{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_73584/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_73584","id":"gutenberg_73584","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73584","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800","Judaism -- Works to 1900","Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED\n\n\n BY\n MOSES MAIMONIDES\n\n TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL ARABIC TEXT\n BY\n M. FRIEDL\u00c4NDER, Ph.D\n\n\n SECOND EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT\n\n\n LONDON\n GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LTD\n New York: E. P. DUTTON & CO\n 1910\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe first Edition of the English Translation of Maimonides\u2019 Dalal\u0101t\nal-Hairin being exhausted without having fully supplied the demand, I\nprepared a second, revised edition of the Translation. In the new\nedition the three volumes of the first edition have been reduced to one\nvolume by the elimination of the notes; besides Hebrew words and\nphrases have been eliminated or transliterated. By these changes the\ntranslator sought to produce a cheap edition in order to bring the work\nof Maimonides within the reach of all students of Theology and Jewish\nLiterature.\n\n\nM. FRIEDL\u00c4NDER.\n\nJews\u2019 College, July 1904.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO VOLUME ONE OF THE FIRST EDITION\n\n\nIn compliance with a desire repeatedly expressed by the Committee of\nthe Hebrew Literature Society, I have undertaken to translate\nMaimonides\u2019 Dalal\u0101t al-\u1e24airin, better known by the Hebrew title Moreh\nNebuchim, and I offer the first instalment of my labours in the present\nvolume. This contains\u2014(1) A short Life of Maimonides, in which special\nattention is given to his alleged apostasy. (2) An analysis of the\nwhole of the Moreh Nebuchim. (3) A translation of the First Part of\nthis work from the Arabic, with explanatory and critical notes.\n\nParts of the Translation have been contributed by Mr. Joseph Abrahams,\nB.A., Ph.D., and Rev. H. Gollancz\u2014the Introduction by the former, and\nthe first twenty-five chapters by the latter.\n\nIn conclusion I beg to tender my thanks to Rev. A. Loewy, Editor of the\nPublications of the Hebrew Literature Society, for his careful revision\nof my manuscript and proofs, and to Mr. A. Neubauer, M.A., for his\nkindness in supplying me with such information as I required.\n\n\nM. FRIEDL\u00c4NDER.\n\nJews\u2019 College, June 1881.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n PAGE\n\n Life of Maimonides xv\n\n Moreh Nebuchim Literature. Analysis of the Guide for the \n Perplexed xxvii\n\n Part I.\n\n Introduction\u2014\n Dedicatory Letter 1\n The Object of the Guide 2\n On Similes 4\n Directions for the Study of this Work 8\n Introductory Remarks 9\n\n CHAPTER.\n I The homonymity of \u1e92elem 13\n II On Genesis iii. 5 14\n III On tabnit and temunah 16\n IV On raah, hibbit and \u1e25azah 17\n V On Exod. xxiv. 10 18\n VI On ish and ishshah, a\u1e25 and a\u1e25ot 19\n VII On yalad 19\n VIII On ma\u1e33om 20\n IX On kisse 21\n X On \u02bbalah, yarad 22\n XI On yashab 23\n XII On kam 24\n XIII On \u02bbamad 25\n XIV On adam 25\n XV On na\u1e93ab, ya\u1e93ab 25\n XVI On \u1e92ur 26\n XVII On Mishnah \u1e24agigah ii. 1 27\n XVIII On \u1e33arab, naga\u02bb, niggash 27\n XIX On male 28\n XX On ram, nissa 29\n XXI On \u02bbabar 30\n XXII On ba 32\n XXIII On Ya\u1e93a, shub 32\n XXIV On halak 33\n XXV On shaken 34\n XXVI On \u201cThe Torah speaketh the language of man\u201d 34\n XXVII On Targum of Gen. xlvi. 4 35\n XXVIII On regel 37\n XXIX On \u02bba\u1e93eb 39\n XXX On akal 39\n XXXI, XXXII On the Limit of Man\u2019s Intellect 40, 42\n XXXIII to XXXVI On the Study and the Teaching of \n Metaphysics 43\u201352\n XXXVII On panim 52\n XXXVIII On a\u1e25or 53\n XXXIX On leb 54\n XL On rua\u1e25 55\n XLI On nefesh 56\n XLII On \u1e25ayyim-mavet 56\n XLIII On kanaf 57\n XLIV On \u02bbayin 58\n XLV On shama\u02bb 58\n XLVI, XLVII On the Attribution of Senses and Sensations \n to God 59, 63\n XLVIII The Targum of shama\u02bb and raah 64\n XLIX Figurative Expressions applied to Angels 65\n L On Faith 67\n LI\u2013LX On Attributes 68\u201389\n LI On the Necessity of Proving the Inadmissibility of \n Attributes in reference to God 68\n LII Classification of Attributes 69\n LIII The Arguments of the Attributists 72\n LIV On Exod. xxxiii. 13; xxxiv. 7 75\n LV On Attributes implying Corporeality, Emotion, \n Non-existence and Comparison 78\n LVI On Attributes denoting Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom \n and Will 79\n LVII On the Identity of the Essence of God and His \n Attributes 80\n LVIII On the Negative Sense of the True Attributes of God 81\n LIX On the Character of the Knowledge of God Consisting \n of Negations 83\n LX On the Difference between Positive and Negative \n Attributes 87\n LXI On the Names of God 89\n LXII On the Divine Names composed of Four, Twelve and \n Forty-two Letters 91\n LXIII On Ehyeh, Yah and Shaddai 93\n LXIV On \u201cThe Name of the Lord,\u201d and \u201cThe Glory of God\u201d 95\n LXV On the phrase \u201cGod spake\u201d 96\n LXVI On Exod. xxxii. 16 98\n LXVII On shabat and na\u1e25 99\n LXVIII On the Terms: The Intellectus, the Intelligens and \n the Intelligibile 100\n LXIX On the Primal Cause 102\n LXX On the attribute rokeb ba\u02bbarabot 105\n LXXI The Origin of the Kal\u0101m 107\n LXXII A Parallel between the Universe and Man 113\n LXXIII Twelve Propositions of the Kal\u0101m 120\n LXXIV Proofs of the Kal\u0101m for the creatio ex nihilo 133\n LXXV Proofs of the Kal\u0101m for the Unity of God 138\n LXXVI Proofs of the Kal\u0101m for the Incorporeality of God 141\n\n\n Part II.\n\n The Author\u2019s Introduction. The Twenty-Six Propositions \n employed by the Philosophers to prove the Existence of God 145\n\n CHAPTER.\n I Philosophical proofs for the Existence, Incorporeality, \n and Unity of the First Cause 149\n II On the Existence of Intelligences or purely Spiritual \n Beings 154\n III The Author adopts the Theory of Aristotle as least \n open to Objections 156\n IV The Spheres and the Causes of their Motion 156\n V Agreement of the Aristotelian Theory with the Teaching \n of Scripture 159\n VI What is meant by the Scriptural Term \u201cAngels\u201d 160\n VII The Homonymity of the term \u201cAngel\u201d 162\n VIII On the Music of the Spheres 163\n IX On the Number of the Heavenly Spheres 163\n X The Influence of the Spheres upon the Earth manifests \n itself in four different ways 164\n XI The Theory of Eccentricity Preferable to that of \n Epicycles 166\n XII On the Nature of the Divine Influence and that of \n the Spheres 168\n XIII Three Different Theories about the Beginning of the \n Universe 171\n XIV Seven Methods by which the Philosophers sought to \n prove the Eternity of the Universe 174\n XV Aristotle does not scientifically demonstrate his \n Theory 176\n XVI The Author refutes all Objections to Creatio ex \n nihilo 178\n XVII The Laws of Nature apply to Things Created, but do \n not regulate the Creative Act which produces them 178\n XVIII Examinations of the Proofs of Philosophers for the \n Eternity of the Universe 181\n XIX Design in Nature 184\n XX The Opinion of Aristotle as regards Design in Nature 189\n XXI Explanation of the Aristotelian Theory that the \n Universe is the necessary Result of the First Cause 190\n XXII Objections to the Theory of the Eternity of the \n Universe 192\n XXIII The Theory of Creatio ex nihilo is preferable to \n that of the Eternity of the Universe 195\n XXIV Difficulty of Comprehending the Nature and the Motion \n of the Spheres according to the Theory of Aristotle 196\n XXV The Theory of Creation is adopted because of its own \n Superiority, the Proofs based on Scripture being \n Inconclusive 199\n XXVI Examination of a passage from Pir\u1e33e di-Rabbi Eliezer \n in reference to Creation 200\n XXVII The Theory of a Future Destruction of the Universe is \n not part of the Religious Belief taught in the Bible 201\n XXVIII Scriptural Teaching is in favour of the \n Indestructibility of the Universe 202\n XXIX Explanation of Scriptural Phrases implying the \n Destruction of Heaven and Earth 204\n XXX Philosophical Interpretation of Genesis i.-iv. 212\n XXXI The Institution of the Sabbath serves (1) to Teach \n the Theory of Creation, and (2) to promote Man\u2019s \n Welfare 218\n XXXII Three Theories concerning Prophecy 219\n XXXIII The Difference between Moses and the other Israelites \n as regards the Revelation on Mount Sinai 221\n XXXIV Explanation of Exodus xxiii. 20 223\n XXXV The Difference between Moses and the other Prophets \n as regards the Miracles wrought by them 223\n XXXVI On the Mental, Physical and Moral Faculties of the \n Prophets 225\n XXXVII On the Divine Influence upon Man\u2019s Imaginative and \n Mental Faculties through the Active Intellect 227\n XXXVIII Courage and Intuition reach the highest degree of \n Perfection in Prophets 229\n XXXIX Moses was the fittest Prophet to Receive and \n Promulgate the Immutable Law, which succeeding \n Prophets merely Taught and Expounded 231\n XL The Test of True Prophecy 232\n XLI What is Meant by \u201cVision\u201d 234\n XLII Prophets Received Direct Communication only in Dreams \n or Visions 236\n XLIII On the Allegories of the Prophets 238\n XLIV On the Different Modes in which Prophets Receive \n Divine Messages 240\n XLV The Various Classes of Prophets 241\n XLVI The Allegorical Acts of Prophets formed Parts of \n Prophetic Visions 245\n XLVII On the Figurative Style of the Prophetic Writings 247\n XLVIII Scripture ascribes Phenomena directly produced by \n Natural Causes to God as the First Cause of all \n things 249\n\n\n Part III.\n\n The Author\u2019s Introduction and Apology for Publishing, contrary \n to the Teaching of the Mishnah, an Interpretation of Ezek. i. 251\n\n CHAPTER.\n I The \u201cFour Faces\u201d are Human Faces with four different \n peculiarities 252\n II The \u1e24ayyot and the Ofannim 252\n III Further Explanation of the \u1e24ayyot and the Ofannim \n derived from Ezek. x. 255\n IV The rendering of Ofan by Gilgal in the Targum of \n Jonathan 256\n V The Vision of Ezekiel is divided into three stages: \n (1) \u1e24ayyot (=the Spheres); (2) Ofannim (=Earthly \n elements); and (3) the man above the \u1e24ayyot \n (=Intelligences) 257\n VI On the Difference between the Vision of Ezekiel and \n that of Isaiah (vi.) 258\n VII The Different Ways in which the Prophet perceived the \n Three Parts of the Mercabah (Chariot) 259\n VIII Man has the Power to Control his Bodily Wants and \n Earthly Desires 261\n IX The Material Element in Man Prevents him from \n Attaining Perfection 264\n X God is not the Creator of Evil 265\n XI Man is the Cause of his own Misfortunes 267\n XII Three Kinds of Evil: (1) That caused by the Nature \n of Man; (2) Caused by Man to Man; (3) Caused by \n Man to himself 267\n XIII The Universe has No other Purpose than its own \n Existence 272\n XIV It is the Will of the Creator that the Spheres \n regulate the Affairs of Mankind 277\n XV Impossible Things are not ascribed to the Creator, \n but it is difficult to Prove the Impossibility in \n each Individual Case 279\n XVI On God\u2019s Omniscience 280\n XVII Five Theories concerning Providence 282\n XVIII Every Individual Member of Mankind enjoys the \n Influence of Divine Providence in proportion to \n his Intellectual Perfection 289\n XIX It is an ancient Error to Assume that God takes no \n Notice of Man 290\n XX God\u2019s Knowledge is Different from Man\u2019s Knowledge 292\n XXI The Creator\u2019s knowledge of His Production is Perfect 295\n XXII Object of the Book of Job, and Explanation of the \n First Two Chapters 296\n XXIII Job and his Friends Discuss the various Theories \n concerning Providence 299\n XXIV On Trials and Temptation 304\n XXV The Actions of God are Not Purposeless 307\n XXVI The Divine Precepts Serve a certain Purpose 310\n XXVII The Object of the Divine Precepts is to Secure the \n Well-being of Man\u2019s Soul and Body 312\n XXVIII This Object is easily seen in some Precepts, whilst \n in others it is only known after due Reflection 313\n XXIX On the Sabeans or Star-worshippers 315\n XXX It is one of the Objects of the Law of Moses to \n Oppose Idolatry 320\n XXXI The Law Promotes the Well-being of Man by teaching \n Truth, Morality and Social Conduct 321\n XXXII Why did God give Laws to Oppose Idolatry instead of \n Uprooting it directly? 322\n XXXIII Another chief Object of the Law is to Train Man in \n Mastering his Appetites and Desires 327\n XXXIV The Law is based on the ordinary condition of man 328\n XXXV Division of the Precepts into Fourteen Classes 329\n XXXVI First Class of Precepts, to Know, Love and Fear God 331\n XXXVII Second Class, Laws concerning Idolatry 332\n XXXVIII Third Class, Moral Precepts 338\n XXXIX Fourth Class, Laws relating to Charity 339\n XL Fifth Class, Compensation for Injury and the Duty of \n Preventing Sin 342\n XLI Sixth Class, Punishment of the Sinner 344\n XLII Seventh Class, Equity and Honesty 350\n XLIII Eighth Class, Sabbath and Festival 352\n XLIV Ninth Class, Prayer, Tefillin, \u1e92i\u1e93it and Mezuzah 354\n XLV Tenth Class, The Temple, its Vessels and its Ministers 355\n XLVI Eleventh Class, Sacrifices 359\n XLVII Twelfth Class, Distinction between Clean and Unclean; \n and on Purification 366\n XLVIII Thirteenth Class, Dietary Laws 370\n XLIX Fourteenth Class, Marriage Laws 372\n L On Scriptural Passages with seemingly Purposeless \n Contents 380\n LI How God is worshipped by a Perfect Man 384\n LII On the Fear of God 391\n LIII Explanation of \u1e24esed (Love), Mishpat (Judgment), and \n \u1e92eda\u1e33ah (Righteousness) 392\n LIV On True Wisdom 393\n\n Index of Scriptural Passages 399\n Index of Quotations from the Targumim 409\n Index of Quotations from the Midrashim 409\n Index of Quotations from the Talmud 410\n Index of References to Other Works of Maimonides 411\n Index of References to Works of Science and Philosophy 412\n Alphabetical Index 412\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES\n\n\n\u201cBefore the sun of Eli had set the sun of Samuel had risen.\u201d Before the\nvoice of the prophets had ceased to guide the people, the Interpreters\nof the Law, the Doctors of the Talmud, had commenced their labours, and\nbefore the Academies of Sura and of Pumbadita were closed, centres of\nJewish thought and learning were already flourishing in the far West.\nThe circumstances which led to the transference of the head-quarters of\nJewish learning from the East to the West in the tenth century are thus\nnarrated in the Sefer ha-kabbalah of Rabbi Abraham ben David:\n\n\u201cAfter the death of Hezekiah, the head of the Academy and Prince of the\nExile, the academies were closed and no new Geonim were appointed. But\nlong before that time Heaven had willed that there should be a\ndiscontinuance of the pecuniary gifts which used to be sent from\nPalestine, North Africa and Europe. Heaven had also decreed that a ship\nsailing from Bari should be captured by Ibn Romahis, commander of the\nnaval forces of Abd-er-rahman al-nasr. Four distinguished Rabbis were\nthus made prisoners\u2014Rabbi \u1e24ushiel, father of Rabbi \u1e24ananel, Rabbi\nMoses, father of Rabbi \u1e24anok, Rabbi Shemarjahu, son of Rabbi El\u1e25anan,\nand a fourth whose name has not been recorded. They were engaged in a\nmission to collect subsidies in aid of the Academy in Sura. The captor\nsold them as slaves; Rabbi \u1e24ushiel was carried to Kairuan, R.\nShemarjahu was left in Alexandria, and R. Moses was brought to Cordova.\nThese slaves were ransomed by their brethren and were soon placed in\nimportant positions. When Rabbi Moses was brought to Cordova, it was\nsupposed that he was uneducated. In that city there was a synagogue\nknown at that time by the name of Keneset ha-midrash, and Rabbi Nathan,\nrenowned for his great piety, was the head of the congregation. The\nmembers of the community used to hold meetings at which the Talmud was\nread and discussed. One day when Rabbi Nathan was expounding the Talmud\nand was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the passage under\ndiscussion, Rabbi Moses promptly removed the difficulty and at the same\ntime answered several questions which were submitted to him. Thereupon\nR. Nathan thus addressed the assembly:\u2014\u2018I am no longer your leader;\nthat stranger in sackcloth shall henceforth be my teacher, and you\nshall appoint him to be your chief.\u2019 The admiral, on hearing of the\nhigh attainments of his prisoner, desired to revoke the sale, but the\nking would not permit this retraction, being pleased to learn that his\nJewish subjects were no longer dependent for their religious\ninstruction on the schools in the East.\u201d\n\nHenceforth the schools in the West asserted their independence, and\neven surpassed the parent institutions. The Caliphs, mostly opulent,\ngave every encouragement to philosophy and poetry; and, being generally\nliberal in sentiment, they entertained kindly feelings towards their\nJewish subjects. These were allowed to compete for the acquisition of\nwealth and honour on equal terms with their Mohammedan fellow-citizens.\nPhilosophy and poetry were consequently cultivated by the Jews with the\nsame zest as by the Arabs. Ibn Gabirol, Ibn \u1e24asdai, Judah ha-levi,\n\u1e24ananel, Alfasi, the Ibn Ezras, and others who flourished in that\nperiod were the ornament of their age, and the pride of the Jews at all\ntimes. The same favourable condition was maintained during the reign of\nthe Omeyades; but when the Moravides and the Almohades came into power,\nthe horizon darkened once more, and misfortunes threatened to destroy\nthe fruit of several centuries. Amidst this gloom there appeared a\nbrilliant luminary which sent forth rays of light and comfort: this was\nMoses Maimonides.\n\nMoses, the son of Maimon, was born at Cordova, on the 14th of Nisan,\n4895 (March 30, 1135). Although the date of his birth has been recorded\nwith the utmost accuracy, no trustworthy notice has been preserved\nconcerning the early period of his life. But his entire career is a\nproof that he did not pass his youth in idleness; his education must\nhave been in harmony with the hope of his parents, that one day he\nwould, like his father and forefathers, hold the honourable office of\nDayyan or Rabbi, and distinguish himself in theological learning. It is\nprobable that the Bible and the Talmud formed the chief subjects of his\nstudy; but he unquestionably made the best use of the opportunities\nwhich Mohammedan Spain, and especially Cordova, afforded him for the\nacquisition of general knowledge. It is not mentioned in any of his\nwritings who were his teachers; his father, as it seems, was his\nprincipal guide and instructor in many branches of knowledge. David\nConforte, in his historical work, \u1e32ore ha-dorot, states that Maimonides\nwas the pupil of two eminent men, namely, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Migash and\nIbn Roshd (Averroes); that by the former he was instructed in the\nTalmud, and by the latter in philosophy. This statement seems to be\nerroneous, as Maimonides was only a child at the time when Rabbi Joseph\ndied, and already far advanced in years when he became acquainted with\nthe writings of Ibn Roshd. The origin of this mistake, as regards Rabbi\nJoseph, can easily be traced. Maimonides in his Mishneh Tora, employs,\nin reference to R. Isaac Alfasi and R. Joseph, the expression \u201cmy\nteachers\u201d (rabbotai), and this expression, by which he merely describes\nhis indebtedness to their writings, has been taken in its literal\nmeaning.\n\nWhoever his teachers may have been, it is evident that he was well\nprepared by them for his future mission. At the age of twenty-three he\nentered upon his literary career with a treatise on the Jewish\nCalendar. It is unknown where this work was composed, whether in Spain\nor in Africa. The author merely states that he wrote it at the request\nof a friend, whom he, however, leaves unnamed. The subject was\ngenerally considered to be very abstruse, and to involve a thorough\nknowledge of mathematics. Maimonides must, therefore, even at this\nearly period, have been regarded as a profound scholar by those who\nknew him. The treatise is of an elementary character.\u2014It was probably\nabout the same time that he wrote, in Arabic, an explanation of Logical\nterms, Millot higgayon, which Moses Ibn Tibbon translated into Hebrew.\n\nThe earlier period of his life does not seem to have been marked by any\nincident worth noticing. It may, however, be easily conceived that the\nlater period of his life, which was replete with interesting incidents,\nengaged the exclusive attention of his biographers. So much is certain,\nthat his youth was beset with trouble and anxiety; the peaceful\ndevelopment of science and philosophy was disturbed by wars raging\nbetween Mohammedans and Christians, and also between the several\nMohammedan sects. The Moravides, who had succeeded the Omeyades, were\nopposed to liberality and toleration; but they were surpassed in\ncruelty and fanaticism by their successors. Cordova was taken by the\nAlmohades in the year 1148, when Maimonides was about thirteen years\nold. The victories of the Almohades, first under the leadership of the\nMahadi Ibn Tamurt, and then under Abd-al-mumen, were, according to all\ntestimonies, attended by acts of excessive intolerance. Abd-al-mumen\nwould not suffer in his dominions any other faith but the one which he\nhimself confessed. Jews and Christians had the choice between Islam and\nemigration or a martyr\u2019s death. The Sefer ha-\u1e33abbalah contains the\nfollowing description of one of the persecutions which then occurred:\n\n\u201cAfter the death of R. Joseph ha-levi the study of the Torah was\ninterrupted, although he left a son and a nephew, both of whom had\nunder his tuition become profound scholars. \u2018The righteous man (R.\nJoseph) was taken away on account of the approaching evils.\u2019 After the\ndeath of R. Joseph there came for the Jews a time of oppression and\ndistress. They quitted their homes, \u2018Such as were for death, to death,\nand such as were for the sword, to the sword; and such as were for the\nfamine, to the famine, and such as were for the captivity, to the\ncaptivity\u2019; and\u2014it might be added to the words of Jeremiah (xv.\n2)\u2014\u2018such as were for apostasy, to apostasy.\u2019 All this happened through\nthe sword of Ibn Tamurt, who, in 4902 (1142), determined to blot out\nthe name of Israel, and actually left no trace of the Jews in any part\nof his empire.\u201d\n\nIbn Verga in his work on Jewish martyrdom, in Shebe\u1e6d Jehudah, gives the\nfollowing account of events then happening:\u2014\u201cIn the year 4902 the\narmies of Ibn Tamurt made their appearance. A proclamation was issued\nthat any one who refused to adopt Islam would be put to death, and his\nproperty would be confiscated. Thereupon the Jews assembled at the gate\nof the royal palace and implored the king for mercy. He answered\u2014\u2018It is\nbecause I have compassion on you, that I command you to become\nMuslemim; for I desire to save you from eternal punishment.\u2019 The Jews\nreplied\u2014\u2018Our salvation depends on our observance of the Divine Law; you\nare the master of our bodies and of our property, but our souls will be\njudged by the King who gave them to us, and to whom they will return;\nwhatever be our future fate, you, O king, will not be held responsible\nfor it.\u2019 \u2018I do not desire to argue with you,\u2019 said the king; \u2018for I\nknow you will argue according to your own religion. It is my absolute\nwill that you either adopt my religion or be put to death.\u2019 The Jews\nthen proposed to emigrate, but the king would not allow his subjects to\nserve another king. In vain did the Jews implore the nobles to\nintercede in their behalf; the king remained inexorable. Thus many\ncongregations forsook their religion; but within a month the king came\nto a sudden death; the son, believing that his father had met with an\nuntimely end as a punishment for his cruelty to the Jews, assured the\ninvoluntary converts that it would be indifferent to him what religion\nthey professed. Hence many Jews returned at once to the religion of\ntheir fathers, while others hesitated for some time, from fear that the\nking meant to entrap the apparent converts.\u201d\n\nFrom such records it appears that during these calamities some of the\nJews fled to foreign countries, some died as martyrs, and many others\nsubmitted for a time to outward conversion. Which course was followed\nby the family of Maimon? Did they sacrifice personal comfort and safety\nto their religious conviction, or did they, on the contrary, for the\nsake of mere worldly considerations dissemble their faith and pretend\nthat they completely submitted to the dictates of the tyrant? An answer\nto this question presents itself in the following note which Maimonides\nhas appended to his commentary on the Mishnah: \u201cI have now finished\nthis work in accordance with my promise, and I fervently beseech the\nAlmighty to save us from error. If there be one who shall discover an\ninaccuracy in this Commentary or shall have a better explanation to\noffer, let my attention be directed unto it; and let me be exonerated\nby the fact that I have worked with far greater application than any\none who writes for the sake of pay and profit, and that I have worked\nunder the most trying circumstances. For Heaven had ordained that we be\nexiled, and we were therefore driven about from place to place; I was\nthus compelled to work at the Commentary while travelling by land, or\ncrossing the sea. It might have sufficed to mention that during that\ntime I, in addition, was engaged in other studies, but I preferred to\ngive the above explanation in order to encourage those who wish to\ncriticise or annotate the Commentary, and at the same time to account\nfor the slow progress of this work. I, Moses, the son of Maimon,\ncommenced it when I was twenty-three years old, and finished it in\nEgypt, at the age of thirty[-three] years, in the year 1479 Sel.\n(1168).\u201d\n\nThe Sefer \u1e24aredim of R. Eleazar Askari of Safed contains the following\nstatement of Maimonides:\u2014\u201cOn Sabbath evening, the 4th of Iyyar, 4925\n(1165), I went on board; on the following Sabbath the waves threatened\nto destroy our lives.... On the 3rd of Sivan, I arrived safely at Acco,\nand was thus rescued from apostasy.... On Tuesday, the 4th of\nMar\u1e25eshvan, 4926, I left Acco, arrived at Jerusalem after a journey\nbeset with difficulties and with dangers, and prayed on the spot of the\ngreat and holy house on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of Mar\u1e25eshvan. On Sunday,\nthe 9th of that month, I left Jerusalem and visited the cave of\nMachpelah, in Hebron.\u201d\n\nFrom these two statements it may be inferred that in times of\npersecution Maimonides and his family did not seek to protect their\nlives and property by dissimulation. They submitted to the troubles of\nexile in order that they might remain faithful to their religion.\nCarmoly, Geiger, Munk, and others are of opinion that the treatise of\nMaimonides on involuntary apostasy, as well as the accounts of some\nMohammedan authors, contain strong evidence to show that there was a\ntime when the family of Maimon publicly professed their belief in\nMohammed. A critical examination of these documents compels us to\nreject their evidence as inadmissible.\u2014After a long period of trouble\nand anxiety, the family of Maimon arrived at Fostat, in Egypt, and\nsettled there. David, the brother of Moses Maimonides, carried on a\ntrade in precious stones, while Moses occupied himself with his studies\nand interested himself in the communal affairs of the Jews.\n\nIt appears that for some time Moses was supported by his brother, and\nwhen this brother died, he earned a living by practising as a\nphysician; but he never sought or derived any benefit from his services\nto his community, or from his correspondence or from the works he wrote\nfor the instruction of his brethren; the satisfaction of being of\nservice to his fellow-creatures was for him a sufficient reward.\n\nThe first public act in which Maimonides appears to have taken a\nleading part was a decree promulgated by the Rabbinical authorities in\nCairo in the year 1167. The decree begins as follows:\u2014\u201cIn times gone\nby, when storms and tempests threatened us, we used to wander about\nfrom place to place; but by the mercy of the Almighty we have now been\nenabled to find here a resting-place. On our arrival, we noticed to our\ngreat dismay that the learned were disunited; that none of them turned\nhis attention to the needs of the congregation. We therefore felt it\nour duty to undertake the task of guiding the holy flock, of inquiring\ninto the condition of the community, of \u201creconciling the hearts of the\nfathers to their children,\u201d and of correcting their corrupt ways. The\ninjuries are great, but we may succeed in effecting a cure, and\u2014in\naccordance with the words of the prophet\u2014\u2018I will seek the lost one, and\nthat which has been cast out I will bring back, and the broken one I\nwill cure\u2019 (Micah iv. 6). When we therefore resolved to take the\nmanagement of the communal affairs into our hands, we discovered the\nexistence of a serious evil in the midst of the community,\u201d etc.\n\nIt was probably about that time that Maimon died. Letters of condolence\nwere sent to his son Moses from all sides, both from Mohammedan and\nfrom Christian countries; in some instances the letters were several\nmonths on their way before they reached their destination.\n\nThe interest which Maimonides now took in communal affairs did not\nprevent him from completing the great and arduous work, the Commentary\non the Mishnah, which he had begun in Spain and continued during his\nwanderings in Africa. In this Commentary he proposed to give the\nquintessence of the Gemara, to expound the meaning of each dictum in\nthe Mishnah, and to state which of the several opinions had received\nthe sanction of the Talmudical authorities. His object in writing this\nwork was to enable those who are not disposed to study the Gemara, to\nunderstand the Mishnah, and to facilitate the study of the Gemara for\nthose who are willing to engage in it. The commentator generally\nadheres to the explanations given in the Gemara, and it is only in\ncases where the halakah, or practical law, is not affected, that he\nventures to dissent. He acknowledges the benefit he derived from such\nworks of his predecessors as the Halakot of Alfasi, and the writings of\nthe Geonim, but afterwards he asserted that errors which were\ndiscovered in his works arose from his implicit reliance on those\nauthorities. His originality is conspicuous in the Introduction and in\nthe treatment of general principles, which in some instances precedes\nthe exposition of an entire section or chapter, in others that of a\nsingle rule. The commentator is generally concise, except when occasion\nis afforded to treat of ethical and theological principles, or of a\nscientific subject, such as weights and measures, or mathematical and\nastronomical problems. Although exhortations to virtue and warnings\nagainst vice are found in all parts of his work, they are especially\nabundant in the Commentary on Abot, which is prefaced by a separate\npsychological treatise, called The Eight Chapters. The dictum \u201cHe who\nspeaketh much commits a sin,\u201d elicited a lesson on the economy of\nspeech; the explanation of \u02bbolam ha-ba in the treatise Sanhedrin (xi.\n1) led him to discuss the principles of faith, and to lay down the\nthirteen articles of the Jewish creed. The Commentary was written in\nArabic, and was subsequently translated into Hebrew and into other\nlanguages. The estimation in which the Commentary was held may be\ninferred from the following fact: When the Jews in Italy became\nacquainted with its method and spirit, through a Hebrew translation of\none of its parts, they sent to Spain in search of a complete Hebrew\nversion of the Commentary. R. Sim\u1e25ah, who had been entrusted with the\nmission, found no copy extant, but he succeeded, through the influence\nof Rabbi Shelomoh ben Aderet, in causing a Hebrew translation of this\nimportant work to be prepared.\u2014In the Introduction, the author states\nthat he has written a Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud treatise\n\u1e24ullin and on nearly three entire sections, viz., Mo\u00ebd, Nashim, and\nNezikin. Of all these Commentaries only the one on Rosh ha-shanah is\nknown.\n\nIn the year 1172 Maimonides wrote the Iggeret Teman, or Peta\u1e25-ti\u1e33vah\n(\u201cLetter to the Jews in Yemen,\u201d or \u201cOpening of hope\u201d) in response to a\nletter addressed to him by Rabbi Jacob al-Fayumi on the critical\ncondition of the Jews in Yemen. Some of these Jews had been forced into\napostasy; others were made to believe that certain passages in the\nBible alluded to the mission of Mohammed; others again had been misled\nby an impostor who pretended to be the Messiah. The character and style\nof Maimonides\u2019 reply appear to have been adapted to the intellectual\ncondition of the Jews in Yemen, for whom it was written. These probably\nread the Bible with Midrashic commentaries, and preferred the easy and\nattractive Agadah to the more earnest study of the Halakah. It is\ntherefore not surprising that the letter contains remarks and\ninterpretations which cannot be reconciled with the philosophical and\nlogical method by which all the other works of Maimonides are\ndistinguished. After a few complimentary words, in which the author\nmodestly disputes the justice of the praises lavished upon him, he\nattempts to prove that the present sufferings of the Jews, together\nwith the numerous instances of apostasy, were foretold by the prophets,\nespecially by Daniel, and must not perplex the faithful. It must be\nborne in mind, he continues, that the attempts made in past times to do\naway with the Jewish religion, had invariably failed; the same would be\nthe fate of the present attempts; for \u201creligious persecutions are of\nbut short duration.\u201d The arguments which profess to demonstrate that in\ncertain Biblical passages allusion is made to Mohammed, are based on\ninterpretations which are totally opposed to common sense. He urges\nthat the Jews, faithfully adhering to their religion, should impress\ntheir children with the greatness of the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and\nof the miracles wrought through Moses; they also should remain firm in\nthe belief that God will send the Messiah to deliver their nation, but\nthey must abandon futile calculations of the Messianic period, and\nbeware of impostors. Although there be signs which indicate the\napproach of the promised deliverance, and the times seem to be the\nperiod of the last and most cruel persecution mentioned in the visions\nof Daniel (xi. and xii.), the person in Yemen who pretends to be the\nMessiah is an impostor, and if care be not taken, he is sure to do\nmischief. Similar impostors in Cordova, France, and Africa, have\ndeceived the multitude and brought great troubles upon the Jews.\u2014Yet,\ninconsistently with this sound advice the author gives a positive date\nof the Messianic time, on the basis of an old tradition; the\ninconsistency is so obvious that it is impossible to attribute this\npassage to Maimonides himself. It is probably spurious, and has,\nperhaps, been added by the translator. With the exception of the rhymed\nintroduction, the letter was written in Arabic, \u201cin order that all\nshould be able to read and understand it\u201d; for that purpose the author\ndesires that copies should be made of it, and circulated among the\nJews. Rabbi Na\u1e25um, of the Maghreb, translated the letter into Hebrew.\n\nThe success in the first great undertaking of explaining the Mishnah\nencouraged Maimonides to propose to himself another task of a still\nmore ambitious character. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, it was his\nobject that those who were unable to read the Gemara should be made\nacquainted with the results obtained by the Amoraim in the course of\ntheir discussions on the Mishnah. But the Mishnah, with the Commentary,\nwas not such a code of laws as might easily be consulted in cases of\nemergency; only the initiated would be able to find the section, the\nchapter, and the paragraph in which the desired information could be\nfound. The halakah had, besides, been further developed since the time\nwhen the Talmud was compiled. The changed state of things had suggested\nnew questions; these were discussed and settled by the Geonim, whose\ndecisions, being contained in special letters or treatises, were not\ngenerally accessible. Maimonides therefore undertook to compile a\ncomplete code, which would contain, in the language and style of the\nMishnah, and without discussion, the whole of the Written and the Oral\nLaw, all the precepts recorded in the Talmud, Sifra, Sifre and Tosefta,\nand the decisions of the Geonim. According to the plan of the author,\nthis work was to present a solution of every question touching the\nreligious, moral, or social duties of the Jews. It was not in any way\nhis object to discourage the study of the Talmud and the Midrash; he\nonly sought to diffuse a knowledge of the Law amongst those who,\nthrough incapacity or other circumstances, were precluded from that\nstudy. In order to ensure the completeness of the code, the author drew\nup a list of the six hundred and thirteen precepts of the Pentateuch,\ndivided them into fourteen groups, these again he subdivided, and thus\nshowed how many positive and negative precepts were contained in each\nsection of the Mishneh torah. The principles by which he was guided in\nthis arrangement were laid down in a separate treatise, called Sefer\nha-mi\u1e93vot. Works of a similar kind, written by his predecessors, as the\nHalakot gedolot of R. Shimon Kahira, and the several Azharot were,\naccording to Maimonides, full of errors, because their authors had not\nadopted any proper method. But an examination of the rules laid down by\nMaimonides and of their application leads to the conclusion that his\nresults were not less arbitrary; as has, in fact, been shown by the\ncriticisms of Na\u1e25manides. The Sefer ha-mi\u1e93vot was written in Arabic,\nand thrice translated into Hebrew, namely, by Rabbi Abraham ben \u1e24isdai,\nRabbi Shelomoh ben Joseph ben Job, and Rabbi Moses Ibn Tibbon.\nMaimonides himself desired to translate the book into Hebrew, but to\nhis disappointment he found no time.\n\nThis Sefer ha-mi\u1e93vot was executed as a preparation for his principal\nwork, the Mishneh Torah, or Yad ha-\u1e25azakah, which consists of an\nIntroduction and fourteen Books. In the Introduction the author first\ndescribes the chain of tradition from Moses to the close of the Talmud,\nand then he explains his method in compiling the work. He distinguishes\nbetween the dicta found in the Talmud, Sifre, Sifra, or Tosefta, on the\none hand, and the dicta of the Geonim on the other; the former were\nbinding on all Jews, the latter only as far as their necessity and\ntheir utility or the authority of their propounders was recognized.\nHaving once for all stated the sources from which he compiled his work,\nhe did not deem it necessary to name in each case the authority for his\nopinion or the particular passage from which he derived his dictum. Any\naddition of references to each paragraph he probably considered useless\nto the uninformed and superfluous to the learned. At a later time he\ndiscovered his error, he being himself unable to find again the sources\nof some of his decisions. Rabbi Joseph Caro, in his commentary on the\nMishneh Torah, termed Keseph Mishneh, remedied this deficiency. The\nIntroduction is followed by the enumeration of the six hundred and\nthirteen precepts and a description of the plan of the work, its\ndivision into fourteen books, and the division of the latter into\nsections, chapters, and paragraphs.\n\nAccording to the author, the Mishneh Torah is a mere compendium of the\nTalmud; but he found sufficient opportunities to display his real\ngenius, his philosophical mind, and his ethical doctrines. For in\nstating what the traditional Law enjoined he had to exercise his own\njudgment, and to decide whether a certain dictum was meant to be taken\nliterally or figuratively; whether it was the final decision of a\nmajority or the rejected opinion of a minority; whether it was part of\nthe Oral Law or a precept founded on the scientific views of a\nparticular author; and whether it was of universal application or was\nonly intended for a special period or a special locality. The first\nBook, Sefer ha-madda\u02bb, is the embodiment of his own ethical and\ntheological theories, although he frequently refers to the Sayings of\nour Sages, and employs the phraseology of the Talmud. Similarly, the\nsection on the Jewish Calendar, Hilkot ha-\u02bbibur, may be considered as\nhis original work. In each group of the halakot, its source, a certain\npassage of the Pentateuch, is first quoted, with its traditional\ninterpretation, and then the detailed rules follow in systematic order.\nThe Mishneh Torah was written by the author in pure Hebrew; when\nsubsequently a friend asked him to translate it into Arabic, he said he\nwould prefer to have his Arabic writings translated into Hebrew instead\nof the reverse. The style is an imitation of the Mishnah; he did not\nchoose, the author says, the philosophical style, because that would be\nunintelligible to the common reader; nor did he select the prophetic\nstyle, because that would not harmonize with the subject.\n\nTen years of hard work by day and by night were spent in the\ncompilation of this code, which had originally been undertaken for \u201chis\nown benefit, to save him in his advanced age the trouble and the\nnecessity of consulting the Talmud on every occasion.\u201d Maimonides knew\nvery well that his work would meet with the opposition of those whose\nignorance it would expose, also of those who were incapable of\ncomprehending it, and of those who were inclined to condemn every\ndeviation from their own preconceived notions. But he had the\nsatisfaction to learn that it was well received in most of the\ncongregations of Israel, and that there was a general desire to possess\nand study it. This success confirmed him in his hope that at a later\ntime, when all cause for jealousy would have disappeared, the Mishneh\nTorah would be received by all Jews as an authoritative code. This hope\nhas not been realized. The genius, earnestness, and zeal of Maimonides\nare generally recognized; but there is no absolute acceptance of his\ndicta. The more he insisted on his infallibility, the more did the\nRabbinical authorities examine his words and point out errors wherever\nthey believed that they could discover any. It was not always from base\nmotives, as contended by Maimonides and his followers, that his\nopinions were criticised and rejected. The language used by Rabbi\nAbraham ben David in his notes (hasagot) on the Mishneh Torah appears\nharsh and disrespectful, if read together with the text of the\ncriticised passage, but it seems tame and mild if compared with\nexpressions used now and then by Maimonides about men who happened to\nhold opinions differing from his own.\n\nMaimonides received many complimentary letters, congratulating him upon\nhis success; but likewise letters with criticisms and questions\nrespecting individual halakot. In most cases he had no difficulty in\ndefending his position. From the replies it must, however, be inferred\nthat Maimonides made some corrections and additions, which were\nsubsequently embodied in his work. The letters addressed to him on the\nMishneh Torah and on other subjects were so numerous that he frequently\ncomplained of the time he had to spend in their perusal, and of the\nannoyance they caused him; but \u201che bore all this patiently, as he had\nlearned in his youth to bear the yoke.\u201d He was not surprised that many\nmisunderstood his words, for even the simple words of the Pentateuch,\n\u201cthe Lord is one,\u201d had met with the same fate. Some inferred from the\nfact that he treated fully of \u02bbOlam ha-ba, \u201cthe future state of the\nsoul,\u201d and neglected to expatiate on the resurrection of the dead, that\nhe altogether rejected that principle of faith. They therefore asked\nRabbi Samuel ha-levi of Bagdad to state his opinion; the Rabbi\naccordingly discussed the subject; but, according to Maimonides, he\nattempted to solve the problem in a very unsatisfactory manner. The\nlatter thereupon likewise wrote a treatise \u201cOn the Resurrection of the\nDead,\u201d in which he protested his adherence to this article of faith. He\nrepeated the opinion he had stated in the Commentary on the Mishnah and\nin the Mishneh Torah, but \u201cin more words; the same idea being\nreiterated in various forms, as the treatise was only intended for\nwomen and for the common multitude.\u201d\n\nThese theological studies engrossed his attention to a great extent,\nbut it did not occupy him exclusively. In a letter addressed to R.\nJonathan, of Lunel, he says: \u201cAlthough from my birth the Torah was\nbetrothed to me, and continues to be loved by me as the wife of my\nyouth, in whose love I find a constant delight, strange women whom I at\nfirst took into my house as her handmaids have become her rivals and\nabsorb a portion of my time.\u201d He devoted himself especially to the\nstudy of medicine, in which he distinguished himself to such a degree,\naccording to Alkifti, that \u201cthe King of the Franks in Ascalon wanted to\nappoint him as his physician.\u201d Maimonides declined the honour.\nAlfadhel, the Vizier of Saladin king of Egypt, admired the genius of\nMaimonides, and bestowed upon him many distinctions. The name of\nMaimonides was entered on the roll of physicians, he received a\npension, and was introduced to the court of Saladin. The method adopted\nin his professional practice he describes in a letter to his pupil, Ibn\nAknin, as follows: \u201cYou know how difficult this profession is for a\nconscientious and exact person who only states what he can support by\nargument or authority.\u201d This method is more fully described in a\ntreatise on hygiene, composed for Alfadhel, son of Saladin, who was\nsuffering from a severe illness and had applied to Maimonides for\nadvice. In a letter to Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon he alludes to the amount\nof time spent in his medical practice, and says: \u201cI reside in Egypt (or\nFostat); the king resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day\njourneys from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very\nheavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and\nwhen he or any of his children or the inmates of his harem are\nindisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but must stay during the greater\npart of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or\ntwo of the royal officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As\na rule, I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing\nunusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when I am almost\ndying with hunger; but I find the antechambers filled with Jews and\nGentiles, with nobles and common people, awaiting my return,\u201d etc.\n\nNotwithstanding these heavy professional duties of court physician,\nMaimonides continued his theological studies. After having compiled a\nreligious guide\u2014Mishneh Torah\u2014based on Revelation and Tradition, he\nfound it necessary to prove that the principles there set forth were\nconfirmed by philosophy. This task he accomplished in his Dalal\u0101t\nal-\u1e25a\u00efrin, \u201cThe Guide for the Perplexed,\u201d of which an analysis will be\ngiven below. It was composed in Arabic, and written in Hebrew\ncharacters. Subsequently it was translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Samuel\nIbn Tibbon, in the lifetime of Maimonides, who was consulted by the\ntranslator on all difficult passages. The congregation in Lunel,\nignorant of Ibn Tibbon\u2019s undertaking, or desirous to possess the most\ncorrect translation of the Guide, addressed a very flattering letter to\nMaimonides, requesting him to translate the work into Hebrew.\nMaimonides replied that he could not do so, as he had not sufficient\nleisure for even more pressing work, and that a translation was being\nprepared by the ablest and fittest man, Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon. A\nsecond translation was made later on by Jehudah Al\u1e25arizi. The Guide\ndelighted many, but it also met with much adverse criticism on account\nof the peculiar views held by Maimonides concerning angels, prophecy,\nand miracles, especially on account of his assertion that if the\nAristotelian proof for the Eternity of the Universe had satisfied him,\nhe would have found no difficulty in reconciling the Biblical account\nof the Creation with that doctrine. The controversy on the Guide\ncontinued long after the death of Maimonides to divide the community,\nand it is difficult to say how far the author\u2019s hope to effect a\nreconciliation between reason and revelation was realized. His\ndisciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin, to whom the work was dedicated, and who was\nexpected to derive from it the greatest benefit, appears to have been\ndisappointed. His inability to reconcile the two antagonistic elements\nof faith and science, he describes allegorically in the form of a\nletter addressed to Maimonides, in which the following passage occurs:\n\u201cSpeak, for I desire that you be justified; if you can, answer me. Some\ntime ago your beloved daughter, the beautiful and charming Kimah,\nobtained grace and favour in my sight, and I betrothed her unto me in\nfaithfulness, and married her in accordance with the Law, in the\npresence of two trustworthy witnesses, viz., our master, Abd-allah and\nIbn Roshd. But she soon became faithless to me; she could not have\nfound fault with me, yet she left me and departed from my tent. She\ndoes no longer let me behold her pleasant countenance or hear her\nmelodious voice. You have not rebuked or punished her, and perhaps you\nare the cause of this misconduct. Now, \u2018send the wife back to the man,\nfor he is\u2019\u2014or might become\u2014\u2018a prophet; he will pray for you that you\nmay live,\u2019 and also for her that she may be firm and steadfast. If,\nhowever, you do not send her back, the Lord will punish you. Therefore\nseek peace and pursue it; listen to what our Sages said: \u2018Blessed be he\nwho restores to the owner his lost property\u2019; for this blessing applies\nin a higher degree to him who restores to a man his virtuous wife, the\ncrown of her husband.\u201d Maimonides replied in the same strain, and\nreproached his \u201cson-in-law\u201d that he falsely accused his wife of\nfaithlessness after he had neglected her; but he restored him his wife\nwith the advice to be more cautious in future. In another letter\nMaimonides exhorts Ibn Aknin to study his works, adding, \u201capply\nyourself to the study of the Law of Moses; do not neglect it, but, on\nthe contrary, devote to it the best and the most of your time, and if\nyou tell me that you do so, I am satisfied that you are on the right\nway to eternal bliss.\u201d\n\nOf the letters written after the completion of the \u201cGuide,\u201d the one\naddressed to the wise men of Marseilles (1194) is especially\nnoteworthy. Maimonides was asked to give his opinion on astrology. He\nregretted in his reply that they were not yet in the possession of his\nMishneh Torah; they would have found in it the answer to their\nquestion. According to his opinion, man should only believe what he can\ngrasp with his intellectual faculties, or perceive by his senses, or\nwhat he can accept on trustworthy authority. Beyond this nothing should\nbe believed. Astrological statements, not being founded on any of these\nthree sources of knowledge, must be rejected. He had himself studied\nastrology, and was convinced that it was no science at all. If some\ndicta be found in the Talmud which appear to represent astrology as a\ntrue source of knowledge, these may either be referred to the rejected\nopinion of a small minority, or may have an allegorical meaning, but\nthey are by no means forcible enough to set aside principles based on\nlogical proof.\n\nThe debility of which Maimonides so frequently complained in his\ncorrespondence, gradually increased, and he died, in his seventieth\nyear, on the 20th Tebeth, 4965 (1204). His death was the cause of great\nmourning to all Jews. In Fostat a mourning of three days was kept; in\nJerusalem a fast was appointed; a portion of the tocha\u1e25ah (Lev. xxvi.\nor Deut. xxix.) was read, and also the history of the capture of the\nArk by the Philistines (1 Sam. iv.). His remains were brought to\nTiberias. The general regard in which Maimonides was held, both by his\ncontemporaries and by succeeding generations, has been expressed in the\npopular saying: \u201cFrom Moses to Moses there was none like Moses.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE MOREH NEBUCHIM LITERATURE\n\n\nI. The Arabic Text.\u2014The editio princeps, the only edition of the\noriginal text of the Guide (in Arabic, D\u0115lil, or Dalalat al-\u1e25a\u00efrin),\nwas undertaken and executed by the late S. Munk. Its title is: Le Guide\ndes \u00c9gar\u00e9s, trait\u00e9 de Th\u00e9ologie et de Philosophie par Mo\u00efse ben Maimon,\npubli\u00e9 pour la premi\u00e8re fois dans l\u2019original Arabe, et accompagn\u00e9 d\u2019une\ntraduction Fran\u00e7aise et de notes critiques, litt\u00e9raires et\nexplicatives, par S. Munk (Paris, 1850\u20131866). The plan was published,\n1833, in Reflexions sur le culte des anciens H\u00e9breux (La Bible, par S.\nCahen, vol. iv.), with a specimen of two chapters of the Third Part.\nThe text adopted has been selected from the several MSS. at his\ndisposal with great care and judgment. Two Leyden MSS. (cod. 18 and\n221), various MSS. of the Biblioth\u00e8que Nationale (No. 760, very old;\n761 and 758, written by R. Saadia Ibn Danan), and some MSS. of the\nBodleian Library were consulted. In the notes which accompany the\nFrench translation, the various readings of the different MSS. are\nfully discussed. At the end of the third volume a list is added of\n\u201cVariantes des Manuscrits Arabes et des deux Versions H\u00e9bra\u00efques.\u201d\n\nThe library of the British Museum possesses two copies of the Arabic\ntext; the one Or. 1423 is complete, beautifully written, with\nexplanatory notes in the margin and between the lines. The name of the\ncopyist is not mentioned, nor the date when it has been written. The\nvolume has in the beginning an incomplete index to the Scriptural\npassages referred to in the Guide, and at the end fragments of Psalm\ncxli. in Arabic and of astronomical tables.\n\nThe second copy of the Dalalat al-\u1e25a\u00efrin is contained in the MS. Or.\n2423, written in large Yemen Rabbinic characters. It is very\nfragmentary. The first fragment begins with the last paragraph of the\nintroduction; there are a few marginal notes in Hebrew.\n\nIn the Bodleian Library there are the following copies of the Dalalat\nal-\u1e25a\u00efrin according to the Catal. of Hebr. MSS. by Dr. A. Neubauer:\u2014\n\n\n\nNo. 1236. The text is preceded by Jehudah al-Charizi\u2019s index of the\ncontents of the chapters, and by an index of Biblical quotations. In\nthe margin there are notes, containing omissions, by different hands,\ntwo in Arabic characters. The volume was written 1473.\n\nNo. 1237. The Arabic text, with a few marginal notes containing various\nreadings; the text is preceded by three Hebrew poems, beginning, De\u2019i\nholek, Bi-sedeb tebunot; and Binu be-dat Mosheh. Fol. 212 contains a\nfragment of the book (III., xxix.).\n\nNo. 1238. Text with a few marginal notes.\n\nNo. 1239. The end of the work is wanting in this copy. The second part\nhas forty-nine chapters, as the introduction to Part II. is counted as\nchapter i.; Part III. has fifty-six chapters, the introduction being\ncounted as chapter i., and chapter xxiv. being divided into two\nchapters. The index of passages from the Pentateuch follows the\nordinary mode of counting the chapters of the Guide.\n\nNo. 1240. Arabic text transcribed in Arabic characters by Saadiah b.\nLevi Azanko\u1e6d for Prof. Golius in 1645.\n\nNo. 1241. First part of the Dalalat al-\u1e25a\u00efrin, written by Saadiah b.\nMordecai b. Mosheh in the year 1431.\n\nNo. 1242 contains the same Part, but incomplete.\n\nNos. 1243, 1244, 1245, and 1246 contain Part II. of the Arabic text,\nincomplete in Nos. 1245 and 1246.\n\nNos. 1247, 1248, and 1249 have Part III.; it is incomplete in Nos. 1248\nand 1249. No. 1249 was written 1291, and begins with III., viii.\n\nA fragment of the Arabic text, the end of Part III., is contained in\nNo. 407, 2.\n\nNo. 2508 includes a fragment of the original (I. ii.\u2013xxxii.), with a\nHebrew interlineary translation of some words and a few marginal notes.\nIt is written in Yemen square characters, and is marked as \u201choly\nproperty of the Synagogue of Alsiani.\u201d\n\nA fragment (I. i.) of a different recension from the printed is\ncontained in 2422, 16. On the margin the Commentaries of Shem-\u1e6dob and\nEphodi are added in Arabic.\n\nA copy of the Dalalat is also contained in the Berlin Royal Library MS.\nOr. Qu., 579 (105 Cat. Steinschneider); it is defective in the\nbeginning and at the end.\n\nThe Cairo Genizah at Cambridge contains two fragments: (a) I. lxiv. and\nbeginning of lxv.; (b) II. end of xxxii. and xxxiii. According to Dr.\nH. Hirschfeld, Jewish Quarterly Review (vol. xv. p. 677), they are in\nthe handwriting of Maimonides.\n\nThe valuable collection of MSS. in the possession of Dr. M. Gaster\nincludes a fragment of the Dalalat-al-\u1e25a\u00efrin (Codex 605). II.\nxiii.\u2013xv., beginning and end defective.\n\n\n\nII. Translations. a. Hebrew.\u2014As soon as European Jews heard of the\nexistence of this work, they procured its translation into Hebrew. Two\nscholars, independently of each other, undertook the task: Samuel Ibn\nTibbon and Jehudah al-\u1e24arizi. There is, besides, in the Moreh ha-moreh\nof Shem\u1e6dob Palquera an original translation of some portions of the\nMoreh. In the Sifte yeshenim (No. 112) a rhymed translation of the\nDalalat by Rabbi Mattityahu Kartin is mentioned. Ibn Tibbon\u2019s version\nis very accurate; he sacrificed elegance of style to the desire of\nconscientiously reproducing the author\u2019s work, and did not even neglect\na particle, however unimportant it may appear. Ibn Tibbon went in his\nanxiety to retain peculiarities of the original so far as to imitate\nits ambiguities, e.g., me\u1e93iut (I. lviii.) is treated as a masculine\nnoun, only in order to leave it doubtful whether a pronoun which\nfollows agrees with me\u1e93iut, \u201cexistence,\u201d or with nim\u1e93a, \u201cexisting\nbeing,\u201d both occurring in the same sentence (Br. Mus. MS. Harl. 7586,\nmarg. note by Ibn Tibbon). When he met with passages that offered any\ndifficulty he consulted Maimonides. \u1e24arizi, on the other hand, was less\nconscientious about words and particles, but wrote in a superior style.\nVox populi, however, decided in favour of the version of Ibn Tibbon,\nthe rival of which became almost forgotten. Also Abraham, the son of\nMoses Maimonides, in Mil\u1e25amoth ha-shem, describes \u1e24arizi\u2019s version as\nbeing inaccurate. Most of the modern translations were made from Ibn\nTibbon\u2019s version. There are, therefore, MSS. of this version almost in\nevery library containing collections of Hebrew books and MSS. It has\nthe title Moreh-nebuchim. The British Museum has the following eight\ncopies of Ibn Tibbon\u2019s version:\u2014\n\n\n\nHarl. 7586 A. This codex was written in the year 1284, for Rabbi\nShabbatai ben Rabbi Mattityahu. In the year 1340 it came into the\npossession of Jacob b. Shelomoh; his son Mena\u1e25em sold it in the year\n1378 to R. Mattityahu, son of R. Shabbatai, for fifty gold florins. It\nwas again sold in the year 1461 by Ye\u1e25iel ben Joab. There is this\npeculiarity in the writing, that long words at the end of a line are\ndivided, and written half on the one line, half on the next; in words\nwhich are vocalized, pata\u1e25 is frequently found for \u1e33ame\u1e93. There are\nnumerous various readings in the margin. The text is preceded by a\npoem, written by Joseph Ibn Aknin, pupil of Maimonides, in praise of\nhis master, and beginning Adon yi\u1e93ro. This poem is attributed to R.\nYehudah ha-Levi (Luzzatto, in his Divan, Betulat-bat-Yehudah, p. 104).\nAt the end the copyist adds an epigram, the translation of which is as\nfollows:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe Moreh is finished\u2014Praise to Him who formed and created\neverything\u2014written for the instruction and benefit of the few whom the\nLord calleth. Those who oppose the Moreh ought to be put to death; but\nthose who study and understand it deserve that Divine Glory rest upon\nthem, and inspire them with a spirit from above.\u201d\n\nHarl. 7586 B. This codex, much damaged in the beginning and at the end,\ncontains the version of Ibn Tibbon, with marginal notes, consisting of\nwords omitted in the text, and other corrections. The version is\nfollowed by the poems \u1e32arob meod, etc., and De\u2019i holek, etc.\n\nHarl. 5507 contains the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon, with the\ntranslator\u2019s preface and marginal notes, consisting of various readings\nand omissions from the text. The work of Maimonides is followed by Ibn\nTibbon\u2019s Vocabulary (millot-zarot), Mesharet-mosheh, \u02bbArugot\nha-mezimmah, Millot higgayon, Rua\u1e25-\u1e25en, Alfarabi\u2019s Hat\u1e25alot, a\nHebrew-Italian vocabulary of logical terms, and an explanation of\nko\u1e6deb. The passage in Part I., chap. lxxi., which refers to\nChristianity, has been erased.\n\nHarl. 5525 was the property of Shimshon Kohen Modon. The MS. begins\nwith \u1e24arizi\u2019s Kavvanat ha-pera\u1e33im; then follows the text, with a few\nmarginal notes of a later hand, mostly adverse criticisms and\nreferences to \u02bbArama\u2019s \u02bbA\u1e33edah and the Biblical commentaries of\nAbarbanel. There is also a note in Latin. The text is followed by Ibn\nTibbon\u2019s Vocabulary (Millot-zarot) and Masoret ha-pesu\u1e33im (Index to the\nBiblical quotations in the Moreh). In a poem, beginning Moreh asher\nmennu derakav gabehu, the Moreh is compared to a musical instrument,\nwhich delights when played by one that understands music, but is\nspoiled when touched by an ignorant person.\n\nAdd. 27068 (Almanzi coll.). At the end the following remark is added:\nI, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, finished the translation of this work in the\nmonth of Tebet 4965 (1205). The text is preceded by the well-known\nepigrams, De\u2019i holek and Moreh-nebuchim sa shelomi; the last page\ncontains the epigram \u1e32arob meod. There are some notes in the margin,\nmostly referring to various readings.\n\nAdd. 14763. This codex, written 1273 at Viterbo, contains the preface\nof \u1e24arizi to his translation of the Moreh and his index of contents,\nIbn Tibbon\u2019s version with a few marginal notes of different hands,\nincluding some remarks of the translator, and the contents of the\nchapters. The codex contains besides the following treatises:\nCommentary of Maimonides on Abot; Comm. of Maim. on Mishnah Sanhedrin\nx. 1; Letter of Maimonides on the Resurrection of the Dead; Vocabulary\nof difficult words by Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Maimonides\u2019 Letter to the wise\nmen of Marseilles; his Letter to Rabbi Jonathan; Keter-malkut,\nMesharet-mosheh, Rua\u1e25-\u1e25en, Otot ha-shamayim, translated from the Arabic\nby Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Hat\u1e25alot ha-nim\u1e93aot, of Alfarabi; Sefer\nha-\u1e25appua\u1e25, Mishle \u1e25amishim ha-talmidim; on the seven zones of the\nearth; a fragment of a chronicle from the exile of Babylon down to the\nfourth year of the Emperor Nicepheros of Constantinople, and a poem,\nwhich begins asher yishal, and has the following sense:\u2014\u201cIf one asks\nthe old and experienced for advice, you may expect his success in all\nhe undertakes; but if one consults the young, remember the fate of\nRehoboam, son of Solomon.\u201d\n\nAdd. 14764. In addition to the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (from end\nof I. xxvii.) with a few marginal notes and index, the codex contains\nat the end of Part I. an Index of references made by the author to\nexplanations given in preceding or succeeding chapters. At the end of\nthe text the statement is added, that the translation was finished in\nthe month of Tebet 968 (1208). The Moreh is followed by Rua\u1e25-\u1e25en, and\nIbn Tibbon\u2019s Vocabulary of millot-zarot (incomplete), and is preceded\nby four poems in praise of the Moreh, beginning Shim\u2019u nebone leb,\nMoreh nebuchim sa shelomi, De\u2019i holek and Nofet ma\u1e25kim.\n\nBibl. Reg. 16 A, xi. This codex, written in Prov. curs. characters in\nthe year 1308, has in front a fragment of III. i., then follows the\npoem of Meshullam, beginning Yehgu mezimmotai (Gr\u00e4tz Leket-shoshannim,\np. 151), and other poems.\n\n\n\nThe following MS. copies of Ibn Tibbon\u2019s version are included in the\nOxford Bodleian Library; the numbers refer to Dr. Neubauer\u2019s catalogue\nof the MSS.:\u2014\n\n\n\n1250. An index of the passages from the Bible referred to in the work,\nand an index of the contents precede the version. The marginal notes\ncontain chiefly omissions.\n\n1251. This codex was written in 1675. The marginal notes contain\nomissions and explanations.\n\n1252. The marginal notes contain the translator\u2019s remarks on I. lxxiv.\n4, and III. xlvii. The version is followed by Ibn Tibbon\u2019s vocabulary,\nand his additional remarks on the reasons for the commandments. The MS.\nwas bought by Samuel ben Moses from a Christian after the pillage of\nPadua, where it had belonged to a Synagogue of foreigners (lo\u2019azim); he\ngave it to a Synagogue of the same character at Mantua.\n\n1253. The marginal notes include that of the translator on III. xlvii.\n\n1254. 1. Text with marginal notes containing omissions.\n\n1255. The marginal notes include those of the translator on I. xlvi.\nand lxxiv. 5.\n\n1256. The marginal notes contain various readings, notes relating to\n\u1e24arizi\u2019s translation and the Arabic text; on fol. 80 there is a note in\nLatin. There are in this codex six epigrams concerning the Moreh.\n\n1257. Text incomplete; with marginal notes.\n\nFragments of the Version are contained in the following codices: 2047,\n3, p. 65; 2283, 8; 2309, 2, and 2336.\n\n\n\nAmong the MS. copies of the Moreh in the Bibl. Nat. in Paris, there is\none that has been the property of R. Eliah Mizra\u1e25i, and another that\nhad been in the hands of Azariah de Rossi (No. 685 and No. 691); the\nG\u00fcnzburg Library (Paris) possesses a copy (No. 771), that was written\n1452 by Samuel son of Isaac for Rabbi Moses de Leon, and Eliah del\nMedigo\u2019s copy of the Moreh is in the possession of Dr. Ginsburg\n(London); it contains six poems, beginning Moreh nebuchim sa; Emet\nmoreh emet; Bi-leshon esh; Mah-ba\u02bbaru; Kamu more shav.\n\nThe editio princeps of this version has no statement as to where and\nwhen it was printed, and is without pagination. According to F\u00fcrst\n(Bibliogr.) it is printed before 1480. The copy in the British Museum\nhas some MS. notes. Subsequent editions contain besides the Hebrew text\nthe Commentaries of Shem-\u1e6dob and Efodi, and the index of contents by\n\u1e24arizi (Venice, 1551, fol.); also the Comm. of Crescas and Vocabulary\nof Ibn Tibbon (Sabionetta, 1553, fol.; Jessnitz, 1742, fol. etc.); the\nCommentaries of Narboni and S. Maimon (Berlin, 1791); the commentaries\nof Efodi, Shem-\u1e6dob, Crescas and Abarbanel (Warsaw, 1872, 4to); German\ntranslation and Hebrew Commentary (Biur) Part I. (Krotoschin, 1839,\n8vo); German translation and notes, Part II. (Wien, 1864), Part III.\n(Frankfort-a.-M., 1838).\n\nThe Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (Part I. to ch. lxxii.) has been\ntranslated into Mishnaic Hebrew by M. Levin (Zolkiew, 1829, 4to).\n\nThere is only one MS. known of \u1e24arizi\u2019s version, viz., No. 682 of the\nBiblioth\u00e8que Nationale at Paris. It has been edited by L. Schlosberg,\nwith notes. London, 1851 (Part I.), 1876 (II.), and 1879 (III.). The\nnotes on Part I. were supplied by S. Scheyer.\n\nThe first Latin translation of the Moreh has been discovered by Dr. J.\nPerles among the Latin MSS. of the Munich Library, Catal. Cod.\nlatinorum bibl. regiae Monacensis, tom. I, pars iii. pag. 208 (Kaish.\n36 b), 1700 (7936 b). This version is almost identical with that edited\nby Augustinus Justinianus, Paris, 1520, and is based on \u1e24arizi\u2019s Hebrew\nversion of the Moreh. The name of the translator is not mentioned. In\nthe Commentary of Moses, son of Solomon, of Salerno, on the Moreh, a\nLatin translation is quoted, and the quotations agree with this\nversion. It is called by this commentator ha \u02bbata\u1e33at ha-no\u1e93rit (\u201cthe\nChristian translation\u201d), and its author, ha-ma \u02bbati\u1e33 ha-no\u1e93er (lit.\n\u201cthe Christian translator\u201d). Dr. Perles is, however, of opinion that\nthese terms do not necessarily imply that a Christian has made this\ntranslation, as the word no\u1e93er may have been used here for \u201cLatin.\u201d He\nthinks that it is the result of the combined efforts of Jewish and\nChristian scholars connected with the court of the German Emperor\nFrederic II., especially as in the thirteenth century several Jewish\nscholars distinguished themselves by translating Oriental works into\nLatin. See Gr\u00e4tz Monatschrift, 1875, Jan.\u2013June, \u201cDie in einer M\u00fcnchener\nHandschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Uebersetzung,\u201d etc., von Dr.\nJ. Perles. The title has been variously rendered into Latin: Director\nneutrorum, directorium dubitantium, director neutrorum, nutantium or\ndubitantium; doctor perplexorum.\n\nGedaliah ibn Yahyah, in Shalshelet ha-\u1e33abbalah, mentions a Latin\ntranslation of the Moreh by Jacob Monteno; but nothing is known of it,\nunless it be the anonymous translation of the Munich MS., mentioned\nabove. Augustinus Justinianus edited this version (Paris, 1520), with\nslight alterations and a great number of mistakes. Joseph Scaliger\u2019s\nopinion of this version is expressed in a letter to Casaubonus, as\nfollows: Qui latine vertit, Hebraica, non Arabica, convertit, et quidem\ns\u00e6pe hallucinatur, neque mentem Authoris assequitur. Magna seges\nmendorum est in Latino. Pr\u00e6ter illa qu\u00e6 ab inertia Interpretis peccata\nsunt accessit et inertia Librariorum aut Typographorum, e.g., propheti\u00e6\npro philosophi\u00e6; altitudo pro aptitudo; bonitatem pro brevitatem.\n(Buxtorf, Doctor Perplexorum, Pr\u00e6f.)\n\nJohannes Buxtorfius, Fil., translated the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon\ninto Latin (Basile\u00e6, 1629, 4to). In the Pr\u00e6fatio ad Lectorem, the\ntranslator discusses the life and the works of Maimonides, and dwells\nespecially on the merits and the fate of the Moreh-nebuchim. The\npreface is followed by a Hebrew poem of Rabbi Raphael Joseph of Tr\u00e8ves,\nin praise of an edition of the Moreh containing the Commentaries of\nEfodi, Shem-tob, and Crescas.\n\nItalian was the first living language into which the Moreh has been\ntranslated. This translation was made by Yedidyah ben Moses (Amadeo de\nMo\u00efse di Recanati), and dedicated by him to \u201cdivotissimo e divinissimo\nSignor mio il Signor Immanuel da Fano\u201d (i.e., the Kabbalist Mena\u1e25em\nAzarriah). The translator dictated it to his brother Eliah, who wrote\nit in Hebrew characters; it was finished the 8th of February, 1583. The\nMS. copy is contained in the Royal Library at Berlin, MS. Or. Qu. 487\n(M. Steinschneider Catal., etc.)\u2014The Moreh has been translated into\nItalian a second time, and annotated by D. J. Maroni: Guida degli\nSmarriti, Firenze, 1870, fol.\n\nThe Moreh has been translated into German by R. F\u00fcrstenthal (Part I.,\nKrotoschin, 1839), M. Stern (Part II., Wien, 1864), and S. Scheyer\n(Part III., Frankfort-a.-M., 1838). The translation is based on Ibn\nTibbon\u2019s Hebrew version. The chapters on the Divine Attributes have\nbeen translated into German, and fully discussed, by Dr. Kaufmann in\nhis Geschichte der Attributenlehre (Gotha, 1877). An excellent French\ntranslation, based on the Arabic original, has been supplied by the\nregenerator of the Guide, S. Munk. It was published together with the\nArabic text (Paris, 1850\u20131866).\n\nThe Moreh has also been translated into the Hungarian language by Dr.\nKlein. The translation is accompanied by notes (Budapest, 1878\u201380).\n\nThe portion containing the reasons of the Commandments (Part III. ch.\nxxvi.\u2013xlix.) has been translated into English by James Townley (London,\n1827). The translation is preceded by an account on the life and works\nof Maimonides, and dissertations on various subjects; among others,\nTalmudical and Rabbinical writings, the Originality of the Institutions\nof Moses, and Judicial astrology.\n\nIII. Commentaries.\u2014It is but natural that in a philosophical work like\nthe Moreh, the reader will meet with passages that at first thought\nseem unintelligible, and require further explanation, and this want has\nbeen supplied by the numerous commentators that devoted their attention\nto the study of the Moreh. Joseph Solomon del Medigo (1591) saw\neighteen Commentaries. The four principal ones he characterizes thus\n(in imitation of the Hagadah for Passover): Moses Narboni is rasha\u02bb,\nhas no piety, and reveals all the secrets of the Moreh. Shem-\u1e6dob is\n\u1e25akam, \u201cwise,\u201d expounds and criticises; Crescas is tam, \u201csimple,\u201d\nexplains the book in the style of the Rabbis; Epodi is she-eno yode\u02bba\nlishol, \u201cdoes not understand to ask,\u201d he simply explains in short notes\nwithout criticism (Miktab-a\u1e25uz; ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840, p. 18).\nThe earliest annotations were made by the author himself on those\npassages, which the first translator of the Moreh was unable to\ncomprehend. They are contained in a letter addressed to Samuel Ibn\nTibbon, beginning, lefi siklo yehullal ish (Bodl. Library, No. 2218,\ns.; comp. The Guide, etc., I. 21, 343; II. 8, 99). Ibn Tibbon, the\ntranslator, likewise added a few notes, which are found in the margin\nof MSS. of the Hebrew version of the Moreh (on I. xlv. lxxiv.; II.\nxxiv.; and III. xlvii.\u2014MSS. Bodl. 1252, 1; 1253, 1255, 1257; Brit. Mus.\nAdd. 14,763 and 27,068).\n\nBoth translators wrote explanations of the philosophical terms employed\nin the versions. \u1e24arizi wrote his vocabulary first, and Ibn Tibbon, in\nthe introductory remarks, to Perush millot zarot (\u201cExplanation of\ndifficult words\u201d), describes his rival\u2019s vocabulary as full of\nblunders. Ibn Tibbon\u2019s Perush is found almost in every copy of his\nversion, both MS. and print; so also \u1e24arizi\u2019s index of the contents of\nthe chapters of the Moreh (Kavvanat ha-pera\u1e33im).\n\nThe following is an alphabetical list of Commentaries on the Moreh:\u2014\n\n\n\nAbarbanel (Don Isaak) wrote a Commentary on I. i.\u2013lv.; II. xxxi.\u2013xlv.,\nand a separate book Shamayim-\u1e25adashim, \u201cNew Heavens,\u201d on II. xix., in\nwhich he fully discusses the question concerning Creatio ex nihilo. The\nopinion of Maimonides is not always accepted. Thus twenty-seven\nobjections are raised against his interpretation of the first chapter\nof Ezekiel. These objections he wrote at Molin, in the house of R.\nAbraham Treves \u1e92arfati. The Commentary is followed by a short essay\n(maamar) on the plan of the Moreh. The method adopted by Abarbanel in\nall his Commentaries, is also employed in this essay. A series of\nquestions is put forth on the subject, and then the author sets about\nto answer them. M. J. Landau edited the Commentary without text, with a\nPreface, and with explanatory notes, called Moreh li-\u1e93eddakah (Prag.\n1831; MS. Bodl. 2385). In addition to these the same author wrote\nTeshubot \u201cAnswers\u201d to several questions asked by Rabbi Shaul ha-Cohen\non topics discussed in the Moreh (Venice, 1754).\n\nAbraham Abulafia wrote \u201cSodot ha-moreh,\u201d or Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic\nCommentary on the Moreh. He gives the expression, \u200f\u05d2\u05df \u05e2\u05d3\u05df\u200e (Paradise),\nfor the number (177) of the chapters of the Moreh. MS. Nat. Bibl. 226,\n3. Leipsic Libr. 232, 4. MS. Bodl. 2360, 5, contains a portion of Part\nIII.\n\nBuchner A. Ha-moreh li-\u1e93eda\u1e33ab (Warsaw, 1838). Commentary on \u201cThe\nReasons of the Laws,\u201d Moreh III. xxix.\u2013xlix. The Commentary is preceded\nby an account of the life of Maimonides.\n\nComtino, Mordecai b. Eliezer, wrote a short commentary on the Moreh\n(Dr. Ginsburg\u2019s collection of MSS. No. 10). Narboni, who \u201cspread light\non dark passages in the Guide,\u201d is frequently quoted. Reference is also\nmade to his own commentary on Ibn Ezra\u2019s Yesod-mora.\n\nCrescas (Asher b. Abraham), expresses in the Preface to his Commentary\nthe conviction that he could not always comprehend the right sense of\nthe words of Maimonides, for \u201cthere is no searching to his\nunderstanding.\u201d He nevertheless thinks that his explanations will help\n\u201cthe young\u201d to study the Moreh with profit. A long poem in praise of\nMaimonides and his work precedes the Preface. His notes are short and\nclear, and in spite of his great respect of Maimonides, he now and then\ncriticises and corrects him.\n\nDavid Ya\u1e25ya is named by Joseph Del Medigo (Miktab-a\u1e25uz ed. A. Geiger,\nBerlin, 1840; p. 18, and note 76), as having written a Commentary on\nthe Moreh.\n\nDavid ben Yehudah Leon Rabbino wrote \u02bbEn ha-\u1e33ore, MS. Bodl. 1263. He\nquotes in his Commentary among others \u02bbArama\u2019s \u02bbAkedat yi\u1e93\u1e25a\u1e33. The\nPreface is written by Immanuel ben Raphael Ibn Meir, after the death of\nthe author.\n\nEfodi is the name of the Commentary written by Isaac ben Moses, who\nduring the persecution of 1391 had passed as Christian under the name\nof Profiat Duran. He returned to Judaism, and wrote against\nChristianity the famous satire \u201cAl tehee ka-aboteka\u201d (\u201cBe not like your\nFathers\u201d), which misled Christians to cite it as written in favour of\nChristianity. It is addressed to the apostate En Bonet Bon Giorno. The\nsame author also wrote a grammatical work, Ma\u02bbaseh-efod. The name Efod\n(\u200f\u05d0\u05e4\u05d3\u200e), is explained as composed of the initials Amar Profiat Duran.\nHis Commentary consists of short notes, explanatory of the text. The\nbeginning of this Commentary is contained in an Arabic translation in\nMS. Bodl. 2422, 16.\n\nEphraim Al-Naqavah in Sha\u02bbar Kebod ha-shem (MS. Bodl. 939, 2 and 1258,\n2), answers some questions addressed to him concerning the Moreh. He\nquotes \u1e24isdai\u2019s Or adonai.\n\nF\u00fcrstenthal, R., translator and commentator of the Ma\u1e25zor, added a\nBiur, short explanatory notes, to his German translation of Part I. of\nthe Moreh (Krotoschin, 1839).\n\nGershon, Moreh-derek, Commentary on Part I. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl.\n1265).\n\nHillel b. Samuel b. Elazar of Verona explained the Introduction to Part\nII. (the 25 Propos.). S. H. Halberstam edited this Commentary together\nwith Tagmule ha-nefesh of the same author, for the Society\nMe\u1e33i\u1e93e-nirdamim (Lyck, 1874).\n\nJoseph ben Aba-mari b. Joseph, of Caspi (Argenti\u00e8re), wrote three\nCommentaries on the Moreh. The first is contained in a Munich MS. (No.\n263); and seems to have been recast by the author, and divided into two\nseparate Commentaries: \u02bbAmmude Kesef, and Maskiyot Kesef. The former\nwas to contain plain and ordinary explanation, whilst profound and\nmysterious matter was reserved for the second (Steinschn. Cat.). In\nII., chap. xlviii., Caspi finds fault with Maimonides that he does not\nplace the book of Job among the highest class of inspired writings,\n\u201cits author being undoubtedly Moses.\u201d These Commentaries have been\nedited by T. Werblumer (Frankfort-a.-M., 1848). R. Kirchheim added a\nHebrew introduction discussing the character of these commentaries, and\ndescribing the manuscripts from which these were copied; a Biography of\nthe author is added in German.\n\nJoseph Giqatilia wrote notes on the Moreh, printed with \u201cQuestions of\nShaul ha-kohen\u201d (Venice, 1574. MS. Bodl. 1911, 3).\n\nJoseph b. Isaac ha-Levi\u2019s Gib\u2019at ha-Moreh is a short Commentary on\nportions of the Moreh, with notes by R. Yom-\u1e6dob Heller, the author of\nTosafot Yom-tob (Prag., 1612).\n\nIsaac Satanov wrote a commentary on Parts II. and III. of the Moreh\n(see Maimon Solomon p. xxi.).\n\nIsaac ben Shem-\u1e6dob ibn Shem-\u1e6dob wrote a lengthy Commentary on the\nMoreh, Part I. (MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 1388). The object of the Commentary\nis to show that there is no contradiction between Maimonides and the\nDivine Law. He praises Maimonides as a true believer in Creatio ex\nnihilo, whilst Ibn Ezra and Gersonides assumed a prima materia (Yo\u1e93er,\n\u1e33adosh). Nachmanides is called ha-\u1e25asid ha-gadol, but is nevertheless\nblamed, together with Narboni and Zera\u1e25yah ha-Levi, for criticising\nMaimonides, instead of trying to explain startling utterances even in\n\u201ca forced way\u201d (bederek ra\u1e25ok); and Narboni, \u201cin spite of his wisdom,\nfrequently misunderstood the Moreh.\u201d At the end of each chapter a\nr\u00e9sum\u00e9 (derush) of the contents of the chapter is given, and the lesson\nto be derived from it. The MS. is incomplete, chaps, xlvi.\u2013xlviii. are\nmissing.\n\nKaufmann, D., in his Geschichte der Attributenlehre, translated Part I.\nchap, l.\u2013lxiii. into German, and added critical and explanatory notes.\n\nKalonymos wrote a kind of introduction to the Moreh (Mesharet Mosheh),\nin which he especially discusses the theory of Maimonides on\nProvidence.\n\nLeibnitz made extracts from Buxtorf\u2019s Latin version of the Moreh, and\nadded his own remarks. Observationes ad R. Mosen Maimoniden (Foucher de\nCareil. C.A., La Philosophie Juive, 1861).\n\nLevin, M., wrote Allon-moreh as a kind of introduction to his\nretranslation of Tibbon\u2019s Hebrew version into the language of the\nMishnah.\n\nMaimon, Solomon, is the author of Gib\u2019at ha-moreh, a lengthy commentary\non Book I. (Berlin, 1791). The author is fond of expatiating on topics\nof modern philosophy. In the introduction he gives a short history of\nphilosophy. The commentary on Books II. and III. was written by Isaac\nSatanov.\n\nMeir ben Jonah ha-mekunneh Ben-shneor wrote a commentary on the Moreh\nin Fez 1560 (MS. Bodl. 1262).\n\nMena\u1e25em Kara expounded the twenty-five propositions enumerated in the\nIntroduction to Part II. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1649, 13).\n\nMordecai Yaffe, in his Or Ye\u1e33arot, or Pinnat Yi\u1e33rat, one of his ten\nLebushim, comments upon the theories contained in the Moreh.\n\nMoses, son of Abraham Proven\u00e7al, explains the passage in Part I. chap,\nlxxiii. Prop. 3, in which Maimonides refers to the difference between\ncommensurable and incommensurable lines (MS. Bodl. 2033, 8).\n\nMoses, son of Jehudah Nagari, made an index of the subjects treated in\nthe Moreh, indicating in each case the chapters in which allusion is\nmade to the subject. He did so, \u201cin obedience to the advice of\nMaimonides, to consider the chapters in connected order\u201d (Part I. p.\n20). It has been printed together with the questions of Shaul ha-kohen\n(Venice, 1574).\n\nMoses, son of Solomon of Salerno, is one of the earliest expounders of\nthe Moreh. He wrote his commentary on Parts I. and II., perhaps\ntogether with a Christian scholar. He quotes the opinion of \u201cthe\nChristian scholar with whom he worked together.\u201d Thus he names Petrus\nde Bernia and Nicolo di Giovenazzo. R. Jacob Anatoli, author of the\nMalmed ha-talmidim, is quoted as offering an explanation for the\npassage from Pir\u1e33e di-rabbi Eliezer, which Maimonides (II. chap, xxvi.)\nconsiders as strange and inexplicable (Part I., written 1439; MS. of\nBet ha-midrash, London; Parts I.\u2013II., MS. Bodl. 1261, written, 1547;\nMS. Petersburg, No. 82; Munich MS. 60 and 370).\n\nMoses ha-\u1e33atan, son of Jehudah, son of Moses, wrote To\u2019aliyot pir\u1e33e\nha-maamar (\u201cLessons taught in the chapters of this work\u201d). It is an\nindex to the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1267).\n\nMoses Leiden explained the 25 Prop. of the Introduction to Part II.\n(MS. G\u00fcnzburg, Paris).\n\nMoses Narboni wrote a short commentary at Soria, 1362. He freely\ncriticizes Maimonides, and uses expressions like the following:\u2014\u201cHe\nwent too far, may God pardon him\u201d (II. viii.). Is. Euchel ed. Part I.\n(Berlin, 1791); J. Goldenthal, I. to III. (Wien, 1852). The Bodl. Libr.\npossesses several MS. copies of this commentary (Nos. 1260, 1264, 2,\nand 1266).\n\nMunk, S., added to his French translation of the Moreh numerous\ncritical and explanatory notes.\n\nS. Sachs (Ha-te\u1e25iyah, Berlin, 1850, p. 8) explains various passages of\nthe Moreh, with a view of discovering the names of those who are\nattacked by Maimonides without being named.\n\nScheyer, S., added critical and explanatory notes to his German\ntranslation of the Moreh, Part 3, and to the Hebrew version of \u1e24arizi,\nPart 1. He also wrote Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, an\nIntroduction to the Moreh (Frankf.-a.-M., 1845).\n\nShem \u1e6dob Ibn Palquera\u2019s Moreh ha-moreh consists of 3 parts: (1) a\nphilosophical explanation of the Moreh, (2) a description of the\ncontents of the chapters of the Moreh, Part I, i.-lvii. (Presburg,\n1827); (3) Corrections of Ibn Tibbon\u2019s version. He wrote the book for\nhimself, that in old age he might have a means of refreshing his\nmemory. The study of science and philosophy is to be recommended, but\nonly to those who have had a good training in \u201cthe fear of sin.\u201d Ibn\nRoshd (Averroes) is frequently quoted, and referred to as he-\u1e25akam\nha-nizkar (the philosopher mentioned above).\n\nShem-\u1e6dob ben Joseph ben Shem-\u1e6dob had the commentary of Efodi before\nhim, which he seems to have quoted frequently verbatim without naming\nhim. In the preface he dwells on the merits of the Moreh as the just\nmediator between religion and philosophy. The commentary of Shem-\u1e6dob is\nprofuse, and includes almost a paraphrase of the text. He apologises in\nconclusion for having written many superfluous notes and added\nexplanation where no explanation was required; his excuse is that he\ndid not only intend to write a commentary (biur) but also a work\ncomplete in itself (\u1e25ibbur). He often calls the reader\u2019s attention to\nthings which are plain and clear.\n\nShem-\u1e6dob. Ibn Shem-\u1e6dob, in Sefer ha-emunot (Ferrara, 1556), criticises\nsome of the various theories discussed in the Moreh, and rejects them\nas heretic. His objections were examined by Moses Al-ashkar, and\nanswered in Hasagot \u02bbal mah she-katab Rabbi Shem-\u1e6dob neged ha-Rambam\n(Ferrara, 1556).\n\nSolomon b. Jehudah ha-nasi wrote in Germany Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic\ncommentary on the Moreh, and dedicated it to his pupil Jacob b. Samuel\n(MS. Bet-ha-midrash, London).\n\nTabrizi. The twenty-five Propositions forming the introduction to Part\n2, have been fully explained by Mohammed Abu-becr ben Mohammed\nal-tabrizi. His Arabic explanations have been translated by Isaac b.\nNathan of Majorca into Hebrew (Ferrara, 1556). At the end the following\neulogy is added:\u2014The author of these Propositions is the chief whose\nsceptre is \u201cwisdom\u201d and whose throne is \u201cunderstanding,\u201d the Israelite\nprince, that has benefited his nation and all those who love God, etc.:\nMoses b. Maimon b. Ebed-elohim, the Israelite.... May God lead us to\nthe truth. Amen!\n\nTishbi. In MS. Bodl. 2279, 1, there are some marginal notes on Part\nIII. which are signed Tishbi (Neub. Cat.).\n\nYa\u1e25ya Ibn Suleiman wrote in Arabic a Commentary on the Guide for the\nPerplexed. A fragment is contained in the Berlin MS. Or. Qu., 554, 2\n(Steinschneider, Cat. No. 92).\n\nZera\u1e25yah b. Isaac ha-Levi. Commentary on the Moreh, I., i.\u2013lxxi., and\nsome other portions of the work. (See Maskir, 1861, p. 125).\n\nMS. Bodl. 2360, 8, contains a letter of Jehudah b. Shelomoh on some\npassages of the Moreh, and Zera\u1e25yah\u2019s reply.\n\n\n\nAnonymous Commentaries.\u2014The MS. Brit. Mus. 1423 contains marginal and\ninterlineary notes in Arabic. No author or date is given, nor is any\nother commentary referred to in the notes. The explanations given are\nmostly preceded by a question, and introduced by the phrase, \u201cthe\nanswer is,\u201d in the same style as is employed in the Hebrew-Arabic\nMidrash, MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 2213. The Midrashic character is prominent\nin the notes. Thus the verse \u201cOpen, ye gates, that the righteous nation\nwhich keepeth the truth may enter in,\u201d is explained as meaning: Open,\nye gates of wisdom, that human understanding that perceiveth truth may\nenter. The notes are numerous, especially in the first part, explaining\nalmost every word; e.g., on \u201cRabbi\u201d: Why does Maimonides employ this\ntitle before the name of his pupil? The answer is: either the word is\nnot to be taken literally (\u201cmaster\u201d), but as a mere compliment, or it\nhas been added by later copyists. Of a similar style seem to be the\nArabic notes in the Berlin MS. Or. Oct. 258, 2, 8, 10. (Cat.\nSteinschneider, No. 108.)\u2014Anonymous marginal notes are met with almost\nin every MS. of the Moreh; e.g., Brit. Mus. Harl. 5525; Add. 14,763,\n14,764; Bodl. 1264, 1; 2282, 10; 2423, 3; Munich MS., 239, 6.\n\nThe explanation of passages from the Pentateuch contained in the Moreh\nhave been collected by D. Ottensosser, and given as an appendix\n(Moreh-derek) to Derek-selulah (Pent. with Comm. etc., Furth, 1824).\n\nIV. Controversies.\u2014The seemingly new ideas put forth by Maimonides in\nthe Moreh and in the first section of his Mishneh-torah (Sefer\nha-madda\u02bb) soon produced a lively controversy as regards the merits of\nMaimonides\u2019 theories. It was most perplexing to pious Talmudists to\nlearn how Maimonides explained the anthropomorphisms employed in the\nBible, the Midrashim and the Talmud, what he thought about the future\nstate of our soul, and that he considered the study of philosophy as\nthe highest degree of Divine worship, surpassing even the study of the\nLaw and the practice of its precepts. The objections and attacks of\nDaniel of Damascus were easily silenced by a \u1e25erem (excommunication)\npronounced against him by the Rosh ha-golah Rabbi David. Stronger was\nthe opposition that had its centre in Montpellier. Rabbi Solomon ben\nAbraham noticed with regret in his own community the fruit of the\ntheories of Maimonides in the neglect of the study of the Law and of\nthe practice of the Divine precepts. It happened to Moses Maimonides\nwhat in modern times happened to Moses Mendelssohn. Many so-called\ndisciples and followers of the great master misunderstood or\nmisinterpreted his teaching in support of their dereliction of Jewish\nlaw and Jewish practice, and thus brought disrepute on him in the eyes\nof their opponents. Thus it came that Rabbi Solomon and his disciples\nturned their wrath against the writings of Maimonides instead of\ncombating the arguments of the pseudo-Maimonists. The latter even\naccused Solomon of having denounced the Moreh and the Sefer ha-madda\u02bb\nto the Dominicans, who condemned these writings to the flames; when\nsubsequently copies of the Talmud were burnt, and some of the followers\nof the Rabbi of Montpellier were subjected to cruel tortures, the\nMaimonists saw in this event a just punishment for offending\nMaimonides. (Letters of Hillel of Verona, \u1e24emdah Genuzah, ed. H.\nEdelmann, p. 18 sqq.).\n\nMeir b. Todros ha-levi Abulafia wrote already during the lifetime of\nMaimonides to the wise men in Lunel about the heretic doctrines he\ndiscovered in the works of Maimonides. Ahron b. Meshullam and Shesheth\nBenvenisti defended Maimonides. About 1232 a correspondence opened\nbetween the Maimonists and the Anti-Maimonists (Gr\u00e4tz, Gesch. d. J.\nvii. note I). The Grammarian David Kim\u1e25i wrote in defence of Maimonides\nthree letters to Jehudah Alfachar, who answered each of them in the\nsense of Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier. Abraham b. \u1e24isdai and Samuel b.\nAbraham Saportas on the side of the Maimonists, took part in the\ncontroversy. Meshullam b. Kalonymos b. Todros of Narbonne begged\nAlfachar to treat Kim\u1e25i with more consideration, whereupon Alfachar\nresolved to withdraw from the controversy. Na\u1e25manides, though more on\nthe side of Rabbi Solomon, wrote two letters of a conciliatory\ncharacter, advising moderation on both sides. Representatives of the\ncongregations of Saragossa, Huesca, Monzon, Kalatajud, and Lerida\nsigned declarations against R. Solomon. A \u1e25erem was proclaimed from\nLunel and Narbonne against the Anti-Maimonists. The son of Maimonides,\nAbraham, wrote a pamphlet Mil\u1e25amot adonai, in defence of the writings\nof his father. The controversy raised about fifty years later by Abba\nMari Don Astruc and R. Solomon ben-Aderet of Barcelona, concerned the\nMoreh less directly. The question was of a more general character: Is\nthe study of philosophy dangerous to the religious belief of young\nstudents? The letters written in this controversy are contained in\nMin\u1e25at-\u1e33enaot by Abba Mari Don Astruc (Presburg, 1838), and Kitab\nalrasail of Meir Abulafia ed. J. Brill (Paris, 1871). Yedaya Bedrasi\ntook part in this controversy, and wrote Ketab hitna\u1e93lut in defence of\nthe study of philosophy (Teshubot Rashba, Hanau, 1610, p. 111 b.). The\nwhole controversy ended in the victory of the Moreh and the other\nwritings of Maimonides. Stray remarks are found in various works, some\nin praise and some in condemnation of Maimonides. A few instances may\nsuffice. Rabbi Jacob Emden in his Mitpa\u1e25at-sefarim (Lemberg, 1870, p.\n56) believes that parts of the Moreh are spurious; he even doubts\nwhether any portion of it is the work of \u201cMaimonides, the author of the\nMishneh-torah, who was not capable of writing such heretic doctrines.\u201d\nS. D. Luzzato regards Maimonides with great reverence, but this does\nnot prevent him from severely criticising his philosophical theories\n(Letters to S. Rappoport, No. 79, 83, 266, Iggeroth Shedal ed. E.\nGraber, Przemys\u2019l, 1882), and from expressing his conviction that the\nsaying \u201cFrom Moses to Moses none rose like Moses,\u201d was as untrue as\nthat suggested by Rappoport, \u201cFrom Abraham to Abraham (Ibn-Ezra) none\nrose like Abraham.\u201d Rabbi Hirsch Chayyuth in Darke-Mosheh (Zolkiew,\n1840) examines the attacks made upon the writings of Maimonides, and\ntries to refute them, and to show that they can be reconciled with the\nteaching of the Talmud.\n\nThe Bodl. MS. 2240, 3a, contains a document signed by Josselman and\nother Rabbis, declaring that they accept the teaching of Maimonides as\ncorrect, with the exception of his theory about angels and sacrifices.\n\nNumerous poems were written, both in admiration and in condemnation of\nthe Moreh. Most of them precede or follow the Moreh in the printed\neditions and in the various MS. copies of the work. A few have been\nedited in Dibre-\u1e25akamim, pp. 75 and 86; in the Literaturblatt d. Or. I.\n379, II. 26\u201327, IV. 748, and Leket-shoshannim by Dr. Gr\u00e4tz. In the\nSammelband of the Mekize Nirdamim (1885) a collection of 69 of these\npoems is contained, edited and explained by Prof. Dr. A. Berliner. In\nimitation of the Moreh and with a view of displacing Maimonides\u2019 work,\nthe Karaite Ahron II. b. Eliah wrote a philosophical treatise,\nE\u1e93-\u1e25ayyim (Ed. F. Delitzsch. Leipzig, 1841).\n\nOf the works that discuss the whole or part of the philosophical system\nof the Moreh the following are noteworthy:\u2014\n\n\n\nBacher, W. Die Bibilexegese Moses Maim\u00fbni\u2019s, in the Jahresbericht der\nLandes Rabbinerschule zu Buda-Pest. 1896.\n\nEisler, M. Vorlesungen \u00fcber die j\u00fcdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters.\nAbtheil. II., Moses Maimonides (Wien, 1870).\n\nGeiger, A. Das Judenthum u. seine Geschichte (Breslau, 1865), Zehnte\nVorlesung: Aben Ezra u. Maimonides.\n\nGr\u00e4tz, H. Geschichte d. Juden, VI. p. 363 sqq.\n\nJoel, M. Religionsphilosophie des Moses b. Maimon (Breslau, 1859).\n\nJoel, M. Albertus Magnus u. sein Verh\u00e4ltniss zu Maimonides (Breslau,\n1863).\n\nKaufmann, D. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, VII. Gotha, 1874.\n\nPhilippsohn, L. Die Philosophie des Maimonides. Predigt und\nSchul-Magazin, I. xviii. (Magdeburg, 1834.)\n\nRosin, D. Die Ethik d. Maimonides (Breslau, 1876).\n\nRubin, S. Spinoza u. Maimonides, ein Psychologisch-Philosophisches\nAntitheton (Wien, 1868).\n\nScheyer, S. Das psychologische System des Maimonides. Frankfort-a.-M.,\n1845.\n\nWeiss, T. H. Beth-Talmud, I. x. p. 289.\n\nDavid Yellin and Israel Abrahams, Maimonides.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED\n\n\nIt is the object of this work \u201cto afford a guide for the perplexed,\u201d\ni.e. \u201cto thinkers whose studies have brought them into collision with\nreligion\u201d (p. 9), \u201cwho have studied philosophy and have acquired sound\nknowledge, and who, while firm in religious matters, are perplexed and\nbewildered on account of the ambiguous and figurative expressions\nemployed in the holy writings\u201d (p. 5). Joseph, the son of Jehudah Ibn\nAknin, a disciple of Maimonides, is addressed by his teacher as an\nexample of this kind of students. It was \u201cfor him and for those like\nhim\u201d that the treatise was composed, and to him this work is inscribed\nin the dedicatory letter with which the Introduction begins.\nMaimonides, having discovered that his disciple was sufficiently\nadvanced for an exposition of the esoteric ideas in the books of the\nProphets, commenced to give him such expositions \u201cby way of hints.\u201d His\ndisciple then begged him to give him further explanations, to treat of\nmetaphysical themes, and to expound the system and the method of the\nKal\u0101m, or Mohammedan Theology. [1] In compliance with this request,\nMaimonides composed the Guide for the Perplexed. The reader has,\ntherefore, to expect that the subjects mentioned in the disciple\u2019s\nrequest indicate the design and arrangement of the present work, and\nthat the Guide consists of the following parts:\u20141. An exposition of the\nesoteric ideas (sodot) in the books of the Prophets. 2. A treatment of\ncertain metaphysical problems. 3. An examination of the system and\nmethod of the Kal\u0101m. This, in fact, is a correct account of the\ncontents of the book; but in the second part of the Introduction, in\nwhich the theme of this work is defined, the author mentions only the\nfirst-named subject. He observes: \u201cMy primary object is to explain\ncertain terms occurring in the prophetic book. Of these some are\nhomonymous, some figurative, and some hybrid terms.\u201d \u201cThis work has\nalso a second object. It is designed to explain certain obscure figures\nwhich occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterised as\nbeing figures\u201d (p. 2). Yet from this observation it must not be\ninferred that Maimonides abandoned his original purpose; for he\nexamines the Kal\u0101m in the last chapters of the First Part (ch.\nlxx.\u2013lxxvi.), and treats of certain metaphysical themes in the\nbeginning of the Second Part (Introd. and ch. i.\u2013xxv.). But in the\npassage quoted above he confines himself to a delineation of the main\nobject of this treatise, and advisedly leaves unmentioned the other two\nsubjects, which, however important they may be, are here of subordinate\ninterest. Nor did he consider it necessary to expatiate on these\nsubjects; he only wrote for the student, for whom a mere reference to\nworks on philosophy and science was sufficient. We therefore meet now\nand then with such phrases as the following: \u201cThis is fully discussed\nin works on metaphysics.\u201d By references of this kind the author may\nhave intended to create a taste for the study of philosophical works.\nBut our observation only holds good with regard to the Aristotelian\nphilosophy. The writings of the Mutakallemim are never commended by\nhim; he states their opinions, and tells his disciple that he would not\nfind any additional argument, even if he were to read all their\nvoluminous works (p. 133). Maimonides was a zealous disciple of\nAristotle, although the theory of the Kal\u0101m might seem to have been\nmore congenial to Jewish thought and belief. The Kal\u0101m upheld the\ntheory of God\u2019s Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity, together with the\ncreatio ex nihilo. Maimonides nevertheless opposed the Kal\u0101m, and,\nanticipating the question, why preference should be given to the system\nof Aristotle, which included the theory of the Eternity of the\nUniverse, a theory contrary to the fundamental teaching of the\nScriptures, he exposed the weakness of the Kal\u0101m and its fallacies.\n\nThe exposition of Scriptural texts is divided by the author into two\nparts; the first part treats of homonymous, figurative, and hybrid\nterms, [2] employed in reference to God; the second part relates to\nBiblical figures and allegories. These two parts do not closely follow\neach other; they are separated by the examination of the Kal\u0101m, and the\ndiscussion of metaphysical problems. It seems that the author adopted\nthis arrangement for the following reason: first of all, he intended to\nestablish the fact that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply\ncorporeality, and that the Divine Being of whom the Bible speaks could\ntherefore be regarded as identical with the Primal Cause of the\nphilosophers. Having established this principle, he discusses from a\npurely metaphysical point of view the properties of the Primal Cause\nand its relation to the universe. A solid foundation is thus\nestablished for the esoteric exposition of Scriptural passages. Before\ndiscussing metaphysical problems, which he treats in accordance with\nAristotelian philosophy, he disposes of the Kal\u0101m, and demonstrates\nthat its arguments are illogical and illusory.\n\nThe \u201cGuide for the Perplexed\u201d contains, therefore, an Introduction and\nthe following four parts:\u20141. On homonymous, figurative, and hybrid\nterms. 2. On the Supreme Being and His relation to the universe,\naccording to the Kal\u0101m. 3. On the Primal Cause and its relation to the\nuniverse, according to the philosophers. 4. Esoteric exposition of some\nportions of the Bible (sodot): a, Ma\u02bbaseh bereshith, or the history of\nthe Creation (Genesis, ch. i.\u2013iv.); b, on Prophecy; c, Ma\u02bbaseh\nmercabhah, or the description of the divine chariot (Ezekiel, ch. i.).\n\nAccording to this plan, the work ends with the seventh chapter of the\nThird Part. The chapters which follow may be considered as an appendix;\nthey treat of the following theological themes: the Existence of Evil,\nOmniscience and Providence, Temptations, Design in Nature, in the Law,\nand in the Biblical Narratives, and finally the true Worship of God.\n\nIn the Introduction to the \u201cGuide,\u201d Maimonides (1) describes the object\nof the work and the method he has followed; (2) treats of similes; (3)\ngives \u201cdirections for the study of the work\u201d; and (4) discusses the\nusual causes of inconsistencies in authors.\n\n1 (pp. 2\u20133). Inquiring into the root of the evil which the Guide was\nintended to remove, viz., the conflict between science and religion,\nthe author perceived that in most cases it originated in a\nmisinterpretation of the anthropomorphisms in Holy Writ. The main\ndifficulty is found in the ambiguity of the words employed by the\nprophets when speaking of the Divine Being; the question arises whether\nthey are applied to the Deity and to other things in one and the same\nsense or equivocally; in the latter case the author distinguishes\nbetween homonyms pure and simple, figures, and hybrid terms. In order\nto show that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply the\ncorporeality of the Deity, he seeks in each instance to demonstrate\nthat the expression under examination is a perfect homonym denoting\nthings which are totally distinct from each other, and whenever such a\ndemonstration is impossible, he assumes that the expression is a hybrid\nterm, that is, being employed in one instance figuratively and in\nanother homonymously. His explanation of \u201cform\u201d (\u1e93elem) may serve as an\nillustration. According to his opinion, it invariably denotes \u201cform\u201d in\nthe philosophical acceptation of the term, viz., the complex of the\nessential properties of a thing. But to obviate objections he proposes\nan alternative view, to take \u1e93elem as a hybrid term that may be\nexplained as a class noun denoting only things of the same class, or as\na homonym employed for totally different things, viz., \u201cform\u201d in the\nphilosophical sense, and \u201cform\u201d in the ordinary meaning of the word.\nMaimonides seems to have refrained from explaining anthropomorphisms as\nfigurative expressions, lest by such interpretation he might implicitly\nadmit the existence of a certain relation and comparison between the\nCreator and His creatures.\n\nJewish philosophers before Maimonides enunciated and demonstrated the\nUnity and the Incorporeality of the Divine Being, and interpreted\nScriptural metaphors on the principle that \u201cthe Law speaks in the\nlanguage of man\u201d; but our author adopted a new and altogether original\nmethod. The Commentators, when treating of anthropomorphisms, generally\ncontented themselves with the statement that the term under\nconsideration must not be taken in its literal sense, or they\nparaphrased the passage in expressions which implied a lesser degree of\ncorporeality. The Talmud, the Midrashim, and the Targumim abound in\nparaphrases of this kind. Saadiah in \u201cEmunot ve-de\u02bbot,\u201d Bahya in his\n\u201c\u1e24obot ha-lebabot,\u201d and Jehudah ha-levi in the \u201cCusari,\u201d insist on the\nnecessity and the appropriateness of such interpretations. Saadiah\nenumerates ten terms which primarily denote organs of the human body,\nand are figuratively applied to God. To establish this point of view he\ncites numerous instances in which the terms in question are used in a\nfigurative sense without being applied to God. Saadiah further shows\nthat the Divine attributes are either qualifications of such of God\u2019s\nactions as are perceived by man, or they imply a negation. The\ncorrectness of this method was held to be so obvious that some authors\nfound it necessary to apologize to the reader for introducing such\nwell-known topics. From R. Abraham ben David\u2019s strictures on the Yad\nha\u1e25aza\u1e33ah it is, however, evident that in the days of Maimonides\npersons were not wanting who defended the literal interpretation of\ncertain anthropomorphisms. Maimonides, therefore, did not content\nhimself with the vague and general rule, \u201cThe Law speaks in the\nlanguage of man,\u201d but sought carefully to define the meaning of each\nterm when applied to God, and to identify it with some transcendental\nand metaphysical term. In pursuing this course he is sometimes forced\nto venture upon an interpretation which is much too far-fetched to\ncommend itself even to the supposed philosophical reader. In such\ninstances he generally adds a simple and plain explanation, and leaves\nit to the option of the reader to choose the one which appears to him\npreferable. The enumeration of the different meanings of a word is\noften, from a philological point of view, incomplete; he introduces\nonly such significations as serve his object. When treating of an\nimperfect homonym, the several significations of which are derived from\none primary signification, he apparently follows a certain system which\nhe does not employ in the interpretation of perfect homonyms. The\nhomonymity of the term is not proved; the author confines himself to\nthe remark, \u201cIt is employed homonymously,\u201d even when the various\nmeanings of a word might easily be traced to a common source.\n\n2 (pag. 4\u20138). In addition to the explanation of homonyms Maimonides\nundertakes to interpret similes and allegories. At first it had been\nhis intention to write two distinct works\u2014Sefer ha-nebuah, \u201cA Book on\nProphecy,\u201d and Sefer ha-shevaah, \u201cA Book of Reconciliation.\u201d In the\nformer work he had intended to explain difficult passages of the Bible,\nand in the latter to expound such passages in the Midrash and the\nTalmud as seemed to be in conflict with common sense. With respect to\nthe \u201cBook of Reconciliation,\u201d he abandoned his plan, because he\napprehended that neither the learned nor the unlearned would profit by\nit: the one would find it superfluous, the other tedious. The subject\nof the \u201cBook on Prophecy\u201d is treated in the present work, and also\nstrange passages that occasionally occur in the Talmud and the Midrash\nare explained.\n\nThe treatment of the simile must vary according as the simile is\ncompound or simple. In the first case, each part represents a separate\nidea and demands a separate interpretation; in the other case, only one\nidea is represented, and it is not necessary to assign to each part a\nseparate metaphorical meaning. This division the author illustrates by\nciting the dream of Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 12 sqq.), and the description\nof the adulteress (Prov. vii. 6 sqq.). He gives no rule by which it\nmight be ascertained to which of the two categories a simile belongs,\nand, like other Commentators, he seems to treat as essential those\ndetails of a simile for which he can offer an adequate interpretation.\nAs a general principle, he warns against the confusion and the errors\nwhich arise when an attempt is made to expound every single detail of a\nsimile. His own explanations are not intended to be exhaustive; on the\ncontrary, they are to consist of brief allusions to the idea\nrepresented by the simile, of mere suggestions, which the reader is\nexpected to develop and to complete. The author thus aspires to follow\nin the wake of the Creator, whose works can only be understood after a\nlong and persevering study. Yet it is possible that he derived his\npreference for a reserved and mysterious style from the example of\nancient philosophers, who discussed metaphysical problems in figurative\nand enigmatic language. Like Ibn Ezra, who frequently concludes his\nexposition of a Biblical passage with the phrase, \u201cHere a profound idea\n(sod) is hidden,\u201d Maimonides somewhat mysteriously remarks at the end\nof different chapters, \u201cNote this,\u201d \u201cConsider it well.\u201d In such phrases\nsome Commentators fancied that they found references to metaphysical\ntheories which the author was not willing fully to discuss. Whether\nthis was the case or not, in having recourse to that method he was not,\nas some have suggested, actuated by fear of being charged with heresy.\nHe expresses his opinion on the principal theological questions without\nreserve, and does not dread the searching inquiries of opponents; for\nhe boldly announces that their displeasure would not deter him from\nteaching the truth and guiding those who are able and willing to follow\nhim, however few these might be. When, however, we examine the work\nitself, we are at a loss to discover to which parts the professed\nenigmatic method was applied. His theories concerning the Deity, the\nDivine attributes, angels, creatio ex nihilo, prophecy, and other\nsubjects, are treated as fully as might be expected. It is true that a\ncloud of mysterious phrases enshrouds the interpretation of Ma\u02bbaseh\nbereshit (Gen. i.\u2013iii.) and Ma\u02bbaseh mercabah (Ez. i.). But the\nsignificant words occurring in these portions are explained in the\nFirst Part of this work, and a full exposition is found in the Second\nand Third Parts. Nevertheless the statement that the exposition was\nnever intended to be explicit occurs over and over again. The treatment\nof the first three chapters of Genesis concludes thus: \u201cThese remarks,\ntogether with what we have already observed on the subject, and what we\nmay have to add, must suffice both for the object and for the reader we\nhave in view\u201d (II. xxx.). In like manner, he declares, after the\nexplanation of the first chapter of Ezekiel: \u201cI have given you here as\nmany suggestions as may be of service to you, if you will give them a\nfurther development.... Do not expect to hear from me anything more on\nthis subject, for I have, though with some hesitation, gone as far in\nmy explanation as I possibly could go\u201d (III. vii.).\n\n3 (pag. 8\u20139). In the next paragraph, headed, \u201cDirections for the Study\nof this Work,\u201d he implores the reader not to be hasty with his\ncriticism, and to bear in mind that every sentence, indeed every word,\nhad been fully considered before it was written down. Yet it might\neasily happen that the reader could not reconcile his own view with\nthat of the author, and in such a case he is asked to ignore the\ndisapproved chapter or section altogether. Such disapproval Maimonides\nattributes to a mere misconception on the part of the reader, a fate\nwhich awaits every work composed in a mystical style. In adopting this\npeculiar style, he intended to reduce to a minimum the violation of the\nrule laid down in the Mishnah (\u1e24agigah ii. 1), that metaphysics should\nnot be taught publicly. The violation of this rule he justifies by\nciting the following two Mishnaic maxims: \u201cIt is time to do something\nin honour of the Lord\u201d (Berakot ix. 5), and \u201cLet all thy acts be guided\nby pure intentions\u201d (Abot ii. 17). Maimonides increased the\nmysteriousness of the treatise, by expressing his wish that the reader\nshould abstain from expounding the work, lest he might spread in the\nname of the author opinions which the latter never held. But it does\nnot occur to him that the views he enunciates might in themselves be\nerroneous. He is positive that his own theory is unexceptionally\ncorrect, that his esoteric interpretations of Scriptural texts are\nsound, and that those who differed from him\u2014viz., the Mutakallemim on\nthe one hand, and the unphilosophical Rabbis on the other\u2014are\nindefensibly wrong. In this respect other Jewish philosophers\u2014e.g.\nSaadiah and Ba\u1e25ya\u2014were far less positive; they were conscious of their\nown fallibility, and invited the reader to make such corrections as\nmight appear needful. Owing to this strong self-reliance of Maimonides,\nit is not to be expected that opponents would receive a fair and\nimpartial judgment at his hands.\n\n4 (pag. 9\u201311). The same self-reliance is noticeable in the next and\nconcluding paragraph of the Introduction. Here he treats of the\ncontradictions which are to be found in literary works, and he divides\nthem with regard to their origin into seven classes. The first four\nclasses comprise the apparent contradictions, which can be traced back\nto the employment of elliptical speech; the other three classes\ncomprise the real contradictions, and are due to carelessness and\noversight, or they are intended to serve some special purpose. The\nScriptures, the Talmud, and the Midrash abound in instances of apparent\ncontradictions; later works contain real contradictions, which escaped\nthe notice of the writers. In the present treatise, however, there\noccur only such contradictions as are the result of intention and\ndesign.\n\n\nPART I.\n\nThe homonymous expressions which are discussed in the First Part\ninclude\u2014(1) nouns and verbs used in reference to God, ch. i. to ch.\nxlix.; (2) attributes of the Deity, ch. l. to lx.; (3) expressions\ncommonly regarded as names of God, ch. lxi. to lxx. In the first\nsection the following groups can be distinguished\u2014(a) expressions which\ndenote form and figure, ch. i. to ch. vi.; (b) space or relations of\nspace, ch. viii. to ch. xxv.; (c) parts of the animal body and their\nfunctions, ch. xxviii. to ch. xlix. Each of these groups includes\nchapters not connected with the main subject, but which serve as a help\nfor the better understanding of previous or succeeding interpretations.\nEvery word selected for discussion bears upon some Scriptural text\nwhich, according to the opinion of the author, has been misinterpreted.\nBut such phrases as \u201cthe mouth of the Lord,\u201d and \u201cthe hand of the\nLord,\u201d are not introduced, because their figurative meaning is too\nobvious to be misunderstood.\n\nThe lengthy digressions which are here and there interposed appear like\noutbursts of feeling and passion which the author could not repress.\nYet they are \u201cwords fitly spoken in the right place\u201d; for they\ngradually unfold the author\u2019s theory, and acquaint the reader with\nthose general principles on which he founds the interpretations in the\nsucceeding chapters. Moral reflections are of frequent occurrence, and\ndemonstrate the intimate connexion between a virtuous life and the\nattainment of higher knowledge, in accordance with the maxim current\nlong before Maimonides, and expressed in the Biblical words, \u201cThe fear\nof the Lord is the beginning of wisdom\u201d (Ps. cxi. 10). No opportunity\nis lost to inculcate this lesson, be it in a passing remark or in an\nelaborate essay.\n\nThe discussion of the term \u201c\u1e93elem\u201d (ch. i.) afforded the first occasion\nfor reflections of this kind. Man, \u201cthe image of God,\u201d is defined as a\nliving and rational being, as though the moral faculties of man were\nnot an essential element of his existence, and his power to discern\nbetween good and evil were the result of the first sin. According to\nMaimonides, the moral faculty would, in fact, not have been required,\nif man had remained a purely rational being. It is only through the\nsenses that \u201cthe knowledge of good and evil\u201d has become indispensable.\nThe narrative of Adam\u2019s fall is, according to Maimonides, an allegory\nrepresenting the relation which exists between sensation, moral\nfaculty, and intellect. In this early part (ch. ii.), however, the\nauthor does not yet mention this theory; on the contrary, every\nallusion to it is for the present studiously avoided, its full\nexposition being reserved for the Second Part.\n\nThe treatment of \u1e25azah \u201che beheld\u201d (ch. vi.), is followed by the advice\nthat the student should not approach metaphysics otherwise than after a\nsound and thorough preparation, because a rash attempt to solve\nabstruse problems brings nothing but injury upon the inexperienced\ninvestigator. The author points to the \u201cnobles of the children of\nIsrael\u201d (Exod. xxiv. 11), who, according to his interpretation, fell\ninto this error, and received their deserved punishment. He gives\nadditional force to these exhortations by citing a dictum of Aristotle\nto the same effect. In a like way he refers to the allegorical use of\ncertain terms by Plato (ch. xvii.) in support of his interpretation of\n\u201c\u1e93ur\u201d (lit., \u201crock\u201d) as denoting \u201cPrimal Cause.\u201d\n\nThe theory that nothing but a sound moral and intellectual training\nwould entitle a student to engage in metaphysical speculations is again\ndiscussed in the digression which precedes the third group of homonyms\n(xxxi.\u2013xxxvi.). Man\u2019s intellectual faculties, he argues, have this in\ncommon with his physical forces, that their sphere of action is\nlimited, and they become inefficient whenever they are overstrained.\nThis happens when a student approaches metaphysics without due\npreparation. Maimonides goes on to argue that the non-success of\nmetaphysical studies is attributable to the following causes: the\ntranscendental character of this discipline, the imperfect state of the\nstudent\u2019s knowledge, the persistent efforts which have to be made even\nin the preliminary studies, and finally the waste of energy and time\nowing to the physical demands of man. For these reasons the majority of\npersons are debarred from pursuing the study of metaphysics.\nNevertheless, there are certain metaphysical truths which have to be\ncommunicated to all men, e.g., that God is One, and that He is\nincorporeal; for to assume that God is corporeal, or that He has any\nproperties, or to ascribe to Him any attributes, is a sin bordering on\nidolatry.\n\nAnother digression occurs as an appendix to the second group of\nhomonyms (ch. xxvi.\u2013xxvii.). Maimonides found that only a limited\nnumber of terms are applied to God in a figurative sense; and again,\nthat in the \u201cTargum\u201d of Onkelos some of the figures are paraphrased,\nwhile other figures received a literal rendering. He therefore seeks to\ndiscover the principle which was applied both in the Sacred Text and in\nthe translation, and he found it in the Talmudical dictum, \u201cThe Law\nspeaketh the language of man.\u201d For this reason all figures are eschewed\nwhich, in their literal sense, would appear to the multitude as\nimplying debasement or a blemish. Onkelos, who rigorously guards\nhimself against using any term that might suggest corporification,\ngives a literal rendering of figurative terms when there is no cause\nfor entertaining such an apprehension. Maimonides illustrates this rule\nby the mode in which Onkelos renders \u201cyarad\u201d (\u201che went down,\u201d), when\nused in reference to God. It is generally paraphrased, but in one\nexceptional instance, occurring in Jacob\u2019s \u201cvisions of the night\u201d (Gen.\nxlvi. 4), it is translated literally; in this instance the literal\nrendering does not lead to corporification; because visions and dreams\nwere generally regarded as mental operations, devoid of objective\nreality. Simple and clear as this explanation may be, we do not\nconsider that it really explains the method of Onkelos. On the\ncontrary, the translator paraphrased anthropomorphic terms, even when\nhe found them in passages relating to dreams or visions; and indeed it\nis doubtful whether Maimonides could produce a single instance in\nfavour of his view. He was equally unsuccessful in his explanation of\n\u201c\u1e25azah\u201d \u201che saw\u201d (ch. xlviii.). He says that when the object of the\nvision was derogatory, it was not brought into direct relation with the\nDeity; in such instances the verb is paraphrased, while in other\ninstances the rendering is literal. Although Maimonides grants that the\nforce of this observation is weakened by three exceptions, he does not\ndoubt its correctness.\n\nThe next Section (ch. l. to ch. lix.) \u201cOn the Divine Attributes\u201d begins\nwith the explanation that \u201cfaith\u201d consists in thought, not in mere\nutterance; in conviction, not in mere profession. This explanation\nforms the basis for the subsequent discussion. The several arguments\nadvanced by Maimonides against the employment of attributes are\nintended to show that those who assume the real existence of Divine\nattributes may possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity\nand the Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it. A\ndemonstration of this fact would be needless, if the Attributists had\nnot put forth their false theses and defended them with the utmost\ntenacity, though with the most absurd arguments.\n\nAfter this explanation the author proceeds to discuss the impropriety\nof assigning attributes to God. The Attributists admit that God is the\nPrimal Cause, One, incorporeal, free from emotion and privation, and\nthat He is not comparable to any of His creatures. Maimonides therefore\ncontends that any attributes which, either directly or indirectly, are\nin contradiction to this creed, should not be applied to God. By this\nrule he rejects four classes of attributes: viz., those which include a\ndefinition, a partial definition, a quality, or a relation.\n\nThe definition of a thing includes its efficient cause; and since God\nis the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or described by a partial\ndefinition. A quality, whether psychical, physical, emotional, or\nquantitative, is always regarded as something distinct from its\nsubstratum; a thing which possesses any quality, consists, therefore,\nof that quality and a substratum, and should not be called one. All\nrelations of time and space imply corporeality; all relations between\ntwo objects are, to a certain degree, a comparison between these two\nobjects. To employ any of these attributes in reference to God would be\nas much as to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is not\nOne, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to His creatures.\n\nThere is only one class of attributes to which Maimonides makes no\nobjection, viz. such as describe actions, and to this class belong all\nthe Divine attributes which occur in the Scriptures. The \u201cThirteen\nAttributes\u201d (shelosh esreh middot, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7) serve as an\nillustration. They were communicated to Moses when he, as the chief of\nthe Israelites, wished to know the way in which God governs the\nuniverse, in order that he himself in ruling the nation might follow\nit, and thereby promote their real well-being.\n\nOn the whole, the opponents of Maimonides admit the correctness of this\ntheory. Only a small number of attributes are the subject of dispute.\nThe Scriptures unquestionably ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power,\nWisdom, Unity, Eternity, and Will. The Attributists regard these as\nproperties distinct from, but co-existing with, the Essence of God.\nWith great acumen, and with equally great acerbity, Maimonides shows\nthat their theory is irreconcilable with their belief in the Unity and\nthe Incorporeality of God. He points out three different ways of\ninterpreting these attributes:\u20141. They may be regarded as descriptive\nof the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such\nproperties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result of the\nwill, the power, and the wisdom of a living being. 2. The terms\n\u201cexisting,\u201d \u201cone,\u201d \u201cwise,\u201d etc., are applied to God and to His\ncreatures homonymously; as attributes of God they coincide with His\nEssence; as attributes of anything beside God they are distinct from\nthe essence of the thing. 3. These terms do not describe a positive\nquality, but express a negation of its opposite. This third\ninterpretation appears to have been preferred by the author; he\ndiscusses it more fully than the two others. He observes that the\nknowledge of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative\ncharacter, and he shows by simple and appropriate examples that an\napproximate knowledge of a thing can be attained by mere negations,\nthat such knowledge increases with the number of these negations, and\nthat an error in positive assertions is more injurious than an error in\nnegative assertions. In describing the evils which arise from the\napplication of positive attributes to God, he unsparingly censures the\nhymnologists, because he found them profuse in attributing positive\nepithets to the Deity. On the basis of his own theory he could easily\nhave interpreted these epithets in the same way as he explains the\nScriptural attributes of God. His severity may, however, be accounted\nfor by the fact that the frequent recurrence of positive attributes in\nthe literary composition of the Jews was the cause that the Mohammedans\ncharged the Jews with entertaining false notions of the Deity.\n\nThe inquiry into the attributes is followed by a treatment of the names\nof God. It seems to have been beyond the design of the author to\nelucidate the etymology of each name, or to establish methodically its\nsignification; for he does not support his explanations by any proof.\nHis sole aim is to show that the Scriptural names of God in their true\nmeaning strictly harmonize with the philosophical conception of the\nPrimal Cause. There are two things which have to be distinguished in\nthe treatment of the Primal Cause: the Primal Cause per se, and its\nrelation to the Universe. The first is expressed by the tetragrammaton\nand its cognates, the second by the several attributes, especially by\nrokeb ba\u02bbarabot, \u201cHe who rideth on the \u02bbarabot\u201d (Ps. lxviii. 4)\n\nThe tetragrammaton exclusively expresses the essence of God, and\ntherefore it is employed as a nomen proprium. In the mystery of this\nname, and others mentioned in the Talmud, as consisting of twelve and\nof forty-two letters, Maimonides finds no other secret than the\nsolution of some metaphysical problems. The subject of these problems\nis not actually known, but the author supposes that it referred to the\n\u201cabsolute existence of the Deity.\u201d He discovers the same idea in ehyeh\n(Exod. iii. 14), in accordance with the explanation added in the Sacred\nText: asher ehyeh, \u201cthat is, I am.\u201d In the course of this discussion he\nexposes the folly or sinfulness of those who pretend to work miracles\nby the aid of these and similar names.\n\nWith a view of preparing the way for his peculiar interpretation of\nrokeb ba\u02bbarabot, he explains a variety of Scriptural passages, and\ntreats of several philosophical terms relative to the Supreme Being.\nSuch expressions as \u201cthe word of God,\u201d \u201cthe work of God,\u201d \u201cthe work of\nHis fingers,\u201d \u201cHe made,\u201d \u201cHe spake,\u201d must be taken in a figurative\nsense; they merely represent God as the cause that some work has been\nproduced, and that some person has acquired a certain knowledge. The\npassage, \u201cAnd He rested on the seventh day\u201d (Exod. xx. 11) is\ninterpreted as follows: On the seventh Day the forces and laws were\ncomplete, which during the previous six days were in the state of being\nestablished for the preservation of the Universe. They were not to be\nincreased or modified.\n\nIt seems that Maimonides introduced this figurative explanation with a\nview of showing that the Scriptural \u201cGod\u201d does not differ from the\n\u201cPrimal Cause\u201d or \u201cEver-active Intellect\u201d of the philosophers. On the\nother hand, the latter do not reject the Unity of God, although they\nassume that the Primal Cause comprises the causa efficiens, the agens,\nand the causa finalis (or, the cause, the means, and the end); and that\nthe Ever-active Intellect comprises the intelligens, the intellectus,\nand the intellectum (or, the thinking subject, the act of thought, and\nthe object thought of); because in this case these apparently different\nelements are, in fact, identical. The Biblical term corresponding to\n\u201cPrimal Cause\u201d is rokeb ba\u02bbarabot, \u201criding on \u02bbarabot.\u201d Maimonides is\nat pains to prove that \u02bbarabot denotes \u201cthe highest sphere,\u201d which\ncauses the motion of all other spheres, and which thus brings about the\nnatural course of production and destruction. By \u201cthe highest sphere\u201d\nhe does not understand a material sphere, but the immaterial world of\nintelligences and angels, \u201cthe seat of justice and judgment, stores of\nlife, peace, and blessings, the seat of the souls of the righteous,\u201d\netc. Rokeb ba\u02bbarabot, therefore, means: He presides over the immaterial\nbeings, He is the source of their powers, by which they move the\nspheres and regulate the course of nature. This theory is more fully\ndeveloped in the Second Part.\n\nThe next section (chap. lxxi.\u2013lxxvi.) treats of the Kal\u0101m. According to\nthe author, the method of the Kal\u0101m is copied from the Christian\nFathers, who applied it in the defence of their religious doctrines.\nThe latter examined in their writings the views of the philosophers,\nostensibly in search of truth, in reality, however, with the object of\nsupporting their own dogmas. Subsequently Mohammedan theologians found\nin these works arguments which seemed to confirm the truth of their own\nreligion; they blindly adopted these arguments, and made no inquiry\nwhence these had been derived. Maimonides rejects \u00e0 priori the theories\nof the Mutakallemim, because they explain the phenomena in the universe\nin conformity with preconceived notions, instead of following the\nscientific method of the philosophers. Among the Jews, especially in\nthe East and in Africa, there were also some who adopted the method of\nthe Kal\u0101m; in doing so they followed the Mu\u02bbtazilah (dissenting\nMohammedans), not because they found it more correct than the Kal\u0101m of\nthe Ashariyah (orthodox Mohammedans), but because at the time when the\nJews became acquainted with the Kal\u0101m it was only cultivated by the\nMu\u02bbtazilah. The Jews in Spain, however, remained faithful to the\nAristotelian philosophy.\n\nThe four principal dogmas upheld by the dominant religions were the\ncreatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God, His Incorporeality, and His\nUnity. By the philosophers the creatio ex nihilo was rejected, but the\nMutakallemim defended it, and founded upon it their proofs for the\nother three dogmas. Maimonides adopts the philosophical proofs for the\nExistence, Incorporeality, and Unity of God, because they must be\nadmitted even by those who deny the creatio ex nihilo, the proofs being\nindependent of this dogma. In order to show that the Mutakallemim are\nmistaken in ignoring the organization of the existing order of things,\nthe author gives a minute description of the analogy between the\nUniverse, or Kosmos, and man, the mikrokosmos (ch. lxxii.). This\nanalogy is merely asserted, and the reader is advised either to find\nthe proof by his own studies, or to accept the fact on the authority of\nthe learned. The Kal\u0101m does not admit the existence of law,\norganization, and unity in the universe. Its adherents have,\naccordingly, no trustworthy criterion to determine whether a thing is\npossible or impossible. Everything that is conceivable by imagination\nis by them held as possible. The several parts of the universe are in\nno relation to each other; they all consist of equal elements; they are\nnot composed of substance and properties, but of atoms and accidents:\nthe law of causality is ignored; man\u2019s actions are not the result of\nwill and design, but are mere accidents. Maimonides in enumerating and\ndiscussing the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kal\u0101m (ch.\nlxiii.), which embody these theories, had apparently no intention to\ngive a complete and impartial account of the Kal\u0101m; he solely aimed at\nexposing the weakness of a system which he regarded as founded not on a\nsound basis of positive facts, but on mere fiction; not on the\nevidences of the senses and of reason, but on the illusions of\nimagination.\n\nAfter having shown that the twelve fundamental propositions of the\nKal\u0101m are utterly untenable, Maimonides finds no difficulty in\ndemonstrating the insufficiency of the proofs advanced by the\nMutakallemim in support of the above-named dogmas. Seven arguments are\ncited which the Mutakallemim employ in support of the creatio ex\nnihilo. [3] The first argument is based on the atomic theory, viz.,\nthat the universe consists of equal atoms without inherent properties:\nall variety and change observed in nature must therefore be attributed\nto an external force. Three arguments are supplied by the proposition\nthat finite things of an infinite number cannot exist (Propos. xi.).\nThree other arguments derive their support from the following\nproposition (x.): Everything that can be imagined can have an actual\nexistence. The present order of things is only one out of the many\nforms which are possible, and exist through the fiat of a determining\npower.\n\nThe Unity of God is demonstrated by the Mutakallemim as follows: Two\nGods would have been unable to produce the world; one would have\nimpeded the work of the other. Maimonides points out that this might\nhave been avoided by a suitable division of labour. Another argument is\nas follows: The two Beings would have one element in common, and would\ndiffer in another; each would thus consist of two elements, and would\nnot be God. Maimonides might have suggested that the argument moves in\na circle, the unity of God being proved by assuming His unity. The\nfollowing argument is altogether unintelligible: Both Gods are moved to\naction by will; the will, being without a substratum, could not act\nsimultaneously in two separate beings. The fallacy of the following\nargument is clear: The existence of one God is proved; the existence of\na second God is not proved, it would be possible; and as possibility is\ninapplicable to God, there does not exist a second God. The possibility\nof ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with\npotentiality of existence. Again, if one God suffices, the second God\nis superfluous; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and\ncannot be a deity. Maimonides objects that it would not be an\nimperfection in either deity to act exclusively within their respective\nprovinces. As in the criticism of the first argument, Maimonides seems\nhere to forget that the existence of separate provinces would require a\nsuperior determining Power, and the two Beings would not properly be\ncalled Gods.\n\nThe weakest of all arguments are, according to Maimonides, those by\nwhich the Mutakallemim sought to support the doctrine of God\u2019s\nIncorporeality. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and\nwould not be one; or He would be comparable to other beings: but a\ncomparison implies the existence of similar and of dissimilar elements,\nand God would thus not be one. A corporeal God would be finite, and an\nexternal power would be required to define those limits.\n\n\nPART II.\n\nThe Second Part includes the following sections:\u20141. Introduction; 2.\nPhilosophical Proof of the Existence of One Incorporeal Primal Cause\n(ch. i.); 3. On the Spheres and the Intelligences (ii.\u2013xii.); 4. On the\ntheory of the Eternity of the Universe (xiii.\u2013xxix.); 5. Exposition of\nGen. i.\u2013iv. (xxx., xxxi.); 6. On Prophecy (xxxii.\u2013xlviii.).\n\nThe enumeration of twenty-six propositions, by the aid of which the\nphilosophers prove the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorporeality of\nthe Primal Cause, forms the introduction to the Second Part of this\nwork. The propositions treat of the properties of the finite and the\ninfinite (i.\u2013iii., x.\u2013xii., xvi.), of change and motion (iv.\u2013ix.,\nxiii.\u2013xviii.), and of the possible and the absolute or necessary\n(xx.\u2013xxv.); they are simply enumerated, but are not demonstrated.\nWhatever the value of these Propositions may be, they were inadequate\nfor their purpose, and the author is compelled to introduce auxiliary\npropositions to prove the existence of an infinite, incorporeal, and\nuncompounded Primal Cause. (Arguments I. and III.)\n\nThe first and the fourth arguments may be termed cosmological proofs.\nThey are based on the hypothesis that the series of causes for every\nchange is finite, and terminates in the Primal Cause. There is no\nessential difference in the two arguments: in the first are discussed\nthe causes of the motion of a moving object; the fourth treats of the\ncauses which bring about the transition of a thing from potentiality to\nreality. To prove that neither the spheres nor a force residing in them\nconstitute the Primal Cause, the philosophers employed two\npropositions, of which the one asserts that the revolutions of the\nspheres are infinite, and the other denies the possibility that an\ninfinite force should reside in a finite object. The distinction\nbetween the finite in space and the finite in time appears to have been\nignored; for it is not shown why a force infinite in time could not\nreside in a body finite in space. Moreover, those who, like Maimonides,\nreject the eternity of the universe, necessarily reject this proof,\nwhile those who hold that the universe is eternal do not admit that the\nspheres have ever been only potential, and passed from potentiality to\nactuality. The second argument is supported by the following\nsupplementary proposition: If two elements coexist in a state of\ncombination, and one of these elements is to be found at the same time\nseparate, in a free state, it is certain that the second element is\nlikewise to be found by itself. Now, since things exist which combine\nin themselves motive power and mass moved by that power, and since mass\nis found by itself, motive power must also be found by itself\nindependent of mass.\n\nThe third argument has a logical character: The universe is either\neternal or temporal, or partly eternal and partly temporal. It cannot\nbe eternal in all its parts, as many parts undergo destruction; it is\nnot altogether temporal, because, if so, the universe could not be\nreproduced after being destroyed. The continued existence of the\nuniverse leads, therefore, to the conclusion that there is an immortal\nforce, the Primal Cause, besides the transient world.\n\nThese arguments have this in common, that while proving the existence\nof a Primal Cause, they at the same time demonstrate the Unity, the\nIncorporeality, and the Eternity of that Cause. Special proofs are\nnevertheless superadded for each of these postulates, and on the whole\nthey differ very little from those advanced by the Mohammedan\nTheologians.\n\nThis philosophical theory of the Primal Cause was adapted by Jewish\nscholars to the Biblical theory of the Creator. The universe is a\nliving, organized being, of which the earth is the centre. Any changes\non this earth are due to the revolutions of the spheres; the lowest or\ninnermost sphere, viz., the one nearest to the centre, is the sphere of\nthe moon; the outermost or uppermost is \u201cthe all-encompassing sphere.\u201d\nNumerous spheres are interposed; but Maimonides divides all the spheres\ninto four groups, corresponding to the moon, the sun, the planets, and\nthe fixed stars. This division is claimed by the author as his own\ndiscovery; he believes that it stands in relation to the four causes of\ntheir motions, the four elements of the sublunary world, and the four\nclasses of beings, viz., the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and\nthe rational. The spheres have souls, and are endowed with intellect;\ntheir souls enable them to move freely, and the impulse to the motion\nis given by the intellect in conceiving the idea of the Absolute\nIntellect. Each sphere has an intellect peculiar to itself; the\nintellect attached to the sphere of the moon is called \u201cthe active\nintellect\u201d (Sekel ha-po\u02bb\u0113l). In support of this theory numerous\npassages are cited both from Holy Writ and from post-Biblical Jewish\nliterature. The angels (elohim, malakim) mentioned in the Bible are\nassumed to be identical with the intellects of the spheres; they are\nfree agents, and their volition invariably tends to that which is good\nand noble; they emanate from the Primal Cause, and form a descending\nseries of beings, ending with the active intellect. The transmission of\npower from one element to the other is called \u201cemanation\u201d (shefa\u02bb).\nThis transmission is performed without the utterance of a sound; if any\nvoice is supposed to be heard, it is only an illusion, originating in\nthe human imagination, which is the source of all evils (ch. xii.).\n\nIn accordance with this doctrine, Maimonides explains that the three\nmen who appeared to Abraham, the angels whom Jacob saw ascend and\ndescend the ladder, and all other angels seen by man, are nothing but\nthe intellects of the spheres, four in number, which emanate from the\nPrimal Cause (ch. x.). In his description of the spheres he, as usual,\nfollows Aristotle. The spheres do not contain any of the four elements\nof the sublunary world, but consist of a quintessence, an entirely\ndifferent element. Whilst things on this earth are transient, the\nbeings which inhabit the spheres above are eternal. According to\nAristotle, these spheres, as well as their intellects, coexist with the\nPrimal Cause. Maimonides, faithful to the teaching of the Scriptures,\nhere departs from his master, and holds that the spheres and the\nintellects had a beginning, and were brought into existence by the will\nof the Creator. He does not attempt to give a positive proof of his\ndoctrine; all he contends is that the theory of the creatio ex nihilo\nis, from a philosophical point of view, not inferior to the doctrine\nwhich asserts the eternity of the universe, and that he can refute all\nobjections advanced against his theory (ch. xiii.\u2013xxviii.).\n\nHe next enumerates and criticises the various theories respecting the\norigin of the Universe, viz.: A. God created the Universe out of\nnothing. B. God formed the Universe from an eternal substance. C. The\nUniverse originating in the eternal Primal Cause is co-eternal.\u2014It is\nnot held necessary by the author to discuss the view of those who do\nnot assume a Primal Cause, since the existence of such a cause has\nalready been proved (ch. xiii.).\n\nThe objections raised to a creatio ex nihilo by its opponents are\nfounded partly on the properties of Nature, and partly on those of the\nPrimal Cause. They infer from the properties of Nature the following\narguments: (1) The first moving force is eternal; for if it had a\nbeginning, another motion must have produced it, and then it would not\nbe the First moving force. (2) If the formless matter be not eternal,\nit must have been produced out of another substance; it would then have\na certain form by which it might be distinguished from the primary\nsubstance, and then it would not be formless. (3) The circular motion\nof the spheres does not involve the necessity of termination; and\nanything that is without an end, must be without a beginning. (4)\nAnything brought to existence existed previously in potentia; something\nmust therefore have pre-existed of which potential existence could be\npredicated. Some support for the theory of the eternity of the heavens\nhas been derived from the general belief in the eternity of the\nheavens.\u2014The properties of the Primal Cause furnished the following\narguments:\u2014If it were assumed that the Universe was created from\nnothing, it would imply that the First Cause had changed from the\ncondition of a potential Creator to that of an actual Creator, or that\nHis will had undergone a change, or that He must be imperfect, because\nHe produced a perishable work, or that He had been inactive during a\ncertain period. All these contingencies would be contrary to a true\nconception of the First Cause (ch. xiv.).\n\nMaimonides is of opinion that the arguments based on the properties of\nthings in Nature are inadmissible, because the laws by which the\nUniverse is regulated need not have been in force before the Universe\nwas in existence. This refutation is styled by our author \u201ca strong\nwall built round the Law, able to resist all attacks\u201d (ch. xvii.). In a\nsimilar manner the author proceeds against the objections founded on\nthe properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual beings, he says,\nare not subject to the same laws as material bodies; that which\nnecessitates a change in the latter or in the will of man need not\nproduce a change in immaterial beings. As to the belief that the\nheavens are inhabited by angels and deities, it has not its origin in\nthe real existence of these supernatural beings; it was suggested to\nman by meditation on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch.\nxviii.).\n\nMaimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of the authority\nof Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief in the creatio ex\nnihilo. Admitting that the great variety of the things in the sublunary\nworld can be traced to those immutable laws which regulate the\ninfluence of the spheres on the beings below\u2014the variety in the spheres\ncan only be explained as the result of God\u2019s free will. According to\nAristotle\u2014the principal authority for the eternity of the Universe\u2014it\nis impossible that a simple being should, according to the laws of\nnature, be the cause of various and compound beings. Another reason for\nthe rejection of the Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact\nthat the astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view\nwhich Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system of that\nastronomer is likewise far from being perfect and final (ch. xxiv.). It\nis impossible to obtain a correct notion of the properties of the\nheavenly spheres; \u201cthe heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord\u2019s, but\nthe earth hath He given to the children of man\u201d (Ps. cxv. 16). The\nauthor, observing that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are\nuntenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such prophets as\nAbraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural quotation could, by a\nfigurative interpretation, be made to agree with the opposite theory,\nMaimonides declines to ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be\nin opposition to well-established truths, as is the case with\nanthropomorphic expressions; for the latter, if taken literally, would\nbe contrary to the demonstrated truth of God\u2019s incorporeality (ch.\nxxv.). He is therefore surprised that the author of Pirke-di Rabbi\nEliezer ventured to assume the eternity of matter, and he thinks it\npossible that Rabbi Eliezer carried the license of figurative speech\ntoo far. (Ch. xxvi.).\n\nThe theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the belief that\nthe Universe will at a future time be destroyed; the Bible distinctly\nteaches the creation, but not the destruction of the world except in\npassages which are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On\nthe contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it is clearly\nstated \u201cHe established them for ever.\u201d (Ps. cxlviii. 5.) The\ndestruction of the Universe would be, as the creation has been, a\ndirect act of the Divine will, and not the result of those immutable\nlaws which govern the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set\naside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages of the\nUniverse. Within this interval, however, the laws remain undisturbed\n(ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the miracles, originate in these\nlaws, although man is unable to perceive the causal relation. The\nBiblical account of the creation concludes with the statement that God\nrested on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the work\nwas complete; no new act of creation was to take place, and no new law\nwas to be introduced. It is true that the second and the third chapters\nof Genesis appear to describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new\nlaw, viz., that of man\u2019s mortality, but these chapters are explained as\ncontaining an allegorical representation of man\u2019s psychical and\nintellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the contents of the\nfirst chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer the allegorical explanation\nwhich, as it seems, he had in view without expressly stating it, in his\ntreatment of Adam\u2019s sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is\ncertainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the pleasure of\nthe Almighty the laws of nature may become inoperative, and that the\nwhole Universe may become annihilated, and on the other hand to deny,\nthat during the existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever\nhave been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Maimonides could not\nconceive the idea that the work of the All-wise should be, as the\nMutakallemim taught\u2014without plan and system, or that the laws once laid\ndown should not be sufficient for all emergencies.\n\nThe account of the Creation given in the book of Genesis is explained\nby the author according to the following two rules: First its language\nis allegorical; and, Secondly, the terms employed are homonyms. The\nwords erez, mayim, rua\u1e25, and \u1e25oshek in the second verse (ch. i.), are\nhomonyms and denote the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire; in\nother instances erez is the terrestrial globe, mayim is water or\nvapour, rua\u1e25 denotes wind, and \u1e25oshek darkness: According to\nMaimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given thus; God\ncreated the Universe by producing first the reshit the \u201cbeginning\u201d\n(Gen. i. 1), or hat\u1e25alah, i.e., the intellects which give to the\nspheres both existence and motion, and thus become the source of the\nexistence of the entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a\nchaos of elements, but its form was successively developed by the\ninfluence of the spheres, and more directly by the action of light and\ndarkness, the properties of which were fixed on the first day of the\nCreation. In the subsequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and\nthe intellectual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which\nthe Universe was for the first time ruled by the same natural laws\nwhich still continue in operation, was distinguished as a day blessed\nand sanctified by the Creator, who designed it to proclaim the creatio\nex nihilo (Exod. xx. 11). The Israelites were moreover commanded to\nkeep this Sabbath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut.\nv. 15), because during the period of the Egyptian bondage, they had not\nbeen permitted to rest on that day. In the history of the first sin of\nman, Adam, Eve, and the serpent represent the intellect, the body, and\nthe imagination. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan,\nmentioned in the Midrash in connexion with this account, is added as\nrepresenting man\u2019s appetitive faculties. Imagination, the source of\nerror, is directly aided by the appetitive faculty, and the two are\nintimately connected with the body, to which man generally gives\nparamount attention, and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in\nthe end, however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power.\nInstead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms false\nconceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to suffering, whilst\nthe imagination, instead of being guided by the intellect and attaining\na higher development becomes debased and depraved. In the three sons of\nAdam, Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the three\nelements in man: the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual.\nFirst, the animal element (Abel) becomes extinct; then the vegetable\nelements (Kain) are dissolved; only the third element, the intellect\n(Seth), survives, and forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).\n\nMaimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit terms, it is\ndifficult to understand what he had in view by the avowal that he could\nnot disclose everything. It is unquestionably no easy matter to adapt\neach verse in the first chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory;\nbut such an adaptation is, according to the author\u2019s own view (Part I.,\nIntrod., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objectionable.\n\nIn the next section (xxxii.\u2013xlviii.) Maimonides treats of Prophecy. He\nmentions the following three opinions:\u20141. Any person, irrespective of\nhis physical or moral qualifications, may be summoned by the Almighty\nto the mission of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of\nmental development, and can only be attained by training and study. 3.\nThe gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and mental training,\ncombined with inspiration. The author adopts the last-mentioned\nopinion. He defines prophecy as an emanation (shefa\u02bb), which through\nthe will of the Almighty descends from the Active Intellect to the\nintellect and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The\nprophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose intellect alone\nreceived the necessary impulse from the Active Intellect, and from\ndiviners or dreamers, whose imagination alone has been influenced by\nthe Active Intellect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of\nthis prophetic faculty depends on God\u2019s will, this dependence is\nnothing else but the relation which all things bear to the Primal\nCause; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity with the laws\nestablished by the will of God; it gives an impulse to the intellect of\nman, and, bringing to light those mental powers which lay dormant, it\nmerely turns potential faculty into real action. These faculties can be\nperfected to such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest\ntruths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of research\nrequired by ordinary persons. The same fact is noticed with respect to\nimagination; man sometimes forms faithful images of objects and events\nwhich cannot be traced to the ordinary channel of information, viz.,\nimpressions made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a\nnatural process, it may appear surprising that, of the numerous men\nexcelling in wisdom, so few became prophets. Maimonides accounts for\nthis fact by assuming that the moral faculties of such men had not been\nduly trained. None of them had, in the author\u2019s opinion, gone through\nthe moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet.\nBesides this, everything which obstructs mental improvement, misdirects\nthe imagination or impairs the physical strength, and precludes man\nfrom attaining to the rank of prophet. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed\nto Jacob during the period of his anxieties on account of his\nseparation from Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a Divine message during\nthe years which the Israelites, under Divine punishment, spent in the\ndesert. On the other hand, music and song awakened the prophetic power\n(comp. 2 Kings iii. 15), and \u201cThe spirit of prophecy alights only on\nhim who is wise, strong, and rich\u201d (Babyl. Talm. Shabbat, 92a).\nAlthough the preparation for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of\nearnest and persevering study, as also the execution of the Divine\ndictates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when the\nprophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs were\nsuspended. The intellect then acquired true knowledge, which presented\nitself to the prophet\u2019s imagination in forms peculiar to that faculty.\nPure ideals are almost incomprehensible; man must translate them into\nlanguage which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to his\nown mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and communicating them to\nothers the exercise of the prophet\u2019s imagination was therefore as\nessential as that of his intellect, and Maimonides seems to apply to\nthis imagination the term \u201cangel,\u201d which is so frequently mentioned in\nthe Bible as the medium of communication between the Supreme Being and\nthe prophet.\n\nOnly Moses held his bodily functions under such control that even\nwithout their temporary suspension he was able to receive prophetic\ninspiration; the interposition of the imagination was in his case not\nneeded: \u201cGod spoke to him mouth to mouth\u201d (Num. xii. 8). Moses differed\nso completely from other prophets that the term \u201cprophet\u201d could only\nhave been applied to him and other men by way of homonymy.\n\nThe impulses descending from the Active Intellect to man\u2019s intellect\nand to his imagination produce various effects, according to his\nphysical, moral, and intellectual condition. Some men are thus endowed\nwith extraordinary courage and with an ambition to perform great deeds,\nor they feel themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen\nby means of exalted and pure language. Such men are filled with \u201cthe\nspirit of the Lord,\u201d or, \u201cwith the spirit of holiness.\u201d To this\ndistinguished class belonged Jephthah, Samson, David, Solomon, and the\nauthors of the Hagiographa. Though above the standard of ordinary men,\nthey were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides divides the\nprophets into two groups, viz., those who receive inspiration in a\ndream and those who receive it in a vision. The first group includes\nthe following five classes:\u20141. Those who see symbolic figures; 2. Those\nwho hear a voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker; 3.\nThose who see a man and hear him addressing them; 4. Those who see an\nangel addressing them; 5. Those who see God and hear His voice. The\nother group is divided in a similar manner, but contains only the first\nfour classes, for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet\nshould see God in a vision. This classification is based on the various\nexpressions employed in the Scriptures to describe the several\nprophecies.\n\nWhen the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai, they distinctly\nheard the first two commandments, which include the doctrines of the\nExistence and the Unity of God; of the other eight commandments, which\nenunciate moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere \u201csound of\nwords\u201d; and it was through the mouth of Moses that the Divine\ninstruction was revealed to them. Maimonides defends this opinion by\nquotations from the Talmud and the Midrashim.\n\nThe theory that imagination was an essential element in prophecy is\nsupported by the fact that figurative speech predominates in the\nprophetical writings, which abound in figures, hyperbolical expressions\nand allegories. The symbolical acts which are described in connexion\nwith the visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel\nfrom Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah\u2019s walking about naked\nand barefoot (Isa. xx. 2), Jacob\u2019s wrestling with the angel (Gen.\nxxxii. 27 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam\u2019s ass (Num. xxii. 28), had\nno positive reality. The prophets, employing an elliptical style,\nfrequently omitted to state that a certain event related by them was\npart of a vision or a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech\nevents are described in the Bible as coming directly from God, although\nthey simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of nature, and as such\ndepend on the will of God. Such passages cannot be misunderstood when\nit is borne in mind that every event and every natural phenomenon can\nfor its origin be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the\nprophets employ such phrases as the following: \u201cAnd I will command the\nclouds that they rain no rain upon it\u201d (Isa. v. 6); \u201cI have also called\nmy mighty men\u201d (ibid. xi. 3).\n\n\nPART III.\n\nThis part contains the following six sections:\u20141. Exposition of the\nma\u02bbaseh mercabah (Ez. i.), ch. i. vii.; 2. On the nature and the origin\nof evil, ch. viii. xii.; 3. On the object of the creation, ch.\nxiii.\u2013xv.; 4. On Providence and Omniscience, ch. xvi.\u2013xxv.; 5. On the\nobject of the Divine precepts (ta\u02bbame ha-mi\u1e93vot) and the historical\nportions of the Bible, ch. xxv.\u2013xl.; 6. A guide to the proper worship\nof God.\n\nWith great caution Maimonides approaches the explanation of the ma\u02bbaseh\nmercabah, the chariot which Ezekiel beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The\nmysteries included in the description of the Divine chariot had been\norally transmitted from generation to generation, but in consequence of\nthe dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken, and the\nknowledge of these mysteries had vanished. Whatever he knew of those\nmysteries he owed exclusively to his own intellectual faculties; he\ntherefore could not reconcile himself to the idea that his knowledge\nshould die with him. He committed his exposition of the ma\u02bbaseh\nmercabah and the ma\u02bbaseh bereshit to writing, but did not divest it of\nits original mysterious character; so that the explanation was fully\nintelligible to the initiated\u2014that is to say, to the philosopher\u2014but to\nthe ordinary reader it was a mere paraphrase of the Biblical\ntext.\u2014(Introduction.)\n\nThe first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of the Divine\nchariot. According to Maimonides three distinct parts are to be\nnoticed, each of which begins with the phrase, \u201cAnd I saw.\u201d These parts\ncorrespond to the three parts of the Universe, the sublunary world, the\nspheres and the intelligences. First of all the prophet is made to\nbehold the material world which consists of the earth and the spheres,\nand of these the spheres, as the more important, are noticed first. In\nthe Second Part, in which the nature of the spheres is discussed, the\nauthor dwells with pride on his discovery that they can be divided into\nfour groups. This discovery he now employs to show that the four\n\u201chayyot\u201d (animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He\npoints out that the terms which the prophet uses in the description of\nthe hayyot are identical with terms applied to the properties of the\nspheres. For the four hayyot or \u201cangels,\u201d or cherubim, (1) have human\nform; (2) have human faces; (3) possess characteristics of other\nanimals; (4) have human hands; (5) their feet are straight and round\n(cylindrical); (6) their bodies are closely joined to each other; (7)\nonly their faces and their wings are separate; (8) their substance is\ntransparent and refulgent; (9) they move uniformly; (10) each moves in\nits own direction; (11) they run; (12) swift as lightning they return\ntowards their starting point; and (13) they move in consequence of an\nextraneous impulse (rua\u1e25). In a similar manner the spheres are\ndescribed:\u2014(1) they possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and\nintellect; (2) they consist like man of body and soul; (3) they are\nstrong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the eagle; (4)\nthey perform all manner of work as though they had hands; (5) they are\nround, and are not divided into parts; (6) no vacuum intervenes between\none sphere and the other; (7) they may be considered as one being, but\nin respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their existence\nand motion, they appear as four different beings; (8) they are\ntransparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere moves uniformly, (10) and\naccording to its special laws; (11) they revolve with great velocity;\n(12) each point returns again to its previous position; (13) they are\nself-moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.\n\nIn the second part of the vision the prophet saw the ofannim. These\nrepresent the four elements of the sublunary world. For the ofannim (1)\nare connected with the \u1e25ayyot and with the earth; (2) they have four\nfaces, and are four separate beings, but interpenetrate each other \u201cas\nthough it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel\u201d (Ez. i. 16); (3) they\nare covered with eyes; (4) they are not self-moving; (5) they are set\nin motion by the \u1e25ayyot; (6) their motion is not circular but\nrectilinear. The same may almost be said of the four elements:\u2014(1) they\nare in close contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the sphere\nof the moon; earth occupies the centre, water surrounds earth, air has\nits position between water and fire; (2) this order is not invariably\nmaintained; the respective portions change and they become intermixed\nand combined with each other; (3) though they are only four elements\nthey form an infinite number of things; (4) not being animated they do\nnot move of their own accord; (5) they are set in motion by the action\nof the spheres; (6) when a portion is displaced it returns in a\nstraight line to its original position.\n\nIn the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above the \u1e25ayyot. The\nfigure was divided in the middle; in the upper portion the prophet only\nnoticed that it was \u1e25ashmal, (mysterious); from the loins downwards\nthere was \u201cthe vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory,\u201d and \u201cthe\nlikeness of the throne.\u201d The world of Intelligences was represented by\nthe figure; these can only be perceived in as far as they influence the\nspheres, but their relation to the Creator is beyond human\ncomprehension. The Creator himself is not represented in this vision.\n\nThe key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the introductory words,\n\u201cAnd the heavens were opened,\u201d and in the minute description of the\nplace and the time of the revelation. When pondering on the grandeur of\nthe spheres and their influences, which vary according to time and\nplace, man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the\nconclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he will, in the\nsubsequent chapters, refrain from giving further explanation of the\nma\u02bbaseh mercabah. The foregoing summary, however, shows that the\nopinion of the author on this subject is fully stated, and it is indeed\ndifficult to conceive what additional disclosures he could still have\nmade.\n\nThe task which the author has proposed to himself in the Preface he now\nregarded as accomplished. He has discussed the method of the Kal\u0101m, the\nsystem of the philosophers, and his own theory concerning the relation\nbetween the Primal Cause and the Universe: he has explained the\nBiblical account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the\nmysteries in Ezekiel\u2019s vision. In the remaining portion of the work the\nauthor attempts to solve certain theological problems, as though he\nwished to obviate the following objections, which might be raised to\nhis theory that there is a design throughout the creation, and that the\nentire Universe is subject to the law of causation:\u2014What is the purpose\nof the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was the world\ncreated? In how far does Providence interfere with the natural course\nof events? Does God know and foresee man\u2019s actions? To what end was the\nDivine Law revealed? These problems are treated seriatim.\n\nAll evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material element of man\u2019s\nexistence. Those who are able to emancipate themselves from the tyranny\nof the body, and unconditionally to submit to the dictates of reason,\nare protected from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the\nbody, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his thoughts far\naway from them; convivial and erotic songs debase man\u2019s noblest\ngifts\u2014thought and speech. Matter is the partition separating man from\nthe pure Intellects; it is \u201cthe thickness of the cloud\u201d which true\nknowledge has to traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is\nthe mere negative of good: \u201cGod saw all that He had made, and behold it\nwas very good\u201d (Gen. i. 31). Evil does not exist at all. When evils are\nmentioned in the Scriptures as the work of God, the Scriptural\nexpressions must not be taken in their literal sense.\n\nThere are three kinds of evils:\u20141. Evils necessitated by those laws of\nproduction and destruction by which the species are perpetuated. 2.\nEvils which men inflict on each other; they are comparatively few,\nespecially among civilized men. 3. Evils which man brings upon himself,\nand which comprise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of\nthese three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that \u201cthe Lord is\ngood to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works\u201d (Ps. cxlv.\n9).\n\nThe question, What is the object of the creation? must be left\nunanswered. The creation is the result of the will of God. Also those\nwho believe that the Universe is eternal must admit that they are\nunable to discover the purpose of the Universe. It would, however, not\nbe illogical to assume that the spheres have been created for the sake\nof man, notwithstanding the great dimensions of the former and the\nsmallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even if\nmankind were the main and central object of creation, there is no\nabsolute interdependence between them; for it is a matter of course\nthat, under altered conditions, man could exist without the spheres.\nAll teleological theories must therefore be confined within the limits\nof the Universe as it now exists. They are only admissible in the\nrelation in which the several parts of the Universe stand to each\nother; but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be accounted\nfor. It is simply an emanation from the will of God.\n\nRegarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enumerates the following\nfive opinions:\u20141. There is no Providence; everything is subject to\nchance; 2. Only a part of the Universe is governed by Providence, viz.,\nthe spheres, the species, and such individual beings as possess the\npower of perpetuating their existence (e.g., the stars); the rest\u2014that\nis, the sublunary world\u2014is left to mere chance. 3. Everything is\npredetermined; according to this theory, revealed Law is inconceivable.\n4. Providence assigns its blessings to all creatures, according to\ntheir merits; accordingly, all beings, even the lowest animals, if\ninnocently injured or killed, receive compensation in a future life. 5.\nAccording to the Jewish belief, all living beings are endowed with\nfree-will; God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits.\nMaimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine love,\ni.e. afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but as\nmeans to procure for him a reward in times to come. Maimonides also\nrejects the notion that God ordains special temptation. The Biblical\naccount, according to which God tempts men, \u201cto know what is in their\nhearts,\u201d must not be taken in its literal sense; it merely states that\nGod made the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in\norder that their good example should be followed. Of all creatures man\nalone enjoys the especial care of Providence; because the acts of\nProvidence are identical with certain influences (shefa\u02bb) which the\nActive Intellect brings to bear upon the human intellect; their effect\nupon man varies according to his physical, moral, and intellectual\ncondition; irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these\ninfluences. If we cannot in each individual case see how these\nprinciples are applied, it must be borne in mind that God\u2019s wisdom is\nfar above that of man. The author seems to have felt that his theory\nhas its weak points, for he introduces it as follows:\u2014\u201cMy theory is not\nestablished by demonstrative proof; it is based on the authority of the\nBible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the theories\npreviously mentioned.\u201d\n\nProvidence implies Omniscience, and men who deny this, eo ipso, have no\nbelief in Providence. Some are unable to reconcile the fate of man with\nDivine Justice, and are therefore of opinion that God takes no notice\nwhatever of the events which occur on earth. Others believe that God,\nbeing an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multitude of\nthings, or of things that do not yet exist, or the number of which is\ninfinite. These objections, which are based on the nature of man\u2019s\nperception, are illogical; for God\u2019s knowledge cannot be compared to\nthat of man; it is identical with His essence. Even the Attributists,\nwho assume that God\u2019s knowledge is different from His essence, hold\nthat it is distinguished from man\u2019s knowledge in the following five\npoints:\u20141. It is one, although it embraces a plurality. 2. It includes\neven such things as do not yet exist. 3. It includes things which are\ninfinite in number. 4. It does not change when new objects of\nperception present themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of\nevents.\u2014However difficult this theory may appear to human\ncomprehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah (lv. 8):\n\u201cYour thoughts are not My thoughts, and your ways are not My ways.\u201d\nAccording to Maimonides, the difficulty is to be explained by the fact\nthat God is the Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things\nis not dependent on their existence; while the knowledge of man is\nsolely dependent on the objects which come under his cognition.\n\nAccording to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the several views\nwhich have been mentioned above. Satan, that is, the material element\nin human existence, is described as the cause of Job\u2019s sufferings. Job\nat first believed that man\u2019s happiness depends on riches, health, and\nchildren; being deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived\nthe notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal beings.\nAfter a careful study of natural phenomena, he rejected this opinion.\nEliphaz held that all misfortunes of man serve as punishments of past\nsins. Bildad, the second friend of Job, admitted the existence of those\nafflictions which Divine love decrees in order that the patient\nsufferer may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zofar, the third\nfriend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond human\ncomprehension; there is but one explanation assignable to all Divine\nacts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu gives a fuller development to\nthis idea; he says that such evils as befell Job may be remedied once\nor twice, but the course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is\ntrue that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God can be\nobtained, but there are only few who arrive at that exalted\nintellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must content themselves\nwith acquiring a knowledge of God through the study of nature. Such a\nstudy leads man to the conviction that his understanding cannot fathom\nthe secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.\n\nThe concluding section of the Third Part treats of the purpose of the\nDivine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are described as the means of\nacquiring wisdom, enduring happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch.\nxxxi.). Generally a distinction is made between \u201c\u1e25u\u1e33\u1e33im\u201d (\u201cstatutes\u201d)\nand mishpa\u1e6dim (\u201cjudgments\u201d). The object of the latter is, on the whole,\nknown, but the \u1e25u\u1e33\u1e33im are considered as tests of man\u2019s obedience; no\nreason is given why they have been enacted. Maimonides rejects this\ndistinction; he states that all precepts are the result of wisdom and\ndesign, that all contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with\nregard to the \u1e25u\u1e33\u1e33im this is less obvious. The author draws another\nline of distinction between the general principles and the details of\nrules. For the selection and the introduction of the latter there is\nbut one reason, viz.: \u201cSuch is the will of God.\u201d\n\nThe laws are intended to promote man\u2019s perfection; they improve both\nhis mental and his physical condition; the former in so far as they\nlead him to the acquisition of true knowledge, the latter through the\ntraining of his moral and social faculties. Each law thus imparts\nknowledge, improves the moral condition of man, or conduces to the\nwell-being of society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to\ncorrect false opinions. This object is not always clearly announced.\nGod in His wisdom sometimes withheld from the knowledge of man the\npurpose of commandments and actions. There are other precepts which\ntend to restrain man\u2019s passions and desires. If the same end is\noccasionally attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the\nDivine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emotional state of\nman, and not to exceptional circumstances. In this work, as in the Yad\nha-\u1e25aza\u1e33ah, Maimonides divides the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen\ngroups, and in each group he discusses the principal and the special\nobject of the laws included in it.\n\nIn addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes historical\ninformation; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing the Biblical\nnarratives, shows that these are likewise intended to improve man\u2019s\nphysical, moral, and intellectual condition. \u201cIt is not a vain thing\nfor you\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 47), and when it proves vain to anyone, it is\nhis own fault.\n\nIn the final chapters the author describes the several degrees of human\nperfection, from the sinners who have turned from the right path to the\nbest of men, who in all their thoughts and acts cling to the Most\nPerfect Being, who aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God,\nand strive to serve their Maker in the practice of \u201cloving-kindness,\nrighteousness, and justice.\u201d This degree of human perfection can only\nbe attained by those who never forget the presence of the Almighty, and\nremain firm in their fear and love of God. These servants of the Most\nHigh inherit the choicest of human blessings; they are endowed with\nwisdom: they are godlike beings.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\n[Letter of the Author to his Pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknin.]\n\nIn the name of God, Lord of the Universe.\n\nTo R. Joseph (may God protect him!), son of R. Jehudah (may his repose\nbe in Paradise!):\u2014\n\n\n\u201cMy dear pupil, ever since you resolved to come to me, from a distant\ncountry, and to study under my direction, I thought highly of your\nthirst for knowledge, and your fondness for speculative pursuits, which\nfound expression in your poems. I refer to the time when I received\nyour writings in prose and verse from Alexandria. I was then not yet\nable to test your powers of apprehension, and I thought that your\ndesire might possibly exceed your capacity. But when you had gone with\nme through a course of astronomy, after having completed the [other]\nelementary studies which are indispensable for the understanding of\nthat science, I was still more gratified by the acuteness and the\nquickness of your apprehension. Observing your great fondness for\nmathematics, I let you study them more deeply, for I felt sure of your\nultimate success. Afterwards, when I took you through a course of\nlogic, I found that my great expectations of you were confirmed, and I\nconsidered you fit to receive from me an exposition of the esoteric\nideas contained in the prophetic books, that you might understand them\nas they are understood by men of culture. When I commenced by way of\nhints, I noticed that you desired additional explanation, urging me to\nexpound some metaphysical problems; to teach you the system of the\nMutakallemim; to tell you whether their arguments were based on logical\nproof; and if not, what their method was. I perceived that you had\nacquired some knowledge in those matters from others, and that you were\nperplexed and bewildered; yet you sought to find out a solution to your\ndifficulty. I urged you to desist from this pursuit, and enjoined you\nto continue your studies systematically; for my object was that the\ntruth should present itself in connected order, and that you should not\nhit upon it by mere chance. Whilst you studied with me I never refused\nto explain difficult verses in the Bible or passages in rabbinical\nliterature which we happened to meet. When, by the will of God, we\nparted, and you went your way, our discussions aroused in me a\nresolution which had long been dormant. Your absence has prompted me to\ncompose this treatise for you and for those who are like you, however\nfew they may be. I have divided it into chapters, each of which shall\nbe sent to you as soon as it is completed. Farewell!\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n[PREFATORY REMARKS.]\n\n\n \u201cCause me to know the way wherein I should walk, for I lift \n up my soul unto Thee.\u201d (Psalm cxliii. 8.)\n\n \u201cUnto you, O men, I call, and my voice is to the sons of \n men.\u201d (Prov. viii. 4.)\n\n \u201cBow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise, and \n apply thine heart unto my knowledge.\u201d (Prov. xxii. 17.)\n\n\nMy primary object in this work is to explain certain words occurring in\nthe prophetic books. Of these some are homonyms, and of their several\nmeanings the ignorant choose the wrong ones; other terms which are\nemployed in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons in\ntheir primary signification. There are also hybrid terms, denoting\nthings which are of the same class from one point of view and of a\ndifferent class from another. It is not here intended to explain all\nthese expressions to the unlettered or to mere tyros, a previous\nknowledge of Logic and Natural Philosophy being indispensable, or to\nthose who confine their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean\nthe study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of the\nTorah is the special aim of this and similar works.\n\nThe object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has\nbeen trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who\nconscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the same\ntime has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has\nattracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to\naccept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of\nthe Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from\nthose homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost\nin perplexity and anxiety. If he be guided solely by reason, and\nrenounce his previous views which are based on those expressions, he\nwould consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the\nLaw; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those\nexpressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its\nguidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious\nconvictions had suffered loss and injury. For he would then be left\nwith those errors which give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief\nand great perplexity.\n\nThis work has also a second object in view. It seeks to explain certain\nobscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly\ncharacterized as being figures. Ignorant and superficial readers take\nthem in a literal, not in a figurative sense. Even well informed\npersons are bewildered if they understand these passages in their\nliteral signification, but they are entirely relieved of their\nperplexity when we explain the figure, or merely suggest that the terms\nare figurative. For this reason I have called this book Guide for the\nPerplexed.\n\nI do not presume to think that this treatise settles every doubt in the\nminds of those who understand it, but I maintain that it settles the\ngreater part of their difficulties. No intelligent man will require and\nexpect that on introducing any subject I shall completely exhaust it;\nor that on commencing the exposition of a figure I shall fully explain\nall its parts. Such a course could not be followed by a teacher in a\nviva voce exposition, much less by an author in writing a book, without\nbecoming a target for every foolish conceited person to discharge the\narrows of folly at him. Some general principles bearing upon this point\nhave been fully discussed in our works on the Talmud, and we have there\ncalled the attention of the reader to many themes of this kind. We also\nstated (Mishneh torah, I. ii. 12, and iv. 10) that the expression\nMa\u02bbase Bereshit (Account of the Creation) signified \u201cNatural Science,\u201d\nand Ma\u02bbaseh Mercabah (\u201cDescription of the Chariot\u201d) Metaphysics, and we\nexplained the force of the Rabbinical dictum, \u201cThe Ma\u02bbaseh Mercabah\nmust not be fully expounded even in the presence of a single student,\nunless he be wise and able to reason for himself, and even then you\nshould merely acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of\nthe subject.\u201d (Babyl. Talm. \u1e24agigah, fol. 11 b). You must, therefore,\nnot expect from me more than such heads. And even these have not been\nmethodically and systematically arranged in this work, but have been,\non the contrary, scattered, and are interspersed with other topics\nwhich we shall have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this\narrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at\nanother time concealed. Thus we shall not be in opposition to the\nDivine Will (from which it is wrong to deviate) which has withheld from\nthe multitude the truths required for the knowledge of God, according\nto the words, \u201cThe secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him\u201d (Ps.\nxxv. 14).\n\nKnow that also in Natural Science there are topics which are not to be\nfully explained. Our Sages laid down the rule, \u201cThe Ma\u02bbaseh Bereshith\nmust not be expounded in the presence of two.\u201d If an author were to\nexplain these principles in writing, it would be equal to expounding\nthem unto thousands of men. For this reason the prophets treat these\nsubjects in figures, and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture,\nspeak of them in metaphors and allegories; because there is a close\naffinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed they form\npart of its mysteries. Do not imagine that these most difficult\nproblems can be thoroughly understood by any one of us. This is not the\ncase. At times the truth shines so brilliantly that we perceive it as\nclear as day. Our nature and habit then draw a veil over our\nperception, and we return to a darkness almost as dense as before. We\nare like those who, though beholding frequent flashes of lightning,\nstill find themselves in the thickest darkness of the night. On some\nthe lightning flashes in rapid succession, and they seem to be in\ncontinuous light, and their night is as clear as the day. This was the\ndegree of prophetic excellence attained by (Moses) the greatest of\nprophets, to whom God said, \u201cBut as for thee, stand thou here by Me\u201d\n(Deut. v. 31), and of whom it is written \u201cthe skin of his face shone,\u201d\netc. (Exod. xxxiv. 29). [Some perceive the prophetic flash at long\nintervals; this is the degree of most prophets.] By others only once\nduring the whole night is a flash of lightning perceived. This is the\ncase with those of whom we are informed, \u201cThey prophesied, and did not\nprophesy again\u201d (Num. xi. 25). There are some to whom the flashes of\nlightning appear with varying intervals; others are in the condition of\nmen, whose darkness is illumined not by lightning, but by some kind of\ncrystal or similar stone, or other substances that possess the property\nof shining during the night; and to them even this small amount of\nlight is not continuous, but now it shines and now it vanishes, as if\nit were \u201cthe flame of the rotating sword.\u201d\n\nThe degrees in the perfection of men vary according to these\ndistinctions. Concerning those who never beheld the light even for one\nday, but walk in continual darkness, it is written, \u201cThey know not,\nneither will they understand; they walk on in darkness\u201d (Ps. lxxxii.\n5). Truth, in spite of all its powerful manifestations, is completely\nwithheld from them, and the following words of Scripture may be applied\nto them, \u201cAnd now men see not the light which is bright in the skies\u201d\n(Job xxxvii. 21). They are the multitude of ordinary men; there is no\nneed to notice them in this treatise.\n\nYou must know that if a person, who has attained a certain degree of\nperfection, wishes to impart to others, either orally or in writing,\nany portion of the knowledge which he has acquired of these subjects,\nhe is utterly unable to be as systematic and explicit as he could be in\na science of which the method is well known. The same difficulties\nwhich he encountered when investigating the subject for himself will\nattend him when endeavouring to instruct others; viz., at one time the\nexplanation will appear lucid, at another time, obscure; this property\nof the subject appears to remain the same both to the advanced scholar\nand to the beginner. For this reason, great theological scholars gave\ninstruction in all such matters only by means of metaphors and\nallegories. They frequently employed them in forms varying more or less\nessentially. In most cases they placed the lesson to be illustrated at\nthe beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the simile. When they\ncould find no simile which from beginning to end corresponded to the\nidea which was to be illustrated, they divided the subject of the\nlesson, although in itself one whole, into different parts, and\nexpressed each by a separate figure. Still more obscure are those\ninstances in which one simile is employed to illustrate many subjects,\nthe beginning of the simile representing one thing, the end another.\nSometimes the whole metaphor may refer to two cognate subjects in the\nsame branch of knowledge.\n\nIf we were to teach in these disciplines, without the use of parables\nand figures, we should be compelled to resort to expressions both\nprofound and transcendental, and by no means more intelligible than\nmetaphors and similes; as though the wise and learned were drawn into\nthis course by the Divine Will, in the same way as they are compelled\nto follow the laws of nature in matters relating to the body. You are\nno doubt aware that the Almighty, desiring to lead us to perfection and\nto improve our state of society, has revealed to us laws which are to\nregulate our actions. These laws, however, presuppose an advanced state\nof intellectual culture. We must first form a conception of the\nExistence of the Creator according to our capabilities; that is, we\nmust have a knowledge of Metaphysics. But this discipline can only be\napproached after the study of Physics; for the science of Physics\nborders on Metaphysics, and must even precede it in the course of our\nstudies, as is clear to all who are familiar with these questions.\nTherefore the Almighty commenced Holy Writ with the description of the\nCreation, that is, with Physical Science; the subject being on the one\nhand most weighty and important, and on the other hand our means of\nfully comprehending those great problems being limited. He described\nthose profound truths, which His Divine Wisdom found it necessary to\ncommunicate to us, in allegorical, figurative, and metaphorical\nlanguage. Our Sages have said (Yemen Midrash on Gen. i. 1), \u201cIt is\nimpossible to give a full account of the Creation to man. Therefore\nScripture simply tells us, In the beginning God created the heavens and\nthe earth\u201d (Gen. i. 1). Thus they have suggested that this subject is a\ndeep mystery, and in the words of Solomon, \u201cFar off and exceedingly\ndeep, who can find it out?\u201d (Eccles. vii. 24). It has been treated in\nmetaphors in order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to\nthe measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their\napprehension, while educated persons may take it in a different sense.\nIn our commentary on the Mishnah we stated our intention to explain\ndifficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony.\nIn the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash\nwhich, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and\ncommon sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively. Many years have\nelapsed since I first commenced those works. I had proceeded but a\nshort way when I became dissatisfied with my original plan. For I\nobserved that by expounding these passages by means of allegorical and\nmystical terms, we do not explain anything, but merely substitute one\nthing for another of the same nature, whilst in explaining them fully\nour efforts would displease most people; and my sole object in planning\nto write those books was to make the contents of Midrashim and the\nexoteric lessons of the prophecies intelligible to everybody. We have\nfurther noticed that when an ill-informed Theologian reads these\nMidrashim, he will find no difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of\nthe properties of things, he will not reject statements which involve\nimpossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well\neducated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: either he\ntakes them literally, and questions the abilities of the author and the\nsoundness of his mind\u2014doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the\nprinciples of our faith,\u2014or he will acquiesce in assuming that the\npassages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to\nhold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory\nor not. As regards prophecy in its various degrees and the different\nmetaphors used in the prophetic books, we shall give in the present\nwork an explanation, according to a different method. Guided by these\nconsiderations I have refrained from writing those two books as I had\npreviously intended. In my larger work, the Mishnah Torah, I have\ncontented myself with briefly stating the principles of our faith and\nits fundamental truths, together with such hints as approach a clear\nexposition. In this work, however, I address those who have studied\nphilosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who while firm in\nreligious matters are perplexed and bewildered on account of the\nambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings.\nSome chapters may be found in this work which contain no reference\nwhatever to homonyms. Such chapters will serve as an introduction to\nothers; they will contain some reference to the signification of a\nhomonym which I do not wish to mention in that place, or explain some\nfigure; point out that a certain expression is a figure; treat of\ndifficult passages generally misunderstood in consequence of the\nhomonymy they include, or because the simile they contain is taken in\nplace of that which it represents, and vice vers\u00e2.\n\nHaving spoken of similes, I proceed to make the following remark:\u2014The\nkey to the understanding and to the full comprehension of all that the\nProphets have said is found in the knowledge of the figures, their\ngeneral ideas, and the meaning of each word they contain. You know the\nverse:\u2014\n\n\u201cI have also spoken in similes by the Prophets\u201d (Hosea xii. 10); and\nalso the verse, \u201cPut forth a riddle and speak a parable\u201d (Ezek. xvii.\n2). And because the Prophets continually employ figures, Ezekiel said,\n\u201cDoes He not speak parables?\u201d (xxi. 5). Again, Solomon begins his book\nof Proverbs with the words, \u201cTo understand a proverb and figurative\nspeech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings\u201d (Prov. i. 6); and\nwe read in Midrash, (Shir ha-shirim Rabba, i. 1); \u201cTo what were the\nwords of the Law to be compared before the time of Solomon? To a well\nthe waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh,\nyet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and\nrope with rope, and drew up and drank. So Solomon went from figure to\nfigure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of\nthe Law.\u201d So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any\nintelligent man thinks that \u201cthe words of the Law\u201d mentioned here as\nrequiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can\nrefer to the rules for building tabernacles, for preparing the lulab,\nor for the four kinds of trustees. What is really meant is the\napprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our\nSages said, \u201cIf a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can\nfind it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in\nthemselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the\nholy Law are rendered intelligible.\u201d These likewise are the words of\nour Sages; consider well their statement, that the deeper sense of the\nwords of the holy Law are pearls, and the literal acceptation of a\nfigure is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning\nincluded in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark\nroom, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in\nthe room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is\njust as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been\nstated, it affords him no benefit whatever until he kindles a light.\nThe same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile\nrepresents. The wise king said, \u201cA word fitly spoken is like apples of\ngold in vessels of silver\u201d (Prov. xxv. 11). Hear the explanation of\nwhat he said:\u2014The word maskiyoth, the Hebrew equivalent for \u201cvessels,\u201d\ndenotes \u201cfiligree network\u201d\u2014i.e., things in which there are very small\napertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are\ncalled in Hebrew maskiyyoth (lit. \u201ctranspicuous,\u201d from the verb sakah,\n\u201che saw,\u201d a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. xxvi.\n8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus Solomon meant to say,\n\u201cJust as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is\na word fitly spoken.\u201d\n\nSee how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in\nthis figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a\nliteral one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable\nas silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious; so that the\nfigurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold\nto silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase\nshall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the\nfigure represents. Just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of\nsilver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is\nmistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at\nthe object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is\ngold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken\nliterally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes,\namong others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g.,\nthe Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense.\nTheir hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the\nrecognition of real truth.\n\nKnow that the figures employed by prophets are of two kinds: first,\nwhere every word which occurs in the simile represents a certain idea;\nand secondly, where the simile, as a whole, represents a general idea,\nbut has a great many points which have no reference whatever to that\nidea; they are simply required to give to the simile its proper form\nand order, or better to conceal the idea; the simile is therefore\ncontinued as far as necessary, according to its literal sense. Consider\nthis well.\n\nAn example of the first class of prophetic figures is to be found in\nGenesis:\u2014\u201cAnd, behold, a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it\nreached to heaven; and, behold, the angels of God ascending and\ndescending on it\u201d (Gen. xxviii. 12). The word \u201cladder\u201d refers to one\nidea; \u201cset up on the earth\u201d to another; \u201cand the top of it reached to\nheaven\u201d to a third; \u201cangels of God\u201d to a fourth; \u201cascending\u201d to a\nfifth; \u201cdescending\u201d to a sixth; \u201cthe Lord stood above it\u201d (ver. 13) to\na seventh. Every word in this figure introduces a fresh element into\nthe idea represented by the figure.\n\nAn example of the second class of prophetic figures is found in\nProverbs (vii. 6\u201326):\u2014\u201cFor at the window of my house I looked through\nmy casement, and beheld among the simple ones; I discerned among the\nyouths a young man void of understanding, passing through the street\nnear her corner: and he went the way to her house, in the twilight, in\nthe evening, in the black and dark night: and, behold, there met him a\nwoman with the attire of a harlot, and subtil of heart. (She is loud\nand stubborn; her feet abide not in her house: now she is without, now\nin the streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught him,\nand kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto him, I have peace\nofferings with me; this day have I paid my vows. Therefore came I forth\nto meet thee, diligently to seek thy face, and I have found thee. I\nhave decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with striped cloths of\nthe yarn of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and\ncinnamon. Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning: let us\nsolace ourselves with loves. For the goodman is not at home, he is gone\na long journey: he hath taken a bag of money with him, and will come\nhome at the day appointed. With her much fair speech she caused him to\nyield, with the flattering of her lips she forced him. He goeth after\nher straightway, as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as fetters to the\ncorrection of a fool: till a dart strike through his liver; as a bird\nhasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life. Hearken\nunto me now therefore, O ye children, and attend to the words of my\nmouth. Let not thine heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her\npaths. For she hath cast down many wounded: yea, many strong men have\nbeen slain by her.\u201d\n\nThe general principle expounded in all these verses is to abstain from\nexcessive indulgence in bodily pleasures. The author compares the body,\nwhich is the source of all sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at\nthe same time is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of\nhis entire book. We shall hereafter show the wisdom of Solomon in\ncomparing sensual pleasures to an adulterous harlot. We shall explain\nhow aptly he concludes that work with the praises of a faithful wife\nwho devotes herself to the welfare of her husband and of her household.\nAll obstacles which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life,\nall the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil\npropensities, are to be traced to the body alone. This will be\nexplained later on. The predominant idea running throughout the figure\nis that man shall not be entirely guided by his animal, or material\nnature; for the material substance of man is identical with that of the\nbrute creation.\n\nAn adequate explanation of the figure having been given, and its\nmeaning having been shown, do not imagine that you will find in its\napplication a corresponding element for each part of the figure; you\nmust not ask what is meant by \u201cI have peace offerings with me\u201d (ver.\n14); by \u201cI have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry\u201d (ver. 16); or\nwhat is added to the force of the figure by the observation \u201cfor the\ngoodman is not at home\u201d (ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter.\nFor all this is merely to complete the illustration of the metaphor in\nits literal meaning. The circumstances described here are such as are\ncommon to adulterers. Such conversations take place between all\nadulterous persons. You must well understand what I have said, for it\nis a principle of the utmost importance with respect to those things\nwhich I intend to expound. If you observe in one of the chapters that I\nexplained the meaning of a certain figure, and pointed out to you its\ngeneral scope, do not trouble yourself further in order to find an\ninterpretation of each separate portion, for that would lead you to one\nof the two following erroneous courses; either you will miss the sense\nincluded in the metaphor, or you will be induced to explain certain\nthings which require no explanation, and which are not introduced for\nthat purpose. Through this unnecessary trouble you may fall into the\ngreat error which besets most modern sects in their foolish writings\nand discussions; they all endeavour to find some hidden meaning in\nexpressions which were never uttered by the author in that sense. Your\nobject should be to discover in most of the figures the general idea\nwhich the author wishes to express. In some instances it will be\nsufficient if you understand from my remarks that a certain expression\ncontains a figure, although I may offer no further comment. For when\nyou know that it is not to be taken literally, you will understand at\nonce to what subject it refers. My statement that it is a figurative\nexpression will, as it were, remove the screen from between the object\nand the observer.\n\n\n\n\nDIRECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THIS WORK.\n\nIf you desire to grasp all that is contained in this book so that\nnothing shall escape your notice, consider the chapters in connected\norder. In studying each chapter, do not content yourself with\ncomprehending its principal subject, but attend to every term mentioned\ntherein, although it may seem to have no connection with the principal\nsubject. For what I have written in this work was not the suggestion of\nthe moment; it is the result of deep study and great application. Care\nhas been taken that nothing that appeared doubtful should be left\nunexplained. Nothing of what is mentioned is out of place, every remark\nwill be found to illustrate the subject-matter of the respective\nchapter. Do not read superficially, lest you do me an injury, and\nderive no benefit for yourself. You must study thoroughly and read\ncontinually; for you will then find the solution of those important\nproblems of religion, which are a source of anxiety to all intelligent\nmen. I adjure any reader of my book, in the name of the Most High, not\nto add any explanation even to a single word; nor to explain to another\nany portion of it except such passages as have been fully treated of by\nprevious theological authorities; he must not teach others anything\nthat he has learnt from my work alone, and that has not been hitherto\ndiscussed by any of our authorities. The reader must, moreover, beware\nof raising objections to any of my statements, because it is very\nprobable that he may understand my words to mean the exact opposite to\nwhat I intended to say. He will injure me, while I endeavoured to\nbenefit him. \u201cHe will requite me evil for good.\u201d Let the reader make a\ncareful study of this work; and if his doubt be removed on even one\npoint, let him praise his Maker and rest contented with the knowledge\nhe has acquired. But if he derive from it no benefit whatever, he may\nconsider the book as if it had never been written. Should he notice any\nopinions with which he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a\nsuitable explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, in order that he may\njudge me charitably. Such a duty we owe to every one. We owe it\nespecially to our scholars and theologians, who endeavour to teach us\nwhat is the truth according to the best of their ability. I feel\nassured that those of my readers who have not studied philosophy, will\nstill derive profit from many a chapter. But the thinker whose studies\nhave brought him into collision with religion, will, as I have already\nmentioned, derive much benefit from every chapter. How greatly will he\nrejoice! How agreeably will my words strike his ears! Those, however,\nwhose minds are confused with false notions and perverse methods, who\nregard their misleading studies as sciences, and imagine themselves\nphilosophers, though they have no knowledge that could truly be termed\nscience, will object to many chapters, and will find in them many\ninsuperable difficulties, because they do not understand their meaning,\nand because I expose therein the absurdity of their perverse notions,\nwhich constitute their riches and peculiar treasure, \u201cstored up for\ntheir ruin.\u201d God knows that I hesitated very much before writing on the\nsubjects contained in this work, since they are profound mysteries;\nthey are topics which, since the time of our captivity have not been\ntreated by any of our scholars as far as we possess their writings; how\nthen shall I now make a beginning and discuss them? But I rely on two\nprecedents: first, to similar cases our Sages applied the verse, \u201cIt is\ntime to do something in honour of the Lord: for they have made void thy\nlaw\u201d (Ps. cxix. 126). Secondly, they have said, \u201cLet all thy acts be\nguided by pure intentions.\u201d On these two principles I relied while\ncomposing some parts of this work. Lastly, when I have a difficult\nsubject before me\u2014when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way\nof teaching a well established truth except by pleasing one intelligent\nman and displeasing ten thousand fools\u2014I prefer to address myself to\nthe one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the\nmultitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his\nembarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may\nattain perfection and be at peace.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY REMARKS.\n\n[On Method.]\n\nThere are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met\nwith in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the\nauthor collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the\nother, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular\nopinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur,\nsince any two statements may belong to two different authors. Second\ncause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently\nrejects; in his work, however, both his original and altered views are\nretained. Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken\nliterally; some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while\nin others figurative language is employed, which includes another\nmeaning besides the literal one: or, in the apparently inconsistent\npassages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally,\nwould seem to be contradictories or contraries. Fourth cause: The\npremises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons\nthey are not fully stated in these passages; or two propositions with\ndifferent subjects which are expressed by the same term without having\nthe difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The\ncontradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction\nin reality. The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method\nadopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a\ndifficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed\nas known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible\nsubject which must be taught beforehand, the commencement being always\nmade with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in\nany manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems,\nwhich have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with\ngiving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It\nis, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the\nstudents, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to\nunderstand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly\ntreated and fully developed in its right place. Sixth cause: The\ncontradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a\nseries of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to\nprove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the\nchance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not\nperceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by\nmeans of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the\nenunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other\nconclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many\ntimes, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are\ncontradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook\nsuch inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the\noriginal statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while\nwriting the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater\ndeficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: It\nis sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may\npartly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed; while, therefore, on\none occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that\nthe metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be\nconvenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite\nway. The author must endeavour, by concealing the fact as much as\npossible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the\ncontradiction.\n\nInconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Boraitot are traceable to\nthe first cause. You meet frequently in the Gemara with passages like\nthe following:\u2014\u201cDoes not the beginning of the passage contradict the\nend? No; the beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi; the end that\nof another\u201d; or \u201cRabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the opinion of a\ncertain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, and having\naccepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced that\nview without naming the authority\u201d; or \u201cWho is the author of this\nanonymous dictum? Rabbi A.\u201d \u201cWho is the author of that paragraph in the\nMishnah? Rabbi B.\u201d Instances of this kind are innumerable.\n\nApparent contradictions or differences occurring in the Gemara may be\ntraced to the first cause and to the second, as e.g., \u201cIn this\nparticular case he agrees with this rabbi\u201d; or \u201cHe agrees with him in\none point, but differs from him in another\u201d; or \u201cThese two dicta are\nthe opinions of two Amoraim, who differ as regards the statement made\nby a certain rabbi.\u201d These are examples of contradictions traceable to\nthe first cause. The following are instances which may be traced to the\nsecond cause. \u201cRabba altered his opinion on that point\u201d; it then\nbecomes necessary to consider which of the two opinions came second.\nAgain, \u201cIn the first recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one\nassertion, and in the second a different one.\u201d\n\nThe inconsistencies and contradictions met with in some passages of the\nprophetic books, if taken literally, are all traceable to the third or\nfourth cause, and it is exclusively in reference to this subject that I\nwrote the present Introduction. You know that the following expression\nfrequently occurs, \u201cOne verse says this, another that,\u201d showing the\ncontradiction, and explaining that either some premise is wanting or\nthe subject is altered. Comp. \u201cSolomon, it is not sufficient that thy\nwords contradict thy father; they are themselves inconsistent, etc.\u201d\nMany similar instances occur in the writings of our Sages. The passages\nin the prophetical books which our Sages have explained, mostly refer\nto religious or moral precepts. Our desire, however, is to discuss such\npassages as contain apparent contradictions in regard to the principles\nof our faith. I shall explain some of them in various chapters of the\npresent work; for this subject also belongs to the secrets of the\nTorah.\n\nContradictions traceable to the seventh cause occurring in the\nprophetical works require special investigation; and no one should\nexpress his opinion on that matter by reasoning and arguing without\nweighing the matter well in his mind.\n\nInconsistencies in the writings of true philosophers are traceable to\nthe fifth cause. Contradictions occurring in the writings of most\nauthors and commentators, such as are not included in the\nabove-mentioned works, are due to the sixth cause. Many examples of\nthis class of contradictions are found in the Midrash and the Agada;\nhence the saying, \u201cWe must not raise questions concerning the\ncontradictions met with in the Agada.\u201d You may also notice in them\ncontradictions due to the seventh cause. Any inconsistency discovered\nin the present work will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth\ncause or the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember it\nwell, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this book.\n\nHaving concluded these introductory remarks I proceed to examine those\nexpressions, to the true meaning of which, as apparent from the\ncontext, it is necessary to direct your attention. This book will then\nbe a key admitting to places the gates of which would otherwise be\nclosed. When the gates are opened and men enter, their souls will enjoy\nrepose, their eyes will be gratified, and even their bodies, after all\ntoil and labour, will be refreshed.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\n \u201cOpen ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth \n the truth may enter in.\u201d\u2014(Isa. xxvi. 2.)\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nSome have been of opinion that by the Hebrew \u1e93elem, the shape and\nfigure of a thing is to be understood, and this explanation led men to\nbelieve in the corporeality [of the Divine Being]: for they thought\nthat the words \u201cLet us make man in our \u1e93elem\u201d (Gen. i. 26), implied\nthat God had the form of a human being, i.e., that He had figure and\nshape, and that, consequently, He was corporeal. They adhered\nfaithfully to this view, and thought that if they were to relinquish it\nthey would eo ipso reject the truth of the Bible: and further, if they\ndid not conceive God as having a body possessed of face and limbs,\nsimilar to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even the\nexistence of God. The sole difference which they admitted, was that He\nexcelled in greatness and splendour, and that His substance was not\nflesh and blood. Thus far went their conception of the greatness and\nglory of God. The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in\nthe true sense of the word\u2014for there is no real unity without\nincorporeality\u2014will be fully proved in the course of the present\ntreatise. (Part II., ch. i.) In this chapter it is our sole intention\nto explain the meaning of the words \u1e93elem and demut. I hold that the\nHebrew equivalent of \u201cform\u201d in the ordinary acceptation of the word,\nviz., the figure and shape of a thing, is to\u00e4r. Thus we find \u201c[And\nJoseph was] beautiful in to\u00e4r (\u2018form\u2019), and beautiful in appearance\u201d\n(Gen. xxxix. 6): \u201cWhat form (to\u00e4r) is he of?\u201d (1 Sam. xxviii. 14): \u201cAs\nthe form (to\u00e4r) of the children of a king\u201d (Judges viii. 18). It is\nalso applied to form produced by human labour, as \u201cHe marketh its form\n(to\u00e4r) with a line,\u201d \u201cand he marketh its form (to\u00e4r) with the compass\u201d\n(Isa. xliv. 13). This term is not at all applicable to God. The term\n\u1e93elem, on the other hand, signifies the specific form, viz., that which\nconstitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what it is;\nthe reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular being. In man\nthe \u201cform\u201d is that constituent which gives him human perception: and on\naccount of this intellectual perception the term \u1e93elem is employed in\nthe sentences \u201cIn the \u1e93elem of God he created him\u201d (Gen. i. 27). It is\ntherefore rightly said, \u201cThou despisest their \u1e93elem\u201d (Ps. lxiii. 20);\nthe \u201ccontempt\u201d can only concern the soul\u2014the specific form of man, not\nthe properties and shape of his body. I am also of opinion that the\nreason why this term is used for \u201cidols\u201d may be found in the\ncircumstance that they are worshipped on account of some idea\nrepresented by them, not on account of their figure and shape. For the\nsame reason the term is used in the expression, \u201cthe forms (\u1e93alme) of\nyour emerods\u201d (1 Sam. vi. 5), for the chief object was the removal of\nthe injury caused by the emerods, not a change of their shape. As,\nhowever, it must be admitted that the term \u1e93elem is employed in these\ntwo cases, viz. \u201cthe images of the emerods\u201d and \u201cthe idols\u201d on account\nof the external shape, the term \u1e93elem is either a homonym or a hybrid\nterm, and would denote both the specific form and the outward shape,\nand similar properties relating to the dimensions and the shape of\nmaterial bodies; and in the phrase \u201cLet us make man in our \u1e93elem\u201d (Gen.\ni. 26), the term signifies \u201cthe specific form\u201d of man, viz., his\nintellectual perception, and does not refer to his \u201cfigure\u201d or \u201cshape.\u201d\nThus we have shown the difference between \u1e93elem and to\u00e4r, and explained\nthe meaning of \u1e93elem.\n\nDemut is derived from the verb damah, \u201che is like.\u201d This term likewise\ndenotes agreement with regard to some abstract relation: comp. \u201cI am\nlike a pelican of the wilderness\u201d (Ps. cii. 7); the author does not\ncompare himself to the pelican in point of wings and feathers, but in\npoint of sadness. \u201cNor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him\nin beauty\u201d (Ezek. xxxi. 8); the comparison refers to the idea of\nbeauty. \u201cTheir poison is like the poison of a serpent\u201d (Ps. lviii. 5);\n\u201cHe is like unto a lion\u201d (Ps. xvii. 12); the resemblance indicated in\nthese passages does not refer to the figure and shape, but to some\nabstract idea. In the same manner is used \u201cthe likeness of the throne\u201d\n(Ezek. i. 26); the comparison is made with regard to greatness and\nglory, not, as many believe, with regard to its square form, its\nbreadth, or the length of its legs: this explanation applies also to\nthe phrase \u201cthe likeness of the \u1e25ayyot\u201d (\u201cliving creatures,\u201d Ezek. i.\n13).\n\nAs man\u2019s distinction consists in a property which no other creature on\nearth possesses, viz., intellectual perception, in the exercise of\nwhich he does not employ his senses, nor move his hand or his foot,\nthis perception has been compared\u2014though only apparently, not in\ntruth\u2014to the Divine perception, which requires no corporeal organ. On\nthis account, i.e., on account of the Divine intellect with which man\nhas been endowed, he is said to have been made in the form and likeness\nof the Almighty, but far from it be the notion that the Supreme Being\nis corporeal, having a material form.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nSome years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance;\nthe problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the\nclosest attention. Before, however, entering upon this problem and its\nsolution I must premise that every Hebrew knows that the term Elohim is\na homonym, and denotes God, angels, judges, and the rulers of\ncountries, and that Onkelos the proselyte explained it in the true and\ncorrect manner by taking Elohim in the sentence, \u201cand ye shall be like\nElohim\u201d (Gen. iii. 5) in the last-mentioned meaning, and rendering the\nsentence \u201cand ye shall be like princes.\u201d Having pointed out the\nhomonymity of the term \u201cElohim\u201d we return to the question under\nconsideration. \u201cIt would at first sight,\u201d said the objector, \u201cappear\nfrom Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal\nto the rest of the animal creation, which is not endowed with\nintellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil:\nbut that Adam\u2019s disobedience to the command of God procured him that\ngreat perfection which is the peculiarity of man, viz., the power of\ndistinguishing between good and evil\u2014the noblest of all the faculties\nof our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus\nappears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the\nmeans of elevating man to a pinnacle of perfection to which he had not\nattained previously. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man\nwas rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed\nfor the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.\u201d\nSuch was the purport and subject of the question, though not in the\nexact words of the inquirer. Now mark our reply, which was as\nfollows:\u2014\u201cYou appear to have studied the matter superficially, and\nnevertheless you imagine that you can understand a book which has been\nthe guide of past and present generations, when you for a moment\nwithdraw from your lusts and appetites, and glance over its contents as\nif you were reading a historical work or some poetical composition.\nCollect your thoughts and examine the matter carefully, for it is not\nto be understood as you at first sight think, but as you will find\nafter due deliberation; namely, the intellect which was granted to man\nas the highest endowment, was bestowed on him before his disobedience.\nWith reference to this gift the Bible states that \u201cman was created in\nthe form and likeness of God.\u201d On account of this gift of intellect man\nwas addressed by God, and received His commandments, as it is said:\n\u201cAnd the Lord God commanded Adam\u201d (Gen. ii. 16)\u2014for no commandments are\ngiven to the brute creation or to those who are devoid of\nunderstanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true\nand the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely.\nThe right and the wrong are terms employed in the science of apparent\ntruths (morals), not in that of necessary truths, as, e.g., it is not\ncorrect to say, in reference to the proposition \u201cthe heavens are\nspherical,\u201d it is \u201cgood\u201d or to declare the assertion that \u201cthe earth is\nflat\u201d to be \u201cbad\u201d; but we say of the one it is true, of the other it is\nfalse. Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by\nthe terms emet and sheker, of the morally right and the morally wrong,\nby tob and ra\u2019. Thus it is the function of the intellect to\ndiscriminate between the true and the false\u2014a distinction which is\napplicable to all objects of intellectual perception. When Adam was yet\nin a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and\nreason\u2014on account of which it is said: \u201cThou hast made him (man) little\nlower than the angels\u201d (Ps. viii. 6)\u2014he was not at all able to follow\nor to understand the principles of apparent truths; the most manifest\nimpropriety, viz., to appear in a state of nudity, was nothing\nunbecoming according to his idea: he could not comprehend why it should\nbe so. After man\u2019s disobedience, however, when he began to give way to\ndesires which had their source in his imagination and to the\ngratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, \u201cAnd the wife saw\nthat the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes\u201d (Gen. iii.\n6), he was punished by the loss of part of that intellectual faculty\nwhich he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command\nwith which he had been charged on the score of his reason; and having\nobtained a knowledge of the apparent truths, he was wholly absorbed in\nthe study of what is proper and what improper. Then he fully understood\nthe magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and\nin what situation he was thereby placed. Hence we read, \u201cAnd ye shall\nbe like elohim, knowing good and evil,\u201d and not \u201cknowing\u201d or\n\u201cdiscerning the true and the false\u201d: while in necessary truths we can\nonly apply the words \u201ctrue and false,\u201d not \u201cgood and evil.\u201d Further\nobserve the passage, \u201cAnd the eyes of both were opened, and they knew\nthey were naked\u201d (Gen. iii. 7): it is not said, \u201cAnd the eyes of both\nwere opened, and they saw\u201d; for what the man had seen previously and\nwhat he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same; there had\nbeen no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty\nwhereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as\nwrong. Besides, you must know that the Hebrew word paka\u1e25 used in this\npassage is exclusively employed in the figurative sense of receiving\nnew sources of knowledge, not in that of regaining the sense of sight.\nComp., \u201cGod opened her eyes\u201d (Gen. xxi. 19). \u201cThen shall the eyes of\nthe blind be opened\u201d (Isaiah xxxviii. 8). \u201cOpen ears, he heareth not\u201d\n(ibid. xlii. 20), similar in sense to the verse, \u201cWhich have eyes to\nsee, and see not\u201d (Ezek. xii. 2). When, however, Scripture says of\nAdam, \u201cHe changed his face (panav) and thou sentest him forth\u201d (Job\nxiv. 20), it must be understood in the following way: On account of the\nchange of his original aim he was sent away. For panim, the Hebrew\nequivalent of face, is derived from the verb panah, \u201che turned,\u201d and\nsignifies also \u201caim,\u201d because man generally turns his face towards the\nthing he desires. In accordance with this interpretation, our text\nsuggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his\nthoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished\nfrom Paradise: this was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At\nfirst he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of\nenjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and\nhe followed his desires and impulses, (as we have already stated\nabove), and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was\ndeprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of\nfood, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion\nand labour, as it is said, \u201cThorns and thistles shall grow up for thee\u201d\n(Gen. iii. 18), \u201cBy the sweat of thy brow,\u201d etc., and in explanation of\nthis the text continues, \u201cAnd the Lord God drove him from the Garden of\nEden, to till the ground whence he was taken.\u201d He was now with respect\nto food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower\nanimals; comp., \u201cThou shalt eat the grass of the field\u201d (Gen. iii. 18).\nReflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says, \u201cAdam unable to dwell\nin dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast\u201d (Ps. xlix. 13).\n\n\u201cMay the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be\nfathomed.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nIt might be thought that the Hebrew words temunah and tabnit have one\nand the same meaning, but this is not the case. Tabnit, derived from\nthe verb banah (he built), signifies the build and construction of a\nthing\u2014that is to say, its figure, whether square, round, triangular, or\nof any other shape. Comp. \u201cthe pattern (tabnit) of the Tabernacle and\nthe pattern (tabnit) of all its vessels\u201d (Exod. xxv. 9); \u201caccording to\nthe pattern (tabnit) which thou wast shown upon the mount\u201d (Exod. xxv.\n40); \u201cthe form of any bird\u201d (Deut. iv. 17); \u201cthe form (tabnit) of a\nhand\u201d (Ezek. viii. 3); \u201cthe pattern (tabnit) of the porch\u201d (1 Chron.\nxxviii. 11). In all these quotations it is the shape which is referred\nto. Therefore the Hebrew language never employs the word tabnit in\nspeaking of the qualities of God Almighty.\n\nThe term temunah, on the other hand, is used in the Bible in three\ndifferent senses. It signifies, first, the outlines of things which are\nperceived by our bodily senses, i.e., their shape and form; as, e.g.,\n\u201cAnd ye make an image the form (temunat) of some likeness\u201d (Deut. iv.\n16); \u201cfor ye saw no likeness\u201d (temunah) (Deut. iv. 15). Secondly, the\nforms of our imagination, i.e., the impressions retained in imagination\nwhen the objects have ceased to affect our senses. In this sense it is\nused in the passage which begins \u201cIn thoughts from the visions of the\nnight\u201d (Job iv. 13), and which concludes \u201cit remained but I could not\nrecognize its sight, only an image\u2014temunah\u2014was before my eyes,\u201d i.e.,\nan image which presented itself to my sight during sleep. Thirdly, the\ntrue form of an object, which is perceived only by the intellect: and\nit is in this third signification that the term is applied to God. The\nwords \u201cAnd the similitude of the Lord shall he behold\u201d (Num. xii. 8)\ntherefore mean \u201che shall comprehend the true essence of the Lord.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nThe three verbs raah, hibbit, and \u1e25azah, which denote \u201che perceived\nwith the eye,\u201d are also used figuratively in the sense of intellectual\nperception. As regards the first of these verbs this is well known,\ne.g., \u201cAnd he looked (va-yar) and behold a well in the field\u201d (Gen.\nxxix. 2): here it signifies ocular perception; \u201cyea, my heart has seen\n(raah) much of wisdom and of knowledge\u201d (Eccles. i. 16); in this\npassage it refers to the intellectual perception.\n\nIn this figurative sense the verb is to be understood, when applied to\nGod; e.g., \u201cI saw (ra\u00efti) the Lord\u201d (1 Kings xxii. 19); \u201cAnd the Lord\nappeared (va-yera) unto him\u201d (Gen. xviii. 1); \u201cAnd God saw (va-yar)\nthat it was good\u201d (Gen. i. 10); \u201cI beseech thee, show me (hareni) thy\nglory\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 18); \u201cAnd they saw (va-yir\u00fc) the God of Israel\u201d\n(Exod. xxiv. 10). All these instances refer to intellectual perception,\nand by no means to perception with the eye as in its literal meaning:\nfor, on the one hand, the eye can only perceive a corporeal object, and\nin connection with it certain accidents, as colour, shape, etc.; and,\non the other hand, God does not perceive by means of a corporeal organ,\nas will be explained.\n\nIn the same manner the Hebrew hibbit signifies \u201che viewed\u201d with the\neye; comp. \u201cLook (tabbit) not behind thee\u201d (Gen. xix. 17); \u201cBut his\nwife looked (va-tabbet) back from him\u201d (Gen. xix. 26); \u201cAnd if one look\n(ve-nibbat) unto the land\u201d (Isa. v. 30); and figuratively, \u201cto view and\nobserve\u201d with the intellect, \u201cto contemplate\u201d a thing till it be\nunderstood. In this sense the verb is used in passages like the\nfollowing: \u201cHe hath not beheld (hibbit) iniquity in Jacob\u201d (Num. xxiii.\n21); for \u201ciniquity\u201d cannot be seen with the eye. The words, \u201cAnd they\nlooked (ve-hibbitu) after Moses\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 8)\u2014in addition to the\nliteral understanding of the phrase\u2014were explained by our Sages in a\nfigurative sense. According to them, these words mean that the\nIsraelites examined and criticised the actions and sayings of Moses.\nCompare also \u201cContemplate (habbet), I pray thee, the heaven\u201d (Gen. xv.\n5); for this took place in a prophetic vision. This verb, when applied\nto God, is employed in this figurative sense; e.g., \u201cto look\n(me-habbit) upon God\u201d (Exod. iii. 6); \u201cAnd the similitude of the Lord\nshall he behold\u201d (yabbit) (Num. xii. 8); \u201cAnd thou canst not look\n(habbet) on iniquity\u201d (Hab. i. 13).\n\nThe same explanation applies to \u1e25azah. It denotes to view with the eye,\nas: \u201cAnd let our eye look (ve-ta\u1e25az) upon Zion\u201d (Mic. iv. 11); and also\nfiguratively, to perceive mentally: \u201cwhich he saw (\u1e25azah) concerning\nJudah and Jerusalem\u201d (Isa. i. 1); \u201cThe word of the Lord came unto\nAbraham in a vision\u201d (ma\u1e25azeh) (Gen. xv. 1): in this sense \u1e25azah is\nused in the phrase, \u201cAlso they saw (va-ye\u1e25ezu) God\u201d (Exod. xxiv. 11).\nNote this well.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nWhen the chief of philosophers [Aristotle] was about to inquire into\nsome very profound subjects, and to establish his theory by proofs, he\ncommenced his treatise with an apology, and requested the reader to\nattribute the author\u2019s inquiries not to presumption, vanity, egotism,\nor arrogance, as though he were interfering with things of which he had\nno knowledge, but rather to his zeal and his desire to discover and\nestablish true doctrines, as far as lay in human power. We take the\nsame position, and think that a man, when he commences to speculate,\nought not to embark at once on a subject so vast and important; he\nshould previously adapt himself to the study of the several branches of\nscience and knowledge, should most thoroughly refine his moral\ncharacter and subdue his passions and desires, the offspring of his\nimagination; when, in addition, he has obtained a knowledge of the true\nfundamental propositions, a comprehension of the several methods of\ninference and proof, and the capacity of guarding against fallacies,\nthen he may approach the investigation of this subject. He must,\nhowever, not decide any question by the first idea that suggests itself\nto his mind, or at once direct his thoughts and force them to obtain a\nknowledge of the Creator, but he must wait modestly and patiently, and\nadvance step by step.\n\nIn this sense we must understand the words \u201cAnd Moses hid his face, for\nhe was afraid to look upon God\u201d (Exod. iii. 6), though retaining also\nthe literal meaning of the passage, that Moses was afraid to gaze at\nthe light which appeared to his eye; but it must on no account be\nassumed that the Being which is exalted far above every imperfection\ncan be perceived by the eye. This act of Moses was highly commended by\nGod, who bestowed on him a well deserved portion of His goodness, as it\nis said: \u201cAnd the similitude of the Lord shall he behold\u201d (Num. xii.\n8). This, say our Sages, was the reward for having previously hidden\nhis face, lest he should gaze at the Eternal. (Talm. B. Berakot Fa.)\n\nBut \u201cthe nobles of the Children of Israel\u201d were impetuous, and allowed\ntheir thoughts to go unrestrained: what they perceived was but\nimperfect. Therefore it is said of them, \u201cAnd they saw the God of\nIsrael, and there was under his feet,\u201d etc. (Exod. xxiv. 10); and not\nmerely, \u201cand they saw the God of Israel\u201d; the purpose of the whole\npassage is to criticize their act of seeing and not to describe it.\nThey are blamed for the nature of their perception, which was to a\ncertain extent corporeal\u2014a result which necessarily followed, from the\nfact that they ventured too far before being perfectly prepared. They\ndeserved to perish, but at the intercession of Moses this fate was\naverted by God for the time. They were afterwards burnt at Taberah,\nexcept Nadab and Abihu, who were burnt in the Tabernacle of the\ncongregation, according to what is stated by authentic tradition.\n(Midr. Rabba ad locum.)\n\nIf such was the case with them, how much more is it incumbent on us who\nare inferior, and on those who are below us, to persevere in perfecting\nour knowledge of the elements, and in rightly understanding the\npreliminaries which purify the mind from the defilement of error; then\nwe may enter the holy and divine camp in order to gaze: as the Bible\nsays, \u201cAnd let the priests also, which come near to the Lord, sanctify\nthemselves, lest the Lord break forth upon them\u201d (Exod. xix. 22).\nSolomon, also, has cautioned all who endeavour to attain this high\ndegree of knowledge in the following figurative terms, \u201cKeep thy foot\nwhen thou goest to the house of God\u201d (Eccles. iv. 17).\n\nI will now return to complete what I commenced to explain. The nobles\nof the Children of Israel, besides erring in their perception, were,\nthrough this cause, also misled in their actions; for in consequence of\ntheir confused perception, they gave way to bodily cravings. This is\nmeant by the words, \u201cAlso they saw God and did eat and drink\u201d (Exod.\nxxiv. 11). The principal part of that passage, viz., \u201cAnd there was\nunder his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone\u201d (Exod.\nxxiv. 10), will be further explained in the course of the present\ntreatise (ch. xxviii.). All we here intend to say is, that wherever in\na similar connection any one of the three verbs mentioned above occurs,\nit has reference to intellectual perception, not to the sensation of\nsight by the eye; for God is not a being to be perceived by the eye.\n\nIt will do no harm, however, if those who are unable to comprehend what\nwe here endeavour to explain should refer all the words in question to\nsensuous perception, to seeing lights created [for the purpose],\nangels, or similar beings.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nThe two Hebrew nouns ish and ishshah were originally employed to\ndesignate the \u201cmale and female\u201d of human beings, but were afterwards\napplied to the \u201cmale and female\u201d of the other species of the animal\ncreation. For instance, we read, \u201cOf every clean beast thou shalt take\nto thee by sevens,\u201d ish ve-ishto (Gen. vii. 2), in the same sense as\nish ve-ishshah, \u201cmale and female.\u201d The term zakar u-nekebah was\nafterwards applied to anything designed and prepared for union with\nanother object. Thus we read, \u201cThe five curtains shall be coupled\ntogether, one (ishshah) to the other\u201d (a\u1e25otah) (Exod. xxvi. 3).\n\nIt will easily be seen that the Hebrew equivalents for \u201cbrother and\nsister\u201d are likewise treated as homonyms, and used, in a figurative\nsense, like ish and ishshah.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nIt is well known that the verb yalad means \u201cto bear,\u201d \u201cthey have born\n(ve-yaledu) him children\u201d (Deut. xxi. 15). The word was next used in a\nfigurative sense with reference to various objects in nature, meaning,\n\u201cto create,\u201d e.g. \u201cbefore the mountains were created\u201d (yulladu) (Ps.\nxc. 2); also, \u201cto produce,\u201d in reference to that which the earth causes\nto come forth as if by birth, e.g., \u201cHe will cause her to bear\n(holidah) and bring forth\u201d (Isa. lv. 10). The verb further denotes, \u201cto\nbring forth,\u201d said of changes in the process of time, as though they\nwere things which were born, e.g., \u201cfor thou knowest not what a day may\nbring forth\u201d (yeled) (Prov. xxvii. 1). Another figurative use of the\nword is its application to the formation of thoughts and ideas, or of\nopinions resulting from them; comp. \u201cand brought forth (ve-yalad)\nfalsehood\u201d (Ps. vii. 14); also, \u201cand they please themselves in the\nchildren (yalde) of strangers\u201d (Isa. ii. 6), i.e., \u201cthey delight in the\nopinions of strangers.\u201d Jonathan the son of Uzziel paraphrases this\npassage, \u201cthey walk in the customs of other nations.\u201d\n\nA man who has instructed another in any subject, and has improved his\nknowledge, may in like manner be regarded as the parent of the person\ntaught, because he is the author of that knowledge; and thus the pupils\nof the prophets are called \u201csons of the prophets,\u201d as I shall explain\nwhen treating of the homonymity of ben (son). In this figurative sense,\nthe verb yalad (to bear) is employed when it is said of Adam, \u201cAnd Adam\nlived an hundred and thirty years, and begat (va-yoled) a son in his\nown likeness, in his form\u201d (Gen. v. 3). As regards the words, \u201cthe form\nof Adam, and his likeness,\u201d we have already stated (ch. i.) their\nmeaning. Those sons of Adam who were born before that time were not\nhuman in the true sense of the word, they had not \u201cthe form of man.\u201d\nWith reference to Seth who had been instructed, enlightened and brought\nto human perfection, it could rightly be said, \u201che (Adam) begat a son\nin his likeness, in his form.\u201d It is acknowledged that a man who does\nnot possess this \u201cform\u201d (the nature of which has just been explained)\nis not human, but a mere animal in human shape and form. Yet such a\ncreature has the power of causing harm and injury: a power which does\nnot belong to other creatures. For those gifts of intelligence and\njudgment with which he has been endowed for the purpose of acquiring\nperfection, but which he has failed to apply to their proper aim, are\nused by him for wicked and mischievous ends; he begets evil things, as\nthough he merely resembled man, or simulated his outward appearance.\nSuch was the condition of those sons of Adam who preceded Seth. In\nreference to this subject the Midrash says: \u201cDuring the 130 years when\nAdam was under rebuke he begat spirits,\u201d i.e., demons; when, however,\nhe was again restored to divine favour \u201che begat in his likeness, in\nhis form.\u201d This is the sense of the passage, \u201cAdam lived one hundred\nand thirty years, and he begat in his likeness, in his form\u201d (Gen. v.\n3).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nOriginally the Hebrew term makom (place) applied both to a particular\nspot and to space in general; subsequently it received a wider\nsignification and denoted \u201cposition,\u201d or \u201cdegree,\u201d as regards the\nperfection of man in certain things. We say, e.g., this man occupies a\ncertain place in such and such a subject. In this sense this term, as\nis well known, is frequently used by authors, e.g., \u201cHe fills his\nancestors\u2019 place (makom) in point of wisdom and piety\u201d; \u201cthe dispute\nstill remains in its place\u201d (makom), i.e., in statu quo [ante]. In the\nverse, \u201cBlessed be the glory of the Lord from His place\u201d (mekomo)\n(Ezek. iii. 12), makom has this figurative meaning, and the verse may\nbe paraphrased \u201cBlessed be the Lord according to the exalted nature of\nHis existence,\u201d and wherever makom is applied to God, it expresses the\nsame idea, namely, the distinguished position of His existence, to\nwhich nothing is equal or comparable, as will be shown below (chap.\nlvi.).\n\nIt should be observed that when we treat in this work of any homonym,\nwe do not desire you to confine yourself to that which is stated in\nthat particular chapter; but we open for you a portal and direct your\nattention to those significations of the word which are suited to our\npurpose, though they may not be complete from a philological point of\nview. You should examine the prophetical books and other works composed\nby men of science, notice the meaning of every word which occurs in\nthem, and take homonyms in that sense which is in harmony with the\ncontext. What I say in a particular passage is a key for the\ncomprehension of all similar passages. For example, we have explained\nhere makom in the sentence \u201cBlessed be the glory of the Lord from His\nplace\u201d (mekomo); but you must understand that the word makom has the\nsame signification in the passage \u201cBehold, a place (makom) is with me\u201d\n(Exod. xxxiii. 26), viz., a certain degree of contemplation and\nintellectual intuition (not of ocular inspection), in addition to its\nliteral meaning \u201ca place,\u201d viz., the mountain which was pointed out to\nMoses for seclusion and for the attainment of perfection.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nThe original meaning of the word kisse, \u201cthrone,\u201d requires no comment.\nSince men of greatness and authority, as, e.g., kings, use the throne\nas a seat, and \u201cthe throne\u201d thus indicates the rank, dignity, and\nposition of the person for whom it is made, the Sanctuary has been\nstyled \u201cthe throne,\u201d inasmuch as it likewise indicates the superiority\nof Him who manifests Himself, and causes His light and glory to dwell\ntherein. Comp. \u201cA glorious throne on high from the beginning is the\nplace of our sanctuary\u201d (Jer. xvii. 12). For the same reason the\nheavens are called \u201cthrone,\u201d for to the mind of him who observes them\nwith intelligence they suggest the Omnipotence of the Being which has\ncalled them into existence, regulates their motions, and governs the\nsublunary world by their beneficial influence: as we read, \u201cThus saith\nthe Lord, The heavens are my throne and the earth my footstool\u201d (Isa.\nlxvi. 1); i.e., they testify to my Existence, my Essence, and my\nOmnipotence, as the throne testifies to the greatness of him who is\nworthy to occupy it.\n\nThis is the idea which true believers should entertain; not, however,\nthat the Omnipotent, Supreme God is supported by any material object;\nfor God is incorporeal, as we shall prove further on; how, then, can He\nbe said to occupy any space, or rest on a body? The fact which I wish\nto point out is this: every place distinguished by the Almighty, and\nchosen to receive His light and splendour, as, for instance, the\nSanctuary or the Heavens, is termed \u201cthrone\u201d; and, taken in a wider\nsense, as in the passage \u201cFor my hand is upon the throne of God\u201d (Exod.\nxvii. 16), \u201cthe throne\u201d denotes here the Essence and Greatness of God.\nThese, however (the Essence and Greatness of God) need not be\nconsidered as something separate from the God Himself or as part of the\nCreation, so that God would appear to have existed both without the\nthrone, and with the throne; such a belief would be undoubtedly\nheretical. It is distinctly stated, \u201cThou, O Lord, remainest for ever;\nThy throne from generation to generation\u201d (Lam. v. 19). By \u201cThy throne\u201d\nwe must, therefore, understand something inseparable from God. On that\naccount, both here and in all similar passages, the word \u201cthrone\u201d\ndenotes God\u2019s Greatness and Essence, which are inseparable from His\nBeing.\n\nOur opinion will be further elucidated in the course of this Treatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nWe have already remarked that when we treat in this work of homonyms,\nwe have not the intention to exhaust the meanings of a word (for this\nis not a philological treatise); we shall mention no other\nsignifications but those which bear on our subject. We shall thus\nproceed in our treatment of the terms \u02bbalah and yarad.\n\nThese two words, \u02bbalah, \u201che went up,\u201d and yarad, \u201che went down,\u201d are\nHebrew terms used in the sense of ascending and descending. When a body\nmoves from a higher to a lower place, the verb yarad, \u201cto go down,\u201d is\nused; when it moves from a lower to a higher place, \u02bbalah, \u201cto go up,\u201d\nis applied. These two verbs were afterwards employed with regard to\ngreatness and power. When a man falls from his high position, we say\n\u201che has come down,\u201d and when he rises in station \u201che has gone up.\u201d Thus\nthe Almighty says, \u201cThe stranger that is within thee shall get up above\nthee very high, and thou shalt come down very low\u201d (Deut. xxviii. 43).\nAgain, \u201cThe Lord thy God will set thee on high (\u02bbelyon) above all\nnations of the earth\u201d (Deut. xxviii. 1): \u201cAnd the Lord magnified\nSolomon exceedingly\u201d (lema\u02bbalah) (1 Chron. xxix. 25). The Sages often\nemploy these expressions, as: \u201cIn holy matters men must ascend\n(ma\u02bbalin) and not descend (moridin).\u201d The two words are also applied to\nintellectual processes, namely, when we reflect on something beneath\nourselves we are said to go down, and when our attention is raised to a\nsubject above us we are said to rise.\n\nNow, we occupy a lowly position, both in space and rank in comparison\nwith the heavenly sphere, and the Almighty is Most High not in space,\nbut with respect to absolute existence, greatness and power. When it\npleased the Almighty to grant to a human being a certain degree of\nwisdom or prophetic inspiration, the divine communication thus made to\nthe prophet and the entrance of the Divine Presence into a certain\nplace is termed yeridah, \u201cdescending,\u201d while the termination of the\nprophetic communication or the departure of the divine glory from a\nplace is called \u02bbaliyah, \u201cascending.\u201d\n\nThe expressions \u201cto go up\u201d and \u201cto go down,\u201d when used in reference to\nGod, must be interpreted in this sense. Again, when, in accordance with\nthe divine will, some misfortune befalls a nation or a region of the\nearth, and when the biblical account of that misfortune is preceded by\nthe statement that the Almighty visited the actions of the people, and\nthat He punished them accordingly, then the prophetic author employs\nthe term \u201cto descend\u201d: for man is so low and insignificant that his\nactions would not be visited and would not bring punishment on him,\nwere it not for the divine will: as is clearly stated in the Bible,\nwith regard to this idea, \u201cWhat is man that thou shouldst remember him,\nand the son of man that thou shouldst visit him\u201d (Ps. viii. 5).\n\nThe design of the Deity to punish man is, therefore, introduced by the\nverb \u201cto descend\u201d; comp. \u201cGo to, let us go down and there confound\ntheir language\u201d (Gen. xi. 7); \u201cAnd the Lord came down to see\u201d (Gen. xi.\n5); \u201cI will go down now and see\u201d (Gen. xviii. 21). All these instances\nconvey the idea that man here below is going to be punished.\n\nMore numerous, however, are the instances of the first case, viz., in\nwhich these verbs are used in connection with the revelation of the\nword and of the glory of God, e.g., \u201cAnd I will come down and talk with\nthee there\u201d (Num. xi. 17); \u201cAnd the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai\u201d\n(Exod. xix. 20); \u201cThe Lord will come down in the sight of all the\npeople\u201d (Exod. xix. 11); \u201cAnd God went up from him\u201d (Gen. xxxv. 13);\n\u201cAnd God went up from Abraham\u201d (Gen. xvii. 22). When, on the other\nhand, it says, \u201cAnd Moses went up unto God\u201d (Exod. xix. 3), it must be\ntaken in the third signification of these verbs, in addition to its\nliteral meaning that Moses also ascended to the top of the mount, upon\nwhich a certain material light (the manifestation of God\u2019s glory) was\nvisible; but we must not imagine that the Supreme Being occupies a\nplace to which we can ascend, or from which we can descend. He is far\nfrom what the ignorant imagine.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nThe primary meaning of the Hebrew yashab is \u201che was seated,\u201d as \u201cNow\nEli the priest sat (yashab) upon a seat\u201d (1 Sam. i. 9); but, since a\nperson can best remain motionless and at rest when sitting, the term\nwas applied to everything that is permanent and unchanging; thus, in\nthe promise that Jerusalem should remain constantly and permanently in\nan exalted condition, it is stated, \u201cShe will rise and sit in her\nplace\u201d (Zech. xiv. 10); further, \u201cHe maketh the woman who was childless\nto sit as a joyful mother of children\u201d (Ps. cxiii. 9); i.e., He makes\nher happy condition to be permanent and enduring.\n\nWhen applied to God, the verb is to be taken in that latter sense:\n\u201cThou, O Lord, remainest (tesheb) for ever\u201d (Lam. v. 19); \u201cO thou who\nsittest (ha-yoshebi) in the heavens\u201d (Ps. cxxiii. 1); \u201cHe who sitteth\nin the heavens\u201d (ii. 4), i.e., He who is everlasting, constant, and in\nno way subject to change; immutable in His Essence, and as He consists\nof nought but His Essence, He is mutable in no way whatever; not\nmutable in His relation to other things; for there is no relation\nwhatever existing between Him and any other being, as will be explained\nbelow, and therefore no change as regards such relations can take place\nin Him. Hence He is immutable in every respect, as He expressly\ndeclares, \u201cI, the Lord, do not change\u201d (Mal. iii. 6); i.e., in Me there\nis not any change whatever. This idea is expressed by the term yashab\nwhen referring to God.\n\nThe verb, when employed of God, is frequently complemented by \u201cthe\nHeavens,\u201d inasmuch as the heavens are without change or mutation, that\nis to say, they do not individually change, as the individual beings on\nearth, by transition from existence into non-existence.\n\nThe verb is also employed in descriptions of God\u2019s relation (the term\n\u201crelation\u201d is here used as a homonym) to existing species of evanescent\nthings; for those species are as constant, well organized, and\nunvarying as the individuals of the heavenly hosts. Thus we find, \u201cWho\nsitteth over the circle of the earth\u201d (Isa. xl. 22), Who remains\nconstantly and unremittingly over the sphere of the earth; that is to\nsay, over the things that come into existence within that sphere.\n\nAgain, \u201cThe Lord sitteth upon the flood\u201d (Ps. xxix. 10), i.e., despite\nthe change and variation of earthly objects, no change takes place with\nrespect to God\u2019s relation (to the earth): His relation to each of the\nthings which come into existence and perish again is stable and\nconstant, for it concerns only the existing species and not the\nindividuals. It should therefore be borne in mind, that whenever the\nterm \u201csitting\u201d is applied to God, it is used in this sense.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nThe term kam (he rose) is a homonym. In one of its significations it is\nthe opposite of \u201cto sit,\u201d as \u201cHe did not rise (kam) nor move for him\u201d\n(Esth. v. 9). It further denotes the confirmation and verification of a\nthing, e.g.: \u201cThe Lord will verify (yakem) His promise\u201d (1 Sam. i. 23);\n\u201cThe field of Ephron was made sure (va-yakom) as the property of\nAbraham\u201d (Gen. xxiii. 17). \u201cThe house that is in the walled city shall\nbe established (ve-kam)\u201d (Lev. xxv. 30); \u201cAnd the kingdom of Israel\nshall be firmly established (ve-kamah) in thy hand\u201d (1 Sam. xxiv. 20).\nIt is always in this sense that the verb is employed with reference to\nthe Almighty; as \u201cNow shall I rise (akum), saith the Lord\u201d (Ps. xii.\n7), which is the same as saying, \u201cNow shall I verify my word and my\ndispensation for good or evil.\u201d \u201cThou shalt arise (takum) and have\nmercy upon Zion\u201d (Ps. cii. 13), which means: Thou wilt establish what\nthou hast promised, viz., that thou wouldst pity Zion.\n\nGenerally a person who resolves to set about a matter, accompanies his\nresolve by rising, hence the verb is employed to express \u201cto resolve\u201d\nto do a certain thing; as, \u201cThat my son hath stirred up my servant\nagainst me\u201d (1 Sam. xxii. 8). The word is figuratively used to signify\nthe execution of a divine decree against a people sentenced to\nextermination, as \u201cAnd I will rise against the house of Jeroboam\u201d (Amos\nvii. 9); \u201cbut he will arise against the house of the evildoers\u201d (Isa.\nxxxi. 2). Possibly in Psalm xii. 7 the verb has this latter sense, as\nalso in Psalm cii. 13, namely: Thou wilt rise up against her enemies.\n\nThere are many passages to be interpreted in this manner, but in no way\nshould it be understood that He rises or sits\u2014far be such a notion! Our\nSages expressed this idea in the formula, \u201cIn the world above there is\nneither sitting nor standing (\u02bbamidah)\u201d; for the two verbs \u02bbamad and\nkam are synonyms [and what is said about the former is also applicable\nto the latter].\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nThe term \u02bbamad (he stood) is a homonym signifying in the first instance\n\u201cto stand upright,\u201d as \u201cWhen he stood (be-\u02bbomdo) before Pharaoh\u201d (Gen.\nxli. 46); \u201cThough Moses and Samuel stood (ya\u02bbamod)\u201d (Jer. xv. 1); \u201cHe\nstood by them\u201d (Gen. xviii. 8). It further denotes \u201ccessation and\ninterruption,\u201d as \u201cbut they stood still (\u02bbamedu) and answered no more\u201d\n(Job xxxii. 16); \u201cand she ceased (va-ta\u02bbamod) to bear\u201d (Gen. xxix. 35).\nNext it signifies \u201cto be enduring and lasting,\u201d as, \u201cthat they may\ncontinue (yo-\u02bbamedu) many days\u201d (Jer. xxxii. 14); \u201cThen shalt thou be\nable to endure (\u02bbamod)\u201d (Exod. xviii. 23); \u201cHis taste remained (\u02bbamad)\nin him\u201d (Jer. xlviii. 11), i.e., it has continued and remained in\nexistence without any change; \u201cHis righteousness standeth for ever\u201d\n(Ps. cxi. 3), i.e., it is permanent and everlasting. The verb applied\nto God must be understood in this latter sense, as in Zechariah xiv. 4,\n\u201cAnd his feet shall stand (ve-\u02bbamedu) in that day upon the Mount of\nOlives\u201d (Zech. xiv. 4), \u201cHis causes, i.e., the events of which He is\nthe cause, will remain efficient,\u201d etc. This will be further elucidated\nwhen we speak of the meaning of regel (foot). (Vide infra, chap,\nxxviii.) In the same sense is this verb employed in Deuteronomy v. 28,\n\u201cBut as for thee, stand thou here by me,\u201d and Deuteronomy v. 5, \u201cI\nstood between the Lord and you.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nThe homonymous term adam is in the first place the name of the first\nman, being, as Scripture indicates, derived from adamah, \u201cearth.\u201d Next,\nit means \u201cmankind,\u201d as \u201cMy spirit shall not strive with man (adam)\u201d\n(Gen. vi. 3). Again \u201cWho knoweth the spirit of the children of man\n(adam)\u201d (Eccles. iii. 21); \u201cso that a man (adam) has no pre-eminence\nabove a beast\u201d (Eccles. iii. 19). Adam signifies also \u201cthe multitude,\u201d\n\u201cthe lower classes\u201d as opposed to those distinguished from the rest, as\n\u201cBoth low (bene adam) and high (bene ish)\u201d (Ps. xlix. 3).\n\nIt is in this third signification that it occurs in the verses, \u201cThe\nsons of the higher order (Elohim) saw the daughters of the lower order\n(adam)\u201d (Gen. vi. 2); and \u201cForsooth! as the humble man (adam) you shall\ndie\u201d (Ps. lxxxii. 7).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nAlthough the two roots na\u1e93ab and ya\u1e93ab are distinct, yet their meaning\nis, as you know, identical in all their various forms.\n\nThe verb has several meanings: in some instances it signifies \u201cto\nstand\u201d or \u201cto place oneself,\u201d as \u201cAnd his sister stood (va-teta\u1e93\u1e93ab)\nafar off\u201d (Exod. ii. 4); \u201cThe kings of the earth set themselves\u201d\n(yitya\u1e93\u1e93ebu) (Ps. ii. 2); \u201cThey came out and stood\u201d (ni\u1e93\u1e93abim) (Num.\nxvi. 27). In other instances it denotes continuance and permanence, as,\n\u201cThy word is established (ni\u1e93\u1e93ab) in Heaven\u201d (Ps. cxix. 89), i.e., it\nremains for ever.\n\nWhenever this term is applied to God it must be understood in the\nlatter sense, as, \u201cAnd, behold, the Lord stood (ni\u1e93\u1e93ab) upon it\u201d (Gen.\nxxviii. 13), i.e., appeared as eternal and everlasting \u201cupon it,\u201d\nnamely, upon the ladder, the upper end of which reached to heaven,\nwhile the lower end touched the earth. This ladder all may climb up who\nwish to do so, and they must ultimately attain to a knowledge of Him\nwho is above the summit of the ladder, because He remains upon it\npermanently. It must be well understood that the term \u201cupon it\u201d is\nemployed by me in harmony with this metaphor. \u201cAngels of God\u201d who were\ngoing up represent the prophets. That the term \u201cangel\u201d was applied to\nprophets may clearly be seen in the following passages: \u201cHe sent an\nangel\u201d (Num. xx. 16); \u201cAnd an angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to\nBochim\u201d (Judges ii. 1). How suggestive, too, is the expression\n\u201cascending and descending on it\u201d! The ascent is mentioned before the\ndescent, inasmuch as the \u201cascending\u201d and arriving at a certain height\nof the ladder precedes the \u201cdescending,\u201d i.e., the application of the\nknowledge acquired in the ascent for the training and instruction of\nmankind. This application is termed \u201cdescent,\u201d in accordance with our\nexplanation of the term yarad (chapter x.).\n\nTo return to our subject. The phrase \u201cstood upon it\u201d indicates the\npermanence and constancy of God, and does not imply the idea of\nphysical position. This is also the sense of the phrase \u201cThou shalt\nstand upon the rock\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 21). It is therefore clear that\nni\u1e93\u1e93ab and \u02bbamad are identical in this figurative signification. Comp.\n\u201cBehold, I will stand (\u02bbomed) before thee there upon the rock in Horeb\u201d\n(Exod. xvii. 6).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nThe word \u1e93ur (rock) is a homonym. First, it denotes \u201crock,\u201d as \u201cAnd\nthou shalt smite the rock\u201d (\u1e93ur) (Exod. xvii. 6). Then, \u201chard stone,\u201d\nlike the flint, e.g., \u201cKnives of stone\u201d (\u1e93urim) (Josh. v. 2). It is\nnext employed to signify the quarry from which the stones are hewn;\ncomp. \u201cLook unto the rock (\u1e93ur) whence ye are hewn\u201d (Isa. li. 1). From\nthis latter meaning of the term another figurative notion was\nsubsequently derived, viz., \u201cthe root and origin\u201d of all things. It is\non this account that after the words \u201cLook to the rock whence ye are\nhewn,\u201d the Prophet continues, \u201cLook unto Abraham your father,\u201d from\nwhich we evidently may infer that the words \u201cAbraham your father\u201d serve\nto explain \u201cthe rock whence ye are hewn\u201d; and that the Prophet meant to\nsay, \u201cWalk in his ways, put faith in his instruction, and conduct\nyourselves according to the rule of his life! for the properties\ncontained in the quarry should be found again in those things which are\nformed and hewn out of it.\u201d\n\nIt is in the latter sense that the Almighty is called \u201crock,\u201d He being\nthe origin and the causa efficiens of all things besides Himself. Thus\nwe read, \u201cHe is the Rock, His work is perfect\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 4); \u201cOf\nthe Rock that begat thee thou art unmindful\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 18); \u201cTheir\nRock had sold them\u201d (xxxi. 30); \u201cThere is no rock like our God\u201d (1 Sam.\nii. 2): \u201cThe Rock of Eternity\u201d (Isa. xxvi. 4). Again, \u201cAnd thou shalt\nstand upon the Rock\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 21), i.e., Be firm and steadfast in\nthe conviction that God is the source of all things, for this will lead\nyou towards the knowledge of the Divine Being. We have shown (chap.\nviii.) that the words \u201cBehold, a place is with me\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 21)\ncontain the same idea.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nDo not imagine that only Metaphysics should be taught with reserve to\nthe common people and to the uninitiated; for the same is also the case\nwith the greater part of Natural Science. In this sense we have\nrepeatedly made use of the expression of the Sages, \u201cDo not expound the\nchapter on the Creation in the presence of two\u201d [vide Introd. page 2].\nThis principle was not peculiar to our Sages; ancient philosophers and\nscholars of other nations were likewise wont to treat of the principia\nrerum obscurely, and to use figurative language in discussing such\nsubjects. Thus Plato and his predecessors called Substance the female,\nand Form the male. (You are aware that the principia of all existing\ntransient things are three, viz., Substance, Form, and Absence of a\nparticular form; the last-named principle is always inherent in the\nsubstance, for otherwise the substance would be incapable of receiving\na new form; and it is from this point of view that absence [of a\nparticular form] is included among the principia. As soon, then, as a\nsubstance has received a certain form, the privation of that form,\nnamely, of that which has just been received, has ceased, and is\nreplaced by the privation of another form, and so on with all possible\nforms, as is explained in treatises on natural philosophy.)\u2014Now, if\nthose philosophers who have nothing to fear from a lucid explanation of\nthese metaphysical subjects still were in the habit of discussing them\nin figures and metaphors, how much more should we, having the interest\nof religion at heart, refrain from elucidating to the mass any subject\nthat is beyond their comprehension, or that might be taken in a sense\ndirectly opposite to the one intended. This also deserves attention.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\n\nThe three words karab, \u201cto come near,\u201d naga\u02bb, \u201cto touch,\u201d and nagash,\n\u201cto approach,\u201d sometimes signify \u201ccontact\u201d or \u201cnearness in space,\u201d\nsometimes the approach of man\u2019s knowledge to an object, as if it\nresembled the physical approach of one body to another. As to the use\nof karab in the first meaning, viz., to draw near a certain spot, comp.\n\u201cAs he drew near (karab) the camp\u201d (Exod. xxxii. 19); \u201cAnd Pharaoh drew\nnear (hikrib)\u201d (Exod. xiv. 10). Naga\u02bb, in the first sense, viz.,\nexpressing the contact of two bodies, occurs in \u201cAnd she cast it\n(va-tagga\u02bb) at his feet\u201d (Exod. iv. 25); \u201cHe caused it to touch\n(va-yagga\u02bb) my mouth\u201d (Isa. vi. 7). And nagash in the first sense,\nviz., to approach or move towards another person, is found, e.g., in\n\u201cAnd Judah drew near (va-yiggash) unto him\u201d (Gen. xliv. 1).\n\nThe second meaning of these three words is \u201capproach by means of\nknowledge,\u201d or \u201ccontact by comprehension,\u201d not in reference to space.\nAs to naga\u02bb in this second sense, comp. \u201cfor her judgment reacheth\n(naga\u02bb) unto heaven\u201d (Jer. li. 9). An instance of karab being used in\nthis meaning is contained in the following passage, \u201cAnd the cause that\nis too hard for you, bring (takribun) it unto me\u201d (Deut. i. 17); this\nis equivalent to saying, \u201cYe shall make it known unto me.\u201d The verb\nkarab (in the Hiphil) is thus employed in the sense of giving\ninformation concerning a thing. The verb nagash is used figuratively in\nthe phrase, \u201cAnd Abraham drew near (va-yiggash), and said\u201d (Gen. xviii.\n23); this took place in a prophetic vision and in a trance, as will be\nexplained (Part I. chap, xxi., and Part II. chap, xli.); also in\n\u201cForasmuch as this people draw near (niggash) me with their mouths and\nwith their lips\u201d (Isa. xxix. 13). Wherever a word denoting approach or\ncontact is employed in the prophetic writings to describe a certain\nrelation between the Almighty and any created being, it has to be\nunderstood in this latter sense [viz., to approach mentally]. For, as\nwill be proved in this treatise (II. chap, iv.), the Supreme is\nincorporeal, and consequently He does not approach or draw near a\nthing, nor can aught approach or touch Him; for when a being is without\ncorporeality, it cannot occupy space, and all idea of approach,\ncontact, distance, conjunction, separation, touch, or proximity is\ninapplicable to such a being.\n\nThere can be no doubt respecting the verses \u201cThe Lord is nigh (karob)\nunto all them that call upon him\u201d (Ps. cxlv. 18); \u201cThey take delight in\napproaching (kirbat) to God\u201d (Isa. lviii. 2); \u201cThe nearness (kirbat) of\nGod is pleasant to me\u201d (Ps. lxxiii. 28); all such phrases intimate a\nspiritual approach, i.e., the attainment of some knowledge, not,\nhowever, approach in space. Thus also \u201cwho hath God so nigh (kerobim)\nunto him\u201d (Deut. iv. 7); \u201cDraw thou near (kerab) and hear\u201d (Deut. v.\n27); \u201cAnd Moses alone shall draw near (ve-niggash) the Lord; but they\nshall not come nigh (yiggashu)\u201d (Exod. xxiv. 2).\n\nIf, however, you wish to take the words \u201cAnd Moses shall draw near\u201d to\nmean that he shall draw near a certain place in the mountain, whereon\nthe Divine Light shone, or, in the words of the Bible, \u201cwhere the glory\nof the Lord abode,\u201d you may do so, provided you do not lose sight of\nthe truth that there is no difference whether a person stand at the\ncentre of the earth or at the highest point of the ninth sphere, if\nthis were possible; he is no further away from God in the one case, or\nnearer to Him in the other; those only approach Him who obtain a\nknowledge of Him; while those who remain ignorant of Him recede from\nHim. In this approach towards, or recession from God there are numerous\ngrades one above the other, and I shall further elucidate, in one of\nthe subsequent chapters of the Treatise (I. chap, lx., and II. chap,\nxxxvi.) what constitutes the difference in our perception of God.\n\nIn the passage, \u201cTouch (ga\u02bb) the mountains, and they shall smoke\u201d (Ps.\ncxliv. 5), the verb \u201ctouch\u201d is used in a figurative sense, viz., \u201cLet\nthy word touch them.\u201d So also the words, \u201cTouch thou him himself\u201d (Job\nii. 5), have the same meaning as \u201cBring thy infliction upon him.\u201d In a\nsimilar manner must this verb, in whatever form it may be employed, be\ninterpreted in each place, according to the context; for in some cases\nit denotes contact of two material objects, in others knowledge and\ncomprehension of a thing, as if he who now comprehends anything which\nhe had not comprehended previously had thereby approached a subject\nwhich had been distant from him. This point is of considerable\nimportance.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\n\nThe term male is a homonym which denotes that one substance enters\nanother, and fills it, as \u201cAnd she filled (va-temalle) her pitcher\u201d\n(Gen. xxiv. 16); \u201cAn omer-full (melo) for each\u201d (Exod. xvi. 32), and\nmany other instances. Next, it signifies the expiration or completion\nof a fixed period of time, as \u201cAnd when her days to be delivered were\nfulfilled (va-yimle\u00fc)\u201d (Gen. xxv. 24); \u201cAnd forty days were completed\n(va-yimle\u00fc) for him\u201d (Gen. l. 3). It further denotes attainment of the\nhighest degree of excellency, as \u201cFull (male) with the blessing of the\nLord\u201d (Deut. xxxiii. 23); \u201cThem hath he filled (mille) with wisdom of\nheart\u201d (Exod. xxxv. 35); \u201cHe was filled (va-yimmale) with wisdom, and\nunderstanding, and cunning\u201d (1 Kings vii. 14). In this sense it is said\n\u201cThe whole earth is full (melo) of his glory\u201d (Isa. vi. 4), \u201cAll the\nearth gives evidence of his perfection,\u201d i.e. leads to a knowledge of\nit. Thus also \u201cThe glory of the Lord filled (male) the tabernacle\u201d\n(Exod. xl. 34); and, in fact, every application of the word to God must\nbe interpreted in this manner; and not that He has a body occupying\nspace. If, on the other hand, you prefer to think that in this passage\nby \u201cthe glory of the Lord,\u201d a certain light created for the purpose is\nto be understood, that such light is always termed \u201cglory,\u201d and that\nsuch light \u201cfilled the tabernacle,\u201d we have no objection.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\n\nThe word ram (high) is a homonym, denoting elevation in space, and\nelevation in dignity, i.e., greatness, honour, and power. It has the\nfirst meaning in \u201cAnd the ark was lifted up (va-tarom) above the earth\u201d\n(Gen. vii. 17); and the latter meaning in \u201cI have exalted (harimoti)\none chosen out of the people\u201d (Ps. lxxxix. 20); \u201cForasmuch as I have\nexalted (harimoti) thee from amongst the dust\u201d (1 Kings xvi. 2);\n\u201cForasmuch as I exalted (harimoti) thee from among the people\u201d (1 Kings\nxiv. 7).\n\nWhenever this term is employed in reference to God, it must be taken in\nthe second sense: \u201cBe thou exalted (rumah), O God, above the heavens\u201d\n(Ps. lvii. 12). In the same manner does the root nasa (to lift up)\ndenote both elevation in space and elevation in rank and dignity. In\nthe former sense it occurs in \u201cAnd they lifted up (va-yisse\u00fc) their\ncorn upon their asses\u201d (Gen. xlii. 26); and there are many instances\nlike this in which this verb has the meaning \u201cto carry,\u201d \u201cto move\u201d from\nplace to place; for this implies elevation in space. In the second\nsense we have \u201cAnd his kingdom shall be exalted\u201d (ve-tinnase) (Num.\nxxiv. 7); \u201cAnd he bare them, and carried them\u201d (va-yenasse\u00ebm) (Isa.\nlxiii. 9); \u201cWherefore do ye exalt yourselves\u201d (titnasse\u00fc) (Num. xvi.\n3).\n\nEvery form of this verb when applied to God has this latter sense\u2014e.g.,\n\u201cLift up thyself (hinnase), thou judge of the earth\u201d (Ps. xciv. 2);\n\u201cThus saith the High (ram) and Exalted (nissa) One\u201d (Isa. lvii.\n15)\u2014denoting elevation in rank, quality, and power, and not elevation\nin space.\n\nYou may be surprised that I employ the expression, \u201celevation in rank,\nquality, and power,\u201d and you may say, \u201cHow can you assert that several\ndistinct expressions denote the same thing?\u201d It will be explained later\non (chap. l. seqq.) that those who possess a true knowledge of God do\nnot consider that He possesses many attributes, but believe that these\nvarious attributes which describe His Might, Greatness, Power,\nPerfection, Goodness, etc., are identical, denoting His Essence, and\nnot anything extraneous to His Essence. I shall devote special chapters\nto the Names and Attributes of God; our intention here is solely to\nshow that \u201chigh and exalted\u201d in the passage quoted denote elevation in\nrank, not in space.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\n\nIn its primary signification the Hebrew \u02bbabar, \u201cto pass,\u201d refers to the\nmotion of a body in space, and is chiefly applied to living creatures\nmoving at some distance in a straight line, e.g., \u201cAnd He passed over\n(\u02bbabar) before them\u201d (Gen. xxxiii. 3); \u201cPass (\u02bbabor) before the people\u201d\n(Exod. xvii. 5). Instances of this kind are numerous. The verb was next\napplied to the passage of sound through air, as \u201cAnd they caused a\nsound to pass (va-ya\u02bbabiru) throughout the camp\u201d (Exod. xxxvi. 6);\n\u201cThat I hear the Lord\u2019s people spreading the report\u201d (ma\u02bbabirim) (1\nSam. ii. 24).\n\nFiguratively it denoted the appearance of the Light and the Divine\nPresence (Shechinah) which the prophets perceived in their prophetic\nvisions, as it is said, \u201cAnd behold a smoking furnace, and a burning\nlamp that passed (\u02bbabar) between those pieces\u201d (Gen. xv. 17). This took\nplace in a prophetic vision, for the narrative commences, \u201cAnd a deep\nsleep fell upon Abram.\u201d The verb has this latter meaning in Exodus xii.\n12, \u201cAnd I shall pass (ve-\u02bbabarti) through the land of Egypt\u201d (denoting\n\u201cI shall reveal myself,\u201d etc.), and in all similar phrases.\n\nThe verb is next employed to express that a person has gone too far,\nand transgressed the usual limit, in the performance of some act, as\n\u201cAnd as a man who is drinking wine has passed (\u02bbabarv) the proper\nlimit\u201d (Jer. xxiii. 9).\n\nIt is also used figuratively to denote: to abandon one aim, and turn to\na different aim and object, e.g., \u201cHe shot an arrow, causing it to miss\nthe aim (leha\u02bbabiro)\u201d (1 Sam. xx. 36). This is the sense, it appears to\nme, of this verb in \u201cAnd the Lord passed by (va-ya\u02bbabor) before his\nface\u201d (Exod. xxxiv. 6). I take \u201chis face\u201d to mean \u201cthe face of God\u201d;\nour Teachers likewise interpreted \u201chis face\u201d as being identical with\n\u201cthe face of God.\u201d And, although this is found in the midst of Agadic\ninterpretations which would be out of place in this our work, yet it is\nsome support of our view, that the pronoun \u201chis\u201d is employed in this\npassage as a substitute for \u201cGod\u2019s\u201d\u2014and the whole passage could in my\nopinion be explained as follows: Moses sought to attain to a certain\nperception which is called \u201cthe perception of the Divine face,\u201d a term\noccurring in the phrase \u201cMy face cannot be seen\u201d; but God vouchsafed to\nhim a perception of a lower degree, viz., the one called, \u201cthe seeing\nof the back,\u201d in the words, \u201cAnd thou shalt see my back\u201d (Exod. xxxiii.\n23). We have mentioned this subject in our work Mishneh Torah.\nAccordingly, it is stated in the above-mentioned passage that the Lord\nwithheld from Moses that perception which is termed \u201cthe seeing of the\nDivine face,\u201d and substituted for it another gift, viz., the knowledge\nof the acts attributed to God, which, as I shall explain (chap. liv.)\nare considered to be different and separate attributes of the Supreme.\nIn asserting that God withheld from Moses (the higher knowledge) I mean\nto say that this knowledge was unattainable, that by its nature it was\ninaccessible to Moses; for man, whilst able to gain perfection by\napplying his reasoning faculties to the attainment of what is within\nthe reach of his intellect, either weakens his reason or loses it\naltogether as soon as he ventures to seek a higher degree of\nknowledge\u2014as I shall elucidate in one of the chapters of this\nwork\u2014unless he be granted a special aid from heaven, as is described in\nthe words, \u201cAnd I will cover thee with my hand until I pass by\u201d (Exod.\nxxxiii. 23).\n\nOnkelos, in translating this verse, adopts the same method which he\napplies to the explanation of similar passages, viz., every expression\nimplying corporeality or corporal properties, when referring to God, he\nexplains by assuming an ellipsis of a nomen regens before \u201cGod,\u201d thus\nconnecting the expression (of corporeality) with another word which is\nsupplied, and which governs the genitive \u201cGod\u201d; e.g., \u201cAnd behold the\nLord stood upon it\u201d (Gen. xxviii. 13), he explains, \u201cThe glory of the\nLord stood arrayed above it.\u201d Again, \u201cThe Lord watch between me and\nthee\u201d (Gen. xxxi. 49), he paraphrases, \u201cThe word of the Lord shall\nwatch.\u201d This is his ordinary method in explaining Scripture. He applies\nit also to Exod. xxxiv. 6, which he paraphrases, \u201cThe Lord caused his\nPresence to pass before his face and called.\u201d According to this\nrendering the thing which passed was unquestionably some physical\nobject, the pronoun \u201chis\u201d refers to Moses, and the phrase \u02bbal panav is\nidentical with lefanav, \u201cbefore him.\u201d Comp. \u201cSo went the present over\nbefore him\u201d (\u02bbal panav) (Gen. xxxii, 22). This is likewise an\nappropriate and satisfactory explanation; and I can adduce still\nfurther support for the opinion of Onkelos from the words \u201cwhile my\nglory passeth by\u201d (ba-\u02bbabor) (Exod. xxxiii. 22), which expressly state\nthat the passing object was something ascribed to God, not God Himself;\nand of this Divine glory it is also said, \u201cuntil I pass by,\u201d and \u201cAnd\nthe Lord passed by before him.\u201d\n\nShould it, however, be considered necessary to assume here an ellipsis,\naccording to the method of Onkelos, who supplies in some instances the\nterm \u201cthe Glory,\u201d in others \u201cthe Word,\u201d and in others \u201cthe Divine\nPresence,\u201d as the context may require in each particular case, we may\nalso supply here the word \u201cvoice,\u201d and explain the passage, \u201cAnd a\nvoice from the Lord passed before him and called.\u201d We have already\nshown that the verb \u02bbabar, \u201che passed,\u201d can be applied to the voice, as\nin \u201cAnd they caused a voice to pass through the camp\u201d (Exod. xxxvi. 6).\nAccording to this explanation, it was the voice which called. No\nobjection can be raised to applying the verb kara (he called) to kol\n(voice), for a similar phrase occurs in the Bible in reference to God\u2019s\ncommands to Moses, \u201cHe heard the voice speaking unto him\u201d; and, in the\nsame manner as it can be said \u201cthe voice spoke,\u201d we may also say \u201cthe\nvoice called\u201d; indeed, we can even support this application of the\nverbs \u201cto say,\u201d and \u201cto call,\u201d to \u201cthe voice,\u201d by parallel passages, as\n\u201cA voice saith \u2018Cry,\u2019 and it says \u2018What shall I cry?\u2019\u201d (Isa. xl. 6).\nAccording to this view, the meaning of the passage under discussion\nwould be: \u201cA voice of God passed before him and called, \u2018Eternal,\nEternal, All-powerful, All-merciful, and All-gracious!\u2019\u201d (The word\nEternal is repeated; it is in the vocative, for the Eternal is the one\nwho is called. Comp. Moses, Moses! Abraham, Abraham!) This, again, is a\nvery appropriate explanation of the text.\n\nYou will surely not find it strange that this subject, so profound and\ndifficult, should bear various interpretations; for it will not impair\nthe force of the argument with which we are here concerned. Either\nexplanation may be adopted; you may take that grand scene altogether as\na prophetic vision, and the whole occurrence as a mental operation, and\nconsider that what Moses sought, what was withheld from him, and what\nhe attained, were things perceived by the intellect without the use of\nthe senses (as we have explained above): or you may assume that in\naddition there was a certain ocular perception of a material object,\nthe sight of which would assist intellectual perception. The latter is\nthe view of Onkelos, unless he assumes that in this instance the ocular\nperception was likewise a prophetic vision, as was the case with \u201ca\nsmoking furnace and a burning lamp that passed between those pieces\u201d\n(Gen. xv. 17), mentioned in the history of Abraham. You may also assume\nthat in addition there was a perception of sound, and that there was a\nvoice which passed before him, and was undoubtedly something material.\nYou may choose either of these opinions, for our sole intention and\npurpose is to guard you against the belief that the phrase \u201cand the\nLord passed,\u201d is analogous to \u201cpass before the people\u201d (Exod. xvii. 5),\nfor God, being incorporeal, cannot be said to move, and consequently\nthe verb \u201cto pass\u201d cannot with propriety be applied to Him in its\nprimary signification.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\n\nIn Hebrew, the verb bo signifies \u201cto come\u201d as applied to a living\nbeing, i.e., its arrival at a certain place, or approach to a certain\nperson, as \u201cThy brother came (ba) with subtilty\u201d (Gen. xxvii. 35). It\nnext denotes (with regard to a living being) \u201cto enter\u201d a certain\nplace, e.g., \u201cAnd when Joseph came (va-yabo) into the house\u201d (Gen.\nxliii. 26); \u201cWhen ye come (ta-bo\u00fc) into the land\u201d (Exod. xii. 25). The\nterm was also employed metaphorically in the sense of \u201cto come\u201d applied\nto a certain event, that is, to something incorporeal, as \u201cWhen thy\nsayings come to pass (yabo)\u201d (Judg. xiii. 17); \u201cOf that which will come\n(yabo\u00fc) over thee\u201d (Isa. xlvii. 13). Nay, it is even applied to\nprivatives, e.g., \u201cYet evil came (va-yabo)\u201d (Job iii. 26); \u201cAnd\ndarkness came (va-yabo)\u201d Now, since the word has been applied to\nincorporeal things, it has also been used in reference to God\u2014to the\nfulfilment of His word, or to the manifestation of His Presence (the\nShechinah). In this figurative sense it is said, \u201cLo, I come (ba) unto\nthee in a thick cloud\u201d (Exod. xix. 9); \u201cFor the Lord the God of Israel\ncometh (ba) through it\u201d (Ezek. xliv. 2). In these and all similar\npassages, the coming of the Shechinah is meant, but the words, \u201cAnd the\nLord my God shall come (u-ba)\u201d (Zech. xiv. 5) are identical with \u201cHis\nword will come,\u201d that is to say, the promises which He made through the\nProphets will be fulfilled; therefore Scripture adds \u201call the holy ones\nthat are with thee,\u201d that is to say, \u201cThe word of the Lord my God will\nbe performed, which has been spoken by all the holy ones who are with\nthee, who address the Israelites.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\n\nYa\u1e93a (\u201che came out\u201d) is the opposite of ba (\u201che came in\u201d). The term\nya\u1e93a is applied to the motion of a body from a place in which it had\npreviously rested, to another place (whether the body be a living being\nor not), e.g., \u201cAnd when they were gone out (ya\u1e93e\u00fc) of the city\u201d (Gen.\nxliv. 4); \u201cIf fire break out (te\u1e93e)\u201d (Exod. xxii. 5). It was then\nfiguratively employed to denote the appearance of something\nincorporeal, as, \u201cThe word went out (ya\u1e93a) of the king\u2019s mouth\u201d (Esth.\nvii. 8); \u201cWhen this deed of the queen shall come abroad (ye\u1e93e) unto all\nwomen\u201d (Esth. i. 17), that is to say, \u201cthe report will spread.\u201d Again,\n\u201cFor out of Zion shall go forth (te\u1e93e) the Law\u201d (Isa. ii. 3); further,\n\u201cThe sun had risen (ya\u1e93a) upon the earth\u201d (Gen. xix. 23), i.e., its\nlight became visible.\n\nIn this figurative sense we must take every expression of coming out\nwhen applied to the Almighty, e.g., \u201cBehold, the Lord cometh out (yo\u1e93e)\nof his place\u201d (Isa. xxvi. 21), i.e., \u201cThe word of God, which until now\nhas been in secret, cometh out, and will become manifest,\u201d i.e.,\nsomething will come into being which had not existed before; for\neverything new emanating from God is ascribed to His word. Comp. \u201cBy\nthe word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by\nthe breath of his mouth\u201d (Ps. xxxiii. 6). This is a simile taken from\nthe conduct of kings, who employ the word as the means of carrying\ntheir will into effect. God, however, requires no instrument wherewith\nto operate in order to perform anything; the effect is produced solely\nby His will alone. He does not employ any kind of speech, as will be\nexplained further on (chap. lv.).\n\nThe verb \u201cto come out\u201d is thus employed to designate the manifestation\nof a certain work of God, as we noticed in our interpretation of the\nphrase, \u201cBehold, the Lord cometh out of his place.\u201d In a similar manner\nthe term shub, \u201cto return,\u201d has been figuratively employed to denote\nthe discontinuance of a certain act according to the will of God, as in\n\u201cI will go and return to my place\u201d (Hosea v. 15); that is to say, the\nDivine presence (Shechinah) which had been in our midst departed from\nus, the consequence of which has been the absence of Divine protection\nfrom amongst us. Thus the Prophet foretelling misfortune says, \u201cAnd I\nwill hide my face from them, and they shall be devoured\u201d (Deut. xxxi.\n17); for, when man is deprived of Divine protection he is exposed to\nall dangers, and becomes the butt of all fortuitous circumstances; his\nfortune and misfortune then depend on chance. Alas! how terrible a\nthreat!\u2014This is the idea contained in the words, \u201cI will go and return\nto my place\u201d (Hos. v. 15).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\n\nThe term halak is likewise one of the words which denote movements\nperformed by living beings, as in \u201cAnd Jacob went (halak) on his way\u201d\n(Gen. xxxii. 1), and in many other instances. The verb \u201cto go\u201d was next\nemployed in describing movements of objects less solid than the bodies\nof living beings, comp. \u201cAnd the waters were going on (halok)\ndecreasing\u201d (Gen. viii. 5); \u201cAnd the fire went along (va-tihalak) upon\nthe ground\u201d (Exod. ix. 23). Then it was employed to express the\nspreading and manifestation of something incorporeal, comp. \u201cThe voice\nthereof shall go like a serpent\u201d (Jer. xlvi. 22); again, \u201cThe voice of\nthe Lord God walking in the garden\u201d (Gen. iii. 8). It is \u201cthe voice\u201d\nthat is qualified by \u201cwalking.\u201d\n\nWhenever the word \u201cto go\u201d is used in reference to God, it must be taken\nin this figurative sense, i.e., it applies to incorporeal things, and\nsignifies either the manifestation of something incorporeal, or the\nwithdrawal of the Divine protection, an act corresponding in lifeless\nbeings to the removal of a thing, in living beings to the departure of\na living being, \u201cwalking.\u201d The withdrawal of God\u2019s protection is called\nin the Bible \u201cthe hiding of God\u2019s countenance,\u201d as in Deuteronomy xxxi.\n18, \u201cAs for me, I will hide my countenance.\u201d On the same ground it has\nbeen designated \u201cgoing away,\u201d or moving away from a thing, comp. \u201cI\nwill depart and return to my place\u201d (Hos. v. 15). But in the passage,\n\u201cAnd the anger of the Lord was kindled against them, and he went\u201d (Num.\nxii. 9), the two meanings of the verb are combined, viz., the\nwithdrawal of the Divine protection, expressed by \u201cand he went,\u201d and\nthe revelation, manifestation, and appearance of something namely, of\nthe anger which went forth and reached them, in consequence of which\nMiriam became \u201cleprous, white as snow.\u201d The expression \u201cto walk\u201d was\nfurther applied to conduct, which concerns only the inner life, and\nwhich requires no bodily motion, as in the following passages, \u201cAnd\nthou shalt walk in his ways\u201d (Deut. xxviii. 9); \u201cYe shall walk after\nthe Lord your God\u201d (Deut. xiii. 5); \u201cCome ye, and let us walk in the\nlight of the Lord.\u201d (Isa. ii. 5).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\n\nThe Hebrew shakan, as is well known, signifies \u201cto dwell,\u201d as, \u201cAnd he\nwas dwelling (shoken) in the plains of Mamre\u201d (Gen. xiv. 13); \u201cAnd it\ncame to pass, when Israel dwelt (bishekon)\u201d (Gen. xxxv. 22). This is\nthe most common meaning of the word. But \u201cdwelling in a place\u201d consists\nin the continued stay in a place, general or special; when a living\nbeing dwells long in a place, we say that it stays in that place,\nalthough it unquestionably moves about in it, comp. \u201cAnd he was staying\nin the plains of Mamre\u201d (Gen. xiv. 13), and, \u201cAnd it came to pass, when\nIsrael stayed\u201d (Gen. xxxv. 22).\n\nThe term was next applied metaphorically to inanimate objects, i.e., to\neverything which has settled and remains fixed on one object, although\nthe object on which the thing remains is not a place, and the thing\nitself is not a living being; for instance, \u201cLet a cloud dwell upon it\n[the day]\u201d (Job iii. 5); there is no doubt that the cloud is not a\nliving being, and that the day is not a corporeal thing, but a division\nof time.\n\nIn this sense the term is employed in reference to God, that is to say,\nto denote the continuance of His Divine Presence (Shechinah) or of His\nProvidence in some place where the Divine Presence manifested itself\nconstantly, or in some object which was constantly protected by\nProvidence. Comp. \u201cAnd the glory of the Lord abode\u201d (Exod. xxiv. 16);\n\u201cAnd I will dwell among the children of Israel\u201d (Exod. xxix. 45); \u201cAnd\nfor the goodwill of him that dwelt in the bush\u201d (Deut. xxxiii. 16).\nWhenever the term is applied to the Almighty, it must be taken\nconsistently with the context in the sense either as referring to the\nPresence of His Shechinah (i.e., of His light that was created for the\npurpose) in a certain place, or of the continuance of His Providence\nprotecting a certain object.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\n\nYou, no doubt, know the Talmudical saying, which includes in itself all\nthe various kinds of interpretation connected with our subject. It runs\nthus: \u201cThe Torah speaks according to the language of man,\u201d that is to\nsay, expressions, which can easily be comprehended and understood by\nall, are applied to the Creator. Hence the description of God by\nattributes implying corporeality, in order to express His existence;\nbecause the multitude of people do not easily conceive existence unless\nin connection with a body, and that which is not a body nor connected\nwith a body has for them no existence. Whatever we regard as a state of\nperfection, is likewise attributed to God, as expressing that He is\nperfect in every respect, and that no imperfection or deficiency\nwhatever is found in Him. But there is not attributed to God anything\nwhich the multitude consider a defect or want; thus He is never\nrepresented as eating, drinking, sleeping, being ill, using violence,\nand the like. Whatever, on the other hand, is commonly regarded as a\nstate of perfection is attributed to Him, although it is only a state\nof perfection in relation to ourselves; for in relation to God, what we\nconsider to be a state of perfection, is in truth the highest degree of\nimperfection. If, however, men were to think that those human\nperfections were absent in God, they would consider Him as imperfect.\n\nYou are aware that locomotion is one of the distinguishing\ncharacteristics of living beings, and is indispensable for them in\ntheir progress towards perfection. As they require food and drink to\nsupply animal waste, so they require locomotion, in order to approach\nthat which is good for them and in harmony with their nature, and to\nescape from what is injurious and contrary to their nature. It makes,\nin fact, no difference whether we ascribe to God eating and drinking or\nlocomotion; but according to human modes of expression, that is to say,\naccording to common notions, eating and drinking would be an\nimperfection in God, while motion would not, in spite of the fact that\nthe necessity of locomotion is the result of some want. Furthermore, it\nhas been clearly proved, that everything which moves is corporeal and\ndivisible; it will be shown below that God is incorporeal and that He\ncan have no locomotion; nor can rest be ascribed to Him; for rest can\nonly be applied to that which also moves. All expressions, however,\nwhich imply the various modes of movement in living beings, are\nemployed with regard to God in the manner we have described and in the\nsame way as life is ascribed to Him; although motion is an accident\npertaining to living beings, and there is no doubt that, without\ncorporeality, expressions like the following could not be imagined: \u201cto\ndescend, to ascend, to walk, to place, to stand, to surround, to sit,\nto dwell, to depart, to enter, to pass, etc.\u201d\n\nIt would have been superfluous thus to dilate on this subject, were it\nnot for the mass of the people, who are accustomed to such ideas. It\nhas been necessary to expatiate on the subject, as we have attempted,\nfor the benefit of those who are anxious to acquire perfection, to\nremove from them such notions as have grown up with them from the days\nof youth.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII\n\n\nOnkelos the Proselyte, who was thoroughly acquainted with the Hebrew\nand Chaldaic languages, made it his task to oppose the belief in God\u2019s\ncorporeality. Accordingly, any expression employed in the Pentateuch in\nreference to God, and in any way implying corporeality, he paraphrases\nin consonance with the context. All expressions denoting any mode of\nmotion, are explained by him to mean the appearance or manifestation of\na certain light that had been created [for the occasion], i.e., the\nShekhinah (Divine Presence), or Providence. Thus he paraphrases \u201cthe\nLord will come down\u201d (Exod. xix. 11), \u201cThe Lord will manifest Himself\u201d;\n\u201cAnd God came down\u201d (xvi. 20), \u201cAnd God manifested Himself\u201d; and does\nnot say \u201cAnd God came down\u201d; \u201cI will go down now and see\u201d (Gen. xviii.\n21), he paraphrases, \u201cI will manifest myself now and see.\u201d This is his\nrendering [of the verb yarad, \u201che went down,\u201d when used in reference to\nGod] throughout his version, with the exception of the following\npassage, \u201cI will go down (ered) with thee into Egypt\u201d (Gen. xlvi. 4),\nwhich he renders literally. A remarkable proof of this great man\u2019s\ntalents, the excellence of his version, and the correctness of his\ninterpretation! By this version he discloses to us an important\nprinciple as regards prophecy.\n\nThis narrative begins: \u201cAnd God spake unto Israel in the visions of the\nnight, and said, Jacob, Jacob, etc. And He said, I am God, etc., I will\ngo down with thee into Egypt\u201d (Gen. xlvi. 2, 3). Seeing that the whole\nnarrative is introduced as a vision of the night, Onkelos did not\nhesitate to translate literally the words addressed to Jacob in the\nnocturnal vision, and thus gave a faithful account of the occurrence.\nFor the passage in question contains a statement of what Jacob was\ntold, not what actually took place, as is the case in the words, \u201cAnd\nthe Lord came down upon Mount Sinai\u201d (Exod. xix. 20). Here we have an\naccount of what actually occurred in the physical world; the verb yarad\nis therefore paraphrased \u201cHe manifested Himself,\u201d and entirely detached\nfrom the idea of motion. Accounts of what happened in the imagination\nof man, I mean of what he was told, are not altered. A most remarkable\ndistinction!\n\nHence you may infer that there is a great difference between a\ncommunication, designated as having been made in a dream, or a vision\nof the night, and a vision or a manifestation simply introduced with\nphrases like \u201cAnd the word of the Lord came unto me, saying\u201d; \u201cAnd the\nLord spake unto me, saying.\u201d\n\nAccording to my opinion, it is also possible that Onkelos understood\nElohim in the above passage to signify \u201cangel,\u201d and that for this\nreason he did not hesitate to translate literally, \u201cI will go down with\nthee to Egypt.\u201d Do not think it strange that Onkelos should have\nbelieved the Elohim, who said to Jacob, \u201cI am God, the God of thy\nfather\u201d (ib. 3), to be an angel, for this sentence can, in the same\nform, also have been spoken by an angel. Thus Jacob says, \u201cAnd the\nangel of God spake unto me in a dream, saying, Jacob. And I said, Here\nam I,\u201d etc. (Gen. xxxi. 11); and concludes the report of the angel\u2019s\nwords to him in the following way, \u201cI am the God of Bethel, where thou\nanointedst the pillar, and where thou vowedst a vow unto me\u201d (ib. 13),\nalthough there is no doubt that Jacob vowed to God, not to the angel.\nIt is the usual practice of prophets to relate words addressed to them\nby an angel in the name of God, as though God Himself had spoken to\nthem. Such passages are all to be explained by supplying the nomen\nregens, and by considering them as identical with \u201cI am the messenger\nof the God of thy father,\u201d \u201cI am the messenger of God who appeared to\nthee in Bethel,\u201d and the like. Prophecy with its various degrees, and\nthe nature of angels, will be fully discussed in the sequel, in\naccordance with the object of this treatise (II. chap. xiv.).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII\n\n\nThe term regel is homonymous, signifying, in the first place, the foot\nof a living being; comp. \u201cFoot for foot\u201d (Exod. xxi. 24). Next it\ndenotes an object which follows another; comp. \u201cAnd all the people that\nfollow thee\u201d (lit. that are at thy feet) (ib. xi. 18). Another\nsignification of the word is \u201ccause\u201d; comp. \u201cAnd the Lord hath blessed\nthee, I being the cause\u201d (leragli) (Gen. xxx. 30), i.e., for my sake;\nfor that which exists for the sake of another thing has the latter for\nits final cause. Examples of the term used in this sense are numerous.\nIt has that meaning in Genesis xxxiii. 14, \u201cBecause (leregel) of the\ncattle that goeth before me, and because (leregel) of the children.\u201d\n\nConsequently, the Hebrew text, of which the literal rendering is: \u201cAnd\nhis feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives\u201d (Zech. xiv.\n4) can be explained in the following way: \u201cAnd the things caused by him\n(raglav) on that day upon the Mount of Olives, that is to say, the\nwonders which will then be seen, and of which God will be the Cause or\nthe Maker, will remain permanently.\u201d To this explanation does Jonathan\nson of Uzziel incline in paraphrasing the passage, \u201cAnd he will appear\nin his might on that day upon the Mount of Olives.\u201d He generally\nexpresses terms denoting those parts of the body by which contact and\nmotion are effected, by \u201chis might\u201d [when referring to God], because\nall such expressions denote acts done by His Will.\n\nIn the passage (Exod. xxiv. 10, lit., \u201cAnd there was under his feet,\nlike the action of the whiteness of a sapphire stone\u201d), Onkelos, as you\nknow, in his version, considers the word (raglav) \u201chis feet\u201d as a\nfigurative expression and a substitute for \u201cthrone\u201d; the words \u201cunder\nhis feet\u201d he therefore paraphrases, \u201cAnd under the throne of his\nglory.\u201d Consider this well, and you will observe with wonder how\nOnkelos keeps free from the idea of the corporeality of God, and from\neverything that leads thereto, even in the remotest degree. For he does\nnot say, \u201cand under His throne\u201d; the direct relation of the throne to\nGod, implied in the literal sense of the phrase \u201cHis throne,\u201d would\nnecessarily suggest the idea that God is supported by a material\nobject, and thus lead directly to the corporeality of God; he therefore\nrefers the throne to His glory, i.e., to the Shekhinah, which is a\nlight created for the purpose.\n\nSimilarly he paraphrases the words, \u201cFor my hand I lift up to the\nthrone of God\u201d (Exod. xvii. 16), \u201cAn oath has been uttered by God,\nwhose Shekhinah is upon the throne of his glory.\u201d This principle found\nalso expression in the popular phrase, \u201cthe Throne of the Glory.\u201d\n\nWe have already gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, and\ntouched upon things which will be discussed in other chapters; we will\nnow return to our present theme. You are acquainted with the version of\nOnkelos [of the passage quoted]. He contents himself with excluding\nfrom his version all expressions of corporeality in reference to God,\nand does not show us what they (the nobles of the children of Israel,\nExod. xxiv. 10) perceived, or what is meant by that figure. In all\nsimilar instances Onkelos also abstains from entering into such\nquestions, and only endeavours to exclude every expression implying\ncorporeality; for the incorporeality of God is a demonstrative truth\nand an indispensable element in our faith; he could decidedly state all\nthat was necessary in that respect. The interpretation of a simile is a\ndoubtful thing; it may possibly have that meaning, but it may also\nrefer to something else. It contains besides very profound matter, the\nunderstanding of which is not a fundamental element in our faith, and\nthe comprehension of which is not easy for the common people. Onkelos,\ntherefore, did not enter at all into this subject.\n\nWe, however, remaining faithful to our task in this treatise, find\nourselves compelled to give our explanation. According to our opinion\n\u201cunder his feet\u201d (raglav) denotes \u201cunder that of which He is the\ncause,\u201d \u201cthat which exists through Him,\u201d as we have already stated.\nThey (the nobles of the children of Israel) therefore comprehended the\nreal nature of the materia prima, which emanated from Him, and of whose\nexistence He is the only cause. Consider well the phrase, \u201clike the\naction of the whiteness of the sapphire stone.\u201d If the colour were the\npoint of comparison, the words, \u201cas the whiteness of the sapphire\nstone\u201d would have sufficed; but the addition of \u201clike the action\u201d was\nnecessary, because matter, as such, is, as you are well aware, always\nreceptive and passive, active only by some accident. On the other hand,\nform, as such, is always active, and only passive by some accident, as\nis explained in works on Physics. This explains the addition of \u201clike\nthe action\u201d in reference to the materia prima. The expression \u201cthe\nwhiteness of the sapphire\u201d refers to the transparency, not to the white\ncolour; for \u201cthe whiteness\u201d of the sapphire is not a white colour, but\nthe property of being transparent. Things, however, which are\ntransparent, have no colour of their own, as is proved in works on\nPhysics; for if they had a colour they would not permit all the colours\nto pass through them nor would they receive colours; it is only when\nthe transparent object is totally colourless, that it is able to\nreceive successively all the colours. In this respect it (the whiteness\nof the sapphire) is like the materia prima, which as such is entirely\nformless, and thus receives all the forms one after the other. What\nthey (the nobles of the children of Israel) perceived was therefore the\nmateria prima, whose relation to God is distinctly mentioned, because\nit is the source of those of his creatures which are subject to genesis\nand destruction, and has been created by him. This subject also will be\ntreated later on more fully.\n\nObserve that you must have recourse to an explanation of this kind,\neven when adopting the rendering of Onkelos, \u201cAnd under the throne of\nHis glory\u201d; for in fact the materia prima is also under the heavens,\nwhich are called \u201cthrone of God,\u201d as we have remarked above. I should\nnot have thought of this unusual interpretation, or hit on this\nargument were it not for an utterance of R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, which\nwill be discussed in one of the parts of this treatise (II. chap.\nxxvi.). The primary object of every intelligent person must be to deny\nthe corporeality of God, and to believe that all those perceptions\n(described in the above passage) were of a spiritual not of a material\ncharacter. Note this and consider it well.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX\n\n\nThe term \u02bbe\u1e93eb is homonymous, denoting, in the first place, pain and\ntrembling; comp. \u201cIn sorrow (be-\u02bbe\u1e93eb) thou shalt bring forth children\u201d\n(Gen. iii. 16). Next it denotes anger; comp. \u201cAnd his father had not\nmade him angry (\u02bba\u1e93abo) at any time\u201d (1 Kings i. 6); \u201cfor he was angry\n(ne\u02bbe\u1e93ab) for the sake of David\u201d (1 Sam. xx. 34). The term signifies\nalso provocation; comp. \u201cThey rebelled, and vexed (\u02bbi\u1e93\u1e93ebu) his holy\nspirit\u201d (Isa. lxiii. 10); \u201cand provoked (ya\u02bba\u1e93ibahu) him in the desert\u201d\n(Ps. lxxviii. 40); \u201cIf there be any way of provocation (\u02bbo\u1e93eb) in me\u201d\n(ib. cxxxix. 24); \u201cEvery day they rebel (ye\u02bba\u1e93\u1e93ebu) against my words\u201d\n(ib. lvi. 6).\n\nIn Genesis vi. 6 the word has either the second or the third\nsignification. In the first case, the sense of the Hebrew va-yit\u02bba\u1e93\u1e93eb\nel libbo is \u201cGod was angry with them on account of the wickedness of\ntheir deeds\u201d; as to the words \u201cto his heart\u201d used here, and also in the\nhistory of Noah (ib. viii. 21) I will here explain what they mean. With\nregard to man, we use the expression \u201che said to himself,\u201d or \u201che said\nin his heart,\u201d in reference to a subject which he did not utter or\ncommunicate to any other person. Similarly the phrase \u201cAnd God said in\nhis heart,\u201d is used in reference to an act which God decreed without\nmentioning it to any prophet at the time the event took place according\nto the will of God. And a figure of this kind is admissible, since \u201cthe\nTorah speaketh in accordance with the language of man\u201d (supra c.\nxxvi.). This is plain and clear. In the Pentateuch no distinct mention\nis made of a message sent to the wicked generation of the flood,\ncautioning or threatening them with death; therefore, it is said\nconcerning them, that God was angry with them in His heart; likewise\nwhen He decreed that no flood should happen again, He did not tell a\nprophet to communicate it to others, and for that reason the words \u201cin\nhis heart\u201d are added.\n\nTaking the verb in the third signification, we explain the passage\nthus: \u201cAnd man rebelled against God\u2019s will concerning him\u201d; for leb\n(heart) also signifies \u201cwill,\u201d as we shall explain when treating of the\nhomonymity of leb (heart).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX\n\n\nIn its primary meaning akal (to eat) is used in the sense of taking\nfood by animals; this needs no illustration. It was afterwards observed\nthat eating includes two processes\u2014(1) the loss of the food, i.e., the\ndestruction of its form, which first takes place; (2) the growth of\nanimals, the preservation of their strength and their existence, and\nthe support of all the forces of their body, caused by the food they\ntake.\n\nThe consideration of the first process led to the figurative use of the\nverb, in the sense of \u201cconsuming,\u201d \u201cdestroying\u201d; hence it includes all\nmodes of depriving a thing of its form; comp. \u201cAnd the land of your\nenemies shall destroy (lit. eat) you\u201d (Lev. xxvi. 38); \u201cA land that\ndestroyeth (lit. eateth) the inhabitants thereof\u201d (Num. xiii. 32); \u201cYe\nshall be destroyed (lit. eaten) with the sword\u201d (Isa. i. 6); \u201cShall the\nsword destroy (lit. eat)\u201d (2 Sam. ii. 26); \u201cAnd the fire of the Lord\nburnt among them, and destroyed (lit. ate) them that were in the\nuttermost parts of the camp\u201d (Num. xi. 1); \u201c(God) is a destroying (lit.\neating) fire\u201d (Deut. iv. 24), that is, He destroys those who rebel\nagainst Him, as the fire destroys everything that comes within its\nreach. Instances of this kind are very frequent.\n\nWith reference to the second effect of the act of eating, the verb \u201cto\neat\u201d is figuratively used in the sense of \u201cacquiring wisdom,\u201d\n\u201clearning\u201d; in short, for all intellectual perceptions. These preserve\nthe human form (intellect) constantly in the most perfect manner, in\nthe same way as food preserves the body in its best condition. Comp.\n\u201cCome ye, buy and eat\u201d (Isa. lv. 1); \u201cHearken diligently unto me, and\neat ye that which is good\u201d (ib. 2); \u201cIt is not good to eat much honey\u201d\n(Prov. xxv. 27); \u201cMy son, eat thou honey, because it is good, and the\nhoneycomb, which is sweet to thy taste; so shall the knowledge of\nwisdom be unto thy soul\u201d (ib. xxiv. 13, 14).\n\nThis figurative use of the verb \u201cto eat\u201d in the sense of \u201cacquiring\nwisdom\u201d is frequently met with in the Talmud, e.g., \u201cCome, eat fat meat\nat Raba\u2019s\u201d (Baba Bathra 22a); comp. \u201cAll expressions of \u2018eating\u2019 and\n\u2018drinking\u2019 found in this book (of Proverbs) refer to wisdom,\u201d or,\naccording to another reading, \u201cto the Law\u201d (Koh. rabba on Eccl. iii.\n13). Wisdom has also been frequently called \u201cwater,\u201d e.g., \u201cHo, every\none that thirsteth, come ye to the waters\u201d (Isa. lv. 1).\n\nThe figurative meaning of these expressions has been so general and\ncommon, that it was almost considered as its primitive signification,\nand led to the employment \u201cof hunger\u201d and \u201cthirst\u201d in the sense of\n\u201cabsence of wisdom and intelligence\u201d; comp. \u201cI will send a famine in\nthe land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing\nthe words of the Lord\u201d; \u201cMy soul thirsteth for God, for the living God\u201d\n(Ps. xlii. 3). Instances of this kind occur frequently. The words,\n\u201cWith joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation\u201d (Isa. xii.\n3), are paraphrased by Jonathan son of Uzziel thus: \u201cYou will joyfully\nreceive new instruction from the chosen of the righteous.\u201d Consider how\nhe explains \u201cwater\u201d to indicate \u201cthe wisdom which will then spread,\u201d\nand \u201cthe wells\u201d (ma\u02bbayene) as being identical with \u201cthe eyes of the\ncongregation\u201d (Num. xv. 24), in the sense of \u201cthe chiefs,\u201d or \u201cthe\nwise.\u201d By the phrase, \u201cfrom the chosen of the righteous,\u201d he expresses\nhis belief that righteousness is true salvation. You now see how he\ngives to every word in this verse some signification referring to\nwisdom and study. This should be well considered.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI\n\n\nKnow that for the human mind there are certain objects of perception\nwhich are within the scope of its nature and capacity; on the other\nhand, there are, amongst things which actually exist, certain objects\nwhich the mind can in no way and by no means grasp: the gates of\nperception are closed against it. Further, there are things of which\nthe mind understands one part, but remains ignorant of the other; and\nwhen man is able to comprehend certain things, it does not follow that\nhe must be able to comprehend everything. This also applies to the\nsenses: they are able to perceive things, but not at every distance;\nand all other powers of the body are limited in a similar way. A man\ncan, e.g., carry two kikkar, but he cannot carry ten kikkar. How\nindividuals of the same species surpass each other in these sensations\nand in other bodily faculties is universally known, but there is a\nlimit to them, and their power cannot extend to every distance or to\nevery degree.\n\nAll this is applicable to the intellectual faculties of man. There is a\nconsiderable difference between one person and another as regards these\nfaculties, as is well known to philosophers. While one man can discover\na certain thing by himself, another is never able to understand it,\neven if taught by means of all possible expressions and metaphors, and\nduring a long period; his mind can in no way grasp it, his capacity is\ninsufficient for it. This distinction is not unlimited. A boundary is\nundoubtedly set to the human mind which it cannot pass. There are\nthings (beyond that boundary) which are acknowledged to be inaccessible\nto human understanding, and man does not show any desire to comprehend\nthem, being aware that such knowledge is impossible, and that there are\nno means of overcoming the difficulty; e.g., we do not know the number\nof stars in heaven, whether the number is even or odd; we do not know\nthe number of animals, minerals, or plants, and the like. There are\nother things, however, which man very much desires to know, and\nstrenuous efforts to examine and to investigate them have been made by\nthinkers of all classes, and at all times. They differ and disagree,\nand constantly raise new doubts with regard to them, because their\nminds are bent on comprehending such things, that is to say, they are\nmoved by desire; and every one of them believes that he has discovered\nthe way leading to a true knowledge of the thing, although human reason\nis entirely unable to demonstrate the fact by convincing evidence.\u2014For\na proposition which can be proved by evidence is not subject to\ndispute, denial, or rejection; none but the ignorant would contradict\nit, and such contradiction is called \u201cdenial of a demonstrated proof.\u201d\nThus you find men who deny the spherical form of the earth, or the\ncircular form of the line in which the stars move, and the like; such\nmen are not considered in this treatise. This confusion prevails mostly\nin metaphysical subjects, less in problems relating to physics, and is\nentirely absent from the exact sciences. Alexander Aphrodisius said\nthat there are three causes which prevent men from discovering the\nexact truth: first, arrogance and vainglory; secondly, the subtlety,\ndepth, and difficulty of any subject which is being examined; thirdly,\nignorance and want of capacity to comprehend what might be\ncomprehended. These causes are enumerated by Alexander. At the present\ntime there is a fourth cause not mentioned by him, because it did not\nthen prevail, namely, habit and training. We naturally like what we\nhave been accustomed to, and are attracted towards it. This may be\nobserved amongst villagers; though they rarely enjoy the benefit of a\ndouche or bath, and have few enjoyments, and pass a life of privation,\nthey dislike town life and do not desire its pleasures, preferring the\ninferior things to which they are accustomed, to the better things to\nwhich they are strangers; it would give them no satisfaction to live in\npalaces, to be clothed in silk, and to indulge in baths, ointments, and\nperfumes.\n\nThe same is the case with those opinions of man to which he has been\naccustomed from his youth; he likes them, defends them, and shuns the\nopposite views. This is likewise one of the causes which prevent men\nfrom finding truth, and which make them cling to their habitual\nopinions. Such is, e.g., the case with the vulgar notions with respect\nto the corporeality of God, and many other metaphysical questions, as\nwe shall explain. It is the result of long familiarity with passages of\nthe Bible, which they are accustomed to respect and to receive as true,\nand the literal sense of which implies the corporeality of God and\nother false notions; in truth, however, these words were employed as\nfigures and metaphors for reasons to be mentioned below. Do not imagine\nthat what we have said of the insufficiency of our understanding and of\nits limited extent is an assertion founded only on the Bible; for\nphilosophers likewise assert the same, and perfectly understand it,\nwithout having regard to any religion or opinion. It is a fact which is\nonly doubted by those who ignore things fully proved. This chapter is\nintended as an introduction to the next.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII\n\n\nYou must consider, when reading this treatise, that mental perception,\nbecause connected with matter, is subject to conditions similar to\nthose to which physical perception is subject. That is to say, if your\neye looks around, you can perceive all that is within the range of your\nvision; if, however, you overstrain your eye, exerting it too much by\nattempting to see an object which is too distant for your eye, or to\nexamine writings or engravings too small for your sight, and forcing it\nto obtain a correct perception of them, you will not only weaken your\nsight with regard to that special object, but also for those things\nwhich you otherwise are able to perceive: your eye will have become too\nweak to perceive what you were able to see before you exerted yourself\nand exceeded the limits of your vision.\n\nThe same is the case with the speculative faculties of one who devotes\nhimself to the study of any science. If a person studies too much and\nexhausts his reflective powers, he will be confused, and will not be\nable to apprehend even that which had been within the power of his\napprehension. For the powers of the body are all alike in this respect.\n\nThe mental perceptions are not exempt from a similar condition. If you\nadmit the doubt, and do not persuade yourself to believe that there is\na proof for things which cannot be demonstrated, or to try at once to\nreject and positively to deny an assertion the opposite of which has\nnever been proved, or attempt to perceive things which are beyond your\nperception, then you have attained the highest degree of human\nperfection, then you are like R. Akibha, who \u201cin peace entered [the\nstudy of these theological problems], and came out in peace.\u201d If, on\nthe other hand, you attempt to exceed the limit of your intellectual\npower, or at once to reject things as impossible which have never been\nproved to be impossible, or which are in fact possible, though their\npossibility be very remote, then you will be like Elisha A\u1e25er; you will\nnot only fail to become perfect, but you will become exceedingly\nimperfect. Ideas founded on mere imagination will prevail over you, you\nwill incline toward defects, and toward base and degraded habits, on\naccount of the confusion which troubles the mind, and of the dimness of\nits light, just as weakness of sight causes invalids to see many kinds\nof unreal images, especially when they have looked for a long time at\ndazzling or at very minute objects.\n\nRespecting this it has been said, \u201cHast thou found honey? eat so much\nas is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled therewith, and vomit it\u201d\n(Prov. xxv. 16). Our Sages also applied this verse to Elisha A\u1e25er.\n\nHow excellent is this simile! In comparing knowledge to food (as we\nobserved in chap. xxx.), the author of Proverbs mentions the sweetest\nfood, namely, honey, which has the further property of irritating the\nstomach, and of causing sickness. He thus fully describes the nature of\nknowledge. Though great, excellent, noble and perfect, it is injurious\nif not kept within bounds or not guarded properly; it is like honey\nwhich gives nourishment and is pleasant, when eaten in moderation, but\nis totally thrown away when eaten immoderately. Therefore, it is not\nsaid \u201clest thou be filled and loathe it,\u201d but \u201clest thou vomit it.\u201d The\nsame idea is expressed in the words, \u201cIt is not good to eat much honey\u201d\n(Prov. xxv. 27); and in the words, \u201cNeither make thyself over-wise; why\nshouldst thou destroy thyself?\u201d (Eccles. vii. 16); comp. \u201cKeep thy foot\nwhen thou goest to the house of God\u201d (ibid. v. 1). The same subject is\nalluded to in the words of David, \u201cNeither do I exercise myself in\ngreat matters, or in things too high for me\u201d (Ps. cxxxi. 2), and in the\nsayings of our Sages: \u201cDo not inquire into things which are too\ndifficult for thee, do not search what is hidden from thee; study what\nyou are allowed to study, and do not occupy thyself with mysteries.\u201d\nThey meant to say, Let thy mind only attempt things which are within\nhuman perception; for the study of things which lie beyond man\u2019s\ncomprehension is extremely injurious, as has been already stated. This\nlesson is also contained in the Talmudical passage, which begins, \u201cHe\nwho considers four things,\u201d etc., and concludes, \u201cHe who does not\nregard the honour of his Creator\u201d; here also is given the advice which\nwe have already mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly engage in\nspeculation with false conceptions, and when he is in doubt about\nanything, or unable to find a proof for the object of his inquiry, he\nmust not at once abandon, reject and deny it; he must modestly keep\nback, and from regard to the honour of his Creator, hesitate [from\nuttering an opinion] and pause. This has already been explained.\n\nIt was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in these utterances\nto close the gate of investigation entirely, and to prevent the mind\nfrom comprehending what is within its reach, as is imagined by simple\nand idle people, whom it suits better to put forth their ignorance and\nincapacity as wisdom and perfection, and to regard the distinction and\nwisdom of others as irreligion and imperfection, thus taking darkness\nfor light and light for darkness. The whole object of the Prophets and\nthe Sages was to declare that a limit is set to human reason where it\nmust halt. Do not criticise the words used in this chapter and in\nothers in reference to the mind, for we only intended to give some idea\nof the subject in view, not to describe the essence of the intellect;\nfor other chapters have been dedicated to this subject.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII\n\n\nYou must know that it is very injurious to begin with this branch of\nphilosophy, viz., Metaphysics; or to explain [at first] the sense of\nthe similes occurring in prophecies, and interpret the metaphors which\nare employed in historical accounts and which abound in the writings of\nthe Prophets. On the contrary, it is necessary to initiate the young\nand to instruct the less intelligent according to their comprehension;\nthose who appear to be talented and to have capacity for the higher\nmethod of study, i.e., that based on proof and on true logical\nargument, should be gradually advanced towards perfection, either by\ntuition or by self-instruction. He, however, who begins with\nMetaphysics, will not only become confused in matters of religion, but\nwill fall into complete infidelity. I compare such a person to an\ninfant fed with wheaten bread, meat and wine; it will undoubtedly die,\nnot because such food is naturally unfit for the human body, but\nbecause of the weakness of the child, who is unable to digest the food,\nand cannot derive benefit from it. The same is the case with the true\nprinciples of science. They were presented in enigmas, clad in riddles,\nand taught by all wise men in the most mysterious way that could be\ndevised, not because they contain some secret evil, or are contrary to\nthe fundamental principles of the Law (as fools think who are only\nphilosophers in their own eyes), but because of the incapacity of man\nto comprehend them at the beginning of his studies: only slight\nallusions have been made to them to serve for the guidance of those who\nare capable of understanding them. These sciences were, therefore,\ncalled Mysteries (sodoth), and Secrets of the Law (sitre torah), as we\nshall explain.\n\nThis also is the reason why \u201cthe Torah speaks the language of man,\u201d as\nwe have explained, for it is the object of the Torah to serve as a\nguide for the instruction of the young, of women, and of the common\npeople; and as all of them are incapable to comprehend the true sense\nof the words, tradition was considered sufficient to convey all truths\nwhich were to be established; and as regards ideals, only such remarks\nwere made as would lead towards a knowledge of their existence, though\nnot to a comprehension of their true essence. When a man attains to\nperfection, and arrives at a knowledge of the \u201cSecrets of the Law,\u201d\neither through the assistance of a teacher or by self-instruction,\nbeing led by the understanding of one part to the study of the other,\nhe will belong to those who faithfully believe in the true principles,\neither because of conclusive proof, where proof is possible, or by\nforcible arguments, where argument is admissible; he will have a true\nnotion of those things which he previously received in similes and\nmetaphors, and he will fully understand their sense. We have frequently\nmentioned in this treatise the principle of our Sages \u201cnot to discuss\nthe Ma\u02bbaseh Mercabah even in the presence of one pupil, except he be\nwise and intelligent; and then only the headings of the chapters are to\nbe given to him.\u201d We must, therefore, begin with teaching these\nsubjects according to the capacity of the pupil, and on two conditions,\nfirst, that he be wise, i.e., that he should have successfully gone\nthrough the preliminary studies, and secondly that he be intelligent,\ntalented, clear-headed, and of quick perception, that is, \u201chave a mind\nof his own\u201d (mebin midda\u02bbato), as our Sages termed it.\n\nI will now proceed to explain the reasons why we should not instruct\nthe multitude in pure metaphysics, or begin with describing to them the\ntrue essence of things, or with showing them that a thing must be as it\nis, and cannot be otherwise. This will form the subject of the next\nchapter; and I proceed to say\u2014\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV\n\n\nThere are five reasons why instruction should not begin with\nMetaphysics, but should at first be restricted to pointing out what is\nfitted for notice and what may be made manifest to the multitude.\n\nFirst Reason.\u2014The subject itself is difficult, subtle and profound,\n\u201cFar off and exceeding deep, who can find it out?\u201d (Eccles. vii. 24).\nThe following words of Job may be applied to it: \u201cWhence then cometh\nwisdom? and where is the place of understanding?\u201d (Job xxviii. 20).\nInstruction should not begin with abstruse and difficult subjects. In\none of the similes contained in the Bible, wisdom is compared to water,\nand amongst other interpretations given by our Sages of this simile,\noccurs the following: He who can swim may bring up pearls from the\ndepth of the sea, he who is unable to swim will be drowned, therefore\nonly such persons as have had proper instruction should expose\nthemselves to the risk.\n\nSecond Reason.\u2014The intelligence of man is at first insufficient; for he\nis not endowed with perfection at the beginning, but at first possesses\nperfection only in potenti\u00e2, not in fact. Thus it is said, \u201cAnd man is\nborn a wild ass\u201d (Job xi. 12). If a man possesses a certain faculty in\npotenti\u00e2, it does not follow that it must become in him a reality. He\nmay possibly remain deficient either on account of some obstacle, or\nfrom want of training in practices which would turn the possibility\ninto a reality. Thus it is distinctly stated in the Bible, \u201cNot many\nare wise\u201d (ib., xxxii. 9); also our Sages say, \u201cI noticed how few were\nthose who attained to a higher degree of perfection\u201d (B. T. Succah\n45a). There are many things which obstruct the path to perfection, and\nwhich keep man away from it. Where can he find sufficient preparation\nand leisure to learn all that is necessary in order to develop that\nperfection which he has in potenti\u00e2?\n\nThird Reason.\u2014The preparatory studies are of long duration, and man, in\nhis natural desire to reach the goal, finds them frequently too\nwearisome, and does not wish to be troubled by them. Be convinced that,\nif man were able to reach the end without preparatory studies, such\nstudies would not be preparatory but tiresome and utterly superfluous.\nSuppose you awaken any person, even the most simple, as if from sleep,\nand you say to him, Do you not desire to know what the heavens are,\nwhat is their number and their form; what beings are contained in them;\nwhat the angels are; how the creation of the whole world took place;\nwhat is its purpose, and what is the relation of its various parts to\neach other; what is the nature of the soul; how it enters the body;\nwhether it has an independent existence, and if so, how it can exist\nindependently of the body; by what means and to what purpose, and\nsimilar problems. He would undoubtedly say \u201cYes,\u201d and show a natural\ndesire for the true knowledge of these things; but he will wish to\nsatisfy that desire and to attain to that knowledge by listening to a\nfew words from you. Ask him to interrupt his usual pursuits for a week,\ntill he learn all this, he would not do it, and would be satisfied and\ncontented with imaginary and misleading notions; he would refuse to\nbelieve that there is anything which requires preparatory studies and\npersevering research.\n\nYou, however, know how all these subjects are connected together; for\nthere is nothing else in existence but God and His works, the latter\nincluding all existing things besides Him; we can only obtain a\nknowledge of Him through His works; His works give evidence of His\nexistence, and show what must be assumed concerning Him, that is to\nsay, what must be attributed to Him either affirmatively or negatively.\nIt is thus necessary to examine all things according to their essence,\nto infer from every species such true and well established propositions\nas may assist us in the solution of metaphysical problems. Again, many\npropositions based on the nature of numbers and the properties of\ngeometrical figures, are useful in examining things which must be\nnegatived in reference to God, and these negations will lead us to\nfurther inferences. You will certainly not doubt the necessity of\nstudying astronomy and physics, if you are desirous of comprehending\nthe relation between the world and Providence as it is in reality, and\nnot according to imagination. There are also many subjects of\nspeculation, which, though not preparing the way for metaphysics, help\nto train the reasoning power, enabling it to understand the nature of a\nproof, and to test truth by characteristics essential to it. They\nremove the confusion arising in the minds of most thinkers, who\nconfound accidental with essential properties, and likewise the wrong\nopinions resulting therefrom. We may add, that although they do not\nform the basis for metaphysical research, they assist in forming a\ncorrect notion of these things, and are certainly useful in many other\nthings connected with that discipline. Consequently he who wishes to\nattain to human perfection, must therefore first study Logic, next the\nvarious branches of Mathematics in their proper order, then Physics,\nand lastly Metaphysics. We find that many who have advanced to a\ncertain point in the study of these disciplines become weary, and stop;\nthat others, who are endowed with sufficient capacity, are interrupted\nin their studies by death, which surprises them while still engaged\nwith the preliminary course. Now, if no knowledge whatever had been\ngiven to us by means of tradition, and if we had not been brought to\nthe belief in a thing through the medium of similes, we would have been\nbound to form a perfect notion of things with their essential\ncharacteristics, and to believe only what we could prove: a goal which\ncould only be attained by long preparation. In such a case most people\nwould die, without having known whether there was a God or not, much\nless that certain things must be asserted about Him, and other things\ndenied as defects. From such a fate not even \u201cone of a city or two of a\nfamily\u201d (Jer. iii. 14) would have escaped.\n\nAs regards the privileged few, \u201cthe remnant whom the Lord calls\u201d (Joel\niii. 5), they only attain the perfection at which they aim after due\npreparatory labour. The necessity of such a preparation and the need of\nsuch a training for the acquisition of real knowledge, has been plainly\nstated by King Solomon in the following words: \u201cIf the iron be blunt,\nand he do not whet the edge, then must he put to more strength; and it\nis profitable to prepare for wisdom\u201d (Eccles. x. 10); \u201cHear counsel,\nand receive instruction, that thou mayest be wise in thy latter end\u201d\n(Prov. xix. 20).\n\nThere is still another urgent reason why the preliminary disciplines\nshould be studied and understood. During the study many doubts present\nthemselves, and the difficulties, or the objections raised against\ncertain assertions, are soon understood, just as the demolition of a\nbuilding is easier than its erection; while, on the other hand, it is\nimpossible to prove an assertion, or to remove any doubts, without\nhaving recourse to several propositions taken from these preliminary\nstudies. He who approaches metaphysical problems without proper\npreparation is like a person who journeys towards a certain place, and\non the road falls into a deep pit, out of which he cannot rise, and he\nmust perish there; if he had not gone forth, but had remained at home,\nit would have been better for him.\n\nSolomon has expatiated in the book of Proverbs on sluggards and their\nindolence, by which he figuratively refers to indolence in the search\nafter wisdom. He thus speaks of a man who desires to know the final\nresults, but does not exert himself to understand the preliminary\ndisciplines which lead to them, doing nothing else but desire. \u201cThe\ndesire of the slothful killeth him; for his hands refuse to labour. He\ncoveteth greedily all the day long; but the righteous giveth, and\nspareth not\u201d (Prov. xxi. 25, 26); that is to say, if the desire killeth\nthe slothful, it is because he neglects to seek the thing which might\nsatisfy his desire, he does nothing but desire, and hopes to obtain a\nthing without using the means to reach it. It would be better for him\nwere he without that desire. Observe how the end of the simile throws\nlight on its beginning. It concludes with the words \u201cbut the righteous\ngiveth, and spareth not\u201d; the antithesis of \u201crighteous\u201d and \u201cslothful\u201d\ncan only be justified on the basis of our interpretation. Solomon thus\nindicates that only such a man is righteous who gives to everything its\ndue portion; that is to say, who gives to the study of a thing the\nwhole time required for it, and does not devote any part of that time\nto another purpose. The passage may therefore be paraphrased thus: \u201cAnd\nthe righteous man devotes his ways to wisdom, and does not withhold any\nof them.\u201d Comp. \u201cGive not thy strength unto women\u201d (Prov. xxxi. 3).\n\nThe majority of scholars, that is to say, the most famous in science,\nare afflicted with this failing, viz., that of hurrying at once to the\nfinal results, and of speaking about them, without treating of the\npreliminary disciplines. Led by folly or ambition to disregard those\npreparatory studies, for the attainment of which they are either\nincapable or too idle, some scholars endeavour to prove that these are\ninjurious or superfluous. On reflection the truth will become obvious.\n\nThe Fourth Reason is taken from the physical constitution of man. It\nhas been proved that moral conduct is a preparation for intellectual\nprogress, and that only a man whose character is pure, calm and\nsteadfast, can attain to intellectual perfection; that is, acquire\ncorrect conceptions. Many men are naturally so constituted that all\nperfection is impossible; e.g., he whose heart is very warm and is\nhimself very powerful, is sure to be passionate, though he tries to\ncounteract that disposition by training; he whose testicles are warm,\nhumid, and vigorous, and the organs connected therewith are surcharged,\nwill not easily refrain from sin, even if he makes great efforts to\nrestrain himself. You also find persons of great levity and rashness,\nwhose excited manners and wild gestures prove that their constitution\nis in disorder, and their temperament so bad that it cannot be cured.\nSuch persons can never attain to perfection; it is utterly useless to\noccupy oneself with them on such a subject [as Metaphysics]. For this\nscience is, as you know, different from the science of Medicine and of\nGeometry, and, from the reason already mentioned, it is not every\nperson who is capable of approaching it. It is impossible for a man to\nstudy it successfully without moral preparation; he must acquire the\nhighest degree of uprightness and integrity, \u201cfor the froward is an\nabomination to the Lord, but His secret is with the righteous\u201d (Prov.\niii. 32). Therefore it was considered inadvisable to teach it to young\nmen; nay, it is impossible for them to comprehend it, on account of the\nheat of their blood and the flame of youth, which confuses their minds;\nthat heat, which causes all the disorder, must first disappear; they\nmust have become moderate and settled, humble in their hearts, and\nsubdued in their temperament; only then will they be able to arrive at\nthe highest degree of the perception of God, i.e., the study of\nMetaphysics, which is called Ma\u02bbaseh Mercabah Comp. \u201cThe Lord is nigh\nunto them that are of a broken heart\u201d (Ps. xxxiv. 18); \u201cI dwell in the\nhigh and lofty place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble\nspirit; to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of\nthe contrite ones\u201d (Isa. lvii. 15).\n\nTherefore the rule, \u201cthe headings of the sections may be confided to\nhim,\u201d is further restricted in the Talmud, in the following way: The\nheadings of the sections must only be handed down to an Ab-bet-din\n(President of the Court), whose heart is full of care, i.e., in whom\nwisdom is united with humility, meekness, and a great dread of sin. It\nis further stated there: \u201cThe secrets of the Law can only be\ncommunicated to a counsellor, scholar, and good orator.\u201d These\nqualities can only be acquired if the physical constitution of the\nstudent favour their development. You certainly know that some persons,\nthough exceedingly able, are very weak in giving counsel, while others\nare ready with proper counsel and good advice in social and political\nmatters. A person so endowed is called \u201ccounsellor\u201d and may be unable\nto comprehend purely abstract notions, even such as are similar to\ncommon sense. He is unacquainted with them, and has no talent whatever\nfor them; we apply to him the words: \u201cWherefore is there a price in the\nhand of a fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it?\u201d (Prov.\nxvii. 16). Others are intelligent and naturally clear-sighted, able to\nconvey complicated ideas in concise and well chosen language,\u2014such a\nperson is called \u201ca good orator,\u201d but he has not been engaged in the\npursuit of science, or has not acquired any knowledge of it. Those who\nhave actually acquired a knowledge of the sciences, are called \u201cwise in\narts\u201d (or \u201cscholars\u201d); the Hebrew term for \u201cwise in arts\u201d\u2014\u1e25akam\n\u1e25arashim\u2014has been explained in the Talmud as implying, that when such a\nman speaks, all become, as it were, speechless.\n\nNow, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the admission of a\nperson into discourses on metaphysics is made dependent on distinction\nin social qualities, and study of philosophy, as well as on the\npossession of clear-sightedness, intelligence, eloquence, and ability\nto communicate things by slight allusions. If a person satisfies these\nrequirements, the secrets of the Law are confided to him. In the same\nplace we also read the following passage:\u2014R. Jochanan said to R.\nElasar, \u201cCome, I will teach you Ma\u02bbaseh Mercabah.\u201d The reply was, \u201cI am\nnot yet old,\u201d or in other words, I have not yet become old, I still\nperceive in myself the hot blood and the rashness of youth. You learn\nfrom this that, in addition to the above-named good qualities, a\ncertain age is also required. How, then, could any person speak on\nthese metaphysical themes in the presence of ordinary people, of\nchildren, and of women!\n\nFifth Reason.\u2014Man is disturbed in his intellectual occupation by the\nnecessity of looking after the material wants of the body, especially\nif the necessity of providing for wife and children be superadded; much\nmore so if he seeks superfluities in addition to his ordinary wants,\nfor by custom and bad habits these become a powerful motive. Even the\nperfect man to whom we have referred, if too busy with these necessary\nthings, much more so if busy with unnecessary things, and filled with a\ngreat desire for them\u2014must weaken or altogether lose his desire for\nstudy, to which he will apply himself with interruption, lassitude, and\nwant of attention. He will not attain to that for which he is fitted by\nhis abilities, or he will acquire imperfect knowledge, a confused mass\nof true and false ideas. For these reasons it was proper that the study\nof Metaphysics should have been exclusively cultivated by privileged\npersons, and not entrusted to the common people. It is not for the\nbeginner, and he should abstain from it, as the little child has to\nabstain from taking solid food and from carrying heavy weights.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV\n\n\nDo not think that what we have laid down in the preceding chapters on\nthe importance, obscurity, and difficulty of the subject, and its\nunsuitableness for communication to ordinary persons, includes the\ndoctrine of God\u2019s incorporeality and His exemption from all affections\n(\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7). This is not the case. For in the same way as all people must be\ninformed, and even children must be trained in the belief that God is\nOne, and that none besides Him is to be worshipped, so must all be\ntaught by simple authority that God is incorporeal; that there is no\nsimilarity in any way whatsoever between Him and His creatures; that\nHis existence is not like the existence of His creatures, His life not\nlike that of any living being, His wisdom not like the wisdom of the\nwisest of men; and that the difference between Him and His creatures is\nnot merely quantitative, but absolute [as between two individuals of\ntwo different classes]; I mean to say that all must understand that our\nwisdom and His, or our power and His do not differ quantitatively or\nqualitatively, or in a similar manner; for two things, of which the one\nis strong and the other weak, are necessarily similar, belong to the\nsame class, and can be included in one definition. The same is the case\nwith all other comparisons; they can only be made between two things\nbelonging to the same class, as has been shown in works on Natural\nScience. Anything predicated of God is totally different from our\nattributes; no definition can comprehend both; therefore His existence\nand that of any other being totally differ from each other, and the\nterm existence is applied to both homonymously, as I shall explain.\n\nThis suffices for the guidance of children and of ordinary persons who\nmust believe that there is a Being existing, perfect, incorporeal, not\ninherent in a body as a force in it\u2014God, who is above all kinds of\ndeficiency, above all affections. But the question concerning the\nattributes of God, their inadmissibility, and the meaning of those\nattributes which are ascribed to Him; concerning the Creation, His\nProvidence, in providing for everything; concerning His will, His\nperception, His knowledge of everything; concerning prophecy and its\nvarious degrees; concerning the meaning of His names which imply the\nidea of unity, though they are more than one; all these things are very\ndifficult problems, the true \u201cSecrets of the Law\u201d the \u201csecrets\u201d\nmentioned so frequently in the books of the Prophets, and in the words\nof our Teachers, the subjects of which we should only mention the\nheadings of the chapters, as we have already stated, and only in the\npresence of a person satisfying the above-named conditions.\n\nThat God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with His creatures,\nthat He is not subject to external influence; these are things which\nmust be explained to every one according to his capacity, and they must\nbe taught by way of tradition to children and women, to the stupid and\nignorant, as they are taught that God is One, that He is eternal, and\nthat He alone is to be worshipped. Without incorporeality there is no\nunity, for a corporeal thing is in the first case not simple, but\ncomposed of matter and form which are two separate things by\ndefinition, and secondly, as it has extension it is also divisible.\nWhen persons have received this doctrine, and have been trained in this\nbelief, and are in consequence at a loss to reconcile it with the\nwritings of the Prophets, the meaning of the latter must be made clear\nand explained to them by pointing out the homonymity and the figurative\napplication of certain terms discussed in this part of the work. Their\nbelief in the unity of God and in the words of the Prophets will then\nbe a true and perfect belief.\n\nThose who are not sufficiently intelligent to comprehend the true\ninterpretation of these passages in the Bible, or to understand that\nthe same term admits of two different interpretations, may simply be\ntold that the scriptural passage is clearly understood by the wise, but\nthat they should content themselves with knowing that God is\nincorporeal, that He is never subject to external influence, as\npassivity implies a change, while God is entirely free from all change,\nthat He cannot be compared to anything besides Himself, that no\ndefinition includes Him together with any other being, that the words\nof the Prophets are true, and that difficulties met with may be\nexplained on this principle. This may suffice for that class of\npersons, and it is not proper to leave them in the belief that God is\ncorporeal, or that He has any of the properties of material objects,\njust as there is no need to leave them in the belief that God does not\nexist, that there are more Gods than one, or that any other being may\nbe worshipped.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI\n\n\nI shall explain to you, when speaking on the attributes of God, in what\nsense we can say that a particular thing pleases Him, or excites His\nanger and His wrath, and in reference to certain persons that God was\npleased with them, was angry with them, or was in wrath against them.\nThis is not the subject of the present chapter; I intend to explain in\nit what I am now going to say. You must know, that in examining the Law\nand the books of the Prophets, you will not find the expressions\n\u201cburning anger,\u201d \u201cprovocation,\u201d or \u201cjealousy\u201d applied to God except in\nreference to idolatry; and that none but the idolater called \u201cenemy,\u201d\n\u201cadversary,\u201d or \u201chater of the Lord.\u201d Comp. \u201cAnd ye serve other gods,\n... and then the Lord\u2019s wrath will be kindled against you\u201d (Deut. xi.\n16, 17); \u201cLest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindled against thee.\u201d\netc. (ib. vi. 15); \u201cTo provoke him to anger through the work of your\nhands\u201d (ib. xxxi. 29); \u201cThey have moved me to jealousy with that which\nis not God; they have provoked me to anger with their vanities\u201d (ib.\nxxxii. 21); \u201cFor the Lord thy God is a jealous God\u201d (ib. vi. 15); \u201cWhy\nhave they provoked me to anger with their graven images, and with\nstrange vanities?\u201d (Jer. viii. 19); \u201cBecause of the provoking of his\nsons and of his daughters\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 19); \u201cFor a fire is kindled in\nmine anger\u201d (ib. 22); \u201cThe Lord will take vengeance on His adversaries,\nand he reserveth wrath for his enemies\u201d (Nah. i. 2); \u201cAnd repayeth them\nthat hate Him\u201d (Deut. vii. 10); \u201cUntil He hath driven out His enemies\nfrom before Him\u201d (Num. xxxii. 21); \u201cWhich the Lord thy God hateth\u201d\n(Deut. xvi. 22); \u201cFor every abomination to the Lord, which He hateth,\nhave they done unto their gods\u201d (ib. xii. 31). Instances like these are\ninnumerable; and if you examine all the examples met with in the holy\nwritings, you will find that they confirm our view.\n\nThe Prophets in their writings laid special stress on this, because it\nconcerns errors in reference to God, i.e., it concerns idolatry. For if\nany one believes that, e.g., Zaid is standing, while in fact he is\nsitting, he does not deviate from truth so much as one who believes\nthat fire is under the air, or that water is under the earth, or that\nthe earth is a plane, or things similar to these. The latter does not\ndeviate so much from truth as one who believes that the sun consists of\nfire, or that the heavens form a hemisphere, and similar things; in the\nthird instance the deviation from truth is less than the deviation of a\nman who believes that angels eat and drink, and the like. The latter\nagain deviates less from truth than one who believes that something\nbesides God is to be worshipped; for ignorance and error concerning a\ngreat thing, i.e., a thing which has a high position in the universe,\nare of greater importance than those which refer to a thing which\noccupies a lower place;\u2014by \u201cerror\u201d I mean the belief that a thing is\ndifferent from what it really is; by \u201cignorance,\u201d the want of knowledge\nrespecting things the knowledge of which can be obtained.\n\nIf a person does not know the measure of the cone, or the sphericity of\nthe sun, it is not so important as not to know whether God exists, or\nwhether the world exists without a God; and if a man assumes that the\ncone is half (of the cylinder), or that the sun is a circle, it is not\nso injurious as to believe that God is more than One. You must know\nthat idolaters when worshipping idols do not believe that there is no\nGod besides them; and no idolater ever did assume that any image made\nof metal, stone, or wood has created the heavens and the earth, and\nstill governs them. Idolatry is founded on the idea that a particular\nform represents the agent between God and His creatures. This is\nplainly said in passages like the following: \u201cWho would not fear thee,\nO king of nations?\u201d (Jer. x. 7); \u201cAnd in every place incense is offered\nunto my name\u201d (Mal. i. 11); by \u201cmy name\u201d allusion is made to the Being\nwhich is called by them [i.e., the idolaters] \u201cthe First Cause.\u201d We\nhave already explained this in our larger work (Mishneh Torah, I. On\nIdolatry, chap. i.), and none of our co-religionists can doubt it.\n\nThe infidels, however, though believing in the existence of the\nCreator, attack the exclusive prerogative of God, namely, the service\nand worship which was commanded, in order that the belief of the people\nin His existence should be firmly established, in the words, \u201cAnd you\nshall serve the Lord,\u201d etc. (Exod. xxiii. 25). By transferring that\nprerogative to other beings, they cause the people, who only notice the\nrites, without comprehending their meaning or the true character of the\nbeing which is worshipped, to renounce their belief in the existence of\nGod. They were therefore punished with death; comp. \u201cThou shalt save\nalive nothing that breatheth\u201d (Deut. xx. 16). The object of this\ncommandment, as is distinctly stated, is to extirpate that false\nopinion, in order that other men should not be corrupted by it any\nmore; in the words of the Bible \u201cthat they teach you not,\u201d etc. (ib.\n18). They are called \u201cenemies,\u201d \u201cfoes,\u201d \u201cadversaries\u201d; by worshipping\nidols they are said to provoke God to jealousy, anger, and wrath. How\ngreat, then, must be the offence of him who has a wrong opinion of God\nHimself, and believes Him to be different from what He truly is, i.e.,\nassumes that He does not exist, that He consists of two elements, that\nHe is corporeal, that He is subject to external influence, or ascribes\nto Him any defect whatever. Such a person is undoubtedly worse than he\nwho worships idols in the belief that they, as agents, can do good or\nevil.\n\nTherefore bear in mind that by the belief in the corporeality or in\nanything connected with corporeality, you would provoke God to jealousy\nand wrath, kindle His fire and anger, become His foe, His enemy, and\nHis adversary in a higher degree than by the worship of idols. If you\nthink that there is an excuse for those who believe in the corporeality\nof God on the ground of their training, their ignorance or their\ndefective comprehension, you must make the same concession to the\nworshippers of idols; their worship is due to ignorance, or to early\ntraining, \u201cthey continue in the custom of their fathers.\u201d (T. B.\nHullin, 13a) You will perhaps say that the literal interpretation of\nthe Bible causes men to fall into that doubt, but you must know that\nidolaters were likewise brought to their belief by false imaginations\nand ideas. There is no excuse whatever for those who, being unable to\nthink for themselves, do not accept [the doctrine of the incorporeality\nof God] from the true philosophers. I do not consider those men as\ninfidels who are unable to prove the incorporeality, but I hold those\nto be so who do not believe it, especially when they see that Onkelos\nand Jonathan avoid [in reference to God] expressions implying\ncorporeality as much as possible. This is all I intended to say in this\nchapter.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII\n\n\nThe Hebrew term panim (face) is homonymous; most of its various\nmeanings have a figurative character. It denotes in the first place the\nface of a living being; comp. \u201cAnd all faces are turned into paleness\u201d\n(Jer. xxx. 6); \u201cWherefore are your faces so sad?\u201d (Gen. xl. 7). In this\nsense the term occurs frequently.\n\nThe next meaning of the word is \u201canger\u201d; comp. \u201cAnd her anger (paneha)\nwas gone\u201d (1 Sam. i. 18). Accordingly, the term is frequently used in\nreference to God in the sense of anger and wrath; comp. \u201cThe anger\n(pene) of the Lord hath divided them\u201d (Lam. iv. 16); \u201cThe anger (pene)\nof the Lord is against them that do evil\u201d (Ps. xxxiv. 17); \u201cMine anger\n(panai) shall go and I will give thee rest\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 14); \u201cThen\nwill I set mine anger\u201d (panai) (Lev. xx. 3); there are many other\ninstances.\n\nAnother meaning of the word is \u201cthe presence and existence of a\nperson\u201d; comp. \u201cHe died in the presence (pene) [i.e., in the lifetime]\nof all his brethren\u201d (Gen. xxv. 18); \u201cAnd in the presence (pene) of all\nthe people I will be glorified\u201d (Lev. x. 3); \u201cHe will surely curse thee\nin thy very presence\u201d (paneka) (Job i. 11). In the same sense the word\nis used in the following passage, \u201cAnd the Lord spake unto Moses face\nto face,\u201d i.e., both being present, without any intervening medium\nbetween them. Comp. \u201cCome, let us look one another in the face\u201d (2\nKings xiv. 8); and also \u201cThe Lord talked with you face to face\u201d (Deut.\nv. 4); instead of which we read more plainly in another place, \u201cYe\nheard the voice of the words, but saw no similitude; only ye heard a\nvoice\u201d (ib. iv. 12). The hearing of the voice without seeing any\nsimilitude is termed \u201cface to face.\u201d Similarly do the words, \u201cAnd the\nLord spake unto Moses face to face\u201d correspond to \u201cThere he heard the\nvoice of one speaking unto him\u201d (Num. vii. 89), in the description of\nGod\u2019s speaking to Moses. Thus it will be clear to you that the\nperception of the Divine voice without the intervention of an angel is\nexpressed by \u201cface to face.\u201d In the same sense the word panim must be\nunderstood in \u201cAnd my face (panai) shall not be seen\u201d (Exod. xxxiii.\n23); i.e., my true existence, as it is, cannot be comprehended.\n\nThe word panim is also used in Hebrew as an adverb of place, in the\nsense of \u201cbefore,\u201d or \u201cbetween the hands.\u201d In this sense it is\nfrequently employed in reference to God; so also in the passage, \u201cAnd\nmy face (panai) shall not be seen,\u201d according to Onkelos, who renders\nit, \u201cAnd those before me shall not be seen.\u201d He finds here an allusion\nto the fact, that there are also higher created beings of such\nsuperiority that their true nature cannot be perceived by man; viz.,\nthe ideals, separate intellects, which in their relation to God are\ndescribed as being constantly before Him, or between His hands, i.e.,\nas enjoying uninterruptedly the closest attention of Divine Providence.\nHe, i.e., Onkelos, considers that the things which are described as\ncompletely perceptible are those beings which, as regards existence,\nare inferior to the ideals, viz., substance and form; in reference to\nwhich we are told, \u201cAnd thou shalt see that which is behind me\u201d\n(ibid.), i.e., beings, from which, as it were, I turn away, and which I\nleave behind me. This figure is to represent the utter remoteness of\nsuch beings from the Deity. You shall later on (chap. liv.) hear my\nexplanation of what Moses, our teacher, asked for.\n\nThe word is also used as an adverb of time, meaning \u201cbefore.\u201d Comp. \u201cIn\nformer time (le-phanim) in Israel\u201d (Ruth iv. 7); \u201cOf old (le-phanim)\nhast Thou laid the foundation of the earth\u201d (Ps. cii. 25).\n\nAnother signification of the word is \u201cattention and regard.\u201d Comp.\n\u201cThou shalt not have regard (pene) to the poor\u201d (Lev. xx. 15); \u201cAnd a\nperson receiving attention (panim)\u201d (Isa. iii. 3); \u201cWho does not show\nregard (panim),\u201d etc. (Deut. x. 17, etc.). The word panim (face) has a\nsimilar signification in the blessing, \u201cThe Lord turn his face to thee\u201d\n(i.e., The Lord let his providence accompany thee), \u201cand give thee\npeace.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII\n\n\nThe Hebrew term a\u1e25or is a homonym. It is a noun, signifying \u201cback.\u201d\nComp. \u201cBehind (a\u1e25are) the tabernacle\u201d (Exod. xxvi. 12); \u201cThe spear came\nout behind him (a\u1e25arav)\u201d (2 Sam. ii. 23).\n\nIt is next used in reference to time, signifying \u201cafter\u201d; \u201cneither\nafter him (a\u1e25arav) arose there any like him\u201d (2 Kings xxiii. 25);\n\u201cAfter (a\u1e25ar) these things\u201d (Gen. xv. 1). In this sense the word occurs\nfrequently.\n\nThe term includes also the idea of following a thing and of conforming\nwith the moral principles of some other being. Comp. \u201cYe shall walk\nafter (a\u1e25are) the Lord, your God\u201d (Deut. xiii. 5); \u201cThey shall walk\nafter (a\u1e25are) the Lord\u201d (Hos. xi. 10), i.e., follow His will, walk in\nthe way of His actions, and imitate His virtues; \u201cHe walked after\n(a\u1e25are) the commandment\u201d (ib. v. 11). In this sense the word occurs in\nExodus xxxiii. 20, \u201cAnd thou shalt see my back\u201d (a\u1e25orai); thou shalt\nperceive that which follows me, is similar to me, and is the result of\nmy will, i.e., all things created by me, as will be explained in the\ncourse of this treatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX\n\n\nThe Hebrew leb (heart) is a homonymous noun, signifying that organ\nwhich is the source of life to all beings possessing a heart. Comp.\n\u201cAnd thrust them through the heart of Absalom\u201d (1 Sam. xviii. 14).\n\nThis organ being in the middle of the body, the word has been\nfiguratively applied to express \u201cthe middle part of a thing.\u201d Comp.\n\u201cunto the midst (leb) of heaven\u201d (Deut. iv. 11); \u201cthe midst (labbath)\nof fire\u201d (Exod. iii. 2).\n\nIt further denotes \u201cthought.\u201d Comp. \u201cWent not mine heart with thee?\u201d (2\nKings v. 26), i.e., I was with thee in my thought when a certain event\nhappened. Similarly must be explained, \u201cAnd that ye seek not after your\nown heart\u201d (Num. xv. 39), i.e., after your own thoughts; \u201cWhose heart\n(i.e., whose thought), turneth away this day\u201d (Deut. xxix. 18).\n\nThe word further signifies \u201ccounsel.\u201d Comp. \u201cAll the rest of Israel\nwere of one heart (i.e., had one plan) to make David king\u201d (1 Chron.\nxii. 38); \u201cbut fools die for want of heart,\u201d i.e., of counsel; \u201cMy\nheart (i.e., my counsel) shall not turn away from this so long as I\nlive\u201d (Job xxvii. 6); for this sentence is preceded by the words, \u201cMy\nrighteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go\u201d; and then follows,\n\u201cmy heart shall never turn away from this.\u201d\u2014As regards the expression\nye\u1e25eraf, I think that it may be compared with the same verb in the form\nne\u1e25refet, \u201ca handmaid betrothed (ne\u1e25refet) to a man\u201d (Lev. xix. 20),\nwhere ne\u1e25refet\u1e25 is similar in meaning to the Arabic mun\u1e25arifat,\n\u201cturning away,\u201d and signifies \u201cturning from the state of slavery to\nthat of marriage.\u201d\n\nLeb (heart) denotes also \u201cwill\u201d; comp. \u201cAnd I shall give you pastors\naccording to my will (libbi)\u201d (Jer. iii. 15), \u201cIs thine heart right as\nmy heart is?\u201d (2 Kings x. 15), i.e., is thy will right as my will is?\nIn this sense the word has been figuratively applied to God. Comp.\n\u201cThat shall do according to that which is in mine heart and in my soul\u201d\n(1 Sam. ii. 35), i.e., according to My will; \u201cAnd mine eyes and mine\nheart (i.e., My providence and My will) shall be there perpetually\u201d (1\nKings ix. 3).\n\nThe word is also used in the sense of \u201cunderstanding.\u201d Comp. \u201cFor vain\nman will be endowed with a heart\u201d (Job xi. 12), i.e., will be wise; \u201cA\nwise man\u2019s heart is at his right hand\u201d (Eccles. x. 2), i.e., his\nunderstanding is engaged in perfect thoughts, the highest problems.\nInstances of this kind are numerous. It is in this sense, namely, that\nof understanding, that the word is used whenever figuratively applied\nto God; but exceptionally it is also used in the sense of \u201cwill.\u201d It\nmust, in each passage, be explained in accordance with the context.\nAlso, in the following and similar passages, it signifies\n\u201cunderstanding\u201d; \u201cConsider it in thine heart\u201d (Deut. iv. 39); \u201cAnd none\nconsidereth in his heart\u201d (Isa. xliv. 19). Thus, also, \u201cYet the Lord\nhath not given you an heart to perceive,\u201d is identical in its meaning\nwith \u201cUnto thee it was shown that thou mightest know\u201d (Deut. iv. 35).\n\nAs to the passage, \u201cAnd thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine\nheart\u201d (Ib. vi. 5), I explain \u201cwith all thine heart\u201d to mean \u201cwith all\nthe powers of thine heart,\u201d that is, with all the powers of the body,\nfor they all have their origin in the heart; and the sense of the\nentire passage is: make the knowledge of God the aim of all thy\nactions, as we have stated in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Aboth,\nEight Chapters, v.), and in our Mishneh Torah, yesode hatorah, chap.\nii. 2.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL\n\n\nRua\u1e25 is a homonym, signifying \u201cair,\u201d that is, one of the four elements.\nComp. \u201cAnd the air of God moved\u201d (Gen. i. 2).\n\nIt denotes also, \u201cwind.\u201d Comp. \u201cAnd the east wind (rua\u1e25) brought the\nlocusts\u201d (Exod. x. 13); \u201cwest wind\u201d (rua\u1e25) (ib. 19). In this sense the\nword occurs frequently.\n\nNext, it signifies \u201cbreath.\u201d Comp. \u201cA breath (rua\u1e25) that passeth away,\nand does not come again\u201d (Ps. lxxviii. 39); \u201cwherein is the breath\n(rua\u1e25) of life\u201d (Gen. vii. 15).\n\nIt signifies also that which remains of man after his death, and is not\nsubject to destruction. Comp. \u201cAnd the spirit (rua\u1e25) shall return unto\nGod who gave it\u201d (Eccles. xii. 7).\n\nAnother signification of this word is \u201cthe divine inspiration of the\nprophets whereby they prophesy\u201d\u2014as we shall explain, when speaking on\nprophecy, as far as it is opportune to discuss this subject in a\ntreatise like this.\u2014Comp. \u201cAnd I will take of the spirit (rua\u1e25) which\nis upon thee, and will put it upon them\u201d (Num. xi. 17); \u201cAnd it came to\npass, when the spirit (rua\u1e25) rested upon them\u201d (ib. 25); \u201cThe spirit\n(rua\u1e25) of the Lord spake by me\u201d (2 Sam. xxiii. 2). The term is\nfrequently used in this sense.\n\nThe meaning of \u201cintention,\u201d \u201cwill,\u201d is likewise contained in the word\nrua\u1e25. Comp. \u201cA fool uttereth all his spirit\u201d (rua\u1e25) (Prov. xxix. 11),\ni.e., his intention and will; \u201cAnd the spirit (rua\u1e25) of Egypt shall\nfail in the midst thereof, and I will destroy the counsel thereof\u201d\n(Isa. xix. 3), i.e., her intentions will be frustrated, and her plans\nwill be obscured; \u201cWho has comprehended the spirit (rua\u1e25) of the Lord,\nor who is familiar with his counsel that he may tell us?\u201d (Isa. xl.\n13), i.e., Who knows the order fixed by His will, or perceives the\nsystem of His Providence in the existing world, that he may tell us? as\nwe shall explain in the chapters in which we shall speak on Providence.\n\nThus the Hebrew rua\u1e25, when used in reference to God, has generally the\nfifth signification; sometimes, however, as explained above, the last\nsignification, viz., \u201cwill.\u201d The meaning of the word in each individual\ncase is therefore to be determined by the context.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI\n\n\nThe Hebrew nefesh (soul) is a homonymous noun, signifying the vitality\nwhich is common to all living, sentient beings. E.g. \u201cwherein there is\na living soul\u201d (nefesh) (Gen. i. 30). It denotes also blood, as in\n\u201cThou shalt not eat the blood (nefesh) with the meat\u201d (Deut. xii. 23).\nAnother signification of the term is \u201creason,\u201d that is, the\ndistinguishing characteristic of man, as in \u201cAs the Lord liveth that\nmade us this soul\u201d (Jer. xxxviii. 16). It denotes also the part of man\nthat remains after his death (nefesh, soul); comp. \u201cBut the soul\n(nefesh) of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life\u201d (1 Sam. xxv.\n29). Lastly, it denotes \u201cwill\u201d; comp. \u201cTo bind his princes at his will\u201d\n(be-nafsho) (Ps. cv. 22); \u201cThou wilt not deliver me unto the will\n(be-nefesh) of my enemies\u201d (Ps. xli. 3); and according to my opinion,\nit has this meaning also in the following passages, \u201cIf it be your will\n(nafshekem) that I should bury my dead\u201d (Gen. xxiii. 8); \u201cThough Moses\nand Samuel stood before me, yet my will (nafshi) could not be toward\nthis people\u201d (Jer. xv. 1), that is, I had no pleasure in them, I did\nnot wish to preserve them. When nefesh is used in reference to God, it\nhas the meaning \u201cwill,\u201d as we have already explained with reference to\nthe passage, \u201cThat shall do according to that which is in my will\n(bi-lebabi) and in mine intention (be-nafshi)\u201d (1 Sam. ii. 35).\nSimilarly we explain the phrase, \u201cAnd his will (nafsho) to trouble\nIsrael ceased\u201d (Judg. x. 16). Jonathan, the son of Uzziel [in the\nTargum of the Prophets], did not translate this passage, because he\nunderstood nafshi to have the first signification, and finding,\ntherefore, in these words sensation ascribed to God, he omitted them\nfrom his translation. If, however, nefesh be here taken in the last\nsignification, the sentence can well be explained. For in the passage\nwhich precedes, it is stated that Providence abandoned the Israelites,\nand left them on the brink of death; then they cried and prayed for\nhelp, but in vain. When, however, they had thoroughly repented, when\ntheir misery had increased, and their enemy had had power over them, He\nshowed mercy to them, and His will to continue their trouble and misery\nceased. Note it well, for it is remarkable. The preposition ba in this\npassage has the force of the preposition min (\u201cfrom\u201d or \u201cof\u201d); and\nba\u02bbamal is identical with me\u02bbamal. Grammarians give many instances of\nthis use of the preposition ba: \u201cAnd that which remaineth of (ba) the\nflesh and of (ba) the bread\u201d (Lev. viii. 32); \u201cIf there remains but few\nof (ba) the years\u201d (ib. xxv. 52); \u201cOf (ba) the strangers and of (ba)\nthose born in the land\u201d (Exod. xii. 19).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII\n\n\n\u1e24ai (\u201cliving\u201d) signifies a sentient organism (lit. \u201cgrowing\u201d and\n\u201chaving sensation\u201d), comp. \u201cEvery moving thing that liveth\u201d (Gen. ix.\n3); it also denotes recovery from a severe illness: \u201cAnd was recovered\n(va-ye\u1e25i) of his sickness\u201d (Isa. xxxviii. 9); \u201cIn the camp till they\nrecovered\u201d (\u1e25ayotam) (Josh. v. 8); \u201cquick, raw (\u1e25ai) flesh\u201d (Lev. xiii.\n10).\n\nMavet signifies \u201cdeath\u201d and \u201csevere illness,\u201d as in \u201cHis heart died\n(va-yamot) within him, and he became as a stone\u201d (1 Sam. xxv. 37), that\nis, his illness was severe. For this reason it is stated concerning the\nson of the woman of Zarephath, \u201cAnd his sickness was so sore, that\nthere was no breath left in him\u201d (1 Kings xvii. 17). The simple\nexpression va-yamoth would have given the idea that he was very ill,\nnear death, like Nabal when he heard what had taken place.\n\nSome of the Andalusian authors say that his breath was suspended, so\nthat no breathing could be perceived at all, as sometimes an invalid is\nseized with a fainting fit or an attack of asphyxia, and it cannot be\ndiscovered whether he is alive or dead; in this condition the patient\nmay remain a day or two.\n\nThe term \u1e25ai has also been employed in reference to the acquisition of\nwisdom. Comp. \u201cSo shall they be life (\u1e25ayyim) unto thy soul\u201d (Prov.\niii. 22); \u201cFor whoso findeth me findeth life\u201d (ib. viii. 35); \u201cFor they\nare life (\u1e25ayyim) to those that find them\u201d (ib. iv. 22). Such instances\nare numerous. In accordance with this metaphor, true principles are\ncalled life, and corrupt principles death. Thus the Almighty says,\n\u201cSee, I have set before thee this day life and good and death and evil\u201d\n(Deut. xxx. 15), showing that \u201clife\u201d and \u201cgood,\u201d \u201cdeath\u201d and \u201cevil,\u201d\nare identical, and then He explains these terms. In the same way I\nunderstand His words, \u201cThat ye may live\u201d (ib. v. 33), in accordance\nwith the traditional interpretation of \u201cThat it may be well with thee\u201d\n[scil. in the life to come] (ib. xxii. 7). In consequence of the\nfrequent use of this figure in our language our Sages said, \u201cThe\nrighteous even in death are called living, while the wicked even in\nlife are called dead.\u201d (Talm. B. Berakhoth, p. 78). Note this well.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII\n\n\nThe Hebrew kanaf is a homonym; most of its meanings are metaphorical.\nIts primary signification is \u201cwing of a flying creature,\u201d e.g., \u201cAny\nwinged (kanaf) fowl that flieth in the air\u201d (Deut. iv. 17).\n\nThe term was next applied figuratively to the wings or corners of\ngarments; comp. \u201cupon the four corners (kanfoth) of thy vesture\u201d (ib.\nxxii. 12).\n\nIt was also used to denote the ends of the inhabited part of the earth,\nand the corners that are most distant from our habitation. Comp. \u201cThat\nit might take hold of the ends (kanfoth) of the earth\u201d (Job xxxviii.\n13); \u201cFrom the uttermost part (kenaf) of the earth have we heard songs\u201d\n(Isa. xxiv. 16).\n\nIbn Gana\u1e25 (in his Book of Hebrew Roots) says that kenaf is used in the\nsense of \u201cconcealing,\u201d in analogy with the Arabic kanaftu alshaian, \u201cI\nhave hidden something,\u201d and accordingly explains, Isaiah xxx. 20, \u201cAnd\nthy teacher will no longer be hidden or concealed.\u201d It is a good\nexplanation, and I think that kenaf has the same meaning in Deuteronomy\nxxiii. 1, \u201cHe shall not take away the cover (kenaf) of his father\u201d;\nalso in, \u201cSpread, therefore, thy cover (kenafeka) over thine handmaid\u201d\n(Ruth iii. 9). In this sense, I think, the word is figuratively applied\nto God and to angels (for angels are not corporeal, according to my\nopinion, as I shall explain). Ruth ii. 12 must therefore be translated\n\u201cUnder whose protection (kenafav) thou art come to trust\u201d; and wherever\nthe word occurs in reference to angels, it means concealment. You have\nsurely noticed the words of Isaiah (Isa. vi. 2), \u201cWith twain he covered\nhis face, and with twain he covered his feet.\u201d Their meaning is this:\nThe cause of his (the angel\u2019s) existence is hidden and concealed; this\nis meant by the covering of the face. The things of which he (the\nangel) is the cause, and which are called \u201chis feet\u201d (as I stated in\nspeaking of the homonym regel), are likewise concealed; for the actions\nof the intelligences are not seen, and their ways are, except after\nlong study, not understood, on account of two reasons\u2014the one of which\nis contained in their own properties, the other in ourselves; that is\nto say, because our perception is imperfect and the ideals are\ndifficult to be fully comprehended. As regards the phrase \u201cand with\ntwain he flieth,\u201d I shall explain in a special chapter (xlix.) why\nflight has been attributed to angels.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV\n\n\nThe Hebrew \u02bbayin is a homonym, signifying \u201cfountain\u201d; e.g., \u201cBy a\nfountain (\u02bben) of water\u201d (Gen. xvi. 7). It next denotes \u201ceye\u201d; comp.\n(\u02bbayin) \u201cEye for eye\u201d (Exod. xxi. 24). Another meaning of the word is\n\u201cprovidence,\u201d as it is said concerning Jeremiah, \u201cTake him and direct\nthine attention (eneka) to him\u201d (Jer. xxxix. 12). In this figurative\nsense it is to be understood when used in reference to God; e.g., \u201cAnd\nmy providence and my pleasure shall be there perpetually\u201d (1 Kings ix.\n3), as we have already explained (page 140); \u201cThe eyes (\u02bbene), i.e.,\nthe Providence of the Lord thy God, are always upon it\u201d (Deut. xi. 12);\n\u201cThey are the eyes (\u02bbene) of the Lord, which run to and fro through the\nwhole earth\u201d (Zech. iv. 10), i.e., His providence is extended over\neverything that is on earth, as will be explained in the chapters in\nwhich we shall treat of Providence. When, however, the word \u201ceye\u201d is\nconnected with the verb \u201cto see,\u201d (raah or \u1e25azah) as in \u201cOpen thine\neyes, and see\u201d (1 Kings xix. 16); \u201cHis eyes behold\u201d (Ps. xi. 4), the\nphrase denotes perception of the mind, not that of the senses; for\nevery sensation is a passive state, as is well known to you, and God is\nactive, never passive, as will be explained by me.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV\n\n\nShama\u02bb is used homonymously. It signifies \u201cto hear,\u201d and also \u201cto\nobey.\u201d As regards the first signification, comp. \u201cNeither let it be\nheard out of thy mouth\u201d (Exod. xxiii. 13); \u201cAnd the fame thereof was\nheard in Pharaoh\u2019s house\u201d (Gen. xlv. 16). Instances of this kind are\nnumerous.\n\nEqually frequent are the instances of this verb being used in the sense\nof \u201cto obey\u201d: \u201cAnd they hearkened (shame\u02bb\u00fc) not unto Moses\u201d (Exod. vi.\n9). \u201cIf they obey (yishme\u02bb\u00fc) and serve him\u201d (Job xxxvi. 11); \u201cShall we\nthen hearken (nishma\u02bb) unto you\u201d (Neh. xiii. 27); \u201cWhosoever will not\nhearken (yishma\u02bb) unto thy words\u201d (Josh. i. 18).\n\nThe verb also signifies \u201cto know\u201d (\u201cto understand\u201d), comp. \u201cA nation\nwhose tongue, i.e., its language, thou shalt not understand\u201d (tishma\u02bb)\n(Deut. xxviii. 49). The verb shama\u02bb, used in reference to God, must be\ntaken in the sense of perceiving, which is part of the third\nsignification, whenever, according to the literal interpretation of the\npassage, it appears to have the first meaning: comp. \u201cAnd the Lord\nheard it\u201d (Num. xi. 1); \u201cFor that He heareth your murmurings\u201d (Exod.\nxvi. 7). In all such passages mental perception is meant. When,\nhowever, according to the literal interpretation the verb appears to\nhave the second signification, it implies that God responded to the\nprayer of man and fulfilled his wish, or did not respond and did not\nfulfil his wish: \u201cI will surely hear his cry\u201d (Exod. xxii. 23); \u201cI will\nhear, for I am gracious\u201d (ib. 27); \u201cBow down thine ear, and hear\u201d (2\nKings xix. 16); \u201cBut the Lord would not hearken to your voice, nor give\near unto you\u201d (Deut. i. 45); \u201cYea, when ye make many prayers, I will\nnot hear\u201d (Isa. i. 15); \u201cFor I will not hear thee\u201d (Jer. vii. 16).\nThere are many instances in which shama\u02bb has this sense.\n\nRemarks will now be presented to you on these metaphors and similes,\nwhich will quench your thirst, and explain to you all their meanings\nwithout leaving a doubt.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVI\n\n\nWe have already stated, in one of the chapters of this treatise, that\nthere is a great difference between bringing to view the existence of a\nthing and demonstrating its true essence. We can lead others to notice\nthe existence of an object by pointing to its accidents, actions, or\neven most remote relations to other objects: e.g., if you wish to\ndescribe the king of a country to one of his subjects who does not know\nhim, you can give a description and an account of his existence in many\nways. You will either say to him, the tall man with a fair complexion\nand grey hair is the king, thus describing him by his accidents; or you\nwill say, the king is the person round whom are seen a great multitude\nof men on horse and on foot, and soldiers with drawn swords, over whose\nhead banners are waving, and before whom trumpets are sounded; or it is\nthe person living in the palace in a particular region of a certain\ncountry; or it is the person who ordered the building of that wall, or\nthe construction of that bridge; or by some other similar acts and\nthings relating to him. His existence can be demonstrated in a still\nmore indirect way, e.g., if you are asked whether this land has a king,\nyou will undoubtedly answer in the affirmative. \u201cWhat proof have you?\u201d\n\u201cThe fact that this banker here, a weak and little person, stands\nbefore this large mass of gold pieces, and that poor man, tall and\nstrong, who stands before him asking in vain for alms of the weight of\na carob-grain, is rebuked and is compelled to go away by the mere force\nof words; for had he not feared the king, he would, without hesitation,\nhave killed the banker, or pushed him away and taken as much of the\nmoney as he could.\u201d Consequently, this is a proof that this country has\na ruler and his existence is proved by the well-regulated affairs of\nthe country, on account of which the king is respected and the\npunishments decreed by him are feared. In this whole example nothing is\nmentioned that indicated his characteristics, and his essential\nproperties, by virtue of which he is king. The same is the case with\nthe information concerning the Creator given to the ordinary classes of\nmen in all prophetical books and in the Law. For it was found necessary\nto teach all of them that God exists, and that He is in every respect\nthe most perfect Being, that is to say, He exists not only in the sense\nin which the earth and the heavens exist, but He exists and possesses\nlife, wisdom, power, activity, and all other properties which our\nbelief in His existence must include, as will be shown below. That God\nexists was therefore shown to ordinary men by means of similes taken\nfrom physical bodies; that He is living, by a simile taken from motion,\nbecause ordinary men consider only the body as fully, truly, and\nundoubtedly existing; that which is connected with a body but is itself\nnot a body, although believed to exist, has a lower degree of existence\non account of its dependence on the body for existence. That, however,\nwhich is neither itself a body, nor a force within a body, is not\nexistent according to man\u2019s first notions, and is above all excluded\nfrom the range of imagination. In the same manner motion is considered\nby the ordinary man as identical with life; what cannot move\nvoluntarily from place to place has no life, although motion is not\npart of the definition of life, but an accident connected with it. The\nperception by the senses, especially by hearing and seeing, is best\nknown to us; we have no idea or notion of any other mode of\ncommunication between the soul of one person and that of another than\nby means of speaking, i.e., by the sound produced by lips, tongue, and\nthe other organs of speech. When, therefore, we are to be informed that\nGod has a knowledge of things, and that communication is made by Him to\nthe Prophets who convey it to us, they represent Him to us as seeing\nand hearing, i.e., as perceiving and knowing those things which can be\nseen and heard. They represent Him to us as speaking, i.e., that\ncommunications from Him reach the Prophets; that is to be understood by\nthe term \u201cprophecy,\u201d as will be fully explained. God is described as\nworking, because we do not know any other mode of producing a thing\nexcept by direct touch. He is said to have a soul in the sense that He\nis living, because all living beings are generally supposed to have a\nsoul; although the term soul is, as has been shown, a homonym.\n\nAgain, since we perform all these actions only by means of corporeal\norgans, we figuratively ascribe to God the organs of locomotion, as\nfeet, and their soles; organs of hearing, seeing, and smelling, as ear,\neye, and nose; organs and substance of speech, as mouth, tongue, and\nsound; organs for the performance of work, as hand, its fingers, its\npalm, and the arm. In short, these organs of the body are figuratively\nascribed to God, who is above all imperfection, to express that He\nperforms certain acts; and these acts are figuratively ascribed to Him\nto express that He possesses certain perfections different from those\nacts themselves. E.g., we say that He has eyes, ears, hands, a mouth, a\ntongue, to express that He sees, hears, acts, and speaks; but seeing\nand hearing are attributed to Him to indicate simply that He perceives.\nYou thus find in Hebrew instances in which the perception of the one\nsense is named instead of the other; thus, \u201cSee the word of the Lord\u201d\n(Jer. ii. 31), in the same meaning as \u201cHear the word of the Lord,\u201d for\nthe sense of the phrase is, \u201cPerceive what He says\u201d; similarly the\nphrase, \u201cSee the smell of my son\u201d (Gen. xxvii. 27) has the same meaning\nas \u201cSmell the smell of my son,\u201d for it relates to the perception of the\nsmell. In the same way are used the words, \u201cAnd all the people saw the\nthunders and the lightnings\u201d (Exod. xx. 15), although the passage also\ncontains the description of a prophetical vision, as is well known and\nunderstood among our people. Action and speech are likewise\nfiguratively applied to God, to express that a certain influence has\nemanated from Him, as will be explained (chap. lxv. and chap. lxvi.).\nThe physical organs which are attributed to God in the writings of the\nProphets are either organs of locomotion, indicating life; organs of\nsensation, indicating perception; organs of touch, indicating action;\nor organs of speech, indicating the divine inspiration of the Prophets,\nas will be explained.\n\nThe object of all these indications is to establish in our minds the\nnotion of the existence of a living being, the Maker of everything, who\nalso possesses a knowledge of the things which He has made. We shall\nexplain, when we come to speak of the inadmissibility of Divine\nattributes, that all these various attributes convey but one notion,\nviz., that of the essence of God. The sole object of this chapter is to\nexplain in what sense physical organs are ascribed to the Most Perfect\nBeing, namely, that they are mere indications of the actions generally\nperformed by means of these organs. Such actions being perfections\nrespecting ourselves, are predicated of God, because we wish to express\nthat He is most perfect in every respect, as we remarked above in\nexplaining the Rabbinical phrase, \u201cThe language of the Torah is like\nthe language of man.\u201d Instances of organs of locomotion being applied\nto the Creator occur as follows:\u2014\u201cMy footstool\u201d (Isa. lxvi. 1); \u201cthe\nplace of the soles of my feet\u201d (Ezek. xliii. 7). For examples of organs\nof touch applied to God, comp. \u201cthe hand of the Lord\u201d (Exod. ix. 3);\n\u201cwith the finger of God\u201d (ib. xxxi. 18); \u201cthe work of thy fingers\u201d (Ps.\nviii. 4), \u201cAnd thou hast laid thine hand upon me\u201d (ib. cxxxix. 5); \u201cThe\narm of the Lord\u201d (Isa. liii. 1); \u201cThy right hand, O Lord\u201d (Exod. xv.\n6). In instances like the following, organs of speech are attributed to\nGod: \u201cThe mouth of the Lord has spoken\u201d (Isa. i. 20); \u201cAnd He would\nopen His lips against thee\u201d (Job xi. 5); \u201cThe voice of the Lord is\npowerful\u201d (Ps. xxix. 4); \u201cAnd his tongue as a devouring fire\u201d (Isa.\nxxx. 27). Organs of sensation are attributed to God in instances like\nthe following: \u201cHis eyes behold, His eyelids try\u201d (Ps. xi. 4); \u201cThe\neyes of the Lord which run to and fro\u201d (Zech. iv. 10); \u201cBow down thine\near unto me, and hear\u201d (2 Kings xix. 16); \u201cYou have kindled a fire in\nmy nostril\u201d (Jer. xvii. 5). Of the inner parts of the human body only\nthe heart is figuratively applied to God, because \u201cheart\u201d is a homonym,\nand denotes also \u201cintellect\u201d; it is besides the source of animal life.\nIn phrases like \u201cmy bowels are troubled for him\u201d (Jer. xxxi. 20); \u201cThe\nsounding of thy bowels\u201d (Isa. lxiii. 15), the term \u201cbowels\u201d is used in\nthe sense of \u201cheart\u201d; for the term \u201cbowels\u201d is used both in a general\nand in a specific meaning; it denotes specifically \u201cbowels,\u201d but more\ngenerally it can be used as the name of any inner organ, including\n\u201cheart.\u201d The correctness of this argument can be proved by the phrase\n\u201cAnd thy law is within my bowels\u201d (Ps. xl. 9), which is identical with\n\u201cAnd thy law is within my heart.\u201d For that reason the prophet employed\nin this verse the phrase \u201cmy bowels are troubled\u201d (and \u201cthe sounding of\nthy bowels\u201d); the verb hamah is in fact used more frequently in\nconnection with \u201cheart,\u201d than with any other organ; comp. \u201cMy heart\nmaketh a noise (homeh) in me\u201d (Jer. iv. 19). Similarly, the shoulder is\nnever used as a figure in reference to God, because it is known as a\nmere instrument of transport, and also comes into close contact with\nthe thing which it carries. With far greater reason the organs of\nnutrition are never attributed to God; they are at once recognized as\nsigns of imperfection. In fact all organs, both the external and the\ninternal, are employed in the various actions of the soul; some, as\ne.g., all inner organs, are the means of preserving the individual for\na certain time; others, as the organs of generation, are the means of\npreserving the species; others are the means of improving the condition\nof man and bringing his actions to perfection, as the hands, the feet,\nand the eyes, all of which tend to render motion, action, and\nperception more perfect. Animate beings require motion in order to be\nable to approach that which is conducive to their welfare, and to move\naway from the opposite; they require the senses in order to be able to\ndiscern what is injurious to them and what is beneficial. In addition,\nman requires various kinds of handiwork, to prepare his food, clothing,\nand dwelling; and he is compelled by his physical constitution to\nperform such work, namely, to prepare what is good for him. Some kinds\nof work also occur among certain animals, as far as such work is\nrequired by those animals. I do not believe that any man can doubt the\ncorrectness of the assertion that the Creator is not in need of\nanything for the continuance of His existence, or for the improvement\nof His condition. Therefore, God has no organs, or, what is the same,\nHe is not corporeal; His actions are accomplished by His Essence, not\nby any organ, and as undoubtedly physical forces are connected with the\norgans, He does not possess any such forces, that is to say, He has,\nbesides His Essence, nothing that could be the cause of His action, His\nknowledge, or His will, for attributes are nothing but forces under a\ndifferent name. It is not my intention to discuss the question in this\nchapter. Our Sages laid down a general principle, by which the literal\nsense of the physical attributes of God mentioned by the prophets is\nrejected; a principle which evidently shows that our Sages were far\nfrom the belief in the corporeality of God, and that they did not think\nany person capable of misunderstanding it, or entertaining any doubt\nabout it. For that reason they employ in the Talmud and the Midrashim\nphrases similar to those contained in the prophecies, without any\ncircumlocution; they knew that there could not be any doubt about their\nmetaphorical character, or any danger whatever of their being\nmisunderstood; and that all such expressions would be understood as\nfigurative [language], employed to communicate to the intellect the\nnotion of His existence. Now, it was well known that in figurative\nlanguage God is compared to a king who commands, cautions, punishes,\nand rewards, his subjects, and whose servants and attendants publish\nhis orders, so that they might be acted upon, and they also execute\nwhatever he wishes. Thus the Sages adopted that figure, used it\nfrequently, and introduced such speech, consent, and refusal of a king,\nand other usual acts of kings, as became necessary by that figure. In\nall these instances they were sure that no doubt or confusion would\narise from it. The general principle alluded to above is contained in\nthe following saying of our Sages, mentioned in Bereshith Rabba (c.\nxxvii.), \u201cGreat was the power of the Prophets; they compared the\ncreature to its Creator; comp. \u2018And over the resemblance of the throne\nwas a resemblance like the appearance of man\u2019\u201d (Ezek. i. 26). They have\nthus plainly stated that all those images which the Prophets perceived,\ni.e. in prophetic visions, are images created by God. This is perfectly\ncorrect; for every image in our imagination has been created. How\npregnant is the expression, \u201cGreat is their boldness!\u201d They indicated\nby it, that they themselves found it very remarkable; for whenever they\nperceived a word or act difficult to explain, or apparently\nobjectionable, they used that phrase; e.g., a certain Rabbi has\nperformed the act (of \u201c\u1e25ali\u1e93ah\u201d) with a slipper, alone and by night.\nAnother Rabbi, thereupon exclaimed \u201cHow great is his boldness to have\nfollowed the opinion of the minority.\u201d The Chaldee phrase rab gubreh in\nthe original of the latter quotation, and the Hebrew gadol ko\u1e25o in that\nof the former quotation, have the same meaning, viz., Great is the\npower of (or the boldness of). Hence, in the preceding quotation, the\nsense is, How remarkable is the language which the Prophets were\nobliged to use when they speak of God the Creator in terms signifying\nproperties of beings created by Him. This deserves attention. Our Sages\nhave thus stated in distinct and plain terms that they are far from\nbelieving in the corporeality of God; and in the figures and forms seen\nin a prophetical vision, though belonging to created beings, the\nProphets, to use the words of our Sages, \u201ccompared the creature to its\nCreator.\u201d If, however, after these explanations, any one wishes out of\nmalice to cavil at them, and to find fault with them, though their\nmethod is neither comprehended nor understood by him, the Sages o.b.m.\nwill sustain no injury by it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII\n\n\nWe have already stated several times that the prophetic books never\nattribute to God anything which ordinary men consider a defect, or\nwhich they cannot in their imagination combine with the idea of the\nAlmighty, although such terms may not otherwise be different from those\nwhich were employed as metaphors in relation to God. Indeed all things\nwhich are attributed to God are considered in some way to be\nperfection, or can at least be imagined [as appertaining to Him].\n\nWe must now show why, according to this principle, the senses of\nhearing, sight and smell, are attributed to God, but not those of taste\nand touch. He is equally elevated above the use of all the five senses;\nthey are all defective as regards perception, even for those who have\nno other source of knowledge; because they are passive, receive\nimpressions from without, and are subject to interruptions and\nsufferings, as much as the other organs of the body. By saying that God\nsees, we mean to state that He perceives visible things; \u201cHe hears\u201d is\nidentical with saying \u201cHe perceives audible things\u201d; in the same way we\nmight say, \u201cHe tastes and He touches,\u201d in the sense of \u201cHe perceives\nobjects which man perceives by means of taste and touch.\u201d For, as\nregards perception, the senses are identical; if we deny the existence\nof one sensation in God, we must deny that of all other sensations,\ni.e., the perceptions of the five senses; and if we attribute the\nexistence of one sensation to Him, i.e., the perception appertaining to\none of the senses, we must attribute all the five sensations.\nNevertheless, we find in Holy Writ, \u201cAnd God saw\u201d (Gen. vi. 5); \u201cAnd\nGod heard\u201d (Num. xi. 1); \u201cAnd God smelt\u201d (Gen. viii. 21); but we do not\nmeet with the expressions, \u201cAnd God tasted,\u201d \u201cAnd God touched.\u201d\nAccording to our opinion the reason of this is to be found in the idea,\nwhich has a firm hold in the minds of all men, that God does not come\ninto contact with a body in the same manner as one body comes into\ncontact with another, since He is not even seen by the eye. While these\ntwo senses, namely, taste and touch, only act when in close contact\nwith the object, by sight, hearing, and smell, even distant objects are\nperceived. These, therefore, were considered by the multitude\nappropriate expressions [to be figuratively applied to God]. Besides,\nthe object in figuratively applying the sensations to Him, could only\nhave been to express that He perceives our actions; but hearing and\nsight are sufficient for that, namely, for the perception of what a man\ndoes or says. Thus our Sages, among other admonitions, gave the\nfollowing advice and warning: \u201cKnow what is above thee, a seeing eye,\nand a hearing ear.\u201d (Mishnah Abot, ii. 1.)\n\nYou, however, know that, strictly speaking, the condition of all the\nsensations is the same, that the same argument which is employed\nagainst the existence of touch and taste in God, may be used against\nsight, hearing, and smell; for they all are material perceptions and\nimpressions which are subject to change. There is only this difference,\nthat the former, touch and taste, are at once recognized as\ndeficiencies, while the others are considered as perfections. In a\nsimilar manner the defect of the imagination is easily seen, less\neasily that of thinking and reasoning. Imagination (ra\u02bbayon) therefore,\nwas never employed as a figure in speaking of God, while thought and\nreason are figuratively ascribed to Him. Comp. \u201cThe thoughts which the\nLord thought\u201d (Jer. xlix. 20); \u201cAnd with his understanding he stretched\nout the heavens\u201d (ib. x. 12). The inner senses were thus treated in the\nsame way as the external; some are figuratively applied to God, some\nnot. All this is according to the language of man; he ascribes to God\nwhat he considers a perfection, and does not ascribe to Him what he\nconsiders a defect. In truth, however, no real attribute, implying an\naddition to His essence, can be applied to Him, as will be proved.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII\n\n\nWhenever in the Pentateuch the term \u201cto hear\u201d is applied to God,\nOnkelos, the Proselyte, does not translate it literally, but\nparaphrases it, merely expressing that a certain speech reached Him,\ni.e., He perceived it, or that He accepted it or did not accept, when\nit refers to supplication and prayer as its object. The words \u201cGod\nheard\u201d are therefore paraphrased by him regularly either, \u201cIt was heard\nbefore the Lord,\u201d or \u201cHe accepted\u201d when employed in reference to\nsupplication and prayer; [e.g.] \u201cI will surely accept,\u201d lit. \u201cI will\nsurely hear\u201d (Exod. xxii. 22). This principle is followed by Onkelos in\nhis translation of the Pentateuch without any exception. But as regards\nthe verb \u201cto see,\u201d (raah), his renderings vary in a remarkable manner,\nand I was unable to discern his principle or method. In some instances\nhe translates literally, \u201cand God saw\u201d; in others he paraphrases \u201cit\nwas revealed before the Lord.\u201d The use of the phrase va-\u1e25aza adonai by\nOnkelos is sufficient evidence that the term \u1e25aza in Chaldee is\nhomonymous, and that it denotes mental perception as well as the\nsensation of sight. This being the case, I am surprised that, in some\ninstances avoiding the literal rendering, he substituted for it \u201cAnd it\nwas revealed before the Lord.\u201d When I, however, examined the various\nreadings in the version of Onkelos, which I either saw myself or heard\nfrom others during the time of my studies, I found that the term \u201cto\nsee\u201d when connected with wrong, injury, or violence, was paraphrased,\n\u201cIt was manifest before the Lord.\u201d There is no doubt that the term \u1e25aza\nin Chaldee denotes complete apprehension and reception of the object in\nthe state in which it has been perceived. When Onkelos, therefore,\nfound the verb \u201cto see\u201d connected with the object \u201cwrong,\u201d he did not\nrender it literally, but paraphrased it, \u201cIt was revealed before the\nLord.\u201d Now, I noticed that in all instances of the Pentateuch where\nseeing is ascribed to God, he translated it literally, except those\ninstances which I will mention to you: \u201cFor my affliction was revealed\nbefore the Lord\u201d (Gen. xxix. 32); \u201cFor all that Laban doeth unto thee\nis revealed before me\u201d (ib. xxxi. 12);\u2014although the first person in the\nsentence refers to the angel [and not to God], Onkelos does not ascribe\nto him that perception which implies complete comprehension of the\nobject, because the object is \u201ciniquity\u201d\u2014\u201cThe oppression of the\nchildren of Israel was known to the Lord\u201d (Exod. ii. 25); \u201cThe\noppression of my people was surely known to me\u201d (ib. iii. 7); \u201cThe\naffliction is known to me\u201d (ib. 9); \u201cTheir oppression is known to me\u201d\n(ib. iv. 31); \u201cThis people is known to me\u201d (ib. xxxii. 9), i.e., their\nrebellion is known to me\u2014comp. the Targum of the passage, \u201cAnd God saw\nthe children of Israel\u201d (ib. ii. 25), which is equal to \u201cHe saw their\naffliction and their trouble\u201d\u2014\u201cAnd it was known to the Lord, and he\nabhorred them\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 19); \u201cIt was known to him that their power\nwas gone\u201d (ib. 36); in this instance the object of the perception is\nlikewise the wrong done to the Israelites, and the increasing power of\nthe enemy. In all these examples Onkelos is consistent, following the\nmaxim expressed in the words, \u201cThou canst not look on iniquity\u201d (Hab.\ni. 13); wherefore he renders the verb \u201cto see,\u201d when referring to\noppression or rebellion, It is revealed before him, etc. This\nappropriate and satisfactory explanation, the correctness of which I do\nnot doubt, is weakened by three passages, in which, according to this\nview, I expected to find the verb \u201cto see\u201d paraphrased \u201cto be revealed\nbefore him,\u201d but found instead the literal rendering \u201cto see\u201d in the\nvarious copies of the Targum. The following are the three passages:\n\u201cAnd God saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth\u201d (Gen.\nvi. 6); \u201cAnd the Lord saw the earth, and behold it was corrupt\u201d (ib.\nvi. 12); \u201cand God saw that Leah was hated\u201d (ib. xxx. 31). It appears to\nme that in these passages there is a mistake, which has crept into the\ncopies of the Targum, since we do not possess the Targum in the\noriginal manuscript of Onkelos, for in that case we should have assumed\nthat he had a satisfactory explanation of it.\n\nIn rendering Genesis xxii. 8, \u201cthe lamb is known to the Lord,\u201d he\neither wished to indicate that the Lord was not expected to seek and to\nbring it, or he considered it inappropriate, in Chaldee to connect the\ndivine perception with one of the lower animals.\n\nHowever, the various copies of the Targum must be carefully examined\nwith regard to this point, and if you still find those passages the\nsame as I quoted them, I cannot explain what he meant.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIX\n\n\nThe angels are likewise incorporeal; they are intelligences without\nmatter, but they are nevertheless created beings, and God created them,\nas will be explained below. In Bereshith Rabbah (on Gen. iii. 24) we\nread the following remark of our Sages: \u201cThe angel is called \u2018the flame\nof the sword which turned every way\u2019 (Gen. iii. 24), in accordance with\nthe words, \u2018His ministers a flaming fire\u2019 (Ps. civ. 4); the attribute,\n\u2018which turned every way\u2019 is added, because angels are changeable in\nform; they appear at one time as males, at another as females; now as\nspirits; now as angels.\u201d By this remark they clearly stated that angels\nare incorporeal, and have no permanent bodily form independent of the\nmind [of him who perceives them], they exist entirely in prophetic\nvision, and depend on the action of the imaginative power, as will be\nexplained when speaking on the true meaning of prophecy. As to the\nwords \u201cat another time as females,\u201d which imply that the Prophets in\nprophetical vision perceived angels also in the form of women, they\nrefer to the vision of Zechariah (v. 9), \u201cAnd, behold, there came out\ntwo women, and the wind was in their wings.\u201d You know very well how\ndifficult it is for men to form a notion of anything immaterial, and\nentirely devoid of corporeality, except after considerable training: it\nis especially difficult for those who do not distinguish between\nobjects of the intellect and objects of the imagination, and depend\nmostly on the mere imaginative power. They believe that all imagined\nthings exist or at least have the possibility of existing; but that\nwhich cannot be imagined does not exist, and cannot exist. For persons\nof this class\u2014and the majority of thinkers belong to it\u2014cannot arrive\nat the true solution of any question, or at the explanation of anything\ndoubtful. On account of this difficulty the prophetic books contain\nexpressions which, taken literally, imply that angels are corporeal,\nmoving about, endowed with human form, receiving commands of God,\nobeying His word and performing whatever He wishes, according to His\ncommand. All this only serves to lead to the belief that angels exist,\nand are alive and perfect, in the same way as we have explained in\nreference to God. If the figurative representation of angels were\nlimited to this, their true essence would be believed to be the same as\nthe essence of God, since, in reference to the Creator expressions are\nlikewise employed, which literally imply that He is corporeal, living,\nmoving and endowed with human form. In order, therefore, to give to the\nmind of men the idea that the existence of angels is lower than the\nexistence of God, certain forms of lower animals were introduced in the\ndescription of angels. It was thereby shown, that the existence of God\nis more perfect than that of angels, as much as man is more perfect\nthan the lower animals. Nevertheless no organ of the brute creation was\nattributed to the angels except wings. Without wings the act of flying\nappears as impossible as that of walking without legs; for these two\nmodes of motion can only be imagined in connection with these organs.\nThe motion of flying has been chosen as a symbol to represent that\nangels possess life, because it is the most perfect and most sublime\nmovement of the brute creation. Men consider this motion a perfection\nto such an extent that they themselves wish to be able to fly, in order\nto escape easily what is injurious, and to obtain quickly what is\nuseful, though it be at a distance. For this reason this motion has\nbeen attributed to the angels.\n\nThere is besides another reason. The bird in its flight is sometimes\nvisible, sometimes withdrawn from our sight; one moment near to us, and\nin the next far off; and these are exactly the circumstances which we\nmust associate with the idea of angels, as will be explained below.\nThis imaginary perfection, the motion of flight, being the exclusive\nproperty of the brute creation, has never been attributed to God. You\nmust not be misled by the passage, \u201cAnd he rode upon a cherub, and he\ndid fly\u201d (Ps. xviii. 10), for it is the cherub that did fly, and the\nsimile only serves to denote the rapid arrival of that which is\nreferred to in that passage. Comp.: \u201cBehold, the Lord rideth upon a\nswift cloud, and shall come into Egypt\u201d (Isa. xix. 1); that is, the\npunishment alluded to will come down quickly upon Egypt. Nor should\nexpressions like \u201cthe face of an ox,\u201d \u201cthe face of a lion,\u201d \u201cthe face\nof an eagle,\u201d \u201cthe sole of the foot of a calf,\u201d found in the prophecies\nof Ezekiel (i. 10 and 7) mislead you; for all these are explained in a\ndifferent manner, as you will learn later, and besides, the prophet\nonly describes the animals (\u1e25ayyot). The subject will be explained\n(III. i.), though by mere hints, as far as necessary, for directing\nyour attention to the true interpretation.\n\nThe motion of flying, frequently mentioned in the Bible, necessitates,\naccording to our imagination, the existence of wings; wings are\ntherefore given to the angels as symbols expressive of their existence,\nnot of their true essence. You must also bear in mind that whenever a\nthing moves very quickly, it is said to fly, as that term implies great\nvelocity of motion. Comp. \u201cAs the eagle flieth\u201d (Deut. xxviii. 49). The\neagle flies and moves with greater velocity than any other bird, and\ntherefore it is introduced in this simile. Furthermore, the wings are\nthe organs [lit. causes] of flight; hence the number of the wings of\nangels in the prophetic vision corresponds to the number of the causes\nwhich set a thing in motion, but this does not belong to the theme of\nthis chapter. (Comp. II. iv. and x.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER L\n\n\nWhen reading my present treatise, bear in mind that by \u201cfaith\u201d we do\nnot understand merely that which is uttered with the lips, but also\nthat which is apprehended by the soul, the conviction that the object\n[of belief] is exactly as it is apprehended. If, as regards real or\nsupposed truths, you content yourself with giving utterance to them in\nwords, without apprehending them or believing in them, especially if\nyou do not seek real truth, you have a very easy task as, in fact, you\nwill find many ignorant people professing articles of faith without\nconnecting any idea with them.\n\nIf, however, you have a desire to rise to a higher state, viz., that of\nreflection, and truly to hold the conviction that God is One and\npossesses true unity, without admitting plurality or divisibility in\nany sense whatever, you must understand that God has no essential\nattribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and that the rejection\nof corporeality implies the rejection of essential attributes. Those\nwho believe that God is One, and that He has many attributes, declare\nthe unity with their lips, and assume plurality in their thoughts. This\nis like the doctrine of the Christians, who say that He is one and He\nis three, and that the three are one. Of the same character is the\ndoctrine of those who say that God is One, but that He has many\nattributes; and that He with His attributes is One, although they deny\ncorporeality and affirm His most absolute freedom from matter; as if\nour object were to seek forms of expression, not subjects of belief.\nFor belief is only possible after the apprehension of a thing; it\nconsists in the conviction that the thing apprehended has its existence\nbeyond the mind [in reality] exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If\nin addition to this we are convinced that the thing cannot be different\nin any way from what we believe it to be, and that no reasonable\nargument can be found for the rejection of the belief or for the\nadmission of any deviation from it, then the belief is true. Renounce\ndesires and habits, follow your reason, and study what I am going to\nsay in the chapters which follow on the rejection of the attributes;\nyou will then be fully convinced of what we have said; you will be of\nthose who truly conceive the Unity of God, not of those who utter it\nwith their lips without thought, like men of whom it has been said,\n\u201cThou art near in their mouth, and far from their reins\u201d (Jer. xii. 2).\nIt is right that a man should belong to that class of men who have a\nconception of truth and understand it, though they do not speak of it.\nThus the pious are advised and addressed, \u201cCommune with your own heart\nupon your bed and be still. Selah.\u201d (Ps. iv. 5.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LI\n\n\nThere are many things whose existence is manifest and obvious; some of\nthese are innate notions or objects of sensation, others are nearly so;\nand in fact they would require no proof if man had been left in his\nprimitive state. Such are the existence of motion, of man\u2019s free will,\nof phases of production and destruction, and of the natural properties\nperceived by the senses, e.g., the heat of fire, the coldness of water,\nand many other similar things. False notions, however, may be spread\neither by a person labouring under error, or by one who has some\nparticular end in view, and who establishes theories contrary to the\nreal nature of things, by denying the existence of things perceived by\nthe senses, or by affirming the existence of what does not exist.\nPhilosophers are thus required to establish by proof things which are\nself-evident, and to disprove the existence of things which only exist\nin man\u2019s imagination. Thus Aristotle gives a proof for the existence of\nmotion, because it had been denied; he disproves the reality of atoms,\nbecause it had been asserted.\n\nTo the same class belongs the rejection of essential attributes in\nreference to God. For it is a self-evident truth that the attribute is\nnot inherent in the object to which it is ascribed, but it is\nsuperadded to its essence, and is consequently an accident; if the\nattribute denoted the essence [\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f76 \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9] of the object, it would\nbe either mere tautology, as if, e.g., one would say \u201cman is man,\u201d or\nthe explanation of a name, as, e.g., \u201cman is a speaking animal\u201d; for\nthe words \u201cspeaking animal\u201d include the true essence of man, and there\nis no third element besides life and speech in the definition of man;\nwhen he, therefore, is described by the attributes of life and speech,\nthese are nothing but an explanation of the name \u201cman,\u201d that is to say,\nthat the thing which is called man, consists of life and speech. It\nwill now be clear that the attribute must be one of two things, either\nthe essence of the object described\u2014in that case it is a mere\nexplanation of a name, and on that account we might admit the attribute\nin reference to God, but we reject it from another cause as will be\nshown\u2014or the attribute is something different from the object\ndescribed, some extraneous superadded element; in that case the\nattribute would be an accident, and he who merely rejects the\nappellation \u201caccidents\u201d in reference to the attributes of God, does not\nthereby alter their character; for everything superadded to the essence\nof an object joins it without forming part of its essential properties,\nand that constitutes an accident. Add to this the logical consequence\nof admitting many attributes, viz., the existence of many eternal\nbeings. There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by\nadmitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or\nplurality of elements; one from whatever side you view it, and by\nwhatever test you examine it; not divisible into two parts in any way\nand by any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either\nobjectively or subjectively, as will be proved in this treatise.\n\nSome thinkers have gone so far as to say that the attributes of God are\nneither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence. This is\nlike the assertion of some theorists, that the ideals, i.e., the\nuniversalia, are neither existing nor non-existent, and like the views\nof others, that the atom does not fill a definite place, but keeps an\natom of space occupied; that man has no freedom of action at all, but\nhas acquirement. Such things are only said; they exist only in words,\nnot in thought, much less in reality. But as you know, and as all know\nwho do not delude themselves, these theories are preserved by a\nmultitude of words, by misleading similes sustained by declamation and\ninvective, and by numerous methods borrowed both from dialectics and\nsophistry. If after uttering them and supporting them by such words, a\nman were to examine for himself his own belief on this subject, he\nwould see nothing but confusion and stupidity in an endeavour to prove\nthe existence of things which do not exist, or to find a mean between\ntwo opposites that have no mean. Or is there a mean between existence\nand non-existence, or between the identity and non-identity of two\nthings? But, as we said, to such absurdities men were forced by the\ngreat licence given to the imagination, and by the fact that every\nexisting material thing is necessarily imagined as a certain substance\npossessing several attributes; for nothing has ever been found that\nconsists of one simple substance without any attribute. Guided by such\nimaginations, men thought that God was also composed of many different\nelements, viz., of His essence and of the attributes superadded to His\nessence. Following up this comparison, some believed that God was\ncorporeal, and that He possessed attributes; others, abandoning this\ntheory, denied the corporeality, but retained the attributes. The\nadherence to the literal sense of the text of Holy Writ is the source\nof all this error, as I shall show in some of the chapters devoted to\nthis theme.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LII\n\n\nEvery description of an object by an affirmative attribute, which\nincludes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must be\nmade in one of the following five ways:\u2014\n\nFirst. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man is\ndescribed as a being that lives and has reason; such a description,\ncontaining the true essence of the object, is, as we have already\nshown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree that this\nkind of description cannot be given of God; for there are no previous\ncauses to His existence, by which He could be defined: and on that\naccount it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers,\nwho are precise in their statements, that no definition can be given of\nGod.\n\nSecondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when,\ne.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. This\nkind of description includes the necessary connection [of the two\nideas]; for when we say that every man is rational we mean by it that\nevery being which has the characteristics of man must also have reason.\nAll agree that this kind of description is inappropriate in reference\nto God; for if we were to speak of a portion of His essence, we should\nconsider His essence to be a compound. The inappropriateness of this\nkind of description in reference to God is the same as that of the\npreceding kind.\n\nThirdly. An object is described by something different from its true\nessence, by something that does not complement or establish the essence\nof the object. The description, therefore, relates to a quality; but\nquality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If God could be\ndescribed in this way, He would be the substratum of accidents: a\nsufficient reason for rejecting the idea that He possesses quality,\nsince it diverges from the true conception of His essence. It is\nsurprising how those who admit the application of attributes to God can\nreject, in reference to Him, comparison and qualification. For when\nthey say \u201cHe cannot be qualified,\u201d they can only mean that He possesses\nno quality; and yet every positive essential attribute of an object\neither constitutes its essence,\u2014and in that case it is identical with\nthe essence,\u2014or it contains a quality of the object.\n\nThere are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give you\ninstances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that this\nclass of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man is\ndescribed by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any of\nthe dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when, e.g.,\nwe speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or\nwho is ill. It makes no difference whether we say, a carpenter, or a\nsage, or a physician; by all these we represent certain physical\ndispositions; nor does it make any difference whether we say\n\u201csin-fearing\u201d or \u201cmerciful.\u201d Every trade, every profession, and every\nsettled habit of man are certain physical dispositions. All this is\nclear to those who have occupied themselves with the study of Logic.\n(b) A thing is described by some physical quality it possesses, or by\nthe absence of the same, e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no\ndifference whether we say \u201csoft or hard,\u201d or \u201cstrong or weak\u201d; in both\ncases we speak of physical conditions. (c) A man is described by his\npassive qualities, or by his emotions; we speak, e.g., of a person who\nis passionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that these\nconditions have become permanent. The description of a thing by its\ncolour, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this\nclass of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of its qualities\nresulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g., of a thing which is\nlong, short, curved, straight, etc.\n\nConsider all these and similar attributes, and you will find that they\ncannot be employed in reference to God. He is not a magnitude that any\nquality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him; He\nis not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess\nany quality resulting from emotion. He is not subject to physical\nconditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar\nqualities; He is not an animate being, that He should have a certain\ndisposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness,\nmodesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are\nsubject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows\nthat no attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest sense,\ncan be predicated of God. Consequently, these three classes of\nattributes, describing the essence of a thing, or part of the essence,\nor a quality of it, are clearly inadmissible in reference to God, for\nthey imply composition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question as\nregards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, that He\nis absolutely One.\n\nFourthly. A thing is described by its relation to another thing, e.g.,\nto time, to space, or to a different individual; thus we say, Zaid, the\nfather of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, or\nwho lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does not necessarily\nimply plurality or change in the essence of the object described; for\nthe same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is the partner of Amru, the\nfather of Becr, the master of Khalid, the friend of Zaid, dwells in a\ncertain house, and was born in a certain year. Such relations are not\nthe essence of a thing, nor are they so intimately connected with it as\nqualities. At first thought, it would seem that they may be employed in\nreference to God, but after careful and thorough consideration we are\nconvinced of their inadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no\nrelation between God and time or space. For time is an accident\nconnected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of\nanteriority and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is\nexplained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of\nthe conditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God is\nimmaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time. Similarly\nthere is no relation between Him and space. But what we have to\ninvestigate and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists\nbetween God and any of the substances created by Him, by which He could\nbe described? That there is no correlation between Him and any of His\ncreatures can easily be seen; for the characteristic of two objects\ncorrelative to each other is the equality of their reciprocal relation.\nNow, as God has absolute existence, while all other beings have only\npossible existence, as we shall show, there consequently cannot be any\ncorrelation [between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of\nrelation does exist between them is by some considered possible, but\nwrongly. It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellect and\nsight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence is common to\nboth; how, then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and\nGod, who has nothing in common with any other being; for even the term\nexistence is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion,\nonly by way of pure homonymity. Consequently there is no relation\nwhatever between Him and any other being. For whenever we speak of a\nrelation between two things, these belong to the same kind; but when\ntwo things belong to different kinds though of the same class, there is\nno relation between them. We therefore do not say, this red compared\nwith that green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although both\nbelong to the same class\u2014colour; when they belong to two different\nclasses, there does not appear to exist any relation between them, not\neven to a man of ordinary intellect, although the two things belong to\nthe same category; e.g., between a hundred cubits and the heat of\npepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the other a\nquantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between meekness and\nbitterness, although all these come under the head of quality in its\nmore general signification. How, then, could there be any relation\nbetween God and His creatures, considering the important difference\nbetween them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all\ndifferences. Besides, if any relation existed between them, God would\nbe subject to the accident of relation; and although that would not be\nan accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a\nkind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you applied\naffirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though they\ncontained only relations; these, however, are the most appropriate of\nall attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in reference to\nGod, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things\nexists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when\nthose things change to which God is in relation.\n\nFifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean by \u201cits\nactions\u201d the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressed in\n\u201ccarpenter,\u201d \u201cpainter,\u201d or \u201csmith\u201d\u2014for these belong to the class of\nqualities which have been mentioned above\u2014but I mean the action the\nlatter has performed\u2014we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built\nthat wall, wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from\nthe essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be\nemployed in describing the Creator, especially since we know that these\ndifferent actions do not imply that different elements must be\ncontained in the substance of the agent, by which the different actions\nare produced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions of\nGod emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded\nto His essence, as we have shown.\n\nWhat we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God is one\nin every respect, containing no plurality or any element superadded to\nHis essence: and that the many attributes of different significations\napplied in Scripture to God, originate in the multitude of His actions,\nnot in a plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed\nwith the object of conveying to us some notion of His perfection, in\naccordance with what we consider perfection, as has been explained by\nus. The possibility of one simple substance excluding plurality, though\naccomplishing different actions, will be illustrated by examples in the\nnext chapter.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIII\n\n\nThe circumstance which caused men to believe in the existence of divine\nattributes is similar to that which caused others to believe in the\ncorporeality of God. The latter have not arrived at that belief by\nspeculation, but by following the literal sense of certain passages in\nthe Bible. The same is the case with the attributes; when in the books\nof the Prophets and of the Law, God is described by attributes, such\npassages are taken in their literal sense, and it is then believed that\nGod possesses attributes; as if He were to be exalted above\ncorporeality, and not above things connected with corporeality, i.e.,\nthe accidents, I mean psychical dispositions, all of which are\nqualities [and connected with corporeality]. Every attribute which the\nfollowers of this doctrine assume to be essential to the Creator, you\nwill find to express, although they do not distinctly say so, a quality\nsimilar to those which they are accustomed to notice in the bodies of\nall living beings. We apply to all such passages the principle, \u201cThe\nTorah speaketh in the language of man,\u201d and say that the object of all\nthese terms is to describe God as the most perfect being, not as\npossessing those qualities which are only perfections in relation to\ncreated living beings. Many of the attributes express different acts of\nGod, but that difference does not necessitate any difference as regards\nHim from whom the acts proceed. This fact, viz., that from one agency\ndifferent effects may result, although that agency has not free will,\nand much more so if it has free will, I will illustrate by an instance\ntaken from our own sphere. Fire melts certain things and makes others\nhard, it boils and burns, it bleaches and blackens. If we described the\nfire as bleaching, blackening, burning, boiling, hardening and melting,\nwe should be correct, and yet he who does not know the nature of fire,\nwould think that it included six different elements, one by which it\nblackens, another by which it bleaches, a third by which it boils, a\nfourth by which it consumes, a fifth by which it melts, a sixth by\nwhich it hardens things\u2014actions which are opposed to one another, and\nof which each has its peculiar property. He, however, who knows the\nnature of fire, will know that by virtue of one quality in action,\nnamely, by heat, it produces all these effects. If this is the case\nwith that which is done by nature, how much more is it the case with\nregard to beings that act by free will, and still more with regard to\nGod, who is above all description. If we, therefore, perceive in God\ncertain relations of various kinds\u2014for wisdom in us is different from\npower, and power from will\u2014it does by no means follow that different\nelements are really contained in Him, that He contains one element by\nwhich He knows, another by which He wills, and another by which He\nexercises power, as is, in fact, the signification of the attributes of\nGod according to the Attributists. Some of them express it plainly, and\nenumerate the attributes as elements added to the essence. Others,\nhowever, are more reserved with regard to this matter, but indicate\ntheir opinion, though they do not express it in distinct and\nintelligible words. Thus, e.g., some of them say: \u201cGod is omnipotent by\nHis essence, wise by His essence, living by His essence, and endowed\nwith a will by His essence.\u201d (I will mention to you, as an instance,\nman\u2019s reason, which being one faculty and implying no plurality,\nenables him to know many arts and sciences; by the same faculty man is\nable to sow, to do carpenter\u2019s work, to weave, to build, to study, to\nacquire a knowledge of geometry, and to govern a state. These various\nacts resulting from one simple faculty, which involves no plurality,\nare very numerous; their number, that is, the number of the actions\noriginating in man\u2019s reason, is almost infinite. It is therefore\nintelligible how in reference to God, those different actions can be\ncaused by one simple substance, that does not include any plurality or\nany additional element. The attributes found in Holy Scripture are\neither qualifications of His actions, without any reference to His\nessence, or indicate absolute perfection, but do not imply that the\nessence of God is a compound of various elements.) For in not admitting\nthe term \u201ccompound,\u201d they do not reject the idea of a compound when\nthey admit a substance with attributes.\n\nThere still remains one difficulty which led them to that error, and\nwhich I am now going to mention. Those who assert the existence of the\nattributes do not found their opinion on the variety of God\u2019s actions;\nthey say it is true that one substance can be the source of various\neffects, but His essential attributes cannot be qualifications of His\nactions, because it is impossible to imagine that the Creator created\nHimself. They vary with regard to the so-called essential attributes\u2014I\nmean as regards their number\u2014according to the text of the Scripture\nwhich each of them follows. I will enumerate those on which all agree,\nand the knowledge of which they believe that they have derived from\nreasoning, not from some words of the Prophets, namely, the following\nfour:\u2014life, power, wisdom, and will. They believe that these are four\ndifferent things, and such perfections as cannot possibly be absent\nfrom the Creator, and that these cannot be qualifications of His\nactions. This is their opinion. But you must know that wisdom and life\nin reference to God are not different from each other; for in every\nbeing that is conscious of itself, life and wisdom are the same thing,\nthat is to say, if by wisdom we understand the consciousness of self.\nBesides, the subject and the object of that consciousness are\nundoubtedly identical [as regards God]; for according to our opinion,\nHe is not composed of an element that apprehends, and another that does\nnot apprehend; He is not like man, who is a combination of a conscious\nsoul and an unconscious body. If, therefore, by \u201cwisdom\u201d we mean the\nfaculty of self-consciousness, wisdom and life are one and the same\nthing. They, however, do not speak of wisdom in this sense, but of His\npower to apprehend His creatures. There is also no doubt that power and\nwill do not exist in God in reference to Himself; for He cannot have\npower or will as regards Himself; we cannot imagine such a thing. They\ntake these attributes as different relations between God and His\ncreatures, signifying that He has power in creating things, will in\ngiving to things existence as He desires, and wisdom in knowing what He\ncreated. Consequently, these attributes do not refer to the essence of\nGod, but express relations between Him and His creatures.\n\nTherefore we, who truly believe in the Unity of God, declare, that as\nwe do not believe that some element is included in His essence by which\nHe created the heavens, another by which He created the [four]\nelements, a third by which He created the ideals, in the same way we\nreject the idea that His essence contains an element by which He has\npower, another element by which He has will, and a third by which He\nhas a knowledge of His creatures. On the contrary, He is a simple\nessence, without any additional element whatever; He created the\nuniverse, and knows it, but not by any extraneous force. There is no\ndifference whether these various attributes refer to His actions or to\nrelations between Him and His works; in fact, these relations, as we\nhave also shown, exist only in the thoughts of men. This is what we\nmust believe concerning the attributes occurring in the books of the\nProphets; some may also be taken as expressive of the perfection of God\nby way of comparison with what we consider as perfections in us, as we\nshall explain.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIV\n\n\nThe wisest man, our Teacher Moses, asked two things of God, and\nreceived a reply respecting both. The one thing he asked was, that God\nshould let him know His true essence; the other, which in fact he asked\nfirst, that God should let him know His attributes. In answer to both\nthese petitions God promised that He would let him know all His\nattributes, and that these were nothing but His actions. He also told\nhim that His true essence could not be perceived, and pointed out a\nmethod by which he could obtain the utmost knowledge of God possible\nfor man to acquire. The knowledge obtained by Moses has not been\npossessed by any human being before him or after him. His petition to\nknow the attributes of God is contained in the following words: \u201cShow\nme now thy way, that I may know thee, that I may find grace in thy\nsight\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 13). Consider how many excellent ideas found\nexpression in the words, \u201cShow me thy way, that I may know thee.\u201d We\nlearn from them that God is known by His attributes, for Moses believed\nthat he knew Him, when he was shown the way of God. The words \u201cThat I\nmay find grace in thy sight,\u201d imply that he who knows God finds grace\nin His eyes. Not only is he acceptable and welcome to God who fasts and\nprays, but everyone who knows Him. He who has no knowledge of God is\nthe object of His wrath and displeasure. The pleasure and the\ndispleasure of God, the approach to Him and the withdrawal from Him are\nproportional to the amount of man\u2019s knowledge or ignorance concerning\nthe Creator. We have already gone too far away from our subject, let us\nnow return to it.\n\nMoses prayed to God to grant him knowledge of His attributes, and also\npardon for His people; when the latter had been granted, he continued\nto pray for the knowledge of God\u2019s essence in the words, \u201cShow me thy\nglory\u201d (ib. 18), and then received, respecting his first request, \u201cShow\nme thy way,\u201d the following favourable reply, \u201cI will make all my\ngoodness to pass before thee\u201d (ib. 19); as regards the second request,\nhowever, he was told, \u201cThou canst not see my face\u201d (ib. 20). The words\n\u201call my goodness\u201d imply that God promised to show him the whole\ncreation, concerning which it has been stated, \u201cAnd God saw everything\nthat he had made, and, behold, it was very good\u201d (Gen. i. 31); when I\nsay \u201cto show him the whole creation,\u201d I mean to imply that God promised\nto make him comprehend the nature of all things, their relation to each\nother, and the way they are governed by God both in reference to the\nuniverse as a whole and to each creature in particular. This knowledge\nis referred to when we are told of Moses, \u201che is firmly established in\nall mine house\u201d (Num. xii. 7); that is, \u201chis knowledge of all the\ncreatures in My universe is correct and firmly established\u201d; for false\nopinions are not firmly established. Consequently the knowledge of the\nworks of God is the knowledge of His attributes, by which He can be\nknown. The fact that God promised Moses to give him a knowledge of His\nworks, may be inferred from the circumstance that God taught him such\nattributes as refer exclusively to His works, viz., \u201cmerciful and\ngracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness,\u201d etc., (Exod. xxxiv.\n6). It is therefore clear that the ways which Moses wished to know, and\nwhich God taught him, are the actions emanating from God. Our Sages\ncall them middot (qualities), and speak of the thirteen middoth of God\n(Talm. B. Rosh ha-shanah, p. 17b); they used the term also in reference\nto man; comp. \u201cthere are four different middoth (characters) among\nthose who go to the house of learning\u201d; \u201cThere are four different\nmiddoth (characters) among those who give charity\u201d (Mishnah Abot, v.\n13, 14). They do not mean to say that God really possesses middot\n(qualities), but that He performs actions similar to such of our\nactions as originate in certain qualities, i.e., in certain psychical\ndispositions; not that God has really such dispositions. Although Moses\nwas shown \u201call His goodness,\u201d i.e., all His works, only the thirteen\nmiddot are mentioned, because they include those acts of God which\nrefer to the creation and the government of mankind, and to know these\nacts was the principal object of the prayer of Moses. This is shown by\nthe conclusion of his prayer, \u201cthat I may know thee, that I may find\ngrace in thy sight, and consider that this nation is thy people\u201d (Exod.\nxxxiii. 16), that is to say, the people whom I have to rule by certain\nacts in the performance of which I must be guided by Thy own acts in\ngoverning them. We have thus shown that \u201cthe ways\u201d used in the Bible,\nand \u201cmiddot\u201d used in the Mishnah, are identical, denoting the acts\nemanating from God in reference to the universe.\n\nWhenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe to God\nthat emotion which is the source of the act when performed by\nourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is formed from the verb\nexpressing that emotion. We see, e.g., how well He provides for the\nlife of the embryo of living beings; how He endows with certain\nfaculties both the embryo itself and those who have to rear it after\nits birth, in order that it may be protected from death and\ndestruction, guarded against all harm, and assisted in the performance\nof all that is required [for its development]. Similar acts, when\nperformed by us, are due to a certain emotion and tenderness called\nmercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to be merciful; e.g., \u201cLike as\na father is merciful to his children, so the Lord is merciful to them\nthat fear Him\u201d (Ps. ciii. 13); \u201cAnd I will spare them, as a man spareth\n(ya\u1e25amol) his own son that serveth him\u201d (Mal. iii. 17). Such instances\ndo not imply that God is influenced by a feeling of mercy, but that\nacts similar to those which a father performs for his son, out of pity,\nmercy and real affection, emanate from God solely for the benefit of\nHis pious men, and are by no means the result of any impression or\nchange\u2014[produced in God].\u2014When we give something to a person who has no\nclaim upon us, we perform an act of grace; e.g., \u201cGrant them graciously\nunto us\u201d (Judges xxi. 22). [The same term is used in reference to God,\ne.g.] \u201cwhich God hath graciously given\u201d (Gen. xxxiii. 5); \u201cBecause God\nhath dealt graciously with me\u201d (ib. 11). Instances of this kind are\nnumerous. God creates and guides beings who have no claim upon Him to\nbe created and guided by Him; He is therefore called gracious\n(\u1e25annun).\u2014His actions towards mankind also include great calamities,\nwhich overtake individuals and bring death to them, or affect whole\nfamilies and even entire regions, spread death, destroy generation\nafter generation, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence there occur\ninundations, earthquakes, destructive storms, expeditions of one nation\nagainst the other for the sake of destroying it with the sword and\nblotting out its memory, and many other evils of the same kind.\nWhenever such evils are caused by us to any person, they originate in\ngreat anger, violent jealousy, or a desire for revenge. God is\ntherefore called, because of these acts, \u201cjealous,\u201d \u201crevengeful,\u201d\n\u201cwrathful,\u201d and \u201ckeeping anger\u201d (Nah. i. 2); that is to say, He\nperforms acts similar to those which, when performed by us, originate\nin certain psychical dispositions, in jealousy, desire for retaliation,\nrevenge, or anger; they are in accordance with the guilt of those who\nare to be punished, and not the result of any emotion; for He is above\nall defect! The same is the case with all divine acts; though\nresembling those acts which emanate from our passions and psychical\ndispositions, they are not due to anything superadded to His\nessence.\u2014The governor of a country, if he is a prophet, should conform\nto these attributes. Acts [of punishment] must be performed by him\nmoderately and in accordance with justice, not merely as an outlet of\nhis passion. He must not let loose his anger, nor allow his passion to\novercome him; for all passions are bad, and they must be guarded\nagainst as far as it lies in man\u2019s power. At times and towards some\npersons he must be merciful and gracious, not only from motives of\nmercy and compassion, but according to their merits; at other times and\ntowards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath in\nproportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion. He must be\nable to condemn a person to death by fire without anger, passion, or\nloathing against him, and must exclusively be guided by what he\nperceives of the guilt of the person, and by a sense of the great\nbenefit which a large number will derive from such a sentence. You\nhave, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how the commandment to annihilate\nthe seven nations, and \u201cto save alive nothing that breatheth\u201d (Deut.\nxx. 16) is followed immediately by the words, \u201cThat they teach you not\nto do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their\ngods; so should you sin against the Lord your God\u201d (ib. 18); that is to\nsay, you shall not think that this commandment implies an act of\ncruelty or of retaliation; it is an act demanded by the tendency of man\nto remove everything that might turn him away from the right path, and\nto clear away all obstacles in the road to perfection, that is, to the\nknowledge of God. Nevertheless, acts of mercy, pardon, pity, and grace\nshould more frequently be performed by the governor of a country than\nacts of punishment; seeing that all the thirteen middoth of God are\nattributes of mercy with only one exception, namely, \u201cvisiting the\niniquity of the fathers upon the children\u201d (Exod. xxxiv. 7); for the\nmeaning of the preceding attribute (in the original ve-nakkeh lo\nyenakkeh) is \u201cand he will not utterly destroy\u201d; (and not \u201cHe will by no\nmeans clear the guilty\u201d); comp. \u201cAnd she will be utterly destroyed\n(ve-nikketah), she shall sit upon the ground\u201d (Isa. iii. 26). When it\nis said that God is visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the\nchildren, this refers exclusively to the sin of idolatry, and to no\nother sin. That this is the case may be inferred from what is said in\nthe ten commandments, \u201cupon the third and fourth generation of my\nenemies\u201d (Exod. xx. 5), none except idolaters being called \u201cenemy\u201d;\ncomp. also \u201cevery abomination to the Lord, which he hateth\u201d (Deut. xii.\n31). It was, however, considered sufficient to extend the punishment to\nthe fourth generation, because the fourth generation is the utmost a\nman can see of his posterity; and when, therefore, the idolaters of a\nplace are destroyed, the old man worshipping idols is killed, his son,\nhis grandson, and his great-grandson, that is, the fourth generation.\nBy the mention of this attribute we are, as it were, told that His\ncommandments, undoubtedly in harmony with His acts, include the death\neven of the little children of idolaters because of the sin of their\nfathers and grandfathers. This principle we find frequently applied in\nthe Law, as, e.g., we read concerning the city that has been led astray\nto idolatry, \u201cdestroy it utterly, and all that is therein\u201d (Deut. xiii.\n15). All this has been ordained in order that every vestige of that\nwhich would lead to great injury should be blotted out, as we have\nexplained.\n\nWe have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, but we have\nshown why it has been considered sufficient to mention only these\n(thirteen) out of all His acts; namely, because they are required for\nthe good government of a country; for the chief aim of man should be to\nmake himself, as far as possible, similar to God: that is to say, to\nmake his acts similar to the acts of God, or as our Sages expressed it\nin explaining the verse, \u201cYe shall be holy\u201d (Lev. xxi. 2): \u201cHe is\ngracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful, so be you also\nmerciful.\u201d\n\nThe principal object of this chapter was to show that all attributes\nascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and do not imply that God\nhas any qualities.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LV\n\n\nWe have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise that\neverything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to be negatived\nin reference to God, for all passiveness implies change; and the agent\nproducing that state is undoubtedly different from the object affected\nby it; and if God could be affected in any way whatever, another being\nbeside Him would act on Him and cause change in Him. All kinds of\nnon-existence must likewise be negatived in reference to Him; no\nperfection whatever can therefore be imagined to be at one time absent\nfrom Him, and at another present in Him: for if this were the case, He\nwould [at a certain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality\nalways implies non-existence, and when anything has to pass from\npotentiality into reality, another thing that exists in reality is\nrequired to effect that transition. Hence it follows that all\nperfections must really exist in God, and none of them must in any way\nbe a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise to be denied in\nreference to God, is similarity to any existing being. This has been\ngenerally accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of the Prophets;\ne.g., \u201cTo whom, then, will you liken me?\u201d (Isa. xl. 25); \u201cTo whom,\nthen, will you liken God?\u201d (ib. 18); \u201cThere is none like unto Thee\u201d\n(Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind are frequent. In short, it is\nnecessary to demonstrate by proof that nothing can be predicated of God\nthat implies any of the following four things: corporeality, emotion or\nchange, non-existence,\u2014e.g., that something would be potential at one\ntime and real at another\u2014and similarity with any of His creatures. In\nthis respect our knowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural\nScience. For he who is ignorant of the latter cannot understand the\ndefect implied in emotions, the difference between potentiality and\nreality, the non-existence implied in all potentiality, the inferiority\nof a thing that exists in potenti\u00e2 to that which moves in order to\ncause its transition from potentiality into reality, and the\ninferiority of that which moves for this purpose compared with its\ncondition when the transition has been effected. He who knows these\nthings, but without their proofs, does not know the details which\nlogically result from these general propositions; and therefore he\ncannot prove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned above\nare inadmissible in reference to God.\n\nHaving premised these remarks, I shall explain in the next chapter the\nerror of those who believe that God has essential attributes; those who\nhave some knowledge of Logic and Natural Science will understand it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVI\n\n\nSimilarity is based on a certain relation between two things; if\nbetween two things no relation can be found, there can be no similarity\nbetween them, and there is no relation between two things that have no\nsimilarity to each other; e.g., we do not say this heat is similar to\nthat colour, or this voice is similar to that sweetness. This is\nself-evident. Since the existence of a relation between God and man, or\nbetween Him and other beings has been denied, similarity must likewise\nbe denied. You must know that two things of the same kind\u2014i.e., whose\nessential properties are the same, and which are distinguished from\neach other by greatness and smallness, strength and weakness, etc.\u2014are\nnecessarily similar, though different in this one way; e.g., a grain of\nmustard and the sphere of the fixed stars are similar as regards the\nthree dimensions, although the one is exceedingly great, the other\nexceedingly small, the property of having [three] dimensions is the\nsame in both; or the heat of wax melted by the sun and the heat of the\nelement of fire, are similar as regards heat; although the heat is\nexceedingly great in the one case, and exceedingly small in the other,\nthe existence of that quality (heat) is the same in both. Thus those\nwho believe in the presence of essential attributes in God, viz.,\nExistence, Life, Power, Wisdom, and Will, should know that these\nattributes, when applied to God, have not the same meaning as when\napplied to us, and that the difference does not only consist in\nmagnitude, or in the degree of perfection, stability, and durability.\nIt cannot be said, as they practically believe, that His existence is\nonly more stable, His life more permanent, His power greater, His\nwisdom more perfect, and His will more general than ours, and that the\nsame definition applies to both. This is in no way admissible, for the\nexpression \u201cmore than\u201d is used in comparing two things as regards a\ncertain attribute predicated of both of them in exactly the same sense,\nand consequently implies similarity [between God and His creatures].\nWhen they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-called\nessential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes\nof other things, and should according to their own opinion not be\nincluded in one of the same definition, just as there is no similarity\nbetween the essence of God and that of other beings. They do not follow\nthis principle, for they hold that one definition may include them, and\nthat, nevertheless, there is no similarity between them. Those who are\nfamiliar with the meaning of similarity will certainly understand that\nthe term existence, when applied to God and to other beings, is\nperfectly homonymous. In like manner, the terms Wisdom, Power, Will,\nand Life are applied to God and to other beings by way of perfect\nhomonymity, admitting of no comparison whatever. Nor must you think\nthat these attributes are employed as hybrid terms; for hybrid terms\nare such as are applied to two things which have a similarity to each\nother in respect to a certain property which is in both of them an\naccident, not an essential, constituent element. The attributes of God,\nhowever, are not considered as accidental by any intelligent person,\nwhile all attributes applied to man are accidents, according to the\nMutakallemim. I am therefore at a loss to see how they can find any\nsimilarity [between the attributes of God and those of man]; how their\ndefinitions can be identical, and their significations the same! This\nis a decisive proof that there is, in no way or sense, anything common\nto the attributes predicated of God, and those used in reference to\nourselves; they have only the same names, and nothing else is common to\nthem. Such being the case, it is not proper to believe, on account of\nthe use of the same attributes, that there is in God something\nadditional to His essence, in the same way as attributes are joined to\nour essence. This is most important for those who understand it. Keep\nit in memory, and study it thoroughly, in order to be well prepared for\nthat which I am going to explain to you.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVII\n\n\nOn attributes; remarks more recondite than the preceding. It is known\nthat existence is an accident appertaining to all things, and therefore\nan element superadded to their essence. This must evidently be the case\nas regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its\nexistence is an element superadded to its essence. But as regards a\nbeing whose existence is not due to any cause\u2014God alone is that being,\nfor His existence, as we have said, is absolute\u2014existence and essence\nare perfectly identical; He is not a substance to which existence is\njoined as an accident, as an additional element. His existence is\nalways absolute, and has never been a new element or an accident in\nHim. Consequently God exists without possessing the attribute of\nexistence. Similarly He lives, without possessing the attribute of\nlife; knows, without possessing the attribute of knowledge; is\nomnipotent without possessing the attribute of omnipotence; is wise,\nwithout possessing the attribute of wisdom; all this reduces itself to\none and the same entity; there is no plurality in Him, as will be\nshown. It is further necessary to consider that unity and plurality are\naccidents supervening to an object according as it consists of many\nelements or of one. This is fully explained in the book called\nMetaphysics. In the same way as number is not the substance of the\nthings numbered, so is unity not the substance of the thing which has\nthe attribute of unity, for unity and plurality are accidents belonging\nto the category of discrete quantity, and supervening to such objects\nas are capable of receiving them.\n\nTo that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute existence, and\nin which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity is as\ninadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say, God\u2019s unity\nis not an element superadded, but He is One without possessing the\nattribute of unity. The investigation of this subject, which is almost\ntoo subtle for our understanding, must not be based on current\nexpressions employed in describing it, for these are the great source\nof error. It would be extremely difficult for us to find, in any\nlanguage whatsoever, words adequate to this subject, and we can only\nemploy inadequate language. In our endeavour to show that God does not\ninclude a plurality, we can only say \u201cHe is one,\u201d although \u201cone\u201d and\n\u201cmany\u201d are both terms which serve to distinguish quantity. We therefore\nmake the subject clearer, and show to the understanding the way of\ntruth by saying He is one but does not possess the attribute of unity.\n\nThe same is the case when we say God is the First (Kadmon), to express\nthat He has not been created; the term \u201cFirst\u201d is decidedly inaccurate,\nfor it can in its true sense only be applied to a being that is subject\nto the relation of time; the latter, however, is an accident to motion\nwhich again is connected with a body. Besides the attribute \u201cfirst\u201d is\na relative term, being in regard to time the same as the terms \u201clong\u201d\nand \u201cshort\u201d are in regard to a line. Both expressions, \u201cfirst\u201d and\n\u201ccreated,\u201d are equally inadmissible in reference to any being to which\nthe attribute of time is not applicable, just as we do not say\n\u201ccrooked\u201d or \u201cstraight\u201d in reference to taste, \u201csalted\u201d or \u201cinsipid\u201d in\nreference to the voice. These subjects are not unknown to those who\nhave accustomed themselves to seek a true understanding of the things,\nand to establish their properties in accordance with the abstract\nnotions which the mind has formed of them, and who are not misled by\nthe inaccuracy of the words employed. All attributes, such as \u201cthe\nFirst,\u201d \u201cthe Last,\u201d occurring in the Scriptures in reference to God,\nare as metaphorical as the expressions \u201cear\u201d and \u201ceye.\u201d They simply\nsignify that God is not subject to any change or innovation whatever;\nthey do not imply that God can be described by time, or that there is\nany comparison between Him and any other being as regards time, and\nthat He is called on that account \u201cthe first\u201d and \u201cthe last.\u201d In short,\nall similar expressions are borrowed from the language commonly used\namong the people. In the same way we use \u201cOne\u201d in reference to God, to\nexpress that there is nothing similar to Him, but we do not mean to say\nthat an attribute of unity is added to His essence.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVIII\n\n\nThis chapter is even more recondite than the preceding. Know that the\nnegative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include\nany incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God,\nwhile positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate, as we\nhave already shown. It is now necessary to explain how negative\nexpressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes, and how\nthey are distinguished from positive attributes. Then I shall show that\nwe cannot describe the Creator by any means except by negative\nattributes. An attribute does not exclusively belong to the one object\nto which it is related; while qualifying one thing, it can also be\nemployed to qualify other things, and is in that case not peculiar to\nthat one thing. E.g., if you see an object from a distance, and on\nenquiring what it is, are told that it is a living being, you have\ncertainly learnt an attribute of the object seen, and although that\nattribute does not exclusively belong to the object perceived, it\nexpresses that the object is not a plant or a mineral. Again, if a man\nis in a certain house, and you know that something is in the house, but\nnot exactly what, you ask what is in that house, and you are told, not\na plant nor a mineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge\nof the thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you\ndo not yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negative\nattributes have this in common with the positive, that they necessarily\ncircumscribe the object to some extent, although such circumscription\nconsists only in the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded.\nIn the following point, however, the negative attributes are\ndistinguished from the positive. The positive attributes, although not\npeculiar to one thing, describe a portion of what we desire to know,\neither some part of its essence or some of its accidents; the negative\nattributes, on the other hand, do not, as regards the essence of the\nthing which we desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it\nbe indirectly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.\n\nAfter this introduction, I would observe that,\u2014as has already been\nshown\u2014God\u2019s existence is absolute, that it includes no composition, as\nwill be proved, and that we comprehend only the fact that He exists,\nnot His essence. Consequently it is a false assumption to hold that He\nhas any positive attribute; for He does not possess existence in\naddition to His essence; it therefore cannot be said that the one may\nbe described as an attribute [of the other]; much less has He [in\naddition to His existence] a compound essence, consisting of two\nconstituent elements to which the attribute could refer; still less has\nHe accidents, which could be described by an attribute. Hence it is\nclear that He has no positive attribute whatever. The negative\nattributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the mind\nto the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on the one\nhand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other, they convey\nto man the highest possible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been\nestablished by proof that some being must exist besides those things\nwhich can be perceived by the senses, or apprehended by the mind; when\nwe say of this being, that it exists, we mean that its non-existence is\nimpossible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance,\nlike the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore say that\nit is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We call such a\nbeing incorporeal, because we notice that it is unlike the heavens,\nwhich are living, but material. Seeing that it is also different from\nthe intellect, which, though incorporeal and living, owes its existence\nto some cause, we say it is the first, expressing thereby that its\nexistence is not due to any cause. We further notice, that the\nexistence, that is the essence, of this being is not limited to its own\nexistence; many existences emanate from it, and its influence is not\nlike that of the fire in producing heat, or that of the sun in sending\nforth light, but consists in constantly giving them stability and order\nby well-established rule, as we shall show: we say, on that account, it\nhas power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not feeble or ignorant, or\nhasty, and does not abandon its creatures; when we say that it is not\nfeeble, we mean that its existence is capable of producing the\nexistence of many other things; by saying that it is not ignorant, we\nmean \u201cit perceives\u201d or \u201cit lives,\u201d\u2014for everything that perceives is\nliving\u2014by saying \u201cit is not hasty, and does not abandon its creatures,\u201d\nwe mean that all these creatures preserve a certain order and\narrangement; they are not left to themselves; they are not produced\naimlessly, but whatever condition they receive from that being is given\nwith design and intention. We thus learn that there is no other being\nlike unto God, and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods\nthan one.\n\nIt has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God either\ndenotes the quality of an action, or\u2014when the attribute is intended to\nconvey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of His actions\u2014the\nnegation of the opposite. Even these negative attributes must not be\nformed and applied to God, except in the way in which, as you know,\nsometimes an attribute is negatived in reference to a thing, although\nthat attribute can naturally never be applied to it in the same sense,\nas, e.g., we say, \u201cThis wall does not see.\u201d Those who read the present\nwork are aware that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we\ncan obtain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens\u2014a revolving\nsubstance which has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and\nexamined even as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each\nother and respecting most of their motions\u2014although we know that they\nmust consist of matter and form; but the matter not being the same as\nsublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms expressing\nnegative properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities. Thus\nwe say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, not passive and\ntherefore not subject to impressions, and that they do not possess the\nsensations of taste and smell; or we use similar negative attributes.\nAll this we do, because we do not know their substance. What, then, can\nbe the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a knowledge of a\nBeing that is free from substance, that is most simple, whose existence\nis absolute, and not due to any cause, to whose perfect essence nothing\ncan be superadded, and whose perfection consists, as we have shown, in\nthe absence of all defects. All we understand is the fact that He\nexists, that He is a Being to whom none of His creatures is similar,\nwho has nothing in common with them, who does not include plurality,\nwho is never too feeble to produce other beings, and whose relation to\nthe universe is that of a steersman to a boat; and even this is not a\nreal relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea\nthat God rules the universe; that is, that He gives it duration, and\npreserves its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treated more\nfully. Praised be He! In the contemplation of His essence, our\ncomprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in the examination of\nHis works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge\nproves to be ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol Him in words, all\nour efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure!\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIX\n\n\nThe following question might perhaps be asked: Since there is no\npossibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true essence of God, and\nsince it has also been proved that the only thing that man can\napprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positive\nattributes are inadmissible, as has been shown; what is the difference\namong those who have obtained a knowledge of God? Must not the\nknowledge obtained by our teacher Moses, and by Solomon, be the same as\nthat obtained by any one of the lowest class of philosophers, since\nthere can be no addition to this knowledge? But, on the other hand, it\nis generally accepted among theologians and also among philosophers,\nthat there can be a great difference between two persons as regards the\nknowledge of God obtained by them. Know that this is really the case,\nthat those who have obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from\neach other; for in the same way as by each additional attribute an\nobject is more specified, and is brought nearer to the true\napprehension of the observer, so by each additional negative attribute\nyou advance toward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than\nhe who does not negative, in reference to God, those qualities which\nyou are convinced by proof must be negatived. There may thus be a man\nwho after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuit of one\nscience, and to the true understanding of its principles, till he is\nfully convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result of this\nstudy the conviction that a certain quality must be negatived in\nreference to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it is\nimpossible to apply it to Him. Superficial thinkers will have no proof\nfor this, will doubtfully ask, Is that thing existing in the Creator,\nor not? And those who are deprived of sight will positively ascribe it\nto God, although it has been clearly shown that He does not possess it.\nE.g., while I show that God is incorporeal, another doubts and is not\ncertain whether He is corporeal or incorporeal; others even positively\ndeclare that He is corporeal, and appear before the Lord with that\nbelief. Now see how great the difference is between these three men;\nthe first is undoubtedly nearest to the Almighty; the second is remote,\nand the third still more distant from Him. If there be a fourth person\nwho holds himself convinced by proof that emotions are impossible in\nGod, while the first who rejects the corporeality, is not convinced of\nthat impossibility, that fourth person is undoubtedly nearer the\nknowledge of God than the first, and so on, so that a person who,\nconvinced by proof, negatives a number of things in reference to God,\nwhich according to our belief may possibly be in Him or emanate from\nHim, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than we are, and would surpass\nus still more if we positively believed these things to be properties\nof God. It will now be clear to you, that every time you establish by\nproof the negation of a thing in reference to God, you become more\nperfect, while with every additional positive assertion you follow your\nimagination and recede from the true knowledge of God. Only by such\nways must we approach the knowledge of God, and by such researches and\nstudies as would show us the inapplicability of what is inadmissible as\nregards the Creator, not by such methods as would prove the necessity\nof ascribing to Him anything extraneous to His essence, or asserting\nthat He has a certain perfection, when we find it to be a perfection in\nrelation to us. The perfections are all to some extent acquired\nproperties, and a property which must be acquired does not exist in\neverything capable of making such acquisition.\n\nYou must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of God, you are\nremoved from Him in two respects; first, whatever you affirm, is only a\nperfection in relation to us; secondly, He does not possess anything\nsuperadded to this essence; His essence includes all His perfections,\nas we have shown. Since it is a well-known fact that even that\nknowledge of God which is accessible to man cannot be attained except\nby negations, and that negations do not convey a true idea of the being\nto which they refer, all people, both of past and present generations,\ndeclared that God cannot be the object of human comprehension, that\nnone but Himself comprehends what He is, and that our knowledge\nconsists in knowing that we are unable truly to comprehend Him. All\nphilosophers say, \u201cHe has overpowered us by His grace, and is invisible\nto us through the intensity of His light,\u201d like the sun which cannot be\nperceived by eyes which are too weak to bear its rays. Much more has\nbeen said on this topic, but it is useless to repeat it here. The idea\nis best expressed in the book of Psalms, \u201cSilence is praise to Thee\u201d\n(lxv. 2). It is a very expressive remark on this subject; for whatever\nwe utter with the intention of extolling and of praising Him, contains\nsomething that cannot be applied to God, and includes derogatory\nexpressions; it is therefore more becoming to be silent, and to be\ncontent with intellectual reflection, as has been recommended by men of\nthe highest culture, in the words \u201cCommune with your own heart upon\nyour bed, and be still\u201d (Ps. iv. 4). You must surely know the following\ncelebrated passage in the Talmud\u2014would that all passages in the Talmud\nwere like that!\u2014although it is known to you, I quote it literally, as I\nwish to point out to you the ideas contained in it: \u201cA certain person,\nreading prayers in the presence of Rabbi \u1e24aninah, said, \u2018God, the\ngreat, the valiant and the tremendous, the powerful, the strong, and\nthe mighty.\u2019\u2014The rabbi said to him, Have you finished all the praises\nof your Master? The three epithets, \u2018God, the great, the valiant and\nthe tremendous,\u2019 we should not have applied to God, had Moses not\nmentioned them in the Law, and had not the men of the Great Synagogue\ncome forward subsequently and established their use in the prayer; and\nyou say all this! Let this be illustrated by a parable. There was once\nan earthly king, possessing millions of gold coin; he was praised for\nowning millions of silver coin; was this not really dispraise to him?\u201d\nThus far the opinion of the pious rabbi. Consider, first, how repulsive\nand annoying the accumulation of all these positive attributes was to\nhim; next, how he showed that, if we had only to follow our reason, we\nshould never have composed these prayers, and we should not have\nuttered any of them. It has, however, become necessary to address men\nin words that should leave some idea in their minds, and, in accordance\nwith the saying of our Sages, \u201cThe Torah speaks in the language of\nmen,\u201d the Creator has been described to us in terms of our own\nperfections; but we should not on that account have uttered any other\nthan the three above-mentioned attributes, and we should not have used\nthem as names of God except when meeting with them in reading the Law.\nSubsequently, the men of the Great Synagogue, who were prophets,\nintroduced these expressions also into the prayer, but we should not on\nthat account use [in our prayers] any other attributes of God. The\nprincipal lesson to be derived from this passage is that there are two\nreasons for our employing those phrases in our prayers: first, they\noccur in the Pentateuch; secondly, the Prophets introduced them into\nthe prayer. Were it not for the first reason, we should never have\nuttered them; and were it not for the second reason, we should not have\ncopied them from the Pentateuch to recite them in our prayers; how then\ncould we approve of the use of those numerous attributes! You also\nlearn from this that we ought not to mention and employ in our prayers\nall the attributes we find applied to God in the books of the Prophets;\nfor he does not say, \u201cWere it not that Moses, our Teacher, said them,\nwe should not have been able to use them\u201d; but he adds another\ncondition\u2014\u201cand had not the men of the Great Synagogue come forward and\nestablished their use in the prayer,\u201d because only for that reason are\nwe allowed to use them in our prayers. We cannot approve of what those\nfoolish persons do who are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in\nthe prayers they compose, and in the hymns they make in the desire to\napproach the Creator. They describe God in attributes which would be an\noffence if applied to a human being; for those persons have no\nknowledge of these great and important principles, which are not\naccessible to the ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creator as\na familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in any\nexpressions they think proper; they eloquently continue to praise Him\nin that manner, and believe that they can thereby influence Him and\nproduce an effect on Him. If they find some phrase suited to their\nobject in the words of the Prophets they are still more inclined to\nconsider that they are free to make use of such texts\u2014which should at\nleast be explained\u2014to employ them in their literal sense, to derive new\nexpressions from them, to form from them numerous variations, and to\nfound whole compositions on them. This license is frequently met with\nin the compositions of the singers, preachers, and others who imagine\nthemselves to be able to compose a poem. Such authors write things\nwhich partly are real heresy, partly contain such folly and absurdity\nthat they naturally cause those who hear them to laugh, but also to\nfeel grieved at the thought that such things can be uttered in\nreference to God. Were it not that I pitied the authors for their\ndefects, and did not wish to injure them, I should have cited some\npassages to show you their mistakes; besides, the fault of their\ncompositions is obvious to all intelligent persons. You must consider\nit, and think thus: If slander and libel is a great sin, how much\ngreater is the sin of those who speak with looseness of tongue in\nreference to God, and describe Him by attributes which are far below\nHim; and I declare that they not only commit an ordinary sin, but\nunconsciously at least incur the guilt of profanity and blasphemy. This\napplies both to the multitude that listens to such prayers, and to the\nfoolish man that recites them. Men, however, who understand the fault\nof such compositions, and, nevertheless, recite them, may be classed,\naccording to my opinion, among those to whom the following words are\napplied: \u201cAnd the children of Israel used words that were not right\nagainst the Lord their God\u201d (2 Kings xvii. 9); and \u201cutter error against\nthe Lord\u201d (Isa. xxxii. 6). If you are of those who regard the honour of\ntheir Creator, do not listen in any way to them, much less utter what\nthey say, and still less compose such prayers, knowing how great is the\noffence of one who hurls aspersions against the Supreme Being. There is\nno necessity at all for you to use positive attributes of God with the\nview of magnifying Him in your thoughts, or to go beyond the limits\nwhich the men of the Great Synagogue have introduced in the prayers and\nin the blessings, for this is sufficient for all purposes, and even\nmore than sufficient, as Rabbi \u1e24aninah said. Other attributes, such as\noccur in the books of the Prophets, may be uttered when we meet with\nthem in reading those books; but we must bear in mind what has already\nbeen explained, that they are either attributes of God\u2019s actions, or\nexpressions implying the negation of the opposite. This likewise should\nnot be divulged to the multitude; but a reflection of this kind is\nfitted for the few only who believe that the glorification of God does\nnot consist in uttering that which is not to be uttered, but in\nreflecting on that on which man should reflect.\n\nWe will now conclude our exposition of the wise words of R. \u1e24aninah. He\ndoes not employ any such simile as: \u201cA king who possesses millions of\ngold denarii, and is praised as having hundreds\u201d; for this would imply\nthat God\u2019s perfections, although more perfect than those ascribed to\nman are still of the same kind; but this is not the case, as has been\nproved. The excellence of the simile consists in the words: \u201cwho\npossesses golden denarii, and is praised as having silver denarii\u201d;\nthis implies that these attributes, though perfections as regards\nourselves, are not such as regards God; in reference to Him they would\nall be defects, as is distinctly suggested in the remark, \u201cIs this not\nan offence to Him?\u201d\n\nI have already told you that all these attributes, whatever perfection\nthey may denote according to your idea, imply defects in reference to\nGod, if applied to Him in the same sense as they are used in reference\nto ourselves. Solomon has already given us sufficient instruction on\nthis subject by saying, \u201cFor God is in heaven, and thou upon earth;\ntherefore let thy words be few\u201d (Eccles. v. 2).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LX\n\n\nI will give you in this chapter some illustrations, in order that you\nmay better understand the propriety of forming as many negative\nattributes as possible, and the impropriety of ascribing to God any\npositive attributes. A person may know for certain that a \u201cship\u201d is in\nexistence, but he may not know to what object that name is applied,\nwhether to a substance or to an accident; a second person then learns\nthat the ship is not an accident; a third, that it is not a mineral; a\nfourth, that it is not a plant growing in the earth; a fifth, that it\nis not a body whose parts are joined together by nature; a sixth, that\nit is not a flat object like boards or doors; a seventh, that it is not\na sphere; an eighth, that it is not pointed; a ninth, that it is not\nround-shaped; nor equilateral; a tenth, that it is not solid. It is\nclear that this tenth person has almost arrived at the correct notion\nof a \u201cship\u201d by the foregoing negative attributes, as if he had exactly\nthe same notion as those have who imagine it to be a wooden substance\nwhich is hollow, long, and composed of many pieces of wood, that is to\nsay, who know it by positive attributes. Of the other persons in our\nillustration, each one is more remote from the correct notion of a ship\nthan the next mentioned, so that the first knows nothing about it but\nthe name. In the same manner you will come nearer to the knowledge and\ncomprehension of God by the negative attributes. But you must be\ncareful, in what you negative, to negative by proof, not by mere words,\nfor each time you ascertain by proof that a certain thing, believed to\nexist in the Creator, must be negatived, you have undoubtedly come one\nstep nearer to the knowledge of God.\n\nIt is in this sense that some men come very near to God, and others\nremain exceedingly remote from Him, not in the sense of those who are\ndeprived of vision, and believe that God occupies a place, which man\ncan physically approach or from which he can recede. Examine this well,\nknow it, and be content with it. The way which will bring you nearer to\nGod has been clearly shown to you; walk in it, if you have the desire.\nOn the other hand, there is a great danger in applying positive\nattributes to God. For it has been shown that every perfection we could\nimagine, even if existing in God in accordance with the opinion of\nthose who assert the existence of attributes, would in reality not be\nof the same kind as that imagined by us, but would only be called by\nthe same name, according to our explanation; it would in fact amount to\na negation. Suppose, e.g., you say He has knowledge, and that\nknowledge, which admits of no change and of no plurality, embraces many\nchangeable things; His knowledge remains unaltered, while new things\nare constantly formed, and His knowledge of a thing before it exists,\nwhile it exists, and when it has ceased to exist, is the same without\nthe least change: you would thereby declare that His knowledge is not\nlike ours; and similarly that His existence is not like ours. You thus\nnecessarily arrive at some negation, without obtaining a true\nconception of an essential attribute; on the contrary, you are led to\nassume that there is a plurality in God, and to believe that He, though\none essence, has several unknown attributes. For if you intend to\naffirm them, you cannot compare them with those attributes known by us,\nand they are consequently not of the same kind. You are, as it were,\nbrought by the belief in the reality of the attributes, to say that God\nis one subject of which several things are predicated; though the\nsubject is not like ordinary subjects, and the predicates are not like\nordinary predicates. This belief would ultimately lead us to associate\nother things with God, and not to believe that He is One. For of every\nsubject certain things can undoubtedly be predicated, and although in\nreality subject and predicate are combined in one thing, by the actual\ndefinition they consist of two elements, the notion contained in the\nsubject not being the same as that contained in the predicate. In the\ncourse of this treatise it will be proved to you that God cannot be a\ncompound, and that He is simple in the strictest sense of the word.\n\nI do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of God has not\nsufficient knowledge concerning the Creator, admits some association\nwith God, or conceives Him to be different from what He is; but I say\nthat he unconsciously loses his belief in God. For he whose knowledge\nconcerning a thing is insufficient, understands one part of it while he\nis ignorant of the other, as, e.g., a person who knows that man\npossesses life, but does not know that man possesses understanding; but\nin reference to God, in whose real existence there is no plurality, it\nis impossible that one thing should be known, and another unknown.\nSimilarly he who associates an object with [the properties of] another\nobject, conceives a true and correct notion of the one object, and\napplies that notion also to the other; while those who admit the\nattributes of God, do not consider them as identical with His essence,\nbut as extraneous elements. Again, he who conceives an incorrect notion\nof an object, must necessarily have a correct idea of the object to\nsome extent; he, however, who says that taste belongs to the category\nof quantity has not, according to my opinion, an incorrect notion of\ntaste, but is entirely ignorant of its nature, for he does not know to\nwhat object the term \u201ctaste\u201d is to be applied.\u2014This is a very difficult\nsubject; consider it well.\n\nAccording to this explanation you will understand, that those who do\nnot recognize, in reference to God, the negation of things, which\nothers negative by clear proof, are deficient in the knowledge of God,\nand are remote from comprehending Him. Consequently, the smaller the\nnumber of things is which a person can negative in relation to God, the\nless he knows of Him, as has been explained in the beginning of this\nchapter; but the man who affirms an attribute of God, knows nothing but\nthe same; for the object to which, in his imagination, he applies that\nname, does not exist; it is a mere fiction and invention, as if he\napplied that name to a non-existing being, for there is, in reality, no\nsuch object. E.g., some one has heard of the elephant, and knows that\nit is an animal, and wishes to know its form and nature. A person, who\nis either misled or misleading, tells him it is an animal with one leg,\nthree wings, lives in the depth of the sea, has a transparent body; its\nface is wide like that of a man, has the same form and shape, speaks\nlike a man, flies sometimes in the air, and sometimes swims like a\nfish. I should not say, that he described the elephant incorrectly, or\nthat he has an insufficient knowledge of the elephant, but I would say\nthat the thing thus described is an invention and fiction, and that in\nreality there exists nothing like it; it is a non-existing being,\ncalled by the name of a really existing being, and like the griffin,\nthe centaur, and similar imaginary combinations for which simple and\ncompound names have been borrowed from real things. The present case is\nanalogous; namely, God, praised be His name, exists, and His existence\nhas been proved to be absolute and perfectly simple, as I shall\nexplain. If such a simple, absolutely existing essence were said to\nhave attributes, as has been contended, and were combined with\nextraneous elements, it would in no way be an existing thing, as has\nbeen proved by us; and when we say that that essence, which is called\n\u201cGod,\u201d is a substance with many properties by which it can be\ndescribed, we apply that name to an object which does not at all exist.\nConsider, therefore, what are the consequences of affirming attributes\nto God! As to those attributes of God which occur in the Pentateuch, or\nin the books of the Prophets, we must assume that they are exclusively\nemployed, as has been stated by us, to convey to us some notion of the\nperfections of the Creator, or to express qualities of actions\nemanating from Him.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXI\n\n\nIt is well known that all the names of God occurring in Scripture are\nderived from His actions, except one, namely, the Tetragrammaton, which\nconsists of the letters yod, h\u00e9, vau and h\u00e9. This name is applied\nexclusively to God, and is on that account called Shem ha-meforash,\n\u201cThe nomen proprium.\u201d It is the distinct and exclusive designation of\nthe Divine Being; whilst His other names are common nouns, and are\nderived from actions, to which some of our own are similar, as we have\nalready explained. Even the name Adonay, \u201cLord,\u201d which has been\nsubstituted for the Tetragrammaton, is derived from the appellative\n\u201clord\u201d; comp. \u201cThe man who is the lord (adone) of the land spake\nroughly to us\u201d (Gen. xliii. 30). The difference between Adoni, \u201cmy\nlord,\u201d (with \u1e25irek under the nun), or Adonay (with kame\u1e93) is similar to\nthe difference between Sari, \u201cmy prince,\u201d and Sara\u00ef, Abraham\u2019s wife\n(ib. xvi. 1), the latter form denoting majesty and distinction. An\nangel is also addressed as \u201cAdonay\u201d; e.g., \u201cAdonay (My lord), pass not\naway, I pray thee\u201d (ib. xviii. 3). I have restricted my explanation to\nthe term Adonay, the substitute for the Tetragrammaton, because it is\nmore commonly applied to God than any of the other names which are in\nfrequent use, like dayyan, \u201cjudge,\u201d shadday, \u201calmighty,\u201d \u1e93addik,\n\u201crighteous,\u201d \u1e25annun, \u201cgracious,\u201d ra\u1e25um \u201cmerciful,\u201d and elohim \u201cchief\u201d;\nall these terms are unquestionably appellations and derivatives. The\nderivation of the name, consisting of yod, h\u00e9, vau, and h\u00e9, is not\npositively known, the word having no additional signification. This\nsacred name, which, as you know, was not pronounced except in the\nsanctuary by the appointed priests, when they gave the sacerdotal\nblessing, and by the high priest on the Day of Atonement, undoubtedly\ndenotes something which is peculiar to God, and is not found in any\nother being. It is possible that in the Hebrew language, of which we\nhave now but a slight knowledge, the Tetragrammaton, in the way it was\npronounced, conveyed the meaning of \u201cabsolute existence.\u201d In short, the\nmajesty of the name and the great dread of uttering it, are connected\nwith the fact that it denotes God Himself, without including in its\nmeaning any names of the things created by Him. Thus our Sages say:\n\u201c\u2018My name\u2019 (Num. vi. 27) means the name which is peculiar to Me.\u201d All\nother names of God have reference to qualities, and do not signify a\nsimple substance, but a substance with attributes, they being\nderivatives. On that account it is believed that they imply the\npresence of a plurality in God, I mean to say, the presence of\nattributes, that is, of some extraneous element superadded to His\nessence. Such is the meaning of all derivative names; they imply the\npresence of some attribute and its substratum, though this be not\ndistinctly named. As, however, it has been proved, that God is not a\nsubstratum capable of attributes, we are convinced that those\nappellatives when employed as names of God, only indicate the relation\nof certain actions to Him, or they convey to us some notion of His\nperfection.\n\nHence R. \u1e24aninah would have objected to the expression \u201cthe great, the\nmighty, and the tremendous,\u201d had it not been for the two reasons\nmentioned by him; because such expressions lead men to think that the\nattributes are essential, i.e., they are perfections actually present\nin God. The frequent use of names of God derived from actions, led to\nthe belief that He had as many [essential] attributes as there were\nactions from which the names were derived. The following promise was\ntherefore made, implying that mankind will at a certain future time\nunderstand this subject, and be free from the error it involves: \u201cIn\nthat day will the Lord be One, and His name One\u201d (Zech. xiv. 9). The\nmeaning of this prophecy is this: He being One, will then be called by\none name, which will indicate the essence of God; but it does not mean\nthat His sole name will be a derivative [viz., \u201cOne\u201d]. In the Pirke\nRabbi Eliezer (chap. iii.) occurs the following passage: \u201cBefore the\nuniverse was created, there was only the Almighty and His name.\u201d\nObserve how clearly the author states that all these appellatives\nemployed as names of God came into existence after the Creation. This\nis true; for they all refer to actions manifested in the Universe. If,\nhowever, you consider His essence as separate and as abstracted from\nall actions, you will not describe it by an appellative, but by a\nproper noun, which exclusively indicates that essence. Every other name\nof God is a derivative, only the Tetragrammaton is a real nomen\nproprium, and must not be considered from any other point of view. You\nmust beware of sharing the error of those who write amulets (kameot).\nWhatever you hear from them, or read in their works, especially in\nreference to the names which they form by combination, is utterly\nsenseless; they call these combinations shemot (names) and believe that\ntheir pronunciation demands sanctification and purification, and that\nby using them they are enabled to work miracles. Rational persons ought\nnot to listen to such men, nor in any way believe their assertions. No\nother name is called shem ha-meforash except this Tetragrammaton, which\nis written, but is not pronounced according to its letters. The words,\n\u201cThus shall ye bless the children of Israel\u201d (Num. vi. 23) are\ninterpreted in Siphri as follows: \u201c\u2018Thus,\u2019 in the holy language; again\n\u2018thus,\u2019 with the Shem ha-meforash.\u201d The following remark is also found\nthere: \u201cIn the sanctuary [the name of God is pronounced] as it is\nspelt, but elsewhere by its substitutes.\u201d In the Talmud, the following\npassage occurs: \u201c\u2018Thus,\u2019 i.e., with the shem ha-meforash.\u2014You say [that\nthe priests, when blessing the people, had to pronounce] the shem\nha-meforash; this was perhaps not the case, and they may have used\nother names instead.\u2014We infer it from the words: \u2018And they shall put My\nname\u2019 (Num. vi. 27), i.e., My name, which is peculiar to Me.\u201d It has\nthus been shown that the shem ha-meforash (the proper name of God) is\nthe Tetragrammaton, and that this is the only name which indicates\nnothing but His essence, and therefore our Sages in referring to this\nsacred term said \u201c\u2018My name\u2019 means the one which is peculiar to Me\nalone.\u201d\n\nIn the next chapter I will explain the circumstances which brought men\nto a belief in the power of Shemot (names of God); I will point out the\nmain subject of discussion, and lay open to you its mystery, and then\nnot any doubt will be left in your mind, unless you prefer to be\nmisguided.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXII\n\n\nWe were commanded that, in the sacerdotal blessing, the name of the\nLord should be pronounced as it is written in the form of the\nTetragrammaton, the shem ha-meforash. It was not known to every one how\nthe name was to be pronounced, what vowels were to be given to each\nconsonant, and whether some of the letters capable of reduplication\nshould receive a dagesh. Wise men successively transmitted the\npronunciation of the name; it occurred only once in seven years that\nthe pronunciation was communicated to a distinguished disciple. I must,\nhowever, add that the statement, \u201cThe wise men communicated the\nTetragrammaton to their children and their disciples once in seven\nyears,\u201d does not only refer to the pronunciation but also to its\nmeaning, because of which the Tetragrammaton was made a nomen proprium\nof God, and which includes certain metaphysical principles.\n\nOur Sages knew in addition a name of God which consisted of twelve\nletters, inferior in sanctity to the Tetragrammaton. I believe that\nthis was not a single noun, but consisted of two or three words, the\nsum of their letters being twelve, and that these words were used by\nour Sages as a substitute for the Tetragrammaton, whenever they met\nwith it in the course of their reading the Scriptures, in the same\nmanner as we at present substitute for it aleph, daleth, etc. [i.e.,\nAdonay, \u201cthe Lord\u201d]. There is no doubt that this name also, consisting\nof twelve letters, was in this sense more distinctive than the name\nAdonay: it was never withheld from any of the students; whoever wished\nto learn it, had the opportunity given to him without any reserve: not\nso the Tetragrammaton; those who knew it did not communicate it except\nto a son or a disciple, once in seven years. When, however,\nunprincipled men had become acquainted with that name which consists of\ntwelve letters and in consequence had become corrupt in faith\u2014as is\nsometimes the case when persons with imperfect knowledge become aware\nthat a thing is not such as they had imagined\u2014the Sages concealed also\nthat name, and only communicated it to the worthiest among the priests,\nthat they should pronounce it when they blessed the people in the\nTemple; for the Tetragrammaton was then no longer uttered in the\nsanctuary on account of the corruption of the people. There is a\ntradition, that with the death of Simeon the Just, his brother priests\ndiscontinued the pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton in the blessing;\nthey used, instead, this name of twelve letters. It is further stated,\nthat at first the name of twelve letters was communicated to every man;\nbut when the number of impious men increased it was only entrusted to\nthe worthiest among the priests, whose voice, in pronouncing it, was\ndrowned amid the singing of their brother priests. Rabbi Tarphon said,\n\u201cOnce I followed my grandfather to the da\u00efs [where the blessing was\npronounced]; I inclined my ear to listen to a priest [who pronounced\nthe name], and noticed that his voice was drowned amid the singing of\nhis brother priests.\u201d\n\nThere was also a name of forty-two letters known among them. Every\nintelligent person knows that one word of forty-two letters is\nimpossible. But it was a phrase of several words which had together\nforty-two letters. There is no doubt that the words had such a meaning\nas to convey a correct notion of the essence of God, in the way we have\nstated. This phrase of so many letters is called a name because, like\nother proper nouns, they represent one single object, and several words\nhave been employed in order to explain more clearly the idea which the\nname represents; for an idea can more easily be comprehended if\nexpressed in many words. Mark this and observe now that the instruction\nin regard to the names of God extended to the signification of each of\nthose names, and did not confine itself to the pronunciation of the\nsingle letters which, in themselves, are destitute of an idea. Shem\nha-meforash applied neither to the name of forty-two letters nor to\nthat of twelve, but only to the Tetragrammaton, the proper name of God,\nas we have explained. Those two names must have included some\nmetaphysical ideas. It can be proved that one of them conveyed profound\nknowledge, from the following rule laid down by our Sages: \u201cThe name of\nforty-two letters is exceedingly holy; it can only be entrusted to him\nwho is modest, in the midway of life, not easily provoked to anger,\ntemperate, gentle, and who speaks kindly to his fellow men. He who\nunderstands it, is cautious with it, and keeps it in purity, is loved\nabove and is liked here below; he is respected by his fellow men; his\nlearning remaineth with him, and he enjoys both this world and the\nworld to come.\u201d So far in the Talmud. How grievously has this passage\nbeen misunderstood! Many believe that the forty-two letters are merely\nto be pronounced mechanically; that by knowledge of these, without any\nfurther interpretation, they can attain to these exalted ends, although\nit is stated that he who desires to obtain a knowledge of that name\nmust be trained in the virtues named before, and go through all the\ngreat preparations which are mentioned in that passage. On the\ncontrary, it is evident that all this preparation aims at a knowledge\nof Metaphysics, and includes ideas which constitute the \u201csecrets of the\nLaw,\u201d as we have explained (chap. xxxv.). In works on Metaphysics it\nhas been shown that such knowledge, i.e., the perception of the active\nintellect, can never be forgotten; and this is meant by the phrase \u201chis\nlearning remaineth with him.\u201d\n\nWhen bad and foolish men were reading such passages, they considered\nthem to be a support of their false pretensions and of their assertion\nthat they could, by means of an arbitrary combination of letters, form\na shem (\u201ca name\u201d) which would act and operate miraculously when written\nor spoken in a certain particular way. Such fictions, originally\ninvented by foolish men, were in the course of time committed to\nwriting, and came into the hands of good but weak-minded and ignorant\npersons who were unable to discriminate between truth and falsehood,\nand made a secret of these shemot (names). When after the death of such\npersons those writings were discovered among their papers, it was\nbelieved that they contained truths; for, \u201cthe simple believeth every\nword\u201d (Prov. xiv. 15).\n\nWe have already gone too far away from our interesting subject and\nrecondite inquiry, endeavouring to refute a perverse notion, the\nabsurdity of which every one must perceive who gives a thought to the\nsubject. We have, however, been compelled to mention it, in treating of\nthe divine names, their meanings, and the opinions commonly held\nconcerning them. We shall now return to our theme. Having shown that\nall names of God, with the exception of the Tetragrammaton (Shem\nha-meforash), are appellatives, we must now, in a separate chapter,\nspeak on the phrase Ehyeh asher Ehyeh, (Exod. iii. 14), because it is\nconnected with the difficult subject under discussion, namely, the\ninadmissibility of divine attributes.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXIII\n\n\nBefore approaching the subject of this chapter, we will first consider\nthe words of Moses, \u201cAnd they shall say unto me, What is His name? what\nshall I say unto them?\u201d (Exod. iii. 13). How far was this question,\nanticipated by Moses, appropriate, and how far was he justified in\nseeking to be prepared with the answer? Moses was correct in declaring,\n\u201cBut, behold, they will not believe me, for they will say, The Lord\nhath not appeared unto thee\u201d (ib. iv. 1); for any man claiming the\nauthority of a prophet must expect to meet with such an objection so\nlong as he has not given a proof of his mission. Again, if the\nquestion, as appears at first sight, referred only to the name, as a\nmere utterance of the lips, the following dilemma would present itself:\neither the Israelites knew the name, or they had never heard it; if the\nname was known to them, they would perceive in it no argument in favour\nof the mission of Moses, his knowledge and their knowledge of the\ndivine name being the same. If, on the other hand, they had never heard\nit mentioned, and if the knowledge of it was to prove the mission of\nMoses, what evidence would they have that this was really the name of\nGod? Moreover, after God had made known that name to Moses, and had\ntold him, \u201cGo and gather the elders of Israel, ... and they shall\nhearken to thy voice\u201d (ib. xvi. 18), he replied, \u201cBehold, they will not\nbelieve me nor hearken unto my voice,\u201d although God had told him, \u201cAnd\nthey will hearken to thy voice\u201d; whereupon God answered, \u201cWhat is that\nin thine hand?\u201d and he said, \u201cA rod\u201d (ib. iv. 2). In order to obviate\nthis dilemma, you must understand what I am about to tell you. You know\nhow widespread were in those days the opinions of the Sabeans; all men,\nexcept a few individuals, were idolaters, that is to say, they believed\nin spirits, in man\u2019s power to direct the influences of the heavenly\nbodies, and in the effect of talismans. Any one who in those days laid\nclaim to authority, based it either, like Abraham, on the fact that, by\nreasoning and by proof he had been convinced of the existence of a\nBeing who rules the whole Universe, or that some spiritual power was\nconferred upon him by a star, by an angel, or by a similar agency; but\nno one could establish his claim on prophecy, that is to say, on the\nfact that God had spoken to him, or had entrusted a mission to him;\nbefore the days of Moses no such assertion had ever been made. You must\nnot be misled by the statements that God spoke to the Patriarchs, or\nthat He had appeared to them. For you do not find any mention of a\nprophecy which appealed to others, or which directed them. Abraham,\nIsaac, or Jacob, or any other person before them did not tell the\npeople, \u201cGod said unto me, you shall do this thing, or you shall not do\nthat thing,\u201d or \u201cGod has sent me to you.\u201d Far from it! for God spoke to\nthem on nothing but of what especially concerned them, i.e., He\ncommunicated to them things relating to their perfection, directed them\nin what they should do, and foretold them what the condition of their\ndescendants would be; nothing beyond this. They guided their fellow-men\nby means of argument and instruction, as is implied, according to the\ninterpretation generally received amongst us, in the words \u201cand the\nsouls that they had gotten in Haran\u201d (Gen. xii. 5). When God appeared\nto our Teacher Moses, and commanded him to address the people and to\nbring them the message, Moses replied that he might first be asked to\nprove the existence of God in the Universe, and that only after doing\nso he would be able to announce to them that God had sent him. For all\nmen, with few exceptions, were ignorant of the existence of God; their\nhighest thoughts did not extend beyond the heavenly sphere, its forms\nor its influences. They could not yet emancipate themselves from\nsensation, and had not yet attained to any intellectual perfection.\nThen God taught Moses how to teach them, and how to establish amongst\nthem the belief in the existence of Himself, namely, by saying Ehyeh\nasher Ehyeh, a name derived from the verb hayah in the sense of\n\u201cexisting,\u201d for the verb hayah denotes \u201cto be,\u201d and in Hebrew no\ndifference is made between the verbs \u201cto be\u201d and \u201cto exist.\u201d The\nprincipal point in this phrase is that the same word which denotes\n\u201cexistence,\u201d is repeated as an attribute. The word asher, \u201cthat,\u201d\ncorresponds to the Arabic illadi and illati, and is an incomplete noun\nthat must be completed by another noun; it may be considered as the\nsubject of the predicate which follows. The first noun which is to be\ndescribed is ehyeh; the second, by which the first is described, is\nlikewise ehyeh, the identical word, as if to show that the object which\nis to be described and the attribute by which it is described are in\nthis case necessarily identical. This is, therefore, the expression of\nthe idea that God exists, but not in the ordinary sense of the term;\nor, in other words, He is \u201cthe existing Being which is the existing\nBeing,\u201d that is to say, the Being whose existence is absolute. The\nproof which he was to give consisted in demonstrating that there is a\nBeing of absolute existence, that has never been and never will be\nwithout existence. This I will clearly prove (II. Introd. Prop. 20 and\nchap. i.).\n\nGod thus showed Moses the proofs by which His existence would be firmly\nestablished among the wise men of His people. Therefore the explanation\nof the name is followed by the words, \u201cGo, gather the elders of\nIsrael,\u201d and by the assurance that the elders would understand what God\nhad shown to him, and would accept it, as is stated in the words, \u201cAnd\nthey will hearken to thy voice.\u201d Then Moses replied as follows: They\nwill accept the doctrine that God exists convinced by these\nintelligible proofs. But, said Moses, by what means shall I be able to\nshow that this existing God has sent me? Thereupon God gave him the\nsign. We have thus shown that the question, \u201cWhat is His name?\u201d means\n\u201cWho is that Being, which according to thy belief has sent thee?\u201d The\nsentence, \u201cWhat is his name\u201d (instead of, Who is He), has here been\nused as a tribute of praise and homage, as though it had been said,\nNobody can be ignorant of Thy essence and of Thy real existence; if,\nnevertheless, I ask what is Thy name, I mean, What idea is to be\nexpressed by the name? (Moses considered it inappropriate to say to God\nthat any person was ignorant of God\u2019s existence, and therefore\ndescribed the Israelites as ignorant of God\u2019s name, not as ignorant of\nHim who was called by that name.)\u2014The name Jah likewise implies eternal\nexistence. Shadday, however, is derived from day, \u201cenough\u201d; comp. \u201cfor\nthe stuff they had was sufficient\u201d (dayyam, Exod. xxxvi. 7); the shin\nis equal to asher, \u201cwhich,\u201d as in she-kebar, \u201cwhich already\u201d (Eccles.\nii. 16). The name Shadday, therefore, signifies \u201che who is sufficient\u201d;\nthat is to say, He does not require any other being for effecting the\nexistence of what He created, or its conservation: His existence is\nsufficient for that. In a similar manner the name \u1e25asin implies\n\u201cstrength\u201d; comp. \u201che was strong (\u1e25ason) as the oaks\u201d (Amos ii. 9). The\nsame is the case with \u201crock,\u201d which is a homonym, as we have explained\n(chap. xvi.). It is, therefore, clear that all these names of God are\nappellatives, or are applied to God by way of homonymy, like \u1e93ur and\nothers, the only exception being the tetragrammaton, the Shem\nha-meforash (the nomen proprium of God), which is not an appellative;\nit does not denote any attribute of God, nor does it imply anything\nexcept His existence. Absolute existence includes the idea of eternity,\ni.e., the necessity of existence. Note well the result at which we have\narrived in this chapter.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXIV\n\n\nKnow that in some instances by the phrase \u201cthe name of the Lord,\u201d\nnothing but the name alone is to be understood; comp. \u201cThou shalt not\ntake the name of the Lord thy God in vain\u201d (Exod. xx. 7); \u201cAnd he that\nblasphemeth the name of the Lord\u201d (Lev. xxiv. 16). This occurs in\nnumerous other passages. In other instances it means the essence and\nreality of God Himself, as in the phrase \u201cThey shall say to me, What is\nhis name?\u201d Sometimes it stands for \u201cthe word of God,\u201d so that \u201cthe name\nof God,\u201d \u201cthe word of God,\u201d and \u201cthe command of God,\u201d are identical\nphrases; comp. \u201cfor my name is in him\u201d (Exod. xxiii. 21), that is, My\nword or My command is in him; i.e., he is the instrument of My desire\nand will. I shall explain this fully in treating of the homonymity of\nthe term \u201cangel\u201d (II. chap. vi. and xxxiv.).\u2014The same is the case with\n\u201cThe glory of the Lord.\u201d The phrase sometimes signifies \u201cthe material\nlight,\u201d which God caused to rest on a certain place in order to show\nthe distinction of that place, e.g., \u201cAnd the glory of the Lord (kebod\nadonay) abode upon Mount Sinai and the cloud covered it\u201d (Exod. xxiv.\n16): \u201cAnd the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle\u201d (ib. xl. 35).\nSometimes the essence, the reality of God is meant by that expression,\nas in the words of Moses, \u201cShow me thy glory\u201d (ib. xxxiii. 18), to\nwhich the reply was given, \u201cFor no man shall see me and live\u201d (ib.\nxx.). This shows that the glory of the Lord in this instance is the\nsame as He Himself, and that \u201cThy glory\u201d has been substituted for\n\u201cThyself,\u201d as a tribute of homage; an explanation which we also gave of\nthe words, \u201cAnd they shall say unto me, What is his name?\u201d Sometimes\nthe term \u201cglory\u201d denotes the glorification of the Lord by man or by any\nother being. For the true glorification of the Lord consists in the\ncomprehension of His greatness, and all who comprehend His greatness\nand perfection, glorify Him according to their capacity, with this\ndifference, that man alone magnifies God in words, expressive of what\nhe has received in his mind, and what he desires to communicate to\nothers. Things not endowed with comprehension, as e.g., minerals, may\nalso be considered as glorifying the Lord, for by their natural\nproperties they testify to the omnipotence and wisdom of their Creator,\nand cause him who examines them to praise God, by means of speech or\nwithout the use of words, if the power of speech be wanting. In Hebrew\nthis licence has been extended still further, and the use of the verb\n\u201cto speak\u201d has been admitted as applicable in such a case; things which\nhave no comprehension are therefore said to give utterance to praise,\ne.g., \u201cAll my bones shall say, Lord, who is like unto thee?\u201d (Ps. xxxv.\n10). Because a consideration of the properties of the bones leads to\nthe discovery of that truth, and it is through them that it became\nknown, they are represented as having uttered the divine praise; and\nsince this [cause of God\u2019s praise] is itself called \u201cpraise,\u201d it has\nbeen said \u201cthe fulness of the whole earth is his praise\u201d (Isa. vi. 3),\nin the same sense as \u201cthe earth is full of his praise\u201d (Hab. iii. 3).\nAs to kabod being employed in the sense of praise, comp. \u201cGive praise\n(kabod) to the Lord your God\u201d (Jer. xiii. 16); also \u201cand in his temple\ndoes every one speak of his praise (kabod)\u201d (Ps. xxix. 9), etc.\nConsider well the homonymity of this term, and explain it in each\ninstance in accordance with the context; you will thus escape great\nembarrassment.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXV\n\n\nAfter you have advanced thus far, and truly comprehended that God\nexists without having the attribute of existence, and that He is One,\nwithout having the attribute of unity, I do not think that I need\nexplain to you the inadmissibility of the attribute of speech in\nreference to God, especially since our people generally believe that\nthe Law, i.e., the word ascribed to Him, was created. Speech is\nattributed to Him, in so far as the word which Moses heard, was\nproduced and brought to existence by God in the same manner as He\nproduced all His other works and creations. As we shall have to speak\nmore fully on prophecy, we shall here merely show that speech is\nattributed to God in the same way as all other actions, which are\nsimilar to our own. When we are told that God addressed the Prophets\nand spoke to them, our minds are merely to receive a notion that there\nis a Divine knowledge to which the Prophets attain; we are to be\nimpressed with the idea that the things which the Prophets communicate\nto us come from the Lord, and are not altogether the products of their\nown conceptions and ideas. This subject, which we have already\nmentioned above, will receive further explanation. It is the object of\nthis chapter to show that the words \u201cspeaking\u201d and \u201csaying\u201d are\nsynonymous terms denoting (a) \u201cSpeech\u201d; as, e.g., \u201cMoses shall speak\n(yedabber)\u201d (Exod. xix. 19); \u201cAnd Pharaoh said (va-yomer)\u201d (ib. v. 5);\n(b) \u201cThought\u201d as formed in the mind without being expressed in words;\ne.g., \u201cAnd I thought (ve-amarti) in my heart\u201d (Eccles. ii. 15); \u201cAnd I\nthought (vedibbarti) in my heart\u201d (ib.); \u201cAnd thy heart will imagine\n(yedabber)\u201d (Prov. xxiii. 33); \u201cConcerning Thee my heart thought\n(amar)\u201d (Ps. xxvii. 8); \u201cAnd Esau thought (va-yomer) in his heart\u201d\n(Gen. xxvii. 41); examples of this kind are numerous; (c) Will; e.g.,\n\u201cAnd he said (va-yomer) to slay David\u201d (2 Sam. xxi. 16), that is to\nsay, he wished or he intended to slay him; \u201cDost thou desire (omer) to\nslay me\u201d (Exod. ii. 14); \u201cAnd the whole congregation intended\n(va-yomeru) to stone them\u201d (Num. xiv. 10). Instances of this kind are\nlikewise numerous.\n\nThe two terms, when applied to God, can only have one of the two\nlast-mentioned significations, viz., he wills and he desires, or he\nthinks, and there is no difference whether the divine thought became\nknown to man by means of an actual voice, or by one of those kinds of\ninspiration which I shall explain further on (II. chap, xxxviii.). We\nmust not suppose that in speaking God employed voice or sound, or that\nHe has a soul in which the thoughts reside, and that these thoughts are\nthings superadded to His essence; but we ascribe and attribute to Him\nthoughts in the same manner as we ascribe to Him any other attributes.\nThe use of these words in the sense of will and desire, is based, as I\nhave explained, on the homonymity of these terms. In addition they are\nfigures borrowed from our common practices, as has been already pointed\nout. For we cannot, at a first glance, see how anything can be produced\nby a mere desire; we think that he who wishes to produce a thing, must\nperform a certain act, or command some one else to perform it.\nTherefore the command is figuratively ascribed to God when that takes\nplace which He wishes, and we then say that He commanded that a certain\nthing should be accomplished. All this has its origin in our comparing\nthe acts of God to our own acts, and also in the use of the term amar\nin the sense of \u201cHe desired,\u201d as we have already explained. The words\n\u201cAnd He said,\u201d occurring in the account of the creation, signify \u201cHe\nwished,\u201d or \u201cHe desired.\u201d This has already been stated by other\nauthors, and is well known. A proof for this, namely that the phrase\n\u201cGod said,\u201d in the first chapter of Genesis, must be taken in a\nfigurative sense \u201cHe willed,\u201d and not in its literal meaning, is found\nin the circumstance that a command can only be given to a being which\nexists and is capable of receiving the command. Comp. \u201cBy the word of\nthe Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath\nof his mouth\u201d (Ps. xxxiii. 6). \u201cHis mouth,\u201d and \u201cthe breath of his\nmouth,\u201d are undoubtedly figurative expressions, and the same is the\ncase with \u201cHis word\u201d and \u201cHis speech.\u201d The meaning of the verse is\ntherefore that they [the heavens and all their host] exist through His\nwill and desire. All our eminent authorities are cognisant of this;\nand, I need not explain that in Hebrew amar and dibber have the same\nmeaning, as is proved by the passage, \u201cFor it has heard all the words\n(imre) of the Lord which he spake (dibber) unto us\u201d (Josh. xxiv. 27).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXVI\n\n\n\u201cAnd the tables were the work of God\u201d (Exod. xxxii. 16), that is to\nsay, they were the product of nature, not of art; for all natural\nthings are called \u201cthe work of the Lord,\u201d e.g., \u201cThese see the works of\nthe Lord\u201d (Ps. cvii. 24); and the description of the several things in\nnature, as plants, animals, winds, rain, etc., is followed by the\nexclamation, \u201cO Lord, how manifold are thy works!\u201d (Ps. civ. 24). Still\nmore striking is the relation between God and His creatures, as\nexpressed in the phrase, \u201cThe cedars of Lebanon, which he hath planted\u201d\n(ib. 16); the cedars being the product of nature, and not of art, are\ndescribed as having been planted by the Lord. Similarly we explain,\n\u201cAnd the writing was the writing of God\u201d (Exod. xxxii. 16); the\nrelation in which the writing stood to God has already been defined in\nthe words \u201cwritten with the finger of God\u201d (ib. xxxi. 18), and the\nmeaning of this phrase is the same as that of \u201cthe work of thy fingers\u201d\n(Ps. viii. 4), this being said of the heavens; of the latter it has\nbeen stated distinctly that they were made by a word; comp. \u201cBy the\nword of the Lord were the heavens made\u201d (ib. xxxiii. 6). Hence you\nlearn that in the Bible, the creation of a thing is figuratively\nexpressed by terms denoting \u201cword\u201d and \u201cspeech.\u201d The same thing which\naccording to one passage has been made by the word, is represented in\nanother passage as made by the \u201cfinger of God.\u201d The phrase \u201cwritten by\nthe finger of God\u201d is therefore identical with \u201cwritten by the word of\nGod\u201d; and if the latter phrase had been used, it would have been equal\nto \u201cwritten by the will and desire of God.\u201d Onkelos adopted in this\nplace a strange explanation, and rendered the words literally \u201cwritten\nby the finger of the Lord\u201d; he thought that \u201cthe finger\u201d was a certain\nthing ascribed to God; so that \u201cthe finger of the Lord\u201d is to be\ninterpreted in the same way as \u201cthe mountain of God\u201d (Exod. iii. 1),\n\u201cthe rod of God\u201d (ib. iv. 20), that is, as being an instrument created\nby Him, which by His will engraved the writing on the tables. I cannot\nsee why Onkelos preferred this explanation. It would have been more\nreasonable to say \u201cwritten by the word of the Lord,\u201d in imitation of\nthe verse \u201cBy the word of the Lord the heavens were made.\u201d Or was the\ncreation of the writing on the tables more difficult than the creation\nof the stars in the spheres? As the latter were made by the direct will\nof God, not by means of an instrument, the writing may also have been\nproduced by His direct will, not by means of an instrument. You know\nwhat the Mishnah says, \u201cTen things were created on Friday in the\ntwilight of the evening,\u201d and \u201cthe writing\u201d is one of the ten things.\nThis shows how generally it was assumed by our forefathers that the\nwriting of the tables was produced in the same manner as the rest of\nthe creation, as we have shown in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Aboth,\nv. 6).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXVII\n\n\nSince the verb \u201cto say\u201d has been figuratively used to express the will\nof the Creator, and the phrase \u201cAnd he said\u201d has repeatedly been\nemployed in the account of all the things created in \u201cthe six days of\nthe beginning,\u201d the expression \u201cto rest\u201d has likewise been figuratively\napplied to God in reference to the Sabbath-day, on which there was no\ncreation; it is therefore said, \u201cAnd he rested (va-yishbot) on the\nseventh day\u201d (Gen. ii. 2). For \u201cto leave off speaking\u201d is, in Hebrew,\nlikewise expressed by the same verb, as, e.g., \u201cSo these three men\nceased (va-yishbetu) to answer Job\u201d (Job xxxii. 1); also by nua\u1e25, as,\nin \u201cThey spake to Nabal according to all those words in the name of\nDavid, and ceased (va-yanu\u1e25u)\u201d (1 Sam. xxv. 9). In my opinion,\n(va-yanu\u1e25u) means \u201cthey ceased to speak,\u201d and waited for the answer;\nfor no allusion to exertion whatever having previously been mentioned,\nthe words, \u201cand they rested,\u201d in its primary signification, would have\nbeen entirely out of place in that narrative, even if the young men who\nspoke had really used some exertion. The author relates that having\ndelivered that whole speech, which, as you find, consisted of gentle\nexpressions, they were silent, that is to say, they did not add any\nword or act by which the reply of Nabal could be justified; it being\nthe object of the entire passage to represent Nabal\u2019s conduct as\nextremely reprehensible. In that sense [viz., \u201cto cease,\u201d or \u201cto leave\noff\u201d] the verb nua\u1e25 is used in the phrase \u201cAnd he left off (va-yana\u1e25)\non the seventh day.\u201d\n\nOur Sages, and some of the Commentators, took, however, nua\u1e25 in its\nprimary sense \u201cto rest,\u201d but as a transitive form (hiphil), explaining\nthe phrase thus: \u201cand he gave rest to the world on the seventh day,\u201d\ni.e., no further act of creation took place on that day.\n\nIt is possible that the word va-yana\u1e25 is derived either from yana\u1e25, a\nverb of the class pe-yod, or na\u1e25ah, a verb of the class lamed-he, and\nhas this meaning: \u201che established\u201d or \u201che governed\u201d the Universe in\naccordance with the properties it possessed on the seventh day; that is\nto say, while on each of the six days events took place contrary to the\nnatural laws now in operation throughout the Universe, on the seventh\nday the Universe was merely upheld and left in the condition in which\nit continues to exist. Our explanation is not impaired by the fact that\nthe form of the word deviates from the rules of verbs of these two\nclasses; for there are frequent exceptions to the rules of\nconjugations, and especially of the weak verbs; and any interpretation\nwhich removes such a source of error must not be abandoned because of\ncertain grammatical rules. We know that we are ignorant of the sacred\nlanguage, and that grammatical rules only apply to the majority of\ncases.\u2014The same root is also found as a verb \u02bbayin-vav in the sense \u201cto\nplace\u201d and \u201cto set,\u201d as e.g., \u201cand it shall be established and she\nshall be placed (ve-hunni\u1e25ah) there upon her own base\u201d (Zech. v. 11),\nand \u201cshe suffered neither the birds of the air to settle (la-nua\u1e25) on\nthem\u201d (2 Sam. xxi. 10). According to my opinion, the verb has the same\nsignification in Hab. iii. 16, \u201cthat I might remain firm (anua\u1e25) in the\nday of trouble.\u201d\n\nThe word (va-yinnafash) is a verb derived from nefesh, the homonymity\nof which we have already explained (chap. xli.), namely, that it has\nthe signification of intention or will; (va-yinnafash) accordingly\nmeans: \u201cthat which he desired was accomplished, and what he wished had\ncome into existence.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXVIII\n\n\nYou are acquainted with the well-known principle of the philosophers\nthat God is the intellectus, the ens intelligens, and the ens\nintelligibile. These three things are in God one and the same, and do\nnot in any way constitute a plurality. We have also mentioned it in our\nlarger work, \u201cMishneh Torah,\u201d and we have explained there that it is a\nfundamental principle of our religion, namely, that He is absolutely\none, that nothing combines with Him; that is to say, there is no\nEternal thing besides Him. On that account we say \u1e25ai adonay, \u201cthe Lord\nliveth\u201d (Ruth iii. 13), and not \u1e25e adonay, \u201cthe life of the Lord,\u201d for\nHis life is not a thing distinct from His essence, as we have explained\nin treating of the inadmissibility of the attributes. There is no doubt\nthat he who has not studied any works on mental philosophy, who has not\ncomprehended the nature of the mind, who has no knowledge of its\nessence, and considers it in no other way than he would consider the\nnature of whiteness and of blackness, will find this subject extremely\ndifficult, and to him our principle that the intellectus, the\nintelligens, and the intelligibile, are in God one and the same thing,\nwill appear as unintelligible as if we said that the whiteness, the\nwhitening substance, and the material which is whitened are one and the\nsame thing. And, indeed, many ignorant people refute at once our\nprinciple by using such comparisons. Even amongst those who imagine\nthat they are wise, many find this subject difficult, and are of\nopinion that it is impossible for the mind to grasp the truth of this\nproposition, although it is a demonstrated truth, as has been shown by\nMetaphysicians. I will tell you now what has been proved. Man, before\ncomprehending a thing, comprehends it in potentia (\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9); when,\nhowever, he comprehends a thing, e.g., the form of a certain tree which\nis pointed out to him, when he abstracts its form from its substance,\nand reproduces the abstract form, an act performed by the intellect, he\ncomprehends in reality (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3), and the intellect which he has\nacquired in actuality, is the abstract form of the tree in man\u2019s mind.\nFor in such a case the intellect is not a thing distinct from the thing\ncomprehended. It is therefore clear to you that the thing comprehended\nis the abstract form of the tree, and at the same time it is the\nintellect in action; and that the intellect and the abstract form of\nthe tree are not two different things, for the intellect in action is\nnothing but the thing comprehended, and that agent by which the form of\nthe tree has been turned into an intellectual and abstract object,\nnamely, that which comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action.\nAll intellect is identical with its action; the intellect in action is\nnot a thing different from its action, for the true nature and essence\nof the intellect is comprehension, and you must not think that the\nintellect in action is a thing existing by itself, separate from\ncomprehension, and that comprehension is a different thing connected\nwith it; for the very essence of the intellect is comprehension. In\nassuming an intellect in action you assume the comprehension of the\nthing comprehended. This is quite clear to all who have made themselves\nfamiliar with the figurative language common to this discipline. You\ntherefore accept it as proved that the intellect consists in its\naction, which is its true nature and essence. Consequently the very\nthing by which the form of that tree has been made abstract and\nintelligible, viz., the intellect, is at the same time the intelligens,\nfor the intellect is itself the agens which abstracts the form and\ncomprehends it, and that is the action, on account of which it is\ncalled the intelligens; but itself and its action are identical; and\nthat which is called intellect in action consists [in the\nabove-mentioned instance] of nothing else but of the form of the tree.\nIt must now be obvious to you that whenever the intellect is found in\naction, the intellect and the thing comprehended are one and the same\nthing; and also that the function of all intellect, namely, the act of\ncomprehending, is its essence. The intellect, that which comprehends\nand that which is comprehended, are therefore the same, whenever a real\ncomprehension takes place. But, when we speak of the power of\ncomprehension, we necessarily distinguish two things: the power itself,\nand the thing which can be comprehended; e.g., that hylic intellect of\nZaid is the power of comprehension, and this tree is, in like manner, a\nthing which is capable of being comprehended; these, undoubtedly, are\ntwo different things. When, however, the potential is replaced by the\nactual, and when the form of the tree has really been comprehended, the\nform comprehended is the intellect, and it is by that same intellect,\nby the intellect in action, that the tree has been converted into an\nabstract idea, and has been comprehended. For everything in which a\nreal action takes place exists in reality. On the other hand, the power\nof comprehension, and the object capable of comprehension are two\nthings; but that which is only potential cannot be imagined otherwise\nthan in connexion with an object possessing that capacity, as, e.g.,\nman, and thus we have three things: the man who possesses the power,\nand is capable of comprehending; that power itself, namely, the power\nof comprehension, and the object which presents itself as an object of\ncomprehension, and is capable of being comprehended; to use the\nforegoing example, the man, the hylic intellect, and the abstract form\nof the tree, are three different things. They become one and the same\nthing when the intellect is in action, and you will never find the\nintellect different from the comprehensible object, unless the power of\ncomprehending and the power of being comprehended be referred to. Now,\nit has been proved, that God is an intellect which always is in action,\nand that\u2014as has been stated, and as will be proved hereafter\u2014there is\nin Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He does not comprehend at\none time, and is without comprehension at another time, but He\ncomprehends constantly; consequently, He and the things comprehended\nare one and the same thing, that is to say, His essence; and the act of\ncomprehending because of which it is said that He comprehends, is the\nintellect itself, which is likewise His essence, God is therefore\nalways the intellectus, the intelligens, and the intelligibile.\n\nWe have thus shown that the identity of the intellect, the intelligens\nand the intelligibile, is not only a fact as regards the Creator, but\nas regards all intellect, when in action. There is, however, this\ndifference, that from time to time our intellect passes over from mere\npotentiality to reality, and that the pure intellect, i.e., the active\nintellect, finds sometimes obstacles, though not in itself, but\naccidentally in some external cause. It is not our present intention to\nexplain this subject, but we will merely show that God alone, and none\nbesides Him, is an intellect constantly in action, and there is,\nneither in Himself nor in anything beside Him, any obstacle whereby His\ncomprehension would be hindered. Therefore He always includes the\nintelligens, the intellectus, and the intelligibile, and His essence is\nat the same time the intelligens, the intelligibile, and the\nintellectus, as is necessarily the case with all intellect in action.\n\nWe have reiterated this idea in the present chapter because it is\nexceedingly abstruse, and I do not apprehend that the reader will\nconfound intellectual comprehension with the representative\nfaculty\u2014with the reproduction of the material image in our imagination,\nsince this work is designed only for those who have studied philosophy,\nand who know what has already been said on the soul and its faculties.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXIX\n\n\nThe philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause (in Hebrew\n\u02bbillah and sibbah): but those who are known by the name of Mutakallemim\nare very much opposed to the use of that name, and call Him Agens,\nbelieving that there is a great difference whether we say that God is\nthe Cause or that He is the Agens. They argue thus: If we say that God\nis the Cause, the coexistence of the Cause with that which was produced\nby that Cause would necessarily be implied; this again would involve\nthe belief that the Universe was eternal, and that it was inseparable\nfrom God. When, however, we say that God is the Agens, the co-existence\nof the Agens with its product is not implied; for the agens can exist\nanterior to its product; we cannot even imagine how an agens can be in\naction unless it existed before its own production. This is an argument\nadvanced by persons who do not distinguish between the potential and\nthe actual. You, however, should know that in this case there is no\ndifference whether you employ the term \u201ccause\u201d or \u201cagens\u201d; for if you\ntake the term \u201ccause\u201d in the sense of a mere potentiality, it precedes\nits effect; but if you mean the cause in action, then the effect must\nnecessarily co-exist with the cause in action. The same is the case\nwith the agens; take it as an agens in reality, the work must\nnecessarily co-exist with its agens. For the builder, before he builds\nthe house, is not in reality a builder, but has the faculty for\nbuilding a house\u2014in the same way as the materials for the house before\nit is being built are merely in potenti\u00e2\u2014but when the house has been\nbuilt, he is the builder in reality, and his product must likewise be\nin actual existence. Nothing is therefore gained by choosing the term\n\u201cagens\u201d and rejecting the term \u201ccause.\u201d My object here is to show that\nthese two terms are equal, and in the same manner as we call God an\nAgens, although the work does not yet exist, only because there is no\nhindrance or obstacle which might prevent Him from doing it whenever He\npleases, we may also call Him the Cause, although the effect may not\nyet be in existence.\n\nThe reason why the philosophers called God the Cause, and did not call\nHim the Agens, is not to be sought in their belief that the universe is\neternal, but in other motives, which I will briefly describe to you. It\nhas been shown in the science of Physics that everything, except the\nPrimal Cause, owes its origin to the following four causes:\u2014the\nsubstance, the form, the agens, the final cause. These are sometimes\ndirect, sometimes indirect causes; but each by itself is called \u201ca\ncause.\u201d They also believe\u2014and I do not differ from their opinion\u2014that\nGod Himself is the agens, the form, and the end; therefore they call\nGod \u201cthe Cause,\u201d in order to express that He unites in Himself these\nthree causes, viz., that He is the agens, the form, and the final cause\nof the universe. In the present chapter I only wish to show you in what\nsense it may be said of God that He is the agens, the form, and also\nthe final cause of the universe. You need not trouble yourself now with\nthe question whether the universe has been created by God, or whether,\nas the philosophers have assumed, it is eternal, co-existing with Him.\nYou will find [in the pages of this treatise] full and instructive\ninformation on the subject. Here I wish to show that God is the \u201ccause\u201d\nof every event that takes place in the world, just as He is the Creator\nof the whole universe as it now exists. It has already been explained\nin the science of Physics, that a cause must again be sought for each\nof the four divisions of causes. When we have found for any existing\nthing those four causes which are in immediate connexion with it, we\nfind for these again causes, and for these again other causes, and so\non until we arrive at the first causes. E.g., a certain production has\nits agens, this agens again has its agens, and so on and on until at\nlast we arrive at a first agens, which is the true agens throughout all\nthe intervening links. If the letter aleph be moved by bet, bet by\ngimel, gimel by dalet, and dalet by h\u00e9\u2014and as the series does not\nextend to infinity, let us stop at h\u00e9\u2014there is no doubt that the h\u00e9\nmoves the letters aleph, bet, gimel, and dalet, and we say correctly\nthat the aleph is moved by h\u00e9. In that sense everything occurring in\nthe universe, although directly produced by certain nearer causes, is\nascribed to the Creator, as we shall explain. He is the Agens, and He\nis therefore the ultimate cause. We shall also find, after careful\nexamination, that every physical and transient form must be preceded by\nanother such form, by which the substance has been fitted to receive\nthe next form; the previous form again has been preceded by another,\nand we arrive at length at that form which is necessary for the\nexistence of all intermediate forms, which are the causes of the\npresent form. That form to which the forms of all existing things are\ntraced is God. You must not imagine that when we say that God is the\nfirst form of all forms existing in the Universe, we refer to that\nfirst form which Aristotle, in the Book of Metaphysics, describes as\nbeing without beginning and without end, for he treats of a form which\nis a physical, and not a purely intellectual one. When we call God the\nultimate form of the universe, we do not use this term in the sense of\nform connected with substance, namely, as the form of that substance,\nas though God were the form of a material being. It is not in this\nsense that we use it, but in the following: Everything existing and\nendowed with a form, is whatever it is through its form, and when that\nform is destroyed its whole existence terminates and is obliterated.\nThe same is the case as regards the relation between God and all\ndistant causes of existing beings; it is through the existence of God\nthat all things exist, and it is He who maintains their existence by\nthat process which is called emanation (in Hebrew shepha\u2019), as will be\nexplained in one of the chapters of the present work. If God did not\nexist, suppose this were possible, the universe would not exist, and\nthere would be an end to the existence of the distant causes, the final\neffects, and the intermediate causes. Consequently God maintains the\nsame relation to the world as the form has to a thing endowed with a\nform; through the form it is what it is, and on it the reality and\nessence of the thing depends. In this sense we may say that God is the\nultimate form, that He is the form of all forms; that is to say, the\nexistence and continuance of all forms in the last instance depend on\nHim, the forms are maintained by Him, in the same way as all things\nendowed with forms retain their existence through their forms. On that\naccount God is called, in the sacred language, \u1e25e ha-\u02bbolamim, \u201cthe life\nof the Universe,\u201d as will be explained (chap. lxxii.). The same\nargument holds good in reference to all final causes. If you assign to\na thing a certain purpose, you can find for that purpose another\npurpose. We mention, e.g., a (wooden) chair; its substance is wood, the\njoiner is its agens, the square its form, and its purpose is that one\nshould sit upon it. You may then ask, For what purpose does one sit\nupon it? The answer will be that he who is sitting upon it desires to\nbe high above the ground. If again you ask, For what purpose does he\ndesire to be high above the ground, you will receive the answer that he\nwishes to appear high in the eyes of those who see him. For what\npurpose does he wish to appear higher in the eyes of those who see him?\nThat the people may respect and fear him. What is the good of his being\nfeared? His commands will be respected. For what purpose are his\ncommands to be respected? That people shall refrain from injuring each\nother. What is the object of this precaution? To maintain order amongst\nthe people. In this way one purpose necessitates the pre-existence of\nanother, except the final purpose, which is the execution of the will\nof God, according to one of the opinions which have been propounded, as\nwill be explained (III. xiii. and xvii.), and the final answer will be,\n\u201cIt is the will of God.\u201d According to the view of others, which will\nlikewise be explained, the final purpose is the execution of the decree\nof His wisdom, and the final answer will be, \u201cIt has been decreed by\nHis wisdom.\u201d According to either opinion, the series of the successive\npurposes terminates, as has been shown, in God\u2019s will or wisdom, which,\nin our opinion, are identical with His essence, and are not any thing\nseparate from Himself or different from His essence. Consequently, God\nis the final purpose of everything. Again, it is the aim of everything\nto become, according to its faculties, similar to God in perfection;\nthis is meant by the expression, \u201cHis will, which is identical with His\nessence,\u201d as will be shown below (ibid.). In this sense God is called\nthe End of all ends.\n\nI have thus explained to you in what sense God is said to be the Agens,\nthe Form, and the End. This is the reason why the philosophers not only\ncall Him \u201cthe Maker\u201d but also the \u201cCause.\u201d Some of the scholars\nbelonging to the Mutakallemim (Mohammedan theologians), went so far in\ntheir folly and in their vainglory as to say that the non-existence of\nthe Creator, if that were possible, would not necessarily imply the\nnon-existence of the things created by Him, i.e., the Universe: for a\nproduction need not necessarily cease to exist when the producer, after\nhaving produced it, has ceased to exist. They would be right, if God\nwere only the maker of the Universe, and if its permanent existence\nwere not dependent on Him. The storehouse does not cease to exist at\nthe death of the builder; for he does not give permanent existence to\nthe building. God, however, is Himself the form of the Universe, as we\nhave already shown, and it is He who causes its continuance and\npermanency. It is therefore wrong to say that a thing can remain\ndurable and permanent, after the being that makes it durable and\npermanent has ceased to exist, since that thing can possess no more\ndurability and permanency than it has received from that being. Now you\nunderstand the greatness of the error into which they have fallen\nthrough their assumption that God is only the Agens, and not the End or\nthe Form.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXX\n\n\nThe term rakab, \u201cto ride,\u201d is a synonym. In its primary signification\nit is applied to man\u2019s riding on an animal, in the usual way; e.g.,\n\u201cNow he was riding (rokeb) upon his ass\u201d (Num. xxii. 22). It has then\nbeen figuratively used to denote \u201cdominion over a thing\u201d; because the\nrider governs and rules the animal he rides upon; e.g., \u201cHe made him\nride (yarkibehu) on the high places of the earth\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 13);\n\u201cand I will cause thee to ride (ve-hirkabtika) upon the high places of\nthe earth\u201d (Isa. lviii. 14), that is, you shall have dominion over the\nhighest (people) on earth; \u201cI will make Ephraim to ride (arkib)\u201d (Hos.\nx. 11), i.e., I shall give him rule and dominion. In this same sense it\nis said of God, \u201cwho rideth (rokeb) upon the heaven in thy help\u201d (Deut.\nxxxiii. 26), that is, who rules the heaven; and \u201cHim that rideth\n(la-rokeb) upon the \u02bbarabot\u201d (Ps. lxviii. 4), i.e., who rules the\n\u02bbarabot, the uppermost, all-encompassing sphere. It has also been\nrepeatedly stated by our Sages that there are seven reki\u02bbim\n(firmaments, heavens), and that the uppermost of them, the\nall-surrounding, is called \u02bbarabot. Do not object to the number seven\ngiven by them, although there are more reki\u02bbim, for there are spheres\nwhich contain several circles (gilgallim), and are counted as one; this\nis clear to those who have studied that subject, and I shall also\nexplain it; here I wish merely to point out that our Sages always\nassumed that \u02bbarabot is the uppermost sphere. The \u02bbarabot is also\nreferred to in the words, \u201cwho rideth upon the heaven in thy help.\u201d\nThus we read in Talm. B. \u1e24agigah, p. 12, \u201cThe high and exalted dwelleth\non \u02bbarabot, as it is said, \u2018Extol Him that rideth upon \u02bbarabot\u2019\u201d (Ps.\nlxviii. 4). How is it proved that \u201cheaven\u201d and \u201c\u02bbarabot\u201d are identical?\nThe one passage has \u201cwho rideth on \u02bbarabot,\u201d the other \u201cwho rideth upon\nthe heaven.\u201d Hence it is clear that in all these passages reference is\nmade to the same all-surrounding sphere, concerning which you will\nhereafter (II. xxiv.) receive more information. Consider well that the\nexpression \u201cdwelling over it,\u201d is used by them, and not \u201cdwelling in\nit.\u201d The latter expression would have implied that God occupies a place\nor is a power in the sphere, as was in fact believed by the Sabeans,\nwho held that God was the soul of the sphere. By saying \u201cdwelling over\nit,\u201d they indicated that God was separate from the sphere, and was not\na power in it. Know also that the term \u201criding upon the heavens,\u201d has\nfiguratively been applied to God in order to show the following\nexcellent comparison. The rider is better than the animal upon which he\nrides\u2014the comparative is only used for the sake of convenience, for the\nrider is not of the same class as the animal upon which he\nrides\u2014furthermore, the rider moves the animal and leads it as he likes;\nit is as it were his instrument, which he uses according to his will;\nhe is separate from it, apart from it, not connected with it. In like\nmanner the uppermost sphere, by the rotation of which everything\nmoveable is set in motion, is moved by God, who is separate from the\nsphere, and is not a power in it. In Bereshit Rabba we read that in\ncommenting on the Divine words, \u201cThe eternal God is a refuge\u201d (lit., a\ndwelling, Deut. xxxiii. 27), our Sages said, \u201cHe is the dwelling of His\nworld, the world is not His dwelling.\u201d This explanation is then\nfollowed by the remark, \u201cThe horse is secondary to the rider, the rider\nis not subservient to the horse; this is meant by \u2018Thou wilt ride upon\nthy horses\u2019\u201d (Hab. iii. 8). Consider and learn how they described the\nrelation of God to the sphere, asserting that the latter is His\ninstrument, by means of which He rules the universe. For whenever you\nfind our Sages saying that in a certain heaven are certain things, they\ndo not mean to say that in the heavens there are any extraneous things,\nbut that from a certain heaven the force emanates which is required for\nthe production of certain things, and for their continuing in proper\norder. The proof for my statement you may find in the following sayings\nof our Sages\u2014\u201cThe \u02bbarabot, in which there are justice, charity, right,\ntreasures of life and peace, treasures of blessing, of the souls of the\nrighteous, of the souls and the spirits of those to be born, and of the\ndew by which God will at some future time revive the dead, etc.\u201d It is\nclear that the things enumerated here are not material, and do not\noccupy a place\u2014for \u201cdew\u201d is not to be taken in its literal\nsense.\u2014Consider also that here the phrase \u201cin which,\u201d meaning \u201cin the\n\u02bbarabot,\u201d is used, and not \u201cover which,\u201d as if to say that all the\nthings existing in the universe derive their existence from powers\nemanating from the \u02bbarabot, which God made to be the origin and the\nplace of these powers. They are said to include \u201cthe treasures of\nlife\u201d; a perfectly true and correct assertion! For all existing life\noriginates in that treasure of life, as will be mentioned below (chap.\nlxii., and II. chap. x.). Reflect on the fact that the souls of the\nrighteous as well as the souls and the spirits of those to be born are\nmentioned here! How sublime is this idea to him who understands it! for\nthe soul that remains after the death of man, is not the soul that\nlives in a man when he is born; the latter is a mere faculty, while\nthat which has a separate existence after death, is a reality; again,\nthe soul and the spirit of man during his life are two different\nthings; therefore the souls and the spirits are both named as existing\nin man; but separate from the body only one of them exists. We have\nalready explained the homonymity of rua\u1e25 (spirit) in this work, and\nalso at the end of Sefer ha madda\u02bb (Mishneh torah Hil. teshubah, viii.\n3\u20134) we treated of the homonymity of these expressions. Consider how\nthese excellent and true ideas, comprehended only by the greatest\nphilosophers, are found scattered in the Midrashim. When a student who\ndisavows truth reads them, he will at first sight deride them, as being\ncontrary to the real state of things. The cause of this is the\ncircumstance, that our Sages spoke of these subjects in metaphors; they\nare too difficult for the common understanding of the people, as has\nbeen noticed by us several times.\n\nI will now return to the subject which I commenced to explain, in order\nto bring it to a conclusion. Our Sages commenced to adduce proofs from\nScripture for their assertion that the things enumerated above are\ncontained in the \u02bbarabot. As to justice and right they quote \u201cJustice\nand judgment are the habitation of thy throne\u201d (Ps. lxxxix. 18). In the\nsame way they prove their assertion concerning all things enumerated by\nthem, by showing that they are described as being related to God, as\nbeing near Him. Note this. In the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer it is said: God\ncreated seven reki\u02bbim (heavens), and out of all of them He selected the\n\u02bbaraboth for His royal throne; comp. \u201cExalt him who rideth upon the\n\u02bbarabot\u201d (Ps. lxviii. 4). These are his (Rabbi Eliezer\u2019s) words. Note\nthem likewise.\n\nYou must know that in Hebrew the collective noun denoting animals used\nfor riding is \u201cmercabah.\u201d Instances of this noun are not rare. \u201cAnd\nJoseph made ready his chariot\u201d (merkabto) (Gen. xlvi. 29); \u201cin the\nsecond chariot\u201d (be-mirkebet) (ib. xli. 43); \u201cPharaoh\u2019s chariots\u201d\n(markebot) (Exod. xv. 4). The following passage especially proves that\nthe Hebrew merkabah denotes a collection of animals: \u201cAnd a merkabah\ncame up and went out of Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver, and a\nhorse for an hundred and fifty\u201d (1 Kings x. 21). Hence we may learn\nthat mercabah denotes here four horses. Therefore I think that when it\nwas stated, according to the literal sense of the words, that four\n\u1e24ayyot (beasts) carry the Throne of Glory, our Sages called this\n\u201cmercabah\u201d on account of its similarity with the mercabah consisting of\nfour single animals. So far has the theme of this chapter carried us,\nand we shall be compelled to make many further remarks on this subject.\nHere, however, it is our object, and the aim of all we have said, to\nshow that \u201cwho rideth upon heaven\u201d (Deut. xxxiii. 26) means \u201cwho sets\nthe all-surrounding sphere in motion, and turns it by His power and\nwill.\u201d The same sense is contained in the conclusion of that verse:\n\u201cand in his excellency the spheres,\u201d i.e., who in His excellency moves\nthe spheres (she\u1e25akim). In reference to the first sphere, the \u02bbarabot,\nthe verb \u201cto ride\u201d is used, in reference to the rest, the noun\n\u201cexcellency,\u201d because through the motion of the uppermost sphere in its\ndaily circuit, all the spheres move, participating as parts in the\nmotion of the whole; and this being that great power that sets\neverything in motion, it is called \u201cexcellency.\u201d Let this subject\nconstantly remain in your memory when you study what I am going to say;\nfor it\u2014i.e., the motion of the uppermost sphere\u2014is the greatest proof\nfor the existence of God, as I shall demonstrate. Note this.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXI\n\n\nKnow that many branches of science relating to the correct solution of\nthese problems, were once cultivated by our forefathers, but were in\nthe course of time neglected, especially in consequence of the tyranny\nwhich barbarous nations exercised over us. Besides, speculative studies\nwere not open to all men, as we have already stated (Introd. p. 2, and\nI. chap, xxxi.), only the subjects taught in the Scriptures were\naccessible to all. Even the traditional Law, as you are well aware, was\nnot originally committed to writing, in conformity with the rule to\nwhich our nation generally adhered, \u201cThings which I have communicated\nto you orally, you must not communicate to others in writing.\u201d With\nreference to the Law, this rule was very opportune; for while it\nremained in force it averted the evils which happened subsequently,\nviz., great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the meaning of written\nwords, slips of the pen, dissensions among the people, formation of new\nsects, and confused notions about practical subjects. The traditional\nteaching was in fact, according to the words of the Law, entrusted to\nthe Great Tribunal, as we have already stated in our works on the\nTalmud. (Introd. to Mishneh Torah and Introd. to Commen. on the\nMishnah).\n\nCare having been taken, for the sake of obviating injurious influences,\nthat the Oral Law should not be recorded in a form accessible to all,\nit was but natural that no portion of \u201cthe secrets of the Law\u201d (i.e.,\nmetaphysical problems) would be permitted to be written down or\ndivulged for the use of all men. These secrets, as has been explained,\nwere orally communicated by a few able men to others who were equally\ndistinguished. Hence the principle applied by our teachers, \u201cThe\nsecrets of the Law can only be entrusted to him who is a councillor, a\ncunning artificer, etc.\u201d The natural effect of this practice was that\nour nation lost the knowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing\nbut a few remarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the\nMidrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity of husk,\nthat the reader is generally occupied with the husk, and forgets that\nit encloses a kernel.\n\nIn addition you will find that in the few works composed by the Geonim\nand the Karaites on the unity of God and on such matter as is connected\nwith this doctrine, they followed the lead of the Mohammedan\nMutakallemim, and what they wrote is insignificant in comparison with\nthe kindred works of the Mohammedans. It also happened, that at the\ntime when the Mohammedans adopted this method of the Kalam, there arose\namong them a certain sect, called Mu\u02bbtazilah, i.e., Separatists. In\ncertain things our scholars followed the theory and the method of these\nMu\u02bbtazilah. Although another sect, the Asha\u2019ariyah, with their own\npeculiar views, was subsequently established amongst the Mohammedans,\nyou will not find any of these views in the writings of our authors;\nnot because these authors preferred the opinions of the first-named\nsect to those of the latter, but because they chanced first to become\nacquainted with the theory of the Mu\u02bbtazilah, which they adopted and\ntreated as demonstrated truth. On the other hand our Andalusian\nscholars followed the teachings of the philosophers, from whom they\naccepted those opinions which were not opposed to our own religious\nprinciples. You will find that they did not adopt any of the methods of\nthe Mutakallemim; in many respects they approached the view expressed\nin the present treatise, as may be noticed in the few works which were\nrecently written by authors of that school. You should also know that\nwhatever the Mohammedans, that is, the Mu\u02bbtazilah and the Asha\u2019ariyah,\nsaid on those subjects, consists in nothing but theories founded on\npropositions which are taken from the works of those Greek and Syrian\nscholars who attempted to oppose the system of the philosophers, and to\nrefute their arguments. The following was the cause of that opposition:\nAt the time when the Christian Church brought the Greeks and Syrians\ninto its fold, and promulgated its well-known dogmas, the opinions of\nthe philosophers were current amongst those nations; and whilst\nphilosophy flourished, kings became defenders of the Christian faith.\nThe learned Greek and Syrian Christians of the age, seeing that their\ndogmas were unquestionably exposed to severe attacks from the existing\nphilosophical systems, laid the foundation for this science of\nDogmatics; they commenced by putting forth such propositions as would\nsupport their doctrines, and be useful for the refutation of opinions\nopposed to the fundamental principles of the Christian religion.\n\nWhen the Mohammedans caused Arabic translations of the writings of the\nPhilosophers to be made, those criticisms were likewise translated.\nWhen the opinions of John the Grammarian, of Ibn Adi, and of kindred\nauthors on those subjects were made accessible to them, they adopted\nthem, and imagined that they had arrived at the solution of important\nproblems. Moreover, they selected from the opinions of the ancient\nphilosophers whatever seemed serviceable to their purposes, although\nlater critics had proved that those theories were false; as, e.g., the\ntheories of atoms and of a vacuum. They believed that the discussions\nof those authors were of a general character, and contained\npropositions useful for the defence of positive religion. At a\nsubsequent period the same theories were more fully developed, and\npresented an aspect unknown to those Theologians of the Greeks and\nother nations who were the immediate successors of the Philosophers. At\na later time, when the Mohammedans adopted certain peculiar theological\ntheories they were naturally obliged to defend them; and when their new\ntheories, again became the subject of controversy among them, each\nparty laid down such propositions as suited their special doctrine.\n\nTheir arguments undoubtedly involved certain principles which concerned\nthe three communities\u2014Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, such as the\ncreatio ex nihilo, which afforded support to the belief in miracles and\nto various other doctrines. There are, however, other subjects of\nbelief which the Christians and Mohammedans have undertaken to defend,\nsuch as the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological works of the\nformer, and \u201cthe Word\u201d in the works of some Mohammedan sects; in order\nto prove the dogmas which they thus desired to establish, they were\ncompelled to resort to certain hypotheses. It is not our object to\ncriticize things which are peculiar to either creed, or books which\nwere written exclusively in the interest of the one community or the\nother. We merely maintain that the earlier Theologians, both of the\nGreek Christians and of the Mohammedans, when they laid down their\npropositions, did not investigate the real properties of things; first\nof all they considered what must be the properties of the things which\nshould yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was\nfound they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those\nproperties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the\nidentical arguments which had led to the assertion, and by which they\neither supported or refuted a certain opinion. This course was followed\nby able men who originated this method, and adopted it in their\nwritings. They professed to be free from preconceived opinions, and to\nhave been led to a stated result by actual research. Therefore when\nphilosophers of a subsequent date studied the same writings they did\nnot perceive the true character of the arguments; on the contrary, they\nfound in the ancient works strong proofs and a valuable support for the\nacceptance or the rejection of certain opinions, and thus thought that,\nso far as religious principles were concerned, there was no necessity\nwhatever to prove or refute any of their propositions, and that the\nfirst Mutakallemim had discussed those subjects with the sole object of\ndefeating certain views of the philosophers, and demonstrating the\ninsufficiency of their proofs. Persons who hold this opinion, do not\nsuspect how much they are mistaken; for the first Mutakallemim tried to\nprove a proposition when it was expedient to demonstrate its truth; and\nto disprove it, when its rejection was desirable, and when it was\ncontrary to the opinion which they wished to uphold, although the\ncontradiction might only become obvious after the application of a\nhundred successive propositions. In this manner the earlier\nMutakallemim effected a radical cure of the malady! I tell you,\nhowever, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying that\nthe properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but\nour opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.\n\nHaving studied the works of these Mutakallemim, as far as I had an\nopportunity, just as I had studied the writings of the philosophers\naccording to the best of my ability, I found that the method of all\nMutakallemim was the same in its general characteristics, namely, they\nassume that the really existing form of things proves nothing at all,\nbecause it is merely one of the various phases of the things, the\nopposite of which is equally admissible to our minds. In many instances\nthese Theologians were guided by their imagination, and thought that\nthey were following the dictates of the intellect. They set forth the\npropositions which I shall describe to you, and demonstrated by their\npeculiar mode of arguing that the Universe had a beginning. The theory\nof the creatio ex nihilo being thus established, they asserted, as a\nlogical consequence, that undoubtedly there must be a Maker who created\nthe Universe. Next they showed that this Maker is One, and from the\nUnity of the Creator they deduced His Incorporeality. This method was\nadopted by every Mohammedan Mutakallem in the discussion of this\nsubject, and by those of our co-religionists who imitated them and\nwalked in their footsteps. Although the Mutakallemim disagree in the\nmethods of their proofs, and employ different propositions in\ndemonstrating the act of creation or in rejecting the eternity of the\nUniverse, they invariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and\nestablish on that proof the existence of God. I have examined this\nmethod, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because\nall the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be\nconsidered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference\nbetween a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who\nunderstand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all\nthe proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have\nbeen employed which have never been proved. I think that the utmost\nthat can be effected by believers in the truth of Revelation is to\nexpose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers who hold that the\nUniverse is eternal, and if forsooth a man has effected this, he has\naccomplished a great deed! For it is well known to all clear and\ncorrect thinkers who do not wish to deceive themselves, that this\nquestion, namely, whether the Universe has been created or is eternal,\ncannot be answered with mathematical certainty; here human intellect\nmust pause. We shall have occasion to speak more fully on this subject,\nbut for the present it may suffice to state that the philosophers have\nfor the last three thousand years been continually divided on that\nsubject, as far as we can learn from their works and the record of\ntheir opinions.\n\nSuch being the nature of this theory, how can we employ it as an axiom\nand establish on it the existence of the Creator? In that case the\nexistence of God would be uncertain; if the universe had a beginning,\nGod does exist; if it be eternal, God does not exist; the existence of\nGod would therefore remain either an open question, or we should have\nto declare that the creation had been proved, and compel others by mere\nforce to accept this doctrine, in order thus to be enabled to declare\nthat we have proved the existence of God. Such a process is utterly\ninadmissible. The true method, which is based on a logical and\nindubitable proof, consists, according to my opinion, in demonstrating\nthe existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality by such\nphilosophical arguments as are founded on the theory of the eternity of\nthe Universe. I do not propose this method as though I believed in the\neternity of the Universe, for I do not follow the philosophers on this\npoint, but because by the aid of this method these three principles,\nviz., the existence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be\nfully proved and verified, irrespectively of the question whether the\nuniverse has had a beginning or not. After firmly establishing these\nthree principles by an exact proof, we shall treat of the problem of\ncreation and discuss it as fully as possible. You are at liberty to\ncontent yourself with the declaration of the Mutakallemim, and to\nbelieve that the act of creation has been demonstrated by proof; nor\ncan there be any harm if you consider it unproven that the universe had\na beginning, and accept this theory as supported by the authority of\nthe Prophets. Before you learn our opinion on prophecy, which will be\ngiven in the present work, do not ask, how could the belief in prophecy\nbe justified, if it were assumed that the universe was eternal. We will\nnot now expatiate on that subject. You should, however, know that some\nof the propositions, started and proved by the Radicals, i.e., the\nMutakallemim, in order to prove the act of creation, imply an order of\nthings contrary to that which really exists, and involve a complete\nchange in the laws of nature; this fact will be pointed out to you, for\nit will be necessary to mention their propositions and their\nargumentation. My method, as far as I now can explain it in general\nterms, is as follows. The universe is either eternal or has had a\nbeginning; if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being\nwhich caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing\nthat has had a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning,\nanother must have caused it. The universe was, therefore, created by\nGod. If on the other hand the universe were eternal, it could in\nvarious ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the\nuniverse, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a\nbody, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and\nimmutable. That being is God. You see that the proofs for the\nExistence, the Unity and the Incorporeality of God must vary according\nto the propositions admitted by us. Only in this way can we succeed in\nobtaining a perfect proof, whether we assume the eternity or the\ncreation of the universe. For this reason you will find in my works on\nthe Talmud, whenever I have to speak of the fundamental principles of\nour religion, or to prove the existence of God, that I employ arguments\nwhich imply the eternity of the universe. I do not believe in that\neternity, but I wish to establish the principle of the existence of God\nby an indisputable proof, and should not like to see this most\nimportant principle founded on a basis which every one could shake or\nattempt to demolish, and which others might consider as not being\nestablished at all; especially when I see that the proofs of the\nphilosophers are based on those visible properties of things, which can\nonly be ignored by persons possessing certain preconceived notions,\nwhile the Mutakallemim establish their arguments on propositions which\nare to such an extent contrary to the actual state of things as to\ncompel these arguers to deny altogether the existence of the laws of\nnature. When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a\nspecial chapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the\nsame end which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view, yet I shall\nnot contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the\nAristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct. Even the most\ncogent of the proofs offered by the Mutakallemim respecting the act of\ncreation, has only been obtained by reversing the whole order of things\nand by rejecting everything fully demonstrated by the philosophers. I,\nhowever, shall be able to give a similar proof without ignoring the\nlaws of nature and without being forced to contradict facts which have\nbeen clearly perceived. I find it necessary to mention to you the\ngeneral propositions of the Mutakallemim, by which they prove the act\nof creation, the Existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality. I\nintend to explain their method, and also to point out the inferences\nwhich are to be drawn from each proposition. After this, I shall\ndescribe those theories of the philosophers which are closely connected\nwith our subject, and I shall then explain their method.\n\nDo not ask me to prove in this work the propositions of the\nphilosophers, which I shall briefly mention to you; they form the\nprincipal part of Physics and Metaphysics. Nor must you expect that I\nshould repeat the arguments of the Mutakallemim in support of their\npropositions, with which they wasted their time, with which the time of\nfuture generations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous books\nhave been written. Their propositions, with few exceptions, are\ncontradicted by the visible properties of things, and beset with\nnumerous objections. For this reason they were obliged to write many\nbooks and controversial works in defence of their theories, for the\nrefutation of objections, and for the reconciliation of all apparent\ncontradictions, although in reality this object cannot be attained by\nany sophistical contrivance. As to the propositions of the philosophers\nwhich I shall briefly explain, and which are indispensable for the\ndemonstration of the three principles\u2014the Existence, the Unity, and the\nIncorporeality of God, they will for the greater part be admitted by\nyou as soon as you shall hear them and understand their meaning; whilst\nin the discussion of other parts reference must be made for their\nproofs to works on Physics and Metaphysics, and if you direct your\nattention to such passages as will be pointed out to you, you will find\neverything verified that requires verification.\n\nI have already told you that nothing exists except God and this\nuniverse, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence but\nthis universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequently\nthe universe must be examined as it is; the propositions must be\nderived from those properties of the universe which are clearly\nperceived, and hence you must know its visible form and its nature.\nThen only will you find in the universe evidence for the existence of a\nbeing not included therein. I have considered it, therefore, necessary\nto discuss first in a merely colloquial manner, in the next chapter,\nthe totality of existing things, and to confine our remarks to such as\nhave been fully proved and established beyond all doubt. In subsequent\nchapters I shall treat of the propositions of the Mutakallemim, and\ndescribe the method by which they explain the four fundamental\nprinciples. In the chapters which will follow, I propose to expound the\npropositions of the philosophers and the methods applied by them in\nverifying those principles. In the last place, I shall explain to you\nthe method applied by me in proving those four principles, as I have\nstated to you.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXII\n\n\nKnow that this Universe, in its entirety, is nothing else but one\nindividual being; that is to say, the outermost heavenly sphere,\ntogether with all included therein, is as regards individuality beyond\nall question a single being like Said and Omar. The variety of its\nsubstances\u2014I mean the substances of that sphere and all its component\nparts\u2014is like the variety of the substances of a human being: just as,\ne.g., Said is one individual, consisting of various solid substances,\nsuch as flesh, bones, sinews, of various humours, and of various\nspiritual elements; in like manner this sphere in its totality is\ncomposed of the celestial orbs, the four elements and their\ncombinations; there is no vacuum whatever therein, but the whole space\nis filled up with matter. Its centre is occupied by the earth, earth is\nsurrounded by water, air encompasses the water, fire envelopes the air,\nand this again is enveloped by the fifth substance (quintessence).\nThese substances form numerous spheres, one being enclosed within\nanother so that no intermediate empty space, no vacuum, is left. One\nsphere surrounds and closely joins the other. All the spheres revolve\nwith constant uniformity, without acceleration or retardation; that is\nto say, each sphere retains its individual nature as regards its\nvelocity and the peculiarity of its motion; it does not move at one\ntime quicker, at another slower. Compared with each other, however,\nsome of the spheres move with less, others with greater velocity. The\noutermost, all-encompassing sphere, revolves with the greatest speed;\nit completes its revolution in one day, and causes everything to\nparticipate in its motion, just as every particle of a thing moves when\nthe entire body is in motion; for existing beings stand in the same\nrelation to that sphere as a part of a thing stands to the whole. These\nspheres have not a common centre; the centres of some of them are\nidentical with the centre of the Universe, while those of the rest are\ndifferent from it. Some of the spheres have a motion independent of\nthat of the whole Universe, constantly revolving from East to West,\nwhile other spheres move from West to East. The stars contained in\nthose spheres are part of their respective orbits; they are fixed in\nthem, and have no motion of their own, but participating in the motion\nof the sphere of which they are a part, they appear themselves to move.\nThe entire substance of this revolving fifth element is unlike the\nsubstance of those bodies which consist of the other four elements, and\nare enclosed by the fifth element.\n\nThe number of these spheres encompassing the Universe cannot possibly\nbe less than eighteen; it may even be larger; but this is a matter for\nfurther investigation. It also remains an open question whether there\nare spheres which, without moving round the centre of the Universe,\nhave nevertheless a circular motion. Within that sphere which is\nnearest to us, a substance is contained which is different from the\nsubstance of the fifth element; it first received four primary forms,\nand then became in these four forms, four kinds of matter: earth,\nwater, air, fire. Each of the four elements occupies a certain position\nof its own assigned to it by nature; it is not found in another place,\nso long as no other but its own natural force acts upon it; it is a\ndead body; it has no life, no perception, no spontaneous motion, and\nremains at rest in its natural place. When moved from its place by some\nexternal force, it returns towards its natural place as soon as that\nforce ceases to operate. For the elements have the property of moving\nback to their place in a straight line, but they have no properties\nwhich would cause them to remain where they are, or to move otherwise\nthan in a straight line. The rectilinear motions of these four elements\nwhen returning to their original place are of two kinds, either\ncentrifugal, viz., the motion of the air and the fire; or centripetal,\nviz., the motion of the earth, and the water; and when the elements\nhave reached their original place, they remain at rest.\n\nThe spherical bodies, on the other hand, have life, possess a soul by\nwhich they move spontaneously; they have no properties by which they\ncould at any time come to a state of rest; in their perpetual rotations\nthey are not subject to any change, except that of position. The\nquestion whether they are endowed with an intellect, enabling them to\ncomprehend, cannot be solved without deep research. Through the\nconstant revolution of the fifth element, with all contained therein,\nthe four elements are forced to move and to change their respective\npositions, so that fire and air are driven into the water, and again\nthese three elements enter the depth of the earth. Thus are the\nelements mixed together; and when they return to their respective\nplaces, parts of the earth, in quitting their places, move together\nwith the water, the air and the fire. In this whole process the\nelements act and react upon each other. The elements intermixed, are\nthen combined, and form at first various kinds of vapours; afterwards\nthe several kinds of minerals, every species of plants, and many\nspecies of living beings, according to the relative proportion of the\nconstituent parts. All transient beings have their origin in the\nelements, into which again they resolve when their existence comes to\nan end. The elements themselves are subject to being transformed from\none into another; for although one substance is common to all,\nsubstance without form is in reality impossible, just as the physical\nform of these transient beings cannot exist without substance. The\nformation and the dissolution of the elements, together with the things\ncomposed of them, and resolving into them, follow each other in\nrotation. The changes of the finite substance, in successively\nreceiving one form after the other, may therefore be compared to the\nrevolution of the sphere in space, when each part of the sphere\nperiodically reappears in the same position.\n\nAs the human body consists both of principal organs and of other\nmembers which depend on them and cannot exist without the control of\nthose organs, so does the universe consist both of principal parts,\nviz., the quintessence, which encompasses the four elements and of\nother parts which are subordinated and require a leader, viz., the four\nelements and the things composed of them.\n\nAgain, the principal part in the human body, namely, the heart, is in\nconstant motion, and is the source of every motion noticed in the body;\nit rules over the other members, and communicates to them through its\nown pulsations the force required for their functions. The outermost\nsphere by its motion rules in a similar way over all other parts of the\nuniverse, and supplies all things with their special properties. Every\nmotion in the universe has thus its origin in the motion of that\nsphere; and the soul of every animated being derives its origin from\nthe soul of that same sphere.\n\nThe forces which according to this explanation are communicated by the\nspheres to this sublunary world are four in number, viz., (a) the force\nwhich effects the mixture and the composition of the elements, and\nwhich undoubtedly suffices to form the minerals; (b) the force which\nsupplies every growing thing with its vegetative functions; (c) the\nforce which gives to each living being its vitality, and (d) the force\nwhich endows rational beings with intellect. All this is effected\nthrough the action of light and darkness, which are regulated by the\nposition and the motion of the spheres round the earth.\n\nWhen for one instant the beating of the heart is interrupted, man dies,\nand all his motions and powers come to an end. In a like manner would\nthe whole universe perish, and everything therein cease to exist if the\nspheres were to come to a standstill.\n\nThe living being as such is one through the action of its heart,\nalthough some parts of the body are devoid of motion and sensation, as,\ne.g., the bones, the cartilage, and similar parts. The same is the case\nwith the entire universe; although it includes many beings without\nmotion and without life, it is a single being living through the motion\nof the sphere, which may be compared to the heart of an animated being.\nYou must therefore consider the entire globe as one individual being\nwhich is endowed with life, motion, and a soul. This mode of\nconsidering the universe is, as will be explained, indispensable, that\nis to say, it is very useful for demonstrating the unity of God; it\nalso helps to elucidate the principle that He who is One has created\nonly one being.\n\nAgain, it is impossible that any of the members of a human body should\nexist by themselves, not connected with the body, and at the same time\nshould actually be organic parts of that body, that is to say, that the\nliver should exist by itself, the heart by itself, or the flesh by\nitself. In like manner, it is impossible that one part of the Universe\nshould exist independently of the other parts in the existing order of\nthings as here considered, viz., that the fire should exist without the\nco-existence of the earth, or the earth without the heaven, or the\nheaven without the earth.\n\nIn man there is a certain force which unites the members of the body,\ncontrols them, and gives to each of them what it requires for the\nconservation of its condition, and for the repulsion of injury\u2014the\nphysicians distinctly call it the leading force in the body of the\nliving being; sometimes they call it \u201cnature.\u201d The Universe likewise\npossesses a force which unites the several parts with each other,\nprotects the species from destruction, maintains the individuals of\neach species as long as possible, and endows some individual beings\nwith permanent existence. Whether this force operates through the\nmedium of the sphere or otherwise remains an open question.\n\nAgain, in the body of each individual there are parts which are\nintended for a certain purpose, as the organs of nutrition for the\npreservation of the individual, the organs of generation for the\npreservation of the species, the hands and eyes for administering to\ncertain wants, as to food, etc.; there are also parts which, in\nthemselves, are not intended for any purpose, but are mere accessories\nand adjuncts to the constitution of the other parts. The peculiar\nconstitution of the organs, indispensable for the conservation of their\nparticular forms and for the performance of their primary functions,\nproduces, whilst it serves its special purpose, according to the nature\nof the substance, other things, such as the hair and the complexion of\nthe body. Being mere accessories, they are not formed according to a\nfixed rule; some are altogether absent in many individuals; and vary\nconsiderably in others. This is not the case with the organs of the\nbody. You never find that the liver of one person is ten times larger\nthan that of another person, but you may find a person without a beard,\nor without hair on certain parts of his body, or with a beard ten times\nlonger than that of another man. Instances of this phenomenon, viz.,\ngreat variation as regards hair and colour, are not rare. The same\ndifferences occur in the constitution of the Universe. Some species\nexist as an integral part of the whole system; these are constant and\nfollow a fixed law; though they vary as far as their nature permits,\nthis variation is insignificant in quantity and quality. Other species\ndo not serve any purpose; they are the mere result of the general\nnature of transient things, as, e.g., the various insects which are\ngenerated in dunghills, the animals generated in rotten fruit, or in\nfetid liquids, and worms generated in the intestines, etc. In short,\neverything devoid of the power of generation belongs to this class. You\nwill, therefore, find that these things do not follow a fixed law,\nalthough their entire absence is just as impossible as the absence of\ndifferent complexions and of different kinds of hair amongst human\nbeings.\n\nIn man there are substances the individual existence of which is\npermanent, and there are other substances which are only constant in\nthe species not in the individuals, as, e.g., the four humours. The\nsame is the case in the Universe; there are substances which are\nconstant in individuals, such as the fifth element, which is constant\nin all its formations, and other substances which are constant in the\nspecies, as, e.g., the four elements and all that is composed of them.\n\nThe same forces which operate in the birth and the temporal existence\nof the human being operate also in his destruction and death. This\ntruth holds good with regard to this whole transient world. The causes\nof production are at the same time the causes of destruction. This may\nbe illustrated by the following example. If the four forces which are\npresent in every being sustained by food, viz., attraction, retention,\ndigestion, and secretion, were, like intelligent forces, able to\nconfine themselves to what is necessary, and to act at the proper time\nand within the proper limits, man would be exempt from those great\nsufferings and the numerous diseases [to which he is exposed]. Since,\nhowever, such is not the case, and since the forces perform their\nnatural functions without thought and intelligence, without any\nconsciousness of their action, they necessarily cause dangerous\nmaladies and great pains, although they are the direct cause of the\nbirth and the temporal existence of the human being. This fact is to be\nexplained as follows: if the attractive force would absorb nothing but\nthat which is absolutely beneficial, and nothing but the quantity which\nis required, man would be free from many such sufferings and disorders.\nBut such is not the case; the attractive force absorbs any humour that\ncomes within the range of its action, although such humour be\nill-adapted in quality or in quantity. It is, therefore, natural that\nsometimes a humour is absorbed which is too warm, too cold, too thick,\nor too thin, or that too much humour is absorbed, and thus the veins\nare choked, obstruction and decay ensue, the quality of the humour is\ndeteriorated, its quantities altered, diseases are originated, such as\nscurvy, leprosy, abscess, or a dangerous illness, such as cancer,\nelephantiasis, gangrene, and at last the organ or organs are destroyed.\nThe same is the case with every one of the four forces, and with all\nexisting beings. The same force that originates all things, and causes\nthem to exist for a certain time, namely, the combination of the\nelements which are moved and penetrated by the forces of the heavenly\nspheres, that same cause becomes throughout the world a source of\ncalamities, such as devastating rain, showers, snow-storms, hail,\nhurricanes, thunder, lightning, malaria, or other terrible catastrophes\nby which a place or many places or an entire country may be laid waste,\nsuch as landslips, earthquakes, meteoric showers and floods issuing\nforth from the seas and from the interior of the earth.\n\nBear in mind, however, that in all that we have noticed about the\nsimilarity between the Universe and the human being, nothing would\nwarrant us to assert that man is a microcosm; for although the\ncomparison in all its parts applies to the Universe and any living\nbeing in its normal state, we never heard that any ancient author\ncalled the ass or the horse a microcosm. This attribute has been given\nto man alone on account of his peculiar faculty of thinking, I mean the\nintellect, viz., the hylic intellect which appertains to no other\nliving being. This may be explained as follows. An animal does not\nrequire for its sustenance any plan, thought or scheme; each animal\nmoves and acts by its nature, eats as much as it can find of suitable\nthings, it makes its resting-place wherever it happens to be, cohabits\nwith any mate it meets while in heat in the periods of its sexual\nexcitement. In this manner does each individual conserve itself for a\ncertain time, and perpetuates the existence of its species without\nrequiring for its maintenance the assistance or support of any of its\nfellow creatures; for all the things to which it has to attend it\nperforms by itself. With man it is different; if an individual had a\nsolitary existence, and were, like an animal, left without guidance, he\nwould soon perish, he would not endure even one day, unless it were by\nmere chance, unless he happened to find something upon which he might\nfeed. For the food which man requires for his subsistence demands much\nwork and preparation, which can only be accomplished by reflection and\nby plan; many vessels must be used, and many individuals, each in his\npeculiar work, must be employed. It is therefore necessary that one\nperson should organize the work and direct men in such a manner that\nthey should properly co-operate, and that they should assist each\nother. The protection from heat in summer and from cold in winter, and\nshelter from rain, snow, and wind, require in the same manner the\npreparation of many things, none of which can properly be done without\ndesign and thought. For this reason man has been endowed with\nintellectual faculties, which enable him to think, consider, and act,\nand by various labours to prepare and procure for himself food,\ndwelling and clothing, and to control every organ of his body, causing\nboth the principal and the secondary organs to perform their respective\nfunctions. Consequently, if a man, being deprived of his intellectual\nfaculties, only possessed vitality, he would in a short time be lost.\nThe intellect is the highest of all faculties of living creatures; it\nis very difficult to comprehend, and its true character cannot be\nunderstood as easily as man\u2019s other faculties.\n\nThere also exists in the Universe a certain force which controls the\nwhole, which sets in motion the chief and principal parts, and gives\nthem the motive power for governing the rest. Without that force, the\nexistence of this sphere, with its principal and secondary parts, would\nbe impossible. It is the source of the existence of the Universe in all\nits parts. That force is God; blessed be His name! It is on account of\nthis force that man is called microcosm; for he likewise possesses a\ncertain principle which governs all the forces of the body, and on\naccount of this comparison God is called \u201cthe life of the Universe\u201d;\ncomp. \u201cand he swore by the life of the Universe\u201d (Dan. xii. 7).\n\nYou must understand that in the parallel which we have drawn between\nthe whole universe, on the one hand, and the individual man, on the\nother, there is a complete harmony in all the points which we mentioned\nabove; only in the following three points a discrepancy may be noticed.\n\nFirst, the principal organ of any living being which has a heart,\nderives a benefit from the organs under the control of the heart, and\nthe benefits of the organs thus become the benefits of the heart. This\nis not the case in the constitution of the universe. That part which\nbestows authority or distributes power, does not receive in return any\nbenefit from the things under its control; whatever it grants, is\ngranted in the manner of a generous benefactor, not from any selfish\nmotive, but from a natural generosity and kindliness; only for the sake\nof imitating the ways of the Most High.\n\nSecondly, living creatures endowed with a heart have it within the body\nand in the midst thereof; there it is surrounded by organs which it\ngoverns. Thus it derives a benefit from them, for they guard and\nprotect it, and they do not allow that any injury from without should\napproach it. The reverse occurs in the case of the Universe. The\nsuperior part encompasses the inferior parts, it being certain that it\ncannot be affected by the action of any other being; and even if it\ncould be affected, there is nobody without it that could affect it.\nWhile it influences all that is contained within, it is not influenced\nby any act or force of any material being. There is, however, some\nsimilarity [between the universe and man] in this point. In the body of\nanimals, the organs more distant from the principal organ are of less\nimportance than those nearer to it. Also in the universe, the nearer\nthe parts are to the centre, the greater is their turbidness, their\nsolidity, their inertness, their dimness and darkness, because they are\nfurther away from the loftiest element, from the source of light and\nbrightness, which moves by itself and the substance of which is the\nmost rarefied and simplest: from the outermost sphere. At the same\nratio at which a body is nearer this sphere, it derives properties from\nit, and rises above the spheres below it.\n\nThirdly. The faculty of thinking is a force inherent in the body, and\nis not separated from it, but God is not a force inherent in the body\nof the universe, but is separate from all its parts. How God rules the\nuniverse and provides for it is a complete mystery; man is unable to\nsolve it. For, on the one hand, it can be proved that God is separate\nfrom the universe, and in no contact whatever with it; but, on the\nother hand, His rule and providence can be proved to exist in all parts\nof the universe, even in the smallest. Praised be He whose perfection\nis above our comprehension.\n\nIt is true, we might have compared the relation between God and the\nuniverse, to the relation between the absolute acquired intellect and\nman; it is not a power inherent in the body, but a power which is\nabsolutely separate from the body, and is from without brought into\ncontact with the body. The rational faculty of man may be further\ncompared to the intelligence of the spheres, which are, as it were,\nmaterial bodies. But the intelligence of the spheres, purely spiritual\nbeings, as well as man\u2019s absolute and acquired intellect, are subjects\nof deep study and research; the proof of their existence, though\ncorrect, is abstruse, and includes arguments which present doubts, are\nexposed to criticism, and can be easily attacked by objectors. We have,\ntherefore, preferred to illustrate the relation of God to the universe\nby a simile which is clear, and which will not be contradicted in any\nof the points which have been laid down by us without any\nqualification. The opposition can only emanate either from an ignorant\nman, who contradicts truths even if they are perfectly obvious, just as\na person unacquainted with geometry rejects elementary propositions\nwhich have been clearly demonstrated, or from the prejudiced man who\ndeceives himself. Those, however, who wish to study the subject must\npersevere in their studies until they are convinced that all our\nobservations are true, and until they understand that our account of\nthis universe unquestionably agrees with the existing order of things.\nIf a man is willing to accept this theory from one who understands how\nto prove things which can be proved, let him accept it, and let him\nestablish on it his arguments and proofs. If, on the other hand, he\nrefuses to accept without proof even the foregoing principles, let him\ninquire for himself, and ultimately he will find that they are correct.\n\u201cLo this, we have searched it, so it is; hear it, and know thou it for\nthy good\u201d (Job v. 27).\n\nAfter these preliminary remarks, we will treat of the subject which we\npromised to introduce and to explain.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXIII\n\n\nThere are twelve propositions common to all Mutakallemim, however\ndifferent their individual opinions and methods may be; the\nMutakallemim require them in order to establish their views on the four\nprinciples. I shall first enumerate these propositions, and then\ndiscuss each separately, together with the inferences which may be\ndrawn from it.\n\nProposition I. All things are composed of atoms.\n\nProposition II. There is a vacuum.\n\nProposition III. Time is composed of time-atoms.\n\nProposition IV. Substance cannot exist without numerous accidents.\n\nProposition V. Each atom is completely furnished with the accidents\n(which I will describe), and cannot exist without them.\n\nProposition VI. Accidents do not continue in existence during two\ntime-atoms.\n\nProposition VII. Both positive and negative properties have a real\nexistence, and are accidents which owe their existence to some causa\nefficiens.\n\nProposition VIII. All existing things, i.e., all creatures, consist of\nsubstance and of accidents, and the physical form of a thing is\nlikewise an accident.\n\nProposition IX. No accident can form the substratum for another\naccident.\n\nProposition X. The test for the possibility of an imagined object does\nnot consist in its conformity with the existing laws of nature.\n\nProposition XI. The idea of the infinite is equally inadmissible,\nwhether the infinite be actual, potential, or accidental, i.e., there\nis no difference whether the infinite be formed by a number of\nco-existing things, or by a series of things, of which one part comes\ninto existence when another has ceased to exist, in which case it is\ncalled accidental infinite; in both cases the infinite is rejected by\nthe Mutakallemim as fallacious.\n\nProposition XII. The senses mislead, and are in many cases inefficient;\ntheir perceptions, therefore, cannot form the basis of any law, or\nyield data for any proof.\n\n\nFirst Proposition.\n\n\u201cThe Universe, that is, everything contained in it, is composed of very\nsmall parts [atoms] which are indivisible on account of their\nsmallness; such an atom has no magnitude; but when several atoms\ncombine, the sum has a magnitude, and thus forms a body.\u201d If,\ntherefore, two atoms were joined together, each atom would become a\nbody, and they would thus form two bodies, a theory which in fact has\nbeen proposed by some Mutakallemim. All these atoms are perfectly\nalike; they do not differ from each other in any point. The\nMutakallemim further assert, that it is impossible to find a body that\nis not composed of such equal atoms which are placed side by side.\nAccording to this view genesis and composition are identical;\ndestruction is the same as decomposition. They do not use the term\n\u201cdestruction,\u201d for they hold that \u201cgenesis\u201d implies composition and\ndecomposition, motion and rest. These atoms, they believe, are not, as\nwas supposed by Epicurus and other Atomists numerically constant; but\nare created anew whenever it pleases the Creator; their annihilation is\ntherefore not impossible. Now I will explain to you their opinion\nconcerning the vacuum.\n\n\nSecond Proposition.\n\nOn the vacuum. The original Mutakallemim also believe that there is a\nvacuum, i.e., one space, or several spaces which contain nothing, which\nare not occupied by anything whatsoever, and which are devoid of all\nsubstance. This proposition is to them an indispensable sequel to the\nfirst. For, if the Universe were full of such atoms, how could any of\nthem move? For it is impossible to conceive that one atom should move\ninto another. And yet the composition, as well as the decomposition of\nthings, can only be effected by the motion of atoms! Thus the\nMutakallemim are compelled to assume a vacuum, in order that the atoms\nmay combine, separate, and move in that vacuum which does not contain\nany thing or any atom.\n\n\nThird Proposition.\n\n\u201cTime is composed of time-atoms,\u201d i.e., of many parts, which on account\nof their short duration cannot be divided. This proposition also is a\nlogical consequence of the first. The Mutakallemim undoubtedly saw how\nAristotle proved that time, space, and locomotion are of the same\nnature, that is to say, they can be divided into parts which stand in\nthe same proportion to each other: if one of them is divided, the other\nis divided in the same proportion. They, therefore, knew that if time\nwere continuous and divisible ad infinitum, their assumed atom of space\nwould of necessity likewise be divisible. Similarly, if it were\nsupposed that space is continuous, it would necessarily follow, that\nthe time-element, which they considered to be indivisible, could also\nbe divided. This has been shown by Aristotle in the treatise called\nAcroasis. Hence they concluded that space was not continuous, but was\ncomposed of elements that could not be divided; and that time could\nlikewise be reduced to time-elements, which were indivisible. An hour\nis, e.g., divided into sixty minutes, the minute into sixty seconds,\nthe second into sixty parts, and so on; at last after ten or more\nsuccessive divisions by sixty, time-elements are obtained, which are\nnot subjected to division, and in fact are indivisible, just as is the\ncase with space. Time would thus be an object of position and order.\n\nThe Mutakallemim did not at all understand the nature of time. This is\na matter of course; for if the greatest philosophers became embarrassed\nwhen they investigated the nature of time, if some of them were\naltogether unable to comprehend what time really was, and if even\nGalenus declared time to be something divine and incomprehensible, what\ncan be expected of those who do not regard the nature of things?\n\nNow, mark what conclusions were drawn from these three propositions,\nand were accepted by the Mutakallemim as true. They held that\nlocomotion consisted in the translation of each atom of a body from one\npoint to the next one; accordingly the velocity of one body in motion\ncannot be greater than that of another body. When, nevertheless, two\nbodies are observed to move during the same time through different\nspaces, the cause of this difference is not attributed by them to the\nfact that the body which has moved through a larger distance had a\ngreater velocity, but to the circumstance that motion which in ordinary\nlanguage is called slow, has been interrupted by more moments of rest,\nwhile the motion which ordinarily is called quick has been interrupted\nby fewer moments of rest. When it is shown that the motion of an arrow,\nwhich is shot from a powerful bow, is in contradiction to their theory,\nthey declare that in this case too the motion is interrupted by moments\nof rest. They believe that it is the fault of man\u2019s senses if he\nbelieves that the arrow moves continuously, for there are many things\nwhich cannot be perceived by the senses, as they assert in the twelfth\nproposition. But we ask them: \u201cHave you observed a complete revolution\nof a millstone? Each point in the extreme circumference of the stone\ndescribes a large circle in the very same time in which a point nearer\nthe centre describes a small circle; the velocity of the outer circle\nis therefore greater than that of the inner circle. You cannot say that\nthe motion of the latter was interrupted by more moments of rest; for\nthe whole moving body, i.e., the millstone, is one coherent body.\u201d They\nreply, \u201cDuring the circular motion, the parts of the millstone separate\nfrom each other, and the moments of rest interrupting the motion of the\nportions nearer the centre are more than those which interrupt the\nmotion of the outer portions.\u201d We ask again, \u201cHow is it that the\nmillstone, which we perceive as one body, and which cannot be easily\nbroken, even with a hammer, resolves into its atoms when it moves, and\nbecomes again one coherent body, returning to its previous state as\nsoon as it comes to rest, while no one is able to notice the breaking\nup [of the stone]?\u201d Again their reply is based on the twelfth\nproposition, which is to the effect that the perception of the senses\ncannot be trusted, and thus only the evidence of the intellect is\nadmissible. Do not imagine that you have seen in the foregoing example\nthe most absurd of the inferences which may be drawn from these three\npropositions: the proposition relating to the existence of a vacuum\nleads to more preposterous and extravagant conclusions. Nor must you\nsuppose that the aforegoing theory concerning motion is less irrational\nthan the proposition resulting from this theory, that the diagonal of a\nsquare is equal to one of its sides, and some of the Mutakallemim go so\nfar as to declare that the square is not a thing of real existence. In\nshort, the adoption of the first proposition would be tantamount to the\nrejection of all that has been proved in Geometry. The propositions in\nGeometry would, in this respect, be divided into two classes: some\nwould be absolutely rejected; e.g., those which relate to properties of\nthe incommensurability and the commensurability of lines and planes, to\nrational and irrational lines, and all other propositions contained in\nthe tenth book of Euclid, and in similar works. Other propositions\nwould appear to be only partially correct; e.g., the solution of the\nproblem to divide a line into two equal parts, if the line consists of\nan odd number of atoms; according to the theory of the Mutakallemim\nsuch a line cannot be bisected. Furthermore, in the well-known book of\nproblems by the sons of Shakir are contained more than a hundred\nproblems, all solved and practically demonstrated; but if there really\nwere a vacuum, not one of these problems could be solved, and many of\nthe waterworks [described in that book] could not have been\nconstructed. The refutation of such propositions is a mere waste of\ntime. I will now proceed to treat of the other propositions mentioned\nabove.\n\n\nFourth Proposition.\n\n\u201cThe accidents of things have real existence; they are elements\nsuperadded to the substance itself, and no material thing can be\nwithout them.\u201d Had this proposition been left by the Mutakallemim in\nthis form it would have been correct, simple, dear, and indisputable.\nThey have, however, gone further, asserting that a substance which has\nnot the attribute of life, must necessarily have that of death; for it\nmust always have one of two contrasting properties. According to their\nopinion, colour, taste, motion or rest, combination or separation,\netc., can be predicated of all substances, and, if a substance have the\nattribute of life, it must at the same time possess such other kinds of\naccidents, as wisdom or folly, freewill or the reverse, power or\nweakness, perception or any of its opposites, and, in short, the\nsubstance must have the one or the other of all correlative accidents\nappertaining to a living being.\n\n\nFifth Proposition.\n\n\u201cThe atom is fully provided with all these foregoing accidents, and\ncannot exist if any be wanting.\u201d The meaning of the proposition is\nthis: The Mutakallemim say that each of the atoms created by God must\nhave accidents, such as colour, smell, motion, or rest, except the\naccident of quantity: for according to their opinion an atom has no\nmagnitude; and they do not designate quantity as an accident, nor do\nthey apply to it the laws of accidents. In accordance with this\nproposition, they do not say, when an accident is noticed in a body,\nthat it is peculiar to the body as such, but that it exists in each of\nthe atoms which form the constituent elements of that body. E.g., take\na heap of snow; the whiteness does not exist in that heap as a whole,\nbut each atom of the snow is white, and therefore the aggregate of\nthese atoms is likewise white. Similarly they say that when a body\nmoves each atom of it moves, and thus the whole body is in motion. Life\nlikewise exists, according to their view, in each atom of a living\nbody. The same is the case according to their opinion with the senses;\nin each atom of the aggregate they notice the faculty of perception.\nLife, sensation, intellect and wisdom are considered by them as\naccidents, like blackness and whiteness, as will be shown in the\nfurther discussion of their theory.\n\nConcerning the soul, they do not agree. The view most predominant among\nthem is the following:\u2014The soul is an accident existing in one of the\natoms of which, e.g., man is composed; the aggregate is called a being\nendowed with a soul, in so far as it includes that atom. Others are of\nopinion that the soul is composed of ethereal atoms, which have a\npeculiar faculty by virtue of which they constitute the soul, and that\nthese atoms are mixed with the atoms of the body. Consequently they\nmaintain that the soul is an accident.\n\nAs to the intellect, I found that all of them agreed in considering it\nto be an accident joined to one of the atoms which constitute the whole\nof the intelligent being. But there is a confusion among them about\nknowledge; they are uncertain whether it is an accident to each of the\natoms which form the knowing aggregate, or whether it belongs only to\none atom. Both views can be disproved by a reductio ad absurdum, when\nthe following facts are pointed out to them. Generally metals and\nstones have a peculiar colour, which is strongly pronounced, but\ndisappears when they are pulverised. Vitriol, which is intensely green,\nbecomes white dust when pounded; this shows that that accident exists\nonly in the aggregate, not in the atoms. This fact is more striking in\nthe following instance: when parts of a living being are cut off they\ncease to live, a proof that the accident [of life] belongs to the\naggregate of the living being, not to each atom. In order to meet this\nobjection they say that the accident is of no duration, but is\nconstantly renewed. In discussing the next proposition I shall explain\ntheir view on this subject.\n\n\nSixth Proposition.\n\n\u201cThe accidents do not exist during two time-atoms.\u201d\u2014The sense of the\nproposition is this: They believe that God creates a substance, and\nsimultaneously its accidents; that the Creator is incapable of creating\na substance devoid of an accident, for that is impossible; that the\nessential characteristic of an accident is its incapability of enduring\nfor two periods, for two time-atoms; that immediately after its\ncreation it is utterly destroyed, and another accident of the same kind\nis created; this again is destroyed and a third accident of the same\nkind is created, and so on, so long as God is pleased to preserve [in\nthat substance] this kind of accident; but He can at His will create in\nthe same substance an accident of a different kind, and if He were to\ndiscontinue the creation and not produce a new accident, that substance\nwould at once cease to exist. This is one of the opinions held by the\nMutakallemim; it has been accepted by most of them, and it is the\nso-called \u201ctheory of the creation of the accidents.\u201d Some of them,\nhowever, and they belong to the sect of the Mu\u02bbtazilah, say that there\nare accidents which endure for a certain period, and other accidents\nwhich do not endure for two atoms of time; they do not follow a fixed\nprinciple in deciding what class of accidents has and what class has\nnot a certain duration. The object of this proposition is to oppose the\ntheory that there exists a natural force from which each body derives\nits peculiar properties. They prefer to assume that God himself creates\nthese properties without the intervention of a natural force or of any\nother agency: a theory which implies that no accident can have any\nduration. For suppose that certain accidents could endure for a certain\nperiod and then cease to exist, the question would naturally be asked,\nWhat is the cause of that non-existence? They would not be satisfied\nwith the reply that God by His will brought about this non-existence,\nand non-existence does not at all require any agens whatever; for as\nsoon as the agens leaves off acting, the product of the agens ceases\nlikewise to exist. This is true to some extent. Having thus chosen to\nestablish the theory that there does not exist any natural force upon\nwhich the existence or non-existence of a thing depends, they were\ncompelled to assume that the properties of things were successively\nrenewed. When God desires to deprive a thing of its existence, He,\naccording to some of the Mutakallemim, discontinues the creation of its\naccidents, and eo ipso the body ceases to exist. Others, however, say\nthat if it pleased the Almighty to destroy the world, He would create\nthe accident of destruction, which would be without any substratum. The\ndestruction of the Universe would be the correlative accident to that\nof existence.\u2014In accordance with this [sixth] proposition they say,\nthat the cloth which according to our belief we dyed red, has not been\ndyed by us at all, but God created that colour in the cloth when it\ncame into contact with the red pigment; we believe that colour to have\npenetrated into the cloth, but they assert that this is not the case.\nThey say that God generally acts in such a way, that, e.g., the black\ncolour is not created unless the cloth is brought into contact with\nindigo; but this blackness, which God creates in the instant when the\ncloth touches the black pigment is of no duration, and another creation\nof blackness then takes place; they further say that after the\nblackness is gone, He does not create a red or green colour, but again\na black colour.\n\nAccording to this principle, the knowledge which we have of certain\nthings to-day, is not the same which we had of them yesterday; that\nknowledge is gone, and another like it has been created. They\npositively believe that this does take place, knowledge being an\naccident. In like manner it would follow that the soul, according to\nthose who believe that it is an accident, is renewed each moment in\nevery animated being, say a hundred thousand times; for, as you know,\ntime is composed of time-atoms. In accordance with this principle they\nassert that when man is perceived to move a pen, it is not he who has\nreally moved it; the motion produced in the pen is an accident which\nGod has created in the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which moves\nthe pen is likewise an accident which God has created in the moving\nhand; but the creative act of God is performed in such a manner that\nthe motion of the hand and the motion of the pen follow each other\nclosely; but the hand does not act, and is not the cause of the pen\u2019s\nmotion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one thing to\nanother. Some of the Mutakallemim accordingly contend that this white\ncloth, which is coloured when put into the vessel filled with indigo,\nhas not been blackened by the indigo; for blackness being an attribute\nof indigo, does not pass from one object to another. There does not\nexist any thing to which an action could be ascribed; the real agens is\nGod, and He has [in the foregoing instance] created the blackness in\nthe substance of the cloth when it came into contact with the indigo,\nfor this is the method adopted by Him. In short, most of the\nMutakallemim believe that it must never be said that one thing is the\ncause of another; some of them who assumed causality were blamed for\ndoing so. As regards, however, the acts of man their opinions are\ndivided. Most of them, especially the sect of the Asha\u2019ariyah, assume\nthat when the pen is set in motion God has created four accidents, none\nof which is the cause of any of the rest, they are only related to each\nother as regards the time of their co-existence, and have no other\nrelation to each other. The first accident is man\u2019s will to move the\npen, the second is man\u2019s power to do so, the third is the bodily motion\nitself, i.e., the motion of the hand, and the fourth is the motion of\nthe pen. They believe that when a man has the will to do a thing and,\nas he believes, does it, the will has been created for him, then the\npower to conform to the will, and lastly the act itself. The act is not\naccomplished by the power created in man; for, in reality, no act can\nbe ascribed to that power. The Mu\u02bbtazilah contend that man acts by\nvirtue of the power which has been created in him. Some of the\nAsha\u2019ariyah assert that the power created in man participates in the\nact, and is connected with it, an opinion which has been rejected by\nthe majority of them. The will and the power created in man, according\nto the concurrent belief of the Mutakallemim, together with the act\ncreated in him, according to some of them, are accidents without\nduration. In the instance of the pen, God continually creates one\nmotion after the other so long as the pen is in motion; it only then\nceases to move when God has created in it the accident of rest; and so\nlong as the pen is at rest, God continually renews in it that accident.\nConsequently in every one of these moments, i.e., of the time-atoms,\nGod creates some accident in every existing individual, e.g., in the\nangels, in the spheres and in other things; this creation takes place\ncontinually and without interruption. Such is, according to their\nopinion, the right interpretation of the creed that God is the causa\nefficiens. But I, together with all rational persons, apply to those\ntheories the words, \u201cWill you mock at Him, as you mock at man?\u201d for\ntheir words are indeed nothing but mockery.\n\n\nSeventh Proposition.\n\n\u201cThe absence of a property is itself a property that exists in the\nbody, a something superadded to its substance, an actual accident,\nwhich is constantly renewed; as soon as it is destroyed it is\nreproduced.\u201d The reason why they hold this opinion is this: they do not\nunderstand that rest is the absence of motion; death the absence of\nlife; that blindness is the absence of sight, and that all similar\nnegative properties are the absence of the positive correlatives. The\nrelation between motion and rest is, according to their theory, the\nsame as the relation between heat and cold, namely, as heat and cold\nare two accidents found in two objects which have the properties of\nheat and cold, so motion is an accident created in the thing which\nmoves, and rest an accident created in the thing which rests; it does\nnot remain in existence during two consecutive time-atoms, as we have\nstated in treating of the previous proposition. Accordingly, when a\nbody is at rest, God has created the rest in each atom of that body,\nand so long as the body remains at rest God continually renews that\nproperty. The same, they believe, is the case with a man\u2019s wisdom and\nignorance; the latter is considered by them as an actual accident,\nwhich is subject to the constant changes of destruction and creation,\nso long as there remains a thing of which such a man is ignorant. Death\nand life are likewise accidents, and as the Mutakallemim distinctly\nstate, life is constantly destroyed and renewed during the whole\nexistence of a living being; when God decrees its death, He creates in\nit the accident of death after the accident of life, which does not\ncontinue during two time-atoms, has ceased to exist. All this they\nstate clearly.\n\nThe logical consequence of this proposition is that the accident of\ndeath created by God instantly ceases to exist, and is replaced by\nanother death which again is created by God; otherwise death could not\ncontinue. Death is thus continually created in the same manner as life\nis renewed every moment. But I should wish to know how long God\ncontinues to create death in a dead body. Does He do so whilst the form\nremains, or whilst one of the atoms exists? For in each of the atoms of\nthe body the accident of death which God creates is produced, and there\nare to be found teeth of persons who died thousands of years ago; we\nsee that those teeth have not been deprived of existence, and therefore\nthe accident of death has during all these thousands of years been\nrenewed, and according to the opinion prevailing amongst those\ntheorists, death was continually replaced by death. Some of the\nMu\u02bbtazilah hold that there are cases in which the absence of a physical\nproperty is not a real property, that weariness is the absence of\nstrength, and ignorance the absence of knowledge; but this cannot be\nsaid in every case of negative properties: it cannot be said that\ndarkness is the mere absence of light, or that rest is the absence of\nmotion. Some negative properties are thus considered by them as having\na real existence, while other negative properties are considered as\nnon-existing, just as suits their belief. Here they proceed in the same\nmanner as they proceed respecting the duration of accidents, and they\ncontend that some accidents exist a long time, and other accidents do\nnot last two time-atoms. Their sole object is to fashion the Universe\naccording to their peculiar opinions and beliefs.\n\n\nEighth Proposition.\n\n\u201cThere exists nothing but substance and accident, and the physical form\nof things belong to the class of accidents.\u201d It is the object of this\nproposition to show that all bodies are composed of similar atoms, as\nwe have pointed out in explaining the first proposition. The difference\nof bodies from each other is caused by the accidents, and by nothing\nelse. Animality, humanity, sensibility, and speech, are denoted as\naccidents like blackness, whiteness, bitterness, and sweetness, and the\ndifference between two individuals of two classes is the same as the\ndifference of two individuals of the same class. Also the body of the\nheaven, the body of the angels, the body of the Divine Throne\u2014such as\nit is assumed to be\u2014the body of anything creeping on the earth, and the\nbody of any plant, have one and the same substance; they only differ in\nthe peculiarity of the accidents, and in nothing else; the substance of\nall things is made up of equal atoms.\n\n\nNinth Proposition.\n\n\u201cNone of the accidents form the substratum of another accident; it\ncannot be said, This is an accident to a thing which is itself an\naccident to a substance. All accidents are directly connected with the\nsubstance.\u201d The Mutakallemim deny the indirect relation of the accident\nto the substance, because if such a relation were assumed it would\nfollow that the second accident could only exist in the substance after\nanother accident had preceded it, a conclusion to which they would\nobject even with regard to some special accidents; they prefer to show\nthat these accidents can exist in every possible substance, although\nsuch substance is not determined by any other accident; for they hold\nthat all the accidents collectively determine the thing. They advance\nalso another proof [in support of this proposition], namely: The\nsubstratum which is the bearer of certain attributes must continue to\nexist for a certain time; how, then, could the accident;\nwhich\u2014according to their opinion\u2014does not remain in existence for two\nmoments, become the substratum of something else?\n\n\nTenth Proposition.\n\nThis proposition concerns the theory of \u201cadmissibility,\u201d which is\nmentioned by the Mutakallemim, and forms the principal support of their\ndoctrine. Mark its purport: they observe that everything conceived by\nthe imagination is admitted by the intellect as possible; e.g., that\nthe terrestrial globe should become the all-encompassing sphere, or\nthat this sphere should become the terrestrial globe; reason does not\nfind here an impossibility; or that the sphere of fire should move\ntowards the centre, and the sphere of earth towards the circumference.\nHuman intellect does not perceive any reason why a body should be in a\ncertain place instead of being in another. In the same manner they say\nthat reason admits the possibility that an existing being should be\nlarger or smaller than it really is, or that it should be different in\nform and position from what it really is; e.g., a man might have the\nheight of a mountain, might have several heads, and fly in the air; or\nan elephant might be as small as an insect, or an insect as huge as an\nelephant. This method of admitting possibilities is applied to the\nwhole Universe. Whenever they affirm that a thing belongs to this class\nof admitted possibilities, they say that it can have this form, and\nthat it is also possible that it be found differently, and that the one\nform is not more possible than the other; but they do not ask whether\nthe reality confirms their assumption. They say that the thing which\nexists with certain constant and permanent forms, dimensions, and\nproperties, only follows the direction of habit, just as the king\ngenerally rides on horseback through the streets of the city, and is\nnever found departing from this habit; but reason does not find it\nimpossible that he should walk on foot through the place; there is no\ndoubt that he may do so, and this possibility is fully admitted by the\nintellect. Similarly, earth moves towards the centre, fire turns away\nfrom the centre; fire causes heat, water causes cold, in accordance\nwith a certain habit; but it is logically not impossible that a\ndeviation from this habit should occur, namely, that fire should cause\ncold, move downward, and still be fire; that the water should cause\nheat, move upward, and still be water. On this foundation their whole\nfabric is constructed. They admit, however, the impossibility of two\nopposite properties coexisting at the same time in one substance. This\nis impossible; reason would not admit this possibility. Again, reason\ndoes not admit the possibility of a substance existing without an\naccident, or an accident existing without a substance, a possibility\nadmitted by some of the Mutakallemim. It is also impossible that a\nsubstance should become an accident, that an accident should become a\nsubstance, or that one substance should penetrate another. They admit\nthat reason rejects all these things as impossible. It is perfectly\ntrue that no notion whatever can be formed of those things which they\ndescribe as impossible; whilst a notion can be formed of those things\nwhich they consider as possible. The philosophers object to this\nmethod, and say, You call a thing impossible because it cannot be\nimagined, or possible because it can be imagined; and thus you consider\nas possible that which is found possible by imagination, not by the\nintellect, consequently you determine that a thing is necessary,\npossible, or impossible in some instances, by the aid of the\nimagination\u2014not by the intellect\u2014and in other instances by the ordinary\ncommon sense, as Abu Nasr says in speaking of that which the\nMutakallemim call intellect. It is clear that they describe as possible\nthat which can be imagined, whether the reality correspond to it or\nnot, and as impossible that which cannot be imagined. This proposition\ncan only be established by the nine aforementioned propositions, and no\ndoubt these were exclusively required for the support of this\nproposition. This you will see clearly when I shall show and explain to\nyou some important parts of this theory, which I shall now introduce in\nthe form of a discussion supposed to have taken place between a\nMutakallem and a philosopher.\n\nThe Mutakallem said to the philosopher: What is the reason that we find\nthe substance of iron extremely hard and strong, with a dark colour;\nthe substance of cream, on the other hand, extremely soft and white?\nThe philosopher replied as follows: All physical bodies have two kinds\nof accidents: those which concern their substance, as, e.g., the health\nand the illness of a man; and those which concern their form, as, e.g.,\nthe astonishment and laughter of a man. The substances of compound\nbodies differ very much in their ultimate form, according to the\ndifference of the forms peculiar to each component substance. Hence the\nsubstance of iron has become in its properties the opposite of the\nsubstance of cream, and this difference is attended by the difference\nof accidents. You notice, therefore, hardness in the one, and softness\nin the other: two accidents, whose difference results from the\ndifference which exists in the forms of the substances; while the\ndarkness and the whiteness are accidents whose divergence corresponds\nto that of the two substances in their ultimate condition. The\nMutakallem refuted this reply by means of his propositions, as I am now\ngoing to state:\u2014There does not exist a form which, as you believe,\nmodifies the substance, and thus causes substances to be different from\neach other; this difference is exclusively effected by the\naccidents\u2014according to the theory of the Kal\u00e2m, which we mentioned in\nexplaining the eighth proposition. He then continued thus: There is no\ndifference between the substance of iron and that of cream; all things\nare composed of the same kind of atoms.\u2014We explained the view of the\nMutakallemim on this point in treating of the first proposition, the\nlogical consequences of which are, as we have shown, the second and the\nthird propositions; they further require the twelfth proposition, in\norder to establish the theory of atoms. Nor do they admit that any\naccidents determine the nature of a substance, or predispose it to\nreceive certain other accidents; for, according to their opinion, an\naccident cannot be the substratum of another accident, as we have shown\nin explaining the ninth proposition; nor can it have any duration,\naccording to the sixth proposition. When the Mutakallemim have\nestablished all that they wish to infer from these propositions, they\narrive at the conclusion that the component atoms of cream and of iron\nare alike.\u2014The relation of each atom to each of the accidents is the\nsame; one atom is not more adapted than another to receive a certain\naccident; and as a certain atom is not more fitted to move than to\nrest, so one atom is not more apt than another to receive the accident\nof life, of reason, of sensation. It is here of no moment whether a\nthing contains a larger or smaller quantity of atoms, for, according to\nthe view of the Mutakallemim, which we explained in treating of the\nfifth proposition, every accident [of a thing] exists in each of its\natoms. All these propositions lead to the conclusion that a human being\nis not better constituted to become wise than the bat, and establish\nthe theory of admissibility expressed in this [tenth] proposition.\nEvery effort was made to demonstrate this proposition, because it is\nthe best means for proving anything they like, as will be explained.\n\nNote.\u2014Mark, O reader, that if you know the nature of the soul and its\nproperties, and if you have a correct notion of everything which\nconcerns the soul, you will observe that most animals possess\nimagination. As to the higher class of animals, that is, those which\nhave a heart, it is obvious that they have imagination. Man\u2019s\ndistinction does not consist in the possession of imagination, and the\naction of imagination is not the same as the action of the intellect,\nbut the reverse of it. For the intellect analyses and divides the\ncomponent parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of them, represents\nthem in their true form as well as in their causal relations, derives\nfrom one object a great many facts, which\u2014for the intellect\u2014totally\ndiffer from each other, just as two human individuals appear different\nto the imagination; it distinguishes that which is the property of the\ngenus from that which is peculiar to the individual,\u2014and no proof is\ncorrect, unless founded on the former; the intellect further determines\nwhether certain qualities of a thing are essential or non-essential.\nImagination has none of these functions. It only perceives the\nindividual, the compound in that aggregate condition in which it\npresents itself to the senses; or it combines things which exist\nseparately, joins some of them together, and represents them all as one\nbody or as a force of the body. Hence it is that some imagine a man\nwith a horse\u2019s head, with wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a\nphantasm; it is a thing to which nothing in the actual world\ncorresponds. Nor can imagination in any way obtain a purely immaterial\nimage of an object, however abstract the form of the image may be.\nImagination yields therefore no test for the reality of a thing.\n\nHear what profit we derive from the preliminary disciplines, and how\nexcellent the propositions are which we learn through them. Know that\nthere are certain things, which would appear impossible, if tested by\nman\u2019s imagination, being as inconceivable as the co-existence of two\nopposite properties in one object; yet the existence of those same\nthings, which cannot be represented by imagination, is nevertheless\nestablished by proof, and attested by their reality. E.g., Imagine a\nlarge globe, of any magnitude you like, even as large as the\nall-encompassing sphere; further an axis passing through the centre,\nand two persons standing on the two extremities of the axis in such a\nmanner that their feet are in the same straight line with the axis,\nwhich may be either in the plane of the horizon or not; in the first\ncase both persons would fall, in the second case one, namely the one\nwho stands on the lower extremity would fall, the other would remain\nstanding, as far as our imagination can perceive. It has however,\nalready been proved that the earth has the form of a globe, that it is\ninhabited on both extremities of a certain diameter, that both the\ninhabitants have their heads towards the heaven, and their legs towards\neach other, and yet neither can possibly fall, nor can it be imagined;\nfor it is incorrect to say that the one extremity is above, the other\nbelow; but the term \u201cabove\u201d and \u201cbelow\u201d apply to both of them as\nregards their relative position to each other. Similarly it has been\nproved in the second chapter of the book on Conic Sections, that two\nlines, which at first are at a certain distance from each other, may\napproach each other in the same proportion as they are produced\nfurther, and yet would never meet, even if they were produced to\ninfinity, although they are observed to be constantly converging. This\nis a fact which cannot easily be conceived, and which does not come\nwithin the scope of imagination. Of these two lines the one is\nstraight, the other curved, as stated in the aforementioned book. It\nhas consequently been proved that things which cannot be perceived or\nimagined, and which would be found impossible if tested solely by\nimagination, are nevertheless in real existence. The non-existence of\nthings which are represented by imagination as possible has likewise\nbeen established by proof, e.g., the corporeality of God, and His\nexistence as a force residing in a body. Imagination perceives nothing\nexcept bodies, or properties inherent in bodies.\n\nIt has thus been clearly shown that in man exists a certain faculty\nwhich is entirely distinct from imagination, and by which the\nnecessary, the possible, and the impossible can be distinguished from\neach other. This inquiry is most useful. It is of the greatest profit\nto him who desires to guard himself against the errors of men guided by\nimagination! Do not think that the Mutakallemim ignore this altogether;\nto some extent they do take it into consideration; they know it, and\ncall that which can be imagined without having reality\u2014as, e.g., the\ncorporeality of God\u2014a phantom and a fancy; they state frequently that\nsuch phantoms are not real. It is for this reason that they advance the\nfirst nine propositions and establish on them the proof of the tenth,\naccording to which all those imaginable things which they wish to admit\nas possible are really possible, because of the similarity of all atoms\nand the equality of all accidents as regards their accidentality, as we\nhave explained.\n\nConsider, O reader, and bear in mind that this requires deep research.\nFor there are certain notions which some believe to be founded on\nreason, while others regard them as mere fictions. In such cases it\nwould be necessary to find something that could show the difference\nbetween conceptions of the intellect and mere imaginary fancies. When\nthe philosopher, in his way of expressing himself, contends, \u201cReality\nis my evidence; by its guidance I examine whether a thing is necessary,\npossible, or impossible,\u201d the religionist replies, \u201cThis is exactly the\ndifference between us; that which actually exists, has, according to my\nview, been produced by the will of the Creator, not by necessity; just\nas it has been created with that special property, it might have been\ncreated with any other property, unless the impossibility which you\npostulate be proved by a logical demonstration.\u201d\n\nAbout this admissibility (of imaginable things) I shall have to say\nmore, and I shall return to it in various parts of this treatise; for\nit is not a subject which should be rejected in haste and on the spur\nof the moment.\n\n\nEleventh Proposition.\n\n\u201cThe existence of the infinite is in every respect impossible.\u201d The\nfollowing is an explanation of this proposition. The impossibility of\nthe existence of an infinite body has been clearly demonstrated; the\nsame can be said of an infinite number of bodies, though each of them\nbe finite, if these beings, infinite in number, exist at the same time;\nequally impossible is the existence of an infinite series of causes,\nnamely, that a certain thing should be the cause of another thing, but\nitself the effect of another cause, which again is the result of\nanother cause, and so on to infinity, or that things in an infinite\nseries, either bodies or ideals, should be in actual existence, and in\ncausal relation to each other. This causal relation is the essential\norder of nature, in which, as has been fully proved, the infinite is\nimpossible. As regards the virtual and the accidental existence of the\ninfinite, it has been established in some cases; it has been proved,\ne.g., that a body can virtually be divided ad infinitum, also that time\ncan be divided ad infinitum; in other cases it is still an open\nquestion, as, e.g., the existence of the infinite in succession, which\nis called the accidental infinite, i.e., a series of things in which\none thing comes forth when the other is gone, and this again in its\nturn succeeded a thing which had ceased to exist, and so on ad\ninfinitum. This subject requires deep research.\n\nThose who boast that they have proved the eternity of the Universe say\nthat time is infinite; an assertion which is not necessarily erroneous;\nfor only when one atom has ceased to exist, the other follows. Nor is\nit absolutely wrong, when they assert, that the accidents of the\nsubstance succeed each other in an infinite series, for these accidents\ndo not co-exist, but come in succession one after the other, and the\nimpossibility of the infinite in that case has not been proved. The\nMutakallemim, however, make no difference between the existence of an\ninfinite body and the divisibility of a body or of time ad infinitum,\nbetween the co-existence of an infinite number of things, as e.g., the\nindividual human beings who exist at present, and the infinite number\nof beings successively existing, as, e.g., Reuben the son of Jacob, and\nJacob the son of Isaac, and Isaac the son of Abraham, and so on to\ninfinity. This is according to their opinion as inadmissible as the\nfirst case; they believe these four forms of the infinite to be quite\nequal. Some of the Mutakallemim endeavour to establish their\nproposition concerning the last named form of the infinite, and to\ndemonstrate its impossibility by a method which I shall explain in this\ntreatise; others say that this impossibility is a self-evident axiom\nand requires no further proof. But if it were undoubtedly wrong to\nassume that an infinite number of things can exist in succession,\nalthough that link of the series which exists at present is finite, the\ninadmissibility of the eternity of the Universe would be equally\nself-evident, and would not require for its proof any other\nproposition. This, however, is not the place for investigating the\nsubject.\n\n\nTwelfth Proposition.\n\n\u201cThe senses are not always to be trusted.\u201d For two reasons the\nMutakallemim find fault with the perception of the senses. First, the\nsenses are precluded from perceiving many objects, either on account of\nthe smallness of the objects\u2014this is the case with the atoms, as we\nhave already stated\u2014or on account of the remoteness of the objects from\nthe person who desires to perceive them; e.g., we cannot see, hear, or\nsmell at a distance of many miles; nor do we perceive the motion of the\nheavens. Secondly, the senses misapprehend the objects of their\nperception: a large object appears small from a distance; a small\nobject immersed in water appears larger; a crooked thing appears\nstraight when partly placed in water, and partly out of it; things\nappear yellow to a person suffering from jaundice; sweet things are\nbitter to him whose tongue has imbibed red gall; and they mention many\nother things of this kind. Therefore they say, we cannot trust our\nsenses so far as to establish any proof on their perceptions. You must\nnot believe that the Mutakallemim had no purpose in agreeing upon this\nproposition, or as most of the later adherents of that school affirm,\nthat the first Mutakallemim had no ulterior object in endeavouring to\nprove the existence of atoms. On the contrary, every proposition here\nmentioned is indispensable; if one of these be rejected, the whole\ntheory falls to the ground. The last-mentioned proposition is of\nparticular importance; for when our senses perceive things by which any\nof the foregoing propositions are confuted, the Mutakallemim say that\nno notice should be taken of the perception of the senses so long as\nthe proposition is supported by the testimony of the intellect, and\nestablished (as they believe) by proof. Thus they say that the\ncontinuous motion is interrupted by moments of rest; that the millstone\nin its motion is broken into atoms; that the white colour of a garment\nceases to exist, and another whiteness comes in its stead. All these\ntheories are contrary to what the eye perceives, and many inferences\nare drawn from the assumed existence of a vacuum, all of which are\ncontradicted by the senses. The Mutakallemim, however, meet these\nobjections by saying, whenever they can do so, that the perception of\nthese things is withheld from the senses; in other instances they\nmaintain that the contradiction has its source in the deceptive\ncharacter of the senses. You know that this theory is very ancient, and\nwas the pride of the sophists, who asserted that they themselves were\nits authors; this is stated by Galenus in his treatise on natural\nforces; and you know well what he says of those who will not admit the\nevidence of the senses.\n\nHaving discussed these propositions, I now proceed to explain the\ntheory of the Mutakallemim concerning the above-mentioned four\nproblems.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXIV\n\n\nIn this chapter will be given an outline of the proofs by which the\nMutakallemim attempt to demonstrate that the universe is not eternal.\nYou must of course not expect that I shall quote their lengthy\narguments verbatim; I only intend to give an abstract of each proof, to\nshow in what way it helps to establish the theory of the creatio ex\nnihilo or to confute the eternity of the universe, and briefly to\nnotice the propositions they employed in support of their theory. If\nyou were to read their well-known and voluminous writings, you would\nnot discover any arguments with which they support their view left\nunnoticed in the present outline, but you might find there greater\ncopiousness of words combined with more grace and elegance of style;\nfrequently they employ rhyme, rhythm, and poetical diction, and\nsometimes mysterious phrases which perhaps are intended to startle\npersons listening to their discourses, and to deter those who might\notherwise criticize them. You would also find many repetitions;\nquestions propounded and, as they believe, answered, and frequent\nattacks on those who differ from their opinions.\n\n\nThe First Argument.\n\nSome of the Mutakallemim thought that by proving the creation of one\nthing, they demonstrated the creatio ex nihilo in reference to the\nentire universe. E.g., Zaid, who from a small molecule had gradually\nbeen brought to a state of perfection, has undoubtedly not effected\nthis change and development by his own efforts, but owes it to an\nexternal agency. It is therefore clear that an agent is required for\nsuch organization and successive transmutation. A palm-tree or any\nother object might equally be selected to illustrate this idea. The\nwhole universe, they argue, is analogous to these instances. Thus you\nsee how they believe that a law discovered in one thing may equally be\napplied to everything.\n\n\nThe Second Argument.\n\nThis argument is likewise based on the belief that the proof by which\nthe creation of one thing is demonstrated, holds good for the creatio\nex nihilo in reference to the whole universe. E.g., a certain\nindividual, called Zaid, who one time was not yet in existence,\nsubsequently came into existence; and if it be assumed that Amr, his\nfather, was the cause of his existence, Amr himself must likewise have\npassed from non-existence into existence; suppose then that Zaid\u2019s\nfather unquestionably owed his origin to Khaled, Zaid\u2019s grandfather, it\nwould be found that Khaled himself did not exist from eternity, and the\nseries of causes could thus be carried back to infinity. But such an\ninfinite series of beings is inadmissible according to the theory of\nthe Mutakallemim, as we have shown in our discussion of the eleventh\nproposition. In continuing this species of reasoning, you come to a\nfirst man, who had no parent, viz. Adam. Then you will of course ask,\nwhence came this first man? If, e.g., the reply be given that he was\nmade out of earth, you will again inquire, \u201cWhence came that earth?\u201d\n\u201cOut of water.\u201d \u201cWhence came the water?\u201d The inquiry would be carried\non, either ad infinitum, which is absurd, or until you meet with a\nsomething that came into existence from absolute non-existence; in this\nlatter case you would arrive at the real truth; here the series of\ninquiries ends. This result of the question proves, according to the\nopinion of the Mutakallemim, that the whole universe came into\nexistence from absolute non-existence.\n\n\nThe Third Argument.\n\nThe atoms of things are necessarily either joined together or separate,\nand even the same atoms may at one time be united at another disunited.\nIt is therefore evident that the nature of the atoms does not\nnecessitate either their combination or their separation; for if they\nwere separate by virtue of their nature they would never join, and if\nthey were joined by virtue of their nature, they could never again be\nseparated. Thus there is no reason why atoms should rather be combined\nthan separate, or vice vers\u00e2, why rather in a state of separation than\nof combination. Seeing that some atoms are joined, others separate, and\nagain others subject to change, they being combined at one time and\nseparated at another, the fact may therefore be taken as a proof that\nthe atoms cannot combine or separate without an agent. This argument,\naccording to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, establishes the theory\nthat the universe has been created from nothing. You have already been\ntold, that those who employ this argument rely on the first proposition\nof the Mutakallemim with its corollaries.\n\n\nThe Fourth Argument.\n\nThe whole Universe is composed of substance and accidents; every\nsubstance must possess one accident or more, and since the accidents\nare not eternal, the substance, the substratum of the accidents, cannot\nbe eternal; for that which is joined to transient things and cannot\nexist without them is itself transient. Therefore the whole Universe\nhas had a beginning. To the objection, that the substance may possibly\nbe eternal while the accidents, though in themselves transient, succeed\neach other in an infinite series, they reply that, in this case, an\ninfinite number of transient things would be in existence, an\neventuality which, according to their theory, is impossible. This\nargument is considered by them the best and safest, and has been\naccepted by many of them as a strict proof. Its acceptance implies the\nadmission of the following three propositions, the object of which is\nwell understood by philosophers. (1) An infinite series of things, of\nwhich the one succeeds when the other has ceased to exist, is\nimpossible. (2) All accidents have a beginning.\u2014Our opponent, who\ndefends the theory of the eternity of the universe, can refute this\nproposition by pointing to one particular accident, namely to the\ncircular motion of the sphere; for it is held by Aristotle that this\ncircular motion is eternal, and, therefore, the spheres which perform\nthis motion are, according to his opinion, likewise eternal. It is of\nno use to prove that all other accidents have a beginning; for our\nopponent does not deny this; he says that accidents may supervene an\nobject which has existed from eternity, and may follow each other in\nrotation. He contents himself with maintaining that this particular\naccident, viz., circular motion, the motion of the heavenly sphere, is\neternal, and does not belong to the class of transient accidents. It is\ntherefore necessary to examine this accident by itself, and to prove\nthat it is not eternal. (3) The next proposition which the author of\nthis argument accepts is as follows: Every material object consists of\nsubstance and accidents, that is to say, of atoms and accidents in the\nsense in which the Mutakallemim use the term. But if a material object\nwere held to be a combination of matter and form, as has been proved by\nour opponent, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the primal\nmatter and the primal form are transient, and only then the proof of\nthe creatio ex nihilo would be complete.\n\n\nThe Fifth Argument.\n\nThis argument is based on the theory of Determination, and is made much\nof by the Mutakallemim. It is the same as the theory which I explained\nin discussing the tenth proposition. Namely, when they treat either of\nthe Universe in general, or of any of its parts, they assume that it\ncan have such properties and such dimensions as it actually has; that\nit may receive such accidents as in reality are noticed in it, and that\nit may exist in such a place and at such a time as in fact is the case;\nbut it may be larger or smaller, may receive other properties and\naccidents, and come to existence at an earlier or a later period, or in\na different place. Consequently, the fact that a thing has been\ndetermined in its composition, size, place, accident and time\u2014a\nvariation in all these points being possible\u2014is a proof that a being\nexists which freely chooses and determines these divers relations; and\nthe circumstance that the Universe or a part of it requires a being\nable to make this selection, proves that the Universe has been created\nex nihilo. For there is no difference which of the following\nexpressions is used: to determine, to make, to create, to produce, to\noriginate, or to intend; these verbs have all one and the same meaning.\nThe Mutakallemim give a great many examples, both of a general and a\nspecial character. They say it is not more natural for earth to be\nunder water than to be above water; who then determined its actual\nposition? Or, is it more natural that the sun is round than that it\nshould be square or triangular; for all qualities have the same\nrelation to a body capable of possessing them. Who then determined one\nparticular quality? In a similar way they treat of every individual\nbeing; when, e.g., they notice flowers of different colours, they are\nunable to explain the phenomenon, and they take it as a strong proof in\nfavour of their theory; they say, \u201cBehold, the earth is everywhere\nalike, the water is alike; why then is this flower red and that one\nyellow?\u201d Some being must have determined the colour of each, and that\nbeing is God. A being must therefore exist which determines everything,\nboth as regards the Universe generally, and each of its parts\nindividually. All this is the logical consequence of the tenth\nproposition. The theory of determination is moreover adopted by some of\nthose who assume the eternity of the Universe, as will be explained\nbelow. In conclusion, I consider this to be the best argument; and in\nanother part I shall more fully acquaint you with the opinion I have\nformed concerning the theory of Determination.\n\n\nThe Sixth Argument.\n\nOne of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he had found a very good\nargument, much better than any advanced hitherto, namely, the argument\nbased on the triumph of existence over non-existence. He says that,\naccording to the common belief, the existence of the Universe is merely\npossible; for if it were necessary, the Universe would be God\u2014but he\nseems to forget that we are at issue with those who, whilst they\nbelieve in the existence of God, admit at the same time the eternity of\nthe Universe.\u2014The expression \u201cA thing is possible\u201d denotes that the\nthing may either be in existence or not in existence, and that there is\nnot more reason why it should exist than why it should not exist. The\nfact that a thing, the existence of which is possible, actually does\nexist\u2014although it bears the same relation to the state of existence as\nto that of non-existence\u2014proves that there is a Being which gave the\npreference to existence over non-existence. This argument is very\nforcible; it is a modified form of the foregoing argument which is\nbased on the theory of determination. He only chose the term\n\u201cpreference\u201d instead of \u201cdetermination,\u201d and instead of applying it to\nthe properties of the existing being he applies it to \u201cthe existence of\nthe being itself.\u201d He either had the intention to mislead, or he\nmisunderstood the proposition, that the existence of the Universe is\npossible. Our opponent who assumes the eternity of the Universe,\nemploys the term \u201cpossible,\u201d and says, \u201cthe existence of the Universe\nis possible\u201d in a sense different from that in which the Mutakallem\napplies it, as will be explained below. Moreover it may be doubted\nwhether the conclusion, that the Universe owes its origin to a being\nwhich is able to give preference to existence over non-existence, is\ncorrect. For we may apply the terms \u201cpreference\u201d and \u201cdetermination\u201d to\nanything capable of receiving either of two properties which are\ncontrary or opposed to each other; and when we find that the thing\nactually possesses one property and not the other, we are convinced\nthat there exists a determining agent. E.g., you say that a piece of\ncopper could just as well be formed into a kettle as into a lamp; when\nwe find that it is a lamp or a kettle, we have no doubt that a deciding\nand determining agent had advisedly chosen one of the two possible\nforms; for it is clear that the substance of copper existed, and that\nbefore the determination took place it had neither of the two possible\nforms which have just been mentioned. When, however, it is the question\nwhether a certain existing object is eternal, or whether it has passed\nfrom non-existence into existence, this argument is inadmissible; for\nit cannot be asked who decided in favour of the existence of a thing,\nand rejected its non-existence, except when it has been admitted that\nit has passed from non-existence into existence; in the present case\nthis is just the point under discussion. If we were to take the\nexistence and the non-existence of a thing as mere objects of\nimagination, we should have to apply the tenth proposition which gives\nprominence to imagination and fiction, and ignores the things which\nexist in reality, or are conceived by the intellect. Our opponent,\nhowever, who believes in the eternity of the Universe, will show that\nwe can imagine the non-existence of the universe as well as we can\nimagine any other impossibility. It is not my intention to refute their\ndoctrine of the creatio ex nihilo: I only wish to show the\nincorrectness of their belief that this argument differs from the one\nwhich precedes; since in fact the two arguments are identical, and are\nfounded on the well-known principle of determination.\n\n\nThe Seventh Argument.\n\nOne of the modern Mutakallemim says that he is able to prove the\ncreation of the Universe from the theory put forth by the philosophers\nconcerning the immortality of the soul. He argues thus: If the world\nwere eternal the number of the dead would necessarily be infinite, and\nconsequently an infinite number of souls would coexist, but it has long\nsince been shown that the coexistence of an infinite number of things\nis positively impossible. This is indeed a strange argument! One\ndifficulty is explained by another which is still greater! Here the\nsaying, well known among the Arameans, may be applied: \u201cYour guarantee\nwants himself a guarantee.\u201d He rests his argument on the immortality of\nthe soul, as though he understood this immortality, in what respect the\nsoul is immortal, or what the thing is which is immortal! If, however,\nhe only meant to controvert the opinion of his opponent, who believed\nin the eternity of the Universe, and also in the immortality of the\nsoul, he accomplished his task, provided the opponent admitted the\ncorrectness of the idea which that Mutakallem formed of the\nphilosopher\u2019s view on the immortality of the soul. Some of the later\nphilosophers explained this difficulty as follows: the immortal souls\nare not substances which occupy a locality or a space, and their\nexistence in an infinite number is therefore not impossible. You must\nbear in mind that those abstract beings which are neither bodies nor\nforces dwelling in bodies, and which in fact are ideals\u2014are altogether\nincapable of being represented as a plurality unless some ideals be the\ncause of the existence of others, and can be distinguished from each\nother by the specific difference that some are the efficient cause and\nothers the effect; but that which remains of Zaid [after his death] is\nneither the cause nor the effect of that which is left of Amr, and\ntherefore the souls of all the departed form only one being as has been\nexplained by Ibn Bekr Ibn Al-zaig, and others who ventured to speak on\nthese profound subjects. In short, such intricate disciplines, which\nour mind can scarcely comprehend, cannot furnish any principles for the\nexplanation of other subjects.\u2014It should be noted that whoever\nendeavours to prove or to disprove the eternity of the Universe by\nthese arguments of the Mutakallemim, must necessarily rely on one of\nthe two following propositions, or on both of them; namely on the tenth\nproposition, according to which the actual form of a thing is merely\none of many equally possible forms, and which implies that there must\nbe a being capable of making the special selection; or on the eleventh\nproposition which rejects the existence of an infinite series of things\ncoming successively into existence. The last-named proposition is\ndemonstrated in various ways, e.g., they advert to a class of transient\nindividuals, and to a certain particular date. From the theory which\nasserts the eternity of the Universe, it would follow that the\nindividuals of that class up to that particular date are infinite in\nnumber; a thousand years later the individuals of that class are\nlikewise infinite in number; the last number must exceed the previous\none by the number of the individuals born in those thousand years, and\nconsequently one infinite number would be larger than another. The same\nargument is applied to the revolutions of the heavenly sphere, and in\nlike manner it is shown that one infinite number of revolutions would\nbe larger than another; the same result is obtained when revolutions of\none sphere are compared with those of another moving more slowly; the\nrevolutions of both spheres [though unequal] would be infinite in\nnumber. Similarly they proceed with all those accidents which are\nsubject to destruction and production; the individual accidents that\nhave passed into non-existence are counted and represented as though\nthey were still in existence, and as though they were things with a\ndefinite beginning; this imaginary number is then either increased or\nreduced. Yet all these things have no reality and are mere fictions.\nAbunazar Alfarabi in criticizing this proposition, has exposed all its\nweak points, as you will clearly perceive, when you study his book on\nthe changeable beings earnestly and dispassionately. These are the\nprincipal arguments of the Mutakallemim in seeking to establish the\ncreatio ex nihilo. Having thus proved that the Universe is not eternal,\nthey necessarily infer that there is an Agens who created it in\naccordance with His intention, desire and will. They then proceed to\nprove the unity of that Agens as I am going to point out in the next\nchapter.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXV\n\n\nIn this chapter I shall explain to you how the Mutakallemim prove the\nUnity of God. They contend that the Maker and Creator of the Universe,\nthe existence of whom is testified by all nature, is One. Two\npropositions are employed by them in demonstrating the Unity of God,\nviz., two deities or more would neutralize each other, and if several\ndeities existed they would be distinguished from each other by a\nspecific difference.\n\n\nFirst Argument.\n\nThe first argument is that of mutual neutralization, and is employed by\nthe majority of the Mutakallemim. It is to the following effect:\u2014If the\nUniverse had two Gods, it would necessarily occur that the atom\u2014subject\nto a combination with one or two opposite qualities\u2014either remained\nwithout either of them, and that is impossible, or, though being only\none atom, included both qualities at the same time, and that is\nlikewise impossible. E.g., whilst one of the two deities determined\nthat one atom or more should be warm, the other deity might determine\nthat the same should be cold; the consequence of the mutual\nneutralization of the two divine beings would thus be that the atoms\nwould be neither warm nor cold\u2014a contingency which is impossible,\nbecause all bodies must combine with one of two opposites; or they\nwould be at the same time both warm and cold. Similarly, it might occur\nthat whilst one of the deities desired that a body be in motion, the\nother might desire that it be at rest; the body would then be either\nwithout motion and rest, or would both move and rest at the same time.\nProofs of this kind are founded on the atomic theory contained in the\nfirst proposition of the Mutakallemim, on the proposition which refers\nto the creation of the accidents, and on the proposition that negatives\nare properties of actual existence and require for their production an\nagens. For if it were assumed that the substance of this world which,\naccording to the philosophers is subject to successive production and\ndestruction, is different from the substance of the world above, viz.,\nfrom the substance of the spheres\u2014a fact established by proof\u2014and that\nas the Dualists assert, there are two divine beings, one of whom rules\nthis world without influencing the spheres, whilst the other governs\nthe world above without interfering with this world\u2014such theory would\nnot involve the mutual neutralization of the two deities. If it were\nthen objected, that the existence of two deities would necessitate an\nimperfection in both of them, in so far as one deity would be unable to\ninfluence the province of the other, the objection would be met by the\nreply that this inability need not be considered a defect in either of\nthem; for that which is not included within the sphere of action of a\nbeing can of course not be performed by that being, and an agens is not\ndeficient in power, if it is unable to perform what is intrinsically\nimpossible. Thus we, Monotheists, do not consider it a defect in God,\nthat He does not combine two opposites in one object, nor do we test\nHis omnipotence by the accomplishment of any similar impossibility.\nWhen the Mutakallemim noticed the weakness of their argument, for which\nthey had some apparent support, they had recourse to another argument.\n\n\nSecond Argument.\n\nIf there were two Gods, there would necessarily be some element common\nto both, whilst some element present in the one would be absent in the\nother, and constitute the specific difference between them. This is a\nphilosophic and sound argument for those who are able to examine it,\nand to obtain a clear insight into its premises, which will be further\nexplained, in our exposition of the view of the philosophers on this\npoint. But it cannot be accepted by those who admit the existence of\ndivine attributes. For according to their opinion, the Primal Cause\nincludes many different elements. They represent its wisdom and its\nomnipotence as two different things, and again the omnipotence as\ndifferent from the will. Consequently it would not be impossible that\neither of the two divine beings possessed several properties, some of\nwhich would be common to both, and some peculiar to only one of them.\n\n\nThird Argument.\n\nThis argument is likewise based on one of the Propositions of the\nKal\u00e2m. For some of the Mutakallemim belonging to the old school assume,\nthat when the Creator wills a thing, the will is not an element\nsuperadded to the essence of God: it is a will without a substratum. In\naccordance with the propositions which we have mentioned, and of which,\nas you will see, it is difficult to form a true conception, they say\nthat one will, which is independent of any substratum, cannot be\nascribed to two beings; for, as they assert, one cause cannot be the\nsource of two laws for two essences. This is, as I told you, the method\nof explaining one difficulty by means of another and still greater\ndifficulty. For as they define the Will, it is inconceivable, and some\nhave, therefore, considered it to be a mere non-entity; others who\nadmit its existence, meet with many insuperable difficulties. The\nMutakallemim, nevertheless, establish on its existence one of the\nproofs for the unity of God.\n\n\nFourth Argument.\n\nThe existence of an action is necessarily positive evidence of the\nexistence of an agens, but does not prove the existence of more than\none agens. There is no difference whether the existence of one God be\nassumed or the existence of two, or three, or twenty, or any number.\nThis is plain and clear. But the argument does not seem to prove the\nnon-existence of a multitude of deities; it only shows that their\nnumber is unknown; the deity may be one sole being, but may also\ninclude several divine beings. The following supplemental argument has\ntherefore been advanced: possibility is inapplicable to the existence\nof God, which is absolute; the possibility of the existence of more\nthan one God must therefore be denied. This is the whole essence of the\nproof, and its fallacy is self-evident; for although the notion of\npossibility cannot be applied to the existence of God, it can be\napplied to our knowledge of God: for an alternative in our knowledge of\na thing does not involve an alternative in the actual existence of the\nthing, and perhaps there is neither a tripartite deity as the\nChristians believe, nor an undivided Unity as we believe. This is clear\nto those who have been taught to notice the conclusions implied in\ngiven premises.\n\n\nFifth Argument.\n\nOne of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he found a proof of the\nUnity of God in the idea of requisiteness. Suppose there were two\ndivine beings; if one of them were able to create the universe, the\nsecond God would be superfluous, and there would be no need for his\nexistence. If, on the other hand, the entire universe could not be\ncreated or governed except by both of them, each of them would be\nimperfect in so far as he would require the co-operation of another\nbeing, and would thus be limited in power. This argument is, in fact,\nonly a variation of \u201cthe mutual neutralization of two deities.\u201d There\nis this difficulty in such proofs, that a certain degree of\nimperfection is ascribed to a Being which does not accomplish tasks\nbeyond its sphere. We do not call a person weak because he cannot move\na thousand hundredweights, and we do not say that God is imperfect\nbecause He cannot transform Himself into a body, or cannot create\nanother being like Himself, or make a square whose diagonal should be\nequal to one of its sides. In the same manner we should not consider it\nan imperfection in God, if He were not the only Creator, and if it were\nabsolutely necessary that there should be two Creators; not because the\none God required the assistance of the other, but because the existence\nof both of them was equally necessary, and because it was impossible\nthat it should be otherwise. Further we do not say that the Almighty is\nimperfect, because He does not, according to the opinion of the\nMutakallemim, produce a body otherwise than by the creation of atoms,\nand by their combination with accidents created in them. That inability\nis not called want or imperfection, since another process is\nimpossible. In like manner the Dualist might say, that it is impossible\nfor one Being to act alone, and that this circumstance constitutes no\nimperfection in either of the Deities, because the absolute existence\nof one Deity necessitates the co-existence of the other. Some of the\nMutakallemim, weary of these arguments, declared that the Unity of God\nis a doctrine which must be received as a matter of faith, but most of\nthem rejected this theory, and reviled its authors. I, however, hold,\nthat those who accept this theory are right-minded, and shrink from\nadmitting an erroneous opinion; when they do not perceive any cogency\nin the arguments, and find that the proofs advanced in favour of the\ndoctrine are inconclusive, they prefer to assume that it could only be\nreceived as a matter of faith. For the Mutakallemim do not hold that\nthe Universe has any defined properties on which a true proof could be\nfounded, or that man\u2019s intellect is endowed with any such faculty as\nwould enable him to form correct conclusions. It is, however, not\nwithout a motive that they defend this theory; they wish to assume such\na form of the Universe, as could be employed to support a doctrine for\nwhich otherwise no proof could be found, and would lead us to neglect\nthe investigation of that which in fact can be proved. We can only\nappeal to the Almighty and to those intelligent persons who confess\ntheir error when they discover it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXVI\n\n\nThe reasonings and arguments of the Mutakallemim to demonstrate the\nIncorporeality of God are very weak, and indeed inferior to their\narguments for the Unity of God. They treat the doctrine of the\nIncorporeality of God as if it were the logical sequence of the theory\nof His Unity, and they say that the attribute \u201cone\u201d cannot be applied\nto a corporeal object. Those who maintain that God is incorporeal\nbecause a corporeal object consists of substance and form\u2014a combination\nknown to be impossible in the Divine Being, are not in my opinion\nMutakallemim, and such an argument is not founded on the propositions\nof the Kal\u00e2m; on the contrary, it is a logical proof based on the\ntheory of substance and form, and on a right conception of their\nproperties. It has the character of a philosophical argument, and I\nshall fully explain it when treating of the arguments of the\nphilosophers. Here we only propose to discuss the arguments by which\nthe Mutakallemim desire to prove the Incorporeality of God in\naccordance with their propositions and the method of their reasoning.\n\n\nFirst Argument.\n\nIf God were corporeal, His true essence would necessarily either exist\nentirely in every part of the body, that is to say, in each of its\natoms, or would be confined to one of the atoms. In the latter\nalternative the other atoms would be superfluous, and the existence of\nthe corporeal being [with the exception of the one atom] would be of no\npurpose. If, on the other hand, each atom fully represented the Divine\nBeing, the whole body would not be one deity, but a complex of deities,\nand this would be contrary to the doctrine adopted by the Kal\u0101m that\nGod is one. An examination of this argument shows that it is based on\nthe first and fifth propositions. But there is room for the following\nobjection: \u201cGod does not consist of atoms, that is to say, He is not,\nas you assert, composed of a number of elements created by Himself, but\nis one continuous body, and indivisible except in man\u2019s imagination,\nwhich affords no test; for in man\u2019s imagination the substance of the\nheavens may be torn or rent asunder. The philosopher holds that such a\npossibility results from assuming a similarity and an analogy between\nthe visible, i.e., the bodies which exist among us, and the invisible.\u201d\n\n\nSecond Argument.\n\nThis argument, they believe, is of great importance. Its main support\nis the impossibility of comparison, i.e., the belief that God cannot be\ncompared to any of His creatures; and that He would be comparable to\nother corporeal objects if He were corporeal. They put great stress on\nthis argument, and say as follows: \u201cIf it were asserted that God is\ncorporeal, but that His substance is not like that of other corporeal\nbeings, it would be self-contradictory; for all bodies are alike as\nregards their substance, and are distinguished from each other by other\nthings, viz., the accidents.\u201d They also argue that if God were\ncorporeal it would follow that He has created another being like\nHimself. This argument is refuted in two ways. First, the objector does\nnot admit the impossibility of comparison; he asks how it could be\nproved that God cannot be compared to any of His creatures. No doubt\nthat, in support of their view, that a comparison between the Almighty\nand any other being is inadmissible, they would have to cite the words\nof the Prophets, and thus accept this doctrine by the authority of\ntradition, not by the authority of reason. The argument that God, if\ncomparable to any of His creatures, would be found to have created\nbeings like Himself, is refuted by the objector in the following way:\n\u201cThe created things are not like Him in every respect; for I do not\ndeny that God has many properties and peculiarities.\u201d For he who admits\nthe corporeality of God does not deny the existence of properties in\nthe divine Being. Another and more forcible argument is this: All who\nhave studied philosophy, and have made themselves thoroughly acquainted\nwith philosophical theories, assume as demonstrated facts, first that\nthe term substance, when applied to the spheres above and to, the\ncorporeal objects here on earth is a perfect homonym, for the substance\nof the one is not the substance of the other; and secondly that the\nforms of the things on this earth are different from the forms of the\nspheres; the terms substance and form when applied both to things below\nand to the spheres above are homonyms; although there is no doubt that\nthe spheres have [like the things below, three] dimensions, they are\ncorporeal because they consist of substance and form, not because they\nhave dimensions. If this explanation is admitted with reference to the\nspheres, how much more is he who believes that God is corporeal\njustified in saying that God is a corporeal being which has dimensions,\nbut which in its substance, its true nature and properties is very\ndifferent from all created bodies, and that the term \u201csubstance\u201d is\napplied to Him and to His creatures homonymously, in the same manner as\nthe true believers, who have a correct conception of the divine idea,\napply the term \u201cexistence\u201d homonymously to Him and to His creatures.\nThe Corporealists do not admit that all bodies consist of similar\natoms; they believe that God created all things, and that these differ\nfrom each other both in their substances and in their constituent\nproperties; and just as the substance of dung differs from the\nsubstance of the sun, so does, according to this theory, the substance\nof the spheres and the stars differ from the substance of the created\nlight, i.e., the Divine Glory (Shechinah), and again the substance of\nthe Divine Glory, or the pillar of cloud created [for the purpose],\ndiffer from the substance of the Most High; for the substance of the\nlatter is sublime, perfect, simple, constant and immutable. His\nabsolute existence remains always the same, and He creates all things\naccording to His will and desire. How could this argument, though it be\nweak, be refuted by these strange methods of the Mutakallemim, which I\npointed out to you?\n\n\nThird Argument.\n\nIf God were corporeal, He would be finite, and so far this argument is\ncorrect; if He were finite, He would have certain dimensions and a\ncertain form; this is also a correct conclusion. But they continue\nthus: Attribute to God any magnitude or form whatever: He might be\neither larger or smaller, and might also have a different form. The\nfact that He has one special magnitude and one special form presupposes\nthe existence of a determining agens. I have heard that they attach\ngreat importance to this argument, but in truth it is the weakest of\nall the arguments mentioned above. It is founded on the tenth\nproposition, the feebleness of which in ignoring the actual properties\nof things, we have clearly shown in regard to ordinary beings and must\nbe much more evident in regard to the Creator. There is no difference\nbetween this argument and their assertion that the fact of the\nexistence of the Universe having been preferred to its non-existence\nproves the existence of an agens that preferred the existence of the\nUniverse to its non-existence at a time when both were equally\npossible. If it were asked why this argument should not be applied to\nGod\u2014viz., that His mere existence proved the existence of an agens\nwhich determined His existence and rejected His non-existence\u2014they\nwould undoubtedly answer that this admission would only lead to a\nrepetition of the same argument until at length a being be found whose\nexistence is not merely potential but necessary, and which does not\nrequire a causa efficiens. But this same answer can also be applied to\ndimensions and to form. It can only be said in reference to all other\nforms and magnitudes, the existence of which is possible, that is to\nsay which came into existence after a state of non-existence, that they\nmight have been larger or smaller than they actually are, or that they\nmight have had a form different from that which they actually possess,\nand require for this reason some determining agens. But the forms and\ndimensions of God (who is above all imperfection and similitude)! did\nnot come into existence according to the opinion of the Corporealist\nafter a state of non-existence, and therefore no determining agens was\nnecessary; His substance with its dimensions and forms has a necessary\nexistence; no agens was required to decide upon His existence, and to\nreject His non-existence, since non-existence is altogether\ninadmissible in God. In like manner there was no force required to\ndetermine His magnitude and form, they were absolutely inseparable from\nHis existence.\n\nIf you wish to go in search of truth, to cast aside your passions, your\ntradition, and your fondness of things you have been accustomed to\ncherish, if you wish to guard yourself against error: then consider the\nfate of these speculators and the result of their labours; observe how\nthey rushed, as it were, from the ashes into the fire. They denied the\nnature of the existing things, misrepresented the properties of heaven\nand earth, and thought that they were able, by their propositions, to\nprove the creation of the world, but in fact they were far from proving\nthe creatio ex nihilo, and have weakened the arguments for the\nexistence, the unity, and the incorporeality of God. The proofs of all\nthese doctrines must be based on the well-known nature of the existing\nthings, as perceived by the senses and the intellect.\n\nHaving thus discussed the arguments of the Mutakallemim, we shall now\nproceed to consider the propositions of the philosophers and their\narguments for the existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality,\nand we shall for the present assume the Eternity of the Universe\nwithout finally accepting it. Next to this we shall develop our own\nmethod, which is the result of deep study, in demonstrating these three\nprinciples, and we shall then examine the theory of the Eternity of the\nUniverse as assumed by the philosophers.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nTwenty-five of the propositions which are employed in the proof for the\nexistence of God, or in the arguments demonstrating that God is neither\ncorporeal nor a force connected with a material being, or that He is\nOne, have been fully established, and their correctness is beyond\ndoubt. Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him have proved each\nof these propositions. There is, however, one proposition which we do\nnot accept\u2014namely, the proposition which affirms the Eternity of the\nUniverse, but we will admit it for the present, because by doing so we\nshall be enabled dearly to demonstrate our own theory.\n\n\nProposition I.\n\nThe existence of an infinite magnitude is impossible.\n\n\nProposition II.\n\nThe co-existence of an infinite number of finite magnitudes is\nimpossible.\n\n\nProposition III.\n\nThe existence of an infinite number of causes and effects is\nimpossible, even if these were not magnitudes; if, e.g., one\nIntelligence were the cause of a second, the second the cause of a\nthird, the third the cause of a fourth, and so on, the series could not\nbe continued ad infinitum.\n\n\nProposition IV.\n\nFour categories are subject to change:\u2014\n\n(a.) Substance.\u2014Changes which affect the substance of a thing are\ncalled genesis and destruction.\n\n(b.) Quantity.\u2014Changes in reference to quantity are increase and\ndecrease.\n\n(c.) Quality.\u2014Changes in the qualities of things are transformations.\n\n(d.) Place.\u2014Change of place is called motion.\n\nThe term \u201cmotion\u201d is properly applied to change of place, but is also\nused in a general sense of all kinds of changes.\n\n\nProposition V.\n\nMotion implies change and transition from potentiality to actuality.\n\n\nProposition VI.\n\nThe motion of a thing is either essential or accidental; or it is due\nto an external force, or to the participation of the thing in the\nmotion of another thing. This latter kind of motion is similar to the\naccidental one. An instance of essential motion may be found in the\ntranslation of a thing from one place to another. The accident of a\nthing, as, e.g., its black colour, is said to move when the thing\nitself changes its place. The upward motion of a stone, owing to a\nforce applied to it in that direction, is an instance of a motion due\nto an external force. The motion of a nail in a boat may serve to\nillustrate motion due to the participation of a thing in the motion of\nanother thing; for when the boat moves, the nail is said to move\nlikewise. The same is the case with everything composed of several\nparts: when the thing itself moves, every part of it is likewise said\nto move.\n\n\nProposition VII.\n\nThings which are changeable are, at the same time, divisible. Hence\neverything that moves is divisible, and consequently corporeal; but\nthat which is indivisible cannot move, and cannot therefore be\ncorporeal.\n\n\nProposition VIII.\n\nA thing that moves accidentally must come to rest, because it does not\nmove of its own accord; hence accidental motion cannot continue for\never.\n\n\nProposition IX.\n\nA corporeal thing that sets another corporeal thing in motion can only\neffect this by setting itself in motion at the time it causes the other\nthing to move.\n\n\nProposition X.\n\nA thing which is said to be contained in a corporeal object must\nsatisfy either of the two following conditions: it either exists\nthrough that object, as is the case with accidents, or it is the cause\nof the existence of that object; such is, e.g., its essential property.\nIn both cases it is a force existing in a corporeal object.\n\n\nProposition XI.\n\nAmong the things which exist through a material object, there are some\nwhich participate in the division of that object, and are therefore\naccidentally divisible, as, e.g., its colour, and all other qualities\nthat spread throughout its parts. On the other hand, among the things\nwhich form the essential elements of an object, there are some which\ncannot be divided in any way, as, e.g., the soul and the intellect.\n\n\nProposition XII.\n\nA force which occupies all parts of a corporeal object is finite, that\nobject itself being finite.\n\n\nProposition XIII.\n\nNone of the several kinds of change can be continuous, except motion\nfrom place to place, provided it be circular.\n\n\nProposition XIV.\n\nLocomotion is in the natural order of the several kinds of motion the\nfirst and foremost. For genesis and corruption are preceded by\ntransformation, which, in its turn, is preceded by the approach of the\ntransforming agent to the object which is to be transformed. Also,\nincrease and decrease are impossible without previous genesis and\ncorruption.\n\n\nProposition XV.\n\nTime is an accident that is related and joined to motion in such a\nmanner that the one is never found without the other. Motion is only\npossible in time, and the idea of time cannot be conceived otherwise\nthan in connexion with motion; things which do not move have no\nrelation to time.\n\n\nProposition XVI.\n\nIncorporeal bodies can only be numbered when they are forces situated\nin a body; the several forces must then be counted together with\nsubstances or objects in which they exist. Hence purely spiritual\nbeings, which are neither corporeal nor forces situated in corporeal\nobjects, cannot be counted, except when considered as causes and\neffects.\n\n\nProposition XVII.\n\nWhen an object moves, there must be some agent that moves it, from\nwithout, as, e.g., in the case of a stone set in motion by the hand; or\nfrom within, e.g., when the body of a living being moves. Living beings\ninclude in themselves, at the same time, the moving agent and the thing\nmoved; when, therefore, a living being dies, and the moving agent, the\nsoul, has left the body, i.e., the thing moved, the body remains for\nsome time in the same condition as before, and yet cannot move in the\nmanner it has moved previously. The moving agent, when included in the\nthing moved, is hidden from, and imperceptible to, the senses. This\ncircumstance gave rise to the belief that the body of an animal moves\nwithout the aid of a moving agent. When we therefore affirm, concerning\na thing in motion, that it is its own moving agent, or, as is generally\nsaid, that it moves of its own accord, we mean to say that the force\nwhich really sets the body in motion exists in that body itself.\n\n\nProposition XVIII.\n\nEverything that passes over from a state of potentiality to that of\nactuality, is caused to do so by some external agent; because if that\nagent existed in the thing itself, and no obstacle prevented the\ntransition, the thing would never be in a state of potentiality, but\nalways in that of actuality. If, on the other hand, while the thing\nitself contained that agent, some obstacle existed, and at a certain\ntime that obstacle was removed, the same cause which removed the\nobstacle would undoubtedly be described as the cause of the transition\nfrom potentiality to actuality, [and not the force situated within the\nbody]. Note this.\n\n\nProposition XIX.\n\nA thing which owes its existence to certain causes has in itself merely\nthe possibility of existence; for only if these causes exist, the thing\nlikewise exists. It does not exist if the causes do not exist at all,\nor if they have ceased to exist, or if there has been a change in the\nrelation which implies the existence of that thing as a necessary\nconsequence of those causes.\n\n\nProposition XX.\n\nA thing which has in itself the necessity of existence cannot have for\nits existence any cause whatever.\n\n\nProposition XXI.\n\nA thing composed of two elements has necessarily their composition as\nthe cause of its present existence. Its existence is therefore not\nnecessitated by its own essence; it depends on the existence of its two\ncomponent parts and their combination.\n\n\nProposition XXII.\n\nMaterial objects are always composed of two elements [at least], and\nare without exception subject to accidents. The two component elements\nof all bodies are substance and form. The accidents attributed to\nmaterial objects are quantity, geometrical form, and position.\n\n\nProposition XXIII.\n\nEverything that exists potentially, and whose essence includes a\ncertain state of possibility, may at some time be without actual\nexistence.\n\n\nProposition XXIV.\n\nThat which is potentially a certain thing is necessarily material, for\nthe state of possibility is always connected with matter.\n\n\nProposition XXV.\n\nEach compound substance consists of matter and form, and requires an\nagent for its existence, viz., a force which sets the substance in\nmotion, and thereby enables it to receive a certain form. The force\nwhich thus prepares the substance of a certain individual being, is\ncalled the immediate motor.\n\nHere the necessity arises of investigating into the properties of\nmotion, the moving agent and the thing moved. But this has already been\nexplained sufficiently; and the opinion of Aristotle may be expressed\nin the following proposition: Matter does not move of its own accord\u2014an\nimportant proposition that led to the investigation of the Prime Motor\n(the first moving agent).\n\nOf these foregoing twenty-five propositions some may be verified by\nmeans of a little reflection and the application of a few propositions\ncapable of proof, or of axioms or theorems of almost the same force,\nsuch as have been explained by me. Others require many arguments and\npropositions, all of which, however, have been established by\nconclusive proofs partly in the Physics and its commentaries, and\npartly in the Metaphysics and its commentary. I have already stated\nthat in this work it is not my intention to copy the books of the\nphilosophers or to explain difficult problems, but simply to mention\nthose propositions which are closely connected with our subject, and\nwhich we want for our purpose.\n\nTo the above propositions one must be added which enunciates that the\nuniverse is eternal, and which is held by Aristotle to be true, and\neven more acceptable than any other theory. For the present we admit\nit, as a hypothesis, only for the purpose of demonstrating our theory.\nIt is the following proposition:\u2014\n\n\nProposition XXVI.\n\nTime and motion are eternal, constant, and in actual existence.\n\nIn accordance with this proposition, Aristotle is compelled to assume\nthat there exists actually a body with constant motion, viz., the fifth\nelement. He therefore says that the heavens are not subject to genesis\nor destruction, because motion cannot be generated nor destroyed. He\nalso holds that every motion must necessarily be preceded by another\nmotion, either of the same or of a different kind. The belief that the\nlocomotion of an animal is not preceded by another motion, is not true;\nfor the animal is caused to move, after it had been in rest, by the\nintention to obtain those very things which bring about that\nlocomotion. A change in its state of health, or some image, or some new\nidea can produce a desire to seek that which is conducive to its\nwelfare and to avoid that which is contrary. Each of these three causes\nsets the living being in motion, and each of them is produced by\nvarious kinds of motion. Aristotle likewise asserts that everything\nwhich is created must, before its actual creation, have existed in\npotenti\u00e2. By inferences drawn from this assertion he seeks to establish\nhis proposition, viz., The thing that moves is finite, and its path\nfinite; but it repeats the motion in its path an infinite number of\ntimes. This can only take place when the motion is circular, as has\nbeen stated in Proposition XIII. Hence follows also the existence of an\ninfinite number of things which do not co-exist but follow one after\nthe other.\n\nAristotle frequently attempts to establish this proposition; but I\nbelieve that he did not consider his proofs to be conclusive. It\nappeared to him to be the most probable and acceptable proposition. His\nfollowers, however, and the commentators of his books, contend that it\ncontains not only a probable but a demonstrative proof, and that it\nhas, in fact, been fully established. On the other hand, the\nMutakallemim try to prove that the proposition cannot be true, as,\naccording to their opinion, it is impossible to conceive how an\ninfinite number of things could even come into existence successively.\nThey assume this impossibility as an axiom. I, however, think that this\nproposition is admissible, but neither demonstrative, as the\ncommentators of Aristotle assert, nor, on the other hand, impossible,\nas the Mutakallemim say. We have no intention to explain here the\nproofs given by Aristotle, or to show our doubts concerning them, or to\nset forth our opinions on the creation of the universe. I here simply\ndesire to mention those propositions which we shall require for the\nproof of the three principles stated above. Having thus quoted and\nadmitted these propositions, I will now proceed to explain what may be\ninferred from them.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nAccording to Proposition XXV., a moving agent must exist which has\nmoved the substance of all existing transient things and enabled it to\nreceive Form. The cause of the motion of that agent is found in the\nexistence of another motor of the same or of a different class, the\nterm \u201cmotion,\u201d in a general sense, being common to four categories\n(Prop. IV.). This series of motions is not infinite (Prop. III.); we\nfind that it can only be continued till the motion of the fifth element\nis arrived at, and then it ends. The motion of the fifth element is the\nsource of every force that moves and prepares any substance on earth\nfor its combination with a certain form, and is connected with that\nforce by a chain of intermediate motions. The celestial sphere [or the\nfifth element] performs the act of locomotion which is the first of the\nseveral kinds of motion (Prop. XIV.), and all locomotion is found to be\nthe indirect effect of the motion of this sphere; e.g., a stone is set\nin motion by a stick, the stick by a man\u2019s hand, the hand by the\nsinews, the sinews by the muscles, the muscles by the nerves, the\nnerves by the natural heat of the body, and the heat of the body by its\nform. This is undoubtedly the immediate motive cause, but the action of\nthis immediate cause is due to a certain design, e.g., to bring a stone\ninto a hole by striking against it with a stick in order to prevent the\ndraught from coming through the crevice. The motion of the air that\ncauses the draught is the effect of the motion of the celestial sphere.\nSimilarly it may be shown that the ultimate cause of all genesis and\ndestruction can be traced to the motion of the sphere. But the motion\nof the sphere must likewise have been effected by an agent (Prop.\nXVII.) residing either without the sphere or within it; a third case\nbeing impossible. In the first case, if the motor is without the\nsphere, it must either be corporeal or incorporeal; if incorporeal, it\ncannot be said that the agent is without the sphere; it can only be\ndescribed as separate from it; because an incorporeal object can only\nbe said metaphorically to reside without a certain corporeal object. In\nthe second case, if the agent resides within the sphere, it must be\neither a force distributed throughout the whole sphere so that each\npart of the sphere includes a part of the force, as is the case with\nthe heat of fire; or it is an indivisible force, e.g., the soul and the\nintellect (Props. X. and XI.). The agent which sets the sphere in\nmotion must consequently be one of the following four things: a\ncorporeal object without the sphere; an incorporeal object separate\nfrom it; a force spread throughout the whole of the sphere; or an\nindivisible force [within the sphere].\n\nThe first case, viz., that the moving agent of the sphere is a\ncorporeal object without the sphere, is impossible, as will be\nexplained. Since the moving agent is corporeal, it must itself move\nwhile setting another object in motion (Prop. IX.), and as the sixth\nelement would likewise move when imparting motion to another body, it\nwould be set in motion by a seventh element, which must also move. An\ninfinite number of bodies would thus be required before the sphere\ncould be set in motion. This is contrary to Proposition II.\n\nThe third case, viz., that the moving object be a force distributed\nthroughout the whole body, is likewise impossible. For the sphere is\ncorporeal, and must therefore be finite (Prop. I.); also the force it\ncontains must be finite (Prop. XII.), since each part of the sphere\ncontains part of the force (Prop. XI.): the latter can consequently not\nproduce an infinite motion, such as we assumed according to Proposition\nXXVI., which we admitted for the present.\n\nThe fourth case is likewise impossible, viz., that the sphere is set in\nmotion by an indivisible force residing in the sphere in the same\nmanner as the soul resides in the body of man. For this force, though\nindivisible, could not be the cause of infinite motion by itself alone;\nbecause if that were the case the prime motor would have an accidental\nmotion (Prop. VI.). But things that move accidentally must come to rest\n(Prop. VIII.), and then the thing comes also to rest which is set in\nmotion. (The following may serve as a further illustration of the\nnature of accidental motion. When man is moved by the soul, i.e., by\nhis form, to go from the basement of the house to the upper storey, his\nbody moves directly, while the soul, the really efficient cause of that\nmotion, participates in it accidentally. For through the translation of\nthe body from the basement to the upper storey, the soul has likewise\nchanged its place, and when no fresh impulse for the motion of the body\nis given by the soul, the body which has been set in motion by such\nimpulse comes to rest, and the accidental motion of the soul is\ndiscontinued). Consequently the motion of that supposed first motor\nmust be due to some cause which does not form part of things composed\nof two elements, viz., a moving agent and an object moved; if such a\ncause is present the motor in that compound sets the other element in\nmotion; in the absence of such a cause no motion takes place. Living\nbeings do therefore not move continually, although each of them\npossesses an indivisible motive element; because this element is not\nconstantly in motion, as it would be if it produced motion of its own\naccord. On the contrary, the things to which the action is due are\nseparate from the motor. The action is caused either by desire for that\nwhich is agreeable, or by aversion from that which is disagreeable, or\nby some image, or by some ideal when the moving being has the capacity\nof conceiving it. When any of these causes are present then the motor\nacts; its motion is accidental, and must therefore come to an end\n(Prop. VIII.). If the motor of the sphere were of this kind the sphere\ncould not move ad infinitum. Our opponent, however, holds that the\nspheres move continually ad infinitum; if this were the case, and it is\nin fact possible (Prop. XIII.), the efficient cause of the motion of\nthe sphere must, according to the above division, be of the second\nkind, viz., something incorporeal and separate from the sphere.\n\nIt may thus be considered as proved that the efficient cause of the\nmotion of the sphere, if that motion be eternal, is neither itself\ncorporeal nor does it reside in a corporeal object; it must move\nneither of its own accord nor accidentally; it must be indivisible and\nunchangeable (Prop. VII. and Prop. V.). This Prime Motor of the sphere\nis God, praised be His name!\n\nThe hypothesis that there exist two Gods is inadmissible, because\nabsolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted (Prop. XVI.), except as\ncause and effect; the relation of time is not applicable to God (Prop.\nXV.), because motion cannot be predicated of Him.\n\nThe result of the above argument is consequently this: the sphere\ncannot move ad infinitum of its own accord; the Prime Motor is not\ncorporeal, nor a force residing within a body; it is One, unchangeable,\nand in its existence independent of time. Three of our postulates are\nthus proved by the principal philosophers.\n\nThe philosophers employ besides another argument, based on the\nfollowing proposition of Aristotle. If there be a thing composed of two\nelements, and the one of them is known to exist also by itself, apart\nfrom that thing, then the other element is likewise found in existence\nby itself separate from that compound. For if the nature of the two\nelements were such that they could only exist together\u2014as, e.g., matter\nand form\u2014then neither of them could in any way exist separate from the\nother. The fact that the one component is found also in a separate\nexistence proves that the two elements are not indissolubly connected,\nand that the same must therefore be the case with the other component.\nThus we infer from the existence of honey-vinegar and of honey by\nitself, that there exists also vinegar by itself. After having\nexplained this Proposition Aristotle continues thus: We notice many\nobjects consisting of a motor and a motum, i.e., objects which set\nother things in motion, and whilst doing so are themselves set in\nmotion by other things; such is clearly the case as regards all the\nmiddle members of a series of things in motion. We also see a thing\nthat is moved, but does not itself move anything, viz., the last member\nof the series; consequently a motor must exist without being at the\nsame time a motum, and that is the Prime Motor, which, not being\nsubject to motion, is indivisible, incorporeal, and independent of\ntime, as has been shown in the preceding argument.\n\nThird Philosophical Argument.\u2014This is taken from the words of\nAristotle, though he gives it in a different form. It runs as follows:\nThere is no doubt that many things actually exist, as, e.g., things\nperceived with the senses. Now there are only three cases conceivable,\nviz., either all these things are without beginning and without end, or\nall of them have beginning and end, or some are with and some without\nbeginning and end. The first of these three cases is altogether\ninadmissible, since we clearly perceive objects which come into\nexistence and are subsequently destroyed. The second case is likewise\ninadmissible, for if everything had but a temporary existence all\nthings might be destroyed, and that which is enunciated of a whole\nclass of things as possible is necessarily actual. All things must\ntherefore come to an end, and then nothing would ever be in existence,\nfor there would not exist any being to produce anything. Consequently\nnothing whatever would exist [if all things were transient]; but as we\nsee things existing, and find ourselves in existence we conclude as\nfollows:\u2014Since there are undoubtedly beings of a temporary existence,\nthere must also be an eternal being that is not subject to destruction,\nand whose existence is real, not merely possible.\n\nIt has been further argued that the existence of this being is\nnecessary, either on account of itself alone or on account of some\nexternal force. In the latter case its existence and non-existence\nwould be equally possible, because of its own properties, but its\nexistence would be necessary on account of the external force. That\nforce would then be the being that possesses absolute existence (Prop.\nXIX.). It is therefore certain that there must be a being which has\nabsolutely independent existence, and is the source of the existence of\nall things, whether transient or permanent, if, as Aristotle assumes,\nthere is in existence such a thing, which is the effect of an eternal\ncause, and must therefore itself be eternal. This is a proof the\ncorrectness of which is not doubted, disputed, or rejected, except by\nthose who have no knowledge of the method of proof. We further say that\nthe existence of anything that has independent existence is not due to\nany cause (Prop. X.), and that such a being does not include any\nplurality whatever (Prop. XXI.); consequently it cannot be a body, nor\na force residing in a body (Prop. XXII.). It is now clear that there\nmust be a being with absolutely independent existence, a being whose\nexistence cannot be attributed to any external cause, and which does\nnot include different elements; it cannot therefore be corporeal, or a\nforce residing in a corporeal object; this being is God.\n\nIt can easily be proved that absolutely independent existence cannot be\nattributed to two beings. For, if that were the case, absolutely\nindependent existence would be a property added to the substance of\nboth; neither of them would be absolutely independent on account of\ntheir essence, but only through a certain property, viz., that of this\nindependent existence, which is common to both. It can besides be shown\nin many ways that independent existence cannot be reconciled with the\nprinciple of dualism by any means. It would make no difference, whether\nwe imagine two beings of similar or of different properties. The reason\nfor all this is to be sought in the absolute simplicity and in the\nutmost perfection of the essence of this being, which is the only\nmember of its species, and does not depend on any cause whatever; this\nbeing has therefore nothing in common with other beings.\n\nFourth Argument.\u2014This is likewise a well-known philosophical argument.\nWe constantly see things passing from a state of potentiality to that\nof actuality, but in every such case there is for that transition of a\nthing an agent separate from it (Prop. XVIII.). It is likewise clear\nthat the agent has also passed from potentiality to actuality. It has\nat first been potential, because it could not be actual, owing to some\nobstacle contained in itself, or on account of the absence of a certain\nrelation between itself and the object of its action; it became an\nactual agent as soon as that relation was present. Whichever cause be\nassumed, an agent is again necessary to remove the obstacle or to\ncreate the relation. The same can be argued respecting this\nlast-mentioned agent that creates the relation or removes the obstacle.\nThis series of causes cannot go on ad infinitum; we must at last arrive\nat a cause of the transition of an object from the state of\npotentiality to that of actuality, which is constant, and admits of no\npotentiality whatever. In the essence of this cause nothing exists\npotentially, for if its essence included any possibility of existence\nit would not exist at all (Prop. XXIII.); it cannot be corporeal, but\nit must be spiritual (Prop. XXIV.); and the immaterial being that\nincludes no possibility whatever, but exists actually by its own\nessence, is God. Since He is incorporeal, as has been demonstrated, it\nfollows that He is One (Prop. XVI.).\n\nEven if we were to admit the Eternity of the Universe, we could by any\nof these methods prove the existence of God; that He is One and\nincorporeal, and that He does not reside as a force in a corporeal\nobject.\n\nThe following is likewise a correct method to prove the Incorporeality\nand the Unity of God: If there were two Gods, they would necessarily\nhave one element in common by virtue of which they were Gods, and\nanother element by which they were distinguished from each other and\nexisted as two Gods; the distinguishing element would either be in both\ndifferent from the property common to both\u2014in that case both of them\nwould consist of different elements, and neither of them would be the\nFirst Cause, or have absolutely independent existence; but their\nexistence would depend on certain causes (Prop. XIX.)\u2014or the\ndistinguishing element would only in one of them be different from the\nelement common to both: then that being could not have absolute\nindependence.\n\nAnother proof of the Unity of God.\u2014It has been demonstrated by proof\nthat the whole existing world is one organic body, all parts of which\nare connected together; also, that the influences of the spheres above\npervade the earthly substance and prepare it for its forms. Hence it is\nimpossible to assume that one deity be engaged in forming one part, and\nanother deity in forming another part of that organic body of which all\nparts are closely connected together. A duality could only be imagined\nin this way, either that at one time the one deity is active, the other\nat another time, or that both act simultaneously, nothing being done\nexcept by both together. The first alternative is certainly absurd for\nmany reasons; if at the time the one deity be active the other could\nalso be active, there is no reason why the one deity should then act\nand the other not; if, on the other hand, it be impossible for the one\ndeity to act when the other is at work, there must be some other cause\n[besides these deities] which [at a certain time] enables the one to\nact and disables the other. [Such difference would not be caused by\ntime], since time is without change, and the object of the action\nlikewise remains one and the same organic whole. Besides, if two\ndeities existed in this way, both would be subject to the relations of\ntime, since their actions would depend on time; they would also in the\nmoment of acting pass from potentiality to actuality, and require an\nagent for such transition; their essence would besides include\npossibility [of existence]. It is equally absurd to assume that both\ntogether produce everything in existence, and that neither of them does\nanything alone; for when a number of forces must be united for a\ncertain result, none of these forces acts of its own accord, and none\nis by itself the immediate cause of that result, but their union is the\nimmediate cause. It has, furthermore, been proved that the action of\nthe absolute cannot be due to an [external] cause. The union is also an\nact which presupposes a cause effecting that union, and if that cause\nbe one, it is undoubtedly God; but if it also consists of a number of\nseparate forces, a cause is required for the combination of these\nforces, as in the first case. Finally, one simple being must be arrived\nat, that is the cause of the existence of the Universe, which is one\nwhole; it would make no difference whether we assumed that the First\nCause had produced the Universe by creatio ex nihilo, or whether the\nUniverse co-existed with the First Cause. It is thus clear how we can\nprove the Unity of God from the fact that this Universe is one whole.\n\nAnother argument concerning the Incorporeality of God.\u2014Every corporeal\nobject is composed of matter and form (Prop. XXII.); every compound of\nthese two elements requires an agent for effecting their combination.\nBesides, it is evident that a body is divisible and has dimensions; a\nbody is thus undoubtedly subject to accidents. Consequently nothing\ncorporeal can be a unity, either because everything corporeal is\ndivisible or because it is a compound; that is to say, it can logically\nbe analysed into two elements; because a body can only be said to be a\ncertain body when the distinguishing element is added to the corporeal\nsubstratum, and must therefore include two elements; but it has been\nproved that the Absolute admits of no dualism whatever.\n\nNow that we have discussed these proofs, we will expound our own method\nin accordance with our promise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nThe fifth essence, i.e., the heavenly spheres, must either be\ntransient, and in this case motion would likewise be temporary, or, as\nour opponent assumes, it must be eternal. If the spheres are transient,\nthen God is their Creator; for if anything comes into existence after a\nperiod of non-existence, it is self-evident that an agent exists which\nhas effected this result. It would be absurd to contend that the thing\nitself effected it. If, on the other hand, the heavenly spheres be\neternal, with a regular perpetual motion, the cause of this perpetual\nmotion, according to the Propositions enumerated in the Introduction,\nmust be something that is neither a body, nor a force residing in a\nbody, and that is God, praised be His name! We have thus shown that\nwhether we believe in the Creatio ex Nihilo, or in the Eternity of the\nUniverse, we can prove by demonstrative arguments the existence of God,\ni.e., an absolute Being, whose existence cannot be attributed to any\ncause, or admit in itself any potentiality. The theory that God is One\nand Incorporeal has likewise been established by proof without any\nreference to the theory of the Creation or the Eternity of the\nUniverse. This has been explained by us in the third philosophical\nargument [in support of the Existence of God], and also in our\nsubsequent description of the methods of the philosophers in proving\nthe Incorporeality and the Unity of God.\n\nWe deem it now convenient to continue with the theory of the\nphilosophers, and to give their proofs for the existence of\nIntelligences. We will then show that their theory in this regard is in\nharmony with the teaching of Scripture concerning the existence of\nangels. After the full treatment of this subject we shall return to our\ntask and discuss the theory of creatio ex nihilo. For the best\narguments in favour of this theory cannot be fully comprehended unless\nthe theory of the existence of Intelligences be well understood, and\nalso the method which I adopt in proving their existence. We must,\nhowever, first give the following note, which will introduce you into\nthe secrets of this whole subject, both of that which we have already\ngiven and of what will yet be given.\n\nNote.\u2014It was not my intention when writing this treatise to expound\nnatural science or discuss metaphysical systems; it was not my object\nto prove truths which have already been demonstrated, or describe the\nnumber and the properties of the spheres: for the books written on\nthese subjects serve their purpose, and if in some points they are not\nsatisfactory, I do not think that what I could say would be better than\nwhat has already been explained by others. But my intention was, as has\nbeen stated in the Introduction, to expound Biblical passages which\nhave been impugned, and to elucidate their hidden and true sense, which\nis above the comprehension of the multitude. When you therefore notice\nthat I prove the existence and number of Intelligences or the number of\nthe spheres, with the causes of their motion, or discuss the true\nrelation of matter and form, the meaning of Divine manifestation, or\nsimilar subjects, you must not think that I intend merely to establish\na certain philosophical proposition; for these subjects have been\ndiscussed in many books, and most of them have been demonstrated by\nproof. I only desire to mention that which might, when well understood,\nserve as a means of removing some of the doubts concerning anything\ntaught in Scripture; and indeed many difficulties will disappear when\nthat which I am about to explain is taken into consideration. From the\nIntroduction to this treatise you may learn that its principal object\nis to expound, as far as can be done, the account of the Creation (Gen.\ni.-iii.), and of the Divine Chariot (Ezek. i.), and to answer questions\nraised in respect to Prophecy and to the knowledge of God. You will\nsometimes notice that I am rather explicit on truths already\nascertained; some of them Natural Philosophy has established as facts;\nothers Metaphysics has either fully demonstrated, or at least shown to\nbe worthy of belief; others Mathematics have made plain. But you will\ninvariably find that my exposition includes the key for the\nunderstanding of some allegorical passage of Holy Writ and its esoteric\ninterpretation, and that I have mentioned, explained, and demonstrated\nthe subject only because it furthers the knowledge of the \u201cDivine\nChariot,\u201d or \u201cthe Creation,\u201d or explains some principle with respect to\nProphecy, or to the belief in any of the truths taught in Scripture.\nNow, having made this statement, we return to the subject of which we\nbegan to treat.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nThe theory of Aristotle in respect to the causes of the motion of the\nspheres led him to assume the existence of Intelligences. Although this\ntheory consists of assertions which cannot be proved, yet it is the\nleast open to doubt, and is more systematic than any other, as has been\nstated by Alexander in the book called The Origin of the Universe. It\nincludes maxims which are identical with those taught in Scripture, and\nit is to a still greater extent in harmony with doctrines contained in\nwell-known genuine Midrashim, as will be explained by me. For this\nreason I will cite his views and his proofs, and collect from them what\ncoincides with the teachings of Scripture, and agrees with the doctrine\nheld by our Sages.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nThe enunciation that the heavenly sphere is endowed with a soul will\nappear reasonable to all who sufficiently reflect on it; but at first\nthought they may find it unintelligible or even objectionable; because\nthey wrongly assume that when we ascribe a soul to the heavenly spheres\nwe mean something like the soul of man, or that of an ass, or ox. We\nmerely intend to say that the locomotion of the sphere undoubtedly\nleads us to assume some inherent principle by which it moves; and this\nprinciple is certainly a soul. For it would be absurd to assume that\nthe principle of the circular motion of the spheres was like that of\nthe rectilinear motion of a stone downward or of fire upwards, for the\ncause of the latter motion is a natural property and not a soul; a\nthing set in motion by a natural property moves only as long as it is\naway from the proper place of its element, but when it has again\narrived there, it comes to rest; whilst the sphere continues its\ncircular motion in its own place. It is, however, not because the\nsphere has a soul, that it moves in this manner; for animate beings\nmove either by instinct or by reason. By \u201cinstinct\u201d I mean the\nintention of an animal to approach something agreeable, or to retreat\nfrom something disagreeable; e.g., to approach the water it seeks\nbecause of thirst, or to retreat from the sun because of its heat. It\nmakes no difference whether that thing really exists or is merely\nimaginary, since the imagination of something agreeable or of something\ndisagreeable likewise causes the animal to move. The heavenly sphere\ndoes not move for the purpose of withdrawing from what is bad or\napproaching what is good. For in the first instance it moves toward the\nsame point from which it has moved away, and vice vers\u00e2 it moves away\nfrom the same point towards which it has moved. Secondly, if this were\nthe object of the motion, we should expect that the sphere would move\ntowards a certain point, and would then rest; for if it moved for the\npurpose of avoiding something, and never obtained that object, the\nmotion would be in vain. The circular motion of the sphere is\nconsequently due to the action of some idea which produces this\nparticular kind of motion; but as ideas are only possible in\nintellectual beings, the heavenly sphere is an intellectual being. But\neven a being that is endowed with the faculty of forming an idea, and\npossesses a soul with the faculty of moving, does not change its place\non each occasion that it forms an idea; for an idea alone does not\nproduce motion, as has been explained in [Aristotle\u2019s] Metaphysics. We\ncan easily understand this, when we consider how often we form ideas of\ncertain things, yet do not move towards them, though we are able to do\nso; it is only when a desire arises for the thing imagined, that we\nmove in order to obtain it. We have thus shown that both the soul, the\nprinciple of motion, and the intellect, the source of the ideas, would\nnot produce motion without the existence of a desire for the object of\nwhich an idea has been formed. It follows that the heavenly sphere must\nhave a desire for the ideal which it has comprehended, and that ideal,\nfor which it has a desire, is God, exalted be His name! When we say\nthat God moves the spheres, we mean it in the following sense: the\nspheres have a desire to become similar to the ideal comprehended by\nthem. This ideal, however, is simple in the strictest sense of the\nword, and not subject to any change or alteration, but constant in\nproducing everything good, whilst the spheres are corporeal; the latter\ncan therefore not be like this ideal in any other way, except in the\nproduction of circular motion; for this is the only action of corporeal\nbeings that can be perpetual; it is the most simple motion of a body;\nthere is no change in the essence of the sphere, nor in the beneficial\nresults of its motion.\n\nWhen Aristotle had arrived at this result, he further investigated the\nsubject, and found, by proof, that there were many spheres, and that\nall moved in circles, but each with its peculiar motion as regards\nvelocity and direction. He naturally argued that the ideal comprehended\nby the one sphere, which completes its circuit in one day, is different\nfrom that of another sphere which completes its circuit in thirty\nyears; he thus arrived at the conclusion that there were as many ideals\nas there were spheres; each sphere has a desire for that ideal which is\nthe source of its existence, and that desire is the cause of its\nindividual motion, so that in fact the ideal sets the sphere in motion.\nAristotle does not say, nor does any other authority, that there are\nten or a hundred ideals; he simply states that their number agrees with\nthat of the spheres. When, therefore, some of his contemporaries held\nthat the number of spheres was fifty, he said, if that was true, the\nnumber of ideals must likewise be fifty. For the scholars in his time\nwere few and possessed but imperfect learning; they thought that there\nmust be a separate sphere for each movement, because they did not know\nthat what appear to be several distinct movements can be explained as\nresulting from the inclination of one sphere as is, e.g., the case with\nthe change in the longitude of a star, its declination and the places\nof its rising and setting noticed in the circle of the horizon. This\npoint, however, does not concern us at present; let us therefore return\nto our subject.\n\nThe later philosophers assumed ten Intelligences, because they counted\nthe spheres containing stars and the all-encompassing sphere, although\nsome of the spheres included several distinct orbits. There are\naltogether nine spheres, viz., the all-encompassing sphere, that of the\nfixed stars, and those of the seven planets; nine Intelligences\ncorrespond to the nine spheres; the tenth Intelligence is the Active\nIntellect. The existence of the latter is proved by the transition of\nour intellect from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, and by\nthe same transition in the case of the forms of all transient beings.\nFor whatever passes from potentiality into actuality, requires for that\ntransition an external agent of the same kind as itself. Thus the\nbuilder does not build the storehouse in his capacity of workman, but\nin that of a person that has the form of the storehouse in his mind;\nand that form of the building which exists in the mind of the builder\ncaused the transition of the potential form of the storehouse into\nactuality, and impressed it on the material of the building. As that\nwhich gives form to matter must itself be pure form, so the source of\nintellect must itself be pure intellect, and this source is the Active\nIntellect. The relation of the latter to the elements and their\ncompounds is the same as that of the Intelligences to their respective\nspheres; and our intellect in action, which originates in the Active\nIntellect, and enables us to comprehend that intellect, finds a\nparallel in the intellect of each of the spheres which originates in\nthe Intelligence corresponding to that sphere, and enables the sphere\nto comprehend that Intelligence, to form an idea of it, and to move in\nseeking to become similar to it.\n\nAristotle further infers, what has already been explained, that God\ndoes not act by means of direct contact. When, e.g., He destroys\nanything with fire, the fire is set in motion through the movement of\nthe spheres, and the spheres by the Intelligences; the latter, which\nare identical with \u201cthe angels,\u201d and act by direct influence, are\nconsequently, each in its turn, the cause of the motion of the spheres;\nas however, purely spiritual beings do not differ in their essence, and\nare by no means discrete quantities, he (Aristotle) came to the\nfollowing conclusion: God created the first Intelligence, the motive\nagent of the first sphere; the Intelligence which causes the second\nsphere to move has its source and origin in the first Intelligence, and\nso on; the Intelligence which sets the sphere nearest to the earth in\nmotion is the source and origin of the Active Intellect, the last in\nthe series of purely spiritual beings. The series of material bodies\nsimilarly begins with the uppermost sphere, and ends with the elements\nand their compounds. The Intelligence which moves the uppermost sphere\ncannot be the Absolute Being, for there is an element common to all\nIntelligences, namely, the property of being the motive agent of a\nsphere, and there is another element by which each of them is\ndistinguished from the rest; each of the ten Intelligences includes,\ntherefore, two elements, and consequently another being must be the\nFirst Cause.\n\nThis is the theory and opinion of Aristotle on these questions, and his\nproofs, where proof is possible, are given in various works of the\nAristotelian school. In short, he believes that the spheres are\nanimated and intellectual beings, capable of fully comprehending the\nprincipia of their existence; that there exist purely spiritual beings\n(Intelligences), which do not reside in corporeal objects, and which\nderive existence from God; and that these form the intermediate element\nbetween God and this material world.\n\nIn the chapters which follow I will show how far the teaching of\nScripture is in harmony with these views, and how far it differs from\nthem.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nScripture supports the theory that the spheres are animate and\nintellectual, i.e., capable of comprehending things; that they are not,\nas ignorant persons believe, inanimate masses like fire and earth, but\nare, as the philosophers assert, endowed with life, and serve their\nLord, whom they mightily praise and glorify; comp. \u201cThe heavens declare\nthe glory of God,\u201d etc. (Ps. xix. 2). It is a great error to think that\nthis is a mere figure of speech; for the verbs \u201cto declare\u201d and \u201cto\nrelate,\u201d when joined together, are, in Hebrew, only used of\nintellectual beings. That the Psalmist really means to describe the\nheavens\u2019 own doing, in other words, what the spheres actually do, and\nnot what man thinks of them, may be best inferred from the words,\n\u201cThere is no speech, nor language, their voice is not heard\u201d (ver. 4).\nHere he clearly shows that he describes the heavens themselves as in\nreality praising God, and declaring His wonders without words of lip\nand tongue. When man praises God in words actually uttered, he only\nrelates the ideas which he has conceived, but these ideas form the real\npraise. The reason why he gives expression to these ideas is to be\nfound in his desire to communicate them to others, or to make himself\nsure that he has truly conceived them. Therefore it is said, \u201cCommune\nwith your own heart upon your bed, and be still\u201d (Ps. iv. 5). Only\nignorant or obstinate persons would refuse to admit this proof taken\nfrom Scripture.\n\nAs to the opinion of our Sages, I do not see any necessity for\nexpounding or demonstrating it. Consider only the form they gave to the\nblessing recited on seeing the new moon, the ideas repeatedly occurring\nin the prayers and the remarks in the Midrash on the following and\nsimilar passages:\u2014\u201cAnd the host of heaven worshippeth thee\u201d (Neh. ix.\n6); \u201cWhen the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God\nshouted for joy\u201d (Job xxxviii. 7). In Bereshit Rabba, on the\npassage\u2014\u201cAnd the earth was empty and formless\u201d (Gen. i. 2), our Sages\nremark as follows: \u201cThe words tohu and bohu mean mourning and crying;\nthe earth mourned and cried on account of her evil lot, saying, \u2018I and\nthe heavens were created together, and yet the beings above live for\never, and we are mortal.\u2019\u201d Our Sages, by this remark, indicate their\nbelief that the spheres are animated beings, and not inanimate matter\nlike the elements.\n\nThe opinion of Aristotle, that the spheres are capable of comprehension\nand conception, is in accordance with the words of our prophets and our\ntheologians or Sages. The philosophers further agree that this world\nbelow is governed by influences emanating from the spheres, and that\nthe latter comprehend and have knowledge of the things which they\ninfluence. This theory is also met with in Scripture; comp. [the stars\nand all the host of heaven] \u201cwhich the Lord thy God hath divided unto\nall nations\u201d (Deut. iv. 19), that is to say, the stars, which God\nappointed to be the means of governing His creatures, and not the\nobjects of man\u2019s worship. It has therefore been stated clearly: \u201cAnd to\nrule over the day and over the night\u201d (Gen. i. 18). The term \u201cruling\u201d\nhere refers to the power which the spheres possess of governing the\nearth, in addition to the property of giving light and darkness. The\nlatter property is the direct cause of genesis and destruction; it is\ndescribed in the words, \u201cAnd to divide the light from the darkness\u201d\n(ibid.). It is impossible to assume that those who rule a thing are\nignorant of that very thing which they rule, if we take \u201cto rule\u201d in\nits proper sense. We will add another chapter on this subject.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nAs for the existence of angels, there is no necessity to cite any proof\nfrom Scripture, where the fact is frequently mentioned. The term elohim\nsignifies \u201cjudges\u201d; comp. \u201cThe cause of both parties shall come before\nthe \u2018judges\u2019\u201d (ha-elohim; Exod. xxii. 8). It has been figuratively\napplied to angels, and to the Creator as being Judge over the angels.\nWhen God says, \u201cI am the Lord your God,\u201d the pronoun \u201cyour\u201d refers to\nall mankind; but in the phrase elohe ha-elohim, He is described as the\nGod of the angels, and in adone ha-adonim, as the Lord of the spheres\nand the stars, which are the masters of the rest of the corporeal\ncreation. The nouns elohim and adonim in these phrases do not refer to\nhuman judges or masters, because these are in rank inferior to the\nheavenly bodies; much less do they refer to mankind in general,\nincluding masters and servants, or to objects of stone and wood\nworshipped by some as gods; for it is no honour or greatness to God to\nbe superior to stone, wood, or a piece of metal. The phrases therefore\nadmit of no other meaning than this: God is the Judge over the judges;\ni.e., over the angels, and the Lord over the spheres.\n\nWe have already stated above that the angels are incorporeal. This\nagrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference in\nthe names employed\u2014he uses the term \u201cIntelligences,\u201d and we say instead\n\u201cangels.\u201d His theory is that the Intelligences are intermediate beings\nbetween the Prime Cause and existing things, and that they effect the\nmotion of the spheres, on which motion the existence of all things\ndepends. This is also the view we meet with in all parts of Scripture;\nevery act of God is described as being performed by angels. But \u201cangel\u201d\nmeans \u201cmessenger\u201d; hence every one that is intrusted with a certain\nmission is an angel. Even the movements of the brute creation are\nsometimes due to the action of an angel, when such movements serve the\npurpose of the Creator, who endowed it with the power of performing\nthat movement; e.g., \u201cGod hath sent His angel, and hath shut the lions\u2019\nmouths that they have not hurt me\u201d (Dan. vi. 22). Another instance may\nbe seen in the movements of Balaam\u2019s ass, described as caused by an\nangel. The elements are also called angels. Comp. \u201cWho maketh winds His\nangels, flaming fire His ministers\u201d (Ps. civ. 4). There is no doubt\nthat the word \u201cangel\u201d is used of a messenger sent by man; e.g., \u201cAnd\nJacob sent angels\u201d (Gen. xxxii. 4); of a prophet, e.g., \u201cAnd an angel\nof the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim\u201d (Judges ii. 1); \u201cAnd He sent\nan angel, and hath brought us forth out of Egypt\u201d (Num. xx. 16). It is\nalso used of ideals, perceived by prophets in prophetic visions, and of\nman\u2019s animal powers, as will be explained in another place.\n\nWhen we assert that Scripture teaches that God rules this world through\nangels, we mean such angels as are identical with the Intelligences. In\nsome passages the plural is used of God, e.g., \u201cLet us make man in our\nimage\u201d (Gen. i. 26); \u201cGo to, let us go down, and there confound their\nlanguage\u201d (ibid. xi. 7). Our Sages explain this in the following\nmanner: God, as it were, does nothing without contemplating the host\nabove. I wonder at the expression \u201ccontemplating,\u201d which is the very\nexpression used by Plato: God, as it were, \u201ccontemplates the world of\nideals, and thus produces the existing beings.\u201d In other passages our\nSages expressed it more decidedly: \u201cGod does nothing without consulting\nthe host above\u201d (the word familia, used in the original, is a Greek\nnoun, and signifies \u201chost\u201d). On the words, \u201cwhat they have already\nmade\u201d (Eccles. ii. 12), the following remark is made in Bereshit Rabba\nand in Midrash Koheleth: \u201cIt is not said \u2018what He has made,\u2019 but \u2018what\nthey have made\u2019; hence we infer that He, as it were, with His court,\nhave agreed upon the form of each of the limbs of man before placing it\nin its position, as it is said, \u2018He hath made thee and established\nthee\u2019\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 6). In Bereshit Rabba (chap. li.) it is also\nstated, that wherever the term \u201cand the Lord\u201d occurred in Scripture,\nthe Lord with His court is to be understood. These passages do not\nconvey the idea that God spoke, thought, reflected, or that He\nconsulted and employed the opinion of other beings, as ignorant persons\nhave believed. How could the Creator be assisted by those whom He\ncreated! They only show that all parts of the Universe, even the limbs\nof animals in their actual form, are produced through angels; for\nnatural forces and angels are identical. How bad and injurious is the\nblindness of ignorance! Say to a person who is believed to belong to\nthe wise men of Israel that the Almighty sends His angel to enter the\nwomb of a woman and to form there the f\u0153tus, he will be satisfied with\nthe account; he will believe it, and even find in it a description of\nthe greatness of God\u2019s might and wisdom; although he believes that the\nangel consists of burning fire, and is as big as a third part of the\nUniverse, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tell\nhim that God gave the seed a formative power which produces and shapes\nthe limbs, and that this power is called \u201cangel,\u201d or that all forms are\nthe result of the influence of the Active Intellect, and that the\nlatter is the angel, the Prince of the world, frequently mentioned by\nour Sages, and he will turn away; because he cannot comprehend the true\ngreatness and power of creating forces that act in a body without being\nperceived by our senses. Our Sages have already stated\u2014for him who has\nunderstanding\u2014that all forces that reside in a body are angels, much\nmore the forces that are active in the Universe. The theory that each\nforce acts only in one particular way, is expressed in Bereshit Rabba\n(chap. l.) as follows: \u201cOne angel does not perform two things, and two\nangels do not perform one thing\u201d; this is exactly the property of all\nforces. We may find a confirmation of the opinion that the natural and\npsychical forces of an individual are called angels in a statement of\nour Sages which is frequently quoted, and occurs originally in Bereshit\nRabba (chap. lxxviii.): \u201cEvery day God creates a legion of angels; they\nsing before Him, and disappear.\u201d When, in opposition to this statement,\nother statements were quoted to the effect that angels are eternal\u2014and,\nin fact, it has repeatedly been shown that they live permanently\u2014the\nreply has been given that some angels live permanently, others perish;\nand this is really the case; for individual forces are transient,\nwhilst the genera are permanent and imperishable. Again, we read (in\nBereshit Rabba, chap. lxxxv.), in reference to the relation between\nJudah and Tamar: \u201cR. Jochanan said that Judah was about to pass by\n[without noticing Tamar], but God caused the angel of lust, i.e., the\nlibidinous disposition, to present himself to him.\u201d Man\u2019s disposition\nis here called an angel. Likewise we frequently meet with the phrase\n\u201cthe angel set over a certain thing.\u201d In Midrash-Koheleth (on Eccles.\nx. 7) the following passage occurs: \u201cWhen man sleeps, his soul speaks\nto the angel, the angel to the cherub.\u201d The intelligent reader will\nfind here a clear statement that man\u2019s imaginative faculty is also\ncalled \u201cangel,\u201d and that \u201ccherub\u201d is used for man\u2019s intellectual\nfaculty. How beautiful must this appear to him who understands it; how\nabsurd to the ignorant!\n\nWe have already stated that the forms in which angels appear form part\nof the prophetic vision. Some prophets see angels in the form of man,\ne.g., \u201cAnd behold three men stood by him\u201d (Gen. xviii. 2); others\nperceive an angel as a fearful and terrible being, e.g., \u201cAnd his\ncountenance was as the countenance of an angel of God, very terrible\u201d\n(Judges xiii. 6); others see them as fire, e.g., \u201cAnd the angel of the\nLord appeared to him in a flame of fire\u201d (Exod. iii. 2). In Bereshit\nRabba (chap. 1.) the following remark occurs: \u201cTo Abraham, whose\nprophetic power was great, the angels appeared in the form of men; to\nLot, whose power was weak, they appeared as angels.\u201d This is an\nimportant principle as regards Prophecy; it will be fully discussed\nwhen we treat of that subject (chap. xxxii. sqq.). Another passage in\nBereshit Rabba (ibid.) runs thus: \u201cBefore the angels have accomplished\ntheir task they are called men, when they have accomplished it they are\nangels.\u201d Consider how clearly they say that the term \u201cangel\u201d signifies\nnothing but a certain action, and that every appearance of an angel is\npart of a prophetic vision, depending on the capacity of the person\nthat perceives it.\n\nThere is nothing in the opinion of Aristotle on this subject contrary\nto the teaching of Scripture. The whole difference between him and\nourselves is this: he believes all these beings to be eternal,\nco-existing with the First Cause as its necessary effect; but we\nbelieve that they have had a beginning, that God created the\nIntelligences, and gave the spheres the capacity of seeking to become\nlike them; that in creating the Intelligences and the spheres, He\nendowed them with their governing powers. In this point we differ from\nhim.\n\nIn the course of this treatise we shall give his theory as well as the\ntheory of Creatio ex nihilo taught in Scripture.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nWe have already explained that the term \u201cangel\u201d is a homonym, and is\nused of the intellectual beings, the spheres, and the elements; for all\nthese are engaged in performing a divine command. But do not imagine\nthat the Intelligences and the spheres are like other forces which\nreside in bodies and act by the laws of nature without being conscious\nof what they do. The spheres and the Intelligences are conscious of\ntheir actions, and select by their own free will the objects of their\ninfluence, although not in the same manner as we exercise free will and\nrule over other things, which only concern temporary beings. I have\nbeen led to adopt this theory by certain passages in Scripture; e.g.,\nan angel says to Lot: \u201cFor I cannot do anything,\u201d etc. (Gen. xix. 21);\nand telling him to deliver himself, the angel says: \u201cBehold I have\naccepted thee concerning this thing\u201d (ver. 21). Again: \u201cTake heed\nbefore him, and listen to his voice,\u201d etc. (Exod. xxiii. 21). These\npassages show that angels are conscious of what they do, and have free\nwill in the sphere of action intrusted to them, just as we have free\nwill within our province, and in accordance with the power given to us\nwith our very existence. The difference is that what we do is the\nlowest stage of excellence, and that our influence and actions are\npreceded by non-action; whilst the Intelligences and the spheres always\nperform that which is good, they contain nothing except what is good\nand perfect, as will be shown further on, and they have continually\nbeen active from the beginning.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nIt is one of the ancient beliefs, both among the philosophers and other\npeople, that the motions of the spheres produced mighty and fearful\nsounds. They observed how little objects produced by rapid motion a\nloud, shrilling, and terrifying noise, and concluded that this must to\na far higher degree be the case with the bodies of the sun, the moon\nand the stars, considering their greatness and their velocity. The\nPythagoreans believed that the sounds were pleasant, and, though loud,\nhad the same proportions to each other as the musical notes. They also\nexplained why these mighty and tremendous sounds are not heard by us.\nThis belief is also widespread in our nation. Thus our Sages describe\nthe greatness of the sound produced by the sun in the daily circuit in\nits orbit. The same description could be given of all heavenly bodies.\nAristotle, however, rejects this, and holds that they produce no\nsounds. You will find his opinion in the book The Heavens and the World\n(De C\u0153lo). You must not find it strange that Aristotle differs here\nfrom the opinion of our Sages. The theory of the music of the spheres\nis connected with the theory of the motion of the stars in a fixed\nsphere, and our Sages have, in this astronomical question, abandoned\ntheir own theory in favour of the theory of others. Thus, it is\ndistinctly stated, \u201cThe wise men of other nations have defeated the\nwise men of Israel.\u201d It is quite right that our Sages have abandoned\ntheir own theory; for speculative matters every one treats according to\nthe results of his own study, and every one accepts that which appears\nto him established by proof.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nWe have stated above that in the age of Aristotle the number of spheres\nwas not accurately known; and that those who at present count nine\nspheres consider a sphere containing several rotating circles as one, a\nfact well known to all who have a knowledge of astronomy. We need,\ntherefore, not reject the opinion of those who assume two spheres in\naccordance with the words of Scripture: \u201cBehold the heaven and the\nheaven of heavens are the Lord\u2019s\u201d (Deut. x. 14). They reckon all the\nspheres with stars, i.e., with all the circles in which the stars move,\nas one; the all-encompassing sphere in which there are no stars, is\nregarded by them as the second; hence they maintain that there are two\nspheres.\n\nI will here introduce an explanation which is necessary for the\nunderstanding of our view on the present subject. There is a difference\namong ancient astronomers whether the spheres of Mercury and Venus are\nabove or below the sun, because no proof can be given for the position\nof these two spheres. At first it was generally assumed that they were\nabove the sun\u2014note this well; later on Ptolemy maintained that they\nwere below the sun; because he believed that in this manner the whole\narrangement of the spheres would be most reasonable; the sun would be\nin the middle, having three stars below and three above itself. More\nrecently some Andalusian scholars concluded, from certain principles\nlaid down by Ptolemy, that Venus and Mercury were above the sun. Ibn\nAfla\u1e25 of Seville, with whose son I was acquainted, has written a famous\nbook on the subject; also the excellent philosopher Abu-Bekr\nibn-Al\u1e93aig, one of whose pupils was my fellow-student, has treated of\nthis subject and offered certain proofs\u2014which we have copied\u2014of the\nimprobability of Venus and Mercury being above the sun. The proofs\ngiven by Abu-Bekr show only the improbability, not the impossibility.\nIn short, whether it be so or not, the ancients placed Venus and\nMercury above the sun, and had, therefore, the following five spheres:\nthat of the moon, which is undoubtedly the nearest to us; that of the\nsun, which is, of course, above the former; then that of the five\nplanets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and the outermost sphere, which\ndoes not contain any star. Consequently there are four spheres\ncontaining figures, i.e., stars, which were called figures by the\nancients in their well-known works\u2014viz., the spheres of the fixed\nstars, of the five planets, of the sun, and of the moon; above these\nthere is one sphere which is empty, without any star. This number is\nfor me of great importance in respect to an idea which none of the\nphilosophers clearly stated, though I was led to it by various\nutterances of the philosophers and of our Sages. I will now state the\nidea and expound it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nIt is a well-known fact that the philosophers, when they discuss in\ntheir works the order of the Universe, assume that the existing order\nof things in this sublunary world of transient beings depends on forces\nwhich emanate from the spheres. We have mentioned this several times.\nIn like manner our Sages say, \u201cThere is no single herb below without\nits corresponding star above, that beats upon it and commands it to\ngrow.\u201d Comp. \u201cKnowest thou the ordinances of heaven? Canst thou set the\ndominion thereof in the earth?\u201d (Job xxxviii. 33). The term mazzal,\nliterally meaning a constellation in the Zodiac, is also used of every\nstar, as may be inferred from the following passage in the beginning of\nBereshit Rabba (chap. x.): \u201cWhile one star (mazzal) completes its\ncircuit in thirty days, another completes it in thirty years.\u201d They\nhave thus clearly expressed it, that even each individual being in this\nworld has its corresponding star. Although the influences of the\nspheres extend over all beings, there is besides the influence of a\nparticular star directed to each particular species; a fact noticed\nalso in reference to the several forces in one organic body; for the\nwhole Universe is like one organic body, as we have stated above. Thus\nthe philosophers speak of the peculiar influence of the moon on the\nparticular element water. That this is the case is proved by the\nincrease and decrease of the water in the seas and rivers according to\nthe increase and decrease of the moon; also by the rising and the\nfalling of the seas according to the advance or return of the moon,\ni.e., her ascending and her descending in the several quarters of her\ncourse. This is dear to every one who has directed his attention to\nthese phenomena. The influence of the sun\u2019s rays upon fire may easily\nbe noticed in the increase of heat or cold on earth, according as the\nsun approaches the earth or recedes or is concealed from it. All this\nis so clear that I need not explain it further. Now it occurred to my\nmind that the four spheres which contain stars exercise influence upon\nall beings on earth that come into existence, and, in fact, are the\ncause of their existence; but each of the four spheres is the exclusive\nsource of the properties of one only of the four elements, and becomes\nby its own motion the cause of the motion and changes of that element.\nThus water is set in motion by the moon-sphere, fire by the sun-sphere,\nair by the other planets, which move in many and different courses with\nretrogressions, progressions, and stations, and therefore produce the\nvarious forms of the air with its frequent changes, contractions, and\nexpansions; the sphere of the other stars, namely, the fixed stars,\nsets earth in motion; and it may be that on this account, viz., on\naccount of the slow motion of the fixed stars, earth is but slowly set\nin motion to change and to combine with other elements. The particular\ninfluence which the fixed stars exercise upon earth is implied in the\nsaying of our Sages, that the number of the species of plants is the\nsame as that of the individuals included in the general term \u201cstars.\u201d\n\nThe arrangement of the Universe may therefore be assumed to be as\nfollows: there are four spheres, four elements set in motion by them,\nand also four principal properties which earthly beings derive from\nthem, as has been stated above. Furthermore, there are four causes of\nthe motion of every sphere, namely, the following four essential\nelements in the sphere; its spherical shape, its soul, its intellect,\nby which the sphere is capable of forming ideas, and the Intelligence,\nwhich the sphere desires to imitate. Note this well. The explanation of\nwhat I said is this: the sphere could not have been continuously in\nmotion, had it not this peculiar form; continuity of motion is only\npossible when the motion is circular. Rectilinear motion, even if\nfrequently repeated in the same moment, cannot be continuous; for when\na body moves successively in two opposite directions, it must pass\nthrough a moment of rest, as has been demonstrated in its proper place.\nThe necessity of a continuous motion constantly repeated in the same\npath implies the necessity of a circular form. The spheres must have a\nsoul; for only animate beings can move freely. There must be some cause\nfor the motion, and as it does not consist in the fear of that which is\ninjurious, or the desire of that which is profitable, it must be found\nin the notion which the spheres form of a certain being, and in the\ndesire to approach that being. This formation of a notion demands, in\nthe first place, that the spheres possess intellect; it demands further\nthat something exists which corresponds to that notion, and which the\nspheres desire to approach. These are the four causes of the motion of\nthe spheres. The following are the four principal forces directly\nderived from the spheres: the nature of minerals, the properties\npeculiar to plants, the animal faculties, and the intellect. An\nexamination of these forces shows that they have two functions, namely,\nto produce things and to perpetuate them; that is to say, to preserve\nthe species perpetually, and the individuals in each species for a\ncertain time. These are also the functions ascribed to Nature, which is\nsaid to be wise, to govern the Universe, to provide, as it were, by\nplan for the production of living beings, and to provide also for their\npreservation and perpetuation. Nature creates formative faculties,\nwhich are the cause of the production of living beings, and nutritive\nfaculties as the source of their temporal existence and preservation.\nIt may be that by Nature the Divine Will is meant, which is the origin\nof these two kinds of faculties through the medium of the spheres.\n\nAs to the number four, it is strange, and demands our attention. In\nMidrash Tan\u1e25uma the following passage occurs: \u201cHow many steps were in\nJacob\u2019s ladder?\u2014Four.\u201d The question refers to the verse, \u201cAnd behold a\nladder set upon the earth,\u201d etc. (Gen. xxviii. 12). In all the\nMidrashim it is stated that there were four hosts of angels; this\nstatement is frequently repeated. Some read in the above passage: \u201cHow\nmany steps were in the ladder?\u2014Seven.\u201d But all readings and all\nMidrashim unanimously express that the angels whom Jacob saw ascending\nthe ladder, and descending, were only four; two of whom were going up\nand two coming down. These four angels, the two that went up and the\ntwo that came down, occupied one step of the ladder, standing in one\nline. Hence it has been inferred that the breadth of the ladder in this\nvision was four-thirds of the world. For the breadth of an angel in a\nprophetic vision is equal to one-third of the world; comp. \u201cAnd his\nbody was like tarshish (two-sixths)\u201d (Dan. x. 6); the four angels\ntherefore occupied four-thirds of the world.\u2014Zechariah, in describing\nthe allegorical vision of \u201cthe four chariots that came out from between\ntwo mountains, which mountains were mountains of brass\u201d (Zech. vi. 1),\nadds the explanation, \u201cThese are the four spirits of the heavens which\ngo forth from standing before the Lord of all the earth\u201d (ibid. ver.\n5). By these four spirits the causes are meant which produce all\nchanges in the Universe. The term \u201cbrass\u201d (ne\u1e25oshet), employed here,\nand the phrase \u201cburnished brass\u201d (ne\u1e25oshet kalal), used by Ezekiel (i.\n7), are to some extent homonymous, and will be discussed further on.\n\nThe saying of our Sages, that the angel is as broad as the third part\nof the Universe, or, in the words of Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.), that\nthe angel is the third part of the world, is quite clear; we have\nalready explained it in our large work on the Holy Law. The whole\ncreation consists of three parts, (1) the pure intelligences, or\nangels; (2) the bodies of the spheres; and (3) the materia prima, or\nthe bodies which are below the spheres, and are subject to constant\nchange.\n\nIn this manner may those understand the dark sayings of the prophets\nwho desire to understand them, who awake from the sleep of\nforgetfulness, deliver themselves from the sea of ignorance, and raise\nthemselves upward nearer the higher beings. But those who prefer to\nswim in the waters of their ignorance, and to \u201cgo down very low,\u201d need\nnot exert the body or heart; they need only cease to move, and they\nwill go down by the law of nature. Note and consider well all we have\nsaid.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nWhen a simple mathematician reads and studies these astronomical\ndiscussions, he believes that the form and the number of the spheres\nare facts established by proof. But this is not the case; for the\nscience of astronomy does not aim at demonstrating them, although it\nincludes subjects that can be proved; e.g., it has been proved that the\npath of the sun is inclined against the equator; this cannot be\ndoubted. But it has not yet been decided whether the sphere of the sun\nis excentric or contains a revolving epicycle, and the astronomer does\nnot take notice of this uncertainty, for his object is simply to find\nan hypothesis that would lead to a uniform and circular motion of the\nstars without acceleration, retardation, or change, and which is in its\neffects in accordance with observation. He will, besides, endeavour to\nfind such an hypothesis which would require the least complicated\nmotion and the least number of spheres; he will therefore prefer an\nhypothesis which would explain all the phenomena of the stars by means\nof three spheres to an hypothesis which would require four spheres.\nFrom this reason we adopt, in reference to the circuit of the sun, the\ntheory of excentricity, and reject the epicyclic revolution assumed by\nPtolemy. When we therefore perceive that all fixed stars move in the\nsame way uniformly, without the least difference, we conclude that they\nare all in one sphere. It is, however, not impossible that the stars\nshould have each its own sphere, with a separate centre, and yet move\nin the same way. If this theory be accepted, a number of Intelligences\nmust be assumed, equal to that of the stars, and therefore Scripture\nsays in reference to them, \u201cIs there any number of his armies?\u201d (Job\nxxv. 3); for the Intelligences, the heavenly bodies, and the natural\nforces, are called the armies of God. Nevertheless the species of the\nstars can be numbered, and therefore we would still be justified in\ncounting the spheres of the fixed stars collectively as one, just as\nthe five spheres of the planets, together with the numerous spheres\nthey contain, are regarded by us as one. Our object in adopting this\nnumber is, as you have noticed, to divide the influences which we can\ntrace in the Universe according to their general character, without\ndesiring to fix the number of the Intelligences and the spheres. All we\nwish to point out is this: in the first place, that the whole Creation\nis divided into three parts, viz. (1) the pure Intelligences; (2) the\nbodies of the spheres endowed with permanent forms\u2014(the forms of these\nbodies do not pass from one substratum to another, nor do their\nsubstrata undergo any change whatever); and (3) the transient earthly\nbeings, all of which consist of the same substance. Furthermore, we\ndesire to show that the ruling power emanates from the Creator, and is\nreceived by the Intelligences according to their order; from the\nIntelligences part of the good and the light bestowed upon them is\ncommunicated to the spheres, and the latter, being in possession of the\nabundance obtained of the Intelligences, transmit forces and properties\nunto the beings of this transient world. We must, however, add that the\npart which benefits the part below it in the order described does not\nexist for the sole purpose of producing that benefit. For if this were\nthe case it would lead to the paradox that the higher, better, and\nnobler beings existed for the sake of beings lower in rank, whilst in\nreality the object should be of greater importance than the means\napplied for attaining it. No intelligent person will admit that this is\npossible. The nature of the influence which one part of the Creation\nexercises upon another must be explained as follows: A thing perfect in\na certain way is either perfect only in itself, without being able to\ncommunicate that perfection to another being, or it is so perfect that\nit is capable of imparting perfection to another being. A person may\npossess wealth sufficient for his own wants without being able to spare\nanything for another, or he may have wealth enough to benefit also\nother people, or even to enrich them to such an extent as would enable\nthem to give part of their property to others. In the same manner the\ncreative act of the Almighty in giving existence to pure Intelligences\nendows the first of them with the power of giving existence to another,\nand so on, down to the Active Intellect, the lowest of the purely\nspiritual beings. Besides producing other Intelligences, each\nIntelligence gives existence to one of the spheres, from the highest\ndown to the lowest, which is the sphere of the moon. After the latter\nfollows this transient world, i.e., the materia prima, and all that has\nbeen formed of it. In this manner the elements receive certain\nproperties from each sphere, and a succession of genesis and\ndestruction is produced.\n\nWe have already mentioned that these theories are not opposed to\nanything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages. Our nation is wise and\nperfect, as has been declared by the Most High, through Moses, who made\nus perfect: \u201cSurely this great nation is a wise and understanding\npeople\u201d (Deut. iv. 6). But when wicked barbarians have deprived us of\nour possessions, put an end to our science and literature, and killed\nour wise men, we have become ignorant; this has been foretold by the\nprophets, when they pronounced the punishment for our sins: \u201cThe wisdom\nof their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent\nmen shall be hid\u201d (Isa. xxix. 14). We are mixed up with other nations;\nwe have learnt their opinions, and followed their ways and acts. The\nPsalmist, deploring this imitation of the actions of other nations,\nsays, \u201cThey were mingled among the nations, and learned their works\u201d\n(Ps. cvi. 35). Isaiah likewise complains that the Israelites adopted\nthe opinions of their neighbours, and says, \u201cAnd they please themselves\nin the children of strangers\u201d (Isa. ii. 6); or, according to the\nAramaic version of Jonathan, son of Uzziel, \u201cAnd they walk in the ways\nof the nations.\u201d Having been brought up among persons untrained in\nphilosophy, we are inclined to consider these philosophical opinions as\nforeign to our religion, just as uneducated persons find them foreign\nto their own notions. But, in fact, it is not so.\n\nSince we have repeatedly spoken of the influence emanating from God and\nthe Intelligences, we will now proceed to explain what is the true\nmeaning of this influence, and after that I will discuss the theory of\nthe Creation.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nIt is clear that whenever a thing is produced, an efficient cause must\nexist for the production of the thing that has not existed previously.\nThis immediate efficient cause is either corporeal or incorporeal; if\ncorporeal, it is not the efficient cause on account of its\ncorporeality, but on account of its being an individual corporeal\nobject, and therefore by means of its form. I will speak of this\nsubject later on. The immediate efficient cause of a thing may again be\nthe effect of some cause, and so on, but not ad infinitum. The series\nof causes for a certain product must necessarily conclude with a First\nCause, which is the true cause of that product, and whose existence is\nnot due to another cause. The question remains, Why has this thing been\nproduced now and not long before, since the cause has always been in\nexistence? The answer is, that a certain relation between cause and\nproduct has been absent, if the cause be corporeal; or, that the\nsubstance has not been sufficiently prepared, if the cause be\nincorporeal. All this is in accordance with the teachings of natural\nscience. We ignore for the present the question whether to assume the\nEternity of the Universe, or the Creatio ex nihilo. We do not intend to\ndiscuss the question here.\n\nIn Physics it has been shown that a body in acting upon another body\nmust either directly be in contact with it, or indirectly through the\nmedium of other bodies. E.g., a body that has been heated has been in\ncontact with fire, or the air that surrounds the body has been heated\nby the fire, and has communicated the heat to the body; the immediate\ncause of the heat in this body is the corporeal substance of the heated\nair. The magnet attracts iron from a distance through a certain force\ncommunicated to the air round the iron. The magnet does therefore not\nact at all distances, just as fire does not act at every distance, but\nonly as long as the air between the fire and the object is affected by\nthe fire. When the air is no longer affected by the fire which is under\na piece of wax, the latter does not melt. The same is the case with\nmagnetism. When an object that has previously not been warm has now\nbecome warm, the cause of its heat must now have been created; either\nsome fire has been produced, or the distance of the fire from the\nobject has been changed, and the altered relation between the fire and\nthe object is the cause now created. In a similar manner we find the\ncauses of all changes in the Universe to be changes in the combination\nof the elements that act upon each other when one body approaches\nanother or separates from it. There are, however, changes which are not\nconnected with the combination of the elements, but concern only the\nforms of the things; they require likewise an efficient cause; there\nmust exist a force that produces the various forms. This cause is\nincorporeal, for that which produces form must itself be abstract form,\nas has been shown in its proper place. I have also indicated the proof\nof this theorem in previous chapters. The following may, in addition,\nserve to illustrate it: All combinations of the elements are subject to\nincrease and decrease, and this change takes place gradually. It is\ndifferent with forms; they do not change gradually, and are therefore\nwithout motion; they appear and disappear instantaneously, and are\nconsequently not the result of the combination of corporeal elements.\nThis combination merely prepares matter for receiving a certain form.\nThe efficient cause which produces the form is indivisible, because it\nis of the same kind as the thing produced. Hence it may be concluded\nthat the agent that has produced a certain form, or given it to a\ncertain substance, must itself be an abstract form. The action of this\nincorporeal agent cannot depend on a certain relation to the corporeal\nproduct; being incorporeal, it cannot approach a body, or recede from\nit; nor can a body approach the incorporeal agent, or recede from it,\nbecause there is no relation of distance between corporeal and\nincorporeal beings. The reason why the action has not taken place\nbefore must be sought in the circumstance that the substance has not\nbeen prepared for the action of the abstract form.\n\nIt is now clear that the action of bodies upon each other, according to\ntheir forms, prepares the substance for receiving the action of an\nincorporeal being, or Form. The existence of actions of purely\nincorporeal beings, in every case of change that does not originate in\nthe mere combination of elements, is now firmly established. These\nactions do not depend on impact, or on a certain distance. They are\ntermed \u201cinfluence\u201d (or \u201cemanation\u201d), on account of their similarity to\na water-spring. The latter sends forth water in all directions, has no\npeculiar side for receiving or spending its contents; it springs forth\non all sides, and continually waters both neighbouring and distant\nplaces. In a similar manner incorporeal beings, in receiving power and\nimparting it to others, are not limited to a particular side, distance,\nor time. They act continually; and whenever an object is sufficiently\nprepared, it receives the effect of that continuous action, called\n\u201cinfluence\u201d (or \u201cemanation\u201d). God being incorporeal, and everything\nbeing the work of Him as the efficient cause, we say that the Universe\nhas been created by the Divine influence, and that all changes in the\nUniverse emanate from Him. In the same sense we say that He caused\nwisdom to emanate from Him and to come upon the prophets. In all such\ncases we merely wish to express that an incorporeal Being, whose action\nwe call \u201cinfluence,\u201d has produced a certain effect. The term\n\u201cinfluence\u201d has been considered applicable to the Creator on account of\nthe similarity between His actions and those of a spring. There is no\nbetter way of describing the action of an incorporeal being than by\nthis analogy; and no term can be found that would accurately describe\nit. For it is as difficult to form an idea of that action as to form an\nidea of the incorporeal being itself. As we imagine only bodies or\nforces residing in bodies, so we only imagine actions possible when the\nagent is near, at a certain distance, and on a particular side. There\nare therefore persons who, on learning that God is incorporeal, or that\nHe does not approach the object of His action, believe that He gives\ncommands to angels, and that the latter carry them out by approach or\ndirect contact, as is the case when we produce something. These persons\nthus imagine also the angels as bodies. Some of them, further, believe\nthat God commands an action in words consisting, like ours, of letters\nand sound, and that thereby the action is done. All this is the work of\nthe imagination, which is, in fact, identical with \u201cevil inclination.\u201d\nFor all our defects in speech or in character are either the direct or\nthe indirect work of imagination. This is not the subject of the\npresent chapter, in which we only intended to explain the term\n\u201cinfluence\u201d in so far as it is applied to incorporeal beings, namely,\nto God and to the Intelligences or angels. But the term is also applied\nto the forces of the spheres in their effects upon the earth; and we\nspeak of the \u201cinfluence\u201d of the spheres, although the spheres are\ncorporeal, and the stars, being corporeal, only act at certain\ndistances, i.e., at a smaller or a greater distance from the centre, or\nat a definite distance from each other, a circumstance which led to\nAstrology.\n\nAs to our assertion that Scripture applies the notion of \u201cinfluence\u201d to\nGod, compare \u201cThey have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters\u201d\n(Jer. ii. 13), i.e., the Divine influence that gives life or existence,\nfor the two are undoubtedly identical. Further, \u201cFor with Thee is the\nfountain of life\u201d (Ps. xxxvi. 10), i.e., the Divine influence that\ngives existence. The concluding words of this verse, \u201cin Thy light we\nsee light,\u201d express exactly what we said, namely, that by the influence\nof the intellect which emanates from God we become wise, by it we are\nguided and enabled to comprehend the Active Intellect. Note this.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nAmong those who believe in the existence of God, there are found three\ndifferent theories as regards the question whether the Universe is\neternal or not.\n\nFirst Theory.\u2014Those who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, hold that\nthe whole Universe, i.e., everything except God, has been brought by\nHim into existence out of non-existence. In the beginning God alone\nexisted, and nothing else; neither angels, nor spheres, nor the things\nthat are contained within the spheres existed. He then produced from\nnothing all existing things such as they are, by His will and desire.\nEven time itself is among the things created; for time depends on\nmotion, i.e., on an accident in things which move, and the things upon\nwhose motion time depends are themselves created beings, which have\npassed from non-existence into existence. We say that God existed\nbefore the creation of the Universe, although the verb existed appears\nto imply the notion of time; we also believe that He existed an\ninfinite space of time before the Universe was created; but in these\ncases we do not mean time in its true sense. We only use the term to\nsignify something analogous or similar to time. For time is undoubtedly\nan accident, and, according to our opinion, one of the created\naccidents, like blackness and whiteness; it is not a quality, but an\naccident connected with motion. This must be clear to all who\nunderstand what Aristotle has said on time and its real existence.\n\nThe following remark does not form an essential part of our present\nresearch; it will nevertheless be found useful in the course of this\ndiscussion. Many scholars do not know what time really is, and men like\nGalen were so perplexed about it that they asked whether time has a\nreal existence or not; the reason for this uncertainty is to be found\nin the circumstance that time is an accident of an accident. Accidents\nwhich are directly connected with material bodies, e.g., colour and\ntaste, are easily understood, and correct notions are formed of them.\nThere are, however, accidents which are connected with other accidents,\ne.g., the splendour of colour, or the inclination and the curvature of\na line; of these it is very difficult to form a correct notion,\nespecially when the accident which forms the substratum for the other\naccident is not constant but variable. Both difficulties are present in\nthe notion of time: it is an accident of motion, which is itself an\naccident of a moving object; besides, it is not a fixed property; on\nthe contrary, its true and essential condition is, not to remain in the\nsame state for two consecutive moments. This is the source of ignorance\nabout the nature of time.\n\nWe consider time a thing created; it comes into existence in the same\nmanner as other accidents, and the substances which form the substratum\nfor the accidents. For this reason, viz., because time belongs to the\nthings created, it cannot be said that God produced the Universe in the\nbeginning. Consider this well; for he who does not understand it is\nunable to refute forcible objections raised against the theory of\nCreatio ex nihilo. If you admit the existence of time before the\nCreation, you will be compelled to accept the theory of the Eternity of\nthe Universe. For time is an accident and requires a substratum. You\nwill therefore have to assume that something [beside God] existed\nbefore this Universe was created, an assumption which it is our duty to\noppose.\n\nThis is the first theory, and it is undoubtedly a fundamental principle\nof the Law of our teacher Moses; it is next in importance to the\nprinciple of God\u2019s unity. Do not follow any other theory. Abraham, our\nfather, was the first that taught it, after he had established it by\nphilosophical research. He proclaimed, therefore, \u201cthe name of the Lord\nthe God of the Universe\u201d (Gen. xxi. 33); and he had previously\nexpressed this theory in the words, \u201cThe Possessor of heaven and earth\u201d\n(ibid. xiv. 22).\n\nSecond Theory.\u2014The theory of all philosophers whose opinions and works\nare known to us is this: It is impossible to assume that God produced\nanything from nothing, or that He reduces anything to nothing; that is\nto say, it is impossible that an object consisting of matter and form\nshould be produced when that matter is absolutely absent, or that it\nshould be destroyed in such a manner that that matter be absolutely no\nlonger in existence. To say of God that He can produce a thing from\nnothing or reduce a thing to nothing is, according to the opinion of\nthese philosophers, the same as if we were to say that He could cause\none substance to have at the same time two opposite properties, or\nproduce another being like Himself, or change Himself into a body, or\nproduce a square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar\nimpossibilities. The philosophers thus believe that it is no defect in\nthe Supreme Being that He does not produce impossibilities, for the\nnature of that which is impossible is constant\u2014it does not depend on\nthe action of an agent, and for this reason it cannot be changed.\nSimilarly there is, according to them, no defect in the greatness of\nGod, when He is unable to produce a thing from nothing, because they\nconsider this as one of the impossibilities. They therefore assume that\na certain substance has co-existed with God from eternity in such a\nmanner that neither God existed without that substance nor the latter\nwithout God. But they do not hold that the existence of that substance\nequals in rank that of God; for God is the cause of that existence, and\nthe substance is in the same relation to God as the clay is to the\npotter, or the iron to the smith; God can do with it what He pleases;\nat one time He forms of it heaven and earth, at another time He forms\nsome other thing. Those who hold this view also assume that the heavens\nare transient, that they came into existence, though not from nothing,\nand may cease to exist, although they cannot be reduced to nothing.\nThey are transient in the same manner as the individuals among living\nbeings which are produced from some existing substance, and are again\nreduced to some substance that remains in existence. The process of\ngenesis and destruction is, in the case of the heavens, the same as in\nthat of earthly beings.\n\nThe followers of this theory are divided into different schools, whose\nopinions and principles it is useless to discuss here; but what I have\nmentioned is common to all of them. Plato holds the same opinion.\nAristotle says in his Physics, that according to Plato the heavens are\ntransient. This view is also stated in Plato\u2019s Tim\u00e6us. His opinion,\nhowever, does not agree with our belief; only superficial and careless\npersons wrongly assume that Plato has the same belief as we have. For\nwhilst we hold that the heavens have been created from absolutely\nnothing, Plato believes that they have been formed out of\nsomething.\u2014This is the second theory.\n\nThird Theory.\u2014viz., that of Aristotle, his followers, and commentators.\nAristotle maintains, like the adherents of the second theory, that a\ncorporeal object cannot be produced without a corporeal substance. He\ngoes, however, farther, and contends that the heavens are\nindestructible. For he holds that the Universe in its totality has\nnever been different, nor will it ever change: the heavens, which form\nthe permanent element in the Universe, and are not subject to genesis\nand destruction, have always been so; time and motion are eternal,\npermanent, and have neither beginning nor end; the sublunary world,\nwhich includes the transient elements, has always been the same,\nbecause the materia prima is itself eternal, and merely combines\nsuccessively with different forms; when one form is removed, another is\nassumed. This whole arrangement, therefore, both above and here below,\nis never disturbed or interrupted, and nothing is produced contrary to\nthe laws or the ordinary course of Nature. He further says\u2014though not\nin the same terms\u2014that he considers it impossible for God to change His\nwill or conceive a new desire; that God produced this Universe in its\ntotality by His will, but not from nothing. Aristotle finds it as\nimpossible to assume that God changes His will or conceives a new\ndesire, as to believe that He is non-existing, or that His essence is\nchangeable. Hence it follows that this Universe has always been the\nsame in the past, and will be the same eternally.\n\nThis is a full account of the opinions of those who consider that the\nexistence of God, the First Cause of the Universe, has been established\nby proof. But it would be quite useless to mention the opinions of\nthose who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the\nexisting state of things is the result of accidental combination and\nseparation of the elements, and that the Universe has no Ruler or\nGovernor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and his school, and similar\nphilosophers, as stated by Alexander [Aphrodisiensis]; it would be\nsuperfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of God has been\ndemonstrated whilst their theory is built upon a basis proved to be\nuntenable. It is likewise useless to prove the correctness of the\nfollowers of the second theory in asserting that the heavens are\ntransient, because they at the same time believe in the Eternity of the\nUniverse, and so long as this theory is adopted, it makes no difference\nto us whether it is believed that the heavens are transient, and that\nonly their substance is eternal, or the heavens are held to be\nindestructible, in accordance with the view of Aristotle. All who\nfollow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, and Abraham, our Father, and all\nwho adopt similar theories, assume that nothing is eternal except God,\nand that the theory of Creatio ex nihilo includes nothing that is\nimpossible, whilst some thinkers even regard it as an established\ntruth.\n\nAfter having described the different theories, I will now proceed to\nshow how Aristotle proved his theory, and what induced him to adopt it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nIt is not necessary to repeat in every chapter that I write this\ntreatise with the full knowledge of what you have studied; that I\ntherefore need not quote the exact words of the philosophers; it will\nsuffice to give an abstract of their views. I will, however, point out\nthe methods which they employ, in the same manner as I have done when I\ndiscussed the theories of the Mutakallemim. No notice will be taken of\nthe opinion of any philosopher but that of Aristotle; his opinions\nalone deserve to be criticized, and if our objections or doubts with\nregard to any of these be well founded, this must be the case in a far\nhigher degree in respect to all other opponents of our fundamental\nprinciples.\n\nI now proceed to describe the methods of the philosophers.\n\nFirst Method.\u2014According to Aristotle, motion, that is to say, motion\npar excellence, is eternal. For if the motion had a beginning, there\nmust already have been some motion when it came into existence, for\ntransition from potentiality into actuality, and from non-existence\ninto existence, always implies motion; then that previous motion, the\ncause of the motion which follows, must be eternal, or else the series\nwould have to be carried back ad infinitum. On the same principle he\nmaintains that time is eternal, for time is related to and connected\nwith motion: there is no motion except in time, and time can only be\nperceived by motion, as has been demonstrated by proof. By this\nargument Aristotle proves the eternity of the Universe.\n\nSecond Method.\u2014The First Substance common to the four elements is\neternal. For if it had a beginning it would have come into existence\nfrom another substance; it would further be endowed with a form, as\ncoming into existence is nothing but receiving Form. But we mean by\n\u201cFirst Substance\u201d a formless substance; it can therefore not have come\ninto existence from another substance, and must be without beginning\nand without end; hence it is concluded that the Universe is eternal.\n\nThird Method.\u2014The substance of the spheres contains no opposite\nelements; for circular motion includes no such opposite directions as\nare found in rectilinear motion. Whatever is destroyed, owes its\ndestruction to the opposite elements it contains. The spheres contain\nno opposite elements; they are therefore indestructible, and because\nthey are indestructible they are also without beginning. Aristotle thus\nassumes the axiom that everything that has had a beginning is\ndestructible, and that everything destructible has had a beginning;\nthat things without beginning are indestructible, and indestructible\nthings are without beginning. Hence follows the Eternity of the\nUniverse.\n\nFourth Method.\u2014The actual production of a thing is preceded in time by\nits possibility. The actual change of a thing is likewise preceded in\ntime by its possibility. From this proposition Aristotle derives the\neternity of the circular motion of the spheres. The Aristotelians in\nmore recent time employ this proposition in demonstrating the Eternity\nof the Universe. They argue thus: When the Universe did not yet exist,\nits existence was either possible or necessary, or impossible. If it\nwas necessary, the Universe could never have been non-existing; if\nimpossible, the Universe could never have been in existence; if\npossible, the question arises, What was the substratum of that\npossibility? for there must be in existence something of which that\npossibility can be predicated. This is a forcible argument in favour of\nthe Eternity of the Universe. Some of the later schools of the\nMutakallemim imagined that they could confute this argument by\nobjecting that the possibility rests with the agent, and not with the\nproduction. But this objection is of no force whatever; for there are\ntwo distinct possibilities, viz., the thing produced has had the\npossibility of being produced before this actually took place; and the\nagent has had the possibility of producing it before he actually did\nso. There are, therefore, undoubtedly two possibilities\u2014that of the\nsubstance to receive a certain form, and that of the agent to perform a\ncertain act.\n\nThese are the principal methods, based on the properties of the\nUniverse, by which Aristotle proves the Eternity of the Universe. There\nare, however, other methods of proving the Eternity of the Universe.\nThey are based on the notions formed of God, and philosophers after\nAristotle derived them from his philosophy. Some of them employed the\nfollowing argument:\u2014\n\nFifth Method.\u2014If God produced the Universe from nothing, He must have\nbeen a potential agent before He was an actual one, and must have\npassed from a state of potentiality into that of actuality\u2014a process\nthat is merely possible, and requires an agent for effecting it. This\nargument is likewise a source of great doubts, and every intelligent\nperson must examine it in order to refute it and to expose its\ncharacter.\n\nSixth Method.\u2014An agent is active at one time and inactive at another,\naccording as favourable or unfavourable circumstances arise. The\nunfavourable circumstances cause the abandonment of an intended action.\nThe favourable ones, on the other hand, even produce a desire for an\naction for which there has not been a desire previously. As, however,\nGod is not subject to accidents which could bring about a change in His\nwill, and is not affected by obstacles and hindrances that might appear\nor disappear, it is impossible, they argue, to imagine that God is\nactive at one time and inactive at another. He is, on the contrary,\nalways active in the same manner as He is always in actual existence.\n\nSeventh Method.\u2014The actions of God are perfect; they are in no way\ndefective, nor do they contain anything useless or superfluous. In\nsimilar terms Aristotle frequently praises Him, when he says that\nNature is wise and does nothing in vain, but makes everything as\nperfect as possible. The philosophers therefore contend that this\nexisting Universe is so perfect that it cannot be improved, and must be\npermanent; for it is the result of God\u2019s wisdom, which is not only\nalways present in His essence, but is identical with it.\n\nAll arguments in favour of the Eternity of the Universe are based on\nthe above methods, and can be traced to one or other of them. The\nfollowing objection is also raised against Creatio ex nihilo: How could\nGod ever have been inactive without producing or creating anything in\nthe infinite past? How could He have passed the long infinite period\nwhich preceded the Creation without producing anything, so as to\ncommence, as it were, only yesterday, the Creation of the Universe? For\neven if you said, e.g., that God created previously as many successive\nworlds as the outermost sphere could contain grains of mustard, and\nthat each of these worlds existed as many years: considering the\ninfinite existence of God, it would be the same as if He had only\nyesterday commenced the Creation. For when we once admit the beginning\nof the existence of things after their non-existence, it makes no\ndifference whether thousands of centuries have passed since the\nbeginning, or only a short time. Those who defend the Eternity of the\nUniverse find both assumptions equally improbable.\n\nEighth Method.\u2014The following method is based on the circumstance that\nthe theory implies a belief which is so common to all peoples and ages,\nand so universal, that it appears to express a real fact and not merely\nan hypothesis. Aristotle says that all people have evidently believed\nin the permanency and stability of the heavens; and thinking that these\nwere eternal, they declared them to be the habitation of God and of the\nspiritual beings or angels. By thus attributing the heavens to God,\nthey expressed their belief that the heavens are indestructible.\nSeveral other arguments of the same kind are employed by Aristotle in\ntreating of this subject in order to support the results of his\nphilosophical speculation by common sense.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nIn this chapter I intend to show that Aristotle was well aware that he\nhad not proved the Eternity of the Universe. He was not mistaken in\nthis respect. He knew that he could not prove his theory, and that his\narguments and proofs were only apparent and plausible. They are the\nleast objectionable, according to Alexander; but, according to the same\nauthority, Aristotle could not have considered them conclusive, after\nhaving himself taught us the rules of logic, and the means by which\narguments can be refuted or confirmed.\n\nThe reason why I have introduced this subject is this: Later\nphilosophers, disciples of Aristotle, assume that he has proved the\nEternity of the Universe, and most of those who believe that they are\nphilosophers blindly follow him in this point, and accept all his\narguments as conclusive and absolute proofs. They consider it wrong to\ndiffer from Aristotle, or to think that he was ignorant or mistaken in\nanything. For this reason, taking their standpoint, I show that\nAristotle himself did not claim to have proved the Eternity of the\nUniverse. He says in his book Physics (viii., chap. i.) as follows:\n\u201cAll the Physicists before us believed that motion is eternal, except\nPlato, who holds that motion is transient; according to his opinion the\nheavens are likewise transient.\u201d Now if Aristotle had conclusive proofs\nfor his theory, he would not have considered it necessary to support it\nby citing the opinions of preceding Physicists, nor would he have found\nit necessary to point out the folly and absurdity of his opponents. For\na truth, once established by proof, does neither gain force nor\ncertainty by the consent of all scholars, nor lose by the general\ndissent. We further find that Aristotle, in the book The Heavens and\nthe World, introduces his theory of the Eternity of the Universe in the\nfollowing manner: \u201cLet us inquire into the nature of the heavens, and\nsee whether they are the product of something or not, destructible or\nnot.\u201d After this statement of the problem, he proceeds to cite the\nviews of those who hold that the heavens have had a beginning, and\ncontinues thus: \u201cBy doing this, our theory will be most plausible and\nacceptable in the opinion of profound thinkers; and it will be the more\nso, when, as we propose, the arguments of our opponents are first\nheard. For if we were to state our opinion and our arguments without\nmentioning those of our opponents, our words would be received less\nfavourably. He who desires to be just must not show himself hostile to\nhis opponent; he must have sympathy with him, and readily acknowledge\nany truth contained in his words; he must admit the correctness of such\nof his opponent\u2019s arguments as he would admit if they were in his own\nfavour.\u201d This is the contents of the words of Aristotle. Now, I ask\nyou, men of intelligence, can we have any complaint against him after\nthis frank statement? Or can any one now imagine that a real proof has\nbeen given for the Eternity of the Universe? Or can Aristotle, or any\none else, believe that a theorem, though fully proved, would not be\nacceptable unless the arguments of the opponents were fully refuted? We\nmust also take into consideration that Aristotle describes this theory\nas his opinion, and his proofs as arguments. Is Aristotle ignorant of\nthe difference between argument and proof? between opinions, which may\nbe received more or less favourably, and truths capable of\ndemonstration? or would rhetorical appeal to the impartiality of\nopponents have been required for the support of his theory if a real\nproof had been given? Certainly not. Aristotle only desires to show\nthat his theory is better than those of his opponents, who hold that\nphilosophical speculation leads to the conviction that the heavens are\ntransient, but have never been entirely without existence; or that the\nheavens have had a beginning, but are indestructible; or to defend any\nof the other views mentioned by him. In this he is undoubtedly right;\nfor his opinion is nearer the truth than theirs, so far as a proof can\nbe taken from the nature of existing things; we differ from him, as\nwill be explained. Passion, that exercises great influence in most of\nthe different sects, must have influenced even the philosophers who\nwished to affirm that Aristotle demonstrated his theory by proof.\nPerhaps they really believe it, and assume that Aristotle himself was\nnot aware of it, as it was only discovered after his death! My\nconviction is, that what Aristotle says on the Eternity of the\nUniverse, the cause of the variety in the motion of the spheres and the\norder of the Intelligences, cannot be proved, and that Aristotle never\nintended to prove these things. I agree with him that the ways of\nproving this theory have their gates closed before us, there being no\nfoundation on which to build up the proof. His words on this subject\nare well known. He says, \u201cThere are things concerning which we are\nunable to reason, or which we find too high for us; to say why these\nthings have a certain property is as difficult as to decide whether the\nUniverse is eternal or not.\u201d So far Aristotle. The interpretation which\nAbu-nasr offers of this parallel is well known. He denies that\nAristotle had any doubt about the Eternity of the Universe, and is very\nsevere upon Galen, who maintains that this theory is still doubtful,\nand that no proof has been offered. According to Abu-nasr, it is clear\nand demonstrable by proof that the heavens are eternal, but all that is\nenclosed within the heavens is transient. We hold, that by none of the\nmethods mentioned in this chapter can a theory be established, refuted,\nor shaken.\n\nWe have mentioned these things only because we know that the majority\nof those who consider themselves wise, although they know nothing of\nscience, accept the theory of the Eternity of the Universe on the\nauthority of famous scholars. They reject the words of the prophets,\nbecause the latter do not employ any scientific method by which only a\nfew persons would be instructed who are intellectually well prepared,\nbut simply communicate the truth as received by Divine inspiration.\n\nIn the chapters which follow we will expound the theory of the Creation\nin accordance with the teaching of Scripture.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nIn this chapter I will first expound my view on this question, and then\nsupport it by argument\u2014not by such arguments as those of the\nMutakallemim, who believe that they have proved the Creatio ex nihilo.\nI will not deceive myself, and consider dialectical methods as proofs;\nand the fact that a certain proposition has been proved by a\ndialectical argument will never induce me to accept that proposition,\nbut, on the contrary, will weaken my faith in it, and cause me to doubt\nit. For when we understand the fallacy of a proof, our faith in the\nproposition itself is shaken. It is therefore better that a proposition\nwhich cannot be demonstrated be received as an axiom, or that one of\nthe two opposite solutions of the problem be accepted on authority. The\nmethods by which the Mutakallemim proved the Creatio ex nihilo have\nalready been described by me, and I have exposed their weak points. As\nto the proofs of Aristotle and his followers for the Eternity of the\nUniverse, they are, according to my opinion, not conclusive; they are\nopen to strong objections, as will be explained. I intend to show that\nthe theory of the Creation, as taught in Scripture, contains nothing\nthat is impossible; and that all those philosophical arguments which\nseem to disprove our view contain weak points which make them\ninconclusive, and render the attacks on our view untenable. Since I am\nconvinced of the correctness of my method, and consider either of the\ntwo theories\u2014viz., the Eternity of the Universe, and the Creation\u2014as\nadmissible, I accept the latter on the authority of Prophecy, which can\nteach things beyond the reach of philosophical speculation. For the\nbelief in prophecy is, as will be shown in the course of this treatise,\nconsistent even with the belief in the Eternity of the Universe. When I\nhave established the admissibility of our theory, I will, by\nphilosophical reasoning, show that our theory of the Creation is more\nacceptable than that of the Eternity of the Universe; and although our\ntheory includes points open to criticism, I will show that there are\nmuch stronger reasons for the rejection of the theory of our opponents.\n\nI will now proceed to expound the method by which the proofs given for\nthe Eternity of the Universe can be refuted.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nEverything produced comes into existence from non-existence; even when\nthe substance of a thing has been in existence, and has only changed\nits form, the thing itself, which has gone through the process of\ngenesis and development, and has arrived at its final state, has now\ndifferent properties from those which it possessed at the commencement\nof the transition from potentiality to reality, or before that time.\nTake, e.g., the human ovum as contained in the female\u2019s blood when\nstill included in its vessels; its nature is different from what it was\nin the moment of conception, when it is met by the semen of the male\nand begins to develop; the properties of the semen in that moment are\ndifferent from the properties of the living being after its birth when\nfully developed. It is therefore quite impossible to infer from the\nnature which a thing possesses after having passed through all stages\nof its development, what the condition of the thing has been in the\nmoment when this process commenced; nor does the condition of a thing\nin this moment show what its previous condition has been. If you make\nthis mistake, and attempt to prove the nature of a thing in potential\nexistence by its properties when actually existing, you will fall into\ngreat confusion; you will reject evident truths and admit false\nopinions. Let us assume, in our above instance, that a man born without\ndefect had after his birth been nursed by his mother only a few months;\nthe mother then died, and the father alone brought him up in a lonely\nisland, till he grew up, became wise, and acquired knowledge. Suppose\nthis man has never seen a woman or any female being; he asks some\nperson how man has come into existence, and how he has developed, and\nreceives the following answer: \u201cMan begins his existence in the womb of\nan individual of his own class, namely, in the womb of a female, which\nhas a certain form. While in the womb he is very small; yet he has\nlife, moves, receives nourishment, and gradually grows, till he arrives\nat a certain stage of development. He then leaves the womb and\ncontinues to grow till he is in the condition in which you see him.\u201d\nThe orphan will naturally ask: \u201cDid this person, when he lived, moved,\nand grew in the womb, eat and drink, and breathe with his mouth and his\nnostrils? Did he excrete any substance?\u201d The answer will be, \u201cNo.\u201d\nUndoubtedly he will then attempt to refute the statements of that\nperson, and to prove their impossibility, by referring to the\nproperties of a fully developed person, in the following manner: \u201cWhen\nany one of us is deprived of breath for a short time he dies, and\ncannot move any longer: how then can we imagine that any one of us has\nbeen inclosed in a bag in the midst of a body for several months and\nremained alive, able to move? If any one of us would swallow a living\nbird, the bird would die immediately when it reached the stomach, much\nmore so when it came to the lower part of the belly; if we should not\ntake food or drink with our mouth, in a few days we should undoubtedly\nbe dead: how then can man remain alive for months without taking food?\nIf any person would take food and would not be able to excrete it,\ngreat pains and death would follow in a short time, and yet I am to\nbelieve that man has lived for months without that function! Suppose by\naccident a hole were formed in the belly of a person, it would prove\nfatal, and yet we are to believe that the navel of the f\u0153tus has been\nopen! Why should the f\u0153tus not open the eyes, spread forth the hands\nand stretch out the legs, if, as you think, the limbs are all whole and\nperfect.\u201d This mode of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that man\ncannot come into existence and develop in the manner described.\n\nIf philosophers would consider this example well and reflect on it,\nthey would find that it represents exactly the dispute between\nAristotle and ourselves. We, the followers of Moses, our Teacher, and\nof Abraham, our Father, believe that the Universe has been produced and\nhas developed in a certain manner, and that it has been created in a\ncertain order. The Aristotelians oppose us, and found their objections\non the properties which the things in the Universe possess when in\nactual existence and fully developed. We admit the existence of these\nproperties, but hold that they are by no means the same as those which\nthe things possessed in the moment of their production; and we hold\nthat these properties themselves have come into existence from absolute\nnon-existence. Their arguments are therefore no objection whatever to\nour theory; they have demonstrative force only against those who hold\nthat the nature of things as at present in existence proves the\nCreation. But this is not my opinion.\n\nI will now return to our theme, viz., to the description of the\nprincipal proofs of Aristotle, and show that they prove nothing\nwhatever against us, since we hold that God brought the entire Universe\ninto existence from absolute non-existence, and that He caused it to\ndevelop into the present state. Aristotle says that the materia prima\nis eternal, and by referring to the properties of transient beings he\nattempts to prove this statement, and to show that the materia prima\ncould not possibly have been produced. He is right; we do not maintain\nthat the materia prima has been produced in the same manner as man is\nproduced from the ovum, and that it can be destroyed in the same manner\nas man is reduced to dust. But we believe that God created it from\nnothing, and that since its creation it has its own properties, viz.,\nthat all things are produced of it and again reduced to it, when they\ncease to exist; that it does not exist without Form; and that it is the\nsource of all genesis and destruction. Its genesis is not like that of\nthe things produced from it, nor its destruction like theirs; for it\nhas been created from nothing, and if it should please the Creator, He\nmight reduce it to absolutely nothing. The same applies to motion.\nAristotle founds some of his proofs on the fact that motion is not\nsubject to genesis or destruction. This is correct; if we consider\nmotion as it exists at present, we cannot imagine that in its totality\nit should be subject, like individual motions, to genesis and\ndestruction. In like manner Aristotle is correct in saying that\ncircular motion is without beginning, in so far as seeing the rotating\nspherical body in actual existence, we cannot conceive the idea that\nthat rotation has ever been absent. The same argument we employ as\nregards the law that a state of potentiality precedes all actual\ngenesis. This law applies to the Universe as it exists at present, when\neverything produced originates in another thing; but nothing perceived\nwith our senses or comprehended in our mind can prove that a thing\ncreated from nothing must have been previously in a state of\npotentiality. Again, as regards the theory that the heavens contain no\nopposites [and are therefore indestructible], we admit its correctness;\nbut we do not maintain that the production of the heavens has taken\nplace in the same way as that of a horse or ass, and we do not say that\nthey are like plants and animals, which are destructible on account of\nthe opposite elements they contain. In short, the properties of things\nwhen fully developed contain no clue as to what have been the\nproperties of the things before their perfection. We therefore do not\nreject as impossible the opinion of those who say that the heavens were\nproduced before the earth, or the reverse, or that the heavens have\nexisted without stars, or that certain species of animals have been in\nexistence, and others not. For the state of the whole Universe when it\ncame into existence may be compared with that of animals when their\nexistence begins; the heart evidently precedes the testicles, the veins\nare in existence before the bones; although, when the animal is fully\ndeveloped, none of the parts is missing which is essential to its\nexistence. This remark is not superfluous, if the Scriptural account of\nthe Creation be taken literally; in reality, it cannot be taken\nliterally, as will be shown when we shall treat of this subject.\n\nThe principle laid down in the foregoing must be well understood; it is\na high rampart erected round the Law, and able to resist all missiles\ndirected against it. Aristotle, or rather his followers, may perhaps\nask us how we know that the Universe has been created; and that other\nforces than those it has at present were acting in its Creation, since\nwe hold that the properties of the Universe, as it exists at present,\nprove nothing as regards its creation? We reply, there is no necessity\nfor this according to our plan; for we do not desire to prove the\nCreation, but only its possibility; and this possibility is not refuted\nby arguments based on the nature of the present Universe, which we do\nnot dispute. When we have established the admissibility of our theory,\nwe shall then show its superiority. In attempting to prove the\ninadmissibility of Creatio ex nihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore\nnot derive any support from the nature of the Universe; they must\nresort to the notion our mind has formed of God. Their proofs include\nthe three methods which I have mentioned above, and which are based on\nthe notion conceived of God. In the next chapter I will expose the weak\npoints of these arguments, and show that they really prove nothing.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\n\nThe first method employed by the philosophers is this: they assume that\na transition from potentiality to actuality would take place in the\nDeity itself, if He produced a thing only at a certain fixed time. The\nrefutation of this argument is very easy. The argument applies only to\nbodies composed of substance\u2014the element that possesses the possibility\n[of change]\u2014and form; for when such a body does not act for some time,\nand then acts by virtue of its form, it must undoubtedly have possessed\nsomething in potentia that hath now become actual, and the transition\ncan only have been effected by some external agent. As far as corporeal\nbodies are concerned, this has been fully proved. But that which is\nincorporeal and without substance does not include anything merely\npossible; everything it contains is always in existence. The above\nargument does not apply to it, and it is not impossible that such a\nbeing acts at one time and does not act at another. This does not imply\na change in the incorporeal being itself nor a transition from\npotentiality to actuality. The Active Intellect may be taken as an\nillustration. According to Aristotle and his school, the Active\nIntellect, an incorporeal being, acts at one time and does not act at\nanother, as has been shown by Abu-nasr in his treatise on the\nIntellect. He says there quite correctly as follows: \u201cIt is an evident\nfact that the Active Intellect does not act continually, but only at\ntimes.\u201d And yet he does not say that the Active Intellect is\nchangeable, or passes from a state of potentiality to that of\nactuality, although it produces at one time something which it has not\nproduced before. For there is no relation or comparison whatever\nbetween corporeal and incorporeal beings, neither in the moment of\naction nor in that of inaction. It is only by homonymity that the term\n\u201caction\u201d is used in reference to the forms residing in bodies, and also\nin reference to absolutely spiritual beings. The circumstance that a\npurely spiritual being does not effect at one time that which it\neffects at another, does not necessitate a transition from potentiality\nto actuality; such a transition is necessary in the case of forces\nconnected with bodies. It might, perhaps, be objected that our argument\nis, to some extent, a fallacy; since it is not due to anything\ncontained in the Active Intellect itself, but to the absence of\nsubstances sufficiently prepared for its action, that at times it does\nnot act; it does act always when substances sufficiently prepared are\npresent, and, when the action does not continue, it is owing to the\nabsence of substance sufficiently prepared, and not to any change in\nthe Intellect. I answer that it is not our intention to state the\nreason why God created at one time and not at another; and, in\nreferring to the Active Intellect as a parallel, we do not mean to\nassert that God acts at one time and not at another, in the same manner\nas the Active Intellect, an absolutely spiritual being, acts\nintermittently. We do not make this assertion, and, if we did, the\nconclusion would be fallacious. What we infer, and what we are\njustified in inferring, is this: the Active Intellect is neither a\ncorporeal object nor a force residing in a body; it acts\nintermittently, and yet whatever the cause may be why it does not\nalways act, we do not say that the Active Intellect has passed from a\nstate of potentiality to that of actuality; or that it implies the\npossibility [of change], or that an agent must exist that causes the\ntransition from potentiality to actuality. We have thus refuted the\nstrong objection raised by those who believe in the Eternity of the\nUniverse; since we believe that God is neither a corporeal body nor a\nforce residing in a body, we need not assume that the Creation, after a\nperiod of inaction, is due to a change in the Creator Himself.\n\nThe second method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is\nbased on the theory that all wants, changes, and obstacles are absent\nfrom the Essence of God. Our refutation of this proof, which is both\ndifficult and profound, is this. Every being that is endowed with free\nwill and performs certain acts in reference to another being,\nnecessarily interrupts those acts at one time or another, in\nconsequence of some obstacles or changes. E.g., a person desires to\nhave a house, but he does not build one, because he meets with some\nobstacles: he has not the material, or he has the material, but it is\nnot prepared for the purpose on account of the absence of proper\ninstruments; or he has material and instruments, and yet does not build\na house, because he does not desire to build it; since he feels no want\nfor a refuge. When changed circumstances, as heat or cold, impel him to\nseek a refuge, then he desires to build a house. Thus changed\ncircumstances change his will, and the will, when it meets with\nobstacles, is not carried into effect. This, however, is only the case\nwhen the causes of the actions are external; but when the action has no\nother purpose whatever than to fulfil the will, then the will does not\ndepend on the existence of favourable circumstances. The being endowed\nwith this will need not act continually even in the absence of all\nobstacles, because there does not exist anything for the sake of which\nit acts, and which, in the absence of all obstacles, would necessitate\nthe action: the act simply follows the will. But, some might ask, even\nif we admit the correctness of all this, is not change imputed in the\nfact that the will of the being exists at one time and not at another?\nI reply thus: The true essence of the will of a being is simply the\nfaculty of conceiving a desire at one time and not conceiving it at\nanother. In the case of corporeal beings, the will which aims at a\ncertain external object changes according to obstacles and\ncircumstances. But the will of an absolutely spiritual being which does\nnot depend on external causes is unchangeable, and the fact that the\nbeing desires one thing one day and another thing another day, does not\nimply a change in the essence of that being, or necessitate the\nexistence of an external cause [for this change in the desire].\nSimilarly it has been shown by us that if a being acted at one time and\ndid not act at another, this would not involve a change in the being\nitself. It is now clear that the term \u201cwill\u201d is homonymously used of\nman\u2019s will and of the will of God, there being no comparison whatever\nbetween God\u2019s will and that of man. The objection is refuted, and our\ntheory is not shaken by it. This is all we desire to establish.\n\nThe third method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is\nthis: whatever the wisdom of God finds necessary to produce is produced\neo ipso; but this wisdom, being His Essence, is eternal, and that which\nresults from His wisdom must be eternal. This is a very weak argument.\nAs we do not understand why the wisdom of God produced nine spheres,\nneither more nor less, or why He fixed the number and size of the stars\nexactly as they are; so we cannot understand why His wisdom at a\ncertain time caused the Universe to exist, whilst a short time before\nit had not been in existence. All things owe their existence to His\neternal and constant wisdom, but we are utterly ignorant of the ways\nand methods of that wisdom, since, according to our opinion [that God\nhas no attributes], His will is identical with His wisdom, and all His\nattributes are one and the same thing, namely, His Essence or Wisdom.\nMore will be said on this question in the section on Providence. Thus\nthis objection to our theory falls likewise to the ground.\n\nThere is no evidence for the theory of the Eternity of the Universe,\nneither in the fact cited by Aristotle of the general consent of the\nancient peoples when they describe the heavens as the habitation of the\nangels and of God, nor in the apparent concurrence of Scriptural texts\nwith this belief. These facts merely prove that the heavens lead us to\nbelieve in the existence of the Intelligences, i.e., ideals and angels,\nand that these lead us to believe in the existence of God; for He sets\nthem in motion, and rules them. We will explain and show that there is\nno better evidence for the existence of a Creator, as we believe, than\nthat furnished by the heavens; but also according to the opinion of the\nphilosophers, as has been mentioned by us, they give evidence that a\nbeing exists that sets them in motion, and that this being is neither a\ncorporeal body nor a force residing in a body.\n\nHaving proved that our theory is admissible, and not impossible, as\nthose who defend the Eternity of the Universe assert, I will, in the\nchapters which follow, show that our theory is preferable from a\nphilosophical point of view, and expose the absurdities implied in the\ntheory of Aristotle.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\n\nIt has been shown that according to Aristotle, and according to all\nthat defend his theory, the Universe is inseparable from God; He is the\ncause, and the Universe the effect; and this effect is a necessary one;\nand as it cannot be explained why or how God exists in this particular\nmanner, namely, being One and incorporeal, so it cannot be asked\nconcerning the whole Universe why or how it exists in this particular\nway. For it is necessary that the whole, the cause as well as the\neffect, exist in this particular manner, it is impossible for them not\nto exist, or to be different from what they actually are. This leads to\nthe conclusion that the nature of everything remains constant, that\nnothing changes its nature in any way, and that such a change is\nimpossible in any existing thing. It would also follow that the\nUniverse is not the result of design, choice, and desire; for if this\nwere the case, they would have been non-existing before the design had\nbeen conceived.\n\nWe, however, hold that all things in the Universe are the result of\ndesign, and not merely of necessity; He who designed them may change\nthem when He changes His design. But not every design is subject to\nchange; for there are things which are impossible, and their nature\ncannot be altered, as will be explained. Here, in this chapter, I\nmerely wish to show by arguments almost as forcible as real proofs,\nthat the Universe gives evidence of design; but I will not fall into\nthe error in which the Mutakallemim have so much distinguished\nthemselves, namely, of ignoring the existing nature of things or\nassuming the existence of atoms, or the successive creation of\naccidents, or any of their propositions which I have tried to explain,\nand which are intended to establish the principle of Divine selection.\nYou must not, however, think that they understood the principle in the\nsame sense as we do, although they undoubtedly aimed at the same thing,\nand mentioned the same things which we also will mention, when they\ntreated of Divine Selection. For they do not distinguish between\nselection in the case of a plant to make it red and not white, or sweet\nand not bitter, and determination in the case of the heavens which gave\nthem their peculiar geometrical form and did not give them a triangular\nor quadrilateral shape. The Mutakallemim established the principle of\ndetermination by means of their propositions, which have been\nenumerated above (Part I., chap. lxxiii.). I will establish this\nprinciple only as far as necessary, and only by philosophical\npropositions based on the nature of things. But before I begin my\nargument, I will state the following facts: Matter is common to things\ndifferent from each other; there must be either one external cause\nwhich endows this matter partly with one property, partly with another,\nor there must be as many different causes as there are different forms\nof the matter common to all things. This is admitted by those who\nassume the Eternity of the Universe. After having premised this\nproposition, I will proceed with the discussion of our theme from an\nAristotelian point of view, in form of a dialogue.\n\nWe.\u2014You have proved that all things in the sublunary world have one\ncommon substance; why then do the species of things vary? why are the\nindividuals in each species different from each other?\n\nAristotelian.\u2014Because the composition of the things formed of that\nsubstance varies. For the common substance at first received four\ndifferent forms, and each form was endowed with two qualities, and\nthrough these four qualities the substance was turned into the elements\nof which all things are formed. The composition of the elements takes\nplace in the following manner:\u2014First they are mixed in consequence of\nthe motion of the spheres, and then they combine together; a cause for\nvariation arises then in the variation of the degree of heat, cold,\nmoisture, and dryness of the elements which form the constituent parts\nof the things. By these different combinations things are variously\npredisposed to receive different forms; and these in their turn are\nagain prepared to receive other forms, and so on. Each generic form\nfinds a wide sphere in its substance both as regards quality and\nquantity; and the individuals of the classes vary accordingly. This is\nfully explained in Natural Science. It is quite correct and clear to\nevery one that readily acknowledges the truth, and does not wish to\ndeceive himself.\n\nWe.\u2014Since the combination of the elements prepares substances and\nenables them to receive different forms, what has prepared the first\nsubstance and caused one part of it to receive the form of fire,\nanother part the form of earth, and the parts between these two the\nforms of water and of air, since one substance is common to all?\nThrough what has the substance of earth become more fit for the form of\nearth, and the substance of fire more fit for that of fire?\n\nAr.\u2014The difference of the elements was caused by their different\nposition; for the different places prepared the same substance\ndifferently, in the following way: the portion nearest the surrounding\nsphere became more rarified and swifter in motion, and thus approaching\nthe nature of that sphere, it received by this preparation the form of\nfire. The farther the substance is away from the surrounding sphere\ntowards the centre, the denser, the more solid, and the less luminous\nit is; it becomes earth; the same is the cause of the formation of\nwater and air. This is necessarily so; for it would be absurd to deny\nthat each part of the substance is in a certain place; or to assume\nthat the surface is identical with the centre, or the centre with the\nsurface. This difference in place determined the different forms, i.e.,\npredisposed the substance to receive different forms.\n\nWe.\u2014Is the substance of the surrounding sphere, i.e., the heavens, the\nsame as that of the elements?\n\nAr.\u2014No; the substance is different, and the forms are different. The\nterm \u201cbody\u201d is homonymously used of these bodies below and of the\nheavens, as has been shown by modern philosophers. All this has been\ndemonstrated by proof.\n\nBut let now the reader of this treatise hear what I have to say.\nAristotle has proved that the difference of forms becomes evident by\nthe difference of actions. Since, therefore, the motion of the elements\nis rectilinear, and that of the spheres circular, we infer that the\nsubstances are different. This inference is supported by Natural\nScience. When we further notice that substances with rectilinear motion\ndiffer in their directions, that some move upward, some downward, and\nthat substances which move in the same direction have different\nvelocities, we infer that their forms must be different. Thus we learn\nthat there are four elements. In the same way we come to the conclusion\nthat the substance of all the spheres is the same, since they all have\ncircular motion. Their forms, however, are different, since one sphere\nmoves from east to west, and another from west to east; and their\nmotions have also different velocities. We can now put the following\nquestion to Aristotle: There is one substance common to all spheres;\neach one has its own peculiar form. Who thus determined and predisposed\nthese spheres to receive different forms? Is there above the spheres\nany being capable of determining this except God? I will show the\nprofundity and the extraordinary acumen which Aristotle displayed when\nthis question troubled him. He strove very hard to meet this objection\nwith arguments, which, however, were not borne out by facts. Although\nhe does not mention this objection, it is clear from his words that he\nendeavours to show the nature of the spheres, as he has shown that of\nthe things in the sublunary world. Everything is, according to him, the\nresult of a law of Nature, and not the result of the design of a being\nthat designs as it likes, or the determination of a being that\ndetermines as it pleases. He has not carried out the idea consistently,\nand it will never be done. He tries indeed to find the cause why the\nsphere moves from east and not from west; why some spheres move with\ngreater velocity, others with less velocity, and he finds the cause of\nthese differences in their different positions in reference to the\nuppermost sphere. He further attempts to show why there are several\nspheres for each of the seven planets, while there is only one sphere\nfor the large number of fixed stars. For all this he endeavours to\nstate the reason, so as to show that the whole order is the necessary\nresult of the laws of Nature. He has not attained his object. For as\nregards the things in the sublunary world, his explanations are in\naccordance with facts, and the relation between cause and effect is\nclearly shown. It can therefore be assumed that everything is the\nnecessary result of the motions and influences of the spheres. But when\nhe treats of the properties of the spheres, he does not clearly show\nthe causal relation, nor does he explain the phenomena in that\nsystematic way which the hypothesis of natural laws would demand. For\nlet us consider the spheres: in one case a sphere with greater velocity\nis above a sphere with less velocity, in another case we notice the\nreverse; in a third case there are two spheres with equal velocities,\none above the other. There are, besides, other phenomena which speak\nstrongly against the hypothesis that all is regulated by the laws of\nNature, and I will devote a special chapter to the discussion of these\nphenomena. In short, there is no doubt that Aristotle knew the weakness\nof his arguments in tracing and describing the cause of all these\nthings, and therefore he prefaces his researches on these things as\nfollows:\u2014\u201cWe will now thoroughly investigate two problems, which it is\nour proper duty to investigate and to discuss according to our\ncapacity, wisdom, and opinion. This our attempt must not be attributed\nto presumption and pride, but to our extraordinary zeal in the study of\nphilosophy; when we attempt the highest and grandest problems, and\nendeavour to offer some proper solution, every one that hears it should\nrejoice and be pleased.\u201d So far Aristotle. This shows that he\nundoubtedly knew the weakness of his theory. How much weaker must it\nappear when we bear in mind that the science of Astronomy was not yet\nfully developed, and that in the days of Aristotle the motions of the\nspheres were not known so well as they are at present. I think that it\nwas the object of Aristotle in attributing in his Metaphysics one\nIntelligence to every sphere, to assume the existence of something\ncapable of determining the peculiar course of each sphere. Later on I\nwill show that he has not gained anything thereby; but now I will\nexplain the words, \u201caccording to our capacity, wisdom, and opinion,\u201d\noccurring in the passage which we quoted. I have not noticed that any\nof the commentators explain them. The term \u201cour opinion\u201d refers to the\nprinciple that everything is the result of natural laws, or to the\ntheory of the Eternity of the Universe. By \u201cour wisdom\u201d he meant the\nknowledge of that which is clear and generally accepted, viz., that the\nexistence of every one of these things is due to a certain cause, and\nnot to chance. By \u201cour capacity\u201d he meant the insufficiency of our\nintellect to find the causes of all these things. He only intended to\ntrace the causes for a few of them; and so he did. For he gives an\nexcellent reason why the sphere of the fixed stars moves slowly, while\nthe other spheres move with greater velocity, namely, because its\nmotion is in a different direction [from the uppermost sphere]. He\nfurther says that the more distant a sphere is from the eighth sphere\nthe greater is its velocity. But this rule does not hold good in all\ncases, as I have already explained (p. 174). More forcible still is the\nfollowing objection: There are spheres below the eighth that move from\neast to west. Of these each upper one, according to this rule, would\nhave a greater velocity than the lower one; and the velocity of these\nspheres would almost equal that of the ninth sphere. But Astronomy had,\nin the days of Aristotle, not yet developed to the height it has\nreached at present.\n\nAccording to our theory of the Creation, all this can easily be\nexplained; for we say that there is a being that determines the\ndirection and the velocity of the motion of each sphere; but we do not\nknow the reason why the wisdom of that being gave to each sphere its\npeculiar property. If Aristotle had been able to state the cause of the\ndifference in the motion of the spheres, and show that it corresponded\nas he thought to their relative positions, this would have been\nexcellent, and the variety in their motions would be explained in the\nsame way as the variety of the elements, by their relative position\nbetween the centre and the surface; but this is not the case, as I said\nbefore.\n\nThere is a phenomenon in the spheres which more clearly shows the\nexistence of voluntary determination; it cannot be explained otherwise\nthan by assuming that some being designed it: this phenomenon is the\nexistence of the stars. The fact that the sphere is constantly in\nmotion, while the stars remain stationary, indicates that the substance\nof the stars is different from that of the spheres. Abu-nasr has\nalready mentioned the fact in his additions to the Physics of\nAristotle. He says: \u201cThere is a difference between the stars and the\nspheres; for the spheres are transparent, the stars are opaque; and the\ncause of this is that there is a difference, however small it may be,\nbetween their substances and forms.\u201d So far Abu-nasr. But I do not say\nthat there is a small difference, but a very great difference; because\nI do not infer it from the transparency of the spheres, but from their\nmotions. I am convinced that there are three different kinds of\nsubstance, with three different forms, namely:\u2014(1) Bodies which never\nmove of their own accord; such are the bodies of the stars; (2) bodies\nwhich always move, such are the bodies of the spheres; (3) bodies which\nboth move and rest, such are the elements. Now, I ask, what has united\nthese two bodies, which, according to my opinion, differ very much from\neach other, though, according to Abu-nasr, only a little? Who has\nprepared the bodies for this union? In short, it would be strange that,\nwithout the existence of design, one of two different bodies should be\njoined to the other in such a manner that it is fixed to it in a\ncertain place but does not combine with it. It is still more difficult\nto explain the existence of the numerous stars in the eighth sphere;\nthey are all spherical; some of them are large, some small; here we\nnotice two stars apparently distant from each other one cubit; there a\ngroup of ten close together; whilst in another place there is a large\nspace without any star. What determined that the one small part should\nhave ten stars, and the other portion should be without any star? and\nthe whole body of the sphere being uniform throughout, why should a\nparticular star occupy the one place and not another? The answer to\nthese and similar questions is very difficult, and almost impossible,\nif we assume that all emanates from God as the necessary result of\ncertain permanent laws, as Aristotle holds. But if we assume that all\nthis is the result of design, there is nothing strange or improbable;\nand the only question to be asked is this: What is the cause of this\ndesign? The answer to this question is that all this has been made for\na certain purpose, though we do not know it; there is nothing that is\ndone in vain, or by chance. It is well known that the veins and nerves\nof an individual dog or ass are not the result of chance; their\nmagnitude is not determined by chance; nor is it by chance, but for a\ncertain purpose, that one vein is thick, another thin; that one nerve\nhas many branches, another has none; that one goes down straight,\nwhilst another is bent; it is well known that all this must be just as\nit is. How, then, can any reasonable person imagine that the position,\nmagnitude, and number of the stars, or the various courses of their\nspheres, are purposeless, or the result of chance? There is no doubt\nthat every one of these things is necessary and in accordance with a\ncertain design; and it is extremely improbable that these things should\nbe the necessary result of natural laws, and not that of design.\n\nThe best proof for design in the Universe I find in the different\nmotions of the spheres, and in the fixed position of the stars in the\nspheres. For this reason you find all the prophets point to the spheres\nand stars when they want to prove that there must exist a Divine Being.\nThus Abraham reflected on the stars, as is well known; Isaiah (xl. 26)\nexhorts to learn from them the existence of God, and says, \u201cLift up\nyour eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things?\u201d Jeremiah\n[calls God] \u201cThe Maker of the heavens\u201d; Abraham calls Him \u201cThe God of\nthe heavens\u201d (Gen. xxiv. 7); [Moses], the chief of the Prophets, uses\nthe phrase explained by us (Part I., chap, lxx.), \u201cHe who rideth on the\nheavens\u201d (Deut. xxxiii. 26). The proof taken from the heavens is\nconvincing; for the variety of things in the sublunary world, though\ntheir substance is one and the same, can be explained as the work of\nthe influences of the spheres, or the result of the variety in the\nposition of the substance in relation to the spheres, as has been shown\nby Aristotle. But who has determined the variety in the spheres and the\nstars, if not the Will of God? To say that the Intelligences have\ndetermined it is of no use whatever; for the Intelligences are not\ncorporeal, and have no local relation to the spheres. Why then should\nthe one sphere in its desire to approach the Intelligence, move\neastward, and another westward? Is the one Intelligence in the east,\nthe other in the west? or why does one move with great velocity,\nanother slowly? This difference is not in accordance with their\ndistances from each other, as is well known. We must then say that the\nnature and essence of each sphere necessitated its motion in a certain\ndirection, and in a certain manner, as the consequence of its desire to\napproach its Intelligence. Aristotle clearly expresses this opinion. We\nthus have returned to the part from which we started; and we ask, Since\nthe substance of all things is the same, what made the nature of one\nportion different from another? Why has this sphere a desire which\nproduces a motion different from that which the desire of another\nsphere produces? This must have been done by an agent capable of\ndetermining. We have thus been brought to examine two questions:\u2014(1) Is\nit necessary to assume that the variety of the things in the Universe\nis the result of Design, and not of fixed laws of Nature, or is it not\nnecessary? (2) Assuming that all this is the result of Design, does it\nfollow that it has been created after not having existed, or does\nCreatio ex nihilo not follow, and has the Being which has determined\nall this done always so? Some of those who believe in the Eternity of\nthe Universe hold the last opinion. I will now begin the examination of\nthese two questions, and explain them as much as necessary in the\nfollowing chapters.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\n\nAccording to Aristotle, none of the products of Nature are due to\nchance. His proof is this: That which is due to chance does not\nreappear constantly nor frequently, but all products of Nature reappear\neither constantly or at least frequently. The heavens, with all that\nthey contain, are constant; they never change, as has been explained,\nneither as regards their essence nor as regards their place. But in the\nsublunary world we find both things which are constant and things which\nreappear frequently [though not constantly]. Thus, e.g., the heat of\nfire and the downward tendency of a stone are constant properties,\nwhilst the form and life of the individuals in each species are the\nsame in most cases. All this is clear. If the parts of the Universe are\nnot accidental, how can the whole Universe be considered as the result\nof chance? Therefore the existence of the Universe is not due to\nchance. The following is, in short, the objection which Aristotle\nraises against one of the earlier philosophers who assumed that the\nUniverse is the result of chance, and that it came into existence by\nitself, without any cause. Some assume that the heavens and the whole\nUniverse came into existence spontaneously, as well as the rotation and\nmotion [of the spheres], which has produced the variety of things and\nestablished their present order. This opinion implies a great\nabsurdity. They admit that animals and plants do not owe their\nexistence or production to chance, but to a certain cause, be that\ncause Nature, or reason, or the like; e.g., they do not assume that\neverything might be formed by chance of a certain seed or semen, but\nthat of a certain seed only an olive-tree is produced, and of a certain\nsemen only a human being is developed. And yet they think that the\nheavens, and those bodies which appear divine among the rest of bodies,\ncame into existence spontaneously, without the action of any such cause\nas produces plants and animals. Having thus examined this theory,\nAristotle then proceeds to refute it at greater length. It is therefore\nclear that Aristotle believes and proves that things in real existence\nare not accidental; they cannot be accidental, because they are\nessential, i.e., there is a cause which necessitates that they should\nbe in their actual condition, and on account of that cause they are\njust as they in reality are. This has been proved, and it is the\nopinion of Aristotle. But I do not think that, according to Aristotle,\nthe rejection of the spontaneous origin of things implies the admission\nof Design and Will. For as it is impossible to reconcile two opposites,\nso it is impossible to reconcile the two theories, that of necessary\nexistence by causality, and that of Creation by the desire and will of\na Creator. For the necessary existence assumed by Aristotle must be\nunderstood in this sense, that for everything that is not the product\nof work there must be a certain cause that produces it with its\nproperties; for this cause there is another cause, and for the second a\nthird, and so on. The series of causes ends with the Prime Cause, from\nwhich everything derives existence, since it is impossible that the\nseries should continue ad infinitum. He nevertheless does not mean to\nsay that the existence of the Universe is the necessary product of the\nCreator, i.e., the Prime Cause, in the same manner as the shadow is\ncaused by a body, or heat by fire, or light by the sun. Only those who\ndo not comprehend his words attribute such ideas to him. He uses here\nthe term necessary in the same sense as we use the term when we say\nthat the existence of the intellectus necessarily implies that of the\nintellectum, for the former is the efficient cause of the latter in so\nfar as intellectum. Even Aristotle holds that the Prime Cause is the\nhighest and most perfect Intellect; he therefore says that the First\nCause is pleased, satisfied, and delighted with that which necessarily\nderives existence from Him, and it is impossible that He should wish it\nto be different. But we do not call this \u201cdesign,\u201d and it has nothing\nin common with design. E.g., man is pleased, satisfied, and delighted\nthat he is endowed with eyes and hands, and it is impossible that he\nshould desire it to be otherwise, and yet the eyes and hands which a\nman has are not the result of his design, and it is not by his own\ndetermination that he has certain properties and is able to perform\ncertain actions. The notion of design and determination applies only to\nthings not yet in existence, when there is still the possibility of\ntheir being in accordance with the design or not. I do not know whether\nthe modern Aristotelians understood his words to imply that the\nexistence of the Universe presupposes some cause in the sense of design\nand determination, or whether, in opposition to him, they assumed\ndesign and determination, in the belief that this does not conflict\nwith the theory of the Eternity of the Universe.\n\nHaving explained this, I will now proceed to examine the opinions of\nthe modern philosophers.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\n\nSome of the recent philosophers who adhere to the theory of the\nEternity of the Universe hold that God produces the Universe, that He\nby His will designs and determines its existence and form; they reject,\nhowever, the theory that this act took place at one certain time, and\nassume that this always has been the case, and will always be so. The\ncircumstance that we cannot imagine an agent otherwise than preceding\nthe result of its action, they explain by the fact that this is\ninvariably the case in all that we produce; because for agents of the\nsame kind as we are, there are some moments in which they are not\nactive, and are only agents in potentia; they become agents when they\nact. But as regards God there are no moments of non-action, or of\npotentiality in any respect; He is not before His work, He is always an\nactual agent. And as there is a great difference between His essence\nand ours, so is also a great difference between the relation of His\nwork to Him and the relation of our work to us. They apply the same\nargument to will and determination; for there is no difference in this\nrespect whether we say He acts, wills, designs, or determines. They\nfurther assume that change in His action or will is inadmissible. It is\ntherefore clear that these philosophers abandoned the term \u201cnecessary\nresult,\u201d but retained the theory of it; they perhaps sought to use a\nbetter expression, or to remove an objectionable term. For it is the\nsame thing, whether we say in accordance with the view of Aristotle\nthat the Universe is the result of the Prime Cause, and must be eternal\nas that Cause is eternal, or in accordance with these philosophers that\nthe Universe is the result of the act, design, will, selection, and\ndetermination of God, but it has always been so, and will always be so;\nin the same manner as the rising of the sun undoubtedly produces the\nday, and yet it does not precede it. But when we speak of design we do\nnot mean it in this sense; we mean to express by it that the Universe\nis not the \u201cnecessary result\u201d of God\u2019s existence, as the effect is the\nnecessary result of the efficient cause; in the latter case the effect\ncannot be separated from the cause; it cannot change unless the cause\nchanges entirely, or at least in some respect. If we accept this\nexplanation we easily see how absurd it is to say that the Universe is\nin the same relation to God as the effect is to the efficient cause,\nand to assume at the same time that the Universe is the result of the\naction and determination of God.\n\nHaving fully explained this subject, we come to the question whether\nthe cause, which must be assumed for the variety of properties noticed\nin the heavenly beings, is merely an efficient cause, that must\nnecessarily produce that variety as its effect, or whether that variety\nis due to a determining agent, such as we believe, in accordance with\nthe theory of Moses our Teacher. Before I discuss this question I will\nfirst explain fully what Aristotle means by \u201cnecessary result\u201d; after\nthat I will show by such philosophical arguments as are free from every\nfallacy why I prefer the theory of Creatio ex nihilo. It is clear that\nwhen he says that the first Intelligence is the necessary result of the\nexistence of God, the second Intelligence the result of the existence\nof the first, the third of the second [and so on], and that the spheres\nare the necessary result of the existence of the Intelligences, and so\nforth, in the well-known order which you learnt from passages dealing\nwith it, and of which we have given a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 in this part (ch. iv.)\u2014he\ndoes not mean that the one thing was first in existence, and then the\nsecond came as the necessary result of the first; he denies that any\none of these beings has had a beginning. By \u201cnecessary result\u201d he\nmerely refers to the causal relation; he means to say that the first\nIntelligence is the cause of the existence of the second; the second of\nthe third, and so on to the last of the Intelligences; and the same is\nalso the case as regards the spheres and the materia prima; none of\nthese preceded another, or has been in existence without the existence\nof that other. We say, e.g., that the necessary result of the primary\nqualities are roughness [and] smoothness, hardness [and] softness,\nporosity and solidity; and no person doubts that heat, cold, moisture,\nand dryness are the causes of smoothness and roughness, of hardness and\nsoftness, porosity and solidity, and similar qualities, and that the\nlatter are the necessary result of those four primary qualities. And\nyet it is impossible that a body should exist with the primary\nqualities without the secondary ones; for the relation between the two\nsets of qualities is that of causality, not that of agent and its\nproduct. Just in the same way the term \u201cnecessary result\u201d is used by\nAristotle in reference to the whole Universe, when he says that one\nportion is the result of the other, and continues the series up to the\nFirst Cause as he calls it, or first Intellect, if you prefer this\nterm. For we all mean the same, only with this difference, that\naccording to Aristotle everything besides that Being is the necessary\nresult of the latter, as I have already mentioned; whilst, according to\nour opinion, that Being created the whole Universe with design and\nwill, so that the Universe which had not been in existence before, has\nby His will come into existence. I will now begin in the following\nchapters my proofs for the superiority of our theory, that of Creatio\nex nihilo.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\n\nAristotle and all philosophers assume as an axiom that a simple element\ncan only produce one simple thing, whilst a compound can produce as\nmany things as it contains simple elements; e.g., fire combines in\nitself two properties, heat and dryness; it gives heat by the one\nproperty, and produces dryness by the other: an object composed of\nmatter and form produces certain things on account of its matter, and\nothers on account of its form, if [both matter and form] consist of\nseveral elements. In accordance with this axiom, Aristotle holds that\nthe direct emanation from God must be one simple Intelligence, and\nnothing else.\n\nA second axiom assumed by him is this: Things are not produced by other\nthings at random; there must be some relation between cause and effect.\nThus accidents are not produced by accidents promiscuously; quality\ncannot be the origin of quantity, nor quantity that of quality; a form\ncannot emanate from matter, nor matter from form.\n\nA third axiom is this: A single agent that acts with design and will,\nand not merely by the force of the laws of Nature, can produce\ndifferent objects.\n\nA fourth axiom is as follows: An object, whose several elements are\nonly connected by juxtaposition, is more properly a compound than an\nobject whose different elements have entirely combined; e.g., bone,\nflesh, veins, or nerves, are more simple than the hand or the foot,\nthat are a combination of bone, flesh, veins, and nerves. This is very\nclear, and requires no further explanation.\n\nHaving premised these axioms, I ask the following question: Aristotle\nholds that the first Intelligence is the cause of the second, the\nsecond of the third, and so on, till the thousandth, if we assume a\nseries of that number. Now the first Intellect is undoubtedly simple.\nHow then can the compound form of existing things come from such an\nIntellect by fixed laws of Nature, as Aristotle assumes? We admit all\nhe said concerning the Intelligences, that the further they are away\nfrom the first, the greater is the variety of their compounds, in\nconsequence of the larger number of the objects comprehensible by the\nIntelligences; but even after admitting this, the question remains, By\nwhat law of Nature did the spheres emanate from the Intelligences? What\nrelation is there between material and immaterial beings? Suppose we\nadmit that each sphere emanates from an Intelligence of the form\nmentioned; that the Intelligence, including, as it were, two elements,\nin so far as it comprehends itself and another thing, produces the next\nIntelligence by the one element, and a sphere by the other; but the\nquestion would then be, how the one simple element could produce the\nsphere, that contains two substances and two forms, namely, the\nsubstance and the form of the sphere, and also the substance and the\nform of the star fixed in that sphere. For, according to the laws of\nNature, the compound can only emanate from a compound. There must\ntherefore be one element, from which the body of the sphere emanates,\nand another element, from which the body of the star emanates. This\nwould be necessary even if the substance of all stars were the same;\nbut it is possible that the luminous stars have not the same substance\nas the non-luminous stars; it is besides well known that each body has\nits own matter and its own form. It must now be clear that this\nemanation could not have taken place by the force of the laws of\nNature, as Aristotle contends. Nor does the difference of the motions\nof the spheres follow the order of their positions; and therefore it\ncannot be said that this difference is the result of certain laws of\nNature. We have already mentioned this (ch. xix.).\n\nThere is in the properties of the spheres another circumstance that is\nopposed to the assumed laws of Nature; namely, if the substance of all\nspheres is the same, why does it not occur that the form of one sphere\ncombines with the substance of another sphere, as is the case with\nthings on earth, simply because their substance is fit [for such\nchanges]? If the substance of all spheres is the same, if it is not\nassumed that each of them has a peculiar substance, and if, contrary to\nall principles, the peculiar motion of each sphere is no evidence for\nthe special character of its substance, why then should a certain form\nconstantly remain united with a certain substance? Again, if the stars\nhave all one substance, by what are they distinguished from each other?\nis it by forms? or by accidents? Whichever be the case, the forms or\nthe accidents would interchange, so that they would successively unite\nwith every one of the stars, so long as their substance [being the\nsame] admits the combinations [with every one of the forms or the\naccidents]. This shows that the term substance, when used of the\nspheres or the stars, does not mean the same as it signifies when used\nof the substance of earthly things, but is applied to the two\nsynonymously. It further shows that every one of the bodies of the\nspheres has its own peculiar form of existence different from that of\nall other beings. Why then is circular motion common to all spheres,\nand why is the fixed position of the stars in their respective spheres\ncommon to all stars? If we, however, assume design and determination of\na Creator, in accordance with His incomprehensible wisdom, all these\ndifficulties disappear. They must arise when we consider the whole\nUniverse, not as the result of free will, but as the result of fixed\nlaws of Nature: a theory which, on the one hand, is not in harmony with\nthe existing order of things, and does not offer for it a sufficient\nreason or argument; and, on the other hand, implies many and great\nimprobabilities. For, according to this theory, God, whose perfection\nin every respect is recognised by all thinking persons, is in such a\nrelation to the Universe that He cannot change anything; if He wished\nto make the wing of a fly longer, or to reduce the number of the legs\nof a worm by one, He could not accomplish it. According to Aristotle,\nHe does not try such a thing, and it is wholly impossible for Him to\ndesire any change in the existing order of things; if He could, it\nwould not increase His perfection; it might, on the contrary, from some\npoint of view, diminish it.\n\nAlthough I know that many partial critics will ascribe my opinion\nconcerning the theory of Aristotle to insufficient understanding, or to\nintentional opposition, I will not refrain from stating in short the\nresults of my researches, however poor my capacities may be. I hold\nthat the theory of Aristotle is undoubtedly correct as far as the\nthings are concerned which exist between the sphere of the moon and the\ncentre of the earth. Only an ignorant person rejects it, or a person\nwith preconceived opinions of his own, which he desires to maintain and\nto defend, and which lead him to ignore clear facts. But what Aristotle\nsays concerning things above the sphere of the moon is, with few\nexceptions, mere imagination and opinion; to a still greater extent\nthis applies to his system of Intelligences, and to some of his\nmetaphysical views; they include great improbabilities, [promote] ideas\nwhich all nations consider as evidently corrupt, and cause views to\nspread which cannot be proved.\n\nIt may perhaps be asked why I have enumerated the doubts which can be\nraised against the theory of Aristotle; whether by mere doubts a theory\ncan be overthrown, or its opposite established? This is certainly not\nthe case. But we treat this philosopher exactly as his followers tell\nus to do. For Alexander stated that when a theory cannot be established\nby proof, the two most opposite views should be compared as to the\ndoubts entertained concerning each of them, and that view which admits\nof fewer doubts should be accepted. Alexander further says that this\nrule applies to all those opinions of Aristotle in Metaphysics for\nwhich he offered no proof. For those that followed Aristotle believed\nthat his opinions are far less subject to doubt than any other opinion.\nWe follow the same rule. Being convinced that the question whether the\nheavens are eternal or not cannot be decided by proof, neither in the\naffirmative nor in the negative, we have enumerated the objections\nraised to either view, and shown how the theory of the Eternity of the\nUniverse is subject to stronger objections, and is more apt to corrupt\nthe notions concerning God [than the other]. Another argument can be\ndrawn from the fact that the theory of the Creation was held by our\nFather Abraham, and by our Teacher Moses.\n\nHaving mentioned the method of testing the two theories by the\nobjections raised against them, I find it necessary to give some\nfurther explanation of the subject.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\n\nIn comparing the objections raised against one theory with those raised\nagainst the opposite theory, in order to decide in favour of the least\nobjectionable, we must not consider the number of the objections, but\nthe degree of improbability and of deviation from real facts [pointed\nout by the objections]; for one objection may sometimes have more\nweight than a thousand others. But the comparison cannot be trustworthy\nunless the two theories be considered with the same interest, and if\nyou are predisposed in favour of one of them, be it on account of your\ntraining or because of some advantage, you are too blind to see the\ntruth. For that which can be demonstrated you cannot reject, however\nmuch you may be inclined against it; but in questions like those under\nconsideration you are apt to dispute [in consequence of your\ninclination]. You will, however, be able to decide the question, as far\nas necessary, if you free yourself from passions, ignore customs, and\nfollow only your reason. But many are the conditions which must be\nfulfilled. First you must know your mental capacities and your natural\ntalents; you will find this out when you study all mathematical\nsciences, and are well acquainted with Logic. Secondly, you must have a\nthorough knowledge of Natural Science, that you may be able to\nunderstand the nature of the objections. Thirdly, you must be morally\ngood. For if a person is voluptuous or passionate, and, loosening the\nreins, allows his anger to pass the just limits, it makes no difference\nwhether he is so from nature or from habit, he will blunder and stumble\nin his way, he will seek the theory which is in accordance with his\ninclinations. I mention this lest you be deceived; for a person might\nsome day, by some objection which he raises, shake your belief in the\ntheory of the Creation, and then easily mislead you; you would then\nadopt the theory [of the Eternity of the Universe] which is contrary to\nthe fundamental principles of our religion, and leads to \u201cspeaking\nwords that turn away from God.\u201d You must rather have suspicion against\nyour own reason, and accept the theory taught by two prophets who have\nbid the foundation for the existing order in the religious and social\nrelations of mankind. Only demonstrative proof should be able to make\nyou abandon the theory of the Creation; but such a proof does not exist\nin Nature.\n\nYou will not find it strange that I introduce into this discussion\nhistorical matter in support of the theory of the Creation, seeing that\nAristotle, the greatest philosopher, in his principal works, introduces\nhistories in support of the theory of the Eternity of the Universe. In\nthis regard we may justly quote the saying: \u201cShould not our perfect Law\nbe as good as their gossip?\u201d (B. T. Baba batra, 115 b). When he\nsupports his view by quoting Sabean stories, why should we not support\nour view by that which Moses and Abraham said, and that which follows\nfrom their words?\n\nI have before promised to describe in a separate chapter the strong\nobjections which must occur to him who thinks that human wisdom\ncomprehends fully the nature of the spheres and their motions; that\nthese are subject to fixed laws, and capable of being comprehended as\nregards order and relation. I will now explain this.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\n\nYou know of Astronomy as much as you have studied with me, and learnt\nfrom the book Almagest; we had not sufficient time to go beyond this.\nThe theory that [the spheres] move regularly, and that the assumed\ncourses of the stars are in harmony with observation, depends, as you\nare aware, on two hypotheses: we must assume either epicycles, or\nexcentric spheres, or a combination of both. Now I will show that each\nof these two hypotheses is irregular, and totally contrary to the\nresults of Natural Science. Let us first consider an epicycle, such as\nhas been assumed in the spheres of the moon and the five planets,\nrotating on a sphere, but not round the centre of the sphere that\ncarries it. This arrangement would necessarily produce a revolving\nmotion; the epicycle would then revolve, and entirely change its place;\nbut that anything in the spheres should change its place is exactly\nwhat Aristotle considers impossible. For that reason Abu-bekr\nibn-Alzaig, in an astronomical treatise which he wrote, rejects the\nexistence of epicycles. Besides this impossibility, he mentions others,\nshowing that the theory of epicycles implies other absurd notions. I\nwill here explain them:\u2014(1) It is absurd to assume that the revolution\nof a cycle has not the centre of the Universe for its centre; for it is\na fundamental principle in the order of the Universe that there are\nonly three kinds of motion\u2014from the centre, towards the centre, and\nround the centre; but an epicycle does not move away from the centre,\nnor towards it, nor round it. (2) Again, according to what Aristotle\nexplains in Natural Science, there must be something fixed round which\nthe motion takes place; this is the reason why the earth remains\nstationary. But the epicycle would move round a centre which is not\nstationary. I have heard that Abu-bekr discovered a system in which no\nepicycles occur; but excentric spheres are not excluded by him. I have\nnot heard it from his pupils; and even if it be correct that he\ndiscovered such a system, he has not gained much by it; for\nexcentricity is likewise as contrary as possible to the principles laid\ndown by Aristotle. For it seems to me that an excentric sphere does not\nmove round the centre of the Universe, but round an imaginary point\ndistant from the centre, and therefore round a point which is not\nfixed. A person ignorant of astronomy might think that the motion of\nthe excentric spheres may still be considered as taking place round\nsomething fixed, since their centre is apparently within the sphere of\nthe moon. I would admit this if the centre were situated in the region\nof fire or air, although the spheres would not move round a stable\npoint. But I will show that the amount of excentricity has, in a\ncertain way, been described in the Almagest; and later scholars have\ncalculated the exact amount of excentricity in terms of radii of the\nearth, and have proved the result. The same measure has been used in\nastronomy in describing all distances and magnitudes. It has thus been\nshown that the point round which the sun moves lies undoubtedly beyond\nthe sphere of the moon, and below the superficies of the sphere of\nMercury. The centre for the circuit of Mars, that is, the centre of the\nexcentric sphere of Mars, is beyond the sphere of Mercury, and below\nthe sphere of Venus. The centre of Jupiter has the same distance; it\nlies between the sphere of Venus and that of Mercury, whilst the centre\nof Saturn lies between the spheres of Mars and Jupiter. Now, consider\nhow improbable all this appears according to the laws of Natural\nScience. You will find it out when you consider the known distances and\nmagnitudes of each sphere and each star, all expressed in terms of the\nradii of the earth. There is a uniform measure for all, and the\nexcentricity of each sphere is not determined by units proportionate to\nits own magnitude.\n\nIt is still more improbable and more objectionable to assume that there\nare two spheres, the one within the other; that these are closely\njoined from all sides, and have, nevertheless, different centres. For\nin this case the smaller sphere might move whilst the larger be at\nrest; but the smaller cannot be at rest when the larger moves, and must\nmove with the larger when the latter rotates round any other axis than\nthat which passes through the two centres. Now we have this proposition\nwhich can be proved; and, further, the established theory that there is\nno vacuum, and also the assumed excentricity of the spheres; from all\nthis it follows that in every two spheres the motion of the upper one\nshould cause the lower sphere to move in the same way, and round the\nsame centre. But this is not the case; the outer and the inner spheres\ndo not move in the same way, and not round the same centre or the same\naxis; each of them has its peculiar motion. For this reason it has been\nassumed that between every two spheres there are substances different\nfrom those of the spheres. It may be very much doubted whether this is\nthe case; for where should the centres of these intermediate substances\nbe placed? have these substances likewise their own peculiar motion?\nThabith has explained the above-mentioned theory in one of his\ntreatises, and proved that we must assume a substance of a spherical\nform intermediate between one sphere and the other. All this is part of\nthat which I have not explained to you when you studied with me, for I\nwas afraid you might become confused and would not understand even\nthose things which I wished to show you. But as to the inclination and\nthe deviation assumed in respect to the latitude of the paths of Venus\nand Mercury, I have already clearly shown you viv\u00e2 voce that it is\nimpossible to imagine material beings under such conditions. You have\nseen that Ptolemy has already pointed out this difficulty. He says as\nfollows: \u201cLet no one think that these and similar principles are\nimprobable. If any one considers what we have here expounded in the\nsame light as he considers things produced by skill and subtle work, he\nwill find it improbable; but it is not right to compare human things to\ndivine things.\u201d This is, as you know, what Ptolemy says, and I have\nalready pointed out to you the passages by which you can verify all I\nsaid, except what I stated about the position of the centres of the\nexcentric spheres; for I have not heard that any one has paid attention\nto this question. But you will understand it when you know the length\nof the diameter of each sphere, and the extent of its excentricity in\nterms of radii of the earth, according to the facts which Kabici has\nestablished in his treatise on the distances. When you notice these\ndistances you will confirm my words.\n\nConsider, therefore, how many difficulties arise if we accept the\ntheory which Aristotle expounds in Physics. For, according to that\ntheory, there are no epicycles, and no excentric spheres, but all\nspheres rotate round the centre of the earth! How then can the\ndifferent courses of the stars be explained? how is it possible to\nassume a uniform perfect rotation with the phenomena which we perceive,\nexcept by admitting one of the two hypotheses or both of them? The\ndifficulty is still more apparent when we find that admitting what\nPtolemy said as regards the epicycle of the moon, and its inclination\ntowards a point different both from the centre of the Universe and from\nits own centre, the calculations according to these hypotheses are\nperfectly correct, within one minute; that their correctness is\nconfirmed by the most accurate calculation of the time, duration, and\nextent of the eclipses, which is always based on these hypotheses.\nFurthermore, how can we reconcile, without assuming the existence of\nepicycles, the apparent retrogression of a star with its other motions?\nHow can rotation or motion take place round a point which is not fixed?\nThese are real difficulties.\n\nI have explained to you already viv\u00e2 voce, that these difficulties do\nnot concern the astronomer; for he does not profess to tell us the\nexisting properties of the spheres, but to suggest, whether correctly\nor not, a theory in which the motion of the stars is circular and\nuniform, and yet in agreement with our observation. You know that\nAbu-bekr al-Zaig, in his treatise on Physics, expresses a doubt whether\nAristotle knew the excentricity of the sun but ignored it, and only\ndiscussed the effect of the inclination, because he saw that the effect\nof the excentricity was identical with that of the inclination; or\nwhether he did not perceive it. The truth is that he did not notice it\nor hear of it; the science was not perfect in his age. If he had heard\nof it, he would have strongly opposed it; if he had been convinced of\nits correctness, he would have been greatly embarrassed as regards all\nthat he said on the question. What I said before (ch. xxii.) I will\nrepeat now, namely, that the theory of Aristotle, in explaining the\nphenomena in the sublunary world, is in accordance with logical\ninference; here we know the causal relation between one phenomenon and\nanother; we see how far science can investigate them, and the\nmanagement of nature is clear and intelligible. But of the things in\nthe heavens man knows nothing except a few mathematical calculations,\nand you see how far these go. I say in the words of the poet, \u201cThe\nheavens are the Lord\u2019s, but the earth He hath given to the sons of man\u201d\n(Ps. cxv. 16); that is to say, God alone has a perfect and true\nknowledge of the heavens, their nature, their essence, their form,\ntheir motions, and their causes; but He gave man power to know the\nthings which are under the heavens; here is man\u2019s world, here is his\nhome, into which he has been placed, and of which he is himself a\nportion. This is in reality the truth. For the facts which we require\nin proving the existence of heavenly beings are withheld from us; the\nheavens are too far from us, and too exalted in place and rank. Man\u2019s\nfaculties are too deficient to comprehend even the general proof the\nheavens contain for the existence of Him who sets them in motion. It is\nin fact ignorance or a kind of madness to weary our minds with finding\nout things which are beyond our reach, without having the means of\napproaching them. We must content ourselves with that which is within\nour reach, and that which cannot be approached by logical inference let\nus leave to him who has been endowed with that great and divine\ninfluence, expressed in the words: \u201cMouth to mouth do I speak with Him\u201d\n(Num. xii. 8).\n\nThis is all I can say on this question; another person may perhaps be\nable to establish by proof what appears doubtful to me. It is on\naccount of my great love of truth that I have shown my embarrassment in\nthese matters, and I have not heard, nor do I know that any of these\ntheories have been established by proof.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\n\nWe do not reject the Eternity of the Universe, because certain passages\nin Scripture confirm the Creation; for such passages are not more\nnumerous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal being;\nnor is it impossible or difficult to find for them a suitable\ninterpretation. We might have explained them in the same manner as we\ndid in respect to the Incorporeality of God. We should perhaps have had\nan easier task in showing that the Scriptural passages referred to are\nin harmony with the theory of the Eternity of the Universe if we\naccepted the latter, than we had in explaining the anthropomorphisms in\nthe Bible when we rejected the idea that God is corporeal. For two\nreasons, however, we have not done so, and have not accepted the\nEternity of the Universe. First, the Incorporeality of God has been\ndemonstrated by proof; those passages in the Bible, which in their\nliteral sense contain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and\ncan be interpreted otherwise. But the Eternity of the Universe has not\nbeen proved; a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not\nsufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text,\nand explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be\nsupported by an equally good argument.\n\nSecondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary to\nany of the fundamental principles of our religion; it is not contrary\nto the words of any prophet. Only ignorant people believe that it is\ncontrary to the teaching of Scripture; but we have shown that this is\nnot the case; on the contrary, Scripture teaches the Incorporeality of\nGod. If we were to accept the Eternity of the Universe as taught by\nAristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws,\nthat Nature does not change, and that there is nothing supernatural, we\nshould necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion,\nwe should disbelieve all miracles and signs, and certainly reject all\nhopes and fears derived from Scripture, unless the miracles are also\nexplained figuratively. The Allegorists amongst the Mohammedans have\ndone this, and have thereby arrived at absurd conclusions. If, however,\nwe accepted the Eternity of the Universe in accordance with the second\nof the theories which we have expounded above (ch. xxiii.), and\nassumed, with Plato, that the heavens are likewise transient, we should\nnot be in opposition to the fundamental principles of our religion;\nthis theory would not imply the rejection of miracles, but, on the\ncontrary, would admit them as possible. The Scriptural text might have\nbeen explained accordingly, and many expressions might have been found\nin the Bible and in other writings that would confirm and support this\ntheory. But there is no necessity for this expedient, so long as the\ntheory has not been proved. As there is no proof sufficient to convince\nus, this theory need not be taken into consideration, nor the other\none; we take the text of the Bible literally, and say that it teaches\nus a truth which we cannot prove; and the miracles are evidence for the\ncorrectness of our view.\n\nAccepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, that\nRevelation is possible, and that every difficulty in this question is\nremoved. We might be asked, Why has God inspired a certain person and\nnot another? why has He revealed the Law to one particular nation, and\nat one particular time? why has He commanded this, and forbidden that?\nwhy has He shown through a prophet certain particular miracles? what is\nthe object of these laws? and why has He not made the commandments and\nthe prohibitions part of our nature, if it was His object that we\nshould live in accordance with them? We answer to all these questions:\nHe willed it so; or, His wisdom decided so. Just as He created the\nworld according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form, and\nas we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decided upon that\npeculiar form, and upon that peculiar time, so we do not know why His\nwill or wisdom determined any of the things mentioned in the preceding\nquestions. But if we assume that the Universe has the present form as\nthe result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions;\nand these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying\ndenial and rejection of the Biblical texts, the correctness of which no\nintelligent person doubts. Owing to the absence of all proof, we reject\nthe theory of the Eternity of the Universe; and it is for this very\nreason that the noblest minds spent and will spend their days in\nresearch. For if the Creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if\nonly according to the Platonic hypothesis, all arguments of the\nphilosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand,\nAristotle had a proof for his theory, the whole teaching of Scripture\nwould be rejected, and we should be forced to other opinions. I have\nthus shown that all depends on this question. Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\n\nIn the famous chapters known as the Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, I find\nR. Eliezer the Great saying something more extraordinary than I have\never seen in the utterances of any believer in the Law of Moses. I mean\nthe following passage: \u201cWhence were the heavens created? He took part\nof the light of His garment, stretched it like a cloth, and thus the\nheavens were extending continually, as it is said: He covereth Himself\nwith light as with a garment, He stretcheth the heavens like a curtain\u201d\n(Ps. civ. 2). \u201cWhence was the earth created? He took of the snow under\nthe throne of glory, and threw it; according to the words: He saith to\nthe snow, Be thou earth\u201d (Job xxxvii. 6). These are the words given\nthere; and I, in my surprise, ask, What was the belief of this sage?\ndid he think that nothing can be produced from nothing, and that a\nsubstance must have existed of which the things were formed? and did he\nfor this reason ask whence were the heavens and the earth created? What\nhas he gained by the answer? We might ask him, Whence was the light of\nHis garment created? or the snow under the throne of His glory? or the\nthrone of glory itself? If the terms \u201cthe light of His garment\u201d and\n\u201cthe throne of glory\u201d mean something eternal, they must be rejected;\nthe words would imply an admission of the Eternity of the Universe,\nthough only in the form taught by Plato. The creation of the throne of\nglory is mentioned by our Sages, though in a strange way; for they say\nthat it has been created before the creation of the Universe.\nScripture, however, does not mention the creation of the throne, except\nin the words of David, \u201cThe Lord hath established his throne in the\nheavens\u201d (Ps. ciii. 19), which words admit of figurative\ninterpretation; but the eternity of the throne is distinctly described,\n\u201cThou, O Lord, dwellest for ever, thy throne for ever and ever\u201d (Lam.\nv. 19). Now, if R. Eliezer had believed that the throne was eternal, so\nthat the word \u201cthrone\u201d expressed an attribute of God, and not something\ncreated, how could anything be produced of a mere attribute? Stranger\nstill is his expression \u201cof the light of His garment.\u201d\n\nIn short, it is a passage that greatly confuses the notions of all\nintelligent and religious persons. I am unable to explain it\nsufficiently. I quoted it in order that you may not be misled by it.\nOne important thing R. Eliezer taught us here, that the substance of\nthe heavens is different from that of the earth; that there are two\ndifferent substances: the one is described as belonging to God, being\nthe light of His garment, on account of its superiority; and the other,\nthe earthly substance, which is distant from His splendour and light,\nas being the snow under the throne of His glory. This led me to explain\nthe words, \u201cAnd under his feet as the work of the whiteness of the\nsapphire\u201d (Exod. xxiv. 10), as expressing that the nobles of the\nchildren of Israel comprehended in a prophetical vision the nature of\nthe earthly materia prima. For, according to Onkelos, the pronoun in\nthe phrase, \u201cHis feet\u201d refers to \u201cthrone,\u201d as I have shown; this\nindicates that the whiteness under the throne signifies the earthly\nsubstance. R. Eliezer has thus repeated the same idea, and told us that\nthere are two substances\u2014a higher one, and a lower one; and that there\nis not one substance common to all things. This is an important\nsubject, and we must not think light of the opinion which the wisest\nmen in Israel have held on this point. It concerns an important point\nin explaining the existence of the Universe, and one of the mysteries\nof the Law. In Bereshit Rabba (chap. xii.) the following passage\noccurs: \u201cR. Eliezer says, The things in the heavens have been created\nof the heavens, the things on earth of the earth.\u201d Consider how\ningeniously this sage stated that all things on earth have one common\nsubstance; the heavens and the things in them have one substance,\ndifferent from the first. He also explains in the Chapters [of R.\nEliezer], in addition to the preceding things, the superiority of the\nheavenly substance, and its proximity to God; and, on the other hand,\nthe inferiority of the earthly substance and its position. Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII\n\n\nWe have already stated that the belief in the Creation is a fundamental\nprinciple of our religion; but we do not consider it a principle of our\nfaith that the Universe will again be reduced to nothing. It is not\ncontrary to the tenets of our religion to assume that the Universe will\ncontinue to exist for ever. It might be objected that everything\nproduced is subject to destruction, as has been shown; consequently the\nUniverse, having had a beginning, must come to an end. This axiom\ncannot be applied according to our views. We do not hold that the\nUniverse came into existence, like all things in Nature, as the result\nof the laws of Nature. For whatever owes its existence to the action of\nphysical laws is, according to the same laws, subject to destruction:\nthe same law which caused the existence of a thing after a period of\nnon-existence, is also the cause that the thing is not permanent; since\nthe previous non-existence proves that the nature of that thing does\nnot necessitate its permanent existence. According to our theory,\ntaught in Scripture, the existence or non-existence of things depends\nsolely on the will of God and not on fixed laws, and, therefore, it\ndoes not follow that God must destroy the Universe after having created\nit from nothing. It depends on His will. He may, according to His\ndesire, or according to the decree of His wisdom, either destroy it, or\nallow it to exist, and it is therefore possible that He will preserve\nthe Universe for ever, and let it exist permanently as He Himself\nexists. It is well known that our Sages never said that the throne of\nglory will perish, although they assumed that it has been created. No\nprophet or sage ever maintained that the throne of glory will be\ndestroyed or annihilated; but, on the contrary, the Scriptural passages\nspeak of its permanent existence. We are of opinion that the souls of\nthe pious have been created, and at the same time we believe that they\nare immortal. Some hold, in accordance with the literal meaning of the\nMidrashim, that the bodies of the pious will also enjoy everlasting\nhappiness. Their notion is like the well-known belief of certain\npeople, that there are bodily enjoyments in Paradise. In short,\nreasoning leads to the conclusion that the destruction of the Universe\nis not a certain fact. There remains only the question as to what the\nprophets and our Sages say on this point; whether they affirm that the\nworld will certainly come to an end, or not. Most people amongst us\nbelieve that such statements have been made, and that the world will at\none time be destroyed. I will show you that this is not the case; and\nthat, on the contrary, many passages in the Bible speak of the\npermanent existence of the Universe. Those passages which, in the\nliteral sense, would indicate the destruction of the Universe, are\nundoubtedly to be understood in a figurative sense, as will be shown.\nIf, however, those who follow the literal sense of the Scriptural texts\nreject our view, and assume that the ultimate certain destruction of\nthe Universe is part of their faith, they are at liberty to do so. But\nwe must tell them that the belief in the destruction is not necessarily\nimplied in the belief in the Creation; they believe it because they\ntrust the writer, who used a figurative expression, which they take\nliterally. Their faith, however, does not suffer by it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII\n\n\nMany of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believed in the\nEternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can we suppose that\nany one that adheres to the Law of Moses, our Teacher, should accept\nthat theory? if we were to assume that Solomon has on this point, God\nforbid, deviated from the Law of Moses, the question would be asked,\nWhy did most of the Prophets and of the Sages accept it of him? Why\nhave they not opposed him, or blamed him for holding that opinion, as\nhe has been blamed for having married strange women, and for other\nthings? The reason why this has been imputed to him is to be found in\nthe following passage: \u201cThey desired to suppress the book Koheleth,\nbecause its words incline towards scepticism.\u201d It is undoubtedly true\nthat certain passages in this book include, when taken literally,\nopinions different from those taught in the Law, and they must\ntherefore be explained figuratively. But the theory of the Eternity of\nthe Universe is not among those opinions, the book does not even\ncontain any passage that implies this theory; much less a passage in\nwhich it is clearly set forth. There are, however, in the book, some\npassages which imply the indestructibility of the Universe, a doctrine\nthat is true; and from the fact that the indestructibility of the\nUniverse is taught in this book, some persons wrongly inferred that the\nauthor believed in the Eternity of the Universe. The following are the\nwords that refer to the indestructibility of the Universe: \u201cAnd the\nearth remaineth for ever.\u201d And those who do not agree with me as\nregards the above distinction [between the indestructibility and the\nEternity of the Universe], are compelled to explain the term le-\u02bbolam\n(lit., \u201cfor ever\u201d), to mean \u201cthe time fixed for the existence of the\nearth.\u201d Similarly they explain the words of God, \u201cYet all the days of\nthe earth\u201d (Gen. viii. 22) to signify the days fixed for its existence.\nBut I wonder how they would explain the words of David: \u201cHe laid the\nfoundations of the earth, that it should not be moved for ever\u201d (Ps.\nciv. 5). If they maintain here also that the term le-\u02bbolam va-\u02bbed (lit.\n\u201cfor ever\u201d) does not imply perpetuity, they must come to the conclusion\nthat God exists only for a fixed period, since the same term is\nemployed in describing the perpetuity of God, \u201cThe Lord will reign\n(le-\u02bbolam) for ever\u201d (Exod. xv. 18, or Ps. x. 16). We must, however,\nbear in mind that \u02bbolam only signifies perpetuity when it is combined\nwith \u02bbad; it makes no difference whether \u02bbad follows, as in \u02bbolam\nva-\u02bbed, or whether it precedes, as in \u02bbad \u02bbolam. The words of Solomon\nwhich only contain the word le-\u02bbolam, have therefore less force than\nthe words of David, who uses the term \u02bbolam va-\u02bbed. David has also in\nother passages clearly spoken of the incorruptibility of the heavens,\nthe perpetuity and immutability of their laws, and of all the heavenly\nbeings. He says, \u201cPraise ye the Lord from the heavens, etc. For He\ncommanded, and they were created. He hath also stablished them for ever\nand ever; he hath made a decree which shall not pass\u201d (Ps. cxlviii.\n1\u20136); that is to say, there will never be a change in the decrees which\nGod made, or in the sources of the properties of the heavens and the\nearth, which the Psalmist has mentioned before. But he distinctly\nstates that they have been created. For he says, \u201cHe hath commanded,\nand they were created.\u201d Jeremiah (xxxi. 35) likewise says, \u201cHe giveth\nthe sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the\nstars for a light by night,\u201d etc. \u201cIf these ordinances depart from\nbefore me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall cease\nfrom being a nation before me for ever.\u201d He thus declares, that these\ndecrees will never be removed, although they had a beginning. We\ntherefore find this idea, when we search for it, expressed not only by\nSolomon but also by others. Solomon himself has stated that these works\nof God, the Universe, and all that is contained in it, remain with\ntheir properties for ever, although they have been created. For he\nsays, \u201cWhatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put\nto it, nor anything taken away from it\u201d (Eccles. iii. 14). He declares\nin these words that the world has been created by God and remains for\never. He adds the reason for it by saying, \u201cNothing can be put to it,\nnor anything taken from it;\u201d for this is the reason for the perpetuity,\nas if he meant to say that things are changed in order to supply that\nwhich is wanting, or in order to take away what is superfluous. The\nworks of God being most perfect, admitting no addition or deduction,\nmust remain the same for ever. It is impossible that anything should\nexist that could cause a change in them. In the conclusion of the\nverse, Solomon, as it were describes the purpose of exceptions from the\nlaws of Nature, or an excuse for changes in them, when he says, \u201cAnd\nGod doeth it (viz., He performs miracles) that men should fear before\nhim.\u201d The words which follow, \u201cThat which hath been is now; and that\nwhich is to be hath already been, and God seeketh that which is\npursued,\u201d contain the idea that God desires the perpetuity and\ncontinuity of the Universe. The fact that the works of God are perfect,\nadmitting of no addition or diminution, has already been mentioned by\nMoses, the wisest of all men, in the words: \u201cThe rock, His work is\nperfect\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 14). All His works or creations are most\nperfect, containing no defect whatever, nothing superfluous, nor\nanything unnecessary. Also whatever God decrees for those created\nthings, and whatever He effects through them, is perfectly just, and is\nthe result of His wisdom, as will be explained in some chapters of this\ntreatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX\n\n\nIf we hear a person speaking whose language we do not understand, we\nundoubtedly know that he speaks, but do not know what his words mean;\nit may even happen that we hear some words which mean one thing in the\ntongue of the speaker, and exactly the reverse in our language, and\ntaking the words in the sense which they have in our language, we\nimagine that the speaker employed them in that sense. Suppose, e.g., an\nArab hears of a Hebrew the word abah, he thinks that the Hebrew relates\nhow a man despised and refused a certain thing, whilst the Hebrew in\nreality says that the man was pleased and satisfied with it. The very\nsame thing happens to the ordinary reader of the Prophets; some of\ntheir words he does not understand at all, like those to whom the\nprophet says (Isa. xxix. 11), \u201cthe vision of all is become unto you as\nthe words of a book that is sealed\u201d; in other passages he finds the\nopposite or the reverse of what the prophet meant; to this case\nreference is made in the words, \u201cYe have perverted the words of the\nliving God\u201d (Jer. xxiii. 36). Besides, it must be borne in mind that\nevery prophet has his own peculiar diction, which is, as it were, his\nlanguage, and it is in that language that the prophecy addressed to him\nis communicated to those who understand it. After this preliminary\nremark you will understand the metaphor frequently employed by Isaiah,\nand less frequently by other prophets, when they describe the ruin of a\nkingdom or the destruction of a great nation in phrases like the\nfollowing:\u2014\u201cThe stars have fallen,\u201d \u201cThe heavens are overthrown,\u201d \u201cThe\nsun is darkened,\u201d \u201cThe earth is waste, and trembles,\u201d and similar\nmetaphors. The Arabs likewise say of a person who has met with a\nserious accident, \u201cHis heavens, together with his earth, have been\ncovered\u201d; and when they speak of the approach of a nation\u2019s prosperity,\nthey say, \u201cThe light of the sun and moon has increased,\u201d \u201cA new heaven\nand a new earth has been created,\u201d or they use similar phrases. So also\nthe prophets, in referring to the ruin of a person, of a nation, or of\na country, describe it as the result of God\u2019s great anger and wrath,\nwhilst the prosperity of a nation is the result of God\u2019s pleasure and\nsatisfaction. In the former case the prophets employ such phrases as\n\u201cHe came forth,\u201d \u201ccame down,\u201d \u201croared,\u201d \u201cthundered,\u201d or \u201ccaused his\nvoice to be heard\u201d; also \u201cHe commanded,\u201d \u201csaid,\u201d \u201cdid,\u201d \u201cmade,\u201d and the\nlike, as will be shown. Sometimes the prophets use the term \u201cmankind\u201d\ninstead of \u201cthe people of a certain place,\u201d whose destruction they\npredict; e.g., Isaiah speaking of the destruction of Israel says, \u201cAnd\nthe Lord will remove man far away\u201d (Isa. vi. 12). So also Zephaniah (i.\n3, 4), \u201cAnd I will cut off man from off the earth. I will also stretch\nout mine hand upon Judah.\u201d Note this likewise.\n\nHaving spoken of the language of the prophets in general, I will now\nverify and prove my statement. When Isaiah received the divine mission\nto prophesy the destruction of the Babylonian empire, the death of\nSennacherib and that of Nebuchadnezzar, who rose after the overthrow of\nSennacherib, he commences in the following manner to describe their\nfall and the end of their dominion, their defeat, and such evils as are\nendured by all who are vanquished and compelled to flee before the\nvictorious sword [of the enemy]: \u201cFor the stars of heaven, and the\nconstellations thereof, shall not give their light: the sun is darkened\nin his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine\u201d\n(xiii. 10); again, \u201cTherefore I will shake the heavens, and the earth\nshall remove out of her place, in the wrath of the Lord of hosts, and\nin the day of his fierce anger\u201d (xiii. 13). I do not think that any\nperson is so foolish and blind, and so much in favour of the literal\nsense of figurative and oratorical phrases, as to assume that at the\nfall of the Babylonian kingdom a change took place in the nature of the\nstars of heaven, or in the light of the sun and moon, or that the earth\nmoved away from its centre. For all this is merely the description of a\ncountry that has been defeated; the inhabitants undoubtedly find all\nlight dark, and all sweet things bitter: the whole earth appears too\nnarrow for them, and the heavens are changed in their eyes. He speaks\nin a similar manner when he describes the poverty and humiliation of\nthe people of Israel, their captivity and their defeat, the continuous\nmisfortunes caused by the wicked Sennacherib when he ruled over all the\nfortified places of Judah, or the loss of the entire land of Israel\nwhen it came into the possession of Sennacherib. He says (xxiv. 17):\n\u201cFear, and the pit, and the snare, are upon thee, O inhabitant of the\nearth. And it shall come to pass, that he who fleeth from the noise of\nthe fear shall fall into the pit; and he that cometh out of the midst\nof the pit shall be taken in the snare: for the windows from on high\nare open, and the foundations of the earth do shake. The earth is\nutterly broken down, the earth is clean dissolved, the earth is moved\nexceedingly. The earth shall reel to and fro like a drunkard.\u201d At the\nend of the same prophecy, when Isaiah describes how God will punish\nSennacherib, destroy his mighty empire, and reduce him to disgrace, he\nuses the following figure (xxiv. 23): \u201cThen the moon shall be\nconfounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign,\u201d\netc. This verse is beautifully explained by Jonathan, the son of\nUzziel; he says that when Sennacherib will meet with his fate because\nof Jerusalem, the idolaters will understand that this is the work of\nGod; they will faint and be confounded. He therefore translates the\nverse thus: \u201cThose who worship the moon will be ashamed, and those who\nbow down to the sun will be humbled, when the kingdom of God shall\nreveal itself,\u201d etc. The prophet then pictures the peace of the\nchildren of Israel after the death of Sennacherib, the fertility and\nthe cultivation of their land, and the increasing power of their\nkingdom through Hezekiah. He employs here the figure of the increase of\nthe light of the sun and moon. When speaking of the defeated, he says\nthat for them the light of the sun and moon will be diminished and\ndarkened; in the same sense their light is said to increase for the\nvictorious. We can frequently notice the correctness of this figure of\nspeech. When great troubles befall us, our eyes become dim, and we\ncannot see clearly because the spiritus visus is made turbid by the\nprevailing vapours, and is weakened and diminished by great anxiety and\nstraits of the soul; whilst in a state of gladness and comfort of the\nsoul the spiritus visus becomes clear, and man feels as if the light\nhad increased. Thus the good tidings that the people shall dwell in\nZion, and in Jerusalem, and shall weep no more, etc., conclude in the\nfollowing manner: \u201cMoreover, the light of the moon shall be as the\nlight of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the\nlight of seven days, in the day that the Lord bindeth up the breaches\nof his people, and healeth the stroke of their wound\u201d (Isa. xxx. 19,\n26); that is to say, when God will raise them up again after they had\nfallen through the wicked Sennacherib. The phrase \u201cas the light of\nseven days\u201d signifies, according to the commentators, \u201cvery great\nlight\u201d: for in this same sense the number \u201cseven\u201d is frequently used in\nHebrew. I think that reference is made by this phrase to the seven days\nof the dedication of the temple in the reign of Solomon; for there was\nnever a nation so great, prosperous, and happy in every respect, as\nIsrael was at that time, and therefore the prophet says, that Israel\u2019s\ngreatness and happiness will be the same as it was in those seven days.\nSpeaking of wicked Edom, Israel\u2019s oppressor, Isaiah says: \u201cTheir slain\nalso shall be cast out, and their stink shall come up out of their\ncarcases, and the mountains shall be melted with their blood. And all\nthe host of heaven shall be dissolved, and the heavens shall be rolled\ntogether as a scroll: and all their host shall fall down, as a leaf\nfalleth off from the vine, and as a fig falleth from the fig-tree. For\nmy sword shall be bathed in heaven; behold, I shall come down upon\nIdumea, and upon the people of my curse, to judgment,\u201d etc. (Isa.\nxxxiv. 3\u20135). Will any person who has eyes to see find in these verses\nany expression that is obscure, or that might lead him to think that\nthey contain an account of what will befall the heavens? or anything\nbut a figurative description of the ruin of the Edomites, the\nwithdrawal of God\u2019s protection from them, their decline, and the sudden\nand rapid fall of their nobles? The prophet means to say that the\nindividuals, who were like stars as regards their permanent, high, and\nundisturbed position, will quickly come down, as a leaf falleth from\nthe vine, and as a fig falling from the fig-tree. This is self-evident;\nand there would be no need to mention it, much less to speak on it at\nlength, had it not become necessary, owing to the fact that the common\npeople, and even persons who are considered as distinguished scholars,\nquote this passage without regarding its context or its purpose, [in\nsupport of their view of the future destruction of the heavens]. They\nbelieve that Scripture describes here what will, in future, happen to\nthe heavens, in the same manner as it informs us how the heavens have\ncome into existence. Again, when Isaiah told the Israelites\u2014what\nafterwards became a well-known fact\u2014that Sennacherib, with his allied\nnations and kings, would perish, and that the Israelites would be\nhelped by God alone, he employed figurative language, and said: \u201cSee\nhow the heavens decay and the earth withers away, and all beings on the\nearth die, and you are saved\u201d; that is to say, those who have filled\nthe earth, and have been considered, to use an hyperbole, as permanent\nand stable as the heavens, will quickly perish and disappear like\nsmoke; and their famous power, that has been as stable as the earth,\nwill be destroyed like a garment. The passage to which I refer begins:\n\u201cFor the Lord hath comforted Zion; He hath comforted all her waste\nplaces,\u201d etc. \u201cHearken unto me, my people,\u201d etc. \u201cMy righteousness is\nnear: my salvation is gone forth,\u201d etc. It continues thus: \u201cLift up\nyour eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath; for the\nheavens shall vanish like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a\ngarment, and they that dwell therein shall die in like manner; for my\nsalvation shall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be\nabolished\u201d (Isa. li. 3\u20136). The restoration of the kingdom of Israel,\nits stability and permanence, is described as a creation of heaven and\nearth. For Isaiah frequently speaks of the land of a king as if it were\nthe whole Universe, as if heaven and earth belonged to him. He\ntherefore comforts Israel and says: \u201cI, even I, am he that comforteth\nyou,\u201d etc. \u201cAnd I have put my words in thy mouth, and I have covered\nthee in the shadow of mine hand, that I may plant the heavens, and lay\nthe foundations of the earth, and say unto Zion, Thou art my people\u201d\n(li. 12\u201316). In the following verses, Isaiah declares that the dominion\nof Israel will continue, whilst that of the renowned and mighty people\nwill cease: \u201cFor the mountains shall depart,\u201d etc. (liv. 10). In order\nto express that the kingdom of the Messiah will be permanent, and that\nthe kingdom of Israel will not be destroyed any more, he says, \u201cThy sun\nshall no more go down,\u201d etc. (lx. 20). In metaphors like these, which\nare intelligible to those who understand the context, Isaiah continues\nto describe the details of the exile, the restoration, and the removal\nof all sorrow, and says figuratively as follows: \u201cI will create new\nheavens and a new earth; for the first shall be forgotten, and their\nmemory shall be blotted out.\u201d He explains this in the course of the\nspeech, by pointing out that by the phrase, \u201cI will create,\u201d he means\nthat God will give them perpetual gladness and joy in place of the\nprevious grief and mourning, which shall no longer be remembered. I\nwill now describe the sequence of the ideas, and the order of the\nverses in which these ideas are contained. The prophet begins as\nfollows: \u201cI will mention the loving-kindnesses of the Lord,\u201d etc.\n(lxiii. 7). He then gives (1) an account of God\u2019s past kindness to us,\nconcluding with the words, \u201cAnd he bare them and carried them all the\ndays of old\u201d (ver. 9). (2) Next follows our rebellion: \u201cBut they\nrebelled, and vexed his holy spirit,\u201d etc. (ver. 10); (3) the dominion\nof our enemies over us: \u201cOur adversaries have trodden down thy\nsanctuary; we are like those over whom thou hast never ruled,\u201d etc.\n(vers. 18, 19); (4) and the prophet\u2019s prayer on our account: \u201cBe not\nwroth very sore,\u201d etc. (lxiv. 9). (5) The prophet then describes how we\ndeserved these punishments, and how we were called to the truth but did\nnot respond: \u201cI offered myself to be sought of them that asked not for\nme,\u201d etc. (lxv. 1); (6) promises mercy and pardon: \u201cThus saith the\nLord, As the new wine is found in the cluster,\u201d etc. (ver. 8); (7)\npredicts evil for our oppressors: \u201cBehold, my servant shall eat, but ye\nshall be hungry,\u201d etc. (ver. 13); (8) and moral improvement of our\nnation to such a degree that we shall be a blessing on the earth, and\nthe previous troubles will be forgotten: \u201cAnd he shall call his\nservants by another name: that he who blesseth himself in the earth,\nshall bless himself in the God of truth; and he that sweareth in the\nearth, shall swear by the God of truth; because the former troubles are\nforgotten, and because they are hid from mine eyes. For, behold, I\ncreate new heavens, and a new earth: and the former shall not be\nremembered, nor come into mind. But be ye glad and rejoice for ever in\nthat which I create: for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and\nher people a joy. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my\npeople,\u201d etc. (lxv. 15\u201319). The whole subject must now be clear and\nevident; for the words, \u201cI create new heavens, and a new earth,\u201d etc.,\nare followed by the explanation, \u201cI create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and\nher people a joy,\u201d etc. The prophet then adds that the seed and name of\nIsrael will be as permanent as their faith and as the rejoicing in it,\nwhich God promised to create and to spread over the whole earth: for\nfaith in God and rejoicing in it are two possessions which, once\nobtained, are never lost or changed. This is expressed in the words:\n\u201cFor as the new heavens and the new earth, which I will make, remain\nbefore me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain\u201d\n(lxvi. 22). But of other nations, in some instances, the seed remains,\nwhilst the name has perished; so, e.g., many people are of the seed of\nthe Persians or Greeks, without being known by that special name; they\nbear the names of other nations, of which they form part. According to\nmy opinion, we have here a prophecy that our religion, which gives us\nour special name, will remain permanently.\n\nAs these figures are frequent in Isaiah, I explained all of them. But\nwe meet with them also in the words of other prophets. Jeremiah, in\ndescribing the destruction of Jerusalem in consequence of our sins,\nsays (iv. 23): \u201cI beheld the earth, and, lo, it was without form, and\nvoid,\u201d etc. Ezekiel (xxxii. 7, 8) foretells the destruction of the\nkingdom of Egypt, and the death of Pharaoh, through Nebuchadnezzar, in\nthe following words: \u201cAnd when I shall put thee out, I will cover the\nheaven, and make the stars thereof dark; I will cover the sun with a\ncloud, and the moon shall not give her light. All the bright lights of\nheaven will I make dark over thee, and set darkness upon thy land,\nsaith the Lord.\u201d Joel, the son of Pethuel (ii. 10), describes the\nmultitude of locusts that came in his days as follows: \u201cThe earth shall\nquake before them: the heavens shall tremble: the sun and the moon\nshall be dark, and the stars shall withdraw their shining.\u201d Amos (viii.\n9, 10), speaking of the destruction of Samaria, says: \u201cI will cause the\nsun to go down at noon, and I will darken the earth in the clear day;\nand I will turn your feasts,\u201d etc. Micah (i. 3, 4), in relating the\nfall of Samaria, uses the following well-known rhetorical figures:\n\u201cFor, behold, the Lord cometh forth out of his place, and will come\ndown, and tread upon the high places of the earth. And the mountains\nshall be molten,\u201d etc. Similarly Haggai (ii. 6, 7), in describing the\ndestruction of the kingdom of the Medes and Persians: \u201cI will shake the\nheavens and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land; and I will shake\nall nations,\u201d etc. When [David] (Ps. lx. 4) describes how, during the\nexpedition of Joab against the Edomites, the nation was low and weak,\nand how he prayed to God for His assistance, he says: \u201cThou hast made\nthe earth to tremble; thou hast broken it: heal the breaches thereof;\nfor it shaketh.\u201d In another instance he expresses the idea that we need\nnot fear when we see other nations die and perish, because we rely on\nGod\u2019s support, and not on our sword and strength, in accordance with\nthe words: \u201cA people saved by the Lord, the shield of thy help\u201d (Deut.\nxxxiii. 29); he says (Ps. xlvi. 2): \u201cTherefore will we not fear, though\nthe earth be removed, and though the mountains be shaken in the midst\nof the sea.\u201d\n\nThe following figurative language is employed in Scripture in referring\nto the death of the Egyptians in the Red Sea: \u201cThe waters saw thee;\nthey were afraid: the depths also were troubled, etc. The voice of thy\nthunder was in the heaven: the lightnings lightened the world; the\nearth trembled and shook\u201d (Ps. lxxvii. 17\u201319). \u201cWas the Lord displeased\nagainst the rivers?\u201d etc. (Hab. iii. 8). \u201cThere went up a smoke out of\nhis nostrils,\u201d etc. (Ps. xviii. 9). \u201cThe earth trembled,\u201d etc. (Judges\nv. 4, in the Song of Deborah). There are many other instances; but\nthose which I have not quoted can be explained in accordance with those\nwhich I have cited.\n\nLet us now consider the words of Joel (iii. 3\u20135): \u201cAnd I will show\nwonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood and fire, and pillars of\nsmoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood,\nbefore the great and terrible day of the Lord come. And it shall come\nto pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be\ndelivered, for in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be deliverance,\u201d\netc. I refer them to the defeat of Sennacherib near Jerusalem; but they\nmay be taken as an account of the defeat of Gog and Magog near\nJerusalem in the days of the Messiah, if this appears preferable,\nalthough nothing is mentioned in this passage but great slaughter,\ndestruction, fire, and the diminution of the light of the two\nluminaries. You may perhaps object: How can the day of the fall of\nSennacherib, according to our explanation, be called \u201cthe great and the\nterrible day of the Lord?\u201d But you must know that a day of great\nsalvation or of great distress is called \u201cthe great and terrible day of\nthe Lord.\u201d Thus Joel (ii. 11) says of the day on which the locusts came\nover the land, \u201cFor the day of the Lord is great and terrible, and who\ncan abide it?\u201d\n\nOur opinion, in support of which we have quoted these passages, is\nclearly established, namely, that no prophet or sage has ever announced\nthe destruction of the Universe, or a change of its present condition,\nor a permanent change of any of its properties. When our Sages say,\n\u201cThe world remains six thousand years, and one thousand years it will\nbe waste,\u201d they do not mean a complete cessation of existing things;\nthe phrase \u201cone thousand years it will be waste\u201d distinctly shows that\ntime will continue; besides, this is the individual opinion of one\nRabbi, and in accordance with one particular theory. But on the other\nhand the words, \u201cThere is nothing new under the sun\u201d (Eccles. i. 9), in\nthe sense that no new creation takes place in any way and under any\ncircumstances, express the general opinion of our Sages, and include a\nprinciple which every one of the doctors of the Mishnah and the Talmud\nrecognises and makes use of in his arguments. Even those who understand\nthe words \u201cnew heavens and a new earth\u201d in their literal sense hold\nthat the heavens, which will in future be formed, have already been\ncreated and are in existence, and that for this reason the present\ntense \u201cremain\u201d is used, and not the future \u201cwill remain.\u201d They support\ntheir view by citing the text, \u201cThere is nothing new under the sun.\u201d Do\nnot imagine that this is opposed to our opinion. They mean, perhaps, to\nsay that the natural laws, by which the promised future condition of\nIsrael will be effected, have been in existence since the days of the\nCreation, and in that they are perfectly correct. When I, however, said\nthat no prophet ever announced \u201ca permanent change of any of its\nproperties,\u201d I intended to except miracles. For although the rod was\nturned into a serpent, the water into blood, the pure and noble hand\ninto a leprous one, without the existence of any natural cause that\ncould effect these or similar phenomena, these changes were not\npermanent, they have not become a physical property. On the contrary,\nthe Universe since continues its regular course. This is my opinion;\nthis should be our belief. Our Sages, however, said very strange things\nas regards miracles; they are found in Bereshit Rabba, and in Midrash\nKoheleth, namely, that the miracles are to some extent also natural;\nfor they say, when God created the Universe with its present physical\nproperties, He made it part of these properties, that they should\nproduce certain miracles at certain times, and the sign of a prophet\nconsisted in the fact that God told him to declare when a certain thing\nwill take place, but the thing itself was effected according to the\nfixed laws of Nature. If this is really the meaning of the passage\nreferred to, it testifies to the greatness of the author, and shows\nthat he held it to be impossible that there should be a change in the\nlaws of Nature, or a change in the will of God [as regards the physical\nproperties of things] after they have once been established. He\ntherefore assumes, e.g., that God gave the waters the property of\njoining together, and of flowing in a downward direction, and of\nseparating only at the time when the Egyptians were drowned, and only\nin a particular place. I have already pointed out to you the source of\nthis passage, and it only tends to oppose the hypothesis of a new\ncreation. It is said there: R. Jonathan said, God made an agreement\nwith the sea that it should divide before the Israelites; thus it is\nsaid, \u201cAnd the sea returned to its strength when the morning appeared\u201d\n(Exod. xiv. 27). R. Jeremiah, son of Elazar, said: Not only with the\nsea, but with all that has been created in the six days of the\nbeginning [was the agreement made]; this is referred to in the words,\n\u201cI, even my hands have stretched out the heavens, and all their host\nhave I commanded\u201d (Isa. xlv. 12); i.e., I have commanded the sea to\ndivide, the fire not to hurt Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, the lions\nnot to harm Daniel, and the fish to spit out Jonah. The same is the\ncase with the rest of the miracles.\n\nWe have thus clearly stated and explained our opinion, that we agree\nwith Aristotle in one half of his theory. For we believe that this\nUniverse remains perpetually with the same properties with which the\nCreator has endowed it, and that none of these will ever be changed\nexcept by way of miracle in some individual instances, although the\nCreator has the power to change the whole Universe, to annihilate it,\nor to remove any of its properties. The Universe, had, however, a\nbeginning and commencement, for when nothing was as yet in existence\nexcept God, His wisdom decreed that the Universe be brought into\nexistence at a certain time, that it should not be annihilated or\nchanged as regards any of its properties, except in some instances;\nsome of these are known to us, whilst others belong to the future, and\nare therefore unknown to us. This is our opinion and the basis of our\nreligion. The opinion of Aristotle is that the Universe, being\npermanent and indestructible, is also eternal and without beginning. We\nhave already shown that this theory is based on the hypothesis that the\nUniverse is the necessary result of causal relation, and that this\nhypothesis includes a certain amount of blasphemy. Having come thus far\nwe will make in the next chapter a few remarks on passages in the first\nchapters of Genesis. For the primary object in this treatise has been\nto expound as much as possible of the Scriptural account of the\nCreation (ma\u02bbaseh bereshit), and the description of the heavenly\nchariot (ma\u02bbaseh mercabah). But let us premise two general\nobservations.\n\nFirst, the account given in Scripture of the Creation is not, as is\ngenerally believed, intended to be in all its parts literal. For if\nthis were the case, wise men would not have kept its explanation\nsecret, and our Sages would not have employed figurative speech [in\ntreating of the Creation] in order to hide its true meaning, nor would\nthey have objected to discuss it in the presence of the common people.\nThe literal meaning of the words might lead us to conceive corrupt\nideas and to form false opinions about God, or even entirely to abandon\nand reject the principles of our Faith. It is therefore right to\nabstain and refrain from examining this subject superficially and\nunscientifically. We must blame the practice of some ignorant preachers\nand expounders of the Bible, who think that wisdom consists in knowing\nthe explanation of words, and that greater perfection is attained by\nemploying more words and longer speech. It is, however, right that we\nshould examine the Scriptural texts by the intellect, after having\nacquired a knowledge of demonstrative science, and of the true hidden\nmeaning of prophecies. But if one has obtained some knowledge in this\nmatter he must not preach on it, as I stated in my Commentary on the\nMishnah (\u1e24agigah, ii. 7), and our Sages said distinctly: From the\nbeginning of the book to this place\u2014after the account of the sixth day\nof the Creation\u2014it is \u201cthe glory of God to conceal a thing\u201d (Prov. xxv.\n2).\n\nWe have thus clearly stated our opinion. It is, however, part of the\nDivine plan that every one who has obtained some perfection transmit it\nto some other persons, as will be shown in the chapter on Prophecy. It\nis, therefore, impossible for a scholar to possess knowledge of these\nproblems, whether it be through his own researches or through his\nmaster\u2019s teaching, without communicating part of that knowledge to\nothers; it cannot be done in clear words; it must be done sparingly by\nway of hints. We find in the words of some of our Sages numerous hints\nand notes of this kind, but mixed up with the words of others and with\nother subjects. In treating of these mysteries, as a rule, I quote as\nmuch as contains the principal idea, and leave the rest for those who\nare worthy of it.\n\nSecondly, the prophets employ homonymous terms and use words which are\nnot meant to be understood in their ordinary signification, but are\nonly used because of some other meaning which they admit, e.g., \u201ca rod\nof an almond-tree (shaked),\u201d because of the words which follow, \u201cfor I\nwill hasten (shaked)\u201d (Jer. i. 11, 12), as will be shown in the chapter\non Prophecy. According to the same principle Ezekiel in the account of\nthe Divine Chariot employs, as we have stated the term \u1e25ashmal (Ezek.\ni. 4); also regel egel (v. 7), ne\u1e25oshet kalal (v. 7), and similar\nterms; Zechariah (vi. 1) likewise adopts this method, and says: \u201cAnd\nthe mountains were mountains of ne\u1e25oshet (brass),\u201d and the like.\n\nAfter these two remarks I will proceed to the chapter which I have\npromised.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX\n\n\nThere is a difference between first and beginning (or principle). The\nlatter exists in the thing of which it is the beginning, or co-exists\nwith it; it need not precede it; e.g., the heart is the beginning of\nthe living being; the element is the beginning of that of which it is\nthe basis. The term \u201cfirst\u201d is likewise applied to things of this kind;\nbut is also employed in cases where precedence in time alone is to be\nexpressed, and the thing which precedes is not the beginning (or the\ncause) of the thing that follows. E.g., we say A. was the first\ninhabitant of this house, after him came B; this does not imply that A\nis the cause of B inhabiting the house. In Hebrew, te\u1e25illah is used in\nthe sense of \u201cfirst\u201d; e.g., when God first (te\u1e25illat) spake to Hosea\n(Hos. i. 1), and the \u201cbeginning\u201d is expressed by reshith, derived from\nrosh, \u201chead,\u201d the principal part of the living being as regards\nposition. The Universe has not been created out of an element that\npreceded it in time, since time itself formed part of the Creation. For\nthis reason Scripture employs the term \u201cbereshit\u201d (in a principle), in\nwhich the beth is a preposition denoting \u201cin.\u201d The true explanation of\nthe first verse of Genesis is as follows: \u201cIn [creating] a principle\nGod created the beings above and the things below.\u201d This explanation is\nin accordance with the theory of the Creation. We find that some of our\nSages are reported to have held the opinion that time existed before\nthe Creation. But this report is very doubtful, because the theory that\ntime cannot be imagined with a beginning, has been taught by Aristotle,\nas I showed you, and is objectionable. Those who have made this\nassertion have been led to it by a saying of one of our Sages in\nreference to the terms \u201cone day,\u201d \u201ca second day.\u201d Taking these terms\nliterally, the author of that saying asked, What determined \u201cthe first\nday,\u201d since there was no rotating sphere, and no sun? and continues as\nfollows: Scripture uses the term \u201cone day\u201d; R. Jehudah, son of R.\nSimon, said: \u201cHence we learn that the divisions of time have existed\npreviously.\u201d R. Abahu said, \u201cHence we learn that God built worlds and\nagain destroyed them.\u201d This latter exposition is still worse than the\nformer. Consider the difficulty which these two Rabbis found in the\nstatement that time existed before the creation of the sun. We shall\nundoubtedly soon remove this difficulty, unless these two Rabbis\nintended to infer from the Scriptural text that the divisions of time\nmust have existed before the Creation, and thus adopted the theory of\nthe Eternity of the Universe. But every religious man rejects this. The\nabove saying is, in my opinion, certainly of the same character as that\nof R. Eliezer, \u201cWhence were the heavens created,\u201d etc., (chap. xxvi.).\nIn short, in these questions, do not take notice of the utterances of\nany person. I told you that the foundation of our faith is the belief\nthat God created the Universe from nothing; that time did not exist\npreviously, but was created; for it depends on the motion of the\nsphere, and the sphere has been created.\n\nYou must know that the particle et in the phrase et ha-shamayim ve-et\nha-are\u1e93 (\u201cthe heavens and the earth\u201d) signifies \u201ctogether with\u201d; our\nSages have explained the word in the same sense in many instances.\nAccordingly they assume that God created with the heavens everything\nthat the heavens contain, and with the earth everything the earth\nincludes. They further say that the simultaneous Creation of the\nheavens and the earth is implied in the words, \u201cI call unto them, they\nstand up together\u201d (Ps. xlviii.). Consequently, all things were created\ntogether, but were separated from each other successively. Our Sages\nillustrated this by the following simile: We sow various seeds at the\nsame time; some spring forth after one day, some after two, and some\nafter three days, although all have been sown at the same time.\nAccording to this interpretation, which is undoubtedly correct, the\ndifficulty is removed, which led R. Jehudah, son of R. Simon, to utter\nthe above saying, and consisted in the doubt as to the thing by which\nthe first day, the second, and the third were determined. In Bereshit\nRabba, our Sages, speaking of the light created on the first day\naccording to the Scriptural account, say as follows: these lights [of\nthe luminaries mentioned in the Creation of the fourth day] are the\nsame that were created on the first day, but were only fixed in their\nplaces on the fourth day. The meaning [of the first verse] has thus\nbeen clearly stated.\n\nWe must further consider that the term ere\u1e93 is a homonym, and is used\nin a general and a particular sense. It has a more general\nsignification when used of everything within the sphere of the moon,\ni.e., of all the four elements; and is used in particular of one of\nthem, of the lowest, viz., earth. This is evident from the passage:\n\u201cAnd the earth was without form and void, and darkness was on the\nsurface of the deep. And the wind of God moved upon the face of the\nwaters.\u201d The term \u201cearth\u201d [mentioned here, and in the first verse]\nincludes all the four elements, whilst further on it is said, \u201cAnd God\ncalled the dry land Earth\u201d (Gen. i. 10).\n\nIt is also important to notice that the words, \u201cAnd God called a\ncertain thing a certain name,\u201d are invariably intended to distinguish\none thing from others which are called by the same common noun. I\nexplain, therefore, the first verse in Genesis thus: In creating the\nprinciple God created the things above and those below. Ere\u1e93 in this\nverse denotes \u201cthe things below,\u201d or \u201cthe four elements,\u201d and in the\nverse, \u201cAnd God called the dry land Earth\u201d (ere\u1e93), it signifies the\nelement earth. This subject is now made clear.\n\nThe four elements indicated, according to our explanation, in the term\nere\u1e93 \u201cearth,\u201d in the first verse, are mentioned first after the\nheavens; for there are named ere\u1e93 (earth), rua\u1e25 (air), mayim (water),\nand \u1e25oshek (fire). By \u1e25oshek the element fire is meant, nothing else;\ncomp. \u201cAnd thou heardest his words out of the midst of the fire\u201d (Deut.\niv. 36); and, \u201cWhen ye heard the voice out of the midst of the \u1e25oshek\u201d\n(darkness) (ibid. v. 2); again, \u201cAll \u1e25oshek (darkness) shall be hid in\nhis secret places: a fire not blown shall consume him\u201d (Job xx. 26).\nThe element fire is called \u1e25oshek because it is not luminous, it is\nonly transparent; for if it were luminous we should see at night the\nwhole atmosphere in flames. The order of the four elements, according\nto the natural position is here described; namely, first earth, above\nit water, air close to water, and fire above air; for by placing air\nover water, \u1e25oshek (fire), which is \u201cupon the face of the deep,\u201d is\nundoubtedly above air. It was here necessary to use the term rua\u1e25\nelohim, because air is described here as in motion (mera\u1e25efet), and the\nmotion of the air is, as a rule, ascribed to God; comp. \u201cAnd there went\nforth a wind from the Lord\u201d (Num. xi. 31); \u201cThou didst blow with thy\nwind\u201d (Exod. xv. 10); \u201cAnd the Lord turned a mighty strong west wind\u201d\n(ibid. x. 19), and the like. As the first \u1e25oshek, which denotes the\nelement fire, is different from the \u1e25oshek mentioned further on in the\nsense of \u201cdarkness,\u201d the latter is explained and distinguished from the\nformer, according to our explanation, in the words, \u201cAnd darkness he\ncalled Night.\u201d This is now clear.\n\nThe phrase, \u201cAnd he divided between the waters,\u201d etc., does not\ndescribe a division in space, as if the one part were merely above the\nother, whilst the nature of both remained the same, but a distinction\nas regards their nature or form. One portion of that which was first\ncalled water was made one thing by certain properties it received, and\nanother portion received a different form, and this latter portion is\nthat which is commonly called water and of this it is said, \u201cAnd the\ngathering of the waters he called Seas.\u201d Scripture even indicates that\nthe first mayim (\u201cwater\u201d) in the phrase, \u201cOn the face of the waters,\u201d\ndoes not refer to the waters which form the seas; and that part of the\nelement \u201cwater,\u201d having received a particular form, and being above the\nair, is distinguished from the other part which has received the form\nof ordinary water. For the words, \u201cAnd he divided between the waters\nwhich are beneath the firmament and the waters which are above the\nfirmament,\u201d are similar in meaning to the phrase, \u201cAnd God divided\nbetween the light and the darkness,\u201d and refer to a distinction by a\nseparate form. The firmament itself was formed of water; and in the\nwords of our Sages (Bereshit Rabba; cap. iv.), \u201cThe middle drop\ncongealed and formed the heavens.\u201d\n\nHere likewise Scripture says, in accordance with what I said above,\n\u201cAnd God called the firmament Heaven\u201d (Gen. i. 8), in order to explain\nthe homonymity of the term shamayim (heaven), and to show that shamayim\nin the first verse is not the firmament which is also called shamayim\n(heaven). The difference is more clearly expressed in the words, \u201cIn\nthe open firmament of heaven\u201d (ibid. i. 20); here it is shown that\n\u201cfirmament\u201d (raki\u02bba), and \u201cheaven\u201d (shamayim), are two different\nthings. In consequence of this homonymity of the term shamayim the term\nraki\u02bba (firmament) is also used of the true heaven, just as the real\nfirmament is sometimes called shamayim (heaven); comp. \u201cAnd God set\nthem in the raki\u02bba (firmament) of the heaven\u201d (ibid. i. 17).\n\nThis verse shows clearly that the stars, the sun, and the moon are not,\nas people believe, on the surface of the spheres, but they are fixed in\nthe spheres, and this has been proved satisfactorily, there being no\nvacuum in the Universe; for it is said, \u201cin the firmament of the\nheaven,\u201d and not \u201cupon the firmament of the heaven.\u201d\n\nIt is therefore clear that there has been one common element called\nwater, which has been afterwards distinguished by three different\nforms; one part forms the seas, another the firmament, and a third part\nis over the firmament, and all this is separate from the earth. The\nScriptural text follows here a peculiar method in order to indicate\nsome extraordinary mysteries. It has also been declared by our Sages\nthat the portion above the firmament is only water by name, not in\nreality, for they say (Babyl. Talmud, \u1e24agigah 14b) \u201cFour entered the\nparadise,\u201d etc. R. Akiba said to them, \u201cWhen you come to the stores of\npure marble, do not say, Water, water, for it is written, \u2018He that\ntelleth lies shall not tarry in my sight\u2019\u201d (Ps. ci. 7). Consider, if\nyou belong to the class of thinking men, how clearly and distinctly\nthis passage explains the subject for those who reflect on it!\nUnderstand that which has been proved by Aristotle in his book On\nMeteorology, and note whatever men of science have said on\nmeteorological matters.\n\nIt is necessary to inquire into the reason why the declaration \u201cthat it\nwas good\u201d is not found in the account of the second day of the\nCreation. The various Midrashic sayings of our Sages on this point are\nwell known; the best of them is the explanation that the creation of\nthe water was not completed on that day. According to my opinion the\nreason is likewise clear, and is as follows: When the creation of any\npart of the Universe is described that is permanent, regular, and in a\nsettled order, the phrase \u201cthat it is good\u201d is used. But the account of\nthe firmament, with that which is above it and is called water, is, as\nyou see, of a very mysterious character. For if taken literally the\nfirmament would appear at first thought to be merely an imaginary\nthing, as there is no other substance but the elements between us and\nthe lowest of the heavenly spheres, and there is no water above the\nair; and if the firmament, with that which is over it, be supposed to\nbe above the heavens, it would a fortiori seem to be unreal and\nuncomprehensible. But if the account be understood in a figurative\nsense and according to its true meaning, it is still more mysterious,\nsince it was considered necessary to make this one of the most hidden\nsecrets, in order to prevent the multitude from knowing it. This being\nthe case, how could it be said [of the creation of the second day]\n\u201cthat it was good\u201d? This phrase would tell us that it is perfectly\nclear what share the thing to which it refers takes in the permanent\nexistence of the Universe. But what good can people find in a thing\nwhose real nature is hidden, and whose apparent nature is not real?\nWhy, therefore, should it be said in reference to it, \u201cthat it was\ngood\u201d? I must, however, give the following additional explanation.\nAlthough the result of the second day\u2019s creation forms an important\nelement among the existing things, the firmament was not its primary\nobject in the organization of the Universe, and therefore it could not\nbe said \u201cthat it was good\u201d; it was only the means for the uncovering of\nthe earth. Note this. Our Sages have already explained that the herbs\nand trees, which God caused to spring forth from the ground, were\ncaused by God to grow, after He had sent down rain upon them; and the\npassage beginning, \u201cAnd there went up a mist from the earth\u201d (ii. 6),\nrefers to that which took place before the creative act, related in the\nwords, \u201cLet the earth bring forth grass,\u201d etc. (i. ii.). Therefore\nOnkelos translates it: \u201cAnd there had gone up a mist from the earth.\u201d\nIt is also evident from the text itself, where it is distinctly said,\n\u201cAnd every plant in the field before it was in the earth,\u201d etc. (ii.\n5). This question is now explained.\n\nIt is well known to every philosopher that the principal causes of\nproduction and destruction, after the influence of the spheres, are\nlight and darkness, in so far as these are accompanied by heat and\ncold. For by the motion of the spheres the elements intermix, and by\nlight and darkness their constitution changes. The first change\nconsists in the formation of two kinds of mist; these are the first\ncauses of meteorological phenomena, such as rain; they also caused the\nformation of minerals, of plants, of animals, and at last of man. It is\nlikewise known that darkness is the natural property of all things on\nearth; in them light is accidental, coming from an external cause, and\ntherefore everything remains in a state of rest in the absence of\nlight. The Scriptural account of the Creation follows in every respect\nexactly the same order, without any deviation.\n\nNote also the saying of our Sages: \u201cWhen the Universe was created, all\nthings were created with size, intellect, and beauty fully developed,\ni.e., everything was created perfect in magnitude and form, and endowed\nwith the most suitable properties; the word \u1e93ibyonam (their beauty)\nused here has the same meaning as \u1e93ebi, \u2018glory\u2019\u201d (Ezek. xx. 6). Note\nthis likewise, for it includes a principle fully established.\n\nThe following point now claims our attention. The account of the six\ndays of creation contains, in reference to the creation of man, the\nstatement: \u201cMale and female created he them\u201d (i. 27), and concludes\nwith the words: \u201cThus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all\nthe host of them\u201d (ii. 1), and yet the portion which follows describes\nthe creation of Eve from Adam, the tree of life, and the tree of\nknowledge, the history of the serpent and the events connected\ntherewith, and all this as having taken place after Adam had been\nplaced in the Garden of Eden. All our Sages agree that this took place\non the sixth day, and that nothing new was created after the close of\nthe six days. None of the things mentioned above is therefore\nimpossible, because the laws of Nature were then not yet permanently\nfixed. There are, however, some utterances of our Sages on this subject\n[which apparently imply a different view]. I will gather them from\ntheir different sources and place them before you, and I will refer\nalso to certain things by mere hints, just as has been done by the\nSages. You must know that their words, which I am about to quote, are\nmost perfect, most accurate, and clear to those for whom they were\nsaid. I will therefore not add long explanations, lest I make their\nstatements plain, and I might thus become \u201ca revealer of secrets,\u201d but\nI will give them in a certain order, accompanied with a few remarks,\nwhich will suffice for readers like you.\n\nOne of these utterances is this: \u201cAdam and Eve were at first created as\none being, having their backs united; they were then separated, and one\nhalf was removed and brought before Adam as Eve.\u201d The term mi-\u1e93al\u02bbotav\n(lit. \u201cof his ribs\u201d) signifies \u201cof his sides.\u201d The meaning of the word\nis proved by referring to \u1e93el\u02bba, \u201cthe side\u201d of the tabernacle (Exod.\nxxvi. 20), which Onkelos renders setar (\u201cside\u201d), and so also\nmi-\u1e93al\u02bbotav is rendered by him \u201cmi-sitrohi\u201d (of his sides). Note also\nhow clearly it has been stated that Adam and Eve were two in some\nrespects, and yet they remained one, according to the words, \u201cBone of\nmy bones, and flesh of my flesh\u201d (Gen. ii. 23). The unity of the two is\nproved by the fact that both have the same name, for she is called\nishshah (woman), because she was taken out of ish (man), also by the\nwords, \u201cAnd shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh\u201d\n(ii. 24). How great is the ignorance of those who do not see that all\nthis necessarily includes some [other] idea [besides the literal\nmeaning of the words]. This is now clear.\n\nAnother noteworthy Midrashic remark of our Sages is the following: \u201cThe\nserpent had a rider, the rider was as big as a camel, and it was the\nrider that enticed Eve; this rider was Sama\u00ebl.\u201d Sama\u00ebl is the name\ngenerally applied by our Sages to Satan. Thus they say in several\nplaces that Satan desired to entice Abraham to sin, and to abstain from\nbinding Isaac, and he desired also to persuade Isaac not to obey his\nfather. At the same time they also say, in reference to the same\nsubject, viz., the Akedah (\u201cthe binding of Isaac\u201d), that Sama\u00ebl came to\nAbraham and said to him, \u201cWhat! hast thou, being an old man, lost thy\nsenses?\u201d etc. This shows that Sama\u00ebl and Satan are identical. There is\na meaning in this name [Sama\u00ebl], as there is also in the name na\u1e25ash\n(\u201cserpent\u201d). In describing how the serpent came to entice Eve, our\nSages say: \u201cSama\u00ebl was riding on it, and God was laughing at both the\ncamel and its rider.\u201d It is especially of importance to notice that the\nserpent did not approach or address Adam, but all his attempts were\ndirected against Eve, and it was through her that the serpent caused\ninjury and death to Adam. The greatest hatred exists between the\nserpent and Eve, and between his seed and her seed; her seed being\nundoubtedly also the seed of man. More remarkable still is the way in\nwhich the serpent is joined to Eve, or rather his seed to her seed; the\nhead of the one touches the heel of the other. Eve defeats the serpent\nby crushing its head, whilst the serpent defeats her by wounding her\nheel. This is likewise clear.\n\nThe following is also a remarkable passage, most absurd in its literal\nsense; but as an allegory it contains wonderful wisdom, and fully\nagrees with real facts, as will be found by those who understand all\nthe chapters of this treatise. When the serpent came to Eve he infected\nher with poison; the Israelites, who stood at Mount Sinai, removed that\npoison; idolaters, who did not stand at Mount Sinai, have not got rid\nof it. Note this likewise. Again they said: \u201cThe tree of life extends\nover an area of five hundred years\u2019 journey, and it is from beneath it\nthat all the waters of the creation sprang forth\u201d; and they added the\nexplanation that this measure referred to the thickness of its body,\nand not to the extent of its branches, for they continue thus: \u201cNot the\nextent of the branches thereof, but the stem thereof [korato, lit.,\n\u2018its beam,\u2019 signifying here \u2018its stem\u2019] has a thickness of five hundred\nyears\u2019 journey.\u201d This is now sufficiently clear. Again: \u201cGod has never\nshown the tree of knowledge [of good and evil] to man, nor will He ever\nshow it.\u201d This is correct, for it must be so according to the nature of\nthe Universe. Another noteworthy saying is this: \u201cAnd the Lord God took\nthe man, i.e., raised him, and placed him in the Garden of Eden,\u201d i.e.,\nHe gave him rest. The words \u201cHe took him,\u201d \u201cHe gave him,\u201d have no\nreference to position in space, but they indicate his position in rank\namong transient beings, and the prominent character of his existence.\nRemarkable and noteworthy is the great wisdom contained in the names of\nAdam, Cain, and Abel, and in the fact that it was Cain who slew Abel in\nthe field, that both of them perished, although the murderer had some\nrespite, and that the existence of mankind is due to Seth alone. Comp.\n\u201cFor God has appointed me another seed\u201d (iv. 25). This has proved true.\n\nIt is also necessary to understand and consider the words, \u201cAnd Adam\ngave names\u201d (ii. 20); here it is indicated that languages are\nconventional, and that they are not natural, as has been assumed by\nsome. We must also consider the four different terms employed in\nexpressing the relations of the heavens to God, bore (Creator), \u02bboseh\n(Maker), koneh (Possessor), and el (God). Comp. \u201cGod created the heaven\nand the earth\u201d (i. 1); \u201cIn the day that God made the earth and the\nheavens\u201d (ii. 4); \u201cPossessor of heaven and earth\u201d (xiv. 19); \u201cGod of\nthe Universe\u201d (xxi. 31); \u201cThe God of heaven and the God of the earth\u201d\n(xxiv. 3). As to the verbs, konen, \u201che established,\u201d tafa\u1e25, \u201che\nspanned,\u201d and natah, \u201che stretched out,\u201d occurring in the following\npassages, \u201cWhich thou hast established\u201d (Ps. viii. 4), \u201cMy right hand\nhath spanned the heavens\u201d (Isa. xviii. 13), \u201cWho stretchest out the\nheavens\u201d (Ps. civ. 2), they are included in the term \u02bbasah (\u201che made\u201d);\nthe verb ya\u1e93ar, \u201che formed,\u201d does not occur in reference to the\nheavens. According to my opinion the verb ya\u1e93ar denotes to make a form,\na shape, or any other accident (for form and shape are likewise\naccidents). It is therefore said, yo\u1e93er or, \u201cWho formeth the light\u201d\n(Isa. xiv. 7), light being an accident; yo\u1e93er harim, \u201cThat formeth the\nmountains\u201d (Amos iv. 13), i.e., that gave them their shape. In the same\nsense the verb is used in the passage, \u201cAnd the Lord God formed\n(va-yi\u1e93er) all the beasts,\u201d etc. (Gen. ii. 7). But in reference to the\nUniverse, viz., the heavens and the earth, which comprises the totality\nof the Creation, Scripture employs the verb bara, which we explain as\ndenoting he produced something from nothing; also \u02bbasah (\u201che made\u201d), on\naccount of the general forms or natural properties of the things which\nwere given to them; kanah, \u201che possessed,\u201d because God rules over them\nlike a master over his servants. For this reason He is also called,\n\u201cThe Lord of the whole earth\u201d (Jos. iii. 11\u201313); ha-adon, \u201cthe Lord\u201d\n(Exod. xx., iii. 17). But although none can be a master unless there\nexists something that is in his possession, this attribute cannot be\nconsidered to imply the belief in the eternal existence of a materia\nprima, since the verbs bara, \u201che created,\u201d and \u02bbasah, \u201che made,\u201d are\nalso employed in reference to the heavens. The Creator is called the\nGod of the heavens and the God of the Universe, on account of the\nrelations between Him and the heavens; He governs, and they are\ngoverned; the word elohim does not signify \u201cmaster\u201d in the sense of\n\u201cowner\u201d; it expresses the relation between His position in the totality\nof existing beings, and the position of the heavens or the Universe; He\nis God, not they, i.e., not the heavens. Note this.\n\nThis, together with those explanations which we have given, and which\nwe intend to give, in reference to this subject, may suffice,\nconsidering the object of this treatise and the capacity of the reader.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI\n\n\nIt is perhaps clear why the laws concerning Sabbath are so severe, that\ntheir transgression is visited with death by stoning, and that the\ngreatest of the prophets put a person to death for breaking the\nSabbath. The commandment of the Sabbath is the third from the\ncommandment concerning the existence and the unity of God. For the\ncommandment not to worship any other being is merely an explanation of\nthe first. You know already from what I have said, that no opinions\nretain their vitality except those which are confirmed, published, and\nby certain actions constantly revived among the people. Therefore we\nare told in the Law to honour this day; in order to confirm thereby the\nprinciple of Creation which will spread in the world, when all peoples\nkeep Sabbath on the same day. For when the question is asked, why this\nis done, the answer is given: \u201cFor in six days the Lord hath made,\u201d\netc. (Exod. xx. 11). Two different reasons are given for this\ncommandment, because of two different objects. In the Decalogue in\nExodus, the following reason is given for distinguishing the Sabbath:\n\u201cFor in six days,\u201d etc. But in Deuteronomy (chap. v. 15) the reason is\ngiven: \u201cAnd thou shalt remember that thou hast been a slave in the land\nof Egypt, etc., therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee,\u201d etc. This\ndifference can easily be explained. In the former, the cause of the\nhonour and distinction of the day is given; comp. \u201cTherefore the Lord\nhath blessed the day of the Sabbath and sanctified it\u201d (Exod. xx. 10),\nand the cause for this is, \u201cFor in six days,\u201d etc. But the fact that\nGod has given us the law of the Sabbath and commanded us to keep it, is\nthe consequence of our having been slaves; for then our work did not\ndepend on our will, nor could we choose the time for it; and we could\nnot rest. Thus God commanded us to abstain from work on the Sabbath,\nand to rest, for two purposes; namely, (1) That we might confirm the\ntrue theory, that of the Creation, which at once and clearly leads to\nthe theory of the existence of God. (2) That we might remember how kind\nGod has been in freeing us from the burden of the Egyptians.\u2014The\nSabbath is therefore a double blessing: it gives us correct notions,\nand also promotes the well-being of our bodies.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII\n\n\nThere are as many different opinions concerning Prophecy as concerning\nthe Eternity or Non-Eternity of the Universe. For we have shown that\nthose who assume the existence of God as proved may be divided into\nthree classes, according to the view they take of the question, whether\nthe Universe is eternal or not. Similarly there are three different\nopinions on Prophecy. I will not notice the view of the Atheist; he\ndoes not believe in the Existence of God, much less in Prophecy; but I\nwill content myself with discussing the various opinions [on Prophecy]\nheld by those who believe in God.\n\n1. Among those who believe in Prophecy, and even among our\ncoreligionists, there are some ignorant people who think as follows:\nGod selects any person He pleases, inspires him with the spirit of\nProphecy, and entrusts him with a mission. It makes no difference\nwhether that person be wise or stupid, old or young; provided he be, to\nsome extent, morally good. For these people have not yet gone so far as\nto maintain that God might also inspire a wicked person with His\nspirit. They admit that this is impossible, unless God has previously\ncaused him to improve his ways.\n\n2. The philosophers hold that prophecy is a certain faculty of man in a\nstate of perfection, which can only be obtained by study. Although the\nfaculty is common to the whole race, yet it is not fully developed in\neach individual, either on account of the individual\u2019s defective\nconstitution, or on account of some other external cause. This is the\ncase with every faculty common to a class. It is only brought to a\nstate of perfection in some individuals, and not in all; but it is\nimpossible that it should not be perfect in some individual of the\nclass; and if the perfection is of such a nature that it can only be\nproduced by an agent, such an agent must exist. Accordingly, it is\nimpossible that an ignorant person should be a prophet; or that a\nperson being no prophet in the evening, should, unexpectedly on the\nfollowing morning, find himself a prophet, as if prophecy were a thing\nthat could be found unintentionally. But if a person, perfect in his\nintellectual and moral faculties, and also perfect, as far as possible,\nin his imaginative faculty, prepares himself in the manner which will\nbe described, he must become a prophet; for prophecy is a natural\nfaculty of man. It is impossible that a man who has the capacity for\nprophecy should prepare himself for it without attaining it, just as it\nis impossible that a person with a healthy constitution should be fed\nwell, and yet not properly assimilate his food; and the like.\n\n3. The third view is that which is taught in Scripture, and which forms\none of the principles of our religion. It coincides with the opinion of\nthe philosophers in all points except one. For we believe that, even if\none has the capacity for prophecy, and has duly prepared himself, it\nmay yet happen that he does not actually prophesy. It is in that case\nthe will of God [that withholds from him the use of the faculty].\nAccording to my opinion, this fact is as exceptional as any other\nmiracle, and acts in the same way. For the laws of Nature demand that\nevery one should be a prophet, who has a proper physical constitution,\nand has been duly prepared as regards education and training. If such a\nperson is not a prophet, he is in the same position as a person who,\nlike Jeroboam (1 Kings xiii. 4), is deprived of the use of his hand, or\nof his eyes, as was the case with the army of Syria, in the history of\nElisha (2 Kings vi. 18). As for the principle which I laid down, that\npreparation and perfection of moral and rational faculties are the sine\nqu\u00e2 non, our Sages say exactly the same: \u201cThe spirit of prophecy only\nrests upon persons who are wise, strong, and rich.\u201d We have explained\nthese words in our Commentary on the Mishnah, and in our large work. We\nstated there that the Sons of the Prophets were constantly engaged in\npreparation. That those who have prepared themselves may still be\nprevented from being prophets, may be inferred from the history of\nBaruch, the son of Nerijah; for he followed Jeremiah, who prepared and\ninstructed him; and yet he hoped in vain for prophecy; comp., \u201cI am\nweary with my sighing, and rest have I not found.\u201d He was then told\nthrough Jeremiah, \u201cThus saith the Lord, Thus shalt thou say to him,\nThou seekest for thee great things, do not seek\u201d (Jer. xlv. 5). It may\nperhaps be assumed that prophecy is here described as a thing \u201ctoo\ngreat\u201d for Baruch. So also the fact that \u201cher prophets did not find\nvisions from the Lord\u201d (Lam. ii. 4), may be considered as the result of\nthe exile of her prophets, as will be explained (chap. xxxvi.). There\nare, however, numerous passages in Scripture as well as in the writings\nof our Sages, which support the principle that it depends chiefly on\nthe will of God who is to prophesy, and at what time; and that He only\nselects the best and the wisest. We hold that fools and ignorant people\nare unfit for this distinction. It is as impossible for any one of\nthese to prophesy as it is for an ass or a frog; for prophecy is\nimpossible without study and training; when these have created the\npossibility, then it depends on the will of God whether the possibility\nis to be turned into reality. We must not be misled by the words of\nJeremiah (i. 5), \u201cBefore I formed thee in the womb I knew thee, and\nbefore thou camest forth from the womb I have sanctified thee\u201d; for\nthis is the case with all prophets; there must be a physical\npreparation from the beginning of their existence, as will be\nexplained. As to the words, \u201cFor I am young\u201d (ibid. ver. 6), it is well\nknown that the pious Joseph, when he was thirty years old, is called by\nthe Hebrew \u201cyoung\u201d (na\u02bbar); also Joshua, when he was nearly sixty years\nold. For the statement, \u201cand his minister Joshua, the son of Nun, was\nyoung,\u201d occurs in the account of the Golden Calf (Exod. xxxiii. 11).\nMoses was then eighty-one years old, he lived one hundred and twenty\nyears; Joshua, who survived him fourteen years, lived one hundred and\nten years and must consequently have been at least fifty-seven years\nold at the time when the Golden Calf was made, and yet he is called\nna\u02bbar, \u201cyoung.\u201d Nor must we be misled by prophecies like the following:\n\u201cI will pour out my spirit over all flesh, and your sons and your\ndaughters shall prophesy\u201d; since it is distinctly stated what is meant\nby \u201cprophesy\u201d in this place, viz., \u201cYour old men will dream dreams,\nyour young men shall see visions.\u201d For we call also prophets all those\nwho reveal something unknown by surmises, or conjectures, or correct\ninferences. Thus \u201cprophets of Baal\u201d and \u201cof Asherah\u201d are mentioned in\nScripture. And God says, \u201cIf there arise among you a prophet or a\ndreamer of dreams,\u201d etc. (Deut. xiii. 1). As to the revelation on Mount\nSinai, all saw the great fire, and heard the fearful thunderings, that\ncaused such an extraordinary terror; but only those of them who were\nduly qualified were prophetically inspired, each one according to his\ncapacities. Therefore it is said, \u201cCome up unto the Lord, thou and\nAaron, Nadab and Abihu.\u201d Moses rose to the highest degree of prophecy,\naccording to the words, \u201cAnd Moses alone shall come near the Lord.\u201d\nAaron was below him, Nadab and Abihu below Aaron, and the seventy\nelders below Nadab and Abihu, and the rest below the latter, each one\naccording to his degree of perfection. Similarly our Sages wrote: Moses\nhad his own place and Aaron his own. Since we have touched upon the\nrevelation on Mount Sinai, we will point out in a separate chapter what\nmay be inferred as regards the nature of that event, both from the\nScriptural text, in accordance with reasonable interpretation, and from\nthe words of our Sages.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII\n\n\nIt is clear to me that what Moses experienced at the revelation on\nMount Sinai was different from that which was experienced by all the\nother Israelites, for Moses alone was addressed by God, and for this\nreason the second person singular is used in the Ten Commandments;\nMoses then went down to the foot of the mount and told his fellow-men\nwhat he had heard. Comp., \u201cI stood between the Lord and you at that\ntime to tell you the word of the Lord\u201d (Deut. v. 5). Again, \u201cMoses\nspake, and God answered him with a loud voice\u201d (Exod. xix. 19). In the\nMechilta our Sages say distinctly that he brought to them every word as\nhe had heard it. Furthermore, the words, \u201cIn order that the people hear\nwhen I speak with thee\u201d (Exod. xix. 9), show that God spoke to Moses,\nand the people only heard the mighty sound, not distinct words. It is\nto the perception of this mighty sound that Scripture refers in the\npassage, \u201cWhen ye hear the sound\u201d (Deut. v. 20); again it is stated,\n\u201cYou heard a sound of words\u201d (ibid. iv. 12), and it is not said \u201cYou\nheard words\u201d; and even where the hearing of the words is mentioned,\nonly the perception of the sound is meant. It was only Moses that heard\nthe words, and he reported them to the people. This is apparent from\nScripture, and from the utterances of our Sages in general. There is,\nhowever, an opinion of our Sages frequently expressed in the Midrashim,\nand found also in the Talmud, to this effect: The Israelites heard the\nfirst and the second commandments from God, i.e., they learnt the truth\nof the principles contained in these two commandments in the same\nmanner as Moses, and not through Moses. For these two principles, the\nexistence of God and His Unity, can be arrived at by means of\nreasoning, and whatever can be established by proof is known by the\nprophet in the same way as by any other person; he has no advantage in\nthis respect. These two principles were not known through prophecy\nalone. Comp., \u201cThou hast been shown to know that,\u201d etc. (Deut. iv. 34).\nBut the rest of the commandments are of an ethical and authoritative\ncharacter, and do not contain [truths] perceived by the intellect.\nNotwithstanding all that has been said by our Sages on this subject, we\ninfer from Scripture as well as from the words of our Sages, that the\nIsraelites heard on that occasion a certain sound which Moses\nunderstood to proclaim the first two commandments, and through Moses\nall other Israelites learnt them when he in intelligible sounds\nrepeated them to the people. Our Sages mention this view, and support\nit by the verse, \u201cGod hath spoken once; twice have I heard this\u201d (Ps.\nlxii. 11). They state distinctly, in the beginning of Midrash \u1e24azita,\nthat the Israelites did not hear any other command directly from God;\ncomp. \u201cA loud voice, and it was not heard again\u201d (Deut. v. 19). It was\nafter this first sound was heard that the people were seized with the\nfear and terror described in Scripture, and that they said, \u201cBehold the\nLord our God has shown us, etc., and now why shall we die, etc. Come\nthou near,\u201d etc. Then Moses, the most distinguished of all mankind,\ncame the second time, received successively the other commandments, and\ncame down to the foot of the mountain to proclaim them to the people,\nwhilst the mighty phenomena continued; they saw the fire, they heard\nthe sounds, which were those of thunder and lightning during a storm,\nand the loud sound of the shofar; and all that is said of the many\nsounds heard at that time, e.g., in the verse, \u201cand all the people\nperceived the sounds,\u201d etc., refers to the sound of the shofar,\nthunder, and similar sounds. But the voice of the Lord, that is, the\nvoice created for that purpose, which was understood to include the\ndiverse commandments, was only heard once, as is declared in the Law,\nand has been clearly stated by our Sages in the places which I have\nindicated to you. When the people heard this voice their soul left\nthem; and in this voice they perceived the first two commandments. It\nmust, however, be noticed that the people did not understand the voice\nin the same degree as Moses did. I will point out to you this important\nfact, and show you that it was a matter of tradition with the nation,\nand well known by our Sages. For, as a rule, Onkelos renders the word\nva-yedabber by u-mallel (\u201cand God spake\u201d); this is also the case with\nthis word in the beginning of the twentieth chapter of Exodus, but the\nwords ve-al yedabber immanu elohim, \u201clet not God speak to us\u201d (Exod.\nxx. 19), addressed by the people to Moses, is rendered vela yitmallel\nimmanu min kodam adonai (\u201cLet not aught be spoken to us by the Lord\u201d).\nOnkelos makes thus the same distinction which we made. You know that\naccording to the Talmud Onkelos received all these excellent\ninterpretations directly from R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, the wisest men\nin Israel. Note it, and remember it, for it is impossible for any\nperson to expound the revelation on Mount Sinai more fully than our\nSages have done, since it is one of the secrets of the Law. It is very\ndifficult to have a true conception of the events, for there has never\nbeen before, nor will there ever be again, anything like it. Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV\n\n\nThe meaning of the Scriptural passage, \u201cBehold I will send an angel\nbefore thee,\u201d etc. (Exod. xxiii. 20), is identical with the parallel\npassage in Deuteronomy which God is represented to have addressed to\nMoses at the revelation on Mount Sinai, namely, \u201cI will raise them up a\nprophet from among their brethren,\u201d etc. (Deut. xviii. 18). The words,\n\u201cBeware of him, and obey his voice,\u201d etc., said in reference to the\nangel, prove [that this passage speaks of a prophet]. For there is no\ndoubt that the commandment is given to the ordinary people, to whom\nangels do not appear with commandments and exhortations, and it is\ntherefore unnecessary to tell them not to disobey him. The meaning of\nthe passage quoted above is this: God informs the Israelites that He\nwill raise up for them a prophet, to whom an angel will appear in order\nto speak to him, to command him, and to exhort him; he therefore\ncautions them not to rebel against this angel, whose word the prophet\nwill communicate to them. Therefore it is expressly said in\nDeuteronomy, \u201cUnto him ye shall hearken\u201d (Deut. xviii. 15); \u201cAnd it\nshall come to pass that whosoever shall not hearken unto my words which\nhe shall speak in my name,\u201d etc. (ibid. 19). This is the explanation of\nthe words, \u201cfor my name is in him\u201d (Exod. xxiv. 21). The object of all\nthis is to say to the Israelites, This great sight witnessed by you,\nthe revelation on Mount Sinai, will not continue for ever, nor will it\never be repeated. Fire and cloud will not continually rest over the\ntabernacle, as they are resting now on it; but the towns will be\nconquered for you, peace will be secured for you in the land, and you\nwill be informed of what you have to do, by an angel whom I will send\nto your prophets; he will thus teach you what to do, and what not to\ndo. Here a principle is laid down which I have constantly expounded,\nviz., that all prophets except Moses receive the prophecy through an\nangel. Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV\n\n\nI have already described the four points in which the prophecy of Moses\nour Teacher was distinguished from that of other prophets, in books\naccessible to every one, in the Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin x.\n1) and in Mishneh-torah (S. Madd\u02bba I. vii. 6); I have also adduced\nevidence for my explanation, and shown the correctness thereof. I need\nnot repeat the subject here, nor is it included in the theme of this\nwork. For I must tell you that whatever I say here of prophecy refers\nexclusively to the form of the prophecy of all prophets before and\nafter Moses. But as to the prophecy of Moses I will not discuss it in\nthis work with one single word, whether directly or indirectly,\nbecause, in my opinion, the term prophet is applied to Moses and other\nmen homonymously. A similar distinction, I think, must be made between\nthe miracles wrought by Moses and those wrought by other prophets, for\nhis signs are not of the same class as the miracles of other prophets.\nThat his prophecy was distinguished from that of all his predecessors\nis proved by the passage, \u201cAnd I appeared to Abraham, etc., but by my\nname, the Lord, I was not known unto them\u201d (Exod. vi. 3). We thus learn\nthat his prophetic perception was different from that of the\nPatriarchs, and excelled it; a fortiori it must have excelled that of\nother prophets before Moses. As to the distinction of Moses\u2019 prophecy\nfrom that of succeeding prophets, it is stated as a fact, \u201cAnd there\narose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew\nface to face\u201d (Deut. xxxiv. 10). It is thus clear that his prophetic\nperception was above that of later prophets in Israel, who are \u201ca\nkingdom of priests and a holy nation,\u201d and \u201cin whose midst is the\nLord\u201d; much more is it above that of prophets among other nations.\n\nThe general distinction between the wonders of Moses and those of other\nprophets is this: The wonders wrought by prophets, or for them, are\nwitnessed by a few individuals, e.g., the wonders wrought by Elijah and\nElisha; the king of Israel is therefore surprised, and asked Gehazi to\ndescribe to him the miracles wrought by Elisha: \u201cTell me, I pray thee,\nall the great things that Elisha hath done. And it came to pass as he\nwas telling, etc. And Gehazi said: \u2018My lord, O king, this is the woman,\nand this is her son, whom Elisha restored to life\u2019\u201d (2 Kings viii. 4,\n5). The same is the case with the signs of every other prophet, except\nMoses our Teacher. Scripture, therefore declares that no prophet will\never, like Moses, do signs publicly in the presence of friend and\nenemy, of his followers and his opponents; this is the meaning of the\nwords: \u201cAnd there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses,\netc., in all the signs and the wonders, etc., in the sight of all\nIsrael.\u201d Two things are here mentioned together; namely, that there\nwill not arise a prophet that will perceive as Moses perceived, or a\nprophet that will do as he did; then it is pointed out that the signs\nwere made in the presence of Pharaoh, all his servants and all his\nland, the opponents of Moses, and also in the presence of all the\nIsraelites, his followers. Comp. \u201cIn the sight of all Israel.\u201d This is\na distinction not possessed by any prophet before Moses; nor, as is\ncorrectly foretold, will it ever be possessed by another prophet. We\nmust not be misled by the account that the light of the sun stood still\ncertain hours for Joshua, when \u201che said in the sight of Israel,\u201d etc.\n(Josh. x. 12); for it is not said there \u201cin the sight of all Israel,\u201d\nas is said in reference to Moses. So also the miracle of Elijah, at\nMount Carmel, was witnessed only by a few people. When I said above\nthat the sun stood still certain hours, I explain the words \u201cka-jom\ntamim\u201d to mean \u201cthe longest possible day,\u201d because tamim means\n\u201cperfect,\u201d and indicates that that day appeared to the people at Gibeon\nas their longest day in the summer. Your mind must comprehend the\ndistinction of the prophecy and the wonders of Moses, and understand\nthat his greatness in prophetic perception was the same as his power of\nproducing miracles. If you further assume that we are unable fully to\ncomprehend the nature of this greatness, you will understand that when\nI speak, in the chapters which follow this, on prophecy and the\ndifferent classes of prophets, I only refer to the prophets which have\nnot attained the high degree that Moses attained. This is what I\ndesired to explain in this chapter.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI\n\n\nProphecy is, in truth and reality, an emanation sent forth by the\nDivine Being through the medium of the Active Intellect, in the first\ninstance to man\u2019s rational faculty, and then to his imaginative\nfaculty; it is the highest degree and greatest perfection man can\nattain; it consists in the most perfect development of the imaginative\nfaculty. Prophecy is a faculty that cannot in any way be found in a\nperson, or acquired by man, through a culture of his mental and moral\nfaculties; for even if these latter were as good and perfect as\npossible, they would be of no avail, unless they were combined with the\nhighest natural excellence of the imaginative faculty. You know that\nthe full development of any faculty of the body, such as the\nimagination, depends on the condition of the organ, by means of which\nthe faculty acts. This must be the best possible as regards its\ntemperament and its size, and also as regards the purity of its\nsubstance. Any defect in this respect cannot in any way be supplied or\nremedied by training. For when any organ is defective in its\ntemperament, proper training can in the best case restore a healthy\ncondition to some extent, but cannot make such an organ perfect. But if\nthe organ is defective as regards size, position, or as regards the\nsubstance and the matter of which the organ is formed, there is no\nremedy. You know all this, and I need not explain it to you at length.\n\nPart of the functions of the imaginative faculty is, as you well know,\nto retain impressions by the senses, to combine them, and chiefly to\nform images. The principal and highest function is performed when the\nsenses are at rest and pause in their action, for then it receives, to\nsome extent, divine inspiration in the measure as it is predisposed for\nthis influence. This is the nature of those dreams which prove true,\nand also of prophecy, the difference being one of quantity, not of\nquality. Thus our Sages say, that dream is the sixtieth part of\nprophecy; and no such comparison could be made between two things of\ndifferent kinds, for we cannot say the perfection of man is so many\ntimes the perfection of a horse. In Bereshit Rabba (sect. xvii.) the\nfollowing saying of our Sages occurs, \u201cDream is the nobelet (the unripe\nfruit) of prophecy.\u201d This is an excellent comparison, for the unripe\nfruit (nobelet) is really the fruit to some extent, only it has fallen\nfrom the tree before it was fully developed and ripe. In a similar\nmanner the action of the imaginative faculty during sleep is the same\nas at the time when it receives a prophecy, only in the first case it\nis not fully developed, and has not yet reached its highest degree. But\nwhy need I quote the words of our Sages, when I can refer to the\nfollowing passage of Scripture: \u201cIf there be among you a prophet, I,\nthe Lord, will make myself known unto him in a vision, in a dream will\nI speak to him\u201d (Num. xii. 6). Here the Lord tells us what the real\nessence of prophecy is, that it is a perfection acquired in a dream or\nin a vision (the original mareh is a noun derived from the verb raah);\nthe imaginative faculty acquires such an efficiency in its action that\nit sees the thing as if it came from without, and perceives it as if\nthrough the medium of bodily senses. These two modes of prophecy,\nvision and dream, include all its different degrees. It is a well-known\nfact that the thing which engages greatly and earnestly man\u2019s attention\nwhilst he is awake and in the full possession of his senses forms\nduring his sleep the object of the action of his imaginative faculty.\nImagination is then only influenced by the intellect in so far as it is\npredisposed for such influence. It would be quite useless to illustrate\nthis by a simile, or to explain it fully, as it is clear, and every one\nknows it. It is like the action of the senses, the existence of which\nno person with common sense would ever deny. After these introductory\nremarks you will understand that a person must satisfy the following\nconditions before he can become a prophet: The substance of the brain\nmust from the very beginning be in the most perfect condition as\nregards purity of matter, composition of its different parts, size and\nposition; no part of his body must suffer from ill-health; he must in\naddition have studied and acquired wisdom, so that his rational faculty\npasses from a state of potentiality to that of actuality; his intellect\nmust be as developed and perfect as human intellect can be; his\npassions pure and equally balanced; all his desires must aim at\nobtaining a knowledge of the hidden laws and causes that are in force\nin the Universe; his thoughts must be engaged in lofty matters; his\nattention directed to the knowledge of God, the consideration of His\nworks, and of that which he must believe in this respect. There must be\nan absence of the lower desires and appetites, of the seeking after\npleasure in eating, drinking, and cohabitation; and, in short, every\npleasure connected with the sense of touch. (Aristotle correctly says\nthat this sense is a disgrace to us, since we possess it only in virtue\nof our being animals; and it does not include any specifically human\nelement, whilst enjoyments connected with other senses, as smell,\nhearing, and sight, though likewise of a material nature, may sometimes\ninclude [intellectual] pleasure, appealing to man as man, according to\nAristotle. This remark, although forming no part of our subject, is not\nsuperfluous, for the thoughts of the most renowned wise men are to a\ngreat extent affected by the pleasures of this sense, and filled with a\ndesire for them. And yet people are surprised that these scholars do\nnot prophesy, if prophesying be nothing but a certain degree in the\nnatural development of man.) It is further necessary to suppress every\nthought or desire for unreal power and dominion; that is to say, for\nvictory, increase of followers, acquisition of honour, and service from\nthe people without any ulterior object. On the contrary, the multitude\nmust be considered according to their true worth; some of them are\nundoubtedly like domesticated cattle, and others like wild beasts, and\nthese only engage the mind of the perfect and distinguished man in so\nfar as he desires to guard himself from injury, in case of contact with\nthem, and to derive some benefit from them when necessary. A man who\nsatisfies these conditions, whilst his fully developed imagination is\nin action, influenced by the Active Intellect according to his mental\ntraining,\u2014such a person will undoubtedly perceive nothing but things\nvery extraordinary and divine, and see nothing but God and His angels.\nHis knowledge will only include that which is real knowledge, and his\nthought will only be directed to such general principles as would tend\nto improve the social relations between man and man.\n\nWe have thus described three kinds of perfection: mental perfection\nacquired by training, perfection of the natural constitution of the\nimaginative faculty, and moral perfection produced by the suppression\nof every thought of bodily pleasures, and of every kind of foolish or\nevil ambition. These qualities are, as is well known, possessed by the\nwise men in different degrees, and the degrees of prophetic faculty\nvary in accordance with this difference. Faculties of the body are, as\nyou know, at one time weak, wearied, and corrupted, at others in a\nhealthy state. Imagination is certainly one of the faculties of the\nbody. You find, therefore, that prophets are deprived of the faculty of\nprophesying when they mourn, are angry, or are similarly affected. Our\nSages say, Inspiration does not come upon a prophet when he is sad or\nlanguid. This is the reason why Jacob did not receive any revelation\nduring the period of his mourning, when his imagination was engaged\nwith the loss of Joseph. The same was the case with Moses, when he was\nin a state of depression through the multitude of his troubles, which\nlasted from the murmurings of the Israelites in consequence of the evil\nreport of the spies, till the death of the warriors of that generation.\nHe received no message of God, as he used to do, even though he did not\nreceive prophetic inspiration through the medium of the imaginative\nfaculty, but directly through the intellect. We have mentioned it\nseveral times that Moses did not, like other prophets, speak in\nsimiles. This will be further explained (chap. xlv.), but it is not the\nsubject of the present chapter. There were also persons who prophesied\nfor a certain time and then left off altogether, something occurring\nthat caused them to discontinue prophesying. The same circumstance,\nprevalence of sadness and dulness, was undoubtedly the direct cause of\nthe interruption of prophecy during the exile; for can there be any\ngreater misfortune for man than this: to be a slave bought for money in\nthe service of ignorant and voluptuous masters, and powerless against\nthem as they unite in themselves the absence of true knowledge and the\nforce of all animal desires? Such an evil state has been prophesied to\nus in the words, \u201cThey shall run to and fro to seek the word of God,\nbut shall not find it\u201d (Amos viii. 12); \u201cHer king and her princes are\namong the nations, the law is no more, her prophets also find no vision\nfrom the Lord\u201d (Lam. ii. 9). This is a real fact, and the cause is\nevident; the pre-requisites [of prophecy] have been lost. In the\nMessianic period\u2014may it soon commence\u2014prophecy will therefore again be\nin our midst, as has been promised by God.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII\n\n\nIt is necessary to consider the nature of the divine influence, which\nenables us to think, and gives us the various degrees of intelligence.\nFor this influence may reach a person only in a small measure, and in\nexactly the same proportion would then be his intellectual condition,\nwhilst it may reach another person in such a measure that, in addition\nto his own perfection, he can be the means of perfection for others.\nThe same relation may be observed throughout the whole Universe. There\nare some beings so perfect that they can govern other beings, but there\nare also beings that are only perfect in so far as they can govern\nthemselves and cannot influence other beings. In some cases the\ninfluence of the [Active] Intellect reaches only the logical and not\nthe imaginative faculty; either on account of the insufficiency of that\ninfluence, or on account of a defect in the constitution of the\nimaginative faculty, and the consequent inability of the latter to\nreceive that influence: this is the condition of wise men or\nphilosophers. If, however, the imaginative faculty is naturally in the\nmost perfect condition, this influence may, as has been explained by us\nand by other philosophers, reach both his logical and his imaginative\nfaculties: this is the case with prophets. But it happens sometimes\nthat the influence only reaches the imaginative faculty on account of\nthe insufficiency of the logical faculty, arising either from a natural\ndefect, or from a neglect in training. This is the case with statesmen,\nlawgivers, diviners, charmers, and men that have true dreams, or do\nwonderful things by strange means and secret arts, though they are not\nwise men; all these belong to the third class. It is further necessary\nto understand that some persons belonging to the third class perceive\nscenes, dreams, and confused images, when awake, in the form of a\nprophetic vision. They then believe that they are prophets; they wonder\nthat they perceive visions, and think that they have acquired wisdom\nwithout training. They fall into grave errors as regards important\nphilosophical principles, and see a strange mixture of true and\nimaginary things. All this is the consequence of the strength of their\nimaginative faculty, and the weakness of their logical faculty, which\nhas not developed, and has not passed from potentiality to actuality.\n\nIt is well known that the members of each class differ greatly from\neach other. Each of the first two classes is again subdivided, and\ncontains two sections, namely, those who receive the influence only as\nfar as is necessary for their own perfection, and those who receive it\nin so great a measure that it suffices for their own perfection and\nthat of others. A member of the first class, the wise men, may have his\nmind influenced either only so far, that he is enabled to search, to\nunderstand, to know, and to discern, without attempting to be a teacher\nor an author, having neither the desire nor the capacity; but he may\nalso be influenced to such a degree that he becomes a teacher and an\nauthor. The same is the case with the second class. A person may\nreceive a prophecy enabling him to perfect himself but not others; but\nhe may also receive such a prophecy as would compel him to address his\nfellow-men, teach them, and benefit them through his perfection. It is\nclear that, without this second degree of perfection, no books would\nhave been written, nor would any prophets have persuaded others to know\nthe truth. For a scholar does not write a book with the object to teach\nhimself what he already knows. But the characteristic of the intellect\nis this: what the intellect of one receives is transmitted to another,\nand so on, till a person is reached that can only himself be perfected\nby such an influence, but is unable to communicate it to others, as has\nbeen explained in some chapters of this treatise (chap. xi.). It is\nfurther the nature of this element in man that he who possesses an\nadditional degree of that influence is compelled to address his\nfellow-men, under all circumstances, whether he is listened to or not,\neven if he injures himself thereby. Thus we find prophets that did not\nleave off speaking to the people until they were slain; it is this\ndivine influence that moves them, that does not allow them to rest in\nany way, though they might bring upon themselves great evils by their\naction. E.g., when Jeremiah was despised, like other teachers and\nscholars of his age, he could not, though he desired it, withhold his\nprophecy, or cease from reminding the people of the truths which they\nrejected. Comp. \u201cFor the Word of the Lord was unto me a reproach and a\nmocking all day, and I said, I will not mention it, nor will I again\nspeak in His name; but it was in mine heart as a burning fire, enclosed\nin my bones, and I was wearied to keep it, and did not prevail\u201d (Jer.\nxx. 8, 9). This is also the meaning of the words of another prophet,\n\u201cThe Lord God hath spoken, who shall not prophesy?\u201d (Amos iii. 8) Note\nit.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII\n\n\nEvery man possesses a certain amount of courage, otherwise he would not\nstir to remove anything that might injure him. This psychical force\nseems to me analogous to the physical force of repulsion. Energy varies\nlike all other forces, being great in one case and small in another.\nThere are, therefore, people who attack a lion, whilst others run away\nat the sight of a mouse. One attacks a whole army and fights, another\nis frightened and terrified by the threat of a woman. This courage\nrequires that there be in a man\u2019s constitution a certain disposition\nfor it. If man, in accordance with a certain view, employs it more\nfrequently, it develops and increases, but, on the other hand, if it is\nemployed, in accordance with the opposite view, more rarely, it will\ndiminish. From our own youth we remember that there are different\ndegrees of energy among boys.\n\nThe same is the case with the intuitive faculty; all possess it, but in\ndifferent degrees. Man\u2019s intuitive power is especially strong in things\nwhich he has well comprehended, and in which his mind is much engaged.\nThus you may yourself guess correctly that a certain person said or did\na certain thing in a certain matter. Some persons are so strong and\nsound in their imagination and intuitive faculty that, when they assume\na thing to be in existence, the reality either entirely or partly\nconfirms their assumption. Although the causes of this assumption are\nnumerous, and include many preceding, succeeding, and present\ncircumstances, by means of the intuitive faculty the intellect can pass\nover all these causes, and draw inferences from them very quickly,\nalmost instantaneously. This same faculty enables some persons to\nforetell important coming events. The prophets must have had these two\nforces, courage and intuition, highly developed, and these were still\nmore strengthened when they were under the influence of the Active\nIntellect. Their courage was so great that, e.g., Moses, with only a\nstaff in his hand, dared to address a great king in his desire to\ndeliver a nation from his service. He was not frightened or terrified,\nbecause he had been told, \u201cI will be with thee\u201d (Exod. iii. 12). The\nprophets have not all the same degree of courage, but none of them have\nbeen entirely without it. Thus Jeremiah is told: \u201cBe not afraid of\nthem,\u201d etc. (Jer. i. 8), and Ezekiel is exhorted, \u201cDo not fear them or\ntheir word\u201d (Ezek. ii. 6). In the same manner, you find that all\nprophets possessed great courage. Again, through the excellence of\ntheir intuitive faculty, they could quickly foretell the future, but\nthis excellence, as is well known, likewise admits of different\ndegrees.\n\nThe true prophets undoubtedly conceive ideas that result from premisses\nwhich human reason could not comprehend by itself; thus they tell\nthings which men could not tell by reason and ordinary imagination\nalone; for [the action of the prophets\u2019 mental capacities is influenced\nby] the same agent that causes the perfection of the imaginative\nfaculty, and that enables the prophet thereby to foretell a future\nevent with such clearness as if it was a thing already perceived with\nthe senses, and only through them conveyed to his imagination. This\nagent perfects the prophet\u2019s mind, and influences it in such a manner\nthat he conceives ideas which are confirmed by reality, and are so\nclear to him as if he deduced them by means of syllogisms.\n\nThis should be the belief of all who choose to accept the truth. For\n[all things are in a certain relation to each other, and] what is\nnoticed in one thing may be used as evidence for the existence of\ncertain properties in another, and the knowledge of one thing leads us\nto the knowledge of other things. But [what we said of the\nextraordinary powers of our imaginative faculty] applies with special\nforce to our intellect, which is directly influenced by the Active\nIntellect, and caused by it to pass from potentiality to actuality. It\nis through the intellect that the influence reaches the imaginative\nfaculty. How then could the latter be so perfect as to be able to\nrepresent things not previously perceived by the senses, if the same\ndegree of perfection were withheld from the intellect, and the latter\ncould not comprehend things otherwise than in the usual manner, namely,\nby means of premiss, conclusion, and inference? This is the true\ncharacteristic of prophecy, and of the disciplines to which the\npreparation for prophecy must exclusively be devoted. I spoke here of\ntrue prophets in order to exclude the third class, namely, those\npersons whose logical faculties are not fully developed, and who do not\npossess any wisdom, but are only endowed with imaginative and inventive\npowers. It may be that things perceived by these persons are nothing\nbut ideas which they had before, and of which impressions were left in\ntheir imaginations together with those of other things; but whilst the\nimpressions of other images are effaced and have disappeared, certain\nimages alone remain, are seen and considered as new and objective,\ncoming from without. The process is analogous to the following case: A\nperson has with him in the house a thousand living individuals; all\nexcept one of them leave the house: when the person finds himself alone\nwith that individual, he imagines that the latter has entered the house\nnow, contrary to the fact that he has only not left the house. This is\none of the many phenomena open to gross misinterpretations and\ndangerous errors, and many of those who believed that they were wise\nperished thereby.\n\nThere were, therefore, men who supported their opinion by a dream which\nthey had, thinking that the vision during sleep was independent of what\nthey had previously believed or heard when awake. Persons whose mental\ncapacities are not fully developed, and who have not attained\nintellectual perfection, must not take any notice of these [dreams].\nThose who reach that perfection may, through the influence of the\ndivine intellect, obtain knowledge independent of that possessed by\nthem when awake. They are true prophets, as is distinctly stated in\nScripture, ve-nabi lebab \u1e25okmah (Ps. xc. 12), \u201cAnd the true prophet\npossesseth a heart of wisdom.\u201d This must likewise be noticed.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX\n\n\nWe have given the definition of prophecy, stated its true\ncharacteristics, and shown that the prophecy of Moses our Teacher was\ndistinguished from that of other prophets; we will now explain that\nthis distinction alone qualified him for the office of proclaiming the\nLaw, a mission without a parallel in the history from Adam to Moses, or\namong the prophets who came after him; it is a principle in our faith\nthat there will never be revealed another Law. Consequently we hold\nthat there has never been, nor will there ever be, any other divine Law\nbut that of Moses our Teacher. According to what is written in\nScripture and handed down by tradition, the fact may be explained in\nthe following way: There were prophets before Moses, as the patriarchs\nShem, Eber, Noah, Methushelah, and Enoch, but of these none said to any\nportion of mankind that God sent him to them and commanded him to\nconvey to them a certain message or to prohibit or to command a certain\nthing. Such a thing is not related in Scripture, or in authentic\ntradition. Divine prophecy reached them as we have explained. Men like\nAbraham, who received a large measure of prophetic inspiration, called\ntheir fellow-men together and led them by training and instruction to\nthe truth which they had perceived. Thus Abraham taught, and showed by\nphilosophical arguments that there is one God, that He has created\neverything that exists beside Him, and that neither the constellations\nnor anything in the air ought to be worshipped; he trained his\nfellow-men in this belief, and won their attention by pleasant words as\nwell as by acts of kindness. Abraham did not tell the people that God\nhad sent him to them with the command concerning certain things which\nshould or should not be done. Even when it was commanded that he, his\nsons, and his servants should be circumcised, he fulfilled that\ncommandment, but he did not address his fellow-men prophetically on\nthis subject. That Abraham induced his fellow-men to do what is right,\ntelling them only his own will [and not that of God], may be learnt\nfrom the following passage of Scripture: \u201cFor I know him, because he\ncommands his sons and his house after him, to practise righteousness\nand judgment\u201d (Gen. xix. 19). Also Isaac, Jacob, Levi, Kohath, and\nAmram influenced their fellow-men in the same way. Our Sages, when\nspeaking of prophets before Moses, used expressions like the following:\nThe bet-din (court of justice) of Eber, the bet-din of Methushelah, and\nin the college of Methushelah; although all these were prophets, yet\nthey taught their fellow-men in the manner of preachers, teachers, and\npedagogues, but did not use such phrases as the following: \u201cAnd God\nsaid to me, Speak to certain people so and so.\u201d This was the state of\nprophecy before Moses. But as regards Moses, you know what [God] said\nto him, what he said [to the people], and the words addressed to him by\nthe whole nation: \u201cThis day we have seen that God doth talk with man,\nand that he liveth\u201d (Deut. v. 21). The history of all our prophets that\nlived after Moses is well known to you; they performed, as it were, the\nfunction of warning the people and exhorting them to keep the Law of\nMoses, threatening evil to those who would neglect it, and announcing\nblessings to those who would submit to its guidance. This we believe\nwill always be the case. Comp. \u201cIt is not in the heavens that one might\nsay,\u201d etc. (ibid. xxx. 12); \u201cFor us and for our children for ever\u201d\n(ibid. xxix. 28). It is but natural that it should be so. For if one\nindividual of a class has reached the highest perfection possible in\nthat class, every other individual must necessarily be less perfect,\nand deviate from the perfect measure either by surplus or deficiency.\nTake, e.g., the normal constitution of a being, it is the most proper\ncomposition possible in that class; any constitution that deviates from\nthat norm contains something too much or too little. The same is the\ncase with the Law. It is clear that the Law is normal in this sense;\nfor it contains \u201cJust statutes and judgments\u201d (Deut. iv. 8); but \u201cjust\u201d\nis here identical with \u201cequibalanced.\u201d The statutes of the Law do not\nimpose burdens or excesses as are implied in the service of a hermit or\npilgrim, and the like; but, on the other hand, they are not so\ndeficient as to lead to gluttony or lewdness, or to prevent, as the\nreligious laws of the heathen nations do, the development of man\u2019s\nmoral and intellectual faculties. We intend to discuss in this treatise\nthe reasons of the commandments, and we shall then show, as far as\nnecessary, the justice and wisdom of the Law, on account of which it is\nsaid: \u201cThe Law of God is perfect, refreshing the heart\u201d (Ps. xix. 8).\nThere are persons who believe that the Law commands much exertion and\ngreat pain, but due consideration will show them their error. Later on\nI will show how easy it is for the perfect to obey the Law. Comp. \u201cWhat\ndoes the Lord thy God ask of thee?\u201d etc. (Deut. x. 12); \u201cHave I been a\nwilderness to Israel?\u201d (Jer. ii. 31). But this applies only to the\nnoble ones; whilst wicked, violent, and pugnacious persons find it most\ninjurious and hard that there should be any divine authority tending to\nsubdue their passion. To low-minded, wanton, and passionate persons it\nappears most cruel that there should be an obstacle in their way to\nsatisfy their carnal appetite, or that a punishment should be inflicted\nfor their doings. Similarly every godless person imagines that it is\ntoo hard to abstain from the evil he has chosen in accordance with his\ninclination. We must not consider the Law easy or hard according as it\nappears to any wicked, low-minded, and immoral person, but as it\nappears to the judgment of the most perfect, who, according to the Law,\nare fit to be the example for all mankind. This Law alone is called\ndivine; other laws, such as the political legislations among the\nGreeks, or the follies of the Sabeans, are the works of human leaders,\nbut not of prophets, as I have explained several times.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL\n\n\nIt has already been fully explained that man is naturally a social\nbeing, that by virtue of his nature he seeks to form communities; man\nis therefore different from other living beings that are not compelled\nto combine into communities. He is, as you know, the highest form in\nthe creation, and he therefore includes the largest number of\nconstituent elements; this is the reason why the human race contains\nsuch a great variety of individuals, that we cannot discover two\npersons exactly alike in any moral quality, or in external appearance.\nThe cause of this is the variety in man\u2019s temperament, and in accidents\ndependent on his form; for with every physical form there are connected\ncertain special accidents different from those which are connected with\nthe substance. Such a variety among the individuals of a class does not\nexist in any other class of living beings; for the variety in any other\nspecies is limited; only man forms an exception; two persons may be so\ndifferent from each other in every respect that they appear to belong\nto two different classes. Whilst one person is so cruel that he kills\nhis youngest child in his anger, another is too delicate and\nfaint-hearted to kill even a fly or worm. The same is the case with\nmost of the accidents. This great variety and the necessity of social\nlife are essential elements in man\u2019s nature. But the well-being of\nsociety demands that there should be a leader able to regulate the\nactions of man; he must complete every shortcoming, remove every\nexcess, and prescribe for the conduct of all, so that the natural\nvariety should be counterbalanced by the uniformity of legislation, and\nthe order of society be well established. I therefore maintain that the\nLaw, though not a product of Nature, is nevertheless not entirely\nforeign to Nature. It being the will of God that our race should exist\nand be permanently established, He in His wisdom gave it such\nproperties that men can acquire the capacity of ruling others. Some\npersons are therefore inspired with theories of legislation, such as\nprophets and lawgivers; others possess the power of enforcing the\ndictates of the former, and of compelling people to obey them, and to\nact accordingly. Such are kings, who accept the code of lawgivers, and\n[rulers] who pretend to be prophets, and accept, either entirely or\npartly, the teaching of the prophets. They accept one part while\nrejecting another part, either because this course appears to them more\nconvenient, or out of ambition, because it might lead people to believe\nthat the rulers themselves had been prophetically inspired with these\nlaws, and did not copy them from others. For when we like a certain\nperfection, find pleasure in it, and wish to possess it, we sometimes\ndesire to make others believe that we possess that virtue, although we\nare fully aware that we do not possess it. Thus people, e.g., adorn\nthemselves with the poems of others, and publish them as their own\nproductions. It also occurs in the works of wise men on the various\nbranches of Science, that an ambitious, lazy person sees an opinion\nexpressed by another person, appropriates it, and boasts that he\nhimself originated it. The same [ambition] occurs also with regard to\nthe faculty of prophecy. There were men who, like Zedekiah, the son of\nChenaanah (1 Kings xxii. 11, 24) boasted that they received a prophecy,\nand declared things which have never been prophesied. Others, like\nHananiah, son of Azzur (Jer. xxviii. 1\u20135), claim the capacity of\nprophecy, and proclaim things which, no doubt, have been said by God,\nthat is to say, that have been the subject of a divine inspiration, but\nnot to them. They nevertheless say that they are prophets, and adorn\nthemselves with the prophecies of others. All this can easily be\nascertained and recognized. I will, however, fully explain this to you,\nso that no doubt be left to you on this question, and that you may have\na test by which you may distinguish between the guidance of human\nlegislation, of the divine law, and of teachings stolen from prophets.\nAs regards those who declare that the laws proclaimed by them are their\nown ideas, no further test is required; the confession of the defendant\nmakes the evidence of the witness superfluous. I only wish to instruct\nyou about laws which are proclaimed as prophetic. Some of these are\ntruly prophetic, originating in divine inspiration, some are of\nnon-prophetic character, and some, though prophetic originally, are the\nresult of plagiarism. You will find that the sole object of certain\nlaws, in accordance with the intention of their author, who well\nconsidered their effect, is to establish the good order of the state\nand its affairs, to free it from all mischief and wrong; these laws do\nnot deal with philosophic problems, contain no teaching for the\nperfecting of our logical faculties, and are not concerned about the\nexistence of sound or unsound opinions. Their sole object is to\narrange, under all circumstances, the relations of men to each other,\nand to secure their well-being, in accordance with the view of the\nauthor of these laws. These laws are political, and their author\nbelongs, as has been stated above, to the third class, viz., to those\nwho only distinguish themselves by the perfection of their imaginative\nfaculties. You will also find laws which, in all their rules, aim, as\nthe law just mentioned, at the improvement of the material interests of\nthe people; but, besides, tend to improve the state of the faith of\nman, to create first correct notions of God, and of angels, and to lead\nthen the people, by instruction and education, to an accurate knowledge\nof the Universe: this education comes from God; these laws are divine.\nThe question which now remains to be settled is this: Is the person who\nproclaimed these laws the same perfect man that received them by\nprophetic inspiration, or a plagiarist, who has stolen these ideas from\na true prophet? In order to be enabled to answer this question, we must\nexamine the merits of the person, obtain an accurate account of his\nactions, and consider his character. The best test is the rejection,\nabstention, and contempt of bodily pleasures; for this is the first\ncondition of men, and a fortiori of prophets; they must especially\ndisregard pleasures of the sense of touch, which, according to\nAristotle, is a disgrace to us; and, above all, restrain from the\npollution of sensual intercourse. Thus God exposes thereby false\nprophets to public shame, in order that those who really seek the truth\nmay find it, and not err or go astray; e.g., Zedekiah, son of Maasiah,\nand Ahab, son of Kolaiah, boasted that they had received a prophecy.\nThey persuaded the people to follow them, by proclaiming utterances of\nother prophets; but all the time they continued to seek the low\npleasures of sensual intercourse, committing even adultery with the\nwives of their companions and followers. God exposed their falsehood as\nHe has exposed that of other false prophets. The king of Babylon burnt\nthem, as Jeremiah distinctly states: \u201cAnd of them shall be taken up a\ncurse by all the captivity of Judah, which are in Babylon, saying, The\nLord make thee like Zedekiah, and like Ahab, whom the king of Babylon\nroasted in the fire. Because they have committed villainy in Israel,\nand have committed adultery with their neighbours\u2019 wives, and have\nspoken lying words in my name, which I have not commanded them\u201d (Jer.\nxxix. 22, 23). Note what is meant by these words.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI\n\n\nI need not explain what a dream is, but I will explain the meaning of\nthe term mareh, \u201cvision,\u201d which occurs in the passage: \u201cIn a vision\n(be-mareh) do I make myself known unto him\u201d (Num. xii. 6). The term\nsignifies that which is also called mareh ha-nebuah, \u201cprophetic\nvision,\u201d yad ha-shem, \u201cthe hand of God,\u201d and ma\u1e25azeh, \u201ca vision.\u201d It is\nsomething terrible and fearful which the prophet feels while awake, as\nis distinctly stated by Daniel: \u201cAnd I saw this great vision, and there\nremained no strength in me, for my comeliness was turned in me into\ncorruption, and I retained no strength\u201d (Dan. x. 8). He afterwards\ncontinues, \u201cThus was I in deep sleep on my face, and my face toward the\nground\u201d (ibid. ver. 9). But it was in a prophetic vision that the angel\nspoke to him and \u201cset him upon his knees.\u201d Under such circumstances the\nsenses cease to act, and the [Active Intellect] influences the rational\nfaculties, and through them the imaginative faculties, which become\nperfect and active. Sometimes the prophecy begins with a prophetic\nvision, the prophet greatly trembles, and is much affected in\nconsequence of the perfect action of the imaginative faculty, and after\nthat the prophecy follows. This was the case with Abraham. The\ncommencement of the prophecy is, \u201cThe word of the Lord came to Abraham\nin a vision\u201d (Gen. xv. 1); after this, \u201ca deep sleep fell upon\nAbraham\u201d; and at last, \u201che said unto Abraham,\u201d etc. When prophets speak\nof the fact that they received a prophecy, they say that they received\nit from an angel, or from God; but even in the latter case it was\nlikewise received through an angel. Our Sages, therefore, explain the\nwords, \u201cAnd the Lord said unto her\u201d that He spake through an angel. You\nmust know that whenever Scripture relates that the Lord or an angel\nspoke to a person, this took place in a dream or in a prophetic vision.\n\nThere are four different ways in which Scripture relates the fact that\na divine communication was made to the prophet. (1) The prophet relates\nthat he heard the words of an angel in a dream or vision; (2) He\nreports the words of the angel without mentioning that they were\nperceived in a dream or vision, assuming that it is well known that\nprophecy can only originate in one of the two ways, \u201cIn a vision I will\nmake myself known unto him, in a dream I will speak unto him\u201d (Num.\nxii. 6). (3) The prophet does not mention the angel at all; he says\nthat God spoke to him, but he states that he received the message in a\ndream or a vision. (4) He introduces his prophecy by stating that God\nspoke to him, or told him to do a certain thing, or speak certain\nwords, but he does not explain that he received the message in a dream\nor vision, because he assumes that it is well known, and has been\nestablished as a principle that no prophecy or revelation originates\notherwise than in a dream or vision, and through an angel. Instances of\nthe first form are the following:\u2014\u201cAnd the angel of the Lord said unto\nme in a dream, Jacob\u201d (Gen. xxxi. 11); \u201cAnd an angel said unto Israel\nin a vision of night\u201d (ibid. xlvi. 2); \u201cAnd an angel came to Balaam by\nnight\u201d; \u201cAnd an angel said unto Balaam\u201d (Num. xxii. 20\u201322). Instances\nof the second form are these: \u201cAnd Elohim (an angel), said unto Jacob,\nRise, go up to Bethel\u201d (Gen. xxxv. 1); \u201cAnd Elohim said unto him, Thy\nname is Jacob,\u201d etc. (ibid. xxxv. 10); \u201cAnd an angel of the Lord called\nunto Abraham out of heaven the second time\u201d (ibid. xxii. 15); \u201cAnd\nElohim said unto Noah\u201d (ibid. vi. 13). The following is an instance of\nthe third form: \u201cThe word of the Lord came unto Abraham in a vision\u201d\n(ibid. xv. 1). Instances of the fourth form are: \u201cAnd the Lord said\nunto Abraham\u201d (ibid. xviii. 13); \u201cAnd the Lord said unto Jacob,\nReturn,\u201d etc. (ibid. xxxi. 3); \u201cAnd the Lord said unto Joshua\u201d (Josh.\nv. 9); \u201cAnd the Lord said unto Gideon\u201d (Judges vii. 2). Most of the\nprophets speak in a similar manner: \u201cAnd the Lord said unto me\u201d (Deut.\nii. 2); \u201cAnd the word of the Lord came unto me\u201d (Ezek. xxx. 1); \u201cAnd\nthe word of the Lord came\u201d (2 Sam. xxiv. 11); \u201cAnd behold, the word of\nthe Lord came unto him\u201d (1 Kings xix. 9); \u201cAnd the word of the Lord\ncame expressly\u201d (Ezek. i. 3); \u201cThe beginning of the word of the Lord by\nHosea\u201d (Hos. i. 2); \u201cThe hand of the Lord was upon me\u201d (Ezek. xxxvii.\n1). There are a great many instances of this class. Every passage in\nScripture introduced by any of these four forms is a prophecy\nproclaimed by a prophet; but the phrase, \u201cAnd Elohim (an angel) came to\na certain person in the dream of night,\u201d does not indicate a prophecy,\nand the person mentioned in that phrase is not a prophet; the phrase\nonly informs us that the attention of the person was called by God to a\ncertain thing, and at the same time that this happened at night. For\njust as God may cause a person to move in order to save or kill another\nperson, so He may cause, according to His will, certain things to rise\nin man\u2019s mind in a dream by night. We have no doubt that the Syrian\nLaban was a perfectly wicked man, and an idolater; likewise Abimelech,\nthough a good man among his people, is told by Abraham concerning his\nland [Gerar] and his kingdom, \u201cSurely there is no fear of God in this\nplace\u201d (Gen. xx. 11). And yet concerning both of them, viz., Laban and\nAbimelech, it is said [that an angel appeared to them in a dream].\nComp. \u201cAnd Elohim (an angel) came to Abimelech in a dream by night\u201d\n(ibid. ver. 3); and also, \u201cAnd Elohim came to the Syrian Laban in the\ndream of the night\u201d (ibid. xxxi. 24). Note and consider the distinction\nbetween the phrases, \u201cAnd Elohim came,\u201d and \u201cElohim said,\u201d between \u201cin\na dream by night,\u201d and \u201cin a vision by night.\u201d In reference to Jacob it\nis said, \u201cAnd an angel said to Israel in the visions by night\u201d (Gen.\nxlvi. 2), but in reference to Laban and Abimelech, \u201cAnd Elohim came,\u201d\netc. Onkelos makes the distinction clear; he translates, in the last\ntwo instances, ata memar min kodam adonai, \u201ca word came from the Lord,\u201d\nand not ve-itgeli, \u201cand the Lord appeared.\u201d The phrase, \u201cAnd the Lord\nsaid to a certain person,\u201d is employed even when this person was not\nreally addressed by the Lord, and did not receive any prophecy, but was\ninformed of a certain thing through a prophet. E.g., \u201cAnd she went to\ninquire of the Lord\u201d (Gen. xxv. 22); that is, according to the\nexplanation of our Sages, she went to the college of Eber, and the\nlatter gave her the answer; and this is expressed by the words, \u201cAnd\nthe Lord said unto her\u201d (ibid. ver. 23). These words have also been\nexplained thus, God spoke to her through an angel; and by \u201cangel\u201d Eber\nis meant here, for a prophet is sometimes called \u201cangel,\u201d as will be\nexplained; or the angel that appeared to Eber in this vision is\nreferred to, or the object of the Midrash explanation is merely to\nexpress that wherever God is introduced as directly speaking to a\nperson, i.e., to any of the ordinary prophets, He speaks through an\nangel, as has been set forth by us (chap. xxxiv.).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII\n\n\nWe have already shown that the appearance or speech of an angel\nmentioned in Scripture took place in a vision or dream; it makes no\ndifference whether this is expressly stated or not, as we have\nexplained above. This is a point of considerable importance. In some\ncases the account begins by stating that the prophet saw an angel; in\nothers, the account apparently introduces a human being, who ultimately\nis shown to be an angel; but it makes no difference, for if the fact\nthat an angel has been heard is only mentioned at the end, you may rest\nsatisfied that the whole account from the beginning describes a\nprophetic vision. In such visions, a prophet either sees God who speaks\nto him, as will be explained by us, or he sees an angel who speaks to\nhim, or he hears some one speaking to him without seeing the speaker,\nor he sees a man who speaks to him, and learns afterwards that the\nspeaker was an angel. In this latter kind of prophecies, the prophet\nrelates that he saw a man who was doing or saying something, and that\nhe learnt afterwards that it was an angel.\n\nThis important principle was adopted by one of our Sages, one of the\nmost distinguished among them, R. \u1e24iya the Great (Bereshit Rabba,\nxlviii.), in the exposition of the Scriptural passage commencing, \u201cAnd\nthe Lord appeared unto him in the plain of Mamre\u201d (Gen. xviii.). The\ngeneral statement that the Lord appeared to Abraham is followed by the\ndescription in what manner that appearance of the Lord took place;\nnamely, Abraham saw first three men; he ran and spoke to them. R. \u1e24iya,\nthe author of the explanation, holds that the words of Abraham, \u201cMy\nLord, if now I have found grace in thy sight, do not, I pray thee, pass\nfrom thy servant,\u201d were spoken by him in a prophetic vision to one of\nthe men; for he says that Abraham addressed these words to the chief of\nthese men. Note this well, for it is one of the great mysteries [of the\nLaw]. The same, I hold, is the case when it is said in reference to\nJacob, \u201cAnd a man wrestled with him\u201d (Gen. xxxii. 25); this took place\nin a prophetic vision, since it is expressly stated in the end (ver.\n31) that it was an angel. The circumstances are here exactly the same\nas those in the vision of Abraham, where the general statement, \u201cAnd\nthe Lord appeared to him,\u201d etc., is followed by a detailed description.\nSimilarly the account of the vision of Jacob begins, \u201cAnd the angels of\nGod met him\u201d (Gen. xxxii. 2); then follows a detailed description how\nit came to pass that they met him; namely, Jacob sent messengers, and\nafter having prepared and done certain things, \u201che was left alone,\u201d\netc., \u201cand a man wrestled with him\u201d (ibid. ver. 24). By this term \u201cman\u201d\n[one of] the angels of God is meant, mentioned in the phrase, \u201cAnd\nangels of God met him\u201d; the wrestling and speaking was entirely a\nprophetic vision. That which happened to Balaam on the way, and the\nspeaking of the ass, took place in a prophetic vision, since further\non, in the same account, an angel of God is introduced as speaking to\nBalaam. I also think that what Joshua perceived, when \u201che lifted up his\neyes and saw, and behold a man stood before him\u201d (Josh. v. 13) was a\nprophetic vision, since it is stated afterwards (ver. 14) that it was\n\u201cthe prince of the host of the Lord.\u201d But in the passages, \u201cAnd an\nangel of the Lord came up from Gilgal\u201d (Judges ii. 1); \u201cAnd it came to\npass that the angel of the Lord spake these words to all Israel\u201d (ibid.\nver. 2); the \u201cangel\u201d is, according to the explanation of our Sages,\nPhineas. They say, The angel is Phineas, for, when the Divine Glory\nrested upon him, he was \u201clike an angel.\u201d We have already shown (chap.\nvi.) that the term \u201cangel\u201d is homonymous, and denotes also \u201cprophet,\u201d\nas is the case in the following passages:\u2014\u201cAnd He sent an angel, and He\nhath brought us up out of Egypt\u201d (Num. xx. 16); \u201cThen spake Haggai, the\nangel of the Lord, in the Lord\u2019s message\u201d (Hagg. i. 13); \u201cBut they\nmocked the angels of God\u201d (2 Chron. xxxvi. 16).\u2014Comp. also the words of\nDaniel, \u201cAnd the man Gabriel, whom I had seen in the vision at the\nbeginning, being caused to fly swiftly, touched me about the time of\nthe evening oblation\u201d (Dan. ix. 11). All this passed in a prophetic\nvision. Do not imagine that an angel is seen or his word heard\notherwise than in a prophetic vision or prophetic dream, according to\nthe principle laid down:\u2014\u201cI make myself known unto him in a vision, and\nspeak unto him in a dream\u201d (Num. xii. 6). The instances quoted may\nserve as an illustration of those passages which I do not mention. From\nthe rule laid down by us that prophecy requires preparation, and from\nour interpretation of the homonym \u201cangel,\u201d you will infer that Hagar,\nthe Egyptian woman, was not a prophetess; also Manoah and his wife were\nno prophets; for the speech they heard, or imagined they heard, was\nlike the bat-kol (prophetic echo), which is so frequently mentioned by\nour Sages, and is something that may be experienced by men not prepared\nfor prophecy. The homonymity of the word \u201cangel\u201d misleads in this\nmatter. This is the principal method by which most of the difficult\npassages in the Bible can be explained. Consider the words, \u201cAnd an\nangel of the Lord found her by the well of water\u201d (Gen. xvi. 7), which\nare similar to the words referring to Joseph\u2014\u201cAnd a man found him, and\nbehold, he was erring in the field\u201d (ibid. xxxvii. 15). All the\nMidrashim assume that by man in this passage an angel is meant.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII\n\n\nWe have already shown in our work that the prophets sometimes prophesy\nin allegories; they use a term allegorically, and in the same prophecy\nthe meaning of the allegory is given. In our dreams, we sometimes\nbelieve that we are awake, and relate a dream to another person, who\nexplains the meaning, and all this goes on while we dream. Our Sages\ncall this \u201ca dream interpreted in a dream.\u201d In other cases we learn the\nmeaning of the dream after waking from sleep. The same is the case with\nprophetic allegories. Some are interpreted in the prophetic vision.\nThus it is related in Zechariah, after the description of the\nallegorical vision\u2014\u201cAnd the angel that talked with me came again and\nwaked me as a man that is awakened from his sleep. And he said unto me,\n\u2018What dost thou see?\u2019\u201d etc. (Zech. iv. 1\u20132), and then the allegory is\nexplained (ver. 6, sqq.).\n\nAnother instance we find in Daniel. It is first stated there: \u201cDaniel\nhad a dream and visions of his head upon his bed\u201d (Dan. vii. 1). The\nwhole allegory is then given, and Daniel is described as sighing that\nhe did not know its interpretation. He asks the angel for an\nexplanation, and he received it in a prophetic vision. He relates as\nfollows: \u201cI came near unto one of those that stood by, and asked him\nthe truth of all this. So he told me, and made me know the\ninterpretation of the things\u201d (ibid. ver. 16). The whole scene is\ncalled \u1e25azon (vision), although it was stated that Daniel had a dream,\nbecause an angel explained the dream to him in the same manner as is\nmentioned in reference to a prophetic dream. I refer to the verse: \u201cA\nvision appeared to me Daniel, after that which appeared to me at the\nfirst\u201d (ibid. viii. 1). This is clear, for \u1e25azon (vision) is derived\nfrom \u1e25aza, \u201cto see,\u201d and mareh, \u201cvision,\u201d from raah, \u201cto see\u201d; and \u1e25aza\nand raah are synonymous. There is therefore no difference whether we\nuse mareh, or ma\u1e25azeh, or \u1e25azon, there is no other mode of revelation\nbut the two mentioned in Scripture: \u201cIn a vision I make myself known to\nhim, in a dream I will speak unto him\u201d (Num. xii. 6). There are,\nhowever, different degrees [of prophetic proficiency], as will be shown\n(chap. xlv.).\n\nThere are other prophetic allegories whose meaning is not given in a\nprophetic vision. The prophet learns it when he awakes from his sleep.\nTake, e.g., the staves which Zechariah took in a prophetic vision.\n\nYou must further know that the prophets see things shown to them\nallegorically, such as the candlesticks, horses, and mountains of\nZechariah (Zech. iv. 2; vi. 1\u20137), the scroll of Ezekiel (Ezek. ii. 9),\nthe wall made by a plumb-line (Amos vii. 7), which Amos saw, the\nanimals of Daniel (Dan. vii. and viii.), the seething pot of Jeremiah\n(Jer. i. 13), and similar allegorical objects shown to represent\ncertain ideas. The prophets, however, are also shown things which do\nnot illustrate the object of the vision, but indicate it by their name\nthrough its etymology or homonymity. Thus the imaginative faculty forms\nthe image of a thing, the name of which has two meanings, one of which\ndenotes something different [from the image]. This is likewise a kind\nof allegory. Comp. Makkal shaked, \u201calmond staff,\u201d of Jeremiah (i.\n11\u201312). It was intended to indicate by the second meaning of shaked the\nprophecy, \u201cFor I will watch\u201d (shoked), etc., which has no relation\nwhatever to the staff or to almonds. The same is the case with the\nkelub \u1e33ayi\u1e93, \u201ca basket of summer fruit,\u201d seen by Amos, by which the\ncompletion of a certain period was indicated, \u201cthe end (ha-\u1e33e\u1e93) having\ncome\u201d (Amos viii. 2). Still more strange is the following manner of\ncalling the prophet\u2019s attention to a certain object. He is shown a\ndifferent object, the name of which has neither etymologically nor\nhomonymously any relation to the first object, but the names of both\ncontain the same letters, though in a different order. Take, e.g., the\nallegories of Zechariah (chap. xi. 7, sqq.). He takes in a prophetic\nvision staves to lead the flock; he calls the one No\u02bbam (pleasure), the\nother \u1e25obelim. He indicates thereby that the nation was at first in\nfavour with God, who was their leader and guide. They rejoiced in the\nservice of God, and found happiness in it, while God was pleased with\nthem, and loved them, as it is said, \u201cThou hast avouched the Lord thy\nGod,\u201d etc., and \u201cthe Lord hath avouched thee,\u201d etc. (Deut. xxvi. 17,\n18). They were guided and directed by Moses and the prophets that\nfollowed him. But later a change took place. They rejected the love of\nGod, and God rejected them, appointing destroyers like Jeroboam and\nManasse as their rulers. Accordingly, the word \u1e25obelim has the same\nmeaning [viz., destroying] as the root \u1e25abal has in Me\u1e25abbelim keramim,\n\u201cdestroying vineyards\u201d (Song of Sol. ii. 15). But the prophet found\nalso in this name \u1e24obelim the indication that the people despised God,\nand that God despised them. This is, however, not expressed by the word\n\u1e25abal, but by a transposition of the letters \u1e24et, Bet, and Lamed, the\nmeaning of despising and rejecting is obtained. Comp. \u201cMy soul loathed\nthem, and their soul also abhorred me\u201d [ba\u1e25alah] (Zech. xi. 8). The\nprophet had therefore to change the order of the letters in \u1e25abal into\nthat of Ba\u1e25al. In this way we find very strange things and also\nmysteries (Sodot) in the words ne\u1e25oshet, Kalal, regel, \u02bbegel, and\n\u1e25ashmal of the Mercabah, and in other terms in other passages. After\nthe above explanation you will see the mysteries in the meaning of\nthese expressions if you examine them thoroughly.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV\n\n\nProphecy is given either in a vision or in a dream, as we have said so\nmany times, and we will not constantly repeat it. We say now that when\na prophet is inspired with a prophecy he may see an allegory, as we\nhave shown frequently, or he may in a prophetic vision perceive that\nGod speaks to him, as is said in Isaiah (vi. 8), \u201cAnd I heard the voice\nof the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?\u201d or he\nhears an angel addressing him, and sees him also. This is very\nfrequent, e.g., \u201cAnd the angel of God spake unto me,\u201d etc. (Gen. xxxi.\n11); \u201cAnd the angel that talked with me answered and said unto me, Dost\nthou not know what these are\u201d (Zech. iv. 5); \u201cAnd I heard one holy\nspeaking\u201d (Dan. viii. 13). Instances of this are innumerable. The\nprophet sometimes sees a man that speaks to him. Comp., \u201cAnd behold\nthere was a man, whose appearance was like the appearance of brass, and\nthe man said to me,\u201d etc. (Ezek. xl. 3, 4), although the passage\nbegins, \u201cThe hand of the Lord was upon me\u201d (ibid. ver. 1). In some\ncases the prophet sees no figure at all, only hears in the prophetic\nvision the words addressed to him; e.g., \u201cAnd I heard the voice of a\nman between the banks of Ulai\u201d (Dan. viii. 16); \u201cThere was silence, and\nI heard a voice\u201d (in the speech of Eliphaz, Job iv. 16); \u201cAnd I heard a\nvoice of one that spake to me\u201d (Ezek. i. 28). The being which Ezekiel\nperceived in the prophetic vision was not the same that addressed him;\nfor at the conclusion of the strange and extraordinary scene which\nEzekiel describes expressly as having been perceived by him, the object\nand form of the prophecy is introduced by the words, \u201cAnd I heard a\nvoice of a man that spake to me.\u201d After this remark on the different\nkinds of prophecy, as suggested by Scripture, I say that the prophet\nmay perceive that which he hears with the greatest possible intensity,\njust as a person may hear thunder in his dream, or perceive a storm or\nan earthquake; such dreams are frequent. The prophet may also hear the\nprophecy in ordinary common speech, without anything unusual. Take,\ne.g., the account of the prophet Samuel. When he was called in a\nprophetic vision, he believed that the priest Eli called him; and this\nhappened three times consecutively. The text then explains the cause of\nit, saying that Samuel naturally believed that Eli had called him,\nbecause at that time he did not yet know that God addressed the prophet\nin this form, nor had that secret as yet been revealed to him. Comp.,\n\u201cAnd Samuel did not yet know the Lord, and the word of the Lord was not\nyet revealed to him,\u201d i.e., he did not yet know, and it had not yet\nbeen revealed to him, that the word of God is communicated in this way.\nThe words, \u201cHe did not yet know the Lord,\u201d may perhaps mean that Samuel\nhad not yet received any prophecy; for in reference to a prophet\u2019s\nreceiving divine communication it is said, \u201cI make myself known to him\nin a vision, I speak to him in a dream\u201d (Num. xii. 6). The meaning of\nthe verse accordingly is this, Samuel had not yet received any\nprophecy, and therefore did not know that this was the form of\nprophecy. Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV\n\n\nAfter having explained prophecy in accordance with reason and\nScripture, I must now describe the different degrees of prophecy from\nthese two points of view. Not all the degrees of prophecy which I will\nenumerate qualify a person for the office of a prophet. The first and\nthe second degrees are only steps leading to prophecy, and a person\npossessing either of these two degrees does not belong to the class of\nprophets whose merits we have been discussing. When such a person is\noccasionally called prophet, the term is used in a wider sense, and is\napplied to him because he is almost a prophet. You must not be misled\nby the fact that according to the books of the Prophets, a certain\nprophet, after having been inspired with one kind of prophecy, is\nreported to have received prophecy in another form. For it is possible\nfor a prophet to prophesy at one time in the form of one of the degrees\nwhich I am about to enumerate, and at another time in another form. In\nthe same manner, as the prophet does not prophesy continuously, but is\ninspired at one time and not at another, so he may at one time prophesy\nin the form of a higher degree, and at another time in that of a lower\ndegree; it may happen that the highest degree is reached by a prophet\nonly once in his lifetime, and afterwards remains inaccessible to him,\nor that a prophet remains below the highest degree until he entirely\nloses the faculty; for ordinary prophets must cease to prophesy a\nshorter or longer period before their death. Comp. \u201cAnd the word of the\nLord ceased from Jeremiah\u201d (Ezra i. 1); \u201cAnd these are the last words\nof David\u201d (2 Sam. xxiii. 1). From these instances it can be inferred\nthat the same is the case with all prophets. After this introduction\nand explanation, I will begin to enumerate the degrees of prophecy to\nwhich I have referred above.\n\n(1) The first degree of prophecy consists in the divine assistance\nwhich is given to a person, and induces and encourages him to do\nsomething good and grand, e.g., to deliver a congregation of good men\nfrom the hands of evildoers; to save one noble person, or to bring\nhappiness to a large number of people; he finds in himself the cause\nthat moves and urges him to this deed. This degree of divine influence\nis called \u201cthe spirit of the Lord\u201d; and of the person who is under that\ninfluence we say that the spirit of the Lord came upon him, clothed\nhim, or rested upon him, or the Lord was with him, and the like. All\nthe judges of Israel possessed this degree, for the following general\nstatement is made concerning them:\u2014\u201cThe Lord raised up judges for them;\nand the Lord was with the judge, and he saved them\u201d (Judges ii. 18).\nAlso all the noble chiefs of Israel belonged to this class. The same is\ndistinctly stated concerning some of the judges and the kings:\u2014\u201cThe\nspirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah\u201d (ibid. xi. 29); of Samson it is\nsaid, \u201cThe spirit of the Lord came upon him\u201d (ibid. xiv. 19); \u201cAnd the\nspirit of the Lord came upon Saul when he heard those words\u201d (1 Sam.\nxi. 6). When Amasa was moved by the holy spirit to assist David, \u201cA\nspirit clothed Amasa, who was chief of the captains, and he said, Thine\nare we, David,\u201d etc. (1 Chron. xii. 18). This faculty was always\npossessed by Moses from the time he had attained the age of manhood; it\nmoved him to slay the Egyptian, and to prevent evil from the two men\nthat quarrelled; it was so strong that, after he had fled from Egypt\nout of fear, and arrived in Midian, a trembling stranger, he could not\nrestrain himself from interfering when he saw wrong being done; he\ncould not bear it. Comp. \u201cAnd Moses rose and saved them\u201d (Exod. ii.\n17). David likewise was filled with this spirit, when he was anointed\nwith the oil of anointing. Comp. \u201cAnd the spirit of God came upon David\nfrom that day and upward\u201d (1 Sam. xvi. 13). He thus conquered the lion\nand the bear and the Philistine, and accomplished similar tasks, by\nthis very spirit. This faculty did not cause any of the above-named\npersons to speak on a certain subject, for it only aims at encouraging\nthe person who possesses it to action; it does not encourage him to do\neverything, but only to help either a distinguished man or a whole\ncongregation when oppressed, or to do something that leads to that end.\nJust as not all who have a true dream are prophets, so it cannot be\nsaid of every one who is assisted in a certain undertaking, as in the\nacquisition of property, or of some other personal advantage, that the\nspirit of the Lord came upon him, or that the Lord was with him, or\nthat he performed his actions by the holy spirit. We only apply such\nphrases to those who have accomplished something very good and grand,\nor something that leads to that end; e.g., the success of Joseph in the\nhouse of the Egyptian, which was the first cause leading evidently to\ngreat events that occurred subsequently.\n\n(2) The second degree is this: A person feels as if something came upon\nhim, and as if he had received a new power that encourages him to\nspeak. He treats of science, or composes hymns, exhorts his fellow-men,\ndiscusses political and theological problems; all this he does while\nawake, and in the full possession of his senses. Such a person is said\nto speak by the holy spirit. David composed the Psalms, and Solomon the\nBook of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon by this spirit;\nalso Daniel, Job, Chronicles, and the rest of the Hagiographa were\nwritten in this holy spirit; therefore they are called ketubim\n(Writings, or Written), i.e., written by men inspired by the holy\nspirit. Our Sages mention this expressly concerning the Book of Esther.\nIn reference to such holy spirit, David says: \u201cThe spirit of the Lord\nspoke in me, and his word is on my tongue\u201d (2 Sam. xxiii. 2); i.e., the\nspirit of the Lord caused him to utter these words. This class includes\nthe seventy elders of whom it is said, \u201cAnd it came to pass when the\nspirit rested upon them, that they prophesied, and did not cease\u201d (Num.\nxi. 25); also Eldad and Medad (ibid. ver. 26); furthermore, every high\npriest that inquired [of God] by the Urim and Tummim; on whom, as our\nSages say, the divine glory rested, and who spoke by the holy spirit;\nYahaziel, son of Zechariah, belongs likewise to this class. Comp. \u201cThe\nspirit of the Lord came upon him in the midst of the assembly, and he\nsaid, Listen, all Judah and inhabitants of Jerusalem, thus saith the\nLord unto you,\u201d etc. (2 Chron. xx. 14, 15); also Zechariah, son of\nJehoiada the priest. Comp. \u201cAnd he stood above the people and said unto\nthem, Thus saith God\u201d (ibid. xxiv. 20); furthermore, Azariah, son of\nOded; comp. \u201cAnd Azariah, son of Oded, when the spirit of the Lord came\nupon him, went forth before Asa,\u201d etc. (ibid. xv. 1, 2); and all who\nacted under similar circumstances. You must know that Balaam likewise\nbelonged to this class, when he was good; this is indicated by the\nwords, \u201cAnd God put a word in the mouth of Balaam\u201d (Num. xxiii. 5),\ni.e., Balaam spoke by divine inspiration; he therefore says of himself,\n\u201cWho heareth the words of God,\u201d etc. (ibid. xxiv. 4). We must\nespecially point out that David, Solomon, and Daniel belonged to this\nclass, and not to the class of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Nathan the prophet,\nAhijah the Shilonite, and those like them. For David, Solomon, and\nDaniel spoke and wrote inspired by the holy spirit, and when David\nsays, \u201cThe God of Israel spoke and said unto me, the rock of Israel\u201d (2\nSam. xxiii. 3), he meant to say that God promised him happiness through\na prophet, through Nathan or another prophet. The phrase must here be\ninterpreted in the same manner as in the following passages, \u201cAnd God\nsaid to her\u201d (Gen. xxv. 26); \u201cAnd God said unto Solomon, Because this\nhath been in thy heart, and thou hast not kept my covenant,\u201d etc. (1\nKings xi. 11). The latter passage undoubtedly contains a prophecy of\nAhijah the Shilonite, or another prophet, who foretold Solomon that\nevil would befall him. The passage, \u201cGod appeared to Solomon at Gibeon\nin a dream by night, and God said\u201d (ibid. iii. 5), does not contain a\nreal prophecy, such as is introduced by the words: \u201cThe word of the\nLord came to Abram in a vision, saying\u201d (Gen. xv. 1); or, \u201cAnd God said\nto Israel in the visions of the night\u201d (ibid. xlvi. 2), or such as the\nprophecies of Isaiah and Jeremiah contain; in all these cases the\nprophets, though receiving the prophecy in a prophetic dream, are told\nthat it is a prophecy, and that they have received prophetic\ninspiration. But in the case of Solomon, the account concludes, \u201cAnd\nSolomon awoke, and behold it was a dream\u201d (1 Kings iii. 15); and in the\naccount of the second divine appearance, it is said, \u201cAnd God appeared\nto Solomon a second time, as he appeared to him at Gibeon\u201d (ibid. ix.\n2); it was evidently a dream. This kind of prophecy is a degree below\nthat of which Scripture says, \u201cIn a dream I will speak to him\u201d (Num.\nxii. 6). When prophets are inspired in a dream, they by no means call\nthis a dream, although the prophecy reached them in a dream, but\ndeclare it decidedly to be a prophecy. Thus Jacob, our father, when\nawaking from a prophetic dream, did not say it was a dream, but\ndeclared, \u201cSurely there is the Lord in this place,\u201d etc. (Gen. xxviii.\n16); \u201cGod the Almighty appeared to me in Luz, in the land of Canaan\u201d\n(ibid. xlviii. 3), expressing thereby that it was a prophecy. But in\nreference to Solomon we read:\u2014\u201cAnd Solomon awoke, and behold it was a\ndream\u201d (1 Kings iii. 15). Similarly Daniel declares that he had a\ndream; although he sees an angel and hears his word, he speaks of the\nevent as of a dream; even when he had received the information\n[concerning the dreams of Nebukadnezzar], he speaks of it in the\nfollowing manner\u2014\u201cThen was the secret revealed to Daniel in a night\nvision\u201d (Dan. ii. 19). On other occasions it is said, \u201cHe wrote down\nthe dream\u201d; \u201cI saw in the visions by night,\u201d etc.; \u201cAnd the visions of\nmy head confused me\u201d (Dan. vii. 1, 2, 15); \u201cI was surprised at the\nvision, and none noticed it\u201d (ibid. viii. 27). There is no doubt that\nthis is one degree below that form of prophecy to which the words, \u201cIn\na dream I will speak to him,\u201d are applied. For this reason the nation\ndesired to place the book of Daniel among the Hagiographa, and not\namong the Prophets. I have, therefore, pointed out to you, that the\nprophecy revealed to Daniel and Solomon, although they saw an angel in\nthe dream, was not considered by them as a perfect prophecy, but as a\ndream containing correct information. They belonged to the class of men\nthat spoke, inspired by the rua\u1e25 ha-kodesh, \u201cthe holy spirit.\u201d Also in\nthe order of the holy writings, no distinction is made between the\nbooks of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Daniel, Psalms, Ruth, and Esther; they\nare all written by divine inspiration. The authors of all these books\nare called prophets in the more general sense of the term.\n\n(3) The third class is the lowest [class of actual prophets, i.e.] of\nthose who introduce their speech by the phrase, \u201cAnd the word of the\nLord came unto me,\u201d or a similar phrase. The prophet sees an allegory\nin a dream\u2014under those conditions which we have mentioned when speaking\nof real prophecy\u2014and in the prophetic dream itself the allegory is\ninterpreted. Such are most of the allegories of Zechariah.\n\n(4) The prophet hears in a prophetic dream something clearly and\ndistinctly, but does not see the speaker. This was the case with Samuel\nin the beginning of his prophetic mission, as has been explained (chap.\nxliv.).\n\n(5) A person addresses the prophet in a dream, as was the case in some\nof the prophecies of Ezekiel. Comp. \u201cAnd the man spake unto me, Son of\nman,\u201d etc. (Ezek. xl. 4).\n\n(6) An angel speaks to him in a dream; this applies to most of the\nprophets; e.g., \u201cAnd an angel of God said to me in a dream of night\u201d\n(Gen. xxxi. 11).\n\n(7) In a prophetic dream it appears to the prophet as if God spoke to\nhim. Thus Isaiah says, \u201cAnd I saw the Lord, and I heard the voice of\nthe Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?\u201d (Isa. vi.\n1, 8). Micaiah, son of Imla, said likewise, \u201cI saw the Lord\u201d (1 Kings\nxxii. 19).\n\n(8) Something presents itself to the prophet in a prophetic vision; he\nsees allegorical figures, such as were seen by Abraham in the vision\n\u201cbetween the pieces\u201d (Gen. xv. 9, 10); for it was in a vision by\ndaytime, as is distinctly stated.\n\n(9) The prophet hears words in a prophetic vision; as, e.g., is said in\nreference to Abraham, \u201cAnd behold, the word came to him, saying, This\nshall not be thine heir\u201d (ibid. xv. 4).\n\n(10) The prophet sees a man that speaks to him in a prophetic vision;\ne.g., Abraham in the plain of Mamre (ibid. xviii. 1), and Joshua in\nJericho (Josh. v. 13).\n\n(11) He sees an angel that speaks to him in the vision, as was the case\nwhen Abraham was addressed by an angel at the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen.\nxxii. 15). This I hold to be\u2014if we except Moses\u2014the highest degree a\nprophet can attain according to Scripture, provided he has, as reason\ndemands, his rational faculties fully developed. But it appears to me\nimprobable that a prophet should be able to perceive in a prophetic\nvision God speaking to him; the action of the imaginative faculty does\nnot go so far, and therefore we do not notice this in the case of the\nordinary prophets; Scripture says expressly, \u201cIn a vision I will make\nmyself known, in a dream I will speak to him\u201d; the speaking is here\nconnected with dream, the influence and the action of the intellect is\nconnected with vision; comp. \u201cIn a vision I will make myself known to\nhim\u201d (etvadda\u02bb, hitpael of yada\u02bb, \u201cto know\u201d), but it is not said here\nthat in a vision anything is heard from God. When I, therefore, met\nwith statements in Scripture that a prophet heard words spoken to him,\nand that this took place in a vision, it occurred to me that the case\nin which God appears to address the prophet seems to be the only\ndifference between a vision and a dream, according to the literal sense\nof the Scriptural text. But it is possible to explain the passages in\nwhich a prophet is reported to have heard in the course of a vision\nwords spoken to him, in the following manner: at first he has had a\nvision, but subsequently he fell into a deep sleep, and the vision was\nchanged into a dream. Thus we explained the words, \u201cAnd a deep sleep\nfell upon Abram\u201d (Gen. xv. 12); and our Sages remark thereon, \u201cThis was\na deep sleep of prophecy.\u201d According to this explanation, it is only in\na dream that the prophet can hear words addressed to him; it makes no\ndifference in what manner words are spoken. Scripture supports this\ntheory, \u201cIn a dream I will speak to him.\u201d But in a prophetic vision\nonly allegories are perceived, or rational truths are obtained, that\nlead to some knowledge in science, such as can be arrived at by\nreasoning. This is the meaning of the words, \u201cIn a vision I will make\nmyself known unto him.\u201d According to this second explanation, the\ndegrees of prophecy are reduced to eight, the highest of them being the\nprophetic vision, including all kinds of vision, even the case in which\na man appears to address the prophet, as has been mentioned. You will\nperhaps ask this question: among the different degrees of prophecy\nthere is one in which prophets, e.g., Isaiah, Micaiah, appear to hear\nGod addressing them; how can this be reconciled with the principle that\nall prophets are prophetically addressed through an angel, except Moses\nour Teacher, in reference to whom Scripture says, \u201cMouth to mouth I\nspeak to him\u201d (Num. xii. 8)? I answer, this is really the case, the\nmedium here being the imaginative faculty that hears in a prophetic\ndream God speaking; but Moses heard the voice addressing him \u201cfrom\nabove the covering of the ark from between the two cherubim\u201d (Exod.\nxxv. 22) without the medium of the imaginative faculty. In Mishne-torah\nwe have given the characteristics of this kind of prophecy, and\nexplained the meaning of the phrases, \u201cMouth to mouth I speak to him\u201d;\n\u201cAs man speaketh to his neighbour\u201d (Exod. xxxiii. 11), and the like.\nStudy it there, and I need not repeat what has already been said.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVI\n\n\nOne individual may be taken as an illustration of the individuals of\nthe whole species. From its properties we learn those of each\nindividual of the species. I mean to say that the form of one account\nof a prophecy illustrates all accounts of the same class. After this\nremark you will understand that a person may sometimes dream that he\nhas gone to a certain country, married there, stayed there for some\ntime, and had a son, whom he gave a certain name, and who was in a\ncertain condition [though nothing of all this has really taken place];\nso also in prophetic allegories certain objects are seen, acts\nperformed\u2014if the style of the allegory demands it\u2014things are done by\nthe prophet, the intervals between one act and another determined, and\njourneys undertaken from one place to another; but all these things are\nonly processes of a prophetic vision, and not real things that could be\nperceived by the senses of the body. Some of the accounts simply relate\nthese incidents [without premising that they are part of a vision],\nbecause it is a well-known fact that all these accounts refer to\nprophetic visions, and it was not necessary to repeat in each case a\nstatement to this effect.\n\nThus the prophet relates: \u201cAnd the Lord said unto me,\u201d and need not add\nthe explanation that it was in a dream. The ordinary reader believes\nthat the acts, journeys, questions, and answers of the prophets really\ntook place, and were perceived by the senses, and did not merely form\npart of a prophetic vision. I will mention here an instance concerning\nwhich no person will entertain the least doubt. I will add a few more\nof the same kind, and these will show you how those passages must be\nunderstood which I do not cite. The following passage in Ezekiel (viii.\n1, 3) is clear, and admits of no doubt: \u201cI sat in mine house, and the\nelders of Judah sat before me, etc., and a spirit lifted me up between\nthe earth and the heaven, and brought me in the visions of God to\nJerusalem,\u201d etc.; also the passage, \u201cThus I arose and went into the\nplain\u201d (iii. 2, 3), refers to a prophetic vision; just as the words,\n\u201cAnd he brought him forth abroad, and said, Look now toward heaven and\ntell the stars, if thou be able to number them\u201d (Gen. xv. 5) describe a\nvision. The same is the case with the words of Ezekiel (xxxvii. 1),\n\u201cAnd set me down in the midst of the valley.\u201d In the description of the\nvision in which Ezekiel is brought to Jerusalem, we read as follows:\n\u201cAnd when I looked, behold a hole in the wall. Then said he unto me,\nSon of man, dig now in the wall; and when I had digged in the wall,\nbehold a door\u201d (ibid. viii. 7\u20138), etc. It was thus in a vision that he\nwas commanded to dig in the wall, to enter and to see what people were\ndoing there, and it was in the same vision that he digged, entered\nthrough the hole, and saw certain things, as is related. Just as all\nthis forms part of a vision, the same may be said of the following\npassages: \u201cAnd thou take unto thee a tile,\u201d etc., \u201cand lie thou also on\nthy left side,\u201d etc.; \u201cTake thou also wheat and barley,\u201d etc., \u201cand\ncause it to pass over thine head and upon thy beard\u201d (chaps, iv. and\nv.) It was in a prophetic vision that he saw that he did all these\nactions which he was commanded to do. God forbid to assume that God\nwould make his prophets appear an object of ridicule and sport in the\neyes of the ignorant, and order them to perform foolish acts. We must\nalso bear in mind that the command given to Ezekiel implied\ndisobedience to the Law, for he, being a priest, would, in causing the\nrazor to pass over every corner of the beard and of the head, have been\nguilty of transgressing two prohibitions in each case. But it was only\ndone in a prophetic vision. Again, when it is said, \u201cAs my servant\nIsaiah went naked and barefoot\u201d (Isa. xx. 3), the prophet did so in a\nprophetic vision. Weak-minded persons believe that the prophet relates\nhere what he was commanded to do, and what he actually did, and that he\ndescribes how he was commanded to dig in a wall on the Temple mount\nalthough he was in Babylon, and relates how he obeyed the command, for\nhe says, \u201cAnd I digged in the wall.\u201d But it is distinctly stated that\nall this took place in a vision.\n\nIt is analogous to the description of the vision of Abraham which\nbegins, \u201cThe word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying\u201d (Gen.\nxv. 1); and contains at the same time the passage, \u201cHe brought him\nforth abroad, and said, Look now to the heaven and count the stars\u201d\n(ibid. ver. 6). It is evident that it was in a vision that Abraham saw\nhimself brought forth from his place looking towards the heavens and\nbeing told to count the stars. This is related [without repeating the\nstatement that it was in a vision]. The same I say in reference to the\ncommand given to Jeremiah, to conceal the girdle in the Euphrates, and\nthe statement that he concealed it, examined it after a long time, and\nfound it rotten and spoiled (Jer. xiii. 4\u20137). All this was\nallegorically shown in a vision; Jeremiah did not go from Palestine to\nBabylon, and did not see the Euphrates. The same applies to the account\nof the commandment given to Hosea (i.-iii.): \u201cTake unto thee a wife of\nwhoredom, and children of whoredom,\u201d to the birth of the children and\nto the giving of names to them. All this passed in a prophetic vision.\nWhen once stated that these are allegories, there is left no doubt that\nthe events related had no real existence, except in the minds of those\nof whom the prophet says: \u201cAnd the vision of every one was unto them\nlike the words of a sealed book\u201d (Isa. xxix. 11). I believe that the\ntrial of Gideon (Judges vi. 21, 27) with the fleece and other things\nwas a vision. I do not call it a prophetic vision, as Gideon had not\nreached the degree of prophets, much less that height which would\nenable him to do wonders. He only rose to the height of the Judges of\nIsrael, and he has even been counted by our Sages among persons of\nlittle importance, as has been pointed out by us.\n\nThe same can be said of the passage in Zechariah (xi. 7), \u201cAnd I fed\nthe flock of slaughter,\u201d and all the incidents that are subsequently\ndescribed; the graceful asking for wages, the acceptance of the wages,\nthe wanting of the money, and the casting of the same into the house of\nthe treasure; all these incidents form part of the vision. He received\nthe commandment and carried it out in a prophetic vision or dream.\n\nThe correctness of this theory cannot be doubted, and only those do not\ncomprehend it who do not know to distinguish between that which is\npossible, and that which is impossible. The instances quoted may serve\nas an illustration of other similar Scriptural passages not quoted by\nme. They are all of the same kind, and in the same style. Whatever is\nsaid in the account of a vision, that the prophet heard, went forth,\ncame out, said, was told, stood, sat, went up, went down, journeyed,\nasked, or was asked, all is part of the prophetic vision; even when\nthere is a lengthened account, the details of which are well connected\nas regards the time, the persons referred to, and the place. After it\nhas once been stated that the event described is to be understood\nfiguratively, it must be assumed for certain that the whole is a\nprophetic vision.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII\n\n\nIt is undoubtedly clear and evident that most prophecies are given in\nimages, for this is the characteristic of the imaginative faculty, the\norgan of prophecy. We find it also necessary to say a few words on the\nfigures, hyperboles, and exaggerations that occur in Scripture. They\nwould create strange ideas if we were to take them literally without\nnoticing the exaggeration which they contain, or if we were to\nunderstand them in accordance with the original meaning of the terms,\nignoring the fact that these are used figuratively. Our Sages say\ndistinctly Scripture uses hyperbolic or exaggerated language; and quote\nas an instance, \u201ccities walled and fortified, rising up to heaven\u201d\n(Deut. i. 28). As a hyperbole our Sages quote, \u201cFor the bird of heaven\ncarries the voice\u201d (Eccles. x. 20); in the same sense it is said,\n\u201cWhose height is like that of cedar trees\u201d (Amos ii. 9). Instances of\nthis kind are frequent in the language of all prophets; what they say\nis frequently hyperbolic or exaggerated, and not precise or exact. What\nScripture says about Og, \u201cBehold, his bedstead was an iron bedstead,\nnine cubits its length,\u201d etc. (Deut.), does not belong to this class of\nfigures, for the bedstead (eres, comp. arsenu, Song of Sol. i. 16) is\nnever exactly of the same dimensions as the person using it; it is not\nlike a dress that fits round the body; it is always greater than the\nperson that sleeps therein; as a rule, it is by a third longer. If,\ntherefore, the bed of Og was nine cubits in length, he must, according\nto this proportion, have been six cubits high, or a little more. The\nwords, \u201cby the cubit of a man,\u201d mean, by the measure of an ordinary\nman, and not by the measure of Og; for men have the limbs in a certain\nproportion. Scripture thus tells us that Og was double as long as an\nordinary person, or a little less. This is undoubtedly an exceptional\nheight among men, but not quite impossible. As regards the Scriptural\nstatement about the length of man\u2019s life in those days, I say that only\nthe persons named lived so long, whilst other people enjoyed the\nordinary length of life. The men named were exceptions, either in\nconsequence of different causes, as e.g., their food or mode of living,\nor by way of miracle, which admits of no analogy.\n\nWe must further discuss the figurative language employed in Scripture.\nIn some cases this is clear and evident, and doubted by no person;\ne.g., \u201cThe mountains and hills shall break forth in song before you,\nand all the trees of the wood clap their hands\u201d (Isa. lv. 12); this is\nevidently figurative language; also the following passage\u2014\u201cThe\nfir-trees rejoice at thee,\u201d etc. (ibid. xiv. 8), which is rendered by\nJonathan, son of Uzziel, \u201cThe rulers rejoice at thee, who are rich in\npossessions.\u201d This figure is similar to that used in the phrase,\n\u201cButter of kine and milk of sheep,\u201d etc. (Deut. xxxii. 14).\n\nAnd these figures are very frequent in the books of the prophets. Some\nare easily recognised by the ordinary reader as figures, others with\nsome difficulty. Thus nobody doubts that the blessing, \u201cMay the Lord\nopen to thee his good treasure, the heavens,\u201d must be taken\nfiguratively; for God has no treasure in which He keeps the rain. The\nsame is the case with the following passage\u2014\u201cHe opened the doors of\nheaven, he rained upon them manna to eat\u201d (Ps. lxxviii. 23, 24). No\nperson assumes that there is a door or gate in heaven, but every one\nunderstands that this is a simile and a figurative expression. In the\nsame way must be understood the following passages\u2014\u201cThe heavens were\nopened\u201d (Ezek. i. 1); \u201cIf not, blot me out from thy book which thou\nhast written\u201d (Exod. xxxii. 32); \u201cI will blot him out from the book of\nlife\u201d (ibid. ver. 33). All these phrases are figurative; and we must\nnot assume that God has a book in which He writes, or from which He\nblots out, as those generally believe that do not find figurative\nspeech in these passages. They are all of the same kind. You must\nexplain passages not quoted by me by those which I have quoted in this\nchapter. Employ your reason, and you will be able to discern what is\nsaid allegorically, figuratively, or hyperbolically, and what is meant\nliterally, exactly according to the original meaning of the words. You\nwill then understand all prophecies, learn and retain rational\nprinciples of faith, pleasing in the eyes of God who is most pleased\nwith truth, and most displeased with falsehood; your mind and heart\nwill not be so perplexed as to believe or accept as law what is untrue\nor improbable, whilst the Law is perfectly true when properly\nunderstood. Thus Scripture says, \u201cThy testimonies are righteousness for\never\u201d (Ps. cxix. 144); and \u201cI the Lord speak righteousness\u201d (Isa. xlv.\n19). If you adopt this method, you will not imagine the existence of\nthings which God has not created, or accept principles which might\npartly lead to atheism, or to a corruption of your notions of God so as\nto ascribe to Him corporeality, attributes, or emotions, as has been\nshown by us, nor will you believe that the words of the prophets are\nfalse; for the cause of this disease is ignorance of what we have\nexplained. These things belong likewise to the mysteries of the Law;\nand although we have treated them in a general manner, they can easily\nbe understood in all their details in accordance with the above\nremarks.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII\n\n\nIt is clear that everything produced must have an immediate cause which\nproduced it; that cause again a cause, and so on, till the First Cause,\nviz., the will and decree of God is reached. The prophets therefore\nomit sometimes the intermediate causes, and ascribe the production of\nan individual thing directly to God, saying that God has made it. This\nmethod is well known, and we, as well as others of those who seek the\ntruth, have explained it; it is the belief of our co-religionists.\n\nAfter having heard this remark, listen to what I will explain in this\nchapter; direct your special attention to it more than you have done to\nthe other chapters of this part. It is this: As regards the immediate\ncauses of things produced, it makes no difference whether these causes\nconsist in substances, physical properties, freewill, or chance\u2014by\nfreewill I mean that of man\u2014or even in the will of another living\nbeing. The prophets [omit them and] ascribe the production directly to\nGod and use such phrases as, God has done it, commanded it, or said it;\nin all such cases the verbs \u201cto say,\u201d \u201cto speak,\u201d \u201cto command,\u201d \u201cto\ncall,\u201d and \u201cto send\u201d are employed. What I desired to state in this\nchapter is this: According to the hypothesis and theory accepted, it is\nGod that gave will to dumb animals, freewill to the human being, and\nnatural properties to everything; and as accidents originate in the\nredundancy of some natural force, as has been explained [by Aristotle],\nand are mostly the result of the combined action of nature, desire, and\nfreewill: it can consequently be said of everything which is produced\nby any of these causes, that God commanded that it should be made, or\nsaid that it should be so. I will give you instances, and they will\nguide you in the interpretation of passages which I do not mention. As\nregards phenomena produced regularly by natural causes, such as the\nmelting of the snow when the atmosphere becomes warm, the roaring of\nthe sea when a storm rages [I quote the following passages], \u201cHe\nsendeth his word and melteth them\u201d (Ps. cxlvii. 18); \u201cAnd he saith, and\na storm-wind riseth, and lifteth up its waves\u201d (ibid. cvii. 25). In\nreference to the rain we read: \u201cI will command the clouds that they\nshall not rain,\u201d etc. (Isa. v. 6). Events caused by man\u2019s freewill,\nsuch as war, the dominion of one nation over another, the attempt of\none person to hurt another, or to insult him, [are ascribed to God, as]\ne.g., in reference to the dominion of Nebuchadnezzar and his host, \u201cI\nhave commended my holy ones, also I have called my heroes for my anger\u201d\n(Isa. xiii. 3); and \u201cI will send him against a hypocrite nation\u201d (ibid.\nx. 6); in reference to Shimei, son of Gera, \u201cFor God said to him, Curse\nDavid\u201d (2 Sam. xvi. 10); in reference to the deliverance of Joseph, the\nrighteous, from prison, \u201cHe sent an angel and loosed him\u201d (Ps. cv. 20);\nin reference to the victory of the Persians over the Chaldees, \u201cI will\nsend to Babylon scatterers, and they shall scatter it\u201d (Jer. li. 2); in\nreference to the providing of food to Eliah, \u201cI have commanded there a\nwoman, a widow, to maintain thee\u201d (1 Kings xvii. 9); and Joseph, the\nrighteous, says: \u201cNot ye have sent me hither,\u201d etc. (Gen. xlv. 8). The\ncase that the will of an animal or its desire for some of its natural\nwants is the cause of some event, may be illustrated by the following\ninstance: \u201cAnd God spake unto the fish, and it vomited out Jonah\u201d (ii.\n11). The act is ascribed to God, because He gave the fish the will, and\nnot because He made it a prophet or endowed it with a prophetical\nspirit. Similarly it is said of the locusts that appeared in the days\nof Joel, son of Pethuel, \u201cMighty is he that accomplishes his word\u201d\n(Joel ii. 11); or of the beasts that took possession of the land of\nEdom when destroyed in the days of Sennacherib, \u201cHe cast lot for them,\nand his hand divided it unto them by a line\u201d (Isa. xxxiv. 17). Although\nhere the verbs \u201cto say,\u201d \u201cto command,\u201d \u201cto send,\u201d are not used, the\nmeaning is evidently the same, and you must explain all passages that\nare analogous to it in a similar manner. Events evidently due to chance\nare ascribed to God; e.g., in reference to Rebecca, \u201cLet her be a wife\nto the son of thy master, as the Lord spake\u201d (Gen. xxiv. 51); in\nreference to David and Jonathan, \u201cGo, for the Lord has sent thee.\u201d (1\nSam. xx. 22); in reference to Joseph, \u201cGod sent me before you\u201d (Gen.\nxlv. 7). You see clearly that the providing of a cause, in whatever\nmanner this may take place, by substance, accident, freewill, or will,\nis always expressed by one of the five terms, commanding, saying,\nspeaking, sending, or calling. Note this, and apply it everywhere\naccording to the context. Many difficulties will thereby be removed,\nand passages apparently containing things far from truth will prove to\nbe true. This is the conclusion of the treatise on Prophecy, its\nallegories and language. It is all I intend to say on this subject in\nthis treatise. We will now commence to treat of other subjects, with\nthe help of the Most High.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART III\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nWe have stated several times that it is our primary object in this\ntreatise to expound, as far as possible, the Biblical account of the\nCreation (Ma\u02bbaseh bereshit) and the description of the Divine Chariot\n(Ma\u02bbaseh mercabah) in a manner adapted to the training of those for\nwhom this work is written.\n\nWe have also stated that these subjects belong to the mysteries of the\nLaw. You are well aware how our Sages blame those who reveal these\nmysteries, and praise the merits of those who keep them secret,\nalthough they are perfectly clear to the philosopher. In this sense\nthey explain the passage, \u201cHer merchandise shall be for them that dwell\nbefore the Lord, to eat sufficiently\u201d (Isa. xxiii. 18), which concludes\nin the original with the words ve-li-me-kasseh \u02bbatik, i.e., that these\nblessings are promised to him who hides things which the Eternal has\nrevealed [to him], viz., the mysteries of the Law (Babyl. Talmud,\nPesa\u1e25im 119a). If you have understanding you will comprehend that which\nour Sages pointed out. They have clearly stated that the Divine Chariot\nincludes matters too deep and too profound for the ordinary intellect.\nIt has been shown that a person favoured by Providence with reason to\nunderstand these mysteries is forbidden by the Law to teach them except\nviv\u00e2 voce, and on condition that the pupil possess certain\nqualifications, and even then only the heads of the sections may be\ncommunicated. This has been the cause why the knowledge of this mystery\nhas entirely disappeared from our nation, and nothing has remained of\nit. This was unavoidable, for the explanation of these mysteries was\nalways communicated viv\u00e2 voce, it was never committed to writing. Such\nbeing the case, how can I venture to call your attention to such\nportions of it as may be known, intelligible, and perfectly clear to\nme? But if, on the other hand, I were to abstain from writing on this\nsubject, according to my knowledge of it, when I die, as I shall\ninevitably do, that knowledge would die with me, and I would thus\ninflict great injury on you and all those who are perplexed [by these\ntheological problems], I would then be guilty of withholding the truth\nfrom those to whom it ought to be communicated, and of jealously\ndepriving the heir of his inheritance. I should in either case be\nguilty of gross misconduct.\n\nTo give a full explanation of the mystic passages of the Bible is\ncontrary to the Law and to reason; besides, my knowledge of them is\nbased on reasoning, not on divine inspiration [and is therefore not\ninfallible]. I have not received my belief in this respect from any\nteacher, but it has been formed by what I learnt from Scripture and the\nutterances of our Sages, and by the philosophical principles which I\nhave adopted. It is therefore possible that my view is wrong, and that\nI misunderstood the passages referred to. Correct thought and divine\nhelp have suggested to me the proper method, viz., to explain the words\nof the prophet Ezekiel in such a manner that those who will read my\ninterpretation will believe that I have not added anything to the\ncontents of the text, but only, as it were, translated from one\nlanguage into another, or given a short exposition of plain things.\nThose, however, for whom this treatise has been composed, will, on\nreflecting on it and thoroughly examining each chapter, obtain a\nperfect and clear insight into all that has been clear and intelligible\nto me. This is the utmost that can be done in treating this subject so\nas to be useful to all without fully explaining it.\n\nAfter this introductory remark I ask you to study attentively the\nchapters which follow on this sublime, important, and grand subject,\nwhich is the pin upon which everything hangs, and the pillar upon which\neverything rests.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nIt is well known that there are men whose face is like that of other\nanimals; thus the face of some person is like that of a lion, that of\nanother person like that of an ox, and so on; and man\u2019s face is\ndescribed according as the form of his face resembles the form of the\nface of other animals. By the expressions, \u201cthe face of an ox,\u201d \u201cthe\nface of a lion,\u201d \u201cthe face of an eagle\u201d (Ezek, i. 10), the prophet\ndescribes a human face inclining towards the forms of these various\nspecies. This interpretation can be supported by two proofs. First, the\nprophet says of the \u1e24ayyot in general that \u201ctheir appearance is this,\nthey have the form of man\u201d (ver. 5), and then in describing each of the\n\u1e24ayyot he attributes to them the face of a man, that of an ox, that of\na lion, and that of an eagle. Secondly, in the second description of\nthe Chariot, which is intended as a supplement to the first, the\nprophet says, Each hath four faces; the one is the face of a cherub,\nthe second a man\u2019s face, the third a lion\u2019s face, and the fourth that\nof an eagle (ibid. x. 14). He thus clearly indicates that the terms\n\u201cthe face of an ox\u201d and \u201cthe face of a cherub\u201d are identical. But\ncherub designates \u201ca youth.\u201d By analogy we explain the two other\nterms\u2014\u201cthe face of a lion\u201d and \u201cthe face of an eagle\u201d in the same\nmanner. \u201cThe face of the ox\u201d has been singled out on account of the\netymology of the Hebrew term shor (ox), as has been indicated by me. It\nis impossible to assume that this second description refers to the\nperception of another prophetic vision, because it concludes thus:\n\u201cThis is the \u1e24ayyah which I saw at the river Chebar\u201d (ibid. ver. 15).\nWhat we intended to explain is now clear.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nThe prophet says that he saw four \u1e24ayyot; each of them had four faces,\nfour wings, and two hands, but on the whole their form was human. Comp.\n\u201cThey had the likeness of a man\u201d (Ezek. i. 5). The hands are also\ndescribed as human hands, because these have undoubtedly, as is well\nknown, such a form as enables them to perform all manner of cunning\nwork. Their feet are straight; that is to say, they are without joints.\nThis is the meaning of the phrase \u201ca straight foot,\u201d taken literally.\nSimilarly our Sages say, the words, \u201cAnd their feet were straight feet\u201d\n(ibid. i. 7), show that the beings above do not sit. Note this\nlikewise. The soles of the feet of the \u1e24ayyot, the organs of walking,\nare described as different from the feet of man, but the hands are like\nhuman hands. The feet are round, for the prophet says, \u201clike the sole\nof a round foot.\u201d The four \u1e24ayyot are closely joined together, there is\nno space or vacuum left between them. Comp. \u201cThey were joined one to\nanother\u201d (ibid. i. 9). \u201cBut although they were thus joined together,\ntheir faces and their wings were separated above\u201d (ibid. ver. 11).\nConsider the expression \u201cabove\u201d employed here, although the bodies were\nclosely joined, their faces and their wings were separated, but only\nabove. The prophet then states that they are transparent; they are\n\u201clike burnished brass\u201d (ibid. ver. 7). He also adds that they are\nluminous. Comp. \u201cTheir appearance was like burning coals of fire\u201d\n(ibid. ver. 13). This is all that has been said as regards the form,\nshape, face, figure, wings, hands, and feet of the \u1e24ayyot. The prophet\nthen begins to describe the motions of these \u1e24ayyot, namely, that they\nhave a uniform motion, without any curvature, deviation, or deflexion:\n\u201cThey turned not when they went\u201d (ver. 17). Each of the \u1e24ayyot moves in\nthe direction of its face. Comp. \u201cThey went every one in the direction\nof his face\u201d (ver. 9). Now, it is here clearly stated that each \u1e24ayyah\nwent in the direction of its face, but since each \u1e24ayyah has several\nfaces, I ask, in the direction of which face? In short, the four \u1e24ayyot\ndo not move in the same direction; for, if this were the case, a\nspecial motion would not have been ascribed to each of them; it would\nnot have been said, \u201cThey went each one towards the side of his face.\u201d\nThe motion of these \u1e24ayyot is further described as a running, so also\ntheir returning is described as a running. Comp. \u201cAnd the \u1e24ayyot ran,\nand returned as the appearance of a flash of lightning\u201d (ver. 14),\nra\u1e93oh being the infinitive of ru\u1e93, \u201cto run,\u201d and shob the infinitive\ninstead of shub, \u201cto return.\u201d The ordinary words, haloch and bo, \u201cto\ngo\u201d and \u201cto come,\u201d are not used, but such words as indicate running to\nand fro; and these are further explained by the phrase, \u201cAs the\nappearance of a flash of lightning\u201d (bazak, used by the prophet, is\nidentical with barak), for the lightning appears to move very quickly;\nit seems to hasten and to run from a certain place, and then to turn\nback and to come again to the place from which it had started. This is\nrepeated several times with the same velocity. Jonathan, the son of\nUzziel, renders the phrase ra\u1e93o vashob thus: They move round the world\nand return at once, and are as swift as the appearance of lightning.\nThis quick movement and return the \u1e24ayyah does not perform of its own\naccord, but through something outside of it, viz., the Divine Will; for\n\u201cto whichever side it is the Divine Will that the \u1e24ayyah should move,\nthither the \u1e24ayyah moves,\u201d in that quick manner which is expressed by\n\u201crunning and returning.\u201d This is implied in the words, \u201cWhithersoever\nthe spirit was to go they went\u201d (ver. 20); \u201cThey turned not when they\nwent\u201d (ver. 17). By \u201cthe spirit\u201d (rua\u1e25), the prophet does not mean \u201cthe\nwind,\u201d but \u201cthe intention,\u201d as we have explained when discussing the\nhomonym rua\u1e25 (spirit). The meaning of the phrase is, that whithersoever\nit is the Divine Will that the \u1e24ayyah shall go, thither it runs.\nJonathan, the son of Uzziel, gives a similar explanation: Towards the\nplace whither it is the will to go, they go; they do not turn when they\ngo. The employment of the future tense of the verbs yihyeh and yeleku\nin this passage seems to imply that sometimes it will be the will of\nGod that the \u1e24ayyah should move in one direction, in which it will in\nfact move, and at other times it will be His will that the \u1e24ayyah\nshould move in the opposite direction, in which it will then move. An\nexplanation is, however, added, which is contrary to this conclusion,\nand shows that the future form (yihyeh) of the verb has here the\nmeaning of the preterite, as is frequently the case in Hebrew. The\ndirection in which God desires the \u1e24ayyah to move has already been\ndetermined and fixed, and the \u1e24ayyah moves in that direction which His\nwill has determined long ago, without having ever changed. The prophet,\ntherefore, in explaining, and at the same time concluding [this\ndescription of the \u1e24ayyot], says, \u201cWhithersoever the spirit was to go\nthey go, thither was the spirit to go\u201d (ver. 20). Note this wonderful\ninterpretation. This passage forms likewise part of the account of the\nmotion of the four \u1e24ayyot which follows the description of their form.\n\nNext comes the description of another part; for the prophet relates\nthat he saw a body beneath the \u1e24ayyot, but closely joining them. This\nbody, which is connected with the earth, consists likewise of four\nbodies, and has also four faces. But no distinct form is ascribed to\nit; neither that of man nor that of any other living being. The [four\nbodies] are described as great, tremendous, and terrible; no form is\ngiven to them, except that they are covered with eyes. These are the\nbodies called Ofannim (lit. wheels). The prophet therefore says: \u201cNow,\nas I beheld the \u1e24ayyot, behold one wheel upon the earth beside the\nliving creatures, with his four faces\u201d (ver. 15). He thus distinctly\nstates that the Ofannim form a body, of which the one part touches the\n\u1e24ayyot, and the other part the earth; and that the Ofan has four faces.\nBut he continues\u2014\u201cThe appearance of the Ofannim (wheels) and their work\nwas like unto the colour of a beryl: and they four had one likeness\u201d\n(ver. 16). By speaking of four Ofannim, after having mentioned only one\nOfan, the prophet indicates that the \u201cfour faces\u201d and the \u201cfour\nOfannim\u201d are identical. These four Ofannim have the same form; comp.,\n\u201cAnd they four had one likeness.\u201d The Ofannim are then described as\npartly inter-joined; for \u201ctheir appearance and their work was as it\nwere a wheel in the middle of a wheel\u201d (ver. 16). In the description of\nthe \u1e24ayyot such a phrase, with the term \u201cin the middle of\u201d (tok) is not\nemployed. The \u1e24ayyot are partly joined, according to the words, \u201cthey\nwere joined one to another\u201d (ver. 11); whilst in reference to the\nOfannim it is stated that they are partly intermixed, \u201cas it were a\nwheel in the middle of a wheel.\u201d The body of the Ofannim is described\nas being covered with eyes; it is possible that a body covered with\nreal eyes is here meant, or a body with different colours [\u02bbayin\ndenoting \u201ceye,\u201d also \u201ccolour\u201d], as in the phrase \u201cthe colour thereof\n[\u02bbeno] as the colour (ke\u02bben) of bdellium\u201d (Num. xi. 7); or a body\nfilled with likenesses of things. In this latter sense the term \u02bbayin\nis used by our Sages in phrases like the following:\u2014Like that [ke\u02bben]\nwhich he has stolen, like that [ke\u02bben] which he has robbed; or\ndifferent properties and qualities are meant, according to the meaning\nof the word \u02bbayin in the passage, \u201cIt may be that the Lord will look\n(be\u02bbenai) on my condition\u201d (2 Sam. xvi. 12). So much for the form of\nthe Ofannim. Their motion is described as being without curvature and\ndeviation; as being straight, without any change. This is expressed in\nthe words, \u201cWhen they went, they went upon their four sides: and they\nturned not when they went\u201d (E.; ver. 17). The four Ofannim do not move\nof their own accord, as the \u1e24ayyot, and have no motion whatever of\ntheir own; they are set in motion by other beings, as is emphatically\nstated twice. The \u1e24ayyot are the moving agents of the Ofannim. The\nrelation between the Ofan and the \u1e24ayyah may be compared to the\nrelation between a lifeless body tied to the hand or the leg of a\nliving animal; whithersoever the latter moves, thither moves also the\npiece of wood, or the stone, which is tied to the named limb of the\nanimal. This is expressed in the following words:\u2014\u201cAnd when the \u1e24ayyot\nwent, the Ofannim went by them; and when the living creatures were\nlifted up from the earth, the Ofannim were lifted up\u201d (ver. 19); \u201cand\nthe Ofannim were lifted up over against them\u201d (ver. 20). And the cause\nof this is explained thus:\u2014\u201cThe spirit of the \u1e24ayyah was in the\nOfannim\u201d (ibid.). For the sake of emphasis and further explanation the\nprophet adds, \u201cWhen those went, these went; and when those stood, these\nstood; and when those were lifted up from the earth, the Ofannim were\nlifted up over against them; for the spirit of the \u1e24ayyah was in the\nOfannim\u201d (ver. 21). The order of these movements is therefore as\nfollows:\u2014Whithersoever it is the will of God that the \u1e24ayyot should\nmove, thither they move of their own accord. When the \u1e24ayyot move the\nOfannim necessarily follow them, because they are tied to them, and not\nbecause they move of their own accord in the direction in which the\n\u1e24ayyot move. This order is expressed in the words, \u201cWhithersoever the\nspirit was to go, they went, thither was the spirit to go; and the\nOfannim were lifted up over against them; for the spirit of the \u1e24ayyah\nwas in the Ofannim\u201d (ver. 20). I have told you that Jonathan, the son\nof Uzziel, translates the verse thus, \u201cto the place whither it was the\nwill that the \u1e24ayyot should go,\u201d etc.\n\nAfter having completed the account of the \u1e24ayyot, with their form and\nmotion, and of the Ofannim, which are beneath the \u1e24ayyot, connected\nwith them and forced to move when the \u1e24ayyot move, the prophet begins\nto describe a third object which he perceived prophetically, and gives\nthe account of a new thing, viz., of that which is above the \u1e24ayyot. He\nsays that the firmament is above the four \u1e24ayyot, above the firmament\nis the likeness of a throne, and over the throne the likeness of the\nappearance of man. This is the whole account of what the prophet\nperceived at first at the river Chebar.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nWhen Ezekiel recalled to memory the form of the Chariot, which he\ndescribed in the beginning of the book, the same vision presented\nitself to him a second time; in this vision he was borne to Jerusalem.\nHe explains in describing it things which have not been made clear at\nfirst, e.g., he substitutes the term \u201ccherubim\u201d for \u1e24ayyot, whereby he\nexpresses that the \u1e24ayyot of the first vision are likewise angels like\nthe cherubim. He says, therefore: \u201cWhere the cherubims went, the\nOfannim went by them: and when the cherubims lifted up their wings to\nmount up from the earth, the same Ofannim also turned not from beside\nthem\u201d (x. 16). By these words he shows how closely connected the two\nmotions are [viz., that of the \u1e24ayyot and that of the Ofannim]. The\nprophet adds, \u201cThis is the \u1e24ayyah that I saw under the God of Israel by\nthe river of Chebar; and I knew that they were cherubims\u201d (ver. 20). He\nthus describes the same forms and the same motions, and states that the\n\u1e24ayyot and the cherubim are identical. A second point is then made\nclear in this second description, namely, that the Ofannim are\nspherical; for the prophet says, \u201cAs for the Ofannim, it was cried unto\nthem in my hearing, O sphere\u201d (ver. 13). A third point concerning the\nOfannim is illustrated here in the following words: \u201cTo the place\nwhither the head looked they followed it: they turned not as they went\u201d\n(ver. 11). The motion of the Ofannim is thus described as involuntary,\nand directed \u201cto the place whither the head looketh\u201d; and of this it is\nstated that it moves \u201cwhither the spirit is to go\u201d (i. 20). A fourth\npoint is added concerning the Ofannim, namely, \u201cAnd the Ofannim were\nfull of eyes round about, even the Ofannim that they four had\u201d (x. 12).\nThis has not been mentioned before. In this second description there\nare further mentioned \u201ctheir flesh, and their backs, and their hands,\nand their wings\u201d (ibid.), whilst in the first account none of these is\nmentioned; and it is only stated that they are bodies. Though they are\nendowed in the second account with flesh, hands, and wings, no form is\ngiven to them. In the second account each ofan is attributed to a\ncherub, \u201cone ofan by one cherub, and another ofan by another cherub.\u201d\nThe four \u1e24ayyot are then described as one \u1e24ayyah on account of their\ninterjoining: \u201cThis is the \u1e24ayyah that I saw under the God of Israel by\nthe river of Chebar\u201d (ver. 20). Also the Ofannim, though being four in\nnumber, as has been mentioned, are called \u201cone ofan upon the earth\u201d\n(ver. 15), because they interjoin, and \u201cthey four have one likeness\u201d\n(ver. 16). This is the additional explanation which the second vision\ngives of the form of the \u1e24ayyot and the Ofannim.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nIt is necessary to call your attention to an idea expressed by\nJonathan, the son of Uzziel. When he saw that the prophet says in\nreference to the Ofannim, \u201cIt was cried unto them in my hearing, O\ngilgal\u201d (\u201csphere\u201d) (x. 13), he assumed that by Ofannim the heavens are\nmeant, and rendered ofan by gilgal, \u201csphere,\u201d and ofannim by gilgelaya,\n\u201cspheres.\u201d I have no doubt that he found a confirmation of his opinion\nin the words of the prophet that the Ofannim were like unto the colour\nof tarshish (ver. 16), a colour ascribed to the heavens, as is well\nknown. When he, therefore, noticed the passage, \u201cNow as I beheld the\n\u1e24ayyot, behold one Ofan upon the earth\u201d (i. 15), which clearly shows\nthat the Ofannim were upon the earth, he had a difficulty in explaining\nit in accordance with his opinion. Following, however, his\ninterpretation, he explains the terms ere\u1e93, employed here as denoting\nthe inner surface of the heavenly sphere, which may be considered as\nere\u1e93 (\u201cearth\u201d or \u201cbelow\u201d), in relation to all that is above that\nsurface. He therefore translates the words ofan e\u1e25ad ba-are\u1e93 as\nfollows: \u201cOne ofan was below the height of the heavens.\u201d Consider what\nhis explanation of the passage must be. I think that he gave this\nexplanation because he thought that gilgal denotes in its original\nmeaning \u201cheaven.\u201d My opinion is that gilgal means originally \u201canything\nrolling\u201d; comp. \u201cAnd I will roll thee (ve-gilgaltika) down from the\nrocks\u201d (Jer. li. 25); \u201cand rolled (va-yagel) the stone\u201d (Gen. xxix.\n10); the same meaning the word has in the phrase: \u201cLike a rolling thing\n(gilgal) before the whirlwind\u201d (Isa. xvii. 13). The poll of the head,\nbeing round, is therefore called gulgolet; and because everything round\nrolls easily, every spherical thing is called gilgal; also the heavens\nare called gilgallim on account of their spherical form. Thus our Sages\nuse the phrase, \u201cIt is a wheel (gilgal) that moves round the world\u201d;\nand a wooden ball, whether small or large, is called gilgal. If so, the\nprophet merely intended by the words, \u201cAs for the Ofannim, it is cried\nto them in my hearing, O sphere\u201d (gilgal), to indicate the shape of the\nOfannim, as nothing has been mentioned before respecting their form and\nshape; but he did not mean to say that the Ofannim are the same as the\nheavens. The term \u201clike tarshish\u201d is explained in the second account,\nin which it is said of the Ofannim: \u201cAnd the appearance of the ofannim\nwas like the colour of tarshish.\u201d This latter passage is translated by\nJonathan, the son of Uzziel, \u201clike the colour of a precious stone,\u201d\nexactly in the same manner as Onkelos translates the phrase ke-ma\u02bbase\nlibnat ha-sappir, \u201clike the work of the whiteness of sapphire\u201d (Exod.\nxxix. 10). Note this. You will not find it strange that I mention the\nexplanation of Jonathan, son of Uzziel, whilst I gave a different\nexplanation myself; for you will find many of the wise men and the\ncommentators differ sometimes from him in the interpretation of words\nand in many things respecting the prophets. Why should it be otherwise\nin these profound matters? Besides, I do not decide in favour of my\ninterpretation. It is for you to learn both\u2014the whole of his\nexplanation, from what I have pointed out to you, and also my own\nopinion. God knoweth which of the two explanations is in accordance\nwith that which the prophet intended to say.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nIt is necessary to notice that the plural marot elohim, \u201cvisions of\nGod,\u201d is here used, and not the singular mareh, \u201cvision,\u201d for there\nwere several things, of different kinds, that were perceived by the\nprophet. The following three things were perceived by him: the Ofannim,\nthe \u1e24ayyot, and the man above the \u1e24ayyot. The description of each of\nthese visions is introduced by the word va-ereh, \u201cand I beheld.\u201d For\nthe account of the \u1e24ayyot, begins, \u201cAnd I looked (va-ereh), and behold\na whirlwind,\u201d etc. (Ezek. i. 4). The account of the Ofannim begins:\n\u201cNow as I beheld (va-ereh) the \u1e24ayyot, behold one Ofan upon the earth\u201d\n(ver. 15). The vision of that which is above the \u1e24ayyot in order and\nrank begins: \u201cAnd I saw (va-ereh) as the colour of the amber, etc.,\nfrom the appearance of his loins even upward\u201d (ver. 27). The word\nva-ereh, \u201cand I beheld,\u201d only occurs these three times in the\ndescription of the Mercabah. The doctors of the Mishnah have already\nexplained this fact, and my attention was called to it by their\nremarks. For they said that only the two first visions, namely, that of\nthe \u1e24ayyot and the Ofannim, might be interpreted to others; but of the\nthird vision, viz., that of the \u1e25ashmal and all that is connected with\nit, only the heads of the sections may be taught. Rabbi [Jehudah], the\nHoly, is of opinion that all the three visions are called ma\u02bbaseh\nmercabah, and nothing but the heads of the sections could be\ncommunicated to others. The exact words of the discussion are as\nfollows:\u2014Where does ma\u02bbaseh mercabhah end? Rabbi says, with the last\nva-ereh; Rabbi Yi\u1e93\u1e25ak says it ends at the word \u1e25ashmal (ver. 27). The\nportion from va-ereh to \u1e25ashmal may be fully taught; of that which\nfollows, only the heads of the sections; according to some it is the\npassage from va-ereh to \u1e25ashmal, of which the heads of the sections may\nbe taught, but that which follows may only be studied by those who\npossess the capacity, whilst those that cannot study it by themselves\nmust leave it.\u2014It is clear from the words of our Sages that different\nvisions are described, as may also be inferred from the repetition of\nthe word va-ereh, and that these visions are different from each other\nin degree; the last and highest of them is the vision commencing, \u201cAnd\nI saw as the colour of \u1e25ashmal\u201d; that is to say, the divided figure of\nthe man, described as \u201cthe appearance of fire, etc., from the\nappearance of his loins even upward, and from the appearance of his\nloins even downward,\u201d etc. There is a difference of opinion among our\nSages whether it is permitted to give by way of hints an exposition of\nany part of this third vision, or whether it is prohibited even to\nteach of it the heads of the sections, so that only the wise can arrive\nat understanding it by their own studies. You will also notice a\ndifference of opinion among our Sages in reference to the two first\nvisions, viz., that of the \u1e24ayyot and that of the Ofannim whether these\nmay be taught explicitly or only by way of hints, dark sayings, and\nheads of sections. You must also notice the order of these three\nvisions. First comes the vision of the \u1e24ayyot, because they are first\nin rank and in the causal relation, as it is said, \u201cFor the spirit of\nthe \u1e24ayyah was in the Ofannim\u201d and also for other reasons. The vision\nof the Ofannim [comes next, and] is followed by one which is higher\nthan the \u1e24ayyot, as has been shown. The cause of this arrangement is,\nthat in study the first two must necessarily precede the third, and in\nfact they lead to it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nThe sublime and great subject which Ezekiel by prophetic impulse began\nto teach us in the description of the Mercabah, is exactly the same\nwhich Isaiah taught us in general outlines, because he did not require\nall the detail. Isaiah says, \u201cI saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,\nhigh and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood\nseraphims,\u201d etc. (Isa. vi. 1 seq.). Our Sages have already stated all\nthis clearly, and called our attention to it. For they say that the\nvision of Ezekiel is the same as that of Isaiah, and illustrate their\nview by the following simile:\u2014Two men saw the king riding, the one a\ntownsman, the other a countryman. The former, seeing that his\nneighbours know well how the king rides, simply tells them that he saw\nthe king; but the villager, wishing to tell his friends things which\nthey do not know, relates in detail how the king was riding, describes\nhis followers, and the officers who execute his order and command. This\nremark is a most useful hint; it is contained in the following passage\n(\u1e24agigah, 13 b): \u201cIsaiah saw all that has been seen by Ezekiel; Isaiah\nis like a townsman that sees the king, Ezekiel like a countryman that\nsees the king.\u201d These words can be explained in the manner which I have\njust mentioned, viz., the generation of Isaiah did not require the\ndetailed description; his account, \u201cI saw the Lord,\u201d etc., sufficed.\nThe generation of the Babylonian exile wanted to learn all the details.\nIt is, however, possible that the author of this saying held Isaiah as\nmore perfect than Ezekiel, so that the vision might have overawed\nEzekiel and appeared fearful to him; but Isaiah was so familiar with it\nthat he did not consider it necessary to communicate it to others as a\nnew thing, especially as it was well known to the intelligent.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nOne of the points that require investigation is the connexion between\nthe vision of the mercabah and the year, month, and day, and also the\nplace of the vision. A reason must be found for this connexion, and we\nmust not think that it is an indifferent element in the vision. We must\nconsider the words, \u201cthe heavens were opened\u201d (Ezek. i. 1); they give\nthe key to the understanding of the whole. The figure of opening, also\nthat of opening the gates, occurs frequently in the books of the\nprophets; e.g., \u201cOpen ye the gates that the righteous nation may enter\nin\u201d (Isa. xxvi. 2); \u201cHe opened the doors of heaven\u201d (Ps. lxxviii. 23);\n\u201cLift them up, ye everlasting doors\u201d (ibid. xxiv. 9); \u201cOpen to me the\ngates of righteousness, I will go into them, and I will praise the\nLord\u201d (ibid. cxviii. 19). There are many other instances of this kind.\nYou must further notice that the whole description refers undoubtedly\nto a prophetic vision, as it is said, \u201cAnd the hand of the Lord was\nthere upon him\u201d (Ezek. i. 3); and yet there is a very great difference\nbetween the various parts of the description, for in the account of the\n\u1e24ayyot the prophet does not say four \u1e24ayyot, but \u201cthe likeness of the\nfour \u1e24ayyot\u201d (ibid. ver. 5); similarly he says, \u201cAnd the likeness of a\nfirmament was over the heads of the \u1e24ayyot\u201d (ver. 22); \u201cas the\nappearance of a sapphire stone, the likeness of a throne,\u201d and \u201cthe\nlikeness of the appearance of man above it\u201d (ver. 26). In all these\ninstances the word \u201clikeness\u201d is used, whilst in the account of the\nOfannim the phrases, \u201cthe likeness of Ofannim,\u201d the \u201clikeness of an\nOfan,\u201d are not employed, but they are described in a positive manner as\nbeings in actual existence, with their real properties. The sentence\n\u201cthey four had one likeness\u201d must not mislead you, for here the word\n\u201clikeness\u201d is not used in the same connexion or in the same sense as\nindicated above. In the description of the last vision the prophet\nconfirms and explains this view. When he commences to describe the\nfirmament in detail, he says, \u201cthe firmament,\u201d without adding the words\n\u201cthe likeness of,\u201d for he says, \u201cAnd I looked, and behold, in the\nfirmament that was above the head of the cherubims there appeared over\nthem as it were a sapphire stone, as the appearance of the likeness of\na throne\u201d (x. 1). Here the prophet speaks of \u201cthe firmament\u201d and not of\n\u201cthe likeness of the firmament,\u201d as he does when he connects the\nfirmament with the heads of the likeness of the \u1e24ayyot (i. 22). But, as\nregards the throne, he says, \u201cthe likeness of a throne appeared over\nthem,\u201d in order to indicate that the firmament was first perceived and\nthen the likeness of the throne was seen over it. Consider this well.\n\nYou must further notice that in the description of the first vision the\n\u1e24ayyot have wings and at the same time human hands, whilst in the\nsecond vision, in which the term cherubim is substituted for \u1e24ayyot, at\nfirst only wings were perceived, and later on human hands were seen.\nComp. \u201cAnd there appeared in the cherubims the form of a man\u2019s hand\nunder their wings\u201d (x. 8). Here \u201cform\u201d (tabnit) is used instead of\n\u201clikeness\u201d (demut); and the hands are placed under the wings. Note\nthis.\n\nConsider that in reference to the ofannim, the prophet says,\nle-\u02bbummatam, \u201cover against them,\u201d although he does not ascribe to them\nany form.\n\nHe further says, \u201cAs the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in\nthe day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about.\nThis was the appearance of the likeness of the glory,\u201d etc. (i. 28).\nThe substance and true essence of the bow described here is well known.\nThe simile and comparison is in this case very extraordinary, and is\nundoubtedly part of the prophecy; and note it well.\n\nIt is also noteworthy that the likeness of man above the throne is\ndivided, the upper part being like the colour of \u1e25ashmal, the lower\npart like the appearance of fire. As regards the word \u1e25ashmal, it has\nbeen explained to be a compound of two words \u1e25ash and mal, including\ntwo different notions, viz., \u1e25ash signifying \u201cswiftness,\u201d and mal\ndenoting \u201cpause.\u201d The two different notions are here joined in one word\nin order to indicate figuratively the two different parts,\u2014the upper\npart and the lower. We have already given a second explanation, namely,\nthat \u1e25ashmal includes the two notions of speech and silence; in\naccordance with the saying of our Sages, \u201cAt times they are silent, at\ntimes they speak,\u201d thus deriving hash of the same root as he\u1e25eshethi,\n\u201cI have been silent\u201d (Isa. xlii. 14); the word \u1e25ashmal thus includes\ntwo notions, and indicates \u201cspeech without sound.\u201d There is no doubt\nthat the words, \u201cat times they are silent, at times they speak,\u201d refer\nto a created object. Now consider how they clearly stated that the\ndivided likeness of man over the throne does not represent God, who is\nabove the whole chariot, but represents a part of the creation. The\nprophet likewise says \u201cthat is the likeness of the glory of the Lord\u201d;\nbut \u201cthe glory of the Lord\u201d is different from \u201cthe Lord\u201d Himself, as\nhas been shown by us several times. All the figures in this vision\nrefer to the glory of the Lord, to the chariot, and not to Him who\nrides upon the chariot; for God cannot be compared to anything. Note\nthis. I have thus given you also in this chapter as much of the heads\nof the sections as will be useful to you for the comprehension of this\nsubject, if you fill out [the sections of] these heads. If you consider\nall that has been said in this part up to this chapter, the greater\npart of this subject or the whole of it will be clear to you, except a\nfew points and some repetitions the meaning of which is unknown.\nPerhaps further study will help to reveal even these things so that\nnothing will remain unintelligible.\n\nDo not expect or hope to hear from me after this chapter a word on this\nsubject, either explicitly or implicitly, for all that could be said on\nit has been said, though with great difficulty and struggle. I will now\nbegin to treat of some of the other subjects which I hope to elucidate\nin this treatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nTransient bodies are only subject to destruction through their\nsubstance and not through their form, nor can the essence of their form\nbe destroyed; in this respect they are permanent. The generic forms, as\nyou know, are all permanent and stable. Form can only be destroyed\naccidentally, i.e., on account of its connexion with substance, the\ntrue nature of which consists in the property of never being without a\ndisposition to receive form. This is the reason why no form remains\npermanently in a substance; a constant change takes place, one form is\ntaken off and another is put on. How wonderfully wise is the simile of\nKing Solomon, in which he compares matter to a faithless wife; for\nmatter is never found without form, and is therefore always like such a\nwife who is never without a husband, never single; and yet, though\nbeing wedded, constantly seeks another man in the place of her husband;\nshe entices and attracts him in every possible manner till he obtains\nfrom her what her husband has obtained. The same is the case with\nmatter. Whatever form it has, it is disposed to receive another form;\nit never leaves off moving and casting off the form which it has in\norder to receive another. The same takes place when this second form is\nreceived. It is therefore clear that all corruption, destruction, or\ndefect comes from matter. Take, e.g., man; his deformities and\nunnatural shape of limbs; all weakness, interruption, or disorder of\nhis actions, whether innate or not, originate in the transient\nsubstance, not in the form. All other living beings likewise die or\nbecome ill through the substance of the body and not through its form.\nMan\u2019s shortcomings and sins are all due to the substance of the body\nand not to its form; while all his merits are exclusively due to his\nform. Thus the knowledge of God, the formation of ideas, the mastery of\ndesire and passion, the distinction between that which is to be chosen\nand that which is to be rejected, all these man owes to his form; but\neating, drinking, sexual intercourse, excessive lust, passion, and all\nvices, have their origin in the substance of his body. Now it was clear\nthat this was the case,\u2014it was impossible, according to the wisdom of\nGod, that substance should exist without form, or any of the forms of\nthe bodies without substance, and it was necessary that the very noble\nform of man, which is the image and likeness of God, as has been shown\nby us, should be joined to the substance of dust and darkness, the\nsource of all defect and loss. For these reasons the Creator gave to\nthe form of man power, rule, and dominion over the substance;\u2014the form\ncan subdue the substance, refuse the fulfilment of its desires, and\nreduce them, as far as possible, to a just and proper measure. The\nstation of man varies according to the exercise of this power. Some\npersons constantly strive to choose that which is noble, and to seek\nperpetuation in accordance with the direction of their nobler\npart,\u2014their form; their thoughts are engaged in the formation of ideas,\nthe acquisition of true knowledge about everything, and the union with\nthe divine intellect which flows down upon them, and which is the\nsource of man\u2019s form. Whenever they are led by the wants of the body to\nthat which is low and avowedly disgraceful, they are grieved at their\nposition, they feel ashamed and confounded at their situation. They try\nwith all their might to diminish this disgrace, and to guard against it\nin every possible way. They feel like a person whom the king in his\nanger ordered to remove refuse from one place to another in order to\nput him to shame; that person tries as much as possible to hide himself\nduring the time of his disgrace; he perhaps removes a small quantity a\nshort distance in such a manner that his hands and garments remain\nclean, and he himself be unnoticed by his fellow-men. Such would be the\nconduct of a free man, whilst a slave would find pleasure in such\nwork;\u2014he would not consider it a great burden, but throw himself into\nthe refuse, smear his face and his hands, carry the refuse openly,\nlaughing and singing. This is exactly the difference in the conduct of\ndifferent men. Some consider, as we just said, all wants of the body as\nshame, disgrace, and defect to which they are compelled to attend; this\nis chiefly the case with the sense of touch, which is a disgrace to us\naccording to Aristotle, and which is the cause of our desire for\neating, drinking, and sensuality. Intelligent persons must, as much as\npossible, reduce these wants, guard against them, feel grieved when\nsatisfying them, abstain from speaking of them, discussing them, and\nattending to them in company with others. Man must have control over\nall these desires, reduce them as much as possible, and only retain of\nthem as much as is indispensable. His aim must be the aim of man as\nman, viz., the formation of ideas, and nothing else. The best and\nsublimest among them is the idea which man forms of God, angels, and\nthe rest of the creation according to his capacity. Such men are always\nwith God, and of them it is said, \u201cYe are princes, and all of you are\nchildren of the Most High\u201d (Ps. lxxxii. 6). This is man\u2019s task and\npurpose. Others, however, that are separated from God form the\nmultitude of fools, and do just the opposite. They neglect all thought\nand all reflection on ideas, and consider as their task the cultivation\nof the sense of touch,\u2014that sense which is the greatest disgrace; they\nonly think and reason about eating and love. Thus it is said of the\nwicked who are drowned in eating, drinking, and love, \u201cThey also have\nerred through wine, and through strong drink are out of the way,\u201d etc.\n(Isa. xxviii. 7), \u201cfor all tables are full of vomit and filthiness, so\nthat there is no place clean\u201d (ver. 8); again, \u201cAnd women rule over\nthem\u201d (ibid. iii. 2),\u2014the opposite of that which man was told in the\nbeginning of the creation, \u201cAnd for thy husband shall thy desire be,\nand he shall rule over thee\u201d (Gen. iii. 16). The intensity of their\nlust is then described thus, \u201cEvery one neighed after his neighbour\u2019s\nwife,\u201d etc. (Jer. v. 8); \u201cthey are all adulterers, an assembly of\ntreacherous men\u201d (ibid. ix. 2). The whole book of the Proverbs of\nSolomon treats of this subject, and exhorts to abstain from lust and\nintemperance. These two vices ruin those that hate God and keep far\nfrom Him; to them the following passages may be applied, \u201cThey are not\nthe Lord\u2019s\u201d (ibid. v. 10); \u201cCast them out of my sight, and let them go\nforth\u201d (ibid. xv. 1). As regards the portion beginning, \u201cWho can find a\nvirtuous woman?\u201d it is clear what is meant by the figurative\nexpression, \u201ca virtuous woman.\u201d When man possesses a good sound body\nthat does not overpower him nor disturb the equilibrium in him, he\npossesses a divine gift. In short, a good constitution facilitates the\nrule of the soul over the body, but it is not impossible to conquer a\nbad constitution by training. For this reason King Solomon and others\nwrote the moral lessons; also all the commandments and exhortations in\nthe Pentateuch aim at conquering the desires of the body. Those who\ndesire to be men in truth, and not brutes, having only the appearance\nand shape of men, must constantly endeavour to reduce the wants of the\nbody, such as eating, love, drinking, anger, and all vices originating\nin lust and passion; they must feel ashamed of them and set limits to\nthem for themselves. As for eating and drinking in so far as it is\nindispensable, they will eat and drink only as much as is useful and\nnecessary as food, and not for the purpose of pleasure. They will also\nspeak little of these things, and rarely congregate for such purposes.\nThus our Sages, as is well known, kept aloof from a banquet that was\nnot part of a religious act, and pious men followed the example of R.\nPhine\u1e25as, son of Jair, who never dined with other persons, and even\nrefused to accept an invitation of R. Jehudah, the Holy. Wine may be\ntreated as food, if taken as such, but to form parties for the purpose\nof drinking wine together must be considered more disgraceful than the\nunrestrained conduct of persons who in daylight meet in the same house\nundressed and naked. For the natural action of the digestive organ is\nindispensable to man, he cannot do without it; whilst drunkenness\ndepends on the free will of an evil man. To appear naked in the\npresence of other people is misconduct only according to public\nopinion, not according to the dictates of reason, whilst drunkenness,\nwhich ruins the mind and the body of man, reason stamps as a vice. You,\ntherefore, who desire to act as human beings must keep away from it,\nand even from speaking of it. On sexual intercourse, I need not add\nanything after I have pointed out in the commentary on Abot (i. 17) how\nit is treated by our Law, which is the teaching of pure wisdom\u2014no\nexcuse whatever should induce us to mention it or to speak of it. Thus\nour Sages said, that Elisha the prophet is called holy, because he did\nnot think of it, and consequently never found himself polluted with\nsemen. In a similar manner they say that Jacob had the first issue of\nsemen for the conception of Reuben. All these traditional stories have\nthe object of teaching the nation humane conduct. There is a well-known\nsaying of our Sages, \u201cThe thoughts about the sin are more dangerous\nthan the sin itself.\u201d I can offer a good explanation of this saying:\nWhen a person is disobedient, this is due to certain accidents\nconnected with the corporeal element in his constitution; for man sins\nonly by his animal nature, whereas thinking is a faculty of man\nconnected with his form,\u2014a person who thinks sinfully sins therefore by\nmeans of the nobler portion of his self; and he who wrongly causes a\nfoolish slave to work does not sin as much as he who wrongly causes a\nnoble and free man to do the work of a slave. For this specifically\nhuman element, with all its properties and powers, should only be\nemployed in suitable work, in attempts to join higher beings, and not\nin attempts to go down and reach the lower creatures. You know how we\ncondemn lowness of speech, and justly so, for speech is likewise\npeculiar to man and a boon which God granted to him that he may be\ndistinguished from the rest of living creatures. Thus God says, \u201cWho\ngave a mouth to man?\u201d (Exod. iv. 11); and the prophet declares, \u201cThe\nLord God hath given me a learned tongue\u201d (Isa. l. 4). This gift,\ntherefore, which God gave us in order to enable us to perfect\nourselves, to learn and to teach, must not be employed in doing that\nwhich is for us most degrading and perfectly disgraceful; we must not\nimitate the songs and tales of ignorant and lascivious people. It may\nbe suitable to them, but is not fit for those who are told, \u201cAnd ye\nshall be unto me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation\u201d (Exod. xix.\n6). Those who employ the faculty of thinking and speaking in the\nservice of that sense which is no honour to us, who think more than\nnecessary of drink and love, or even sing of these things; they employ\nand use the divine gift in acts of rebellion against the Giver, and in\nthe transgression of His commandments. To them the following words may\nbe applied: \u201cAnd I multiplied her silver and gold, which they prepared\nfor Baal\u201d (Hos. ii. 10). I have also a reason and cause for calling our\nlanguage the holy language\u2014do not think it is exaggeration or error on\nmy part, it is perfectly correct\u2014the Hebrew language has no special\nname for the organ of generation in females or in males, nor for the\nact of generation itself, nor for semen, nor for secretion. The Hebrew\nhas no original expressions for these things, and only describes them\nin figurative language and by way of hints, as if to indicate thereby\nthat these things should not be mentioned, and should therefore have no\nnames; we ought to be silent about them, and when we are compelled to\nmention them, we must manage to employ for that purpose some suitable\nexpressions, although these are generally used in a different sense.\nThus the organ of generation in males is called in Hebrew gid, which is\na figurative term, reminding of the words, \u201cAnd thy neck is an iron\nsinew\u201d (gid) (Isa. xlviii. 4). It is also called shupka, \u201cpouring out\u201d\n(Deut. xxiii. 2), on account of its function. The female organ is\ncalled kobah (Num. xxv. 8), from kebah (Deut. xviii. 3), which denotes\n\u201cstomach\u201d; re\u1e25em, \u201cwomb,\u201d is the inner organ in which the f\u0153tus\ndevelops; \u1e93oah (Isa. xxviii. 8), \u201crefuse,\u201d is derived from the verb\nya\u1e93a, \u201che went out\u201d; for \u201curine\u201d the phrase meme raglayim, \u201cthe water\nof the feet\u201d (2 Kings. xviii. 17), is used; semen is expressed by\nshikbat zera\u02bb, \u201ca layer of seed.\u201d For the act of generation there is no\nexpression whatever in Hebrew; it is described by the following words\nonly: ba\u02bbal, \u201che was master\u201d; shakab, \u201che lay\u201d; la\u1e33a\u1e25, \u201che took\u201d;\ngillah \u02bbervah, \u201che uncovered the nakedness.\u201d Be not misled by the word\nyishgalennah (Deut. xxviii. 30), to take it as denoting that act; this\nis not the case, for shegal denotes a female ready for cohabitation.\nComp. \u201cUpon thy right hand did stand the maiden\u201d (shegal) \u201cin gold of\nOphir\u201d (Ps. xlv. 10). Yishgalennah, according to the Kethib, denotes\ntherefore \u201che will take the female for the purpose of cohabitation.\u201d\n\nWe have made in the greater part of this chapter a digression from the\ntheme of this treatise, and introduced some moral and religious matter,\nalthough they do not entirely belong to the subject of this treatise,\nbut the course of the discussion has led to it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nThe corporeal element in man is a large screen and partition that\nprevents him from perfectly perceiving abstract ideals; this would be\nthe case even if the corporeal element were as pure and superior as the\nsubstance of the spheres; how much more must this be the case with our\ndark and opaque body. However great the exertion of our mind may be to\ncomprehend the Divine Being or any of the ideals, we find a screen and\npartition between Him and ourselves. Thus the prophets frequently hint\nat the existence of a partition between God and us. They say He is\nconcealed from us in vapours, in darkness, in mist, or in a thick\ncloud; or use similar figures to express that on account of our bodies\nwe are unable to comprehend His essence. This is the meaning of the\nwords, \u201cClouds and darkness are round about Him\u201d (Ps. xcvii. 2). The\nprophets tell us that the difficulty consists in the grossness of our\nsubstance; they do not imply, as might be gathered from the literal\nmeaning of their words, that God is corporeal, and is invisible because\nHe is surrounded by thick clouds, vapours, darkness, or mist. This\nfigure is also expressed in the passage, \u201cHe made darkness His secret\nplace\u201d (Ps. xviii. 12). The object of God revealing Himself in thick\nclouds, darkness, vapours, and mist was to teach this lesson; for every\nprophetic vision contains some lesson by means of allegory; that mighty\nvision, therefore, though the greatest of all visions, and above all\ncomparison, viz., His revelation in a thick cloud, did not take place\nwithout any purpose, it was intended to indicate that we cannot\ncomprehend Him on account of the dark body that surrounds us. It does\nnot surround God, because He is incorporeal. A tradition is current\namong our people that the day of the revelation on Mount Sinai was\nmisty, cloudy, and a little rainy. Comp. \u201cLord, when thou wentest forth\nfrom Seir, when thou marchedst out of the field of Edom, the earth\ntrembled, and the heavens dropped water\u201d (Judges v. 4). The same idea\nis expressed by the words \u201cdarkness, clouds, and thick darkness\u201d (Deut.\niv. 11). The phrase does not denote that darkness surrounds God, for\nwith Him there is no darkness, but the great, strong, and permanent\nlight, which, emanating from Him, illuminates all darkness, as is\nexpressed by the prophetic simile, \u201cAnd the earth shined with His\nglory\u201d (Ezek. xliii. 2).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nThe Mutakallemim, as I have already told you, apply the term\nnon-existence only to absolute non-existence, and not to the absence of\nproperties. A property and the absence of that property are considered\nby them as two opposites, they treat, e.g., blindness and sight, death\nand life, in the same way as heat and cold. Therefore they say, without\nany qualification, non-existence does not require any agent, an agent\nis required when something is produced. From a certain point of view\nthis is correct. Although they hold that non-existence does not require\nan agent, they say in accordance with their principle that God causes\nblindness and deafness, and gives rest to anything that moves, for they\nconsider these negative conditions as positive properties. We must now\nstate our opinion in accordance with the results of philosophical\nresearch. You know that he who removes the obstacle of motion is to\nsome extent the cause of the motion, e.g., if one removes the pillar\nwhich supports the beam he causes the beam to move, as has been stated\nby Aristotle in his Physics (VIII., chap. iv.); in this sense we say of\nhim who removed a certain property that he produced the absence of that\nproperty, although absence of a property is nothing positive. Just as\nwe say of him who puts out the light at night that he has produced\ndarkness, so we say of him who destroyed the sight of any being that he\nproduced blindness, although darkness and blindness are negative\nproperties, and require no agent. In accordance with this view we\nexplain the following passage of Isaiah: \u201cI form the light and create\n(bore) darkness: I make peace, and create (bore) evil\u201d (Isa. xlv. 7),\nfor darkness and evil are non-existing things. Consider that the\nprophet does not say, I make (\u02bboseh) darkness, I make (\u02bboseh) evil,\nbecause darkness and evil are not things in positive existence to which\nthe verb \u201cto make\u201d would apply; the verb bara \u201che created\u201d is used,\nbecause in Hebrew this verb is applied to non-existing things, e.g.,\n\u201cIn the beginning God created\u201d (bara), etc.; here the creation took\nplace from nothing. Only in this sense can non-existence be said to be\nproduced by a certain action of an agent. In the same way we must\nexplain the following passage: \u201cWho hath made man\u2019s mouth? or who\nmaketh the dumb, or the deaf, or the seeing,\u201d etc. (Exod. iv. 11). The\npassage can also be explained as follows: Who has made man able to\nspeak? or can create him without the capacity of speaking, i.e., create\na substance that is incapable of acquiring this property? for he who\nproduces a substance that cannot acquire a certain property may be\ncalled the producer of that privation. Thus we say, if any one abstains\nfrom delivering a fellow-man from death, although he is able to do so,\nthat he killed him. It is now clear that according to all these\ndifferent views the action of an agent cannot be directly connected\nwith a thing that does not exist; only indirectly is non-existence\ndescribed as the result of the action of an agent, whilst in a direct\nmanner an action can only influence a thing really in existence;\naccordingly, whoever the agent may be, he can only act upon an existing\nthing.\n\nAfter this explanation you must recall to memory that, as has been\nproved, the [so-called] evils are evils only in relation to a certain\nthing, and that which is evil in reference to a certain existing thing,\neither includes the non-existence of that thing or the non-existence of\nsome of its good conditions. The proposition has therefore been laid\ndown in the most general terms, \u201cAll evils are negations.\u201d Thus for man\ndeath is evil; death is his non-existence. Illness, poverty, and\nignorance are evils for man; all these are privations of properties. If\nyou examine all single cases to which this general proposition applies,\nyou will find that there is not one case in which the proposition is\nwrong except in the opinion of those who do not make any distinction\nbetween negative and positive properties, or between two opposites, or\ndo not know the nature of things,\u2014who, e.g., do not know that health in\ngeneral denotes a certain equilibrium, and is a relative term. The\nabsence of that relation is illness in general, and death is the\nabsence of life in the case of any animal. The destruction of other\nthings is likewise nothing but the absence of their form.\n\nAfter these propositions, it must be admitted as a fact that it cannot\nbe said of God that He directly creates evil, or He has the direct\nintention to produce evil; this is impossible. His works are all\nperfectly good. He only produces existence, and all existence is good;\nwhilst evils are of a negative character, and cannot be acted upon.\nEvil can only be attributed to Him in the way we have mentioned. He\ncreates evil only in so far as He produces the corporeal element such\nas it actually is; it is always connected with negatives, and is on\nthat account the source of all destruction and all evil. Those beings\nthat do not possess this corporeal element are not subject to\ndestruction or evil; consequently the true work of God is all good,\nsince it is existence. The book which enlightened the darkness of the\nworld says therefore, \u201cAnd God saw everything that He had made, and,\nbehold, it was very good\u201d (Gen. i. 31). Even the existence of this\ncorporeal element, low as it in reality is, because it is the source of\ndeath and all evils, is likewise good for the permanence of the\nUniverse and the continuation of the order of things, so that one thing\ndeparts and the other succeeds. Rabbi Meir therefore explains the words\n\u201cand behold it was very good\u201d (tob me\u2019od); that even death was good in\naccordance with what we have observed in this chapter. Remember what I\nsaid in this chapter, consider it, and you will understand all that the\nprophets and our Sages remarked about the perfect goodness of all the\ndirect works of God. In Bereshit Rabba (chap. i.) the same idea is\nexpressed thus: \u201cNo evil comes down from above.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nAll the great evils which men cause to each other because of certain\nintentions, desires, opinions, or religious principles, are likewise\ndue to non-existence, because they originate in ignorance, which is\nabsence of wisdom. A blind man, for example, who has no guide, stumbles\nconstantly, because he cannot see, and causes injury and harm to\nhimself and others. In the same manner various classes of men, each man\nin proportion to his ignorance, bring great evils upon themselves and\nupon other individual members of the species. If men possessed wisdom,\nwhich stands in the same relation to the form of man as the sight to\nthe eye, they would not cause any injury to themselves or to others;\nfor the knowledge of truth removes hatred and quarrels, and prevents\nmutual injuries. This state of society is promised to us by the prophet\nin the words: \u201cAnd the wolf shall dwell with the lamb,\u201d etc.; \u201cand the\ncow and the bear shall feed together,\u201d etc.; and \u201cthe sucking child\nshall play on the hole of the asp,\u201d etc. (Isa. xi. 6 seq.). The prophet\nalso points out what will be the cause of this change; for he says that\nhatred, quarrel, and fighting will come to an end, because men will\nthen have a true knowledge of God. \u201cThey shall not hurt nor destroy in\nall my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of\nthe Lord, as the waters cover the sea\u201d (ibid. ver. 9). Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nMen frequently think that the evils in the world are more numerous than\nthe good things; many savings and songs of the nations dwell on this\nidea. They say that a good thing is found only exceptionally, whilst\nevil things are numerous and lasting. Not only common people make this\nmistake, but even many who believe that they are wise. Al-Razi wrote a\nwell-known book On Metaphysics [or Theology]. Among other mad and\nfoolish things, it contains also the idea, discovered by him, that\nthere exists more evil than good. For if the happiness of man and his\npleasure in the times of prosperity be compared with the mishaps that\nbefall him,\u2014such as grief, acute pain, defects, paralysis of the limbs,\nfears, anxieties, and troubles,\u2014it would seem as if the existence of\nman is a punishment and a great evil for him. This author commenced to\nverify his opinion by counting all the evils one by one; by this means\nhe opposed those who hold the correct view of the benefits bestowed by\nGod and His evident kindness, viz., that God is perfect goodness, and\nthat all that comes from Him is absolutely good. The origin of the\nerror is to be found in the circumstance that this ignorant man, and\nhis party among the common people, judge the whole universe by\nexamining one single person. For an ignorant man believes that the\nwhole universe only exists for him; as if nothing else required any\nconsideration. If, therefore, anything happens to him contrary to his\nexpectation, he at once concludes that the whole universe is evil. If,\nhowever, he would take into consideration the whole universe, form an\nidea of it, and comprehend what a small portion he is of the Universe,\nhe will find the truth. For it is clear that persons who have fallen\ninto this widespread error as regards the multitude of evils in the\nworld, do not find the evils among the angels, the spheres and stars,\nthe elements, and that which is formed of them, viz., minerals and\nplants, or in the various species of living beings, but only in some\nindividual instances of mankind. They wonder that a person, who became\nleprous in consequence of bad food, should be afflicted with so great\nan illness and suffer such a misfortune; or that he who indulges so\nmuch in sensuality as to weaken his sight, should be struck with\nblindness! and the like. What we have, in truth, to consider is\nthis:\u2014The whole mankind at present in existence, and a fortiori, every\nother species of animals, form an infinitesimal portion of the\npermanent universe. Comp. \u201cMan is like to vanity\u201d (Ps. cxliv. 4); \u201cHow\nmuch less man, that is a worm; and the son of man, which is a worm\u201d\n(Job xxv. 6); \u201cHow much less in them who dwell in houses of clay\u201d\n(ibid. iv. 19); \u201cBehold, the nations are as a drop of the bucket\u201d (Isa.\nxl. 15). There are many other passages in the books of the prophets\nexpressing the same idea. It is of great advantage that man should know\nhis station, and not erroneously imagine that the whole universe exists\nonly for him. We hold that the universe exists because the Creator\nwills it so; that mankind is low in rank as compared with the uppermost\nportion of the universe, viz., with the spheres and the stars; but, as\nregards the angels, there cannot be any real comparison between man and\nangels, although man is the highest of all beings on earth; i.e., of\nall beings formed of the four elements. Man\u2019s existence is nevertheless\na great boon to him, and his distinction and perfection is a divine\ngift. The numerous evils to which individual persons are exposed are\ndue to the defects existing in the persons themselves. We complain and\nseek relief from our own faults; we suffer from the evils which we, by\nour own free will, inflict on ourselves and ascribe them to God, who is\nfar from being connected with them! Comp. \u201cIs destruction his [work]?\nNo. Ye [who call yourselves] wrongly his sons, you who are a perverse\nand crooked generation\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 5). This is explained by Solomon,\nwho says, \u201cThe foolishness of man perverteth his way, and his heart\nfretteth against the Lord\u201d (Prov. xix. 3).\n\nI explain this theory in the following manner. The evils that befall\nman are of three kinds:\u2014\n\n(1) The first kind of evil is that which is caused to man by the\ncircumstance that he is subject to genesis and destruction, or that he\npossesses a body. It is on account of the body that some persons happen\nto have great deformities or paralysis of some of the organs. This evil\nmay be part of the natural constitution of these persons, or may have\ndeveloped subsequently in consequence of changes in the elements, e.g.,\nthrough bad air, or thunderstorms, or landslips. We have already shown\nthat, in accordance with the divine wisdom, genesis can only take place\nthrough destruction, and without the destruction of the individual\nmembers of the species the species themselves would not exist\npermanently. Thus the true kindness, and beneficence, and goodness of\nGod is clear. He who thinks that he can have flesh and bones without\nbeing subject to any external influence, or any of the accidents of\nmatter, unconsciously wishes to reconcile two opposites, viz., to be at\nthe same time subject and not subject to change. If man were never\nsubject to change there could be no generation; there would be one\nsingle being, but no individuals forming a species. Galen, in the third\nsection of his book, The Use of the Limbs, says correctly that it would\nbe in vain to expect to see living beings formed of the blood of\nmenstruous women and the semen virile, who will not die, will never\nfeel pain, or will move perpetually, or will shine like the sun. This\ndictum of Galen is part of the following more general\nproposition:\u2014Whatever is formed of any matter receives the most perfect\nform possible in that species of matter; in each individual case the\ndefects are in accordance with the defects of that individual matter.\nThe best and most perfect being that can be formed of the blood and the\nsemen is the species of man, for as far as man\u2019s nature is known, he is\nliving, reasonable, and mortal. It is therefore impossible that man\nshould be free from this species of evil. You will, nevertheless, find\nthat the evils of the above kind which befall man are very few and\nrare; for you find countries that have not been flooded or burned for\nthousands of years; there are thousands of men in perfect health,\ndeformed individuals are a strange and exceptional occurrence, or say\nfew in number if you object to the term exceptional,\u2014they are not\none-hundredth, not even one-thousandth part of those that are perfectly\nnormal.\n\n(2) The second class of evils comprises such evils as people cause to\neach other, when, e.g., some of them use their strength against others.\nThese evils are more numerous than those of the first kind; their\ncauses are numerous and known; they likewise originate in ourselves,\nthough the sufferer himself cannot avert them. This kind of evil is\nnevertheless not widespread in any country of the whole world. It is of\nrare occurrence that a man plans to kill his neighbour or to rob him of\nhis property by night. Many persons are, however, afflicted with this\nkind of evil in great wars; but these are not frequent, if the whole\ninhabited part of the earth is taken into consideration.\n\n(3) The third class of evils comprises those which every one causes to\nhimself by his own action. This is the largest class, and is far more\nnumerous than the second class. It is especially of these evils that\nall men complain,\u2014only few men are found that do not sin against\nthemselves by this kind of evil. Those that are afflicted with it are\ntherefore justly blamed in the words of the prophet, \u201cThis hath been by\nyour means\u201d (Mal. i. 9); the same is expressed in the following\npassage, \u201cHe that doeth it destroyeth his own soul\u201d (Prov. vi. 32). In\nreference to this kind of evil, Solomon says, \u201cThe foolishness of man\nperverteth his way\u201d (ibid. xix. 3). In the following passage he\nexplains also that this kind of evil is man\u2019s own work, \u201cLo, this only\nhave I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have thought out\nmany inventions\u201d (Eccles. vii. 29), and these inventions bring the\nevils upon him. The same subject is referred to in Job (v. 6), \u201cFor\naffliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring\nout of the ground.\u201d These words are immediately followed by the\nexplanation that man himself is the author of this class of evils, \u201cBut\nman is born unto trouble.\u201d This class of evils originates in man\u2019s\nvices, such as excessive desire for eating, drinking, and love;\nindulgence in these things in undue measure, or in improper manner, or\npartaking of bad food. This course brings diseases and afflictions upon\nbody and soul alike. The sufferings of the body in consequence of these\nevils are well known; those of the soul are twofold:\u2014First, such evils\nof the soul as are the necessary consequence of changes in the body, in\nso far as the soul is a force residing in the body; it has therefore\nbeen said that the properties of the soul depend on the condition of\nthe body. Secondly, the soul, when accustomed to superfluous things,\nacquires a strong habit of desiring things which are neither necessary\nfor the preservation of the individual nor for that of the species.\nThis desire is without a limit, whilst things which are necessary are\nfew in number and restricted within certain limits; but what is\nsuperfluous is without end\u2014e.g., you desire to have your vessels of\nsilver, but golden vessels are still better: others have even vessels\nof sapphire, or perhaps they can be made of emerald or rubies, or any\nother substance that could be suggested. Those who are ignorant and\nperverse in their thought are constantly in trouble and pain, because\nthey cannot get as much of superfluous things as a certain other person\npossesses. They as a rule expose themselves to great dangers, e.g., by\nsea-voyage, or service of kings, and all this for the purpose of\nobtaining that which is superfluous and not necessary. When they thus\nmeet with the consequences of the course which they adopt, they\ncomplain of the decrees and judgments of God; they begin to blame the\ntime, and wonder at the want of justice in its changes; that it has not\nenabled them to acquire great riches, with which they could buy large\nquantities of wine for the purpose of making themselves drunk, and\nnumerous concubines adorned with various kind of ornaments of gold,\nembroidery, and jewels, for the purpose of driving themselves to\nvoluptuousness beyond their capacities, as if the whole Universe\nexisted exclusively for the purpose of giving pleasure to these low\npeople. The error of the ignorant goes so far as to say that God\u2019s\npower is insufficient, because He has given to this Universe the\nproperties which they imagine cause these great evils, and which do not\nhelp all evil-disposed persons to obtain the evil which they seek, and\nto bring their evil souls to the aim of their desires, though these, as\nwe have shown, are really without limit. The virtuous and wise,\nhowever, see and comprehend the wisdom of God displayed in the\nUniverse. Thus David says, \u201cAll the paths of the Lord are mercy and\ntruth unto such as keep His covenant and His testimonies\u201d (Ps. xxv.\n10). For those who observe the nature of the Universe and the\ncommandments of the Law, and know their purpose, see clearly God\u2019s\nmercy and truth in everything; they seek, therefore, that which the\nCreator intended to be the aim of man, viz., comprehension. Forced by\nthe claims of the body, they seek also that which is necessary for the\npreservation of the body, \u201cbread to eat and garment to clothe,\u201d and\nthis is very little; but they seek nothing superfluous; with very\nslight exertion man can obtain it, so long as he is contented with that\nwhich is indispensable. All the difficulties and troubles we meet in\nthis respect are due to the desire for superfluous things; when we seek\nunnecessary things, we have difficulty even in finding that which is\nindispensable. For the more we desire to have that which is\nsuperfluous, the more we meet with difficulties; our strength and\npossessions are spent in unnecessary things, and are wanting when\nrequired for that which is necessary. Observe how Nature proves the\ncorrectness of this assertion. The more necessary a thing is for living\nbeings, the more easily it is found and the cheaper it is; the less\nnecessary it is, the rarer and dearer it is. E.g., air, water, and food\nare indispensable to man: air is most necessary, for if man is without\nair a short time he dies; whilst he can be without water a day or two.\nAir is also undoubtedly found more easily and cheaper [than water].\nWater is more necessary than food; for some people can be four or five\ndays without food, provided they have water; water also exists in every\ncountry in larger quantities than food, and is also cheaper. The same\nproportion can be noticed in the different kinds of food; that which is\nmore necessary in a certain place exists there in larger quantities and\nis cheaper than that which is less necessary. No intelligent person, I\nthink, considers musk, amber, rubies, and emerald as very necessary for\nman except as medicines; and they, as well as other like substances,\ncan be replaced for this purpose by herbs and minerals. This shows the\nkindness of God to His creatures, even to us weak beings. His\nrighteousness and justice as regards all animals are well known; for in\nthe transient world there is among the various kinds of animals no\nindividual being distinguished from the rest of the same species by a\npeculiar property or an additional limb. On the contrary, all physical,\npsychical, and vital forces and organs that are possessed by one\nindividual are found also in the other individuals. If any one is\nsomehow different it is by accident, in consequence of some exception,\nand not by a natural property; it is also a rare occurrence. There is\nno difference between individuals of a species in the due course of\nNature; the difference originates in the various dispositions of their\nsubstances. This is the necessary consequence of the nature of the\nsubstance of that species; the nature of the species is not more\nfavourable to one individual than to the other. It is no wrong or\ninjustice that one has many bags of finest myrrh and garments\nembroidered with gold, while another has not those things, which are\nnot necessary for our maintenance; he who has them has not thereby\nobtained control over anything that could be an essential addition to\nhis nature, but has only obtained something illusory or deceptive. The\nother, who does not possess that which is not wanted for his\nmaintenance, does not miss anything indispensable: \u201cHe that gathered\nmuch had nothing over, and he that gathered little had no lack: they\ngathered every man according to his eating\u201d (Exod. xvi. 18). This is\nthe rule at all times and in all places; no notice should be taken of\nexceptional cases, as we have explained.\n\nIn these two ways you will see the mercy of God toward His creatures,\nhow He has provided that which is required, in proper proportions, and\ntreated all individual beings of the same species with perfect\nequality. In accordance with this correct reflection the chief of the\nwise men says, \u201cAll his ways are judgment\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 4); David\nlikewise says: \u201cAll the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth\u201d (Ps.\nxxv. 10); he also says expressly, \u201cThe Lord is good to all; and his\ntender mercies are over all his works\u201d (ibid. cxlv. 9); for it is an\nact of great and perfect goodness that He gave us existence; and the\ncreation of the controlling faculty in animals is a proof of His mercy\ntowards them, as has been shown by us.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nIntelligent persons are much perplexed when they inquire into the\npurpose of the Creation. I will now show how absurd this question is,\naccording to each one of the different theories [above-mentioned]. An\nagent that acts with intention must have a certain ulterior object in\nthat which he performs. This is evident, and no philosophical proof is\nrequired. It is likewise evident that that which is produced with\nintention has passed over from non-existence to existence. It is\nfurther evident, and generally agreed upon, that the being which has\nabsolute existence, which has never been and will never be without\nexistence, is not in need of an agent. We have explained this before.\nThe question, \u201cWhat is the purpose thereof?\u201d cannot be asked about\nanything which is not the product of an agent; therefore we cannot ask\nwhat is the purpose of the existence of God. He has not been created.\nAccording to these propositions it is clear that the purpose is sought\nfor everything produced intentionally by an intelligent cause; that is\nto say, a final cause must exist for everything that owes its existence\nto an intelligent being: but for that which is without a beginning, a\nfinal cause need not be sought, as has been stated by us. After this\nexplanation you will understand that there is no occasion to seek the\nfinal cause of the whole Universe, neither according to our theory of\nthe Creation, nor according to the theory of Aristotle, who assumes the\nEternity of the Universe. For according to Aristotle, who holds that\nthe Universe has not had a beginning, an ultimate final cause cannot be\nsought even for the various parts of the Universe. Thus it cannot be\nasked, according to his opinion, What is the final cause of the\nexistence of the heavens? Why are they limited by this measure or by\nthat number? Why is matter of this description? What is the purpose of\nthe existence of this species of animals or plants? Aristotle considers\nall this as the result of a permanent order of things. Natural\nPhilosophy investigates into the object of everything in Nature, but it\ndoes not treat of the ultimate final cause, of which we speak in this\nchapter. It is a recognized fact in Natural Philosophy that everything\nin Nature has its object, or its final cause, which is the most\nimportant of the four causes, though it is not easily recognized in\nmost species. Aristotle repeatedly says that Nature produces nothing in\nvain, for every natural action has a certain object. Thus, Aristotle\nsays that plants exist for animals; and similarly he shows of other\nparts of the Universe for what purpose they exist. This is still more\nobvious in the case of the organs of animals. The existence of such a\nfinal cause in the various parts of Nature has compelled philosophers\nto assume the existence of a primal cause apart from Nature; it is\ncalled by Aristotle the intellectual or divine cause, and this cause\ncreates one thing for the purpose of another. Those who acknowledge the\ntruth will accept as the best proof for the Creation the fact that\neverything in Nature serves a certain purpose, so that one thing exists\nfor the benefit of another; this fact is supported by numerous\ninstances, and shows that there is design in Nature; but the existence\nof design in Nature cannot be imagined unless it be assumed that Nature\nhas been produced.\n\nI will now return to the subject of this chapter, viz., the final\ncause. Aristotle has already explained that in Nature the efficient\ncause of a thing, its form, and its final cause are identical; that is\nto say, they are one thing in relation to the whole species. E.g., the\nform of Zeid produces the form of his son Amr; its action consists in\nimparting the form of the whole species [of man] to the substance of\nAmr, and the final cause is Amr\u2019s possession of human form. The same\nargument is applied by Aristotle to every individual member of a class\nof natural objects which is brought to existence by another individual\nmember. The three causes coincide in all such cases. All this refers\nonly to the immediate purpose of a thing; but the existence of an\nultimate purpose in every species, which is considered as absolutely\nnecessary by every one who investigates into the nature of things, is\nvery difficult to discover: and still more difficult is it to find the\npurpose of the whole Universe. I infer from the words of Aristotle that\naccording to his opinion the ultimate purpose of the genera is the\npreservation of the course of genesis and destruction; and this course\nis absolutely necessary [in the first instance] for the successive\nformation of material objects, because individual beings formed of\nmatter are not permanent; [secondly], for the production of the best\nand the most perfect beings that can be formed of matter, because the\nultimate purpose [in these productions] is to arrive at perfection. Now\nit is clear that man is the most perfect being formed of matter; he is\nthe last and most perfect of earthly beings, and in this respect it can\ntruly be said that all earthly things exist for man, i.e., that the\nchanges which things undergo serve to produce the most perfect being\nthat can be produced. Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity of the\nUniverse, need therefore not ask to what purpose does man exist, for\nthe immediate purpose of each individual being is, according to his\nopinion, the perfection of its specific form. Every individual thing\narrives at its perfection fully and completely when the actions that\nproduce its form are complete. The ultimate purpose of the species is\nthe perpetuation of this form by the repeated succession of genesis and\ndestruction, so that there might always be a being capable of the\ngreatest possible perfection. It seems therefore clear that, according\nto Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity of the Universe, there is no\noccasion for the question what is the object of the existence of the\nUniverse. But of those who accept our theory that the whole Universe\nhas been created from nothing, some hold that the inquiry after the\npurpose of the Creation is necessary, and assume that the Universe was\nonly created for the sake of man\u2019s existence, that he might serve God.\nEverything that is done they believe is done for man\u2019s sake; even the\nspheres move only for his benefit, in order that his wants might be\nsupplied. The literal meaning of some passages in the books of the\nprophets greatly support this idea. Comp. \u201cHe formed it (viz., the\nearth) to be inhabited\u201d (Isa. xlv. 18); \u201cIf my covenant of day and\nnight were not,\u201d etc. (Jer. xxxiii. 25); \u201cAnd spreadeth them out as a\ntent to dwell in\u201d (Isa. xl. 22). If the sphere existed for the sake of\nman, how much more must this be the case with all other living beings\nand the plants. On examining this opinion as intelligent persons ought\nto examine all different opinions, we shall discover the errors it\nincludes. Those who hold this view, namely, that the existence of man\nis the object of the whole creation, may be asked whether God could\nhave created man without those previous creations, or whether man could\nonly have come into existence after the creation of all other things.\nIf they answer in the affirmative, that man could have been created\neven if, e.g., the heavens did not exist, they will be asked what is\nthe object of all these things, since they do not exist for their own\nsake but for the sake of something that could exist without them? Even\nif the Universe existed for man\u2019s sake and man existed for the purpose\nof serving God, as has been mentioned, the question remains, What is\nthe end of serving God? He does not become more perfect if all His\ncreatures serve Him and comprehend Him as far as possible; nor would He\nlose anything if nothing existed beside Him. It might perhaps be\nreplied that the service of God is not intended for God\u2019s perfection;\nit is intended for our own perfection,\u2014it is good for us, it makes us\nperfect. But then the question might be repeated, What is the object of\nour being perfect? We must in continuing the inquiry as to the purpose\nof the creation at last arrive at the answer, It was the Will of God,\nor His Wisdom decreed it; and this is the correct answer. The wise men\nin Israel have, therefore, introduced in our prayers (for Ne\u02bbilah of\nthe Day of Atonement) the following passage:\u2014\u201cThou hast distinguished\nman from the beginning, and chosen him to stand before Thee; who can\nsay unto Thee, What dost Thou? And if he be righteous, what does he\ngive Thee?\u201d They have thus clearly stated that it was not a final cause\nthat determined the existence of all things, but only His will. This\nbeing the case, we who believe in the Creation must admit that God\ncould have created the Universe in a different manner as regards the\ncauses and effects contained in it, and this would lead to the absurd\nconclusion that everything except man existed without any purpose, as\nthe principal object, man, could have been brought into existence\nwithout the rest of the creation. I consider therefore the following\nopinion as most correct according to the teaching of the Bible, and\nbest in accordance with the results of philosophy; namely, that the\nUniverse does not exist for man\u2019s sake, but that each being exists for\nits own sake, and not because of some other thing. Thus we believe in\nthe Creation, and yet need not inquire what purpose is served by each\nspecies of the existing things, because we assume that God created all\nparts of the Universe by His will; some for their own sake, and some\nfor the sake of other beings, that include their own purpose in\nthemselves. In the same manner as it was the will of God that man\nshould exist, so it was His will that the heavens with their stars\nshould exist, that there should be angels, and each of these beings is\nitself the purpose of its own existence. When anything can only exist\nprovided some other thing has previously existed, God has caused the\nlatter to precede it; as, e.g., sensation precedes comprehension. We\nmeet also with this view in Scripture: \u201cThe Lord hath made everything\n(la-ma\u02bbanehu) for its purpose\u201d (Prov. xvi. 4). It is possible that the\npronoun in la-maanehu refers to the object; but it can also be\nconsidered as agreeing with the subject; in which case the meaning of\nthe word is, for the sake of Himself, or His will which is identical\nwith His self [or essence], as has been shown in this treatise. We have\nalso pointed out that His essence is also called His glory. The words,\n\u201cThe Lord hath made everything for Himself,\u201d express therefore the same\nidea as the following verse, \u201cEverything that is called by my name: I\nhave created it for my glory, I have formed it; yea, I have made it\u201d\n(Isa. xliii. 7); that is to say, everything that is described as My\nwork has been made by Me for the sake of My will and for no other\npurpose. The words, \u201cI have formed it,\u201d \u201cI have made it,\u201d express\nexactly what I pointed out to you, that there are things whose\nexistence is only possible after certain other things have come into\nexistence. To these reference is made in the text, as if to say, I have\nformed the first thing which must have preceded the other things, e.g.,\nmatter has been formed before the production of material beings; I have\nthen made out of that previous creation, or after it, what I intended\nto produce, and there was nothing but My will. Study the book which\nleads all who want to be led to the truth, and is therefore called\nTorah (Law or Instruction), from the beginning of the account of the\nCreation to its end, and you will comprehend the opinion which we\nattempt to expound. For no part of the creation is described as being\nin existence for the sake of another part, but each part is declared to\nbe the product of God\u2019s will, and to satisfy by its existence the\nintention [of the Creator]. This is expressed by the phrase, \u201cAnd God\nsaw that it was good\u201d (Gen. i. 4, etc.). You know our interpretation of\nthe saying of our Sages, \u201cScripture speaks the same language as is\nspoken by man.\u201d But we call \u201cgood\u201d that which is in accordance with the\nobject we seek. When therefore Scripture relates in reference to the\nwhole creation (Gen. i. 31), \u201cAnd God saw all that He had made, and\nbehold it was exceedingly good,\u201d it declares thereby that everything\ncreated was well fitted for its object, and would never cease to act,\nand never be annihilated. This is especially pointed out by the word\n\u201cexceedingly\u201d; for sometimes a thing is temporarily good; it serves its\npurpose, and then it fails and ceases to act. But as regards the\nCreation it is said that everything was fit for its purpose, and able\ncontinually to act accordingly. You must not be misled by what is\nstated of the stars [that God put them in the firmament of the heavens]\nto give light upon the earth, and to rule by day and by night. You\nmight perhaps think that here the purpose of their creation is\ndescribed. This is not the case; we are only informed of the nature of\nthe stars, which God desired to create with such properties that they\nshould be able to give light and to rule. In a similar manner we must\nunderstand the passage, \u201cAnd have dominion over the fish of the sea\u201d\n(ibid. i. 28). Here it is not meant to say that man was created for\nthis purpose, but only that this was the nature which God gave man. But\nas to the statement in Scripture that God gave the plants to man and\nother living beings, it agrees with the opinion of Aristotle and other\nphilosophers. It is also reasonable to assume that the plants exist\nonly for the benefit of the animals, since the latter cannot live\nwithout food. It is different with the stars, they do not exist only\nfor our sake, that we should enjoy their good influence; for the\nexpressions \u201cto give light\u201d and \u201cto rule\u201d merely describe, as we have\nstated above, the benefit which the creatures on earth derive from\nthem. I have already explained to you the character of that influence\nthat causes continually the good to descend from one being to another.\nTo those who receive the good flowing down upon them, it may appear as\nif the being existed for them alone that sends forth its goodness and\nkindness unto them. Thus some citizen may imagine that it was for the\npurpose of protecting his house by night from thieves that the king was\nchosen. To some extent this is correct; for when his house is\nprotected, and he has derived this benefit through the king whom the\ncountry had chosen, it appears as if it were the object of the king to\nprotect the house of that man. In this manner we must explain every\nverse, the literal meaning of which would imply that something superior\nwas created for the sake of something inferior, viz., that it is part\nof the nature of the superior thing [to influence the inferior in a\ncertain manner]. We remain firm in our belief that the whole Universe\nwas created in accordance with the will of God, and we do not inquire\nfor any other cause or object. Just as we do not ask what is the\npurpose of God\u2019s existence, so we do not ask what was the object of His\nwill, which is the cause of the existence of all things with their\npresent properties, both those that have been created and those that\nwill be created.\n\nYou must not be mistaken and think that the spheres and the angels were\ncreated for our sake. Our position has already been pointed out to us,\n\u201cBehold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket\u201d (Isa. xl. 15). Now\ncompare your own essence with that of the spheres, the stars, and the\nIntelligences, and you will comprehend the truth, and understand that\nman is superior to everything formed of earthly matter, but not to\nother beings; he is found exceedingly inferior when his existence is\ncompared with that of the spheres, and a fortiori when compared with\nthat of the Intelligences. Comp. \u201cBehold, he putteth no trust in his\nservants: and his messengers he charged with folly: how much less in\nthem that dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust,\nwhich are crushed before the moth?\u201d (Job iv. 18, 19). The expression\n\u201chis servants,\u201d occurring in this passage, does not denote human\nbeings; this may be inferred from the words, \u201cHow much less in them\nthat dwell in houses of clay?\u201d The \u201cservants\u201d referred to in this place\nare the angels; whilst by the term \u201chis messengers\u201d the spheres are\nundoubtedly meant. Eliphas himself, who uttered the above words,\nexplains this [in the second speech] when he refers to it in one of his\nreplies in other words, saying, \u201cBehold, he putteth no trust in his\nholy ones; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight, how much more\nabominable and filthy is man, who drinketh iniquity like water\u201d (ibid.\nxv. 15, 16). He thus shows that \u201chis servants\u201d and \u201chis holy ones\u201d are\nidentical, and that they are not human beings; also that \u201chis\nmessengers,\u201d mentioned in the first passage, are the same as \u201cthe\nheavens.\u201d The term \u201cfolly\u201d is explained by the phrase \u201cthey are not\nclean in his sight,\u201d i.e., they are material; although their substance\nis the purest and the most luminous, compared with the Intelligences it\nappears dark, turbid, and impure. The phrase, \u201cBehold, he putteth no\ntrust in his servants,\u201d is employed in reference to the angels,\nindicating that these do not possess perpetual existence, since, as we\nbelieve, they have had a beginning; and even according to those who\nassume the Eternity of the Universe, the existence of the angels is at\nall events dependent on and therefore inferior to, the absolute\nexistence of God. The words, \u201cHow much more abominable and filthy is\nman,\u201d in the one passage, correspond to the phrase \u201cHow much less in\nthose who dwell in houses of clay\u201d in the other passage. Their meaning\nis this: How much less in man who is abominable and filthy, in whose\nperson crookedness or corporeality is mixed up and spread through all\nhis parts. \u201cIniquity\u201d (\u02bbavlah) is identical with \u201ccrookedness,\u201d as may\nbe inferred from the passage, \u201cIn the land of uprightness he will act\nwith iniquity\u201d (Isa. xxvi. 10), and ish, \u201cman,\u201d is here used in the\nsame sense as adam, \u201chuman being\u201d; for \u201cman\u201d in a general sense is\nsometimes expressed in Scripture by ish. Comp. \u201cHe who smiteth a man\n(ish) and he die\u201d (Exod. xxi. 12).\n\nThis must be our belief when we have a correct knowledge of our own\nself, and comprehend the true nature of everything; we must be content,\nand not trouble our mind with seeking a certain final cause for things\nthat have none, or have no other final cause but their own existence,\nwhich depends on the Will of God, or, if you prefer, on the Divine\nWisdom.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nIn order to obtain a correct estimate of ourselves, we must reflect on\nthe results of the investigations which have been made into the\ndimensions and the distances of the spheres and the stars. The\ndistances are clearly stated in radii of the earth, and are well known,\nsince the circumference and the radius of the earth are known. It has\nbeen proved that the distance between the centre of the earth and the\nouter surface of the sphere of Saturn is a journey of nearly eight\nthousand seven hundred solar years. Suppose a day\u2019s journey to be forty\nlegal miles of two thousand ordinary cubits, and consider the great and\nenormous distance! or in the words of Scripture, \u201cIs not God in the\nheight of heaven? and behold the height of the stars, how high they\nare!\u201d (Job xxii. 12); that is to say, learn from the height of the\nheavens how far we are from comprehending God, for there is an enormous\ndistance between ourselves and these corporeal objects, and the latter\nare greatly distinguished from us by their position, and hidden from us\nas regards their essence and most of their actions. How much more\nincomprehensible therefore is their Maker, who is incorporeal! The\ngreat distance which has been proved is, in fact, the least that can be\nassumed. The distance between the centre of the earth and the surface\nof the sphere of the fixed stars can by no means be less, but it may\npossibly be many times as great; for the measure of the thickness of\nthe body of the spheres has not been proved, and the least possible has\nbeen assumed, as appears from the treatises On the Distances. The same\nis the case with the substances which are between every two spheres.\nAccording to logical inference, as has been mentioned by Thabit, the\nthickness of these substances cannot be accurately stated, since they\ndo not contain any star, which might serve as a means of obtaining it.\nAs to the thickness of the sphere of the fixed stars, it is at least\nfour years\u2019 journey, as may be inferred from the measure of the stars\ncontained in the sphere. The body of each of these stars is more than\nninety times as big as the globe of the earth, and it is possible that\nthe thickness of the sphere is still greater. Of the ninth sphere, that\ncauses the daily revolution of the whole system of spheres, we do not\nknow the dimensions; it contains no stars, and therefore we have no\nmeans of finding out its magnitude. Now consider the enormous\ndimensions and the large number of these material beings. If the whole\nearth is infinitely small in comparison with the sphere of the stars,\nwhat is man compared with all these created beings! How, then, could\nany one of us imagine that these things exist for his sake and benefit,\nand that they are his tools! This is the result of an examination of\nthe corporeal beings: how much more so will this be the result of an\nexamination into the nature of the Intelligences!\n\nThe following question may be asked against the opinion of philosophers\non this subject: There is no doubt that from a philosophical point of\nview it would be a mistake to assume that the spheres exist for the\npurpose of regulating the fate of one individual person or community;\nbut it is not absurd to think that they serve to regulate the affairs\nof mankind, since these mighty individual beings would serve to give\nexistence to the individual members of the species, the number of\nwhich, according to the philosophers, will never come to an end. We can\nbest illustrate this by the following simile: An artisan makes iron\ntools of a hundred-weight for the purpose of making a small needle of\nthe weight of a grain. If only one needle had to be produced, we admit\nthat it would certainly be bad management, though it would not be\nentirely a failure; but if with those enormous tools needle after\nneedle is produced, even many hundred-weights of needles, the\npreparation of those tools would be a wise act and excellent\nmanagement. In a similar manner the object of the spheres may be the\ncontinuance of successive genesis and destruction; and the succession\nof genesis and destruction serves, as has already been said, to give\nexistence to mankind. This idea is supported by Biblical texts and\nsayings [of our Sages]. The philosopher replies thus: If the difference\nbetween the heavenly bodies and the transient individual members of the\nspecies consisted in their different sizes, this opinion could be\nmaintained; but as the difference consists in their essence, it remains\nimprobable that the superior beings should be the means of giving\nexistence to the lower ones. In short, this question supports our\nbelief in the Creation; and this is the principal object of this\nchapter. [It serves] besides [a second purpose]. I frequently hear from\nthose who know something about astronomy, that our Sages exaggerated\nthe distances [of the heavenly bodies] when they said that the\nthickness of each sphere is five hundred years\u2019 journey; the distance\nof the seven spheres from each other five hundred years\u2019 journey, so\nthat the distance of the outer surface of the seventh sphere from the\ncentre of the earth is seven thousand years\u2019 journey. Those who hear\nsuch statements consider them [at first thought] as exaggeration, and\nbelieve that the distance is not so great. But you may ascertain from\nthe data proved in scientific treatises on the distances, that the\ncentre of the earth is distant from the inner surface of the seventh\nsphere, that of Saturn, nearly seven thousand and twenty-four years\u2019\njourney. The number eight thousand and seven hundred given by us,\nrefers to the distance of the centre of the earth from the inner\nsurface of the eighth sphere. The distance of the spheres from each\nother, mentioned by astronomers, is identical with the thickness of the\nsubstance that intervenes between one sphere and the other, and does\nnot imply that there is a vacuum. You must, however, not expect that\neverything our Sages say respecting astronomical matters should agree\nwith observation, for mathematics were not fully developed in those\ndays; and their statements were not based on the authority of the\nProphets, but on the knowledge which they either themselves possessed\nor derived from contemporary men of science. But I will not on that\naccount denounce what they say correctly in accordance with real fact,\nas untrue or accidentally true. On the contrary, whenever the words of\na person can be interpreted in such a manner that they agree with fully\nestablished facts, it is the duty of every educated and honest man to\ndo so.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nThat which is impossible has a permanent and constant property, which\nis not the result of some agent, and cannot in any way change, and\nconsequently we do not ascribe to God the power of doing what is\nimpossible. No thinking man denies the truth of this maxim; none ignore\nit, but such as have no idea of Logic. There is, however, a difference\nof opinion among philosophers with reference to the existence of any\nparticular thing. Some of them consider its existence to be impossible,\nand hold that God cannot produce the thing in question, whilst others\nthink that it is possible, and that God can create it if He pleases to\ndo so. E.g., all philosophers consider that it is impossible for one\nsubstratum to have at the same moment two opposite properties, or for\nthe elementary components of a thing, substance and accident, to\ninterchange, so that the substance becomes accident, and the accident\nbecomes substance, or for a material substance to be without accident.\nLikewise it is impossible that God should produce a being like Himself,\nor annihilate, corporify, or change Himself. The power of God is not\nassumed to extend to any of these impossibilities. But the existence of\naccidents independent of substance is possible according to one class\nof philosophers, the Mutazilah, whilst according to others it is\nimpossible; it must, however, be added that those who admit the\nexistence of an accident independent of substance, have not arrived at\nthis conclusion by philosophical research alone; but it was mainly by\nthe desire to defend certain religious principles, which speculation\nhad greatly shaken, that they had recourse to this theory. In a similar\nmanner the creation of corporeal things, otherwise than from a\nsubstance, is possible according to our view, whilst the philosophers\nsay that it is impossible. Again, whilst philosophers say that it is\nimpossible to produce a square with a diagonal equal to one of the\nsides, or a solid angle that includes four right angles, or similar\nthings, it is thought possible by some persons who are ignorant of\nmathematics, and who only know the words of these propositions, but\nhave no idea of that which is expressed by them. I wonder whether this\ngate of research is open, so that all may freely enter, and whilst one\nimagines a thing and considers it possible, another is at liberty to\nassert that such a thing is impossible by its very nature; or whether\nthe gate is closed and guarded by certain rules, so that we are able to\ndecide with certainty whether a thing is physically impossible. I\nshould also like to know, in the latter case, whether imagination or\nreason has to examine and test objects as to their being possible or\nnot; likewise how things imagined, and things conceived intellectually,\nare to be distinguished from each other. For it occurs that we consider\na thing as physically possible, and then some one objects, or we\nourselves fear that our opinion is only the result of imagination, and\nnot that of reason. In such a case it would be desirable to ascertain\nwhether there exists some faculty to distinguish between imagination\nand intellect, [and if so,] whether this faculty is different from\nboth, or whether it is part of the intellect itself to distinguish\nbetween intellectual and imaginary objects. All this requires\ninvestigation, but it does not belong to the theme of this chapter.\n\nWe have thus shown that according to each one of the different theories\nthere are things which are impossible, whose existence cannot be\nadmitted, and whose creation is excluded from the power of God, and the\nassumption that God does not change their nature does not imply\nweakness in God, or a limit to His power. Consequently things\nimpossible remain impossible, and do not depend on the action of an\nagent. It is now clear that a difference of opinion exists only as to\nthe question to which of the two classes a thing belongs; whether to\nthe class of the impossible, or to that of the possible. Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nThe philosophers have uttered very perverse ideas as regards God\u2019s\nOmniscience of everything beside Himself; they have stumbled in such a\nmanner that they cannot rise again, nor can those who adopt their\nviews. I will further on tell you the doubts that led them to these\nperverse utterances on this question; and I will also tell you the\nopinion which is taught by our religion, and which differs from the\nevil and wrong principles of the philosophers as regards God\u2019s\nOmniscience.\n\nThe principal reason that first induced the philosophers to adopt their\ntheory is this: at first thought we notice an absence of system in\nhuman affairs. Some pious men live a miserable and painful life, whilst\nsome wicked people enjoy a happy and pleasant life. On this account the\nphilosophers assumed as possible the cases which you will now hear.\nThey said that only one of two things is possible, either God is\nignorant of the individual or particular things on earth, and does not\nperceive them, or He perceives and knows them. These are all the cases\npossible. They then continued thus: If He perceives and knows all\nindividual things, one of the following three cases must take place:\n(1) God arranges and manages human affairs well, perfectly and\nfaultlessly; (2) He is overcome by obstacles, and is too weak and\npowerless to manage human affairs; (3) He knows [all things] and can\narrange and manage them, but leaves and abandons them, as too base,\nlow, and vile, or from jealousy; as we may also notice among ourselves\nsome who are able to make another person happy, well knowing what he\nwants for his happiness, and still in consequence of their evil\ndisposition, their wickedness and jealousy against him, they do not\nhelp him to his happiness.\u2014This is likewise a complete enumeration of\nall possible cases. For those who have a knowledge of a certain thing\nnecessarily either (1) take care of the thing which they know, and\nmanage it, or (2) neglect it (as we, e.g., neglect and forget the cats\nin our house, or things of less importance); or (3) while taking care\nof it, have not sufficient power and strength for its management,\nalthough they have the will to do so. Having enumerated these different\ncases, the philosophers emphatically decided that of the three cases\npossible [as regards the management of a thing by one who knows that\nthing], two are inadmissible in reference to God\u2014viz., want of power,\nor absence of will; because they imply either evil disposition or\nweakness, neither of which can by any means be attributed to Him.\nConsequently there remains only the alternative that God is altogether\nignorant of human affairs, or that He knows them and manages them well.\nSince we, however, notice that events do not follow a certain order,\nthat they cannot be determined by analogy, and are not in accordance\nwith what is wanted, we conclude that God has no knowledge of them in\nany way or for any reason. This is the argument which led the\nphilosophers to speak such blasphemous words. In the treatise On\nProvidence, by Alexander Aphrodisiensis, you will find the same as I\nhave said about the different views of the philosophers, and as I have\nstated as to the source of their error.\n\nYou must notice with surprise that the evil into which these\nphilosophers have fallen is greater than that from which they sought to\nescape, and that they ignore the very thing which they constantly\npointed out and explained to us. They have fallen into a greater evil\nthan that from which they sought to escape, because they refuse to say\nthat God neglects or forgets a thing, and yet they maintain that His\nknowledge is imperfect, that He is ignorant of what is going on here on\nearth, that He does not perceive it. They also ignore, what they\nconstantly point out to us, in as much as they judge the whole universe\nby that which befalls individual men, although, according to their own\nview, frequently stated and explained, the evils of man originate in\nhimself, or form part of his material nature. We have already discussed\nthis sufficiently. After having laid this foundation, which is the ruin\nof all good principles, and destroys the majesty of all true knowledge,\nthey sought to remove the opprobrium by declaring that for many reasons\nit is impossible that God should have a knowledge of earthly things,\nfor the individual members of a species can only be perceived by the\nsenses, and not by reason; but God does not perceive by means of any of\nthe senses. Again, the individuals are infinite, but knowledge\ncomprehends and circumscribes the object of its action, and the\ninfinite cannot be comprehended or circumscribed; furthermore,\nknowledge of individual beings, that are subject to change,\nnecessitates some change in him who possesses it, because this\nknowledge itself changes constantly. They have also raised the\nfollowing two objections against those who hold, in accordance with the\nteaching of Scripture, that God knows things before they come into\nexistence. First, this theory implies that there can be knowledge of a\nthing that does not exist at all; secondly, it leads to the conclusion\nthat the knowledge of an object in potentia is identical with the\nknowledge of that same object in reality. They have indeed come to very\nevil conclusions, and some of them assumed that God only knows the\nspecies, not the individual beings, whilst others went as far as to\ncontend that God knows nothing beside Himself, because they believe\nthat God cannot have more than one knowledge.\n\nSome of the great philosophers who lived before Aristotle agree with\nus, that God knows everything, and that nothing is hidden from Him.\nAlexander also refers to them in the above-mentioned treatise; he\ndiffers from them, and says that the principal objection against this\ntheory is based on the fact that we clearly see evils befalling good\nmen, and wicked men enjoying happiness.\n\nIn short, you see that if these philosophers would find human affairs\nmanaged according to rules laid down by the common people, they would\nnot venture or presume to speak on this subject. They are only led to\nthis speculation because they examine the affairs of the good and the\nwicked, and consider them as being contrary to all rule, and say in the\nwords of the foolish in our nation, \u201cThe way of the Lord is not right\u201d\n(Ezek. xxxiii. 17).\n\nAfter having shown that knowledge and Providence are connected with\neach other, I will now proceed to expound the opinions of thinkers on\nProvidence, and then I shall attempt to remove their doubts as to God\u2019s\nknowledge of individual beings.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nThere are four different theories concerning Divine Providence; they\nare all ancient, known since the time of the Prophets, when the true\nLaw was revealed to enlighten these dark regions.\n\nFirst Theory.\u2014There is no Providence at all for anything in the\nUniverse; all parts of the Universe, the heavens and what they contain,\nowe their origin to accident and chance; there exists no being that\nrules and governs them or provides for them. This is the theory of\nEpicurus, who assumes also that the Universe consists of atoms, that\nthese have combined by chance, and have received their various forms by\nmere accident. There have been atheists among the Israelites who have\nexpressed the same view; it is reported of them: \u201cThey have denied the\nLord, and said he is not\u201d (Jer. v. 12). Aristotle has proved the\nabsurdity of the theory, that the whole Universe could have originated\nby chance; he has shown that, on the contrary, there is a being that\nrules and governs the Universe. We have already touched upon this\nsubject in the present treatise.\n\nSecond Theory.\u2014Whilst one part of the Universe owes its existence to\nProvidence, and is under the control of a ruler and governor, another\npart is abandoned and left to chance. This is the view of Aristotle\nabout Providence, and I will now explain to you his theory. He holds\nthat God controls the spheres and what they contain: therefore the\nindividual beings in the spheres remain permanently in the same form.\nAlexander has also expressed it in his writings that Divine Providence\nextends down to, and ends with, the sphere of the moon. This view\nresults from his theory of the Eternity of the Universe; he believes\nthat Providence is in accordance with the nature of the Universe:\nconsequently in the case of the spheres with their contents, where each\nindividual being has a permanent existence, Providence gives permanency\nand constancy. From the existence of the spheres other beings derive\nexistence, which are constant in their species but not in their\nindividuals: in the same manner it is said that Providence sends forth\n[from the spheres to the earth] sufficient influence to secure the\nimmortality and constancy of the species, without securing at the same\ntime permanence for the individual beings of the species. But the\nindividual beings in each species have not been entirely abandoned,\nthat portion of the materia prima which has been purified and refined,\nand has received the faculty of growth, is endowed with properties that\nenable it to exist a certain time, to attract what is useful and to\nrepel what is useless. That portion of the materia prima which has been\nsubject to a further development, and has received the faculty of\nsensation, is endowed with other properties for its protection and\npreservation; it has a new faculty of moving freely toward that which\nis conducive to, and away from that which is contrary to its\nwell-being. Each individual being received besides such properties as\nare required for the preservation of the species to which it belongs.\nThe portion of the materia prima which is still more refined, and is\nendowed with the intellectual faculty, possesses a special property by\nwhich each individual, according to the degree of his perfection, is\nenabled to manage, to calculate, and to discover what is conducive both\nto the temporary existence of the individual and to the preservation of\nthe species. All other movements, however, which are made by the\nindividual members of each species are due to accident; they are not,\naccording to Aristotle, the result of rule and management; e.g., when a\nstorm or gale blows, it causes undoubtedly some leaves of a tree to\ndrop, breaks off some branches of another tree, tears away a stone from\na heap of stones, raises dust over herbs and spoils them, and stirs up\nthe sea so that a ship goes down with the whole or part of her\ncontents. Aristotle sees no difference between the falling of a leaf or\na stone and the death of the good and noble people in the ship; nor\ndoes he distinguish between the destruction of a multitude of ants\ncaused by an ox depositing on them his excrement and the death of\nworshippers killed by the fall of the house when its foundations give\nway; nor does he discriminate between the case of a cat killing a mouse\nthat happens to come in her way, or that of a spider catching a fly,\nand that of a hungry lion meeting a prophet and tearing him. In short,\nthe opinion of Aristotle is this: Everything is the result of\nmanagement which is constant, which does not come to an end and does\nnot change any of its properties, as e.g., the heavenly beings, and\neverything which continues according to a certain rule, and deviates\nfrom it only rarely and exceptionally, as is the case in objects of\nNature. All these are the result of management, i.e., in a close\nrelation to Divine Providence. But that which is not constant, and does\nnot follow a certain rule, as e.g., incidents in the existence of the\nindividual beings in each species of plants or animals, whether\nrational or irrational, is due to chance and not to management; it is\nin no relation to Divine Providence. Aristotle holds that it is even\nimpossible to ascribe to Providence the management of these things.\nThis view is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity of the\nUniverse, and with his opinion that everything different from the\nexisting order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of\nthose who turned away from our Law, and said: \u201cGod hath forsaken the\nearth\u201d (Ezek. ix. 9).\n\nThird Theory.\u2014This theory is the reverse of the second. According to\nthis theory, there is nothing in the whole Universe, neither a class\nnor an individual being, that is due to chance; everything is the\nresult of will, intention, and rule. It is a matter of course that he\nwho rules must know [that which is under his control]. The Mohammedan\nAshariyah adhere to this theory, notwithstanding evident absurdities\nimplied in it; for they admit that Aristotle is correct in assuming one\nand the same cause [viz., the wind] for the fall of leaves [from the\ntree] and for the death of a man [drowned in the sea]. But they hold at\nthe same time that the wind did not blow by chance; it is God that\ncaused it to move; it is not therefore the wind that caused the leaves\nto fall; each leaf falls according to the Divine decree; it is God who\ncaused it to fall at a certain time and in a certain place; it could\nnot have fallen before or after that time or in another place, as this\nhas previously been decreed. The Ashariyah were therefore compelled to\nassume that motion and rest of living beings are predestined, and that\nit is not in the power of man to do a certain thing or to leave it\nundone. The theory further implies a denial of possibility in these\nthings; they can only be either necessary or impossible. The followers\nof this theory accepted also the last-mentioned proposition, and say,\nthat we call certain things possible, as e.g., the facts that Zeid\nstands, and that Amr is coming; but they are only possible for us,\nwhilst in their relation to God they cannot be called possible; they\nare either necessary or impossible. It follows also from this theory,\nthat precepts are perfectly useless, since the people to whom any law\nis given are unable to do anything: they can neither do what they are\ncommanded nor abstain from what they are forbidden. The supporters of\nthis theory hold that it was the will of God to send prophets, to\ncommand, to forbid, to promise, and to threaten, although we have no\npower [over our actions]. A duty would thus be imposed upon us which is\nimpossible for us to carry out, and it is even possible that we may\nsuffer punishment when obeying the command and receive reward when\ndisobeying it. According to this theory, it must also be assumed that\nthe actions of God have no final cause. All these absurdities are\nadmitted by the Ashariyah for the purpose of saving this theory. When\nwe see a person born blind or leprous, who could not have merited a\npunishment for previous sins, they say, It is the will of God; when a\npious worshipper is tortured and slain, it is likewise the will of God;\nand no injustice can be asserted to Him for that, for according to\ntheir opinion it is proper that God should afflict the innocent and do\ngood to the sinner. Their views on these matters are well known.\n\nFourth Theory.\u2014Man has free will; it is therefore intelligible that the\nLaw contains commands and prohibitions, with announcements of reward\nand punishment. All acts of God are due to wisdom; no injustice is\nfound in Him, and He does not afflict the good. The Mu\u2019tazila profess\nthis theory, although they do not believe in man\u2019s absolute free will.\nThey hold also that God takes notice of the falling of the leaf and the\ndestruction of the ant, and that His Providence extends over all\nthings. This theory likewise implies contradictions and absurdities.\nThe absurdities are these: The fact that some persons are born with\ndefects, although they have not sinned previously, is ascribed to the\nwisdom of God, it being better for those persons to be in such a\ncondition than to be in a normal state, though we do not see why it is\nbetter; and they do not suffer thereby any punishment at all, but, on\nthe contrary, enjoy God\u2019s goodness. In a similar manner the slaughter\nof the pious is explained as being for them the source of an increase\nof reward in future life. They go even further in their absurdities. We\nask them why is God only just to man and not to other beings, and how\nhas the irrational animal sinned, that it is condemned to be\nslaughtered? and they reply it is good for the animal, for it will\nreceive reward for it in the world to come; also the flea and the louse\nwill there receive compensation for their untimely death: the same\nreasoning they apply to the mouse torn by a cat or vulture; the wisdom\nof God decreed this for the mouse, in order to reward it after death\nfor the mishap. I do not consider it proper to blame the followers of\nany of the [last named] three theories on Providence, for they have\nbeen driven to accept them by weighty considerations. Aristotle was\nguided by that which appears to be the nature of things. The Ashariyah\nrefused to ascribe to God ignorance about anything, and to say that God\nwhilst knowing one individual being or one portion of the Universe is\nignorant of another portion; they preferred to admit the\nabove-mentioned absurdities. The Mu\u2019tazilites refused to assume that\nGod does what is wrong and unjust; on the other hand, they would not\ncontradict common sense and say that it was not wrong to inflict pain\non the guiltless, or that the mission of the Prophets and the giving of\nthe Law had no intelligible reason. They likewise preferred to admit\nthe above-named absurdities. But they even contradicted themselves,\nbecause they believe on the one hand that God knows everything, and on\nthe other that man has free will. By a little consideration we discover\nthe contradiction.\n\nFifth Theory.\u2014This is our theory, or that of our Law. I will show you\n[first] the view expressed on this subject in our prophetical books,\nand generally accepted by our Sages. I will then give the opinion of\nsome later authors among us, and lastly, I will explain my own belief.\nThe theory of man\u2019s perfectly free will is one of the fundamental\nprinciples of the Law of our Teacher Moses, and of those who follow the\nLaw. According to this principle man does what is in his power to do,\nby his nature, his choice, and his will; and his action is not due to\nany faculty created for the purpose. All species of irrational animals\nlikewise move by their own free will. This is the Will of God; that is\nto say, it is due to the eternal divine will that all living beings\nshould move freely, and that man should have power to act according to\nhis will or choice within the limits of his capacity. Against this\nprinciple we hear, thank God, no opposition on the part of our nation.\nAnother fundamental principle taught by the Law of Moses is this: Wrong\ncannot be ascribed to God in any way whatever; all evils and\nafflictions as well as all kinds of happiness of man, whether they\nconcern one individual person or a community, are distributed according\nto justice; they are the result of strict judgment that admits no wrong\nwhatever. Even when a person suffers pain in consequence of a thorn\nhaving entered into his hand, although it is at once drawn out, it is a\npunishment that has been inflicted on him [for sin], and the least\npleasure he enjoys is a reward [for some good action]; all this is\nmeted out by strict justice; as is said in Scripture, \u201call his ways are\njudgment\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 4); we are only ignorant of the working of that\njudgment.\n\nThe different theories are now fully explained to you; everything in\nthe varying human affairs is due to chance, according to Aristotle, to\nthe Divine Will alone according to the Ashariyah, to Divine Wisdom\naccording to the Mu\u2019tazilites, to the merits of man according to our\nopinion. It is therefore possible, according to the Ashariyah, that God\ninflicts pain on a good and pious man in this world, and keeps him for\never in fire, which is assumed to rage in the world to come; they\nsimply say it is the Will of God. The Mu\u2019tazilites would consider this\nas injustice, and therefore assume that every being, even an ant, that\nis stricken with pain [in this world], has compensation for it, as has\nbeen mentioned above; and it is due to God\u2019s Wisdom that a being is\nstruck and afflicted in order to receive compensation. We, however,\nbelieve that all these human affairs are managed with justice; far be\nit from God to do wrong, to punish any one unless the punishment is\nnecessary and merited. It is distinctly stated in the Law, that all is\ndone in accordance with justice; and the words of our Sages generally\nexpress the same idea. They clearly say: \u201cThere is no death without\nsin, no sufferings without transgression.\u201d (B. T. Shabbath, 55a.)\nAgain, \u201cThe deserts of man are meted out to him in the same measure\nwhich he himself employs.\u201d (Mish. Sotah, i. 7.) These are the words of\nthe Mishnah. Our Sages declare it wherever opportunity is given, that\nthe idea of God necessarily implies justice; that He will reward the\nmost pious for all their pure and upright actions, although no direct\ncommandment was given them through a prophet; and that He will punish\nall the evil deeds of men, although they have not been prohibited by a\nprophet, if common sense warns against them, as e.g., injustice and\nviolence. Thus our Sages say: \u201cGod does not deprive any being of the\nfull reward [of its good deed]\u201d (B. T. Pes. 118a) again, \u201cHe who says\nthat God remits part of a punishment, will be punished severely; He is\nlong-suffering, but is sure to exact payment.\u201d (B. T. Baba K. 50a.)\nAnother saying is this: \u201cHe who has received a commandment and acts\naccordingly is not like him who acts in the same manner without being\ncommanded to do so\u201d (B. T. Kidd. 31a); and it is distinctly added that\nhe who does a good thing without being commanded, receives nevertheless\nhis reward. The same principle is expressed in all sayings of our\nSages. But they contain an additional doctrine which is not found in\nthe Law; viz., the doctrine of \u201cafflictions of love,\u201d as taught by some\nof our Sages. According to this doctrine it is possible that a person\nbe afflicted without having previously committed any sin, in order that\nhis future reward may be increased; a view which is held by the\nMu\u2019tazilites, but is not supported by any Scriptural text. Be not\nmisled by the accounts of trials, such as \u201cGod tried Abraham\u201d (Gen.\nxxii. 1); \u201cHe afflicted thee and made thee hungry,\u201d etc. (Deut. viii.\n3); for you will hear more on this subject later on (chap. xxiv.). Our\nLaw is only concerned with the relations of men; but the idea that\nirrational living beings should receive a reward, has never before been\nheard of in our nation; the wise men mentioned in the Talmud do not\nnotice it; only some of the later Geonim were pleased with it when they\nheard it from the sect of the Mu\u2019tazilites, and accepted it.\n\nMy opinion on this principle of Divine Providence I will now explain to\nyou. In the principle which I now proceed to expound I do not rely on\ndemonstrative proof, but on my conception of the spirit of the Divine\nLaw, and the writings of the Prophets. The principle which I accept is\nfar less open to objections, and is more reasonable than the opinions\nmentioned before. It is this: In the lower or sublunary portion of the\nUniverse Divine Providence does not extend to the individual members of\nspecies except in the case of mankind. It is only in this species that\nthe incidents in the existence of the individual beings, their good and\nevil fortunes, are the result of justice, in accordance with the words,\n\u201cFor all His ways are judgment.\u201d But I agree with Aristotle as regards\nall other living beings, and \u00e0 fortiori as regards plants and all the\nrest of earthly creatures. For I do not believe that it is through the\ninterference of Divine Providence that a certain leaf drops [from a\ntree], nor do I hold that when a certain spider catches a certain fly,\nthat this is the direct result of a special decree and will of God in\nthat moment; it is not by a particular Divine decree that the spittle\nof a certain person moved, fell on a certain gnat in a certain place,\nand killed it; nor is it by the direct will of God that a certain fish\ncatches and swallows a certain worm on the surface of the water. In all\nthese cases the action is, according to my opinion, entirely due to\nchance, as taught by Aristotle. Divine Providence is connected with\nDivine intellectual influence, and the same beings which are benefited\nby the latter so as to become intellectual, and to comprehend things\ncomprehensible to rational beings, are also under the control of Divine\nProvidence, which examines all their deeds in order to reward or punish\nthem. It may be by mere chance that a ship goes down with all her\ncontents, as in the above-mentioned instance, or the roof of a house\nfalls upon those within; but it is not due to chance, according to our\nview, that in the one instance the men went into the ship, or remained\nin the house in the other instance; it is due to the will of God, and\nis in accordance with the justice of His judgments, the method of which\nour mind is incapable of understanding. I have been induced to accept\nthis theory by the circumstance that I have not met in any of the\nprophetical books with a description of God\u2019s Providence otherwise than\nin relation to human beings. The prophets even express their surprise\nthat God should take notice of man, who is too little and too\nunimportant to be worthy of the attention of the Creator; how, then,\nshould other living creatures be considered as proper objects for\nDivine Providence! Comp. \u201cWhat is man, that thou takest knowledge of\nhim?\u201d (Ps. cxliv. 3); \u201cWhat is man, that thou art mindful of him?\u201d\n(ibid. viii. 8). It is clearly expressed in many Scriptural passages\nthat God provides for all men, and controls all their deeds\u2014e.g., \u201cHe\nfashioneth their hearts alike, he considereth all their works\u201d (ibid.\nxxxiii. 15); \u201cFor thine eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of\nmen, to give every one according to his ways\u201d (Jer. xxxii. 19). Again:\n\u201cFor his eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings\u201d\n(Job xxxii. 21). In the Law there occur instances of the fact that men\nare governed by God, and that their actions are examined by him. Comp.\n\u201cIn the day when I visit I will visit their sin upon them\u201d (Exod.\nxxxii. 34); \u201cI will even appoint over you terror\u201d (Lev. xxvi. 16);\n\u201cWhosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book\u201d\n(Exod. xxxii. 33); \u201cThe same soul will I destroy\u201d (Lev. xxiii. 30); \u201cI\nwill even set my face against that soul\u201d (ibid. xx. 6). There are many\ninstances of this kind. All that is mentioned of the history of\nAbraham, Isaac, and Jacob is a perfect proof that Divine Providence\nextends to every man individually. But the condition of the individual\nbeings of other living creatures is undoubtedly the same as has been\nstated by Aristotle. On that account it is allowed, even commanded, to\nkill animals; we are permitted to use them according to our pleasure.\nThe view that other living beings are only governed by Divine\nProvidence in the way described by Aristotle, is supported by the words\nof the Prophet Habakkuk. When he perceived the victories of\nNebuchadnezzar, and saw the multitude of those slain by him, he said,\n\u201cO God, it is as if men were abandoned, neglected, and unprotected like\nfish and like worms of the earth.\u201d He thus shows that these classes are\nabandoned. This is expressed in the following passage: \u201cAnd makest men\nas the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler\nover them. They take up all of them with the angle,\u201d etc. (Hab. i. 14,\n15). The prophet then declares that such is not the case; for the\nevents referred to are not the result of abandonment, forsaking, and\nabsence of Providence, but are intended as a punishment for the people,\nwho well deserved all that befell them. He therefore says: \u201cO Lord,\nThou hast ordained them for judgment, and O mighty God, Thou hast\nestablished them for correction\u201d (ibid. ver. 12). Our opinion is not\ncontradicted by Scriptural passages like the following: \u201cHe giveth to\nthe beast his food\u201d (Ps. cxlvii. 9); \u201cThe young lions roar after their\nprey, and seek their meat from God\u201d (ibid. civ. 21); \u201cThou openest\nthine hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing\u201d (ibid.\ncxlv. 16); or by the saying of our Sages: \u201cHe sitteth and feedeth all,\nfrom the horns of the unicorns even unto the eggs of insects.\u201d There\nare many similar sayings extant in the writings of our Sages, but they\nimply nothing that is contrary to my view. All these passages refer to\nProvidence in relation to species, and not to Providence in relation to\nindividual animals. The acts of God are as it were enumerated; how He\nprovides for every species the necessary food and the means of\nsubsistence. This is clear and plain. Aristotle likewise holds that\nthis kind of Providence is necessary, and is in actual existence.\nAlexander also notices this fact in the name of Aristotle, viz., that\nevery species has its nourishment prepared for its individual members;\notherwise the species would undoubtedly have perished. It does not\nrequire much consideration to understand this. There is a rule laid\ndown by our Sages that it is directly prohibited in the Law to cause\npain to an animal, and is based on the words: \u201cWherefore hast thou\nsmitten thine ass?\u201d etc. (Num. xxii. 32). But the object of this rule\nis to make us perfect; that we should not assume cruel habits; and that\nwe should not uselessly cause pain to others; that, on the contrary, we\nshould be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures,\nexcept when necessity demands the contrary: \u201cWhen thy soul longeth to\neat flesh,\u201d etc. (Deut. xii. 20). We should not kill animals for the\npurpose of practising cruelty, or for the purpose of play. It cannot be\nobjected to this theory, Why should God select mankind as the object of\nHis special Providence, and not other living beings? For he who asks\nthis question must also inquire, Why has man alone, of all species of\nanimals, been endowed with intellect? The answer to this second\nquestion must be, according to the three afore-mentioned theories: It\nwas the Will of God, it is the decree of His Wisdom, or it is in\naccordance with the laws of Nature. The same answers apply to the first\nquestion. Understand thoroughly my theory, that I do not ascribe to God\nignorance of anything or any kind of weakness; I hold that Divine\nProvidence is related and closely connected with the intellect, because\nProvidence can only proceed from an intelligent being, from a being\nthat is itself the most perfect Intellect. Those creatures, therefore,\nwhich receive part of that intellectual influence, will become subject\nto the action of Providence in the same proportion as they are acted\nupon by the Intellect. This theory is in accordance with reason and\nwith the teaching of Scripture, whilst the other theories previously\nmentioned either exaggerate Divine Providence or detract from it. In\nthe former case they lead to confusion and entire nonsense, and cause\nus to deny reason and to contradict that which is perceived with the\nsenses. The latter case, viz., the theory that Divine Providence does\nnot extend to man, and that there is no difference between man and\nother animals, implies very bad notions about God; it disturbs all\nsocial order, removes and destroys all the moral and intellectual\nvirtues of man.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\n\nHaving shown in the preceding chapter that of all living beings mankind\nalone is directly under the control of Divine Providence, I will now\nadd the following remarks: It is an established fact that species have\nno existence except in our own minds. Species and other classes are\nmerely ideas formed in our minds, whilst everything in real existence\nis an individual object, or an aggregate of individual objects. This\nbeing granted, it must further be admitted that the result of the\nexisting Divine influence, that reaches mankind through the human\nintellect, is identical with individual intellects really in existence,\nwith which, e.g., Zeid, Amr, Kaled and Bekr, are endowed. Hence it\nfollows, in accordance with what I have mentioned in the preceding\nchapter, that the greater the share is which a person has obtained of\nthis Divine influence, on account of both his physical predisposition\nand his training, the greater must also be the effect of Divine\nProvidence upon him, for the action of Divine Providence is\nproportional to the endowment of intellect, as has been mentioned\nabove. The relation of Divine Providence is therefore not the same to\nall men; the greater the human perfection a person has attained, the\ngreater the benefit he derives from Divine Providence. This benefit is\nvery great in the case of prophets, and varies according to the degree\nof their prophetic faculty; as it varies in the case of pious and good\nmen according to their piety and uprightness. For it is the intensity\nof the Divine intellectual influence that has inspired the prophets,\nguided the good in their actions, and perfected the wisdom of the\npious. In the same proportion as ignorant and disobedient persons are\ndeficient in that Divine influence, their condition is inferior, and\ntheir rank equal to that of irrational beings; and they are \u201clike unto\nthe beasts\u201d (Ps. xlix. 21). For this reason it was not only considered\na light thing to slay them, but it was even directly commanded for the\nbenefit of mankind. This belief that God provides for every individual\nhuman being in accordance with his merits is one of the fundamental\nprinciples on which the Law is founded.\n\nConsider how the action of Divine Providence is described in reference\nto every incident in the lives of the patriarchs, to their occupations,\nand even to their passions, and how God promised to direct His\nattention to them. Thus God said to Abraham, \u201cI am thy shield\u201d (Gen.\nxv. 1); to Isaac, \u201cI will be with thee, and I will bless thee\u201d (ibid.\nxxvi. 3); to Jacob, \u201cI am with thee, and will keep thee\u201d (ibid. xxviii.\n15); to [Moses] the chief of the Prophets, \u201cCertainly I will be with\nthee, and this shall be a token unto thee\u201d (Exod. iii. 12); to Joshua,\n\u201cAs I was with Moses, so I shall be with thee\u201d (Josh. i. 5). It is\nclear that in all these cases the action of Providence has been\nproportional to man\u2019s perfection. The following verse describes how\nProvidence protects good and pious men, and abandons fools; \u201cHe will\nkeep the feet of his saints, and the wicked shall be silent in\ndarkness; for by strength shall no man prevail\u201d (1 Sam. ii. 9). When we\nsee that some men escape plagues and mishaps, whilst others perish by\nthem, we must not attribute this to a difference in the properties of\ntheir bodies, or in their physical constitution, \u201cfor by strength shall\nno man prevail\u201d; but it must be attributed to their different degrees\nof perfection, some approaching God, whilst others moving away from\nHim. Those who approach Him are best protected, and \u201cHe will keep the\nfeet of his saints\u201d; but those who keep far away from Him are left\nexposed to what may befall them; there is nothing that could protect\nthem from what might happen; they are like those who walk in darkness,\nand are certain to stumble. The protection of the pious by Providence\nis also expressed in the following passages:\u2014\u201cHe keepeth all his\nbones,\u201d etc. (Ps. xxxiv. 21); \u201cThe eyes of the Lord are upon the\nrighteous\u201d (ibid. ver. 16); \u201cHe shall call upon me and I shall answer\nhim\u201d (ibid. xci. 15). There are in Scripture many more passages\nexpressing the principle that men enjoy Divine protection in proportion\nto their perfection and piety. The philosophers have likewise discussed\nthis subject. Abu-nasr, in the Introduction to his Commentary on\nAristotle\u2019s Nikomachean Ethics, says as follows:\u2014Those who possess the\nfaculty of raising their souls from virtue to virtue obtain, according\nto Plato, Divine protection to a higher degree.\n\nNow consider how by this method of reasoning we have arrived at the\ntruth taught by the Prophets, that every person has his individual\nshare of Divine Providence in proportion to his perfection. For\nphilosophical research leads to this conclusion, if we assume, as has\nbeen mentioned above, that Divine Providence is in each case\nproportional to the person\u2019s intellectual development. It is wrong to\nsay that Divine Providence extends only to the species, and not to\nindividual beings, as some of the philosophers teach. For only\nindividual beings have real existence, and individual beings are\nendowed with Divine Intellect; Divine Providence acts, therefore, upon\nthese individual beings.\n\nStudy this chapter as it ought to be studied; you will find in it all\nthe fundamental principles of the Law; you will see that these are in\nconformity with philosophical speculation, and all difficulties will be\nremoved; you will have a clear idea of Divine Providence.\n\nAfter having described the various philosophical opinions on\nProvidence, and on the manner how God governs the Universe, I will\nbriefly state the opinion of our co-religionists on the Omniscience of\nGod, and what I have to remark on this subject.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\n\nIt is undoubtedly an innate idea that God must be perfect in every\nrespect and cannot be deficient in anything. It is almost an innate\nidea that ignorance in anything is a deficiency, and that God can\ntherefore not be ignorant of anything. But some thinkers assume, as I\nsaid before, haughtily and exultingly, that God knows certain things\nand is ignorant of certain other things. They did so because they\nimagined that they discovered a certain absence of order in man\u2019s\naffairs, most of which are not only the result of physical properties,\nbut also of those faculties which he possesses as a being endowed with\nfree will and reason. The Prophets have already stated the proof which\nignorant persons offer for their belief that God does not know our\nactions; viz., the fact that wicked people are seen in happiness, ease,\nand peace. This fact leads also righteous and pious persons to think\nthat it is of no use for them to aim at that which is good and to\nsuffer for it through the opposition of other people. But the Prophets\nat the same time relate how their own thoughts were engaged on this\nquestion, and how they were at last convinced that in the instances to\nwhich these arguments refer, only the end and not the beginning ought\nto be taken into account. The following is a description of these\nreflections (Ps. lxxiii. 11, seq.): \u201cAnd they say, How does God know?\nand is there knowledge in the Most High? Behold, these are the ungodly\nwho prosper in the world; they increase in riches. Verily I have\ncleansed my heart in vain, and washed my hands in innocency.\u201d He then\ncontinues, \u201cWhen I thought to know this, it was too painful for me,\nuntil I went into the sanctuary of God; then understood I their end.\nSurely thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down\ninto destruction. How are they brought into desolation, as in a moment!\nThey are utterly consumed with terrors.\u201d The very same ideas have also\nbeen expressed by the prophet Malachi, for he says thus (Mal. iii.\n13\u201318): \u201cYour words have been stout against me, saith the Lord. As you\nhave said, It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have\nkept his ordinance, and that we have walked mournfully before the Lord\nof hosts? And now we call the proud happy; yea, they that work\nwickedness are set up; yea, they that tempt God are even delivered.\nThen they that feared the Lord spake often one to another, etc. Then\nshall ye return and discern between the righteous and the wicked,\nbetween him that serveth God and him that serveth him not.\u201d David\nlikewise shows how general this view was in his time, and how it led\nand caused people to sin and to oppress one another. At first he argues\nagainst this theory, and then he declares that God is omniscient. He\nsays as follows:\u2014\u201cThey slay the widow and the stranger, and murder the\nfatherless. Yet they say, The Lord shall not see, neither shall the God\nof Jacob regard it. Understand, ye brutish among the people, and ye\nfools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall he not\nhear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that chastiseth\nnations, shall not he correct? or he that teacheth man knowledge?\u201d I\nwill now show you the meaning of these arguments, but first I will\npoint out how the opponents to the words of the Prophets misunderstood\nthis passage. Many years ago some intelligent co-religionists\u2014they were\nphysicians\u2014told me that they were surprised at the words of David; for\nit would follow from his arguments that the Creator of the mouth must\neat and the Creator of the lungs must cry; the same applies to all\nother organs of our body. You who study this treatise of mine, consider\nhow grossly they misunderstood David\u2019s arguments. Hear now what its\ntrue meaning is: He who produces a vessel must have had in his mind an\nidea of the use of that instrument, otherwise he could not have\nproduced it. If, e.g., the smith had not formed an idea of sewing and\npossessed a knowledge of it, the needle would not have had the form so\nindispensable for sewing. The same is the case with all instruments.\nWhen some philosopher thought that God, whose perception is purely\nintellectual, has no knowledge of individual things, which are\nperceivable only by the senses, David takes his argument from the\nexistence of the senses, and argues thus:\u2014If the sense of sight had\nbeen utterly unknown to God, how could He have produced that organ of\nthe sense of sight? Do you think that it was by chance that a\ntransparent humour was formed, and then another humour with certain\nsimilar properties, and besides a membrane which by accident had a hole\ncovered with a hardened transparent substance? in short, considering\nthe humour of the eye, in membranes and nerves, with their well-known\nfunctions, and their adaptation to the purpose of sight, can any\nintelligent person imagine that all this is due to chance? Certainly\nnot; we see here necessarily design in nature, as has been shown by all\nphysicians and philosophers; but as nature is not an intellectual\nbeing, and is not capable of governing [the universe], as has been\naccepted by all philosophers, the government [of the universe], which\nshows signs of design, originates, according to the philosophers, in an\nintellectual cause, but is according to our view the result of the\naction of an intellectual being, that endows everything with its\nnatural properties. If this intellect were incapable of perceiving or\nknowing any of the actions of earthly beings, how could He have\ncreated, or, according to the other theory, caused to emanate from\nHimself, properties that bring about those actions of which He is\nsupposed to have no knowledge? David correctly calls those who believe\nin this theory brutes and fools. He then proceeds to explain that the\nerror is due to our defective understanding; that God endowed us with\nthe intellect which is the means of our comprehension, and which on\naccount of its insufficiency to form a true idea of God has become the\nsource of great doubts; that He therefore knows what our defects are,\nand how worthless the doubts are which originate in our faulty\nreasoning. The Psalmist therefore says: \u201cHe who teaches man knowledge,\nthe Lord, knoweth the thoughts of man that they are vanity\u201d (ibid.\nxciv. 10\u201311).\n\nMy object in this chapter was to show how the belief of the ignorant,\nthat God does not notice the affairs of man because they are uncertain\nand unsystematic, is very ancient. Comp. \u201cAnd the Israelites uttered\nthings that were not right against the Lord\u201d (2 Kings xvii. 9). In\nreference to this passage the Midrash says: \u201cWhat have they uttered?\nThis Pillar [i.e., God] does not see, nor hear, nor speak\u201d; i.e., they\nimagine that God takes no notice of earthly affairs, that the Prophets\nreceived of God neither affirmative nor negative precepts; they imagine\nso, simply because human affairs are not arranged as every person would\nthink it desirable. Seeing that these are not in accordance with their\nwish, they say, \u201cThe Lord does not see us\u201d (Ezek. viii. 12). Zephaniah\n(i. 12) also describes those ignorant persons \u201cwho say in their heart\nthe Lord will not do good, neither will he do evil.\u201d I will tell you my\nown opinion as regards the theory that God knows all things on earth,\nbut I will before state some propositions which are generally adopted,\nand the correctness of which no intelligent person can dispute.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\n\nIt is generally agreed upon that God cannot at a certain time acquire\nknowledge which He did not possess previously; it is further impossible\nthat His knowledge should include any plurality, even according to\nthose who admit the Divine attributes. As these things have been fully\nproved, we, who assert the teaching of the Law, believe that God\u2019s\nknowledge of many things does not imply any plurality; His knowledge\ndoes not change like ours when the objects of His knowledge change.\nSimilarly we say that the various events are known to Him before they\ntake place; He constantly knows them, and therefore no fresh knowledge\nis acquired by Him. E.g., He knows that a certain person is\nnon-existent at present, will come to existence at a certain time, will\ncontinue to exist for some time, and will then cease to exist. When\nthis person, in accordance with God\u2019s foreknowledge concerning him,\ncomes into existence, God\u2019s knowledge is not increased; it contains\nnothing that it did not contain before, but something has taken place\nthat was known previously exactly as it has taken place. This theory\nimplies that God\u2019s knowledge extends to things not in existence, and\nincludes also the infinite. We nevertheless accept it, and contend that\nwe may attribute to God the knowledge of a thing which does not yet\nexist, but the existence of which God foresees and is able to effect.\nBut that which never exists cannot be an object of His knowledge; just\nas our knowledge does not comprise things which we consider as\nnon-existing. A doubt has been raised, however, whether His knowledge\nincludes the infinite. Some thinkers assume that knowledge has the\nspecies for its object, and therefore extends at the same time to all\nindividual members of the species. This view is taken by every man who\nadheres to a revealed religion and follows the dictates of reason.\nPhilosophers, however, have decided that the object of knowledge cannot\nbe a non-existing thing, and that it cannot comprise that which is\ninfinite. Since, therefore, God\u2019s knowledge does not admit of any\nincrease, it is impossible that He should know any transient thing. He\nonly knows that which is constant and unchangeable. Other philosophers\nraised the following objection: God does not know even things that\nremain constant; for His knowledge would then include a plurality\naccording to the number of objects known; the knowledge of every thing\nbeing distinguished by a certain peculiarity of the thing. God\ntherefore only knows His own essence.\n\nMy opinion is this: the cause of the error of all these schools is\ntheir belief that God\u2019s knowledge is like ours; each school points to\nsomething withheld from our knowledge, and either assumes that the same\nmust be the case in God\u2019s knowledge, or at least finds some difficulty\nhow to explain it. We must blame the philosophers in this respect more\nthan any other persons, because they demonstrated that there is no\nplurality in God, and that He has no attribute that is not identical\nwith His essence; His knowledge and His essence are one and the same\nthing; they likewise demonstrated, as we have shown, that our intellect\nand our knowledge are insufficient to comprehend the true idea of His\nessence. How then can they imagine that they comprehend His knowledge,\nwhich is identical with His essence; seeing that our incapacity to\ncomprehend His essence prevents us from understanding the way how He\nknows objects? for His knowledge is not of the same kind as ours, but\ntotally different from it and admitting of no analogy. And as there is\nan Essence of independent existence, which is, as the philosophers call\nit, the Cause of the existence of all things, or, as we say, the\nCreator of everything that exists beside Him, so we also assume that\nthis Essence knows everything, that nothing whatever of all that exists\nis hidden from it, and that the knowledge attributed to this essence\nhas nothing in common with our knowledge, just as that essence is in no\nway like our essence. The homonymity of the term \u201cknowledge\u201d misled\npeople; [they forgot that] only the words are the same, but the things\ndesignated by them are different; and therefore they came to the absurd\nconclusion that that which is required for our knowledge is also\nrequired for God\u2019s knowledge.\n\nBesides, I find it expressed in various passages of Scripture that the\nfact that God knows things while in a state of possibility, when their\nexistence belongs to the future, does not change the nature of the\npossible in any way; that nature remains unchanged; and the knowledge\nof the realization of one of several possibilities does not yet effect\nthat realization. This is likewise one of the fundamental principles of\nthe Law of Moses, concerning which there is no doubt nor any dispute.\nOtherwise it would not have been said, \u201cAnd thou shalt make a\nbattlement for thy roof,\u201d etc. (Deut. xxii. 8), or \u201cLest he die in the\nbattle, and another man take her\u201d (ibid. xx. 7). The fact that laws\nwere given to man, both affirmative and negative, supports the\nprinciple, that God\u2019s knowledge of future [and possible] events does\nnot change their character. The great doubt that presents itself to our\nmind is the result of the insufficiency of our intellect. Consider in\nhow many ways His knowledge is distinguished from ours according to all\nthe teaching of every revealed religion. First, His knowledge is one,\nand yet embraces many different kinds of objects. Secondly, it is\napplied to things not in existence. Thirdly, it comprehends the\ninfinite. Fourthly, it remains unchanged, though it comprises the\nknowledge of changeable things; whilst it seems [in reference to\nourselves] that the knowledge of a thing that is to come into existence\nis different from the knowledge of the thing when it has come into\nexistence; because there is the additional knowledge of its transition\nfrom a state of potentiality into that of reality. Fifthly, according\nto the teaching of our Law, God\u2019s knowledge of one of two eventualities\ndoes not determine it, however certain that knowledge may be concerning\nthe future occurrence of the one eventuality.\u2014Now I wonder what our\nknowledge has in common with God\u2019s knowledge, according to those who\ntreat God\u2019s knowledge as an attribute. Is there anything else common to\nboth besides the mere name? According to our theory that God\u2019s\nknowledge is not different from His essence, there is an essential\ndistinction between His knowledge and ours, like the distinction\nbetween the substance of the heavens and that of the earth. The\nProphets have clearly expressed this. Comp. \u201cFor my thoughts are not\nyour thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as\nthe heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your\nways\u201d (Isa. lv. 8\u20139). In short, as we cannot accurately comprehend His\nessence, and yet we know that His existence is most perfect, free from\nall admixture of deficiency, change, or passiveness, so we have no\ncorrect notion of His knowledge, because it is nothing but His essence,\nand yet we are convinced that He does not at one time obtain knowledge\nwhich He had not before; i.e., He obtains no new knowledge, He does not\nincrease it, and it is not finite; nothing of all existing things\nescapes His knowledge, but their nature is not changed thereby; that\nwhich is possible remains possible. Every argument that seems to\ncontradict any of these statements is founded on the nature of our\nknowledge, that has only the name in common with God\u2019s knowledge. The\nsame applies to the term intention; it is homonymously employed to\ndesignate our intention towards a certain thing, and the intention of\nGod. The term \u201cmanagement\u201d (Providence) is likewise homonymously used\nof our management of a certain thing, and of God\u2019s management. In fact\nmanagement, knowledge, and intention are not the same when ascribed to\nus and when ascribed to God. When these three terms are taken in both\ncases in the same sense, great difficulties must arise; but when it is\nnoticed that there is a great difference whether a thing it predicated\nof God or of us, the truth will become clear. The difference between\nthat which is ascribed to God and that which is ascribed to man is\nexpressed in the words above mentioned, \u201cAnd your ways are not my\nways.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\n\nThere is a great difference between the knowledge which the producer of\na thing possesses concerning it, and the knowledge which other persons\npossess concerning the same thing. Suppose a thing is produced in\naccordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then\nguided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other\npeople, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the\nwhole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. E.g., An\nartisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the\nwater, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of\nthe night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the\ndifferent ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every\nlittle ball that descends\u2014all this is fully perceived by him who makes\nthe clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the\nmovements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the\nmovements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another\nperson who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at\nevery movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge\ndoes he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully\nunderstands the machinery. If an infinite number of movements were\nassumed for this instrument, he would never be able to complete his\nknowledge. Besides, he cannot know any of the movements before they\ntake place, since he only knows them from their actual occurrence. The\nsame is the case with every object, and its relation to our knowledge\nand God\u2019s knowledge of it. Whatever we know of the things is derived\nfrom observation; on that account it is impossible for us to know that\nwhich will take place in future, or that which is infinite.\n\nOur knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things\nknown by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is\nnot derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there\nwould be change and plurality in His knowledge; on the contrary, the\nthings are in accordance with His eternal knowledge, which has\nestablished their actual properties, and made part of them purely\nspiritual, another part material and constant as regards its individual\nmembers, a third part material and changeable as regards the individual\nbeings according to eternal and constant laws. Plurality, acquisition,\nand change in His knowledge is therefore impossible. He fully knows His\nunchangeable essence, and has thus a knowledge of all that results from\nany of His acts. If we were to try to understand in what manner this is\ndone, it would be the same as if we tried to be the same as God, and to\nmake our knowledge identical with His knowledge. Those who seek the\ntruth, and admit what is true, must believe that nothing is hidden from\nGod; that everything is revealed to His knowledge, which is identical\nwith His essence; that this kind of knowledge cannot be comprehended by\nus; for if we knew its method, we would possess that intellect by which\nsuch knowledge could be acquired. Such intellect does not exist except\nin God, and is at the same time His essence. Note this well, for I\nthink that this is an excellent idea, and leads to correct views; no\nerror will be found in it; no dialectical argument; it does not lead to\nany absurd conclusion, nor to ascribing any defect to God. These\nsublime and profound themes admit of no proof whatever, neither\naccording to our opinion who believe in the teaching of Scripture, nor\naccording to the philosophers who disagree and are much divided on this\nquestion. In all questions that cannot be demonstrated, we must adopt\nthe method which we have adopted in this question about God\u2019s\nOmniscience. Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\n\nThe strange and wonderful Book of Job treats of the same subject as we\nare discussing; its basis is a fiction, conceived for the purpose of\nexplaining the different opinions which people hold on Divine\nProvidence. You know that some of our Sages clearly stated Job has\nnever existed, and has never been created, and that he is a poetic\nfiction. Those who assume that he has existed, and that the book is\nhistorical, are unable to determine when and where Job lived. Some of\nour Sages say that he lived in the days of the Patriarchs; others hold\nthat he was a contemporary of Moses; others place him in the days of\nDavid, and again others believe that he was one of those who returned\nfrom the Babylonian exile. This difference of opinion supports the\nassumption that he has never existed in reality. But whether he has\nexisted or not, that which is related of him is an experience of\nfrequent occurrence, is a source of perplexity to all thinkers, and has\nsuggested the above-mentioned opinions on God\u2019s Omniscience and\nProvidence. This perplexity is caused by the account that a simple and\nperfect person, who is upright in his actions, and very anxious to\nabstain from sin, is afflicted by successive misfortunes, namely, by\nloss of property, by the death of his children, and by bodily disease,\nthough he has not committed any sin. According to both theories, viz.,\nthe theory that Job did exist, and the theory that he did not exist,\nthe introduction to the book is certainly a fiction; I mean the portion\nwhich relates to the words of the adversary, the words of God to the\nformer, and the handing over of Job to him. This fiction, however, is\nin so far different from other fictions that it includes profound ideas\nand great mysteries, removes great doubts, and reveals the most\nimportant truths. I will discuss it as fully as possible; and I will\nalso tell you the words of our Sages that suggested to me the\nexplanation of this great poem.\n\nFirst, consider the words: \u201cThere was a man in the land U\u1e93.\u201d The term\nU\u1e93 has different meanings; it is used as a proper noun. Comp. \u201cU\u1e93, his\nfirst-born\u201d (Gen. xxii. 21); it is also imperative of the verb U\u1e93, \u201cto\ntake advice.\u201d Comp. u\u1e93u, \u201ctake counsel\u201d (Isa. viii. 10). The name U\u1e93\ntherefore expresses the exhortation to consider well this lesson, study\nit, grasp its ideas, and comprehend them, in order to see which is the\nright view. \u201cThe sons of God then came to present themselves before the\nLord, and the adversary came also among them and in their number\u201d\n(chap. i. 6, ii. 1). It is not said: \u201cAnd the sons of God and the\nadversary came to present themselves before the Lord\u201d; this sentence\nwould have implied that the existence of all that came was of the same\nkind and rank. The words used are these: \u201cAnd the sons of God came to\npresent themselves before the Lord, and the adversary came also among\nthem.\u201d Such a phrase is only used in reference to one that comes\nwithout being expected or invited; he only comes among others whose\ncoming has been sought. The adversary is then described as going to and\nfro on the earth, and walking up and down thereon. He is in no relation\nto the beings above, and has no place among them. For this reason it is\nsaid, \u201cfrom going to and fro on the earth, and walking up and down on\nit,\u201d for his \u201cgoing\u201d and \u201cwalking\u201d can only take place on the earth.\n[Job], the simple and righteous man, is given and handed over to the\nadversary; whatever evils and misfortunes befell Job as regards his\nproperty, children, and health, were all caused by this adversary. When\nthis idea is sufficiently indicated, the author begins to reflect on\nit; one opinion Job is represented to hold, whilst other opinions are\ndefended by his friends. I will further on expound these opinions which\nformed the substance of the discussion on the misfortunes of Job,\ncaused by the adversary alone. Job, as well as his friends, were of\nopinion that God Himself was the direct agent of what happened, and\nthat the adversary was not the intermediate cause. It is remarkable in\nthis account that wisdom is not ascribed to Job. The text does not say\nhe was an intelligent, wise, or clever man; but virtues and\nuprightness, especially in actions, are ascribed to him. If he were\nwise he would not have any doubt about the cause of his suffering, as\nwill be shown later on. Besides, his misfortunes are enumerated in the\nsame order as they rank in man\u2019s estimation. There are some who are not\nperplexed or discouraged by loss of property, thinking little of it;\nbut are terrified when they are threatened with the death of their\nchildren and are killed by their anxiety. There are others who bear\nwithout shock or fainting even the loss of their children, but no one\nendowed with sensation is able to bear bodily pain. We generally extol\nGod in words, and praise Him as righteous and benevolent, when we\nprosper and are happy, or when the grief we have to bear is moderate.\nBut [it is otherwise] when such troubles as are described in Job come\nover us. Some of us deny God, and believe that there is no rule in the\nUniverse, even if only their property is lost. Others retain their\nfaith in the existence of justice and order, even when suffering from\nloss of property, whereas loss of children is too much affliction for\nthem. Others remain firm in their faith, even with the loss of their\nchildren; but there is no one who can patiently bear the pain that\nreaches his own person; he then murmurs and complains of injustice\neither in his heart or with his tongue.\n\nNow consider that the phrase, \u201cto present themselves before the Lord,\u201d\nis used in reference to the sons of God, both the first and the second\ntimes, but in reference to the adversary, who appeared on either\noccasion among them and in their number, this phrase is not used the\nfirst time, whilst in his second appearance \u201cthe adversary also came\namong them to present himself before the Lord.\u201d Consider this, and see\nhow very extraordinary it is!\u2014These ideas presented themselves like an\ninspiration to me.\u2014The phrase, \u201cto present themselves before the Lord,\u201d\nimplies that they are beings who are forced by God\u2019s command to do what\nHe desires. This may be inferred from the words of the prophet\nZechariah concerning the four chariots that came forth. He says: \u201cAnd\nthe angel answered and said to me, These four winds of the heavens come\nforth from presenting themselves before the Lord of the whole earth\u201d\n(Zech. vi. 5). It is clear that the relation of the sons of God to the\nUniverse is not the same as that of the adversary. The relation of the\nsons of God is more constant and more permanent. The adversary has also\nsome relation to the Universe, but it is inferior to that of the sons\nof God. It is also remarkable in this account that in the description\nof the adversary\u2019s wandering about on the earth, and his performing\ncertain actions, it is distinctly stated that he has no power over the\nsoul; whilst power has been given to him over all earthly affairs,\nthere is a partition between him and the soul; he has not received\npower over the soul. This is expressed in the words, \u201cBut keep away\nfrom his soul\u201d (Job. ii. 6). I have already shown you the homonymous\nuse of the term \u201csoul\u201d (nefesh) in Hebrew (Part I., chap. xli.). It\ndesignates that element in man that survives him; it is this portion\nover which the adversary has no power.\u2014After these remarks of mine\nlisten to the following useful instruction given by our Sages, who in\ntruth deserve the title of \u201cwise men\u201d; it makes clear that which\nappears doubtful, and reveals that which has been hidden, and discloses\nmost of the mysteries of the Law. They said in the Talmud as follows:\nR. Simeon, son of Lakish, says: \u201cThe adversary (satan), evil\ninclination (ye\u1e93er ha-ra\u2019), and the angel of death, are one and the\nsame being.\u201d Here we find all that has been mentioned by us in such a\nclear manner that no intelligent person will be in doubt about it. It\nhas thus been shown to you that one and the same thing is designated by\nthese three different terms, and that actions ascribed to these three\nare in reality the actions of one and the same agent. Again, the\nancient doctors of the Talmud said: \u201cThe adversary goes about and\nmisleads, then he goes up and accuses, obtains permission, and takes\nthe soul.\u201d You have already been told that when David at the time of\nthe plague was shown the angel \u201cwith the sword drawn in his hand\nstretched out over Jerusalem\u201d (2 Sam. xxiv. 17), it was done for the\npurpose of conveying a certain idea to him. The same idea was also\nexpressed in the vision concerning the sins of the sons of Joshua, the\nhigh priest, by the words, \u201cAnd the adversary stood on his right hand\nto accuse him\u201d (Zech. iii. 1). The vision then reveals that [the\nadversary] is far from God, and continues thus: \u201cThe Lord will rebuke\nthee, O adversary, the Lord who hath chosen Jerusalem will rebuke thee\u201d\n(ibid. ver. 2). Balaam saw prophetically the same vision in his\njourney, addressing him with the words, \u201cBehold I have come forth to be\na hindrance to thee\u201d (Num. xxii. 32). The Hebrew, satan, is derived\nfrom the same root as s\u00e9teh, \u201cturn away\u201d (Prov. iv. 15); it implies the\nnotion of turning and moving away from a thing; he undoubtedly turns us\naway from the way of truth, and leads us astray in the way of error.\nThe same idea is contained in the passage, \u201cAnd the imagination of the\nheart of man is evil from his youth\u201d (Gen. viii. 21). The theory of the\ngood and the evil inclinations (ye\u1e93er ha-tob, ve-ye\u1e93er ha-ra\u2019) is\nfrequently referred to in our religion. Our Sages also say, \u201cServe God\nwith your good and your evil inclinations.\u201d (B. T. Ber. 57a.) They also\nsay that the evil inclination we receive at our birth; for \u201cat the door\nsin croucheth\u201d (Gen. iv. 7), as is distinctly said in the Law, \u201cAnd the\nimagination of the heart of man is evil from his youth\u201d (ibid. viii.\n21). The good inclination, however, comes when the mind is developed.\nIn explaining the allegory representing the body of man and his\ndifferent faculties, our Sages (B. T. Ned. 32b) said: \u201cThe evil\ninclination is called a great king, whilst the good inclination is a\nchild, poor, though wise\u201d (Eccles. ix. 14). All these sayings of our\nSages are contained in their writings, and are well known. According to\nour Sages the evil inclination, the adversary (satan), and the angel\n[of death], are undoubtedly identical; and the adversary being called\n\u201cangel,\u201d because he is among the sons of God, and the good inclination\nbeing in reality an angel, it is to the good and the evil inclinations\nthat they refer in their well-known words, \u201cEvery person is accompanied\nby two angels, one being on his right side, one on his left.\u201d In the\nBabylonian Gemara (Shabbath 119b), they say distinctly of the two\nangels that one is good and one bad. See what extraordinary ideas this\npassage discloses, and how many false ideas it removes.\n\nI believe that I have fully explained the idea contained in the account\nof Job; but I will now show the character of the opinion attributed to\nJob, and of the opinions attributed to his friends, and support my\nstatement by proofs gathered from the words of each of them. We need\nnot take notice of the remaining passages which are only required for\nthe context, as has been explained to you in the beginning of this\ntreatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\n\nAssuming the first part of the history of Job as having actually taken\nplace, the five, viz., Job and his friends, agreed that the misfortune\nof Job was known to God, and that it was God that caused Job\u2019s\nsuffering. They further agree that God does no wrong, and that no\ninjustice can be ascribed to Him. You will find these ideas frequently\nrepeated in the words of Job. When you consider the words of the five\nwho take part in the discussion, you will easily notice that things\nsaid by one of them are also uttered by the rest. The arguments are\nrepeated, mixed up, and interrupted by Job\u2019s description of his acute\npain and troubles, which had come upon him in spite of his strict\nrighteousness, and by an account of his charity, humane disposition,\nand good acts. The replies of the friends to Job are likewise\ninterrupted by exhortations to patience, by words of comfort, and other\nspeeches tending to make him forget his grief. He is told by them to be\nsilent; that he ought not to let loose the bridle of his tongue, as if\nhe were in dispute with another man; that he ought silently to submit\nto the judgments of God. Job replies that the intensity of his pains\ndid not permit him to bear patiently, to collect his thoughts and to\nsay what he ought to say. The friends, on the other hand, contend that\nthose who act well receive reward, and those who act wickedly are\npunished. When a wicked and rebellious person is seen in prosperity, it\nmay be assumed for certain that a change will take place; he will die,\nor troubles will afflict him and his house. When we find a worshipper\nof God in misfortune, we may be certain that God will heal the stroke\nof his wound. This idea is frequently repeated in the words of the\nthree friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar, who agree in this opinion.\nIt is, however, not the object of this chapter to describe in what they\nagree, but to define the distinguishing characteristic of each of them,\nand to elucidate the opinion of each as regards the question why the\nmost simple and upright man is afflicted with the greatest and acutest\npain. Job found in this fact a proof that the righteous and the wicked\nare equal before God, who holds all mankind in contempt. Job therefore\nsays (ix. 22, 23): \u201cThis is one thing, therefore I said it, He\ndestroyeth the perfect and the wicked. If the scourge slay suddenly, he\nwill laugh at the trial of the innocent.\u201d He thus declares that when a\nscourge comes suddenly, killing and destroying all it meets, God laughs\nat the trial of the innocent. He further confirms this view in the\nfollowing passage: \u201cOne dieth in his full strength, being wholly at\nease and quiet. His vessels are full of milk, etc. And another dieth in\nthe bitterness of his soul, and never eateth with pleasure. They shall\nlie down alike in the dust, and the worms shall cover them\u201d (ibid. xxi.\n23\u201326). In a similar manner he shows the good condition and prosperity\nof wicked people; and is even very explicit on this point. He speaks\nthus: \u201cEven when I remember I am afraid, and trembling taketh hold on\nmy flesh. Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in\npower? Their seed is established in their sight with them,\u201d etc. (ibid.\n6\u20138). Having thus described their prosperity, he addresses his\nopponents, and says to them: \u201cGranted that as you think, the children\nof this prosperous atheist will perish after his death, and their\nmemory will be blotted out, what harm will the fate of his family cause\nhim after his death? For what pleasure hath he in his house after him,\nwhen the number of his months is cut off in the midst?\u201d (ibid. 21). Job\nthen explains that there is no hope after death, so that the cause [of\nthe misfortune of the righteous man] is nothing else but entire neglect\non the part of God. He is therefore surprised that God has not\nabandoned the creation of man altogether; and that after having created\nhim, He does not take any notice of him. He says in his surprise: \u201cHast\nthou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese?\u201d etc.\n(ibid. x. 10, seq.). This is one of the different views held by some\nthinkers on Providence. Our Sages (B. T. Baba B. 16a) condemned this\nview of Job as mischievous, and expressed their feeling in words like\nthe following: \u201cdust should have filled the mouth of Job\u201d; \u201cJob wished\nto upset the dish\u201d; \u201cJob denied the resurrection of the dead\u201d; \u201cHe\ncommenced to blaspheme.\u201d When, however, God said to Eliphaz and his\ncolleagues, \u201cYou have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my\nservant Job hath\u201d (xlii. 7), our Sages assume as the cause of this\nrebuke, the maxim \u201cMan is not punished for that which he utters in his\npain\u201d; and that God ignored the sin of Job [in his utterances], because\nof the acuteness of his suffering. But this explanation does not agree\nwith the object of the whole allegory. The words of God are justified,\nas I will show, by the fact that Job abandoned his first very erroneous\nopinion, and himself proved that it was an error. It is the opinion\nwhich suggests itself as plausible at first thought, especially in the\nminds of those who meet with mishaps, well knowing that they have not\nmerited them through sins. This is admitted by all, and therefore this\nopinion was assigned to Job. But he is represented to hold this view\nonly so long as he was without wisdom, and knew God only by tradition,\nin the same manner as religious people generally know Him. As soon as\nhe had acquired a true knowledge of God, he confessed that there is\nundoubtedly true felicity in the knowledge of God; it is attained by\nall who acquire that knowledge, and no earthly trouble can disturb it.\nSo long as Job\u2019s knowledge of God was based on tradition and\ncommunication, and not on research, he believed that such imaginary\ngood as is possessed in health, riches, and children, was the utmost\nthat men can attain; this was the reason why he was in perplexity, and\nwhy he uttered the above-mentioned opinions, and this is also the\nmeaning of his words: \u201cI have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear;\nbut now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent\nbecause of dust and ashes\u201d (xlii. 5, 6); that is to say, he abhorred\nall that he had desired before, and that he was sorry that he had been\nin dust and ashes; comp. \u201cand he sat down among the ashes\u201d (ii. 8). On\naccount of this last utterance, which implies true perception, it is\nsaid afterwards in reference to him, \u201cfor you have not spoken of me the\nthing that is right, as my servant Job hath.\u201d\n\nThe opinion set forth by Eliphaz in reference to Job\u2019s suffering is\nlikewise one of the current views on Providence. He holds that the fate\nof Job was in accordance with strict justice. Job was guilty of sins\nfor which he deserved his fate. Eliphaz therefore says to Job: \u201cIs not\nthy wickedness great, and thine iniquities infinite?\u201d (xxii. 5). He\nthen points out to him that his upright actions and his good ways, on\nwhich he relies, need not be so perfect in the eyes of God that no\npunishment should be inflicted on him. \u201cBehold, he putteth no trust in\nhis servants; and his angels he chargeth with folly: how much less in\nthem that dwell in houses of clay,\u201d etc. (iv. 17\u201318). Eliphaz never\nabandoned his belief that the fate of man is the result of justice,\nthat we do not know all our shortcomings for which we are punished, nor\nthe way how we incur the punishment through them.\n\nBildad the Shuhite defends in this question the theory of reward and\ncompensation. He therefore tells Job that if he is innocent and without\nsin, his terrible misfortunes will be the source of great reward, will\nbe followed by the best compensation, and will prove a boon to him as\nthe cause of great bliss in the future world. This idea is expressed in\nthe words: \u201cIf thou be pure and upright, surely now he will awake for\nthee, and make the habitation of thy righteousness prosperous. Though\nthy beginning was small, yet thy latter end will greatly increase\u201d\n(viii. 6\u20138). This opinion concerning Providence is widespread, and we\nhave already explained it.\n\nZofar the Naamathite holds that the Divine Will is the source of\neverything that happens; no further cause can be sought for His\nactions, and it cannot be asked why He has done this and why He has not\ndone that. That which God does can therefore not be explained by the\nway of justice or the result of wisdom. His true Essence demands that\nHe does what He wills; we are unable to fathom the depth of His wisdom,\nand it is the law and rule of this wisdom that whatever He does is done\nbecause it is His will and for no other cause. Zofar therefore says to\nJob: \u201cBut oh that God would speak, and open his lips against thee; and\nthat he would show thee the secrets of wisdom, for wisdom hath two\nportions! Know, therefore, that God exacteth of thee less than thine\niniquity deserveth. Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou\nfind out the Almighty unto perfection?\u201d (xi. 6\u20137).\n\nIn this manner consider well how the Book of Job discusses the problem,\nwhich has perplexed many people, and led them to adopt in reference to\nDivine Providence some one of the theories which I have explained\nabove; all possible different theories are mentioned therein. The\nproblem is described either by way of fiction or in accordance with\nreal fact, as having manifested itself in a man famous for his\nexcellency and wisdom. The view ascribed to Job is the theory of\nAristotle. Eliphaz holds the opinion taught in Scripture, Bildad\u2019s\nopinion is identical with that of the Mu\u02bbtazilah, whilst Zofar defends\nthe theory of the Asha\u2019riyah. These were the ancient views on\nProvidence; later on a new theory was set forth, namely, that ascribed\nto Elihu. For this reason he is placed above the others, and described\nas younger in years but greater in wisdom. He censures Job for his\nfoolishly exalting himself, expressing surprise at such great troubles\nbefalling a good man, and dwelling on the praises of his own deeds. He\nalso tells the three friends that their minds have been weakened by\ngreat age. A profound and wonderful discourse then follows. Reflecting\non his words we may at first thought be surprised to find that he does\nnot add anything to the words of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar; and that\nhe only repeats their ideas in other terms and more explicitly. For he\nlikewise censures and rebukes Job, attributes justice to God, relates\nHis wonders in nature, and holds that God is not affected by the\nservice of the worshipper, nor by the disobedience of the rebellious.\nAll this has already been said by His colleagues. But after due\nconsideration we see clearly the new idea introduced by Elihu, which is\nthe principal object of his speech, an idea which has not been uttered\nby those who spoke before him. In addition to this he mentions also\nother things set forth by the previous speakers, in the same manner as\neach of the rest, viz., Job and his three friends, repeat what the\nothers have said. The purpose of this repetition is to conceal the\nopinion peculiar to each speaker, and to make all appear in the eyes of\nthe ordinary reader to utter one and the same view, although in reality\nthis is not the case. The new idea, which is peculiar to Elihu and has\nnot been mentioned by the others, is contained in his metaphor of the\nangel\u2019s intercession. It is a frequent occurrence, he says, that a man\nbecomes ill, approaches the gates of death, and is already given up by\nhis neighbours. If then an angel, of any kind whatever, intercedes on\nhis behalf and prays for him, the intercession and prayers are\naccepted; the patient rises from his illness, is saved, and returns to\ngood health. This result is not always obtained; intercession and\ndeliverance do not always follow each other; it happens only twice, or\nthree times. Elihu therefore says: \u201cIf there be an angel with him, an\ninterpreter, one among a thousand, to show unto man his uprightness,\u201d\netc. (xxxiii. 29). He then describes man\u2019s condition when convalescent\nand the rejoicing at his recovery, and continues thus: \u201cLo, all these\nthings worketh God twice, three times with man\u201d (ibid. 29). This idea\noccurs only in the words of Elihu. His description of the method of\nprophecy in preceding verses is likewise new. He says: \u201cSurely God\nspeaketh in one way, yea in two ways, yet man perceiveth it not. In a\ndream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon man, in\nslumberings upon the bed\u201d (ibid. 14, 15). He afterwards supports and\nillustrates his theory by a description of many natural phenomena, such\nas thunder, lightning, rain, and winds; with these are mixed up\naccounts of various incidents of life, e.g., an account of pestilence\ncontained in the following passage: \u201cIn a moment they die, and at\nmidnight; the people become tumultuous and pass away\u201d (xxxiv. 20).\nGreat wars are described in the following verse: \u201cHe breaketh in pieces\nmighty men without number, and setteth others in their stead\u201d (ibid.\n24). There are many more passages of this kind. In a similar manner the\nRevelation that reached Job (chap. xxxviii., chap. xli.), and explained\nto him the error of his whole belief, constantly describes natural\nobjects, and nothing else; it describes the elements, meteorological\nphenomena, and peculiarities of various kinds of living beings. The\nsky, the heavens, Orion and Pleiades are only mentioned in reference to\ntheir influence upon our atmosphere, so that Job\u2019s attention is in this\nprophecy only called to things below the lunar sphere. Elihu likewise\nderives instruction from the nature of various kinds of animals. Thus\nhe says: \u201cHe teacheth us through the beasts of the earth, and maketh us\nwise through the fowls of heaven\u201d (xxxv. 11). He dwells longest on the\nnature of the Leviathan, which possesses a combination of bodily\npeculiarities found separate in different animals, in those that walk,\nthose that swim, and those that fly. The description of all these\nthings serves to impress on our minds that we are unable to comprehend\nhow these transient creatures come into existence, or to imagine how\ntheir natural properties commenced to exist, and that these are not\nlike the things which we are able to produce. Much less can we compare\nthe manner in which God rules and manages His creatures with the manner\nin which we rule and manage certain beings. We must content ourselves\nwith this, and believe that nothing is hidden from God, as Elihu says:\n\u201cFor his eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings.\nThere is no darkness nor shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity\nmay hide themselves\u201d (xxxiv. 21, 22). But the term management, when\napplied to God, has not the same meaning which it has when applied to\nus; and when we say that He rules His creatures we do not mean that He\ndoes the same as we do when we rule over other beings. The term \u201crule\u201d\nhas not the same definition in both cases; it signifies two different\nnotions, which have nothing in common but the name. In the same manner,\nas there is a difference between works of nature and productions of\nhuman handicraft, so there is a difference between God\u2019s rule,\nprovidence, and intention in reference to all natural forces, and our\nrule, providence, and intention in reference to things which are the\nobjects of our rule, providence, and intention. This lesson is the\nprincipal object of the whole Book of Job; it lays down this principle\nof faith, and recommends us to derive a proof from nature, that we\nshould not fall into the error of imagining His knowledge to be similar\nto ours, or His intention, providence, and rule similar to ours. When\nwe know this we shall find everything that may befall us easy to bear;\nmishap will create no doubts in our hearts concerning God, whether He\nknows our affairs or not, whether He provides for us or abandons us. On\nthe contrary, our fate will increase our love of God; as is said in the\nend of this prophecy: \u201cTherefore I abhor myself and repent concerning\nthe dust and ashes\u201d (xlii. 6); and as our Sages say: \u201cThe pious do\neverything out of love, and rejoice in their own afflictions.\u201d (B. T.\nShabb. 88b.) If you pay to my words the attention which this treatise\ndemands, and examine all that is said in the Book of Job, all will be\nclear to you, and you will find that I have grasped and taken hold of\nthe whole subject; nothing has been left unnoticed, except such\nportions as are only introduced because of the context and the whole\nplan of the allegory. I have explained this method several times in the\ncourse of this treatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\n\nThe doctrine of trials is open to great objections; it is in fact more\nexposed to objections than any other thing taught in Scripture. It is\nmentioned in Scripture six times, as I will show in this chapter.\nPeople have generally the notion that trials consist in afflictions and\nmishaps sent by God to man, not as punishments for past sins, but as\ngiving opportunity for great reward. This principle is not mentioned in\nScripture in plain language, and it is only in one of the six places\nreferred to that the literal meaning conveys this notion. I will\nexplain the meaning of that passage later on. The principle taught in\nScripture is exactly the reverse; for it is said: \u201cHe is a God of\nfaithfulness, and there is no iniquity in him\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 4).\n\nThe teaching of our Sages, although some of them approve this general\nbelief [concerning trials], is on the whole against it. For they say,\n\u201cThere is no death without sin, and no affliction without\ntransgression.\u201d (See p. 285.) Every intelligent religious person should\nhave this faith, and should not ascribe any wrong to God, who is far\nfrom it; he must not assume that a person is innocent and perfect and\ndoes not deserve what has befallen him. The trials mentioned in\nScripture in the [six] passages, seem to have been tests and\nexperiments by which God desired to learn the intensity of the faith\nand the devotion of a man or a nation. [If this were the case] it would\nbe very difficult to comprehend the object of the trials, and yet the\nsacrifice of Isaac seems to be a case of this kind, as none witnessed\nit, but God and the two concerned [Abraham and Isaac]. Thus God says to\nAbraham, \u201cFor now I know that thou fearest God,\u201d etc. (Gen. xxii. 12).\nIn another passage it is said: \u201cFor the Lord your God proveth you to\nknow whether ye love,\u201d etc. (Deut. xiii. 4). Again, \u201cAnd to prove thee\nto know what was in thine heart,\u201d etc. (ibid. viii. 2). I will now\nremove all the difficulties.\n\nThe sole object of all the trials mentioned in Scripture is to teach\nman what he ought to do or believe; so that the event which forms the\nactual trial is not the end desired; it is but an example for our\ninstruction and guidance. Hence the words \u201cto know (la-da\u02bbat) whether\nye love,\u201d etc., do not mean that God desires to know whether they loved\nGod; for He already knows it; but la-da\u02bbat, \u201cto know,\u201d has here the\nsame meaning as in the phrase \u201cto know (la-da\u02bbat) that I am the Lord\nthat sanctifieth you\u201d (Exod. xxxi. 13), i.e., that all nations shall\nknow that I am the Lord who sanctifieth you. In a similar manner\nScripture says:\u2014If a man should rise, pretend to be a prophet, and show\nyou his signs by which he desired to convince you that his words are\ntrue, know that God intends thereby to prove to the nations how firmly\nyou believe in the truth of God\u2019s word, and how well you have\ncomprehended the true Essence of God; that you cannot be misled by any\ntempter to corrupt your faith in God. Your religion will then afford a\nguidance to all who seek the truth, and of all religions man will\nchoose that which is so firmly established that it is not shaken by the\nperformance of a miracle. For a miracle cannot prove that which is\nimpossible; it is useful only as a confirmation of that which is\npossible, as we have explained in our Mishneh-torah. (Yesode ha-torah\nvii. f. viii. 3.)\n\nHaving shown that the term \u201cto know\u201d means \u201cthat all people may know,\u201d\nwe apply this interpretation to the following words said in reference\nto the manna: \u201cTo humble thee, and to prove thee, to know what was in\nthine heart, whether thou wouldst keep his commandments, or not\u201d (Deut.\nviii. 2). All nations shall know, it shall be published throughout the\nworld, that those who devote themselves to the service of God are\nsupported beyond their expectation. In the same sense it was said when\nthe manna commenced to come down, \u201cthat I may prove them whether they\nwill walk in my law or no\u201d (Exod. xvi. 4); i.e., let every one who\ndesires try and see whether it is useful and sufficient to devote\nhimself to the service of God. It is, however, said a third time in\nreference to the manna: \u201cWho fed thee in the wilderness with manna,\nwhich thy fathers knew not, that he might humble thee, and that he\nmight prove thee, to do thee good at thy latter end\u201d (Deut. viii. 16).\nThis might induce us to think that God sometimes afflicts man for the\npurpose of increasing his reward. But in truth this is not the case. We\nmay rather assume one of the two following explanations; either this\npassage expresses the same idea as is expressed in the first and second\npassages, viz., to show [to all people] whether faith in God is\nsufficient to secure man\u2019s maintenance and his relief from care and\ntrouble, or not. Or the Hebrew term le-nassoteka means \u201cto accustom\nthee\u201d; the word is used in this sense in the following passage: \u201cShe\nhas not accustomed (nisseta) the sole of her foot to set it upon the\nground\u201d (ibid. xxviii. 56). The meaning of the above passage would then\nbe: \u201cGod has first trained you in the hardships of the wilderness, in\norder to increase your welfare when you enter the land of Canaan.\u201d It\nis indeed a fact that the transition from trouble to ease gives more\npleasure than continual ease. It is also known that the Israelites\nwould not have been able to conquer the land and fight with its\ninhabitants, if they had not previously undergone the trouble and\nhardship of the wilderness. Scripture says in reference to this: \u201cFor\nGod said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and\nthey return to Egypt. But God led the people about, through the way of\nthe wilderness of the Red Sea; and the children of Israel went up\nharnessed out of the land of Egypt\u201d (Exod. xiii. 17, 18). Ease destroys\nbravery, whilst trouble and care for food create strength; and this was\n[also for the Israelites] the good that ultimately came out of their\nwanderings in the wilderness. The passage, \u201cFor God is come to prove\nyou, and that his fear may be before your faces, that ye sin not\u201d\n(ibid. xx. 20), expresses the same idea as is expressed in Deuteronomy\n(xiii. 4) in reference to a person who prophesies in the name of idols,\nnamely in the words: \u201cFor the Lord your God proveth you to know whether\nye love the Lord.\u201d We have already explained the meaning of the latter\npassage. In the same sense Moses said to the Israelites when they stood\nround Mount Sinai: \u201cDo not fear; the object of this great sight which\nyou perceived is that you should see the truth with your own eyes. When\nthe Lord your God, in order to show your faithfulness to Him, will\nprove you by a false prophet, who will tell you the reverse of what you\nhave heard, you will remain firm and your steps will not slide. If I\nhad come as a messenger as you desired, and had told you that which had\nbeen said unto me and which you had not heard, you would perhaps\nconsider as true what another might tell you in opposition to that\nwhich you heard from me. But it is different now, as you have heard it\nin the midst of the great sight.\u201d\n\nThe account of Abraham our father binding his son, includes two great\nideas or principles of our faith. First, it shows us the extent and\nlimit of the fear of God. Abraham is commanded to perform a certain\nact, which is not equalled by any surrender of property or by any\nsacrifice of life, for it surpasses everything that can be done, and\nbelongs to the class of actions which are believed to be contrary to\nhuman feelings. He had been without child, and had been longing for a\nchild; he had great riches, and was expecting that a nation should\nspring from his seed. After all hope of a son had already been given\nup, a son was born unto him. How great must have been his delight in\nthe child! how intensely must he have loved him! And yet because he\nfeared God, and loved to do what God commanded, he thought little of\nthat beloved child, and set aside all his hopes concerning him, and\nconsented to kill him after a journey of three days. If the act by\nwhich he showed his readiness to kill his son had taken place\nimmediately when he received the commandment, it might have been the\nresult of confusion and not of consideration. But the fact that he\nperformed it three days after he had received the commandment, proves\nthe presence of thought, proper consideration, and careful examination\nof what is due to the Divine command and what is in accordance with the\nlove and fear of God. There is no necessity to look for the presence of\nany other idea or of anything that might have affected his emotions.\nFor Abraham did not hasten to kill Isaac out of fear that God might\nslay him or make him poor, but solely because it is man\u2019s duty to love\nand to fear God, even without hope of reward or fear of punishment. We\nhave repeatedly explained this. The angel, therefore, says to him, \u201cFor\nnow I know,\u201d etc. (ibid. ver. 12), that is, from this action, for which\nyou deserve to be truly called a God-fearing man, all people shall\nlearn how far we must go in the fear of God. This idea is confirmed in\nScripture; it is distinctly stated that one sole thing, fear of God, is\nthe object of the whole Law with its affirmative and negative precepts,\nits promises and its historical examples, for it is said, \u201cIf thou wilt\nnot observe to do all the words of this Law that are written in this\nbook, that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, the Lord\nthy God,\u201d etc. (Deut. xxviii. 58). This is one of the two purposes of\nthe \u02bbakedah (sacrifice or binding of Isaac).\n\nThe second purpose is to show how the prophets believed in the truth of\nthat which came to them from God by way of inspiration. We shall not\nthink that what the prophets heard or saw in allegorical figures may at\ntimes have included incorrect or doubtful elements, since the Divine\ncommunication was made to them, as we have shown, in a dream or a\nvision and through the imaginative faculty. Scripture thus tells us\nthat whatever the Prophet perceives in a prophetic vision, he considers\nas true and correct and not open to any doubt; it is in his eyes like\nall other things perceived by the senses or by the intellect. This is\nproved by the consent of Abraham to slay \u201chis only son whom he loved,\u201d\nas he was commanded, although the commandment was received in a dream\nor a vision. If the Prophets had any doubt or suspicion as regards the\ntruth of what they saw in a prophetic dream or perceived in a prophetic\nvision, they would not have consented to do what is unnatural, and\nAbraham would not have found in his soul strength enough to perform\nthat act, if he had any doubt [as regards the truth of the\ncommandment]. It was just the right thing that this lesson derived from\nthe \u02bbakedah (\u201csacrifice\u201d) should be taught through Abraham and a man\nlike Isaac. For Abraham was the first to teach the Unity of God, to\nestablish the faith [in Him], to cause it to remain among coming\ngenerations, and to win his fellow-men for his doctrine; as Scripture\nsays of him: \u201cI know him, that he will command,\u201d etc. (Gen. viii. 19).\nIn the same manner as he was followed by others in his true and\nvaluable opinions when they were heard from him, so also the principles\nshould be accepted that may be learnt from his actions; especially from\nthe act by which he confirmed the principle of the truth of prophecy,\nand showed how far we must go in the fear and the love of God.\n\nThis is the way how we have to understand the accounts of trials; we\nmust not think that God desires to examine us and to try us in order to\nknow what He did not know before. Far is this from Him; He is far above\nthat which ignorant and foolish people imagine concerning Him, in the\nevil of their thoughts. Note this.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\n\n[Man\u2019s] actions are divided as regards their object into four classes;\nthey are either purposeless, unimportant, in vain, or good. An action\nis in vain if the object which is sought by it is not obtained on\naccount of some obstacles. Thus people frequently use the phrase \u201cthou\nhast worked in vain\u201d in reference to a person who looks out for some\none and cannot find him; or who undertakes the troubles of a journey\nfor his business without profit. Our endeavours and exertions are in\nvain as regards a patient that is not cured. This applies to all\nactions which are intended for certain purposes that are not realized.\nPurposeless are such actions, which serve no purpose at all. Some\npersons, e.g., do something with their hands whilst thinking of\nsomething else. The actions of the insane and confused are of this\nkind. Unimportant are such actions by which a trivial object is sought,\nan object that is not necessary and is not of great use. This is the\ncase when a person dances without seeking to benefit his digestion by\nthat exercise, or performs certain actions for the purpose of causing\nlaughter. Such actions are certainly mere pastimes. Whether an action\nbelongs to this class or not depends on the intention of those who\nperform it, and on the degree of their perfection. For many things are\nnecessary or very useful in the opinion of one person and superfluous\nin the opinion of another. E.g., bodily exercise, in its different\nkinds, is necessary for the proper preservation of health in the\nopinion of him who understands the science of medicine; writing is\nconsidered as very useful by scholars. When people take exercise by\nplaying with the ball, wrestling, stretching out the hands or keeping\nback the breathing, or do certain things as preparation for writing,\nshape the pen and get the paper ready, such actions are mere pastimes\nin the eyes of the ignorant, but the wise do not consider them as\nunimportant. Useful are such actions as serve a proper purpose; being\neither necessary or useful for the purpose which is to be attained.\nThis division [of man\u2019s actions] is, as I believe, not open to any\nobjection. For every action is either intended for a certain purpose or\nis not intended; and if intended for a certain purpose, that purpose\nmay be important or unimportant, is sometimes attained and sometimes\nmissed. This division is therefore complete.\n\nAfter having explained this division, I contend that no intelligent\nperson can assume that any of the actions of God can be in vain,\npurposeless, or unimportant. According to our view and the view of all\nthat follow the Law of Moses, all actions of God are \u201cexceedingly\ngood.\u201d Thus Scripture says, \u201cAnd God saw everything that he had made,\nand behold, it was very good\u201d (Gen. i. 31). And that which God made for\na certain thing is necessary or [at least] very useful for the\nexistence of that thing. Thus food is necessary for the existence of\nliving beings; the possession of eyes is very useful to man during his\nlife, although food only serves to sustain living beings a certain\ntime, and the senses are only intended to procure to animals the\nadvantages of sensation. The philosophers likewise assume that in\nNature there is nothing in vain, so that everything that is not the\nproduct of human industry serves a certain purpose, which may be known\nor unknown to us. There are thinkers that assume that God does not\ncreate one thing for the sake of another, that existing things are not\nto each other in the relation of cause and effect; that they are all\nthe direct result of the Will of God, and do not serve any purpose.\nAccording to this opinion we cannot ask why has He made this and not\nthat; for He does what pleases Him, without following a fixed system.\nThose who defend this theory must consider the actions of God as\npurposeless, and even as inferior to purposeless actions; for when we\nperform purposeless actions, our attention is engaged by other things\nand we do not know what we are doing; but God, according to these\ntheorists, knows what He is doing, and knowingly does it for no purpose\nor use whatever. The absurdity of assuming that some of God\u2019s actions\nare trivial, is apparent even at first sight, and no notice need be\ntaken of the nonsensical idea that monkeys were created for our\npastime. Such opinions originate only in man\u2019s ignorance of the nature\nof transient beings, and in his overlooking the principle that it was\nintended by the Creator to produce in its present form everything whose\nexistence is possible; a different form was not decreed by the Divine\nWisdom, and the existence [of objects of a different form] is therefore\nimpossible, because the existence of all things depends on the decree\nof God\u2019s wisdom. Those who hold that God\u2019s works serve no purpose\nwhatever believe that an examination of the totality of existing things\ncompels them to adopt this theory. They ask what is the purpose of the\nwhole Universe? they necessarily answer, like all those who believe in\nthe Creation, that it was created because God willed it so, and for no\nother purpose. The same answer they apply to all parts of the Universe,\nand do not admit that the hole in the uvea and the transparency of the\ncornea are intended for the purpose of allowing the spiritus visus to\npass and to perceive certain objects; they do not assume that these\ncircumstances are causes for the sight; the hole in the uvea and the\ntransparent matter over it are not there because of the sight, but\nbecause of the Will of God, although the sense of sight could have been\ncreated in a different form. There are passages in the Bible which at\nfirst sight we might understand to imply this theory. E.g., \u201cThe Lord\nhath done whatever he pleased\u201d (Ps. cxxxv. 6); \u201cHis soul desired it and\nhe made it\u201d (Job xxiii. 13); \u201cWho will say unto thee, What doest thou?\u201d\n(Eccles. viii. 4). The meaning of these and similar verses is this:\nwhatever God desires to do is necessarily done; there is nothing that\ncould prevent the realization of His will. The object of His will is\nonly that which is possible, and of the things possible only such as\nHis wisdom decrees upon. When God desires to produce the best work, no\nobstacle or hindrance intervenes between Him and that work. This is the\nopinion held by all religious people, also by the philosophers; it is\nalso our opinion. For although we believe that God created the Universe\nfrom nothing, most of our wise and learned men believe that the\nCreation was not the exclusive result of His will; but His wisdom,\nwhich we are unable to comprehend, made the actual existence of the\nUniverse necessary. The same unchangeable wisdom found it as necessary\nthat non-existence should precede the existence of the Universe. Our\nSages frequently express this idea in the explanation of the words, \u201cHe\nhath made everything beautiful in his time\u201d (Eccles. iii. 11), only in\norder to avoid that which is objectionable, viz., the opinion that God\ndoes things without any purpose whatever. This is the belief of most of\nour Theologians; and in a similar manner have the Prophets expressed\nthe idea that all parts of natural products are well arranged, in good\norder, connected with each other, and stand to each other in the\nrelation of cause and effect; nothing of them is purposeless, trivial,\nor in vain; they are all the result of great wisdom. Comp. \u201cO Lord, how\nmanifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is\nfull of thy riches\u201d (Ps. civ. 24); \u201cAnd all his works are done in\ntruth\u201d (ibid. xxxiii. 4); \u201cThe Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth\u201d\n(Prov. iii. 19). This idea occurs frequently; there is no necessity to\nbelieve otherwise; philosophic speculation leads to the same result;\nviz., that in the whole of Nature there is nothing purposeless,\ntrivial, or unnecessary, especially in the Nature of the spheres, which\nare in the best condition and order, in accordance with their superior\nsubstance.\n\nKnow that the difficulties which lead to confusion in the question what\nis the purpose of the Universe or of any of its parts, arise from two\ncauses: first, man has an erroneous idea of himself, and believes that\nthe whole world exists only for his sake; secondly, he is ignorant both\nabout the nature of the sublunary world, and about the Creator\u2019s\nintention to give existence to all beings whose existence is possible,\nbecause existence is undoubtedly good. The consequences of that error\nand of the ignorance about the two things named, are doubts and\nconfusion, which lead many to imagine that some of God\u2019s works are\ntrivial, others purposeless, and others in vain. Those who adopt this\nabsurd idea that God\u2019s actions are utterly purposeless, and refuse to\nconsider them as the result of His wisdom, are afraid they might\notherwise be compelled to admit the theory of the Eternity of the\nUniverse, and guard themselves against it by the above theory. I have\nalready told you the view which is set forth in Scripture on this\nquestion, and which it is proper to accept. It is this: it is not\nunreasonable to assume that the works of God, their existence and\npreceding non-existence, are the result of His wisdom, but we are\nunable to understand many of the ways of His wisdom in His works. On\nthis principle the whole Law of Moses is based; it begins with this\nprinciple: \u201cAnd God saw all that He had made, and, behold, it was very\ngood\u201d (Gen. i. 31); and it ends with this principle: \u201cThe Rock, perfect\nis His work\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 4). Note it. When you examine this view and\nthat of the philosophers, taking into consideration all preceding\nchapters which are connected with this subject, you will find that\nthere is no other difference of opinion as regards any portions of the\nUniverse, except that the philosophers believe in the Eternity of the\nUniverse and we believe in the Creation. Note this.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\n\nAs Theologians are divided on the question whether the actions of God\nare the result of His wisdom, or only of His will without being\nintended for any purpose whatever, so they are also divided as regards\nthe object of the commandments which God gave us. Some of them hold\nthat the commandments have no object at all; and are only dictated by\nthe will of God. Others are of opinion that all commandments and\nprohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim;\nconsequently there is a reason for each one of the precepts; they are\nenjoined because they are useful. All of us, the common people as well\nas the scholars, believe that there is a reason for every precept,\nalthough there are commandments the reason of which is unknown to us,\nand in which the ways of God\u2019s wisdom are incomprehensible. This view\nis distinctly expressed in Scripture; comp. \u201crighteous statutes and\njudgments\u201d (Deut. iv. 8); \u201cthe judgments of the Lord are true, and\nrighteous altogether\u201d (Ps. xix. 10). There are commandments which are\ncalled \u1e25u\u1e33\u1e33im, \u201cordinances,\u201d like the prohibition of wearing garments\nof wool and linen (sha\u02bbatnez), boiling meat and milk together, and the\nsending of the goat [into the wilderness on the Day of Atonement]. Our\nSages use in reference to them phrases like the following: \u201cThese are\nthings which I have fully ordained for thee; and you dare not criticize\nthem\u201d; \u201cYour evil inclination is turned against them\u201d; and \u201cnon-Jews\nfind them strange.\u201d But our Sages generally do not think that such\nprecepts have no cause whatever, and serve no purpose; for this would\nlead us to assume that God\u2019s actions are purposeless. On the contrary,\nthey hold that even these ordinances have a cause, and are certainly\nintended for some use, although it is not known to us; owing either to\nthe deficiency of our knowledge or the weakness of our intellect.\nConsequently there is a cause for every commandment; every positive or\nnegative precept serves a useful object; in some cases the usefulness\nis evident, e.g., the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the\nusefulness is not so evident, e.g., the prohibition of enjoying the\nfruit of a tree in the first three years (Lev. xix. 23), or of a\nvineyard in which other seeds have been growing (Deut. xxii. 9). Those\ncommandments, whose object is generally evident, are called \u201cjudgments\u201d\n(mishpatim); those whose object is not generally clear are called\n\u201cordinances\u201d (\u1e25u\u1e33\u1e33im). Thus they say [in reference to the words of\nMoses]: Ki lo dabar rek hu mi-kem (lit. \u201cfor it is not a vain thing for\nyou,\u201d Deut. xxxii. 74); \u201cIt is not in vain, and if it is in vain, it is\nonly so through you.\u201d That is to say, the giving of these commandments\nis not a vain thing and without any useful object; and if it appears so\nto you in any commandment, it is owing to the deficiency in your\ncomprehension. You certainly know the famous saying that Solomon knew\nthe reason for all commandments except that of the \u201cred heifer.\u201d Our\nSages also said that God concealed the causes of commandments, lest\npeople should despise them, as Solomon did in respect to three\ncommandments, the reason for which is clearly stated. In this sense\nthey always speak; and Scriptural texts support the idea. I have,\nhowever, found one utterance made by them in Bereshit-rabba (sect.\nxliv.), which might at first sight appear to imply that some\ncommandments have no other reason but the fact that they are commanded,\nthat no other object is intended by them, and that they do not serve\nany useful object. I mean the following passage: What difference does\nit make to God whether a beast is killed by cutting the neck in front\nor in the back? Surely the commandments are only intended as a means of\ntrying man; in accordance with the verse, \u201cThe word of God is a test\u201d\n(lit. tried) (Ps. xviii. 31). Although this passage is very strange,\nand has no parallel in the writings of our Sages, I explain it, as you\nshall soon hear, in such a manner that I remain in accord with the\nmeaning of their words and do not depart from the principle which we\nagreed upon, that the commandments serve a useful object; \u201cfor it is\nnot a vain thing for you\u201d; \u201cI have not said to the seed of Jacob, seek\nme in vain. I the Lord speak righteousness, declare that which is\nright\u201d (Isa. xlv. 19). I will now tell you what intelligent persons\nought to believe in this respect; namely, that each commandment has\nnecessarily a cause, as far as its general character is concerned, and\nserves a certain object; but as regards its details we hold that it has\nno ulterior object. Thus killing animals for the purpose of obtaining\ngood food is certainly useful, as we intend to show (below, ch.\nxlviii.); that, however, the killing should not be performed by ne\u1e25irah\n(poleaxing the animal), but by she\u1e25itah (cutting the neck), and by\ndividing the \u0153sophagus and the windpipe in a certain place; these\nregulations and the like are nothing but tests for man\u2019s obedience. In\nthis sense you will understand the example quoted by our Sages [that\nthere is no difference] between killing the animal by cutting its neck\nin front and cutting it in the back. I give this instance only because\nit has been mentioned by our Sages; but in reality [there is some\nreason for these regulations]. For as it has become necessary to eat\nthe flesh of animals, it was intended by the above regulations to\nensure an easy death and to effect it by suitable means; whilst\ndecapitation requires a sword or a similar instrument, the she\u1e25itah can\nbe performed with any instrument; and in order to ensure an easy death\nour Sages insisted that the knife should be well sharpened.\n\nA more suitable instance can be cited from the detailed commandments\nconcerning sacrifices. The law that sacrifices should be brought is\nevidently of great use, as will be shown by us (infra, chap. xlvi.);\nbut we cannot say why one offering should be a lamb, whilst another is\na ram; and why a fixed number of them should be brought. Those who\ntrouble themselves to find a cause for any of these detailed rules, are\nin my eyes void of sense; they do not remove any difficulties, but\nrather increase them. Those who believe that these detailed rules\noriginate in a certain cause, are as far from the truth as those who\nassume that the whole law is useless. You must know that Divine Wisdom\ndemanded it\u2014or, if you prefer, say that circumstances made it\nnecessary\u2014that there should be parts [of His work] which have no\ncertain object; and as regards the Law, it appears to be impossible\nthat it should not include some matter of this kind. That it cannot be\navoided may be seen from the following instance. You ask why must a\nlamb be sacrificed and not a ram? but the same question would be asked,\nwhy a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb, so long as one\nparticular kind is required. The same is to be said as to the question\nwhy were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight; the same question might\nhave been asked if there were eight, ten, or twenty lambs, so long as\nsome definite number of lambs were sacrificed. It is almost similar to\nthe nature of a thing which can receive different forms, but actually\nreceives one of them. We must not ask why it has this form and not\nanother which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the\nsame question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the\nother possible forms. Note this, and understand it. The repeated\nassertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all commandments, and\nthe tradition that Solomon knew them, refer to the general purpose of\nthe commandments, and not to the object of every detail. This being the\ncase, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen\nprecepts into classes; each class will include many precepts of the\nsame kind, or related to each other by their character. I will [first]\nexplain the reason of each class, and show its undoubted and undisputed\nobject, and then I shall discuss each commandment in the class, and\nexpound its reason. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason\nfor which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been\nable to comprehend in some cases even the object of many of the\nconditions and details as far as these can be discovered. You will hear\nall this later on. But in order to fully explain these reasons I must\npremise several chapters; in these I will discuss principles which form\nthe basis of my theory. I will now begin these chapters.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII\n\n\nThe general object of the Law is twofold: the well-being of the soul,\nand the well-being of the body. The well-being of the soul is promoted\nby correct opinions communicated to the people according to their\ncapacity. Some of these opinions are therefore imparted in a plain\nform, others allegorically; because certain opinions are in their plain\nform too strong for the capacity of the common people. The well-being\nof the body is established by a proper management of the relations in\nwhich we live one to another. This we can attain in two ways: first by\nremoving all violence from our midst; that is to say, that we do not do\nevery one as he pleases, desires, and is able to do; but every one of\nus does that which contributes towards the common welfare. Secondly, by\nteaching every one of us such good morals as must produce a good social\nstate. Of these two objects, the one, the well-being of the soul, or\nthe communication of correct opinions, comes undoubtedly first in rank,\nbut the other, the well-being of the body, the government of the state,\nand the establishment of the best possible relations among men, is\nanterior in nature and time. The latter object is required first; it is\nalso treated [in the Law] most carefully and most minutely, because the\nwell-being of the soul can only be obtained after that of the body has\nbeen secured. For it has already been found that man has a double\nperfection: the first perfection is that of the body, and the second\nperfection is that of the soul. The first consists in the most healthy\ncondition of his material relations, and this is only possible when man\nhas all his wants supplied, as they arise; if he has his food, and\nother things needful for his body, e.g., shelter, bath, and the like.\nBut one man alone cannot procure all this; it is impossible for a\nsingle man to obtain this comfort; it is only possible in society,\nsince man, as is well known, is by nature social.\n\nThe second perfection of man consists in his becoming an actually\nintelligent being; i.e., he knows about the things in existence all\nthat a person perfectly developed is capable of knowing. This second\nperfection certainly does not include any action or good conduct, but\nonly knowledge, which is arrived at by speculation, or established by\nresearch.\n\nIt is clear that the second and superior kind of perfection can only be\nattained when the first perfection has been acquired; for a person that\nis suffering from great hunger, thirst, heat, or cold, cannot grasp an\nidea even if communicated by others, much less can he arrive at it by\nhis own reasoning. But when a person is in possession of the first\nperfection, then he may possibly acquire the second perfection, which\nis undoubtedly of a superior kind, and is alone the source of eternal\nlife. The true Law, which as we said is one, and beside which there is\nno other Law, viz., the Law of our teacher Moses, has for its purpose\nto give us the twofold perfection. It aims first at the establishment\nof good mutual relations among men by removing injustice and creating\nthe noblest feelings. In this way the people in every land are enabled\nto stay and continue in one condition, and every one can acquire his\nfirst perfection. Secondly, it seeks to train us in faith, and to\nimpart correct and true opinions when the intellect is sufficiently\ndeveloped. Scripture clearly mentions the twofold perfection, and tells\nus that its acquisition is the object of all the divine commandments.\nComp. \u201cAnd the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the\nLord our God, for our good always, that he might preserve us alive as\nit is this day\u201d (Deut. vi. 24). Here the second perfection is first\nmentioned because it is of greater importance, being, as we have shown,\nthe ultimate aim of man\u2019s existence. This perfection is expressed in\nthe phrase, \u201cfor our good always.\u201d You know the interpretation of our\nSages, \u201c\u2018that it may be well with thee\u2019 (ibid. xxii. 7), namely, in the\nworld that is all good, \u2018and that thou mayest prolong thy days\u2019\n(ibid.), i.e., in the world that is all eternal.\u201d In the same sense I\nexplain the words, \u201cfor our good always,\u201d to mean that we may come into\nthe world that is all good and eternal, where we may live permanently;\nand the words, \u201cthat he might preserve us alive as it is this day,\u201d I\nexplain as referring to our first and temporal existence, to that of\nour body, which cannot be in a perfect and good condition except by the\nco-operation of society, as has been shown by us.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII\n\n\nIt is necessary to bear in mind that Scripture only teaches the chief\npoints of those true principles which lead to the true perfection of\nman, and only demands in general terms faith in them. Thus Scripture\nteaches the Existence, the Unity, the Omniscience, the Omnipotence, the\nWill, and the Eternity of God. All this is given in the form of final\nresults, but they cannot be understood fully and accurately except\nafter the acquisition of many kinds of knowledge. Scripture further\ndemands belief in certain truths, the belief in which is indispensable\nin regulating our social relations; such is the belief that God is\nangry with those who disobey Him, for it leads us to the fear and dread\nof disobedience [to the will of God]. There are other truths in\nreference to the whole of the Universe which form the substance of the\nvarious and many kinds of speculative sciences, and afford the means of\nverifying the above-mentioned principles as their final result. But\nScripture does not so distinctly prescribe the belief in them as it\ndoes in the first case; it is implied in the commandment, \u201cto love the\nLord\u201d (Deut. xi. 13). It may be inferred from the words, \u201cAnd thou\nshalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul,\nand with all thy might\u201d (ibid. vi. 5), what stress is laid on this\ncommandment to love God. We have already shown in the Mishneh-torah\n(Yes. ha-torah ii. 2) that this love is only possible when we\ncomprehend the real nature of things, and understand the divine wisdom\ndisplayed therein. We have likewise mentioned there what our Sages\nremark on this subject.\n\nThe result of all these preliminary remarks is this: The reason of a\ncommandment, whether positive or negative, is clear, and its usefulness\nevident, if it directly tends to remove injustice, or to teach good\nconduct that furthers the well-being of society, or to impart a truth\nwhich ought to be believed either on its own merit or as being\nindispensable for facilitating the removal of injustice or the teaching\nof good morals. There is no occasion to ask for the object of such\ncommandments; for no one can, e.g., be in doubt as to the reason why we\nhave been commanded to believe that God is one; why we are forbidden to\nmurder, to steal, and to take vengeance, or to retaliate, or why we are\ncommanded to love one another. But there are precepts concerning which\npeople are in doubt, and of divided opinions, some believing that they\nare mere commands, and serve no purpose whatever, whilst others believe\nthat they serve a certain purpose, which, however, is unknown to man.\nSuch are those precepts which in their literal meaning do not seem to\nfurther any of the three above-named results: to impart some truth, to\nteach some moral, or to remove injustice. They do not seem to have any\ninfluence upon the well-being of the soul by imparting any truth, or\nupon the well-being of the body by suggesting such ways and rules as\nare useful in the government of a state, or in the management of a\nhousehold. Such are the prohibitions of wearing garments containing\nwool and linen; of sowing divers seeds, or of boiling meat and milk\ntogether; the commandment of covering the blood [of slaughtered beasts\nand birds], the ceremony of breaking the neck of a calf [in case of a\nperson being found slain, and the murderer being unknown]; the law\nconcerning the first-born of an ass, and the like. I am prepared to\ntell you my explanation of all these commandments, and to assign for\nthem a true reason supported by proof, with the exception of some minor\nrules, and of a few commandments, as I have mentioned above. I will\nshow that all these and similar laws must have some bearing upon one of\nthe following three things, viz., the regulation of our opinions, or\nthe improvement of our social relations, which implies two things, the\nremoval of injustice, and the teaching of good morals. Consider what we\nsaid of the opinions [implied in the laws]; in some cases the law\ncontains a truth which is itself the only object of that law, as e.g.,\nthe truth of the Unity, Eternity, and Incorporeality of God; in other\ncases, that truth is only the means of securing the removal of\ninjustice, or the acquisition of good morals; such is the belief that\nGod is angry with those who oppress their fellow-men, as it is said,\n\u201cMine anger will be kindled, and I will slay,\u201d etc. (Exod. xxii. 23);\nor the belief that God hears the crying of the oppressed and vexed, to\ndeliver them out of the hands of the oppressor and tyrant, as it is\nwritten, \u201cAnd it shall come to pass, when he will cry unto me, that I\nwill hear, for I am gracious\u201d (Exod. xxii. 25).\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX\n\n\nIt is well known that the Patriarch Abraham was brought up in the\nreligion and the opinion of the Sabeans, that there is no divine being\nexcept the stars. I will tell you in this chapter their works which are\nat present extant in Arabic translations, and also in their ancient\nchronicles; and I will show you their opinion and their practice\naccording to these books. You will then see clearly that they consider\nthe stars as deities, and the sun as the chief deity. They believe that\nall the seven stars are gods, but the two luminaries are greater than\nall the rest. They say distinctly that the sun governs the world, both\nthat which is above and that which is below; these are exactly their\nexpressions. In these books, and in their chronicles, the history of\nAbraham our father is given in the following manner. Abraham was\nbrought up in Kutha; when he differed from the people and declared that\nthere is a Maker besides the sun, they raised certain objections, and\nmentioned in their arguments the evident and manifest action of the sun\nin the Universe. \u201cYou are right,\u201d said Abraham; \u201c[the sun acts in the\nsame manner] as \u2018the axe in the hand of him that hews with it.\u2019\u201d Then\nsome of his arguments against his opponents are mentioned. In short,\nthe king put him in prison; but he continued many days, while in\nprison, to argue against them. At last the king was afraid that Abraham\nmight corrupt the kingdom, and turn the people away from their\nreligion; he therefore expelled Abraham into Syria, after having\ndeprived him of all his property.\n\nThis is their account which you find clearly stated in the book called\nThe Nabatean Agriculture. Nothing is said there of the account given in\nour trustworthy books, nor do they mention what he learnt by way of\nprophecy; for they refused to believe him, because he attacked their\nevil doctrine. I do not doubt that when he attacked the doctrine of all\nhis fellow-men, he was cursed, despised, and scorned by these people\nwho adhered to their erroneous opinions. When he submitted to this\ntreatment for the sake of God, as ought to be done for the sake of His\nglory, God said to him, \u201cAnd I will bless them that bless thee, and\ncurse them that curse thee\u201d (Gen. xii. 3). The result of the course\nwhich Abraham took, is the fact that most people, as we see at present,\nagree in praising him, and being proud of him; so that even those who\nare not his descendants call themselves by his name. No one opposes\nhim, and no one ignores his merits, except some ignoble remnants of the\nnations left in the remote corners of the earth, like the savage Turks\nin the extreme North, and the Indians in the extreme South. These are\nremnants of the Sabeans, who once filled the earth. Those who were able\nto think, and were philosophers in those days, could only raise\nthemselves to the idea that God is the spirit of the spheres; the\nspheres with their stars being the body, and God the spirit. Abu-becr\nal-Zaig mentions this in his Commentary on the book of Physics.\n\nAll the Sabeans thus believed in the eternity of the Universe, the\nheavens being in their opinion God. Adam was in their belief a human\nbeing born from male and female, like the rest of mankind; he was only\ndistinguished from his fellow-men by being a prophet sent by the moon;\nhe accordingly called men to the worship of the moon, and he wrote\nseveral works on agriculture. The Sabeans further relate that Noah was\nan agriculturist, and that he was not pleased with the worship of\nidols; they blame him for that, and say that he did not worship any\nimage. In their writings we meet even with the statement that Noah was\nrebuked and imprisoned because he worshipped God, and with many other\naccounts about him. The Sabeans contend that Seth differed from his\nfather Adam, as regards the worship of the moon. They manufactured\nridiculous stories, which prove that their authors were very deficient\nin knowledge, that they were by no means philosophers, but on the\ncontrary were extremely ignorant persons. Adam, they say, left the\ntorrid zone near India and entered the region of Babylon, bringing with\nhim wonderful things, such as a golden tree, that was growing, and had\nleaves and branches; a stone tree of the same kind, and a fresh leaf of\na tree proof against fire. He related that there was a tree which could\nshelter ten thousand men, although it had only the height of a man; two\nleaves he brought with him, each of which was sufficient to cover two\nmen. Of these stories the Sabeans have a wonderful abundance. I am\nsurprised that persons who think that the Universe is eternal, can yet\nbelieve in these things which nature cannot produce, as is known to\nevery student of Natural Science. They only mention Adam, and relate\nthe above stories about him, in order to support their theory of the\nEternity of the Universe; from this theory they then derive the\ndoctrine that the stars and the spheres are deities. When [Abraham] the\n\u201cPillar of the World\u201d appeared, he became convinced that there is a\nspiritual Divine Being, which is not a body, nor a force residing in a\nbody, but is the author of the spheres and the stars; and he saw the\nabsurdity of the tales in which he had been brought up. He therefore\nbegan to attack the belief of the Sabeans, to expose the falsehood of\ntheir opinions, and to proclaim publicly in opposition to them, \u201cthe\nname of the Lord, the God of the Universe\u201d (Gen. xxi. 33), which\nproclamation included at the same time the Existence of God, and the\nCreation of the Universe by God.\n\nIn accordance with the Sabean theories images were erected to the\nstars, golden images to the sun, images of silver to the moon, and they\nattributed the metals and the climates to the influence of the planets,\nsaying that a certain planet is the god of a certain zone. They built\ntemples, placed in them images, and assumed that the stars sent forth\ntheir influence upon these images, which are thereby enabled (to speak)\nto understand, to comprehend, to inspire human beings, and to tell them\nwhat is useful to them. They apply the same to trees which fall to the\nlot of these stars. When, namely, a certain tree, which is peculiar to\na certain star, is dedicated to the name of this star, and certain\nthings are done for the tree and to the tree, the spiritual force of\nthat star which influences that tree, inspires men, and speaks to them\nwhen they are asleep. All this is written in their works, to which I\nwill call your attention. It applies to the \u201cprophets of Baal,\u201d and the\n\u201cprophets of Asherah,\u201d mentioned in Scripture, in whose hearts the\nSabean theories had taken root, who forsook God, and called, \u201cBaal,\nhear us\u201d (1 Kings xviii. 26); because these theories were then general,\nignorance had spread, and the madness with which people adhered to this\nkind of imaginations had increased in the world. When such opinions\nwere adopted among the Israelites, they had observers of clouds,\nenchanters, witches, charmers, consulters with familiar spirits,\nwizards, and necromancers.\n\nWe have shown in our large work, Mishneh-torah (Hilkot, \u02bbAbodah-zarah\ni. 3), that Abraham was the first that opposed these theories by\nargument and by soft and persuasive speech. He induced these people, by\nshowing kindness to them, to serve God. Afterwards came the chief of\nthe prophets and completed the work by the commandment to slay those\nunbelievers, to blot out their name, and to uproot them from the land\nof the living. Comp. \u201cYe shall destroy their altars,\u201d etc. (Exod.\nxxxiv. 13). He forbade us to follow their ways; he said, \u201cYe shall not\nwalk in the manners of the heathen,\u201d etc. (Lev. xx. 23). You know from\nthe repeated declarations in the Law that the principal purpose of the\nwhole Law was the removal and utter destruction of idolatry, and all\nthat is connected therewith, even its name, and everything that might\nlead to any such practices, e.g., acting as a consulter with familiar\nspirits, or as a wizard, passing children through the fire, divining,\nobserving the clouds, enchanting, charming, or inquiring of the dead.\nThe law prohibits us to imitate the heathen in any of these deeds, and\na fortiori to adopt them entirely. It is distinctly said in the Law\nthat everything which idolaters consider as service to their gods, and\na means of approaching them, is rejected and despised by God; comp.\n\u201cfor every abomination to the Lord, which he hateth, have they done\nunto their gods\u201d (Deut. xii. 31). In the books which I shall name to\nyou later on, it is stated that on certain occasions they offered to\nthe sun, their greatest god, seven beetles, and seven mice, and seven\nbats. This alone suffices to show how disgusting their practice must be\nto human nature. Thus all precepts cautioning against idolatry, or\nagainst that which is connected therewith, leads to it, or is related\nto it, are evidently useful. They all tend to save us from the evil\ndoctrines that deprive us of everything useful for the acquisition of\nthe twofold perfection of man, by leading to those absurd practices in\nwhich our fathers and ancestors have been brought up. Comp. \u201cAnd Joshua\nsaid unto all the people, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, your\nfathers dwelt on the other side of the river in old time, even Terah,\nthe father of Abraham, and the father of Nahor, and they served other\ngods\u201d (Josh. xxiv. 2). It is in reference to these [idolatrous ideas]\nthat the true prophets exclaim, \u201cThey walked after [vain] things, which\ndo not profit.\u201d How great is the usefulness of every precept that\ndelivers us from this great error, and leads us back to the true faith:\nthat God, the Creator of all things, rules the Universe; that He must\nbe served, loved, and feared, and not those imaginary deities.\nAccording to this faith we approach the true God, and obtain His favour\nwithout having recourse to burdensome means; for nothing else is\nrequired but to love and fear Him; this is the aim in serving God, as\nwill be shown. Comp. \u201cAnd now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God\nrequire of thee but to fear the Lord\u201d? etc. (Deut. x. 12). I shall\ncomplete this subject later on; now let us return to the theme [of this\nchapter].\n\nI say that my knowledge of the belief, practice, and worship of the\nSabeans has given me an insight into many of the divine precepts, and\nhas led me to know their reason. You will confirm it when I shall give\nthe reason of commandments which are seemingly purposeless. I will\nmention to you the works from which you may learn all that I know of\nthe religion and the opinions of the Sabeans; you will thereby obtain a\ntrue knowledge of my theory as regards the purpose of the divine\nprecepts.\n\nThe great book on this subject is the book On the Nabatean Agriculture,\ntranslated by Ibn Wahshiya. In a succeeding chapter I shall explain why\nthe Sabeans had their religious doctrines written in a work on\nagriculture. The book is full of the absurdities of idolatrous people,\nand with those things to which the minds of the multitude easily turn\nand adhere [perseveringly]; it speaks of talismans, the means of\ndirecting the influence [of the stars]; witchcraft, spirits, and demons\nthat dwell in the wilderness. There occur also in this book great\nabsurdities, which are ridiculous in the eyes of intelligent people.\nThey were intended as a criticism and an attack on the evident miracles\nby which all people learnt that there exists a God who is judge over\nall people. Comp. \u201cThat thou mayest know how that the earth is the\nLord\u2019s\u201d (Exod. ix. 29), \u201cThat I am the Lord in the midst of the earth\u201d\n(ibid. viii. 18).\n\nThe book describes things as having been mentioned by Adam in his book;\na tree which is found in India, and has the peculiarity that any branch\ntaken from it and thrown to the ground creeps along and moves like\nserpents; it also mentions a tree which in its root resembles a human\nbeing, utters a loud sound, and speaks a word or words; a plant is\nmentioned which has this peculiarity, that a leaf of it put on the neck\nof a person conceals that person from the sight of men, and enables him\nto enter or leave a place without being seen, and if any part of it is\nburnt in open air a noise and terrible sounds are heard whilst the\nsmoke ascends. Numerous fables of this kind are introduced in the\ndescription of the wonders of plants and the properties of agriculture.\nThis leads the author to argue against the [true] miracles, and to say\nthat they were the result of artifice.\n\nAmong other fables we read there that the plant althea, one of the\nAsherot, which they made, as I told you, stood in Nineveh twelve\nthousand years. This tree had once a quarrel with the mandragora, which\nwanted to take the place of the former. The person who had been\ninspired by this tree ceased to receive inspiration; when after some\ntime the prophetical power had returned to him, he was told by the\nalthea that the latter had been engaged in a dispute with the\nmandragora. He was then commanded to write to the magicians that they\nshould decide whether the althea or the mandragora was better and more\neffective in witchcraft. It is a long story, and you may learn from it,\nwhen you read it, the opinions and the wisdom of the men of that time.\nSuch were in those days of darkness the wise men of Babel, to whom\nreference is made in Scripture, and such were the beliefs in which they\nwere trained. And were it not that the theory of the Existence of God\nis at present generally accepted, our days would now have been darker\nthan those days, though in other respects. I return now to my subject.\n\nIn that book the following story is also related: One of the idolatrous\nprophets, named Tammuz, called upon the king to worship the seven\nplanets and the twelve constellations of the Zodiac; whereupon the king\nkilled him in a dreadful manner. The night of his death the images from\nall parts of the land came together in the temple of Babylon which was\ndevoted to the image of the Sun, the great golden image. This image,\nwhich was suspended between heaven and earth, came down into the midst\nof the temple, and surrounded by all other images commenced to mourn\nfor Tammuz, and to relate what had befallen him. All other images cried\nand mourned the whole night; at dawn they flew away and returned to\ntheir temples in every corner of the earth. Hence the regular custom\narose for the women to weep, lament, mourn, and cry for Tammuz on the\nfirst day of the month of Tammuz.\n\nConsider what opinions people had in these days. The legend of Tammuz\nis very old among the Sabeans. This book will disclose to you most of\nthe perverse ideas and practices of the Sabeans, including their\nfeasts. But you must be careful and must not be misled to think that we\nhave real incidents in the life of Adam, or of any other person, or any\nreal fact in the stories which they relate about Adam, the serpent, the\ntree of knowledge of good and evil, and the allusion to the garment of\nAdam which he had not been accustomed to wear. A little consideration\nwill lay open the falsehood of all these accounts; it will show that\nthey have been invented in imitation of the Pentateuch when it became\nknown among the nations. The account of the Creation was heard, and it\nwas taken entirely in its literal sense. They have done this in order\nthat the ignorant may hear it, and be persuaded to assume the Eternity\nof the Universe, and to believe that the Scriptural account contained\nfacts which happened in the manner as has been assumed by the Sabeans.\n\nIt is by no means necessary to point this out to men like you. You have\nacquired sufficient knowledge to keep your mind free from the\nabsurdities of the Kasdim, Chaldeans, and Sabeans, who are bare of\nevery true science. But I wish to exhort you that you should caution\nothers, for ordinary people are very much inclined to believe these\nfables.\n\nTo the same class of books we count the book Istimachis, attributed to\nAristotle, who can by no means have been its author; also the books on\nTalismans, such as the book of Tomtom; the book al-Sarb; the book on\nthe degrees of the sphere and the constellations rising with each\ndegree; a book on Talismans attributed to Aristotle, a book ascribed to\nHermes, a book of the Sabean Is\u1e25ak in defence of the Sabean religion,\nand his large work on Sabean customs, details of their religion,\nceremonies, festivals, offerings, prayers and other things relating to\ntheir faith.\n\nAll these books which I have mentioned are works on idolatry translated\ninto Arabic; there is no doubt that they form a very small portion in\ncomparison to that which has not been translated, and that which is no\nlonger extant, but has been lost in the course of time. But those works\nwhich are at present extant, include most of the opinions of the\nSabeans and their practices, which are to some degree still in vogue in\nthe world.\n\nThey describe how temples are built and images of metal and stone\nplaced in them, altars erected and sacrifices and various kinds of food\nare offered thereon, festivals celebrated, meetings held in the temples\nfor prayer and other kinds of service; how they select certain very\ndistinguished places and call them temples of Intellectual Images (or\nForms); how they make images \u201con the high mountains\u201d (Deut. xii. 2),\nrear asherot, erect pillars, and do many other things which you can\nlearn from the books mentioned by us. The knowledge of these theories\nand practices is of great importance in explaining the reasons of the\nprecepts. For it is the principal object of the Law and the axis round\nwhich it turns, to blot out these opinions from man\u2019s heart and make\nthe existence of idolatry impossible. As regards the former Scripture\nsays: \u201cLest your heart be persuaded,\u201d etc. (Deut. xi. 16), \u201cwhose heart\nturneth away to-day,\u201d etc. (ibid. xxix. 17). The actual abolition of\nidolatry is expressed in the following passage: \u201cYe shall destroy their\naltars, and burn their groves in fire\u201d (Deut. vii. 5), \u201cand ye shall\ndestroy their name,\u201d etc. (xii. 3). These two things are frequently\nrepeated; they form the principal and first object of the whole Law, as\nour Sages distinctly told us in their traditional explanation of the\nwords \u201call that God commanded you by the hand of Moses\u201d (Num. xv. 23);\nfor they say, \u201cHence we learn that those who follow idolatry deny as it\nwere their adhesion to the whole Law, and those who reject idolatry\nfollow as it were the whole Law.\u201d (B. T. Kidd, 40a.) Note it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX\n\n\nOn examining these old and foolish doctrines we find that it was most\ngenerally believed by the people that by the worship of stars the earth\nwill become inhabited, and the ground fertilized. The wise, pious, and\nsin-fearing men among them reproved the people and taught them that\nagriculture, on which the preservation of mankind depended, would\nbecome perfect and satisfy man\u2019s wishes, when he worshipped the sun and\nthe stars. If man provoked these beings by his rebelliousness, the\ntowns would become empty and waste. In the above-named books it is\nstated that Mars was angry with [lands, that form now] deserts and\nwastes, and in consequence of that anger they were deprived of water\nand trees, and have become the habitation of demons. Tillers of the\nground and husbandmen are praised in those books, because they are\nengaged with the cultivation of the land in accordance with the will\nand desire of the stars. The idolaters also held cattle in esteem on\naccount of their use in agriculture, and went even so far as to say,\nthat it is not allowed to slay them, because they combine in themselves\nstrength and willingness to do the work of man in tilling the ground.\nThe oxen, notwithstanding their great strength, do this, and submit to\nman, because it is the will of God that they should be employed in\nagriculture. When these views became generally known, idolatry was\nconnected with agriculture, because the latter is indispensable for the\nmaintenance of man, and of most animals. The idolatrous priests then\npreached to the people who met in the temples, and taught them that by\ncertain religious acts, rain would come down, the trees of the field\nwould yield their fruit, and the land would be fertile and inhabited.\nSee what is said in the Nabatean Agriculture in the chapter on\nvineyards. The following words of the Sabeans are quoted there: \u201cAll\nancient wise men advised, and prophets likewise commanded and enjoined\nto play before the images on certain instruments during the festivals.\nThey also said\u2014and what they said is true\u2014that the deities are pleased\nwith it, and reward those who do it. They promise, indeed, very great\nreward for these things; e.g., length of life, protection from illness,\nexemption from great bodily deformities, plenty of the produce of the\nearth, and of the fruits of the trees.\u201d These are the words of the\nSabeans. When these ideas spread, and were considered as true, God, in\nHis great mercy for us, intended to remove this error from our minds,\nand to protect our bodies from trouble; and therefore desired us to\ndiscontinue the practice of these useless actions. He gave us His Law\nthrough Moses, our teacher, who told us in the name of God, that the\nworship of stars and other corporeal beings would effect that rain\nwould cease, the land be waste, and would not produce anything, and the\nfruit of the trees would wither; calamities would befall the people,\ntheir bodies would be deformed, and life would be shortened. These are\nthe contents of \u201cthe words of the covenant which God made\u201d (Deut.\nxxviii. 6\u20139). It is frequently expressed in all parts of Scripture,\nthat the worship of the stars would be followed by absence of rain,\ndevastation of the land, bad times, diseases, and shortness of life.\nBut abandonment of that worship, and the return to the service of God,\nwould be the cause of the presence of rain, fertility of the ground,\ngood times, health and length of life. Thus Scripture teaches, in order\nthat man should abandon idolatry, the reverse of that which idolatrous\npriests preached to the people, for, as has been shown by us, the\nprincipal object of the Law is to remove this doctrine, and to destroy\nits traces.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI\n\n\nThere are persons who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the\ncommandments, and consider it right to assume that the commandments and\nprohibitions have no rational basis whatever. They are led to adopt\nthis theory by a certain disease in their soul, the existence of which\nthey perceive, but which they are unable to discuss or to describe. For\nthey imagine that these precepts, if they were useful in any respect,\nand were commanded because of their usefulness, would seem to originate\nin the thought and reason of some intelligent being. But as things\nwhich are not objects of reason and serve no purpose, they would\nundoubtedly be attributed to God, because no thought of man could have\nproduced them. According to the theory of those weak-minded persons,\nman is more perfect than his Creator. For what man says or does has a\ncertain object, whilst the actions of God are different; He commands us\nto do what is of no use to us, and forbids us to do what is harmless.\nFar be this! On the contrary, the sole object of the Law is to benefit\nus. Thus we explained the Scriptural passage, \u201cfor our good always,\nthat He might preserve us alive, as it is this day\u201d (Deut. vi. 24).\nAgain, \u201cwhich shall hear all those statutes (\u1e25u\u1e33\u1e33im), and say, surely\nthis great nation is a wise and understanding people\u201d (ibid. iv. 6). He\nthus says that even every one of these \u201cstatutes\u201d convinces all nations\nof the wisdom and understanding it includes. But if no reason could be\nfound for these statutes, if they produced no advantage and removed no\nevil, why then should he who believes in them and follows them be wise,\nreasonable, and so excellent as to raise the admiration of all nations?\nBut the truth is undoubtedly as we have said, that every one of the six\nhundred and thirteen precepts serves to inculcate some truth, to remove\nsome erroneous opinion, to establish proper relations in society, to\ndiminish evil, to train in good manners, or to warn against bad habits.\nAll this depends on three things: opinions, morals, and social conduct.\nWe do not count words, because precepts, whether positive or negative,\nif they relate to speech, belong to those precepts which regulate our\nsocial conduct, or to those which spread truth, or to those which teach\nmorals. Thus these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for\nevery one of the Divine commandments.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII\n\n\nOn considering the Divine acts, or the processes of Nature, we get an\ninsight into the prudence and wisdom of God as displayed in the\ncreation of animals, with the gradual development of the movements of\ntheir limbs and the relative positions of the latter, and we perceive\nalso His wisdom and plan in the successive and gradual development of\nthe whole condition of each individual. The gradual development of the\nanimals\u2019 movements and the relative position of the limbs may be\nillustrated by the brain. The front part is very soft, the back part is\na little hard, the spinal marrow is still harder, and the farther it\nextends the harder it becomes. The nerves are the organs of sensation\nand motion. Some nerves are only required for sensation, or for slight\nmovements, as, e.g., the movement of the eyelids or of the jaws; these\nnerves originate in the brain. The nerves which are required for the\nmovements of the limbs come from the spinal marrow. But nerves, even\nthose that come directly from the spinal cord, are too soft to set the\njoints in motion; therefore God made the following arrangement: the\nnerves branch out into fibres which are covered with flesh, and become\nmuscles; the nerves that come forth at the extremities of the muscles\nand have already commenced to harden, and to combine with hard pieces\nof ligaments, are the sinews which are joined and attached to the\nlimbs. By this gradual development the nerves are enabled to set the\nlimbs in motion. I quote this one instance because it is the most\nevident of the wonders described in the book On the use of the limbs;\nbut the use of the limbs is clearly perceived by all who examine them\nwith a sharp eye. In a similar manner did God provide for each\nindividual animal of the class of mammalia. When such an animal is born\nit is extremely tender, and cannot be fed with dry food. Therefore\nbreasts were provided which yield milk, and the young can be fed with\nmoist food which corresponds to the condition of the limbs of the\nanimal, until the latter have gradually become dry and hard.\n\nMany precepts in our Law are the result of a similar course adopted by\nthe same Supreme Being. It is, namely, impossible to go suddenly from\none extreme to the other; it is therefore according to the nature of\nman impossible for him suddenly to discontinue everything to which he\nhas been accustomed. Now God sent Moses to make [the Israelites] a\nkingdom of priests and a holy nation (Exod. xix. 6) by means of the\nknowledge of God. Comp. \u201cUnto thee it was showed that thou mightest\nknow that the Lord is God\u201d (Deut. iv. 35); \u201cKnow therefore this day,\nand consider it in thine heart, that the Lord is God\u201d (ibid. v. 39).\nThe Israelites were commanded to devote themselves to His service;\ncomp. \u201cand to serve him with all your heart\u201d (ibid. xi. 13); \u201cand you\nshall serve the Lord your God\u201d (Exod. xxiii. 25); \u201cand ye shall serve\nhim\u201d (Deut. xiii. 5). But the custom which was in those days general\namong all men, and the general mode of worship in which the Israelites\nwere brought up, consisted in sacrificing animals in those temples\nwhich contained certain images, to bow down to those images, and to\nburn incense before them; religious and ascetic persons were in those\ndays the persons that were devoted to the service in the temples\nerected to the stars, as has been explained by us. It was in accordance\nwith the wisdom and plan of God, as displayed in the whole Creation,\nthat He did not command us to give up and to discontinue all these\nmanners of service; for to obey such a commandment it would have been\ncontrary to the nature of man, who generally cleaves to that to which\nhe is used; it would in those days have made the same impression as a\nprophet would make at present if he called us to the service of God and\ntold us in His name, that we should not pray to Him, not fast, not seek\nHis help in time of trouble; that we should serve Him in thought, and\nnot by any action. For this reason God allowed these kinds of service\nto continue; He transferred to His service that which had formerly\nserved as a worship of created beings, and of things imaginary and\nunreal, and commanded us to serve Him in the same manner; viz., to\nbuild unto Him a temple; comp. \u201cAnd they shall make unto me a\nsanctuary\u201d (Exod. xxv. 8); to have the altar erected to His name; comp.\n\u201cAn altar of earth thou shalt make unto me\u201d (ibid. xx. 21); to offer\nthe sacrifices to Him; comp. \u201cIf any man of you bring an offering unto\nthe Lord\u201d (Lev. i. 2), to bow down to Him and to burn incense before\nHim. He has forbidden to do any of these things to any other being;\ncomp. \u201cHe who sacrificeth unto any God, save the Lord only, he shall be\nutterly destroyed\u201d (Exod. xxii. 19); \u201cFor thou shalt bow down to no\nother God\u201d (ibid. xxxiv. 14). He selected priests for the service in\nthe temple; comp. \u201cAnd they shall minister unto me in the priest\u2019s\noffice\u201d (ibid. xxviii. 41). He made it obligatory that certain gifts,\ncalled the gifts of the Levites and the priests, should be assigned to\nthem for their maintenance while they are engaged in the service of the\ntemple and its sacrifices. By this Divine plan it was effected that the\ntraces of idolatry were blotted out, and the truly great principle of\nour faith, the Existence and Unity of God, was firmly established; this\nresult was thus obtained without deterring or confusing the minds of\nthe people by the abolition of the service to which they were\naccustomed and which alone was familiar to them. I know that you will\nat first thought reject this idea and find it strange; you will put the\nfollowing question to me in your heart: How can we suppose that Divine\ncommandments, prohibitions, and important acts, which are fully\nexplained, and for which certain seasons are fixed, should not have\nbeen commanded for their own sake, but only for the sake of some other\nthing; as if they were only the means which He employed for His primary\nobject? What prevented Him from making His primary object a direct\ncommandment to us, and to give us the capacity of obeying it? Those\nprecepts which in your opinion are only the means and not the object\nwould then have been unnecessary. Hear my answer, which will cure your\nheart of this disease and will show you the truth of that which I have\npointed out to you. There occurs in the Law a passage which contains\nexactly the same idea; it is the following: \u201cGod led them not through\nthe way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God\nsaid, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they\nreturn to Egypt; but God led the people about, through the way of the\nwilderness of the Red Sea,\u201d etc. (Exod. xiii. 17). Here God led the\npeople about, away from the direct road which He originally intended,\nbecause He feared they might meet on that way with hardships too great\nfor their ordinary strength; He took them by another road in order to\nobtain thereby His original object. In the same manner God refrained\nfrom prescribing what the people by their natural disposition would be\nincapable of obeying, and gave the above-mentioned commandments as a\nmeans of securing His chief object, viz., to spread a knowledge of Him\n[among the people], and to cause them to reject idolatry. It is\ncontrary to man\u2019s nature that he should suddenly abandon all the\ndifferent kinds of Divine service and the different customs in which he\nhas been brought up, and which have been so general, that they were\nconsidered as a matter of course; it would be just as if a person\ntrained to work as a slave with mortar and bricks, or similar things,\nshould interrupt his work, clean his hands, and at once fight with real\ngiants. It was the result of God\u2019s wisdom that the Israelites were led\nabout in the wilderness till they acquired courage. For it is a\nwell-known fact that travelling in the wilderness, and privation of\nbodily enjoyments, such as bathing, produce courage, whilst the reverse\nis the source of faint-heartedness; besides, another generation rose\nduring the wanderings that had not been accustomed to degradation and\nslavery. All the travelling in the wilderness was regulated by Divine\ncommands through Moses; comp. \u201cAt the commandment of the Lord they\nrested, and at the commandment of the Lord they journeyed; they kept\nthe charge of the Lord and the commandment of the Lord by the hand of\nMoses\u201d (Num. ix. 23). In the same way the portion of the Law under\ndiscussion is the result of divine wisdom, according to which people\nare allowed to continue the kind of worship to which they have been\naccustomed, in order that they might acquire the true faith, which is\nthe chief object [of God\u2019s commandments]. You ask, What could have\nprevented God from commanding us directly, that which is the chief\nobject, and from giving us the capacity of obeying it? This would lead\nto a second question, What prevented God from leading the Israelites\nthrough the way of the land of the Philistines, and endowing them with\nstrength for fighting? The leading about by a pillar of cloud by day\nand a pillar of fire by night would then not have been necessary. A\nthird question would then be asked in reference to the good promised as\nreward for the keeping of the commandments, and the evil foretold as a\npunishment for sins. It is the following question: As it is the chief\nobject and purpose of God that we should believe in the Law, and act\naccording to that which is written therein, why has He not given us the\ncapacity of continually believing in it, and following its guidance,\ninstead of holding out to us reward for obedience, and punishment for\ndisobedience, or of actually giving all the predicted reward and\npunishment? For [the promises and the threats] are but the means of\nleading to this chief object. What prevented Him from giving us, as\npart of our nature, the will to do that which He desires us to do, and\nto abandon the kind of worship which He rejects? There is one general\nanswer to these three questions, and to all questions of the same\ncharacter; it is this: Although in every one of the signs [related in\nScripture] the natural property of some individual being is changed,\nthe nature of man is never changed by God by way of miracle. It is in\naccordance with this important principle that God said, \u201cO that there\nwere such an heart in them, that they would fear me,\u201d etc. (Deut. v.\n26). It is also for this reason that He distinctly stated the\ncommandments and the prohibitions, the reward and the punishment. This\nprinciple as regards miracles has been frequently explained by us in\nour works; I do not say this because I believe that it is difficult for\nGod to change the nature of every individual person; on the contrary,\nit is possible, and it is in His power, according to the principles\ntaught in Scripture; but it has never been His will to do it, and it\nnever will be. If it were part of His will to change [at His desire]\nthe nature of any person, the mission of prophets and the giving of the\nLaw would have been altogether superfluous.\n\nI now return to my theme. As the sacrificial service is not the primary\nobject [of the commandments about sacrifice], whilst supplications,\nprayers, and similar kinds of worship are nearer to the primary object,\nand indispensable for obtaining it, a great difference was made in the\nLaw between these two kinds of service. The one kind, which consists in\noffering sacrifices, although the sacrifices are offered to the name of\nGod, has not been made obligatory for us to the same extent as it had\nbeen before. We were not commanded to sacrifice in every place, and in\nevery time, or to build a temple in every place, or to permit any one\nwho desires to become priest and to sacrifice. On the contrary, all\nthis is prohibited unto us. Only one temple has been appointed, \u201cin the\nplace which the Lord shall choose\u201d (Deut. xii. 26); in no other place\nis it allowed to sacrifice; comp. \u201cTake heed to thyself, that thou\noffer not thy burnt-offerings in every place that thou seest\u201d (ibid. v.\n13); and only the members of a particular family were allowed to\nofficiate as priests. All these restrictions served to limit this kind\nof worship, and keep it within those bounds within which God did not\nthink it necessary to abolish sacrificial service altogether. But\nprayer and supplication can be offered everywhere and by every person.\nThe same is the case with the commandment of \u1e93i\u1e93it (Num. xv. 38);\nmezuzah (Deut. vi. 9; xi. 20); tefillin (Exod. xiii. 9, 16); and\nsimilar kinds of divine service.\n\nBecause of this principle which I explained to you, the Prophets in\ntheir books are frequently found to rebuke their fellow-men for being\nover-zealous and exerting themselves too much in bringing sacrifices;\nthe prophets thus distinctly declared that the object of the sacrifices\nis not very essential, and that God does not require them. Samuel\ntherefore said, \u201cHath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and\nsacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord\u201d (1 Sam. xv. 22)? Isaiah\nexclaimed, \u201cTo what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto\nme? saith the Lord\u201d (Isa. i. 11); Jeremiah declared: \u201cFor I spake not\nunto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them\nout of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices. But\nthis thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your\nGod, and ye shall be my people\u201d (Jer. vii. 22, 23). This passage has\nbeen found difficult in the opinion of all those whose words I read or\nheard; they ask, How can Jeremiah say that God did not command us about\nburnt-offering and sacrifice, seeing so many precepts refer to\nsacrifice? The sense of the passage agrees with what I explained to\nyou. Jeremiah says [in the name of God] the primary object of the\nprecepts is this, Know me, and serve no other being; \u201cI will be your\nGod, and ye shall be my people\u201d (Lev. xxvi. 12). But the commandment\nthat sacrifices shall be brought and that the temple shall be visited\nhas for its object the success of that principle among you; and for its\nsake I have transferred these modes of worship to my name; idolatry\nshall thereby be utterly destroyed, and Jewish faith firmly\nestablished. You, however, have ignored this object, and taken hold of\nthat which is only the means of obtaining it; you have doubted my\nexistence, \u201cye have denied the Lord, and said he is not\u201d (Jer. v. 12);\nye served idols; \u201cburnt incense unto Baal, and walked after other gods\nwhom ye know not. And come and stand before me in this house\u201d (ibid.\nvii. 9\u201310); i.e., you do not go beyond attending the temple of the\nLord, and offering sacrifices; but this is not the chief object.\u2014I have\nanother way of explaining this passage with exactly the same result.\nFor it is distinctly stated in Scripture, and handed down by tradition,\nthat the first commandments communicated to us did not include any law\nat all about burnt-offering and sacrifice. You must not see any\ndifficulty in the Passover which was commanded in Egypt; there was a\nparticular and evident reason for that, as will be explained by me\n(chap. xlvi.). Besides it was revealed in the land of Egypt; whilst the\nlaws to which Jeremiah alludes in the above passage are those which\nwere revealed after the departure from Egypt. For this reason it is\ndistinctly added, \u201cin the day that I brought them out from the land of\nEgypt.\u201d The first commandment after the departure from Egypt was given\nat Marah, in the following words, \u201cIf thou wilt diligently hearken to\nthe voice of the Lord thy God, and wilt do that which is right in His\nsight, and wilt give ear to His commandments\u201d (Exod. xv. 26). \u201cThere he\nmade for them a statute and an ordinance, and there he proved them\u201d\n(ibid. ver. 25). According to the true traditional explanation, Sabbath\nand civil laws were revealed at Marah; \u201cstatute\u201d alludes to Sabbath,\nand \u201cordinance\u201d to civil laws, which are the means of removing\ninjustice. The chief object of the Law, as has been shown by us, is the\nteaching of truths; to which the truth of the creatio ex nihilo\nbelongs. It is known that the object of the law of Sabbath is to\nconfirm and to establish this principle, as we have shown in this\ntreatise (Part II. chap. xxxi.). In addition to the teaching of truths\nthe Law aims at the removal of injustice from mankind. We have thus\nproved that the first laws do not refer to burnt-offering and\nsacrifice, which are of secondary importance. The same idea which is\ncontained in the above passage from Jeremiah is also expressed in the\nPsalms, where the people are rebuked that they ignore the chief object,\nand make no distinction between chief and subsidiary lessons. The\nPsalmist says: \u201cHear, O my people, and I will speak; O Israel, and I\nwill testify against thee: I am God, even thy God. I will not reprove\nthee for thy sacrifices or thy burnt-offerings, they have been\ncontinually before me. I will take no bullock out of thy house, nor\nhe-goats out of thy folds\u201d (Ps. l. 29).\u2014Wherever this subject is\nmentioned, this is its meaning. Consider it well, and reflect on it.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII\n\n\nIt is also the object of the perfect Law to make man reject, despise,\nand reduce his desires as much as is in his power. He should only give\nway to them when absolutely necessary. It is well known that it is\nintemperance in eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse that people\nmostly rave and indulge in; and these very things counteract the\nulterior perfection of man, impede at the same time the development of\nhis first perfection, and generally disturb the social order of the\ncountry and the economy of the family. For by following entirely the\nguidance of lust, in the manner of fools, man loses his intellectual\nenergy, injures his body, and perishes before his natural time; sighs\nand cares multiply; there is an increase of envy, hatred, and warfare\nfor the purpose of taking what another possesses. The cause of all this\nis the circumstance that the ignorant considers physical enjoyment as\nan object to be sought for its own sake. God in His wisdom has\ntherefore given us such commandments as would counteract that object,\nand prevent us altogether from directing our attention to it, and has\ndebarred us from everything that leads only to excessive desire and\nlust. This is an important thing included in the objects of our Law.\nSee how the Law commanded to slay a person from whose conduct it is\nevident that he will go too far in seeking the enjoyment of eating and\ndrinking. I mean \u201cthe rebellious and stubborn son\u201d; he is described as\n\u201ca glutton and a drunkard\u201d (Deut. xxi. 20). The Law commands to stone\nhim and to remove him from society lest he grow up in this character,\nand kill many, and injure the condition of good men by his great lust.\n\nPoliteness is another virtue promoted by the Law. Man shall listen to\nthe words of his neighbour; he shall not be obstinate, but shall yield\nto the wish of his fellow-men, respond to their appeal, act according\nto their desire, and do what they like. Thus the Law commands,\n\u201cCircumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, and be no more\nstiff-necked\u201d (Deut. x. 16); \u201cTake heed and hearken\u201d (ibid. xxvii. 9).\n\u201cIf you be willing and obedient\u201d (Isa. i. 19). Those who listen [to the\nwords of others] and accept as much as is right are represented as\nsaying, \u201cWe will hear and do\u201d (Deut. v. 24), or in a figurative style,\n\u201cDraw me, we will run after thee\u201d (Song i. 4).\n\nThe Law is also intended to give its followers purity and holiness; by\nteaching them to suppress sensuality, to guard against it and to reduce\nit to a minimum, as will be explained by us. For when God commanded\n[Moses] to sanctify the people for the receiving of the Law, and said,\n\u201cSanctify them to-day and to-morrow\u201d (Exod. xix. 10), Moses [in\nobedience to this command] said to the people, \u201cCome not at your wives\u201d\n(ibid. ver. 15). Here it is clearly stated that sanctification consists\nin absence of sensuality. But abstinence from drinking wine is also\ncalled holiness; in reference to the Nazarite it is therefore said, \u201cHe\nshall be holy\u201d (Num. vi. 5). According to Siphra the words, \u201csanctify\nyourselves and be ye holy\u201d (Lev. xx. 7), refer to the sanctification\neffected by performing the divine commands. As the obedience to such\nprecepts as have been mentioned above is called by the Law\nsanctification and purification, so is defilement applied to the\ntransgression of these precepts and the performance of disgraceful\nacts, as will be shown. Cleanliness in dress and body by washing and\nremoving sweat and dirt is included among the various objects of the\nLaw, but only if connected with purity of action, and with a heart free\nfrom low principles and bad habits. It would be extremely bad for man\nto content himself with a purity obtained by washing and cleanliness in\ndress, and to be at the same time voluptuous and unrestrained in food\nand lust. These are described by Isaiah as follows: \u201cThey that sanctify\nthemselves and purify themselves in the gardens, but continue their\nsinful life, when they are in the innermost [of their houses], eating\nswine\u2019s flesh, and the abomination, and the mouse\u201d (Isa. lxvi. 17):\nthat is to say, they purify and sanctify themselves outwardly as much\nas is exposed to the sight of the people, and when they are alone in\ntheir chambers and the inner parts of their houses, they continue their\nrebelliousness and disobedience, and indulge in partaking of forbidden\nfood, such as [the flesh of] swine, worms, and mice. The prophet\nalludes perhaps in the phrase \u201cbehind one tree in the midst\u201d to\nindulgence in forbidden lust. The sense of the passage is therefore\nthis: They appear outwardly clean, but their heart is bent upon their\ndesires and bodily enjoyments, and this is contrary to the spirit of\nthe Law. For the chief object of the Law is to [teach man to] diminish\nhis desires, and to cleanse his outer appearance after he has purified\nhis heart. Those who wash their body and cleanse their garments whilst\nthey remain dirty by bad actions and principles, are described by\nSolomon as \u201ca generation that are pure in their own eyes, and yet are\nnot washed from their filthiness; a generation, oh how lofty are their\neyes!\u201d etc. (Prov. xxx. 12\u201313). Consider well the principles which we\nmentioned in this chapter as the final causes of the Law; for there are\nmany precepts, for which you will be unable to give a reason unless you\npossess a knowledge of these principles, as will be explained further\non.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV\n\n\nIt is also important to note that the Law does not take into account\nexceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions which rarely\noccur. Whatever the Law teaches, whether it be of an intellectual, a\nmoral, or a practical character, is founded on that which is the rule\nand not on that which is the exception; it ignores the injury that\nmight be caused to a single person through a certain maxim or a certain\ndivine precept. For the Law is a divine institution, and [in order to\nunderstand its operation] we must consider how in Nature the various\nforces produce benefits which are general, but in some solitary cases\nthey cause also injury. This is clear from what has been said by\nourselves as well as by others. We must consequently not be surprised\nwhen we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every\nindividual; there must naturally be people who are not perfected by the\ninstruction of the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive\nfrom the specific forms in Nature all that they require. For all this\ncomes from one God, is the result of one act; \u201cthey are all given from\none shepherd\u201d (Eccles. xii. 11). It is impossible to be otherwise; and\nwe have already explained (chap. xv.) that that which is impossible\nalways remains impossible and never changes. From this consideration it\nalso follows that the laws cannot like medicine vary according to the\ndifferent conditions of persons and times; whilst the cure of a person\ndepends on his particular constitution at the particular time, the\ndivine guidance contained in the Law must be certain and general,\nalthough it may be effective in some cases and ineffective in others.\nIf the Law depended on the varying conditions of man, it would be\nimperfect in its totality, each precept being left indefinite. For this\nreason it would not be right to make the fundamental principles of the\nLaw dependent on a certain time or a certain place; on the contrary,\nthe statutes and the judgments must be definite, unconditional, and\ngeneral, in accordance with the divine words: \u201cAs for the congregation,\none ordinance shall be for you and for the stranger\u201d (Num. xv. 15);\nthey are intended, as has been stated before, for all persons and for\nall times.\n\nAfter having premised these introductory remarks I will now proceed to\nthe exposition of that which I intended to explain.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV\n\n\nIn accordance with this intention I find it convenient to divide all\nprecepts into fourteen classes.\n\nThe first class comprises those precepts which form fundamental\nprinciples, such as we have enumerated in Hilkot yesode ha-torah.\nRepentance and fasts belong also to this class, as will be shown.\n\nThe second class comprises the precepts which are connected with the\nprohibition of idolatry, and which have been described by us in Hilkot\na\u02bbbodah-zarah. The laws concerning garments of linen and wool,\nconcerning the fruit of trees in the first three years after they have\nbeen planted, and concerning divers seeds in a vineyard, are likewise\ncontained in this class. The object of these precepts is to establish\ncertain true principles and to perpetuate them among the people.\n\nThe third class is formed by commandments which are connected with the\nimprovement of the moral condition [of mankind]; these are mentioned in\nHilkot de\u02bbot. It is known that by a good moral state those social\nrelations, which are indispensable for the well-being of mankind, are\nbrought to perfection.\n\nThe fourth class includes precepts relating to charity, loans, gifts,\nand the like, e.g., the rules respecting \u201cvaluations,\u201d (scil., of\nthings devoted to sacred purposes, Lev. xxvii. 1\u201327); \u201cthings devoted\u201d\n(ibid. ver. 28); laws concerning loans and servants, and all the laws\nenumerated in the section Zera\u02bbim, except the rules of \u201cmixtures\u201d and\n\u201cthe fruit of trees in the first three years.\u201d The object of these\nprecepts is clear; their benefit concerns all people by turns; for he\nwho is rich to-day may one day be poor\u2014either he himself or his\ndescendants; and he who is now poor, he himself or his son may be rich\nto-morrow.\n\nThe fifth class contains those precepts which relate to the prevention\nof wrong and violence; they are included in our book in the section\nNezi\u1e33in. Their beneficial character is evident.\n\nThe sixth class is formed of precepts respecting fines, e.g., the laws\non theft and robbery, on false witnesses, and most of the laws\ncontained in the section Shofetim belong to this class. Their benefit\nis apparent; for if sinners and robbers were not punished, injury would\nnot be prevented at all: and persons scheming evil would not become\nrarer. They are wrong who suppose that it would be an act of mercy to\nabandon the laws of compensation for injuries; on the contrary, it\nwould be perfect cruelty and injury to the social state of the country.\nIt is an act of mercy that God commanded \u201cjudges and officers thou\nshalt appoint to thee in all thy gates\u201d (Deut. xvi. 18).\n\nThe seventh class comprises those laws which regulate the business\ntransactions of men with each other; e.g., laws about loans, hire,\ntrust, buying, selling, and the like; the rules about inheritance\nbelong to this class. We have described these precepts in the sections\n\u1e32inyan and Mishpatim. The object of these precepts is evident, for\nmonetary transactions are necessary for the peoples of all countries,\nand it is impossible to have these transactions without a proper\nstandard of equity and without useful regulations.\n\nThe eighth class includes those precepts which relate to certain days,\nas Sabbaths and holydays; they are enumerated in the section Zemannim.\nThe Law states clearly the reason and object of each of these precepts;\nthey are to serve as a means for establishing a certain principle among\nus, or securing bodily recreation, or effecting both things at the same\ntime, as will be shown by me.\n\nThe ninth class comprises the general laws concerning religious rites\nand ceremonies, e.g., laws concerning prayers, the reading of Shema\u2019,\nand the other rules given in the section Ahabah, with the exception of\nthe law concerning circumcision. The object of these laws is apparent;\nthey all prescribe actions which firmly establish the love of God in\nour minds, as also the right belief concerning Him and His attributes.\n\nThe tenth class is formed of precepts which relate to the Sanctuary,\nits vessels, and its ministers; they are contained in the section\n\u02bbAbodah. The object of these precepts has already been mentioned by us\n(supra, chap. xxxii.).\n\nThe eleventh class includes those precepts which relate to Sacrifices.\nMost of these laws we have mentioned in the sections \u02bbAbodah and\n\u1e32orbanot. We have already shown the general use of the sacrificial\nlaws, and their necessity in ancient time.\n\nThe twelfth class comprises the laws concerning things unclean and\nclean. The general object of these laws is, as will be explained by me,\nto discourage people from [frequently] entering the Sanctuary; in order\nthat their minds be impressed with the greatness of the Sanctuary, and\napproach it with respect and reverence.\n\nThe thirteenth class includes the precepts concerning forbidden food\nand the like; we have given them in Hilkot maakalot asurot; the laws\nabout vows and temperance belong also to this class. The object of all\nthese laws is to restrain the growth of desire, the indulgence in\nseeking that which is pleasant, and the disposition to consider the\nappetite for eating and drinking as the end [of man\u2019s existence]. We\nhave explained this in our Commentary on the Mishnah, in the\nIntroduction (chap, iv.) to The Sayings of the Fathers.\n\nThe fourteenth class comprises the precepts concerning forbidden sexual\nintercourse; they are given in the section Nashim and Hilkot\nissure-biah. The laws concerning the intermixture of cattle belong to\nthis class. The object of these precepts is likewise to diminish sexual\nintercourse, to restrain as much as possible indulgence in lust, and\n[to teach] that this enjoyment is not, as foolish people think, the\nfinal cause of man\u2019s existence. We have explained this in our\nCommentary on The Sayings of the Fathers (Introd. chap. viii.). The\nlaws about circumcision belong to this class.\n\nAs is well known, the precepts are also divided into two classes, viz.,\nprecepts concerning the relation between man and God, and precepts\nconcerning the relation between man and man. Of the classes into which\nwe divide the precepts and which we have enumerated, the fifth, sixth,\nand seventh, and part of the third, include laws concerning the\nrelation of man to man. The other classes contain the laws about the\nrelation of man to God, i.e., positive or negative precepts, which tend\nto improve the moral or intellectual condition of mankind, or to\nregulate such of each man\u2019s actions which [directly] only concern him\nand lead him to perfection. For these are called laws concerning man\u2019s\nrelation to God, although in reality they lead to results which concern\nalso his fellow-men; because these results become only apparent after a\nlong series of intermediate links, and from a general point of view;\nwhilst directly these laws are not intended to prevent man from\ninjuring his fellow-man. Note this.\n\nHaving described the laws of these classes, I will now again consider\nthe precepts of each class, and explain the reason and use of those\nwhich are believed to be useless or unreasonable, with the exception of\na few, the object of which I have not yet comprehended.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI\n\n\nThe reason of all precepts of the first class, viz., of the principles\nenumerated by us in the Hilkot yesode ha-torah, is obvious. Consider\nthem one by one, and you will find that the lesson which every one of\nthem contains is correct and demonstrable. It is also evident that the\nprecepts which exhort and command us to learn and to teach are useful;\nfor without wisdom there cannot be any good act or any true knowledge.\nThe law which prescribes to honour the teachers of the Law is likewise\nuseful; for if they were not considered by the people as great and\nhonourable men, they would not be followed as guides in their\nprinciples and actions. The Law demands also that we be humble and\nmodest [in their presence]. \u201cThou shalt rise up before the hoary head\u201d\n(Lev. xix. 32). This class includes also the commandment to swear by\nthe name of God and the prohibition of swearing falsely or in vain. The\nreason for all these precepts is evident; they aim at the glorification\nof God; they prescribe acts which lead to the belief in God\u2019s\ngreatness. Likewise the commandment to cry to God in time of trouble,\n\u201cto blow an alarm with the trumpets\u201d (Num. x. 9), belongs to this\nclass. We are told to offer up prayers to God, in order to establish\nfirmly the true principle that God takes notice of our ways, that He\ncan make them successful if we worship Him, or disastrous if we disobey\nHim, that [success and failure] are not the result of chance or\naccident. In this sense we must understand the passage, \u201cIf ye walk\nwith me by chance\u201d (be\u1e33eri. xxvi. 21); i.e., if I bring troubles upon\nyou for punishment, and you consider them as mere accidents, I will\nagain send you some of these accidents as you call them, but of a more\nserious and troublesome character. This is expressed in the words: \u201cIf\nye walk with me by chance: then I will walk with you also in the fury\nof chance\u201d (ibid. vers. 27, 28). For the belief of the people that\ntheir troubles are mere accidents causes them to continue in their evil\nprinciples and their wrong actions, and prevents them from abandoning\ntheir evil ways. Comp. \u201cThou hast stricken them, but they have not\ngrieved\u201d (Jer. v. 3). For this reason God commanded us to pray to Him,\nto entreat Him, and to cry before Him in time of trouble. It is clear\nthat repentance is likewise included in this class; that is to say, it\nis one of those principles which are an indispensable element in the\ncreed of the followers of the Law. For it is impossible for man to be\nentirely free from error and sin; he either does not know the opinion\nwhich he has to choose, or he adopts a principle, not for its own\nmerits, but in order to gratify his desire or passion. If we were\nconvinced that we could never make our crooked ways straight, we should\nfor ever continue in our errors, and perhaps add other sins to them\nsince we did not see that any remedy was left to us. But the belief in\nthe effect of repentance causes us to improve, to return to the best of\nthe ways, and to become more perfect than we were before we sinned. For\nthis reason many things are prescribed for the promotion of this very\nuseful principle; e.g., confessions and sacrifices for sins committed\nunknowingly, and in some cases even for sins committed intentionally,\nand fasts, and that which is common to all cases of repentance from\nsin, the resolve to discontinue sinning. For that is the aim of this\nprinciple. Of all these precepts the use is obvious.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII\n\n\nThe precepts of the second class are those which we have enumerated in\nthe section \u201cOn idolatry.\u201d It is doubtless that they all tend to save\nman from the error of idolatry and the evil practices connected with\nit; e.g., observing the times, enchantment, witchcraft, incantation,\nconsulting with familiar spirits, and the like. When you read the books\nwhich I mentioned to you, you will find that witchcraft, which will be\ndescribed to you, is part of the customs of the Sabeans, Kasdim,\nChaldeans, and to a higher degree of the Egyptians and Canaanites. They\ncaused others to believe, or they themselves believed, that by means of\nthese arts they would perform wonderful things in reference to an\nindividual person, or to the inhabitants of a whole country, although\nno analogy and no reasoning can discover any relation between these\nperformances of the witches and the promised result. Thus they are\ncareful to collect certain plants at a particular time, and to take a\ndefinite number of certain objects. There are many things comprised by\nwitchcraft; they may be divided into three classes: first, witchcraft\nconnected with objects in Nature, viz., plants, animals, or minerals.\nSecondly, witchcraft dependent for its performance on a certain time;\nand thirdly, witchcraft dependent on the performance of certain acts of\nman, such as dancing, clapping, laughing, jumping with one leg, lying\non the ground with the face upward, burning a thing, fumigating with a\ncertain material, or speaking intelligible or unintelligible words.\n\nThese are the various kinds of witchcraft. In some cases all these\nvarious performances are required. Thus the witches sometimes order:\ntake a leaf of a certain plant, when the moon is seen in a certain\ndegree [of the Zodiac] in the east point or in one of the other\ncardinal points [of the horizon], also a certain quantity of the horn,\nthe sweat, the hair and the blood of a certain animal when the sun is,\ne.g., in the middle of the sky, or in some other definite place; and a\nportion of a certain mineral or minerals, melted at a certain\nconjunction of sun and moon, and at a definite position of the stars;\nspeak then, and say certain words, and fumigate with those leaves or\nsimilar ones to that molten image, and such and such a thing will\nhappen. In other instances of witchcraft it is assumed that one of the\nabove performances suffices. In most cases the condition is added that\nwomen must perform these actions. Thus it is stated in reference to the\nmeans of obtaining rain, that ten virgins dressed with diadems and red\ngarments should dance, push each other, moving backwards and forwards,\nand make signs to the sun: the result of this long process was believed\n[by the idolaters] to be a downpour of rain.\n\nIt is further stated that if four women lay on their back, with their\nfeet spread and lifted up, said certain words and did certain things\nwhilst in this disgraceful position, hail would discontinue coming down\nin that place. The number of these stupid and mad things is great; in\nall of them without exception women are required to be the agent.\nWitchcraft is intimately connected with astrology; those that practise\nit assign each plant, animal, or mineral to a certain star, and believe\nthat the above processes of witchcraft are different forms of worship\noffered to that star, which is pleased with that act, word, or offering\nof incense, and fulfils their wishes.\n\nAfter this remark, which you will understand when you have read such of\ntheir works as are at present extant, and have been mentioned by me,\nhear what I will tell you. It is the object and centre of the whole Law\nto abolish idolatry and utterly uproot it, and to overthrow the opinion\nthat any of the stars could interfere for good or evil in human\nmatters, because it leads to the worship of stars. It was therefore\nnecessary to slay all witches as being undoubtedly idolaters, because\nevery witch is an idolater; they only have their own strange ways of\nworship, which are different from the common mode of worship offered to\nthose deities. But in all performances of witchcraft it is laid down as\na rule that women should be employed in the chief operation; and\ntherefore the Law says, \u201cThou shalt not suffer a witch to live\u201d (Exod.\nxxii. 17). Another reason is the natural reluctance of people to slay\nwomen. This is also the cause why in the law of idolatry it is said\n\u201cman or woman\u201d (Deut. xvii. 2), and again repeated a second time, \u201cthe\nman or the woman\u201d (ibid. ver. 5)\u2014a phrase which does not occur in the\nlaw about the breaking of Sabbath, or in any other law; for great\nsympathy is naturally shown to women. Now the witches believed that\nthey produced a certain result by their witchcraft; that they were able\nthrough the above-mentioned actions to drive such dangerous animals as\nlions, serpents, and the like out of the cities, and to remove various\nkinds of damage from the products of the earth. Thus they imagine that\nthey are able by certain acts to prevent hail from coming down, and by\ncertain other acts to kill the worms in the vineyards, whereby the\nlatter are protected from injury; in fact, the killing of the worms in\nvineyards, and other superstitions mentioned in the Nabatean\nAgriculture, are fully described by the Sabeans. They likewise imagine\nthat they know certain acts by which they can prevent the dropping of\nleaves from the trees and the untimely falling of their fruit. On\naccount of these ideas, which were general in those days, the Law\ndeclares in \u201cthe words of the covenant\u201d as follows: The same idolatry\nand superstitious performances which, in your belief, keep certain\nmisfortunes far from you, will cause those very misfortunes to befall\nyou. \u201cI will also send wild beasts among you\u201d (Lev. xxvi. 22); \u201cI will\nalso send the teeth of wild beasts upon them, with the poison of those\nthat creep in dust\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 24). \u201cThe fruit of thy land, and all\nthy labours, shall a nation, which thou knowest not, eat up\u201d (ibid.\nxxviii. 33). \u201cThou shalt plant vineyards and dress them, but shalt\nneither drink of the wine nor gather the grapes, etc. Thou shalt have\nolive trees throughout all thy coasts, but thou shalt not anoint\nthyself with the oil\u201d (Deut. xxviii. 39, 40). In short, in spite of the\nschemes of idolaters to support and firmly establish their doctrine,\nand to make people believe that by idolatry certain misfortunes could\nbe averted and certain benefits gained, worship of idols will, on the\ncontrary, as is stated in \u201cthe words of the covenant,\u201d prevent the\nadvantages and bring the troubles. The reader will now understand why,\nof all kinds of curses and blessings, those mentioned in \u201cthe words of\nthe covenant\u201d have been selected by the Law, and particularly pointed\nout. Note also the greatness of the benefit [of these laws].\n\nIn order that we may keep far from all kinds of witchcraft, we are\nwarned not to adopt any of the practices of the idolaters, even such as\nare connected with agriculture, the keeping of cattle, and similar\nwork. [The Law prohibits] everything that the idolaters, according to\ntheir doctrine, and contrary to reason, consider as being useful and\nacting in the manner of certain mysterious forces. Comp. \u201cNeither shall\nye walk in their ordinances\u201d (Lev. xviii. 3). \u201cAnd ye shall not walk in\nthe manners of the nation which I cast out before you\u201d (ibid. xx. 23).\nOur Sages call such acts \u201cthe ways of the Amorite\u201d; they are kinds of\nwitchcraft, because they are not arrived at by reason, but are similar\nto the performances of witchcraft, which is necessarily connected with\nthe influences of the stars; thus [\u201cthe manners of the nations\u201d] lead\npeople to extol, worship, and praise the stars. Our Sages say\ndistinctly, \u201cwhatever is used as medicine\u201d does not come under the law\nof \u201cthe ways of the Amorite\u201d; for they hold that only such cures as are\nrecommended by reason are permitted, and other cures are prohibited.\nWhen, therefore, the dictum was quoted: a tree that casts off its fruit\nmay be laden with stone or dyed with red colour, the following\nobjection was raised: The loading of the tree with stones may be\njustified on the plea that it serves to weaken the strength of the\ntree, but why should it be permitted to dye the tree with red colour?\nThis question shows that the dyeing of the tree with red colour, and\nall similar things which are not explained by analogy from nature, are\nprohibited as \u201cways of the Amorite.\u201d For the same reason our Sages\nsaid, \u201cThe uterus of animals which have been selected for the Sanctuary\nmust be buried; it must not be suspended from a tree, and not buried in\nthe cross-road, because this is one of \u2018the ways of the Amorite.\u2019\u201d\nHence you may learn how to treat similar cases.\n\nIt is not inconsistent that a nail of the gallows and the tooth of a\nfox have been permitted to be used as cures; for these things have been\nconsidered in those days as facts established by experiment. They\nserved as cures, in the same manner as the hanging of the peony over a\nperson subject to epileptic fits, or the application of a dog\u2019s refuse\nto the swellings of the throat, and of the vapours of vinegar and\nmarcasite to the swelling of hard tumours. For the Law permits as\nmedicine everything that has been verified by experiment, although it\ncannot be explained by analogy. The above-named cures are permitted in\nthe same way as the application of purgatives. Learn, reader, these\nnoteworthy lessons from this my work, and keep them; \u201cfor they are a\ndiadem of grace for thy head\u201d (Prov. iv.).\n\nWe have explained in our large work that it is prohibited to round the\ncorners of the head, and to mar the corners of the beard, because it\nwas the custom of idolatrous priests. For the same reason, the wearing\nof garments made of linen and wool is prohibited; the heathen priests\nadorned themselves with garments containing vegetable and animal\nmaterial, whilst they held in their hand a seal made of a mineral. This\nyou find written in their books. The same is also the reason of the\nprecept, \u201cThe woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man\u201d\n(Deut. xxii. 5). You find it in the book Tomtom, that a male person\nshould wear coloured woman\u2019s dress when he stands before Venus, and a\nfemale, when standing before Mars, should wear a buckler and other\narmour. I think that this precept has also another reason; namely, that\nthe interchange of dress creates lust and leads to immorality.\n\nIt is easily understood why it is prohibited to derive any benefit\nwhatever from an idol. For sometimes a person buys it with the\nintention to break it, but keeps it, and it becomes a snare to him.\nEven if he broke it, recast it, and sold it to a heathen, he must not\nuse the money which he received in exchange for the idol; because\npeople frequently mistake accidental circumstances for essential\ncauses; thus most people say of a certain person that he has become\nrich and wealthy after having dwelt in a certain house, or bought a\ncertain animal or vessel; and that these things were a blessing to him.\nIn the same way a person may be successful and make a good profit on\nthe business in which he employed the money received for the idol; he\nmight then think that the idol was the cause of his success, and that\nthe blessing of the money received for it brought him the profit; he\nwould then believe in the idol; a belief which is just the reverse of\nthe chief object of the Law, as is clearly seen in every word of it.\nFor this same reason, we are forbidden to turn to our use the covering\nof the idol, its offerings and vessels. We are thus guarded against the\nidea [of ascribing our success to idols]. In those days the belief in\nthe stars was very strong; it was generally assumed that life and\ndeath, good and evil, depended on the stars. The Law employed therefore\nstrong means, as covenant, witnesses, great oaths, and the\nabove-mentioned [blessings and] curses, in order to overthrow that\nbelief. We are thus commanded to abstain from taking any portion of the\nidol, and deriving any benefit from it; and God tells us that if money\nreceived for idols be mixed with any person\u2019s property, it will bring\nloss and ruin to that property. This warning is contained in the words:\n\u201cNeither shalt thou bring an abomination into thine house, lest thou be\na cursed thing like it\u201d (Deut. vii. 26). How much more wrong must it be\nto believe that there is a blessing in idols. When you examine all the\nprecepts that relate to idolatry, you will find that their reason is\nobvious, and that they serve to make us abandon this evil belief, and\nkeep at the greatest possible distance from it.\n\nWe must also point out that originators of false, baseless, and useless\nprinciples scheme and plan for the firm establishment of their faith;\nand tell their fellow-men that a certain plague will befall those who\nwill not perform the act by which that faith is supported and confirmed\nfor ever; this plague may one day accidentally befall a person, who\nwill then direct his attention to the performance of that act, and\nadopt idolatry. It being well known that people are naturally most in\nfear and dread of the loss of their property and their children, the\nworshippers of fire spread the tale, that if any one did not pass his\nson and daughter through the fire, he will lose his children by death.\nThere is no doubt that on account of this absurd menace every one at\nonce obeyed, out of pity and sympathy for the child; especially as it\nwas a trifling and a light thing that was demanded, in passing the\nchild over the fire. We must further take into account that the care of\nyoung children is intrusted to women, who are generally weak-minded,\nand ready to believe everything, as is well known. The Law makes,\ntherefore, an earnest stand against this practice, and uses in\nreference to it stronger terms than in any other kind of idolatry;\nnamely, \u201che defileth my sanctuary, and profaneth my holy name\u201d (Lev.\nxx. 3). The true prophet then declares in the name of God that the very\nact which is performed for the purpose of keeping the child alive, will\nbring death upon him who performs it, and destruction upon his seed.\nComp. \u201cAnd I will set my face against that man and against his family,\u201d\netc. (ibid. xx. 5). Know that traces of this practice have survived\neven to the present day, because it was widespread in the world. You\ncan see how midwives take a young child wrapped in its\nswaddling-clothes, and after having placed incense of a disagreeable\nsmell on the fire, swing the child in the smoke over that fire. This is\ncertainly a kind of passing children through the fire, and we must not\ndo it. Reflect on the evil cunning of the author of this doctrine; how\npeople continued to adhere to this doctrine, and how, in spite of the\nopposition of the Law during thousands of years, its name is not\nblotted out, and its traces are still in existence.\n\nIdolaters have acted similarly in reference to property. They made it a\nlaw that a certain tree, the asherah, should be worshipped, and that of\nits fruit one part should be offered, and the rest consumed in the\ntemple of the idol; this is stated in the regulations concerning the\nasherah. In the same manner, they made it a rule, that the first-fruit\nof every fruit-tree should be partly offered as a sacrifice and partly\nconsumed in the idol\u2019s temple. It was also a widespread belief that if\nthe first-fruit of any tree was not treated in this manner, the tree\nwould dry up, its fruit would be cast off, its increase would be\ndiminished, or some disease would come over it; just as they spread the\nbelief that every child, that was not passed through the fire, must\ndie. People in their anxiety for their property obeyed also this\nprecept unhesitatingly. The Law, in opposition to this doctrine,\ncommanded us to burn the produce of fruit-trees the first three years;\nfor some trees bear fruit after one year, whilst some begin to yield\nfruit after two, and others after three years. The law is based upon\nthe nature of trees grown in an ordinary way, namely, in one of the\nthree well-known methods: planting, propagation, and inoculation\n(neti\u02bbah, habrakah, and harcabah). The Law does not take notice of the\ncase that a kernel or stone is sown; for the ordinances of the Law are\nbased on the usual condition of things, and as a rule a young tree in\nPalestine bears fruit for the first time not later than the third year\nafter it has been planted. According to the divine promise, the waste\nand destruction of this first-fruit of the tree will be followed by\nyears of plenty of fruit; for it is said, \u201cthat it may increase unto\nyou the fruit thereof\u201d (Lev. xix. 25). The fruit of the fourth year we\nare commanded to eat before God, instead of [the heathen custom of]\neating \u02bborlah, \u201cthe fruit of the preceding years,\u201d in the temples of\nthe idols, as has been described by us.\n\nIt is further mentioned in the Nabatean Agriculture that the ancient\nidolaters caused certain things named in that work to rot, waited till\nthe sun stood in a certain degree [of the ecliptic], and then they\nperformed many acts of witchcraft. They believed that that substance\nshould be kept ready by every one, and when a fruit-tree is planted, a\nportion of that rotten substance should be scattered round the tree or\nunder it; the tree would then grow quicker and produce more fruit than\nis generally the case. They say that this process is very\nextraordinary; it acts like a talisman, and is more efficient than any\nkind of witchcraft in accelerating the productiveness of fruit-trees. I\nhave already shown and explained to you how the Law opposes all kinds\nof witchcraft. The Law, therefore, prohibits us to use the fruit\nyielded by a tree in the first three years after it has been planted,\nso that there should be no opportunity for accelerating, according to\ntheir imagination, the productiveness of any tree. After three years\nmost fruit-trees in Palestine yield fruit by the ordinary course of\nnature, without the application of those magical performances which\nwere very general in those days. Note this remarkable fact.\n\nAnother belief which was very common in those days, and survived the\nSabeans, is this: When a tree is grafted into another in the time of a\ncertain conjunction of sun and moon, and is fumigated with certain\nsubstances whilst a formula is uttered, that tree will produce a thing\nthat will be found exceedingly useful. More general than anything\nmentioned by the heathen writers was the ceremony of grafting an olive\nbranch upon a citron tree, as described in the beginning of the\nNabatean Agriculture. I am of opinion that the book of medicines which\nHezekiah put away (B. T. Pes. 56a) was undoubtedly of this kind. They\nalso said that when one species is grafted upon another, the branch\nwhich is to be grafted must be in the hand of a beautiful damsel,\nwhilst a male person has disgraceful and unnatural sexual intercourse\nwith her; during that intercourse the woman grafts the branch into the\ntree. There is no doubt that this ceremony was general, and that nobody\nrefused to perform it, especially as the pleasure of love was added to\nthe (supposed) future results of the grafting. The Law, therefore,\nprohibits us to mix different species together, i.e., to graft one tree\ninto another, because we must keep away from the opinions of idolaters\nand the abominations of their unnatural sexual intercourse. In order to\nguard against the grafting of trees, we are forbidden to sow any two\nkinds of seed together or near each other. When you study the\ntraditional explanation of this precept, you will find that the\nprohibition of grafting, the principal element in this commandment,\nholds good for all countries, and is punishable by forty stripes; but\nthe sowing of seeds one near the other is only prohibited in Palestine.\nIn the Nabatean Agriculture it is further distinctly stated that it was\nthe custom of the people in those days to sow barley and stones of\ngrapes together, in the belief that the vineyard could only prosper in\nthis way. Therefore the Law prohibits us to use seed that has grown in\na vineyard, and commands us to burn both the barley and the produce of\nthe vineyard. For the practices of the heathen, which they considered\nas of a magic and talismanic character, even if not containing any\nidolatrous element, are prohibited, as we have stated above (p. 334) in\nreference to the dictum of our Sages, \u201cWe must not hang upon a tree the\nf\u0153tus of an animal belonging to the Sanctuary.\u201d The Law prohibits all\nheathen customs, called by our Sages \u201cthe ways of the Amorite,\u201d because\nthey are connected with idolatry. On considering the customs of the\nheathen in their worship, you will find that in certain kinds of\nworship they turn toward stars, in others to the two great luminaries;\nfrequently they choose the rise of signs in the Zodiac for sowing and\nfumigating; and as to the circuits made by those who plant or sow, some\ncomplete five circles, corresponding to the five planets, with the\nexclusion of the two luminaries; others go seven times round, according\nto the number of the planets, when including sun and moon. They believe\nthat all these practices are magic charms of great efficiency in\nagriculture. Thus those practices lead to the worship of stars; and\ntherefore all practices of those nations have been prohibited, in the\nwords, \u201cYe shall not walk in the manners of the nation which I cast out\nbefore you\u201d (Lev. xx. 23). Those practices which were more general and\ncommon, or were distinctly connected with idolatry, are particularly\npointed out as prohibited; e.g., eating the fruit of a tree during the\nfirst three years, intermixing of species and the mixed species sown in\na vineyard. I am surprised at the dictum of Rabbi Joshiyah, which has\nbeen adopted as legally binding, in reference to the mixed seed in a\nvineyard, viz., that the law is only transgressed when wheat, barley,\nand the stone of a grape are sown simultaneously. He must undoubtedly\nhave seen the source of that kind of the ways of the Amorite. It must\nnow be clear to you, and no room can be left for any doubt, that the\nprohibition of wearing garments of wool and linen, of using the fruit\nof a tree in the first three years, and of mixing divers species, are\ndirected against idolatry, and that the prohibition against adopting\nheathen manners serves to remove anything which leads to idolatry, as\nhas been shown by us.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII\n\n\nThe precepts of the third class are identical with those which we have\nenumerated in Hilkot de\u02bbot. Their use is evident; they are rules\nconcerning moral conduct by which the social relations of men are\nregulated. This is sufficiently clear, and I need not dwell long on it.\nKnow that some precepts prescribe certain acts which are considered as\narbitrary decrees without any purpose, but are nevertheless the means\nof acquiring some moral principle. We shall explain every one of them\nin its proper place. But of all those precepts which are mentioned in\nHilkot de\u02bbot, it is distinctly stated that their object is to inculcate\ngood moral principles.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX\n\n\nThe precepts in the fourth class include the laws which in our work are\ncontained in the section Zera\u02bbim, excepting the laws on the mixture of\nspecies; the rules about things to be \u201cvalued\u201d and things \u201cdevoted\u201d\n(Hilkot \u02bberekin va-\u1e25aramim), and those concerning lender and borrower\n(Hilkot malveh ve-loveh) and slaves (Hilkot \u02bbabadim). When you examine\nthese precepts you will clearly see the use of every one of them: they\nteach us to have sympathy with the poor and infirm, to assist the needy\nin various ways; not to hurt the feelings of those who are in want, and\nnot to vex those who are in a helpless condition [viz., the widow, the\norphan, and the like]. The purpose of the laws concerning the portions\nwhich are to be given to the poor is likewise obvious; the reason of\nthe laws concerning the heave-offerings and the tithe is distinctly\nstated: \u201cfor he hath no portion and inheritance with thee\u201d (Deut. xiv.\n29). You certainly know that the Levites had no portion, because their\nwhole tribe was to be exclusively engaged in the service of God and the\nstudy of the Law. They shall not plow or cut the corn, but shall only\nminister to God. \u201cThey shall teach Jacob thy judgments and Israel thy\nlaw: they shall put incense before thee\u201d (Deut. xxxiii. 10). In the Law\nwe meet frequently with the phrase, \u201cthe Levite, the stranger, and the\norphan and the widow\u201d; for the Levite is reckoned among the poor\nbecause he had no property. The second tithe was commanded to be spent\non food in Jerusalem; in this way the owner was compelled to give part\nof it away as charity. As he was not able to use it otherwise than by\nway of eating and drinking, he must have easily been induced to give it\ngradually away. This rule brought multitudes together in one place, and\nstrengthened the bond of love and brotherhood among the children of\nmen. The law concerning the fruit of a tree in its fourth year has some\nrelation to idolatrous customs, as has been stated by us (chap.\nxxxvii.), and is connected with the law concerning the fruit of a tree\nin its first three years. But it has in addition the same object as the\nlaw concerning the heave-offering (Deut. xviii. 4), the dough-offering\n(\u1e25allah) (Num. xv. 20), the first-fruit (Exod. xxiii. 19), and the\nfirst of the shearing (Deut. xviii. 4). For the first of everything is\nto be devoted to the Lord; and by doing so man accustoms himself to be\nliberal, and to limit his appetite for eating and his desire for\nproperty. The same is the reason why the priest took the shoulder, the\ntwo cheeks, and the maw (Deut. xviii. 3); the cheek being the first\npart of the body of animals, the right shoulder the first of the\nextremities of the body, and the maw the first of all inwards.\n\nThe reciting of a certain portion of the Law when the first-fruits are\nbrought to the temple, tends also to create humility. For he who brings\nthe first-fruits takes the basket upon his shoulders and proclaims the\nkindness and goodness of God. This ceremony teaches man that it is\nessential in the service of God to remember the times of trouble and\nthe history of past distress, in days of comfort. The Law lays stress\non this duty in several places; comp. \u201cAnd thou shalt remember that\nthou hast been a slave,\u201d etc. (Deut. v. 15). For it is to be feared\nthat those who become great in riches and comfort might, as is\ngenerally the case, fall into the vices of insolence and haughtiness,\nand abandon all good principles. Comp. \u201cLest thou eat and be full,\netc., and thine heart be lifted up and thou forget the Lord\u201d (ibid.\nviii. 12\u201314); \u201cAnd Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked\u201d (ibid. xxx. 15). On\naccount of this fear the Law commanded us to read each year a certain\nportion before the Lord and His glory, when we offer the first-fruit.\nYou know how much the Law insists that we shall always remember the\nplagues that have befallen the Egyptians; comp. \u201cThat thou mayest\nremember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt all\nthe days of thy life\u201d (ibid. xvi. 3); \u201cThat thou mayest tell in the\nears of thy son what things I have wrought in Egypt\u201d (Exod. x. 2). Such\na law was necessary in order to perpetuate the memory of the departure\nfrom Egypt; because such events verify prophecy and the doctrine of\nreward and punishment. The benefit of every commandment that serves to\nkeep certain miracles in remembrance, or to perpetuate true faith, is\ntherefore obvious.\n\nIn reference to the law concerning the first-born of man and cattle it\nis distinctly said, \u201cAnd it came to pass, when Pharaoh would hardly let\nus go, that the Lord slew all the first-born in the land of Egypt,\netc., therefore I sacrifice to the Lord,\u201d etc. (Exod. xiii. 15). But it\ncan easily be explained why only cattle, sheep, and asses are mentioned\nin this law; these are kept as domestic animals, and are found in most\nplaces, especially in Palestine, where the Israelites were shepherds,\nthey, their fathers, and forefathers; comp. \u201cThy servants are\nshepherds, both we and also our fathers\u201d (Gen. xlvii. 3). Horses and\ncamels, however, are not wanted by shepherds, and are not found in all\nplaces; thus in the booty of Midian (Num. xxxi.) no other animals are\nmentioned but oxen, sheep, and asses. But asses alone are indispensable\nto all people, especially to those who are engaged in the field or in\nthe forest. Thus Jacob says, \u201cI have oxen and asses\u201d (Gen. xxxii. 5).\nCamels and horses are not possessed by many people, but only by a few,\nand are only found in a few places. The law that the first-born of an\nass was to have its neck broken [in case it is not redeemed], will only\nensure the redemption of the ass. It has, therefore, been said that the\nact of redeeming the ass is to be preferred to that of breaking its\nneck.\n\nAs to the precepts enumerated in the laws concerning the year of\nrelease and the jubilee (Hilkot shemittah ve-yobel) some of them imply\nsympathy with our fellow-men, and promote the well-being of mankind;\nfor in reference to these precepts it is stated in the Law, \u201cThat the\npoor of thy people may eat\u201d (Exod. xxiii. 11); and besides, the land\nwill also increase its produce and improve when it remains fallow for\nsome time. Other precepts of this class prescribe kindness to servants\nand to the poor, by renouncing all claims to debts [in the year of\nrelease], and relieving the slaves of their bondage [in the seventh\nyear]. There are some precepts in this class that serve to secure for\nthe people a permanent source of maintenance and support by providing\nthat the land should remain the permanent property of its owners, and\nthat it could not be sold. \u201cAnd the land shall not be sold for ever\u201d\n(Lev. xxv. 23). In this way the property of a person remains intact for\nhim and his heirs, and he can only enjoy the produce thereof. I have\nthus explained the reason of all precepts contained in our work in the\nSection Zerai\u02bbim, with the exception of the laws concerning the\nintermixture of different species of beasts the reason of which will be\ngiven (chap. xlix.).\n\nIn the same manner we find that all the precepts comprised in \u201cthe laws\non valuations,\u201d and on \u201cthings devoted\u201d are based on the principle of\ncharity; some of them prescribe what should be given to the priests;\nothers tell us what must be devoted to the repairs of the temple. The\npractice of all these things accustoms man to act liberally and to\nspend money unhesitatingly to the glory of God. For it is in the nature\nof man to strive to gain money and to increase it; and his great desire\nto add to his wealth and honour is the chief source of misery for man.\nAlso the precepts contained in \u201cthe laws concerning the relation\nbetween lender and borrower\u201d (Hilkot malveh veloveh) will be found, on\nbeing carefully examined, to be nothing but commands to be lenient,\nmerciful and kind to the needy, not to deprive them of the use of\nanything indispensable in the preparation of food. \u201cNo man shall take\nthe nether or the upper millstone to pledge: for he taketh a man\u2019s life\nto pledge\u201d (Deut. xxiv. 6).\n\nThe precepts contained in \u201cthe laws concerning slaves\u201d (Hilkot\n\u02bbabadim), likewise prescribe only acts of pity, mercy and kindness to\nthe poor. It is an act of mercy to give liberty to a Canaanite servant\nfor the loss of one of his limbs (Exod. xxi. 26, 27), in order that he\nshould not suffer from slavery and illness at the same time. The law\napplies even to the case that a tooth of a slave has been knocked out,\nmuch more to the mutilation of other limbs. He could only be corrected\nwith a rod or reed or the like, as we have stated in Mishneh-torah.\nBesides, if the master strikes the slave too hard and kills him, he is\npunished with death as for ordinary murder. Mercy is also the object of\nthe law, \u201cThou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant that is\nescaped from his master\u201d (Deut. xxiii. 15); but it teaches besides a\nvery useful lesson, namely, that we must always practise this virtue,\nhelp and protect those who seek our help, and not deliver them unto\nthose from whom they flee; and it is not sufficient to give assistance\nto those who are in need of our help; we must look after their\ninterests, be kind to them, and not hurt their feeling by words. Thus\nthe Law says: \u201cHe shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place\nwhich he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best:\nthou shalt not vex him\u201d (ibid. ver. 16). This we owe to the lowest\namong men, to the slave; how much more must we do our duty to the\nfreeborn, when they seek our assistance? But, on the other hand, when\nsinners and evildoers seek our help, it must not be granted; no mercy\nmust be shown to them, and the course of justice must not be interfered\nwith, even if they claim the protection of that which is noblest and\nhighest; for \u201cThou shalt take him from mine altar that he may die\u201d\n(Exod. xxi. 14). Here a person comes to seek the help of God, and\nclaims the protection of that which is devoted to his name; God,\nhowever, does not help him, and commands that he be delivered up to the\nprosecutor, from whom he fled. Much less need any one of us help or\npity his fellow-men [under such circumstances]; because mercy on\nsinners is cruelty to all creatures. These are undoubtedly the right\nways designated \u201crighteous statutes and judgments\u201d (Deut. iv. 8), and\ndifferent from the ways of the fools, who consider a person\npraiseworthy when he helps and protects his fellow-men, without\ndiscriminating between the oppressor and the oppressed. This is well\nknown from their words and songs.\n\nThe reason and usefulness of every precept of this class has thus been\nclearly demonstrated.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL\n\n\nThe precepts of the fifth class, enumerated in the Section \u201cOn Damages\u201d\n(Sepher nezi\u1e33in), aim at the removal of wrong and the prevention of\ninjury. As we are strongly recommended to prevent damage, we are\nresponsible for every damage caused by our property or through our work\nin so far as it is in our power to take care and to guard it from\nbecoming injurious. We are, therefore, responsible for all damage\ncaused by our cattle; we must guard them. The same is the case with\nfire and pits; they are made by man, and he can be careful that they do\nnot cause damage. I will point out the equity of the various laws in\nthis respect. No compensation is enforced for damage caused by the\nmouth or the foot of an animal in a public thoroughfare; because this\ncannot be guarded against, and the damage caused there is not very\nlarge. Those who place their things in a public place are themselves\nguilty of neglect, and expose their property to injury. But\ncompensation is given for damage caused to the property of a person in\nhis own field by the tooth or the foot of an animal. It is different in\nthe case of damage caused by the horn of animals or the like. The\nanimal can be guarded everywhere [and prevented from causing injury],\nwhilst those who pass public thoroughfares cannot sufficiently take\ncare against accidents of this kind. In this case the law is the same\nfor all places; but there is a difference whether the owner of the\nanimal has been warned concerning it or not (mu\u02bbad or tam). If the\nanimal has not been in the habit of causing damage, the owner need only\npay half the damage; but damage caused by an animal which has been in\nthe habit of doing so, and has been known as savage, must be paid in\nfull. The compensation for a slave is uniformly estimated at half the\nvalue fixed for a free man. For in the law concerning the valuation of\nman you find the highest valuation at sixty shekels, whilst the money\nto be paid for a slave is fixed at thirty shekels silver. The killing\nof an animal that has killed a human being (Exod. xxi. 28, 29) is not a\npunishment to the animal, as the dissenters insinuate against us, but\nit is a fine imposed on the owner of that animal. For the same reason\nthe use of its flesh is prohibited. The owner of an animal will,\ntherefore, take the greatest possible care in guarding it; he will know\nthat if any person is killed by the animal, whether that person be\ngrown up or young, free or in bondage, he forfeits at least the animal;\nand in case he has already received a warning concerning it, he will\nhave to pay a ransom in addition to the loss of the animal. This is\nalso the reason why a beast is killed that has been used by a human\nbeing for an immoral purpose (Lev. xx. 15, 16); its owner will be more\ncareful as regards his beast, will guard it, and never lose sight of\nit, just as he watches his household: for people fear the loss of their\nproperty as much as that of their own life; some even more, but most\npeople hold both in the same estimation. Comp. \u201cand to take us for\nbondmen, and our asses\u201d (Gen. xliii. 18).\n\nThis class includes also the duty of killing him who pursues another\nperson; that is to say, if a person is about to commit a crime we may\nprevent it by killing him. Only in two cases is this permitted; viz.,\nwhen a person runs after another in order to murder him, or in order to\ncommit fornication; because in these two cases the crime, once\ncommitted; cannot be remedied. In the case of other sins, punished with\ndeath by the court of law, such as idolatry and profanation of the\nSabbath, by which the sinner does no harm to another person, and which\nconcern only his own principles, no person may be killed for the mere\nintention, if he has not carried it out.\n\nIt is known that desire is denounced because it leads to coveting, and\nthe latter is prohibited because it leads to robbery, as has been said\nby our Sages.\n\nThe object of the law of restoring lost property to its owner (Deut.\nxxii. 1\u20133) is obvious. In the first instance, it is in itself a good\nfeature in man\u2019s character. Secondly, its benefit is mutual; for if a\nperson does not return the lost property of his fellow-man, nobody will\nrestore to him what he may lose, just as those who do not honour their\nparents cannot expect to be honoured by their children.\n\nA person who killed another person unknowingly must go into exile\n(Exod. xxi. 13; Num. xxxv. 11\u201328); because the anger of \u201cthe avenger of\nthe blood\u201d (Num. xxxv. 19) cools down while the cause of the mischief\nis out of sight. The chance of returning from the exile depends on the\ndeath of [the high-priest], the most honoured of men, and the friend of\nall Israel. By his death the relative of the slain person becomes\nreconciled (ibid. ver. 25); for it is a natural phenomenon that we find\nconsolation in our misfortune when the same misfortune or a greater one\nhas befallen another person. Amongst us no death causes more grief than\nthat of the high-priest.\n\nThe beneficial character of the law concerning \u201cthe breaking of the\nneck of a heifer\u201d (Deut. xxi. 1\u20138) is evident. For it is the city that\nis nearest to the slain person that brings the heifer, and in most\ncases the murderer comes from that place. The elders of the place call\nupon God as their witness, according to the interpretation of our\nSages, that they have always kept the roads in good condition, have\nprotected them, and have directed every one that asked his way; that\nthe person has not been killed because they were careless in these\ngeneral provisions, and they do not know who has slain him. As a rule\nthe investigation, the procession of the elders, the measuring, and the\ntaking of the heifer, make people talk about it, and by making the\nevent public, the murderer may be found out, and he who knows of him,\nor has heard of him, or has discovered him by any due, will now name\nthe person that is the murderer, and as soon as a man, or even a woman\nor handmaid, rises up and names a certain person as having committed\nthe murder, the heifer is not killed. It is well known that it is\nconsidered great wickedness and guilt on the part of a person who knows\nthe murderer, and is silent about him whilst the elders call upon God\nas witness that they know nothing about the murderer. Even a woman\nwill, therefore, communicate whatever knowledge she has of him. When\nthe murderer is discovered, the benefit of the law is apparent. If the\ncourt of justice cannot sentence him to death, the king may find him\nguilty, who has the power to sentence to death on circumstantial\nevidence; and if the king does not put him to death, the avenger of\nblood may scheme and plan his death, and at last kill him. We have thus\nshown the use of the law concerning the breaking of the neck of the\nheifer in discovering the murderer. Force is added to the law by the\nrule that the place in which the neck of the heifer is broken should\nnever be cultivated or sown. The owner of the land will therefore use\nall means in his power to search and to find the murderer, in order\nthat the heifer be not killed and his land be not made useless to him.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI\n\n\nThe precepts of the sixth class comprise the different ways of\npunishing the sinner. Their general usefulness is known and has also\nbeen mentioned by us. I will here describe them one by one and point\nout their nature in detail.\n\nThe punishment of him who sins against his neighbour consists in the\ngeneral rule that there shall be done unto him exactly as he has done:\nif he injured any one personally, he must suffer personally; if he\ndamaged the property of his neighbour, he shall be punished by loss of\nproperty. But the person whose property has been damaged should be\nready to resign his claim totally or partly. Only to the murderer we\nmust not be lenient because of the greatness of his crime; and no\nransom must be accepted of him. \u201cAnd the land cannot be cleansed of the\nblood that is shed therein but by the blood of him that shed it\u201d (Num.\nxxxi. 33). Hence even if the murdered person continued to live after\nthe attack for an hour or for days, was able to speak and possessed\ncomplete consciousness, and if he himself said, \u201cPardon my murderer, I\nhave pardoned and forgiven him,\u201d he must not be obeyed. We must take\nlife for life, and estimate equally the life of a child and that of a\ngrown-up person, of a slave and of a freeman, of a wise man and of a\nfool. For there is no greater sin than this. And he who mutilated a\nlimb of his neighbour, must himself lose a limb. \u201cAs he hath caused a\nblemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again\u201d (Lev. xxiv. 20).\nYou must not raise an objection from our practice of imposing a fine in\nsuch cases. For we have proposed to ourselves to give here the reason\nfor the precepts mentioned in the Law, and not for that which is stated\nin the Talmud. I have, however, an explanation for the interpretation\ngiven in the Talmud, but it will be communicated viv\u00e2 voce. Injuries\nthat cannot be reproduced exactly in another person, are compensated\nfor by payment; \u201conly he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall\ncause him to be thoroughly healed\u201d (Exod. xxi. 19). If any one damaged\nthe property of another, he must lose exactly as much of his own\nproperty: \u201cwhom the judges shall condemn he shall pay double unto his\nneighbour\u201d (Exod. xxii. 8); namely, he restores that which he has\ntaken, and adds just as much [to it] of his own property. It is right\nthat the more frequent transgressions and sins are, and the greater the\nprobability of their being committed, the more severe must their\npunishment be, in order to deter people from committing them; but sins\nwhich are of rare occurrence require a less severe punishment. For this\nreason one who stole a sheep had to pay twice as much as for other\ngoods, i.e., four times the value of the stolen object; but this is\nonly the case when he has disposed of it by sale or slaughter (Exod.\nxxi. 37). As a rule, the sheep remained always in the fields, and could\ntherefore not be watched so carefully as things kept in town. The thief\nof a sheep used therefore to sell it quickly before the theft became\nknown, or to slaughter it and thereby change its appearance. As such\ntheft happened frequently, the punishment was severe. The compensation\nfor a stolen ox is still greater by one-fourth, because the theft is\neasily carried out. The sheep keep together when they feed, and can be\nwatched by the shepherd, so that theft when it is committed can only\ntake place by night. But oxen when feeding are very widely scattered,\nas is also mentioned in the Nabatean Agriculture, and a shepherd cannot\nwatch them properly; theft of oxen is therefore a more frequent\noccurrence.\n\nThe law concerning false witnesses (Deut. xix. 19) prescribes that they\nshall suffer exactly the same loss which they intended to inflict upon\nanother. If they intended to bring a sentence of death against a\nperson, they are killed; if they aimed at the punishment of stripes,\nthey receive stripes; and if they desire to make a person pay money,\nthey are sentenced to pay exactly the same sum. The object of all these\nlaws is to make the punishment equal to the crime; and it is also on\nthis account that the judgments are \u201crighteous\u201d (Deut. iv. 8). A robber\nwith violence is not ordered to pay anything as fine (Lev. v. 24); the\nadditional fifth part [of the value of the robbed goods] is only an\natonement-offering for his perjury. The reason of this rule is to be\nfound in the rare occurrence of robbery; theft is committed more\nfrequently than robbery, for theft can be committed everywhere; robbery\nis not possible in towns, except with difficulty; besides, the thief\ntakes things exposed as well as things hidden away; robbery applies\nonly to things exposed; against robbery we can guard and defend\nourselves; we cannot do so against theft; again, the robber is known,\ncan be sought, and forced to return that which he has robbed, whilst\nthe thief is not known. On account of all these circumstances the law\nfines the thief and not the robber.\n\nPreliminary Remark.\u2014Whether the punishment is great or small, the pain\ninflicted intense or less intense, depends on the following four\nconditions.\n\n1. The greatness of the sin. Actions that cause great harm are punished\nseverely, whilst actions that cause little harm are punished less\nseverely.\n\n2. The frequency of the crime. A crime that is frequently committed\nmust be put down by severe punishment; crimes of rare occurrence may be\nsuppressed by a lenient punishment considering that they are rarely\ncommitted.\n\n3. The amount of temptation. Only fear of a severe punishment remains\nus from actions for which there exists a great temptation, either\nbecause we have a great desire for these actions, or are accustomed to\nthem, or feel unhappy without them.\n\n4. The facility of doing the thing secretly, and unseen and unnoticed.\nFrom such acts we are deterred only by the fear of a great and terrible\npunishment.\n\nAfter this preliminary remark, I say that the precepts of the Law may\nbe divided into the following four classes with respect to the\npunishment for their transgression:\u2014(1) Precepts whose transgression is\nfollowed by sentence of death pronounced by a court of law. (2)\nPrecepts whose transgression is punished with excision, such\ntransgression being held to be a very great sin. (3) In some cases the\ntransgression is punished by stripes administered with a strap (such\ntransgression not being considered a grievous sin, as it concerns only\na simple prohibition); or by \u201cdeath by Heaven.\u201d (4) Precepts the\ntransgression of which is not punished [even] by stripes. Prohibitions\nof this kind are all those that involve no act. But there are the\nfollowing exceptions: [First], Swearing falsely, because it is gross\nneglect of man\u2019s duty, who ought to bear constantly in mind the\ngreatness of God. [Secondly], Changing an animal devoted to the\nsanctuary for another (Lev. xxvii. 10), because this change leads to\ncontemning sacrifices devoted to the name of God. [Thirdly], Cursing a\nperson by the name of God (ibid. xix. 14); because many dread the\neffect of a curse more than bodily harm. The transgression of other\nnegative commandments that involve no act causes little harm, and\ncannot always be avoided, as it consists in mere words; moreover, man\u2019s\nback would be inflicted with stripes all the year round if he were to\nbe punished with stripes for each transgression of this kind. Besides,\nprevious warning is impossible in this case. There is also wisdom in\nthe number of stripes; for although the number of their maximum is\ngiven, there is no fixed number how many are to be applied to each\nperson; each man receives only as many stripes as he can bear, but not\nmore than forty (Deut. xxv. 3), even if he be strong enough for a\nhundred.\n\nThe \u201cdeath by the court of law\u201d is not inflicted for the transgression\nof any of the dietary laws; because in such a case no great harm is\ndone, and the temptation of man to transgress these laws is not so\ngreat as the temptation to the enjoyment of sexual intercourse. In some\nof the dietary laws the punishment is excision. This is the case with\nthe prohibition of eating blood (Lev. xvii. 26). For in ancient days\npeople were very eager and anxious to eat blood as a kind of idolatrous\nceremony, as is explained in the book Tomtom, and therefore the\nprohibition of eating blood is made very stringent. Excision is also\nthe punishment for eating fat; because people enjoy it, and because it\nwas distinguished and sanctified by its use in the offerings. The\neating of leavened bread on Passover (Exod. xii. 15), and breaking the\nfast on the Day of Atonement (Lev. xxiii. 29), are likewise punished\nwith excision: [first] on account of the great discomfort which the\nobedience to the law causes in these cases; [secondly] on account of\nthe principles of faith which the laws of Passover and of the Day of\nAtonement inculcate: they confirm fundamental principles of the Law,\nviz., the belief in the wonderful departure [of Israel] from Egypt, and\nin the effect of repentance, according to the words, \u201cFor on this day\nwill he forgive you\u201d (Lev. xvi. 31). Just as in the case of eating fat,\nso is excision also announced as a punishment when a person eats that\nwhich is left [of a sacrifice beyond its limited time], or partakes of\na sacrifice which has been made abominable; or when an unclean person\neats of holy things (ibid. vii. 16\u201321). The object of this severity is\nto increase the estimation of the offering in the eyes of the people,\nas has been shown.\n\nDeath by the court of law is decreed in important cases: when faith is\nundermined, or a great crime is committed, viz., idolatry, incest,\nmurder, or actions that lead to these crimes. It is further decreed for\nbreaking the Sabbath (Exod. xxxi. 15); because the keeping of Sabbath\nis a confirmation of our belief in the Creation; a false prophet and a\nrebellious elder are put to death on account of the mischief which they\ncause; he who strikes his father or his mother is killed on account of\nhis great audacity, and because he undermines the constitution of the\nfamily, which is the foundation of the state. A rebellious and\ndisobedient son is put to death (Deut. xxi. 18 seq.) on account of what\nhe might become, because he will likely be a murderer; he who steals a\nhuman being is killed, because he is also prepared to kill him whom he\nsteals (Exod. xxi. 16). Likewise he who is found breaking into a house\nis prepared for murder (ibid. xxii. 1), as our Sages stated. These\nthree, the rebellious and disobedient son, he who steals and sells a\nhuman being, and he who breaks into a house, become murderers in the\ncourse of time, as is well known. Capital punishment is only decreed\nfor these serious crimes, and in no other case. Not all forbidden\nsexual intercourse is visited with the penalty of death, but only in\nthose cases in which the criminal act can easily be done, is of\nfrequent occurrence, is base and disgraceful, and of a tempting\ncharacter; otherwise excision is the punishment. Likewise not all kinds\nof idolatry are capital crimes, but only the principal acts of\nidolatry, such as praying to an idol, prophesying in its name, passing\na child through the fire, consulting with familiar spirits, and acting\nas a wizard or witch.\n\nAs punishments and judgments are evidently indispensable, it was\nnecessary to appoint judges throughout the country in every town;\nwitnesses must be heard; and a king is required whom all fear and\nrespect, who is able to restrain the people by various means, and who\ncan strengthen and support the authority of the judges. Although I have\nshown the reason of all the laws contained in \u201cthe Section of Judges\u201d\n(Sefer Shofetim), I find it necessary, in accordance with the object of\nthis treatise, to explain a few of these laws, e.g., the laws\nconcerning a rebellious elder.\n\nGod knew that the judgments of the Law will always require an extension\nin some cases and curtailment in others, according to the variety of\nplaces, events, and circumstances. He therefore cautioned against such\nincrease and diminution, and commanded, \u201cThou shalt not add thereto nor\ndiminish from it\u201d (Deut. xiii. 1); for constant changes would tend to\ndisturb the whole system of the Law, and would lead people to believe\nthat the Law is not of Divine origin. But permission is at the same\ntime given to the wise men, i.e., the great court (Synhedrion) of every\ngeneration to make fences round the judgments of the Law for their\nprotection, and to introduce bye-laws (fences) in order to ensure the\nkeeping of the Law. Such fences once erected remain in force for ever.\nThe Mishnah therefore teaches: \u201cAnd make a fence round the Law\u201d (Abot\ni. 1). In the same manner they have the power temporarily to dispense\nwith some religious act prescribed in the Law, or to allow that which\nis forbidden, if exceptional circumstances and events require it; but\nnone of the laws can be abrogated permanently, as has been explained by\nus in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah in treating of\ntemporary legislation. By this method the Law will remain perpetually\nthe same, and will yet admit at all times and under all circumstances\nsuch temporary modifications as are indispensable. If every scholar had\nthe power to make such modifications, the multitude of disputes and\ndifferences of opinion would have produced an injurious effect.\nTherefore it was commanded that of the Sages only the great Synhedrion,\nand none else, should have this power; and whoever would oppose their\ndecision should be killed. For if any critic were allowed to dispute\nthe decision of the Synhedrion, the object of this law would not be\nattained; it would be useless.\n\nTransgressions may be divided into four classes, viz.\u2014(1) involuntary\ntransgressions, (2) sins committed in ignorance, (3) sins done\nknowingly, and (4) sins done spitefully. He who sins involuntarily is,\naccording to the distinct declaration of the Law, exempt from\npunishment, and free from all blame; comp. \u201cUnto the damsel thou shalt\ndo nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death\u201d (Deut. xxii.\n26). If a person sins in ignorance, he is blamable; for if he had been\nmore considerate and careful, he would not have erred. Although he is\nnot punished, his sin must be atoned for, and for this reason he brings\na sin-offering. The Law distinguishes in this respect between a private\nperson and a king, a high-priest or Teacher of Halakah. Hence we\nconclude that a person who acts wrongly, or who teaches wrongly, guided\nby his own reasoning\u2014except in the case of the great Synhedrion or the\nhigh-priest\u2014is treated as mezid (as one who sins knowingly), and does\nnot belong to the category of shogegim (of those who sin by error). A\nrebellious elder is therefore put to death, although he acted and\ntaught according to his view. But the great Synhedrion must teach\naccording to its opinion, and if the opinion is wrong, the sin is\nconsidered as due to error. In reference to such a case the Law says,\n\u201cAnd if the whole congregation of Israel err,\u201d etc. (Lev. iv. 13). It\nis on this principle that our Sages say, \u201cThe error in learning amounts\nto intentional sin\u201d (Abot iv. 13); he who has studied insufficiently,\nand teaches and acts according to his defective knowledge, is to be\nconsidered as if he sinned knowingly. For if a person eats of the fat\nof the kidneys in the belief that it is the fat of the rump, his error\nis not so grave as the error of him who, eating of the fat of the\nkidneys, knows that it is that fat, but is ignorant of the fact that it\nis prohibited. The latter brings a sin-offering although he is almost\nan intentional transgressor. But this is only the case as far as he\nacts according to his knowledge; but if he decides a religious question\n[wrongly], he is undoubtedly an intentional sinner. The Law admits the\nplea of error in a religious decision only in the case of the great\nSynhedrion.\n\nHe who has sinned knowingly must pay the penalty prescribed in the Law;\nhe is put to death or receives stripes, or\u2014for transgression of\nprohibitions not punishable by stripes\u2014other corporal punishment, or\npays a fine. There are some sins for which the punishment is the same,\nwhether they have been committed knowingly or unknowingly; because they\nare frequent, and are easily done, consisting only in the utterance of\nwords, and involving no action besides; e.g., false swearing by\nwitnesses, or by trustees. Intercourse with a betrothed handmaid is\nlikewise easy and frequent; she is exposed unprotected, being in\nreality neither handmaid nor a free person, nor a married woman,\naccording to the traditional interpretation of this precept.\n\nIf a person sins presumptuously, so that in sinning he shows impudence\nand seeks publicity, if he does not sin only to satisfy his appetite,\nif he does what is prohibited by the Law, not only because of his evil\ninclinations, but in order to oppose and resist the Law, he\n\u201creproacheth the Lord\u201d (Num. xv. 30), and must undoubtedly be put to\ndeath. None will act in such a manner but such as have conceived the\nidea to act contrary to the Law. According to the traditional\ninterpretation, therefore, the above passage speaks of an idolater who\nopposes the fundamental principles of the Law; for no one worships a\nstar unless he believes [\u2014contrary to the teachings of Scripture\u2014] that\nthe star is eternal, as we have frequently stated in our work. I think\nthat the same punishment [viz., sentence of death] applies to every sin\nwhich involves the rejection of the Law, or opposition to it. Even if\nan Israelite eats meat [boiled] in milk, or wears garments of wool and\nlinen, or rounds the corners of his head, out of spite against the Law,\nin order to show clearly that he does not believe in its truth, I apply\nto him the words, \u201che reproacheth the Lord,\u201d and [I am of opinion] that\nhe must suffer death as an unbeliever, though not for a punishment, but\nin the same manner as the inhabitants of a \u201ccity misled to idolatry\u201d\nare slain for their unbelief, and not by way of punishment for crime;\nwherefore their property is destroyed by fire, and is not given to\ntheir heirs, as is the case with the property of other criminals\ncondemned to death. According to my opinion, all the members of an\nIsraelitish community which has insolently and presumptuously\ntransgressed any of the divine precepts, must be put to death. This is\nproved by the history of \u201cthe sons of Reuben and the sons of Gad\u201d\n(Josh. xxii.), against whom the whole congregation of Israel decided to\nmake war. When warning was given to the supposed offenders, it was\nexplained to them that they had relinquished their faith, because by\nagreeing to transgress one particular law they rejected the truth of\nthe whole Law. For they were addressed as follows: \u201cWhat trespass is\nthis that ye have committed against the God of Israel, to turn away\nthis day from following the Lord?\u201d (Josh. xxii. 16); and they replied:\n\u201cThe Lord knoweth, etc., if it be in rebellion, or if in transgression\nagainst the Lord,\u201d etc. (ibid. 22). Take well notice of these\nprinciples in respect to punishments.\n\nThe Section on Judges includes also the commandment to blot out the\nmemory of Amalek (Deut. xxv. 17\u201319). In the same way as one individual\nperson is punished, so must also a whole family or a whole nation be\npunished, in order that other families shall hear it and be afraid, and\nnot accustom themselves to practise mischief. For they will say, we may\nsuffer in the same way as those people have suffered; and if there be\nfound among them a wicked, mischievous man, who cares neither for the\nevil he brings upon himself nor for that which he causes to others, he\nwill not find in his family any one ready to help him in his evil\ndesigns. As Amalek was the first to attack Israel with the sword (Exod.\nxvii. 8\u201316), it was commanded to blot out his name by means of the\nsword; whilst Ammon and Moab, who have not been friendly simply from\nmeanness, and have caused them injury by cunning, were only punished by\nexclusion from intermarriage with the Israelites, and from their\nfriendship. All these things which God has commanded as a punishment\nare not excessive nor inadequate, but, as is distinctly stated,\n\u201caccording to the fault\u201d (Deut. xxv. 2).\n\nThis section contains also the law concerning preparing \u201ca place\nwithout the camp,\u201d and \u201chaving a paddle upon the weapon\u201d (Deut. xxiii.\n12, 13). As I have told you, it is one of the objects of the Law to\ntrain Israel to cleanliness; that they should keep free from dirt and\nfilth, and that men should not be degraded to the condition of cattle.\nAnother object of this law is to confirm by these preparations the\nbelief of the warriors that God dwells in their midst. The reason of\nthe law is therefore stated thus: \u201cFor the Lord thy God walketh in the\nmidst of the camp\u201d (ibid. ver. 14). The mention of this reason gave\noccasion to add another lesson: \u201cThat he see no unclean thing in thee\nand turn away from thee\u201d (ibid.). These words warn and caution us\nagainst the usual inclination of soldiers to fornication, when they are\naway from their homes a long time. God therefore commanded us to do\ncertain things which remind us that He is in our midst; we will thereby\nbe saved from those evil practices; as it is said, \u201cand thy camp shall\nbe holy, that he see no unclean thing in thee\u201d (ibid.). Even those who\nare unclean by pollution were compelled to stop outside the camp till\nthe evening, and \u201cthen he shall come into the camp again.\u201d It will thus\nbe confirmed in the heart of every one of the Israelites that their\ncamp must be like a sanctuary of the Lord, and it must not be like the\ncamps of the heathen, whose sole object is corruption and sin; who only\nseek to cause injury to others and to take their property; whilst our\nobject is to lead mankind to the service of God, and to a good social\norder. I have told you already that I only propose to give here such\nreasons as are apparent from the text of the Law.\n\nTo the same class belongs also the law concerning \u201cthe marriage of a\ncaptive woman\u201d (Deut. xxi. 10 seq.). There is a well-known saying of\nour Sages: \u201cThis law is only a concession to human weakness.\u201d This law\ncontains, nevertheless, even for the nobler class of people, some moral\nlessons to which I will call your attention. For although the soldier\nmay be overcome by his desire which he is unable to suppress or to\nrestrain, he must take the object of his lust to a private place, \u201cinto\nthe inner of his house\u201d (Deut. xxi. 12), and he is not permitted to\nforce her in the camp. Similarly our Sages say, that he may not cohabit\nwith her a second time before she leaves off her mourning, and is at\nease about her troubles. She must not be prevented from mourning and\ncrying, and she must be permitted to abstain from bathing, in\naccordance with the words, \u201cand she shall weep for her father and for\nher mother\u201d (ibid.); for mourners find comfort in crying and in\nexcitement till the body has not sufficient strength to bear the inner\nemotions; in the same manner as happy persons find rest in various\nkinds of play. Thus the Lord is merciful to her and gives her\npermission to continue her mourning and weeping till she is worn out.\nYou know certainly that he married her as a heathen, and that during\nthe thirty days she openly keeps her religion and even continues her\nidolatrous practices; no interference with her faith was allowed during\nthat time; and after all that she could not be sold, nor treated as a\nhandmaid, if she could not be induced to accept the statutes of the\nLaw. Thus the Law does not ignore the cohabitation of the Israelite\nwith the captive woman, although it involved disobedience to God to\nsome extent, having taken place when she was still a heathen. The Law\nprescribes: \u201cThou shalt not make merchandise of her, because thou hast\nhumbled her\u201d (ibid. 14). We have thus shown the moral lessons contained\nin these laws, and we have explained the reason of every precept of\nthis section.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII\n\n\nThe precepts of the seventh class are the civil laws enumerated in the\nSection on Judgments, and part of the Section on Property. The object\nof these precepts is obvious. They define the ways of equity in the\nvarious transactions which must take place between man and man. Those\nthat are engaged in such transactions must mutually promote each\nother\u2019s interests; neither of the parties must strive to increase only\nhis own profit, and that he alone should enjoy the whole benefit of the\ntransaction. In the first place, no overcharge is permitted; only the\nordinary and known rate of profit may be taken. The law fixes the\nlimits of profits within which the transaction is valid. Even\nimposition in mere words [where no material harm is inflicted] is\nforbidden, as is well known. Next comes the law of the four kind of\nbailees; the fairness of the law is evident. If one keeps the property\nof his neighbour for nothing, without deriving therefrom any benefit\nfor himself, and is only obliging his neighbour, he is free from all\nresponsibility, and if any injury is done to the property, the owner\nalone must bear the loss. He who borrows a thing keeps it only for his\nown advantage, whilst the owner lends it to him to oblige him; he is\ntherefore responsible for everything; any loss in the property must be\nborne by the borrower. If one takes wages for keeping the property or\npays for using it, he as well as the owner profit thereby; the losses\nmust therefore be divided between them. It is done in this manner; the\nbailee pays for any loss caused through want of care, namely, when the\nproperty is stolen or lost; for this happens only when the bailee does\nnot take sufficient precaution. The owner, on the other hand, bears\nsuch losses as cannot be prevented; namely, if by accident the animal\nfalls and breaks its limbs, or is carried away by armed men as booty,\nor if it dies. The Law further ordains merciful conduct towards hired\nworkmen because of their poverty. Their wages should be paid without\ndelay, and they must not be wronged in any of their rights; they must\nreceive their pay according to their work. Another instance of kindness\nto workmen is this: according to the regulations of this law, workmen,\nand even animals, must be permitted to partake of the food in the\npreparation of which they have been engaged. The laws which relate to\nproperty include laws concerning inheritance. They are based on the\nsound principle that man must not \u201cwithhold good from those to whom it\nis due\u201d (Prov. iii. 27), and when he is about to die, he must not\nconceive ill-will against his heirs, by squandering his property, but\nleave it to the one who has the greatest claim on it, that is, to him\nwho is his nearest relation, \u201cunto his kinsman that is next to him of\nhis family\u201d (Num. xxvii. 11). It is clearly stated that the son has the\nfirst claim, then comes the daughter, then the brother, and then the\nfather\u2019s brothers, as is well known. The father must leave the right of\nthe first-born to his eldest son, because his love for this son came\nfirst; he must not be guided by his inclination. He may not make the\nson of the beloved first-born before the son of the hated (Deut. xxi.\n16). Thus our highly equitable Law preserves and strengthens the virtue\nof respecting all kinsmen, and doing well unto them, as the prophet\nsays: \u201cHe that is cruel troubleth his own flesh\u201d (Prov. xi. 17). The\nLaw correctly says, \u201cThou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy brother,\nunto thy poor\u201d (Deut. xv. 11). Our Sages bestow much praise upon him\nwho is kind to his relatives, and him who marries the daughter of his\nsister. The Law has taught us how far we have to extend this principle\nof favouring those who are near to us, and of treating kindly every one\nwith whom we have some relationship, even if he offended or wronged us;\neven if he is very bad, we must have some consideration for him. Thus\nthe Law says: \u201cThou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy brother\u201d\n(ibid. xxiii. 7). Again, if we find a person in trouble, whose\nassistance we have once enjoyed, or of whom we have received some\nbenefit, even if that person has subsequently done evil to us, we must\nbear in mind his previous [good] conduct. Thus the Law tells us: \u201cThou\nshalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land\u201d\n(ibid.), although the Egyptians have subsequently oppressed us very\nmuch, as is well-known. See how many moral lessons we have derived from\nthese precepts. The last two precepts do not belong to the seventh\nclass; but the discussion of the preference due to relatives as regards\ninheritance led us to speak of the Egyptians and the Edomites.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII\n\n\nThe precepts of the eighth class are enumerated in \u201cthe Section on\nSeasons\u201d (Sefer zemannim). With a few exceptions, the reasons for all\nof them are stated in the Law. The object of Sabbath is obvious, and\nrequires no explanation. The rest it affords to man is known;\none-seventh of the life of every man, whether small or great, passes\nthus in comfort, and in rest from trouble and exertion. This the\nSabbath effects in addition to the perpetuation and confirmation of the\ngrand doctrine of the Creation. The object of the Fast of Atonement is\nevident. The Fast creates the sense of repentance; it is the same day\non which the chief of all prophets came down [from Mount Sinai] with\nthe second tables, and announced to the people the divine pardon of\ntheir great sin; the day was therefore appointed for ever as a day\ndevoted to repentance and true worship of God. For this reason all\nmaterial enjoyment, all trouble and care for the body, are interdicted,\nno work may be done; the day must be spent in confession; every one\nshall confess his sins and abandon them.\n\nOther holy days are appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasant\ngathering as people generally need. They also promote the good feeling\nthat men should have to each other in their social and political\nrelations. The appointment of the special days for such purposes has\nits cause. The reason for the Passover is well known. It is kept seven\ndays, because the period of seven days is the unit of time intermediate\nbetween a day and a month. It is also known how great is the importance\nof this period in Nature, and in many religious duties. For the Law\nalways follows Nature, and in some respects brings it to perfection;\nfor Nature is not capable of designing and thinking, whilst the Law is\nthe result of the wisdom and guidance of God, who is the author of the\nintellect of all rational beings. This, however, is not the theme of\nthe present chapter; let us return to our subject.\n\nThe Feast of Weeks is the anniversary of the Revelation on Mount Sinai.\nIn order to raise the importance of this day, we count the days that\npass since the preceding festival, just as one who expects his most\nintimate friend on a certain day counts the days and even the hours.\nThis is the reason why we count the days that pass since the offering\nof the Omer, between the anniversary of our departure from Egypt and\nthe anniversary of the Lawgiving. The latter was the aim and object of\nthe exodus from Egypt, and thus God said, \u201cI brought you unto myself\u201d\n(Exod. xix. 4). As that great revelation took place only on one day, so\nwe keep its anniversary only one day; but if the eating of unleavened\nbread on Passover were only commanded for one day, we should not have\nnoticed it, and its object would not have been manifest. For it\nfrequently happens that we take the same kind of food for two or three\ndays. But by our continuing for a whole period [of seven days] to eat\nunleavened bread, its object becomes clear and evident.\n\nNew-Year is likewise kept for one day; for it is a day of repentance on\nwhich we are stirred up from our forgetfulness. For this reason the\nshofar is blown on this day, as we have shown in Mishneh-torah. The day\nis, as it were, a preparation for and an introduction to the day of the\nFast, as is obvious from the national tradition about the days between\nNew-Year and the Day of Atonement.\n\nThe Feast of Tabernacles, which is a feast of rejoicing and gladness,\nis kept seven days, in order that the idea of the festival may be more\nnoticeable. The reason why it is kept in the autumn is stated in the\nLaw, \u201cWhen thou hast gathered in thy labours out of the field\u201d (Exod.\nxxiii. 16); that is to say, when you rest and are free from pressing\nlabours. Aristotle, in the ninth book of his Ethics, mentions this as a\ngeneral custom among the nations. He says: \u201cIn ancient times the\nsacrifices and assemblies of the people took place after the\ningathering of the corn and the fruit, as if the sacrifices were\noffered on account of the harvest.\u201d Another reason is this\u2014in this\nseason it is possible to dwell in tabernacles, as there is neither\ngreat heat nor troublesome rain.\n\nThe two festivals, Passover and the Feast of Tabernacles, imply also\nthe teaching of certain truths and certain moral lessons. Passover\nteaches us to remember the miracles which God wrought in Egypt, and to\nperpetuate their memory; the Feast of Tabernacles reminds us of the\nmiracles wrought in the wilderness. The moral lessons derived from\nthese feasts is this: man ought to remember his evil days in his days\nof prosperity. He will thereby be induced to thank God repeatedly, to\nlead a modest and humble life. We eat, therefore, unleavened bread and\nbitter herbs on Passover in memory of what has happened unto us, and\nleave [on Succoth] our houses in order to dwell in tabernacles, as\ninhabitants of deserts do that are in want of comfort. We shall thereby\nremember that this has once been our condition; [comp.] \u201cI made the\nchildren of Israel to dwell in booths\u201d (Lev. xxiii. 43); although we\ndwell now in elegant houses, in the best and most fertile land, by the\nkindness of God, and because of His promises to our forefathers,\nAbraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were perfect in their opinions and in\ntheir conduct. This idea is likewise an important element in our\nreligion; that whatever good we have received and ever will receive of\nGod, is owing to the merits of the Patriarchs, who \u201ckept the way of the\nLord to do justice and judgment\u201d (Gen. xviii. 19). We join to the Feast\nof Tabernacles the Feast of the Eighth Day, in order to complete our\nrejoicings, which cannot be perfect in booths, but in comfortable and\nwell-built houses. As regards the four species [the branches of the\npalm tree, the citron, the myrtle, and the willows of the brook] our\nSages gave a reason for their use by way of Agadic interpretation, the\nmethod of which is well known to those who are acquainted with the\nstyle of our Sages. They use the text of the Bible only as a kind of\npoetical language [for their own ideas], and do not intend thereby to\ngive an interpretation of the text. As to the value of these Midrashic\ninterpretations, we meet with two different opinions. For some think\nthat the Midrash contains the real explanation of the text, whilst\nothers, finding that it cannot be reconciled with the words quoted,\nreject and ridicule it. The former struggle and fight to prove and to\nconfirm such interpretations according to their opinion, and to keep\nthem as the real meaning of the text; they consider them in the same\nlight as traditional laws. Neither of the two classes understood it,\nthat our Sages employ biblical texts merely as poetical expressions,\nthe meaning of which is dear to every reasonable reader. This style was\ngeneral in ancient days; all adopted it in the same way as poets [adopt\na certain style]. Our Sages say, in reference to the words, \u201cand a\npaddle (yated) thou shalt have upon thy weapon\u201d [azeneka, Deut. xxiii.\n14]: Do not read azeneka, \u201cthy weapon,\u201d but ozneka, \u201cthy ear.\u201d You are\nthus told, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful,\nput your fingers into your ears. Now, I wonder whether those ignorant\npersons [who take the Midrashic interpretations literally] believe that\nthe author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation of the\ntext quoted, and as the meaning of this precept; that in truth yated,\n\u201cthe paddle,\u201d is used for \u201cthe finger,\u201d and azeneka denotes \u201cthy ear.\u201d\nI cannot think that any person whose intellect is sound can admit this.\nThe author employed the text as a beautiful poetical phrase, in\nteaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this: It is as bad to listen\nto bad language as it is to use it. This lesson is poetically connected\nwith the above text. In the same sense you must understand the phrase,\n\u201cDo not read so, but so,\u201d wherever it occurs in the Midrash. I have\ndeparted from my subject, but it was for the purpose of making a remark\nuseful to every intellectual member of the Rabbanites. I now return to\nour theme. I believe that the four species are a symbolical expression\nof our rejoicing that the Israelites changed the wilderness, \u201cno place\nof seed, or of figs, or of vines, or of pomegranates, or of water to\ndrink\u201d (Num. xx. 5), with a country full of fruit-trees and rivers. In\norder to remember this we take the fruit which is the most pleasant of\nthe fruit of the land, branches which smell best, most beautiful\nleaves, and also the best of herbs, i.e., the willows of the brook.\nThese four kinds have also those three purposes: First, they were\nplentiful in those days in Palestine, so that every one could easily\nget them. Secondly, they have a good appearance, they are green; some\nof them, viz., the citron and the myrtle, are also excellent as regards\ntheir smell, the branches of the palm-tree and the willow having\nneither good nor bad smell. Thirdly, they keep fresh and green for\nseven days, which is not the case with peaches, pomegranates,\nasparagus, nuts, and the like.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV\n\n\nThe precepts of the ninth class are those enumerated in the Section on\nLove. Their reason is obvious. The actions prescribed by them serve to\nremind us continually of God, and of our duty to fear and to love Him,\nto keep all His commandments, and to believe concerning God that which\nevery religious person must believe. This class includes the laws of\nPrayer, Reading of Shema, Grace, and duties connected with these,\nBlessing of the priests, Tefillin, Mezuzah, \u1e92i\u1e93it, acquiring a scroll\nof the Law, and reading in it at certain times. The performance of all\nthese precepts inculcates into our heart useful lessons. All this is\nclear, and a further explanation is superfluous, as being a mere\nrepetition and nothing else.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV\n\n\nThe precepts of the tenth class are those enumerated in the laws on the\nTemple (Hilkot bet ha-be\u1e25irah), the laws on the vessels of the temple\nand on the ministers in the temple [Hilkot kele ha-mi\u1e33dash veha-\u02bbobedim\nbo]. The use of these precepts we have stated in general terms. It is\nknown that idolaters selected the highest possible places on high\nmountains where to build their temples and to place their images.\nTherefore Abraham, our father, chose Mount Moriah, being the highest\nmount in that country, and proclaimed there the Unity of God. He\nselected the west of the mount as the place toward which he turned\nduring his prayers, because [he thought that] the most holy place was\nin the West; this is the meaning of the saying of our Sages, \u201cThe\nShekinah (the Glory of God) is in the West\u201d (B. T. Baba B 25a); and it\nis distinctly stated in the Talmud Yoma that our father Abraham chose\nthe west side, the place where the Most Holy was built. I believe that\nhe did so because it was then a general rite to worship the sun as a\ndeity. Undoubtedly all people turned then to the East [worshipping the\nSun]. Abraham turned therefore on Mount Moriah to the West, that is,\nthe site of the Sanctuary, and turned his back toward the sun; and the\nIsraelites, when they abandoned their God and returned to the early bad\nprinciples, stood \u201cwith their backs toward the Temple of the Lord and\ntheir faces toward the East, and they worshipped the sun toward the\nEast\u201d (Ezek. viii. 16). Note this strange fact. I do not doubt that the\nspot which Abraham chose in his prophetical spirit, was known to Moses\nour Teacher, and to others; for Abraham commanded his children that on\nthis place a house of worship should be built. Thus the Targum says\ndistinctly, \u201cAnd Abraham worshipped and prayed there in that place, and\nsaid before God, \u2018Here shall coming generations worship the Lord\u2019\u201d\n(Gen. xxii. 14). For three practical reasons the name of the place is\nnot distinctly stated in the Law, but indicated in the phrase \u201cTo the\nplace which the Lord will choose\u201d (Deut. xii. 11, etc.). First, if the\nnations had learnt that this place was to be the centre of the highest\nreligious truths, they would occupy it, or fight about it most\nperseveringly. Secondly, those who were then in possession of it might\ndestroy and ruin the place with all their might. Thirdly, and chiefly,\nevery one of the twelve tribes would desire to have this place in its\nborders and under its control; this would lead to divisions and\ndiscord, such as were caused by the desire for the priesthood.\nTherefore it was commanded that the Temple should not be built before\nthe election of a king who would order its erection, and thus remove\nthe cause of discord. We have explained this in the Section on Judges\n(ch. xli.).\n\nIt is known that the heathen in those days built temples to stars, and\nset up in those temples the image which they agreed upon to worship;\nbecause it was in some relation to a certain star or to a portion of\none of the spheres. We were, therefore, commanded to build a temple to\nthe name of God, and to place therein the ark with two tables of stone,\non which there were written the commandments \u201cI am the Lord,\u201d etc., and\n\u201cThou shalt have no other God before me,\u201d etc. Naturally the\nfundamental belief in prophecy precedes the belief in the Law, for\nwithout the belief in prophecy there can be no belief in the Law. But a\nprophet only receives divine inspiration through the agency of an\nangel. Comp. \u201cThe angel of the Lord called\u201d (Gen. xxii. 15); \u201cThe angel\nof the Lord said unto her\u201d (ibid. xvi. 11); and other innumerable\ninstances. Even Moses our Teacher received his first prophecy through\nan angel. \u201cAnd an angel of the Lord appeared to him in the flame of\nfire\u201d (Exod. iii.). It is therefore clear that the belief in the\nexistence of angels precedes the belief in prophecy, and the latter\nprecedes the belief in the Law. The Sabeans, in their ignorance of the\nexistence of God, believed that the spheres with their stars were\nbeings without beginning and without end, that the images and certain\ntrees, the Asherot, derived certain powers from the spheres, that they\ninspired the prophets, spoke to them in visions, and told them what was\ngood and what bad. I have explained their theory when speaking of the\nprophets of the Ashera. But when the wise men discovered and proved\nthat there was a Being, neither itself corporeal nor residing as a\nforce in a corporeal body, viz., the true, one God, and that there\nexisted besides other purely incorporeal beings which God endowed with\nHis goodness and His light, namely, the angels, and that these beings\nare not included in the sphere and its stars, it became evident that it\nwas these angels and not the images or Asherot that charged the\nprophets. From the preceding remarks it is clear that the belief in the\nexistence of angels is connected with the belief in the Existence of\nGod; and the belief in God and angels leads to the belief in Prophecy\nand in the truth of the Law. In order to firmly establish this creed,\nGod commanded [the Israelites] to make over the ark the form of two\nangels. The belief in the existence of angels is thus inculcated into\nthe minds of the people, and this belief is in importance next to the\nbelief in God\u2019s Existence; it leads us to believe in Prophecy and in\nthe Law, and opposes idolatry. If there had only been one figure of a\ncherub, the people would have been misled and would have mistaken it\nfor God\u2019s image which was to be worshipped, in the fashion of the\nheathen; or they might have assumed that the angel [represented by the\nfigure] was also a deity, and would thus have adopted a Dualism. By\nmaking two cherubim and distinctly declaring \u201cthe Lord is our God, the\nLord is One,\u201d Moses clearly proclaimed the theory of the existence of a\nnumber of angels; he left no room for the error of considering those\nfigures as deities, since [he declared that] God is one, and that He is\nthe Creator of the angels, who are more than one.\n\nA candlestick was then put in front of the curtain, as a sign of honour\nand distinction for the Temple. For a chamber in which a continual\nlight burns, hidden behind a curtain, makes a great impression on man,\nand the Law lays great stress on our holding the Sanctuary in great\nestimation and regard, and that at the sight of it we should be filled\nwith humility, mercy, and soft-heartedness. This is expressed in the\nwords, \u201cAnd ye shall reverence my sanctuary\u201d (Lev. xix. 30), and in\norder to give these words more weight, they are closely joined to the\ncommand to keep the Sabbath.\n\nThe use of the altar for incense and the altar for burnt-offering and\ntheir vessels is obvious; but I do not know the object of the table\nwith the bread upon it continually, and up to this day I have not been\nable to assign any reason to this commandment.\n\nThe commandment that the stones of the altar shall not be hewn and that\nno iron tool shall be lifted up upon them (Deut. xxvii. 5), has been\nexplained by our Sages as follows: It is not right that the tool that\nshortens man\u2019s life should be lifted up upon that which gives length of\nlife. As an Agadic explanation this is good; but the real reason is\nthis: the heathen used to build their altars with hewn stones; we ought\nnot to imitate them. For this reason we have to make an altar of earth:\n\u201cThou shalt make unto me an altar of earth\u201d (Exod. xx. 24); if it\nshould be impossible to dispense altogether with stones, they must not\nbe hewn, but employed in their natural state. Thus the Law also\nprohibits from worshipping over painted stones (Lev. xxvi. 1), or from\nplanting any tree near the altar of the Lord (Deut. xvi. 21). The\nobject of all these commandments is the same, namely, that we shall not\nemploy in the worship of God anything which the heathen employed in the\nworship of their idols. In general terms this is repeated in the\nfollowing passage: \u201cTake heed, that thou inquire not after their gods,\nsaying, How did these nations serve their gods? even so will I do\nlikewise\u201d (Deut. xii. 30); the Israelites shall not do this, because\u2014as\nis expressly added\u2014\u201cevery abomination unto the Lord, which he hateth,\nhave they done unto their gods.\u201d\n\nThe mode of worshipping Peor, then very general among the heathen,\nconsisted in uncovering the nakedness. The priests were therefore\ncommanded to make breeches for themselves to cover their nakedness\nduring the service, and, besides, no steps were to lead up to the\naltar, \u201cthat thy nakedness be not discovered thereon\u201d (Exod. xx. 23).\n\nThe Sanctuary was constantly guarded and surrounded [by Levites] as a\nmark of respect and honour; and at the same time the layman, the\nunclean, and mourners, were prevented from entering the Sanctuary, as\nwill be explained. Among other things that tend to display the\ngreatness and the glory of the Temple and to inspire us with awe, is\nthe rule that none shall approach it in a state of drunkenness or\nuncleanness, or in a disorderly state, i.e., the hair undressed and the\ngarments rent; and that every one who officiated as priest should first\nwash his hands and his feet.\n\nIn order to raise the estimation of the Temple, those who ministered\ntherein received great honour; and the priests and Levites were\ntherefore distinguished from the rest. It was commanded that the\npriests should be clothed properly with beautiful and good garments,\n\u201choly garments for glory and for beauty\u201d (Exod. xxviii. 2). A priest\nthat had a blemish was not allowed to officiate; and not only those\nthat had a blemish were excluded from the service, but also\u2014according\nto the Talmudic interpretation of this precept\u2014those that had an\nabnormal appearance; for the multitude does not estimate man by his\ntrue form but by the perfection of his bodily limbs and the beauty of\nhis garments, and the Temple was to be held in great reverence by all.\n\nThe Levites did not sacrifice; they were not considered as being agents\nin the atonement of sins, for it was only the priest who was commanded\n\u201cto make atonement for him\u201d (Lev. iv. 26) and \u201cto make atonement for\nher\u201d (Lev. xii. 8). The duty of the Levites was the performance of\nvocal music; and a Levite became therefore disabled for service when he\nlost his voice. The object of the singing is to produce certain\nemotions; this object can only be attained by pleasing sounds and\nmelodies accompanied by music, as was always the case in the Temple.\n\nAgain, the priests, even when fit for service, and actually officiating\nin the Temple, were not allowed to sit down, or enter it whenever they\nliked; the Most Holy was only entered by the high-priest four times on\nthe Day of Atonement, and on no other occasion. The object of all these\nrules was to raise the estimation of the Sanctuary in the eyes of the\npeople.\n\nSince many beasts were daily slaughtered in the holy place, the flesh\ncut in pieces and the entrails and the legs burnt and washed, the smell\nof the place would undoubtedly have been like the smell of\nslaughter-houses, if nothing had been done to counteract it. They were\ntherefore commanded to burn incense there twice every day, in the\nmorning and in the evening (Exod. xxx. 7, 8), in order to give the\nplace and the garments of those who officiated there a pleasant odour.\nThere is a well-known saying of our Sages, \u201cIn Jericho they could smell\nthe incense\u201d [burnt in the Temple]. This provision likewise tended to\nsupport the dignity of the Temple. If there had not been a good smell,\nlet alone if there had been a stench, it would have produced in the\nminds of the people the reverse of respect; for our heart generally\nfeels elevated in the presence of good odour, and is attracted by it,\nbut it abhors and avoids bad smell.\n\nThe anointing oil (Exod. xxx. 22\u201333) served a double purpose: to give\nthe anointed object a good odour, and to produce the impression that it\nwas something great, holy, and distinguished, and better than other\nobjects of the same species; it made no difference whether that object\nwas a human being, a garment, or a vessel. All this aimed at producing\ndue respect towards the Sanctuary, and indirectly fear of God. When a\nperson enters the Temple, certain emotions are produced in him; and\nobstinate hearts are softened and humbled. These plans and indirect\nmeans were devised by the Law, to soften and humble man\u2019s heart at\nentering the holy place, in order that he might entrust himself to the\nsure guidance of God\u2019s commandments. This is distinctly said in the\nLaw: \u201cAnd thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God, in the place which he\nshall choose to place his name there, the tithe of thy corn, of thy\nwine, and of thine oil, and the firstlings of thy herds and of thy\nflocks; that thou mayest learn to fear the Lord thy God always\u201d (Deut.\nxiv. 23). The object of all these ceremonies is now clear. The reason\nwhy we are not allowed to prepare [for common use] the anointing oil\nand the incense (ibid. ver. 32, 38) is obvious; for when the odour [of\nthe oil and incense] is perceived only in the Sanctuary, the desired\neffect is great; besides [if it were allowed for every one to prepare\nthe anointing oil], people might anoint themselves therewith and\nimagine themselves distinguished; much disorder and dissension would\nthen follow.\n\nIt is clear that when the ark was carried on the shoulder, and was not\nput on a waggon, it was done out of respect towards it, and also to\nprevent its being damaged in its form and shape; even the staves were\nnot moved out of the rings, for this reason. In order that the form of\nthe ephod and the breastplate should not be spoiled, they were never\nseparated. The garments were also entirely woven and not cut, in order\nnot to spoil the work of the weaving.\n\nThose that ministered in the Temple were strictly prohibited to\ninterfere with each other\u2019s work; for if in public duties and offices,\neach one would not have assigned to him his particular task, general\ncarelessness and neglect would soon be noticed.\n\nIt is evident that the object of giving different degrees of sanctity\nto the different places, to the Temple mount, the place between the two\nwalls, to the Hall of women, to the Hall, and so on up to the Most\nHoly, was to raise the respect and reverence of the Temple in the heart\nof every one that approached it.\n\nWe have thus described the reason of all precepts of this class.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVI\n\n\nThe precepts of the eleventh class are enumerated in the Section on\nDivine Service (Sefer \u02bbabodah) and the Section on Sacrifices (Sefer\nha-\u1e33orbanot). We have described their use in general terms (chap.\nxxxii.). I will now proceed to give the reason of each precept\nseparately.\n\nScripture tells us, according to the Version of Onkelos, that the\nEgyptians worshipped Aries, and therefore abstained from killing sheep,\nand held shepherds in contempt. Comp. \u201cBehold we shall sacrifice the\nabomination of the Egyptians,\u201d etc. (Exod. viii. 26); \u201cFor every\nshepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians\u201d (Gen. xlvi. 34). Some\nsects among the Sabeans worshipped demons, and imagined that these\nassumed the form of goats, and called them therefore \u201cgoats\u201d [se\u02bbirim].\nThis worship was widespread. Comp. \u201cAnd they shall no more offer their\nsacrifices unto demons, after whom they have gone a whoring\u201d (Lev.\nxvii. 7). For this reason those sects abstained from eating goats\u2019\nflesh. Most idolaters objected to killing cattle, holding this species\nof animals in great estimation. Therefore the people of Hodu [Indians]\nup to this day do not slaughter cattle even in those countries where\nother animals are slaughtered. In order to eradicate these false\nprinciples, the Law commands us to offer sacrifices only of these three\nkinds: \u201cYe shall bring your offering of the cattle [viz.], of the herd\nand of the flock\u201d (Lev. i. 2). Thus the very act which is considered by\nthe heathen as the greatest crime, is the means of approaching God, and\nobtaining His pardon for our sins. In this manner, evil principles, the\ndiseases of the human soul, are cured by other principles which are\ndiametrically opposite.\n\nThis is also the reason why we were commanded to kill a lamb on\nPassover, and to sprinkle the blood thereof outside on the gates. We\nhad to free ourselves of evil doctrines and to proclaim the opposite,\nviz., that the very act which was then considered as being the cause of\ndeath would be the cause of deliverance from death. Comp. \u201cAnd the Lord\nwill pass over the door, and will not suffer the destroyer to come unto\nyour houses to smite you\u201d (Exod. xii. 23). Thus they were rewarded for\nperforming openly a service every part of which was objected to by the\nidolaters.\n\nTo the above reason for the exclusive selection of the three kinds of\nanimals for sacrifices, we may add the following, namely, that these\nspecies are animals which can be got very easily, contrary to the\npractice of idolaters that sacrifice lions, bears, and wild beasts, as\nis stated in the book Tomtom. As, however, many could not afford to\noffer a beast, the Law commanded that birds also should be sacrificed,\nbut only of those species which are found abundantly in Palestine, are\nsuitable, and can easily be obtained, namely, turtle-doves and pigeons.\nThose who are too poor to offer a bird, may bring bread of any of the\nkinds then in use: baked in the oven, baked in a pan, or in a\nfrying-pan. If the baking of the bread is too much trouble for a\nperson, he may bring flour. All this concerns only those who desire to\nsacrifice; for we are distinctly told that the omission of the\nsacrificial service on our part will not be reckoned to us a sin: \u201cIf\nthou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee\u201d (Deut. xxiii.\n22). The idolaters did not offer any other bread but leavened, and\nchose sweet things for their sacrifices, which they seasoned with\nhoney, as is fully described in the books which I named before; but\nsalt is not mentioned in any of their sacrifices. Our Law therefore\nforbade us to offer leaven or honey, and commanded us to have salt in\nevery sacrifice: \u201cWith all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt\u201d (Lev.\nii. 13). It is further ordained that the offerings must all be perfect\nand in the best condition, in order that no one should slight the\noffering or treat with contempt that which is offered to God\u2019s name:\n\u201cOffer it now unto thy governor; will he be pleased with thee?\u201d (Mal.\ni. 8). This is the reason why no animal could be brought that was not\nyet seven days old (Lev. xxii. 26); it is imperfect and contemptible,\nlike an untimely birth. Because of their degraded character it was\nprohibited to bring \u201cthe hire of a harlot and the price of a dog\u201d\n(Deut. xxiii. 18) into the Sanctuary. In order to bring the offering in\nthe best condition, we choose the old of the turtle-doves and the young\nof the pigeons, the old pigeons being less agreeable. The oblation must\nlikewise be mingled with oil, and must be of fine flour (Lev. ii. 1),\nfor in this condition it is good and pleasant. Frankincense is\nprescribed (ibid.) because its fumes are good in places filled with the\nodour of burnt flesh. The burnt-offering was flayed (Lev. i. 16), and\nits inwards and legs, although they were entirely burnt, had to be\npreviously washed (ibid. ver. 9), in order that due respect should be\nshown to the sacrifice, and it should not appear despicable and\ncontemptible. This object is constantly kept in view, and is often\ntaught, \u201cYe say, The table of the Lord is polluted; and the fruit\nthereof, even his meat, is contemptible\u201d (Mal. i. 12). For the same\nreason no body uncircumcised, or unclean (Lev. xxii. 4), was allowed to\npartake of any offering; nor could any offering be eaten that had\nbecome unclean (Lev. vii. 19), or was left till after a certain time\n(ibid. vii. 15\u201317), or concerning which an illegal intention had been\nconceived; and it had also to be consumed in a particular place. Of the\nburnt-offering, which is entirely devoted to God, nothing at all was\neaten. Those sacrifices which are brought for a sin, viz., sin-offering\nand guilt-offering, must be eaten within the court of the Sanctuary\n(\u02bbazarah), and only on the day of their slaughtering and the night\nfollowing, whilst peace-offerings, which are next in sanctity, being\nsacrifices of the second degree, may be eaten in the whole of\nJerusalem, on the day they have been offered and on the following day,\nbut not later. After that time the sacrifices would become spoiled, and\nbe unfit for food.\n\nIn order that we may respect the sacrifices and all that is devoted to\nthe name of God, we are told that whosoever takes part of a holy thing\nfor common use has committed a trespass, must bring a sin-offering, and\nrestore what he has taken with an addition of the fifth part of its\nvalue, although he may have committed the trespass in ignorance. For\nthe same reason animals reserved for holy purposes must not be employed\nin work; nor is the shearing of such animals permitted (Deut. xv. 19).\nThe law concerning the change of a sacrifice must be considered as a\npreventive; for if it were permitted to substitute a good animal for a\nbad one, people would substitute a bad animal for a good one, and say\nthat it was better than the original; it was therefore the rule that,\nif any such change had taken place, both the \u201coriginal sacrifice and\nthe exchange thereof should be holy\u201d (Lev. xxvii. 9). When a person\nredeems a thing devoted by him to the Sanctuary, he must likewise add\none-fifth (Lev. xxvii. 13, 15); the reason for this is plain. Man is\nusually selfish, and is naturally inclined to keep and save his\nproperty. He would therefore not take the necessary trouble in the\ninterest of the Sanctuary; he would not expose his property\nsufficiently to the sight of the valuer, and its true value would not\nbe fixed. Therefore the owner had to add one-fifth, whilst a stranger\npaid only the exact value. These rules were laid down in order that\npeople should not despise that with which the name of God is connected,\nand which serves as a means of approaching God. The oblation of the\npriest was entirely burnt (Lev. vi. 16), because the priest offered up\nhis oblation by himself, and if he were to offer it, and at the same\ntime to eat it, it would appear as if he had not performed any service.\nFor nothing was offered upon the altar of the ordinary oblations of any\nperson except the frankincense and a handful of the flour or cake; and\nif, in addition to the fact that the offering was small, he who offered\nit were himself to eat it, nothing of a sacrificial service would be\nnoticed. It is therefore entirely burnt (Lev. vi. 16).\n\nThe reason of the particular laws concerning the Passover lamb is\nclear. It was eaten roasted by fire (Exod. xii. 8\u20139) in one house, and\nwithout breaking the bones thereof (ibid. ver. 46). In the same way as\nthe Israelites were commanded to eat unleavened bread, because they\ncould prepare it hastily, so they were commanded, for the sake of\nhaste, to roast the lamb, because there was not sufficient time to boil\nit, or to prepare other food; even the delay caused by breaking the\nbones and to extract their marrow was prohibited; the one principle is\nlaid down for all these rules, \u201cYe shall eat it in haste\u201d (Exod. xii.\n11). But when haste is necessary the bones cannot be broken, nor parts\nof it sent from house to house; for the company could not wait with\ntheir meal till he returned. Such things would lead to laxity and\ndelay, whilst the object of these rules was to make a show of the hurry\nand haste, in order that none should be too late to leave Egypt with\nthe main body of the people, and be thus exposed to the attacks and the\nevil [designs of the enemy]. These temporary commandments were then\nmade permanent, in order that we may remember what was done in those\ndays. \u201cAnd thou shalt keep this ordinance in his season from year to\nyear\u201d (Exod. xiii. 10). Each Passover lamb was only eaten by those who\nhad previously agreed to consume it together, in order that people\nshould be anxious to procure it, and should not rely on friends,\nrelations, or on chance, without themselves taking any trouble about it\nbefore Passover. The reason of the prohibition that the uncircumcised\nshould not eat of it (Exod. xii. 48) is explained by our Sages as\nfollows:\u2014The Israelites neglected circumcision during their long stay\nin Egypt, in order to make themselves appear like the Egyptians. When\nGod gave them the commandment of the Passover, and ordered that no one\nshould kill the Passover lamb unless he, his sons, and all the male\npersons in his household were circumcised, that only \u201cthen he could\ncome near and keep it\u201d (ibid. xii. 48), all performed this commandment,\nand the number of the circumcised being large the blood of the Passover\nand that of the circumcision flowed together. The Prophet Ezekiel (xvi.\n6), referring to this event, says, \u201cWhen I saw thee sprinkled with\nthine own blood I said unto thee, Live because of thy [two kinds of]\nblood,\u201d i.e., because of the blood of the Passover and that of the\ncircumcision.\n\nAlthough blood was very unclean in the eyes of the Sabeans, they\nnevertheless partook of it, because they thought it was the food of the\nspirits; by eating it man has something in common with the spirits,\nwhich join him and tell him future events, according to the notion\nwhich people generally have of spirits. There were, however, people who\nobjected to eating blood, as a thing naturally disliked by man; they\nkilled a beast, received the blood in a vessel or in a pot, and ate of\nthe flesh of that beast, whilst sitting round the blood. They imagined\nthat in this manner the spirits would come to partake of the blood\nwhich was their food, whilst the idolaters were eating the flesh; that\nlove, brotherhood, and friendship with the spirits were established,\nbecause they dined with the latter at one place and at the same time;\nthat the spirits would appear to them in dreams, inform them of coming\nevents, and be favourable to them. Such ideas people liked and accepted\nin those days; they were general, and their correctness was not doubted\nby any one of the common people. The Law, which is perfect in the eyes\nof those who know it, and seeks to cure mankind of these lasting\ndiseases, forbade the eating of blood, and emphasized the prohibition\nexactly in the same terms as it emphasizes idolatry: \u201cI will set my\nface against that soul that eateth blood\u201d (Lev. xvii. 10). The same\nlanguage is employed in reference to him \u201cwho giveth of his seed unto\nMolech\u201d; \u201cthen I will set my face against that man\u201d (ibid. xx. 5).\nThere is, besides idolatry and eating blood, no other sin in reference\nto which these words are used. For the eating of blood leads to a kind\nof idolatry, to the worship of spirits. Our Law declared the blood as\npure, and made it the means of purifying other objects by its touch.\n\u201cAnd thou shalt take of the blood ... and sprinkle it upon Aaron, and\nupon his garments, and upon his sons, and upon the garments of his sons\nwith him. And he shall be hallowed, and his garments, and his sons,\u201d\netc. (Exod. xxix. 21). Furthermore, the blood was sprinkled upon the\naltar, and in the whole service it was insisted upon pouring it out,\nand not upon collecting it. Comp. \u201cAnd he shall pour out all the blood\nat the bottom of the altar\u201d (Lev. iv. 18); \u201cAnd the blood of thy\nsacrifices shall be poured out upon the altar of the Lord thy God\u201d\n(Deut. xii. 27). Also the blood of those beasts that were killed for\ncommon use, and not for sacrifices, must be poured out, \u201cThou shalt\npour it upon the earth as water\u201d (ibid. ver. 24). We are not allowed to\ngather and have a meal round the blood, \u201cYou shall not eat round the\nblood\u201d (Lev. xix. 26). As the Israelites were inclined to continue\ntheir rebellious conduct, to follow the doctrines in which they had\nbeen brought up, and which were then general, and to assemble round the\nblood in order to eat there and to meet the spirits, God forbade the\nIsraelites to eat ordinary meat during their stay in the wilderness;\nthey could only partake of the meat of peace-offerings. The reason of\nthis precept is distinctly stated, viz., that the blood shall be poured\nout upon the altar, and the people do not assemble round about. Comp.\n\u201cTo the end that the children of Israel may bring their sacrifices,\nwhich they offer in the open field, even that they may bring them unto\nthe Lord.... And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar,\n... and they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto the spirits\u201d\n(Lev. xvii. 5\u20137). Now there remained to provide for the slaughtering of\nthe beasts of the field and birds, because those beasts were never\nsacrificed, and birds did never serve as peace-offerings (Lev. iii.).\nThe commandment was therefore given that whenever a beast or a bird\nthat may be eaten is killed, the blood thereof must be covered with\nearth (Lev. xvii. 13), in order that the people should not assemble\nround the blood for the purpose of eating there. The object was thus\nfully gained to break the connexion between these fools and their\nspirits. This belief flourished about the time of our Teacher Moses.\nPeople were attracted and misled by it. We find it in the Song of Moses\n(Deut. xxxii.): \u201cThey sacrificed unto spirits, not to God\u201d (ibid. 17).\nAccording to the explanation of our Sages, the words lo eloha imply the\nfollowing idea: They have not only not left off worshipping things in\nexistence; they even worship imaginary things. This is expressed in\nSifri as follows: \u201cIt is not enough for them to worship the sun, the\nmoon, the stars; they even worship their babuah.\u201d The word babuah\nsignifies \u201cshadow.\u201d Let us now return to our subject. The prohibition\nof slaughtering cattle for common use applied only to the wilderness,\nbecause as regards the \u201cspirits\u201d it was then the general belief that\nthey dwelt in deserts, that there they spoke and were visible, whilst\nin towns and in cultivated land they did not appear. In accordance with\nthis belief those inhabitants of a town who wanted to perform any of\nthose stupid practices, left the town and went to woods and waste\nplaces. The use of cattle for common food was therefore allowed when\nthe Israelites entered Palestine. Besides, there were great hopes that\nthe disease would become weakened, and the followers of the doctrines\nwould decrease. Furthermore, it was almost impossible that every one\nwho wanted to eat meat should come to Jerusalem. For these reasons the\nabove restriction was limited to the stay of the Israelites in the\nwilderness.\n\nThe greater the sin which a person had committed, the lower was the\nspecies from which the sin-offering was brought. The offering for\nworshipping idols in ignorance was only a she-goat, whilst for other\nsins an ordinary person brought either a ewe-lamb or a she-goat (Lev.\niv. 27\u201335), the females bring, as a rule, in every species, inferior to\nthe males. There is no greater sin than idolatry, and also no inferior\nspecies than a she-goat. The offering of a king for sins committed\nignorantly was a he-goat (ibid. vers. 22\u201326), as a mark of distinction.\nThe high priest and the Synhedrion, who only gave a wrong decision in\nignorance, but have not actually committed a sin, brought a bull for\ntheir sin-offering (ibid. ver. 3\u201321), or a he-goat, when the decision\nreferred to idolatry (Num. xv. 22\u201326). The sins for which\nguilt-offerings were brought were not as bad as transgressions that\nrequired a sin-offering. The guilt-offering was therefore a ram, or a\nlamb, so that the species as well as the sex were superior in this\nlatter case, for the guilt-offering was a male sheep. For the same\nreason we see the burnt-offering, which was entirely burnt upon the\naltar, was selected from the superior sex; for only male animals were\nadmitted as burnt-offerings. It is in accordance with the same\nprinciple that luxury and incense were absent from the oblations of a\nsinner (Lev. v. 11), and of a sotah, i.e., a woman suspected of\nadultery (Num. v. 15). In these cases the oil and the frankincense were\nnot added; this luxury was absent, because the persons that brought the\noblation were not good and proper in their deeds, and they are, as it\nwere, to be reminded by their offerings that they ought to repent; as\nif they were told, \u201cYour offering is without any ornamental addition on\naccount of the wickedness of your deeds.\u201d As the sotah acted more\ndisgracefully than any person who sins in ignorance, her offering\nconsisted of the lowest kind, viz., of barley flour (ibid.). Thus the\nreasons of all these particular laws are well connected, and show that\nthe precepts are wonderful in their significance.\n\nOur Sages say that the offering for the eighth day of dedication was \u201ca\ncalf, a young bullock, for a sin-offering\u201d (Lev. xi. 2), in order to\natone for the sin of the Israelites in making a golden calf. The\nsin-offering, which was brought on the Day of Atonement (ibid. xvi. 3),\nwas likewise explained as being an atonement for that sin. From this\nargument of our Sages I deduce that he-goats were always brought as\nsin-offerings, by individual persons and also by the whole\ncongregation, viz., on the Festivals, New-moon, Day of Atonement, and\nfor idolatry, because most of the transgressions and sins of the\nIsraelites were sacrifices to spirits (se\u02bbirim, lit., goats), as is\nclearly stated, \u201cThey shall no more offer their sacrifices unto\nspirits\u201d (Lev. xvii. 7). Our Sages, however, explained the fact that\ngoats were always the sin-offerings of the congregation, as an allusion\nto the sin of the whole congregation of Israel; for in the account of\nthe selling of the pious Joseph we read, \u201cAnd they killed a kid of the\ngoats\u201d (Gen. xxxvii. 31). Do not consider this as a weak argument; for\nit is the object of all these ceremonies to impress on the mind of\nevery sinner and transgressor the necessity of continually remembering\nand mentioning his sins. Thus the Psalmist says, \u201cAnd my sin is ever\nbefore me\u201d (Ps. li. 3). The above-mentioned sin-offerings further show\nus that when we commit a sin, we, our children, and the children of our\nchildren, require atonement for that sin by some kind of service\nanalogous to the sin committed. If a person has sinned in respect to\nproperty he must liberally spend his property in the service of God; if\nhe indulged in sinful bodily enjoyments he must weary his body and\ntrouble it by a service of privation and fasting, and rising early\nbefore daybreak. If he went astray in respect to his moral conduct he\nmust oppose his failings by keeping to the opposite extreme, as we have\npointed out in Mishneh-torah Hilkot De\u02bbot (chap. ii.) et passim. If his\nintellectual faculties have been concerned in the sin, if he has\nbelieved something false on account of the insufficiency of his\nintellect, and his neglect of research and proper study, he must remedy\nhis fault by turning his thoughts entirely away from worldly affairs,\nand directing them exclusively to intellectual exercise, and by\ncarefully reflecting on that which ought to form the subject of his\nbelief. Comp. \u201cAnd my heart hath been secretly enticed, but my hand\ntouched my mouth\u201d (Job xxxi. 27). These words express figuratively the\nlesson that we should pause and stop at that which appears doubtful, as\nhas been pointed out by us in the beginning of this treatise. The same\nwe notice in the case of Aaron. He had his share in the sin of the\ngolden calf, and therefore a bullock and a calf were brought by him and\nhis successors as an offering. Similarly, the sin connected with a kid\nof goats was atoned for by a kid of goats. When this theory has been\nwell established in the minds of the people, they must certainly be led\nby it to consider disobedience to God as a disgraceful thing. Every one\nwill then be careful that he should not sin, and require a protracted\nand burdensome atonement; he will be afraid he might not be able to\ncomplete it, and will therefore altogether abstain from sinning, and\navoid it. This object [of the laws under discussion] is very clear, and\nnote it likewise.\n\nI will here call your attention to a very remarkable thing, although it\ndoes not seem at first thought to belong to our subject. It is only the\ngoat brought on New-moon as a sin-offering that the law calls \u201ca\nsin-offering unto the Lord\u201d (Num. xxviii. 15). The sin-offerings\nbrought on the three festivals (ibid. vers. 22, 30; xxix. 5, 11, etc.)\nare not called so, nor are any other sin-offerings. The reason thereof\nis, according to my opinion, undoubtedly this: The additional offerings\nbrought by the congregation at certain periods were all\nburnt-offerings; only \u201cone kid of goats to make an atonement\u201d was\noffered on every one of these exceptional days. The latter was eaten\n[by the priests], whilst the burnt-offerings were entirely consumed by\nfire, and are called \u201can offering made by fire unto the Lord.\u201d The\nphrases \u201ca sin-offering unto the Lord\u201d and \u201ca peace-offering unto the\nLord\u201d do not occur in the law, because these were eaten by man; but\neven those sin-offerings that were entirely burnt (Lev. iv. 12, 21)\ncannot be called \u201can offering made by fire unto the Lord,\u201d as will be\nexplained in the course of this chapter. It is therefore impossible\nthat the goats which are eaten [by the priests], and are not entirely\nburnt, should be called \u201csin-offerings unto the Lord.\u201d But as it was\nfound that the kid offered on New-moon might be mistaken as an offering\nbrought to the moon, in the manner of the Egyptians, who sacrificed to\nthe moon on the days of New-moon, it was distinctly stated that this\ngoat is offered in obedience to God\u2019s command, and not in honour of the\nmoon. This fear did not apply to the sin-offerings on the Festivals,\nnor to any other sin-offering, because they were not offered on the\ndays of New-moon, or on any other day marked out by Nature, but on such\ndays as were selected by the Divine Will. Not so the days of New-moon;\nthey are not fixed by the Law [but by Nature]. On the New-moon the\nidolaters sacrificed to the moon, in the same manner as they sacrificed\nto the sun when it rose and set in certain particular degrees. This is\ndescribed in the works [mentioned above]. On this account the\nextraordinary phrase \u201cA sin-offering unto the Lord\u201d is exceptionally\nintroduced in reference to the goat brought on New-moon, in order to\nremove the idolatrous ideas that were still lingering in the sorely\ndiseased hearts. Note this exception likewise. A sin-offering which is\nbrought in the hope to atone for one or more great sins, as, e.g., the\nsin-offering [of the Synhedrion or the high-priest] for a sin committed\nin ignorance, and the like, are not burnt upon the altar, but without\nthe camp; upon the altar only the burnt-offering, and the like, are\nburnt, wherefore it was called the altar of the burnt-offering. The\nburning of the holocaust, and of every \u201cmemorial,\u201d is called \u201ca sweet\nsavour unto the Lord\u201d; and so it undoubtedly is, since it serves to\nremove idolatrous doctrines from our hearts, as we have shown. But the\nburning of these sin-offerings is a symbol that the sin [for which the\noffering it brought] is utterly removed and destroyed, like the body\nthat is being burnt; of the sinful seed no trace shall remain, as no\ntrace is left of the sin-offering, which is entirely destroyed by fire;\nthe smoke thereof is not \u201ca sweet savour unto the Lord,\u201d but, on the\ncontrary, a smoke despised and abhorred. For this reason the burning\ntook place without the camp. Similarly we notice that the oblations of\na sotah is called \u201can offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to\nremembrance\u201d (Num. v. 15); it is not a pleasing thing [to the Lord].\nThe goat [of the Day of Atonement] that was sent [into the wilderness]\n(Lev. xvi. 20, seq.) served as an atonement for all serious\ntransgressions more than any other sin-offering of the congregation. As\nit thus seemed to carry off all sins, it was not accepted as an\nordinary sacrifice to be slaughtered, burnt, or even brought near the\nSanctuary; it was removed as far as possible, and sent forth into a\nwaste, uncultivated, uninhabited land. There is no doubt that sins\ncannot be carried like a burden, and taken off the shoulder of one\nbeing to be laid on that of another being. But these ceremonies are of\na symbolic character, and serve to impress men with a certain idea, and\nto induce them to repent; as if to say, we have freed ourselves of our\nprevious deeds, have cast them behind our backs, and removed them from\nus as far as possible.\n\nAs regards the offering of wine (Num. xv. 5, seq.), I am at a loss to\nfind a reason why God commanded it, since idolaters brought wine as an\noffering. But though I am unable to give a reason, another person\nsuggested the following one: Meat is the best nourishment for the\nappetitive faculty, the source of which is the liver; wine supports\nbest the vital faculty, whose centre is the heart; music is most\nagreeable to the psychic faculty, the source of which is in the brain.\nEach one of our faculties approaches God with that which it likes best.\nThus the sacrifice consists of meat, wine, and music.\n\nThe use of keeping festivals is plain. Man derives benefit from such\nassemblies: the emotions produced renew the attachment to religion;\nthey lead to friendly and social intercourse among the people. This is\nespecially the object of the commandment to gather the people together\non the Feast of Tabernacles, as is plainly stated: \u201cthat they may hear,\nand that they may learn and fear the Lord\u201d (Deut. xxxi. 12). The same\nis the object of the rule that the money for the second tithe must be\nspent by all in one place (ibid. xiv. 22\u201326), as we have explained\n(chap. xxxix. p. 184). The fruit of trees in their fourth year, and the\ntithe of the cattle, had to be brought to Jerusalem. There would\ntherefore be in Jerusalem the meat of the tithes, the wine of the fruit\nof the fourth year, and the money of the second tithe. Plenty of food\nwould always be found there. Nothing of the above things could be sold;\nnothing could be set aside for another year; the Law orders that they\nshould be brought \u201cyear by year\u201d (Deut. xiv. 22); the owner was thus\ncompelled to spend part of them in charity. As regards the Festivals it\nis especially enjoined: \u201cAnd thou shalt rejoice in thy feast, thou, and\nthy son, and thy daughter, and thy man-servant, and thy maid-servant,\nand the Levite, the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow\u201d (ibid.\nxvi. 14). We have thus explained the reason of every law belonging to\nthis class, and even many details of the laws.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII\n\n\nThe precepts of the twelfth class are those which we have enumerated in\nthe section on \u201cPurity\u201d (Sefer tohorah). Although we have mentioned\ntheir use in general, we will here offer an additional explanation, and\n[first] fully discuss the object of the whole class, and then show the\nreason of each single commandment, as far as we have been able to\ndiscover it. I maintain that the Law which was revealed to Moses, our\nTeacher, and which is called by his name, aims at facilitating the\nservice and lessening the burden, and if a person complains that\ncertain precepts cause him pain and great trouble, he cannot have\nthought of the habits and doctrines that were general in those days.\nLet him consider the difference between a man burning his own son in\nserving his god, and our burning a pigeon to the service of our God.\nScripture relates, \u201cfor even their sons and their daughters they burn\nin the fire to their gods\u201d (Deut. xii. 31). This was the way in which\nthe heathen worshipped their gods, and instead of such a sacrifice we\nhave the burning of a pigeon or a handful of flour in our worship. In\naccordance with this fact, the Israelites, when disobedient, were\nrebuked by God as follows: \u201cO My people, what have I done unto thee?\nand wherein have I wearied thee? Testify against me\u201d (Mic. vi. 3).\nAgain, \u201cHave I been a wilderness unto Israel? a land of darkness?\nWherefore say my people, We are miserable; we will come no more unto\nthee\u201d (Jer. ii. 31); that is to say, Through which of the commandments\nhas the Law become burdensome to the Israelites, that they renounce it?\nIn the same manner God asks the people, \u201cWhat iniquity have your\nfathers found in me, that they are gone far from me?\u201d etc. (ibid. ii.\n5). All these passages express one and the same idea.\n\nThis is the great principle which you must never lose sight of. After\nhaving stated this principle, I repeat that the object of the Sanctuary\nwas to create in the hearts of those who enter it certain feelings of\nawe and reverence, in accordance with the command, \u201cYou shall reverence\nmy sanctuary\u201d (Lev. xix. 30). But when we continually see an object,\nhowever sublime it may be, our regard for that object will be lessened,\nand the impression we have received of it will be weakened. Our Sages,\nconsidering this fact, said that we should not enter the Temple\nwhenever we liked, and pointed to the words: \u201cMake thy foot rare in the\nhouse of thy friend\u201d (Prov. xxv. 17). For this reason the unclean were\nnot allowed to enter the Sanctuary, although there are so many kinds of\nuncleanliness, that [at a time] only a few people are clean. For even\nif a person does not touch a beast that died of its own accord (Lev.\nxi. 27), he can scarcely avoid touching one of the eight kinds of\ncreeping animals (ibid. 29, seq.), the dead bodies of which we find at\nall times in houses, in food and drink, and upon which we frequently\ntread wherever we walk; and, if he avoids touching these, he may touch\na woman in her separation (ibid. xv. 18), or a male or female that have\na running issue (ibid. ver. 1, seq. and 25, seq.), or a leper (ibid.\nxiii. 46), or their bed (ibid. xv. 5). Escaping these, he may become\nunclean by cohabitation with his wife, or by pollution (ibid. 15), and\neven when he has cleansed himself from any of these kinds of\nuncleanliness, he cannot enter the Sanctuary till after sunset; but not\nbeing enabled to enter the Sanctuary at night time, although he is\nclean after sunset, as may be inferred from Middot and Tamid, he is\nagain, during the night, subject to becoming unclean either by\ncohabiting with his wife or by some other source of uncleanliness, and\nmay rise in the morning in the same condition as the day before. All\nthis serves to keep people away from the Sanctuary and to prevent them\nfrom entering it whenever they liked. Our Sages, as is well known,\nsaid, \u201cEven a clean person may not enter the Sanctuary for the purpose\nof performing divine service, unless he takes previously a bath.\u201d By\nsuch acts the reverence [for the Sanctuary] will continue, the right\nimpression will be produced which leads man, as is intended, to\nhumility.\n\nThe easier the diffusion of uncleanliness is, the more difficult and\nthe more retarded is its purification. Most easily is uncleanliness\ncommunicated by the dead body to those who are under the same roof,\nespecially to relatives. The purification can only be completed by\nmeans of the ashes of the red heifer, however scarce it may be, and\nonly in seven days (Num. xix. 11). The uncleanness caused by a woman\nhaving running issue or during her separation is more frequent than\nthat caused by contact with unclean objects; seven days are therefore\nrequired for their purification (Lev. xv. 19, 28), whilst those that\ntouch them are only unclean one day (ibid. vii. 18). Males or females\nthat are unclean through running issue, and a woman after childbirth,\nmust in addition bring a sacrifice, because their uncleanness occurs\nless frequently than that of women in their separation. All these cases\nof uncleanliness, viz., running issue of males or females,\nmenstruations, leprosy, dead bodies of human beings, carcases of beasts\nand creeping things, and issue of semen, are sources of dirt and filth.\nWe have thus shown that the above precepts are very useful in many\nrespects. First, they keep us at a distance from dirty and filthy\nobjects; secondly, they guard the Sanctuary; thirdly, they pay regard\nto an established custom (for the Sabeans submitted to very troublesome\nrestrictions when unclean, as you will soon hear); fourthly, they\nlightened that burden for us; for we are not impeded through these laws\nin our ordinary occupations by the distinction the Law makes between\nthat which is unclean and that which is clean. For this distinction\napplies only in reference to the Sanctuary and the holy objects\nconnected with it; it does not apply to other cases. \u201cShe shall touch\nno hallowed thing, nor come into the Sanctuary\u201d (Lev. xii. 4). Other\npersons [that do not intend to enter the Sanctuary or touch any holy\nthing], are not guilty of any sin if they remain unclean as long as\nthey like, and eat, according to their pleasure, ordinary food that has\nbeen in contact with unclean things. But the practice of the Sabeans,\neven at present general in the East, among the few still left of the\nMagi, was to keep a menstruous woman in a house by herself, to burn\nthat upon which she treads, and to consider as unclean every one that\nspeaks with her; even if a wind passed over her and a clean person, the\nlatter was unclean in the eyes of the Sabeans. See the difference\nbetween this practice and our rule, that \u201cwhatever services a wife\ngenerally does to her husband, she may do to him in her separation\u201d;\nonly cohabitation is prohibited during the days of her uncleanness.\nAnother custom among the Sabeans, which is still widespread, is this:\nwhatever is separated from the body, as hair, nail, or blood, is\nunclean; every barber is therefore unclean in their estimation, because\nhe touches blood and hair; whenever a person passes a razor over his\nskin he must take a bath in running water. Such burdensome practices\nwere numerous among the Sabeans, whilst we apply the laws that\ndistinguish between the unclean and the clean only with regard to\nhallowed things and to the Sanctuary. The divine words, \u201cAnd ye shall\nsanctify yourselves, and ye shall be holy\u201d (Lev. xi. 44), do not refer\nto these laws at all. According to Sifra, they refer to sanctity by\nobedience to God\u2019s commandments. The same interpretation is given in\nSifra of the words, \u201cYe shall be holy,\u201d i.e. obedient to His\ncommandments (xix. 2). Hence the transgression of commandments is also\ncalled uncleanliness or defilement. This term is especially used of the\nchief and principal crimes, which are idolatry, adultery, and murder.\nIn reference to idolatry it is said, \u201cHe hath given of his seed unto\nMolech to defile my sanctuary, and to profane my holy name\u201d (ibid. xx.\n3). In reference to adultery we read, \u201cDefile not ye yourselves in any\nof these things\u201d (ibid. xviii. 24), and \u201cDefile not the land\u201d (Num.\nxxxv. 34) in reference to murder. It it therefore clear that the term\n\u201cdefilement\u201d [or uncleanliness] is used homonymously of three things:\n1. Of man\u2019s violation and transgression of that which he is commanded\nas regards his actions and his opinions. 2. Of dirt and filth; comp.\n\u201cHer filthiness in her skirts\u201d (Lam. i. 9). 3. Of the above-named\nimaginary defilement such as touching and carrying certain objects, or\nbeing with them under the same roof. In reference to the third kind,\nour Sages said, The words of the Law are not subject to becoming\nunclean (B. T. Ber. 22a). In the same manner the term \u201choliness\u201d is\nused homonymously of three things corresponding to the three kinds of\nuncleanness. As uncleanness caused by a dead body could only be removed\nafter seven days, by means of the ashes of the red heifer, and the\npriests had constantly occasion to enter the Sanctuary, the Law\nexceptionally forbids them to defile themselves by a dead body (Lev.\nxxi. 1), except in cases where defilement is necessary, and the\ncontrary would be unnatural. For it would be unnatural to abstain from\napproaching the dead body of a parent, child, or brother. As it was\nvery necessary that the high-priest should always be in the Sanctuary,\nin accordance with the Divine command, \u201cAnd it shall always be on his\nforehead\u201d (Exod. xxviii. 38), he was not permitted to defile himself by\nany dead body whatever, even of the above-named relatives (Lev. xxi.\n10\u201312). Women were not engaged in sacrificial service; the above law\nconsequently does not apply to women; it is addressed to \u201cthe sons of\nAaron,\u201d and not to \u201cthe daughters of Aaron.\u201d It was, however,\nimpossible to assume that none of the Israelites made a mistake, by\nentering the Sanctuary, or eating hallowed things in a state of\nuncleanliness. It was even possible that there were persons who did\nthis knowingly, since there are wicked people who commit knowingly even\nthe greatest crimes; for this reason certain sacrifices were commanded\nas an atonement for the defilement of the Sanctuary and its hallowed\nthings. They were of different kinds; some of them atoned for\ndefilement caused ignorantly, others for defilement caused knowingly.\nFor this purpose were brought the goats on the Festivals and the\nNew-moon days (Num. xxviii. 15, 22, etc.), and the goat sent away on\nthe Day of Atonement (Lev. xvi. 16), as is explained in its place\n(Mishnah Shebnot, i. 4). These sacrifices serve to prevent those who\ndefiled the Sanctuary of the Lord knowingly from thinking that they had\nnot done a great wrong; they should know that they obtained atonement\nby the sacrifice of the goat, as the Law says, \u201cThat they die not in\ntheir uncleanness\u201d (Lev. xv. 31); \u201cThat Aaron may bear the iniquity of\nthe holy things\u201d (Exod. xxviii. 38). This idea is frequently repeated.\n\nThe uncleanness through leprosy we have already explained. Our Sages\nhave also clearly stated the meaning thereof. All agree that leprosy is\na punishment for slander. The disease begins in the walls of the houses\n(Lev. xiv. 33, seq.). If the sinner repents, the object is attained; if\nhe remains in his disobedience, the disease affects his bed and house\nfurniture; if he still continues to sin, the leprosy attacks his own\ngarments, and then his body. This is a miracle received in our nation\nby tradition, in the same manner as the effect of the trial of a\nfaithless wife (Num. v. 11, seq.). The good effect of this belief is\nevident. Leprosy is besides a contagious disease, and people almost\nnaturally abhor it, and keep away from it. The purification was\neffected by cedar-wood, hyssop, scarlet thread, and two birds (Lev.\nxiv. 4); their reason is stated in various Midrashic sayings, but the\nexplanation does not agree with our theory. I do not know at present\nthe reason of any of these things; nor why cedar-wood, hyssop, and\nscarlet were used in the sacrifice of the red heifer (Num. xix. 6); nor\nwhy a bundle of hyssop was commanded for the sprinkling of the blood of\nthe Passover-lamb (Exod. xii. 22). I cannot find any principle upon\nwhich to found an explanation why these particular things have been\nchosen.\n\nThe red heifer is called a sin-offering, because it effects the\npurification of persons that have become unclean through the dead body\nof a human being, and enables them to enter the Sanctuary [and to eat\nof hallowed things]. The idea taught by this law is this: Those who\nhave defiled themselves would never be allowed to enter the Sanctuary,\nor to partake of holy things, were it not for the sacrifice of the red\nheifer, by which this sin is removed; in the same manner as the plate\n[which the high-priest wears on his forehead] atones for uncleanness,\nand as a similar object is attained by the goats that are burnt. For\nthis reason those were unclean who were engaged in the sacrifice of the\nheifer or the goats which were burnt, and even their garments were\nunclean. The same was the law in the case of the goat that was sent\naway [on the Day of Atonement]; for it was believed that it made\nunclean those who touched it, because it carried off so many sins.\n\nWe have now mentioned the reasons for those commandments of this class,\nfor which we were able to give a satisfactory reason according to our\nview.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII\n\n\nThe precepts of the thirteenth class are those which we have enumerated\nin the \u201cLaws concerning forbidden food\u201d (Hilkot maakalot asurot), \u201cLaws\nconcerning killing animals for food\u201d (Hilkot she\u1e25itah), and \u201cLaws\nconcerning vows and Nazaritism\u201d (Hilkot nedarim u-nezirot). We have\nfully and very explicitly discussed the object of this class in this\ntreatise, and in our Commentary on the Sayings of the Fathers. We will\nhere add a few remarks in reviewing the single commandments which are\nmentioned there.\n\nI maintain that the food which is forbidden by the Law is unwholesome.\nThere is nothing among the forbidden kinds of food whose injurious\ncharacter is doubted, except pork (Lev. xi. 7), and fat (ibid. vii.\n23). But also in these cases the doubt is not justified. For pork\ncontains more moisture than necessary [for human food], and too much of\nsuperfluous matter. The principal reason why the Law forbids swine\u2019s\nflesh is to be found in the circumstance that its habits and its food\nare very dirty and loathsome. It has already been pointed out how\nemphatically the Law enjoins the removal of the sight of loathsome\nobjects, even in the field and in the camp; how much more objectionable\nis such a sight in towns. But if it were allowed to eat swine\u2019s flesh,\nthe streets and houses would be more dirty than any cesspool, as may be\nseen at present in the country of the Franks. A saying of our Sages\ndeclares: \u201cThe mouth of a swine is as dirty as dung itself\u201d (B. T. Ber.\n25a)\n\nThe fat of the intestines makes us full, interrupts our digestion, and\nproduces cold and thick blood; it is more fit for fuel [than for human\nfood].\n\nBlood (Lev. xvii. 12), and nebelah, i.e., the flesh of an animal that\ndied of itself (Deut. xiv. 21), are indigestible, and injurious as\nfood; Trefah, an animal in a diseased state (Exod. xxii. 30), is on the\nway of becoming a nebelah.\n\nThe characteristics given in the Law (Lev. xi., and Deut. xiv.) of the\npermitted animals, viz., chewing the cud and divided hoofs for cattle,\nand fins and scales for fish, are in themselves neither the cause of\nthe permission when they are present, nor of the prohibition when they\nare absent; but merely signs by which the recommended species of\nanimals can be discerned from those that are forbidden.\n\nThe reason why the sinew that shrank is prohibited is stated in the Law\n(Gen. xxxii. 33).\n\nIt is prohibited to cut off a limb of a living animal and eat it,\nbecause such act would produce cruelty, and develop it; besides, the\nheathen kings used to do it; it was also a kind of idolatrous worship\nto cut off a certain limb of a living animal and to eat it.\n\nMeat boiled in milk is undoubtedly gross food, and makes overfull; but\nI think that most probably it is also prohibited because it is somehow\nconnected with idolatry, forming perhaps part of the service, or being\nused on some festival of the heathen. I find a support for this view in\nthe circumstance that the Law mentions the prohibition twice after the\ncommandment given concerning the festivals \u201cThree times in the year all\nthy males shall appear before the Lord God\u201d (Exod. xxiii. 17, and\nxxxiv. 23), as if to say, \u201cWhen you come before me on your festivals,\ndo not seethe your food in the manner as the heathen used to do.\u201d This\nI consider as the best reason for the prohibition; but as far as I have\nseen the books on Sabean rites, nothing is mentioned of this custom.\n\nThe commandment concerning the killing of animals is necessary, because\nthe natural food of man consists of vegetables and of the flesh of\nanimals; the best meat is that of animals permitted to be used as food.\nNo doctor has any doubts about this. Since, therefore, the desire of\nprocuring good food necessitates the slaying of animals, the Law\nenjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest. It is not\nallowed to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a clumsy manner,\nby poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb whilst the animal is alive.\n\nIt is also prohibited to kill an animal with its young on the same day\n(Lev. xxii. 28), in order that people should be restrained and\nprevented from killing the two together in such a manner that the young\nis slain in the sight of the mother; for the pain of the animals under\nsuch circumstances it very great. There is no difference in this case\nbetween the pain of man and the pain of other living beings, since the\nlove and tenderness of the mother for her young ones is not produced by\nreasoning, but by imagination, and this faculty exists not only in man\nbut in most living beings. This law applies only to ox and lamb,\nbecause of the domestic animals used as food these alone are permitted\nto us, and in these cases the mother recognises her young.\n\nThe same reason applies to the law which enjoins that we should let the\nmother fly away when we take the young. The eggs over which the bird\nsits, and the young that are in need of their mother, are generally\nunfit for food, and when the mother is sent away she does not see the\ntaking of her young ones, and does not feel any pain. In most cases,\nhowever, this commandment will cause man to leave the whole nest\nuntouched, because [the young or the eggs], which he is allowed to\ntake, are, as a rule, unfit for food. If the Law provides that such\ngrief should not be caused to cattle or birds, how much more careful\nmust we be that we should not cause grief to our fellow-men. When in\nthe Talmud (Ber. p. 33b) those are blamed who use in their prayer the\nphrase, \u201cThy mercy extendeth to young birds,\u201d it is the expression of\nthe one of the two opinions mentioned by us, namely, that the precepts\nof the Law have no other reason but the Divine will. We follow the\nother opinion.\n\nThe reason why we cover the blood when we kill animals, and why we do\nit only when we kill clean beasts and clean birds, has already been\nexplained by us (supra, chap. xlvi., p. 362).\n\nIn addition to the things prohibited by the Law, we are also commanded\nto observe the prohibitions enjoined by our own vows (Num. xxx.). If we\nsay, This bread or this meat is forbidden for us, we are not allowed to\npartake of that food. The object of that precept is to train us in\ntemperance, that we should be able to control our appetites for eating\nand drinking. Our Sages say accordingly, \u201cVows are a fence for\nabstinence.\u201d As women are easily provoked to anger, owing to their\ngreater excitability and the weakness of their mind, their oaths, if\nentirely under their own control, would cause great grief, quarrel, and\ndisorder in the family; one kind of food would be allowed for the\nhusband, and forbidden for the wife; another kind forbidden for the\ndaughter, and allowed for the mother. Therefore the Law gives the\nfather of the family control over the vows of those dependent on him. A\nwoman that is independent, and not under the authority of a chief of\nthe family, is, as regards vows, subject to the same laws as men; I\nmean a woman that has no husband, or that has no father, or that is of\nage, i.e., twelve years and six months.\n\nThe object of Nazaritism (Num. vi.) is obvious. It keeps away from wine\nthat has ruined people in ancient and modern times. \u201cMany strong men\nhave been slain by it\u201d (Prov. xxvii. 26). \u201cBut they also have erred\nthrough wine, ... the priest and the prophet\u201d (Isa. xxviii. 7). In the\nlaw about the Nazarite we notice even the prohibition, \u201che shall eat\nnothing that is made of the vine tree\u201d (Num. vi. 4), as an additional\nprecaution, implying the lesson that man must take of wine, only as\nmuch as is absolutely necessary. For he who abstains from drinking it\nis called \u201choly\u201d; his sanctity is made equal to that of the\nhigh-priest, in not being allowed to defile himself even to his father,\nto his mother, and the like. This honour is given him because he\nabstains from wine.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIX\n\n\nThe precepts of the fourteenth class are those which we enumerated in\nthe Section on Women, the Laws concerning forbidden sexual intercourse,\nand cross-breeding of cattle (Sefer nashim, Hilkot issure biah ve-kalee\nbehemah). The law concerning circumcision belongs also to this class.\nThe general purpose of these precepts has already been described by us.\nWe will now proceed to explain them singly.\n\nIt is well known that man requires friends all his lifetime. Aristotle\nexplains this in the ninth book of his Nikomachean Ethics. When man is\nin good health and prosperous, he enjoys the company of his friends; in\ntime of trouble he is in need of them; in old age, when his body is\nweak, he is assisted by them. This love is more frequent and more\nintense between parents and children, and among [other] relations.\nPerfect love, brotherhood, and mutual assistance is only found among\nthose near to each other by relationship. The members of a family\nunited by common descent from the same grandfather, or even from some\nmore distant ancestor, have towards each other a certain feeling of\nlove, help each other, and sympathize with each other. To effect this\nis one of the chief purposes of the Law. Professional harlots were\ntherefore not tolerated in Israel (Deut. xxiii. 18), because their\nexistence would disturb the above relationship between man and man.\nTheir children are strangers to everybody; no one knows to what family\nthey belong; nor does any person recognize them as relatives. And this\nis the greatest misfortune that can befall any child or father. Another\nimportant object in prohibiting prostitution is to restrain excessive\nand continual lust; for lust increases with the variety of its objects.\nThe sight of that to which a person has been accustomed for a long time\ndoes not produce such an ardent desire for its enjoyment as is produced\nby objects new in form and character. Another effect of this\nprohibition is the removal of a cause for strife; for if the\nprohibition did not exist, several persons might by chance come to one\nwoman, and would naturally quarrel with each other; they would in many\ncases kill one another, or they would kill the woman. This is known to\nhave occurred in days of old, \u201cAnd they assembled themselves by troops\nin a harlot\u2019s house\u201d (Jer. v. 7). In order to prevent these great\nevils, and to effect the great boon that all men should know their\nrelationship to each other, prostitutes (Deut. xxiii. 17) were not\ntolerated, and sexual intercourse was only permitted when man has\nchosen a certain female, and married her openly; for if it sufficed\nmerely to choose her, many a person would bring a prostitute into his\nhouse at a certain time agreed upon between them, and say that she was\nhis wife. Therefore it is commanded to perform the act of engagement by\nwhich he declares that he has chosen her to take her for his wife, and\nthen to go through the public ceremony of marriage. Comp. \u201cAnd Boaz\ntook ten men,\u201d etc. (Ruth iv. 2). It may happen that husband and wife\ndo not agree, live without love and peace, and do not enjoy the benefit\nof a home; in that case he is permitted to send her away. If he had\nbeen allowed to divorce her by a mere word, or by turning her out of\nhis house, the wife would wait for some negligence [on the part of the\nhusband], and then come out and say that she was divorced; or having\ncommitted adultery, she and the adulterer would contend that she had\nthen been divorced. Therefore the law is that divorce can only take\nplace by means of a document which can serve as evidence, \u201cHe shall\nwrite her a bill of divorcement\u201d (Deut. xxiv. 1). There are frequently\noccasions for suspicion of adultery and doubts concerning the conduct\nof the wife. Laws concerning a wife suspected of adultery (sotah) are\ntherefore prescribed (Num. v.); the effect of which is that the wife,\nout of fear of the \u201cbitter waters,\u201d is most careful to prevent any\nill-feeling on the part of her husband against her. Even of those that\nfelt quite innocent and safe most were rather willing to lose all their\nproperty than to submit to the prescribed treatment; even death was\npreferred to the public disgrace of uncovering the head, undoing the\nhair, rending the garments and exposing the heart, and being led round\nthrough the Sanctuary in the presence of all, of women and men, and\nalso in the presence of the members of the Synhedrion. The fear of this\ntrial keeps away great diseases that ruin the home comfort.\n\nAs every maiden expects to be married, her seducer therefore is only\nordered to marry her; for he is undoubtedly the fittest husband for\nher. He will better heal her wound and redeem her character than any\nother husband. If, however, he is rejected by her or her father, he\nmust give the dowry (Exod. xxii. 15). If he uses violence he has to\nsubmit to the additional punishment, \u201che may not put her away all his\ndays\u201d (Deut. xxii. 29).\n\nThe reason of the law concerning marrying the deceased brother\u2019s wife\nis stated in the Bible (Deut. xxv. 5). It was a custom in force before\nthe Law was given, and the Law perpetuated it. The ceremony of \u1e25ali\u1e93ah\n(ibid. 6, seq.), \u201ctaking off the shoe,\u201d has been introduced, because in\nthose days it was considered disgraceful to go through that ceremony,\nand in order to avoid the disgrace, a person might perhaps be induced\nto marry his deceased brother\u2019s wife. This is evident from the words of\nthe Law: \u201cSo shall it be done unto that man that will not build up his\nbrother\u2019s house. And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of\nhim that hath his shoe loosed\u201d (Deut. xxv. 9). In the action of Judah\nwe may perhaps notice an example of a noble conduct, and uprightness in\njudgment. He said: \u201cLet her take it to her, lest we be shamed; behold,\nI sent this kid, and thou hast not found her\u201d (Gen. xxxviii. 23). For\nbefore the Lawgiving, the intercourse with a harlot was as lawful as\ncohabitation of husband and wife since the Lawgiving; it was perfectly\npermitted, nobody considered it wrong. The hire which was in those days\npaid to the harlot in accordance with a previous agreement, corresponds\nto the ketubah which in our days the husband pays to his wife when he\ndivorces her. It is a just claim on the part of the wife, and the\nhusband is bound to pay it. The words of Judah, \u201cLet her take it to\nher, lest we be shamed,\u201d etc., show that conversation about sexual\nintercourse, even of that which is permitted, brings shame upon us; it\nis proper to be silent about it, to keep it secret, even if the silence\nwould lead to loss of money. In this sense Judah said: It is better for\nus to lose property, and to let her keep what she has, than to make our\naffair public by inquiring after her, and bring still more shame upon\nus. This is the lesson, as regards conduct, to be derived from this\nincident. As to the uprightness to be learned therefrom, it is\ncontained in the words of Judah when he wanted to show that he had not\nrobbed her, that he has not in the least departed from his agreement\nwith her. For he said, \u201cBehold, I sent this kid, and thou hast not\nfound her.\u201d The kid was probably very good, therefore he points to it,\nsaying, \u201cthis kid.\u201d This is the uprightness which he had inherited from\nAbraham, Isaac, and Jacob: that man must not depart from his given\nword, nor deviate from what he agreed upon; but he must give to others\nall that is due to them. It makes no difference whether he holds a\nportion of his neighbour\u2019s property as a loan or a trust, or whether he\nis in any other way his neighbour\u2019s debtor, owing him wages or the\nlike.\n\nThe sum which the husband settles upon his wife (ketubah) is to be\ntreated in the same way as the wages of a hired servant. There is no\ndifference whether a master withholds the wages of a hired servant, or\ndeprives his wife of that which is due to her; whether a master wrongs\na hired servant, and brings charges against him with the intention to\nsend him away without payment, or a husband treats his wife in a manner\nthat would enable him to send her away without the payment of the\npromised sum.\n\nThe equity of the statutes and judgments of the Law in this regard may\nbe noticed in the treatment of a person accused of spreading an evil\nreport about his wife (Deut. xxii. 13, seq.). There is no doubt that\nthe man that did this is bad, does not love his wife, and is not\npleased with her. If he desired to divorce her in a regular manner,\nthere is nothing to prevent him, but he would be bound to give her what\nis due unto her; but instead of this, \u201che gives occasion of speech\nagainst her\u201d (ibid. xxii. 14), in order to get rid of his wife without\npaying anything; he slanders her, and utters falsehood in order to keep\nin his possession the fifty shekels of silver, the dowry fixed in the\nLaw for maidens, which he is obliged to pay unto her. He is therefore\nsentenced to pay one hundred shekels of silver, in accordance with the\nprinciple, \u201cWhom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his\nneighbour\u201d (Exod. xxii. 9). The Law is also analogous to that about\nfalse witnesses, which we have explained above (chap. xli. p. 195). For\nhe intended to cheat her of her fifty shekels of silver, he must\ntherefore [add fifty, and] pay her a hundred shekels. This is his\npunishment for withholding from her her due, and endeavouring to keep\nit. But in so far as he degraded her, and spread the rumour that she\nwas guilty of misconduct, he was also degraded, and received stripes,\nas is implied in the words, \u201cand they shall chastise him\u201d (Deut. xxii.\n18). But he sinned besides in clinging to lust, and seeking only that\nwhich gave pleasure to him; he was therefore punished by being\ncompelled to keep his wife always, \u201che may not put her away all his\ndays\u201d (ibid. 19); for he has been brought to all this only because he\nmay have found her ugly. Thus are these bad habits cured when they are\ntreated according to the divine Law; the ways of equity are never lost\nsight of; they are obvious and discernible in every precept of the Law\nby those who consider it well. See how, according to the Law, the\nslanderer of his wife, who only intended to withhold from her what he\nis bound to give her, is treated in the same manner as a thief who has\nstolen the property of his neighbour; and the false witness (Deut. xix.\n16, seq.) who schemes to injure, although the injury was in reality not\ninflicted, is punished like those who have actually caused injury and\nwrong, viz., like the thief and the slanderer. The three kinds of\nsinners are tried and judged by one and the same law. See how wonderful\nare the divine laws, and admire His wonderful deeds. Scripture says:\n\u201cThe Rock, His work is perfect; for all His ways are judgment\u201d (Deut.\nxxxii. 4), i.e., as His works are most perfect, so are His laws most\nequitable; but our mind is too limited to comprehend the perfection of\nall His works, or the equity of all His laws; and as we are able to\ncomprehend some of His wonderful works in the organs of living beings\nand the motions of the spheres, so we understand also the equity of\nsome of His laws; that which is unknown to us of both of them is far\nmore than that which is known to us. I will now return to the theme of\nthe present chapter.\n\nThe law about forbidden sexual intercourse seeks in all its parts to\ninculcate the lesson that we ought to limit sexual intercourse\naltogether, hold it in contempt, and only desire it very rarely. The\nprohibition of pederasty (Lev. xviii. 22) and carnal intercourse with\nbeasts (ibid. 23) is very clear. If in the natural way the act is too\nbase to be performed except when needed, how much more base is it if\nperformed in an unnatural manner, and only for the sake of pleasure.\n\nThe female relatives whom a man may not marry are alike in this\nrespect\u2014that as a rule they are constantly together with him in his\nhouse; they would easily listen to him, and do what he desires; they\nare near at hand, and he would have no difficulty in procuring them. No\njudge could blame him if found in their company. If to these relatives\nthe same law applied as to all other unmarried women, if we were\nallowed to marry any of them, and were only precluded from sexual\nintercourse with them without marriage, most people would constantly\nhave become guilty of misconduct with them. But as they are entirely\nforbidden to us, and sexual intercourse with them is most emphatically\ndenounced unto us as a capital crime, or a sin punishable with\nextinction (karet), and as there is no means of ever legalizing such\nintercourse, there is reason to expect that people will not seek it,\nand will not think of it. That the persons included in that prohibition\nare, as we have stated, at hand and easily accessible, is evident. For\nas a rule, the mother of the wife, the grandmother, the daughter, the\ngranddaughter, and the sister-in-law, are mostly with her; the husband\nmeets them always when he goes out, when he comes in, and when he is at\nhis work. The wife stays also frequently in the house of her husband\u2019s\nbrother, father, or son. It is also well known that we are often in the\ncompany of our sisters, our aunts, and the wife of our uncle, and are\nfrequently brought up together with them. These are all the relatives\nwhich we must not marry. This is one of the reasons why intermarriage\nwith a near relative is forbidden. But according to my opinion the\nprohibition serves another object, namely, to inculcate chastity into\nour hearts. Licence between the root and the branch, between a man and\nhis mother, or his daughter, is outrageous. The intercourse between\nroot and branch is forbidden, and it makes no difference whether the\nmale element is the root or the branch, or both root and branch combine\nin the intercourse with a third person, so that the same individual\ncohabits with the root and with the branch. On this account it is\nprohibited to marry a woman and her mother, the wife of the father or\nof the son; for in all these cases there is the intercourse between one\nand the same person on the one side and root and branch on the other.\n\nThe law concerning brothers is like the law concerning root and branch.\nThe sister is forbidden, and so is also the sister of the wife and the\nwife of the brother; because in the latter cases two persons who are\nconsidered like root and branch, cohabit with the same person. But in\nthese prohibitions brothers and sisters are partly considered as root\nand branch and partly as one body; the sister of the mother is\ntherefore like the mother, and the sister of the father like the\nfather, and both are prohibited; and since the daughter of the parent\u2019s\nbrother or sister is not included in the number of prohibited\nrelatives, so may we also marry the daughter of the brother or the\nsister. The apparent anomaly, that the brother of the father may marry\na woman that has been the wife of his brother\u2019s son, whilst the nephew\nmust not marry a woman that has been the wife of his father\u2019s brother,\ncan be explained according to the above-mentioned first reason. For the\nnephew is frequently in the house of his uncle, and his conduct towards\nthe wife of his uncle is the same as that towards his brother\u2019s wife.\nThe uncle, however, is not so frequent in the house of his nephew, and\nhe is consequently less intimate with the wife of his nephew; whilst in\nthe case of father and son, the familiarity of the father with his\ndaughter-in-law is the same at that of the son with the wife of his\nfather, and therefore the law and punishment is the same for both\n[father and son]. The reason why it is prohibited to cohabit with a\nmenstruous woman (Lev. xviii. 19) or with another man\u2019s wife (ibid.\n20), is obvious, and requires no further explanation.\n\nIt is well known that we must not indulge in any sensual enjoyment\nwhatever with the persons included in the above prohibitions; we must\nnot even look at them if we intend to derive pleasure therefrom. We\nhave explained this in \u201cthe laws about forbidden sexual intercourse\u201d\n(Hilkot issure b\u00efah, xxi. 1\u20132), and shown that according to the Law we\nmust not even engage our thoughts with the act of cohabitation (ibid.\n19) or irritate the organ of generation; and when we find ourselves\nunintentionally in a state of irritation, we must turn our mind to\nother thoughts, and reflect on some other thing till we are relieved.\nOur Sages (B.T. Kidd 30b), in their moral lessons, which give\nperfection to the virtuous, say as follows: \u201cMy son, if that monster\nmeets you, drag it to the house of study. It will melt if it is of\niron; it will break in pieces if it is of stone: as is said in\nScripture, \u2018Is not my word like a fire? saith the Lord, and like a\nhammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?\u2019\u201d (Jer. xxiii. 29). The author\nof this saying thus exhorts his son to go to the house of study when he\nfinds his organ of generation in an irritated state. By reading,\ndisputing, asking, and listening to questions, the irritation will\ncertainly cease. See how properly the term monster is employed, for\nthat irritation is indeed like a monster. Not only religion teaches\nthis lesson, the philosophers teach the same. I have already quoted\nverbatim the words of Aristotle. He says: \u201cThe sense of touch which is\na disgrace to us, leads us to indulge in eating and sensuality,\u201d etc.\nHe calls people degraded who seek carnal pleasures and devote\nthemselves to gastronomy; he denounces in extenso their low and\nobjectionable conduct, and ridicules them. This passage occurs in his\nEthics and in his Rhetoric.\n\nIn accordance with this excellent principle, which we ought strictly to\nfollow, our Sages teach us that we ought not to look at beasts or birds\nin the moment of their copulation. According to my opinion, this is the\nreason why the cross-breeding of cattle is prohibited (Lev. xix. 19).\nIt is a fact that animals of different species do not copulate\ntogether, unless by force. It is well known that the low class of\nbreeders of mules are regularly engaged in this work. Our Law objected\nto it that any Israelite should degrade himself by doing these things,\nwhich require so much vulgarity and indecency, and doing that which\nreligion forbids us even to mention, how much more to witness or to\npractise, except when necessary. Cross-breeding, however, is not\nnecessary. I think that the prohibition to bring together two species\nin any kind of work, as included in the words, \u201cThou shalt not plow\nwith an ox and an ass together\u201d (Deut. xxii. 10), is only a preventive\nagainst the intercourse of two species. For if it were allowed to join\nsuch together in any work, we might sometimes also cause their\nintercourse. That this is the reason of the commandment is proved by\nthe fact that it applies to other animals besides ox and ass; it is\nprohibited to plow not only with ox and ass together, but with any two\nkinds. But Scripture mentions as an instance that which is of regular\noccurrence.\n\nAs regards circumcision, I think that one of its objects is to limit\nsexual intercourse, and to weaken the organ of generation as far as\npossible, and thus cause man to be moderate. Some people believe that\ncircumcision is to remove a defect in man\u2019s formation; but every one\ncan easily reply: How can products of nature be deficient so as to\nrequire external completion, especially as the use of the fore-skin to\nthat organ is evident. This commandment has not been enjoined as a\ncomplement to a deficient physical creation, but as a means for\nperfecting man\u2019s moral shortcomings. The bodily injury caused to that\norgan is exactly that which is desired; it does not interrupt any vital\nfunction, nor does it destroy the power of generation. Circumcision\nsimply counteracts excessive lust; for there is no doubt that\ncircumcision weakens the power of sexual excitement, and sometimes\nlessens the natural enjoyment; the organ necessarily becomes weak when\nit loses blood and is deprived of its covering from the beginning. Our\nSages (Beresh. Rabba, c. 80) say distinctly: It is hard for a woman,\nwith whom an uncircumcised had sexual intercourse, to separate from\nhim. This is, as I believe, the best reason for the commandment\nconcerning circumcision. And who was the first to perform this\ncommandment? Abraham, our father! of whom it is well known how he\nfeared sin; it is described by our Sages in reference to the words,\n\u201cBehold, now I know that thou art a fair woman to look upon\u201d (Gen. xii.\n11).\n\nThere is, however, another important object in this commandment. It\ngives to all members of the same faith, i.e., to all believers in the\nUnity of God, a common bodily sign, so that it is impossible for any\none that is a stranger, to say that he belongs to them. For sometimes\npeople say so for the purpose of obtaining some advantage, or in order\nto make some attack upon the Jews. No one, however, should circumcise\nhimself or his son for any other reason but pure faith; for\ncircumcision is not like an incision on the leg, or a burning in the\narm, but a very difficult operation. It is also a fact that there is\nmuch mutual love and assistance among people that are united by the\nsame sign when they consider it as [the symbol of] a covenant.\nCircumcision is likewise the [symbol of the] covenant which Abraham\nmade in connexion with the belief in God\u2019s Unity. So also every one\nthat is circumcised enters the covenant of Abraham to believe in the\nunity of God, in accordance with the words of the Law, \u201cTo be a God\nunto thee, and to thy seed after thee\u201d (Gen. xvii. 7). This purpose of\nthe circumcision is as important as the first, and perhaps more\nimportant.\n\nThis law can only be kept and perpetuated in its perfection, if\ncircumcision is performed when the child is very young, and this for\nthree good reasons. First, if the operation were postponed till the boy\nhad grown up, he would perhaps not submit to it. Secondly, the young\nchild has not much pain, because the skin is tender, and the\nimagination weak; for grown-up persons are in dread and fear of things\nwhich they imagine as coming, some time before these actually occur.\nThirdly, when a child is very young, the parents do not think much of\nhim; because the image of the child, that leads the parents to love\nhim, has not yet taken a firm root in their minds. That image becomes\nstronger by the continual sight; it grows with the development of the\nchild, and later on the image begins again to decrease and to vanish.\nThe parents\u2019 love for a new-born child is not so great as it is when\nthe child is one year old; and when one year old, it is less loved by\nthem than when six years old. The feeling and love of the father for\nthe child would have led him to neglect the law if he were allowed to\nwait two or three years, whilst shortly after birth the image is very\nweak in the mind of the parent, especially of the father who is\nresponsible for the execution of this commandment. The circumcision\nmust take place on the eighth day (Lev. xii. 3), because all living\nbeings are after birth, within the first seven days, very weak and\nexceedingly tender, as if they were still in the womb of their mother;\nnot until the eighth day can they be counted among those that enjoy the\nlight of the world. That this is also the case with beasts may be\ninferred from the words of Scripture: \u201cSeven days shall it be under the\ndam\u201d (Lev. xxii. 27), as if it had no vitality before the end of that\nperiod. In the same manner man is circumcised after the completion of\nseven days. The period has been fixed, and has not been left to\neverybody\u2019s judgment.\n\nThe precepts of this class include also the lesson that we must not\ninjure in any way the organs of generation in living beings (ibid.\nxxii. 24). The lesson is based on the principle of \u201crighteous statutes\nand judgment\u201d (Deut. iv. 8); we must keep in everything the golden\nmean; we must not be excessive in love, but must not suppress it\nentirely; for the Law commands, \u201cBe fruitful, and multiply\u201d (Gen. i.\n22). The organ is weakened by circumcision, but not destroyed by the\noperation. The natural faculty is left in full force, but is guarded\nagainst excess. It it prohibited for an Israelite \u201cthat is wounded in\nthe stones, or hath his privy member cut off\u201d (Deut. xxiii. 2), to\nmarry an Israelitish woman; because the sexual intercourse is of no use\nand of no purpose; and that marriage would be a source of ruin to her,\nand to him who would claim her. This is very clear.\n\nIn order to create a horror of illicit marriages, a bastard was not\nallowed to marry an Israelitish woman (ibid. xxiii. 3); the adulterer\nand the adulteress were thus taught that by their act they bring upon\ntheir seed irreparable injury. In every language and in every nation\nthe issue of licentious conduct has a bad name; the Law therefore\nraises the name of the Israelites by keeping them free from the\nadmixture of bastards. The priests, who have a higher sanctity, are not\nallowed to marry a harlot, or a woman that is divorced from her\nhusband, or that is profane (Lev. xii. 7); the high-priest, the noblest\nof the priests, must not marry even a widow, or a woman that has had\nsexual intercourse of any kind (ibid. xii. 14). Of all these laws the\nreason is obvious. If bastards were prohibited to marry any member of\nthe congregation of the Lord, how much more rigidly had slaves and\nhandmaids to be excluded. The reason of the prohibition of\nintermarriage with other nations is stated in the Law: \u201cAnd thou take\nof their daughters unto thy sons, and their daughters go a whoring\nafter their gods, and make thy sons go a whoring after their gods\u201d\n(Exod. xxxiv. 16).\n\nMost of the \u201cstatutes\u201d (\u1e25ukkim), the reason of which is unknown to us,\nserve as a fence against idolatry. That I cannot explain some details\nof the above laws or show their use is owing to the fact that what we\nhear from others is not so clear as that which we see with our own\neyes. Thus my knowledge of the Sabean doctrines, which I derived from\nbooks, is not as complete as the knowledge of those who have witnessed\nthe public practice of those idolatrous customs, especially as they\nhave been out of practice and entirely extinct since two thousand\nyears. If we knew all the particulars of the Sabean worship, and were\ninformed of all the details of those doctrines, we would clearly see\nthe reason and wisdom of every detail in the sacrificial service, in\nthe laws concerning things that are unclean, and in other laws, the\nobject of which I am unable to state. I have no doubt that all these\nlaws served to blot out wrong principles from man\u2019s heart, and to\nexterminate the practices which are useless, and merely a waste of time\nin vain and purposeless things. Those principles have turned the mind\nof the people away from intellectual research and useful actions. Our\nprophets therefore describe the ways of the idolaters as follows:\n\u201c(They go) after vain things which cannot profit nor deliver; for they\nare vain\u201d (1 Sam. xii. 21); \u201cSurely our fathers have inherited lies,\nvanity and things wherein there is no profit\u201d (Jer. xvi. 19). Consider\nhow great the evil consequences of idolatry are, and say whether we\nought with all our power to oppose it or not! Most of the precepts\nserve, as has been stated by us, as a mere fence against those\ndoctrines [of idolatry], and relieve man from the great and heavy\nburdens, from the pains and inflictions which formed part of the\nworship of idols. Every positive or negative precept, the reason of\nwhich is unknown to thee, take as a remedy against some of those\ndiseases with which we are unacquainted at present, thank God. This\nshould be the belief of educated men who know the true meaning of the\nfollowing divine dictum: \u201cI said not unto the seed of Jacob, Seek me in\nvain\u201d (Isa. xlv. 19).\n\nI have now mentioned all the commandments of these fourteen classes one\nby one, and pointed out the reason of each of them, with the exception\nof a few for which I was unable to give the reason, and of some details\nof less importance; but implicitly we have given the reason even of\nthese, and every intelligent reader will easily find it.\n\nThe reasons of the Precepts are now complete.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER L\n\n\nThere are in the Law portions which include deep wisdom, but have been\nmisunderstood by many persons; they require, therefore, an explanation.\nI mean the narratives contained in the Law which many consider as being\nof no use whatever; e.g., the list of the various families descended\nfrom Noah, with their names and their territories (Gen. x.); the sons\nof Seir the Horite (ibid. xxxvi. 20\u201330); the kings that reigned in Edom\n(ibid. 31, seq.); and the like. There is a saying of our Sages (B.T.\nSanh. 99b) that the wicked king Manasse frequently held disgraceful\nmeetings for the sole purpose of criticising such passages of the Law.\n\u201cHe held meetings and made blasphemous observations on Scripture,\nsaying, Had Moses nothing else to write than, And the sister of Lotan\nwas Timna\u201d (Gen. xxxvi. 22)? With reference to such passages, I will\nfirst give a general principle, and then discuss them seriatim, as I\nhave done in the exposition of the reasons of the precepts.\n\nEvery narrative in the Law serves a certain purpose in connexion with\nreligious teaching. It either helps to establish a principle of faith,\nor to regulate our actions, and to prevent wrong and injustice among\nmen; and I will show this in each case.\n\nIt is one of the fundamental principles of the Law that the Universe\nhas been created ex nihilo, and that of the human race, one individual\nbeing, Adam, was created. As the time which elapsed from Adam to Moses\nwas not more than about two thousand five hundred years, people would\nhave doubted the truth of that statement if no other information had\nbeen added, seeing that the human race was spread over all parts of the\nearth in different families and with different languages, very unlike\nthe one to the other. In order to remove this doubt the Law gives the\ngenealogy of the nations (Gen. v. and x.), and the manner how they\nbranched off from a common root. It names those of them who were well\nknown, and tells who their fathers were, how long and where they lived.\nIt describes also the cause that led to the dispersion of men over all\nparts of the earth, and to the formation of their different languages,\nafter they had lived for a long time in one place, and spoken one\nlanguage (ibid. xi.), as would be natural for descendants of one\nperson. The accounts of the flood (ibid. vi.-viii.) and of the\ndestruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (ibid. xix.), serve as an\nillustration of the doctrine that \u201cVerily there is a reward for the\nrighteous; verily He is a God that judgeth in the earth\u201d (Ps. lviii.\n12).\n\nThe narration of the war among the nine kings (ibid. xiv.) shows how,\nby means of a miracle, Abraham, with a few undisciplined men, defeated\nfour mighty kings. It illustrates at the same time how Abraham\nsympathized with his relative, who had been brought up in the same\nfaith, and how he exposed himself to the dangers of warfare in order to\nsave him. We further learn from this narrative how contented and\nsatisfied Abraham was, thinking little of property, and very much of\ngood deeds; he said, \u201cI will not take from a thread even to a\nshoe-latchet\u201d (Gen. xiv. 23).\n\nThe list of the families of Seir and their genealogy is given in the\nLaw (ibid. xxxvi. 20\u201330), because of one particular commandment. For\nGod distinctly commanded the Israelites concerning Amalek to blot out\nhis name (Deut. xxv. 17\u201319). Amalek was the son of Eliphas and Timna,\nthe sister of Lotan (ibid. xxxvi. 12). The other sons of Esau were not\nincluded in this commandment. But Esau was by marriage connected with\nthe Seirites, as is distinctly stated in Scripture; and Seirites were\ntherefore his children; he reigned over them; his seed was mixed with\nthe seed of Seir, and ultimately all the countries and families of Seir\nwere called after the sons of Esau who were the predominant family, and\nthey assumed more particularly the name Amalekites, because these were\nthe strongest in that family. If the genealogy of these families of\nSeir had not been described in full they would all have been killed,\ncontrary to the plain words of the commandment. For this reason the\nSeirite families are fully described, as if to say, the people that\nlive in Seir and in the kingdom of Amalek are not all Amalekites; they\nare the descendants of some other man, and are called Amalekites\nbecause the mother of Amalek was of their tribe. The justice of God\nthus prevented the destruction of an [innocent] people that lived in\nthe midst of another people [doomed to extirpation]; for the decree was\nonly pronounced against the seed of Amalek. The reason of this decree\nhas already been stated by us (p. 205).\n\nThe kings that have reigned in the land of Edom are enumerated (Gen\nxxxvi. 31, seq.) on account of the law, \u201cThou mayst not set a stranger\nover thee, which is not thy brother\u201d (Deut. xvii. 15). For of these\nkings none was an Edomite; wherefore each king is described by his\nnative land; one king from this place, another king from that place.\nNow I think that it was then well known how these kings that reigned in\nEdom conducted themselves, what they did, and how they humiliated and\noppressed the sons of Esau. Thus God reminded the Israelites of the\nfate of the Edomites, as if saying unto them, Look unto your brothers,\nthe sons of Esau, whose kings were so and so, and whose deeds are well\nknown. [Learn therefrom] that no nation ever chose a foreigner as king\nwithout inflicting thereby some great or small injury upon the country.\nIn short, what I remarked in reference to our ignorance of the Sabean\nworship, applies also to the history of those days. If the religious\nrules of the Sabeans and the events of those days were known to us, we\nshould be able to see plainly the reason for most of the things\nmentioned in the Pentateuch.\n\nIt is also necessary to note the following observations. The view we\ntake of things described by others is different from the view we take\nof things seen by us as eye-witnesses. For that which we see contains\nmany details which are essential, and must be fully described. The\nreader of the description believes that it contains superfluous matter,\nor useless repetition, but if he had witnessed the event of which he\nreads, he would see the necessity of every part of the description.\nWhen we therefore notice narratives in the Torah, which are in no\nconnexion with any of the commandments, we are inclined to think that\nthey are entirely superfluous, or too lengthy, or contain repetitions;\nbut this is only because we do not see the particular incidents which\nmake those narratives noteworthy. Of this kind is the enumeration of\nthe stations [of the Israelites in the wilderness] (Num. xxxiii.). At\nfirst sight it appears to be entirely useless; but in order to obviate\nsuch a notion Scripture says, \u201cAnd Moses wrote their goings out\naccording to their journeys by the commandment of the Lord\u201d (ibid. ver.\n2). It was indeed most necessary that these should be written. For\nmiracles are only convincing to those who witnessed them; whilst coming\ngenerations, who know them only from the account given by others, may\nconsider them as untrue. But miracles cannot continue and last for all\ngenerations; it is even inconceivable [that they should be permanent].\nNow the greatest of the miracles described in the Law is the stay of\nthe Israelites in the wilderness for forty years, with a daily supply\nof manna. This wilderness, as described in Scripture, consisted of\nplaces \u201cwherein were fiery serpents and scorpions, and drought, where\nthere was no water\u201d (Deut. viii. 15); places very remote from\ncultivated land, and naturally not adapted for the habitation of man,\n\u201cIt is no place of seed, or of figs, or of vines, or of pomegranates,\nneither is there any water to drink\u201d (Num. xx. 5); \u201cA land that no man\npassed through, and where no man dwelt\u201d (Jer. ii. 6). [In reference to\nthe stay of the Israelites in the wilderness], Scripture relates, \u201cYe\nhave not eaten bread, neither have ye drunk wine or strong drink\u201d\n(Deut. xix. 5). All these miracles were wonderful, public, and\nwitnessed by the people. But God knew that in future people might doubt\nthe correctness of the account of these miracles, in the same manner as\nthey doubt the accuracy of other narratives; they might think that the\nIsraelites stayed in the wilderness in a place not far from inhabited\nland, where it was possible for man to live [in the ordinary way]; that\nit was like those deserts in which Arabs live at present; or that they\ndwelt in such places in which they could plow, sow, and reap, or live\non some vegetable that was growing there; or that manna came always\ndown in those places as an ordinary natural product; or that there were\nwells of water in those places. In order to remove all these doubts and\nto firmly establish the accuracy of the account of these miracles,\nScripture enumerates all the stations, so that coming generations may\nsee them, and learn the greatness of the miracle which enabled human\nbeings to live in those places forty years.\n\nFor this very reason Joshua cursed him who would ever build up Jericho\n(Josh. vi. 26); the effect of the miracle was to remain for ever, so\nthat any one who would see the wall sunk in the ground would understand\nthat it was not in the condition of a building pulled down by human\nhands, but sunk through a miracle. In a similar manner the words, \u201cAt\nthe commandment of the Lord the children of Israel journeyed, and at\nthe commandment of the Lord they pitched\u201d (Num. ix. 18), would suffice\nas a simple statement of facts; and the reader might at first sight\nconsider as unnecessary additions all the details which follow, viz.,\n\u201cAnd when the cloud tarried long.... And so it was when the cloud was a\nfew days.... Or whether it were two days,\u201d etc. (ibid. ix. 19\u201322). But\nI will show you the reason why all these details are added. For they\nserve to confirm the account, and to contradict the opinion of the\nnations, both of ancient and modern times, that the Israelites lost\ntheir way, and did not know where to go; that \u201cthey were entangled in\nthe land\u201d (Exod. xiv. 3); wherefore the Arabs unto this day call that\ndesert Al-tih, \u201cthe desert of going astray,\u201d imagining that the\nIsraelites erred about, and did not know the way. Scripture, therefore,\nclearly states and emphatically declares that it was by God\u2019s command\nthat the journeyings were irregular, that the Israelites returned to\nthe same places several times, and that the duration of the stay was\ndifferent in each station; whilst the stay in one place continued for\neighteen years, in another place it lasted one day, and in another one\nnight. There was no going astray, but the journey was regulated by \u201cthe\nrising of the pillar of cloud\u201d (Num. ix. 17). Therefore all these\ndetails are given. Scripture clearly states that the way was near,\nknown, and in good condition; I mean the way from Horeb, whither they\ncame intentionally, according to the command of God, \u201cYe shall serve\nGod upon this mountain\u201d (Exod. ii. 12), to Kadesh-barnea, the beginning\nof inhabited land, as Scripture says, \u201cBehold, we are now in Kadesh, a\ncity in the uttermost of thy border\u201d (Num. xx. 16). That way was a\njourney of eleven days; comp. \u201cEleven days\u2019 journey from Horeb, by the\nway of mount Seir, unto Kadesh-barnea\u201d (Deut. i. 3). In such a journey\nit is impossible to err about for forty years; but Scripture states the\ncause of the delay.\n\nIn like manner there is a good reason for every passage the object of\nwhich we cannot see. We must always apply the words of our Sages: \u201cIt\nis not a vain thing for you\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 47), and if it seems vain,\nit seems your fault.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LI\n\n\nThe present chapter does not contain any additional matter that has not\nbeen treated in the [previous] chapters of this treatise. It is a kind\nof conclusion, and at the same time it will explain in what manner\nthose worship God who have obtained a true knowledge concerning God; it\nwill direct them how to come to that worship, which is the highest aim\nman can attain, and show how God protects them in this world till they\nare removed to eternal life.\n\nI will begin the subject of this chapter with a simile. A king is in\nhis palace, and all his subjects are partly in the country, and partly\nabroad. Of the former, some have their backs turned towards the king\u2019s\npalace, and their faces in another direction; and some are desirous and\nzealous to go to the palace, seeking \u201cto inquire in his temple,\u201d and to\nminister before him, but have not yet seen even the face of the wall of\nthe house. Of those that desire to go to the palace, some reach it, and\ngo round about in search of the entrance gate; others have passed\nthrough the gate, and walk about in the ante-chamber; and others have\nsucceeded in entering into the inner part of the palace, and being in\nthe same room with the king in the royal palace. But even the latter do\nnot immediately on entering the palace see the king, or speak to him;\nfor, after having entered the inner part of the palace, another effort\nis required before they can stand before the king\u2014at a distance, or\nclose by\u2014hear his words, or speak to him. I will now explain the simile\nwhich I have made. The people who are abroad are all those that have no\nreligion, neither one based on speculation nor one received by\ntradition. Such are the extreme Turks that wander about in the north,\nthe Kushites who live in the south, and those in our country who are\nlike these. I consider these as irrational beings, and not as human\nbeings; they are below mankind, but above monkeys, since they have the\nform and shape of man, and a mental faculty above that of the monkey.\n\nThose who are in the country, but have their backs turned towards the\nking\u2019s palace, are those who possess religion, belief, and thought, but\nhappen to hold false doctrines, which they either adopted in\nconsequence of great mistakes made in their own speculations, or\nreceived from others who misled them. Because of these doctrines they\nrecede more and more from the royal palace the more they seem to\nproceed. These are worse than the first class, and under certain\ncircumstances it may become necessary to slay them, and to extirpate\ntheir doctrines, in order that others should not be misled.\n\nThose who desire to arrive at the palace, and to enter it, but have\nnever yet seen it, are the mass of religious people; the multitude that\nobserve the divine commandments, but are ignorant. Those who arrive at\nthe palace, but go round about it, are those who devote themselves\nexclusively to the study of the practical law; they believe\ntraditionally in true principles of faith, and learn the practical\nworship of God, but are not trained in philosophical treatment of the\nprinciples of the Law, and do not endeavour to establish the truth of\ntheir faith by proof. Those who undertake to investigate the principles\nof religion, have come into the ante-chamber; and there is no doubt\nthat these can also be divided into different grades. But those who\nhave succeeded in finding a proof for everything that can be proved,\nwho have a true knowledge of God, so far as a true knowledge can be\nattained, and are near the truth, wherever an approach to the truth is\npossible, they have reached the goal, and are in the palace in which\nthe king lives.\n\nMy son, so long as you are engaged in studying the Mathematical\nSciences and Logic, you belong to those who go round about the palace\nin search of the gate. Thus our Sages figuratively use the phrase:\n\u201cBen-zoma is still outside.\u201d When you understand Physics, you have\nentered the hall; and when, after completing the study of Natural\nPhilosophy, you master Metaphysics, you have entered the innermost\ncourt, and are with the king in the same palace. You have attained the\ndegree of the wise men, who include men of different grades of\nperfection. There are some who direct all their mind toward the\nattainment of perfection in Metaphysics, devote themselves entirely to\nGod, exclude from their thought every other thing, and employ all their\nintellectual faculties in the study of the Universe, in order to derive\ntherefrom a proof for the existence of God, and to learn in every\npossible way how God rules all things; they form the class of those who\nhave entered the palace, namely, the class of prophets. One of these\nhas attained so much knowledge, and has concentrated his thoughts to\nsuch an extent in the idea of God, that it could be said of him, \u201cAnd\nhe was with the Lord forty days,\u201d etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 28); during that\nholy communion he could ask Him, answer Him, speak to Him, and be\naddressed by Him, enjoying beatitude in that which he had obtained to\nsuch a degree that \u201che did neither eat bread nor drink water\u201d (ibid.);\nhis intellectual energy was so predominant that all coarser functions\nof the body, especially those connected with the sense of touch, were\nin abeyance. Some prophets are only able to see, and of these some\napproach near and see, whilst others see from a distance: comp. \u201cThe\nLord hath appeared from far unto me\u201d (Jer. xxxi. 3). We have already\nspoken of the various degrees of prophets; we will therefore return to\nthe subject of this chapter, and exhort those who have attained a\nknowledge of God, to concentrate all their thoughts in God. This is the\nworship peculiar to those who have acquired a knowledge of the highest\ntruths; and the more they reflect on Him, and think of Him, the more\nare they engaged in His worship. Those, however, who think of God, and\nfrequently mention His name, without any correct notion of Him, but\nmerely following some imagination, or some theory received from another\nperson, are, in my opinion, like those who remain outside the palace\nand distant from it. They do not mention the name of God in truth, nor\ndo they reflect on it. That which they imagine and mention does not\ncorrespond to any being in existence; it is a thing invented by their\nimagination, as has been shown by us in our discussion on the Divine\nAttributes (Part I. chap. 1.). The true worship of God is only possible\nwhen correct notions of Him have previously been conceived. When you\nhave arrived by way of intellectual research at a knowledge of God and\nHis works, then commence to devote yourselves to Him, try to approach\nHim and strengthen the intellect, which is the link that joins you to\nHim. Thus Scripture says, \u201cUnto thee it was showed, that thou mightest\nknow that the Lord He is God\u201d (Deut. iv. 35); \u201cKnow therefore this day,\nand consider it in thine heart, that the Lord He is God\u201d (ibid. 36);\n\u201cKnow ye that the Lord is God\u201d (Ps. c. 3). Thus the Law distinctly\nstates that the highest kind of worship to which we refer in this\nchapter, is only possible after the acquisition of the knowledge of\nGod. For it is said, \u201cTo love the Lord your God, and to serve Him with\nall your heart and with all your soul\u201d (Deut. xi. 13), and, as we have\nshown several times, man\u2019s love of God is identical with His knowledge\nof Him. The Divine service enjoined in these words must, accordingly,\nbe preceded by the love of God. Our Sages have pointed out to us that\nit is a service in the heart, which explanation I understand to mean\nthis: man concentrates all his thoughts on the First Intellect, and is\nabsorbed in these thoughts as much as possible. David therefore\ncommands his son Solomon these two things, and exhorts him earnestly to\ndo them: to acquire a true knowledge of God, and to be earnest in His\nservice after that knowledge has been acquired. For he says, \u201cAnd thou,\nSolomon my son, know thou the God of thy father, and serve him with a\nperfect heart ... if thou seek him, he will be found of thee; but if\nthou forsake him, he will cast thee off for ever\u201d (1 Chron. xxviii. 9).\nThe exhortation refers to the intellectual conceptions, not to the\nimaginations; for the latter are not called \u201cknowledge,\u201d but \u201cthat\nwhich cometh into your mind\u201d (Ezek. xx. 32). It has thus been shown\nthat it must be man\u2019s aim, after having acquired the knowledge of God,\nto deliver himself up to Him, and to have his heart constantly filled\nwith longing after Him. He accomplishes this generally by seclusion and\nretirement. Every pious man should therefore seek retirement and\nseclusion, and should only in case of necessity associate with others.\n\nNote.\u2014I have shown you that the intellect which emanates from God unto\nus is the link that joins us to God. You have it in your power to\nstrengthen that bond, if you choose to do so, or to weaken it gradually\ntill it breaks, if you prefer this. It will only become strong when you\nemploy it in the love of God, and seek that love; it will be weakened\nwhen you direct your thoughts to other things. You must know that even\nif you were the wisest man in respect to the true knowledge of God, you\nbreak the bond between you and God whenever you turn entirely your\nthoughts to the necessary food or any necessary business; you are then\nnot with God, and He is not with you; for that relation between you and\nHim is actually interrupted in those moments. The pious were therefore\nparticular to restrict the time in which they could not meditate upon\nthe name of God, and cautioned others about it, saying, \u201cLet not your\nminds be vacant from reflections upon God.\u201d In the same sense did David\nsay, \u201cI have set the Lord always before me; because he is at my right\nhand, I shall not be moved\u201d (Ps. xvi. 8); i.e., I do not turn my\nthoughts away from God; He is like my right hand, which I do not forget\neven for a moment on account of the ease of its motions, and therefore\nI shall not be moved, I shall not fall.\n\nWe must bear in mind that all such religious acts as reading the Law,\npraying, and the performance of other precepts, serve exclusively as\nthe means of causing us to occupy and fill our mind with the precepts\nof God, and free it from worldly business; for we are thus, as it were,\nin communication with God, and undisturbed by any other thing. If we,\nhowever, pray with the motion of our lips, and our face toward the\nwall, but at the same time think of our business; if we read the Law\nwith our tongue, whilst our heart is occupied with the building of our\nhouse, and we do not think of what we are reading; if we perform the\ncommandments only with our limbs, we are like those who are engaged in\ndigging in the ground, or hewing wood in the forest, without reflecting\non the nature of those acts, or by whom they are commanded, or what is\ntheir object. We must not imagine that [in this way] we attain the\nhighest perfection; on the contrary, we are then like those in\nreference to whom Scripture says, \u201cThou art near in their mouth, and\nfar from their reins\u201d (Jer. xii. 2).\n\nI will now commence to show you the way how to educate and train\nyourselves in order to attain that great perfection.\n\nThe first thing you must do is this: Turn your thoughts away from\neverything while you read Shema\u02bb or during the Tefillah, and do not\ncontent yourself with being devout when you read the first verse of\nShema, or the first paragraph of the prayer. When you have successfully\npractised this for many years, try in reading the Law or listening to\nit, to have all your heart and all your thought occupied with\nunderstanding what you read or hear. After some time when you have\nmastered this, accustom yourself to have your mind free from all other\nthoughts when you read any portion of the other books of the prophets,\nor when you say any blessing; and to have your attention directed\nexclusively to the perception and the understanding of what you utter.\nWhen you have succeeded in properly performing these acts of divine\nservice, and you have your thought, during their performance, entirely\nabstracted from worldly affairs, take then care that your thought be\nnot disturbed by thinking of your wants or of superfluous things. In\nshort, think of worldly matters when you eat, drink, bathe, talk with\nyour wife and little children, or when you converse with other people.\nThese times, which are frequent and long, I think, must suffice to you\nfor reflecting on everything that is necessary as regards business,\nhousehold, and health. But when you are engaged in the performance of\nreligious duties, have your mind exclusively directed to what you are\ndoing.\n\nWhen you are alone by yourself, when you are awake on your couch, be\ncareful to meditate in such precious moments on nothing but the\nintellectual worship of God, viz., to approach Him and to minister\nbefore Him in the true manner which I have described to you\u2014not in\nhollow emotions. This I consider as the highest perfection wise men can\nattain by the above training.\n\nWhen we have acquired a true knowledge of God, and rejoice in that\nknowledge in such a manner, that whilst speaking with others, or\nattending to our bodily wants, our mind is all that time with God; when\nwe are with our heart constantly near God, even whilst our body is in\nthe society of men; when we are in that state which the Song on the\nrelation between God and man poetically describes in the following\nwords: \u201cI sleep, but my heart waketh; it is the voice of my beloved\nknocketh\u201d (Song v. 2):\u2014then we have attained not only the height of\nordinary prophets, but of Moses, our Teacher, of whom Scripture\nrelates: \u201cAnd Moses alone shall come near before the Lord\u201d (ibid.\nxxxiv. 28); \u201cBut as for thee, stand thou here by me\u201d (Deut. v. 28). The\nmeaning of these verses has been explained by us.\n\nThe Patriarchs likewise attained this degree of perfection; they\napproached God in such a manner that with them the name of God became\nknown in the world. Thus we read in Scripture: \u201cThe God of Abraham, the\nGod of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.... This is My name for ever\u201d (Exod.\niii. 15). Their mind was so identified with the knowledge of God, that\nHe made a lasting covenant with each of them: \u201cThen will I remember my\ncovenant with Jacob,\u201d etc. (Lev. xxvi. 42). For it is known from\nstatements made in Scripture that these four, viz., the Patriarchs and\nMoses, had their minds exclusively filled with the name of God, that\nis, with His knowledge and love; and that in the same measure was\nDivine Providence attached to them and their descendants. When we\ntherefore find them also, engaged in ruling others, in increasing their\nproperty, and endeavouring to obtain possession of wealth and honour,\nwe see in this fact a proof that when they were occupied in these\nthings, only their bodily limbs were at work, whilst their heart and\nmind never moved away from the name of God. I think these four reached\nthat high degree of perfection in their relation to God, and enjoyed\nthe continual presence of Divine Providence, even in their endeavours\nto increase their property, feeding the flock, toiling in the field, or\nmanaging the house, only because in all these things their end and aim\nwas to approach God as much as possible. It was the chief aim of their\nwhole life to create a people that should know and worship God. Comp.\n\u201cFor I know him, that he will command his children and his household\nafter him\u201d (Gen. xviii. 19). The object of all their labours was to\npublish the Unity of God in the world, and to induce people to love\nHim; and it was on this account that they succeeded in reaching that\nhigh degree; for even those [worldly] affairs were for them a perfect\nworship of God. But a person like myself must not imagine that he is\nable to lead men up to this degree of perfection. It is only the next\ndegree to it that can be attained by means of the above-mentioned\ntraining. And let us pray to God and beseech Him that He clear and\nremove from our way everything that forms an obstruction and a\npartition between us and Him, although most of these obstacles are our\nown creation, as has several times been shown in this treatise. Comp.\n\u201cYour iniquities have separated between you and your God\u201d (Isa. lix.\n2).\n\nAn excellent idea presents itself here to me, which may serve to remove\nmany doubts, and may help to solve many difficult problems in\nmetaphysics. We have already stated in the chapters which treat of\nDivine Providence, that Providence watches over every rational being\naccording to the amount of intellect which that being possesses. Those\nwho are perfect in their perception of God, whose mind is never\nseparated from Him, enjoy always the influence of Providence. But those\nwho, perfect in their knowledge of God, turn their mind sometimes away\nfrom God, enjoy the presence of Divine Providence only when they\nmeditate on God; when their thoughts are engaged in other matters,\ndivine Providence departs from them. The absence of Providence in this\ncase is not like its absence in the case of those who do not reflect on\nGod at all; it is in this case less intense, because when a person\nperfect in his knowledge [of God] is busy with worldly matters, he has\nnot knowledge in actuality, but only knowledge in potentiality [though\nready to become actual]. This person is then like a trained scribe when\nhe is not writing. Those who have no knowledge of God are like those\nwho are in constant darkness and have never seen light. We have\nexplained in this sense the words: \u201cThe wicked shall be silent in\ndarkness\u201d (1 Sam. ii. 9) whilst those who possess the knowledge of God,\nand have their thoughts entirely directed to that knowledge, are, as it\nwere, always in bright sunshine; and those who have the knowledge, but\nare at times engaged in other themes, have then as it were a cloudy\nday: the sun does not shine for them on account of the cloud that\nintervenes between them and God.\n\nHence it appears to me that it is only in times of such neglect that\nsome of the ordinary evils befall a prophet or a perfect and pious man;\nand the intensity of the evil is proportional to the duration of those\nmoments, or to the character of the things that thus occupy their mind.\nSuch being the case, the great difficulty is removed that led\nphilosophers to assert that Providence does not extend to every\nindividual, and that man is like any other living being in this\nrespect, viz., the argument based on the fact that good and pious men\nare afflicted with great evils. We have thus explained this difficult\nquestion even in accordance with the philosophers\u2019 own principles.\nDivine Providence is constantly watching over those who have obtained\nthat blessing which is prepared for those who endeavour to obtain it.\nIf man frees his thoughts from worldly matters, obtains a knowledge of\nGod in the right way, and rejoices in that knowledge, it is impossible\nthat any kind of evil should befall him while he is with God, and God\nwith him. When he does not meditate on God, when he is separated from\nGod, then God is also separated from him; then he is exposed to any\nevil that might befall him; for it is only that intellectual link with\nGod that secures the presence of Providence and protection from evil\naccidents. Hence it may occur that the perfect man is at times not\nhappy, whilst no evil befalls those who are imperfect; in these cases\nwhat happens to them is due to chance. This principle I find also\nexpressed in the Law. Comp. \u201cAnd I will hide my face from them, and\nthey shall be devoured, and many evils and troubles shall befall them;\nso that they will say in that day, Are not these evils come upon us,\nbecause our God is not among us?\u201d (Deut. xxxi. 17). It is clear that we\nourselves are the cause of this hiding of the face, and that the screen\nthat separates us from God is of our own creation. This is the meaning\nof the words: \u201cAnd I will surely hide my face in that day, for all the\nevils which they shall have wrought\u201d (ibid. ver. 18). There is\nundoubtedly no difference in this regard between one single person and\na whole community. It is now clearly established that the cause of our\nbeing exposed to chance, and abandoned to destruction like cattle, is\nto be found in our separation from God. Those who have their God\ndwelling in their hearts, are not touched by any evil whatever. For God\nsays: \u201cFear thou not, for I am with thee; be not dismayed, for I am thy\nGod\u201d (Isa. xli. 10). \u201cWhen thou passest through the waters, I will be\nwith thee; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee\u201d (ibid.\nxliii. 2). For if we prepare ourselves, and attain the influence of the\nDivine Intellect, Providence is joined to us, and we are guarded\nagainst all evils. Comp. \u201cThe Lord is on my side; I will not fear; what\ncan man do unto me?\u201d (Ps. cxviii. 6). \u201cAcquaint now thyself with him,\nand be at peace\u201d (Job xxii. 21); i.e., turn unto Him, and you will be\nsafe from all evil.\n\nConsider the Psalm on mishaps, and see how the author describes that\ngreat Providence, the protection and defence from all mishaps that\nconcern the body, both from those that are common to all people, and\nthose that concern only one certain individual; from those that are due\nto the laws of Nature, and those that are caused by our fellow-men. The\nPsalmist says: \u201cSurely he will deliver thee from the snare of the\nfowler, and from the noisome pestilence. He shall cover thee with his\nfeathers, and under his wings shalt thou trust: His truth shall be thy\nshield and buckler. Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night;\nnor for the arrow that flieth by day\u201d (Ps. xci. 3\u20135). The author then\nrelates how God protects us from the troubles caused by men, saying, If\nyou happen to meet on your way with an army fighting with drawn swords,\nkilling thousands at your left hand and myriads at your right hand, you\nwill not suffer any harm; you will behold and see how God judges and\npunishes the wicked that are being slain, whilst you remain unhurt. \u201cA\nthousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousand at thy right hand;\nbut it shall not come nigh thee. Only with thine eyes shalt thou behold\nand see the reward of the wicked\u201d (ibid. vers. 7, 8). The author then\ncontinues his description of the divine defence and shelter, and shows\nthe cause of this great protection, saying that such a man is well\nguarded \u201cBecause he hath set his love upon me, therefore will I deliver\nhim: I will set him on high, because he hath known my name\u201d (ibid. ver.\n14). We have shown in previous chapters that by the \u201cknowledge of God\u2019s\nname,\u201d the knowledge of God is meant. The above passage may therefore\nbe paraphrased as follows: \u201cThis man is well guarded, because he hath\nknown me, and then (bi chashak) loved me.\u201d You know the difference\nbetween the two Hebrew terms that signify \u201cto love,\u201d ahab and \u1e25ashak.\nWhen a man\u2019s love is so intense that his thought is exclusively engaged\nwith the object of his love, it is expressed in Hebrew by the term\n\u1e25ashak.\n\nThe philosophers have already explained how the bodily forces of man in\nhis youth prevent the development of moral principles. In a greater\nmeasure this is the case as regards the purity of thought which man\nattains through the perfection of those ideas that lead him to an\nintense love of God. Man can by no means attain this so long as his\nbodily humours are hot. The more the forces of his body are weakened,\nand the fire of passion quenched, in the same measure does man\u2019s\nintellect increase in strength and light; his knowledge becomes purer,\nand he is happy with his knowledge. When this perfect man is stricken\nin age and is near death, his knowledge mightily increases, his joy in\nthat knowledge grows greater, and his love for the object of his\nknowledge more intense, and it is in this great delight that the soul\nseparates from the body. To this state our Sages referred, when in\nreference to the death of Moses, Aaron, and Miriam, they said that\ndeath was in these three cases nothing but a kiss. They say thus: We\nlearn from the words, \u201cAnd Moses the servant of the Lord died there in\nthe land of Moab by the mouth of the Lord\u201d (Deut. xxxiv. 5), that his\ndeath was a kiss. The same expression is used of Aaron: \u201cAnd Aaron the\npriest went up into Mount Hor ... by the mouth of the Lord, and died\nthere\u201d (Num. xxxiii. 38). Our Sages said that the same was the case\nwith Miriam; but the phrase \u201cby the mouth of the Lord\u201d is not employed,\nbecause it was not considered appropriate to use these words in the\ndescription of her death as she was a female. The meaning of this\nsaying is that these three died in the midst of the pleasure derived\nfrom the knowledge of God and their great love for Him. When our Sages\nfiguratively call the knowledge of God united with intense love for Him\na kiss, they follow the well-known poetical diction \u201cLet him kiss me\nwith the kisses of his mouth\u201d (Song i. 2). This kind of death, which in\ntruth is deliverance from death, has been ascribed by our Sages to none\nbut to Moses, Aaron, and Miriam. The other prophets and pious men are\nbeneath that degree; but their knowledge of God is strengthened when\ndeath approaches. Of them Scripture says, \u201cThy righteousness shall go\nbefore thee; the glory of the Lord shall be thy rereward\u201d (Isa. lviii.\n8). The intellect of these men remains then constantly in the same\ncondition, since the obstacle is removed that at times has intervened\nbetween the intellect and the object of its action; it continues for\never in that great delight, which is not like bodily pleasure. We have\nexplained this in our work, and others have explained it before us.\n\nTry to understand this chapter, endeavour with all your might to spend\nmore and more time in communion with God, or in the attempt to approach\nHim; and to reduce the hours which you spend in other occupations, and\nduring which you are not striving to come nearer unto Him. This\ninstruction suffices for the object of this treatise.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LII\n\n\nWe do not sit, move, and occupy ourselves when we are alone and at home\nin the same manner as we do in the presence of a great king; we speak\nand open our mouth as we please when we are with the people of our own\nhousehold and with our relatives, but not so when we are in a royal\nassembly. If we therefore desire to attain human perfection, and to be\ntruly men of God, we must awake from our sleep, and bear in mind that\nthe great king that is over us, and is always joined to us, is greater\nthan any earthly king, greater than David and Solomon. The king that\ncleaves to us and embraces us is the Intellect that influences us, and\nforms the link between us and God. We perceive God by means of that\nlight that He sends down unto us, wherefore the Psalmist says, \u201cIn Thy\nlight shall we see light\u201d (Ps. xxxvi. 9): so God looks down upon us\nthrough that same light, and is always with us beholding and watching\nus on account of this light. \u201cCan any hide himself in secret places\nthat I shall not see him?\u201d (Jer. xxiii. 24). Note this particularly.\n\nWhen the perfect bear this in mind, they will be filled with fear of\nGod, humility, and piety, with true, not apparent, reverence and\nrespect of God, in such a manner that their conduct, even when alone\nwith their wives or in the bath, will be as modest as they are in\npublic intercourse with other people. Thus it is related of our\nrenowned Sages that even in their sexual intercourse with their wives\nthey behaved with great modesty. They also said, \u201cWho is modest? He\nwhose conduct in the dark night is the same as in the day.\u201d You know\nalso how much they warned us not to walk proudly, since \u201cthe fulness of\nthe whole earth is His glory\u201d (Isa. vi. 3). They thought that by these\nrules the above-mentioned idea will be firmly established in the hearts\nof men, viz., that we are always before God, and it is in the presence\nof His glory that we go to and fro. The great men among our Sages would\nnot uncover their heads because they believed that God\u2019s glory was\nround them and over them; for the same reason they spoke little. In our\nCommentary on the Sayings of the Fathers (chap. i. 17) we have fully\nexplained how we have to restrict our speech. Comp. \u201cFor God is in\nheaven and thou upon earth, therefore let thy words be few\u201d (Eccles. v.\n1).\n\nWhat I have here pointed out to you is the object of all our religious\nacts. For by [carrying out] all the details of the prescribed\npractices, and repeating them continually, some few pious men may\nattain human perfection. They will be filled with respect and reverence\ntowards God; and bearing in mind who is with them, they will perform\ntheir duty. God declares in plain words that it is the object of all\nreligious acts to produce in man fear of God and obedience to His\nword\u2014the state of mind which we have demonstrated in this chapter for\nthose who desire to know the truth, as being our duty to seek. Comp.\n\u201cIf thou wilt not observe to do all the words of this law that are\nwritten in this book, that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful\nname, the Lord thy God\u201d (Deut. xxviii. 58). Consider how clearly it is\nstated here that the only object and aim of \u201call the words of this law\u201d\nis to [make man] fear \u201cthe glorious and fearful name.\u201d That this end is\nattained by certain acts we learn likewise from the phrase employed in\nthis verse: \u201cIf thou wilt not observe to do ... that thou mayest fear.\u201d\nFor this phrase clearly shows that fear of God is inculcated [into our\nhearts] when we act in accordance with the positive and the negative\nprecepts. But the truths which the Law teaches us\u2014the knowledge of\nGod\u2019s Existence and Unity\u2014create in us love of God, as we have shown\nrepeatedly. You know how frequently the Law exhorts us to love God.\nComp. \u201cAnd thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and\nwith all thy soul, and with all thy might\u201d (Deut. vi. 5). The two\nobjects, love and fear of God, are acquired by two different means. The\nlove is the result of the truths taught in the Law, including the true\nknowledge of the Existence of God; whilst fear of God is produced by\nthe practices prescribed in the Law. Note this explanation.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIII\n\n\nThis chapter treats of the meaning of three terms which we find\nnecessary to explain, viz., \u1e25esed (\u201cloving-kindness\u201d), mishpat\n(\u201cjudgment\u201d), and \u1e93edakah (\u201crighteousness\u201d).\n\nIn our Commentary on the Sayings of the Fathers (chap. v. 7) we have\nexplained the expression \u1e25esed as denoting an excess [in some moral\nquality]. It is especially used of extraordinary kindness.\nLoving-kindness is practised in two ways: first, we show kindness to\nthose who have no claim whatever upon us; secondly, we are kind to\nthose to whom it is due, in a greater measure than is due to them. In\nthe inspired writings the term \u1e25esed occurs mostly in the sense of\nshowing kindness to those who have no claim to it whatever. For this\nreason the term \u1e25esed is employed to express the good bestowed upon us\nby God: \u201cI will mention the loving-kindness of the Lord\u201d (Isa. lxiii.\n7). On this account, the very act of the creation is an act of God\u2019s\nloving-kindness. \u201cI have said, The Universe is built up in\nloving-kindness\u201d (Ps. lxxxix. 3); i.e., the building up of the Universe\nis an act of loving-kindness. Also, in the enumeration of God\u2019s\nattributes, Scripture says: \u201cAnd abundant in loving-kindness\u201d (Exod.\nxxxiv. 6).\n\nThe term \u1e93edakah is derived from \u1e93edek, \u201crighteousness\u201d; it denotes the\nact of giving every one his due, and of showing kindness to every being\naccording as it deserves. In Scripture, however, the expression \u1e93edakah\nis not used in the first sense, and does not apply to the payment of\nwhat we owe to others. When we therefore give the hired labourer his\nwages, or pay a debt, we do not perform an act of \u1e93edakah. But we do\nperform an act of \u1e93edakah when we fulfil those duties towards our\nfellow-men which our moral conscience imposes upon us; e.g., when we\nheal the wound of the sufferer. Thus Scripture says, in reference to\nthe returning of the pledge [to the poor debtor]: \u201cAnd it shall be\n\u1e93edakah (righteousness) unto thee\u201d (Deut. xxiv. 11). When we walk in\nthe way of virtue we act righteously towards our intellectual faculty,\nand pay what is due unto it; and because every virtue is thus \u1e93edakah,\nScripture applies the term to the virtue of faith in God. Comp. \u201cAnd he\nbelieved in the Lord, and he accounted it to him as righteousness\u201d\n(Gen. xv. 6); \u201cAnd it shall be our righteousness\u201d (Deut. vi. 25).\n\nThe noun mishpat, \u201cjudgment,\u201d denotes the act of deciding upon a\ncertain action in accordance with justice which may demand either mercy\nor punishment.\n\nWe have thus shown that \u1e25esed denotes pure charity; \u1e93edakah kindness,\nprompted by a certain moral conscience in man, and being a means of\nattaining perfection for his soul, whilst mishpat may in some cases\nfind expression in revenge, in other cases in mercy.\n\nIn discussing the impropriety of admitting attributes of God (Part I.,\nchap. liii., seq.), we stated that the divine attributes which occur in\nScripture are attributes of His actions; thus He is called \u1e25asid,\n\u201ckind,\u201d because He created the Universe; \u1e93addik, \u201crighteous,\u201d on\naccount of His mercy with the weak, in providing for every living being\naccording to its powers; and shofet, \u201cjudge,\u201d on account of the\nrelative good and the great relative evils that are decreed by God\u2019s\njustice as directed by His wisdom. These three names occur in the\nPentateuch: \u201cShall not the Judge (shofet) of all the earth,\u201d etc. (Gen.\nxviii. 25); \u201cRighteous (\u1e93addik) and upright is he\u201d (Deut. xxxii. 4);\n\u201cAbundant in loving-kindness\u201d (\u1e25esed, Exod. xxxiv. 6).\n\nWe intended in explaining these three terms to prepare the reader for\nthe next chapter.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIV\n\n\nThe term \u1e25okmah (\u201cwisdom\u201d) in Hebrew is used of four different things:\n(1) It denotes the knowledge of those truths which lead to the\nknowledge of God. Comp. \u201cBut where shall wisdom be found?\u201d (Job xxviii.\n12); \u201cIf thou seekest her like silver\u201d (Prov. ii. 4). The word occurs\nfrequently in this sense. (2) The expression \u1e25okmah denotes also\nknowledge of any workmanship. Comp. \u201cAnd every wise-hearted among you\nshall come and make all that the Lord hath commanded\u201d (Exod. xxxv. 10);\n\u201cAnd all the women that were wise-hearted did spin\u201d (ibid. ver. 25).\n(3) It is also used of the acquisition of moral principles. Comp. \u201cAnd\nteach his senators wisdom\u201d (Ps. cv. 22); \u201cWith the ancient is wisdom\u201d\n(Job xii. 12): for it is chiefly the disposition for acquiring moral\nprinciples that is developed by old age alone. (4) It implies, lastly,\nthe notion of cunning and subtlety; comp. \u201cCome on, let us deal wisely\nwith them\u201d (Exod. i. 10). In the same sense the term is used in the\nfollowing passages: \u201cAnd fetched thence a wise woman\u201d (2 Sam. xiv. 2);\n\u201cThey are wise to do evil\u201d (Jer. iv. 22). It is possible that the\nHebrew \u1e25okmah (\u201cwisdom\u201d) expresses the idea of cunning and planning,\nwhich may serve in one case as a means of acquiring intellectual\nperfection, or good moral principles; but may in another case produce\nskill in workmanship, or even be employed in establishing bad opinions\nand principles. The attribute \u1e25akam (\u201cwise\u201d) is therefore given to a\nperson that possesses great intellectual faculties, or good moral\nprinciples, or skill in art; but also to persons cunning in evil deeds\nand principles.\n\nAccording to this explanation, a person that has a true knowledge of\nthe whole Law is called wise in a double sense; he is wise because the\nLaw instructs him in the highest truths, and secondly, because it\nteaches him good morals. But as the truths contained in the Law are\ntaught by way of tradition, not by a philosophical method, the\nknowledge of the Law, and the acquisition of true wisdom, are treated\nin the books of the Prophets and in the words of our Sages as two\ndifferent things; real wisdom demonstrates by proof those truths which\nScripture teaches us by way of tradition. It is to this kind of wisdom,\nwhich proves the truth of the Law, that Scripture refers when it extols\nwisdom, and speaks of the high value of this perfection, and of the\nconsequent paucity of men capable of acquiring it, in sayings like\nthese: \u201cNot many are wise\u201d (Job xxxii. 9); \u201cBut where shall wisdom be\nfound\u201d (ibid. xxviii. 12)? In the writings of our Sages we notice\nlikewise many passages in which distinction is made between knowledge\nof the Law and wisdom. They say of Moses, our Teacher, that he was\nFather in the knowledge of the Law, in wisdom and in prophecy. When\nScripture says of Solomon, \u201cAnd he was wiser than all men\u201d (1 Kings v.\n11), our Sages add, \u201cbut not greater than Moses\u201d; and the phrase, \u201cthan\nall men,\u201d is explained to mean, \u201cthan all men of his generation\u201d; for\nthis reason [only] \u201cHeman, Chalcol, and Darda, the sons of Mahol,\u201d the\nrenowned wise men of that time, are named. Our Sages further say, that\nman has first to render account concerning his knowledge of the Law,\nthen concerning the acquisition of wisdom, and at last concerning the\nlessons derived by logical conclusions from the Law, i.e., the lessons\nconcerning his actions. This is also the right order: we must first\nlearn the truths by tradition, after this we must be taught how to\nprove them, and then investigate the actions that help to improve man\u2019s\nways. The idea that man will have to render account concerning these\nthree things in the order described, is expressed by our Sages in the\nfollowing passage: \u201cWhen man comes to the trial, he is first asked,\n\u2018Hast thou fixed certain seasons for the study of the Law? Hast thou\nbeen engaged in the acquisition of wisdom? Hast thou derived from one\nthing another thing?\u2019\u201d This proves that our Sages distinguished between\nthe knowledge of the Law on the one hand, and wisdom on the other, as\nthe means of proving the lessons taught in the Law by correct\nreasoning.\n\nHear now what I have to say after having given the above explanation.\nThe ancient and the modern philosophers have shown that man can acquire\nfour kinds of perfection. The first kind, the lowest, in the\nacquisition of which people spend their days, is perfection as regards\nproperty; the possession of money, garments, furniture, servants, land,\nand the like; the possession of the title of a great king belongs to\nthis class. There is no close connexion between this possession and its\npossessor; it is a perfectly imaginary relation when on account of the\ngreat advantage a person derives from these possessions, he says, This\nis my house, this is my servant, this is my money, and these are my\nhosts and armies. For when he examines himself he will find that all\nthese things are external, and their qualities are entirely independent\nof the possessor. When, therefore, that relation ceases, he that has\nbeen a great king may one morning find that there is no difference\nbetween him and the lowest person, and yet no change has taken place in\nthe things which were ascribed to him. The philosophers have shown that\nhe whose sole aim in all his exertions and endeavours is the possession\nof this kind of perfection, only seeks perfectly imaginary and\ntransient things; and even if these remain his property all his\nlifetime, they do not give him any perfection.\n\nThe second kind is more closely related to man\u2019s body than the first.\nIt includes the perfection of the shape, constitution, and form of\nman\u2019s body; the utmost evenness of temperaments, and the proper order\nand strength of his limbs. This kind of perfection must likewise be\nexcluded from forming our chief aim; because it is a perfection of the\nbody, and man does not possess it as man, but as a living being; he has\nthis property besides in common with the lowest animal; and even if a\nperson possesses the greatest possible strength, he could not be as\nstrong as a mule, much less can he be as strong as a lion or an\nelephant; he, therefore, can at the utmost have strength that might\nenable him to carry a heavy burden, or break a thick substance, or do\nsimilar things, in which there is no great profit for the body. The\nsoul derives no profit whatever from this kind of perfection.\n\nThe third kind of perfection is more closely connected with man himself\nthan the second perfection. It includes moral perfection, the highest\ndegree of excellency in man\u2019s character. Most of the precepts aim at\nproducing this perfection; but even this kind is only a preparation for\nanother perfection, and is not sought for its own sake. For all moral\nprinciples concern the relation of man to his neighbour; the perfection\nof man\u2019s moral principles is, as it were, given to man for the benefit\nof mankind. Imagine a person being alone, and having no connexion\nwhatever with any other person, all his good moral principles are at\nrest, they are not required, and give man no perfection whatever. These\nprinciples are only necessary and useful when man comes in contact with\nothers.\n\nThe fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man; the\npossession of the highest intellectual faculties; the possession of\nsuch notions which lead to true metaphysical opinions as regards God.\nWith this perfection man has obtained his final object; it gives him\ntrue human perfection; it remains to him alone; it gives him\nimmortality, and on its account he is called man. Examine the first\nthree lands of perfection, you will find that, if you possess them,\nthey are not your property, but the property of others; according to\nthe ordinary view, however, they belong to you and to others. But the\nlast kind of perfection is exclusively yours; no one else owns any part\nof it, \u201cThey shall be only thine own, and not strangers\u2019 with thee\u201d\n(Prov. v. 17). Your aim must therefore be to attain this [fourth]\nperfection that is exclusively yours, and you ought not to continue to\nwork and weary yourself for that which belongs to others, whilst\nneglecting your soul till it has lost entirely its original purity\nthrough the dominion of the bodily powers over it. The same idea is\nexpressed in the beginning of those poems, which allegorically\nrepresent the state of our soul. \u201cMy mother\u2019s children were angry with\nme; they made me the keeper of the vineyards; but mine own vineyard\nhave I not kept\u201d (Song i. 6). Also the following passage refers to the\nsame subject, \u201cLest thou give thine honour unto others, and thy years\nunto the cruel\u201d (Prov. v. 9).\n\nThe prophets have likewise explained unto us these things, and have\nexpressed the same opinion on them as the philosophers. They say\ndistinctly that perfection in property, in health, or in character, is\nnot a perfection worthy to be sought as a cause of pride and glory for\nus; that the knowledge of God, i.e., true wisdom, is the only\nperfection which we should seek, and in which we should glorify\nourselves. Jeremiah, referring to these four kinds of perfection, says:\n\u201cThus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither\nlet the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in\nhis riches; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he\nunderstandeth and knoweth me\u201d (Jer. ix. 22, 23). See how the prophet\narranged them according to their estimation in the eyes of the\nmultitude. The rich man occupies the first rank; next is the mighty\nman; and then the wise man; that is, the man of good moral principles:\nfor in the eyes of the multitude, who are addressed in these words, he\nis likewise a great man. This is the reason why the three classes are\nenumerated in this order.\n\nOur Sages have likewise derived from this passage the above-mentioned\nlessons, and stated the same theory that has been explained in this\nchapter, viz., that the simple term \u1e25okmah, as a rule, denotes the\nhighest aim of man, the knowledge of God; that those properties which\nman acquires, makes his peculiar treasure, and considers as his\nperfection, in reality do not include any perfection; and that the\nreligious acts prescribed in the Law, viz., the various kinds of\nworship and the moral principles which benefit all people in their\nsocial intercourse with each other, do not constitute the ultimate aim\nof man, nor can they be compared to it, for they are but preparations\nleading to it. Hear the opinion of our Sages on this subject in their\nown words. The passage occurs in Bereshit Rabba, and runs thus, \u201cIn one\nplace Scripture says, \u2018And all things that are desirable (\u1e25afa\u1e93im) are\nnot to be compared to her\u2019 (Prov. viii. 11); and in another place, \u2018And\nall things that thou desirest (\u1e25afa\u1e93e\u1e25a) are not to be compared unto\nher\u2019\u201d (ibid. iii. 15). By \u201cthings that are desirable\u201d the performance\nof Divine precepts and good deeds is to be understood, whilst \u201cthings\nthat thou desirest\u201d refer to precious stones and pearls. Both\u2014things\nthat are desirable, and things that thou desirest\u2014cannot be compared to\nwisdom, but \u201cin this let him that glorieth glory, that he understandeth\nand knoweth me.\u201d Consider how concise this saying is, and how perfect\nits author; how nothing is here omitted of all that we have put forth\nafter lengthy explanations and preliminary remarks.\n\nHaving stated the sublime ideas contained in that Scriptural passage,\nand quoted the explanation of our Sages, we will now complete what the\nremainder of that passage teaches us. The prophet does not content\nhimself with explaining that the knowledge of God is the highest kind\nof perfection; for if this only had been his intention, he would have\nsaid, \u201cBut in this let him who glorieth glory, that he understandeth\nand knoweth me,\u201d and would have stopped there; or he would have said,\n\u201cthat he understandeth and knoweth me that I am One,\u201d or, \u201cthat I have\nnot any likeness,\u201d or, \u201cthat there is none like me,\u201d or a similar\nphrase. He says, however, that man can only glory in the knowledge of\nGod and in the knowledge of His ways and attributes, which are His\nactions, as we have shown (Part I. liv.) in expounding the passage,\n\u201cShow me now thy ways\u201d (Exod. xxxviii. 13). We are thus told in this\npassage that the Divine acts which ought to be known, and ought to\nserve as a guide for our actions, are, \u1e25esed, \u201cloving-kindness,\u201d\nmishpat, \u201cjudgment,\u201d and \u1e93edakah, \u201crighteousness.\u201d Another very\nimportant lesson is taught by the additional phrase, \u201cin the earth.\u201d It\nimplies a fundamental principle of the Law; it rejects the theory of\nthose who boldly assert that God\u2019s providence does not extend below the\nsphere of the moon, and that the earth with its contents is abandoned,\nthat \u201cthe Lord hath forsaken the earth\u201d (Ez. viii. 12). It teaches, as\nhas been taught by the greatest of all wise men in the words, \u201cThe\nearth is the Lord\u2019s\u201d (Exod. ix. 29), that His providence extends to the\nearth in accordance with its nature, in the same manner as it controls\nthe heavens in accordance with their nature. This is expressed in the\nwords, \u201cThat I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment,\nand righteousness in the earth.\u201d The prophet thus, in conclusion, says,\n\u201cFor in these things I delight, saith the Lord,\u201d i.e., My object [in\nsaying this] is that you shall practise loving-kindness, judgment, and\nrighteousness in the earth. In a similar manner we have shown (Part I.\nliv.) that the object of the enumeration of God\u2019s thirteen attributes\nis the lesson that we should acquire similar attributes and act\naccordingly. The object of the above passage is therefore to declare,\nthat the perfection, in which man can truly glory, is attained by him\nwhen he has acquired\u2014as far as this is possible for man\u2014the knowledge\nof God, the knowledge of His Providence, and of the manner in which it\ninfluences His creatures in their production and continued existence.\nHaving acquired this knowledge he will then be determined always to\nseek loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, and thus to imitate\nthe ways of God. We have explained this many times in this treatise.\n\nThis is all that I thought proper to discuss in this treatise, and\nwhich I considered useful for men like you. I hope that, by the help of\nGod, you will, after due reflection, comprehend all the things which I\nhave treated here. May He grant us and all Israel with us to attain\nwhat He promised us, \u201cThen the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and\nthe ears of the deaf shall be unstopped\u201d (Isa. xxxv. 5); \u201cThe people\nthat walked in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the\nshadow of death upon them hath the light shined\u201d (ibid. ix. 1).\n\nGod is near to all who call Him, if they call Him in truth, and turn to\nHim. He is found by every one who seeks Him, if he always goes toward\nHim, and never goes astray. Amen.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\n[1] See infra, page 4, note 1.\n\n[2] See infra, page 5, note 4.\n\n[3] Saadiah proves the existence of the Creator in the following\nway:\u20141. The Universe is limited, and therefore cannot possess an\nunlimited force. 2. All things are compounds; the composition must be\nowing to some external cause. 3. Changes observed in all beings are\neffected by some external cause. 4. If time were infinite, it would be\nimpossible to conceive the progress of time from the present moment to\nthe future, or from the past to the present moment. (Emunot vede\u02bbot,\nch. i.).\u2014Ba\u1e25ya founds his arguments on three propositions:\u20141. A thing\ncannot be its own maker. 2. The series of successive causes is finite.\n3. Compounds owe their existence to an external force. His arguments\nare:\u20141. The Universe, even the elements, are compounds consisting of\nsubstance and form. 2. In the Universe plan and unity is discernible.\n(\u1e24obot ha-lebabot, ch. i.)","title":"The guide for the perplexed","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":271146}