{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_73430/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_73430","id":"gutenberg_73430","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73430","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics -- History"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Note: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Superscripts\nare indicated by carets and braces: 5^{me}. Additional notes will be\nfound near the end of this ebook.\n\n\n\n\n HISTORY AS PAST ETHICS\n\n AN INTRODUCTION TO THE\n HISTORY OF MORALS\n\n BY\n\n PHILIP VAN NESS MYERS\n\n FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE\n UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI. AUTHOR OF \u201cANCIENT HISTORY,\u201d\n \u201cMEDI\u00c6VAL AND MODERN HISTORY,\u201d AND\n \u201cA GENERAL HISTORY\u201d\n\n GINN AND COMPANY\n\n BOSTON \u00b7 NEW YORK \u00b7 CHICAGO \u00b7 LONDON\n ATLANTA \u00b7 DALLAS \u00b7 COLUMBUS \u00b7 SAN FRANCISCO\n\n\n\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1913, BY\n PHILIP VAN NESS MYERS\n\n ALL RIGHTS RESERVED\n\n PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n 526.2\n\n The Athen\u00e6um Press\n\n GINN AND COMPANY \u00b7 PROPRIETORS\n \u00b7 BOSTON \u00b7 U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\n TO\n I. C. M.\n\n My conviction gains infinitely\n the moment another soul will\n believe in it.--NOVALIS\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis work completes the series of historical textbooks which I\nbegan more than thirty years ago. It is an expansion of a course of\nlectures given for several years to my advanced classes in history,\nand is designed as a brief introduction to the history of morals. In\ntreating the science of morals as a branch of history my thought is,\nwithout trenching in the least upon the domain of the philosophy of\nmorals, to make the work of the department of history more helpfully\nintroductory than it has hitherto been to that of the department of\nmoral philosophy. The book is the outgrowth of a conviction that the\nphilosophy of ethics, if it shall become a stimulus and guide to\nsocial service and humanitarian effort,--especially if it shall bring\nre\u00ebnforcement to that ethical idealism which so largely motives the\npresent-day movement for world peace,--must be based on a knowledge of\nthe facts of the moral life of the race in all the various stages of\nthe historic evolution, and that to gather and systematize these facts\nis a part of the task of the historian, indeed the most important part\nof his task. It is my hope that teachers of both history and ethics may\nfind the book helpful, whether made the basis of classroom discussion\nor of lecture comment.\n\n P. V. N. M.\n\n COLLEGE HILL\n CINCINNATI, OHIO\n\n\n\n\n Ethics gives to History its rational goal; and all morality has the\n perfect shaping of universal history as its ultimate end. A real\n understanding of history is not possible without ethics; universal\n history is the realization of the moral ... within humanity.--ADOLF\n WUTTKE.\n\n The real advance made by Thucydides consists, perhaps, in this,\n that he perceived the motive forces of human history to be in the\n moral constitution of human nature.--LEOPOLD VON RANKE.\n\n Ethics, if it is to become truly a science, must shun the path of\n speculation and follow closely the historical method.... Range in\n fancy over the whole circle of the sciences, and you will find\n there no place for ethics save as a branch of human history....\n Given the earliest morality of which we have any written record, to\n trace from it through progressive stages the morality of to-day;\n that is the problem, and the only problem which can fall to a\n truly scientific ethics.... Ethics as the comparative history\n of universal morality is the vestibule to the temple of moral\n philosophy.--JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n CHAPTER PAGE\n\n I. INTRODUCTION 1\n\n\n II. THE DAWN OF MORALITY: CONSCIENCE IN THE KINSHIP GROUP 12\n\n I. INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS, AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE\n DETERMINING THE RULES OF CONDUCT 12\n\n II. ESSENTIAL FACTS OF KINSHIP OR INTRATRIBAL MORALITY 15\n\n III. THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERTRIBAL MORALITY 22\n\n\n III. THE MORAL LIFE IN ANCIENT EGYPT: AN IDEAL OF SOCIAL\n JUSTICE 30\n\n I. CIRCUMSTANCES AND IDEAS WHICH MOLDED AND MOTIVED\n MORALITY 30\n\n II. THE IDEAL 33\n\n\n IV. THE BABYLONIAN-ASSYRIAN CONSCIENCE 45\n\n\n V. CHINESE MORALS: AN IDEAL OF FILIAL PIETY 53\n\n I. IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES\n DETERMINING THE CAST OF THE MORAL IDEAL 53\n\n II. THE IDEAL 60\n\n III. EFFECTS OF THE IDEAL UPON CHINESE LIFE AND HISTORY 69\n\n\n VI. JAPANESE MORALS: AN IDEAL OF LOYALTY 77\n\n I. FORMATIVE AND MODIFYING INFLUENCES 77\n\n II. THE IDEAL 80\n\n III. SOME SIGNIFICANT FACTS IN THE MORAL HISTORY OF JAPAN 87\n\n\n VII. THE ETHICAL IDEALS OF INDIA 95\n\n PART I. THE ETHICS OF BRAHMANISM--A CLASS MORALITY 95\n\n I. HISTORICAL AND SPECULATIVE BASIS OF THE SYSTEM 95\n\n II. THE VARIOUS MORAL STANDARDS 101\n\n PART II. THE ETHICS OF BUDDHISM: AN IDEAL OF SELF-CONQUEST\n AND UNIVERSAL BENEVOLENCE 106\n\n I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE SYSTEM 106\n\n II. THE IDEAL 110\n\n III. SOME EXPRESSIONS OF THE ETHICAL SPIRIT OF BUDDHISM 115\n\n\n VIII. THE ETHICS OF ZOROASTRIANISM: AN IDEAL OF COMBAT 123\n\n I. PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS WHICH CREATED THE\n ETHICAL TYPE 123\n\n II. THE IDEAL 126\n\n III. THE PRACTICE 131\n\n\n IX. THE MORAL EVOLUTION IN ISRAEL: AN IDEAL OF OBEDIENCE TO A\n REVEALED LAW 135\n\n I. THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF HEBREW MORALITY 135\n\n II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MORAL IDEAL 140\n\n 1. The Development up to the Exile 140\n\n 2. The Morality of the Prophets of the Exile 157\n\n 3. The Moral Life in the Postexilic Age 162\n\n\n X. THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF HELLAS: AN IDEAL OF\n SELF-REALIZATION 169\n\n I. INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS DETERMINING THE MORAL TYPE 169\n\n II. THE IDEAL 174\n\n III. LIMITATIONS AND DEFECTS OF THE IDEAL 179\n\n IV. THE MORAL EVOLUTION 185\n\n\n XI. ROMAN MORALS: AN IDEAL OF CIVIC DUTY 212\n\n I. INSTITUTIONS AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE DETERMINING THE\n EARLY MORAL TYPE 212\n\n II. THE PRIMITIVE MORAL TYPE 214\n\n III. THE MORAL EVOLUTION UNDER THE REPUBLIC 218\n\n IV. THE MORAL EVOLUTION UNDER THE PAGAN EMPIRE 231\n\n\n XII. THE ETHICS OF DOCTRINAL CHRISTIANITY: AN IDEAL OF RIGHT\n BELIEF 255\n\n I. RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND THEOLOGICAL DOGMAS MOLDING THE\n IDEAL 256\n\n II. THE MORAL IDEAL 261\n\n\n XIII. MORAL HISTORY OF THE AGE OF CHRISTIAN ASCETICISM 267\n\n I. CONCEPTIONS OF LIFE AND HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT\n PRODUCED THE ASCETIC IDEAL 267\n\n II. THE IDEAL AND ITS CHIEF TYPES 270\n\n III. THE CHIEF MORAL FACTS OF THE PERIOD 272\n\n\n XIV. THE ETHICS OF ISLAM: A MARTIAL IDEAL 288\n\n I. RELIGIOUS BASIS OF THE MORAL SYSTEM 288\n\n II. THE MORAL CODE 289\n\n III. THE MORAL LIFE 293\n\n\n XV. THE MORAL LIFE OF EUROPE DURING THE AGE OF CHIVALRY 300\n\n I. THE CHURCH CONSECRATES THE MARTIAL IDEAL OF\n KNIGHTHOOD 300\n\n II. THE COMPOSITE IDEAL OF KNIGHTHOOD 306\n\n III. THE CHIEF MORAL PHENOMENA OF THE PERIOD 309\n\n\n XVI. RENAISSANCE ETHICS: REVIVAL OF NATURALISM IN MORALS 320\n\n I. DETERMINING INFLUENCES 320\n\n II. SOME ESSENTIAL FACTS IN THE MORAL HISTORY OF THE AGE 322\n\n\n XVII. ETHICS OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION 333\n\n I. PRINCIPLES OF THE REFORMATION OF ETHICAL IMPORT 333\n\n II. SOME IMPORTANT MORAL OUTCOMES OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY\n RELIGIOUS REFORM 334\n\n\n XVIII. THE MORAL EVOLUTION SINCE THE INCOMING OF DEMOCRACY: THE\n NEW SOCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONSCIENCE 340\n\n I. FORCES DETERMINING THE TREND OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT 340\n\n II. EXPRESSIONS OF THE NEW MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN\n DIFFERENT DOMAINS OF LIFE AND THOUGHT 344\n\n 1. The Ethics of Democracy 344\n\n 2. The Ethics of Industrialism 347\n\n 3. The Ethics of Modern Science 353\n\n 4. The Ethics of Theology 360\n\n 5. Social Ethics: the New Social Conscience 364\n\n 6. International Ethics: the New International\n Conscience 371\n\n\n INDEX 383\n\n\n\n\nHISTORY AS PAST ETHICS\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical\ninterpretation of history]\n\nProfessor Freeman defined history as \u201cpast politics.\u201d Mr. Buckle argued\nthat the essence of the historical evolution consists in intellectual\nprogress.[1] Many present-day economists hold that the dominant forces\nin the historical development are economic.[2] Churchmen consistently\nmake the chief factor in history to be religion.\n\nWhether the upholders of these several interpretations of history\nwould have us understand them as speaking of the ultimate goal of the\nhistoric evolution, or merely of the dominant motive under which men\nand society act, none of these interpretations can be accepted by the\nstudent of the facts of the moral life of the race as a true reading\nof history. To him not only does moral progress constitute the very\nessence of the historic movement, but the ethical motive presents\nitself as the most constant and regulative force in the evolution of\nhumanity. His chief interest in all the other factors of the historical\nevolution is in noting in what way and in what measure they have\ncontributed to the growth and enrichment of the moral life of mankind.\n\nThus the historian of morals is deeply interested in the growth of\npolitical institutions among men, but chiefly in observing in what way\nthese institutions have affected for good or for evil the moral life of\nthe nation. Particularly is the progress of the world toward political\nunity a matter of profound concern to him, not because he regards the\nestablishment of the world state as an end in itself, but because the\nuniversal state alone can furnish those conditions under which the\nmoral life of humanity can most freely expatiate and find its noblest\nand truest expression.\n\nIt is the same with intellectual progress. The student of morals\nrecognizes the fact that the progress of the race in morality is\nnormally dependent upon its progress in knowledge--that conscience\nwaits upon the intellect. But in opposition to Buckle and those of\nhis school, he maintains that, so far from an advance in knowledge\nconstituting the essence of a progressive civilization, this\nmental advance constitutes merely the condition precedent of real\ncivilization, the distinctive characteristic of which must be a true\nmorality. A civilization or culture which does not include this is\ndoomed to quick retrogression and decay. As Benjamin Kidd truly\nobserves, \u201cWhen the intellectual development of any section of the\nrace, for the time being, outruns the ethical development, natural\nselection has apparently weeded it out like any other unsuitable\nproduct.\u201d[3]\n\nAs with the political and intellectual elements of civilization so is\nit with the economic. The outward forms of the moral life are, it is\ntrue, largely determined by the industry of a people; but the informing\nspirit of morality is the expression of an implanted faculty. It is\nelicited but not created by environment. No industrial order from\nwhich it is lacking can long endure. Natural selection condemns it\nas unfit. And this we are beginning to recognize--that economics and\nethics cannot be divorced, that every great industrial problem is at\nbottom a moral problem. To the student of the ethical phase of history\nall social reformers from the old Hebrew prophets down to Karl Marx\nand Henry George are primarily moralists pleading for social justice,\nequity, and righteousness.\n\nAnd pre\u00ebminently the same is it with religion. Religion has been a\ngreat part of the life of man, and the historian of morals must be a\ndiligent student of the religious systems of the world, but mainly\nbecause religion has been in general such a potent agency in the moral\neducation of mankind. For it is the ethical factor in the great world\nreligions which constitutes their universal and permanent element.\n\u201cIt is the function of religion to kindle moral enthusiasm in society\nat large.\u201d[4] \u201cChristianity has no other function or value than as an\naid to morality.\u201d[5] All the great religions of the world--Buddhism,\nConfucianism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism (reckoning historic Judaism as\nbeginning with the great prophets of the ninth and eighth centuries\nB.C.), Christianity, and Islam--began as moral reforms.[6]\n\nIn short, in the words of Wellhausen, \u201cMorality is that for the sake of\nwhich all other things exist; it is the alone essential thing in the\nworld.\u201d[7] The really constructive and regulative forces in history are\nin truth moral ideas and convictions. And there is vast significance\nin this--that the ethical motive, never absent and always active, is\nconstantly becoming more and more dominant in the processes of the\nhistorical evolution. As the ages pass there enters into history--we\nshall see this to be so later--an ever larger ethical element.\nConscience becomes ever more and more involved in the personal,\nnational, and international affairs of the world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The history of morals\nin the main a record of the\nexpansion of the circle covered by\nthe moral feelings]\n\nMoral progress consists not so much in changes in the quality or\nintensity of the moral emotions, although these gain in diversity,\npurity, and refinement as time passes, as in the successive\nenlargements of the circle of persons embraced by the moral\nfeelings.[8] \u201cIt is not the sense of duty to a neighbor, but the\npractical answer to the question, Who is my neighbor? that has\nvaried.\u201d[9] As we shall see when we come to examine the morality of\nprimitive man, the moral feelings embrace at first only kinsmen, that\nis, the members of one\u2019s own family, clan, or social group. All others\nare outside the moral pale. But gradually this circle grows larger and\nembraces in successive expansions the tribe, the city, the nation, and\nlastly humanity.\n\nThis expansion of the area covered by the moral feelings is the\ndominant fact in the moral history of mankind. It is the overlooking\nof this fact that has caused writers like Buckle to make their strange\nmisreading of history and to maintain that though man during historic\ntimes has made immense progress on material and intellectual lines, he\nhas made little or no progress in morality. The truth is, as we shall\nlearn, that in no domain has progress been greater, the gains larger or\nmore precious, than in the moral. From clan morality, based on physical\nkinship, mankind has advanced or is advancing to world morality, based\non the ethical kinship of men. This is the one increasing purpose\nrunning through all history--the creation of a moral order embracing\nthe whole human race.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sources for the history\nof morals]\n\nThe facts for a history of morals must be sought chiefly outside the\nliterature of ethical theory and speculation. They must be looked\nfor in the customs, laws, institutions, mythologies, literatures,\nmaxims, and religions of the different races, peoples, and ages of\nhistory.[10] In all these there is always an ethical element; often\nthis forms their very essence. \u201cIn every sentence of the penal code,\u201d\nas the moralist Wilhelm Wundt remarks, \u201cthere speaks the voice of an\nobjective moral conscience.\u201d In truth all law codes, whether civil or\ncriminal, are essentially nothing more nor less than the embodiment of\nman\u2019s conceptions of what is just and unjust. Mythologies, literatures,\nand philosophies are charged with moral sentiment. In religion there\nstruggle for utterance the deepest moral feelings and convictions of\nthe human soul.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moral ideal]\n\nThe moral life fulfills itself in many ways. Every age and every race\nhas its own moral type or ideal.[11] This, as we shall use the term,\nmay be defined as a group of virtues held in esteem by a given people\nor a given age. It is the accepted standard of conduct, of excellence,\nof character. This ideal may be a very simple thing, embracing only a\nfew rudimentary virtues, as in the case of peoples on the lower levels\nof culture; or it may be a very complex thing, embracing many and\nrefined virtues, as in the case of civilized societies in which the\nmutual relationships of the members are many and various.\n\nThe history of morals is in the main an account of moral ideals or\ntypes.[12] Indeed so large is the part that these have played in the\ngrowth and decay of races and civilizations that universal history may\nbe defined quite accurately as \u201cthe paleontology of moral ideals.\u201d[13]\n\nThere is one thing about a moral ideal which sets it apart from all\nother ideals. It possesses a unique dynamic force. All ideals, it is\ntrue, have in them the impulsion to their embodiment in reality. But in\na moral ideal there is the added imperative of conscience. There speaks\nfrom it the majestic voice of duty, demanding that the ideal be made\nactual in the life of the individual and of society. It is this that\nhas made moral ideals such molding and constructive forces in history.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Composite moral ideals\nor types]\n\nThere is a striking analogy between the different types of moral\ncharacter and the different types of human beauty. Thus corresponding\nto the great types of masculine and feminine beauty there are masculine\nand feminine types of moral excellence. And then, just as the elements\nof the two chief types of feminine beauty, the blond and the brunette,\ncombine to form a great variety of mixed or composite types, so do the\nelements of the chief types of goodness blend into many composite types\nof character.[14]\n\nThere is no more instructive chapter in the history of morals than that\nwhich has to do with the formation of these composite ethical types,\nsince these are often the most significant results of those great race\ncollisions and comminglings which make up so much of the history of\nthe past; for when races meet and mingle they blend not only their\nblood but also their consciences. There appears not only a new physical\nman but also a new moral man.\n\nThus the fusion of races in Europe has resulted in a great fusion\nof moralities. The conscience of Europe is a very composite one,\nincluding Greek, Roman, Hebraic, Celtic, Gothic, and Slavonic elements.\nThis heterogeneous conscience, so different, for instance, from the\ncomparatively homogeneous conscience of ancient Egypt and of China,\nhas been the most important factor in the life and civilization of\nthe European people. It is largely because Europe has been constantly\ngetting a new conscience that its history has been so disturbed and\nso progressive, just as it is largely because China has had the same\nConfucian conscience for two thousand years and more, that her history\nhas been so uneventful and unchanging.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Causes which determine\nand which modify the moral type]\n\nThough every race and every age, since man is by nature a moral\nbeing, must have some type or standard of moral goodness, still the\ncast and content of this type is determined by a great variety of\ncircumstances, such as the stage of intellectual development, the\nphysical environment, social and political institutions, occupation,\nand speculative and religious ideas.[15]\n\nThe stage of intellectual development of a given society determines\nin general whether the moral standard shall be high or low. Peoples\nstill on the level of savagery must necessarily have a very simple\nmoral code, embracing only a few rudimentary virtues. As a people or\nrace progresses in intelligence and the mental horizon widens, the\nmoral sense becomes clarified and the moral standard comes to embrace\nnew and refined virtues, corresponding to the larger and truer mental\nlife; for, speaking broadly, there is a general coincidence between\nintellectual and moral growth. To create a new intellectual life is to\ncreate a new moral life.[16]\n\nPhysical environment is also a potent agency in determining the cast of\nthe moral type. Thus the hot depressing climate and the prodigality of\nnature in the tropics foster the passive, quietistic virtues; while the\nharsher and more grudging nature of the temperate regions favors the\ndevelopment of the active, industrial virtues. The strongly contrasted\nmoral types of the peoples of the tropic regions of the earth and\nthose of the temperate lands may without reasonable doubt be ascribed,\nin part at least, to differences in the climatic and other physical\ninfluences to which these peoples have been subjected through long\nperiods of time.\n\nMore positively influential in the formation of moral ideas and\nfeelings are social institutions. Thus the place which a whole group of\nmoral qualities that we designate as domestic virtues are assigned in\nthe ethical standard is determined by the place which circumstances may\nhave given the family in the social organism. In ancient Sparta, for\nexample, where certain influences subordinated the family in an unusual\ndegree to the state, the family virtues held a very low place, indeed\nscarcely any place at all, in the moral ideal; while in China, where\ncertain notions of the relation of the spirits of the dead members of\nthe family to its living members created a remarkable solidarity of\nthe family group, the domestic virtues, and among them pre\u00ebminently\nthe virtue of filial piety, came to determine the entire cast of the\ngeneral ideal of goodness.\n\nGovernment is another potent agency in molding the moral type.\nPatriarchal monarchy and popular government tend each to nourish a\ndistinct morality, so that we speak of the ethics of monarchy and the\nethics of democracy. As time passes, governments, speaking broadly,\nbecome constantly more and more ethical in aim and purpose, and hence\nact more and more dynamically upon the moral evolution. The greatest\nforce making for a truer and higher morality in the world to-day is\npolitical democracy.[17]\n\nMore effective than any of the agencies thus far mentioned in\ndetermining the moral code of a people is occupation. \u201cMan\u2019s\ncharacter,\u201d as the economist Alfred Marshall truly affirms, \u201chas been\nmolded by his everyday work ... more than by any other influence\nunless it be that of his religious ideals.\u201d[18] Every occupation\ndevelops a characteristic group of virtues. This is especially true of\nagriculture. \u201cThe cultivation of the soil,\u201d says Wedgwood, \u201ccultivates\nmuch besides--it molds ideals, implants aspirations, creates permanent\ntendencies. It gives, where it is the predominant industry, to the\ncharacter of a people its moral stamp.\u201d[19]\n\nFinally we mention religion as the most potent of all agencies in the\nmolding of the moral type.[20] Religion has been the great schoolmaster\nin the moral education of the race. It is true that religion has to go\nto school itself in morals before it can become a schoolmaster. That\nis to say, religion in its beginnings is in the main unethical. In its\nlower manifestations it is hardly more than a system of incantations\nand sorcery. One of the most important facts of the moral history\nof the race is the gradual moralization of man\u2019s at first unethical\nconception of the gods, and the rise out of the unethical religions of\nprimitive times of the great ethical world religions.\n\n\n[Sidenote: In what virtue or moral\ngoodness consists]\n\nHaving defined ethical ideals and noted the agencies determining their\ncast and content, we may now seek an answer, in terms of the ethical\nideal, to the question, In what does moral goodness consist? All the\ntruly great seers and moral teachers of the race have here the same\nword for us, and it is this: Do the thing thou seest to be good;\nrealize thy ideal. In the words of Sabatier, \u201cThe essential thing\nin the world is not to serve this ideal or that, but with all one\u2019s\nsoul to serve the ideal which one has chosen.\u201d Such loyalty to one\u2019s\nideal is moral goodness.[21] This imperative of conscience that one be\ntrue and loyal to the best one knows is the only thing absolute and\ncategorical in the utterance of the moral faculty.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Every age must be\njudged by its own moral standard]\n\n\u201cA man must learn a great deal,\u201d says Marcus Aurelius, \u201cto enable him\nto pass a correct judgment on another man\u2019s acts.\u201d[22] And among the\nthings which he must first learn is this--that the men of every age\nhave their own standard of excellence and that they can be judged\nfairly only by their own code of morals.[23] It is largely because of\nthe general ignorance of the history of moral ideals that there is\nso much uncharitableness in the world, so much intolerance, so much\nrace prejudice and hatred. As one\u2019s intellectual outlook broadens, as\nhe becomes acquainted with the various types of goodness of different\npeoples and different ages, he becomes more liberal and charitable in\nhis moral judgments, since he comes to understand that moral character\nis determined not by the ideal of conduct but by the way in which this\nideal is lived up to. \u201cThere may be as genuine self-devotion,\u201d declares\nthe moralist Professor Green, \u201cin the act of the barbarian warrior\nwho gives his life that his tribe may win a piece of land from its\nneighbors, as in that of the missionary who dies in carrying the gospel\nto the heathen.\u201d[24]\n\nStudying the ideals of races and epochs in the spirit of these words,\nwe shall make some fruitful discoveries. We shall learn for one thing\nthat since the beginning of the truly ethical age there has ever been\nabout the same degree of conscientiousness in the world; that the\ndifferent ages, viewed in respect to their moral life, have differed\nchiefly in the degree of light they have enjoyed, and consequently in\ntheir conceptions of what is noblest in conduct, of what constitutes\nduty, not in their fealty or lack of fealty to their chosen standard\nof excellence. That is to say, speaking broadly, the majority of men\nin every age and in every land have ever followed loyally the right\nas they have been given to see the right.[25] \u201cIf men and times were\nreally understood,\u201d the historian Von Holst truly observes, \u201cthe moral\nfault of their follies and crimes will almost always appear diminished\nby one half.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE DAWN OF MORALITY: CONSCIENCE IN THE KINSHIP GROUP\n\n\nI. INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS, AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE DETERMINING THE RULES OF\nCONDUCT\n\n\n[Sidenote: The kinship group]\n\nThe most important social product of the human evolution on the lower\nlevels of civilization was the patriarchal family or clan. This\ncommunity of kinsfolk is the great history-making group. It was the\nseed plot and nursery not only of almost every social and political\ninstitution of the historic peoples, but of their morality as well.\nIn the bosom of this group were born and nurtured the chief of those\naffections and sentiments into which enters an ethical element and\nwhich form the basis of the moral life.[26]\n\nThe fundamental bond uniting this group was the bond of blood. The\nmembers of the group were, or believed themselves to be, the actual\ndescendants of a common ancestor. It was this tie of blood, this\nphysical relationship real or assumed, that rendered the clan such a\nclosely knit body and created its feeling of corporate oneness. \u201cThe\nmembers of one kindred,\u201d says W. Robertson Smith in describing this\ncharacteristic of the Semitic clan, \u201clooked on themselves as one living\nwhole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh, and bones, of which no\nmember could be touched without all the members suffering.... If one of\nthe clan has been murdered, they say \u2018Our blood has been shed.\u2019\u201d[27]\nCompared with this sense of solidarity as it is found among certain\nof the negro clans in Africa, the feeling of solidarity of the family\namong European peoples \u201cis thin and feeble.\u201d[28]\n\nIt was this corporate consciousness of the primitive clan that created\nits moral solidarity. It naturally called into existence those\naltruistic sentiments that formed the ground out of which grew man\u2019s\nearliest feelings of moral obligation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The religious\nbond--ancestor worship]\n\nThere was a second bond uniting the members of the kinship group.\nThey were united not only by the ties of physical kinship but also\nby the bonds of a common cult. This was the worship of ancestors. To\nrealize the ethical educative value of this worship we must recall\nthe remarkable constitution of the clan. This group of kinsmen has a\nvisible and an invisible side. There are the earthly members of the\ngroup and the spirit members--the souls of the dead. These spirit\nmembers are the protectors of the little group, the punishers of\nwrongdoing, the conservators of morals. Among the most sacred duties of\nthe earthly members are the duties they owe to these spirit members;\nfor these spirits have need of many things, especially of meat and\ndrink at the grave, and it is the duty of their earthly kinsmen to\nsupply all these wants. The earth group is thus enveloped in a sort of\nsacred atmosphere, and in this atmosphere are nurtured those ethical\nsentiments which form the most precious product of history.\n\nAs an agency in the moralizing of the life of the race it would be\ndifficult to exaggerate the importance of ancestor worship. To no other\nform of religion, save ethical monotheism, does morality owe so large\na debt. In this cult religion and morality are at one almost at the\noutset,[29] whereas in nature cults, or the cults of nature gods, it\nis generally only at a late period that these elements are united. It\nwas this cult of ancestors which formed the basis of an essential part\nof the morality of the Greeks and Romans, particularly the latter, at\nthe first appearance of these peoples in history, and which to-day, as\nthe chief religion of the Chinese, Japanese, and other peoples of the\nFar East, fosters the best virtues of a third of the human race.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Conceptions of the god\nworld]\n\nAnother influence determining the moral code of primitive man is his\nideas of the god world. It is true that the conceptions formed of the\ngods by the untutored mind are for the most part crude and unethical.\nBut man ever makes and remakes his gods in his own image; therefore\nas soon as an ethical element begins to enter into his own life he\nbegins to moralize the character of his gods. At this stage the god\nworld begins to react favorably upon the moral life of man. The gods\nare now conceived as taking notice of the conduct of men and as\napproving certain acts as right and disapproving certain other acts as\nwrong. Especially are they believed to punish atrocious crimes, such\nas the slaying of a kinsman and the breaking of the word sworn by the\noath-god. In this way primitive man\u2019s ideas of deity react favorably\nupon his morality.\n\nThe gods further advance morality by being invoked as the witnesses and\nguardians of treaties between clans and tribes. By thus giving an added\nsanctity to solemn engagements mutually entered into by communities\nthey widen the moral domain and become the promoters of intertribal\nmorality.[30]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The fact that\ncompetition is between communities\nand not between individuals]\n\nIn nothing perhaps does primitive society differ more widely from\nmodern than in the fact that the competition or struggle for existence\nis between communities and not between individuals. Within the\nkinship group life is almost wholly communistic. There is practically\nno competition between the individuals of the community such as\ncharacterizes societies advanced in civilization. The only real\ncompetition is that between communities. And here the struggle for\nexistence or for superiority is generally habitual and ruthless, often\nbeing carried to the point of the complete destruction of one of the\ncompeting communities.\n\nThese conditions of existence have vast significance for morality. Just\nas the individual competition in cultured societies molds an essential\npart of their moral code, so does the group competition of races still\nin the clan or tribal stage of civilization determine what qualities of\ncharacter shall be developed among them. As we shall see in a moment,\nit makes them strong in the clan virtues.\n\n\nII. ESSENTIAL FACTS OF KINSHIP OR INTRATRIBAL MORALITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: The life of primitive\npeoples largely unmoral]\n\nAs students of morals our chief interest in primeval man as he emerges\nfrom the obscurity of prehistoric times is not concerning the degree\nof skill he has developed in making his weapons or in constructing\nfor himself a shelter, nor concerning what advance he has made in the\narts of weaving and pottery, nor yet concerning what kind of social\narrangements he has worked out; our main interest in this primeval man\nas he appears on the threshold of the historic day is not concerning\nthese or any like things, but rather respecting what kind of a\nconscience has grown up within him during those long prehistoric ages\nof struggle, privation, watch and ward.\n\nThe first fact that compels our notice here is that the life of the\nsavage is largely _un_moral.[31] His activities to secure food,\nshelter, and clothing arise from purely animal impulses, such as hunger\nand cold. Into all of these activities, however, there enters as time\npasses an ethical element.[32] The economic life, in a word, comes\nmore and more under the dominance of moral feelings and motives.[33]\nConscience becomes more and more involved in all these matters. This\ngradual moralization of these at first nonmoral activities of primitive\nman constitutes one of the most important phases of the moral evolution\nof the race.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The \u201cgoodness\u201d of\nuncivilized races largely a\nnegative goodness]\n\nA second fact in the moral life of savages that claims our attention\nis that much that is counted unto them for \u201cgoodness\u201d is a purely\nnegative goodness. Failure in discrimination here often results in a\nwrong estimate of their morality as compared with that of advanced\ncommunities. Thus in portraying the manners and customs of primitive\npeoples, some writers, like Tacitus in his account of the early German\nfolk, laud their morals as superior to those of civilized men. This\nopinion is based rather on the absence among such peoples of the usual\nvices and crimes of civilized societies than on the practice by them\nof the higher positive virtues.[34] But the absence of the vices which\ncharacterize civilization is to be explained, of course, by the simpler\norganization of society and the fewer temptations to wrongdoing. Thus\nthe single circumstance that the institution of individual property has\nnot yet come into existence, or at least has not as yet received any\ngreat extension, accounts for the comparative absence of crimes against\nproperty, which constitute probably the greater number of criminal acts\nin civilized society.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The true starting\npoint of the historic ethical\ndevelopment]\n\nBut notwithstanding that so much of the life of primitive man is\nlived on the nonmoral plane, and that much which is reckoned unto\nhim for goodness is merely negative goodness, still in certain of\nhis activities growing out of his clan relationships we discover the\nbeginnings of all human morality. For as we have already said, the true\nstarting point of the moral evolution of mankind is to be sought in the\naltruistic sentiments nourished in the atmosphere of the kinship group.\nThere is scarcely an ethical sentiment which does not appear here\nat least in a rudimentary form. Out of the most sacred and intimate\nrelationships of the group we find springing up the maternal virtues\nof patience, tenderness, and self-denial,[35] and the filial virtues\nof love, obedience, and reverence; out of the fellowship of the men in\nhunting and in war[36] we see developing the manly virtues of courage,\nfortitude, self-control, and, above all, self-devotion to the common\ngood; out of the hearth worship of ancestors[37] we observe springing\nup many of those religious-ethical feelings and sentiments which form\none of the chief moral forces in civilization; out of the sacrificial\nmeal shared with the gods and the spirits of the dead through\nofferings of portions of the food and drink, we see forming customs\nof incalculable moral value in the ethical training of the race.[38]\nA great part of the history of morals consists in the record of how\nthese earliest forms of social virtues, first nourished by the customs,\nhabits, and practices of the kinship group, have been gradually refined\nand developed into wider and richer forms of ethical sentiment and\nfeeling.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Custom as the maker of\ngroup morality]\n\nThere is one special feature of this germinal morality to which our\nattention must now be directed. It is what is often called customary\nmorality. That is to say, the standard of right and wrong in the\nkinship community is custom. Custom is the lawgiver, and morality\nconsists in following custom. The individual, in a word, follows\nthe tribal or group conscience rather than the dictates of his own\nconscience. Indeed there is practically no such thing here as a private\nconscience. Individualism has not yet arisen. No one ordinarily has\nprivate notions of right and wrong which he feels impelled to set up\nagainst the immemorial customs and usages of the community.[39]\n\nBut there is really nothing in this fact which sets this nascent\nmorality apart from our own. It differs from ours not in kind but\nonly in degree. The morality of the masses is still largely customary\nmorality. Most persons in their social relations, in business, and\nin religion, follow unthinkingly the tribal conscience, that is,\nthe conventional morality of the society of which they are members,\nrather than their own individual sense of right and wrong. \u201cReflective\nmorality\u201d is still the morality of the few. The ever-renewed moral task\nof man is to change the customary tribal conscience into a reflective\nindividual conscience.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Collective\nresponsibility]\n\nThere is still another phase of the incipient morality of the kinship\ngroup which claims our attention because of its significance for the\nhistory of the evolution of morals. It is a group morality, that is, a\nmorality based on the idea of collective responsibility.\n\nThis conception presents one of the most striking phenomena in the\nhistory of the moral evolution of mankind. Among peoples in the earlier\nstages of moral development the family or clan group rather than the\nindividual is regarded as the ethical unit, and the act of any member\nof this group, when such act concerns a member or members of another\nsocial group, is looked upon as the act of the whole body to which he\nbelongs.[40] For the wrongdoing of one all are held responsible.[41]\n\nThis group morality, with which the true history of the unfolding\nmoral consciousness of the race begins, we shall meet with as a sort\nof survival in every stage of the moral progress of humanity from\nthe lowest to the highest level of culture. \u201cIt is,\u201d in the words of\nHobhouse, \u201cone of the dominant facts, if not _the_ dominant fact,\nethically considered, in the evolution of human society.\u201d[42] The\naccount of that slow change in the moral consciousness of man which has\ngradually caused group morality, in most spheres of life and thought,\nto give place to individual morality, that is, to that conception of\nmoral responsibility which holds every man responsible for his own act,\nand only for his own act, makes up one of the most instructive chapters\nin the moral history of the world.[43] We shall find significant\nsurvivals of this idea of collective responsibility, particularly in\nthe religious domain. In truth, a large part of religious history is\nnothing more nor less than an account of the influence and outworkings\nof this notion. Men making their gods like unto themselves have\nimagined them as acting on this principle of communal responsibility,\nand as bringing upon a whole people pestilence, famine, war, or other\ncalamity in revenge or punishment for some neglect in worship or act of\nsacrilege on the part of perhaps a single member of the tribe or nation.\n\nBy the early Fathers of the Church this idea of collective\nresponsibility, embodied in the doctrine of the imputation of the guilt\nof the transgression of the first man Adam to all his descendants to\nthe end of the world, was given a prominent place in Christian theology\nand has been a great force in molding the morality of the Western world.\n\nAgain, we find this idea of group morality embodied in the war ethics\nof the modern nations, which, regarded from one point of view, is\nlargely group ethics, that is to say, the survival in the domain of\ninternational relations of ethical ideas that had their birth on the\nlow intellectual and moral levels of barbarism.\n\nAs we follow the upward trend of the lines of the moral evolution of\nthe race we shall hear louder and louder protests against this notion\nof communal responsibility, especially when this form of human morality\nhas been transferred to the heavens and made a fundamental principle of\nthe divine government.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The duty of revenge;\nthe blood feud]\n\nIn primitive society if a man slay a kinsman, he is punished by\noutlawry, that is, by expulsion from the family or clan.[44] The\nstory of Cain, the first murderer of a kinsman in Hebrew legend, is\ntypical.[45] If, however, a member of a clan is slain by an outsider,\nit is the duty of the nearest kinsman of the person killed, or of the\ncollective body of his kinsfolk, to kill in revenge the slayer or some\nrelative of his.[46] To ignore this obligation or to forgive the slayer\nof one\u2019s kinsman is regarded as base and cowardly.\n\nAs, through the advance of society, the ties of the clan become relaxed\nand this group becomes more and more perfectly merged with the larger\ngroup of the tribe or state of which it has become a part, and justice\ncomes to be administered by the tribal head or by regular tribunals,\nthen blood revenge on the part of the kinsmen of the slain gradually\nceases to be a duty and private vengeance becomes a crime. But this is\na slow evolution, and within societies far advanced in civilization\nwe often find belated groups still following with good conscience the\nancient custom of blood revenge. The vendetta in Italy and the feud in\nsome sections of our Southern states[47] are survivals or degenerate\nforms of this primitive virtue.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The _Lex talionis_]\n\nClosely related to the punishment of homicide in primitive society is\npunishment of lesser offenses, especially the infliction of bodily\ninjury, within the social group. Here, too, private vengeance rules.\nThe person wronged or injured inflicts such punishment upon the\noffender as passion or resentment may dictate. As time passes, however,\nand the sense of justice grows more discriminating, there are limits\nset to this private vengeance. There is established what is called\nthe rule of equivalence. The avenger is not allowed to wreak upon the\noffender indiscriminate and unmeasured punishment, but is restricted\nto the infliction upon him of exactly such injury and pain as he has\ninflicted upon his victim. Hence arose the _Lex talionis_, limb for\nlimb, eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.[48] This regulation thus\nregisters an advance in moral feeling, and may be regarded as probably\nthe first rule of the criminal code of the nations.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The virtue of courage;\nits altruistic element]\n\nIn early society those virtues are most highly esteemed which are of\nservice to the clan or tribe. Thus courage comes to hold a first place\namong the virtues. What is especially important to be noted here is\nthat under courage is hidden the virtue of self-sacrifice, which we\ngive the highest place in our ideal of character. It is this altruistic\nelement in courage which lends to it its real ethical quality. In\nprimitive society this virtue finds expression chiefly in the ready\nself-devotion of the individual in battle for the common good.\n\nThroughout pagan antiquity this virtue held a central place in\npractically every ideal of excellence. In the words of Robertson\nSmith, \u201cThis devotion to the common weal was, as every one knows, the\nmainspring of ancient morality and the source of all the heroic virtues\nof which ancient history presents so many illustrious examples.\u201d[49]\n\n\nIII. THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERTRIBAL MORALITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: Primitive man\u2019s double\nstandard of morality]\n\nThe accounts given by travelers and observers of the morals of savages\noften present a perplexing contrariety of opinion. Some writers\nrepresent such people as absolutely without a moral sense, while\nothers, as has already been remarked, hold them up as models for\nimitation by ourselves.\n\nThis contrariety in view results in part from an overlooking of the\nfact, just pointed out, that the moral goodness of the savage is\nlargely a negative goodness, but chiefly from a failure to observe\nthat the shield has two sides, that is to say, that savages have a\ndouble standard of morality--one standard regulating conduct within\nthe social group, and another regulating conduct toward outsiders.\nThus the command, \u201cThou shalt not kill,\u201d means to the savage merely\nthat he shall not kill a kinsman. It has in his mind no application to\nstrangers, just as in our minds it has no application to animals.\n\nIt is the same in regard to lying. Savages in general have a high\nregard for truthfulness, as they understand this virtue. The plighted\nword among them is probably as sacredly kept as by the average of\ncivilized men.[50] The repute of many savage folk for untruthfulness\ncomes about from the fact that they do not think that a stranger has\nany right to the truth. \u201cAmong themselves,\u201d writes Professor Starr of\ncertain Congo tribes, \u201clying is not commended and truth is appreciated;\nbut to deceive a stranger or a white man is commendable.\u201d[51]\n\nAnd so it is with stealing. Many uncivilized peoples are charged, and\nin a certain sense rightly, with making of theft a virtue. But it must\nbe borne in mind that to the savage all persons not members of his own\ngroup are strangers and enemies. To steal from such is looked upon as a\nmost praiseworthy exploit, while to steal from the members of one\u2019s own\ngroup is regarded as a crime.[52]\n\n\n[Sidenote: This dual morality a\nsurvival in civilization]\n\nNow the important thing to note here is that this double morality is\nnot something peculiar to the ethics of savages. This dualism runs\nthrough the whole moral history of the race, from the beginning to the\npresent day, and constitutes one of the most important facts in the\nmoral evolution of humanity. We too, like the savage, have our double\nstandard of morality. The chief difference between us and the savage\nis this: he puts his double standard in practice all the time, we only\noccasionally. On occasion we fling aside our ordinary standard of\nmorality, lift the savage\u2019s war standard, and then like the savage lie\nand steal and kill--outside the tribe. To deceive the stranger now is\ncommendable; to steal from him proper and right; to kill him a glorious\nexploit.\n\nThe great task of this century is to put an end to this scandal of\ncivilization, to teach men the oneness and universality of the moral\nlaw, to get them to understand that right and wrong are right and wrong\neverywhere--outside the tribe as well as within.\n\nThe history of intertribal or international morality, then, is the\nrecord of its gradual assimilation to intratribal morality.[53] It is a\nrecord of how the stranger, the outsider, has come, or is coming, to be\nregarded as a kinsman, as a neighbor.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Hospitality, or the\nguest right; the first step beyond\nkinship morality[54]]\n\nThe duty of hospitality, to which a high place is assigned in the code\nof primitive peoples, shows morality taking a step, the first step,\nbeyond the narrow circle of the original group of kinsmen. As we have\nseen, in the beginning the feeling of duty and obligation is restricted\nto the little group of fellow clansmen or tribesmen. Every one outside\nthis social circle is an enemy, and is without rights. But necessity\nforces men to go beyond the limits of their own clan or tribe, and\nin time there grows up a rule that the defenseless stranger shall be\nkindly received, entertained for a certain period, and then allowed to\ndepart unharmed. It is easy to see how among clans scattered thinly\nover a wide territory, and where the earlier isolation is beginning to\nbe broken by trade relations, this duty of hospitality should come to\nbe regarded as a very sacred one, and the person of the stranger guest\nas inviolable.[55]\n\nThus in the development of the guest right we see morality broadening,\nthe circle of moral obligation enlarged, and the stranger, ordinarily\ncounted as an enemy and as rightless, brought for a moment within the\nsacred pale of ethical sentiment and duty.[56] A new ground of moral\nobligation other than that of kinship has been established. Morality\nis now something more than clan morality. We witness the rise of\nintertribal morality. The first step in the moral unification of the\nhuman race has been taken.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Beginnings of the\nethics of war]\n\nEven in the domain of war we discover traces of the awakening of an\nintertribal conscience in races that are still in what we may regard as\nthe kinship stage of culture. Speaking broadly, primitive man, whose\nchief occupations are hunting and fighting,[57] makes no distinction\nbetween war and the hunt. All persons not belonging to his own group\nare regarded by him just as he regards wild game. In his efforts to\nkill or capture them, all means are right. Once in his power, he may\ndo with them as he likes; he may make slaves of them, he may torture\nthem, or he may eat their flesh as he would that of animals taken in\nthe chase. Conscience lays upon him not the least restraint. Only\nslowly do the moral feelings make conquests in this province.\n\nOne of the earliest mitigations of the barbarities of primitive warfare\nis probably to be found in the discontinuance of the practice of\neating the bodies of the slain.[58] It is this practice of cannibalism\nas a concomitant of war by peoples in the earlier stages of their\ndevelopment that perhaps more than any other circumstance gives such a\nrepellent aspect to human life on the lower levels of culture. But as\nMontaigne observes, the wrong consists in killing men, not in eating\nthem after they are dead[59]--a very just observation, and one which\nshould awaken reflection in us who, while piously abstaining from\neating our enemies, still persist in killing them.\n\nThe discontinuance of the practice of cannibalism--the practice seems\ninvariably to be left behind by all peoples as soon as they have\nmade any considerable advance in civilization[60]--may with little\nhesitation be attributed in part at least to the growth and refinement\nof the moral feelings. In one case at least we have historical evidence\nthat among a wide reach of savage tribes the custom was abolished by\nthe action of a more civilized people, who did just what the more\nadvanced European nations, under the impulsion of moral feeling, are\ndoing in regard to the slave trade and cannibalism in Africa to-day.\nThe Incas of Peru, before granting to conquered tribes terms of peace,\nforced them to abandon the practice of cannibalism.[61]\n\nThe disuse of poisoned arrows marks another significant mitigation of a\ncommon barbarity of early warfare. We know that in the Greek world by\nthe opening of the historic period there were communities that had come\nto look on the use of poisoned weapons with abhorrence, and to regard\nthe practice as a crime that aroused the anger of the gods. Thus Homer\nrepresents Ilus of Ephyra, when asked by Odysseus for the fatal poison\nwherewith to smear the tips of his arrows, as refusing his request\nbecause he feared the immortal gods.[62]\n\nIn these mitigations and prohibitions of the barbarities of war on\nthe lower levels of savagery we have probably the earliest articles\nof the war code of the nations. They mark the first steps taken in\nthe humanization of war. They indicate the birth of those sympathetic\nand moral feelings which, though of painfully slow growth and of\nintermittent action, have during the course of the historic ages\neffected great ameliorations of the cruelties of primitive warfare, and\nforeshadow a time when war between civilized nations shall have become\nan inconceivable thing.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The reaction of\nintertribal upon intratribal\nmorality]\n\nThere is a heart of good in things evil. Even the habitual intertribal\nwars of primitive communities contain a germ of good. The pressure\nexerted by these life-and-death struggles upon the clan or tribe has\na good effect upon the inner relationships of the group. Many of the\nsocial virtues, such as loyalty to comrades and self-devotion to the\ncommon weal, are called into constant and keen activity. For this\nreason we usually find these social virtues well developed among\npeoples in the clan or tribal stage of civilization. Such peoples may\neven be stronger in these special virtues than civilized peoples.\n\nBut there is another side to this. Intertribal wars, though they may\nin the very earliest stages of human culture be positively promotive\nof some of the social virtues, in later and more advanced stages exert\na decidedly unfavorable influence upon the moral development. The low\nbackward standard of intertribal ethics, reacting upon the higher and\nmore advanced intratribal standard, tends to make it like unto itself.\nAs Spencer expresses it, the life of internal amity is assimilated to\nthe life of external enmity. \u201cTaken in the mass the evidence shows,\u201d\nhe says, \u201cas we might expect, that in proportion as intertribal and\ninternational antagonisms are great and constant, the ideas and\nfeelings belonging to the ethics of enmity predominate; and conflicting\nas they do with the ideas and feelings belonging to the ethics of amity\nproper to the internal life of a society, they in greater or less\ndegree suppress these, or fill with aggressions the conduct of man\nto man.\u201d[63] Thus tribes engaged habitually in war are characterized\nby the frequency of homicide within the group. Tribes that regard\nthe robbery of strangers as honorable come to regard stealing within\nthe tribe as irreproachable.[64] Revengefulness, inhumanity, and\nuntruthfulness within each tribe characterize warlike communities.[65]\nOn the other hand, peaceful tribes are characterized by their superior\nintratribal morality. Tribes among whom war is infrequent or unknown\nare scrupulously honest.[66] Among such people crimes of violence are\nrare.[67]\n\nThus war, a heritage (as a phase of the \u201cstruggle for existence\u201d) of\nthe human from the lower animal world, becomes early in the human stage\nof the cosmic evolution a drag upon the moral progress of the race.[68]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE MORAL LIFE IN ANCIENT EGYPT: AN IDEAL OF SOCIAL JUSTICE\n\n\nI. CIRCUMSTANCES AND IDEAS WHICH MOLDED AND MOTIVED MORALITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: A homogeneous\npopulation and a comparatively\nstatic civilization]\n\nEgypt was the China of the ancient Mediterranean world. Like the\nChinese, the Egyptians were a comparatively unmixed people. During the\nhistoric period no new elements of importance were incorporated with\nthe native population. Again, like the civilization of China, that\nof Egypt throughout a great part of the historic age was singularly\nstatic. After having made wonderful advance in early times the\nEgyptians ceased to make further noteworthy progress.\n\nBoth these fundamental facts of Egyptian history had great significance\nfor Egyptian morals; for since when races mingle their blood they\nmingle also their moralities, it is a matter of supreme importance\nto the moral life of a people whether on the one hand it has, as the\ncenturies have passed, undergone a change in physical type through\nthe incorporation of new racial elements, or on the other hand has\npreserved unchanged its racial type and physical characteristics.\n\nEqually important for the moral ideal is it whether the civilization\nof which it forms one element is progressive or unprogressive; for\nchanges in the moral standard are largely dependent on changes in the\nother elements of civilization. Where the intellectual life and the\nreligious ideas remain unmodified, and where all political, social,\nand industrial institutions remain essentially unchanged, we need not\nlook for fundamental changes in ethical ideas and convictions. How\nthe history of conscience in ancient Egypt illustrates these truths we\nshall see a little further on.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The teaching that\nimmortality is conditioned on\nrighteousness]\n\nWe have seen how potent an influence the notion of a life beyond the\ntomb exercised upon the conduct of the members of the primitive kinship\ngroup, giving birth to some of the noblest virtues of their simple code\nof morals. Now this idea of continued existence after death dominated\nthe life of no other civilized people of antiquity so completely as it\ndominated the life of the Egyptians; and probably in the case of no\nother people ancient or modern has the belief exerted so profound an\ninfluence upon conduct. This was so for the reason that the conception\nwas here early moralized and represented the blessed life in the\nhereafter as dependent upon rightdoing in the present life. No soul\nthat had done evil was admitted to the bark of the ferryman at the\nEgyptian Styx. In this discrimination we find \u201cthe earliest traces in\nthe history of man of an ethical test at the close of life.\u201d[69]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical qualities\nof the sun-god Ra]\n\nIt is the sun-god Ra who in the remotest times is most intimately\nassociated with these moral requirements for participation in the\nfelicities of the celestial hereafter. The latest reading and analysis\nof the texts of the Pyramid Age has thrown new light upon the relations\nof the rival divinities Ra and Osiris to the development of the moral\nconsciousness in ancient Egypt. In his latest work Professor Breasted\nsays: \u201cThe later rapid growth of ethical teaching in the Osiris\nfaith and the assumption of the r\u00f4le of judge by Osiris is not yet\ndiscernible in the Pyramid Age, and the development which made these\nelements so prominent in the Middle Kingdom took place in the obscure\nperiod after the development of the Pyramid Age. Contrary to the\nconclusions generally accepted at present, it was the sun-god ... who\nwas the earliest champion of moral worthiness and the great judge in\nthe hereafter.\u201d[70]\n\nThe conception of Ra as the righteous judge, as the father and\nprotector of the reigning Pharaoh, and as the guardian divinity of\nthe Egyptian state, influenced profoundly the moral development in\nprefeudal Egypt, and was seemingly the inspiration of the great social\nreform movement which marked the history of the Eleventh and Twelfth\nDynasties. In the words of Professor Breasted, \u201cThe moral obligations\nemerging in the Solar theology thus wrought the earliest social\nregeneration and won the earliest battle for social justice of which we\nknow anything in history.\u201d[71]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Religious dualism]\n\nIn our introductory chapter we spoke of the influence of physical\nenvironment upon the moral life of a people. The history of the\nformation of the ethical type of ancient Egypt affords an excellent\nillustration of this; for it was probably out of the striking physical\ndualism of the Egyptian lands--the antagonism between the life-giving\nNile and the ever-encroaching desert--that grew Egyptian religious\ndualism, embodied in the myth of the struggle between Osiris and\nSet.[72] At first the tale was a pure nature myth reflecting simply the\nconflict between two physical elements; but as the moral consciousness\nof the people who recited the story deepened, there was gradually read\ninto it an ethical meaning. The conflict was now conceived as a mighty\nstruggle between the powers of good and evil, between the beneficent\nOsiris (and his son and avenger, Horus) and the malignant Set.[73]\n\nThis world philosophy reacted powerfully upon Egyptian morality,\nkeeping as it did in the foreground of the moral consciousness the\ntruth that the moral life is a battle against evil. \u201cThe triumph of\nright over wrong ... is the burden of nine tenths of the Egyptian texts\nwhich have come down to us.\u201d[74]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Osirian myth in its\nspecial development]\n\nActed upon by the moral feelings, the Osirian myth underwent a special\ndevelopment. It came to represent not simply the eternal opposition\nbetween good and evil, but the whole moral order of the present and\nthe future world. It told of the beneficent life of Osiris as king of\nEgypt, his death and resurrection, and of his office as king and judge\nin the realms of the dead.\n\nAfter having been given this rich moral content, the myth reacted\npowerfully upon the moral consciousness and became a chief agency in\nthe formation of the moral character of the Egyptian race. Osiris, as\nreflected in the Osirian myth, became the incarnation of the ethical\nideal. It is a great advantage to morality when the ideal of goodness\nis thus embodied in a divine exemplar. Osiris held some such relation\nto the moral life of ancient Egypt as Christ holds to the moral life of\nthe Christian world.\n\n\nII. THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: A homogeneous and\nunchanging conscience]\n\nBy the dawn of history there had been developed in ancient Egypt\nan enlightened and discriminating conscience.[75] There are two\naspects of this conscience which we need to note. First, it was a\ncomparatively homogeneous conscience; that is, the morality of the\nancient Egyptians was not a mixture of moralities like that of the\nmodern European nations whose morality is a blend of the moralities\nof different races--Greek, Roman, Celtic, and Teutonic; of different\nreligions--pagan and Christian; and of different civilizations--Greek,\nLatin, Celtic, and German.\n\nSecond, it was a comparatively unchanging conscience. The moral\nconsciousness which we find in pre-Christian Roman Egypt is\nfundamentally the same as that which emerged in the Pyramid Age more\nthan three thousand years before. During this long period the Egyptian\nconscience, although it gained in depth and sensitiveness as the\nmillenniums passed, underwent less change in its essential qualities\nthan the moral consciousness underwent in less than ten centuries in\nall the other great nations, save China, of the ancient world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Evidences of moral\nprogress during early times]\n\nBut though the moral development, like the development of all other\nphases of Egyptian civilization, was early checked and thereafter made\nbut slow progress, the essential refinement and clarification of the\nmoral sense during prehistoric times, or in the obscure period of the\nearliest dynasties, is shown by various testimonies, as, for instance,\nin the moralization of the Osirian myth, to which we have already\nreferred, in the abandonment of the practice of human sacrifices at\nthe tomb, and in the transition, concerning the conception of the life\nafter death, from the continuance to the retribution theory.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Substitution of\nka-statues for human sacrifices]\n\nThe early Egyptians, after the manner of savages, killed and buried\nwith the dead master a number of his slaves, that their souls\nmight attend him in the spirit land. But after a time the growing\nhumanitarian and ethical feelings of the Egyptians forbade human\nsacrifices, and then merely the portrait-statues of the slaves were\nplaced in the tomb.[76] These, it was thought,--in consonance with the\nbelief which led to the substitution of pictures or of clay and wood\nmodels for the real articles at first buried with the dead,--would take\nthe place of the actual bodies of the servants.\n\nBut as time passed, the deepening moral feelings of the Egyptians would\nnot permit them to do even this thing. It did not now seem right to\nthem that because a man was a slave in the earthly Egypt he should be\na slave forever in the Osirian fields.[77] So they ceased to place in\nthe tomb of the master these portrait-statues of his servants, and in\ntheir stead put in statuettes of nobody in particular. The doubles of\nthese, it was conceived, would appear as newly created souls in the\nunderworld, and, being indebted for life itself to the master of the\ntomb, would, it was na\u00efvely assumed, gratefully labor for him through\nall eternity.[78]\n\nThe history of the ka-statues, as these substitutes are called, thus\nbears testimony similar to that of the Osirian myth as to the upward\ntrend of ethical thought and humanitarian feeling in prehistoric\nEgypt.[79]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Transition from the\ncontinuance to the retribution\ntheory]\n\nStill further evidence of the advance on moral lines in early Egypt is\nafforded by the character of the belief held by the Egyptians at the\nbeginning of the second millennium B.C. and perhaps earlier respecting\nthe fate of souls in the world beyond the tomb. To understand this we\nneed to cast our glance a little aside and observe how the world of\nshades, in its social and ethical classifications, has ever been a\nregister of the changing moral feelings of men. As Oscar Peschel finely\nsays, \u201cThe other world has ever answered to this as spectrum to the\nsource of light.\u201d\n\nEdward B. Tylor happily names the two chief theories which have\nbeen held in regard to the state of souls in the hereafter as the\ncontinuance and the retribution theory. The first theory is that of\nprimitive man while his moral sense is yet undeveloped. According to\nthis theory the same fate is allotted to all who go down to death.\nThere is no such thing as rewards and punishments. This is the\nconception of the after-life which is held by all races on the lower\nlevels of culture, and it is a view which often lingers on as a\nsurvival among peoples far advanced in civilization. But as the moral\njudgment becomes more discriminating, then this view of the other\nworld is very certain to undergo a change. The quickened sense of\njustice demands that the allotments after death shall be in accordance\nwith merit and demerit. This ethical feeling gradually transforms\nthe topography of the underworld and organizes the as yet undivided\ncommunity of shades. The hitherto common abode of the dead is usually\ndivided into two distinct compartments or regions, heaven and hell,\nand souls are separated, according to their deeds on earth, into two\nclasses, the good and the bad, those to be welcomed to the abode of\nthe blessed and these consigned to the place of torment. Sometimes,\nhowever, the lot conceived for the wicked is simply annihilation.\n\nThe incoming of this theory of rewards and punishments after death\nconstitutes a great landmark in the moral evolution of mankind. In the\nwords of Tylor, this transition from the continuance to the retribution\ntheory \u201cfor deep import to human life has scarcely its rival in the\nhistory of religion.\u201d[80] The sanctions of morality are doubled.\n\nNow in ancient Egypt by the beginning of the second millennium B.C. the\ntransition from the continuance to the retribution theory had already\nbeen effected, as will appear in the following account of the Egyptian\nJudgment of the Dead. Thus here, as in the change of practices at the\ntomb, we have indisputable evidence of the progress of moral ideas in\nearly Egypt.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Judgment of the\nDead]\n\nThe Judgment of the Dead was the trial which every soul had to undergo\nbefore Osiris and his forty-two assessors in the great tribunal hall of\nthe underworld. The astonishing thing about this tribunal, as we have\njust intimated, is that at a time when the oldest monuments raised in\nEgypt were yet recent this whole conception of the moral order in all\nits details was already fully matured.[81] Osiris had been raised to\nthe judgment seat in the other world, and the moral standard in some\ndepartments of life, particularly in the relations of man to man in the\neveryday social and business spheres, was as high and true as is the\nstandard in many of the civilized nations of to-day. This admirable\ncode of social morals points unmistakably to long periods of organized\nsociety and moral training in prefeudal Egypt.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Negative Confession]\n\nThis early standard of goodness is embodied in the so-called Negative\nConfession, in which the soul before the Osirian tribunal pleaded his\ninnocence of the forty-two sins condemned by the Egyptian code of\nmorality. This confession, previous to the discovery of the Babylonian\ncode of Hammurabi, constituted the oldest known code of morality of the\nancient world. These are some of the declarations of the soul: \u201cI did\nnot steal\u201d; \u201cI did not get any man treacherously killed\u201d; \u201cI did not\nutter any lie\u201d;[82] \u201cI did not make any one weep\u201d; \u201cI did not kill any\nsacred animals\u201d; \u201cI did not damage any cultivated land\u201d; \u201cI was angry\nonly when there was reason [for being angry]\u201d; \u201cI did not turn a deaf\near to the words of truth\u201d; \u201cI did not commit any act of rebellion\u201d;\n\u201cI did not do any witchcraft\u201d; \u201cI did not blaspheme a god\u201d; \u201cI did not\nmake the slave to be misused by his master\u201d; \u201cI was not imperious\u201d; \u201cI\ndid not strip the mummies of their stuff.\u201d[83]\n\nAfter this confession to the forty-two assessors in the hall of\njudgment, the soul made the following affirmative declaration, which\nmakes a singularly close approach to Christian morality: \u201cI gave bread\nto the hungry, water to the thirsty, garments to the naked, a bark to\nthe one who was without one [that is, a boat to the detained traveler],\nofferings to the gods, and funeral conservations to the shades.\u201d[84]\n\nAfter this confession and declaration the heart of the man was placed\nin one scale of a balance and the image of Truth in the other. If\nthe heart was not found wanting, but weighed just equal to the\nimage, Osiris pronounced the soul justified, and it was welcomed to\nthe company of the blessed. The punishment meted out to the soul\nfound lacking seems to have been of a negative nature--a denial of\nimmortality.[85]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Comparison of the\nmorality of the Negative\nConfession with that of the Hebrew\nDecalogue and other codes]\n\nIt is instructive to compare this ancient code, both in its contents\nand in its omissions, with the moral codes of other peoples and other\nages. The similarity of the morality of the Negative Confession to that\nof the Hebrew Decalogue forces itself at once upon the attention.[86]\nThe Egyptian code, however, lays less emphasis than the Hebrew upon\nreligious duties. In the forty-two duties named only seven are duties\ntoward the gods, while of the Ten Commandments five concern religious\nduties. As we have already observed, the duties of the Egyptian code\nare those due from man to man; that is, they are social as opposed to\nreligious duties.\n\nIn striking contrast to the Confucian code of the Chinese, the\nEgyptian code gives very little place to the duties of children to\ntheir parents. These duties are noticed, it is true, by the Egyptian\nmoralists, but no emphasis is laid upon them. They are mentioned only\nonce in the Negative Confession before Osiris. As the stress laid\nby Chinese moralists upon filial piety came about largely through\nthe supposed need of the spirits of the dead for regular offerings\nat the grave, so it may be that the neglect of this virtue by the\nEgyptian teachers is to be explained, as Flinders Petrie suggests,\nby the circumstance that \u201cthe provision of offerings in semblance by\nthe Egyptians in the tomb left little place for the urgency of filial\nduties in maintaining continual supplies for the deceased.\u201d[87]\n\nAnother defect of Egyptian morality is its lack of depth and\nseriousness. There is no hungering and thirsting after righteousness,\nno passionate yearning for holiness. There is no call to lofty\nself-sacrifice. It is a calm, prudent, worldly-wise, practical\nmorality. Its spirit and temper are well set forth by Petrie when, in\nspeaking of its virtues and vices, he says that \u201cthese belong far more\nto the tone of Chesterfield and Gibbon than to that of Kingsley and\nCarlyle.\u201d[88]\n\nBut in spite of the limitations and defects of the code, it was one\nof the purest and loftiest framed by the moral consciousness of the\nraces of antiquity. The Negative Confession shows that Egypt had early\nlearned the lesson that blessedness in the hereafter is conditioned on\nthe practice of justice, truth, and righteousness in the present life\non earth.[89]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moral precepts of\nPtah-hotep; an ethical conception\nof kinship]\n\nAfter the Negative Confession the most valuable memorial of the\ncharacter of the Egyptian conscience is found in the precepts of the\nmoralist Ptah-hotep,[90] who lived probably in the time of the Twelfth\nDynasty. This moralist laid particular emphasis upon the duties of\nrulers and of the rich and great. His maxims are intended as a sort\nof \u201cManual of the Perfect Official.\u201d \u201cIf, having been of no account,\nthou hast become great, and if, having been poor, thou hast become\nrich, and if thou hast become governor of the city, be not hard-hearted\non account of thy advancement, because thou hast become merely the\nguardian of the things which God has provided.\u201d[91] In like words\nemphasis is laid upon the duties of gentleness and considerateness on\nthe part of the administrator and the judge. In truth the doctrine\nof trusteeship of wealth and of office has never been more zealously\ntaught than in these precepts of the early Egyptian moralist.[92]\n\nThe teachings of Ptah-hotep respecting the duties of rulers would seem\nto have made effective appeal to the heart and conscience of even\nthe holders of the royal office. In any event we find these lofty\nconceptions of the duties of kingship incarnated in the lives and\ndeeds of several of the Pharaohs of the Old Kingdom. The view held by\nthese monarchs respecting the nature of the royal office was almost\nexactly like that entertained by the so-called benevolent despots of\nthe eighteenth century of our era. The inscriptions on the royal\ntomb boast not alone of exploits and triumphs in war, but the prince\nvaunts himself for having put no ward in mourning, for having made\nno distinction between the great and the humble, for having been the\nprotector of the widow and the asylum of the orphan, and for having\nlaid no unjust taxes.[93]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Slavery approved by the\nEgyptian conscience]\n\nThe Egyptian conscience, like the conscience of the ancient world in\ngeneral, did not condemn the institution of slavery. The relation of\nmaster and slave was looked upon by the Egyptians as perfectly natural\nand legitimate.\n\nThe slave class, which included both whites and blacks, was recruited\nnot only from the prisoners of war brought back by the Pharaohs from\ntheir numerous foreign conquests, but also from captives secured on\nregular man-hunting expeditions into the negro regions of the Upper\nNile.\n\nThe treatment of the slave was usually mild, and the development of\nthe moral feelings had already in early times placed him under the\nprotection of the gods. Thus in the judgment hall of Osiris the soul\nrepudiates the sin of oppression by affirming, \u201cI did not cause the\nslave to be misused by his master.\u201d[94]\n\nRespecting the moral side, in general, of the slave system of\nantiquity, which we encounter now for the first time here among the\nEgyptians, the following observation may be made. If we except the\nHebrews, we shall not find among the peoples of the ancient world\nwhose ethical standards we shall pass in review any fundamental change\nthroughout their history in the common conscience regarding the\nrightfulness of slavery. Indeed any radical and permanent change in\nthe moral feelings of men on this subject was hardly possible till\nafter the incoming of Christianity with its teachings of a common\nFather-God and the brotherhood of man.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethics of war]\n\nOne of the most striking phenomena of the moral evolution of mankind is\nthe unequal rate of movement on different lines. Thus while morality\nhas made great progress in some departments of life, in the domain of\nwar it has remained comparatively stationary from the dawn of history\ndown almost to the present day. The war code of the modern nations,\nnotwithstanding improvements and ameliorations to which our attention\nwill be drawn later in our study, is still in large part an unchanged\nheritage from the ages of primitive savagery.\n\nBearing this in mind, it will not be a matter of surprise to us that\nthe laws of war of the Egyptians showed little advance the practices of\nthe negro savages of Africa; indeed it seems probable that this part of\nthe moral code of Egypt was actually of African origin.[95] There is\nnot a word in Egyptian literature in reprobation of war.[96]\n\nWhile in their relations to their own people the Pharaohs observed a\ncomparatively enlightened code of ethics, being in general humane,\nconsiderate, and clement, still in their treatment of the vanquished\nthey seem to have been wholly insensible to all humanitarian feelings.\nLike the Assyrian kings they \u201cimmortalized their cruelty in their art.\u201d\nNumerous scenes upon the monuments celebrate the Pharaoh\u2019s inhumanity;\nnot one celebrates his compassion or mercy. He is constantly\nrepresented in the act of slaying in heaps with his own hands his bound\nand suppliant captives.[97]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Influence of the moral\nideal upon Egyptian life and\nhistory]\n\nTaken altogether, the moral standard of ancient Egypt, as disclosed in\nthe foregoing brief account of what the Egyptian conscience condemned\nand what it approved, was not a high one, but it was, in so far as\nit concerned the everyday life of the people, wholly practical, and\nprobably was as well lived up to by the masses as our higher ideal of\ncharacter is lived up to by ourselves. We have a right to infer this\nfrom the persistence of Egyptian institutions through two thirds of\nthe historic millenniums; for no nation or society can long endure\nwhere the relations of man to man and of subject to ruler are not in\nsubstantial agreement with the real convictions of the age as to what\nconstitutes essential justice and righteousness.\n\nThe moral standard of the Egyptians has been compared to that of the\nRomans after it had felt the influence of Stoicism and Christianity.\nLike the Roman ideal of excellence at its best, the Egyptian ideal\ntended to develop a strong and manly type of character, particularly\nin the ruling class. We think it not an illusion which causes us to\nsee the influence of the ideal in the face of Rameses the Great. This\nface bears the stamp of strength, resolution, indomitable energy. We\nmay believe that it was the moral ideal which had something to do in\ncreating such a type of character as we see here, just as it was the\nprimitive Roman ideal which helped to create that admirable type of\ncharacter which lives in the legends of early Rome.\n\nFurther, the moral ideal tended to ameliorate the autocratic government\nof the Pharaohs by holding constantly before the ruler the example of\nthe righteous and beneficent king-gods Ra and Osiris. The influence of\nthe ideal in this relation may be likened to the influence of the moral\nideal of Christianity upon the government of the later C\u00e6sars.\n\nAgain, the practical moral ideal of Egypt, laying its emphasis upon the\nfundamental social virtues, helped to establish and maintain relations\nof justice and equity between man and man, and thus contributed to the\ngeneral well-being of Egyptian society and to the stability of Egyptian\ninstitutions.\n\nNor was the influence of the moral ideal of Egypt confined to the\nEgyptian land. For, as Am\u00e9lineau truly says, the wonderful edifice of\nmorality is the collective work of all peoples and all ages.[98] In the\nuprearing of this edifice Egypt played a great r\u00f4le. Her contributions\nto the morality of the first nations were as helpful, we may believe,\nas were those she made to the other domains--material, artistic, and\nintellectual--of the civilization of the early world.\n\nLater she made a rich bequest to European morality, a bequest only less\nimportant perhaps than that made by Judea. Her ideas of the future\nlife, her meditations on death and the final judgment, re\u00ebnforced the\nteachings of Christianity and thus contributed to create that deep\nconviction of a life hereafter and a coming retribution which for\neighteen hundred years and more has furnished sanction and stimulus\nto the moral life of Christendom.[99] It is not without significance\nthat Christian monasticism, with all its otherworldliness, had its\nbeginnings in Egypt. \u201cThe first Christian monk [Pachomius] had been a\npagan monk of Serapis.\u201d[100]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE BABYLONIAN-ASSYRIAN CONSCIENCE\n\n\n[Sidenote: The importance of\nBabylonian-Assyrian morality for\nthe history of comparative morals]\n\nThe information which the cuneiform texts have yielded concerning the\nmoral life of the Babylonian and Assyrian peoples, though scanty, is\nof the greatest value to the student of comparative morals, not only\nbecause it casts light upon a moral development in some important\nrespects like the moral evolution of the kindred Semitic people of\nIsrael, but also because that later evolution was probably deeply\ninfluenced by it. Therefore, though nothing like a connected account of\nthe moral evolution in the Euphratean lands can be attempted till the\nthousands of cuneiform tablets recovered from the ancient libraries of\nthe Babylonian-Assyrian cities have been deciphered, and the ethical\ncharacter and value of their contents determined, we shall devote a\nfew pages to the portrayal of such manifestations of conscience as are\ndisclosed in the religious, literary, historical, and law tablets whose\ncontents are already known to us.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The general\nnonethical character of the\nBabylonian-Assyrian religion]\n\nReligion filled a large place in the life of the ancient Babylonians\nand Assyrians, especially in that of the former; but religion with\nthem had at first little or nothing to do with morality. Like the\nreligion of savage and barbarian folk, it lacked wholly or almost\nwholly the ethical spirit. Throughout the early period it was in the\nmain simply a system of incantations and magical rites. Scarcely any\nmoral element entered into the system until the later centuries of\nBabylonian-Assyrian history.\n\nThis religion was in truth simply a survival from primitive savage\ntimes when religion was merely a belief in the existence of evil\nspirits, and in their disposition and power to do harm to men.[101] In\nthis stage of the religious evolution sickness, death, misadventure\nof every kind are believed to be caused by some malignant demon or by\nsome offended and revengeful god. The evil spirits are supposed to\nact from pure malignancy, while the great gods are conceived to be\nangered especially by the nonobservance of some religious rite, by the\nviolation of some taboo forbidding the use of certain kinds of food, or\nby some other like act.\n\nTo ward off the attacks of the evil demons, or to appease the offended\ngods, recourse was had to the recital of magical formulas and\nincantations. This was Shamanism in its lowest and crudest form, in\nwhich there was at work as a motive on the part of the suppliant only\ncringing fear or a desire to get rid of some present pain, without the\nleast trace of moral emotions, such as remorse and repentance.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethical tendencies in\nthe religion]\n\nBut as time passed, this earlier nonethical religion, as is evidenced\nby the texts recovered from the long-buried temple libraries,[102]\nbecame in a measure moralized. A moral character was given to the great\ngods, and they became the inspirers and guardians of a true morality.\nThis ethicalizing process was the same in character as that which\nwent on in the religion of the ancient Hebrews, gradually moralizing\nthe primitive conceptions and cult of Yahweh until among that people\nreligion and morality became wholly at one. The ethical development,\nhowever, never went as far as this in Babylonia and Assyria, but the\nmovement was such as to lift these peoples far above the low moral\nplane of primitive society. \u201cIn the seventh century before Christ,\nif not earlier, the Babylonians and Assyrians possessed a system of\nmorality which in many respects resembled that of the descendants of\nAbraham.\u201d[103]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Evidence afforded by\nthe penitential psalms of the\ngrowth in moral feeling]\n\nThe ethical movement found its truest expression in the so-called\npenitential hymns,[104] which are in spirit altogether like the\npenitential psalms of the Hebrew Scriptures.[105] They exhibit the same\nintense yearning of the penitent soul for reconciliation and union with\na god conceived as just and holy and piteous.\n\nIn one hymn is found the new moral conception that disease is the work\nof a good spirit. This is a very lofty ethical idea, and approaches\nthe Hebrew conception of afflictions as the visitation in disguise of\nlove. But this idea seems never to have become a permanent part of the\nBabylonian moral consciousness.\n\nIn these psalms and prayers we have evidence that at times the\nworshipers of Marduk and Ashur attained to almost as lofty a conception\nof deity as that reached by the teachers and prophets of Israel. The\ngreat gods were conceived as the creators, the sustainers of man; as\nloving, compassionate, merciful, and forgiving. The religious-moral\nideal was here verging toward the highest that man has ever been able\nto form, and could this standard have been steadily upheld and the\nlower abandoned, then Babylonia and Assyria like Judea might have made\nprecious contributions to the moral life of humanity. But this was not\ndone. The tablets holding magical formulas and incantations, wholly\ndevoid of all ethical character, outnumber a thousand to one those\nexhaling the spiritual perfume of genuine moral feeling and aspiration.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethical significance of\nthe conception of the after life]\n\nRespecting the lot of the dead, the Babylonians held views like those\nof the early Hebrews. This was the continuance as opposed to the\nretribution theory.[106] Arallu, \u201cthe land of no return,\u201d was a vast\nunderground region where were gathered all, without distinction, who\nwent down to the grave. It was a sad, dolorous life that the drowsing\nshades lived in this dark underworld, where the bats flitted in\nthe twilight and the dust gathered on the lintels of the doors. An\nundiscriminating fate allotted the same destiny to all. In so far as\nthe moral consciousness of the Babylonians demanded that a distinction\nbe made between the good and the bad, this demand was met by the\nassumption--which was also that of the Hebrews so long as they held the\nBabylonian view of the life after death--that the evil man is punished\nin this life, and the good man rewarded here on earth with numerous\nflocks, reputation, many children, and long life.\n\nFor four thousand years the masses in Babylonia seem to have remained\nsatisfied with this view of the moral government of the world. In the\nlater periods of Babylonian history, however, we find in the literature\ntraces of a protest against this nonethical conception of life in\nthe afterworld--a protest which shows that, in the case of the more\nspiritually minded at least, the moral consciousness was deepening and\nthe ethical judgment becoming clearer and truer.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical spirit of\nthe laws; the code of Hammurabi]\n\nSince the law code of a people embraces all those duties the\nperformance of which the state or public authority attempts to\nenforce, the ethical spirit of an age or people finds one of its\ntruest embodiments in its laws. It is this fact which renders of such\nextraordinary interest to the student of the history of morals the\nrecent discovery of the code of the Babylonian king Hammurabi,[107]\nthe oldest known code of public and private morality. This law system\nexhibits in some departments of life an enlightened and advanced\nmorality, yet one with serious limitations and defects, a morality\nin many respects like that of the Mosaic code of the kindred Semitic\nnation of Israel.\n\nThe code informs us that the Babylonian feeling as to what is right\nand wrong, just and unjust, in the ordinary business relations of life\nwas much like the average conscience of to-day. In some matters the\nBabylonian law held ground morally in advance of that held by modern\ncodes, as, for instance, in providing that in case of misfortune\nthe debtor should have both his rent and the interest on his debt\nremitted.[108]\n\nBut in its provisions touching the family relations the code reveals\nethical conceptions very different from our own. As in other Oriental\nlaw systems, ancient and modern, polygamy was regarded as a moral\ninstitution. A man in debt could bind his wife and children out to\nservice or sell them as slaves, but not for a longer period than three\nyears.\n\nThe punishments meted out to offenders were harsh and cruel, yet not\nmuch more atrociously cruel than those provided by the English laws of\nthree hundred years ago. Impaling, burning, cutting out the tongue,\ngouging out the eyes, cutting off the fingers, breaking the bones of\nthe hands were common penalties.\n\nSometimes the punishment was measured by the primitive principle of\nthe _Lex talionis_; it was eye for eye, bone for bone, tooth for\ntooth.[109] This law of retaliation was carried out so rigorously as\nto result in the punishment of the innocent for the guilty. Thus if a\nman caused the death of another man\u2019s daughter, the law required that\nhis own daughter should be put to death.[110] If a builder, through\nthe faulty construction of a house, caused the death of the son of the\nowner through the falling of the house, the son of the builder was\nto be put to death.[111] It is in these provisions of the code that\nwe find the greatest divergence between the Babylonian feeling and\nour own as to what is right and just. Yet this Babylonian conscience\nwhich sanctioned the visiting of the iniquity of the father upon the\nchildren is a conscience which we shall meet with in societies much\nmore advanced than that for which the Hammurabi code was formulated.\n\nThe Babylonian conscience in regard to slavery as embodied in the\ncode was about like our own conscience respecting negro slavery of a\ngeneration or two ago. The slave was viewed as a mere chattel, and the\nmaster possessed over him the power of life and death. Kind treatment,\nhowever, was enjoined by the law. There was a fugitive-slave law which\nreads curiously like our negro-slave laws of two generations ago, in\nwhich the aiding and harboring of a fugitive slave is made a crime\npunishable with death.[112]\n\nThe slave class was recruited, as in other lands of the ancient world,\nfrom prisoners of war, foundlings, debtors, criminals, and through the\nsale by fathers and husbands of their children and wives. The system\nseems to have undergone no essential changes or ameliorations, such\nas we shall see effected in the Hebrew system, by growth in ethical\nfeeling during the four thousand years of Babylonian history. It is\ntrue that enfranchisement of slaves was not uncommon, the freed man\nbecoming the dependent of his old master, but it does not appear that\nmoral sentiment afforded the motive for manumission.[113]\n\n\n[Sidenote: International morality;\nwar ethics]\n\nThe international ethics of the Babylonians and Assyrians was in every\nessential respect the international ethics of their age in the Semitic\nworld. It was the character of the religion of these peoples which\ndetermined in large measure international relations in the Mesopotamian\nlands throughout the period of Semitic ascendancy. \u201cThe conception\nof religion as an alliance between God and man against other peoples\nand their gods never ceased in Mesopotamia.\u201d[114] This conception was\nessentially the same as that held by the Hebrews down to the time of\nthe great prophets. \u201cLet us go up against them, for our god is greater\nthan their god,\u201d is the war cry of four thousand years of history of\nthe Semitic world.\n\nThe Assyrians far surpassed the Babylonians in their ferocious cruelty\nin the treatment of war captives. Notwithstanding their advanced\nmorality in some departments of life, in this domain they stood, if\nwe except the practice of cannibalism, on practically the same level\nas savages. Witness the following inscription of Assur-natsir-pal,\nin which he tells of his treatment of certain prisoners of war: \u201cThe\nnobles, as many as had revolted, I flayed; with their skins I covered\nthe pyramid. Some [of these] I immured in the midst of the pyramid;\nothers above the pyramid I impaled on stakes.... Three thousand of\ntheir captives I burned with fire. I left not one alive among them to\nbecome a hostage.... I cut off the hands [and] feet of some; I cut\noff the noses, the ears [and] the fingers of others; the eyes of the\nnumerous soldiers I put out. In the middle [of them] I suspended their\nheads on vine stems in the neighborhood of their city. Their young men\n[and] their maidens I burned as a holocaust.\u201d[115]\n\nThe significant thing here is not so much the fact that these things\nwere done, as the fact that the king exults in having done them and\nthinks to immortalize himself by portraying them upon imperishable\nstone. The careful way in which to-day all reference to atrocities of\nthis character, when in the fury of battle they are inflicted upon a\nsavage enemy, are suppressed by those responsible for them, and the\nindignant condemnation of them by the public opinion of the civilized\nworld, measures the moral progress humanity has made even along those\nlines on which progress has been so painfully slow and halting.[116]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nCHINESE MORALS: AN IDEAL OF FILIAL PIETY\n\n\nI. IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES DETERMINING THE\nCAST OF THE MORAL IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introductory]\n\nWith the exception of the teachers of the ancient Hebrews, the leaders\nof thought of no people have so insistently interpreted life and\nhistory in terms of ethics as have the sages of the Chinese race. And,\nexcepting the Hebrew teachers, no moralists have so emphasized duties\nwhile leaving rights--upon which the Western world in modern times has\nlaid such stress--to take care of themselves.[117]\n\nIt cannot fail to enhance our interest in a study of the ideal\nupheld by these teachers of morality, if we recall that this ideal\nof character has for upwards of three thousand years exercised an\nincalculable influence upon the moral life of probably a fourth of the\nhuman race and is the cement of a social structure that has outlasted\nall others of the ancient world.\n\nThe cast of this moral ideal affords a good illustration of the\nway in which the moral type of a people is molded by religious and\nphilosophical ideas, social institutions, race experiences, and\nphysical environment. Following our usual method of exposition we shall\nbegin our examination of Chinese morality by first casting a glance\nat some of the agencies which have been especially influential in the\ncreation of the ethical standard.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Confucianism: the state\nworship of Heaven and the popular\nworship of ancestors]\n\nThere are two religious elements in Confucianism which have special\nsignificance for Chinese morality. These are, first, the state worship\nof Heaven and of the lesser gods of the sky and earth; and second, the\npopular cult of ancestral spirits.\n\nThe worship of Heaven, the supreme deity, is a state function; that\nis, it is a matter which is left entirely to the Emperor and the\nmagistrates. Consequently those duties to God, that is, to a being\nlooked upon as Creator and Father,--duties of reverence, love, and\nworship, which fill so large a place in the moral ideals of Judaism and\nChristianity,--find scarcely any place among the duties enjoined upon\nthe multitude by Confucianism.[118]\n\nThe worship of ancestors is the essential and popular element of\nConfucianism. Commenting on the ethical value of this cult, Dr.\nMartin affirms that \u201cin respect to moral efficiency, it would appear\nto be only second to that of faith in the presence of an all-seeing\nDeity.\u201d[119] The constant and reverent dwelling upon the virtues of\ntheir ancestors has exalted the virtue of filial piety among the\nChinese to the highest place in their ideal of character and has helped\nto make respect for what is old, for what has been handed down from\nancestral ages, a highly prized virtue and a distinguishing trait of\nthe race character.\n\nIn an indirect way also ancestor worship has exerted a great influence\nupon the moral life of the Chinese people, for this worship is\nnecessarily a family cult and must be cared for by the head of the\nfamily. This has prevented the growth of a priestly caste in Confucian\nChina. The absence of a powerful national priesthood has been a great\nboon to Chinese morality. The place thus left vacant has been filled\nby the _literati_, or learned class,[120] whose influence upon the\nethical life of the people has, without question, been more beneficent\nthan that of a priestly class would have been.[121]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Demonism: evil spirits\nthe ministers of retributive\njustice]\n\nBesides peopling the invisible world with beneficent ancestral spirits,\nthe Chinese have filled heaven and earth with innumerable demons or\nevil spirits. Even the souls of dead men, if they have been wronged on\nearth or if their wants since death have been undutifully neglected,\nmay become malignant, revengeful spirits. These demons are believed to\nbe the cause of all kinds of diseases, of blight and famine, and of\nevery misfortune befalling men.[122]\n\nThe thing about this Chinese demonism which is of interest to the\nstudent of morals is that, unlike the demonism of Babylonia (p. 46),\nor that of the Middle Ages in Europe, it contains a distinct ethical\nelement. There was little or nothing ethical in the Babylonian or the\nmedieval belief in the existence of evil spirits because the good\nman and the bad were indifferently the victims of their malignant\nactivity. But the Chinese have moralized their demonism and conceive\nthese spirits as under the control of Heaven and without power to\ndo harm without Heaven\u2019s commission or consent. They thus represent\nretributive justice and become the ministers of the Supreme Power to\npunish evildoers, like Nemesis and the Erinyes of the Greeks. It is\nthis ethical side of the Chinese belief in evil spirits which causes De\nGroot, in emphasizing the import of this demonism for Chinese morality,\nto say that \u201cit occupies the rank of moral educator of the people, and\nhas fulfilled a great mission to many thousands of millions who have\nlived and died on Asiatic soil. Demonism, the lowest form of religion,\nin China a source of ethics and moral education--this certainly may be\ncalled a singular phenomenon, perhaps the only one of its kind to be\nfound on this terrestrial globe.\u201d [123]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Taoism: nature the\nexemplar]\n\nNext to Confucianism and demonism, Taoism has been the most important\nmoral force in the life of the Chinese people. Taoism was originally a\nlofty philosophical ethical system out of which was developed later a\nreligion.[124] The philosophy, however, has always remained something\nquite distinct from the religious system.\n\nThe essence of Taoism is the pantheistic doctrine that the universe,\nor nature, is God. The ethical character of the universe is revealed\nin its way or method, which is _Tao_. Now the characteristics of\nnature as disclosed in its method of operation are constancy--\u201cheaven\nnever diverges from its course\u201d; unselfishness--\u201cthe earth nourishes\nall things\u201d; impartiality--\u201cthe earth brings forth its fruits for all\nalike\u201d; placidity--\u201cheaven is calm, serene, passionless\u201d; humility--the\nsun which \u201cafter shining sets,\u201d the moon which \u201cafter fullness, wanes,\u201d\nthe warmth of summer which \u201cwhen it has finished its work retires,\u201d\nwater which \u201cseeks the lowest place,\u201d all these are symbols of\n\u201cnature\u2019s humility.\u201d[125]\n\nWhat gives these interpretations of the ethical qualities of nature\ntheir importance for human morality is that man\u2019s highest duty is to\nimitate the universe, to behave as nature behaves.[126] \u201cTaoism is the\nexhibition of a way or method of living which men should cultivate as\nthe brightest and purest development of their nature.\u201d[127] \u201cThe true\nTaoist then is the man who unites in himself [the] virtues or qualities\nof the universe, including the constant virtues.\u201d[128] Man\u2019s way must\nbe nature\u2019s way (Tao). The perfect man must cultivate constancy,\nunselfishness, impartiality, benevolence, impassibility, serenity,\nhumility, and quietness, for these are the characteristics of the\nuniverse.[129]\n\nThis Taoist code is designed especially for rulers.[130] He who has\nassimilated all his virtues to the virtues of nature is qualified\nto administer government.[131] It is in the qualities of character\ncultivated by the highest-minded ministers and mandarins, and in the\nstate worship and official customs that we are to look for the main\nethical influence of the doctrines of Taoism.[132]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The conception of human\nnature as good]\n\n\u201cThe tendency of man\u2019s nature to good,\u201d says Mencius, \u201cis like the\ntendency of water to flow downwards.\u201d[133] Just as the theological\ndogma that man\u2019s nature is hereditarily corrupt, with a proneness to\nevil, has shaped and colored a large part of Christian ethics, so has\nthis opposing conception of human nature as good exercised a tremendous\ninfluence upon the ethical ideal of the Chinese race.[134] For if\nman\u2019s nature is good, then for him to live conformably to his nature\nis to live rationally, that is, morally. \u201cTo nourish one\u2019s nature,\u201d\ndeclared Mencius, \u201cis the way to secure heaven.\u201d[135]\n\nObjections to this view of human nature, based on the fact that men are\nactually very different in moral character, are met by saying that this\ndifference is the effect of environment, just as the inequalities in\nthe yield of barley seed are due not to a difference in the nature of\nthe grain but to the different qualities of the soil.[136] In a word,\nit is the social environment--instruction and example--which determines\nthe character of men. \u201cBy nature,\u201d says Confucius, \u201cmen are nearly\nalike; by practice they get to be far apart.\u201d[137]\n\nAs we shall see, it makes a vast difference in a man\u2019s conception as to\nwhat he ought to do,--as to how he should regulate his life,--whether\nhe believes his nature to be inclined to virtue and all his instincts,\nimpulses, and appetites to be good, or believes his nature to be\ncorrupt and all his instincts and appetencies to be evil.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Conception of the past\nas perfect]\n\nAnother conception that has had a molding influence upon the moral\nideal of China is the conception of the past as perfect without any\nhistoric lapse from this perfection. To understand the import of\nthis in the ethical history of China we must compare it with the\ntheological conception of the fall of man. This conception determined\nwhat should be the saving virtues of the historic ethical ideal of the\nWestern world, making them to be theological in character and having to\ndo with man\u2019s restoration from an hereditary fallen state.\n\nNow the Chinese, instead of believing in the lapse of man from a\nstate of original innocence, conceive the past as perfect. This\ninterpretation of history has had the effect of making reverence for\nthe past, for the customs, institutions, and teachings of the fathers,\na chief virtue of the moral ideal.[138] The far-reaching consequences\nfor Chinese life and history which the emphasis laid upon this virtue\nhas had will be the subject of remark a little further on.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Geographical and\nintellectual isolation]\n\nAgain, the moral development of the Chinese people has been profoundly\ninfluenced by the geographical isolation of China. From the earliest\ntimes down almost to the present day China was shut out from\nintercourse with the civilized and progressive nations of the West,\nand was surrounded by neighbors greatly her inferior in intellectual,\nsocial, and moral culture. The effect of this isolation upon the\nChinese was to foster in them an exaggerated self-esteem and a feeling\nof contempt for foreigners. In this respect the masses are still\nethically in that stage of development that the Greeks were in when\nthey looked contemptuously upon all non-Greeks as \u201cbarbarians.\u201d\n\nIn still another way has the physical and intellectual isolation of\nthe Chinese people reacted upon their ethical life. This isolation\nhas prevented progress beyond a certain stage, and where there is no\nprogress or very slow progress there is likely to grow up an undue\nattachment to ways and customs that are old. This is what has happened\nin China, and this has worked together with the worship of ancestors\nto create one of the main requirements of the ideal of character,\nnamely, reverence for the past.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The appearance of great\nmen: Confucius and Mencius]\n\nBesides the various agencies already passed under review, the teachings\nof two great moralists, Confucius and Mencius, have been a vital force\nin the shaping of the moral ideal of China. The greater of these sages\nwas Confucius (551\u2013478 B.C.) He was unimaginative and practical.\nHe was not an original thinker. His mission was not to found a new\nreligion or hold up a new ideal of character, but to give new force\nand effectiveness to the already existing moral code of his time and\npeople.[139] His teachings were especially effective in giving filial\npiety the fixed place it holds in the moral ideal of his countrymen.\n\nThe influence of Mencius (371\u2013288 B.C.), whose teachings are\ncharacterized by an emphatic denunciation of the wickedness of war, is\nto be traced particularly in the low place which is assigned in the\nChinese standard of character to the martial virtues, and the general\ndisesteem in which the military life is held.\n\n\nII. THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: The four cardinal\nvirtues]\n\nChiefly under the molding influence of the agencies noticed in the\npreceding sections, there was shaped in early times in China one of\nthe most remarkable moral ideals of history, an ideal which has been a\nguiding and controlling force in the moral life of probably more of the\nhuman race than any other of the ethical ideals of mankind.\n\nThe duties given the highest place in this standard of character are\nfilial obedience, reverence for superiors, a conforming to ancient\ncustom, and the maintenance of the just medium. The man who is\ncarefully observant of these duties is looked upon in China as a man\nof superior excellence. In the following pages we shall speak with some\ndetail of each of these requirements of the ethical ideal.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Filial obedience or\npiety]\n\nIn an analysis of the symbols used in the Chinese system of writing\nDr. Legge points out the significant fact that one of the oldest of\nthese characters, the one standing for filial piety, was originally the\npicture of a youth upholding on his shoulders an old man.[140] In this\nworn-down symbol is embodied the fundamental fact in the moral life\nof the Chinese people. It tells us that the first of family virtues,\nfilial piety, the virtue that formed the basis of the strength and\ngreatness of early Rome, constituted also the firm foundation upon\nwhich the enduring fabric of Chinese society was raised. The whole\nframework of the social structure is modeled on the family, and all\nrelations and duties are assimilated, in so far as possible, to those\nof the domestic circle.\n\nIn no other of the moral ideals of history do we find a more prominent\nplace given the duties of children toward their parents. It was\nancestor worship, doubtless, as we have already said, which gave these\nduties this foremost place in the moral code, and which through all\nthe millenniums of Chinese history has maintained for them the highest\nplace in the Chinese standard of moral excellence.[141] The Classic of\nFilial Piety declares: \u201cThe services of love and reverence to parents\nwhen alive, and those of grief and sorrow to them when dead--these\ncompletely discharge the fundamental duty of living men.\u201d[142] \u201cThe\nMaster said: \u2018There are three thousand offenses against which the five\npunishments are directed, and there is not one of them greater than\nbeing unfilial.\u2019\u201d[143]\n\nThe punishments which the Chinese laws enjoin for unfilial conduct\nbear witness to the high estimation in which the Chinese moralists and\nrulers hold the virtue of filial obedience and reverence. Thus a parent\nmay, with the consent of the maternal uncle, require a magistrate to\nwhip to death an unfilial son.[144] A parricide is beheaded, his body\ncut in pieces, his house torn down, his neighbors are punished, his\nchief teacher is put to death, and the magistrates of the district in\nwhich he lived are degraded or deposed.[145]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Reverence toward\nsuperiors]\n\nFilial piety is regarded by Chinese moralists as the root out of\nwhich grow all other virtues. Immediately out of this root springs\nthe duty of obedience and reverence toward all superiors. This is the\ncorner stone of the Chinese system of political ethics. \u201cIn the family\nlife,\u201d in the words of Jernigan, \u201cmay be seen the larger life of the\nempire.\u201d[146]\n\n\n[Sidenote: A conforming to ancient\ncustom]\n\nWe have here the third of the cardinal duties, the duty which in\npractice constitutes the heart and core of Chinese morality.[147]\nThe commandment is, Follow the ancients; walk in the trodden paths;\nlet to-day be like yesterday. This duty, as we have already noticed,\nsprings from the Chinese conception of the past as perfect. If that\npast be perfect, then of course it becomes the duty of living men\nto make the present like unto it, and in no case to depart from the\ncustoms and practices of the fathers.\n\nWe can easily make the Chinese view in this matter intelligible to\nourselves by recalling how we have been wont to regard the religious\npast of that Hebrew world of which we are the heirs. Sanctity in our\nminds has attached to it all, and we regard any departure from the\nteachings and commandments of that past to be a fault, even a species\nof wickedness deserving eternal punishment.\n\nNow in China this idea of sanctity, which among ourselves attaches\nonly to the religious side of life, has attached to all phases of\nlife, to government, to society, to art, to science, to trade and\ncommerce--to all of the ideas, ways, and customs of antiquity. As their\nfathers did, so must the children do. They must deem worthy what their\nfathers deemed worthy and love what their fathers loved.[148] He who\ndeparts from the beliefs and practices of the ancients is regarded as\nirreverent and immoral, just as he who with us departs from the beliefs\nand customs of the fathers in religion is looked upon as presumptuous\nand irreligious.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The maintenance of the\njust medium]\n\nThe virtue with which we here have to do is akin to the Greek virtue of\nmoderation. It consists in never going to extremes, in avoiding excess\nin everything, in being always well balanced, standing in the middle,\nand leaning not to either side; \u201cto go beyond is as wrong as to fall\nshort.\u201d[149] One of the sacred books of the Chinese, called _Chung\nYung_, which is ascribed to a grandson of Confucius, and in which is\nportrayed an ideally perfect character, The Princely Man, celebrates\nthis virtue of the just medium.[150] This portraiture of the perfect\nman, held up as a pattern for imitation to the successive generations\nof Chinese youth, has been a molding force in the moral life of the\nChinese race.[151]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The duty of\nintellectual self-culture]\n\nHaving now spoken of the four cardinal virtues of the Chinese standard\nof excellence, we shall next proceed to speak more briefly of several\nother virtues, which, though not given the most prominent place in\nthe ideal, are nevertheless assigned a high place among the virtues\nexemplified by the perfect man.\n\nFirst among these we note that of intellectual self-culture. Concerning\nthis virtue and duty the Chinese sages have thoughts like those of the\nGreek teachers. Confucius taught that true morality is practically\ndependent upon learning. \u201cIt is not easy,\u201d he says, \u201cto find a man who\nhas learned for three years without coming to be good.\u201d[152] Here we\nhave, as in the teachings of the Greek philosophers, knowledge made\nalmost identical with goodness. Intellectual culture and good morals\nrun together. Again the Master, speaking of the ancients, says: \u201cTheir\nknowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere; their thoughts\nbeing sincere, their hearts were then rectified.\u201d[153] \u201cHow would it\nbe possible,\u201d asks Lao-tsze, \u201cto go forward in one\u2019s knowledge and go\nbackward in one\u2019s morals?\u201d[154]\n\nThis commendation of learning by the sages, as we shall see further on,\ngave a great impulse to the educational system of China.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The duties of rulers]\n\nThe teachings of Chinese moralists are especially marked by the\nemphasis laid upon the duties of rulers. In the times of Confucius\nthere was lack of union between the different provinces, and China was\nin a state bordering on political anarchy. A chief aim of the teachings\nof the Master was to correct this condition of things by laying stress\nupon the duties of those in authority. Never have the duties of rulers\nbeen more insistently inculcated.\n\nIn the first place Confucius set a high aim for the state, an aim\naltogether like that set by Plato for the ideal Greek city. He makes\nthe end of government to be virtue and not wealth. Its aim should be\nto promote goodness and not merely material prosperity: \u201cIn a state,\npecuniary gain is not to be considered to be prosperity, but prosperity\nwill be found in righteousness.\u201d[155]\n\nThe indispensable qualification in the ruler is goodness. \u201cThe love\nof what is good,\u201d declares Mencius, \u201cis more than a sufficient\nqualification for the government of the empire.\u201d[156] The ruler should\nbe a father to his people, kind and benevolent, should instruct them,\nshould follow the laws of the ancient kings, should be a model for his\nsubjects, should leave a good example to future ages.\n\nMuch is said by the Master respecting the influence of the example\nset by the ruler: \u201cWhen the ruler as a father, a son, a brother, is\na model, then the people imitate him.\u201d[157] The relation between\nsuperior and inferior is like that between the wind and the grass:\n\u201cThe grass must bend when the wind blows across it.\u201d[158] \u201cNever has\nthere been a case of the sovereign loving benevolence and the people\nnot loving righteousness.\u201d[159] \u201cIf good men were to govern a country\nin succession for a hundred years, they would be able to transform the\nviolently bad and dispense with capital punishment.\u201d[160]\n\nBut there has never been such a succession of good rulers in China.\nRespecting the influences and circumstances which have brought about\na great discrepancy between the ideal and practice we shall have\nsomething to say in the last division of this chapter.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Disesteem of the heroic\nor martial virtues]\n\nThe Chinese ideal of goodness and nobility allows no place among its\nvirtues to the qualities of the warrior, which have in general been\ngiven such a prominent place in the moral ideals of almost all other\npeoples throughout all periods of history. Soldiers hold a very low\nplace in the social scale; they are looked upon as a \u201cpariah class,\u201d\nand their life is regarded as degrading. The Emperor of China, \u201calone\namong the great secular rulers of the world, never wears a sword.\u201d[161]\n\nThis spirit of opposition to militarism is embodied in the teachings\nof the great moralist Mencius. \u201cThe warlike Western world has scarcely\nknown a more vigorous and sweeping protest against warfare and\neverything connected with it and every principle upon which it is\nbased.\u201d[162] To gain territory by the slaughter of men Mencius declared\nto be contrary to the principles of benevolence and righteousness.[163]\nHe speaks as follows of the military profession: \u201cThere are men who\nsay, I am skillful at marshaling troops. I am skillful in conducting\na battle. They are great criminals.\u201d[164] In _Spring and Autumn_,\na chronicle of early Chinese history, he declares, \u201cThere are no\nrighteous wars,\u201d though he admits that one might be better than\nanother.[165]\n\nConfucius also, though he did not lay the stress upon the inherent\nwickedness of war that was placed upon it by Mencius, maintained that\nthe same rules of morality apply in the relations of nations as in\nthose of individuals, and taught that differences between nations\nshould be settled by arbitration and by considerations of equity and\njustice, not by brute force.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Principles and inner\ndisposition]\n\nIt is often affirmed that the teachings of Chinese moralists are\ndefective in that they consist in moral precepts rather than in moral\nprinciples, that they lay stress upon the observance of minute rules\nof conduct rather than upon the inner disposition. There is, however,\nin the body of ethical teachings of the sages no lack of insistence\nupon principles of conduct and upon states and dispositions of mind and\nheart. All must be right within the heart, says Confucius, for \u201cwhat\ntruly is within will be manifested without.\u201d[166] \u201cLet the prince be\nbenevolent,\u201d says Mencius, \u201cand all his acts will be benevolent; let\nthe prince be righteous and all his acts will be righteous.\u201d[167] Have\nno depraved thoughts, sums up the contents of the three hundred pieces\nin the Book of Poetry. \u201cIn the ceremony of mourning,\u201d says Confucius\nagain, \u201cit is better that there be deep sorrow than a minute attention\nto observances.\u201d[168]\n\nAnd it is the same teaching as to what constitutes true morality\nwhich we find in such sayings as these: \u201cThe doctrine of our Master\nis to be true to the principles of our nature.\u201d[169] \u201cMan is born for\nuprightness,\u201d[170] and he should love virtue as he loves beauty,[171]\nfor its own sake.\n\nIn reciprocity Confucius found that same comprehensive rule of conduct\nwhich is rightly regarded as one of the noblest principles of Christian\nmorality. Being asked if there was one word which may serve as a rule\nof practice for all one\u2019s life, the Master said: \u201cIs not reciprocity\nsuch a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to\nothers.\u201d[172]\n\nAnd surely nothing could be farther from mere preceptorial teaching\nthan these words of Mencius: \u201cLet a man not do what his own sense of\nrighteousness tells him not to do;... To act thus is all he has to\ndo.\u201d[173] And in the following utterances the sages of China speak with\nan accent strangely like that of the Great Prophet of Israel: \u201cThe\ngreat man is he who does not lose his child heart.\u201d[174] Again, \u201cI like\nlife; I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I\nwill let life go and choose righteousness.\u201d[175] Still again: \u201cWith\ncoarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a\npillow--I have still joy in the midst of these things.\u201d[176]\n\nIn the following Mencius shows that he understood the moral use of\ndark things: \u201cWhen Heaven is about to confer a great office on any\nman, it first exercises his mind with suffering and his sinews and\nbones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger and subjects him\nto extreme poverty. It confounds his undertakings. By all these\nmethods it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies\nhis incompetencies.\u201d[177] And again: \u201cLife springs from sorrow and\ncalamity, and death from ease and pleasure.\u201d[178] \u201cMen who are\npossessed of intelligent virtue and prudence in affairs will generally\nbe found to have been in sickness and trouble.\u201d[179]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Defects of the ideal:\nno duties to God, and the duties\nof parents to children not\nemphasized]\n\nRegarded from our point of view the Confucian ideal of moral character\nhas serious limitations and defects. First, it omits practically all\nduties to God. In the words of Dr. Legge, \u201cman\u2019s duty to God is left to\ntake care of itself.\u201d God or Heaven was a subject of which Confucius\nseldom spoke, and the Chinese have in this matter followed the example\nof the Master. Heaven is not in all their thoughts.\n\nIf we recall what an influence the conception of a supreme being as\nCreator and Father has exerted upon the morality of all the races that\nhave accepted as their creed the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew\nteachers, we shall realize how fundamentally the Chinese ideal of\nexcellence has been modified by the omission of all those duties which\nhave entered into our own moral code as duties owed to God.[180]\n\nSecond, while laying such stress upon the duties of children to their\nparents, Confucianism is almost silent regarding the duty of parents\nto their children. At this point there is a wide divergence between\nthe Christian and the Chinese conception of duty. Commenting upon\nthis matter, Dr. Legge says: \u201cI never quoted in a circle of Chinese\nfriends the words of Paul in Corinthians--\u2018The children ought not to\nlay up for the parents, but the parents for the children\u2019--without\ntheir encountering a storm of opposition. When I tried to show that the\nsentiment was favorable to the progress of society, and would enable\neach generation to start from a higher standpoint, I found it difficult\nto obtain a hearing.\u201d[181]\n\nThe effects of the family ethics of Confucianism upon the moral\npractice of the Chinese in the domestic sphere will be noted in the\nfollowing division of this chapter.\n\n\nIII. EFFECTS OF THE IDEAL UPON CHINESE LIFE AND HISTORY\n\n\n[Sidenote: Degree of accordance\nbetween theory and practice;\nmandarin morality]\n\nNo people have ever lived up to their ideal of moral excellence. The\nChinese like others have obviously fallen far short of embodying in\nactual practice the high standard of their sages. But it is certainly\na gross misjudgment of Chinese morality to say, as some writers on\nthings Chinese have said, that the ideal and the standard maintained\nare wholly disconnected.[182] This depreciatory opinion, however,\nadmits of little dispute if its application be confined to the mandarin\nclass. In public or official morality there is a deplorable divergence\nbetween theory and practice. Probably the Chinese official class, in\nspite of the stress which is laid by moralists upon the duties of\nmagistrates and rulers, is the most corrupt in the world. Peculation\nin office is universal. Bribery is as rife as it was in Rome under the\nlater Republic. Justice is almost universally bought and sold. This\nvery general lack of integrity in office is attributable in part at\nleast to the inadequate salaries. This inevitably calls into existence\na system of fees and presents, which as inevitably grows into a system\nof extortion, oppression, and corruption. But, as a well-informed\nwriter affirms, \u201cWhatever laxity Chinese morality may permit in\nofficial relations, from the workingman, the tradesman, and the servant\nit exacts most scrupulous honesty.\u201d[183] The average man in China, it\nmay be confidently affirmed, is as moral--defining morality as loyalty\nto an ideal--as the average man in any other country of the world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Favorable effects of\nthe ideal]\n\nBut this general loyalty to the ideal, since this has serious defects,\nhas brought it about that the ideal has been an efficient force for\nevil as well as for good. In some respects it has promoted a true\nmorality, while in others it has marred and cramped the moral life of\nthe Chinese people.\n\nProminent among the favorable effects of the ideal is its exaltation\nof the family life. Through the emphasis laid upon special domestic\nvirtues, particularly that of filial piety, the ideal has given the\nfamily such a place in the fabric of Chinese society as has probably\nbeen given it in no other society ancient or modern, except in that\nof early Rome. As the family is the connecting link between the\ngenerations, and consequently as a true family life must characterize\nevery society that shall live long on the earth, we may without\nreserve accept that interpretation of Chinese history which finds in\nthe exaltation of filial virtue by the sages of China one secret of\nthat longevity of the Chinese nation which makes it the sole survivor\namong the nations from the ancient world of culture.\n\nLike the maxim of filial piety, the Confucian teaching which makes\nvirtue and not material prosperity the aim and end of government has\nbeen a conservative force in Chinese life and society. \u201cIt would be\nhard to overestimate,\u201d says Dr. Martin, \u201cthe influence which has been\nexerted by this little schedule of political ethics [the Great Study],\noccupying, as it has, so prominent a place in the Chinese mind for\nfour and twenty centuries, teaching the people to regard the Empire as\na vast family, and the Emperor to rule by moral influence, making the\ngoal of his ambition not the wealth but the virtue of his subjects.\nIt is certain that the doctrines which it embodies have been largely\nefficient in rendering China what she is, the most ancient and the most\npopulous of existing nations.\u201d[184]\n\nIn still another way has the moral ideal reacted favorably upon\nChinese civilization. We have noted the high place in the standard of\nexcellence assigned by the Chinese sages to the duty of intellectual\nself-culture. It is scarcely to be doubted that this emphasis laid upon\nlearning as an important factor in the formation of moral character has\ngreatly fostered learning and has been a chief agency in the creation\nof the Chinese educational system with its competitive literary\nexaminations, which from the earliest times down almost to the present\nday formed the sole gateway to public office.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Unfavorable effects of\nthe ideal]\n\nBut Confucius, while inculcating the duty of seeking wisdom, taught his\npeople to look for it in the past. He enjoined them to seek the moral\nideal in the life and deeds of the ancients.\n\nNever in the moral history of the world has the inculcation of a\nspecific duty had a profounder influence upon the destinies of a\npeople than this requirement of conformity to the ways of the fathers\nhas had upon the destinies of the Chinese race. It has been one of\nthe chief causes of the unchanging, stereotyped character of Chinese\ncivilization. In obedience to the requirements of this ideal of\ngoodness the Chinese for two millenniums and more have made to-day like\nyesterday. Hence the cycling, goalless movement of Chinese history.\n\nJust as the undue emphasis laid by the Chinese moralists upon the duty\nof conforming to the ways of the ancients has reacted in some respects\nunfavorably upon Chinese life, so has the exaggerated stress laid by\nthem upon the doctrine of the just medium exerted a similar unfavorable\ninfluence. This has tended to produce a dull uniformity in Chinese life\nand thought. The lack of lofty ideal aims has caused Chinese history to\nbe singularly barren in chivalric and heroic elements. The everlasting\nround of routine makes life a treadmill. It is \u201cthe prose of existence.\u201d\n\nAgain, the Confucian system tends to produce a formal morality. While\nit is not true, as we have seen, that Confucianism neglects to deal\nwith general principles, right feelings, and motives of action, still\nit is true that instead of relying upon these there is an immense\nmultitude of precepts and minute rules covering the smallest details\nof conduct. There are three thousand rules of deportment. This has\nresulted, and naturally, in the substitution of the letter for the\nspirit. Even the Master has come to serve as a pattern rather in the\nouter form of his life than in its informing spirit.[185]\n\nNever was there a better illustration of how the letter killeth;\nfor a reliance on exact rules and instructions as to conduct in\nall conceivable relations and situations has made much of Chinese\nmorality a formal and lifeless thing. The Chinese are governed by a\nsense of propriety rather than by a sense of duty. Their morality is\nlargely etiquette.[186] It has justly been likened to the morality of\nthe ancient Romans in that it makes manners and morals to be almost\ninterchangeable terms. Especially have the hundreds of rules prescribed\nfor the expression of reverence for superiors tended to empty this\npart of Chinese morality of reality and sincerity, and to make Chinese\nofficial ceremonialism one of the most curious phases of Chinese life.\n\nIt would seem, further, that the very great emphasis laid by the\nChinese moralists upon the duties of children toward their parents has\nprevented the normal development among the Chinese of that ethical\nsentiment which among ourselves assigns the duties of parents to infant\nchildren an important place in the code of domestic morality. This lack\namong the Chinese of any deep feeling of parental obligation results in\na widespread practice condemned by the conscience of Christian nations.\nThe exposure or destruction of infants prevails in almost every\nprovince of the Republic. It is the girl babies that are the victims of\nthis practice.[187] They are often drowned or buried alive.\n\nIn this practice the subsistence motive of course is active. It is in\ngeneral the extreme poverty of the people which causes them thus to\ndestroy their offspring. But what renders this practice significant\nfor the student of morality is the fact that these things are done with\nlittle or no scruple of conscience,[188] showing that acts respecting\nwhich the conscience of Christian nations has become very sensitive\nhave not yet among the Chinese been brought generally within the circle\ncovered by the moral feelings.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Impending changes in\nthe moral ideal]\n\nWe have seen how the moral ideal of a people is modified by all the\nchanging circumstances of their life and history. The moral ideal\nof the Chinese has undergone little modification for upward of two\nmillenniums, such, for instance, as the ideal of the European peoples\nhas undergone in a like period, because throughout this long term\nthe influences acting upon the national life have been practically\nunchanged. There have been in Chinese history no such interminglings of\nraces, revivals in learning, religious reformations, and political and\nindustrial revolutions as mark the history of the Western nations, and\nresponding to which the moral evolution of these peoples has gone on\napace.\n\nBut now that the long-continued isolation of China has been broken,\nand she is being subjected to all the potent influences of the\ncivilization of the West, it is certain that her social and mental life\nwill be remolded and cast in new forms. Sooner or later constitutional\ngovernment must supersede, has already superseded, the patriarchal\ngovernment of the past; the whole social fabric must necessarily be\nreconstructed and the individual instead of the family or clan be made\nthe social and ethical unit;[189] the science of the Western nations\nwill displace, is already displacing, the obsolete learning of the\nFour Classics; Christianity will quicken the atrophied religious\nconsciousness of the race; and in place of the isolation of the\npast there will be established those international relations and\nintellectual exchanges which perhaps more than all other agencies\ncombined have been the motive force of European civilization and\nprogress.\n\nThis new environment, these new influences molding afresh Chinese\nsocial, intellectual, and religious life and institutions, cannot fail\nto react powerfully upon the moral ideal of the nation. It too must\ninevitably undergo a great change. There will be a shifting in the\nstandard of character of the different virtues, for the moral ideal\nof a simple patriarchal community cannot serve as the model for a\ncomplex modern society, and doubtless some of those virtues--as, for\ninstance, reverence for the past--which now hold the highest rank in\nthe code will exchange places with others at present held in little\nesteem. Changes in the feelings and beliefs of the people in regard to\nancestor worship, which changes are inevitable, will effect important\nmodifications in family ethics. The substitution of Western science for\nthe lore of the classics will introduce evolutionary ethics and the\nphilosophical virtues of the Western world; while the substitution of\npopular government for the patriarchal autocracy will necessarily bring\nin the ethics of democracy.\n\nThese certain changes in the form and content of the ancestral ideal of\ngoodness will not only assimilate it to the ethical standard of the\nWestern world, but, correcting some of its obvious shortcomings, will\nrender it a still more effective force in the guidance and control of\nthe moral life of a great and ancient people, whose day apparently is\nstill in the future.[190]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nJAPANESE MORALS: AN IDEAL OF LOYALTY\n\n\nI. FORMATIVE AND MODIFYING INFLUENCES\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introductory: a\npractically independent evolution\nin morals]\n\nIn their moral evolution the Japanese people have developed a system\nof morals which, notwithstanding certain defects and limitations, is\none of the noblest created by any of the great races. A study of this\nsystem is especially interesting and instructive for the reason that it\nshows how a very admirable moral ideal may be created by a people in\ncomparative isolation and under influences wholly different from those\nwhich have shaped and molded our own ideal of moral goodness. This\ncompels a recognition of the fact that the historian of morals can no\nlonger overlook or ignore the moral phenomena of the Far East.\n\nA second reason that a study of the Japanese code of morals is\nimportant and interesting is because this ideal of worthiness and duty\nhas been indubitably a main factor in lifting the Japanese nation to\nthe high place it holds to-day among the great nations of the earth.\n\nIn our examination of this system of morality we must first note the\nnature of the agencies which lent to the moral ideal its characteristic\ncast. Among the various forces molding and modifying the ethical type\nwe shall find the most important to have been the family and clan\nsystem, ancestor worship, the monarchy of supposed divine origin,\nfeudalism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Western civilization.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The family and clan\nsystem]\n\nAs in China, so in Old Japan the family rather than the individual\nwas the social unit. Through the expansion of the family arose the\nclan, which in the sentiments and feelings which governed its members\nwas simply a large patriarchal household. This organization of early\nJapanese society, with the family and its outgrowth, the clan, forming\nthe basis of the fabric, was, as we shall learn, a potent force in the\ncreation of the moral type of the nation. The relationships of the\nkinship group determined the duties and virtues of its members and\nconstituted the chief sphere of their moral activity. Here was the\nnursery of Japanese morality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Shinto, or ancestor\nworship]\n\nThe influence of religion has mingled with that of the family\nsentiment. Throughout all the past the vital religious element in the\nlife of the Japanese peoples has been the Shinto cult, and this is now\nthe established religion of the state. The system in its essence is\nancestor and hero worship, the spirits of the dead being revered as\nguardian divinities. This cult has created moral feelings and family\nduties like those called into existence by the same cult in China.\nOut of these rudimentary family virtues, as from a central root, have\nsprung many of those virtues of wider relationships which have helped\nto give to the Japanese type of moral excellence its essential features.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The monarchy of divine\norigin]\n\nThe central teaching of Shinto is that the Emperor is of divine descent\nand that his person is sacred and inviolate.[191] This doctrine of the\ndivine nature of the monarchy[192] has exerted a profound influence\nupon the moral ideal of Japan and has had consequences of great moment.\nIt has made unquestioning obedience and absolute loyalty to the Emperor\nthe religious duties and pre\u00ebminent virtues of the subject.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Feudalism]\n\nIn times preceding the twelfth century there grew up in Japan a feudal\nsystem which in many respects was remarkably like the feudal system of\nmedieval Europe. The unit of the system was the clan, the members of\nwhich, forming a close brotherhood, were bound to their lord by ties of\naffection and fidelity like those which in Europe theoretically bound\nthe retainer to his lord.[193] This system exerted a great influence\nupon the moral type. It developed a martial ideal of character known\nas Bushido, many of the virtues of which are almost identical with\ncorresponding virtues in the European ideal of chivalry. Probably this\nsystem has had more to do with creating in Japan a moral consciousness\nin many respects like our own than has any other single agency. To the\nlack in the Chinese social system of any institution like Japanese\nfeudalism may be ascribed in part at least the wide difference which\nexists between the moral ideals of the two peoples, especially in\nregard to the rank assigned the military virtues.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Confucianism]\n\nAlong with the Chinese classics Confucianism was introduced into Japan\nabout the middle of the sixth century of our era, and being in perfect\naccord with the native system of Shinto and with the Japanese ways of\nthinking, this cult of ancestors tended to re\u00ebnforce native ethical\ntendencies and thus contributed essentially to make the virtues of\nfilial obedience and reverence for superiors prominent in the growing\ntype of character.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Buddhism]\n\nBuddhism was introduced into Japan in the sixth century of our era. Its\nincoming had deep import for the moral life of the Japanese people.\nIt inculcated the gentler virtues, exerting here in this respect, as\nelsewhere in the Far East,--save in China, where it too quickly became\nshockingly degenerate,--an influence like that exerted by Christianity\nin the Western world. It helped to make gentleness, courtesy, and\ntenderness distinctive traits of the Japanese character. Through the\nregard which it instilled for dumb animals it placed the whole lower\nworld of animal life under the protection of the moral sentiment.[194]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Western civilization]\n\nA little more than a generation ago the civilization of Japan came into\nvital contact with the civilization of the West. Almost every element\nof the old Japanese culture has felt the modifying effect of this\ncontact. The political, the economic, the social, the domestic, and the\nreligious institutions have undergone or are undergoing great changes.\nThese changes in these departments of life and thought have caused, as\nsuch changes always do, important modifications in ethical sentiments\nand convictions. Of all the influences which for more than two thousand\nyears have been at work shaping and molding the moral ideal of the\nJapanese nation, those now entering from the Occidental world will\ndoubtless leave the deepest impress upon the ethical type.\n\nIn a still more direct way is this contact of Japan with Western\ncivilization resulting in important consequences for Japanese morality.\nChristian ethics, like Buddhist ethics, is making a strong appeal to\ncertain classes of Japanese society. The result is what in an earlier\nchapter was designated as a \u201cmingling of moralities\u201d and the creation\nof a new composite conscience.\n\n\nII. THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: Bushido]\n\nThe heart of Japanese morality is to be sought in Bushido,[195] the\nethics of the samurai. We shall best understand this moral code by\nthinking of it as the Japanese ideal of chivalry or, perhaps better,\nas a blending of the Western chivalric, Spartan, and Stoic ideals of\ngoodness and nobility, since in the list of virtues making up the\nBushido ideal we find several of the cardinal virtues entering into\neach of these three distinct types of character.\n\nAs we have already intimated, Bushido is an ideal of excellence\nwhich grew up out of the root of Japanese feudalism, just as the\nWestern ideal of chivalry developed out of European feudalism. It was\nessentially an ideal of knighthood, the prime virtue of which was\npersonal loyalty to one\u2019s superior. Fealty to one\u2019s chief was made\nso dominant a virtue that it overshadowed all other virtues. In the\ndefense or in the service of his lord a samurai might commit, without\noffense to his sense of moral right, practically any crime, such as\nblackmailing, lying, treachery, or even murder.\n\nGrouped about this cardinal virtue of loyalty were the other knightly\nvirtues of courage, fidelity to the plighted word, liberality,\nself-sacrifice, gratitude, courtesy, and benevolence. Liberality, or\nfree-handedness, was carried to such an extreme as to become a defect\nof character. The true samurai must have no thought of economy and\nmoney-making. \u201cIgnorance of the value of different coins was a token of\ngood breeding.\u201d[196] To handle money was thought degrading.\n\nIn one respect the code of honor of the Japanese knight was wholly\nunlike that of the Western knight. It did not include any special duty\nto woman. \u201cNeither God nor the ladies inspired any enthusiasm in the\nsamurai\u2019s breast.\u201d\n\nThe Spartan element in the samurai code appears particularly in the\ntraining of the youth. The boy was taught always to act from motives\nof duty. He was denied every comfort. His clothing and his diet were\ncoarse. He was allowed no fire in the winter. \u201cIf his feet were numbed\nby frost, he would be told to run about in the snow to make them\nwarm.\u201d To accustom him to the sight of blood, he was taken to see the\nexecution of criminals; and to banish foolish fear from his mind, he\nwas forced to visit alone at night the place of execution.[197]\n\nThe Stoic element in the ideal appears in the high place assigned to\nthe virtue of self-control. The samurai, like the Stoic, must suppress\nall signs of his emotions. Like the Stoic, too, he must have courage\nto live or courage to die, as enjoined by duty. And his code of honor\ntaught him what true courage is: \u201cIt is true courage to live when it is\nright to live, and to die only when it is right to die.\u201d[198]\n\nThis samurai ideal of character constitutes, as we shall see, a molding\nforce in the moral life of Japan. Bushido, it is true, died with the\npassing of feudalism,[199] but the spirit of Bushido lived on. The\nsamurai\u2019s sense of honor and of duty became the inheritance of the\nJapanese people. This great bequest of honor and valor and of all\nsamurai virtues is, in the words of the author of the _Soul of Japan_,\nbut \u201ca trust to the nation, and the summons of the present is to guard\nthis heritage, nor to bate one jot of the ancient spirit; the summons\nof the future will be so to widen its scope as to apply it in all walks\nand relations of life.\u201d[200]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The virtue of loyalty\nto the Emperor, or patriotism]\n\nThe belief in the divine origin of the imperial house of Japan makes\nloyalty to the Emperor the supreme duty.[201] During the ascendancy\nof feudalism this duty, in so far as the samurai class was concerned,\nwas, it is true, overshadowed by the duty of loyalty to one\u2019s immediate\nfeudal superior. The sentiment due the Emperor was intercepted by the\ndaimyos. But in theory loyalty to the imperial house has ever been\nthe paramount virtue of the Japanese. The Emperor\u2019s command is to his\nsubjects as the command of God to us, and obedience must be perfect and\nunquestioning. So dominant is the place assigned this virtue of loyalty\nto the head of the nation that the Japanese moralist seems almost to\nmake morality consist in this single virtue, as if \u201cto fear the Emperor\nand to keep his commandments\u201d were the full duty of man.[202]\n\nThis sentiment of the people toward the imperial family renders the\ngovernment a sort of theocracy. Hence patriotism with the Japanese\nis in large measure a religious feeling. Indeed, patriotism has been\ncalled the religion of the Japanese. It is this virtue, exalted to a\ndegree which the world has never seen surpassed, which has contributed\nmore than any other quality of the Japanese character to make Japan a\ngreat nation and to give her the victory over a powerful foe in one of\nthe most gigantic wars of modern times.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Family ethics]\n\nIf the first duty of the Japanese is to his Emperor, his second is to\nhis parents. In Japanese phrase, the two virtues of loyalty and filial\npiety are \u201cthe two wheels of the chariot of Japanese ethics.\u201d[203]\nShinto and Confucianism, as we have seen, have both contributed to\nthe fostering in children of the moral sentiments of grateful love,\nreverence, and obedience toward parents and all ancestors living and\ndead. The Japanese regard the high place assigned to these filial\nduties in the standard of character as a mark of the vast superiority\nof their morality to ours.[204] The sentiments of filial affection and\nreverence, coloring as they do the whole moral life, lend to Japanese\nsociety an ethical cast which places it in many respects in strong\ncontrast to the social order of the Western nations, and makes it\ndifficult for the Japanese to understand us and for us to understand\nthem.[205]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Woman as wife and as\nmother]\n\nAs respects the position of woman the family ethics of Japan are\nthe family ethics of the East. In a work from every page of which\nbreathes the spirit of the Orient, a Japanese writer, dwelling\nupon the difference between the ethical sentiments respecting\nfamily relationships which have been evoked by the different social\nenvironments of the East and the West, says: \u201cIn the East woman has\nalways been worshiped as the mother, and all those honors which the\nChristian knight brought in homage to his ladylove, the samurai laid at\nhis mother\u2019s feet.\u201d[206]\n\nLafcadio Hearn, touching upon this same feature of the family ethics\nof the Japanese, declares that the Bible text, \u201cFor this cause shall a\nman leave his father and mother and shall cleave unto his wife,\u201d is, to\ntheir way of thinking and feeling, \u201cone of the most immoral sentences\never written.\u201d[207]\n\nIn another important respect does the domestic morality of the Japanese\ndiffer essentially from that of the Christian West. The family is not\nstrictly monogamous, as with us. The moral sense of the Japanese\ndiscerns nothing wrong in polygamy or concubinage.[208] As respects the\nwhole relation of marriage, the Japanese appear to be in about the same\nstage of evolution as had been reached by the Hebrews at the time of\nAbraham.\n\nA chief virtue of the Japanese women in all their relations is\nobedience to the one--whether father, or husband, or son--to whom\nobedience is due. It is the setting of this duty before all other\nduties that causes the Japanese women sometimes to do what appears\nto us immoral, but which seems to them truest piety and noblest\nself-sacrifice.[209] In loyalty to duty, as they interpret duty, they\nmaintain a standard rarely surpassed by the women of any land.[210]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Suicide regarded as a\nvirtuous act]\n\nSuicide is infrequent among savage and barbarian races, but is common\namong all peoples in an advanced stage of civilization. It is not so\nmuch the fact itself of self-destruction that claims the attention of\nthe historian of morals, as the light in which the act is viewed; that\nis, whether it is considered a virtuous or a reprehensible deed.\n\nNow the Japanese regard suicide, if prompted by a good motive, as a\njustifiable and noble act. The motives with them for the deed are\nvarious, as in the case of other peoples, but among these motives is\none which discloses the existence among the Japanese of a sentiment\nunknown or almost unknown among ourselves. The deed is often committed\nin the way of making a solemn protest against something disapproved of\nin the conduct or acts of others. Thus when the Japanese government\nafter war with China in 1898 acceded to the demands of Russia, France,\nand Germany respecting the recession to China of certain territories\non the Continent, forty men in the Japanese army, by way of protest,\ncommitted suicide \u201cin the ancient way.\u201d[211]\n\nTyrannicide is also looked upon by the Japanese as an heroic and\npraiseworthy deed, provided the person committing the act makes clear\nthe self-sacrificing and patriotic character of his motives by at once\ntaking his own life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Low estimation of the\nvirtue of truthfulness]\n\nA marked defect of the moral standard of the Japanese is the low place\nassigned to the virtue of truthfulness. Among the Japanese, to call a\nperson a liar is not to apply to him a term of reproach, but rather to\npay him a pleasant compliment as a person of tact and shrewdness.\n\nThis lack of reverence for truth probably springs in part from the\nvirtue of politeness as a root. The extreme emphasis laid upon courtesy\nas the sign and expression of reverence and loyalty toward superiors\nfosters the general habit of saying things which are pleasant and\nagreeable whether they are true or not. This complacent disregard of\ntruth in social intercourse would seem to have dulled the sense of\nobligation of truth-speaking in other relations.\n\n\nIII. SOME SIGNIFICANT FACTS IN THE MORAL HISTORY OF JAPAN\n\n\n[Sidenote: General influence of\nthe ideal of Bushido]\n\nThe Japanese knightly ideal, which, as we have said, constitutes the\nheart and core of theoretical Japanese morality, has a history somewhat\nlike that of the ideal of European knighthood. It was a lofty ideal\nvery imperfectly realized, yet realized to such a degree as to make\nit a chief motive force in the political and social life of Japan for\nseveral centuries.[212] It left a permanent impress upon the moral\nconsciousness of the Japanese nation, an impress certainly deeper and\nmore enduring than that left by the ideal of European chivalry upon\nthe moral consciousness of the peoples of Western Europe. New Japan is\ndirectly or indirectly the creation of Japanese knighthood.\n\nWe have seen that loyalty to his chief was the pre\u00ebminent virtue of the\nsamurai. Upon the downfall of feudalism this loyalty was transferred\nto the Emperor. The spirit of the samurai came to inspire the Japanese\nnation. Since the time when the loyalty of Scottish clansmen to their\nchief was transferred to Scottish royalty, there has not been seen a\nmore remarkable example of the absolute devotion of a people to their\nsovereign than that exhibited to-day by the people of Japan.\n\nThe samurai were taught to despise the love of gain, and thus these\nknights of Japan were strangers to those vices which spring from the\nlove of money. To this circumstance may be ascribed the fact that the\nstatesmen of Japan, who almost invariably are of the samurai class,\nhave been so notably free from venality and corruption.[213]\n\nFinally, Bushido held aloft a high standard of truthfulness. The true\nsamurai regarded an oath as a derogation of his honor. It cannot be\naffirmed that this Bushido virtue of veracity has yet become the\ninheritance of the mercantile and peasant classes of Japan, but it has\nat least been retained by the samurai as a class, and is working to-day\nlike leaven in the mass of Japanese society.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Bushido code in\naction]\n\nThere are two remarkable passages in recent Japanese history which\nwell illustrate in what way and to what degree the spirit of the\nsamurai, \u201cthe spirit of not living unto one\u2019s self,\u201d has become an\ninspiration to the whole Japanese nation. The first passage has to do\nwith the Russo-Japanese War of 1904\u20131905, which on the part of Japan\nwas a struggle for national existence. It was the samurai morality, a\nmorality of loyalty, of valor, of selflessness, of fidelity to duty,\nthat formed a chief element of the strength of Japan in that critical\njuncture of the nation\u2019s life. The Bushido code of honor showed itself\nequal to the Spartan code in creating a race of invincible warriors.\nSince the Spartan Leonidas and his companions died for Greece in the\npass of Thermopyl\u00e6 there has been no sublimer exhibition of fortitude\nand self-devotion in a great cause than that shown by Japanese soldiers\nin the trenches before Port Arthur and on the battlefields of Manchuria.\n\nThis war for national independence also afforded proof of how the\ngentle virtue of Japanese knighthood, courteous generosity to the\nvanquished, has passed as a noble legacy to the nation at large; for\nas an eminent Japanese statesman affirms, \u201cIn the tender care bestowed\nupon our stricken adversary of the battlefield will be found the\nancient courtesy of the samurai.\u201d[214]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moral standard of\nthe samurai in competition with\nthat of the plebeian trader]\n\nThe second passage shows the morality of the samurai in competition\nwith the morality of the common Japanese shopman. Now the morality\nof the plebeian Japanese trader is about on a level with that of the\nancient Greek shopkeeper.[215] And a chief cause of his low moral\nstandard is the same, namely, the general disesteem in which the\ntrader\u2019s business has been held. This social stigma has resulted in\nthe mercantile business being left in the hands of the lowest class\nsocially, intellectually, and morally.[216] The great mass of the\npeople have from time immemorial been engaged in the honorable business\nof agriculture; while the samurai class, as we have seen, regarded\nit as degrading to engage in trade or even to handle money. In these\ncircumstances it was inevitable that the mercantile class should evolve\na very low code of business ethics; for, as the author of _Bushido_\nvery justly observes, \u201cput a stigma on a calling and its followers\nadjust their morals to it.\u201d\n\nThe strictly class character of this loose commercial morality is shown\nby the experience of the samurai after the abolition of feudalism in\n1868. Upon that event many of them engaged in mercantile business,\ncarrying with them their high moral standard, with results pathetically\ndepicted by Nitob\u00e9 in these words: \u201cThose who had eyes to see could\nnot weep enough, those who had hearts to feel could not sympathize\nenough, with the fate of many a noble and honest samurai who signally\nand irrevocably failed in his new and unfamiliar field of trade and\nindustry, through sheer lack of shrewdness in coping with his artful\nplebeian rival.... It will be long before it will be recognized how\nmany fortunes were wrecked in the attempt to apply Bushido ethics to\nbusiness methods, but it was soon apparent to every observing mind that\nthe ways of wealth were not the ways of honor.\u201d[217] About ninety-nine\nout of every hundred samurai who ventured into business are said to\nhave failed.\n\nThis passage out of the history of New Japan carries with it various\nlessons, but particularly does it teach how unjust it is to judge the\nmorality of a people by the morality of a class.[218]\n\nNotwithstanding the disastrous outcome of their first venture into the\nmercantile field, the samurai still remain in business, so that there\nis going on to-day in Japan in the commercial domain a competition\nbetween two moral standards. The triumph of the standard of the samurai\nover that of the plebeian trader would mean the development in Japan\nof a matchless business morality, which, in the increasing closeness\nof commercial relations between the East and the West, might well act\ncleansingly on our own business ethics.[219]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Moral education in the\nschools; the Imperial Rescript]\n\nThe rapid transformation in the institutions and ideas of Old Japan\nafter the revolution of 1868 created a crisis in the moral life of\nthe Japanese people. The old basis of the national morality was\ndestroyed. Reverence for the Confucian teachings was lost. Respect\nfor ancestral customs was seriously impaired. Moral anarchy impended.\nIn this critical juncture some proposed that Buddhism, others that\nChristianity, should be made the basis of the moral code.\n\nEspecially in the schools was the urgency of the need of some new\nsanction for morality felt, because moral instruction and training\nhave always formed an essential part of the education of the youth of\nJapan. The Japanese have ever believed that it is possible to mold\nthe character of the nation by education. \u201cWith us,\u201d says a native\nwriter, \u201ceducation has meant moral education more than anything else\nfor centuries.\u201d[220] \u201cThe object of teaching,\u201d says the official\nregulations for teaching in elementary schools, \u201cis to cultivate\nthe moral nature of children and to guide them in the practice of\nvirtues.\u201d[221] Because of this central place assigned moral education\nin the work of the schools, the necessity for removing all uncertainty\nas to what should be inculcated was all the more exigent.\n\nTo meet the crisis the following imperial rescript was\nissued--certainly one of the most remarkable state papers ever\npromulgated:\n\n \u201cKnow ye, our subjects:\n\n \u201cOur imperial ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis broad\n and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; our\n subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from\n generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is\n the glory and the fundamental character of our Empire, and herein\n also lies the source of our education. Ye, our subjects, be filial\n to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as\n husbands and wives be harmonious; as friends true; bear yourselves\n in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue\n learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual\n faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public\n good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution\n and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves\n courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the\n prosperity of our imperial throne coeval with heaven and earth. So\n shall ye not only be our good and faithful subjects, but render\n illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.\n\n \u201cThe way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our\n imperial ancestors, to be observed alike by their descendants and\n the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is\n our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you,\n our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.\n\n \u201cThe 30th day of the 10th month of the 23d year of Meiji\u201d\n [1890].[222]\n\nIt would be almost impossible to exaggerate the influence of this\nimperial edict. \u201cOur whole moral education,\u201d affirms Baron Kikuchi,\n\u201cconsists in instilling into the minds of our children the proper\nappreciation of the spirit of this rescript.\u201d[223] The children learn\nit by heart just as the Roman children committed to memory the Twelve\nTables of the laws.\n\nJapanese believe that the effect of this instruction upon the national\ncharacter, re\u00ebnforcing the ancestral virtues of loyalty and devotion to\nduty, was exhibited in the recent war with Russia.[224]\n\nA noteworthy feature of the rescript is that it is simply a\nreaffirmation of the teachings of the ancient moralists and the ethical\ntraditions of the fathers--an inculcation of those virtues of loyalty\nand filial piety which the Japanese people have held in esteem and\npracticed from generation to generation.\n\nA second feature of the edict which arrests attention is the\nuniversalistic and secular character of the morality inculcated. The\nvirtues enjoined are universal benevolence, loyalty to duty, and\nself-devotion to the common good--a morality of the universal human\nheart and conscience, a morality, as the edict declares, good for all\nages and for all places.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Japanese morals and\nWestern civilization]\n\nThe foregoing anticipates and gives answer to the questions: What will\nbe the effect upon Japanese morality of those changes now going on in\nthe life and thought of Japan through contact with the civilization of\nthe West? What will be the effect upon Japanese public morality when\nthe common belief in the divine descent of the Emperor, which is the\nroot from which springs the primal duty of loyalty, is undermined, as\nmodern science is certain to undermine it? What will be the effect upon\nJapanese domestic morality when Occidental conceptions of the family\nand of woman\u2019s place in it come to modify, as they seem likely to do,\nthose ideas and sentiments which from time immemorial have formed the\nbasis of the family ethics of the East? What will be the ethical\nconsequences when Western science renders obsolete the Shinto learning\nand the Confucian classics, which have hitherto formed the basis of\nso large a part of Japanese morality? What will be the effect upon\nthe ancient ideal of character of the adoption of Christian ideas and\nteachings in place of those which have so long nourished the ethical\nfeelings and sentiments of the Japanese people?\n\nThat the intrusion into the ancient culture of Japan of these various\nelements of Western civilization has deep import for Japanese morality\ncannot be made a matter of doubt. In the new environment, so different\nfrom that in the midst of which the ancient ideal of goodness was\ndeveloped, this ideal must inevitably undergo important changes. Some\nof those qualities of character which have so long held high places in\nthe ideal of excellence will cease to evoke the old-time homage, while\nother qualities at present assigned low places in the standard will\nbe exalted. Virtues now practically unrecognized by the Japanese as\nvirtues, but which among us are highly esteemed moral qualities, will\ncertainly be incorporated in the modified ideal, giving it a new cast,\nyet probably without changing fundamentally the type; for the moral\nlife of the Japanese people is too virile and too essentially sound to\npermit us to think that the new influences now coming in will produce\nsuch radical changes in the ethical feelings and convictions of the\nrace as to result in a repetition of what happened upon the entrance\nof Christianity into the morally decadent Greco-Roman world--the\ndisplacement of the old ideal of character by a new and essentially\ndifferent ideal.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE ETHICAL IDEALS OF INDIA\n\n\nPART I. THE ETHICS OF BRAHMANISM--A CLASS MORALITY\n\n\nI. HISTORICAL AND SPECULATIVE BASIS OF THE SYSTEM\n\n\n[Sidenote: The conception of the\nFirst Cause--Brahma]\n\nAs in Judea so in India the conception formed of the Supreme Being\nreacted potently upon morality. Hence in naming the influences under\nwhich the moral ideal of Brahmanism was molded we must speak first of\nthe Indian conception of the First Cause.\n\nThe Aryan conquerors of India originally held notions of the gods in\ngeneral like those held by their kinsmen, the early Greeks and Romans.\nWhen they entered India they were ancestor worshipers and polytheists.\nThey had earth gods and sky gods. The gods of the celestial phenomena\ngradually acquired ascendancy. Then, as in Egypt, there came a tendency\ntoward unity. The various gods came to be looked upon by the loftier\nminds as merely different manifestations of one primal being.[225]\n\nIt is right at this point that we find the great antithesis between\nIndian modes of thought and those of all or almost all other peoples.\nWhen the thinkers of Egypt, of the Semitic lands, of Persia, of Greece\nand Rome, had at last through reflection evolved the lofty conception\nof a single great First Cause, they endowed this cause with conscious\npersonal life. This mode of thought is our heritage from the past. It\nis to us almost or quite impossible to conceive of conscious personal\nlife as springing from an unconscious impersonal cause. Hence we place\nbehind the manifold phenomena of the universe a conscious personal\nbeing as the origin and source of all things and all life.[226]\n\nIt is wholly different with the thinkers of India. They seem to be able\nto postulate as the beginning of things an impersonal cause, a cause\nwithout perception, thought, or consciousness. They affirm that out of\nunconsciousness consciousness arises. They teach that out of Brahma,\nthe unconscious, impersonal, passionless One, emanate all material\nworlds and sentient beings, gods as well as men.\n\nHow profoundly this conception of the First Cause has reacted on the\nethical speculations of the Hindu sages and on the moral life of India\nwill appear a little further on.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The god Brahma\n(Brahman)]\n\nBut this incomprehensible, unconscious, passionless Brahma is not the\nBrahma of the popular faith. The masses and even the philosophers\nthemselves must have something more concrete. So this impersonal,\nneuter Brahma is conceived as giving existence to the personal,\nmasculine God Brahma (Brahman), \u201cthe progenitor of all worlds, the\nfirst-born among beings.\u201d[227]\n\nIt is very necessary for the student of Brahmanic ethics to keep in\nmind the distinction between the uncreated, unconditioned, impersonal\nBrahma and the created, conditioned, personal Brahma, since there\nis here laid the foundation of a double goal for rational moral\nstriving: the goal of the ascetic whose ultimate aim is deliverance\nfrom individual existence and absorption into the absolute,\nunchangeable, impersonal Brahma, which means a state of eternal\nunconsciousness--dreamless sleep; and the goal of the multitude, whose\nhope and aim is blissful, though temporary, union with the personal\nBrahma in the heaven of the mortal, conditioned gods.[228]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The system of castes]\n\nThe ethical evolution in India was also profoundly influenced by a\nprehistoric event, namely, the subjection of the original non-Aryan\npopulation of the land by an intruding Aryan people. As a result of\nthe long and bitter struggle the two races became separated by a sharp\nline of race prejudice and hatred. The dark-skinned natives were\nreduced to a state of servitude or dependence upon their conquerors.\nIntermarriages between the two races were strictly prohibited, and\nthus the population of the conquered districts of the peninsula became\ndivided into two sharply defined classes. These constituted a model\nupon which Indian society was framed. Other classes were formed, and\nthese gradually hardened into castes, that is, into classes between\nwhich marriages were prohibited. Four great castes arose: namely,\npriests or Brahmans, warriors and rulers, peasants and merchants, and\nsudras. Below these castes were the pariahs, or outcasts, made up of\nthe most degraded of the natives. As time passed, still other divisions\nwere formed, every occupation coming to constitute the basis of a new\ncaste, till society was stratified like a geologic deposit.\n\nReligion came in to consecrate this division of the people into\nprivileged and nonprivileged classes.[229] The sacred scriptures\ndeclare that the Brahmans sprang from the mouth of Brahma, the\nwarriors from his arms, the peasants and traders from his thighs, and\nthe sudras from his feet.[230]\n\nNo institution known among men ever exercised a more fateful and\nsinister influence upon morality than this caste system has exercised\nupon the morality of the peoples of India. The rooted belief and dogma\nof the natural inequality of men has made Brahmanic ethics a thing of\ngrades and classes, and has thus rendered impossible the evolution of\na true morality, which requires for its basis genuine sentiments of\nequality and brotherhood.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of\ntransmigration]\n\nWe easily realize the importance for morality of a belief in a\nlife after death. But a belief in pre\u00ebxistence may exert an even\ngreater influence upon the moral code of a people than a belief in\npost-existence.[231] Now the morality of the Hindus has been molded\nby both these doctrines, for according to the teachings of Brahmanism\na man has lived through many lives before his \u201cbirth,\u201d and may wander\nthrough \u201cten thousand millions of existences\u201d after death has freed\nhim from his present body.[232] The class and the condition into which\nhe is born here on earth is believed to be determined by the sum total\nof his merits or demerits earned in preceding existences. As a result\nof sin he may in his next birth be reborn in a lower caste, or may be\nimprisoned in some animal or vegetable form. He may pass a thousand\ntimes through the bodies of spiders, snakes, and lizards, and hundreds\nof times through the forms of grasses, shrubs, and creepers. And all\nthis experience may come after the soul has passed through dreadful and\ninnumerable hells for vast cycles of years.[233]\n\nThis transmigration theory was framed by the thinkers of India to\nexplain among other things the seemingly unjust inequalities of human\nlife.[234] It afforded an explanation why one man should be born a\nBrahman and another a sudra, one born in a hovel and another in a\npalace, by conceiving the place of every person born into the world as\nbeing determined by the manner of his life in former existences.[235]\n\nIt is unnecessary to dwell upon the profound influence which this\ndoctrine of transmigration, or round of births, has exerted upon\nthe moral life of India. The tendency of this theory, as soon as\nelaborated, was to render still more intolerable the position of the\nlower castes, particularly that of the sudras, since it made their low\nplace and hard lot to be the merited punishment of crimes and misdoings\nin previous lives; while at the same time it fed the pride and enhanced\nthe arrogance of the Brahmans, since their superior lot was, according\nto the theory, attributable to merit acquired in other existences. Thus\ndid the theory tend to give a more sinister aspect to the baneful caste\nsystem, to make it appear a part of the unchangeable order of things,\nand to render impossible the growth of any other than a class morality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Indian pessimism]\n\nHardly less important than the doctrine of transmigration for Hindu\nmorality is the Indian conception of life--of all individual, conscious\nexistence whether here on earth or in other worlds--as inseparable from\nmisery, pain, decay, and death.\n\nThe Aryan immigrants into India seem to have been, like their kinsmen\nthe Greeks, a light-hearted folk, filled with a strong joy in life.\nBut as in their journeyings they pressed southward into the valleys\nof the Indus and the Ganges and came under the influences of the\nhot, depressing climate, and of an oppressive social and political\nsystem,[236] they appeared to have lost their buoyant spirits. The\nskies seemed less bright and life less worth living, and, weary of it\nall, they at last came to regard eternal death, annihilation, as the\ngreatest of boons.\n\nThis pessimistic view of the world and of life, as we shall see a\nlittle further on, forms the basis of large sections of Indian ethics,\nsince it makes the ultimate goal of rational or moral effort to be the\ngetting rid of conscious existence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The conception of\nsacrifice]\n\nAnother conception which has exerted a profound influence upon the\nreligious ethics of Brahmanism is that respecting sacrifice. This\nconception is that the gods need sustenance, and can only exist through\nthe gifts and offerings made to them by men.[237] \u201cThe gods live by\nsacrifice\u201d say the sacred scriptures; \u201cthe sun would not rise if the\npriests did not make sacrifice.\u201d\n\nTo understand this teaching we must connect it with the belief of\nprimitive man that the spirits of the dead have absolute need of meat\nand drink offerings at the hands of the living, and remember that in\nIndia there is no sharp distinction drawn between the gods and the\nsouls of men. The gods, like the spirits of the dead, are dependent\nfor life and strength upon the offerings laid on their altars. Without\nthese gifts they would die or pine away, and all the movements of the\nuniverse controlled by them would cease.[238]\n\nFrom this conception of the gods came the emphasis laid by Brahmanism\nupon sacrifice, and the prominence given the religious duty of bringing\nrich gifts to the priests and keeping the altars of the gods heaped\nwith food.[239]\n\n\nII. THE VARIOUS MORAL STANDARDS\n\n\n[Sidenote: A class morality]\n\nThe fundamental fact of Brahmanic morality is that as a result of the\ncaste system it is a class morality; that is, there is a different\nmoral standard or code for each of the different castes.\n\nIn the account given in the _Laws of Manu_ of the origin of the\nfour chief castes, the occupation and the duties of each class are\ncarefully prescribed. To the Brahman was assigned teaching and offering\nsacrifice; to the warriors and rulers the protection of the people;\nto the peasants and merchants the tilling of the ground and trading;\nand to the sudras--\u201cOne occupation only,\u201d reads the sacred law, \u201cis\nprescribed to the sudra, to serve meekly the other three castes.\u201d[240]\n\nThe Brahman is by right the lord of the whole creation.[241] His name\nmust express something auspicious, but the first part of the sudra\u2019s\nname must express something contemptible, and the second part must be a\nword denoting service.[242]\n\nFor a man of a lower caste to affect equality with a person of a higher\ncaste is a crime: \u201cIf a man of an inferior caste, proudly affecting an\nequality with a man of superior caste, should travel by his side on the\nroad, or sit or sleep upon the same carpet with him, the magistrate\nshall take a fine from the man of inferior caste to the extent of his\nability.\u201d[243]\n\nFor a Brahman to explain to a sudra the sacred Vedas is a sin: \u201cLet him\n[the Brahman] not give to a sudra advice nor the remnants of his meal\n...; nor let him explain the sacred law to such a man; ... for he who\nexplains the sacred law to such ... will sink together with that man\ninto hell.\u201d[244]\n\nIn the matter of punishments for crimes the laws are grossly unequal,\nthe punishment of a person of inferior caste being always more severe\nthan that of a person of a superior caste for the same offense.\nThus for a crime punishable with death if committed by a person\nof an inferior caste, tonsure only is ordained if committed by a\nBrahman;[245] for a Brahman must never be slain, \u201cthough he have\ncommitted all horrible crimes.\u201d[246] There is no crime in all the world\nas great as that of slaying a Brahman.[247]\n\nA knowledge of the inequality of these sacred laws of the Brahmans and\nthe burdensomeness of this caste morality as it pressed upon the lower\nclasses is necessary to an understanding of the rise and rapid spread\nof Buddhism, and the fervor with which its teachings of equality and\nbrotherhood were embraced by the masses of Brahmanic India.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The highest moral\nexcellence attainable in general\nonly by Brahmans]\n\nOf the different standards of morality of the several castes that of\nthe Brahman is of course the highest. The study of the sacred books is\nfor him the chief duty. \u201cLet him,\u201d says the sacred law, \u201cwithout tiring\ndaily mutter the Veda at the proper time; for that is one\u2019s highest\nduty; all other observances are secondary duties.\u201d[248] Knowledge\nof the Veda destroys guilt as fire consumes fuel.[249] Among the\nsecondary duties are observance of the rules of purification, the\npractice of austerities, and doing no injury to created beings.[250]\n\nBy austerities, that is, by ascetic practices, by hideous self-torture,\nthe Brahman may atone for all sins of whatsoever kind and may become\nso holy that at death, having conquered all desires, save only the\ndesire for union with the Universal One, he may hope to fall away\ninto unawakening unconsciousness and be absorbed into the absolute,\nimpersonal Brahma, and thus escape forever from the weary round of\nbirths. This way of full salvation, and it is the only one, is open\nonly to Brahmans and to the chosen few from other castes who, having\ngone forth \u201cfrom home into homelessness,\u201d as mendicants or forest\nhermits, follow this life of complete renunciation of all that is\nearthly.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moral code for\ninferior castes]\n\nThe duties, the faithful performance of which avail most for persons of\ninferior castes, are those that have to do with religion, and chiefly\nwith sacrifice. These duties are the bringing of gifts and offerings\nfor the sacrifices and the giving of generous fees to the priests.\nThrough the faithful performance of his assigned duties the man of\ninferior caste can make sure of salvation--not the full and perfect\nsalvation attained by the Brahman through his austerities, but a\nqualified salvation. He may hope for rebirth in some higher caste or in\nsome better state either on earth or in some other world.[251]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Animal ethics]\n\nDuty to animals seems to have formed no part of the moral code of the\nearly Indian Aryans. But chiefly through the influence of the doctrine\nof transmigration respect for every living thing became a high moral\nrequirement. To take life wantonly became a crime. To kill a kine, a\nhorse, a camel, a deer, an elephant, a goat, a sheep, a fish, a snake,\na buffalo, insects, or birds is an offense which must be expiated by\npenances.[252]\n\nIn order that he may not harm any living creature, the ascetic is\nenjoined \u201calways by day and by night, even with pain to his body, to\nwalk carefully, scanning the ground.\u201d[253] Should he unintentionally\ninjure any creature he must expiate its death by penitent\nausterities.[254]\n\nAnimals may, however, be slain for food[255] and for sacrifices,\nsince they were created for these special purposes. And then there is\ncompensation for the victims of the altars: \u201cHerbs, trees, cattle,\nbirds, and all animals that have been destroyed for sacrifices receive,\nbeing reborn, higher existences.\u201d[256]\n\nThe killing of animals for sport is an inexpiable sin: \u201cHe who injures\ninnoxious beings from a wish to (give) himself pleasure never finds\nhappiness, neither living nor dead.\u201d[257]\n\nUnder the influence of Buddhism we shall see this consideration for\nanimal life deepening into a genuine tenderness for every living\ncreature, and duties toward the inferior animals becoming one of the\nmost beautiful and characteristic features of the ethical ideal.\n\n\n[Sidenote: War ethics]\n\nIn Brahmanic as in Confucian ethics the military virtues are assigned\na low place. Brahmanism, however, concedes the legitimacy of war\nand permits the employment of force by the king in augmenting his\npossessions,[258] even enjoining upon him to be ever ready to strike;\nfor \u201cof him who is always ready to strike, the whole world stands in\nawe.\u201d[259]\n\nBut the genuine spirit of Brahmanism is opposed to the fierce war\nspirit of the Aryan conquerors of India, and the sacred law attempts\nto ameliorate the cruelties and atrocities of primeval warfare,\ninstilling in the warrior a spirit of magnanimity and chivalry. Thus\nthe \u201cblameless law for the warrior\u201d forbids to him the use of barbed or\npoisoned weapons; he must spare the suppliant for mercy; he must not\nstrike an enemy who has lost his armor or whose weapons are broken,\nor who has received a wound, or who has turned in flight. He must do\nno harm to the onlooker. The king must conduct war without guile or\ntreachery.[260]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Natural morality versus\nritualism]\n\nAt the heart of Brahmanism, as at the heart of every other great\nreligion of the world, there is a core of lofty spiritual teachings and\ntrue morality. The sacred scriptures of the Brahmans declare, \u201cThe soul\nitself is the witness of the soul, and the soul is the refuge of the\nsoul; despise not thy own soul, the supreme witness of men.\u201d[261]\n\nThe sacred law teaches that he is pure who is pure in thought and in\ndeed: \u201cAmong all modes of purification, purity in (the acquisition of)\nwealth is declared to be the best; for he is pure who gains wealth with\nclean hands, not he who purifies himself with earth and water.\u201d[262]\n\nRepentance and resolutions of amendment free the soul from its\ntransgressions: \u201cHe who has committed a sin and has repented, is freed\nfrom that sin, but he is purified only by the resolution of ceasing to\nsin and thinking I will do so no more.\u201d[263]\n\nBrahmanism teaches the duty of forgiving injuries and of returning\nblessings for curses: \u201cAgainst an angry man let him [the ascetic] not\nin return show anger; let him bless when he is cursed.\u201d[264] \u201cA king\nmust always forgive litigants, infants, aged and sick men, who inveigh\nagainst him.\u201d[265] \u201cHe who, being abused by men in pain, pardons them,\nwill in reward of that act be exalted in heaven.\u201d[266]\n\nHere is a morality as pure and lofty as any taught by Hebrew prophets.\nBut as in Judaism, so in Brahmanism, such was the stress laid by the\npriests upon sacrifice, upon the observance of the rites and ceremonies\nof the temple, and upon the performance of a thousand and one morally\nindifferent acts, that as time passed there resulted an almost complete\novershadowing of natural by ritual morality. It was such a triumph of\nritualism as marked the postexilic period in the history of Israel. As\nthere came a protest and reaction in Judea issuing in Christianity, so\ndid there come a protest and reaction in Brahmanic India issuing in\nBuddhism.\n\n\nPART II. THE ETHICS OF BUDDHISM; AN IDEAL OF SELF-CONQUEST AND\nUNIVERSAL BENEVOLENCE\n\n\nI. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE SYSTEM\n\n\n[Sidenote: The four great truths]\n\nFour tenets or principles, called the four truths, sum up the\nessentials of Buddhism.[267] These are the truth of pain, the origin of\npain, the destruction of pain, and the eightfold way that \u201cleads to the\nquieting of pain.\u201d[268]\n\nThe first three of these truths form the philosophical basis of\nBuddhist ethics, and to a brief exposition of these tenets we shall\ndevote the immediately following sections. The fourth truth is a\nsummary of the ethics of Buddhism,[269] and therefore what we shall\nhave to say about it will appropriately find a place under the next\nsubdivision of this chapter when we come to speak of the moral ideal of\nBuddhism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The truth of pain]\n\nThe truth of pain, in the language of the sacred scriptures, is this:\n\u201cBirth is pain, death is pain, clinging to earthly things is pain.\u201d\n\nThis is simply an expression, with added emphasis, of that\nworld-weariness, of that despair of life, which we have seen pressing\nlike an incubus upon the spirit of Brahmanic India. Buddhism teaches\nthat life is an evil, that misery and sorrow and pain are inseparable\nfrom all modes of existence. We shall be able to get the Buddhist\u2019s\npoint of view if we bear in mind how we ourselves sometimes look upon\nthis earthly life. In despondent moods we ask, \u201cIs life worth living?\u201d\nand make answer ourselves by declaring that if this earthly life is\nall, then there is in it nothing worth while. If now we extend this\ngloomy view so as to make it embrace the life to come as well as the\nlife that now is, we shall have the viewpoint of the true Buddhist. To\nhim life not only in this world but in all other possible worlds is\ntransitory, illusive, and painful, and in utter despair and weariness\nhe longs to be through with it all and to lay down forever the\nintolerable burden of existence.[270] \u201cAs the glow of the Indian sun\ncauses rest in cool shades to appear to the wearied body the good of\ngoods, so also with the wearied soul, rest, eternal rest, is the only\nthing for which it craves.\u201d[271]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The origin of pain]\n\nThe truth of the origin of pain is this: \u201cIt is the thirst for life,\ntogether with lust and desire, which causes birth and rebirth.\u201d\n\nIt should be noted here that there are different interpretations given\nto this tenet. Some understand by it not that all desires, but simply\nevil desires, cause and feed the flame of life; others interpret it as\nteaching that desires or longings of every kind whatsoever possess this\nsinister potency of recreating life and keeping one entangled in the\nmeshes of the net of existence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The truth of the\ndestruction of pain]\n\nThe truth of the destruction of pain is this: \u201cPain can be ended only\nby the complete extinction of desire.\u201d Desire being the root which\nfeeds life and causes the round of births, existence can be ended only\nby getting rid of desire.\n\nHere again there are different acceptations of the dogma. To most it\nmeans simply the getting rid of all unholy passions and desires, while\nto the thoroughgoing Buddhist it means freedom from every desire of\nwhatsoever kind: \u201cNot a few trees but the whole forest\u201d of desires must\nbe cut down, together with all \u201cthe undergrowth.\u201d[272]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of karma]\n\nBesides these three philosophical principles,--the truth of pain,\nthe origin of pain, and the extinction of pain,--there are two other\nspeculative doctrines of orthodox Buddhism, a comprehension of which is\nnecessary to an understanding of the ethics of the system. The first of\nthese is the doctrine of karma. This is a denial of the soul theory.\nOrthodox Buddhism denies that man has a soul separable from the body.\nIt teaches that when a person dies there does not go out of his body\na spirit which lives elsewhere a conscious life, a continuation of\nthe life just ended, but that all that goes out is _karma_, that is,\nsomething which is the net product of all the good and evil acts of\nthe person in all his various existences--a sort of seed or germ from\nwhich will spring up here on earth or in some heaven or hell another\nbeing.[273] There is no conscious identity, however, between the two\nbeings. They stand related to each other as father to son.\n\nSome illustrations will help us to seize the thought. The Buddhist\nteacher likens the relation of the life going out here to the new life\nbeginning elsewhere, to the relation of two candle flames, the second\nof which has been lighted from the first. Through the transmission of\nkarma the flame of life is passed on from one being to another; but\nall these life flames are different. No abiding self-consciousness\nbinds them together and makes them one. Again, this succession of lives\nis likened to the undulations of a wave in the ocean. The successive\nundulations are not the same, yet the first causes the second, the\nsecond the third, and so on.\n\nNotwithstanding the important place this doctrine holds in Buddhist\nspeculative philosophy and theoretical ethics, it was neither\nunderstood nor adopted by the masses. It was developed in the schools,\nbut the people in general held to their old Brahmanic belief in the\nsoul and its transmigrations, so that in most Buddhist lands to-day\nbelief in a conscious personal existence after death is the prevailing\none.[274]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Nirvana and the\ndifferent senses in which the term\nis used]\n\nThe other philosophical doctrine of which we have to speak is that\nof Nirvana. This term is used with many different meanings. Often it\ndenotes merely the extinguishment in the soul of lust and hate and\nignorance, and the state of quiet contentment and blissful repose which\nresults from such self-mastery. Buddha himself, says Rhys Davids, meant\nby the term just what Christ meant by the kingdom of God, that kingdom\nwithin the soul of calm and abiding peace.[275]\n\nAgain, it is used to express a state of eternal, unchanging, blissful\nrest and ineffable peace beyond all the realms--heavens and hells--of\ntransmigration.\n\nStill again the term is used to denote the absolute extinction of\nexistence, annihilation. This is the view of Nirvana held to-day by\nthe Buddhists of Ceylon, Siam, and Burma who claim to hold the ancient\nfaith in its primitive purity.[276]\n\n\nII. THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: The truth of the\neightfold path]\n\nThe ethics of Buddhism is summed up in the formula of the truth of the\neightfold path.[277] The truth of the eight-membered way is this: the\nonly path which leads to the quieting of pain is the eightfold holy\npath--right belief, right resolve, right speech, right behavior, right\noccupation, right effort, right thought, right concentration.[278]\n\nThe essence of all this expressed in familiar ethical phrase is that\nthe demands of morality are right thoughts, right words, and right\ndeeds. As the eight requirements are interpreted and expounded by\nBuddhist teachers, they demand a mind free from all evil passions and\nunholy desires (and, according to the thoroughgoing Buddhist, of every\ndesire whatsoever)[279] and \u201ca heart of love far-reaching, grown great,\nand beyond measure.\u201d This is the path leading to deliverance from\ntransmigration, this the path leading to the quieting of pain, this the\npath leading to the sweet rest and peace of Nirvana.\n\nIt will be worth our while to note with some attention some of the\nspecial primary duties and virtues which are included in these general\ndemands of self-conquest and unmeasured love.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Particular virtues and\nduties of the ideal]\n\nOne of the primary duties of the true Buddhist is to seek knowledge,\nfor true knowledge, insight, is the cure for desire. This knowledge\nwhich quenches all craving thirst is best attained, so Buddha taught,\nthrough meditation.[280] One must meditate on the transitoriness of\nlife, on pain, on death, on truth, on gentleness, on love. It was\nthrough profound meditation under the Bo tree that Gautama became the\nBuddha, \u201cThe Enlightened.\u201d\n\nAnother cardinal virtue of the Buddhist ideal of character is universal\nbenevolence. By no other ethical system has such stress been laid upon\nthe duty of gentleness to everything that has life. The animal world\nis here brought within the sanctuary of morality and safeguarded by\nethical sentiment. It is of course the doctrine of transmigration,\nwhich Buddhism inherits from Brahmanism, which gives animal ethics the\nprominent place it holds in Buddhist morality.[281]\n\nStill a third requirement of the true Buddhist is toleration, which\nfollows as a corollary from the virtue of universal benevolence. In\nthe prominent place assigned this virtue in the ideal of character,\nBuddhism stands alone among the great world religions.\n\nA fourth cardinal duty of the ideal is to make known to all men the\neightfold way to salvation. Buddha\u2019s command to his disciples was,\n\u201cGo ye now and preach the most excellent Law, explaining every point\nthereof, unfolding it with diligence and care.\u201d This is a duty which\nbrings its own reward; for the exercise of compassion and charity\nproduces that serenity of spirit which is the aim of moral striving;\nand hence nothing advances one more rapidly on the way to salvation\nthan preaching the good tidings and laboring to lessen the sorrows and\nlighten the burdens of one\u2019s fellow creatures. The moral requirement\nto preach to all the most excellent way made of Buddhism a missionary\nreligion. In a few centuries after the death of Buddha devoted\nmissionaries had spread the new faith throughout the Far East.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The different degrees\nof moral attainment]\n\nThere are in Buddhism three grades of moral attainment. The lowest is\nthat which may be reached by any one in the ordinary life. Through\npurity of thought and word and deed, through the exercise of universal\nkindliness, and by the fulfillment of every duty pertaining to his\nstation in life, one attains such a degree of moral excellence that he\nmay at least hope at death to avoid painful rebirth.\n\nThe second degree of moral excellence is that attained by the monk\nof Gautama\u2019s Order. The idea of the Buddhist here is like that of\nthe Christian respecting the monastic life. For centuries in the West\nthe ascetic life was looked upon as more perfect than the ordinary\nlife, and as the better and surer way to salvation. It is the same\nin Buddhist lands. The goal striven after, the extinction of unholy\ndesires, the Buddhist believes is most quickly and surely reached by\nhim who has rid himself of the cares and worries of domestic life, and\nwithdrawn from all the distractions of the world.\n\nThe prime duty of the Buddhist monk is meditation, which takes the\nplace of prayer in the code of the Christian recluse. Through following\nfaithfully and patiently all the rules of the Order he may hope to\nattain such comparative perfection that at his death he will be reborn\nin some better state.\n\nThe third and highest degree of moral attainment can be reached only\nin the Arhatship. The Arhat is what we would call the perfect man.\nHe is one who, like the Buddha, reaches a state of perfect insight\nor mental illumination and of perfect freedom from all desires[282]\nsave the desire for Nirvana. This state is reached only through\nabsolute renunciation of the world. He who would be perfect must leave\nall earthly pleasures behind, and calling nothing his own, with all\nappetites stilled, passionless and desireless, go out from home into\nhomelessness.[283] In such a one karma becomes extinct, and for him\nthere are no new births. \u201cThe living, moving body of the perfect man is\nvisible still,\u201d says Rhys Davids in explaining this state, ... \u201cbut it\nwill decay and die and pass away, and as no new body will be formed,\nwhere life was, will be nothing.\u201d[284]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The genuine altruism of\nBuddhist ethics]\n\nIt is impossible to conceive a higher altruism than that inculcated\nby the higher thoroughgoing Buddhism. Since it denies the existence\nof the soul,--nothing save the seed (karma) of another but different\nlife remaining at death,--when one strives to break the chain of\nexistence, to make an end of the weary cycle of births, such a one\nis seeking good not for himself but for another. In the words of Dr.\nHopkins, \u201cIt is to save from sorrow this son of one\u2019s acts that one\nshould seek to find the end.\u201d[285] Thus orthodox Buddhism alone, of\nall the great ethical systems of history, refuses to sully virtue with\npromises of reward. Its morality stands absolutely alone, unsupported\nby the hope of recompense either in this world or in the world to come.\n\u201cBuddhism alone teaches that to live on earth is weariness, that there\nis no bliss beyond, and that one should yet be calm, pure, loving, and\nwise.\u201d[286]\n\nAnother thing especially noteworthy regarding the ethics of Buddhism is\nthat it is the ethics of naturalism. \u201cFor the first time in the history\nof the world,\u201d in the words of Rhys Davids, \u201cBuddhism proclaimed a\nsalvation which each man could gain for himself and by himself in this\nworld, during this life, without the least reference to God or the\ngods, either great or small.\u201d In this respect Buddhism is somewhat like\nthe present-day socialism of the materialistic school, which ardently\nproclaims justice, equity, and universal brotherhood, but says nothing\nabout God.\n\n\nIII. SOME EXPRESSIONS OF THE ETHICAL SPIRIT OF BUDDHISM\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introductory]\n\nBuddhism has been called the Christianity of the Orient. Like\nChristianity, it has been a great moralizing force in history. Its\nethical ideal has been just such a factor in the moral life of the East\nas the ethical ideal of Christianity has been in the moral life of the\nWest.\n\nTo portray even in scantiest outline the influence of this ideal\nupon the different peoples who have accepted it as their standard of\ngoodness, or whose moral codes have felt its modifying effects, would\nlead us far beyond the limits of our work. In what follows we shall aim\nat nothing more--after having first remarked the ethical kinship of\nthe Buddhist reform with other contemporary reform movements--than to\nnote briefly the practical outworkings of the ideal in three or four\ndepartments of the moral domain.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical\nrelationships of the Buddhist\nreform]\n\nWe shall understand best the import for the moral evolution of humanity\nof that remarkable revolution in Brahmanic India which resulted in\nthe establishment of Buddhism throughout the peninsula and in other\ncountries of the Far East, if we first notice its ethical kinship\nwith other reform movements which, about the close of the sixth\npre-Christian century, make a dividing line in the inner histories of\nso many of the progressive societies and cultures of that age.[287]\n\nIn Greece Pythagoreanism was rising. This movement was in its essential\nspirit a social and moral reform. It was an attempt to introduce a true\nethics in Greek city life, and to find a basis for morality in the deep\nintuitions of the human soul.[288]\n\nIn Israel the Isaiah of the Exile was proclaiming the loftiest ethical\ndoctrines ever taught by Hebrew prophet, and in his interpretation of\nthe moral government of Yahweh was scattering the seed from which was\nto spring up a new ethical life among men.\n\nIn Persia the great teacher Zarathustra (Zoroaster), with like vision\nof moral things, was declaring to the followers of Ahura Mazda that\nwhat God requires of men is purity of purpose, truthfulness in word and\nact, and unceasing warfare against evil within and without.\n\nIn China the Master, Confucius, reaffirming the teachings of antiquity,\nwas inculcating essentially the same truth--that the sum of true\nmorality is reverence, obedience, and right living.\n\nIt probably would be unhistorical to suppose that there was any actual\nconnection between these several ethical or religious reform movements\nin these widely separated lands. They are brought together here merely\nthat they may be used to interpret one another in terms of ethical\nprogress, and that they may bear witness to the substantial oneness of\nthe expressions of the moral faculty of man in response to the same or\nsimilar intellectual and social stimulus.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical content for\nthe masses of Buddha\u2019s message]\n\nThe question naturally arises, How could Buddha\u2019s dismal doctrine of\nannihilation as the ultimate aim and end of moral striving--for this\ndogma was undoubtedly one of the fundamental principles of primitive\nBuddhism--ever have been received by the multitude as a word of\nconsolation and hope? What is there of ethical authority or appeal in\nsuch a doctrine to constitute it the motive force in a great popular\nmoral reform? The answer is that although Buddha himself probably\nbelieved that death for the perfect man meant absolute extinction of\nbeing, nevertheless he lay no emphasis upon this part of his world\nphilosophy. He knew very well that it would be a hard doctrine for many\nto receive, and when questioned about it he was reticent. It was his\nother doctrine, the way in which one may escape painful rebirths, upon\nwhich Buddha laid the stress of his teaching. And here his simple word\nto the people was this: Be gentle and merciful and just; get rid of all\nimpure and craving desires, and then at death, instead of suffering\nsome painful rebirth, you will be reborn into a happier condition here\non earth or in some other world. In a word, he said, Follow after\ngoodness and it will be well with you.\n\nTo be able to understand how this simple word should be received with\nsuch enthusiasm by the multitude, we need to bear in mind how hard the\nway of escape from painful rebirths had been made by the Brahmans.\nThey had taught the people that salvation was possible only through\nritual and ceremony, through costly offerings to the gods, through the\npayment of liberal fees to the priests, through penances and ascetic\npractices.[289] Thus the way of deliverance had been made so hard that\nfew could follow it, and so unethical that it left the heart cold and\nthe conscience unsatisfied.\n\nThe situation was like that in Judea when the greatest of the prophets,\nin opposition to the teachings of the scribes and Pharisees who\nwere laying upon men\u2019s shoulders a burden of ritualism too heavy to\nbe borne, declared that man finds salvation not through ritual or\nsacrifice, but through humility, obedience, and love--and the people\nheard him gladly and followed him, because his yoke was easy and his\nburden light.\n\nSo was it in India. Buddha interprets anew to men the divine message\nthat all which is required of them is purity and justice and tenderness\ntoward all creatures. The spirit of the heavy-burdened multitude\nwitnesseth with the spirit of the Prophet that this is indeed a true\nand divine Word; and Buddhism, with its ethical enthusiasms and fresh\nhopes, marks a new era in the moral evolution of the peoples of the\nEastern world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Monasticism as an\nethical expression of Buddhism]\n\nIn explaining the different degrees of moral attainment possible to\nthe Buddhist, we spoke of the monastic ideal of virtue. This part of\nBuddhist ethical theory has left a deep impress upon practical morality\nin all those lands into which the faith of the Buddha has spread.\nMonasticism has been, and is still to-day, just such a dominant factor\nin the moral life of all Buddhist communities of eastern Asia as it was\nin the moral life of medieval Christian Europe.\n\nThe causes that fostered the upgrowth of the system in the East were\nessentially the same as those that fostered its development in the\nWest. Among these causes a prominent place must be assigned that\nfeeling of world-weariness to which we have already more than once\nreferred, a feeling evoked by the burden and ache of existence. It was\nthis predisposition of spirit that caused the doctrine of renunciation\nof the world preached by the disciples of Buddha to appeal with such\npersuasion to multitudes throughout all the Eastern lands.\n\nWe may stop to note but one of various points of difference between\nBuddhist and Christian monasticism. The latter, in general, recognized\nthe ethical value of labor. This feeling found expression in various\nforms of activity among the monks, particularly in agricultural labor\nand in the work of the scriptorium. It was this which not only helped\nto keep life in the Western monasteries morally wholesome for a period,\nbut which also made the monastic system such an efficient force in\nthe conquest and redemption of the waste lands of Europe and in the\nupbuilding of Western civilization in the early medieval age. Now\nBuddhist monasticism never recognized the moral value of work.[290]\nUseful labor had no place among the requirements of the monastic ideal.\nHere doubtless is to be sought one cause of that lamentable moral\ndegeneracy into which the monastic communities soon fell in almost all\nthe lands whither Buddhism was carried by the missionary zeal of its\nearly converts.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Practical effects of\nthe animal ethics of Buddhism]\n\nWe have seen that under the Buddhist system the whole animal and insect\nworld is brought within the domain of ethics. Buddhist morality has\ngone to a greater extreme here than any other ethical system, excepting\nthat of Jainism. The inculcating of this sympathy with all living\ncreatures has developed one of the most attractive traits of the Hindu\ncharacter.[291] But the extreme emphasis laid upon this branch of\nethics by Buddhism, Jainism, and modern Brahmanism or Hinduism has had\npractical consequences of a very serious nature. The scruple in regard\nto killing animals, even harmful creatures, has cost India millions\nof human lives. It has been a contributory cause of the country being\noverrun with dangerous animals, such as tigers and venomous snakes,\nwhich destroy many thousands of human beings annually, and has even\nfostered the propagation of forms of life which are now known to be\neffective agents in the spread of infectious diseases like the bubonic\nplague.[292] Nothing is surer than that at this point the ethics of\nBuddhism must sooner or later feel the modifying influence of Western\nscience.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Buddhist spirit of\ntoleration]\n\nAs an efficient force in promoting a spirit of the broadest toleration,\nBuddhism holds a unique place among the great religious and ethical\nsystems of the world.[293] An edict of the Buddhist Emperor Asoka,\ndating from the third century B.C., inculcates the practice of\ntoleration in these words: \u201cA man must not do reverence to his own sect\nby disparaging that of another man for trivial reasons. Depreciation\nshould be for adequate reasons only, because the sects of other people\ndeserve reverence for one reason or another.\u201d\n\nThe spirit of this imperial edict has been obeyed wherever the word of\nthe Buddha has prevailed. \u201cThere is no record known to me,\u201d writes Rhys\nDavids, \u201cin the whole long history of Buddhism, throughout the many\ncenturies where its followers have been for such lengthened periods\nsupreme, of any persecution by the Buddhists of the followers of any\nother faith.\u201d[294]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Disesteem of the\nmilitary life]\n\nLike Confucianism, Buddhism in its spirit and its ethical teachings\nis, as we have seen, absolutely opposed to the spirit of militarism\nin every form. Doubtless it has been a potent force in fostering\namong the peoples of eastern Asia an anti-military spirit and in\ncreating a disesteem for the warlike qualities of character.[295]\nFrom one land--the Tartar land of Thibet--it has banished absolutely\nthe war spirit and practically war itself.[296] \u201cIt has taken all the\nfierceness out of the Mongols,\u201d and thus rendered useless the Great\nWall built to check their raids into China.[297]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Softening effects on\nnational character of Buddhist\nteachings]\n\nBuddhism has been well characterized as the incarnation of sympathy\nwith suffering. Inculcating a morality of gentleness, instilling\ntenderness toward every living thing, it has exercised a softening\ninfluence upon the spirit and temper of every race that has received\nits teachings. We have in the preceding chapter noted its humanizing\neffects upon Japanese morality.[298] Even in India, where after a\ncomparatively short period of supremacy it yielded sway again to\nBrahmanism, it left significant traces of its brief dominance in the\ndeepened humanitarianism of the restored creed of the Brahmans, and\nin certain of those traits and dispositions of the native races which\nrender truthfully descriptive the term \u201cgentle Hindu.\u201d \u201cThe land of\nmeekness and gentleness,\u201d were the words used by a native Hindu[299]\nat a recent Lake Mohonk Conference to express the ethical character of\nIndia.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Historical significance\nof the ethical unity created by\nBuddhism]\n\nThere is deep significance for the moral evolution of the human race\nin this ethical propaganda of Buddhism. For just as Christianity has\ncreated an ethical unity among the nations of the Western world, so\nhas Buddhism created a certain ethical unity among the races of the\nEastern world. The historical importance of this lies in the fact that\nthese two ethical systems, though differing in form and content, are\nin spirit essentially the same: both are moralities of universalism;\nboth teach the brotherhood of man; both exalt the gentle[300] and\nself-denying virtues; both enjoin self-conquest; both inculcate the\nduty of universal benevolence.\n\nBecause of this moral kinship, the ethical conquests of Buddhism--and\nthere is not a land in the Far East that has not felt its\ninfluence--are in a degree supplemental to those of Christianity in\nthe West, and are thus an important step in the creation of the ethical\nunity of the world. India and Japan are both nearer to us ethically\nto-day than they would be, were it not for the modifying influence\nof Buddhist teachings upon the ethical spirit and temper of their\npeoples.[301]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE ETHICS OF ZOROASTRIANISM: AN IDEAL OF COMBAT\n\n\nI. PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS WHICH CREATED THE ETHICAL TYPE\n\n\n[Sidenote: Religious dualism]\n\nIn view of the mixed good and evil in the world, thinkers of antiquity,\noutside of Israel and before the rise of the Stoic philosophy in\nGreece, could not conceive the universe as being set in motion and\ndirected by one God infinite at once in power and goodness. Even the\nmost penetrating intellect of Greece faltered in his search for unity:\n\u201cWe cannot suppose,\u201d says Plato, \u201cthat the universe is ordered by one\nsoul; there must be more than one, probably not less than two--one the\nauthor of good, and the other of evil.\u201d[302] The seers of Israel alone\nreached with perfect conviction the height of the great argument, and\nannounced confidently that He who is the author of the good in the\nworld is the author likewise of the evil: \u201cI form the light and create\nthe darkness; I make peace and create evil,\u201d are the words which the\nprophet Isaiah puts in the mouth of Yahweh.[303]\n\nThe religious thinkers of Persia never reached this lofty viewpoint. It\nseemed to them, as it seemed to the Greek philosopher, that at least\ntwo deities must have been concerned in the creation and ordering of\nthe universe. They believed in the existence of two great powers: a\ngood being, Ahura Mazda, the creator of light and of all beneficent\nthings; and an evil being, Ahriman, the author of darkness and of all\nbaneful creatures. Between these two powers they conceived to be going\non a fierce struggle for the mastery, in which ultimate victory was\nassured to the good Ahura.[304]\n\nThis Persian world philosophy reacted favorably upon the moral\ncharacter, and, as we shall see further on, contributed to create in\nancient Persia a deep consciousness of the eternal distinction between\ngood and evil, a profound sentiment of duty, and an active, strenuous\nmorality.[305] It is when contrasted with the world philosophy of\nBrahmanism and Buddhism that the ethical value of this dualistic\nphilosophy of the old Persian thinkers is best disclosed.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Conception of the\ncharacter of the supreme god,\nAhura Mazda]\n\nWhile it is true that the moral qualities attributed by a people to\ntheir gods are nothing more nor less than the moral qualities possessed\nor revered by this people themselves, still it is also true that the\nmoral nature thus given to the gods reacts powerfully upon the ethical\nlife of their worshipers and tends to mold their moral character after\nthe heavenly type. In a word, celestial morality is at once effect and\ncause.\n\nIn the case of no other people of antiquity, except the people of\nIsrael, did the conception of deity exercise a greater influence upon\nmorality than in that of the ancient Persians. The supreme being,\nAhura Mazda, was conceived, as we have already noted, as the creator\nof the light and of all good things, as the god of righteous order\nand benevolence. He was the lover of truth. Truth was the innermost\nessence of his being, as love is the innermost essence of the God of\nChristianity. Farther on we shall see how this conception of deity\nformed the mold in which was cast the Persian ideal of moral excellence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical character\nof Mithra]\n\nAhura Mazda was the god of the sky. As time passed, Mithra, the\ngod of the sun, gradually came into greater prominence and finally\nquite eclipsed the at first supreme deity, Ahura. As the solar god\nhe appropriated the ethical attributes of the sky god and became\npre\u00ebeminently the god of light, the champion of truth, and the avenger\nof lies. He it is who, when not deceived, establisheth nations in\nvictory and strength.[306]\n\nIt was from this solar deity that Zoroastrianism in the later\npre-Christian centuries was called Mithraism, under which name, as we\nshall see, it entered the Greco-Roman world and there became a chief\ncompetitor with Christianity for the control and guidance of the moral\nlife of the European nations.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Doctrine of the\nsacredness of the elements--fire,\nearth, and water]\n\nThe principle of Persian world philosophy which, next after that of\nthe divided government of the universe, had probably the greatest\nconsequences, and those not wholly favorable, for Persian morality,\nwas the principle of the purity and sacredness of the elements--fire,\nearth, and water. From this principle or belief were deduced endless\nritual requirements whose aim was to preserve these elements from\npollution, or to restore their purity after defilement, and thus one\nlarge division of the moral code embraced mainly artificial duties,\nduties which had no vital relation to natural morality, that is, to\nconduct deriving its sanction from the natural feelings of moral right\nand wrong.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The personality of a\ngreat reformer, Zarathustra]\n\nAs the great moral systems of Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity,\nand Mohammedanism bear each the impress of the moral consciousness of\nsome great teacher, so is it with Zoroastrianism. For the moral ideal\nof Persia, while doubtless largely the creation of the ethical feelings\nand convictions of the Iranian race, developed through many centuries\nof race experiences, nevertheless bears the unmistakable imprint of\na unique personality. That the Zarathustra of tradition represents a\nreal historical personage, there can hardly be longer a reasonable\ndoubt.[307]\n\nThe time of Zarathustra\u2019s mission probably falls in the first half\nof the sixth century B.C. He thus belongs to that era in the history\nof antiquity when, at various centers of culture, reform movements\nannounced the opening of a new epoch in the moral evolution of the\nhuman race.[308] The sum of what we may believe to have been his moral\nteachings was that man\u2019s full duty is purity and sincerity in thought,\nword, and deed, and an untiring warfare against evil.\n\n\nII. THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: The essence of the\nmoral life]\n\nThe distinctive character of the Persian moral ideal was determined\nby the Persian dualistic world philosophy. The essence of the moral\nlife is a struggle against evil. The good man is the strong fighter\nwith Ahura against Ahriman and all his creations. There was no\nplace in the ideal for those ascetic virtues--celibacy, fasting,\nself-mortification--which conferred sainthood in India.[309]\n\nThe married state was regarded as superior to the unmarried: \u201cHe who\nhas children,\u201d says the Zend-Avesta, \u201cis far above the childless\nman.\u201d[310] Fasting was condemned as ungodly, for \u201cno one who does not\neat has strength to do heavy work of holiness\u201d;[311] the well-fed man\ncan fight better than the one who lessens his vitality by fasting, can\nwithstand the cold better, \u201ccan strive against the wicked tyrant and\nsmite him on the head.\u201d[312] The Zoroastrians regarded Christianity, in\nthe form in which they knew it, with disapproval, because it exalted\ncelibacy and made fasting a virtue.\n\nThis moral ideal which made life a strenuous battling for the right\nwas, after the ideal of the Hebrew prophets, the loftiest developed by\nthe ancient world. As we shall see immediately, it tended to make the\nmorality of the ancient Persians \u201ca morality of vigor and manliness.\u201d\n\n\n[Sidenote: Truthfulness the\nparamount virtue]\n\nAmong the special virtues making up the moral ideal, the highest place\nwas assigned the virtue of veracity. It is noteworthy how this virtue\nwas, if not created, at least fostered by the Persian conception of the\nsupreme god, Ahura Mazda, whose symbol was the light.[313] As Ahriman\nwas the god of deceit and lies, so was Ahura the god of sincerity and\ntruth. This thought of deity made truthfulness a supreme virtue, for\nman must in all things take for his model the good spirit on whose side\nhe battles.\n\nVarious testimonies bear witness to the high place assigned in the\nscale of virtues to veracity. There was to be no liar among those\npersons whom the Persian Noah (Yima) was commanded to bring into the\ngreat underground abode, that the earth might be repeopled with a\nsuperior race after the deadly cold of the long winter.[314] The\npunishment provided in the Zend-Avesta for false swearing was terrible.\nThe very first time one knowingly tells a lie unto Mithra (the god\nadjured in taking an oath), \u201cwithout waiting until it is done again,\u201d\nhe shall be beaten on earth with twice seven hundred stripes, and below\nin hell shall receive punishment harder than the pain from the cutting\noff of limbs, from falling down a precipice, from impalement.[315]\n\nWhat is especially noteworthy here is that Zoroastrian morals\nrecognize the universality of the law of truthfulness and require that\ncontracts made even with the unfaithful be faithfully kept: \u201cBreak\nnot the contract,\u201d says the sacred law; ... \u201cfor Mithra stands for\nboth the faithful and the unfaithful.\u201d[316] Even more sacred than\nthe engagements of kinsman with kinsman are the engagements between\nnations, for while a contract between members of the same group is\nthirtyfold more binding than one between two strangers, a contract\nbetween two nations is a thousandfold more binding.[317] Here is raised\na standard of international morality to which modern statesmen and\ndiplomatists have not yet attained.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The duty of industry;\nthe ethics of labor]\n\nIndustry was another cardinal virtue of the Zoroastrian ideal of\ncharacter. Labor was enjoined not only as honorable but as a sacred\nduty. Wedgwood endeavors to show how this virtue was the outgrowth of\nthe Persian conception of the origin of the universe. In Indian thought\nthe world is not a creation, the work of a divine Creator; it is an\nemanation from an impersonal, unconscious, primal principle. But in the\nPersian world-view the universe is conceived as the work of a deity who\nlabors to give it form and shape. This conception of God as a worker\nreacted powerfully upon the ideal of human excellence. Man must imitate\nthis divine virtue of labor. He must become a co-worker with the good\nAhura Mazda. Thus was labor idealized, and all work, even the most\nlowly, made a sacred thing.[318]\n\nThere is in this view doubtless an element of truth, but it is probable\nthat this duty of industry and thrift upon which such emphasis is laid\nin the Zend-Avesta was in the beginning taught and enforced by the\nlimited area of fruitful soil and the necessity of careful irrigation\nand tillage, and that only later the virtue thus engendered received\nthe sanction and support of religion. We may infer this from the fact\nthat agriculture was the most sacred of occupations. \u201cHe who sows\ncorn,\u201d says the Zend-Avesta, \u201csows righteousness.\u201d[319] To sow corn,\ngrass, and fruit; to water dry ground and to drain ground that is too\nwet--this is the duty of man.[320]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Animal ethics]\n\nThe Zoroastrian code, like the _Laws of Manu_, gives a large place to\nman\u2019s duties toward the lower animal creation. But the animal ethics\nof the Iranian lawgiver are much more reasonable than those of the\nHindu legislator. The Buddhist, as we have seen, is enjoined to spare\nevery living thing; there is no distinction made between useful animals\nand dangerous beasts and noxious reptiles. To such an extreme is this\nregard for all life carried that agriculture, though a permissible\nbecause a necessary occupation, still is looked upon with disfavor for\nthe reason that the plow injures the beings living in the earth.[321]\n\nOn the other hand, the Zoroastrian code distinguishes between\nbeneficent and baneful creatures, declares the first to have been\ncreated by the good Ahura and the latter by the evil Ahriman, and\nmakes it the duty of the good man to protect and treat kindly all\nuseful animals, and to destroy all baneful creatures, including noxious\nplants, such as weeds and brambles. Hence tilling the soil is praised\nas an especially holy occupation, since the plow destroys the thistles\nand weeds sown by the evil-disposed Ahriman.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Duty of protecting the\npurity of the elements]\n\nAnother important department of Persian ethics was based on the idea of\nthe holiness of the elements--fire, earth, and water. Any defilement\nof these was a sin, in some cases an unpardonable sin. For instance,\nburying the corpse of a man or of an animal in the earth, and not\ndisinterring it within two years--\u201cfor that deed there is nothing that\ncan pay; ... it is a trespass for which there is no atonement for ever\nand ever.\u201d[322] Equally stringent were the prohibitions against the\npollution of the holy elements fire and water, through casting into\nthem any unclean matter.[323]\n\nWe shall perhaps best understand the moral value of such duties as we\nhave to do with in this division of Persian ethics, if we compare them\nwith those duties of the Christian code--Sabbath observances--which are\nbased on the idea of the holiness of a certain portion of time. The\nethical feelings evoked in the one case are akin to those evoked in the\nother.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The judgment of the\ndead; the soul the judge of the\nsoul]\n\nIn the Persian judgment of the soul after death we have the most\nprofound and spiritual conception of the rewards and punishments of\nthe hereafter that has found expression in the ethical teachings of\nany people. The soul is conceived as being judged by itself. Upon its\ndeparture from this life the soul of the faithful is met by a beautiful\nmaiden, \u201cfair as the fairest thing,\u201d who says to him: \u201cI am thy own\nconscience; I was lovely and thou madest me still lovelier; I was fair\nand thou madest me still fairer, through thy good thought, thy good\nspeech, and thy good deed.\u201d And then the soul is led into the paradise\nof endless light. But the soul of the wicked one is met by a hideous\nold woman, \u201cuglier than the ugliest thing,\u201d who is his own conscience.\nShe says to him: \u201cI am thy bad actions, O youth of evil thoughts, of\nevil words, of evil deeds, of evil religion. It is on account of thy\nwill and actions that I am hideous and vile.\u201d And then the soul is led\ndown into the hell of endless darkness.[324]\n\nThe remarkable thing about all this is that this profound and spiritual\nconception of \u201ca mental heaven and hell with which we are now familiar\nas the only future state recognized by intelligent people\u201d should\nhave found expression at the early period when the faith of the\nZend-Avesta was formulated. \u201cWhile mankind were delivered up to the\nchildish terrors of a future replete with horrors visited upon them\nfrom without, the early Iranian sage announced the eternal truth that\nthe rewards of Heaven and the punishments of Hell can only be from\nwithin. He gave us, we may fairly say, through the systems which he has\ninfluenced, that great doctrine of subjective recompense, which must\nwork an essential change in the mental habits of every one who receives\nit.\u201d[325]\n\n\nIII. THE PRACTICE\n\n\n[Sidenote: Effects of the moral\nideal upon the Persian character]\n\nIn setting for man as his chief moral task a courageous warfare\nagainst evil, the Zoroastrian ethics produced a certain exaltation of\ncharacter, and inspired strenuous activity motived by a deep sense of\nduty. It created, or concurred with other causes in creating, \u201ca race\nof zealous Puritans,\u201d a strong, self-reliant people, who disdained all\nasceticism and indolence.[326] Fasting, as we have seen, was regarded\nas a crime because it weakens the body and unfits one for active\nexertion.\n\nIt is instructive to place the masculine ideal of Persia alongside\nthe feminine ideal of Buddhist India and note the different effects\nof these strongly contrasted standards of goodness upon the races\naccepting them as the measure and rule of rational conduct and duty.\nThe Buddhist ideal, as we have seen, is made up largely of the gentler,\ncontemplative, passive virtues, the virtues of the recluse and the\nascetic. Its issue in character is quietism. In opposition to this, the\nZoroastrian ideal inspires sturdy, virile, active virtues, the moral\nqualities of the reformer, of the toiler and the fighter. The natural\neffect of the ideal was to confirm in the Persians all the seemingly\noriginal strong ethical qualities of the Iranic race.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Persian veneration for\nthe truth]\n\nWe have seen that one of the chief requirements of the Zoroastrian\ncode was truthfulness; man must be veracious even as Ahura Mazda is\nveracious. Various testimonies assure us that in respect to this virtue\nthere was in ancient Persia a commendable conformity of practice to\ntheory. The feeling for the beauty and nobility of truthfulness was\nmuch more fully developed among the Persians than among any other\npeople of ancient or modern times. They were a truth-revering and a\ntruth-speaking people. Lying was the great crime. To lie, to deceive,\nwas to be a follower of Ahriman, the god of lies and deceit. Hence\nlying was regarded as a species of treason against Ahura Mazda. \u201cThe\nmost disgraceful thing in the world,\u201d affirms Herodotus, in his account\nof the Persians, \u201cthey think, is to tell a lie; the next worse is to\nowe a debt, because, among other reasons, the debtor is obliged to\ntell lies.\u201d[327] In his report of the Persian system of education\nhe says, \u201cThe boys are taught to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak\nthe truth.\u201d[328] I was not wicked, nor a liar, is the substance and\npurport of many a record of the ancient kings. Rawlinson adduces\nthis as evidence of their veneration for truthfulness. \u201cThe special\nestimation in which truth was held among the Persians,\u201d he says, \u201cis\nevidenced in a remarkable manner by the inscriptions of Darius, where\n_lying_ is taken as the representative of all evil. It is the great\ncalamity of the usurpation of the pseudo-Smerdis, that \u2018then the _lie_\nbecame abounding in the land.\u2019 \u2018The Evil One (?) invented _lies_ that\nthey should deceive the state.\u2019 Darius is favored by Ormazd, \u2018because\nhe was not a heretic, nor a _liar_, nor a tyrant.\u2019 His successors are\nexhorted not to cherish, but to cast into utter perdition, \u2018the man who\nmay be a _liar_, or who may be an evildoer.\u2019 His great fear is lest\nit may be thought that any part of the record which he has set up has\nbeen \u2018_falsely_ related,\u2019 and he even abstains from relating certain\nevents of his reign \u2018lest to him who may hereafter peruse the tablet,\nthe many deeds that have been done by him may seem to be \u2018_falsely_\nrecorded.\u2019\u201d[329]\n\nThe Persian kings, shaming in this all other nations ancient and\nmodern, kept sacredly their pledged word;[330] only once were they ever\neven charged with having broken a treaty with a foreign power.[331]\n\nThat truthfulness was a national virtue of the Persians is further\nattested by the fact that Herodotus represents them as always relying\nimplicitly upon every tale told them by the lying Greeks whom they\nhad taken captive. It never seemed to occur to them that even an\nenemy could be guilty of so awful a blasphemy as lying. It was this\ntrait which led to their undoing at Salamis by the unscrupulous and\nmendacious Themistocles.[332]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Influence of the ideal\nupon Persian history]\n\nThat exaltation of character which we have remarked as springing\nnaturally from the moral dignity with which man was invested by being\nmade an associate of the good Ahura in his struggle with the wicked\nAhriman may be noticed especially in the aims and undertakings of\nthe Persian monarchs in the period before the moral decadence of the\nIranian civilization set in, and while the strength of the ethical\nappeal of the Zoroastrian ideal was yet unimpaired. This appears in\nall their records, which make the aim of their conquests to be the\noverthrow of the powers of evil and disorder and the setting up of\na kingdom of righteousness in the world. The inscriptions of Darius\nI read like the letters of the Puritan Cromwell. Indeed, just as it\nwas the masculine moral ideal of English Puritanism which helped to\nmake England great, and strong to play her part in the transactions\nof modern times, so we may believe it was the strenuous moral ideal\nof Zoroastrianism that helped to make Persia great, and strong to\nplay her great r\u00f4le in the affairs of the ancient world. In truth,\nthe ideal is still an unexpended force in history. It seems to have\ngiven immortality to the people that it inspired; for it can hardly be\ndoubted that it is largely owing to their active practical morality\nthat the Parsees in India, the representatives to-day of the old\nZoroastrian faith, constitute such a dominant element in the Indian\ncommunities of which they form a part.[333]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE MORAL EVOLUTION IN ISRAEL: AN IDEAL OF OBEDIENCE TO A REVEALED LAW\n\n\nI. THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF HEBREW MORALITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introductory: Israel\u2019s\nhistoric task a moral one]\n\nTo the pious Hebrew the rainbow, which to the esthetic Greek was merely\nthe beautiful pathway of Iris, the messenger of Olympus, was Yahweh\u2019s\nbow hung out from the dark retreating thundercloud as a sign of\nrighteous anger spent and the pledge of a divine covenant and promise.\nIn this ethical interpretation by the Hebrew spirit of this portent\nis foretokened the history and mission of ancient Israel. It was her\nallotted task to interpret in ethical terms the phenomena of the world\nof nature and the drama of human life and history. And it was her happy\nlot to become the teacher to mankind of the truth of an alone and\nrighteous God, and to be the creator of a moral ideal which is to-day\nthe highest ethical standard of all the races of the Western world, and\nthe most vital moral force at work in universal history.\n\nIn the short account which we shall give of Hebrew morality we shall\nadopt a mode of treatment somewhat different from that followed in\ndescribing the moral systems of the peoples already passed in review,\nfor the reason that in the case of the ancient Hebrews the historical\nmaterial is sufficiently abundant to enable us to trace step by\nstep the development of the ethical ideal and to watch the gradual\nclarification of the moral consciousness of the race.[334] Hence,\nafter speaking of the religious ideas which formed the basis of the\nmoral code, we shall sketch briefly the evolution of the rudimentary\nmorality of the tribal age of the nation into the high ideal of the\nprophets of the later time.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The conception of\ndeity; monolatry and monotheism]\n\nWe have seen how the Persian view of deity molded Persian morality. In\na still more decisive way did the Hebrew idea of God, of his character\nand his relation to Israel and the world, shape and mold the moral\nideal of the race.[335]\n\nWhen the Hebrews in the second millennium before Christ appeared in\nhistory, they were in possession of a stock of ideas concerning the\ngods which was, in all essentials save one, altogether like that held\nby their Semitic kinsmen of the various lands of southwestern Asia. The\nsingle essential point of difference between their religious belief\nand that of their neighbors was this: the nations about them were\npolytheists; they were monolatrists; that is, the Hebrews, while they\nbelieved in many gods, worshiped only one god, their tribal god Yahweh.\nAs Stade expresses it, \u201cthe old Israelite was a theoretical polytheist,\nbut a practical monotheist.\u201d[336]\n\nThere is scarcely need that we add in qualification of this, that when\nthe Hebrews first appeared in history they were not all monolatrists.\nThe multitude were then, and for a long time thereafter, polytheists.\nAll that can be affirmed is that in the earliest times of their history\nthere were among them teachers of monolatrism, teachers who inculcated\nthe duty of worshiping a single god, the patron and champion of the\nnation.\n\nThrough what experiences and under what tuition these teachers of\nIsrael made the passage in thought from polytheism to monolatrism we\nneed not now inquire. For our purpose we need simply note the fact and\nemphasize its supreme historical importance. It marks the beginning of\na divergent evolution in religious belief and ethical conviction which\nin the lapse of time was to lead Israel far apart from her Semitic\nkinsmen, and make her the standard bearer of a universal religion and\na universal morality. For monolatry was with the prophets and seers\nof Israel only the first step toward monotheism, the doctrine that\nthere is only one God, the Universal Father. This idea of deity was\nnot reached much before the time of the Second Isaiah. Along with\nthis later view of Yahweh there came the thought and conviction that\nhe is a God of absolute righteousness. This conception of God and of\nhis character was, as we shall see, an idea charged with the deepest\nsignificance not only for the ethical development in Israel but for the\nmoral life of all mankind.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The belief in a\nsupernaturally revealed law]\n\nAfter this conception of Yahweh, first as a jealous tribal deity\nand later as the sole God and Universal Father, the belief in a\nsupernaturally revealed law wherein all the duties of man were made\nknown was the most potent force in molding the moral ideal of Israel.\nIt was this belief which made the chief duty of man to be unquestioning\nobedience to the divine commandments; for the revealed law was the\nmeasure of duty--what it enjoined was right, what it forbade was wrong.\n\nThis investiture of an outer law, conceived to be of supernatural\norigin, with sovereign authority over man\u2019s every act, and the\nsubordination to it of the inner law of the individual conscience, had\nconsequences of vast importance for the ethical evolution not only\nin ancient Israel but also among all the peoples whose moral ideal\nwas essentially an inheritance from her. For where the full duty of\nman is made to consist in obedience to the minute requirements of an\nexternal law there is inevitably created a morality made up largely\nof artificial ritual duties, and as intelligence grows and the moral\nconsciousness deepens and clarifies, there necessarily arises a\nconflict between this conventional morality and the natural morality\nof the human reason and conscience. In such a conflict, in this way\ncreated, within the moral life of Israel centers the dramatic interest\nof her moral history.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Special ground of the\nIsraelites\u2019 feeling that obedience\nto the law was their highest duty]\n\nThere was a special reason why the Israelites felt that their first\nduty was absolute obedience to the revealed will of Yahweh. They\npossessed a tradition which told how their fathers were serfs in the\nland of Egypt; how Yahweh, through his servant Moses, had intervened in\ntheir behalf, and with a strong arm and with mighty signs had brought\nthem up out of the land of bondage; and how at Mt. Sinai he had entered\ninto a covenant with them in which he pledged to them his powerful\nprotection on condition of their fidelity in his worship and obedience\nto all his commandments.\n\nThis belief was the germ out of which grew most of what was unique in\nthe ethical development of Israel.[337] It played exactly the same\npart in creating and molding the religious conscience of Israel that\nthe Christian\u2019s belief in the descent of the Son of God into the world\nand his voluntary death to effect man\u2019s deliverance has had in molding\nthe religious conscience of Christendom. As we advance in our study we\nshall see how largely the moral consciousness of the Israelites was a\ncreation of this belief in a most sacred covenant between Yahweh and\ntheir fathers at the \u201cTerrible Mount\u201d in the wilderness.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The rite of sacrifice]\n\nWe have seen that religion on the lower levels of culture consists\nlargely in sacrifice; that is, in gifts or offerings either to the\nspirits of the dead or to the gods. The religion of the ancient Hebrews\ndid not differ in this respect from the religion of other peoples\nin the same stage of culture.[338] But the evolution of the rite of\nsacrifice among the Israelites differs from its development among all\nother peoples in that, under the influence of the Hebrew spirit, the\nrite was gradually reduced to symbolism and spiritualized. In this\nprocess it underwent the most remarkable metamorphoses. Beginning with\nmeat and drink offerings from man to God, it ends with God giving\nhimself a sacrifice for man. The system thus transformed became the\ngreat inspirer of ethical sentiment and a unique vehicle of moral\ninstruction.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The vagueness of the\nbelief in an after life]\n\nThe Israelite\u2019s thought of death and of the after life also reacted\npowerfully upon his moral feelings and colored all his ethical\nspeculations; for, like the conceptions held of God, the notions\nentertained of man\u2019s lot after death, as we have seen in the case of\nthe ancient Egyptians, has far-reaching consequences for the moral life.\n\nNow the Hebrew conception of the future state was the same as the\nBabylonian. Sheol, like the Babylonian Arallu, was a vague and shadowy\nregion beneath the earth, a sad and dismal place which received without\ndistinction the good and the bad. The same fate was allotted all who\nwent down to the grave: \u201cThe small and the great are there; and the\nservant is free from his master.\u201d[339] There was no return there for\ngood, or for evil: \u201cBut the dead know not anything, neither have they\nany more a reward.\u201d[340] Memory and hope were there dead: \u201cFor in death\nthere is no remembrance of thee.... They that go down into the pit\ncannot hope for thy truth.\u201d[341]\n\nWe shall see later how this vague and feebly held idea of the future\nlife reacted upon the evolution of the moral consciousness in Israel,\nhow deeply it influenced the troubled ethical speculations of the more\nthoughtful minds of the nation, and how it inspired theories of the\nmoral order of the world which have not yet lost their power over the\nthoughts and the conduct of men.[342] We need in this place merely to\npoint out how it was the absence of a clearly defined belief in a life\nof rewards and punishments in another world that created, or helped to\ncreate, the Messianic ideal, one of the most fruitful conceptions, in\nits ethical outcomes, that ever entered into the mind of man.\n\n\nII. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MORAL IDEAL\n\n\n_1. The Development up to the Exile_\n\n\n[Sidenote: The primitive moral\ncode]\n\nThe history of Hebrew morals is the record of a long and slow\nevolution. The primitive code with which the development began was\nthe code of Semitic nomadism. It was essentially the same as that\nwhich to-day governs the conduct of the practically unchanged kinsmen\nof the Hebrews, the Bedouin of Arabia and neighboring lands. It was\nthe morality of the kinship group.[343] The principle of communal\nresponsibility, which affords the key to a large part of the moral\nhistory of Israel, had not yet been challenged as unethical, and\nblood revenge was a most sacred duty. The circle covered by the moral\nfeelings was still narrow; there was practically no sentiment of duty\nor obligation toward tribes or nations outside the group of tribes\nconstituting the people of Israel. The conception of Yahweh as a\njealous national god prevented the growth of feelings which might have\nformed the basis of a true international morality. The wars which the\nIsraelites waged against their enemies were wars of ruthless slaughter\nand rapine.\n\nThis rudimentary morality is summarized in the Decalogue,[344] for the\nTen Commandments are indisputably of a high antiquity. One mark of the\nprimitive character of this legislation is the negative form of the\ncommandments.[345] Where there is need of the \u201cthou shalt not,\u201d the\nmoral life is still on a low plane. The aim and purpose of the law\nthus worded are restraint and repression. There is a wide interval in\nmoral chronology between the morality of the Ten Words and that of the\nSermon on the Mount. In this earlier code there is only the slightest\nrecognition of the truth that the truly moral life consists not in\nrefraining from evil but in doing good. The nomads of the desert for\nwhom these negative commands were framed, forbidding mostly crude,\ncoarse crimes, were evidently a long way yet from that level of moral\nattainment where the only law is the law of love and liberty.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moral anarchy of\nthe age of the Judges]\n\nThat period of transition which marks the passage of the Israelite\ntribes from the nomadic pastoral life of the desert to a settled\nagricultural life in Palestine may be instructively compared with that\ntransition period in the history of Europe which followed the migration\nof the German tribes and their settlement in the provinces of the\ndisrupted Roman Empire. It was an epoch characterized by the rapid\ndecay of the clan and tribal organization, with an accompanying loss of\nthe rude virtues of the nomadic and pastoral life, and the acquisition\nof the vices of the civilized or semicivilized communities among which\nthey had thrust themselves and whose lands they had forcibly seized.\n\nEspecially upon the religious system, which in Israel was ever closely\nbound up with morality, was felt the reaction of the new environment.\nMany foreign elements adopted from the Canaanite peoples were\nincorporated with it, while the national god Yahweh, as conceived by\nthe popular imagination, tended to become sanguinary, capricious, and\nunjust. He became eminently a god of war, and is for his people right\nor wrong. Thus a chief bulwark of morality was impaired. The result was\na moral interregnum. The old standards and rules of conduct lost their\nsanction. Every man did that which was right in his own eyes.[346]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Prophetism: its\ndifferent elements]\n\nThe necessities of the situation called into existence the monarchy\n(about 1050 B.C.). Then followed the disruption of the kingdom (about\n953 B.C.). The significant matter in the moral domain during the\nperiod of the united and the divided kingdom[347] was the appearance\nof teachers called prophets or seers, men who were believed to speak\nthe word given them by Yahweh. This emergence of prophetism in Israel\nis beyond controversy one of the most important phenomena in the moral\nhistory of the world.\n\nThere were in this prophetism various elements.[348] First, it\ncontained a nomadic element; that is, some of the prophets were men\nwho looked backward to the simple pastoral life of the desert as the\nideal moral life. They regarded civilization as the sum of all evils.\nTheir reading of history was, in the words of Wellhausen, that \u201cas the\nhuman race goes forward in civilization, it goes backward in the fear\nof God.\u201d Second, there was in it a socialistic element. These prophets\nwere the first socialists. Theirs was the first passionate plea for\nthe poor, the wretched, and the heavy-burdened. Third, it contained a\npredictive element. The prophets were regarded as seers, as foretellers\nof future events. Fourth, there was in this prophetism an element of\npure intuitional morality which was in irreconcilable antagonism to all\nlegal ritual morality. Fifth, it contained a monotheistic element. The\nlater prophets were distinctively teachers of the doctrine that there\nis only one God, beside whom there is no other.\n\nOf these several elements the predictive, or prophetic in the popular\nsense, has been given such undue prominence that Hebrew prophetism\nin the minds of many stands for little else than a supernatural\nforecasting of future events. But, in truth, this is the element of\nleast importance. In the words of Kuenen, the business of the prophets\nwas \u201cnot to communicate what shall happen, but to insist upon what\n_ought_ to happen.\u201d[349] They were preachers of individual and social\nrighteousness. It is this ethical element, forming the very heart and\ncore of their message, which makes the appearance of prophetism in\nIsrael a matter of such transcendent importance for universal history.\nOur main task in the following pages of this chapter will be to point\nout this moral element in the message of the prophets, to show how the\nconception of Yahweh was by them moralized, and how the morality they\ninculcated became purer and more elevated as the centuries passed,\ntill the evolution culminated in the lofty teachings of the Prophet of\nNazareth.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The beginnings of\nhistorical prophetism: Elijah and\nElisha]\n\nThe real history of Hebrew prophetism opens with the appearance in\nthe northern kingdom, about the beginning of the ninth century B.C.,\nof the great prophets Elijah and Elisha. It was the moral degeneracy\nof the times of the monarchy, the inrush of the hateful vices of\ncivilization,--the greed of land[350] and of wealth, the cruel\ninequalities of the new society, the selfish luxury of the rich, the\nharsh oppression of the poor, the forgetting of men\u2019s kinship, the\nsubstitution of the worship of other gods for the sole worship of\nYahweh,--it was all this which called out the vehement protest of these\nteachers of social justice and national righteousness.\n\nIt was, however, a very different prophetism from that of the later\nseers of Israel which was represented by these early teachers. There\nwas in it a large nomadic element. Its representatives looked back to\nthe times of the simple pastoral life of the fathers as the Golden Age\nof Israel. They hated civilization, that grossly material civilization\nwhich Israel, under the lead of an idolatrous and luxurious court, was\nnow adopting from the surrounding nations, and looked upon it as \u201cthe\nsum of all evils.\u201d They were, furthermore, monolatrists rather than\nmonotheists. They believed in sacrifice; but sacrifices must not be\noffered to strange gods--only to Yahweh. They were fanatical in their\nzeal for the worship of Israel\u2019s patron God; but even here there was\nan ethical element, for in their view the triumph of the worship of\nYahweh over that of the Baals meant a triumph of the simple, severe,\ndesert morality over the voluptuousness and the nameless vices of the\nCanaanite civilization.\n\nThis early prophetism, in a word, was a sort of Puritanism. Renan\ncalls it \u201cthis terrible prophetism.\u201d It was fierce, cruel, fanatical,\nintolerant, like English Puritanism. Indeed, it can best be studied\nin this modern seventeenth-century prophetism, which was essentially\na revival of it. But notwithstanding the imperfect character of\nthis early prophetism, because of the true ethical element it\ncontained,[351] its appearance in Israel and its successful fight\nagainst a sensuous idolatry was a matter of vast moral import, for\nhere in this narrow, intolerant monolatry is the real historical\nbeginning of that long religious-ethical development which lends chief\nsignificance to the story of Israel, and constitutes a main interest\nof the history of European civilization. In the words of Renan, \u201cThe\nprophetism which struggled under Ahab and triumphed under Jehu is ...\nupon the whole the most decisive event in the history of Israel. It\nforms the commencement of the chain which, after nine hundred years,\nfound the last link in Jesus.\u201d[352]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moral advance\nrepresented by Amos (760 B.C.) and\nHosea (738\u2013735 B.C.)]\n\nThe second link in this chain was formed by the prophets Amos and\nHosea, who delivered their message about the middle of the eighth\ncentury. Amos was the earlier. There is in his message the note of\ntrue prophetism. His thought of Yahweh is that he is a God who hates\niniquity and loves righteousness. What angers him is not idolatry or\nthe worship of other gods, but social wrongs and injustice--wickedness\nin every form. He is angry with Israel[353] because there has been\nstored up violence and robbery in the palace;[354] because of the\nluxury and self-indulgence of the rich; because of the treading upon\nthe poor and the taking from him burdens of wheat; because of the\ntaking of bribes and the turning aside of the poor in the gate from\ntheir right;[355] because of the falsifying of the balances by deceit\nthat the poor may be bought for silver and the needy for a pair of\nshoes.[356] And what pleases Yahweh is not fast days and sacrifices,\nbut justice and righteousness: \u201cI hate, ... I despise your fast\ndays,\u201d[357] declares Yahweh. \u201cThough ye offer me burnt offerings and\nmeat offerings, I will not accept.\u201d[358] \u201cBut let judgment run down as\nwater and righteousness as a mighty stream.\u201d[359]\n\nA generation later the prophet Hosea repeats the same message; namely,\nthat what angers Yahweh is moral evil--lying, swearing, stealing, and\nkilling. He puts in the mouth of Yahweh these words: \u201cFor I desire\nmercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt\nofferings.\u201d[360]\n\nThere is here a notable ethical advance over the word to Israel of the\nprophets of the preceding century. The thought of Amos and Hosea that\nit is social wrongdoing that angers Yahweh is indeed no new thought,\nfor we meet with this conception of the moral character of God in the\nteachings of the earlier prophets; what is new is the emphasis which is\nlaid upon it. Here we reach ethical monolatry;[361] ethical monotheism\nlies not far in the future.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ideal of the\nbrotherhood of nations and\nuniversal peace]\n\nThe morality of Amos and Hosea infolded the germ of ethical\ncosmopolitanism. The conviction that the government of Yahweh is\nfounded on absolute justice and righteousness led to the conviction of\nits ultimate universality, \u201cfor right is everywhere right, and wrong\nis everywhere wrong.\u201d The political situation in the Semitic world at\nthis time fostered the thought thus awakened. The predominant fact in\ninternational relations in the latter half of the eighth century was\nthe growth of the Assyrian Empire. In its expansion it had already\nengulfed many of the smaller states of western Asia, and Assyria had\nbecome a world power. Political unity suggested now, as it did when\nRome had established a world empire, religious and ethical unity.\nYahweh, Israel\u2019s God of justice and right, is the suzerain of all other\ngods and peoples. He will establish a world-wide kingdom, and all\nnations shall acknowledge his righteous rule.\n\nAs representatives of this broadening vision we have the great prophets\nIsaiah and Micah, who, proclaiming the universal reach of the law of\nright and justice, held aloft a noble ethical ideal of the brotherhood\nof nations and universal peace. Seers by virtue of their conviction of\nthe absoluteness, the oneness and sovereignty, of the moral law, they\nforetold the coming of a time in the last days when all the nations of\nthe earth should form a federation under the suzerainty of Israel with\nJerusalem as the world capital: \u201cOut of Zion shall go forth the law,\nand the word of the Lord from Jerusalem, and he shall judge among the\nnations, and shall rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords\ninto ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall\nnot lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any\nmore.\u201d[362]\n\nThis is the first distinct expression in Hebrew literature, or in that\nof any race, of the idea of the brotherhood of man and a federated\nworld. The lofty ideal has never faded from the eyes of men. It has\ninspired all the noblest visions of world unity and peace through\nthe war-troubled ages, and is in the world of to-day the source and\nspring of much of that ethical idealism which with prophetic faith\nand conviction proclaims a federated world, with the nations dwelling\ntogether in peace and amity, as the one divine event toward which all\nhistory moves.\n\nWith this lofty ethical universalism in the teachings of Isaiah and\nMicah was joined a simple personal and social morality of the human\nheart and reason. These prophets were at one with Amos and Hosea in\nproclaiming that what Yahweh delights in is not sacrifices and the\nobservance of new moons and Sabbaths, but cleanliness of life and\nservices of love. Hear Isaiah as he repeats the words of the Lord: \u201cI\ndelight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats....\nYour new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth.... Cease to\ndo evil; learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed,\njudge the fatherless, plead for the widow.\u201d[363] And listen to Micah:\n\u201cWherewith shall I come before the Lord and bow myself before the high\nGod? Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a\nyear old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams and with ten\nthousands of rivers of oil?... He hath shewed thee, O man, what is\ngood; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to\nlove mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?\u201d[364]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The prophetic spirit\ncreates a unique ethical\nliterature]\n\nThe prophets of the eighth century were the first of the literary\nprophets; that is, the first of those who employed literature as\nthe vehicle of their message to Israel. Hence here our attention is\ncalled to a matter of supreme significance for universal morality--the\nethicalizing of the mythology and traditional history of the Hebrew\npeople.\n\nIt was during the age of the kings that the mass of cosmological myths\nand legends borrowed from Babylonia,--doubtless largely through contact\nwith Assyria,--the traditions of the patriarchs, and the story of the\nsojourn in Egypt and the Exodus, all of which had been transmitted\nfrom the foretime orally or in writing, was worked over and edited\nafresh, in which process it received the indelible stamp of the deeper\nand truer moral consciousness of this later age. For though probably\nlittle of this work was done by the prophets themselves, it was done\nby men who wrote under the inspiration of the new thoughts of God and\nof his moral government which had been awakened in the souls of the\ngreat teachers of Israel. The polytheistic elements of these myths and\ntraditions and their grosser and more archaic immoralities were pruned\naway, while at the same time they were given a monotheistic cast and\na truer morality was breathed into them. In a word, all this literary\nmaterial was censored by the growing moral consciousness of Israel.\nThe outcome was the creation of a literature absolutely unique in its\nmoral educative worth.\n\nThus the remolded and moralized Chaldean account of the creation of the\nworld and the beginnings of human history came to form the basis of\nthe opening chapters of Genesis, whose influence upon Hebrew morality,\nthrough molding Israel\u2019s idea of the character of Yahweh and of his\nrelations to man, it would hardly be possible to exaggerate. Also the\ntradition of the Exodus, given now its final form and received by the\nlater generations of Israel as an historically true account of the\nexperiences of their fathers, left an ineffaceable impress upon the\nmind and heart of the Hebrew nation, determining largely their ideas\nas to their chief moral obligations as the chosen and covenanted\npeople of Yahweh. It was this tradition of their heroic past which was\nthe inspiration of the moral strivings of the nation. Furthermore,\nall this literary material, thus reshaped and colored by the growing\nmonotheistic ideas of the teachers of Israel and bearing the stamp\nof their gradually deepening moral consciousness, and in this form\ntransmitted to the Aryan nations of the West, was destined to become\none of the most important factors not merely in the religious but\nespecially in the moral life of the European peoples.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethicalizing of\npagan festivals and cults]\n\nJust as the myths and traditions, in part borrowed from neighboring\npeoples and in part transmitted from Israel\u2019s own foretime, were\ntransformed and moralized by the ethical genius of the Hebrew spirit,\nso were the institutions and festivals borrowed by the Israelites\nfrom kindred Semitic peoples, and particularly from the Canaanites,\ntransmuted and moralized.[365] Permeated by the ethical spirit of\nIsrael\u2019s great teachers and transformed into moral symbols, these\noriginally nonethical agricultural cults and festivals were given a\ndistinct educative value.\n\nAmong these pagan institutions thus moralized was the festival or rest\nday of the Sabbath.[366] Filled with ethical meaning and consecrated\nto a religious-moral purpose, this originally pagan lunar festival was\nmade a most important means of moral instruction and discipline.[367]\nThis borrowing and moralizing by Israel of this festival has an almost\nexact parallel in the later borrowing and moralizing by the Christian\nChurch of the pagan festival of the winter solstice, which has given\nChristendom one of its most beautiful anniversaries, one which takes\nprecedence of all others in its power to evoke the tenderest altruistic\nsentiments.\n\nAs with the Sabbath, so was it with all the festivals which the\nIsraelites, after their settlement in Palestine and during the period\nwhen they were passing from the nomadic to the agricultural life,\nadopted from the Canaanite peoples among whom they were dwelling. All\nof these in the course of time were turned from their original purpose,\nwere cleansed of immoral and sensuous elements, and were thus made the\nmeans of awakening moral feelings and developing moral character.\n\nThis transforming power of the ethical genius of Israel finds a true\nhistorical parallel in the esthetic genius of ancient Hellas, which,\nreceiving from every side elements of art and general culture, inspired\nthem all with the beauty and energy of her own spirit.[368] \u201cIsrael,\u201d\nas Cornill finely says, \u201cresembles in spiritual things the fabulous\nKing Midas, who turned everything he touched into gold.\u201d\n\n\n[Sidenote: The dual morality of\nthe Deuteronomic code]\n\nThe effect of the capture of Samaria by the Assyrians in 722 B.C. and\nthe carrying away into captivity of the flower of the Ten Tribes was to\nput an end to prophetism in the North and to make Judah in the South\nthe center of the movement which had such significance for the moral\nlife of the world.\n\nDuring the century and a half that passed between the fall of the\nnorthern kingdom and the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonian\nKing Nebuchadnezzar, only one great prophet appeared in Judah. This was\nJeremiah, who prophesied in the reign of King Josiah, just a little\ntime before the Captivity.\n\nIt was during the reign of this king that there appeared a book which,\nexcepting the Gospels of the New Testament, has had a greater influence\nupon the general evolution of morality than any other book ever\nwritten. This was a work known as the Book of Deuteronomy, that is, the\nrepetition of the law. Before the discovery of the Laws of Hammurabi\nthis was the oldest known code of laws.\n\nThe book contains much archaic material--traditions, customs, judicial\ndecisions, laws, and rituals--manifestly handed down from the earliest\ntimes in Israel, with additions made at the moment of its appearance,\nand all bearing plainly the stamp of the spirit and temper of these\nlater times. Hence it comes that there are two moralities embodied\nin the work--an atavistic ritual morality and a progressive social\nmorality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ritual ethics of\nthe code]\n\nIn that part of the code which has to do with the ethics of ritualism\nthe dominant motive of the editors or compilers springs from a dread\nand abhorrence of idolatry, like the dread and abhorrence of heresy\nin medieval Christendom. Yahweh will divide his worship with no other\ngod. Israel had gone after other gods and Yahweh had given her into\nthe hands of the Assyrians. A like fate awaited Judah if she served\nany other than him: \u201cYe shall not go after other gods, or the gods\nof the people which are round about you, lest the anger of the Lord\nbe kindled against thee, and destroy thee from off the face of the\nearth,\u201d[369] is the first commandment with threatening.\n\nFear that Yahweh would do unto Judah as he had done unto Israel\nawakened the conscience of the nation. Idolatry was suppressed; the\nhigh places on which incense was burned unto the Baals were defiled,\nand the altars and the images of the strange gods were broken down and\nground into dust.\n\nThis reform movement practically ended the long struggle which had\ngone on now for six hundred years and more between polytheism and the\nrising monotheism of the people of Israel. But unfortunately while\nthe monotheistic element of the religion of Yahweh was brought out by\nthe reform in sharper outline, the ethical element was obscured. The\nreligion that was now made the exclusive worship was really little\nmore than a pagan cult. It consisted in the careful keeping of feast\ndays and the observance of the rites and sacrifices of the Temple--an\ninheritance largely from the heathen nations around about Israel.\nNothing could have been more opposed to true prophetism. It was the\ntriumph of reactionary ritualism.\n\nThis victory of ritualism has exerted an almost incalculable influence\nupon the development of morality from the time of King Josiah down to\nthe present day. The immediate effect upon prophetism in Judah was most\nlamentable. \u201cDeuteronomy simply confirmed the belief that religion\nwas concerned with ritual rather than with morality.\u201d[370] And so the\noutcome of the promulgation of a written revealed law was, in the words\nof Wellhausen, \u201cthe death of prophecy.\u201d[371]\n\nBut this fatal effect was not felt at once. In the dark days of the\nExile, now just at hand, there was a revival of true prophetism; but\nafter the return from the Captivity, as we shall see, the prophetic\nspirit was almost stifled by the rigid legalism of the Temple cult.\nAnd it was this same Deuteronomic law which, in the hands of medieval\ninquisitors, stifled awakening prophetism in Europe and delayed for\ngenerations true moral reform after the stirring of the European mind\nby the Renaissance.[372]\n\nThe intolerant spirit of this narrow, rigid religion of ritualism\nfound specially sinister expression in Israel\u2019s war ethics. Instead of\npromoting international amity and good will, it deepened intertribal\nprejudices and hatreds and intensified the barbarities of war. \u201cThou\nshalt save alive nothing that breatheth;\u201d[373] \u201cthou shalt smite them\nand utterly destroy them, thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor\nshow mercy unto them,\u201d[374] were the commands to Israel regarding the\nnations round about her who were the worshipers of other gods than\nYahweh.\n\nThus religion was made an active principle of international savagery.\nIt made it, in the words of Cheyne, \u201cdifficult, if not impossible,\n... to love God fervently without hating a large section of God\u2019s\ncreatures.\u201d[375] Under the influence of the fierce ordinances of the\nDeuteronomic code the war practices of the Israelites became more\nferocious and savage than those of any other nation of antiquity,\nunless it be those of the Assyrian kings. Their enemies, who were also\nthe enemies of Yahweh, they smote with the utmost fury, putting to the\nedge of the sword men, women, and the little ones, and taking as booty\nthe cattle and the spoils.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The social ethics of\nthe code]\n\nBut, as we have said, there were two spirits striving together in\nthis strange Deuteronomic code. In opposition to this spirit of stern\nfanatical intolerance there was a spirit of tender sympathy for the\nunfortunate, the poor, and the oppressed.[376] Along with this priestly\nmorality, based on a certain conception of Yahweh and of his relations\nto Israel, there was another wholly different morality--a social\nmorality whose chief sanctions were the natural impulses and sentiments\nof the human heart and conscience.\n\nThis code of social ethics bears witness to a progressive development\nof the moral consciousness in Israel. The ethical advance is\nunmistakably registered in various ameliorations effected in the crude\ncustomary law of earlier times. One of the most noteworthy of these\nmitigations concerned the primitive blood revenge. In common with other\npeoples in the kinship stage of culture, the early Hebrews in their\npursuit of blood vengeance made no distinction between intentional\nand unintentional homicide. The regulations of the Deuteronomic code\nregarding the so-called cities of refuge[377] bear witness to a growing\npower of moral discrimination; for these cities are made inviolable\nsanctuaries whither might flee the manslayer who had slain his neighbor\nunawares and hated him not in time past.[378]\n\nEspecially is the humanitarian advance shown in the provisions of\nthe code which relate to the poor, the debtor, and the bondsman. We\nmeet here some of the most humane regulations to be found in any of\nthe codes of antiquity. Social morality is almost made to consist in\nconsideration for the poor: \u201cIf there be among you a poor man ...\nthou shalt open thine hand wide unto him\u201d--so the law enjoins--\u201cand\nshalt surely lend him sufficient for his need.\u201d[379] Things that\nwere necessities to the poor man were not to be taken as security\nfor a loan: \u201cNo man shall take the nether or the upper millstone to\npledge.\u201d[380] If a garment be taken as security, this must be returned\nbefore night, in order that the man may sleep in his own raiment.[381]\nThe widow\u2019s raiment must not be taken in pledge at all.[382] The wages\nof the poor and needy must be promptly paid: \u201cAt his day thou shalt\ngive him his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it; for he is\npoor, and setteth his heart upon it.\u201d[383]\n\nThe law goes even further in its humane endeavor to prevent the\noppression of the needy. The loaning of money in ancient times was\nin general a very different thing from similar money transactions\nin this commercial and industrial age of ours. Those seeking loans\nwere the very poor, who were forced to borrow to meet domestic\nnecessities. Under such conditions the taking of interest would\nnaturally be denounced, and those who did so would come to be regarded\nas extortioners, and robbers of the poor. Hence the prohibition, \u201cThou\nshalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; ... unto a stranger thou\nmayest lend upon usury.\u201d[384]\n\nThis legislation, well adapted to the times and the conditions of the\nsociety for which it was enacted, became centuries later, through its\nadoption and attempted enforcement by the medieval Church, a source of\ngrave mischief. It constituted a heavy drag for centuries upon the\nindustrial development of European civilization.\n\nThe same spirit of tenderness toward the portionless and needy is shown\nin the provision concerning the ingathering of the harvest: \u201cWhen thou\ncuttest down thine harvest in thy field, and hast forgot a sheaf in\nthe field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it; it shall be for the\nstranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow.\u201d[385] This tender\nconsideration for the poor speaks from one of the most beautiful of\nBible pictures--that of the Moabitess Ruth gleaning in the fields\nafter the reapers, who \u201clet fall some of the handfuls of purpose for\nher.\u201d[386]\n\nThe social conscience awakening in Israel, to which the above\nregulations and commandments bear witness, finds further expression in\nthe provisions of the code effecting ameliorations in the lot of the\nunfortunate bondsman. The master is enjoined to see that the Sabbath\nis observed by his slave as well as by himself and his family, and the\nreason assigned is the humanitarian one--\u201cthat thy manservant and thy\nmaidservant may rest as well as thou.\u201d[387] And a limitation was set to\nthe time that a person could be held in bondage: \u201cAnd if thy brother,\nan Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and serve thee\nsix years; then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from\nthee.\u201d[388] Furthermore, the law is solicitous respecting the welfare\nof the bondsman even after emancipation: \u201cAnd when thou sendest him\nout free from thee, thou shalt not let him go away empty. Thou shalt\nfurnish him liberally out of thy flock, and out of thy threshing floor,\nand out of thy winepress: of that wherewith the Lord thy God hath\nblessed thee thou shalt give unto him.\u201d[389]\n\nTo these ameliorative measures effect is sought to be given through\na revival of memories of the past. The masters are enjoined to be\ncompassionate to their bondsmen because they themselves had been worn\nand bruised in bondage: \u201cRemember,\u201d says the lawgiver, \u201cthat ye were\nbondsmen in the land of Egypt.\u201d[390]\n\n\n_2. The Morality of the Prophets of the Exile_\n\n\n[Sidenote: The effects of the\nCaptivity upon the moral evolution\nin Israel]\n\nWe have reached now a turning point in the moral history of Israel.\nSpeaking of the effects of the Exile upon the inner life of Israel,\nRenan uses these words: \u201cTwice it was the fate of Israel to owe its\nsalvation to that which is the ruin of others, and to be recalled by\nthe crushing of its earthly hopes to a sense of its great duties toward\nhumanity.\u201d\n\nThe mission of Israel, her duty toward humanity, was, as we have said,\nto interpret life in ethical terms. As the story of the exilic and the\npostexilic period unfolds, we shall see how the sad experiences of the\nExile purified and deepened the moral consciousness of Israel, and\nprepared her for the great part she was destined to play in the moral\neducation of mankind.\n\nIt was the great unknown prophet of the Exile, the so-called Second\nIsaiah, who wrote just after the capture of Babylon by the Persian king\nCyrus (539 B.C.), who was the representative of the essentially new\nconceptions of Yahweh and of the requirements of the moral law which\ncharacterize this ethical development.[391]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethical monotheism at\nlast; religion and morality at one]\n\nShut out from participation in political affairs, the best energies\nof the exiled community seem to have been turned to the things of the\ninner life, and consequently the development in the religious and moral\nspheres went on apace. The conception of God--of what is pleasing to\nhim and what he requires of man--was elevated and purified.\n\nWe meet now for the first time monotheism pure and absolute. Yahweh is\nconceived as the only God; the gods of the other nations are no gods\nat all. Some of the earlier prophets had, it is true, caught sight of\nthis lofty truth; but the multitude of the people certainly had no such\nidea of their patron god. The prophets of the Exile are the first to\nproclaim this doctrine with such emphasis as to cause it to become a\npart of the indestructible religious consciousness of Israel.[392]\n\nOne cannot read the declarations which the unknown prophet puts in the\nmouth of Yahweh--\u201cBefore me there was no God formed, neither shall\nthere be after me;\u201d[393] \u201cI am the first and I am the last; and besides\nme there is no God;\u201d[394] \u201cI am Yahweh who wrought everything, who\nstretched forth the heavens above, who spread forth the earth--who\nwas with me;\u201d[395] \u201cI am Yahweh and there is none beside me;\u201d[396]\n\u201cI am God, and there is none else, I am God, and there is none like\nme\u201d[397]--one cannot read these declarations without being convinced\nthat they were not phrased by one to whom the idea of the unity of God\nhad become a commonplace, but rather by one to whom the thought was\nsomething in the nature of a discovery.[398]\n\nBut it was not merely the idea of the oneness of deity, of Yahweh as\nthe sole God, that was the element of supreme significance in this\npractically new thought of God. There is nothing unethical in the\nbelief in many gods; nor, on the other hand, is there anything ethical\nin the belief that there is only one God. The historically important\nthing about the monotheism of Israel is that it was ethical monotheism.\nUp to the time of the Exile the multitude in Israel, notwithstanding\nthe teachings of the prophets Amos and Hosea, Isaiah and Micah, had\nnever thought of Yahweh as an absolutely just god, but rather as one\nwho would favor his people under all circumstances. Put in the language\nof to-day, they conceived Yahweh as a partisan, who would be for his\npeople right or wrong. But under the discipline of the Exile the\nmore spiritual-minded of the nation came to accept the teaching that\nYahweh\u2019s favor \u201cis conditioned by a law of absolute righteousness.\u201d[399]\n\nThis conception of God marks a turning point in the moral evolution\nof humanity. It lifted a new ethical standard. It effected a union of\nreligion and morality. This, it is true, was not a wholly new thing in\nhistory. In the worship of the good Osiris in Egypt these elements had\nbeen united; in the Zoroastrian worship of Ahura Mazda they had also\nbeen brought together; and at this very time in Greece there was an\neffort being made to unite them in the worship of the Delphian Apollo.\nBut the union effected by the prophets of Israel was the only one\ndestined to have large and permanent historical consequences. Because\nof the ethical content given the god idea by them, their conception\nof deity constituted the most precious part of the spiritual heritage\nbequeathed by Judaism to Christianity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Repudiation of\nthe doctrine of collective\nresponsibility]\n\nThe progressive clarification of the moral consciousness in Israel\ndisclosed by this truer conception of the divine character is further\nshown by the definite and emphatic repudiation by the prophets of the\nExile of the doctrine of collective responsibility.[400]\n\nThere was an ironical proverb current in Israel, which, expressing\nbitter protest against the unequal ways of Yahweh in visiting the sins\nof the fathers upon the children,[401] ran thus: \u201cThe fathers have\neaten sour grapes, and the children\u2019s teeth are set on edge.\u201d[402] The\nprophet Ezekiel says to the people that they shall not have occasion\nany more to use this proverb.[403] With clear moral vision he sees\nhow impossible it is that the moral government of Yahweh should rest\nupon the principle of collective responsibility, and that the innocent\nshould be punished for the guilty. Declaring that the ways of God are\njust and equal, he annuls all earlier provisions of the law by boldly\nproclaiming that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,\nneither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son.[404]\n\nIt marks a great moral advance when guilt comes thus to be viewed as\na personal and not a communal thing. But unfortunately the ground\nhere gained for morality was lost when the theologians of the early\nChristian Church, reviving the outgrown conception of collective\nresponsibility, formulated the dogma that all the generations of\nmen--such being the solidarity of the human race--are partakers in the\nsin of the first parents and under condemnation therefor.[405]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of the\nsufferings of the righteous as\nvicarious and expiatory]\n\nBut the decisive rejection by the deepening moral consciousness in\nIsrael of the doctrine that under the moral government of Yahweh the\ninnocent are punished for the guilty left still unsolved the problem\nof the sufferings of the righteous--that problem which had at all\ntimes so troubled the pious Israelite, and for the solution of which\nso many different theories had been framed. The new teaching, or the\nimplication of the new teaching, that such sufferings are not penal\nin character, that they are no sign of God\u2019s displeasure with the\nsufferer, while a teaching of consolation, contributed nothing to the\nactual solution of the problem. But a new theory now offers a new\ninterpretation. This theory assumes that all transgression must be\natoned for by suffering, but teaches that this suffering may be borne\nvicariously by one not the transgressor, and the guilt thereby expiated.\n\nThis idea worked itself out in the sorrow-burdened souls of the pious\nexiles in Babylon. Never did acquaintance with bitter sorrow yield\nsweeter fruit. The thought finds expression in Chapters LII and LIII\nof Isaiah.[406] The righteous Servant of Yahweh, who is despised and\nrejected of men, a man of sorrow and acquainted with grief, is the\npersonified community of the pious Israelites, who are wounded for the\ntransgressions and bruised for the iniquities of the nation.[407]\n\nOf all the ethical products of the troublous life of Israel, this\nidea that under the moral government of the world one may vicariously\nbear the burden of another\u2019s fault and thus atone for it was the most\nimportant in its historical consequences. Six hundred years after\nthe utterance of this message of consolation to the pious Israelite\nexiles, the ideal of the suffering Servant of Yahweh, thus held aloft\nby the Great Unknown, was incarnated, so it was believed, in Jesus of\nNazareth. Clothed in actual flesh and blood, the sweet persuasiveness\nof the ideal--the nobility and divineness of suffering voluntarily\nborne in the stead of another--made unwonted appeal to the heart of\nhumanity, and for eighteen hundred years and more, accepted as a true\nsymbol and interpretation of the moral order, it has been a chief\nmolding force in the moral life of the Western world.\n\n\n_3. The Moral Life in the Postexilic Age_\n\n\n[Sidenote: A ritual morality]\n\nThe chief moral fact in the postexilic period[408] was the putting\ninto strict practice of the Levitical and Deuteronomic law, and the\nconsequent triumph of ritual morality. From the establishment of this\nlaw till the rise of Christianity, orthodox morality in Judah consisted\nin the careful observance of the thousand and one minute rules and\nrequirements of this Temple code. The good man was he who kept the law\nof the Lord.[409] All duties were in a sense religious duties; they\nwere acts performed simply because of the supposed divine command that\nthey should be performed.[410]\n\nSuch dependence as this on rules and forms and rites is of course\ndisastrous to all true morality. It fosters the idea that morality\nconsists in the performance of certain outer acts, instead of being the\nattitude of the soul toward the good and the right inwardly discerned.\nIt substitutes an outer standard for the individual conscience.\nConscience disused loses its power of discrimination and becomes\natrophied. The ethically indifferent is made the all-important, and\nthus all moral values are confused.\n\nWhat confusion resulted in Israel is revealed in the denunciations\nof this rigid, mechanical legalism by the Prophet of Nazareth: \u201cWoe\nunto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint\nand anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the\nlaw, judgment, mercy, and faith; these ought ye to have done, and not\nto leave the other undone.\u201d[411] \u201cNot that which goeth into the mouth\ndefileth a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth.... To eat with\nunwashen hands defileth not a man.\u201d[412]\n\nThe Sermon on the Mount announces the awakening of the true prophetic\nspirit in Israel after a sleep of five hundred years.\n\n\n[Sidenote: An intolerant\nnationalism]\n\nA sinister phase of the orthodox religious-ethical system of the\npostexilic age was its narrow, intolerant nationalism. To be an enemy\nof Israel was what was believed to constitute wickedness, and to\nexcite the wrath of Yahweh, just as later in the ethics of certain\nsystems of Christian theology the unbeliever or pagan, merely because\nof his unbelief or paganism, was regarded as wicked and as deserving\nof eternal punishment. In psalms which date from this period these\nenemies of Yahweh are cursed with a fierce hatred which spares not even\nthe children, but pronounces happy him who shall take up and dash the\nlittle ones against the stones.[413] Nowhere in history do we meet with\na more fanatically intolerant nationalism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The relation of the\nsynagogue to the moral evolution]\n\nIt was only a comparatively small part of the Jewish nation whose\nhome was the city of Jerusalem in the later postexilic period. The\nIsraelite community was now widely scattered in the cities of the East\nand the West. One important outcome of this, in its bearings upon the\nmoral life of Israel and of the nations that were to receive ethical\ninstruction from her, was the establishment of the synagogue.[414]\nFor the Deuteronomic code had made religion to be something connected\nwith the Temple, something separate and apart from true morality,\nwhose root is in human relationships. Now the Dispersion, tearing the\nIsraelites away from the Temple, tended to bring into prominence those\nreligious exercises and those duties which had nothing to do with the\nTemple service. This was favorable to the religion and morality of\nthe prophets, as opposed to the religion and morality of the priests.\nThe services of the synagogue took the place of the ceremonies and\nsacrifices of the Temple.[415] These services consisted in the\nreading and translation of a portion of the Scriptures with comments\nthereupon.[416] This meant the incoming of a new and powerful agency\nin the promotion not only of the religious but also of the moral\neducation of humanity, for this custom \u201cwas the origin of the homily\nand sermon.\u201d[417] The synagogue was the prototype and precursor of the\nChristian basilica and the Puritan meetinghouse.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The new doctrine of\nimmortality: its ethical import]\n\nThe re\u00ebstablishment of the Law we have pronounced the chief ethical\nfact in the history of Judaism after the return from the Babylonian\nCaptivity. And this is true if it is the history of the Jews alone that\nwe have in mind; but regarding the moral evolution in the world at\nlarge there is another fact belonging to this period of even greater\nimportance. This was the incoming of the doctrine of immortality.[418]\n\nWe have seen that from the first the Hebrews, like the Babylonians,\nheld a belief in a sort of shadowy existence after death;[419] but of a\nbelief in personal immortality in our sense of the word, of a life of\nrewards and punishments beyond the grave, there is no certain trace in\nHebrew literature until about the third or second century B.C.[420]\n\nDifferent influences had concurred to create this new conception of\nthe hereafter and to secure for it by the end of the Greek period a\nwide acceptance. First, there was what has been called the subjective\nsense of fellowship with God. During this period of Israelite history\nthere was engendered in select souls a passionate outreaching after\ndivine companionship. This feeling is revealed in many a postexilic\npsalm, as where the psalmist exclaims, \u201cFor thou wilt not leave my\nsoul to Sheol; neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one [beloved] to\nsee corruption.\u201d[421] This was the divination of love like that of the\nold mystic who exclaimed, \u201cO God, if I should die, Thou couldst not\nlive.\u201d[422] It was such filial love and trust as this, which found its\ndivinest expression in the life of \u201cthe Sublime Mystic of Galilee,\u201d\nthat created in many a devout soul in Israel that larger hope which\ngave birth to the doctrine of personal immortality.\n\nBut while it was probably deep religious feeling, the soul\u2019s\nrecognition of its sonship to God, that called into existence the idea\nof personal immortality, it was the ethical necessity created by a\nprofound faith in God\u2019s absolute justice, an irrefragable conviction\nthat under the moral government of the world well-doing will be\nrewarded and evildoing punished, that gained for the doctrine its wide\nacceptance. That good men should be afflicted and wicked men should\nenjoy prosperity, has in all ages of reflection caused questionings\nand murmurings. But this ethical problem filled with peculiar unrest\nthe souls of the Israelites, first, because more than any other\npeople they felt the need of a just God; and second, because of their\nlack of belief in a future life of rewards and punishments in which\nthe wrongs and inequalities of this life might be righted. Hence\nthe many different solutions of the problem which they thought out,\nand through which they sought to justify the ways of God to man. So\nlong, however, as life practically ended at the grave, the problem\nremained insolvable. But the doctrine of another existence in which\nthe righteous man should receive compensation for his sufferings here,\nand the evil man just retribution for his deeds, offered a reasonable\nsolution of the problem that had so troubled the conscience of Israel.\nIt was this undoubtedly that caused the teaching to gain popular\ncurrency.\n\nThe doctrine, however, was not wholly the product of the religious\nand ethical development within Israel. Its growth was fostered by\nvarious outside influences. Among these was the Persian doctrine\nof the resurrection and a future life of retributive justice, with\nwhich the Jews became familiar at the time of the Exile in Babylon or\nlater in the Persian period. Then again the development of the idea\nwas stimulated, after the third century B.C., by Greek philosophy,\nparticularly the Platonic.\n\nBut far more influential than either Zoroastrian teachings or Greek\nphilosophy must have been the thought and conviction of ancient Egypt.\nAfter the founding of Alexandria, toward the end of the fourth century\nB.C., a vast number of Jews were settled in that capital; and though\nthe positive evidence here is very meager, still we have a right to\nsomething more than a conjecture that in that city Judaism was deeply\ninfluenced by the ancient Egyptian doctrine of immortality.[423]\n\nUnder these various influences this doctrine rooted itself firmly among\nthe Jews, and by the time of the appearance of Christ had become a\ndistinctive tenet of a large and influential party among them.[424]\n\nAfter the conception of a just God and the ideal of the suffering\nServant of Yahweh, this doctrine of immortality, with its correlate\nteaching of future rewards and punishments, was perhaps the most\nimportant product, in its moral consequences, of the life and ethical\nexperiences of ancient Israel. It exercised little or no influence, at\nleast no decisive influence, upon the moral evolution in Judaism, but,\nadopted by Christianity, it was given new force and currency, and for\neighteen hundred years and more has been one of the great bulwarks and\nsanctions of morality in the Western world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The expansion of\nthe moral sympathies in the\nHellenistic Age]\n\nWe have spoken of the rigid legalism and the narrow nationalistic\nspirit of orthodox postexilic Judaism. But it must not be thought\nthat in these last days the spirit of prophetism was dead. Hidden\nbeneath this hard rind of legalism there pulsed a true moral life. This\nlife found expression in a movement toward ethical universalism. To\nunderstand this movement we must recall the great political revolution\nof this epoch.\n\nAlmost exactly two centuries after the return of the Jews from the\nBabylonian Captivity, all the political relations of the Semitic East\nwere abruptly ended and new relations established by the conquests of\nAlexander the Great. Hellenism, the most powerful solvent of history,\nnow came in contact with Hebrew life and thought both in Palestine\nand in Egypt. The effect upon the ethical development in Judaism was\nprofound. With the expansion of the political and mental horizons\nthe moral sympathies of men were widened. The wall of separation\nbetween Jew and Gentile was thrown down. In Alexandria and in the\nmany new Hellenistic cities in Asia, the nobler spirits of dispersed\nIsrael, casting aside their narrow racial prejudices, with enlarged\nmental vision and widened moral sympathies, came to read with new\nunderstanding their great prophets who had preached the universality of\nthe moral law and the brotherhood of nations.[425] Hebrew literature\nregisters the change. This new spirit of internationalism, of\nkindness and justice even to enemies, breathes from many of the later\npsalms[426] and speaks from many a passage of the so-called \u201cwisdom\nbooks\u201d of the period. The allegory of Jonah embodies the liberal spirit\nof this new Judaism. The great lawyers Hillel and Shammai,[427] who\nlaid emphasis upon social duties and human service, represented the\nhumanitarian phase of the age movement. Philo, the Alexandrian Jew,\nrepresented its philosophical side. The way was being prepared for the\nincoming of the ethical universalism of Christianity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF HELLAS: AN IDEAL OF SELF-REALIZATION\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introduction]\n\nThe Greek ethical ideal, a creation of the natural feelings and\nimpulses of the human mind and heart uninfluenced by theological\ndoctrines, was one of the most imperishable products of Greek life\nand thought. This conception of what constitutes good life became a\npart of the Greek bequest to civilization. The modern world is thus\nindebted to Greece not only for priceless elements of its intellectual\nand art life, but for precious elements of its moral life as well.\nThroughout the medieval age, it is true, it was the ethical heritage\nfrom Judea that shaped and colored the moral ideal of the European\npeoples, but even during that period this Semitic ideal bore the deep\nimpress of Greek ethics, while ever since the Renaissance it is the\nethical bequest of Hellas which has steadily become an ever more and\nmore dominant factor in the moral life of the Western nations. The\nconscience of the modern world of science is Hellenic rather than\nHebraic.\n\n\nI. INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS DETERMINING THE MORAL TYPE\n\n\n[Sidenote: The city state the mold\nof Greek morality and the chief\nsphere of Greek moral activity]\n\nThe Greek city state was the creator of the Greek conscience; that is\nto say, the relationships and activities of the Greek as a citizen, and\nnot his relationships and activities as a husband or father or business\nman, determined his chief duties. Conscience was very little involved\nin that part of his life which lay outside the civic sphere. It was\nsolely as a member of a city community, which was to the Greek what\nthe Church was to the man of medieval times, that he could live the\ntruly moral life and attain the highest virtue.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Greek view of man\u2019s\nnature as good]\n\nThe common Greek view of man\u2019s nature was like that of the Chinese\nmoralists; that is, it conceived human nature as being essentially\ngood.[428] And this conception included the whole of man\u2019s nature,\nhis body as well as his spirit. As we shall learn, this doctrine\ninfluenced profoundly the Greek conception of what is permissible and\nright in conduct. It made it seem right to give full, though regulated\nand reasonable, indulgence to the bodily impulses and instincts. It\nmade the fundamental maxim of Greek morality to be, Live according to\nnature. It left no place in Greek thought for the Oriental notion of an\nantagonism between the flesh and the spirit. Hence asceticism with its\nrepressions of the bodily instincts and appetites, which is so common\nan expression of the moral sentiment among the Oriental races, found no\nplace in Greek morality till after Greek culture had come in contact\nwith the religious and ethical systems of Asia.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The idea of harmony in\nthe god world]\n\nClosely connected with this idea of the essential goodness and oneness\nof man\u2019s nature was the conception of unity and harmony in the god\nworld. In passing from the Orient to Greece we leave behind not only\nIndian pessimism, but Egyptian and Persian dualism. We leave behind\nthat conception of disharmony and conflict in the invisible world which\nis such a characteristic phase of much of Oriental thought. We hear,\nindeed, the faint echo of a prehistoric struggle between the earth gods\nand the sky gods. But all now is peace. The Titans are chained, and the\ngods that are the friends of men reign supreme.[429]\n\nJust as that Oriental dualistic world philosophy exercised a vast\ninfluence upon the moral ideals of the East and of the later Christian\nworld that inherited that system of thought, making the moral life\nserious and strenuous, a fight against evil, so did the opposing Greek\nconception of unity and harmony in the god world exert a profound\ninfluence upon Greek morality, emptying the moral life of everything\nlike strenuousness and battle. It made Greek morality to be like the\nmorality of sensuous, joyous youth.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The character of the\nGreek gods]\n\nIn strong contrast to Hebrew morality, which, as we have seen, was\nalmost exclusively a religious one, springing, that is to say, from\ncertain conceptions of God\u2019s character and of his relations to man,\nGreek morality was in the main a lay or secular one. Aristotle, who\ngave scientific form to Greek ethics, allowed hardly any place in the\nmoral code to religious duties. Yet, though the Greek moral ideal was\nnot based upon religion, it was influenced by it; for there cannot be\nan entire separation of religion and morality. Religious beliefs, like\nbeliefs of every other kind, help to shape men\u2019s ideas of what is right\nand what is wrong in conduct.\n\nThe influence of the Greek religion upon Greek morality was not wholly\nfavorable. The attribution by the Greeks of human frailties and vices\nto their gods tended to depress human morality, since men are never\nbetter than their gods. It is true that the moral character of the gods\nof any people is a creation of the moral consciousness of that people;\nstill, after once called into existence and enthroned, these divinities\nreact upon their creators and shape in a greater or less degree the\nmoral character of their worshipers.\n\nBut though there were elements in some of the Greek cults, particularly\nin those of Dionysus[430] and Aphrodite in the later period,[431] that\nwere harmful to morality, still in general Greek morality found in\nreligion at once a restraining and a stimulating influence.\n\nEven as early as the Homeric Age religion had become a moral force. It\nis the fear of the gods even more than the fear of men which is the\nmotive force for rightdoing.[432] Odysseus\u2019 request of Ilus of Ephyra\nfor poison with which to smear the points of his arrows is refused\nthrough fear of the divine anger, and Priam in praying Achilles for the\nbody of Hector admonishes him to have reverence for the gods.\n\nAnd throughout later times the gods are the guardians of morality.\nThey are the avengers of perjury. They are the punishers of him who\nbreaks the law of hospitality. Especially does Zeus, as the god of\nhospitality, \u201ctake note of those who welcome and those who maltreat\nthe stranger.\u201d[433] The shrines of all the gods are places of refuge\nand sanctuary. The suppliant at the altar is sacrosanct. Here the hand\nof the avenger of injury is stayed. \u201cMercy,\u201d says Sophocles, \u201cshares\nthe judgment seat of Zeus.\u201d As the god of the suppliant, Zeus not only\nprotects but purifies and delivers. Thus were the high moral qualities\nof mercy and forgiveness thrown into relief, and men, while taught\nself-restraint, were imbued with reverence for these attributes of\ncharacter.\n\nThis high morality of the Greek religion reached its culmination in the\nworship of the Delphian Apollo. In truth, the history of Delphi is\na large part of the history of Greek morality. It reflected from age\nto age the deepening moral perceptions of the race. The oracle thus\nstood in close relation with the great teachers of Greece. The ethical\nimpulse of Pythagoreanism seems to have gone forth from Delphi. Apollo\ngave a religious sanction to the emancipation of the slave, and thus\npromoted social morality. The slave given his freedom by his master at\nDelphi became, as a freedman, sacrosanct.[434] Apollo stimulated also\npolitical morality. Through the Delphic Amphictyony his influence was\nexerted in mitigating the barbarities of war between Greek and Greek,\nand in creating an Hellenic fraternity. Thus through religion was the\nnarrow sphere embraced by the ordinary moral feelings of the Greeks\nbroadened and brought to cover wide federations of cities and tribes.\n\nGreek religion also exercised a stimulating influence upon morality\nthrough the Mysteries, especially through those of Eleusis. The greater\nnumber of these religious fraternities had an ethical aim--\u201cthe aim of\nworshiping a pure god, the aim of living a pure life, and the aim of\ncultivating a spirit of brotherhood.\u201d[435]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Significance for Greek\nmorality of the absence of a\npriestly caste]\n\nBut the most noteworthy fact concerning Greek religion in its relations\nto Greek morality is this--that it was a religion practically without a\npriesthood. For there never arose in Greece a priestly class like that\nin Egypt, in Persia, in India, and in Judea. This is a fact of supreme\nimportance in the history of Greek morals. It prevented the growth\nof a theocratic morality, with its artificial ritual duties and its\nconservative tendencies.\n\nIt is interesting to note that it was the early rise of philosophy in\nthe Greek cities of Ionia that saved Hellas from the domination of\na sacerdotal caste. For at the time this philosophy arose the Orphic\ndoctrines were overspreading Greece. Now this was a priestly religion,\nthat is, a religion interpreted and administered by priests. Its\ntriumph in Greece would have meant the establishment of a powerful\nnational priesthood. This misfortune was prevented by the intellectual\nand philosophical movement in Ionia. It is this fact which leads\nProfessor Bury to pronounce the rise of the study of philosophy in\nthe Ionian cities one of the most important facts in the history of\nHellas; for \u201cit meant the triumph of reason over mystery; it led to the\ndiscrediting of the Orphic movement; it insured the free political and\nsocial progress of Hellas.\u201d[436] And all this meant the keeping of the\nground clear for the upgrowth and development of an essentially lay\nor secular morality, a morality that found its sanctions alone in the\nhuman reason and conscience.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of race\nelection; Hellenes and Barbarians]\n\nThere was one conception common to both Greek and Jew which reacted\npowerfully upon the moral system of each. This was what has been called\nthe doctrine of race election. The Jews believed themselves to be the\n\u201cchosen people.\u201d The Greeks believed the same concerning themselves.\nThey were the intellectually elect people. All other peoples were\n\u201cbarbarians.\u201d Just as the Jewish doctrine of election excluded the\nGentile world from the pale of Jewish moral sympathies, so did the\nGreek doctrine of separateness cause the Greek to shut out from his\nmoral sympathies the entire non-Greek world. We shall see a little\nfurther on how this race egotism dictated large sections of the Greek\ncode of morals.\n\n\nII. THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: Patriotism the cardinal\nvirtue; civic and military duties]\n\nAs we have already noticed, it was out of his relations as a citizen\nthat the primary duties of the Greek arose. His supreme duty was\npatriotism, devotion to his city. \u201cGood citizen\u201d and \u201cgood man\u201d were\ninterchangeable terms. And since a state of war rather than of peace\nwas the normal relation of the Greek cities, the military virtues held\nthe highest place in the ideal of excellence. \u201cTheir bodies,\u201d--thus\nThucydides makes one of his characters speak of the citizen soldiers\nof a typical Greek city--\u201ctheir bodies they devote to their country\nas though they belonged to other men.\u201d[437] Thus the pre\u00ebminent Greek\nvirtue, courage, was almost synonymous with valor in war. To throw away\none\u2019s shield was the last infamy with the Greeks as with the Romans.\n\nThis type of character, blending the civic and the military virtues, is\npresented to us with incomparable charm in Plutarch\u2019s _Lives_. Here we\nsee the ideal in actual flesh and blood. It is the altruistic element\nin this type of character which renders it so morally attractive.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Greek virtue of\ncourage a form of our virtue of\nself-sacrifice]\n\nFor we should not fail to note that in the Greek enumeration of the\nvirtues, the virtue of self-sacrifice, which we give the first place in\nour own moral ideal, is hidden under courage or fortitude.[438] With\nus this virtue expresses itself in a great variety of forms; with the\nGreeks, in one form chiefly--self-devotion on the battlefield. This\naltruism, it is true, was narrow; it did not look beyond one\u2019s own\ncity; but notwithstanding this limitation it was genuine altruism, for\nfacing death in battle, as Aristotle says, is \u201cthe greatest and noblest\nof perils.\u201d[439] This ready self-devotion of the individual to the\ncommon interests of his city was the most attractive feature of Greek\nmorality. It formed the basis of Greek civilization. When this virtue\nwas lost the Greek city perished, and with it Greek civilization passed\naway.\n\nAmong all the cities of Greece, Sparta realized most perfectly the\nmilitary virtues of the Greek ideal. The great place so long held by\nher in the ancient world she won through the loyalty of her citizens\nto the soldier\u2019s ideal of obedience, courage, and self-devotion. The\nconduct of Leonidas and his companions in the pass of Thermopyl\u00e6 not\nonly had a bracing effect upon Greek character for generations, but has\nnever ceased, through the inspiration of example, to add to the sum\ntotal in the world of loyalty to duty.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The virtues of\ntemperance and justice]\n\nTo the virtue of self-sacrifice, under the guise of fortitude, or the\nfacing of danger or the endurance of pain in a worthy cause, the Greeks\nadded temperance, justice, and wisdom.\n\nThe Greek virtue of temperance or moderation was essentially the same\nas our virtue of self-control or self-denial. It meant measure in\nall things, the avoidance of the too much and the too little.[440]\nEverything must be in fair proportion. In building a house one should\nnot go \u201cbeyond bounds in size, magnificence, and expense.\u201d In conduct\nlikewise the mean must always be the aim. Restraint must be laid upon\none\u2019s appetites and desires. Excessive ambition was a grave fault, as\nwas an undue lack of ambition.\n\nThe Greek conception of justice was this: Do no wrong, and suffer no\nwrong to self or to others--with the emphasis on the latter part of the\ninjunction.[441] Christianity shifted the emphasis to the first part of\nthe commandment.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The virtue of wisdom;\nmental self-culture a duty]\n\nBy the term \u201cwisdom\u201d the Greeks covered very nearly what we mean by\nmental self-culture. Now there has been a wide divergence of opinion\namong different peoples respecting this matter. Primitive races can of\ncourse have no feeling of obligation as to intellectual self-culture;\nbut even a people as advanced in civilization as the Romans may\nhave little or no conscience concerning it. Throughout a great part\nof the medieval age in Europe mental culture was looked upon with\nsuspicion. Very few regarded it as a duty. But since the Renaissance,\nthat is, since the rebirth in the European world of the Greek spirit,\nintellectual culture has been coming to be regarded more and more as an\nurgent and imperious duty. It is to the ancient Greeks, as implied in\nwhat we have just said, that we are largely indebted for this ethical\nfeeling. To the truly representative Greek the ethical imperative to\nseek self-realization called especially for the development of the\nmind, \u201chis true self.\u201d Mere intellectual curiosity, love of knowledge\nfor its own sake, was, it is true, one of the creative forces of Greek\nintellectualism; but the ethical motive was ever near. In the Socratic\nphilosophy indeed it is made the dominant motive for the reason that\nvirtuous conduct is by Socrates held to be dependent upon knowledge,\nthe knowledge of things as they really are, things human and divine.\nWith the philosopher the gaining of this knowledge is the aim and end\nof life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The development of the\nbody a duty; the ethical element\nin Greek athleticism]\n\nAsceticism, a chief characteristic of which is the conception that\nthere is something meritorious in the illtreatment or neglect of the\nbody, is one of the most striking phenomena in the moral history\nof mankind. The Oriental peoples especially have ever been easily\npersuaded, under the influence of religious ideas, that the body should\nbe illtreated in the interest of the spirit.\n\nIn passing from Asia to Greece we seem to enter a new ethical\natmosphere. We leave behind every trace of asceticism. We are no\nlonger surrounded by unkempt, gaunt, hollow-eyed fakirs, anchorites,\nand monks. In Greek thought, as we have seen, there was no trace of\nthat Oriental idea of a warring between body and spirit. This happy\nconsciousness of the Greek of harmony in his own being had most\nimportant consequences for Greek morality. It made the development of\nthe body, equally with that of the soul, an ethical requirement. The\noutcome was Greek athleticism, one of the most attractive phases of\nHellenic civilization.\n\nWe do not mean to say that moral feeling was to the same degree active\nin calling into existence Greek athleticism that religious-ethical\nfeeling was active in the creation of Oriental asceticism, but simply\nthat the ethical motive held a place among the various motives and\nsentiments at work. Without this motive the Olympian games and the\nother sacred festivals into which athletic exercises and competitions\nentered, would never have won the place they held in Greek life and\nculture. When in later times these festivals, subjected to commercial\nand mercenary influences, lost wholly or in part this religious-ethical\nelement, then they lost also their distinctive character, and that\nmorally wholesome and uplifting influence which they had exercised upon\nthe Greek world throughout the best days of Hellas.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Identification of moral\ngoodness with beauty]\n\nJust as the cultured Greek brought the intellectual domain of life\nwithin the province of morals, so likewise did he with the \u00e6sthetic.\nIt was not merely his \u00e6sthetic sense which was offended by ugliness\nin form, but also his moral sense. To the Greek mind, to love beauty,\nsensuous and spiritual, and to be beautiful was synonymous with being\ngood. \u201cHe who is beautiful to look upon,\u201d says Sappho, \u201cis good; and\nwho is good will soon be beautiful.\u201d[442] \u201cThe beautiful,\u201d comments\nWuttke in speaking of this phase of Greek ethics, \u201cis _per se_ the\ngood; in enjoying and creating the beautiful man is moral.\u201d[443] \u201cThe\n\u2018good\u2019 and the \u2018beautiful\u2019\u201d--thus G. Lowes Dickinson sums up the Greek\nview--\u201cwere one and the same thing; that is the first and the last word\nof the Greek ideal.\u201d[444]\n\nThis identification by the Greeks of goodness with beauty is one of\nthe most important matters in Greek ethics. For the conception was not\nwith them an inert thing. Greek civilization in all its phases was in\na great measure the expression of this conviction. The Greeks filled\nthe world with beautiful things because to create beauty was with them\nan ethical as well as an \u00e6sthetic impulse and necessity. They felt the\nholiness of beauty.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Live according\nto nature sums up all moral\nrequirements]\n\nAll the particular requirements of Greek morality, some of the most\nimportant of which we have now briefly commented upon, are summed up\nin the formula, Live conformably to nature. The idea here embodied of\nwhat constitutes man\u2019s full duty springs naturally from the doctrine\nthat man\u2019s nature is essentially good. If that nature be good, then\nvirtuousness will consist in the well-rounded symmetrical development\nof all the capacities of body and mind. Pindar\u2019s profound injunction,\n\u201cBe what you are,\u201d embodies the essence of the teachings of the Greek\nmoralists. They taught that man fulfills his destiny by becoming what\nhe is in his innermost being--by complete self-realization.[445]\n\n\nIII. LIMITATIONS AND DEFECTS OF THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: Its aristocratic\ncharacter]\n\nA chief defect of Greek ethics was its aristocratic spirit. So many\nwere the classes excluded in whole or in part from the moral field\nthat Greek morality was almost as much a class morality as that of\nBrahmanic India. Entire races and classes were as completely outside\nthe moral pale as is the Indian pariah. It was only the higher cultured\nclasses of citizens who, the moral philosophers taught, were capable\nof attaining the noblest virtues and living the truly moral life. All\nothers were regarded as living on a semimoral or nonmoral animal plane\nof existence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The exclusion of\nnon-Greek races from the moral\nsphere]\n\nThus throughout a great part of the historic period the Greeks\nvirtually excluded all non-Greek peoples from the moral domain.[446]\nThey regarded these non-Hellenic folk about as we regard animals,\nor as many a few generations ago looked upon the black race. They\nthought it right for them to make unprovoked war upon such people and\nto make slaves of those they might capture. Aristotle taught that to\nhunt barbarians for the purpose of getting slaves was just as right\nand proper as to hunt animals for food or sacrifice.[447] In a word,\nnon-Greeks were regarded as being practically outside the pale of\nhumanity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The exclusion of slaves]\n\nThe moral status of the slave in ancient Greece was determined by the\nfact that slaves were usually barbarians.[448] Since as non-Greeks\nthey were already outside the moral pale, it followed naturally that\nas slaves they had no standing in the court of morals. Their status\nwas almost the same as that of domestic animals. The Greek master\nnever felt that he owed any moral duties to his slaves, though kind\nand merciful treatment of them was enjoined by the philosophers and\nmoralists. According to Aristotle, the relation of slave and master\nis a purely natural one, like that of body and soul. He calls slaves\n\u201cliving instruments.\u201d\n\n\n[Sidenote: The exclusion of the\ndomestic sphere]\n\nOut of the family relationships arise a large part of the duties making\nup the moral code of the modern Western world, while in the atmosphere\nof the domestic circle are nourished many of what we regard as the most\nsacred and attractive of the virtues. Now these family virtues, which\nwe esteem so highly, found only a very subordinate place in the Greek\nideal of character, for the reason that the family, like the clan and\nthe tribe, was almost absorbed by the city. In Sparta the family and\nfamily life practically disappeared. In Plato\u2019s ideal republic the\nfamily is sacrificed to the state.\n\nThe status of the wife in most of the Greek cities was a low one. She\nwas practically one of the slaves. Ethical sentiment, as was true\nof the sentiment of romantic love, seems to have been almost wholly\nlacking in the marriage relation.\n\nInfancy, in its earliest stages, was in general never brought beneath\nthe protecting \u00e6gis of the moral sentiment.[449] In the practice of the\nexposure of ill-formed, weak, defective, or unpromising newborn infants\nthe Greeks, like the Romans, never advanced much beyond the standpoint\nof barbarians. This abandonment or destruction by parents of their\noffspring did not offend the common conscience. Even the philosophers\nand moralists saw nothing in the practice to censure. Evidence of how\ngeneral the custom was, is afforded by various tales and dramas which\nturn on the rescue of the hero in his infancy after having been cast\nout to die.[450] The story of King \u0152dipus is typical.[451]\n\nIn this connection a word must be said regarding chastity. We find\nhere one of the most serious defects of Greek morality. The virtue of\nchastity was given a very low place, hardly any place at all, in the\nGreek ideal of character. It was the undervaluing of this virtue that\nwithout doubt was one of the contributing causes of the decline and\nearly decay of Greek civilization.\n\nAnother equally grave defect in the Greek moral character was lack of\nrespect for the aged. Save at Sparta and Athens, age was not reverenced\nin ancient Greece.[452] In this respect the Greeks stood almost on a\nlevel with most primitive races.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The disesteem of\nindustrial virtues]\n\nA marked characteristic of Greek ethical feeling was a deep prejudice\nagainst manual and commercial occupations as unworthy of freemen.\nAristotle taught that there was \u201cno room for moral excellence\u201d in the\ntrades and employments of artisans, traders, and laborers.[453] Even\nartists like Phidias and Polyclitus were looked upon as \u201cmiserable\nhandicraftsmen.\u201d[454] Plato in his _Laws_ says: \u201cHe who in any way\nshares in the illiberality of retail trade may be indicted by any one\nwho likes for dishonoring his race, before those who are judged to\nbe first in virtue; and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father\u2019s\nhouse,--by an unworthy occupation,--let him be imprisoned for a year\nand abstain from that sort of thing.\u201d[455] In some cities the person\nwho engaged in trade was disqualified for citizenship, and in others no\nmechanic or field laborer could enter the place where the freemen met.\n\nThis feeling that labor is degrading came in after the Homeric Age,\nwith the rule of the oligarchs, and was the natural and inevitable\noutcome of slavery. The effect of slavery is to make work seem ignoble\nand servile, and to cause the industrial virtues to assume a low place\nin the moral ideal, or to drop out of it entirely. The high place\nassigned the industrial virtues in the moral ideals of ancient Persia\nand Israel was due probably as largely to the subordinate place which\nslavery held in those countries as to the influence of religious\ndoctrines and physical environment.\n\nAnother ground for the feeling was that hard, coarse work destroys the\nsuppleness and mars the beauty and symmetry of the body; and this to\nthe Greek way of thinking was sufficient reason why the freeman--to use\nPlato\u2019s phrase--\u201cshould abstain from that sort of thing.\u201d\n\nStill another reason for the feeling that the retail trades were\nunworthy of citizens was the conviction that this kind of business had\n\u201ca strong tendency to make men bad.\u201d The small merchants and traders in\nGreece certainly bore a very bad reputation,[456] and it is probable\nthat the public disesteem of their occupation and the contempt in\nwhich they themselves were held had the same sinister influence upon\nthem that the similar feeling in Old Japan had upon the petty trader\nthere.[457]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Revenge reckoned as a\nvirtue]\n\nIn nothing did the ordinary Greek moral consciousness differ more\nwidely from the Christian than in the matter of forgiving injuries.\nThis was one of the virtues brought in by Christianity which to the\nGreek mind was foolishness. To the Greek the taking of revenge upon an\nenemy was a duty. A man should render himself useful to his friends\nand dangerous to his enemies. The Greek orator, in order to justify\nhis resentment toward any one, always took pains to show that he had\nbeen injured in some way by the person, and hence had good ground\nfor wishing to do him evil. Indeed, one who neglected to take revenge\nupon his personal enemy was looked upon as a weak, pusillanimous\ncreature.[458]\n\nBut out of this virtue of revenge, paradoxically enough, arose the\nvirtue of forgiveness; for revenge was limited by the requirements\nof the virtue of moderation or self-restraint. The person seeking\nrevenge for an injury must set reasonable bounds to his thirst for\nvengeance. Hence when the age of reflection came there were teachers of\nspiritual insight who, regarding the matter from this point of view,\nsaw forgiveness to be a virtue because it required in the one forgiving\ngreat self-conquest and self-control.[459]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Low estimation of\ntruthfulness]\n\nAnother serious defect in the ordinary Greek moral standard was the\nlow place assigned to the virtue of veracity. The Greeks, in marked\ncontrast to the ancient Persians, had only a very feeble sense of the\nsanctity of the plighted word. Untruthfulness was ingrained in the\nnation. The Homeric heroes were full of guile and deceit, and the\nhistoric Greeks were little better. They had throughout the ancient\nworld a well-earned reputation for disregard of promises and oaths.\nWhen it seemed to them necessary to lie in order to gain a desired end,\nthen lying appeared to them justifiable. Scythas, tyrant of Zancle, if\nwe may judge from a story told by Herodotus, was the only Greek who\nkept his word to Darius. This man was in exile at Susa. He obtained\nfrom the king permission, presumably on parole, to visit Sicily, and\nhonorably returned to Persia. The conduct of Scythas in this matter\nmust have been exceptional, for, in the words of Herodotus, \u201chim Darius\nregarded the most upright of all the Greeks to whom he afforded a\nrefuge.\u201d[460]\n\nThe great moral teachers of Greece recognized this defect in the moral\ncharacter of their countrymen and sought to correct it by extolling the\nvirtue of truthfulness. After the Persian war a class of men arose,\nhistorians and philosophers, whom Schmidt, because of their reverence\nfor truth, calls the ancestors of the modern men of science.[461]\nThucydides had the same sense of the sanctity of exactness in statement\nof fact as has the historian of to-day. Socrates died rather than cloak\nthe truth before his judges. Aristotle said, \u201cFriends and truth are\nboth dear to us, but it is a sacred duty to prefer the truth.\u201d[462]\n\n\nIV. THE MORAL EVOLUTION\n\n\n[Sidenote: The morality of the\nHomeric Age]\n\nThe historical starting point of the moral evolution in Greece is the\nmorality of the Homeric Age. This morality we find incarnated in the\nheroes of the time, Achilles and Odysseus, for, as Wundt observes, \u201cthe\ninmost moral convictions of a people are shown far more plainly in the\ncharacter of its heroes than in its gods.\u201d[463]\n\nThe qualities of character with which, as worthy of admiration, the\npoet invests his heroes show that, notwithstanding the great advance\nalready achieved in many of the arts of life, in morality the Greeks\nof this age were still in some respects on a level with savages.\nThus the poet extols the \u201cgood Autolycus\u201d for his skill in thievery\nand perjury.[464] But stealing and lying, as with uncivilized people\ngenerally, to be proper and right, must be adroit and \u201cfor the\ngood of friends and the harm of enemies.\u201d Piracy was an honorable\noccupation.[465] The bodies of enemies slain in battle were maltreated,\nas is the wont of savages.[466] Conceptions of deity were crude and\nunethical, the gods being represented as capricious, profligate,\npartial, and unjust.\n\nBut there was a sound core in this morality. Clan virtues were firmly\ninwrought in character. The virtue of loyalty to comrades was strong;\nthe ethical qualities of courage and self-devotion for the common good,\nand of hospitality to strangers were well developed; and the domestic\nvirtues of chastity and constancy in woman are portrayed in such a way\nas to show that, if not common, they were at least held in high esteem\nand reverence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Reprobation by the\nphilosophers and later poets of\nthe Homeric tales of the gods]\n\nFrom the Homeric Age onward there was a progressive purification of the\nmoral feelings. One evidence of this ethical progress is found in the\nrepudiation by the later moral consciousness of the primitive myths of\nthe gods. These tales, as we have just noted, were coarse, sensual, and\nimmoral. The philosophers of the sixth and following centuries, and\nthe poets of this later time, denounced these stories as unworthy and\nunethical conceptions of deity. Pythagoras is said, upon his return\nfrom Hades, to have reported seeing there the souls of Homer and Hesiod\nundergoing punishment for what they had said of the gods. Pindar purges\nthe tales of their grosser immoral elements. Others sought to relieve\nthe poets of the charge of impiety by reading the myths as allegories.\nThe Sophists and Stoics moralized them, giving them an ethical aim\nand purpose.[467] Plato, in reprobating what Hesiod says of Uranus,\ndeclared it \u201cthe greatest of all lies in high places.\u201d He would strike\nout from the poets all passages in which they told these lies about the\ngods and heroes, before allowing the boys and men to read them.[468]\nIn the hands of the later Attic tragedians the whole traditionary\nreligious mythology was spiritualized and given a deeper ethical\ncontent and meaning.\n\nThis purifying of the Greek moral consciousness finds an exact parallel\nin what is taking place in the modern Christian world respecting the\nconceptions of deity found in the early chronicles of the Hebrew Bible\nand transmitted as a religious bequest to the European peoples. These\nideas of God are rejected by the truer moral consciousness of to-day\nas the crude notions of a gross and morally immature age. Just as this\nmodern rejection of these unworthy primitive conceptions of the divine\ncharacter register our own moral advance, so does the rejection, by\nthe later Greek thinkers and teachers, of the Homeric and Hesiodic\nconceptions of the gods register the advance in ethical thought in\nGreece during the interval that separates the era of these poets from\nthe Solonian and Platonic Ages.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethical significance\nof the transition from the\ncontinuance to the retribution\ntheory]\n\nIn an earlier chapter we spoke of the continuance theory of life after\ndeath, and of the retribution theory as marking an advance upon this in\nethical feeling.[469] At the opening of the historical period in Greece\nwe find the primitive unethical continuance theory in existence, but\nin a state of transition into the retribution theory. The early Greek\nHades, like the Babylonian Arallu and the Hebrew Sheol, was a place\nwhere moral distinctions were not recognized. The same phantom life\nwas the lot of all alike who went down to the world of shadows. The\nElysian Fields, it is true, had already been created, but these were\nsimply a sort of aristocratic heaven, a \u201cGreek Valhalla,\u201d the abode of\nthe great heroes of the race;[470] and Tartarus also had been called\ninto existence, but this was a prison house only for those who had\nincurred the special enmity of the gods. The fables of Tantalus, Ixion,\nand the Dana\u00efdes show that the belief in an after life had no ethical\nsignificance for the masses.[471]\n\nBut already in Pindar these ideas of the after life, through virtue of\nan ethical necessity, have undergone great changes.[472] Just as the\npoet moralizes the Homeric conception of the gods, so does he moralize\nthe Homeric conception of the underworld. Alongside the continuance\ntheory we find now the retribution theory. The life beyond the grave is\nconceived as a life of rewards and punishments. The Elysian Fields have\nbeen \u201copened to moral worth,\u201d and a tribunal, called into existence\nby a growing moral consciousness like that which created the Egyptian\nJudgment of the Dead, has been set up, and Rhadamanthus apportions the\ndestiny of souls according to their merit and demerit.[473] From the\nPersian war on, the life after death had ethical significance for all\nmen, and not simply for exceptional cases. In the literature there are\nallusions in growing numbers to the retribution awaiting the wicked and\nthe blessedness in store for those \u201cunstained with vice.\u201d\n\nIn Plato this moral evolution attains a stage almost identical with\nthat reached by medieval Christian ethics. We find in the _Republic_\na threefold division of the realm of the dead corresponding closely\nto the Schoolmen\u2019s purgatory, heaven, and hell.[474] Punishment is\nconceived as having for aim and end, in all save cases of abominable\nand incurable wickedness, the purification of earth-stained souls.\n\nAll these modifications in the topography, the classifications, and the\narrangements of the underworld, like the similar changes effected by\nthe modern spirit in the medieval conception of hell, were the work of\na gradually clarifying moral sense, and bear witness to the progressive\ndevelopment of Greek ethical thought between the Homeric and the\nAlexandrian Age.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The evolution of the\ndoctrine of divine envy into that\nof Nemesis]\n\nThe early Greeks held a doctrine known as the Envy of the Gods. They\nimagined that the gods were envious of the great and prosperous. Hence\nthey thought it was the envy of the gods which brought about the\nundoing of the great and powerful. Their prayer for a friend enjoying\nan unusual run of good fortune was, \u201cMay the gods not become envious.\u201d\nWe find this doctrine embodied in the Herodotean story of Cr\u0153sus,\nking of Lydia, whose long career of unbroken and dazzling prosperity\nends at last in dreadful reverses and sudden downfall.[475] The same\nbelief colors the advice which Herodotus represents Artabanus, the\nuncle of Xerxes, as giving the king, who was meditating an attack on\nthe Greek cities. The immoderate ambition of the king, in view of the\nenvious nature of the gods, had awakened the apprehension of the old\nand experienced counselor, and he labored to dissuade the king from\nengaging in so vast a project. \u201cDost thou not notice,\u201d said he, \u201chow\nthe lightning smites always the highest buildings and the tallest\ntrees. Thus often the mighty host is overthrown by lightning sent by\nthe jealous gods; for the gods are jealous of mortals, and will allow\nno one unduly to exalt himself.\u201d[476] There is here no suggestion of an\nethical element. The envious gods overthrow things simply and solely\nbecause they are big and tall and cast them into the shade.\n\nAt a still later period the Athenian general Nicias gives memorable\nexpression to this belief in his speech to his disheartened troops\nbefore Syracuse. He bade them take cheer from their wretched plight\nbecause the envious gods must certainly be disarmed by the sight of\ntheir woeful condition and would now pity and help.[477]\n\nBut alongside this unethical doctrine of the Envy of the Gods the\nGreeks held another, which seems to have been simply a modification\nand outgrowth of the earlier crude conception of deity. This was\nthe doctrine of Nemesis. There was here full recognition of the\nvicissitudes of human life. The great and the overpowerful are indeed\ndestroyed by the gods,--there was no denying the fact,--but not\nmerely because they are great, but because their greatness and their\nprosperity has made them self-confident, insolent, overbearing. In\ntheir blind arrogance they have overstepped the limits of moderation;\nhence their downfall wrought by the gods.\n\nIt was under the spell of this belief that Herodotus wrote his history\nof the Persian wars, although, as we have seen, he loved to rehearse\nstories which illustrated the doctrine of the envious nature of the\ngods. His narrative is in truth a great historical drama illustrating\nthe moral order of the world and teaching the impressive lesson of\nhow the gods punish presumptuous pride and overvaulting ambition. The\nhistorian prepares his pious readers for the final catastrophe by\nshowing in vivid portrayal the transactions at the Hellespont. The\nswift current of the strait has broken the bridge of boats laid upon\nthe waters by Xerxes. The all-powerful and audacious king orders that\nthe sacred Hellespont be scourged with three hundred lashes, that\nfetters be cast into the rebellious waters, and that they be branded\nas a slave is marked with branding irons. All this is done, and the\ntreacherous waters are cursed with blasphemous words.\n\nNow follows quickly the tragic issue at Salamis of the vast\nundertaking, and the return passage of the Hellespont a few months\nlater by the humbled and fugitive king. All this is the work of\nNemesis, the punisher of those who have lifted up their hearts in\ninsufferable pride and arrogance.\n\nIt is not alone in the dramatized history of Herodotus that we are\nable to trace the moral effects of the Persian wars in bringing into\nthe foreground of the Greek consciousness the conception of Nemesis as\nthe vindicator of the moral government of the world. \u201cAfter the battle\nof Salamis,\u201d in the words of the historian Abbott, \u201cthe instability\nof human greatness and the punishment of \u2018insolence\u2019 echoes as an\nundertone through all Greek thought.\u201d[478]\n\nThis deepened moral feeling of the nation found expression both in\nart and in the drama. The order given by the Athenians to Phidias to\ncarve a statue of Nemesis as a memorial of the war was a sanction\nof that interpretation of the Persian overthrow which made it the\nwork of the avenging goddess. But the fullest expression of this new\nethical sentiment is found in Athenian tragedy.[479] \u00c6schylus was the\nrepresentative of this moral awakening and advance. The doctrine of\nNemesis colors all his dramas. He was the first to give to the legend\nof Niobe, originally merely a tale of the envy of Apollo, an ethical\nmeaning as an instance of \u201cretribution for presumptuous sin.\u201d[480] His\nimperishable tragedy _Prometheus Bound_ makes the sufferings of the\nTitan to be but the just penalty of his presumption and self-will. His\n_Agamemnon_ depicts with tragic intensity the awful vengeance with\nwhich the implacable goddess punishes unnatural crime. His _Persians_\nteaches how Nemesis humbles insolent pride and \u201cZeus tames excessive\nlifting up of heart.\u201d\n\nIn the later Thucydides we meet with the same teaching concerning the\nmoral government of the world. In a memorable passage of his _History\nof the Peloponnesian War_ the historian becomes the moralist and gives\nhis reader a tragic illustration of the workings of the law of Nemesis.\nThucydides is approaching the chapter in his history which depicts\nthe terrible catastrophe which befell the Athenians in Sicily. He\nskillfully foreshadows the coming tragedy by preluding his narrative\nof the Sicilian Expedition with an account of the arrogant and wicked\nconduct of the Athenians in driving the Melians from their island home\nand adding the stolen land to their own empire.[481] This high-handed\ncrime, like the impiety of the presumptuous Mede at the Hellespont,\narouses the avenging Nemesis. The reader forecasts the future, and\nin the cruel fate of the Melians reads the doom of the Athenian army\nbefore Syracuse.\n\nThis moralizing of the primitive unethical conception of the gods as\nenvious and unjust, and the evolving therefrom of the morally advanced\ndoctrine of Nemesis, is an instructive illustration of how, as time\npassed, Greek ethical feeling was deepened and Greek ethical thought\nwas purified and elevated through intellectual progress and the\nteachings of experience.[482]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Further moralization of\nthe doctrine of Nemesis]\n\nThere was a still further evolution of Greek ethical thought along\nthe line traced above. The mutations and tragedies of life,--terrible\nreverses of fortune, sudden loss of reputation and friends,\nirremediable ruin following great prosperity,--these things are by a\ntruer moral insight recognized as the sign neither of the envy nor of\nthe righteous anger of the gods, but of the divine pity and love.[483]\n\u201cThe wholesomeness of punishment for the wrongdoer himself is the\ncrown of \u00c6schylean ethics.\u201d[484] Phidias taught the same lofty truth\nthrough carving the myth of Prometheus Unbound on the throne of his\nOlympian Zeus. It spoke, as no other scene wrought there, of the moral\nsignificance of suffering, of divine mercy and deliverance.[485] And\nPlato\u2019s philosophy accords with the \u00c6schylean teaching that \u201cZeus has\nput in suffering sovereign instruction.\u201d \u201cThen this must be our notion\nof the just man,\u201d he says, \u201cthat even when he is in poverty or sickness\nor any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work\ntogether for good to him in life and death.\u201d[486]\n\nIn this ethical interpretation of the vicissitudes of human life, of\nthe miscarriage of ambitious plans, the wrecking of high hopes, the\nGreek thinkers reached at last the same elevated point of view that was\nattained by the great prophets of the Hebrew race.[487]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The amelioration of war\nrules and practices]\n\nIn the ethics of war a similar though less marked development in moral\nfeeling is traceable. Aside from the relapse into the practices of\nsavagery under the malign influence of the Peloponnesian War, there\nwas throughout Greek history a slow but steady amelioration of the\nprimitive barbarities of warfare. In the Homeric Age moral feeling had\nhardly begun to exercise its influence in humanizing war and in setting\nlimits to the rights of the conqueror. The Greeks of Homer were in\nsome respects almost on the level of savages in their war practices.\nThe life of the captive was in the hands of his captor, and he might\nbe slain without offense to the common conscience. Women and children\nwere, as a matter of course, appropriated by the conqueror or sold\ninto slavery. Homer relates as something to be gloried in, how his hero\nAchilles dragged the body of Hector around the walls of Troy. Such an\nact of savagery evidently stirred in the poet\u2019s listeners no feelings\nof reprobation.[488]\n\nIn the historical period the mitigation of the barbarities of war was,\nafter the protection of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, a chief\nobject of the celebrated Amphictyonic League. The oath taken by the\nmembers of the league included the following engagement: \u201cWe will not\ndestroy any Amphictyonic town, nor cut it off from running water,\nin war or in peace.\u201d This was one of the most noteworthy efforts in\nantiquity to lay restraint upon the primitive license of war. Limits\nare set to the rights of the conqueror. War begins to have rules.\n\nFrom the words which Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Plat\u00e6ans at\nthe beginning of the Peloponnesian War, we gather that at that time\nthe common sentiment of Hellas condemned the slaughter of prisoners of\nwar.[489] At Athens this sentiment had found embodiment in the laws,\nwhich forbade the slaying of war captives. But under the demoralizing\ninfluences of the long and bitter struggle between Sparta and Athens,\nthe little gain which had been made in the humanizing of war during\nthe preceding centuries was lost. Prisoners of war were sold into\nslavery or killed without the least offense being given to the numbed\nconscience of Hellas.[490] Even the terrible massacre, toward the end\nof the war, of the four thousand Athenian prisoners at \u00c6gospotami, by\nthe Spartan Lysander, awakened no protest in Greece at large.[491]\nNever has \u201cthe moral damage of war\u201d had a more tragic illustration.[492]\n\nDuring the century following the Peloponnesian War, however, there\nseems to have been a positive advance in this domain. In this period\nthe grosser atrocities of war were in a measure mitigated by a growing\nhumanitarian sentiment. But all efforts to humanize war seem to have\nbeen limited to wars between Greek and Greek. From first to last in\nGreek history war against barbarians was waged practically without the\nleast mitigation of its primitive barbarities. It was the practice of\nAlexander the Great in his campaigns in Asia to massacre the men of\nnon-Greek cities taken by assault, and to sell the women and children\nas slaves. We hear no protest, even on the part of the philosophers,\nagainst these atrocities so long as it is non-Greeks who are the\nvictims of them.\n\nBut though the efforts of the Greeks to regulate and limit the rights\nof the conqueror were confined to wars of Greek against Greek, still\nthese efforts are significant as a sign of an awakening ethical\nsentiment in this domain. This is a prophecy of a future day, distant\nthough it be, when the growing conscience of mankind shall have\nrendered wars between civilized nations an impossible crime.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Efforts to prevent war\nby arbitration]\n\nThe common Greek conscience never condemned war in itself. There never\nsprang up in Greece an agitation like the Peace Movement of to-day in\nChristendom. How deeply ingrained in the Greek mind was the conviction\nthat war is a part of the established order of things is shown by the\nfact that their treaties ending open hostilities were ordinarily drawn\nfor a limited term of years. They were merely truces, as though peace\nwere only an incident in international relations.\n\nEven the philosophers regarded a state of war as the normal and natural\nrelation of Hellenes and barbarians. Aristotle, as we have seen,\ntaught that barbarians might, without moral scruple, be hunted like\nwild animals.[493] Plato had no word of condemnation of war by Greek\nagainst non-Greek. But the Greeks had an uneasy feeling respecting the\nrightfulness of war between Greek and Greek; and there came a time when\nthe best-instructed conscience of Greece positively denounced wars\nof this kind. Plato condemned wars between Hellenes and Hellenes as\nunnatural.[494] This feeling had a kind of restraining influence upon\nthe Greek cities, and there are many instances of arbitration in Greek\nhistory. Sometimes a single person of eminence acted as mediator; but\noftener some city or league like the Delphian Amphictyony was chosen\nas the arbitrator. In the Hellenistic Age the Roman Senate frequently\nundertook the commission of arbitrating quarrels. The cities concerned\nwere sometimes bound by oath or by a deposit of money to abide by the\ndecision. Oftener, however, the decisions rendered, like those by the\nHague Tribunal of to-day, depended for their execution upon the good\nwill and honor of the states concerned. There are instances recorded\nwhere one or both of the parties refused to abide by the judgment of\nthe arbitrator.[495]\n\nVarious motives, it is true, were at work in these arbitration\ntreaties, but the ethical motive was certainly operative to a greater\nor less degree. There was not lacking the feeling, vague though it may\nhave been, which was later given explicit expression by Plato, that\nwar between Greek and Greek was wrong and a crime against Hellenic\ncivilization.\n\nBut the most interesting and instructive of all the measures taken\nby the Greeks to limit wars among themselves or to fence them away\nfrom a given district was the consecration, by common consent and\nagreement, of the land of Elis--wherein was situated the sacred\nOlympia--to perpetual peace and the establishment of a truce of forty\ndays, embracing the festival period of the Olympian games, during which\nit was sacrilegious for one Greek city to make war upon another. With\ntrue vision the philosopher-historian Laurent sees in the little land\nof Elis, inviolable as a temple, a prophecy of the time when the whole\nearth shall be consecrated to perpetual peace--an ideal toward which\nhumanity unceasingly advances.[496]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates and his\nrelation to the moral movement]\n\nFrom no other personage in history, aside from the founders of\nuniversal religions, has there flowed such a stream of moral influence\nas issued from the life and teachings of Socrates, the son of\nSophroniscus. All the chief ethical systems of the Greco-Roman world\nwere the development of germs found in his doctrines. The Cyrenaic and\nEleatic, the Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean, the Platonic, Neoplatonic,\nand Aristotelian systems had their sources here. The Stoic and\nNeoplatonic systems contributed important elements to early Christian\nethics, while the Aristotelian system exercised a profound influence\nupon the scholastic ethics of medieval times. In the contribution\nwhich these various systems, especially the Stoic, have made to the\nworld\u2019s common fund of ethical thought and feeling is found in large\npart the measure of the ethical debt which modern civilization owes to\nHellenism.\n\nSocrates\u2019 aim was to replace the artificial conventional conscience\nof his contemporaries by a natural rational conscience; in other\nwords, to replace customary communal morality by reflective individual\nmorality.[497] His fundamental doctrine was that virtue is dependent\nupon knowledge; indeed he almost or quite made knowledge and virtue one\nand the same thing. He maintained that one can no more see the right\nwithout doing it than one can see a proposition to be true without\nbelieving it. Therefore without knowledge--insight--there can be no\ntrue virtue.[498]\n\nBut clearness of vision requires the purification of the intellect, the\ngetting rid of all false intellectual and moral notions; hence the aim\nand purpose of Socrates\u2019 unique method of cross-examination was to show\nhis interlocutor the baseless and mutually contradictory character of\nhis inherited chance-acquired ideas and beliefs, and to bring him to\nthat self-knowledge which is the beginning of real knowledge.[499]\n\nThis practical identification by Socrates of knowledge and virtue, this\ndoctrine of his that it is impossible that one should not will to do\nthat which he sees to be good and right, overlooks the saddest and yet\nmost certain fact of human experience, namely, that perversity of the\nhuman will which causes man though seeing the good to choose the evil.\nBut it is a theory of human nature which, in the case of such happily\nconstituted souls as Socrates, in whom the authority of conscience is\nsacrosanct and inviolable, is nearly or quite accordant with fact.\nWith such persons to see an act to be right is to do it. With them\ndissonance between knowledge and volition is a moral impossibility.\n\nRight here, however, a just criticism may be made of the Socratic\nphilosophy. It is true that without self-knowledge, without the\nfulfilling of the Delphian requirement, \u201cKnow thyself,\u201d one cannot be\ntruly moral. But neither Socrates nor the Greek philosophers in general\nrecognized that this self-knowledge comes through right living rather\nthan through right thinking. As Goethe discerningly observes, man comes\nto know himself not through reflection but through conduct: \u201cDo your\nduty and thou wilt know what thou art.\u201d[500]\n\nAnd for the common moral life of the world there is a profound\nteaching in this Socratic doctrine which makes knowledge the spring\nof virtue.[501] There is in knowledge, in insight, in the clear\nrecognition of the relation of man\u2019s highest good to virtue, an\nimpelling force and authority. As the world advances in true knowledge,\nit will advance in true morality. The Renaissance is ever the precursor\nof the Reformation. It is this fact which should make optimists of\nus all, for the unceasing advance of the world in knowledge is well\nassured.\n\nIn the ethical system of Socrates we have a good illustration of\nthe truth that great men are the product of their age. With all his\noriginality and profound spiritual insight, Socrates could not and did\nnot rise much above the plane of the common moral consciousness of his\ncontemporaries. He stood on essentially Greek ground. His morality was\nthe morality of his time and place. In his practical code of morals\nhe made the Greek virtue of self-control or moderation a cardinal\nvirtue; he laid the Greek emphasis upon the civic virtues, dying\nrather than disobey or evade the decree of his city; he entertained\nthe common Greek ideas respecting the family and the domestic virtues;\nhe saw nothing to disapprove in the life of the het\u00e6ra; he viewed the\nbeautiful from a standpoint wholly Greek, almost identifying beauty\nwith goodness; he was thoroughly Greek in the aristocratic tendency\nof his ethical teachings, making the practice of true virtue the\nprerogative of the cultured class alone; he had the ordinary Greek\nconscience in regard to slavery; and he never detached himself from\nthat narrow Greek prejudice which saw in the Hellenes the elect race.\nHe never proclaimed, as did many a later Greek and Roman moralist, the\nessential unity of the human race.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Plato and his ethical\nsystem]\n\nSocrates made virtue and man\u2019s moral nature the subject of philosophic\nreflection. His pupil, Plato, systematized his master\u2019s teachings, and,\nreducing these and the common ethical notions of his time to scientific\nform laid the basis of the science of ethics.\n\nPlato agreed with Socrates in teaching that to know the good is\nnecessarily to seek it. He accordingly makes wisdom the first of the\nvirtues, by wisdom meaning insight, the clear recognition of what\nconstitutes the highest good. Issuing from this primary virtue of\nwisdom, like a stream from a fountain, are the virtues of courage,\ntemperance, and justice.\n\nFrom wisdom comes courage, for perfect knowledge of good and evil casts\nout fear; and moderation, for knowledge of higher and lower, of the\npenalty that awaits all excess, leads to prudence and self-control; and\njustice, for knowledge of one\u2019s relations to one\u2019s fellows creates\nconsideration for the rights of others. Plato here simply systematizes\nand reduces to scientific form those various virtues which the common\nGreek conscience recognized as constituting moral excellence.\n\nParticularly noteworthy is Plato\u2019s doctrine that virtue in the state is\nthe same as virtue in the individual. There is need of emphasis being\nlaid anew upon this teaching at the present time, when the disciples of\nMachiavelli would give fresh vogue to the doctrine of a double standard\nof morality, one for the individual and another for the state. The\nmodern world might well sit at Plato\u2019s feet and learn that virtue is\never one and the same, and that the moral law can no more be traversed\nwith impunity by a nation than by a single individual.\n\nIn many of his ethical teachings Plato anticipated and deeply\ninfluenced Christian doctrines. He has been called the precursor of\nthe Fathers of the Church. \u201cHis ideas on virtue,\u201d as Denis observes,\n\u201ctake us far from Greece and antiquity; they seem addressed rather\nto the saints and anchorites than to the citizens of Sparta and\nAthens.\u201d[502] His doctrines that the way of approach to God is through\ncontemplation; that withdrawal from the turmoil of public life is a\nfurtherance of the true life; that the body is a \u201cprison house\u201d of the\nsoul; that the soul is immortal and that there awaits it in the after\nlife recompense for deeds done in the flesh; that expiation for sin is\nan ethical necessity; that punishment is not a deterrent and restraint\nbut a remedy that restores to health the sin-diseased soul[503]--all\nthese ideas and principles were in exact accord with the Christian\nmoral consciousness, and through St. Augustine and other Fathers of the\nChurch came to enrich and re\u00ebnforce the ethical system of the monastic\nand the papal Church of the medieval age.\n\nPerhaps what is the most admirable of Plato\u2019s teachings is embodied in\nthis petition: \u201cAnd may I, being of sound mind, do to others as I would\nthat they should do to me.\u201d[504] The significance of this lies in the\nfact that it is a prayer, and that the petitioner asks that he may be\nof sound mind when he reflects on what he would like to have others do\nto him.\n\nYet notwithstanding the loftiness and nobility of much of Plato\u2019s\nethical thought, still, like Socrates, he stood almost wholly on\nGreek ground. His ethics is scarcely more than a justification of\nthe common Greek morality of his time. He destroys the family in the\ninterest of the state; he approves of the exposition of ill-formed,\nunpromising infants; he makes morality to be a class thing--only select\nand cultured souls are with him capable of genuine virtue. He accepts\nslavery as a necessary institution of the state; he practically shuts\nout the non-Greek world from the sphere of morality;[505] and with\nthe common Greek he believes that to do evil to one\u2019s enemies is an\nimperative duty.[506] Nor does Plato, like Hebrew seer, rise high\nenough above the general Greek viewpoint to discern the great law of\nmoral progress, and to prevision the historical goal--ethical world\nunity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Aristotle and his\nethics]\n\nAristotle makes Plato\u2019s classification of the virtues the basis of\nhis well-rounded system of ethics. In one important respect, however,\nhe differs from Plato; he did not believe that knowledge of the right\nnecessarily leads to its practice. He recognized the fact that man\nthough knowing the good often perversely follows evil.\n\nThe great defect of Aristotelian ethics is its failure to rise to the\nethical conception of collective humanity. In the moral inequality\nof men, which he assumes as the presupposition of his ethics, he even\nexaggerated the common Greek view. He divided men so rigorously into\nclasses with varying grades of moral capacity that his moral system was\nethically like the caste system of the Indian Brahmans. To affirm the\nmoral equality of men seemed to him to be a species of treason against\nthe true humanity, a crime against Greek civilization.\n\nAccording to Aristotle the slave was a being so morally different\nfrom the freeman as to constitute practically another species. He was\nnot wholly incapable of virtue, but could practice only such servile\nvirtues as obedience and humility. The last, though a virtue in a\nslave, was in a freeman an unworthy weakness.\n\nBarbarians were slaves by nature. Hence it was right for the Greeks\nto make war on them and reduce them to slavery, because \u201cfor that\nend they were born.\u201d[507] Plato had in his _Laws_ accepted slavery\nas a political necessity; Aristotle proclaimed it as a part of the\nnatural order of things. This doctrine had far-reaching historical\nconsequences. Aristotle\u2019s declaration that slaves are merely animated\ninstruments, are men incapable of virtue, worked as powerfully in\ndestroying ancient slavery as the _obiter dictum_ of Chief Justice\nTaney of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Dred Scott\ncase, that negro slaves have no rights which the white man is bound to\nrespect, worked for the destruction of negro slavery in the Southern\nstates. For, as Professor Denis says, by pushing too far the argument,\nby founding slavery on natural right, Aristotle provoked thought and\nprotest, and led the Stoics to reject with indignation his theories\nand to proclaim the moral equality of master and slave, of Greek and\nbarbarian.[508]\n\nAristotle\u2019s ethics exercised very little influence either upon the\nactual moral life or the ethical speculations of antiquity; but in the\nmedieval time it came to exert a profound influence upon Christian\nethics.[509] The schoolmen made it the trunk into which they grafted\nChristian morals--with incongruous results, as we shall see later.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Decay of the Greek city\nstate and the accompanying decay\nof the Greek ideal of character]\n\nThe political revolution in Hellas in the fourth century B.C. had deep\nimport for Greek morality. That century saw the triumph of Macedonia\nover the Greek cities. This meant the triumph of despotic monarchy\nover city democracy. This revolution in the political realm meant a\ngreat revolution in the realm of morals, for the reason that, as we\nhave seen, the old Greek ideal of excellence was largely based upon the\nrelation of the individual to the state. With the loss of Greek liberty\nthe very basis of the Greek ideal of character was removed, and the\nvirtues of the type tended to disappear.[510]\n\nIn the despotic monarchies of the successors of Alexander there was\nlittle room for the growth and exercise of those virtues of citizenship\nwhich had been nourished in the free air of the ancient city. The\nvirtues now in vogue and fostered by the new monarchical r\u00e9gime were\nno longer those of the patriot citizen and the patriot warrior, but\nthose of the pliant subject, the servile courtier, and the mercenary\nsoldier. In Plutarch\u2019s _Lives_, out of the twenty heroes and worthies\nwhom the biographer selected as the noblest representatives of the\nvirtues most highly esteemed by the Greeks, we find only two who lived\nafter the general loss of Greek freedom, and these[511] were men whose\ncharacters were formed in the cities of the Ach\u00e6an League, in which\nthe ancient liberties of Hellas were maintained till the rise of the\nRoman power. It could not be otherwise, so completely were the fortunes\nof the Greek moral ideal bound up with the fortunes of the Greek city\nstate.\n\nBut besides the decay of the free city there were other causes\ncontributing to the moral decadence which marked Hellenism in the\nAlexandrian Age. The close contact of Greek culture with the corrupt\nsociety of the Orient had disastrous consequences for Greek morality.\nThe principal courts of the Hellenistic East were plague spots of moral\ncontagion. The virus of gross sensual immorality was communicated to\nGreece, and Greek society was fatally infected. The Orontes emptied\ninto the Ilissus and the Eurotas, as later it emptied into the Tiber.\n\nAnd still another contributing cause of the moral decline in Hellas was\nthe sudden acquisition of vast individual and social wealth through the\nconquest and exploitation of the East. The morals of no age or people\nhave been proof against suddenly acquired riches. One explanation of\nthis is that new and untried sources of pleasure, most often illicit\nsensuous pleasure, are opened up, and the temptation to selfish\nindulgence is irresistible, coming as it does before self-restraint, in\nthe face of these unaccustomed solicitations, has become a habit.\n\nStill another cause of the moral degeneracy of the age, one which we\nshall have occasion to speak of more at length a little further on,\nis to be sought in the fact that the period was one of transition in\nreligion as well as in politics and social relations. Greek morality\nwas, it is true, based in the main upon the old system of independent\ncity life. Yet Greek morality was in a way braced by religion and even\nin part based upon it. Now in the Alexandrian Age the religious system\nof Hellas was undergoing a process of disintegration. Men were losing\nfaith in their ancestral gods. Philosophic skepticism was widespread.\nInevitably this movement in the religious realm caused all that part\nof the moral system dependent in any degree upon the old religious\ndoctrines and teachings to weaken and crumble away.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethical products of\nthe Hellenistic Age: Stoicism and\nEpicureanism]\n\nThere were, however, two ethical products of the Hellenistic Age which\nrender that period one of the most important of all epochs in the moral\nevolution of humanity. These were Stoicism and Epicureanism. At first\nblush it may seem strange that out of the same environment there should\narise two systems of life and thought so strongly contrasted. But both\nof these systems are perfectly natural, indeed inevitable, products\nof an epoch, such as the Alexandrian Age was, of transition and moral\ndecadence. In such times strong, self-reliant, deeply moral natures\never seek refuge in the philosophy and creed of Zeno, while those of\nless sturdy faith in the moral order of the world, of a less strong\nsense of duty, turn to the philosophy and creed of Epicurus.\n\nSpringing up in Greece as an offshoot of the Socratic philosophy just\nafter the death of Alexander, Stoicism became the creed of the select\nspirits of the age. The crowning virtues of the moral ideal it held\naloft were self-control, imperturbability, the patient endurance of the\nills of life. Amidst the wreck of worlds one must stand unmoved and\nerect.\n\nIn the very rigid restraint it placed upon the appetites, passions, and\nemotions the Stoic ideal of character differed widely from the ordinary\nGreek ideal. It approached here the ascetic type.[512] However, in\ngeneral the Stoic type of character was closely related to the historic\nideal of the Greek race. The Stoics adopted the fundamental maxim of\nclassical Greek morality, namely, that man should live conformably\nto nature. They possessed the common Greek consciousness in the light\nesteem in which they held the family relations and duties. They were\naristocratic in their moral sympathies and looked upon the multitude\nwith disdain. They regarded the gentler virtues, compassion and\nforgiveness, as weaknesses, and ranked humility as a virtue only in the\nslave.\n\nBecause of the weak sense of duty possessed in general by the Greeks,\nthe Stoic ideal of character did not become a really important factor\nin the ethical life of the ancient world till after its adoption by the\nfiner spirits, like Marcus Aurelius, among the Romans, to whose sense\nof \u201cthe majesty of duty\u201d the ideal made strong and effective appeal. It\nnever influenced the masses, but for several centuries it gave moral\nsupport and guidance to the best men of the Roman race.\n\nAlongside Stoicism grew up Epicureanism, which made pleasure, not gross\nsensuous pleasure, but rational refined enjoyment, the chief good, and\nhence the pursuit of pleasure \u201cthe highest wisdom and morality.\u201d But\nthis philosophy made pleasurable feeling dependent upon tranquillity\nof mind. To secure this mental repose, one must get rid of fear of the\ngods and of death. These ignoble and disquieting fears Epicurus and his\ndisciples sought to banish by teaching that the gods do not concern\nthemselves with human affairs, and that death ends all for man.\n\nEpicureanism in its moral code was at one with the common Greek\nconsciousness in making moderation or prudence a cardinal virtue;[513]\nbut it differed radically from the ordinary Greek mode of thought in\nits depreciation and neglect of the civic virtues. Hence the system was\nat once a symptom and a cause of the decay of the Greek city state and\nof the old moral ideal which was based so largely upon it.\n\nThe philosophy of Epicurus, as we have already said, is the natural\nproduct of an age of transition and social dislocation. It offers\nan ideal of life which is eagerly adopted by those unable to combat\ntrouble, by those to whom duty does not appeal as something dignified\nand majestic. Hence in the decadent and unsettled age of the Roman\nEmpire it became the rule of life of large numbers of the cultured\nclasses of society, and must be regarded as one of the disintegrating\nagencies of Greco-Roman civilization.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Advance in humanitarian\nfeelings and growth in ethical\ncosmopolitanism]\n\nA general view of the society of the Hellenistic world toward the\nopening of the Christian era discloses the fact that the moral\nevolution so long in progress has effected such changes in the Greek\nmoral consciousness as to render this ethical movement an important\npreparation for the incoming of the moral ideal of Christianity. These\nchanges are especially to be observed in the growth of humanitarian\nsentiment and in a broadening of the moral sympathies.\n\nThe Greeks, compared with the Romans, were naturally a humane folk.\nWhen it was proposed to introduce at Athens the gladiatorial games,\nthe orator Demonax told the people that they should first tear down\nthe ancestral altar to Pity, a shrine which, in the words of Lecky,\n\u201cwas venerated throughout the ancient world as the first great\nassertion among mankind of the supreme sanctity of mercy.\u201d[514] One\nof the motives of Pythagoras in forbidding the use of meat as food\nwas, seemingly, to inspire a horror of shedding blood, even that of an\nanimal. The laws of Athens permitted no punishment more severe than a\npainless death.[515]\n\nThis natural humaneness of the Greek spirit deepened as the centuries\npassed. Contrasted with the Periclean Age the Platonic Age shows,\nProfessor Mahaffy affirms, \u201ca greater gentleness and softness, ... a\nnearer approach to the greater humanity of Christian teaching.\u201d[516]\nWe have already noted this movement in the domain of war practices and\ncustoms, where it found expression in the amelioration of the gross,\narchaic barbarities of primitive warfare. In the social sphere the\nprogressive evolution is evidenced by the growing mildness of slavery\nand the frequency of the manumission of slaves.[517]\n\nThe broadening movement ran parallel with the humanitarian. Classical\nGreek morality, as we have seen, was narrow and racial. Now one of\nthe most important facts in the moral evolution of Hellas was the\nbroadening of the moral sympathies, especially during the three\ncenturies immediately preceding our era. This development is connected\nclosely with the great expansion movement which followed the conquests\nof Alexander and which resulted in the Hellenization of the East.\nEverywhere the Greeks came in close contact with various peoples upon\nwhom they had been accustomed to look with aversion or disdain. Ancient\nprejudices were dispelled, race barriers were leveled, and the moral\nsympathies overspread wide areas from which they had hitherto been\nexcluded by ignorance and race egotism.\n\nIt would doubtless be unhistorical to represent this movement as\nanything more than a tendency--a dawning recognition by select spirits\nof the ethical kinship of all men, and the coextension of the moral\nlaw with the human race. It may, however, rightly be compared with\nthat broadening of the moral feelings which we have traced among the\npeople of Israel, and which resulted in a morality at first as narrow\nand exclusive as that of the Greeks, widening at last into the ethical\nuniversalism of the great teachers of the nation.\n\nThe widening movement was represented, and was given its chief impetus,\nby the Stoics. The Stoic ideal of character differed from the ordinary\nGreek ideal especially in its cosmopolitanism. Influenced by the spirit\nof the age in which it had birth, it ignored the old distinction\nbetween Greek and non-Greek and proclaimed the essential brotherhood\nof man.[518] The Stoic regarded the world and not his native city as\nhis fatherland. The Cynics, whom we may regard as extreme Stoics,\nlooked upon city patriotism as a narrow prejudice and refused to give\nlove of one\u2019s city a place among the virtues. Just as the Greek age\nwas merging into the Greco-Roman the broadening movement found its\nnoblest representative in Plutarch, \u201cthe last of the Greeks.\u201d[519]\nHis chief characteristics were his broad interests and his universal\nmoral sympathies. He had moved far away from the common Greek\nstandpoint. He had emancipated himself from the tyranny of the common\nGreek prejudices. Under the influences of his time he had become a\ncosmopolitan. To him the Greek was no longer an elect race. His moral\nsympathies embraced all mankind. His was almost a Christian conscience,\nsave as to the purely theological virtues.\n\nThis enlargement of the intellectual and moral outlook of the Greek\nworld presaged the dawn of a new epoch in the moral evolution of\nhumanity. It made easier for many the acceptance of the Gospel\nteachings of human brotherhood and universal love. Christian ethics was\nlargely debtor to the cosmopolitan spirit of Greek culture, especially\nas embodied in the Stoic ideal of moral excellence.[520]\n\nTo trace further this moral development in the ancient world we must\nnow turn from following its course among the Greeks to follow it among\nthat kindred people, the Romans, who, through the political unification\nof the world, re\u00ebnforced this growing universalism in the moral domain,\nand thereby reached that ethical conception of collective humanity\nwhich Israel had reached through spiritual intuition, and Hellas\nthrough philosophical reflection and widening culture.[521]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nROMAN MORALS: AN IDEAL OF CIVIC DUTY\n\n\nI. INSTITUTIONS AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE DETERMINING THE EARLY MORAL TYPE\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Roman family:\nancestor worship and the _patria\npotestas_]\n\nThe family in early Rome may more unreservedly be pronounced a seed\nplot of morals than in the case of any other ancient people save\nthe Chinese. It was ancestor worship which made it such a nursery\nof morality, for the cult of ancestors made the family a group of\nco-worshipers about the domestic hearth. This worship purified and\nbraced morality, since the tutelary spirits were believed to watch over\nthe morals of the family and to punish wrongdoing. No impure act could\nbe committed in the presence of the chaste hearth fire, and no one\nguilty of unexpiated crime dared to come into its presence.[522]\n\nBut it was in constituting the father the high priest of the family\ngroup that this domestic worship exercised its greatest influence upon\nearly Roman morality. It gave a religious sanction to the father\u2019s\nauthority and made the _patria potestas_ for many centuries a molding\nforce in the moral life of the Roman people.[523] A little further on\nwe shall see how, in the atmosphere of the home thus constituted, was\nfostered in the youth the virtues of submission to rightful authority,\nrespect for law, and obedience to magistrates--virtues which were one\nsecret of the strength and triumphs of early Rome.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The city state]\n\nNext after the family the state was the most important agency in the\ncreation of the Roman type of virtue. We have to do here, as in Greece,\nwith the city state. This was the chief sphere of duty of the Roman\nduring his mature and active life. Consequently, just as it was the\nnature of the city state which in Greece determined in large measure\nwhat should constitute the supreme virtues and duties of the Greek\nideal of character, so was it the constitution of Rome as a city state\nthat, as we shall see a little later, determined what should be the\nleading virtues and duties entering into the Roman ideal of goodness.\nThis made that ideal to be pre\u00ebminently an ideal of civic duty.\n\u201cNever since the fall of paganism have the civic virtues shone out so\nbrilliantly.\u201d[524]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The occupations of\nfarming and war]\n\nAlongside domestic and political institutions stands, as we have seen,\noccupation as a creator and molder of the moral type of a people. The\ntwo occupations of the early Latins were farming and war, and thus it\ncame about that in the primitive ethical type were united the sturdy\nmoral qualities of the peasant farmer and the heroic virtues of the\nwarrior. This blend produced one of the most admirable moral types of\nthe ancient world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The religion]\n\nAside from the cult of ancestors, religion among the Romans exercised\nbut little direct influence upon morality, for the reason that it was\nmainly a method of obtaining prosperity, of averting calamity, and of\nreading the future. There was in truth an almost complete separation\nof religion and morality. It was only in later times that the Roman\nphilosophers sought in the moral character of the gods models for human\nimitation. But though religion had so little to do in creating the\nsalient virtues of the moral type, it did re\u00ebnforce the sentiment of\npatriotism, since the temple was a state institution, and in various\nother ways--as, for instance, in lending sanctity to oaths--quickened\nand strengthened the sense of obligation and duty.\n\n\nII. THE PRIMITIVE MORAL TYPE\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethics of the\nfamily; the virtue of obedience]\n\nIn the bosom of the family was nourished what we may regard as the\nprimal virtue of the Latin race--submission to authority.[525] The\nson\u2019s subjection to the father\u2019s authority was complete throughout\nhis whole existence. He could not disobey his father\u2019s command. More\nthan seven centuries after the founding of Rome the Emperor Tiberius\nabsolved a certain person from guilt in participating in a revolt,\nbecause it was shown that he had acted under the orders of his\nfather.[526]\n\nThis virtue of submission to rightful authority, of obedience to\nsuperiors, contributed much to the military efficiency of the Roman\npeople. Indeed, it lay at the basis of their greatness in war. The\nconsul\u2019s authority in the field was like that of the father in the\nfamily, and obedience in the soldier was a habit, almost a religious\ninstinct. Thus did this virtue, which had its starting point in the\nfamily, help largely to give the Romans the rule of the world.[527]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Civic and military\nvirtues]\n\nPatriotism, meaning submission, obedience, devotion to the state, was\nthe saving virtue in the Roman ideal of excellence. \u201cPatriot\u201d and \u201cgood\nman\u201d were identical terms. \u201cDear to us are our parents,\u201d says Cicero,\n\u201cdear our children, our kindred and our friends; but one\u2019s country\nalone includes all our loves, for what good man would hesitate to die\nif he could promote her welfare.\u201d[528]\n\nSince war was the normal status of society in ancient times, the moral\nqualities of the Roman as of the Greek patriot were the virtues of the\nsoldier--obedience, courage, and self-devotion in battle. And by no\npeople, save perhaps the Japanese as shown in their recent history, has\nthe soldierly virtue of self-renunciation for the fatherland been more\nexalted or more finely exemplified than by the Romans in early times.\n\nIn this ready self-devotion of the Roman hero to public interests\nwe have an exhibition of the altruistic sentiment in its loftiest\nform, for of all forms of disinterested action, as Lecky maintains,\nthe self-abnegation of the ancient warrior for his city was the most\nunselfish, for the reason that he made the sacrifice without any hope\nof reward in another life.[529]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The industrial virtues]\n\nIn early Rome there was no such prejudice against labor as unworthy\nand morally degrading as we meet with at a later period. The fact that\na large body of the citizens in primitive Rome were peasant farmers\ndetermined that the traditional virtues of this class should find a\nhigh place in the early national ideal of character. The moral or\nsemi-moral qualities of the peasant, namely, simplicity, frugality,\nindustry, and conservatism or respect for the past, formed the\nsubstratum of early Roman morality. It was from the primitive citizen\npeasantry that came the strong, tough, moral fiber of the old Roman\ncharacter.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Religious duties]\n\nIn dealing with the subject of the relation of the Roman religion to\nmorality we may speak of religious duties but hardly of religious\nvirtues, and for the reason that the aim of religion was the safety\nand welfare of the state. Neglect of the temple rites and sacrifices\nwas believed to anger the gods, who would in their resentment bring\nterrible trouble and misfortune upon the nation--for the Romans never\noutgrew the conception of collective responsibility. Hence the careful\nperformance of religious duties was a phase of patriotism. Neglect of\nthese duties was antisocial conduct.[530]\n\nIn the performance of his religious duties the Roman conceived that\nall that was necessary was to do the right thing, to perform the right\nact, or repeat correctly the right formula; the disposition of mind and\nstate of heart made no difference with the result. Man\u2019s relations to\ndeity were assimilated to his relations to nature. To secure a given\nresult in the physical world, man needs only to do the right thing, as,\nfor instance, to drop the seed into the ground at the right season and\nthe harvest follows without any regard to the state of mind or heart\nof the person performing the act. This was the Roman\u2019s conception of\nhis relation to the gods. Hence religion and morality were practically\nseparated. Religion failed to supply motives for moral action, except\nin so far as it re\u00ebnforced the sentiment of patriotism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Defects of the type:\n(_a_) its aristocratic character]\n\nFrom the foregoing brief notice of some of the chief expressions of the\nmoral consciousness of the early Romans we cannot fail to recognize\nthat their ideal of character was in many respects a very admirable\none. Its realization in actual flesh and blood gives us those heroic\ncharacters which will live forever in Roman legend, and alongside the\nGreek heroes in the pages of Plutarch. It molded men grave, earnest,\nand austere, reverent toward superiors, patriotic and self-devoted to\nthe common good.\n\nBut the ideal had great defects. One of the most conspicuous of these\nwas its aristocratic character. Rome, writes Wedgwood, \u201caccepts\nconsistently and logically the aristocratic theory on which ancient\nsociety is based, and carries out the ideal of the Old World in all\nits naked impressiveness.\u201d[531] Though advancing far during a thousand\nyears of eventful history toward ethical universalism, pagan Rome never\nactually reached this moral goal. She never recognized in practice the\nmoral equality of all men. There were to the very last in the pagan\nEmpire, classes, such as slaves and gladiators, who were practically\noutside the moral sphere. Even Roman Stoicism, which was the latest\nand noblest expression of the moral life of Rome, notwithstanding its\ncosmopolitan tendencies, was essentially aristocratic.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) Its omission of\nthe gentler and the intellectual\nvirtues]\n\nAnother defect of the old Roman type of excellence was its exclusion\nof the gentler virtues--humility, tenderness, and sympathy with\nsuffering. The type of character fostered by the ideal was hard and\nsevere, even callous and cruel, proud and self-assertive. It was a type\nsomewhat like the Spartan, one which, when the age of reflection came,\nnaturally developed into the Stoic. The old Romans lacked the quality\nof mercy and compassion for weakness. They seemed almost destitute of\nthe sentiment of pity for misfortune. Their treatment of prisoners of\nwar and of their slaves in the later period was marked by a repellent\nbrutality. The place in their amusements which the gladiatorial combats\nassumed evidences their callous insensibility to suffering.\n\nStill another defect of this ideal was that it gave little or no\nplace to the intellectual virtues. These ethical qualities which were\nassigned so prominent a place in the Greek type of excellence, and\nwhich since the Renaissance the Western world has come to esteem so\nhighly, were never greatly valued by the Romans until they came under\nthe influence of Greek culture, and then only by the few; hence their\nintellectual life was, in general, lacking in moral impulse. Mental\nself-culture was not with them, as it was with the Greeks and is coming\nto be with ourselves, a moral requirement.\n\n\nIII. THE MORAL EVOLUTION UNDER THE REPUBLIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: The maintenance of the\nstandard in early times]\n\nThe four essential facts in the moral life of Rome as a republic are:\nfirst, the high standard maintained in the early period; second, the\ngradual widening of the moral sympathies through the influence of\nconquest and advance in civilization; third, the general decline in\nmorals during the two centuries preceding the establishment of the\nEmpire; and fourth, the modification of the moral type through contact\nwith Greece and the Orient.\n\nThrough the legendary haze which envelops all the earlier centuries\nof Rome, the one fact which stands out with comparative clearness is\nthe Spartan-like loyalty of the old Roman to the ideal of character\nwhich he had conceived as the noblest and best. The legends of this\nperiod, invented or repeated by the men of a later age, celebrate\nqualities of character which we may believe really marked early Roman\nlife and thought. Among these virtues were patriotic altruism, absolute\nself-abnegation for the common good, as illustrated by such tales as\nthose of the self-devotion for the Roman people of Curtius and of the\nElder and Younger Publius Decius Mus; reverence for law, as shown by\nthe consul Lucius Junius Brutus in the condemnation of his sons to\ndeath for taking part in a conspiracy; and incorruptible integrity, as\nillustrated by the tales of Fabricius.\n\nEven though all these stories of the heroic age of Rome be the\ninvention of a later time, they at least show what at this later\n(though still comparatively early) period were highly esteemed\nqualities of character, just as the stories celebrating the filial\npiety of Chinese heroes of the olden time show how high a place this\nmoral trait held in the ideal of the age that invented or repeated\nthese tales with a didactic purpose.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The widening of the\nmoral sympathies]\n\nThe gradual broadening of the moral sympathies was a very important\nphase of the moral evolution in Roman society up to the end of the\nRepublic. These sympathies embraced at first hardly more than the\npatrician class, which formed the nucleus of the early Roman community.\nThe enlarging of the area covered by the ethical feelings was simply\none phase, and, from the viewpoint of the student of morals, the most\nimportant phase of that political evolution which in the course of\ncenturies brought within the sacred pale of Roman citizenship first\nthe Plebeians, then the Latins, next the Italians, and finally all the\nfreemen of the extended Roman dominions. That is to say, this central\nfact in Roman history, the expansion of the city into the world state,\nwas in its deepest significance, in its remote consequences, as much a\nmoral as a political movement. Conquest, it is true, prepared the way\nfor the revolution, and the concessions made by the ruling class to\nthe demands of the disfranchised classes and peoples were motived in\nthe main by political prudence and expediency. But it is equally true\nthat ethical sentiment worked with these other causes in determining\nthe course and progress of the revolution, and that one of its most\nimportant results was the imparting of a great impulse to the widening\nmoral movement going on in the ancient world, and the bringing to\nrecognition of the principles of the moral equality and brotherhood of\nmen.\n\nThis great all-embracing movement in the Roman world can, we believe,\nbest be understood in its significance for the moral evolution of\nmankind only when translated into terms of the similar movement in\nmodern times. We recognize the moral character, in a final analysis,\nof the revolution which, during the past century, has by successive\nenfranchisements admitted to a share in government and to the\nenjoyment of political rights the masses in modern civilized states.\nThe movement has been largely ethical in its causes and still more\nlargely ethical in its effects. The struggle of the people has had\nfor aim to do away with unjust privilege and to establish equality\nand justice. The most important permanent effects of the revolution\nare indisputably to be looked for in the moral sphere. The incoming\nof democracy, meaning as it does the investing of the individual with\ndignity and worth, means the ennobling of the moral life of the world.\nIt is this that constitutes the real significance of the democratic\nrevolution and which gives it its important place in the moral history\nof humanity.[532]\n\nThe same is true of that phase of the modern movement which looks\ntoward the formation of the world state. The forces at work here are\nadmittedly varied and complex, but prominent among these agencies\nare the ethical. It is the broadening of the moral sympathies, the\ndevelopment of a true cosmopolitanism, a deepening consciousness of\nthe brotherhood of men, the growth of a new social and international\nconscience--it is this slow evolution in the moral realm that has laid\nor is laying the true basis of the future world union. The universal\nstate, once created,--this need not be argued,--would inevitably react\npowerfully and favorably upon the moral feelings and sympathies of men.\n\nIt was the same in the ancient world. The admission to full Roman\ncitizenship, through successive enfranchisements, of all the freemen of\nthe Roman dominions was at once the sign and the cause of a vast moral\ndevelopment. As fellow citizens with equal rights and privileges, men\ncame to know and feel their ethical kinship. Likewise the establishment\nof the world state registered a great moral advance and supplied the\nconditions of a still greater progress. Had not the moral forces worked\nwith the Roman legions, the world union could never have been formed,\nor, at least, if once formed, could never have been maintained for the\nlong period that it was. It is probably true that the bringing by Rome\nof such a wide reach of lands under her rule did as much to awaken the\nsense of the brotherhood of man as did the teachings of Hebrew prophet\nor the culture and philosophy of Greece. It was certainly the political\nunion of the civilized world that helped to awaken in Cicero and in\nthe later philosophers of the Empire the conviction that the reach of\nthe moral sympathies should be as extended as the human race. Thus the\nwide empire created by Rome was a potent influence making for ethical\nuniversalism. Never since the unification of the ancient world by Rome\nhave the moral feelings of men been quite so narrow as before; never\nsince has the conception of human brotherhood, the ideal of a united\nworld, seemed so entirely a dream.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Causes of the decline\nin morals under the later\nRepublic: (_a_) the passing of the\ncity state]\n\nNotwithstanding this broadening movement in the moral domain, the\nlast century of the Republic was marked by a great lowering of the\nearlier high moral standard and by a loss of some of the chief virtues\nof the primitive Roman type. There were many causes contributing to\nthis moral degeneracy. Among these was the decay of institutions that\nhad created or fostered the primitive moral type, and the growth of\nothers, such as slavery and the gladiatorial games, which exercised a\npernicious influence upon morality. Besides causes of this nature there\nwere others which were the natural outcome of the career of conquest\nthe Romans had led. The conquest of the world had imported into the\nRoman political and social system many alien elements unfavorable to\nmorality, and had brought Roman civilization, on one side, into hurtful\ncontact with the older and morally corrupt cultures of the Orient. In\nwhat follows we shall speak in some detail of the more important of\nthese agencies, which in the later preimperial period undermined the\noriginally sound morality of the Roman people.\n\nA first cause of the moral deterioration was the decay of the city\nconstitution. We have seen that the free city state was the chief\nnursery of those patriotic virtues which constituted the cardinal moral\nqualities of the Roman ideal of character. But by the beginning of\nthe last century preceding the Christian era various causes, chiefly,\nhowever, the mere widening of the Roman territory through conquest, had\nundermined the political institutions of Rome and had converted into\nmobs of the proletariat the public assemblies of citizens. The original\nconstitution of the city had become an empty form, and the way had been\npaved for the setting up of monarchical government.\n\nWith the passing of the city state those civic patriotic virtues\nwhich the discipline of the democratic city constitution had trained\nand developed, disappeared.[533] As the Christian Church, which was\ndestined in the fullness of time to take the place of the city in the\nminds and hearts of men and become the object and inspirer of moral\nenthusiasm, had not yet come in with its new ideal of virtue, there\nensued a sort of moral interregnum, such as usually marks transition\nperiods in the history of states and races.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) The economic\ndecay of the rural class]\n\nA second cause of the moral decline is to be found in the decay of the\nItalian peasantry. This economic revolution had its real starting point\nin the Hannibalic War. That protracted struggle, carried on largely in\nItaly itself, practically ruined the peasant class in many districts,\nand their little farms were absorbed by the growing estates of the\ngreat landholders--those _latifundia_ which Pliny later declared to\nhave been the ruin of Italy.\n\nThe practical disappearance of the Italian peasant farmer meant the\ndisappearance of those simple robust virtues, bred in thousands of\nhomes of the countryside, like the little Sabine farm of the Elder\nCato, which had contributed so largely to determine the type of Roman\ncharacter.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) Growth of the\nslave system]\n\nThe decay of the Italian peasantry was accompanied by the development\nof the slave system, so that at the same time that the peasant home,\na nursery of sterling if crude virtues, was being destroyed, the\nslave estate with its chain gangs and its ergastula, a very hotbed\nof degrading vices, was being created. Of all the institutions that\ncontributed to the moral degradation of the later Republic, slavery as\nit developed here must be assigned the first place of evil pre\u00ebminence.\nIts effects were equally debasing upon the master, the slave, and the\npoor farmer. It tended to render more callous and cruel the spirit\nof the master,[534] to destroy the moral character of the slave, to\nundermine family morals,[535] and, by placing a stigma upon labor, to\ndegrade the free laborer. Thus did the institution tend to develop\nin different classes of the population feelings, sentiments, and\na disposition of mind wholly unfavorable to the existence or the\ndevelopment of a sound moral life in society at large.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_d_) The disesteem of\nthe industrial virtues]\n\nIn placing a stigma upon labor, slavery did not create a new prejudice,\nbut merely intensified and made more inclusive a prejudice already\nexisting. As we have seen, there existed in classical antiquity a\ndeep-rooted feeling against manual labor as morally unworthy of a\nfreeman. Agriculture was the only occupation which escaped this general\ncondemnation, and which was regarded as becoming a gentleman.[536]\nCicero declares all mechanical laborers to be by virtue of their\nprofession mean, the gains of hired workmen to be ungenteel, and says\nthat all retailers of merchandise should be despised.[537] Even buying\nand selling on a large scale did not entirely escape the taint of\nretail merchandizing; it was merely a little less despicable.\n\nThis general contempt for the occupations of the artisan and merchant\nrendered impossible the development of industrial virtues in the\nRoman masses. Torn from the soil and swept into the cities by the\nmovement cityward in this period, the free poor, too proud to engage\nin occupations which were looked upon as degrading, were stranded in\nidleness and exposed to all the demoralizing influences of city life.\nCrowds of them became the dependents of the rich and formed that\ndespicable client class of the later Republic and the early Empire\nwhose abominable vices roused the anger and provoked the scorn of the\nsatirists and moralists of the time.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_e_) Free distribution\nof corn]\n\nA direct outgrowth of the presence in Rome of this great multitude of\nthe idle free poor was the evil of the corn laws. The indiscriminate\npublic free distribution of corn to the poorer citizens--prompted, for\nthe most part, not by genuine humanitarian feelings but by unworthy\npolitical and personal motives--had a most debauching effect upon\nmorals. It intensified the very evil it was supposed to ameliorate. It\nattracted still greater crowds of the idle to the capital, depressed to\na still greater degree agriculture in Italy,--grain for distribution\nbeing imported in the main from Egypt and North Africa,--and\nchecked every tendency toward the formation of habits of industry,\nself-reliance, and thrift in the lower classes. The evil attained its\nclimax when the largesses became an undisguised bid by the corrupt\ndemagogue for popular favor--the naked price paid by rich plotters\nagainst the commonwealth for the support of the morally debauched and\nfickle proletariat.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_f_) Gladiatorial\ngames]\n\nThe idle population of Rome had not only to be fed but to be amused.\nThe same motives that had led to the enormous increase in the largesses\nof grain to the free poor contributed also to the multiplication\nof the spectacles of the circus and the amphitheater, particularly\nof the gladiatorial games, which, introduced at Rome in the third\ncentury B.C., had now become the favorite amusement of the Roman\npopulace. \u201cThat not only men, but women in an advanced period of\ncivilization,--men and women who not only professed but very frequently\nacted upon a high code of morals,--should have made the carnage of\nmen their habitual amusement, that all this should have continued for\ncenturies, with scarcely a protest, is one of the most startling facts\nin moral history.\u201d[538]\n\nBut this fact is by no means an isolated or unique one in the ethical\nhistory of mankind. The student of the history of morals is often\nbrought face to face with similar facts in the annals of every race and\nof every age. The fact with which the moralist is here confronted is\nhardly more startling than the hideously barbarous treatment of their\nenemies by the deeply pious Jews; the heartless massacre at times of\ntheir prisoners by the naturally humane Greeks; the savage severity of\nthe medieval inquisitors toward heretics, while in general showing the\ngreatest compassion and sympathy for those in pain and distress; the\natrocious cruelty of the punishments meted out to offenders against\nsociety by the Christian governments of Europe down almost to the last\ncentury; the callous insensibility, until just now, of modern society\nto \u201cthe bitter cry of the children\u201d of its city slums; and, above all,\nthe glorification of war by the professed followers of Him whose most\ndistinctive title is the Prince of Peace.\n\nBut just as all these startling inconsistencies and aberrations in\nmoral conduct may be explained, in part at least, by reference to the\neffect upon the moral sympathies of tribal religion, of political\nrancor and fanaticism, of false theological dogmas, and of bad bequests\nof practices and conventions unreflectingly adopted by an advanced\ncivilization from ages of barbarism and savagery, so is it possible\nin the same way to explain and render in a measure comprehensible\nto ourselves the existence without protest among the comparatively\ncultured Romans of such an institution as that of the gladiatorial\ncombats. The system was fostered by slavery and the Romans\u2019 occupation\nof war. The Roman people were originally stern and just; slavery and\nwar tended to make them hard and callous. Slavery created a sort of\ncaste morality, which excluded from the moral sphere large classes as\ncompletely as though they belonged to the dumb-animal creation. It was\nthese pariah classes that contributed a large portion of the victims\nof the cruel sport. The enormous quantities of human flesh and blood\nrequired to nourish the system could have been found in no society\nexcept in one where a considerable part of the population had been\ndegraded to a mere animal plane of existence and thus put practically\nbeyond the range and reach of the moral feelings.\n\nLike slavery, the constant wars in which the Romans were engaged tended\nto indurate their feelings and to destroy all sense of the sanctity of\nhuman life. In what way the military life of the Romans reacted upon\ntheir feelings and sentiments and molded even their ethical theories is\nshown by the fact that the Roman moral philosophers in general defended\nand approved the combats of the amphitheater on the ground that they\ninured the soldier to the sight of blood and taught him contempt of\ndeath.[539]\n\nThe effect of these inhuman spectacles upon morality was most\nlamentable. They hindered the growth of humane feelings in the men,\ndeadened every tender sensibility of the women, habituated the\nyoung to scenes of cruelty,[540] and developed finally the normal\nimpassiveness of the Roman temperament into a fierce delight in human\nsuffering.[541]\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_g_) Decay of\nreligious faith]\n\nThe influence of religion upon Roman morality was never great;\nstill, as we have seen, the Roman\u2019s sense of duty was in some degree\nstrengthened by his belief in the gods and in their general watch over\nthe conduct of men. Hence that growth of philosophic doubt among the\nlearned class which characterized the later period of the Republic,\nand the transformation of religion into gross superstition among the\ndebased population of the cities, contributed to hasten and render more\ndecisive the moral decline we are tracing.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_h_) Extremes of\nwealth and poverty]\n\nThe apparent teaching of history is that there is an antithesis between\nwealth and morality. It is a commonplace of the records of civilization\nthat as a community has advanced in material prosperity and waxed rich\nit has gone backward in morals. The growth in great riches of a people\nhas usually been the prelude to their moral degeneracy and loss of\nplace in the competition of races and cultures.\n\nThere ought certainly to be no antithesis between riches and morality,\nany more than between intellectual culture and morality. To suppose\nthat there is any natural and necessary incompatibility between these\ntwo elements of civilization is to suppose that there exists a fatal\nantinomy at the very heart of the cosmic evolution.\n\nThat moral degeneracy should be the common accompaniment of a\ncommunity\u2019s growth in wealth, springs not from the mere possession of\nwealth, but in the main from its inequitable distribution. Thus far in\nhistory, as a society has grown in riches it has become divided into\ntwo sharply contrasted classes, the very rich and the very poor. Now\neach of these extremes is unfavorable to morality. Excessive fortune\ngives birth to luxury, to gross, extravagant, and unethical uses of\nwealth. Particularly is this likely to be true if the elevation to\naffluence has been sudden and from comparative poverty. The reason\nof this is, as was long ago pointed out, that men before they have\nlearned self-control have placed in their hands means for the unlimited\nsatisfaction of every appetite and desire, and generally the desire\nof such men is for indulgence in gross sensuous and sensual forms of\npleasure. On the other hand, extreme poverty is equally disastrous to\nmorals; for poverty means almost inevitably undue nutrition of body\nand soul, and generally squalid and insanitary conditions of life that\ndestroy at once physical and moral health, and breed in the young and\nold alike the most repellent and contagious forms of vice.\n\nNow while at every period of Roman history we find two classes, the\nrich and the poor, the extremes of wealth and poverty do not appear\nuntil about a century before the establishment of the Empire.[542] And\nunfortunately all the conditions which tend to render such inequality\nof fortune especially pernicious to morals were existent at this time\nin Roman society. The men into whose control came the great fortunes of\nthe period were generally men of servile origin, because law and public\nsentiment prevented the senatorial order from engaging in trade or\ncommerce. These men, who had not yet outgrown the grossness and vices\nof the slave class from which they had sprung, with unlimited wealth\nat their command, and \u201cwithout the restraint of traditions or ideals,\u201d\nwere naturally prone to indulge in vulgar luxury, in ostentatious\nextravagance, and in orgies of sensuality.\n\nAt the same time at the other end of the social scale were the very\npoor, subjected to the debasing influences of idleness, of a grossly\nimmoral stage, and of the brutalizing spectacles of the amphitheater.\nThe relations of the large number of propertyless clients to their\nwealthy patrons bred in this class the hateful vices of servility and\nhypocrisy.[543]\n\nThus the division of Roman society into two classes, the overrich and\nthe very poor,--a division which is always the sign and register of\nsocial maladjustment and injustice,--became one of the most potent\ncauses of that moral degeneracy which relaxed the fiber of the Roman\nrace and preluded the downfall of the Republic.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_i_) Demoralizing\ninfluence of Eastern luxury and\nvice]\n\nAfter the conquest of the East the national character of the Romans\nwas subjected to a great variety of influences from Greece and the\nhalf-Hellenized countries of the Orient. Many of these influences,\nas we shall notice a little later, had a strengthening and uplifting\neffect upon Roman life, especially in the upper circles of society, but\nin general the new elements now imported into Roman civilization from\nthe Hellenistic East were hurtful to morals. Rome \u201csucked poison from\nthe Attic bloom decayed.\u201d\n\nIt is a commonplace of history that at the time of the Roman conquest\nof the East the great semi-Hellenized cities of the Orient were sinks\nof moral corruption. Brought into close contact with these morally\ndebased communities, Roman civilization was at once infected with the\nfatal virus. Streams of impurity overflowed every country of the once\nmoral West. The Orontes emptied into the Tiber. Oriental vices and\nluxury came in as a flood. The primitive Roman virtues of frugality\nand simplicity disappeared. Greek cooks, we are told, brought a higher\nprice than Greek philosophers.\n\nAlmost every element of the Greco-Oriental culture seemed to bear\nwithin it the seeds of moral deterioration and decay. Greek philosophy,\npervaded in general by a spirit of skepticism, tended to unsettle\nstill more positively the already shaken faith of the Romans in their\nancestral gods. Roman morality, in so far as it was supported by\nreligious belief, was thus fatally impaired. The Epicurean philosophy,\nif not--as taught by most of the Sophists--a direct incentive to\nvice, afforded at least a ready apology for indulgence in coarse and\ngluttonous pleasures.\n\nThe plays presented on the Roman comic stage were mostly pieces of the\nGreek drama, which, in the process of adaptation to a Roman audience,\nhad been made coarse and dissolute. Thus the theater became one of the\nmost effective agencies of social corruption. In the words of Mommsen,\nit was \u201cthe great school at once of Hellenism and of vice.\u201d[544]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Modifications in the\nmoral type itself]\n\nA much more important fact in the moral history of the later Republic\nthan this lowering of the standard of conduct is the change which was\nbeing effected in the moral ideal itself. While certain causes were\nat work depressing the moral standard to the lowest point, perhaps,\nthat it ever touched in the long history of Rome, there were other\ncauses in operation which were slowly modifying the old Roman type of\ncharacter and creating a new type made up largely of new virtues. We\nspeak of this change in the ideal as a fact of greater significance\nthan that of moral degeneracy, for the reason that a decline in actual\nmorality, the failure of a people to live up to the best they know, is\nalways a superficial and transient phenomenon compared with the changes\neffected by different influences in the moral type itself, since these\nchanges constitute the very essence of the ethical evolution.\n\nThe causes at work modifying the old Roman ideal of character were\nvarious; but more vital than all other influences were those that came\nthrough the contact of Rome with Greek culture and the civilizations\nof the Orient. At the heart of these ancient cultures were ethical\nelements of inestimable value. Among these were the Greek humanitarian\nspirit and the various intellectual virtues which characterized the\nGreek type of excellence; and, in the Oriental theosophic cultures,\na deeply religious spirit and the religious virtues which marked the\nmoral ideals of the Eastern nations, particularly the Egyptian, the\nPersian, and the Hebrew. We recognize the supreme importance for the\nlater moral history of Rome, as well as for that of the whole Western\nworld, of the ethical products of the religious culture of Judea, but\nwe do not recognize as fully the importance of the ethical elements of\nthe secular culture of Greece and of the theosophic civilizations of\nEgypt and Persia. But Rome\u2019s ethical debt to these older cultures was\nalso indisputably great.\n\nBut since these Greco-Oriental influences which were at work modifying\nthe old Roman type of character had not wrought their full effects\nbefore the close of the third century of the imperial period, we shall\nreserve further comment on them, and on the new composite type they\nwere contributing to create, for the next division of this chapter, in\nwhich we shall follow the trend of the moral evolution under the pagan\nEmpire.\n\n\nIV. THE MORAL EVOLUTION UNDER THE PAGAN EMPIRE\n\n\n[Sidenote: The bad bequest]\n\nRoman society throughout the first century of the pagan Empire, as\nmirrored in the literature of the period, presents a picture of\nfrightful moral degeneracy. This state of things was largely an\ninheritance from the Republic. It was the continuation of that moral\ndecline which began in the second century B.C., and some of the\ncontributing causes of which, such as slavery, the spectacles of the\namphitheater, the free distribution of corn, together with contact with\nthe dissolute civilizations of the Orient, were considered briefly in\nthe preceding pages. Since all these causes of moral degradation were\nstill at work in the society of the early Empire, and as fresh agencies\nof malign influence were added to them, it was inevitable that the\nmoral anarchy should not only continue but should grow worse.\n\nThe definitive establishment of the Empire and the passing of the\nliberal institutions of the Republic changed wholly the atmosphere in\nwhich had been nourished the virtues of Republican Rome. Political\nliberty was dead, and all true civic activity, which had been the very\nbreath of life to the citizen of the ancient city, had come to an end.\nIn the new world that was forming there was no room for the exercise\nof those patriotic virtues which had made the early history of Rome so\ngreat, and had given her the rule of the world.[545]\n\nOne wholly fresh cause of moral debasement was the personal character\nof several of the occupants of the imperial throne during the first\ncentury of the Empire. The Oriental extravagancies and coarse\ndebaucheries which disgraced the court of a Claudius, a Caligula, or\na Nero, communicated their virus to every part of the social body.\nNever did the proverb, \u201cAs court, so people,\u201d have such justification.\nAt the same time the tyranny which marked the rule of more than one\nof the emperors instituted a demoralizing terror like that of the\nproscriptions of the Civil Wars. Under the influence of the frightful\npersecutions of their order, the senatorial aristocracy, with moral\nfiber now relaxed and corroded by effeminate luxury, lost seemingly\nall those virtues which earlier had characterized their class, and\nwas transformed into a body at times sycophantic, cringing, and base\nalmost beyond belief. But it is doubtful if any other aristocracy which\nhistory has known would have stood the test any better. The French\nnobility of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, excluded from\nparticipation in political affairs by the divine-right monarchy, and\nmade servile dependents of the court, exhibited almost as depressing a\nspectacle of moral degeneracy as did the higher Roman classes under the\nmore frightful tyranny of the early C\u00e6sars.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The old and the new]\n\nBut we may here profitably call to mind the words of Wedgwood to the\neffect that the phenomenon of moral decay, although the most striking,\nis not the most significant fact in the moral history of a race or of\nan age. \u201cThe fact that an old ideal is perishing,\u201d remarks this writer,\n\u201cmust always be a stronger or at least a more obvious moral influence\nthan the fact that a new one is coming into life.... A death is more\nimpressive than a birth.\u201d[546]\n\nWhat in this reflection claims our attention here is the implied truth\nthat the passing of the old means the coming of the new. At the base of\nthe falling leaf there is always a new-forming bud. It is not otherwise\nin the moral world. Unless the forces of the moral life have become\nfatally impaired, the decay of an old ideal of excellence is ever\naccompanied by the growth of a new and better one. And it was so in the\nRome of the early C\u00e6sars. The Roman ancestral ideal of character, with\nits attractive civic and heroic virtues, was indeed falling into decay\nand passing away, but a new and better ideal of goodness was slowly\nforming and winning the allegiance of the select spirits of the age.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The three periods in\nthe moral history of Rome]\n\nLecky distinguishes in the moral history of pagan Rome three periods\ncharacterized \u201cby the successive ascendancy of the Roman, the Greek,\nand the Egyptian spirit.\u201d Up to near the end of the Republic the moral\nideal was essentially Roman; during the first and second centuries of\nthe Empire it was characterized by the dominance of the humanitarian\nand cosmopolitan spirit of Greece; while in the third and last century\nof the pagan Empire it was marked by the ascendency of the Egyptian\nspirit of religious reverence.[547] In the immediately following pages\nwe shall consider the second of these periods.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Modifying influence\non the Roman ideal of the Greek\nspirit]\n\nAlready at the time of the establishment of the Empire the two great\ncivilizations of classical antiquity had been in close contact for a\nhundred years and more. The elements of Greek culture which reacted\nmost powerfully upon Roman society were the purely intellectual and\nthe ethical. History has fully recognized the debt of Rome to Greek\nintellectualism, but it has not so fully recognized her ethical debt\nto Hellenism. Yet it was the contribution made by Greece to the\nnew-forming moral ideal of the Roman world which was probably the most\nhistorically important element of the Hellenic bequest. This ethical\ninheritance of Rome from Greece was second only to her ethical heritage\nfrom Judea.\n\nIt was largely through the medium of Greek literature and Greek\nphilosophy, particularly the Platonic and the Stoic, that the ethical\nGreek spirit, characterized by its humanitarian and cosmopolitan\nsympathies, exerted its modifying influence upon the Roman moral\nconsciousness and gradually changed it into something very different\nfrom what it was at first. This influence can best be traced in Roman\nliterature and the imperial legislation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Evidences in literature\nof the softening of the moral\nfeelings]\n\nThe two great changes in the moral type consisted, as Lecky observes,\nin the greater prominence accorded the benevolent or amiable virtues,\nand in the broadening of the moral sympathies.[548] The effect of the\naction of the humanitarian Greek spirit upon the old Roman ideal of\ncharacter was to soften its harsher features and to cause the heroic\nvirtues to yield place, in a measure, to the benevolent qualities, that\nis to say, to those virtues which in the course of three centuries\nor more, largely under Hebrew-Christian influences, were destined to\nassume a dominant place in the accepted ideal of moral excellence.[549]\n\nCicero, Vergil, Juvenal, and Seneca may be considered the truest\nrepresentatives of this new-forming social conscience. Cicero,\nwriting just at the end of the Republic and after Rome for more than\nthree generations had been under the influence of Greek culture and\nphilosophy, exhibits unmistakably the effect upon the Roman character\nof the comparatively humane and gentle spirit of Hellas. In his\ntreatise _De Officiis_, \u201cconcerning duties,\u201d in which he interprets\nand enlarges for the benefit of his son Marcus the ethical work of the\nGreek philosopher Pan\u00e6tius, he gives his sanction to moral doctrines\nwhich could hardly have been approved by a Roman moralist before Rome\nhad felt the influence of the ethical spirit of Greece. The work is a\nglorification of the virtues of pity, gentleness, and benevolence.\n\nThe softening movement finds another representative in Vergil. His\ngreat poem is in its ethical spirit more Greek than Roman. In the\n\u201ctransformation of the goddess of lawless self-pleasing love into a\ngoddess of a maternal compassionate love,\u201d Wedgwood would have us see\nsummed up the change in moral feeling of the classical world during\nthe centuries that separated the age of the _Iliad_ from that of the\n_\u00c6neid_.[550]\n\nJuvenal,[551] too, applauds the moral qualities of pity and tenderness.\n\u201cHis moral tone appears to unite the spirit of two different\nages.\u201d[552] Seneca denounced the gladiatorial games as inhuman and\ndegrading. He constantly lays emphasis upon those amiable virtues\nwhich belong rather to the Greek than to the Roman ideal of moral\nexcellence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethical theory finds\nembodiment in practice]\n\nNor was this moral evolution confined to ethical theory; these precepts\nof the moralists found generous embodiment in practice. Especially\nwas the age of the Antonines a benevolent age, one in which all kinds\nof charities abounded. Respecting private benefactions in this period\nProfessor Samuel Dill asserts that we may well doubt whether they were\nless numerous and generous than at the present day, and that \u201cthere has\nprobably seldom been a time when wealth was more generally regarded\nas a trust, a possession in which the community at large has a right\nto share.\u201d[553] These numerous gifts and legacies assumed the form of\nbaths, theaters, libraries, markets, colonnades, aqueducts, fountains,\ntemples, basilicas, and other monuments of utility or adornment.\n\nThe motives which led to all this public giving were of course mixed,\njust as are the motives of givers of to-day, but we may without much\nhesitation assume with the historian Dill that they sprang largely\nfrom genuine altruistic feeling, from a recognition of the true uses\nof wealth, and from a sense of the duty of the rich to the poor and\ndependent--from the same motives, in a word, that a century or two\nlater were to cover these same lands with churches and monasteries and\noratories.[554]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The broadening\nmovement: ethical universalism as\nthe outcome of the world empire\nand of Stoicism]\n\nThe second important ethical movement in the pre-Christian Roman world\nconsisted, as we have seen, in the widening of the moral sympathies.\nThe two most efficient causes of this movement were the establishment\nof the world empire and the ascendancy at Rome of Greek philosophy,\nparticularly the philosophy of the Stoics.\n\nNever before in the history of the world down to our own day were there\nso many forces and circumstances making for cosmopolitanism in life\nand thought as in the age of the early C\u00e6sars. The growth of the little\ncity state of Rome into a world state had made all freemen actually or\npotentially citizens of the world. The political unity of the world had\nawakened the consciousness of a moral unity. In thought and feeling\nmany select souls recognized themselves as brothers of all other men.\nIt was not merely the world-wide reach of the Roman rule that promoted\nthe growth of this cosmopolitanism, but contributing largely to it\nwere the policies of the imperial government, many of whose agencies\nand institutions made directly and powerfully for the development of\na sentiment of universal human kinship. The unification of the world\non its physical side, by the creation of the splendid Roman roads and\nthe facilities thus provided for world-wide trade and travel, had the\nsame broadening effect upon the moral feelings that modern railways,\nsteamboats, and telegraphs have upon the ethical sympathies of our own\nday. Furthermore, the practically autocratic authority of the Emperor\ntended to destroy class distinctions by reducing all to the same level\nof servitude, to obliterate national boundaries, and to weaken race\nprejudices. Then also, as the capital of the world, Rome had become,\nas a center and creator of cosmopolitan life, a second Alexandria.\nThe character, too, of the slaves, drawn now largely from the East,\nand often superior in culture to their masters, tended to blur the\ndistinctions between classes based on outer conditions, and to suggest\nthe doctrine of equality in the sphere of the spirit. The army, also,\nrecruited from every race and land in the Empire, and from the outside\nbarbarian world as well, with the legions raised in one country serving\nin another, was a liberalizing agency, and a most effective one in\nbreaking down race barriers and in widening the mental outlook and the\nmoral sympathies of the traveled legionaries.\n\nThe second great cause of the enlarging of the moral feelings was the\ninfluence of the Greek spirit. Indeed, this broadening movement was in\nlarge measure the effect of the action of the cosmopolitan spirit of\nthe Stoic philosophy upon the originally narrow spirit of Rome.[555]\nEvidences in literature of this widening of the moral horizon multiply\nfrom Terence in the second century B.C. to the age of the Antonines.\nThe familiar sentiment of the poet, \u201cI am a man and nothing human is\nalien to me,\u201d[556] although we know nothing as to the response this\nevoked in the readers of Terence, may fairly be accepted as evidence\nthat the new spirit of cosmopolitanism was already at work in Roman\nsociety. But the first clear sustained note of universalistic morality\ncomes from Cicero in his treatise _De Officiis_,[557] to which we\nhave already referred. The author says much about the Law of Nature\nand of the society and community of the human race. One should, in\nimitation of Hercules, even at the cost of great labor and pain, give\nsuccor and aid to every one, whoever he may be, for this is consonant\nwith nature.[558] In destroying Corinth Rome was guilty of a great\ncrime.[559] The human race forms a universal society, by virtue of the\nbond of reason and speech; therefore we are to do good to all men--but\nliberality should begin at home.[560] \u201cThe love of humanity,\u201d he says,\n\u201cwhich has its beginnings in the love of parents for their offspring,\nbinds together first the members of the family; then, gradually\nreaching out beyond the domestic circle, embraces successively\nrelatives, friends, neighbors, fellow citizens; next broadens to\ninclude allied nations; and finally comes to embrace the whole human\nrace.\u201d[561]\n\nTwo generations later, in the reign of Nero, Seneca enjoined the\nsame cosmopolitan morality. He declared all men to be citizens of a\nuniversal commonwealth, and inculcated the lofty sentiment, \u201cMan should\nbe sacred to his fellow man.\u201d Epictetus in the same age preached a\nlike doctrine of human fraternity, and taught that a man should regard\nhimself not as a citizen of this or of that city, but as a citizen of\nthe world.\n\nBut it is in the _Meditations_ of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius that we\nfind the most emphatic declaration of this Stoic doctrine of the unity\nof mankind and the universal reach of the moral law. As envisioned by\nthe emperor-philosopher the whole world is a single state and all men\nare fellow citizens. \u201cMy city and country,\u201d he says, \u201cso far as I am\nAntoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world.\u201d[562]\nAgain he muses: \u201cThe poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou\nsay, Dear city of Zeus?\u201d[563] Every man, he declares, should remember\nthat every rational being is his kinsman, and that \u201cto care for all men\nis according to man\u2019s nature;\u201d[564] for \u201cmen exist for the sake of one\nanother.\u201d[565]\n\nIn what measure these moralists and philosophers whom we have quoted\nreally represented their times it is of course impossible to say; but\nprobably we would not be wrong in assuming that they appealed to a\ncertain public sentiment, and that the doctrines they taught evoked\nconsenting response from the moral consciousness of more than a few in\nevery rank of Roman society.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Stoic doctrine of\nthe Law of Nature and its ethical\ninfluence]\n\nThe doctrine of the Law of Nature, upon which such emphasis was laid\nby the Stoic philosophers, had such consequences for the evolution of\nRoman morals and so great an influence upon the moral philosophers of\nlater times, particularly upon the speculations of the philosophers of\nthe eighteenth century, that we must in the present connection endeavor\nto gain some idea of what the Stoics meant by this phrase, and the\nethical value of the conception.[566]\n\nThe Law of Nature is merely the Stoic designation of a law which,\nunder other names, all the ages have revered as the supreme law of\nthe universe. It is practically the law of conscience, the inner law\nwritten on the hearts of men.[567] It is that law which is in the\nbackground of our consciousness when we say, \u201cWe must obey God rather\nthan man.\u201d It is that holy law which came to Hebrew prophet as the\nword of Jehovah. It is that inviolable law which Antigone feared to\nbreak, \u201ca law not proclaimed by men, and which lives not for to-day\nnor yesterday, but evermore.\u201d[568] It is what the Supreme Court of the\nUnited States in a recent decision calls \u201cthe rule of reason,\u201d that\ninborn sense of what is reasonable and just.\n\nThis Law of Nature being thus the expression of what is most\nconstituent and essential in man as man, it necessarily results that\nthere is a large common element in the customs and the rules of conduct\nof all peoples who are in the same or nearly the same stage of culture;\nhence the substantial conformity between the Law of Nature and the Laws\nof Nations. The conformity, however, is not perfect. The moral task of\nhumanity is to make it perfect.\n\nIt is of course the ethical imperative of the Law of Nature which has\nrendered it such a revolutionary and reconstructive force in history.\nDuring the medieval period it was seldom invoked because the Church\nand not the normal human reason was regarded as the supreme authority\nin the domain of morals. But after the Renaissance and the Reformation\nhad proclaimed the autonomy of the individual spirit and the ultimate\nauthority of the individual conscience in the realm of moral right and\nwrong, then came naturally an appeal from the rules and conventions of\nsociety to the unwritten Law of Nature; hence the prominence it assumed\nin the writings of the philosophers of the eighteenth century, who\nprepared the way for the French Revolution.\n\nBut what it concerns us now to notice is merely the influence of this\nconception of a Law of Nature on the moral development in the later\nperiod of the Roman Empire. A fundamental principle of the law, as\napprehended by the Stoics, is that men are born free and equal. If\nthis teaching be received as axiomatic, it is easy to understand\nits importance for morality. Tried by this touchstone, many social\ninstitutions, such for instance as slavery, are shown at once to\nbe contrary to nature, and hence opposed to natural justice. The\nacceptance of this Stoic doctrine by the Roman jurists caused the\nRoman law, as we shall see immediately, to be molded in opposition to\nservitude and in the interest of freedom.[569]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Influence of Stoicism\nas an ethical force on Roman\ngovernment and law]\n\nIn its moral influence Stoicism worked in the Roman world more like a\nreligion than a philosophy. In truth it was a missionary philosophy.\nIt created in a remarkable measure moral enthusiasm. \u201cIn the Roman\nEmpire,\u201d declares Lecky, \u201calmost every great character, almost\nevery effort in the cause of liberty, emanated from the ranks of\nStoicism.\u201d[570]\n\nIn the first place it presented an ideal of monarchy which powerfully\ninfluenced Roman imperialism.[571] It made the prince \u201cthe shepherd of\nhis people.\u201d It taught that the sole aim of the ruler should be \u201cthe\ngood of his subjects.\u201d The effects of these teachings were evident in\nthe rule of more than one of the pagan emperors. The blessings which\nthe reigns of Pius and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus and others of the\n\u201cgood emperors\u201d brought to the Roman world are to be attributed in\nlarge measure to the influence upon these rulers of the doctrines and\nideals of Stoicism. In the beneficent rule of these Stoic emperors the\nideal of Plato and Dion was realized; the philosopher was upon the\nthrone. Only in the effects of the teachings of the philosophers of\nthe eighteenth century upon the Enlightened Despots of that period do\nwe find a like illustration of the influence of philosophy upon the\npossessors of absolute power.\n\nThe enlightened and humane spirit of Stoicism was felt especially\nin the law.[572] It was the Stoic doctrine of the natural equality\nof all men that worked most effectively in this domain. Many of the\ndisabilities placed upon woman by the earlier law were removed;\nchildren were emancipated in a measure from the now unreasonable\nauthority of the father;[573] and the slave was placed under the\nprotection of the law and safeguarded against the worst brutalities of\na cruel master.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Amelioration of slavery\nunder the pagan emperors]\n\nThe mitigation of the lot of the slave constitutes so important a\nphase of the moral evolution of the pre-Christian period that we must\nconsider it here apart and in some detail. The causes of this moral\nreform were various. Among the most efficient agencies were Stoicism\nand the other Greek philosophies.[574] Then the character of many of\nthe slaves themselves, the equal or superior often of their master in\nintelligence and culture, won for the class respect and consideration.\nFurthermore, the great number of freedmen, who constituted a very large\nelement of the free population of the Empire,[575] tended to create a\npublic sentiment favorable to the slave. Having had, like Epictetus the\nStoic, acquaintance with the bitterness of bondage, they knew how to\npity the bondsman.\n\nAlready in the first century of the Empire all the chief leaders of\nmoral reform taught that the slave is the equal of his master in\ncapacity for virtue.[576] Dion Chrysostom condemned hereditary slavery\nas contrary to the Law of Nature and hence wrong. He is thought to have\nbeen the earliest writer in the Roman Empire to take this advanced\nmoral ground.[577] Seneca proclaimed the obligations of the higher law:\n\u201cAlthough our laws,\u201d he says, \u201cpermit a master to treat his slave with\nevery degree of cruelty, still there are some things that the common\nlaw of life forbids being done to a human being.\u201d[578] Cruel masters,\nhe adds, are hated and detested.\n\nThe growing sentiment of tenderness for the slave found significant\npopular expression in the reign of Nero. A certain prefect of the\ncity having been murdered by a slave, the Senate, in accordance with\nancient usage, adjudged to death the entire household of slaves, four\nhundred in number. Sentiment in the Senate itself was divided, some of\nthe senators voting against the proposal, while the people gathering\nin seditious crowds threatened to prevent by force the carrying out of\nthe edict. A body of soldiers was necessary to overawe the populace and\nsecure the execution of the slaves.[579]\n\nA little later we see these growing humanitarian feelings reflected in\nthe imperial legislation. Hadrian took away from masters the ancient\nright willfully to kill their slaves; and Antoninus Pius made the\nkilling of a slave, _sine causa_, murder. The edicts of other emperors\neffected further mitigations of the law, so that the slave code of\nthe later pagan Empire is characterized by a humaneness of spirit\nthat places it in strong contrast with the callousness of the code of\nearlier times.\n\nAdditional evidence of the increased humanity of the age is afforded\nby the numerous manumissions of slaves.[580] The motives that prompted\nsuch action were undoubtedly mixed, one self-regarding motive being\nthe ambition to have a great retinue of clients;[581] but the dominant\nmotive is unquestionably to be sought in the growing humanity of the\nage.\n\nIt is noteworthy that the greatest alleviations of slavery were\neffected before the influence of Christianity was felt. The Christian\nemperors added almost nothing to the laws of the pagan Empire\nameliorating the lot of the slave, and the Christian bishops in general\nfell behind Seneca in advocacy of the cause of the bondsman. The\nemphasis laid by the Church upon a future life where the poor and the\noppressed of this world should receive compensation for their wrongs\nand sufferings here, caused the Christian teachers to regard earthly\nrank and outer conditions of life as of little moment.[582]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethics of the\npersecution of the Christians by\nthe pagan emperors]\n\nWhile considering the steady expansion of the moral sympathies and the\ngrowth of humanitarian sentiment in the pagan Empire, we are confronted\nby the startling fact that the best of the emperors, those most closely\nidentified with the legislation embodying the new spirit of humanity\nand justice, were among the most severe and persistent persecutors of\nthe Christians.\n\nThis apparent moral paradox is the same as will again confront us in\nthe medieval age in connection with the Inquisition and the cruel\npersecution of heretics and dissenters by a Church which was based on\nthe principle of universal love, and which exalted to the highest place\nin its ideal of goodness the qualities of gentleness and pity.\n\nThe paradox in each case is, however, such only in seeming. The\npersecution of Christians by pagans, and of heretics by Christians,\nwas practically the inevitable issue of certain ideas and beliefs\nwhich became the premises of moral conclusions. In neither case does\nthe act of the persecutor necessarily imply moral turpitude.[583]\nThe persecution of the Christians by the pagan emperors sprang in\nthe main from the belief--in connection with the idea of corporate\nresponsibility--that the welfare of the state was bound up with the\ncareful observance of the rites of the temple.[584] It was thought that\nthe neglect of the temple service by any single member of the community\nawakened the resentment of the gods toward all the members alike. If\nthe Tiber overflowed its banks, the people were ready to believe that\nthe calamity had been brought upon the city by the neglect of the new\nsect to offer the customary sacrifices to the gods, and the cry arose,\n\u201cThe Christians to the lions!\u201d In a word, the refusal of the Christians\nto participate in the common worship was looked upon as a crime, as a\nspecies of treason against the state, and was punished as such.[585]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoic teachings\nChristian in tone and sentiment]\n\nAs we are now approaching the time when a new moral ideal, that of\nChristianity, is to displace the old classical ideal of character,\nit will be both instructive and interesting to note to what degree\nthis ideal which was passing away had, in theory if not in practice,\nunder the varied influences to which it had been subjected through the\ncenturies, become assimilated to this new ideal of excellence.[586]\n\nThe nobility of forgiveness was taught by many of the pagan\nphilosophers with Christian insistence. Cicero regarded repentance as\nperhaps sufficient to stay the hand of chastisement, and declares that\nnothing is more laudable than clemency and willingness to forgive.[587]\nMarcus Aurelius would repress even the first risings of resentment\nfor injury: \u201cWhen one is trying to do thee harm, continue to be of a\nkind disposition toward him, gently admonish him, and calmly correct\nhis error, saying, \u2018Not so, my child; we are constituted by nature for\nsomething else; I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring\nthyself, my child,\u2019--and show him by gentle tact and by general\nprinciples that this is so.\u201d[588]\n\nAnd again: \u201cIt is royal to do good and to be abused\u201d[589]; \u201cbe gentle\ntoward those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble thee.\u201d[590]\n\u201cThe best way of avenging thyself is not to become like [the\nwrongdoer].\u201d[591] Epictetus quotes with approval Pittacus, one of the\nSeven Wise Men, in these words: \u201cForgiveness is better than revenge,\nfor forgiveness is the sign of a gentle nature, but revenge the sign of\na savage nature.\u201d[592]\n\nPurity and sincerity of thought is inculcated by Marcus Aurelius. \u201cA\nman should,\u201d he says, \u201caccustom himself to think of those things only\nabout which if one should suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy\nthought? with perfect openness thou mightest immediately answer, This\nor that; so that from thy word it should be plain that everything in\nthee is simple and benevolent.\u201d[593]\n\nSeneca taught that adversity has moral uses: \u201cGod does not pamper\nthe good man; he puts him to the test to prove him, he hardens him,\nand thus prepares him for himself.\u201d[594] Trust in Providence and\nresignation is inculcated by Marcus Aurelius in many passages in which\nhe teaches that one should accept with all his soul everything which\nhappens to him as his portion assigned by God. He trusts in Him who\ngoverns; he says to the universe, \u201cI love as thou lovest.\u201d[595] He\naccepts death with perfect resignation whether it be extinction, or\nbirth into another life: \u201cTo go away from among men is not a thing to\nbe afraid of, for the gods, if there be gods, will not involve thee in\nevil.\u201d[596] But death may be extinction. If so, well; for \u201cif it ought\nto have been otherwise, the gods would have ordered it so.\u201d[597]\n\nStrangely Christian in tone are the reflections of Marcus Aurelius on\nthe transitoriness of earthly life: \u201cWhat belongs to the soul is a\ndream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger\u2019s sojourn.\u201d[598]\n\nThe duty of godlikeness is enjoined by Epictetus: \u201cHe who seeks to\nplease the gods must labor as far as in him lies to resemble them. He\nmust be faithful as God is faithful, free as He is free, beneficent\nas He is beneficent, magnanimous as He is magnanimous.\u201d[599] Marcus\nAurelius sums up the duty of man in love to his fellows and in\nfollowing God;[600] and Plutarch declares that \u201cman can enjoy no\ngreater blessing from God than to attain to virtue by the earnest\nimitation of the noblest qualities of the divine nature.\u201d[601]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Some divergences\nbetween Roman and Christian ethics]\n\nBut while in many of the teachings of the leaders of moral thought in\nthe later Roman Empire, as shown by the above quotations, we find a\nnear approach to Christian ethics, or a perfect accordance therewith,\nstill it is a fact that must not be overlooked or minimized that in\nother of their teachings in which they represented more truly the\npopular conceptions of right and wrong, they as conspicuously diverged\nfrom the Christian ideal.\n\nWe have heard some of the moralists, particularly the Stoic Marcus\nAurelius, condemning the spirit of revenge and extolling forgiveness\nas a virtue; but in general the Stoics as well as the followers of\nother schools had not advanced beyond the common conscience of the\ntime in regard to the permissibility and even duty of returning injury\nfor injury. Cicero unequivocally approved the taking of revenge for\ninjuries received;[602] only the person injured should avenge himself\nequitably and humanely.[603] Again he says that justice requires that\nno one should do harm to another, \u201cunless in requital of some injury\nreceived.\u201d[604] Even the gentle Plutarch, who may be regarded as\nrepresenting the composite ideal of character which was forming in\nthe first century of the Empire through the union of Greek and Roman\nethical ideas and feelings, declares it to be a virtue to make one\u2019s\nself disagreeable to one\u2019s enemies.\n\nTyrannicide, which in general is condemned by the modern conscience,\nwas given by the Roman moralist, as by the Greek teachers, a place\namong the greatest of the virtues. Cicero deems it a meritorious act to\nslay a tyrant on the ground that he is but a \u201cferocious beast in the\nguise of a man,\u201d[605] and declares that of all illustrious deeds the\nRoman people regard tyrannicide the most laudable.[606] Consistently he\nextols the killing of the Gracchi.[607]\n\nPity or compassion for suffering, which is assigned such a high place\nin the Christian type of character, was regarded by the Roman moralists\nas a weakness, even a vice; not but that they extolled clemency in the\nruler, but they distinguished between this sentiment and that of pity.\nSeneca declared pity to be a vice incident to weak minds. \u201cThe wise\nman,\u201d he said, \u201cwill dry the tears of others but will not add his to\ntheirs. He will not pity those in distress, but will relieve and aid\nthem.\u201d[608]\n\nSuicide, which to the modern conscience appears a censurable act, was\nby most of the Roman moralists regarded with unqualified approval,[609]\nprovided the person committing the act had a strong motive for doing\nso. Epictetus said, \u201cThe door is open\u201d; but added this admonition, \u201cDo\nnot depart without a reason.\u201d[610] But almost any circumstance which\nmade life hard or a burden would justify the act; \u201cThe house is smoky,\nand I quit it,\u201d calmly remarks the Stoic Emperor Aurelius.[611] Seneca\nsays, \u201cThe eternal law has decreed nothing better than this, that life\nshould have but one entrance and many exits.\u201d[612] He thinks the gods\nmust have looked on with great joy when Cato, with the world fallen\ninto C\u00e6sar\u2019s power, drove the sword into his own breast. That in his\nview was \u201ca glorious and memorable departure.\u201d By such an act a man\nraises himself to the level of the gods.[613]\n\nSuicide was at its height in the early Empire. This is to be\nexplained by the teachings of the Stoics--among whom suicides were\nnumerous[614]--and the unbearable tyranny of the imperial r\u00e9gime. Not\ntill Christianity came with its teachings regarding the sacredness\nof human life and the duty of resignation was there any essential\nchange in the general attitude of the ancient world toward the act of\nself-destruction.[615]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The insufficiency of\nStoicism as a moral guide for the\nmasses]\n\nThe composite Greco-Roman ideal, in which Stoicism had united the best\nelements of the Greek and the Roman type of character, while it did\nserve as a guide to the moral strivings of select souls, was wholly\nunfitted to give support to the moral life of the masses or to awaken\nin them moral enthusiasm. There were in Stoicism two serious defects\nwhich made it impossible for it to become the guide and rule of life\nfor the multitude. First, it was too intellectually exalted and cold\nto make appeal to the common people. The Stoics, in the suppression\nof the feelings and emotions,--\u201cthey made solitude in the heart and\ncalled it peace,\u201d[616]--cut themselves off from all sympathy with the\nmasses, with whom feeling is ever the larger part of life. Second,\nStoicism failed to give due place to the religious sentiment. Belief\nin the ancestral Roman gods had, it is true, been undermined, but the\nreligious feeling of awe and mystery in the presence of the Unseen was\ndeeper and more universal than ever before. Man, in the fine phrase of\nSabatier, is incurably religious.\n\nThe ideal of character which shall appeal to the masses must be an\nideal whose requirements make full recognition of the rightful claims\nof human affections and of the religious instinct of mankind. The\nmystical and religious East contributes to the ideal created by the\ninteraction of the Greek and the Roman spirit those elements which\nneither of the classical cultures could supply.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Orient contributes\nnew elements to the moral life of\nthe West]\n\nFrom the first century of our era, Rome was in close contact with the\nOrient, as long before she had been in contact with Greece. And just as\nthe Greek spirit had profoundly influenced the moral ideal of Rome, so\nnow was the spirit of the Orient to effect even greater changes in her\nancestral standard of character.\n\nAs philosophy mediated between Rome and Greece, so did religion mediate\nbetween Rome and the Orient. It was through the religions or cults\nof Egypt, Persia, and Judea that the ethical forces of the ancient\ncultures of the East were brought to bear on Roman life and thought\nand conduct. In the present connection we shall speak only of the\ninfluences which went forth from Egypt and Persia, and point out in\nwhat way they gave an added impulse to that ethical movement going on\nin the Roman world which finally culminated in the triumph of the creed\nand moral ideal of Judea.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The contribution of\nEgypt; the worship of Isis]\n\nAnd first we note the relation to this ethical evolution of the\nworship of Isis and Serapis, the chief imported and modified cults of\nthe ancient civilization of the Valley of the Nile. In this worship\nreligion and morality were joined in a way practically unknown to the\npriestly colleges of Rome. \u201cThe Egyptian,\u201d says Lecky, \u201c... bowed low\nbefore the divine presence. He veiled his eyes, he humbled his reason,\nhe represented the introduction of a new element into the moral life of\nEurope, the spirit of religious reverence and awe.\u201d[617]\n\nForming an important part of the body of ideas which constituted the\nbasis of this religious feeling, was the doctrine of a life after\ndeath. This was a doctrine which was common to all the Oriental\nreligions with which we have here to do,--the Isiac, the Mithraic,\nand the Christian,--but a doctrine which, aside from the initiates of\nthe Orphic, the Eleusinian, and like Mysteries, was practically new\nto the classical world. It was this doctrine which helped greatly to\nsecure for these religions or cults such wide acceptance in the Roman\nworld,--for the Roman world, old, worn, and weary, was yearning for\nassurance of another and better life,--and which largely explains the\nmoral influence they exerted upon the nations of the West.[618]\n\nFor more than five hundred years the worship of Isis particularly found\nardent devotees in the West. The general effect of the cult upon its\nfollowers was to cause the active, heroic qualities in the old Roman\nideal of character to be overshadowed by the passive contemplative\nvirtues, and to impart a religious, ritual character to the moral code.\nExpiatory and purification rites formed a large part of the duties of\nthe worshiper of the Egyptian goddess.[619]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The contribution of\nPersia: Mithraism]\n\nThe influence of Egypt upon the religious-ethical life of the West was\nre\u00ebnforced by a like influence from Persia, which came through the cult\nof Mithra.[620] This worship came into Europe by the way of Asia Minor.\nIts missionaries were seemingly Oriental recruits in the Roman legions.\nIt came bearing many accretions gathered in its passage through the\nwest Asian lands, and yet with all the characteristics which marked\nthe old Persian religion as a religion of combat and strenuousness,\nof moral striving and moral achievement.[621] During the last three\ncenturies of the Empire the cult spread widely in the Western lands,\ntaking deep root especially in the frontier regions of the Danube and\nthe Rhine, and in the remote province of Britain.\n\nThis incoming of Mithraism had special significance for the reason\nthat Mithra, as the god of light, was invested with certain moral\nqualities symbolized by his physical attributes. He was the god of\ntruth and purity. It was this moral element in the cult, in connection\nwith its doctrine of a future life,--the promise and hope of which\nwas dependent upon purification, inward as well as ceremonial, from\nall earthly stains and impurities,--which in a measure met and\nsatisfied the yearnings of the age, and which, in the great religious\nand ethical propaganda that marked the later centuries of the Roman\nEmpire, rendered the religion of Mithra the most formidable rival\nof Christianity in its great competition with the various Oriental\nreligions and cults for supremacy in the hearts and consciences of\nmen.[622]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Relation of the\nEgyptian and Persian propaganda to\nthat of Christianity]\n\nBut the pagan priest no more than the pagan philosopher could\neffect the moral renovation of ancient society. Like the moral\npropaganda carried on by Cynic, Stoic, and Neoplatonist missionaries\nand preachers, these efforts of paganism to effect its own moral\nregeneration failed, perhaps because these pagan cults lacked what\nChristianity possessed--\u201cthe dynamic of a great personality.\u201d Yet these\nefforts were not without influence upon the ethical development of the\nWestern nations. In two ways the Egyptian and Persian propaganda was a\npreparation for the moral revolution effected by Christianity: first,\nit helped to give morality a religious basis, which it did not have in\nclassical antiquity; and second, it taught men to seek in deity and not\nin themselves the pattern of moral excellence.[623] Thus did Egypt and\nPersia, through the mediation of religion, contribute important ethical\nelements to Greco-Roman civilization, and thereby help to give a fresh\nimpulse and a new trend to the moral evolution of the Western world.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nTHE ETHICS OF DOCTRINAL CHRISTIANITY: AN IDEAL OF RIGHT BELIEF\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethical import of the\nChristianization of Rome]\n\nThe establishment of Christianity, in its Greco-Judaic form, as the\nfavored religion of the Roman Empire by the edict of the Emperor\nConstantine is rightly regarded as one of the most important events\nnot only in the history of the Empire but also in that of the Western\nworld. What made this act, or rather the religious revolution it\nregistered, of such transcendent importance was the fact that the\nascendancy of the new religion meant the ascendancy of a new moral\nideal; for Christianity, unlike Stoicism, did not merely act upon\nthe old classical ideal of excellence to modify and remold it, but\nsuperseded it by another made up largely of a wholly different set of\nvirtues.\n\nIt was this new ethical element thus introduced into Greco-Roman\ncivilization which was the most dynamic of the forces active in the\ntransformation of the ancient into the medieval world. The new ideal\nre-created ethically the Roman world and made Europe for a thousand\nyears and more--until the Renaissance of the fifteenth century called\nforth again the ethical thought and feeling of classical antiquity--in\nmoral conviction and striving an extension of Asia.\n\nA prerequisite to an intelligent study of the history of this new moral\nideal is a knowledge of the beliefs and theological doctrines out of\nwhich it arose; for this ideal has through the centuries followed the\nfortune of these beliefs and teachings. In the immediately following\npages we shall indicate what were some of the most influential of these\nideas and doctrines.\n\n\nI. RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND THEOLOGICAL DOGMAS MOLDING THE IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of a moral\nlaw supernaturally revealed]\n\nAmong the doctrines of Christian theology freighted heavily with\nethical consequences was that of a moral law supernaturally\npromulgated. This was essentially an Oriental conception, a heritage\nof Christianity from the Hebrew past, and a conception quite alien in\ngeneral to the manner of thinking of the Greeks and Romans, with whom\nmorality, as we have seen, was a civic and secular and human thing, an\nexpression of man\u2019s essential nature, that is, an outcome of the human\nreason and conscience.\n\nThis doctrine exercised an immense influence upon the moral\nevolution in the Western world. First, it displaced naturalism with\nsupernaturalism in ethics. The whole history of morals records no\nrevolution more momentous than this. Second, it made rigid large\nsections of the moral code and thus tended to impart for an historical\nepoch a certain immobility to the religious-ethical side of European\ncivilization.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The teaching of the\nunity of God and of his universal\nfatherhood]\n\nAnother idea found in this body of religious doctrines, an idea rich\nin ethical consequences, was the conception of God as one and as the\nUniversal Father. We have seen that the great defect in primitive\nmorality was the limited range of the moral feelings. The circle of\nmoral obligation was bounded by the clan, the tribe, the city. This\nresulted in large part from the notion that each kin group had an\norigin and ancestry different from that of every other. One group\nthought themselves to be the offspring of Zeus; another proclaimed\nthemselves to be the descendants of Heracles; and still another\nbelieved themselves to be the children of Mars. So long as this view\nof men\u2019s origin and descent prevailed there could arise no conception\nof their spiritual relationship and ethical oneness. Tacitus merely\nexpressed the common opinion of the ancient world when he declared\nabsurd the doctrine that all men are brothers.\n\nBut from the doctrine of the common fatherhood of God there arises\nnaturally the conception of the essential brotherhood of men. The\napostle\u2019s declaration, \u201cWe are the offspring of God,\u201d[624]--phrasing\nthe teachings of the Master in terms understood by the men to whom he\nspoke,--announced the opening of a new era in the moral development of\nthe race. The proclamation of this practically new thought[625] meant,\nat once in ethical theory and sooner or later in actual practice, the\nwidening of the narrow class and race circle of moral obligation to\ninclude all tribes and peoples.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of a\nfuture life of rewards and\npunishments]\n\nGreco-Roman morality was influenced but slightly by a belief in a\nlife after death. The vision of the other world was in general too\nindistinct for it to exert any decided influence upon the conduct of\nmen.[626] The conception of Hades, though it did undergo with the lapse\nof time a process of moralization, was never so far ethicalized as to\nhave a positive moral value.\n\nBut by Christianity the other world was lifted into such prominence as\nit had had in the life and thought of no people of antiquity except\nthe Egyptians, and immortality was declared to be the destiny of every\nhuman soul. With the classical peoples it was the city which had been\nconceived as eternal. This transference of immortality from the city\nto the individual had vast import for morality.[627] What contributed\nto render it of such ethical importance was the fact that the after\nlife was conceived as a life of rewards and punishments. A heaven\nof ineffable and everlasting bliss and a hell of unutterable and\neverlasting torment were laid open to the eyes of men, and became the\ntremendous sanctions of the new moral code promulgated by Christianity.\nIt would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of this teaching\nupon the moral life of the European peoples, especially during the\nmedieval centuries of faith. To make this life transitory, vain, and\nworthless, and life in another world the only real life, is to cause\nthe transvaluation of all moral values, and to change fundamentally\nconceptions of what is rational and right in conduct.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The teaching of the\nsanctity of human life]\n\nSpringing naturally from the foregoing conceptions of man\u2019s origin and\neternal destiny is the Christian doctrine of the sanctity of human\nlife. In no respect do Christian teachings contrast more sharply with\npagan conceptions than in this regard. In the Greco-Roman view value\ndid not attach to man as man. To the Greek way of thinking it was\nthe Greek freeman alone who possessed the full capacity for virtue\nand the rights of manhood. In the common Roman view only the Roman\ncitizen was regarded as dowered with the full faculties and rights of a\nhuman being. The slave was looked upon and treated as belonging to an\ninferior order of existence.\n\nThe Christian doctrine of man\u2019s divine sonship and of his eternal\ndestiny gave infinite worth to every human life, and, investing man as\nman with an inviolable sanctity, worked effectively in widening the\nrange of the moral sympathies and in bringing within the scope of the\nmoral law all classes and conditions of men. It checked infanticide,\nwhich in the pre-Christian world had been very generally practiced\nwithout the least moral scruple; it suppressed the gladiatorial games\nin which the lives of men were placed on a level with those of the wild\nbeasts with which they fought; it helped to make suicide, which the\nRomans looked upon as a noble mode of departure from life, a crime; and\ncontributed to mitigate the lot of the slave and finally to help lift\nhim into freedom.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The dogma of the fall\nof man and hereditary guilt]\n\nThe view of man\u2019s moral nature taught by the Founder of Christianity\nwas simple and natural. It is embodied in the parable of the prodigal\nson. Man may go wrong, but he has ever the capacity, and, when he comes\nto himself, the desire, to return to the right way.\n\nIn direct opposition to this view of man\u2019s nature and deepest\npreferences as being essentially good, we find elaborated in early\nChristian theology the dogma that the first man, though created\nupright, fell through disobedience and transmitted to all his\ndescendants a nature wholly evil and a total incapacity for doing good\nor even desiring the good. And not only was man thus attainted by the\nprimal disobedience, but all nature became accursed.\n\nThis dogma of the fall of man is one of the most influential\nconceptions in the moral domain ever entertained by the human mind.\nIt was the germ from which was developed the larger part of Christian\ntheological ethics.[628] For out of the dogma of ancestral sin and\ntotal depravity sprang naturally and logically the doctrines of the\natonement, imputed righteousness, and salvation through faith. The\nmoral history of the Christian centuries we shall find to be largely\nthe history of the influence of this doctrine upon men\u2019s conceptions\nof their religious obligations and duties. As with the passage of\ntime and the incoming of evolutionary science the belief in this\nteaching decays, we shall find men\u2019s idea of what constitutes duty in\nthe religious sphere undergoing a great change, and shall see acts,\nobservances, and states of mind once regarded as supremely virtuous and\nindispensable to salvation now looked upon as morally indifferent or\neven positively wrong.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of the\nsacredness of the Sabbath]\n\nChristianity inherited from Judaism the belief in the sacred character\nof the Sabbath day. This belief created one of the most important of\nthe religious duties of the Christian. It determined how one seventh\nof all his time should be spent. The history of the observance of\nthis Sabbath as holy time, and the changed moral value attached to\nsuch observance as times and beliefs have changed, forms a chapter\nof the greatest suggestiveness to the student of the evolution of\nmorals, since this chapter epitomizes and repeats the entire history of\nceremonial or ritual morality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The personality of the\nProphet of Nazareth[629]]\n\nBut far more influential than all these inherited Jewish beliefs\nand doctrines of speculative theology in molding the moral ideal of\nChristianity, in all that renders it superior to the moral ideals of\nthe other great religions of the world, as well as in all that it\npossesses of permanent ethical value for humanity, has been the simple\nappealing story of the words and deeds of the Prophet of Nazareth.[630]\nThose elements of the ideal which are based on speculative theological\ndoctrines have changed as these doctrines have changed with the\nworld\u2019s advance in general intelligence and with the deepening and\nclarifying of the moral consciousness of men; while those elements\nderived from that wonderful personality, from that life of unbounded\ntenderness and love and self-forgetting service, have been given an\never higher and more dominant place in the world\u2019s ideal of goodness.\nIn the eloquent words of the historian Lecky: \u201cIt was reserved for\nChristianity to present to the world an ideal character, which through\nall the changes of eighteen centuries has inspired the hearts of men\nwith an impassioned love; has shown itself capable of acting on all\nages, nations, temperaments, and conditions; has been not only the\nhighest pattern of virtue but the strongest incentive to its practice;\nand has exercised so deep an influence that it may be truly said that\nthe simple record of three short years of active life has done more\nto regenerate and to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of\nphilosophers and the exhortations of moralists. This has indeed been\nthe well-spring of whatever is best and purest in Christian life.\u201d[631]\n\n\nII. THE MORAL IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: Orthodoxy, or\ncorrect religious opinion, the\nindispensable saving virtue[632]]\n\nBefore the end of the third century, under the influence largely\nof the speculative Greek spirit, what was to be essentially the\nhistorical creed of the Church had been practically formulated and the\ncorresponding moral code brought into existence.[633] In the creation\nof this standard of goodness which was to give guidance for an epoch to\nthe moral life of the European peoples, it was the theological doctrine\nof the moral value of faith, which came practically to be defined as\n\u201cthe acceptance of the dogma of the Trinity and the main articles\nof the creed,\u201d that determined the precedence and subordination of\nvirtues and duties.[634] Correct belief was made an indispensable\nvirtue. Without this there could be no salvation.[635] On the other\nhand, unbelief, doubt, error, even honest error, in religious matters\nwas declared to be in the highest degree sinful. This conception that\nbelief is a virtue and doubt a sin was destined, since it imperils\nfreedom of thought, to have momentous and sinister consequences for the\nintellectual and moral history of Europe.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The virtue of charity\nor love]\n\nJust as the theological dogma of the ethical value of religious\nopinions has made correct belief theoretically the saving virtue in\nChurch ethics, so has the personality of Jesus, his teachings and his\nself-sacrificing life as mirrored in the gospel records, made love and\nservice of others, in multitudes of souls, practically the supreme and\ncontrolling motive of life. It was the emphasis placed by primitive\nChristianity on this virtue, and the persuasion to its practice\nafforded by the example of the Master, that for the first two centuries\nof the new era--until the emphasis became changed from right living\nto right opinion--lent to the moral life in the Christian communities\nof the Empire such sincerity, purity, and elevation as have marked no\nother period in the history of the Church.\n\nBut orthodox theology has never allowed that charity, though combined\nwith perfect uprightness of life and expressed in noblest acts of\nself-abnegating service of humanity, is a saving virtue unless\nassociated with correctness of religious belief and the outgrowth\nof it. This opposition in the bosom of the Church itself between\ntheological and natural morality has created a great dualism in the\nmoral history of all the Christian centuries, like the dualism in\nancient Hebrew history caused by the opposition between the morality of\nritualism and the morality of prophetism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The body of secondary\nvirtues]\n\nAlongside the primary Christian virtue, whether this be regarded as\ncorrect belief or as charity, were grouped a cluster of secondary\nvirtues, such as humility, meekness, gentleness, compassion for\nweakness, resignation, and renunciation of the world. What is\nespecially noteworthy respecting this body of moral qualities making up\nthe Christian ideal of excellence is that all these were virtues which\nin general were undervalued or held in positive disesteem by the Greeks\nand Romans.[636] Indeed it was made a matter of reproach to the early\nChristians by the pagan opponents of Christianity, that its virtues\nwere all servile virtues--the virtues of the slave.\n\nIt was undoubtedly this character of the new ideal which caused it,\nin the primal age of Christianity, to make such strong appeal to the\ncommon people, to the despised and lowly, to the broken and humble in\nspirit, in the aristocratically graded society of the ancient world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Creation of specific\ntypes through modifications of the\ngeneral ideal]\n\nThe Christian ideal of excellence has fulfilled itself in many ways;\nthat is, different types have arisen through the shifting in rank of\nthe virtues constituting the ideal, through the incorporation of pagan\nelements, through racial influence, and through the reaction upon the\nideal of the changing intellectual, political, and economic environment.\n\nGenerally these specific forms of the ideal have been created by an\nexaggerated enthusiasm for one or another particular virtue of the\nstandard, which has caused this special virtue so to overshadow all the\nothers, save the indispensable one of correct belief, as to bring into\nexistence a distinctive Christian type. Thus through the exaltation\nof the virtue of chastity there arose in the early Church the ascetic\ntype of excellence, which for several centuries inspired unbounded\nmoral enthusiasm and drew away into the desert and into the seclusion\nof the cloister great multitudes of both men and women; later, through\nthe reaction upon the Church of the pagan and barbarian world it had\nnominally converted, and through the incorporation into the ideal of a\nnumber of heathen virtues, there came into existence a composite type\nof character--a combination of the virtues of the saint and the virtues\nof the hero--known as the chivalric ideal, which colored the events of\nEuropean history from the ninth to the fourteenth century; and still\nlater, through the suppression of some of the distinctive virtues of\nthe Roman Catholic type of excellence and a fresh emphasis laid upon\nothers, there was created the Protestant type of moral character, which\nhas given a special cast to the theological morality of a large section\nof modern Christendom.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Limitations and defects\nof the ideal]\n\nThat we may better be prepared to follow intelligently the various\nphases of the moral history of the Christian centuries, to the tracing\nof which the remaining chapters of this volume will be devoted, there\nis need that to the brief description we have now given of the chief\nvirtues making up the ideal which was to give guidance to the moral\nlife of the European peoples, we add a word concerning its limitations\nand defects, since these negative qualities of the ideal have exercised\nan influence scarcely less decisive than its positive qualities in\nmaking the history of the Christian world what it has been--a history,\non the whole, of inspiring moral progress, yet a history of moral\nlosses as well as of moral gains.\n\nThe first limitation of the ideal which we notice is its practical\nexclusion of those civic, patriotic duties and virtues which had\nbeen so highly esteemed by both the Greeks and the Romans. Man was\nhenceforth to be the citizen of no earthly city, but of a heavenly\ncity whose builder and maker is God. We can easily understand how this\nnew conception of life, which transferred all its chief interests to\nanother world, which substituted the Church--symbolized in accordance\nwith the modes of thought of the time as \u201cthe city of God\u201d--for the\nancient city state as the object of moral enthusiasm and self-devotion,\nshould leave no place for those civic, military, and heroic virtues\nthat had constituted the very soul of the morality of classical\nantiquity.\n\nA second limitation of the ideal is its neglect of the intellectual\nvirtues, which by the Greeks had been assigned such a high place in\ntheir ethical standard.[637] The slighting of this important domain of\nethics by Christian theology arose naturally from its exaltation of\nfaith above reason, and from its assumption that in the revealed word\nthe Church was already in possession of all knowledge really essential\nto man\u2019s welfare and salvation.[638]\n\nBut the chief defect of the ideal, the lamentable historical\nconsequences of which we shall witness later, is, as we have already\npointed out, in its making the acceptance of all the articles of a\ngiven creed an indispensable virtue. In assigning orthodox belief\nthis place in the ideal of moral goodness, theological ethics has\nmarred Christian morality by fostering the faults of intolerance and\nintellectual insincerity. This dogma inspired in the Church, as soon\nas it became powerful, a persecuting spirit, and made Christianity for\ncenturies something altogether alien to its real genius and spirit--one\nof the most intolerant of the world\u2019s religions. At the same time\nthis dogma, by making religious unbelief and nonconformity a sin so\nheinous as to be worthy of death by the most exquisite torture, and\nof everlasting punishment in the hereafter, discouraged intellectual\nveracity and open-mindedness, and fostered the vice of insincere\nconformity, which, more than any other fault, has marred Church\nmorality from the end of the early age of the martyrs to the present\nday.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Conclusion]\n\nIn the following pages we shall follow the fortunes of this ethical\nideal through medieval and modern times. We shall trace the modifying\ninfluence upon it of the different and changing elements of the\ncivilization of which it has formed a part, and shall note the reaction\nof the ideal, in its successive types, upon the history of the passing\ncenturies.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nMORAL HISTORY OF THE AGE OF CHRISTIAN ASCETICISM\n\n\nI. CONCEPTIONS OF LIFE AND HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PRODUCED THE\nASCETIC IDEAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: General fostering\ncauses of asceticism]\n\nBefore the close of the third century the development in the Christian\ncommunities of the East of asceticism, the germs of which were\nimmanent from the first in Christianity, had given a remarkable trend\nto the moral movement inaugurated by the new religion. We shall gain\na sympathetic understanding of this phase of Christian ethics only\nas we bear in mind the conceptions of life and of the world, and the\nhistorical conditions which in general tend to foster the development\nof the ascetic ideal of goodness.\n\nAsceticism, a definitive characteristic of which is renunciation of the\nworld and all earthly pleasures, springs from various roots. Sometimes\nit grows out of a dualistic world philosophy, which, holding matter to\nbe an evil creation and \u201cthe corruptible body a load upon the soul,\u201d\nteaches the meritoriousness of the suppression, in the interest of the\nspirit, of all bodily impulses and appetites.\n\nSometimes it arises from inequitable and oppressive conditions of\nsociety, which have made life for the enslaved and impoverished masses\nso joyless and wretched as to create an inappeasable yearning for\ndeliverance from its intolerable burdens.\n\nAgain, it springs from a world philosophy, which, because of its vivid\nvision of another world of eternal realities, undervalues and reduces\nto nothingness this earthly life and all its relationships.\n\nStill again, it may spring from the soil of a morally decadent\ncivilization, for, unless the sources of spiritual life have been\nwholly destroyed, from a debasing sensuality and dissoluteness that\nrob life of worth and dignity there is ever sure to come a reaction--a\nreaction expressing itself in an extreme emphasis laid upon the worth\nand meritoriousness of world renunciation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fostering causes of\nChristian asceticism: (_a_)\ncertain Christian teachings]\n\nNow in the case of Christianity there was, in the early Christian\ncenturies, an unusual concurrence of causes and conditions conducive to\nthe growth of asceticism. First, there were virile germs of asceticism\nin the teachings of the new religion. It taught that the things of the\nspirit are the only abiding realities. It caused this earthly life to\nshrink into insignificance and to disappear as it opened to the eyes of\nfaith the infinite perspectives of another world. The Master said: \u201cHe\nthat hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal....\nWhosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot\nbe my disciple.\u201d And to the young man who asked him what he should do\nto inherit eternal life, he replied, \u201cSell all that thou hast, and\ndistribute unto the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and\ncome, follow me.\u201d He seemed to set the relationships of the spiritual\nlife above the most intimate of earthly relationships when he declared,\n\u201cIf any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife,\nand children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he\ncannot be my disciple.\u201d He taught the worthlessness of earthly riches\ncompared with the treasures of the spirit, and declared that the rich\nshould hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven.\n\nThe disciples and near followers of the Master spoke in like manner.\nThese teachings tended directly and powerfully to cause men to regard\nthis earthly life as fleeting and valueless, and to esteem those as\nchoosing the better and worthier part who, breaking all earthly ties\nand suppressing all natural affections and desires, sought in the\nsolitude of the desert or the quiet of the cloister to win the life\neternal.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) The social and\nmoral state of the Greco-Roman\nworld]\n\nThese seeds of Asian asceticism fell into a soil well fitted to nourish\nthem into a vigorous growth. The doctrine of world renunciation was\none easy of acceptance by the age in which Christianity arose,[639]\nfor the world into which primitive Christianity entered was a senile,\ndisillusioned, morally corrupt, and life-weary world.\n\nIt was an aged and disillusioned world. The great races of the East and\nthe West, which had been the pioneers in human culture, were now old.\nThey had lost the youthful zest of life. It was the disillusionment of\nage that predisposed the minds of men to an acceptance of the doctrine\nof deliverance through self-denial and renunciation of the world.\n\nAnd this old world was morally corrupt. The vice of ancient\ncivilization in its senility was sensuality. Christian asceticism was\nin part a recoil from this dissoluteness which denied the worth and\nmajesty of life.[640]\n\nAnd because it was a sensual world it was a life-weary world. The\nprevailing mood of society of the Greco-Roman Empire at the time of the\ngreat propaganda of Christianity was one of satiety and weariness. It\nwas a favorable moment to preach contempt of the world and all earthly\nthings.\n\nThus did the state of decrepitude and moral decadence into which\nthe cultured communities of the ancient world had fallen, help to\ndevelop into a spirit of absolute world renunciation the spirit of\nunworldliness which characterized primitive Christianity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) The Platonic\nphilosophy]\n\nStill another influence which contributed to give direction and force\nto the ethical movement of the age was the Platonic philosophy. There\nis in this philosophy an ascetic element. Plato taught that a life of\ncontemplation aloof from society is the highest and the truly blessed\nlife. This teaching was one of the formative forces in the creation of\nthe monastic ideal.\n\n\nII. THE IDEAL AND ITS CHIEF TYPES\n\n\n[Sidenote: The two types of\nthe ascetic ideal: (_a_) the\nanchoretic; (_b_) the monastic]\n\nThe moral ideal of Christian asceticism is, in its essential elements,\nthe same as the ascetic ideal of other religions. Its leading\nrequirement, after that of right belief, is, in comprehensive terms,\nworld renunciation. In the early Christian period with which we have\nhere to do, the ideal presented two types, the anchoretic and the\nmonastic. The anchoretic or eremite conception of the perfect life\nwas complete renunciation of the world with all its domestic, social,\nbusiness, and political ties, and a life in the desert, apart from all\nhuman companionship, spent in ceaseless vigils, prayer, and meditation.\nHe who followed this mode of life with the utmost rigor, who suppressed\nevery natural desire,--desire of family and wealth and reputation\nand pleasure,--and tamed his body by fasting, scourging, and other\nausterities was looked upon as a saint and was regarded with peculiar\nhomage and veneration.\n\nThroughout the third and much of the fourth century in all the\ncountries of the Orient where Christianity had spread, the anchoretic\nideal was regarded as the highest and most meritorious type of the\nChristian life. But as the ascetic enthusiasm overspread the lands of\nthe West, various influences, such as climate and race temperament,\ncaused the ascetics in general to avoid the solitary life, and,\ngathering in communities, to subject themselves to rules and the\noversight of superiors. After the legislation of St. Benedict (480\u2013543\nA.D.) this quickly became the prevailing mode of life for ascetics.\nThus came into existence the monastic system with its distinctive\nideal of character, which added to the virtues of the eremite ideal\nthe virtue of obedience or humility and abated somewhat its bodily\nausterities. This ideal was destined to exercise for centuries a\nprofound influence upon the religious ethical evolution of the European\npeoples.\n\nBoth types are mirrored in _The Lives of the Saints_,[641] the\ncharacteristic literary product of the earlier medieval time. This\nspecies of literature, a creation of the pious inventiveness of the\nmonks, was steeped in the spirit that pervaded hermitage and cloister.\nThe tales illustrate many sides of the life of the recluses, but are\nchiefly valuable in showing what acts and practices were regarded as\nconstituting the most meritorious and morally excellent life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moral standard for\nthe ordinary life]\n\nThe ascetic life was not binding upon all. It could not, of course,\nbecome the universal mode of life. It was a sort of extra service,\nwhich secured extra merit for him who rendered it.[642] It is true that\nthe ascetic ideal absorbed a vast amount of the moral enthusiasm of the\nage, nevertheless it was a standard of moral attainment for the lesser\nnumber; for the larger body of Christians there was the less exacting\nideal of excellence which could be realized in the ordinary life in\nthe world. He who practiced the common domestic, social, and business\nvirtues, who accepted the creed of the Church, paid tithes to the\npriest, and was faithful in the performance of all required religious\nduties, was accounted a good man, and had the approval of his fellow\nmen and the approbation of his own conscience.\n\n\nIII. THE CHIEF MORAL FACTS OF THE PERIOD\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introductory]\n\nIn the present division of this chapter it will be our aim merely\nto indicate the essential facts in the moral history of the earlier\nmedieval centuries. Some of these facts will serve to show in how\nremarkable a manner the age was dominated by the monastic conception of\ngood life, while others will simply reveal the historical outworkings,\nin its more general manifestations, of the new conscience brought into\nthe world by Christianity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ideal of the saint\nand that of the hero: \u201cDialogue\nbetween Oisin and St. Patrick\u201d]\n\nAs a prelude to the brief review proposed we shall do well to consider\nfor a moment the contrariety between the new ideal of the Christian\nmonk and the old ideal of the pagan hero as this oppositeness emerges\nin the so-called \u201cDialogue between Oisin and St. Patrick.\u201d[643] This\npoem discloses most impressively the vast revolution which the incoming\nof Christianity effected in the moral feelings and judgments of men.\n\nOisin, \u201cthe blind Homer of Erin,\u201d is represented as in his old age\nentering into a controversy with the saint respecting the relative\nmerits of the monk\u2019s and the hero\u2019s conception of worthiness. The\ndialogue runs as follows:\n\n ST. PATRICK. Oisin, long is thy slumber, arise and listen to the\n psalm; forsaken is thy activity, forsaken thy strength, yet wouldst\n thou delight in battle and wild uproar.\n\n OISIN. My swiftness and my strength have deserted me since the Fenii,\n with Fionn their chief, are no longer alive; for clerks I have no\n attachment, and their melodies are not sweet to me.\n\n * * * * *\n\n O Patrick, hard is thy service, and shameful is it for you to\n reproach me for my appearance; if Fionn lived, and the Fenii, I\n would forsake the clergy of the cross.\n\n * * * * *\n\n Patrick, pray thou to the God of heaven for Fionn of the Fenii and\n for his children, making entreaty of the prince, whose equal I have\n never heard of.\n\n ST. PATRICK. O learned man, I desire not strife with thee, but I will\n not make request to heaven for Fionn, for all the actions of his\n life were to be in love and to urge the sounding chase.\n\n OISIN. If you were to be in company with the Fenii, O clerk of clergy\n and of bells, not for long wouldst thou be able to give heed to the\n God of truth, and serve the clergy.\n\n ST. PATRICK. ... Oisin, the remainder of your life is short, and\n badly will you fare if you despise the clergy.\n\n OISIN. Small is my esteem for thyself and clergy, O holy Patrick of\n the crozier: I have greater regard for Fionn, the white-handed king\n of the Fenii, but he is not near me now.\n\n Mournful I am without his hounds bounding, and his dogs all around\n me; if they and their agile hero were alive, Patrick, you would\n have to fear rebuke from me.\n\n ST. PATRICK. In that way did you and the Fenii of Erin forsake\n heaven: you never submitted to religion, but ever put confidence in\n strength of limbs, and in battles.\n\n OISIN. Were Fionn alive, and the Fenii comely and warlike, with their\n hounds running propitiously, they would seem to me more majestic\n than those who dwell in heaven.\n\n ST. PATRICK. Desolate are the Fenii, without slumber or liberty in\n the house of torment, for never in any way did they render service\n to the Holy Father.\n\n * * * * *\n\n OISIN. Fionn delighted in strokes upon shields, in conquering heroes,\n and hunting on hills; the sound of his dogs in toil was more\n melodious to me than the preaching of clerks in church of bells.\n\n * * * * *\n\n ST. PATRICK. It is because his time and delight were taken up by\n pleasures of the chase, and the array of warlike hosts; and because\n he never thought about God, that Fionn of the Fenii is in thralldom.\n\n He is now shut up in torment; all his generosity and wealth do not\n avail him now, for lack of piety toward God, for this he is in\n sorrow, in the mansion of pain.\n\n OISIN. Little do I believe in thy speech, thou man from Rome with\n white books, that Fionn the generous hero is now with demons and\n devils.\n\n * * * * *\n\n O Patrick, doleful is the story: Fionn the hospitable to be under\n locks! heart without malice and without aversion, heart stern in\n defense of battle.\n\n ST. PATRICK. However great the number of troops fighting for Fionn,\n he did not act the will of God above: his crimes are above him in\n pains of fire, forever in anguish.\n\n OISIN. It is plain that your God does not delight in giving gold and\n food to others: Fionn never refused strong or weak, and shall he\n receive hell for his abode!!!\n\n ST. PATRICK. However much he may have divided gold and venison, hard\n are his bonds in the den of pains: no glimpse of light for him, no\n sight of brightness such as he first received from God.\n\n * * * * *\n\n OISIN. Patrick, inquire of God if He remembers the Fenii when alive:\n ask if, east or west, He ever saw men better in conflict.\n\n Or did He observe in His own country, although it is high above\n us, for sense, for conflict, or for strength, any man good in\n comparison with Fionn?\n\n * * * * *\n\n Patrick, I am wretched, a poor bard, ever changing residence,\n without power, without activity, without force, journeying to mass\n and altars.\n\n Without good food, without getting wealth and booty, without play\n in athletic games; without going a-wooing and hunting, two objects\n for which I always longed.\n\n Without reciting deeds of champions, without bearing spear; alas! I\n have lost Osgur and Fionn, and I am left standing like a withered\n tree, out under injury.\n\n ST. PATRICK. Cease, O Bard! Leave off thy folly; you have as yet said\n but little in favour of yourself: think of the torments that await\n you; the Fenii are departed, and ere long you will go likewise.\n\n * * * * *\n\n OISIN. I will not obey you, O Patrick, though great your creed and\n faith. I own without lie that firm is my belief that the devil will\n be your portion.\n\n * * * * *\n\n I would rather return to the Fenii once more, O Patrick, if they\n were alive, than go to the heaven of Jesus Christ, to be forever\n under tribute to Him.\n\n ST. PATRICK. O withered Bard, thou art foolish; thou wouldst not pay\n tribute to any one if thou wast in the heaven of Jesus Christ, nor\n wouldst thou witness battle and uproar.\n\n OISIN. I would rather be in Fionn\u2019s court harkening to the voices of\n hounds every morning, and meditating on hard-fought battles, than\n in the court of Jesus Christ; that is certain.\n\n * * * * *\n\n It was easier for me to obtain without fail both meat and drink in\n Fionn\u2019s court than in thy mansion, and in the dwelling of the Son\n of God, O Patrick, not generous in dividing.\n\n * * * * *\n\n ST. PATRICK. It is better for thee to be with me and the clergy, as\n thou art, than to be with Fionn and the Fenii, for they are in hell\n without order of release.\n\n OISIN. By thy book and its meaning, by thy crozier and by thy image,\n better were it for me to share their torments, rather than be among\n the clergy continually talking.\n\n * * * * *\n\n Ah! Patrick, your religion may be great; but I have not, up to this\n day, witnessed among ye dinner nor banquet like banquet of the\n Fenii.\n\n\n ST. PATRICK. Although Fionn spent generously all he obtained by\n strength, fleetness, and plunder, he is now sorrowful in the\n mansion of a lord who furnishes no dinner, and demons torment him\n forever.\n\n OISIN. It would be pitiful and mournful, if thy story were true, ah\n Patrick! for all the saints who are in heaven, if they were to\n strive with Fionn in contest of liberality, could not obtain the\n victory over him.\n\n * * * * *\n\n Tell to me without controversy what is the reason of the custom you\n have to be ever beating your breasts, and each evening kneeling\n under gloom?\n\n ST. PATRICK. I tell thee that it is not because we have scarcity of\n food and of drink that we are under armour (watching), but because\n we desire to be perpetually on our guard against gluttony.\n\n OISIN. It is not fear of gluttony, nor in dread of king of saints\n that I receive for myself scarcity of bread, but because I am not\n able to obtain it from the clergy.\n\n Astonishment is upon me to witness the greatness of your love for\n the man you call Christ, if hereafter he will perpetually upbraid\n you for the abundance of your portions and of your drink!\n\n Farewell to Fionn of the noble Fenii; with him was ample banquet\n and division; he was not like the man who is called God; and\n moreover he gave without waiting for remuneration.... Never at any\n time did I witness him asking for kneeling and bitter weeping.[644]\n\nBut vain was the lament of the blind bard. The ideal of the pagan\nhero, whose fame he vaunted, had lost its primal appeal. It was the\nideal of the cloister, incarnate in the \u201csaint of many prayers and\nmany vigils,\u201d that was now enthralling the affections and shaping the\nconsciences of men.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The monasteries as\nthe cradle of the modern social\nconscience]\n\nIn the course of a few generations the vast enthusiasm awakened for the\nascetic life covered all Christian lands with convents and monasteries,\nwhich in their ethical influence constituted one of the most important\nof the institutions of the Church. In truth, the monasteries stand\nin closer and more vital relation than does any other ecclesiastical\ninstitution to the ethical evolution of the Western world. The service\nthey rendered to civilization in preserving and transmitting to the\nmodern world various elements of the intellectual and material cultures\nof antiquity has been fully recognized and gratefully acknowledged;\nbut not so full justice has been rendered them for their contribution\nto the moral life of modern times. Yet it is probably true that the\nmost precious thing conserved by the monasteries from the wreck of\nancient civilization was that social conscience which was generated\nin the heart of old Judaism and bequeathed to Christianity. Professor\nNash, in his work entitled _The Genesis of the New Social Conscience_,\nmaintains, and we think with right, that the distinctive qualities\nof the modern conscience--tenderness for the unfortunate, a lofty\naltruism, a noble capacity for self-sacrifice--were qualities conserved\nand cradled in the medieval monasteries.\n\nThis view of the relation of the monasteries to the moral evolution\nin Western civilization may be accepted by the student of morals as\na correct interpretation of medieval monastic history, while at the\nsame time he admits the truth of Lecky\u2019s contention that there was\na self-regarding motive in Christian asceticism--it was personal\nsalvation, he says, that the monk was primarily seeking--which made\nthe morality of the Christian saints inferior to the morality of the\nheroes of Greece and Rome. It is undoubtedly true that many entered\nupon the monastic life from self-regarding motives; but it is also\ntrue that constant meditation upon religious themes, and especially\nthe holding ever before the imagination the ideal of the Master,\nwho for love of man made the supreme self-sacrifice of the Cross,\nhad as a natural result the deepening of the altruistic feelings,\nthe sensitizing of the conscience, and the moving of the will to\nself-denying service for others. As a consequence the spirit of true\nself-renunciation was often exalted among the recluses of the cloister\nto an unwonted degree, and thus it came about in the course of time\nthat many who out of solicitude for their own salvation had sought the\nsolitude of the cloister are later found in the outside world, going\nabout, in imitation of their Master, doing good, ministering in the\nspirit of absolute self-forgetfulness to the needs, temporal as well\nas spiritual, of the poor, the afflicted, the heavy-laden, and the\nlife-weary. A large part of the philanthropic work of the Church during\nthe Middle Ages was carried on by the monks.\n\nThis humanitarian spirit, this cloister conscience of monasticism, was\nbequeathed to society at large. Thus may the direct line of descent of\nthe modern social conscience be traced through the medieval monasteries.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The new conscience\ncondemns and finally suppresses\nthe gladiatorial games]\n\nOne of the earliest and the most important of the moral reforms\neffected by the new conscience in the institutions of pagan Rome was\nthe suppression of the gladiatorial games. For almost seven hundred\nyears preceding the triumph of Christianity in the Roman world, these\nspectacles had formed the favorite amusement of the Roman people\nwithout having awakened any special moral protest. Some of the pagan\nphilosophers and moralists, particularly Seneca and Plutarch, had\ndenounced them as opposed to the sentiment of humanity, but their\nprotest had found no echo in the common conscience of the age. As a\nrule the pagan moralists saw nothing in them to condemn.\n\nIt was reserved for the Christian moralists to awaken the conscience\nto a recognition of the criminality of these cruel spectacles. It was\nparticularly the Christian teaching of the sacredness of human life\nthat contributed powerfully to create the new ethical feeling as to\nthe immoral character of these amusements, and prepared the way for\ntheir final abolition (404 A.D.) through the protest made by the monk\nTelemachus and sealed by his martyr death.\n\nSpeaking of the significance of the abolition of the gladiatorial\ngames, Lecky declares that \u201cthere is scarcely any other reform so\nimportant in the moral history of mankind.\u201d[645] One thing which\nenhanced greatly the importance of the reform was its timeliness. Just\nat the moment of the suppression of these spectacles the Germanic\ntribes were passing the frontiers of the Empire and adopting the\ncustoms and institutions of the Romans. Had not these amusements been\nabolished or put under the ban of the moral feelings before the final\ncatastrophe to the Empire, the barbarian tastes and fighting instincts\nof this new race would have led to the eager introduction of these\nsports into all the northern countries, just as certainly as the humane\nspirit of the Greeks prevented their general introduction into Grecian\nlands. When we recall the indurating and dehumanizing effects of these\namusements upon the Roman populace, we realize the importance and\ntimeliness of the reform which kept the barbarian nations free from\ntheir brutalizing and deadening influence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The new conscience\ncondemns infanticide and\nself-destruction]\n\nEqually emphatic was the condemnation which the new conscience\npronounced on infanticide and self-destruction. We have seen in our\nreview of the morality of the classical peoples how almost universal\nwas the practice of the exposition of infants, and how slight was the\nmoral condemnation which the custom evoked even from philosophers and\nmoralists. When the practice was prohibited, usually the prohibition\nsprang from considerations of a prudential or economic character rather\nthan from scruples of conscience.\n\nBut the Christian teachers, proclaiming the sacredness of human life\nand the immortal destiny of every human soul, declared the destruction\nof the infant as sinful as the taking of the life of the adult. It is\nto this teaching doubtless that is, in large measure, due the existence\nin Christian lands of a conscience which condemns the destruction of\nthe newborn babe as an act of deep moral turpitude.\n\nIt was the same Christian doctrine of the sacredness of human life,\nalong with the teaching of the duty of resignation, that created also a\nnew moral feeling in regard to suicide. We have seen how the conscience\nof the classical peoples in general passed no condemnation upon the act\nof self-destruction if life had in any way become a burden; but the\nChurch taught that suicide is the same as murder, indeed a greater sin\nbecause it destroys not only the body but also the soul. Some Christian\nmoralists maintained that \u201cJudas committed a greater sin in killing\nhimself than in betraying his master Christ.\u201d[646]\n\nThroughout the Middle Ages, under the influence of the Church, the act\nof self-destruction was regarded with the greatest abhorrence,[647] and\nwithout that commingling of tenderness and pity which with us has come\nto temper the feeling of condemnation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The great missionary\npropaganda as an expression of\nChristian altruism]\n\nBut the new conscience found most characteristic expression not in\nits restraints and prohibitions but in its impulsions to altruistic\nactivity and endeavor. In our account of the primitive ethical\nideals of Greece and Rome we noticed how the virtue of altruism or\nself-abnegation for the common good was hidden under the guise of\ncourage.[648] It was therefore no new virtue which Christianity brought\ninto the world when it proclaimed the supreme moral excellence of\nself-renunciation for others. What it did was to widen the circle of\nthose for whom the supreme sacrifice should be made, and to give the\nvirtue fuller and richer content. It thus imparted fresh impulse to\nthat altruistic movement which we have seen to characterize the last\ncenturies of the civilization of Greco-Roman antiquity. The deepened\nethical sentiment found various forms of expression, but the most\nimportant of these was the great missionary propaganda which, during\nthe centuries from the sixth to the ninth, carried the new gospel to\nthe pagan German tribes of Europe. Lecky regards this as the chief\naltruistic movement of the medieval period.\n\nThis conquest of the continent for Christianity was effected in large\npart by men whose fervid zeal for social service had been kindled in\nthe quiet and holy atmosphere of the cloister.[649] The movement was\ninspired and maintained by that same spirit of self-devotion which\nanimated the missionaries of the apostolic age of Christianity. The\ndeclaration of the first great apostle to the gentiles, St. Paul, that\nhe would himself willingly be a castaway if thereby he might secure\nthe salvation of others, could have been made by many a self-devoted\nmonk-apostle who won a like crown of martyrdom. In the romance of\nChristian missions the monastic chronicles of Iona and Lindisfarne and\nSt. Gall, and the tales of the labors and martyrdom of Saints Columba,\nWilfrid, Boniface, and a great company of others will never cease to\nenthrall the imagination so long as the virtue of self-renunciation is\nesteemed and reverenced among men.\n\nThis great missionary movement which brought within the pale of the\nChurch the northern peoples is of transcendent interest to the student\nof the history of morals, not merely because it is such a splendid\nexhibition of the altruistic spirit of Christianity, but also because\nthe success of these medieval missions meant, besides the winning of\nthe barbarians to a new religion, the winning of them to a new moral\nlife; for to give a people a new religion is to give them also a new\nconscience.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Almsgiving and\nthe founding of charitable\ninstitutions]\n\nThe altruistic spirit of the new religion found a second expression\nin charity, in the sense of almsgiving to the poor and the wretched.\nThis was not a new virtue any more than that of general benevolence. It\nwas never, it is true, a prominent virtue with the Greeks and Romans,\nbut it had always been given a place among the cardinal virtues by all\nthe great ethical religions of the East. Judaism laid special stress\nupon the duty of open-handedness to the poor, while Buddhism made it\na rudimentary virtue.[650] Christianity inherited from Judaism this\nattractive virtue and laid a fresh emphasis upon it. Since the incoming\nof Christianity the poor and the afflicted have been cared for in a\nspirit of compassion and tenderness never before known in the history\nof the Western races. Asylums and hospitals and charitable institutions\nof every kind have multiplied in number and have been increased in\neffectiveness in relieving want and distress as the centuries have\npassed, until these endowments and provisions have become a distinctive\nfeature of Christian civilization. In the period we are here reviewing,\nand throughout the later medieval ages, gifts to the monasteries were\nespecially numerous and large, one reason for this being that the\nmonks were looked upon as the almoners of society and \u201ctrustees for\nthe poor.\u201d The founding of hospitals and the endowing of infirmaries\nafforded another outlet for the unbounded charity of the age. The first\nChristian hospital was founded at Rome in the fourth century by a Roman\nlady named Fabiola, a widow of the ancient house of the Fabii, who\nalso established a hospice for pilgrims at the mouth of the Tiber.[651]\n\nThe spirit of charity found further expression in the emancipation of\nslaves, and in the ransoming of prisoners of war, especially, after the\nrise of Islam, of Christian captives. Unfortunately the teaching of\nthe Church respecting the possibility of possession by demons caused\ninsanity to be regarded as obsession by an evil spirit, and for more\nthan a thousand years this belief not only put the unhappy class of the\ninsane outside the pale of Christian charity, but subjected them to the\nmost cruel treatment that fear and superstition could devise.[652]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Mitigations of slavery]\n\nA religion or a philosophy which has for aim the reform and improvement\nof human society may act directly either upon the individual or upon\ninstitutions. Thus modern socialism ignores the individual, maintaining\nthat the individual is the product of environment, and makes its direct\nproximate end and aim the reform of social and economic institutions.\nThrough the improvement and perfection of these it would bring about\nthe improvement and perfection of the individual, and thus usher in the\nera of equality, justice, and brotherhood among men.\n\nNow the method of Christianity is exactly the reverse of this. Its\nappeal is made to the individual; it does not concern itself directly\nwith social and industrial systems, or with governmental institutions\nand arrangements. It would reform society by reforming the individual.\nWhen Christianity entered the world C\u00e6sarism had just established\nitself upon the ruins of republican and national freedom, but the\nChristian preachers said nothing about political liberty; the Master\nhad said, \u201cRender unto C\u00e6sar the things that are C\u00e6sar\u2019s.\u201d The war\nsystem was in full vigor; after a period of Quakerism the Church first\ncondoned, then accepted, and finally consecrated this heritage of\nbarbarism as one of the necessary institutions of human society. The\ngladiatorial games were the sole important institution of antiquity\nwhich the Christian teachers absolutely condemned as an institution,\nand the abolition of which they persistently demanded and finally\neffected.\n\nIt was the same with slavery as with other social institutions. It\nexisted everywhere when Christianity appeared, but the Christian\nteachers never preached abolition. The Christian emperors adopted, and\nfor two centuries maintained practically unchanged, the pagan slave\ncode. There were under these rulers, it is true, some ameliorations in\nthe laws, due to Christian influence; thus cruel forms of punishment,\nas branding on the forehead or throwing from a precipice, were\nprohibited. With the exception of these minor isolated mitigations of\nthe lot of the slave, slavery passed over into Christian civilization\nas an unchanged heritage from the ancient world, and continued to\nexist as a Christian institution until, through the action of various\nagencies, political and economic as well as moral, it was gradually\ntransformed into serfdom. During the later centuries of its prevalence,\nhowever, Christian teachings softened many of the cruelties of the\nsystem, and caused, speaking generally, the individual slave to be\ntreated with greater consideration and humanity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The broadening moral\nmovement in progress in the\nancient world is checked]\n\nUnfortunately there were large offsets to the moral gains of which\nwe have been speaking. Christianity had entered a world in which the\nmost important ethical movement in progress was the broadening of the\nmoral sympathies. The genius of the new religion, a genius inherited\nfrom the great prophets of Judaism, was well calculated to impart, as\nfor a period it did, a fresh impulse to this cosmopolitan movement,\nand to foster and strengthen this growing sentiment of philanthropy\nand universal brotherhood. Its mission seemed to be to consummate the\nwork of Greek philosophy and of Roman world conquest, to complete the\nobliteration of national boundaries, to throw down the partition wall\nbetween Greek and barbarian, Jew and gentile, patrician and plebeian,\nbond and free, and to make each man\u2019s neighbor to be every fellow being\nof whatsoever race or class or creed.\n\nBut this spirit of genuine Christianity was soon obscured and the world\nmovement toward ethical universalism obstructed and checked by the\ntheological teaching which made moral merit and salvation dependent\nupon the acceptance of a prescribed creed. In place of the tribal and\nracial walls of division which had originally separated the communities\nof men and which the progress of events had thrown down, it raised\na new partition wall which divided mankind into two great ethically\nartificial classes, believers and unbelievers, Christians and pagans.\nIn place of the doctrine of race election it substituted the doctrine\nof individual election. Throughout a large part of the Christian\nperiod \u201cinfidels\u201d and \u201cheathen\u201d have too often been to Christians\nwhat \u201cgentiles\u201d were to the \u201cchosen people,\u201d and \u201cbarbarians\u201d to the\nintellectually elect Greeks.\n\nThus was the broadening and leveling movement which marked the later\ncenturies of antiquity checked, while a new division as inimical to\nuniversal charity as the old divisions of race and cult was created.\n\n\n[Sidenote: St. Augustine as the\nrepresentative of the narrowing\nmovement]\n\nThe representative and promoter of this retrograde movement in the\nmoral domain was the African bishop St. Augustine. His \u201cCity of\nGod,\u201d viewed from one side, is altogether like unto the old city of\nman. It is simply the ancient classical city in its early period of\naristocratic pride and exclusiveness before it had felt the broadening\ninfluence of a thousand years of varied experience and growing culture.\nOnly a few can acquire citizenship in the new city. Its privileges are\nonly for \u201cthe elect.\u201d A great multitude, the nonelect, are left outside\nthe city gates. Thus, in the words of Wedgwood, \u201call the arrogance,\nall the exclusiveness, all the love of privilege, for which the city\nof man no longer afforded any escape, found a refuge in the city of\nGod.\u201d[653]\n\nThe narrowing and hampering influence upon the moral development of the\nEuropean peoples of this unethical system of Augustinian theology and\nmetaphysics it would be difficult to exaggerate.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Loss of the virtue of\ntoleration]\n\nThe new division was even more of a hindrance in some respects\nthan the old to the moral progress of the world; for there was not\nmerely created a tendency to the limitation of Christian charity to\nthe community of believers, but there was fostered an intolerant\nand persecuting spirit. The world into which Christianity entered\nwas, speaking generally, a tolerant world. There were, it is true,\npersecutions for opinion\u2019s sake in the pre-Christian age, but these\nwere comparatively infrequent. In general, persecution in classical\nantiquity sprang from some other motive than dislike or fear of\nreligious dissent, as we have seen to have been the case in the\npersecution of the Christians by the pagan emperors of Rome.[654]\n\nBut after the promulgation of the moral code of the Church, which made\nwrong belief or denial of the orthodox creed a fault of unmeasured\ncriminality, toleration ceased to be a virtue and became a vice.\nThus the virtue of toleration, which Lecky pronounces \u201cthe supreme\nattainment of Roman civilization,\u201d was lost. Intolerance became a duty,\nand remained such for more than a thousand years, making a tragedy\nof centuries of European history. Wars of annihilation or subjection\nagainst pagans and infidels were waged, and the persecution of heretics\nwas carried on with a hatred and ferocity in strange contrast to\nthe unbounded charity and infinite tenderness of the Founder of the\nreligion in the name of which these things were done.\n\nThis spirit of intolerance thus called into existence led, during\nthe period under review, to the suppression, first, in the fourth\ncentury by the Christian emperors, of freedom of religious worship;\nand then quickly to the suppression of liberty of thought throughout\nChristendom.[655] By the opening of the sixth century no one in any\nChristian land could freely think or freely express his thought, even\non philosophical themes. This retrograde movement in its ultimate\nconsequences was one of the most far-reaching revolutions in the moral\nhistory of the Western world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: \u201cBetween moralities\u201d;\nthe new-forming ideal]\n\nAside from the broad ethical movements traced above, induced by the\nChristian conception of life and its new valuation of particular\nvirtues and duties, there was in this epoch a moral phenomenon of\nanother sort which we must now notice, namely, the moral anarchy which\ncharacterized the later centuries of the period under review.\n\nIn an earlier chapter we spoke of the fusion of moral ideals which\nultimately takes place when two races meet and unite to form a new\nrace and a new culture.[656] But as Bagehot has pointed out, such a\ncommingling of races is always attended by a special danger. It is\nlikely for a time to produce \u201csomething not only between races, but\n_between moralities_.\u201d[657]\n\nIn the fact here stated we must doubtless look for the explanation in\npart of the turbulent, anarchical character, ethically viewed, of the\nperiod which immediately followed the downfall of ancient civilization,\nand which saw the creation, out of Roman and barbarian elements, of\nthe new Romano-German world. In the migrations and settlements of the\nGerman conquerors in the Roman provinces, and in the mixture of races\nwhich there took place, there resulted necessarily, on the one side,\na break-up of all the old tribal relations which formed the basis of\nthe morality of the barbarians, and, on the other side, the destruction\nof all the restraints and conventions which had formed the bulwark and\nstay of the more refined, if less simple and pure, morality of the\nRomans. With the old moral codes discredited, with ancestral ethical\nideals disintegrated,[658] men stood, to use Bagehot\u2019s phrase, not\nbetween races only but also between moralities, and the historical\nethical evolution was broken by what has been aptly called a moral\ninterregnum. The epoch covering the interval between the destruction\nof the Roman governmental system in the West in the fifth century and\nthe establishment of a semblance of social order by Charlemagne toward\nthe end of the eighth century, presents, according to the concurrent\nview of all chroniclers and historians of the period, one of the most\nappalling spectacles of moral anarchy afforded by the records of human\nhistory.\n\nIn the midst of this moral chaos, however, a new moral world was\nforming. Gradually, under various influences, racial, cultural, and\nreligious, there was taking shape and form, through a fusion of\ndifferent ethical elements, a new moral ideal, the ideal of knighthood,\nwhich for an epoch--throughout the crusading centuries--was to absorb a\nlarge part of the moral enthusiasm of Christendom, and to determine in\ngreat measure the character of the enterprises of the age.\n\nSince one of the influences which produced this great transformation in\nthe Christian ideal was the creed and moral code of Islam, we shall in\nour next chapter turn aside from following the ethical evolution among\nthe European peoples to watch for a space the rise and progress of this\nnew faith whose martial ethics was destined to leave so deep an impress\nupon the moral ideal of Christianity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nTHE ETHICS OF ISLAM: A MARTIAL IDEAL\n\n\nI. RELIGIOUS BASIS OF THE MORAL SYSTEM\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introduction: Islam\ncreates a new conscience in the\nArab race]\n\nThe great revolution which in the seventh century of the Christian\nera agitated all Arabia and gave a new trend to vast currents of\nworld history was essentially a moral revolution. It was the moral\ndegradation of the Arab tribes, still clinging to an outgrown,\nidolatrous worship incapable longer of giving moral guidance to its\nfollowers, that stirred the soul and inspired the message of Mohammed.\nThe Prophet\u2019s real appeal was to the conscience of the Arab race. The\nchief aim and purpose of his preaching was to effect a moral reform.\nHe gave the Arabs, it is true, a new religion, but the religion was to\ngive impulse and sanction to the new morality. The transformation which\nthe new faith wrought in the moral consciousness of the Arabian nation\nwas probably not less profound than that effected by Christianity in\nthe moral consciousness of the European peoples. It is this which\nmakes the rise of Islam a matter as important in the moral as in the\nreligious history of mankind.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of the\nunity of God]\n\nIslam may, with strict historical accuracy, be said to be essentially a\nrepublication of Judaism. Its morality, like the old Hebrew morality,\nis largely derived from its conception of deity. It teaches that God\nis one, and that he is all-powerful, compassionate, forgiving, and\nrighteous. Allah is great and merciful and just, is the burden of the\nProphet\u2019s message respecting deity. This ethical monotheism has been a\ngoverning force in the moral life of the Mohammedan world, just as a\nlike ethical monotheism has been a molding influence in the moral life\nof the Jews and of all those nations that have received their religion\nfrom them.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The dogma of salvation\nby belief]\n\nAnother religious doctrine which has contributed largely to shape\nthe morality of Islam is that of salvation by belief. Only the true\nbeliever can be saved. The tendency, indeed the logical and inevitable\nconsequence of this doctrine, has been to make Islam one of the most\nintolerant of the great religions. It has tended to restrict the moral\nsympathies of Moslems to coreligionists and to make propagandism by\nviolence seem a virtue.\n\n\n[Sidenote: An unchangeable moral\nlaw]\n\nIslam claims to be a divine revelation to man. This doctrine of the\nsupernatural origin of the religion makes the moral code, which is\nbound up with it, a rigid, unchangeable law, for it is only a human\ncode that can be changed without irreverence and sacrilege. The\nblighting effects upon Mohammedan morality of this dogma of a moral law\nsupernaturally given for all time will be noted a little later, when we\ncome to speak of the actual moral life in Mohammedan lands.\n\n\nII. THE MORAL CODE\n\n\n[Sidenote: General nature of the\ncode]\n\nLike all the other ethical systems of Asia, save those of genuine\nChristianity and Buddhism, the Islamic system lays special emphasis\nupon the performance of particular prescribed acts. It is by no means\nsilent respecting the necessity of right states and dispositions\nof mind. But instead of relying upon general principles for the\nguidance of the moral life, it lays its emphasis upon specific outer\nobservances, such as almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimages, and stated\nprayers.[659] The tendency of such a code of precise rules and\ncommands, as was pointed out in connection with Chinese morality and\nagain in connection with the postexilic morality of the Jews, is\nto externalize morality and render the moral life conventional and\nmechanical.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The duty and virtue of\nright belief]\n\nIn correspondence with the dogma of salvation through belief, the\nparamount duty and virtue in the ethical-religious code of Islam is\nunquestioning belief in Allah as the only true God and in Mohammed\nas his prophet. Without this virtue of correct belief there can be,\naccording to the teachings of Islam, no salvation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fighting for the true\nreligion a cardinal duty]\n\nOne effect of thus making right belief an indispensable virtue was to\nmake intolerance practically a virtuous disposition of mind, and the\nconquest of infidels a paramount duty. It is here that we find one of\nthe fundamental differences between the ethical teachings of Christ and\nthose of Mohammed. The Founder of Christianity, through his teaching\nof nonresistance, condemned war. He commanded his followers to put\nup the sword. The founder of Islam, on the other hand, frankly and\nwithout scruple adopted the war system of his time and consecrated it\nto a religious end and purpose. His followers were commanded to fight\nfor the extension of the religion of Allah.[660] Those who fell in\nbattle for the faith were promised immediate entrance into the joys of\nParadise.[661]\n\nNever was there a more fateful provision given a place in a code of\nmorals. It determined in large measure the character of Islam and\nforeshadowed its history. It made it a martial religion. This martial\nreligion, through reaction upon Christianity, helped to make it like\nunto itself. Thus was prepared the way for the Holy Wars.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Provisions of the code\nrespecting slavery]\n\nJust as Mohammed adopted the war system he found in existence, so did\nhe adopt that of slavery. But while accepting the system, he did much\nto improve the status of the bondsman. The legislation of the Koran\nin this department of ethics follows the humane regulations of the old\nHebrew code. In its specific provisions favorable to the slave it goes\nbeyond the requirements of the New Testament. It not only enjoins the\nkind treatment of slaves but provides that converts to Islam shall be\nset free, and in general encourages manumission.[662]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Family morals: polygamy\nrecognized as ethical]\n\nIn no department of ethics is the contrast between Christian and\nMohammedan morals sharper than in the sphere of domestic morality.\nSex relations which the Christian Church condemns as sin, and which\nthe Christian civil law makes a crime, are by the Mohammedan moral\nconsciousness pronounced natural and right, or at least ethically\nindifferent. The New Testament absolutely prohibited polygamy, although\nfrom primitive times the moralists of the East had had in general no\ncondemnation for the custom; but the Koran accepted the system without\nscruple. In doing so, however, it placed salutary restraints upon the\nunregulated license which had hitherto characterized the institution.\nIt limited the number of wives of the faithful to four,[663] and\nsurrounded divorce with wholesome restrictions.\n\nFamily ethics were further lifted to a higher level by the positive\nprohibition of infanticide,[664] a practice which constituted\none of the worst evils of Arab society in pre-Islamic times. The\npositive enactments of the Koranic code in this department of morals\naccomplished what was effected indirectly in the same domain by\nChristianity through its teachings of the sanctity of human life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The prohibition\nof gambling and the use of\nintoxicating liquors]\n\nAmong the other prohibitions of the moral code of Islam are two worthy\nof special notice for the reason that, being made largely effective\nby the sanctions of religion, they have exercised an incalculable\ninfluence upon the Mohammedan world. These are the provisions of the\nKoran forbidding in the most positive terms gambling and the use\nof alcoholic drinks.[665] These prohibitions have had a great and\nundeniable influence in preserving Mohammedan civilization, in the\nextended reach of lands over which it has spread, from those inveterate\ntwin evils of gambling and drunkenness which constitute one of the\ndeepest stains on Christian civilization.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Animal ethics]\n\nIt has been maintained that the place given duties to lower animals is\na crucial test of a moral code.[666] Tried by this standard, the code\nof Islam must be accorded a high place among the ethical systems of the\nworld. In the department of animal ethics it is on a level with that of\nthe old Hebrew Testament. Indeed, the tender solicitude of the code for\ndumb animals is one of its most admirable features. The whole animal\ncreation is here brought within the pale of ethics. Thus at the outset\nIslam took up a position respecting man\u2019s duty toward the animal world\nwhich Christianity is only just now tardily assuming.\n\n\n[Sidenote: A concrete and\npractical morality]\n\nTaken as a whole the ethical rules and commands of the Koran constitute\nan admirable code, one which has been an efficient force in the moral\nimprovement and uplift of the peoples of vast regions of the earth. The\nmorality inculcated has been succinctly characterized as a concrete and\npractical one. It is particularly well adapted to races in a low stage\nof culture. The very fact that, notwithstanding some serious defects\nand limitations, the code has been accepted by so large a part of the\nhuman race, and has, for over a thousand years, given moral guidance\nand inspiration to such vast multitudes, goes to prove that the great\nbody of its rules and prescriptions of conduct are in general in line\nwith the elemental laws of the moral world.\n\n\nIII. THE MORAL LIFE\n\n\n[Sidenote: Mohammedan morality\ndepressed by racial influences]\n\nIn any comparison instituted between Christianity and Islam as moral\nregenerators of society there is need that the difference in the\nfields entered by these rival creeds be kept carefully in mind.\nIslam was placed at a disadvantage in that it went among the morally\ndegenerate and dissolute peoples of the Orient, while Christianity had\nfor its field the classical peoples and particularly the fresh German\nrace. In those same Eastern lands and among those same Oriental or\nsemi-Hellenized races Christianity had not only signally failed morally\nto reform and uplift society, but in that unfavorable environment had\nitself become lamentably degenerate and corrupt. In pointing out this\ndisadvantage to which Islam has been subjected, a discerning Moslem\nwriter says, \u201cLike rivers flowing through varied tracts, both these\ncreeds have produced results in accordance with the nature of the soil\nthrough which they have found their course.\u201d[667] There is here the\nnecessary recognition of the influence which the historical environment\nexercises upon the moral standard. The prerequisite of a good harvest\nin the field of morals, as in the physical world, is not only good seed\nbut also a good soil.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Consequence of giving a\nreligious sanction to war]\n\nThe whole history of Islam, as already remarked, has been molded by\nthe fact that fighting for the extension of the true religion was made\nby Mohammed a chief duty of the faithful. Islam\u2019s wonderful career of\nconquest during the first century after its rise was in large measure\nthe result of the Prophet having made war against infidels a pious\nduty. Hitherto war among the Arabs had been for the most part merely\na raid or hunt. Now it was given an ethical-religious motive and thus\nmade a crusade. In the space of a single century a large part of the\ncountries which had formed the historic lands of antiquity had been\nbrought by the Arabian warriors under the sway of Islam.\n\nBut this was not all. These conquests brought Islam in contact with\nChristendom along all its extended frontier from the Straits of\nGibraltar to the Bosporus, and thus created the conditions which led to\nthe Holy Wars between Moslem and Christian, which filled the eleventh\nand twelfth centuries. Such were the momentous and far-reaching\nconsequences of the giving by the Arabian Prophet of a religious\nsanction to war, and the re\u00ebnforcing of the war spirit among a martial\nrace by making warfare a duty and death in battle a sure passport to\nthe bliss of paradise.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Mitigation of Oriental\nbarbarities in war]\n\nWhile adopting and sanctifying the war system, Islam did something in\nthe way of mitigating its savagery. Up to this time the war code of\nthe Asian peoples had lost little or none of its primitive barbarity.\nThe indiscriminate slaughter of the vanquished, without regard to\nage or sex, had been a common practice. But when the second Arabian\ncaliph, Omar, sent out his warriors to effect the conquest of the world\nfor the true religion, he strictly enjoined them to spare the women\nand children and the old men. This injunction became a part of the\nMohammedan war code, and, though not always observed, it did much to\nmake the earlier wars waged for the spread of Islam, compared with most\nof the recorded wars among the Oriental races, merciful and humane.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Intolerance as a\ncorollary of religious principles]\n\nIntimately related to the subject of the Mohammedan ethics of war is\nthe subject of toleration. As we have seen, the natural tendency of the\nteaching that right religious belief is necessary to salvation, and\nthat fighting for the spread of the true religion is a paramount duty,\nis to foster intolerance, indeed, is to make intolerance a virtue.\nThese doctrines of Islam have in the main restricted to the faithful\nthe outgoings of the moral sympathies. To the moral consciousness of\nthe Moslem masses tolerance has not presented itself as a virtue\nat all, but rather as a reprehensible disposition of mind, since it\nargues lack of zeal for the true faith. There is to-day more religious\nintolerance in Moslem lands than in any other regions of the earth. In\nthis respect the Mohammedan world is about at the standpoint held by\nChristendom in the Middle Ages.\n\nBut fortunately it is the same with a bad principle as with a good\none--it never produces its full logical consequences. There is that in\nthe constitution of things and in human nature which prevents this.\nHence there has been in Mohammedan lands a larger measure of toleration\nthan, in view of the teachings of Islam, we should have looked for.\nBut the toleration enjoyed by non-Moslems under Mohammedan rule has\nbeen at best precarious. With lamentable frequency, in lands where\nlarge sections of the population are ignorant and debased, outbursts of\nfanaticism have resulted in terrible massacres of \u201cunbelievers.\u201d\n\nNot until Moslem civilization has felt the broadening effect of those\nmaterial, intellectual, and moral revolutions which have finally\nbrought in toleration in a once intolerant Christendom, will this\nvirtue, without which a true and progressive moral life is impossible,\nfind a place in the ethical code of Islam.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The slave trade under\nIslam]\n\nThe slave trade in Mohammedan lands has been fostered through the\nconsecration of the war system by Mohammed and his recognition of\nslavery as a part of the established social order. Throughout the first\ncentury of the career of Islam the propaganda of the faith by the sword\nprovided an unfailing source of slaves, such as had not been opened\nup since the completion of the conquest of the world by the Roman\nlegions.[668] This religious legitimatizing of the slave trade filled\nMoslem lands with slave markets, and, when the wars of the religious\npropaganda had ceased, tended to give a fresh impulse to the African\nslave traffic, which had been in existence from time immemorial. This\ntrade by Mohammedans has been just such a curse to eastern and central\nAfrica as the European Christian slave traffic--which, beginning in\nthe fifteenth century, continued till its final suppression in the\nnineteenth--was to the west African coast and the hinterland. The\nMoslem trade is still carried on clandestinely,[669] since there has as\nyet been little or no moral disapprobation of the traffic awakened in\nMohammedan lands.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Drunkenness in\nMohammedan countries]\n\nThe absolute prohibition in the Koran of the use of all intoxicating\nliquors has been wonderfully effective in preserving Mohammedan lands\nfrom the great evil of drunkenness. This vice, so common in Christian\nlands, is almost unknown in countries where the faith of the Koran is\nreally dominant and the influence of Europeans has not been felt.\n\nIn Afghanistan the penalty inflicted for drunkenness is death. So\nrigorously is the law of Islam in this matter enforced that persons in\na state of intoxication are almost never seen. Nor is the evil simply\ndriven under cover; there is practically very little drinking going on\nin the privacy of the home.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Moslem charity]\n\nIslam has been only less effective than Buddhism and Christianity in\nfostering the attractive virtue of charity. The precepts of the Koran\nrespecting almsgiving and other deeds of benevolence have greatly\npromoted the habit of giving among the followers of the Prophet. The\ngiving of direct relief to the poor in the form of alms is probably\nquite as general as among Christians, though much of this charity is\nindiscriminate and tends to foster that mendicity which is such an\never-present evil in Mohammedan lands. The building of caravansaries,\nthe construction of aqueducts, the opening of fountains along the\nroutes of travel, and the founding of asylums are forms of benevolence\nwhich recall similar works of philanthropy in the later period of the\npagan Roman Empire.\n\nRespecting this charity, however, it must be said that much of it has\nthe taint of self-interest. Many of these good works are performed not\nso much from genuine philanthropy as from self-regarding motives, the\ndominant thought of the doer being to gain religious merit for himself.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Moral influence of\nIslam on races low in civilization]\n\nThe spread of Islam has been almost from the first largely among\ntribes and peoples low in the scale of civilization. In the earlier\ncenturies of its career, besides its conquests among the peoples of\nancient culture, it won over a great part of the uncivilized clans\nand tribes of Asia, and to-day is making constant and rapid progress\namong the negro tribes of central Africa. What renders this fact of\nsignificance to the historian of morals is that Islam has shown itself\nto be one of the most potent forces at work in the world to-day for\nthe moral elevation of peoples still on or near the level of savagery.\nCanon Isaac Taylor affirms that it \u201ccauses the negro tribes of Africa\nto renounce paganism, devil worship, fetishism, cannibalism, human\nsacrifices, infanticide, witchcraft, gambling, drunkenness, unchastity,\ncruelty, and personal uncleanliness.\u201d[670]\n\nThat the moral code of Islam should be even more effective than the\nChristian in lifting savages to a higher moral level is attributed by\nCanon Taylor to the fact that the moral standard of Christianity is so\nhigh that \u201cits virtues are only vaguely understood and not generally\npracticed, while the lower virtues which Islam enforces are understood\nand generally practiced.\u201d\n\nIn a word, it is with Islam\u2019s morality the same as with its theology.\nIts doctrine of one God is simple, concrete, and easily understood,\nand for this reason Islam is admittedly more readily accepted by races\nlow in culture than Christianity with its metaphysical doctrine of the\nTrinity. As the simplicity and concreteness of its teachings respecting\ndeity adapt its creed to the savage mind, so do the lower concrete\npractical virtues of its moral code adapt it to the rudimentary moral\nsense of the primitive man.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Effects upon Mohammedan\nmorality of an unpliant law]\n\nOne of the most striking and instructive phenomena of universal history\nis the contrasted fortunes of Mohammedan and Christian civilization. In\nthe eighth century of our era Mohammedan culture was in many respects\nsuperior to that of Christendom. It held forth great promises for the\nfuture. But these promises were not kept. Stagnation quickly followed\nthe period of brilliant achievement, and a blight fell upon the Moslem\nworld, while the history of Christendom has been a record of wonderful\ndevelopment and progress, until to-day the two worlds cannot be placed\nin comparison with one another, but only in contrast.\n\nBeyond question many agencies, such as race, religion, and government,\nhave concurred to produce this contrast in history and fortune,\nbut equally certain is it that a potent contributory cause is\nthe difference in the moral systems which the two civilizations\nrespectively inherited. The moral life of the Christian world,\nhappily freed from the bondage of the rigid Mosaic law, an outer law\nof positive minute commands, has expatiated under the comprehensive,\nflexible law of the Gospel, a law of love and liberty. As a result\nthe moral life of Christendom has been, on the whole, notwithstanding\ncertain Mohammedanizing tendencies, an expansive growth under the\nguidance of a moral consciousness gradually purified and refined by\nexperience and advancing culture. On the other hand, the moral life\nof the Mohammedan world has been subjected to the authority of an\nexternal, unchanging law, a law conceived to have been given for all\ntime, a republication practically of that rigid Mosaic law from the\nbondage of which the Christian world had fortunately escaped. But the\nmoral life cannot be thus subjected to a rigid external authority\nwithout resulting inanition and death. \u201cThe blight that has fallen on\nthe Moslem nations,\u201d declares a well-informed and thoughtful Mohammedan\nwriter, \u201cis due to the patristic doctrine which has prohibited\nthe exercise of individual judgment.\u201d[671] The ethical code of a\npeople, like its civil code, must be elastic and responsive to the\never-changing needs and demands of the growing moral life.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\nTHE MORAL LIFE OF EUROPE DURING THE AGE OF CHIVALRY\n\n\nI. THE CHURCH CONSECRATES THE MARTIAL IDEAL OF KNIGHTHOOD\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introductory]\n\nFrom the third to the ninth century the ideal of asceticism absorbed\na great part of the moral enthusiasm of Christendom. During the later\npart of this period, however, as we have noted, there was growing up\nalongside the ascetic ideal another of a very different character--the\nmartial ideal of knighthood. In the present chapter we shall first make\na brief survey of the various causes that gave this new trend to the\nmoral feelings and convictions of the age, and then shall glance at\nsome of the more important historical outcomes of the vast enthusiasm\nevoked by this new ideal of character.\n\nThe ideal of knighthood, a product in the main of feudalism, grew up\noutside the Church, and only later was recognized by ecclesiastical\nauthority and approved as compatible with the ethical spirit of\nChristianity. Had not the ideal been thus approved by ecclesiastical\nauthority, and advantage taken of the enthusiasm it evoked to promote\nthrough it the cause of the Church, it would never have become the\nsignificant force it did in European history. Therefore we must first\ninquire what were the influences that engendered a military spirit in\nthe Church and led it to approve the martial ideal of the knight and\ngive the consecration of religion to the institution of chivalry which\nwas its embodiment.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The genius of\nChristianity opposed to the war\nspirit]\n\nIf at the advent of Christianity one reflecting upon the genius of the\nnew religion and the teachings of its Founder had ventured to forecast\nthe influence of the new faith upon the different departments of\nmorality, he would almost certainly have predicted that this influence\nwould be felt most decisively upon the ethics of war. The attitude\nassumed by the early Christians toward the military life would have\njustified this forecast, for Christianity brought into the world the\nnew principle of nonresistance.[672] This teaching made the primitive\nChristian community almost a Quaker body; but barely three centuries\nhad passed before this religion which had entered the world as a gospel\nof peace and good will had become a martial creed and its emblem been\nmade a battle standard.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Causes which fostered\nthe war spirit in the Church:\n(_a_) the heritage of the war\nethics of the ancient world of\nculture]\n\nThe causes that produced this amazing transformation in the Christian\nChurch were various and so interrelated as to make it difficult to\ndetermine just what influence was exercised by each. Yet it is possible\nto note the character of the different agencies at work, and to form\nat least some general idea of the way in which the transformation was\nwrought.\n\nFirst, there was the inheritance from the past. War had always been\none of the leading occupations of men. It had scarcely ever occurred\nto any one to question its legitimacy. It was looked upon as a part of\nthe constitution of things. The ideas, feelings, habits, engendered\nby its practice through uncounted millenniums of history had become\ningrained in every tissue and fiber of man\u2019s being. Set in the midst\nof the world, the Church yielded to the influence of this baneful pagan\nheritage. It incorporated with its own moral code, wholly alien to the\nessential spirit of Christianity as these elements were, the war ethics\nof the pre-Christian world, and thus made this pagan international\nmorality a permanent part of Christian ethics.[673] It will be\ninstructive for us to follow somewhat closely this reaction upon the\nethics of the Church, first of the war code of the civilized world of\nthe south, and then later of the war spirit of the barbarian world of\nthe north.\n\nThe early Fathers of the Church in general condemned the military\nservice as incompatible with the Christian life.[674] Not till the\nsecond century of the Empire do we find any record of Christian\nsoldiers serving in the Roman armies. By this time the early rule of\nthe Church forbidding a member to serve in the army had become relaxed;\nbut members of the Christian body who entered the Roman legions were\nrequired to undertake a prescribed penance and to seek absolution\nbefore partaking of the Eucharist. By the time of Diocletian Christians\nappear to have entered with little or no scruple upon the military\nlife.[675] A significant waymark of this gradual transformation is\nthe great victory won by the Emperor Constantine over his rival\nMaxentius at the battle of Milvian Bridge, 312 A.D. Upon that field\nthe soldiers of Constantine fought beneath the Labarum, a standard\nwhich bore as an emblem the Christian cross. The fortunate issue of\nthe battle for Constantine seems to have greatly confirmed the feeling\nin the Christian community as to the legitimacy of war. The Church\nconformed more and more positively its teachings and discipline to\nthe requirements of the military service. Saints Augustine (354\u2013430\nA.D.) and Ambrose (340\u2013397 A.D.), in opposition to most of the earlier\nFathers, were open apologists and defenders of war and of the military\nlife.\n\nThus during the very period when the Church was putting under its ban\nthe cruel and sanguinary amusements of the Romans by the suppression\nof the gladiatorial games,[676] and thus lifting domestic morality to\na new and higher plane, through a strange inconsistency it was first\ncondoning and then finally consecrating the international pagan war\nsystem of which these sports were only a mild imitation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) The war spirit of\nthe German race]\n\nAfter the fifth century the influence upon the ethics of the Church of\nthe war system of the civilized world of the south was re\u00ebnforced by\nthe martial spirit of the barbarian world of the north. That world was\nnow, largely through the missions of the monastic Church, being rapidly\nbrought within the pale of Christianity. But all these northern peoples\nwere the very incarnation of the war spirit. Their favorite deities\nwere gods who delighted in battle and bloodshed. Fighters these men\nwere, and fighters they remained even after conversion and baptism.\nThe mingling of moralities which followed their conversion is well\nillustrated by the passionate outburst of the Frankish chieftain Clovis\nas he listened to the story of the Crucifixion: \u201cOh,\u201d he exclaimed,\n\u201cif only I could have been there with my trusty warriors!\u201d The soul\nof Clovis lived on in his race. Four centuries later these Frankish\nwarriors, as knight crusaders, were on the spot of the Crucifixion,\nredeeming with lance and sword the tomb of the slain Christ from the\nhands of infidels. It was this ineradicable war spirit of the northern\nbarbarians to which was due, perhaps more than to any other agency, the\ninfusion of a military spirit into that church of which the Founder was\nthe Prince of Peace.\n\nAmong the customs of the early Germans there was one which had such a\npositive influence upon the evolution we are tracing in Church morality\nthat we must here make special note of it. This was the ordeal by fire,\nby water, or by wager of battle to determine the guilt or innocence of\nan accused person. The prominent place held by this institution among\nsavage or semicivilized peoples is familiar to the student of primitive\nsociety. Now the German folk brought with them this institution, and\nwith it the belief which made the ordeal, and particularly the ordeal\nby combat, a solemn judicial matter in which God rendered decision and\ngave victory to the one whose cause was just. This barbarian conception\nof the wager of battle between individuals became incorporated with\nthe common body of Christian ideas and beliefs. The same manner of\nthinking was perforce applied to war. A conflict between great armies\nwas conceived as a wager of battle in which God gave victory to the\nright. Thus was war consecrated and made an agency whereby God executes\njudgment among the nations.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) The war records\nof the Old Hebrew Testament]\n\nThis interpretation of the nature and mission of war was re\u00ebnforced by\na like unfortunate interpretation of the records of the Old Testament.\nThe good bishop Ulfilas was right when, in translating the Hebrew Bible\ninto the Gothic tongue, he omitted the war chronicles through fear that\nthese records of wars and massacres would fan into too fierce a flame\nthe martial zeal of his Gothic neophytes. To these terrible chronicles,\nwhich represent God as commanding the Israelites to wage war against\nhis enemies, and even as ordering the most horrid atrocities upon war\ncaptives, is due in large part the idea so dominant even to-day among\nChristian nations that God is a God of War, and that through the ordeal\nof battle he gives judgment on the earth.[677]\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_d_) The armed\npropaganda of Islam]\n\nThe transformation taking place in the ethical standard of the\nChurch under the various influences we have named was hastened and\ncompleted by the reaction upon Christian ethics of the martial ethics\nof Islam.[678] This new influence began to be exerted in the seventh\ncentury. By infection the crusading spirit of the Mohammedan zealots\nwas communicated to the Christian Church. Toward the close of the\neleventh century the spiritual head of Christendom, Pope Urban II,\nsummoned the Christian nations of Europe to arms for the recovery of\nthe Holy Sepulcher from the hands of the unbelievers.\n\nFeudalism by this time had flowered in chivalry. The Christian\nlands were filled with brave young knights, especially knights of\nNorman descent, aflame with martial enthusiasm and eager for warlike\nadventure. It was the ancestors of these very men, instinct with the\nmilitary spirit, that Rome had once enlisted in her legions to fight\nthe battles of the Empire; it is the children of those legionaries that\nthe Christian Church now summons in the name of Christ to her standard\nto fight the battles of the Cross.\n\nThe transformation of that Church was now complete. The age of the\nCrusades had opened. Christ and Mars were co-sovereigns in Christian\nEurope. The teachings of the Prince of Peace and the war spirit of\nthe civilization of antiquity and of the German barbarians were\nreconciled.[679] As Lecky finely portrays it, \u201cAt the hour of sunset\nwhen the Christian soldier knelt down to pray before his cross, that\ncross was the handle of his sword.\u201d[680]\n\n\nII. THE COMPOSITE IDEAL OF KNIGHTHOOD\n\n\n[Sidenote: The composite character\nof the ideal: its pagan-Christian\nvirtues]\n\nThe foregoing brief account of the reconciliation and commingling in\nlater Roman and early medieval times of the pagan ethics of war and\nthe Christian ethics of peace has already acquainted us with what was\nthe distinctive characteristic of the ethical ideal of knighthood,\nthe ideal which resulted from this mingling of these two strongly\ncontrasted moralities. It was a composite ideal, a combination of pagan\nand Christian virtues. The true knight, who was the incarnation of the\nideal, must possess all the admired moral qualities of the pagan hero,\nand, together with these, all the essential virtues of the Christian\nsaint. Among the pagan virtues we find a set of moral qualities that\nare attributes of character which, with possibly one or two exceptions,\nwere assigned a high place either in the barbarian German or in the\nclassical ideal of excellence. Chief among these qualities are personal\nloyalty, courage, truthfulness, justice, magnanimity, courtesy, and\nself-respect.\n\nThe first duty and virtue of the true knight was absolute loyalty to\nhis superior, to his comrades in arms, and to the cause espoused.\nThis virtue of loyalty is the virtue which Professor Royce makes the\nroot from which all other virtues spring.[681] Without doubt it is,\nif not the central virtue of every true moral system, one of the most\nattractive of all ethical traits, and one most sacredly held from taint\nby every person with a nice sense of what constitutes true nobility of\ncharacter.\n\nA second and indispensable virtue was courage. The knight must be brave\nas well as loyal. Cowardice and knighthood were wholly incompatible\nthings.\n\nAnother moral quality was veracity, absolute fidelity to a promise. The\npledged word of the true knight was sacrosanct and inviolable.[682]\n\nStill another indispensable trait in the character of the ideal knight\nwas love of justice. The true knight must be just; an unjust knight\ncould not be a true knight any more than an unjust judge can be a true\njudge.\n\nAgain, the knight who would be loyal to the ideal of knighthood must\nbe magnanimous. One of the elements of this virtue is unwillingness\nto take an unfair advantage of another, especially of an enemy. It\nwas a disgraceful thing for a knight to attack his foe when at a\ndisadvantage, as when disarmed or fallen. He must always meet his enemy\nin fair and open fight.\n\nFurthermore, the true knight must be courteous. It was as much his\nduty to be courteous as to be truthful. Now courtesy is not a trait or\nfeeling which inspires lofty action, but one which induces gentleness,\nkind consideration, and gracious deference toward all alike--rich and\npoor, high and low.\n\nLastly, the knight must possess dignity or self-respect. The age of\nchivalry interpreted this virtue or duty as requiring the knight to\nstand on his rights as a man. He must not let an injury to himself\nor to a friend go unpunished. He must resent every insult and return\nblow for blow. Not to do so argued cowardice and pusillanimity. All\nthis was of course directly opposed to the Christian requirements of\nhumility, meekness, nonresistance, and forgiveness of injuries, and was\ndistinctly a part of the moral code of chivalry which was borrowed from\npre-Christian or non-Christian morality.\n\nTo these essentially pagan virtues the knight, after the institution\nof chivalry had been approved and consecrated by the Church, must add\nall the distinctly Christian virtues, particularly the virtue of right\nreligious belief. Only the true believer could be a true knight.\n\nA striking illustration of the mixture of moralities with which we\nhave to do in the period of chivalry is afforded by the celebrated\nreligious military orders of the Hospitalers and Templars, which were\nformed just before the Second Crusade, when the enthusiasm for the\nchivalric ideal was at its height, while that for the ascetic had not\nyet sensibly abated. The Hospitalers were monks who, to their monastic\nvows of poverty, chastity, and obedience or humility, added the martial\nobligations of knighthood; the Templars were knights who to their\nmilitary vows added those of the monk. Thus in these remarkable orders\nof knight-monks we see incongruously united the monastic and military\nideals, two of the most sharply contrasted conceptions of worthy life\nthat it is possible to find in the whole history of ethical ideals.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Defects of the ideal]\n\nThe ideal of chivalry had serious defects. First, the military\nspirit, borrowed from paganism, which the ideal apotheosized, was in\nabsolute opposition to the spirit of Christianity, so that the perfect\nreconciliation and fusion of the different moral qualities entering\ninto the ideal was impossible.\n\nSecond, from feudalism, with its sharply defined social classes, the\nideal received an aristocratic stamp. In this respect it was the\ndirect opposite of the monastic ideal. Any person, freeman or slave,\nking or peasant, could become a monk, and by following the more\nexcellent way gain the homage of men and win the crown of sainthood.\nBut the chivalric ideal was one to which no plebeian might aspire.\nOnly a person of noble birth could become a knight. This exclusive\naristocratic character of the ideal constituted one of its most\nserious defects. Yet in spite of this and other defects it was a noble\nand attractive ideal, and one which not only left a deep stamp upon\nmedieval history, but contributed precious elements to the ethical\nheritage which the modern world received from the Middle Ages.\n\n\nIII. THE CHIEF MORAL PHENOMENA OF THE PERIOD\n\n\n[Sidenote: Influence of the ideal\nof chivalry upon the history of\nthe epoch]\n\nJust as the moral enthusiasm awakened by the monastic ideal gave a\nspecial character and trend to much of the history of the age of its\nascendancy,--inspiring or helping to inspire the missionary propaganda\namong the barbarian tribes of Europe, giving birth to a special\nliterature (the _Lives of the Saints_), and fostering the spirit of\nbenevolence and self-renunciation,--so did the unmeasured enthusiasm\ncreated by the chivalric ideal give a distinctive character to much of\nthe history of the age of its predominance--lending a romantic cast\nto the Crusades, creating a new form of literature, and giving a more\nassured place in the growing European ideal of character to several\nattractive traits and virtues. Respecting each of these matters we\nshall offer some observations in the immediately following pages, and\nthen shall proceed to speak briefly of some reform movements which\nbelong to the general moral history of the epoch under review.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Chivalry and the\nCrusades]\n\nThe Crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries against the Moslems\nof the East, in so far as those enterprises were inspired by moral\nfeeling,--and religious-ethical feeling was the chief motive force\nbehind them,--were largely the translation into action of the ideal\nof chivalry now commended and consecrated by the Church. The oath of\nthe Knights of Malta, who were a perfect incarnation of the spirit of\nchivalry, was \u201cto make eternal war upon the Turks; to recognize no\ncessation of hostilities with the infidel, on any pretext whatsoever.\u201d\n\nIt is an amazing change that, in the course of a few generations, has\ncome over the ethical spirit and temper of the peoples of Christendom.\nIn the earlier medieval time the best conscience of the age was\nembodied in the monk-saints Augustine, Columba, Winfrid, and a great\ncompany of other unarmed missionary apostles to the pagan Celts\nand Germans; in this later time the best conscience of the age is\nincarnated in the armor-clad warriors Godfrey of Bouillon, Raymond,\nBohemond, Tancred, and a multitude of other knightly leaders of the\nhosts of Crusaders who go forth to redeem with blood and slaughter the\ntomb of their martyred Lord.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Romance literature\nas an expression of the ethical\nspirit of the age]\n\nNo element of civilization responds more quickly to the changing\nethical ideal of a people than its literature. The change that passed\nover the popular literature of Christendom in the transition of Europe\nfrom the age of asceticism to the age of chivalry is finely summarized\nby Lecky in these words: \u201cWhen the popular imagination [in the earlier\nage] embodied in legends its conception of humanity in its noblest and\nmost attractive form, it instinctively painted some hermit-saint of\nmany penances and many miracles.... In the romances of Charlemagne and\nArthur we may trace the dawning of a new type of greatness. The hero of\nthe imagination of Europe is no longer the hermit but a knight.\u201d[683]\n\nAn interesting monument of this new species of literature, in what\nwe may view as a transition stage, is the _Gesta Romanorum_,[684] a\ncollection of moral stories invented by the monks in their idle hours.\nThese tales are a curious mixture of things Roman, monastic, and\nknightly.\n\nBut for a true expression of this romance literature we must turn to\nthe legends of the Holy Grail, in which a lofty imagination blends,\nin so far as they can be blended, all the varied elements of the\nknightly ideal in a consistent whole. No age save the age of Christian\nknighthood could have produced this wonderful cycle of tales.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Contribution of\nchivalry to the moral heritage of\nthe Christian world]\n\nBut it is neither in the crusading enterprises nor in the literary\nproducts of the age of chivalry that we are to look for the real\nhistorical significance of the ideal of chivalry. Its chief import\nfor the moral evolution of the European nations lies in the fact that\nit helped to give fuller and richer content to the Christian ideal\nby contributing to it, or by giving a surer place in it, certain\nnontheological virtues, some of which the Church had laid little\nemphasis upon or had entirely neglected.\n\nThus the enthusiasm for the ideal of chivalry, like the Church\u2019s\nveneration of the Holy Virgin,[685] tended to elevate and refine\nthe ideal of woman, and thus to counteract certain tendencies of\nthe ascetic ideal. It helped to give a high valuation to the moral\nqualities of loyalty, truthfulness, magnanimity, self-reliance,\nand courtesy. We designate these attractive traits of character as\nchivalrous virtues for the reason that we recognize that knighthood\nmade precious contributions to these elements of the moral inheritance\nwhich the modern received from the medieval world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Restrictions on the\nright of private war: the Truce of\nGod]\n\nVery closely connected ethically and historically with chivalry is\nthe movement during the later medieval time for the abolition of\nthe right of private war.[686] In the tenth century, as feudalism\ndeveloped and the military spirit of knighthood came more and more\nto dominate society, the right of waging war, with which privilege\nevery feudal lord of high rank was invested, resulted in a state of\nintolerable anarchy in all those lands where the feudal system had\nbecome established. Respecting this right, claimed and exercised by the\nfeudal prince, of waging war against any and every other chieftain,\neven though this one were a member of the same state as that to which\nhe himself belonged, there was in these medieval centuries precisely\nthe same moral feeling, or rather lack of moral feeling, that exists\nto-day in regard to the right claimed and exercised by the different\nindependent nations of waging war against one another.\n\nAs a result of this practice of private war, Europe reverted to a\ncondition of primitive barbarism. Every land was filled with fightings\nand violence. \u201cEvery hill,\u201d as one pictures it, \u201cwas a stronghold,\nevery plain a battlefield. The trader was robbed on the highway, the\npeasant was killed at his plow, the priest was slain at the altar.\nNeighbor fought against neighbor, baron against baron, city against\ncity.\u201d\n\nIn the midst of this universal anarchy the Church lifted a protesting\nvoice. Toward the end of the tenth century there was started in France\na movement which aimed at the complete abolition of private war. The\nChurch aspired to do what had been done by pagan Rome. It proclaimed\nwhat was called the Peace of God. It commanded all men everywhere\nto refrain from fighting and robbery and violence of every kind as\ncontrary to the spirit and teachings of Christianity.\n\nBut it was found utterly impossible to make the great feudal barons\nrefrain from fighting one another even though they were threatened with\nthe eternal torments of hell. They were just as unwilling to surrender\nthis highly prized privilege and right of waging private war as the\nnations of to-day are to surrender their prized privilege and right to\nwage public war.\n\nThen the leaders of the clergy of France, seeing that they could not\nsuppress the evil entirely, resolved to attempt to regulate it. This\nled to the proclamation of what was called the Truce of God. The first\ncertain trace of this movement dates from the year 1041.[687] In that\nyear the abbot of the monastery of Cluny and the other French abbots\nand bishops issued an edict commanding all men to maintain a holy and\nunbroken peace during four days of every week, from Wednesday evening\ntill Monday morning.[688] Every man was required to take an oath to\nobserve this Truce of God. The oath was renewed every three years, and\nwas administered to boys on their reaching their twelfth year.\n\nThis movement to redeem at least a part of the days from fighting\nand violence came gradually to embrace all the countries of Western\nEurope. The details of the various edicts issued by Church councils\nand popes vary greatly, but all embody the principle of the edict of\n1041. Holydays, and especially consecrated periods, as Easter time\nand Christmas week, came to be covered by the Truce. The Council of\nClermont, which inaugurated the First Crusade, extended greatly the\nterms of the Truce, forbidding absolutely private wars while the\nCrusade lasted, and placing under the \u00e6gis of the Church the person and\nproperty of every crusader.\n\nThe Truce of God was never well observed, yet it did something during\nthe eleventh and twelfth centuries to mitigate the evils of private\nwar and to render life more secure and tolerable. After the twelfth\ncentury the kings of Europe, who were now strengthening their authority\nand consolidating their dominions, took the place of the Church in\nmaintaining peace among their feudal vassals. They came to regard\nthemselves as responsible for the \u201cpeace of the land,\u201d which phrase now\nsuperseded those of the \u201cPeace of God\u201d and the \u201cTruce of God.\u201d Thus the\nmovement to which moral forces had given the first impulse was carried\nto its consummation by political motives. To the Church, however,\nhistory will ever accord the honor of having begun this great reform\nwhich enforced peace upon the members of the same state, and which has\nmade private wars in civilized lands a thing of the past.\n\nThe abolition of private warfare was the first decisive step marking\nthe advance of Europe toward universal peace. Public war, that is,\nwar between nations, is still an established and approved institution\nof international law; but in the moral evolution of humanity a time\napproaches when public war shall also, like private war, be placed\nunder the ban of civilization, and will have passed upon it by the\ntruer conscience of that better age the same judgment that the\nconscience of to-day pronounces on that private warfare upon which the\nTruce of God laid the first arresting hand.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Progress in the ethics\nof war: sale into slavery of\nChristian captives condemned]\n\nAlthough the Church has done little in a direct way to abolish public\nwar, or even directly to create in society at large a new conscience\nin regard to the wickedness of war in itself as an established method\nof settling international differences, its influence has been felt\nfrom early Christian times in the alleviation of its barbarities and\ncruelties. One of the first ameliorations in the rules of war effected\nthrough Christian influence concerned the treatment of war captives.\n\nAmong the ancient Greeks, as we have seen, under the influence of the\nsentiment of Panhellenism, there was developed a vague feeling that\nGreeks should not enslave Greeks. But aside from this Panhellenic\nsentiment, which had very little influence upon actual practice, there\nwas in the pre-Christian period seemingly little or no moral feeling on\nthe subject, and the custom of reducing prisoners of war to slavery was\npractically universal.\n\nBut the custom, in so far as it concerned Christian prisoners, was\ncondemned by the Christian conscience as incompatible with the spirit\nof Christianity, and the rule was established that such captives\nshould not be enslaved.[689] We observe the first clear workings of\nthis new war conscience in Britain after the conversion of the Saxon\ninvaders. The Celts of Britain were Christians, and the Saxons, after\nthey themselves had been won over to Christianity, ceased to sell into\nslavery their Celtic captives. Gradually this new rule was adopted by\nall Christian nations. No other advance of equal importance marks the\nmoral history of public war during the medieval period.\n\nThis humane rule, however, did not, as we have intimated, embrace\nnon-Christians. Our word \u201cslave\u201d bears witness to this fact. This term\ncame to designate a person in servitude from the circumstance that up\nto the eleventh century, which saw the evangelization of Russia, the\nslave class in Europe was made up largely of _Slavs_, who, as pagans,\nwere without scruple reduced to slavery by their Christian captors.\n\nBut the earlier rights which the immemorial laws of war conferred upon\nthe captor were not wholly annulled in the case of Christian captives.\nThe practice of holding for ransom took the place of sale into slavery.\nThis custom prevailed throughout the feudal period, but gradually\nduring the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this practice finally\nyielded to the more humanitarian custom of exchange of prisoners.[690]\nThus in this department of ethics there is to be traced a gradual\nhumanization of the code, which, beginning in savagery with gross\ncannibalism and torture, advances through killing in cold blood, sale\ninto slavery, and holding for ransom, to equal exchange.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Morality in the\nmonasteries: moral significance of\nthe rise of the Mendicant Orders]\n\nDuring the age of chivalry the ideal of the knight overshadowed the\nideal of the monk. Nevertheless throughout the whole period the\nmonastic ideal inspired a great deal of moral enthusiasm. The founding\nand endowment of monasteries divided with the equipping of knightly\nexpeditions for the Crusades the zeal and efforts and sacrifices of the\nEuropean peoples.\n\nIn the old orders of monks, however, zeal for the ascetic ideal would\noften grow cold, and the high moral standard of the earlier time would\nbe lowered. Then some select soul, set aflame by a fresh vision of the\nideal, would draw together a group of devoted followers, and thus would\ncome into existence a new order of monks, among whom the flame of a\nholy enthusiasm would burn brightly for a time.[691]\n\nAmong the numerous new orders called into existence by these reform\nmovements there were two which, in the ideal of duty which they\nfollowed, stand quite apart from the ordinary monastic orders. This\nnew ideal had its incarnation in St. Francis[692] and St. Dominic, the\nfounders respectively of the Franciscan and the Dominican order of\nfriars.\n\nIn this new conception of what constitutes the worthiest and most\nmeritorious life, the quietistic virtues of the earlier ascetic ideal,\nwhich had developed during the period of terror and suffering which\nfollowed the subversion of classical civilization by the northern\nbarbarians, gave place to the active, benevolent virtues. In the\nearlier monastic movement there was a self-regarding element. The monk\nfled from the world in order to make sure of his own salvation. The\nworld was left to care for itself. In the new orders, the brother, in\nimitation of the Master who went about among men teaching and healing,\nleft the cloister and went out into the world to rescue and save\nothers. In its lofty call to absolute self-forgetfulness and complete\nconsecration to the service of humanity, the early ideal of the\nMendicants was one of the noblest and most attractive that had grown\nup under Christian influence. The loftiness of the ideal attracted\nthe select spirits of the age--for noble souls love self-sacrifice.\n\u201cWhenever in the thirteenth century,\u201d says the historian Lea, \u201cwe find\na man towering above his fellows, we are almost sure to trace him to\none of the Mendicant Orders.\u201d[693]\n\nIt is in the exaltation of this virtue of self-renunciation that we\nfind one of the chief services rendered by the Mendicant Orders,\nespecially by the Franciscan, to European morality. Just as the early\nmonks, through the emphasis laid on the virtue of chastity, made\na needed protest against the sensuality of a senile and decadent\ncivilization, so did the friars, through the stress laid on the\nvirtue of self-denial for others, make a needed protest against the\nselfishness and hardness of an age that seemed to have forgotten the\nclaims of the poor and the lowly.[694] It can hardly be made a matter\nof reasonable doubt that the slowly growing fund of altruistic feeling\nin Christendom was greatly enriched by the self-devoted lives and\nlabors of the followers of Saints Francis and Dominic.\n\nBut the value of the ideal of the friars as an ethical force in the\nevolution of European civilization was seriously impaired by certain\ntheological elements it contained. It was an ideal in which, as in the\nordinary monastic ideal, the duty of correct opinion came to be exalted\nabove all others. The ethics of belief took precedence of the ethics of\nservice. Thus the friars, particularly the Dominicans, through their\nzeal for orthodoxy, fostered the grave moral fault of intolerance. The\ngrowth of this conception of Christian duty, concurring with other\ncauses of which we shall speak in the next chapter, ushered in the age\nof the Inquisition.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethics of\nScholasticism]\n\nThe ethical history of the friars or the preaching orders mingles with\nthe ethical history of Scholasticism. The ethics of the Schoolmen was\na syncretism of two moral systems, the pagan-classical or Aristotelian\nand the Christian. With the four classical virtues of wisdom, prudence,\ntemperance, and justice were combined the three Christian virtues\nof faith, hope, and love. But these two moral types, the classical\nand the theological, each being taken in its entirety, were mutually\ninconsistent ideals of virtue. The pagan code was a morality based on\nthe autonomy of the individual reason; the Church code was based on an\nexternal authority. The one was inner and natural, the other outer and\nsupernatural. The scholastic system was thus an incongruous combination\nof naturalism and supernaturalism in ethics, of native virtues and\n\u201cvirtues of grace.\u201d This dualism is the essential fact in the history\nof the ethics of Scholasticism.\n\nAs it was the great effort of the Schoolmen in the domain of dogma to\njustify the doctrines of the Church, to show their reasonableness and\nconsistency, so was it their great effort in the domain of ethics to\njustify the Church\u2019s composite moral ideal, to show all its duties\nand virtues to form a reasonable and consistent system. The best\nrepresentative of this effort of reconciliation was the great Schoolman\nThomas Aquinas. But a perfect fusion of the diverse elements was\nimpossible. There were ever striving in the system two spirits--the\nspirit of Greek naturalism and the spirit of Hebrew-Christian\nsupernaturalism.\n\nBut there was another line of cleavage in the system which was still\nmore fateful in its historical consequences than the cleavage between\nthe Aristotelian and the Church morality. This cleavage was created\nby the twofold ethics of the Church, for the ecclesiastical morality,\nconsidered apart from the Aristotelian element, was itself made up of\ntwo mutually inconsistent ethics, namely, Gospel ethics and Augustinian\nethics.[695] The saving virtue of the first was loving, self-abnegating\nservice; the saving virtue of the second was faith, which was\npractically defined as \u201cthe acceptance as true of the dogma of the\nTrinity and the main articles of the creed.\u201d Such was the emphasis laid\nby certain of the Schoolmen upon the metaphysical side of this dual\nsystem that there was in their ethics more of the mind of Augustine\nthan of the mind of Christ. This making of an external authority\nthe basis of morality, this emphasizing of the theological virtues,\nespecially the virtue of right belief, had two results of incalculable\nconsequences for the moral evolution in Christendom. First, it led\nnaturally and inevitably to that system of casuistry[696] which was\none of the most striking phenomena of the moral history of the later\nmedieval and earlier modern centuries; and second, it laid the basis of\nthe tribunal of the Inquisition. Thus does the theological ethics of\nScholasticism stand in intimate and significant relation to these two\nimportant matters in the moral history of Europe.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\nRENAISSANCE ETHICS: REVIVAL OF NATURALISM IN MORALS\n\n\nI. DETERMINING INFLUENCES\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Renaissance: the\nnew intellectual life]\n\nToward the close of the medieval ages came that important movement in\nEuropean society known as the Renaissance, a main feature of which\nwas the restoration of classical culture. Since the incoming of the\nnorthern barbarians with their racial traits and martial moral code\nthere had been no such modifying force brought to bear upon the moral\nevolution of the European peoples, nor was there to appear a greater\ntill the rise of modern evolutionary science.\n\nThe Renaissance exerted its transforming influence on the moral life\nof the West chiefly through the new intellectual life it awakened\nby bringing the European mind in vital contact with the culture of\nthe ancient world; for intellectual progress means normally moral\nprogress. Hence as the Renaissance meant a new birth of the European\nintellect, so did it mean also a new birth of the European conscience.\nJust as the conscience of the medieval age had its genesis in the new\nreligion which superseded the paganism of the ancient world, so did the\ncommon conscience of to-day have its genesis in the new science, the\nnew culture, which in the Renaissance superseded medieval ideas and\ntheological modes of thought. A chief part of our remaining task will\nbe to make plain how the new intellectual life born in the revival of\nthe fifteenth century, and expressing itself since in every department\nof human life, thought, and activity, has reacted upon the moral\nfeelings and judgments of men and taught them to seek the ultimate\nsanctions of a true morality in the deep universal intuitions of the\nhuman heart and conscience.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The decay of feudalism\nand the rise of monarchy: court\nlife]\n\nRunning parallel throughout the later medieval time with the classical\nrevival, whose significance was so great for European morality, there\nwas going on a political and social revolution which exerted an\ninfluence on the ethical evolution only less potent and far-reaching\nthan that of the intellectual movement. During this period the\npetty feudal states in the different countries of Europe were being\ngathered up into larger political units. The principle of monarchy was\neverywhere triumphing over that of feudalism. The multitude of feudal\ncastles, in which had been cradled the knightly ideal of manhood, were\nreplaced by the palaces and courts of rich princes and powerful kings.\nThis meant a great change in the social and political environment of\nthe higher classes.\n\nIn the first place, in these later courts there was a brilliancy\nof life, a culture and a refinement rarely found in the earlier\nfeudal castles. In the next place, the relation which every member\nof the court sustained to the prince or sovereign was fundamentally\ndifferent from that which the vassal had sustained to his lord under\nthe feudal r\u00e9gime. This relation, it is true, was still a personal\none; but independence was gone, and with this were gone the pride and\nself-sufficiency which it engendered. In these princely courts the\nknight became a courtier.\n\nThe effect of these changes in surroundings and relationships upon\nthe standard of conduct was profound, as we shall see when, a little\nfarther on, we come to inquire what were the ethical feelings and\njudgments awakened in this new environment.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The growth of the\ntowns: the workshop and the market\nas molders of morals]\n\nThree institutions--the monastery, the castle, and the town--dominated\nsuccessively the life of the Middle Ages. Each developed a distinct\nethical ideal. The monastery cradled the conscience of the monk; the\ncastle, the conscience of the knight; and the town, the conscience of\nthe burgher.\n\nWhat particular virtues were approved by the moral sense of the town\ndweller we shall note a little farther on. We here merely observe that\nin the atmosphere of the town, in the relationships of the workshop and\nthe market, were nourished the lowly lay virtues of the artisan and\nthe trader, virtues which, though disesteemed by classical antiquity,\nregarded as of subordinate worth by the monk, and held in positive\ncontempt by the knight, were yet to constitute the heart and core of\nthe ethical ideal of the modern world.\n\n\nII. SOME ESSENTIAL FACTS IN THE MORAL HISTORY OF THE AGE\n\n\n[Sidenote: Revival of the\nclassical conception of life:\nthe new birth of the European\nconscience]\n\nWhen Christianity entered the Greco-Roman world with its new moral\nideal, the old classical ideal of character, as we have seen, was\npractically superseded. There were, it is true, certain elements of\nthis pagan morality which were consciously or unconsciously absorbed by\nChristianity; but the classical ideal as a whole was rejected, just as\nthe greater part of the cultural elements of Greco-Roman civilization\nwere cast aside. For a thousand years Hebrew-Christian conceptions of\nthe world and of life shaped the thought and conduct of men. Then came\nthe Renaissance.[697]\n\nIn the study of this movement the attention of the historian has\nordinarily been centered on the literary, artistic, and intellectual\nphases of the revival, while the ethical phase has been given but\nslight attention or has been dismissed with the facile observation that\nthe movement induced a revival of pagan immorality. This is true. But\nthe really significant thing was not the revival of pagan _immorality_\nbut the revival of pagan _morality_. For just as this classical revival\nmeant a new enthusiasm for the artistic, literary, and cultural\nelements of the earlier Greco-Roman civilization, so did it also mean a\nnew enthusiasm for the Greco-Roman ideal of character. To many it was\nno longer the Church ideal but the classical that seemed the embodiment\nof what is ethically most noble and worthy. Such persons gave up the\npractice of the distinctively Christian theological virtues, or,\nif they still outwardly observed the Church code, this was merely\ninsincere conformity suggested by prudence or policy; the code of\nmorals which their minds and hearts approved and which they observed,\nif they observed any at all, was the code of pagan antiquity. It is in\nthis secularization of the ethical ideal, in this divorce of morality\nfrom theology, in this announcement of the freedom and autonomy of the\nindividual spirit, that is to be sought the real significance of the\nclassical revival of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries for the\nmoral history of the Western world.\n\nIn two ways chiefly did the Renaissance exert its transforming\ninfluence upon European morals: first, by awakening a new intellectual\nlife, for, as we have had repeatedly shown us, a new mental life\nmeans a new moral life; and second, by the direct introduction of\nvarious elements of Greco-Roman morals into the Christian ideal of\ncharacter. Thus at the same time that the cultural life of Europe\nwas being enlarged and enriched by the incorporation of those\nliterary and art elements of classical civilization which had been\nrejected or underestimated by the Middle Ages, the moral life of\nChristendom was being profoundly modified by the incorporation of\nthose ethical elements which constituted the precious product of the\nmoral aspirations and achievements of the best generations of the\nancient world. The conscience of those persons in the modern world\nwho are imbued with the true scientific spirit, that is to say, with\nthe humanistic spirit of the Renaissance, is quite as largely Greek\nas Hebraic. A recent writer reviewing the life of a distinguished\npersonage (Julia Ward Howe) recognized this mingling in modern culture\nof these diverse elements in these words: \u201cShe has blended and lived,\nas no other eminent American woman, the humanistic and the Christian\nideals of life. She has preached love and self-sacrifice, and she has\nloved beauty and self-realization.\u201d\n\n\n[Sidenote: Theological morality:\nthe ethics of persecution]\n\nIn the domain of theological morality the history of the Renaissance\naffords one of the most painful chapters in European history. This\nchapter has to do with the establishment of the Inquisition to maintain\nuniformity of religious belief.\n\nIt is not an accident that this chapter should form an integral part of\nthe history of the Renaissance. The spread of heresy, which threatened\nthe unity of the medieval Church, was largely the outgrowth of the new\nintellectual life awakened by the revival of learning.[698] Hence it\nwas inevitable that the age of the Renaissance should be also the age\nof persecution. It is not a recital of the history of the Holy Office\nduring the period under review which is our concern in this place,\nbut only a consideration of the motives of Christian persecution.\nThat intolerance should ever have been regarded by the followers of\nthe tolerant Nazarene as a virtue and persecution of misbelievers as\na pious duty, challenges the attention of the historian of morals and\nincites earnest inquiry into the causes of such an aberration of the\nmoral sentiment.\n\nIt cannot be made a matter of reasonable doubt that one of the chief\ncauses of Christian intolerance is the theological doctrine that\nsalvation is dependent upon right belief in religious matters, and\nthat error in belief, even though honest, is a crime that merits and\nreceives eternal punishment.[699] This dogma leads logically and\ninevitably to intolerance and persecution;[700] for if wrong belief is\na crime of so heinous a nature as justly to subject the misbeliever to\neverlasting and horrible torments, and if the misbeliever is likely to\nbring others into the same fatal way of thinking, then it follows that\nheresy should be extirpated, just as the germs of a dreaded contagion\nare stamped out, by any and every means however seemingly harsh and\ncruel. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas and other theologians logically \u201cargued\nthat if the death penalty could be rightly inflicted on thieves and\nforgers, who rob us only of worldly goods, how much more righteously\non those who cheat us out of supernatural goods--out of faith, the\nsacraments, the life of the soul.\u201d[701]\n\nIt was this theological teaching that heresy is a fault of unmeasured\nsinfulness, an \u201cinsidious preventable contagion,\u201d which was the main\nroot that fostered Christian intolerance and persecution.[702] The\nactivities of the Holy Office were maintained not by bad men but by\ngood men. \u201cWith such men it was not hope of gain, or lust of blood,\nor pride of opinion, or wanton exercise of power [that moved them],\nbut sense of duty, and they but represented what was universal public\nopinion from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century.\u201d[703]\n\nReflecting on these facts, we readily give assent to the charitable\njudgment of the historian Von Holst in commenting on the acts of the\nTerrorists in the French Revolution, that \u201cwrongdoing to others lies\nnot so much in the will as in the understanding.\u201d The greatest crime\nof history was committed by men who knew not what they did.[704] It\nwas a theological doctrine which is to-day rejected by the reason\nand conscience of a large section of the Church itself, that caused\nthe loss for centuries of the virtue of toleration, which in the\nethical systems of the classical world had been assigned a prominent\nplace among the virtues, and which, could it have found a place in\nthe standard of goodness of the Church, would have saved Christendom\nthe horrors of the Albigensian crusades, the pious cruelties of the\nInquisition, and the mutual persecutions of Catholics and Protestants\nthroughout the age of the Reformation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Political morality:\nMachiavellian ethics]\n\nThe matter of dominant importance in the sphere of political morality\nduring the Renaissance was the creation of a code of morals for\nprinces. This was a system formulated by the Italian philosopher\nMachiavelli, who wrote under the secularizing influences of the\nclassical revival and of the paganized courts of the Italian princes of\nhis time.[705] It was a code which the ruling class, for whom it was\ndesigned, eagerly adopted, for the reason that it harmonized with their\ndesires, ambitions, and practices, and sanctioned as not only morally\npermissible, but even as obligatory and meritorious, policies and acts\nwhich, without such sanction, might have awakened in some at least\ninconvenient and hampering scruples of conscience.\n\nThis princely ideal, notwithstanding that the conduct of the prince who\nacted in accordance with it was generally condoned, was not one which,\nlike the ascetic or the knightly ideal, awakened moral enthusiasm. It\nwas a standard of conduct never approved by the best conscience of\nChristendom. On the contrary, the work in which Machiavelli embodied\nthis ideal for princes was, on its first appearance, fiercely assailed\nas grossly immoral, and ever since has called forth the severest\ncondemnation of moralists.\n\nThe fundamental principle of Machiavelli\u2019s system is that the moral\ncode binding on the subject is not binding on the ruler; or rather that\nethics has nothing to do with politics.[706] With the prince the end\njustifies the means. He is at liberty to lie, defraud, steal, and kill,\nin fine, to employ all and every form of deception, injustice, cruelty,\nand unrighteousness in dealing with his enemies and with other princes\nor states.\n\nThis moral standard set for princes by Machiavelli was the dominant\nforce in international affairs from the middle of the sixteenth to the\nmiddle of the seventeenth century. During this period it debased the\npublic morals not only of Italy but of every other land in Christendom.\nIts vicious principles were acted upon by every court of Europe.[707]\nEven to-day Machiavellism, though condemned in theory, is still too\noften followed in practice. It would not be an exaggeration to say that\n_The Prince_ has exercised a more baneful influence over the political\nmorals of Europe than any other book ever written.\n\nIt is instructive to contrast the influence of Machiavellism with that\nof Stoicism. Among the good effects of Roman Stoicism was its ennobling\ninfluence upon the imperial government. It gave the Roman Empire such a\nsuccession of high-minded and conscientious rulers as scarce is shown\nby the history of any other state ancient or modern. In contrast to\nthe influence of this noble philosophy which apotheosized duty and\nexalted in rulers the virtues of clemency, truthfulness, magnanimity,\nand justice, Machiavellism filled, or contributed to fill, the thrones\nof Christendom with rulers whose moral sense was so blunted by its\nsinister doctrines that for generations truth speaking, sincerity,\nregard for the obligations of treaties, and respect for the rights of\nsister states were almost unknown in the diplomacy and mutual dealings\nof the governments of Europe. It is only after the lapse of more than\nthree centuries that Christendom is freeing itself from the evil\ninfluence of Machiavelli\u2019s teachings, and that there has been generated\na new public conscience which recognizes that states like individuals\nare subjects of the moral law, and that the code which is binding on\nindividuals is binding likewise on governments and communities.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical value of\nthe ideal of the courtier]\n\nWe have already mentioned the ideal of the courtier as one of the\nethical or semi-ethical products of the age of the Renaissance. This\nwas a conception of perfect manhood which was nurtured in the socially\nbrilliant and refined courts of the Italian princes of this period. It\nwas a fusion and modification of selected virtues and qualities of the\nknight and of the scholar. The Christian theological virtues had no\nnecessary place in it.\n\nIt was the distinctive virtues of the knight, elevated and refined,\nwhich formed the heart and core of the ideal. Like the ideal of\nknighthood, the courtly ideal was an aristocratic one; the courtier,\nlike the knight, must be \u201cnobly born and of gentle race.\u201d[708] Martial\nexploits were accounted to him as virtues; \u201chis principal and true\nprofession ought to be that of arms.\u201d[709] As loyalty to his superior\nwas a supreme virtue in the knight, so was absolute loyalty to his\nprince the pre-eminent virtue of the courtier. Not less prominent was\nthe place accorded in the ideal to the knightly virtues of courage and\ncourtesy.[710]\n\nBut to these qualities and virtues of the knight the courtier must\nneeds add those of the scholar. The ordinary knight despised learning\nand held the virtues of the scholar in contempt. But the ideal of\ncourtliness grew up in a land where humanistic studies had become a\nruling passion, and in an age when the highest ambition of many an\nItalian prince was to be known as a patron of learning. It was natural\nthat, developing in the atmosphere of these courts, the new standard of\nperfect manhood should give a prominent place to the qualifications and\nvirtues of the scholar.\n\nThis ideal of the courtier was never such a moral force in history\nas that of the monk or of the knight, but there were in it ethical\nelements of positive value to the moral life of the world. It was\nthe inspiration of many of the finest spirits of the sixteenth and\nseventeenth centuries.[711] Of the noble-minded Sir Philip Sidney a\nbiographer says, \u201cHe conscientiously molded his life on the model of\nthe perfect courtier of Cortelliani.\u201d Nor has the ideal ever ceased\nto appeal to the imagination, or lost its power to soften and refine\nmanners and ennoble conduct. It inspires gentle consideration for\nothers of whatsoever estate, incites to unselfish service, and induces\nabsolute good faith and self-forgetting loyalty to friends and to the\ncause espoused, all of which are moral qualities of high value, and all\nof which have entered or are entering as permanent elements into the\ngrowing world ideal of perfect manhood.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethics of industry:\nthe medieval towns the cradle of\nthe modern business conscience]\n\nIn the medieval town was developed a moral ideal as distinct and\nindividual as that of the monastery or of the castle. Central in this\ntype of goodness were the homely virtues of industry, carefulness in\nworkmanship, punctuality, honesty, faithful observance of engagements,\nand general fair dealing. To these lay virtues were added all those\nwhich made up the Church ideal for the ordinary life, for there had not\nyet been effected that divorce of business from theology which had been\neffected in the case of politics.\n\nThe development of this ideal of goodness was a matter of immense\nimportance for the moral life of the West, because, acted upon by the\npractical ethical spirit of Protestantism and other agencies, it was\ndestined to supersede the ascetic and chivalric ideals of life, which\nfor more than a thousand years had been the ruling moral forces in the\nlife of Christendom, for neither of these ideals of goodness could be\nmore than a partial and passing form of the moral life. The ascetic\nideal, having for its distinctive qualities such virtues as celibacy,\npoverty, solitary contemplation, vigils, fastings, and mortifications\nof the body, could not possibly become the standard for all men. It was\nconfessedly a standard of perfection for the few only.\n\nAs to the knightly ideal, this was too exclusively a martial one\nto become the supreme rule of life and conduct for the multitude.\nFurthermore, it was an aristocratic ideal, an ideal for the noble born\nalone. This precluded the possibility of its becoming, as a distinct\ntype, a permanent force in civilization.\n\nBut the ethical type of the towns, embracing those native human virtues\nwhich spring up everywhere out of the usual and universal relationships\nof everyday life and occupations, was sure of a permanent place among\nthe ethical types of the classes and professions of modern society. In\nthe same sense that the medieval towns (as the birthplace of the third\nestate) were the cradle of modern democracy, were they the cradle of\nmodern business morality. Just as through the medieval monastery passes\nthe direct line of descent of the present-day social conscience of\nChristendom,[712] just so through the medieval town passes the direct\nline of descent of the present-day business conscience of the Western\nworld.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Disuse of trial by\nwager of battle]\n\nThe influence of the spirit generated in the medieval towns is seen in\nthat important reform, the abolition of the judicial duel, which was\none of the most noteworthy matters in the moral history of the Middle\nAges.[713]\n\nIt was the military spirit of the German barbarians which, as we have\nseen, was a chief agency in the introduction of the wager of battle\nor trial by combat in the jurisprudence of the European peoples.[714]\nBesides the influence of the towns, a number of other causes concurred\nin gradually effecting the abrogation of this method of settling\ndisputes, among which the most efficient were the opposition of the\nChurch, the revival of the Roman law in the eleventh century, and the\nadvance in general intelligence. Into every one of these agencies there\nentered an ethical element, so that we may regard this great reform, in\nits causes as well as in its effects, as distinctively a moral reform.\nThus the influence of the towns was essentially ethical, for the rise\nof these communities, as we have just seen, meant the superseding\nof the ethics of aristocracy and war by the ethics of democracy and\nindustry. Consequently the influence exerted by the towns was largely\nthat of a new ideal of character.\n\nThe opposition of the Church was motived chiefly by moral feeling,\nthe pontiffs and the bishops who opposed the practice doing so on\nthe ground that the ordeal by battle was \u201cbrutal, unchristian, and\nunrighteous.\u201d\n\nThe advocates of the civil law opposed the practice not only because\nit interfered with the royal and imperial administration of justice,\nbut because it was a practice based on ignorance and superstition and\n\u201cincompatible with every notion of equity and justice,\u201d since brutal\nforce was allowed to usurp the place of testimony and reason. Thus the\nRoman law, as the embodiment of right reason, was here as everywhere\nelse a moral force making for what is reasonable and just.\n\nThe influence of the general progress in enlightenment was also\nprofoundly ethical, since this movement resulted, as intellectual\nadvance always normally does, in a growing refinement of the moral\nfeelings, in progress in moral ideas, and in truer ethical judgments.\n\nBy the opening of the modern age trial by combat, acted on by these\nvarious influences, had become obsolete or obsolescent in most of the\ncountries of Europe.[715] Strangely enough, the international duel or\npublic war, resting on substantially the same basis as the private\njudicial duel, has held its place as the instituted and legalized\nmethod of settling controversies between nations down to the present\ntime, without, till just yesterday, being seriously challenged by the\nawakening conscience of the world as equally repugnant to the moral law\nand incompatible with every principle of reason, humanity, and justice.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\nETHICS OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION\n\n\nI. PRINCIPLES OF THE REFORMATION OF ETHICAL IMPORT\n\n\n[Sidenote: Principle of the\nself-sovereignty of the individual\nas the ultimate authority in\nmorals]\n\nIn its essential principle the Protestant Reformation was a protest\nagainst the principle of authority in the realm of the spirit. It\nproclaimed the right of individual judgment in matters of religion\nand morals. There was in this proclamation an ethical implication of\nrevolutionary significance. It was a recognition of the truth \u201cthat\nduty in the last analysis is imposed upon the individual ... by\nhimself; that there is no authority in moral matters more ultimate than\na man\u2019s rational conviction of what is best.\u201d[716]\n\nOf all the agencies which during recent times have been at work\nmoralizing morality and creating for the moral life a permanent\nand indestructible basis in reason and conscience, this Protestant\nprinciple of the autonomy of the individual soul in the spiritual\ndomain has been one of the most efficient and pervasive.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The principle of\nsalvation by right belief]\n\nThough the chief significance of the Protestant revolution and\nits ultimate import for morality lay in this assertion of the\nself-sovereignty of the individual, still the full ethical consequences\nof this revolutionary principle did not become clearly manifest till\nafter the lapse of more than three centuries.\n\nThroughout the earlier periods of the Reformation era the moral\nevolution in Protestant lands was influenced less by the announcement\nof this principle than by that of certain other principles less\nfundamentally important, or by certain minor modifications effected\nby the reformers in the body of doctrines and practices of the Roman\nCatholic Church.\n\nAmong these principles was that of salvation by faith, which meant\npractically salvation by right belief. This was no new principle in\nChristian theology. The Church had always insisted upon acceptance\nof the main articles of its creed as necessary to salvation. But by\nreason of the emphasis which had been placed upon the doctrine of the\nmeritoriousness of works, many had come to believe, and to act upon\nthe belief, that a man is justified by what he does. The assertion\nof the doctrine of justification through faith alone had important\nconsequences for morality, since it implied the denial of the ethical\nvalue of works, which meant specifically the repudiation of the\nprinciples of asceticism, on which the monastic system rested, as well\nas the rejection of the doctrine of purgatory, which afforded basis\nand sanction for a considerable part of the moral code of the medieval\nChurch.\n\n\nII. SOME IMPORTANT MORAL OUTCOMES OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY RELIGIOUS\nREFORM\n\n\n[Sidenote: The reform movement\nre\u00ebnforces the ethical tendencies\nof the Renaissance]\n\nThough the immediate results of the Reformation were disastrous\nto Humanism, the ultimate effect of the religious movement was to\nre\u00ebnforce the true ethical tendencies of the intellectual revival. As\nwe have seen, the thing of deepest import for morals in the Renaissance\nof the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was the announcement of\nthe freedom and self-dependence of the individual spirit, since such\nself-sovereignty is the prerequisite of a true and vital morality.\nLikewise the essential proclamation of the Reformation was the\nautonomy of the individual in matters religious and moral. It is true\nthat the reformers, though proclaiming liberty of conscience, the\nright of individual judgment, did not, as has already been said, at\nonce recognize all the ethical implications of this principle. \u201cThe\nReformation,\u201d as Dr. Arnold truly observes, \u201cwas weak in that it never\nconsciously grasped or applied the central idea of the Renaissance--the\nHellenic idea of pursuing, in all lines of activity, the law and\nscience, to use Plato\u2019s words, of things as they really are.\u201d[717]\n\nBut the assertion of the right of individual judgment in matters\nreligious and moral was bound sooner or later to lead to the\nrecognition of the duty of inquiry, of investigation of the law and\nscience of things as they really are, and of absolute loyalty to the\ntruth when found. The final outcome within the Church of this new\nmental attitude has been the \u201cHigher Criticism,\u201d which is simply the\ncontinuation by modern scholars within the reformed denominations\nof the scientific criticism of the Bible begun by the distinguished\nhumanist Erasmus. In this remoter issue of the Reformation the\nessential oneness of its spirit with that of the Renaissance is\nrevealed, and the ground for the assertion that the ultimate moral\nresults of the religious reform were a re\u00ebnforcement of the deepest\nethical tendencies of the intellectual revival is disclosed.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Substitution of an\ninerrant Book for an inerrant\nChurch]\n\nHad all the implications of the principle of the right of individual\njudgment in matters of religion and morals been seen and frankly\naccepted by the reformers of the sixteenth century, the Protestant\nrevolution would have effected at once the transfer of morality from\na supernatural to a natural basis. But for an inerrant Church the\nreformers substituted an inerrant Book, which every one should accept\nas an infallible guide and rule of conduct. The ultimate sanctions\nof morality were still looked for in the historic past, in an outer\nrevelation and an outer authority. Consequently the moral ideal of\nProtestantism retained the essentially theological, supernatural\ncharacter of the ideal of Roman Catholicism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: New ranking of virtues\nin the moral type]\n\nBut the changes effected by the reformers in the body of the teachings\nof the old Church resulted necessarily in a certain displacement and\nshifting of the virtues in the moral type, and in a new estimation\nof ethical values. Various virtues or duties hitherto regarded as\nessential to excellence of character were assigned a lower place in\nthe rank of virtues or were excluded altogether from the ideal, while\nnew moral qualities or attributes were added, the outcome being what\nwe must regard as a new moral type. In the following pages we shall\ncomment briefly upon the more important of the changes effected in\nseveral domains of the religious-ethical life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Protestantism brings\ninto disesteem the monastic ideal]\n\nWe proceed now to notice some of the immediate and special moral\neffects of the Reformation. In the first place Protestantism\ndiscredited the monastic type of goodness. The meritoriousness of\ncelibacy was denied. The austerities of the ascetic were declared to be\nnot only useless but positively wrong. Instead of being an object of\nprofound veneration and homage, the saint of medieval times became to\nthe Protestant reformers an object of the deepest moral detestation.\n\nThe immediate consequences of this change in men\u2019s conceptions of what\nconstitutes the highest moral excellence was that throughout one half\nof Europe the monasteries, which the religious-moral enthusiasm of the\nearlier centuries of Christianity had created, were dismantled and\nrazed to the ground, and an institution which had dominated Christian\nEurope for a thousand years was suppressed in all the northern lands.\n\nThis revolution, we believe, effected on the whole a great gain for\nmorality and marked a forward movement in the moral evolution of\nthe Western world; but at the same time it must be recognized that\nthe destruction of this system, which throughout a full historical\nperiod had fostered some of the most admirable of Christian virtues\nand nurtured unnumbered saintly lives, resulted in the exclusion\nof valuable ethical elements from the moral life of Protestant\ncommunities. There are types of character nourished by the conventual\nsystem that society can ill afford to spare. Very few will dissent\nfrom Lecky\u2019s view that \u201cin the Sisters of Charity the religious orders\nof Catholicism have produced one of the most perfect of all types of\nwomanhood.\u201d[718]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Effects upon industrial\nmorals of the dissolution of the\nmonasteries]\n\nIn destroying monasticism the Protestant reformers destroyed an\nanti-industrial type of character, and thus helped to clear the\nground for the great industrial development which during the last\nthree centuries has given a new aspect and outlook to civilization.\nThe reformed Church gave prominence to the active masculine virtues\nas opposed to the passive feminine virtues exalted by the conventual\nsystem. Hence it was more favorable than the old Church to the\ndevelopment of civilization on its material side. It hardly admits\nof doubt that in these opposed tendencies of the ethical ideals of\nthe two churches is to be sought one cause of the amazing contrast,\nindustrially viewed, long observed between the distinctively Protestant\nand the distinctively Catholic countries of Europe. It is true that\nthe line of demarcation once so observable is now becoming blurred,\nand that modern industrialism with its ideal of industrial virtues is\nfast becoming equally characteristic of all lands of advancing culture,\nwhether Protestant, Catholic, or pagan.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Effects upon morals of\nthe abolition of purgatory]\n\nThe Protestant denial of the Catholic doctrine of purgatory, which\nfollowed as a direct logical result of the reformers\u2019 doctrine of\njustification by faith, had consequences for morality no less positive\nthan those that followed the denial of the Catholic teaching of the\nmeritoriousness of the ascetic life.\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that the doctrine of purgatory, conceived as\npart of a system of future rewards and punishments, has exerted on\nthe whole an influence favorable to morality. But the institution\nlends itself easily to misuse. In the Middle Ages the doctrine of\nindulgences was applied to souls in purgatory, and the shortening\nof the period of their suffering there made dependent not alone\nupon the prayers of their friends on earth, but often practically\nupon the payment of sums of money, designated as alms to the poor\nor gifts to the Church. The forgiveness of sins was thus too often\nmade a commercial transaction. Thus the doctrine of purgatory, beyond\ncontroversy, contributed essentially to that despiritualizing of\nreligion and that deadening in wide circles of the moral sense which\ncharacterized the later medieval period and which, through inevitable\nreaction, helped to provoke the Protestant revolt.\n\nThe effect upon morals of the abolition of purgatory by the reformers\nwas immediate and far-reaching. Many specific duties were at once\ndropped from the moral code. Prayers for the dead ceased to be a\npious duty; they were not even morally permissible. Furthermore, the\nperformance of such good works as the making of pilgrimages and the\ngiving of alms for the benefit of souls in purgatory not only ceased to\nbe regarded as meritorious, but came to be looked upon as positively\nwrong. Besides these direct ethical consequences of the abolition of\npurgatory there were indirect ethical results which we shall notice in\nanother connection.[719]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Effects of the\nreligious reform upon the virtue\nof toleration[720]]\n\nUltimately the Reformation, largely through the outworkings of the\nprinciple of the right of private judgment in matters of conscience,\nwas destined to foster the growth of the important virtue of\ntoleration. But throughout the first three centuries of Protestantism,\nowing mainly to the great emphasis laid by the reformers on the\ndoctrine of the supreme ethical value of correctness of religious\nbelief, this principle of the right of private judgment exerted\nlittle appreciable influence upon the moral evolution. Holding fast\nto the doctrine of the criminality of wrong belief, the new Church\nlike the old was necessarily intolerant. It regarded heresy with\ndread, looked upon toleration as a fault, and, whenever circumstances\nfavored, engaged in persistent and unrelenting persecution to maintain\nuniformity of religious belief. It was not till late in the modern\nperiod that religious toleration came generally to be recognized by the\nProtestant conscience as a virtuous disposition of supreme worth.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\nTHE MORAL EVOLUTION SINCE THE INCOMING OF DEMOCRACY: THE NEW SOCIAL AND\nINTERNATIONAL CONSCIENCE\n\n\nI. FORCES DETERMINING THE TREND OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT\n\n\n[Sidenote: The incoming of\ndemocracy]\n\nOf all the forces which since the rise of Christianity have given\nfresh impulse to the ethical movement inaugurated by the new religion,\nnone has exerted a greater influence than modern democracy. This is so\nbecause in its essential spirit democracy is at one with Christianity.\nIt is merely \u201ca principle which continues ... over a wider range of\ninstitutions the same principle as Christianity introduced.\u201d[721] It\nextends the Christian principle of equality from the spiritual to the\npolitical, the social, and the economic domain. It makes all men equal\nbefore C\u00e6sar as well as before God.\n\nAnd like Christianity, democracy extends the range of persons who are\nbrothers until not only all classes within the same state but all\npeoples and races are included. \u201cIn the democratic union of nations,\u201d\nin the words of Lecky, \u201cwe find the last and highest expression of the\nChristian ideal of the brotherhood of mankind.\u201d[722]\n\nIt is this identity of the essential spirit of democracy with the\nessential spirit of Christianity which makes the incoming of democracy\na revolution of such supreme importance in the moral history of the\nworld. To truly democratize society, as to truly christianize it, is to\nmoralize it.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Modern inventions and\nthe new industrialism]\n\n\u201cThe causes,\u201d observes Lecky, \u201cwhich most disturbed or accelerated\nthe moral progress of society in antiquity were the appearance of\ngreat men; in modern times they have been the appearance of great\ninventions.\u201d[723]\n\nIn no department of morals, save the international, have modern\ninventions exerted a greater influence than in the department of\nindustrial ethics. In this sphere these inventions have reacted on\nmorals in two ways: first, they have changed fundamentally for the\nmasses in all civilized lands the economic conditions of life, which\nconditions, as we have seen, are the great molders of morals; and\nsecond, through the changes they have wrought in the processes of\nproduction, and through the immense development they have given to the\nwhole industrial system, they have caused principles and institutions\nonce just and beneficent in their outworkings to become instruments of\ninequity and oppression, and have thus awakened new moral judgments\nrespecting these maxims and conventions. The growth of these new\nethical feelings and convictions constitute an important part, perhaps\n_the_ most important part, of the moral history of recent times. They\nare the motive force in several of the most significant moral movements\nof to-day in the industrial world. Pre\u00ebminently true is this of the\npresent-day labor movement. \u201cIts form,\u201d as Professor Peabody says, \u201cis\neconomic, but its motives are moral. It is an effort--often blind and\ngroping, sometimes pitifully misdirected, yet none the less proceeding\nfrom the conscience of the time--to shape economic life into an\ninstrument of social justice and peace.\u201d[724] Socialism, too, with all\nits ethical aspirations and enthusiasms, is in large part a product of\nthe new industrialism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of\nevolution]\n\nNot less disturbing to morals than the political and industrial\nrevolutions has been the revolution in scientific thought effected by\nthe doctrine of evolution. This theory has been not only a powerful\ndissolvent of a large part of the body of medieval theology and hence\nof that part of morality dependent upon this system of thought, but,\nthrough the dominant place which this interpretation of the cosmic\nprocess assigns to the self-regarding motives, it has exercised in wide\ncircles of society an unfavorable influence upon morals by seeming to\ngive nature\u2019s sanction to self-assertive, antisocial conduct. There\nare drifts in both the public and the private morality of the last\nhalf century which, as we shall see, find their explanation in the\ndisturbance of ethical values created by the general acceptance of the\nDarwinian theory of progress through \u201cthe survival of the fittest.\u201d\nBut we shall also see this same theory, better interpreted in its\nprofoundest intimations, giving strong support to the best ethical\ninstincts of humanity and supplying new incentives and encouragement to\nhumanitarian endeavor.\n\n\n[Sidenote: General intellectual\nprogress]\n\nThe moral history of the Western world since the Renaissance affords\na striking illustration of the dependence of progress in morals upon\nprogress in general intelligence. It is undoubtedly true that, fostered\nby a free press, by the public-school system, and by various other\nagencies, the average of intelligence in the modern democratic state\nis higher than it was in any of the states--save possibly in some of\nthe small city states of Greece--of ancient or medieval times. This\nnew intellectual life, speaking broadly, has reacted favorably upon\nthe moral life. It has dispelled superstition, destroyed prejudices,\nwidened the outlook of men, and broadened their moral sympathies. In a\nword, the seeing of life and things as they really are has tended to\nclarify the moral sense and to render clearer and truer the vision of\nthe ethical ideal.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The decline of dogmatic\ntheology]\n\nThe body of hereditary ethical convictions and judgments upon which\nmodern influences have been especially at work was, as has been seen,\nshaped and molded largely by theology. Hence nothing has influenced\nmore positively the moral evolution in recent times than the profound\nmodification which, during the period, has taken place in men\u2019s\nreligious beliefs. Under the influence of advancing intelligence, of\nevolutionary science, of ever closer relations between the different\nraces and nations, and the resulting contact and comparison of\ndifferent religions, there has gone on a rapid disintegration of old\ncreeds. The effect of this upon many has been the elimination from\ntheir moral code of all purely theological elements, the erection of a\nnew standard of moral values, and the adoption of an ideal of character\nwhich may best be described as being in the main a composite of Greek\nand gospel ethics.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Growing intimacy of\ninternational relations]\n\nThe dependence of moral progress in modern times upon inventions, as\nLecky observes, is shown perhaps even more strikingly in the domain of\ninternational than in that of industrial ethics. As in antiquity it\nwas the world-wide extension of the Roman rule through conquest which\nbroke the primal isolation of the Mediterranean peoples and created\nthat cosmopolitanism in life and thought from which arose the ethical\nuniversalism characterizing the cultured circles of Roman society in\nthe later centuries of the Empire, so in this modern age it is the\ngreat inventions of the steamship, the steam railway, the electric\ntelegraph, the ocean cable, the telephone, wireless telegraphy, and\nthe rest, which have broken the isolation of the nations, bound them\ntogether by a thousand commercial, social, and intellectual ties,\nand created that cosmopolitanism in life and thought from which have\nnaturally sprung those ethical feelings and convictions which form the\ngrowing international conscience of to-day.\n\nThus it is that inventions, whose aims were primarily to promote\ncivilization on its material side, have become the most efficient\nagencies in creating a sense of ethical oneness among the nations, and\nthus in opening a new epoch in the moral evolution of mankind.\n\n\nII. EXPRESSIONS OF THE NEW MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN DIFFERENT DOMAINS OF\nLIFE AND THOUGHT\n\n\n_1. The Ethics of Democracy_\n\n\n[Sidenote: The democratic\nrevolution a moral movement]\n\nThe great history-making upheavals and readjustments in human society\nare moral in their causes as well as in their effects. They arise from\na divergence between what _is_ and what _ought to be_. The democratic\nrevolution which began in France in 1789 affirms with emphasis the\ncorrectness of this ethical interpretation of the great passages of\nhuman history. What superficially viewed appears to have been primarily\na political or economic revolution was in truth, in its deepest\nmotives and impulses, a moral revolution. \u201cIt was moral enthusiasm\nfor the rights of man ... and not the breakdown of an economic\nsystem, which created modern democracy.\u201d[725] The watchwords of the\nRevolution--Liberty, Equality, Fraternity--are all words of moral\nimport. They are tremulous with righteous wrath at age-long oppression,\ncontempt, and abuse; and they are instinct with the living forces of a\nnoble moral ideal. They express the essential spirit of the Revolution,\nwhich each day, where it has free course, finds fuller embodiment in\npolitical, social, and moral reforms, in humanitarian institutions and\naltruistic effort.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethics of democracy\nrejects class morality]\n\nDemocracy tends in various ways to purify and ennoble morality, but\nespecially by destroying all invidious class distinctions, and thereby\ndestroying that class morality which through all periods of history has\nhampered the moral progress of the race. All the civilizations known\nto history before the incoming of modern democracy had their superior\nclass, including only the few, who alone were regarded as possessing\ncapacity for the highest virtues; and their inferior classes, embracing\nthe many,--sudras, slaves, or serfs,--persons regarded as created\nfor the use of others and capable of nothing more than a qualified or\nservile morality.\n\nNow democracy, recognizing \u201chuman capacities in all and not merely in a\nfew,\u201d throws down the partition walls between classes and puts all on\nthe same level of opportunity and privilege. It thus establishes the\nconditions of a common moral life and of a progressive moral evolution;\nfor if history teaches any truth, it teaches that a civilization\ndominated by a privileged class that uses the masses selfishly or\nthoughtlessly for the enhancement of its own interests and pleasures\nis foredoomed to moral stagnation and decadence--so true is it that\nsociety is an organic body and that if one member suffers the whole\nbody suffers with it.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical import of\neducation by the state]\n\nAgain, democracy has deep significance for morality on account of its\nrelation to education. Despotic bureaucratic monarchy is indifferent or\npositively opposed to the education of the masses because the safest\nbasis of such a government is sodden ignorance. On the other hand,\ngeneral intelligence is the very breath of life of a democracy. Hence\nthe education of the masses is the foremost task of the modern free\nstate. The public-school system of the modern world is the outcome of\nthis imperious demand of democracy.\n\nNow this relation of the democratic state to popular education has\nimmense importance for the moral life, first, for the reason that\nadvance in general intelligence means a better maintenance of the moral\nstandard. To increase the number of schools in a community is to lessen\nthe need of prisons and reformatories. More than a century ago Beccaria\nprevisioned this relation of popular education to crime. \u201cThe most\ncertain method of preventing crime,\u201d he maintained, \u201cis to perfect the\nsystem of education.\u201d[726]\n\nAnd second, education in the modern democratic state has special\nsignificance for the moral development going on in Western\ncivilization, for the reason that it means not merely a better\nmaintenance of the moral standard, but also an essential modification\nof the moral type itself. For in the establishment of its system of\neducation the state has assumed what formerly was one of the chief\nfunctions of the Church. This transference of the business of education\nfrom the Church to the state has rightly been pronounced \u201cone of the\nmost important movements in the history of education since the Dark\nAges.\u201d What renders it of such importance in the view of the historian\nof morals is that, in the hands of the state, education has become or\nis becoming wholly secularized. In some countries even the reading of\nthe Bible in the schools or the giving of any religious instruction\nwhatsoever is prohibited.\n\nNow this secularization of education results inevitably in the\nsecularization of morality. That portion of the moral code which\nderives its sanction from theological or special religious doctrines\nis neglected. Thus one outcome of the transfer of the function of\neducation from the Church to the state has been the imparting of a\nfresh impulse to that naturalistic movement in morals whose point of\ndeparture was the classical revival of the fifteenth century. And thus\nthe three dominant movements in modern European civilization--the\nRenaissance, the Reformation (in its ultimate effects), and the\ndemocratic revolution--have all worked together in determining the\ngeneral trend of the moral evolution in the Western world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The democratic state\nassumes the social-ethical\nfunctions of the Church]\n\nThe ethical import of the incoming of democracy is shown again in\nthe assumption by the democratic state of the philanthropic work of\nsociety. Throughout the Middle Ages the Church was the almoner of\nsociety, the builder of hospitals, asylums, and poorhouses. Since the\nadvent of democracy much of this humanitarian work has, like education,\nbeen taken over by the state. This assumption by the state of these\nformer functions of the Church is one of the most noteworthy ethical\nmovements in modern history.[727] What makes it significant is, first,\nthe fact that the work is undertaken by modern governments largely\nfrom purely philanthropic motives. This means that with the coming to\npolitical power of the people a new spirit has entered into government,\nwhich means, further, that those altruistic sentiments which it has\nbeen a chief function of religion to foster have come to inspire\nsociety at large.\n\nAnd second, this assumption by the state of the philanthropic functions\nof the Church is significant because of what has made its undertaking\nof these tasks necessary. This necessity has arisen not merely by\nreason of the possession by the state of the taxing power and hence\nof the means needed for carrying on this humanitarian work, but also\nbecause of its relation to modern science. Much of this work of rescue\nand cure is dependent for its successful administration upon scientific\nknowledge and skill. It is largely because the state is in closer\nalliance than the Church with modern science, and therefore is the more\nefficient agent for carrying on this humanitarian work, that society\nmakes it, instead of the Church, its chief almoner and trustee.\n\n\n_2. The Ethics of Industrialism_\n\n\n[Sidenote: The alliance of modern\nindustry and science]\n\nA distinctive characteristic of modern industry is its alliance with\nscience. This union dates from the French Revolution. One aim of\nthe revolutionists was to put exact knowledge at the service of the\nindustrial arts, and, by thus increasing the productive forces of\nsociety, to create an abundance for all, banish poverty from the earth,\nand advance civilization to a higher point than ever before reached.\n\nAnd this alliance of industry and science has, in so far as mere\nproduction is concerned, more than met every expectation. Through\nthe application of inventions and scientific knowledge to the\nvarious industrial processes, society\u2019s powers of production have\nbeen increased threefold, tenfold, fifty-fold, in some arts even a\nthousandfold. Surely now all will be fed and clothed and sheltered.\n\nBut this vision of a millennium of well-being for all as the result of\nthe union of science and industry has not come true. The great mass of\nthe world\u2019s toilers are underfed, ill-clad, and improperly housed. From\nthe slums, from the dark and noisome tenements of our great cities,\narises the bitter cry of children, ragged, wan, and hungry, robbed\nthrough the parents\u2019 poverty of every delight and right of childhood.\n\u201cThe poverty of the workers,\u201d cries Henry Demarest Lloyd in passionate\nprotest, \u201cis the sin of our age.\u201d[728]\n\n\n[Sidenote: The divorce of modern\nindustry and ethics: economic\nMachiavellism]\n\nThe causes of this pitiful failure of the new industrialism,\nnotwithstanding its capacity for enormous production, to provide for\nthe wants of all is not far to seek. Our age, while uniting science\nand business, has divorced ethics and business, just as in the time of\nthe Renaissance in Italy there was effected a divorce of ethics and\npolitics. Political economists have taught that ethics has nothing\nto do with economics. And this economic Machiavellism of the schools\nhas not been merely an academic thing; it has probably exerted as\nsinister an influence upon the modern industrial order as the political\ndoctrines of Machiavelli exerted upon the diplomacy and governmental\npolicies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Dominated by this\nphilosophy our business life has become frankly unmoral--large sections\nof it grossly immoral.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The breakdown of the\nsystem]\n\nBut economics and ethics can no more be divorced than politics and\nethics. Machiavellism has succeeded no better in economics than in\npolitics. \u201cThe system based on [this philosophy] is breaking down\nall over, in strikes, riots, panics, gluts, unemployed idleness, and\nclass murder. It is breaking down not because the task of getting\nplenty for the body--and the soul--for every one out of the fruitful\nearth and the fellowship of man is an impossible task, but because the\ntask is an impossible one of accomplishment--that or anything else in\nhuman affairs--by the devil\u2019s code of selfishness instead of love, of\nsolitary advantage instead of the good of all. By such a philosophy\nthere could be no government, no family; and if it continues, there\nwill ere long be no business. But it cannot continue.\u201d[729]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Reforms whose aims are\nthe moralization of the industrial\norder: (_a_) socialization of the\nunearned increment in land values]\n\nIt cannot continue because there is a fast-growing conviction of the\nfalsity of the philosophy of economic Machiavellism--an ever-growing\nrecognition of the truth that the relationships of men in business,\nlike all other human relationships, are conditioned by the moral law\nof human brotherhood. There are profound changes taking place in the\nmoral feelings and judgments of men respecting many of the customs,\nprinciples, and institutions of the modern industrial order. There is\na growing recognition of the fact that though these conventions and\narrangements may in past periods of history have been promotive of\nhuman welfare and therefore moral, they are, as applied to the more\ncomplex social and economic relations of modern society, the very\nembodiment of unreason and injustice.\n\nAmong the economic institutions respecting which there is taking place\nsuch a change in moral judgment is that of absolute private property\nin land. Although this is an institution unknown to primitive peoples,\nin all the great civilizations of the past we find society based upon\nit. That the system, since it inevitably results in private monopoly,\nhas contributed largely to the creation of that gross inequality in\nwealth which has characterized every advanced civilization known to\nhistory, and which has helped to prepare its downfall, does not admit\nof reasonable doubt. The monopolization of land by a class has been one\nsource, and probably a main source, of the phenomenon in modern society\nof deepening poverty in the midst of growing wealth, of dehumanizing\nwant for the many along with demoralizing luxury for the few. That in\ncountries of large and thickening population a private monopoly in\nthe arable land is the embodiment of a colossal and cruel wrong is\nincontrovertible. That a single class should be allowed to become the\nabsolute owners of the soil and thereby acquire the legal right to\nexclude all others from it save on the condition that practically all\nthat can be got from it by the hardest toil, save just enough for the\nbare subsistence of the laborer, shall be given over as rent to the\nholder of the land, is as great a moral wrong as to take directly from\nthe worker the product of his toil by reducing him to bodily slavery.\nIt is this gross inequity which has made the history of many countries,\nlike much of the history of Ireland, a harrowing tragedy. The wrong, if\nnot greater, is at least more obvious when the land thus monopolized\nis the site of a great city where the enormous ground values have been\ncreated not by any labor or expenditure on the part of the owners, but\nby the growth and enterprise of the community as a whole.\n\nJust as the world has got a new conscience in regard to the wrong of\nslavery, so is it getting a new conscience in regard to this \u201cgreat\niniquity,\u201d as Tolstoy calls it, of private monopoly in land. This\ngrowing ethical conviction will ultimately destroy the illusion that\nthe earth and its resources may, without moral wrong, be monopolized by\na fortunate or favored few and the great masses be dispossessed.[730]\nThe new conscience will decree that all of nature\u2019s gifts in land and\nall increments in its value created by society shall belong to society\nand shall be the common heritage of the successive generations of men.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) Limitation of\ninheritance]\n\nAnother of the conventions of our industrial system in which the moral\nsense of mankind is beginning to recognize an element of inequity is\nthe right of unlimited inheritance. So long as land remains the common\nproperty of the community, or so long as there exists substantial\nequality in wealth among the members or families of a social group,\nthe injustice of this is not apparent. But after great extremes of\npoverty and wealth have appeared, as in present-day civilization, then\nthe essential injustice of the institution is disclosed; for there is\nthus created an idle class living on the labor of others. When a single\nchild through the accident of birth becomes the heir of millions, while\nhundreds of other children come into the world absolutely portionless\nand at the same time shut out from the use of any bit of the earth\neven as standing room, then the system becomes a crass denial of human\nsolidarity and brotherhood. And there is in this law of unlimited\nbequest a double wrong. The child of over-great wealth is wronged\nas well as the child of poverty. One is born to a life of luxurious\nleisure, and the other to a life of unremitting toil. Now, as Professor\nDewey observes, there is moral value in work and there is moral value\nin leisure, but \u201cit is beginning to be seen that their values cannot be\ndivided so that one social class shall perform the labor and the other\nenjoy the freedom.\u201d[731]\n\nTherefore the ethical demand for the modification of our laws of\ninheritance in such a way that they shall recognize the social as\nwell as the individual element in wealth must be heeded as much out\nof regard for the children of the overrich as out of regard for the\nchildren of the very poor.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) Socialism: the\ndemocratization of industry]\n\nStill another institution of modern industrialism which has come or is\ncoming under the reprobation of the present-day conscience of a rapidly\ngrowing number is private capitalism, that is, private ownership of\nthe instruments of production, together with competition and the wage\nsystem, the necessary concomitants of this capitalistic r\u00e9gime. These\nnew ethical feelings and convictions form the real motive force in the\npropaganda of modern socialism. The presupposition of socialism is that\nnot merely ground rents but all returns (interest, dividends, profits)\non every form of private capital embody an unearned increment, and that\nthis element should determine the ownership and control of capital.\nHence socialists demand that all the material instruments of production\nnow owned by individuals or by a class shall be held in common; that\nthere shall be common, democratic management of production; that\ncompetition, as inherently unethical,[732] shall be replaced by\nco\u00f6peration; and that the wage system shall be replaced by a system of\ndistribution by public authority which shall give the manual workers of\nthe world a more equitable share of the products of industry.\n\nSocialism embodies one of the largest funds of ethical feeling that\nhave become active in Western civilization since the incoming of\nChristianity. In truth, in its real essence and purified form it\nis the spirit of primitive Christianity at work in the industrial\ndomain. It is a recognition of human fraternity. It is an effort to\nunite economics and ethics, to make business life a realization of the\nmoral ideal. The aim of true socialists is to make the benefits of\nscience, invention, and civilization a common heritage. They recognize\nthat society can continuously progress only as these benefits become\nthe possession not merely of a few but of all. In the disregard of\nthis immutable law of human progress they discern the main cause of\nthe retrogression, decay, and failure of every great civilization of\nthe past; in its solicitous fulfillment they find the only ground of\nhope for the constant improvement of human society as a whole and the\nuninterrupted moral progress of the world.\n\n\n_3. The Ethics of Modern Science_\n\n\n[Sidenote: Science and the virtue\nof intellectual sincerity]\n\nWe have already referred to the influence of modern science upon\nmorals. This influence has been felt in the fostering of specific\nvirtues and in the creation of a certain attitude of mind toward life\nand its ethical problems.\n\nAmong the particular virtues which science has fostered is\nphilosophical veracity or love of truth. This virtue of intellectual\nsincerity is to the scientist what the virtue of faith or belief is\nto the churchman. Without it there is no salvation in the world of\nscience. The man of science must be a truth-lover, a truth-seeker, and\na truth-teller. He must take every pains to find out what is the exact\nfact, and then make a scrupulously veracious report of what he has\nfound. He must be loyal to the truth at all hazards.\n\nThis reverent regard for the truth, this intellectual sincerity, which\nis the cardinal virtue of the man of science, is fostered in him\npartly by the recognition of the supreme importance of exactness when\nit comes to the application of scientific knowledge to the arts of\nlife. The least departure here from the truth of the matter means dire\ndisaster and loss. Then also the veraciousness of nature reacts upon\nthe student of her laws. Nature is not only infinitely exact in all her\nmovements, but punctual in the fulfillment of all her engagements. She\nkeeps her word with us, as Emerson says. She is the same yesterday,\nto-day, and forever. The careless, unveracious man can enter into no\npartnership with her.\n\nOpen-mindedness and impartiality are elements of this virtue of\nintellectual veracity. The wide divergence between philosophical and\ntheological morality is here impressed upon the student of moral ideals\nand standards. In the ethics of theology doubt, even sincere doubt, is\nreckoned as an unfortunate infirmity, or often as positive and fatal\nsin. Science, on the other hand, reckons it a cardinal duty. Hardening\noneself in belief when there are circumstances calculated to awaken\ndoubt, even the slightest conceivable doubt, is justly regarded by the\nman of science as treachery to truth and an unpardonable sin.\n\nIt is in the creation of this scientific conscience, which pronounces\nthe habit of accuracy, open-mindedness, impartiality of judgment, love\nof truth for truth\u2019s sake a supreme virtue, that science has rendered\none of its greatest services to morality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Egotistic tendencies\nof the doctrine of evolution: the\nphilosophy of Nietzsche]\n\nThe scientific doctrine of evolution, which teaches that life has\nadvanced from lower to higher forms through struggle and competition,\nresulting in the survival of the fittest, has exercised a profound\ninfluence upon all the sciences relating to man, but upon none has it\nleft a deeper impress than upon the science of ethics.[733] Nor have\nits effects here been confined to ethical speculation; it has largely\nshaped and molded actual conduct.\n\nIn some respects this influence has been harmful to both ethical theory\nand practice. In the domain of philosophy it may best be traced in the\nteachings of Nietzsche. Nietzsche insists that man must follow the lead\nof nature; that the struggle for existence must be kept up on the human\nplane just as it goes on in the lower realms of life; that the strong\nshould use for their own advancement the weak; that the nurture and\ncare of the defective and weak is a crime against humanity[734]--for\n\u201cthe hope of the future lies in perfecting the strong, not in\nstrengthening the weak\u201d; that only through the struggle for existence\nhas nature produced her highest type, man, and that it is only through\nobedience to this great cosmic law, in accordance with which the higher\nprey upon the lower, that \u201cthe superman,\u201d the highest possible type of\nmankind, can be brought into existence.\n\nThis teaching tends to steel the heart against human sympathy and to\nblunt all the finer sensibilities. It seems to justify and excuse all\nkinds of antisocial action. And, indeed, the doctrine has been used as\na justification and excuse not only of individual self-assertion and\negotism but of national and race self-assertion and egotism as well.\nModern imperialism has sought to justify aggression upon weaker and\nso-called \u201cinferior races\u201d by an appeal to this law of evolution as it\nworks on the lower levels of life. Thus the doctrine has in a certain\nmeasure fostered national egotism, and has stood right in the way of\nthe development of a true international morality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Altruism _versus_\negotism in the cosmic process]\n\nBut these drifts toward egotism in modern philosophy and life induced\nby evolutionary science are more than compensated by opposing movements\nof ethical thought created by a truer interpretation of the facts of\nevolution and a deeper insight into the cosmic process.[735]\n\nThe philosophy of Nietzsche is a strange misreading of nature. To say\nthat self-sacrifice is \u201cin open defiance of nature,\u201d is to overlook\nthe dominant fact in evolution, namely, maternity; for maternity,\nmotherhood, is only another name for self-sacrifice. And it is further\nto overlook the fact that the principle of co\u00f6peration is even more\ndominant and controlling in the cosmic process than the principle of\ncompetition. Social animals, those in which the altruistic instincts\nare most strongly developed, greatly outnumber the unsocial, solitary\nanimals.[736] The Carnivora, those animals that live by preying upon\nothers, are becoming extinct. On the plane of human life this principle\nof co\u00f6peration, of mutual helpfulness, has supplanted, or is gradually\nsupplanting, the lower principle of competition. In the struggle\nfor existence between tribes and peoples those groups have gained\nsupremacy that have developed the strongest social instincts; that is,\nthose within which the principle of co\u00f6peration and the virtue of the\nself-devotion of the individual to the welfare of the whole have been\ndominant forces in the life of the community. From these facts we are\njustified in assuming that it is the altruistic and not the egoistic\ninstincts and motives that nature aims to make the permanent and\ncontrolling factors in the cosmic evolution.\n\nAgain, that nature is ethical in her aim is disclosed by the fact that\nshe has brought forth such a being as man. Her preferences are shown in\nthe preferences of the being she has produced.[737] Man prefers good to\nevil; he loves justice and hates injustice; he reveres the truth and\ndetests falsehood; he recognizes that self-sacrifice is nobler than\nselfishness; he divines the final triumph of his ethical ideals. In\nman--at his best--nature reveals her preferences. Man is the answer to\nthe question, \u201cIs Nature good?\u201d[738]\n\nViewed thus from a higher standpoint the cosmic process of evolution\nhas re\u00ebnforced faith in a moral order of the universe and has been an\ninspiration and an incentive to humanitarian effort.[739]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Evolution and animal\nethics[740]]\n\nIn Brahmanic India and in all Buddhist lands religious beliefs have,\nas we have seen, placed the whole animal creation under the protection\nof the moral feelings. In ancient Persia it was religious ideas which\ncaused one half of the lower animal world to be regarded as sacred and\nthus to be brought within the protective pale of morals.\n\nDogmatic Christianity, falling far short of the ethics of Judaism in\nthis domain, created a vast rift in the organic world between man and\nthe lower animals. The dumb creatures were declared to be made solely\nfor man\u2019s use and enjoyment. Psychical relationship between them and\nman was denied, though the ancient world had very generally assumed\nthis. Indeed, this attitude of the Christian dogmatists toward the\nanimal creation was made a matter of reproach by their pagan critics.\n\nThese teachings were not without their influence on practice.\nHumanity to animals became a less prominent virtue than it had been\nin pre-Christian times. The closeness to nature of the lives of the\nmedieval hermits and monks often caused, it is true, a feeling of\ntenderness to be awakened in them for their \u201cbrothers,\u201d the birds and\nanimals, which found expression in many beautiful legends. But in\ngeneral the attitude of the Christian world toward the lower animals\nhas been unsympathetic.\n\nThe doctrine of evolution, however, teaching the kinship of all life,\nhas bridged the gulf between man and the lower animal world, and has\nbrought all dumb creatures more positively than ever before in the\nWestern world under the protection of the moral sentiment. Societies\nfor the prevention of cruelty to animals have sprung up and increased\nin number as in no other epoch of the Christian era. The new moral\nfeeling condemns all inhumanity to dumb creatures, and looks with\ndisapproval upon such sports as cockfighting, bear baiting, and\nbullfights, which were favorite amusements only a few generations\nago.[741] Hunting for pastime is also coming under the condemnation of\nthis growing moral sentiment. Thus \u201cthrough the portals of spiritual\nkinship,\u201d in the words of Professor Evans, ... \u201cour elder brothers\nenter into the temple of justice, and enjoy the privilege of sanctuary\nagainst the wanton or unwitting cruelty hitherto authorized by the\nassumptions and usurpations of man.\u201d[742]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Import for morals of\npsychical research]\n\nIt is undeniable that the earlier tendency of modern science was\nagnostic and materialistic. It caused in many minds an attenuation or\nan absolute destruction of the belief in a supersensuous world and a\nlife after death. The practical effect of this fading from the eyes\nof men of the vision of another world was, upon certain temperaments,\na loss of faith in the ethical character of the cosmic process and a\nconsequent lessening of moral enthusiasm.\n\nThis attitude of mind, which is still that of a large class, can be\nchanged only by the reaffirmation by science of the assumptions and\nteachings of all the great world religions respecting the existence\nof a supersensuous world and a future life. It is therefore a matter\nof immeasurable import to morality that these assumptions of religion\nare coming to be regarded by an ever-growing number of scientists as\nwell founded in reality. Psychical research has given a new trend to\nlarge sections of scientific speculation.[743] It is no longer crassly\nmaterialistic. It even assumes the existence of a supersensuous world.\nThus at the conclusion of a careful survey of the evidence of man\u2019s\nsurvival gathered by the English Society for Psychical Research, the\ndistinguished physicist Sir Oliver Lodge writes: \u201cThe boundary between\nthe two states--the known and the unknown--is still substantial, but\nit is wearing thin in places; and like excavators engaged in boring a\ntunnel from opposite ends, amid the roar of water and other noises, we\nare beginning to hear now and again the strokes of the pickaxes of our\ncomrades on the other side.\u201d[744]\n\nIncontrovertible proof of man\u2019s survival after bodily death would mark\nthe opening of a new era in the moral life of humanity; for, in the\nminds of many, \u201cethics can be rendered ethical only on the assumption\nthat there is a reality deeper than the phenomenal world of sense,\ntruer than the world we know and better.\u201d[745] It was doubtless a\nconviction that the future of both religion and morality is in large\nmeasure dependent upon a firm belief in a future life which led\nWilliam Ewart Gladstone to say of psychical research that it is \u201cthe\nmost important work which is being done in the world--by far the most\nimportant.\u201d Indisputably, the reaction of another world lying clear and\ndistinct in the light of science beyond the frontiers of earth would\ngive new meaning to life and a fresh impulse to the moral progress of\nthe race. The effect upon the moral life of the modern world would be\nnot less profound than that produced upon the moral life of the ancient\nworld by the incoming of Christianity with its glad affirmation of a\nlife beyond the tomb.\n\n\n_4. The Ethics of Theology_\n\n\n[Sidenote: The progressive\nmoralization of the idea of God]\n\nIn an admirable chapter entitled \u201cEthics and Theology\u201d the author\nof _Moral Evolution_, after noting how religious ideas and beliefs\nexert an influence on moral ideas and conduct, remarks: \u201cNow we\nare to observe that moral ideals have, in their turn, modified and\nclarified doctrine, or, in other words, that there has been an ethical\ndevelopment of theology, and that contempt of creed is really the\nsubstitution of a moral for an immoral or a nonmoral theology.\u201d[746]\nThe same truth is expressed by Newman Smyth in these words:\n\u201cReformations have grown out of the ethical protest of the Christian\nmind against inherited dogmas. Old theology is always becoming new in\nthe vitalizing influence of ethics.\u201d[747]\n\nAs a result of the growth and refinement of the moral feelings, there\nhas been going on in wide circles in Western Christendom just such a\nchange in men\u2019s conception of the character of God as marked the best\nHebrew thought during the later centuries of the history of the people\nof Israel. The idea of God inherited by the modern from the medieval\nage was an incongruous blending of ideas derived from three different\nsources. There was, first, the crude archaic notion of deity derived\nfrom the Old Testament records of what conduct in his chosen people\nYahweh approved; second, the dogmas of Augustinian theology respecting\nimputed sin, election, everlasting punishment, and other supposed\nprinciples of the divine government; and third, conceptions wholly\ninconsistent with these drawn from the New Testament narratives of the\nlife and teachings of the Prophet of Nazareth.\n\nGradually, through the growth of the moral feelings, this conception\nof the divine character has been purged of its grosser, archaic, and\nimmoral elements. The early Hebrew ideas have been rejected as the\nimmature and unworthy notions of deity of a race still on a low plane\nof religious development; the Calvinistic idea of God has become \u201cthe\nsupreme incredibility\u201d; while the Gospel teaching of deity has been\nreceived by the instructed reason and conscience as the only credible\nideal of the divine.[748]\n\nSince, as we have repeatedly had brought to our attention, religious\nideas exert a profound influence on moral ideas and on conduct, this\nmoralization of the conception of the divine character has deep\nsignificance for the progressive purification and refinement of the\nmoral life of man.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The moralization of the\nconception of future punishment]\n\nClosely connected with these changes in men\u2019s idea of God, indeed\nforming a part of that conception, are the changes which have taken\nplace in their ideas of the divine government in the hereafter.\n\nAt different stages of our study we have noted how the classifications\nand arrangements of the invisible world are the work of the moral\nfaculty, and how the developing moral feelings of the historic peoples\nhave, with the lapse of time, ever modified anew the topography and\nmoralized afresh the government of the world of spirits.[749]\n\nNow one of the most important modifications ever effected in man\u2019s\nconceptions of the other world was brought about by the Protestant\nReformation. The reformers abolished purgatory, and thus left only\ntwo separate realms, heaven and hell, in the world of souls. But in\nabolishing purgatory and thereby making all suffering in the hereafter\npunitive and eternal, and in failing to recognize gradations of guilt\nin human sin by consigning all evildoers, unbelievers, and misbelievers\nto the same awful and everlasting torments, the reformers made still\nmore unethical the government which the popular medieval imagination\nhad created for the unseen world.\n\nThe gradual clarification and growing sensitiveness of the moral\nfeelings could not long leave unchallenged such a grossly immoral\nnotion of the divine government. During the last two generations a\nnotable change has passed over men\u2019s conceptions of the netherworld of\nspirits. The hell of the reformers\u2019 imagination has become, like much\nelse in the Augustinian theology, \u201cthe supreme incredibility.\u201d The\nblurring of that awful vision is one of the most significant changes\nwhich, during the Christian era, have passed over that world which is\nat once the creation and the creator of human morality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Exchange in rank of the\ntheological and the natural Gospel\nvirtues]\n\nThe advance in religious ethics during the last few decades is\nregistered again in the exchange in rank of the theological and the\nnatural gospel virtues in the moral ideal of Protestant Christendom.\nDuring this period there has taken place here a genuine \u201ctransvaluation\nof moral values.\u201d Many representative religious teachers have come to\nassign a dominant place in the ethical standard to the natural social\nvirtues, and have relegated to a lower place the purely theological\nvirtues, such as right religious belief and ritual observances. In the\ncase of many the rejection of that part of the moral code resting upon\ntheological dogmas is as complete as was the rejection by Christianity\nof the morality based on the ceremonial laws of the Jews. With these\nthe saving virtue is no longer acceptance of a prescribed creed, but\nloving, self-denying service of humanity.[750]\n\nThis transvaluation of moral values within the Church itself is one of\nthe most important movements going on in the moral life of the modern\nworld.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Extension to\ntheological ethics of the\nprinciple of individual\nresponsibility]\n\nFurther illustration of progress in Church ethics in recent times is\nfound in the extension of the principle of individual responsibility\nto the domain of religion.[751] It will be recalled how completely the\nlaw of collective responsibility dominates the morality of primitive\npeoples.[752] With the growth and clearing of the moral sense the\ninjustice of this is perceived, and the principle of individual\nresponsibility comes to be established.\n\nThis moral movement is consummated earlier in the civil than in the\nreligious domain; that is, the civil-law codes are first modified in\naccordance with the demands of the truer ethical feeling, and not\nuntil later does the religious code, more conservative, undergo a like\nchange. Thus gradually during the medieval time the civil law of the\nmore advanced nations of Western Christendom abrogated the principle\nof collective responsibility, while the ecclesiastical code retained\nit far into the nineteenth century. During the last fifty years,\nhowever, the best conscience of the Church has rejected the principle\nas the embodiment of a gross inequity. The doctrine that all the\ngenerations of men sinned in the first parent and justly suffer for his\ntransgression has been repudiated by the modern instructed conscience\nas incredible, untrue, and immoral.\n\nThis repudiation of the principle of collective responsibility by the\nethics of religion harmonizes in this respect Church morality with\nthe morality of the civil codes of the civilized world, and marks the\nconsummation of an ethical evolution which, commencing in the dawn of\ncivilization, covers all the millenniums of human history.\n\n\n_5. Social Ethics: the New Social Conscience_\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) As manifested in\nthe history of the African slave\ntrade]\n\nBy the phrase \u201csocial conscience,\u201d as we shall use it here, we mean\nthose ethical feelings and judgments which cover the relations of\nmaster and slave and the relations of society to its unfortunate and\nerring members.\n\nIn the entire history of the moral evolution of humanity there is\nno chapter which reveals so plainly the upward trend of the ethical\nmovement in civilization as that which tells the story of the\nbeginnings and the final suppression of the African slave trade, and of\nthe rise and fall of the institution of negro slavery among Christian\npeoples.[753] Restricting our survey for the moment to the slave trade\nas distinct from slavery, the amazing fact which meets us here at the\noutset is that until late in the modern period the peoples of Western\nChristendom had practically no conscience whatsoever in regard to the\nAfrican slave trade, and this notwithstanding that the conscience of\nthe age was in many other matters true and sensitive. The whole subject\nlay practically outside the realm of morals. The slave trade was looked\nupon as a perfectly legitimate business.[754] Practically no one\nthought it wrong to go to Africa, kidnap or purchase a shipload of the\nnatives, bring them in stifling holds--where sometimes half the unhappy\nvictims died on the passage--to the West Indies or to the Spanish and\nEnglish mainland of the Americas and sell them as slaves.[755] What\nlittle opposition to the traffic existed, arose in general from other\nthan feelings of moral disapproval.[756]\n\nThe movement for the abolition of the trade constitutes an important\nphase of the social and moral life, particularly of England and of the\nEnglish colonies in America, during the latter part of the eighteenth\ncentury and the earlier part of the nineteenth. In England the wave\nof humanitarian feeling which swept away the obstacles set in the way\nof the abolition of the traffic by selfish interests was raised by\nthe great religious revival led by Whitefield and the Wesleys. The\nleaders of the reform were Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce.\nAfter twenty years of agitation a bill was passed abolishing the trade\n(1807). This marked as great a moral victory as ever was won in the\nEnglish Parliament, for it was the aroused moral sentiment of the\nnation which was the main force that carried the reform measure through\nthe Houses.\n\nIn America there had arisen among the Quakers of Pennsylvania, even\nbefore the Revolution, a protest against the trade on purely moral\ngrounds. By the time the Federal Convention met in 1787 sufficient\nsentiment had been developed in the matter to secure the adoption of\na provision in the Constitution to the effect that the importation of\nslaves should cease in 1808. From that year on, the slave trade, as\ndistinct from slavery, was under the ban both of the law and of the\npublic conscience; but it continued to be carried on clandestinely\nuntil the Civil War.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) As manifested in\nthe antislavery movement]\n\nEven before the consummation of the movement for the suppression of the\nnegro slave trade there had sprung up an agitation for the suppression\nof the negro-slave system itself. England abolished slavery in her\ncolonies in 1833, paying \u00a320,000,000 for the emancipation of 800,000\nslaves in her West India possessions. In the United States there was\nvery little antislavery feeling prior to 1830.[757] At that time\nthe great majority of the peoples of the Northern as well as of the\nSouthern states, if they did not look upon negro slavery as wholly\nproper and right, at least regarded as reprehensible any interference\nwith the institution where established. Even the Church in general\ndenounced the abolitionists as infidels and pronounced their conduct\nfanatical and wicked.[758] But notwithstanding this opposition the\nabolition movement and the movement for the restriction of slavery to\nthe states where already established gained impetus steadily, and the\nheated debate led up quickly to the Civil War.\n\nThe most significant thing in that passage of our history is not the\nrevolt of the South, but the revolt of the conscience of the North.\nHad there been no moral revolt in the North, there would have been no\nslaveholders\u2019 revolt in the South.\n\nThe development of moral feeling respecting the wrongfulness of\nslavery did not cease with the emancipation of the slaves as a\nresult of the Civil War. Indeed, with the reform an accomplished\nfact, the clarification of the moral sense of the people has gone on\nuninterruptedly until a gulf has come to separate the present-day\nconscience of the great majority of the instructed and thinking classes\nin both sections of the Union from the conscience of the same classes\none or two generations ago.\n\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) As manifested\nin society\u2019s treatment of its\nunfortunate and delinquent members]\n\nThe record of society\u2019s treatment of its dependent and erring members\nforms another inspiring chapter in the history of the growth of\nthe new social conscience. In a little over one hundred years the\nChristian world has advanced from harsh vagrant laws to associated\ncharities; from the burning of witches to asylums for the insane;\nfrom noisome dungeons to penitentiaries and institutions of rescue\nand correction.[759] The numerous and costly private and public\ninstitutions established and maintained by the new humanitarian\nsentiment is one of the most distinctive characteristics, ethically\nviewed, of modern civilization. So multiform are the expressions of\nthis new spirit that it is impossible in so brief a survey as the\npresent to exhibit in more than barest outline this phase of the\nethical evolution.\n\nThe recent history of charity, taken in the sense of relief given to\nthe poor, is a record of change both in motive and method. There has\nalways been a great deal of almsgiving in the world, since this has\nbeen a duty especially enjoined by religion. But because charity has\nhad this religious motive, it has often been sullied by self-love, alms\nbeing given not so much for the sake of the poor as for the benefit of\nthe soul of the donor. In recent times this religious motive has become\nless operative, but the amount of almsgiving has undoubtedly increased,\nand we are justified in the conclusion that it is motived as never\nbefore by genuine altruistic feeling. It is probably true, however,\nthat there is less indiscriminate, emotional almsgiving now than\nformerly. But there is greater \u201csocial compunction,\u201d a deeper sense of\nsociety\u2019s responsibility for the existence of poverty, and an earnest\ninquiry respecting the primary social causes of it. Hence effort is\ndirected not merely to the immediate relief of want and misery through\norganized charity, but to the cure of poverty through the removal\nof the causes of destitution. At this point the investigations and\nlabors of the philanthropist merge with those of the sociologist, the\neconomist, and the statesman.\n\nIn society\u2019s treatment of the defective and the insane, as compared\nwith its treatment of these same classes scarcely more than a century\nago, is registered an ethical progress truly remarkable. A hundred\nyears or less ago in England and in all the European countries the\nidiot and the oddly formed human prodigy were exhibited to afford\namusement to the people. The growth in humanitarian feeling has\nrendered all this a thing of the past. \u201cThe passing of the freak is\nnot a casual incident in the history of the circus, but a striking\nillustration of the tendency which has been in progress for centuries\ntoward the humanizing of our amusements.... To spend a merry afternoon\nat the madhouse watching the antics of the maniacs in their chains\nseemed natural and reasonable to civilized Englishmen not so many\ngenerations ago. It has become absolutely unthinkable.\u201d[760] The\nhistory of the stage offers like testimony. \u201cNot so very long ago,\u201d\nwrites David Belasco, in giving advice to the amateur playwright, \u201cthe\nentrance of a cripple or a hunchback was sufficient to get a laugh from\nthe audience. In these humanitarian times there is no fun to be made\nout of physical deformity.\u201d[761]\n\nBut it is in society\u2019s treatment of the criminal class that there is to\nbe traced the greatest progress in humanitarianism. In the pre-Norman\nperiod in England the punishments for crime were characterized by a\nbarbarity incredibly callous. \u201cMen branded on the forehead, without\nhands, without feet, without tongues, lived as an example of the danger\nwhich attended the commission of petty crimes, and as a warning to all\nwho had the misfortune of holding no higher position than that of a\nchurl.... The eyes were plucked out; the nose, the ears, and the upper\nlips were cut off; the scalp was torn away; and sometimes even, there\nis reason to believe, the whole body was flayed alive.\u201d[762]\n\nWhat was true of English law was true of the laws of every other\nEuropean country. And there was little or no essential amelioration\nof these savage law systems before the last quarter of the eighteenth\ncentury. Seventy thousand executions took place in England during the\nreign of Henry VIII.[763] \u201cIn the reign of William III there does not\nappear to have been any consciousness that the penal laws were, in many\nrespects, disgraceful to any community but a tribe of savages.\u201d[764]\n\nIf a definite point of departure of the movement for the humanizing\nof the criminal laws of Europe and the putting of the treatment of\ncriminals on an ethical basis be sought, it will be found in the life\nand writings of the Italian jurist Beccaria,[765] who maintained that\nthe effect of cruel punishments is to increase crime by indurating the\nsensibilities of the people.[766]\n\nA great impulse to the humanitarian movement initiated by Beccaria\nwas given by the devoted labors of the great philanthropist John\nHoward (1726\u20131790), who, with his eyes opened to the awful conditions\nof prison life through official connection with Bedford jail, where\nBunyan dreamed, spent his life in visiting all lands inspecting prisons\nand jails and dungeons and lazar houses, and \u201ctaking the gauge and\ndimension of misery, depression, and contempt.\u201d\n\nThe crusade of John Howard marks the real beginning of practical prison\nreform, which has \u201ctransformed prisons from hells into hospitals for\nrecovery,\u201d and revolutionized the entire theory and administration\nof judicial punishment.[767] The aim and purpose of the modern\npenitentiary system is to develop self-respect and manhood.[768] To\nthis end the lock-step and striped clothing have been abolished in many\nprisons, and along with them all cruel and humiliating punishments. The\nestablishment of reform schools, reformatories, and penitentiaries, the\nintroduction of the indeterminate sentence, the proposed creation of\ncourts of rehabilitation, and the founding of the juvenile court,[769]\nmark the ethical advance which the last century has witnessed in this\ndomain.[770]\n\n\n_6. International Ethics: the New International Conscience_\n\n\n[Sidenote: The development\nof international morality\nforeshadowed by the earlier\ndevelopment of intranational\nmorality]\n\nOne of the most significant of phylogenetic laws is formulated by\nHaeckel in these words: \u201cThe short, quick history of an individual\norganism is a compressed story of the long, slow history of the species\nto which the organism belongs.\u201d Now this law holds good for the\nhistory of the human species as well as for that of the lower tribes of\nlife. And here it embraces not only the history of the bodily but also\nthat of the psychical development. Consequently the law under which\nthe moral evolution of man is going on may be stated in this way: The\nhistory of the development of conscience within a social group (clan,\ntribe, nation) is a compressed story of the long, slow history of the\ndevelopment of conscience in humanity at large, that is to say, between\nthe groups composing the human race. And since law codes, private and\npublic, are essentially embodiments of the growing and clarifying\nconscience, this mode of the ethical evolution may be expressed in\nstrictly juristic terms as follows: \u201cThe development of international\nlaw follows step by step the earlier development of municipal law.\u201d[771]\n\nWith this law in mind we may define moral progress in the international\ndomain as the gradual assimilation of international to intranational\nethics, or, in other words, the growing conformity of the standard of\npublic morality to that of private morality.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The gradual moralizing\nof the relations of the advanced\nto the backward races: _The White\nMan\u2019s Burden_]\n\nAs thus defined, a special expression of progress in international\nmorality is found in the growing recognition by governments that the\nobligations of the strong toward the weak are the same for nations as\nfor individuals. A public conscience that is like the best private\nconscience is constantly becoming more and more a regulative force in\nthe relations of the superior to the inferior races.[772] Unhappily\nthat exploitation of the weaker by the stronger races, which makes up\nso large a part of the history of the past ages, still goes on; but\nit is, in general, less grossly unethical than ever before, while with\neach succeeding generation the protest of the common conscience of the\ncivilized world against all unfair and oppressive treatment of the\nbackward by the more advanced races grows more earnest and insistent.\n\nGood illustrations of this quickening of the public conscience are\nfound in England\u2019s dealings with India and China. In the year 1813\na resolution declaring that England\u2019s first duty in legislating for\nIndia was to promote the interests of the people of India was proposed\nin Parliament, but was defeated. Twenty years later (in 1833) this\nprinciple was definitely embodied in a Government of India Act.[773]\nIn 1841\u20131842 England, at the end of what has been justly characterized\nas \u201cone of the most dishonorable and detestable wars that ever stained\nher annals,\u201d compelled China to keep her ports open to the iniquitous\nopium traffic. Two generations later (in 1906) the House of Commons by\nresolution unanimously declared the Indian opium trade with China to\nbe \u201cmorally indefensible,\u201d and requested the Government to bring it to\na speedy end.[774] Five years later England entered into an agreement\nwith China, according to the terms of which the importation of Indian\nopium into China will cease on or before 1917. This is a notable\ntriumph of the new international conscience.\n\nOur dealings with the island of Cuba since its liberation--opinions\nmay differ in regard to the rightness of our original act of\nintervention--affords another encouraging illustration of the progress\nthe world has made in international morality. And the same is true of\nour dealings with the Filipinos, notwithstanding the utterly painful\ncharacter of the earlier chapters of the story. There has been no\nresponsible official utterance on this subject that has represented\nour task in our acquired dependency as other than a public trust, as a\nguardianship to be exercised solely in the interest of the Filipinos as\nthe nation\u2019s wards. The better moral feeling of the nation, intensified\nin many by deep compunction, has indignantly repudiated all those\nunofficial utterances which have cynically represented the islands as\nan inviting field for selfish exploitation by American capitalists,\nand has demanded that our government in the islands should be inspired\nand controlled by the spirit of unselfish service. And this ethical\nspirit has in general marked our administration of the affairs of the\nislanders. \u201cI believe that I am speaking with historic accuracy and\nimpartiality,\u201d declares ex-President Roosevelt, \u201cwhen I say that the\nAmerican treatment of and attitude toward the Filipino people, in its\ncombination of disinterested ethical purpose and sound common sense,\nmarks a new and long stride forward in advance of all steps that\nhave hitherto been taken along the path of wise and proper treatment\nof weaker by stronger races.\u201d This ethical purpose is especially\nmanifested in the sending out, in the early period of our rule, of five\nhundred young American teachers to carry to this deeply wronged people\nthe best we have to give--a national act without a parallel in all the\nhistory of the past.\n\nIt inspires hope in the future to note how far this last step forward\ncarries us away from the starting point on this line of ethical\nadvance. At first the fate of the weaker race was extermination\nor slavery; then its fate was to be reduced to the condition of a\ntributary; still later, to be subjected to commercial and industrial\nexploitation by the conquering people; and lastly, to be made, in\ntheory if not yet in actual practice, the beneficiaries of a benevolent\nself-sacrificing service, which finds lofty expression in Kipling\u2019s\n_The White Man\u2019s Burden_:\n\n Go, bind your sons to exile\n To serve your captives\u2019 need.\n\nThis sentiment would scarcely have found any such response in the\ncommon heart and conscience of any past age of human history as it\nfinds in the heart and conscience of our own. But, it must be admitted,\nthe sentiment embodies an ideal yet to be realized, rather than\nsomething already attained.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Progress in war ethics:\nHugo Grotius]\n\nBut it is in the changes effected in men\u2019s feelings respecting what\nis morally permissible in warfare that is to be observed the most\nencouraging progress in international ethics in modern times. This\nprogressive clarification of the moral consciousness may be distinctly\ntraced from the close of the Thirty Years\u2019 War in Germany. In no period\nof Christian history had war been waged with greater ferocity or with\ngreater contempt of moral rules than during the so-called religious\nwars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What little gains had\nbeen made in the humanization of war during preceding eras seem to have\nbeen lost.\n\nThis barbarizing of war, however, produced, as all retrogressions in\nmorality do if the moral life is still on the whole virile and sound,\na reaction which found expression in the epoch-making work, _De Jure\nBelli et Pacis_, by the distinguished Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius[775]--a\nwork that has been pronounced \u201cthe most beneficent of all volumes ever\nwritten not claiming divine inspiration.\u201d[776] The aim of Grotius was\nnot to abolish war,--he did not think universal peace an attainable\nideal,--but simply to moderate its excesses and lessen its atrocities,\nto set limits to the rights of the victor. The age of nationalism had\ncome, and an ethics for nations in their mutual relations must be\nformulated. Grotius sought a law that all would recognize as binding.\nThe law to which he appealed was the Stoic Law of Nature.[777] As the\nStoics had made this law the instrument for the reform of the Roman\ncivil law, so now would Grotius make it the instrument for the reform\nof the laws of war.[778]\n\nThe influence of the work of Grotius was profound and widespread. From\nthe time of its appearance dates a new departure in the humanization of\nwar, and a fresh moral advance in international law.[779] \u201cHis ideas,\u201d\nsays Dr. Andrew D. White, \u201cfound their way into current discussion,\ninto systems of law, into treaties; and as generations rolled by, the\nworld began to find itself, it hardly knew how, less and less cruel,\nuntil men looked back on war as practiced in his time as upon a hideous\ndream--doubtless much as men in future generations will look back upon\nthe wars of our times.\u201d[780]\n\nThe humane provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the\nestablishment of the Red Cross Society, which on the field of\nbattle cares without discrimination for the stricken, are inspiring\nillustrations of the growth of this new humanitarianism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Movement for the\nabolition of war--a moral issue]\n\nNow this growing sensitiveness of the public conscience which has\neffected so many mitigations of the barbarities of war has resulted\nin a widespread and insistent demand that war between civilized\nnations shall not merely be humanized but that it shall be abolished,\nthat disputes between nations shall be settled as disputes between\nindividuals are settled--by courts of justice.\n\nWithout doubt many influences, political, social, and economic,[781]\nhave concurred in creating this great world-wide movement, and in\ncalling into existence the Hague Conferences and the international\nand national peace congresses of the last decade or two; but among all\nthese forces and motives the one of greatest potency is the awakened\nand instructed conscience of the world in regard to the criminality of\nwar as an established and legalized method of settling controversies\nbetween civilized nations. It is this new conscience and not the\nnew dreadnought to which we must look to abolish war and to keep it\nabolished. For, like the question of slavery two generations ago,\nthis question of war has become a moral issue, and, like the slavery\nquestion, it will give the world no rest until settled in accordance\nwith the demands of the new conscience.\n\n\n[Sidenote: War an abrogation of\nthe ordinary moral code]\n\nEspecially intolerable to the more sensitive conscience of to-day\nis the assumption that nations may at will suspend or abrogate the\nordinary moral code. For, as Lord Morley truly says, \u201cTo declare war\nis to suspend not merely _habeas corpus_ but the Ten Commandments,\nand some other good commandments besides.\u201d[782] That is to say, war\nis a suspension of a great part of those rules of morality which,\nslowly and painfully formulated by the growing moral consciousness of\nman, have become the guide and standard of ordinary conduct. In war\nthe conscience of the commander is inhibited. \u201cThe commander who lost\na battle through the activity of his moral nature,\u201d once cynically\ndeclared United States Senator Ingalls, \u201cwould be the derision and jest\nof history.\u201d And that is so. The world has not yet ceased to deride\nthose Jews who lost their city to the Romans because their consciences\nforsooth would not let them fight on the Sabbath day. War cannot be\nconducted by the rules of ordinary morality.\n\nWith a great part of the ordinary moral code suspended, there is\nsubstituted for it a war code every maxim of which reveals its archaic,\nvestigial character, stamps it as a survival from an early savage\nstage of human development, as a legacy from a long-past age of the\nhistorical evolution when morality was as yet only an intratribal\nthing, that is, when men felt that they owed duties only to members of\ntheir own tribe or social group.[783]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Unfavorable reaction of\nthe ethics of war upon the ethics\nof peace]\n\nIn many ways, some obvious and others subtle and hidden, war works\n\u201cmoral damage\u201d to society, but we here confine ourselves to emphasizing\nmerely the moral loss and hurt resulting from the reaction of its low\narchaic code upon the more advanced peace code. For, as Professor J.\nNeville Figgis justly observes, \u201cIt is impossible to remove the very\nnotion of morality from international affairs without in the long run\nundermining it in private life.\u201d[784] What is regarded as right and\nproper in war will come to be regarded as right and proper in peace.\nThat is to say, the maintenance of a double standard in morals is just\nas impossible as the maintenance of a double standard in money. By a\nsort of Gresham\u2019s Law the lower standard will drive out the higher or\ndrag it down to its own low level.\n\nThis reaction of the war code upon the ordinary moral code is well\nillustrated by what takes place when society metes out to persons\nconvicted of crime ferocious and barbarous punishments. In the\nmedieval centuries in Europe when the penalties for offenses were\noften fiendishly cruel mutilations of the body, such as cutting off\nthe ears, the hands, the lips, or the nose, this judicial procedure\nwas imitated to such a degree by individuals seeking private vengeance\nthat mayhem, that is, the mutilation of an enemy by depriving him\nof a member, became a crime of such frequent occurrence that it was\nnecessary to make special and severe enactments against it.[785] After\nsociety stopped mutilating the bodies of offenders against its laws,\nthis offense of mayhem virtually dropped out of the calendar of private\ncrimes.\n\nIn a similar way does the war ethics of the nations react disastrously\nupon private morality. The slow moral progress of European civilization\nduring the last two or three centuries, compared with its wonderful\nintellectual and material progress, may with little hesitation be\nattributed in large part to the unfavorable influence of its war ethics\nupon its everyday moral code. The war code is applied to politics,\nto ordinary business, and to the relations of industrial classes.\nThe politician as a politician does a hundred things he would not\nthink of doing as a man, and justifies his acts by appealing to the\nadage, \u201cPolitics is war.\u201d The business man, citing the like maxim,\n\u201cBusiness is business,\u201d which means that competition is a species of\nwar and must be conducted on war principles, flings his Christian\ncode to the winds and, pitilessly pushing his competitor to the wall,\ncompasses his financial ruin. It is the same in the struggle between\nlabor and capital. In this struggle acts of violence, like those of\nthe McNamaras, are committed, and the persons who do these things\nabsolve themselves in the forum of their own consciences on the plea\nthat a state of war exists between capital and labor and that this\njustifies the adoption of war methods. Here doubtless we have the moral\npsychology of the suffragette movement in England. Indeed, the leaders\nof this startling propaganda tell us frankly that they are waging war,\nand that this justifies their suspension of the ordinary rules of\nconduct. In the light of this avowal the alleged inscrutability of\ntheir acts disappears. The movement is simply another illustration of\nthe truth that so long as nations act under the illusion that they may\nwithout moral wrong employ violence to obtain justice, just so long\nwill there be individuals who with good conscience will seek justice\nthrough violence.\n\nAt the same time, however, these same classes and persons who thus in\nvarious important spheres of activity adopt the lower standard of war\nethics, in all other domains and relationships--in the family, in the\nChurch, and in social intercourse--act in accordance with the higher\nmoral code. The result is a loose synthesis of the two systems, the\nestablishment of a sort of bi-moral code made up of rules and practices\nmutually inconsistent and irreconcilable. The moral damage resulting\nfrom such moral confusion is beyond estimate. It is the inconsistencies\nand hypocrisies involved in such a bi-moral code that is one ground\nof Nietzsche\u2019s bitter attack on the ethics of Christendom. Yet, as\nProfessor Figgis says, \u201cNietzsche deserves the gratitude of all friends\nof humanity for the service he has done in ... showing that the whole\nsphere of private life cannot in the long run be different from the\nideals accepted in public affairs.\u201d[786]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Obsolescence of war\nas a school of morals: the war\nsystem an anachronism in modern\ncivilization]\n\nThe arraignment of the war system by the awakening conscience of the\ncivilized world has led its advocates to lay the stress of their\nargument on the moral uses of war. They eulogize war as the nurse of\nthe sturdy, heroic virtues, and hence as an indispensable agency in\nthe moral education of the race. War has, it is true, in past ages\nbeen \u201cthe supreme theater of human strenuousness,\u201d and it may be true,\nas is assumed by Professor William James in his _Moral Equivalent of\nWar_, that the qualities of courage, fortitude, and self-devotion to\ncommon interests were in the beginning evoked and fostered in the race\nby war; but whatever may have been the moral uses of war in the past\nstages of human development, the time is past when the war system can\nserve the highest ends of civilization. It is an anachronism in the\nmodern world. It has become a drag upon the moral progress of the\nrace. By an ethical necessity the day of its abolition approaches. At\na time not remote, as history reckons time, the common conscience of\nthe world will brand war between civilized nations as the greatest of\ncrimes, and will regard the nation that assaults another with intent\nto commit general slaughter as a criminal nation--as a common enemy of\nthe human race. In that coming and better age men will look with the\nsame incredulous amazement upon our infernal engines and devices for\nwholesale man-killing that we of this age look upon \u201cthe iron virgin of\nNuremberg\u201d and the other medieval instruments of torture in the museums\nof Europe.\n\nTo many this optimistic forecast, in the face of the prevailing\nwar spirit and the ever-growing armaments of the nations, may seem\noversanguine and incredible. But to think despairingly of the future\nargues a failure to discern what is really most significant in the\ninternational situation to-day. The most significant thing in the\nongoings of life at Rome on that memorable day of the year 404 of our\nera which saw the last gladiatorial combat in the Colosseum was not\nthat, four hundred years after the incoming of Christianity with its\nteachings of the sanctity of human life, gladiators fought on the arena\nto make a holiday for Rome; the significant thing was the protest made\nby the Christian monk Telemachus and sealed by his martyr death,[787]\nfor that announced the birth into the Roman world of a new conscience,\nand that, through an ethical necessity, meant the speedy abolition of\n\u201cthe human sacrifices of the amphitheater.\u201d\n\nAnd so to-day the significant thing is not that nineteen hundred years\nafter the advent of a religion of peace and good will among men,\ngladiator nations still wet the earth with fratricidal blood; the\nsignificant thing is the constantly growing protest against it all, for\nthat announces the birth into the modern world of a new international\nconscience, and that, through an ethical necessity like that which\nabolished forever the bloody sacrifices of the Colosseum, means the\ncertain and speedy abolition of war as a crass negation of human\nsolidarity and brotherhood, and a venturous denial of a moral order of\nthe world and the sovereignty of conscience.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] Henry T. Buckle, _History of Civilization in England_ (1891), vol.\ni, chap. iv. For a trenchant criticism of Buckle\u2019s contention that\nthere has been no progress in morals during historic times, see article\nentitled \u201cThe Natural History of Morals,\u201d _North British Review_ for\nDecember, 1867.\n\n[2] For a discussion of the economic theory, see Edwin R.\u00a0A. Seligman,\n_The Economic Interpretation of History_, 2d ed.\n\n[3] _Social Evolution_ (1894), p. 307.\n\n[4] Ralph Barton Perry, _The Moral Economy_ (1909), p. 254.\n\n[5] Immanuel Kant, _Critique of the Practical Reason_; cited by Fisher,\n_History of the Christian Church_ (1888), p. 623.\n\n[6] \u201cIt is probable indeed that every movement of religious reform has\noriginated in some clearer conception of the ideal of human conduct,\narrived at by some person or persons.\u201d--T.\u00a0H. GREEN, _Prolegomena to\nEthics_, 5th ed., p. 361.\n\n[7] _Prolegomena to the History of Israel_, tr. Black and Menzies\n(1885), p. 472; summing up the moral teachings of the prophet Amos.\n\n[8] Wake, _The Evolution of Morality_ (1878), vol. ii, p. 4;\nWestermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_ (1906),\nvol. ii, p. 743; T.\u00a0H. Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 237;\nGeorge Harris, _Moral Evolution_ (1896), p. 79.\n\n[9] T.\u00a0H. Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 240.\n\n[10] \u201cWe cannot explain morality without going to objective morality,\nwhich is expressed in the customs and laws, in the moral commands\nand judgments, conceptions and ideals of the race\u201d (Frank Thilly,\n\u201cFriedrich Paulsen\u2019s Ethical Work and Influence,\u201d _The International\nJournal of Ethics_ for January, 1909, p. 150). And so Wundt: \u201cThe\noriginal source of ethical knowledge is the moral consciousness of man,\nas it finds objective expression in the universal perceptions of right\nand wrong, and further, in religious ideas and in customs. The most\ndirect method for the discovery of ethical principles is, therefore,\nthe anthropological method. We use this term in a wider sense than\nis customary, to include ethnic psychology, the history of primitive\nman and the history of civilization, as well as the natural history\nof mankind\u201d (_Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_, tr. Gulliver\nand Titchener (1908), p. 19). Cf. also Westermarck, _The Origin and\nDevelopment of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, pp. 158 ff.\n\n[11] \u201cAn ideal is essential to the very existence of morality.\u201d--GEORGE\nHARRIS, _Moral Evolution_ (1896), p. 54.\n\n[12] \u201cThe history of moral ideals and institutions, though hitherto\nignored by moralists, seems to me the most important topic in the whole\nrealm of ethics.\u201d--SCHURMAN, _The Ethical Import of Darwinism_ (1887),\np. 201.\n\n[13] S. Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_ (1889), p. 354. The same\nthought is expressed by the writer of \u201cThe Natural History of Morals,\u201d\n_North British Review_ for December, 1867: \u201cThe earth is a moral\ngraveyard ... and our virtues and vices will, in turn, be but fossils\nwhich the eye of science shall curiously scan, and they will finally\ncrumble into dust, from which the moral harvests of the future shall\nspring.\u201d\n\n[14] Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 154.\n\n[15] \u201cEffective ideals are elicited by circumstances. But they are not\ncreated by them. It is a prejudice of modern sociology, a prejudice\nwhich sociology has taken over from biology, to try to explain the\ninner by the outer.\u201d--G. LOWES DICKINSON, \u201cIdeals and Facts,\u201d _Hibbert\nJournal_ for January, 1911, p. 266.\n\n[16] \u201cThe growth of intellectuality, considered as breadth of view and\ncompetence of personal judgment, carries with it normally growth in\nsensitiveness of feeling and rightness of ethical attitude.\u201d--BALDWIN,\n_Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Development_ (1897), p.\n397.\n\n[17] See Chapter XVIII. \u201cThe activity of a free people creates a great\nnumber of social relations from which arise new duties and new rights;\nso that liberty is not less favorable to the development of morality\nthan to that of letters, arts, and sciences, of all the noble interests\nand high faculties of our nature.\u201d--DENIS, _Histoire des th\u00e9ories et\ndes id\u00e9es morales dans l\u2019antiquit\u00e9_ (1879), t. i, p. 10.\n\n[18] _Principles of Economics_, 2d ed., p. 1. \u201cIt is not Christianity\nbut industrialism that has brought into the world that strong sense of\nthe moral value of thrift, steady industry, punctuality in observing\nengagements, constant forethought with a view to providing for the\ncontingencies of the future, which is now so characteristic of the\nmoral type of the most civilized nations.\u201d--LECKY, _The Map of Life_\n(1900), pp. 53 f.\n\n[19] _The Moral Ideal_, new and revised edition, p. 19.\n\n[20] \u201cDoubtless the ethical life of the world has suffered much from\nreligion, but it owes to religion immeasurably more than it has\nsuffered from it. Faulty enough indeed the influence has been, but the\nethical life of the world has on the whole been greatly re\u00ebnforced and\npurified by its religions.\u201d--WILLIAM NEWTON CLARKE, _The Christian\nDoctrine of God_ (1909), p. 13.\n\n[21] \u201cMorality is the endeavor to realize an ideal\u201d (George Harris,\n_Moral Evolution_ (1896), p. 54). Not to miss the import of this\ndictum emphasis must be laid on the word \u201cendeavor\u201d; for, in the words\nof Professor Green, morality must be regarded \u201cas an effort, not an\nattainment\u201d (_Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 301).\n\n[22] _Meditations_, tr. Long, xi, 18.\n\n[23] \u201cThere is nothing more modern than the critical spirit which\ndwells upon the difference between the minds of men in one age and in\nanother; which endeavors to make each age its own interpreter, and\njudge what it did or produced by a relative standard.\u201d--JAMES BRYCE,\n_The Holy Roman Empire_, 8th ed., p. 261.\n\n[24] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 291.\n\n[25] After long observation of the life of the uncivilized races of\nPolynesia, Alfred Russel Wallace records as his opinion that \u201csavages\nact up to their simple code at least as well as we act up to ours\u201d\n(_The Malay Archipelago_, vol. i, p. 139). \u201cMany strange customs\nand laws obtain in Zululand, but there is no moral code in all the\nworld more rigidly observed than that of the Zulus\u201d (Russell Hastings\nMillward in _National Geographic Magazine_ for March, 1909, p. 287).\n\n[26] \u201cThe larger morality which embraces all mankind has its basis\nin habits of loyalty, love, and self-sacrifice which were originally\nformed and grew strong in the narrow circle of the family or the\nclan.\u201d--W. ROBERTSON SMITH, _The Religion of the Semites_, 2d ed., p.\n54.\n\n[27] _The Religion of the Semites_, 2d ed., p. 274. Cf. Judges ix. 2; 2\nSam. v. 1.\n\n[28] Dudley Kidd, _Savage Childhood_ (1906), p. 74. See also Clifford,\n_Lectures and Essays_ (1901), vol. ii, p. 79, on the \u201ctribal self.\u201d\n\n[29] W. Robertson Smith, _The Religion of the Semites_, 2d ed., p. 267.\nSee also Coulanges, _The Ancient City_, bk. ii, chap. ix.\n\n[30] Before this stage in civilization has been reached, religion is\na hindrance to the widening of the moral sympathies; for in earlier\nstages \u201ca man is held answerable to his god [only] for wrong done to a\nmember of his own kindred or political community; ... he may deceive,\nrob, or kill an alien without offense to religion; the deity cares\nonly for his own kinsfolk\u201d (W. Robertson Smith, _The Religion of the\nSemites_, 2d ed., pp. 53 f.).\n\n[31] It should be carefully noted that this is very different from\nsaying that his life is _im_moral. To pronounce it immoral would be\nlike pronouncing immoral the life of the child, in whom the sense of\nright and wrong has not yet arisen. The savage is a child not only\nin intellect but also in moral feeling. As Bagehot says, \u201cWe may be\ncertain that the morality of prehistoric man was as imperfect and as\nrudimentary as his reason\u201d (_Physics and Politics_ (1873), p. 115).\n\n[32] \u201cAt the beginning of the developmental series stands the bare\nanimal impulse, stripped of all moral motives; at the end we have\nthe complete interpenetration of organic requirement and moral\nidea.\u201d--WUNDT, _Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_ (1908), p. 191.\n\n[33] See II, The Ethics of Industrialism, Chapter XVIII.\n\n[34] Respecting certain Brazilian tribes the naturalist Bates remarks:\n\u201cThe goodness of these Indians, like that of most others amongst whom\nI lived, consisted perhaps more in the absence of active bad qualities\nthan in the possession of good ones; in a word, it was negative rather\nthan positive\u201d (_The Naturalist on the River Amazon_). Cf. Edward\nHoward Griggs, _The New Humanism_, 6th ed., pp. 103 f.\n\n[35] For the relation of motherhood and infancy to the beginnings of\nmorality, see Fiske, _Cosmic Philosophy_ (1875), vol. ii, pp. 340 ff.\n\n[36] \u201cThe spring of virtuous action is the social instinct, which is\nset to work by the practice of comradeship.\u201d--CLIFFORD, _Lectures and\nEssays_ (1901), vol. ii, p. 253. Cf. Peabody, _The Approach to the\nSocial Question_ (1909), p. 149.\n\n[37] \u201cThis family worship (long-forgotten precursor of our modern\nfamily prayers) was always offered to the ancestors at the domestic\nhearth.\u201d--HELEN BOSANQUET, _The Family_ (1906), p. 18. Cf. Wundt,\n_Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_ (1908), p. 171.\n\n[38] The blessing offered at the daily family meal is presumptively a\nsurvival from the consecrated communal meal of the primitive kinship\ngroup.\n\n[39] When such an individual arises he becomes, if circumstances favor,\na lawgiver, and the age of law supersedes the age of custom. Morality\nnow consists in obedience to the law.\n\n[40] Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_\n(1906), vol. i, chap. ii, and passim.\n\n[41] \u201cIn early times the solidarity of the kinship is such that it does\nnot occur to the individual to regard as unjust a suffering which he\nendures in behalf of, or along with, his people.\u201d--EDWARD CAIRD, _The\nEvolution of Religion_ (1894), p. 37.\n\n[42] Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 283.\n\n[43] The system of collective responsibility arises in part, it is\ntrue, from the belief that sin is contagious and infects all persons\nrelated to the transgressor. Therefore the innocent members of the\nfamily or group of the transgressor may be put out of the way as a\nmerely preventive measure--not as a measure of justice or punishment.\nBut the ethical element is seldom or never absent and it is this which\ngives the conception its importance for the student of morals.\n\n[44] \u201cOutlawry from the clan is the most effective of all weapons,\nbecause in primitive society the exclusion of a man from his kinsfolk\nmeans he is delivered over to the first comer absolutely without\nprotection.\u201d--HOBHOUSE, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 90.\n\n[45] Gen. iv. 13, 14.\n\n[46] \u201cBlood atonement ... was one of the very earliest cases\nwe can find in which there was a notion of duty and social\nobligation.\u201d--SUMNER, _Folkways_ (1907), p. 506.\n\n[47] \u201cIt [the feud] is the Southern sense of the solidarity of the\nfamily in opposition to extreme Northern individualism.\u201d--WINES,\n_Punishment and Reformation_ (1895), p. 33.\n\n[48] On the _Lex talionis_ consult Westermarck, _The Origin and\nDevelopment of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, pp. 177 ff.; Hobhouse,\n_Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, pp. 84 ff.; Spencer, _Principles\nof Ethics_ (1892), vol. i, pp. 369 ff. The principle embodied in the\n_Lex talionis_ has played a large part in the jurisprudence of all\npeoples.\n\n[49] _The Religion of the Semites_ (1894), p. 267.\n\n[50] Seeck (_Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt_ (1901), Bd. i,\nS. 200) reminds us how the ancient German player when he had lost in a\ngame where the stake was his own liberty, honorably gave himself up as\nthe slave of the winner.\n\n[51] _The Truth about the Congo_ (1907), p. 29.\n\n[52] \u201cThroughout tribal life the stranger is a menace; he is a being to\nbe plundered because he is a being who plunders.... Native houses are\noften left for days or weeks, and it would be easy for any one to enter\nand rob them. Yet robbery among themselves is not common. To steal,\nhowever, from a white employer ... is no sin.\u201d--STARR, _The Truth about\nthe Congo_ (1907), pp. 28 f.\n\n[53] See VI, International Ethics: the New International Conscience, in\nChapter XVIII.\n\n[54] On this subject see Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of\nthe Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, chap. xxiv, \u201cHospitality.\u201d\n\n[55] Speaking of the duty of hospitality among the early Greeks,\nFarnell says, \u201cThe sanctity of the stranger guest ... was almost as\ngreat as the sanctity of the kinsman\u2019s life\u201d (_The Cults of the Greek\nStates_ (1896), vol. i, p. 73).\n\n[56] Without doubt other feelings and conceptions than purely ethical\nones are sometimes operative in the case of the guest right. The\nstranger may be kindly treated because of superstitious fears. Thus\nthe primitive man\u2019s notions of magic and sorcery may cause him to\nbe hospitable to the stranger through fear of the consequences of a\nrefusal, since untutored people are apt to attribute magical powers to\nthe stranger. See Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral\nIdeas_ (1906), vol. i, chap. xxiv.\n\n[57] Among some uncivilized peoples, however, where the population\nis thin and there is little competition wars are unknown. \u201cTo the\nGreenlander ... war is incomprehensible and repulsive, a thing for\nwhich their language has no word\u201d (Westermarck, _The Origin and\nDevelopment of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, p. 334).\n\n[58] Cannibalism springs from several roots. Sometimes savages eat the\nbody of the enemy slain in battle because they believe that thereby\nthey destroy the soul or double and thus secure themselves against its\nvengeance. Again the custom grows out of the belief that the virtues of\nthe victim pass into him who eats the flesh. But the most common motive\nis the subsistence motive. Indeed, many of the incessant wars waged by\nprimitive tribes are nothing more nor less than man-hunting expeditions\nfor securing food. Later these expeditions became raids for securing\nslaves.\n\n[59] Quoted by Letourneau, _La guerre dans les diverses races humaines_\n(1895), p. vi.\n\n[60] Often we find vestiges of the abandoned practice in what may be\ncalled celestial cannibalism (see W. Robertson Smith, _The Religion\nof the Semites_ (1894), p. 224). Thus the god of war of the Mexican\nAztecs and the gods of many Polynesian tribes were cannibals, for\nhuman sacrifices must be regarded as a sort of celestial cannibalism,\nwhen the offering is made in the belief that the god actually repasts\non the blood and the finer essences of the sacrificial victim. Where\nmen have thus made their gods like unto themselves, and the practice\nof cannibalism has been consecrated by religion, the gods, because\nreligion is always conservative, are certain to remain anthropophagi\nmuch longer than their worshipers. Consequently we find human\nsacrifices still lingering on as a kind of survival among peoples, as,\nfor instance, the Mexicans, who have themselves left far behind the\npractice of eating human flesh.\n\n[61] Letourneau, _La guerre dans les diverses races humaines_ (1895),\np. 185.\n\n[62] _Od._ i. 260.\n\n[63] Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_ (1892), vol. i, p. 350.\n\n[64] _Ibid._ vol. i, pp. 355 f.\n\n[65] _Ibid._ vol. i, pp. 368, 398, 401.\n\n[66] Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_ (1892), vol. i, pp. 359 f.\n\n[67] _Ibid._ vol. i, p. 349.\n\n[68] For the influence of the war ethics of the modern nations upon\ntheir peace ethics, see VI, International Ethics: the New International\nConscience, in Chapter XVIII.\n\n[69] Breasted, _A History of Egypt_ (1905), p. 65.\n\n[70] _Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt_ (1912), p.\n176.\n\n[71] Breasted, _Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt_\n(1912), p. 250.\n\n[72] Maspero, _The Dawn of Civilization_, p. 172.\n\n[73] This moralization of pure physical myths marks the advance of\nall races in culture and morality. As we shall see, Greek and Hebrew\nmythologies underwent just such an ethicalizing process.\n\n[74] Renouf, _The Religion of Ancient Egypt_ (1884), p. 73.\n\n[75] \u201cIt has long been recognized that the Egyptians had a much more\nhighly organized conscience than that of most other nations of early\ntimes.\u201d--PETRIE, _Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt_ (1898), p.\n86.\n\n[76] Maspero, _The Dawn of Civilization_, pp. 193 f.\n\n[77] Wiedemann, _The Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of\nthe Soul_ (1895), pp. 62 f.\n\n[78] Wiedemann, _The Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of\nthe Soul_ (1895), p. 64.\n\n[79] The same evolution is to be traced in China. \u201cImitations made of\nwood, clay, straw, paper, and of other material have been substituted\nfor the real things.... Slaves and servants, wives and concubines are\nalso burned, i.e., in paper imitations. They point back to the time\nwhen actual human sacrifices were the custom\u201d (De Groot, _The Religion\nof the Chinese_ (1910), p. 71).\n\n[80] _Primitive Culture_ (1874), vol. ii, p. 85.\n\n[81] Maspero, _The Dawn of Civilization_, pp. 187 ff.\n\n[82] Truthfulness was one of the cardinal virtues of the Egyptian\nideal. The requirements here were very exact: \u201cI have not altered a\nstory in the telling of it; I have repeated what I have heard just\nas it was told to me,\u201d are the words of one in the judgment hall of\nOsiris. Cf. Renouf, _The Religion of Ancient Egypt_ (1884), pp. 76 f.\n\n[83] _The Egyptian Book of the Dead_, tr. Davis, chap. cxxv.\n\n[84] _The Egyptian Book of the Dead_, tr. Davis, chap. cxxv.\n\n[85] Annihilation appears to have been the lot of the very wicked; but\nthe texts are not perfectly clear on this point. Consult Wiedemann,\n_The Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul_ (1895),\np. 55.\n\n[86] Here are six declarations of the confession which correspond\nalmost exactly with six of the Ten Commandments: (1) I have not\nblasphemed; (2) I have not stolen; (3) I have not slain any one\ntreacherously; (4) I have not slandered any one, or made false\naccusations; (5) I have not reviled the face of my father; (6) I have\nnot eaten my heart through with envy. See Rawlinson, _History of\nAncient Egypt_, 2d ed., vol. i, p. 142.\n\n[87] Petrie, _Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt_ (1898), p. 135.\n\n[88] _Ibid._ p. 162.\n\n[89] \u201cIn this judgment the Egyptian introduced for the first time in\nthe history of man the fully developed idea that the future destiny of\nthe dead must be dependent entirely upon the ethical quality of the\nearthly life, the idea of future responsibility,--of which we found\nthe first traces in the Old Kingdom\u201d (Breasted, _A History of Egypt_\n(1905), p. 173). Professor Breasted suggests a connection between the\ngrowth of the ideal of an ethical ordeal in the hereafter with the\ndiscontinuance of the building of immense pyramids. He says: \u201cIt is\nimpossible to contemplate the colossal tombs of the Fourth Dynasty,\nso well known as the pyramids of Gizeh, and to contrast them with the\ncomparatively diminutive royal tombs which follow in the next two\ndynasties, without ... discerning more than exclusively political\ncauses behind this sudden and startling change.... The recognition of\na judgment and the requirement of moral worthiness in the hereafter\n... marked a transition from reliance on agencies external to the\npersonality of the dead to dependence on inner values. Immortality\nbegan to make its appeal as a thing achieved in a man\u2019s own soul\u201d\n(_Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt_ (1912), pp. 178\nf.).\n\n[90] _Records of the Past_, New Series, vol. iii. For extended comments\non the maxims of Ptah-hotep, see Am\u00e9lineau, _Essai sur l\u2019\u00e9volution\nhistorique et philosophique des id\u00e9es morales dans l\u2019Egypt ancienne_\n(1895), pp. 93 ff.\n\n[91] Budge, _Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life_ (1899), p. ii.\n\n[92] For other documents of this age which embody the same spirit\nof social justice as the precepts of Ptah-hotep, see Breasted,\n_Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt_ (1912), lect.\nvii.\n\n[93] Am\u00e9lineau, _Essai_, pp. 140 f.\n\n[94] Alongside slavery proper there existed the system of serfdom, the\nnature of which is revealed by the history of the Children of Israel\nin Lower Egypt. The status of the Egyptian serf appears to have been\nsomewhat like that of the Helots of Laconia in Greece. If we rightly\ninterpret the Biblical account of the servitude of the Children of\nIsrael, the number of serfs, if their increase seemed dangerous, was\nkept down by enforced infanticide (Ex. i. 7\u201322).\n\n[95] Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l\u2019histoire de l\u2019humanit\u00e9_, t. i, p. 321.\n\n[96] Am\u00e9lineau, _Essai_, p. 344. The monotheist Ikhnaton (Amenhotep\nIV), the reform Pharaoh of the Eighteenth Dynasty, it is true, pursued\nthroughout his reign a peace policy, but this policy manifestly was\ndictated by temperament, or the king\u2019s preoccupation with religious\naffairs, and not by moral scruples. His reform was essentially a\nreligious and not a social or moral one. Not one of the historical\ndocuments of the age contains a word in condemnation of war as\ninherently wrong (see Breasted, _Ancient Records of Egypt_ (1906), vol.\nii, pp. 382\u2013419), though in these \u201cthe customary glorying in war has\nalmost disappeared\u201d (Petrie, _A History of Egypt_ (1896), vol. ii, p.\n218).\n\n[97] This, however, must not be regarded as wholly an act of wanton\nsavagery. The killing of his prisoners by the king was probably a sort\nof sacrifice in honor of the god who had given him victory over his\nenemies. See Am\u00e9lineau, _Essai_, p. 12.\n\n[98] _Essai_, p. ix; see also p. 252, n. 1.\n\n[99] For the influence of the moral ideas of Egypt on Greece, see\nAm\u00e9lineau, _Essai_, chap. xii, pp. 359\u2013399; Wiedemann, _The Ancient\nEgyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul_ (1895), p. x; and\nToy, _Judaism and Christianity_ (1891), p. 387.\n\n[100] Petrie, _Egypt and Israel_ (1911), p. 133.\n\n[101] Demonism here was not, as it was and is in China (p. 55), a\nmoral educator of the people, for the reason that the spirits were not\nconceived as the avengers of wrongdoing, but were thought to molest\nindifferently the good and the bad.\n\n[102] It is not possible, however, to draw a definite chronological\nline between the nonethical and the ethical texts. Cf. Jastrow, _The\nReligion of Babylonia and Assyria_ (1898), p. 297.\n\n[103] King, _Babylonian Religion and Mythology_ (1899), p. 220.\n\n[104] The nature myths constituting the epic literature of the\nBabylonians, which consisted largely of elaborate tales of the struggle\nbetween the gods of light and the powers of darkness, were never\nmoralized like the Egyptian myth of Osiris and Set, or the Iranian myth\nof Ahura Mazda and Ahriman.\n\n[105] Here are a few lines of a penitential prayer or psalm:\n\n O my god who art angry with me, accept my prayer;\n\n * * * * *\n\n May my sins be forgiven, my transgressions be wiped out.\n May the ban be loosened, the chain broken,\n May the seven winds carry off my sighs.\n Let me tear away my iniquity, let the birds carry it to heaven;\n\n * * * * *\n\n May the beasts of the field take it away from me,\n The flowing waters of the stream wash me clean.\n Let me be pure like the sheen of gold.\n\n JASTROW, _The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria_ (1898), p. 323.\n\n\n[106] Cf. above, p. 35.\n\n[107] The stele which bore this code of laws was discovered at Susa in\n1901\u20131902. The reign of Hammurabi is placed at about the end of the\nthird millennium B.C. There are translations of the code by C.\u00a0H.\u00a0W.\nJohns (1903) and Robert Francis Harper (1904).\n\n[108] \u201cIf a man owe a debt and Adad [god of storms] inundate his field\nand carry away the produce, or, through lack of water, grain have\nnot grown in the field, in that year he shall not make any return of\ngrain to the creditor, he shall alter his contract-tablet and he shall\nnot pay the interest for that year.\u201d--_Code_, sec. 48. [We have used\nthroughout Harper\u2019s translation.]\n\n[109] _Code_, secs. 196, 197, 200. Cf. similar provisions of the Mosaic\ncode: Ex. xxi. 23\u201325; Deut. xix. 21.\n\n[110] _Ibid._ secs. 209, 210.\n\n[111] _Ibid._ secs. 229, 230.\n\n[112] The provisions read: \u201cIf a man aid a male or female slave of the\npalace, or a male or female slave of a freeman to escape from the city\ngate, he shall be put to death.\u201d\n\n\u201cIf a man harbor in his home a male or female slave who has fled from\nthe palace or from a freeman, and do not bring him [the slave] forth\nat the call of the commandant, the owner of that house shall be put to\ndeath\u201d (_Code_, secs. 15, 16).\n\n[113] Maspero, _The Dawn of Civilization_, p. 744.\n\n[114] Taylor, _Ancient Ideals_ (1896), vol. i, p. 41.\n\n[115] _Records of the Past_, New Series, vol. ii, pp. 143 ff.\n\n[116] \u201cThe white man has no doubt committed great barbarities upon\nthe savage, but he does not like to speak of them, and when necessity\ncompels a reference he has always something to say of manifest destiny,\nthe advance of civilization and the duty of shouldering the white\nman\u2019s burden in which he pays tribute to a higher ethical conscience\u201d\n(Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 27). King Leopold\nmay have been responsible for barbarities committed against the natives\nof the Kongo as atrocious as those of the Assyrians, but he paid\ntribute to the modern conscience by refraining from portraying them in\nimperishable marble at The Hague.\n\n[117] Cf. Martin, _The Lore of Cathay_ (1901), p. 226.\n\n[118] Though the people are shut out from participation in the state\nworship, they have set up for themselves a multitude of local shrines\nwhere they worship the spirits of almost every earthly thing, such as\nmountains, rivers, trees, and rocks. \u201cMen debarred from communion with\nthe Great Spirit resorted more eagerly to inferior spirits, to spirits\nof the fathers, and to spirits generally.... The accredited worship of\nancestors, with that of the departed great added to it, was not enough\nto satisfy the cravings of men\u2019s minds.\u201d (Legge, _The Religions of\nChina_ (1881), p. 176).\n\n[119] _The Lore of Cathay_ (1901), p. 274.\n\n[120] Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_ (1883), vol. ii, p. 239.\n\n[121] We do not mention Buddhism in this connection for the reason\nthat it is not possible to trace any decisive influence, save in\nthe promotion of toleration, that this system has exercised upon\nChinese morality. Buddhism enjoins celibacy, and this, like Christian\nasceticism, is in radical opposition to the genius of Confucianism.\nFor this reason, in conjunction with others,--among these its early\ndegeneracy,--Buddhism has remained practically inert as an ethical\nforce in Chinese society. What little influence it has exerted has been\nconfined almost wholly to the monasteries.\n\n[122] \u201cThe dread of spirits is the nightmare of the Chinaman\u2019s\nlife.\u201d--LEGGE, _The Religions of China_ (1881), p. 197.\n\n[123] _The Religion of the Chinese_ (1910), p. 34.\n\n[124] The Taoist doctrines are contained in the _Tao-teh-king_,\nsupposed to have been written by Lao-tsze, a sage who lived in the\nfifth century B.C. The religion which grew out of his philosophy became\nin time degenerate, absorbed the worst elements of Buddhism, and is\nto-day a system of gross superstitions, magic, and sorcery, which has\nundeniably a blighting effect upon morality.\n\n[125] De Groot, _The Religion of the Chinese_ (1910), pp. 139 ff.\n\n[126] _Ibid._ 138.\n\n[127] Legge, _The Religions of China_ (1881), p. 229.\n\n[128] De Groot, _The Religion of the Chinese_ (1910), p. 143.\n\n[129] Nietzscheism is in essence at one with Taoism. Nietzsche insists\nthat man should behave as Nature behaves; for instance, that the\nstrong should prey upon the weak. The difference between Lao-tsze and\nNietzsche lies in their different readings of the essential qualities\nof the universe. See below, p. 355.\n\n[130] Taoism is too lofty a doctrine for the multitude. They are\nenjoined to imitate the ancient sages, and as these imitated the way\nof heaven and earth, in imitating them they are really imitating the\nuniverse.\n\n[131] De Groot, _The Religion of the Chinese_ (1910), p. 143.\n\n[132] The imitation of the qualities of nature \u201chave given existence\nto important state institutions, considered to be for the nation and\nrulers matters of life and death.\u201d (De Groot, _The Religion of the\nChinese_ (1910), p. 139).\n\n[133] _The Works of Mencius_ (The Chinese Classics, 2d ed., vol. ii),\nbk. vi, pt. i, chap. ii, 2.\n\n[134] \u201cThis inference [that man is naturally good] comes into\nprominence in the classics as a dogma, and therefore has been the\nprincipal basis of all Taoistic and Confucian ethics to this day\u201d (De\nGroot, _The Religion of the Chinese_ (1910), p. 137). Every schoolboy\nis taught this doctrine: \u201cMan commences life with a virtuous nature\u201d\n(Martin, _The Lore of Cathay_ (1901), p. 217).\n\n[135] _The Works of Mencius_, bk. vii, pt. i, chap. ii, 2. And so\nConfucius: \u201cAn accordance with this nature [man\u2019s] is called the Path\nof Duty\u201d (_The Doctrine of the Mean_, chap. i; The Chinese Classics, 2d\ned., vol. i).\n\n[136] _The Works of Mencius_, bk. vi, pt. i, chap. vii, 2, 3.\n\n[137] _Confucian Analects_ (The Chinese Classics, 2d ed., vol. i),\nbk. xvii, chap. ii. The student of biology will see in this view an\nanticipation of the latest teaching of modern science in respect to the\nrelative importance of heredity and education in the determining of\ncharacter.\n\n[138] \u201cThere is nothing in this world so dangerous for the national\nsafety, public health and welfare as heterodoxy, which means acts,\ninstitutions, doctrines not based upon the classics.\u201d--DE GROOT, _The\nReligion of the Chinese_ (1910), p. 48.\n\n[139] Confucius thus describes himself: \u201cA transmitter and not a maker,\nbelieving in and loving the ancients\u201d (_Confucian Analects_, bk. vii,\nchap. i).\n\n[140] _The Religions of China_ (1881), p. 255.\n\n[141] Chinese literature bears unique testimony to the high\nconsideration in which the virtue of filial devotion and reverence is\nheld. It abounds in anecdotes exalting this virtue, holding up great\nexemplars of it for imitation by the Chinese youth. See Doolittle,\n_Social Life of the Chinese_.\n\n[142] _The Hsiao King_ (Sacred Books of the East, vol. iii), chap.\nxviii.\n\n[143] _Ibid._ chap. xi.\n\n[144] Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_ (1868), p. 103.\n\n[145] _Ibid._ p. 103.\n\n[146] _China in Law and Commerce_ (1905), p. 34.\n\n[147] \u201cThe chief characteristic of Chinese society and the essence of\nChinese morality is reverence for the past.\u201d--REINSCH, _World Politics_\n(1900), p. 90.\n\n[148] _The Great Learning_ (The Chinese Classics, 2d ed., vol. i),\nchap. iii, 5.\n\n[149] _Confucian Analects_, bk. xi, chap. xv, 3.\n\n[150] It is interesting to compare the portraiture of The Princely Man,\nas depicted by the pagan Chinese moralist, with that of The Prince, as\nportrayed by Machiavelli.\n\n[151] \u201cThe standard of excellence [in The Princely Man] is placed so\nhigh as to be absolutely unattainable by unaided human nature; and\nthough [the author] probably intended to elevate the character of his\ngrandfather [Confucius] to this height, and thus hand him down to\nfuture ages as a _shing jin_, or \u2018perfect and holy man,\u2019 he has in\nthe providence of God done his countrymen great service in setting\nbefore them such a character as is here given in the _Chung Yung_.\nBy being made a text-book in the schools it has been constantly\nstudied and memorized by generations of students to their great\nbenefit.\u201d--WILLIAMS, _The Middle Kingdom_ (1883), vol. i, pp. 655 f.\n\n[152] _Confucian Analects_, bk. viii, chap. xii.\n\n[153] _The Great Learning_ (text), par. 5.\n\n[154] Quoted by Pfleiderer, _Religions and Historic Faiths_, p. 96.\n\n[155] _The Great Learning_, chap. x, 22.\n\n[156] _The Works of Mencius_, bk. vi, pt. ii, chap. xiii, 6.\n\n[157] _The Great Learning_, chap. ix, 8.\n\n[158] _Confucian Analects_, bk. xii, chap. xix.\n\n[159] _The Great Learning_, chap. x, 21.\n\n[160] _Confucian Analects_, bk. xiii, chap. xi.\n\n[161] Okakura-Kakuzo, _The Ideals of the East_ (1905), p. 239.\n\n[162] Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 265.\n\n[163] _The Works of Mencius_, bk. vi, pt. ii, chap. viii, 8.\n\n[164] _Ibid._ bk. vii, pt. ii, chap. iv, 1.\n\n[165] _Ibid._ bk. vii, pt. ii, chap. ii, 1. While denouncing the\nessential wickedness of war, Mencius sanctioned rebellion against a\ntyrannical and wicked ruler.\n\n[166] _The Great Learning_, chap. vi, 2.\n\n[167] _The Works of Mencius_, bk. iv, pt. i, chap. xx.\n\n[168] _Confucian Analects_, bk. iii, chap. iv, 3.\n\n[169] _Ibid._ bk. iv, chap. xv, 2.\n\n[170] _Ibid._ bk. vi, chap. xvii.\n\n[171] _Ibid._ bk. ix, chap. xvii.\n\n[172] _Ibid._ bk. xv, chap. xxiii. The same precept is found in bk.\nxii, chap. ii, of the _Analects_, and also in _The Doctrine of the\nMean_, chap. xiii, 3.\n\n[173] _The Works of Mencius_, bk. vii, pt. i, chap. xvii.\n\n[174] _Ibid._ bk. iv, pt. ii, chap. xii.\n\n[175] _Ibid._ bk. vi, pt. i, chap. x, 1.\n\n[176] _Confucian Analects_, bk. vii, chap. xv.\n\n[177] _The Works of Mencius_, bk. vi, pt. ii, chap. xv, 2.\n\n[178] _Ibid._ bk. vi, pt. ii, chap. xv, 5.\n\n[179] _Ibid._ bk. vii, pt. i, chap. xviii, 1.\n\n[180] The Chinese pay worship, it is true, to the multitude of inferior\ngods of Buddhism, but there is little in these cults calculated to\nawaken and discipline the moral feelings.\n\n[181] _The Religions of China_ (1881), p. 256.\n\n[182] See Colquhuon, _China in Transformation_ (1898), p. 189.\n\n[183] Reinsch, _World Politics_ (1900), p. 98. In their relations with\nforeigners the Chinese bankers have won an enviable reputation for\nintegrity and the scrupulous observance of engagements. The word of a\nChinaman in financial matters is his bond.\n\n[184] _The Lore of Cathay_ (1901), p. 214.\n\n[185] Froebel has an illuminating comment on the danger to true\nmorality that lurks here: \u201cA life whose ideal value has been perfectly\nestablished in experience never aims to serve as a model in its form,\nbut only in its essence, in its spirit. It is the greatest mistake to\nsuppose that spiritual, human perfection can serve as a model in its\nform. This accounts for the common experience that the taking of such\nexternal manifestations of perfection as examples, instead of elevating\nmankind, checks, nay, represses, its development\u201d (_The Education of\nMan_, pt. i, sec. 10).\n\n[186] Etiquette has been well defined as \u201cthe formal expression of\ncourtesy,\u201d and courtesy as \u201cmorality in trifles.\u201d In Japan, as Kikuchi\ninforms us, etiquette forms a part of the moral instruction in the\nschools. See Sadler, _Moral Instruction and Training in Schools_, vol.\nii, p. 342.\n\n[187] Edward A. Ross (_The Changing Chinese_ (1911), p. 193) says\nnative authorities admit that from one tenth to one twentieth of the\ngirl infants are abandoned or made away with.\n\n[188] \u201cFemale infanticide in some parts is openly confessed and\ndivested of all disgrace and penalties everywhere\u201d (Williams, _The\nMiddle Kingdom_ (1883), vol. i, p. 836). Jernigan, however, says, \u201cWhen\ncarried to the extreme there is a public sentiment in China which\ncondemns it, and there are official proclamations against infanticide\u201d\n(_China in Law and Commerce_ (1905), p. 123).\n\n[189] The primitive kinship group is a characteristic feature of\nChinese society. \u201cThousands of Chinese villages comprise exclusively\npersons having the same surname and the same ancestors\u201d (A.\u00a0H. Smith,\n_Chinese Characteristics_ (1894), p. 226). \u201cI have seen a town of\n25,000 people, all belonging to the same clan and bearing the same\nfamily name\u201d (Martin, _The Lore of Cathay_ (1901), p. 272). Along with\nthis clan constitution of society goes the principle of collective\nresponsibility. The group is to a great degree held responsible for\nthe conduct of each of its members. In case of serious crime, as, for\ninstance, treason, all the male adult members of the criminal\u2019s family\nare punished along with the offender (Westermarck, _The Origin and\nDevelopment of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, p. 45). Recently the\npunishment of relatives of the offender has been abolished in certain\ncases.\n\n[190] The efforts of the Chinese government to put an end to the use of\nopium among its subjects--the anti-opium decree was issued in 1906--is\nthe most noteworthy matter in the recent moral history of China. This\nmovement is motived by moral feeling as truly as is the movement among\nourselves for the suppression of the liquor traffic. It is, in the\nwords of Professor Edward A. Ross, \u201cthe most extensive warfare on a\nvicious private habit that the world has ever known\u201d (_The Changing\nChinese_ (1911), p. 146).\n\n[191] \u201cThe Emperor is sacred and inviolable.\u201d--_Japanese Constitution_,\nart. iii.\n\n[192] The state in Japan occupies the place of the Church with us.\n\u201cTo look up to the state as a sacred institution has always been\ncharacteristic of the people, and from the great work of the recent\nreformation onward there has not been a single event of national\nconsequence which has not originated in this peculiar turn of mind\u201d\n(Count Okuma, _Fifty Years of New Japan_ (1909), vol. ii, p. 559).\n\n[193] Corresponding to the knights in European feudalism were the\nsamurai, above them the daimios, and at the head of the system the\nShogun.\n\n[194] Japanese boys and men, Dr. William Elliot Griffis affirms, are\n\u201cmore tender and careful with all living creatures than are those of\nChristendom\u201d (_The Religions of Japan_ (1895), p. 294). Buddhism caused\nin large measure the disuse of flesh for food.\n\n[195] This word means \u201cthe way of the warrior,\u201d or \u201cthe rule of\nknighthood.\u201d\n\n[196] Nitob\u00e9, _Bushido: the Soul of Japan_, p. 98. The edition cited\nthroughout this chapter is that of G.\u00a0P. Putnam\u2019s Sons, 1905. The\nIntroduction is by William Elliot Griffis.\n\n[197] Nitob\u00e9, _Bushido_, p. 32.\n\n[198] _Ibid._ p. 30.\n\n[199] For the subject of the downfall of feudalism and the Restoration,\nsee Count Okuma, _Fifty Years of New Japan_ (1909), vol. i, chap. ii.\n\n[200] Nitob\u00e9, _Bushido_, p. 189.\n\n[201] Baron Kikuchi, in Sadler, _Moral Instruction and Training in\nSchools_ (1908), vol. ii, p. 323.\n\n[202] Scherer, _What is Japanese Morality?_ (1906), p. 10.\n\n[203] Nitob\u00e9, _Bushido_, p. vi.\n\n[204] The works of Moli\u00e8re, it is said, have been put under the ban\nof the censor in Japan and their circulation forbidden, for the\nreason that Moli\u00e8re ridicules old age, and constantly, like the comic\nsupplement of the newspapers, \u201cmakes some father the butt of jokes and\ngross wit by his child or children.\u201d\n\n[205] \u201cAny social system of which filial piety is not the moral cement;\nany social system in which children leave their parents in order to\nestablish families of their own; any social system in which it is\nconsidered not only natural but right to love wife and child more\nthan the author of one\u2019s being; any social system in which marriage\ncan be decided independently of the will of parents, by the mutual\ninclination of the young people themselves; any social system in which\nthe mother-in-law is not entitled to the obedient service of the\ndaughter-in-law, appears to him [the Japanese] of necessity a state of\nlife scarcely better than that of the birds of the air and the beasts\nof the field, or at best a sort of moral chaos.\u201d--LAFCADIO HEARN, _Out\nof the East_ (1895), p. 89.\n\n[206] Okakura-Kakuzo, _The Awakening of Japan_ (1904), p. 179. Romantic\nlove is almost unknown in Japan. B.\u00a0H. Chamberlain affirms that in a\nresidence of twenty-eight years he heard of only one love match, and\nthen the young people had been brought up in America.\n\n[207] _Out of the East_ (1985), p. 80.\n\n[208] Five per cent of the men have concubines.\n\n[209] \u201cThe central idea in Japanese life is obedience to parents and\nreverence for ancestors. Should a Japanese father have misfortunes, his\ndaughter would think it her filial duty to sell her body. She would not\nbe regarded as fallen and disgraced, but as having done a right and\nnoble deed, and might afterwards be restored to her place in society.\nBut, though it is hard to explain, the Japanese woman is as chaste\nand pure and exalted in her ideas of womanhood as any woman on the\nglobe.\u201d--SIR EDWIN ARNOLD (in an interview).\n\n[210] Bacon, _Japanese Girls and Women_ (1891), p. 121.\n\n[211] Chamberlain, _Things Japanese_, 4th ed., p. 220. By \u201cthe ancient\nway\u201d is meant _hara-kiri_, or disemboweling. The death by his own hand\nof General Nogi, the hero of Port Arthur, during the funeral of his\ndeparted sovereign Mutsuhito (September 13, 1912), reveals another\nmotive for suicide which is wholly foreign to our modes of thought\nand feeling. \u201cIn very early, almost prehistoric, times the custom of\n_jun-shi_, or dying with the master, led to the interment of living\nJapanese retainers with their dead lord. The custom gradually died\nout, but voluntary suicide as a means of showing personal devotion\nor attachment to a master or superior persisted for many centuries\u201d\n(George Kennan, \u201cThe Death of General Nogi,\u201d New York _Outlook_ for\nOctober 5, 1912). It was this ancient custom that Count Nogi followed.\n\u201cWhen all was over\u201d--such is Mr. Kennan\u2019s interpretation of his\nact--\u201che ended his own life as an expression of his boundless devotion\nto the man whom he had loved. It was in the spirit of Old Japan,\nbut Nogi was a man of that era, and lived in the mental and moral\natmosphere of that time.\u201d\n\n[212] Japanese feudalism began about the eleventh century. The year\n1868 saw its final downfall.\n\n[213] Nitob\u00e9, _Bushido_, p. 99.\n\n[214] Okakura-Kakuzo, _The Awakening of Japan_ (1904), p. 175. Count\nOkuma makes a similar assertion: \u201cThe humanitarian efforts which in the\ncourse of the recent war were so much in evidence, and which so much\nsurprised Western nations, were not, as might have been thought, the\nproducts of the new civilization, but survivals of our ancient feudal\nchivalry\u201d (_Fifty Years of New Japan_ (1909), vol. i, p. 124). By no\npeople has the Red Cross movement been taken up with greater enthusiasm\nthan by the Japanese.\n\n[215] Consult Count Okuma, _Fifty Years of New Japan_ (1909), vol. ii,\npp. 566 f.\n\n[216] \u201cThe obloquy attached to the calling brought within its pale such\nas cared little for social repute\u201d (Nitob\u00e9, _Bushido_, p. 66). \u201cThe\ntrades-people,\u201d writes Chamberlain, \u201cstood at the very bottom of the\nscale. The hucksters or traders were a degraded class in old Japan, and\ndegraded their business morals remain, which is the principal cause\nof the difficulties experienced by European merchants in dealing with\nthem\u201d (_Things Japanese_, 4th ed., p. 93).\n\n[217] Nitob\u00e9, _Bushido_, p. 67.\n\n[218] The statement has obtained wide currency that all the banks in\nJapan employ only Chinese as cashiers because they cannot find honest\nJapanese for these positions of trust. Chinese are sometimes employed\nin Japanese banks, but the true reason for their employment is not the\none here assigned. One well qualified to speak authoritatively on this\nsubject says:\n\n Chinese bankers and cashiers are largely Shansi men, that is,\n men from the province of Shansi, where the profession of banking\n has become hereditary in a large number of families. They are\n all, or nearly all, members of the powerful organization known\n as the Bankers\u2019 Guild, which has branches in every part of the\n Empire. The Bankers\u2019 Guild has discovered that it is practically\n impossible to conduct large financial operations without honesty;\n and it therefore enforces honesty by means of a discipline that\n is as rigorous ... as that of the New York Stock Exchange.... If\n a Chinese banker breaks faith, violates a contract, or betrays a\n trust, he is expelled from his guild and the doors of banks are\n closed against him for all time. In the first place, therefore, the\n Chinese cashier is honest because honesty is a condition of his\n business existence. He may not be honest in other respects,--often\n he is not,--but he is absolutely honest in the handling of money.\n In the second place, he is probably the most expert man living in\n the rapid calculation of exchanges. The monetary system of his\n country is the most confused, chaotic, and complicated system in\n the world. There are fifteen or twenty different kinds of taels,\n no one of which bears a fixed relation to any other, or to any\n established monetary standard.... The necessity of dealing in some\n way with this great mass of unstable and fluctuating currency and\n of earning a subsistence from it has made the Chinese cashier one\n of the most expert of living accountants. He will solve difficult\n monetary problems by short cuts of mental arithmetic, and he\n calculates exchanges to eight points of decimals. In the third\n place, the Chinese cashier counts and manipulates bank bills and\n coins with extraordinary skill and accuracy. I have had dealings\n with him in many parts of the Far East, but I cannot remember ever\n to have seen him count a sum of money twice, and I have never\n caught him in an error....\n\n Now, when you get a man whose honesty is guaranteed by his guild,\n whose manipulation of money is phenomenally dexterous, and who can\n calculate exchanges to eight points of decimals, you have an ideal\n cashier; and if Japanese bankers employ him, it shows their good\n business sense rather than their distrust of their own people. But\n all Japanese bankers do not employ him. In some of the largest\n banks in Tokyo, Kioto, and Osaka there are no Chinese at all--or\n at least I have never seen any. This explanation would not be\n worth, perhaps, the space that I have given to it, if the story of\n the Chinese cashier had not been so widely circulated, and if it\n were not typical of a whole class of cases in which the Japanese\n are misjudged on the basis of a single incident or a solitary\n fact.--GEORGE KENNAN, \u201cAre the Japanese Honest?\u201d the New York\n _Outlook_ for August 31, 1912.\n\n\n[219] \u201cIf the descendants of the samurai can erect a standard of\ncommercial integrity at all comparable to their fine record for courage\nand loyalty, we shall be their debtors, not they ours.\u201d--The New York\n_Nation_ for July 30, 1908, p. 90.\n\n[220] Baron Kikuchi, in Sadler, _Moral Instruction and Training in\nSchools_ (1908), vol. ii, p. 343.\n\n[221] Baron Kikuchi, in Sadler, _Moral Instruction and Training in\nSchools_ (1908), vol. ii, p. 331.\n\n[222] _Ibid._ vol. ii, p. 319.\n\n[223] _Ibid._ vol. ii, p. 230.\n\n[224] \u201cI certainly consider that the courage and devotion of the\nJapanese soldiers during the late war was to a great extent the result\nof this systematic moral instruction and training in schools.\u201d--BARON\nKIKUCHI, in Sadler, _Moral Instruction and Training in Schools_ (1908),\nvol. ii, p. 344.\n\n[225] Wedgwood (_The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 22) suggestively\nlikens the reduction to unity of the various gods of polytheism to\nthe correlation of the physical forces--light, heat, electricity,\nand magnetism. Just as all these are found to be merely different\nmanifestations of a single force or energy, so are all the deified\nphenomena of nature at last discovered to be but different\nmanifestations of a single primal power--the One, the Supreme, the\nEternal. This correlation of the gods, this reduction of polytheism to\nmonotheism, holds the same place in the records of the religious and\nmoral evolution of the race that the correlation of the physical forces\nholds in the records of the progress of science.\n\n[226] There may be some philosophers and scientists who profess\nmaterialism, and who make an infinite and eternal unconscious energy\nthe primal cause of all things. But this is a philosophy of the\nuniverse which has never secured a wide acceptance in the West.\n\n[227] Oldenberg, _Buddha_ (1882), p. 59.\n\n[228] Hopkins, _The Religions of India_ (1895), p. 356.\n\n[229] This was the work of the Brahmans, who, to secure the ascendancy\nof their own class, falsified and misinterpreted the sacred books.\n\n[230] _Laws of Manu_ (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxv), i. 31, 87.\n\n[231] Cf. Hearn, _Kokora_, chap. xii.\n\n[232] _Laws of Manu_, vi. 63.\n\n[233] _Ibid._ xii. 9, 53\u201358. The germs out of which this system was\ndeveloped by the Brahmans formed a part of the animistic conception of\nthe world held by the conquered natives. By the sixth century B.C. the\nsystem had been fully elaborated. See Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures_\n(1881), pp. 16 f.\n\n[234] The theory was also undoubtedly in part the creation of the same\nethical necessity that called into existence the purgatory of the\nmedieval Church. The reincarnations have for aim and purpose not merely\nretribution, but expiation and purification.\n\n[235] The reader of Edward Beecher\u2019s _The Conflict of Ages_, wherein\nthe author attempts to explain the inequalities of earthly life by\nthe theory of pre\u00ebxistence, will be able to appreciate this effort of\nIndian philosophers to solve the same problem.\n\n[236] Indian pessimism is doubtless to be attributed in part to the\nhot, depressing climate, but more largely to the burdensome caste\nsystem and an oppressive government, which made free and joyous life\nimpossible to the masses, shutting them up, without hope, to an\nexistence of ache and pain and wretchedness. \u201cPolitics and society,\nin our opinion,\u201d says Dr. Hopkins, \u201chad more to do with altering the\nreligion of India than had a higher temperature and miasma\u201d (_The\nReligions of India_ (1895), p. 199). But cf. Bloomfield, _The Religion\nof the Veda_ (1908), pp. 263 ff.\n\n[237] Hopkins, _The Religions of India_ (1895), p. 149.\n\n[238] _Ibid._ p. 187.\n\n[239] This Brahmanic notion of sacrifice, that the gods need food,\nis the underlying notion in all religions of which sacrifices form\na part. \u201cThat the purpose of sacrifice was simply to feed the gods\nwas admitted on all sides in the controversy which accompanied the\ndiffusion of Christianity in the ancient world.... The altar, in the\nwords of Dean Spenser, was merely the table on which food and drink\nwere set before the languishing deity\u201d (Payne, _History of the New\nWorld called America_ (1892), vol. i, pp. xi f.). \u201cIt is on precisely\nthe same principle that the Mexicans kept their great war-gods ...\nalive and vigorous by the blood of young human victims selected from\ntheir tributaries, and the Peruvians maintained the Creator, Sun, Moon,\nand Thunder, on whose favor their crops depended, in youth and vigor by\nthe continual smoke of burnt llamas\u201d (_Ibid._ vol. i, p. 484). Consult\nalso Frazer, _Adonis, Attis, and Osiris_. All these were divinities of\nvegetation, which were believed to die and to come to life again, as\nwith the revolution of the seasons vegetation died and was renewed.\nAlong with this belief went the notion that by magical ceremonies\nthe worshipers of the gods could aid them in recovering their wasted\nenergies.\n\n[240] _Laws of Manu_, i. 88\u201391.\n\n[241] _Ibid._ i. 93.\n\n[242] _Ibid._ ii. 32, 35.\n\n[243] _The Gentoo Code_ (1776), xvi. 1.\n\n[244] _Laws of Manu_, iv. 80, 81.\n\n[245] _Ibid._ viii. 379.\n\n[246] _Ibid._ viii. 380.\n\n[247] _Ibid._ viii. 381.\n\n[248] _Ibid._ iv. 147.\n\n[249] _Laws of Manu_, xi. 247.\n\n[250] _Ibid._ iv. 148.\n\n[251] Even the sudra is not shut out from this hope. If he be pure, the\nfaithful servant of his betters, gentle in his speech and free from\npride, he will at death be reborn into a higher caste (_Laws of Manu_,\nix. 335).\n\n[252] _Laws of Manu_, xi. 60, 69, 71, 72, 132\u2013138, 140\u2013142, 144.\nEspecially severe is the penance imposed for killing a cow. See _Ibid._\nxi. 109\u2013117.\n\n[253] _Ibid._ vi. 68.\n\n[254] _Ibid._ vi. 69.\n\n[255] It is better, however, to abstain wholly from the use of meat,\nsince this can be obtained only through pain to sentient beings (_Laws\nof Manu_, v. 48). There is no sin in eating meat, \u201cbut abstention\nbrings great rewards\u201d (_Ibid._ v. 56).\n\n[256] _Laws of Manu_, v. 40.\n\n[257] _Ibid._ v. 45.\n\n[258] _Ibid._ vii. 101.\n\n[259] _Ibid._ vii. 103.\n\n[260] _Laws of Manu_, vii. 90\u201393, 104.\n\n[261] _Ibid._ viii. 84.\n\n[262] _Ibid._ v. 106.\n\n[263] _Ibid._ xi. 231.\n\n[264] _Ibid._ vi. 48.\n\n[265] _Ibid._ viii. 312.\n\n[266] _Laws of Manu_, viii. 313.\n\n[267] Gautama or Buddha, \u201cThe Enlightened,\u201d the founder of Buddhism,\ndied about B.C. 480. Long before he began his teachings moral reform\nwas in the air in India. Many reforming sects came into existence. The\nmost important of these was the sect of the Jains. The central teaching\nof Jainism is the sacredness of all life, and its first and chief\ncommandment, Do no harm to any living thing. Its spirit of universal\nbenevolence left a deep impress not only upon Buddhism but also upon\nlater Hinduism.\n\n[268] _Dhammapada_ (Sacred Books of the East, 2d ed., vol. x), xiv.\n190, 191. Cf. Oldenberg, _Buddha_ (1882), p. 209.\n\n[269] Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 286.\n\n[270] Cf. Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures_ (1881), p. 21; Hopkins, _The\nReligions of India_ (1895), pp. 316 f.\n\n[271] Oldenberg, _Buddha_ (1882), p. 220.\n\n[272] _Dhammapada_, xx. 283. This doctrine that peace and contentment\nof mind come through suppression of desire was also the teaching of the\nGreek Cynics.\n\n[273] \u201cNo sentient being can tell in what state the karma that he\npossesses will appoint his next birth, though he may be now, and\ncontinue to be until death, one of the most meritorious of men. In that\nkarma may be the crime of murder, committed many ages ago, but not\nyet expiated; and in the next existence its punishment may have to be\nendured. There will ultimately be a reward for that which is good, but\nit may be long delayed. It acts like an hereditary disease.\u201d--HARDY,\n_Manual of Buddhism_ (1880), p. 411.\n\n[274] \u201cThe difficulties attendant upon this peculiar dogma [karma] may\nbe seen in the fact that it is almost universally repudiated.... In\nhistorical composition, in narrative, and in conversation, the common\nidea of transmigration is continually presented\u201d (Hardy, _Manual of\nBuddhism_ (1880), p. 412). By 250 B.C. \u201cin the North and also in the\nSouth the old heresy of the soul-theory had crept back by side issue\ninto the doctrine from which it had been categorically and explicitly\nexcluded by Gautama and his earlier followers\u201d (Rhys Davids, _Buddhism_\n(1896), p. 198).\n\n[275] _Hibbert Lectures_ (1881), pp. 31, 206. Cf. Hopkins, _The\nReligions of India_ (1895), p. 321.\n\n[276] But this, as we have just seen, is not the Buddhism of the\nBuddhist world in general. The masses in Buddhist lands have never\naccepted the doctrine of Nirvana in the sense of extinction of\nexistence. The following conversation between Moncure Conway and a\nSinghalese priest discloses the meaning of the term to an orthodox\nBuddhist of Ceylon: \u201cI asked, \u2018Have those who are in Nirvana any\nconsciousness?\u2019 I was then informed that there is no Singhalese word\nfor consciousness. Sumangala said, \u2018To reach Nirvana is to be no more.\u2019\nI pointed to a stone step and said, \u2018One is there only as that stone is\nhere?\u2019 \u2018Not so much,\u2019 answered the priest; \u2018for the stone is actually\nhere, but in Nirvana there is no existence at all\u2019\u201d (_My Pilgrimage to\nthe Wise Men of the East_ (1906), p. 134).\n\n[277] These eight requirements are often condensed into four, and then\nthe formula is called the fourfold path to deliverance.\n\n[278] Cf. Oldenberg, _Buddha_ (1882), p. 211; Hopkins, _The Religions\nof India_ (1895), p. 305.\n\n[279] There is in this teaching respecting desirelessness an apparent\ninconsistency, for with all other desires suppressed, there remains\nthe desire for Nirvana. But the difficulty here is only apparent. A\nBuddhist priest, questioned respecting this, replied as follows: \u201cThe\ndesire for Nirvana escapes from the mesh that entangles all other\ndesires, because it is not desire for any object at all\u201d (Conway,\n_My Pilgrimage to the Wise Men of the East_ (1906), p. 134). But all\nother desires aside from this desire for Nirvana are in a sense sins\nof covetousness. And this is the cardinal sin in the view of the true\nBuddhist, for covetousness \u201cis a strong desire for something, and all\ndesire is a hindrance in one\u2019s way to Nirvana.\u201d\n\n[280] This teaching that mental illumination comes through\ncontemplation is the doctrine in general of the religious and moral\nteachers of the East, and of all mystics. It differs fundamentally from\nthe scientific view, which makes observation and study the means of\nenlightenment.\n\n[281] Buddhism limits transmigration to the animal creation;\nBrahmanism, it will be recalled, supposes the soul to transmigrate into\nvegetable as well as into animal forms.\n\n[282] \u201cTo be a true Buddhist, one must renounce, as lust, all desire\nof evil, which brings evil; and must live without other hope than that\nof extinguishing all desire and passion, believing that in so doing\nhe will at death be annihilated.\u201d--HOPKINS, _The Religions of India_\n(1895), p. 564.\n\n[283] _Dhammapada_, vii. 90\u201399.\n\n[284] But--and differing in this from Dr. Hopkins--Professor Rhys\nDavids makes this perfection which results in annihilation to consist\nnot in the extinction of every desire, but only of craving desire and\nevil passions.\n\n[285] _The Religions of India_ (1895), p. 322.\n\n[286] Hopkins, _The Religions of India_ (1895), p. 317. Stoicism indeed\napproaches Buddhism in this respect; but its attitude toward the\ndoctrine of a future life was in general merely agnostic--it made no\npositive denial of immortality.\n\n[287] Cf. Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures_ (1881), p. 123.\n\n[288] Zeller represents Pythagoreanism as springing from an effort to\ngive an ethical content to life. \u201cWe may consider it proved,\u201d he says,\n\u201cthat the school of Pythagoras, believing in the almighty favor of the\ngods, and in future retribution, enforced purity of life, moderation\nand justice, minute self-examination and discretion in all actions, and\nespecially discouraged self-conceit\u201d (_History of Philosophy_ (1881),\nvol. i, p. 496). Oldenberg (_Ancient India_ (1896), p. 87) conceives\nPythagoreanism--together with the Orphic worship--as \u201ca bit of Buddhism\nin the midst of Greek civilization.\u201d\n\n[289] Gautama\u2019s attitude toward ascetic practices is shown by the\nfollowing: \u201cNot nakedness, not platted hair, not dirt, not fasting, or\nlying on the earth, not rubbing with dust, not sitting motionless, can\npurify a mortal who has not overcome desires\u201d (_Dhammapada_, x. 141).\n\n[290] Oldenberg, _Buddha_ (1882), p. 366.\n\n[291] This is well illustrated in the following incident related by\nMoncure Conway. In the island of Ceylon he was visited by an aged\nBuddhist priest, who came in a sedan borne by men. Asked why he did\nnot use a carriage drawn by horses, the priest replied that \u201che was\nafraid a horse might be vitally injured by carrying him.\u201d \u201cBut,\u201d said\nMr. Conway, \u201cmight it not be the same with one of those men while he is\ncarrying you?\u201d After a moment\u2019s silence the priest answered, \u201cBut a man\ncan tell me if he is suffering\u201d (_My Pilgrimage to the Wise Men of the\nEast_ (1906), pp. 116 f.).\n\n[292] Thousands of rats were formerly kept at public expense in a\nhospital at the Indian town of Kutel.\n\n[293] Toleration is not even recognized as a virtue in the moral codes\nof ancient Judaism, dogmatic Christianity, and Islam.\n\n[294] _Hibbert Lectures_ (1881), p. 231.\n\n[295] Under Asoka, it is true, Buddhism, like Christianity under\nConstantine the Great, became militant. But Asoka was a gentle warrior\nand made war gently. He neither killed his prisoners nor tortured them,\na common practice with Oriental conquerors, nor did he sell them as\nslaves.\n\n[296] \u201cLes paisibles sujets du Grand-Lama thibetain ont cess\u00e9 d\u2019aimer\nla guerre et presque de la faire\u201d (Letourneau, _La guerre dans les\ndiverses races humaines_ (1895), p. 213).\n\n[297] Edward A. Ross, _The Changing Chinese_ (1911), p. 29.\n\n[298] See above, p. 79.\n\n[299] Mozoomdar, a leader of the Brahmo-Somaj.\n\n[300] Buddhism, like Christianity, teaches that hatred must be overcome\nby love: \u201cLet a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by\ngood\u201d (_Dhammapada_, xvii. 223). \u201cFor hatred does not cease by hatred\nat any time; hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule\u201d (_Ibid._ i. 5).\n\n[301] For the influence of Buddhism on the Japanese character, see\nCount Okuma, _Fifty Years of New Japan_ (1909), vol. ii, chap. iv,\n\u201cJapanese Religious Beliefs: Buddhism.\u201d\n\n[302] _Laws_, tr. Jowett, x. 896. And the thought is near even in the\nlatest philosophy: \u201cBut it feels like a real fight,\u201d says Professor\nWilliam James, \u201cas if there were something really wild in the universe\nwhich we, with all our idealities and faithfulness, are needed to\nreform.\u201d\n\n[303] Is. xlv. 7.\n\n[304] This dualistic world philosophy is regarded by some students of\nthe Zend-Avesta as being in the nature of a protest against \u201cthe inert\nasceticism of Buddhism and the ethical indifference of Brahmanism\u201d\n(Darmesteter, \u201cIntroduction,\u201d Sacred Books of the East, 2d ed., vol.\niv, p. lxviii). Ranke views it as the product of environment: \u201cIf we\nkeep well in view the contrasts between the various districts and\nnations included within the limits of Persia and her provinces, the\nincessant struggle between the settled populations and the inhabitants\nof the steppes, between the cultivated regions and the desolation of\nthe desert, thrust back, indeed, yet ever resuming its encroachments,\nthe ideas of the Zend-Avesta will appear to us natural and, as we may\nterm it, autochthonic\u201d (_Universal History_, vol. i (1885), p. 105).\n\n[305] The way in which such a conception acts upon the moral life is\nwell illustrated in the history of English Puritanism. The ethical\nstrenuousness of the Puritan was the outcome of his deeply felt\nconsciousness of the ineradicable antagonism between good and evil.\nIt is all brought vividly before us in Bunyan\u2019s _Holy War_, in the\nstruggle between Immanuel and Diabolus--of which the myth of Ahura and\nAhriman was the prototype.\n\n[306] _Mihir Yasht_ (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxiii), vii. 26.\n\n[307] See Jackson, _Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran_.\n\n[308] See above, p. 115.\n\n[309] Zoroastrian ethics, as Wedgwood says, is best understood when\nviewed as a protest against the Hindu conception of the universe\nand life. \u201cThe injunction to industry, the elaborate provisions for\nagriculture, the constant stimulus to exertion of every kind, are most\nintelligible when we see in them a recoil from the faith which appeared\nto this active race [the Iranian] a confusion of good and evil\u201d (_The\nMoral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 59).\n\n[310] _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_ (Sacred Books of the East, 2d ed., vol. iv), Farg. iv.\n47.\n\n[311] _Ibid._ Farg. iii. 33.\n\n[312] _Ibid._ Farg. iv. 49.\n\n[313] \u201cAryan morality came down from the heavens in a ray of light\u201d\n(_Selected Essays of James Darmesteter_, ed. Morris Jastrow, p. 304).\n\n[314] _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, Farg. ii. 29.\n\n[315] _Ibid._ Farg. iv. 49 (bis)-55.\n\n[316] _Mihir Yasht_, i. 2.\n\n[317] _Ibid._ xxix. 116, 117.\n\n[318] _The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., pp. 71 ff. It is significant that the\nsacred standard of the early Persians was the apron of a blacksmith.\n\n[319] _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, Farg. iii. 31.\n\n[320] _Ibid._ Farg. iii. 4.\n\n[321] _Laws of Manu_, x. 84.\n\n[322] _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, Farg. iii. 38, 39.\n\n[323] The king who reigned in Persia at the time of Nero, going from\nAsia to Italy, traveled by land along the shore instead of going\nby ship, \u201cbecause the Magi are forbidden to defile the sea\u201d (James\nDarmesteter, Sacred Books of the East, vol. iv, p. xl). But the anxious\nobservance by the Persians of the requirements of the code is best\ndisclosed in the disposition which they made of their dead. Since\ncorpses could neither be burned nor buried nor thrown into the water\nwithout defiling a sacred element, they were exposed on the summits of\nmountains or on the top of low towers (dakhmas), the so-called \u201cTowers\nof Silence,\u201d that the flesh might be eaten by birds of prey.\n\n[324] _Zend-Avesta_, pt. ii, Yasht xxii (Sacred Books of the East, vol.\nxxiii, pp. 314 ff.).\n\n[325] Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxxi, \u201cIntroduction,\u201d p. xx.\n\n[326] \u201cTheir [the servitors of Mithra] dualistic system was\nparticularly adapted to fostering individual effort and to developing\nhuman energy.\u201d--CUMONT, _The Mysteries of Mithra_ (1903), p. 141.\n\n[327] _Herod._ i. 139. We quote Rawlinson\u2019s version.\n\n[328] _Herod._ i. 136.\n\n[329] Rawlinson\u2019s _Herodotus_, vol. i, p. 214, n. 10. We omit the\nreferences.\n\n[330] Cf. _Herod._ ix. 109.\n\n[331] Rawlinson, _The Five Great Monarchies_ (1871), vol. iii, p. 170.\nThe exception was the case of the Barc\u00e6ans. Cf. _Herod._ iv. 201.\n\n[332] The modern Persians, who have exchanged the truth-impelling creed\nof Zoroaster for that of Mohammed, seem to have lost this ancestral\nvirtue. It is noteworthy, however, that the Indian Parsees, the\ninheritors and preservers of the faith of ancient Persia, are noted for\ntheir uprightness and veracity.\n\n[333] \u201cThey [the Parsees] form one of the most esteemed, wealthy, and\nphilanthropic communities on the west coast of India, notably in the\ncity of Bombay.\u201d--BLOOMFIELD, _The Religion of the Veda_ (1908), p. 15.\n\n[334] \u201cThe whole history of the religion of Israel is a history of\nthe development of the moral consciousness, and consequently of the\ndeepening and widening of the opposition between that _which ought to\nbe_ and that _which is_.\u201d--EDWARD CAIRD, _The Evolution of Religion_\n(1894), vol. ii, p. 92.\n\n[335] It may be urged that the moral character given to Yahweh was the\ncreation of the moral consciousness of his worshipers; but even so,\nthis conception of deity once formed would inevitably react upon the\nmoral sense to deepen and purify the feelings that gave it birth.\n\n[336] _Geschichte des Volkes Israel_ (1889), Bd. i, S. 429.\n\n[337] Budde, _Religion of Israel to the Exile_ (1899), pp. 35 ff.; Toy,\n_Judaism and Christianity_ (1891), p. 307; W. Robertson Smith, _The\nReligion of the Semites_ (1894), pp. 75 ff.\n\n[338] W. Robertson Smith urges that sacrifice among the Hebrews had its\norigin in the sacramental communal idea. According to this belief the\nclansmen and their god are of the same stock, and the bond of kinship\nis renewed and strengthened through the human and the divine members of\nthe community partaking together of the flesh and blood of an animal\nslain.\n\n[339] Job iii. 19.\n\n[340] Eccl. ix. 5; and so ix. 10: \u201cFor there is no work, nor desire,\nnor knowledge, nor wisdom in Sheol, whither thou goeth.\u201d\n\n[341] Is. xxxviii. 18.\n\n[342] See below, pp. 165 f.\n\n[343] Cf. Chapter II.\n\n[344] The oldest form of the Decalogue is found in Ex. xxxiv; cf. Ex.\nxxxiii.\n\n[345] If we compare the morality of this Hebrew Decalogue with that of\nthe Egyptian Negative Confession, we shall find it to belong to about\nthe same stage of ethical development.\n\n[346] In the Book of Judges are preserved some traditions which are\nillustrative of the moral state of society at this time; for though\nall the details of these stories may not be historical, still they\ndoubtless reflect the general condition of things during this period.\nThere is a striking similarity between these traditions of gross and\nincredible crimes and the traditions of the atrocious immoralities of\nthe Merovingian Age in European history.\n\n[347] The kingdom of Israel was destroyed by the Assyrian power 722\nB.C.; the kingdom of Judah fell before Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon,\n586 B.C.\n\n[348] Cf. Kuenen, _The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel_.\n\n[349] _The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel_ (1877), p. 344.\n\n[350] Cf. 1 Kings xxi--the story of Naboth\u2019s vineyard.\n\n[351] \u201cThe life-work of Elijah was a turning-point in the history of\nthe religion of Israel, similar in its consequences to those which\nfollowed the appearance of Zarathustra in Iran.... It was the ethical\nidea of God matured in the soul of the prophet by the need of his time\nwhich broke through with irresistible power to the demand for a final\nchoice between Jehovah, the holy God, and the unholy nature gods of the\nheathen.\u201d--PFLEIDERER, _Religions and Historic Faiths_ (1907), pp. 225\nf.\n\n[352] _History of the People of Israel_ (1892), vol. ii, p. 275.\n\n[353] Calamities were at this time befalling Israel. \u201cThe national\ndistress served to awaken Israel\u2019s conscience. The obligation\ncovenanted at Sinai knocked again at the door of their hearts\u201d (Budde,\n_Religion of Israel to the Exile_ (1899), p. 93).\n\n[354] Amos iii. 10.\n\n[355] _Ibid._ v. 11, 12.\n\n[356] _Ibid._ viii. 5, 6.\n\n[357] _Ibid._ v. 21.\n\n[358] _Ibid._ v. 22.\n\n[359] _Ibid._ v. 24.\n\n[360] Hosea vi. 6.\n\n[361] To Amos and Hosea, Yahweh is simply the supreme god, the suzerain\nof all other gods.\n\n[362] Is. ii. 3, 4; cf. Micah iv. 1\u20133. See Driver, _Introduction to\nthe Literature of the Old Testament_ (1897), p. 229, for the opinion\nof different commentators on the possible exilic or postexilic date of\nthese passages.\n\n[363] Is. i. 11\u201317.\n\n[364] Micah vi. 6\u20138.\n\n[365] Wellhausen, _Prolegomena to the History of Israel_ (1885), p. 414.\n\n[366] This festival was probably of Babylonian origin. It was\nassociated with astronomical phenomena--with the seven planets of\nancient astronomy and with the phases of the moon.\n\n[367] The feast of Purim is another transformed festival; \u201cBabylonian\nin origin, it was given a Jewish dress and became incorporated into the\nsystem of Jewish observances\u201d (David Philipson, _The Reform Movement in\nJudaism_ (1907), p. 3).\n\n[368] Thus the festival of Dionysus, which \u201cin its origin was a mere\nburst of primitive animal spirits, is transmuted into a complex and\nbeautiful work of art\u201d (Dickinson, _The Greek View of Life_, p. 14).\n\n[369] Deut. vi. 14.\n\n[370] Montefiori, _Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion_\n(1892), p. 197.\n\n[371] _Prolegomena to the History of Israel_ (1885), p. 402. Renan\nspeaks of Deuteronomy in the same strain: \u201cThis Thora was the worst\nenemy of the universal religion which the prophets of the eighth\ncentury had in their dreams\u201d (_History of the People of Israel_ (1891),\nvol. iii, p. 175).\n\n[372] Cf. Chapter XVI. The persecutions of the medieval Church were\nlargely the outcome of this legislation which made the extermination\nof God\u2019s enemies, that is, idolators and misbelievers, a pious duty.\n\u201cThe terrible _Directorium Inquisitorum_ of Nicholas Eymeric follows\nDeuteronomy word for word\u201d (Renan, _History of the people of Israel_\n(1891), vol. iii, p. 179).\n\n[373] Deut. xx. 16.\n\n[374] _Ibid._ vii. 2.\n\n[375] _Jewish Religious Life after the Exile_ (1898), p. 45. The\nteachings of this same intolerant monolatry has, down to the\npresent day, exerted a retarding influence upon the development of\ninternational morality, especially upon the war ethics of the Christian\nnations.\n\n[376] We meet with the same phenomenon in medieval times. The Christian\nChurch, which was so harsh in its dealings with misbelievers, was a\ntender mother toward the poor and the afflicted of the faith.\n\n[377] The origin of these cities may date from a much earlier time than\nthe reform under King Josiah. The code may simply register changes\nalready effected in the customary law. See Nathaniel Schmidt, _The\nProphet of Nazareth_ (1905), p. 61.\n\n[378] Deut. iv. 41, 42; xix. 1\u201313.\n\n[379] Deut. xv. 7, 8.\n\n[380] _Ibid._ xxiv. 6.\n\n[381] _Ibid._ xxiv. 12, 13.\n\n[382] _Ibid._ xxiv. 17.\n\n[383] _Ibid._ xxiv. 14, 15.\n\n[384] _Ibid._ xxiii. 19, 20. Cf. Maspero, _The Dawn of Civilization_,\np. 760. The poor in these early times were, in all the lands advancing\nin civilization, literally devoured by the money lenders.\n\n[385] Deut. xxiv. 19.\n\n[386] Ruth ii. 4\u201317.\n\n[387] Deut. v. 14, 15.\n\n[388] _Ibid._ xv. 12.\n\n[389] _Ibid._ xv. 13, 14.\n\n[390] All these regulations respecting slaves, however, lack\nuniversalism. It is compassion for the slave not as a man, but as a\nHebrew, that moves the legislator. The laws are in general for the\nbenefit of Hebrew slaves alone. Gentiles or foreigners are not included\nin these humane provisions. See Lev. xxv and Ex. xxi. 2.\n\n[391] See Is. xl-lxvi.\n\n[392] \u201cDeutero-Isaiah was the first to emphasize and make use of this\nplenary and unconditional monotheism.\u201d--MONTEFIORI, _Lectures on the\nOrigin and Growth of Religion_ (1892), p. 269.\n\n[393] Is. xliii. 10.\n\n[394] _Ibid._ xliv. 6.\n\n[395] _Ibid._ xliv. 24.\n\n[396] _Ibid._ xlv. 5.\n\n[397] _Ibid._ xlvi. 9.\n\n[398] There is a repetition of this in the _Koran_, where the Prophet\nof Arabia speaks as one to whom the idea of the unity of deity had come\nas a new thought.\n\n[399] W. Robertson Smith, _The Religion of the Semites_ (1894), p. 81.\n\n[400] See above, pp. 18\u201320.\n\n[401] \u201cI the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of\nthe fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of\nthem that hate me.\u201d--Deut. v. 9.\n\n[402] Ezek. xviii. 2.\n\n[403] _Ibid._ xviii. 3.\n\n[404] Ezek. xviii. 20. The entire chapter is devoted to this single\nsubject. This truer view had dawned upon the compilers of the\nDeuteronomic code. Cf. Deut. xxiv. 16 and Jer. xxxi. 29, 30.\n\n[405] See below, p. 364.\n\n[406] See lii. 13-liii. 12.\n\n[407] Cf. Bennett, _The Religion of the Post-Exilic Prophets_ (1907),\npp. 326 ff.\n\n[408] In the year 539 B.C. Cyrus, king of Persia, having captured\nBabylon, issued a decree giving the Jewish exiles in Babylonia\npermission to return to their own land and to rebuild the Temple\ndestroyed fifty years before by Nebuchadnezzar. A band returned and\nset themselves to the task of restoring their houses and rebuilding\nthe Temple. After many interruptions and long delay the building was\nfinished and dedicated anew to the worship of Yahweh (516 B.C.).\n\n[409] \u201cThe growth of Judaism and the Judaic veneration for the law,\nafter Ezra\u2019s reformation, shows some marked resemblances to the growth\nin post-Reformation Protestant theology of the legal conception of\nsalvation, and particularly the tendency to formalize and almost to\ndeify the literal inspiration and authority of the Scriptures.\u201d--NEWMAN\nSMYTH, _Christian Ethics_ (1892), p. 95.\n\n[410] For life under the law consult Sch\u00fcrer, _History of the Jewish\nPeople_, division ii, vol. ii, pp. 90 ff.\n\n[411] Matt. xxiii. 23.\n\n[412] _Ibid._ xv. 11, 20. \u201cThe identification of morality with ritual\nin his [Jesus\u2019] day had confused the issue before human life much as\nthat issue is now confused by the identification of morality with\nopinion\u201d (Hall, _History of Ethics within Organized Christianity_\n(1910), p. 62).\n\n[413] Ps. cxxxvii. 9; see Ps. cix.\n\n[414] On this subject see Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_ (1891), pp.\n246 ff.\n\n[415] \u201cThe people had learned to draw nigh to God without the aid of\nsacrifice.\u201d--W. ROBERTSON SMITH, _The Religion of the Semites_ (1894),\np. 215.\n\n[416] Cf. Mark i. 21; vi. 2.\n\n[417] Renan, _History of the People of Israel_ (1895), vol. iv, p. 195.\n\n[418] Consult on this subject Charles, _A Critical History of the\nDoctrine of a Future Life_ (1898\u20131899).\n\n[419] See above, pp. 139 f.\n\n[420] See Cheyne, _Jewish Religious Life after the Exile_ (1898), p.\n229; and Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_ (1891), pp. 378, 386.\n\n[421] Ps. xvi. 10, Rev. Ver.\n\n[422]\n\n \u201cI know without me God cannot a moment live;\n If I to death should go, He, too, would death receive.\u201d\n\n Quoted by BLOW, _A Study of Dante_ (1887), p. 102.\n\n\n[423] Cf. above, p. 44; see also Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_\n(1891), p. 387; Hall, _History of Ethics within Organized Christianity_\n(1910), p. 216.\n\n[424] The Pharisees; cf. Acts xxiii. 6\u20138.\n\n[425] We see a repetition of all this in what is going on to-day\namong the Jews in the great cities of the New World. Liberal Judaism\nis largely the outcome of just such influences as brought forth\nChristianity out of the narrow ritual Judaism of the Alexandrian Age.\nSee David Philipson, _The Reform Movement in Judaism_ (1907), chap. xii.\n\n[426] \u201cThose psalms into which a sense of something like the\nbrotherhood of nations begins to penetrate are for various reasons\nlater than 382 B.C.... Not till the coming of the Macedonian reconciler\nof East and West could there be a presentiment of the truth of the\ndivine education, not only of Israel, but of the human race.\u201d--CHEYNE,\n_Jewish Religious Life after the Exile_ (1898), pp. 134 f.\n\n[427] To Hillel is credited the maxim, \u201cWhat thou wouldst not have\nanother do to thee, do not thou to another.\u201d\n\n[428] The teaching of the Orphic sects that there are two elements,\none good and another bad, in man\u2019s nature, was an esoteric doctrine\nwhich had no influence on the popular mind and conscience. Cf. G. Lowes\nDickinson, _The Greek View of Life_, 6th ed., pp. 31 f.\n\n[429] There are, it is true, gods of the lower world unfriendly to\nman, but there is nothing in the Greek world-view corresponding to\nthe Egyptian conception of the struggle between the good Osiris and\nthe wicked Set, or of the Persian idea of the conflict between the\nbeneficent Ahura Mazda and the evil-working Ahriman. Nor was there\nanything in this view like the Babylonian or Persian notion of\nmalicious spirits.\n\n[430] The Dionysian cult fostered art, but not directly morality. In so\nfar as the Attic drama was an elevating moral influence, the cult may\nbe said to have indirectly promoted morals. But the foreign orgiastic\ngod had to be thoroughly converted before he could strengthen others.\n\n[431] The pre-Hellenic Oriental cult of Aphrodite had undoubtedly an\nunfavorable influence on morality. \u201cSome part of this evil character\n[was] transplanted into Greek legend, but very little into Greek\nworship.... What we know is that until the declining period of Greek\nhistory the cult of Aphrodite, so far as it appears in written or\nmonumental record, was as pure and austere as that of Zeus and Athena\u201d\n(Farnell, _The Cults of the Greek States_ (1896), vol. ii, pp. 657,\n663).\n\n[432] Cf. Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. i, S. 165.\n\n[433] Farnell, _The Cults of the Greek States_ (1896), vol. i, p. 74,\nquoting Charondas, the Sicilian legislator.\n\n[434] Farnell, _The Cults of the Greek States_ (1896), vol. iv, pp. 177\nff.\n\n[435] Hatch, _The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the\nChristian Church_, 2d ed., p. 292.\n\n[436] _History of Greece_ (1900), pp. 320 f.\n\n[437] _Thucyd._ i. 70.\n\n[438] For an illuminating comparison of the Greek virtues of fortitude\nand temperance with the corresponding Christian virtues, see T.\u00a0H.\nGreen, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., pp. 304 ff.\n\n[439] _Ethics_, iii. 10.\n\n[440] \u201cBut let [each man] know,\u201d says Plato, \u201chow to choose the mean\nand avoid the extremes on either side, as far as in him lies, not only\nin this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of\nhappiness\u201d (_Republic_, tr. Jowett, x. 619).\n\n[441] Socrates, it is true, taught that it is better to suffer wrong\nthan to do wrong, but he was here far in advance of the common Greek\nconscience.\n\n[442] Quoted by Taylor, _Ancient Ideals_ (1896), vol. i, p. 247.\n\n[443] _Christian Ethics_ (1873), vol. i, p. 63.\n\n[444] _The Greek View of Life_ (1909), p. 205.\n\n[445] If we contrast the Greek conception of man\u2019s nature with that of\ncertain systems of Christian theology, we shall better understand the\nethical value of such ideas and beliefs. On the occasion of a college\ncommencement one of the speakers, a stout upholder of the doctrines of\nthe fall of man, original sin, and the utter depravity of the natural\nman, roundly denounced this injunction of Pindar\u2019s. He said to the\nyoung people who had chosen as their class motto, \u201cBe what you are,\u201d\nthat that was just what they ought not to be. He then went on to show\nthem that their nature was wholly corrupt, that all their natural\ninclinations were toward evil continually, and that if they ever hoped\nfor salvation they must become what they were not.\n\n[446] \u201cAristotle may be almost said to have made the difference between\nGreek and barbarian the basis of his moral code.\u201d--LECKY, _History of\nEuropean Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 200.\n\n[447] _Politics_, i. 7, sec. 5; 8, sec. 12; vii. 14, sec. 21.\n\n[448] For the ethics of Greek slavery consult Schmidt, _Die Ethik der\nalten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. ii, S. 203\u2013219.\n\n[449] Thebes, but not from moral scruples seemingly, prohibited under\nthe penalty of death the destruction of healthy infants.\n\n[450] The reader of Plato will recall how Socrates uses this practice\nof the exposition of infants to illustrate his art of bringing to birth\ntrue and false ideas (\u201clies and shadows\u201d) in the minds of his pupils,\nand exposing to die those that are vain shadows. See his _Dialogues_,\ntr. Jowett, vol. iii, pp. 350 f.\n\n[451] The practice of the exposition of female infants in the\nHellenistic Age, when luxury increased and children became a burden,\nseems to have been more common than in earlier times.\n\n[452] Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_ (1888), p. 120.\n\n[453] _Politics_, vi. 4, sec. 12. This contempt for tradesmen and\nlaborers, generally speaking, continued through all periods of Greek\nhistory. In some states, however, particularly in Athens, it underwent\nmodification. \u201cThe later Athenians began to consider trade an honorable\nroad to riches, and aristocrats like Nicias were known as careful trade\nmasters.\u201d In Rhodes, also, trade became honorable.\n\n[454] Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, tr. Thilly, p. 62 n.\n\n[455] _Laws_, tr. Jowett, xi. 919.\n\n[456] They were charged with adulteration of foods, cheating in\nmeasure, etc. Demosthenes declares that a man honest in commercial\ntransactions was a prodigy. Cf. Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_\n(1888), p. 419.\n\n[457] See above, p. 89.\n\n[458] This ethical feeling is to be reckoned with in dealing with\nAsiatics--until there is a change in their ideal of manliness. The\noverlooking of an injury is apt to be regarded by them as an indication\nof weakness and cowardice.\n\n[459] Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. ii, S. 312.\n\n[460] _Herod._ vi. 24. The Delphian oracle tried to cure this defect in\nthe national character. See the story of Glaucus, _Herod._ vi. 86.\n\n[461] _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. ii, S. 413.\n\n[462] _Ethics_, tr. Welldon, i. 4.\n\n[463] _Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_ (1908), p. 95.\n\n[464] _Od._ xix. 396\u2013398.\n\n[465] _Thucyd._ i. 5.\n\n[466] _Il._ xxii. 485\u2013499.\n\n[467] See Xen. _Mem._ ii. 1, 21, for the parable, by the Sophist\nProdicus, of the choice of Heracles at the parting of the ways.\n\n[468] _The Republic_, iii. 386\u2013392.\n\n[469] See above, p. 35.\n\n[470] \u201cThe blessed islands of the West were indeed even then [in the\nHomeric Age] a home for the dead, but they had not yet been opened\nto moral worth, as in the days of Pindar.\u201d--MAHAFFY, _Social Life in\nGreece_ (1888), p. 26.\n\n[471] See Zeller, _History of Philosophy_ (1881), vol. i, p. 125, and\nSchmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. i, S. 99. \u201cStrictly\nspeaking,\u201d says Professor Seymour, \u201cHomer knows of no instance of\nrewards, and of only one case of punishment after death\u201d (_Life in the\nHomeric Age_ (1908), p. 469).\n\n[472] For the Greek view of the underworld, and the incoming of the\nidea of rewards and punishments in the after life, see Schmidt, _Die\nEthik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. i, S. 97 ff., and Rhode, _Psyche:\nSeelencult und Unsterblichkeits Glaube der Griechen_, 4te Auflage, Bd.\ni, S. 301\u2013319.\n\n[473] This moralization of Hades is carried still further by Vergil. It\nis instructive to compare his vision of Hades with Homer\u2019s.\n\n[474] _Republic_, x. 614\u2013616; see also _Gorgias_, 523\u2013527.\n\n[475] _Herod._ i. 30\u201332. But Nemesis appears later in the story, and\nCr\u0153sus is represented as being punished for the crime of an ancestor.\n\n[476] _Ibid._ vii. 10. The views which the historian here attributes to\nthe Persian Artabanus were of course a reflection of Greek belief. For\nfurther instances in Greek literature of the conception of the envy of\nthe gods, consult Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd.\ni, S. 78\u201384.\n\n[477] _Thucyd._ vii. 77.\n\n[478] _Pericles_ (1890), p. 312.\n\n[479] \u201cThe very event [the Persian war] which determined the sudden\nsplendor of the drama gave a sublime and terrific sanction to the\nalready existing morality.\u201d--SYMONDS, _Studies of the Greek Poets_\n(1880), vol. ii, p. 17.\n\n[480] Farnell, _The Cults of the Greek States_ (1896), vol. i, p. 129.\nAfter the tale had been moralized by \u00c6schylus, Phidias carved the story\non the great Zeus throne at Olympia, using it to give emphasis to the\nconception of the god as the guardian of the moral order of the world.\n\n[481] _Thucyd._ v. 84\u2013116.\n\n[482] The attitude of the later philosophers toward the notion that the\ngods are envious is fairly represented by Plato\u2019s protest: \u201cHe [the\nCreator] is good, and no goodness can have any jealousy of anything\u201d\n(_Tim\u00e6us_, tr. Jowett, 29).\n\n[483] \u201cThe dispensation which takes the aspect of divine envy to\nmortals might, it seems, from a higher point of view, be discerned\nas the very opposite; human vicissitude is the result of a divine\nlove anxious to share the true blessedness which comes in the form of\nsorrow.\u201d--WEDGWOOD, _The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 112.\n\n[484] Taylor, _Ancient Ideals_ (1896), vol. i, p. 227.\n\n[485] Farnell, _The Cults of the Greek States_ (1891), vol. i, p. 129.\n\n[486] _Republic_, tr. Jowett, x. 613.\n\n[487] See James Adam, _The Vitality of Platonism_ (1911), chap. v,\n\u201cAncient Greek Views of Suffering and Evil.\u201d\n\n[488] When we contrast with this Sophocles\u2019 treatment of the same theme\nin _Antigone_ we realize how great an advance during the interval the\nGreeks had made in humanitarian feeling.\n\n[489] See _Thucyd._ iii. 53\u201359.\n\n[490] The Spartan admiral Callicratides (the successor of Lysander,\n406 B.C.) refused to sell his Greek prisoners of war as slaves, but he\nstood almost or quite alone in this. See Xen. _Hellen._ i. 6, 14.\n\n[491] Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_ (1888), p. 235.\n\n[492] The war brought into fearful exaggeration the salient weakness of\nGreek morality. The most reprehensible moral faults of the Greeks were\nthe outgrowth of political factions and cabals, of party jealousies and\nrivalries in the close quarters of city walls. These faults were lifted\ninto the most savage passions by the war. Thucydides in a memorable\npassage (iii. 82) draws a striking picture of the disastrous moral\neffects of the prolonged quarrel.\n\n[493] See above, p. 180.\n\n[494] _Republic_, v. 469\u2013471.\n\n[495] Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 267; see also\nA. R\u00e6der, _L\u2019Arbitrage international chez les Hellenes_ (1912).\n\n[496] _\u00c9tudes sur l\u2019histoire de humanit\u00e9_ (1880), t. ii, p. 105.\nBecause of its long exemption from the ravages of war, Elis was more\npopulous and wealthy than any other district of the Peloponnesus\n(_Polyb._ iv. 73, 74). The contrast presented by Greece in general\nconstituted an impressive commentary on the fatal consequences for\nGreek civilization of the war system. Speaking of the depopulation\nwhich incessant wars had caused over almost all the world he knew,\nPlutarch says of Greece, a land once \u201cstrong in cities,\u201d that the whole\ncountry could raise barely three thousand men, the same number that the\nsingle city of Megara sent to Plat\u00e6a at the time of the Persian war\n(_Philosophical Essays_, \u201cOn the Cessation of Oracles,\u201d sec. viii).\n\n[497] See above, p. 18.\n\n[498] \u201cReally to see the good and to know it as such, yet not to love\nand pursue it, is impossible; the vision carries with it its own\npersuasion and authority.\u201d--MARTINEAU, _Types of Ethical Theory_, 3d\ned., vol. i, p. 74. \u201cMere school and word knowledge, of course, is\npowerless, but real knowledge, knowledge that represents real personal\nconviction, cannot fail to influence life.\u201d--PAULSEN, _System of\nEthics_, tr. Thilly (1906), p. 62.\n\n[499] \u201cThere are few men whose minds are not more or less in\nthat state of sham knowledge against which Socrates made war;\nthere is no man whose notions have not been first got together by\nspontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified association--resting\nupon forgotten particulars, blending together disparities or\ninconsistencies, and leaving in his mind old and familiar phrases\nand oracular propositions, of which he has never rendered to himself\naccount; there is no man, who, if he be destined for vigorous and\nprofitable scientific effort, has not found it a necessary branch of\nself-education to break up, disentangle, analyse, and reconstruct\nthis ancient mental compound, and who has not been driven to it by\nhis own lame and solitary efforts, since the giant of the colloquial\nElenchus no longer stands in the market place to lend him help and\nstimulus.\u201d--GROTE, _History of Greece_ (1888), vol. vii, pp. 168 f.\n\n[500] Quoted by Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. ii,\nS. 396.\n\n[501] \u201cHis [Socrates\u2019] significancy for moral philosophy lies in\nhis calling attention to _rational_ knowledge as the source of the\nmoral.\u201d--WUTTKE, _Christian Ethics_ (1873), vol. i, p. 69.\n\n[502] _Histoire des th\u00e9ories et des id\u00e9es morales dans l\u2019antiquit\u00e9_\n(1879), t. i, pp. 125 f.\n\n[503] Cf. _Gorgias_, 478, 479.\n\n[504] _Laws_, tr. Jowett, xi. 913. Plato saw what the\nsocialist-philosopher Lloyd saw when he wrote, \u201cMore searching ... than\nthe Golden Rule is that which commands us to inquire if what we desire\nfor ourselves and others is a right desire\u201d (_Man the Social Creator_\n(1906), p. 147).\n\n[505] In the _Republic_ Plato reaches the conception of a Greek\nbrotherhood, but beyond this he never advanced.\n\n[506] Xen. _Mem._ ii. 6, 35.\n\n[507] _Politics_, i. 7, sec. 5; 8, sec. 12; vii. 2, sec. 15; 14, sec.\n21.\n\n[508] _Histoire des th\u00e9ories et des id\u00e9es morales dans l\u2019antiquit\u00e9_\n(1879), t. i, p. 228.\n\n[509] \u201cA moral ideal which was not coextensive with the whole spiritual\nnature of man was taken by the schoolmen from the Aristotelian ethics,\nand then the so-called religious virtues were more or less cumbrously\nand precariously built upon it. Supernaturalism in morals was added to\nthe classic naturalism as a divine appendix to ethics.\u201d--NEWMAN SMYTH,\n_Christian Ethics_ (1892), p. 133.\n\n[510] The downfall of the institutions of the free city state was to\nGreek morality what the downfall of the papal Church would have been to\nthe morality of the medieval ages.\n\n[511] Philop\u0153man and Aratus.\n\n[512] This ascetic tendency in Stoicism is doubtless to be attributed\nto the influence of the Orient upon Greek life and thought.\n\n[513] Consistently so, since only through self-control and the\navoidance of all excesses of passion, appetite, and desires can one\nmaintain that tranquillity of mind which is the condition precedent of\nhappiness.\n\n[514] Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 228.\n\n[515] Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_, p. 264. The author contrasts\nthis humaneness of the laws of the Athenian democracy four centuries\nbefore Christ with the atrocious cruelty of the criminal laws of\nChristian Europe down almost to the nineteenth century.\n\n[516] _Social Life in Greece_ (1888), p. 269.\n\n[517] _Ibid._ p. 554.\n\n[518] The Apostle Paul at Athens, seeking common ground with his\nhearers for the doctrine he preached that God hath made of one blood\nall nations of men, finds it in the familiar line of the Stoic\nCleanthes--\u201cWe are the offspring of God.\u201d\n\n[519] Plutarch died about 40 A.D.\n\n[520] \u201cFrom contact with the Greeks, therefore, Christianity obtained\nthis support, that an ideal long known to the Western world, the Stoic\nideal, was found to correspond with it, so that the preaching of the\nApostles was in this respect not out of harmony with the wants and\naspirations of the higher and better minds of the age.\u201d--MAHAFFY,\n_Progress of Hellenism in Alexander\u2019s Empire_ (1905), p. 146.\n\n[521] \u201cThe essential oneness of human moral experience has shown itself\nin the ethical results achieved by these various peoples.\u201d--TOY,\n_Judaism and Christianity_ (1891), p. 337.\n\n[522] Coulanges, _The Ancient City_, ii, 9.\n\n[523] The authority of the father over each and every member of the\nfamily was legally absolute, extending to life and death. Not until\nlate in the Empire did the law forbid fathers to kill their grown-up\nchildren or to sell them as slaves. Cf. McKenzie, _Studies in Roman\nLaw_, 6th ed., p. 141; and Sohm, _Institutes_ (1901), p. 53.\n\n[524] Inge, _Society in Rome under the C\u00e6sars_ (1888), p. 8.\n\n[525] This Roman virtue of obedience to the state has been just such\nan enduring force in the moral life of the Christian world as has\nthe Jewish virtue of obedience to a revealed law (see Chapter IX).\nHistorically regarded, the Protestant Church, which makes obedience\nto a written revealed law a necessary virtue, is the inheritor of the\nethical feeling and conviction of ancient Israel; while the Roman\nCatholic Church, which makes submission to ecclesiastical authority an\nindispensable virtue, is the inheritor of the ethical tradition and\nspirit of ancient Rome. See H.\u00a0M. Gwatkin (co-author), _Early Ideals of\nRighteousness_ (1910), pp. 71 ff.\n\n[526] Tacitus, _Annals_, iii. 16, 17.\n\n[527] This legal subjection of the son to the father, while it\ndeveloped and strengthened the virtue of obedience, seemed to deaden\nfilial _affection_. \u201cOf all the forms of virtue,\u201d says Lecky, \u201cfilial\naffection is perhaps that which appears most rarely in Roman history\u201d\n(_History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 299).\n\n[528] _De Off._ i. 17.\n\n[529] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, pp. 177 f.\n\n[530] See p. 245, on the ethics of persecution.\n\n[531] _The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 148.\n\n[532] Cf. Chapter XVIII.\n\n[533] The citizen army, which had been the seed plot of those heroic\nvirtues that cast such a halo around the earlier history of Rome, had\nbeen replaced by a mercenary force in which only the coarser military\nvirtues could find sphere for exercise.\n\n[534] \u201cThe unchecked power of the master ... produced those cold hearts\nwhich gloated over the agony of gallant men in the arena.\u201d--DILL,\n_Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_ (1904), p. 12.\n\n[535] Friedlander, _Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms_\n(1888), Bd. i, S. 479\u2013481; English ed., _Roman Life and Manners under\nthe Early Empire_, vol. i, pp. 243 f.\n\n[536] \u201cThe senator was forbidden down to the last age of the empire,\nboth by law and sentiment, to increase his fortune by commerce.\u201d--DILL,\n_Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_, p. 102.\n\n[537] _De Off._ i. 42.\n\n[538] Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 271.\n\n[539] Friedlander, _Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms_\n(1889), Bd. ii, S. 414; English ed., _Roman Life and Manners under the\nEarly Empire_, vol. ii, p. 77.\n\n[540] \u201cThe unusual enthusiasm for the shows is expressed in many a rude\nsketch which has been traced by boyish hands upon the walls.\u201d--DILL,\n_Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_, p. 238.\n\n[541] In an eloquent passage Lecky thus sums up the demoralizing\neffects of the spectacles: \u201cThose hateful games, which made the\nspectacle of human suffering and death the delight of all classes, had\nspread their brutalising influence wherever the Roman name was known,\nhad rendered millions absolutely indifferent to the sight of human\nsuffering, had produced in many, in the very centre of an advanced\ncivilization, a relish and a passion for torture, a rapture and an\nexultation in watching the spasms of extreme agony, such as an African\nor an American savage alone can equal\u201d. (_History of European Morals_,\n3d ed., vol. i, p. 467).\n\n[542] The period which witnessed the greatest inequality of fortunes\nwas the last century of the Republic and the first of the Empire.\n\n[543] It should be borne in mind that the clients of this period were\nwholly different from the clients of the earlier times. The relations\nof the early clients to their patrons were those of clansmen to their\nchief; the relations of these later clients to their patrons were the\ndegrading relations of idle, needy dependents to newly rich men without\nfamily traditions and socially and morally wholly unfit for their\nelevation.\n\n[544] _The History of Rome_ (1888), vol. ii, p. 524.\n\n[545] \u201cThe deepest feeling of Tacitus about the early Empire seems\nto have been that it was fatal to character both in prince and\nsubject.\u201d--DILL, _Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_, p. 29.\n\n[546] _The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 204.\n\n[547] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, pp. 332 ff.\n\n[548] _Ibid._ 3d ed., vol. i, p. 227.\n\n[549] \u201cMen ceased to be adventurous, patriotic, just, magnanimous;\nbut in exchange they became chaste, tender-hearted, loyal, religious,\nand capable of infinite endurance in a good cause.\u201d--SEELEY, _Roman\nImperialism_ (1889), p. 33.\n\n[550] _The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 187.\n\n[551] About 40\u2013120 A.D.\n\n[552] Dill, _Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_, p. 64.\n\n[553] Dill, _Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_, pp. 231 f.\n\n[554] Cf. _Ibid._ p. 232.\n\n[555] Stoicism is second only to Christianity as a moral force in\nEuropean civilization. \u201cOne of the most important expressions of the\nmoral sense for all time,\u201d affirms Professor Clifford, \u201cis that of the\nStoic philosophy, especially after its reception among the Romans\u201d\n(_Lectures and Essays_ (1901), vol. ii, p. 108). Mahaffy declares that\nthe Stoic philosophy, \u201cabove all the human influences we know, purified\nand ennobled the world\u201d (_The Silver Age_ (1906), p. 103). Denis thinks\nthat it was through Stoicism that Rome did most for civilization\n(_Histoire des th\u00e9ories et des id\u00e9es morales dans l\u2019antiquit\u00e9_ (1879),\nt. ii, p. 5).\n\n[556] Taken from Menander.\n\n[557] \u201cOne of the most emphatic as well as one of the earliest extant\nassertions of the duty of charity to the human race occurs in the\ntreatise of Cicero upon duties.\u201d--LECKY, _History of European Morals_,\n3d ed., vol. i, p. 240.\n\n[558] _De Off._ iii. 5.\n\n[559] _Ibid._ iii. xi.\n\n[560] _Ibid._ i. 16.\n\n[561] _De Finibus_, v. 23.\n\n[562] _Meditations_, vi. 44. This and the following citations are from\nLong\u2019s translation, 2d ed.\n\n[563] _Ibid._ iv. 23. The moral element in the conception of the\nuniversal city must not be overlooked. There was implied in it the\nidea of universal brotherhood, of the ethical oneness of mankind. The\ncreation and promulgation of this conception was one of the great\nservices which Stoicism rendered to civilization.\n\n[564] _Ibid._ iii. 4.\n\n[565] _Ibid._ viii. 59.\n\n[566] This subject is dealt with by Lecky, _History of European\nMorals_, 3d ed., vol. i, pp. 295 ff.; Bryce, _Studies in History and\nJurisprudence_, vol. ii, essay xi, \u201cThe Law of Nature.\u201d\n\n[567] Bryce, _Studies in History and Jurisprudence_ (1901), vol. ii, p.\n143.\n\n[568] Sophocles, _Antigone_.\n\n[569] Commenting on the consequences of the inspiration of Roman law\nby this doctrine of Stoicism, Lecky says: \u201cTo the Stoics and the Roman\nlawyers is mainly due the clear recognition of the existence of a\nlaw of nature above and beyond all human enactments, which has been\nthe basis of the best moral and of the most influential, though most\nchimerical, political speculations of later ages, and the renewed study\nof Roman law was an important element in the revival that preceded the\nReformation\u201d (_History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 297).\n\n[570] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 129. Lecky\ninstances (vol. i, p. 292) three ways in which Stoicism worked for good\nin the Empire: (1) it raised up good emperors; (2) it led men to engage\nin the public service; and (3) it rendered the law more catholic and\nhumane.\n\n[571] Dill, _Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_ (1904), p. 376.\n\n[572] \u201cIn the Stoic emperors ... we find probably the earliest\nexample of great moral principles applied to legislation on a large\nscale.\u201d--CLIFFORD, _Lectures and Essays_, vol. ii, p. 108.\n\n[573] Public feeling in regard to the exercise of the _patria potestas_\nhad been slowly changing during the centuries. Seneca relates (_De\nClem._ i. 14) how within his memory the people furiously assaulted in\nthe Forum a certain knight because he had whipped his son to death.\n\n[574] \u201cThe alleviations of slavery by the imperial law are essentially\ntraceable to the influence of the Greek view.\u201d--MOMMSEN, _Roman\nProvinces_ (1887), vol. i, p. 296.\n\n[575] \u201cThe majority of the free population had probably either\nthemselves been slaves, or were descended from slaves.\u201d--LECKY,\n_History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 237.\n\n[576] Dill, _Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius_ (1904), p. 3.\n\n[577] Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 312.\n\n[578] _De Clem._ i. 18.\n\n[579] Tacitus, _Annals_, xiv. 42\u201345.\n\n[580] Manumissions were frequent even in Seneca\u2019s time. Pliny the\nElder was a kind master, regarded his slaves as \u201chumble friends,\u201d and\nmanumitted many of them.\n\n[581] The client class of the imperial period was made up almost wholly\nof freedmen.\n\n[582] It is surprising that while in the Stoic and other schools there\nwas, during these centuries, great advance in theoretical ethics in\nvarious domains, in that of war there was no essential modification of\nthe views and feelings of the teachers and leaders of moral reforms.\nIn the whole range of Roman literature and philosophy there are to be\nfound scarcely any expressions of disapproval of war. The attitude of\nthe Roman moralists in this matter appears to have been altogether\nlike that of the Greek philosophers. The right to wage war for empire\nand for glory was taught even by Cicero, only such wars, he insisted,\nshould be waged more gently than wars to recover property, to punish\ninsult, or to avenge a wrong (_De Off._ i. 12).\n\n[583] For the ethics of Christian persecution, see below, p. 324.\n\n[584] See on this subject Fiske, _Excursions of an Evolutionist_\n(1883), pp. 238 ff.; Hardy, _Christianity and the Roman Government_\n(1894), p. 17; Pollock, _Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics_ (1882), p.\n147.\n\n[585] Besides this main motive of the persecutions there were these\nminor ones: (1) The teachings and practices of the new sect offended\nthe prevailing spirit of luxury and sensuality; (2) families were\ndivided; (3) the business of many, as that of the silversmiths of\nEphesus, was threatened (Acts xix. 24\u201341); and (4) fear on the part\nof the government of the danger from the growth of such a strong\nsemi-secret organization as the Church was becoming within the Empire\n(Hardy, _Christianity and the Roman Government_ (1894), p. 165).\n\n[586] \u201cUpon the approach of Christianity humanity took a consciousness\nmore alert and sensitive, and during the first three centuries of\nour era all the ideas, all the sentiments which constitute morality\ndeveloped on parallel lines and with remarkable force in the growing\nChurch and in expiring paganism.\u201d--DENIS, _Histoire des th\u00e9ories et des\nid\u00e9es morales dans l\u2019antiquit\u00e9_ (1879), t. ii, p. 145.\n\n[587] _De Off._ i. 25.\n\n[588] _Meditations_, xi. 18.\n\n[589] _Ibid._ vii. 36.\n\n[590] _Ibid._ ix. 9; cf. vi. 47.\n\n[591] _Ibid._ vi. 6.\n\n[592] _Fragments_, tr. Long, lxviii; cf. lxvii.\n\n[593] _Meditations_, iii. 4.\n\n[594] _De Prov._ i. 1.\n\n[595] _Meditations_, x. 21.\n\n[596] _Ibid._ ii. 11.\n\n[597] _Ibid._ xii. 5.\n\n[598] _Ibid._ ii. 17.\n\n[599] Arrian, _Epict._ ii. 14; quoted by Lecky, _History of European\nMorals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 246.\n\n[600] _Meditations_, vii. 31.\n\n[601] _Ethical Essays_, v, \u201cOn those who are punished by the Deity\nlate.\u201d\n\n[602] _De Off._ ii. 14.\n\n[603] _Ibid._ ii. 5.\n\n[604] _Ibid._ i. 7.\n\n[605] _Ibid._ iii. 6.\n\n[606] _Ibid._ iii. 4. Compare this expression of the ancient Greek and\nRoman moral consciousness with that of the modern Japanese (see p. 86).\n\n[607] _Ibid._ ii. 12.\n\n[608] _De Clem._ ii. 6. The trouble with this philosophy, as has been\nsaid, is that if one does not feel pity for the sufferings of others he\nwill not be likely to help them.\n\n[609] Cicero, however, denied the right of self-destruction, and Vergil\nmildly censured the act. See _\u00c6neid_, vi. 434.\n\n[610] _Discourses_, i. 9.\n\n[611] _Meditations_, v. 29.\n\n[612] _Ep._ lxx; quoted by Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed.,\nvol. i, p. 218.\n\n[613] _De Prov._ i. 2.\n\n[614] Zeno, the founder of the school, and Cato, its exemplifier in\nactive life, both committed suicide.\n\n[615] Compare the views on this subject of the ancient classical\npeoples with those of the modern Japanese (see p. 85 and p. 86 n. 1.).\n\n[616] Glover, _The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire_, 3d\ned. (1909), p. 67.\n\n[617] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 324.\n\n[618] Paulsen, _A System of Ethics_, tr. Thilly (1906), pp. 111 f.\n\n[619] The cult of Isis when introduced into the Western lands favored\nillicit love, but by the second century of our era it had, in its new\nenvironment, become so far transformed as to be a true moral force in\nsociety. \u201cSacrament and mystery lent their aid to fortify the worshiper\n[of Isis] in the face of death, but, to derive their full virtue,\nhe must exercise himself in temperance, abjure the pleasures of the\nsenses, and purify himself for the vision of God\u201d (Dill, _Roman Society\nfrom Nero to Marcus Aurelius_ (1904), p. 583).\n\n[620] On this subject see Franz Cumont, _Les Myst\u00e8res de Mithra_\n(1892); English ed., _The Mysteries of Mithra_, tr. McCormack.\n\n[621] \u201cIt [Mithraism] is perhaps the highest and most striking example\nof the last efforts of paganism to reconcile itself to the great moral\nand spiritual movement which was settling steadily, and with growing\nmomentum, toward purer conceptions of God, of man\u2019s relations to Him,\nand of the life to come.\u201d--DILL, _Roman Society from Nero to Marcus\nAurelius_, p. 585.\n\n[622] \u201cOn peut dire que, si le christianisme e\u00fbt \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9 dans\nsa croissance par quelque maladie mortelle, le monde e\u00fbt \u00e9t\u00e9\nMithriaste.\u201d--RENAN, _Marc-Aur\u00e8le_, 5^{me} ed., p. 579.\n\n[623] \u201cIsis and Serapis and Mithra were preparing the Western world for\nthe religion which was to approve the long travail of humanity by a\nmore perfect vision of the divine.\u201d--DILL, _Roman Society from Nero to\nMarcus Aurelius_ (1904), p. 574.\n\n[624] Acts xvii. 29.\n\n[625] New to the multitude. Some of the Stoic philosophers, as we have\nseen, held and taught this doctrine.\n\n[626] The Eleusinian Mysteries in Greece, and some Oriental cults,\nparticularly that of Mithra, imported into the Roman Empire, made the\nparticipation in a blessed life beyond the grave dependent upon moral\npurity of life on earth and through this doctrine exercised a favorable\ninfluence upon morality (see p. 254).\n\n[627] This thought and conviction of the immortality of the individual\nwas, it is possible, in part the outcome of the decay of the ancient\ncity, whose fancied eternity had satisfied for a time the instinct of\nimmortality. But when some centuries had passed, the \u201cRomans sailed\nround the Mediterranean and recognized that the cities of the past were\nnot eternal, and with the same waft of conviction came a compensating\nbelief that eternity was the heritage of every son of man. Immortality\narose on the horizon of the man, as its last glow faded from the city\u201d\n(Wedgwood, _The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 341). It was the same in\nJudea; as immortality faded from the political horizon of Israel, it\narose on that of the individual soul.\n\n[628] Though the account of the fall of man forms the prelude of the\nHebrew Scriptures, the conception never influenced to an appreciable\ndegree pre-Christian ethics.\n\n[629] See Schmidt, _The Prophet of Nazareth_ (1905), p. 322.\n\n[630] \u201cL\u2019humanit\u00e9 cherche l\u2019id\u00e9al; mais elle veut que l\u2019id\u00e9al soit une\npersonne; elle n\u2019aime pas une abstraction.\u201d--RENAN, _Marc-Aur\u00e8le_,\n5^{me} ed., p. 582.\n\n[631] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. ii, p. 8.\n\n[632] On this subject consult Hatch, _The Influence of Greek Ideas\nand Usages upon the Christian Church_ (1888), lect. xii, \u201cThe\nTransformation of the Basis of Christian Union: Doctrine in the Place\nof Conduct.\u201d\n\n[633] \u201cAfter the middle of the third century, ... Christianity may be\njust as truly called a Hellenic religion as an Oriental.\u201d--HARNACK,\n_The Expansion of Christianity_ (1904), vol. i, pp. 393 f.\n\n[634] The change of emphasis from moral life to correct doctrine took\nplace during the last half of the second and the first half of the\nthird century. \u201cUnder the influence of contemporary Greek thought, the\nword faith came to be transferred from simple trust in God to mean\nthe acceptance of a series of propositions, and these propositions,\npropositions in abstract metaphysics\u201d (Hatch, _The Influence of Greek\nIdeas and Usages upon the Christian Church_ (1888), p. 310).\n\n[635] The Athanasian Creed, which by the end of the ninth century\nwas in use in the churches of the West as an authoritative symbol\nand exposition of the Roman Catholic faith, says, \u201cWhosoever will be\nsaved, before all things, it is necessary that he hold the Catholic\nfaith, which faith, except every one who do keep entire and unviolated,\nwithout doubt he shall perish everlastingly\u201d (Philip Schaff,\n_Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesiae Universalis_, vol. ii, p. 66).\n\n[636] Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. ii, p. 68.\n\n[637] \u201cThe virtues of the intellect, freedom and boldness of\nthought and the power to doubt, the vital principle of scientific\nresearch, are, in the eyes of primitive Christianity, worthless and\ndangerous.\u201d--PAULSEN, _A System of Ethics_, tr. Thilly (1906), p. 68.\n\n[638] Cf. Harnack, _The Expansion of Christianity_ (1904), vol. i,\nchap. v, \u201cThe Religion of Authority and Reason.\u201d\n\n[639] See Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, tr. Thilly (1906), bk. i, chap.\niii.\n\n[640] The ascetic movement was a reaction not only against the moral\ndissoluteness of pagan society, but also against the moral degeneracy\nwhich, before the end of the third century, had set in within the\nChristian community itself. The Church had become to a lamentable\ndegree conformed unto the world, and had lost much of that moral fervor\nwhich characterized it during the first two centuries.\n\n[641] Alban Butler, _The Lives of the Saints_ (the Fathers, Martyrs,\nand other Principal Saints, compiled from monuments and other authentic\nsources), 12 vols. (1854). Orig. ed. pub. 1754\u20131760.\n\n[642] \u201cIf you do any good beyond what is commanded by God, you will\ngain for yourself more abundant glory, and will be more honored by God\nthan you would otherwise be,\u201d was the teaching of the Church respecting\nthe meritoriousness of ascetic practices. Cf. Newman Smyth, _Christian\nEthics_ (1892), p. 313.\n\n[643] The \u201cDialogue\u201d is of course a purely literary creation of some\nmonk. Oisin was not a contemporary of St. Patrick.\n\n[644] J.\u00a0H. Simpson, _Poems of Oisin_ (1857), pp. 42 ff. We have\nreproduced only a small part of the poem.\n\n[645] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. ii, p. 34.\n\n[646] Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_\n(1908), vol. ii, p. 252.\n\n[647] Cf. Dante, _Inf._ xiii.\n\n[648] See above, pp. 175, 215.\n\n[649] Ireland was foremost in this missionary movement because she was\nso given over to the monastic spirit. See Montalembert, _The Monks of\nthe West_ (1861), vol. ii, p. 397.\n\n[650] According to Westermarck (_The Origin and Development of the\nMoral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, pp. 565\u2013569) charity took the place of\nsacrifice in the primitive cults, and for this reason became such a\nprominent religious duty in all the higher faiths.\n\n[651] Montalembert, _The Monks of the West_ (1861), vol. i, pp. 397 f.\n\n[652] Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. ii, pp. 86 ff.\n\n[653] _The Moral Ideal_, 3d ed., p. 369.\n\n[654] See above, p. 245.\n\n[655] \u201cThe suppression of all religions but one by Theodosius, the\nmurder of Hypatia by the monks of Cyril, and the closing by Justinian\nof the schools of Athens, are the three events which mark the decisive\noverthrow of intellectual freedom.\u201d--LECKY, _History of European\nMorals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 428.\n\n[656] See above, p. 6.\n\n[657] _Physics and Politics_ (1873), pp. 70 f.\n\n[658] \u201cOne may find ... the chief characteristic of the period of the\nmigrations in a complete uprooting of public morality, a universal\noverturning of inherited conceptions of right and wrong.\u201d--FRANCKE,\n_Social Forces in German Literature_, 2d ed., p. 12.\n\n[659] _Parliament of Religions_ (1893), vol. i, pp. 574 f.; consult\nalso Bryce, _Studies in History and Jurisprudence_ (1901), vol. ii, p.\n237.\n\n[660] _Qur\u2019\u00e2n_, tr. Palmer (Sacred Books of the East, vols. vi, ix),\nsuras ii. 184\u2013189, 212\u2013215; iv. 90; viii. 40; ix. 5\u201314, 29; xlvii. 4,\nand many others.\n\n[661] _Ibid._ suras ii. 149; iii. 151; ix. 113.\n\n[662] Sura xxiv. 33. The New Testament nowhere inculcates the\nmanumission of slaves, but the spirit of its teachings is opposed\nto slavery, and the early Fathers of the Church encouraged the\nemancipation of slaves.\n\n[663] Sura iv. 3.\n\n[664] Suras vi. 138, 141, 152; xvii. 33.\n\n[665] Suras ii. 216; v. 93.\n\n[666] R. Bosworth Smith, _Mohammed and Mohammedanism_ (1875), p. 204.\n\n[667] Ameer Ali, _The Spirit of Islam_, 2d ed., p. 283.\n\n[668] According to the principles of the Koran, though no Moslem\ncaptive might be reduced to servitude, all non-Moslem prisoners could,\nas spoils of war, be enslaved: \u201cWe make lawful for ye ... what thy\nright hand possesses [slaves] out of the booty God has granted thee\u201d\n(sura xxxiii. 49).\n\n[669] \u201cThe recognition of the slave traffic by Mohammedanism has been,\nand is to this day, a curse to Africa and a source of disturbance to\nthe world\u2019s politics.\u201d--HOBHOUSE, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i,\np. 307.\n\n[670] In an address. Cf. R. Bosworth Smith, _Mohammed and\nMohammedanism_ (1875), pp. 59 ff.\n\n[671] Ameer Ali, _The Spirit of Islam_, 2d ed., p. 328. The author\nmaintains that Mohammed himself did not intend that his rules should be\nbinding for all time.\n\n[672] This teaching is one which does not show itself as a generally\nrecognized principle in the pre-Christian centuries, as does the\nprinciple of love, or self-devotion to the common good, or universal\nbenevolence. \u201cChristianity at its inception did not take over this\nmoral principle, ready-made, from any of the older cults or cultures\nfrom which the Christian movement was in a position to draw. It is not\nfound, at least in appreciable force, in the received Judaism; nor can\nit be derived from the classical (Greco-Roman) cultures, which had none\nof it\u201d (Thorstein B. Veblen, \u201cChristian Morals and the Competitive\nSystem,\u201d _The International Journal of Ethics_ for January, 1910).\n\n[673] \u201cChristian mores in the Western Empire were formed by syncretism\nof Jewish and pagan mores. Christian mores therefore contain war,\nslavery, concubinage, demonism, and base amusements, together\nwith some abstract ascetic doctrines with which these things are\ninconsistent.\u201d--SUMNER, _Folkways_ (1907), p. 116.\n\n[674] For opinions of early Christian writers and the attitude of the\nChurch on the soldier\u2019s profession and the rightfulness of war, see\nGrotius, _Rights of War and Peace_, tr. Whewell, pp. 49 ff.\n\n[675] Harnack, _The Expansion of Christianity_ (1904), vol. ii, p. 205.\n\n[676] See above, p. 277.\n\n[677] Throughout the medieval ages and down almost to our own day\nthese Old Testament records, misread, were used to justify many of the\ncruelties of war, and other atrocities:\n\n Plunder and pillage were supported by reference to the divinely\n approved \u201cspoiling of the Egyptians\u201d by the Israelites. The right\n to massacre unresisting enemies was based upon the command of the\n Almighty to the Jews in the twentieth chapter of Deuteronomy. The\n indiscriminate slaughter of whole populations was justified by a\n reference to the divine command to slaughter the nations round\n about Israel. Torture and mutilation of enemies was sanctioned\n by the conduct of Samuel against Agag, of King David against the\n Philistines, of the men of Judah against Adonibezek. Even the\n slaughter of babes in arms was supported by a passage from the\n Psalms, \u201cHappy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones\n against the stones.\u201d Treachery and assassination were supported\n by a reference to the divinely approved Phinehas, Ehud, Judith,\n and Jael; and murdering the ministers of unapproved religions, by\n Elijah\u2019s slaughter of the priests of Baal.--ANDREW D. WHITE, _Seven\n Great Statesmen_ (1910), pp. 85 f.\n\n\n[678] Lecky believes this to have been the main cause of the\ntransformation in the Church. \u201cThe transition,\u201d he says, \u201cfrom the\nalmost Quaker tenets of the primitive Church to the essentially\nmilitary Christianity of the Crusades was due chiefly ... to the terror\nand the example of Mohammedanism\u201d (_History of European Morals_, 3d\ned., vol. ii, p. 252). But, as we have seen, the transition was already\nnearly complete before the rise of Islam.\n\n[679] In a portrayal of the character of the Scandinavians, the Church\nhistorian Schaff observes: \u201cTheir only enthusiasm was the feeling of\nduty; but the direction which had been given to this feeling was so\nabsolutely opposed to that pointed out by the Christian morality, that\nno reconciliation was possible\u201d (_History of the Christian Church_,\nvol. iv, p. 110). Yet in the important domain of ethics which we are\nhere examining this is exactly what did happen.\n\n[680] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. ii, p. 253.\n\n[681] Josiah Royce, _The Philosophy of Loyalty_ (1908).\n\n[682] \u201cSo great, it is said, was the knights\u2019 respect for an oath, a\npromise, or a vow, that when they lay under any of these restrictions,\nthey appeared everywhere with little chains attached to their arms\nor habits to show all the world they were slaves to their word; nor\nwere these chains taken off till their promise had been performed,\nwhich sometimes extended to a term of four or five years. It cannot\nbe expected, of course, that reality should have always come up to\nthe ideal.\u201d--WESTERMARCK, _The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_\n(1908), vol. ii, p. 102.\n\n[683] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. ii, p. 272.\n\n[684] First printed in 1873, from MSS. compiled probably as early as\nthe twelfth or thirteenth century. There is an English translation by\nCharles Swan (1877).\n\n[685] \u201cThere can be little doubt,\u201d says Lecky, \u201cthat the Catholic\nreverence for the Virgin has done much to elevate and purify the ideal\nof woman and soften the manners of men\u201d (_History of European Morals_,\n3d ed., vol. ii, p. 367). And so Professor Nathaniel Schmidt: \u201cThe\nchivalry of the medieval knight from which our modern treatment of\nwoman so largely is derived cannot be regarded as solely a product of\nChristianity, for it has a deep root in the dreamy reverence for woman\ncharacteristic of our pagan ancestors. Yet it would not have become\nwhat it was but for the veneration accorded to the Virgin Mary\u201d (_The\nProphet of Nazareth_ (1905), p. 324).\n\n[686] See Curtis M. Geer, _The Beginning of the Peace Movement_ (1912).\n\n[687] Kluckhohn, _Geschichte des Gottesfriedens_ (1857), p. 38.\n\n[688] This part of the week was chosen because these days had been\nconsecrated by Christ\u2019s passion, burial, resurrection, and ascension.\n\n[689] Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 314.\n\n[690] The last instance of an arrangement for ransom of prisoners\nwas an agreement between England and France in 1780. See Hall,\n_International Law_, 5th ed., p. 414, n. 1.\n\n[691] One center of these reform movements was the celebrated French\nmonastery of Cluny. The influences which radiated from the cloisters of\nthis convent had a profound effect for centuries upon the moral life of\nChristendom.\n\n[692] See Sabatier, _Life of St. Francis of Assisi_.\n\n[693] _History of the Inquisition_ (1887), vol. i, p. 266.\n\n[694] \u201cThere was need of the exaggeration of self-sacrifice taught by\nFrancis to recall humanity to a sense of its obligations.... The value\nof such an ideal on an age hard and cruel can scarce be exaggerated\u201d\n(Lea, _History of the Inquisition_ (1887), vol. i, pp. 260 f.). See\nalso Nathaniel Schmidt, _The Prophet of Nazareth_ (1905), p. 325.\n\n[695] See above, p. 262.\n\n[696] \u201cEthics on the basis of authority becomes a mere legal\ncasuistry.\u201d--HALL, _The History of Ethics within Organized\nChristianity_ (1910), pp. 296, 326.\n\n[697] \u201cBut meanwhile by alternations of Hebraism and Hellenism, of a\nman\u2019s intellectual and moral impulses, of the effort to see things as\nthey really are, and the effort to win peace by self-conquest, the\nhuman spirit proceeds; and each of these two forces has its appointed\nhours of culmination and seasons of rule.\u201d--MATTHEW ARNOLD, _Culture\nand Anarchy_ (1875), p. 143.\n\n[698] It must be borne in mind that the spirit of the Renaissance was\nat work long before the Renaissance.\n\n[699] In this there is substantial agreement among historians of the\nInquisition: consult Lea, _The Inquisition of the Middle Ages_ (1887),\nvol. i, pp. 236 ff.; Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed.,\nvol. i, pp. 98, 395 f.; Pollock, _Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics_\n(1882), essay vi, \u201cThe Theory of Persecution\u201d; _Catholic Encyclopedia_,\nvol. viii, article on \u201cInquisition.\u201d\n\n[700] \u201cThe case for theological persecution is unanswerable if we\nadmit the fundamental supposition that one faith is known to be true\nand necessary for salvation.\u201d--POLLOCK, _Essays in Jurisprudence and\nEthics_ (1882), p. 155.\n\n[701] _Catholic Encyclopedia_, vol. viii, under \u201cInquisition.\u201d\n\n[702] Besides the doctrine of the criminality of misbelief, Lecky finds\na secondary cause of Christian persecution in the medieval teaching\nrespecting hell. That vision of the awful and eternal torments prepared\nfor misbelievers, he says, \u201cchilled and deadened the sympathies and\npredisposed men to inflict suffering\u201d (_Rationalism in Europe_, new ed.\n(1890), vol. i, p. 347).\n\n[703] Lea, _History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages_ (1887), vol.\ni, p. 234. \u201cThe representatives of the Church were children of their\nown age.... Theologians and canonists, the highest and the saintliest,\nstood by the code of their day and sought to explain and justify it\u201d\n(_Catholic Encyclopedia_, vol. viii, under \u201cInquisition\u201d).\n\n[704] \u201cIt was strange that one almost swooning with pain should have\nsaid the gentlest-hearted and truest thing about human nature that has\never been said since the world began.\u201d--GERALD STANLEY LEE, \u201cBusiness,\nGoodness, and Imagination,\u201d _Hibbert Journal_ for April, 1912, p. 651.\n\n[705] On Machiavellism see _The Prince_, and introductions to different\neditions by Macaulay, Lord Acton, and Henry Morley; Figgis, _Studies\nof Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius_ (1907), pp. 81\u2013107; John\nMorley, _Machiavelli_ (Romanes Lecture for 1897).\n\n[706] It should be borne in mind that in Machiavelli\u2019s age politics had\nbeen secularized, that is, divorced from theology, and this with the\napproval of most men. Machiavelli would now go farther and separate\npolitics and morality. This is Lord Morley\u2019s interpretation of _The\nPrince_. He thinks we shall best understand Machiavelli, yet without\nfor a moment approving his teaching, \u201cif we take him as following up\nthe divorce of politics from theology, by a divorce from ethics also.\nHe was laying down certain maxims of government as an art; the end of\nthat art is the security and permanence of the ruling power; and the\nfundamental principle from which he silently started, without shadow\nof doubt or misgiving as to its soundness, was that the application\nof moral standards to this business is as little to the point as it\nwould be in the navigation of a ship. The effect was fatal even for his\nown purpose, for what he put aside, whether for the sake of argument\nor because he thought them in substance irrelevant, were nothing less\nthan the living forces by which societies subsist and governments are\nstrong\u201d (_Machiavelli_, Romanes Lecture for 1897).\n\n[707] \u201cCatherine de Medici, Philip II, Alva, Des Adrets, Tilly,\nWallenstein were simply incarnations of the Machiavellian theories\nwhich ruled this period.\u201d--ANDREW D. WHITE, _Seven Great Statesmen_\n(1910), pp. 86 f.\n\n[708] Castiglione, _The Book of the Courtier_ (1903), p. 22.\n\n[709] _Ibid._ p. 25.\n\n[710] Special emphasis was laid upon this virtue of courtesy in the\nideal of courtliness. And rightly so, for, as has been well said, \u201cTo\nbe courteous is just as much a duty as to be honest, for rudeness\nrouses more hatred and bitterness than good honest cheating.\u201d\n\n[711] In many lives of this period there was a combination of the ideal\nof the courtier and that of the monk. There is a fine portrayal of such\na character in Shorthouse\u2019s _John Inglesant_.\n\n[712] See above, p. 276.\n\n[713] The best authority on this subject is Lea, _Superstition and\nForce_, 4th ed., pp. 101\u2013247.\n\n[714] See above, p. 304.\n\n[715] The last judicial duel in England was fought in 1492, but the\npractice was not abrogated in Russia till 1649.\n\n[716] Ralph Barton Perry, _The Moral Economy_ (1909), p. 34. And so\nThomas Cuming Hall: \u201cThe glory of Protestant ethics as founded by\nLuther and developed by Kant is the autonomous, democratic, unpriestly\ncharacter stamped upon it\u201d (_History of Ethics within Organized\nChristianity_ (1910), p. 527).\n\n[717] _Culture and Anarchy_ (1875), p. 145.\n\n[718] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. ii, p. 370.\n\n[719] See below, p. 362.\n\n[720] On this subject see Andrew D. White, _Seven Great Statesmen_\n(1910), chapter on Thomasius.\n\n[721] S. Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_ (1889), p. 391.\n\n[722] _History of Rationalism in Europe_ (1890), vol. ii, p. 220.\n\n[723] _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 126.\n\n[724] _The Approach to the Social Question_ (1909), p. 84.\n\n[725] Muirhead, _The Elements of Ethics_ (1909), p. 232.\n\n[726] _An Essay on Crimes and Punishments_, tr. Voltaire (1793), p. 157.\n\n[727] See Sisson, \u201cThe State absorbing the Functions of the Church,\u201d\n_International Journal of Ethics_ for April, 1907, p. 341.\n\n[728] \u201cIt won\u2019t do any longer to lay the blame for poverty wholly upon\nits victims. These cruel theories cannot face a growing suspicion that\npoverty is somehow involved in the ethics of distribution.\u201d--LOUIS F.\nPOST, in address; see _The Public_ for June 21, 1912, p. 593.\n\n[729] Lloyd, _Man the Social Creator_ (1906), p. 135.\n\n[730] The most practicable proposal for the undoing of this ancient and\never-augmenting wrong of private monopoly in land is that presented\nwith singular force and clarity by Henry George in his epochal work,\n_Progress and Poverty_. His proposal is to exempt from taxation\nindustry and all forms of property save land, and to lay upon land\nvalues, or, in other words, upon actual or potential ground rents, a\ntax that would reclaim practically the whole of these for society, and\nsecure to the public all future increments in land values created by\ncommunal growth and enterprise. Since this tax is to take the place of\nall other forms of taxation it has become known as \u201cthe single tax.\u201d\nSuch a change in the tax system would inevitably create a hardship\nin a few cases, but a hardship almost infinitesimal as compared with\nthat now inflicted upon the many by the pre\u00ebmption of the earth by\na class. The reform would undoubtedly, as claimed by its advocates,\ndestroy private monopoly in land, the root which nourishes most other\nmonopolies, and secure to all equal right of access to the earth and\nits resources.\n\n[731] Dewey and Tufts, _Ethics_ (1908), p. 162.\n\n[732] See Ira Woods Howerth, \u201cCompetition, Natural and Industrial,\u201d\n_The International Journal of Ethics_ for July, 1912.\n\n[733] \u201cWe may fairly ask whether there is a single moral question of\nany magnitude which intelligent and educated men would answer to-day\nin precisely the same fashion as they would have done before the\npublication of Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_\u201d (Taylor, _The Problem of\nConduct_ (1901), pp. 57 f.). See also Huxley, _Evolution and Ethics_\n(1899). Huxley maintains that the \u201ccosmic process\u201d is nonethical and in\ndirect opposition to the ethical evolution going on in human society.\n\n[734] \u201cThe best is wanting when selfishness begins to be deficient\u201d\n(\u201cThe Twilight of the Gods,\u201d _The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche_, ed.\nAlexander Tille, vol. xi, p. 191). \u201cThe weak and ill-constituted shall\nperish.... What is more injurious than any crime? Practical sympathy\nfor all the ill-constituted and weak--Christianity\u201d (\u201cThe Antichrist,\u201d\n_ibid._ vol. xi, p. 238). This way of thinking and talking is by no\nmeans exclusively modern. Callicles, in Plato\u2019s _Gorgias_, says to\nSocrates: \u201cAnd therefore this seeking to have more than the many is\nconventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice,\nwhereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have\nmore than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many\nways, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities\nand races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having\nmore than the inferior\u201d (Jowett\u2019s _Dialogues of Plato_, vol. iii, p.\n72).\n\n[735] See Kropotkin, _Mutual Aid_.\n\n[736] \u201cThe animal species in which individual struggle has been reduced\nto its narrowest limits, and the practice of mutual aid has attained\nthe greatest development, are invariably the most numerous, the most\nprosperous, and the most open to further progress\u201d (Kropotkin, _Mutual\nAid_ (1909), p. 293). See also Bixby, _The Crisis in Morals_ (1891), p.\n235.\n\n[737] See Dewey, \u201cIs Nature Good,\u201d _Hibbert Journal_ for July, 1909.\n\n[738] \u201c\u2018Ye have compassion on one another\u2019: this struck me much: Allah\nmight have made you having no compassion on one another,--how had it\nbeen then? This is a great direct thought, a glance at first hand into\nthe very fact of things\u201d (Carlyle, _Heroes and Hero Worship_, \u201cThe\nHero as Prophet\u201d). The _G\u00e2thas_ have the same thought: \u201cWho, O Great\nCreator! is the inspirer of the good thoughts (within our souls)? Who\n... hath made the son revering the father?\u201d (Yasna xliv. 4, 7, Sacred\nBooks of the East, vol. xxxi).\n\n[739] \u201cIn the new way of looking at things, which came to the world\nfrom Darwin, there is hope and cheer, if we but take the matter aright.\nOnly consider what his doctrine of the shaping power of environment\nis leading us to do in bettering the conditions of the poor, the\ndefective, the prone to crime. His demonstration that circumstances may\nmake or break a man, is a clarion call to humanitarian zeal. And his\nteaching of the infinite variability of species, and of the indefinite\nprogress which man may make in the cultivation of humane and moral\nqualities, is one that looks distinctly to the perfectibility of the\nrace.\u201d--The New York _Nation_ for January 7, 1909, p. 7.\n\n[740] On this subject see Evans, _Evolutional Ethics and Animal\nPsychology_ (1898).\n\n[741] When in 1654 matches for cockfighting were forbidden in England\nthe reason for the prohibition was not that it was cruel to the birds,\nbut for the reason that the matches were \u201ccommonly accompanied with\ngaming, drinking, swearing, quarreling, and other dissolute practices\u201d\n(Pike, _A History of Crime in England_ (1873), vol. ii, p. 186).\nConsult further, Lecky, _Rationalism in Europe_ (1890), vol. i, pp. 307\nf.\n\n[742] _Evolutional Ethics and Animal Psychology_ (1898), p. 18.\nDarwinism has without doubt also aided the vegetarians in their crusade\nagainst the use of animal flesh for food, and in conjunction with the\ninfluence of Eastern ideas and convictions may cause ultimately a\ngreat change in the ethical feelings of the Western peoples respecting\nthis practice. They may come to regard it with the same deep moral\nreprobation as is now felt by Eastern moralists. \u201cFor my part,\u201d says\nthe Japanese writer Nitob\u00e9, \u201cthe surprising thing is that European\nethics can be so atavistic as to stoop to a sort of cannibalism\u201d\n(_Fifty Years of New Japan_ (1909), vol. ii, p. 462).\n\n[743] See Frederic W.\u00a0H. Myers, _Human Personality_ (1903), 2 vols.;\nSir Oliver Lodge, _The Survival of Man_ (1909); James H. Hyslop,\n_Enigmas of Psychical Research_ (1906); W.\u00a0F. Barrett, _Psychical\nResearch_ (1912).\n\n[744] _The Survival of Man_ (1909), p. 341.\n\n[745] George William Knox, \u201cReligion and Ethics,\u201d _International\nJournal of Ethics_ for April, 1902.\n\n[746] George Harris, _Moral Evolution_ (1896), p. 392.\n\n[747] _Christian Ethics_ (1892), p. 11. Lecky makes a similar\nobservation: \u201cGeneration after generation the power of the moral\nfaculty becomes more absolute, the doctrines that oppose it wane and\nvanish, and the various elements of theology are absorbed and recast by\nits influence\u201d (_History of Rationalism in Europe_ (1890), vol. i, pp.\n351 f.).\n\n[748] \u201cIt is because the ethical ideals of Christendom have become so\nwonderfully enlarged and perfected within the last half century that\nthe character of God has taken on such new and glorious forms. The\nGod whom Christian people generally believe in and worship is a very\ndifferent being from the one they were thinking about and praying to\nwhen I began my ministry.\u201d--WASHINGTON GLADDEN (in report of address).\n\n[749] See above, pp. 35, 164 and 187.\n\n[750] Cf. Borden Parker Bowne, _The Essence of Religion_ (1910), chap.\niv, \u201cRighteousness the Essence of Religion.\u201d\n\n[751] Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_\n(1908), vol. i, p. 72.\n\n[752] See above, p. 18.\n\n[753] \u201cAlong with the gloomy record of the two hundred fifty years\nof negro slavery we find the history of its abolition; perhaps the\nmost impressive history on record of the origin and completion of\na purification of the moral consciousness of peoples.\u201d--CALDECOTT,\n_English Colonization and Empire_ (1891), p. 196.\n\n[754] \u201cIn Elizabeth\u2019s time Sir John Hawkins initiated the slave trade,\nand in commemoration of the achievement was allowed to put in his coat\nof arms \u2018a demi-moor, proper bound with a cord\u2019; the honorableness of\nhis action being thus assumed by himself and recognized by Queen and\npublic.\u201d--SPENCER, _Principles of Ethics_ (1892), vol. i, p. 468.\n\n[755] By a provision of the Peace of Utrecht (1714) England secured the\ncontract known as the Assiento, which gave English subjects the sole\nright for thirty years of shipping annually 4800 African slaves to the\nSpanish colonies in America.\n\n[756] In the Southern colonies the opposition to the further\nimportation of negroes sprang in general from the fear of the\ninsurrection of the slaves, should they become too numerous. The little\nopposition that existed in some of the Middle States was based almost\nwholly on economic grounds.\n\n[757] The first abolition paper was established in 1821, but the\nmovement it represented soon died out. The movement started anew with\nthe appearance of _The Liberator_ in 1831. See Albert Bushnell Hart,\n_Slavery and Abolition_ (1906), pp. 173 ff.\n\n[758] \u201cWhen Garrison began his work, he thought nothing was more like\nthe spirit of Christ ... than to bring a whole race of people out\nof sin and debasement, ... but he soon found that neither minister\nnor church anywhere in the lower South continued to protest against\nslavery; that the cloth in the North was arrayed against him, and that\nmany northern divines entered the lists against abolition, especially\nMoses Stuart, Professor of Hebrew in Andover Theological Seminary, who\njustified slavery from the New Testament; President Lord of Dartmouth\nCollege, who held that slavery was an institution of God, according to\nnatural law; and Hopkins, Episcopal bishop of Vermont, who came forward\nas a thick and thin defender of slavery. The positive opposition of\nchurches soon followed\u201d (Albert Bushnell Hart, _Slavery and Abolition_\n(1906), p. 211). In 1832 took place the secession of students from\nLane Seminary, Cincinnati, because the trustees and Dr. Lyman Beecher\nhad forbidden them to discuss the slavery question. Four fifths of the\nstudent body withdrew.\n\n[759] Cf. Henderson, _Dependents, Defectives, and Delinquents_ (1893);\nZebulon R. Brockway, _Fifty Years of Prison Service_ (1912).\n\n[760] The New York _Nation_ of March 19, 1908, p. 254.\n\n[761] _The Century Magazine_ for September, 1912, p. 886.\n\n[762] Pike, _A History of Crime in England_ (1876), vol. i, p. 50.\n\n[763] Wines, _Punishment and Reformation_, 6th ed., p. 103.\n\n[764] Pike, _A History of Crime in England_ (1876), vol. ii, p. 287.\n\n[765] His _Essay on Crimes and Punishments_ appeared in 1764 and\nproduced a profound impression. It did much to abolish torture in\njudicial proceedings.\n\n[766] \u201cIn proportion as punishments become more cruel, the minds of\nmen, as a fluid rises to the same height with that which surrounds\nit, grow hardened and insensible.\u201d--BECCARIA, _An Essay on Crimes and\nPunishments_ (1793), p. 95.\n\n[767] Wines, _Punishment and Reformation_, 6th ed., pp. 122 ff.\n\n[768] The penitentiary system was inaugurated in 1704 by Pope Clement\nXI, who in that year established the Hospital of St. Michael at Rome.\nFor the history of the penitentiary movement see Wines, _Punishment and\nReformation_.\n\n[769] \u201cThe whole conception and method of these courts suggests the\nreligious spirit and almost startles us with its indication of the\nspiritualizing of the civil power.\u201d--EDWARD O. SISSON, \u201cThe State\nabsorbing the Functions of the Church,\u201d _International Journal of\nEthics_ for April, 1907, p. 344.\n\n[770] The progressive purification of the social conscience may be\ntraced further in the changed feeling in regard to dueling, lotteries,\ngambling, and the use of intoxicating liquors. Less than a century\nago dueling was common among all the European peoples. To-day in all\nAnglo-Saxon lands the duel is condemned by the common conscience and\nprohibited by law. During the last few decades in the United States\nlotteries have been transferred \u201cfrom the class of respectable to\na class of criminal enterprises.\u201d So too is it the growing moral\ndisapproval of the use of alcoholic drinks that has caused drunkenness\nboth in England and in our country to become much less common among the\nreputable members of society than it was only two or three generations\nago.\n\n[771] Thus formulated by the distinguished jurist James Brown Scott.\nCf. _Report of the Seventeenth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference_ (1911),\npp. 35 ff. Professor Scott here shows how the growth of juridical\ninstitutions between nations is similar to that within nations,\nonly later and slower. The stages of this growth are self-redress,\narbitration, courts of justice.\n\n[772] See Sir Charles Bruce, \u201cThe Modern Conscience in Relation to\nthe Treatment of Dependent Peoples and Communities,\u201d _Papers on\nInter-Racial Problems_ (1911), pp. 279 ff.\n\n[773] _Papers on Inter-Racial Problems_ (1911), ed. G. Spiller, p. 286.\n\n[774] For this subject viewed from a Chinese standpoint, see Edward\nAlsworth Ross, _The Changing Chinese_ (1911), p. 170.\n\n[775] Grotius (Hugo de Groot), _The Rights of War and Peace_, tr.\nCampbell (1901\u20131903). On Grotius see Hill, _History of Diplomacy_\n(1905\u20131906), vol. ii, pp. 569 ff.; Andrew D. White, _Seven Great\nStatesmen_ (1910), pp. 55 ff.; Dunning, _A History of Political\nTheories_ (1905), vol. ii, chap. v.\n\n[776] Andrew D. White, _Seven Great Statesmen_ (1910), p. 79.\n\n[777] See above, p. 240.\n\n[778] James Bryce, _Studies in History and Jurisprudence_ (1901), vol.\nii, p. 167.\n\n[779] Hill, _History of Diplomacy_ (1905\u20131906), vol. ii, p. 573.\n\n[780] _Seven Great Statesmen_ (1910), p. 73.\n\n[781] We cannot concur with the author, Norman Angell, of _The Great\nIllusion_ in his contention that there will be no change in the\npractice of nations regarding war and preparations for war till there\nis a change in ideas respecting the economic advantage to be derived\nfrom successful war. Moral idealism, finding expression in revolutions\nand reforms, is constantly giving denial to the validity of the\neconomic or materialistic interpretation of history when the economic\nmotive is thus made the dominant motive in human action. War will\nbecome a thing of the past only when men can no longer fight with a\ngood conscience.\n\n[782] _Machiavelli_ (The Romanes Lecture for 1897).\n\n[783] This archaic nature of the code is shown especially in its\nretention as a survival of the principle of collective responsibility,\nwhich, long outgrown by ordinary morality, still forms the very basis\nof the war system. Again, the true nature of the war code as a heritage\nfrom the low level of savagery is shown in its retention of the\nprimitive rule that the one suffering an injury shall be the judge of\nhis own cause and the avenger of his wrong, a principle of self-redress\nlong since discarded by the private law of all civilized peoples.\n\n[784] _Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius_ (1907), p.\n94.\n\n[785] Pike, _A History of Crime in England_ (1873), vol. i, p. 211;\nvol. ii, p. 414.\n\n[786] _Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius_ (1907), p.\n96.\n\n[787] Telemachus was an Asiatic monk who journeyed to Rome for the\npurpose of making a protest against the bloody spectacles. \u201cThe Romans\nwere provoked by the interruption of their pleasures; and the rash\nmonk, who had descended into the arena to separate the gladiators,\nwas overwhelmed under a shower of stones. But the madness of the\npeople soon subsided; they respected the memory of Telemachus, who had\ndeserved the honors of martyrdom; and they submitted without a murmur\nto the laws of Honorius, which abolished forever the human sacrifices\nof the amphitheatre\u201d (Gibbon, _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_,\nchap. xxx).\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n \u00c6gospotami, slaughter of Athenian prisoners at, 194\n\n \u00c6schylus, 191\n\n Ahriman, 124\n\n Ahura Mazda, 124\n\n Almsgiving, 281, 368\n\n Altruism, Greek and Roman, 175, 215;\n Christian, 279\n\n Am\u00e9lineau, 44\n\n Amos, 145\n\n Amphictyonic League, 194\n\n Amusements, humanizing of, 369\n\n Ancestor worship, as a moral force, 13;\n in China, 54;\n in Japan, 78\n\n Angell, Norman, 376 n. 5\n\n Animal ethics, Brahmanic, 103;\n Buddhist, 119;\n Zoroastrian, 129;\n Mohammedan, 292;\n Christian, 357;\n influence of evolutionary science upon, 358\n\n Aphrodite, 171\n\n Aquinas, Thomas, 318, 325\n\n Arbitration among the Greeks, 195\n\n Arhat, the, 113\n\n Aristotle, views of, on war against non-Greeks, 180;\n ethical system of, 202\u2013204;\n views of, on slavery, 203\n\n Asceticism, general fostering causes of, 267;\n Christian fostering causes of, 268\n\n Assur-natsir-pal, 51\n\n Athleticism, Greek moral elements in, 177\n\n Aurelius, Marcus, _Meditations_ of, 239, 247\n\n Autolycus, 185\n\n\n Bagehot, 287\n\n Beccaria, 345, 370\n\n Benevolence, Roman, 236\n\n Blood feud, 20\n\n Brahma, the impersonal, 96;\n the personal, 96\n\n Brahmans, the, 97, 101, 102\n\n Breasted, Professor, 31, 39 n. 3\n\n Buckle, Henry T., 1, 2\n\n Buddha, 111;\n ethical content of his message, 116\n\n Buddhism, in Japan, 79;\n the four truths of, 106;\n the eightfold path of, 110;\n influence of, on the military spirit, 120\n\n Bury, J.\u00a0B., 174\n\n Bushido, ideal of, 79, 80\u201382;\n influence of, 87;\n in action, 88, 89\n\n\n Cannibalism, 26;\n celestial, 26 n. 3\n\n Castes, Hindu, 97\n\n Charity, Christian, 279\u2013282;\n Moslem, 296\n\n Chinese cashiers in Japan, 90 n. 2\n\n Christianity, doctrinal, ethical ideal of, 261;\n limitations of the ideal of, 264\n\n Chrysostom, Dion, 243\n\n Cicero, 215;\n contempt of, for manual labor and merchandizing, 224\n\n City state, as the mold of Greek morality, 169;\n Roman, 213;\n effect of decay of, on Greek and Roman morals, 204, 221\n\n Class morality, 344\n\n Clemency, Roman virtue, 249\n\n Clovis, Frankish chieftain, 303\n\n Cluny, 313\n\n Collective responsibility, 18\u201320;\n doctrine of, repudiated by Hebrew prophets, 159;\n principle of, as embodied in Church code rejected by the modern\n conscience, 364;\n a survival of, in modern war code, 378 n. 1\n\n Competition, in primitive society, 14\n\n Confucianism, 53\n\n Confucius, 60\n\n Conscience, new social, nurtured in the medieval towns, 330, 331;\n purification in modern times, 364\u2013371;\n new international, 371\u2013382\n\n Constantine the Great, 302\n\n Continuance theory, 35\u201337;\n in the Greek moral evolution, 187\n\n Corn, moral effects of free distribution of, at Rome, 224\n\n Cosmopolitanism, growth of, in Hellenistic Age, 209;\n in the Roman Empire, 236\u2013240\n\n Courage, altruistic element in, 22, 175\n\n Courtier, ideal of the, 328\u2013330\n\n Criticism, higher, 335\n\n Crusades, as ideal of knighthood in action, 309\n\n Cuba, our dealings with, 373\n\n Customary morality, 18\n\n Cynics, 210\n\n\n Darius I, inscriptions of, 134\n\n Davids, Rhys, 109, 114, 120\n\n Delphi, relation of, to Greek morality, 172\n\n Democracy, effect of its incoming upon moral evolution, 340;\n ethics of, 344\u2013347\n\n Demonax, 208\n\n Demonism, Babylonian, 46;\n Chinese, 55\n\n _De Officiis_ of Cicero, 238\n\n Deuteronomy, dual morality of, 151\n\n Dionysus, 171\n\n Double standard in morality, 22\u201324\n\n Dualism, religious, Egyptian, 32;\n Persian, 123\n\n Duel, international, 332;\n judicial, see _Wager of battle_\n\n\n Education, in Japan, 91\u201393;\n its relation to morality, 345;\n transferred from Church to State, 346\n\n Election, race, 174\n\n Elijah, 143\n\n Elis, consecrated to peace, 197\n\n Elisha, 143\n\n Elysian Fields, 187, 188\n\n Envy of the gods, doctrine of, 189\n\n Epictetus, 247, 248, 250\n\n Epicureanism, 207\n\n Evolution, disturbing effects of doctrine upon morals, 341;\n egoistic tendencies of the doctrine, 354;\n altruistic factor in, 350\n\n\n Fabiola, 281\n\n Fall of man, dogma of, 259\n\n Family ethics, Greek, 181;\n Roman, 212, 214;\n Mohammedan, 291\n\n Festivals, Hebrew, moralization of, 149\n\n Figgis, J. Neville, 378, 380\n\n Filial piety, Chinese virtue, 61\n\n Filipinos, American treatment of, 373\u2013375\n\n\n Gambling, prohibited by the Koran, 291\n\n Geneva Convention of 1864, 376\n\n George, Henry, 350 n. 1\n\n _Gesta Romanorum_, 310\n\n Gladiatorial combats, demoralizing effects of, 225;\n suppression of, 277;\n the last in Colosseum, 381\n\n Gladstone, William E., 360\n\n Golden Rule, as stated by Confucius, 67\n\n Green, T.\u00a0H., 11\n\n Gresham\u2019s Law in morals, 378\n\n Grotius, Hugo, 375\n\n Group, kinship, 12\n\n Guatama, see _Buddha_\n\n\n Hades, gradual moralizing of, 187\u2013189\n\n Hammurabi, code of, 49\n\n Hearn, Lafcadio, 84\n\n Heresy, viewed as a contagion, 325\n\n Higher criticism, 335\n\n Hillel, 168\n\n Holy Grail, 311\n\n Holy Virgin, moral influence of veneration of, 311\n\n Homeric Age, morals of, 185\n\n Hopkins, Edward W., 114\n\n Hosea, 146\n\n Hospital, first Christian, 281\n\n Hospitalers, the, 308\n\n Hospitality, 24\n\n Howard, John, 370\n\n Howe, Julia Ward, 324\n\n Humanitarianism, growth of, in Hellenistic Age, 208;\n in pre-Christian, of Roman Empire, 234\u2013236;\n advance of, in modern times, 369\u2013371\n\n\n Ideal, moral, defined, 5;\n causes which determine, 7\u201310\n\n Ilus, prince of Ephyra, 172\n\n Immortality, emergence of doctrine of, in Israel, 164\u2013166;\n its ethical value, 257\n\n India, Government of India Act, 373\n\n Industrial virtues, Persian, 128;\n disesteemed by the Greeks and Romans, 182, 223;\n cradled in the medieval towns, 330;\n effects upon, of the dissolution of the monasteries, 337\n\n Industrialism, modern, relation to morals, 341;\n ethics of, 347\u2013353;\n modern, alliance of industry and science, 347;\n divorce of industry and ethics, 348\n\n Infanticide, in China, 73;\n condemned by Christian teaching, 278;\n in Greece, 181\n\n Inheritance, limitation of, 351\n\n Inquisition, 324\u2013326\n\n Insanity, regarded as demon possession, 282\n\n Intellectual progress, relation of, to moral progress, 342\n\n International law, relation of, to municipal law, 372\n\n Intertribal morality, beginnings of, 22\u201329\n\n Intolerance, Jewish, 163;\n Christian, 265, 324;\n Mohammedan, 294\n\n Intoxicating liquors, use of, prohibited by Koran, 292, 296\n\n Inventions, relation of, to moral progress, 341\n\n Iona, 280\n\n Iron virgin of Nuremberg, 381\n\n Isaiah, 147;\n the Second, 157, 161\n\n Isis, worship of, in Roman Empire, 252\n\n Ixion, 187\n\n\n Jeremiah, 151\n\n Jesus of Nazareth, relation of, to moral history of West, 260\n\n Judgment of Dead, Egyptian, 36;\n Persian, 130\n\n Justice, Greek virtue of, 176\n\n Juvenal, 235\n\n\n _Karma_, 108\n\n Ka-statues, 34\n\n Kidd, Benjamin, 2\n\n Knighthood, ideal of, 306\u2013309;\n contribution of, to moral heritage of Christendom, 311\n\n Koran, ethics of, 289\u2013292\n\n\n Labarum, 302\n\n Land values, property in, 349\n\n Legge, James, 68, 69\n\n Leonidas, 176\n\n _Lex talionis_, 21\n\n Lindisfarne, 280\n\n\n Machiavelli, 326\u2013328\n\n Machiavellism in politics, 326\u2013328;\n in economics, 348\n\n Malta, Knights of, 310\n\n Mandarin morality, 69\n\n Melians, 192\n\n Mencius, 60\n\n Mendicant Orders, 316\u2013318\n\n Micah, 148\n\n Milvian Bridge, battle of, 302\n\n Mithra, 125\n\n Mithraism, propaganda of, in Roman Empire, 253\n\n Mohammed, 288, 290\n\n Mohammedanism, moral code of, 289\u2013292\n\n Monasteries, cradle of modern social conscience, 276;\n dissolution of, 336\n\n Monastic ideal, 270;\n discredited by Protestant Reformation, 336\n\n Monasticism, Buddhist, 118;\n Christian, 267\u2013287\n\n Monopoly in land, 350\n\n Monotheism, ethical, emergence of, in Israel, 158, 159\n\n Morley, Lord, 377\n\n\n Nature, Law of, 240\n\n Negative Confession, 37\n\n Nemesis, doctrine of, 190\u2013192\n\n Nietzsche, 355, 356\n\n Nirvana, 109\n\n Nonresistance, Christian teaching of, 301, 302\n\n\n Occupation, influence of, on morals, 9\n\n Oisin, 272 n.\n\n Opium trade with China, 373\n\n Ordeals, 304\n\n Orphic doctrines, 174\n\n Orthodoxy, regarded as saving virtue, 261\n\n Osiris, myth of, 32\n\n\n Pachomius, 44\n\n _Patria potestas_, 212\n\n Paulsen, Friedrich, 5 n. 1\n\n Peace of God, 312\n\n Peace, universal, an ideal of Hebrew prophets, 146, 147\n\n Peloponnesian War, effects of, on Greek morality, 194, 195 n. 1\n\n Penitential psalms, Babylonian, 47\n\n Penitentiary system, 371\n\n Persecution of Christians by pagan Roman emperors, 245\n\n Pessimism, in Brahmanic system, 99;\n in Buddhist, 107\n\n Petrie, Flinders, 39\n\n Philipson, David, 168 n. 1\n\n Philo, 168\n\n Pindar, 179, 186, 188\n\n Plato, 200\u2013202\n\n Plutarch, 210, 249\n\n Poisoned arrows, disuse of, 27, 172\n\n Polygamy, accepted as ethical by Mohammed, 291\n\n Private war, restrictions on, 312\u2013314\n\n Prophetism, Hebrew, different elements of, 142\n\n Psychical research, import of, for morals, 359\n\n Ptah-hotep, 40\n\n Purgatory, effect of abolition of, upon morals, 337, 362\n\n Pythagoras, 186\n\n Pythagoreanism, 115\n\n\n Ra, son-god, 31\n\n Ransom of war captives, 315\n\n Red Cross Society, 376\n\n Reformation, Protestant, 333\u2013339\n\n Refuge, cities of, 154\n\n Religion, relation of, to morals, 9, 14\n\n Renaissance, influence of, on the moral evolution, 320, 322\u2013324\n\n Retribution theory, 35\u201337;\n in Greek moral evolution, 188\n\n Revenge, duty of, 20;\n a Greek virtue, 183;\n how regarded by Roman moralists, 249\n\n Right belief regarded as a virtue, 334\n\n Ritual morality, in India, 106;\n in Israel, 151\u2013154, 162\n\n Ruth, the Moabitess, 156\n\n\n Sabbath, 150, 260\n\n Sacrifice, in Brahmanic system, 100;\n in Israel, 138\n\n St. Ambrose, 303\n\n St. Augustine, 284, 303\n\n St. Boniface, 280\n\n St. Columba, 280\n\n St. Dominic, 316, 317\n\n St. Francis, 316, 317\n\n St. Gall, 280\n\n St. Patrick, 272\n\n St. Wilfred, 280\n\n _Saints, Lives of the_, 309\n\n Samurai, 80, 82, 87\u201391\n\n Sappho, 178\n\n Schmidt, Nathaniel, 154 n. 2, 260 n. 1\n\n Scholasticism, ethics of, 318\n\n Science, ethics of, 353\u2013360\n\n Scott, James Brown, 372 n. 1\n\n Self-redress, a survival of, in international law, 378 n. 1\n\n Seneca, 239, 243, 247, 249, 250\n\n Set, Egyptian god, 32\n\n Shammai, 168\n\n Sheol, 139\n\n Shinto cult, 78\n\n Single tax, 350 n. 1\n\n Slave trade, suppression of, 364\u2013366\n\n Slavery, in ancient Egypt, 41;\n among the Hebrews, 156;\n in Greece, 180, 203;\n Roman, 223;\n ameliorations of, under pagan Roman emperors, 243;\n influence of Christianity upon, 282;\n under Islam, 290, 295;\n prisoners of war sold as slaves, 314;\n origin of word \u201cslave,\u201d 315;\n abolition of African, 366\n\n Smith, W. Robertson, 12\n\n Social ethics, 364\u2013371\n\n Socialism, 352\n\n Socrates, 197\u2013200\n\n Stoicism, 206, 209;\n influence of, upon Roman government and law, 241\u2013243;\n as a moral force, 241;\n teachings of, Christian in tone, 246\u2013248;\n insufficiency of, as guide to the masses, 251;\n contrasted with Machiavellism, 328\n\n Stoics, views of, on slavery, 203\n\n Suicide, among the Japanese, 85;\n among the Romans, 250;\n condemned by Christianity, 279\n\n Synagogue, 163, 164\n\n\n Tantalus, 187\n\n Taoism, 56\n\n Telemachus, Christian monk, 381 n. 1\n\n Temperance, Greek virtue of, 176\n\n Templars, the, 308\n\n Terence, 238\n\n Theology, moralization of, 360, 361\n\n Thirty Years\u2019 War, 375\n\n Thucydides, 192\n\n Toleration, under Buddhism, 112, 120;\n influence of doctrinal Christianity upon virtue of, 285;\n how affected by the Protestant Reformation, 338\n\n Towns, medieval, as molders of morals, 321, 330\n\n Transmigration, 98\n\n Truce of God, 312\u2013314\n\n Truthfulness, virtue of, Japanese lack of reverence for, 85;\n highly esteemed by the Persians, 128, 132\u2013134;\n low estimation of, among Greeks, 184\n\n Tyrannicide, among Japanese, 86;\n views of Roman moralist on, 249\n\n\n Ulfilas, bishop, 304\n\n Unearned increment, 349\n\n Universalism, ethical, pre-Christian, 236\n\n Urban II, Pope, 305\n\n Usury, 155\n\n\n Veracity, fostered by science, 353\n\n Vergil, 235\n\n Vicarious suffering, doctrine of, 160\n\n\n Wager of battle, 304;\n disuse of, 331, 332\n\n War, abolition of, a moral issue, 376;\n abrogation of the ordinary moral code by, 377;\n obsolescence of, as school of morals, 380\n\n War ethics, as group morality, 20;\n as survival from barbarism, 20;\n beginning of rules of, 25\u201329;\n Egyptian, 42;\n Assyrian, 51;\n Chinese, 65;\n Brahmanic, 104;\n Greek, 193\u2013195;\n Roman, 245 n. 1;\n Mohammedan, 290, 294;\n syncretism of pagan war ethics and Christian peace ethics, 300\u2013306;\n influence of martial ethics of Islam upon Christian ethics, 305;\n progress in, in Middle Ages, 314\u2013316;\n progress in, in modern times, 375, 376;\n atavistic character of war code, 378;\n unfavorable reaction of, upon peace code, 378\u2013380\n\n Wealth, moral effects of unequal distribution of, 228\n\n Wedgwood, Julia, 9\n\n Wellhausen, 3\n\n Wisdom, Greek virtue of, 176\n\n World state, ethical basis of, 220\n\n Wundt, Wilhelm, 5\n\n\n Zarathustra, 126\n\n Zeno, 206\n\n Zoroaster, see _Zarathustra_\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Notes\n\n\nPunctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a\npredominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they\nwere not changed.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation\nmarks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left\nunbalanced.\n\nFootnotes, originally at the bottoms of the pages that referenced them,\nhave been collected, sequentially renumbered, and placed at the end of\nthe main text, just before the Index.\n\nThe Index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page\nreferences.\n\nPage 159: \u201cthe good Osiris\u201d was printed that way, but may be a misprint\nfor \u201cthe god Osiris\u201d.","title":"History as past ethics; an introduction to the history of morals","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":135654}