crimes. The Jews, intoxicated\nwith the promises of their God, arrogated the rights of exterminating\nwhole nations. Relying on the oracles of their God, the Romans conquered\nand ravaged the world. The Arabians, encouraged by their divine prophet,\ncarried fire and sword among the Christians and the idolaters. The\nCHRISTIANS, under pretext of extending their holy religion, have often\ndeluged both hemispheres in blood.\n\nIn all events favourable to their own interest, which they always call\n_the cause of God_, priests show us the _finger of God_. According to\nthese principles, the devout have the happiness to see the _finger of\nGod_ in revolts, revolutions, massacres, regicides, crimes, prostitutions,\nhorrors; and, if these things contribute ever so little to the triumph\nof religion, we are told, that \"God uses all sorts of means to attain his\nends.\" Is any thing more capable of effacing every idea of morality from\nthe minds of men, than to inform them, that their God, so powerful and\nperfect, is often forced to make use of criminal actions in order to\naccomplish his designs?\n\n\n\n\n159.\n\nNo sooner do we complain of the extravagancies and evils, which Religion\nhas so often caused upon the earth, than we are reminded, that these\nexcesses are not owing to Religion; but \"that they are the sad effects of\nthe passions of men.\" But I would ask, what has let loose these passions?\nIt is evidently Religion; it is zeal, that renders men inhuman, and serves\nto conceal the greatest atrocities. Do not these disorders then prove,\nthat religion, far from restraining the passions of men, only covers them\nwith a veil, which sanctifies them, and that nothing would be more useful,\nthan to tear away this sacred veil of which men often make such a terrible\nuse? What horrors would be banished from society, if the wicked were\ndeprived of so plausible a pretext for disturbing it!\n\nInstead of being angels of peace among men, priests have been demons of\ndiscord. They have pretended to receive from heaven the right of being\nquarrelsome, turbulent, and rebellious. Do not the ministers of the\nLord think themselves aggrieved, and pretend that the divine Majesty is\noffended, whenever sovereigns have the temerity to prevent them from\ndoing evil? Priests are like the spiteful woman who cried _fire! murder!\nassassination!_ while her husband held her hands to prevent her from\nstriking him.\n\n\n\n\n160.\n\nNotwithstanding the bloody tragedies, which Religion often acts, it is\ninsisted, that, without Religion, there can be no Morality. If we judge\ntheological opinions by their effects, we may confidently assert, that all\nMorality is perfectly incompatible with men's religious opinions.\n\n\"Imitate God,\" exclaim the pious. But, what would be our Morality, should\nwe imitate this God! and what God ought we to imitate? The God of the\nDeist? But even this God cannot serve us as a very constant model of\ngoodness. If he is the author of all things, he is the author both of good\nand evil. If he is the author of order, he is also the author of disorder,\nwhich could not take place without his permission. If he produces, he\ndestroys; if he gives life, he takes it away; if he grants abundance,\nriches, prosperity, and peace, he permits or sends scarcity, poverty,\ncalamities, and wars. How then can we receive as a model of permanent\nbeneficence, the God of Deism or natural religion, whose favourable\ndispositions are every instant contradicted by all the effects we behold?\nMorality must have a basis less tottering than the example of a God, whose\nconduct varies, and who cannot be called good, unless we obstinately shut\nour eyes against the evil which he causes or permits in this world.\n\nShall we imitate the _beneficent, mighty Jupiter_ of heathen antiquity? To\nimitate such a god, is to admit as a model, a rebellious son, who ravishes\nthe throne from his father. It is to imitate a debauchee, an adulterer,\none guilty of incest and of base passions, at whose conduct every\nreasonable mortal would blush. What would have been the condition of men\nunder paganism, had they imagined, like Plato, that virtue consisted in\nimitating the gods!\n\nMust we imitate the God of the Jews! Shall we find in _Jehovah_ a model\nfor our conduct? This is a truly savage god, made for a stupid, cruel,\nand immoral people; he is always furious, breathes nothing but vengeance,\ncommands carnage, theft, and unsociability. The conduct of this god cannot\nserve as a model to that of an honest man, and can be imitated only by a\nchief of robbers.\n\nShall we then imitate the _Jesus_ of the Christians? Does this God, who\ndied to appease the implacable fury of his father, furnish us an example\nwhich men ought to follow? Alas! we shall see in him only a God, or\nrather a fanatic, a misanthrope, who, himself plunged in wretchedness and\npreaching to wretches, will advise them to be poor, to combat with and\nstifle nature, to hate pleasure, seek grief, and detest themselves. He\nwill tell them to leave father, mother, relations, friends, etc., to\nfollow him. \"Fine morality!\" you say. It is, undoubtedly, admirable: it\nmust be divine, for it is impracticable to men. But is not such sublime\nmorality calculated to render virtue odious? According to the so much\nboasted morality of the _man_-God of the Christians, a disciple of his in\nthis world must be like _Tantalus_, tormented with a burning thirst, which\nhe is not allowed to quench. Does not such morality give us a wonderful\nidea of the author of nature? If, as we are assured, he has created all\nthings for his creatures, by what strange whim does he forbid them the\nuse of the goods he has created for them? Is pleasure then, which man\ncontinually desires, only a snare, which God has maliciously laid to\nsurprise his weakness?\n\n\n\n\n161.\n\nThe followers of Christ would have us regard, as a miracle, the\nestablishment of their Religion, which is totally repugnant to nature,\nopposite to all the propensities of the heart, and inimical to sensual\npleasures. But the austerity of a doctrine renders it the more marvellous\nin the eyes of the vulgar. The same disposition, which respects\ninconceivable mysteries as divine and supernatural, admires, as divine and\nsupernatural, a Morality, that is impracticable, and beyond the powers of\nman.\n\nTo admire a system of Morality, and to put it in practice, are two very\ndifferent things. All Christians admire and extol the Morality of the\ngospel; which they do not practise.\n\nThe whole world is more or less infected with a Religious morality,\nfounded upon the opinion, that to please the Divinity, it is absolutely\nnecessary to render ourselves unhappy upon earth. In all parts of our\nglobe, we see penitents, fakirs, and fanatics, who seem to have profoundly\nstudied the means of tormenting themselves, in honour of a being whose\ngoodness all agree in celebrating. Religion, by its essence, is an enemy\nto the joy and happiness of men. \"Blessed are the poor, blessed are\nthey, who weep; blessed are they, who suffer; misery to those, who are\nin abundance and joy.\" Such are the rare discoveries, announced by\nChristianity!\n\n\n\n\n162.\n\nWhat is a Saint in every religion? A man, who prays, and fasts, who\ntorments himself, and shuns the world; who like an owl, delights only\nin solitude, abstains from all pleasure, and seems frightened of every\nobject, which may divert him from his fanatical meditations. Is this\nvirtue? Is a being of this type, kind to himself, or useful to others?\nWould not society be dissolved, and man return to a savage state, if every\none were fool enough to be a Saint?\n\nIt is evident, that the literal and rigorous practice of the divine\nMorality of the Christians would prove the infallible ruin of nations. A\nChristian, aiming at perfection, ought to free his mind from whatever can\ndivert it from heaven, his true country. Upon earth, he sees nothing but\ntemptations, snares, and rocks of perdition. He must fear science, as\nhurtful to faith; he must avoid industry, as a means of obtaining riches,\ntoo fatal to salvation; he must renounce offices and honours, as capable\nof exciting his pride, and calling off his attention from the care of\nhis soul. In a word, the sublime Morality of Christ, were it practicable,\nwould break all the bonds of society.\n\nA Saint in society is as useless, as a Saint in the desert; his humour is\nmorose, discontented, and often turbulent; his zeal sometimes obliges him\nin conscience to trouble society by opinions or dreams, which his vanity\nmakes him consider as inspirations from on high. The annals of every\nreligion are full of restless Saints, intractable Saints, and seditious\nSaints, who have become famous by the ravages, with which, _for the\ngreater glory of God_, they have desolated the universe. If Saints, who\nlive in retirement, are useless, those who live in the world, are often\nvery dangerous.\n\nThe vanity of acting, the desire of appearing illustrious and peculiar in\nconduct, commonly constitute the distinguishing character of Saints. Pride\npersuades them, that they are extraordinary men far above human nature,\nbeings much more perfect than others, favourites whom God regards with\nmuch more complaisance than the rest of mortals. Humility, in a Saint,\nis commonly only a more refined pride than that of the generality of men.\nNothing but the most ridiculous vanity can induce man to wage continual\nwar against his own nature.\n\n\n\n\n163.\n\nA morality, which contradicts the nature of man, is not made for man.\n\"But,\" say you, \"the nature of man is depraved.\" In what consists this\npretended depravity? In having passions? But, are not passions essential\nto man? Is he not obliged to seek, desire, and love what is, or what he\nthinks is, conducive to his happiness? Is he not forced to fear and avoid\nwhat he judges disagreeable or fatal? Kindle his passions for useful\nobjects; connect his welfare with those objects; divert him, by sensible\nand known motives, from what may injure either him or others, and you will\nmake him a reasonable and virtuous being. A man without passions would be\nequally indifferent to vice and to virtue.\n\nHoly Doctors! you are always repeating to us that the nature of man is\nperverted; you exclaim, \"that _all flesh has corrupted its way_, that\nall the propensities of nature have become inordinate.\" In this case, you\naccuse your God; who was either unable, or unwilling, that this nature\nshould preserve its primitive perfection. If this nature is corrupted, why\nhas not God repaired it? The Christian immediately assures me, \"that human\nnature is repaired; that the death of his God has restored its integrity.\"\nHow then, I would ask, do you pretend that human nature, notwithstanding\nthe death of a God, is still depraved? Is then the death of your God\nwholly fruitless? What becomes of his omnipotence and of his victory over\nthe Devil, if it is true that the Devil still preserves the empire, which,\naccording to you, he has always exercised in the world?\n\nAccording to Christian theology, Death is the _wages of sin_. This opinion\nis conformable to that of some negro and savage nations, who imagine that\nthe Death of a man is always the supernatural effect of the anger of the\nGods. Christians firmly believe, that Christ has delivered them from sin;\nthough they see, that, in their Religion, as in others, man is subject to\nDeath. To say that Jesus Christ has delivered us from sin, is it not to\nsay, that a judge has pardoned a criminal, while we see that he leaves him\nfor execution?\n\n\n\n\n164.\n\nIf shutting our eyes upon whatever passes in the world, we would credit\nthe partisans of the Christian Religion, we should believe, that the\ncoming of their divine Saviour produced the most wonderful and complete\nreform in the morals of nations.\n\nIf we examine the Morals of Christian nations, and listen to the clamours\nof their priests, we shall be forced to conclude, that Jesus Christ, their\nGod, preached and died, in vain; his omnipotent will still finds in men,\na resistance, over which he cannot, or will not triumph. The Morality\nof this divine Teacher, which his disciples so much admire and so little\npractise, is followed, in a whole century only by half a dozen obscure\nsaints, and fanatics, and unknown monks, who alone will have the glory\nof shining in the celestial court, while all the rest of mortals, though\nredeemed by the blood of this God, will be the prey of eternal flames.\n\n\n\n\n165.\n\nWhen a man is strongly inclined to sin, he thinks very little about\nhis God. Nay more, whatever crimes he has committed, he always flatters\nhimself, that this God will soften, in his favour, the rigour of his\ndecrees. No mortal seriously believes, that his conduct can damn him.\nThough he fears a terrible God, who often makes him tremble, yet, whenever\nhe is strongly tempted, he yields; and he afterwards sees only the God\nof _mercies_, the idea of whom calms his apprehensions. If a man commits\nevil, he hopes, he shall have time to reform, and promises to repent at a\nfuture day.\n\nIn religious pharmacy, there are infallible prescriptions to quiet\nconsciences: priests, in every country, possess sovereign secrets to\ndisarm the anger of heaven. Yet, if it be true that the Deity is appeased\nby prayers, offerings, sacrifices, and penances, it can no longer be said,\nthat Religion is a check to the irregularities of men; they will first\nsin, and then seek the means to appease God. Every Religion, which\nexpiates crime and promises a remission of them, if it restrain some\npersons, encourages the majority to commit evil. Notwithstanding his\nimmutability, God, in every Religion, is a true _Proteus_. His priests\nrepresent him at one time armed with severity, at another full of clemency\nand mildness; sometimes cruel and unmerciful, and sometimes easily melted\nby the sorrow and tears of sinners. Consequently, men see the Divinity\nonly on the side most conformable to their present interests. A God always\nangry would discourage his worshippers, or throw them into despair.\nMen must have a God, who is both irritable, and placable. If his anger\nfrightens some timorous souls, his clemency encourages the resolutely\nwicked, who depend upon recurring, sooner or later, to the means of\naccommodation. If the judgments of God terrify some faint-hearted pious\npersons, who by constitution and habit are not prone to evil, _the\ntreasures of divine mercy_ encourage the greatest criminals, who have\nreason to hope they participate therein equally with the others.\n\n\n\n\n166.\n\nMost men seldom think of God, or, at least, bestow on him serious\nattention. The only ideas we can form of him are so devoid of object, and\nare at the same time so afflicting, that the only imaginations they can\narrest are those of melancholy hypochondriacs, who do not constitute the\nmajority of the inhabitants of this world. The vulgar have no conception\nof God; their weak brains are confused, whenever they think of him.\nThe man of business thinks only of his business; the courtier of his\nintrigues; men of fashion, women, and young people of their pleasures;\ndissipation soon effaces in them all the fatiguing notions of Religion.\nThe ambitious man, the miser and the debauchee carefully avoid\nspeculations too feeble to counterbalance their various passions.\n\nWho is awed by the idea of a God? A few enfeebled men, morose and\ndisgusted with the world; a few, in whom the passions are already deadened\nby age, by infirmity, or by the strokes of fortune. Religion is a check,\nto those alone who by their state of mind and body, or by fortuitous\ncircumstances, have been already brought to reason. The fear of God\nhinders from sin only those, who are not much inclined to it, or else\nthose who are no longer able to commit it. To tell men, that the\nDeity punishes crimes in this world, is to advance an assertion, which\nexperience every moment contradicts. The worst of men are commonly the\narbiters of the world, and are those whom fortune loads with her favours.\nTo refer us to another life, in order to convince us of the judgments\nof God, is to refer us to conjectures, in order to destroy facts, which\ncannot be doubted.\n\n\n\n\n167.\n\nNobody thinks of the life to come, when he is strongly smitten with\nthe objects he finds here below. In the eyes of a passionate lover, the\npresence of his mistress extinguishes the flames of hell, and her charms\nefface all the pleasures of paradise. Woman! you leave, say you, your\nlover for your God. This is either because your lover is no longer the\nsame in your eyes, or because he leaves you.\n\nNothing is more common, than to see ambitious, perverse, corrupt, and\nimmoral men, who have some ideas of Religion, and sometimes appear even\nzealous for its interest. If they do not practise it at present, they hope\nto in the future. They lay it up, as a remedy, which will be necessary\nto salve the conscience for the evil they intend to commit. Besides, the\nparty of devotees and priests being very numerous, active, and powerful,\nis it not astonishing, that rogues and knaves seek its support to attain\ntheir ends? It will undoubtedly be said, that many honest people are\nsincerely religious, and that without profit; but is uprightness of heart\nalways accompanied with knowledge?\n\nIt is urged, that many learned men, many men of genius have been strongly\nattached to Religion. This proves, that men of genius may have prejudices,\nbe pusillanimous, and have an imagination, which misleads them and\nprevents them from examining subjects coolly. Pascal proves nothing in\nfavour of Religion, unless that a man of genius may be foolish on some\nsubjects, and is but a child, when he is weak enough to listen to his\nprejudices. Pascal himself tells us, that _the mind may be strong and\ncontracted, enlarged and weak_. He previously observes, that _a man may\nhave a sound mind, and not understand every subject equally well; for\nthere are some, who, having a sound judgment in a certain order of things,\nare bewildered in others_.\n\n\n\n\n168.\n\nWhat is virtue according to theology? _It is_, we are told, _the\nconformity of the actions of man to the will of God_. But, what is God?\nA being, of whom nobody has the least conception, and whom every one\nconsequently modifies in his own way. What is the will of God? It is what\nmen, who have seen God, or whom God has inspired, have declared to be the\nwill of God. Who are those, who have seen God? They are either fanatics,\nor rogues, or ambitious men, whom we cannot believe.\n\nTo found Morality upon a God, whom every man paints to himself\ndifferently, composes in his way, and arranges according to his own\ntemperament and interest, is evidently to found Morality upon the caprice\nand imagination of men; it is to found it upon the whims of a sect, a\nfaction, a party, who believe they have the advantage to adore a true God\nto the exclusion of all others.\n\nTo establish Morality or the duties of man upon the divine will, is to\nfound it upon the will, the reveries and the interests of those, who make\nGod speak, without ever fearing that he will contradict them. In every\nReligion, priests alone have a right to decide what is pleasing or\ndispleasing to their God, and we are certain they will always decide, that\nit is what pleases or displeases themselves. The dogmas, the ceremonies,\nthe morals, and the virtues, prescribed by every Religion, are visibly\ncalculated only to extend the power or augment the emoluments of the\nfounders and ministers of these Religions. The dogmas are obscure,\ninconceivable, frightful, and are therefore well calculated to bewilder\nthe imagination and to render the vulgar more obsequious to the will of\nthose who wish to domineer over them. The ceremonies and practices procure\nthe priests, riches or respect. Religion consists in a submissive faith,\nwhich prohibits the exercise of reason; in a devout humility, which\ninsures priests the submission of their slaves; in an ardent zeal, when\nReligion, that is, when the interest of these priests, is in danger. The\nonly object of all religions is evidently the advantage of its ministers.\n\n\n\n\n169.\n\nWhen we reproach theologians with the barrenness of their divine virtues,\nthey emphatically extol _charity_, that tender love of one's neighbour,\nwhich Christianity makes an essential duty of its disciples. But, alas!\nwhat becomes of this pretended charity, when we examine the conduct of the\nministers of the Lord? Ask them, whether we must love or do good to our\nneighbour, if he be an impious man, a heretic, or an infidel, that is,\nif he do not think like them? Ask them, whether we must tolerate opinions\ncontrary to those of the religion, they profess? Ask them, whether the\nsovereign can show indulgence to those who are in error? Their charity\ninstantly disappears, and the established clergy will tell you, that _the\nprince bears the sword only to support the cause of the Most High_: they\nwill tell you that, through love for our neighbour, we must prosecute,\nimprison, exile, and burn him. You will find no toleration except among a\nfew priests, persecuted themselves, who will lay aside Christian charity\nthe instant they have power to persecute in their turn.\n\nThe Christian religion, in its origin preached by beggars and miserable\nmen, under the name of _charity_, strongly recommends alms. The religion\nof Mahomet also enjoins it as an indispensable duty. Nothing undoubtedly\nis more conformable to humanity, than to succour the unfortunate, to\nclothe the naked, to extend the hand of beneficence to every one in\ndistress. But would it not be more humane and charitable to prevent the\nsource of misery and poverty? If Religion, instead of deifying princes,\nhad taught them to respect the property of their subjects, to be just, to\nexercise only their lawful rights, we should not be shocked by the sight\nof such a multitude of beggars. A rapacious, unjust, tyrannical government\nmultiplies misery; heavy taxes produce discouragement, sloth, and poverty,\nwhich in their turn beget robberies, assassinations, and crimes of every\ndescription. Had sovereigns more humanity, charity, and equity, their\ndominions would not be peopled by so many wretches, whose misery it\nbecomes impossible to alleviate.\n\nChristian and Mahometan states are full of large hospitals, richly\nendowed, in which we admire the pious charity of the kings and sultans,\nwho erected them. But would it not have been more humane to govern the\npeople justly, to render them happy, to excite and favour industry and\ncommerce, and to let men enjoy in safety the fruit of their labours, than\nto crush them under a despotic yoke, to impoverish them by foolish wars,\nto reduce them to beggary, in order that luxury may be satisfied, and then\nto erect splendid buildings, which can contain but a very small portion\nof those, who have been rendered miserable? Religion has only deluded men;\ninstead of preventing evils, it always applies ineffectual remedies.\n\nThe ministers of heaven have always known how to profit by the calamities\nof others. Public misery is their element. They have every where become\nadministrators of the property of the poor, distributors of alms,\ndepositaries of charitable donations; and thereby they have at all times\nextended and supported their power over the unhappy, who generally compose\nthe most numerous, restless, and seditious part of society. Thus the\ngreatest evils turn to the profit of the ministers of the Lord. Christian\npriests tell us, that the property they possess is the property of the\npoor, and that it is therefore sacred. Consequently they have eagerly\naccumulated lands, revenues, and treasures. Under colour of charity,\nspiritual guides have become extremely opulent, and in the face of\nimpoverished nations enjoy wealth, which was destined solely for the\nunfortunate; while the latter, far from murmuring, applaud a pious\ngenerosity, which enriches the church, but rarely contributes to the\nrelief of the poor.\n\nAccording to the principles of Christianity, poverty itself is a virtue;\nindeed, it is the virtue, which sovereigns and priests oblige their slaves\nto observe most rigorously. With this idea, many pious Christians have of\ntheir own accord renounced riches, distributed their patrimony among the\npoor, and retired into deserts, there to live in voluntary indigence. But\nthis enthusiasm, this supernatural taste for misery, has been soon forced\nto yield to nature. The successors of these volunteers in poverty sold to\nthe devout people their prayers, and their intercessions with the Deity.\nThey became rich and powerful. Thus monks and hermits lived in indolence,\nand under colour of charity, impudently devoured the substance of the\npoor.\n\nThe species of poverty, most esteemed by Religion, is _poverty of mind_.\nThe fundamental virtue of every Religion, most useful to its ministers,\nis _faith_. It consists in unbounded credulity, which admits, without\nenquiry, whatever the interpreters of the Deity are interested in making\nmen believe. By the aid of this wonderful virtue, priests became the\narbiters of right and wrong, of good and evil: they could easily cause the\ncommission of crimes to advance their interest. Implicit faith has been\nthe source of the greatest outrages that have been committed.\n\n\n\n\n170.\n\nHe, who first taught nations, that, when we wrong Man, we must ask pardon\nof God, appease _him_ by presents, and offer _him_ sacrifices, evidently\ndestroyed the true principles of Morality. According to such ideas, many\npersons imagine that they may obtain of the king of heaven, as of kings\nof the earth, permission to be unjust and wicked, or may at least obtain\npardon for the evil they may commit.\n\nMorality is founded upon the relations, wants, and constant interests\nof mankind; the relations, which subsist between God and Men, are either\nperfectly unknown, or imaginary. Religion, by associating God with Man,\nhas wisely weakened, or destroyed, the bonds, which unite them. Mortals\nimagine, they may injure one another with impunity, by making suitable\nsatisfaction to the almighty being, who is supposed to have the right of\nremitting all offences committed against his creatures.\n\nIs any thing better calculated to encourage the wicked or harden them in\ncrimes, than to persuade them that there exists an invisible being, who\nhas a right to forgive acts of injustice, rapine, and outrage committed\nagainst society? By these destructive ideas, perverse men perpetrate the\nmost horrid crimes, and believe they make reparation by imploring divine\nmercy; their conscience is at rest, when a priest assures them that heaven\nis disarmed by a repentance, which, though sincere, is very useless to the\nworld.\n\nIn the mind of a devout man, God must be regarded more than his creatures;\nit is better to obey him, than men. The interests of the celestial monarch\nmust prevail over those of weak mortals. But the interests of heaven are\nobviously those of its ministers; whence it evidently follows, that in\nevery religion, priests, under pretext of the interests of heaven or the\nglory of God, can dispense with the duties of human Morality, when they\nclash with the duties, which God has a right to impose. Besides, must\nnot he, who has power to pardon crimes, have a right to encourage the\ncommission of crimes?\n\n\n\n\n171.\n\nWe are perpetually told, that, without a God there would be no _moral\nobligation_; that the people and even the sovereigns require a legislator\npowerful enough to constrain them. Moral constraint supposes a law; but\nthis law arises from the eternal and necessary relations of things with\none another; relations, which have nothing common with the existence of a\nGod. The rules of Man's conduct are derived from his own nature which he\nis capable of knowing, and not from the Divine nature of which he has no\nidea. These rules constrain or oblige us; that is, we render ourselves\nestimable or contemptible, amiable or detestable, worthy of reward or of\npunishment, happy or unhappy, accordingly as we conform to, or deviate\nfrom these rules. The law, which obliges man not to hurt himself, is\nfounded upon the nature of a sensible being, who, in whatever way he came\ninto this world, is forced by his actual essence to seek good and shun\nevil, to love pleasure and fear pain. The law, which obliges man not\nto injure, and even to do good to others, is founded upon the nature of\nsensible beings, living in society, whose essence compels them to despise\nthose who are useless, and to detest those who oppose their felicity.\n\nWhether there exists a God or not, whether this God has spoken or not, the\nmoral duties of men will be always the same, so long as they are sensible\nbeings. Have men then need of a God whom they know not, of an invisible\nlegislator, of a mysterious religion and of chimerical fears, in order to\nlearn that every excess evidently tends to destroy them, that to preserve\nhealth they must be temperate; that to gain the love of others it is\nnecessary to do them good, that to do them evil is a sure means to incur\ntheir vengeance and hatred? \"Before the law there was no sin.\" Nothing is\nmore false than this maxim. It suffices that man is what he is, or that\nhe is a sensible being, in order to distinguish what gives him pleasure or\ndispleasure. It suffices that one man knows that another man is a sensible\nbeing like himself, to perceive what is useful or hurtful to him. It\nsuffices that man needs his fellow-creature, in order to know that he must\nfear to excite sentiments unfavourable to himself. Thus the feeling and\nthinking being has only to feel and think, in order to discover what he\nmust do for himself and others. I feel, and another feels like me; this is\nthe foundation of all morals.\n\n\n\n\n172.\n\nWe can judge of the goodness of a system of Morals, only by its conformity\nto the nature of man. By this comparison, we have a right to reject it,\nif contrary to the welfare of our species. Whoever has seriously meditated\nReligion; whoever has carefully weighed its advantages and disadvantages,\nwill be fully convinced, that both are injurious to the interests of Man,\nor directly opposite to his nature.\n\n\"To arms! the cause of your God is at stake! Heaven is outraged! The faith\nis in danger! Impiety! blasphemy! heresy!\" The magical power of these\nformidable words, the real value of which the people never understand,\nhave at all times enabled priests to excite revolts, to dethrone kings, to\nkindle civil wars, and to lay waste. If we examine the important objects,\nwhich have produced so many ravages upon earth, it appears, that either\nthe foolish reveries and whimsical conjectures of some theologian who did\nnot understand himself, or else the pretensions of the clergy, have broken\nevery social bond and deluged mankind with blood and tears.\n\n\n\n\n173.\n\nThe sovereigns of this world, by associating the Divinity in the\ngovernment of their dominions, by proclaiming themselves his vicegerents\nand representatives upon earth, and by acknowledging they hold their power\nfrom him, have necessarily constituted his ministers their own rivals or\nmasters. Is it then astonishing, that priests have often made kings feel\nthe superiority of the Celestial Monarch? Have they not more than once\nconvinced temporal princes, that even the greatest power is compelled to\nyield to the spiritual power of opinion? Nothing is more difficult than\nto serve two masters, especially when they are not agreed upon what they\nrequire.\n\nThe association of Religion with Politics necessarily introduced double\nlegislation. The law of God, interpreted by his priests, was often\nrepugnant to the law of the sovereign, or the interest of the state. When\nprinces have firmness and are confident of the love of their subjects,\nthe law of God is sometimes forced to yield to the wise intentions of the\ntemporal sovereign; but generally the _sovereign_ authority is obliged\nto give way to the _divine_ authority, that is, to the interests of the\nclergy. Nothing is more dangerous to a prince, than to _encroach upon the\nauthority of the Church_, that is, to attempt to reform abuses consecrated\nby religion. God is never more angry than when we touch the divine rights,\nprivileges, possessions, or immunities of his priests.\n\nThe metaphysical speculations or religious opinions of men influence their\nconduct, only when they judge them conformable to their interest. Nothing\nproves this truth more clearly, than the conduct of many princes with\nrespect to the spiritual power, which they often resist. Ought not a\nsovereign, persuaded of the importance and rights of Religion, to believe\nhimself in conscience bound to receive respectfully the orders of its\npriests, and to regard them as the orders of the Divinity? There was\na time, when kings and people, more consistent in their conduct, were\nconvinced of the rights of spiritual power, and becoming its slaves,\nyielded to it upon every occasion, and were but docile instruments in\nits hands. That happy time is passed. By a strange inconsistency the most\ndevout monarchs are sometimes seen to oppose the enterprises of those,\nwhom they yet regard as the ministers of God. A sovereign, deeply\nreligious, ought to remain prostrate at the feet of his ministers, and\nregard them as true sovereigns. Is there upon earth a power which has a\nright to put itself in competition with that of the Most High?\n\n\n\n\n174.\n\nHave princes then, who imagine themselves interested in cherishing the\nprejudices of their subjects, seriously reflected upon the effects, which\nhave been, and may be again produced by certain privileged demagogues, who\nhave a right to speak at pleasure, and in the name of heaven to inflame\nthe passions of millions of subjects? What ravages would not these sacred\nharanguers cause, if they should conspire, as they have so often done, to\ndisturb the tranquillity of a state!\n\nTo most nations, nothing is more burthensome and ruinous than the worship\nof their gods. Not only do the ministers of these gods every where\nconstitute the first order in the state, but they also enjoy the largest\nportion of the goods of society, and have a right to levy permanent taxes\nupon their fellow-citizens. What real advantages then do these organs of\nthe Most High procure the people, for the immense profits extorted from\ntheir industry? In exchange for their riches and benefits, what do they\ngive them but mysteries, hypotheses, ceremonies, subtle questions, and\nendless quarrels, which states are again compelled to pay with blood?\n\n\n\n\n175.\n\nReligion, though said to be the firmest prop of Morality, evidently\ndestroys its true springs, in order to substitute imaginary ones,\ninconceivable chimeras, which, being obviously contrary to reason, nobody\nfirmly believes. All nations declare that they firmly believe in a God,\nwho rewards and punishes; all say they are persuaded of the existence of\nhell and paradise; yet, do these ideas render men better or counteract\nthe most trifling interests? Every one assures us, that he trembles at\nthe judgments of God; yet every one follows his passions, when he thinks\nhimself sure of escaping the judgments of Man. The fear of invisible\npowers is seldom so strong as the fear of visible ones. Unknown or remote\npunishments strike the multitude far less forcibly than the sight of\nthe gallows. Few courtiers fear the anger of their God so much as the\ndispleasure of their master. A pension, a title, or a riband suffices to\nefface the remembrance both of the torments of hell, and of the pleasures\nof the celestial court. The caresses of a woman repeatedly prevail over\nthe menaces of the Most High. A jest, a stroke of ridicule, a witticism,\nmake more impression upon the man of the world, than all the grave notions\nof his Religion.\n\nAre we not assured that _a true repentance_ is enough to appease the\nDeity? Yet we do not see that this _true repentance_ is very sincere;\nat least, it is rare to see noted thieves, even at the point of death,\nrestore goods, which they have unjustly acquired. Men are undoubtedly\npersuaded, that they shall fit themselves for eternal fire, if they cannot\ninsure themselves against it. But, \"Some useful compacts may be made with\nheaven.\" By giving the church a part of his fortune, almost every devout\nrogue may die in peace, without concerning himself in what he gained his\nriches.\n\n\n\n\n176.\n\nBy the confession of the warmest defenders of Religion and of its utility,\nnothing is more rare than sincere conversions, and, we might add, nothing\nmore unprofitable to society. Men are not disgusted with the world, until\nthe world is disgusted with them.\n\nIf the devout have the talent of pleasing God and his priests, they\nhave seldom that of being agreeable or useful to society. To a devotee,\nReligion is a veil, which covers all passions; pride, ill-humour,\nanger, revenge, impatience, and rancour. Devotion arrogates a tyrannical\nsuperiority, which banishes gentleness, indulgence, and gaiety; it\nauthorizes people to censure their neighbours, to reprove and revile the\nprofane for the greater glory of God. It is very common to be devout, and\nat the same time destitute of every virtue and quality necessary to social\nlife.\n\n\n\n\n177.\n\nIt is asserted, that the dogma of another life is of the utmost importance\nto peace and happiness; that without it, men would be destitute of motives\nto do good. What need is there of terrors and fables to make man sensible\nhow he ought to conduct himself? Does not every one see, that he has the\ngreatest interest, in meriting the approbation, esteem, and benevolence of\nthe beings who surround him, and in abstaining from every thing, by which\nhe may incur the censure, contempt, and resentment of society? However\nshort an entertainment, a conversation, or visit, does not each desire to\nact his part decently, and agreeably to himself and others? If life is but\na passage, let us strive to make it easy; which we cannot effect, if we\nfail in regard for those who travel with us. Religion, occupied with\nits gloomy reveries, considers man merely as a pilgrim upon earth; and\ntherefore supposes that, in order to travel the more securely, he must\nforsake company, and deprive himself of pleasure and amusements, which\nmight console him for the tediousness and fatigue of the journey. A\nstoical and morose philosopher sometimes gives us advice as irrational\nas that of Religion. But a more rational philosophy invites us to spread\nflowers upon the way of life, to dispel melancholy and banish terrors, to\nconnect our interest with that of our fellow-travellers, and by gaiety and\nlawful pleasures, to divert our attention from difficulties and accidents,\nto which we are often exposed; it teaches us, that, to travel agreeably,\nwe should abstain from what might be injurious to ourselves, and carefully\nshun what might render us odious to our associates.\n\n\n\n\n178.\n\nIt is asked, _what motives an Atheist can have to do good?_ The motive to\nplease himself and his fellow-creatures; to live happily and peaceably;\nto gain the affection and esteem of men. \"Can he, who fears not the gods,\nfear any thing?\" He can fear men; he can fear contempt, dishonour, the\npunishment of the laws; in short, he can fear himself, and the remorse\nfelt by all those who are conscious of having incurred or merited the\nhatred of their fellow-creatures.\n\nConscience is the internal testimony, which we bear to ourselves, of\nhaving acted so as to merit the esteem or blame of the beings, with whom\nwe live; and it is founded upon the clear knowledge we have of men, and of\nthe sentiments which our actions must produce in them. The Conscience of\nthe religious man consists in imagining that he has pleased or displeased\nhis God, of whom he has no idea, and whose obscure and doubtful intentions\nare explained to him only by men of doubtful veracity, who, like him, are\nutterly unacquainted with the essence of the Deity, and are little agreed\nupon what can please or displease him. In a word, the conscience of the\ncredulous is directed by men, who have themselves an erroneous conscience,\nor whose interest stifles knowledge.\n\n\"Can an Atheist have a Conscience? What are his motives to abstain from\nhidden vices and secret crimes of which other men are ignorant, and which\nare beyond the reach of laws?\" He may be assured by constant experience,\nthat there is no vice, which, by the nature of things, does not punish\nitself. Would he preserve this life? he will avoid every excess, that\nmay impair his health; he will not wish to lead a languishing life, which\nwould render him a burden to himself and others. As for secret crimes, he\nwill abstain from them, for fear he shall be forced to blush at himself,\nfrom whom he cannot flee. If he has any reason, he will know the value\nof the esteem which an honest man ought to have for himself. He will\nsee, that unforeseen circumstances may unveil the conduct, which he feels\ninterested in concealing from others. The other world furnishes no motives\nfor doing good, to him, who finds none on earth.\n\n\n\n\n179.\n\n\"The speculative Atheist,\" says the Theist, \"may be an honest man, but his\nwritings will make political Atheists. Princes and ministers, no longer\nrestrained by the fear of God, will abandon themselves, without scruple,\nto the most horrid excesses.\" But, however great the depravity of an\nAtheist upon the throne, can it be stronger and more destructive, than\nthat of the many conquerors, tyrants, persecutors, ambitious men, and\nperverse courtiers, who, though not Atheists, but often very religious and\ndevout, have notwithstanding made humanity groan under the weight of their\ncrimes? Can an atheistical prince do more harm to the world, than a\nLouis XI., a Philip II., a Richelieu, who all united Religion with crime?\nNothing is more rare, than atheistical princes; nothing more common, than\ntyrants and ministers, who are very wicked and very religious.\n\n\n\n\n180.\n\nA man of reflection cannot be incapable of his duties, of discovering\nthe relations subsisting between men, of meditating his own nature, of\ndiscerning his own wants, propensities, and desires, and of perceiving\nwhat he owes to beings, who are necessary to his happiness. These\nreflections naturally lead him to a knowledge of the Morality most\nessential to social beings. Dangerous passions seldom fall to the lot of\na man who loves to commune with himself, to study, and to investigate the\nprinciples of things. The strongest passion of such a man will be to know\ntruth, and his ambition to teach it to others. Philosophy cultivates the\nmind. On the score of morals and honesty, has not he who reflects and\nreasons, evidently an advantage over him, who makes it a principle never\nto reason?\n\nIf ignorance is useful to priests, and to the oppressors of mankind, it is\nfatal to society. Man, void of knowledge, does not enjoy reason; without\nreason and knowledge, he is a savage, liable to commit crimes. Morality,\nor the science of duties, is acquired only by the study of Man, and of\nwhat is relative to Man. He, who does not reflect, is unacquainted with\ntrue Morality, and walks with precarious steps, in the path of virtue. The\nless men reason, the more wicked they are. Savages, princes, nobles,\nand the dregs of the people, are commonly the worst of men, because they\nreason the least. The devout man seldom reflects, and rarely reasons. He\nfears all enquiry, scrupulously follows authority, and often, through an\nerror of conscience, makes it a sacred duty to commit evil. The Atheist\nreasons: he consults experience, which he prefers to prejudice. If he\nreasons justly, his conscience is enlightened; he finds more real motives\nto do good than the bigot whose only motives are his fallacies, and who\nnever listens to reason. Are not the motives of the Atheist sufficiently\npowerful to counteract his passions? Is he blind enough to be unmindful\nof his true interest, which ought to restrain him? But he will be neither\nworse nor better, than the numerous believers, who, notwithstanding\nReligion and its sublime precepts, follow a conduct which Religion\ncondemns. Is a credulous assassin less to be feared, than an assassin who\nbelieves nothing? Is a very devout tyrant less tyrannical than an undevout\ntyrant?\n\n\n\n\n181.\n\nNothing is more uncommon, than to see men consistent. Their opinions never\ninfluence their conduct except when conformable to their temperaments,\npassions, and interests. Daily experience shows, that religious opinions\nproduce much evil and little good. They are hurtful, because they often\nfavour the passions of tyrants, of ambitious men, of fanatics, and of\npriests; they are of no effect, because incapable of counter-balancing the\npresent interests of the greater part of mankind. Religious principles\nare of no avail, when they act in opposition to ardent desires; though not\nunbelievers, men then conduct themselves as if they believed nothing.\n\nWe shall always be liable to err, when we judge of the opinions of men\nby their conduct, or of their conduct by their opinions. A religious man,\nnotwithstanding the unsociable principles of a sanguinary religion, will\nsometimes by a happy inconsistency, be humane, tolerant, and moderate; the\nprinciples of his religion do not then agree with the gentleness of his\ncharacter. Libertines, debauchees, hypocrites, adulterers, and rogues,\noften appear to have the best ideas upon morals. Why do they not reduce\nthem to practice? Because their temperament, their interest, and their\nhabits do not accord with their sublime theories. The rigid principles of\nChristian morality, which many people regard as divine, have but little\ninfluence upon the conduct of those, who preach them to others. Do they\nnot daily tell us, _to do what they preach, and not what they practise?_\n\nThe partisans of Religion often denote an infidel by the word _libertine_.\nIt is possible that many unbelievers may have loose morals, which is\nowing to their temperament, and not to their opinions. But how does\ntheir conduct affect their opinions? Cannot then an immoral man be a good\nphysician, architect, geometrician, logician, or metaphysician? A man of\nirreproachable conduct may be extremely deficient in knowledge and reason.\nIn quest of truth, it little concerns us from whom it comes. Let us not\njudge men by their opinions, nor opinions by men; let us judge men by\ntheir conduct, and their opinions by their conformity with experience and\nreason and by their utility to mankind.\n\n\n\n\n182.\n\nEvery man, who reasons, soon becomes an unbeliever; for reason shows, that\ntheology is nothing but a tissue of chimeras; that religion is contrary to\nevery principle of good sense, that it tinctures all human knowledge with\nfalsity. The sensible man is an unbeliever, because he sees, that, far\nfrom making men happier, religion is the chief source of the greatest\ndisorders, and the permanent calamities, with which man is afflicted. The\nman, who seeks his own welfare and tranquillity, examines and throws aside\nreligion, because he thinks it no less troublesome than useless, to spend\nhis life in trembling before phantoms, fit to impose only upon silly women\nor children.\n\nIf licentiousness, which reasons but little, sometimes leads to\nirreligion, the man of pure morals may have very good motives for\nexamining his religion, and banishing it from his mind. Religious terrors,\ntoo weak to impose upon the wicked in whom vice is deeply rooted, afflict,\ntorment and overwhelm restless imaginations. Courageous and vigorous\nminds soon shake off the insupportable yoke. But those, who are weak and\ntimorous, languish under it during life; and as they grow old their fears\nincrease.\n\nPriests have represented God as so malicious, austere, and terrible a\nbeing, that most men would cordially wish, that there was no God. It is\nimpossible to be happy, while always trembling. Ye devout! you adore a\nterrible God! But you hate him; you would be glad, if he did not exist.\nCan we refrain from desiring the absence or destruction of a master, the\nidea of whom destroys our happiness? The black colours, in which priests\npaint the Divinity, are truly shocking, and force us to hate and reject\nhim.\n\n\n\n\n183.\n\nIf fear created the gods, fear supports their empire over the minds of\nmortals. So early are men accustomed to shudder at the mere name of the\nDeity, that they regard him as a spectre, a hobgoblin, a bugbear, which\ntorments and deprives them of courage even to wish relief from their\nfears. They apprehend, that the invisible spectre, will strike them the\nmoment they cease to be afraid. Bigots are too much in fear of their God\nto love him sincerely. They serve him like slaves, who, unable to escape\nhis power, resolve to flatter their master, and who, by dint of lying, at\nlength persuade themselves, that they in some measure love him. They make\na virtue of necessity. The love of devotees for their God, and of slaves\nfor their despots, is only a feigned homage.\n\n\n\n\n184.\n\nChristian divines have represented their God so terrible and so little\nworthy of love, that several of them have thought they must dispense\nwith loving him; a blasphemy, shocking to other divines, who were less\ningenuous. St. Thomas having maintained, that we are obliged to love God\nas soon as we attain the use of reason, the Jesuit Sirmond answered him,\n_that is very soon_. The Jesuit Vasquez assures us, that _it is enough to\nlove God at the point of death_. Hurtado, more rigid, says, _we must\nlove God very year_. Henriquez is contented that we love him _every five\nyears_; Sotus, _every Sunday_. Upon what are these opinions grounded? asks\nfather Sirmond; who adds, that Suarez requires us to _love God sometimes_.\nBut when? He leaves that to us; he knows nothing about it himself. _Now_,\nsays he, _who will be able to know that, of which such a learned divine is\nignorant?_ The same Jesuit Sirmond further observes, that _God_ \"does not\ncommand us to love him with an affectionate love, nor does he promise us\nsalvation upon condition that we give him our hearts; it is enough to obey\nand love him with an effective love by executing his orders; this is the\nonly love we owe him; and he has not so much commanded us to love him, as\nnot to hate him.\" This doctrine appears heretical, impious, and abominable\nto the Jansenists, who, by the revolting severity they attribute to their\nGod, make him far less amiable, than the Jesuits, their adversaries. The\nlatter, to gain adherents, paint God in colours capable of encouraging\nthe most perverse of mortals. Thus nothing is more undecided with the\nChristians, than the important question, whether they can, ought, or\nought not to love God. Some of their spiritual guides maintain, that it\nis necessary to love him with all one's heart, notwithstanding all his\nseverity; others, like father Daniel, think that, _an act of pure love\nto God is the most heroic act of Christian virtue, and almost beyond the\nreach of human weakness_. The Jesuit Pintereau goes farther; he says, _a\ndeliverance from the grievous yoke of loving God is a privilege of the new\ncovenant_.\n\n\n\n\n185.\n\nThe character of the Man always decides that of his God; every body\nmakes one for himself and like himself. The man of gaiety, involved in\ndissipation and pleasure, does not imagine, that, God can be stern and\ncross; he wants a good-natured God, with whom he can find reconciliation.\nThe man of a rigid, morose, bilious, sour disposition, must have a God\nlike himself, a God of terror; and he regards, as perverse, those, who\nadmit a placable, indulgent God. As men are constituted, organized, and\nmodified in a manner, which cannot be precisely the same, how can they\nagree about a chimera, which exists only in their brains?\n\nThe cruel and endless disputes between the ministers of the Lord, are not\nsuch as to attract the confidence of those, who impartially consider them.\nHow can we avoid complete infidelity, upon viewing principles, about which\nthose who teach them to others are never agreed? How can we help doubting\nthe existence of a God, of whom it is evident that even his ministers\ncan only form very fluctuating ideas? How can we in short avoid totally\nrejecting a God, who is nothing but a shapeless heap of contradictions?\nHow can we refer the matter to the decision of priests, who are\nperpetually at war, treating each other as impious and heretical, defaming\nand persecuting each other without mercy, for differing in the manner of\nunderstanding what they announce to the world?\n\n\n\n\n186.\n\nThe existence of a God is the basis of all Religion. Nevertheless, this\nimportant truth has not as yet been demonstrated, I do not say so as\nto convince unbelievers, but in a manner satisfactory to theologians\nthemselves. Profound thinkers have at all times been occupied in inventing\nnew proofs. What are the fruits of their meditations and arguments?\nThey have left the subject in a worse condition; they have demonstrated\nnothing; they have almost always excited the clamours of their brethren,\nwho have accused them of having poorly defended the best of causes.\n\n\n\n\n187.\n\nThe apologists of religion daily repeat, that the passions alone make\nunbelievers. \"Pride,\" say they, \"and the desire of signalizing themselves,\nmake men Atheists. They endeavour to efface from their minds the idea\nof God, only because they have reason to fear his terrible judgments.\"\nWhatever may be the motives, which incline men to Atheism, it is our\nbusiness to examine, whether their sentiments are founded in truth. No man\nacts without motives. Let us first examine the arguments and afterwards\nthe motives. We shall see whether these motives are not legitimate, and\nmore rational than those of many credulous bigots, who suffer themselves\nto be guided by masters little worthy of the confidence of men.\n\nYou say then, Priests of the Lord! that the passions make unbelievers;\nthat they renounce Religion only through interest, or because it\ncontradicts their inordinate propensities; you assert, that they attack\nyour gods only because they fear their severity. But, are you yourselves,\nin defending Religion and its chimeras, truly exempt from passions and\ninterests? Who reap advantages from this Religion, for which priests\ndisplay so much zeal? Priests. To whom does Religion procure power,\ninfluence, riches, and honours? To Priests. Who wage war, in every\ncountry, against reason, science, truth, and philosophy, and render them\nodious to sovereigns and people? Priests. Who profit by the ignorance and\nvain prejudices of men? Priests.--Priests! you are rewarded, honoured\nand paid for deceiving mortals, and you cause those to be punished who\nundeceive them. The follies of men procure you benefices, offerings, and\nexpiations; while those, who announce the most useful truths, are rewarded\nonly with chains, gibbets and funeral-piles. Let the world judge between\nus.\n\n\n\n\n188.\n\nPride and vanity have been, and ever will be, inherent in the priesthood.\nIs any thing more capable of rendering men haughty and vain, than the\npretence of exercising a power derived from heaven, of bearing a sacred\ncharacter, of being the messengers and ministers of the Most High? Are not\nthese dispositions perpetually nourished by the credulity of the people,\nthe deference and respect of sovereigns, the immunities, privileges, and\ndistinctions enjoyed by the clergy? In every country, the vulgar are much\nmore devoted to their spiritual guides, whom they regard as divine, than\nto their temporal superiors, whom they consider as no more than ordinary\nmen. The parson of a village acts a much more conspicuous part, than the\nlord of the manor or the justice of the peace. Among the Christians, a\npriest thinks himself far above a king or an emperor. A Spanish grandee\nhaving spoken rather haughtily to a monk, the latter arrogantly said,\n\"Learn to respect a man, who daily has your God in his hands, and your\nQueen at his feet.\" Have priests then a right to accuse unbelievers of\npride? Are they themselves remarkable for uncommon modesty or profound\nhumility? Is it not evident, that the desire of domineering over men is\nessential to their trade? If the ministers of the Lord were truly modest,\nshould we see them so greedy of respect, so impatient of contradiction, so\npositive in their decisions, and so unmercifully revengeful to those\nwhose opinions offend them? Has not Science the modesty to acknowledge\nhow difficult it is to discover truth? What other passion but ungovernable\npride can make men so savage, revengeful, and void of indulgence and\ngentleness? What can be more presumptuous, than to arm nations and deluge\nthe world in blood, in order to establish or defend futile conjectures?\n\nYou say, that presumption alone makes Atheists. Inform them then what your\nGod is; teach them his essence; speak of him intelligibly; say something\nabout him, which is reasonable, and not contradictory or impossible. If\nyou are unable to satisfy them, if hitherto none of you have been able to\ndemonstrate the existence of a God in a clear and convincing manner; if\nby your own confession, his essence is completely veiled from you, as from\nthe rest of mortals, forgive those, who cannot admit what they can neither\nunderstand nor make consistent with itself; do not tax with presumption\nand vanity those who are sincere enough to confess their ignorance; do\nnot accuse of folly those who find themselves incapable of believing\ncontradictions; and for once, blush at exciting the hatred and fury of\nsovereigns and people against men, who think not like you concerning a\nbeing, of whom you have no idea. Is any thing more rash and extravagant,\nthan to reason concerning an object, known to be inconceivable? You say,\nthat the corruption of the heart produces Atheism, that men shake off the\nyoke of the Deity only because they fear his formidable judgments.\nBut, why do you paint your God in colours so shocking, that he becomes\ninsupportable? Why does so powerful a God permit men to be so corrupt? How\ncan we help endeavouring to shake off the yoke of a tyrant, who, able to\ndo as he pleases with men, consents to their perversion, who hardens, and\nblinds them, and refuses them his grace, that he may have the satisfaction\nto punish them eternally, for having been hardened, and blinded, and for\nnot having the grace which he refused? Theologians and priests must be\nvery confident of the grace of heaven and a happy futurity, to refrain\nfrom detesting a master so capricious as the God they announce. A God,\nwho damns eternally, is the most odious of beings that the human mind can\ninvent.\n\n\n\n\n189.\n\nNo man upon earth is truly interested in the support of error, which is\nforced sooner or later to yield to truth. The general good must at length\nopen the eyes of mortals: the passions themselves sometimes contribute\nto break the chains of prejudices. Did not the passions of sovereigns,\ncenturies ago, annihilate in some countries of Europe the tyrannical\npower, which a too haughty pontiff once exercised over all princes of his\nsect? In consequence of the progress of political science, the clergy\nwere then stripped of immense riches, which credulity had accumulated\nupon them. Ought not this memorable example to convince priests, that\nprejudices triumph but for a time, and that truth alone can insure solid\nhappiness?\n\nBy caressing sovereigns, by fabricating divine rights for them, by\ndeifying them, and by abandoning the people, bound hand and foot, to their\nwill, the ministers of the Most High must see, that they are labouring to\nmake them tyrants. Have they not reason to apprehend, that the gigantic\nidols, which they raised to the clouds, will one day crush them by\ntheir enormous weight? Do not a thousand examples remind them that these\ntyrants, after preying upon the people, may prey upon them in their turn.\n\nWe will respect priests, when they become sensible men. Let them, if they\nplease, use the authority of heaven to frighten those princes who are\ncontinually desolating the earth; but let them no more adjudge to them the\nhorrid right of being unjust with impunity. Let them acknowledge, that no\nman is interested in living under tyranny; and let them teach sovereigns,\nthat they themselves are not interested in exercising a despotism, which,\nby rendering them odious, exposes them to danger, and detracts from\ntheir power and greatness. Finally, let priests and kings become so\nfar enlightened as to acknowledge, that no power is secure which is not\nfounded upon truth, reason, and equity.\n\n\n\n\n190.\n\nBy waging war against Reason, which they ought to have protected and\ndeveloped, the ministers of the gods evidently act against their own\ninterest. What power, influence, and respect might they not have gained\namong the wisest of men, what gratitude would they not have excited in the\npeople, if, instead of wasting their time about their vain disputes, they\nhad applied themselves to really useful science, and investigated the\ntrue principles of philosophy, government, and morals! Who would dare to\nreproach a body with its opulence or influence, if the members dedicating\nthemselves to the public good, employed their leisure in study, and\nexercised their authority in enlightening the minds both of sovereigns and\nsubjects?\n\nPriests! Forsake your chimeras, your unintelligible dogmas, your\ncontemptible quarrels! Banish those phantoms which could be useful only in\nthe infancy of nations. Assume, at length, the language of reason. Instead\nof exciting persecution; instead of entertaining the people with silly\ndisputes; instead of preaching useless and fanatical dogmas, preach human\nand social morality; preach virtues really useful to the world; become the\napostles of reason, the defenders of liberty, and the reformers of abuses.\n\n\n\n\n191.\n\nPhilosophers have every where taken upon themselves a part, which seemed\ndestined to the ministers of Religion. The hatred of the latter for\nphilosophy was only a jealousy of trade. But, instead of endeavouring\nto injure and decry each other, all men of good sense should unite their\nefforts to combat error, seek truth, and especially to put to flight the\nprejudices, that are equally injurious to sovereigns and subjects, and of\nwhich the abettors themselves sooner or later become the victims.\n\nIn the hands of an enlightened government, the priests would become the\nmost useful of the citizens. Already richly paid by the state, and free\nfrom the care of providing for their own subsistence, how could they\nbe better employed than in qualifying themselves for the instruction\nof others? Would not their minds be better satisfied with discovering\nluminous truths, than in wandering through the thick darkness of error?\nWould it be more difficult to discern the clear principles of Morality,\nthan the imaginary principles of a divine and theological Morality? Would\nmen of ordinary capacities find it as difficult to fix in their heads the\nsimple notions of their duties, as to load their memories with mysteries,\nunintelligible words and obscure definitions, of which they can never\nform a clear idea? What time and pains are lost in learning and teaching\nthings, which are not of the least real utility! What resources for the\nencouragement of the sciences, the advancement of knowledge, and the\neducation of youth, well disposed sovereigns might find in the many\nmonasteries, which in several countries live upon the people without in\nthe slightest degree profiting them! But superstition, jealous of its\nexclusive empire, seems resolved to form only useless beings. To what\nadvantage might we not turn a multitude of cenobites of both sexes,\nwho, in many countries, are amply endowed for doing nothing? Instead\nof overwhelming them with fasting and austerities; instead of barren\ncontemplations, mechanical prayers, and trifling ceremonies; why should\nwe not excite in them a salutary emulation, which may incline them to seek\nthe means, not of being _dead_ to the world, but of being _useful_ to it?\nInstead of filling the youthful minds of their pupils with fables, sterile\ndogmas, and puerilities, why are not priests obliged, or invited to teach\nthem truths, and to render them useful citizens of their country? Under\nthe present system, men are only useful to the clergy who blind them, and\nto the tyrants who fleece them.\n\n\n\n\n192.\n\nThe partisans of credulity often accuse unbelievers of insincerity,\nbecause they sometimes waver in their principles, alter their minds in\nsickness, and retract at death. When the body is disordered, the faculty\nof reasoning is commonly disordered with it. At the approach of death,\nman, weak and decayed, is sometimes himself sensible that Reason abandons\nhim, and that Prejudice returns. There are some diseases, which tend to\nweaken the brain; to create despondency and pusillanimity; and there are\nothers, which destroy the body, but do not disturb the reason. At any\nrate, an unbeliever who recants in sickness is not more extraordinary,\nthan a devotee who neglects in health the duties which his religion\nexplicitly enjoins.\n\nMinisters of Religion openly contradict in their daily conduct the\nrigorous principles, they teach to others; in consequence of which,\nunbelievers, in their turn, may justly accuse them of insincerity. Is it\neasy to find many prelates humble, generous, void of ambition, enemies\nof pomp and grandeur, and friends of poverty? In short, is the conduct of\nChristian ministers conformable to the austere morality of Christ, their\nGod, and their model?\n\n\n\n\n193.\n\n_Atheism_, it is said, _breaks all the ties of society. Without the belief\nof a God, what will become of the sacredness of oaths? How shall we oblige\na man to speak the truth, who cannot seriously call the Deity to witness\nwhat he says?_ But, does an oath strengthen our obligation to fulfil the\nengagements contracted? Will he, who is not fearful of lying, be less\nfearful of perjury? He, who is base enough to break his word, or unjust\nenough to violate his engagements, in contempt of the esteem of men, will\nnot be more faithful therein for having called all the gods to witness his\noaths. Those, who disregard the judgments of men, will soon disregard the\njudgments of God. Are not princes, of all men, the most ready to swear,\nand the most ready to violate their oaths?\n\n\n\n\n194.\n\n_The vulgar_, it is repeatedly said, _must have a Religion. If enlightened\npersons have no need of the restraint of opinion, it is at least necessary\nto rude men, whose reason is uncultivated by education_. But, is it indeed\na fact, that religion is a restraint upon the vulgar? Do we see, that\nthis religion preserves them from intemperance, drunkenness, brutality,\nviolence, fraud, and every kind of excess? Could a people who have no idea\nof the Deity conduct themselves in a more detestable manner, than these\nbelieving people, among whom we find dissipation and vices, the most\nunworthy of reasonable beings? Upon going out of the churches, do not the\nworking classes, and the populace, plunge without fear into their ordinary\nirregularities, under the idea, that the periodical homage, which they\nrender to their God, authorizes them to follow, without remorse, their\nvicious habits and pernicious propensities? Finally, if the people are\nso low-minded and unreasonable, is not their stupidity chargeable to\nthe negligence of their princes, who are wholly regardless of public\neducation, or who even oppose the instruction of their subjects? Is not\nthe want of reason in the people evidently the work of the priests, who,\ninstead of instructing men in a rational morality, entertain them with\nfables, reveries, ceremonies, fallacies, and false virtues which they\nthink of the greatest importance?\n\nTo the people, Religion is but a vain display of ceremonies, to which\nthey are attached by habit, which entertains their eyes, and produces\na transient emotion in their torpid understandings, without influencing\ntheir conduct or reforming their morals. Even by the confession of the\nministers of the altars, nothing is more rare than that _internal_ and\n_spiritual_ Religion, which alone is capable of regulating the life of\nman and of triumphing over his evil propensities. In the most numerous\nand devout nation, are there many persons, who are really capable of\nunderstanding the principles of their religious system, and who find them\npowerful enough to stifle their perverse inclinations?\n\nMany persons will say, that _any restraint whatever is better than none._\nThey will maintain, that _if religion awes not the greater part, it serves\nat least to restrain some individuals, who would otherwise without remorse\nabandon themselves to crime_. Men ought undoubtedly to have a restraint,\nbut not an imaginary one. Religion only frightens those whose imbecility\nof character has already prevented them from being formidable to their\nfellow-citizens. An equitable government, severe laws, and sound morality\nhave an equal power over all; at least, every person must believe in them,\nand perceive the danger of not conforming to them.\n\n\n\n\n195.\n\nPerhaps it will be asked, _whether Atheism can be proper for the\nmultitude?_ I answer, that any system, which requires discussion, is\nnot made for the multitude. _What purpose then can it serve to preach\nAtheism?_ It may at least serve to convince all those who reason, that\nnothing is more extravagant than to fret one's self, and nothing more\nunjust than to vex others, for mere groundless conjectures. As for the\nvulgar who never reason, the arguments of an Atheist are no more fit for\nthem than the systems of a natural philosopher, the observations of\nan astronomer, the experiments of a chemist, the calculations of a\ngeometrician, the researches of a physician, the plans of an architect,\nor the pleadings of a lawyer, who all labour for the people without their\nknowledge.\n\nAre the metaphysical reasonings and religious disputes, which have so\nlong engrossed the time and attention of so many profound thinkers, better\nadapted to the generality of men than the reasoning of an Atheist? Nay,\nas the principles of Atheism are founded upon plain common sense, are they\nnot more intelligible, than those of a theology, beset with difficulties,\nwhich even the persons of the greatest genius cannot explain? In every\ncountry, the people have a religion, the principles of which they\nare totally ignorant, and which they follow from habit without any\nexamination: their priests alone are engaged in theology, which is too\ndense for vulgar heads. If the people should chance to lose this unknown\ntheology, they mighty easily console themselves for the loss of a thing,\nnot only perfectly useless, but also productive of dangerous commotions.\n\nIt would be madness to write for the vulgar, or to attempt to cure their\nprejudices all at once. We write for those only, who read and reason;\nthe multitude read but little, and reason still less. Calm and rational\npersons will require new ideas, and knowledge will be gradually diffused.\n\n\n\n\n196.\n\nIf theology is a branch of commerce profitable to theologians, it is\nevidently not only superfluous, but injurious to the rest of society.\nSelf-interest will sooner or later open the eyes of men. Sovereigns\nand subjects will one day adopt the profound indifference and contempt,\nmerited by a futile system, which serves only to make men miserable.\nAll persons will be sensible of the inutility of the many expensive\nceremonies, which contribute nothing to public felicity. Contemptible\nquarrels will cease to disturb the tranquility of states, when we blush at\nhaving considered them important.\n\nInstead of Parliament meddling with the senseless combats of your clergy;\ninstead of foolishly espousing their impertinent quarrels, and attempting\nto make your subjects adopt uniform opinions--strive to make them happy\nin this world. Respect their liberty and property, watch over their\neducation, encourage them in their labours, reward their talents and\nvirtues, repress licentiousness; and do not concern yourselves with their\nmanner of thinking. Theological fables are useful only to tyrants and the\nignorant.\n\n\n\n\n197.\n\nDoes it then require an extraordinary effort of genius to comprehend,\nthat what is above the capacity of man, is not made for him; that things\nsupernatural are not made for natural beings; that impenetrable mysteries\nare not made for limited minds? If theologians are foolish enough to\ndispute upon objects, which they acknowledge to be unintelligible even to\nthemselves, ought society to take any part in their silly quarrels? Must\nthe blood of nations flow to enhance the conjectures of a few infatuated\ndreamers? If it is difficult to cure theologians of their madness and\nthe people of their prejudices, it is at least easy to prevent the\nextravagancies of one party, and the silliness of the other from producing\npernicious effects. Let every one be permitted to think as he pleases; but\nnever let him be permitted to injure others for their manner of thinking.\nWere the rulers of nations more just and rational, theological opinions\nwould not affect the public tranquillity, more than the disputes of\nnatural philosophers, physicians, grammarians, and critics. It is\ntyranny which causes theological quarrels to be attended with serious\nconsequences.\n\nThose, who extol the importance and utility of Religion, ought to shew\nus its happy effects, the advantages for instance, which the disputes\nand abstract speculations of theology can be to porters, artisans, and\nlabourers, and to the multitude of unfortunate women and corrupt servants\nwith which great cities abound. All these beings are religious; they have\nwhat is called _an implicit faith_. Their parsons believe for them; and\nthey stupidly adhere to the unknown belief of their guides. They go to\nhear sermons, and would think it a great crime to transgress any of the\nordinances, to which, in childhood, they are taught to conform. But of\nwhat service to morals is all this? None at all. They have not the least\nidea of Morality, and are even guilty of all the roguery, fraud, rapine,\nand excess, that is out of the reach of law.\n\nThe populace have no idea of their Religion; what they call Religion\nis nothing but a blind attachment to unknown opinions and mysterious\npractices. In fact, to deprive people of Religion is to deprive them\nof nothing. By overthrowing their prejudices, we should only lessen or\nannihilate the dangerous confidence they put in interested guides, and\nshould teach them to mistrust those, who, under the pretext of Religion,\noften lead them into fatal excesses.\n\n\n\n\n198.\n\nWhile pretending to instruct and enlighten men, Religion in reality keeps\nthem in ignorance, and stifles the desire of knowing the most interesting\nobjects. The people have no other rule of conduct, than what their priests\nare pleased to prescribe. Religion supplies the place of every thing else:\nbut being in itself essentially obscure, it is more proper to lead mortals\nastray than to guide them in the path of science and happiness. Religion\nrenders enigmatical all Natural Philosophy, Morality, Legislation and\nPolitics. A man blinded by religious prejudices, fears truth, whenever\nit clashes with his opinions: he cannot know his own nature he cannot\ncultivate his reason, he cannot perform experiments.\n\nEverything concurs to render the people devout; but every thing tends to\nprevent them from being humane, reasonable and virtuous. Religion seems to\nhave no other object, than to stupefy the mind.\n\nPriests have been ever at war with genius and talent, because\nwell-informed men perceive, that superstition shackles the human mind, and\nwould keep it in eternal infancy, occupied solely by fables and\nfrightened by phantoms. Incapable of improvement itself, Theology opposed\ninsurmountable barriers to the progress of true knowledge; its sole object\nis to keep nations and their rulers in the most profound ignorance of\ntheir duties, and of the real motives, that should incline them to do\ngood. It obscures Morality, renders its principles arbitrary, and subjects\nit to the caprice of the gods or of their ministers. It converts the\nart of governing men into a mysterious tyranny, which is the scourge\nof nations. It changes princes into unjust, licentious despots, and the\npeople into ignorant slaves, who become corrupt in order to merit the\nfavour of their masters.\n\n\n\n\n199.\n\nBy tracing the history of the human mind, we shall be easily convinced,\nthat Theology has cautiously guarded against its progress. It began by\ngiving out fables as sacred truth: it produced poetry, which filled the\nimagination of men with its puerile fictions: it entertained them with its\ngods and their incredible deeds. In a word, Religion has always treated\nmen, like children, whom it lulled to sleep with tales, which its\nministers would have us still regard as incontestable truths.\n\nIf the ministers of the gods have sometimes made useful discoveries, they\nhave always been careful to give them a dogmatical tone, and envelope them\nin the shades of mystery. Pythagoras and Plato, in order to acquire some\ntrifling knowledge, were obliged to court the favour of priests, to be\ninitiated in their mysteries, and to undergo whatever trials they were\npleased to impose. At this price, they were permitted to imbibe those\nexalted notions, still so bewitching to all those who admire only what\nis perfectly unintelligible. It was from Egyptian, Indian, and Chaldean\npriests, from the schools of these visionaries, professionally interested\nin bewildering human reason, that philosophy was obliged to borrow its\nfirst rudiments. Obscure and false in its principles, mixed with fictions\nand fables, and made only to dazzle the imagination, the progress of this\nphilosophy was precarious, and its theories unintelligible; instead of\nenlightening, it blighted the mind, and diverted it from objects truly\nuseful.\n\nThe theological speculations and mystical reveries of the ancients are\nstill law in a great part of the philosophic world; and being adopted by\nmodern theology, it is heresy to abandon them. They tell us \"of aerial\nbeings, of spirits, angels, demons, genii,\" and other phantoms, which are\nthe object of their meditations, and serve as the basis of _metaphysics_,\nan abstract and futile science, which for thousands of years the greatest\ngeniuses have vainly studied. Hypothesis, imagined by a few visionaries\nof Memphis and Babylon, constitute even now the foundations of a science,\nwhose obscurity makes it revered as marvellous and divine.\n\nThe first legislators were priests; the first mythologists, poets, learned\nmen, and physicians were priests. In their hands science became sacred\nand was withheld from the profane. They spoke only in allegories, emblems,\nenigmas, and ambiguous oracles--means well calculated to excite curiosity,\nand above all to inspire the astonished vulgar with a holy respect for\nmen, who when they were thought to be instructed by the gods, and capable\nof reading in the heavens the fate of the earth, boldly proclaimed\nthemselves the oracles of the Deity.\n\n\n\n\n200.\n\nThe religions of ancient priests have only changed form. Although our\nmodern theologians regard their predecessors as impostors, yet they have\ncollected many scattered fragments of their religious systems. In modern\nReligions we find, not only their metaphysical dogmas, which theology has\nmerely clothed in a new dress, but also some remarkable remains of their\nsuperstitious practices, their magic, and their enchantments. Christians\nare still commanded to respect the remaining monuments of the legislators,\npriests, and prophets of the Hebrew Religion, which had borrowed its\nstrange practices from Egypt. Thus extravagancies, imagined by knaves or\nidolatrous visionaries, are still sacred among Christians!\n\nIf we examine history, we shall find a striking resemblance among all\nReligions. In all parts of the earth, we see, that religious notions,\nperiodically depress and elevate the people. The attention of man is\nevery where engrossed, by rites often abominable, and by mysteries always\nformidable, which become the sole objects of meditation. The different\nsuperstitions borrow, from one another, their abstract reveries and\nceremonies. Religions are in general mere unintelligible rhapsodies,\ncombined by new teachers, who use the materials of their predecessors,\nreserving the right of adding or retrenching whatever is not conformable\nto the present age. The religion of Egypt was evidently the basis of the\nreligion of Moses, who banished the worship of idols: Moses was merely a\nschismatic Egyptian. Christianism is only reformed Judaism. Mahometanism\nis composed of Judaism, Christianity, and the ancient religion of Arabia,\netc.\n\n\n\n\n201.\n\nTheology, from the remotest antiquity to the present time, has had the\nexclusive privilege of directing philosophy. What assistance has been\nderived from its labours? It changed philosophy into an unintelligible\njargon, calculated to render uncertain the clearest truths; it has\nconverted the art of reasoning into a jargon of words; it has carried the\nhuman mind into the airy regions of metaphysics, and there employed it in\nvainly fathoming an obscure abyss. Instead of physical and simple causes,\nthis transformed philosophy has substituted supernatural, or rather,\n_occult_ causes; it has explained phenomena difficult to be conceived by\nagents still more inconceivable. It has filled language with words, void\nof sense, incapable of accounting for things, better calculated to obscure\nthan enlighten, and which seems invented expressly to discourage man,\nto guard him against the powers of his mind, to make him mistrust the\nprinciples of reason and evidence, and to raise an insurmountable barrier\nbetween him and truth.\n\n\n\n\n202.\n\nWere we to believe the partisans of Religion, nothing could be explained\nwithout it; nature would be a perpetual enigma, and man would be incapable\nof understanding himself. But, what does this Religion in reality explain?\nThe more we examine it, the more we are convinced that its theological\nnotions are fit only to confuse our ideas; they change every thing into\nmystery: they explain difficult things by things that are impossible. Is\nit a satisfactory explanation of phenomena, to attribute them to unknown\nagents, to invisible powers, to immaterial causes? Does the human mind\nreceive much light by being referred to _the depths of the treasures of\ndivine wisdom_, to which, we are repeatedly told, it is vain to extend\nour rash enquiries? Can the divine nature, of which we have no conception,\nenable us to conceive the nature of man?\n\nAsk a Christian, what is the origin of the world? He will answer, that God\ncreated it. What is God? He cannot tell. What is it to create? He knows\nnot. What is the cause of pestilence, famine, wars, droughts, inundations\nand earthquakes? The anger of God. What remedies can be applied to these\ncalamities? Prayers, sacrifices, processions, offerings, and ceremonies\nare, it is said, the true means of disarming celestial fury. But why is\nheaven enraged? Because men are wicked. Why are men wicked? Because their\nnature is corrupt. What is the cause of this corruption? It is, says the\ntheologian, because the first man, beguiled by the first woman, ate an\napple, which God had forbidden him to touch. Who beguiled this woman into\nsuch folly? The devil. Who made the devil? God. But, why did God make this\ndevil, destined to pervert mankind? This is unknown; it is a mystery which\nthe Deity alone is acquainted with.\n\nIt is now universally acknowledged, that the earth turns round the sun.\nCenturies ago, this opinion was blasphemy, as being irreconcileable with\nthe sacred books which every Christian reveres as inspired by the Deity\nhimself. Notwithstanding divine revelation, astronomers now depend rather\nupon evidence, than upon the testimony of their inspired books.\n\nWhat is the hidden principle of the motions of the human body? The soul.\nWhat is a soul? A spirit. What is a spirit? A substance, which has neither\nform, nor colour, nor extension, nor parts. How can we form any idea\nof such a substance? How can it move a body? That is not known; it is a\nmystery. Have beasts souls? But, do they not act, feel, and think, in a\nmanner very similar to man? Mere illusion! By what right do you deprive\nbeasts of a soul, which you attribute to man, though you know nothing at\nall about it? Because the souls of beasts would embarrass our theologians,\nwho are satisfied with the power of terrifying and damning the immaterial\nsouls of men, and are not so much interested in damning those of beasts.\nSuch are the puerile solutions, which philosophy, always in the leading\nstrings of theology, was obliged to invent, in order to explain the\nproblems of the physical and moral world?\n\n\n\n\n203.\n\nHow many evasions have been used, both in ancient and modern times, in\norder to avoid an engagement with the ministers of the gods, who have ever\nbeen the tyrants of thought? How many hypotheses and shifts were such men\nas Descartes, Mallebranche, and Leibnitz, forced to invent, in order to\nreconcile their discoveries with the fables and mistakes which Religion\nhad consecrated! In what guarded phrases have the greatest philosophers\nexpressed themselves, even at the risk of being absurd, inconsistent, or\nunintelligible, whenever their ideas did not accord with the principles of\ntheology! Priests have been always attentive to extinguish systems which\nopposed their interest. Theology was ever the bed of Procrustes, to be\nadapted to which, the limbs of travellers, if too long were cut off, and\nif too short were lengthened.\n\nCan any sensible man, delighted with the sciences and attached to the\nwelfare of his fellow-creatures, reflect, without vexation and anguish,\nhow many profound, laborious, and subtle brains have been for ages\nfoolishly occupied in the study of absurdities? What a treasure of\nknowledge might have been diffused by many celebrated thinkers, if instead\nof engaging in the impertinent disputes of vain theology, they had devoted\ntheir attention to intelligible objects really important to mankind? Half\nthe efforts which religious opinions have cost genius, and half the wealth\nwhich frivolous forms of worship have cost nations would have sufficed\nto instruct them perfectly in morality, politics, natural philosophy,\nmedicine, agriculture, etc. Superstition generally absorbs the attention,\nadmiration, and treasures of the people; their Religion costs them very\ndear; but they have neither knowledge, virtue, nor happiness, for their\nmoney.\n\n\n\n\n204.\n\nSome ancient and modern philosophers have been bold enough to assume\nexperience and reason for their guides, and to shake off the chains of\nsuperstition. Democritus, Epicurus, and other Greeks presumed to tear\naway the veil of prejudice, and to deliver philosophy from theological\nshackles. But their systems, too simple, too sensible, and too free from\nthe marvellous, for imaginations enamoured with chimeras, were obliged to\nyield to the fabulous conjectures of such men as Plato and Socrates. Among\nthe moderns, Hobbes, Spinosa, Bayle, etc., have followed the steps of\nEpicurus; but their doctrine has found very few followers, in a world,\nstill intoxicated with fables, to listen to reason.\n\nIn every age, it has been dangerous to depart from prejudices. Discoveries\nof every kind have been prohibited. All that enlightened men could do, was\nto speak ambiguously, hence they often confounded falsehood with truth.\nSeveral had a _double doctrine_, one public and the other secret; the\nkey of the latter being lost, their true sentiments, have often become\nunintelligible and consequently useless.\n\nHow could modern philosophers, who, under pain of cruel persecution, were\ncommanded to renounce reason, and to subject it to faith, that is, to the\nauthority of priests; how, I say, could men, thus bound, give free scope\nto their genius, improve reason, and accelerate the progress of the human\nmind? It was with fear and trembling that even the greatest men obtained\na glimpse of truth; rarely had they the courage to announce it; and those,\nwho did, were terribly punished. With Religion, it has ever been unlawful\nto think, or to combat the prejudices of which man is every where the\nvictim and the dupe.\n\n\n\n\n205.\n\nEvery man, sufficiently intrepid to announce truths to the world, is sure\nof incurring the hatred of the ministers of Religion, who loudly call to\ntheir aid secular powers; and want the assistance of laws to support both\ntheir arguments and their gods. Their clamours expose too evidently the\nweakness of their cause.\n\n     \"None call for aid but those who feel distressed.\"\n\nIn Religion, man is not permitted to err. In general, those who err are\npitied, and some kindness is shewn to persons who discover new truths;\nbut, when Religion is thought to be interested either in the errors or\nthe discoveries, a holy zeal is kindled, the populace become frantic, and\nnations are in an uproar.\n\nCan any thing be more afflicting, than to see public and private felicity\ndepending upon a futile system, which is destitute if principles, founded\nonly on a distempered imagination, and incapable of presenting any thing\nbut words void of sense? In what consists the so much boasted utility of\na Religion, which nobody can comprehend, which continually torments those\nwho are weak enough to meddle with it, which is incapable of rendering men\nbetter, and which often makes them consider it meritorious to be unjust\nand wicked? Is there a folly more deplorable, and more justly to be\ncombated, than that, which far from doing any service to the human race,\nonly makes them blind, delirious, and miserable, by depriving them of\nTruth, the sole cure for their wretchedness.\n\n\n\n\n206.\n\nReligion has ever filled the mind of man with darkness, and kept him in\nignorance of his real duties and true interests. It is only by dispelling\nthe clouds and phantoms of Religion, that we shall discover Truth, Reason,\nand Morality. Religion diverts us from the causes of evils, and from the\nremedies which nature prescribes; far from curing, it only aggravates,\nmultiplies, and perpetuates them. Let us observe with the celebrated\nLord Bolingbroke, that \"_theology is the box of Pandora; and if it is\nimpossible to shut it, it is at least useful to inform men, that this\nfatal box is open_.\"\n\n\nTHE END.","title":"Good Sense","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":59227}