{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_73782/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_73782","id":"gutenberg_73782","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73782","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Free thought","Life","Nobel Prizes in Literature","Philosophy"],"text":"WHAT I BELIEVE\n\n\n\n\n           THE TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW SERIES\n\n\n  _D\u00c6DALUS, or Science and the Future_\n      By J. B. S. Haldane\n\n  _ICARUS, or The Future of Science_\n      By the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.\n\n  _THE MONGOL IN OUR MIDST_\n      By F. G. Crookshank, M.D. _Fully Illustrated_\n\n  _WIRELESS POSSIBILITIES_\n      By Prof. A. M. Low. _With four Diagrams_\n\n  _TANTALUS, or The Future of Man_\n      By F. C. S. Schiller\n\n  _NARCISSUS, An Anatomy of Clothes_\n      By Gerald Heard. _Illustrated_\n\n  _CALLINICUS, A Defence of Chemical Warfare_\n      By J. B. S. Haldane\n\n  _THE PASSING OF THE PHANTOMS_\n      By C. J. Patten, M.A., M.D., Sc.D., F.R.A.I.\n\n  _QUO VADIMUS? Some Glimpses of the Future_\n      By E. E. Fournier d\u2019Albe, D.Sc., F.Inst.P.\n\n  _THE CONQUEST OF CANCER_\n      By H. W. S. Wright, M.S., F.R.C.S.\n\n  _LYSISTRATA, or Woman and the Future_\n      By Anthony M. Ludovici\n\n  _WHAT I BELIEVE_\n      By the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.\n\n  _HYPATIA_\n      By Dora Russell (The Hon. Mrs. Bertrand Russell)\n\n\n                   _In Preparation_\n\n  _PERSEUS, of Dragons_\n      By H. F. Scott Stokes, M.A.\n\n  _THE EVOCATION OF GENIUS_\n      By Alan Porter\n\n  _THE FUTURE OF SEX_\n      By Rebecca West\n\n  _AESCULAPIUS, or Disease and The Man_\n      By F. G. Crookshank, M.D.\n\n\n                 E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY\n\n\n\n\n                            WHAT I BELIEVE\n\n                                  BY\n                           BERTRAND RUSSELL\n\n\n                            [Illustration]\n\n\n                               NEW YORK\n                        E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY\n                           681 FIFTH AVENUE\n\n\n\n\n                            Copyright, 1925\n                       By E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY\n\n\n                         _All Rights Reserved_\n\n                      First Printing, April, 1925\n                      Second Printing, June, 1925\n                      Third Printing, June, 1925\n                     Fourth Printing, March, 1926\n\n\n                PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n\n\n\n                                PREFACE\n\n\nIn this little book, I have tried to say what I think of man\u2019s place\nin the universe, and of his possibilities in the way of achieving the\ngood life. In _Icarus_ I expressed my fears; in the following pages I\nhave expressed my hopes. The inconsistency is only apparent. Except\nin astronomy, mankind have not achieved the art of predicting the\nfuture; in human affairs, we can see that there are forces making for\nhappiness, and forces making for misery. We do not know which will\nprevail, but to act wisely we must be aware of both.\n\n _January 1st, 1925_                                          B. R.\n\n\n\n\n              TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n CHAP.                                   PAGE\n\n   I NATURE AND MAN                         1\n\n  II THE GOOD LIFE                         19\n\n III MORAL RULES                           35\n\n  IV SALVATION: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL      55\n\n   V SCIENCE AND HAPPINESS                 65\n\n\n\n\n                            WHAT I BELIEVE\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER I\n\n                            NATURE AND MAN\n\n\nMan is a part of Nature, not something contrasted with Nature. His\nthoughts and his bodily movements follow the same laws that describe\nthe motions of stars and atoms. The physical world is large compared\nwith Man\u2015\u2015larger than it was thought to be in Dante\u2019s time, but not so\nlarge as it seemed a hundred years ago. Both upward and downward, both\nin the large and in the small, science seems to be reaching limits. It\nis thought that the universe is of finite extent in space, and that\nlight could travel round it in a few hundred millions of years. It is\nthought that matter consists of electrons and protons, which are of\nfinite size, and of which there are only a finite number in the world.\nProbably their changes are not continuous, as used to be thought, but\nproceed by jerks, which are never smaller than a certain minimum jerk.\nThe laws of these changes can apparently be summed up in a small number\nof very general principles, which determine the past and the future of\nthe world when any small section of its history is known.\n\nPhysical science is thus approaching the stage when it will be\ncomplete, and therefore uninteresting. Given the laws governing the\nmotions of electrons and protons, the rest is merely geography\u2015\u2015a\ncollection of particular facts telling their distribution throughout\nsome portion of the world\u2019s history. The total number of facts of\ngeography required to determine the world\u2019s history is probably finite;\ntheoretically, they could all be written down in a big book to be\nkept at Somerset House, with a calculating machine attached, which, by\nturning a handle, would enable the inquirer to find out the facts at\nother times than those recorded. It is difficult to imagine anything\nless interesting, or more different from the passionate delights of\nincomplete discovery. It is like climbing a high mountain and finding\nnothing at the top except a restaurant where they sell ginger-beer,\nsurrounded by fog but equipped with wireless. Perhaps in the time of\nAhmes the multiplication-table was exciting.\n\nOf this physical world, uninteresting in itself, Man is a part. His\nbody, like other matter, is composed of electrons and protons, which,\nso far as we know, obey the same laws as those not forming part of\nanimals or plants. There are some who maintain that physiology\ncan never be reduced to physics, but their arguments are not very\nconvincing and it seems prudent to suppose that they are mistaken.\nWhat we call our \u201cthoughts\u201d seem to depend upon the organization of\ntracks in the brain in the same sort of way in which journeys depend\nupon roads and railways. The energy used in thinking seems to have\na chemical origin; for instance, a deficiency of iodine will turn a\nclever man into an idiot. Mental phenomena seem to be bound up with\nmaterial structure. If this be so, we cannot suppose that a solitary\nelectron or proton can \u201cthink\u201d; we might as well expect a solitary\nindividual to play a football match. We also cannot suppose that an\nindividual\u2019s thinking survives bodily death, since that destroys the\norganization of the brain, and dissipates the energy which utilized the\nbrain-tracks.\n\nGod and immortality, the central dogmas of the Christian religion,\nfind no support in science. It cannot be said that either doctrine\nis essential to religion, since neither is found in Buddhism. (With\nregard to immortality, this statement in an unqualified form might be\nmisleading, but it is correct in the last analysis). But we in the West\nhave come to think of them as the irreducible minimum of theology. No\ndoubt people will continue to entertain these beliefs, because they are\npleasant, just as it is pleasant to think ourselves virtuous and our\nenemies wicked. But for my part I cannot see any ground for either.\nI do not pretend to be able to prove that there is no God. I equally\ncannot prove that Satan is a fiction. The Christian God may exist; so\nmay the Gods of Olympus, or of ancient Egypt, or of Babylon. But no one\nof these hypotheses is more probable than any other: they lie outside\nthe region of even probable knowledge, and therefore there is no reason\nto consider any of them. I shall not enlarge upon this question, as I\nhave dealt with it elsewhere.[A]\n\n  [A] See my _Philosophy of Leibniz_, Chapter XV.\n\nThe question of personal immortality stands on a somewhat different\nfooting. Here evidence either way is possible. Persons are part of the\neveryday world with which science is concerned, and the conditions\nwhich determine their existence are discoverable. A drop of water\nis not immortal; it can be resolved into oxygen and hydrogen. If,\ntherefore, a drop of water were to maintain that it had a quality of\naqueousness which would survive its dissolution, we should be inclined\nto be sceptical. In like manner we know that the brain is not immortal,\nand that the organized energy of a living body becomes, as it were,\ndemobilized at death, and therefore not available for collective\naction. All the evidence goes to show that what we regard as our mental\nlife is bound up with brain-structure and organized bodily energy.\nTherefore it is rational to suppose that mental life ceases when bodily\nlife ceases. The argument is only one of probability, but it is as\nstrong as those upon which most scientific conclusions are based.\n\nThere are various grounds upon which this conclusion might be\nattacked. Psychical research professes to have actual scientific\nevidence of survival, and undoubtedly its procedure is, in principle,\nscientifically correct. Evidence of this sort might be so overwhelming\nthat no one with a scientific temper could reject it. The weight to be\nattached to the evidence, however, must depend upon the antecedent\nprobability of the hypothesis of survival. There are always different\nways of accounting for any set of phenomena, and of these we should\nprefer the one which is antecedently least improbable. Those who\nalready think it likely that we survive death will be ready to view\nthis theory as the best explanation of psychical phenomena. Those,\nwho, on other grounds, regard this theory as unplausible will seek\nfor other explanations. For my part, I consider the evidence so far\nadduced by psychical research in favour of survival much weaker than\nthe physiological evidence on the other side. But I fully admit that\nit might at any moment become stronger, and in that case it would be\nunscientific to disbelieve in survival.\n\nSurvival of bodily death is, however, a different matter from\nimmortality: it may only mean a postponement of psychical death. It\nis immortality that men desire to believe in. Believers in immortality\nwill object to physiological arguments, such as I have been using, on\nthe ground that soul and body are totally disparate, and that the soul\nis something quite other than its empirical manifestations through our\nbodily organs. I believe this to be a metaphysical superstition. Mind\nand matter alike are for certain purposes convenient terms, but are not\nultimate realities. Electrons and protons, like the soul, are logical\nfictions: each is really a history, a series of events, not a single\npersistent entity. In the case of the soul, this is obvious from the\nfacts of growth. Whoever considers conception, gestation, and infancy\ncannot seriously believe that the soul is an indivisible something,\nperfect and complete throughout this process. It is evident that it\ngrows like the body, and that it derives both from the spermatozoon\nand from the ovum, so that it cannot be indivisible. This is not\nmaterialism: it is merely the recognition that everything interesting\nis a matter of organization, not of primal substance.\n\nMetaphysicians have advanced innumerable arguments to prove that the\nsoul _must_ be immortal. There is one simple test by which all these\narguments can be demolished. They all prove equally that the soul must\npervade all space. But as we are not so anxious to be fat as to live\nlong, none of the metaphysicians in question have ever noticed this\napplication of their reasonings. This is an instance of the amazing\npower of desire in blinding even very able men to fallacies which would\notherwise be obvious at once. If we were not afraid of death, I do not\nbelieve that the idea of immortality would ever have arisen.\n\nFear is the basis of religious dogma, as of so much else in human\nlife. Fear of human beings, individually or collectively, dominates\nmuch of our social life, but it is fear of nature that gives rise\nto religion. The antithesis of mind and matter is, as we have seen,\nmore or less illusory; but there is another antithesis which is more\nimportant\u2015\u2015that, namely, between things that can be affected by our\ndesires and things that cannot be so affected. The line between the\ntwo is neither sharp nor immutable\u2015\u2015as science advances, more and more\nthings are brought under human control. Nevertheless there remain\nthings definitely on the other side. Among these are all the _large_\nfacts of our world, the sort of facts that are dealt with by astronomy.\nIt is only facts on or near the surface of the earth that we can, to\nsome extent, mould to suit our desires. And even on the surface of the\nearth, our powers are very limited. Above all, we cannot prevent death,\nalthough we can often delay it.\n\nReligion is an attempt to overcome this antithesis. If the world\nis controlled by God, and God can be moved by prayer, we acquire a\nshare in omnipotence. In former days, miracles happened in answer to\nprayer; they still do in the Catholic Church, but Protestants have lost\nthis power. However, it is possible to dispense with miracles, since\nProvidence has decreed that the operation of natural laws shall produce\nthe best possible results. Thus belief in God still serves to humanize\nthe world of nature, and to make men feel that physical forces are\nreally their allies. In like manner immortality removes the terror from\ndeath. People who believe that when they die they will inherit eternal\nbliss may be expected to view death without horror, though, fortunately\nfor medical men, this does not invariably happen. It does, however,\nsoothe men\u2019s fears somewhat, even when it cannot allay them wholly.\n\nReligion, since it has its source in terror, has dignified certain\nkinds of fear, and made people think them not disgraceful. In this it\nhas done mankind a great disservice: _all_ fear is bad, and ought to be\novercome not by fairy tales, but by courage and rational reflection.\nI believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will\nsurvive. I am not young, and I love life. But I should scorn to shiver\nwith terror at the thought of annihilation. Happiness is none the less\ntrue happiness because it must come to an end, nor do thought and love\nlose their value because they are not everlasting. Many a man has\nborne himself proudly on the scaffold: surely the same pride should\nteach us to think truly about man\u2019s place in the world. Even if the\nopen windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor\nwarmth of traditional humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings\nvigour, and the great spaces have a splendour of their own.\n\nThe philosophy of nature is one thing, the philosophy of value is\nquite another. Nothing but harm can come of confusing them. What we\nthink good, what we should like, has no bearing whatever upon what is,\nwhich is the question for the philosophy of nature. On the other hand,\nwe cannot be forbidden to value this or that on the ground that the\nnon-human world does not value it, nor can we be compelled to admire\nanything because it is a \u201claw of nature.\u201d Undoubtedly we are part\nof nature, which has produced our desires, our hopes and fears, in\naccordance with laws which the physicist is beginning to discover. In\nthis sense we are part of nature; in the philosophy of nature, we are\nsubordinated to nature, the outcome of natural laws, and their victims\nin the long run.\n\nThe philosophy of nature must not be unduly terrestrial; for it, the\nearth is merely one of the smaller planets of one of the smaller stars\nof the Milky Way. It would be ridiculous to warp the philosophy of\nnature in order to bring out results that are pleasing to the tiny\nparasites of this insignificant planet. Vitalism as a philosophy, and\nevolutionism, show, in this respect, a lack of sense of proportion and\nlogical relevance. They regard the facts of life, which are personally\ninteresting to us, as having a cosmic significance, not a significance\nconfined to the earth\u2019s surface. Optimism and pessimism, as cosmic\nphilosophies, show the same na\u00efve humanism: the great world, so far\nas we know it from the philosophy of nature, is neither good nor bad,\nand is not concerned to make us either happy or unhappy. All such\nphilosophies spring from self-importance, and are best corrected by a\nlittle astronomy.\n\nBut in the philosophy of value the situation is reversed. Nature is\nonly a part of what we can imagine; everything, real or imagined, can\nbe appraised by us, and there is no outside standard to show that our\nvaluation is wrong. We are ourselves the ultimate and irrefutable\narbiters of value, and in the world of value Nature is only a part.\nThus in this world we are greater than Nature. In the world of values,\nNature in itself is neutral, neither good nor bad, deserving of\nneither admiration nor censure. It is we who create value, and our\ndesires which confer value. In this realm we are kings, and we debase\nour kingship if we bow down to Nature. It is for us to determine the\ngood life, not for Nature\u2015\u2015not even for Nature personified as God.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER II\n\n                             THE GOOD LIFE\n\n\nThere have been at different times and among different people many\nvarying conceptions of the good life. To some extent the differences\nwere amenable to argument; this was when men differed as to the\nmeans to achieve a given end. Some think that prison is a good way\nof preventing crime; others hold that education would be better. A\ndifference of this sort can be decided by sufficient evidence. But some\ndifferences cannot be tested in this way. Tolstoy condemned all war;\nothers have held the life of a soldier doing battle for the right to\nbe very noble. Here there was probably involved a real difference as\nto ends. Those who praise the soldier usually consider the punishment\nof sinners a good thing in itself; Tolstoy did not think so. On such\na matter, no argument is possible. I cannot, therefore, prove that my\nview of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that\nas many as possible will agree. My view is this:\n\n_The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge._\n\nKnowledge and love are both indefinitely extensible; therefore, however\ngood a life may be, a better life can be imagined. Neither love without\nknowledge, nor knowledge without love can produce a good life. In the\nMiddle Ages, when pestilence appeared in a country, holy men advised\nthe population to assemble in churches and pray for deliverance; the\nresult was that the infection spread with extraordinary rapidity among\nthe crowded masses of supplicants. This was an example of love without\nknowledge. The late War afforded an example of knowledge without love.\nIn each case, the result was death on a large scale.\n\nAlthough both love and knowledge are necessary, love is in a sense more\nfundamental, since it will lead intelligent people to seek knowledge,\nin order to find out how to benefit those whom they love. But if people\nare not intelligent, they will be content to believe what they have\nbeen told, and may do harm in spite of the most genuine benevolence.\nMedicine affords, perhaps, the best example of what I mean. An able\nphysician is more useful to a patient than the most devoted friend,\nand progress in medical knowledge does more for the health of the\ncommunity than ill-informed philanthropy. Nevertheless, an element of\nbenevolence is essential even here, if any but the rich are to profit\nby scientific discoveries.\n\nLove is a word which covers a variety of feelings; I have used it\npurposely, as I wish to include them all. Love as an emotion\u2015\u2015which\nis what I am speaking about, for love \u201con principle\u201d does not seem to\nme genuine\u2015\u2015moves between two poles: on the one side, pure delight in\ncontemplation; on the other, pure benevolence. Where inanimate objects\nare concerned, delight alone enters in: we cannot feel benevolence\ntowards a landscape or a sonata. This type of enjoyment is presumably\nthe source of art. It is stronger, as a rule, in very young children\nthan in adults, who are apt to view objects in a utilitarian spirit. It\nplays a large part in our feelings towards human beings, some of whom\nhave charm and some the reverse, when considered simply as objects of\naesthetic contemplation.\n\nThe opposite pole of love is pure benevolence. Men have sacrificed\ntheir lives to helping lepers in such a case, the love they felt cannot\nhave had any element of aesthetic delight. Parental affection, as a\nrule, is accompanied by pleasure in the child\u2019s appearance, but remains\nstrong when this element is wholly absent. It would seem odd to call a\nmother\u2019s interest in a sick child \u201cbenevolence,\u201d because we are in the\nhabit of using this word to describe a pale emotion nine parts humbug.\nBut it is difficult to find any other word to describe the desire for\nanother person\u2019s welfare. It is a fact that a desire of this sort\nmay reach any degree of strength in the case of parental feeling. In\nother cases it is far less intense; indeed it would seem likely that\nall altruistic emotion is a sort of overflow of parental feeling,\nor sometimes a sublimation of it. For want of a better word, I shall\ncall this emotion \u201cbenevolence.\u201d But I want to make it clear that I am\nspeaking of an emotion, not a principle, and that I do not include in\nit any feeling of superiority such as is sometimes associated with the\nword. The word \u201csympathy\u201d expresses part of what I mean, but leaves out\nthe element of activity that I wish to include.\n\nLove at its fullest is an indissoluble combination of the two elements,\ndelight and well-wishing. The pleasure of a parent in a beautiful and\nsuccessful child combines both elements; so does sex-love at its best.\nBut in sex-love benevolence will only exist where there is secure\npossession, since otherwise jealousy will destroy it, while perhaps\nactually increasing the delight in contemplation. Delight without\nwell-wishing may be cruel; well-wishing without delight easily tends\nto become cold and a little superior. A person who wishes to be loved\nwishes to be the object of a love containing both elements, except in\ncases of extreme weakness, such as infancy and severe illness. In these\ncases benevolence may be all that is desired. Conversely, in cases of\nextreme strength admiration is more desired than benevolence: this is\nthe state of mind of potentates and famous beauties. We only desire\nother people\u2019s good wishes in proportion as we feel ourselves in need\nof help or in danger of harm from them. At least, that would seem to\nbe the biological logic of the situation, but it is not quite true\nto life. We desire affection in order to escape from the feeling of\nloneliness, in order to be, as we say, \u201cunderstood.\u201d This is a matter\nof sympathy, not merely of benevolence; the person whose affection is\nsatisfactory to us must not merely wish us well, but must know in what\nour happiness consists. But this belongs to the other element of the\ngood life, namely knowledge.\n\nIn a perfect world, every sentient being would be to every other the\nobject of the fullest love, compounded of delight, benevolence, and\nunderstanding inextricably blended. It does not follow that, in this\nactual world, we ought to attempt to have such feelings towards all the\nsentient beings whom we encounter. There are many in whom we cannot\nfeel delight, because they are disgusting; if we were to do violence\nto our nature by trying to see beauties in them, we should merely\nblunt our susceptibilities to what we naturally find beautiful. Not\nto mention human beings, there are fleas and bugs and lice. We should\nhave to be as hard pressed as the Ancient Mariner before we could feel\ndelight in contemplating these creatures. Some saints, it is true, have\ncalled them \u201cpearls of God,\u201d but what these men delighted in was the\nopportunity of displaying their own sanctity.\n\nBenevolence is easier to extend widely, but even benevolence has its\nlimits. If a man wished to marry a lady, we should not think the better\nof him for withdrawing if he found that some one else also wished to\nmarry her: we should regard this as a fair field for competition. Yet\nhis feelings towards a rival cannot be _wholly_ benevolent. I think\nthat in all descriptions of the good life here on earth we must assume\na certain basis of animal vitality and animal instinct; without this,\nlife becomes tame and uninteresting. Civilization should be something\nadded to this, not substituted for it; the ascetic saint and the\ndetached sage fail in this respect to be complete human beings. A small\nnumber of them may enrich a community; but a world composed of them\nwould die of boredom.\n\nThese considerations lead to a certain emphasis on the element of\ndelight as an ingredient in the best love. Delight, in this actual\nworld, is unavoidably selective, and prevents us from having the same\nfeelings towards all mankind. When conflicts arise between delight and\nbenevolence, they must, as a rule, be decided by a compromise, not by\na complete surrender of either. Instinct has its rights, and if we\ndo violence to it beyond a point it takes vengeance in subtle ways.\nTherefore in aiming at a good life the limits of human possibility\nmust be borne in mind. Here again, however, we are brought back to the\nnecessity of knowledge.\n\nWhen I speak of knowledge as an ingredient of the good life, I am\nnot thinking of ethical knowledge, but of scientific knowledge and\nknowledge of particular facts. I do not think there is, strictly\nspeaking, such a thing as ethical knowledge. If we desire to achieve\nsome end, knowledge may show us the means, and this knowledge may\nloosely pass as ethical. But I do not believe that we can decide\nwhat sort of conduct is right or wrong except by reference to its\nprobable consequences. Given an end to be achieved, it is a question\nfor science to discover how to achieve it. All moral rules must be\ntested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire.\nI say ends that we desire, not ends that we _ought_ to desire. What\nwe \u201cought\u201d to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire.\nUsually it is what the authorities wish us to desire\u2015\u2015parents,\nschoolmasters, policemen, and judges. If you say to me \u201cyou ought to do\nso-and-so,\u201d the motive power of your remark lies in my desire for your\napproval\u2015\u2015together, possibly, with rewards or punishments attached to\nyour approval or disapproval. Since all behaviour springs from desire,\nit is clear that ethical notions can have no importance except as they\ninfluenced desire. They do this through the desire for approval and the\nfear of disapproval. These are powerful social forces, and we shall\nnaturally endeavour to win them to our side if we wish to realize any\nsocial purpose. When I say that the morality of conduct is to be judged\nby its probable consequences, I mean that I desire to see approval\ngiven to behaviour likely to realize social purposes which we desire,\nand disapproval to opposite behaviour. At present this is not done;\nthere are certain traditional rules according to which approval and\ndisapproval are meted out quite regardless of consequences. But this is\na topic with which we shall deal in the next chapter.\n\nThe superfluity of theoretical ethics is obvious in simple cases.\nSuppose, for instance, that your child is ill. Love makes you wish\nto cure it, and science tells you how to do so. There is not an\nintermediate stage of ethical theory, where it is demonstrated that\nyour child had better be cured. Your act springs directly from desire\nfor an end, together with knowledge of means. This is equally true of\nall acts, whether good or bad. The ends differ, and the knowledge is\nmore adequate in some cases than in others. But there is no conceivable\nway of making people do things they do not wish to do. What is possible\nis to alter their desires by a system of rewards and penalties, among\nwhich social approval and disapproval are not the least potent. The\nquestion for the legislative moralist is, therefore: How shall this\nsystem of rewards and punishments be arranged so as to secure the\nmaximum of what is desired by the legislative authority? If I say that\nthe legislative authority has bad desires, I mean merely that its\ndesires conflict with those of some section of the community to which I\nbelong. Outside human desires there is no moral standard.\n\nThus, what distinguishes ethics from science is not any special kind\nof knowledge, but merely desire. The knowledge required in ethics is\nexactly like the knowledge elsewhere; what is peculiar is that certain\nends are desired, and that right conduct is what conduces to them. Of\ncourse, if the definition of right conduct is to make a wide appeal,\nthe ends must be such as large sections of mankind desire. If I defined\nright conduct as that which increases my own income, readers would\ndisagree. The whole effectiveness of any ethical argument lies in its\nscientific part, i. e. in the proof that one kind of conduct, rather\nthan some other, is a means to an end which is widely desired. I\ndistinguish, however, between ethical argument and ethical education.\nThe latter consists in strengthening certain desires and weakening\nothers. This is quite a different process, which will be separately\ndiscussed at a later stage.\n\nWe can now explain more exactly the purport of the definition of the\ngood life with which this chapter began. When I said that the good\nlife consists of love guided by knowledge, the desire which prompted\nme was the desire to live such a life as far as possible, and to see\nothers living it; and the logical content of the statement is that, in\na community where men live in this way, more desires will be satisfied\nthan in one where there is less love or less knowledge. I do not mean\nthat such a life is \u201cvirtuous\u201d or that its opposite is \u201csinful,\u201d\nfor these are conceptions which seem to me to have no scientific\njustification.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER III\n\n                              MORAL RULES\n\n\nThe practical need of morals arises from the conflict of desires,\nwhether of different people or of the same person at different times\nor even at one time. A man desires to drink, and also to be fit for\nhis work next morning. We think him immoral if he adopts the course\nwhich gives him the smaller total satisfaction of desire. We think ill\nof people who are extravagant or reckless, even if they injure no one\nbut themselves. Bentham supposed that the whole of morality could be\nderived from \u201cenlightened self-interest,\u201d and that a person who always\nacted with a view to his own maximum satisfaction in the long run would\nalways act rightly. I cannot accept this view. Tyrants have existed\nwho derived exquisite pleasure from watching the infliction of torture;\nI cannot praise such men when prudence led them to spare their victims\u2019\nlives with a view to further sufferings another day. Nevertheless,\nother things being equal, prudence is a part of the good life. Even\nRobinson Crusoe had occasion to practise industry, self-control, and\nforesight, which must be reckoned as moral qualities, since they\nincreased his total satisfaction without counterbalancing injury to\nothers. This part of morals plays a great part in the training of young\nchildren, who have little inclination to think of the future. If it\nwere more practised in later life, the world would quickly become a\nparadise, since it would be quite sufficient to prevent wars, which\nare acts of passion, not of reason. Nevertheless, in spite of the\nimportance of prudence, it is not the most interesting part of morals.\nNor is it the part that raises intellectual problems, since it does not\nrequire an appeal to anything beyond self-interest.\n\nThe part of morality that is not included in prudence is, in essence,\nanalogous to law, or the rules of a club. It is a method of enabling\nmen to live together in a community in spite of the possibility that\ntheir desires may conflict. But here two very different methods are\npossible. There is the method of the criminal law, which aims at a\nmerely external harmony by attaching disagreeable consequences to acts\nwhich thwart other men\u2019s desires in certain ways. This is also the\nmethod of social censure: to be thought ill of by one\u2019s own society is\na form of punishment, to avoid which most people avoid being known\nto transgress the code of their set. But there is another method,\nmore fundamental, and far more satisfactory when it succeeds. This is\nto alter men\u2019s characters and desires in such a way as to minimize\noccasions of conflict by making the success of one man\u2019s desires as\nfar as possible consistent with that of another\u2019s. That is why love is\nbetter than hate, because it brings harmony instead of conflict into\nthe desires of the persons concerned. Two people between whom there is\nlove succeed or fail together, but when two people hate each other the\nsuccess of either is the failure of the other.\n\nIf we were right in saying that the good life is inspired by love and\nguided by knowledge, it is clear that the moral code of any community\nis not ultimate and self-sufficient, but must be examined with a\nview to seeing whether it is such as wisdom and benevolence would\nhave decreed. Moral codes have not always been faultless. The Aztecs\nconsidered it their painful duty to eat human flesh for fear the light\nof the sun should grow dim. They erred in their science; and perhaps\nthey would have perceived the scientific error if they had had any love\nfor the sacrificial victims. Some tribes immerse girls in the dark from\nthe age of ten to the age of seventeen, for fear the sun\u2019s rays should\nrender them pregnant. But surely our modern codes of morals contain\nnothing analogous to these savage practices? Surely we only forbid\nthings which really are harmful, or at any rate so abominable that no\ndecent person could defend them? I am not so sure.\n\nCurrent morality is a curious blend of utilitarianism and superstition,\nbut the superstitious part has the stronger hold, as is natural,\nsince superstition is the origin of moral rules. Originally, certain\nacts were thought displeasing to the gods, and were forbidden by law\nbecause the divine wrath was apt to descend upon the community, not\nmerely upon the guilty individuals. Hence arose the conception of sin,\nas that which is displeasing to God. No reason can be assigned as to\nwhy certain acts should be thus displeasing; it would be very difficult\nto say, for instance, why it was displeasing that the kid should be\nseethed in its mother\u2019s milk. But it was known by Revelation that\nthis was the case. Sometimes the Divine commands have been curiously\ninterpreted. For example, we are told not to work on Saturdays, and\nProtestants take this to mean that we are not to play on Sundays. But\nthe same sublime authority is attributed to the new prohibition as to\nthe old.\n\nIt is evident that a man with a scientific outlook on life cannot let\nhimself be intimidated by texts of Scripture or by the teaching of\nthe Church. He will not be content to say \u201csuch-and-such an act is\nsinful, and that ends the matter.\u201d He will inquire whether it does\nany harm, or whether, on the contrary, the belief that it is sinful\ndoes harm. And he will find that, especially in what concerns sex, our\ncurrent morality contains a very great deal of which the origin is\npurely superstitious. He will find also that this superstition, like\nthat of the Aztecs, involves needless cruelty, and would be swept away\nif people were actuated by kindly feelings towards their neighbours.\nBut the defenders of traditional morality are seldom people with\nwarm hearts, as may be seen from the love of militarism displayed by\nChurch dignitaries. One is tempted to think that they value morals as\naffording a legitimate outlet for their desire to inflict pain: the\nsinner is fair game, and therefore away with tolerance!\n\nLet us follow an ordinary human life from conception to the grave,\nand note the points where superstitious morals inflict preventable\nsuffering. I begin with conception, because here the influence of\nsuperstition is particularly noteworthy. If the parents are not\nmarried, the child has a stigma, as clearly undeserved as anything\ncould be. If either of the parents has venereal disease, the child\nis likely to inherit it. If they already have too many children for\nthe family income, there will be poverty, underfeeding, overcrowding,\nvery likely incest. Yet the great majority of moralists agree that the\nparents had better not know how to prevent this misery by preventing\nconception. To please these moralists, a life of torture is inflicted\nupon millions of human beings who ought never to have existed, merely\nbecause it is supposed that sexual intercourse is wicked unless\naccompanied by desire for offspring, but not wicked when this desire is\npresent, even though the offspring is humanly certain to be wretched.\nTo be killed suddenly and then eaten, which was the fate of the Aztecs\u2019\nvictims, is a far less degree of suffering than is inflicted upon a\nchild born in miserable surroundings and tainted with venereal disease.\nYet it is the greater suffering which is deliberately inflicted by\nBishops and politicians in the name of morality. If they had even the\nsmallest spark of love or pity for children they could not adhere to a\nmoral code involving this fiendish cruelty.\n\nAt birth, and in early infancy, the average child suffers more from\neconomic causes than from superstition. When well-to-do women have\nchildren, they have the best doctors, the best nurses, the best diet,\nthe best rest, and the best exercise. Working-class women do not enjoy\nthese advantages, and frequently their children die for lack of them. A\nlittle is done by the public authorities in the way of care of mothers,\nbut very grudgingly. At a moment when the supply of milk to nursing\nmothers is being cut down to save expense, public authorities will\nspend vast sums on paving rich residential districts where there is\nlittle traffic. They must know that in taking this decision they are\ncondemning a certain number of working-class children to death for the\ncrime of poverty. Yet the ruling party are supported by the immense\nmajority of ministers of religion, who, with the Pope at their head,\nhave pledged the vast forces of superstition throughout the world to\nthe support of social injustice.\n\nIn all stages of education the influence of superstition is disastrous.\nA certain percentage of children have the habit of thinking; one of the\naims of education is to cure them of this habit. Inconvenient questions\nare met with \u201chush, hush\u201d or with punishment. Collective emotion is\nused to instil certain kinds of belief, more particularly nationalistic\nkinds. Capitalists, militarists, and ecclesiastics co-operate in\neducation, because all depend for their power upon the prevalence of\nemotionalism and the rarity of critical judgment. With the aid of\nhuman nature, education succeeds in increasing and intensifying these\npropensities of the average man.\n\nAnother way in which superstition damages education is through\nits influence on the choice of teachers. For economic reasons, a\nwoman-teacher must not be married; for moral reasons, she must not have\nextra-marital sexual relations. And yet everybody who has taken the\ntrouble to study morbid psychology knows that prolonged virginity is,\nas a rule, extraordinarily harmful to women, so harmful that, in a sane\nsociety, it would be severely discouraged in teachers. The restrictions\nimposed lead more and more to a refusal, on the part of energetic and\nenterprising women, to enter the teaching profession. This is all due\nto the lingering influence of superstitious asceticism.\n\nAt middle- and upper-class schools the matter is even worse. There are\nchapel services, and the care of morals is in the hands of clergymen.\nClergymen, almost necessarily, fail in two ways as teachers of morals.\nThey condemn acts which do no harm, and they condone acts which do\ngreat harm. They all condemn sexual relations between unmarried people\nwho are fond of each other but not yet sure that they wish to live\ntogether all their lives. Most of them condemn birth-control. None of\nthem condemn the brutality of a husband who causes his wife to die of\ntoo frequent pregnancies. I knew a fashionable clergyman whose wife\nhad nine children in nine years. The doctors told him that if she had\nanother she would die. Next year she had another and died. No one\ncondemned him; he retained his benefice, and married again. So long as\nclergymen continue to condone cruelty and condemn innocent pleasure,\nthey can only do harm as guardians of the morals of the young.\n\nAnother bad effect of superstition on education is the absence of\ninstruction about the facts of sex. The main physiological facts\nought to be taught, quite simply and naturally, before puberty, at\na time when they are not exciting. At puberty, the elements of an\nunsuperstitious sexual morality ought to be taught. Boys and girls\nshould be taught that nothing can justify sexual intercourse unless\nthere is mutual inclination. This is contrary to the teaching of the\nChurch, which holds that, provided the parties are married and the man\ndesires another child, sexual intercourse is justified however great\nmay be the reluctance of the wife. Boys and girls should be taught\nrespect for each other\u2019s liberty; they should be made to feel that\nnothing gives one human being rights over another, and that jealousy\nand possessiveness kill love. They should be taught that to bring\nanother human being into the world is a very serious matter, only to\nbe undertaken when the child will have a reasonable prospect of health,\ngood surroundings, and parental care. But they should also be taught\nmethods of birth-control, so as to insure that children shall only come\nwhen they are wanted. Finally, they should be taught the dangers of\nvenereal disease, and the methods of prevention and cure. The increase\nof human happiness to be expected from sex-education on these lines is\nimmeasurable.\n\nIt should be recognized that, in the absence of children, sexual\nrelations are a purely private matter, which does not concern either\nthe State or the neighbours. Certain forms of sex which do not lead to\nchildren are at present punished by the criminal law: this is purely\nsuperstitious, since the matter is one which affects no one except the\nparties directly concerned. Where there are children, it is a mistake\nto suppose that it is necessarily to their interest to make divorce\nvery difficult. Habitual drunkenness, cruelty, insanity are grounds\nupon which divorce is necessary for the children\u2019s sake quite as\nmuch as for the sake of the wife or husband. The peculiar importance\nattached, at present, to adultery is quite irrational. It is obvious\nthat many forms of misconduct are more fatal to married happiness than\nan occasional infidelity. Masculine insistence on a child a year, which\nis not conventionally misconduct or cruelty, is the most fatal of all.\n\nMoral rules ought not to be such as to make instinctive happiness\nimpossible. Yet that is an effect of strict monogamy, in a community\nwhere the numbers of the two sexes are very unequal. Of course, under\nsuch circumstances, the moral rules are infringed. But when the rules\nare such that they can only be obeyed by greatly diminishing the\nhappiness of the community, and when it is better they should be\ninfringed than observed, surely it is time that the rules were changed.\nIf this is not done, many people who are acting in a way not contrary\nto the public interest are faced with the undeserved alternative of\nhypocrisy or obloquy. The Church does not mind hypocrisy, which is\na flattering tribute to its power; but elsewhere it has come to be\nrecognized as an evil which we ought not lightly to inflict.\n\nEven more harmful than theological superstition is the superstition of\nnationalism, of duty to one\u2019s own State and to no other. But I do not\npropose on this occasion to discuss this matter, beyond pointing out\nthat limitation to one\u2019s compatriots is contrary to the principle of\nlove which we recognized as constituting the good life. It is also,\nof course, contrary to enlightened self-interest, since an exclusive\nnationalism does not pay even the victorious nations.\n\nOne other respect in which our society suffers from the theological\nconception of \u201csin\u201d is the treatment of criminals. The view that\ncriminals are \u201cwicked\u201d and \u201cdeserve\u201d punishment is not one which a\nrational morality can support. Undoubtedly certain people do things\nwhich society wishes to prevent, and does right in preventing as far\nas possible. We may take murder as the plainest case. Obviously, if\na community is to hold together and we are to enjoy its pleasures\nand advantages, we cannot allow people to kill each other whenever\nthey feel an impulse to do so. But this problem should be treated in\na purely scientific spirit. We should ask simply: What is the best\nmethod of preventing murder? Of two methods which are equally effective\nin preventing murder, the one involving least harm to the murderer is\nto be preferred. The harm to the murderer is wholly regrettable, like\nthe pain of a surgical operation. It may be equally necessary, but it\nis not a subject of rejoicing. The vindictive feeling called \u201cmoral\nindignation\u201d is merely a form of cruelty. Suffering to the criminal can\nnever be justified by the notion of vindictive punishment. If education\ncombined with kindness is equally effective, it is to be preferred;\nstill more is it to be preferred if it is more effective. Of course\nthe prevention of crime and the punishment of crime are two different\nquestions; the object of causing pain to the criminal is presumably\ndeterrent. If prisons were so humanized that a prisoner got a good\neducation for nothing, people might commit crimes in order to qualify\nfor entrance. No doubt prison must be less pleasant than freedom; but\nthe best way to secure this result is to make freedom more pleasant\nthan it sometimes is at present. I do not wish, however, to embark\nupon the subject of Penal Reform. I merely wish to suggest that we\nshould treat the criminal as we treat a man suffering from plague.\nEach is a public danger, each must have his liberty curtailed until\nhe has ceased to be a danger. But the man suffering from plague is an\nobject of sympathy and commiseration, whereas the criminal is an object\nof execration. This is quite irrational. And it is because of this\ndifference of attitude that our prisons are so much less successful in\ncuring criminal tendencies than our hospitals are in curing disease.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER IV\n\n                   SALVATION: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL\n\n\nOne of the defects of traditional religion is its individualism,\nand this defect belongs also to the morality associated with it.\nTraditionally, the religious life was, as it were, a duologue between\nthe soul and God. To obey the will of God was virtue; and this was\npossible for the individual quite regardless of the state of the\ncommunity. Protestant sects developed the idea of \u201cfinding salvation\u201d,\nbut it was always present in Christian teaching. This individualism of\nthe separate soul had its value at certain stages of history, but in\nthe modern world we need rather a social than an individual conception\nof welfare. I want to consider, in this chapter, how this affects our\nconception of the good life.\n\nChristianity arose in the Roman Empire among populations wholly\ndestitute of political power, whose national States had been destroyed\nand merged in a vast impersonal aggregate. During the first three\ncenturies of the Christian Era, the individuals who adopted Christianity\ncould not alter the social or political institutions under which they\nlived, although they were profoundly convinced of their badness. In\nthese circumstances, it was natural that they should adopt the belief\nthat an individual may be perfect in an imperfect world, and that the\ngood life has nothing to do with this world. What I mean may become\nplain by comparison with Plato\u2019s Republic. When Plato wanted to describe\nthe good life, he described a whole community, not an individual; he did\nso in order to define justice, which is an essentially social\nconception. He was accustomed to citizenship of a Republic, and\npolitical responsibility was something which he took for granted. With\nthe loss of Greek freedom comes the rise of Stoicism, which is like\nChristianity, and unlike Plato, in having an individualistic conception\nof the good life.\n\nWe, who belong to great democracies, should find a more appropriate\nmorality in free Athens than in despotic Imperial Rome. In India, where\nthe political circumstances are very similar to those of Judea in the\ntime of Christ, we find Gandhi preaching a very similar morality to\nChrist\u2019s, and being punished for it by the christianized successors\nof Pontius Pilate. But the more extreme Indian nationalists are not\ncontent with individual salvation: they want national salvation. In\nthis they have taken on the outlook of the free democracies of the\nWest. I want to suggest some respects in which this outlook, owing to\nChristian influences, is not yet sufficiently bold and self-conscious,\nbut is still hampered by the belief in individual salvation.\n\nThe good life, as we conceive it, demands a multitude of social\nconditions, and cannot be realized without them. The good life, we\nsaid, is a life inspired by love and guided by knowledge. The knowledge\nrequired can only exist where governments or millionaires devote\nthemselves to its discovery and diffusion. For example: the spread of\ncancer is alarming\u2015\u2015what are we to do about it? At the moment, no one\ncan answer the question for lack of knowledge; and the knowledge is not\nlikely to emerge except through endowed research. Again: knowledge of\nscience, history, literature, and art ought to be attainable by all\nwho desire it; this requires elaborate arrangements on the part of\npublic authorities, and is not to be achieved by means of religious\nconversion. Then there is foreign trade, without which half the\ninhabitants of Great Britain would starve; and if we were starving\nvery few of us would live the good life. It is needless to multiply\nexamples. The important point is that, in all that differentiates\nbetween a good life and a bad one, the world is a unity, and the man\nwho pretends to live independently is a conscious or unconscious\nparasite.\n\nThe idea of individual salvation, with which the early Christians\nconsoled themselves for their political subjection, becomes impossible\nas soon as we escape from a very narrow conception of the good life.\nIn the orthodox Christian conception, the good life is the virtuous\nlife, and virtue consists in obedience to the will of God, and the will\nof God is revealed to each individual through the voice of conscience.\nThis whole conception is that of men subject to an alien despotism. The\ngood life involves much besides virtue\u2015\u2015intelligence, for instance.\nAnd conscience is a most fallacious guide, since it consists of vague\nreminiscences of precepts heard in early youth, so that it is never\nwiser than its possessor\u2019s nurse or mother. To live a good life in the\nfullest sense a man must have a good education, friends, love, children\n(if he desires them), a sufficient income to keep him from want and\ngrave anxiety, good health, and work which is not uninteresting. All\nthese things, in varying degrees, depend upon the community, and are\nhelped or hindered by political events. The good life must be lived in\na good society, and is not fully possible otherwise.\n\nThis is the fundamental defect of the aristocratic ideal. Certain good\nthings, such as art and science and friendship, can flourish very\nwell in an aristocratic society. They existed in Greece on a basis of\nslavery; they exist among ourselves on a basis of exploitation. But\nlove, in the form of sympathy or benevolence, cannot exist freely in\nan aristocratic society. The aristocrat has to persuade himself that\nthe slave or proletarian or coloured man is of inferior clay, and\nthat his sufferings do not matter. At the present moment, polished\nEnglish gentlemen flog Africans so severely that they die after hours\nof unspeakable anguish. Even if these gentlemen are well-educated,\nartistic, and admirable conversationalists, I cannot admit that they\nare living the good life. Human nature imposes some limitation of\nsympathy, but not such a degree as that. In a democratically-minded\nsociety, only a maniac would behave in this way. The limitation of\nsympathy involved in the aristocratic ideal is its condemnation.\nSalvation is an aristocratic ideal, because it is individualistic. For\nthis reason, also, the idea of personal salvation, however interpreted\nand expanded, cannot serve for the definition of the good life.\n\nAnother characteristic of salvation is that it results from a\ncatastrophic change, like the conversion of Saint Paul. Shelley\u2019s\npoems afford an illustration of this conception applied to societies;\nthe moment comes when everybody is converted, the \u201canarchs\u201d fly, and\n\u201cthe world\u2019s great age begins anew\u201d. It may be said that a poet is\nan unimportant person, whose ideas are of no consequence. But I am\npersuaded that a large proportion of revolutionary leaders have had\nideas extremely like Shelley\u2019s. They have thought that misery and\ncruelty and degradation were due to tyrants or priests or capitalists\nor Germans, and that if these sources of evil were overthrown there\nwould be a general change of heart and we should all live happy ever\nafter. Holding these beliefs, they have been willing to wage a \u201cwar to\nend war\u201d. Comparatively fortunate were those who suffered defeat or\ndeath; those who had the misfortune to emerge victorious were reduced\nto cynicism and despair by the failure of all their glowing hopes.\nThe ultimate source of these hopes was the Christian doctrine of\ncatastrophic conversion as the road to salvation.\n\nI do not wish to suggest that revolutions are never necessary, but I\ndo wish to suggest that they are not short cuts to the millennium.\nThere is no short cut to the good life, whether individual or social.\nTo build up the good life, we must build up intelligence, self-control,\nand sympathy. This is a quantitative matter, a matter of gradual\nimprovement, of early training, of educational experiment. Only\nimpatience prompts the belief in the possibility of sudden improvement.\nThe gradual improvement that is possible, and the methods by which it\nmay be achieved, are a matter for future science. But something can be\nsaid now. Some part of what can be said I shall try to indicate in a\nfinal chapter.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER V\n\n                         SCIENCE AND HAPPINESS\n\n\nThe purpose of the moralist is to improve men\u2019s behaviour. This is\na laudable ambition, since their behaviour is for the most part\ndeplorable. But I cannot praise the moralist either for the particular\nimprovements he desires, or for the methods he adopts for achieving\nthem. His ostensible method is moral exhortation; his real method\n(if he is orthodox) is a system of economic rewards and punishments.\nThe former effects nothing permanent or important; the influence\nof revivalists, from Savonarola downwards, has always been very\ntransitory. The latter\u2015\u2015the rewards and punishments\u2015\u2015have a very\nconsiderable effect. They cause a man, for example, to prefer casual\nprostitutes to a quasi-permanent mistress, because it is necessary to\nadopt the method which is most easily concealed. They thus keep up the\nnumbers of a very dangerous profession, and secure the prevalence of\nvenereal disease. These are not the objects desired by the moralist,\nand he is too unscientific to notice that they are the objects which he\nactually achieves.\n\nIs there anything better to be substituted for this unscientific\nmixture of preaching and bribery? I think there is.\n\nMen\u2019s actions are harmful either from ignorance or from bad desires.\n\u201cBad\u201d desires, when we are speaking from a social point of view, may\nbe defined as those which tend to thwart the desires of others, or,\nmore exactly, those which thwart more desires than they assist. It\nis not necessary to dwell upon the harmfulness that springs from\nignorance; here, more knowledge is all that is wanted, so that the\nroad to improvement lies in more research and more education. But the\nharmfulness that springs from bad desires is a more difficult matter.\n\nIn the ordinary man and woman there is a certain amount of active\nmalevolence, both special ill-will directed to particular enemies\nand general impersonal pleasure in the misfortunes of others. It\nis customary to cover this over with fine phrases; about half of\nconventional morality is a cloak for it. But it must be faced if the\nmoralists\u2019 aim of improving our actions is to be achieved. It is shown\nin a thousand ways, great and small: in the glee with which people\nrepeat and believe scandal, in the unkind treatment of criminals in\nspite of clear proof that better treatment would have more effect in\nreforming them, in the unbelievable barbarity with which all white\nraces treat negroes, and in the gusto with which old ladies and\nclergymen pointed out the duty of military service to young men during\nthe War. Even children may be the objects of wanton cruelty: David\nCopperfield and Oliver Twist are by no means imaginary. This active\nmalevolence is the worst feature of human nature, and the one which it\nis most necessary to change if the world is to grow happier. Probably\nthis one cause has more to do with war than all the economic and\npolitical causes put together.\n\nGiven this problem of preventing malevolence, how shall we deal with\nit? First let us try to understand its causes. These are, I think,\npartly social, partly physiological. The world, now as much as at any\nformer time, is based upon life-and-death competition; the question\nat issue in the War was whether German or Allied children should die\nof want and starvation. (Apart from malevolence on both sides, there\nwas not the slightest reason why both should not survive). Most people\nhave in the background of their minds a haunting fear of ruin; this\nis especially true of people who have children. The rich fear that\nBolsheviks will confiscate their investments; the poor fear that they\nwill lose their job or their health. Every one is engaged in the\nfrantic pursuit of \u201csecurity\u201d, and imagines that this is to be achieved\nby keeping potential enemies in subjection. It is in moments of panic\nthat cruelty becomes most wide-spread and most atrocious. Reactionaries\neverywhere appeal to fear: in England, to fear of Bolshevism; in\nFrance, to fear of Germany; in Germany, to fear of France. And the\nsole effect of their appeals is to increase the danger against which\nthey wish to be protected.\n\nIt must, therefore, be one of the chief concerns of the scientific\nmoralist to combat fear. This can be done in two ways: by increasing\nsecurity, and by cultivating courage. I am speaking of fear as\nan irrational passion, not of the rational prevision of possible\nmisfortune. When a theatre catches fire, the rational man foresees\ndisaster just as clearly as the man stricken with panic, but he adopts\nmethods likely to diminish the disaster, whereas the man stricken with\npanic increases it. Europe since 1914 has been like a panic-stricken\naudience in a theatre on fire; what is needed is calm, authoritative\ndirections as to how to escape without trampling each other to pieces\nin the process. The Victorian age, for all its humbug, was a period of\nrapid progress, because men were dominated by hope rather than fear. If\nwe are again to have progress, we must again be dominated by hope.\n\nEverything that increases the general security is likely to diminish\ncruelty. This applies to prevention of war, whether through the\ninstrumentality of the League of Nations, or otherwise; to prevention\nof destitution; to better health by improvement in medicine, hygiene,\nand sanitation; and to all other methods of lessening the terrors that\nlurk in the abysses of men\u2019s minds and emerge as nightmares when they\nsleep. But nothing is accomplished by an attempt to make a portion of\nmankind secure at the expense of another portion\u2015\u2015Frenchmen at the\nexpense of Germans, capitalists at the expense of wage-earners, white\nmen at the expense of yellow men, and so on. Such methods only increase\nterror in the dominant group, lest just resentment should lead the\noppressed to rebel. Only justice can give security; and by \u201cjustice\u201d I\nmean the recognition of the equal claims of all human beings.\n\nIn addition to social changes designed to bring security, there is,\nhowever, another and more direct means of diminishing fear, namely\nby a regimen designed to increase courage. Owing to the importance\nof courage in battle, men early discovered means of increasing it by\neducation and diet\u2015\u2015eating human flesh, for example, was supposed\nto be useful. But military courage was to be the prerogative of the\nruling caste: Spartans were to have more than helots, British officers\nthan Indian privates, men than women, and so on. For centuries it\nwas supposed to be the privilege of the aristocracy. Every increase\nof courage in the ruling caste was used to increase the burdens on\nthe oppressed, and therefore to increase the grounds for fear in the\noppressors, and therefore to leave the causes of cruelty undiminished.\nCourage must be democratized before it can make men humane.\n\nTo a great extent, courage has already been democratized by recent\nevents. The suffragettes showed that they possessed as much courage\nas the bravest men; this demonstration was essential in winning them\nthe vote. The common soldier in the War needed as much courage as a\nCaptain or Lieutenant, and much more than a General: this had much to\ndo with his lack of servility after demobilization. The Bolsheviks, who\nproclaim themselves the champions of the proletariat, are not lacking\nin courage, whatever else may be said of them; this is proved by their\npre-revolutionary record. In Japan, where formerly the samurai had a\nmonopoly of martial ardour, conscription brought the need of courage\nthroughout the male population. Thus among all the Great Powers much\nhas been done during the past half-century to make courage no longer\nan aristocratic monopoly: if this were not the case, the danger to\ndemocracy would be far greater than it is.\n\nBut courage in fighting is by no means the only form, nor perhaps even\nthe most important. There is courage in facing poverty, courage in\nfacing derision, courage in facing the hostility of one\u2019s own herd. In\nthese, the bravest soldiers are often lamentably deficient. And above\nall there is the courage to think calmly and rationally in the face\nof danger, and to control the impulse of panic fear or panic rage.\nThese are certainly things which education can help to give. And the\nteaching of every form of courage is rendered easier by good health,\ngood physique, adequate nourishment, and free play for fundamental\nvital impulses. Perhaps the physiological sources of courage could\nbe discovered by comparing the blood of a cat with that of a rabbit.\nIn all likelihood there is no limit to what science could do in the\nway of increasing courage, by example, experience of danger, an\nathletic life, and a suitable diet. All these things our upper-class\nboys to a great extent enjoy, but as yet they are in the main the\nprerogative of wealth. The courage so far encouraged in the poorer\nsections of the community is courage under orders, not the kind that\ninvolves initiative and leadership. When the qualities that now confer\nleadership have become universal, there will no longer be leaders and\nfollowers, and democracy will have been realized at last.\n\nBut fear is not the only source of malevolence; envy and disappointment\nalso have their share. The envy of cripples and hunchbacks is\nproverbial as a source of malignity, but other misfortunes than\ntheirs produce similar results. A man or woman who has been thwarted\nsexually is apt to be full of envy; this generally takes the form of\nmoral condemnation of the more fortunate. Much of the driving force\nof revolutionary movement is due to envy of the rich. Jealousy is, of\ncourse, a special form of envy: envy of love. The old often envy the\nyoung; when they do, they are apt to treat them cruelly.\n\nThere is, so far as I know, no way of dealing with envy except to make\nthe lives of the envious happier and fuller, and to encourage in youth\nthe idea of collective enterprises rather than competition. The worst\nforms of envy are in those who have not had a full life in the way of\nmarriage, or children, or career. Such misfortunes could in most cases\nbe avoided by better social institutions. Still, it must be admitted\nthat a residuum of envy is likely to remain. There are many instances\nin history of Generals so jealous of each other that they preferred\ndefeat to enhancement of the other\u2019s reputation. Two politicians of\nthe same party, or two artists of the same school are almost sure\nto be jealous of one another. In such cases, there seems nothing to\nbe done except to arrange, as far as possible, that each competitor\nshall be unable to injure the other, and shall only be able to win by\nsuperior merit. An artist\u2019s jealousy of a rival usually does little\nharm, because the only effective way of indulging it is to paint better\npictures than his rival\u2019s, since it is not open to him to destroy his\nrival\u2019s pictures. Where envy is unavoidable, it must be used as a\nstimulus to one\u2019s own efforts, not to the thwarting of the efforts of\nrivals.\n\nThe possibilities of science in the way of increasing human happiness\nare not confined to diminishing those aspects of human nature which\nmake for mutual defeat, and which we therefore call \u201cbad\u201d. There is\nprobably no limit to what science can do in the way of increasing\npositive excellence. Health has already been greatly improved; in spite\nof the lamentations of those who idealize the past, we live longer\nand have fewer illnesses than any class or nation in the eighteenth\ncentury. With a little more application of the knowledge we already\npossess, we might be much healthier than we are. And future discoveries\nare likely to accelerate this process enormously.\n\nSo far, it has been physical science that has had most effect upon\nour lives, but in the future physiology and psychology are likely to\nbe far more potent. When we have discovered how character depends upon\nphysiological conditions, we shall be able, if we choose, to produce\nfar more of the type of human beings that we admire. Intelligence,\nartistic capacity, benevolence\u2015\u2015all these things no doubt could be\nincreased by science. There seems scarcely any limit to what _could_\nbe done in the way of producing a good world, if only men would use\nscience wisely. I have expressed elsewhere my fears that men may not\nmake a wise use of the power they derive from science.[B] At present I\nam concerned with the good that men could do if they chose, not with\nthe question whether they will choose rather to do harm.\n\n  [B] See _Icarus_.\n\nThere is a certain attitude about the application of science to\nhuman life with which I have some sympathy, though I do not, in the\nlast analysis, agree with it. It is the attitude of those who dread\nwhat is \u201cunnatural.\u201d Rousseau is, of course, the great protagonist\nof this view in Europe. In Asia, Lao-Tze has set it forth even more\npersuasively, and 2400 years sooner. I think there is a mixture\nof truth and falsehood in the admiration of \u201cnature,\u201d which it is\nimportant to disentangle. To begin with, what is \u201cnatural\u201d? Roughly\nspeaking, anything to which the speaker was accustomed in childhood.\nLao-Tze objects to roads and carriages and boats, all of which were\nprobably unknown in the village where he was born. Rousseau has got\nused to these things, and does not regard them as against nature. But\nhe would no doubt have thundered against railways if he had lived\nto see them. Clothes and cooking are too ancient to be denounced by\nmost of the apostles of nature, though they all object to new fashions\nin either. Birth-control is thought wicked by people who tolerate\ncelibacy, because the former is a new violation of nature and the\nlatter an ancient one. In all these ways those who preach \u201cnature\u201d are\ninconsistent, and one is tempted to regard them as mere conservatives.\n\nNevertheless, there is something to be said in their favour. Take for\ninstance vitamines, the discovery of which has produced a revulsion\nin favour of \u201cnatural\u201d foods. It seems, however, that vitamines can\nbe supplied by cod-liver oil and electric light, which are certainly\nnot part of the \u201cnatural\u201d diet of a human being. This case illustrates\nthat, in the absence of knowledge, unexpected harm may be done by a new\ndeparture from nature; but when the harm has come to be understood\nit can usually be remedied by some new artificiality. As regards our\nphysical environment and our physical means of gratifying our desires,\nI do not think the doctrine of \u201cnature\u201d justifies anything beyond\na certain experimental caution in the adoption of new expedients.\nClothes, for instance, are contrary to nature, and need to be\nsupplemented by another unnatural practice, namely washing, if they\nare not to bring disease. But the two practices together make a man\nhealthier than the savage who eschews both.\n\nThere is much more to be said for \u201cnature\u201d in the realm of human\ndesires. To force upon man, woman, or child a life which thwarts their\nstrongest impulses is both cruel and dangerous in this sense, a life\naccording to \u201cnature\u201d is to be commended with certain provisos. Nothing\ncould be more artificial than an underground electric railway, but no\nviolence is done to a child\u2019s nature when it is taken to travel in one;\non the contrary, almost all children find the experience delightful.\nArtificialities which gratify the desires of ordinary human beings\nare good, other things being equal. But there is nothing to be said\nfor ways of life which are artificial in the sense of being imposed\nby authority or economic necessity. Such ways of life are, no doubt,\nto some extent necessary at present; ocean travel would become very\ndifficult if there were no stokers on steamers. But necessities of this\nkind are regrettable, and we ought to look for ways of avoiding them. A\ncertain amount of work is not a thing to complain of; indeed, in nine\ncases out of ten, it makes a man happier than complete idleness. But\nthe amount and kind of work that most people have to do at present is\na grave evil: especially bad is the life-long bondage to routine. Life\nshould not be too closely regulated or too methodical; our impulses,\nwhen not positively destructive or injurious to others, ought if\npossible to have free play; there should be room for adventure. Human\nnature we should respect, because our impulses and desires are the\nstuff out of which our happiness is to be made. It is no use to give\nmen something abstractly considered \u201cgood\u201d; we must give them something\ndesired or needed if we are to add to their happiness. Science may\nlearn in time to mould our desires so that they shall not conflict with\nthose of other people to the same extent as they do now; then we shall\nbe able to satisfy a larger proportion of our desires than at present.\nIn that sense, but in that sense only, our desires will then have\nbecome \u201cbetter.\u201d A single desire is no better and no worse, considered\nin isolation, than any other; but a group of desires is better than\nanother group if all of the first group can be satisfied simultaneously\nwhile in the second group some are inconsistent with others. That is\nwhy love is better than hatred.\n\nTo respect physical nature is foolish; physical nature should be\nstudied with a view to making it serve human ends as far as possible,\nbut it remains ethically neither good nor bad. And where physical\nnature and human nature interact, as in the population question, there\nis no need to fold our hands in passive adoration and accept war,\npestilence, and famine as the only possible means of dealing with\nexcessive fertility. The divines say: it is wicked, in this matter, to\napply science to the physical side of the problem; we must (they say)\napply morals to the human side, and practise abstinence. Apart from\nthe fact that every one, including the divines, knows that their advice\nwill not be taken, why should it be wicked to solve the population\nquestion by adopting physical means for preventing conception? No\nanswer is forthcoming except one based upon antiquated dogmas. And\nclearly the violence to nature advocated by the divines is at least\nas great as that involved in birth-control. The divines prefer a\nviolence to human nature which, when successfully practised, involves\nunhappiness, envy, a tendency to persecution, often madness. I prefer\na \u201cviolence\u201d to physical nature which is of the same sort as that\ninvolved in the steam engine or even in the use of fire. This instance\nshows how ambiguous and uncertain is the application of the principle\nthat we should follow \u201cnature.\u201d\n\nNature, even human nature, will cease more and more to be an absolute\ndatum; more and more it will become what scientific manipulation has\nmade it. Science can, if it chooses, enable our grandchildren to live\nthe good life, by giving them knowledge, self-control, and characters\nproductive of harmony rather than strife. At present it is teaching our\nchildren to kill each other, because many men of science are willing to\nsacrifice the future of mankind to their own momentary prosperity. But\nthis phase will pass when men have acquired the same domination over\ntheir own passions that they already have over the physical forces of\nthe external world. Then at last we shall have won our freedom.\n\n\n                   *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Notes:\n\n \u2015\u2015Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).\n\n \u2015\u2015Obvious spelling inaccuracies were silently corrected.\n\n \u2015\u2015Archaic and variable spelling and punctuation have been preserved.\n\n \u2015\u2015Variations in hyphenation and compound words have been preserved.","title":"What I believe","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":12460}