{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_7370/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_7370","id":"gutenberg_7370","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Liberty -- Early works to 1800","Philosophy","Political science -- Early works to 1800","Politics","Toleration -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT\n\n                             by JOHN LOCKE\n\nDigitized by Dave Gowan. John Locke\u2019s \u201cSecond Treatise of Government\u201d\nwas published in 1690. The complete unabridged text has been republished\nseveral times in edited commentaries. This text is recovered entire from\nthe paperback book, \u201cJohn Locke Second Treatise of Government\u201d, Edited,\nwith an Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company,\nIndianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition is\nincluded in the Etext below; only the original words contained in the\n1690 Locke text is included. The 1690 edition text is free of copyright.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nTWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT\n\n\nBY IOHN LOCKE\n\n\nSALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO\n\nLONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIII\n\nREPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A. MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1. WHISTON AND B.\nWHITE, 1. RIVINGTON, L. DAVIS AND C. REYMERS, R. BALDWIN, HAWES CLARKE\nAND COLLINS; W. IOHNSTON, W. OWEN, 1. RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T.\nLONGMAN, B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E. DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S.\nBAKER, T. PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN\n\nMDCCLXIII\n\nTWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND\nFOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND\nOVERTHROWN. THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT\nAND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.\n\n\n1764 EDITOR\u2019S NOTE The present Edition of this Book has not only been\ncollated with the first three Editions, which were published during the\nAuthor\u2019s Life, but also has the Advantage of his last Corrections and\nImprovements, from a Copy delivered by him to Mr. Peter Coste,\ncommunicated to the Editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nReader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning\ngovernment; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should\nhave filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not\nworth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to\nestablish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to\nmake good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only\none of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any\nprince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of\nEngland, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their\nresolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very\nbrink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flatter\nmyself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those\nwhich are lost, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for I\nimagine, I shall have neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my\npains, and fill up the wanting part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert\nagain, through all the windings and obscurities, which are to be met\nwith in the several branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body\nof the nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his Hypothesis, that I\nsuppose no body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear\nagainst our common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the\nweakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular\nstile, and well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains,\nhimself, in those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert\u2019s\ndiscourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to\nreduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and\nthen compare them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied, there\nwas never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English.\nIf he think it not worth while to examine his works all thro\u2019, let him\nmake an experiment in that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let\nhim try, whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert\nintelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should not\nspeak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the\npulpit, of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the\ncurrent divinity of the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on\nthem to be teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly\nshewed of what authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so\nblindly followed, that so they may either retract what upon so ill\ngrounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; or else justify\nthose principles which they preached up for gospel; though they had no\nbetter an author than an English courtier: for I should not have writ\nagainst Sir Robert, or taken the pains to shew his mistakes,\ninconsistencies, and want of (what he so much boasts of, and pretends\nwholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were there not men amongst us,\nwho, by crying up his books, and espousing his doctrine, save me from\nthe reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been so\nzealous in this point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope\nthey should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the\npublic wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just\nweight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greater\nmischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions\nconcerning government; that so at last all times might not have reason\nto complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic. If any one, concerned really for\ntruth, undertake the confutation of my Hypothesis, I promise him either\nto recant my mistake, upon fair conviction; or to answer his\ndifficulties. But he must remember two things.\n\nFirst, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little\nincident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book.\n\nSecondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either\nof these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound\nto give satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be conscientiously\nscrupulous in the point, and shall shew any just grounds for his\nscruples.\n\nI have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations\nstands for Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation\nof pages always means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680.\n\n\n\n\nBook II\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. I.\n\nAN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL\nGOVERNMENT\n\n\nSect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,\n\n(<i>1</i>). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by\npositive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or\ndominion over the world, as is pretended:\n\n(<i>2</i>). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:\n\n(<i>3</i>). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive\nlaw of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may\narise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could\nnot have been certainly determined:\n\n(<i>4</i>). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which\nis the eldest line of Adam\u2019s posterity, being so long since utterly\nlost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there\nremains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest\nhouse, and to have the right of inheritance:\n\nAll these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is\nimpossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or\nderive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be\nthe fountain of all power, Adam\u2019s private dominion and paternal\njurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that\nall government in the world is the product only of force and violence,\nand that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where\nthe strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder\nand mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers\nof that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out\nanother rise of government, another original of political power, and\nanother way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what\nSir Robert Filmer hath taught us.\n\nSect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what\nI take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a\nsubject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a\nMASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his\nslave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the\nsame man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may\nhelp us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a\nfamily, and a captain of a galley.\n\nSect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with\npenalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the\nregulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the\ncommunity, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the\ncommonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public\ngood.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. II.\n\nOF THE STATE OF NATURE.\n\n\nSect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its\noriginal, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and\nthat is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose\nof their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds\nof the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will\nof any other man.\n\nA state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is\nreciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more\nevident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously\nborn to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same\nfaculties, should also be equal one amongst another without\nsubordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all\nshould, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another,\nand confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted\nright to dominion and sovereignty.\n\nSect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon\nas so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the\nfoundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he\nbuilds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the\ngreat maxims of justice and charity. His words are,\n\n/#\n     The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no\n     less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those\n     things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I\n     cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man\u2019s hands,\n     as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have\n     any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to\n     satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being\n     of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them\n     repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as\n     much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there\n     being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to\n     me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to\n     be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be,\n     imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the\n     like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves\n     and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons\n     natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is\n     ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.\n\n\n#/\n\nSect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of\nlicence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to\ndispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy\nhimself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some\nnobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature\nhas a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason,\nwhich is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that\nbeing all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his\nlife, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship\nof one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one\nsovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his\nbusiness; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to\nlast during his, not one another\u2019s pleasure: and being furnished with\nlike faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be\nsupposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to\ndestroy one another, as if we were made for one another\u2019s uses, as the\ninferior ranks of creatures are for our\u2019s. Every one, as he is bound to\npreserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like\nreason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as\nmuch as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it\nbe to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what\ntends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or\ngoods of another.\n\nSect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights,\nand from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed,\nwhich willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution\nof the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man\u2019s hands,\nwhereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to\nsuch a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would,\nas all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there\nwere no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that\nlaw, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if\nany one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has\ndone, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where\nnaturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another,\nwhat any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a\nright to do.\n\nSect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over\nanother; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when\nhe has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or\nboundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so\nfar as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his\ntransgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and\nrestraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully\ndo harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing\nthe law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule\nthan that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set\nto the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes\ndangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and\nviolence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass\nagainst the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for\nby the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to\npreserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary,\ndestroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one,\nwho hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it,\nand thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like\nmischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT\nTO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.\n\nSect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some\nmen: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what\nright any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any\ncrime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue\nof any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the\nlegislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they\ndid, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which\nthey are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power\nover him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England,\nFrance or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men\nwithout authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath\nnot a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case\nto require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an\nalien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no\nmore power than what every man naturally may have over another.\n\nSect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and\nvarying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes\ndegenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature,\nand to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some\nperson or other, and some other man receives damage by his\ntransgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has,\nbesides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a\nparticular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any\nother person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured,\nand assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make\nsatisfaction for the harm he has suffered.\n\nSect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime\nfor restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing\nis in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to\nthe injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being\nmagistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can\noften, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit\nthe punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot\nremit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has\nreceived. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in\nhis own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this\npower of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender,\nby right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the\ncrime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of\npreserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order\nto that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has\na power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like\ninjury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the\npunishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from\nthe attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule\nand measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and\nslaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind,\nand therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild\nsavage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon\nthis is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man\u2019s blood,\nby man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that\nevery one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder\nof his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me;\nso plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.\n\nSect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the\nlesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I\nanswer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so\nmuch severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the\noffender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the\nlike. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may\nin the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it\nmay, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present\npurpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its\nmeasures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that\ntoo, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of\nthat law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer;\nas much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and\nintricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests\nput into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of\ncountries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law\nof nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.\n\nSect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature\nevery one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but\nit will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in\ntheir own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and\ntheir friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and\nrevenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing\nbut confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath\ncertainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence\nof men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for\nthe inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be\ngreat, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be\nimagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will\nscarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those\nwho make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but\nmen; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which\nnecessarily follow from men\u2019s being judges in their own cases, and the\nstate of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what\nkind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state\nof nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be\njudge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he\npleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul\nthose who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led\nby reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is\nin the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the\nunjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own,\nor any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.\n\nSect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever\nwere there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as\nan answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent\ngovernments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain\nthe world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that\nstate. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether\nthey are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact\nthat puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one\nof agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one\nbody politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with\nanother, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and\nbargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island,\nmentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a\nSwiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them,\nthough they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one\nanother: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not\nas members of society.\n\nSect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of\nnature, I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker,\nEccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says,\n\n/#\n     The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of\n     nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they\n     have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement\n     amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we\n     are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent\n     store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth desire,\n     a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those\n     defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and\n     solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and\n     fellowship with others: this was the cause of men\u2019s uniting\n     themselves at first in politic societies.\n\n\n#/\n\nBut I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and\nremain so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of\nsome politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse,\nto make it very clear.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. III.\n\nOF THE STATE OF WAR.\n\n\nSect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and\ntherefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a\nsedate settled design upon another man\u2019s life, puts him in a state of\nwar with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has\nexposed his life to the other\u2019s power to be taken away by him, or any\none that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it\nbeing reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which\nthreatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature,\nman being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be\npreserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may\ndestroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his\nbeing, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because\nsuch men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no\nother rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as\nbeasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure\nto destroy him whenever he falls into their power.\n\nSect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into\nhis absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with\nhim; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his\nlife: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his\npower without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me\nthere, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can\ndesire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by\nforce to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a\nslave. To be free from such force is the only security of my\npreservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my\npreservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it;\nso that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into\na state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away\nthe freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be\nsupposed to have a design to take away every thing else, that freedom\nbeing the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of\nsociety, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society\nor commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every\nthing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.\n\nSect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in\nthe least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther\nthan, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away\nhis money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he\nhas no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it\nwill, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my\nliberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing\nelse. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put\nhimself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that\nhazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war,\nand is aggressor in it.\n\nSect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of\nnature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are\nas far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and\npreservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual\ndestruction, are one from another. Men living together according to\nreason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge\nbetween them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared\ndesign of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common\nsuperior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it\nis the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against\nan aggressor, tho\u2019 he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief,\nwhom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that\nI am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or\ncoat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it\ncannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost,\nis capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of\nwar, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not\ntime to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for\nremedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common\njudge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without\nright, upon a man\u2019s person, makes a state of war, both where there is,\nand is not, a common judge.\n\nSect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases\nbetween those that are in society, and are equally on both sides\nsubjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies\nopen the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future\nharm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want\nof positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of\nwar once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy\nthe other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and desires\nreconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already\ndone, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to\nthe law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by\na manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws\nto protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party\nof men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for\nwherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to\nadminister justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured\nwith the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to\nprotect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to\nall who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made\nupon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they\nare left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.\n\nSect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to\nheaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where\nthere is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great\nreason of men\u2019s putting themselves into society, and quitting the state\nof nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which\nrelief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war\nis excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there\nbeen any such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine\nthe right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a\nstate of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the\nJudge (says he) be judge this day between the children of Israel and the\nchildren of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying on\nhis appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such\ncontroversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? It cannot\nbe meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha\nhere tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no\njudge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then\ncannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a\nstate of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to\nheaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience,\nas I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. IV.\n\nOF SLAVERY.\n\n\nSect. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior\npower on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of\nman, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of\nman, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that\nestablished, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of\nany will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall\nenact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir\nRobert Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to\ndo what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws:\nbut freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live\nby, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative\npower erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things,\nwhere the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant,\nuncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature\nis, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.\n\nSect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary\nto, and closely joined with a man\u2019s preservation, that he cannot part\nwith it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a\nman, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his\nown consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the\nabsolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he\npleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that\ncannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it.\nIndeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that\ndeserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in\nhis power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and\nhe does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his\nslavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting\nthe will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.\n\nSect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing\nelse, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a\ncaptive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement\nfor a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the\nstate of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as\nhas been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which\nhe hath not in himself, a power over his own life.\n\nI confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men\ndid sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to\nslavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute,\narbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill\nhim, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free\nout of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from\nhaving an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure,\nso much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free,\nExod. xxi.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. V.\n\nOF PROPERTY.\n\n\nSect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men,\nbeing once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to\nmeat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their\nsubsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants\nGod made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very\nclear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth\nto the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being\nsupposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should\never come to have a property in any thing: I will not content myself to\nanswer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a supposition\nthat God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is\nimpossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any\nproperty upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his\nheirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I\nshall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in\nseveral parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that\nwithout any express compact of all the commoners.\n\nSect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also\ngiven them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and\nconvenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the\nsupport and comfort of their being. And tho\u2019 all the fruits it naturally\nproduces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are\nproduced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a\nprivate dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as\nthey are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of\nmen, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or\nother, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any\nparticular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian,\nwho knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his,\nand so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any\nright to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.\n\nSect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all\nmen, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has\nany right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his\nhands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of\nthe state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his\nlabour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby\nmakes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state\nnature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to\nit, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being\nthe unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a\nright to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough,\nand as good, left in common for others.\n\nSect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak,\nor the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly\nappropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is\nhis. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or\nwhen he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he\npicked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not\nhis, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and\ncommon: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother\nof all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one\nsay, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated,\nbecause he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a\nrobbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If\nsuch a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding\nthe plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by\ncompact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing\nit out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property;\nwithout which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that\npart, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus\nthe grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I\nhave digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with\nothers, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any\nbody. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state\nthey were in, hath fixed my property in them.\n\nSect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to\nany one\u2019s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common,\nchildren or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or\nmaster had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one\nhis peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every\none\u2019s, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew\nit out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it\nwas common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby\nappropriated it to himself.\n\nSect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian\u2019s who hath\nkilled it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour\nupon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst\nthose who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and\nmultiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of\nnature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still\ntakes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the\nocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what\nambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out\nof that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes\nthat pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is\nhunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a\nbeast that is still looked upon as common, and no man\u2019s private\npossession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind,\nas to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of\nnature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.\n\nSect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the\nacorns, or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then\nany one may ingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The\nsame law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also\nbound that property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi.\n12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he\ngiven it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any\nadvantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a\nproperty in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and\nbelongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.\nAnd thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long\ntime in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that\nprovision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to\nthe prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by\nreason, of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room\nfor quarrels or contentions about property so established.\n\nSect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of\nthe earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as\nthat which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is\nplain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land\nas a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product\nof, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose\nit from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body\nelse has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he\ncannot inclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, all\nmankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded\nman also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him.\nGod and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it\nfor the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was\nhis own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God,\nsubdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it\nsomething that was his property, which another had no title to, nor\ncould without injury take from him.\n\nSect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving\nit, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as\ngood left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in\neffect, there was never the less left for others because of his\nenclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make\nuse of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself\ninjured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught,\nwho had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst:\nand the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is\nperfectly the same.\n\nSect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them\nfor their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were\ncapable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always\nremain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious\nand rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy\nor covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good\nleft for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain,\nought not to meddle with what was already improved by another\u2019s labour:\nif he did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another\u2019s pains, which\nhe had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common\nwith others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that\nalready possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his\nindustry could reach to.\n\nSect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other\ncountry, where there is plenty of people under government, who have\nmoney and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without\nthe consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by\ncompact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And\nthough it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all\nmankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this parish.\nBesides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to\nthe rest of the commoners, as the whole was when they could all make use\nof the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great\ncommon of the world, it was quite otherwise. The law man was under, was\nrather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to\nlabour. That was his property which could not be taken from him\nwhere-ever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth,\nand having dominion, we see are joined together. The one gave title to\nthe other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far\nto appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour\nand materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions.\n\nSect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of\nmen\u2019s labour and the conveniencies of life: no man\u2019s labour could\nsubdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a\nsmall part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench\nupon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the\nprejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good, and\nas large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it\nwas appropriated. This measure did confine every man\u2019s possession to a\nvery moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself,\nwithout injury to any body, in the first ages of the world, when men\nwere more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the\nthen vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of\nroom to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed still without\nprejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing a man,\nor family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the\nchildren of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places\nof America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself,\nupon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to\nthis day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to\ncomplain, or think themselves injured by this man\u2019s incroachment, though\nthe race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the\nworld, and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning.\nNay, the extent of ground is of so little value, without labour, that I\nhave heard it affirmed, that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to\nplough, sow and reap, without being disturbed, upon land he has no other\ntitle to, but only his making use of it. But, on the contrary, the\ninhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on\nneglected, and consequently waste land, has increased the stock of corn,\nwhich they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on;\nthis I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that\nevery man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still\nin the world, without straitening any body; since there is land enough\nin the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of\nmoney, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced\n(by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has\ndone, I shall by and by shew more at large.\n\nSect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of\nhaving more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things,\nwhich depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had\nagreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without\nwasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole\nheap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour,\neach one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use:\nyet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the\nsame plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry. To\nwhich let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his\nlabour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for\nthe provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one\nacre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass)\nten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an\nequal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses\nland, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten\nacres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be\nsaid to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him\nwith provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an\nhundred lying in common. I have here rated the improved land very low,\nin making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an\nhundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated\nwaste of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or\nhusbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as\nmany conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in\nDevonshire, where they are well cultivated?\n\nBefore the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild\nfruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he\nthat so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of\nnature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them\nin, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a\npropriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without\ntheir due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he\ncould spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was\nliable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour\u2019s share, for he had no\nright, farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve\nto afford him conveniencies of life.\n\nSect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too:\nwhatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it\nspoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could\nfeed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if\neither the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of\nhis planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the\nearth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as\nwaste, and might be the possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning,\nCain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own\nland, and yet leave enough to Abel\u2019s sheep to feed on; a few acres would\nserve for both their possessions. But as families increased, and\nindustry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need\nof them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the\nground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves\ntogether, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to\nset out the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits\nbetween them and their neighbours; and by laws within themselves,\nsettled the properties of those of the same society: for we see, that in\nthat part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to\nbe best peopled, even as low down as Abraham\u2019s time, they wandered with\ntheir flocks, and their herds, which was their substance, freely up and\ndown; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a stranger. Whence\nit is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that\nthe inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than\nthey made use of. But when there was not room enough in the same place,\nfor their herds to feed together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot\ndid, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and inlarged their pasture, where it best\nliked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his father, and his\nbrother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.\n\nSect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property\nin Adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no\nway be proved, nor any one\u2019s property be made out from it; but supposing\nthe world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how\nlabour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for\ntheir private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room\nfor quarrel.\n\nSect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may\nappear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the\ncommunity of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of\nvalue on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is\nbetween an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat\nor barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any\nhusbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour\nmakes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very\nmodest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to\nthe life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if we will\nrightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several\nexpences about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to\nlabour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are\nwholly to be put on the account of labour.\n\nSect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than\nseveral nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and\npoor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as\nliberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a\nfruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food,\nraiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not\none hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large\nand fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a\nday-labourer in England.\n\nSect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the\nordinary provisions of life, through their several progresses, before\nthey come to our use, and see how much they receive of their value from\nhuman industry. Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and\ngreat plenty; yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins,\nmust be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us with\nthese more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than\nacorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss,\nthat is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being the\nfood and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other,\nprovisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much\nthey exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then\nsee how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things\nwe enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is\nscarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of\nit; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature,\nthat hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called,\nas indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to\nlittle more than nothing.\n\nThis shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of\ndominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing of\nthem, is the great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so\nwise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection\nand encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the\noppression of power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard\nfor his neighbours: but this by the by.\n\nTo return to the argument in hand.\n\nSect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and\nanother in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like,\nare, without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the\nbenefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from\nthe other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian\nreceived from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly\nsay, not one thousandth. It is labour then which puts the greatest part\nof value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing:\nit is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products; for\nall that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth\nthan the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all\nthe effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man\u2019s pains, the\nreaper\u2019s and thresher\u2019s toil, and the baker\u2019s sweat, is to be counted\ninto the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who\ndigged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber\nemployed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are\na vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to\nits being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and\nreceived as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the\nalmost worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange\ncatalogue of things, that industry provided and made use of, about every\nloaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron,\nwood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying\ndrugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in\nthe ship, that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the\nworkmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almost\nimpossible, at least too long, to reckon up.\n\nSect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature\nare given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor\nof his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself\nthe great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part\nof what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when\ninvention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly\nhis own, and did not belong in common to others.\n\nSect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property,\nwherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which\nremained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind\nmakes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves\nwith what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though\nafterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people\nand stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some\nvalue) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct\nterritories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of\nthe private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement,\nsettled the property which labour and industry began; and the leagues\nthat have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expresly\nor tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others\npossession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their\nnatural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and\nso have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves,\nin distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still great\ntracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having\njoined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their\ncommon money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it\ndo, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho\u2019 this can scarce\nhappen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of\nmoney.\n\nSect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man,\nand such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the\nworld look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of\nshort duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and\nperish of themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy\nor agreement hath put the value on, more than real use, and the\nnecessary support of life. Now of those good things which nature hath\nprovided in common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much\nas he could use, and property in all that he could effect with his\nlabour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state\nnature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of\nacorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as\nsoon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they\nspoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others. And indeed\nit was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he\ncould make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it\nperished not uselesly in his possession, these he also made use of. And\nif he also bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for\nnuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury;\nhe wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of\ngoods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in\nhis hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal,\npleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a\nsparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he\ninvaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these\ndurable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just\nproperty not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing\nof any thing uselesly in it.\n\nSect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men\nmight keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take\nin exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.\n\nSect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men\npossessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave\nthem the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an\nisland, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world,\nwherein there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses\nand cows, with other useful animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough\nfor corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the\nisland, either because of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to\nsupply the place of money; what reason could any one have there to\nenlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful\nsupply to its consumption, either in what their own industry produced,\nor they could barter for like perishable, useful commodities, with\nothers? Where there is not some thing, both lasting and scarce, and so\nvaluable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their\npossessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to\ntake: for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred\nthousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too\nwith cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had\nno hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him\nby the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we\nshould see him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was\nmore than would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him\nand his family.\n\nSect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so\nthan that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find\nout something that hath the use and value of money amongst his\nneighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge\nhis possessions.\n\nSect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of\nman in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only\nfrom the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the\nmeasure, it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and\nunequal possession of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary\nconsent, found out, a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he\nhimself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the\noverplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any\none; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the\npossessor. This partage of things in an inequality of private\npossessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and\nwithout compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly\nagreeing in the use of money: for in governments, the laws regulate the\nright of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive\nconstitutions.\n\nSect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any\ndifficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the\ncommon things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded\nit. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title,\nnor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave. Right and\nconveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could\nemploy his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than\nhe could make use of. This left no room for controversy about the title,\nnor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man carved\nto himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest,\nto carve himself too much, or take more than he needed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. VI.\n\nOF PATERNAL POWER.\n\n\nSect. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a\ndiscourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have\nobtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new\nones, when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of\npaternal power probably has done, which seems so to place the power of\nparents over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had\nno share in it; whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall\nfind, she hath an equal title. This may give one reason to ask, whether\nthis might not be more properly called parental power? for whatever\nobligation nature and the right of generation lays on children, it must\ncertainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it. And\naccordingly we see the positive law of God every where joins them\ntogether, without distinction, when it commands the obedience of\nchildren, Honour thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12. Whosoever\ncurseth his father or his mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear every man\nhis mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c.\nEph. vi. 1. is the stile of the Old and New Testament.\n\nSect. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking\nany deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running\ninto those gross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents;\nwhich, however it might, without any great harshness, bear the name of\nabsolute dominion, and regal authority, when under the title of paternal\npower it seemed appropriated to the father, would yet have founded but\noddly, and in the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed\nabsolute power over children had been called parental; and thereby have\ndiscovered, that it belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill\nserve the turn of those men, who contend so much for the absolute power\nand authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should\nhave any share in it; and it would have but ill supported the monarchy\nthey contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that that\nfundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of\na single person only, was not placed in one, but two persons jointly.\nBut to let this of names pass.\n\nSect. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are\nequal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or\nvirtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may\nplace others above the common level: birth may subject some, and\nalliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom\nnature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due: and yet all\nthis consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of\njurisdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality I\nthere spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal\nright, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being\nsubjected to the will or authority of any other man.\n\nSect. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of\nequality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule\nand jurisdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for some\ntime after; but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection\nare like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by,\nin the weakness of their infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen\nthem, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own\nfree disposal.\n\nSect. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full\npossession of their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the\nfirst instant of his being to provide for his own support and\npreservation, and govern his actions according to the dictates of the\nlaw of reason which God had implanted in him. From him the world is\npeopled with his descendants, who are all born infants, weak and\nhelpless, without knowledge or understanding: but to supply the defects\nof this imperfect state, till the improvement of growth and age hath\nremoved them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law\nof nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the\nchildren they had begotten; not as their own workmanship, but the\nworkmanship of their own maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be\naccountable for them.\n\nSect. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to\ngovern all his posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having\nanother way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural\nbirth, that produced them ignorant and without the use of reason, they\nwere not presently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which\nis not promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made known\nby reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason, cannot be\nsaid to be under this law; and Adam\u2019s children, being not presently as\nsoon as born under this law of reason, were not presently free: for law,\nin its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a\nfree and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no\nfarther than is for the general good of those under that law: could they\nbe happier without it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itself\nvanish; and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in\nonly from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the\nend of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge\nfreedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where\nthere is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from\nrestraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no\nlaw: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do\nwhat he lists: (for who could be free, when every other man\u2019s humour\nmight domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he\nlists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within\nthe allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be\nsubject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.\n\nSect. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises\nfrom that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their\noff-spring, during the imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind,\nand govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall\ntake its place, and ease them of that trouble, is what the children\nwant, and the parents are bound to: for God having given man an\nunderstanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will,\nand liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within the\nbounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an estate, wherein\nhe has not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to\nhave any will of his own to follow: he that understands for him, must\nwill for him too; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate his\nactions; but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman,\nthe son is a freeman too.\n\nSect. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or\ncivil. Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law?\nwhat gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own\nwill, within the compass of that law? I answer, a state of maturity\nwherein he might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might\nkeep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that\nstate, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and\nhow far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till\nthen, some body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the\nlaw allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of\ndiscretion made him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man\nunder the law of England? What made him free of that law? that is, to\nhave the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to\nhis own will, within the permission of that law? A capacity of knowing\nthat law; which is supposed by that law, at the age of one and twenty\nyears, and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free, it shall\nmake the son free too. Till then we see the law allows the son to have\nno will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian,\nwho is to understand for him. And if the father die, and fail to\nsubstitute a deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to\ngovern his son, during his minority, during his want of understanding,\nthe law takes care to do it; some other must govern him, and be a will\nto him, till he hath attained to a state of freedom, and his\nunderstanding be fit to take the government of his will. But after that,\nthe father and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after\nnonage; equally subjects of the same law together, without any dominion\nleft in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether\nthey be only in the state and under the law of nature, or under the\npositive laws of an established government.\n\nSect. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary\ncourse of nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein\nhe might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within\nthe rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never\nlet loose to the disposure of his own will (because he knows no bounds\nto it, has not understanding, its proper guide) but is continued under\nthe tuition and government of others, all the time his own understanding\nis uncapable of that charge. And so lunatics and ideots are never set\nfree from the government of their parents;\n\n/#\n     children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may\n     have; and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from\n     ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly\n     have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have for their\n     guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over\n     them, to seek and procure their good for them,\n#/\n\nsays Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than\nthat duty, which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other\ncreatures, to preserve their offspring, till they can be able to shift\nfor themselves, and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of\nparents regal authority.\n\nSect. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we\nhave actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with\nit the other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to\nparents may consist together, and are both founded on the same\nprinciple. A child is free by his father\u2019s title, by his father\u2019s\nunderstanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The\nfreedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child\nto his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are so consistent, and so\ndistinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, by right\nof fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most obstinate cannot\nbut allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true, were the\nright heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch in his\nthrone, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer\ntalks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the\nchild, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign,\nbe in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till\nage and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and\nothers? The necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the\ninformation of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of\nothers, and not his own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint\nand subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or\nsovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had\nthe government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him\nthe better and sooner for it. If any body should ask me, when my son is\nof age to be free? I shall answer, just when his monarch is of age to\ngovern. But at what time, says the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. i.\nsect. 6. a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of\nreason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is\nthen bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for\nsense to discern, than for any one by skill and learning to determine.\n\nSect. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that\nthere is a time when men are to begin to act like free men, and\ntherefore till that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or\nother public owning of, or submission to the government of their\ncountries.\n\nSect. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to\nhis own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to\ninstruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know\nhow far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to\nan unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the\nallowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him\nout amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much\nbeneath that of a man, as their\u2019s. This is that which puts the authority\ninto the parents hands to govern the minority of their children. God\nhath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, and\nhath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to\ntemper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to the\nchildren\u2019s good, as long as they should need to be under it.\n\nSect. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due\nto their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father,\nwhose power reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he finds\nmost effectual, to give such strength and health to their bodies, such\nvigour and rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to be\nmost useful to themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to his\ncondition, to make them work, when they are able, for their own\nsubsistence. But in this power the mother too has her share with the\nfather.\n\nSect. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any\npeculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children,\nthat when he quits his care of them, he loses his power over them, which\ngoes along with their nourishment and education, to which it is\ninseparably annexed; and it belongs as much to the foster-father of an\nexposed child, as to the natural father of another. So little power does\nthe bare act of begetting give a man over his issue; if all his care\nends there, and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority\nof a father. And what will become of this paternal power in that part of\nthe world, where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? or in\nthose parts of America, where, when the husband and wife part, which\nhappens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her,\nand are wholly under her care and provision? If the father die whilst\nthe children are young, do they not naturally every where owe the same\nobedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their father\nwere he alive? and will any one say, that the mother hath a legislative\npower over her children? that she can make standing rules, which shall\nbe of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the\nconcerns of their property, and bound their liberty all the course of\ntheir lives? or can she inforce the observation of them with capital\npunishments? for this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which\nthe father hath not so much as the shadow. His command over his children\nis but temporary, and reaches not their life or property: it is but a\nhelp to the weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline\nnecessary to their education: and though a father may dispose of his own\npossessions as he pleases, when his children are out of danger of\nperishing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives or goods,\nwhich either their own industry, or another\u2019s bounty has made their\u2019s;\nnor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the\ninfranchisement of the years of discretion. The father\u2019s empire then\nceases, and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty\nof his son, than that of any other man: and it must be far from an\nabsolute or perpetual jurisdiction, from which a man may withdraw\nhimself, having license from divine authority to leave father and\nmother, and cleave to his wife.\n\nSect. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free\nfrom subjection to the will and command of his father, as the father\nhimself is free from subjection to the will of any body else, and they\nare each under no other restraint, but that which is common to them\nboth, whether it be the law of nature, or municipal law of their\ncountry; yet this freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he\nought, by the law of God and nature, to pay his parents. God having made\nthe parents instruments in his great design of continuing the race of\nmankind, and the occasions of life to their children; as he hath laid on\nthem an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring;\nso he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their\nparents, which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be\nshewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from any thing that\nmay ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness or life\nof those from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of\ndefence, relief, assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he\nentered into being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life:\nfrom this obligation no state, no freedom can absolve children. But this\nis very far from giving parents a power of command over their children,\nor an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives\nor liberties. It is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude and\nassistance; another to require an absolute obedience and submission. The\nhonour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet\nthis lessens not his authority, nor subjects him to her government.\n\nSect. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary\ngovernment, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the\nhonour due from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to\nrespect, reverence, support and compliance too, more or less, as the\nfather\u2019s care, cost, and kindness in his education, has been more or\nless. This ends not with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions\nof a man\u2019s life. The want of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that\nwhich the father hath in the right of tuition, during minority, and the\nright of honour all his life, may perhaps have caused a great part of\nthe mistakes about this matter: for to speak properly of them, the first\nof these is rather the privilege of children, and duty of parents, than\nany prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment and education of\ntheir children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children\u2019s\ngood, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it: and though\nthe power of commanding and chastising them go along with it, yet God\nhath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for\ntheir off-spring, that there is little fear that parents should use\ntheir power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe\nside, the strong byass of nature drawing the other way. And therefore\nGod almighty when he would express his gentle dealing with the\nIsraelites, he tells them, that though he chastened them, he chastened\nthem as a man chastens his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and\naffection, and kept them under no severer discipline than what was\nabsolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to have slackened.\nThis is that power to which children are commanded obedience, that the\npains and care of their parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded.\n\nSect. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which\ngratitude requires to return for the benefits received by and from them,\nis the indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the\nparents. This is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for\nthe child\u2019s; though education, the parents duty, seems to have most\npower, because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need\nof restraint and correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a\nkind of dominion. And that duty which is comprehended in the word\nhonour, requires less obedience, though the obligation be stronger on\ngrown, than younger children: for who can think the command, Children\nobey your parents, requires in a man, that has children of his own, the\nsame submission to his father, as it does in his yet young children to\nhim; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father\u2019s\ncommands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he should have the\nindiscretion to treat him still as a boy?\n\nSect. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which\nis education, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain\nseason; when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and\nis also alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in\nother hands; and he that has made his son an apprentice to another, has\ndischarged him, during that time, of a great part of his obedience both\nto himself and to his mother. But all the duty of honour, the other\npart, remains never the less entire to them; nothing can cancel that: it\nis so inseparable from them both, that the father\u2019s authority cannot\ndispossess the mother of this right, nor can any man discharge his son\nfrom honouring her that bore him. But both these are very far from a\npower to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that may reach\nestate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding ends with\nnonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and defence,\nand whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest benefits\nhe is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents; yet\nall this puts no scepter into the father\u2019s hand, no sovereign power of\ncommanding. He has no dominion over his son\u2019s property, or actions; nor\nany right, that his will should prescribe to his son\u2019s in all things;\nhowever it may become his son in many things, not very inconvenient to\nhim and his family, to pay a deference to it.\n\nSect. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man;\ndefence to his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed;\nand gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he\ncan do, cannot sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no\nright to any one, of making laws over him from whom they are owing. And\nit is plain, all this is due not only to the bare title of father; not\nonly because, as has been said, it is owing to the mother too; but\nbecause these obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is\nrequired of children, may be varied by the different care and kindness,\ntrouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more than\nanother.\n\nSect. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in\nsocieties, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their\nchildren, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are\nin the state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political\npower were only paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same\nthing: for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the subject\ncould naturally have none of it. But these two powers, political and\npaternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so\ndifferent foundations, and given to so different ends, that every\nsubject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his\nchildren, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has\nparents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of\nhis subjects do to their\u2019s; and can therefore contain not any part or\ndegree of that kind of dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over\nhis subject.\n\nSect. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their\nchildren, and the obligation on children to honour their parents,\ncontain all the power on the one hand, and submission on the other,\nwhich are proper to this relation, yet there is another power ordinarily\nin the father, whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children;\nwhich tho\u2019 it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of\nshewing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in\ntheir private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare,\nand less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal\njurisdiction. And this is the power men generally have to bestow their\nestates on those who please them best; the possession of the father\nbeing the expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in\ncertain proportions, according to the law and custom of each country;\nyet it is commonly in the father\u2019s power to bestow it with a more\nsparing or liberal hand, according as the behaviour of this or that\nchild hath comported with his will and humour.\n\nSect. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there\nbeing always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the\ngovernment of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been\ncommonly supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that\ngovernment, of which he himself was a subject, and that his compact held\nthem; whereas, it being only a necessary condition annexed to the land,\nand the inheritance of an estate which is under that government, reaches\nonly those who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie\nor engagement, but a voluntary submission: for every man\u2019s children\nbeing by nature as free as himself, or any of his ancestors ever were,\nmay, whilst they are in that freedom, choose what society they will join\nthemselves to, what commonwealth they will put themselves under. But if\nthey will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on\nthe same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions\nannexed to such a possession. By this power indeed fathers oblige their\nchildren to obedience to themselves, even when they are past minority,\nand most commonly too subject them to this or that political power: but\nneither of these by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward\nthey have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a compliance;\nand is no more power than what a French man has over an English man, who\nby the hopes of an estate he will leave him, will certainly have a\nstrong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy\nit, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the\npossession of land in that country where it lies, whether it be France\nor England.\n\nSect. 74. To conclude then, tho\u2019 the father\u2019s power of commanding\nextends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree\nonly fit for the discipline and government of that age; and tho\u2019 that\nhonour and respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which\nthey indispensably owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all\nestates, with all that support and defence is due to them, gives the\nfather no power of governing, i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on\nhis children; though by all this he has no dominion over the property or\nactions of his son: yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it was, in\nthe first ages of the world, and in places still, where the thinness of\npeople gives families leave to separate into unpossessed quarters, and\nthey have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant habitations,\nfor the father of the family to become the prince of it;* he had been a\nruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children: and since\nwithout some government it would be hard for them to live together, it\nwas likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children\nwhen they were grown up, be in the father, where it seemed without any\nchange barely to continue; when indeed nothing more was required to it,\nthan the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family, that\nexecutive power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally\nhath, and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power,\nwhilst they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right,\nbut only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence, that no\nbody doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business had brought to\nhis family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other\nfact, he might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished\nhim, as well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should\ndo by virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child,\nbut by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a\nman, he had a right to: and he alone could punish him in his family,\nwhere the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such a\npower, to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing should\nremain in him, above the rest of his family.\n\n(*It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was\nof, that the chief person in every houshold was always, as it were, a\nking: so when numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies\ntogether, kings were the first kind of governors amongst them, which is\nalso, as it seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued still\nin them, who, of fathers, were made rulers; as also the ancient custom\nof governors to do as Melchizedec, and being kings, to exercise the\noffice of priests, which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the\nsame occasion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind of regiment that has\nbeen received in the world. The inconveniences of one kind have caused\nsundry others to be devised; so that in a word, all public regiment, of\nwhat kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from the deliberate\nadvice, consultation and composition between men, judging it convenient\nand behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered by\nitself, but that man might have lived without any public regiment,\nHooker\u2019s Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.)\n\nSect. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit,\nand scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father\u2019s authority and\ngovernment. They had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his\ndirection, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they\nwere men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and less\ncovetousness, seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any should\narise, where could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they\nhad every one been sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness\nfor them all? It is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt\nminority and full age; nor looked after one and twenty, or any other age\nthat might make them the free disposers of themselves and fortunes, when\nthey could have no desire to be out of their pupilage: the government\nthey had been under, during it, continued still to be more their\nprotection than restraint; and they could no where find a greater\nsecurity to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a\nfather.\n\nSect. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change,\nbecame the politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live\nlong, and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or\notherwise; so they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective\nkingdoms, under several constitutions and manners, according as chance,\ncontrivance, or occasions happened to mould them. But if princes have\ntheir titles in their fathers right, and it be a sufficient proof of the\nnatural right of fathers to political authority, because they commonly\nwere those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise of government:\nI say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove, that all\nprinces, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain,\nthat in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as that he\nwas ruler in his own houshold.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. VII.\n\nOF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.\n\n\nSect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment,\nit was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of\nnecessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as\nwell as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy\nit. The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to\nthat between parents and children; to which, in time, that between\nmaster and servant came to be added: and though all these might, and\ncommonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the\nmaster or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each\nof these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall\nsee, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of\nthese.\n\nSect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man\nand woman; and tho\u2019 it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in\none another\u2019s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet\nit draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of\ninterests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection,\nbut also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be\nnourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for\nthemselves.\n\nSect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not\nbarely procreation, but the continuation of the species; thisconjunction\nbetwixt male and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long\nas is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who\nare to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift\nand provide for themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker\nhath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures\nsteadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the\nconjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of\ncopulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the\nyoung, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but\nconcerns not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can\ncontribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer:\nbecause the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her\nnumerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as\nmore dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance\nof the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family,\nwhich cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by\nthe joint care of male and female. The same is to be observed in all\nbirds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock\nfrom feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing\nfood in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are\nable to use their wing, and provide for themselves.\n\nSect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why\nthe male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than\nother creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and\nde facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth,\nlong before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents\nhelp, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due\nto him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care\nfor those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal\nsociety with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young\nbeing able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation\nreturns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at\nliberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again\nto chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the\ngreat Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay\nup for the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made\nit necessary, that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than\nof male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might\nbe encouraged, and their interest better united, to make provision and\nlay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy\nand frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb.\n\nSect. 81. But tho\u2019 these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal\nbonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals;\nyet it would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where\nprocreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for,\nmay not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time,\nor upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts,\nthere being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of\nit, that it should always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no\nrestraint of any positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be\nperpetual.\n\nSect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common\nconcern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes\nhave different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last\ndetermination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally\nfalls to the man\u2019s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this\nreaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves\nthe wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her\npeculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than\nshe has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an\nabsolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate\nfrom him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that\ncontract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs\nor laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such\nseparation fall to the father or mother\u2019s lot, as such contract does\ndetermine.\n\nSect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under\npolitic government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil\nmagistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either naturally\nnecessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and\nassistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy\nthat may arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise,\nand that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally\nbelonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between man\nand wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where\nthe husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of\nmatrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of\nconjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to\nthat state. Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without\nit; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance\nand maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might\nbe varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in\nthat society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up\nof children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being\nnecessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it\nis made.\n\nSect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct\nrights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so\nlargely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any\nthing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a\npolitic society.\n\nSect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to\nthose of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant\nto another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he\nundertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though\nthis commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the\nordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary\npower over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract\nbetween them. But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar\nname we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the\nright of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power\nof their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and\nwith it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state\nof slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be\nconsidered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the\npreservation of property.\n\nSect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these\nsubordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united\nunder the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it\nmay have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little\ncommonwealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power\nand end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the\nabsolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered\nand short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that\nthe master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited\npower, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are\nin it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and\nhis power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his\nfamily or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of\nthem, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as\nhe. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family,\nwho has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a\nfamily, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly\npolitical society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political\nsociety itself consists.\n\nSect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect\nfreedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges\nof the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in\nthe world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property,\nthat is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts\nof other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in\nothers, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself,\nin crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires\nit. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having\nin itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto,\npunish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only\nis political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this\nnatural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all\ncases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law\nestablished by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular\nmember being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled\nstanding rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men\nhaving authority from the community, for the execution of those rules,\ndecides all the differences that may happen between any members of that\nsociety concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences\nwhich any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties\nas the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and\nwho are not, in political society together. Those who are united into\none body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to,\nwith authority to decide controversies between them, and punish\noffenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no\nsuch common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature,\neach being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner;\nwhich is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.\n\nSect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what\npunishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think\nworthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is\nthe power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any\ninjury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it,\n(which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation\nof the property of all the members of that society, as far as is\npossible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and\nis become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to\npunish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own\nprivate judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given\nup to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the\nmagistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his\nforce, for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever\nhe shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being\nmade by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original\nof the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to\njudge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when\ncommitted within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional\njudgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far\ninjuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ\nall the force of all the members, when there shall be need.\n\nSect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one\nsociety, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature,\nand to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or\ncivil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the\nstate of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body\npolitic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins\nhimself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for\nhereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative\nthereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall\nrequire; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own\ndecrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of\na commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to\ndetermine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may\nhappen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the\nlegislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are\nany number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power\nto appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.\n\nSect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men\nis counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with\ncivil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the\nend of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies\nof the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man\u2019s being\njudge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every\none of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy\nthat may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;*\nwhere-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to,\nfor the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are\nstill in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in\nrespect of those who are under his dominion.\n\n(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the\nsame society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto\nall that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless\nthere be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of\nreason, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i.\nsect. 16.)\n\nSect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and\nexecutive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no\nappeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with\nauthority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be\nexpected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the\nprince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or\nGrand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature,\nwith all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind: for\nwhere-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge\nto appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right\nbetwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under\nall the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the\nsubject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the\nordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and\naccording to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his\nproperty is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not\nonly no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were\ndegraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a\nliberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all\nthe misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being\nin the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and\narmed with power.\n\n(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e.\nsuch as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by\ngrowing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining\nsome kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject\nthereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by\nthem the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be\nprocured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they\nmight be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek\ntheir own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it\nwas not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be\nwithstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him\nto determine his own right, and according to his own determination\nproceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards\nhimself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that\nstrifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common\nconsent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without\nwhich consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him\nto be lord or judge over another, Hooker\u2019s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)\n\nSect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men\u2019s blood, and\ncorrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of\nthis, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would\nhave been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not\nprobably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion\nshall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and\nthe sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what\nthe protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their\ncountries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and\nsecurity it carries civil society, where this sort of government is\ngrown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon,\nmay easily see.\n\nSect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of\nthe world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide\nany controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the\nsubjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks\nnecessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to\nsociety and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether\nthis be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as\nwe owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more\nthan what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may\nand naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying\none another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage;\nand so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them,\nbut love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked,\nwhat security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the\nviolence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can\nscarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only\nto ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there\nmust be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security:\nbut as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such\ncircumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is\nright when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or\ninjury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently\nthe voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of\nnature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one,\nshould be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain\nall the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made\nlicentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that\nthey take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or\nfoxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.\n\nSect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people\u2019s\nunderstandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive,\nthat any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil\nsociety which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against\nany harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in\nthe state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to\ntake care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in\ncivil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only\nthey entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall\nbe shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this\ndiscourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency\namongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as\nto a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of\ntheir differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without\nany other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and\nwisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade\nus) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing\ninnocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another\nstamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the\ngovernment, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the\npreservation of* property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think\nthemselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in\ncollective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you\nplease. By which means every single person became subject, equally with\nother the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the\nlegislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority;\navoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of\nsuperiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the\nmiscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be\nexempted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit,\nand there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any\nharm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state\nof nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless\nany one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the\nsame thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of\nanarchy as to affirm.\n\n(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed,\nit may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of\ngoveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were\nto rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very\ninconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did\nindeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that\nto live by one man\u2019s will, became the cause of all men\u2019s misery. This\nconstrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty\nbeforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker\u2019s Eccl.\nPol. l. i. sect. 10.)\n\n(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore\nover-rule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. VIII.\n\nOF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.\n\n\nSect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and\nindependent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the\npolitical power of another, without his own consent. The only way\nwhereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the\nbonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite\ninto a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one\namongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a\ngreater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men\nmay do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as\nthey were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men\nhave so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby\npresently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority\nhave a right to act and conclude the rest.\n\nSect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every\nindividual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one\nbody, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and\ndetermination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being\nonly the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to\nthat which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should\nmove that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent\nof the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one\nbody, one community, which the consent of every individual that united\ninto it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that\nconsent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in\nassemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by\nthat positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes\nfor the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the\nlaw of nature and reason, the power of the whole.\n\nSect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body\npolitic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every\none of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and\nto be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with\nothers incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no\ncompact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in\nbefore in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any\ncompact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees\nof the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent\nto? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his\ncompact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit\nhimself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.\n\nSect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be\nreceived as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing\nbut the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of\nthe whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if\nwe consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which\nin a number, though much less than that of a commonwealth, will\nnecessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add\nthe variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably\nhappen in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such\nterms would be only like Cato\u2019s coming into the theatre, only to go out\nagain. Such a constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a\nshorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast\nthe day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think,\nthat rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to\nbe dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there\nthey cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately\ndissolved again.\n\nSect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a\ncommunity, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the\nends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the\ncommunity, unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the\nmajority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one\npolitical society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be,\nbetween the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And\nthus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society,\nis nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a\nmajority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that,\nand that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful\ngovernment in the world.\n\nSect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are no\ninstances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and\nequal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and\nset up a government.\n\nSecondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all\nmen being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not\nat liberty to begin a new one.\n\nSect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all\nto be wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men,\nthat lived together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that\ncondition, and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any\nnumber of them together, but they presently united and incorporated, if\nthey designed to continue together. And if we may not suppose men ever\nto have been in the state of nature, because we hear not much of them in\nsuch a state, we may as well suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes\nwere never children, because we hear little of them, till they were men,\nand imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to records,\nand letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of\ncivil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their\nsafety, ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history\nof their founders, and search into their original, when they have\noutlived the memory of it: for it is with commonwealths as with\nparticular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and\ninfancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are\nbeholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it.\nAnd those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world,\nexcepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed,\nand which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain\ninstances of such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have\nmanifest footsteps of it.\n\nSect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of\nfact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that\nthe beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several\nmen free and independent one of another, amongst whom there was no\nnatural superiority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta\u2019s word may be\ntaken, he tells us, that in many parts of America there was no\ngovernment at all.\n\nThere are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men,\nspeaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor\ncommonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the\nCheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no\ncertain kings, but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose\ntheir captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25.\n\nIf it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or\nthe head of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father\ntook not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he\nthought fit, has been already proved. But be that as it will, these men,\nit is evident, were actually free; and whatever superiority some\npoliticians now would place in any of them, they themselves claimed it\nnot, but by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set\nrulers over themselves. So that their politic societies all began from a\nvoluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the\nchoice of their governors, and forms of government.\n\nSect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus,\nmentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen\nindependent one of another, and to have set up a government over\nthemselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples,\nout of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being\nmet together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of\nsuch instances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor\ncould not be so begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were\nbetter let it alone, than urge it against natural liberty: for if they\ncan give so many instances, out of history, of governments begun upon\npaternal right, I think (though at best an argument from what has been,\nto what should of right be, has no great force) one might, without any\ngreat danger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the\ncase, they would do well not to search too much into the original of\ngovernments, as they have begun de facto, lest they should find, at the\nfoundation of most of them, something very little favourable to the\ndesign they promote, and such a power as they contend for.\n\nSect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are\nnaturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the\ngovernments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning\nlaid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people;\nthere can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what\nhas been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first erecting\nof governments.\n\nSect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will\ndirect us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally\nfind them under the government and administration of one man. And I am\nalso apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist\nby itself, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as\nit often happens, where there is much land, and few people, the\ngovernment commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the\nlaw of nature, the same power with every man else to punish, as he\nthought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish his\ntransgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their\npupilage; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all\njoin with him against the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby\npower to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so in\neffect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that remained in\nconjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted; paternal\naffection secured their property and interest under his care; and the\ncustom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to\nhim, rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one to rule\nthem, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live\ntogether; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common\nfather; unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body\nmade him unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his\nnext heir, for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities,\nless fit for rule; or where several families met, and consented to\ncontinue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but they used their\nnatural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest, and most\nlikely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the people\nof America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords, and\nspreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico)\nenjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they\ncommonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him\nany way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest\nand bravest man for their ruler.\n\nSect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any\naccount of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly\nfind the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I\naffirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the\nconsent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who,\nwhen they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government\nthey thought fit. But this having given occasion to men to mistake, and\nthink, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the\nfather, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in the\nbeginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the\nfather\u2019s pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some\ncommonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in\none hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of\ngovernment in a single person, was not any regard, or respect to\npaternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost all\nmonarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon\noccasion, elective.\n\nSect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father\u2019s\ngovernment of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed\nthem to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised\nwith care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was\nsufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness\nthey sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should pitch\nupon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their\ninfancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they\nhad found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being\nsimple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed\nin forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had\ntaught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the\ninconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt\nto lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that\nthey should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of\nrestraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the\nauthority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by\nplacing several parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt\nthe oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age,\nnor their possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter\nfor covetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or\nprovide against it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves\ninto such a frame of government, as was not only, as I said, most\nobvious and simple, but also best suited to their present state and\ncondition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions\nand injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple\npoor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of\neach man\u2019s small property, made few controversies, and so no need of\nmany laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the\nprocess, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but\nfew trespasses, and few offenders. Since then those, who like one\nanother so well as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have\nsome acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust one in\nanother; they could not but have greater apprehensions of others, than\nof one another: and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be\nsupposed to be, how to secure themselves against foreign force. It was\nnatural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which\nmight best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest man to\nconduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, and\nin this chiefly be their ruler.\n\nSect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which\nis still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the\ninhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money\ngave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest\nfor wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their\narmies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and in\ntime of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very\nmoderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily\neither in the people, or in a council. Tho\u2019 the war itself, which admits\nnot of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the\nking\u2019s sole authority.\n\nSect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their\njudges, and first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and\nleaders of their armies; which (besides what is signified by going out\nand in before the people, which was, to march forth to war, and home\nagain in the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of\nJephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear\nsend to Jephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off, and\narticle with him, if he will assist them against the Ammonites, to make\nhim their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people made him\nhead and captain over them, Judg. xi, 11. which was, as it seems, all\none as to be judge. And he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was\ntheir captain-general six years. So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites\nwith the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and\nruler, he tells them, He fought for you, and adventured his life far,\nand delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing\nmentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is\nfound in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech\nparticularly is called king, though at most he was but their general.\nAnd when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel\u2019s sons, the children\nof Israel desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go\nout before them, and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii. 20. God\ngranting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou\nshalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may save\nmy people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only\nbusiness of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their\ndefence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon\nhim, declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over\nhis inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul\u2019s being\nsolemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling\nto have him their king, made no other objection but this, How shall this\nman save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be\nour king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to\ndefend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it\nis in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath\nsought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to\nbe captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority\nwere nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who\nhad stuck to Saul\u2019s family, and opposed David\u2019s reign, when they came to\nHebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other\narguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in\neffect their king in Saul\u2019s time, and therefore they had no reason but\nto receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when\nSaul was king over us, thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in\nIsrael, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel,\nand thou shalt be a captain over Israel.\n\nSect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a\ncommonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the\nelder son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted\nto it, and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every\none acquiesced, till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a\nright of succession by prescription: or whether several families, or the\ndescendants of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business\nbrought together, uniting into society, the need of a general, whose\nconduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the great\nconfidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age,\n(such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to\nlast in the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners of\ncommonwealths generally put the rule into one man\u2019s hand, without any\nother express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing,\nand the end of government required: which ever of those it was that at\nfirst put the rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no\nbody was intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and to\nthose ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, those who had it commonly\nused it. And unless they had done so, young societies could not have\nsubsisted; without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public\nweal, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities\nof their infancy, and the prince and the people had soon perished\ntogether.\n\nSect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor\nsceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men\u2019s minds into a\nmistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently\nbetter governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then\nno stretching prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor\nconsequently on the other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or\nrestrain the power of the magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers\nand people about governors or government: yet, when ambition and luxury\nin future ages* would retain and increase the power, without doing the\nbusiness for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes\nto have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it\nnecessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of\ngovernment; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and\nprevent the abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in\nanother\u2019s hands only for their own good, they found was made use of to\nhurt them.\n\n(*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may\nbe nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing,\nbut all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule,\ntill by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so\nas the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but\nincrease the sore which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by\none man\u2019s will, became the cause of all men\u2019s misery. This constrained\nthem to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty before hand,\nand know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker\u2019s Eccl. Pol. l. i.\nsect. 10.)\n\nSect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were\nnaturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the\ngovernment of their father, or united together out of different families\nto make a government, should generally put the rule into one man\u2019s\nhands, and chuse to be under the conduct of a single person, without so\nmuch as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power, which\nthey thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence; though they never\ndreamed of monarchy being lure Divino, which we never heard of among\nmankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age;\nnor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be\nthe foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to shew,\nthat as far as we have any light from history, we have reason to\nconclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in\nthe consent of the people. I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion\nin another place to speak of conquest, which some esteem a way of\nbeginning of governments.\n\nThe other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in\nthe way I have mentioned, is this, viz.\n\nSect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it\nis impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite\ntogether, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful\ngovernment.\n\nIf this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into\nthe world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one\nman in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be\nbound to shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to\nunite and begin a new government under a regal, or any other form; it\nbeing demonstration, that if any one, born under the dominion of\nanother, may be so free as to have a right to command others in a new\nand distinct empire, every one that is born under the dominion of\nanother may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject, of a\ndistinct separate government. And so by this their own principle, either\nall men, however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince,\none lawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do,\nbut barely to shew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt\nnot but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him.\n\nSect. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew\nthat it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they\nuse it against; yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this\nargument a little farther. All men, say they, are born under government,\nand therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is\nborn a subject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under the\nperpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. It is plain mankind never\nowned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in,\nto one or to the other that tied them, without their own consents, to a\nsubjection to them and their heirs.\n\nSect. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred\nand profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their\nobedience, from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or\ncommunity they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other\nplaces; from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the\nbeginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was\nroom enough, till the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker;\nand those great ones again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser\ndominions. All which are so many testimonies against paternal\nsovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of the\nfather descending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning,\nsince it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so\nmany little kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal\nmonarchy, if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from\ntheir families, and the government, be it what it will, that was set up\nin it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments, as\nthey thought fit.\n\nSect. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first\nbeginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom\nof mankind, that they are born under constituted and ancient polities,\nthat have established laws, and set forms of government, than if they\nwere born in the woods, amongst the unconfined inhabitants, that run\nloose in them: for those, who would persuade us, that by being born\nunder any government, we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more\nany title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature, have no\nother reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have already\nanswered) to produce for it, but only, because our fathers or\nprogenitors passed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up\nthemselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the\ngovernment, which they themselves submitted to. It is true, that\nwhatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is\nunder the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever,\nbind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being\naltogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give\naway the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed\nannex such conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any\ncommonwealth, as may oblige his son to be of that community, if he will\nenjoy those possessions which were his father\u2019s; because that estate\nbeing his father\u2019s property, he may dispose, or settle it, as he\npleases.\n\nSect. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this\nmatter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions\nto be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their\ncommunity, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his\nfather, but under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member of\nthe society; whereby he puts himself presently under the government he\nfinds there established, as much as any other subject of that\ncommonwealth. And thus the consent of freemen, born under government,\nwhich only makes them members of it, being given separately in their\nturns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together;\npeople take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not\nnecessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.\n\nSect. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it\notherwise; they claim no power over the son, because of that they had\nover the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their\nfathers being so. If a subject of England have a child, by an English\nwoman in France, whose subject is he? Not the king of England\u2019s; for he\nmust have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of\nFrance\u2019s; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and\nbreed him as he pleases? and who ever was judged as a traytor or\ndeserter, if he left, or warred against a country, for being barely born\nin it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then, by the\npractice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of right\nreason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He\nis under his father\u2019s tuition and authority, till he comes to age of\ndiscretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will\nput himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an\nEnglishman\u2019s son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is\nevident there is no tie upon him by his father\u2019s being a subject of this\nkingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And why\nthen hath not his son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he\nbe born any where else? Since the power that a father hath naturally\nover his children, is the same, where-ever they be born, and the ties of\nnatural obligations, are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms\nand commonwealths.\n\nSect. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and\nnothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but\nonly his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood\nto be a sufficient declaration of a man\u2019s consent, to make him subject\nto the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an\nexpress and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. No\nbody doubts but an express consent, of any man entering into any\nsociety, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that\ngovernment. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit\nconsent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on\nto have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has\nmade no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man,\nthat hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of\nany government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far\nforth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such\nenjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land,\nto him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether\nit be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches\nas far as the very being of any one within the territories of that\ngovernment.\n\nSect. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that\nevery man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth,\nhe, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the\ncommunity, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do\nnot already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct\ncontradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the\nsecuring and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose\nproperty is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt\nfrom the jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the\nproprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby\nany one unites his person, which was before free, to any commonwealth,\nby the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it\nalso; and they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to\nthe government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a\nbeing. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase,\npermission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to,\nand under the government of that commonwealth, must take it with the\ncondition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the\ncommonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any\nsubject of it.\n\nSect. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over\nthe land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually\nincorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys\nthat; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to\nsubmit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that\nwhenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to\nthe government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said\npossession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any\nother commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in\nvacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and\nunpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any\nexpress declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is\nperpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a\nsubject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of\nnature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be\ndissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer\na member of it.\n\nSect. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly,\nand enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a\nmember of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due\nto and from all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the\nterritories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force\nof its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that\nsociety, a perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than it would make a\nman a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to\nabide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged\nto comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there.\nAnd thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under\nanother government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it,\nthough they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its\nadministration, as far forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to\nbe subjects or members of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any man\nso, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and\nexpress promise and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the\nbeginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one a\nmember of any commonwealth.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. IX.\n\nOF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.\n\n\nSect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said;\nif he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the\ngreatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why\nwill he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and\ncontroul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that\nthough in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of\nit is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others:\nfor all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater\npart no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the\nproperty he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes\nhim willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears\nand continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out,\nand is willing to join in society with others, who are already united,\nor have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,\nliberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.\n\nSect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men\u2019s uniting into\ncommonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the\npreservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there\nare many things wanting.\n\nFirst, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and\nallowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the\ncommon measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the\nlaw of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet\nmen being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of\nstudy of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the\napplication of it to their particular cases.\n\nSect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and\nindifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according\nto the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and\nexecutioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves,\npassion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much\nheat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to\nmake them too remiss in other men\u2019s.\n\nSect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to\nback and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution,\nThey who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are\nable, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times\nmakes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who\nattempt it.\n\nSect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state\nof nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are\nquickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find\nany number of men live any time together in this state. The\ninconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and\nuncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the\ntransgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established\nlaws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property.\nIt is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of\npunishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it\namongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by\nthem to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original\nright and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as\nof the governments and societies themselves.\n\nSect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of\ninnocent delights, a man has two powers.\n\nThe first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of\nhimself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which\nlaw, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one\ncommunity, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And\nwere it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there\nwould be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate\nfrom this great and natural community, and by positive agreements\ncombine into smaller and divided associations.\n\nThe other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish\nthe crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he\njoins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society,\nand incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of\nmankind.\n\nSect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the\npreservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be\nregulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation\nof himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of\nthe society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of\nnature.\n\nSect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and\nengages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the\nexecution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he\nthought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law\nthereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to\nenjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of\nothers in the same community, as well as protection from its whole\nstrength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in\nproviding for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the\nsociety shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the\nother members of the society do the like.\n\nSect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the\nequality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature,\ninto the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the\nlegislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only\nwith an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his\nliberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to\nchange his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the\nsociety, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to\nextend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every\none\u2019s property, by providing against those three defects above\nmentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so\nwhoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is\nbound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to\nthe people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright\njudges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the\nforce of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or\nabroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community\nfrom inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end,\nbut the peace, safety, and public good of the people.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. X.\n\nOF THE FORMS OF A COMMON-WEALTH.\n\n\nSect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men\u2019s first\nuniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in\nthem, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from\ntime to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own\nappointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy:\nor else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select\nmen, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else\ninto the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his\nheirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon\nhis death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them; an\nelective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make\ncompounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the\nlegislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more\npersons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme\npower to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may\ndispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute\na new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the\nplacing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible\nto conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or\nany but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is\nplaced, such is the form of the commonwealth.\n\nSect. 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not\na democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community,\nwhich the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which\nbest answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most properly\nexpresses such a society of men, which community or city in English does\nnot; for there may be subordinate communities in a government; and city\namongst us has a quite different notion from commonwealth: and\ntherefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word\ncommonwealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James the\nfirst; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body\ndislike, I consent with him to change it for a better.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XI.\n\nOF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.\n\n\nSect. 134. THE great end of men\u2019s entering into society, being the\nenjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great\ninstrument and means of that being the laws established in that society;\nthe first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the\nestablishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental\nnatural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the\npreservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public\ngood) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme\npower of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands\nwhere the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body\nelse, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed,\nhave the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from\nthat legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without\nthis the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its\nbeing a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a\npower to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received\nfrom them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn\nties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this\nsupreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can\nany oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate\npower, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the\nlegislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any\nobedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do\nallow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey\nany power in the society, which is not the supreme.\n\n(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of\nmen, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any\nprince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same\nof himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally\nreceived from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their\nconsent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere\ntyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not\nmade so. Hooker\u2019s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.\n\nOf this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no\nfull and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men,\ntherefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no\nman\u2019s commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that\nsociety, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented,\nwithout revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Laws\ntherefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)\n\nSect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more,\nwhether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the\nsupreme power in every commonwealth; yet:\n\nFirst, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the\nlives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of\nevery member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which\nis legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of\nnature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community:\nfor no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself;\nand no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any\nother, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of\nanother. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the\narbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no\narbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but\nonly so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of\nhimself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up\nto the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the\nlegislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost\nbounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a\npower, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never\nhave a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the\nsubjects.* The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society,\nbut only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known\npenalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of\nnature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as\nothers. The rules that they make for other men\u2019s actions, must, as well\nas their own and other men\u2019s actions, be conformable to the law of\nnature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the\nfundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human\nsanction can be good, or valid against it.\n\n(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a\nnatural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and\nfellowship; the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon,\ntouching the manner of their union in living together: the latter is\nthat which we call the law of a common-weal, the very soul of a politic\nbody, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on\nwork in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic,\nordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed\nas they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly\nobstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws\nof his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his\ndepraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly\nprovide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be\nno hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted.\nUnless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker\u2019s Eccl. Pol. l. i.\nsect. 10.)\n\nSect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot\nassume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but\nis bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by\npromulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of\nnature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of\nmen, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it,\ncannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no\nestablished judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the\nrights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially\nwhere every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and\nthat in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having\nordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend\nhimself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these\ninconveniences, which disorder men\u2019s propperties in the state of nature,\nmen unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the\nwhole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have\nstanding rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To\nthis end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society\nwhich they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into\nsuch hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be\ngoverned by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will\nstill be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature.\n\n(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must\ndirect, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules\nto be measured by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of\nnature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of\nnature, and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture,\notherwise they are ill made. Hooker\u2019s Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9.\n\nTo constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable.\nIbid. l. i. sect. 10.)\n\nSect. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled\nstanding laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and\ngovernment, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature\nfor, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives,\nliberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to\nsecure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should\nintend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an\nabsolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force\ninto the magistrate\u2019s hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily\nupon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the\nstate of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right\nagainst the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to\nmaintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination.\nWhereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute\narbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves,\nand armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a\nmuch worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man,\nwho has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary\npower of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will, who\nhas such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force\nbe 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the\ncommonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and\nreceived laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined\nresolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in\nthe state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the\njoint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the\nexorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or\nunrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any\nmeasures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the\npower the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it\nought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised\nby established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their\nduty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the\nrulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power\nthey have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such\nmeasures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.\n\nSect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part\nof his property without his own consent: for the preservation of\nproperty being the end of government, and that for which men enter into\nsociety, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should\nhave property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by\nentering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it;\ntoo gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society\nhaving property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law\nof the community are their\u2019s, that no body hath a right to take their\nsubstance or any part of it from them, without their own consent:\nwithout this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property\nin that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases,\nagainst my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or\nlegislative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose\nof the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at\npleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the\nlegislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are\nvariable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are\nsubjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest.\nBut in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly\nalways in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is\ndanger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct\ninterest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase\ntheir own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the\npeople: for a man\u2019s property is not at all secure, tho\u2019 there be good\nand equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow\nsubjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any\nprivate man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose\nof it as he thinks good.\n\nSect. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I\nhave before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end,\nthat men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate,\nhowever it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property\nbetween the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to\ntake to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property,\nwithout their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no\nproperty at all. And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it\nis necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited\nby that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some\ncases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice\nof martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of\nthe whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command\nof every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute\nthe most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither\nthe serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a\ncannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can\ncommand that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the\ngeneral, that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or for\nnot obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute\npower of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier\u2019s\nestate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any\nthing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind\nobedience is necessary to that end, for which the commander has his\npower, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods\nhas nothing to do with it.\n\nSect. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great\ncharge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection,\nshould pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it.\nBut still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the\nmajority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives\nchosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes\non the people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the\npeople, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts\nthe end of government: for what property have I in that, which another\nmay by right take, when he pleases, to himself?\n\nSect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making\nlaws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the\npeople, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone\ncan appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the\nlegislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the\npeople have said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made\nby such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall\nmake laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as\nare enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws\nfor them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by\na positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what\nthat positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to\nmake legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their\nauthority of making laws, and place it in other hands.\n\nSect. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by\nthe society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative\npower of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.\n\nFirst, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be\nvaried in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for\nthe favourite at court, and the country man at plough.\n\nSecondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end\nultimately, but the good of the people.\n\nThirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people,\nwithout the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their\ndeputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the\nlegislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not\nreserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to\ntime chosen by themselves.\n\nFourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of\nmaking laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the\npeople have.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XII.\n\nOF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERATIVE POWER OF THE\nCOMMON-WEALTH.\n\n\nSect. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct\nhow the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the\ncommunity and the members of it. But because those laws which are\nconstantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be\nmade in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative\nshould be always in being, not having always business to do. And because\nit may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at\npower, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have\nalso in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt\nthemselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both\nin its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and\nthereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community,\ncontrary to the end of society and government: therefore in wellordered\ncommonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it\nought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons,\nwho duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power\nto make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are\nthemselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near\ntie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good.\n\nSect. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time\nmade, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution,\nor an attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a\npower always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws\nthat are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and\nexecutive power come often to be separated.\n\nSect. 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may\ncall natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man\nnaturally had before he entered into society: for though in a\ncommonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference\nto one another, and as such as governed by the laws of the society; yet\nin reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as\nevery member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the\nrest of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that happen between\nany man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed by the\npublic; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole\nin the reparation of it. So that under this consideration, the whole\ncommunity is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other\nstates or persons out of its community.\n\nSect. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues\nand alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and\ncommunities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative, if\nany one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the\nname.\n\nSect. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be\nreally distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of\nthe municipal laws of the society within its self, upon all that are\nparts of it; the other the management of the security and interest of\nthe public without, with all those that it may receive benefit or damage\nfrom, yet they are always almost united. And though this federative\npower in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the\ncommonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent,\nstanding, positive laws, than the executive; and so must necessarily be\nleft to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be\nmanaged for the public good: for the laws that concern subjects one\namongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede\nthem. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much\nupon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be\nleft in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power\ncommitted to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the\nadvantage of the commonwealth.\n\nSect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of\nevery community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to\nbe separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct\npersons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their\nexercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the\ncommonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the\nexecutive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might\nact separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different\ncommands: which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and\nruin.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XIII.\n\nOF THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMON-WEALTH.\n\n\nSect. 149. THOUGH in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its own\nbasis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the\npreservation of the community, there can be but one supreme power, which\nis the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate,\nyet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain\nends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or\nalter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to\nthe trust reposed in them: for all power given with trust for the\nattaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is\nmanifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be\nforfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it,\nwho may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and\nsecurity. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of\nsaving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body, even of\ntheir legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as\nto lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the\nsubject: for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up\ntheir preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute\nwill and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about\nto bring them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a\nright to preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid\nthemselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and\nunalterable law of self-preservation, for which they entered into\nsociety. And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always\nthe supreme power, but not as considered under any form of government,\nbecause this power of the people can never take place till the\ngovernment be dissolved.\n\nSect. 150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative\nis the supreme power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be\nsuperior to him; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative\nof the society, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts,\nand for every member of the society, prescribing rules to their actions,\nand giving power of execution, where they are transgressed, the\nlegislative must needs be the supreme, and all other powers, in any\nmembers or parts of the society, derived from and subordinate to it.\n\nSect. 151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in\nbeing, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a\nshare in the legislative; there that single person in a very tolerable\nsense may also be called supreme: not that he has in himself all the\nsupreme power, which is that of law-making; but because he has in him\nthe supreme execution, from whom all inferior magistrates derive all\ntheir several subordinate powers, or at least the greatest part of them:\nhaving also no legislative superior to him, there being no law to be\nmade without his consent, which cannot be expected should ever subject\nhim to the other part of the legislative, he is properly enough in this\nsense supreme. But yet it is to be observed, that tho\u2019 oaths of\nallegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme\nlegislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of\nhim with others; allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to\nlaw, which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim\nit otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law,\nand so is to be considered as the image, phantom, or representative of\nthe commonwealth, acted by the will of the society, declared in its\nlaws; and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. But when\nhe quits this representation, this public will, and acts by his own\nprivate will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private person\nwithout power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; the\nmembers owing no obedience but to the public will of the society.\n\nSect. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that\nhas also a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and\naccountable to it, and may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that\nit is not the supreme executive power, that is exempt from\nsubordination, but the supreme executive power vested in one, who having\na share in the legislative, has no distinct superior legislative to be\nsubordinate and accountable to, farther than he himself shall join and\nconsent; so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think\nfit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very little. Of other\nministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not speak,\nthey being so multiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs\nand constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to\ngive a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is\nnecessary to our present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them,\nthat they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by\npositive grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them\naccountable to some other power in the commonwealth.\n\nSect. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that the\nlegislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the\nexecutive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to\nbe made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When\nthe legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into\nother hands, they have a power still to resume it out of those hands,\nwhen they find cause, and to punish for any maladministration against\nthe laws. The same holds also in regard of the federative power, that\nand the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the\nlegislative, which, as has been shewed, in a constituted commonwealth\nis the supreme. The legislative also in this case being supposed to\nconsist of several persons, (for if it be a single person, it cannot but\nbe always in being, and so will, as supreme, naturally have the supreme\nexecutive power, together with the legislative) may assemble, and\nexercise their legislature, at the times that either their original\nconstitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they please;\nif neither of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way\nprescribed to convoke them: for the supreme power being placed in them\nby the people, it is always in them, and they may exercise it when they\nplease, unless by their original constitution they are limited to\ncertain seasons, or by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned\nto a certain time; and when that time comes, they have a right to\nassemble and act again.\n\nSect. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of\nrepresentatives chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards\nreturn into the ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in the\nlegislature but upon a new choice, this power of chusing must also be\nexercised by the people, either at certain appointed seasons, or else\nwhen they are summoned to it; and in this latter case the power of\nconvoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has\none of these two limitations in respect of time: that either the\noriginal constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain\nintervals, and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially\nissue directions for their electing and assembling, according to due\nforms; or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections,\nwhen the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of\nold, or making of new laws, or the redress or prevention of any\ninconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people.\n\nSect. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being\npossessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make use of that\nforce to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the\noriginal constitution, or the public exigencies require it? I say, using\nforce upon the people without authority, and contrary to the trust put\nin him that does so, is a state of war with the people, who have a right\nto reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power: for\nhaving erected a legislative, with an intent they should exercise the\npower of making laws, either at certain set times, or when there is need\nof it, when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to\nthe society, and wherein the safety and preservation of the people\nconsists, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all states\nand conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppose\nforce to it. The use of force without authority, always puts him that\nuses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to\nbe treated accordingly.\n\nSect. 156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative,\nplaced in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it,\nbut is a fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in\na case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not\nbear a steady fixed rule: for it not being possible, that the first\nframers of the government should, by any foresight, be so much masters\nof future events, as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and\nduration to the assemblies of the legislative, in all times to come,\nthat might exactly answer all the exigencies of the commonwealth; the\nbest remedy could be found for this defect, was to trust this to the\nprudence of one who was always to be present, and whose business it was\nto watch over the public good. Constant frequent meetings of the\nlegislative, and long continuations of their assemblies, without\nnecessary occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and must\nnecessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the\nquick turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present\nhelp: any delay of their convening might endanger the public; and\nsometimes too their business might be so great, that the limited time of\ntheir sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the public of\nthat benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation.\nWhat then could be done in this case to prevent the community from being\nexposed some time or other to eminent hazard, on one side or the other,\nby fixed intervals and periods, set to the meeting and acting of the\nlegislative, but to intrust it to the prudence of some, who being\npresent, and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make use\nof this prerogative for the public good? and where else could this be so\nwell placed as in his hands, who was intrusted with the execution of the\nlaws for the same end? Thus supposing the regulation of times for the\nassembling and sitting of the legislative, not settled by the original\nconstitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the executive, not as\nan arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure, but with this trust\nalways to have it exercised only for the public weal, as the occurrences\nof times and change of affairs might require. Whether settled periods of\ntheir convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the\nlegislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the least inconvenience\nattending it, it is not my business here to inquire, but only to shew,\nthat though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking\nand dissolving such conventions of the legislative, yet it is not\nthereby superior to it.\n\nSect. 157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing\nremains long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power,\nchange their stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove\nin times neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places\ngrow into populous countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But\nthings not always changing equally, and private interest often keeping\nup customs and privileges, when the reasons of them are ceased, it often\ncomes to pass, that in governments, where part of the legislative\nconsists of representatives chosen by the people, that in tract of time\nthis representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the\nreasons it was at first established upon. To what gross absurdities the\nfollowing of custom, when reason has left it, may lead, we may be\nsatisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains\nnot so much as the ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote,\nor more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found, sends as many\nrepresentatives to the grand assembly of law-makers, as a whole county\nnumerous in people, and powerful in riches. This strangers stand amazed\nat, and every one must confess needs a remedy; tho\u2019 most think it hard\nto find one, because the constitution of the legislative being the\noriginal and supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws\nin it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter\nit. And therefore the people, when the legislative is once constituted,\nhaving, in such a government as we have been speaking of, no power to\nact as long as the government stands; this inconvenience is thought\nincapable of a remedy.\n\nSect. 158. Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and\nfundamental a rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot\ndangerously err. If therefore the executive, who has the power of\nconvoking the legislative, observing rather the true proportion, than\nfashion of representation, regulates, not by old custom, but true\nreason, the number of members, in all places that have a right to be\ndistinctly represented, which no part of the people however incorporated\ncan pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to\nthe public, it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative, but to\nhave restored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders\nwhich succession of time had insensibly, as well as inevitably\nintroduced: For it being the interest as well as intention of the\npeople, to have a fair and equal representative; whoever brings it\nnearest to that, is an undoubted friend to, and establisher of the\ngovernment, and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the\ncommunity; prerogative being nothing but a power, in the hands of the\nprince, to provide for the public good, in such cases, which depending\nupon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable laws\ncould not safely direct; whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the\ngood of the people, and the establishing the government upon its true\nfoundations, is, and always will be, just prerogative, The power of\nerecting new corporations, and therewith new representatives, carries\nwith it a supposition, that in time the measures of representation might\nvary, and those places have a just right to be represented which before\nhad none; and by the same reason, those cease to have a right, and be\ntoo inconsiderable for such a privilege, which before had it. \u2019Tis not a\nchange from the present state, which perhaps corruption or decay has\nintroduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the tendency\nof it to injure or oppress the people, and to set up one part or party,\nwith a distinction from, and an unequal subjection of the rest.\nWhatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society,\nand people in general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when\ndone, justify itself; and whenever the people shall chuse their\nrepresentatives upon just and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the\noriginal frame of the government, it cannot be doubted to be the will\nand act of the society, whoever permitted or caused them so to do.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XIV.\n\nOF PREROGATIVE.\n\n\nSect. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct\nhands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed\ngovernments) there the good of the society requires, that several things\nshould be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power:\nfor the legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for\nall that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws having\nthe power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make\nuse of it for the good of the society, in many cases, where the\nmunicipal law has given no direction, till the legislative can\nconveniently be assembled to provide for it. Many things there are,\nwhich the law can by no means provide for; and those must necessarily be\nleft to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands,\nto be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require:\nnay, it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to\nthe executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and\ngovernment, viz. That as much as may be, all the members of the society\nare to be preserved: for since many accidents may happen, wherein a\nstrict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm; (as not to pull\ndown an innocent man\u2019s house to stop the fire, when the next to it is\nburning) and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law, which\nmakes no distinction of persons, by an action that may deserve reward\nand pardon; \u2019tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, to\nmitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end\nof government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the\nguilty are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the\ninnocent.\n\nSect. 160. This power to act according to discretion, for the public\ngood, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against\nit, is that which is called prerogative: for since in some governments\nthe lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous,\nand so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because\nalso it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all\naccidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such\nlaws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour,\non all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way;\ntherefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many\nthings of choice which the laws do not prescribe.\n\nSect. 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community,\nand suitably to the trust and ends of the government, is undoubted\nprerogative, and never is questioned: for the people are very seldom or\nnever scrupulous or nice in the point; they are far from examining\nprerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use\nit was meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not manifestly\nagainst it: but if there comes to be a question between the executive\npower and the people, about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the\ntendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or hurt of the\npeople, will easily decide that question.\n\nSect. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments,\nwhen commonwealths differed little from families in number of people,\nthey differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the\ngovernors, being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their\ngood, the government was almost all prerogative. A few established laws\nserved the turn, and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied the\nrest. But when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make\nuse of this power for private ends of their own, and not for the public\ngood, the people were fain by express laws to get prerogative determined\nin those points wherein they found disadvantage from it: and thus\ndeclared limitations of prerogative were by the people found necessary\nin cases which they and their ancestors had left, in the utmost\nlatitude, to the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right\nuse of it, that is, for the good of their people.\n\nSect. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government,\nwho say, that the people have encroached upon the prerogative, when they\nhave got any part of it to be defined by positive laws: for in so doing\nthey have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to\nhim, but only declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in\nhis or his ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a\nthing which they intended him when he used it otherwise: for the end of\ngovernment being the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are\nmade in it, tending to that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any\nbody, since no body in government can have a right tending to any other\nend: and those only are encroachments which prejudice or hinder the\npublic good. Those who say otherwise, speak as if the prince had a\ndistinct and separate interest from the good of the community, and was\nnot made for it; the root and source from which spring almost all those\nevils and disorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if\nthat be so, the people under his government are not a society of\nrational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual good; they\nare not such as have set rulers over themselves, to guard, and promote\nthat good; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures\nunder the dominion of a master, who keeps them and works them for his\nown pleasure or profit. If men were so void of reason, and brutish, as\nto enter into society upon such terms, prerogative might indeed be, what\nsome men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the\npeople.\n\nSect. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free,\nto put himself into subjection to another, for his own harm; (though,\nwhere he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either\nnecessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things)\nprerogative can be nothing but the people\u2019s permitting their rulers to\ndo several things, of their own free choice, where the law was silent,\nand sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public\ngood; and their acquiescing in it when so done: for as a good prince,\nwho is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the good\nof his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to do\ngood; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power which his\npredecessors exercised without the direction of the law, as a\nprerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may\nexercise at his pleasure, to make or promote an interest distinct from\nthat of the public, gives the people an occasion to claim their right,\nand limit that power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good,\nthey were content should be tacitly allowed.\n\nSect. 165. And therefore he that will look into the history of England,\nwill find, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our\nwisest and best princes; because the people, observing the whole\ntendency of their actions to be the public good, contested not what was\ndone without law to that end: or, if any human frailty or mistake (for\nprinces are but men, made as others) appeared in some small declinations\nfrom that end; yet \u2019twas visible, the main of their conduct tended to\nnothing but the care of the public. The people therefore, finding reason\nto be satisfied with these princes, whenever they acted without, or\ncontrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they did, and,\nwithout the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as they\npleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice\nof their laws, since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of\nall laws, the public good.\n\nSect. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary\npower by that argument, that would prove absolute monarchy the best\ngovernment, as that which God himself governs the universe by; because\nsuch kings partake of his wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that\nsaying, That the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous\nto the liberties of their people: for when their successors, managing\nthe government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of those\ngood rulers into precedent, and make them the standard of their\nprerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the people\nwas a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they so\npleased; it has often occasioned contest, and sometimes public\ndisorders, before the people could recover their original right, and get\nthat to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was never so;\nsince it is impossible that any body in the society should ever have a\nright to do the people harm; though it be very possible, and reasonable,\nthat the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative\nof those kings, or rulers, who themselves transgressed not the bounds of\nthe public good: for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing\npublic good without a rule.\n\nSect. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise\ntime, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but\nstill with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the\nnation, as the exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall\nrequire: for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the\nfittest place for them to assemble in, and what the best season; the\nchoice of these was left with the executive power, as might be most\nsubservient to the public good, and best suit the ends of parliaments.\n\nSect. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative,\nBut who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of one\nanswer: between an executive power in being, with such a prerogative,\nand a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there\ncan be no judge on earth; as there can be none between the legislative\nand the people, should either the executive, or the legislative, when\nthey have got the power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave\nor destroy them. The people have no other remedy in this, as in all\nother cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven:\nfor the rulers, in such attempts, exercising a power the people never\nput into their hands, (who can never be supposed to consent that any\nbody should rule over them for their harm) do that which they have not a\nright to do. And where the body of the people, or any single man, is\ndeprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power without\nright, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal\nto heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment. And\ntherefore, though the people cannot be judge, so as to have, by the\nconstitution of that society, any superior power, to determine and give\neffective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a law antecedent and\nparamount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate\ndetermination to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there\nlies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to\nmake their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it\nbeing out of a man\u2019s power so to submit himself to another, as to give\nhim a liberty to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to\nabandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot\ntake away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it.\nNor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder;\nfor this operates not, till the inconveniency is so great, that the\nmajority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it\namended. But this the executive power, or wise princes, never need come\nin the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, they have most\nneed to avoid, as of all others the most perilous.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XV.\n\nOF PATERNAL, POLITICAL, AND DESPOTICAL POWER, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.\n\n\nSect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately\nbefore, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I\nsuppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another,\nit may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together.\n\nSect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that\nwhich parents have over their children, to govern them for the\nchildren\u2019s good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of\nknowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule,\nwhether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their country,\nthey are to govern themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as\nseveral others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and\ntenderness which God hath planted in the breast of parents towards their\nchildren, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a severe\narbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and\npreservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as\nI have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and\ndeath, at any time, over their children, more than over any body else;\nneither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep\nthe child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his\nparents, any farther than having received life and education from his\nparents, obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and\nsupport, all his life, to both father and mother. And thus, \u2019tis true,\nthe paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to\nthe ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. The power of the\nfather doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only\nin his own disposing.\n\nSect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man\nhaving in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the\nsociety, and therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over\nitself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for\ntheir good, and the preservation of their property: now this power,\nwhich every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to\nthe society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to\nuse such means, for the preserving of his own property, as he thinks\ngood, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of\nnature in others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most\nconduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So that\nthe end and measure of this power, when in every man\u2019s hands in the\nstate of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is,\nall mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the\nhands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in\ntheir lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute,\narbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as\npossible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such\npenalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by\ncutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they\nthreaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And\nthis power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the\nmutual consent of those who make up the community.\n\nSect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one\nman has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This\nis a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such\ndistinction between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man\nnot having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give\nanother man such a power over it; but it is the effect only of\nforfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts\nhimself into the state of war with another: for having quitted reason,\nwhich God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common\nbond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and\nhaving renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of\nthe force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has\nno right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by\nmaking force, which is their\u2019s, to be his rule of right, he renders\nhimself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of\nmankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any\nother wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither\nsociety nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful\nwar, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it\narises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the\nstate of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is\nnot master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be\nonce allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary\npower of his master ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own\nlife, has a right too to the means of preserving it; so that as soon as\ncompact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power,\nand puts an end to the state of war, who enters into conditions with his\ncaptive.\n\n(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that\nis destructive to their being.)\n\nSect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to\nparents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to\nsupply their want of ability, and understanding how to manage their\nproperty. (By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to\nmean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.)\nVoluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governors\nfor the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and\nuse of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third despotical power\nto lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of all\nproperty.\n\nSect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the\ndifferent ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal\npower comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical\nexceeds it; and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from\nbeing one kind of civil society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as\nslavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority makes\nthe child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have\nproperty in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have no\nproperty at all.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XVI.\n\nOF CONQUEST.\n\n\nSect. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than\nthat before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the\nconsent of the people; yet such have been the disorders ambition has\nfilled the world with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a\npart of the history of mankind, this consent is little taken notice of:\nand therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of\nthe people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government.\nBut conquest is as far from setting up any government, as demolishing an\nhouse is from building a new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes\nway for a new frame of a commonwealth, by destroying the former; but,\nwithout the consent of the people, can never erect a new one.\n\nSect. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war\nwith another, and unjustly invades another man\u2019s right, can, by such an\nunjust war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be\neasily agreed by all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates\nhave a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master;\nor that men are bound by promises, which unlawful force extorts from\nthem. Should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my\nthroat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him, would this give\nhim any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has an unjust conqueror,\nwho forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is equal,\nwhether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. The\ntitle of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no\ndifference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it. The only\ndifference is, great robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their\nobedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs,\nbecause they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world,\nand have the power in their own possession, which should punish\noffenders. What is my remedy against a robber, that so broke into my\nhouse? Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or\nI am crippled and cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it.\nIf God has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left\nbut patience. But my son, when able, may seek the relief of the law,\nwhich I am denied: he or his son may renew his appeal, till he recover\nhis right. But the conquered, or their children, have no court, no\narbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did,\nto heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native\nright of their ancestors, which was, to have such a legislative over\nthem, as the majority should approve, and freely acquiesce in. If it be\nobjected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, no more than\njustice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her. He that\ntroubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the\njustice of the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must\nbe sure he has right on his side; and a right too that is worth the\ntrouble and cost of the appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that\ncannot be deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one according\nto the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow subjects; that is, any\npart of mankind: from whence it is plain, that he that conquers in an\nunjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of\nthe conquered.\n\nSect. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider\na conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom.\n\nFirst, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that\nconquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the\nconquest, but must at least be as much freemen as they were before. And\nmost commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with\ntheir leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil, and other advantages that\nattend the conquering sword; or at least have a part of the subdued\ncountry bestowed upon them. And the conquering people are not, I hope,\nto be slaves by conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew they are\nsacrifices to their leaders triumph. They that found absolute monarchy\nupon the title of the sword, make their heroes, who are the founders of\nsuch monarchies, arrant Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers\nand soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won, or\nassisted them in the subduing, or shared in possessing, the countries\nthey mastered. We are told by some, that the English monarchy is founded\nin the Norman conquest, and that our princes have thereby a title to\nabsolute dominion: which if it were true, (as by the history it appears\notherwise) and that William had a right to make war on this island; yet\nhis dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the Saxons and\nBritons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans that\ncame with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended from them, are\nfreemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what dominion it\nwill. And if I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived from\nthem, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the\nlaw, that has made no distinction between the one and the other, intends\nnot there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges.\n\nSect. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and\nconquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and\nfreedom; let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the\nsubdued: and that I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power\nover the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but\nnot over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, nor\nover the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it.\n\nSect. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only\nover those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that\nunjust force that is used against him: for the people having given to\ntheir governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an\nunjust war, (for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought\nnot to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is\ncommitted in an unjust war, any farther than they actually abet it; no\nmore than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression\ntheir governors should use upon the people themselves, or any part of\ntheir fellow subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one\nthan to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to\nmake the distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to\nsweep all together: but yet this alters not the right; for the\nconquerors power over the lives of the conquered, being only because\nthey have used force to do, or maintain an injustice, he can have that\npower only over those who have concurred in that force; all the rest are\ninnocent; and he has no more title over the people of that country, who\nhave done him no injury, and so have made no forfeiture of their lives,\nthan he has over any other, who, without any injuries or provocations,\nhave lived upon fair terms with him.\n\nSect. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes\nin a just war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over\nthe lives of those, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have\nforfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title to their\npossessions. This I doubt not, but at first sight will seem a strange\ndoctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world; there\nbeing nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries,\nthan to say such an one conquered it; as if conquest, without any more\nado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider, that the\npractice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is\nseldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of\nthe conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by\nthe conquering sword.\n\nSect. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force\nand damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he\nuses force against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the\nuse of force only that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by\nforce he begins the injury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done\nthe injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it,\n(which is the same thing, as at first to have done it by force) it is\nthe unjust use of force that makes the war: for he that breaks open my\nhouse, and violently turns me out of doors; or having peaceably got in,\nby force keeps me out, does in effect the same thing; supposing we are\nin such a state, that we have no common judge on earth, whom I may\nappeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to submit: for of such I am\nnow speaking. It is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into\nthe state of war with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes\na forfeiture of his life: for quitting reason, which is the rule given\nbetween man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes\nliable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage\nravenous beast, that is dangerous to his being.\n\nSect. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of\nthe children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding\nthe brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his\nmiscarriages and violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves\nnot his children in his guilt or destruction. His goods, which nature,\nthat willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible,\nhath made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing, do\nstill continue to belong to his children: for supposing them not to have\njoined in the war, either thro\u2019 infancy, absence, or choice, they have\ndone nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any right to take\nthem away, by the bare title of having subdued him that by force\nattempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to\nthem, to repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence\nof his own right; which how far it reaches to the possessions of the\nconquered, we shall see by and by. So that he that by conquest has a\nright over a man\u2019s person to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby\na right over his estate to possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal\nforce the aggressor has used, that gives his adversary a right to take\naway his life, and destroy him if he pleases, as a noxious creature; but\nit is damage sustained that alone gives him title to another man\u2019s\ngoods: for though I may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway, yet\nI may not (which seems less) take away his money, and let him go: this\nwould be robbery on my side. His force, and the state of war he put\nhimself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his\ngoods. The right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who\njoined in the war, not to their estates, but only in order to make\nreparation for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and\nthat too with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and\nchildren.\n\nSect. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could\nbe supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could\nforfeit: his life is at the victor\u2019s mercy; and his service and goods he\nmay appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the\ngoods of his wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he\nenjoyed, and their shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in\nthe state of nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of nature\none with another) have injured another man, and refusing to give\nsatisfaction, it comes to a state of war, wherein my defending by force\nwhat I had gotten unjustly, makes me the aggressor. I am conquered: my\nlife, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife\u2019s and\nchildren\u2019s. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could not\nforfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share\nin my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, being\nborn of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance.\nHere then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for\ndamages received, and the children have a title to their father\u2019s estate\nfor their subsistence: for as to the wife\u2019s share, whether her own\nlabour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband\ncould not forfeit what was her\u2019s. What must be done in the case? I\nanswer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may\nbe, should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully\nto satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror\u2019s losses, and children\u2019s\nmaintenance, he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his\nfull satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of\nthose who are in danger to perish without it.\n\nSect. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be\nmade up to the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children\nof the vanquished, spoiled of all their father\u2019s goods, are to be left\nto starve and perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score,\nbe due to the conqueror, will scarce give him a title to any country he\nshall conquer: for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of\nany considerable tract of land, in any part of the world, where all the\nland is possessed, and none lies waste. And if I have not taken away the\nconqueror\u2019s land, which, being vanquished, it is impossible I should;\nscarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine,\nsupposing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming near\nwhat I had overrun of his. The destruction of a year\u2019s product or two\n(for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually\ncan be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away,\nthese are none of nature\u2019s goods, they have but a fantastical imaginary\nvalue: nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by\nher standard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European\nprince, or the silver money of Europe would have been formerly to an\nAmerican. And five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance\nof land, where all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be taken up\nby him that is disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but\ntake away the imaginary value of money, the disproportion being more\nthan between five and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a\nyear\u2019s product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being\nmore land than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has\nliberty to make use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care\nto possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished, No damage\ntherefore, that men in the state of nature (as all princes and\ngovernments are in reference to one another) suffer from one another,\ncan give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the\nvanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the\npossession of them and their descendants to all generations. The\nconqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very\ncondition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if\nthat be all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the\nstronger over the weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will\nhave a right to whatever he pleases to seize on.\n\nSect. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over\nthose of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity\neven of those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his\nconquest, no right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to\nhim, and if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to\nbegin and erect another to themselves.\n\nSect. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over\nthem, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his\nconditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford\nthem; but the enquiry is, what right he has to do so? If it be said,\nthey submit by their own consent, then this allows their own consent to\nbe necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains\nonly to be considered, whether promises extorted by force, without\nright, can be thought consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall\nsay, they bind not at all; because whatsoever another gets from me by\nforce, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently to\nrestore. He that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore\nhim, and I have still a right to retake him. By the same reason, he that\nforced a promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of\nthe obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether I\nwill perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only\nby the rules she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her\nrules: such is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at\nall alter the case to say, I gave my promise, no more than it excuses\nthe force, and passes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and\ndeliver my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol at my\nbreast.\n\nSect. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a\nconqueror, imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right\nof war, or who joined not in the war against him, where he had right,\nhas no obligation upon them.\n\nSect. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being\nall members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in\nthat unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the\nmercy of the conqueror.\n\nSect. 189. I say this concerns not their children who are in their\nminority: for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life\nor liberty of his child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that\nthe children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen,\nand the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the\npersons of the men that were subdued by him, and dies with them: and\nshould he govern them as slaves, subjected to his absolute arbitrary\npower, he has no such right of dominion over their children. He can have\nno power over them but by their own consent, whatever he may drive them\nto say or do; and he has no lawfull authority, whilst force, and not\nchoice, compels them to submission.\n\nSect. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of\nfreedom to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free\ndisposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man,\nto inherit with his brethren his father\u2019s goods.\n\nSect. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from\nsubjection to any government, tho\u2019 he be born in a place under its\njurisdiction; but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he\nwas born in, he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the\nlaws of it, and the possessions there descending to him from his\nancestors, if it were a government made by their consent.\n\nSect. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are\ndescended, and derive a title to their estates from those who are\nsubdued, and had a government forced upon them against their free\nconsents, retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though\nthey consent not freely to the government, whose hard conditions were by\nforce imposed on the possessors of that country: for the first conqueror\nnever having had a title to the land of that country, the people who are\nthe descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to\nthe yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it\noff, and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword\nhath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame\nof government as they willingly and of choice consent to. Who doubts but\nthe Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that\ncountry, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long\ngroaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no\ngovernment can have a right to obedience from a people who have not\nfreely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to do, till\neither they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government\nand governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to which\nthey have by themselves or their representatives given their free\nconsent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so\nto be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part\nof it without their own consent, without which, men under any government\nare not in the state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force\nof war.\n\nSect. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to\nthe estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which,\nit is plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from\nhence, in the continuance of the government; because the descendants of\nthese being all freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to\ninhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing)\nwhatsoever he grants them, they have, so far as it is granted, property\nin. The nature whereof is, that without a man\u2019s own consent it cannot be\ntaken from him.\n\nSect. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their\nproperties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their own\ndispose, and not at his; or else it is no property. Supposing the\nconqueror gives to one man a thousand acres, to him and his heirs for\never; to another he lets a thousand acres for his life, under the rent\nof 50_l_. or 500_l_. per ann. has not the one of these a right to his\nthousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the said\nrent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets\nover and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said\nterm, supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or\nconqueror, after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all,\nor part of the land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his\nlife, he paying the rent? or can he take away from either the goods or\nmoney they have got upon the said land, at his pleasure? If he can, then\nall free and voluntary contracts cease, and are void in the world; there\nneeds nothing to dissolve them at any time, but power enough: and all\nthe grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion:\nfor can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say, I give you and\nyour\u2019s this for ever, and that in the surest and most solemn way of\nconveyance can be devised; and yet it is to be understood, that I have\nright, if I please, to take it away from you again to morrow?\n\nSect. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the\nlaws of their country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the\nlaws of God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the\nobligations of that eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong, in\nthe case of promises, that omnipotency itself can be tied by them.\nGrants, promises, and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty: whatever\nsome flatterers say to princes of the world, who all together, with all\ntheir people joined to them, are, in comparison of the great God, but as\na drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance, inconsiderable, nothing!\n\nSect. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if\nhe have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all,\nthat actually aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right\nto make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he\ninjure not the right of any other. Over the rest of the people, if there\nwere any that consented not to the war, and over the children of the\ncaptives themselves, or the possessions of either, he has no power; and\nso can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion\nover them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an aggressor, if he\nattempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in a state of\nwar against them, and has no better a right of principality, he, nor any\nof his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in\nEngland; or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is\nto have their yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those under their\nsubjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding\nwhatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God\nassisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire.\nAnd the lord was with Hezekiah, and he prospered; wherefore he went\nforth, and he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not,\n2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which\nforce, and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath the name of\nrebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that which he allows and\ncountenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained by\nforce, have intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads\nthe story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued\nAhaz, and deposed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father\u2019s lifetime;\nand that Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute\nall this time.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XVII.\n\nOF USURPATION.\n\n\nSect. 197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation\nis a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an usurper\ncan never have right on his side, it being no usurpation, but where one\nis got into the possession of what another has right to. This, so far as\nit is usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and\nrules of the government: for if the usurper extend his power beyond what\nof right belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the\ncommonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation.\n\nSect. 198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons,\nwho are to bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of\nthe government itself, and is that which had its establishment\noriginally from the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no\nform of government at all; or to agree, that it shall be monarchical,\nbut to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power,\nand be the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with the form of government\nestablished, have rules also of appointing those who are to have any\nshare in the public authority, and settled methods of conveying the\nright to them: for the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of\ngovernment at all; or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to\nappoint no way to know or design the person that shall have the power,\nand be the monarch. Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the\npower, by other ways than what the laws of the community have\nprescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the\ncommonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws\nhave appointed, and consequently not the person the people have\nconsented to. Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever\nhave a title, till the people are both at liberty to consent, and have\nactually consented to allow, and confirm in him the power he hath till\nthen usurped.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XVIII.\n\nOF TYRANNY.\n\n\nSect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a\nright to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no\nbody can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one\nhas in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for\nhis own private separate advantage. When the governor, however intitled,\nmakes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions\nare not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people,\nbut the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any\nother irregular passion.\n\nSect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it\ncomes from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king\nwill make it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to the\nparliament, 1603, tells them thus,\n\n/#\n     I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole\n     commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions, to any\n     particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and\n     weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly\n     felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a\n     tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point\n     of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping\n     tyrant, is this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth\n     think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of\n     his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king\n     doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the\n     procuring of the wealth and property of his people.\n#/\n\nAnd again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words:\n\n/#\n     The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the\n     fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and\n     so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom;\n     and expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just\n     king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made\n     to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable\n     thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after\n     the deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat,\n     and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the\n     earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a settled\n     kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as\n     soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws.\n#/\n\nAnd a little after,\n\n/#\n     Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad\n     to bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that\n     persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them\n     and the commonwealth.\n#/\n\nThus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes\nthe difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that\none makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public,\nthe end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will\nand appetite.\n\nSect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to\nmonarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that:\nfor wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of\nthe people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to\nother ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the\narbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it; there it\npresently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or\nmany. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at\nSyracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome was\nnothing better.\n\nSect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be\ntransgressed to another\u2019s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the\npower given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his\ncommand, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not,\nceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be\nopposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another.\nThis is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority\nto seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a\nrobber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ,\nnotwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal\nauthority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should\nnot hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I\nwould gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother,\nbecause he has the greatest part of his father\u2019s estate, should thereby\nhave a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that\na rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a\nright to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor\nneighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches,\nexceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from\nbeing an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which\nthe endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great\naggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more\na right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a\nking than a constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has\nmore trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of\nhis brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of his education,\nemployment, and counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right\nand wrong.\n\nSect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be\nresisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but\nimagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all\npolities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but\nanarchy and confusion.\n\nSect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but\nto unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other\ncase, draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so\nno such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,\n\nSect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the\nlaw is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still\nfree from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial\ncensure or condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal\nacts of any inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he\nwill, by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people,\ndissolve the government, and leave them to that defence which belongs to\nevery one in the state of nature: for of such things who can tell what\nthe end will be? and a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd\nexample. In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him\nfrom all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, whilst the government\nstands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than which there cannot\nbe a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person not\nbeing likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able\nby his single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the\npeople, should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be\nwilling to do it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that\nmay happen sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well\nrecompensed by the peace of the public, and security of the government,\nin the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of\ndanger: it being safer for the body, that some few private men should be\nsometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the republic should\nbe easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.\n\nSect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king\u2019s\nperson, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted,\nwho use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which\nthe law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the\nking\u2019s writ to arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king;\nand yet he that has it cannot break open a man\u2019s house to do it, nor\nexecute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain\nplaces, though this commission have no such exception in it; but they\nare the limitations of the law, which if any one transgress, the king\u2019s\ncommission excuses him not: for the king\u2019s authority being given him\nonly by the law, he cannot impower any one to act against the law, or\njustify him, by his commission, in so doing; the commission, or command\nof any magistrate, where he has no authority, being as void and\ninsignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between the\none and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority so far,\nand to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the\ncommission, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and\nagainst the laws there can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such\nresistance, the king\u2019s person and authority are still both secured, and\nso no danger to governor or government.\n\nSect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the\nchief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness\nof resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every\nslight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the\ninjured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the\nlaw, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where\na man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be\naccounted hostile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an\nappeal; and it is such force alone, that puts him that uses it into a\nstate of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a sword in\nhis hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps I have not\ntwelve pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another I\ndeliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to\nrestore me, when I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the\npossession of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The mischief\nthis man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than\nthe other perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really did me\nany); and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as hurt\nthe other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain; because the one using\nforce, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the\nlaw to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The\nlaw could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable;\nwhich to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who\nhad put himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my\ndestruction. But in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may\nhave the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100\npounds that way.\n\nSect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be\nmaintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by\nlaw, be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even\nin such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight\noccasions, disturb the government: for if it reach no farther than some\nprivate men\u2019s cases, though they have a right to defend themselves, and\nto recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the\nright to do so will not easily engage them in a contest, wherein they\nare sure to perish; it being as impossible for one, or a few oppressed\nmen to disturb the government, where the body of the people do not think\nthemselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent\nto overturn a well settled state; the people being as little apt to\nfollow the one, as the other.\n\nSect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the\nmajority of the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted\nonly on some few, but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences\nseem to threaten all; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that\ntheir laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in\ndanger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from\nresisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell. This is an\ninconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments whatsoever, when\nthe governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of\ntheir people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put\nthemselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so\neasy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really\nmeans the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their\nlaws together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father\nof a family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of\nthem.\n\nSect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and\nactions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of\nprerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the\nprince\u2019s hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to\nthe end for which it was given: if the people shall find the ministers\nand subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured,\nor laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppose them: if they see\nseveral experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand\nfavoured, (tho\u2019 publicly proclaimed against) which is readiest to\nintroduce it; and the operators in it supported, as much as may be; and\nwhen that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked the better: if a\nlong train of actions shew the councils all tending that way; how can a\nman any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, which\nway things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he\ncould from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying\nhim, and the rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always\nsteering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of\nmen and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way\nfor some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the wind,\nweather, and other circumstances would let him?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER. XIX.\n\nOF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT.\n\n\nSect. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of\ngovernment, ought in the first place to distinguish between the\ndissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. That\nwhich makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of\nnature, into one politic society, is the agreement which every one has\nwith the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one\ndistinct commonwealth. The usual, and almost only way whereby this\nunion is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest\nupon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support\nthemselves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to\nthat body which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every\none return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for\nhimself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other\nsociety. Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the government\nof that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords often cut up\ngovernments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating the\nsubdued or scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence\non, that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The\nworld is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way\nof dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and\nthere wants not much argument to prove, that where the society is\ndissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as\nfor the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are\nscattered and dissipated by a whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused\nheap by an earthquake.\n\nSect. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are\ndissolved from within.\n\nFirst, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of\npeace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is\nexcluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative,\nfor the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is\nin their legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and\ncombined together into one coherent living body. This is the soul that\ngives form, life, and unity, to the commonwealth: from hence the\nseveral members have their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion:\nand therefore, when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution\nand death follows: for the essence and union of the society consisting\nin having one will, the legislative, when once established by the\nmajority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. The\nconstitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of\nsociety, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union,\nunder the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons\nauthorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people,\nwithout which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can have\nauthority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any\none, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have\nnot appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the\npeople are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again\nto be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new\nlegislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the\nforce of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them.\nEvery one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by\nthe delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are\nexcluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such authority\nor delegation.\n\nSect. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth\nwho misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and\nknow at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in\nwhich it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the\nconcurrence of three distinct persons.\n\n(<i>1</i>). A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme,\nexecutive power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the\nother two within certain periods of time.\n\n(<i>2</i>). An assembly of hereditary nobility.\n\n(<i>3</i>). An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the\npeople. Such a form of government supposed, it is evident,\n\nSect. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his\nown arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the\nsociety, declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed:\nfor that being in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put\nin execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and\nother rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative,\nconstituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the\nlegislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto\nauthorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts\nthe old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so\nsets up a new legislative.\n\nSect. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from\nassembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those\nends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is\nnot a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have\nalso freedom of debating, and leisure of perfecting, what is for the\ngood of the society, wherein the legislative consists: when these are\ntaken away or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise\nof their power, the legislative is truly altered; for it is not names\nthat constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers\nthat were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the\nfreedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in\neffect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government.\n\nSect. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the\nelectors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and\ncontrary to the common interest of the people, there also the\nlegislative is altered: for, if others than those whom the society hath\nauthorized thereunto, do chuse, or in another way than what the society\nhath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the\npeople.\n\nSect. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection\nof a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is\ncertainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the\ngovernment: for the end why people entered into society being to be\npreserved one intire, free, independent society, to be governed by its\nown laws; this is lost, whenever they are given up into the power of\nanother.\n\nSect. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the\ngovernment in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident;\nbecause he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to\nemploy, and often persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that\nas supreme magistrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a\ncondition to make great advances toward such changes, under pretence of\nlawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress\nopposers, as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government: whereas\nno other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by themselves to\nattempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and visible\nrebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails,\nproduces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides,\nthe prince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving\nthe other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private\npersons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his\nconcurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being necessary\nto give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet, so far as the other\nparts of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the\ngovernment, and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder\nsuch designs, they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly\nthe greatest crime which men can partake of one towards another.\n\nSec. 219.There is one way more whereby such a government may be\ndissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power,\nneglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no\nlonger be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to\nanarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not\nbeing made for themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of\nthe society, to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and\nfunction; when that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and\nthe people become a confused multitude, without order or connexion.\nWhere there is no longer the administration of justice, for the securing\nof men\u2019s rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct\nthe force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly\nis no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one\nas if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a\nmystery in politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent\nwith human society.\n\nSect. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is\ndissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by\nerecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of\npersons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety\nand good: for the society can never, by the fault of another, lose the\nnative and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be\ndone by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the\nlaws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they\nare not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for\nany. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new\nlegislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a\nforeign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may\nexpect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in\neffect no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care\nof their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act\nlike freemen. This, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men\ncan never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till\nthey are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not\nonly a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.\n\nSect. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments\nare dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either\nof them, act contrary to their trust.\n\nFirst, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they\nendeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves,\nor any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the\nlives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.\n\nSect. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of\ntheir property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative,\nis, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to\nthe properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power,\nand moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for\nsince it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the\nlegislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs\nto secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted\nthemselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators\nendeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to\nreduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a\nstate of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any\nfarther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath\nprovided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore\nthe legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and\neither by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp\nthemselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over\nthe lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust\nthey forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite\ncontrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume\ntheir original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative,\n(such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and\nsecurity, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have\nsaid here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also\nconcerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him,\nboth to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the\nlaw, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary\nwill as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when\nhe either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to\ncorrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly\npreengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he\nhas, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his\ndesigns; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised\nbefore-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates\nand electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut\nup the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public\nsecurity? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of\ntheir representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for\nno other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so\nchosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth,\nand the public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be\njudged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the\ndebate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of\ndoing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the\ndeclared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the\npeople, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a\nbreach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the\ngovernment, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add\nrewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the\narts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that\nstand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to\nbetray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is\ndoing. What power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it\ncontrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is\neasy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once\nattempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.\n\nSect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being\nignorant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government\nin the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose\nit to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if\nthe people may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at\nthe old one. To this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are not so\neasily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are\nhardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the\nframe they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original\ndefects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is\nnot an easy thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees\nthere is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people\nto quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have\nbeen seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to,\nor, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back\nagain to our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever\nprovocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes\nheads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another\nline.\n\nSect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for\nfrequent rebellion. To which I answer,\n\nFirst, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made\nmiserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary\npower, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter;\nlet them be sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven;\ngive them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The\npeople generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon\nany occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them.\nThey will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the change,\nweakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer\nitself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not\nseen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little,\nwho cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the\nworld.\n\nSect. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every\nlittle mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling\npart, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human\nfrailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a\nlong train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same\nway, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel\nwhat they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be\nwondered, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put\nthe rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which\ngovernment was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and\nspecious forms, are so far from being better, that they are much worse,\nthan the state of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all\nas great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.\n\nSect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the\npeople of providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when\ntheir legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their\nproperty, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means\nto hinder it: for rebellion being an opposition, not to persons, but\nauthority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the\ngovernment; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by\nforce justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels:\nfor when men, by entering into society and civil-government, have\nexcluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property,\npeace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again in\nopposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the\nstate of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by\nthe pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have\nin their hands, and the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to\ndo; the properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger\nand injustice of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run into\nit.\n\nSect. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative\nis changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they\nwere constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if\nany one by force takes away the established legislative of any society,\nand the laws by them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes\naway the umpirage, which every one had consented to, for a peaceable\ndecision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war\namongst them. They, who remove, or change the legislative, take away\nthis decisive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and\nconsent of the people; and so destroying the authority which the people\ndid, and no body else can set up, and introducing a power which the\npeople hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of war,\nwhich is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the\nlegislative established by the society, (in whose decisions the people\nacquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the\nknot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who\nby force take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators\nthemselves, as has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they,\nwho were set up for the protection, and preservation of the people,\ntheir liberties and properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to\ntake them away; and so they putting themselves into a state of war with\nthose who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are\nproperly, and with the greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.\n\nSect. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean\nthat it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people\nthey are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon\ntheir liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of\nthose who were their magistrates, when they invade their properties\ncontrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is\nnot to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they\nmay as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose\nrobbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If\nany mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who\ndefends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. If the\ninnocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him\nwho will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what\na kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in\nviolence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit\nof robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace\nbetwix the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance,\nyielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus\u2019s den\ngives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a government,\nwherein Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to\nsuffer themselves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who was a\nprudent man, preached up passive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet\nsubmission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was to\nmankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they should\noffer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.\n\nSect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is\nbest for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the\nboundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable\nto be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and\nemploy it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the\nproperties of their people?\n\nSect. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as\noften as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the\nalteration of the government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever\nthey please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition:\nfor till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the\nrulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part,\nthe people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by\nresistance, are not apt to stir. The examples of particular injustice,\nor oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. But\nif they universally have a persuation, grounded upon manifest evidence,\nthat designs are carrying on against their liberties, and the general\ncourse and tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions of\nthe evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who\ncan help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this\nsuspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of\nrational creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they\nfind and feel them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things\ninto such a posture, that they would not have them thought to be as they\nare? I grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men\nhave sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions\nhave been fatal to states and kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath\noftener begun in the peoples wantonness, and a desire to cast off the\nlawful authority of their rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and\nendeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people;\nwhether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to the\ndisorder, I leave it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure,\nwhoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the\nrights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for\noverturning the constitution and frame of any just government, is highly\nguilty of the greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to\nanswer for all those mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which\nthe breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country. And he who\ndoes it, is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind,\nand is to be treated accordingly.\n\nSect. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the\nproperties of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all\nhands. But that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath\nof late been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and\nadvantages by the law, had thereby a power to break those laws, by which\nalone they were set in a better place than their brethren: whereas their\noffence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater\nshare they have by the law, and breaking also that trust, which is put\ninto their hands by their brethren.\n\nSect. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in\nsociety, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with\nthose against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are\ncancelled, all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend\nhimself, and to resist the aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay\nhimself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings, is\nforced to confess, That it is lawful for the people, in some cases, to\nresist their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to\nshew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of\nrebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since\nthey may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not\nrebellion. His words are these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus\ntyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone\nmultitude civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma vastari, seque, conjuges,\n& liberos fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae\npericula omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num\nillis quod omni animantium generi est a natura tributum, denegari debet,\nut sc. vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? Huic breviter\nresponsum sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis\nest, neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi\ndebere. Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot\nprivatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput\nest, i.e. totum populum, vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani &\nintoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu\nresistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se\ntantum, non enim in principem invadendi: & restituendae injuriae\nillatae, non recedendi a debita reverentia propter acceptam injuriam.\nPraesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscenti\njus habet. Horum enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam scilicet corpusque\ntueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de superiori\nsupplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit,\nimpedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem\nsceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus\nquispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto\nBuchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest. Cum ille si\nintolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resistere\ncum reverentia possit, Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8.\n\nIn English thus:\n\nSect. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always lay\nthemselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their\ncities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to\nthe tyrant\u2019s lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their\nking to ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit\nstill? Must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force\nwith force, which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for\ntheir preservation from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the\nlaw of nature; nor can it be denied the community, even against the king\nhimself: but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed\nthem; it being not agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king shall\nshew an hatred, not only to some particular persons, but sets himself\nagainst the body of the commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and\nshall, with intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or\na considerable part of the people, in this case the people have a right\nto resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with this\ncaution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their\nprince: they may repair the damages received, but must not for any\nprovocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may\nrepulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it\nis natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should\npunish a superior, is against nature. The mischief which is designed\nthem, the people may prevent before it be done; but when it is done,\nthey must not revenge it on the king, though author of the villany. This\ntherefore is the privilege of the people in general, above what any\nprivate person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversaries\nthemselves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy but\npatience; but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable\ntyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it.\n\nSect. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of\nresistance.\n\nSect. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no\npurpose:\n\nFirst, He says, it must be with reverence.\n\nSecondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason\nhe gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. First, How to\nresist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence,\nwill need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an\nassault only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more\nrespectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the confidence\nand force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance,\nand will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse\nusage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as juvenal thought it\nof fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum. And the success of the\ncombat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it:\n\n/*[4]\n      -----Libertas pauperis haec est:\n    Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat,\n    Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.\n*/\n\nThis will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men\nmay not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to\nstrike. And then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the\nhead, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he\nthinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I\nknow, desire for his pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he\ncan meet with it.\n\nSecondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that\nis true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist\nforce with force, being the state of war that levels the parties,\ncancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and\nthen the odds that remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust\nagressor, has this superiority over him, that he has a right, when he\nprevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and\nall the evils that followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in another\nplace, more coherently to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a\nking in any case. But he there assigns two cases, whereby a king may\nun-king himself. His words are,\n\nQuid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere\natque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo\nsuaque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex\ndivinis id obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei\nordinationi resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si\nid committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse\nprincipatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus &\nsuperior efficitur, reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem\ninauguratum in interregno habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa\nejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo\nperlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus rex ipso\nfacto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque\nin subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum\nunus est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is\nnempe senatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque\nvastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod\npalam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore,\ninque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque\nAlexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei\ncervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem\nregnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos\namittit, ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium.\n\nSect. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit,\nac regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae\nditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo\nplane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis\namifit, ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo\ninferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus\nlibertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis\nditionem & potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione\neffecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum\ncui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto\nliberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum\nannales Scotici suppeditant. Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16.\n\nWhich in English runs thus:\n\nSect. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of\nright, and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set\nupon their king, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst\nhe remains a king. Honour the king, and he that resists the power,\nresists the ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit\nit, The people therefore can never come by a power over him, unless he\ndoes something that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests\nhimself of his crown and dignity, and returns to the state of a private\nman, and the people become free and superior, the power which they had\nin the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving to them\nagain. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this\nstate. After considering it well on all sides, I can find but two. Two\ncases there are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes no king, and\nloses all power and regal authority over his people; which are also\ntaken notice of by Winzerus.\n\nThe first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he\nhave a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is\nrecorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of\nRome, lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some\nother place. And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be\nno longer a head to the people or senate, and that he had it in his\nthoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to\nAlexandria: and he wisht that the people had but one neck, that he might\ndispatch them all at a blow, Such designs as these, when any king\nharbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives\nup all care and thought of the commonwealth; and consequently forfeits\nthe power of governing his subjects, as a master does the dominion over\nhis slaves whom he hath abandoned.\n\nSect. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent of\nanother, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the\npeople put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however\nperhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because\nhe has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next\nand immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom; and also because he\nbetrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully\npreserved, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as\nit were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself loses the power he had in\nit before, without transferring any the least right to those on whom he\nwould have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, and\nleaves them at their own disposal. One example of this is to be found in\nthe Scotch Annals.\n\nSect. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute\nmonarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to\nbe a king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he\nhas no authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for\nwheresoever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like\nother men who have no authority. And these two cases he instances in,\ndiffer little from those above mentioned, to be destructive to\ngovernments, only that he has omitted the principle from which his\ndoctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the\nform of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government\nitself, which is the public good and preservation of property. When a\nking has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his\npeople, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as\nthey would any other man, who has put himself into a state of war with\nthem, Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us. This\nfarther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says,\nThe mischief that is designed them, the people may prevent before it be\ndone: whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design. Such\ndesigns as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and\nseriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the\ncommonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good\nis to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a\nsufficient cause of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these\nwords, Because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought\ncarefully to have preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion\nof a foreign nation, signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying\nin the loss of their liberty, which he ought to have preserved, and not\nin any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected.\nThe peoples right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, whether\nthey are made slaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in\nthis lies the injury, and against this only have they the right of\ndefence. And there are instances to be found in all countries, which\nshew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their\ngovernors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson,\na bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and\nprerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of\nChristian subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power,\nand their title to the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed\nauthority in a case where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to\nBracton, Fortescue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers\nthat cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to\nit. But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men, who\nrelying on him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate\ncarried to deny those principles upon which he builds it. Whether they\nare herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own\nfabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policy is so\nnew, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as\nformer ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped,\nthose to come, redeemed from the impositions of these Egyptian\nunder-task-masters, will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers,\nwho, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all government into\nabsolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean souls\nfitted them for, slavery.\n\nSect. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who shall\nbe judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust?\nThis, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the\npeople, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I\nreply, The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his\ntrustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him,\nbut he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a\npower to discard him, when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable\nin particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that\nof the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and\nalso where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very\ndifficult, dear, and dangerous?\n\nSect. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot\nmean, that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on\nearth, to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He\nalone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for\nhimself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether another hath put\nhimself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to\nthe Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.\n\nSect. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the\npeople, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing\nbe of great consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a\ncase, should be the body of the people: for in cases where the prince\nhath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary\nrules of the law; there, if any men find themselves aggrieved, and think\nthe prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to\njudge as the body of the people, (who, at first, lodged that trust in\nhim) how far they meant it should extend? But if the prince, or whoever\nthey be in the administration, decline that way of determination, the\nappeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between either persons,\nwho have no known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a\njudge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies\nonly to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for\nhimself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put\nhimself upon it.\n\nSect. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the\nsociety, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals\nagain, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the\ncommunity; because without this there can be no community, no\ncommonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: so also when\nthe society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to\ncontinue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for\nproviding such successors, the legislative can never revert to the\npeople whilst that government lasts; because having provided a\nlegislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their\npolitical power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they\nhave set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this\nsupreme power in any person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when\nby the miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the\nforfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the\nsociety, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the\nlegislative in themselves; or erect a new form, or under the old form\nplace it in new hands, as they think good.\n\n\nFINIS.","title":"Second Treatise of Government","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":56517}