{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_73906/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_73906","id":"gutenberg_73906","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73906","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Philosophy, English -- 17th century"],"text":"------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nItalics are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character as _italic_.\n\nFootnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are\nreferenced.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n\n\n\n THE\n ENGLISH WORKS\n OF\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n C RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN\u2019S LANE.\n\n THE\n\n ENGLISH WORKS\n\n OF\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n\n OF MALMESBURY;\n\n NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED\n\n BY\n\n SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.\n\n ---\n\n VOL. II.\n\n ---\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n JOHN BOHN,\n HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.\n\n ---\n\n MDCCCXLI.\n\n\n\n\n PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS\n\n CONCERNING\n\n GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.\n\n BY\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n\n OF MALMESBURY.\n\n TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE\n\n WILLIAM EARL OF DEVONSHIRE,\n\n MY MOST HONOURED LORD.\n\n ---\n\nMAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP,\n\nIt was the speech of the Roman people, to whom the name of _king_ had\nbeen rendered odious, as well by the tyranny of the Tarquins as by the\ngenius and decretals of that city; it was the speech, I say, of the\npublic, however pronounced from a private mouth, (if yet Cato the censor\nwere no more than such): _that all kings are to be reckoned amongst\nravenous beasts_. But what a beast of prey was the Roman people; whilst\nwith its conquering eagles it erected its proud trophies so far and wide\nover the world, bringing the Africans, the Asiatics, the Macedonians,\nand the Ach\u00e6ans, with many other despoiled nations, into a specious\nbondage, with the pretence of preferring them to be denizens of Rome! So\nthat if Cato\u2019s saying were a wise one, it was every whit as wise, that\nof Pontius Telesinus; who flying about with open mouth through all the\ncompanies of his army in that famous encounter which he had with Sylla,\ncried out: that _Rome herself as well as Sylla, was to be razed; for\nthat there would always be wolves and depredators of their liberty,\nunless the forest that lodged them were grubbed up by the roots_. To\nspeak impartially, both sayings are very true: that _man to man is a\nkind of God_; and that _man to man is an arrant wolf_. The first is\ntrue, if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we\ncompare cities. In the one, there is some analogy of similitude with the\nDeity; to wit, justice and charity, the twin sisters of peace. But in\nthe other, good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a\nsanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit and violence: that is, in\nplain terms, a mere brutal rapacity. Which although men object to one\nanother as a reproach, by an inbred custom which they have of beholding\ntheir own actions in the persons of other men, wherein, as in a mirror,\nall things on the left side appear to be on the right, and all things on\nthe right side to be as plainly on the left; yet the natural right of\npreservation, which we all receive from the uncontrolable dictates of\nnecessity, will not admit it to be a vice, though it confess it to be an\nunhappiness. Now that with Cato himself, a person of so great a renown\nfor wisdom, animosity should so prevail instead of judgment, and\npartiality instead of reason, that the very same thing which he thought\njust in his popular state, he should censure as unjust in a monarchical;\nother men perhaps may have leisure to admire. But I have been long since\nof this opinion; that there was never yet any more than vulgar prudence,\nthat had the luck of being acceptable to the giddy people; but either it\nhath not been understood, or else having been so hath been levelled and\ncried down. The more eminent actions and apothegms, both of the Greeks\nand Romans, have been indebted for their eulogies not so much to the\n_reason_, as to the _greatness_ of them; and very many times to that\nprosperous usurpation, (with which our histories do so mutually upbraid\neach other), which as a conquering torrent carries all before it, as\nwell public agents as public actions, in the stream of time. Wisdom,\nproperly so called, is nothing else but this: _the perfect knowledge of\nthe truth in all matters whatsoever_. Which being derived from the\nregisters and records of _things_; and that as it were through the\nconduit of certain definite appellations; cannot possibly be the work of\na sudden acuteness, but of a well-balanced reason; which by the\ncompendium of a word, we call _philosophy_. For by this it is that a way\nis opened to us, in which we travel from the contemplation of particular\nthings to the inference or result of universal actions. Now look, how\nmany sorts of things there are, which properly fall within the\ncognizance of human reason; into so many branches does the tree of\nphilosophy divide itself. And from the diversity of the matter about\nwhich they are conversant, there hath been given to those branches a\ndiversity of names too. For treating of figures, it is called\n_geometry_; of motion, _physic_; of natural right, _morals_; put\naltogether, and they make up _philosophy_. Just as the British, the\nAtlantic, and the Indian seas, being diversely christened from the\ndiversity of their shores, do notwithstanding all together make up _the\nocean_. And truly the geometricians have very admirably performed their\npart. For whatsoever assistance doth accrue to the life of man, whether\nfrom the observation of the heavens or from the description of the\nearth, from the notation of times, or from the remotest experiments of\nnavigation; finally, whatsoever things they are in which this present\nage doth differ from the rude simpleness of antiquity, we must\nacknowledge to be a debt which we owe merely to geometry. If the moral\nphilosophers had as happily discharged their duty, I know not what could\nhave been added by human industry to the completion of that happiness,\nwhich is consistent with human life. For were the nature of human\nactions as distinctly known as the nature of _quantity_ in geometrical\nfigures, the strength of _avarice_ and _ambition_, which is sustained by\nthe erroneous opinions of the vulgar as touching the nature of _right_\nand _wrong_, would presently faint and languish; and mankind should\nenjoy such an immortal peace, that unless it were for habitation, on\nsupposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants,\nthere would hardly be left any pretence for war. But now on the\ncontrary, that neither the sword nor the pen should be allowed any\ncessation; that the knowledge of the law of nature should lose its\ngrowth, not advancing a whit beyond its ancient stature; that there\nshould still be such siding with the several factions of philosophers,\nthat the very same action should be decried by some, and as much\nelevated by others; that the very same man should at several times\nembrace his several opinions, and esteem his own actions far otherwise\nin himself than he does in others: these, I say, are so many signs, so\nmany manifest arguments, that what hath hitherto been written by moral\nphilosophers, hath not made any progress in the knowledge of the truth;\nbut yet hath took with the world, not so much by giving any light to the\nunderstanding as entertainment to the affections, whilst by the\nsuccessful rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in\ntheir rashly received opinions. So that this part of philosophy hath\nsuffered the same destiny with the _public ways_, which lie open to all\npassengers to traverse up and down: or the same lot _with highways and\nopen streets_, some for divertisement, and some for business; so that\nwhat with the impertinences of some and the altercations of others,\nthose ways have never a seed time, and therefore yield never a harvest.\nThe only reason of which unluckiness should seem to be this; that\namongst all the writers of that part of philosophy there is not one that\nhath used an idoneous principle of tractation. For we may not, as in a\ncircle, begin the handling of a science from what point we please. There\nis a certain clue of reason, whose beginning is in the dark; but by the\nbenefit of whose conduct, we are led as it were by the hand into the\nclearest light. So that the principle of tractation is to be taken from\nthat darkness; and then the light to be carried thither for irradiating\nthe doubts. As often therefore as any writer doth either weakly forsake\nthat clue, or wilfully cut it asunder; he describes the footsteps, not\nof his progress in science, but of his wanderings from it. And from this\nit was, that when I applied my thoughts to the investigation of natural\n_justice_, I was presently advertised from the very word justice, (which\nsignifies a steady will of giving every one his _own_), that my first\nenquiry was to be, from whence it proceeded that any man should call\nanything rather his _own_, than _another man\u2019s_. And when I found that\nthis proceeded not from nature, but consent; (for what nature at first\nlaid forth in common, men did afterwards distribute into several\n_impropriations_); I was conducted from thence to another inquiry;\nnamely, to what end and upon what impulsives, when all was equally every\nman\u2019s in common, men did rather think it fitting that every man should\nhave his inclosure. And I found the reason was, that from a community of\ngoods there must needs arise contention, whose enjoyment should be\ngreatest. And from that contention all kind of calamities must\nunavoidably ensue, which by the instinct of nature every man is taught\nto shun. Having therefore thus arrived at two maxims of human nature;\nthe one arising from the _concupiscible_ part, which desires to\nappropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a\njoint interest; the other proceeding from the _rational_, which teaches\nevery man to fly a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest mischief\nthat can arrive to nature: which principles being laid down, I seem from\nthem to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion, in this little\nwork of mine, first, the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts,\nand thence the rudiments both of moral and of civil prudence. That\nappendage which is added concerning the regiment of God, hath been done\nwith this intent; that the dictates of God Almighty in the law of\nnature, might not seem repugnant to the written law, revealed to us in\nhis word. I have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my\ndiscourse, not to meddle with the civil laws of any particular nation\nwhatsoever: that is to say, I have avoided coming ashore, which those\ntimes have so infested both with shelves and tempests. At what expense\nof time and industry I have been in this scrutiny after truth, I am not\nignorant; but to what purpose, I know not. For being partial judges of\nourselves, we lay a partial estimate upon our own productions. I\ntherefore offer up this book to your Lordship\u2019s, not favour, but censure\nfirst; as having found by many experiments, that it is not the credit of\nthe author, nor the newness of the work, nor yet the ornament of the\nstyle, but only the weight of reason, which recommends any _opinion_ to\nyour Lordship\u2019s favour and approbation. If it fortune to please, that is\nto say, if it be sound, if it be useful, if it be not vulgar; I humbly\noffer it to your Lordship, as both my glory and my protection. But if in\nanything I have erred, your Lordship will yet accept it as a testimony\nof my gratitude; that the means of study, which I enjoyed by your\nLordship\u2019s goodness, I have employed to the procurement of your\nLordship\u2019s favour. The God of heaven crown your Lordship with length of\ndays, in this earthly station; and in the heavenly Jerusalem with a\ncrown of glory.\n\n Your Honour\u2019s most humble,\n and most devoted Servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n -------\n\n\n\n\n THE AUTHOR\u2019S\n PREFACE TO THE READER.\n\n\nReader, I promise thee here such things, which ordinarily promised\ndo seem to challenge the greatest attention, (whether thou regard\nthe dignity or profit of the matter treated, or the right method of\nhandling it, or the honest motive and good advice to undertake it,\nor lastly the moderation of the author,) and I lay them here before\nthine eyes. In this book thou shalt find briefly described the\nduties of men: first, as men; then as subjects; lastly, as\nChristians. Under which duties are contained, not only the elements\nof the laws of nature and of nations, together with the true\noriginal and power of justice; but also the very essence of\nChristian religion itself, so far forth as the measure of this my\npurpose could well bear it.\n\nWhich kind of doctrine, excepting what relates to Christian\nreligion, the most ancient sages did judge fittest to be delivered\nto posterity, either curiously adorned with verse, or clouded with\nallegories, as a most beautiful and hallowed mystery of royal\nauthority; lest by the disputations of private men it might be\ndefiled. Other philosophers in the mean time, to the advantage of\nmankind, did contemplate the faces and motions of things; others,\nwithout disadvantage, their natures and causes. But in after times,\nSocrates is said to have been the first who truly loved this civil\nscience; although hitherto not thoroughly understood, yet glimmering\nforth as through a cloud in the government of the commonweal: and\nthat he set so great a value on this, that utterly abandoning and\ndespising all other parts of philosophy, he wholly embraced this, as\njudging it only worthy the labour of his mind. After him comes\nPlato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other philosophers, as well Greek as\nLatin. And now at length all men of all nations, not only\nphilosophers but even the vulgar, have and do still deal with this\nas a matter of ease, exposed and prostitute to every mother-wit, and\nto be attained without any great care or study. And, which makes\nmainly for its dignity, those who suppose themselves to have it, or\nare in such employment as they ought to have it, do so wonderfully\nplease themselves in its _idea_, as they easily brook the followers\nof other arts to be esteemed and styled ingenuous, learned, skilful,\nand what you will, except prudent: for this name, in regard of civil\nknowledge, they presume to be due to themselves only. Whether\ntherefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthiness of\nthe persons who entertain them, or by the number of those who have\nwritten of them, or by the judgment of the wisest; certainly this\nmust carry it, which so nearly relates to princes, and others\nengaged in the government of mankind; in whose adulterate species\nalso the most part of men do delight themselves, and in which the\nmost excellent wits of philosophers have been conversant. The\nbenefit of it, when rightly delivered, that is, when derived from\ntrue principles by evident connection, we shall then best discern,\nwhen we shall but well have considered the mischiefs that have\nbefallen mankind from its counterfeit and babbling form. For in\nmatters wherein we speculate for the exercise of our wits, if any\nerror escape us, it is without hurt; neither is there any loss, but\nof time only. But in those things which every man ought to meditate\nfor the steerage of his life, it necessarily happens that not only\nfrom errors, but even from ignorance itself, there arise offences,\ncontentions, nay, even slaughter itself. Look now, how great a\nprejudice these are; such and so great is the benefit arising from\nthis doctrine of morality truly declared. How many kings, and those\ngood men too, hath this one error, that a tyrant king might lawfully\nbe put to death, been the slaughter of! How many throats hath this\nfalse position cut, that a prince for some causes may by some\ncertain men be deposed! And what bloodshed hath not this erroneous\ndoctrine caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators\nfor the multitude! Lastly, how many rebellions hath this opinion\nbeen the cause of, which teacheth that the knowledge whether the\ncommands of kings be just or unjust, belongs to private men; and\nthat before they yield obedience, they not only may, but ought to\ndispute them! Besides, in the moral philosophy now commonly\nreceived, there are many things no less dangerous than those, which\nit matters not now to recite. I suppose those ancients foresaw this,\nwho rather chose to have the science of justice wrapped up in\nfables, than openly exposed to disputations. For before such\nquestions began to be moved, princes did not sue for, but already\nexercised the supreme power. They kept their empire entire, not by\narguments, but by punishing the wicked and protecting the good.\nLikewise subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and\njudgments of private men, but by the laws of the realm; nor were\nthey kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority. Yea,\nthey reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one man or in\na council, as a certain visible divinity. Therefore they little\nused, as in our days, to join themselves with ambitious and hellish\nspirits, to the utter ruin of their state. For they could not\nentertain so strange a fancy, as not to desire the preservation of\nthat by which they were preserved. In truth, the simplicity of those\ntimes was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly. Wherefore\nit was peace and a golden age, which ended not before that, Saturn\nbeing expelled, it was taught lawful to take up arms against kings.\nThis, I say, the ancients not only themselves saw, but in one of\ntheir fables they seem very aptly to have signified it to us. For\nthey say, that when Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet, he\nfell in love, and began to court Juno herself. Offering to embrace\nher, he clasped a cloud; from whence the Centaurs proceeded, by\nnature half men, half horses, a fierce, a fighting, and unquiet\ngeneration. Which changing the names only, is as much as if they\nshould have said, that private men being called to councils of\nstate, desired to prostitute justice, the only sister and wife of\nthe supreme, to their own judgments and apprehensions; but embracing\na false and empty shadow instead of it, they have begotten those\nhermaphrodite opinions of moral philosophers, partly right and\ncomely, partly brutal and wild; the causes of all contentions and\nbloodsheds. Since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise,\nif any man now shall dispel those clouds, and by most firm reasons\ndemonstrate that there are no authentical doctrines concerning right\nand wrong, good and evil, besides the constituted laws in each realm\nand government; and that the question whether any future action will\nprove just or unjust, good or ill, is to be demanded of none but\nthose to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his\nlaws: surely he will not only show us the highway to peace, but will\nalso teach us how to avoid the close, dark, and dangerous by-paths\nof faction and sedition; than which I know not what can be thought\nmore profitable.\n\nConcerning my method, I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and\nevident style in what I have to deliver, except I took my beginning\nfrom the very matter of civil government, and thence proceeded to\nits generation and form, and the first beginning of justice. For\neverything is best understood by its constitutive causes. For as in\na watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion\nof the wheels cannot well be known, except it be taken insunder and\nviewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of\nstates and duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take\nthem insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they were\ndissolved; that is, that we rightly understand what the quality of\nhuman nature is, in what matters it is, in what not, fit to make up\na civil government, and how men must be agreed amongst themselves\nthat intend to grow up into a well-grounded state. Having therefore\nfollowed this kind of method, in the first place I set down for a\nprinciple, by experience known to all men and denied by none, to\nwit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except\nthey be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man\nwill distrust and dread each other; and as by natural right he may,\nso by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he\nhath, toward the preservation of himself. You will object perhaps,\nthat there are some who deny this. Truly so it happens, that very\nmany do deny it. But shall I therefore seem to fight against myself,\nbecause I affirm that the same men confess and deny the same thing?\nIn truth I do not; but they do, whose actions disavow what their\ndiscourses approve of. We see all countries, though they be at peace\nwith their neighbours, yet guarding their frontiers with armed men,\ntheir towns with walls and ports, and keeping constant watches. To\nwhat purpose is all this, if there be no fear of the neighbouring\npower? We see even in well-governed states, where there are laws and\npunishments appointed for offenders, yet particular men travel not\nwithout their sword by their sides for their defences; neither sleep\nthey without shutting not only their doors against their fellow\nsubjects, but also their trunks and coffers for fear of domestics.\nCan men give a clearer testimony of the distrust they have each of\nother, and all of all? Now, since they do thus, and even countries\nas well as men, they publicly profess their mutual fear and\ndiffidence. But in disputing they deny it; that is as much as to\nsay, that out of a desire they have to contradict others, they\ngainsay themselves. Some object that this principle being admitted,\nit would needs follow, not only that all men were wicked, (which\nperhaps though it seem hard, yet we must yield to, since it is so\nclearly declared by holy writ), but also wicked by nature, which\ncannot be granted without impiety. But this, that men are evil by\nnature, follows not from this principle. For though the wicked were\nfewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them,\nthere is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating,\nsubjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and\nfairest conditioned. Much less does it follow, that those who are\nwicked, are so by nature. For though from nature, that is, from\ntheir first birth, as they are merely sensible creatures, they have\nthis disposition, that immediately as much as in them lies they\ndesire and do whatsoever is best pleasing to them, and that either\nthrough fear they fly from, or through hardness repel those dangers\nwhich approach them; yet are they not for this reason to be\naccounted wicked. For the affections of the mind, which arise only\nfrom the lower parts of the soul, are not wicked themselves; but the\nactions thence proceeding may be so sometimes, as when they are\neither offensive or against duty. Unless you give children all they\nask for, they are peevish and cry, aye, and strike their parents\nsometimes; and all this they have from nature. Yet are they free\nfrom guilt, neither may we properly call them wicked; first, because\nthey cannot hurt; next, because wanting the free use of reason they\nare exempted from all duty. These when they come to riper years,\nhaving acquired power whereby they may do hurt, if they shall\ncontinue to do the same things, then truly they both begin to be,\nand are properly accounted wicked. Insomuch as a wicked man is\nalmost the same thing with a child grown strong and sturdy, or a man\nof a childish disposition; and malice the same with a defect of\nreason in that age when nature ought to be better governed through\ngood education and experience. Unless therefore we will say that men\nare naturally evil, because they receive not their education and use\nof reason from nature, we must needs acknowledge that men may derive\ndesire, fear, anger, and other passions from nature, and yet not\nimpute the evil effects of those unto nature. The foundation\ntherefore which I have laid, standing firm, I demonstrate, in the\nfirst place, that the state of men without civil society, which\nstate we may properly call the state of nature, is nothing else but\na mere war of all against all; and in that war all men have equal\nright unto all things. Next, that all men as soon as they arrive to\nunderstanding of this hateful condition, do desire, even nature\nitself compelling them, to be freed from this misery. But that this\ncannot be done, except by compact, they all quit that right they\nhave to all things. Furthermore, I declare and confirm what the\nnature of compact is; how and by what means the right of one might\nbe transferred unto another to make their compacts valid; also what\nrights, and to whom they must necessarily be granted, for the\nestablishing of peace; I mean, what those dictates of reason are,\nwhich may properly be termed the laws of nature. And all these are\ncontained in that part of this book which I entitle _Liberty_.\n\nThese grounds thus laid, I show further what civil government, and\nthe supreme power in it, and the divers kinds of it are; by what\nmeans it becomes so; and what rights particular men, who intend to\nconstitute this civil government, must so necessarily transfer from\nthemselves on the supreme power, whether it be one man or an\nassembly of men, that, except they do so, it will evidently appear\nto be no civil government, but the rights which all men have to all\nthings, that is, the rights of war will still remain. Next I\ndistinguish the divers kinds of it, to wit, monarchy, aristocracy,\ndemocracy; and paternal dominion, and that of masters over their\nservants. I declare how they are constituted, and I compare their\nseveral conveniences and inconveniences, each with other.\nFurthermore, I unfold what those things are which destroy it, and\nwhat his or their duty is, who rule in chief. Last of all, I\nexplicate the natures of law and of sin; and I distinguish law from\ncounsel, from compact, from that which I call right. All which I\ncomprehend under the title of _Dominion_.\n\nIn the last part of it, which is entitled _Religion_, lest that\nright, which by strong reason, in the preceding discourse, I had\nconfirmed the sovereign powers to have over their subjects, might\nseem to be repugnant to the sacred Scriptures; I show, in the first\nplace, how it repugns not the divine right, for as much as God\noverrules all rulers by nature, that is, by the dictates of natural\nreason. In the second, forasmuch as God himself had a peculiar\ndominion over the Jews, by virtue of that ancient covenant of\ncircumcision. In the third, because God doth now rule over us\nChristians, by virtue of our covenant of baptism. And therefore the\nauthority of rulers in chief, or of civil government, is not at all,\nwe see, contrary to religion.\n\nIn the last place, I declare what duties are necessarily required\nfrom us, to enter into the _kingdom of heaven_. And of those I\nplainly demonstrate, and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy\nwrit according to the interpretation made by all, that the\nobedience, which I have affirmed to be due from particular Christian\nsubjects unto their Christian princes, cannot possibly in the least\nsort be repugnant unto Christian religion.\n\nYou have seen my method: receive now the reason which moved me to\nwrite this. I was studying philosophy for my mind sake, and I had\ngathered together its first elements in all kinds; and having\ndigested them into three sections by degrees, I thought to have\nwritten them, so as in the first I would have treated of _body_ and\nits general properties; in the second of _man_ and his special\nfaculties and affections; in the third, of _civil government_ and\nthe duties of subjects. Wherefore the first section would have\ncontained _the first philosophy_, and certain elements of physic; in\nit we would have considered the reasons of _time_, _place_, _cause_,\n_power_, _relation_, _proportion_, _quantity_, _figure_, and\n_motion_. In the second, we would have been conversant about\n_imagination_, _memory_, _intellect_, _ratiocination_, _appetite_,\n_will_, _good_ and _evil_, _honest_ and _dishonest_, and the like.\nWhat this last section handles, I have now already showed you.\nWhilst I contrive, order, pensively and slowly compose these\nmatters; (for I only do reason, I dispute not); it so happened in\nthe interim, that my country, some few years before the civil wars\ndid rage, was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of\ndominion and the obedience due from subjects, the true forerunners\nof an approaching war; and was the cause which, all those other\nmatters deferred, ripened and plucked from me this third part.\nTherefore it happens, that what was last in order, is yet come forth\nfirst in time. And the rather, because I saw that, grounded on its\nown principles sufficiently known by experience, it would not stand\nin need of the former sections. Yet I have not made it out of a\ndesire of praise: although if I had, I might have defended myself\nwith this fair excuse, that very few do things laudably, who are not\naffected with commendation: but for your sakes, readers, who I\npersuaded myself, when you should rightly apprehend and thoroughly\nunderstand this doctrine I here present you with, would rather\nchoose to brook with patience some inconveniences under government,\n(because human affairs cannot possibly be without some), than\nself-opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the public; that, weighing the\njustice of those things you are about, not by the persuasion and\nadvice of private men, but by the laws of the realm, you will no\nlonger suffer ambitious men through the streams of your blood to\nwade to their own power; that you will esteem it better to enjoy\nyourselves in the present state, though perhaps not the best, than\nby waging war endeavour to procure a reformation for other men in\nanother age, yourselves in the meanwhile either killed or consumed\nwith age. Furthermore, for those who will not acknowledge themselves\nsubject to the civil magistrate, and will be exempt from all public\nburthens, and yet will live under his jurisdiction, and look for\nprotection from the violence and injuries of others, that you would\nnot look on them as fellow-subjects, but esteem them for enemies and\nspies; and that ye rashly admit not for God\u2019s word all which, either\nopenly or privately, they shall pretend to be so. I say more\nplainly, if any preacher, confessor, or casuist, shall but say that\nthis doctrine is agreeable with God\u2019s word, namely, that the chief\nruler, nay, any private man may lawfully be put to death without the\nchief\u2019s command, or that subjects may resist, conspire, or covenant\nagainst the supreme power; that ye by no means believe them, but\ninstantly declare their names. He who approves of these reasons,\nwill also like my intentions in writing this book.\n\nLast of all, I have propounded to myself this rule through this\nwhole discourse. First, not to define aught which concerns the\njustice of single actions, but leave them to be determined by the\nlaws. Next, not to dispute the laws of any government in special,\nthat is, not to point which are the laws of any country, but to\ndeclare what the laws of all countries are. Thirdly, not to seem of\nopinion, that there is a less proportion of obedience due to an\n_aristocracy_ or _democracy_ than a _monarchy_. For though I have\nendeavoured, by arguments in my tenth chapter, to gain a belief in\nmen, that monarchy is the most commodious government; which one\nthing alone I confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but\nonly probably stated; yet every where I expressly say, that in all\nkind of government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equal\npower. Fourthly, not in anywise to dispute the positions of divines,\nexcept those which strip subjects of their obedience, and shake the\nfoundations of civil government. Lastly, lest I might imprudently\nset forth somewhat of which there would be no need, what I had thus\nwritten I would not presently expose to the public. Wherefore I got\nsome few copies privately dispersed among some of my friends; that\ndiscrying the opinions of others, if any things appeared erroneous,\nhard, or obscure, I might correct, soften and explain them.\n\nThese things I found most bitterly excepted against. That I had\nmade the civil powers too large; but this by ecclesiastical\npersons. That I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience; but\nthis by sectaries. That I had set princes above the civil laws;\nbut this by lawyers. Wherefore I was not much moved by these men\u2019s\nreprehensions, as who in doing this, did but do their own\nbusiness; except it were to tie those knots somewhat faster.\n\nBut for their sakes who have a little been staggered at the\nprinciples themselves, to wit, the nature of men, the authority or\nright of nature, the nature of compacts and contracts, and the\noriginal of civil government; because in finding fault they have not\nso much followed their passions, as their common-sense, I have\ntherefore in some places added some annotations, whereby I presumed\nI might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts. Lastly,\nI have endeavoured to offend none, beside those whose principles\nthese contradict, and whose tender minds are lightly offended by\nevery difference of opinions.\n\nWherefore, if ye shall meet with some things which have more of\nsharpness, and less of certainty than they ought to have, since they\nare not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties as the\nestablishment of peace, and by one whose just grief for the present\ncalamities of his country may very charitably be allowed some\nliberty; it is his only request to ye, Readers, ye will deign to\nreceive them with an equal mind.\n\n\n\n\n -------\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n THE INDEX.\n\n\n ---\n\n\n OF LIBERTY.\n\n\n CHAP. PAGE\n\n 1. Of the state of men without civil society 1\n\n 2. Of the law of nature concerning contracts 14\n\n 3. Of the other laws of nature 29\n\n 4. That the law of nature is a divine law 59\n\n\n OF DOMINION.\n\n\n 5. Of the causes and first original of civil 63\n government\n\n 6. Of the right, whether we consider it in an 71\n assembly or in one person, which he hath who is\n endued with supreme authority\n\n 7. Of the three kinds of government, Democracy, 92\n Aristocracy, and Monarchy\n\n 8. Of the right which lords and masters have over 108\n their servants\n\n 9. Of the right which parents have over their 114\n children, and of a kingdom paternal\n\n 10. A comparison of the three kinds of government, 126\n each with other, according to the inconveniences\n of each one\n\n 11. The places and examples of Scripture concerning 143\n the right of government, which make for proof of\n the foresaid doctrines\n\n 12. Of the inward causes which dissolve all civil 149\n government\n\n 13. Of the duties of those men who sit at the helm of 165\n state\n\n 14. Of laws and sins 182\n\n\n OF RELIGION.\n\n\n 15. Of God\u2019s government by nature 201\n\n 16. Of his government by the old covenant 226\n\n 17. Of his government by the new covenant 250\n\n 18. Of those things which are necessary for our 298\n entrance into the kingdom of heaven\n\n\n\n\n PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS\n OF\n A TRUE CITIZEN.\n\n ---\n\n LIBERTY.\n\n ---\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n OF THE STATE OF MEN WITHOUT CIVIL SOCIETY.\n\n1. The Introduction. 2. That the beginning of civil society is from\n mutual fear. 3. That men by nature are all equal. 4. Whence the\n will of mischieving each other ariseth. 5. The discord arising\n from comparison of wits. 6. From the appetite many have to the\n same thing. 7. The definition of _right_. 8. A right to the end,\n gives a right to the means necessary to that end. 9. By the\n right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to\n his own preservation. 10. By nature all men have equal right to\n all things. 11. This right which all men have to all things, is\n unprofitable. 12. The state of men without civil society, is a\n mere state of war: the definitions of _peace_ and _war_. 13. War\n is an adversary to man\u2019s preservation. 14. It is lawful for any\n man, by natural right, to compel another whom he hath gotten in\n his power, to give caution of his future obedience. 15. Nature\n dictates the seeking after peace.\n\n[Sidenote: Introduction.]\n\nThe faculties of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds; bodily\nstrength, experience, reason, passion. Taking the beginning of this\nfollowing doctrine from these, we will declare, in the first place,\nwhat manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties\nbear towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty they are\nborn apt for society, and to preserve themselves against mutual\nviolence; then proceeding, we will shew what advice was necessary to\nbe taken for this business, and what are the conditions of society,\nor of human peace; that is to say, (changing the words only), what\nare the fundamental _laws of nature_.\n\n[Sidenote: That the beginning of mutual society is from fear.]\n\n2. The greatest part of those men who have written aught concerning\ncommonwealths, either suppose, or require us or beg of us to\nbelieve, that man is a creature born fit[1] for society. The Greeks\ncall him \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd; and on this foundation they so build up the\ndoctrine of civil society, as if for the preservation of peace, and\nthe government of mankind, there were nothing else necessary than\nthat men should agree to make certain covenants and conditions\ntogether, which themselves should then call laws. Which axiom,\nthough received by most, is yet certainly false; and an error\nproceeding from our too slight contemplation of human nature. For\nthey who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come\ntogether, and delight in each other\u2019s company, shall easily find\nthat this happens not because naturally it could happen no\notherwise, but by accident. For if by nature one man should love\nanother, that is, as man, there could no reason be returned why\nevery man should not equally love every man, as being equally man;\nor why he should rather frequent those, whose society affords him\nhonour or profit. We do not therefore by nature seek society for its\nown sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it;\nthese we desire primarily, that secondarily. How, by what advice,\nmen do meet, will be best known by observing those things which they\ndo when they are met. For if they meet for traffic, it is plain\nevery man regards not his fellow, but his business; if to discharge\nsome office, a certain market-friendship is begotten, which hath\nmore of jealousy in it than true love, and whence factions sometimes\nmay arise, but good will never; if for pleasure and recreation of\nmind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things\nwhich stir up laughter, whence he may, according to the nature of\nthat which is ridiculous, by comparison of another man\u2019s defects and\ninfirmities, pass the more current in his own opinion. And although\nthis be sometimes innocent and without offence, yet it is manifest\nthey are not so much delighted with the society, as their own vain\nglory. But for the most part, in these kinds of meeting we wound the\nabsent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examined, judged,\ncondemned. Nay, it is very rare but some present receive a fling as\nsoon as they part; so as his reason was not ill, who was wont always\nat parting to go out last. And these are indeed the true delights of\nsociety, unto which we are carried by nature, that is, by those\npassions which are incident to all creatures, until either by sad\nexperience or good precepts it so fall out, which in many it never\nhappens, that the appetite of present matters be dulled with the\nmemory of things past: without which the discourse of most quick and\nnimble men on this subject, is but cold and hungry.\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n _Born fit._] Since we now see actually a constituted society among\n men, and none living out of it, since we discern all desirous of\n congress and mutual correspondence, it may seem a wonderful kind\n of stupidity, to lay in the very threshold of this doctrine such a\n stumbling block before the reader, as to deny _man to be born fit\n for society_. Therefore I must more plainly say, that it is true\n indeed, that to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he\n is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to\n help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live\n well. Wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling)\n desire to come together. But civil societies are not mere\n meetings, but bonds, to the making whereof faith and compacts are\n necessary; the virtue whereof to children and fools, and the\n profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which\n accompany its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens,\n that those, because they know not what society is, cannot enter\n into it; these, because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care\n not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they\n are born in infancy, are born unapt for society. Many also,\n perhaps most men, either through defect of mind or want of\n education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives;\n yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human\n nature. Wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but\n by education. Furthermore, although man were born in such a\n condition as to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were\n born fit to enter into it. For it is one thing to desire, another\n to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who\n through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, without\n which there can be no society, do yet desire it.\n\nBut if it so happen, that being met they pass their time in relating\nsome stories, and one of them begins to tell one which concerns\nhimself; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to\nspeak of himself too; if one relate some wonder, the rest will tell\nyou miracles, if they have them; if not, they will feign them.\nLastly, that I may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser than\nothers: if they meet to talk of philosophy, look, how many men, so\nmany would be esteemed masters, or else they not only love not their\nfellows, but even persecute them with hatred. So clear is it by\nexperience to all men who a little more narrowly consider human\naffairs, that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty,\nor from vain glory, whence the parties met endeavour to carry with\nthem either some benefit, or to leave behind them that same\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, some esteem and honour with those, with whom they have\nbeen conversant. The same is also collected by reason out of the\ndefinitions themselves of _will_, _good_, _honour_, _profitable_.\nFor when we voluntarily contract society, in all manner of society\nwe look after the object of the will, that is, that which every one\nof those who gather together, propounds to himself for good. Now\nwhatsoever seems good, is pleasant, and relates either to the\nsenses, or the mind. But all the mind\u2019s pleasure is either glory,\n(or to have a good opinion of one\u2019s self), or refers to glory in the\nend; the rest are sensual, or conducing to sensuality, which may be\nall comprehended under the word _conveniences_. All society\ntherefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for\nlove of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves. But no society\ncan be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory. Because that\nglory is like honour; if all men have it no man hath it, for they\nconsist in comparison and precellence. Neither doth the society of\nothers advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself; for\nevery man must account himself, such as he can make himself without\nthe help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much\nfurthered by mutual help; since yet those may be better attained to\nby dominion than by the society of others, I hope no body will\ndoubt, but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature,\nif all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society.\nWe must therefore resolve, that the original of all great and\nlasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had\ntowards each other, but in the mutual fear[2] they had of each\nother.\n\nFootnote 2:\n\n _The mutual fear._] It is objected: it is so improbable that men\n should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had\n been afraid, they would not have endured each others looks. They\n presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be\n affrighted. I comprehend in this word _fear_, a certain foresight\n of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of\n fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they\n may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They who go to\n sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with\n them, because they fear thieves. Kingdoms guard their coasts and\n frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls;\n and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns. Even the\n strongest armies, and most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes\n parley for peace, as fearing each others power, and lest they\n might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves\n by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape\n otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons;\n whence it happens, that daring to come forth they know each\n other\u2019s spirits. But then if they fight, civil society ariseth\n from the victory; if they agree, from their agreement.\n\n[Sidenote: That men by nature are all equal.]\n\n3. The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality\nof men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to\npass, that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to\nourselves the least security. For if we look on men full-grown, and\nconsider how brittle the frame of our human body is, which\nperishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perisheth\nwith it; and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to\nkill the strongest: there is no reason why any man, trusting to his\nown strength, should conceive himself made by nature above others.\nThey are equals, who can do equal things one against the other; but\nthey who can do the greatest things, namely, kill, can do equal\nthings. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the\ninequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law.\n\n[Sidenote: Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth.]\n\n4. All men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt,\nbut not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be\ncondemned. For one man, according to that natural equality which is\namong us, permits as much to others as he assumes to himself; which\nis an argument of a temperate man, and one that rightly values his\npower. Another, supposing himself above others, will have a license\nto do what he lists, and challenges respect and honour, as due to\nhim before others; which is an argument of a fiery spirit. This\nman\u2019s will to hurt ariseth from vain glory, and the false esteem he\nhath of his own strength; the other\u2019s from the necessity of\ndefending himself, his liberty, and his goods, against this man\u2019s\nviolence.\n\n[Sidenote: The discord arising from comparison of wits.]\n\n5. Furthermore, since the combat of wits is the fiercest, the\ngreatest discords which are, must necessarily arise from this\ncontention. For in this case it is not only odious to contend\nagainst, but also not to consent. For not to approve of what a man\nsaith, is no less than tacitly to accuse him of an error in that\nthing which he speaketh: as in very many things to dissent, is as\nmuch as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from. Which may\nappear hence, that there are no wars so sharply waged as between\nsects of the same religion, and factions of the same commonweal,\nwhere the contestation is either concerning doctrines or politic\nprudence. And since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind\nconsists in this, even to get some, with whom comparing, it may find\nsomewhat wherein to triumph and vaunt itself; it is impossible but\nmen must declare sometimes some mutual scorn and contempt, either by\nlaughter, or by words, or by gesture, or some sign or other; than\nwhich there is no greater vexation of mind, and than from which\nthere cannot possibly arise a greater desire to do hurt.\n\n[Sidenote: From the appetite many have to the same thing.]\n\n6. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other,\nariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to\nthe same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in\ncommon, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must\nhave it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword.\n\n[Sidenote: The definition of right.]\n\n7. Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do\ndaily threaten each other withal, to have a care of one\u2019s self is so\nfar from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has\nneither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is\ndesirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but\nchiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he\ndoth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a\nstone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor\nreprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a\nman to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and\nthe members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not\ncontrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly,\nand with right. Neither by the word _right_ is anything else\nsignified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his\nnatural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first\nfoundation of natural right is this, that _every man as much as in\nhim lies endeavour to protect his life and members_.\n\n[Sidenote: A right to the end gives also a right to the means.]\n\n8. But because it is in vain for a man to have a right to the end,\nif the right to the necessary means be denied him, it follows, that\nsince every man hath a right to preserve himself, he must also be\nallowed a right _to use all the means, and do all the actions,\nwithout which he cannot preserve himself_.\n\n[Sidenote: By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means\n which tend to his preservation.]\n\n9. Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he\nis performing, be necessary to the preservation of his life and\nmembers or not, he himself, by the right of nature, must be judge.\nFor if it be contrary to right reason that I should judge of mine\nown peril, say, that another man is judge. Why now, because he\njudgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason, because we are\nequal by nature, will I judge also of things which do belong to him.\nTherefore it agrees with right reason, that is, it is the right of\nnature that I judge of his opinion, that is, whether it conduce to\nmy preservation or not.\n\n[Sidenote: By right of nature, all men have equal right to all\n things.]\n\n10. Nature hath given to _every one a right to all_; that is, it was\nlawful for every man, in the bare state of nature,[3] or before such\ntime as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds, to do\nwhat he would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use,\nand enjoy all what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a\nman would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and\neither it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute\ntowards his preservation, (but we have already allowed him to be\njudge, in the foregoing article, whether it doth or not, insomuch as\nwe are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so), and\nby the 7th article it appears that by the right of nature those\nthings may be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to\nthe protection of life and members, it follows, that in the state of\nnature, to have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is that\nwhich is meant by that common saying, _nature hath given all to\nall_. From whence we understand likewise, that in the state of\nnature profit is the measure of right.\n\nFootnote 3:\n\n _In the bare state of nature._ This is thus to be understood: what\n any man does in the bare state of nature, is injurious to no man;\n not that in such a state he cannot offend God, or break the laws\n of nature; for injustice against men presupposeth human laws, such\n as in the state of nature there are none. Now the truth of this\n proposition thus conceived, is sufficiently demonstrated to the\n mindful reader in the articles immediately foregoing; but because\n in certain cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget\n the premises, I will contract this argument, and make it most\n evident to a single view. Every man hath right to protect himself,\n as appears by the seventh article. The same man therefore hath a\n right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end,\n by the eighth article. But those are the necessary means which he\n shall judge to be such, by the ninth article. He therefore hath a\n right to make use of, and to do all whatsoever he shall judge\n requisite for his preservation; wherefore by the judgment of him\n that doth it, the thing done is either right or wrong, and\n therefore right. True it is therefore in the bare state of nature,\n &c. But if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his\n preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe\n so, he may offend against the laws of nature, as in the third\n chapter of this book is more at large declared. It hath been\n objected by some: if a son kill his father, doth he him no injury?\n I have answered, that a son cannot be understood to be at any time\n in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of\n them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born,\n namely, either his father\u2019s or his mother\u2019s, or him that nourished\n him; as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: The right of all to all is unprofitable.]\n\n11. But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right\nto all things. For the effects of this right are the same, almost,\nas if there had been no right at all. For although any man might say\nof every thing, _this is mine_, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason\nof his neighbour, who having equal right and equal power, would\npretend the same thing to be his.\n\n[Sidenote: The state of men without society is a state of war.]\n\n12. If now to this natural proclivity of men, to hurt each other,\nwhich they derive from their passions, but chiefly from a vain\nesteem of themselves, you add, the right of all to all, wherewith\none by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise\nperpetual jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a\nthing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with an\nintention to oppress and ruin, though he come with a small number,\nand no great provision; it cannot be denied but that the natural\nstate of men, before they entered into society, was a mere war, and\nthat not simply, but a war of all men against all men. [Sidenote:\nThe definition of war and peace.]For what is WAR, but that same time\nin which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either\nby words or deeds? The time remaining is termed PEACE.\n\n[Sidenote: War is an adversary to man\u2019s preservation.]\n\n13. But it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the\npreservation either of mankind, or of each single man, a perpetual\nwar is. But it is perpetual in its own nature; because in regard of\nthe equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by victory.\nFor in this state the conqueror is subject to so much danger, as it\nwere to be accounted a miracle, if any, even the most strong, should\nclose up his life with many years and old age. They of America are\nexamples hereof, even in this present age: other nations have been\nin former ages; which now indeed are become civil and flourishing,\nbut were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and deprived of\nall that pleasure and beauty of life, which peace and society are\nwont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been\nbest to have continued in that state in which all things were lawful\nfor all men, he contradicts himself. For every man by natural\nnecessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that\nesteems a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such\na state, to be good for him. And so it happens, that through fear of\neach other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition, and\nto get some fellows; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet\nbe against all men, nor without some helps.\n\n[Sidenote: That by the right of nature, it is lawful for any man to\n compel him whom he hath in his power, to give him caution\n for his future obedience.]\n\n14. Fellows are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; by\nconstraint, when after fight the conqueror makes the conquered serve\nhim, either through fear of death, or by laying fetters on him: by\nconsent, when men enter into society to help each other, both\nparties consenting without any constraint. But the conqueror may by\nright compel the conquered, or the strongest the weaker, (as a man\nin health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper years a\nchild), unless he will choose to die, to give caution of his future\nobedience. For since the right of protecting ourselves according to\nour own wills, proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our\nequality, it is more consonant to reason, and more certain for our\nconservation, using the present advantage to secure ourselves by\ntaking caution, than when they shall be full grown and strong, and\ngot out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power again by\ndoubtful fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more\nabsurd, than by discharging whom you already have weak in your\npower, to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one. From\nwhence we may understand likewise as a corollary in the natural\nstate of men, that _a sure and irresistible power confers the right\nof dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist_; insomuch, as\nthe right of all things that can be done, adheres essentially and\nimmediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.\n\n[Sidenote: Nature dictates the seeking after peace.]\n\n15. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation, continuing thus\nin the state of nature, that is, of war, by reason of that equality\nof power, and other human faculties they are endued withal.\nWherefore to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it,\nand where there is none, to enquire out for auxiliaries of war, is\nthe dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature; as shall be\nshowed in the next chapter.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS.\n\n1. That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the\n dictate of reason. 2. That the fundamental law of nature, is to\n seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend\n ourselves. 3. That the first special law of nature, is not to\n retain our right to all things. 4. What it is to quit our right:\n what to transfer it. 5. That in the transferring of our right,\n the will of him that receives it is necessarily required. 6. No\n words but those of the present tense, transfer any right. 7.\n Words of the future, if there be some other tokens to signify\n the will, are valid in the translation of right. 8. In matters\n of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any words of\n the future. 9. The definition of contract and compact. 10. In\n compacts, our right passeth from us through words of the future.\n 11. Compacts of mutual faith, in the state of nature are of no\n effect and vain; but not so in civil government. 12. That no man\n can make compacts with beasts, nor yet with God without\n revelation. 13. Nor yet make a vow to God. 14. That compacts\n oblige not beyond our utmost endeavour. 15. By what means we are\n freed from our compacts. 16. That promises extorted through fear\n of death, in the state of nature are valid. 17. A later compact\n contradicting the former, is invalid. 18. A compact not to\n resist him that shall prejudice my body, is invalid. 19. A\n compact to accuse one\u2019s self, is invalid. 20. The definition of\n swearing. 21. That swearing is to be conceived in that form\n which he useth that takes the oath. 22. An oath superadds\n nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. 23. An oath\n ought not to be pressed, but where the breach of compacts may be\n kept private, or cannot be punished but from God himself.\n\n\n[Sidenote: That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but\n the dictate of reason.]\n\n1. All authors agree not concerning the definition of _the natural\nlaw_, who notwithstanding do very often make use of this term in\ntheir writings. The method therefore wherein we begin from\ndefinitions and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to\nthem who leave no place for contrary disputes. For the rest, if any\nman say that somewhat is done against the law of nature, one proves\nit hence; because it was done against the general agreement of all\nthe most wise and learned nations: but this declares not who shall\nbe the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations. Another\nhence, that it was done against the general consent of all mankind;\nwhich definition is by no means to be admitted. For then it were\nimpossible for any but children and fools, to offend against such a\nlaw; for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend all men\nactually endued with reason. These therefore either do nought\nagainst it, or if they do aught, it is without their own consent,\nand therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the laws of nature\nfrom the consents of them who oftener break than observe them, is in\ntruth unreasonable. Besides, men condemn the same things in others,\nwhich they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publicly\ncommend what they privately condemn; and they deliver their opinions\nmore by hearsay, than any speculation of their own; and they accord\nmore through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or\nsome other perturbation of mind, than true reason. And therefore it\ncomes to pass, that whole bodies of people often do those things\nwith the greatest unanimity and earnestness, which those writers\nmost willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But\nsince all do grant, that is done by _right_, which is not done\nagainst reason, we ought to judge those actions only _wrong_, which\nare repugnant to right reason, that is, which contradict some\ncertain truth collected by right reasoning from true principles. But\nthat which is done _wrong_, we say it is done against some law.\nTherefore _true reason_ is a certain _law_; which, since it is no\nless a part of human nature, than any other faculty or affection of\nthe mind, is also termed natural. Therefore the _law of nature_,\nthat I may define it, is the dictate of right reason,[4] conversant\nabout those things which are either to be done or omitted for the\nconstant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.\n\nFootnote 4:\n\n _Right reason._] By right reason in the natural state of men, I\n understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of\n reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every\n man concerning those actions of his, which may either redound to\n the damage or benefit of his neighbours. I call it peculiar,\n because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme,\n that is, the civil law, is to be received by each single subject\n for the right; yet being without this civil government, in which\n state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it\n with his own, every man\u2019s own reason is to be accounted, not only\n the rule of his own actions, which are done at his own peril, but\n also for the measure of another man\u2019s reason, in such things as do\n concern him. I call it true, that is, concluding from true\n principles rightly framed, because that the whole breach of the\n laws of nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of\n those men, who see not those duties they are necessarily to\n perform towards others in order to their own conservation. But the\n principles of right reasoning about such like duties, are those\n which are explained in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,\n and seventh articles of the first chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace\n where it may be had, and, where not, to defend\n ourselves.]\n\n2. But the first and fundamental law of nature is, _that peace is to\nbe sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to\nprovide ourselves for helps of war_. For we showed in the last\narticle of the foregoing chapter, that this precept is the dictate\nof right reason; but that the dictates of right reason are natural\nlaws, that hath been newly proved above. But this is the first,\nbecause the rest are derived from this, and they direct the ways\neither to peace or self-defence.\n\n[Sidenote: The first special law of nature is, that our rights to\n all things ought not to be retained.]\n\n3. But one of the natural laws derived from this fundamental one is\nthis: _that the right of all men to all things ought not to be\nretained; but that some certain rights ought to be transferred or\nrelinquished_. For if every one should retain his right to all\nthings, it must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade,\nand others, by the same right, might defend themselves against them.\nFor every man by natural necessity endeavours to defend his body,\nand the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of\nhis body. Therefore war would follow. He therefore acts against the\nreason of peace, that is, against the law of nature, whosoever he\nbe, that doth not part with his right to all things.\n\n[Sidenote: What it is to quit our right: what to convey it.]\n\n4. But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely\nrenounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth\nit, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares, that he is\nwilling that it shall never be lawful for him to do that again,\nwhich before _by right_ he might have done. But he conveys it to\nanother, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares to that\nother, that he is willing it should be unlawful for him to resist\nhim, in going about to do somewhat in the performance whereof he\nmight before _with right_ have resisted him. But that the conveyance\nof right consists merely in not resisting, is understood by this,\nthat before it was conveyed, he to whom he conveyed it, had even\nthen also a right to all; whence he could not give any new right;\nbut the resisting right he had before he gave it, by reason whereof\nthe other could not freely enjoy his rights, is utterly abolished.\nWhosoever therefore acquires some right in the natural state of men,\nhe only procures himself security and freedom from just molestation\nin the enjoyment of his primitive right. As for example, if any man\nshall sell or give away a farm, he utterly deprives himself only\nfrom all right to this farm; but he does not so others also.\n\n[Sidenote: The will of the receiver must necessarily be declared,\n before the right be conveyed.]\n\n5. But in the conveyance of right, the will is requisite not only of\nhim that conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be\nwanting, the right remains. For if I would have given what was mine\nto one who refused to accept of it, I have not therefore either\nsimply renounced my right, or conveyed it to any man. For the cause\nwhich moved me to part with it to this man, was in him only, not in\nothers too.\n\n[Sidenote: Words convey not, except they relate to the time\n present.]\n\n6. But if there be no other token extant of our will either to quit\nor convey our right, but only words; those words must either relate\nto the present or time past; for if they be of the future only, they\nconvey nothing. For example, he that speaks thus of the time to\ncome, _I will give to-morrow_, declares openly that yet he hath not\ngiven it. So that all this day his right remains, and abides\nto-morrow too, unless in the interim he actually bestows it: for\nwhat is mine, remains mine till I have parted with it. But if I\nshall speak of the time present, suppose thus; _I do give or have\ngiven you this to be received to-morrow_: by these words is\nsignified that I have already given it, and that his right to\nreceive it to-morrow is conveyed to him by me to-day.\n\n[Sidenote: Words of the future suffice to convey, if other\n testimonies of our will be not wanting.]\n\n7. Nevertheless, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to\ndeclare the will; if yet to words relating to the future there shall\nsome other signs be added, they may become as valid as if they had\nbeen spoken of the present. If therefore, as by reason of those\nother signs, it appear that he that speaks of the future, intends\nthose words should be effectual toward the perfect transferring of\nhis right, they ought to be valid. For the conveyance of right\ndepends not on words, but, as hath been instanced in the fourth\narticle, on the declaration of the will.\n\n[Sidenote: In matters of free gift, words of the future convey no\n right.]\n\n8. If any man convey some part of his right to another, and doth not\nthis for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a\nconveyance in this kind is called a gift or free donation. But in\nfree donation, those words only oblige us, which signify the present\nor the time past; for if they respect the future, they oblige not as\n_words_, for the reason given in the foregoing article. It must\nneeds therefore be, that the obligation arise from some other tokens\nof the will. But, because whatsoever is voluntarily done, is done\nfor some good to him that wills it; there can no other token be\nassigned of the will to give it, except some benefit either already\nreceived, or to be acquired. But it is supposed that no such benefit\nis acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to\nbe a free gift. It remains therefore, that a mutual good turn\nwithout agreement be expected. But no sign can be given, that he,\nwho used future words toward him who was in no sort engaged to\nreturn a benefit, should desire to have his words so understood as\nto oblige himself thereby. Nor is it suitable to reason, that those\nwho are easily inclined to do well to others, should be obliged by\nevery promise, testifying their present good affection. And for this\ncause, a promiser in this kind must be understood to have time to\ndeliberate, and power to change that affection, as well as he to\nwhom he made that promise, may alter his desert. But he that\ndeliberates, is so far forth free, nor can be said to have already\ngiven. But if he promise often, and yet give seldom, he ought to be\ncondemned of levity, and be called not a donor, but doson.\n\n[Sidenote: The definition of contract and covenant.]\n\n9. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveying their rights, is\ncalled a _contract_. But in every contract, either both parties\ninstantly perform what they contract for, insomuch as there is no\ntrust had from either to other; or the one performs, the other is\ntrusted; or neither perform. Where both parties perform presently,\nthere the contract is ended as soon as it is performed. But where\nthere is credit given, either to one or both, there the party\ntrusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is\ncalled a _covenant_.\n\n[Sidenote: In covenants, we pass away our rights by words signifying\n the future.]\n\n10. But the covenant made by the party trusted with him who hath\nalready performed, although the promise be made by words pointing at\nthe future, doth no less transfer the right of future time, than if\nit had been made by words signifying the present or time past. For\nthe other\u2019s performance is a most manifest sign that he so\nunderstood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would\ncertainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by this\nsign the party trusted knew himself to be thus understood; which\nbecause he hindered not, was an evident token of his will to\nperform. The promises therefore which are made for some benefit\nreceived, which are also covenants, are tokens of the will; that is,\nas in the foregoing section hath been declared, of the last act of\ndeliberating, whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolished,\nand by consequence are obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there\nbeginneth obligation.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants, in the state of nature, are in vain and of\n none effect: not so in civil government.]\n\n11. But the covenants which are made in contract of mutual trust,\nneither party performing out of hand, if there arise[5] a just\nsuspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid. For\nhe that first performs, by reason of the wicked disposition of the\ngreatest part of men studying their own advantage either by right or\nwrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he\nhath contracted. For it suits not with reason, that any man should\nperform first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his\npromise after; which, whether it be probable or not, he that doubts\nit must be judge of, as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter in\nthe ninth article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature.\nBut in a civil state, when there is a power which can compel both\nparties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first\nperform; because, that since the other may be compelled, the cause\nwhich made him fear the other\u2019s non-performance, ceaseth.\n\nFootnote 5:\n\n _Arise._] For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either\n from somewhat done, or some other token of the will not to perform\n from the other part, it cannot be judged to be a just fear; for\n the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making\n compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being\n made.\n\n[Sidenote: That no man can make compacts with beasts; neither with\n God, without revelation.]\n\n12. But from this reason, that in all free gifts and compacts there\nis an acceptance of the conveyance of right required: it follows\nthat no man can compact with him who doth not declare his\nacceptance. And therefore we cannot compact with beasts, neither can\nwe give or take from them any manner of right, by reason of their\nwant of speech and understanding. Neither can any man covenant with\nGod, or be obliged to him by vow; except so far forth as it appears\nto him by Holy Scriptures, that he hath substituted certain men who\nhave authority to accept of such-like vows and covenants, as being\nin God\u2019s stead.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor yet vow to God.]\n\n13. Those therefore do vow in vain, who are in the state of nature,\nwhere they are not tied by any civil law, except, by most certain\nrevelation, the will of God to accept their vow or pact, be made\nknown to them. For if what they vow be contrary to the law of\nnature, they are not tied by their vow; for no man is tied to\nperform an unlawful act. But if what is vowed, be commanded by some\nlaw of nature, it is not their vow, but the law itself which ties\nthem. But if he were free, before his vow, either to do it or not do\nit, his liberty remains; because that the openly declared will of\nthe obliger is requisite to make an obligation by vow; which, in the\ncase propounded, is supposed not to be. Now I call him the obliger,\nto whom any one is tied; and the obliged, him who is tied.\n\n[Sidenote: Compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavours.]\n\n14. Covenants are made of such things only as fall under our\ndeliberation. For it can be no covenant without the will of the\ncontractor. But the will is the last act of him who deliberates;\nwherefore they only concern things _possible_ and _to come_. No man,\ntherefore, by his compact obligeth himself to an impossibility. But\nyet, though we often covenant to do such things as then seemed\npossible when we promised them, which yet afterward appear to be\nimpossible, are we not therefore freed from all obligation. The\nreason whereof is, that he who promiseth a future, in certainty\nreceives a present benefit, on condition that he return another for\nit. For his will, who performs the present benefit, hath simply\nbefore it for its object a certain good, equally valuable with the\nthing promised; but the thing itself not simply, but with condition\nif it could be done. But if it should so happen, that even this\nshould prove impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can.\nCovenants, therefore, oblige us not to perform just the thing itself\ncovenanted for, but our utmost endeavour; for this only is, the\nthings themselves are not in our power.\n\n[Sidenote: In what manner we are freed from compacts.]\n\n15. We are freed from covenants two ways, either by performing, or\nby being forgiven. By performing, for beyond that we obliged not\nourselves. By being forgiven, because he whom we obliged ourselves\nto, by forgiving is conceived to return us that right which we\npassed over to him. For forgiving implies giving, that is, by the\nfourth article of this chapter, a conveyance of right to him to whom\nthe gift is made.\n\n[Sidenote: Promises forced from us through fear of death, are valid\n in the state of nature.]\n\n16. It is a usual question, whether compacts extorted from us\nthrough fear, do oblige or not. For example, if, to redeem my life\nfrom the power of a robber, I promise to pay him 100_l._ next day,\nand that I will do no act whereby to apprehend and bring him to\njustice: whether I am tied to keep promise or not. But though such a\npromise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not\nto be accounted so because it proceedeth from fear. For then it\nwould follow, that those promises which reduced men to a civil life,\nand by which laws were made, might likewise be of none effect; (for\nit proceeds from fear of mutual slaughter, that one man submits\nhimself to the dominion of another); and he should play the fool\nfinely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of\nhis redemption. It holds universally true, that promises do oblige,\nwhen there is some benefit received, and when the promise, and the\nthing promised, be lawful. But it is lawful, for the redemption of\nmy life, both to promise and to give what I will of mine own to any\nman, even to a thief. We are obliged, therefore, by promises\nproceeding from fear, except the civil law forbid them; by virtue\nwhereof, that which is promised becomes unlawful.\n\n[Sidenote: A latter compact contradicting the former, is invalid.]\n\n17. Whosoever shall contract with one to do or omit somewhat, and\nshall after covenant the contrary with another, he maketh not the\nformer, but the latter contract unlawful. For he hath no longer\nright to do or to omit aught, who by former contracts hath conveyed\nit to another. Wherefore he can convey no right by latter contracts,\nand what is promised is promised without right. He is therefore tied\nonly to his first contract, to break which is unlawful.\n\n[Sidenote: A promise not to resist him that prejudices my body is\n invalid.]\n\n18. No man is obliged by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him\nwho shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his body. For\nthere is in every man a certain high degree of fear, through which\nhe apprehends that evil which is done to him to be the greatest; and\ntherefore by natural necessity he shuns it all he can, and it is\nsupposed he can do no otherwise. When a man is arrived to this\ndegree of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself\neither by flight or fight. Since therefore no man is tied to\nimpossibilities, they who are threatened either with death, (which\nis the greatest evil to nature), or wounds, or some other bodily\nhurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to\nendure them. Furthermore, he that is tied by contract is trusted;\nfor faith only is the bond of contracts; but they who are brought to\npunishment, either capital or more gentle, are fettered or strongly\nguarded; which is a most certain sign that they seemed not\nsufficiently bound from non-resistance by their contracts. It is one\nthing, if I promise thus: if I do it not at the day appointed, kill\nme. Another thing, if thus: if I do it not, though you should offer\nto kill me, I will not resist. All men, if need be, contract the\nfirst way, and there is need sometimes. This second way, none;\nneither is it ever needful. For in the mere state of nature, if you\nhave a mind to kill, that state itself affords you a right; insomuch\nas you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will\nafterwards kill him. But in a civil state, where the right of life\nand death and of all corporal punishment is with the supreme, that\nsame right of killing cannot be granted to any private person.\nNeither need the supreme himself contract with any man patiently to\nyield to his punishment; but only this, that no man offer to defend\nothers from him. If in the state of nature, as between two realms,\nthere should a contract be made on condition of killing if it were\nnot performed, we must presuppose another contract of not killing\nbefore the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no\nperformance, the right of war returns, that is a hostile state, in\nwhich all things are lawful, and therefore resistance also. Lastly,\nby the contract of not resisting, we are obliged, of two evils to\nmake choice of that which seems the greater. For certain death is a\ngreater evil than fighting. But of two evils it is impossible not to\nchoose the least. By such a compact, therefore, we should be tied to\nimpossibilities; which is contrary to the very nature of compacts.\n\n[Sidenote: The compact of self-accusation is invalid.]\n\n19. Likewise no man is tied by any compacts whatsoever to accuse\nhimself, or any other, by whose damage he is like to procure himself\na bitter life. Wherefore neither is a father obliged to bear witness\nagainst his son, nor a husband against his wife, nor a son against\nhis father, nor any man against any one by whose means he hath his\nsubsistence; for in vain is that testimony which is presumed to be\ncorrupted from nature. But although no man be tied to accuse himself\nby any compact, yet in a public trial he may by torture be forced to\nmake answer. But such answers are no testimony of the fact, but\nhelps for the searching out of truth; so that whether the party\ntortured his answer be true or false, or whether he answer not at\nall, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by right.\n\n[Sidenote: The definition of an oath.]\n\n20. Swearing is a speech joined to a promise, whereby the promiser\ndeclares his renouncing of God\u2019s mercy, unless he perform his word.\nWhich definition is contained in the words themselves, which have in\nthem the very essence of an oath, to wit, _so God help me_, or other\nequivalent, as with the Romans, _do thou Jupiter so destroy the\ndeceiver, as I slay this same beast_. Neither is this any let, but\nthat an oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory as promissory; for\nhe that confirms his affirmation with an oath, promiseth that he\nspeaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for\nsubjects to swear by their kings, that custom took its original\nhence, that those kings took upon them divine honour. For oaths were\ntherefore introduced, that by religion and consideration of the\ndivine power, men might have a greater dread of breaking their\nfaiths, than that wherewith they fear men, from whose eyes their\nactions may lie hid.\n\n[Sidenote: The swearing must be conceived in that fashion which he\n uses who takes it.]\n\n21. Whence it follows that an oath must be conceived in that form,\nwhich he useth who takes it; for in vain is any man brought to swear\nby a God whom he believes not, and therefore neither fears him. For\nthough by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God,\nyet no man thinks he is to swear by him in any other fashion, or by\nany other name, than what is contained in the precepts of his own\nproper, that is (as he who swears imagines) the true religion.\n\n[Sidenote: Swearing adds nothing to the obligation which is by\n compact.]\n\n22. By the definition of an oath, we may understand that a bare\ncontract obligeth no less, than that to which we are sworn. For it\nis the contract which binds us; the oath relates to the divine\npunishment, which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract\nwere not in itself unlawful; but it could not be unlawful, if the\ncontract were not obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the\nmercy of God, obligeth himself not to any punishment; because it is\never lawful to deprecate the punishment, howsoever provoked, and to\nenjoy God\u2019s pardon if it be granted. The only effect therefore of an\noath is this; to cause men, who are naturally inclined to break all\nmanner of faith, through fear of punishment to make the more\nconscience of their words and actions.\n\n[Sidenote: An oath is not to be pressed, but where the breach of\n contract can either be kept private, or not be punished\n but from God alone.]\n\n23. To exact an oath where the breach of contract, if any be made,\ncannot but be known, and where the party compacted withal wants not\npower to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto\nself-defence, and shews a mind desirous not so much to benefit\nitself, as to prejudice another. For an oath, out of the very form\nof swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of God\u2019s anger,\nthat is to say, of him that is omnipotent, against those who\ntherefore violate their faith, because they think that by their own\nstrength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is\nomniscient, against those who therefore usually break their trust,\nbecause they hope that no man shall see them.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.\n\n1. The second law of nature, is to perform contracts. 2. That trust\n is to be held with all men without exception. 3. What injury is.\n 4. Injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract.\n 5. The distinction of justice into that of men, and that of\n actions. 6. The distinction of commutative and distributive\n justice examined. 7. No injury can be done to him that is\n willing. 8. The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. 9.\n The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful.\n 10. The fifth law, of mercy. 11. The sixth law, that punishments\n regard the future only. 12. The seventh law, against reproach.\n 13. The eighth law, against pride. 14. The ninth law, of\n humility. 15. The tenth, of equity, or against acceptance of\n persons. 16. The eleventh, of things to be had in common. 17.\n The twelfth, of things to be divided by lot. 18. The thirteenth,\n of birthright and first possession. 19. The fourteenth, of the\n safeguard of them who are mediators for peace. 20. The\n fifteenth, of constituting an umpire. 21. The sixteenth, that no\n man is judge in his own cause. 22. The seventeenth, that umpires\n must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to\n be judged. 23. The eighteenth, of witnesses. 24. The nineteenth,\n that there can no contract be made with the umpire. 25. The\n twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as hinder the\n use of reason. 26. The rule by which we may presently know,\n whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not.\n 27. The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience.\n 28. The laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things\n agreeable to those laws. 29. The laws of nature are\n unchangeable. 30. Whosoever endeavours to fulfil the laws of\n nature, is a just man. 31. The natural and moral law are one.\n 32. How it comes to pass, that what hath been said of the laws\n of nature, is not the same with what philosophers have delivered\n concerning the virtues. 33. The law of nature is not properly a\n law, but as it is delivered in Holy Writ.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The second law of nature, to perform contracts.]\n\n1. Another of the laws of nature is, to _perform contracts_, or _to\nkeep trust_. For it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter, that\nthe law of nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to\nobtain peace, to convey certain rights from each to other; and that\nthis, as often as it shall happen to be done, is called a contract.\nBut this is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we shall\nperform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or\nomitted; and in vain would contacts be made, unless we stood to\nthem. Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to keep faith,\nis a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace; it will prove, by\nthe second article of the second chapter, to be a precept of the\nnatural law.\n\n[Sidenote: That faith is to be kept with all men without exception.]\n\n2. Neither is there in this matter any exception of the persons with\nwhom we contract; as if they keep no faith with others, or hold that\nnone ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice. For\nhe that contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to\nbe in vain; and it is against reason for a knowing man to do a thing\nin vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking\nso he affirms the contract to be made in vain. He therefore who\ncontracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep\nfaith, he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain,\nand not in vain; which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold\ntrust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either\nthere must be a declared war, or a sure and faithful peace.\n\n[Sidenote: Injury defined.]\n\n3. The breaking of a bargain, as also the taking back of a gift,\n(which ever consists in some action or omission), is called an\ninjury. But that action or omission is called unjust; insomuch as an\ninjury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing,\nand both are the same with breach of contract and trust. And it\nseems the word _injury_ came to be given to any action or omission,\nbecause they were _without right_; he that acted or omitted, having\nbefore conveyed his right to some other. And there is some likeness\nbetween that which in the common course of life we call _injury_,\nand that which in the Schools is usually called _absurd_. For even\nas he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he\nfirst maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like\nmanner, he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which\nbefore he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an\ninjury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the\nSchools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some\nfuture action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not\ndone: which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time,\nwhich is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity\nin conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.\n\n[Sidenote: An injury can only be done to him with whom we contract.]\n\n4. From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no\nman[6] but him with whom we enter covenant, or to whom somewhat is\nmade over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of\nbargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined.\nFor if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him,\nto pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man; the\nservant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but\nhe injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any\nman offend another with whom he hath made no contract, he damages\nhim to whom the evil is done; but he injures none but him to whom\nthe power of government belongs. For if he who receives the hurt\nshould expostulate the mischief, he that did it should answer thus:\n_what art thou to me; why should I rather do according to your than\nmine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own, and\nnot my mind?_ In which speech, where there hath no manner of\npre-contract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible.\n\nFootnote 6:\n\n _Injury can be done to no man, &c._] The word _injustice_ relates\n to some law: _injury_, to some person, as well as some law. For\n what is unjust, is unjust to all; but there may an injury be done,\n and yet not against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes\n against no private person, but the magistrate only; sometimes also\n neither against the magistrate, nor any private man, but only\n against God. For through contract and conveyance of right, we say,\n that an injury is done against this or that man. Hence it is,\n which we see in all kind of government, that what private men\n contract between themselves by word or writing, is released again\n at the will of the obliger. But those mischiefs which are done\n against the laws of the land, as theft, homicide, and the like,\n are punished, not as he wills to whom the hurt is done, but\n according to the will of the magistrate; that is, the constituted\n laws.\n\n[Sidenote: The distinction of justice into that of men and actions.]\n\n5. These words, _just_ and _unjust_, as also _justice_ and\n_injustice_, are equivocal; for they signify one thing when they are\nattributed to persons, another when to actions. When they are\nattributed to actions, _just_ signifies as much as what is done with\nright, and _unjust_, as what is done with injury. He who hath done\nsome just thing, is not therefore said to be a _just_ person, but\n_guiltless_; and he that hath done some unjust thing, we do not\ntherefore say he is an _unjust_, but _guilty_ man. But when the\nwords are applied to persons, _to be just_ signifies as much as to\nbe delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or\nto endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and _to be\nunjust_ is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be\nmeasured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. So\nas the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man,\nis one thing, that of an action or omission another; and innumerable\nactions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just. But\nthat man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the\nlaw commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and\nhe is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of\nthe punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason\nof the iniquity of his mind.\n\n[Sidenote: The distinction of commutative and distributive justice,\n examined.]\n\n6. The justice of actions is commonly distinguished into two kinds,\ncommutative and distributive; the former whereof, they say, consists\nin arithmetical, the latter in geometrical proportion; and that is\nconversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending,\nlocation and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to\ncontractors; where, if there be an equal return made, hence, they\nsay, springs a commutative justice: but this is busied about the\ndignity and merits of men; so as if there be rendered to every man\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, more to him who is more worthy, and less to him that\ndeserves less, and that proportionably; hence, they say, ariseth\ndistributive justice. I acknowledge here some certain distinction of\nequality: to wit, that one is an equality simply so called; as when\ntwo things of equal value are compared together, as a pound of\nsilver with twelve ounces of the same silver: the other is an\nequality _secundum quod_; as when a thousand pounds is to be divided\nto a hundred men, six hundred pounds are given to sixty men, and\nfour hundred to forty, where there is no equality between six\nhundred and four hundred; but when it happens that there is the same\ninequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every\none of them shall take an equal part, whence it is called an equal\ndistribution. But such like equality is the same thing with\ngeometrical proportion. But what is all this to justice? For neither\nif I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, do I injure\nthe buyer, who sought and desired them of me; neither if I divide\nmore of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the\nother what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which truth our\nSaviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore\nis no distinction of justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot\nbe denied but that justice is a certain equality, as consisting in\nthis only; that since we are all equal by nature, one should not\narrogate more right to himself than he grants to another, unless he\nhave fairly gotten it by compact. And let this suffice to be spoken\nagainst this distinction of justice, although now almost generally\nreceived by all; lest any man should conceive an injury to be\nsomewhat else than the breach of faith or contract, as hath been\ndefined above.\n\n[Sidenote: No injury can be done to him that is willing.]\n\n7. It is an old saying, _volenti non fit injuria_, the willing man\nreceives no injury; yet the truth of it may be derived from our\nprinciples. For grant that a man be willing that that should be done\nwhich he conceives to be an injury to him; why then, that is done by\nhis will, which by contract was not lawful to be done. But he being\nwilling that should be done which was not lawful by contract, the\ncontract itself (by the fifteenth article of the foregoing chapter)\nbecomes void. The right therefore of doing it returns; therefore it\nis done by right; wherefore it is no injury.\n\n[Sidenote: The third law of nature, of ingratitude.]\n\n8. The third precept of the natural law is, _that you suffer not him\nto be the worse for you, who, out of the confidence he had in you,\nfirst did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a\nmind to endeavour that the giver shall have no just occasion to\nrepent him of his gift_. For without this, he should act without\nreason, that would confer a benefit where he sees it would be lost;\nand by this means all beneficence and trust, together with all kind\nof benevolence, would be taken from among men, neither would there\nbe aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any commencement of\ngaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of war would\nnecessarily remain, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. But\nbecause the breach of this law is not a breach of trust or contract,\n(for we suppose no contracts to have passed among them), therefore\nis it not usually termed an injury; but because good turns and\nthanks have a mutual eye to each other, it is called _ingratitude_.\n\n[Sidenote: The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself\n useful.]\n\n9. The fourth precept of nature is, _that every man render himself\nuseful unto others_: which that we may rightly understand, we must\nremember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter\ninto society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not\nunlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the\nbuilding, by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure. For\nas a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up\nmore room from other stones than it fills up itself, neither because\nof the hardness of its matter can it well be pressed together, or\neasily cut, and would hinder the building from being fitly\ncompacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, for the\nharshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself,\nand detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible by\nreason of the stubbornness of his affections, is commonly said to be\nuseless and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by\nright only, but even by natural necessity, is supposed with all his\nmain might to intend the procurement of those things which are\nnecessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the\nother side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a war;\nbecause that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending; he\ntherefore acts against the fundamental law of nature. Whence it\nfollows, (which we were to show), that it is a precept of nature,\nthat every man accommodate himself to others. But he who breaks this\nlaw may be called _useless_ and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth\n_inhumanity_ to this _usefulness_, as having regard to this very\nlaw.\n\n[Sidenote: The fifth law of nature, of mercifulness.]\n\n10. The fifth precept of the law of nature is, _that we must forgive\nhim who repents and asks pardon for what is past, having first taken\ncaution for the time to come_. The pardon of what is past, or the\nremission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of peace\nto him that asketh it, after he hath warred against us, and now is\nbecome penitent. But peace granted to him that repents not, that is,\nto him that retains a hostile mind, or that gives not caution for\nthe future, that is, seeks not peace, but opportunity; is not\nproperly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded by nature.\nNow to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future\ncaution, peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary to\nthe natural law.\n\n[Sidenote: The sixth law, that punishments only regard the future.]\n\n11. The sixth precept of the natural law is, _that in revenge and\npunishments we must have our eye not at the evil past, but the\nfuture good_: that is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for\nany other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that\nothers warned by his punishment may become better. But this is\nconfirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of\nnature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the\nfuture, as hath been showed in the foregoing article. Furthermore,\nbecause revenge, if the time past be only considered, is nothing\nelse but a certain triumph and glory of mind, which points at no\nend; for it contemplates only what is past, but the end is a thing\nto come; but that which is directed to no end, is vain: that revenge\ntherefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vain glory,\nand is therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason,\nintroduces a war, and is contrary to the fundamental law of nature.\nIt is therefore a precept of the law of nature, that in revenge we\nlook not backwards, but forward. Now the breach of this law is\ncommonly called _cruelty_.\n\n[Sidenote: The seventh law of nature, against slander.]\n\n12. But because all signs of hatred and contempt provoke most of all\nto brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose\ntheir lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander; it\nfollows in the seventh place, that it is prescribed by the law of\nnature, that no man, either by deeds or words, countenance or\nlaughter, _do declare himself to hate or scorn another_. The breach\nof which law is called _reproach_. But although nothing be more\nfrequent than the scoffs and jeers of the powerful against the weak,\nand namely, of judges against guilty persons, which neither relate\nto the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the judges; yet these\nkind of men do act against the law of nature, and are to be esteemed\nfor contumelious.\n\n[Sidenote: The eighth law, against pride.]\n\n13. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not\nto the natural, but civil state. For it hath been showed before\n(Chap. I. Art. 3) that all men by nature are equal; and therefore\nthe inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of\nkindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle, in his\nfirst book of Politics, affirms as a foundation of the whole\npolitical science, that some men by nature are made worthy to\ncommand, others only to serve; as if lord and servant were\ndistinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a\ncertain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance. Which foundation is\nnot only against reason, (as but now hath been showed), but also\nagainst experience. For neither almost is any man so dull of\nunderstanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than\nto yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser\nand stronger do contest, have these always or often the upper hand\nof those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is\nto be acknowledged; or whether unequal, because they are like to\ncontest for dominion, it is necessary for the obtaining of peace,\n_that they be esteemed as equal_; and therefore it is in the eighth\nplace a precept of the law of nature, _that every man be accounted\nby nature equal to another_; the contrary to which law is _pride_.\n\n[Sidenote: The ninth law, of humility.]\n\n14. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he\nshould part with some of his rights, so it is no less necessary to\nthe same conservation that he retain some others, to wit, the right\nof bodily protection, of free enjoyment of air, water, and all\nnecessaries for life. Since therefore many common rights are\nretained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many\npeculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth this ninth dictate of\nthe natural law, to wit, that what rights soever any man challenges\nto himself, he also grant the same as due to all the rest; otherwise\nhe frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article. For\nwhat is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making\nup of society, but to attribute equal right and power to those whom\nno reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe\n_equal things to equals_, is the same with giving things\n_proportional_ to _proportionals_. The observation of this law is\ncalled _meekness_, the violation \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u1f76\u03b1; the breakers by the\nLatins are styled _immodici et immodesti_.\n\n[Sidenote: The tenth law of equity, or against acceptance of\n persons.]\n\n15. In the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature, _that\nevery man in dividing right to others, shew himself equal to either\nparty_. By the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right\nby nature to ourselves, than we grant to others. We may take less if\nwe will; for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any\ntime matter of right be to be divided by us unto others, we are\nforbidden by this law to favour one more or less than another. For\nhe that by favouring one before another observes not this natural\nequality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is\ndeclared above, that a reproach is against the laws of nature. The\nobservance of this precept is called _equity_; the breach, _respect\nof persons_. The Greeks in one word term it \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03af\u03b1.\n\n[Sidenote: The eleventh law, of things to be had in common.]\n\n16. From the foregoing law is collected this eleventh, _those things\nwhich cannot be divided, must be used in common if they can, and if\nthe quantity of the matter permit, every man as much as he lists;\nbut if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and\nproportionally to the number of the users_. For otherwise that\nequality can by no means be observed, which we have showed in the\nforegoing article to be commanded by the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: The twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot.]\n\n17. Also what cannot be divided nor had in common, it is provided by\nthe law of nature, which may be the twelfth precept, _that the use\nof that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one only by lot;\nand that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot, who\nshall have the first use of it_. For here also regard is to be had\nunto equality: but no other can be found but that of lot.\n\n[Sidenote: The thirteenth law, of birthright and first possession.]\n\n18. But all lot is twofold, _arbitrary_ or _natural_.\n\n_Arbitrary_ is that which is cast by the consent of the contenders,\nand it consists in mere chance, as they say, or fortune. _Natural_\nis primogeniture, in Greek \u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1, as it were, given by lot; or\nfirst possession. Therefore the things which can neither be divided\nnor had in common, must be granted to the first possessor; as also\nthose things which belonged to the father are due to the son, unless\nthe father himself have formerly conveyed away that right to some\nother. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: The fourteenth law, of the safety of those who are\n mediators for peace.]\n\n19. The fourteenth precept of the law of nature is, _that safety\nmust be assured to the mediators for peace_. For the reason which\ncommands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But\nthe first dictate of reason is peace; all the rest are means to\nobtain it, and without which peace cannot be had. But neither can\npeace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety. It is\ntherefore a dictate of reason, that is, a law of nature, that we\nmust give all security to the mediators for peace.\n\n[Sidenote: The fifteenth law, of appointing an umpire.]\n\n20. Furthermore because, although men should agree to make all these\nand whatsoever other laws of nature, and should endeavour to keep\nthem, yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the\napplication of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was\ndone were against the law or not, which we call the question of\nright; whence will follow a fight between parties, either-sides\nsupposing themselves wronged: it is therefore necessary to the\npreservation of peace, because in this case no other fit remedy can\npossibly be thought on, that both the disagreeing parties refer the\nmatter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutual compacts to\nstand to his judgment in deciding the controversy. And he to whom\nthey thus refer themselves, is called an arbiter. It is therefore\nthe fifteenth precept of the natural law, _that both parties\ndisputing concerning the matter of right, submit themselves unto the\nopinion and judgment of some third_.\n\n[Sidenote: The sixteenth law, that no man be judge in his own\n cause.]\n\n21. But from this ground, that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the\ndiffering parties to determine the controversy, we gather that the\narbiter must not be one of the parties. For every man is presumed to\nseek what is good for himself naturally, and what is just only for\npeace sake and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same\nequality commanded by the law of nature, so exactly as a third man\nwould do. It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the\nlaw of nature, _that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own\ncause_.\n\n[Sidenote: The seventeenth law, that arbiters must be without all\n hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be\n judged.]\n\n22. From the same ground follows in the seventeenth place, _that no\nman must be judge, who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or\nglory from the victory of either part_: for the like reason sways\nhere, as in the foregoing law.\n\n[Sidenote: The eighteenth law, of witnesses.]\n\n23. But when there is some controversy of the fact itself, to wit,\nwhether that be done or not which is said to be done, the natural\nlaw wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike, that is,\nbecause they affirm contradictories, that he believe neither. He\nmust therefore give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or\nmore, that he may be able to give judgment of the fact, as often as\nby other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The eighteenth\nlaw of nature therefore enjoins arbiters and judges of fact, _that\nwhere firm and certain signs of the fact appear not, there they rule\ntheir sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both\nparts_.\n\n[Sidenote: The nineteenth law, that no contract is to be made with\n the judge.]\n\n24. From the above declared definition of an arbiter may be\nfurthermore understood, _that no contract or promise must pass\nbetween him and the parties whose judge he is appointed, by virtue\nwhereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or\nbe obliged to judge according to equity, or to pronounce such\nsentence as he shall truly judge to be equal_. The judge is indeed\nbound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equal, by the\nlaw of nature recounted in the 15th article: to the obligation of\nwhich law nothing can be added by way of compact. Such compact\ntherefore would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judgment he\nshould contend for the equity of it, except such compact be of no\nforce, the controversy would remain after judgment given: which is\ncontrary to the constitution of an arbiter, who is so chosen, as\nboth parties have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment which\nhe should pronounce. The law of nature therefore commands the judge\nto be disengaged, which is its nineteenth precept.\n\n[Sidenote: The twentieth law, against gluttony and such things as\n hinder the use of reason.]\n\n25. Furthermore, forasmuch as the laws of nature are nought else but\nthe dictates of reason; so as, unless a man endeavour to preserve\nthe faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the laws of\nnature; it is manifest, that he who knowingly or willingly doth\naught whereby the rational faculty may be destroyed or weakened, he\nknowingly and willingly breaks the law of nature. For there is no\ndifference between a man who performs not his duty, and him who does\nsuch things willingly as make it impossible for him to do it. But\nthey destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who do that which\ndisturbs the mind from its natural state; that which most manifestly\nhappens to drunkards, and gluttons. We therefore sin, in the\ntwentieth place, against the law of nature by drunkenness.\n\n[Sidenote: The rule by which a man may presently know, whether what\n he is about to act be against the law of nature or not.]\n\n26. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of nature derived\nby a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason advising us\nto look to the preservation and safeguard of ourselves, will say\nthat the deduction of these laws is so hard, that it is not to be\nexpected they will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will\nthey prove obliging: for laws, if they be not known, oblige not, nay\nindeed, are not laws. To this I answer, it is true, that hope, fear,\nanger, ambition, covetousness, vain glory, and other perturbations\nof mind, do hinder a man, so as he cannot attain to the knowledge of\nthese laws whilst those passions prevail in him: but there is no man\nwho is not sometimes in a quiet mind. At that time therefore there\nis nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude and\nunlearned, than this only rule, that when he doubts whether what he\nis now doing to another may be done by the law of nature or not, he\nconceive himself to be in that other\u2019s stead. Here instantly those\nperturbations which persuaded him to the fact, being now cast into\nthe other scale, dissuade him as much. And this rule is not only\neasy, but is anciently celebrated in these words, _quod tibi fieri\nnon vis, alteri ne feceris_: _do not that to others, you would not\nhave done to yourself_.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws of nature oblige only in the court of\n conscience.]\n\n27. But because most men, by reason of their perverse desire of\npresent profit, are very unapt to observe these laws, although\nacknowledged by them; if perhaps some, more humble than the rest,\nshould exercise that equity and usefulness which reason dictates,\nthe others not practising the same, surely they would not follow\nreason in so doing: nor would they hereby procure themselves peace,\nbut a more certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the law\nbecome a mere prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be\nimagined, that by nature, that is, by reason, men are obliged to the\nexercise of all these laws[7] in that state of men wherein they are\nnot practised by others. We are obliged yet, in the interim, to a\nreadiness of mind to observe them, whensoever their observation\nshall seem to conduce to the end for which they were ordained. We\nmust therefore conclude, that the law of nature doth always and\neverywhere oblige in the internal court, or that of conscience; but\nnot always in the external court, but then only when it may be done\nwith safety.\n\nFootnote 7:\n\n _The exercise of all these laws._ Nay, among these laws some\n things there are, the omission whereof, provided it be done for\n peace or self-preservation, seems rather to be the fulfilling,\n than breach of the natural law. For he that doth all things\n against those that do all things, and plunders plunderers, doth\n equity. But on the contrary, to do that which in peace is a\n handsome action, and becoming an honest man, is dejectedness and\n poorness of spirit, and a betraying of one\u2019s self, in the time of\n war. But there are certain natural laws, whose exercise ceaseth\n not even in the time of war itself. For I cannot understand what\n drunkenness or cruelty, that is, revenge which respects not the\n future good, can advance toward peace, or the preservation of any\n man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what is just and unjust, is\n not to be esteemed by the actions but by the counsel and\n conscience of the actor. That which is done out of necessity, out\n of endeavour for peace, for the preservation of ourselves, is done\n with right, otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach\n of the natural law, and an injury against God.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws of nature are sometimes broken by an act\n agreeable to those laws.]\n\n28. But the laws which oblige conscience, may be broken by an act\nnot only contrary to them, but also agreeable with them; if so be\nthat he who does it, be of another opinion. For though the act\nitself be answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is against\nthem.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws of nature are immutable and eternal.]\n\n29. _The laws of nature are immutable and eternal_: what they\nforbid, can never be lawful; what they command, can never be\nunlawful. For _pride_, _ingratitude_, _breach of contracts_ (or\n_injury_), _inhumanity_, _contumely_, will never be lawful, nor the\ncontrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as we take them for\ndispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the\ncourt of conscience, where only they oblige and are laws. Yet\nactions may be so diversified by circumstances and the civil law,\nthat what is done with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at\nanother; and what suits with reason at one time, is contrary to it\nanother. Yet reason is still the same, and changeth not her end,\nwhich is peace and defence, nor the means to attain them, to wit,\nthose virtues of the mind which we have declared above, and which\ncannot be abrogated by any custom or law whatsoever.\n\n[Sidenote: He who endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is just.]\n\n30. It is evident by what hath hitherto been said, how easily the\nlaws of nature are to be observed, because they require the\nendeavour only, (but that must be true and constant); which whoso\nshall perform, we may rightly call him _just_. For he who tends to\nthis with his whole might, namely, that his actions be squared\naccording to the precepts of nature, he shows clearly that he hath a\nmind to fulfil all those laws; which is all we are obliged to by\nrational nature. Now he that hath done all he is obliged to, is a\njust man.\n\n[Sidenote: The natural law is the same with the moral.]\n\n31. All writers do agree, that the natural law is the same with the\nmoral. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know, therefore,\nthat good and evil are names given to things to signify the\ninclination or aversion of them, by whom they were given. But the\ninclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse\nconstitutions, customs, opinions; as we may see in those things we\napprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more\nin those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what\nthis man commends, that is to say, calls _good_, the other\nundervalues, as being evil. Nay, very often the same man at diverse\ntimes praises and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they do,\nnecessary it is there should be discord and strife. They are,\ntherefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason of the\ndiversity of the present appetite, they mete good and evil by\ndiverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as\nthey are in it, to be evil, and by consequence that peace is good.\nThey therefore who could not agree concerning a present, do agree\nconcerning a future good; which indeed is a work of reason; for\nthings present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our\nreason only. Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the\nsame reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and\ntherefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy, (which we\nhave demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or\nhabits, that is, virtues. The law therefore, in the means to peace,\ncommands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore\nit is called _moral_.\n\n[Sidenote: Whence it comes to pass, that what hath been said\n concerning the law, is not the same with what hath been\n delivered by philosophers concerning the virtues.]\n\n32. But because men cannot put off this same irrational appetite,\nwhereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which, by strict\nconsequence, many unforseen evils do adhere) before the future; it\nhappens, that though all men do agree in the commendation of the\nforesaid virtues, yet they disagree still concerning their nature,\nto wit, in what each of them doth consist. For as oft as another\u2019s\ngood action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of\nsome neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actions which please them,\nare ever intituled to some virtue. Whence it comes to pass that the\nsame action is praised by these, and called virtue, and dispraised\nby those, and termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found\nby philosophers for this matter. For since they could not observe\nthe goodness of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to\npeace, and the evil in this, that it related to discord, they built\na moral philosophy wholly estranged from the moral law, and\nunconstant to itself. For they would have the nature of virtues\nseated in a certain kind of mediocrity between two extremes, and the\nvices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false. For _to\ndare_ is commended, and, under the name of _fortitude_ is taken for\na virtue, although it be an extreme, if the cause be approved. Also\nthe quantity of a thing given, whether it be great or little, or\nbetween both, makes not liberality, but the cause of giving it.\nNeither is it injustice, if I give any man more of what is mine own\nthan I owe him. The laws of nature, therefore, are the sum of\n_moral_ philosophy; whereof I have only delivered such precepts in\nthis place, as appertain to the preservation of ourselves against\nthose dangers which arise from discord. But there are other precepts\nof _rational_ nature, from whence spring other virtues; for\ntemperance, also, is a precept of reason, because intemperance tends\nto sickness and death. And so fortitude too, that is, that same\nfaculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers, and which are more\nhardly declined than overcome; because it is a means tending to the\npreservation of him that resists.\n\n[Sidenote: The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is\n delivered in Holy Scripture.]\n\n33. But those which we call the laws of nature, (since they are\nnothing else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of\nthings to be done and omitted; but a law, to speak properly and\naccurately, is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to\nothers to be done or omitted), are not in propriety of speech laws,\nas they proceed from nature. Yet, as they are delivered by God in\nholy Scriptures, as we shall see in the chapter following, they are\nmost properly called by the name of laws. For the sacred Scripture\nis the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest right.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n THAT THE LAW OF NATURE IS A DIVINE LAW.\n\n1. The natural and moral law is divine. 2. Which is confirmed in\n Scripture, in general. 3. Specially, in regard of the\n fundamental law of nature in seeking of peace. 4. Also in regard\n of the first law of nature in abolishing all things to be had in\n common. 5. Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith to\n be kept. 6. Also of the third law, of thankfulness. 7. Also of\n the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful. 8. Also of the\n fifth law, concerning mercy. 9. Also of the sixth law, that\n punishment only looks at the future. 10. Also of the seventh\n law, concerning slander. 11. Also of the eighth law, against\n pride. 12. Also of the ninth law, of equity. 13. Also of the\n tenth law, against respect of persons. 14. Also of the eleventh\n law, of having those things in common which cannot be divided.\n 15. Also of the twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot. 16.\n Also of appointing a judge. 17. Also of the seventeenth law,\n that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence. 18.\n Also of the eighteenth law, concerning witnesses. 19. Also of\n the twentieth law, against drunkenness. 20. Also in respect of\n that which hath been said, that the law of nature is eternal.\n 21. Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience. 22.\n Also that the laws of nature are easily observed. 23. Lastly, in\n respect of the rule by which a man may presently know, whether\n what he is about to act, be against the law of nature, or not.\n 24. The law of Christ is the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: The natural and moral law is divine.]\n\n1. The same law which is _natural_ and _moral_, is also wont to be\ncalled _divine_, nor undeservedly; as well because reason, which is\nthe law of nature, is given by God to every man for the rule of his\nactions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived,\nare the same with those which have been delivered from the divine\nMajesty for the _laws_ of his heavenly kingdom, by our Lord Jesus\nChrist, and his holy prophets and apostles. What therefore by\nreasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature, we\nwill endeavour to confirm the same in this chapter by holy writ.\n\n[Sidenote: Which is confirmed in Scripture, in general.]\n\n2. But first we will shew those places in which it is declared, that\nthe divine law is seated in right reason. Psalm xxxvii. 30, 31: _The\nmouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdom, and his tongue\nwill be talking of judgment: the law of God is in his heart._\nJeremiah xxx. 33: _I will put my law in their inward parts, and\nwrite it in their hearts._ Psalm xix. 7: _The law of the Lord is an\nundefiled law, converting the soul._ Verse 8: _The commandment of\nthe Lord is pure, and giveth light unto the eyes._ Deuteron. xxx.\n11: _This commandment, which I command thee this day, it is not\nhidden from thee, neither is it far off, &c._ Verse. 14: _But the\nword is very nigh unto thee in my mouth, and in thine heart, that\nthou mayest do it._ Psalm cxix. 34: _Give me understanding, and I\nshall keep thy law._ Verse 105: _Thy word is a lamp unto my feet,\nand a light unto my paths._ Prov. ix. 10: _The knowledge of the holy\nis understanding._ Christ the law-giver, himself is called (John i.\n1): _the word_. The same Christ is called (verse 9): _the true\nlight, that lighteth every man that cometh in the world_. All which\nare descriptions of right reason, whose dictates, we have showed\nbefore, are the laws of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: Specially in regard of the fundamental law of nature in\n seeking of peace.]\n\n3. But that that which we set down for the fundamental law of\nnature, namely, that peace was to be sought for, is also the sum of\nthe Divine law, will be manifest by these places. Rom. iii. 17:\n_Righteousness_, which is the sum of the law, is called _the way of\npeace_. Psalm lxxxv. 10: _Righteousness and peace have kissed each\nother._ Matth. v. 9: _Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall\nbe called the children of God._ And after St. Paul, in his sixth\nchapter to the Hebrews, and the last verse, had called Christ (the\nlegislator of that law we treat of), _an High-priest for ever after\nthe order of Melchisedec_: he adds in the following chapter, the\nfirst verse: _This Melchisedec was king of Salem, priest of the most\nhigh God_, &c. (Verse 2): _First being by interpretation king of\nrighteousness, and after that also king of Salem, which is, king of\npeace_. Whence it is clear, that Christ, the King, in his kingdom\nplaceth righteousness and peace together. Psalm xxxiv. 14: _Eschew\nevil and do good; seek peace and pursue it._ Isaiah ix. 6, 7: _Unto\nus a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall\nbe upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful,\nCounsellor, the Mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of\nPeace._ Isaiah lii. 7: _How beautiful upon the mountains are the\nfeet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that\nbringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation, that saith\nunto Sion, thy God reigneth!_ Luke ii. 14: In the nativity of\nChrist, the voice of them that praised God, saying, _Glory be to God\non high, and in earth peace, good-will towards men._ And Isaiah\nliii. 5: the Gospel is called the _chastisement of our peace_.\nIsaiah lix. 8: Righteousness is called the _way of peace_. _The way\nof peace they know not, and there is no judgment in their goings._\nMicah v. 4, 5, speaking of the Messias, he saith thus: _He shall\nstand and feed in the strength of the Lord, in the majesty of the\nname of the Lord his God, and they shall abide, for now shall he be\ngreat unto the end of the earth; and this man shall be your peace_,\n&c. Prov. iii. 1, 2: _My son, forget not my law, but let thine heart\nkeep my commandments; for length of days, and long life, and peace,\nshall they add to thee._\n\n[Sidenote: Also in regard of the first law of nature, in abolishing\n all things to be had in common.]\n\n4. What appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of\nall things, or concerning the introduction of _meum_ and _tuum_; we\nperceive in the first place, how great an adversary this same\ncommunity is to peace, by those words of Abraham to Lot (Gen. xiii.\n8, 9): _Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between thee and me,\nand between thy herdmen and my herdmen; for we be brethren. Is not\nthe whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I pray thee from me._\nAnd all those places of Scripture by which we are forbidden to\ntrespass upon our neighbours: as, _Thou shalt not kill_, _thou shalt\nnot commit adultery_, _thou shalt not steal_, &c. do confirm the law\nof distinction between _mine_ and _thine_; for they suppose _the\nright of all men to all things_ to be taken away.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith to be\n kept.]\n\n5. The same precepts establish the second law of nature, of keeping\ntrust. For what doth, _Thou shalt not invade another\u2019s right_,\nimport, but this? _Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by\nthy contract ceaseth to be thine_: but it is expressly set down?\nPsalm xv. 1: to him that asked, _Lord who shall dwell in thy\ntabernacle?_ it is answered (verse 4): _He that sweareth unto his\nneighbour, and disappointeth him not._ And Prov. vi. 12: _My son, if\nthou be surety for thy friend, if thou have stricken thy hand with a\nstranger, thou art snared with the words of thy mouth._\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the third law, of thankfulness.]\n\n6. The third law concerning gratitude, is proved by these places.\nDeut. xxv. 4: _Thou shalt not muzzle the ox, when he treadeth out\nthe corn_: which St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 9) interprets to be spoken of\nmen, not oxen only. Prov. xvii. 13; _Whoso rewardeth evil for good,\nevil shall not depart from his house._ And Deut. xx. 10, 11: _When\nthou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim\npeace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and\nopen unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found\ntherein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee._\nProv. iii. 29: _Devise not evil against thy neighbour, seeing he\ndwelleth securely by thee._\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful.]\n\n7. To the fourth law of accommodating ourselves, these precepts are\nconformable: Exod. xxiii. 4, 5: _If thou meet thine enemy\u2019s ox, or\nhis ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again.\nIf thou see the ass of him that hateth thee, lying under his burden,\nand wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him._\nAlso (verse 9): _Thou shalt not oppress a stranger._ Prov. iii. 30:\n_Strive not with a man without a cause, if he have done thee no\nharm._ Prov. xv. 18: _A wrathful man stirreth up strife; but he that\nis slow to anger, appeaseth strife._ Prov. xviii. 24: _There is a\nfriend that sticketh closer than a brother._ The same is confirmed,\nLuke x, by the parable of the Samaritan, who had compassion on the\nJew that was wounded by thieves; and by Christ\u2019s precept (Matth. v.\n39): _But I say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever\nshall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also._\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the fifth law, concerning mercy.]\n\n8. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are\nsome: Matth. vi. 14, 15: _If you forgive men their trespasses, your\nheavenly Father will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men\ntheir trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses._\nMatth. xviii. 21, 22: _Lord how oft shall my brother sin against me,\nand I forgive him? Till seven times? Jesus saith unto him; I say not\ntill seven times, but till seventy times seven times_; that is,\n_toties quoties_.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the sixth law, that punishment only looks at the\n future.]\n\n9. For the confirmation of the sixth law, all those places are\npertinent which command us to shew mercy, such as Matth. v. 7:\n_Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy._ Levit. xix.\n18: _Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children\nof thy people._ But there are, who not only think this law is not\nproved by Scripture, but plainly disproved from hence; that there is\nan eternal punishment reserved for the wicked after death, where\nthere is no place either for amendment or example. Some resolve this\nobjection by answering, that God, whom no law restrains, refers all\nto his glory, but that man must not do so; as if God sought his\nglory, that is to say, pleased himself in the death of a sinner. It\nis more rightly answered, that the institution of eternal punishment\nwas before sin, and had regard to this only, that men might dread to\ncommit sin for the time to come.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the seventh law, concerning slander.]\n\n10. The words of Christ prove this seventh: (Matth. v. 22): _But I\nsay unto you, that whosoever is angry with his brother without a\ncause, shall be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever shall say\nunto his brother_ Racha, _shall be in danger of the council; but\nwhosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire_.\nProv. x. 18: _He that uttereth a slander, is a fool._ Prov. xiv. 21:\n_He that despiseth his neighbour, sinneth._ Prov. xv. 1: _Grievous\nwords stir up anger_. Prov. xxii. 10: _Cast out the scorner, and\ncontention shall go out, and reproach shall cease._\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the eighth, against pride.]\n\n11. The eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature, that is, of\nhumility, is established by these places: Matth. v. iii: _Blessed\nare the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven._ Prov.\nvi. 16-19: _These six things doth the Lord hate, yea, seven are an\nabomination unto him. A proud look_, &c. Prov. xvi. 5: _Every one\nthat is proud, is an abomination unto the Lord; though hand join in\nhand, he shall not be unpunished._ Prov. xi. 2: _When pride cometh,\nthen cometh shame; but with the lowly is wisdom._ Thus Isaiah xl. 3:\n(where the coming of the Messias is shewed forth, for preparation\ntowards his kingdom): _The voice of him that cried in the\nwilderness, was this: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight\nin the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted,\nand every mountain and hill shall be made low_: which doubtless is\nspoken to men, and not to mountains.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the ninth, of equity.]\n\n12. But that same equity, which we proved in the ninth place to be a\nlaw of nature, which commands every man to allow the same rights to\nothers they would be allowed themselves, and which contains in it\nall the other laws besides, is the same which Moses sets down\n(Levit. xix. 18): _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself._ And\nour Saviour calls it _the sum of the moral law_: Matth. xxii. 36-40:\n_Master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said unto\nhim, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with\nall thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great\ncommandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy\nneighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and\nthe prophets._ But to love our neighbour as ourselves, is nothing\nelse but to grant him all we desire to have granted to ourselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Also the tenth, against respect of persons.]\n\n13. By the tenth law respect of persons is forbid; as also by these\nplaces following: Matth. v. 45: _That ye may be children of your\nFather which is in heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the\nevil, and on the good_, &c. Coloss. iii. 11: _There is neither Greek\nnor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian or Scythian,\nbond or free, but Christ is all, and in all._ Acts x. 34: _Of a\ntruth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons._ 2 Chron. xix.\n7: _There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of\npersons, nor taking of gifts._ Ecclesiasticus xxxv. 12: _The Lord is\nJudge, and with him is no respect of persons._ Rom. ii. 11: _For\nthere is no respect of persons with God._\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the eleventh law, of having those things in\n common which cannot be divided.]\n\n14. The eleventh law, which commands those things to be held in\ncommon which cannot be divided, I know not whether there be any\nexpress place in Scripture for it or not; but the practice appears\nevery where, in the common use of wells, ways, rivers, sacred\nthings, &c.; for else men could not live.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the twelfth, of things to be divided by lot.]\n\n15. We said in the twelfth place, that it was a law of nature, that\nwhere things could neither be divided nor possessed in common, they\nshould be disposed by lot. Which is confirmed, as by the example of\nMoses who, by God\u2019s command (Numb. xxvi. 55), divided the several\nparts of the land of promise unto the tribes by lot: so (Acts i. 24)\nby the example of the Apostles, who received Matthias before Justus\ninto their number, by casting lots, and saying, _Thou, Lord, who\nknowest the hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast\nchosen_, &c. Prov. xvi. 33: _The lot is cast into the lap, but the\nwhole disposing thereof is of the Lord._ And, which is the\nthirteenth law, the succession was due unto Esau, as being the first\nborn of Isaac; if himself had not sold it (Gen. xxv. 33), or that\nthe father had not otherwise appointed.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of appointing a judge.]\n\n16. St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians (1 Epist. vi), reprehends\nthe Corinthians of that city for going to law one with another\nbefore infidel judges, who were their enemies: calling it a fault,\nthat they would not rather take wrong, and suffer themselves to be\ndefrauded; for that is against that law, whereby we are commanded to\nbe helpful to each other. But if it happen the controversy be\nconcerning things necessary, what is to be done? Therefore the\nApostle (verse 5) speaks thus: _I speak to your shame. Is it so,\nthat there is not one wise man among you, no, not one that shall be\nable to judge between his brethren?_ He therefore, by those words,\nconfirms that law of nature which we called the fifteenth, to wit,\nwhere controversies cannot be avoided; there by the consent of\nparties to appoint some arbiter, and him some third man; so as\n(which is the sixteenth law) neither of the parties may be judge in\nhis own cause.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the seventeenth law, that the arbiters must\n receive no reward for their sentence.]\n\n17. But that the judge or arbiter must receive no reward for his\nsentence, which is the seventeenth law appears, Exod. xxiii. 8:\n_Thou shalt take no gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and\nperverteth the words of the righteous._ Ecclesiasticus xx. 29:\n_Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise._ Whence it follows,\nthat he must not be more obliged to one part than the other; which\nis the nineteenth law; and is also confirmed, Deut. i. 17: _Ye shall\nnot respect persons in judgment, ye shall hear the small as well as\nthe great_; and in all those places which are brought against\nrespect of persons.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the eighteenth, concerning witnesses.]\n\n18. That in the judgment of fact witnesses must be had, which is the\neighteenth law, the Scripture not only confirms, but requires more\nthan one. Deut. xvii. 6: _At the mouth of two witnesses, or three\nwitnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death._ The\nsame is repeated Deut. xix. 15.\n\n[Sidenote: Also of the twentieth law, against drunkenness.]\n\n19. Drunkenness, which we have therefore in the last place numbered\namong the breaches of the natural law, because it hinders the use of\nright reason, is also forbid in Sacred Scripture for the same\nreason. Prov. xx. 1: _Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging,\nwhosoever is deceived thereby is not wise._ And Prov. xxxi. 4, 5:\n_It is not for kings to drink wine, lest they drink and forget the\nlaw, and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted._ But that we\nmight know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally in\nthe quantity of the drink, but in that it destroys judgment and\nreason, it follows in the next verse: _Give strong drink to him that\nis ready to perish, and wine to those that be heavy of heart. Let\nhim drink and forget his poverty, and remember his misery no more._\nChrist useth the same reason in prohibiting drunkenness (Luke xxi.\n34): _Take heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts be\novercharged with surfeiting and drunkenness._\n\n[Sidenote: Also in respect of that which hath been said, that the\n law of nature is eternal.]\n\n20. That we said in the foregoing chapter, the law of nature is\neternal, is also proved out of Matth. v. 18: _Verily I say unto you,\ntill heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise\npass from the law_; and Psalm cxix. 160: _Every one of thy righteous\njudgments endureth for ever._\n\n[Sidenote: Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience.]\n\n21. We also said, that the laws of nature had regard chiefly unto\nconscience; that is, that he is just, who by all possible endeavour\nstrives to fulfil them. And although a man should order all his\nactions so much as belongs to external obedience just as the law\ncommands, but not for the law\u2019s sake, but by reason of some\npunishment annexed unto it, or out of vain glory; yet he is unjust.\nBoth these are proved by the Holy Scriptures. The first (Isaiah lv.\n7): _Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his\nthoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy\nupon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon._ Ezek.\nxviii. 31: _Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby you\nhave transgressed, and make you a new heart and a new spirit; for\nwhy will you die, O House of Israel?_ By which, and the like places,\nwe may sufficiently understand that God will not punish their deeds\nwhose heart is right. The second, out of Isaiah xxix. 13, 14: _The\nLord said, forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth,\nand with their lips do honour me, but have removed their hearts far\nfrom me, therefore I will proceed_, &c. Matth. v. 20: _Except your\nrighteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and\nPharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven._\nAnd in the following verses, our Saviour explains to them how that\nthe commands of God are broken, not by deeds only, but also by the\nwill. For the Scribes and Pharisees did in outward act observe the\nlaw most exactly, but for glory\u2019s sake only; else they would as\nreadily have broken it. There are innumerable places of Scripture in\nwhich is most manifestly declared, that God accepts the will for the\ndeed, and that as well in good as in evil actions.\n\n[Sidenote: Also that the laws of nature are easily observed.]\n\n22. That the law of nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares\n(Matth. xi. 28, 29, 30): _Come unto me_, &c. _Take my yoke upon you,\nand learn of me_, &c.; _for my yoke is easy, and my burden light_.\n\n[Sidenote: Lastly, in respect of the rule by which a man may\n presently know, whether what he is about to act be\n against the law of nature, or not.]\n\n23. Lastly, the rule by which I said any man might know, whether\nwhat he was doing were contrary to the law or not, to wit, what thou\nwouldst not be done to, do not that to another; is almost in the\nself-same words delivered by our Saviour (Matth. vii. 12):\n_Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto\nyou, do you even so to them._\n\n[Sidenote: The law of Christ is the law of nature.]\n\n24. As the law of nature is all of it divine, so the law of Christ\nby conversion (which is wholly explained in the v. vi. and vii.\nchapters of St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel), is all of it also (except that\none commandment, of not marrying her who is put away for adultery;\nwhich Christ brought for explication of the divine positive law,\nagainst the Jews, who did not rightly interpret the Mosaical law)\nthe doctrine of nature. I say, the whole law of Christ is explained\nin the fore-named chapters, not the whole doctrine of Christ; for\nfaith is a part of Christian doctrine, which is not comprehended\nunder the title of a law. For laws are made and given in reference\nto such actions as follow our will; not in order to our opinions and\nbelief, which being out of our power, follow not the will.\n\n DOMINION.\n\n\n\n\n ---\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL\n GOVERNMENT.\n\n1. That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. 2.\n That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. 3.\n That the security of living according to the laws of nature,\n consists in the concord of many persons. 4. That the concord of\n many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace. 5. The\n reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm\n in concord only, and why not of men. 6. That not only consent,\n but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. 7.\n What union is. 8. In union, the right of all men is conveyed to\n one. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11.\n What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject\n 12. Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.\n\n\n[Sidenote: That the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation\n of peace.]\n\n1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the\nwill, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall\nsee a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the\nbreach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate\nthem. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and\nself-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may\ndisappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we\nmay understand, that the natural laws, though well understood, do\nnot instantly secure any man in their practice; and consequently,\nthat as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others,\nthere remains to every man that same primitive right of self-defence\nby such means as either he can or will make use of, that is, a right\nto all things, or the right of war. And it is sufficient for the\nfulfilling of the natural law, that a man be prepared in mind to\nembrace peace when it may be had.\n\n[Sidenote: That the laws of nature, in a state of nature, are\n silent.]\n\n2. It is a trite saying, that all laws are silent in the time of\nwar, and it is a true one, not only if we speak of the civil, but\nalso of the natural laws, provided they be referred not to the mind,\nbut to the actions of men, by chap. iii. art. 27. And we mean such a\nwar, as is of all men against all men; such as is the mere state of\nnature; although in the war of nation against nation, a certain mean\nwas wont to be observed. And therefore in old time, there was a\nmanner of living, and as it were a certain economy, which they\ncalled \u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd, living by rapine; which was neither against the\nlaw of nature (things then so standing), nor void of glory to those\nwho exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their custom was,\ntaking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from oxen fit for\nplough, and every instrument serviceable to husbandry. Which yet is\nnot so to be taken, as if they were bound to do thus by the law of\nnature; but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by\ntoo much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of fear.\n\n[Sidenote: That the security of living according to the laws of\n nature, consists in the agreement of many.]\n\n3. Since therefore the exercise of the natural law is necessary for\nthe preservation of peace, and that for the exercise of the natural\nlaw security is no less necessary; it is worth the considering what\nthat is which affords such a security. For this matter nothing else\ncan be imagined, but that each man provide himself of such meet\nhelps, as the invasion of one on the other may be rendered so\ndangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain than to\nmeddle. But first, it is plain that the consent of two or three\ncannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of\none, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the\nvictory undoubtedly sure, and heartens the enemy to attack us. It is\ntherefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be\nobtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutual\nassistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the\nenemy\u2019s party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to\nassure the victory.\n\n[Sidenote: That the agreement of many is not constant enough to\n preserve a lasting peace.]\n\n4. Furthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on\nself-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some\nexcellent means whereby to compass this, but every man after his own\nmanner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done;\nbecause that, divided in their opinions, they will be a hinderance\nto each other; or if they agree well enough to some one action,\nthrough hope of victory, spoil, or revenge, yet afterward, through\ndiversity of wits and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which\nmen naturally contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will\nneither give mutual help nor desire peace, except they be\nconstrained to it by some common fear. Whence it follows that the\nconsent of many, (which consists in this only, as we have already\ndefined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions\nto the same end and the common good), that is to say, that the\nsociety proceeding from mutual help only, yields not that security\nwhich they seek for, who meet and agree in the exercise of the\nabove-named laws of nature; but that somewhat else must be done,\nthat those who have once consented for the common good to peace and\nmutual help, may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again\ndissent, when their private interest shall appear discrepant from\nthe common good.\n\n[Sidenote: Why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in\n concord alone, and not so of men.]\n\n5. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic, not\nman only, but divers others, as the ant, the bee, &c.; which, though\nthey be destitute of reason, by which they may contract and submit\nto government, notwithstanding by consenting, that is to say,\nensuing or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions\nto a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any\nseditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civil government,\nand therefore those animals not to be termed political; because\ntheir government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one\nobject, not (as is necessary in civil government) one will. It is\nvery true, that in those creatures living only by sense and\nappetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need\nof anything more to secure it, and by consequence to preserve peace\namong them, than barely their natural inclination. But among men the\ncase is otherwise. For, first, among them there is a contestation of\nhonour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and\nenvy, out of which arise sedition and war, is among men; among\nbeasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of bees, and the\nlike creatures, is conformable; and they desire the common good,\nwhich among them differs not from their private. But man scarce\nesteems anything good, which hath not somewhat of eminence in the\nenjoyment, more than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those\ncreatures which are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see\nnone, in the administration of their commonweals; but in a multitude\nof men there are many who, supposing themselves wiser than others,\nendeavour to innovate, and divers innovators innovate divers ways;\nwhich is a mere distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute\ncreatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify\ntheir affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words\nwhich is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby\ngood is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in\ntruth it is. But the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition:\nand it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant\nspeeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece\nitself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between _injury_ and\n_harm_; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they\nblame not their fellows. But those men are of most trouble to the\nrepublic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to\ncontend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over\nhunger and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal creatures\nis natural; that of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial.\nIt is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat more be needful for\nmen to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent or\ncontracted society, without some common power whereby particular men\nmay be ruled through fear of punishment, doth not suffice to make up\nthat security, which is requisite to the exercise of natural\njustice.\n\n[Sidenote: That not only consent, but union also, is required to\n establish the peace of men.]\n\n6. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth\nnot suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is\nrequisite that, in those necessary matters which concern peace and\nself-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be\ndone, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one,\nto wit, either man or council, that whatsoever his will is in those\nthings which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for\nthe wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular. Now\nthe gathering together of many men, who deliberate of what is to be\ndone or not to be done for the common good of all men, is that which\nI call a _council_.\n\n[Sidenote: What union is.]\n\n7. This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one\nman or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth\nhimself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will\nof that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that\nis, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength\nagainst any others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain a\nright of defending himself against violence: and this is called\n_union_. But we understand that to be the will of the council, which\nis the will of the major part of those men of whom the council\nconsists.\n\n[Sidenote: In union, the right of all men is transferred to one.]\n\n8. But though the will itself be not voluntary, but only the\nbeginning of voluntary actions; (for we will not to will, but to\nact); and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and\ncompact; yet he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys\nto that other the right of his strength and faculties. Insomuch as\nwhen the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted,\nhath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills\nof particular men unto unity and concord.\n\n[Sidenote: What civil society is.]\n\n9. Now union thus made, is called a city or civil society; and also\na civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be\nesteemed for one person; and by the word _one_, it is to be known\nand distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights\nand properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all of them\ntogether, (if we except him, whose will stands for the will of all),\nis to be accounted a city. A _city_ therefore, (that we may define\nit), is _one person_, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to\nbe received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power\nand faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace,\nand for common defence.\n\n[Sidenote: What a civil person is.]\n\n10. But although every city be a civil person, yet every civil\nperson is not a city; for it may happen that many citizens, by the\npermission of the city, may join together in one person, for the\ndoing of certain things. These now will be civil persons; as the\ncompanies of merchants, and many other convents. But cities they are\nnot, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the\ncompany simply and in all things, but in certain things only\ndetermined by the city, and on such terms as it is lawful for any\none of them to contend in judgment against the body itself of the\nsodality; which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the\ncity. Such like societies, therefore, are civil persons subordinate\nto the city.\n\n[Sidenote: What it is to have the supreme power, what to be\n subject.]\n\n11. In every city, that man or council, to whose will each\nparticular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared, is\nsaid to have the _supreme power_, or _chief command_, or _dominion_.\nWhich power and right of commanding, consists in this, that each\ncitizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man or\ncouncil; which to have done, because no man can transfer his power\nin a natural manner, is nothing else than to have parted with his\nright of resisting. Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil\nperson, is called the _subject_ of him who hath the chief command.\n\n[Sidenote: Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.]\n\n12. By what hath been said, it is sufficiently showed in what manner\nand by what degrees many natural persons, through desire of\npreserving themselves and by mutual fear, have grown together into a\ncivil person, whom we have called a _city_. But they who submit\nthemselves to another for fear, either submit to him whom they fear,\nor some other whom they confide in for protection. They act\naccording to the first manner, who are vanquished in war, that they\nmay not be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet\novercome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives\nits beginning from natural power, and may be called the natural\nbeginning of a city; the latter from the council and constitution of\nthose who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence\nit is that there are two kinds of cities; the one natural, such as\nthe paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be\nalso called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself\nsuch citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own\nwills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one man or one\ncompany of men, endued with the command in chief. But we will speak,\nin the first place, of a city political or by institution; and next,\nof a city natural.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n OF THE RIGHT OF HIM, WHETHER COUNCIL OR ONE MAN\n ONLY, WHO HATH THE SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY.\n\n1. There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil\n society, nor any action to which they have not under seal\n consented. 2. The right of the greater number consenting, is the\n beginning of a city. 3. That every man retains a right to\n protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there\n is no sufficient regard had to his security. 4. That a coercive\n power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice\n is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the\n chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him also. 8.\n All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative power is\n his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and other officers of\n the city belongs to him. 11 Also the examination of all\n doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. 13. That the\n command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what\n proportion of obedience is due to him. 14. That the laws of the\n city bind him not. 15. That no man can challenge a propriety to\n anything against his will. 16. By the laws of the city only we\n come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. 17.\n The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there\n should not be any one endued with an absolute power. 18. The\n marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city be compared with a\n man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city, as\n the human soul is in relation to the man. 20. That the supreme\n command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents, by\n whose compacts it was first constituted.\n\n[Sidenote: There can no right be attributed to a multitude,\n considered out of civil society; nor any action, to which\n they have not given their particular consents.]\n\n1. We must consider, first of all, what a multitude[8] of men,\ngathering themselves of their own free wills into society, is;\nnamely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one\nhath his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things\nthat may be proposed. And though by particular contracts each single\nman may have his own right and propriety, so as one may say _this is\nmine_, the other, _that is his_; yet will there not be anything of\nwhich the whole multitude, as a person distinct from a single man,\ncan rightly say, this is _mine_, more than another\u2019s. Neither must\nwe ascribe any action to the multitude, as its own; but if all or\nmore of them do agree, it will not be an action, but as many actions\nas men. For although in some great sedition, it is commonly said,\nthat the people of that city have taken up arms; yet is it true of\nthose only who are in arms, or who consent to them. For the city,\nwhich is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatsoever,\ntherefore, is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done\nby every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being\nin the multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the\nthings that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing.\nBesides, in a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in that\nmanner as hath been said, there remains that same state of nature in\nwhich all things belong to all men; and there is no place for _meum_\nand _tuum_, which is called dominion and propriety, by reason that\nthat security is not yet extant, which we have declared above to be\nnecessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.\n\nFootnote 8:\n\n _Multitude, &c._] The doctrine of the power of a city over its\n citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the\n difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a\n multitude ruled. For such is the nature of a city, that a\n multitude or company of citizens not only may have command, but\n may also be subject to command; but in diverse senses. Which\n difference I did believe was clearly enough explained in the first\n article; but by the objections of many against those things which\n follow, I discern otherwise. Wherefore it seemed good to me, to\n the end I might make a fuller explication, to add these few\n things.\n\n By multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more\n than one: so as a multitude of men is the same with many men. The\n same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one\n thing; namely, one multitude. But in neither sense can a multitude\n be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to each\n a several; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to\n be attributed to it. Wherefore a multitude cannot promise,\n contract, acquire right, convey right, act, have, possess, and the\n like, unless it be every one apart, and man by man; so as there\n must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as men.\n Wherefore a multitude is no natural person. But if the same\n multitude do contract one with another, that the will of one man,\n or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received\n for the will of all; then it becomes one person. For it is endued\n with a will, and therefore can do voluntary actions, such as are\n commanding, making laws, acquiring and transferring of right, and\n so forth; and it is oftener called the people, than the multitude.\n We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the people or\n multitude wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that\n the city which commands, wills and acts by the will of one, or the\n concurring wills of more; which cannot be done but in an assembly.\n But as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men,\n whether great or small, without the will of that man or assembly\n of men, that is understood to be done by a subjected people; that\n is, by many single citizens together; and not proceeding from one\n will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are citizens and\n subjects, but not a city.\n\n[Sidenote: The beginning of a city is the right of the major part\n agreeing.]\n\n2. Next, we must consider that every one of the multitude, by\nwhose means there may be a beginning to make up the city, must\nagree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be\npropounded by any one in the assembly, that be received for the\nwill of all, which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise\nthere will be no will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills\nand votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will not consent,\nthe rest, notwithstanding, shall among themselves constitute the\ncity without him. Whence it will come to pass, that the city\nretains its primitive right against the dissenter; that is, the\nright of war, as against an enemy.\n\n[Sidenote: That every man retains a right of protecting himself\n according to his own judgment, as long as he is not\n secured.]\n\n3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth article,\nthat there was required to the security of men, not only their\nconsent, but also the subjection of their wills in such things as\nwere necessary to peace and defence; and that in that union and\nsubjection the nature of a city consisted; we must discern now in\nthis place, out of those things which may be propounded, discussed,\nand stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are contained in\nthe will of the major part, what things are necessary to peace and\ncommon defence. But first of all, it is necessary to peace, that a\nman be so far forth protected against the violence of others, that\nhe may live securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to\nfear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men\naltogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or\ninjuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within\ndeliberation. But care may be had, there be no just cause of fear;\nfor security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others;\nwhich if it be not had, no man is supposed to have submitted himself\nto aught, or to have quitted his right to all things, before that\nthere was a care had of his security.\n\n[Sidenote: That a coercive power is necessary for security.]\n\n4. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those\nwho are now growing up into a city, do covenant with the rest,\neither by words or writing, _not to steal_, _not to kill_, and to\nobserve the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is\nmanifest to all, and by experience too well known how little\n(removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through\nconscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our\nsecurity, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then\nsufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments\nappointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to\nhave done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity\nof nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.\n\n[Sidenote: What the sword of justice is.]\n\n5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any\none, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be\npunished. But I will call this right, _the sword of justice_. But\nthese kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part,\ntill either themselves or their near friends are to suffer.\n\n[Sidenote: That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the\n chief command.]\n\n6. Because, therefore, for the security of particular men, and, by\nconsequence, for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of\nusing the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or\ncouncil; that man or council is necessarily understood by right to\nhave the supreme power in the city. For he that by right punisheth\nat his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which\nhe himself wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.\n\n[Sidenote: That the sword of war belongs to him also.]\n\n7. But in vain do they worship peace at home, who cannot defend\nthemselves against foreigners; neither is it possible for them to\nprotect themselves against foreigners, whose forces are not united.\nAnd therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars,\nthat there be some one council or one man, who hath the right to\narm, to gather together, to unite so many citizens, in all dangers\nand on all occasions, as shall be needful for common defence against\nthe certain number and strength of the enemy; and again, as often as\nhe shall find it expedient, to make peace with them. We must\nunderstand, therefore, that particular citizens have conveyed their\nwhole right of war and peace unto some one man or council; and that\nthis right, which we may call _the sword of war_, belongs to the\nsame man or council, to whom the sword of justice belongs. For no\nman can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the\nexpenses of war, but he who by right can punish him who doth not\nobey. Both swords therefore, as well this of war as that of justice,\neven by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong\nto the chief command.\n\n[Sidenote: The power of judicature belongs to him.]\n\n8. But because the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have\npower by right to use the sword at his own will, it follows, that\nthe judgment of its right use pertains to the same party; for if the\npower of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another,\nnothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgment, who could\nnot execute his commands; or, if he executed them by the power of\nanother, he himself is not said to have the power of the sword, but\nthat other, to whom he is only an officer. All judgment therefore,\nin a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who\nhath the supreme authority.\n\n[Sidenote: The legislative power is his also.]\n\n9. Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to\npeace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being\nrisen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the\nopinions of men differ concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, _just_ and\n_unjust_, _profitable_ and _unprofitable_, _good_ and _evil_,\n_honest_ and _dishonest_, and the like; which every man esteems\naccording to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to\nmake some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by\nwhich every man may know what may be called his, what another\u2019s,\nwhat just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what\nevil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in\nour common course of life. But those rules and measures are usually\ncalled the civil laws, or the laws of the city, as being the\ncommands of him who hath the supreme power in the city. And the\n_civil laws_ (that we may define them) are nothing else but _the\ncommands of him who hath the chief authority in the city, for\ndirection of the future actions of his citizens_.\n\n[Sidenote: That the naming of magistrates and officers belongs to\n him also.]\n\n10. Furthermore, since the affairs of the city, both those of war\nand peace, cannot possibly be all administered by one man or one\ncouncil without officers and subordinate magistrates; and that it\nappertaineth to peace and common defence, that they to whom it\nbelongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into\nneighbouring councils, prudently to wage war, and on all hands\nwarily to attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly\nexercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend\non, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and\nin peace.\n\n[Sidenote: The examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise.]\n\n11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their\nbeginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the\nwill of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good\nand evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall\nreceive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are\nruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary\ninference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest\nof peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by\nwhich they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the\nlaws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to\nwhom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist\nhim, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than for\nhim that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done\nunder penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of\neternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the\ncitizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but\nthat the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve\ntwo masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we\nbelieve we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey\nfor fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one,\nwhether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme\npower, have also this right; that he both judge what opinions[9] and\ndoctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be\ntaught.\n\nFootnote 9:\n\n _Judge what opinions, &c._ There is scarce any principle, neither\n in the worship of God nor in human sciences, from whence there may\n not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war\n itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the\n principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to\n themselves, will needs appear such to all others. But though such\n dissensions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be\n restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove\n no hindrance to the public peace. Of these kinds of opinions,\n therefore, I have not spoken in this place. There are certain\n doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted, they verily believe\n that obedience may be refused to the city, and that by right they\n may, nay ought, to oppose and fight against chief princes and\n dignities. Such are those which, whether directly and openly, or\n more obscurely and by consequence, require obedience to be given\n to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed.\n I deny not but this reflects on that power which many, living\n under other government, ascribe to the chief head of the Church of\n Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, out of that Church,\n bishops require in their\u2019s to be given to them; and last of all,\n on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens, under pretence\n of religion, do challenge to themselves. For what civil war was\n there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from,\n or was nourished by this root? The judgment therefore of\n doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not,\n and if they be repugnant, the power of prohibiting them to be\n taught, I do here attribute to the civil authority. For since\n there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those\n things which belong to its peace and defence, and it is manifest\n that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its\n peace; it follows necessarily, that the examination of those\n opinions, whether they be such or not, must be referred to the\n city; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.\n\n[Sidenote: Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.]\n\n12. Last of all, from this consideration, that each citizen hath\nsubmitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city,\nso as he may not employ his strength against him; it follows\nmanifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must\nnot be punished. For as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish\nhim naturally, so neither can he punish him by right, who by right\nhath not sufficient power.\n\n[Sidenote: That he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his\n citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto\n him.]\n\n13. It is most manifest by what hath been said, that in every\nperfect city, that is, where no citizen hath right to use his\nfaculties at his own discretion for the preservation of himself, or\nwhere the right of the private sword is excluded; there is a supreme\npower in some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred\nby men, or greater than which no mortal man can have over himself.\nBut that power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a\nman, we call _absolute_.[10] For whosoever hath so submitted his\nwill to the will of the city, that he can, unpunished, do any thing,\nmake laws, judge controversies, set penalties, make use at his own\npleasure of the strength and wealth of men, and all this by right;\ntruly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted.\nThis same may be confirmed by experience, in all the cities which\nare or ever have been. For though it be sometimes in doubt what man\nor council hath the chief command, yet ever there is such a command\nand always exercised, except in the time of sedition and civil war;\nand then there are two chief commands made out of one. Now, those\nseditious persons who dispute against absolute authority, do not so\nmuch care to destroy it, as to convey it on others: for removing\nthis power, they together take away civil society, and a confusion\nof all things returns. There is so much obedience joined to this\nabsolute right of the chief ruler, as is necessarily required for\nthe government of the city, that is to say, so much as that right of\nhis may not be granted in vain. Now this kind of obedience, although\nfor some reasons it may sometimes by right be denied, yet because a\ngreater cannot be performed, we will call it _simple_. But the\nobligation to perform this grows not immediately from that contract,\nby which we have conveyed all our right on the city; but immediately\nfrom hence, that without obedience the city\u2019s right would be\nfrustrate, and by consequence there would be no city constituted.\nFor it is one thing if I say, _I give you right to command what you\nwill_; another, if I say, _I will do whatsoever you command_. And\nthe command may be such, as I would rather die than do it.\nForasmuch, therefore, as no man can be bound to will being killed,\nmuch less is he tied to that which to him is worse than death. If\ntherefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not bound to do it.\nFor though I deny to do it, yet the right of dominion is not\nfrustrated; since others may be found, who being commanded will not\nrefuse to do it; neither do I refuse to do that, which I have\ncontracted to do. In like manner, if the chief ruler command any man\nto kill him, he is not tied to do it; because it cannot be conceived\nthat he made any such covenant. Nor if he command to execute a\nparent, whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the law;\nsince there are others who being commanded will do that, and a son\nwill rather die than live infamous and hated of all the world. There\nare many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be\ndone by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed\nby these, and refused by those; and this without breach of that\nabsolute right which was given to the chief ruler. For in no case is\nthe right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to\nobey him. But they who thus kill men, although by right given them\nfrom him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than\nright reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is,\nagainst God.\n\nFootnote 10:\n\n _Absolute._] A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion,\n and the citizens oppose it not. For, in the gathering together of\n many men, they acknowledge the face of a city; and even the\n unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet\n monarchy is no less a city than democraty; and absolute kings have\n their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer\n their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided but\n not recalled. But it appears not to most men, how a city is\n contained in the person of a king. And therefore they object\n against absolute command: first, that if any man had such a right,\n the condition of the citizens would be miserable. For thus they\n think; he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts\n it his only happiness, that he is not already spoiled and killed.\n But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have\n a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one or some\n few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without\n injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it justly, that\n is, without breach of the natural laws and injury against God. And\n therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which\n princes take. Next, if he could justly do it, or that he made no\n account of his oath, yet appears there no reason why he should\n desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied,\n but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly. But\n grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not\n absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the\n injuries of others; which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for\n thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he\n that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to\n oppress all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that human\n affairs cannot be without some inconvenience. And this\n inconvenience itself is in the citizens, not in the government.\n For if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command,\n that is to say, could they live according to the laws of nature,\n there would be no need at all of a city, nor of a common coercive\n power. Secondly, they object, that there is no dominion in the\n Christian world absolute. Which, indeed, is not true; for all\n monarchies, and all other states, are so. For although they who\n have the chief command, do not all those things they would, and\n what they know profitable to the city; the reason of that is, not\n the defect of right in them, but the consideration of their\n citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of\n what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform\n their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes\n sometimes forbear the exercise of their right; and prudently remit\n somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.\n\n[Sidenote: That he is not tied to observe the laws of the city.]\n\n14. Neither can any man give somewhat to himself; for he is already\nsupposed to have what he can give himself. Nor can he be obliged to\nhimself; for the same party being both _the obliged_ and _the\nobliger_, and the obliger having power to release the obliged, it\nwere merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself; because he\ncan release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this is\nalready actually free. Whence it is plain, that the city is not tied\nto the civil laws; for the civil laws are the laws of the city, by\nwhich, if she were engaged, she should be engaged to herself.\nNeither can the city be obliged to her citizen; because, if he will,\nhe can free her from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she\nwills; for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended\nin the will of the city; the city therefore is free when she\npleaseth, that is, she is now actually free. But the will of a\ncouncil, or one who hath supreme authority given him, is the will of\nthe city: he therefore contains the wills of all particular\ncitizens. Therefore neither is he bound to the civil laws; for this\nis to be bound to himself; nor to any of his citizens.\n\n[Sidenote: That no man can challenge a propriety in aught against\n him who hath the supreme power.]\n\n15. Now because, as hath been shown above, before the constitution\nof a city all things belonged to all men; nor is there that thing\nwhich any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same\nright, claim as his own; for where all things are _common_, there\ncan be nothing _proper_ to any man; it follows, that _propriety_\nreceived its beginning[11] when cities received their\u2019s, and that\nthat only is _proper_ to each man, which he can keep by the laws and\nthe power of the whole city, that is, of him on whom its chief\ncommand is conferred. Whence we understand, that each particular\ncitizen hath a _propriety_ to which none of his fellow-citizens hath\nright, because they are tied to the same laws; but he hath no\npropriety in which the chief ruler (whose commands are the laws,\nwhose will contains the will of each man, and who by every single\nperson is constituted the supreme judge) hath not a right. But\nalthough there be many things which the city permits to its\ncitizens, and therefore they may sometimes go to law against their\nchief; yet is not that action belonging to civil right, but to\nnatural equity. Neither is it concerning what[12] by right he may do\nwho hath the supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be\ndone; and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity\nof the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong\njudgment.\n\nFootnote 11:\n\n _Propriety received its beginning, &c._] What is objected by some,\n that the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of\n cities, was found in fathers of families, that objection is vain;\n because I have already declared, that a family is a little city.\n For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted\n them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the\n sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father\n himself. But the fathers of divers families, who are subject\n neither to any common father nor lord, have a common right in all\n things.\n\nFootnote 12:\n\n _What by right he may do, &c._] As often as a citizen is granted\n to have an action of law against the supreme, that is, against the\n city, the question is not in that action, whether the city may by\n right keep possession of the thing in controversy, but whether by\n the laws formerly made she would keep it; for the law is the\n declared will of the supreme. Since then the city may raise money\n from the citizens under two titles, either as tribute, or as debt;\n in the former case there is no action of law allowed, for there\n can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute;\n in the latter it is allowed, because the city will take nothing\n from its citizens by fraud or cunning, and yet if need require,\n all they have, openly. And therefore he that condemns this place,\n saying, that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free\n themselves from their debts, he does it impertinently.\n\n[Sidenote: It is known by the civil laws what theft, murder,\n adultery, and injury are.]\n\n16. Theft, murder, adultery, and all injuries, are forbid by the\nlaws of nature; but what is to be called _theft_, what _murder_,\nwhat _adultery_, what _injury_ in a citizen, this is not to be\ndetermined by the natural, but by the civil law. For not every\ntaking away of the thing which another possesseth, but only another\nman\u2019s goods, is theft; but what is our\u2019s, and what another\u2019s, is a\nquestion belonging to the civil law. In like manner, not every\nkilling of a man is murder, but only that which the civil law\nforbids; neither is all encounter with women adultery, but only that\nwhich the civil law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an\ninjury, where the promise itself is lawful; but where there is no\nright to make any compact, there can be no conveyance of it, and\ntherefore there can no injury follow, as hath been said in the\nsecond chapter, Article 17. Now what we may contract for, and what\nnot, depends wholly upon the civil laws. The city of Laced\u00e6mon\ntherefore rightly ordered, that those young men who could so take\naway certain goods from others as not to be caught, should go\nunpunished; for it was nothing else but to make a law, that what was\nso acquired should be their own, and not another\u2019s. Rightly also is\nthat man everywhere slain, whom we kill in war or by the necessity\nof self-defence. So also that copulation which in one city is\nmatrimony, in another will be judged adultery. Also those contracts\nwhich make up marriage in one citizen, do not so in another,\nalthough of the same city; because that he who is forbidden by the\ncity, that is, by that one man or council whose the supreme power\nis, to contract aught, hath no right to make any contract, and\ntherefore having made any, it is not valid, and by consequence no\nmarriage. But his contract which received no prohibition, was\ntherefore of force, and so was matrimony. Neither adds it any force\nto any unlawful contracts, that they were made by an oath or\nsacrament;[13] for those add nothing to the strengthening of the\ncontract, as hath been said above, Chap. II. Art. 22. What therefore\ntheft, what murder, what adultery, and in general what injury is,\nmust be known by the civil laws; that is, the commands of him who\nhath the supreme authority.\n\nFootnote 13:\n\n _That they were made by an oath or sacrament, &c._] Whether\n matrimony be a sacrament, (in which sense that word is used by\n some divines), or not, it is not my purpose to dispute. Only I\n say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live\n together, that is, granted by the civil law, whether it be a\n sacrament or not, is surely a legitimate marriage; but that\n copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage, since it\n is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract. There\n were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jews, the\n Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those\n who permit no such contracts but by a law that they shall never be\n broke, wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the\n city hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because matrimony\n is a sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to\n be performed in the temple, to bless, or, if I may say so, to\n consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the\n office of clergymen; all the rest namely, who, when, and by what\n contracts marriages may be made, pertains to the laws of the city.\n\n[Sidenote: The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where\n there should not be any one endued with absolute power.]\n\n17. This same supreme command and absolute power, seems so harsh to\nthe greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them;\nwhich happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what human nature\nand the civil laws are; and partly also through their default, who,\nwhen they are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to\ntheir own lust. That they may therefore avoid this kind of supreme\nauthority, some of them will have a city well enough constituted, if\nthey who shall be the citizens\u2019 convening, do agree concerning\ncertain articles propounded, and in that convent agitated and\napproved, and do command them to be observed, and punishments\nprescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them. To which\npurpose, and also to the repelling of a foreign enemy, they appoint\na certain and limited return, with this condition, that if that\nsuffice not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not\nin a city thus constituted, that the assembly who prescribed those\nthings had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue, or\nfrom time to time have a certain day and place of meeting, that\npower will be perpetual. But if they wholly dissolve, either the\ncity dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of\nwar: or else there is somewhere a power left to punish those who\nshall transgress the laws, whosoever or how many soever they be that\nhave it; which cannot possibly be without an absolute power. For he\nthat by right hath this might given, by punishments to restrain what\ncitizens he pleaseth, hath such a power as a greater cannot possibly\nbe given by any citizens.\n\n[Sidenote: The notes of supreme authority.]\n\n18. It is therefore manifest, that in every city there is some one\nman, or council, or court, who by right hath as great a power over\neach single citizen, as each man hath over himself considered out of\nthat civil state; that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited only\nby the strength and forces of the city itself, and by nothing else\nin the world. For if his power were limited, that limitation must\nnecessarily proceed from some greater power. For he that prescribes\nlimits, must have a greater power than he who is confined by them.\nNow that confining power is either without limit, or is again\nrestrained by some other greater than itself; and so we shall at\nlength arrive to a power, which hath no other limit but that which\nis the _terminus ultimus_ of the forces of all the citizens\ntogether. That same is called the supreme command; and if it be\ncommitted to a council, a supreme council, but if to one man, the\nsupreme lord of the city. Now the notes of supreme command are\nthese: to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, to\nknow and judge of all controversies, either by himself, or by judges\nappointed by him; to elect all magistrates, ministers, and\ncounsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by right can do some\none action, which is not lawful for any citizen or citizens to do\nbeside himself, that man hath obtained the supreme power. For those\nthings which by right may not be done by any one or many citizens,\nthe city itself can only do. He therefore that doth those things,\nuseth the city\u2019s right; which is the supreme power.\n\n[Sidenote: If the city be compared with a man, he who hath the\n supreme command is in order to the city, as the human\n soul is to the man.]\n\n19. They who compare a city and its citizens with a man and his\nmembers, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the\ncity is in relation to the whole city, such as the head is to the\nwhole man. But it appears by what hath been already said, that he\nwho is endued with such a power, whether it be a man or a court,\nhath a relation to the city, not as that of the head, but of the\nsoul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man hath a will,\nthat is, can either will or nill; so by him who hath the supreme\npower, and no otherwise, the city hath a will, and can either will\nor nill. A court of counsellors is rather to be compared with the\nhead, or one counsellor, whose only counsel (if of any one alone)\nthe chief ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the\noffice of the head is to counsel, as the soul\u2019s is to command.\n\n[Sidenote: That the supreme power cannot by right be dissolved by\n their consents, by whose compacts it was constituted;]\n\n20. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the\ncompacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with\nthe other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the\ncontractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken:\nperhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the\nsubjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away.\nWhich inference, if it were true, I cannot discern what danger would\nthence by right arise to the supreme commanders. For since it is\nsupposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other; if any\none of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he\nis bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me,\ndo that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not\nto do. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that\nall the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine\nagainst the supreme power. Wherefore there is no fear for rulers in\nchief, that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority.\nIf, notwithstanding, it were granted that their right depended only\non that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it\nmight very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion\nunder pretence of right. For subjects being called either by the\ncommand of the city, or seditiously flocking together, most men\nthink that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the\ngreater part; which in truth is false. For it is not from nature\nthat the consent of the major part should be received for the\nconsent of all, neither is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from\ncivil institution: and is then only true, when that man or court\nwhich hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of\nthe greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power\nof speaking for those who elected them; and will have the major part\nof voices, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed,\nto be as effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who\nis chief, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should\ndispute his right; unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he\ndeclared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his\ngovernment. Now, because most men through ignorance esteem not the\nconsent of the major part of citizens only, but even of a very few,\nprovided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole\ncity; it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may\nby right be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly of\ncitizens by the votes of the greater number. But though a government\nbe constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars,\nyet its right depends not on that obligation only; there is another\ntie also towards him who commands. For each citizen compacting with\nhis fellow, says thus: _I convey my right on this party, upon\ncondition that you pass yours to the same_: by which means, that\nright which every man had before to use his faculties to his own\nadvantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man or council\nfor the common benefit. Wherefore what by the mutual contracts each\none hath made with the other, what by the donation of right which\nevery man is bound to ratify to him that commands, the government is\nupheld by a double obligation from the citizens; first, that which\nis due to their fellow-citizens; next, that which they owe to their\nprince. Wherefore no subjects, how many soever they be, can with any\nright despoil him who bears the chief rule of his authority, even\nwithout his own consent.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VII\n OF THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY,\n ARISTOCRACY, MONARCHY.\n\n1. That there are three kinds of government only, democracy,\n aristocracy, monarchy. 2. That oligarchy is not a diverse form\n of government distinct from aristocracy, nor anarchy any form at\n all. 3. That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate\n monarchy. 4. That there cannot be a mixed state, fashioned out\n of these several species. 5. That democracy, except there be\n certain times and places of meeting prefixed, is dissolved. 6.\n In a democracy the intervals of the times of meeting must be\n short, or the administration of government during the interval\n committed to some one. 7. In a democracy, particulars contract\n with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no\n man. 8. By what acts aristocracy is constituted. 9. In an\n aristocracy the nobles make no compact, neither are they obliged\n to any citizen or to the whole people. 10. The nobles must\n necessarily have their set meetings. 11. By what acts monarchy\n is constituted. 12. Monarchy is by compact obliged to none for\n the authority it hath received. 13. Monarchy is ever in the\n readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite\n to good government 14. What kind of sin that is, and what sort\n of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office\n towards the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city. 15. A\n monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his\n successor. 16. Of limited monarchs. 17. A monarch, retaining his\n right of government, cannot by any promise whatsoever be\n conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary\n to the exercise of his authority. 18. How a citizen is freed\n from subjection.\n\n\n[Sidenote: There are three kinds of government only; democracy,\n aristocracy, and monarchy.]\n\n1. We have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus; we\nwill now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of\ncities, it is taken from the difference of the persons to whom the\nsupreme power is committed. This power is committed either to _one\nman_, or _council_, or some _one court_ consisting of many men.\nFurthermore, a council of many men consists either of all the\ncitizens, insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote, and an\ninterest in the ordering of the greatest affairs, if he will\nhimself; or of a part only. From whence there arise three sorts of\ngovernment; the one, when the power is in a council where every\ncitizen hath a right to vote; and it is called a _democracy_. The\nother, when it is in a council, where not all, but some part only\nhave their suffrages; and we call it an _aristocracy_. The third is\nthat, when the supreme authority rests only in one; and it is styled\na _monarchy_. In the first, he that governs is called \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, the\n_people_; in the second, the _nobles_; in the third, the _monarch_.\n\n[Sidenote: Oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from\n aristocracy; neither is anarchy any state at all.]\n\n2. Now, although ancient writers of politics have introduced three\nother kinds of government opposite to these; to wit, _anarchy_ or\nconfusion to _democracy_; _oligarchy_, that is, the command of some\nfew, to _aristocracy_, and _tyranny_ to _monarchy_; yet are not\nthese three distinct forms of government, but three diverse titles\ngiven by those who were either displeased with that present\ngovernment or those that bare rule. For men, by giving names, do\nusually not only signify the things themselves, but also their own\naffections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like. Whence it happens\nthat what one man calls a _democracy_, another calls an _anarchy_;\nwhat one counts an _aristocracy_, another esteems an _oligarchy_;\nand whom one titles a _king_, another styles him a _tyrant_. So as\nwe see, these names betoken not a diverse kind of government, but\nthe _diverse opinions_ of the subjects concerning him who hath the\nsupreme power. For first, who sees not that _anarchy_ is equally\nopposite to all the aforenamed forms? For that word signifies that\nthere is no government at all, that is, not any city. But how is it\npossible that _no city_ should be the species of _a city_?\nFurthermore, what difference is there between an _oligarchy_, which\nsignifies the command of a _few_ or _grandees_, or an _aristocracy_,\nwhich is that of the _prime_ or _chief heads_, more than that men\ndiffer so among themselves, that the same things seem not good to\nall men? Whence it happens that those persons, who by some are\nlooked on as the _best_, are by others esteemed to be the _worst_ of\nall men.\n\n[Sidenote: That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate\n monarchy.]\n\n3. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be\npersuaded that a _kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse kinds of\ncities; who though they would rather have the city subject to one\nthan many, yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it\naccord with their judgments. But we must discover by reason, and not\nby passion, what the difference is between a king and a tyrant. But\nfirst, they differ not in this, that a tyrant hath the greater\npower; for greater than the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this,\nthat one hath a limited power, the other not; for he whose authority\nis limited, is no king, but his subject that limits him. Lastly,\nneither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a\ndemocratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should,\nby force, possess himself of the supreme power, if he gain the\nconsent of all the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if\nnot, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole\nexercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a king who\ngoverns well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case\ntherefore is brought to this pass; that _a king_, legitimately\nconstituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule\nwell and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a\n_king_; if not, they count him a _tyrant_. Wherefore we see a\n_kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse forms of government, but one\nand the self-same monarch hath the name of a _king_ given him in\npoint of honour and reverence to him, and of a _tyrant_ in way of\ncontumely and reproach. But what we frequently find in books said\nagainst tyrants, took its original from Greek and Roman writers,\nwhose government was partly democratical, and partly aristocratical,\nand therefore not tyrants only, but even kings were odious to them.\n\n[Sidenote: That there can no mixed state be formed out of these\n forenamed kinds of government.]\n\n4. There are, who indeed do think it necessary that a supreme\ncommand should be somewhere extant in a city; but if it should be in\nany one, either man or council, it would follow, they say, that all\nthe citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine\nthat there may be a certain form of government compounded of those\nthree kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular;\nwhich they call a _mixed monarchy_, or _mixed aristocracy_, or\n_mixed democracy_, according as any one of these three sorts shall\nbe more eminent than the rest. For example, if the naming of\nmagistrates and the arbitration of war and peace should belong to\nthe King, judicature to the Lords, and contribution of monies to the\nPeople, and the power of making laws to all together, this kind of\nstate would they call a _mixed monarchy_ forsooth. But if it were\npossible that there could be such a state, it would no whit\nadvantage the liberty of the subject. For as long as they all agree,\neach single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be: but if\nthey disagree, the state returns to a civil war and the right of the\nprivate sword; which certainly is much worse than any subjection\nwhatsoever. But that there can be no such kind of government,[14]\nhath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, art.\n6-12.\n\nFootnote 14:\n\n _But that there can be no such kind of government._] Most men\n grant, that a government ought not to be divided; but they would\n have it moderated and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very\n reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of\n moderating and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a\n very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not only\n kings, but all other persons endued with supreme authority, would\n so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and only minding their\n charges, contain themselves within the limits of the natural and\n divine laws. But they who distinguish thus, they would have the\n chief power bounded and restrained by others: which, because it\n cannot be done but they who do set the limits must needs have some\n part of the power, whereby they may be enabled to do it, the\n government is properly divided, not moderated.\n\n[Sidenote: That democracy, except it have certain times and places\n of meeting prescribed, is dissolved.]\n\n5. Let us see a little now, in the constituting of each form of\ngovernment what the constitutors do. Those who met together with\nintention to erect a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a\ndemocracy. For in that they willingly met, they are supposed obliged\nto the observation of what shall be determined by the major part;\nwhich, while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some certain\ndays and places, is a clear democracy. For that convent, whose will\nis the will of all the citizens, hath the supreme authority; and\nbecause in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to\ngive his voice, it follows that it is a democracy, by the definition\ngiven in the first article of this chapter. But if they depart and\nbreak up the convent, and appoint no time or place where and when\nthey shall meet again, the public weal returns to anarchy and the\nsame state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state\nof all men warring against all. The people, therefore, retains the\nsupreme power, no longer than there is a certain day and place\npublicly appointed and known, to which whosoever will may resort.\nFor except that be known and determined, they may either meet at\ndivers times and places, that is, in factions, or not at all; and\nthen it is no longer \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, _the people_, but a dissolute multitude,\nto whom we can neither attribute any action or right. Two things\ntherefore frame a democracy; whereof one, to wit, the perpetual\nprescription of convents, makes \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, _the people_; the other,\nwhich is a plurality of voices, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, or _the power_.\n\n[Sidenote: In democracy, the intervals of the times of convening\n must be short, or the administration of the government\n committed to some one.]\n\n6. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the people, so as to\nmaintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times and places\nof meeting, unless that either the intervals of the times be of less\ndistance, than that anything may in the meantime happen whereby, by\nreason of the defect of power, the city may be brought into some\ndanger; or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be,\nduring the interval, granted to some one man or council. For unless\nthis be done, there is not that wary care and heed taken for the\ndefence and peace of single men, which ought to be; and therefore it\nwill not deserve the name of a city, because that in it, for want of\nsecurity, every man\u2019s right of defending himself at his own pleasure\nreturns to him again.\n\n[Sidenote: In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to\n obey the people: the people is obliged to no man.]\n\n7. Democracy is not framed by contract of particular persons with\nthe _people_, but by mutual compacts of single men each with other.\nBut hence it appears, in the first place, that the persons\ncontracting must be in being before the contract itself. But the\n_people_ is not in being before the constitution of government, as\nnot being any person, but a multitude of single persons; wherefore\nthere could then no contract pass between the people and the\nsubject. Now, if after that government is framed, the subject make\nany contract with the people, it is in vain; because the people\ncontains within its will the will of that subject, to whom it is\nsupposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and\npleasure disengage itself, and by consequence is now actually free.\nBut in the second place, that single persons do contract each with\nother, may be inferred from hence; that in vain sure would the city\nhave been constituted, if the citizens had been engaged by no\ncontracts to do or omit what the city should command to be done or\nomitted. Because, therefore, such kind of compacts must be\nunderstood to pass as necessary to the making up of a city, but none\ncan be made (as is already shewed) between the subject and the\npeople; it follows, that they must be made between single citizens,\nnamely, that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the\nmajor part, on condition that the rest also do the like. As if every\none should say thus: I give up my right unto the people for your\nsake, on condition that you also deliver up yours for mine.\n\n[Sidenote: By what acts an aristocracy is framed.]\n\n8. An _aristocracy_ or council of nobles endowed with supreme\nauthority, receives its original from a democracy, which gives up\nits right unto it. Where we must understand that certain men\ndistinguished from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or\nsome other character, are propounded to the people, and by plurality\nof voices are elected; and being elected, the whole right of the\npeople or city is conveyed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the\npeople might do before, the same by right may this court of elected\nnobles now do. Which being done, it is clear that the people,\nconsidered as one person, its supreme authority being already\ntransferred on these, is no longer now in being.\n\n[Sidenote: In an aristocracy the nobles make no contract, nor are\n they obliged to any citizen, or to the whole people.]\n\n9. As in democracy the people, so in an aristocracy the court of\nnobles is free from all manner of obligation. For seeing subjects\nnot contracting with the people, but by mutual compacts among\nthemselves, were tied to all that the people did; hence also they\nwere tied to that act of the people, in resigning up its right of\ngovernment into the hands of nobles. Neither could this court,\nalthough elected by the people, be by it obliged to anything. For\nbeing elected, the people is at once dissolved, as was declared\nabove, and the authority it had as being a person, utterly\nvanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the _person_,\nmust also vanish, and perish together with it.\n\n[Sidenote: The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings.]\n\n10. _Aristocracy_ hath these considerations, together with\n_democracy_. First, that without an appointment of some certain\ntimes and places, at which the court of nobles may meet, it is no\nlonger a court, or one person, but a dissolute multitude without any\nsupreme power. Secondly, that the times of their assembling cannot\nbe disjoined by long intervals without prejudice to the supreme\npower, unless its administration be transferred to some one man. Now\nthe reasons why this happens, are the same which we set down in the\nfifth article.\n\n[Sidenote: By what acts a monarchy is framed.]\n\n11. As an _aristocracy_, so also a _monarchy_ is derived from the\npower of the _people_, transferring its right, that is, its\nauthority on one man. Here also we must understand, that some _one_\nman, either by name or some other token, is propounded to be taken\nnotice of above all the rest; and that by a plurality of voices the\nwhole right of the people is conveyed on him; insomuch as whatsoever\nthe people could do before he were elected, the same in every\nrespect may he by right now do, being elected. Which being done, the\npeople is no longer one _person_, but a rude multitude, as being\nonly one before by virtue of the supreme command, whereof they now\nhave made a conveyance from themselves on this one man.\n\n[Sidenote: That the monarch is by compact obliged to none for the\n authority he hath received.]\n\n12. And therefore neither doth the monarch oblige himself to any for\nthe command he receives. For he receives it from the people; but as\nhath been shewed above, the people, as soon as that act is done,\nceaseth to be a _person_; but the _person_ vanishing, obligation to\nthe _person_ vanisheth. The subjects therefore are tied to perform\nobedience to the monarch, by those compacts only by which they\nmutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the\npeople should command them, that is, to obey that _monarch_, if he\nwere made by the _people_.\n\n[Sidenote: A monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all\n those acts which are requisite to well governing.]\n\n13. But a _monarchy_ differs as well from an _aristocracy_ as a\n_democracy_, in this chiefly; that in those there must be certain\nset times and places for deliberation and consultation of affairs,\nthat is, for the actual exercise of it in all times and places. For\nthe people or the nobles not being _one natural person_, must\nnecessarily have their meetings. The _monarch_, who is one by\nnature, is always in a present capacity to execute his authority.\n\n[Sidenote: What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty\n of it, when the city performs not its office to the\n citizens, nor the citizens towards the city.]\n\n14. Because we have declared above, (in art. 7, 9, 12), that they\nwho have gotten the _supreme command_, are by no compacts obliged to\nany man, it necessarily follows, that they can do no _injury_ to the\nsubjects. For _injury_, according to the definition made in chap.\nIII. art. 3, is nothing else but a breach of contract; and therefore\nwhere no contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the\npeople, the nobles, and the monarch may diverse ways transgress\nagainst the other laws of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity,\ncontumely, and other like vices, which come not under this strict\nand exact notion of _injury_. But if the subject yield not obedience\nto the supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be\n_injurious_, as well to his fellow-subjects, because each man hath\ncompacted with the other to obey; as to his _chief ruler_, in\nresuming that right which he hath given him, without his consent.\nAnd in a _democracy_ or _aristocracy_, if anything be decreed\nagainst any _law of nature_, the city itself, that is, the civil\nperson sins not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was\ndecreed; for sin is a consequence of the natural express will, not\nof the political, which is artificial. For if it were otherwise,\nthey would be guilty by whom the decree was absolutely disliked. But\nin a _monarchy_, if the _monarch_ make any decree against the _laws\nof nature_, he sins himself; because in him the civil will and the\nnatural are all one.\n\n[Sidenote: A monarch made without limitation of time, may elect his\n successors.]\n\n15. The people who are about to make a _monarch_, may give him the\n_supremacy_ either simply without limitation of time, or for a\ncertain season and time determined. If simply, we must understand\nthat he who receives it, hath the self-same power which they had who\ngave it. On the same grounds, therefore, that the _people_ by right\ncould make him a monarch, may he make another monarch. Insomuch as\nthe _monarch_ to whom the command is simply given, receives a right\nnot of _possession_ only, but of _succession_ also; so as he may\ndeclare whom he pleaseth for his successor.\n\n[Sidenote: Of limited monarchs.]\n\n16. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must have\nregard to somewhat more than the bare gift only. First, whether the\n_people_ conveying its authority, left itself any right to meet at\ncertain times and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this\npower, whether it were done so as they might meet before that time\nwere expired, which they prescribed to the monarch. Thirdly, whether\nthey were contented to meet only at the will of that temporary\nmonarch, and not otherwise. Suppose now the _people_ had delivered\nup its power to some one man for term of life only; which being\ndone, let us suppose in the first place, that every man departed\nfrom the council without making any order at all concerning the\nplace, where after his death they should meet again to make a new\nelection. In this case, it is manifest by the fifth article of this\nchapter, that the _people_ ceaseth to be a _person_, and is become a\ndissolute multitude; every one whereof hath an equal, to wit, a\nnatural right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in\nwhat places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engross the\nsupreme power to himself, and settle it on his own head. What\nmonarch soever, therefore, hath a command in such a condition, he is\nbound by the _law of nature_, set down in chap. III. art. 8, _of not\nreturning evil for good_, prudently to provide that by his death the\ncity suffer not a dissolution; either by appointing a certain day\nand place, in which those subjects of his, who have a mind to it,\nmay assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor; whether\nof these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit.\nHe therefore, who on this foresaid manner hath received his command\nduring life, hath an absolute power, and may at his discretion\ndispose of the succession. In the next place, if we grant that the\n_people_ departed not from the election of the _temporary monarch_,\nbefore they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his\ndeath; then the monarch being dead, the authority is confirmed in\nthe people, not by any new acts of the subjects, but by virtue of\nthe former right. For all the supreme command, as _dominion_, was in\nthe people; but the use and exercise of it was only in the temporary\nmonarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but hath not the right.\nBut if the _people_ after the election of a _temporary monarch_,\ndepart not from the court before they have appointed certain times\nand places to convene during the time prescribed him; as the\ndictators in ancient times were made by the people of Rome; such an\none is not to be accounted a monarch, but the prime officer of the\npeople. And if it shall seem good, the people may deprive him of his\noffice even before that time; as the people of Rome did, when they\nconferred an equal power on Minutius, master of the horse, with\nQuintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made dictator. The\nreason whereof is, that it is not to be imagined, that he, whether\nman or council, who hath the readiest and most immediate power to\nact, should hold his command on such terms, as not to be able\nactually to execute it; for command is nothing else but a right of\ncommanding, as oft as nature allows it possible. Lastly, if the\n_people_ having declared a _temporary monarch_, depart from the\ncourt on such terms, as it shall not be lawful for them to meet\nwithout the command of the monarch, we must understand the people to\nbe immediately dissolved, and that his authority, who is thus\ndeclared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all\nthe subjects to frame the city anew, unless he give consent who hath\nnow alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made\nany promise to assemble his subjects on some certain times; since\nthere remains no _person_ now in being, but at his discretion, to\nwhom the promise was made. What we have spoken of these four cases\nof a _people_ electing a _temporary monarch_, will be more clearly\nexplained by comparing them with an _absolute monarch_ who hath no\nheir-apparent. For the people is lord of the subject in such a\nmanner, as there can be no heir but whom itself doth appoint.\nBesides, the spaces between the times of the subjects\u2019 meeting, may\nbe fitly compared to those times wherein the monarch sleeps; for in\neither the _acts_ of commanding cease, the _power_ remains.\nFurthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet again, is\nthe death of the _people_; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake\nmore, is the death of a man. As therefore a king who hath no heir,\ngoing to his rest so as never to rise again, that is, dying, if he\ncommit the exercise of his regal authority to any one till he awake,\ndoes by consequence give him the succession; the _people_ also\nelecting a _temporary monarch_, and not reserving a power to\nconvene, delivers up to him the whole dominion of the country.\nFurthermore, as a king going to sleep for some season, entrusts the\nadministration of his kingdom to some other, and waking takes it\nagain; so the people having elected a _temporary monarch_, and\nwithal retaining a right to meet at a certain day and place, at that\nday receives its supremacy again. And as a king who hath committed\nthe execution of his authority to another, himself in the meanwhile\nwaking, can recal this commission again when he pleaseth; so the\n_people_, who during the time prescribed to the _temporary monarch_\ndoth by right convene, may if they please deprive the monarch of his\nauthority. Lastly, the king, who commits his authority to another\nwhile himself sleeps, not being able to wake again till he whom he\nentrusted give consent, loses at once both his power and his life;\nso the people, who hath given the supreme power to a temporary\nmonarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command, is\nabsolutely dissolved, and the power remains with him whom they have\nchosen.\n\n[Sidenote: A monarch retaining his right of government, cannot, by\n any promise whatsoever, be conceived to have parted with\n his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his\n authority.]\n\n17. If the monarch _promise_ aught to any one or many subjects\ntogether, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may\nsuffer prejudice, that _promise_ or _compact_, whether made by oath\nor without it, is null. For all _compact_ is a conveyance of right,\nwhich by what hath been said in the fourth article of the second\nchapter, requires meet and proper signs of the will in the conveyer.\nBut he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end,\ndoth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his right to the\nmeans necessary to that end. Now he who hath promised to part with\nsomewhat necessary to the supreme power, and yet retains the power\nitself, gives sufficient tokens that he no otherwise promised it,\nthan so far forth as the power might be retained without it.\nWhensoever therefore it shall appear, that what is promised cannot\nbe performed without prejudice to the power, the promise must be\nvalued as not made, that is, of no effect.\n\n[Sidenote: By what means a subject is freed from his subjection.]\n\n18. We have seen how subjects, nature dictating, have obliged\nthemselves by mutual compacts to obey the supreme power. We will see\nnow by what means it comes to pass, that they are released from\nthese bonds of obedience. And first of all, this happens by\n_rejection_, namely, if a man cast off or forsake, but convey not\nthe _right of his command_ on some other. For what is thus rejected,\nis openly exposed to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again,\nby the right of nature, every subject may heed the preservation of\nhimself according to his own judgment. In the second place, if the\nkingdom fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more\nopposition be made against them, we must understand that he who\nbefore had the supreme authority, hath now lost it: for when the\nsubjects have done their full endeavour to prevent their falling\ninto the enemy\u2019s hands, they have fulfilled those contracts of\nobedience which they made each with other; and what, being\nconquered, they promise afterwards to avoid death, they must with no\nless endeavour labour to perform. Thirdly, in a monarchy, (for a\ndemocracy and aristocracy cannot fail), if there be no successor,\nall the subjects are discharged from their obligations; for no man\nis supposed to be tied he knows not to whom; for in such a case it\nwere impossible to perform aught. And by these three ways, all\nsubjects are restored from their civil subjection to that liberty\nwhich all men have to all things; to wit, natural and savage; for\nthe natural state hath the same proportion to the civil, (I mean,\nliberty to subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to\na man. Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his\nsubjection by the will of him who hath the supreme power, namely, if\nhe change his soil; which may be done two ways, either by\npermission, as he who gets license to dwell in another country; or\ncommand, as he who is banished. In both cases, he is free from the\nlaws of his former country; because he is tied to observe those of\nthe latter.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n OF THE RIGHTS OF LORDS OVER THEIR SERVANTS.\n\n1. What lord and servant signify. 2. The distinction of servants,\n into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves,\n or such as serve being imprisoned or bound in fetters. 3. The\n obligation of a servant arises from the liberty of body allowed\n him by his lord. 4. Servants that are bound, are not by any\n compacts tied to their lords. 5. Servants have no propriety in\n their goods against their lord. 6. The lord may sell his\n servant, or alienate him by testament 7. The lord cannot injure\n his servant. 8. He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his\n servants. 9. By what means servants are freed. 10. Dominion over\n beasts belongs to the right of nature.\n\n\n[Sidenote: What lord and servant are.]\n\n1. In the two foregoing chapters we have treated of an _institutive_\nor _framed_ government, as being that which receives its original\nfrom the consent of many, who by contract and faith mutually given\nhave obliged each other. Now follows what may be said concerning a\n_natural_ government; which may also be called _acquired_, because\nit is that which is gotten by power and natural force. But we must\nknow in the first place, by what means the right of dominion may be\ngotten over the persons of men. Where such a right is gotten, there\nis a kind of a little kingdom; for to be a _king_, is nothing else\nbut to have dominion over many persons; and thus a great family is a\nkingdom, and a little kingdom a family. Let us return again to the\nstate of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of\nthe earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity,\nwithout all kind of engagement to each other. There are but three\nways only, whereby one can have a dominion over the person of\nanother; whereof the first is, if by mutual contract made between\nthemselves, for peace and self-defence\u2019s sake, they have willingly\ngiven up themselves to the power and authority of some man, or\ncouncil of men; and of this we have already spoken. The second is,\nif a man taken prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else\ndistrusting his own forces, to avoid death, promises the conqueror\nor the stronger party his _service_, that is, to do all whatsoever\nhe shall command him. In which contract, the good which the\nvanquished or inferior in strength doth receive, is the grant of his\nlife, which by the right of war in the natural state of men he might\nhave been deprived of; but the good which he promises, is his\nservice and obedience. By virtue therefore of this promise, there is\nas absolute service and obedience due from the vanquished to the\nvanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the divine\nlaws; for he who is obliged to obey the commands of any man before\nhe knows what he will command him, is simply and without any\nrestriction tied to the performance of all commands whatsoever. Now\nhe that is thus tied, is called a _servant_; he to whom he is tied,\na _lord_. Thirdly, there is a right acquired over the person of a\nman by generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be\nspoken in the following chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust\n enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves, or such as serve\n being imprisoned or fettered.]\n\n2. Every one that is taken in the war, and hath his life spared him,\nis not supposed to have contracted with his lord; for every one is\nnot trusted with so much of his natural liberty, as to be able, if\nhe desired it, either to fly away, or quit his service, or contrive\nany mischief to his lord. And these serve indeed, but within prisons\nor bound within irons; and therefore they were called not by the\ncommon name of _servant_ only, but by the peculiar name of _slave_;\neven as now at this day, _un serviteur_, and _un serf_, or _un\nesclave_ have diverse significations.\n\n[Sidenote: The obligation of a servant ariseth from that freedom\n which is granted him by his lord.]\n\n3. The obligation therefore of a _servant_ to his _lord_, ariseth\nnot from a simple grant of his life; but from hence rather, that he\nkeeps him not bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives from\ncontract; but where there is no trust, there can be no contract, as\nappears by chap. ii. art. 9; where a compact is defined to be the\npromise of him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence and\ntrust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, whereby the\n_lord_ affords him his corporal liberty; so that if no obligation\nnor bonds of contract had happened, he might not only have made his\nescape, but also have killed his lord who was the preserver of his\nlife.\n\n[Sidenote: Servants that are bound, are not obliged to their lord by\n any contract.]\n\n4. Wherefore such kind of _servants_ as are restrained by\nimprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of\n_servants_ given above; because those serve not for the contract\u2019s\nsake, but to the end they may not suffer. And therefore if they fly,\nor kill their _lord_, they offend not against the laws of nature.\nFor to bind any man, is a plain sign that the binder supposes him\nthat is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any other obligation.\n\n[Sidenote: Servants have no propriety in their goods against their\n lord.]\n\n5. The lord therefore hath no less dominion over a servant that is\nnot, than over one that is bound; for he hath a supreme power over\nboth, and may say of his servant no less than of another thing,\nwhether animate or inanimate, _this is mine_. Whence it follows,\nthat whatsoever the servant had before his servitude, that\nafterwards becomes the lord\u2019s; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was\ngotten for his lord. For he that can by right dispose of the\n_person_ of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that\n_person_ could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the\nservant may retain as his own against the will of his lord; yet hath\nhe, by his lord\u2019s distribution, a propriety and dominion over his\nown goods: insomuch as one servant may keep and defend them against\nthe invasion of his fellow-servant, in the same manner as hath been\nshewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly _his own_\nagainst the will of the supreme authority, but every subject hath a\npropriety against his fellow-subject.\n\n[Sidenote: The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by\n testament.]\n\n6. Since therefore both the servant himself, and all that belongs to\nhim are his lord\u2019s, and by the right of nature every man may dispose\nof his own in what manner he pleases; the lord may either sell, lay\nto pledge, or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his\nservant, according to his own will and pleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: The lord cannot be injurious to his servant.]\n\n7. Furthermore, what hath before been demonstrated concerning\nsubjects in an _institutive_ government, namely, that he who hath\nthe supreme power can do his subject no injury; is true also\nconcerning _servants_, because they have subjected their will to the\nwill of the Lord. Wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with\ntheir will; but no injury can be done to him that willeth it.\n\n[Sidenote: He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his\n servants.]\n\n8. But if it happen that the _lord_, either by captivity or\nvoluntary subjection, doth become a _servant_ or _subject_ to\nanother, that other shall not only be lord of him, but also of his\n_servants_; supreme lord over these, immediate lord over him. Now\nbecause not the servant only, but also all he hath, are his lord\u2019s;\ntherefore his servants now belong to this man, neither can the\nmediate lord dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to the\nsupreme. And therefore, if sometime in civil governments the lord\nhave an absolute power over his servants, that is supposed to be\nderived from the right of nature, and not constituted, but slightly\npassed over by the civil law.\n\n[Sidenote: By what means servants are freed.]\n\n9. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a\nsubject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection.\nFirst, if his lord enfranchise him; for the right which the servant\ntransferred to his lord over himself, the same may the lord restore\nto the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is\ncalled _manumission_; which is just as if a city should permit a\ncitizen to convey himself under the jurisdiction of some other city.\nSecondly, if the lord cast off his servant from him; which in a city\nis _banishment_; neither differs it from _manumission_ in effect,\nbut in manner only. For there, liberty is granted as a favour, here,\nas a punishment: in both, the dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the\nservant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the\nnew; for as all other things, so servants also are acquired by war,\nwhom in equity the lord must protect, if he will have them to be\nhis. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a\nsuccessor, the lord dying (suppose) without any testament or heir.\nFor no man is understood to be obliged, unless he know to whom he is\nto perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is put in bonds,\nor by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed\nfrom that other obligation of contract. For there can be no contract\nwhere there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not\ngiven. But the _lord_ who himself serves another, cannot so free his\n_servants_, but that they must still continue under the power of the\nsupreme; for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are not his,\nbut the supreme lord\u2019s.\n\n[Sidenote: The dominion over beasts is by the right of nature.]\n\n10. We get a right over irrational creatures, in the same manner\nthat we do over the persons of men; to wit, by force and natural\nstrength. For if in the state of nature it is lawful for every one,\nby reason of that war which is of all against all, to subdue and\nalso to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good;\nmuch more will the same be lawful against brutes; namely, at their\nown discretion to reduce those to servitude, which by art may be\ntamed and fitted for use, and to persecute and destroy the rest by a\nperpetual war as dangerous and noxious. Our dominion therefore over\nbeasts, hath its original from the _right of nature_, not from\n_divine positive right_. For if such a right had not been before the\npublishing of the Sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have\nkilled a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was\nmade manifest by holy writ; a most hard condition for men indeed,\nwhom the beasts might devour without injury, and yet they might not\ndestroy them. Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of\nnature, that a beast may kill a man, it is also by the same right\nthat a man may slay a beast.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n OF THE RIGHT OF PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN, AND\n OF HEREDITARY GOVERNMENT.\n\n1. Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation. 2. Dominion over\n infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their\n power. 3. Dominion over infants is originally the mother\u2019s. 4.\n The exposed infant is his, from whom he receives his\n preservation. 5. The child that hath one parent a subject, and\n the other a sovereign, belongs to him or her in authority. 6. In\n such a conjunction of man and woman, as neither hath command\n over the other, the children are the mother\u2019s, unless by compact\n or civil law it be otherwise determined. 7. Children are no less\n subject to their parents, than servants to their lords and\n subjects to their princes. 8. Of the honour of parents and\n lords. 9. Wherein liberty consists, and the difference of\n subjects and servants. 10. There is the same right over subjects\n in an hereditary government, which there is in an institutive\n government. 11. The question concerning the right of succession\n belongs only to monarchy. 12. A monarch may by his will and\n testament dispose of his supreme authority: 13. Or give it, or\n sell it. 14. A monarch dying without testament, is ever supposed\n to will that a monarch should succeed him: 15. And some one of\n his children: 16. And a male rather than female: 17. And the\n eldest rather than the younger: 18. And his brother, if he want\n issue, before all others. 19. In the same manner that men\n succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of\n succession.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation.]\n\n1. SOCRATES _is a man, and therefore a living creature_, is right\nreasoning; and that most evident, because there is nothing needful\nto the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but that the\nword _man_ be understood; because _a living creature_ is in the\ndefinition itself of _a man_, and every one makes up the proposition\nwhich was desired, namely this, _man is a living creature_. And\nthis, _Sophroniscus is Socrates\u2019 father, and therefore his lord_, is\nperhaps a true inference, but not evident; because the word _lord_\nis not in the definition of _a father_: wherefore it is necessary,\nto make it more evident, that the connexion of _father_ and _lord_\nbe somewhat unfolded. Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove\nthe dominion of a parent over his children, have brought no other\nargument than that of _generation_; as if it were of itself evident,\nthat what is begotten by me is mine; just as if a man should think,\nthat because there is a triangle, it appears presently, without any\nfurther discourse, that its angles are equal to two right. Besides,\nsince dominion, that is, supreme power is indivisible, insomuch as\nno man can serve two masters; but two persons, male and female, must\nconcur in the act of generation; it is impossible that dominion\nshould at all be acquired by generation only. Wherefore we will,\nwith the more diligence, in this place inquire into the original of\n_paternal government_.\n\n[Sidenote: Dominion over infants belongs to him who first hath them\n in his power.]\n\n2. We must therefore return to the state of nature, in which, by\nreason of the equality of nature, all men of riper years are to be\naccounted equal. There _by right of nature_ the conqueror is lord of\nthe conquered. By the right therefore of _nature_, the dominion over\nthe infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power. But\nit is manifest that he who is newly born, is in the _mother\u2019s_ power\nbefore any others; insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own will,\neither breed him up or adventure him to fortune.\n\n[Sidenote: Dominion over infants is originally the mother\u2019s.]\n\n3. If therefore she breed him, because the state of nature is the\nstate of war, she is supposed to bring him up on this condition;\nthat being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is, that\nhe obey her. For since by natural necessity we all desire that which\nappears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on\nsuch terms afforded life to another, that he might both get strength\nby his years, and at once become an enemy. But each man is an enemy\nto that other, whom he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the\nstate of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a\n_mother_ and a _lord_. But what some say, that in this case the\n_father_, by reason of the pre-eminence of sex, and not the _mother_\nbecomes _lord_, signifies nothing. For both reason shows the\ncontrary; because the inequality of their natural forces is not so\ngreat, that the man could get the dominion over the woman without\nwar. And custom also contradicts not; for women, namely Amazons,\nhave in former times waged war against their adversaries, and\ndisposed of their children at their own wills. And at this day, in\ndivers places women are invested with the principal authority;\nneither do their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves;\nwhich in truth they do _by the right of nature_; forasmuch as they\nwho have the supreme power, are not tied at all (as hath been\nshewed) to the civil laws. Add also, that in the state of nature it\ncannot be known who is the _father_, but by the testimony of the\n_mother_; the child therefore is his whose the mother will have it,\nand therefore her\u2019s. Wherefore original dominion over _children_\nbelongs to the _mother_: and among men no less than other creatures,\nthe birth follows the belly.\n\n[Sidenote: The exposed infant is his that preserves him.]\n\n4. The dominion passes from the mother to others, divers ways.\nFirst, if she quit and forsake her right by _exposing_ the child. He\ntherefore that shall bring up the child thus exposed, shall have the\nsame dominion over it which the mother had. For that life which the\nmother had given it, (not by _getting_ but _nourishing_ it), she now\nby _exposing_ takes from it. Wherefore the obligation also which\narose from the benefit of life, is by this exposition made void. Now\nthe preserved oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his\neducation as to a _mother_, or of his service as to a _lord_. For\nalthough the mother in the state of nature, where all men have a\nright to all things, may recover her son again, namely, by the same\nright that anybody else might do it; yet may not the son rightly\ntransfer himself again unto his mother.\n\n[Sidenote: The son of a subject and chief, is his that commands.]\n\n5. Secondly, if the mother be taken prisoner, her son is his that\ntook her; because that he who hath dominion over the person, hath\nalso dominion over all belonging to the person; wherefore over the\nson also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter, in the fifth\narticle. Thirdly, if the mother be a subject under what government\nsoever, he that hath the supreme authority in that government, will\nalso have the dominion over him that is born of her; for he is lord\nalso of the mother, who is bound to obey him in all things.\nFourthly, if a woman for society\u2019s sake give herself to a man on\nthis condition, that he shall bear the sway; he that receives his\nbeing from the contribution of both parties, is the _father\u2019s_, in\nregard of the command he hath over the _mother_. But if a woman\nbearing rule shall have children by a subject, the children are the\n_mother\u2019s_; for otherwise the woman can have no children without\nprejudice to her authority. And universally, if the society of the\nmale and female be such an union, as the one have subjected himself\nto the other, the children belong to him or her that commands.\n\n[Sidenote: In such a conjunction of male and female, as neither hath\n the commanding power over the other, the children are the\n mother\u2019s; except by pact or civil law it be otherwise\n determined.]\n\n6. But in the state of nature, if a man and woman contract so, as\nneither is subject to the command of the other, the children are the\nmother\u2019s, for the reasons above given in the third article, unless\nby pacts it be otherwise provided. For the _mother_ may by pact\ndispose of her right as she lists; as heretofore hath been done by\nthe Amazons, who of those children which have been begotten by their\nneighbours, have by pact allowed them the _males_, and retained\n_females_ to themselves. But in a civil government, if there be a\ncontract of marriage between a man and woman, the children are the\n_father\u2019s_; because in all cities, to wit, constituted of _fathers_,\nnot _mothers_ governing their families, the domestical command\nbelongs to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according to\nthe civil laws, is called matrimony. But if they agree only to lie\ntogether, the children are the _father\u2019s_ or the _mother\u2019s_\nvariously, according to the differing civil laws of divers cities.\n\n[Sidenote: Children are no less subject to their parents, than\n servants to their lords, and subjects to their city.]\n\n7. Now because, by the third article, the _mother is originally lord\nof her children_, and from her the father, or somebody else by\nderived right; it is manifest that the children are no less subject\nto those by whom they are nourished and brought up, than servants to\ntheir lords, and subjects to him who bears the supreme rule; and\nthat a parent cannot be injurious to his son, as long as he is under\nhis power. A son also is freed from subjection in the same manner as\na subject and servant are. For _emancipation_ is the same thing with\n_manumission_, and _abdication_ with _banishment_.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the honour due to parents and lords.]\n\n8. The _enfranchised son_ or _released servant_, do now stand in\nless fear of their _lord_ and _father_, being deprived of his\nnatural and lordly power over them; and, if regard be had to true\nand inward honour, do honour him less than before. For _honour_, as\nhath been said in the section above, is nothing else but the\nestimation of another\u2019s power; and therefore he that hath least\npower, hath always least _honour_. But it is not to be imagined,\nthat the _enfranchiser_ ever intended so to match the _enfranchised_\nwith himself, as that he should not so much as acknowledge a\nbenefit, but should so carry himself in all things as if he were\nbecome wholly his equal. It must therefore be ever understood, that\nhe who is freed from subjection, whether he be a _servant_, _son_,\nor some _colony_, doth promise all those external signs at least,\nwhereby superiors used to be honoured by their inferiors. From\nwhence it follows, that the precept of _honouring our parents_,\nbelongs to the law of nature, not only under the title of\n_gratitude_, but also of _agreement_.\n\n[Sidenote: Wherein liberty doth consist; and the difference between\n subjects and servants.]\n\n9. What then, will some one demand, is the difference between a\n_son_, or between a _subject_ and a _servant_? Neither do I know\nthat any writer hath fully declared what _liberty_ and what\n_slavery_ is. Commonly, to do all things according to our own\nfancies, and that without punishment, is esteemed to be _liberty_;\nnot to be able to do this, is judged _bondage_; which in a civil\ngovernment, and with the peace of mankind, cannot possibly be done;\nbecause there is no city without a command and a restraining right.\n_Liberty_, that we may define it, is nothing else but _an absence of\nthe lets and hindrances of motion_; as water shut up in a vessel is\ntherefore not at liberty, because the vessel hinders it from running\nout; which, the vessel being broken, is made _free_. And every man\nhath more or less _liberty_, as he hath more or less space in which\nhe employs himself: as he hath more _liberty_, who is in a large,\nthan he that is kept in a close prison. And a man may be free toward\none part, and yet not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on\nthis and that side with hedges or stone walls, lest he spoil the\nvines or corn neighbouring on the highway. And these kinds of lets\nare external and absolute. In which sense all _servants_ and\n_subjects_ are _free_, who are not fettered and imprisoned. There\nare others which are arbitrary, which do not absolutely hinder\nmotion, but by accident, to wit, by our own choice; as he that is in\na ship, is not so hindered but he may cast himself into the sea, if\nhe will. And here also the more ways a man may move himself, the\nmore _liberty_ he hath. And herein consists civil _liberty_; for no\nman, whether _subject_, _son_, or _servant_, is so hindered by the\npunishments appointed by the _city_, the _father_, or the _lord_,\nhow cruel soever, but that he may do all things, and make use of all\nmeans necessary to the preservation of his life and health. For my\npart therefore I cannot find what reason a mere _servant_ hath to\nmake complaints, if they relate only to want of _liberty_; unless he\ncount it a misery to be restrained from hurting himself, and to\nreceive that life, which by war, or misfortune, or through his own\nidleness was forfeited, together with all manner of sustenance, and\nall things necessary to the conservation of health, on this\ncondition only, that he will be ruled. For he that is kept in by\npunishments laid before him, so as he dares not let loose the reins\nto his will in all things, is not oppressed by servitude, but is\ngoverned and sustained. But this privilege free subjects and sons of\na family have above servants in every government and family where\nservants are; that they may both undergo the more honourable offices\nof the city or family, and also enjoy a larger possession of things\nsuperfluous. And herein lies the difference between a _free subject_\nand a _servant_, that he is _free_ indeed, who serves his city only;\nbut a _servant_ is he, who also serves his fellow-subject. All other\nliberty is an exemption from the laws of the city, and proper only\nto those that bear rule.\n\n[Sidenote: There is the same right in an hereditary, which there is\n in an institutive government.]\n\n10. A _father_ with his _sons_ and _servants_, grown into a civil\nperson by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction, is called a _family_.\nThis _family_, if through multiplying of _children_ and acquisition\nof _servants_ it becomes numerous, insomuch as without casting the\nuncertain die of war it cannot be subdued, will be termed an\n_hereditary kingdom_. Which though it differ from an _institutive\nmonarchy_, being acquired by force, in the original and manner of\nits constitution; yet being constituted, it hath all the same\nproperties, and the right of authority is everywhere the same;\ninsomuch as it is not needful to speak anything of them apart.\n\n[Sidenote: The question concerning the right of succession belongs\n only to monarchy.]\n\n11. It hath been spoken, by what right supreme authorities are\nconstituted. We must now briefly tell you, by what right they may be\ncontinued. Now the right by which they are continued, is that which\nis called the right of _succession_. Now because in a _democracy_\nthe supreme authority is with the _people_, as long as there be any\nsubjects in being, so long it rests with the same person; for the\npeople hath no successor. In like manner in an _aristocracy_, one of\nthe nobles dying, some other by the rest is substituted in his\nplace; and therefore except they all die together, which I suppose\nwill never happen, there is no succession. The query therefore of\nthe right of succession takes place only in an _absolute monarchy_.\nFor they who exercise the supreme power for a time only, are\nthemselves no _monarchs_, but _ministers_ of state.\n\n[Sidenote: A monarch may dispose of the command of his government by\n testament:]\n\n12. But first, if a monarch shall by testament appoint one to\nsucceed him, the person appointed shall succeed. For if he be\nappointed by the _people_, he shall have all the right over the city\nwhich the _people_ had, as hath been showed in chap. VII. art. 11.\nBut the people might choose him; by the same right therefore may he\nchoose another. But in an _hereditary kingdom_, there are the same\nrights as in an _institutive_. Wherefore every monarch may by his\nwill make a _successor_.\n\n[Sidenote: Or give it away, or sell it.]\n\n13. But what a man may transfer on another by testament, that by the\nsame right may he, yet living, give or sell away. To whomsoever\ntherefore he shall make over the supreme power, whether by gift or\nsale, it is rightly made.\n\n[Sidenote: A monarch dying without testament, is ever understood to\n will that a monarch should succeed him:]\n\n14. But if living he have not declared his will concerning his\nsuccessor by testament nor otherwise, it is supposed, first, that he\nwould not have his government reduced to an anarchy or the state of\nwar, that is, to the destruction of his subjects; as well because he\ncould not do that without breach of the laws of nature, whereby he\nwas obliged to the performance of all things necessarily conducing\nto the preservation of peace; as also because, if that had been his\nwill, it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly.\nNext, because the right passeth according to the will of the father,\nwe must judge of the _successor_ according to the signs of his will.\nIt is understood therefore, that he would have his subjects to be\nunder a _monarchical_ government, rather than any other, because he\nhimself in ruling hath before approved of that state by his example,\nand hath not afterward either by any word or deed condemned it.\n\n[Sidenote: And some one of his children:]\n\n15. Furthermore, because by natural necessity all men wish them\nbetter, from whom they receive glory and honour, than others; but\nevery man after death receives honour and glory from his children,\nsooner than from the power of any other men: hence we gather, that a\nfather intends better for his children than any other person\u2019s. It\nis to be understood therefore, that the will of the father, dying\nwithout testament, was that some of his children should succeed him.\nYet this is to be understood with this proviso, that there be no\nmore apparent tokens to the contrary: of which kind, after many\nsuccessions, custom may be one. For he that makes no mention of his\n_succession_, is supposed to consent to the customs of his realm.\n\n[Sidenote: And a male rather than female:]\n\n16. Among children the males carry the pre-eminence; in the\nbeginning perhaps, because for the most part, although not always,\nthey are fitter for the administration of greater matters, but\nspecially of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown a custom,\nbecause that custom was not contradicted. And therefore the will of\nthe father, unless some other custom or sign do clearly repugn it,\nis to be interpreted in favour of them.\n\n[Sidenote: And of the males, the eldest rather than the younger:]\n\n17. Now because the sons are equal, and the power cannot be divided,\nthe eldest shall succeed. For if there be any difference by reason\nof age, the eldest is supposed more worthy; for nature being judge,\nthe most in years (because usually it is so) is the wisest; but\nother judge there cannot be had. But if the brothers must be equally\nvalued, the succession shall be _by lot_. But _primogeniture_ is a\nnatural lot, and by this the eldest is already preferred; nor is\nthere any that hath power to judge, whether by this or any other\nkind of lots the matter is to be decided. Now the same reason which\ncontends thus for the first-born son, doth no less for the\nfirst-born daughter.\n\n[Sidenote: And his brother, if he want issue, before all others.]\n\n18. But if he have no children, then the command shall pass to his\nbrothers and sisters; for the same reason that the children should\nhave succeeded, if he had had them. For those that are nearest to us\nin nature, are supposed to be nearest in benevolence. And to his\nbrothers sooner than his sisters, and to the elder sooner than the\nyounger; for the reason is the same for these, that it was for the\nchildren.\n\n[Sidenote: In the same manner that men succeed to the power, do they\n also succeed to the right of succession.]\n\n19. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the power,\ndo they also succeed to the right of succession. For if the\nfirst-born die before the father, it will be judged that he\ntransferred his right of succession unto his children; unless the\nfather have otherwise decreed it. And therefore the nephews will\nhave a fairer pretence to the succession, than the uncles. I say all\nthese things will be thus, if the custom of the place (which the\nfather by not contradicting will be judged to have consented to) do\nnot hinder them.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT\n ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES.\n\n1. A comparison of the natural state with the civil. 2. The\n conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects\n are alike. 3. The praise of monarchy. 4. The government under\n one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely,\n because one hath more power than all the rest. 5. A rejection of\n their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot\n make a city. 6. Exactions are more grievous under a popular\n state, than a monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects are less exposed to\n penalties under a monarch, than under the people. 8. The liberty\n of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than under a\n people. 9. It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are\n not all admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil\n deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by\n reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: 11. In\n regard of eloquence: 12. In regard of faction: 13. In regard of\n the unstableness of the laws: 14. In regard of the want of\n secrecy. 15. That these inconveniences adhere to democracy,\n forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit.\n 16. The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a\n child. 17. The power of generals is an evident sign of the\n excellence of monarchy. 18. The best state of a city is that,\n where the subjects are the ruler\u2019s inheritance. 19. The nearer\n aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is; the further it\n keeps from it, the worse.\n\n\n[Sidenote: A comparing the state of nature with the civil.]\n\n1. What _democracy_, _aristocracy_, and _monarchy_ are, hath already\nbeen spoken; but which of them tends most to the preservation of the\nsubjects\u2019 peace and procuring their advantages, we must see by\ncomparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages\nand disadvantages of a city in general; lest some perhaps should\nthink it better, that every man be left to live at his own will,\nthan to constitute any society at all. Every man indeed out of the\nstate of civil government hath a most entire, but unfruitful\nliberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all\nat his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others\nsuffer all at another\u2019s will. But in a constituted city, every\nsubject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live\nwell and quietly; and there is so much taken away from others, as\nmay make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath\nsuch a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one\nsecurely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any man may rightly\nspoil or kill another; in it, none but one. Out of it, we are\nprotected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it,\nno man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are.\nLastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear,\npoverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in\nit, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency,\nsociety, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.\n\n[Sidenote: The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are\n alike.]\n\n2. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his\n_Politics_, saith, that there are two sorts of governments;\nwhereof the one relates to the benefit of the _ruler_, the other\nto that of the _subjects_. As if where _subjects_ are severely\ndealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were\nanother form of government. Which opinion may by no means be\nsubscribed to; for all the profits and disprofits arising from\ngovernment are the same, and common both to the _ruler_ and the\n_subject_. The damages which befall some particular subjects\nthrough misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury,\nmay very well be severed from those which concern the ruler. But\nthose relate not to the government itself, being such as may\nhappen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen\nfrom the first institution of the city, they will then be truly\ncalled the inconveniences of government; but they will be common\nto the ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common. But\nthe first and greatest benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for\nboth he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he\nmay defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his\nfellow-subjects. And in the greatest inconvenience that can befall\na city, namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy,\nboth the commander and the parties commanded are equally\nconcerned. Next, if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from\nhis subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves and\ntheir families, nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor, the\ndisadvantage is as much his as theirs, who, with never so great a\nstock or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or\nhis riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raise no\nmore than is sufficient for the due administration of his power,\nthat is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects, tending to\na common peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way\n_public_ treasures can be a grievance to _private_ subjects, if\nthey be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all\npossibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to\nsustain the strength of their bodies and minds. For even thus the\ngrievance would concern the ruler; nor would it arise from the\nill-institution or ordination of the government, because in all\nmanner of governments subjects may be oppressed; but from the\nill-administration of a well-established government.\n\n[Sidenote: The praise of monarchy.]\n\n3. Now that _monarchy_, of the foresaid forms of _democracy_,\n_aristocracy_, and _monarchy_, hath the pre-eminence, will best\nappear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in\neach one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the _whole_\nuniverse is governed by _one_ God; that the ancients preferred the\nmonarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule of the gods\nto one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of nations, the\ndecrees of princes were held for laws; that paternal government,\ninstituted by God himself in the creation, was monarchical; that\nother governments were compacted by the artifice of men[15] out of\nthe ashes of monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and\nthat the people of God were under the jurisdiction of kings:\nalthough, I say, these do hold forth _monarchy_ as the more eminent\nto us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not\nby solid reason, we will pass them over.\n\nFootnote 15:\n\n _Compacted by the artifice of men, &c._] It seems the ancients who\n made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say that\n Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of\n clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a\n perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention,\n which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by\n imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire\n removed from its natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs\n of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person;\n which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and\n abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived\n under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it;\n that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with\n perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.\n\n[Sidenote: The government of one cannot be said to be evil in this\n respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the\n rest.]\n\n4. Some there are, who are discontented with the government under\n_one_, for no other reason but because it is under _one_; as if it\nwere an unreasonable thing, that _one_ man among so many should so\nfar excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of\nall the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw\nthemselves from under the dominion of _one_ God. But this exception\nagainst _one_ is suggested by envy, while they see one man in\npossession of what all desire. For the same cause, they would judge\nit to be as unreasonable if a _few_ commanded, unless they\nthemselves either were, or hoped to be of the number. For if it be\nan unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right, surely\nan aristocracy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed\nthat the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore\ninequality was introduced by a general consent; this inequality,\nwhereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is\nno longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences\ntherefore which attend the dominion of _one_ man, attend his\n_person_, not his _unity_. Let us therefore see whether brings with\nit the greater grievances to the subject, the command of _one_ man,\nor of _many_.\n\n[Sidenote: Rejection of their opinion, who say that a lord with his\n servants cannot make a city.]\n\n5. But first we must remove their opinion, who deny that to be any\ncity at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of\nservants under a common lord. In the ninth article of the fifth\nchapter, a city is defined to be _one person_ made out of _many\nmen_, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the\nwills of them all; insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties\nof each single person for the public peace and safety. And by the\nsame article of the same chapter, _one person_ is that, when the\nwills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each\nservant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath been declared\nin the fifth article of the eighth chapter; so as he may employ all\ntheir forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure.\nIt follows therefore that that must needs be a city, which is\nconstituted by _a lord and many servants_. Neither can any reason be\nbrought to contradict this, which doth not equally combat against a\ncity constituted by _a father and his sons_. For to a lord who hath\nno children, _servants_ are in the nature of _sons_; for they are\nboth his honour and safeguard; neither are _servants_ more subject\nto their _lords_, then _children_ to their _parents_, as hath been\nmanifested above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: The exactions are more grievous under command of the\n people, than under the monarch.]\n\n6. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the\nruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the\nmaintaining of public ministers, building, and defending of castles,\nwaging wars, honourably sustaining his own household, may also, if\nhe will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sons,\nkindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confess this is a\ngrievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of\ngovernment, but are more tolerable in a _monarchy_ than in a\n_democracy_. For though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot\nbe many, because belonging but to one. But in a _democracy_, look\nhow many demagogues, that is, how many powerful orators there are\nwith the people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing),\nso many children, kinsmen, friends, and flatterers are to be\nrewarded. For every of them desire not only to make their families\nas potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige\nothers to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of\nthemselves. A _monarch_ may in great part satisfy his officers and\nfriends, because they are not many, without any cost to his\nsubjects; I mean without robbing them of any of those treasures\ngiven in for the maintenance of war and peace. In a _democracy_,\nwhere many are to be satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be\ndone without the subject\u2019s oppression. Though a _monarch_ may\npromote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it; but in a\n_democracy_, all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it,\nbecause it is necessary; for else the power of them who did it,\nwould so increase, as it would not only become dreadful to those\nothers, but even to the whole city also.\n\n[Sidenote: Innocent subjects are less obnoxious to punishment under\n a monarch, than under the people.]\n\n7. Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death, which\nevery man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself,\nthat the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he\nlists on any transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath and\nsensuality slaughter his innocent subjects, and those who never\noffended against the laws. And truly this is a very great grievance\nin any form of government, wheresoever it happens; for it is\ntherefore a grievance, because it is, not because it may be done.\nBut it is the fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all the\nacts of Nero are not essential to monarchy; yet subjects are less\noften undeservedly condemned under _one ruler_, than under the\n_people_. For kings are only severe against those who either trouble\nthem with impertinent counsels, or oppose them with reproachful\nwords, or control their wills; but they are the cause that that\nexcess of power which one subject might have above another, becomes\nharmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can\nundeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers,\nand such as are remarkable for some eminent charge; and not all\nneither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to\nenjoy. For they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly\npunished. Whosoever therefore in a _monarchy_ will lead a retired\nlife, let him be what he will that reigns, he is out of danger. For\nthe ambitious only suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries\nof the more potent. But in a popular dominion, there may be as many\nNeros as there are orators who soothe the _people_. For each one of\nthem can do as much as the _people_, and they mutually give way to\neach other\u2019s appetite, as it were by this secret pact, _spare me\nto-day and I\u2019ll spare thee to-morrow_, while they exempt those from\npunishment, who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have\nundeservedly slain their fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a\ncertain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove\npernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof it is necessary\nsometimes for _monarchs_ to have a care, that the common weal do\nthence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in\nthe multitude of riches, they lessened it by diminishing their\nheaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerful party,\nwithout any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among\nthem. The same was usually practised in _democracies_. For the\nAthenians inflicted a punishment of ten years\u2019 banishment on those\nthat were powerful, merely because of their powers, without the\nguilt of any other crime. And those who by liberal gifts did seek\nthe favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men\nambitious of a kingdom. In this _democracy_ and _monarchy_ were\neven; yet differed they much in fame. Because fame derives from the\npeople; and what is done by many, is commended by many. And\ntherefore what the _monarch_ does, is said to be done out of envy to\ntheir virtues; which if it were done by the _people_, would be\naccounted policy.\n\n[Sidenote: Single persons have no less liberty under a monarch, than\n under the people.]\n\n8. There are some, who therefore imagine _monarchy_ to be more\ngrievous then _democracy_, because there is less liberty in that,\nthan in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that\nsubjection which is due to the laws, that is, the commands of the\n_people_; neither in _democracy_, nor in any other state of\ngovernment whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they\nsuppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws, few\nprohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbidden,\nthere could be no peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in\n_democracy_ than _monarchy_; for the one as truly consisteth with\nsuch a liberty, as the other. For although the word _liberty_ may in\nlarge and ample letters be written over the gates of any city\nwhatsoever, yet is it not meant the _subject\u2019s_, but the _city\u2019s_\nliberty; neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a\ncity which is governed by the _people_, than that which is ruled by\na _monarch_. But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under\nthe name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but _dominion_; which\nyet for want of understanding they little consider. For if every man\nwould grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for\nhimself, as is commanded by the law of nature; that same natural\nstate would return again, in which all men may by right do all\nthings; which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse than\nall kinds of civil subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to\nhave his single freedom, the rest being bound, what does he else\ndemand but to have the _dominion_? For whoso is freed from all\nbonds, is lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects\ntherefore have no greater liberty in a _popular_, than in a\n_monarchical_ state. That which deceives them, is the equal\nparticipation of command and public places. For where the authority\nis in the people, single subjects do so far forth share in it, as\nthey are parts of the people ruling; and they equally partake in\npublic offices, so far forth as they have equal voices in choosing\nmagistrates and public ministers. And this is that which Aristotle\naimed at, himself also through the custom of that time miscalling\ndominion liberty. (_Polit._ lib. vi. cap. 2.) _In a popular state\nthere is liberty by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as\nif no man were free out of this state._ From whence, by the way, we\nmay collect, that those subjects who in a _monarchy_ deplore their\nlost liberty, do only stomach this, that they are not received to\nthe steerage of the commonweal.\n\n[Sidenote: It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not\n all admitted to the public deliberations.]\n\n9. But perhaps for this very reason, some will say that a _popular_\nstate is much to be preferred before a _monarchical_; because that\nwhere all men have a hand in public businesses, there all have an\nopportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in\ndeliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by\nreason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is to\nthem who excel in such-like faculties, and seem to themselves to\nexceed others, the most delightful of all things. But in a monarchy,\nthis same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest\npart of subjects; and what is a grievance if this be none? I will\ntell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours;\nto have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain\ntrial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for\nthis cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to\nhate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to\nlay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and\nwithout any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family:\nthese, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial of wits,\nalthough those trials are pleasant to the eloquent, is not therefore\na grievance to them; unless we will say, that it is a grievance to\nvaliant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in\nit.\n\n[Sidenote: Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many, by\n reason of the unskilfulness of most men:]\n\n10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations are less\nsuccessful in great assemblies than in lesser councils. Whereof one\nis, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the\npreservation of a commonweal, we must not only understand matters at\nhome, but foreign affairs too. At home, by what goods the country is\nnourished and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are\nfit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers are best to be\nraised and maintained; what manner of affections the subjects bear\ntowards their prince or governors of their country; and many the\nlike. Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring country is, and\nwherein it consists; what advantage or disadvantage we may receive\nfrom them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how\naffected to each other among themselves; and what counsel daily\npasseth among them. Now, because very few in a great assembly of men\nunderstand these things, being for the most part unskilful, that I\nsay not incapable of them, what can that same number of advisers\nwith their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels, other\nthan mere lets and impediments?\n\n[Sidenote: By reason of their eloquence:]\n\n11. Another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for\nconsultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it\nnecessary to make a long-continued speech; and to gain the more\nesteem from his auditors, he polishes and adorns it with the best\nand smoothest language. Now the nature of eloquence is to make\n_good_ and _evil_, _profitable_ and _unprofitable_, _honest_ and\n_dishonest_, appear to be more or less than indeed they are; and to\nmake that seem _just_ which is _unjust_, according as it shall best\nsuit with his end that speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though\nthey reason, yet take they not their rise from true principles, but\nfrom vulgar received opinions, which for the most part are\nerroneous. Neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the\nnature of the things they speak of, as to the passions of their\nminds to whom they speak; whence it happens, that opinions are\ndelivered not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind.\nNor is this fault in the _man_, but in the nature itself of\n_eloquence_, whose end, as all the masters of rhetoric teach us, is\nnot truth (except by chance), but victory; and whose property is not\nto inform, but to allure.\n\n[Sidenote: By reason of faction:]\n\n12. The third reason why men advise less successfully in a great\nconvent is, because that thence arise _factions_ in a commonweal;\nand out of _factions_, seditions and civil war. For when equal\norators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches, the conquered\nhates the conqueror and all those that were of his side, as holding\nhis council and wisdom in scorn, and studies all means to make the\nadvice of his adversaries prejudicial to the state: for thus he\nhopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself.\nFurthermore, where the votes are not so unequal, but that the\nconquered have hopes, by the accession of some few of their own\nopinion, at another sitting to make the stronger party, the chief\nheads do call the rest together; they advise a part how they may\nabrogate the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and\nearliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what order\neach man shall speak, that the same business may again be brought to\nagitation; that so what was confirmed before by the number of their\nthen present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of\nno effect to them, being negligently absent. And this same kind of\nindustry and diligence which they use to _make_ a people, is\ncommonly called a _faction_. But when a _faction_ is inferior in\nvotes, and superior, or not much inferior in power, then what they\ncannot obtain by craft and language, they attempt by force of arms;\nand so it comes to a civil war. But some will say, these things do\nnot necessarily, nor often happen. He may as well say, that the\nchief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that\nthe greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.\n\n[Sidenote: By reason of the unsettledness of the laws:]\n\n13. It follows hence, that when the legislative power resides in\nsuch convents as these, the laws must needs be inconstant; and\nchange, not according to the alteration of the state of affairs, nor\naccording to the changeableness of men\u2019s minds, but as the major\npart, now of this, then of that _faction_, do convene. Insomuch as\nthe laws do float here and there, as it were upon the waters.\n\n[Sidenote: For want of secrecy.]\n\n14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this\ninconvenience; that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they\nshould be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the\nenemy before they can be brought to any effect; and their power and\nwill is as soon known abroad, as to the _people_ itself commanding\nat home.\n\n[Sidenote: These inconveniences do adhere to democracy, forasmuch as\n men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit.]\n\n15. These inconveniences, which are found in the deliberations of\ngreat assemblies, do so far forth evince _monarchy_ to be better\nthan _democracy_, as in _democracy_ affairs of great consequence are\noftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a\n_monarchy_. Neither can it easily be done otherwise. For there is no\nreason why every man should not naturally mind his _own private_,\nthan the _public_ business, but that here he sees a means to declare\nhis eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious\nand wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his\nwife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his\ndexterous behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus\nhad in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing\nto his mother. But if the _people_ in a democracy would bestow the\npower of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or\nsome very few, being content with the nomination of magistrates and\npublic ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the\nministration; then it must be confessed, that in this particular\n_democracy_ and _monarchy_ would be equal.\n\n[Sidenote: The inconveniences of government proceeding from a king\n who is a child.]\n\n16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to\nbe more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence,\nnamely, because the government itself, or the administration of its\naffairs, are better committed to one than many; or on the other\nside, to many than to some few. For government is the _power_, the\nadministration of it is the _act_. Now the _power_ in all kinds of\ngovernment is equal; the _acts_ only differ, that is to say, the\n_actions_ and _motions_ of a commonweal, as they flow from the\ndeliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent men. Whence\nwe understand, that the conveniences or inconveniences of any\ngovernment depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on\nhis officers; and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal\nmay be well governed, although the _monarch_ be a woman, or youth,\nor infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with\nthe public offices and charges. And that which is said, _woe to the\nland whose king is a child_, doth not signify the condition of a\nmonarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but contrariwise, that\nby accident it is the grievance of a kingdom, that the _king being a\nchild_, it often happens, that many by ambition and power intruding\nthemselves into public councils, the government comes to be\nadministered in a _democratical_ manner; and that thence arise those\ninfelicities, which for the most part accompany the _dominion of the\npeople_.\n\n[Sidenote: The power of generals is an argument of the excellency of\n monarchy.]\n\n17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute _monarchy_ is\nthe best state of government, that not only kings, but even those\ncities which are subject to the _people_ or to _nobles_, give the\nwhole command of war to one only; and that so absolute, as nothing\ncan be more. Wherein, by the way, this must be noted also; that no\nking can give a general greater authority over his army, than he\nhimself by right may exercise over all his subjects. _Monarchy_\ntherefore is the best of all governments in the camps. But what else\nare many commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened with arms\nand men against each other; whose state, because not restrained by\nany common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce,\nmay pass between them, is to be accounted for the state of nature;\nwhich is the state of war.\n\n[Sidenote: The best state of a commonweal, is that where the\n subjects are the ruler\u2019s inheritance.]\n\n18. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of ourselves\nto be subject to some _man_ or _council_, we cannot on better\ncondition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon\nour safety and welfare; and this then comes to pass, when we are the\ninheritance of the ruler. For every man of his own accord endeavours\nthe preservation of his inheritance. But the lands and monies of the\nsubjects are not only the prince\u2019s treasure, but their bodies and\nwildy minds. Which will be easily granted by those, who consider at\nhow great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued; and how\nmuch easier it is for men to procure money, than money men. Nor do\nwe readily meet with any example that shows us when any subject,\nwithout any default of his own, hath by his prince been despoiled of\nhis life or goods, through the sole licentiousness of his authority.\n\n[Sidenote: Aristocracy is so much better, by how much it approaches\n nearer to monarchy; the worse, by how much it is more\n distant from it.]\n\n19. Hitherto we have compared a _monarchical_ with a _popular_\nstate; we have said nothing of _aristocracy_. We may conclude of\nthis, by what hath been said of those, that that which is\nhereditary, and content with the election of magistrates; which\ntransmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which\nsimply imitates the government of _monarchs_ most, and the _people_\nleast of all; is for the subjects both better and more lasting than\nthe rest.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\n PLACES AND EXAMPLES OF SCRIPTURE OF THE RIGHTS\n OF GOVERNMENT, AGREEABLE TO WHAT HATH\n BEEN SAID BEFORE.\n\n1. The beginning of institutive government from the consent of the\n people. 2. Judicature and wars depend on the will of supreme\n commanders. 3. That they who have the chief authority, are by\n right unpunishable. 4. That without a supreme power there is no\n government, but anarchy. 5. That from servants and sons there is\n a simple obedience due to their lords and parents. 6. Absolute\n authority proved by most evident places, as well of the New as\n the Old Testament.\n\n[Sidenote: The beginning of institutive government from the consent\n of the people.]\n\n1. We have, in the sixth chapter and the second article, so derived\nthe original of institutive or political government from the consent\nof the multitude, that it appears they must either all consent, or\nbe esteemed as enemies. Such was the beginning of God\u2019s government\nover the Jews instituted by Moses, (Exod. xix. 5-8): _If ye will\nobey my voice indeed_, &c. _Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of\npriests_, &c. _And Moses came and called the elders of the people_,\n&c. _And all the people answered, and said: All that the Lord hath\nspoken we will do._ Such also was the beginning of Moses\u2019s power\nunder God, or his vicegerency, (Exod. xx. 18-19): _And all the\npeople saw the thunderings and lightenings, and the noise of the\ntrumpet_, &c. _And they said unto Moses, speak thou unto us, and we\nwill hear._ The like beginning also had Saul\u2019s kingdom, (1 Sam. xii.\n12, 13): _When ye saw that Nahash king of the children of Ammon came\nout against you, ye said unto me, nay, but a king shall reign over\nus, when the Lord your God was your king. Now therefore behold the\nking whom ye have chosen, and whom ye have desired._ But the major\npart only consenting, and not all; for there were certain _sons of\nBelial_, who said, (1 Sam. x. 27), _How shall this man save us? And\nthey despised him_; those who did not consent, were put to death as\nenemies. And the people said unto Samuel (1 Sam. xi. 12): _Who is he\nthat said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men, that we may put\nthem to death._\n\n[Sidenote: The power of judicature, and determination of wars,\n depend on the will of the supreme officer.]\n\n2. In the same sixth chapter, the sixth and seventh articles, I have\nshowed that all _judgment_ and _wars_ depend upon the will and\npleasure of him who bears the supreme authority; that is to say, in\na _monarchy_, on a monarch or king; and this is confirmed by the\npeople\u2019s own judgment. 1 Sam. viii. 20; _We also will be like all\nthe nations, and our king shall judge us, and go out before us, and\nfight our battles._ And what pertains to _judgments_, and all other\nmatters whereof there is any controversy, whether they be _good_ or\n_evil_, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon, (1 Kings iii.\n9): _Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy\npeople, that I may discern between good and evil._ And that of\nAbsolom, (2 Sam. xv. 3): _There is no man deputed of the king to\nhear thee._\n\n[Sidenote: They who have the supreme authority are by right\n unpunishable.]\n\n3. That kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been\nshowed above in the sixth chapter and the twelfth article, King\nDavid also confirms; who, though Saul sought to slay him, did\nnotwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him, and forbade\nAbishai, saying, (1 Sam. xxvi. 9): _Destroy him not; for who can\nstretch forth his hand against the Lords anointed, and be innocent?_\nAnd when he had cut off the skirt of his garment, (1 Sam. xxiv. 6):\n_The Lord forbid_, saith he, _that I should do this thing unto my\nmaster the Lord\u2019s anointed, to stretch forth mine hand against him_.\nAnd (_2 Sam._ i. 15) commanded the Amalekite, who for his sake had\nslain Saul, to be put to death.\n\n[Sidenote: That without a supreme power there is no government, but\n confusion.]\n\n4. That which is said in the seventeenth chapter of _Judges_, at the\nsixth verse: _In those days there was no king in Israel, but every\nman did that which was right in his own eyes_: as though where there\nwere not a _monarchy_, there were an _anarchy_ or confusion of all\nthings: may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency of\nmonarchy above all other forms of government; unless that by the\nword _king_ may perhaps be understood not _one man_ only, but also a\n_court_; provided that in it there reside a supreme power. Which if\nit be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that without a\nsupreme and absolute power (which we have endeavoured to prove in\nthe sixth chapter) there will be a liberty for every man to do what\nhe hath a mind, or whatsoever shall seem right to himself; which\ncannot stand with the preservation of mankind. And therefore in all\ngovernment whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power understood to\nbe somewhere existent.\n\n[Sidenote: That servants and sons owe their lords and parents simple\n obedience.]\n\n5. We have, in chap. VIII. art. 7 and 8, said that _servants_ must\nyield a simple obedience to their _lords_, and in chap IX. art. 7,\nthat _sons_ owe the same obedience to their _parents_. Saint Paul\nsays the same thing concerning servants (Coloss. iii. 22): _Servants\nobey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with\neye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing\nGod._ Concerning sons (Colos. iii. 20): _Children obey your parents\nin all things, for this is well-pleasing unto the Lord._ Now as we\nby simple obedience understand all things which are not contrary to\nthe laws of God; so in those cited places of St. Paul, after the\nword _all things_, we must suppose, _excepting those which are\ncontrary to the laws of God_.\n\n[Sidenote: The absolute power of princes proved by most evident\n testimonies of the Scripture, as well New as Old.]\n\n6. But that I may not thus by piecemeal prove the right of princes,\nI will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the\nwhole power; namely, that there is an absolute and simple obedience\ndue to them from their subjects. And first out of the New Testament:\nMatth. xxiii. 2, 3: _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses\u2019 seat;\nall therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do.\nWhatsoever they bid you_ (says Christ) _observe_, that is to say,\n_obey simply_. Why? Because they _sit in Moses\u2019 seat_; namely, the\n_civil magistrate\u2019s_, not Aaron, the priest\u2019s. Rom. xiii. 1, 2: _Let\nevery soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power\nbut of God; the powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever\ntherefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and\nthey that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation._ Now\nbecause the powers that were in St. Paul\u2019s time, were ordained of\nGod, and all kings did at that time require an absolute entire\nobedience from their subjects, it follows that such a power was\nordained of God. 1 Peter ii. 13-15: _Submit yourselves unto every\nordinance of man for the Lord\u2019s sake, whether it be to the king as\nsupreme, or unto governors as unto them that are sent by him for the\npunishment of wicked doers, and for the praise of them that do well;\nfor so is the will of God._ Again St. Paul to Titus, (chap. iii. 1):\n_Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to\nobey magistrates, &c._ What principalities? Was it not to the\nprincipalities of those times, which required an absolute obedience?\nFurthermore, that we may come to the example of Christ himself, to\nwhom the kingdom of the Jews belonged by hereditary right derived\nfrom David himself; he, when he lived in the manner of a subject,\nboth paid tribute unto C\u00e6sar, and pronounced it to be due to him,\nMatth. xxii. 21: _Give unto C\u00e6sar_ (saith he) _the things which are\nC\u00e6sar\u2019s, and unto God the things which are God\u2019s_. When it pleased\nhim to show himself a king, he required entire obedience, Matth.\nxxi. 2, 3: _Go_ (said he) _into the village over against you, and\nstraight-way ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt with her; loose\nthem, and bring them unto me; and if any man say aught unto you, ye\nshall say the Lord hath need of them_. This he did therefore by the\nright of being lord, or a king of the Jews. But to take away a\nsubject\u2019s goods on this pretence only, because _the Lord hath need\nof them_, is an absolute power. The most evident places in the Old\nTestament are these: Deut. v. 27: _Go thou near, and hear all that\nthe Lord our God shall say; and speak thou unto us all that the Lord\nour God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and do it._ But\nunder the word _all_, is contained absolute obedience. Again to\nJoshua (Joshua i. 16-18): _And they answered Joshua, saying, all\nthat thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever thou sendest\nus, we will go; according as we hearkened unto Moses in all things,\nso will we hearken unto thee; only the Lord thy God be with thee, as\nhe was with Moses; whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy\ncommandment, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou\ncommandest him, he shall be put to death._ And the parable of the\nbramble (Judges ix. 14, 15): _Then said all the trees unto the\nbramble, Come thou and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the\ntrees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put\nyour trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the\nbramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon._ The sense of which words\nis, that we must acquiesce to their sayings, whom we have truly\nconstituted to be kings over us, unless we would choose rather to be\nconsumed by the fire of a civil war. But the regal authority is more\nparticularly described by God himself, in 1 Sam. viii. 9, &c.: _Show\nthem the right of the king that shall reign over them, &c. This\nshall be the right of the king that shall reign over you; he will\ntake your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and\nto be his horsemen, and some shall run before his chariots, &c. And\nhe will take your daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will\ntake your vineyards, and give them to his servants, &c._ Is not this\npower absolute? And yet it is by God himself styled the _king\u2019s\nright_. Neither was any man among the Jews, no not the _high-priest_\nhimself, exempted from this obedience. For when the king, namely,\nSolomon, said to Abiathar the priest (1 Kings ii. 26, 27): _Get thee\nto Anathoth unto thine own fields; for thou art worthy of death; but\nI will not at this time put thee to death, because thou barest the\nark of the Lord God before David my father, and because thou hast\nbeen afflicted in all wherein my father was afflicted. So Solomon\nthrust out Abiathar from being priest unto the Lord_; it cannot by\nany argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord;\nneither read we, that either Solomon was reproved, or that his\nperson at that time was any whit less acceptable to God.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n\n OF THE INTERNAL CAUSES TENDING TO THE DISSOLUTION\n OF ANY GOVERNMENT.\n\n1. That _the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons_ is\n a seditious opinion. 2. That _subjects do sin by obeying their\n princes_ is a seditious opinion. 3. That _tyrannicide is lawful_\n is a seditious opinion. 4. That _those who have the supreme\n power are subject to the civil laws_ is a seditious opinion. 5.\n That _the supreme power may be divided_ is a seditious opinion.\n 6. That _faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and\n reason, but always supernaturally infused and inspired_, is a\n seditious opinion. 7. That _each subject hath a propriety or\n absolute dominion of his own goods_ is a seditious opinion. 8.\n Not to understand the difference between the people and the\n multitude, prepares toward sedition. 9. Too great a tax of\n money, though never so just and necessary, prepares toward\n sedition. 10. Ambition disposeth us to sedition. 11. So doth the\n hope of success. 12. Eloquence alone without wisdom, is the only\n faculty needful to raise seditions. 13. How the folly of the\n common people, and the elocution of ambitious men, concur to the\n destruction of a common-weal.\n\n\n[Sidenote: That the judgment of good and evil belongs to private\n persons, is a seditious opinion.]\n\n1. Hitherto hath been spoken, by what causes and pacts commonweals\nare constituted, and what the rights of princes are over their\nsubjects. Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes\nwhich dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the\nmotion of natural bodies three things are to be considered, namely,\n_internal disposition_, that they be susceptible of the motion to be\nproduced; the _external agent_, whereby a certain and determined\nmotion may in act be produced; and the _action itself_: so also in a\ncommonweal where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things\npresent themselves to our regard; first, the _doctrines_ and the\n_passions_ contrary to peace, wherewith the minds of men are fitted\nand disposed; next, their quality and condition who solicit,\nassemble, and direct them, already thus disposed, to take up arms\nand quit their allegiance; lastly, the manner how this is done, or\nthe _faction_ itself. But one and the first which disposeth them to\nsedition, is this, _that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to\neach single man_. In the state of nature indeed, where every man\nlives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to\nthe command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, proved\nit in chap. I. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it\nwas shown (chap. VI. art. 9) that the civil laws were the rules of\n_good_ and _evil_, _just_ and _unjust_, _honest_ and _dishonest_;\nthat therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for\n_good_, and what he forbids for _evil_. And the legislator is ever\nthat person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to\nsay, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in\nchap. XI. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men\nmay pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them\nto be so, to what end serve those words of his: _Give therefore unto\nthy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may\ndiscern between good and evil_? Since therefore it belongs to kings\nto discern between _good_ and _evil_, wicked are those, though\nusual, sayings, _that he only is a king who does righteously_, and\n_that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things_;\nand many other such like. Before there was any government, _just_\nand _unjust_ had no being, their nature only being relative to some\ncommand: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it\nbecomes _just_ or _unjust_, proceeds from the right of the\nmagistrate. Legitimate kings therefore make the things they command\njust, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by\nforbidding them. But private men, while they assume to themselves\nthe knowledge of _good_ and _evil_, desire to be even as kings;\nwhich cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient\nof all God\u2019s commands is, (Gen. ii. 17): _Thou shalt not eat of the\ntree of knowledge of good and evil_: and the most ancient of all\ndiabolical temptations, (Gen. iii. 5): _Ye shall be as gods, knowing\ngood and evil_; and God\u2019s expostulation with man, (verse 11): _Who\ntold thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof\nI commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ As if he had said, how\ncomest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to\ncreate thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself\nthe knowledge of _good and evil_.\n\n[Sidenote: That subjects do sin in obeying their princes, is a\n seditious opinion.]\n\n2. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience, is a sin; for he\nwho doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my\nsin indeed, which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I\nbelieve to be another man\u2019s sin, I may sometimes do that without any\nsin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him\nwho commands me, if I do it, and he that commands me be by right\nlord over me, I sin not. For if I wage war at the commandment of my\nprince, conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken, I do not\ntherefore do unjustly; but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating\nto myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains\nonly to my prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall\ninto a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything is commanded them\nwhich either is, or seems to be unlawful to them: for if they obey,\nthey sin against their conscience; and if they obey not, against\nright. If they sin against their conscience, they declare that they\nfear not the pains of the world to come; if they sin against right,\nthey do, as much as in them lies, abolish human society and the\ncivil life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach,\n_that subjects sin when they obey their prince\u2019s commands which to\nthem seem unjust_, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those\nwhich are contrary to civil obedience; and it depends upon that\noriginal error which we have observed above, in the foregoing\narticle. For by our taking upon us to judge of _good_ and _evil_, we\nare the occasion that as well our obedience, as disobedience,\nbecomes sin unto us.\n\n[Sidenote: That tyrannicide is lawful, is a seditious opinion.]\n\n3. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, that\n_tyrannicide is lawful_; nay, at this day it is by many divines, and\nof old it was by all the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,\nSeneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and\nRoman anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the\ngreatest praise. And under the title of _tyrants_, they mean not\nonly monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any\ngovernment whatsoever; for not Pisistratus only at Athens, but those\nThirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called\n_tyrants_. But he whom men require to be put to death as being _a\ntyrant_, commands either by right or without right. If without\nright, he is an enemy, and by right to be put to death; but then\nthis must not be called the _killing a tyrant_, but an _enemy_. If\nby right, then the divine interrogation takes place: _Who hath told\nthee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I\ncommanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ For why dost thou call\nhim a _tyrant_, whom God hath made a _king_, except that thou, being\na private person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of _good_ and\n_evil_? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but\nespecially to that which is _monarchical_, we may hence discern;\nnamely, that by it every _king_, whether good or ill, stands exposed\nto be condemned by the judgment, and slain by the hand of every\nmurderous villain.\n\n[Sidenote: That even they who have the supreme power are subject to\n the civil laws, is a seditious opinion.]\n\n4. The fourth opinion adversary to civil society, is their\u2019s who\nhold, _that they who bear rule are subject also to the civil laws_.\nWhich hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true, in chap\nVI. art. 14, from this argument: that a city can neither be bound to\nitself, nor to any subject; not to itself, because no man can be\nobliged except it be to another; not to any subject, because the\nsingle wills of the subjects are contained in the will of the city;\ninsomuch that if the city will be free from all such obligation, the\nsubjects will so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which\nholds true in a city, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or\nan assembly of men who have the supreme authority; for they make a\ncity, which hath no being but by their supreme power. Now that this\nopinion cannot consist with the very being of government, is evident\nfrom hence; that by it the knowledge of what is _good_ and _evil_,\nthat is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not against\nthe laws, would return to each single person. Obedience therefore\nwill cease, as oft as anything seems to be commanded contrary to the\ncivil laws, and together with it all coercive jurisdiction; which\ncannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of\ngovernment. Yet this error hath great props, Aristotle and others;\nwho, by reason of human infirmity, suppose the supreme power to be\ncommitted with most security to the laws only. But they seem to have\nlooked very shallowly into the nature of government, who thought\nthat the constraining power, the interpretation of laws, and the\nmaking of laws, all which are powers necessarily belonging to\ngovernment, should be left wholly to the laws themselves. Now\nalthough particular subjects may sometimes contend in judgment, and\ngo to law with the supreme magistrate; yet this is only then, when\nthe question is not what the magistrate may, but what by a certain\nrule he hath declared he would do. As, when by any law the judges\nsit upon the life of a subject, the question is not whether the\nmagistrate could by his absolute right deprive him of his life; but\nwhether by that law his will was that he should be deprived of it.\nBut his will was, he should, if he brake the law; else his will was,\nhe should not. This therefore, that a subject may have an action of\nlaw against his supreme magistrate, is not strength of argument\nsufficient to prove, that he is tied to his own laws. On the\ncontrary, it is evident that he is not tied to his own laws; because\nno man is bound to himself. Laws therefore are set for Titius and\nCaius, not for the ruler. However, by the ambition of lawyers it is\nso ordered, that the laws to unskilful men seem not to depend on the\nauthority of the magistrate, but their prudence.\n\n[Sidenote: That the supreme power may be divided, is a seditious\n opinion.]\n\n5. In the fifth place, _that the supreme authority may be divided_,\nis a most fatal opinion to all commonweals. But diverse men divide\nit diverse ways. For some divide it, so as to grant a supremacy to\nthe civil power in matters pertaining to peace and the benefits of\nthis life; but in things concerning the salvation of the soul they\ntransfer it on others. Now, because justice is of all things most\nnecessary to salvation, it happens that subjects measuring justice,\nnot as they ought, by the civil laws, but by the precepts and\ndoctrines of them who, in regard of the magistrate, are either\nprivate men or strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not\nperform the obedience due to their princes; through fear falling\ninto that which they most feared. Now what can be more pernicious to\nany state, than that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting\ntorments, be deterred from obeying their princes, that is to say,\nthe laws; or from being just? There are also some, who divide the\nsupreme authority so as to allow the power of war and peace unto one\nwhom they call a _monarch_; but the right of raising money they give\nto some others, and not to him. But because monies are the sinews of\nwar and peace, they who thus divide the authority, do either really\nnot divide it at all, but place it wholly in them in whose power the\nmoney is, but give the name of it to another: or if they do really\ndivide it, they dissolve the government. For neither upon necessity\ncan war be waged, nor can the public peace be preserved without\nmoney.\n\n[Sidenote: That faith and holiness are not acquired by study and\n reason, but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired,\n is a seditious opinion.]\n\n6. It is a common doctrine, _that faith and holiness are not\nacquired by study and natural reason, but are always supernaturally\ninfused and inspired into men_. Which, if it were true, I understand\nnot why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or\nwhy any man, who is truly a Christian, should not be a prophet; or\nlastly, why every man should not judge what is fit for him to do,\nwhat to avoid, rather out of his own inspiration, than by the\nprecepts of his superiors or right reason. A return therefore must\nbe made to the private knowledge of _good_ and _evil_; which cannot\nbe granted without the ruin of all governments. This opinion hath\nspread itself so largely through the whole Christian world, that the\nnumber of apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite.\nAnd it sprang from sick-brained men, who having gotten good store of\nholy words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, made such a\nconnexion of them usually in their preaching, that their sermons,\nsignifying just nothing, yet to unlearned men seemed most divine.\nFor he whose nonsense appears to be a divine speech, must\nnecessarily seem to be inspired from above.\n\n[Sidenote: That single subjects have any propriety or absolute\n dominion over their own goods, is a seditious opinion.]\n\n7. The seventh doctrine opposite to government, is this; _that each\nsubject hath an absolute dominion over the goods he is in possession\nof_: that is to say, such a _propriety_ as excludes not only the\nright of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods, but\nalso of the magistrate himself. Which is not true; for they who have\na _lord_ over them, have themselves no _lordship_, as hath been\nproved chap. viii. art. 5. Now the magistrate is lord of all his\nsubjects, by the constitution of government. Before the yoke of\ncivil society was undertaken, no man had any _proper right_; all\nthings were _common_ to all men. Tell me therefore, how gottest thou\nthis _propriety_ but from the magistrate? How got the magistrate it,\nbut that every man transferred his right on him? And thou therefore\nhast also given up thy right to him. Thy _dominion_ therefore, and\n_propriety_, is just so much as he will, and shall last so long as\nhe pleases; even as in a family, each son hath such _proper_ goods,\nand so long lasting, as seems good to the father. But the greatest\npart of men who profess civil prudence, reason otherwise. We are\nequal, say they, by nature; there is no reason why any man should by\nbetter right take my goods from me, than I his from him. We know\nthat money sometimes is needful for the defence and maintenance of\nthe public; but let them who require it, show us the present\nnecessity, and they shall receive it. They who talk thus know not,\nthat what they would have, is already done from the beginning, in\nthe very constitution of government; and therefore speaking as in a\ndissolute multitude and yet not fashioned government, they destroy\nthe frame.\n\n[Sidenote: Not to know the difference between a people and a\n multitude, prepares to sedition.]\n\n8. In the last place, it is a great hindrance to civil government,\nespecially monarchical, that men distinguish not enough between a\n_people_ and a _multitude_. The _people_ is somewhat that is _one_,\nhaving _one will_, and to whom _one action_ may be attributed; none\nof these can properly be said of a multitude. The _people_ rules in\nall governments. For even in _monarchies_ the _people_ commands; for\nthe _people_ wills by the will of _one man_; but the multitude are\ncitizens, that is to say, subjects. In a _democracy_ and\n_aristocracy_, the citizens are the _multitude_, but the _court_ is\nthe _people_. And in a _monarchy_, the subjects are the _multitude_,\nand (however it seem a paradox) the king is the _people_. The common\nsort of men, and others who little consider these truths, do always\nspeak of a _great number_ of men as of the _people_, that is to say,\nthe _city_. They say, that the _city_ hath rebelled against the\n_king_ (which is impossible), and that the _people_ will and nill\nwhat murmuring and discontented subjects would have or would not\nhave; under pretence of the _people_ stirring up the _citizens_\nagainst the _city_, that is to say, the _multitude_ against the\n_people_. And these are almost all the opinions, wherewith subjects\nbeing tainted do easily tumult. And forasmuch as in all manner of\ngovernment majesty is to be preserved by him or them, who have the\nsupreme authority; the _crimen l\u00e6s\u00e6 majestatis_ naturally cleaves to\nthese opinions.\n\n[Sidenote: Too great a tax of money, though never so just and\n necessary, disposeth men to sedition.]\n\n9. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than _poverty_, or\nthe want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of\nlife and honour. And though there be no man but knows, that riches\nare gotten with industry, and kept by frugality, yet all the poor\ncommonly lay the blame on the evil government, excusing their own\nsloth and luxury; as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by\npublic exactions. But men must consider, that they who have no\npatrimony, must not only labour that they may live, but fight too\nthat they may labour. Every one of the Jews, who in Esdras\u2019 time\nbuilt the walls of Jerusalem, did the work with one hand, and held\nthe sword in the other. In all government, we must conceive that the\nhand which holds the sword, is the _king_ or _supreme council_,\nwhich is no less to be sustained and nourished by the subjects\u2019 care\nand industry, than that wherewith each man procures himself a\nprivate fortune; and that _customs_ and _tributes_ are nothing else\nbut their reward who watch in arms for us, that the labours and\nendeavours of single men may not be molested by the incursion of\nenemies; and that their complaint, who impute their poverty to\npublic persons, is not more just, than if they should say that they\nare become in want by paying of their debts. But the most part of\nmen consider nothing of these things. For they suffer the same thing\nwith them who have a disease they call an _incubus_; which springing\nfrom gluttony, it makes men believe they are invaded, oppressed, and\nstifled with a great weight. Now it is a thing manifest of itself,\nthat they who seem to themselves to be burthened with the whole load\nof the commonweal, are prone to be seditious; and that they are\naffected with change, who are distasted at the present state of\nthings.\n\n[Sidenote: Ambition disposeth men to sedition:]\n\n10. Another noxious disease of the mind is theirs, who having little\nemployment, want honour and dignity. All men naturally strive for\nhonour and preferment; but chiefly they, who are least troubled with\ncaring for necessary things. For these men are invited by their\nvacancy, sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the\ncommonweal, sometimes to an easy reading of histories, politics,\norations, poems, and other pleasant books; and it happens that hence\nthey think themselves sufficiently furnished both with wit and\nlearning, to administer matters of the greatest consequence. Now\nbecause all men are not what they appear to themselves; and if they\nwere, yet all (by reason of the multitude) could not be received to\npublic offices; it is necessary that many must be passed by. These\ntherefore conceiving themselves affronted, can desire nothing more,\npartly out of envy to those who were preferred before them, partly\nout of hope to overwhelm them, than ill-success to the public\nconsultations. And therefore it is no marvel, if with greedy\nappetites they seek for occasions of innovations.\n\n[Sidenote: So doth hope of success.]\n\n11. _The hope of overcoming_ is also to be numbered among other\nseditious inclinations. For let there be as many men as you will,\ninfected with opinions repugnant to peace and civil government; let\nthere be as many as there can, never so much wounded and torn with\naffronts and calumnies by them who are in authority; yet if there be\nno _hope of having the better of them_, or it appear not sufficient,\nthere will no sedition follow; every man will dissemble his\nthoughts, and rather content himself with the present burthen than\nhazard a heavier weight. There are four things necessarily requisite\nto this _hope_. Numbers, instruments, mutual trust, and commanders.\nTo resist public magistrates without a great number, is not\nsedition, but desperation. By instruments of war, I mean all manner\nof arms, munition, and other necessary provision: without which\nnumber can do nothing. Nor arms neither, without mutual trust. Nor\nall these, without union under some commander, whom of their own\naccord they are content to obey; not as being engaged by their\nsubmission to his command; (for we have already in this very\nchapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand being obliged\nbeyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes); but for\nsome opinion they have of his virtue, or military skill, or\nresemblance of humours. If these four be near at hand to men grieved\nwith the present state, and measuring the justice of their actions\nby their own judgments; there will be nothing wanting to sedition\nand confusion of the realm, but one to _stir up_ and _quicken them_.\n\n[Sidenote: Eloquence alone without wisdom is the only faculty\n needful to raise seditions.]\n\n12. Sallust\u2019s character of Cataline, than whom there never was a\ngreater artist in raising seditions, is this: _that he had great\neloquence, and little wisdom_. He separates _wisdom_ from\n_eloquence_; attributing this as necessary to a man born for\ncommotions; adjudging that as an instructress of peace and\nquietness. Now eloquence is twofold. The one is an elegant and clear\nexpression of the conceptions of the mind; and riseth partly from\nthe contemplation of the things themselves, partly from an\nunderstanding of words taken in their own proper and definite\nsignification. The other is a commotion of the passions of the mind,\nsuch as are _hope_, _fear_, _anger_, _pity_; and derives from a\nmetaphorical use of words fitted to the passions. That forms a\nspeech from true principles; this from opinions already received,\nwhat nature soever they are of. The art of that is logic, of this\nrhetoric; the end of that is truth, of this victory. Each hath its\nuse; that in deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never\ndisjoined from _wisdom_, but this almost ever. But that this kind of\npowerful _eloquence_, separated from the true knowledge of things,\nthat is to say, from wisdom, is the true character of them who\nsolicit and stir up the people to innovations, may easily be\ngathered out of the work itself which they have to do. For they\ncould not poison the people with those absurd opinions contrary to\npeace and civil society, unless they held them themselves; which\nsure is an ignorance greater than can well befall any wise man. For\nhe that knows not whence the laws derive their power, which are the\nrules of _just_ and _unjust_, _honest_ and _dishonest_, _good_ and\n_evil_; what makes and preserves peace among men, what destroys it;\nwhat is _his_, and what _another\u2019s_; lastly, what he would have done\nto himself, that he may do the like to others: is surely to be\naccounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their auditors out\nof fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are\nill-affected, seem worse, to them who are well-affected, seem evil;\nthat they can enlarge their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond\nreason: this they have from that sort of eloquence, not which\nexplains things as they are, but from that other, which by moving\ntheir minds, makes all things to appear to be such as they in their\nminds, prepared before, had already conceived them.\n\n[Sidenote: How the folly of the common people, and the eloquence of\n ambitious men, concur to the dissolution of a\n commonweal.]\n\n13. Many men, who are themselves very well affected to civil\nsociety, do through want of knowledge co-operate to the disposing of\nsubjects\u2019 minds to _sedition_, whilst they teach young men a\ndoctrine conformable to the said opinions in their schools, and all\nthe people in their pulpits. Now they who desire to bring this\ndisposition into act, place their whole endeavour in this: first,\nthat they may join the ill-affected together into _faction_ and\n_conspiracy_; next, that themselves may have the greatest stroke in\nthe _faction_. They gather them into _faction_, while they make\nthemselves the relators and interpreters of the counsels and actions\nof single men, and nominate the persons and places to assemble and\ndeliberate of such things whereby the present government may be\nreformed, according as it shall seem best to their interests. Now to\nthe end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the\n_faction_, the _faction_ must be kept in a _faction_; that is to\nsay, they must have their secret meetings apart with a few, where\nthey may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general\nmeeting, and by whom, and on what subject, and in what order each of\nthem shall speak, and how they may draw the powerfullest and most\npopular men of the _faction_ to their side. And thus when they have\ngotten a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their\neloquence, they move it to take upon it the managing of affairs. And\nthus they sometimes oppress the commonwealth, namely, where there is\nno other faction to oppose them; but for the most part they rend it,\nand introduce a civil war. For _folly_ and _eloquence_ concur in the\nsubversion of government, in the same manner (as the fable hath it)\nas heretofore the daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, conspired\nwith Medea against their father. They going to restore the decrepit\nold man to his youth again, by the counsel of Medea they cut him\ninto pieces, and set him in the fire to boil; in vain expecting when\nhe would live again. So the common people, through their folly, like\nthe daughters of Pelias, desiring to renew the ancient government,\nbeing drawn away by the _eloquence_ of ambitious men, as it were by\nthe witchcraft of Medea; divided into _faction_ they consume it\nrather by those flames, than they reform it.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n\n CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE.\n\n1. The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its\n exercise. 2. The safety of the people is the supreme law. 3. It\n behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the\n peculiar interest of this or that man. 4. That by safety is\n understood all manner of conveniences. 5. A query, whether it be\n the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their\n subjects\u2019 souls, as they shall judge best according to their own\n consciences. 6. Wherein the safety of the people consists. 7.\n That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. 8.\n That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness,\n in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the\n people. 9. A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines,\n is necessary for the preserving of peace. 10. Equal\n distributions of public offices conduces much to the\n preservation of peace. 11. It is natural equity, that monies be\n taxed according to what every man spends, not what he possesses.\n 12. It conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down\n ambitious men. 13. And to break factions. 14. Laws whereby\n thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce\n to the enriching of the subject. 15. That more ought not to be\n defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his\n subjects requires. 16. That greater punishments must not be\n inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. 13. Subjects must\n have right done them against corrupt judges.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its\n exercise.]\n\n1. By what hath hitherto been said, the _duties_ of citizens and\nsubjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the _power_ of\nthe supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we have as yet said\nnothing of the _duties_ of rulers, and how they ought to behave\nthemselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between\nthe _right_ and the _exercise_ of supreme authority; for they can be\ndivided. As for example, when he who hath the _right_, either cannot\nor will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of\naffairs. For kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order\ntheir affairs; sometimes also, though they can do it themselves, yet\nthey judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choice of their\nofficers and counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where\nthe _right_ and _exercise_ are severed, there the government of the\ncommonweal is like the ordinary government of the world; in which\nGod, the mover of all things, produceth natural effects by the means\nof secondary causes. But where he to whom the right of ruling doth\nbelong, is himself present in all judicatures, consultations, and\npublic actions, there the administration is such, as if God, beyond\nthe ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto\nall matters. We will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly\nspeak somewhat concerning their _duties_, who exercise authority,\nwhether by their own or other\u2019s right. Nor is it my purpose to\ndescend into those things, which being diverse from others, some\nprinces may do, for this is to be left to the political practices of\neach commonweal.\n\n[Sidenote: The safety of the people is the supreme law.]\n\n2. Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence,\n_the safety of the people is the supreme law_. For although they who\namong men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws\nproperly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to\nbe chief and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their _duty_ in\nall things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto\nright reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But\nbecause dominions were constituted for peace\u2019s sake, and peace was\nsought after for safety\u2019s sake; he, who being placed in authority,\nshall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will\nact against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws\nof nature. Now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which\nprinces know their _duty_, so doth it also teach them an art how to\nprocure themselves a benefit; for the power of the citizens is the\npower of the city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in\nany state.\n\n[Sidenote: It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit\n of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.]\n\n3. By the people in this place we understand, not one civil person,\nnamely, the city itself which governs, but the multitude of subjects\nwhich are governed. For the city was not instituted for its own, but\nfor the subjects\u2019 sake: and yet a particular care is not required of\n_this_ or _that_ man. For the ruler (as such) provides no otherwise\nfor the safety of his people, than by his laws, which are universal;\nand therefore he hath fully _discharged_ himself, if he have\nthoroughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the\nwelfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that\nno man suffer ill, but by his own default, or by some chance which\ncould not be prevented. But it sometimes conduces to the safety of\nthe most part, that wicked men do suffer.\n\n[Sidenote: By safety is understood all manner of benefits.]\n\n4. But by _safety_ must be understood, not the sole preservation of\nlife in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to\nthis end did men freely assemble themselves and _institute_ a\ngovernment, that they might, as much as their human condition would\nafford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the\nadministration of power in such a kind of government, would sin\nagainst the law of nature, (because against their trust, who had\ncommitted that power unto them), if they should not study, as much\nas by good laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects\nabundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but\nalso with those which advance to delectation. They who have acquired\ndominion by arms, do all desire that their subjects may be strong in\nbody and mind, that they may serve them the better. Wherefore if\nthey should not endeavour to provide them, not only with such things\nwhereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow\nstrong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.\n\n[Sidenote: Query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the\n salvation of their subjects\u2019 souls, as they shall judge\n best in their own consciences.]\n\n5. And first of all, princes do believe that it mainly concerns\n_eternal salvation_, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what\nmanner of worship he is to be adored with. Which being supposed, it\nmay be demanded whether chief rulers, and whosoever they be, whether\none or more, who exercise supreme authority, sin not against the law\nof nature, if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be\ntaught and practised, or permit a contrary to be taught and\npractised, as they believe necessarily conduceth to the _eternal\nsalvation_ of their subjects. It is manifest that they act against\ntheir conscience; and that they will, as much as in them lies, the\neternal perdition of their subjects. For if they willed it not, I\nsee no reason why they should suffer (when being supreme they cannot\nbe compelled) such things to be taught and done, for which they\nbelieve them to be in a damnable state. But we will leave this\ndifficulty in suspense.\n\n[Sidenote: Wherein the safety of the people consists.]\n\n6. The benefits of subjects, respecting this life only, may be\ndistributed into four kinds. 1. That they be defended against\nforeign enemies. 2. That peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be\nenriched, as much as may consist with public security. 4. That they\nenjoy a harmless liberty. For supreme commanders can confer no more\nto their civil happiness, than that being preserved from foreign and\ncivil wars, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have\npurchased by their own industry.\n\n[Sidenote: That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the\n people.]\n\n7. There are two things necessary for the people\u2019s defence; _to be\nwarned and to be forearmed_. For the state of commonwealths\nconsidered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile.\nNeither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called\npeace; but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the\nmotion and countenance of the other, values his security not\naccording to the pacts, but the forces and counsels of his\nadversary. And this by natural right, as hath been showed in chap.\nII. art. 11, from this, that contracts are invalid in the state of\nnature, as oft as any just fear doth intervene. It is therefore\nnecessary to the defence of the city, first, that there be some who\nmay, as near as may be, _search into_ and _discover_ the counsels\nand motions of all those who may prejudice it. For _discoverers_ to\nministers of state, are like the beams of the sun to the human soul.\nAnd we may more truly say in vision political, than natural, that\nthe sensible and intelligible species of outward things, not well\nconsidered by others, are by the air transported to the soul; that\nis to say, to them who have the supreme authority: and therefore are\nthey no less necessary to the preservation of the state, than the\nrays of the light are to the conservation of man. Or if they be\ncompared to spider\u2019s webs, which, extended on all sides by the\nfinest threads, do warn them, keeping in their small holes, of all\noutward motions; they who bear rule, can no more know what is\nnecessary to be commanded for the defence of their subjects without\n_spies_, than those spiders can, when they shall go forth, and\nwhither they shall repair, without the motion of those threads.\n\n[Sidenote: To have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money in readiness\n in time of peace, is necessary for the people\u2019s defence.]\n\n8. Furthermore, it is necessarily requisite to the people\u2019s defence,\nthat they be _forearmed_. Now to be forearmed is to be furnished\nwith soldiers, arms, ships, forts, and monies, before the danger be\ninstant; for the lifting of soldiers and taking up of arms after a\nblow is given, is too late at least, if not impossible. In like\nmanner, not to raise forts and appoint garrisons in convenient\nplaces before the frontiers are invaded, is to be like those country\nswains, (as Demosthenes said), who ignorant of the art of fencing,\nwith their bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first\nfelt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable\nenough to raise monies for the maintenance of soldiers and other\ncharges of war, when the danger begins to show itself, they consider\nnot, surely, how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of\nclose-fisted men so vast a proportion of monies. For almost all men,\nwhat they once reckon in the number of their goods, do judge\nthemselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they\nconceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to\nemploy but the least part of it for the public good. Now a\nsufficient stock of monies to defend the country with arms, will not\nsoon be raised out of the treasure of imposts and customs. We must\ntherefore, for fear of war, in time of peace hoard up good sums, if\nwe intend the safety of the commonweal. Since therefore it\nnecessarily belongs to rulers, for the subjects\u2019 safety to discover\nthe enemy\u2019s counsel, to keep garrisons, and to have money in\ncontinual readiness; and that princes are, by the law of nature,\nbound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their\nsubjects: it follows, that it is not only lawful for them to send\nout spies, to maintain soldiers, to build forts, and to require\nmonies for these purposes; but also not to do thus is unlawful. To\nwhich also may be added, whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the\nlessening of the power of foreigners whom they suspect, whether by\nslight or force. For rulers are bound according to their power to\nprevent the evils they suspect; lest peradventure they may happen\nthrough their negligence.\n\n[Sidenote: A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is\n necessary for the preserving of peace.]\n\n9. But many things are required to the conservation of inward\npeace; because many things concur (as hath been showed in the\nforegoing chapter) to its perturbation. We have there showed, that\nsome things there are, which dispose the minds of men to sedition,\nothers which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which\ndispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certain perverse\ndoctrines. It is therefore the duty of those who have the chief\nauthority, to root those out of the minds of men, not by\ncommanding, but by teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but\nby the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this evil may be\nwithstood, are not to be made against the persons erring, but\nagainst the errors themselves. Those errors which, in the\nforegoing chapter, we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of\nthe commonweal, have crept into the minds of ignorant men, partly\nfrom the pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who, by\nreason of little employment otherwise, do find leisure enough to\nstudy; and they got into these men\u2019s minds by the teachers of\ntheir youth in public schools. Wherefore also, on the other side,\nif any man would introduce sound doctrine, he must begin from the\n_academies_. There the true and truly demonstrated foundations of\ncivil doctrine are to be laid; wherewith young men, being once\nendued, they may afterward, both in private and public, instruct\nthe vulgar. And this they will do so much the more cheerfully and\npowerfully, by how much themselves shall be more certainly\nconvinced of the truth of those things they profess and teach. For\nseeing at this day men receive propositions, though false, and no\nmore intelligible than if a man should join together a company of\nterms drawn by chance out of an urn, by reason of the frequent use\nof hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason\nentertain true doctrines, suitable to their own understandings and\nthe nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of\nsupreme officers, to cause the true elements of civil doctrine to\nbe written, and to command them to be taught in all the colleges\nof their several dominions.\n\n[Sidenote: Equal distribution of public burthens conduceth much to\n the preservation of peace.]\n\n10. In the next place we showed, that grief of mind arising from\n_want_ did dispose the subjects to sedition; which want, although\nderived from their own luxury and sloth, yet they impute it to those\nwho govern the realm, as though they were drained and oppressed by\npublic pensions. Notwithstanding, it may sometimes happen that this\ncomplaint may be just; namely, when the burthens of the realm are\nunequally imposed on the subjects; for that which to all together is\nbut a light weight, if many withdraw themselves it will be very\nheavy, nay, even intolerable to the rest: neither are men wont so\nmuch to grieve at the burthen itself, as at the inequality. With\nmuch earnestness therefore men strive to be freed from taxes; and in\nthis conflict the less happy, as being overcome, do envy the more\nfortunate. To remove therefore all just complaint, it is the\ninterest of the public quiet, and by consequence it concerns the\nduty of the magistrate, to see that the public burthens be equally\nborne. Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to public\nuse, is nothing else but the price of their bought peace, it is good\nreason that they who equally share in the peace, should also pay an\nequal part, either by contributing their monies or their labours to\nthe commonweal. Now it is the law of nature, (by art. 15, chap.\nIII), that every man in distributing right to others, do carry\nhimself equal to all. Wherefore rulers are, by the natural law,\nobliged to lay the burthens of the commonweal equally on their\nsubjects.\n\n[Sidenote: It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to\n what every man spends, not to what he possesseth.]\n\n11. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of money, but\nof burthen; that is to say, an equality of reason between the\nburthens and the benefits. For although all equally enjoy peace, yet\nthe benefits springing from thence are not equal to all; for some\nget greater possessions, others less; and again, some consume less,\nothers more. It may therefore be demanded, whether subjects ought to\ncontribute to the public according to the rate of what they gain, or\nof what they spend: that is to say, whether the persons must be\ntaxed, so as to pay contribution according to their wealth; or the\ngoods themselves, that every man contribute according to what he\nspends. But if we consider, where monies are raised according to\nwealth, there they who have made equal gain, have not equal\npossessions, because that one preserves what he hath got by\nfrugality, another wastes it by luxury, and therefore equally\nrejoicing in the benefit of peace, they do not equally sustain the\nburthens of the commonweal: and on the other side, where the goods\nthemselves are taxed, there every man, while he spends his private\ngoods, in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably pays part\ndue to the commonweal, according to, not what he hath, but what by\nthe benefit of the realm he hath had: it is no more to be doubted,\nbut that the former way of commanding monies is against equity, and\ntherefore against the duty of rulers; the latter is agreeable to\nreason, and the exercise of their authority.\n\n[Sidenote: It conduces to the preservation of peace, to depress the\n ambitious.]\n\n12. In the third place we said, that that trouble of mind which\nriseth from _ambition_, was offensive to public peace. For there are\nsome, who seeming to themselves to be wiser than others, and more\nsufficient for the managing of affairs than they who at present do\ngovern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their\nvirtue would prove to the commonweal, they show it by harming it.\nBut because ambition and greediness of honours cannot be rooted out\nof the minds of men, it is not the duty of rulers to endeavour it;\nbut by constant application of rewards and punishments they may so\norder it, that men may know that the way to honour is not by\ncontempt of the present government, nor by factions and the popular\nair, but by the contraries. They are good men who observe the\ndecrees, the laws, and rights of their fathers. If with a constant\norder we saw these adorned with honours, but the factious punished\nand had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be more\nambition to obey than withstand. Notwithstanding, it so happens\nsometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much\nfierceness, so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered for fear of\nhis power; but as that happens when the rider, so this when the\ncommander is in danger of falling. But we speak here of those whose\nauthority and power is entire. Their duty, I say, it is to cherish\nobedient subjects, and to depress the factious all they can; nor can\nthe public power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects\u2019 quiet\nwithout it.\n\n[Sidenote: And to dissolve factions.]\n\n13. But if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious, much\nmore does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions\nthemselves. Now I call a _faction_, a multitude of subjects gathered\ntogether either by mutual _contracts_ among themselves, or by the\npower of some one, without his or their authority who bear the\nsupreme rule. A _faction_, therefore, is as it were a city in a\ncity: for as by an union of men in the state of nature, a city\nreceives its being, so by a new union of subjects there ariseth a\n_faction_. According to this definition, a multitude of subjects who\nhave bound themselves simply to obey any foreign prince or subject,\nor have made any pacts or leagues of mutual defence between\nthemselves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme\npower in the city, is a _faction_. Also favour with the vulgar, if\nit be so great that by it an army may be raised, except public\ncaution be given either by hostages or some other pledges, contains\n_faction_ in it. The same may be said of private wealth, if it\nexceed; because all things obey money. Forasmuch therefore as it is\ntrue, that the state of cities among themselves is natural and\nhostile, those princes who permit factions, do as much as if they\nreceived an enemy within their walls: which is contrary to the\nsubjects\u2019 safety, and therefore also against the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: Laws whereby gaining arts are cherished and great\n expenses restrained, do conduce much to the enriching of\n the subject.]\n\n14. There are two things necessary to the enriching of the subjects,\n_labour_ and _thrift_; there is also a third which helps, to wit,\nthe _natural increase of the earth and water_; and there is a fourth\ntoo, namely, _the militia_, which sometimes augments, but more\nfrequently lessens the subjects\u2019 stock. The two first only are\nnecessary. For a city constituted in an island of the sea, no\ngreater than will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without sowing\nor fishing, by merchandize and handicrafts only; but there is no\ndoubt, if they have a territory, that they may be richer with the\nsame number, or equally rich being a greater number. But the fourth,\nnamely, _the militia_, was of old reckoned in the number of the\ngaining arts, under the notion of _booting_ or _taking prey_; and it\nwas by mankind, dispersed by families before the constitution of\ncivil societies, accounted just and honourable. For preying is\nnothing else but a war waged with small forces. And great\ncommonweals, namely, that of Rome and Athens, by the spoils of war,\nforeign tribute, and the territories they have purchased by their\narms, have sometimes so improved the commonwealth, that they have\nnot only not required any public monies from the poorer sort of\nsubjects, but have also divided to each of them both monies and\nlands. But this kind of increase of riches is not to be brought into\nrule and fashion. For the militia, in order to profit, is like a\ndie; wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve them. Since\ntherefore there are three things only, _the fruits of the earth and\nwater_, _labour_, and _thrift_, which are expedient for the\nenriching of subjects, the duty of commanders in chief shall be\nconversant only about those three. For the first those laws will be\nuseful, which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the\nearth and water; such as are _husbandry_ and _fishing_. For the\nsecond all laws against idleness, and such as quicken industry, are\nprofitable; as such whereby the _art of navigation_, by help whereof\nthe commodities of the whole world, bought almost by labour only,\nare brought into one city; and the _mechanics_, under which I\ncomprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen; and the\n_mathematical sciences_, the fountains of navigatory and mechanic\nemployments, are held in due esteem and honour. For the third those\nlaws are useful, whereby all inordinate expense, as well in meats as\nin clothes, and universally in all things which are consumed with\nusage, is forbidden. Now because such laws are beneficial to the\nends above specified, it belongs also to the office of supreme\nmagistrates to establish them.\n\n[Sidenote: That more ought not to be determined by the laws, than\n the benefit of prince and subjects require.]\n\n15. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the\nlaws of the city, or that they who have the supreme power cannot\nmake what laws they have a mind to. But because all the motions and\nactions of subjects are never circumscribed by laws, nor can be, by\nreason of their variety; it is necessary that there be infinite\ncases which are neither commanded nor prohibited, but every man may\neither do or not do them as he lists himself. In these, each man is\nsaid to enjoy his liberty; and in this sense liberty is to be\nunderstood in this place, namely, for that part of natural right\nwhich is granted and left to subjects by the civil laws. As water\ninclosed on all hands with banks, stands still and corrupts; having\nno bounds, it spreads too largely, and the more passages it finds\nthe more freely it takes its current; so subjects, if they might do\nnothing without the commands of the law, would grow dull and\nunwieldy; if all, they would be dispersed; and the more is left\nundetermined by the laws, the more liberty they enjoy. Both extremes\nare faulty; for laws were not invented to take away, but to direct\nmen\u2019s actions; even as nature ordained the banks, not to stay, but\nto guide the course of the stream. The measure of this liberty is to\nbe taken from the subjects\u2019 and the city\u2019s good. Wherefore, in the\nfirst place, it is against the charge of those who command and have\nthe authority of making laws, that there should be more laws than\nnecessarily serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects. For\nsince men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do, by\nnatural reason rather than any knowledge of the laws, where there\nare more laws than can easily be remembered, and whereby such things\nare forbidden as reason of itself prohibits not of necessity, they\nmust through ignorance, without the least evil intention, fall\nwithin the compass of laws, as gins laid to entrap their harmless\nliberty; which supreme commanders are bound to preserve for their\nsubjects by the laws of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are\n prescribed by the laws.]\n\n16. It is a great part of that _liberty_, which is harmless to civil\ngovernment and necessary for each subject to live happily, that\nthere be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and\nlook for; and this is done, where there are either no punishments at\nall defined by the laws, or greater not required than are defined.\nWhere there are none defined, there he that hath first broken the\nlaw, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment; and his fear is\nsupposed boundless, because it relates to an unbounded evil. Now the\nlaw of nature commands them who are not subject to any civil laws,\nby what we have said in chap. III. art. 11, and therefore supreme\ncommanders, that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so\nmuch regard the past evil as the future good; and they sin, if they\nentertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the public\nbenefit. But where the punishment is defined; either by a law\nprescribed, as when it is set down in plain words that _he that\nshall do thus or thus, shall suffer so and so_; or by practice, as\nwhen the penalty, not by any law prescribed, but arbitrary from the\nbeginning, is afterward determined by the punishment of the first\ndelinquent; (for natural equity commands that equal transgressors be\nequally punished); there to impose a greater penalty than is defined\nby the law, is against the law of nature. For the end of punishment\nis not to compel the will of man, but to fashion it, and to make it\nsuch as he would have it who hath set the penalty. And deliberation\nis nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the\nconveniences and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting; where\nthat which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to its\ninclination prevail with us. If therefore the legislator doth set a\nless penalty on a crime, than will make our fear more considerable\nwith us than our lust, that excess of lust above the fear of\npunishment, whereby sin is committed, is to be attributed to the\nlegislator, that is to say, to the supreme; and therefore if he\ninflict a greater punishment than himself hath determined in his\nlaws, he punisheth that in another in which he sinned himself.\n\n[Sidenote: Subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt\n judges.]\n\n17. It pertains therefore to the harmless and necessary _liberty_ of\nsubjects, that every man may without fear enjoy the rights which are\nallowed him by the laws. For it is in vain to have _our own_\ndistinguished by the laws from _another\u2019s_, if by wrong judgment,\nrobbery, or theft, they may be again confounded. But it falls out\nso, that these do happen where judges are corrupted. For the fear\nwhereby men are deterred from doing evil, ariseth not from hence,\nnamely, because penalties are set, but because they are executed.\nFor we esteem the future by what is past, seldom expecting what\nseldom happens. If therefore judges corrupted either by gifts,\nfavour, or even by pity itself, do often forbear the execution of\nthe penalties due by the law, and by that means put wicked men in\nhope to pass unpunished: honest subjects encompassed with murderers,\nthieves, and knaves, will not have the liberty to converse freely\nwith each other, nor scarce to stir abroad without hazard; nay, the\n_city_ itself is dissolved, and every man\u2019s right of protecting\nhimself at his own will returns to him. The law of nature therefore\ngives this precept to supreme commanders, that they not only do\nrighteousness themselves, but that they also by penalties cause the\njudges, by them appointed, to do the same; that is to say, that they\nhearken to the complaints of their subjects; and as oft as need\nrequires, make choice of some extraordinary judges, who may hear the\nmatter debated concerning the ordinary ones.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV.\n\n OF LAWS AND TRESPASSES.\n\n1. How law differs from counsel. 2. How from covenant. 3. How from\n right. 4. Division of laws into divine and human: the divine\n into natural and positive; and the natural into the laws of\n single men and of nations. 5. The division of human, that is to\n say, of civil laws into sacred and secular. 6. Into distributive\n and vindicative. 7. That distributive and vindicative are not\n species, but parts of the laws. 8. All law is supposed to have a\n penalty annexed to it. 9. The precepts of the decalogue of\n honouring parents, of murder, adultery, theft, false witness,\n are civil laws. 10. It is impossible to command aught by the\n civil law contrary to the law of nature. 11. It is essential to\n a law, both that itself and also the lawgiver be known. 12.\n Whence the lawgiver comes to be known. 13. Publishing and\n interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law. 14. The\n division of the civil law into written and unwritten. 15. The\n natural laws are not written laws; neither are the wise\n sentences of lawyers nor custom laws of themselves, but by the\n consent of the supreme power. 16. What the word sin, most\n largely taken, signifies. 17. The definition of sin. 18. The\n difference between a sin of infirmity and malice. 19. Under what\n kind of sin atheism is contained. 20. What treason is. 21. That\n by treason not the civil, but the natural laws are broken. 22.\n And that therefore it is to be punished not by the right of\n dominion, but by the right of war. 23. That obedience is not\n rightly distinguished into active and passive.\n\n\n[Sidenote: How law differs from counsel.]\n\n1. They who less seriously consider the force of words, do sometimes\nconfound _law_ with _counsel_, sometimes with _covenant_, sometimes\nwith _right_. They confound _law_ with _counsel_, who think that it\nis the duty of monarchs not only to give ear to their _counsellors_,\nbut also to obey them; as though it were in vain to take _counsel_,\nunless it were also followed. We must fetch the distinction between\n_counsel_ and _law_, from the difference between _counsel_ and\n_command_. Now _counsel_ is a _precept_, in which the reason of my\nobeying it is taken from _the thing itself which is advised_; but\n_command_ is a _precept_, in which the cause of my obedience depends\non _the will of the commander_. For it is not properly said, _thus I\nwill and thus I command_, except the will stand for a reason. Now\nwhen obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the thing itself, but\nby reason of the adviser\u2019s will, the law is not a _counsel_, but a\n_command_, and is defined thus: _law is the command of that person,\nwhether man or court, whose precept contains in it the reason of\nobedience_: as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates\nin respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in\nrespect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws. _Law_\nand _counsel_ therefore differ many ways. _Law_ belongs to him who\nhath power over them whom he adviseth; _counsel_ to them who have no\npower. To follow what is prescribed by _law_, is _duty_; what by\n_counsel_, is _free-will_. _Counsel_ is directed to his end, that\nreceives it; _law_, to his that gives it. _Counsel_ is given to none\nbut the willing; _law_ even to the unwilling. To conclude, the right\nof the _counsellor_ is made void by the will of him to whom he gives\ncounsel; the right of the _law-giver_ is not abrogated at the\npleasure of him who hath a _law_ imposed.\n\n[Sidenote: How it differs from a covenant.]\n\n2. They confound _law_ and _covenant_, who conceive the laws to be\nnothing else but certain \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, or forms of living determined\nby the common consent of men. Among whom is Aristotle, who defines\n_law_ on this manner; \u039d\u03cc\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03bc\u03b3\u03bd\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1: that is to say, _law\nis a speech, limited according to the common consent of the city,\ndeclaring every thing that we ought to do_. Which definition is not\nsimply of _law_, but of the _civil law_. For it is manifest that the\n_divine laws_ sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the _laws\nof nature_. For if they had their original from the consent of men,\nthey might also by the same consent be abrogated; but they are\nunchangeable. But indeed, that is no right definition of a _civil\nlaw_. For in that place, a city is taken either for one civil\nperson, having one will; or for a multitude of men, who have each of\nthem the liberty of their private wills. If for one person, those\nwords _common consent_ are ill-placed here; for _one_ person hath no\n_common consent_. Neither ought he to have said, _declaring_ what\nwas needful to be done, but _commanding_; for what the city\ndeclares, it commands its subjects. He therefore by a city\nunderstood a multitude of men, declaring by common consent (imagine\nit a writing confirmed by votes) some certain forms of living. But\nthese are nothing else but some mutual contracts, which oblige not\nany man (and therefore are no laws) before that a supreme power\nbeing constituted, which can compel, have sufficient remedy against\nthe rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Laws therefore,\naccording to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else but\nnaked and weak contracts; which then at length, when there is one\nwho by right doth exercise the supreme power, shall either become\n_laws_ or _no laws_ at his will and pleasure. Wherefore he confounds\n_contracts_ with _laws_, which he ought not to have done; for\ncontract is _a promise_, law a _command_. In contracts we say, _I\nwill do this_; in laws, _do this_. Contracts oblige us;[16] laws tie\nus fast, being obliged. A _contract_ obligeth of _itself_; the _law_\nholds the party obliged by virtue of the universal _contract_ of\nyielding obedience. Therefore in _contract_, it is first determined\nwhat is to be done, before we are obliged to do it; but in _law_, we\nare first obliged to perform, and what is to be done is determined\nafterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a _civil law_\nthus: _a civil law is a speech limited by the will of the city,\ncommanding everything behoveful to be done_. Which is the same with\nthat we have given above, in chap. VI. art. 9: to wit, _that the\ncivil laws are the command of him, whether man or court of men, who\nis endued with supreme power in the city, concerning the future\nactions of his subjects_.\n\nFootnote 16:\n\n _Contracts oblige us._] _To be obliged_, and _to be tied being\n obliged_, seems to some men to be one and the same thing; and that\n therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none\n indeed. More clearly therefore, I say thus: that a man is obliged\n by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his\n promise sake; but that the law ties him being obliged, that is to\n say, it compels him to make good his promise for fear of the\n punishment appointed by the law.\n\n[Sidenote: How it differs from right.]\n\n3. They confound _laws_ with _right_, who continue still to do\nwhat is permitted by _divine right_, notwithstanding it be\nforbidden by _the civil law_. That which is prohibited by the\n_divine law_, cannot be permitted by the _civil_; neither can that\nwhich is commanded by the _divine law_, be prohibited _by the\ncivil_. Notwithstanding, that which is permitted by the _divine\nright_, that is to say, that which may be done by _divine right_,\ndoth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the\n_civil laws_; for _inferior laws_ may restrain the liberty allowed\nby the _superior_, although they cannot enlarge them. Now _natural\nliberty_ is a right not constituted, but allowed by the laws. For\nthe _laws_ being removed, our _liberty_ is absolute. This is first\nrestrained by the _natural_ and _divine laws_; the residue is\nbounded by the _civil law_; and what remains, may again be\nrestrained by the _constitutions_ of particular towns and\nsocieties. There is great difference therefore between _law_ and\n_right_. For law is _a fetter_, right is _freedom_; and they\ndiffer like contraries.\n\n[Sidenote: The division of laws into divine and human; and of the\n divine into natural and positive; and of the natural into\n those laws of single men, and those of nations.]\n\n4. All _law_ may be divided, first according to the diversity of its\nauthors into _divine_ and _human_. The _divine_, according to the\ntwo ways whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold;\n_natural_ or _moral_, and _positive_. _Natural_ is that which God\nhath declared to all men by his _eternal word_ born with them, to\nwit, their _natural reason_; and this is that law, which in this\nwhole book I have endeavoured to unfold. _Positive_ is that, which\nGod hath revealed to us by _the word of prophecy_, wherein he hath\nspoken unto men as a man. Such are the laws which he gave to the\nJews concerning their government and divine worship; and they may be\ntermed the _divine civil laws_, because they were peculiar to the\ncivil government of the Jews, his peculiar people. Again, _the\nnatural law_ may be divided into that of _men_, which alone hath\nobtained the title of the _law of nature_; and _that of cities_,\nwhich may be called _that of nations_, but vulgarly it is termed the\n_right of nations_. The precepts of both are alike. But because\ncities once instituted do put on the personal proprieties of men,\nthat _law_, which speaking of the duty of single men we call\n_natural_, being applied to whole cities and nations, is called the\n_right of nations_. And the same elements of _natural law and\nright_, which have hitherto been spoken of, being transferred to\n_whole cities_ and _nations_, may be taken for the elements of the\n_laws_ and _right of nations_.\n\n[Sidenote: The division of human, that is to say, civil laws into\n secular and sacred.]\n\n5. All _human law_ is _civil_. For the state of men considered out\nof civil society, is hostile; in which, because one is not subject\nto another, there are no other laws beside the dictates of natural\nreason, which is the divine law. But in civil government the city\nonly, that is to say, that man or court to whom the supreme power of\nthe city is committed, is the legislator; and the laws of the city\nare civil. _The civil laws_ may be divided, according to the\ndiversity of their subject matter, into _sacred_ or _secular_.\n_Sacred_ are those which pertain to religion, that is to say, to the\nceremonies and worship of God: to wit, what persons, things, places,\nare to be consecrated, and in what fashion; what opinions concerning\nthe Deity are to be taught publicly; and with what words and in what\norder supplications are to be made; and the like; and are not\ndetermined by any divine positive law. For the _civil sacred laws_\nare the _human laws_ (which are also called _ecclesiastical_)\nconcerning _things sacred_; but _the secular_, under a general\nnotion, are usually called the _civil_ laws.\n\n[Sidenote: Into distributive and vindicative.]\n\n6. Again, the _civil law_ (according to the two offices of the\nlegislator, whereof one is to judge, the other to constrain men to\nacquiesce to his judgments) hath two parts; the one _distributive_,\nthe other _vindicative_ or _penal_. By the _distributive_ it is,\nthat every man hath his proper rights; that is to say, it sets forth\nrules for all things, whereby we may know what is properly our\u2019s,\nwhat another man\u2019s; so as others may not hinder us from the free use\nand enjoyment of our own, and we may not interrupt others in the\nquiet possession of their\u2019s; and what is lawful for every man to do\nor omit, and what is not lawful. _Vindicative_ is that, whereby it\nis defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the\nlaw.\n\n[Sidenote: Distributive and vindicative are not two species of the\n laws.]\n\n7. Now _distributive_ and _vindicative_ are not two several\n_species_ of the laws, but two _parts_ of the same law. For if the\nlaw should say no more, but (for example) _whatsoever you take with\nyour net in the sea, be it yours_, it is in vain. For although\nanother should take that away from you which you have caught, it\nhinders not but that it still remains yours. For in the state of\nnature where all things are common to all, _yours_ and _others_ are\nall one; insomuch as what the law defines to be _yours_, was _yours_\neven before the law, and after the law ceases not to be _yours_,\nalthough in another man\u2019s possession. Wherefore the law doth\nnothing, unless it be understood to be so _yours_, as all other men\nbe forbidden to interrupt your free use and secure enjoyment of it\nat all times, according to your own will and pleasure. For this is\nthat which is required to a propriety of goods; not that a man may\nbe able to use them, but to use them alone; which is done by\nprohibiting others to be an hinderance to him. But in vain do they\nalso prohibit any men, who do not withal strike a fear of punishment\ninto them. In vain therefore is the law, unless it contain both\nparts, that which _forbids_ injuries to be done, and that which\n_punisheth_ the doers of them. The first of them, which is called\n_distributive_, is _prohibitory_, and speaks to all; the second,\nwhich is styled _vindicative_ or _penary_, is _mandatory_, and only\nspeaks to public ministers.\n\n[Sidenote: All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it.]\n\n8. From hence also we may understand, _that every civil law hath a\npenalty annexed to it_, either explicitly or implicitly. For where\nthe penalty is not defined, neither by any writing, nor by example\nof any who hath suffered the punishment of the transgressed law,\nthere the penalty is understood to be arbitrary; namely, to depend\non the will of the legislator, that is to say, of the supreme\ncommander. For in vain is that law, which may be broken without\npunishment.\n\n[Sidenote: The precepts of the Decalogue of honouring parents, of\n murder, adultery, theft, false witnesses, are the civil\n laws.]\n\n9. Now because it comes from the civil laws, both that every man\nhave _his proper right_ and distinguished from _another\u2019s_, and also\nthat he is forbidden to invade another\u2019s rights; it follows that\nthese precepts: _Thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defined by\nthe laws, unto thy parents_: _Thou shalt not kill the man, whom the\nlaws forbid thee to kill_: _Thou shalt avoid all copulation\nforbidden by the laws_: _Thou shalt not take away another\u2019s goods,\nagainst the lords will_: _Thou shalt not frustrate the laws and\njudgments by false testimony_: are civil laws. The natural laws\ncommand the same things, but implicitly. For the law of nature (as\nhath been said in chap. III. art. 2) commands us to _keep\ncontracts_; and therefore also to perform obedience, when we have\ncovenanted obedience, and to abstain from another\u2019s goods, when it\nis determined by the civil law what belongs to another. But all\nsubjects (by chap. VI. art. 13) do _covenant_ to obey his commands\nwho hath the supreme power, that is to say, the civil laws, in the\nvery constitution of government, even before it is possible to break\nthem. For the law of nature did oblige in the state of nature; where\nfirst, because nature hath given all things to all men, nothing did\nproperly belong to another, and therefore it was not possible to\ninvade another\u2019s right; next, where all things were common, and\ntherefore all carnal copulations lawful; thirdly, where was the\nstate of war, and therefore lawful to kill; fourthly, where all\nthings were determined by every man\u2019s own judgment, and therefore\npaternal respects also; lastly, where there were no public\njudgments, and therefore no use of bearing witness, either true or\nfalse.\n\n[Sidenote: It is not possible to command aught by the civil law,\n contrary to the laws of nature.]\n\n10. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those laws is more\nancient than the promulgation of the laws themselves, as being\ncontained in the very constitution of the city; by the virtue of the\nnatural law which forbids breach of covenant, the law of nature\ncommands us to keep all the civil laws. For where we are tied to\nobedience before we know what will be commanded us, there we are\nuniversally tied to obey in all things. Whence it follows, that no\ncivil law whatsoever, which tends not to a reproach of the Deity,\n(in respect of whom cities themselves have no right of their own,\nand cannot be said to make laws), can possibly be against the law of\nnature. For though the law of nature forbid theft, adultery, &c; yet\nif the civil law command us to invade anything, that invasion is not\ntheft, adultery, &c. For when the Laced\u00e6monians of old permitted\ntheir youths, by a certain law, to take away other men\u2019s goods, they\ncommanded that these goods should not be accounted other men\u2019s, but\ntheir own who took them; and therefore such surreptions were no\nthefts. In like manner, copulations of heathen sexes, according to\ntheir laws, were lawful marriages.\n\n[Sidenote: It is essential to a law, that both it and the legislator\n be known.]\n\n11. It is necessary to the essence of a law, that the subjects be\nacquainted with two things: first, what man or court hath the\nsupreme power, that is to say, the right of making laws; secondly,\nwhat the law itself says. For he that neither knew either to whom or\nwhat he is tied to, cannot obey; and by consequence is in such a\ncondition as if he were not tied at all. I say not that it is\nnecessary to the essence of a law, that either one or the other be\nperpetually known, but only that it be once known. And if the\nsubject afterward forget either the right he hath who made the law,\nor the law itself, that makes him no less tied to obey; since he\nmight have remembered it, had he a will to obey.\n\n[Sidenote: Whence the legislator is known.]\n\n12. _The knowledge of the legislator_ depends on the subject\nhimself; for the right of making laws could not be conferred on any\nman without his own consent and covenant, either expressed or\nsupposed; expressed, when from the beginning the citizens do\nthemselves constitute a form of governing the city, or when by\npromise they submit themselves to the dominion of any one; or\nsupposed at least, as when they make use of the benefit of the realm\nand laws for their protection and conservation against others. For\nto whose dominion we require our fellow subjects to yield obedience\nfor our good, his dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that\nvery request. And therefore ignorance of the power of making laws,\ncan never be a sufficient excuse; for every man knows what he hath\ndone himself.\n\n[Sidenote: Promulgation and interpretation are necessary to the\n knowledge of a law.]\n\n13. _The knowledge of the laws_ depends on the legislator; who must\npublish them; for otherwise they are not laws. For law is the\ncommand of the law-maker, and his command is the declaration of his\nwill; it is not therefore a law, except the will of the law-maker be\ndeclared, which is done by _promulgation_. Now in _promulgation_ two\nthings must be manifest; whereof one is, that he or they who publish\na law, either have a right themselves to make laws, or that they do\nit by authority derived from him or them who have it; the other is\nthe sense of the law itself. Now, that the first, namely, published\nlaws, proceed from him who hath the supreme command, cannot be\nmanifest (speaking exactly and philosophically) to any, but them who\nhave received them from the mouth of the commander. The rest\nbelieve; but the reasons of their belief are so many, that it is\nscarce possible they should not believe. And truly in a\n_democratical_ city, where every one may be present at the making of\nlaws if he will, he that shall be absent, must believe those that\nwere present. But in _monarchies_ and _aristocracies_, because it is\ngranted but to few to be present, and openly to hear the commands of\nthe _monarch_ or the _nobles_, it was necessary to bestow a power on\nthose few of publishing them to the rest. And thus we believe those\nto be the _edicts_ and _decrees_ of princes, which are propounded to\nus for such, either by the writings or voices of them whose office\nit is to publish them. But yet, when we have these causes of belief;\nthat we have seen the prince or supreme counsel constantly use such\n_counsellors_, _secretaries_, _publishers_, and _seals_, and the\nlike arguments for the declaring of his will; that he never took any\nauthority from them; that they have been punished, who not giving\ncredit to such like promulgations have transgressed the law; not\nonly he who thus believing shall obey the _edicts_ and _decrees_ set\nforth by them, is everywhere excused, but he that not believing\nshall not yield obedience, is punished. For the constant permission\nof these things is a manifest sign enough and evident declaration of\nthe commander\u2019s will; provided there be nothing contained in the\n_law_, _edict_, or _decree_, derogatory from his supreme power. For\nit is not to be imagined that he would have aught taken from his\npower by any of his officers, as long as he retains a will to\ngovern. Now the _sense_ of the _law_, when there is any doubt made\nof it, is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath\ncommitted the _knowledge of causes_ or _judgments_; for to _judge_,\nis nothing else than by _interpretation_ to apply the _laws_ to\nparticular cases. Now we may know who they are that have this office\ngranted them, in the same manner as we know who they be that have\nauthority given them to publish laws.\n\n[Sidenote: The civil law divided into written and unwritten.]\n\n14. Again the _civil law_, according to its two-fold manner of\npublishing, is of two sorts, _written_ and _unwritten_. By\n_written_, I understand that which wants a voice, or some other sign\nof the will of the legislator, that it may become a law. For all\nkind of laws are of the same age with mankind, both in nature and\ntime; and therefore of more antiquity than the invention of letters,\nand the art of writing. Wherefore not a _writing_, but a _voice_ is\nnecessary for a _written law_; this alone is requisite to the\n_being_, that to the _remembrance_ of a law. For we read, that\nbefore letters were found out for the help of memory, that _laws_,\ncontracted into metre, were wont to be sung. The _unwritten_, is\nthat which wants no other publishing than the voice of nature or\nnatural reason; such are the _laws of nature_. For the natural law,\nalthough it be distinguished from the civil, forasmuch as it\ncommands the will; yet so far forth as it relates to our actions, it\nis civil. For example, this same, _thou shalt not covet_, which only\nappertains to the mind, is a natural law only; but this, _thou shalt\nnot invade_, is both natural and civil. For seeing it is impossible\nto prescribe such universal rules, whereby all future contentions,\nwhich perhaps are infinite, may be determined; it is to be\nunderstood that in all cases not mentioned by the _written laws_,\nthe _law of natural equity_ is to be followed, which commands us to\ndistribute equally to equals; and this by the virtue of the _civil\nlaw_, which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly do\nactually transgress the _laws of nature_.\n\n[Sidenote: That the natural laws are not written laws, neither are\n the sentences of lawyers or customs laws of themselves,\n but by the consent of the supreme power.]\n\n15. These things being understood, it appears, first, that the _laws\nof nature_, although they were described in the books of some\nphilosophers, are not for that reason to be termed _written laws_:\nand that the writings of the interpreters of the laws, were no laws,\nfor want of the supreme authority; nor yet those _orations of the\nwise_, that is to say, _judges_, but so far forth as by the consent\nof the supreme power they part into custom; and that then they are\nto be received among the _written laws_, not for the custom\u2019s sake,\n(which by its own force doth not constitute a law), but for the will\nof the supreme commander; which appears in this, that he hath\nsuffered his _sentence_, whether equal or unequal, to pass into\ncustom.\n\n[Sidenote: What the word _sin_, taken in its largest sense,\n signifies.]\n\n16. _Sin_, in its largest signification, comprehends every _deed_,\n_word_, and _thought_ against right reason. For every man, by\nreasoning, seeks out the means to the end which he propounds to\nhimself. If therefore he reason right, that is to say, beginning\nfrom most evident principles he makes a discourse out of\nconsequences continually necessary, he will proceed in a most direct\nway. Otherwise he will go astray, that is to say, he will either\n_do_, _say_, or _endeavour_ somewhat against his proper end; which\nwhen he hath done, he will indeed in reasoning be said to have\n_erred_, but in action and will to have _sinned_. For _sin_ follows\n_error_, just as the _will_ doth the _understanding_. And this is\nthe most general acception of the word; under which is contained\nevery _imprudent_ action, whether against the law, as to overthrow\nanother man\u2019s house, or not against the law, as to build his own\nupon the sand.\n\n[Sidenote: The definition of sin.]\n\n17. But when we speak of _the laws_, the word _sin_ is taken in a\nmore strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right\nreason, but that only which is _blameable_; and therefore it is\ncalled _malum culp\u00e6_, the evil of fault. But yet if anything be\nculpable, it is not presently to be termed _a sin_ or _fault_; but\nonly if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what\nit is to be _blameable with reason_, what _against reason_. Such is\nthe nature of man, that every one calls that _good_ which he\ndesires, and _evil_ which he eschews. And therefore through the\ndiversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that _good_,\nwhich another counts _evil_; and the same man what now he esteemed\nfor _good_, he immediately after looks on as _evil_: and the same\nthing which he calls _good_ in himself, he terms _evil_ in another.\nFor we all measure _good_ and _evil_ by the pleasure or pain we\neither feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the\nprosperous actions of enemies, because they increase their honours,\ngoods, and power; and of equals, by reason of that strife of honours\nwhich is among them; both seem and are _irksome_, and therefore\n_evil_ to all; and men use to repute those _evil_, that is to say,\nto _lay some fault_ to their charge, from whom they receive _evil_;\nit is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom\nthe same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and\nwhat not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general\nthings, as that _theft_, _adultery_, and the like are _sins_; as if\nthey should say that all men account those things _evil_, to which\nthey have given names which are usually taken in an _evil_ sense.\nBut we demand not whether theft be a sin, but what is to be termed\ntheft; and so concerning others, in like manner. Forasmuch therefore\nas in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable\nis not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another,\nbecause of the equality of human nature; and there are no other\nreasons in being, but only those of _particular men_, and that of\nthe _city_: it follows, that the _city_ is to determine what _with\nreason is culpable_. So as a _fault_, that is to say, a _sin_, is\nthat which a man does, omits, says, or wills, against the reason of\n_the city_, that is, contrary to the laws.\n\n[Sidenote: The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice.]\n\n18. But a man may do somewhat against the laws through human\ninfirmity, although he desire to fulfil them; and yet his action, as\nbeing against the laws, is rightly blamed, and called a _sin_. But\nthere are some who _neglect_ the laws; and as oft as any hope of\ngain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of contracts\nand betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation. Not only\nthe deeds, but even the minds of these men are against the laws.\nThey who sin only through infirmity, are _good men_ even when they\nsin; but these, even when they do not sin, are wicked. For though\nboth the action and the mind be repugnant to the laws, yet those\nrepugnances are distinguished by different appellations. For the\nirregularity of the action is called \u1f00\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, _unjust deed_; that of\nthe mind \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f76\u03b1 and \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f76\u03b1, _injustice_ and _malice_; that is the\ninfirmity of a disturbed soul, this the _pravity_ of a sober mind.\n\n[Sidenote: Under what kind of sin atheism is contained.]\n\n19. But seeing there is no sin which is not against some law, and\nthat there is no law which is not the command of him who hath the\nsupreme power, and that no man hath a supreme power which is not\nbestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said\nto sin, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs\nthe world, or casts any other reproach upon him? For he will say:\n_that he never submitted his will to God\u2019s will, not conceiving him\nso much as to have any being: and granting that his opinion were\nerroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be numbered\namong those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be\npunished_. This speech seems so far forth to be admitted, that\nthough this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it\nto be referred to sins of imprudence;[17] but that it should be\nexcused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the atheist is\npunished either immediately by God himself, or by kings constituted\nunder God; not as a subject is punished by a king, because he keeps\nnot the laws; but as one enemy by another, because he would not\naccept of the laws; that is to say, by the right of war, as the\ngiants warring against God. For whosoever are not subject either to\nsome common lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.\n\nFootnote 17:\n\n _Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence._] Many find fault\n that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not to injustice;\n yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared myself an\n enemy bitter enough against atheists. They object further, that\n since I had elsewhere said that it might be known _there is a God_\n by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at\n least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty\n of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to\n atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently\n desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of\n injustice. But when I found none, I inquired next what name God\n himself did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of\n the atheist: _The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God_.\n Wherefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers\n to. Next I show them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name\n of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an\n unjust man. Lastly, I affirm that they may under that notion be\n justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates; and\n therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I\n have said, that it might be known by natural reason _that there is\n a God_, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men\n might know this; except they think, that because Archimedes by\n natural reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the\n square, it follows thence, that every one of the vulgar could have\n found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known\n to some by the light of reason that there is a God; yet men that\n are continually engaged in pleasures or seeking of riches and\n honour; also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do\n it, or care not to do it; lastly, fools, in which number are\n atheists, cannot know this.\n\n[Sidenote: What the sin of treason is.]\n\n20. Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant, whereby each\nsubject is tied to the other to perform absolute and universal\nobedience (such as is defined above, chap. VI. art. 13) to the city,\nthat is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be one man or\ncouncil, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the\ncivil laws; so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at\nonce; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the general\ncovenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the laws. Which\ntrespass is so much worse than any other one sin, by how much to sin\n_always_, is worse than to sin _once_. And this is that sin which is\ncalled _treason_; and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen or\nsubject declares, that he will no longer obey that man or court to\nwhom the supreme power of the city is entrusted. And the subject\ndeclares this same will of his by deed, when he either doth or\nendeavours to do violence to the sovereign\u2019s person, or to them who\nexecute his commands. Of which sort are traitors, regicides, and\nsuch as take up arms against the city, or during a war fly to the\nenemy\u2019s side. And they show the same will in word, who flatly deny\nthat themselves or other subjects are tied to any such kind of\nobedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that we must\nnot obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God entire)\nsimply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as he who should\nsay, that he had no right to wage war at his own will, to make\npeace, enlist soldiers, levy monies, elect magistrates and public\nministers, enact laws, decide controversies, set penalties, or do\naught else without which the state cannot stand. And these and the\nlike words and deeds are treason by the natural, not the civil law.\nBut it may so happen, that some action, which before the civil law\nwas made, was not treason, yet will become such if it be done\nafterwards. As if it be declared by the law, that it shall be\naccounted for a sign of renouncing public obedience, that is to say,\nfor treason, if any man shall coin monies, or forge the privy-seal;\nhe that after that declaration shall do this, will be no less guilty\nof treason than the other. Yet he sins less, because he breaks not\nall the laws at once, but one law only. For the law by calling that\ntreason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by right set a more\nodious name, and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty\npersons; but it makes not the sin itself more grievous.\n\n[Sidenote: Treason breaks not the civil, but the natural law.]\n\n21. But that sin, which by the law of nature is treason, is a\ntransgression of the natural, not the civil law. For since our\nobligation to civil obedience, by virtue whereof the civil laws are\nvalid, is before all civil law, and the sin of treason is naturally\nnothing else but the breach of that obligation; it follows, that by\nthe sin of treason that law is broken which preceded the civil law,\nto wit, the natural, which forbids us to violate covenants and\nbetrothed faith. But if some sovereign prince should set forth a law\non this manner, _thou shalt not rebel_, he would effect just\nnothing. For except subjects were before obliged to obedience, that\nis to say, not to rebel, all law is of no force. Now the obligation\nwhich obligeth to what we were before obliged to, is superfluous.\n\n[Sidenote: And therefore is punished not by the right of\n sovereignty, but by the right of war.]\n\n22. Hence it follows, that _rebels_, _traitors_, and all others\n_convicted of treason_, are punished not by _civil_, but _natural_\nright; that is to say, not as _civil subjects_, but as _enemies to\nthe government_; not by the _right of sovereignty_ and _dominion_,\nbut by the _right of war_.\n\n[Sidenote: Obedience not rightly distinguished into active and\n passive.]\n\n23. There are some who think that those acts which are done against\nthe law, when the punishment is determined by the law itself, are\nexpiated, if the punished willingly undergo the punishment; and that\nthey are not guilty before God of breaking the natural law,\n(although by breaking the civil laws, we break the natural too,\nwhich command us to keep the civil), who have suffered the\npunishment which the law required; as if by the law the fact were\nnot prohibited, but a punishment were set instead of a price,\nwhereby a license might be bought of doing what the law forbids. By\nthe same reason they might infer too, that no transgression of the\nlaw were a sin; but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he\nhath bought by his own peril. But we must know, that the words of\nthe law may be understood in a two-fold sense. The one as containing\ntwo parts, (as hath been declared above in art. 7), namely, that of\nabsolutely prohibiting, as, _thou shalt not do this_; and revenging,\nas, _he that doth this, shall be punished_. The other, as containing\na condition, for example, _thou shalt not do this thing, unless thou\nwilt suffer punishment_; and thus the law forbids not simply, but\nconditionally. If it be understood in the first sense, he that doth\nit sins, because he doth what the law forbids to be done; if in the\nsecond, he sins not, because he cannot be said to do what is\nforbidden him, that performs the condition. For in the first sense,\nall men are forbidden to do it; in the second, they only who keep\nthemselves from the punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative\npart of the law obligeth not the guilty, but the magistrate to\nrequire punishment; in the second, he himself that owes the\npunishment, is obliged to exact it; to the payment whereof, if it be\ncapital or otherwise grievous, he cannot be obliged. But in what\nsense the law is to be taken, depends on the will of him who hath\nthe sovereignty. When therefore there is any doubt of the meaning of\nthe law, since we are sure they sin not who do it not, it will be\nsin if we do it, howsoever the law may afterward be explained. For\nto do that which a man doubts whether it be a sin or not, when he\nhath freedom to forbear it, is a contempt of the laws; and therefore\nby chap. III. art. 28, a sin against the law of nature. Vain\ntherefore is that same distinction of _obedience_ into _active_ and\n_passive_; as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by\nhuman decrees, which is a sin against the law of nature, which is\nthe law of God; or as though they sinned not, who sin at their own\nperil.\n\n\n\n\n RELIGION\n\n\n ---\n\n\n CHAPTER XV.\n\n OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE.\n\n1. The proposition of the following contents. 2. Over whom God is\n said to rule by nature. 3. The word of God threefold; reason,\n revelation, prophecy. 4. The kingdom of God twofold; natural,\n and prophetic. 5. The right whereby God reigns, is seated in his\n omnipotence. 6. The same proved from Scripture. 7. The\n obligation of yielding obedience to God, proceeds from human\n infirmity. 8. The laws of God in his natural kingdom, are those\n which are recited above in chapters II. III. 9. What honour and\n worship is. 10. Worship consists either in attributes or in\n actions. 11. And there is one sort natural, another arbitrary.\n 12. One commanded, another voluntary. 13. What the end or scope\n of worship is. 14. What the natural laws are concerning God\u2019s\n attributes. 15. What the actions are whereby naturally we do\n give worship. 16. In God\u2019s natural kingdom, the city may appoint\n what worship of God it pleaseth. 17. God ruling by nature only,\n the city, that is to say, that man or court who under God hath\n the sovereign authority of the city, is the interpreter of all\n the laws. 18. Certain doubts removed. 19. What sin is in the\n natural kingdom of God; and what treason against the Divine\n Majesty.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The proposition of the following contents.]\n\n1. We have already in the foregoing chapters, proved both by reason\nand testimonies of holy writ, that the estate of nature, that is to\nsay, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs who neither govern nor\nare governed, is an anarchy or hostile state; that the precepts\nwhereby to avoid this state, are _the laws of nature_; that there\ncan be no civil government without a sovereign; and that they who\nhave gotten this sovereign command, must be obeyed simply, that is\nto say, in all things which repugn not the commandments of God.\nThere is this one thing only wanting to the complete understanding\nof all civil duty, and that is, to know which are the laws and\ncommandments of God. For else we cannot tell whether that which the\ncivil power commands us, be against the laws of God, or not; whence\nit must necessarily happen, that either by too much obedience to the\ncivil authority we become stubborn against the divine Majesty; or\nfor fear of sinning against God we run into disobedience against the\ncivil power. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know the\ndivine laws. Now because the knowledge of the laws depends on the\nknowledge of the kingdom, we must in what follows speak somewhat\nconcerning the _kingdom of God_.\n\n[Sidenote: Over whom God is said to reign:]\n\n2. _The Lord is king, the earth may be glad thereof_; saith the\npsalmist, (Psalm xcvii. 1). And again the same psalmist, (Psalm\nxcix. 1): _The Lord is king, be the people never so impatient; he\nsitteth between the cherubims, be the earth never so unquiet_; to\nwit, whether men will or not, God is the king over all the earth;\nnor is he moved from his throne, if there be any who deny either his\n_existence_ or his _providence_. Now although God govern all men so\nby his power, that none can do anything which he would not have\ndone: yet this, to speak properly and accurately, is not to reign.\nFor he is said to reign, who rules not by _acting_, but _speaking_,\nthat is to say, by _precepts_ and _threatenings_. And therefore we\ncount not inanimate nor irrational bodies for subjects in the\nkingdom of God, although they be subordinate to the divine power;\nbecause they _understand not the commands and threats_ of God: nor\nyet the atheists, because they believe not that there is a God; nor\nyet those who believing there is a God, do not yet believe that he\nrules these inferior things: for even these, although they be\ngoverned by the power of God, yet do they not acknowledge any of his\n_commands_, nor stand in awe of his _threats_. Those only therefore\nare supposed to belong to God\u2019s kingdom, who acknowledge him to be\nthe governor of all things, and that he hath given _his commands_ to\nmen, and appointed _punishments_ for the transgressors. The rest we\nmust not call subjects, but enemies of God.\n\n[Sidenote: The word of God threefold; reason, revelation, prophesy.]\n\n3. But none are said to govern by _commands_, but they who openly\ndeclare them to those who are governed by them. For the _commands_\nof the rulers, are the _laws_ of the ruled; but _laws_ they are not,\nif not perspicuously published, insomuch as all excuse of ignorance\nmay be taken away. Men indeed publish their laws by _word_ or\n_voice_; neither can they make their will universally known any\nother way. But God\u2019s _laws_ are declared after a threefold manner:\nfirst, _by the tacit dictates of right reason_; next, by _immediate\nrevelation_, which is supposed to be done either by a supernatural\nvoice, or by a vision or dream, or divine inspiration; thirdly, by\nthe _voice of one man_, whom God recommends to the rest, as worthy\nof belief, by the working of true miracles. Now he whose voice God\nthus makes use of to signify his will unto others, is called a\n_prophet_. These three manners may be termed the _threefold word of\nGod_, to wit, the _rational word_, the _sensible word_, and _the\nword of prophecy_. To which answer the three manners whereby we are\nsaid to hear God; _right reasoning_, _sense_, and _faith_. God\u2019s\n_sensible word_ hath come but to few; neither hath God spoken to men\nby revelation, except particularly to some, and to diverse\ndiversely; neither have any laws of his kingdom been published on\nthis manner unto any people.\n\n[Sidenote: The kingdom of God two-fold: natural, and prophetic.]\n\n4. And according to the difference which is between the _rational\nword_ and the _word of prophecy_, we attribute a two-fold kingdom\nunto God: _natural_, in which he reigns by the dictates of right\nreason; and which is universal over all who acknowledge the divine\npower, by reason of that rational nature which is common to all: and\n_prophetical_, in which he rules also by the _word of prophecy_;\nwhich is peculiar, because he hath not given positive laws to all\nmen, but to his peculiar people and some certain men elected by him.\n\n[Sidenote: The right whereby God governs, is seated in his\n omnipotence.]\n\n5. God in his _natural kingdom_ hath a right to rule, and to punish\nthose who break his laws, from his sole _irresistible power_. For\nall right over others is either from _nature_, or from _contract_.\nHow the right of governing springs from _contract_, we have already\nshowed in chap. VI. And the same right is derived from _nature_, in\nthis very thing, that it is not by nature taken away. For when by\nnature all men had a right over all things, every man had a right of\nruling over all as ancient as nature itself. But the reason why this\nwas abolished among men, was no other but mutual fear, as hath been\ndeclared above in chap. II. art. 3; reason, namely, dictating that\nthey must forego that right for the preservation of mankind; because\nthe equality of men among themselves, according to their strength\nand natural powers, was necessarily accompanied with war; and with\nwar joins the destruction of mankind. Now if any man had so far\nexceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joined forces\ncould not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should\npart with that right, which nature had given him. The right\ntherefore of dominion over all the rest would have remained with\nhim, by reason of that excess of power whereby he could have\npreserved both himself and them. They therefore whose power cannot\nbe resisted, and by consequence God _Almighty_ derives his right of\nsovereignty from the _power_ itself. And as oft as God punisheth or\nslays a sinner, although he therefore punish him because he sinned,\nyet may we not say that he could not justly have punished or killed\nhim although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in\npunishing may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it\ntherefore follow, that the right of afflicting and killing depends\nnot on _divine power_, but on _men\u2019s sins_.\n\n[Sidenote: The same proved from Scripture.]\n\n6. That question made famous by the disputations of the ancients:\n_why evil things befal the good, and good things the evil_: is the\nsame with this of ours; _by what right God dispenseth good and evil\nthings unto men_; and with its difficulty it not only staggers the\nfaith of the vulgar concerning the divine Providence, but also\nphilosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psalm lxxiii. 1,\n2, 3: _Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean\nheart; but as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well\nnigh slipped. And why? I was grieved at the wicked; I do also see\nthe ungodly in such prosperity._ And how bitterly did Job\nexpostulate with God, that being _just_ he should yet be afflicted\nwith so many calamities! God himself with open voice resolved this\ndifficulty in the case of Job, and hath confirmed his right by\narguments drawn not from Job\u2019s sin, but from his own power. For Job\nand his friends had argued so among themselves; that they would\nneeds make him guilty, because he was punished; and he would reprove\ntheir accusation by arguments fetched from his own innocence. But\nGod, when he had heard both him and them, refutes his expostulation,\nnot by condemning him of injustice or any sin, but by declaring his\nown power, (Job xxxviii. 4): _Where wast thou_ (says he) _when I\nlaid the foundation of the earth, &c._ And for his friends, God\npronounces himself angry against them (Job. xlii. 7): _Because they\nhad not spoken of him the thing that is right, like his servant\nJob._ Agreeable to this is that speech of our Saviour\u2019s in the man\u2019s\ncase who was born blind: when his disciples asking him whether he or\nhis parents had sinned, that he was born blind, he answered, (John\nix. 3): _Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the\nworks of God should be manifest in him._ For though it be said,\n(Rom. v. 12), _that death entered into the world by sin_: it follows\nnot but that God by his right might have made men subject to\ndiseases and death, although they had never sinned; even as he hath\nmade the other animals mortal and sickly, although they cannot sin.\n\n[Sidenote: The obligation of yielding obedience unto God, proceeds\n from human infirmity.]\n\n7. Now if God have the right of sovereignty from his power, it is\nmanifest that the _obligation_ of yielding him obedience lies on men\nby reason of their weakness.[18] For that _obligation_ which rises\nfrom contract, of which we have spoken in chap. II. can have no\nplace here; where the right of ruling, no covenant passing between,\nrises only from nature. But there are two species of _natural\nobligation_. One, when liberty is taken away by corporal\nimpediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and\nall creatures, do obey the common laws of their creation. The other,\nwhen it is taken away by hope or fear, according to which the\nweaker, despairing of his own power to resist, cannot but yield to\nthe stronger. From this last kind of obligation, that is to say,\nfrom fear or conscience of our own weakness in respect of the divine\npower, it comes to pass that we are obliged to obey God in his\nnatural kingdom; reason dictating to all, acknowledging the divine\npower and providence, _that there is no kicking against the pricks_.\n\nFootnote 18:\n\n _By reason of their weakness._] If this shall seem hard to any\n man, I desire him with a silent thought to consider, if there were\n two Omnipotents, whether were bound to obey. I believe he will\n confess that neither is bound. If this be true, then it is also\n true what I have set down; that men are subject unto God, because\n they are not omnipotent. And truly our Saviour admonishing Paul,\n who at that time was an enemy to the Church, that he should not\n kick against the pricks; seems to require obedience from him for\n this cause, because he had not power enough to resist.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws of God in his natural kingdom, are those which\n are above set down in chaps. II. III.]\n\n8. Because the _word of God_, ruling by nature only, is supposed to\nbe nothing else but right reason, and the laws of kings can be known\nby their _word_ only; it is manifest that the laws of God, ruling by\nnature alone, are only the _natural laws_; namely, those which we\nhave set down in chaps. II. and III. and deduced from the dictates\nof reason, _humility_, _equity_, _justice_, _mercy_; and other\n_moral virtues_ befriending _peace_, which pertain to the discharge\nof the duties of men one toward the other; and those which right\nreason shall dictate besides, concerning the honour and worship of\nthe Divine Majesty. We need not repeat what those _natural laws_ or\n_moral virtues_ are; but we must see what honours and what divine\nworship, that is to say, what _sacred laws_ the same _natural\nreason_ doth dictate.\n\n[Sidenote: What honour and worship are.]\n\n9. Honour to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion of\nanother\u2019s _power_ joined with _goodness_; and to _honour_ a man, is\nthe same with highly esteeming him: and so honour is not in the\nparty _honoured_, but in the _honourer_. Now three passions do\nnecessarily follow _honour_ thus placed in opinion; _love_, which\nrefers to _goodness_; _hope_ and _fear_, which regard _power_. And\nfrom these arise all outward actions, wherewith the powerful are\nappeased and become propitious; and which are the effects, and\ntherefore also the natural signs of honour itself. But the word\n_honour_ is transferred also to those outward effects of _honour_;\nin which sense, we are said to _honour_ him, of whose power we\ntestify ourselves, either in word or deed, to have a very great\nrespect; insomuch as _honour_ is the same with _worship_. Now\n_worship_ is an outward act, the sign of inward honour; and whom we\nendeavour by our homage to appease if they be angry, or howsoever to\nmake them favourable to us, we are said to _worship_.\n\n[Sidenote: Worship consists either in attributes, or in actions.]\n\n10. All signs of the mind are either _words_ or _deeds_; and\ntherefore all _worship_ consists either in _words_ or _deeds_. Now\nboth the one and the other are referred to three kinds; whereof the\nfirst is _praise_, or _public declaration of goodness_; the second a\n_public declaration of present power_, which is to _magnify_,\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd; the third is a _public declaration of happiness_, or of\n_power secure also for the future_, which is called \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2. I\nsay that all kinds of honour may be discerned, not in _words_ only,\nbut in _deeds_ too. But we then praise and celebrate in _words_,\nwhen we do it by way of proposition, or _dogmatically_, that is to\nsay, by _attributes_ or _titles_; which may be termed praising and\ncelebrating _categorically_ and _plainly_; as when we declare him\nwhom we honour to be _liberal_, _strong_, _wise_. And then in\n_deeds_, when it is done by _consequence_ or by _hypothesis_ or\nsupposition; as by _thanksgiving_, which supposeth _goodness_; or by\n_obedience_, which supposeth _power_; or by _congratulation_, which\nsupposeth _happiness_.\n\n[Sidenote: And there is one sort natural, and another arbitrary.]\n\n11. Now whether we desire to praise a man in _words_ or _deeds_, we\nshall find some things which signify honour with all men: such as\namong _attributes_, are the general words of _virtues_ and _powers_,\nwhich cannot be taken in ill sense; as _good_, _fair_, _strong_,\n_just_, and the like: and among _actions_, _obedience_,\n_thanksgiving_, _prayers_, and others of that kind, by which an\nacknowledgment of virtue and power is ever understood. Others, which\nsignify honour but with some, and scorn with others, or else\nneither; such as in _attributes_, are those words, which, according\nto the diversity of opinions, are diversely referred to virtues or\nvices, to honest or dishonest things. As that a man slew his enemy,\nthat he fled, that he is a philosopher, or an orator, and the like;\nwhich with some are had in honour, with others in contempt. In\n_deeds_, such as depend on the custom of the place, or prescriptions\nof civil laws; as in saluting to be bareheaded, to put off the\nshoes, to bend the body, to petition for anything standing,\nprostrate, kneeling, forms of ceremony, and the like. Now that\n_worship_ which is always and by all men accounted honourable, may\nbe called _natural_; the other, which follows places and customs,\n_arbitrary_.\n\n[Sidenote: One commanded, another voluntary.]\n\n12. Furthermore, _worship_ may be enjoined, to wit, by the _command_\nof him that is worshipped, and it may be _voluntary_, namely, such\nas seems good to the worshipper. If it be _enjoined_, the actions\nexpressing it do not signify honour, as they signify actions, but as\nthey are _enjoined_: for they signify _obedience_ immediately,\nobedience _power_; insomuch as _worship enjoined_ consists in\nobedience. _Voluntary_ is honourable only in the nature of the\nactions; which if they do signify honour to the beholders, it is\n_worship_, if not, it is _reproach_. Again, _worship_ may be either\n_public_ or _private_. But _public_, respecting each single\nworshipper, may not be _voluntary_; respecting the city, it may. For\nseeing that which is done voluntarily, depends on the will of the\ndoer, there would not one worship be given, but as many worships as\nworshippers; except the will of all men were united by the command\nof one. But _private_ worship may be _voluntary_, if it be done\nsecretly; for what is done openly, is restrained either by laws or\nthrough modesty; which is contrary to the nature of a _voluntary_\naction.\n\n[Sidenote: What the end or aim of worship is.]\n\n13. Now that we may know what the _scope_ and _end_ of _worshipping_\nothers is, we must consider the cause why men delight in worship.\nAnd we must grant what we have showed elsewhere; that _joy_ consists\nin this, that a man contemplates virtue, strength, science, beauty,\nfriends, or any _power_ whatsoever, as being, or as though it were\nhis own; and it is nothing else but a _glory_ or triumph of the\nmind, conceiving itself honoured, that is to say, loved and feared,\nthat is to say, having the services and assistances of men in\nreadiness. Now because men believe him to be powerful, whom they see\nhonoured, that is to say, esteemed powerful by others; it falls out\nthat honour is increased by worship; and by the opinion of power\ntrue power is acquired. His _end_ therefore, who either commands or\nsuffers himself to be worshipped, is, that by this means he may\nacquire as many as he can, either through love or fear, to be\nobedient unto him.\n\n[Sidenote: What the natural laws are concerning God\u2019s attributes.]\n\n14. But that we may understand what manner of _worship_ of God\n_natural reason_ doth assign us, let us begin from his _attributes_.\nWhere first, it is manifest that _existence_ is to be allowed him;\nfor there can be no will to honour him, who, we think, hath no\nbeing. Next, those philosophers who said, that God was the world or\nthe world\u2019s soul, that is to say, a part of it, spake unworthily of\nGod; for they attribute nothing to him, but wholly deny his being.\nFor by the word _God_ we understand the _world\u2019s cause_. But in\nsaying that the _world is God_, they say _that it hath no cause_,\nthat is as much as _there is no God_. In like manner, they who\nmaintain the world not to be created, but eternal; because there can\nbe no cause of an eternal thing, in denying _the world to have a\ncause_, they deny also that _there is a God_. They also have a\nwretched apprehension of God, who imputing idleness to him, do take\nfrom him the government of the world and of mankind. For say, they\nshould acknowledge him omnipotent; yet if he mind not these inferior\nthings, that same thread-bare sentence will take place with them:\n_quod supra nos, nihil ad nos_; what is above us, doth not concern\nus. And seeing there is nothing for which they should either love or\nfear him, truly he will be to them as though he were not at all.\nMoreover, in _attributes_ which signify _greatness_ or _power_,\nthose which signify some finite or limited thing, are not signs at\nall of an honouring mind. For we honour not God worthily, if we\nascribe less _power_ or _greatness_ to him than possibly we can. But\nevery finite thing is less than we can; for most easily we may\nalways assign and attribute more to a finite thing. No _shape_\ntherefore must be assigned to God, for all _shape_ is _finite_; nor\nmust he be said to be conceived or comprehended by imagination, or\nany other faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is\n_finite_. And although this word _infinite_ signify a conception of\nthe mind, yet it follows not that we have any conception of an\n_infinite thing_. For when we say that a thing is _infinite_, we\nsignify nothing really, but the impotency in our own mind; as if we\nshould say, we know not whether or where it is limited. Neither\nspeak they honourably enough of God, who say we have an _idea_ of\nhim in our mind: for an idea is our conception; but conception we\nhave none, except of a _finite_ thing. Nor they, who say that he\nhath _parts_, or that he is some certain _entire_ thing; which are\nalso attributes of _finite_ things. Nor that he is in any place; for\nnothing can be said to be in a _place_, but what hath _bounds_ and\n_limits_ of its greatness on all sides. Nor that he is _moved_ or\n_is at rest_; for either of them suppose a _being in some place_.\nNor that there are many Gods; because not many infinites.\nFurthermore, concerning _attributes of happiness_, those are\nunworthy of God which signify _sorrow_; (unless they be taken not\nfor any passion, but, by a metonomy, for the effect); such as\n_repentance_, _anger_, _pity_. Or _want_; as _appetite_, _hope_,\n_concupiscence_, and that _love_ which is also called _lust_; for\nthey are signs of _poverty_; since it cannot be understood that a\nman should _desire_, _hope_, and _wish_ for aught, but what he wants\nand stands in need of. Or any _passive faculty_; for _suffering_\nbelongs to a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we\ntherefore attribute a _will_ to God, it is not to be conceived like\nunto ours, which is called _a rational desire_; (for if God\n_desires_, he _wants_, which for any man to say, is a contumely);\nbut we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive. In\nlike manner when we attribute _sight_ and other _acts of the sense_\nto him, or _knowledge_, or _understanding_, which in us are nothing\nelse but a tumult of the mind, raised from outward objects pressing\nthe organs; we must not think that any such thing befalls the Deity;\nfor it is a sign of power _depending_ upon some other, which is not\nthe most blessed thing. He therefore who would not ascribe any other\ntitles to God than what reason commands, must use such as are either\n_negative_, as _infinite_, _eternal_, _incomprehensible_, &c.; or\n_superlative_, as _most good_, _most great_, _most powerful_, &c.;\nor _indefinite_, as _good_, _just_, _strong_, _creator_, _king_, and\nthe like; in such sense, as not desiring to declare what he is;\n(which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our\nphantasy); but to confess his own admiration and obedience, which is\nthe property of humility and of a mind yielding all the honour it\npossibly can do. For reason dictates one name alone which doth\nsignify the _nature_ of God, that is, _existent_, or simply, _that\nhe is_; and one in _order_ to, and in _relation_ to us, namely\n_God_, under which is contained both _King_, and _Lord_, and\n_Father_.\n\n[Sidenote: What those actions are, whereby naturally we do give\n worship.]\n\n15. Concerning the _outward actions_ wherewith God is to be\nworshipped, as also concerning his _titles_; it is a most general\ncommand of reason, that they be signs of a mind yielding honour.\nUnder which are contained in the first place, _prayers_.\n\n \u201cQui fingit sacros auro vel marmore vultus,\n Non facit ille deos; qui rogat, ille facit.\u201d\n\nFor _prayers_ are the signs of hope; and hope is an acknowledgment\nof the divine _power_ or _goodness_.\n\nIn the second place, _thanksgiving_; which is a sign of the same\naffection, but that _prayers go before_ the benefit, and _thanks\nfollow it_.\n\nIn the third, _gifts_, that is to say, _oblations_ and _sacrifices_;\nfor these are _thanksgivings_.\n\nIn the fourth, _not to swear by any other_. For a man\u2019s oath is an\nimprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both knows\nwhether he do or not, and can punish him if he do, though he be\nnever so powerful; which only belongs to God. For if there were any\nman from whom his subjects\u2019 _malice_ could not lie hid, and whom no\nhuman power could resist, plighted faith would suffice without\nswearing; which broken, might be punished by that man. And for this\nvery reason there would be no need of an oath.\n\nIn the fifth place, _to speak warily of God_; for that is a sign of\n_fear_, and _fear_ is an acknowledgment of _power_. It follows from\nthis precept, _that we may not take the name of God in vain, or use\nit rashly_; for either are inconsiderate. _That we must not swear,\nwhere there is no need_; for that is in vain. But need there is\nnone, unless it be between cities, to avoid or take away contention\nby force, which necessarily must arise where there is no faith kept\nin promises: or in a city, for the better certainty of judicature.\nAlso, _that we must not dispute of the divine nature_; for it is\nsupposed _that all things in the natural kingdom of God are inquired\ninto by reason only_, that is to say, out of the principles of\nnatural science. But we are so far off by these to attain to the\nknowledge of the nature of God, that we cannot so much as reach to\nthe full understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies, or of\nany other creatures. Wherefore there comes nothing from these\ndisputes, but a rash imposition of names to the divine Majesty\naccording to the small measure of our conceptions. It follows also,\n(which belongs to the right of God\u2019s kingdom), that their speech is\ninconsiderate and rash, who say, _that this or that doth not stand\nwith divine justice_. For even men count it an affront that their\nchildren should dispute their right, or measure their justice\notherwise than by the rule of their commands.\n\nIn the sixth, _whatsoever is offered up in prayers, thanksgivings,\nand sacrifices, must in its kind be the best and most betokening\nhonour_; namely, _prayers_ must not be rash, or light, or vulgar,\nbut beautiful, and well composed. For though it were absurd in the\nheathen to worship God in an image, yet was it not against reason to\nuse poetry and music in their churches.\n\nAlso _oblations must be clean, and presents sumptuous_; and such as\nare significative either of submission or gratitude, or\ncommemorative of benefits received. For all these proceed from a\ndesire of honouring.\n\nIn the seventh, _that God must be worshipped not privately only, but\nopenly and publicly in the sight of all men_; because that worship\nis so much more acceptable, by how much it begets honour and esteem\nin others; as hath been declared before in art. 13. Unless others\ntherefore see it, that which is most pleasing in our worship\nvanisheth.\n\nIn the last place, _that we use our best endeavour to keep the laws\nof nature_. For the undervaluing of our master\u2019s command, exceeds\nall other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, obedience is\nmore acceptable than all other sacrifices.\n\nAnd these are principally the natural laws concerning the worship of\nGod; those, I mean, which reason dictates to every man. But to whole\ncities, every one whereof is one person, the same natural reason\nfurther commands an _uniformity of public worship_. For the actions\ndone by particular persons, according to their private reasons, are\nnot the city\u2019s actions; and therefore not the city\u2019s worship. But\nwhat is done by the city, is understood to be done by the command of\nhim or them who have the sovereignty; wherefore also together with\nthe consent of all the subjects, that is to say, _uniformly_.\n\n[Sidenote: In the natural kingdom of God, the city may appoint what\n worship it pleaseth.]\n\n16. The _natural laws_ set down in the foregoing article concerning\nthe divine worship, only command the giving of natural signs of\nhonour. But we must consider that there are two kinds of signs; the\none _natural_; the other done upon _agreement_, or by express or\ntacit composition. Now because in every language the use of _words_\nand _names_ come by appointment, it may also by appointment be\naltered; for that which depends on and derives its force from the\nwill of men, can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed\nagain or abolished. Such _names_ therefore as are _attributed_ to\nGod by the appointment of men, can by the same appointment be taken\naway. Now what can be done by the appointment of men, that the city\nmay do. The city therefore by right, that is to say, they who have\nthe power of the whole city, shall judge what _names_ or\n_appellations_ are more, what less _honourable_ for God; that is to\nsay, what doctrines are to be held and professed concerning the\nnature of God and his operations. Now actions do signify not by\nmen\u2019s appointment, but naturally; even as the effects are signs of\ntheir causes. Whereof some are always signs of scorn to them before\nwhom they are committed; as those whereby the body\u2019s uncleanness is\ndiscovered, and whatsoever men are ashamed to do before those whom\nthey respect. Others are always signs of honour, as to draw near and\ndiscourse decently and humbly, to give way or to yield in any matter\nof private benefit. In these actions the city can alter nothing. But\nthere are infinite others, which, as much as belongs to honour or\nreproach, are indifferent. Now these, by the institution of the\ncity, may both be made signs of honour, and being made so, do in\nvery deed become so. From whence we may understand, that we must\nobey the city in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign\nof honouring God, that is to say, for _worship_; provided it can be\ninstituted for a sign of honour; because that is a sign of honour,\nwhich by the city\u2019s command is used for such.\n\n[Sidenote: God ruling by nature only, the city, that is to say, that\n man or court which under God hath the sovereignty, is the\n interpreter of all the laws.]\n\n17. We have already declared which were the laws of God, as well\nsacred as secular, in his government by the way of nature only. Now\nbecause there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning, and that\nit so falls out that men are of different opinions concerning the\nmost actions; it may be demanded further, whom God would have to be\nthe _interpreter of right reason_, that is to say, of his laws. And\nas for the _secular_ laws, (I mean those which concern justice and\nthe carriage of men towards men), by what hath been said before of\nthe constitution of a city, we have demonstratively showed it\nagreeable to reason, that all _judicature_ belongs to the city; and\nthat _judicature_ is nothing else but an _interpretation of the\nlaws_; and by consequence, that every where cities, that is to say,\nthose who have the sovereign power, are the _interpreters of the\nlaws_. As for the _sacred_ laws, we must consider what hath been\nbefore demonstrated in chap. V. art. 13, that every subject hath\ntransferred as much right as he could on him or them who had the\nsupreme authority. But he could have transferred his right of\njudging the manner how God is to be honoured; and therefore also he\nhath done it. That he could, it appears hence; that the manner of\nhonouring God before the constitution of a city, was to be fetched\nfrom every man\u2019s _private reason_. But every man can subject his\n_private_ reason to the reason of _the whole city_. Moreover, if\neach man should follow his own reason in the _worshipping_ of God,\nin so great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt to judge\nanother\u2019s worship uncomely, or impious; neither would the one seem\nto the other to honour God. Even that therefore which were most\nconsonant to reason, would not be a _worship_; because that the\nnature of _worship_ consists in this, that it be the _sign of inward\nhonour_. But there is no sign, but whereby somewhat becomes known to\nothers; and therefore is there no sign of honour, but what seems so\nto others. Again, that is a true sign, which by the consent of men\nbecomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable, which by the\nconsent of men, that is to say, by the command of the city, becomes\na sign of honour. It is not therefore against the will of God,\ndeclared by the way of reason only, to give him such signs of honour\nas the city shall command. Wherefore subjects can transfer their\nright of judging the manner of God\u2019s worship, on him or them who\nhave the sovereign power. Nay, they must do it; for else all manner\nof absurd opinions concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous\nceremonies which have been used by any nations, will be seen at once\nin the same city. Whence it will fall out, that every man will\nbelieve that all the rest do offer God an affront; so that it cannot\nbe truly said of any, that he worships God; for no man worships God,\nthat is to say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things,\nwhereby he appears to others for to honour him. It may therefore be\nconcluded, that the _interpretation_ of all laws, as well _sacred_\nas _secular_, (God ruling by the way of _nature_ only), depends on\nthe authority of the city, that is to say, that man or counsel to\nwhom the sovereign power is committed; and that whatsoever God\ncommands, he commands by his voice. And on the other side, that\nwhatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the manner of\nhonouring God, and concerning secular affairs, is commanded by God\nhimself.\n\n[Sidenote: Certain doubts removed.]\n\n18. Against this, some man may demand, first, whether it doth not\nfollow that the city must be obeyed, if it command us directly to\naffront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not follow,\nneither must we obey. For to affront, or not to worship at all,\ncannot by any man be understood for a manner of worshipping. Neither\nalso had any one, before the constitution of a city, of those who\nacknowledge God to rule, a right to deny him the honour which was\nthen due unto him; nor could he therefore transfer a right on the\ncity of commanding any such things. Next, if it be demanded whether\nthe city must be obeyed, if it command somewhat to be said or done,\nwhich is not a disgrace to God directly, but from whence by\nreasoning disgraceful consequences may be derived; as for example,\nif it were commanded to worship God in an image, before those who\naccount that honourable: truly it is to be done.[19] For worship is\ninstituted in sign of honour; but to worship him thus, is a sign of\nhonour, and increaseth God\u2019s honour among those who do so account of\nit. Or if it be commanded to call God by a name, which we know not\nwhat it signifies, or how it can agree with this word _God_; that\nalso must be done. For what we do for honour\u2019s sake, (and we know no\nbetter), if it be taken for a sign of honour, it is a sign of\nhonour; and therefore if we refuse to do it, we refuse the enlarging\nof God\u2019s honour. The same judgment must be had of all the\n_attributes_ and _actions_ about the merely rational worship of God,\nwhich may be controverted and disputed. For though this kind of\ncommands may be sometimes contrary to right reason, and therefore\nsins in them who command them; yet are they not against right\nreason, nor sins in subjects; whose right reason, in points of\ncontroversy, is that which submits itself to the reason of the city.\nLastly, if that man or counsel who hath the supreme power, command\nhimself to be worshipped with the same _attributes_ and _actions_,\nwherewith God is to be worshipped; the question is, whether we must\nobey? There are many things, which may be commonly attributed both\nto God and men; for even men may be _praised_ and _magnified_. And\nthere are many actions, whereby God and men may be worshipped. But\nthe significations of the _attributes_ and _actions_ are only to be\nregarded. Those _attributes_ therefore, whereby we signify ourselves\nto be of an opinion, that there is any man endued with a sovereignty\nindependent from God, or that he is immortal, or of infinite power,\nand the like; though commanded by princes, yet must they be\nabstained from. As also from those _actions_ signifying the same; as\nprayer to the absent; to ask those things which God alone can give,\nas rain and fair weather; to offer him what God can only accept, as\noblations, holocausts; or to give a worship, than which a greater\ncannot be given, as sacrifice. For these things seem to tend to this\nend, that God may not be thought to rule; contrary to what was\nsupposed from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration, or any\nother act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even in civil\nworship; for they may signify an acknowledgment of the civil power\nonly. For divine worship is distinguished from civil, not by the\nmotion, placing, habit, or gesture of the body, but by the\ndeclaration of our opinion of him whom we do worship. As if we cast\ndown ourselves before any man, with intention of declaring by that\nsign that we esteem him as God, it is divine worship; if we do the\nsame thing as a sign of our acknowledgment of the civil power, it is\ncivil worship. Neither is the _divine worship_ distinguished from\n_civil_, by any action usually understood by the words \u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 and\n\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1; whereof the former marking out the _duty_ of servants, the\nlatter their _destiny_, they are words of the same action in degree.\n\nFootnote 19:\n\n _Truly it is to be done._] We said in art. 14 of this chapter,\n that they who attributed limits to God, transgressed the natural\n law concerning God\u2019s worship. Now they who worship him in an\n image, assign him limits. Wherefore they do that which they ought\n not to do. And this place seems to contradict the former. We must\n therefore know first, that they who are constrained by authority,\n do not set God any bounds; but they who command them. For they who\n worship unwillingly, do worship in very deed: but they either\n stand or fall there, where they are commanded to stand or fall by\n a lawful sovereign. Secondly, I say it must be done, not at all\n times and everywhere, but on supposition that there is no other\n rule of worshipping God, beside the dictates of human reason; for\n then the will of the city stands for reason. But in the kingdom of\n God by way of covenant, whether old or new, where idolatry is\n expressly forbid, though the city commands us to worship thus, yet\n must we not do it. Which, if he shall consider, who conceived some\n repugnancy between this and art. 14, will surely cease to think so\n any longer.\n\n[Sidenote: What is sin in the natural kingdom of God, and what\n treason against the divine majesty.]\n\n19. From what hath been said may be gathered, that God reigning by\nthe way of natural reason only, subjects do sin, first if they break\nthe moral laws; which are unfolded in chapters II. and III.\nSecondly, if they break the laws or commands of the city, in those\nthings which pertain to justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1 Fourthly, if they confess not before men, both in\nwords and deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most\nblessed, the Supreme King of the world and of all worldly kings;\nthat is to say, if they do not worship God. This fourth sin in the\nnatural kingdom of God, by what hath been said in the foregoing\nchapter in art. 2, is the _sin of treason against the Divine\nMajesty_. For it is a denying of the Divine Power, or _atheism_. For\nsins proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to be the\nsovereign king, who being himself absent, should rule by his\nviceroy. Against whom sure they would transgress, who should not\nobey his viceroy in all things; except he usurped the kingdom to\nhimself, or would give it to some other. But they who should so\nabsolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be\nsaid to be guilty of treason.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI.\n\n OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD UNDER THE OLD COVENANT.\n\n1. Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted true\n religion by the means of Abraham. 2. By the covenant between God\n and Adam, all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of\n superiors. 3. The manner of the covenant between God and\n Abraham. 4. In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of\n God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham. 5. The\n laws unto which Abraham was tied, were no other beside those of\n nature, and the law of circumcision. 6. Abraham was the\n interpreter of the word of God, and of all laws among those that\n belonged to him. 7. Abraham\u2019s subjects could not sin by obeying\n him. 8. God\u2019s covenant with the Hebrews on Mount Sinai. 9. From\n thence God\u2019s government took the name of a kingdom. 10. What\n laws were by God given to the Jews. 11. What the word of God is,\n and how to be known. 12. What was held the written word of God\n among the Jews. 13. The power of interpreting the word of God,\n and the supreme civil power, were united in Moses while he\n lived. 14. They were also united in the high-priest, during the\n life of Joshua. 15. They were united too in the high-priest\n until king Saul\u2019s time. 16. They were also united in the kings\n until the captivity. 17. They were so in the high-priests after\n the captivity. 18. Denial of the Divine Providence, and\n idolatry, were the only treasons against the Divine Majesty\n among the Jews; in all things else they ought to obey their\n princes.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted\n the true religion by the means of Abraham.]\n\n1. Mankind, from conscience of its own weakness and admiration of\nnatural events, hath this; that most men believe God to be the\ninvisible maker of all invisible things; whom they also fear,\nconceiving that they have not a sufficient protection in themselves.\nBut the imperfect use they had of their reason, the violence of\ntheir passions did so cloud them, that they could not rightly\nworship him. Now the fear of invisible things, when it is severed\nfrom right reason, is superstition. It was therefore almost\nimpossible for men, without the special assistance of God, to avoid\nboth rocks of _atheism_ and _superstition_. For this proceeds from\nfear without right reason; that, from an opinion of right reason\nwithout fear. _Idolatry_ therefore did easily fasten upon the\ngreatest part of men; and almost all nations did worship God in\nimages and resemblances of finite things; and they worshipped\nspirits or vain visions, perhaps out of fear calling them devils.\nBut it pleased the Divine Majesty, as we read it written in the\nsacred history, out of all mankind to call forth Abraham, by whose\nmeans he might bring men to the true worship of him; and to reveal\nhimself supernaturally to him, and to make that most famous covenant\nwith him and his seed, which is called the _old covenant_ or\n_testament_. He therefore is the head of true religion; he was the\nfirst that _after the deluge taught, that there was one God, the\nCreator of the universe_. And from him the _kingdom of God by way of\ncovenants_, takes its beginning. _Joseph. Antiq. Jews_, lib. I..\ncap. 7.\n\n[Sidenote: By the covenant between God and Adam, all dispute is\n forbidden concerning the commands of superiors.]\n\n2. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not only\nnaturally, but also _by way of covenant_, over Adam and Eve; so as\nit seems he would have no obedience yielded to him, beside that\nwhich natural reason should dictate, but _by the way of covenant_,\nthat is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this\n_covenant_ was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the\noriginal of God\u2019s _kingdom_ (which we treat of in this place) is not\nto be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way; that by that\nprecept of not eating of the tree of _the knowledge of good and\nevil_, (whether the judicature of good and evil, or the eating of\nthe fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a most\nsimple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were\n_good_ or _evil_ which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if\nthe command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the\neating of it could be morally _evil_, that is to say, _a sin_.\n\n[Sidenote: The manner of the covenant between God and Abraham.]\n\n3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham was made in this manner,\n(Gen. xvii. 7, 8): _I will establish my covenant between me and\nthee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an\neverlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after\nthee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land\nwherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an\neverlasting possession; and I will be their God._ Now it was\nnecessary to institute some sign, whereby Abraham and his seed\nshould retain the memory of this covenant; wherefore _circumcision_\nwas added to the covenant, but yet as a sign only, (verse 10, 11):\n_This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee, and\nthy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised,\nand ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be\na token of the covenant between me and you._ It is therefore\ncovenanted, that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God and the\nGod of his seed, that is to say, that he shall submit himself to be\ngoverned by him; and that God shall give unto Abraham the\ninheritance of that land wherein he then dwelt but as a pilgrim; and\nthat Abraham, for a memorial sign of this covenant, should take care\nto see himself and his male seed _circumcised_.\n\n[Sidenote: In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of God,\n not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham.]\n\n4. But seeing that Abraham, even before the covenant, acknowledged\nGod to be the Creator and King of the world; (for he never doubted\neither of the _being_ or the _providence_ of God); how comes it not\nto be superfluous, that God would purchase to himself with a price\nand by _contract_ an obedience which was due to him by nature;\nnamely, by promising Abraham the land of Canaan, upon condition that\nhe would receive him for his God; when by the right of nature he was\nalready so? By those words therefore, _to be a God unto thee and to\nthy seed after thee_, we understand not that Abraham satisfied this\n_covenant_ by a bare acknowledgment of the power and dominion which\nGod had naturally over men, that is to say, by acknowledging God\nindefinitely, which belongs to _natural reason_; but he must\ndefinitely acknowledge him, who said unto him, (Gen. xii. 1, 2):\n_Get thee out of thy country; &c._ (Gen. xiii. 14): _Lift up thine\neyes, &c._: who appeared unto him, (Gen. xviii. 1, 2), in the shape\nof three celestial men; and (Gen. xv. 1), in a _vision_; and (verse\n13), in a _dream_, which is _matter of faith_. In what shape God\nappeared unto Abraham, by what kind of sound he spake to him, is not\nexpressed. Yet it is plain that Abraham believed that voice to be\nthe voice of God and a true revelation, and would have all his to\nworship him, who had so spoken unto him, for God the Creator of the\nworld; and that his faith was grounded on this, not that he believed\n_God to have a being_ or _that he was true_ in his promises, that\nwhich all men believe, but that he doubted not him to be God, whose\nvoice and promises he had heard, and that the _God_ of Abraham\nsignified not simply _God_, but _that God which appeared unto him_;\neven as the worship, which Abraham owed unto God in that notion, was\nnot the worship of _reason_, but of _religion_ and _faith_, and that\nwhich not reason, but God had _supernaturally_ revealed.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws to which Abraham was tied were no other, but\n those of nature and that of circumcision.]\n\n5. But we read of no laws given by God to Abraham, or by Abraham to\nhis family, either then or after, secular or sacred; excepting the\ncommandment of _circumcision_, which is contained in the _covenant_\nitself. Whence it is manifest, that there were no other laws or\nworship, which Abraham was obliged to, but the laws of nature,\nrational worship, and circumcision.\n\n[Sidenote: Abraham among his own was the interpreter of the word of\n God and of all laws.]\n\n6. Now Abraham was the _interpreter_ of all _laws_, as well sacred\nas secular, among those that belonged to him; not merely naturally,\nas using the laws of nature only, but even by the form of the\ncovenant itself; in which obedience is promised by Abraham, not for\nhimself only, but for his seed also; which had been in vain, except\nhis children had been tied to obey his commands. And how can that be\nunderstood, which God says (Gen. xviii. 18, 19): _All the nations of\nthe earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him, that he will\ncommand his children and his household after him, and they shall\nkeep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment_: unless his\nchildren and his household were supposed to be obliged to yield\nobedience unto his commands?\n\n[Sidenote: Abraham\u2019s subjects could not sin in obeying him.]\n\n7. Hence it follows, that Abraham\u2019s subjects could not sin in\nobeying him, provided that Abraham commanded them not to deny God\u2019s\n_existence_ or _providence_, or to do somewhat expressly contrary to\nthe honour of God. In all other things, _the word of God_ was to be\nfetched from his lips only, as being the interpreter of all the\n_laws_ and _words_ of God. For Abraham alone could teach them who\nwas the God of Abraham, and in what manner he was to be worshipped.\nAnd they who after Abraham\u2019s death were subject to the sovereignty\nof Isaac or Jacob, did by the same reason obey them in all things\nwithout sin, as long as they acknowledged and professed _the God_ of\nAbraham to be their God. For they had submitted themselves _to God_\nsimply, before they did it to Abraham, and to Abraham before they\ndid it to the God of Abraham: again, to the God of Abraham, before\nthey did it to Isaac. In Abraham\u2019s subjects therefore, to deny God\nwas the only _treason against the divine Majesty_; but in their\nposterity, it was also treason _to deny the God of Abraham_, that is\nto say, to worship God otherwise than was instituted by Abraham, to\nwit, in images made with hands,[20] as other nations did; which for\nthat reason were called _idolaters_. And hitherto, subjects might\neasily enough discern what was to be observed, what avoided in the\ncommands of their princes.\n\nFootnote 20:\n\n _In images made with hands._ In chap. XV. art. 14, there we have\n showed such a kind of worship to be irrational. But if it be done\n by the command of a city, to whom the written word of God is not\n known nor received, we have then showed this worship (in article\n 18) to be rational. But where God reigns by way of covenant, in\n which it is expressly warned not to worship thus, as in the\n covenant made with Abraham; there, whether it be with or without\n the command of the city, it is ill done.\n\n[Sidenote: God\u2019s covenant with the Hebrews at Mount Sinai.]\n\n8. To go on now, following the guidance of the holy Scripture; the\nsame _covenant_ was renewed (Gen. xxvi. 3, 4) with Isaac; and (Gen.\nxxviii. 13, 14) with Jacob; where God styles himself not simply God,\nwhom nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly the _God of\nAbraham and Isaac_. Afterward being about to renew the same\n_covenant_ by Moses with the whole people of Israel, (Exod. iii. 6):\n_I am_, saith he, _the God of thy Father, the God of Abraham, the\nGod of Isaac, and the God of Jacob._ Afterward, when that people,\nnot only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to human\nsubjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their Egyptian bondage,\nabode in the wilderness near mount Sinai, that _ancient covenant_\nwas propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner (Exod. xix.\n5, 6): _Therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my\ncovenant_, (to wit, that covenant which was made with Abraham, Isaac\nand Jacob); _then shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me, above all\npeople; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be to me a kingdom\nof priests, and an holy nation. And all the people answered\ntogether, and said_, (verse 8) _All that the Lord hath spoken, will\nwe do._\n\n[Sidenote: From thence God\u2019s government was called a kingdom.]\n\n9. In this covenant, among other things, we must consider well the\nappellation of _kingdom_, not used before. For although God, both by\n_nature_ and by _covenant_ made with Abraham, was their king, yet\nowed they him an obedience and worship only natural, as being his\nsubjects; and religious, such as Abraham instituted, as being the\nsubjects of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, their natural princes. For\nthey had received no _word of God_ beside the natural word of right\nreason; neither had any _covenant_ passed between God and them,\notherwise than as their wills were included in the will of Abraham,\nas their _prince_. But now by the covenant made at Mount Sinai, the\nconsent of each man being had, there becomes an _institutive kingdom\nof God_ over them. That _kingdom of God_, so renowned in Scriptures\nand writings of divines, took its beginning from this time; and\nhither tends that which God said to Samuel, when the Israelites\nasked a king (1 Sam. viii. 7): _They have not rejected thee, but\nthey have rejected me, that I should not reign over them_; and that\nwhich Samuel told the Israelites (1 Sam. xii. 12): _Ye said unto me,\nnay, but a king shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your\nking_; and that which is said, Jer. xxxi. 31: _I will make a new\ncovenant_, &c. _although I was an husband unto them_; and the\ndoctrine also of Judas Galil\u00e6us, where mention is made in _Josephus\u2019\nAntiq. of the Jews_, (Book xviii. chap. 2), in these words: _But\nJudas Galil\u00e6us was the first author of this fourth way of those who\nfollowed the study of wisdom. These agree in all the rest with the\nPharisees, excepting that they burn with a most constant desire of\nliberty; believing God alone to be held for their Lord and prince;\nand will sooner endure even the most exquisite kinds of torments,\ntogether with their kinsfolks and dearest friends, than call any\nmortal man their Lord._\n\n[Sidenote: What laws were by God given to the Jews.]\n\n10. The right of the kingdom being thus constituted by way of\n_covenant_, let us see in the next place, what _laws_ God propounded\nto them. Now those are known to all, to wit, the _decalogue_, and\nthose other, as well _judicial_ as _ceremonial laws_, which we find\nfrom the twentieth chapter of Exodus to the end of Deuteronomy and\nthe death of Moses. Now of those _laws_, delivered in general by the\nhand of Moses, some there are which oblige _naturally_, being made\nby God, as the _God of nature_, and had their force even before\nAbraham\u2019s time. Others there are which oblige by virtue of the\n_covenant_ made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of\nAbraham, which had their force even before Moses\u2019s time, by reason\nof the former _covenant_. But there are _others_ which oblige by\nvirtue of that covenant only, which was made last with the people\nthemselves; being made by God, as being _the peculiar_ king of the\nIsraelites. Of the first sort are all the precepts of the decalogue\nwhich pertain unto manners; such as, _honour thy parents_, _thou\nshalt not kill_, _thou shalt not commit adultery_, _thou shalt not\nsteal_, _thou shalt not bear false witness_, _thou shalt not covet_;\nfor they are the laws of nature. Also the precept of not taking\n_God\u2019s name in vain_; for it is a part of natural worship, as hath\nbeen declared in the foregoing chapter (art. 15). In like manner the\nsecond commandment, of not worshipping by way of any image made by\nthemselves; for this also is a part of natural religion, as hath\nbeen showed in the same article. Of the second sort is the first\ncommandment of the decalogue, _of not having any other Gods_; for in\nthat consists the essence of the _covenant_ made with Abraham, by\nwhich God requires nothing else, but that he should be his God, and\nthe God of his seed. Also the precept of _keeping holy the Sabbath_;\nfor the sanctification of the seventh day is instituted in memorial\nof the six days\u2019 creation, as appears out of these words (Exod.\nxxxi. 16-17): _It is a perpetual covenant_, (meaning _the Sabbath_),\n_and a sign between me and the children of Israel for ever; for in\nsix days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he\nrested, and was refreshed._ Of the third kind are the _politic_,\n_judicial_, and _ceremonial laws_; which only belonged to the Jews.\nThe _laws_ of the first and second sort written in _tables of\nstone_, to wit, the _decalogue_, was kept in the _ark_ itself. The\nrest written in the _volume_ of the whole law, were laid up in _the\nside of the ark_, (Deut. xxxi. 26). For these, retaining the faith\nof Abraham, might be changed; those could not.\n\n[Sidenote: What the word of God is, and how to be known.]\n\n11. All God\u2019s _laws_ are _God\u2019s word_; but all _God\u2019s word_ is not\nhis _law_. _I am the Lord thy God which brought thee out of the land\nof Egypt_, is the word of God; it is no law. Neither is all that,\nwhich for the better declaring of _God\u2019s word_ is pronounced or\nwritten together with it, instantly to be taken for _God\u2019s word_.\nFor, _Thus saith the Lord_, is not the voice of God, but of the\npreacher or prophet. All that, and only that, is the word of God,\nwhich a true prophet hath declared God to have spoken. Now the\nwritings of the prophets, comprehending as well those things which\nGod, as which the prophet himself speaks, are therefore called the\nword of God, because they contain the word of God. Now because all\nthat, and that alone, is the _word of God_, which is recommended to\nus for such by a true prophet, it cannot be known what _God\u2019s word_\nis, before we know who is the true prophet; nor can we believe\n_God\u2019s word_, before we believe the prophet. Moses was believed by\nthe people of Israel for two things; his _miracles_ and his _faith_.\nFor how great and most evident miracles soever he had wrought, yet\nwould they not have trusted him, at least he was not to have been\ntrusted, if he had called them out of Egypt to any other worship\nthan the worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob their\nfathers. For it had been contrary to the _covenant_ made by\nthemselves with God. In like manner two things there are; to wit,\n_supernatural prediction of things to come_, which is a mighty\nmiracle; and _faith in the God of Abraham, their deliverer out of\nEgypt_; which God proposed to all the Jews to be kept for marks of a\ntrue prophet. He that wants either of these, is no prophet; nor is\nit to be received for God\u2019s word, which he obtrudes for such. If\nfaith be wanting, he is rejected in these words, (Deut. xiii. 1, 2,\n3, 4, 5): _If there arise among you a prophet or a dreamer of\ndreams, and giveth thee a sign, or a wonder; and the sign or the\nwonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go\nafter other gods, &c. that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams shall\nbe put to death._ If prediction of events be wanting, he is\ncondemned by these, (Deut. xviii. 21, 22): _And if thou say in thine\nheart, how shall we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken?\nWhen a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow\nnot nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not\nspoken; but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously._ Now, that\nthat is the word of God which is published for such by a true\nprophet; and that he was held to be a true prophet among the Jews,\nwhose faith was true, and to whose predictions the events answered;\nis without controversy. But what it is, to follow other gods, and\nwhether the events which are affirmed to answer their predictions,\ndo truly answer them or not, may admit many controversies;\nespecially in predictions which obscurely and enigmatically foretel\nthe event; such as the predictions of almost all the prophets are;\nas who saw not God apparently, like unto Moses, but _in dark\nspeeches, and in figures_. (Numb. xii. 8). But of these we cannot\njudge, otherwise than _by the way of natural reason_; because that\njudgment depends on the prophet\u2019s interpretation, and on its\nproportion with the event.\n\n[Sidenote: What was held for the written word of God among the\n Jews.]\n\n12. The Jews did hold the book of the whole law, which was called\n_Deuteronomy_, for _the written word of God_; and that only\n(forasmuch as can be collected out of sacred history) until the\ncaptivity. For this book was delivered by Moses himself to the\npriests, to be kept and laid up in the side of the ark of the\ncovenant, and to be copied out by the kings; and the same a long\ntime after, by the authority of king Josiah (2 Kings xxiii. 2),\nacknowledged again for _the word of God_. But it is not manifest,\nwhen the rest of the books of the Old Testament were first received\ninto canon. But what concerns the prophets, Isaiah and the rest,\nsince they foretold no other things than what were to come to pass,\neither in or after the captivity, their writings could not at that\ntime be held for prophetic; by reason of the law cited above (Deut.\nxviii. 21, 22), whereby the Israelites were commanded not to account\nany man for a true prophet, but him whose prophecies were answered\nby the events. And hence peradventure it is, that the Jews esteemed\nthe writings of those whom they slew when they prophesied, for\nprophetic afterward; that is to say, for the word of God.\n\n[Sidenote: The power of interpreting the word of God, and the\n supreme civil power, were united in Moses while he\n lived.]\n\n13. It being known what laws there were under _the old covenant_,\nand what _word of God_ received from the beginning; we must\nfurthermore consider, with whom the authority of judging, whether\nthe writings of the prophets arising afterward were to be received\nfor the _word of God_; that is to say, whether the events did answer\ntheir predictions or not; and with whom also the authority of\ninterpreting the laws already received, and the written word of God,\ndid reside: which thing is to be traced through all the times and\nseveral changes of the commonwealth of Israel. But it is manifest\nthat this power, during the life of Moses, was entirely in himself.\nFor if he had not been the _interpreter of the laws and word_, that\noffice must have belonged either to _every private person_, or to a\n_congregation_ or _synagogue_ of many, or to the _high-priest_ or to\nother _prophets_. First, that that office belonged not to private\nmen, or any congregation made of them, appears hence; that they were\nnot admitted, nay, they were prohibited with most heavy threats, _to\nhear God speak_, otherwise than by the means of Moses. For it is\nwritten, (Exod. xix. 24, 25): _Let not the priests and the people\nbreak through, to come up unto the Lord, lest he break forth upon\nthem. So Moses went down unto the people, and spake unto them._ It\nis further manifestly and expressly declared, upon occasion given by\nthe rebellion of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and the two hundred and\nfifty princes of the assembly, that neither private men nor the\ncongregation should pretend that God had spoken by them, and by\nconsequence that they had the right of _interpreting God\u2019s word_.\nFor they contending, that God spake no less by them than by Moses,\nargue thus, (Numbers xvi. 3): _Ye take too much upon you, seeing all\nthe congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among\nthem. Wherefore then lift ye up yourselves above the congregation of\nthe Lord?_ But how God determined this controversy, is easily\nunderstood by verses 33 and 35 of the same chapter, where _Corah,\nDathan, and Abiram went down alive into the pit, &c. And there came\nout fire from the Lord, and consumed the two hundred and fifty men\nthat offered incense._ Secondly, that Aaron the high-priest had not\nthis authority, is manifest by the like controversy between him\n(together with his sister Miriam) and Moses. For the question was,\nwhether God spake by Moses only, or by them also; that is to say,\nwhether Moses alone, or whether they also were _interpreters of the\nword of God_. For thus they said, (Numb. xii. 2): _Hath the Lord\nindeed spoken only by Moses? Hath he not also spoken by us?_ But God\nreproved them; and made a distinction between Moses and other\nprophets, saying, (verse 6, 7, 8): _If there be a prophet among you,\nI the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision, and will\nspeak unto him in a dream: my servant Moses is not so, &c. For with\nhim will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark\nspeeches, and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold. Wherefore\nthen were ye not afraid to speak against my servant Moses?_ Lastly,\nthat _the interpretation of the word of God_ as long as Moses lived,\nbelonged not to any other prophets whatsoever, is collected out of\nthat place which we now cited, concerning his eminency above all\nothers; and out of natural reason, for as much as it belongs to the\nsame prophet, who brings the commands of God, to unfold them too;\nbut there was then no other _word of God_, beside that which was\ndeclared by Moses. And out of this also, that there was no other\nprophet extant at that time, who prophesied to the people, excepting\nthe seventy elders who prophesied by _the spirit_ of Moses. And even\nthat Joshua, who was then Moses\u2019 servant, his successor afterward,\nbelieved to be injuriously done, till he knew it was by Moses\u2019\nconsent; which thing is manifest by text of Scripture, (Numb. xi.\n25): _And the Lord came down in a cloud, &c. and took of the spirit\nthat was upon Moses, and gave it unto the seventy elders._ Now after\nit was told that they prophesied, Joshua said unto Moses, _Forbid\nthem, my lord._ But Moses answered: _Why enviest thou for my sake?_\nSeeing therefore Moses alone was the messenger of God\u2019s word, and\nthat the authority of interpreting it pertained neither to _private\nmen_, nor to _the synagogue_, nor to the _high-priest_, nor to other\n_prophets_; it remains that Moses alone was _the interpreter of Gods\nword_, who also had the supreme power in civil matters; and that the\nconventions of Corah with the rest of his complices against Moses\nand Aaron, and of Aaron with his sister against Moses, were raised,\nnot for the salvation of their souls, but by reason of their\nambition and desire of dominion over the people.\n\n[Sidenote: They were also united in the high-priest, during the life\n of Joshua.]\n\n14. In Joshua\u2019s time _the interpretation of the laws_, and _of the\nword of God_, belonged to Eleazar the high-priest; who was also,\nunder God, their absolute king. Which is collected, first of all,\nout of the _covenant itself_; in which the commonwealth of Israel is\ncalled a _priestly kingdom_, or, as it is recited in 1 Peter ii. 9,\na _royal priesthood_. Which could in no wise be said, unless by the\ninstitution and _covenant_ of the people, the regal power were\nunderstood to belong to the _high-priest_. Neither doth this repugn\nwhat hath been said before, where Moses, and not Aaron, had the\nkingdom under God. Since it is necessary, when one man institutes\nthe form of a future commonwealth, that one should govern the\nkingdom which he institutes during his life, (whether it be\n_monarchy_, _aristocracy_, or _democracy_); and have all that power\nfor the present, which he is bestowing on others for the future.\nNow, that Eleazar the priest had not only _the priesthood_, but also\nthe _sovereignty_, is expressly set down in Joshua\u2019s call to the\nadministration. For thus it is written (Numb, xxvii. 18, 19, 20,\n21): _Take thee Joshua the son of Nun, a man in whom is the Spirit,\nand lay thine hand upon him, and set him before Eleazar the priest,\nand before all the congregation, and give him a charge in their\nsight; and thou shalt put some of thine honour upon him, that all\nthe congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient; and he\nshall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him\nafter the judgment of Urim, before the Lord; at his word shall they\ngo out, and at his word shall they come in, and all the children of\nIsrael with him, even all the congregation. Where to ask counsel of\nGod for whatsoever is to be done_, that is, _to interpret God\u2019s\nword_, and in the name of God to command in all matters, belongs to\nEleazar; and _to go out_ and _to come in at his word_, that is to\nsay, to obey, belongs both to Joshua and _to all the people_. It is\nto be observed also, that that speech, _part of thy glory_, clearly\ndenotes that Joshua had not a power equal with that which Moses had.\nIn the meantime it is manifest, that even in Joshua\u2019s time the\nsupreme power and authority of interpreting the word of God, were\nboth in one person.\n\n[Sidenote: They were also united in the high-priest, until king\n Saul\u2019s time.]\n\n15. After Joshua\u2019s death follow the times of the Judges until king\nSaul; in which it is manifest that the right of the _kingdom_\ninstituted by God, remained with the _high-priest_. For the\n_kingdom_ was by covenant _priestly_, that is to say, God\u2019s\ngovernment by priests. And such ought it to have been, until that\nform, with God\u2019s consent, were changed by the people themselves;\nwhich was not done before that requiring a king God consented unto\nthem, and said unto Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 7): _Hearken unto the voice\nof the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not\nrejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign\nover them._ The supreme civil power was therefore _rightly_ due by\nGod\u2019s own institution to the high-priest; but _actually_ that power\nwas in the prophets, to whom (being raised by God in an\nextraordinary manner) the Israelites, a people greedy of prophets,\nsubmitted themselves to be protected and judged, by reason of the\ngreat esteem they had of prophecies. The reason of this thing was,\nbecause that though penalties were set and judges appointed in the\ninstitution of God\u2019s priestly kingdom; yet, the right of inflicting\npunishment depended wholly on private judgment; and it belonged to a\ndissolute multitude and each single person to punish or not to\npunish, according as their private zeal should stir them up. And\ntherefore Moses by his own command punished no man with death; but\nwhen any man was to be put to death, one or many stirred up the\nmultitude against him or them, by divine authority, and saying,\n_Thus saith the Lord._ Now this was conformable to the nature of\nGod\u2019s peculiar kingdom. For there God reigns indeed, where his laws\nare obeyed not for fear of men, but for fear of himself. And truly,\nif men were such as they should be, this were an excellent state of\ncivil government; but as men are, there is a coercive power (in\nwhich I comprehend both right and might) necessary to rule them. And\ntherefore also God, from the beginning, prescribed laws by Moses for\nthe future kings (Deut. xvii. 14-20). And Moses foretold this in his\nlast words to the people, saying (Deut. xxxi. 29): _I know that\nafter my death ye will utterly corrupt yourselves, and turn aside\nfrom the way that I have commanded you_, &c. When therefore\naccording to this prediction there arose another generation (Judges\nii. 10-11) _who knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had\ndone for Israel, the children of Israel did evil in the sight of the\nLord, and served Balaam_; to wit, they cast off God\u2019s government,\nthat is to say, that of the _priest_, by whom God ruled; and\nafterward, when they were overcome by their enemies and oppressed\nwith bondage, they looked for God\u2019s will, not at the hands of the\n_priest_ any more, but of the prophets. These therefore _actually_\njudged Israel; but their obedience was _rightly due_ to the\nhigh-priest. Although therefore the priestly kingdom, after the\ndeath of Moses and Joshua, was without power; yet was it not without\nright. Now that the _interpretation of God\u2019s word_ did belong to the\nsame high-priest, is manifest by this; that God, after the\ntabernacle and the ark of the covenant was consecrated, spake no\nmore in Mount Sinai, but in the tabernacle of the covenant, from the\npropitiatory which was between the _cherubims_, whither it was not\nlawful for any to approach except the high-priest. If therefore\nregard be had to the _right_ of the kingdom, the supreme civil power\nand the authority of interpreting God\u2019s word were joined in the\nhigh-priest. If we consider the _fact_, they were united in the\nprophets who judged Israel. For as _judges_, they had the civil\nauthority; as _prophets_, they interpreted God\u2019s word. And thus\nevery way hitherto these two powers continued inseparable.\n\n[Sidenote: They were united in the kings, until the captivity.]\n\n16. Kings being once constituted, it is no doubt but the _civil\nauthority_ belonged to them. For the kingdom of God by the way of\npriesthood (God consenting to the request of the Israelites) was\nended; which Hierom also marks, speaking of the books of Samuel.\nSamuel, says he, Eli being dead and Saul slain, declares the old law\nabolished. Furthermore, the oaths of the new priesthood and new\nsovereignty in Zadok and David, do testify that the right, whereby\nthe _kings_ did rule, was founded in the very concession of the\npeople. The priest could rightly do whatsoever every man could\nrightly do himself; for the Israelites granted him _a right_ to\n_judge_ of all things, and to _wage war_ for all men; in which two\nare contained all right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man.\n_Our king_ say they (1 Sam. viii. 20) _shall judge us, and go out\nbefore us, and fight our battles_. _Judicature_ therefore belonged\nto the kings. But to _judge_ is nothing else, than by _interpreting_\nto apply the _laws_ to the _facts_. To them therefore belonged the\ninterpretation _of laws_ too. And because there was no other written\nword of God acknowledged beside the _law of_ Moses, until the\ncaptivity; the authority _of interpreting God\u2019s word_ did also\nbelong to the kings. Nay, forasmuch as the word of God must be taken\nfor a law, if there had been another written word beside the\nMosaical law, seeing the interpretation of laws belonged to the\nkings, the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them.\nWhen the book of Deuteronomy, in which the whole Mosaical _law_ was\ncontained, being a long time lost was found again; _the priests_\nindeed asked counsel of God concerning that book, but not by their\nown authority, but by the commandment of Josiah; and not immediately\nneither, but by the means of Holda the prophetess. Whence it appears\nthat the authority of admitting books for the word of God, belonged\nnot to the priest. Neither yet follows it, that that authority\nbelonged to the prophetess; because others did judge of the\nprophets, whether they were to be held for true or not. For to what\nend did God give signs and tokens to all the people, whereby the\ntrue prophets might be discerned from the false; namely, the event\nof predictions, and conformity with the religion established by\nMoses; if they might not use those marks? The authority therefore of\nadmitting books for _the word of God_, belonged to the king; and\nthus that book of the law was approved, and received again by the\nauthority of king Josiah; as appears by the second book of the\nKings, chap, xxii. xxiii.: where it is reported that he gathered\ntogether all the several degrees of his kingdom, _the elders,\npriests, prophets, and all the people; and he read in their ears all\nthe words of the covenant_; that is to say, he caused that\n_covenant_ to be acknowledged for the _Mosaical covenant_; that is\nto say, _for the word of God_; and to be again received and\nconfirmed by the Israelites. The civil power therefore, and the\npower of discerning God\u2019s word from the words of men, and of\ninterpreting God\u2019s word even in the days of the kings, was wholly\nbelonging to themselves. Prophets were sent not with authority, but\nin the form and by the right of proclaimers and preachers, of whom\nthe hearers did judge. And if perhaps these were punished who did\nnot listen to them plainly, teaching easy things; it doth not thence\nfollow, that the kings were obliged to follow all things which they,\nin God\u2019s name, did declare were to be followed. For though Josiah,\nthe good king of Judah, were slain because he obeyed not the word of\nthe Lord from the mouth of Necho king of Egypt; that is to say,\nbecause he rejected good counsel though it seemed to come from an\nenemy; yet no man I hope will say that Josiah was, by any bond\neither of divine or human laws, obliged to believe Pharaoh Necho\nking of Egypt, because he said _that God had spoken to him_. But\nwhat some man may object against kings, that for want of learning\nthey are seldom able enough to interpret those books of antiquity,\nin the which God\u2019s word is contained; and that for this cause, it is\nnot reasonable that this office should depend on their authority; he\nmay object as much against the priests and all mortal men; for they\nmay err. And although priests were better instructed in nature and\narts than other men, yet kings are able enough to appoint such\ninterpreters under them; and so, though kings did not themselves\ninterpret the word of God, yet the office of interpreting them might\ndepend on their authority. And they who therefore refuse to yield up\nthis authority to kings, because they cannot practice the office\nitself, do as much as if they should say, that the authority of\nteaching _geometry_ must not depend upon kings, except they\nthemselves were geometricians. We read that kings have prayed for\nthe people; that they have blessed the people; that they have\nconsecrated the temple; that they have commanded the priests; that\nthey have removed priests from their office; that they have\nconstituted others. Sacrifices indeed they have not offered; for\nthat was hereditary to Aaron and his sons. But it is manifest, as in\nMoses\u2019 lifetime, so throughout all ages, from king Saul to the\ncaptivity of Babylon, that the priesthood was not a maistry, but a\nministry.\n\n[Sidenote: The same were united in the priests, after the\n captivity.]\n\n17. After their return from Babylonian bondage, the _covenant_ being\nrenewed and signed, _the priestly kingdom_ was restored to the same\nmanner it was in from the death of Joshua to the beginning of the\nkings; excepting that it is not expressly set down, that the\nreturned Jews did give up the right of sovereignty either to Esdras,\nby whose direction they ordered their state, or to any other beside\nGod himself. That reformation seems rather to be nothing else, than\nthe bare promises and vows of every man, to observe those things\nwhich were written in the book of the law. Notwithstanding, (perhaps\nnot by the people\u2019s intention), by virtue of the _covenant_ which\nthey then renewed, (for the covenant was the same with that which\nwas made at Mount Sinai), that same state was a _priestly kingdom_;\nthat is to say, the supreme civil authority and the sacred were\nunited in the priests. Now, howsoever through the ambition of those\nwho strove for the priesthood, and by the interposition of foreign\nprinces, it was so troubled till our Saviour Jesus Christ\u2019s time,\nthat it cannot be understood out of the histories of those times,\nwhere that authority resided; yet it is plain, that in those times\nthe power _of interpreting God\u2019s word_ was not severed from the\nsupreme civil power.\n\n[Sidenote: Among the Jews, the denial of the Divine providence and\n idolatry, were the only treasons against the Divine\n Majesty: in all other things they ought to obey their\n princes.]\n\n18. Out of all this, we may easily know how the Jews, in all times\nfrom Abraham unto Christ, were to behave themselves in the commands\nof their _princes_. For as in kingdoms merely human, men must obey a\nsubordinate magistrate in all things, excepting when his commands\ncontain in them some treason; so in the kingdom of God, the Jews\nwere bound to obey their _princes_, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses,\nthe _priest_, the _king_, every one during their time in all things,\nexcept when their commands did contain some treason against _the\nDivine Majesty_. Now treason against the Divine Majesty was, first,\n_the denial of divine providence_; for this was _to deny God to be a\nking by nature_: next, _idolatry_, or the worship not of other, (for\nthere is but one God), but of strange Gods; that is to say, a\nworship though of one God, yet under other _titles_, _attributes_,\nand _rites_, than what were established by Abraham and Moses; for\nthis was to _deny the God of Abraham_ to be their king _by covenant_\nmade with Abraham and themselves. In all other things they were to\nobey. And if a king or priest, having the sovereign authority, had\ncommanded somewhat else to be done which was against the laws, that\nhad been his sin, and not his subject\u2019s; whose duty it is, not to\ndispute, but to obey the commands of his superiors.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII.\n\n OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY THE NEW COVENANT.\n\n1. The prophecies concerning Christ\u2019s dignity. 2. The prophecies\n concerning his humility and passion. 3. That Jesus was that\n Christ. 4. That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not\n the kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God. 5. That the\n kingdom by the new covenant is heavenly, and shall begin from\n the day of judgment. 6. That the government of Christ in this\n world was not a sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by the\n way of doctrine and persuasion. 7. What the promises of the new\n covenant are, on both parts. 8. That no laws are added by\n Christ, beside the institution of the sacraments. 9. Repent ye,\n be baptized, keep the commandments, and the like forms of\n speech, are not laws. 10. It pertains to the civil authority, to\n define what the sin of injustice is. 11. It pertains to the\n civil authority, to define what conduces to the peace and\n defence of the city. 12. It pertains to the civil authority, to\n judge (when need requires) what definitions and what inferences\n are true. 13. It belongs to the office of Christ, to teach\n morally, not by the way of speculation, but as a law; to forgive\n sins, and to teach all things whereof there is no science,\n properly so called. 14. A distinction of things temporal from\n spiritual. 15. In how many several sorts the word of God may be\n taken. 16. That all which is contained in Holy Scripture,\n belongs not to the canon of Christian faith. 17. That the word\n of a lawful interpreter of Holy Scriptures, is the word of God.\n 18. That the authority of interpreting Scriptures, is the same\n with that of determining controversies of faith. 19. Divers\n significations of a Church. 20. What a Church is, to which we\n attribute rights, actions, and the like personal capacities. 21.\n A Christian city is the same with a Christian Church. 22. Many\n cities do not constitute one Church. 23. Who are ecclesiastical\n persons. 24. That the election of ecclesiastical persons belongs\n to the Church, their consecration to pastors. 25. That the power\n of remitting the sins of the penitent, and retaining those of\n the impenitent, belongs to the pastors; but that of judging\n concerning repentance belongs to the Church. 26. What\n excommunication is, and on whom it cannot pass. 27. That the\n interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority of the\n city. 28. That a Christian city ought to interpret Scriptures by\n ecclesiastical pastors.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The prophecies concerning Christ\u2019s dignity.]\n\n1. There are many clear prophecies extant in the Old Testament\nconcerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, who was to restore the kingdom\nof _God_ by a new covenant; partly foretelling his regal _dignity_,\npartly his _humility and passion_. Among others concerning his\ndignity, these. God, blessing Abraham, makes him a promise of his\nson Isaac; and adds (Gen. xvii. 16): _And kings of people shall be\nof him._ Jacob blessing his son Judah (Gen. xlix. 10): _The\nsceptre_, quoth he, _shall not depart from Judah_. God to Moses\n(Deut. xviii. 18): _A prophet_, saith he, _will I raise them up from\namong their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his\nmouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him;\nand it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my\nwords, which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him_.\nIsaiah (Isai. vii. 14): _The Lord himself shall give thee a sign;\nBehold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his\nname Emmanuel._ The same prophet (Isaiah ix. 6): _Unto us a child is\nborn, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his\nshoulders; and his name shall be called wonderful, counsellor, the\nmighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace._ And again\n(Isaiah xi. 1-5): _There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of\nJesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; the spirit of the\nLord shall rest upon him_, &c.; _He shall not judge after the sight\nof his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears; but with\nrighteousness shall he judge the poor_, &c.; _And he shall smite the\nearth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips\nshall he slay the wicked_. Furthermore in the same Isaiah (chapters\nli. to lxii.), there is almost nothing else contained but a\ndescription of the coming and the works of Christ. Jeremiah (Jerem.\nxxxi. 31): _Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a\nnew covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah._\nAnd Baruch (Bar. iii. 35-37): _This is our God_, &c. _Afterward did\nhe show himself upon earth, and conversed with men._ Ezekiel (Ezek.\nxxxiv. 23-25): _I will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall\nfeed them; even my servant David. And I will make with them a\ncovenant of peace_, &c. Daniel (Dan. vii. 13-14): _I saw in the\nnight visions; and behold one like the Son of Man came with the\nclouds of heaven, and came to the ancient of days; and they brought\nhim near before him; and there was given him dominion, and glory,\nand a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve\nhim; his dominion is an everlasting dominion_, &c. Haggai (Haggai\nii. 6-7): _Yet once it is a little while, and I will shake the\nheaven, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land; and I will\nshake all nations; and the desire of all nations shall come._\nZachariah, under the type of Joshua the high-priest (Zach. iii. 8):\n_I will bring forth my servant the branch_, &c. And again (Zach. vi.\n12): _Behold the man whose name is the Branch._ And again (Zach. ix.\n9): _Rejoice greatly O daughter of Zion, shout O daughter of\nJerusalem; behold thy king cometh to thee; he is just, having\nsalvation._ The Jews moved by these and other prophecies, expected\nChrist their king to be sent from God; who should redeem them, and\nfurthermore bear rule over all nations. Yea, this prophecy had\nspread over the whole Roman empire; which Vespasian too, though\nfalsely, interpreted in favour of his own enterprises; _that out of\nJudea should come he that should have dominion_.\n\n[Sidenote: The prophecies of Christ\u2019s humility and passion.]\n\n2. Now the prophecies of _Christ\u2019s humility and passion_, amongst\nothers are these: (Isaiah liii. 4): _He hath borne our griefs, and\ncarried our sorrows; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God,\nand afflicted_; and by and by (verse 7): _He was oppressed, he was\nafflicted, yet he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to\nthe slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearer is dumb, so opened\nhe not his mouth_, &c. And again (verse 8): _He was cut out of the\nland of the living; for the transgression of my people was he\nstricken_, &c. (Verse 12): _Therefore I will divide him a portion\nwith the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong;\nbecause he hath poured out his soul unto death, and he was numbered\nwith the transgressors, and he bare the sin of many, and made\nintercession for the transgressors._ And that of Zachariah (Zach.\nix. 9): _He is lowly, riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal\nof an ass._\n\n[Sidenote: That Jesus was the Christ.]\n\n3. In the reign of Tiberius C\u00e6sar, Jesus our Saviour, a Galilean,\nbegan to preach; the son, as was supposed, of Joseph; declaring to\nthe people of the Jews, that the kingdom of God expected by them was\nnow come, and that himself was a _king_, that is to say, the Christ;\nexplaining the _law_, choosing _twelve apostles_ and _seventy\ndisciples_, after the number of the _princes_ of the tribes, and\nseventy elders (according to the pattern of Moses) to the ministry;\n_teaching the way of salvation_ by himself and them; purging the\ntemple, doing great signs, and fulfilling all those things which the\nprophets had foretold of Christ to come. That this man, hated of the\nPharisees, whose false doctrine and hypocritical sanctity he had\nreproved; and by their means, of the people accused of unlawful\nseeking for the kingdom, and crucified; was the true _Christ_ and\n_king_ promised by God, and sent from his Father to renew the _new\ncovenant_ between them and God; both the evangelists do show,\ndescribing his genealogy, nativity, life, doctrine, death, and\nresurrection; and by comparing the things which he did with those\nwhich were foretold of him, all Christians do consent to.\n\n[Sidenote: That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not the\n kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God.]\n\n4. Now from this, that _Christ_ was sent from God his Father to make\na _covenant_ between him and the people, it is manifest, that though\nChrist were equal to his Father according to his nature, yet was he\ninferior according to the right of the kingdom. For this office, to\nspeak properly, was not that of a king, but of a viceroy; such as\nMoses\u2019 government was; for the kingdom was not his, but his\n_Father\u2019s_. Which Christ himself signified when he was baptized as a\nsubject, and openly professed when he taught his disciples to pray,\n_Our Father, thy kingdom come_, &c.: and when he said (Matth. xxvi.\n29): _I will not drink of the blood of the grape, until that day\nwhen I shall drink it new with you in the kingdom of my Father._ And\nSt. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 22-24): _As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall\nall be made alive; but every man in his own order; Christ the first\nfruits; afterward they that are Christ\u2019s, who believed in his\ncoming; then cometh the end when he shall have delivered up the\nkingdom to God even his Father._ The same notwithstanding is also\ncalled the _kingdom of Christ_: for both the mother of the sons of\nZebedee petitioned Christ, saying (Matth. xx. 21): _Grant that these\nmy two sons may sit, the one on thy right hand, the other on thy\nleft, in thy kingdom_: and the thief on the cross (Luke xxiii. 42):\n_Lord remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom_: and St. Paul\n(Ephes. v. 5): _For this know ye, that no whoremonger_, &c. _shall\nenter into the kingdom of God, and of Christ_: and elsewhere (2 Tim.\niv. 1): _I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, who\nshall judge the quick and dead at his appearing, and his kingdom_,\n&c.: (verse 18): _And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil\nwork, and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom_. Nor is it to\nbe marveled at, that the same kingdom is attributed to them both;\nsince both the Father and the Son are the same God; and the new\ncovenant concerning God\u2019s kingdom, is not propounded in the name of\nthe _Father_; but in the name of the _Father_, of the _Son_, and of\nthe _Holy Ghost_, as of one God.\n\n[Sidenote: That the kingdom of God by the new covenant is heavenly,\n and begins from the day of judgment.]\n\n5. But the kingdom of God, for restitution whereof Christ was sent\nfrom God his Father, takes not its beginning before his second\ncoming; to wit, from the day of judgment, when he shall come in\nmajesty accompanied with his angel. For it is promised the apostles,\nthat in the kingdom of God they shall judge the twelve tribes of\nIsrael, (Matth. xix. 28): _Ye which have followed me in the\nregeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his\nglory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve\ntribes of Israel_: which is not to be done till the day of judgment.\nChrist therefore is not yet in the throne of his majesty; nor is\nthat time, when Christ was conversant here in the world, called a\nkingdom, but a _regeneration_; that is to say, a renovation or\nrestitution of the kingdom of God, and a calling of them who were\nhereafter to be received into his kingdom. And where it is said\n(Matth. xxv. 31-32): _When the Son of man shall come in his glory,\nand all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne\nof his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations; and he\nshall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his\nsheep from the goats_: we may manifestly gather that there will be\nno local separation of God\u2019s subjects from his enemies, but that\nthey shall live mixed together until Christ\u2019s second coming. Which\nis also confirmed by the comparison of the kingdom of heaven with\nwheat mingled with darnell, and with a net containing all sorts of\nfish. But a multitude of men, enemies and subjects, living\npromiscuously together, cannot properly be termed a kingdom.\nBesides, the apostles, when they asked our Saviour, whether he would\nat that time when he ascended into heaven, restore the kingdom unto\nIsrael; did openly testify, that they then, when Christ ascended,\nthought the kingdom of God not to be yet come. Furthermore, the\nwords of Christ, _My kingdom is not of this world_: and, _I will not\ndrink_, &c. _till the kingdom of God come_: and, _God hath not sent\nhis Son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world\nthrough him might be saved_: and, _If any man hear my words, and\nkeep them not, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the world,\nbut to save the world_: and, _Man, who made me a judge or divider\nbetween you?_ and the very appellation of _the kingdom of heaven_\ntestifies as much. The same thing is gathered out of the words of\nthe prophet Jeremiah, speaking of the kingdom of God by the new\ncovenant (Jer. xxxi. 34): _They shall teach no more every man his\nneighbour; saying, Know the Lord. For they shall all know me, from\nthe least of them to the greatest of them, saith the Lord_: which\ncannot be understood of a kingdom in this world. The kingdom of God\ntherefore, for the restoring whereof Christ came into the world; of\nwhich the prophets did prophecy, and of which praying we say, _Thy\nkingdom come_; if it is to have subjects locally separated from\nenemies, if judicature, if majesty, according as hath been foretold;\nshall begin from that time, wherein God shall separate the sheep\nfrom the goats; wherein the apostles shall judge the twelve tribes\nof Israel; wherein Christ shall come in majesty and glory; wherein\nlastly, all men shall so know God, that they shall not need to be\ntaught; that is to say, at Christ\u2019s second coming, or the day of\njudgment. But if the kingdom of God were now already restored, no\nreason could be rendered why Christ, having completed the work for\nwhich he was sent, should come again; or why we should pray, _Thy\nkingdom come_.\n\n[Sidenote: The government of Christ in this world was not a\n sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by way of\n doctrine and persuasion.]\n\n6. Now, although the kingdom _of God_ by Christ to be established\nwith a _new covenant_, were heavenly; we must not therefore think,\nthat they, who believing in Christ would make that covenant, were\nnot so to be governed here on the earth too, as that they should\npersevere in their faith and obedience promised by that covenant.\nFor in vain had the kingdom of heaven been promised, if we were not\nto have been led into it; but none can be led, but those who are\ndirected in the way. Moses, when he had instituted the _priestly\nkingdom_, himself though he were no priest, yet ruled and conducted\nthe people all the time of their peregrination, until their entrance\ninto the promised land. In the same manner is it our Saviour\u2019s\noffice, (whom God in this thing would have like unto Moses), as he\nwas sent from his Father, so to govern the future subjects of his\nheavenly kingdom in this life, that they might attain to and enter\ninto that; although the kingdom were not properly his, but his\nFather\u2019s. But the government whereby Christ rules the faithful ones\nin this life, is not properly a _kingdom_ or _dominion_, but a\n_pastoral charge_, or _the right of teaching_; that is to say, God\nthe Father gave him not a power to judge of _meum_ and _tuum_, as he\ndoth to the kings of the earth; nor a _coercive power_, nor\n_legislative_; but of showing to the world, and teaching them _the\nway and knowledge of salvation_; that is to say, of preaching and\ndeclaring what they were to do, who would enter into the kingdom of\nheaven. That Christ had received no power from his Father to judge\nin questions of _meum_ and _tuum_, that is to say, in all questions\nof right among those who believed not, those words above cited do\nsufficiently declare: _Man, who made me a judge or divider between\nyou?_ And it is confirmed by reason. For seeing Christ was sent to\nmake _a covenant_ between God and men; and no man is obliged to\nperform obedience before the contract be made; if he should have\njudged of questions of _right_, no man had been tied to obey his\nsentence. But that the discerning of right was not committed to\nChrist in this world, neither among the faithful nor among infidels,\nis apparent in this; that that right without all controversy belongs\nto princes, as long as it is not by God himself derogated from their\nauthority. But it is not derogated before the day of judgment; as\nappears by the words of St. Paul, speaking of the day of judgment (1\nCor. xv. 24): _Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up\nthe kingdom to God even the Father, when he shall have put down all\nrule, and all authority, and power._ Secondly, the words of our\nSaviour reproving James and John, when they had said (Luke ix. 54):\n_Wilt thou that we call for fire from heaven, that it may consume\nthem?_ (namely the Samaritans, who had denied to receive him going\nup to Jerusalem): and replying (verse 56), _The Son of man is not\ncome to destroy souls, but to save them_; and those words: _Behold I\nsend you as sheep among wolves_; _Shake off the dust of your feet_;\nand the like; and those words, _God sent not his Son into the world,\nto judge the world, but that the world through him might be saved_;\nand those: _If any man hear my words, and keep them not, I judge him\nnot; for I came not to judge the world_, &c.: do all show, that he\nhad no power given him to condemn or punish any man. We read indeed,\nthat _the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to\nthe Son_; but since that both may, and must be understood of the day\nof future judgment, it doth not at all repugn what hath been said\nbefore. Lastly, that he was not sent to make new laws, and that\ntherefore by his office and mission he was no legislator properly so\ncalled, nor Moses neither, but a bringer and publisher of his\nFather\u2019s laws, (for God only, and neither Moses nor Christ, was a\nking by covenant), is collected hence; that he said, _I came not to\ndestroy_, (to wit, the laws before given from God by Moses, which he\npresently interprets), _but to fulfil_; and, _He that shall break\none of the least of these commandments, and shall teach men so, he\nshall be called least in the kingdom of heaven_. Christ therefore\nhad not a royal or sovereign power committed to him from his Father\nin this world, but councillary and doctrinal only; which himself\nsignifies, as well then when he calls his apostles not hunters, but\nfishers of men; as when he compares the kingdom of God to a grain of\nmustard-seed, and to a little leaven hid in meal.\n\n[Sidenote: What the promises of the new covenant are on both parts.]\n\n7. God promised unto Abraham, first, a numerous seed, the possession\nof the land of Canaan, and a blessing upon all nations in his seed,\non this condition; that he and his seed should serve him: next, unto\nthe seed of Abraham according to the flesh, _a priestly_ kingdom, a\ngovernment most free, in which they were to be subject to no human\npower, on this condition; that they should serve the God of Abraham\non that fashion which Moses should teach: lastly, both to them and\nto all nations, a heavenly and _eternal_ kingdom, on condition that\nthey should serve the God of Abraham on that manner which Christ\nshould teach. For by _the new_, that is to say, _the Christian\ncovenant_, it is covenanted on men\u2019s part, to serve the God of\nAbraham _on that manner which Jesus should teach_: on God\u2019s part,\n_to pardon their sins, and bring them into his celestial kingdom_.\nWe have already spoken of the quality of the _heavenly_ kingdom,\nabove in art. 5; but it is usually called, sometimes the _kingdom of\nheaven_, sometimes the _kingdom of glory_, sometimes the _life\neternal_. What is required on men\u2019s part, namely, to serve God as\nChrist should teach, contains two things; _obedience to be performed\nto God_, (for this is to serve God); and _faith in Jesus_, to wit,\nthat we believe _Jesus to be that Christ who was promised by God_;\nfor that only is the cause why his doctrine is to be followed,\nrather than any other\u2019s. Now in holy Scriptures, _repentance_ is\noften put instead of _obedience_; because Christ teacheth\neverywhere, that with God the will is taken for the deed; but\n_repentance_ is an infallible sign of an obedient mind. These things\nbeing understood, it will most evidently appear out of many places\nof sacred Scripture, that those are the conditions of _the Christian\ncovenant_ which we have named; to wit, giving remission of sins and\neternal life on God\u2019s part; and repenting and believing in Jesus\nChrist, on men\u2019s part. First, the words, (Mark i. 15): _The kingdom\nof God is at hand; Repent ye and believe the gospel_, contain the\nwhole covenant. In like manner those (Luke xxiv. 46-47): _Thus it is\nwritten, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the\ndead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should\nbe preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem._\nAnd those (Acts iii. 19): _Repent and be converted, that your sins\nmay be blotted out when the times of refreshing shall come_, &c. And\nsometimes one part is expressly propounded, and the other\nunderstood, as here (John iii. 36): _He that believeth in the Son,\nhath everlasting life; He that believeth not the Son, shall not see\nlife, but the wrath of God abideth on him_: where _faith_ is\nexpressed, _repentance_ not mentioned; and in Christ\u2019s preaching\n(Matth. iv. 17): _Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand_:\nwhere _repentance_ is expressed, _faith_ is understood. But the\nparts of this _new contract_ are most manifestly and formally set\ndown there, where a certain ruler, bargaining as it were for the\nkingdom of God, asketh our Saviour (Luke xviii. 18): _Good Master,\nwhat shall I do to inherit eternal life?_ But Christ first propounds\none part of the price, namely, observation of the commandments, or\nobedience; which when he answered that he had kept, he adjoins the\nother, saying (verse 22): _Yet lackest thou one thing; Sell all that\nthou hast, and distribute to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure\nin heaven; and come, follow me._ This was matter of _faith_. He\ntherefore not giving sufficient credit to Christ and his heavenly\ntreasures, went away sorrowful. The same covenant is contained in\nthese words (Mark xvi. 16): _He that believeth and is baptized,\nshall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned_: where\n_faith_ is expressed, _repentance_ is supposed in those that are\nbaptized. And in these words (John iii. 5): _Except a man be born\nagain of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom\nof heaven_: where, _to be born of water_, is the same with\nregeneration, that is to say, conversion to Christ. Now that\n_baptism_ is required in the two places cited just before, and in\ndivers others, we must understand, that what _circumcision_ was to\nthe _old covenant_, that _baptism_ is to the _new_. Seeing therefore\nthat was not of the essence, but served for a memorial of the _old\ncovenant_, as a ceremony or sign, (and was omitted in the\nwilderness); in like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to\nthe essence, but in memory and for a sign of the _new covenant_\nwhich we make with God. And provided the will be not wanting, the\nact through necessity may be omitted; but _repentance_ and _faith_,\nwhich are of the essence of the _covenant_, are always required.\n\n[Sidenote: There are no laws added by Christ, beside the institution\n of the sacraments.]\n\n8. In the _kingdom_ of God after this life, there will be _no laws_;\npartly, because there is no room for laws, where there is none for\nsins; partly, because laws were given us from God, not to direct us\nin heaven, but unto heaven. Let us now therefore inquire what laws\nChrist established not himself; for he would not take upon him any\nlegislative authority, as hath been declared above in art. 6; but\npropounded to us for his Father\u2019s. We have a place in Scripture,\nwhere he contracts all the laws of God published till that time,\ninto two precepts. (Matth. xxii. 37, 38, 39, 40): _Thou shalt love\nthe Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, and with\nall thy mind; this is the greatest and first commandment. And the\nsecond is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On\nthese two commandments hang all the law and the prophets._ The first\nof these was given before by Moses in the same words (Deut. vi. 5);\nand the second even before Moses; for it is the natural law, having\nits beginning with rational nature itself: and both together is the\nsum of all laws. For all the laws of divine natural worship, are\ncontained in these words, _Thou shalt love God_; and all the laws of\ndivine worship due by the _old covenant_, in these words, _Thou\nshalt love thy God_, that is to say, _God_, as being the peculiar\n_King of Abraham_ and his seed; and all the laws natural and civil,\nin these words, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself._ For he\nthat loves God and his neighbour, hath a mind to obey all laws, both\ndivine and human. But God requires no more than a mind to obey. We\nhave another place where Christ interprets the laws, namely, the\nfifth, sixth, and seventh entire chapters of St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel.\nBut all those laws are set down either in the _decalogue_ or in the\n_moral law_, or are contained in _the faith of Abraham_; as that law\nof not putting away a wife is contained in _the faith of Abraham_.\nFor that same, _two shall be one flesh_, was not delivered, either\nby Christ first, or by Moses, but by Abraham, who first preached the\ncreation of the world. The laws therefore which Christ contracts in\none place, and explains in another, are no other than those to which\nall mortal men are obliged, who acknowledge the God of Abraham.\nBeside these, we read not of any law given by Christ, beside the\ninstitution of the sacraments of _baptism_ and the _eucharist_.\n\n[Sidenote: That these and the like forms, repent, be baptized, keep\n the commandments, are not laws.]\n\n9. What may be said then of these kind of precepts, _Repent_, _Be\nbaptized_, _Keep the Commandments_, _Believe the Gospel_, _Come unto\nme_, _Sell all that thou hast_, _Give to the poor_, _Follow me_; and\nthe like? We must say that they are not _laws_, but a calling of us\nto the faith: such as is that of Isaiah (lv. 1): _Come; buy wine and\nmilk without money and without price._ Neither if they come not, do\nthey therefore sin against any law, but against prudence only;\nneither shall their infidelity be punished, but their former sins.\nWherefore St. John saith of the unbeliever, _The wrath of God\nabideth on him_; he saith not, _The wrath of God shall come upon\nhim_. And, _He that believeth not, is already judged_; he saith not,\n_shall be_ judged, but _is already_ judged. Nay, it cannot be well\nconceived, that remission of sins should be a benefit arising from\n_faith_, unless we understand also on the other side, that the\npunishment of sins is an hurt proceeding from _infidelity_.\n\n[Sidenote: It belongs to the civil authority, to define what the sin\n of injustice is.]\n\n10. From hence, that our Saviour hath prescribed no distributive\nlaws to the subjects of princes, and citizens of cities; that is to\nsay, hath given no rules whereby a subject may know and discern what\nis _his own_, what _another man\u2019s_, nor by what forms, words, or\ncircumstances a thing must be _given_, _delivered_, _invaded_,\n_possessed_, that it may be known by right to belong to the\n_receiver_, _invader_, or _possessor_: we must necessarily\nunderstand that each single subject (not only with unbelievers,\namong whom Christ himself denied himself to be a _judge_ and\n_distributor_, but even with Christians) must take those rules from\nhis city, that is to say, from that man or council which hath the\nsupreme power. It follows therefore, that by those laws; _Thou shalt\nnot kill_, _Thou shalt not commit adultery_, _Thou shalt not steal_,\n_Honour thy father and mother_; nothing else was commanded, but that\nsubjects, and citizens, should absolutely obey their princes in all\nquestions concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, _their own_ and _others\u2019\nright_. For by that precept, _Thou shalt not kill_, all slaughter is\nnot prohibited; for he that said, _Thou shalt not kill_, said also,\n(Exod. xxxv. 2): _Whosoever doth work upon the sabbath, shall be put\nto death_. No, nor yet all slaughter, the cause not being heard; for\nhe said, (Exod. xxxii. 27): _Slay every man his brother, and every\nman his companion, and every man his neighbour._ (Verse 28): _And\nthere fell of the people about three thousand men._ Nor yet all\nslaughter of an innocent person; for Jephtha vowed (Judges xi. 31):\n_Whosoever cometh forth, &c. I will offer him up for a burnt\noffering unto the Lord_; and his vow was accepted of God. What then\nis forbidden? Only this: that no man kill another, who hath not _a\nright_ to kill him; that is to say, that no man kill, unless it\nbelong to him to do so. The law of Christ therefore concerning\nkilling, and consequently all manner of hurt done to any man, and\nwhat penalties are to be set, commands us to obey the city only. In\nlike manner, by that precept, _Thou shalt not commit adultery_, all\nmanner of copulation is not forbidden; but only that of lying with\n_another man\u2019s wife_. But the judgment, which is another man\u2019s wife,\nbelongs to the city; and is to be determined by the rules which the\ncity prescribes. This precept therefore commands both male and\nfemale to keep that faith entire, which they have mutually given\naccording to the statutes of the city. So also by the precept, _thou\nshalt not steal_, all manner of invasion or secret surreption is not\nforbidden; but of _another man\u2019s only_. The subject therefore is\ncommanded this only, that he invade not nor take away aught which\nthe city prohibits to be invaded or taken away; and universally, not\nto call anything _murder_, _adultery_, or _theft_, but what is done\ncontrary to the civil laws. Lastly, seeing Christ hath commanded us\nto _honour our parents_, and hath not prescribed with what rites,\nwhat appellations, and what manner of obedience they are to be\nhonoured; it is to be supposed that they are to be honoured with the\nwill indeed, and inwardly, as kings and lords over their children,\nbut outwardly, not beyond the city\u2019s permission, which shall assign\nto every man, as all things else, so also _his honour_. But since\nthe nature of justice consists in this, that every man have his own\ngiven him; it is manifest, that it also belongs to a Christian city\nto determine what is justice, what injustice, or a sin against\njustice. Now what belongs to a city, that must be judged to belong\nto him or them who have the sovereign power of the city.\n\n[Sidenote: It belongs to civil authority, to define what conduces to\n the peace and safety of the city.]\n\n11. Moreover, because our Saviour hath not showed subjects any other\nlaws for the government of a city, beside those of nature, that is\nto say, beside the command of obedience; no subject can privately\ndetermine who is a public friend, who an enemy, when war, when\npeace, when truce is to be made, nor yet what subjects, what\nauthority and of what men, are commodious or prejudicial to the\nsafety of the commonweal. These and all like matters therefore are\nto be learned, if need be, from the city, that is to say, from the\nsovereign powers.\n\n[Sidenote: It belongs to the civil authority, to judge, when need\n requires, what definitions and what inferences are true.]\n\n12. Furthermore, all these things, to build castles, houses,\ntemples; to move, carry, take away mighty weights; to send securely\nover seas; to contrive engines, serving for all manner of uses; to\nbe well acquainted with the face of the whole world, the courses of\nthe stars, the seasons of the year, the accounts of the times, and\nthe nature of all things; to understand perfectly all natural and\ncivil rights; and all manner of sciences, which, comprehended under\nthe title of philosophy, are necessary partly to live, partly to\nlive well; I say, the understanding of these (because Christ hath\nnot delivered it) is to be learnt from reasoning; that is to say, by\nmaking necessary consequences, having first taken the beginning from\nexperience. But men\u2019s reasonings are sometimes right, sometimes\nwrong; and consequently, that which is concluded and held for a\ntruth, is sometimes truth, sometimes error. Now errors, even about\nthese philosophical points, do sometimes public hurt, and give\noccasions of great seditions and injuries. It is needful therefore,\nas oft as any controversy ariseth in these matters contrary to\npublic good and common peace, that there be somebody to judge of the\nreasoning, that is to say, whether that which is inferred, be\nrightly inferred or not; that so the controversy may be ended. But\nthere are no rules given by Christ to this purpose, neither came he\ninto the world to teach _logic_. It remains therefore that the\njudges of such controversies, be the same with those whom God by\nnature had instituted before, namely, those who in each city are\nconstituted by the sovereign. Moreover, if a controversy be raised\nof the accurate and proper signification, that is, the definition of\nthose names or appellations which are commonly used; insomuch as it\nis needful for the peace of the city, or the distribution of right,\nto be determined; the determination will belong to the city. For\nmen, by reasoning, do search out such kind of definitions in their\nobservation of diverse conceptions, for the signification whereof\nthose appellations were used at diverse times and for diverse\ncauses. But the decision of the question, whether a man do reason\nrightly, belongs to the city. For example, if a woman bring forth a\nchild of an unwonted shape, and the law forbid to kill a man; the\nquestion is, whether the child be a man. It is demanded therefore,\nwhat a man is. No man doubts but the city shall judge it, and that\nwithout taking an account of Aristotle\u2019s definition, that man is a\nrational creature. And these things, namely, _right_, _policy_, and\n_natural sciences_, are subjects concerning which Christ denies that\nit belongs to his office to give any precepts, or teach any thing\nbeside this only; that in all controversies about them, every single\nsubject should obey the laws and determinations of his city. Yet\nmust we remember this, that the same Christ, as God, could not only\nhave taught, but also commanded what he would.\n\n[Sidenote: It belongs to the office of Christ, to teach morality,\n not as a speculation, but as a law; to forgive sins, and\n to teach all things whereof there is no science properly\n so called.]\n\n13. The sum of our Saviour\u2019s office was, to teach the way and all\nthe means of salvation and eternal life. But justice and civil\nobedience, and observation of all the natural laws, is one of the\nmeans to salvation. Now these may be taught two ways; one, as\n_theorems_, by the way of natural reason, by drawing right and the\nnatural laws from human principles and contracts; and this doctrine\nthus delivered, is subject to the censure of civil powers. The\nother, as laws, by divine authority, in showing the will of God to\nbe such; and thus to teach, belongs only to him to whom the will of\nGod is supernaturally known, that is to say, to Christ. Secondly, it\nbelonged to the office of Christ to forgive sins to the penitent;\nfor that was necessary for the salvation of men who had already\nsinned. Neither could it be done by any other. For remission of sins\nfollows not repentance naturally, as a debt; but it depends, as a\nfree gift, on the will of God supernaturally to be revealed.\nThirdly, it belongs to the office of Christ to teach all those\ncommandments of God, whether concerning his worship, or those points\nof faith which cannot be understood by natural reason, but only by\nrevelation; of which nature are those, _that he was the Christ_;\n_that his kingdom was not terrestrial, but celestial_; _that there\nare rewards and punishments after this life_; _that the soul is\nimmortal_; _that there should be such, and so many sacraments_; and\nthe like.\n\n[Sidenote: A distinction of things temporal from spiritual.]\n\n14. From what hath been said in the foregoing chapter, it is not\nhard to distinguish between things _spiritual_ and _temporal_. For\nsince by _spiritual_, those things are understood, which have their\nfoundation on the authority and office of Christ, and, unless Christ\nhad taught them, could not have been known; and all other things are\ntemporal; it follows, that the definition and determination of what\nis _just_ and _unjust_, the cognizance of all controversies about\nthe _means of peace_ and _public defence_, and the examination of\ndoctrines and books in all manner of _rational science_, depends\nupon _the temporal right_; but those which are _mysteries of faith_,\ndepending on Christ\u2019s word and authority only, their judgments\nbelong to _spiritual right_. But it is reason\u2019s inquisition, and\npertains to _temporal right_ to define what is _spiritual_, and what\n_temporal_; because our Saviour hath not made that distinction. For\nalthough St. Paul in many places distinguish between _spiritual_\nthings and _carnal_ things; and call (Rom. viii. 5: 1 Cor. xii.\n8-10) those things _spiritual_, which are of the _spirit_, to wit,\nthe _word of wisdom_, _the word of knowledge_, _faith_, _the gift of\nhealing_, _the working of miracles_, _prophecy_, _divers kind of\ntongues_, _interpretation of tongues_; all supernaturally inspired\nby the Holy Ghost, and such as the _carnal_ man understands not, but\nhe only who hath known the mind of Christ (2 Cor. ii. 14-16); and\nthose things _carnal_, which belong to worldly wealth (Rom. xv. 27);\nand the men _carnal men_ (1 Cor. iii. 1-3): yet hath he not defined,\nnor given us any rules whereby we may know what proceeds from\nnatural reason, what from supernatural inspiration.\n\n[Sidenote: The word of God many ways taken.]\n\n15. Seeing therefore it is plain that our Saviour hath committed to,\nor rather not taken away from _princes_, and those who in each city\nhave obtained the sovereignty, the supreme authority of judging and\ndetermining all manner of controversies about _temporal_ matters; we\nmust see henceforth to whom he hath left the same authority in\nmatters _spiritual_. Which because it cannot be known, except it be\nout of _the word of God_ and _the tradition of the Church_, we must\nenquire in the next place what _the word of God is_, what _to\ninterpret it_, what a _Church_ is, and what _the will and command of\nthe Church_. To omit that the _word of God_ is in Scripture taken\nsometimes for the _Son of God_, it is used three manner of ways.\nFirst, most properly for that which God hath spoken. Thus,\nwhatsoever God spake unto Abraham, the patriarchs, Moses, and the\nprophets, our Saviour to his disciples, or any others; is _the word\nof God_. Secondly, whatsoever hath been uttered by men on the motion\nor by command of the Holy Ghost; in which sense we acknowledge the\nScriptures to be the _word of God_. Thirdly, in the New Testament\nindeed, the _word of God_ most frequently signifies the doctrine of\nthe gospel, or the _word concerning God_, or _the word of the\nkingdom of God_ by Christ. As where it is said (Matth. iv. 23) that\nChrist preached the _gospel of the kingdom_: where the apostles are\nsaid to preach _the word of God_ (Acts xiii. 46): where the _word of\nGod_ is called _the word of life_ (Acts v. 20): _of the word of the\ngospel_ (Acts xv. 7): _the word of faith_ (Rom. x. 8): _the word of\ntruth_, that is to say, (adding an interpretation) _the gospel of\nsalvation_, (Eph. i. 13): and where it is called _the word of the\napostles_; for St. Paul says (2 Thess. iii. 14): _If any man obey\nnot our word_, &c. Which places cannot be otherwise meant than of\n_the doctrine evangelical_. In like manner, where the word of God is\nsaid to be _sown_, _to increase_, and _to be multiplied_ (Acts xii.\n24: and xiii. 49): it is very hard to conceive this to be spoken of\nthe _voice of God_ or _of his apostles_; but of their doctrine,\neasy. And in this third acception is all that _doctrine of the\nChristian faith_, which at this day is preached in pulpits and\ncontained in the books of divines, _the word of God_.\n\n[Sidenote: All things contained in the Scripture, belong not to the\n canon of Christian faith.]\n\n16. Now the sacred Scripture is entirely _the word of God_ in this\nsecond acception, as being that which we acknowledge to be inspired\nfrom God; and innumerable places of it, in the first. And seeing the\ngreatest part of it is conversant either in the prediction of the\n_kingdom of heaven_, or in prefigurations before the incarnation of\nChrist, or in evangelization and explication after; the sacred\nScripture is also _the word of God_, and therefore the canon and\nrule of all _evangelical doctrine_, in this third signification;\nwhere _the word of God_ is taken for _the word concerning God_, that\nis to say, for _the gospel_. But because in the same Scriptures we\nread many things political, historical, moral, physical, and others\nwhich nothing at all concern the mysteries of our faith; those\nplaces, although they contain true doctrine, and are the canon of\nsuch kind of doctrines, yet can they not be the canon of the\nmysteries of Christian religion.\n\n[Sidenote: The word of a lawful interpreter of Scriptures, is the\n word of God.]\n\n17. And truly, it is not the dead voice or letter of _the word of\nGod_, which is the canon of Christian doctrine; but a true and\ngenuine determination. For the mind is not governed by Scriptures,\nunless they be understood. There is need therefore of an interpreter\nto make the Scriptures canon, and hence follows one of these two\nthings; that either the word of the interpreter is the word of God,\nor that the canon of Christian doctrine is not the word of God. The\nlast of these must necessarily be false; for the rule of that\ndoctrine which cannot be known by any human reason, but by divine\nrevelation only, cannot be less than divine; for whom we acknowledge\nnot to be able to discern whether some doctrine be true or not, it\nis impossible to account his opinion for a rule in the same\ndoctrine. The first therefore is true, _that the word of an\ninterpreter of Scriptures is the word of God_.\n\nThe authority of interpreting Scriptures, is the same with that of\ndetermining controversies of faith.\n\n18. Now that interpreter whose determination hath the honour to be\nheld for _the word of God_, is not every one that translates the\nScriptures out of the Hebrew and Greek tongue, to his Latin auditors\nin Latin, to his French in French, and to other nations in their\nmother tongue; for this is not to interpret. For such is the nature\nof speech in general, that although it deserve the chief place among\nthose signs whereby we declare our conceptions to others, yet cannot\nit perform that office alone without the help of many circumstances.\nFor the living voice hath its interpreters present, to wit, time,\nplace, countenance, gesture, the counsel of the speaker, and himself\nunfolding his own meaning in other words as oft as need is. To\nrecall these aids of interpretation, so much desired in the writings\nof old time, is neither the part of an ordinary wit, nor yet of the\nquaintest, without great learning and very much skill in antiquity.\nIt sufficeth not therefore for interpretation of Scriptures, that a\nman understand the language wherein they speak. Neither is every one\nan authentic interpreter of Scriptures, who writes comments upon\nthem. For men may err; they may also either bend them to serve their\nown ambition; or even resisting, draw them into bondage by their\nforestallings; whence it will follow, that an erroneous sentence\nmust be held for _the word of God_. But although this might not\nhappen, yet as soon as these commentators are departed, their\ncommentaries will need explications; and in process of time, those\nexplications expositions; those expositions new commentaries,\nwithout any end. So as there cannot, in any written interpretation\nwhatsoever, be a canon or rule of Christian doctrine, whereby the\ncontroversies of religion may be determined. It remains, that there\nmust be some canonical interpreter, whose legitimate office it is to\nend controversies begun, by explaining the word of God in the\njudgments themselves; and whose authority therefore must be no less\nobeyed, than theirs who first recommended the Scripture itself to us\nfor a canon of faith; and that one and the same person be _an\ninterpreter of Scripture_, and a _supreme judge of all manner of\ndoctrines_.\n\n[Sidenote: Divers significations of a Church.]\n\n19. What concerns the word _ecclesia_, or Church, originally it\nsignifies the same thing that _concio_ or a congregation does in\nLatin; even as _ecclesiastes_ or churchman, the same that\n_concionator_ or preacher, that is to say, he who speaks to the\ncongregation. In which sense we read in the Acts of the Apostles, of\na _Church confused_, and of a _lawful Church_ (Acts xix, 32-39):\nthat, taken for a concourse of people meeting in way of tumult;\nthis, for a convocated assembly. But in holy writ by a _Church of\nChristians_, is sometimes understood the assembly, and sometimes the\nChristians themselves, although not actually assembled, if they be\npermitted to enter into the congregation and to communicate with\nthem. For example, _Tell it to the Church_, (Matth. xviii. 17), is\nmeant of a Church assembled; for otherwise it is impossible to\n_tell_ any thing to the Church. But _He laid waste the Church_,\n(Acts viii. 3), is understood of a Church not assembled. Sometimes a\nChurch is taken for those who are baptized, or for the professors of\nthe Christian faith, whether they be Christians inwardly or\nfeignedly; as when we read of somewhat said or written to the\nChurch, or said, or decreed, or done by the Church. Sometimes for\nthe elect only, as when it is called _holy and without blemish_\n(Ephes. v. 27). But the elect, as they are militant, are not\nproperly called a Church; for they know not how to assemble; but\nthey are a _future Church_, namely, in that day when severed from\nthe reprobate they shall be triumphant. Again, a Church may be\nsometimes taken for all Christians collectively; as when Christ is\ncalled _the head of his Church_ (Ephes. v. 23); and _the head of his\nbody the Church_ (Coloss. i. 18). Sometimes for its parts; as _the\nChurch of Ephesus_, _the Church which is in his house_, _the seven\nChurches_, &c. Lastly, a Church, as it is taken for a company\nactually assembled, according to the divers ends of their meeting,\nsignifies sometimes those who are met together to deliberate and\njudge; in which sense it is also called a council and a synod;\nsometimes those who meet together in the house of prayer to worship\nGod, in which signification it is taken in the 1 Cor. xiv. 4, 5, 23,\n28, &c.\n\n[Sidenote: What a Church is, to whom we attribute rights, actions,\n and the like appellations proper to a person.]\n\n20. Now a _Church_, which hath personal rights and proper actions\nattributed to it, and of which that same must necessarily be\nunderstood, _Tell it to the Church_, and _he that obeys not the\nChurch_, and all such like forms of speech, is to be defined so as\nby that word may be understood a multitude of men, who have made a\nnew covenant with God in Christ, that is to say, a multitude of them\nwho have taken upon them the sacrament of baptism; which multitude\nmay both lawfully be called together by some one into one place,\nand, he so calling them, are bound to be present either in person or\nby others. For a multitude of men, if they cannot meet in assembly\nwhen need requires, is not to be called _a person_. For a Church can\nneither speak, nor discern, nor hear, but as it is a congregation.\nWhatsoever is spoken by particular men, (to wit, as many opinions\nalmost as heads), that is the speech of one man, not of the Church.\nFurthermore, if an assembly be made, and it be unlawful, it shall be\nconsidered as null. Not any one of these therefore who are present\nin a tumult, shall be tied to the decree of the rest; but specially\nif he dissent. And therefore neither can such a Church make any\ndecree; for then a multitude is said to decree somewhat, when every\nman is obliged by the decree of the major part. We must therefore\ngrant to the definition of a Church, to which we attribute _things\nbelonging to a person_, not only a possibility of assembling, but\nalso of doing it lawfully. Besides, although there be some one who\nmay lawfully call the rest together; yet if they who are called, may\nlawfully not appear; which may happen among men who are not subject\none to another; that same _Church_ is not _one person_. For by what\nright they, who being called to a certain time and place do meet\ntogether, are _one Church_; by the same, others flocking to another\nplace appointed by them, are _another Church_. And every number of\nmen of one opinion is a Church; and by consequence, there will be as\nmany Churches as there are divers opinions; that is to say, the same\nmultitude of men will at once prove to be _one_, and _many\nChurches_. Wherefore a Church is not one, except there be a certain\nand known, that is to say, a lawful power, by means whereof every\nman may be obliged to be present in the congregation, either himself\nin person, or by proxy; and that becomes _one_, and is capable of\n_personal_ functions, by the union of a lawful power of convocating\nsynods and assemblies of Christians; not by uniformity of doctrine;\nand otherwise it is a multitude, and _persons_ in the plural,\nhowsoever agreeing in opinions.\n\n[Sidenote: A Christian city is the same with a Christian Church.]\n\n21. It follows what hath been already said by necessary connexion,\nthat _a city of Christian men_ and a _Church_ is altogether the same\nthing, of the same men, termed by two names, for two causes. For the\n_matter of a city_ and a _Church_ is one, to wit, the same Christian\nmen. And the _form_, which consists in a lawful power of assembling\nthem, is the same too; for it is manifest that every subject is\nobliged to come thither, whither he is summoned by his _city_. Now\nthat which is called a _city_, as it is made up of _men_, the same,\nas it consists of _Christians_, is styled a _Church_.\n\n[Sidenote: Many cities do not constitute one Church.]\n\n22. This too is very coherent with the same points: _if there be\nmany Christian cities, they are not altogether personally one\nChurch_. They may indeed by mutual consent become one _Church_, but\nno otherwise than as they must also become one city. For they cannot\nassemble but at some certain time, and to some place appointed. But\npersons, places, and times, belong to civil right; neither can any\nsubject or stranger lawfully set his foot on any place, but by the\npermission of the city, which is lord of the place. But the things\nwhich cannot lawfully be done but by the permission of the city,\nthose, if they be lawfully done, are done by the city\u2019s authority.\nThe _universal Church_ is indeed one _mystical body_, whereof Christ\nis the head; but in the same manner that all men together,\nacknowledging God for the ruler of the world, are one kingdom and\none city; which notwithstanding is neither one _person_, nor hath it\none common action or determination. Furthermore, where it is said\nthat _Christ is the head of his body the Church_, it manifestly\nappears that that was spoken by the Apostle of the elect; who, as\nlong as they are in this world, are a _Church_ only in _potentia_;\nbut shall not actually be so before they be separated from the\nreprobate, and gathered together among themselves in the day of\njudgment. The Church of Rome of old was very great, but she went not\nbeyond the bounds of her empire, and therefore neither was she\n_universal_; unless it were in that sense, wherein it was also said\nof the city of Rome, _Orbem jam totum victor Romanus habebat_; when\nas yet he had not the twentieth part of it. But after that the civil\nempire was divided into parts, the single cities thence arising were\nso many Churches: and that power which the Church of Rome had over\nthem, might perhaps wholly depend on the authority of those\nChurches, who having cast off the emperors, were yet content to\nadmit the doctors of Rome.\n\n[Sidenote: Who are clergymen.]\n\n23. They may be called _churchmen_, who exercise a public office in\nthe Church. But of offices, there was one a _ministery_, another a\n_maistery_. The offices of the _ministers_, was to serve tables, to\ntake care of the temporal goods of the Church, and to distribute, at\nthat time when all propriety of riches being abolished they were fed\nin common, to each man his portion. The _maisters_, according to\ntheir order, were called some _apostles_, some _bishops_, some\n_presbyters_, that is to say, _elders_; yet not so, as that by the\nname of _presbyter_, the _age_, but the office might be\ndistinguished. For Timothy was a _presbyter_, although a young man.\nBut because for the most part the _elders_ were received into the\n_maistership_, the word, denoting age, was used to signify the\noffice. The same _maisters_, according to the diversity of their\nemployments, were called some of them _apostles_, some _prophets_,\nsome _evangelists_, some _pastors_ or _teachers_. And the\n_apostolical_ work indeed was universal; the _prophetical_, to\ndeclare their own revelations in the Church; the _evangelical_, to\npreach or to be publishers of the gospel among the infidels; that of\nthe _pastors_, to teach, confirm, and rule the minds of those who\nalready believed.\n\n[Sidenote: The election of churchmen belongs to the Church; their\n consecration to the pastors.]\n\n24. In the election of churchmen two things are to be considered;\nthe election of the persons, and their _consecration_ or\ninstitution, which also is called _ordination_. The first twelve\napostles Christ himself both elected and ordained. After Christ\u2019s\nascension, Matthias was elected in the room of Judas the traitor;\nthe Church, which at that time consisted of a congregation of about\none hundred and twenty men, choosing two men: _and they appointed\ntwo_, Joseph and Matthias: but God himself by lot approving of\nMatthias. And St. Paul calls these twelve _the first and great\napostles_; also the apostles _of the circumcision_. Afterward were\nadded two other apostles, Paul and Barnabas; ordained indeed by the\ndoctors and prophets of the Church of Antioch (which was _a\nparticular Church_) by the imposition of hands; but elected by the\ncommand of the Holy Ghost. That they were both apostles, is manifest\nin Acts xiii. 2, 3. That they received their apostleship from hence,\nnamely, because they were separated, by command of the spirit, for\nthe work of God from the rest of the prophets and doctors of the\nChurch of Antioch, St. Paul himself shows; who calls himself, for\ndistinction sake (Rom. i. 1), _an apostle separated unto the Gospel\nof God_. But if it be demanded further, _by what authority_ it came\nto pass, that that was received for the command of the Holy Ghost,\nwhich those prophets and doctors did say proceeded from him; it must\nnecessarily be answered, _by the authority of the Church of\nAntioch_. For the prophets and doctors must be examined by the\nChurch, before they be admitted. For St. John (1 Epist. iv. 1)\nsaith: _Believe not every spirit; but try the spirits, whether they\nare of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the\nworld_. But by what Church, but that to which that epistle was\nwritten? In like manner St. Paul (Gal. ii. 14) reproves the Churches\nof Galatia, because they Judaized; although they seemed to do so by\nthe authority of Peter. For when he had told them, that he had\nreprehended Peter himself in these words: _If thou being a Jew,\nlivest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews; why\ncompellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews_: not long after\nhe questions them, saying (Gal. iii. 2): _This only would I learn of\nyou: received ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the\nhearing of faith?_ Where it is evident, that it was Judaism which he\nreprehended the Galatians for, notwithstanding that the apostle\nPeter compelled them to Judaize. Seeing therefore it belonged to the\nChurch, and not to Peter, and therefore also not to any man, to\ndetermine what doctors they should follow; it also pertained to the\nauthority of the Church of Antioch, to elect their prophets and\ndoctors. Now, because the Holy Ghost separated to himself the\napostles Paul and Barnabas by the imposition of hands from doctors\nthus elected, it is manifest, _that imposition of hands and\nconsecration_ of the prime doctors in each Church, belongs to the\ndoctors of the same Church. But _bishops_, who were also called\n_presbyters_, although all presbyters were not bishops, were\nordained sometimes by _apostles_; for Paul and Barnabas, when they\nhad taught in Derbe, Lystra, and Iconium, ordained _elders_ in every\nChurch (Acts xiv. 23): sometimes by other bishops; for Titus was by\nPaul left in Crete, that he should ordain _elders_ in every city\n(Tit. i. 5). And Timothy was advised (1 Tim. iv. 14) _Not to neglect\nthe gift that was in him, which was given him by prophecy with the\nlaying on of the hands of the presbytery_. And he had rules given\nhim concerning the election of _presbyters_. But that cannot be\nunderstood otherwise, than of the ordination of those who were\nelected by the Church; for no man can constitute a doctor in the\nChurch, but by the Church\u2019s permission. For the duty of the apostles\nthemselves was not to command, but to teach. And although they who\nwere recommended by the apostles or presbyters, were not rejected,\nfor the esteem that was had of the recommenders; yet seeing they\ncould not be elected without the _will_ of the Church, they were\nalso supposed elected by the _authority_ of the Church. In like\nmanner ministers, who are called _deacons_, were _ordained_ by the\napostles; yet _elected_ by the Church. For when the seven deacons\nwere to be elected and ordained, the apostles elected them not: but,\n_look ye out_, say they (Acts vi. 3, 5, 6), _among you, brethren,\nseven men of honest report, &c.: and they chose Stephen, &c.: and\nthey set them before the apostles_. It is apparent therefore by the\ncustom of the primitive Church under the apostles, that the\n_ordination_ or _consecration_ of all churchmen, which is done by\n_prayer_ and _imposition of hands_, belonged to the _apostles_ and\n_doctors_; but the _election_ of those who were to be consecrated,\n_to the Church_.\n\n[Sidenote: The power of remitting sins to the penitent, and\n retaining those of the impenitent, belongs to the\n pastors; but judgment of the repentance, to the Church.]\n\n25. Concerning the power of _binding_ and _loosing_, that is to say,\nof _remitting_ and _retaining of sins_; there is no doubt but it was\ngiven by Christ to the pastors then yet for to come, in the same\nmanner as it was to the present apostles. Now the apostles had all\nthe power _of remitting of sins_ given them, which Christ himself\nhad. _As the Father hath sent me_, says Christ, (John xx. 21), _so\nsend I you_; and he adds (verse 23): _Whose soever_ _sins ye remit,\nthey are remitted; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are\nretained_. But what _binding_ and _loosing_, or _remitting_ and\n_retaining of sins_, is, admits of some scruple. For first, to\n_retain_ his sins, who being baptized into remission of sins, is\ntruly penitent, seems to be against the very covenant itself of the\nNew Testament; and therefore could not be done by Christ himself,\nmuch less by his pastors. And to _remit_ the impenitent, seems to be\nagainst the will of God the Father, from whom Christ was sent to\nconvert the world and to reduce men unto obedience. Furthermore, if\neach pastor had an authority granted him to _remit_ and _retain_\nsins in this manner, all awe of princes and civil magistrates,\ntogether with all kind of civil government would be utterly\ndestroyed. For Christ hath said it, nay even nature itself dictates,\nthat _we should not fear them who slay the body, but cannot kill the\nsoul; but rather fear him, who can cast both soul and body into\nhell_ (Matth. x. 28). Neither is any man so mad, as not to choose to\nyield obedience rather to them who can remit and retain their sins,\nthan to the powerfulest kings. Nor yet on the other side is it to be\nimagined, that _remission of sins_ is nothing else but an exemption\nfrom ecclesiastical punishments. For what evil hath excommunication\nin it, beside the eternal pains which are consequent to it? Or what\nbenefit is to be received into the Church, if there were salvation\nout of it? We must therefore hold, _that pastors have power truly\nand absolutely to forgive sins; but to the penitent: and to retain\nthem; but of the impenitent_. But while men think that to repent, is\nnothing else, but that every one condemn his actions and change\nthose counsels which to himself seem sinful and blameable; there is\nan opinion risen, that there may be repentance before any confession\nof sins to men, and that repentance is not an effect, but a cause of\nconfession. And thence the difficulty of those, who say that the\nsins of the penitent are already forgiven in baptism, and theirs who\nrepent not, cannot be forgiven at all, is against Scripture, and\ncontrary to the words of Christ, _whose soever sins ye remit_, &c.\nWe must therefore, to resolve this difficulty, know in the first\nplace, that a true acknowledgment of sin is repentance. For he that\nknows he hath sinned, knows he hath erred; but to will an error, is\nimpossible; therefore he that knows he hath sinned, wishes he had\nnot done it; which is to repent. Further, where it may be doubtful\nwhether that which is done be a sin or not, we must consider, that\nrepentance doth not precede confession of sins, but is subsequent to\nit: for there is no repentance but of sins acknowledged. The\npenitent therefore must both acknowledge the fact, and know it to be\na sin, that is to say, against the law. If a man therefore think,\nthat what he hath done is not against the law, it is impossible he\nshould repent of it. Before repentance therefore, it is necessary\nthere be an application of the facts unto the law. But it is in vain\nto apply the facts unto the law without an interpreter: for not the\nwords of the law, but the sentence of the law-giver is the rule of\nmen\u2019s actions. But surely either one man, or some men are the\ninterpreters of the law; for every man is not judge of his own fact,\nwhether it be a sin or not. Wherefore the fact, of which we doubt\nwhether it be a sin or not, must be unfolded before some man or men;\nand the doing of this is confession. Now when the interpreter of the\nlaw hath judged the fact to be a sin, if the sinner submit to his\njudgment and resolve with himself not to do so any more, it is\nrepentance; and thus, either it is not true repentance, or else it\nis not antecedent, but subsequent to confession. These things being\nthus explained, it is not hard to understand what kind of power that\nof _binding_ and _loosing_ is. For seeing in remission of sins there\nare two things considerable; one, the _judgment_ or _condemnation_\nwhereby the fact is judged to be a sin; the other, when the party\ncondemned does acquiesce and obey the sentence, that is to say,\nrepents, _the remission of the sin_; or, if he repent not, _the\nretention_: the first of these, that is to say, the judging whether\nit be a sin or not, belongs _to the interpreter of the law_, that\nis, the _sovereign judge_; the second, namely, remission or\nretention of the sin, _to the pastor_; and it is that, concerning\nwhich the power _of binding_ and _loosing_ is conversant. And that\nthis was the true meaning of our Saviour Christ in the institution\nof the same power, is apparent in Matth. xviii. 15-18, thus. He\nthere speaking to his disciples, says: _If thy brother sin against\nthee, go and tell him his fault between him and thee alone_. Where\nwe must observe by the way, that _if thy brother sin against thee_,\nis the same with, _if he do thee injury_; and therefore Christ spake\nof those matters which belonged to the civil tribunal. He adds; _if\nhe hear thee not_, (that is to say, if he deny that he hath done it,\nor if having confessed the fact, he denies it to be unjustly done),\n_take with thee yet one or two; and if he refuse to hear them, tell\nit to the Church_. But why to the Church, except that she might\njudge whether it were a sin or not? But if _he refuse to hear the\nChurch_; that is, if he do not submit to the Church\u2019s sentence, but\nshall maintain that to be no sin, which she judges to be a sin; that\nis to say, if he repent not; (for certain it is, that no man repents\nhimself of the action which he conceives not to be a sin); he saith\nnot, _Tell it to the apostles_; that we might know that the\ndefinitive sentence in the question, whether it were a sin or not,\nwas not left unto them; but to the Church. _But let him be unto\nthee_, says he, _as an heathen, or publican_; that is, as one out of\nthe Church, as one that is not baptized, that is to say, as one\nwhose _sins are retained_. For all Christians were baptized into\nremission of sins. But because it might have been demanded, who it\nwas that had so great a power, as that of withholding the benefit of\nbaptism from the impenitent; Christ shows that the same persons, to\nwhom he had given authority to baptize the penitent into the\nremission of sins, and to make them of heathen men Christians, had\nalso authority to retain their sins who by the Church should be\nadjudged to be impenitent, and to make them of Christian men\nheathens: and therefore presently subjoins: _Verily I say unto you,\nwhose soever sins ye shall bind upon earth, they shall be bound also\nin heaven; and whose soever sins ye shall loose upon earth, they\nshall be loosed also in heaven_. Whence we may understand, that the\npower of binding and loosing, or of remitting and retaining of sins,\nwhich is called in another place the power of the keys, is not\ndifferent from the power given in another place in these words\n(Matth. xxviii. 19): _Go, and teach all nations, baptizing them in\nthe name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost_. And\neven as the pastors cannot refuse to baptize him whom the Church\njudges worthy, so neither can they retain his sins whom the Church\nholds fitting to be absolved, nor yet remit his sins whom the Church\npronounceth disobedient. And it is the Church\u2019s part to judge of the\nsin, the pastor\u2019s to cast out or to receive into the Church those\nthat are judged. Thus St. Paul to the Church of Corinth (1 Cor. v.\n12): _Do not ye judge_, saith he, _of those that are within?_ Yet he\nhimself pronounced the sentence of excommunication against the\nincestuous person. _I indeed_, saith he (verse 3), _as absent in\nbody, but present in Spirit_, &c.\n\n[Sidenote: What excommunication is, and on whom it cannot pass.]\n\n26. The act of retaining sins is that which is called by the Church\n_excommunication_, and by St. Paul _delivering over to Satan_. The\nword _excommunication_ sounding the same with \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03ac\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd poiein],\n_casting out of the synagogue_, seems to be borrowed from the\nMosaical law; wherein they who were by the priest adjudged leprous,\nwere commanded (Levit. xiii. 46) to be kept apart out of the camp,\nuntil by the judgment of the priest they were again pronounced\nclean, and by certain rites, among which the washing of the body was\none, were purified. From hence in process of time it become a custom\nof the Jews, not to receive those who passed from Gentilism to\nJudaism, supposing them to be unclean, unless they were first\n_washed_; and those who dissented from the doctrine of the\nsynagogue, they cast out of the synagogue. By resemblance of this\ncustom, those that came to Christianity, whether they were Jews or\nGentiles, were not received into the Church without baptism; and\nthose that dissented from the Church, were deprived of the Church\u2019s\ncommunion. Now, they were therefore said _to be delivered over to\nSatan_, because all that was out of the Church, was comprehended\nwithin his kingdom. The end of this kind of discipline was, that\nbeing destitute for a time of the grace and spiritual privileges of\nthe Church, they might be humbled to salvation; but the effect in\nregard of secular matters, that _being excommunicated_, they should\nnot only be prohibited all congregations or churches, and the\nparticipation of the mysteries, but as being contagious they should\nbe avoided by all other Christians, even more than heathen. For the\napostle allowed to accompany with heathen; but with these, _not so\nmuch as to eat_ (1 Cor. v. 10-11). Seeing then the effect of\n_excommunication_ is such, it is manifest, in the first place, that\n_a Christian city cannot be excommunicated_. For a Christian city is\na Christian Church, (as hath been declared above, in art. 21), and\nof the same extension; but a Church cannot be excommunicated. For\neither she must excommunicate herself, which is impossible; or she\nmust be excommunicated by some other Church; and this, either\n_universal_ or _particular_. But seeing _an universal Church_ is no\n_person_, (as hath been proved in art. 22), and therefore neither\nacts nor does any thing, it cannot _excommunicate_ any man; and a\nparticular Church by excommunicating another Church, doth nothing.\nFor where there is not one common congregation, there cannot be any\nexcommunication. Neither if some one Church (suppose that of\nJerusalem), should have excommunicated another, (suppose that of\nRome), would it any more have excommunicated this, than herself: for\nhe that deprives another of his communion, deprives himself also of\nthe communion of that other. Secondly, _no man can excommunicate the\nsubjects of any absolute government all at once, or forbid them the\nuse of their temples or their public worship of God_. For they\ncannot be excommunicated by a Church, which themselves do\nconstitute. For if they could, there would not only not remain a\nChurch, but not so much as a _commonweal_, and they would be\ndissolved of themselves; and this were not _to be excommunicated_ or\n_prohibited_. But if they be excommunicated by some other Church,\nthat Church is to esteem them as heathen. But no _Christian Church_,\nby the doctrine of Christ, can forbid the heathen to gather together\nand communicate among themselves, as it shall seem good to their\ncities; especially if they meet to worship Christ, although it be\ndone in a singular custom and manner: therefore also not the\n_excommunicated_, who are to be dealt with as heathen. Thirdly, _a\nprince who hath the sovereign power, cannot be excommunicated_. For\nby the doctrine of Christ, neither one nor many subjects together\ncan interdict their prince any public or private places, or deny him\nentrance into any assembly whatsoever, or prohibit him the doing of\nwhat he will with his own jurisdiction. For it is treason among all\ncities, for any one or many subjects jointly to arrogate to\nthemselves any authority over the whole city. But they who arrogate\nto themselves an authority over him who hath the supreme power of\nthe city, do arrogate the same authority over the city itself.\nBesides, a sovereign prince, if he be a Christian, hath this further\nadvantage; that the city whose will is contained in his, is that\nvery thing which we call a Church. The _Church_ therefore\nexcommunicates no man, but whom it excommunicates by the authority\nof the prince. But the prince excommunicates not himself; his\nsubjects therefore cannot do it. It may be indeed, that an assembly\nof rebellious citizens or traitors may pronounce the sentence of\nexcommunication against their prince; but not _by right_. Much less\ncan one prince be excommunicated by another; for this would prove\nnot an excommunication, but a provocation to war by the way of\naffront. For since that is not one Church, which is made up of\ncitizens belonging to two absolute cities, for want of power of\nlawfully assembling them, (as hath been declared before, in art.\n22); they who are of one Church are not bound to obey another, and\ntherefore cannot be excommunicated for their disobedience. Now, what\nsome may say, that princes, seeing they are members of the universal\nChurch, may also by the authority of the universal Church be\nexcommunicated, signifies nothing: because _the universal Church_,\n(as hath been showed in art. 22), is not _one person_, of whom it\nmay be said that _she acted, decreed, determined, excommunicated,\nabsolved_, and the like personal attributes; neither hath she any\ngovernor upon earth, at whose command she may assemble and\ndeliberate. For to be guide of the universal Church, and to have the\npower of assembling her, is the same thing as to be governor and\nlord over all the Christians in the world; which is granted to none,\nbut God only.\n\n[Sidenote: The interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority\n of the city.]\n\n27. It hath been showed above in art. 18, that the authority of\n_interpreting the Holy Scriptures_ consisted not in this, that the\ninterpreter might without punishment expound and explicate his\nsentence and opinion taken thence unto others, either by writing or\nby his own voice; but that others have not a right to do or teach\naught contrary to his sentence; insomuch as _the interpretation_ we\nspeak of, is the same with _the power of defining_ in all manner of\ncontroversies to be determined by sacred Scriptures. Now we must\nshow that that power belongs to each Church; and depends on his or\ntheir authority who have the supreme command, provided that they be\nChristians. For if it depend not on the civil authority, it must\neither depend on the opinion of each private subject, or some\nforeign authority. But among other reasons, the inconveniences that\nmust follow private opinions, cannot suffer its dependance on them.\nOf which this is the chief; that not only all civil obedience would\nbe taken away (contrary to Christ\u2019s precept); but all human society\nand peace would be dissolved (contrary to the laws of nature). For\nseeing every man is his own interpreter of Scripture, that is to\nsay, since every man makes himself judge of what is pleasing and\ndispleasing unto God; they cannot obey their princes, before that\nthey have judged whether their commands be conformable to the word\nof God, or not. And thus either they obey not, or they obey for\ntheir own opinion\u2019s sake; that is to say, they obey themselves, not\ntheir sovereign; civil obedience therefore is lost. Again, when\nevery man follows his own opinion, it is necessary that the\ncontroversies which rise among them, should become innumerable and\nindeterminable; whence there will breed among men, who by their own\nnatural inclinations do account all dissensions an affront, first\nhatred, then brawls and wars; and thus all manner of peace and\nsociety would vanish. We have furthermore for an example, that which\nGod under the old law required to be observed concerning the book of\nthe law; namely, that it should be transcribed and publicly used;\nand he would have it to be the canon of divine doctrine, but the\ncontroversies about it not to be determined by private persons, but\nonly by the priests. Lastly, it is our Saviour\u2019s precept, that if\nthere be any matter of offence between private persons, they should\n_hear the Church_. Wherefore it is the Church\u2019s duty to define\ncontroversies; it therefore belongs not to private men, but to the\nChurch to interpret Scriptures. But that we may know that the\nauthority of _interpreting God\u2019s Word_, that is to say, of\ndetermining all questions concerning God and religion, belongs not\nto any foreign person whatsoever; we must consider, first, what\nweight such a power has in the minds of the citizens, and their\nactions. For no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of\nmen, by a natural necessity, do follow those opinions which they\nhave concerning good and evil, reward and punishment. Whence it\nhappens, that necessarily they would choose rather to obey those, by\nwhose judgment they believe that they shall be eternally happy or\nmiserable. Now, by whose judgment it is appointed what doctrines are\nnecessary to salvation, by their judgment do men expect their\neternal bliss or perdition; they will therefore yield them obedience\nin all things. Which being thus, most manifest it is, that those\nsubjects, who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a foreign\nauthority in those doctrines which are necessary to salvation, do\nnot _per se_ constitute a city, but are the subjects of that foreign\npower. Nor therefore, although some sovereign prince should by\nwriting grant such an authority to any other, yet so as he would be\nunderstood to have retained the civil power in his own hands, shall\nsuch a writing be valid, or transfer aught necessary for the\nretaining or good administration of his command. For by chap. II.\nart. 4, no man is said _to transfer his right, unless he give some\nproper sign, declaring his will to transfer it_. But he who hath\nopenly declared his will to keep his sovereignty, cannot have given\na sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the\nkeeping it. This kind of writing therefore will not be a sign of\nwill, but of ignorance in the contractors. We must consider next,\nhow absurd it is for a city or sovereign to commit the ruling of his\nsubjects\u2019 consciences to an enemy; for they are, as hath been showed\nabove in chap. V. art. 6, in an hostile state, whosoever have not\njoined themselves into the unity of one person. Nor contradicts it\nthis truth, that they do not always fight: for truces are made\nbetween enemies. It is sufficient for an hostile mind, that there is\nsuspicion; that the frontiers of cities, kingdoms, empires,\nstrengthened with garrisons, do with a fighting posture and\ncountenance, though they strike not, yet as enemies mutually behold\neach other. Lastly, how unequal is it to demand that, which by the\nvery reason of your demand you confess to be the right of another. I\nam the interpreter of Scriptures to you, who are the subject of\nanother state. Why? By what covenants passed between you and me? By\ndivine authority. Whence known? Out of holy Scripture: behold the\nbook, read it. In vain, unless I may also interpret the same for\nmyself. That interpretation therefore doth by right belong to me,\nand the rest of my private fellow-subjects; which we both deny. It\nremains therefore that in all _Christian Churches_, that is to say,\nin all _Christian cities_, the _interpretation_ of sacred Scripture,\nthat is to say, the right of determining all controversies, depends\non and derives from the authority of that man or council, which hath\nthe sovereign power of the city.\n\n[Sidenote: A Christian city must interpret Scriptures by clergymen.]\n\n28. Now because there are two kinds of controversies: the one about\nspiritual matters, that is to say, questions of faith, the truth\nwhereof cannot be searched into by natural reason; such are the\nquestions concerning _the nature and office of Christ_, _of rewards\nand punishments to come_, _of the sacraments_, _of outward worship_,\nand the like: the other, about questions of human science, whose\ntruth is sought out by natural reason and syllogisms, drawn from the\ncovenants of men, and definitions, that is to say, significations\nreceived by use and common consent of words; such as are all\nquestions of right and philosophy; for example, when in matter of\nright it is questioned, whether there be _a promise_ and _covenant_,\nor not, that is nothing else but to demand whether such words,\nspoken in such a manner, be by common use and consent of the\nsubjects _a promise_ or _covenant_; which if they be so called, then\nit is true that a contract is made; if not, then it is false: that\ntruth therefore depends on the compacts and consents of men. In like\nmanner, when it is demanded in philosophy, whether the same thing\nmay entirely be in divers places at once; the determination of the\nquestion depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men,\nabout the signification of the word _entire_. For if men, when they\nsay a thing is entirely somewhere, do signify by common consent that\nthey understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere; it is false\nthat the same thing is in divers places at once. That truth\ntherefore depends on the consents of men, and by the same reason, in\nall other questions concerning _right_ and _philosophy_. And they\nwho do judge that anything can be determined, contrary to this\ncommon consent of men concerning the appellations of things, out of\nobscure places of Scripture; do also judge that the use of speech,\nand at once all human society, is to be taken away. For he who hath\nsold a whole field, will say he meant one whole ridge; and will\nretain the rest as unsold. Nay, they take away reason itself; which\nis nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such\nconsent. This kind of questions, therefore, need not be determined\nby the city by way of interpretation of Scriptures; for they belong\nnot to God\u2019s _Word_, in that sense wherein _the Word of God_ is\ntaken for the _Word concerning God_; that is to say, for the\n_doctrine of the gospel_. Neither is he who hath the sovereign power\nin the Church, obliged to employ any _ecclesiastical doctors_ for\nthe judging of any such kind of matters as these. But for the\ndeciding of questions of faith, that is to say, _concerning God_,\nwhich transcend human capacity, we stand in need of a divine\nblessing, (that we may not be deceived at least in necessary\npoints), to be derived from Christ himself by the imposition of\nhands. For, seeing to the end we may attain to eternal salvation we\nare obliged to a supernatural doctrine, and which therefore it is\nimpossible for us to understand; to be left so destitute as that we\ncan be deceived in necessary points, is repugnant to equity. This\ninfallibility our Saviour Christ promised (in those things which are\nnecessary to salvation) to his apostles until the day of judgment;\nthat is to say, to the apostles, and pastors succeeding the\napostles, who were to be consecrated _by the imposition of hands_.\nHe therefore, who hath the sovereign power in the city, is obliged\nas a Christian, where there is any question concerning _the\nmysteries of faith_, to interpret the Holy Scriptures by _clergymen_\nlawfully ordained. And thus in Christian cities, the judgment both\nof _spiritual_ and _temporal matters_ belongs unto the civil\nauthority. And that man or council who hath the supreme power, is\nhead both of _the city_ and _of the Church_; for a _Church_ and _a\nChristian city_ is but one thing.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XVIII.\n\n CONCERNING THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR\n OUR ENTRANCE INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.\n\n1. The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnancy of obeying\n God and men, is to be removed by the distinctions between the\n points necessary and not necessary to salvation. 2. All things\n necessary to salvation, are contained in faith and obedience. 3.\n What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us. 4. What\n faith is, and how distinguished from profession, from science,\n from opinion. 5. What it is to believe in Christ. 6. That that\n article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is necessary to\n salvation; is proved from the scope of the evangelists. 7. From\n the preachings of the apostles. 8. From the easiness of\n Christian religion. 9. From this also, that it is the foundation\n of faith. 10. From the most evident words of Christ and his\n apostles. 11. In that article is contained the faith of the Old\n Testament. 12. How faith and obedience concur to salvation. 13.\n In a Christian city, there is no contradiction between the\n commands of God and of the city. 14. The doctrines which this\n day are controverted about religion, do for the most part relate\n to the right of dominion.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnance of\n obeying God and men, is to be removed by the distinction\n between the points necessary, and not necessary to\n salvation.]\n\n1. It was ever granted, that all authority _in secular matters_\nderived from him who had the sovereign power, whether he were one\nman or an assembly of men. That the same _in spiritual matters_\ndepended on the authority of the _Church_, is manifest by the lastly\nforegoing proofs; and besides by this, that all Christian cities are\nChurches endued with this kind of authority. From whence a man,\nthough but dull of apprehension, may collect, that in _a Christian\ncity_, that is to say, in a city whose sovereignty belongs to a\nChristian prince or council, _all power, as well spiritual as\nsecular, is united under Christ_, and therefore it is to be obeyed\nin all things. But on the other side, _because we must rather obey\nGod than men_, there is a difficulty risen, how obedience may safely\nbe yielded to them, if at any time somewhat should be commanded by\nthem to be done which Christ hath prohibited. The reason of this\ndifficulty is, that seeing God no longer speaks to us by Christ and\nhis prophets in open voice, but by the holy Scriptures, which by\ndivers men are diversely understood; they know indeed what princes\nand a congregated Church do command; but whether that which they do\ncommand, be contrary to the word of God or not, this they know not;\nbut with a wavering obedience between the punishments of temporal\nand spiritual death, as it were sailing between Scylla and\nCharybdis, they often run themselves upon both. But they who rightly\ndistinguish between the things necessary to salvation, and those\nwhich are not necessary, can have none of this kind of doubt. For if\nthe command of the prince or city be such, that he can obey it\nwithout hazard of his eternal salvation, it is unjust not to obey\nthem; and the apostle\u2019s precepts take place (Col. iii. 20-22):\n_Children obey your parents in all things: servants in all things\nobey your masters according to the flesh._ And the command of Christ\n(Matth. xxiii. 2-3): _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses\u2019 chair;\nall things therefore whatsoever they command you, that observe and\ndo._ On the contrary, if they command us to do those things which\nare punished with eternal death, it were madness not rather to\nchoose to die a natural death, than by obeying to die eternally: and\nthen comes in that which Christ says (Matth. x. 28): _Fear not them\nwho kill the body, but cannot kill the soul._ We must see,\ntherefore, what all those things are, which are necessary to\nsalvation.\n\n[Sidenote: All things necessary to salvation, are contained in faith\n and obedience.]\n\n2. Now all things necessary to salvation are comprehended in two\nvirtues, _faith_ and _obedience_. The latter of these, if it could\nbe perfect, would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but\nbecause we have all of us been long since guilty of disobedience\nagainst God in Adam, and besides we ourselves have since actually\nsinned, _obedience_ is not sufficient without _remission of sins_.\nBut this, together with our entrance into the kingdom of heaven, is\nthe reward of _faith_; nothing else is requisite to salvation. For\nthe kingdom of heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say,\nthose who have not performed due _obedience_ to the laws; and not to\nthose neither, if they believe the necessary articles of the\nChristian faith. Now, if we shall know in what points obedience doth\nconsist, and which are the necessary articles of the Christian\nfaith; it will at once be manifest what we must do, and what abstain\nfrom, at the command of cities and of princes.\n\n[Sidenote: What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us.]\n\n3. But by obedience in this place is signified not _the fact_, but\nthe _will_ and _desire_ wherewith we purpose, and endeavour as much\nas we can, to obey for the future. In which sense the word\n_obedience_ is equivalent to _repentance_; for the virtue of\nrepentance consists not in the sorrow which accompanies the\nremembrance of sin; but in our conversion into the way, and full\npurpose to sin no more; without which that sorrow is said to be the\nsorrow not of a penitent, but a desperate person. But because they\nwho love God cannot but desire to obey the divine law, and they who\nlove their neighbours cannot but desire to obey the moral law; which\nconsists (as hath been showed above in chap. III.) in the\nprohibition of _pride_, _ingratitude_, _contumely_, _inhumanity_,\n_cruelty_, _injury_, and the like offences, whereby our neighbours\nare prejudiced; therefore also _love_, or _charity_, is equivalent\nto the word _obedience_. Justice, also, which is a constant will of\ngiving to every man his due, is equivalent with it. But that _faith_\nand _repentance_ are sufficient for salvation, is manifest by the\ncovenant itself of baptism. For they who were by Peter converted on\nthe day of _Pentecost_, demanding him, what they should do: he\nanswered (Acts ii. 38): _Repent and be baptized every one of you, in\nthe name of Jesus, for the remission of your sins._ There was\nnothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptism, that is\nto say, for to enter into the kingdom of God, but _to repent and\nbelieve in the name of Jesus_; for the kingdom of heaven is promised\nby the covenant which is made in baptism. Furthermore, by the words\nof Christ, answering the lawyer who asked him what he should do to\ninherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20): _Thou knowest the\ncommandments: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery_,\n&c.: which refer to obedience; and (Mark x. 21): _Sell all that thou\nhast, and come and follow me_: which relates to faith. And by that\nwhich is said: _The just shall live by faith_; not every man, but\nthe _just_; for _justice_ is the same disposition of will which\n_repentance and obedience_ are. And by the words of St. Mark (i.\n15): _The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand;\nrepent ye, and believe the gospel_; by which words is not obscurely\nsignified, that there is no need of other virtues for our entrance\ninto the kingdom of God, excepting those of _repentance and faith_.\nThe obedience therefore which is _necessarily_ required to\nsalvation, is nothing else but _the will_ or _endeavour_ to obey;\nthat is to say, of doing according to the laws of God; that is, the\nmoral laws, which are the same to all men, and the civil laws; that\nis to say, the commands of sovereigns in _temporal_ matters, and the\necclesiastical laws in _spiritual_. Which two kinds of laws are\ndivers in divers cities and Churches, and are known by their\npromulgation and public sentences.\n\n[Sidenote: What faith is, and how distinguished from profession,\n from science, and from opinion.]\n\n4. That we may understand what the _Christian faith_ is, we must\ndefine _faith_ in general; and distinguish it from those other acts\nof the mind, wherewith commonly it is confounded. The object of\n_faith_ universally taken, namely, _for that which is believed_, is\nevermore a _proposition_, that is to say, a speech affirmative or\nnegative, which we grant to be true. But because propositions are\ngranted for divers causes, it falls out that these kind of\nconcessions are diversely called. But we grant propositions\nsometimes, which notwithstanding we receive not into our minds; and\nthis either for a time, to wit, so long, till by consideration of\nthe consequences we have well examined the truth of them, which we\ncall _supposing_; or also simply, as through fear of the laws, which\nis to _profess_, or _confess_ by outward tokens; or for a voluntary\ncompliance sake, which men use out of civility to those whom they\nrespect, and for love of peace to others, which is _absolute\nyielding_. Now the propositions which we receive for truth, we\nalways grant for some reasons of our own; and these are derived\neither from the _proposition itself_, or from the _person\npropounding_. They are derived from the _proposition itself_, by\ncalling to mind what things those words, which make up the\nproposition, do by common consent usually signify. If so, then the\nassent which we give, is called _knowledge_ or _science_. But if we\ncannot remember what is certainly understood by those words, but\nsometimes one thing, sometimes another seem to be apprehended by us,\nthen we are said to think. For example, if it be propounded that\n_two and three make five_; and by calling to mind, that the order of\nnumeral words is so appointed by the common consent of them who are\nof the same language with us, (as it were, by a certain contract\nnecessary for human society), that _five_ shall be the name of so\nmany unities as are contained in two and three taken together, a man\nassent that this is therefore true, because two and three together\nare the same with five: this assent shall be called knowledge. And\nto know this truth is nothing else, but to acknowledge that it is\nmade by ourselves. For by whose will and rules of speaking the\nnumber || is called two, ||| is called three, and ||||| is called\nfive; by their will also it comes to pass that this proposition is\ntrue, _two and three taken together make five_. In like manner if we\nremember what it is that is called _theft_, and what _injury_; we\nshall understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that\n_theft is an injury_, or not. _Truth_ is the same with a _true\nproposition_; but _the proposition is true_ in which the _word\nconsequent_, which by logicians is called _the predicate_, embraceth\n_the word antecedent_ in its amplitude, which they call _the\nsubject_. And to _know truth_, is the same thing as to _remember_\nthat it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words.\nNeither was it rashly nor unadvisedly said by Plato of old, _that\nknowledge was memory_. But it happens sometimes, that words although\nthey have a certain and defined signification by constitution, yet\nby vulgar use either to adorn or deceive, they are so wrested from\ntheir own significations, that to remember the conceptions for which\nthey were first imposed on things, is very hard, and not to be\nmastered but by a sharp judgment and very great diligence. It\nhappens too that there are many words, which have no proper,\ndetermined, and everywhere the same signification; and are\nunderstood not by their own, but by virtue of other signs used\ntogether with them. Thirdly, there are some words of things\nunconceivable. Of those things, therefore, whereof they are the\nwords, there is no conception; and therefore in vain do we seek for\nthe truth of those propositions, which they make out of the words\nthemselves. In these cases, while by considering the definitions of\nwords we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the\nhope we have of finding it, we think it sometimes true, and\nsometimes false; either of which apart is called _thinking_, and\nalso _believing_; both together, _doubting_. But when our reasons,\nfor which we assent to some proposition, derive not from the\n_proposition itself_, but from the _person propounding_, whom we\nesteem so learned that he is not deceived, and we see no reason why\nhe should deceive us; our assent, because it grows not from any\nconfidence of our own, but from another man\u2019s knowledge, is called\n_faith_. And by the confidence of whom we do believe, we are said\n_to trust them_, or _to trust in them_. By what hath been said, the\ndifference appears, first, between _faith_ and _profession_; for\nthat is always joined with inward assent; this not always. That is\nan inward persuasion of the mind, this an outward obedience. Next,\nbetween _faith_ and _opinion_; for this depends on our own reason,\nthat on the good esteem we have of another. Lastly, between _faith_\nand _knowledge_; for this deliberately takes a proposition broken\nand chewed; that swallows it down whole and entire. The explication\nof words, whereby the matter enquired after is propounded, is\nconducible to knowledge; nay, the only way _to know_, is by\n_definition_. But this is prejudicial to _faith_; for those things\nwhich exceed human capacity, and are propounded to be believed, are\nnever more evident by explication, but, on the contrary, more\nobscure and harder to be credited. And the same thing befalls a man,\nwho endeavours to demonstrate _the mysteries of faith_ by natural\nreason, which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew before he\nwill swallow his wholesome but bitter pills; whence it comes to\npass, that he presently brings them up again; which perhaps would\notherwise, if he had taken them well down, have proved his remedy.\n\n[Sidenote: What it is to believe in Christ.]\n\n5. We have seen therefore what it is _to believe_. But what is it\n_to believe in Christ_? Or what proposition is that, which is the\nobject of our faith in Christ? For when we say, _I believe in\nChrist_, we signify indeed whom, but not what we believe. Now, _to\nbelieve in Christ_ is nothing else but to believe that Jesus is the\nChrist, namely, he who according to the prophecies of Moses and the\nprophets of Israel, was to come into this world _to institute the\nkingdom of God_. And this sufficiently appears out of the words of\nChrist himself to Martha (John xi. 25-27): _I am_, saith he, _the\nresurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were\ndead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me,\nshall never die. Believest thou this? She saith unto him, yea, Lord,\nI believe that thou art the Christ the Son of God, which should come\ninto the world._ In which words, we see that the question,\n_believest thou in me_, is expounded by the answer, _thou art the\nChrist_. To believe in Christ therefore is nothing else but to\nbelieve Jesus himself, saying that he is the Christ.\n\n[Sidenote: That that article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is\n necessary to salvation, is proved out of the scope of the\n evangelists.]\n\n6. _Faith_ and _obedience_ both necessarily concurring to salvation,\nwhat kind of obedience that same is, and to whom due, hath been\nshowed above in art. 3. But now we must enquire what _articles of\nfaith_ are requisite. And I say, that to a Christian[21] there is no\nother article of faith requisite as _necessary_ to salvation, but\nonly this, _that Jesus is the Christ_. But we must distinguish, as\nwe have already done before in art. 4, between _faith_ and\n_profession_. _A profession_, therefore, of more articles, if they\nbe commanded, may be necessary; for it is a part of our _obedience_\ndue to the laws. But we enquire not now what _obedience_, but what\n_faith_ is necessary to salvation. And this is proved, first, out of\nthe scope of the Evangelists, which was, by the description of our\nSaviour\u2019s life, to establish this one article: and we shall know\nthat such was the scope and counsel of the Evangelists, if we\nobserve but the history itself. St. Matthew (chap. i.), beginning at\nhis genealogy, shows that Jesus was of the lineage of David, born of\na virgin: chap, ii., that he was adored by the _wise men_ as king of\nthe Jews; that Herod for the same cause sought to slay him: chap.\niii., iv., that his kingdom was preached both by John the Baptist\nand himself: chapters v. vi. vii., that he taught the laws, not as\nthe Scribes, but as one having authority: chapters viii. ix., that\nhe cured diseases miraculously: chap. x., that he sent his apostles,\nthe preachers of his kingdom, throughout all the parts of Judea to\nproclaim his kingdom: chap. xi., that he commanded the messengers,\nsent from John to enquire whether he were the Christ or not, to tell\nhim what they had seen, namely, the miracles which were only\ncompatible with Christ: chap. xii., that he proved and declared his\nkingdom to the Pharisees and others by arguments, parables, and\nsigns; and the following chapters to xxi., that he maintained\nhimself to be the Christ against the Pharisees: chap. xxi., that he\nwas saluted with the title of king, when he entered into Jerusalem:\nchaps. xxii., xxiii., xxiv., xxv., that he forewarned others of\n_false Christs_; and that he showed in parables what manner of\nkingdom his should be: chaps. xxvi. xxvii., that he was taken and\naccused for this reason, because he said he was a king; and that a\ntitle was written on his cross, _this is Jesus the king of the\nJews_: lastly, chap. xxviii., that after his resurrection, he told\nhis apostles that all power was given unto him both in heaven and in\nearth. All which tends to this end; that we should believe Jesus to\nbe the Christ. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew in\ndescribing his gospel. But such as his was, such also was the rest\nof the Evangelists; which St. John sets down expressly in the end of\nhis gospel (John xx. 31): _These things_, saith he, _are written,\nthat ye may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living\nGod_.\n\nFootnote 21:\n\n _I say, that to a Christian._] Although I conceive this assertion\n to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought\n it worth my labour to make a more ample explication of it; because\n I perceive that being somewhat new, it may possibly be distasteful\n to many divines. First therefore, when I say this article, _that\n Jesus is the Christ_, is necessary to salvation; I say not that\n faith only is necessary, but I require justice also, or that\n obedience which is due to the laws of God; that is to say, a will\n to live righteously. Secondly, I deny not but the profession of\n many articles, provided that that profession be commanded by the\n Church, is also necessary to salvation. But seeing faith is\n internal, profession external, I say that the former only is\n properly faith; the latter a part of obedience; insomuch as that\n article alone sufficeth for inward belief, but is not sufficient\n for the outward profession of a Christian. Lastly, even as if I\n had said that true and inward repentance of sins was only\n necessary to salvation, yet were it not to be held for a paradox;\n because we suppose justice, obedience, and a mind reformed in all\n manner of virtues to be contained in it. So when I say that the\n faith of one article is sufficient to salvation, it may well be\n less wondered at; seeing that in it so many other articles are\n contained. For these words, _Jesus is the Christ_, do signify that\n Jesus was that person, whom God had promised by his prophets\n should come into the world to establish his kingdom; that is to\n say, that Jesus is the Son of God, the creator of heaven and\n earth, born of a virgin, dying for the sins of them who should\n believe in him; that he was Christ, that is to say, a king; that\n he revived (for else he were not like to reign) to judge the\n world, and to reward every one according to his works (for\n otherwise he cannot be a king); also that men shall rise again,\n for otherwise they are not like to come to judgment. The whole\n symbol of the apostles is therefore contained in this one article.\n Which, notwithstanding, I thought reasonable to contract thus;\n because I found that many men for this alone, without the rest,\n were admitted into the kingdom of God, both by Christ and his\n apostles; as the thief on the cross, the eunuch baptized by\n Philip, the two thousand men converted to the Church at once by\n St. Peter. But if any man be displeased that I do not judge all\n those eternally damned, who do not inwardly assent to every\n article defined by the Church, and yet do not contradict, but, if\n they be commanded, do submit: I know not what I shall say to them.\n For the most evident testimonies of Holy Writ, which do follow, do\n withhold me from altering my opinion.\n\n[Sidenote: By the apostles\u2019 sermons.]\n\n7. Secondly, this is proved by the preaching of the apostles. For\nthey were the proclaimers of his kingdom; neither did Christ send\nthem to preach aught but the kingdom of God (Luke ix. 2: Acts x.\n42). And what they did after Christ\u2019s ascension, may be understood\nby the accusation which was brought against them (Acts xvii. 6-7):\n_They drew Jason_, saith St. Luke, _and certain brethren unto the\nrulers of the city, crying, these are the men that have turned the\nworld upside down, and are come hither also, whom Jason hath\nreceived; and these all do contrary to the decrees of C\u00e6sar, saying\nthat there is another king, one Jesus_. It appears also, what the\nsubject of the apostle\u2019s sermon was, out of these words (Acts xvii.\n2-3): _Opening and alleging out of the Scriptures_ (to wit, of the\nOld Testament) _that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again\nfrom the dead; and that this Jesus is the Christ_.\n\n[Sidenote: By the easiness of Christian religion.]\n\n8. Thirdly, by the places, in which the easiness of those things,\nwhich are required by Christ to the attaining of salvation, is\ndeclared. For if an internal assent of the mind were necessarily\nrequired to the truth of all and each proposition, which this day is\ncontroverted about the Christian faith, or by divers churches is\ndiversely defined; there would be nothing more difficult than the\nChristian religion. And how then would that be true (Matth. xi. 30):\n_My yoke is easy and my burden light_; and that (Matth. xviii. 6):\n_little ones do believe in him_; and that (1 Cor. i. 21): _it\npleased God by the foolishness of preaching, to save those that\nbelieve_? Or how was the thief hanging on the cross sufficiently\ninstructed to salvation, the confession of whose faith was contained\nin these words: _Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy\nkingdom_? Or how could St. Paul himself, from an enemy, so soon\nbecome a doctor of Christians?\n\n[Sidenote: By this, that it is the foundation of faith.]\n\n9. Fourthly, by this, that that article is the foundation of faith;\nneither rests it on any other foundation. Matth. xxiv. 23, 24: _If\nany man shall say unto you, Lo here is Christ, or he is there;\nbelieve it not. For there shall arise false Christs and false\nprophets, and shall show great signs and wonders_, &c. Whence it\nfollows, that for the faith\u2019s sake which we have in this article, we\nmust not believe any signs and wonders. Gal. i. 8: _Although we or\nan angel from heaven_, saith the apostle, _should preach to you any\nother gospel, than what we have preached; let him be accursed_. By\nreason of this article, therefore, we might not trust the very\napostles and angels themselves, and therefore, I conceive, not the\nChurch neither, if they should teach the contrary. 1 John iv. 1-2:\n_Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they\nare of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world.\nHereby know ye the spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth Jesus\nChrist is come in the flesh, is of God_, &c. That article therefore\nis the measure of the spirits, whereby the authority of the doctors\nis either received, or rejected. It cannot be denied, indeed, but\nthat all who at this day are Christians, did learn from the doctors\nthat it was Jesus, who did all those things whereby he might be\nacknowledged to be the Christ. Yet it follows not, that the same\npersons believed that article for the doctor\u2019s or the Church\u2019s, but\nfor Jesus\u2019 own sake. For that article was before _the Christian\nChurch_, (Matth. xvi. 18), although all the rest were after it; and\nthe Church was founded upon it, not it upon the Church. Besides,\nthis article, that _Jesus is the Christ_, is so fundamental, that\nall the rest are by St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 11-15) said to be built\nupon it: _For other foundation can no man lay, than that which is\nlaid; which is Jesus Christ_; that is to say, that _Jesus is the\nChrist. Now if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver,\nprecious stones, wood, hay, stubble; every man\u2019s work shall be made\nmanifest; if any man\u2019s work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he\nshall receive a reward; if any man\u2019s work shall be burnt, he shall\nsuffer loss, but he himself shall be saved._ From whence it plainly\nappears, that by _foundation_ is understood this article, _that\nJesus is the Christ_: for gold, and silver, precious stones, wood,\nhay, stubble, whereby the doctrines are signified, are not built\nupon the person of Christ: and also, that false doctrines may be\nraised upon this foundation; yet not so as they must necessarily be\ndamned who teach them.\n\n[Sidenote: By the plain words of Christ and his apostles.]\n\n10. Lastly, that this article alone is needful to be inwardly\nbelieved, may be most evidently proved out of many places of holy\nScripture, let who will be the interpreter. John v. 39: _Search the\nScriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are\nthey which testify of me._ But Christ meant the Scriptures of the\nOld Testament only; for the New was then not yet written. Now, there\nis no other testimony concerning Christ in the Old Testament, but\nthat an eternal king was to come in such a place, that he was to be\nborn of such parents, that he was to teach and do such things\nwhereby, as by certain signs, he was to be known. All which testify\nthis one thing; that Jesus who was so born, and did teach and do\nsuch things, was the Christ. Other faith then was not required to\nattain eternal life, besides this article, John xi. 26: _Whosoever\nliveth and believeth in me, shall never die._ But to believe in\nJesus, as is there expressed, is the same with believing that Jesus\nwas the Christ. He therefore that believes that, shall never die;\nand by consequence, that article alone is necessary to salvation.\nJohn xx. 31: _These are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is\nthe Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life\nthrough his name._ Wherefore he that believes thus, shall have\neternal life; and therefore needs no other faith. 1 John iv. 2:\n_Every spirit, that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the\nflesh, is of God._ And 1 John v. 1: _Whosoever believeth that Jesus\nis the Christ, is born of God._ And verse 5: _Who is he that\novercometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of\nGod?_ If therefore there be no need to believe anything else, to the\nend a man may be _of God, born of God, and overcome the world_, than\nthat Jesus is the Christ; that one article then is sufficient to\nsalvation. Acts viii. 36-37: _See, here is water; what doth hinder\nme to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine\nheart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus\nChrist is the Son of God._ If then this article being believed with\nthe whole heart, that is to say, with inward faith, was sufficient\nfor baptism; it is also sufficient for salvation. Besides these\nplaces, there are innumerable others, which do clearly and expressly\naffirm the same thing. Nay, wheresoever we read that our Saviour\ncommended the faith of any one, or that he said, _thy faith hath\nsaved thee_, or that he healed any one for his faith\u2019s sake; there\nthe proposition believed was no other but this, _Jesus is the\nChrist_, either directly or consequently.\n\n[Sidenote: In this article is contained the faith of the Old\n Testament.]\n\n11. But because no man can believe _Jesus to be the Christ_, who,\nwhen he knows that by Christ is understood that same king, who was\npromised from God by Moses and the prophets for to be the king and\nSaviour of the world, doth not also believe Moses and the prophets;\nneither can he believe these, who believes not that God is, and that\n_he governs the world_; it is necessary, that the faith of God and\nof the Old Testament be contained in this faith of the New. Seeing\ntherefore that atheism, and the denial of the Divine Providence,\nwere the only treason against the Divine Majesty in the kingdom of\nGod by nature; but idolatry also in the kingdom of God by the old\ncovenant; now in this kingdom, wherein God rules by way of a new\ncovenant, apostacy is also added, or the renunciation of this\narticle once received, that Jesus is the Christ. Truly other\ndoctrines, provided they have their determination from a lawful\nChurch, are not to be contradicted; for that is the sin of\ndisobedience. But it hath been fully declared before, that they are\nnot needful to be believed with an _inward faith_.\n\n[Sidenote: How faith and obedience do concur to salvation.]\n\n12. _Faith_ and _obedience_ have divers parts in accomplishing the\nsalvation of a Christian; for this contributes the _power_ or\n_capacity_, that the _act_; and either is said to justify in its\nkind. For Christ forgives not the sins of all men, but of the\n_penitent_ or the _obedient_, that is to say, the _just_. I say not\nthe _guiltless_, but the _just_; for _justice_ is a will of obeying\nthe laws, and may be consistent with a sinner; and with Christ, the\nwill to obey is obedience. For not every man, but _the just shall\nlive by faith_. _Obedience_ therefore _justifies_, because it\n_maketh just_; in the same manner as temperance maketh temperate,\nprudence prudent, chastity chaste; namely, essentially; and puts a\nman in such a state, as makes him capable of pardon. Again, Christ\nhath not promised forgiveness of sins to all just men; but only\n_those of them who believe him to be the Christ_. _Faith_ therefore\n_justifies_ in such a sense as a judge may be said to _justify_, who\n_absolves_, namely, by the _sentence_ which _actually_ saves a man;\nand in this acception of justification (for it is an equivocal term)\n_faith alone_ justifies; but in the other, _obedience only_. But\nneither obedience alone, nor faith alone, do _save_ us; but both\ntogether.\n\n[Sidenote: In a Christian city there is no contrariety between the\n command of God, and of the city.]\n\n13. By what hath been said hitherto, it will be easy to discern what\nthe duty of Christian subjects is towards their sovereigns; who, as\nlong as they profess themselves Christians, cannot command their\nsubjects to deny Christ, or to offer him any contumely: for if they\nshould command this, they would profess themselves to be no\nChristians. For seeing we have showed, both by natural reason and\nout of holy Scriptures, that subjects ought in all things to obey\ntheir princes and governors, excepting those which are contrary to\nthe command of God; and that the commands of God, in a Christian\ncity, concerning _temporal affairs_, that is to say, those which are\nto be discussed by human reason, are the laws and sentence of the\ncity, delivered from those who have received authority from the city\nto make laws and judge of controversies; but concerning spiritual\nmatters, that is to say, those which are to be defined by the holy\nScripture, are the laws and sentences of the city, that is to say,\nthe Church, (for a Christian city and a Church, as hath been showed\nin the foregoing chapter, art. 10, are the same thing), delivered by\npastors lawfully ordained, and who have to that end authority given\nthem by the city; it manifestly follows, that in a Christian\ncommonweal obedience is due to the sovereign in all things, as well\n_spiritual_ as _temporal_. And that the same obedience, even from a\nChristian subject, is due in all _temporal matters_ to those princes\nwho are no Christians, is without any controversy; but in _matters\nspiritual_, that is to say, those things which concern God\u2019s\nworship, some Christian Church is to be followed. For it is an\nhypothesis of the Christian faith, that God speaks not in things\nsupernatural but by the way of Christian interpreters of holy\nScriptures. But what? Must we resist princes, when we cannot obey\nthem? Truly, no; for this is contrary to our civil covenant. What\nmust we do then? Go to Christ by martyrdom; which if it seem to any\nman to be a hard saying, most certain it is that he believes not\nwith his whole heart, _that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the\nliving God_; for he would then desire to be dissolved, and to be\nwith Christ; but he would by a feigned Christian faith elude that\nobedience, which he hath contracted to yield unto the city.\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrines which this day are controverted about\n religion, do for the most part belong to the right of\n dominion.]\n\n14. But some men perhaps will wonder, if (excepting this one\narticle, that Jesus is the Christ, which only is necessary to\nsalvation in relation to internal faith) all the rest belong to\nobedience; which may be performed, although a man do not inwardly\nbelieve, so he do but desire to believe, and make an outward\nprofession, as oft as need requires, of whatsoever is propounded by\nthe Church; how it comes about that there are so many tenets, which\nare all held so to concern our faith, that except a man do inwardly\nbelieve them, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. But if he\nconsider that, in most controversies, the contention is about human\nsovereignty; in some, matter of gain and profit; in others, the\nglory of wits: he will surely wonder the less. The question about\n_the propriety of the Church_, is a question about the _right of\nsovereignty_. For it being known what a _Church_ is, it is known at\nonce to whom the rule over Christians doth belong. For if every\nChristian city be that Church, which Christ himself hath commanded\nevery Christian, subject to that city, to hear; then every subject\nis bound to obey his city, that is to say, him or them who have the\nsupreme power, not only in _temporal_, but also in _spiritual\nmatters_. But if every Christian city be not that Church, then is\nthere some other Church more universal, which must be obeyed. All\nChristians therefore must obey that Church, just as they would obey\nChrist, if he came upon earth. It will therefore rule either by the\nway of monarchy, or by some assembly. This question then concerns\nthe _right of ruling_. To the same end belongs the question\nconcerning _infallibility_. For whosoever were truly and internally\nbelieved by all mankind, that he could not err, would be sure of all\ndominion, as well _temporal_ as _spiritual_, over all mankind,\nunless himself would refuse it. For if he say that he must be obeyed\nin _temporals_, because it is supposed he cannot err, that right of\ndominion is immediately granted him. Hither also tends the privilege\nof interpreting Scriptures. For he to whom it belongs to interpret\nthe controversies arising from the divers interpretations of\nScriptures, hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine\nall manner of controversies whatsoever. But he who hath this, hath\nalso the command over all men who acknowledge the Scriptures to be\nthe word of God. To this end drive all the disputes about _the\npower of remitting and retaining sins_; or _the authority of\nexcommunication_. For every man, if he be in his wits, will in all\nthings yield that man an absolute obedience, by virtue of whose\nsentence he believes himself to be either saved or damned. Hither\nalso tends the power of _instituting societies_. For they depend on\nhim by whom they subsist, who hath as many subjects as monks,\nalthough living in an enemy\u2019s city. To this end also refers the\nquestion concerning the _judge of lawful matrimony_. For he to whom\nthat judicature belongs, to him also pertains the knowledge of all\nthose cases which concern the inheritance and succession of all the\ngoods and rights, not of private men only, but also of sovereign\nprinces. And hither also in some respect tends the _virgin life of\necclesiastical persons_; for unmarried men have less coherence than\nothers with civil society. And besides, it is an inconvenience not\nto be slighted, that princes must either necessarily forego the\npriesthood, which is a great bond of civil obedience; or have no\nhereditary kingdom. To this end also tends the _canonization of\nsaints_, which the heathen called _apotheosis_. For he that can\nallure foreign subjects with so great a reward, may bring those who\nare greedy of such glory, to dare and do anything. For what was it\nbut an honourable name with posterity, which the Decii and other\nRomans sought after; and a thousand others, who cast themselves upon\nincredible perils? The controversies about _purgatory_, and\n_indulgences_, are matter of gain. The questions of _free-will_,\n_justification_, and _the manner of receiving Christ in the\nsacrament_, are philosophical. There are also questions concerning\nsome rites not introduced, but left in the Church not sufficiently\npurged from Gentilism. But we need reckon no more. All the world\nknows that such is the nature of men, that dissenting in questions\nwhich concern their _power_, or _profit_, or _pre-eminence of wit_,\nthey slander and curse each other. It is not therefore to be\nwondered at, if almost all tenets, after men grew hot with\ndisputings, are held forth by some or other to be _necessary_ to\nsalvation and for our entrance into the kingdom of heaven. Insomuch\nas they who hold them not, are not only condemned as guilty of\ndisobedience; which in truth they are, after the Church hath once\ndefined them; but of infidelity: which I have declared above to be\nwrong, out of many evident places of Scripture. To which I add this\none of Saint Paul\u2019s (Rom. xiv. 3, 5): _Let not him that eateth,\ndespise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not, judge\nhim that eateth; for God hath received him. One man esteemeth one\nday above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man\nbe fully persuaded in his own mind._\n\n\n\n\n END OF VOL. II.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\nIn the summary of Chapter XIII, the last article is misnumbered as\n\u201813\u2019, rather than \u201817.\u2019 On p. 221, a reference to article 13 in\nChapter V almost certainly should have been to the 12th article of\nthat chapter.\n\nOther errors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been\ncorrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and\nline in the original.\n\n 3.1 \u03b6\u1ff6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba[\u03bf/\u03cc]\u03bd Replaced.\n\n 5.5 that same [\u1f10\u03c5/\u03b5\u1f50]\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd Replaced.\n\n 56.14 Prov. xxii. 10[)]: Removed.\n\n 99.31 For being e[r/l]ected, the people is at once Replaced.\n dissolved\n\n 102.20 make him a mona[a/r]ch Replaced.\n\n 106.31 have obliged themsel[u/v]es Replaced.\n\n 147.5 the will of God[.] Added.\n\n 196.3 The defin[in]ition of sin. Removed.\n\n 196.32 to which th[a/e]y have given Replaced.\n\n 197.28 \u1f00\u03b4[\u03b9/\u03af]\u03ba\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 Stress\n added.\n\n 228.3 concern[-/ing] the commands Added.\n\n 238.20 that is[ to] say Added.\n\n 272.25 _the word[ of] faith_ Added.\n\n 283.34 (verse 2[2/3]) Replaced.\n\n 285.7 and their[\u2019]s who repent not Removed.\n\n 312.8 in the Old Test[i/a]ment Replaced.\n\n 316.31 the rule over Christ[ai/ia]ns Transposed.","title":"The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 02 (of 11)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":106688}